A.K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras.

Landmark judgment · Constitution & fundamental rights — Early reading of personal liberty and preventive detention; later overruled in Maneka Gandhi.

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
19 May 1950
Judge
Justice Harilal Jekisundas Kania
Neutral citation
1950 INSC 13
Reported in
[1950] 1 S.C.R. 88
Result
Dismissed
Acts & sections
Article 22 Constitution, Article 19 Constitution, Article 32 Constitution, Article 53 Constitution, Article 14 Constitution

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Full judgment

19~0

A.K.GOPALAN

May, 19.

ti.

[1950)

THE STATE OF MADRAS. UNION OF INDIA : INTERVENER. [SHRl HAluLAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL ALI, l'ATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,

MuKHERJF:A and S. R. DAs JJ.J

Preventive Detention Act (IV of 1950), ss. 3, 7, 10-14.-VaJidity-Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 13, 19 to 22, 32-Law relating :o preventive detention-Whether infringes Fundamental

Right as to freedom of movement-Whether subject to judicial review a. to reasonableness under Art. 19 (5)-Scope of Art. 19Right of free movement and Right to personal liberty, nature and incidents of-Art. 221 whether complete code as to preventive detro·

tion-Scope and applicability of Art. 21-"Law," "procedure established ·by law," meanings of-Whether incluile rules of natural justice-Construction of Art. 21-American decisions on °d«e pro.cess of U.W,n value of-Omission to provide objective standard for satisfaction of authorities, to pravirl< for oral hearing or leading of evidence, to fix maximum· period of detention, and to specify "circumstances" and "classes of cases" where period of detention may

be extended over 3 months, prohibiting detenu from disclosing grounds of detention-Validity of law-Construction of Constitution -Reference to· debates and Report of Drafting CommitteePermissibility. The Petitioner who was detained under the Preventive Detention Act (Act IV of 1950) applied under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ of habeas corpus and for his release from detention, on the ground that the said Act contravened the proviSions of Arts. 13, 19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution and was consequently ultra vires and that his detention was therefore illegal:

Held, per KANIA C. )., PATA1'JAL1 SAsTIU, Mu1<HERJEA and DAs JJ. (FAZL Au and MAHAJAN JJ. dissenting)-that the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, with the exception of Sec. 14 thereof did not contravene any of the Articles of the Constitution and even though Sec. 14 was ultra vires inasmuch as it contravened the provisions of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution,·'" this section was severable from the remaining sections of the, ~t, the invalidity of Sec. 14 did not affect the validity of the Act as a whole, and the detentiori of the petitioner was not illegal. FAZL Au and MAHAJAN JJ.-Scction 12 of the Act was also ultra, vires, · and since it contravened the very provision in the ·1

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Constitution under which the· Parliament derived its competence to enact the law, the detention was illegal. Held, by the Full Court (KANIA C. J., FAZL Au, l'ATANJALI SAsTRI, MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ.)-Section 14 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, contravenes the provisions of Art~ 22 ( 5) of the Constitution in so far as it prohibits a person detained trom disclosing to the Court the grounds on which a detention order has been made or the representation made by him against the order of detention, and is to that extent ultra vires and void. Per KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SAsTR1, MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ. (FAZL Au J. dissenting).-Article 19 of the Constitution has no application to a law which relates directly to preventive detention even though as a result of an order 'bf detention the rights referred to in sub-els. (a) to (e) and (g) in general, and sub-cl. (d) in particular, of d. (I) of Art. 19 may be restricted or abridged ; and .the constitutional validity of _a law relating to such detention cannot therefore, be judged in the light of the test prescribed in cl. ( 5) of the said Article. DAs J.-Article 19 ( 1) postulates a legal capacity to exercise the rights guaranteed by it and if a citizen loses the .freedom of his person by reason of lawful detention as a result of a conviction for an offence or otherwise he cannot claim the rights under sub-els. (a) to (e) and (g) of Art. 19 (I); likewise if a citizen's property is compulsorily acquired under Art. 31, he cannot claim the right under sub-cl. (f) of Art. 19 ( l) with respect to that property. In short the rights under sub-els. (a) to (e) and (g) ~nd where lawful detention begins and therefore the validity of a preventive detention Act cannot be judged by Art. 19 (5). MAHAJAN J.-Whatever bethe precise scope of Art. 19 (I) (d) and Art. 19 (5) the provisions of Art. 19 (5) do not apply to a law relating to preventive detention, inasmuch as there is a special self-contained provision in Art. 22 regulating it. F AZL Au J.-Preventive detention is a direct infringement of the right guaranteed in Art. 19.(J) (d), even if a narrow construction is placed on the said sµb-clause, ' and a law relating to preventive detention is therefore subject to such limited judicial review as is permitted by Art. 19 ( 5). Per KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SAsrn1, MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ. (FAzL Au J. dissenting).-The concept of the right "to move freely throughout the territory of India" referred to in Art. 19 (I) ( d), of the Constitution is entirely different from the concept of the right to "personal liberty" referred to in Art. 21, and Art.· 19 should not, therefore, be read as controlled by the provisions of Art. 21. The view that Art. 19 .guarantees substantive rights and Art. 21 prescribes the procedure is incorrect. DAs. J.-Article 19 protects some of the important attributes of personal liberty as independent rights and the expression "Personal liberty" is used in Art. 21 as a compendious term

19j0

A.K. Gopalan

The Stall

19j()

A.K. Cop.Ian

.v. T1" Sl<JU

[1950]

including WJth1n . its meaning all varieties of rights which go to make up the personal liberties of men. FAzi. Ac1 ).-Even if it be assumed that Art. 19 (l)(d) does not .refer to "personal liberty" and that it. bears the restricted mean. ing attributed to it, that is to say, it signifies merely the right to move from one locality to .another, preventive detention must be held to affect this limited right of movement directly and sub. stantially. One of the objects of preventive detentioq is. to res· train a person detained from moving from place to place so that he may not sPread disaffection or indulge in dangerous activities in the places he visits. The same consideration applies to the cases of persons who are interned or externcd. Hence, extcrnment, internment and certain other forms of restriction on movement have always been treated as kindred matters belonging to the same group or family, :rnd the rule which applies to one must necessarily apply to the others.

Per KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SAsTa1 and DAs JJ. (MAHAJAN J. dissenting),_:_Article 22 does not form a complete code of constitutional safeguards relating to preventive detention. To the extent that provision is made in Art. 22 it cannot be controlled by Art. 21 ; but on points of procedure which expressly or by necessary implication are not dealt with by Art. 22, Art. 21 will apply. DAs J.-Art. 21 protects substantive rights by requiring a procedure and Art. 22 lays down the minimum rules of procedure that even the Parliament cannot abrogate or overlook. MAHAJAN J.-Art. 22 contains a self-contained code of constitutional safeguards relating to preventive detention and cannot be examined or controlled by the provisions of Art. 21. The principles underlying Art. 21 are however kept in vic\v in Art. 22 and there is no conflict between these articles. M UKHERJEA J.Even assuming that Art. 22 is not a self.-contained cWe relating to preventive detention and that Art. 21 would apply, it is not permissible to supplement Art. 22 by the application of rules of natural justice. FAzL ALI J.-Art. 22 docs· not form an exhaustive cod.e by itself relating to preventive detention. Parliament can make further provisions and if it has done so Art. 19 (5) may be applied to see if those provisions have transgressed the bounds of reasonableness.

Per KANIA C. J., MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ. (FAzL Au J. tfusttnting).-in Art. 21 the word "law" has been used in the sense of .State-made law and not as an equivalent of law in the abstract or general scn5': embodying the principles of natural justice; and "procedure established by law" means procedure established by law made by the State, that is to say, the Union Parliament or the Legislatures of the States. It is not proper to construe this expression in the light of the meaning given to the expression "due process of law" in the American Constitution, by the Sup~me Court of America. PATANJALI SAsTP.I J.-'-"Law~ .in Art. 21 docs not 'mean the jus naturale of civil law but means

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positive or State-made law. "Procedure established by law" does not however mean any procedure which may be prescribed by a competent legislature, but the ordinary well-established criminal procedure, i.e., those settled usages and normal modes of procedure sanctioned by the Criminal Procedure Code, which is the general law of criminal procedure in this country. The only alternative to this construction, if a constitutional transgression is to be avoided, is to interpret the reference to "law" as implying a constitutional amendment pro tanto, for it is only a law enacted by the procedure provided for such amendment .that could modify or override a fundamental right without contravening Art. 13 (2). FAZL Au ].-There is nothing revolutionary in the view that "procedure established by law" must include the four principles of elementary justice which inhere in and are at the root of all civilized systems of law, and which have been stated by the American Courts and jurists as consisting in (1) notice, (2) opportunity to be heard, ( 3) impartial tribunal and ( 4) orderly course of procedure. These four· principles are really different aspects of the same right, namely, the right to be heard before one is condemned. Hence the words "procedure established by law", whatever its exact meaning be, must necessarily include the principle that no person shall be condemned without hearing by an impartial tribunal.

Per KANIA C. J., F.\zL Au, PATANJAU SAsTRI, MAHAJAN and DAS JJ.-Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, does not delegate any legislative power to an executive officer but merely confers on such officer a discretion to enforce the law made by the legislature, and is not therefore invalid on this ground. The fact that tbe section does not provide an objective standard for determining whether the requirements of law have been complied with, is not a ground for holding that it is invalid. FAZL Au ].-Section 3 is however a reasonable provision only for the first step, i.e., for arrest and initial detention and must be followed by some procedure for testing the so-called subjective satisfaction, which can be done only by providing a suitable machinery for examining the grounds on which the order of detention _is made and considering the representations of the persons detained in relation to those grounds. Per KANIA C. ]., MAHAJAN and DAs JJ.-Scction 7 of, the said Act is not invalid merely because it docs not provide for an oral hearing or an opportunity to lead evidence but only gives a right to make a representation. Right to. an oral hearing and right to give evidence arc not necessarily implm in the right to make a representation given by Art. , 22. fer KANIA C. J. and MAHAJAN J,-Thc _provision contained in Sec. 11 that a person may be detained for such period aa the 12-A

1f.K•. Gopalan

7 M stak.

A.Jr. Goj>olan

Tlw StaU

[1950]

State thinks fit docs not contravene Art. 22 (7) and it is n<(t there. fore invalid.

Per ~IA C. J., PATANJALI SASTRI, MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ, (FAZL Au and MAHAJAN Jj. dissenting).-Article 22 (7) means that Parliament may prescribe either the circumstances under which, or the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period loqger than three months without reference to an advisory board. It is not necessary that the . Parliament shoµld prescribe both. The matters referred to in cla11ses (a) and (b) of s11b-sec. ( 1) of Sec. 12 constirute a sllfii~ient description of such circumstances or classes of cases and Section 12 is not therefore open to -the objection that it does not comply ':Vith Art. 22(7). Das J.-Parliament has in fact .and substance prescribed both in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 12. FAZL Au and MAHAJAN JJ.-Article 22 (7) means that both the circumstances and the class or classes of cases (which are two different expressions with different meanings and connotations) should be prescribed, and the prescription . of one· without the other will not be enough. The enumeration of the subjects for reasons connected with which a law of preventive detention could be made contained in els. (a) and ( b) of sub-sec. (I) of Sec. 12 docs riot amount to pre§cribing the circu~stanccs under which, or the class or classes of cases in which, a person can be detained for mote than three months.

Per KANIA C. J.-While it is not proper to take into consideration the individual opinions of members of. Parliament or Convention to construe the meaning of a particular clause, when a question . is raiScd whether a certain phrase or expression was up for consideration at all or not, a ref~rcnce to the debates may be permitted. PATANJALl SAsTR1 J~In construing the provisions of an Act, speeches made in the course of the debates on the bill should not be taken into consideration. MuKHERJEA J.-In construing the ·Constitution it is better to leave out of account the debates in the Constituent Assembly, but a higher value may be placed on the report of the Drafting Committee. ORIGINAL Jmuso1cnoN : PEnnoN No. XIII OF 1950.

Application under Art. 32 (1) of. the CoJ¥titution of India for a writ of habeas corpus :i.gainst the detention. of the appellant in the Madras jail in pursuance of an order of detention made under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. The material facts of the case and arguments of counsel are ·set out in detail in the judgments. The relevant provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, are printed below.

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J. Short title, extent and duration.-This· Act may be called the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. (2) It extends to the whole of India ...... (3) It shall cease to have effect on the lst day of April, 1951, save as respects things done or omitted to be done before that date. 2. Definitions.-ln this Act, unless the context otherwise requires. · (a) ".State Government" means, in relation to a Part C State, the CKief Commissioner of the State ; and (b) ' 1detention order'' means an order made under Section 3.. 3.. Powq to make prders detaining certain persons.-(1) The Central Governmel!t--Or. the State Government may(a) if satisfied with respect to any pers~n that _with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to(i) the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, or the security of India, or (ii) the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or (iii) the maintenanci: of supplies and services essential to the community, or ( b) if satisfied with respect to any person who is a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigner~ Act, 1946 (XXXI of 1946), that with a view to regulating · his continued presence in India or with- a view· to making arrangements for his expulsion from India it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. (2) Any District Magistrate . or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, or in a Presidency-town, the Commissioner of Police, may, if satisfied as provided in sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1), exercise th• power conferred by the said sub-section. (3) When any order is made under this section by a District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate or Commissioner of Police, he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he is subordinate together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on the necessity for the order.

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7. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to persons affected by the order.-(J)When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention· order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been m:tde, and sha.11 afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order, in a case where such order has been made bv the Central· Government, to that Government, and in a case where it has been made by a State Government or an officer subordinate thereto, to the State Government.

A.K. Gopalan The Stal8

SUPREl\IE COURT REPORTS -

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[1950}

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·· 11. ConfiTmation of detention order.-In any case where theAdvisory Board has reported that - there is in its opinion sufficient i\. K. Gopa!an· cause for the detention of the person concerned, the Central Government or the State Goverllment, ·as the· case ma.y be, may Tke State cOnfirm the detention order and continue the detention of theperson concerned for stich .period as it thinks fit. - -,-~--'- 12. Duration of detention in certain cases.-(!} Any person "detained in any of the following classes of cases or under any of the following circumstances may· be detained without obtainingc . the. opinion-, of an, Advisory Board for a period longer than three· months, but not exceeding one year from the date of his detention, namely, _where such person has been detained with lJo view to· preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to. (a} the defence of India, ·relations of India with foreign: powers or the security of India; or _ (b) the security of a· State or the maintenance of public order. * \..;* -· · * .-o-. ~-~ . • 14. Disclosure of grounds of detention, etc.-(1) No court shall, except for the purpose of a prosecution for - an offence punishable under ·sub-section (2), allow any statement to be made, or any evidence io -be given, before it of the substance of· any communication made under section 7 -of the grounds on which a detention order has been made against any1 person or of· any representation made by him. against such order; and not. withstanding anything contained in any other la.w, no court shall be entitled to require any public officer to produce before it, or~ to disclose the substance of, any such communication or repre .. sentation made, or the proceedings of an Advisory Board or that · part of the report of an Advisory Board which is confidenti•l. (2) It sh~ll · be an offenee punishable with imprisonment for· a term which extend to One );.ear, or with fine, or with both, ·for any person to ·disclose or publish w_ithout the previous· authorisation of. the Central __ Government or the State Govern .. ment, as the case may be, any contents or matter purporting to · be contents Of any such communication' or representation as is referred to in sub·section (1) : · Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to a disclosure made . to his legal adviser by a pe~son wh-o is the sub· · ject of a. detention order.

maY

lYf. K. Nambiar (S. K. Aiyar and V. G. Rao,. with. him) for the petitioner.

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K. Rajali Aiyar, Advocate-General of JJfadras · (C.R. Pattabhi Raman and R. Ganapathi, with him) for the State of Madras . . JJ{. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Jindra-· lal, with him) for the Union of India.

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1950. May 19. delivered.

The

following

Judgments

were

KANIA C. J.-This is a pet1t1on by the applicant under article 32 (1) of the Constitution of India for a writ of habeas. corpus against his detention in the Madras Jail. In the petition he has given various dates showing how he has been under "'detention since December, 1947. Under the ordinary Criminal Law he was sentenced to terms of imprisonment but those convictions were set aside. While he was thus under detention under one of the orders of the Madras State Government, on the 1st of March, 1950, he was served with an order made under section 3 ( 1) of the Preventive Detention Act, IV of 1950. He challenges the legality of , the order as it is contended that Act IV of 1950 contravenes the provisions of articles 13, 19 and 21 and the provisions of that Act are not in accordance with article 22 of the <"'A>nstitution. He has also challenge~ the validity of the order on the ground that it is issued mala fide. The burden of proving that allegation is on the applicant. Because of the penal provisions of section 14 of the impugned Act the applicant has not disclosed the grounds, supplied to him, for his detention and the question of mala fides of the order therefore cannot be gone into under this petition.

The question of the validity of Act IV of 1950 was argued before us at great length. This is the first case in which the different articles of the Constitution of India contained in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights has come for discussion before us. The Court is indebted to ·the learned counsel for the applicant and the Attorney-General for their assistance in interpreting the true meaning of the relevant clauses of the · Constitution.

In order to appreciate the rival contentions it is useful first to bear in mind the general scheme of the Constitution. Under article 53 of the Constitution the executive power of the Union is vested in the President and is to be exercised by him in accordance with the

Jf.K. Gopa/1111 Tiu Stat1 Kania C.]

195()

A.K. Gopalan

The State

Kania C.J.

[1950]

Constitution either directly or through officers subordinate to him. The legislative powers of the Union are divided between the Parliament and Legislatures of the States. The ambit and limitations on their respective powers are found in article 246 read with article 245, Schedule VII, Lists 1, 2 and 3 of the Constitution. For the Union of India the Supreme Court is established and its powers and jurisdiction are set out in articles 124 to 147. This follows the pattern of the Government of India Act, 1935, which was the previous Constitution of the Government of India. Unlike the American · Constitution, there is no article vesting the judicial power of the Union of India in the Supreme Court. The material points substantially altering the edifice are first in the Preamble which declares India a Sovereign Democratic Republic to secure to all its citizens justice, liberty and equality and to promote among them all, fraternity. Part III of the Constitution is an important innovation. It is headed "Fundamental Rights". In that Part the word "State" includes both the Government of the Unio)l and the Government of the States. By articles. 13 it is expressly provided that all laws in force in the territory of India, immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistenl with the provisions of this Part, to the extent of such inconsistency, are void. Therefore, all laws in operation in India on the day the Constitution came into force, unless otherwise saved, to the extent they are inconsistent with this Chapter on Fundamental Rights, become automatically void. Under article 13 (2) provision is made for legislation after the Constitution comes into operation. It is there provided that the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall to the extent of the contravention, be void. Therefore, as regards future legislation also the Fundamental Rights in Part III have to be reS: pected and, unless otherwise saved by the provisions of the Constitution, they will be void to the extent they contravene the provisions of Part III. Under article 245 (1) the legislative powers conferred under

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article 246 are also made "subject to the provisions of this Constitution," which of course includes Part III dealing with the Fundamental Rights. The term law in article 13, is expressed to be wide enough to .include Acts, Ordinances, Orders, Bye-laws, Rules, Reg\llations and even custom or usage having, in the territory of India, the force of law. The rest of this Part js divided in seven divisions. "Right to Equality" is found in articles · 14-18, "Right to Freedom" in articles 19-22, "Right against Exploitation" in articles 23 and 24, "Right to Freedom of Religion" in articles 25-28, "Cultural and Educational Rights" in articles 29 and 30, "Right to Property" in article 31 and "Right to Constitutional Remedies" in artciles 32-35. In this case we are directly concerned only with the articles under the caption "Right to Freedom" (19-22) and article 32 which gives a remedy to enforce the right§ conferred by this Part. The rest of the articles may have to be referred to only to assist in the interpretation of the above-mentioned articles.

'1

It is obvious that by the insertion of this Part the powers of the Legislature and the Executive, both of the Union and the States, are further curtailed and the right to enforce the Fundamental Rights found in Part III by a direct application to the -Supreme Court is removed from the legislative control. The wording of article 32 shows that the Supreme Court can be moved to grant a suitable relief, mentioned in article 32 (2), only in respect of the FuJ?damental Rights mentioned in Part III of the Constitution. The petitioner is detained under a preventive detention order, made under Act IV of 1950, which has been passed by the Parliament of India. In the Seventh Schedule of the · Constitution, List I contains entries specifying items in respect of whieh the Parlia- . ment has exclusive legislative powers. Entry 9 is in these terms : "Preventive detention for reasons connected with Defence, Foreign Affairs or the Security of India ; persons subjected to such detention." List III of that Schedule enumerates topics on which both the Union and the States have concurrent legislative

A.K. Copalan TJ.e Slate Kania C.J.

A.Jr. -G•J>alan . v.

Kania C.J.

f 1950]

powers. Entry 3 of that List is in these terms: "Preventive detention for reasons connected with the security of. a State, the maintenance of public order or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community ; persons subjected to such detention." It is not disputed that Act IV of 1950 is covered by these two Entries in List I and List III of the Seventh Schedule. The contention of the petitioner is that the impugned legislation abridges or. infringes the rights given by articles 19-21 and is also not in accordance with the permissive legislation on preventive detention allowed under articles 22 ( 4) and (7) and in particular is an infringement of the provisions of article 22 (5). It is therefore neces>ary to consider in detail each of these articles and the arguments advanced in respect thereof. Article 19 is for the protection of certain rights of freedom to citizens. It runs as follows :"19. (1)-All citizens shall have the right(a) to freedom of speech and expression ; (b) to assemble peaceably and without arms ; ( c) to form associations or unions ; ( d) to move freely throughout the territory of India: ( e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India ; ( f) to acquire, .hold and dispose of property ; and · (g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. "(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to, libel, slander, defamation, contempt of court or any matter which offends against decency or morality or which undermines the security of, or tends .to overthrow, the State. (3) Nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of public order

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reasonable restrictions on the exercise. of the right conferred by the said sub-clause. (4) Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause. (5) Nothing in sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far· as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise, of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. (6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, 9r prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it prescribes or empowers any authority to prescribe, or prevent the State from making any law prescribing or empowering any authority to prescribe, the professional or technical · qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business." Clause (2) specifies the limits up to which the abridgement of the right contained in 19 (1) (a) may be permitted. It is an exceptionr Similarly· clause (3) sets out the limit of abridgement of the right in 19 (1) (b) and clause (4) specifi~s such limits in respect of the right in 19 (1) (c). Clause (5) .is in respect of the rights mentioned in 19 (I) (d), (e) and (f) and clause . (6) is in respect .of the rights contained in 19 (l) (g). It cannot be disputed that the articles collected under, the caption "Right to Freedom" have to be considered together to appreciate the extent of the Fundamental Rights. In the first place it is necessary to notice that 2-3 S. C. India/58.

A.K. Gopalan The Slate Kania C.J.

.4.E. Gap.Ian

Kania C.J.

(1950]

there is a distinction between rights given to citizens and persons. This is clear on a perusal of the provisions of article 19 on the one hand and articles 20, 21 and 22 on the other. I~ order to determine whether a right is · abridged or infringed it is first necessary to determine the extent of the right given by the articles and the limitations prescribed in the articles themselves permitting its curtailment. The inclusion of article 13 (1) and (2) in the Constitution appears to be a matter of abundant caution. Even in their absence, if any of the fundamental rights was infringed by any legislative enactment, the Court has always the power to declare the enactment, to the extent it transgresses the limits, invalid. The existence of article 13( 1) and (2) in the Constitution therefore is not material for the decision of the question what fundamental right is given and to what extent it is permitted to be abridged by the Constitution itself. As the preventive detention order results in the detention of the applicant in a cell it was contended on his behalf that the rights· specified in article 19 (1) (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (g) have been infringed. It was argued that because of his detention he cannot have a free right to speech as and where he desired and the same argument was urged in respect of the rest of the rights mentioned in sub-clauses (b )', ( c), ( d), (e) and (g). Although this argument is advanced in a case which· deals with preventive detention, if correct, it should be applicable in the case of punitive detention also to any · one sentenced to a term of imprisonment under the relevant section of the Indian Penal Code. So considered, the argument must clearly be rejected. In spite of the saving clause's (2) to (6), permitting abridgement of the rights connected with each of them, punitive detention under several sections . .of the Penal Code, e.g., for theft, cheating, forgery and even ordinary assault, will be illegal. Unless sui:h conclusion necessarily follows from the article, it is obvious that such construction should be avoided. In my opinion, such result is clearly not the outco~e of the Constitution. The article has to be read wh:hout · any pre-conceived notions. So read, it clearly means

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that the legislation to be examined must be directly in respect of one of the rights mentioned in the subclauses. If there is a legislation directly attemp~ing to control a citizen's freedom of speech or expression, or his right to assemble peaceably and without arms, etc., the question whether that legislation is saved by the relevant saving clause of article 19 will arise. If, however, the legislation is l)Ot directly in respect of any of these subjects, but as a result of the operation of other legislation, for instance, for punitive or preventive detention, his right under any of these subclauses is abridged, the question of the application of article 19 does not arise. The true approach is only to consider the directness of the legislation and not what will be the result of the detention otherwise valid, on the mode of the detenue's life. On that short ground, in my opinion, this argument . about the infringement of the rights mentioned in article 19 (I) generally must fail. Any other construction put on the article, it seems to me, will .be unreasonable. It was next urged that while this interpretation may meet the contention in respect of rights under article 19 (1) (a), (b), (c), (e) and (g), the right given by article 19 (1), (d) is left untouched. That sub-clause expressly gives. the right "to move freely throughout the territory of India". It was argued that by the confinement of the petitioner under the preventive detention order his right to move · freely throughout the territory of India is directly abridged and therefore the State must show that the impugned legislation imposes onlv reasonable restrictions on the exercise of that right in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe, under article 19 (5). The Court is thus enjoined to inquire whether the res.tnct10ns imposed on the detained person are reasonable in the -interests of the general public. Article 14 of the Constitution gives the right to equality in these terms : "The State shall not denv to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India."

A.K. Copa/an. The Stale Kanin C.J.

A.Jr. Gopalan The Stat•

Kama C.J.

[1950]

It was argued that the words "within the territory of India" are unnecessary in that article because the Parliament is supreme to make laws operative only within the territory of India. Without those words also the article will bear the same meaning. Similarly, it was urged that the words "territory of India" in article 19 (1) (d) may be treated as superfluous, and preventive detention would thus be an abridgement of the right to move ·freely. In my opinion, this rule of construction itself is faulty. Because certain words may be considered <uperfluous (assuming them to be so in article 14 for the present discussion) it is quite improper to assume that they arc superfluous wherever found in the rest of the Constitution. On the contrary, in my opinion, reading sub-clause ( d) as a whole the words "territory of India" arc very important. What is sought to be protected by that sub-clause is the right to freedom of movement, i.e., without restriction, throughout the territory of India. Read with their natural grammatical meaning the sub-clause only means that if restrictions are sought to be put upon movement of a citizen from State to State or even within a State such restrictions will have to be tested by the permissive limits prescribed· in clause (5) of that Article. Sub-clause ( d) has nothing to do with detention, preventive or punitive. The Constitution mentions a right to freedom of movement throughout the territorv of India. Every word of that clause must be given its true and legitimate meaning and in the construction of a Statute, particularly a Constitution, it is · improper to omit any word which has a reasonable and proper place in it or to refrain from giving effect to its meaning. This position is made quite clear when clause (5) is read along with this sub-clause. It permits the imposition of reasonable restrictions on the exercise of such right either in the interest of general public or the protection of the interest of any Scheduled Tribe. It is difficult to conceive of a reasonable restriction necessary in the interests of the general public for confining a person in a cell. Such restriction may be appropriate to prevent a person from going from one Province to another or

S.C.R.

one area to another; having regard to local conditions prevailing in particular areas. The point however is made abundantly clear by the alternative, viz., for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. What protection of the interests of a Scheduled Tribe requires the confinement of a man in a cell? On the other hand, preventing the movement of a person from one part of the territory of India to another and the question of reasonable restriction imposed to protect the interests of a Scheduled Tribe is clearly intelligible and often noticed in the course of the administration of the country. Scheduled Tribes have certain rights, privileges and also disabilities. They have their own civilization, customs and mode of life and prevention of contact with persons or groups with a particular Scheduled Tribe may be considered undesirable during a certain time or in certain conditions. The legislative history of India shows that Scheduled Tribes have been ·given a separate place on these grounds. Reading article 19 as a whole, therefore, it seems to me that it has no application to a legislation dealing with preventive or punitive detention as its direct object. I may point out that the acceptance of the petitioner's argument on the interpretation of this clause will result in the Court being called upon to decide upon the reasonableness of several provisions of the Indian Penal Code and several other penal legislations as abridging this right. Even under clause (5), the Court is permitted to apply the test of reasonableness of the restrictions or limits not generally, but only to the extent they are either in the interests of the general public, e.g., in case ,of an epidemic, riot, etc., or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. In my opinion, this is not the intention of the Constitution. Therefore the contention urged in respect of article 19 fails. It was argued that article 19 and article 21 should be read together as implementing each other. Article 19 gave substantive rights to citizens while article 21 prescribed that no person can be deprived of hrs life and personal liberty except by procedure

A .K. Gopal an The State Kania C.J.

19 0

A.K. Gopalan The Stale Kania C.J.

(1950]

established by law. Even so, on a true construction of article -19, it seems to me that both preventive and punitive detention are outside the scope of article 19. In order to appreciate the true scope of article 19 it is useful to read it by itself and then to consider how far the other articles in Part III affect or control its meaning. It is the first article under the caption "Right to Freedom". It gives the rights mentioned in 19 (1) (a) to (g) to all citizens of India. These rights read by themselves and apart from the controls "found in clauses (2) to (6} of tht same article, specify the different general rights which a free citizeD. in a democratic country ordinarily has. Having .specified those rights, each of them is considered separately from the point of view of a similar right in the other citizens, and also after taking into consideration the principle that individual liberty must give way, to the extent it is necessary, when the good or safety of the peope genlerally is concerned. - Thus the right to freedom of speech and expression is given by 19 (1) (a). But clause (2) provides that such right shall not prevent the operation of a law which relates to libel", slander, defamation, contempt of Court or any matter which offends against decency or morality or which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State. Clause (2) thus only emphasizes that while the individual citizen has a free right of speech · or expression, he cannot be permitted to use the same to the detriment of a similar right in another citizen or to the detriment of the State. Thus, all laws of libel, slander, contempt of Court or laws in respect of matters which offend against decency or morality. are reaffirmed to be operative in spite of this individual right of the citizen to freedom of speech and expression. Similarly, that right is also subject to laws which prevent undermining the securitv of the State or against activities which tend to overthrow the State. A similar analysis of clauses (3) and (4) shows similar restrictions imposed on. similar grounds. In the same way clause (5) al5o permits reasonable restrictions in the exercise of the right to freedom of movement throughout the · territoq of India, th~ right to reside and settle in any part of the

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territory of India o_r the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, being imposed by law provided such reasonable restrictions on the exercise of such right are in the interest of the general public. The Constitution further provides by the same clause that similar reasonable restrictions could be put on the exercise of those rights for the protection of the interest of a Scheduled Tribe. This is obviously to prevent an argument being advanced that while such restriction could be put in the interest of general public, the Constitution did not provide for the imposition of such restriction to protect the interests o_f a sm~ler group of people only. Reading article 19 in that way as a whole the only concept appears to be that the specified rights of a free citizen are thus controlled by what the tramers of the Constitution thouEfht were necessary restrictions in the interest of the rest of the citizens. Reading article 19 in that way it appears to me that the concept of the right to move freely throughout the territory of India is an entirely different concept from the right to "personal liberty" contemplated by article 21. "Personal liberty" covers many more rights in one sense and has a restricted meaning in another sense. For instance, while the right to move or reside may be covered by · the expression "personal liberty" the right to freedom of speech [mentioned in article 19 (1) (a)J or the right to acquire, hold or dispose of property (mentioned in 19 (1) (f) cannot be considered a part of the personal liberty of a citizen. They form part of the liberty of a citizen but the limitation imposed by the word "personal" leads me to believe that those rights an· not covered by the expression personal liberty. So read there is no conflict between articles 1'9 and 21. The contents and subject matters of articles 19 and 21 are thus not the same and they proceed to deal with the rights covered by their respective words from totally different angles. As already mentioned in respect of each of the rights specified in sub-clauses of article 19 ( 1) · specific limitations in respect of each is provided, while the expression "personal

19:;0

.A.·K. Gopola

Tiii Stau Kania C.j.

.1950 AS. c.,aiao

••

TIN Sia#

KaaioC.J.

f 1950)

liberty" in article 21 is generally controlled by the general expression "procedure established by law." The Constitution, in article 19, and also in other .articles in Part HI, thus attempts to strike a balance petween individual liberty and the general interest of the society. The restraints provided by the Constitution on the legislative powers or the exectifive authority of the State thus operate as guarantees of life and personal liberty of the individuals. Deprivation (total loss) of personal liberty, which inter alia includes the right to eat or sleep when one likes or to work or not to work as and when one pleases and several such rights sought to be protected by the expression "personal liberty" in article 21, is .quite different from restriction (which is only a partial control) of the right to move freely (which is relatively a minor right of a citizen) as safeguarded by article 19 ( 1) ( d). Deprivation of personal liberty has not the same meaning as restriction of free movement ·in the territory of India. This is made clear .. when the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code In Chapter VIU relating to security of peace or maintenance "f public oraer arc read. Therefore article 19 (5) cannot apply to a substantive law depriving a citizen of personal liberty. I am unable; to accept the contention that the word "deprivation" includes within its scope "restriction" when interpreting article 21. Article 22 envisages the law of preventive detention. SO does article 246 read with Scheduk Seven, List I, Entry 9 and List HI, Entry 3. Therefore, when the subject of preventive detention is specifically dealt with in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights I ·do not think it is · proper to consider a legislation permitting preventive detention as in conflict with the rights mentioned in article 19 ( 1). Article 19 ( 1) does not purport to ·cover all aspects of liberty or of personal liberty. In that article only certain phases of liberty arc dealt with. "Personal liberty" would primarily mean liberty of the physical body. The rights given under article 19 ( 1) do not directly come under that description. They are rights which accompany the freedom or liberty of the person. By their very.

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nature they are freedoms of a person assumed to be in full possession of his personal liberty. If article 19 is considered to be the only article safeguarding personal liberty several well-recognised rights, as for instance, the right to eat or drink, the right to work, play, swim and numerous other rights and activities and even the right to life will not be deemed protected under the Constitution. I do not think that is the intention. It seems to me improper to read article 19 as dealing with the same subject as article 21. Article 19 gives the rights specified therein only to the citizens of India while article 21 is applicable to all persons. The word citizen is expressly defined in the Constitution to indicate only a certain section of the inhabitants of India. Moreover, the protection given by article 21 is very general. lt is of "law"-whatever that expression is interpreted to mean. The legislative restrictions on the law-making powers of the legislature are not here prescribed in detail as in the case of the rights specified in article 19. In my opinion therefore article 19 should be read as a separate complete article. Article 21 which is also in Part III under the caption "Right to Freedom" runs as follows :"No person shall be personal liberty except established by law."

deprived of his life or according to procedure

This article has been strongly relied upon by the petitioner in support of his contention · that the impugaed Act is ultra vires the Parliament as i~ abridges the right given by this article to every person. It was argued that under the Constitution of the United States of America the corresponding provision is found in the 5th and 14th Amendments where the provision, inter alia, is "that no person shall be deprived of his life or liberty or property except by due process of law." It was contended for the petitioner that the Indian Constitution gives the same protection to every person in India, except that in the United States "due process of law" has been construed by its Supreme Court to cover both

i.5(1 ,f K. Gop.'llan

T/,. Stau Kania C.J.

1900

A..K. Gopalt111

T1" Siok Kania C.J.

[1950]

substantive and procedural law, while in. India only the protection of procedural law is guaranteed. It was contended that the omission of the word "due" made no difference to the interpretation of the words in article 21. The word "established" was not equivalent to "prescribed". It had a wider meaning. The word "law" did not mean enacted law because that will be no legislative protection at all. If construed, any Act passed by the Parliament or the State Legislature, which was otherwise within its legislative power, can destroy or abridge this right. On the same line of reasoning, it was argued that if that was the intention there was no necessity to put this as a fundamental right in Part III a.t all. As to the meaning of the word "law" it was argued that it meant principles of natural justice. It meant "jus", i.e., law in the abstract sense of the principles of natural justice, as mentioned in standard works of Jurisprudeace, and not "lex", i.e., enacted law. Against the contention that such construction will leave the meaning vague, it was argued that four principles of natural justice recognised in all civilized countries were covered, in any event, by the word "law". They are: (1) An objective test, i.e., a certain, definite and ascertainable rule of human conduct for the violation of which one can be detained ; (2) Notice of the grounds of such detention; (3) An impartial tribunal, administrative, judicial or advisory, to decide whether the detention is justified ; and (4) Orderly course of procedure, induding an opportunity to be heard orally (not merely by making a written repres.entation) with a right to lead evidence and call witnesses. In my opinion, this line of approach is not proper and indeed is misleading. As regards the American Constitution its general structure is noticed in the5e words in "The Government of the United States" by Munro (5th Edition) at page 53 : "The architects of 1787 built only the basement. Their descendants have kept adding walls and windows, wings and gables, pillars and porches to make a rambling struc ture which is not yet finished. Or, to change the metaphor, it has a fabric which, to use the words of

so

'

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James Russell Lowell, is still being 'woven on the roaring loom of time'. That ·is what the framers of the original Constitution intended it to be. Never was it in their mind to work out a final scheme for the government of the country and stereotype it for all time. They sought merely to provide a starting point." The same aspect is emphasized in Professor Willis's book on Constitutional Law and Cooley's Constitutional Limitations. In contrast to the American Constitution, the Indian Constitution is a very detailed one. The Constitution itself provides in minute details the legislative powers of the Parliament and the State Legislatures. The same feature is noticeable in the case of the judiciary, finance, trade, commerce and services. It is thus quite detailed and the whole of it has to be read with the same sanctity, without giving undue weight to Part III or article 246, except to the extent one is legitimately and clearly limited by the other. Four markt!d points of distinction between the clause in the American Constitution and article 21 of .the Constitution of India may be noticed at this stage. 'Ilhe first is that iii. U.S.A. Constitution the word '"liberty" is used simpliciter while in India it is restricted to personal liberty. (2) In U.S.A. Constitution the same protection is given to property, while . in India the fundamental right in respect of property is contained in article 31. (3) The word "due" is omitted altogether and the expression "due process of law" is not used deliberately. ( 4) The word "established" is used and is limited to "Procedure" in our article 21. The whole argument of the petitioner is founded on the meaning of the word "law" given to it by the Supreme Court of America. It seems unnecessary to embark on a discussion of the powers and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the U.S.A. and how they ~ame to enlarge or abridge the meaning of law in the expression "due process of law" Without going into details, I think there is no justification to adopt the meaning of the word "law" as interpreted by the Supreme Court of U.S.A. m the expression "due

19:o A.K. Gopalan The Slau Kania C.J.

A.K. Goftalan

••

Till SIOll

Kania C.j.

[1950]

process of law" merely because the word "law" is used in article 21. The discussion of the meaning of "due process of law" found in Willis on Constitutional Law and in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations shows the diverse meanings given to that expression at different times and under different circumstances by the Supreme Court of U.S.A., so much so that the conclusion reached by these authors is that the expression means reasonable law. according to the view of the majority of the judges of the Supreme Court at a particular time holding office. It also shows how the meaning of the expression was widened or abridged in certain decades. Moreover, to control the meaning so given to that expression from time to time the doctrine of police powers was brought into play. That doctrine, shortly put, is that legislation meant for the good of the people generally, and in which the individual has to surrender his freedom to a certain extent because it is for the benefit of the people at large, has not to be tested by the touchstone of the "due process of law" formula. Our attention was drawn to the debates and report of the drafting committee of the Constituent Assembly in respect of the wording of this clause. The report may be read not to contrbl the meaning of the article, but may be seen in case of ambiguity. In The Municipal Council of Sydney v. The Commonwealth ( ), it was tho'!ght that individual opinion of members of the Convention expressed in the debate cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the Constitution. The same opinion was expressed in United States v. Wong Kim Ark ( ' ). The result appears to be that while it is not proper to take into consideration the individual opinions of Members of Parliament or Convention to ·construe the meaning of the particular clause, when a question is raised whether a certain phrase or expression was lip for consideration at all or not, a reference to the debates may be permitted. In the present case the debate~ were referred to to show that the expression • "due process of law" was known to exist in the American .Constitution (') (1904) 1 Com, L:R. 208.

(1 ) (169) U.S. &19 at 699.

•.'

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SUPU.ME COURT REPORTS

and after a discussion was not adopted by the Constituent Assembly in our Constitution. In AdministratorGeneral of Bengal v. Prem/al Mullick (1), a reference to the proceedings of the Legislature which resulted in the passing of the Act was not considered legitimate aid in the construction of a particular section. The same reasons were held as cogent for excluding a reference to such debate.s in construing an Indian Statute. Resort may be had to these sources with great caution and only when latent ambiguities are to be resolved. See Craies' Statute. Law. (4th Edition) page 122, Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (9th Edition)' pp. 28-29 and Crawford on Statutory Construction · (1940 Edition) p. 379, article 214. A perusal of the report of the drafting committee to which our attention was drawn shows clearly that the Constituent Assembly had before it the American article and the expression "due process of law" but they deliberately dropped the use of that expression from our Constitution. No extrinsic aid is needed to interpret the words of article 21, which in my opinion, are not ambig\lous. Normally r¢ad, and without thinking of other Constitutions, . the expression "procedure established by law" must mean procedure prescribed by the law of the State. If the Indian Constitution wanted to preserve to every person the · pr~ction given by the due process clause of the American Constitution there was nothing to prevent the Assembly from adopting the phrase, or if they wanted to limit . the same· to procedure only, to adopt that expression with only the word "procedural" prefixed to "law". However, the correct question is what is the right given by article 21 ? The · only right is that no person shall be deprived of his life or liberty . except according to procedure established by law. One may like that right to cover a larger area, but to give such a right is not the function of the Court ; it is the function of the Constitution. To read the word "law" as meaning rules of natural justice will land one in (1) (1895) L.R. 22 I.A. 107..

A.K. Gopalan Thi Stau Kania C.J.

A.Jr. Gopalan

Till Stau

Kania C.J.

[1950]

difficulties because the rules of natural justice, as regards procedure, are nowhere defined and in my opinion the Constitution canriot be read as .laying down a vague standard. This is particularly so when in omitting to adopt "due process of law" it was considered that the expression "procedure established by law" made the standard specific. It cannot be specific except by reading the expression .as meaning procedure prescribed by the legislature, The word, "law" as used in this Part has different shades of meaning but in no other article it appears to bear the indefinite meaning of natural justice. If so, there appears no reason why in this article it should receive this peculiar meaning. Article 31 which is also in Part III and relates to the fundamental rights in respect of property runs as follows :-"No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law." It is obvious that in that clause "law" must mean enacted law. The obiect of dealing with property under a different article appears more to provide the exceptions found in article 31 (2) to (6), rather than to give the word "law" a different meaning than the one given in article 21. The word "established" according to the Oxford Dictionarv means "to fix, settle; institute or ordain by enactment or agreement." The word "established" itself suggests an agency which fixes the limits. According to the dictionary this agency can be either the legislature or an agreement between the parties. There is therefore no justification to give the meaning of "jus" to "Jaw" in article 21. The phrase "procedure established by law" seems to be borrowed from article 31 of the Japanese Constitution. But other. articles. of that Constitution which express! y preserve other personal liberties in different clauses have to be read together to determine the meaning of "law" in the expression "procedure established by law." These articles of the Japanese Constitution have not been incorporated in the Constitution of India in the same language. It is not shown that the word "law" means "jus" in the Japanese Constitution. In the Japanese Constitution these

S.C.R.

rights claimed under the rules of natural justice are not given by the interpretation of the words "procedure established by law" in their article 31. The word "due" in the expression "due process of law" in the American Constitution is interpreted to meah "just," according to the opinion of the Supreme Court of U.S.A. That word imparts jurisdiction to the Courts to pronounce what is "due" from otherwise, according to law. The deliberate omission of the word "due" from article ·21 lends strength to the contention that the justiciable aspect of "law", i.e., to consider whether it is reasonable or not by the Court, does not form part of the Indian Constitution. The omission of the word "due'', the limitation imposed by the word "procedure" and the insertiop. of the word "established" thus brings out more clearly the idea of legislative prescription in the expression used in article 21. By adopting the phrase "procedure established by law" the Constitution gave the legislature the final word to determine the law. Our attention was drawn to The King v. The Military Governor of the Hair Park Camp (1 ), where articles 6 and 70 of the Irish Constitution are discussed. Under article 6 it is provided that the liberty of the person is inviolable and no person shall be deprived of such except "in accordance with law" ..... . In article 70 it is provided that no one shall be tried "save in due course of law" and extraordinary Courts were not permitted to be established except the Military Courts to try military offences. The expression "in accordance with law" was interpreted to mean not rules of natural justice but as the law in force at the time. The Irish Court" gave the expression "due course of law" the meaning given to it according to the English law and not the American law.. It was observed by Lord Atkin in Eshugbayi Eleko v. Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria ( 2 ), that in accordance with British --J'w-isprudence no member .of the executive can interfere with the liberty or property of a British subject except when he can support the legality of his act before a Court of justice. ( 1)

[1924] ~ Irish Reports K.B. 104.

(1 ) [1931] A. C. 662 at 670.

A. K. Gopa/1J11 TheStalii

KaniaC.J.

A. K. Gopalan

Tiu State KaniaC.J.

[1950]

In The King v. The Secretary of State for Home Affairs ( ), Scrutton L. J. observed : "A man undoubtedly guilty of murder must yet be released if due forms of law have not been followed in his conviction." It seems .very arguable that in the whole set-up of Part III _of our Constitution these principles only remain guaranteed by article 21. A detailed discussion of the true limits of article 21 will not be necessary if article 22 is. considered a code to the extent there are provisions therein for preventive detention. In this connection it may be noticed that the articles in Part III deal with different and separate rights. Under the caption "Right to Freedom" articles 19-22 are grouped bur each with a separate marginal note, It is obvious that article 22 (1) and (2) prescribe limitations on the right given by article 21. If the procedure mentioned- in those articles is followed the arrest and detention contemplated by article 22 (1) and (2), although they infringe the personal liberty of the individual, will be legal, because that becomes the established legal procedure in respect of arrest and detention. Article 22 is for protection against arrest and detention in certain cases, and runs as follows :"22. (1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitiorier of his choice. (2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate. (3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall. apply( a) to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien ; or ( 1)

[1923] to K.B. 361 at 382·

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(b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention. ( 4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorize the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as. Judges of a High Court, has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention : Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause ( 1) ; or (b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under subclauses (a) and (b) of clause (7). (5) )Vhen any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as spon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. (6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order as is referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authority considers to be against the public interest to disclose. (7) Parliament may by law prescribe( a) the· circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause ( 4) ; (b) the maximum period for which any person may in any class or clas5es of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention ; and ( c) the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry under sub-clause (a) of clause ( 4) ." The learned Attornev-General contended that the subject of preventive detention does not fall under 3-3 S. C. India{5 8.

A. K. Gopa/an

The State

Kania C.J.

A. IC Gopa!an TIN Siau

Kania C.J.

[1950]

article 21 at all and is covered wholly by article 22. According to him, article 22 is a complete code. I am unable to accept that contention. It is obvious that in respect of arrest and detention article 22 (1) and (2) provide safeguards. These safeguards are excluded in the case of preventive detention by article 22 (3), but safeguards in connection with such detention are provided by clauses ( 4) to (7) of the same article. It is therefore clear that article 21 has to be read as supplemented by article 22. Reading in that way the proper mode of construction will be that to the extent the procedure is prescribed by article 22 the same is to be observed ; otherwise article 21 will apply. But if certain procedural safeguards are expressly stated as not required, or specific rules on certain points of procedure are prescribed, it seems improper to interpm these points as not covered by article 22 and left open for consideration under article 21. To the extent the points are dealt with, and included or excluded, article 22 .is a complete code. On the points of procedure which expressly or by necessary implication are not dealt with by article 22, the opetation of article 21 will remain . unaffected. It is thus necessary first to look at article 22 ( 4) to (7) and next at the provisions_ of the impugned Act to determine if the Act or any of its provisions are ultra vires. It may be noticed that neither the American nor the Japanese Constitution contain provisions permitting preventive detention, much less laying down limitations on such right of detention, in normal times, i.e., without a declaration of emergency. Preventive detention in normal times, i.e., without the existence of an emergency like war, is recognised as a normal topic of legislation in List I, Entry 9, and List III, Entry 3, of the Seventh Schedule. Even in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights article 22 envisages legislation in respect of preventive detention in normal times. The provisions of article 22 ( 4) to (7) by their very wording leave unaffected the large powers of legislation on this point and emphasize particularly by article 22 (7) the power of the Parliament to deprive a person of a right to have his case considered by an advisory board. Part III and

''

S.C.R.

article 22 · in particular are the only restrictions on that power .and but for those provisions the power to legislate on this subject would have been quite unrestricted. Parliament could have made a faw without any safcglJMd · or any procedure for preventive detention. Such an autocratic supremacy of the legislature is certainly cut down by article 21. Therefore, if the legislature pr~scribes arprocedure by a validly enacted law and such procedure in the case of preventive detention does not come in conflict with the express provisions of Part III or article 22 (4) to (7), _the Preventive Dentention Act must be held valid notwithstanding that . the Court may not fully approve of the procedure prescribed under such Act. Article 22 (4) opens with a double negative. Put in a positive form it will mean that a law which provides for preventive detention for a perioo longer than three months shall contain a provision establishing an advisory board, (consisting of persons with the qualifications mentioned in sub-clause (a), and which has to report before the expiration of three months if in its opinion there was sufficient cause for -such detention. This clause, if it stood by itself and without the remaining provisions of article 22, will apply both- to the Parliament and the State Legislatures. The proviso to this clause further enjoins that even though the· ·ad~ visory board may be of the opinion that there was sufficient cause for such detention, i.e., detention I» yond the perioo of three months, still the detention is not to be permitted beyond the maximum perioo, if any, prescribed by Parliament under article 22 (7) (b). Again the whole of this sub-clause is made inoperative by article 22 (4) (b) in respect of an Act of preventive detention passed by Parliament under clauses (7) (a) and (b). Inasmuch as the impugned Act is an Act of the Parliament purported to be so made, clause 22 (4) has no operation and may for the present discussion be kept aside. Article 22 (5) prescribes that· when any person under a preventive detention law is detained, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may · be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the

- 1950 Jt. K. O.J.fltin

TlrlS"1#

Kani4 C.J.

A. K. Gopalan

Tlw Stot.

x.,,;,, C.}.

[1950]

earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. This. clause is of general operation in respect of every detention order made under any law permitting detention. Article 22 ( 6) permits the authority making the order to withhold disclosure of facts which such authority considers against the public interest to disclose. It may be noticed that this clause only permits the non-disclosure of facts, and reading clauses (5) and (6) together a distinction is drawn between facts and grounds of detention. Article 22 ( 4) and (7) deal not with the period of detention only but with other requirements in the case of preventive detention also. They provide for the establishment of an advisory board, and the necessity of furnishing grounds to the detenue. and· also to give him a right to make a representation. Reading article 22 clauses ( 4) and (7) together it appears to be implied that preventive detention for less than three months, without an advisory board, is permitted under the Chapter on Fundamental Rights, provided such legislation is within the legislative competence of the Parliament or the State Legislature, as the case may be. . Article 22 (5) permits the detained person to make a representation. The Constitution is silent as to the person to whom it has to be made, or how it has to be dealt with. But that is the procedure laid down by the Constitution. It does not therefore mean that if a law made by the Parliament in respect of preventive detention docs not make provision on those two points it is invalid. Silence on these points does not make the impugned Act in contravention of the Constitution because the first question is what are the rights given by the Constitution in the case of preventive detention. The contention· that the representation should be to an outside body has no support in law. Even in the Liversidge case the representation had to be made to •.he Secretary of State 'and not to another body. After such representation was made, another advisory board had to consider it, but it was not necessary to make the representation itself to a third party. Article 22 ( 4) and (7) permit the non-establishment of an advisory board expressly in a parliamentary legislation

S.C.R.

providing for preventive detention beyond three months. If so, how can it be urged that the nonestablishment of an advisory board is a fundamental right vio1ated by the procedure prescribed in the Act passed by the Parliament ? The important clause to be considered is article 22 (7). Sub-clause (a)·. is important for this ca5e. In the case of an Act of -preventive detention passed by the Parliament this clause contained in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights, thus permits detention beyond a period of three months and excludes the necessity of consulting an advisory board, if the opening words of the sub-clause are complied with. Sub-clause (b) is permissive. It is not obligatory on the Parliament to prescribe any maximum period. It was argued that this gives the Parliament a right to allow a person to be detained indefinitely. If that construction is correct, it springs out of the words of sub-clause: (7) itself and the Court cannot help in the matter. Subclause (c) permits the Parliament to lay down the procedure: to be: followc:q by the advisory board in an inquiry under sub-clause (~) of clause (4). I am unable to accept the contention tliat article 22 (4) (a) is the rule and article 22 (7) the exception. I read them as two alternatives, provided by the Constitution for making laws·on preventive detention. Bearing ·in mind the provisions of article 22 read with article 246 and Schedule VII, List I, Entry 9, and, List III, Entry 3, it is thus clear that the Parliament is empowered to enact a law of preventive detention (a) for reasons connected with defence, (b) for reasons connected with foreign affairs, ( c) fer reasons connected with the security of India ; and (under List III}, ( d) for reasons connected with the security of a State, ( e) for reasons connected with the maintenance of public order, or (£) for rea.Sons connected with the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. Counsel for the petitioner has challenged the validity of several provisions of the Act. . In respect of the construction of a Constitution Lore~ Wright in James v. The Commonwealth of Australif' (1), (') (1936) A.C. 578 at 614.

A. K. GoltJlaa T1" Stall

Kania C.J.

A. E. Gop,/an T/,. Stat<

Kania C.J.

[1950]

observed that "a Constitution must not be construed in any narrow and pedantic sense." Mr. Justice Higgins in Attorney-General of New South Wales v. Brewery Employees' Union (1) , observed: "Although we are to interpret words of the Constitution on the same principles of interpretation as we apply to any ordinary law, these very principles of interpretation compel us to take into account the nature and scope of the Act that we are interpreting-to remember that it is a Constitution, a mechanism under which laws are to be made and not a mere Act which declares what the law is to be." In In re The Central Provinces and Berar Act XIV of 1938 ( 2 ), Sir Maurice Gwyer C. J. after adopting these observations said : "especially is this true of a Federal Constitution with its nice balance of jurisdictions. I conceive that a broad and liberal spirit should inspire those whose duty it is to interpret it ; but I do not imply by this that they are free to stretch or prevert the language of the enactment in the interest of any legal or constitutional theory o.r even for the purpose of supplying omissions or of correcting supposed errors." There is considerable authority for the statement that the Courts are not at liberty to declare an A,ct void because in their opinion it is opposed to a spirit supposed to pervade the Constitution but not expressed in words. Where the fundamental law has not limited, either in terms or by necessary implication, the general powers conferred upon the Legislature we cannot declare a limitation under the notion of having discovered something in the spirit of the Constitution which is not even mentioned in the. instrument. It is difficult upon any general principles to limit the omnipotence of the sovereign legislative power by judicial interposition, except so far as the express :words of a written Constitution give that authority. It is also stated, if the words be positive and without ambiguity, there is no authority for a Court to vacate or repeal a Statute on that ground alone. ·But it is only in express constitutional . provisions limiting legislative power and controlling the temporary ·will of a majority by a permanent and (') (1908) 6 Com. L.R. 469 at 611-12.

(2) (1939) F.C.R. 18 at 37.

s.c.R.

paramount law settled. by the ddibcrate wisdom of the nation that one can find a safe and solid ground for the authority of Courts of justice to declare void any legislative enactment. Any assumption of authority beyond this would be to place in the hands of the judiciary powers too great and too indefinite either for its own security or the protection of private rights. It was first argµcd that by section 3 the Parliament had delegated its legislative power to the executive officer in detaining a person on his being satisfied of its necessity. It was urged that the satisfaction must be of the legislative body. This contention of delegation of the legislative power in such cases has been considered and rejected in numerous cases by our Federal Court and by the English Courts. It is unnecessary to refer to all those cases. A reading of the various speeches in liversidge v. Anderson (1) clearly negatives this contention. Section 3 of · the impugned Act is no delegation of legislative power to make laws. It only confers discretion on the officer to enforce the law made by the legislature. S.ection 3 is also impugned on the ground that it does not provide ?Jl objective standard which the Court can utilize for determining whether the requirements of law have been complied with. It is clear that no such objective standard of conduct can be prescribed, except as laying down conduct tending to achieve or to avoid a particular object. For preventive detention action must be taken on good suspicion. It is a subjective test based on the cumulative effect of different actions, perhaps spread over a considerable period. .As observed by Lord Finlay in The King v. Halliday (•), a Court is the least appropriate· tribunal to investigate the question whether circumstances of suspicion exist warranting the restraint on a person. The contention is urged in respect of preventive detention and not punitive detention. Before a person can be held liable for an offence it is obvious that he should be in a position to know what he may do or not do, and an omission to do or not to do will result in the State (I) (1942) A.C. 206.

(2) (1917) A.C.260 at 269.

A.K.~•

7/wSll* Kaia C.J.

A. K. Gopalan The State

Kania C.J.

[1950]

considering him guilty according to the penal enactment. When it comes however to preventive detention, the very purpose is to prevent the individual not merely from acting in a particular way but, as the sub-heads summarized above show, from achieving a particular object. It will not be humanly possible to tabulate exhaustively all actions which may lead to a particular object. It has therefore been considered that a punitive detention Act which sufficiently prescribes the objects which the legislature considers have not to be worked up to is a sufficient standard to prevent the legislation being vague. In my opinion, therefore, the argument of the petitioner against section 3 of the impugned Act fails. It was also contended that section 3 prescribes no limit of time for detention and therefore the legislation is ultra vires. The answer is found in article 22 (7) (b). A perusal of the provisions of the impugned Act moreover shows that in section 12 provision is made for detention for a period longer than three months bur not exceeding one year in respect of clauses (a) and (b) of that section_ It appears therefore that in respect of the rest of the clauses mentioned in section 3 ( 1) (a) the detention is not contemplated to be for a period longer than three months, and in such cases a reference to the advisory board under section 9 is contemplated. Section 7 of the Act which is next challenged, runs on the same .lines as article 22 (5) and (6) and in my opinion infringes no provision of the Constitution. It' was argued that this gave only the right of making a representation without being heard orally or without affording an opportunity to lead evidence and therefore was not an orderly course of procedure, as required by the rules of natural justice. The Parliament by the Act has expressly given a right to the person detained under a preventive detention order to receive the grounds for detention and also has given him a right to make a representation. The Act has thus complied with the requirements of article 22 (5). That clause, which prescribes what procedure has to be followed as a matter of fundamental right, is silent, about the person detained having a right to be heard

S.C.R.

orally or by a lawyer. The Constituent Assembly had before them the provisions of clause (I) of the same article. The Assembly having dealt with the requirements of receiving grounds and giving an opportunity to make a representation has deliberately refrained from providing a right to be heard orally. If so,. I do not read the clause as guaranteeing such right under article .22 (5). An "orderly course of procedure" is not limited to procedure which has been sanctioned by settled usage. New forms of procedure are as much, held even by the Supreme Court of America, due process of law as old forms, provided they give a person a fair opportunity to present his ca5e. It was contended that the right to make a representation in article 22 (5) must carry with it a right to be heard by an independent tribunal ; otherwise the making of a repn:sentation has no substance because it is not an effective remedy. I am unable to read clause (5) of article 22 as giving a fundamental right to be heard by an. ind¢pendent tribunal. The Constitution deli.berately · stops at giving the right of representation. This is natural because under article 22 (7), in terms, the Constitution permits the making of a law by Parliament· in which a reference to an advisory board may be omitted. To consider the right to make a representation :rs necessarily including a right to be heard by an independent judicial, administrative or advisory tribunal will thus be directly in conflict with the express words of article 22 (7). Even according to the Supreme Court of U.S.A. a right to a judicial trial is not absolute. In the United States v. Ju Toy ( 1 ), a question arose about the exclusion from entry into the States, of a Chinese who claimed to be a citizen of the United States. At page 263 the majority judgment contains the following passage :-"If for the purpose of argument, we assume that the Fifth Amendment applies to him, and that to deny entrance to a citizen is to deprive him of liberty, we nevertheles5 are of opinion that with regard to him due process of law does not require juclicial trial: That is the result of the cases which we· have cited, and the almost necessary result of the (I) (198)U.S. 253 at 263.

A.K.Gopalatt 11.

Tiii S"1U Kania C.].

A. K. Copa/a• - v. TM Siok Kama C.J.

[1950]

power of the Congress to pass exclusion laws. That the decision may be entrusted to an executive officer, and ·that his decision is due process of law, was affirmed and explained in several cases. It is unnecessary to ~epeat the often-quoted rema,ks of Mr. Justice Curits, speaking for the whole Court, in Den Exden ltfurray v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Company ( 1 ), to show that the requirement of a judicial trial does ·not prevail in every case." Again, I am not prepared to accept the contention that a right to be heard orally is an essential right of procedure even according to the rules of natural justice. The right to make a defence may be admitted, but there is nothing to support the contention that an oral interview is compulsory. In the Local Government Board v. Arlidge ( 1 ), the respondent applied to the Board constituted under the Housing Act to state a special case for the opinion of the High Court, contending that the order was invalid because ( 1) the report of the Inspector had been treated as a confidential document and had not been disclosed to the respondent, and (2) because the Board had declined to give the respondent an opportunity of being heard orally by the person or ptrsons by whom the appeal was finalry decided. The Board rejected the application. Both the points were urged before the House of Lords on appeal. Viscount Haldane L. C. in his speech rejected the contention about the necessity of an oral hearing by observing "But it does not follow that the procedure of every tribunal must be the same. In the case of a Court of law tradition in this country has prescribed certain principles to which, in the main, the procedure must conform. But what that procedure is to be in detail must depend on the nature of a tribunal." In rejecting the contention about the disclosure of the report· of the Inspector, the Lord Chancellor stated: "It might or might not have been useful to disclose this report, but I do not think that the Board was bound to do so any more than it would have been bound to disclose all the minutes made on the papers in the office before (I) 18 H.O.W. 272 at 280.

(2) (1915) A.C. 120.

S.C.R.

a decision was come to . . . . What appears to me to have been the fallacy of the judgment of the majority in the Court of appeal is that it begs the question at . the beginning by setting up the test of the procedure ·of a Court of justice instead of the other standard which was laid down for such cases in Board of Education v. Rice ( 1 ). I do not think the Board was bound to hear the respondent orally provided it gave him the opportunities he actually had." In spite of the fact that in England the Parliament is supreme I am unable to accept the view that the Parliament in making laws, legislates against the well-recognised principles of natural justice accepted as such in all civilized countries. The same view is accepted in the United States in Federal Communications Commission v. W/R The Goodwill Station (• ). A right to lead evidence against facts suspected to exist is also not essential in the case of preventive detention. Article 22 (6) permits the non-disclosure of facts. That is one of the:_ clauses of the Constitution dealing with fundamental rights. If even the non-disclosure of facts is permitted, I fail to see how there can exist a right to contest facts by evidence and the noninclusion of such procedural right could make this Act invalid. Section 10 (3) was challenged on the ground that it excludes the right to appear in person or by any lawyer before the advisory board and it was argued that this was an infringement of a fundamental right. It must be noticed that article 22 (1) which gives a detained person a right to consult or be defended by his own legal practitioner is specifically excluded · by article 22 (3) in the case of legislation dealing with preventive detention. Moreover, the Parliament is expressly given power under article 22 (7) (c) to lay down the procedure in an inquiry by an advisory board. This is also a part of article 22 itself. If so, how can the omission to give a right to audience be considered against the constitutional rights ? It wa.~ pointed 'out that section 10 (3) prevents even the disclosure of a (I) (191 n A.C. 179.

(2) 337 U.S. 265 at 276.

A. K. Gopalaa Tu Stall Klllfia C.].

A. K. Gopalan The Stale

Kania C.J.

[1950]

portion: of the report and opinion of the advisory board. It was argued that if so how can the detained person put forth his case before a Court and challenge the conclusions ? This argument was similarly advanced in. Local Government Board v. Arlidge ( 1 ) and rejected, as mentioned above. In my opinion, the answer is in the provision found in article 22 (7) ( c) of the Constitution of India.

It was argued that section 11 of the impugned Act was invalid as it permitted the continuance cif the detention for such period as the Central Government or the State Government thought fit. This may mean an indefinite period. In my opinion this argument has no substance- because the Act has to be read as a whole. The whole life of the Act is for a year and therefore the argument that the detention may be for an indefinite period is unsound. Again, by virtue of article 22 (7) (b ), the Parliament is not obliged to fix the maximum term of such detention. It has not so fixed it, except under section 12, and therefore it cannot be stated that section 11 is in contravention of article

22 (7). Section 12 of the impugned Act is challenged on the ground that it does not conform to the provisions of article 22 (7). It is argued that article 22 (7) permits preventive detention beyond three months, when the Parliament prescribes "the circumstances in which, and the class or classes of cases in which," a person: may be detained. It was argued that both these conditions must be fulfilled. In my opinion, this argument is unsound, because the words used in article 22 (7) themselves are against such interpretation. The use of the word "which" twice in the first part of the sub-clause, read with the. comma put after each, shows that the legislature wanted these to be read as disjunctive and not conjunctive. Such argument might have been possible ( tl,JOugh not necessarily accepted) if the article in the Constitution was "the circumstances and the class or classes of cases in which .... " I have no doubt that by the clause, as worded, the· legislature (l) (1915) A.C. 120.

S.C.R.

(

intended that the power of preventive detention beyond three months may be exercised either if the circumstances in which, or the class or classes of cases in which, a person is suspected or apprehended to be doing the objectionable things mentioned in the section. This contention therefore fails. It was next contended that by section 12 the Parliament had provided that a perso.n might be detained for a period longer than three months but not exceeding one year from the date of his detention, without obtaining the opinion of an advisory board, with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to (a) the defence of India, relations of India with foreign powers or the security of India ; or (b) the security of a State or the maintenance of public order. It must be noticed that the contingency provided in section 3 (1) (a) (iii), viz., the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community is omitted in section 12. Relying on the wording of these two sub-sections in section 12, it was argued that in the impugned Act the wording of Schedule VII List I, Entry 9, and List III, ~ntry 3, except the last part are only copied. This did not comply with the requirement to specify either the circumstances or the class or classes of cases as is necessary to be done under article 22 (7) of the Constitution. Circumstances ordinarily mean events or situation extraneous to the actions of the individual concerned, while a class of cases mean determinable groups based on the actions of the individuals with a common aim or idea. Determinable may be according to the nature of the object also. It is obvious that the classification can be by grouping the activities of people or by specifying the objectives to be attained or avoided. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner on this point does not appeal to me because it assumes that the words of Schedule VII List I, Entry 9, and List III, Entry 3 t<re never capable of being considered as circumstances or classes of cases. In my opinion, th.at assumption is not justified, particularly when we have to take into consideration cases of preventive

A. K. Gopalan

Th• State

Kania C.J.

A. K. Copa/an Tlv Stall

Kania G.].

[1950]

detention and not of conviction and punitive detention. Each of the expressions used in those entries is capable of complying with the requirement of mentioning circumstances or classes of cases. The classification of cases, having regard to an object, may itself amount to a description of the circumstances. It is not disputed that each of the entries in the Legislative Lists in the Seventh Schedule has a specific connotation well understood and ascertainable in law. If so, there appears no reason why the same expression when used in section 12 (1) (a) and (b) of the impugned Act should not be held to have such specific meaning and thus comply with the requirement of prescribing circumstances or classes of cases. This argument therefore must be rejected. Section. 13 (2) was attacked on the ground that even if a detention order was revoked, another detention order under section 3 might be made against the same person on the same grounds. This clause appears to be inserted to prevent a man being released if a detention order was held invalid on some technical ground. There is nothing in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights and in article 21 or 22 to prevent the inclusion of such a clause in a par liame11tary legislation, permitting preventive detention. Article 20 (2) may be read as a contrast on this point. Dealing with the four fundamental principles of natural justice in procedure claimed by the petitioner, it is thus clear that in respect of preventive detention no question of an objective standard of human conduct can be laid down. It is conceded that no notice before detention can be claimed by the very nature of such detention. The argument that after detention i.ntimation of the grounds should be given has been recognised in article 22 (5) and incorporated in the impugned Act. As regards an impartial tribunal, article 22 ( 4) and (7) read together give the Parliament ample discretion. When in specified circumstances and classes of cases the preventive detention exceeds three months, the absence of an advisory board is expressly permitted

S.C.R.

by article 22 (7). Under article 22 (4) it appears implied that a provision for such tribunal is not necessary if the detention is for less than three months. As regards an opportunity to be heard, there is no absolute natural right recognised in respect of oral representation. It has been held to depend on the nature of the tribunal. -The right to make a representation, is affirmed by the Constitution in artitie 22 (5) and finds a place in the impugned Act. The right to an orderly course of procedure to the extent it is guaranteed by article 22 (4) read with article 22 (7) (c), and by article 22 (7) (a) and (b), has also been thus provided in the Act. It seems to me therefore that the petitioner's contentions even on these poin ts fail. Section 14 was strongly attacked on the ground that it violated all principles of natural justice and even infringed the right given by article 22 (5) of the Constitution. It runs as follows : "14. (1) No Court shall, except for the purposes of a prosecution for an offence punishable under subsection (2), allow any ·statement to be made, or any evidence to be given, before it of the substance of any communication made under section 7 of the grounds on which a detention order has been made against any person or of any representation made by him against such order ; and, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, no Court sha~l be entitled to require any public officer to produce before it, or to Jisclose the substance of, any such communication or representation made, or the proceedings of an Advisory Board or that part of the report of an Advisory Board which is confidential. (2) It shall be an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both, for any person to disclose or publish without the previous authorisation of the Central Government or the State. ·.Government, as the case may be, any contents or matter purporting to be contents of any such communication or representation as is referred to in sub-section (1) :

A. K. Gopalara

Tll4 State

Kania C.].

A. K. Gopalan

[1950]

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to a disclosure made to his legal adviser by a person who is the subject of a detention order."

The Stale

Kania C.J.

By that section the Court is prevented (except for the purpose of punishment for such disclosure) from being informed, either by a statement or by leading evidence, of the substance of the grounds conveyed to the detained person under section 7 on which the order was made, or of any representation made by him against such order. It also prevents the Court from calling upon any public officer to disclose the substance of those grounds or from the production of the proceedings or report of the advisory board which may be declared confidential. It is clear that if this provision is permitted to stand the Court can have no material before' it to determine whether the detention is proper or not. I do not mean whether the grounds are sufficient or not. It even prevents the Court from ascertaining whether the alleged grounds of detention have anything to do with the circumstances or class or classes of cases mentioned in section 12 ( 1) (a) or (b). In Machindar Shivaji Mahar v. The King (1), the Federal Court held that the Court can examine the grounds given by the Government to see if they are relevant to the object which the legislation has in view. The provisions of article 22 (5) do not exclude that right of the Court. Section 14 of the impugned Act appears to be a drastic provision which requires considerable support to sustain it in a preventive detention Act. The learned Attorney-General urged that the whole object of the section was to prevent ventilation in public of the grounds and the representations, and that it was a rule of evidence only which the Parliament could prescribe. I do not agree. This argument is clearly not sustainable on the words of article 22 clauses (5) and (6). The Government has the right under article 22 ( 6) not to disclose facts which it considers undersirable to disclose in the public interest. It does not permit the Government to refrain from disclosing grounds which fall under clause (5). (1) [1949-50) F.C.R. 827.

S.C.R.

Therefore, it cannot successfully be contended t,,hat the disclosure of grounds may be withheld from the Court in public interest, as a rule of evidence. Moreover, the position is made clear by the words of article 22 (5). It provides that the detaining authority shall communicate to such detained person the grounds on which the order hat been made. It is therefore essential that the grounds mtist be connected with the order of preventive detention. If they are not so connected the requirements of article 22 (5) are not complied with and the detention order . will be invalid. Therefore, it is open to a detained person to contend before a Court that the grounds on which the order has been made have no connection at all with the order; or have no connection with the circumstances or class or classes, of cases ·under which a preventive detention order cou1d be supported under section 12. To urge this argument tltc: aggrieved party must have a right to intimate to the Cqurt the grounds ·given for the alleged detention and the representation made by him. For instance, a person is served with a paper on which there are written three stanzas of a poem three alphabets written in three different ways.· For the va!Wity of the detention order it is necessary that the grounds should be thost on which the order has been made. H the detained persori is not· in a position to put before the Court this paper, the Court will be prevented from considering :yvhether the. requirement~ of article 22 (5) are complied with and that is a: right. which is guaranteed to. every person. It seems to me therefore that the provisions of section 14 abridge the ,right given under article 22 (5) and a:te therefore ultra vires. It next remains to be considered how far the invalidity of this section affects the rest of the impugned ,'\.ct. The .impugned Act minu.s this section can remain unaffected. The omission of this section will not change the. hature or .the structure or the object of the legislation. . Therefore the decision that section 14 is ultra ilires does no.t.affect the validity of the rest of the Act. In my opinion therefore Act IV of 1950, except section 14, ·is not ultra vires. It does not infringe any

or

4-3 s. C. India/58

A. K. Gopa/11n

tMState

Kania C.J.

A. K. Gopalan The State

Fad Ali J.

[1950]

provJS1orts of Part III of the Constitution and the contention of the applicant against the validity of that Act, except to the extent of section 14, fails. The petition therefore fails and is dismissed. FAZL Au J.-The question to be decided in this case is whether the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950), is wholly or in part invalid and whether the petitioner who has been detained under that Act is entitled to a writ in the nature of habeas corpus on the ground that his detention is illegal. . The question being a pure question of law can be decided without referring to a long chain of facts which are narrated in the petitioner's application to this Court and which have a more direct bearing on the alleged mala {ides of the authorities who have detained him than on the validity of the Act. The Act which is i!Ilpugned was enacted by the Parliament on the 26th February, 1950, and will cease to have effect on the 1st April, 1951, save as respects things done or omitted to be done before that date. The main provisions of the Act are set out in sections 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, ll, 12 and 14. Section 3 (1) provides that "the Central Government or the State Government may( a) if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to(i) the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, or the security of India, or (ii) the security of the State ance of public order, or

or the mainten-

(iii) the maintenance of supplies essential to the community, or

and services

(b) if satisfied with respect to any person who is a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946 (XXXI of 1946), that with a view to regulating his continued presence in India or with a view to . makmg arrangements for his expulsi1 n from India,

S.C.R.

it is necessary so to do, make an .order directing that such person be detained." Sub-sections (2) and (3) of this section empower a District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistarte or the Commissioner of Police in a Presidency Town to exercise the power conferred by and · make the order contemplated in sub-section ( 1), but with the qualification that any order made thereunder must be reported forthiwth to the Government of the State to which the officer in question is subordinate with the groi,mds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on the necessity for the order. Section 7 of the Act provides that the authority making an order of detention shall as soon as may be communicate to the person detained the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order, in a case wh<;re such order has been made by the Central Government, to that Government, and in a case where it has been made by a State Government or an officer subordinate thereto, to the State Government. Section 8 provides that the Central Government and each State Government shall, whenever necessary, constitute one or more advisory boards for the purposes of the Act. and state the qualifications of persons of which the board should consist. Section 9 provides that when a detention order has been made with a view to preventing a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community or if it is made in regard to a person who is :i. foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act with a view to regulating his continued presence in India or making arrangements for . his expulsion from India, · the grounds on which the order I/as been made and the representation, if any, of the person detained shall, within six weeks from the date of detention, be placed before an advisory board. It will be noticed that this section does not provide that the cases of persons who are detained under section 3 (1) (a) (i) and (ii) will also be placed before the advisory board. Section 10 lays down the

A. K. Goftalan T!uSlall

Fazl Ali].

.A. K. Gopalan The Stale Fa</ Ali J.

[1950]

procedure to be followed by. the advisory board and section 11 provides that in any case where the advisory board has reported that there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the detention order may be confirmed and the detention of the person concerned may be continued for such period as the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, thinks fit. Section 12 which is a very important section, as we shall presently see, runs as follows :"12 (I) Any person detained in any of the following classes of cases or under any of the following circumstances may be detained without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board for a period · longer than three months, but not exceeding one year from the date of his detention, namely, where such person has been detained with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to(a) the defence of India, relations of India with foreign powers or the security of India; or (b) the security of a State or the maintenance of public order. (2) The case of every person detained under a detention order to which the provisions of sub-section (1) apply shall, within a period of six months from the date of his detention, be reviewed where the order was made by the Central Government or a . State Government, by such Government, and where the order was made by any officer, specified in sub-section (2) of section 3, by the State Government to which such officer is subordinate, in consultation with a person who is or has been or is qualified to be appointed as Judge of a High Court nominated in that behalf by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be." Section 14, which is also a material section for the purpose of this case, is to the following effect :" ( 1) No Court shall, except for the purposes of a prosecution for an offence punishable under subsection (2), allow any statement to be made, or any .

S.C.R.

SUPREME COQRT REPORTS

evidence to be given, before it of the substance of any communication made l.fnder section 7 of the grounds on which a detention order has been made against any . person or of any representation made by him against such order ; and, notwithstanding anything contained in any other ·1aw, no Court shall be entitled to require any public officer to produce before it, or to disclose the substance of, any such communication or representation made, or the proceedings of an Advisory Board or that part of the report of an Advisory Board which is confidential. (2) It shall be an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both, for any person to disclose or publish without the. previous authorisation of the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, · any contents or matter purporting to be the contents of any such communication or representation as is referred to in sub-section (I) : Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to a disclosure made to his legal adviser by a person who is the subject of a detention order." The point which has been pressed before us is that the Act is invalid, as it takes away or abridges certain fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution of India, and in support of this general proposition, reliance is placed on article 13 (2) which runs as follows:"The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, _-to the extent of the contravention, be void." The rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution are classified under seven broad heads, as follows :--,. (I) Right to equality ; (2) Right to freedom·; (3) Right against exploitation ; ( 4) Right to freedom of religion ; (5) Cultural and educational rights ; ( 6) Right to property ; and (7) Right to constitutional remedies.

,4. K,. Gopaltfl! v,

TheSlaY

Fad.Ali J~·

A. K. Gopd...,. T/,, Stat< Fazl Ali J.

[19501

Most of the articles which are said to have been disregarded occur under the heading "Right to freedom," these articles being articles 19 ( 1) ( d), 21 and 22. Another article which is also said to have been violated is article 32, under which the present application for a writ of habeas corpus purports to have been made. Article 19 ( 1) is divided into seven sub-clauses and runs as follows :"All citizens shall have the right( a) to freedom of speech and expression ; (b) to assemble peaceably and without arms ; ( c) to form associations or unions ; ( d) to move freely throughout the territory of India ; ( e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India ; ( f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property ; and (g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business." Clauses (2), (3), ( 4), (5) and (6) of this article provide that nothing in clause ( 1) shall affect the operation of any existing law in regard to the rights under that clause, under certain conditions which are mentioned therein. Clause (5), with which we are directly concerned and which will serve as a specimen to show the nature of these provisions, is to the following effect :'"Nothing in ;ub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe." The contentions acivanced on behalf of the petitioner with reference to this article are :-(1) that the Act under which he has been detained deprives him who is a citizen of the Republic of India of the right to move freely throughout the territory of India, which is guaranteed under article 19 (1) (d), and (2)

/

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SUPREME COURT REPOltTS

that under clause_ (5) of article 19, it is open to this Cou1 t to judge whether the restrictions imposed by the Act on the exercise of the right conferred by article 19 (1) (d) are reasonable or otherwise. Before dealing with this argument, it is necessary to understand the meaning of the words used in article 19 ( 1) (d), and to have a clear comprehension as to the true nature of the right conferred thereunder. The contention put forward on behalf of the petitioner is that freedom of personal liberty and of movement is the essence any restraint on freedom of movement must be held to amount to abridgment or deprivation of personal liberty, as the case may be, according to the nature of the restraint. After very careful consideration, I have come to the conclusion that this contention is well-founded in law. Blackstone in his "Commentaries on the Laws of England" (4th Edition, volume 1, page 134) states that "personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation or moving one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due course of law". The authority ·of this statement has never been questioned, and it has been bodily incorporated by H. J. Stephen in his "Commentaries on the Laws of England" and has been reproduced by Cooley in his well-known treatise on "Constitutional Limitations" (8th Edition, volume 1, page 710), which was extensively quoted by both parties in the course of their arguments. The view that freedom of movement is the essence of personal liberty will also be confirmed by reference to any book on the criminal law of England dealing with the offence of false imprisonment or any commentary on the Indian Penal Code dealing with the offences of wrongful restraint or confinement. Russell in his book on "Crimes and Misdemeanours" (8th Edition, volume 1, page 861), dealing with the offence of false imprisonment states as follows :"False imprisonment is unlawful and total restraint of the personal liberty of another, whether by constraining him or compelling him to go to a particular place or by confining him in a prison or

A. K. Gopalan Till ;,'fall

Fa.:! Ali J.

A. K. Gopalan . The State Fa</ Ali J.

[1950]

police station or private place, or by detaining him against his will in a public place ........ the essential element in the offence is the unlawful detention of the person or the unlawful restraint on his liberty. Such interference with the liberty of another's movements is unlawful, unless it may be justified ......... " Again, Dr. Gour in dealing with the offence of wrongful restraint in his book on ''The Penal Law of British India" (5th Edition, page 1144) observes as follows :"Following the principle that every man's person is sacred and that it is free, law visits with its penalties those who abridge his personal liberty, though he may have no design upon his person. But the fact that he controls its movements for ever so short a time is an offence against the King's peace, for no one has the right to molest another in his free movements." · Dealing with the offence of wrongful confinement, the same learned author observ~s as follows at page 1148 of his book :" 'Wrongful confinement' is a species of 'wrongful restraint' as defined in the last section. In wrongful restraint, there is only a partial suspension of one's liberty of locomotion, while in wrongful confinement there is a total suspension of liberty 'beyond certain circumscribing limits'."

Both these authors speak of restraint on personal liberty and interference with the liberty of one's movements or suspension of liberty or locomotion as interchangeable terms. In Bird v. Jones ( 1 ), Coleridge J. said that "it is one part of the definition of freedom to be able t0- go whithersoever one pleases". A similar opinion has been expressed by several authors including Sir Alfred Denning in his book entitled. "Freedom under the Law." There can therefore be no doubt that freedom of movement is in the last analysis the essence of personal liberty, and just as a man's wealth is generally measured in this country in terms of rupees, annas and pies, one's personal liberty depends upon the extent of his freedom of movement. But it is contended on behalf of the State that freedom of move(1) 7 Q.B. 742.

S.C.R.

ment to which reference has been made. in art!cle 19 ( 1) (d) is not the freedom of movement to which Blackstone and other authors have referred, but is a different species of freedom which is qualified by the words "throughout the territory of India." How the u~e of the expression "throughout the territory of India" can qualify the meaning of the rest of the words used in the article is a matter beyond my comprehension. In my opinion, the words "throughout the territory of India" were used to stretch the ambit of the freedom of movement to the utmost extent to which it could be guaranteed by our Constitution. The Constitution could not guarantee f~eedom of movement outside the territorial limits of India, and so has used those words to show that a citizen was entitled to move from one corner of the country to another freely and without any obstruction. "Throughout!' is an amplifying and not a limiting expression, and I am surprised to find that the expression "throughout the territory of India," which was used to give the widest possible scope to th~ freedom of movement, is sought to be construed as an expression limiting the scope and nature of the freedom. In my opinion, the words "throughout the territory of India;'' having regard to the context in which they have been used here, have the same force and meaning as the expression "to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct" used by Blackstone, or the expression "freedom to be able to go whithersoever one pleases" used by Coleridge J. in Bird v. Jones (l ). I am certain that neither of these authorities . contemplated that the freedom of movement which is vouchsafed to a British citizen, is guaranteed bevond the territorial · limits of British territories. The question as to wh,ether preventive detention is an encroachment on the right guaranteed by article 19 (1) (d) has been considered by the Nagpur, Patna and Calcutta High Courts. The view which has been

ultimately adopted by these

High .· Courts is . that

preventive detention is not a violation of the right guaranteed by article 19 (1) (d), but, in the Calcutta (!\ 7 Q.B. 742.

A.• K. Gopal~ ~­ T~S~

Fri.ti ~li_J.

A. K. Gopalan The State

Fa.r:l Ali J.

[1950]

High Court, where the matter has been elaborately discussed, at least five Judges have held that it does, and in the ultimate analysis the number of Judges who have held the contrary view appears to be the same. Having regard to the fact that the view expressed by so many learned Judges is opposed to the view I am inclined to take, I consider it necessary to deal briefly with the main objections which have been raised in support of the narrow meaning sought to be attached to the Words in article 19 ( 1) ( d). I have already dealt with one of them which is based on the expression "throughout the territory of India." And I shall now proceed to deal with the other seriatim. I. It will be recalled that clause (5) of article 19, which I have already quoted in full provides among other things that nothing in clause ( 1) ( d) shall affect the operation of any law, present or future, imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right of freedom of movement either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. It has been argued that the use of the words "interests of any Scheduled Tribe" in this clause shows that the right guaranteed by article 19 ( 1) ( d) is a limited right of movement, such as the right to visit different localities and to go from one place to another and is different from the expression "freedom of movement" which has been stated by Blackstone to be another name for personal liberty. It is pointed out that the restrictions in contemplation here are mainly restrictions preventing undesirable outsiders from visiting Scheduled Areas and exploiting Scheduled Tribes, and if the words "freedom of movement" had been used in the larger sense, such a small matter would not have found a place in clause (5) of article 19. I must frankly confess that I am unable to appreciate this argument and to hold that a mere reference to Scheduled Tribes affects the plain meaning of the words used in clause (1) (d) of article 19. The words used in article 19 ( 1) ( d) are very wide and mean that a person can go at his will in any direction to any locality and to any distance. Restraint on a freedom

S.C.R.

so wide in scope and extent may assume a variety of forms and may include internment or externment of a person, his confinement to a particular locality or within the walls of a prison, his being prevented from visiting or staying in any particular area, etc. The framers of the Constitution wanted to save all restrictive legislation affecting freedom of movement made in the interests of the general public (which expression· means the same thing as "public interests") and I think that the law in regard to preventive detention is fully covered by the expression "restrictions imposed in the public interests." But they also remembered that there were restrictive laws made in the interests of an important community and that similar laws may have to be made in future and hence they added the words "for the protection of ·the interests of any Scheduled Tribe." A reference to the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution and the corresponding provisions of the Government of India: Act, 1935, as well as to certain laws made for Chota Nagpur, Santhal Parganas and other localities will show that great importance has been attached in this country to the protection and preservation of the members of the scheduled tribes and maintenance of order in tribal areas, and. this, in my opinion, is sufficient to account for the special mention of the scheduled tribes in clause (5). It may, at first sight, appear to be a relatively small matter, but in their anxiety to cover the whole field of restrictive laws made whether in the public interest or in the interests of a particular community and not to leave the smallest loophole, the framers of the Constjtution apparently decided to draft the clause in the present form. · As far as I am aware, there are no restrictive laws made in the interests of any community other than the scheduled tribes, and I think clause (5) is sufficiently comprehensive to include the smallest as well as the most complete restrictions on freedom of movement. I am also satisfied that the mere mention of scheduled tribes in clause (5) eannot change the plain meaning ot the words of the main provision which we find in article 19(1) (d) and confine it to some kind of peculiar and truncated freedom of

A. K. Gopalan The Stall F~l Ali J.

l95o A.. /[, Gopalan

Thi SlaU

Fad A.II J.

[1950)

movement which is unconnected with personal liberty and which is unknown to any Constitution witb which we are familiar. It will perhaps be not out of place to refer in this connection to Ordinance XIV of 1943, which is one of tbe ordinances by whicb the Defence of India Act, 1939, was partly amended. This ordinance provides for"the apprehension and detention in custody of any person whom the authority empowered by the rules to apprehend or detain as tbe case may be su5pects, on · grounds appearing to such autbority to be reasonable, of being of hostile origin, or of having acted, acting, being about to act, or being likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or interest, the defence of British India, . the maintenance of public order, His Majesty's relations with foreign powers or Indian States, tbe maintenance of peaceful conditions in tribal areas or tbe efficient prosecution of the war, o~ wiJ;li respect to whom ouch autbority is satisfied that liis apprehension and detention are necessary for tbe purpose . of preventing him from acting in any sucb prejudicial manner, the prohibition of such person from entering or residing or remaining in any area, and the compelling of sucb person to reside and remain in anY area, or to do or abstain from doing anything." The points to be noted in connection witb the ordinance are :( l) that it is an ordinance specifically providing for apprehension and detention ; (Z) that notwitbstanding the fact that there is a general reference in it to acts prejudicial to public safety ot interests and maintenance of public order there is also a ·specific reference to maiii.tenance of peaceful ainditicins in tribal areas ; (3) that .tribal areas and scheduled tribes are kfudriid' . subjects as · would appear from the Fifth SchcdillC appended to the Constitution ; and (4) ·that maintenance of peaceful conditions in tribal areas may be as much in the public interest as in the hitercsts of. persons living in those areas.

•

S.C.R.

This ordinance shows at least this much that sometimes the law of preventive detention can also be made in the interests of scheduled tribes or scheduled areas and consequently the mere mention of scheduled tribes in clause (5) does not necessarily exclude laws relating to preventive detention from the scope of article 19 (5). The same remarks apply to the ordinance called "The Restriction and Detention Ordinance, 1944" (Ordinance No. III of 1944) which empowered the Central Government or the Provincial Government to detain and make orders restricting the movements of certain persons in the interest of public safety, maintenance of public order as well as maintenance of peaceful conditions in tribal areas, etc. II. It is· also argued that since preventive detention amounts to a total deprivation of freedom of movement, it is not a violation of the right granted under article 19 (1) ( d) in regard to which the word "restriction" and not "deprivation" has been used in clause (5). This argument also does not appeal to me. There are really two questions which fall to be decided in this case, viz., (a) Does preventive detention take away the right guaranteed by article 19 (1) (d) ? ; and (b) if so, what are the consequences, if any ? It seems obvious to me that preventive detention amounts to a complete deprivation of the right guaranteed by article ( 19) ( d). The meaning of the word "restriction" is to be considered with reference to the second question and I think that it will be highly technical to argue that deprivation of a right cannot be said to involve restriction on the exercise of the right. In my opinion, having regard to the context in which the word "restriction" has been used, there is no antithesis between that word and the word "deprivation." As I have already stated, restraint on the right to move can assume a variety of forms and restriction would be the most appropriate expression to be used in clause (5) so as to cover all those forms. ranging from total to various kinds of partial deprivation of freedom of movement. I will however have to advert to this subject later and will try to show that the

.A. •• K. Gopalil/I T/14.Slak

Fa1:.I .dli J,

1930 A. Ir. Gopalon

TheStau Fa<! Ali J.

[1950]

construction I have suggested is supported by good authority. III. It appears that some of the Judges who had to deal with the question which we have before us were greatly influenced by the argument that if the deprivation of personal liberty amounts to deprivation of the right granted under article 19 (!) (d);any conviction for an offence under the Indian Penal Code involving a sentence of imprisonment will be subject to judicial review on the ground of reasonableness of the provisions of the Code under which tlle conviction is recorded. Meredith C. J. of the Patna High Court has given expression to his concern for the situation which will thereby arise, in these words :"It will be seen that the claim made is very sweeping indeed. It would mean that eyery law under which a person may be imprisoned, including all the provisions of the Penal Code, is open to examination by the Courts on the ground of reasonableness. It makes the Courts supreme arbiters in regard to any such legislation, and they can reject it or accept it in accordance with their ideas of whether it appeals to their reason. Bu't ideas of reasonableness or otherwise are apt to vary widely. Take for example, laws relating to prohibition or take such a matter as adultery which the Indian law regards as a crime punishable with imprisonment but the English law does not. It is difficult to believe the framers of the Constitution ever intended to place so enormous a power in the hands of the Courts ........ " [Rattan Roy v. The State

of Bihar]. The obviqus and strictly legal reply to this argument is that the consideration, which has so greatly weighed with the learned Chief Justice, is not enough to cut down the plain meaning of the general words used in article 19 (5) of the Constitution. As has been pointed out in a number of cases, "in construing enacted words, we are not concerned with the policy involved or with the results injurious or otherwise which may follow bv ~ving effect to the lmguage

S.C.R.

[King Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sharma and others. (1) ]. used"

Apart from this aspect of -the matter, I agree with one of the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in his remark that "no calamitous or untoward result will follow even if the provisions of the Penal Code become justiciable." I am certain that no Court would interfere with a Code which has been the law of the land for nearly a century and the provisions of which are not in conflict with the basic principles of any system of law. It seems to me that this Court should not be deterred from giving effect to a fundamental right granted under the Constitution, merely because of a vague and unfounded fear that something catastrophic may happen. I have so far proceeded on the assutnption that the basis of the objection raised by Meredith C. J. is correct in law, but, in my opinion, it is not. Crime has been defined to consist in those acts or omissions \nvolving breach of a duty to which a sanction is attached by law by way of punishment or pecuniary penalty in the public interests. (See Russell's "Crimes and Misderneanours".) Section 2 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, provides that "every person shall be liable to punishment under this Code and not otherwise for every act or omission contrary to the provisions thereof, of which he shall be guilty within British India." The Indian Penal Code does not primarily or necessarily impose restrictions on the freedom of movement, and it is not correct to say that it is a law imposing restrictions on the right to move freely. Its primary object is to punish crime and not to restrict movement. The punishment may consist in imprisonment or a pecuniary penalty. If it consists in a pecuniary · penalty, it obviously involves no restriction on movement ; but if it consists in imprisonment, there is a restriction on movement. This restraint is imposed not under a law imposing restrictions on movement but under a law defining crime and making it punishable. The punishment is correlated directly with the violation of some other person's ri~ht and not with the right of (I) (19!5) F.C.R. 161 at p. 177.

A. K. Gopalan The Statt

Fad Ali].

19.0 A~ K. Gopalan

The Stale

Fat! Ali J.

[1950)

movement possessed by the offender himself. In my opm10n, therefore, the Indian Penal Code does not come within the ambit of the words "law imposing restriction on the right to move freely". In the course of the arguments, the expression "punitive detention" was frequent! y used and the tendency was to put it on the same footing as preventive detention for the purpose of certain arguments. Punitive detention is however essential! y different from preventive detention. A person is punitively detained only after a trial for committing a crime and after his guilt has been established in a competent Court of justice. A person so convicted can take his case to the State High Court and sometimes bring it to this Court also ; and he can in the course of the proceedings connected with his trial take all pleas available to him including the plea of want of jurisdiction of the Court of trial and the invalidity of tbe . law under which h~ has been prosecuted. The final judgment in the criminal trial will tbus constitute" a serious obstacle in his wav if be chooses to assert even after his conviction that his right under article 19 (!) (d) has been violated. But a person who is preventively detained has not to face such an obstacle whatever other obstacle may be in his way. IV. It was pointed out tbat article 19 being confined to citizens, the anomalous situation will follow that in cases of preventive detention, a citizen will be placed in a better position than a non-citizen, because if a citizen is detained his detention will be open to some kind of judicial review under article 19 (5), but if a non-citizen has been detained his case will not be open to such review. In this view, it is said that the whole Act relating to preventive detention may be declared to be void if it is unreasonable, though it concerns citizens as well as persons other than citizens. I must frankly state th?t I am not at all perturbed by this argument. It is a patent fact that the Constitution has confined all the rights mentioned in article 19 ( 1) to citizens. It is equally clear that restrictions on those rights are to a limited extent at least open to judicial review. The very same question which is

S.C.R.

raised m regard to article 19 (1) (d) will arise with regard to most of the other sub-clauses. A citizen has the right to assemble peaceably and without arms, to form associations or unions and so on. If there is any law imposing u1ireasonable restrictions on any of these rights, that law will not be good law so far as citizens are concerned,' but it may be good law so far as non-citizens are concerned. I do not see why a similar situation arising with regard to the right granted under sub-clause ( d) should be stated to be anomalous. So far as the right of free movement is concerned, a non-citizen has been granted certain p£.otections in articles 21 and 22. If a citizen has been granted certain other· additional protections under article 19 (1) (d), there is no anomaly involved in the discrimination. I think that it is conceivable that a certain law may be declared' to be void as ag~inst a citizen but not against a non-citizen. Such a result however should not affect our mind if it is found to have been clearly within the contemplation o! the framers of the Constitution. V. It was contended that the rights declared by article 19 are the rights of a free citizen and if he has already been deprived of his liberty in the circumstances referred to in articles 20, 21 and 22, then it would be idle to say that he still enjoys the right referred to in article 19. After giving my fullest consideration to· this argument, I have not been able to appreciate how it arises in this case. There is nothing in article 19 to suggest that it .applies only to those cases which do not fall under articles 20, 21 and 22. Confining ourselves to preventive detention, it is enough to point out that a person who is preventively detained must have been, before he lost his liberty, a free man. Why can't he say to those who detained him: "As a citizen I have the right to move freely and you cannot curtail or take away my right beyond the limits imposed by clause (5) of article 19." This is the only question which arises in the case and it should not be obscured by any abstruse or metaphysical considerations. It is true that if you put a man under detention, he cannot move and therefore he is not in a position to 5-3 S. C. India/58

A. K. Gopa/an The State

Faz/ Ali].

A. /(. Gopalon The Sta11

Fa<I Ali].

[1950]

exercise the right guaranteed under article 19 (1) (d), but this is only the physical aspect of the matter and a person who is bed-ridden on account of disease suffers from a similar disability. In law, however, physical duress does not deprive a person of the right to freedom of movement. If he has been detained under some provision of law imposing restrictions on the freedom of movement, then the question will arise whether the restrictions are reasonable. If he has been detained under no provisien of law or under some law which is invalid. he must be set at liberty. To my mind. the scheme of the Chapter dealing with the fundamental rights does not contemplate what is attributed to it. namely, that each article is a code by itself and is independent of the others. In my opinion, it cannot be s~id that articles 19, 20, 21 and 22 do not to some extent overlap each other. The case of a person who is convicted of an offence will come under articles 20 and 21 and also under article 22 so far as his arrest and detention in custody before trial are concerned. Preventive detention, which is dealt with in article 22, also amounts to deprivation of personal liberty which is referred to in article 21, and is a violation of the right of freedom of movement dealt with in article 19 (1) (d). That there arc other instances of overlapping of articles in the Constitution may be illustrated by reference to article 19 ( 1) ( £) and article 31 both of which deal with the right to property and to some extent overlap each other. It appears that some learned High Court Judges, who had· to deal with the very question before us, were greatly impressed by the statement in the report of the Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assemblv on article 15 ( corresponding to the present article · 21 ), that the word "liberty" should be qualified by the insertion of the word "personal" before it for otherwise it may be construed very widely so as to include the freedoms dealt with in article 13 (corresponding to the present article 19). I am not however preparded to hold that this statement is decisive on the question of the construction nf the words used in article 19 ( 1) ( d) which are quite plain and can be construed without any

S.C.R.

extraneous help. Whether the report of the Drafting Committee and the debates on the floor of the House should be used at all in construing the words of a statute, which are words of ordinary and common use and are not used in any technical or peculiar sense, is a debatable question ; and whether they can be used in aid of a construction which is a strain upon the language used in the clause to be)nterpreted is a ·still more doubtful matter. But, apart from these legal considerations, it is, I think, open to us to analyse the statement and see whether it goes beyond adding a somewhat plausible reason-a superficially plausible reason-for a slight verbal change in article 21. It seems clear that the addition of the word · "personal" before "liberty" in article 21 cannot change the meaning of the words used in article 19; nor can it put a matter which is inseparably bound up with personal liberty beyond its place. Personal liberty and personal freedom, in spite of the use of the word "personal," are, as we find in several books, sometimes used in a wide sense and embrace freedom of speech, freedom of association, etc. These rights are some of the most valuable phases or elements of liberty and they do not cease to be so by the addition of the word "personal." A general . statement by the Drafting Committee referring to freedom in plural cannot take the place of an authoritative exposition of the meaning of the words used in article 19 (1) (d), which has not been specifically referred to and cannot be such an overriding consideration as to compel us to put a meaning opposed to reason and authority. The words used in article 19 (1) ( d) must be construed as they stand, and we have to decide upon the words themselves whether in the case of preventive . detention the right under article 19 ( 1) ( d) is or is not infiinged. But, as I shall point out later, however, literally we may construe the words used in article 19 (1) (d) and however restricted may be the meaning we may attribute to those words, there can be no escape 'from the conclusion that preventive detention is a <lirect infringement of the right guaranteed in article 19 (1) (d).

A. K. Gopalan TheStlJU

Fazl Ali].

A. K. Gopalan

The State Fa</ Ali].

[1950]

Having dealt with the principal objections, I. wish to revert once again to the main topic. The expressions "personal liberty" and "personal freedom" have, as we find in several books, a wider meaning and also a narrower meaning. In the wider sense, they include not only immunity from arrest and detention but also freedom of speech, freedom of association, etc. In the narrower sense, they mean immunity from arrest and detention. I have shown that the juristic conception of "personal liberty," when these words are used in the sense of immunity from arrest, is that it consis~ in freedom of movement and -locomotion. I have also pointed out that this conception is at the root of the criminal law of England and of this country, so far as the offences of false imprisonment and wrongful confinement are concerned. The gravamen of these offences is restraint on freedom of movement. With these facts in view, I have tried to find out whether there is any freedom of movement known in England apart from personal liberty used in the sense of immunity from arrest and detention, but I find no trace of any such freedom. In Halsbury's Laws ·of England (2nd Edition, volume 6, page 391), the freedoms mentioned are the right to personal freedom (or immunity from detention or confinement), the right to property, the right to freedom of speech, the right of public meeting, the right of association, etc. Similar classifications will be found in Dicey's "Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution" and Keith's "Constitutional Law" and other books on constitutional subjects, but there is no reference anywhere to any freedom or right of movement in the sense in which we are asked to construe the words used in article l9 (1) (d) ..In the Constitutions of America, Ireland. and many other countries when: freedom is prized, there is no reference to freedom or right of movement as something distinct from personal liberty used in the sense of immunity from arrest and confinement. The obvious explanation is that in lep;al conception no freedom or right of movement exists apart from what personal liberty connotes and therefore a separate treatment of this freedom was not necessary. It is only in the Constitution of the Free

S.C.R.

City of Danzig, which covers an area of 791 square miles, that we find these words in article 75:-"All nationals shall enjoy freedom of movement within the City." There is however no authoritative opinion available to support the view that this freedom is anything different from what is otherwise called personal liberty. The problem of construction in regard to this particular right in the Constitution of Danzig is the same as in our Constitution. Such being the general position, I am confirmed in my view that the juristic conception that personal liberty and freedom of, movement connote the same thing is the correct and true conception, and the words used in article 19 ( 1) ( d) must be construed according to this universally accepted legal concepuon. This conclusion is further supported by reference to the war legislation in England and in India, upon which the law of preventive detention, which has been in force in this country since the war, is based. In the first world war, the British Parliament passed the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act, in 1914, an<l a number of regulations were made under it including which permitted the Secretary regulation 14-B, of State to subject any person "to such obligations and restrictions as hereinafter mentioned in view of his hostile origin or associations." Lord Atkin in referring to this regulation said in Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson "that the regulation undisputedly gave to a Secretary of State unrestricted power to detain a suspected person." Apparently, Lord Atkin meant that the restriction referred to in the Act included pre~ ventive detention. Under this regulation, one Arthur Zadig was interned, and he applied to the King's Bench for a writ of habeas corpus which was refused. The matter ultimately came up before the House of Lords in Rex v. Halliday ( 2 ) , and the noble Lords in dealing with ~he case proceeded on the assumption that there was no difference between internment and incarceration or imprisonment. Lord Shaw in narrating -::he facts of th case stated:-

e ),

(I) [19~2] A. C. 238.

(2) [1917] A. C. 260.

A. K. Gopalan

The Stau

Faz! Ali J.

f930

A. K. Copa/an The Stat< Faz/ Ali

].

[1950]

"His person was seized, he has been interned ... . The appellant lost his liberty and was interned ...... " He then proceeded to state that there was no difference between internment and imprisonment and quoted the following passage from Blackstone:"The confinement of the person, in any wise, is an

imprisonment. So that the keeping a man against his will in a private house, putting him in the stocks, arresting or forcibly detaining him in the street, is an imprisonment.'' Proceeding on- this footing (which I find to be the common basis in all other speeches delivered in the case, though Lord Shaw had given a dissenting judgment}, Lord Finlay while dealing with the provisions of the regwations observed :"One of the most obvious means of taking precautions against dangers such as are enumerated is to impose some restriction on the freedom of movement of persons whom there may be any reason to suspect of being disposed to help the enemy" (' ). Again, Lord Atkinson while dealing with the merits of the case made the following observation :"If the legislature chooses to enact that he can be deprived of his liberty and incarcerated or interned for certain things for· which he could not have been heretofore incarcerated or interned, that enactment and the orders made under it if intra vires do not in~ringe upon the Habeas Corpus Acts or take away any · right conferred by Magna Charta ...... " ( • ) This passage read with the previous passage quoted by me will show that both internment and incarceration were regarded as "restrictions on the freedom of movement" and that deprivation of liberty and restriction on freedom of movement were used as alternative expressions bearing the same· meaning. The same conclusion is to be drawn by· referente to the regulations made in the last world war under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, l939. The regulation which directly dealt with detention orders was 18-B. This regulation and a number of other regulations have been placed in Part I under the heading "Restrictiom (I) [!917] A. C. 269.

(2) [1917] A. C. 272.

S.C.R.

on movements and activitie~ of persons.'' The . classification is important, because it meets tWo . principal arguments advanced in this case. It shows firstly that detention is a form of restriction and secondly that it is a restriction on movement. I have noticed that "movement" is used in plural, and the heading also refers to restncttons on activities, b1,1t, having regard t<f the subjects classified under this head, move-. ment undoubtedly refers to physical movement and includes such movements as entering a particular locality, going from one place to another, etc., i.e., the very things to which article 19 (1) (d~ is said to have reference. In Liversidge's case, in construing the provisions of the Act . of 1939, Viscount Maugham observed as follows:"The language o£ the Act of 1939 (above cited) shows beyond doubt that Defence Regulations may be made which must deprive the subject "whose detention appears to the Secretary of State to be expedient in the interests of public safety" · of all his liberty of move" ment while the regulations remain in force" ( 1 ). Thus Viscount Maugham .also ·considered detention to be synonymous with deprivation of liberty of movement. '.The classification that we find in the Defence of the Realm Regulations was with a little verbal modification adopted in the Defence of India Rules, and we .find that here also rule 26, which dealt with preventive detention, has been placed under the heading "Restriction of movements and activities of persons." A somewhat similar classification has also been adopted in a series of Provincial Acts and Ordinances relating ·to maintenance of order [see section 2 of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, section l6 of the West Bengal Security Act, 1948, section 4 of the East ~unjab Public Safety Act, 1949, section 2 of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, section 3 of the U:P. Maintenance of Public Order Temporary Act, 1947, and section 2 of the Bombay Public Security Measures Act, 1947]. In these Acts and Ordinances, preventive detention and certain (1) [194-2] A. C. 219.

..f. K. Copa/an

'1"111 StaU Ftul Ali J.

A. K. Gopalan

T"6 StaU -<-

Fad Alij

[1950]

other forms of restriction ·~n, movement such as internment, externment, ·etc.. have been classed together and dealt wi~ more or less on the same footing, and sometimes they have been dealt with in different clauses of the same section. In one of the Acts, the same advisory board is to deal with the case of a dctenue as well as that of an· externed person, and there are also similar provisions giving them the right to represent their case to the Government. I will now assume for the sake of argument that the freedom of movement to which reference is made in article 19 ( 1) ( d) has nothing to do with personal liberty and that the words which occur in the ·article bear the restricted meaning attributed to them by the learned Attorney-General and some of my colleagues. It seems to me that even on this assumption, it is difficult to arrive at an} conclusion other than what I have already anived at. There can be no doubt that preventive detention does take away even this limited freedom of movement directly and substantially, and, if so, I d6 not see how it can be argued that the right under article 19 ( 1) ( J) is not infringed if the alternative interpretation is accepted. We have only to ask . ourselves : Does a person who is detained retain even a fraction of his freedom of movement in howsoever restricted sense· the term may be used and does he not lose )lls right to move freely from one place to another or visit any locality he likes as a necessary result of his detentipn ? I think'. I should refer here once more to the fact that in the Defence of the Realm Regulations and Defence of India Rules, preventive detention is classed · under ·the heading "Restriction of movements and activities," "Movement" is here used in plural and refers to that very type of movement which is said to be protected by article 19 ( 1) ( d), moving from one State or place to another, visiting different localities, etc. One of the objects . of preventive detention is to restrain the person detained from moving from place to place so that he may not spread disaffection or indulge in dangerous activities in the places he visits. The same consideration applies to the cases of persons who are interned or, externed. Hence, externment,

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internment and certain other forms of re~triction on movement have always been treated as kindred matters belonging to the same group or family and the rule which applies to one must necessarily apply to the other. It is difficult to hold that ·the case of extemment can possibly be dealt with on a different footing from the case of preventive detention. I am however interested to find that the Patna and Bombay Righ Courts have held that a person who is externed can successfully assert that the right granted to him under article 19 (1) (d) has been violated. This view has not been seriously challenged before us, ai:id, if it is correct, I really do not see how it can be held that preventive detention is also not a direct · invasion of the right guaranteed in article 19 ( 1) ( d). Perhaps, one may pause here to ask wh~t kind of laws were in contemplation of the framers .of the Constitution when they referred to laws imposing restrictions in the public interest in article 19 (5). l think the war laws and the Provincial Ac!s and Ordinances to which I have already referred must have been among them, these being laws which expressly purport to impose restrictions on movements. If so, we should not overlook the fact that preventive detention was an inseparable part of these laws and was treated as a form of restriction on movement and classified as such. It seems to me that when the matter is seriously considered, it would be found that the interpretation of the learned Attorney-General attracts the operation of article 13 (2) no less strongly and directly than the interpretation I have suggested, and I prefer the latter only because I consider that it is legally unsound to treat what is inseparably bound up with and is the essential element in the legal concept of personal liberty as a wholly separate and unconnected entity. But as I have already indicated, it will be enough for the purpose of this case if we forget all about personal liberty and remember only that detention is, as is self-evident and as has been pointed /)ut by Viscount Maugham and other eminent judges, another name for depriving a person of all his "liberty of movement." • It was pointed out in the course of the arguments

A. K. Goj1alan • v. TlllSllJU Faz/ Ali J,

A. /(. C.J>alan

Tt.. SJau Fa1:ol Ali ].

[1950]

that preventive detention not only takes away the right in article 19 (1) (d) but also takes away all the other rights guaranteed by article 19 ( 1), except the right to hold, acquire and dispose of property. Where exactly this argument is intended to lead us to, I cannot fully understand, but it. seems to me that it involves an obvious fallacy, because it overlooks the difference in the modes in which preventive detention operates on the right referred to in sub-clause ( d) and other sub-clauses of article 19 ( l). The difference is that while preventive detention operates on freedom of movement directly and inevitably, its operation on the other rights is indirect and consequential and is often only notional. One who is preventively detained is straightaway deprived of his right of movement as a direct result of his detention, but he foses the other rights only in consequence of his losing freedom of movement. Besides, while freedom of movement is lost by him in all reality and substance, some of the other rights may not be lost until he wishes to exercise: them or is interested in exercising them. A person who is detained may not be interested in freedom of association or may not pursue any profession, OCC\lpation, tr;ide or business. In such a case, the rights referred to are lost only in theory and not as a matter of substance. I wish only to add that when I said that l was not able to understand the full force of the argument which 11 have tried to deal with, what I had in mind was that if preventive detention sweeps away or affects almost all the rights guaranteed in article ( 19) ( l), the matter deserves very serious consideration and we cannot lightly lay down that article l3 (2) docs not come into operation. Being fully alive to the fact that it is a serious matter to be asked to declare a law enacted by Parliament to be unconstitutional, I have again and again asl_ted myself the question : What are we to put in the scales against the construction which I am inclined to adopt and 1n favour of the view that preventive detention does not take away the freedom of movement guaranteed in article 19 (1) (d) ? 'The inevitable answer has always been that while in one of the scales

S.C.R.

we have plain and unambiguous language, the opinion of eminent jurists, judicial dicta of high authority, constitutional practice in the sense that no Constitution refers to any freedom of movement apart from personal liberty, and the manner in which preventive detention has been treated in the very laws on which .our law on this subject is based, all that we can put in the · opposite scale is a vague and ill-founded apprehension that some fearful object.. such as the revision of the Penal Code is looming obscurely in the distant • horizon, the peculiar objection that the mere mention of the scheduled tribes will alter the meaning of certain plain words, the highly technical and unreal distinction · between restriction and deprivation and the assumption not warranted by any express provision that a person who is preventively detained cannot claim the right of freedom of movement because he is not a free man and certain other things which, whether taken singly or collectively, are too unsubstantial to carry any· weight. In these circumstances, I am strongly of the .view that article 19 (1) (d) guarantees the right of freedom of movement in its widest sense, that freedom of movement being the essence of personal liberty, the right guaranteed under the article is really a right to personal liberty and that preventive detention is a deprivation of that right. I am also of the view that even on the interpretation suggested by the learned Attorney-General, preventive detention cannot but be held to be a violation of the ri,ght conferred by article 19 (1) (d). In either view, therefore, the law of preventive detention is subject to such limited judicial review as is permitted under article 19 (5). The scope of the review is simply to see whether any particular law imposes any unreasonable restrictions. Considering that the restrictions are imposed on a most valuable right, there is nothing revolutionary in the legislature trusting the Supreme Court to examine whether an Act which infringes upon that right is within the limits of reason. I will now pass on to the consideration of article 21, which runs as foilows :"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal

.A. K. Gopaloa ·v,.. The.SIJIU

Fad .Ali].

A. E. Gopalan Y.

Ti.. SlaU Fazl Ali].

[1950]

liberty except according to procedure established by law." Here again, our first step must be to arrive at· a clear meaning of the provision. The only words which cause some difficulty in the proper construction of the article are "procedure established by law," The learned Attorney-General contended ~e us that the word "law" which is used in article 21 means State-made law or law enacted by the State. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the peaaoner strongly contended that the expression "procedure established by law" is used in a much wider sense and approximates in meaning to the expression "due process of law" as interpreted by the Supreme Court of America in the earliest times and, if that is so, it means exact! y what some of the American writers mean to convey by the expression "procedural due process." In the course of the arguments, the learned Attorney-General referred us to the proceedings in the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of showing that the article as originally drafted contained the words "without due process of law" but these words were subsequently replaced by the words "except according to procedure established by law." In my opinion, though the proceedings or discussions in the Assembly are not relevant for the purpose of construing the meaning of the expressions used in article 21, especially when they are plain and unambiguous, they . are relevant to show that the Assembly intended to avoid the use of the expression "without due process of law." That expression had its roots in the expression "per legem .terrae" (law of the land) used in Magna Charta in 1215. In the reign of Edward III, how~ver, the words "due process of law" were used in a statute guaranteeing that no person will be deprived of his property or imprisoned or indicted or put to death without being brought in to answer by due process of law (28, Edward III, Ch. III) .. The expression was afterwards adopted in the American Constitution and also in the Constitutions of some of the constituent States, though some of the States preferred to U5e the

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS-==

words " in due course of law". or "according to the law of the land." .[See· Cooley on "Constitutional A. K. Gopa!a,t. Limitations," 8th Edu.Vol. II, pages 734-5].· Jri the earlie~t times, the American Supreme Court construed The State "due process of law"· to· cover matters of procedure Fazl Ali J-. only, but gradually the meaning of the expression was widened so as to cover substantive law also, by laying emphasis. on the word "due." The expression ·was used in such a wide sense that" the judges found it difficult to define· it and in o::e of the cases it was . observed as follows : " It would be difficult and perhaps impossible to · give to those words a definition, at once accurate, and broad enough to cover every case. This _difficulty and perhaps impossibility was referred. to by Mr. Justice 11Iiller in Davidson v. New Orleans, where the opinion was expressed that it is wiser to ascertairi their intent and application by the_' gradual process of judicial inclusion. and exclusion,' as the cases presented.for decision shall require, with the reasoning on which such decisions may be founded:" · l.fissouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Hitmes ('). .. . · . · . _ It ~eems plain that the Constituent Assembly did not adopt this expression on account of the very elastic meaning gtven to it, but preferred . to use the words ''according to procedure. established by law" which occur in the Japanese Constitution framed in 1946. . It will not be out of place to state here in a few words how the Japanese Constitution came into existence. It. appears that on the I Ith October, 1945, General l\IcArthur. directed the Japanese Cabinet to initiate measures for the preparation of the Japanese· Constitution, but, , as no. progress was made, it was decided in February, 1946, that the problem of constitutional reform should be taken over by the Government Section of. the Supreme Commander's Headquarters. Subsequently the Chief of this Section and the staff drafted the Constitution with the help of American constitutional lawyers who . were called to · assist the Government Section in- the task. This ~onstitution, as a learned writer Ii.as remarked,. bore .

...

(1) 115 U.S. 512 at page 518 •

u

[1950)

on almost every page evidences of its essentially ·~l.· K. Gopalan ,\Vestern origin,. and _this characteristic was especially evident in the preamble•-" particularly reminiscent of The State the American Declaration of Independence, a preamble which, it has been observed, no Japanese could Fazl A!i J. possibly have conceived or written and which few could even- understand." [See Ogg and Zink's "Modern Foreign _Governments"]. One of the characteristics of · the· Constitution which undoubtedly bespeaks· of direct American influence is to be found in a lengthy chapter, consisting of 31 articles, entitled " Rights and Duties of the People," which provided for the first time an effective "Bill of Rights" for the Japanese _people. · The usual .safeguards ·have been provided there against apprehension· without a warrant and against arrest or detention without being informed of the charges or without adequate cause (articles 33 and 34). · Now there are two matters which deserve to be noticed :-(1) that the Japanese . Constitution was framed wholly under American influence; and (2) that at the time it was framed the trend of judicial opinion in_America was in favour of confining the meaning. of - • theexpression "due process of law " to wb-at is ex, •pressed· by certain American writers by the somewhat quaint but useful expression "procedural due process." That there was such a trend would be clear from the following passage which I· quote from. Carl Brent Swisher's" The Growth of Constitutional Power in the United States" (page 107) : _ · · · " The American history of its interj>retation falls into three periods. During the first period, covering roughly the first century of government under ·the Constitution, due process was interpreted principally as a restriction upon procedure-_and largely the judicial ·procedure-by which the government exercised its - powers. During the second period, which, again roughly speaking, extended through 1936, due process was expanded to serve as a restriction not merely upoµ procedur~ but upon the substance of the activities in which the government might engage. During the third period, extending from 1936 to date, the use of due

S.C.R.

process as a substantive restriction has been largely suspended or abandoned, leaving it principally in. its original status as a restriction upon procedure." In the circumstances mentioned, it seems permissible to surmise that the expression "procedure established by law" as used in the Japanese Constitution represented the current trend . of American judicial opinion with regard to "due process of law," and, if that is so, the expression as used in our Constitution means all that the American writers have read into the words · "procedural due process." But I do not wish to base any conclusions upon mere surmise and will try to examine the whole question on its merits. The word "law" may be used in an abstract or concrete sense. Sometimes it is preceded by an article such as "a" or "the" or by such words as "any" "all," etc., and sometimes it is used without any such prefix. But, generally, the word "law" has a wider meaning when used in the abstract sense without being preceded by an article. The question to be decided is whether the word "law" means nothing more than statute law. Now whatever may be the meaning of the expression "due process of law," · the word "law" is common to that expression as well as "procedure established by law" and though we are not bound to adopt the construction put on "law" or "due process of law" in America, yet since a number of eminent American Judges have devoted much thought to the subject, I am not prepared to hold that we can derive no help ·from their opinions and we should completely ignore them. I will therefore in the first instance set out certain ·quotations from a few of the decisions of the American Supreme Court construing the word "law as used in the expression "due process of law," in so far as it bears on the question of legal procedure. ( 1) "Although the legislature may at its pleasure provide new remedies or change old ·ones, the power is nevertheless subject to the condition that it cannot remove certain ancient land-marks, or take away certain fundamental rights ,which have been always

A. K. Gopalan Tiu State Fazl Ali:J.

.d. K. Gopalan Tlie Stai.

Fat:I Ali].

[1950]

recognized and observed in judicial procedures :" Bardwell v. Collin ( 1 ) •

(2) "By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general law : a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgments only after trial. The meaning is that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty and property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society:" Dartmouth College Case(') (3) "Can it be doubted that due process of law signifies a right to be heard in one's defence ? If the legislative department of the government were to enact a statute conferring the right to condemn the citizen without any opportunity .whatever of being heard, would it. be pretended that such an enactment would not be violative of the Constitution ? If this be true, as it undoubtedly is, how can it be said that the judicial department, the source and fountain of justice itself, has yet the authority ro render lawful that which if done under express legislative sanction would be violative of tb,e Constitution? If such power obtains; then the judicial department of the government sitting to uphold and enforce the Constitution is the only one possessing a power to disregard it. If such authority exists then establishment, to compel in consequence of their obedience to law and enforce justice, Courts possess the right to inflict the very wrongs which they were created to prevent:" Hovey v. Elliott(•). (4) "It is a rule as old as the law, and never more to ~ respected than now, that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his say in Court, by which is meant, until he has been duly cited to appear, and has been afforded an opportunity to be heard. Judgment without ·.such citation and opportunity wants all the attributes of a judicial determination ; it is judicial usurpation and oppression, and can never be upheld where justice is justly administered: "Gatpin v. Page ( • ). Thus, · in America, the word "law" does not mean merely State-made law or law enacted by the State and does not exclude certain fundamental principles of ( 1) ( )

44 Minn.117; 9L.ll.A. 152. 17 U.S. 4.

(1) 167 u. s. 409 .. _ (') 85 U.S. 18.

417.

S.C.R.

justice which inhere in every civilized system of law and which are at the root of it. The result of the numerou.s decisions in America has been summed up by ·Professor Willis in his book on "Constitutional Law" at page 662, in the statement that the essentials of due process are: (1) notice, (2) opportunity to be heard, (3) an impartial tribunal, and (4) orderly course of procedure. It is pointed out by the learned author that these essentials may assume different forms in different circumstances, and so long as they are conceded in principle, the requirement of law will be fulfilled. For example, a person cannot require any particular form or method of hearing, but all that he can require is a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Similarly, an impartial tribunal does not necessarily mean a judicial tribunal in every case. So far as orderly· course of procedure is concerned, he explains that it does· not require a Court to strictly weigh the evidence but it does require it to examine the entire record to ascertain the issues, to discover whether there are facts not reported and to see whether or not the law has been , correctly applied to facts. The view expressed by other writers is practically the same as that expressed .by Professor Willis, though some of them do not expressly refer to the fourth element, viz., orderly course of procedure. The real point however is that these four elements are really different aspects of the same right, viz.. the right to be heard before one is condemned. So far as this right is concerned, judicial opinion in England appears to be the same as that in America. In England, it would shock one to be told that a man can be deprived of his personal liberty without a fair trial or hearing. Such a case can happen only if the Parliament expressly takes away the right in question in an emergency as the British Parliament did during the last two world wars in a limited number of cases. I will refer here to a few cases which show that the fuf!damental principle that a person whose right is affected must be heard has been observed not onlv in cases involving personal liberty but also in proceedings affecting other rights, even though they · may have &-3 S. C. lndia/58

A. K. Gopalan Th. Stat. F~l Ali].

A. 1'. Gopaian The Stak

Fa.cl Ali].

[1950}

come before administrative or quasi-judicial tribunals. Cooper v. The Wadsworth Board of Works (1) was a case under an Act which empowered the District Board to alter or demolish a house where the builder had neglected to give notice of his intention seven days before proceeding to lay or dig the foundation. Acting upon th.is power, the Board directed the demolition of a building without notice to the builder, but this was held to be illegal. Byles J. in dealing with the matter observed as follows :"I conceive they acted judicially because they had to determine the offence. and they had to apportion the punishment as well as the remedy. That being so, a long course of decisions, beginning with Dr. Bentley's case, and ending with some very recent cases, establish that although there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature. The judgment of Mr. Justice Fortescue, in Dr. Bentlev's case, is somewhat quaint, but it is very ·applicable, and has been the law from that time to the present. He says, "The objection for want of notice can never be got over The laws of God and man both give the party an opportunity to make his defence, .if he has any." In the same case Erle C. J. observed :"It has been said that the principle that no man shall be deprived of his property without an opportunity of being heard, is limited to a judicial proceeding ...... I do not quite agree with that ; ...... the law, I think, has been applied to many exercises of power which in common understanding would not be at all more a judicial proceeding than would be the act of the District Board in ordering a house to be pulled down." The observations made bv Erle C. J. were quoted and applied by Sir Robert Collier in Smith v. The Queen('), and the observations of Lord Campbell in Regina v. The Archbishop of Canterbury (1) were to the same effect. ( 1)

14 C.B. (N.S.) 180.

(') 3 A.G. 614.

(') I E. & E. 559.

S.C.R.

A similar opinion was expressed by Sir George Jessel in Fisher v. Keane (1), Labouchere v. Earl of W harncliffe, (2 ) and Russel v. Russel (8) • In the last mentioned case, he observed as follows:-

1950· A. K. Gopalan TheSlaU

Fozl Ali].

"It [Wood v. Woad(')] contains a verv valuable statement by the Lord Chief Baron as to his view of the mode of administering justice by persons other than Judge~ who have judicial functions to perform which I should have been very glad to have had before me on both those club cases that I recently heard, namely, the case of Fisher v. Keane and the case of Labouchere v. Earl of W harncliffe. The passage I mean is this, referring to a committee : "They are bound in the exercise of their functions by the rule expressed in the maxim "audi alteram partem", that no man should be condemned to conseauences without having the opportunity of making his defence. This rule is not confined to the conduct of strictly legal tribunals, but is applicable to every tribunal or body of persons invested with authority to adiudicate upon matters involving .civil consequences to individuals'." This opinion was quoted with approval by Lord Macnaghten in Lapointe v. L'Association etc. de Montreal ( 5). In that case, on an application for pension by the appellant, who had been obliged to resign, the Board of Directors, without any judicial inquiry into the circumstances, resolved to refuse the claim on the ground that he was obliged to tender his resignation. This procedure was condemned by Lord Macnaghten as being "contrary to rules of society and above all contrary to the elementary principles of justice." These observations of ·Lord Macnaghten were referred to and relied on in The King v. Tribunal of Appeal under the Housing Act, 1919 (6 ). In that case, a company proposed to build a picture house and the local authority having prohibited the building, the company appealed under the Housing l') 11 Ch. D. 1.5:;, ( 11 13 Ch. D. 3-IU. (') 14 Ch. D. 471.

(4 ) [1874] L. R. 9

{') [1906] A. C. 535. ('\ [1920] T. B. 334.

Ex. 190.

• 1950 A. Ir. Gopal•n

The Stall

Faz;/ Ali].

[1950]

(Additional Powers) Act, 1919, which contained a provision that an appeal could in certain cases be properly determined without a hearing and that the appellate Court could dispense with the hearing and determine the appeal summarily. It was held that . the meaning of rule 7 was that the tribunal on appeal might dispense with an oral hearing, not that they might dispense with a hearing of any kind, and that they were bound to give the appellants a hearing in the sense of an opportunity to make <lut a case. The Earl of Reading in delivering the judgment observed : "The principle of law applicable to such a case is well stated · by Kelly C.B. in Wood v. Woad in a passage which is cited with approval by Lord Macnaghten in Lapointe v. L' Association etc. de Montreal ...... " In Local Government Board v. Arlidge ('), the Local Government dismissed an appeal by a person against whom a closing order had been made under Housing, Town Planning, &c. Act, without an oral hearing and without being allowed to see the report made by the Board's Inspector upon public local inquiry. The House of Lords did not interfere with the order on the ground that the appeal had been dealt with by an administrative authority whose duty was to enforce obligations on the individual in the interests of th~ community and whose character was that of an organization with executive functions. The principle however was conceded and lucidly set forth that when the duty of ·deciding an appeal is il\lposed, those whose duty it is to decide it must act judicially, and they must deal with the question referred to them without bias and must give to each of the parties an opportunity of presenting its case, and that the decision must be come to in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility of a tribunal whose duty it is to mete out justice. Commenting upon this case, which is generally regarded as an extreme case, Mr. Gavin Simonds, who afterwards became a member of the House of Lords observes :(') [19U) A. C. 120.

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.

-

"I think you would agree that if the subjectmatter of such proceedings as are here indicated was the liberty of the subject, or 'indeed his life, you would regard such a judicial procedure ·as outrageous." (See C K. Allen's "Law and Orders," page 167). I have particularly referred to cases which were before administrative tribunals, because I have to deal in this case with preventive detention which is said to be an executive act and because I wish to point out that even before executive authorities and administrative tribunals an · order cannot generally be passed affecting one's rights without giving one such hearing as f?ay be appropriate to the circumstances of the case. ·I have only to add that Halsbury .after enumerating the most important liberties which are recognized ' in England, such as right of personal freedom, right to freedom of speech, right of public meeting, etc.,· adds :"It seems to me that there should be added to this list the following rights which appear to have become well-established-the right of the subject to have any case affecting him tried in accordance with the principles of natural justice, particularly the principles that a man may not be a judge in his own cause, and that no party ought to be condemned unheard, or to have a decision given against hi1Il unless he has been given a reasonable opportunity of putting forward his case ...... " (Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edition, volume 6, page 392). The question is whether the principle that no person can be condemned without a hearing by an impartial tribunal ,which is well-recognized in all modern civilized systems of law and which Halsbury puts on a par with well-recognized fundamental rights cannot be regarded as part of the law of this country. I must confess that I ·find it difficult to give a negative answer to this question. The principle being part of the British system of law and procedure which we have inherited, has been observed in this country for a very long time and is also deeply rooted in our ancient history, being the basis of the

A. K. Gopalan TluStilU

F"l Ali].

A. K. Gopalan

The State

Faz/ Ali J.

[1950]

panchayat system from the earliest times. The whole of the Criminal Procedure Code, whether it deals with trial of offences or with preventive or quasiadministrative measures such as are contemplated in sections 107, 108, 109, 110 and 145, is based upon the foundation of this principle, and it is difficult to see that it has not become part of the "law of the land" and does not inhere in our system of law. If that is so, then "procedure established by law" must include this principle, whatever else it may or may not include. That the word "law" used in article 21 does not mean only State-made law is clear from the fact that though there is no statute laying down the complete procedure to be adopted in contempt of Court cases, when the contempt is not within the view of the Court, yet such procedure as now prevails in these cases is part of our law. The statute-law which regulates the procedure of trials and enquiries in criminal cases does not specifically provide for arguments in certain cases, but it has always been held that no decision should be pronounced without hearing arguments. In a number of cases, it has been held that though there may be no specific provision for notice in the statute, the provision must be read into the law. I am aware that some Judges have expressed a strong dislike for the expression "natural justice" on the ground that it is too vague and elastic, but where there are well-known principles with no vagueness about them, which all systems of law have respected and recognized, they cannot be discarded merely because they are in the ultimate analysis found to be based on natural justice. That the expression "natural justice" is not unknown to our la:w is apparent· from the fact that the Privy Council has in many criminal appeals from this country laid · down that it shall exercise its power of interference with the course of criminal justice in this country when there has been a breach of principles of natural justice or departure from the requirements of justice. [See In re Abraham Mallory Di/let (1 ), Taha .~ingh v. King Emperor '), George Gfeller v. The {') 12 A. C. 459.

( 1)

I. L. R. 46 Bom. 515.

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King ( 1 ), and Bugga and others v. Emperor (2 )]. In the present case, there is no vagueness about the right claimed which is the right to have one's guilt or innocence considered by an impartial body and that right must be read into the words of article 21. Article 21 purports to protect life and personal liberty, and it would be a precarious · protection and a protection not worth having, if the elementary principle of law under discussion which, according to Halsbury is on a par with fundamental rights, is to be ignored and excluded. In the course of his arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner repeatedly asked whether the Constitution would permit a law being enacted, abolishing the mode of trial permitted by the existing law and establishing the procedure of trial by battle or trial by ordeal which was in vogue in olden times in England. The question envisages something which is not likely to happen, but it does raise a legal problem which can perhaps be met only in thi~ way that if the expression "procedure established by law" simply means any procedure established or enacted by statute it will be difficult to give a negative answer to the question, but if the word "law" include~ what I have endeavoured to show it does, such an answer may be justified. It seems to me that there is nothing revolutionary in the doctrine that the words "procedure established by law" must include the four principles set out in Professor Willis' book, which, as I have already stated, are different aspects of the same principle and which have no vagueness or uncertainty about them. These principles, as the learned author points out and as the authorities show, are not absolutely rigid principles but are adaptable to the circumstances of each case within certain limits. I have only to add that it has not been seriously controverted that "law" in this article means valid law and "procedure" means certain definite rules of proceeding and not something which is a mere pretence for procedure. I will now proceed to examine article 22 of the Constitution which specifically deals with the subject (1) A. I. R. 1943, P. C. 21 J.

( 1 ) A.

I. R. 1919 P. C. 108.

A. K. Gopalan

Thi S1au F<U:l Ali J.

19SO

A. K. Gopalon The State Fa</ A/; J.

[1950]

of preventive detention. The first point to be noted in regard to this article is that it does not exclude the operation of articles 19 and 21, and it must be read subject to those two articles, in the same way as articles 19 and 21 must be read subject to article 22. The correct position is that article 22 must prevail in so far as there are specific provisions therein regarding preventive detentio1f, but, where there are no such provisions in that'a{_ticle, the operation of articles 19 and 21 cannot be , exclllded. The mere fact that different aspects of the same right have been dealt with in three different articles will not make them mutually exclusive except to the extent I have indicated. I will now proceed to analyse the article and deal with its main provisions. In my opinion, the main provisions of this article are:-( l) that no person can be detained beyond three months without the report of an advisory board [clause 4 (a)] ; (2) that the Parliament may prescribe the circumstances and the class or classes of cases in which a person may be detained for more than three months without obtaining the opinion of an advisory board [clause 7 (a)] ; (3) that when a person is preventively detained, the authority making the order of detention shall communicate to such person the grounds on which the order is made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order [clause (5)] ; and ( 4) that the Parliament may prescribe the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention [clause 7 (b)]. The last point does not require any consideration in this case, but the first three points do require consideration. In connection with the first point, the. question arises as to the exact meaning of the words "such detention" occurring in the end of clause 4 (a). Two alternative interpretations were put forward : (1) "such detention" means preventive detention ; (2) "such detention" means detention for a period longer than three months. If the first interpretation is correct, then the function of the advisory board would be to go into the merits of the case of each person and simply

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report whether there was sufiicient cause for his detention. According to the other interpretation, the function of the advisory board will be to report to the government whether there is sufficient cause for the person being detained for more than three months. On the whole, I am inclined to agree with the second interpretation. Prima facie, it is a serious matter. to detain a person for a long period (more than three months) without any enqmry or trial. But article 22 (4) (a) provides that such detention may be ordered on the report of the advisory board. Since the report must be directly connected with the object for which it is required, the safeguard provided by the article, viz., calling for a report from the advisory board, loses its value, if the advisory board is not to apply its i:nin,d to the vital question before the government, namely, whether prolonged detention (detention for more than three months) is justified or not. . Under article 22 (4) (a), the advisory board has to submit its report before the expiry of three months and may therefore do so on the eighty-ninth day. It would be somewhat farcical to provide, that after a. man has been · detained for eighty-nine days, an advisory board is to say whether his initial detention was. justified. On the other hand, the determination of the question ·whether prolonged detention (detention for more than three motnhs) is justified must necessarily involve the determination of the question whether ·the detention Wl!~ justified at all, and such an interpretation only can give real meaning and effectiveness to the provision. The provision being in the nature , of a protection or safegi:iard, I must naturally lean towards the interpretation which is favourable to the subject and which is also in accord with the object in view. The next question which ·we have to discuss _relates to the meaning and scope of article 22 (7) (a) which runs as follows :"Parliament may by law prescribe(a) the circumstances under which, and the ,cla~s or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer. than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without .obtaining

19:0 A- K. Gopalt111 Tire State Far.I Ali J.

A. /(. Gopalan

Tl.1 State

Ftu::l Ali :J.

[1950]

the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause ( 4)." The question is what is meant by "circumstances" and "class or classes of cases" used in this provision. This question has arisen because of the way in which these expressions appear to have been interpreted and applied in the Act of Parliament with which we are concerned. As the matter is important and somewhat complicated, I shall try to express my meaning as clearly as possible even at the risk of some repetition, and, in doing so, I must necessarily refer to the impugned Act as well as Lists I and III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, under which Parliament had jurisdiction to enact it. Item 9 of· List I-Union List-shows that the Parliament has power to legislate on preventive detention for reasons connected with (1) defence, (2) foreign affairs, and (3) security List-the of India. Under List III-Concurrent appropriate item is item 3 which shows that law as to preventive detention can be made for reasons connected with (1) the security of the State, (2) the maintenance of public order, and (3) the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. The impugned Act refers to all the subjects mentioned in Lists I and III in regard to which law of preventive detention can be made. Section 3 (1) of the Act, the substance of which has already been mentioned, is important, and I shall reproduce it verbatim. "The Central Government or the State Government may( a) if satisfied wit!}. respect to any person that with a view to preventing him ·from acting in any manner prejudicial to(i) the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, or the security of India, or (ii) the security of the State or the tenance of public order, or

main-

(iii) the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, or

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(b) if satisfied with respect to any person who is a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946 (XXXI of 1946), that with a view to regulating his continued presence in India or with a view to making arrangements for his expulsion from India, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained." It will be noticed that all the subjects of legislation concerning preventive detention occurring in item 9 of List I are grouped in sub-clause (1) of clause (a). The subjects in this group are three in number and, for convenience of reference, I shall hereafter refer to them as A, B and C. In sub-clause (ii), we find grouped two of the matters referred to in item 3 of List III, these being security of the State and the maintenance of public order. These two subjects, I shall refer to as D and E. In sub-clause (iii), reference has been made to the third matter in item 3 of List Ill, anci I shall refer to this subject as F. With this classification, let us now turn to the Constitution itself. On reading articles 22 ( 4) and 22 (7) together, it would be clear that so long as article 22 ( 4) (a) holds the field and Parliament .does not act under clause (7) (a) of article 22, there must be an advisory board in every case, i.e., if the legislation relates to groups A to F, as it does here,. there must be an advisory board for all these groups. Article 22 .(7) however practically engrafts an exception. It states in substance that the Parliament may by an Act provide for preventive detention for more than three months without reference to an advisory board, but in such cases it shall be incumbent on the Parliament to prescribe ( 1) the circumstances and (2) the class or classes of cases in which such course is found to be necessary. If the case contemplated in clause ( 4) (a) is the rule and that contemplated in clause (7) (a) is the exception, then the circumstances and the class or classes of cases must be of a special or extraordianry nature, so as to take the case out of the rule and bring it within the excef>tion. It is always

A. K. Gopalan

The State

Fazl Ali J.

A. K. Gopalan The State Fa<I Ali J.

[1950)

possible to draw the line between the normal or ordinary and the abnormal or extraordinary cases, and this is what, in my opinion, the Parliament was expected to do under clause (7) (a). I do not tlunk that it was ever intended that Parliament could at its will treat the normal as the abnormal or the rule as the exception. But this is precisely what has been done in this case. All the items on which preventive legislation is possible excepting one, i.e., A to E, have been put within the exception, and only one, F, which relates to maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, has been allowed co remain under the rule. In other words, it is provided that there shall be an advisory board only for the last category, F, but no provision having been made for the other categories, A to E, it may be assumed that the advisory board has been dispensed with in those cases. The learned Attorney-General maintained that it would have been open to the Parliament to dispense with the advisory board even for the category F, and if such a course had been adopted it would not have affected the V'alidity of the Act. This is undoubtedly a logical position in the sense that it was necessary for him to go as far as this to justify his stand ; but, in my opinion, the course adopted by the Parliament in enacting section 12 of the impugned Act is not what is contemplated under article 22 (7) (a) or is permitted by it. The circumstances to be prescribed must be special and extraordinary circumstances and the class or classes of cases must be of the same nature. In my opinion, the Constitution never contemplated that the Parliament should mechanically reproduce all or most of the categories A to F almost verbatim and not. apply its mind to decide in what circumstances and in what class or classes of cases the sateguard of an advisory board is to be dispensed with. I may state here that two views are put forward before us as to how clauses (4) (a) and 7 (a) of article 22 are to be read:-(1) that clause (4) (a) lays down the rule that in all cases where detention for more than three months is ordered, it should be done in consultation with and on the report of the advisory

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board, and ~tause (7) (a) lays down an exception to this rule h¥ . providing that Parliament may pass an Act permitting detention .for more than three months without reference to an advisory board ; (2) that clauses (4) (a) and (7) (a) are independent clauses ' making two separate and alternative provisions regarding detention for · more than three months, in one case on the report of an advisory board and in other case without reference to an advisory board. Looking at the substance and not merely at the wordsJ I am inclined to ·hold that clause (7) (a) practically engrafts an exception on the rule that preventive detention for . more than three months can be ordered only on the report of an advisory board, and so far I have proceeded on that footing. But it seems to me that it will make no difference to the ultimate conclusion, whichever of the two views we may adopt. Even on the latter view, it must be recognized that the law which the Constitution enables the Parliament to . make under article 22 (7) (a) would be an exceptionally drastic law, and, on the principle that an exceptionally drastic law must be intended for- an exceptional situation, every word of what I have said so far must stand. Clause (7) (a) is only an enabling provision, and it takes care to provide that the Parliament cannot go · to the extreme limit to which it is permitted to go without prescribing the class or classes of cases and the circumstances to which the extreme law would be applicable. It follows that the class or classes of cases and the circumstances must be of a special nature to require such legislation. It was urged that the word "and" which occurs between "circumstances" and "class or classes of cases" is used in a disjunctive sense and should be read as "or", and by way of illustration it was mentioned that when it is said that a person may do this and that; it means that he is at liberty to do either this or that. I do not think that this argument is sound. I think that clause (7) (a) can be accurately paraphrased somewhat as follows :-"Parliament may dispense with an advisory board, but in that case it shall prescribe the circumstances and the class or

A. K. Gopalan The State

F!Jl{.l Ali J.

A. K. Gopolan ·

1"he State

Faz/ Ali].

[1950]

classes of cases .... " If this is the meaning, then "and" must be read as ''and" and not as "or"; and "may" must be read as "'shall" Supposing it was said that Parliament may prescribe the time and place for the doing of a thing, then can it be suggested that both time and place should not be prescribed? It seems obvious to me that the class or classes of cases must have some reference to the persons to be detained or to their activities and movements or to both. "Circumstances" on the other hand refer to something extraneous, such as surroundings, background, prevailing conditions, etc., which might prove a fertile field for the dangerous activities of dangerous persons. Therefore the provision clearly means that both. the circumstances and the class or classes of cases (which are two different expressions with different meanings and connotations and cannot_ be regarded as synonymous) should be prescribed, and prescription of one without prescribing the other will not be enough. As T have already stated, such law as can be enacted under article 22 (7) (a) must involve, by reason of the extreme limit to which it can go, serious consequences to the persons detained. It will mean (1) prolonged detention, i.e., detention for a period longer than three months, and (2) deprivation of the safeguard of an advisory board. Hence article 22 (7) (a) which purports to be a protective provision will cease to serve its object unless it is given a reasonable interpretation. To my mind, what it contemplates is that the law in question must not be too general but its scope should be limited by prescribing both the class or classes of cases and the circumstances. It was contended that the expression "class or classes of cases" is wide enough to enable the Parliament to treat any of the categories mentioned in Lists I and III, items 9 and 3 respectively, (i.e., any of the categories A to F) as constituting a class. At first sight, it seemed to me to be a plausible ari;tument, but the more I think about it the more unsound it appears to me. The chief thing to be remembered is what I have already emphasized more than once,. viz., that a special or extreme type of law must be limited to special classes of cases and circumstances. Under the

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Constitution, the Parliament has to prescribe "the class or classes", acting within the limits of the power granted to it under Lists I and III. The class or · classes must be its own prescription and must be so conceived as to justify by their contents the xemoval of an important safeguard provided by the Constitution. Prescribing is more than a mere mechanical process. It involves a me11tal effort to select and adapt the thing prescribed· to the object for which it has. ·to be prescribed. We find here that what is to be prescribed is "class or classes" (and also "circumstances"). We also find that what the law intends to provide is prolonged detention · (by which words I shall hereafter mean detention for more than three months) and elimination of the advisory board. The class or classes to be prescribed must therefore have a direct bearing on these matters and must be so selected and stated that any one by looking at them may say:-"That is the reason why the law has prescribed prolonged detention without reference to an advisory board." In other words, there must be something to make the class or classes prescribed fit in · with an extreme type of legislation-some element of exceptional gravity or menace which cannot be easily and immediately overcome and therefore necessitates prolonged detention; and there must be something to show that re~rence. to an advisory board would be an undesiral;>le and cumbersome process and wholly unsuitable for . the exceptional sit9ation to which the law applies. Perhaps a simple .illustration may make the position still clearer. Under the Lists, one of the subjects on which Parliament may make a law of preventive detention is ·"matter connected with. the maintenance of puolic order.'~ The Act simply repeats · this phraseology and states. in .section 3: "with a view to preventing him (the person to be detained) from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order." This may be all right for section 3, but section 12 must go further. An act prejudicial ·to the maintenance of public order may. be an ordinary act or it may be an act of special gravity. l think that article 22 (7) (a) contemplates that. the graver and

A. K. Gopalan - .v. Tll4StaU

Fiu:l Ali].

A. K. Copa/an

Tl:.t State

Fad Ali J.

[1950]

more heinous types of acts falling within the category of acts prejudicial to the maintenance of public order (or other heads) should be prescribed so as to define and circumscribe the area of an exceptional piece of legislation. That some kind of sub-classification (if I may be permitted to use this word) of the categories A to F was possible can be .illustrated by reference to regulation 18-B of the British Defence of the Realm Regulations. This regulation was made under an Act of 1939 which authorized "the making of regulations for the detention of persons whose detention appears to the Secretary of State to be expedient in the interests of public safety or the defence of the realm." The two matters "public safety" and "defence of the realm" are analogous to some of the heads stated in Lists I and III. It will be instructive to note that under these two heads, regulation 18-B has set forth several subheads or class or classes of cases in which preventive detention could be ordered. These classes are much more specific than what we find in section 3 of the impugned Act and therefore there is less chance of misuse by the executive of the power to order preventive detention. The classes set out are these:-(1) If the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe any person to be of hostile origin or associations, (2) if the Secretary of Sta.te has reasonable cause to believe any person to have been recently concerned in acts prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the realm or in the preparation or instigation of such acts, (3) if the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe any person to have been or to be a member of or to have been or to be active in the furtherance of the objects of, any such organization as is hereinafter mentioned .... (a) the organization is subject to foreign influence or control (b) the persons in control of the organization have or have had associations with persons concerned in the government of, or sympathies with the system of government of, any Power with which His Majesty is at war, and in either case there is danger of the utilization of the organization for purposes prejudicial to the public safety, etc., (4) if the Secretary

•

S.C.R.

of State has reasonable cadse to believe that the recent conduct of any person for the ·time being in an area or any words recently wri~ten or spoken by such a person expressing sympathy with the enemy, indicates or indicate that that person is likely to assist the enemy. I have only to point out that the scope within which preventive detention can be legislated upon in this country is much larger than the scope indicated in the British Act under which Regulation 18-B was framed, and therefore there is more scope for specification of the circumstances as well as the class or classes of cases under the impugned Act. But all that has been done is that words which occur in the legislative Lists have been taken and transferred into the Act. What I have stated with regard to class or classes of cases also applies to the circumstances which are also to be prescribed under article 22 (7) (a). These circumstances are intended to supply the background or setting in which the dangerous activities of dangerous persons might prove specially harmful.· They must be special circumstances which demand a specially drastic measure and under which reference to an advisory board might defeat the very object of preventive action. The evident meaning of article 22 (7) (a) seems to be. that the pic_ture will not be complete without mentioning both the classes and the circumstances. There was some discussion at the Bar as to what kind of circumstances might ·haV(;... _been specified. It is not for me to answer this question, but I apprehend that an impending rebellion or war, serious disorder in a particular area such as has induced the Puniab Government to declare certain areas as "disturbed areas,'.' tense communal situation, prevalence of sabotage or widespread yolitical dacoities and a -variety of other matters might answer the purpose the Constitution had in view. I will now try to sum up th~ result of a somewhat protracted discussion into which I had to enter merely to clarify .the meaning of a very important provision of the Constitution which has. in mv opinion, been completely misunderstood by the framers of the 7-1 S. C. Ind'af58 .

19·.o

A. K. GopalM The Stat• F~l Ali].

ISO

(1950}

1950 \ '

impugned Act. It appears. to .me that article 22 deals. with three classes of preventive detention : A. K.-Gopalan (I) prev_entive detention ·for. three months ; "· The Stat~ · · (2) preventive . detention for more than three months on the report of the advisory board ; and Fazl Ali J. · · (3fpre~entive detention for .more than three I months without reference to the advisory board. · If one has to find some kind of a label for these classes for a clear understanding of the subject, one may label them as "dangerous," "more dangerous" and "most dangerous." . Now so far as the first twoclasses are concerned, there is not)ling to be prescribed. .under the Constitution. Apparently.the authors of the Constitution were not much concerned.about class No. (I), and they thought that in so far as class No. (2} was concerned the provision that· a reference to the advisory board was necessary coupled with the provision that detention was not to exceed the maximum. period which may be fixed by the . Parliament was . enough. · But they did take· care to. make a special. provision for class No. (3), and it is extermly important for the liberty of the subject as well as for the smooth working of the Constitution that this provision · should not be lightly treated but should receive a wellconsidered and reasonable construction. It js ele-· mentary that the rigour of a law should correspond to· or fit the gravity of the evil or danger it aims at.com-· bating, and ,it is also evident that the law which the· Parliament has been permitted to enact under article· 22 (7) (a) can, so far as rigour is concerned, go to the farthest limit. It follows that the law must have been intended for exceptionally grave situations and exigencies. Hence the authors of the Constitution have made· it necessary that the Parliament should put certain specifications into the Act which it is empowered to. pass under article 22 (7) (a), so that by means of these specifications the necessity for enacting so drastic a law should be apparent on the face of it, and its application. should be confined to the classes and circumstances. specified. The Act must prescribe (I) " ch:.ss or classes of cases" which are to have reference to· the persons~

'

-r

S.C.R.

against whom the law is to operate and their activities and movements and (2) "circumstances" which would bring into prominence the conditions and the backgrounds against which dangerous activities shoul,d call for special measures. By means <!f such two.fold prescription, the sphere for the application of the law will be confined only to a special type of cases-it will be less vague, less open to abuse and enable those who have to administer it to determine objectively when a condition has arisen to justify the use of the power vested in them by the law. This, in my opinion, is the true meaning and significance of article 22 (7) (a) and any attempt to whittle it down will lead to deplorable results. Having stated my views as to the construction of article 22 (7) (a), I propose to consider at once whether section 12 of the impugned Act conforms to the requirements of that provision. In my opm1on, it does not, because it fails to prescribe' either -the circumstances or the class or classes of cases in the manner - required by the Constitution. It does not prescribe circumstances at all, and, though it purports to prescribe the class or classes, it does so in a manner showing that the. true meaning of the provision from which the Parliament derived its power has not been grasped. I have sufficiently dwelt on this part of the case and shall not repeat what I have already said. But I must point out that even if it be assumed that the view advanced by the learned Attorney-General is correct and it was within the competence of Parliament to treat any of the categories mentioned in items 9 and 3 of Lists I and III as constituting a class :ind to include it without any qualification or cha?ge, the impugned section cannot be saved on account of a two-fold error :(1) the word "and" which links "class or classes" with "circumstances" in article 22 (7) (a) has been w.rongly construed to mean "or;" and- (2) the distinction between "circumstances" and "class or classes" has been completely ignored and they are used as interchangeable terms. The first error appears to me to be quite a serious one, because though the Constitution lays down two requirements and 'insists

A. K. Gopolan

The State Far.I Ali J.

A. K. Gopalan

The State

Fazl Ali].

[ 1950]

on the prescnption of circumstances as well as class or classes, it has been assumed m enacting section 12 that prescription of · one of them only will be enough. The other error is still more serious and goes to the root of the matter. There can be no doubt that circumstances and dass or classes are two different expressions and have different meanings, but the Act proceeds on the assumption that circumstances are identical with class or classes, as will appear from the words "any person detained in any of the following classe~ of cases or under any of the following circumstances" used in the section. I have already shown how important the specification of circumstances is in legislation of such an extreme and drastic character. Therefore, to confuse "classes" with circumstances" and to omit to mention "circumstances" at all are in my opinion grave errors. There can, in my opinion, be no escape from the conclusion that section 12 of the Act by which a most important protection or safeguard conferred on the subject by the Constitution has been taken away, is not a valid provmon, since it contravenes the very provmon in the Constitution under which the Parliament derived its competence to enact it. I will now briefly deal with article 22 (5) which makes it incumbent on the authority ordering preventive detention to communicate to the person detained the grounds on which the order has been made and to give him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. It must be remembered that this provision is intended to afford protection to and be a safeguard in favour of a detained person, and it cannot be read as limiting any rights which he has under the law or any other provisions of the Constitution. If article 21 guarantees that before a person is deprived of his liberty he must be allowed an opportunity of establishing his innoceQce before an impartial tribunal, that right still remains. In point of fact, there is no express exclusion of that right in the Constitution and no prohibition against · constituting an impartial tribunal. On the other hand, the right to make a representation which has

S.C.R

been granted under the Constitution, must carry with it the right to the representation being properly oonsidered by an impartial person or persons. There mtist therefore be· some machinery for properly cx:uhining the qses of the detenus and coming to the . conclusion that · they have not been detained without reason. · If this right had been expressly taken away by the Constitution, there would have been an end gf the· matter, but it has not been expressly taken away, . and I am· not prepared to read any implicit deprivation 'Of. such a valuable right. The mere reference to an advisory board in article 22 ( 4) (a) does_ not, if my interpretation of the provision is correct, exclude the oonstitUtion of ·a proper machinery for the piirpose of examining the cases of detenus on merits. The constitutio1' of an advisory board for the purpose of reporting whether a person should be detained for more than three months or not is a very different thing from constituting a board for the purpose of reporting whether a man ·should be detained for a single day. In the view I take, all that Parliament could do under clause (7) (a) of article 22 was to dispense with an advisory board for die purpose contemplated in clause ( 4) (a) of that article and not to dispense with the proper machinery, by , whichever · name it may. be called, for the purpose of examining the merits of the case of a . detained person. It was argued · that article 22 is a code by itself and the whole law of preventive detention is to be found within its four corners: I cannot however easily ,subscribe to this sweeping statement. ' The article does provide for some ~ers of procedure, but it does not exhaustively provide· for them.. It is, said that it prcr vides for notice, an opportunity to the det<;nu to represent his ca5e, an advisory board which may deal .with his .case, and for the maximum period beyond which · a ~):"son. cannot be detained. These points have un- · doubtcdly been . touched, but it cannot be said that they. have been exhaustively treated. The right to represent is given, but it is left to the legislature to provide the machinery for dealing with the representation. The advisory board has been .··mentioned, but

A. K. G1;palan The Stau

Fazl Ali].

A. K. Gopalan The Stat• Fa<l Ali].

(1950)

it is only to safeguard detention for a period longer than three months. There is ample latitude still left to the Parliament, and if the Parliament makes use of that latitude unreasonably, article 19 (5) may enable the Court to see whether it has transgressed the limits of reasonableness. I will now proceed to deal with the Act in the light of the conclusions I have arrived at. So far as section 3 of the Act is concerned, it was contended that it is most unreasonable, because it throws a citizen at the mercy of certain authorities, who may at their own will order his detention and into whose minds we cannot probe to see whether there is any foundation for the subjective satisfaction upon which their action is to rest. I am however unable to accept this argument. The administrative authorities who have to discharge their responsibilities have to come to quick decisions and must necessarily be left to act on their own judgment. This principle is by no means unreasonable - and it underlies all the preventive or quasiadministrative measures which are to be found in the Criminat Procedure Code. Under section 107 of that code, it is left to the discretion. of the magistrate concerned to determine whether in his opinion there is sufficient ·ground for proceeding against any person who is likely to occasion a breach of the peace. Under section 145 also, his initial action depends upon his personal satisfaction. Therefore I do not find anything wrong or unconstitutional in section 3 of the Act. But I must point out that it is a n:asonable provision only for the first step, i.e., for arrest and initial detention, and must be followed by some procedure for testing the so-called subjective satisfaction, which can be done only by providing a suitable machinery for examining the grounds on which the order of detention is made and considering the representations of the persons detained in relation to those grounds. I do not also find anything radically wrong in section 7 of the Act, which makes it incumbent on the authority concerned to communicate to a detenu the grounds on which the order has been made and to

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afford him the · earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. Section 10 which provides that the advisory board shall make its report within ten weeks from the date of the detention order is in conformity with article 22 (4) (a) of the Constitution, and the only comment which one can make is that Parliament was not obliged to fix sue~ a long period for the submission of a report and · could have made it shorter in ordinary cases. . The real sections which appear to me to offend the Constitution are sections 12 and 14. I have already dealt with the principle objection to section 12, while .discussing the provisions of article 22 (7) (a) and I am of the opinion that section 12 does not conform to the provisions of the Constitution .and is therefore· ultra vires. I also think that even if it be held that it technically complies with the requirements of article 22 (7) (a), Parliament has acted unreasonably in exercising its discretionary . po'wer without applying its mind to essential matters and thus depdving the detenus of the safeguard of an advisory board which the Constitution has provided in normal cases. So far as section 14 is concerned, all my colleagues have held it to be ultra vires, and, as I agree with the .views expresse.d by them, I do not wish to encumber my judgment by repeating in my own words what has been said so clearly and so well by them. Section 14 may be severable from the other provisions of the Act and it may not be possible to grant any relief to the petitioner on the ground tM.t section 14 is invalid. But I think that section 12 goes to the very root of the legislation inasmuch as it deprives a detenu of an essential safeguard, and in my opinion the petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that an essential provision of the Constitution has not been complied with. This writ will of course be without prejudice to any action which the authorities may have taken or may hereafter take against the petitioner under the penal law. I have to add this qualification because there were allegations of his being involved in some criminal cases ·but the actual facts were not clearly brought out before us.

A. K. Gopal1J11 The Stau FazlAli J.

A. K. Gopalan

Tiu Stal< Fad Ali J.

[1950]

I have only to add a few concluding' remarks to my judgment. In studying the provisions of the impugned Act, I could not help instituting a comparison in my own mind between it and similar legislation in England. during the last two world wars. I could not also help noticing that the impugned Act purports to be a peacetime Act, whereas the legislation to which I have referred was enacted during the war. During the first war as well as the second, a number of persons were detained and a number of cases were brought to Court in connection with their detention, btit the two leading-eases which will be quoted again and again are Rex v. Halliday ( 1 ) and Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson ( • ). We are aware that in America certain standards which do not conform to ordinary and normal law have been · applied by the Judges during the period of the war ~nd sometimes they are compendiously referred to as being included ,in "war power." The two English cases to ~Qich I ha".e referred also illustrate the same principle, as willappear from two short extracts which I wish to reproduce. In Rex v. Halliday (' ), Lord Atkinson observed as follows:-"However precious .the personal liberty . of the · subject may be, there is something for which it may well be, to some extent, sacrified by legal enactment, namely, national success in the war, or escape from national plunder or enslavement." In Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson ( '), Lord Macmillan struck the same note in these words:~ "The liberty whlch we so justly extol is itself the gift of the law and as Magna Charta recognizes may by the law be ·forfeited or abridged. At a time when it is the undoubted law of the land that a citizen may by conscription or requisition be compelled to give up his life and all that he possesses for his country's cause it may well be no matter for surprise that there should be confided to the Secretary of State a discretionary power of enforcing the relatively mild precaution of detention." (1) (1917] A: C. 260.

(•) [194Z] A. C. 206.

· (3) [1917] A. C. 260 at p. 271. (4) [1942] A. C. 206 at p. 257.

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These passages represent the majority view in the two cases, but the very elaborate judgments of Lord Shaw in Rex v. Halliday and that of Lord Atkin in Liversidge v. Sir fohn Anderson show that there was room for difference of opinion as well as for a more dispassionate treatment of the case and the points involved in it. It is difficult to say that there is not a good substratum of sound law in the celebrated dictum of Lord Atkin that even amidst the clash of arms the laws are not silent and that they speak the same language in war as in peace. However that may be, what I find is that in the regulations made in England during the first war as well as the second war there was an elaborate provision for an advisory board in all cases without any exception, which provided a wartime safeguard for persons deprived of their liberty. There was also a provision in the Act of 1939 that the Secretary of State should report at least once in every month as to the action taken under the regulation including the number of persons detained under orders made thereunder. I find that these reports were printed and made available to the public. I also find that the Secretary of State stated in the House of Commons on the 28th January, 1943, that the general order would be to allow British subjects detained under the Regulation to have consultations with their legal advisers out of the hearing of an officer. This order applied to consultations with barristers and solicitors but not to cases where solicitors sent to inter. view a detained person a clerk who was not an officer of the High Court. The impugned Act suffers in comparison, on account of want of such provisions, though, so far as I can see, no great harm was likely to have been caused by setting up a machinery composed of either administrative or judicial authorities for examining the cases of detained persons so as to satisfy the essentials of fairness and justice. The Act also suffers in comparison with some of the later Provincial Acts in which the safeguard of an advisory board is expressly provided for. I_ find that there is a provision in section 12 (2) of the Act for the review of the cases of detenus after six months, but this is quite different

A. IC GojJala T/rt f;au Fazl Ali_}.

•

A. I(. Gopalan TJ,. 811111

[1950]

from examining the merits of the case. The object of such a review is obviously to find out whether by reason of any change in the circumstances, a review of the original order is required. I hope that in pointing out the shortcomings of the Act I will not be misunderstood. I am aware that both in England and jn America and also in many other countR<:s, there has been a reorientation of the old notions of individual freedom which is gradually yielding to· social control in many matters. I also realize that those who run the State have very onerous responsibilities, and it is not correct to say that emergent conditions have altogether disappeared from this country. Granting th.en that private rights must often be subordinated to the public good, is it not essential in a free community to strike a just balance in the matter ? That a person should be deprived of his pe~sonal liberty without a trial is a serious matter, but the needs of society may demand it and the individual may often have to yield to those needs. Still the balance between the maintenance of individual rights and public good can be struck only if the person who is deprived 6f his liberty is allowed ~ fair chance to establish his innocence. and I do not see how the establishment of ;m appropriate machinery giving him such a chance can be an impediment to good and just government

'.-jail Sann].

PATANJALI S11STRI J.-This is an application under article 32 of the C',onstitution of India for rckasing the pettt10ncr from detention jn jail without trial under directions purporting to be issued by the Government of Madras under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and it has the distinction of being the first application invoking the p;uaranteed protection of this Court as the guardian of Fundamental Rights against alleged infringement of the petitioner's right to freedom of movement. As the case involved issues of great public importance and breaking of new ground it was argued with thoroughness and ability on both sides, reference being made to more or less analogous provisions of the Constitutions of

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other countries and in particular the Constitution of the United States of America. The pet1t1oner ha<l been under detention previous! y un<ler orders passed by the said Government under the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, but as the validity of that Act and all other similar local public safety enactments had been questioned in some of the High Courts in India after the new Constitution came into force, the Parliament enacted a comprehensive measure called the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, (hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act) extending to the whole of India with a certain exception not material he~e. The Act came into force on 25th February 1950, and, on the 27th February, the Government of Madras, in purported exercise of the powers conferred by the impugned Act and in supersession of earlier orders, directed the detention of the petitioner, and - the' Qrder was served on him on 1st March. The petitioner contends that the impugned Act and in particular sections 3, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 thereof take away or abridge the fundamental right to freedom of movement in contravention of article 13 (2) of the Constitution and is, therefore, void as declared therein. Article 13 is one of a fasciculus of articles which are comprised in part III of the Indian Constitution headed "Fundamental Rights." This Part forms a new feature of the Constitution and is the Indian "Bill of Rights." It is modelled on the first ten Amendments of the American Constitution which declare the fundamental rights of the American citizen~ Article 12, which is the first article in this Part, defines "the State" as including the Governments and Legislatures of the Union and the States as well as all local and other authorities against which the fundamental rights are enforceable, and article 13 ( 1) declares that all existing laws inconsistent with the provisions of Part III shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void. Clause (2) of the article, on which the petitioner's contention is primarily founded reads as follows :

A. K. Gopalan The State Palanja/i Sastri }.

[1950]

"The State_ shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to Th•S<au the extent of the contravention, be void." PatlJl!iali Sastri ]. As the constitutional inhibition against deprivation or abridgement relates only to "the rights conferred by this Part," it is necessary first to ascertain the nature and extent of the right which, according to the petitioner, Part III has conferred on him, and, second Iy, to determine whether the right so ascertained has been taken away or abridged by the impugned Act or by any of its provisions. The first question turns on the proper interpretation of the relevant articles of the Constitution, ;md the second involves the consideration of the provisions of the impugned Act. Mr. Nambiar appearing for the petitioner advanced three main lines of argument. In the first place, the right to move freely throughout the territory of India referred to in article 19 ( 1) ( d) is of the very essence of personal liberty, and inasmuch as the detention authorised by the impugned Act was not a "reasonable restriction" which Parliament could validly impose on such right under \Clause (5) of the article, the impugned Act is void. Alternatively, the petitioner had a fundamental right under article 21 not to be deprived of his personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, and the impugned Act by authorising detention otherwise than in accordance with proper procedure took away that right and was therefore void. And. lastly, the provisions . of the impugned Act alreadv referred to were ultra vires and inoperative as Parliament in enacting them has overstepped the limitations placed on its legislative power by article 22 clauses ( 4) to (7). Accordingly, the first question for consideration is whether article 19 (1) (d) and (5) is applicable to the present case : "Liberty," says John Stuart Mill, "consists in doing what tine desires. But the liberty of the individual must be thus far limited-he must · not make himself a nuisance to others." Man, as a rational being, desires to do many things, but in a civil society his desires have to be controlled, regulated A., K. G.pa!an

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and reconciled with the exercise of similar desires by other individuals. Liberty has, therefore, to be limited in order to be effectively possessed. Accordingly, article 19, while guaranteeing some of the most valued phases or elements of liberty to every citizen as civil rights, provides for their regulation for the common good by the State imposing certain "restrictions" on their exercise. The power of locomotion is no doubt an essential element of personal liberty which means freedom from bodily restraint, and detention in jail is a drastic invasion of that liberty. But the question is : Does article 19, in its setting in Part III of the Constitution, deal with the deprivation of personal liberty in the sense of incarceration ? Sub-clause ( d) of clause ( 1) does not refer to freedom of movement simpliciter but guarantees the right to move freely "throughout the territory of India." Sub-clause (e) similarly guarantees the right to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India. And clause (5) authorises the imposition of "reasonable restrictions" on these rights in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. Reading these provisions together, it is reasonably clear that they were designed primarily to emphasise the factual unity of the territory of India and to secure the right of a free citizen to move from one place in India to another and to reside and settle in any part of India unhampered by any barriers which narrow-minded provincialism may seek to interpose. The use of the word "restrictions" in the . various sub-clauses seems to imply, in the context, that the rights guaranteed by the article are still capable of being exercised, and to exclude the idea of incarceration though the words "restriction!' and "deprivation" are sometimes used as interchangeable terms, as restriction may reach a point where it may well amount to deprivation. Read as a whole and viewed in its setting among the group of provisions (articles 19-22) relating to "Right to Freedom," article 19 seems to my mind t.o pre-suppose that the citizen to whom the possession of these fundamental rights is secured retains the substratum

A. K. Gopalan v: The State Patanjali Sastri ].

A. Jr. Goj>alan

"·

T/,.S•ate PattnfialiSa>lri j.

I

[1950]

of personal freedom on which alone the enjoyment of these rights necessarily rests. lt was said that subclause (f) would militate against this view, as the enjoyment of the right "to acquire, hold and dispose of propsrty" does not depend upon the owner retaining his personal freedom. This assumption is obviously wrong as regards moveable properties , and even as regards immoveables he could not acquire· or dispose of them from behind the prison bars ; nor could he "hold" them in the sense of exercising rights of possession and control over them which is what the word seems to 'mean in the context. But where, as a penalty for committing a crime or otherwise, the citizen is lawfully deprived of his freedom, there could no longer be any q uc:stion of his exercising or enforcing the rights referr:d to in clause (1). Deprivation of personal liberty in such a situation is not, in my opinion, within the purview of article 19 at all but is dealt with by the succeeding articles 20 and 21. In other words, article 19 guarantees to the citizens the enjoyment of certain civil liberties while they are free, while articles 20-22 secure to all persons-citizens and non-citizens-certain constitutional guarantees in regard to punishment and prevention of crime. Different criteria are provided by which to measure legislative judgments in the two fields, and a construction which would bring within article 19 imprisonment· in punishment of a crime committed ·or in prevention of a crime threatened would, as it seems to me, make a reductio ad absurdum of that rrovision. If imprisonment were to be regarded as a "restriction" of the right mentioned in article 19 (1) (d), it would equally be a restriction on the rights mentioned by the other subclauses. of clause ( l), with the result that ·all penal laws providing for imprisonment as a mode of punishment would have to run the gauntlet of clauses (2) to ( 6) before their validity could be accepted. For instance, the law which imprisons for theft would, on that view, fall to be justified under clause (2) as a law sanctioning restriction of freedom of speech and expression. Indeed, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in a recent unreported decision brought to our notice,

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applied the test of undermining the security of the State or tending to overthrow it in determining the validity or other wise of the impugned Act. The learned Judges construed article 19 as covering cases of deprivation of pers_onal · liberty and lJ.eld, logically enough, that inasmuch as the impugned Act, by authorising preventive detention, infringed the right to freedom of speech and expression, its validity should be judged by the reservations in clause (2), and as it failed to stand that test, it was unconstitutional· and void. Mr. Nambiar did not seek to g0 so far. He drew a distinction between the right conferred by sub-clause (d) and those conferred by the other - sub-clauses. He urged, referring to Blackstone's Commentaries, that personal liberty consisted "in moving one's person to whatever place one's inclination might direct," and - that any law which deprived a person of such power of locomotion was a direct invasion of the right mentioned in sub-clause (d), whereas it interfered only indirectly and consequentially with the rights mentioned in the other sub-clauses. There is no substance in the distinction suggested. It would be illogical, in construing article 19, to attribute. to one of the sub-clauses a scop~ and effect totally different from the scope and effect of the others or to draw a distinction between one right and another in the group. All the rights mentioned in clause (1) are equally essential elements in the liberty of the individual in any civilised and democratic community, and imprisonment operates as an extinction of all of them alike. It cannot therefore, be said that deprivation of personal liberty is an infringement of the right conferred by sub-clause (d) alone but not of the others. The learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court realised this and were perfectly logical in holding that the constitutional validity of a law providing for deprivation of personal liberty or imprisonment must be judged by the tests laid down not only in clause (5) of-article 19 but also in the other clauses including clause (2), though their major premise that deprivation of personal liberty was a "restriction" within the meaning of •article 19 is, in my judgment, erroneous.

A. K. Gopalan The State Patanjali Sastri ].

A. K.Gopalan V,

Tlw Stau

Patatifali Sastri ].

[1950]

It was said that preventive detention being a drastic restriction of the right to move fredy was, in its "pith and substance'', within article 19 (1) (cl) read with clause. (5) and not within article 21 which deals with crime anp its punishment and prevention. There is no room here, in my opinion, for the application of the rule of "pith and substance." As pointed out by the Privy Council in Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. The Bank of Commerce Ltd., Khulna ( 1 ), approving the observations of the Federal Court in Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muttuswamy Goundan { 1 ), the rule was evolved by the Board for determining whether an impugned statute was, in its true character, legislation with respect to matters within the jurisdiction of one legislature or another in a scheme of divided legislative power. No such question arises here. What the Court has to ascertain is the true scope and meaning of article 19 in the context of Part Ill of the Constitution, in order to decide whether deprivation of° personal liberty falls within that article, and the pith and substance rule will be more misleading than helpful in the decision of that issue. Article 19, as I have already indicated, guarantees protection for the more important civil · liberties of citizens who are in the enjoyment of their. freedom, while at the same time laying down the restrictions which the legislature may properly impose on the exercise of such rights, and it has nothipg to do with deprivation of personal liberty or imprisonment which is dealt with by the succeeding three articles. There is also another consideration which points to the same conclusion. The Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly, to whose Report reference was freely made by both sides during the argument, recommended "that the word liberty should be qualified by the insertion of the word 'personal' before it, for otherwise it might be construed very widely so as to include even the freedoms already dealt with in artirl~ 13" (now article 19). The acceptance of this suggestion shows · that whatever may be the generally accepted 11)

74 I.A. •3·

(•)

[J940J F.C.R. 188.

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connotation of the expression "personal liberty'', it A. K. Copa/an was used in article 21 in a sense which excludes the freedoms dealt with in article 19, that is to say, The Stale personal liberty in the context of Part III of the Constitution is something distinct from the freedom to Patanjali Sastri J. move freely throughout the territory of India. It was further submitted that article 19 declared . the substantive rights of personal liberty while article 21 provided the procedural safeguard against their deprivation. This view of the correlation between the two articles has found favour with some of the Judges in the High Courts which have had occasion to consider the constitutional validity of the impugned Act. It is, however, to be observed that article 19 confers the rights therein specified only on the citizens of India, while article 21 extends the protection of life and personal liberty to all persons-citizens and noncitizens alike. Thus, the two articles do not operate in a conterminous field, and this is one reason for rejecting the correlation suggested. Again, if article 21 is to be understood as prnviding only procedural safeguards, · where is the substantive right to personal liberty of non-citizens to be found in the Constitution ? Are they denied such right altogether ? If they are to have no right of personal liberty, why is the procedural safeguard in article 21 exended to them ? And where is that most fundamental right of all, the right to life, provided for in the Constitution ? The truth is that article 21, like its American prototype in the Fifth and Fourceenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, presents an example of the fusion of procedural and substantive rights in the same provision. The right to live, though the most fundamental of all, is al so one of the most difficult to define and its protection generally takes the form of a declaration that no per~:on shall be deprived of it save by due process of law or by authority of law. "Process" or "procedure" in this context connotes both the act and the manner of proceeding to take away a man's life or personal liberty. And the first and essential step in a procedure established by law for such deprivation must be a law made by a competent legislature

8-3 S .C. India/SP

1%

A. K. Gopalan The State

Patmefali Sastri J.

[1950]

authorising such deprivation. This brings me to the consideration of articles 21 and 22 to which was devoted the greater part of the debate at the Bar. These articles run as follows : "21. No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. 22. (1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be of the grounds for such arrest. nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice. '(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for· the journey from the place of arrest to the Court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate. (3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply( a) to any person who for the time bemg is an enemy alien ; or (b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention. ( 4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless( a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention : Provided that nothing ~n this sub-Clause shall authorise the detention of any - person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7) ; or (b) such person . is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under subclauses (a) and (b) of clause (7).

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(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made -under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. ( 6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order as is referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authoritv considers to be against the public interest to disclose. . (7) Parliament may by law prescribe( a) the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an. Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause ( 4) : (b) t.he maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be detained under any law providing for 'preventive detention ; and (c) the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry under sub-clause (a) of clause (4)." Mr. Nambiar urged that the word "law" in article 21 should be understood, not in the sense of an enactment but as signifying the immutable and universal principles · of natural justice-the jus naturale of the civil law-artd that the expression "procedure established by law" meant the same thing as that famous phrase "due prncess of law" in the American Constitution in its procedural aspect. Numerous American decisions were cited to show that the phrase implied the basic requirements of (1) an objective and a!certainable standard of conduct to which it is possible to conform, (2) notice to the party of the accusation against him, (3) a reasonable opportunitv for him to establish his innocence, and ( 4) an impartial tribunal capable of giving an unbiased judgment. Mr. Nambiar conceded that these reauirements might have to be modified or adapted to suit the nature of the particular proceeding and the object it had in

A. K Gopalti.n TM State Patanjali Sastri J.

d. K. Gopalan

TJt, Stat• Patatliali S4"'i ].

[1950]

view, as for instance, in a case of preventive detention, previous notice, which might result in the person concerned going underground might be dispensed with. Learned counsel insisted that these requirements, being the very core of the principles of natural justice which transcended all State-made laws, must be substantially complied with by any law governing the process of deprivation of life or personal liberty, subject, of course, to any express provision in the Constitution sanctioning their relaxation or dispensation in any case or class of cases. He also appealed to the Preamble of the Constitution as the guiding star in its interpretation to support his thesis that, in view of the democratic Constitution which the people of India have purported to give themselves guaranteeing to the citizens certain fundamental rights which are justiciable, the provisions of Part III must be construed as being paramount to the legislative will, as otherwise the socalled fundamental right to life and personal liberty would have no protection against legislative action, and article 13(2) would be rendered nugatory. There can be no doubt that the people of India have, in exercise of their sovereign will as expressed in the Preamble, adopted the democratic ideal which assures to the citizen the dignity of the individual and other cherished human values as a means to the full evolution and expression of his personality, and in delegating to the legislature, the executive and the judiciary their respective powers in -the Constitution, reserved to themselves certain fundamental rights, s<>called, I apprehend, because thev have been retained by the people and made paramount to the delegated powers, as in the American model. Madison (who played a prominent part in framing the First Amendment of the American Constitution) pointing out the distinction, due to historical reasons, between the American and the British ways of securing "the great and ~sscn­ tial rights of the people," observed "Here they arc secured not by laws paramount to prerogative but by Constitutions paramount · to laws" : Report on the Virginia Resolutions, quoted in Near v. Minnesota ( 1 ). (') 283 U.S. 697.

S.C.R.

This has been translated into positive law in Part III of the Indian Constitution, and I agree that in construing these provisions the high purpose and spirit of the Preamble as well as the constitutional significance of a Declaration of Fundamental Rights should be borne in mind. This, however, is not to say that the language of the provisions should be stretched to square with this or that constitutional theory in disregard of the cardinal rule of interpretation of any enactment, constitutional or other, that its spirit, no less than its intendment should be collected primarily from the natural meaning of the words used. Giving full effect to these principles, however, I am unable to agree that the term "law" in article 21 means the immutable and universal principles of natural justice. "Procedure established by law" must ·be taken to refer to a procedure which has a statutory origin, for no procedure is known or can be said to have been established by such vague and uncertain concepts as "the immutable and universal principles of natural justice." In my opinion, "law" in article 21 means "positive or State-made law." No doubt, the American Judges have adopted the other connotation in their interpretation of the due process clause in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the American Con.stitution ("Nor shall any person be deprived of life. liberty or property without due process of law"). But that clause has an evolutionary history behind it. The phrase has been traced back to 28 Edw. III Ch. 3, and Coke in his Institutes identified the term with the expression "the law of the land" in the great Charter of John. Even in England where the legislative omnipotence of Parliament is now firmly established. Coke understood these terms as implying an .inherent limitation on all legislation, and ruled in Dr. Bonham's Case (1) that "the common law will control Acts of Parliament and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void when they are against common right and reason." Though this doctrine was later discarded in England as being "a warning ( 1)

8 Rep. 118 (a).

A. K. Goj>lllt111 The Stat•

Pala,Yali Sastri J.

A. K. Gopalan The Staie Patanja{i Sastri ].

[1950]

rather than an authority to be followed" [per Willes }. in Lee v. Dude and Torrington Ry. (1 ) ] it gained ground in America, at first as a weapon in the hands of the Revolutionists with which to resist the laws of Parliament, and later as instrument in the hands of the Judges for establishing the supremacy of the judiciary [see Calder v. Bull ( ') ]. In the latter half of the 19th century, this doctrine of a transcendental common law or natural justice was

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