Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. S. S. Shukla ETC. ETC.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 28 April 1976
- Judge
- Justice A.N. Ray
- Neutral citation
- 1976 INSC 129
- Reported in
- [1976] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 172
- Result
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Acts & sections
- Article 21 Constitution, Article 226 Constitution, Article 359 Constitution, Article 22 Constitution, Article 352 Constitution, Article 14 Constitution
- Subject
- Service
Full judgment
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, JABALPUR
v. S. S. SHUKLA ETC. ETC. April 28, 1976
[A. N. RAY, C.1., H. R. KHANNA, M. H. BEG, P. N. BHAGWATI AND Y. v. CliANDRACHUD, JJ.]
Locus· standi to move habeas corpus petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of lndia-Ef]ect of the l'residtntial Order dat<ti June 21 1915Constitution of India, Articles 19, 21, 25, 226 and 359(1A) read wiih Maintenance "f lnternal Security Act (Act 26 of 1971), 1971, «ctlon 3-Remedy
>' \
.by way of writ petition to challenge the legality of an order of detention undtr r/Je Maintenance of lnttrnal Secun·ty Act is not open to a detenu during the en1ergency.
Maintenance of Internal Security Act (Act 26 of 1971), 1971-Section 16A(9) is a rule of e1ddence and constitutionally valid-Not open to challenf!e
on the ground of a1iv viola'ion of Part Ill of the Constitution In view of tlJe provisions of Article 359(1A).
l>
Maintenance of lnternal Security Act (Act 26 of 1971), 1971-Section 18 applies to all orders of detention, a valid piece of legislation and does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation-Not open to challenge on the ground of the theory of basic structure. Constitution of India-Article 21 is the sole repos1°tory of rights ro life and-.
liberty.
l •
Constitution of India, Articles 358 and 3S9-Dlstlnctlon between. Constitution of India, Articles 20 and 21-Dlf]erence between. Disclosure to court-Whether section 16A(9) of the Maintenanct of lntenJal
Security Act (Act 26 of 1911), 1971 Is an exception and constitutes an e11croachment on the con.rtltutlonal jurisdiction of the High Court.
Eclipse, theory of-Applicability to the enforcement of Fundamental Rights under Art. 359( I). Good return, theory of-Not applicable io the practlct! of lndlan courts.
Obiter dictum-When a decision becomts an obittir dictum. Constitution of lndia, Article 256-Non·co1npllar1ce with Article 23'6 by the "T"• State-GrleYanct at the Instance of a prlva1e party not tnttrtalnabft by courts.
Rule v/ Law-Constiuuion Itself is the rule of la1l--' and tht mandate. /udiclal review-Scope of, during t/le period of tmergc11cy.
Constitution of India, Article 12-Whether "State" Includes Judiciary.
Constitution of India-Article 372-Laws In force wh.iher Includes law• Included In Part l/l of the Con!!tltr1tlon-Scope of Article 372. .Maintenance of Internal Security Act (Act 26 of 1971), 1971-Stetlon 16 leaves open a remedy by way of a su/1 for damage> for wrongful conflnemeTllScope of Section. I~.
AODL. DIST. MAGISTMT!l v. S. S. SHUKLA
Basic structure tlwory-Constitution of India. Article 368--Emergency provi· sions themselves are to be regarded as the basic structure of the Constitution.
>·
Objects of the Maintenance of Internal Sec11rity Act (Act 26 of 1971), 1971 and the Amending Acts 31 of 1975 and 14 of 1976 thereto. Presidential Order under Art, 359( I) and Martial Law under Articles 23 and 73 of the Constitution-Distinction-Constitution of India Art. 359(1), 359(1A), 53 and 73 read with Art. 355-Scope of.
1 '
~ ~
Constitution of India, Article 226-Extent of the powers of inquiry by the
High Courts in a pet/lion for writ of habeas corpus when once a prinia facie valid detention order is shown to exist.
Rule of law, Concept of is inapplicable to enrergeney provis/.ons since the emergency provisions themselves contain the rule of law for such situations. Separation of powers-Principles of-Preventive detention being placed exc[u. sively within the control of the Executive authorities of the State for the duration of the emergency, does not violate any principle of separation of powers.
C
Basic structure theory is nothing niore t11an a mode of construction of docu· 1nents of the Constitution. ·
-
lurisdiction of courts under Articles 136 and 226-Nature of. Constitution of India, Articles 34 and 359, effect of-Whether powers of the courts to issue lvrit of habeas corpus during the period of Martial Law are taken away.
Rule of construction-Decisio11s of the Supreme Court and the other high
J
ituilcial authorities-Constitution of lluiia, Article 141 explained. #"" Rights under s. 8 of the }.falntenance of Internal Security Act (Act 26 of • 1971 ), 1911-Nature of, vis--a-vis rights under Constitution of India, Article 22(5)-Rights under Article 22(5) do not bar the enforcement of right 11nder
~s.
_,_
Refl.ection, theory of is not applicable to s. 8 of tile Maintenance of Internal Security Act (Act 26 of 1971), 1971. Practice-Place of dissent in the court of last resort-Desirability of unanimity among J11dges-Constltution of India, Article 141. Fundamemal Rights-Object of guaranteed Fur1dammtal Rig/it.
Natuwil justice, Rules of l9w, being on the sa1ne footing as Fundcunental
Rights do not overide the express tenns of a statute.
Ma.1ims: 1~
(i) 11 Expressuni facit cessare tacit1u11 11-Applicability to Art. 21 of the
Constitution.
(ii) "Ut res magls va/eat quan1 pereat".
(iii) "Salus populi est supren1e le".
Words and phrases : (a) ..Purported to be made under s. 3" in s. 18 of the Mai11tc11ance of Internal Security Act (Act 26 of 1971), 1971.
---
(b) "For any other purpose" in Art. 226 of tlze Constitution-n1eaning of. (c) "Conferred by Part 111'' of tlic Co11Stit11tio11 in Art. 359(1)-Tntem.
I 74
(1976] SUPPLEMENTARY
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (i) of Art. 352 of the Constitution, ihe Pn:sident of India, by proclamation dated December 23, 1971 declared that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of lndia is threatened by external aggression and the Maintenance of Internal Security Act . ~ (Act 26 of 1971), 1971 was published on July 2. 1971, for eftcctivl!ly dealing with the emergency. On November 16, 1974, the President of India, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Art. 359 of the Constitution declared: (a) that the right to move any court with respect to orders of detention which have already been made or \.Vhich may hereafter be made under s. 3(1)(c) of the Mainten~ . ,_ t ance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (as amended by Ordinance 11 ·of 1974) lor the enforcement of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 21 and clauses (4), (5), (6) and (7) of Article 22 of the Constitution; and (b) All proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of any of the atoresaid rights Vi'ith ,. respect to all orders of detention made under the said section 3 ( 1) (c) shall · > remain suspended for a period of six months from the date of issue of the order or the period during which the proclamation of emergency issued under clause (1) of Art. 352 of the Constitution of India on December 3, 1971, is in .force, \Vhichever period expires earlier. The order stood extended to the whole of the territory of India. On June 20, 1975, the President of India, amended the above order by substituting 12 months for "6 months" in the order.
On June 25, 1975, the President, in exercise of his powers conferred by clause (2) of Article 352 of the Constitution declared that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India is threatened by internal disturbances. On June 27, 1975, in exercise of powers conferred by clause (1) of Art. 359, the President declared that the right of any person (including a foreigner) to 1nove any court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Articles 14. 21 and 22 of the Constitution and all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the above mentioned rights shall remain suspended for the period during which the proclamation of emergency made under clause (1) of Art. 352' of the Constitution on December 3, 1971, and on June 25, 1975, are both in • force. The Presidential order of June 27, 1975, further stated that the same shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any order made before the date of the aforesaid order under clause ( 1) of Art. 359 of the Constitution. On June 29, 1975, by another order, the President made the Ordinance of June 27, 1975, applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir as well. On September 25, 1975, the last paragraph in the Presidential Order dated June 27, 1975, was omitted. The President promulgated the amending Ordinances No. 4 and 7 of 1975, now replaced by the Maintenance of Internal Security (Amending Act) (No. 39 of 1975) Act introducing a new section 16i\, and giving a deemed effect to s. 7 of the Act as on from June 25, 1975, \\hile the rest having a deemed effect from June 29, 1975. By the same Act a new section 18 was also inserted with effect from June 25, 1975. By the Constitution (Thirty-eighth Amendment) Act, 1975, Articles 123, Zll, 239(b), 352, 356, 359 and 368 were amended, Clauses (4) and (5) were added in Art. 352 of the Constitution. Broadly stated, the Thirty-eighth Constitution (Amendment) Act renders the satisfaction of the President or the ~· Governor in the relevant Articles final and conclusive and to be beyond any question in any court on any ground.
The power conferred on the President by Art. 352 shall include the power to issue different proclamations on different grounds, being war or external aggression or internal disturbances or imminent danger of war or external aggression or inter~al disturbance w~et~er or ~ot th~re is a proclamation al ready issued by the President. By Constitution Thirty-eighth Amendment ~A.ct 197 5, a new clause (1A1 was also added after clause (1) of Article 359.
The Constitution Thirty-ninth Amendment Act was published on August 10, 1975 amending Articles 71, 329 and 329(A) and added Entries after Entry 86 in th'e 9th Schedule and the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (Act 26 of 1971), 1971 as item 92 in the said Schedule.
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AbbL. iJISt. MAGISTRATE V. S. S. SHUKLA
1 75
On October 17, 1975, an Ordinance 16 of 1975 was issued making further amendments in s. 16A of the 1'1aintenance of Internal Security Act introducing ~ub-clauses (8) and (9) to s. 16A. On November 16, 1975, Ordinan.;e 22 of 1975 ~Was issued making certain amendments in the Maintenance of Internal Security Act inserting also sub-section 2A in s. 16A. AH the an1endments made by the Ordinance were given retrospective effect for the purpose of validating all acts done previously. The said Ordinances were published as the Maintenance of Internal Security (Amendment) Act 1976 (Act 14 of 1976) on January 25, 1976. I '
The respondents rletained under s. 3 {ia) (ii) read with s. 3 (2) of the A1aintenance of Internal Security Act (Act 26 of 1971) as amended by the 1'1aintenance of Internal Security Act (Amendment Act 39 of 1975), 1975 challenged_ in several High Courts, the vires of the Ordinance issued on June 27, 1975, by the President of India as unconstitutional and inoperative in law and prayed for (a) the setting aside of the said order and (b) for directing their release forthwith. In some cases, they challenged the validity of the Thirty-eighth and fhirty-ninth Constitution Amendment Acts. When these petitions came up for hearing, the appellants raised the preliminary objection to the maintainability on the ground that in asking for relea~t: by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, the respondents were, in :n!b'iranc;.:, claiming that they have been deprived of their personal liberty in violation of the procedure established by law, which plea was available to them under Art. 21 of the Constitution only and in view of the Presidential Order dated June 27, 1975, suspending the right to move for enforcement of the right conferred by that Article, the petitions were liable to be dismissed at the threshold.
l
While the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Kenda and 11adras have upheld Lhe preliminary objection, this contention did not find favour with the High Courts of Allahabad, Bombay (Nagpur Bench), Delhi. Karnataka, l\.1adhya Pradesh, Punjab and Haryana respectively. These High Courts broadly took the view that (a) despite the Presidential Order. it is open to the detenus to challenge their detention on the ground that it is ultra vines, as for example, by showing that the order, on the face of it, is passed by an authority uot • empowered to pass it or it is not in exercise of the power delegated to the authority or that the power has been exercised in breach of thei conditions prescribed in that behalf by the Act under which the order is passed, or that the order is not in strict conformity with the provisions of the Act. Some of these High Courts have further held that the detenus can attack the order of tletention on the ground that it is 1nala fide, as for example, by showing that the detaining authority did not apply its mind to the relevant considerations, or that the authority was influenced by irrelevant considerations or that the authority was actuated by improper motives. The Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court read down s. 16A(9) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, implying an exception in favour of disclosure to the Court. The High Court did not decide about the validity of the Thirty-eighth and 'fhirty-ninth Constitution Amendment Acts .
-,.
.... _ Accepting the States' appeals, some by certificates granted by the 1--figh Courts and some by special leave, the Court by majority (Khanna, J. dissenting), ,.
-"'/.
HELD: (Per majority A. N. Ray, C.l., M. H. Beg. Y. V. Chandrachud and P. N. Bhagwati, JJ.) · (1) In view of the Presidential Order dated June 27, 1975, under clause (1) of Art. 359. no person has any locus standi to move any writ petition under Art. 226 before a High Court for habeas corpus or any other writ or order or direction to challenge the legality of an order of detention on the ground that the order is not under or in compliance with the Act or is illegal or is vitiated by mala fides, factual or legal or is based on extraneous considerations. [477 E-F] (2) Section 16A(9) of the ~1ainte_nancc of Jnternal Security A.ct, 1971 is constitutionally valid. [477 F] (3) Section 18 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 is not invalid. [240 A-D, 342 F-G, 414 DJ
l 76
SUPREME C:OURT REPORTS
[1976] SUPPLEMENTARY
( 4) Article 21 of the Constitution is the sole repository of rights to life and personal liberty against State. [246 BJ
Per A. "fo,,r. Ray, CJ.
·;
In view of the Presidential Order dated June 27, 1975, under clause (1) of Art. 359, no person has locus standi to move writ petitions under Art 226 of the Constitution before a High Court for habeas corpus or any other writ or order or direction to enforce any right to personal liberty of a person detained
under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 on the grounds that the order of detention or the continued detention is for any reason not in compliance with the Act or is illegal or male fodc. [245 H, 246 A]
Article 21 is the sole repository of rights to life and personal liberty against Any claim to a \\Tit of habeas corpus is enforcement of Ali. 21 and is, therefore, barred by the Presidential Order. [246 B]
a State.
>•
Giri11dra f\'ath Banerice v. Birendra Nath Lal, ILR 54 Cal. 727; Kittg Emperor v. Shib Nath Ba11erjee 1972 Indian Appeals 241 and Mak/ran Singh v. State of Pu11jab [1964] (4) SCR 797, referred to.
-
Scope of judicial rcvieH' in c111crge11cy.
In ·times of emergency the executive safeguards the life of the nation aild. therefore, its actions either on the ground that these are arbitrary or unlawful cannot be challenged in view of •.he fa<:t that comiderations of security forbid pooof of the evidence upon \Vhich the detention \l.'3S ordered. [219 B-E]
Livcrsidge v. Sir John Anderson [1942] ,'\C 206; Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1942] AC 284; Mohan Chaudhary v. Chief Commissioner, Union 1 crritory of Tripura [1964] 3 SCR 442 and Makhan Singh v. State of Pu11jab [1964] 4 SCR 797, followed. Queen '" Halliday Ex l'arte Zadiq [1917] AC 210, referred. to.
Liberty is confined and controlled by la\v, whether comn1on law or statute. The safeguard of liberty is in the good sense of the people and in the system of representative and responsible Governinent \t,.·hich has been evolved. If extraordinary powers are given, they are given because the emergency is extraordinary and are limiled to the period of emergency. Liberty is itself the gift of the law and may by the law forfeited or abridged. [222 D, G] Zamora's case [1916] 2 AC 107 and Livasidge v. Sir John Anderson [1942] AC 206, referred to. . The vital distinction bcl\\·cen Arts. 358 and 359 is that Art. 358 suspends the rights only in Article 19 to the extent that the Legislature can make laws contravening Art. 19 during the operation of a Proclamation of emergency and
the Exeeutive can take action \\•hich the E-xecutive is competent to take tmder such laws. Article 358 does not suspend any Fundamental Right. Whilo a proclamation of emergency is in operation, the Presidential Order under Art. 359( 1) can suspend the enforcement of any or all Fundamental Right~. Article 359( l) also suspends 3.ny pending proceedings for t11e enforcement of such Fundan1ent..'l.l Right or Rights. Another important distinction between the two Articles is that Art. 358 provi_des· for indemnity; whereas Article 359(1) does not; Article 359(!A) is on the same lines as Art. 358, but Article 359(1Al includes all Fundamental Rights which may be mentioned in a Presidential Order and is. therefore, much wider than Art. 358 \vhich includes Art. 19 only. [223 E·Gl
The purpose and object of Art. 359(1) is that the enforcement of any Fundamental Right mentioned in the Prcsi<lcntiat Order is barred or it remains suspended during the emergency. 111e scope of Art. 359(1) is not only to restrict the application of the Article to 1hc legislative field, but also to, the act'i o( thC Executive. 1'h~ object of Article 359(1) is not only that the right
>-
-
. \<-
ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE V. S. S. SHUKLA
to move this Court only is barred but also the right to move any High Court. The bar created by Art. 359( I) applies to petitions for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights mentioned in the Presidential Order whether by way of an application under Art. 32 or by way of application under Art. 226. An application invoking habeas corpus under s. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot simultaneously be moved in the High Court. {223 H, 224 D, 229 Fl Shri Mohan Chaudhary v. Chief Co1nn1issioner, Union Territory of Tripura [1964] 3 SCR 442; Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 797 and Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar & Ors. [1966] 1 SCR 709, applied.
The argument that jurisdiction and powers of this Court under Art. 32 and •DI the High Courts under Art. 226 are virtually abolished by the Presidential Order without any amendment of the Constitution is incorrect. No amendn1ent to the Constitution is necessary because no jurisdiction and power either of this Court or of the .High Court is taken away. When a Presidential Order takes away the locus standi of the detenu to move any court for the enforcen1ent of Fundamental Rights for the time being, the jurisdiction and powers of tills Court and of the High Courts remain unaltered. [224 E-F]
-
C
Article 359(1) is not directed against any court, it is directed against an individual and deprives him of his locus standi. If courts will in spite of the Presidential Order entertain the applications and allow the detenu to enforce, to start or to continue proceedings or enforce Fundamental Rights, Article 359(1) will be nullified and rendered otiose. [224 F, 227 C-D]
Unlike the 1962 Presidential Order, in the 1975 Order, the suspension is not with any condition of enforcement of any right under Articles 21 and 22. The Presidential Order is, therefore, a bar at the threshold. [228 D-E] hed~ed
•.
,.
Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 797 and State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Pandurang SanRzgiri & Anr. [1966] 1 SCR 702, distinguished.
There are no natural rightSi. Fundamental Rights in our Constitution are interpreted to be what is commonly said to be natural rights. [229 C-DJ H. H. Kesvananda Bharti Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kera/a [1973] Supp. 1 SCR 702, followed.
Law means law enacted by the State. Law means positive State made law. The phrase "Pr~edure established by law" in Art. 21 includes substantive and procedural law. A law providing for the procedure depriving a person ef liberty must be a law made by statute. [229 D-E] A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras [1950] SCR 88; P. D. Shamdasani & Ors.
v. Central Bank of lndia Ltd. [1952] SCR 391; Smt. Vidya Verma through next
friend R. V. S. Mani v. Dr. Shiv Narain Verma [1955] 2 SCR 983, applied.
_,,
·There is no difference between the expression "except according to procedure esta'hlished by law" in Art. 21 and the expression "save by the authority of law" in Art. 31 ( 1) or the expression "except by authority of law" in Art. 265. It is incorrect to suggest that when Art. 21 was enacted, the founding fathers only enshrined the right to personal liberty according to procedure and did not frame the con5titutional mandate tha• personal liberty could not be taken except according to law. [232 B-D] Part III of our Constitution confers Fundamental Rights in positive as well as negative language. A Fundamental Right couched in negative language accentuates by reason thereof the importance of that right. The negative language is worded to emphasize the immunity from State action as a Funda~ mental Right. Fundamental Rights have the texture of Basic Human Rights. [229 G, 230 A-Bl State of Biliar v. Malwraja Dhiraia Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darhhanqa & Ors. (1952] SCR 889 at 988, 989; A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras [1950] SCR 88; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India [1970] 3 SCR 578, 571 and 576 to 578: Shambliu Nath Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal & Ors. [19741 14-833SupCl/76
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] SUPPLEMENTARY
1 SCR; Haradahan Saha & Anr. v. State of West Bengal [1975] l 3CR 778 and Khudiram Das -v. State of West Bengal & Ors. [1975] 2 SCR 832, referred to.
Article 21 is our Rule of Law regarding life and liberty. No other Rule of Law can have separate existence as a distinct right. The negative language of Fundamental Right incorporated in Part III imposes limitations on the l'OWer of the State and declares the corresponding guarantees of the individual to that Fundamental Right. Limitation and guarantee are complementary. The limitation of State action embodied in a Fundamental Right couched in a negative forrn is the measure of the protection of the individual. [230 C-D]
.'
Rusto1n Cavasji Cooper v. Uniofl of India [1970] 3 SCR 568, applied.
Personal liberty in Article 21 includes all varieties of rights which go to make persqnal liberty other than those in Art. 19(1) (d). [230-D]
.Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. [1964] l SCR 332 and Rustom Ca\'asiee Cooper v. Union of India [1970] 3 SCR 530, referred to. If any right existed before the commencement of the Constitution and the sa1ne right with its content is conferred by Part Ill as a Fundamental Right the source of that right is in Part III and not in any pre·existing right. Such pre·constitutional rights have been elevated in Part Ill as Fundamental Rights. If there is a pre·constitution right which is expressly embodied as a Fundamental Right under our Constitution, the common law right has no separate existence under our Constitution. If there be any right other than and more extensive than the Fundamental Right in Part Ill, such right may continue to exist under Art. 372. f230 F-Hl
Dhirubha Devi Singh Gohil v. State of Bombay [1955] l SCR 691-693, to.
ref1~rred
~
B. Shankara Rao Badami and Ors. v. State of Mysore and Anr. [1969] 3 SCR l @ ll-13, applied.
..
Apart from the remedy under the common law of torts, by way of suit for false imprisonment and claim for damages, there was no civil remedy for unlawful infringement of the right to personal liberty in India before the Con· stitution. Even this remedy, after the amendment of s. 491 of the Cede of Criminal Procedure became a statutory right in the nature of a habeas corpus. The provisions of s. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code have been repealed by Act IT of 1974 as being superfluous in view of Art. 226. [231 C-D]
Waghela .Rajsanji v. Sheik Masludin and Ors. 14 IA. 89 @ 96; Sal/sh Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Dayal De I.L.R. 48 Cal. 388 @ 407-10, 425-426; Baboo S/o Thakur Dhobi v. Mst. Subanshi w/o Mangal Dhobi AlR 1942 Nagpur 99; Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 797; District Magistrote Trivandrum v. K. C. Mammen Mappillai I.LR. [1939] Mad. 708; Matthen v . .District Magistrate, Trivandrum L.R. 66 I.A. 222; Girindranath Banerjee v. .Virendranath Pal ILR 54 Cal. 727 and King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee 72 I.A. 241, referred to. There was no statutory right to enforce the right to personal libertYofue'r than that in s. 491 of the Criminal Procedufe Code before the commencement of the Constitution which could be carried over after its commencement under Art. 372. Law in Art. 21 will include all post-constitutional statute. law including Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 and by virtue of Art. 372 all pre-constitutional statute law, including the I.P.C. and the Cr.P.C. [231 F-G]
The present appeals do not touch any aspect of Art. 20. Article 20 is a constitutional mandate to the judiciary and Art. 21 is a constitutional mandate to the Executive. The expression "no person shall be prosecuted for the same effence more than once" in Art. lO would apply only to the E.x:ecutive. It is
'J'· -4
ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE v. S. S. SHUKLA
17 9
incorrect to say that "State" in Art. 12 will also include the Judiciaiy and Art. 20 is enforceable against the Judiciary in respect of illegal orders. [232 E-F, G-HJ
Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab [1964J 4 SCR 797 and Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi and Ors. [1953J SCR 652, not applicable.
Articles 256, 265 and 361 have no relevance to displace the proposition that ,Art. 21 is the repository of rights to life and liberty. Nor does an appeal in a criminal proceedings have anything to do with Art. 21. [233 C-DJ
l •
Garikapatti T'ccrayya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury [1957] SCR 488 and Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Rafn Tahal Ramnand and ors. [1973J 1 SCR 185, referred to.
·
-
The right arising from a decree is not a Fundamental Right and, therefore, will not be prima facie covered by a Presidential Order under An. 359(1). ~33m
Fundamental Rights including the right to personal liberty are conferred by the Constitution. Any pre-constitution rights which are included in Art. 21 do not after the Constitution remain in existence which can be enforced, if Art. 21 is :suspended. If it be assumed that there was any pre-constitutional right to personal liberty included in Art. 21 which continued to exist as a distinct and separate right then Art. 359(1) will be an exercise in futility. [234 A-BJ Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab [1964J SCR 797 explained. The theory of eclipse is untenable. The theory of eclipse refers to pre11:onstitutional ·1aws which were inconsistent \vith Fundamental Rights. By reason of Art. 13 (I) such laws did not became void but became devoid of Jegal force. Such laws became eclipsed for the time being. The theory of .,.. eclipse has no relevance to the suspension of the enforcement of Fundamental Rights under .Art. 359 ( 1 ) . The constitutional provisions conferring Fundamental Rights cannot be said to be inconsistent with Art. 13 (1 ). [234 B-DJ .P. D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India Ltd. [1952J SCR 391 and Snit. Vidya Verma through next friend R. V. S. Mani v. Dr. Shiv Narain Verrna [1955J 2 SCR 983, reiterated.
~
The Act in the present case is valid law and it has laid down procedure of applying the law. The validity of the Act has not been challenged and cannot be challenged. The Legislature has competence to make the law. The procedure, therefore, cannot be challenged because Art. 21 and 22 cannot be enforced. The suggestion that the power of the Executive is widened is equally untenable.. [235 E-FJ The fact that s. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Ccxle has been abolished in he new Code est~blishes that the pre-existing right was embodiei as a Fundamental Right in the Constitution. The right to personal liberty became identified with Fundamental Right to personal liberty under Art. 21. [236 Al The Presidential Orders does not alter or suspend any law. The rule of law is not a mere catchword or incantation. The certainity of law is one of the elements in the concept of the rule of law. The essential feature of rule of law is that the judicial power of the State is, to a large extent, separate from the Executive and the Legislature. [236 B-CJ It is not correct to argue that if pre-existing law is merged in Art. 21, there \vill be conflict in the Article 372. The expression "law in force" in Art. 372 cannot include laws which are incorporated in the Constitution, viz. in Part ITT. The expression "law" in Articles 19(1) and 21 takes in the statute law. [235 BJ The Presidential Order under Art. 359(1) is not a law. The order does not repeal any law either. The contention that permanent law cannot be repealed by temporary law is misplaced. [235 CJ The tntire concept in Art. 21 _is against Executive action. There is no ques~ tion of infringement of Fundamental Right, under An. 21 where the detention
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976) SUPPLEMENTARY
complained of is by a private person and not by a State or under the authority . or orders of a State. [235 DJ
. ;
The Executive cannot detain a person otherwise than under valid legislation. The suspension of any Fundamental Right does not affect this rule of the Constitution. Article 358 does not detract from the position that the Executive cannot act to the prejudice of a person without the authority of law. [237 A-F]
.'
Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur & Ors. v. The State of Punjab [1955J 2 SCR 225; M.P. State v. Bharat Singh [1967J 2 SCR 454; Dy. Collector v. Ibrahim & Co. [1970] 3 SCR 498; Benn</ Coleman & Co. v. Union of India [1973J 2 SCR 757 and Meenakshi Mills v. Union of India [1974J 2 SCR 398, discussed ond
i•
distinguished.
The Constitution is the mandate. The Constitution is the rule of lav,1. No aine can arise above the rule of law. The suspension of right to enforce Fundamental Rights has the effect that the emergency provisions in Part XVIII are by themselves the rule of law during times of emergency. There cannot be any rule of la\v other than the constitutional rule of law. There ca:Rnot be any pre-constitution or post-constitution rule of law which can run counter to the rule of law embodied in the Constitution, nor can there be any invocation to any rule of law to nullify the constitutional provisions during the timeS of emergency. [224 B, 238 D-E]
Eshugbayi Eleko v. Officer Ad1ninistering tlie Govt. of Nigeria [1931J AC 662 and Christie and Anr. v. Leachinsky [1947J AC 573, not applicoble.
The expression "for any other purpose" in Art. 226 means for any purpose other than the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. A petition for habeas corpus by any person under Art. 226 necessarily invokes a question whether the detention is legal or illegal. An executive action if challenged to be ultra vires a statute cannot be challenged by any person who is not aggrieved by any such ultra vires action. [23~ D-E]
;
I
~
Hari Ram Singh v. The Crown [1939J F.C.R. 159; Bhagchand Dagadusa v. The Secretary Df State for India L.R. 54 I.A. 338 @ 352; Albert West Meade v. The King AIR 1948 P.C. 156 at 157-59; Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation etc. [1969] 1 All E.R. 208 at 212, 213 and 237 and Dakshina Ranjan Ghosh v. Omar Chand Oswal l.L.R. 50 Cal. 992 at 995, 1003, applied.
-
Poona Municipal Corporal.ion v. D. N. Deodhar [1964J, 8 SCR 178; Kala Bhandar v. Municipal Comn1ittee [1965] 3 SCR 489 and Indore Municipality v. Niyamutulla AIR 1971 SC 97 and Joseph v. Joseph [1966J 3 All. E.R. 486, not applicable.
" ~
..
The expression "purported to be made under s. 3 of the Act" in s. 18 \viU include an Executive act made by the District Magistrate within the scope of his authority as District Magistrate even if the order is made in breach of the section or is ma/a fide. [240 A-BJ
There is no question of excessive delegation in s. 18 which lays down the law. To contend that s. 18 applies only to post-detention challenge is wrong. Section 18 applies to all orders of detention. Section 18 of Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 is only an illustration of the Act by the officers authorised by the Act. [240 C-E]
..
Section 16A(9) of the Act is valid. It is a rule of evidence and it is not open either to the detenu or the Court to ask for the grounds of detention. [246 CJ
Materials and information on which orders of preventive detention are passed necessarily belong to a class of documents whose disclosures would impair the proper functioning of public service and administration. [242 Dl Liversidge v. John Anderson [1942J AC 206 at 221, 253, 254, 266, 279, 280 and Roger's case [1973J AC 388 @ 400, 401, 405, applied.
267,
y. -
ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE V. S. S. SHUKLA
!8 1
LegisJature has enacted S. 16A(9) providing for a g~n:ral exclusio_n fr?m evidence of all such material as would properly fall w1th1n the classification instead of forcing the State to claim in individual cases privilege under ss. 123, 162 of the Evidence Act or under Art. 22(6) of the Constitution. [242 E-FJ Section 16A cannot be said to be an amendment tO Art. 226. The jurisdiction to issue writs is neither abrogated nor abridged. Section 16A(9) enacts J>rOvisoins analogous to a conclusive proof of presumption. Such a provision is a genuine rule of evidence. It is in the nature of an explanation to ss. 123 and 162 of the Evidence Act. Section 16A(9) is a rule of evidence. When the detaining authority is bound by s. 16A(9) and forbidden absolutely from dis-
closing such material no question can arise of adverse inference against the authority.
[242 G-HJ
Section 16A(9) cannot be read implying an exception in form of disclosu!"e to the Court. Such disclosure to the Court alone and not to the detenu will intrcxluce something unknown to judicial procedure and will bring in an element of arbitrariness and preclude both the parties from representing their respective cases. The View of the detaining authority is not to be substituted by the view of the court. [243 A-CJ State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya [1951) SCR 167; Slziban Lal Saksena v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. [1954J SCR 418; Rameshwar Shaw v. .District Magistrate Burdwan and Anr. [1964] 4 SCR 921; Jaichand Lal v. TV. Bengal [1966] Supp. SCR 464 and Dr. Ran1 Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar [l966J I SCR 709, referred to.
C
The theory of good return mentioned in the English decisions is based on Hie language of Habeas Corpus Act and the Rules of the Supreme Court of England. The practice of our Court is different. [243 C-DJ
M. M. Damnoo v. J. K. State [1972] 2 SCR 1014 and A. K. Gopalan v. "' State of Madras [19521 SCR 391, distinguished .
Tt is .not competent for any court to go into questions of malafiJ.es of the order of detention or ultra vires character of the order of detention or that the order was not passed on the satisfaction of the detaining authority.
Section l 6A of the Act contains definite indications of implied exclusion of judicial review on the allegations of mala fide. The reason why s. 16A has been enacted is to provide for periodical review by Government and that is the' safeguard against any unjust or arbitrary exercise of power. The production of the order which is duly authenticated constitutes a peremptory answer to the challenge. [243 G·H. 244 A, 245 BJ In view of the inability of the court to grant any relief on the basis \Vhether order of detention is the result of malice or ill will, the detention of malafides is not only ineffective but also untenable. [244 DE]
~
La1vrence /oachin1 Joseph D's Souza v. The State of Bombay [1956] SCR 382 @ 392, 393; Smith v. East Elloc Rural District Council & Ors. [1966] AC 136 at 776 and Dr. Ran1 Manohar l..ohia v. State of Bihar and Ors. [19661 1 SCR 709, referred to.
A decisio!1 on .a point no~ .necessary for the purpose or which does not fall to be determined 1n that dec1s1on becomes obiter dictum. [227 F]
Maharaia Dhira,ia .'Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur & Ors. v. Union
~t India [1971J 3 SCR 9 at pages 97 to 98 and 193 to 194, referred to.
Per M. H. Beg, !.
A prima facie valid detention order, that is to say, one duly authenticated and pa~sed by an. <;>fficer authorised to .mftke it r~cording a purported satisfaction ~o detain. the {'et1ttoner under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, which is operative either before or after its confirmation by the Government, is a
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complete answer to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Once such an order is shown to exist in response to a notice for a writ of habeas corpus, the High Court cannot inquire into its validity or vires on the ground of either mala tides of any kind or of non-compliance \Vith any provision of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act in habeas corpus proceedings. [371 G-H, 372 A] The fundamental law found in the Constitution is paramount. The Constitution provides the test for the validity of a11 other laws. It seeks to determine the spheres of executive and legislative and judicial powers with meticulous care and precision. The judicial function. though \vider in range when interpreting or applying other articles of the Constitution, particularly Articles 14 and 19, the enforcement of which is nlso suspended during the current e.mergenc.y. is especially constricted by the elaborate provisions of Articles 21 and 22, which deal \Vith personal liberty and preventive detention. The wider the svveep ot the yrovisions of Articles 21 and 22 the more drastic must be the effect of suspending their enforcement. Suspension does not and cannot mean retention under a disguise. (312 F-Hl Marbury .v. .Madison [1803] 1 Cranch 137; A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras [1950] SCR 88 @ p. 109, referred.
The only Rule of Law which can be recognised by courts of our country is what is deducible from our Constitution itself. The Constitution is an embodiment of the highest "positive law" as well as the reflection of all the rules of natural or ethical or common law lying behind it which can be recognised by courts. The spirit of law or the Rule of Law cannot hover ominously around like some disembodied ghost serving as a substitute for the living Constitution. It has to be found always within and operating in harmony with nnd never outside or in conflict with what our Constitution enjoins. [313 A, D-E] The most important object of making certain basic rights fundamental by the Constitution is to make them enforceable against the State and its agencies through the Courts. (329 Fl
_,
"(. ;..
Under our constitutional jurisprudence courts cannot, during a constitutionally enjoined period of suspension of tho enforceability of fundamental rights through courts, enforce hat may even be a Fundamental Right sought to be protected by Part III of the Constitution, [314 C-D] The enforceability of a right by a constitutionally appointed judicial organ has necessarily to depend upon the fulfilment of two conditions : firstly, its recognition by or under the Constitution as a right; and, secondly, possession of the power of its enforcement by the judicial organs. Article 226 of the Constitution is not meant for futile and unenforceable declarations of right. TI1e whole purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to enforce a right to personal freedom after the declaration of the detention as illegal when it is so found upon investigation. Enforceability of rights, whether they are constitutional or common law or statutory, in constitutionally prescribed ways by constitutionally appointed judicial organs is governed solely by the terms of the written instrument in a Constitution such as ours. The scope for judicial law making on the subject of enforcement of the right to personal freedom was deliberately restricted by our Constitution makers. It is difficult to see any such scope when enforcement itself is suspended. [314 E-F, 315 B-C] What is suspended is really the procedure for the enforcement of a right through courts which could be said to flow from the infringement of a statutory procedure. If the enforcement of a right to be free, resulting derivatively frofn both the constitutional and statutory provisions based on an infraction of the procedure, which is statutory in cases of preventive detention, is suspended, it is impossible to lay down that it becomes enforceable when that pa'rt of the procedure which is mandatory is violated but remains unenforceable so long as the part of the procedure infringed is directory. Such a view would introduce al distinction which is neither warranted by the language of Article 359 of the Constitution nor by that of the Presidential Order of 1975. [315 F-G]
ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE V. S. S. SHUKLA
If the protection of enforceability is validly suspended for the duration of an Emergency, declared under constitutional provisions, the courts will have nothing before them to enforce so as to able to afford any relief to a person who comes with a grievance before them. [329 G]
)'.
A court cannot, in exercise of any supposed inherent or implied or unspecified power, purport to enforce. or, in substance enforce, a right the enforcement of which is suspended. To permit such circun1vention of the suspension is to authorise doing indirectly what law does not allow to be done directly . [317 E-F]
[His Lordship felt that it was unnecessary to consider "any oth\~r purpose" in Art. 226 of the Constitution in view of the fact that each of detenus asked for a writ or habeas corpus and for no other kind of writs or orders.]
\
The Constitution given unto themselves by the people, is legally supren1e. A notional surrender by the people of India of control over their several or individual rights to a Sovereign Republic by means of a legally supreme Constitution only means that the Constitution is supreme and can confer rights and powers. One has to look to it alone and not outside it for 1lnding out the manner in which and the limits subject to which individual citizens can exercise their separate freedoms. A satisfactory explanation of the !anguage of conferment used with reference to rights is that there has to be necessarily, as a result of such a process of Constitution making, a notional surrender of individual freedom so as to convert the possibility of "licence" to all, which ends in the exploitation and oppression of the many weak by the few strong, into the actuality of a freedom for all regulated by law Or under the law applicable to all. [318 F-HJ
-
C
Sn1t. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain [1976] 2 SCR referred to.
Rules of natural justice, which are impliedly read into statutes from the nature of functions imposed upon statutory authorities or bcxlies have sometimes been placed on the same footing as "Fundamental Rights of meni which are directly and absolutely safeguarded" by written Constitutions. The implied rules of natural justice do not override the express terms of a statute. They are only implied because the functions which the statute imposes are presumed to be meant to be exercised in accordance with these rules, and therefore, treated as though they were parts of enacted law. The principles of natural justice which are so implied must always hang, if one may so put it. on pegs of statutory provisions or necessarily flow from them and have no independent existence. [319 G-H. 320 Al
-
State of Orissa v. Dr. Miss Binapani Dei & Ors. [1967] 2 SCR 625, applied.
Fundamental Rights are basic aspects of rights selected from what may previously have been natural or common law rights. These basic asp~ts of rights are elevated to a new level of importance by the Constitution. Any other co-extensive rights, outside the Constitution, are necessarily excluded by their recognition as or merger with Fundamental Rights. [329 B] The object of making certain general aspects of rights fund::irnental is to guarantee them against illegal invasions of these rights by executive, Legislative. or judicial organs (i.e. Article 20) of the State. This necessarily means that these safeguards can also be legally removed under appropriate constitutional or statutory provisions, although their suspension does not, by itself, take away the illegalities or their legal consequences. The intention was to exclude all other control or to make the Constitution, the sole repository of ultimate control over those aspects of human freedom which are guaranteed in Part Ill. [319 A-C & 329 CJ Article 21 of the Constitution bas to be interpreted comprehensively enough to include, together with Art. 19. practically all aspects of personal freedom. I! embraces both procedural and substantive rights. Article 22 mmiy makes it clear that deprivations of liberty by means of laws regulating preventive detention would be included in "procedure established by law" and indicates what that procedure should be. In that sense, it could be viewed as, sub-
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stantially, an elaboration of what is found in Article 21, although it also goei beyond it inasmuch as it imposes limits on ordinary legislative power. [329 D-EJ
.,
Taken by itself, Art. 21 of the Constitution is primarily a protection against illegal deprivations by the executive action of the State's agents or officials, although, read with other Articles, it could operate also as a protection against unjustifiable legislative action purporting to authorise deprivations of personal freedom. [329 E-Fl
.'
Article 21 was only meant, on the face of it, to keep the exercise of executive power, in ordering deprivations of life or liberty, within the bounds of powt!r prescribed by procedure established by legislation. Article 21 furnishes the guarantee of "Lex", which is equated with statute Jaw only, and not of "jus" or a judicial concept of what procedural law ought really to be. 111.e whole idea in using this expression was to exclude judicial interference with executive aiction in dealing with lives and liberties of citirens and others living in our country on any ground other than that it is contrary to procedure actually prescribed by law which meant only statute law. According to well established canons of statutory construction, the express terms of "Lex" (assuming, of course, that the "Lex" is otherwise valid), prescribing procedure, \Vill exclude "Jus" or judicial notions of "due process" or what the procedur.: ought to be. [321 H. 322 A-CJ
-
A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras [1950] SCR 88. referred to.
The suggestion that "jus", which has been deliberate_ly excluded from the purview of "procedure established by law'', can be introduced by courts, through a back door, as though it was an independent right guaranteed by Chapter 111 or by any other part of the Constitution, cannot be acceded to. [322 E-F] R. C. Cooper v. Union of India [1970] 3 SCR 530, 578, distinguished.
1'
Neither rights supposed to be recognised by some natural lav.' nor those assumed to· exht in some part of Comn1on Law could serve a 5 ~ubstituics for tho~ conferred by Part· III of the Constitution. They could not be, on any principle of law or justice or reason, virtually added to Part III as complete replacements for ri!rhts whose enforcement is suspended, and the"n be enforced, through constitutionally provided machinery, as the unseen appendages of the Constitution or as a separate group of rights outside the Constitution meant for the emergency which· suspends but does not resuscitate in a new form certain rights. [325 B-D]
I. C. Golaknath & Ors. v. State of Punjab and Another [1967] 2 SCR 762.
Even if Art. 21 is not the sole repository of all personal freedom, it will be clear, that all aspects of freedom of person are meant to be covered by Articles 19, 21, and 22· of thei Constitution. If the enforcement of these rights by Courts is suspended during the emergency•. an inqury by a court into the question whether any of them is violated by an illeQ!ll deprivation of it by exe{'utive authorities of the State seems futile. [328 H, 329 A]
His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kerala (1973] Supp. SCR @ I; Salish Chandra Chakraworti v. Ram Dayal De !LR 48 Cal. 388 @ 407-410, 425 and 426; Waghela Raisanii v. Sheikh Masludin and Ors. 14 Indian Appeals p. 89 and Baboo Seo Thakur Dhabi v. Mst. Subanshi wl o Mangal Dhobi, AIR 1942 Nagpur 99, referred to.
Not only all steps leading up to the deprivation of personal liberty but also the substantive right to personal freedom. by implication, is covered by Article 21 of the Constitution. [328 E-Fl
A. K. Gopalc:n '" State of Madras [1950] SCR 88 State of UP & Ors. [1964] I SCR 332, applied.
and Kharak Singh v.
The power to issue a writ is conferred up0-n courts exclusively by our Constitution. AH the powers of our courts ft.ow fro~ the Constit~tio-n whic~ is the source of' their jurisdiction. If any provision of the ('onstitut1on aurhonses the
..
ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE V. S. S. SHUKLA
18 5
suspension of the right to obtain relief in any type of cases, the power of courts is thereby curtailed eveh though a general jurisdiction to afford the relief in other cases n1ay be there. If they cannot issuie writs of habeas ccrPUSi to enforce a right to personal freedom against executive authorities during the emergency, the original nature of this writ issuing power comparable to a "prerogative" power cannot help the detenu. [330 G-H]
lt is a well-recognised principle of law that v.·hatever could be formerly even said to be governed by a common Jaw prerogative power becomes merged B in the Constitution as soon as- the Constitution takes it over and regulates that., subject. [331 Al
Principle in Attorney-General v. De KeySier's Royal Hotel Limited,
[1920]
A.C. 508 @ 526 applied.
Jf there is no enforceable. right either arising under the Constitutioh or otherwise, it is useless to appeal to any general poweri of the court to issue a writ of habeas corpus. If the effect o.f sus.pension of the right to move the court for a writ of habeas corpus is that no inquiry can take place beyond :finding out that the cause is ohe ccvered by the prohibiti.on, mere posses'sion of general power will not assist the detenu. [331 C-D] Jf the right to enforce personal freedom. through a writ of habea5 corpus is suspended, it cannot be said that the enforcement can be restored by resorting to ..any other purpose". That other purpose could not embrace defeating the effect of suspension of the enforcement of a constitutional guarantee and if held so would be making a mockery of the Constitution. [331 D-E]
.
C
Nct~hing in the nature of a writ o~ habeas corpUt.; or any power of a High Court under Art. 226 could come to the aid of a detenu when the right to enforce a claim to personal freedom, sought to be. prot-ected by the Constitution, is suspended. [331 E-F]
Provision for preventive detention ih itself aptly described as "jurisdiction of suspicion" is a departure from ordinary norms, and rc:sorred to either illl times of war or of apprehended internal disorders and disturbances of a serious nature, with the object of preventing a greater <lager to national security and integrity' than any claim which could be based upoh a right, moral or legal, to individual liberty. [332 B-C] Haradhan Saha\& Anr. v. The State of West Bcngai and Ors. [1'975] l SCR 778; Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal [1975] 2 SCR p.1832 @ p, 842; State of Mcdras v. V. G. Raw AIR, 1952 SC 197 @ 200 ancl Rex v. Halliday [1917] A.C. 260 @ 275, referred to.
It is true that the Presidential Order of 1975 like the Presidential Order of 1962, does not suspend the general power of this Court uhder Art. 32 or the general powers of High Courts under Art. 226, but the effect of taking away enforceability of the right of a detenu to personal freedom against ~xecntive authorities is to affect the locus standi in cases which are meant to be covered by the Presidential Order. Cou11s, even ih habeas: corpus proceedings, do not grant relief independent of the· rights of the person deprived of liberty. If the locus standi of a detenu is suspended, no one cani claim to get his right enforced. [338 E-F] If a case so patently gross a'nd clear of a detention falling, on the face of the order of detention or the return made to a notice from the court, outside the provisions· of the Act o_n the ground of personal ma1ice of the detaining authority, or, some· other ground utterly outside the Act, arises so that no further inv~tigation is called for, it may be possible to cobtend that it is not Pr<M tected by the, Presidential Order of Jun~ '27, 1975, and by the provision, of Art. 359(1) of the Constitution at all. The mere presence of an official sea\ or siwiature on a detention order, in such a purely hypothetical case, may hot be enough to convert it into a detention by the State or its ageu.ts or officers. That is the almost utterly inoon~ivable situation or type of case which could still
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be covered by the general power to issue writs of habeas· corpus. The remedy by .way of a. writ of hab~as C?rpus is more general than relief against official action. It ~1es ev!!n ~ga1nst illegal detentions by private persons although not under Art. 32 which 1s confined to enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
[339 A-El Shri1nati Vidya. Vern1a, though next friendJ R. V. S. Mani v. Dr. Shiv Narain Verma [1955] 2 SCR p. !'83, referred to.
Courts 1;1l!-1st presume that executive authorities are actingi in conformity \Vith ..both the spirit and the substance of the law : The maxim "Oninia praesuniuntur rite esse actus'' means that all official acts are presumed to have been rightly and regularly done. If the burden to displace that presumption is upon detenu, he cannot, in a habeas corpus petition under Art. 226 of the Constituti~n, ask the court to embark upon an inquiry, during the emergency, and allow him to lead evidence·. to rebut this presumption. To do so would be plainly tocounienance a violation of tho Constitutional mandate suspehding the procedure. [340 A-CJ Eshughayi Eleko v. Officer Administering the Governn1ent of i\'igeria & A nr. [1931] A.C. 622 @ 670; Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson and Anr. [1942] A.C. p. 206 @ 217 and 219 and 273; I?.ex v. Secretary of State for Horne Affairs, Ex [Hirte Lees [19411 1 K.B. 72 and Gree1z v. Secretary of Stare of Home Affairs, [1942] AC 284 @ 293, discussed.
Decisions on what restraints should be put and on which persons during a hational emergency, in the interests of national security, are matters of policy which are outside the sphere of judicial determination. [344 G] · Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson [1942] AC 206 and Rex Parle Zadiq [1917] AC 260, refererd to.
v. Halliday Ex
Under our Constitution, there is no distinction between the effects of a decla1atio11 of en1ergency under Art. 352( 1) whether the threat ro the1 security of the Sta e is from internal or external sources. Pre&idential declarations under Art. 352(1) and 359(1) of our Constitution are immune from challenge in courts even when the en1ergen~y i~ over. A noticeable feature of our Cohstitutions is that, whereas the consequences given iili Art. 358 as a result of a Proclamation under Art. 352(1) are automatic, Presidential Orders under Article 359( 1) may have differing consequehces, from emergency to emergency, depending upon the terms of the Presidential Orders involved. And then, Article 359{1A) made operative retrospectively by the 38th Constitutional amendment of 1st August 1975, makes it clear that both the legislative and executive organs of the State are freed for the duration of the emergency from the limits imposed by Part III of the Constitution. [348 A-DJ
.•
The striking differences in the terms of the two Pre5idential Orders are : (i) The Presidential Order of 1962 did not specify Article 14 of the Constitution, but Art. 14, guaranteeing equality before the law and equal protection of Ja\1.rs to all persohs To India, is mentioned in the 1975 Order. This does make some difference between the intentions behind and effects of the two Presidential Orders. [352 B-C] . (ii) The President'.,al Order of 1962 expressly hedges the suspensiorJ of.the specified Fundamental Rights with the condition, with regard to deprivauons covered by Articles 21 ahd 22 of the Constitution that the detenu should be deprived of his rights' "under the Defence of India Act, 1962 or any rules or order n1ade thereunder"''. In other words~ on the terms of the 1962 Pres:dential Order, the courts were under a duty to see: whether a deprivation satisfies these conditions or not. They could adjudicate upo the question whether a detention was "under " the Act or a rule "made thereunder". On the other hand the Presidential Order of 1975 unconditionally suspends· tile enforcement of the rights conferred upon "any person includin0 a foreigner" to move ahy court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Con>;titution. The Courts are, therefore, no longer obliged or able to test the v:i:Iidity of a detentioh by examining whether they conform to statutOry
ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE V. S. S. SHUKLA requiren1ents.
of the law.
They will have to be content with compliance shown with forms
(iii) Presidetial Order of 1962 makes no mention of pending proceedings, but the 1975 Order suspends aU pending proceedihgs for the enforcement of the rights mentioned therein. This further clarifies and emphasizes that the intention behind the Presidential Order of 1975 was tQ-:tctually affect the jurisd'.ction of courts in which proceedings were actually pendihg. The inference frOm this feature als·o is that all similar proceedin~ in future will similarly be .iffected. [352 E-F]
There can be no doubt whatsoever that the Presidential Order of June 27, 1975. was a part of a unmistakably expressed intention to suspend the ordinary processes of law ih those cases where persons complain of infring\!ment of their fundamental ri.Q-hts· by the executive authorities of the State. The intention of the Parliament itself to bring about this result so that the jurisdiction of courts under Articler 226 in this particular type of cases, is itself affected for the duration of the emergency, seems clear enough from the provisLons of S. 16A(9) of the Act, introduced by Act No. 14 of 1976, which received Presidehtial assent on January 25, 1976, making s. 16A(9) operative retrospectively from June 25, 1975. [352 F-H]
"' ..,
\
[352 C-El
C
There is no doubt that the object of the Presidential Order of June 27, 1975, by suspending the enforcement of the specified rights, ¥tas to affect the po\vers of courts to afford relief to those the enforcement of whose rights was suspended. This· was within the purview of Article 359(1). Hence. objections that powers; of the courts under Art. 226 may indirectly be affected is ho answer to the direct suspension of rights which was bound to have its· effect upon the manner in which jurisdiction is or could reasonably be exercised even if that jurisdiction cannot be itself suspended for all types of cases. [353 A·B]
The term Rule of Law isi hot a magic wand which can be ·waved to dispel every difficulty. It is not an Aladin's lamp which can be scratched to invoke a power which brings to any pe-rson in need whatever he or she may desire to have. Tt can only mean what the law in a particular State or country is and what it enjoins. This means that the Rule of Law must differ in shades of meaning and emphasis from time to time and country to country, It could not be rigid, unchanging, and immutable like the proverbial Jaws of the Medes and Persians. It cannot be like some brooding omnipotence in the skies. Its meaning cannot be what anyone wants to make it. It has to be, for each particular situation, indicated by the courts as to what it means. [353 F-H, 354 A]
The Rule of Law include~ the cohcept of determination by court~r of the question whether an impugned executive action is within the bOunds: of law. It pre-supposes, firstly, the existence of a fixed or identifiable rule of law which the executive has to follow as distinguished from a purely policy decision open to it under the wide terms of the statute: conferring_ a discretioilary power to act. nhd secondJv the power of the- courts to test the action by reference to the rule. [354 E-Fl Even in emergencies, provided the power of the court to so test the JegaUty, of some executiV'e act is not curtailed, courts will apply the test of legality "if the person aggrieved brings the action in the competent court". But, ii' the locus standi of the person to move the court is'. gone and the compet~nce. of the court to enquire into the grievahce is a1so impaired by inability to peruse the grounds of executive action or their relationship with the powerlto act, it is no use appealing to this p_articular concept of the Rule of Law. It is just inapplicable to the situation wh!,Ch arises here. Such a s"ituation is g0verned by the emergency provisions of the Constitution. [354 P·H] Youngs Town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 and Chief Settlement Con1n1issione.r, Rehabilitation Department Punjab & Ors. etc. v. Om Parkash & Ors. etc. [1968] 3 SCR 655 @ 661, referred to.
'Vhereas_ Art. 358, by its own force, suspends the guarantees of A.rt. 19, Article 359(1) has the effect of suspending the operation of specified Funda-
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mental Rights. If, however, the application of Articles· 14, 19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution is suspended i~ is impossible to say that there is a Rule of La\v found there which is a_vailable for the courts to apply during the emergency to test the legality o~ executive action. [355 A-CJ
Mohd. Yaqaob etc. v. The State of Jammu & Kashmir [1968] 2 SCR p, 227 @ 234, referred to.
The suggestion that a common Jaw remedy by way of writ of habeas corpus exists) even after s. 491 was introduoed in the Criminal Procedure Code. in 1923, is incorrect, The sweep of Art. 359(1) of the Constitution taking ih the jurisdiction of "any court" is wide enough to cover any kind of relief claimed by a petitioner for the enforcement of a specified Fundan1ental Right. [355 D-E]
.
Pleas which involve any adduction of evidence would be entirely excluded by the combined effect of the terms of the Presidential Order of June 27, 1975 read with the amended provisions of s. 16A(9} of the Act. In a case in "vhich the officer purporting to detain had, in fact, not been invested at all \Vith any authority to act, the detention would be on the same footing as one by a private person who has no legal authority whatsoever to detain. [357 C-E] Mt1khan Singh v. Stare of.Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 797 @ 821-822 aml S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 733, referred to.
The suspension of enforcement of specified Fundamental Rights operates only to protect infringements of rights by the State and its authorised agents, acting or purporting to act, in official capacitieS' which they could and do hold. A clain1 to an order of release from such a patently illegal detention, which is riot by the State or on its behalf, could be enforced even during the curren~ emergency. [357 G] The presu1nptio'n of validity of a duly authentiicated order of an officer authorised to pass it is conclusive in habeas corpus proceedings during the current emerQency. By means of a differently phrased Presidential Order of June 17, 1975 and the amendments in the Act, intrOducing rather drastic provis'.o'ns of s. 16A of the Act, the intention has been made clear that preventive detention should be a matter controlied exclusively by the executiv~ dep<1rtments of the State. [358 B, 361 B-C] State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Thakur Bh,,tat Singlo [1967] 2 SCR 454; State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Pandurang Sangzgiri and Anr. [1966) 2 SCR 702; D1'. Ram Manohar·Lohia v. :State of Bihar c•nd Ors. [!966)\! SCR 709; K. Anandan Nembiar and Anr. v. Chief Secretary, Gorernment of Madras llnd Ors. r19661 2 SCR 406; Durga Das Dhirali v. Union of India and Ors. [1966] 2 SCR 573; Jai Lal v. State of West Bengal [1966] Supp. SCR p. 4, 64,
ditcussed and distinguished. 1t is· very difficult to See the bearing of any such doctrine that the Rule of Law under our Constitution is embodied ih the principle of Separation of Powers on a pure and simple questio111 of determination of the meaning of constitutional and statutory provisions couched in vvords ¥. hich leave few doubts unresolved. [361 C-DJ
ff
..
If ah order of preventive detention is not quasi-,judicial, as it cannot be because of the impossibility of applying any objective standards to the need for it in a particular case, there could be no question of violating any principle of .Separation of Powers by placing preventive detention exclusively within the. control of executive authorities of the State' for the duration of the en1ergency. [361 H, 352 A] Rai Sahib Rain Jawaya Kapur and Ors. v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549,, referred to.
Means of redress in cases such as those of mistaken identity or 1nisapprehension of facts or of detenus due to false and malicous reports circulated by enemies a1'e still open to detenu by approachinQ1 executive authorities. TheTe
ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE V. S. S. SHUKLA
is no bar against that. What is hot possjble i_s to secure a r&lease- by an order in habeas corpus proceedings after taking the courts behind a duly authenticated prima facie good return. [366 B-C] If the 1neaning of the emergency provisions in our Constitution and the provisiohs or the Act is clearly that what lies .in the executive field should not be subjected to judicial scrutiny or judged by judicial standards of correctness, the courts cannot an·ogate unto themselves a power of judicial superintendencei which they do not, under the law during the emergency, possess. [362 H]
It does not follow from a removal of the normal judicial superinte'ndence, even over questions of vi,res, of dietention orders, which may require going into facts behind the returns that there is no Rule of Law during the emergency or that the principles of ultra vires aro not1 to be applied at all by ahy authority except \Vhen, on the face of the return itself, it is demonstrated in a court of la\V that thei detention does-not even purport to be in exercise of the executive power or <'.Uthority or .is patently outside the law authorising detention. The ihtention behind emergency provisions and _of the Act is that although such executive action as is: not susceptible to judicial appraiSement, should not be subjected to it, yet, it s]}ould be honestly supervised and controlled by the hierarchy of executive authorities themselves. It enhances the powers and, therefore, the respons:bilities of lhe Executive. [363 F-H]
-
In actual practice, the grounds supplied always operate as an objective test for determining the questioh whether a nexus could reasonably exist between the grounds given and the detention order or whether some infirmities bad crept in. The reasonablenes·s of the detention became the justiciable issue because it related to the decision. It is doubtful whether this could be said to be an object of preventive detention authorised by the Constitution and en1bodied in the Act. (334 D-E] 1he object of the amending Acts 39 of 1975 and 14 of 1976 was to affect the manner in \Vhich jurisdiction of courts .~n constldering claims for reliefs by detenus oh petitions for writs of habeas corpus was being exercised w that the only available means that has been developed for such cases by the courts, that i'.'1 to say. the scrutiny of grounds supplied under s. 8 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act may be removed from the judicial armoury, for the duration of emergency. (336- C-D]
C
Prabhu. Dayal Deorah etc. v. District Magistrate Kamrup and Or.f. AIR 1974 SC 183, referred to.
-
The cohtention that s. 16A(9) affects the jurisdiction of High Courts· under Art. 226 which an order under Art. 359(~) could not do, is untenable. A Presidential Order which prevents a claim for the enforcement of a Fundamental Right from being advanced in a court, during the period of an emergency. could possibly be said not to be intended to affect the exercise of jurisdiction of courts at all, is not correct. (336 F-0]
..
That s. 16A(9) amounts to a general legislative declaration in place of judicial decisions which courts had themselves to gi~e f!_fter considering, on the facts of each case, whether Art. 226 could be applied, is also not acceptable. The result of s. 16A(9) to be valid would be to leave tq the pre9Umphon of correctness of an order under s. 3 of the Act untouched bY any investigation relating to its correctness. Now if th!s be the object and effect of lhe amehd. ment, it could not be said to: go beyond it to rebut a presumptien of legality and validity of a.n order under s. 3 of the Act, if prima facie case is made out~ [336 G-H, 337 Al
Observation :
[The same result could have been achieved by enacting that a detention_ order under s. 3, prima facie good, will operate as "conclusive proof" that the requirements of s. 3 have been fulfill«!. But, as the giving of grounds is not entirely! dispensPd with under the Act even as it now exists, this may have left the question in doubt, whether courts could call upon the detaining _authoritie!t
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] SUPPLEMENTARY
to produce the e:rounds. E·nactment of a rule of conclusive proof is a well established folll): . of enactments determining substantive rights in the form of procedural provmons]. [337 A-BJ Section 16A(9) makes it impossible for courts to investigate quesdons relating to the existence1 or absence of bona fides at least 1n proceedings under ,Art. 226, It is clear that the validity of s. 16A(9) cannot be challenoeJ. on the ground of any violation of Part III ofl the Constitution in vie.w of the° provisions of Art. 359(1) (A). [353 C-Dl
A challehge to the validity o.f s. 16A(9) based either on the submission that grounds' for detention do not call for secrecy or that the provision is an unwarranted invasion of judicial power, even ill) an emergency, is not well··feunUed. There is ho such strict separation of power under our Constitution. No part~ cuJar provision of the Constitution couJd be pointed out in 9upport 01' the pro . . position that preventive detention is a matter in \vbich judicial superintendence must necessarily be preserved as a part! of the doctrine of separation of powers. [365 E-FJ
Section 16A(9) imposes a bar which cannot be overcome in habeas corpu~ proceedings during the Emergency. In addition, a specific suspension or enforcement of t~ right of personal freedom aQ'ainst executive authorities places the presumption arisi'ng from a duly authenticated order of a legally authorised detaining officer on a higher footing than merely ordinary rebuttable presumption for purposes of proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution. [367 F-G] [His Lordship felt it unnecessary to consider the validity of s. 16A(9) if it was to be applied at a time not covered. by the emerge'ncy, or whether it should. be read down for the, purposes of a suit for damages· where the issue. is. \Vhethet1 the detention was ordered by a particular officer out of malice in fact and for reasons completely outside the purview of the Act itself.] [337 C-D]
Section 16 of the Act seems to leave open a remedy by way of suit for damages for wrongful imprisonment in a possible case of what may he called "malice in fact". In the cases for habeas corpus, proceedings ubder Art. 226 of the Constitution where "malice-in-fact" could not be investigated, as it is bound to bp an allegation subsidiary to a claim for the enforcement of a rij!jht to personal liberty, a Fundamental Right which cahnot be enforced during:' the Emergency. [337 G-Hl
Sree Mohan Chowdhury v. The Chief Commissioner, Union
-
Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur and Ors. v. State of Punjab AIR 1955 .SC 549, referred to.
Territory
••
of
Tripura [1%4] 3 SCR 442 @ 450, followed.
Even the issue that the detention order is_ vitiated by "malice in fact'' will not be justiciable in habeas c<>rpus proceedings during the emergebcy although it may be in an ordinary suit which is not filed for enforcing a Fundamental Right but for other reliefs'. The question of bona fides seems to- be left open for decision by such suits on the language of s. 16 of the Act itself. [368 D-E] In the case of preventive detention, placing the burden upon the executive authorities ot' prOll'ing the strict le~ity and correctnes9 of every step in the procedure adopted in a case of deprivation of personal liberty, and asking the executive authorities to satisfy such a requirement, in accordance with what has been called the principle in Eschugbayi Eleko's case, [1931] A.O. 662 @ 670, would be to nullify the effect of the suspension of the enforceability of the procedural protection to the right of personal freedom. To do so is really to make the Presidential Order under Article 359( 1) of the Constitution ineffective. [368 B-C] No question of "malice in law" can arise in 'habeas corpus proceedings when such a protection is suspended. M regards the issue of "malice in fact" it cannot be tried at all in a habeas corpus proceedings although it may be possible to try it in a regular suit the object of wh~ch is not to enforce a right to pei'sonal freedom but only to obtain damages for a wrong done which is not
ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE V. S. S. SHUKLA
protected by the terms of s. 16 of the Act. The po"'ibility oti such a suil should be another deterrent against dishonest use of these powers by detaining officern. [368 D-EJ
Section 18, thouQh unnecessary, appears to have been added by way ot abundant caution. It cannot be assailed on the grouhd o.f vLolation of basic structure. [342 F-GJ The theory of basic structure oi' the Constitution cannot ·oe used to build into the Constitution an imaginary part which may be in co'nflicr with the: cons~ titutiona1 provisi,ons, The Constitution cannot have· a base cut away from the superstructure. Jndeed, the emergency provisions could themselves be regarded as part of the basic structure of the Constitution. [3 66 E-FJ The· theory of basic sitructure of the constitution c_annot be considered as anything n1ore than a part of a well recognised mode of constn1cting a document. The Constitution like any, othet documeht has to be read and construed as a whole. The theory was nothing 111ore than a method of detern1ining the intenV behind the constitutional Rrovisions. It could not ahd did not build and add a new part to the c·onstitution. It cannot imply new tests outside he Constitution or be used to defeat constitutional provisions. [366 G, 367 A]
-
His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kerala, [1973] Supp. SCR 1, applied, There is no provision in our Constitution for a declaration of Martial Law except Art. 34 of the Omstitution which recognises the po8'ibility of Martial Law in this country. There is ho separate indication in the Constitution of conditions in whichl Martial Law could be. "proclaimed". A Presidential Order -. under Art. 359(1) of the Constitution would, ordinarily, have a wider range and effect throughout the country than the existence of Martial Law in ahy particular part of_the country. The Presidential Proclamations are meant generally to cover the country as' al whole. Martial Law is t?enerally of a locally res.tricfl~ ed appJication. 1be conditions in which what is called "martial Ia:w'' may .ti prevail result in takihg Military Courts of .powers even to try offenc_es; and, the ordinary or civil courts will not interefere with this special juriOOiction under extraordinary conditions. Such a taking over by Military courts is certainly , outside the provi>ions of A.ti. 359( 1) of the Constitution taken by itself. It could perhaps fall under Presidential powers under. Articles 53 and 73 read with Art. 355. [368 F-H, 369 A-CJ
Judicial proceedings in criminal courts, not meant for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights, are not either at the initial or appellate or revisional stages, covered by the Presidential Order of 1975. Habeas corpus petitions are not maihtainablei in such cases since the prisoner is deemed to be in proper custody under orders of a cqµrt. [371-F-GJ
Neither Article 136 nor Art 226 of the Constitutio!j is meant for the exer· cise of an advi.Sory jurisdiction. Attempts to lay down the law in an abstract form, unrelated to the lac~ of particular cases, not only do not appertain to the kihd of jurisdiction exercised by this Court or by the High Courts under the provisions of Art. 136 and 226 respectively, but may result in misapplications of the law declared by cOUrts to situations' for which; they were not intended at all. !306 D-E] .
Per Clia11drachud, J. The Order issued by the President on June 27, 1975, under Article. 359(1) does not suspend the fundamehtal principle that all executive action must have the authority of law to support it. Nor does the Presidential Order give to the executive a charter to disobey the laws made by the Parliament which is the supreme Jaw making authority.[413 B-C] The aforesaid Presidential Order, however, deprives a person of his locus stlJlllli to move any court, be it the Supreme Court or the High Court, for enforcement of his Fundamental Rights which are mentioned l'.n the Order.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] SUPPLEMENTARY
Such deprivation or suspension enures during the period that the proclamation of emergency is in force or for such shorter period as may be specified in the Order. [413 C-Dl The dominant purpose of the present petitions is to obtain an order of release i'.rom detention by enforcing the. right to personal liberty. The purpose is.·not to obtain a mere declaration that theiorder of detention is ultra vires the Act under which it is passed. The former plea iSi barred by reason of the Pre£i.. dential Order. The latter is als·o barred because· regard must be had to the for. B substance of the mat~ and hot to the form in which the relief is asked,[413 E-F] The Pre.sidential Order dated June 27, 1975, bar51 any investigation or inquiry into the question whether lhe -order of detention is vitiated by niala fideSi, factual or legal, or \vhether it is based on extraneous considerations or whether the detaihing authority had reached his subjective satisfaction validly on prGper and releYant material. [413 F-G] Whether or not Art. 21 of the Constitution is the sole repository. of the r·ght to personal liberty, in a petition filed in the High Court under Art.:226 for the release of a person detained under the ~faintenanoo of Tuternal Security Act~ 1971, noi relief by way of releasing the detenu can 00 granted because no person has a legal Ca-!Jacity to move any court to a~k for such relief. The Presidential Order takes away such legal capacity by includihg Art. 21 within it. The source of the right to personal liberty is immaterial because the words ·'conferred by" which occur in Art. 359(1) and in the Presidential Order are not words of limitation. [413 G-H, 414 A] The. P1esidential Order does not bring abou~ any amendment of A.rt. 226 and is not open to challenge on that ground. [414 B] The contention that Art.. 226 V>'hich occurs in Chapter V, Part VI of the Constitution is an entrenched provision and, therefore, under Art. 368 no amendment can be made to Art. 226 without ratification by the Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States is untenable. It is true that Art. 226 is an " entrenched provision which cannot suffer an amendn1ent except bv fol}owihg tbe procedure prescribed by the· proviso to Art. 368(2). But the -Presirtential E - Order is i&Sued under the Constitution itself and if its true construction produces a certain result, it cahnot be said that some other Article of the Constitution stands thereby amended. Article 359(1) provides for the passing of an order by the President declaring· that the right to move for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights mentioned in the Order shall be suspended. That may, i'h. effect, affect the jurisdiction of the High Courts to entertain a petition for· the issuance of the writ of habeas carpus. But, that does not bring about any amendment of Article 226 within the meaning of Art. 368, which speaks of amendments to the Constitution by the Parliament in the exercise of its constiF tutional po\Ver. Article 226 and Article 359(1) are parts of the same fundan1ental instn1ment and a certaih interpretation of_ one of these Articlesi canilot amount to an amendment of the other. [385 G-H, 386 A-B] The Presidential Order neither bars the right of an accused to defend his personal liberty in the court of first instance or ih a higher conrt nor does it bar the execution of decrees: passed against the Government, nor dos it bar the grant of relief other than or les9 than the release of the detenu from detention_ [414 B-Cl G· Detention without trial is a serious inroad on personal freedom but it bears the sanction of our Constitution. The "clear and present danger test'' evolved by' Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 1919- may wetl be extended to cases where there is a threat of external aggression. [384 D-E] The object of Art. 359 is: to confer wider Power~ on the Presideht thari the power rrlerely to suspend the right to file a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Article 359 aims at empawer,:ng tha: President to suspend the right to enforce all or any of the Fundamental Rights conferred bv Part III. It iS in H order to achieve that object that Article' 359 doeS<- not provide that the Proesident may dec1are that the remedy by way of habeas corpus shall be suspeded during emergency. Personal liberty is but one of the Funda:rpental Rights conferred by Part Ill and the writ of habeas corpus i5 peculiar to the enforcement of the
.
ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE V, S. S. SHUKLA
right to pmonal liberty and, therefore the suspension of the right to enforce the right conferred by Art. 21 meahs and implies the suspension of the tight to file a habeas cerpus petition or to take any other proceeding to enforce thci right to personal liberty conferred by Article 21. [384 G-H, 385 A-BJ
y
.,
The true implication of the Presidential Order is to take away the right of · any person to move any court for the enforcement of the rights mentioned in the Order. In strict legal theory the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court and the High Courts remain the same as before since the Presidential Order merely take!il away the locus, standi of a person to move these courts for the ehforcement pf certain Fundamental Rights during the. operation:; of the Proclamation of Emergency. 1ho drive of Article 35g(l) is not against the courts but is against individuals, the object of the Article being to deprive the J.ndividual concerll'ed of his normal right to move the Supreme Court or the High Court for ·the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Part Ill of the Constitution. [386 C-EJ
Sree Mohan ~howdhury v. The Chief Commissioner,
Union
Territory
of
C
Tripura (1964] 3 SCR 442; .451, referred to. -.
The argument that the limited object of Art.. 359( 1) is to remove restrictions on the power of the Legislature so that during the operation of the Emergency it would be free to make laws in _violation of the Fundamental .Rights sPecified in the Presidential Order loses sight of the distibction between the provisions of Art. 358 and Art. 359' (!A) on the one hand and of Art. 359(1) on the other. Article 358, of' its own force~ removes the restrictions' on the power of _, the legislahlre to make laws inconmstent with Art. 19 and on the power of ~ Executive to take actioh under a Jaw which may thus violate Art. 19. Article 358 does not suspend any right which _was available under Art. 19 tq any person prior to the Prc:~lamation of Emergency. Anicle 359(1) is wider in scope than Art. 358. In view of the language of Art. 359(1) and considering the distin~tion between it and the provisions of Art. 358, there is no justification ~ for ~ricting the operation of Art. 359(1) as against ]aWs made by the· Legis4 lature in violation of the Fundamental Rights, [386 G-H, 387 A-El
Sre.e Mohan Choudhury v. 1'he Chief Comnlis.sfoncr, Union Territory of Tripura [1964] 3 SCR 442 and Makhan $ingh v. State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 797, referred to.
-
1"
Article· 359(1) is as much a basie1 feature or the Cohstitution as any other, and it would_ be inappropriate to hold that because in normal times the: Consti~ tution requires' the Executive to obeY the laws made by the Lej!islature, there~ fore, Article 359(1) which is a.n emergency measure, must be1 construed con..i sistently with that position. The argument of basic feature is wrong for yet another reason that Art. 359(1) doe. hOt provide that the Executive is fre.e ro disobey the_ laws made (by the Legislature. To permit a challenge in a court of law ta an order of detention, which is an Executive action, on the ground that the order violates a Fundamental Right mentioned in the Preside'ntiaI Order, isi to permit the detenu to enforce a Fundamental Right during emergency in a manner plainly contrary to Art. 359(1). [388 E-H, 389 A]
All eXecutive actioh which operates tci thei prejudice of any person must have the authority of law to support it. Art. 358 doe• not purport to invest the State with arbitrary authority to take action to the prejudice of citizens and other. It provides that so long as the Proclamation of Emergency subsists, laws may be enacted and exccutiVCJ action may be taken in purSuance of such laws, which if the prilvisions of Art. 19' were operative wauld have been ihva!id. Article 359(1) bars the enforcement of any Fundamental Right mentioned ill the Presi• dential Order, thereby rendering it incompetent for any persOh to C{lmplain of its violation, whether, the violation is by the Legislature or by the Executive. [389 H, 390 A, 391 E·FJ Srate of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Thakur Bharat Singh [1967] 2 SCR 454; District Collector of Hydtrabad &: Ors. v. Mis. Ibrahim & Co. etc. [1970] 3 SCR 498; Bennett Coleman &: Co. and Ors. v. Union of India &: Ors. [1973]
833SCif76
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] SUPPLEMENTARY
2 SCR 757, 773, 775 and Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Union of Jndico [1974] 2 SCR 398, 405, 406 and 428, dfr1tinguished.
The }{uh: of L::nv rejects t_he. conception of the dual State in whi.ch govern111-ehtal action is placed in a privileged position of immunity from con:rol by law. Such a notion is foreign to our basic constitutional concept<;. [392 Fl
Chief Seit ft n101t Conunissioner, Rehabilitation Departnwnt, Punfab rnd Ors. v. Om Parkash & Ors. (1968] 3 SCR 655, 660-661 and Eshugbayi Eleka v, Offjcc>r Adn1inis:eri11g the Governn1e11t of J\ligeria [1931] AC 662, 670. distinguished.
...
The Rule of La\v argument like the "basic feature" argument is intractable. Emergency provisions contained in Part XVIII of the Constitution which a:c designed to protect the security of the State are as in1portant as any other provision of the Constitution. The Rule of La\\-', during an emergency,_ is as one finds it in th.e provisions contained in Chapter XVIII of the Constitution.. There cannot be a brooding and omnipotent Rule of Law dr0\\ ning in its effervescence the emergency provisions of the Constitution. [393-B-D1
<
...
Article 359 ( l) neither compels nor condones the breaches by the executive of the laws made by the Legislature. Such condonation is the function of an act of indemnity. [3 9 3 G]
The obiect of empowering the President to issue an order under Art. 359( 1 l suspending the enforcement of the right to personal liberty conferred by Part Ill of the Constitution cannot be to save all other rights to personal 1ibe1ty except the one conferred by Part III, which 5eems tctany devoid of n1·;::aning and putpose. Therei: is no'thing peculiar in the content of the right to personal liberty conferred by Part lII w that the ConStituticn should provide only for the suspension of the right to enforce that particular kind or right, leav.inQ'. all other rights to personal liberty i'ntact and untouched. This purpose cannot ever be achieved by interpreting Article 359(1) to mean that every right to petfonal liberty shall be enforceable and every proceeding involving the enforcement of suCh r:.ght shall eontinue during the emergebcy, except to the extent to which the right is conferred by Part 111 of the Constitution. The existence of the right to personal libert~ in the pre-constitution period was s't.11eJy known to the makers of the Constitution. UJ95 H, 396 A-DJ The right to persohal liberty is the right of the individual to personal. free.. dom, nothjnQI more and nothing less. That right along with certain other ri8hts was elevated to the status of a Fundamental Right in order that it may not be tinkered \Vith and in order that a mere majority should not be able to trample over it. Article 359( l) ehables the Preside ml to suspend the enforcement eYen of those rights which were sanctified by being lifted out of the common morass of ht.unan rights. If the enforcement of the _Fundamental Rights can be .sus· pended during an emergency, it isi hard to accept that the right to enforce nob~ Fundamental Rights relating to the same subject matter should remain alive. [396 G-H, 397 A] The \vords "conferred by Part TIL' which occur in Art. 359( 1) are ~ot intended to exclude or except from the purview of the Pres'idehtial Order, rights of the same variety or kind as are mentioned in Prat III but whiCh were ifl existence prior to the Constitution or can be said to be in existence in the .postConstitution era, apart from the Constitution. The words "conferred by Part flt are nsed onJy in order to identify the particuhi.r rights the enforcement of which can -be suspended by the President and not in order to impose a limitation the .power o·: the President so as' to put those rights v.·hich exist or \Vhich e;itisted apart -fron1 the Constitution beyond the reach Of that pO\\~r. It, theref<>.re. does not n1ake any <lift'erence whether any right to personal llherty Wt\.'i in exi<"ll:ehce prior to the enactment of the· Constituiion, either by wav of a natural right, statutory right, common law right or a right available under the faw of 1:orts. Whatever may be the source of the right and whatever ma:y be its justification. the right in essence <ind sub:.1ance i'."i the right to per~onal Jil-.eity. That
•(
"'IJ
>
ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE V. S. S. SHUKLA
Tight having been included in Part III, its enforcement \vill stand suspended if it is mentioned in the Presidential Order issued under Article 359(1). [397 E-H, 398 A-CJ
The rights conferred by Art. 21 and 19 cannot be treated as mutually exclusive. But the suspehsion oi' the right to enforce the right of personal liberty means the suspension of that right wherever it is found unless its content is totally different as from one, Article to another. The ''ri.ght conf'.;:rred hy Article 21" is only a deScription Of the right of personal liberty in order 10 facilitate itsi exact idehtification and such a description cannot li1n:t the· op.:ration of. the Piesidential Order to those cases only \\'here the right to personal liberty is claimed under Article 21. [398 F-G]
l?uston1 Cavasajee Cooper v. Union of India [1970] 3 SCR 530, 578, referred
to.
'fhe circumstance that the pre-Constitution rights continued in force afler the enactment of the Constitution in view of Art. 372 does hot· make any difference to thiS' position because even assuming that" certain rights to P.!fsonal liberty existed before· the Constitution and continu~d thereaf1er <Is they were not repugnant to any provision of the Constitution, all rights to personal liberty. having the same content as the. right conferred by Art. 21, would fall within the mischief of the Presidential Order. [398 G-H, 399 A] The theory of "eclipse" has no application to such cases because that theory applies only when a pre-Constitution law becomes devoid of legal force on the enactmenti of the Constitution by reason of its repugnancy to any provision o[ the Constitution. Such laws are not void but they arei under an eclipse sc) long aSi th~ repugnancy lasts. 'When the repugnancy is re;.nov~d. th~ cdip::.e also is removed and the law becomes vµlid. [399 A-Bl
As regards the dpctrine of "n1erger", every prior right to p.::rso·nal lib;;'.rl} merged in the right to personal liberty c;onferred by Part Ill. But v.hcther it n1erged or not, it cannot survive the, declaration of su:.·pensiol\ if the true effect of the Presidential Order is the Sl,J.Spension of the right to enforce aH and every right to per!£>nal liberty. lh that view, it would also inake no <lifference \Vhether the right 10 personal liberty arises fron1 a statute or fron1 a contract or from a constitutional provision contained in son1e Part other than Prut III. [399 B-C] Article 361(3) Speaks of' a "process'' for the arrest or impri~;onrnent of a <Jovernor issuing. from ahy court. Fulldamental Rights can be cxerci:;ed as :against judicial orders but the circumstances in which such a process n1ay come· to be issued, if at all, may conceivably affect the decision of the question whether a Presidential Order issued under Article 359(i) can bar the rrmedy of an aggrieved Governor. ()400 B·C]
~
A failure· to comply with Article· 256 may attract serious consequences but no court is likely to ehtertain a grievance at the instance of· a private party that Art. 256 has not been complied with by a State Government. [400 DJ [As regards the claiµll to personal liberty foundetl on a challenge to an Qfder on the ground of excessive delegation. His Lordship preferred to cxpre&S no finn opinion though the greater probability is' that such a challehge may fail in face of a Presidential Order of the k:nd \vhich ha~ been passed in the instant case.] [400 D-E]
The existence of common law rights prior to the Constitution \Vill .not curtail by excepting til~e ri,Q'hts from the pur•rew of the Order, [400 El . t~e operation of the Presidehtial Order
D!iin1bha Devisingh Gohil v. The State of Bo111bc•y [19551 1 SCR 691 andi J'vfai-:l1a11 Singh v~ State of Pu11jab [196AJ 4 SCR 797, 818-819·, nppliec{ The Presidential Order dated June 27, 19 75. does· uot contain anv clause Jikc the one in the order dated Noven1ber 3, 1962. Article· 359(1) is ·only an.
(1976] SUPPLEMENTARY
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
enabling provision and the validity of a plea cannot be tested with reference to that Article. The right to move· a cowt for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III is not taken away by Article 359(1). It i$ tho Presidential Order passed. in pursuance of the powers conferred by that Article by which such. a con~-equence can be brought about. The Presidential Order in the i~1stant case is not subj-ect to the pro.-conditions that the detenu should have been deprived of his right under any particular Act and; therefore, there is no scope for tre enquiry whether the order is consistent or in conformity with any particular Act. [405 B-H, 406 A, 407 B-CJ Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab (1964] 4 SCR 797; Dr. Rani Manohur Loh;a v. Stt!fe of Bi/lar [1966] 1 SCR 709 K. Anand<M Nambiar'- and Anr. ~ Chief Secretary, Govern111ent of Madras & Ors. [1966] 2 SCR 406; State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Pandurang Sangzgiri & Anr. [1966] 1 SCR 702,
..., ~
discuss'ed and distinguished.
1 .-,
;
A nzala lide exercise of power doesi not necessarily imply any moral turpitudeand may only inean that the statutory pO\\'e:rr is exercised for purposeS: otbe,r th-an those for whic_h the power was intended by law to be exercised. In view of the fact that ah unconditional Presidential Order of the present kind affects· the locus sttindi of the petitioner to move any court for the enforcement of any of his Fundamental, Rights menti,oned in the Order, it would not be open to him to sho\V that the statutory power has been exercised for a purpose other than the one duly appoihted: under the }a\V. So Ion2 as '1he ')tatutory prescrip~ tion can be seen On the: face: of the order td have been complied with~ no further inquiry is pennis'sible as to whetbe,r the order is vitiated by legal mala fides. [409 E-Fl
-
Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab (1964] 4 SCR 797; Jai Chand Lall Sethia v. State of West Bengal & Ors. L1966] Supp. SCR 464 and Durgadas Shirali v. Union of India & Ors. [1966] 2 SCR 573, referred to.
As regards 1nala Ji.des in the sense of malice in fact, the same position must bo1d good because the Presidential Order operates as a blanket ban on any Jnd every judicial inquisition into the validity of the· detention order. If ih any given case an order of detention appears on the very face of it to be actuated by an ulterior motive, the court would have jurisdiction to set it aside because no judicial inquiry of any sort is required to be undertake'n in such a case. But, short of such ex facie vitiation, any challenge to a detention order on the ground of actual 1nala fides is aJsoi excluded under the Presidential Order dated June 27, 1975. [407 G-H, 408 A-BJ Section 16A (9) is not uhconstitutional on the ground. that it constitutes an encroachment on the writ jurisdiction of the High Court and Art. 226. There· is no warrant for reading do~'n that section so as to allow the courts to inspect the relevant files, to the exclusion of all other parties. [409 D, 411 F, 414 DJ Section 16A (9) is ih aid of the constitutional power conferred by Art. 359(1) and further effectuates the purpose of the Presidential Order issued under that Article. If so, it cannot be declared unconstitutional. [410 A]
The rule enunciated in s. 16A(9) is a genuine rule of evidence.
[410 B]
A. K. Gopalan V. State of Madras [1950] SCR 88 ahd Mohd. Maqboo/ Damnco v. State of Jammu & Kashmir [1972J 2 SCR, 1014, distinguished.
The principles of res judicata and estoppel, the conclusive presumptions of Jaw and various provisions of substantive law deny a tree play to courts. in the exercise of their jurisldiction. These are not for that reason uncohstitutional qua the High Court's jurisdiction under Art. 226. [410 FJ
The limits of judicial review have to be co·extenS:ive and commensurate \vith the right of an aggrieved person to complain of the invas.fon of his rights. Section I6A(9) can.hot be said to shut out an inquiry which is otherwise \\'ithin the jurisdiction of the High Court to make. [411 BJ
J
ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE V. S. S. SHUKLA
19 7
Section 18 does not suffer from the vice of excesive delegation and is a
That section only declares what was the true position prior to its enact. ment on June 25,, 1975. The amendm.eht of section 18 by the substitution of the words "in respect of whom, an order is made or purported to be. n1ade under s. 3", in place of the words "detained under this Act'', does not render the section open to a challenge <;>n the grouhd of exciessive delegation. The words "purported to be made" have been inserted in! order tOI obviate the chal·. Ienge that the detention is not in strict conformity with the Act. Such a .challenge is even otherwise barred under the Presidehtial Order. The object of the said provision is not to encourage the passing of lawless orders of detention but to protect durinQI emergency orders which may happen to be in lesrs than absolute conformity with the Maintehance of Internal Security 1\ct, 1971.
valid piece of legisla!Ion. [414 DJ
[412 B-C] liis lloliness Kes_avananda Bharati Sripad(lga!arvaru v. State of Keralo [1973] Supp. SCR 1 and Makhan Singh v. State of Punj"b [1964] 4 SCR 797, refened to.
C
A jurisdiction of suspicion is not a forum for objectivitY. The only arguL rnent which the court can entertaih is whether the authority which passed the order of detention is duly empowered to pas.s it, whether the detenu is properly identified and whether on the face of itsl order, the stated purpose of detention is within the terms of law. r.414 E-F] Zamora's case [1916] (2) AC 77; Rex v. Halliday [1917] AC 260, 271; Liver$fdge v. Sir John Anderson [1942] AC 206 and Greene v. Secretary of State, 11942] AC 284, referred to.
No judginent can be read as if it is a statute. The generality of the expressions which may be found in a judgment arei not intended to. be expos.itiom. of the whole law, but are goyerned ahd qualified by the particular facts of the case i~ which such expressions are to be found. It is not a profitable task to extract a st':ntence here and there from a judgment and to build upon i.t becauso 1he essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein.
[401 C-El
Quinn v. Leatham, [1901] AC 495, 506 and State of Orissa v. S11dhans11 Sekhar Misra & Ors. [1968) 2 SCR 154, 163, reiterated. Per P. lV. Bhagwati, J.
Th~ Pre9identiaE Order dated June 27, 1975, bars tnaintaihability of a petition for a 'vrit of habeas corpus when an order of detehtion is challenged OnJ the ·ground that it is vitiated by mala fides, legal, factual or ds based on extraneous considerations or is not under the Act or is not in compliance 'vith it. [477 B-C] The suspension of the privilege of the writ does not Je2alise what is done. while it cohtinues : it merely suspends for the time being the remedy of th~ writ. [461 A-Bl The words "the right to move any court" are wide enough to include all claims made by citi7..ens in any court of competent jurisdiction when it is shown that the said claims cannot be effectively adjudicated upon "'ithout examining 1he question as to whether the citizen is, in substance, seeking to enforce any of the specified Fundamental Rights. There can be no doubt that in view Of the Presidential Order which mentions Art. 21, the detenus 'vould have no locus standi to maintain the writ petitions if it could be shown that the writ -petitions were for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Art. 21. [424 C·E)
Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 797, fO!IOWCd,
When a _Pres.idential Order is issued under Art. 359, clauset (1 ), the Funda1:oental Right mentioned in the Presidential Order is suspended· so that the restriction on the power of the executive or the legislature imposed by the Fundamehta1 Right is lifted while the Presidential Order is in operation and
19~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976]
SUPPLEMENTARY
the executive or the Jegislalure is i'ree ~o make any law or to take any a~ticn \Vhich it would, but for the provisions contained in Part Jll, be competent HJl make or to tak,e. The word_s "but for the provisions contained in that part'", that is, but for the· Fundan1en.t'!_l Rights, meani '•if the .Fuhdamental RiQ>h-ts V.'erenot there in the Constituti·on, the executive being limite_d by la'Y would still b0 unable to take any action to the prejudice of a person except by authority of law and in conformity with or in accordance with Jaw and, therefore, cve11 if the. Presidential Order n1entions Art. 21, clause (lA) of Art. 359 wou1d not enable. the executive· to depriv~ a person of his pe_rSonal liberty w:tho~tt sanction of hnv and except in conformity with or ih accordance with l::nv. 11' an order of detention is· n1ade by the executive without the authority of Jaw, it w-0uld be invalid and its invalidity would not be cured by clau~-e ( lA) cf Art. 359 because that clause does not protect executive action taken withou;: Jawful authority. An uhlawful order of detention would not be protected from challenge under Art. 21 by\ reason of clause (lA) of A,rt. 359 and the detenu would be entitled to complajn of su<.:h unla,vful detention as beir;g in violation or Art. 21 except in so far as his right to' move the court for that purpo ei may be held to have been taken away by clause ( l) of Art. 359. [427 C-HJ
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Thakur Bharat Singh [1967] 2 SCR 454; !Jistrict Collector of Hyderabad v. M//s. l'brahim & Co. [1970} 3 SC'R 498; Be1;nelt Colcn1an & Co. v. Union of lndie4 [1973] ~ SCR 757 and Shree 1\1ecnak• .1/ii Mills Ltd. v. Union of India [1974] 2 SCR 398, applied.
Even though t\I Presidential Order issued under clause ( l) of Art. 359 meh~· tions Art. 21, where- it is' found that a detention has not been made in pur~u.'.l.Ilce of lawful authority or iti othei;._,vords, .the doetention is with~ut the :1uthority of Jaw, whether by reason of there being ho Jaw at all or by reason of the Jaw under which the detention is made being void, clause ( lA) of Art. 359' would n6t protect it from chalfenge under Art. 21 and it \vould be in con!1ict \vith that Article. r429 H. 430 A]
The words "rights conf'erred by Part Ill" cannot be read in isolation, nor can they be constnied by reference to theoretis:al or doctrina'.re considerations. They n1ust be: read in the context of the provisions enacted in Purt Ill in order to detern1ine \Vhat are the rights. conferred by the provisions in that Part. Jt is true that. A.rt. 21 is couched in negative language. It is· not uncommon in legislative practice to use negative language for conferring a right. That i<; often dohe for lending greater emphasis and strength to 1he Iegis!ative 1;:nactrncnt. Article 21 confers the Fundan1ental Right of personal liberty. [430 F-Hl Punjab Province v. Dau/at Singh 73 Indian Appeals 59; Baslu~~har Nath v. The Conu11issioner of lncorne Tax Delhi & Rajasthan [1959] Supp. (I} SCR 529; State of Blhar v. Mahal'ajidldraj Ka111eshwa1' Sinf?h of Dorhflanf?ai & Ors. [1952] SCR 889 at p. 988; P. D. Shamd11.M11i v. Ce11tral Ba11k af /11dia Ltd. [!952] SCR 391 -and R. C. Cooper v'. Union of India [1970] 3 SCR 530, refeiTcd to.
If Art. 21 were construed as not conferring a right to personal lib~rty, then there would. be no Fundamental R}ght conferred by Art. 21 and e\'en if a perwh is deprived of his personal liberty otherwise than in accordance with the procedure established by Jaw and there is infringement of Art .21, suc_h Pl.'!fSOn \vould not be ehtitled to move the Supreme C'oun: for a writ of habeas cnrptB under Art. 32, f'or that Article is .available only for enforcement of the rights. conferred by Part IlI. That \vould- be a; startling consequence, as ~t \vou!d deprive the Supreme Court of a wholesome jurisdiction to pr.1tect the- personal liberty of an individual against illegal detent'ion, t'esuftihg in a Ueparture. from the well settled constructional position of Art. 21. [432 B-D] No attribute of personal liberty! can be regarded as having been carved out of _-'\rt. 21. That Article protects all attributes of perscnal liberty against executive action which is not supported by J,aw. Wheh a person is det<lined, there is deprivation of personal liberty \vithin the meaning of Art. 21. [433 A-BJ
Kharak SinQ/1 v, State of U.P. & Ors. [1964] I SCR 332. ref,rred te>
)
ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE V. S. S. SHUKLA
The protection under Art. 21 is\ only against State action and not against private individuals and the protection, it secures, it is a lim~ted one .. The only safeguard enacted by Art. 21 is that a person cannot be depnved of hts person~l liberty except according to procedure prescribed by "State made". law. lt is clear on plain natural construction of its langua~e. that A:t. ~1 1n1ports tv.'o requirements : first, there must be a law authons1ng depnvatton of ~rsonal liberty and secondly, such law must prescribe a p:ocedure. The first re.qt~t_rement is indeed implicit in the phrase "except according to procedure prescnbed by law". When a lav.' prescribes a procedure for depriving a person of pers<;>nal liberty, it must a fortiori auth,orise such deprivation. Article 21, ~hus, l?roVJ.des hotb substantive. as well as procedural s~feguards. Two other ingredients of Art.-21 are that there must not only be a law authoris"ing deprivation of personal liberty. there n1ust also be a procedure preScribed by law or in other words law must prescribe a procedure. [433-C-F; 434 A-C, H; 435 B] P. D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India Lie/. [!952] 2 SCR 391; Smt. Vidya Verma v. Dr. Shiv Narain [1955] 2 SCR 983 and A. K. Gopalan v . .\rate of Madras [1950] SCR 88, followed.
Article 21 operates not merely as. a restriction on executive action against deprivation of personal liberty without authority o.f law, but it also e!Ul~S a check on the legislature by insistitnm that the law, -«rhich authorises depr.vatJ.on, must e9tablish a procedure. What the proceduro should be is not laid dow'n in this Article, but there must be some procedure and at the least, lt must conf'brm to the minimal requirements of Aft. 22:. "Law" within the mean:ng of Art. 21 must be a valid law and not only mUst it be within the legisla!ive competence of the legislature enacting it, but it must also hot be repugnant to any of the Fundamental Rights enumerated in Part III. [435 C-D]
.. I'
8.
C
Shamblw Nath Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal [1974] I SCR I; and Klmdtram Das v. •Tile State of West Bengal & Ors. [1975] 2 SCR 832, referred (O,
The constitutional principle in Eshugabayi E eko v. The Officer Adminfatrating the Governnzent of Nigeria AIR 1931 PC 248 has been accepted by the court<; in India oo part of the law of the land. In our country, even in pre·Constitution days, the executive was a limited executiVtJ, that is, an executive limited by law and it could act only in accordance with law. [438 B, 439 A] Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson [1942] 2 AC 206, Vhnalabai Deshpande v. E1nperor AIR 1945 Nag. 8; Jitendranatlt Ghosh v. ·Tile Chief Secretary to tile Government of Benf!cl, ILR 60: Cat. 364 at 377; In re : Banwarilal Roy 48 Cal. Weekly Notes 766 M 780; Secretary of State for India v. Hari Bhanji ( 1882) !LR S Mad. 373; Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas Advani [1950] SCR 621 and P. K. Tare v. En1peror AIR 1943 Nag, 26, referred to.
Even prior to thd Cohstitution, the principle of rule of law that the executive cann¢ act to the prejudioo of a person without the authority of law was recognised as part of the law of the land and was uttlformly administered by the cOurts. It \YaS- clearly ''law" in fou;e'• andl otdinarily, by reason of Att. 372, it would have continued to subsist as a distinct and separate principle of la\-v even after the commencement of the Constitution, until some aspects of' this principle of Law were expres'sly recognised and given constitutional embodiment in different Articles of the Constitution. [439 B-Cl
When this principle of rule of law that the executive cannot deprive a person of his liberty except by authority of law, is recognised -and emlx.1died as a Fundamental Right and enacted as such in Art. 21 it cannot continue to ~~ve. a di~tinc! and separat~ existence, independently a~d apart from this Art1e1e in \Vh1ch it hat> been g:tven constitutional vesture, unless it \Vere also enac:fed a~ a statutory principle by some positive law of the State. It cannot continue in forre under Art. 372 when it is expressly recognised and embodied as a Fundam<;ntal Right in Art. 21 and finds a place in the express provi;ions of the Co11stitut1on. When the Constitution makers haYe clearly intended
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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that thi• right should be subject to the limitation imposed by Art. 359, clause ( 1) and (IA), it would be contrary to all canons of construction tG hold that the same right continues to exist independently, but free from the limitation imposed by Art. 359, clauses ( 1) and (IA). Such a const,uction would defeat the object of the constitution makers in imposing the. limitation under Art. 359, clauses (1) and (1A) and make a mockery of that limita~ tion. The Presidential Order would in such a cat;e become me<iningless and ineffectual. [439 F-H, 440 A-CJ The only way in which meaning and effect can be given to the Presidential Order su~pcnding the enforcement of the right of personal liberty guaranteed under Art. 21 is that the principle of Rule of Law, on what the executive cannot inh:rfere with the personal liberty of any person except by authority of la\v, is enacted in Art. 21 and it does not exist as a distinct and separate principle conferring a right of personal liberty independently and <1part from that Article. Consequently, when the. enforcen1ent of the right of pen>onal liberty conferred by Art. 21 is suspended by a Presidential Order, the detenu cannot circumvent the Presidential Order and challenge the legality of his detention by falling back on the supposed right of personal liberty based on the principle of Rule of La.w. [440 F-H]
• I
I
The executive is plainly and indubitably subordinated to the law and it cannot flout the mandate of the law but must act in accordance with the law. [441-BJ
Eastern Trust Company v. Mckenzie Mann & Co. [19151 AC 750; .Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. The State of Punjab (1955] 2 SCR 225 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Thakur Bharat Singh [1967] 2 SCR 454, referred lo.
The Pret:iidential Orders issued under Art. 359 clause (1) do not give any power to the executive to alter or suspend or flout the law nor do they enlarge the pO\Ver of the executive so as to permit it to go beyond \Vhat is sanctioned by law. As soon as the en1ergency comes to an end and the Presidential Order ceases to be operative, the unlawful action of the executive becomes actionable and thei citizen is entitled to challenge it by moving a court of law. [461 A-CJ Whilst a Presidential Order fusued under Art. 359, clause (1) is in opera-
tion, the Rule of Law is not obliterated and it continues to operate in all its vigour. The executive is bound to observe and obey the law and it cannot ignore or disregard it. If the executive commits a breach of the Jaw. its
action would be unlawful, but merely the remedy would be temporarily barred where it involves enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights specified in the Presidential Order. [461 C-D]
When the right of personal liberty based on the Rule of Law which existed immediately prior to the commencement of the Cont>titution has been enacted in the Constitution as a Fundamental Right in ..\rt. 21 \Vith the Jimitation that when there'. is a Proclamation of Emergency, the President, may by order under Art. 359, clause (1) suspend its enforcement, that right of personal liberty based on the Rule. of Law cannot continu~ to exillt as. a distinct and jnUcpendent right free from the limitation as to enforcement contained in Art. 359 clause (1). It would be meaningless and futile for the Constitution~n1akers to hive imposed this limitation in regard to enforcement of the righl of personal liberty guaranteed by Art. 21, if th~ detent.J could with impunity, disregard ·such limitation and fall back on the right of personal liberty based on the Rule of Law. r445 E-Gl Attorney General v. De Keyser's Royal l/otel, [1920] AC 508, discussed.
Dhirubha Devisingh Gohil v. The State of Bombay [1955] 1 SCR 691, followed. On an application of the maxim expressum facit cessare tacituni, that is, what is expressed makes what is silent cease-a principle of logic and con1mon
.
ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE v. S. S. SHUKLA
2 01
'$ense and not merely a technical rule of construction-the express provision in Art. 21 that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure prescribed by' law will necessarily exclude a provision to the same effect to be gathered or implied from the other provi~ sions of the Constitution. [447 D-E, 448 DJ Shankara Raa Badami v. State of Mysore [1969] 3 ~CR I and {Walsh ond ors.) v. Lennon and ors. 1942 Irish Reports 112, applied.
I •
State
The contention that the principle of Rule of Law that the executive cannot act to the prejudice of a person except by authority of law continues to exist as a distinct and independent Principle· unaffected inter alia by the enactment of Art. 21, is not correct, [451 Al Slate of Madhya Pradesh v. Thakur Bharat Singh [1967] 2 SCR 454; District Collector, Hyderabad v. M/s. Ibrahim & Co. [1970] 3 SCR 498; Bennet Coleman & Co. v. Union of India [1973] 2 S\CR 757; Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. [1974] 2 SCR 398; Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of llldia. [1956] SCR 267; Bishan Das & Ors. v. State of Punjab [1962] 2 SCR 69; State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Verma [1963] 2 SCR 183; Eshugbayi Eleko v. The Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria AIR 1931 PC 248 and Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 797, distinguished.
,
-
The words "any court" in Article 21 must be given their plain gramn1atical meaning and must be construed to mean any court of .;:ompetent jUrisdiction which would include the Supreme Court and the High Courts before v:hich the specified rights in Art. 359 clause (1) can be enforced by the citizens. !454-A]
C
Mak/um Singh v. State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 797, followed .
When the Presidential Order is without any condition, if a detenu contends that the order of detention has been made mala fide or that it has been passed by a delegate outside the authority conferred on him under the Act or that it hns been exercised inconsistently ·with the cooditions prescribed in that behalf, that it>, it is not in accordance with the provisions of law, such a plea would be barred at the threshold by the Presidential Order. [458
B~J
I'-
"
Quinn &: Leathen [1901] AC 495, State of Orissa v. Sudhansa Sekhar Misra [1968] 2 SCR 154; i\fakhan Singh Tarsikka v. The State of Puniab [1964] 2 SCR 797; A. Nambiar v. Chief Secretary [1966] 2 SCR 406 and State of lvlaharashtra v. Prabhakar Pandurang Sangzgiri [1966} 1 SCR 702, distinguished.
There is no scope for the contention that even if the enforcement of the Fundamental Right conferred by Art. 21 is suspended by the Presidential Order, the detenu can still enforce a t>upposed natural right of personal liberty in a court of law. [459 DJ His lloliness Kesavananda Blwrati Sripadagalavaru v. State [1973] Supp. SCR 1 and Golak Nath & Ors. v. State [1967) 2 SCR 762, referred to.
Kera/a of Pttnjab
'!of
If the positive law of the State decrees that no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except according to the procedure descriOed by law, the enforcement of such statutory right v.·ould not be barred by the Presidential Order. But, there is no legislation in our country which confers the right of personal liberty by providing that there shaJI be no deprivation of it except in accordance with law. On the contrary. s. 18 of the h1aintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, enacts that no person in respect of "'horn an .order of detention is made or purported to be made under s. 3 shall have any right to personal liberty by virtue of natural law or common law, if any. Because the Indian Penal Code in s. 342 makes it penal to wrongfully confine· -any person and the offence of wrongful confinement postulate•3 that no one •hall be deprived of his personal liberty eXcept by authority of law, it cannot
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be said on that account that s. 342 of the Indian Penal Code: confers a right of personal liberty. The utmost that can be said is that this section proceeds on a recognition of the right of personal libery enacted in Art. 21 and makes it an offence to wrongfully confine a pe1!>on in breach of the right conferred by that constitu~'ohal provision. [459 E-H, 460 A] The v.1ords "for any other purpose"· in Art. 226 greatly enlarge the jurisdictiou of the I ligh Court and the J-ligh Court can issue a writ of habeas corpus if it finds that the detention of a person is illegal. It is not necessary for this purpose that the court !>hould be n1oved by the detcnu. It is sufficient if it is n1cved by any person affected by the order of detention. When it is so moved and it exa1nines the legality of the order of detention, it doe') not enforce the right of personal liberty of the dctcnu, but it merely keeps the executive vvithin the bounds of la\V and enforces the principle of legality. The \ .:ords "any other purpose'' cannot be availed of for the purpose· of circumventing the constitutional inhibition flowing from the Presidential Order. [460 B-Gl
• I.
C
1\rticle 359 clause ( 1) and the Presidential Order issued under it do not have the effect of making unhnvful actions of the executive lawful. [460..G] \Vhen a person takes proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure in connection with the offence of wrongful confinement or n1urder or law1ches of prosecution for such offence, he cannot be said to be enforcing the Fundamental Right of the detenu or the. murdered roan under Art. 21 so a!i to· attract the ihhibition of' the Presidential Order. [461 F-G]
An application seeking to enforce a statutory obligation i1nposed on the police officer and a statutory right created in favour of an afrested person by s. 57 of the Criminal Procedure Code would not be barred, because what is 6uspendcd by a Presidential Order specifying Art. 21 is the right to move the court for cnforcen1ent of the Fundamental Right conferred by that Article and' not the right to move the court for enforcement of the statutory right to be relea5ed granted under s. 57, Cr. . P C.. [462.G]
If a positive legal right is conferred on a person b}' legislation and he seeks to enforce it in a court, it 1.vould not be within the inhibition of a1 Presidential Order issu<d under Art. 359, clause (I). [461 G-H]
This does not mean that \Vhenever a petition for a writ of habeas corpus comci,: before the court it must be rejected straightaway without even looking at the averme11ts made in it. The court would have to consider where the bar of the Presidential Order is attracted and for that purpose the court \rould · have to see whether the order of detention is one made by an authority empc,vered to pass such an order under the Act. If it is not, it \vould not be State· action and the petition would not be one· for enforce1nent of the right confemd by Art. 21. [463 G·H, 464 A] Once it is held that the obligation of the executive is not a deprive a person of his personal liberty except in accordance with law, i13 to be found· cnly in Art. 21 and no-where-else it must follow necessarily that in challenging the legality of the detention, what the applicant claims is that there is, in fact, by the executive of the right of personal liberty conferred by Art. 2l and that immediately attracts the applicability of the Presidential Order. [460'
"
D-El
It is the basic characteristic and essence of martial law that during the time that it is in force, the individual cannot enforce his right to life and liberty by resorting to judicial process and the courts cannot issue the writ of habeas corpus or pass any suitable ordersi. [442 01
Jol1n Allen's case (1921) 2 Irish Reports 241, referred to: 1\Ierely by declaring martial la\v would. not by itself deprive the courts of the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus or other process for the p!"flteC-tion of the right of the individual to life and liberty, [443 Aj
..
ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE V. S. S. SHUKLA.
••
The declaration o'f martial law. v,;hich is- not even expressly provided in the Constitution, cannot override the provisions of the Articles confering the ri£tt to life and liberty as also of Articles 32 and 226 and unll!ss the right of nn individual to move the courts for enforcement of the right to life and liberty can bi; suspended or taken a\vay by or under an express provision of the Con5titution, the individual would be entitled to enforce the right to life and liberty under Art. 32 or Art. 226 or by resorting to the ordinary process of l;nv, even during martial law. [443 A-C] 1\i·tidc 34 clearly postulates that during the time that martial law is in force. no jn<lici'4l process can issue to examine the legality of an act done by the military authorities or the executive in connection with the ma:nte... nanco,; of restoration or ordeir. [443' .E.-F] During the n1artial law, the courlt; cannot and should not have the power to examine the legality of the action of the military authorities or the executive on any ground \vhatsoever, including the ground of mala fides. But,. if the courts are tc be prevented from exercising such power during martial law that situation can be brought about only by a Presidential Order issued under Art. 359 clause (i) and in no other way, and the Presidential Order in so far as it suspends the enforcement of the right of pe1!:;onal liberty conferred under ~<\rt. 21 must be construed to bar challenge to the legality of detention in any court including the Supreme Court and the lligh Courts v.·hil5t the Presidential Order is in operation. (444 A-CJ
A.
Ex parte Milligan ( 1866) 4 Wallace 2; Moyer v. Peabody (1909) 212 US 76 .:nJ Duncari v. Kohann1eku (1945) 327 US 304, referred to.
' _.,
Ttere are t\vo rights ·which the detenu has in this connection : one is the Fu1.Camcntal Rig.ht conferreJ by Art. 22, clause (5) and the other is the statutory right conferred by s. 3. Though the content of both these rights is the same, they have distinct and independent e:"l:istence and rn~rely because eO:"c:-cen1ent of one is suspended, it does not mean that the other also cannot be tr.forced. [463 B·CJ The .. theory of rcflectiori" is clearix erroneous. If the riN,i.t conferred un..kr s. 8 v.ere a reflection of the Fundamental Right conferred by Art. 22, clause (5), \\'hic!J is the object reflected, must necessarily rt!;ult in the cffacemtrit of the right under s. 8 \Vhich is said to constitute the reflection. But ever: if. Art. 22 clau.;;e (5) were deleted from the Constitution, s. 8 V./ould still rerr..t!'.n on the statute book until repealed by the legislature. The Presidential Order would not, therefore, bar enforcement of the right conferred by s. 8. (463 C.D] Fathi1na Bcebi v. M. K. Ra1'·indranatlzan (1975) Crl. LJ. rtfted.
1164,
over-
· :Jt io; true that sub~scc. (9) (a) of s. 16A does not specifically refer to any court. But, there is inherent evidence in the sub-section itself to show that it is ·1r:tended to prevent disdosure of such . grounds, information and materials before a co~rt. There is clearly an echo of s. 1.23 of the Indian Evidence Act. Sub-section (9) of s. 16A must also be held to be designed to achieve the same int:::ntion as prohibiting disclosure even to a court. Sub-section (9) (a)· of s. 16A cannot, therefore, be read down so as to imply an exception in favour of disclosure- to a court. (469 D, F]
Khudirarn Da.i v. The State of JVest Bengal & Ors. (1975] Z SCR 832; Ler v. Burrel 170 Engl~th Reports 1402 and Liversidge v. Sir John Anders.~n Ll942] AC 206, rei'erred to.
1here C3n be no doubt that Art. 226 is '3. constitutional provision and it errJ?c"·ers the High Court to issue a \\'Tit of habeas corpus for enforcement of the Fundan1ental Right by Art. 21 and also for any other purpose. The lrith Ccurt has. therefore; constitutional power to examine th~ legality of detention and for that purpose to inquire and det"ermine whether the detention is in accordance \dth the provisions of Jaw. The constitutional power cannot be taken away or abridged by a legislative enactment. If there is any legislative
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] sUPPLEMENTARY
provision which obstructs or retards the exercise of this constitutional power it. \Vould be void. It is, therefore, clear that if it can be sho\vn that sub· section (9) (a) of s. 16A abridges or whitles down the constitutional power of the }Iigh Court under Art. 226 or obstructs or retards its exercise, it Would be void as being in conflict with Art. 226. If there is a legislative provision \Vhich prohibits disclosure. of the grounds, information and materials on which the· order of detention is bated and prevents the court from calling for the production of such grounds, information and materials, it 'voulJ obstruct and retard the exercise of the. constitutional power of the liigh Court under Art. 226 ahd would be void as offendrng tbat Article. [470 Q.D. 471 A-B, E.F[
• I
flari Vishnu Ka1nath v. Syed Ahn1ad Ishaque & Ors. l1955] I_ SCR 1 i04; Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh & ()rs. (1955] 1 SCR 267; Raj Kruslzna Bose· v. Binod Ka111111go & Ors. ll954] SCR 913; The Kerala Education Blll 1951, [1959] SCR 995; Prem Chand G'arg v. Excise Comn1is· sioner, Cl.P. Allahabad [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 885; Khudira1n Das v. State of West Bengal [19751 2 SCR 832; Biren Dutla & Ors. v. Chief l'onzn1issfoner of Tripura & Anr. [1964] 8 SCR 2:9-5; M. M. Damnoo v. J & K Stale [1972] 2 SCR 1014 and A. K. Gopafan v. State of Madra,· [1950] SCR p. 80, referred to.
t
I
\
A rule of e\'idence merely determines what shall be regarded as rel~vant and admissible material for the purpo.se of enabling the cou11 to con1e to a decision in the. exercise of its jl1risdiction and it does not in any way detract froij:l or affect the jurisdiction of the court and it cannot, in the circum+,;tance<;, be violative of Art. 226. But in order that if should not fa11 foul of Art. 226, it niust be a genuine rule of evidence. If in the guise of enacting a rule of evidence the legislature in effect and substance disable anJ in1pedes the lligh Court from effectively exercising its constitutional po\ver under Art. 226, such an enactment \vould be void. It will be colourable exercise of legislative power. The legislature caunot be permitted to violate a constitutional provit>ion by en1ploying an indirect method. If a legislative provision, though in form and outward appearance a rule· of evidence, is in substance and reality something different, obstructing or impeding the exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226, the form in which the legislative provhion is clothed would not save it from condemnation. r474 B·C] It is well settled that in order to determine the true character of a legislative provision, the court must have regard to the subttance of the provision and not its forn1. Sub-sectio!n (9) (a) of s. 16A is in form and outward appearance a rule of evidence which ~ays that the grounds, information and materials on which the order of detention is made or the declaration under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) is bru.;ed shall be treated as confiJential and shall be deen1ed to refer to matters of State and be against the public interest to disclose. Sub-s. (9) (a) of s. 16A assumes a valid declaration under sub-!;. (2) or sub-s. (3) and it is only when such a declaration has bee11 made t11at sub-s, (9) (a) of s. 16A applies or in other words, it is only in cases \vhere a person is detained in order to deal effectively '\Vith the emergencv that the disclosure of the. grounds, information and matedats is prohibited by sub-sec. (9)(a) of s. 16A. [474 E-F, 475 B-C. E-F]
The n1le enncted in sub-s. (9) (a) of s. 16A bears close analogy to a rule of conclusive presumption and in the circumstances, it must be regnrded as a gehuine rule of evWdence. [476 D] If the grounds, information and materials have no rel3.tion to matters of State or they cannot possibly be of such a character that their cl0t,;ure would injure public interest, the le~slatureJ cllnndt, by merely employing a legal fiction, deem thern to refer to matters of State which it \\rould be against public interest to discl.ose and thereby exclude them from the judicial ken. That would not be a genuine rule of evidence : it would he a colourable legislative device-a fraudulent exercise of power.· There can be no blanket ban on disclosure of the grounds, information and materials to the High Court of this Court, irrespective of their true character in s·uch cases. [476 E.F)
+
ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE v. S. S. SHUKLA
M. M. Damnoo v. State of J & K [1972] 2 SCR 1014; A. K. Gopalan v. Stale of Madras [1950] SCR 88 and Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson [1942] AC 206. referred to.
The grounds,,.information and materials in almost all cases would be of a confidential character falling within the class of documents privileged under s. 123 and hence the rule enacted in sub-section genuinely partakes of the character of a rule of evidence. Sub-s. (9) (a) of t. 16A enacts a genuine rule of evidence <tild it does not detract from or affect the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 and henc~ it cannot be successfully assailed as invalid. [476 G~H, 477 A]
There is no \\.'arrant for reading down sub-section 9A of s. 16 so as to imply a favour in favour of disclosure to the court. The provision does not constitute an encroachment on the constitutional jurisdiction or the High Court under Art. 226 and is accordingly not void. [477, C-D] If the declaration under sub-section (2) or sub-s. (3) is invalid, subs. 9(a) of s. 16A will not be attracted on the grounds of information and materials on which the order of detention is made, would not be privileged under tub section. 'Therefore, ,,sub-secttOn 9(a) of s. 16A enacts a genuine rule of evidence. [477 A-BJ
C
[His tordship thought it unnecessary to go into the question of construction and validity of s. 18 of t!le Maintehance of Internal security Act.] [464.AJ An obiter cannot take the place of the ratio. Judges are not oracles. It hasi no binding effect and it cannot be· regarded as conclusive on the point, when considering the observations of a High judicial authority like this Court, the greatest pot.;sible care must be taken to relate the observations of Judge
a
)·
to the,. precise issues· befc•re him and to confine such observations, even though expressed in broad terms, in the general compass of the question before hin1, unless he makes it clear that he intended h.itl remarks to have a wider ambit. Jt is not possible for Judges always to express their judgments so as to exchH.le entirely the risk that in some subsequent caue their language may be misapplied and any att-.npt at such perfection of expression can only lead to' the opposite result of uncertainty and even obscurity as regard the case in hand. [455 F-H, 456 11..CJ
H. }[. Maharajadhiraja 'J..fadhav Rao Jiwaji Rao Scindia Bahadur' & Ors. v. Union of flldla [1971] 3 SCR 9, applied
Per H. R. Khanna, J. (dis!enting)
-
Article 21 cannot be con~idered to be the t;ole repository of the right to life and personal liberty. The right to life and personal liberty is the most precious right of human beings in civilised societies governed by the rule of law. [266 F, 3021 HJ Sanctity of life and liberty was not something new when the Constitution drafted. It represented a facet of higher value!· which mankind began to cherish in il:ti evolution from a state of tooth and claw to a civilized existence. The principle that no one shall be deprived of his life and liberty without the authority cf law was not the gift of the Constitution. It "'as a necessary cQl'Ollary of the concept relating to the sanctity of life and liberty, it existed and was in force before the coming into force of the Constitution. [268 C~D]
\Vas
Even in the absence of Art. 21 in the Constitution, the State has got no power to deprive a person of his life or liberty without the authority of law. That il; the essential postulate and basic assumption of the Rule of Law and not of men in all civilised nations. Without such sanctity of life and liberty,. the distinction between a Lawless society and one governed by laws would cease to have any meaning. The principle that no one shall be deprived of his life or liberty without the authority of Jaw is rooted in the consideration that life and liberty are priceless post;es&ions which cannot be made the plaything of individual whim and caprice and that any act which has
. -
,8
,c
,o
,E
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SUPREME COURT REPORT'°i
[\976) SUPPLEME!>ITARY
the effect of tampering \Vith life and liberty musi receive substenance tfc:n anJ sanction of the laws of the land. Article 21 incorpor.1tes an essent:al aspect of that principle ·and makes it part of the Fundamental Ri2hts guara:r~ teed in Part Ill of the Constitution. It doc!> not, however, fol!ow frcw the above that if Art,, 21 had not been drafted and insertc'd in Part III, ia that event, 1t ":ould have been permissible for the State to deprive a p:':'3:n1 of hi;; life or liberty \Yithout the authority of la\V. There arc no case:; to sho\V thn.t before th~ coming into force of the Constitution or in coun;r:~s under. Rule of La\V v.-bcre there is no provision corresponding to 1\r~.21, a. clai:n \v:is ever sustained by the court~; that the State can deprive a person cf ~is life er liberty ~·ithout the authority of law. [302 H, 269 H, 270 A.CJ
• I
Ol!nstead v. United !S:c<~s 277 U.S. 438 (_ 1928); Ja111cs Somn1ersett's C2.<;C (1772), 16 Cr. Pract. 289;-Fabrigas v. Jr.fostyn, 1 Co\Vp.• 161; Anz.?er Khan's case 6 Bengal La\v Reports 392; l::sliu.t::ba)'i Eleko v. Officer Ad111inisterin:; the Go~·cTJ11ne11t of Nir;eria, AIR (1931) P.C. 248; Prabhakar Kcshed Tare '-~ Ors. v. En1peror AIR (1943) N::i;. 26; Vi111lahai D.:shpande v. Eniperor A.l.R. 1945 Nvg. 8; Jitcndranath Ghosh v. 1T/1e Chief Secretary to th~ Go1·er111t1enr of'Benga! ILR 60 CaL 36.t-; In re: Bali\\"arf Ul Roy'-~ Ors. 48 C\VN 766; Bidl SuppJy· Co. ¥. The U11io11 of India &: Ors. [1956] 5CR 267 and B.11lu:«-1har Jllath v. The Co1111nissioner of InclJn1e-tax, Delhi & Rajasthan '-~ Anr. [1959] Supp, (I) 528, r<ferreu to.
The \•iew, that "'·hen rigl":t to "enforce "the right under Art. 21 is "uspo;;'!n.!2d, the result \V'ouJd b~ that there wculJ be no remedy against deprivatiun of a person's life or Iib~rty by the St<ltc el-en though such deprivation is \vitl:.:n1t the authority of l::nv ot e\:en in flagrant ·violation of the provi$ion~ of ]av: i~ hot accetitablc. - 1-he facts that the framers of the Constitution made an aspect cf suCh right a part of the Fundamental Rights did .not have the cIT.::c~ of exterminating the indepcn~cnt identity of suc.h. right and of m::iJ•.ing: Art. 21 to l;c the sole reposit_orv of that richt. Its real effect was to ensure th:.:.t a Ja\V under which a person can be deprived of his. life or pcrsohal liberty shou 1J. prescribe a procedure for such deprivation or such l:r~ should be a valid l::nv not violative of Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. Recognition as Fundamental Right of one aspect of the pre-constitutlon:ll right · cannot have the effect of making things Jess favourable so far a~ the san.:tLY oi' life and personal liberty is concerned compared to the pcsition if ah a~pect of such right had not been recognised a., Fundamental Right becatL<>e ·of tl:.e vulnerability of Fundamental Rights accruing from Art. 359, [271 D-GJ
...
~
{
••
A. K. Gopalan v. State of ldadraS [1950] SCR 88 and Dhirubha Dei·fair.;h Go/iii v. The State of Bombay [1955] I SCR 691, referred to.
.F
After the earning into force of the· COD:.~titution a detenu ha3 two reml!Ji-~'l. one under Art. 226 or Art. 32 of the Constitution- and another under s. 4:11 of the Cod~ of Criminal Procedure. The· remedy uhder an earlier statut:Jry provision would not get obliterated because of the identical remc<ly by a subsequent Constitutional provision and that the t\VO can co-exist without 1-os'.nt: their independent iJentity. [272 D-EJ
i
, Maklian Singh v. Stale of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 797, applied. Dhirubha Devisingli Gold! v. 1'he State "nf Bon1bay [1955] 1 SCR 691, not ·invokable.
The principle that no one .shall be deprived of hi~ 1ife or liberty \\'i•hc:ut tile authority of law sterng not merely from the ba!'ic ass.umotion in every civilised society governed by the Rule of Law .,:>f I.he Sanctity of life a-r-4 liberty, it flows equally froil\ the fact that under our penal laws noi on<J i:i empc\\o>ered to deprive a, person of his lif'e or liberty \V'ithout the authority oi ~~
~2a~3M
·
·
1 he fact that penat laws of India answer .to the description of !he v.o~d "law" v.hich has been used in Art. 21 v.:ould not milit;:1te ngain~t ·the infcren:~
I
ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE V. S. S. SHUKLA
that Art. 21 is not the sole repository of the right to life or Personal Ubcrty. . A Nor is it the eil'ect of Art.. 21 that p~nal laws get merged in Art. 21 because of i'.he fact that they constitute "law" as mentioned in Art. 21, for were it so the suspension of the right to move a Court fOr enforcement of Fundam.ntal Right contained fu Art. 21 would also result iv, suspension of the r.g. t ·,o move any court for ·enforcement of penal lav.·s. At lne time the Constitution came into force, the l'egal position was that no one could be depr~ved of his life or liberty without the authority of law. [273 A-C}
••
Director of Rationing and Distribution v. 1The Corporatfon of Cclcutta & Ors. [19611 I SCR 158, relied on.
it is diffk:ult to accede to the eontention that because of Art. 21 of the
·Constitution, the law which was already in foice that no c.ne could be deprived of his life or liberty '\\ithout the authority of Jaw was: obliterated and ceased to remain in force. No rule of construction or interpretation \Varrants such an inference. The constitutional recognition of the ren1e<ly of _writ of habeas corpus did not obliterate or abrogate the statutory remedy of writ of habeas . corpus. Section 491, oi' the Code of Criminal Prccedure continued to be a part of that Code till that Code wa_s replaced by ~he new Code. Although. the ren1edy of writ of habeas corpus is not nC?.w avatlable1 under the new· Codei of Criminal Procedure. 1973. the same remedy is still available under Art. Z26 of the Constitution. [273 H, 274-A-CJ
C
l1>fo.kluin Singh v. State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 7CJ7, relied on.
According to the law in force in India before the comin:j into force of th_e -Constitution, no one could be deprived of his life and personal liberty ·without the authority of law. Such a claw continued to be in force after the coming into force of the Constitution in view of Art. 372 of the Constitution. [303 A-BJ The word "'law" bas been used in Art. 21 in the sense of State made law and not as. an· equivalent of law in the abstract or general sense embodying the ~ priru:lpres" of natural justice. "The procedure established by law" means the procedure established by law made by the State, that ig to saY, the Union Parliament or the Iegis1atures of the States. Law meant a valid and binding · taw under the provi!ions of the Constitution and not one infringing Fundamental Rights. [266 C-DJ
A. K. Gopalan v. Stat< of Madras [1950) SCR 88, explained.
;f .
"I1le effect of the suspension of' the ril!ht to 'move any court for the chforce~ · ·ment of the right cenferred by Art. 21 is that when a petition .is' filed in a .court, the court would have to proceed upon tha basi~ that no' relianC:e can be placed upon that Article for obtaining relief from the coun during the period ·of emeri:cncy. - [266 D-'-EJ
Startling consequences would follow from tho acceptance of the conte~tion that consequent upon the issue of the Presidential Order in question, no one. , can seek relief from courts during tho period of emergency, against deP::ivation - of Jifa and peroonal liberty. If two c0nstruct1ons. of ~ PreSidentiat Order v.·ere pos'!l'.ibfe. the court shtiuld lean ih favour of a view which d0es not result in such coru:«::quences. The construction which does nOt: result in such consequences" · is not only possible. it is also pre~cminently possible. {303 B-CJ
Equally well..e5tablished is the"t rule oft construction that if there be a cohfUct - between the municipal law on one side and the international 1aw or the provisions of any treaty obligations on the other, thei courts "'·Ould give effect t.CJ municfral law. If. however. two constructions of the municipal Jaw are po5"' · sible. the courts should lean in favour of adopting such cOnstruction as v.·ouJJ - make the provisions of the municipal law to be in harmony with the international -1aw or treaty oblitations. While dealinJJ; with th~ Presidehtial Orde" und.::-r Art .. 359(1) snch a eonstruction shoulJ be adopted. as would. if pcs.s.fble. not 1,rin_y it in conflict _with tho aOOYe Articles 8 iind 9 of U.N_. Charter. It i.'i - plaid' that such a construction is not only possible, it i'i also pre:emin~ntly
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[1976] SUPPLEMENTARY
reasonable, The Presidential Order, therefore, should be so construed as not to warrant arbitrary arrest or to bar right to an effective remedy by competent national tribuhals. for acts violating bask'l right of personal liberty granted by Jaw. 1276 A-B, 277 D-El Corocraft Ltd. v. Pan A.n1erican Airways Inc. [1969} 1 All. E.R. SO; Article 51 of the Constitution, H. H. Kesavanonda Bharti v. State of Kera!a [1.9731 Supp. SCR I, referred to.\
• I
The argument that suspending the right of a person to move any court for the enforcemeht of right to Jife and, personal liberty is done under a constitutional prevision and, therefore, it cannot be said that the resulting situation would tr.can the absence of the Rule of law, cannot stand close scrutiny for it tries to equate illusion of the Rule of LaW with the rea.Jity of Rule of Law. A. state. of hegation of Rule of Law would inot cease to be such a state because of the fact that such a state of negation of Rule of Law has been brought about by a statute. Absence of Rule of Law \vould neverthele% be absence of Rule of Law ewn though it is broueht about by a law to' repeal all laws. The Rule of Law requires something more than the legal principle ''quad prin~ c:ipi placuit legis habet vigorem." [277 E-H, 278 A-B]
'I
Free<lom under law is not absolute frecdon1. It has its own limitations in its own interest, and can properly be described as regulated freedom. 'Ihe truth that every man ought to be free has for its other side the complementary and consequential truth that no man can be absolutely free. The need of
liberty for each is necessarily qualified and conditioned by the need of libe1ty for all. Liberty in the State, or legal liberty, is never the absolute liberty of all, but relative and regulated liberty. Rule of Jaw is the antithesis of arbitrariness. The rule of law has come to be regarded as the mark of a free society. Its content is different in different countries. It is, however, identified with the liberty of the individual. It seeks to maintain a balance between the opposing .notions of individual liberty and public order. [267 C--D; 268 B-C] ln a long chain of authorities the Supreme Court has laid stress upon the prevalence of the Rule of Law in the country, according to which the executive cannot take action prejudicial to the right of an individual without the authority of law. There is no valid reason to depart from the rule laid down in those decisions. [278 E. 281 E. 303 C--Dl
Rai Sahib Rant Ja1t'aya Kapur & Ors. v. The State of Punjab [1955] 2 SCR 225: State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Thakur Bharat Singh [19671 2 SCR 454; Chief Settlement Con11nissioner, Rehabilitation Departn1ent, Punjab & Ors. etc. v. Oni Parkash &: Or.<:. etc. [1968] 3 SCR 655; District Collector of Hyderabad & On v. Mis. Ibrahim & Co. etc. [1970] 3 SCR 498; Bennett Coleman & Co. and Ors.. v. Union of India [197312 SCR 757; Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Union of India [1974] 2 SCR 398; Naraindas Indurkhya v. The State of Madhya Pradesh ATR 1974 SC 1232; Director of Rationing and Distribution v. The Corporation of Calc11tt11 &: Ors.· [1961] 1 SCR 158; Bislian Das & Ors. •.The State of Punjab & Ors. [1962] 2 SCR 69;-S. G. laisinghani v. Union of India & Ors. [1967] 2 SCR 703; rJnited States v. Wunderlick 342 US 98; John Wilkes's case (1770) 4 Burr. 2528 at 2539 and Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain: [19761 2 SCR 347, referred to.
According to Art. 21. no one can be deprived of his right m·personal liberty except in accordance with the procedure estabHshed by law. Procedure for the exer&ise of power of deprivin~ a person of his right of personal liberty . necessarily vostulates the existence of the substantive power. When Art. 21 is in force, law relating to deprivation of life and personal liberty m~st provide both for the substantive power as well as the procedure for the exercise of such power. When right to move in court for enforcement of right guaranteed by Art. 21 is suspended, it would have .the effect of ?ispensing with t!J.e necessity of prescribing procedure for the exercise of substantive power to deprive a person of his life and personal liberty,. it. cannot have t~e effec~ of permitti.ng an authority to deprive a person of his life or per~onal ltberty without the existence of such substantive power. [303 D-Fl
•'
..
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ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE V. S. S. SHUKLA
The difference in phraseology of the Presidential Order dated June 27, 1975 and that of the earlier Presidential Orders would not, however, justify the conclusion that because of the new Presidential Order dated June 27, 1975, a detention order need not -comply with the requirements of the law providing for preventive detention. Such a detention order would still be liable to be •zhallenged in a court on the ground that it does not co1nply with the require~ ment of law for preventive detention if ground for such challenge be: permissible in spite of and consistently with the new Presidential Order. The effect of the 1:hange in phraseology would only be that such of the observations made by this Court fn the context of the language of the earlier Presidential Orders cannot now be relied upon. Reliance, hov./ever, can still be placed upon the observations made in various cases .,-rhich were not linked with the phraseology of the earlier Presidential Orders. [263 F-HJ
••
li
Maklian.Singh v. State of Punjah ll964} 4 SCR 797; State of Ma/i.iras//tra \' . Prabhakar Pandurang Sangzgiri & Anr. [1966] 1 SCR 702 and Dr. Rani Manohar Lohia v. State of Bilwr & Ors. [1967] I SCR 709, referred to.
,•
A Presidential Order under Art. 359(1) can suspend during the period !)f emergency only the right to move any court for enforcement of the Funda· mental Rights n1entioned in the order. Rights created by statutes being not Fundamental Rights can be enforced during the period of emergency despite the Presidential Order. Obligations and liabilities flowing from statutory provi· sions likewise remain unaffected by the Presidential Order. Any redress sought from a court of law on the score of breach of statutory provision would be outside the purvie\v of Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order made thereunder. 1303 G-H] Ana.ndan Nan1biar & A11r. v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of Madras [1966J 2 SCR 406 @ 410, refmed to. I
t.
Clause (IA) of Art. 359 protects laws and executive actions from any attack on validity on the score of being violative of the Fundamental Rights mentioned in the Presidential Order in the same \vay as Art. 358 protect., the laws and executive actions from being challenged on the ground of being vioJaw tive of Art. 19 during the period of emergency. The language of clause (lA) of Art. 359 makes it clear that the protection which is afforded by that clause is to such law or executive action as the State would but for the provisions contained in Part Ill of the Constitution be competent to make or take. The word "competent" has a significance and it is apparent that despite the Presi· dential Order under Art. 359(1) in the case of executive action the competence of the State to take such action \vould have to be established. Such competence would, however, be judged ignoring the restriction placed by the provisions of Part lil of the Constitution. To put it in other words, clause (I A) of Art. 359 does not dispense. with the necessity of competence to make law or take exccu· tive action. But 1t would still be necessary to establish the competence de hors the restrictions of the Fundamental Rights. [283 D-E] Though, there is nlJ reference to substantive power in Art. 21, it \Vonld cover both the existence of the substantive power of depriving a person of his iife aud personal liberty as 'veil as the procedure for the exercise of that power. ~284-Dl The :suspension of the right to move a court for the enforccn1ent of the right ~ontained in Art. 2 l cannot have the effect of debarring an aggrieved person from approaching the courts with the complaint regarding Jeprivation of !ife or personal liberty by an authority on the score that no power has been vested in the authority to deprive a person of life or liberty. The pre·supposition of the existence of substantive power to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty in Art. 21 even though that article only mentions the procedure, would not necessarily point to the conclusion that in the event of the suspension of the right to move any court for the enforcement of Art. 21, the suspension \vould also dispense with the necessity of the existence of the substantive power. The co·existence of substantive power and procedure established by law for depriving a person of his life and liberty which is implicit in Art. 21 would not lead to the result that even if there is suspension of the right regarding 16-833 SCI/76
C
IJ•
F.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] SUPPLEMENTARY
procedure, suspension would also operate upon the necessity of substantive power. What is true of a proposition need not be true of the converse of that propositi?n. The ~uspe~sion of the right to move any court for the enforcement of the. nght contan:e? in Art. 21 may have the effect of dispensing with the nece~s1ty of prescribing procedure for the exercise of substantive power to ·:lepnve a person of his life or personal liberty, it can in no case have the e.ffect of . permitting a~1 authority to deprive a pefi;On of his life or personal liberty wrhout the existence of substantive pov.. ~r, The close bond which is
lhere between the existence of substantive power of depriving a oerson of his !ifc or personal liberty and the procedure for the exercise of that pO\Ver~ if :he right contained in Art. 21 were in operation, would not neces<;at iiy hold good if that right were suspended because the removal of compulsion about the prescription of procedure for the exercise of the substantive pov:er would not do away with the compulsion regarding the existence of that po\ver. [284 G--H, 285 A-G]
ln r:onsidering the effect of Presidential Order suspending the right of a person to move any court for enforcement of right guaranteed by Art. 21, the words "except nccording to procedure established by la,v" should not be treated to be synonymous with "save by authority of law". [285 Dl A Presidential Order under Art. 359(1) cr;_nnot have the effect of suspending lhe right to enforce rights flowing from statutes, nor can it bar <iccess to the rourts of person<; seeking redress on he s:ore of contravention of statutory provision~. Statutory provisions are enacted to be complied with and it is not permissible to contravene them. Statutory provisions cannot be treatt>d a~ mere piolls exhortations or words of advice which n1ay be adjured or diQobeycd with impunity. Nor is r:ompliance with statutory provisions optional or at the sufference of the official concerned. It is the presence of legal sanctions which ·rl.istinguishes positive law· from other systems of rules and norms. To be a legal system a set of norms must furnish sanctions for ~ome of its nrecept~. A legal sanction is usunlly thought of as a harmful consequence to induce compliance with law. Non~complince with statutory provisions entails rPrtain legal consequences. The Presidential Order cannot stand in the wnv of the court.;; giving effect to those consequences. To put it differently, the Pxecutive authorities exercising po\ver under a statute have to act in conformity with its provisions and within th" limits set out therein. \Vhen a statute deals v,rith matters affecting prejudicially the rights of individuals, the ambit of the power of the authorities acting under the statute would be circumscribed by i~ -provision~ and it would not be permissible to invoke some indefinite general po\vers of the executive. f286 D-Hl
Attorney General v. De Keyser's Royal llotcl Ltd. f19201 AC 508: Jaicl1and Lall Sethia v. State of WPsf BPnf!al f19661 Supp. SCR 464; Dur[:adas Shirali v. Un;on of lndia & Ors. f19661 2 SCR 573 and G. Sadanandan v. State of Kera/a & Anr. [19661 3 SCR 590, referred to.
Article 226 under which the High Courts can issue writs of habeas corplL'I is an integral part of the Constitution. No power has been conferred upon any authority in the Constitution for suspending the power of the Hi.~h Court to issue writs in the nature of habeas corpus during the period of emergency. Such a result cannot be brought about by putting some particular construction on the Presidential Order in question. [288 B. 304 A--B] Greene v. Secretary of State for Horne Affairs [19421 AC 284, Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien [1923] AC 603 (609) and Rai Sahib Rani Jawaya Kapur & Ors. v. The State of Punjab [1955] 2 SCR 225, referred to.
••
,i'\rticle 226 of the Constitution confers power upon the Hi,!?h Courts of i:-;suing appropriate writs in case it is found that the executive orders are not in ronformity with the provisions of the Constitution and the laws of the lnnd. Judicial scrutiny of executive orders with a view to ensure that they are not Tiolative of the provisions of the Constitution and the laws of the land being an integral pa.rt of our constitutional scheme. it is not permissible to exclude judicial scrutiny except to the extent such exclusion is warranted-by the J>rovi-
ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE V. S. S. SHUKLA
-sions of the Constitution and provisions. [290 F-<J]
!av.is made in accordance with those
There is a clear d,emarcation of the spheres of function and power in our 12onstitution. The ac1;eptance of the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants would mean that during the period of en1crgency, the courts \Vould be reduced to the position of being helpiess spectators even if glaring and blatant instances of deprivation- of life and pcrso11al liberty in coritr2vention of the statute arc brought to their notice. It would also mean that whatever inay be the law passed by the legislature, in the raattcr of life and personal liberty of the citizens, the executive duri;1g the p~riod of en1ergency would not be bound by it r.nd would be at liberty to ignore and contravene it. It is obvious that the accep~ance of the contention would result in a kind Of :;upremacy of the executive over the legislative and judicial organs of the State, and thus bring ab~ut a con1jtitutional imbal<).nce which perhaps was never in the contemplation of the framers of the Constitut:_on. The fact th::~t the government which controls the executive has to enjoy the confid..?nce of the legislature does not cl ::tract from the above condu-:ion. The executive under our constitutional sc:::wme is not merely to enjoy the confidence of the majority 'in the legislature, it is also bound to carry out tb:J lcgislaLive intent as n1anifcsted by the statutes passed by the legislature. The Constitution further contemplate5 that the function of deciding whether the executive has acted in accordance with the legislative intent should be performed by the Courts. [290 G-II, 291
th~
2I 1
A-CJ No one can deny the power of the State to assume vast po¥. ers of the detention in the interest of the securhy of the State. It may indeed the necessary to do so to meet the peril facing the nation. The consideration of security of the State must hon'e a primacy and be kept in the forefront compared to which the interests of the individuals can only take a• secondary place. The 1notto has to be "who lives, if the country dies." Extraordinary powers are always assumed by the Government in all countries in times of e1nerc::rcncy because of the extraordinary nature of the emergency. The exercise of the power of detention, it is well-settled, depends uron the subje::tive satisfacti0ri of the detaining authori~ and the courts can neither act as courtg of appeal over the decisions of the detaining authority ner can they substitute their own opinion for that of the authority regarding the necessity of d~tention. There is no antithesis between the power of the State to detain a person without trial under a la\v of preventive detention and the power of the court to examine the legality of such detention. In dealing with an application for a \Vrit of habeas corpus, the courts only ensure that the d'°triinin'! authoritir.~ flct in accordance wi1Ji the law of preventive detention. The impact upon the individual of the massive and comprehensive powers of preventive detention with which the ad1ninistrative officers are armed has to be cushioned with legal safeguardt; against arbitrary deprivation of personal liberty if the premises of the rule of law is not to lose its content and become me<lnin_dess. The C'hances of an innocent per~on being detained under a Jaw providing for preventive detention on the subjective sa-tisfaction of an administrative authority are much greater compared tio the po<:sibilitv of an innocent person being convicted at trial in a court of law. [291 F-H, 292 A. D-E]
C
f
Rex v. Halliday Ex-parte Sadiq [1917] A.C. 260 @ 272 and Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson [1942] A.C. 206 referred to The Presidential Order of June 27, 1975, did not affect maintainability of the habeas corpus petitions to question the legality of the detention orders and such petitions could be proceeded with despite that order. [293 F] Pl'inciple in Ja1nes Com1nersett's case 1772 State Trials p. 1, referred to.
A law of preventive detention is not punitive but precautionary and preventive. The power of detention under such law is based on circumstance of suspicion and not on proof of allegation as is required at a regular trial for the commission of an offence. [294 Fl A court cannot go behind the truth of the alleged facts. If the material is germane to the object for \vhich detention is legally permissible and an
SUPREi\.IE COURT REPORTS
[1976] SUPPLEM£NTARY
o.rder for detention is made on the basis of that 1naterial, the .:ourts cannot sit as .a court of appeal and st1bstitute their own opinion for that of the authonty concerned regarding the necessity of detention. l295 E·-FJ
,
Sharpe v. Wakefield [1891j A.C. 172 at p. 179 and Ross v. Papadnpoi!o.1 119581 2 All. E.R. 23 (on p. 33), referred to.
Malice in fact is quite a different thing: it n1ea11<.; an actual 1nalicious intention on the part of the person \.Vho has Jone the wrongful act, a:i.d it 1nay be, in proceedings based on v..Tongs independent of contract, a very material ingredient in the question of \Vhether n valid cause of action can be stated. [26J C-DI
• I
Sliu!rcr v. Shields [1914] A.C. 808 and Hh11t :Varh v. Sr1uc of !Ve.it Bcngo/, 11974] 3 S.C.R. 315, referred to.
In view of the Presidential Order suspending the right of a per::;on to n10Vc any court for enforcement of specifk'<l Fnnda111ental Rights including the one
I
under Art. 22(5), it may \Vi1h plausibility be [lfgned that the vagueness of grounds of detention would not warrant the quashing of such detention order during the pendency of the Presidenial Order on lhe score of vio!ation of Art. 22(5). The Presidential Order \.Vould, hO\\'evcr, not stanJ in the \V:n ,,f the infinnity of th? v<igucncss of grounds of detention because of t11C contravention of s. 8{1 J of Maintenance of Jntern:1I Securitv r\ct. 1971. [297 E-F] . E\·ery law providing for preventive detention contains certiin procedural It is imperative that there should be strict compliance \vith the requirements of those procedural safcgtmrds to sustain the validity of detention. Detention \Vithout trial results in serious inroads into pcrsonril liberty of an individual. In such cases it is essential 10 ensure that there is no deviation fron1 the procedural s~1feguards provided by the statute. In the matter of even .1 criminal trial, it is procedure thnt spells out much of the difference betv.'ccn the rule of law and the rule by \Vhim and caprice. The need for strict adherence to strict procedural safeguards is much greater \vhen we arc dealing with preventive Jetention \.Vhich postulates detention of a person even though he is not found guilty of the eomn1ission of an offence. To condone or allo\v rclax;~:ion in the 1nattcr of compliance \vith proce<lur:.1! requirements \vould necessarily have the effect of practically doing ~nvny with. even the slender safeguards provided by the legislature against the arbitrary use of the provisions relating to prevention detention. The history of personal liberty is largely the history of insistence upo11 procedure. lt \vould, therefore, be wholly inappropriate to countenance .ind laxity in the matter of strict compliance \vith procedural requiren1ent<; rn:scribed for preventive detention. [297 G-JI, 298 A-Bl ~ufcguanls.
Once suhstnntial <lisqt1ieting doubt<; arc raised by the detenuc in the mind of hi'> detentior,i, it \vonld be the bounden duty of the State to <li~pcl those doubts by placing sPfficicnt material before the court \vith a vie'v to satisfy it about the validity of the detention by filing :1 good return. \299 C-D] ·
uf the court regarding the validity
l\ishori Mohan v. Slate of l..f''1-xt He/If.fa/ AlR 1974 SC 1749: Ki!lg E111peror Sihnath Banerii 71 "IA 241 nnd G. Sada11011da11 v. State of l\era/11 (~ An,· .. (1966.1 3 SCR 590. referred to. l'.
[His Lordship did not express any opinion on the question or the \'a\idity of:;. 16A(9) of the ~faintenance of Internal Security Act.j 301-A
'The appropriate occasion for the High Court to go into the co~s1itutional validity of s. 16A(9) and extend all judicial scrutiny in \\Tit<> of habeas corp11_1 v.-·ould be \.Vhen the State or a dctenu whoever is aggrieved upon, con1es in :1ppenl against the final julilgn1ents in any of the petition5 pending in the High Co111i<>. The \\'hole matter \vould then be at large before the Suprcnte Court and it \voul<l not be inhibited by procedural or other constraints. lt \\'Oul<l not be pern1issible or proper for the Supreme Court to short circuit the wh0lc
~
AOOL. DIST. MAGISTRATE V. S. S. SHUKLA
thing and decide the n1atter by by~passing the l!igh Courts who are seized of the matter. [302 F-G and 304 D-EJ
\
.
Section 18 of the Maintenance of Internal S~curity Act would not detract from the view that Art. 21 is not the sole repository of the right to personal liberty. The principle that no one shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty without the authority of la\v is also an essential facet of the R.ule of law. Section 18, therefore, cannot be of much assistance. 1he vie\.v that s. 18 ~~·ould have the effect of enlarging the ambit of the power of the detaining authority for the purpose of passing an order for detention is not correct. There ha~ been no amendment of s. 3 of the Act. [274 D-Fl Section 18 cannot be construed to mean that even if an order for detention is made on grounds not \van·antcd by s. 3 of tile Act, it shall be taken to be an order under s. 3 of the Act. Apart from the fact that such an inference is not pern1issib!e on the language of s. 18, the acceptance of this vi·;:w would also render the validity of s. 18 open to question on the ground that it suffers fron1 the vice of excest.ive delegation of legislative power. The legislature is bound to lay do·.,.rn the legislative policy by prescribing the circu1nstances in which an order for detention can be made. It is not permissible for the legislature to confer a power of detention without laying down guidelines and prescribing the circumstances in which such order should be made. To do ·~10 \vould be tantamount to abdication of legislation function for in ~uch an event it would be open to the dct<iining: authority to detain a person on any groun<\ whatsoever. [274 F-H. 275 A] 'fhis Court in appeal by the State cannot enlarge the area of the unfavourable decision qua the State and make its position \Vorse compared to what it was before the filing of the appeal. Procedural propriety in matters relating to -i1ppeals forbids such a course. The question of extent of judicial scrutiny in the light of s. 16A should be gone into v..·hcn the \Vhole matter is at targe before ithis court and this court is not inhibited by procedural and other constraints from going into certain aspects which have a vital beaiing. It is primarily for the High Courts before \Vhich the matters are pending to decide the question of area of judicial sctutin}' in the light of s. 16A(9), as an1ended by Act 14 of 1976. A -course which has the effect of bypassing the High Courts and making this Court in appeals from orders on preliminary objection to decide th;! matter even before the matter has been considered by the High Court in the light ,of s. 16.\, as an1cnt!e<l by Act J 4 of 1976 should be <ivoided. [301 F-Hl There is no sufficient ground lo interfere with ihe view taken by all th\: nine High Courts which went into the n1atter that the Presidenti<tl Ord>!r dated June 27, 1975, did not affect the maintainability of the habeas corpus petitions to question the legaHty of the detention orders. f304-· C]
. The principles which should be follov.'ed by the courts in dealing with petitions for writs of habe:.is corpus to challenge the legality of detention are well-established. [304-D]
Unanimity obtained without sacrifice of conviction commends the decision to public confidence. Unafimity which is merely formal and which is recorded at the expense of strong conflicting views is not desirable in a court of last resort. [304-E] A dissent in. a ci;>urt of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of \he law, to the 1n!elhgenc~ of a fu~ure day when a later decision may possibly correct the en·or into \\lhtch the dissenting Judge believes the court have been betrayed. [304-GJ
I.I
r
Prophets with Jlo11or by Alan Barth 1974 E<l. p. 3-6, referred to.
Observation : . Judges are not there simply to decide cases, but to decide them as they think they should be <lec_ided, and while it may be reorettab1e tha~ th_ey cannot ahva~s agree. it is better that their independence sh ould b~ mamta1ned and recognized than that unanimity should be secured through its ~acrifice. ~ ·
2 \4
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1976] SUPPLEMENTARY -
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 279 of 1975.
(From the Judgment and Order dated 1.9.75 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court m M. P. No. 597 of 1975) and
.
Criminal Appeals No. 355-356 of 1975.
;
(From the judgment and Order dated 12.11.1975 of the Allahabad High Court in W.P. Nos 7428 and 6885 of 75) and
Civil Appeals Nos. 1845-1849 of 1975
(From the Judgment and Order dated 26.11.1975 of the Karnataka High Court in W. N. Nos. 3318, 4101, 4103, 4177 and 4178 of 1975) and Criminal Appeal No. 380 of 1975.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 31.10.1975 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Writ No. 149/75) and
Criminal Appeal No. 41 of 1976
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 19-11-1975 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Writ No. 158 of 1975) and Criminal Appeal No. 41 of 1976
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 31 10.75 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Writ No. 128/75) and Criminal Appeal No. 389 of 1975
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 5 / 6/8th Dec. 1975 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appln. Nns. 171. 95, 97, 99, 109, 115, 116 and 168175) and
Criminal AppealNo. 3 of 1976
(From the Judgment and Order dated 12.12.1975 of the High Court of Rajasthan in D. B. Crl. Habeas Corpus petition No. 1606 of 1975) and
A pplicantl Interveners
1. Smt. Manek Ben (In Crl. A. No. 279175) 2. Maharaj Jai Singh (In Crl. A. Nos. 279, 355-356/75) 3. M/s. Surinder Mohan & Saraj Bhan Gupta (In Crl. A. Nos. 279, 355-356/75)
4. Mr. V.K. Singh Chowdhry (In Crl. A. No. 355175) 5. Mr. Deepchand Jain (In Cr!. A, Nos. 355-356/75)
-
ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE v. S. S. SHUKLA
I. N. Shroff and H. S. Parihar M. C. Nihalani, Adv. Genl., Ram Punjwani, Dy. Adv. Genl., for the State of Madhya Pradesh--for the j!ppellant, in Criminal Appeal No. 279 /75.
~
Shanti Bhushan, R. P. Goyal, S. ·s. Khanduja, B. R.
Agarwala
C. L. Sahu arul R. N. Nath, for the respond~nt in Criminal Appeal \
.
No. 279 of 1975.
S. N. Kakar, Adv. Genl. Girdhar Malviya and 0. P. Rana for the appellant-State of U. P. in criminal appeals Nos. 355-356 of 1975.
Soli l. Sorabjee, S. S. Kharuluja, Mrs. K. Hingorani, K. N. Tripathi, R. P. Goyal and Y atirulra Singh for the respondent in Crl. A . No. 355/75.
•'
G. C. Dwivedi, S. S. Khanduja, Dr. N. M. Ghatate, R. P. Goyal, K. N. Tripathi and K .K. Iha, for the respondent in Cr!. A. No. 356/75.
For the applicant/lnterveners
!. Smt. Manek Ben M/s. S. Venkataswami, C. S. Vaidianatha, Hardev Singh and R. S. Sodhi. 2. Maharaj lai Singh A. K. Sen, R. H. Dhebar, R. C. Bhatia and B. V. Desai
)
.
3. M/s. Surinder Mohan & Suraj Bhan Gupta M/s Sharad Marwhar and R. N. Nath 4. Mr. V. K. Singh Chowdhry Mr. Santokh Singh . 5. Mr. Deepchand lain M/s. Sharad Manohar and Amlan Ghosh
Niren De, Attorney General for India, V. P. Raman, Addi Sol. General, R. N. Sachthey, Girish Chandra and S. P. Nayar for the appellant in Civil Appeals Nos. 1846-1849/75 and 1926/75) Rama Joise, N. M. Ghatate and S. S. Khanduja for respondent in CA No. 1845175 C. K. Daphtary, M. Veerappa, N. M. Ghatate, Rama Joise, S. S. Khanduja and Miss Lilly Thomas for respondent in CA No. 1846.
F'
Shanti Bhushan, N. M. Ghatate and Rama Poise for respondent in CA No. 1847 /75. N. M. Ghatate, Rama Joise, S. S. Khanduja, Miss Lilly Thomas, Pramod Swaroop, M. Veerappa, S. Balakrishnan Sharad Manoharn, M. K. Jain, Altai Ahmed, R. P. Goyal, K. N. Tripathi, C. C. Dwivedi and Mrs. K. Hingorani for respondent in CA No. 1848/75.
S. S. Khanduja for respondent in CA No. 1849 and R. I. 1926/75 K. N. Byra Reddy and Narayan Nettar for the appellant in CA No. 1926175.
V. M. Tarkunde, S. K. Sinha, C. K. Ratnaparkhi, S. K. Verma and M. P. !ha for respondent I in Criminal A. 380175.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
N. M. Qazi and M. N. Shroff, for Appeal No. 380/75.
[1976] SUPPLEMENTARY
the appellants
in Criminal
N. M. Ghatate and S. Balakrishnan for respondents 3 & 8 and 2, 4-7 in Cr. A. No. 380/75. S. M . .fain for the appellant in Cr. A. No. 3/76.
V. S. Krishnan and A. V. M. Krishnan for respondent No. 2 in Criminal Appeal No. 3/76. Niren De, Attorney Genl., V. P. Raman, Addi. Sol. Genl. R. N. Sachthey, Girish Chandra, S. P. Nayar and P. P. Rao (in Cr. A. No. 279175 only) for the Attorney General in Cr!. As No. 279 & 355356/75)
C
P. Ramchandra Reddy, Adv. Genl. and P. P. Rao for the State of Andhra Pradesh in Cr!. As. Nos. 279, 355-356175. Mr. Balblzadra Prasad Singh and Mr. U. P. Singh for the State o! Bihar in Cr!. As. Nos. 279, 355-356/75.
J. N. Kaushal, Adv. General, P. P. Rao and G. D. Gupta for the State of Haryana in Cr!. A. No. 279 /75.
Bakshi Sita Ram, Adv. General, R. N. Sachthey and S, P. Nayar for the State of Himachal Pradesh in Crl. As. Nos. 279, 355-356/75. 0. K. Tikhu, Advocate General and Vineet Kumar for the State of Jamrnu and Kashmir in CA. Nos. 1845-1849.
R. N. Byra Reddy, Advocate General and N. Nettar for the State of Karnataka in Cr!. A. 279 and 1845/75. M. M. Abdul Khader, Advocate General and D. K. M. K. Nair for the State of Kerala in Cr!. As. 279, 355-356/75. R. W. Adik, Advocate General and D. R. Dhanuka and M. N. Shroff for the State of Maharashtra in Cr!. As. 279, 355-356/75.
J. S. Wasu, Advocate General and 0. P. Rana for the State of Punjab in Cr!. As. 279, 355-356/75.
A. V. Rangam and Miss A. Subhashini for the State Nadu in Cr!. As. 279, 355-356175.
of Tamil
S. N. Kakar, Advocate General and!. M. Nanavati (0. P. Rana) for the State of Uttar Predesh in Cr!. A. 279 and CA No. 1845-1849175. J. M. Thakore, Advocate General, !. M. Nanavati, S. K. Dholakia and R. C. Bhatia for the State of Gujarat in all appeals.
The following Judgments were delivered :
RAY, C.J. These appeals are by certificates in some cases and by leave in other cases. The State is the appellant. The respondents were petitioners in the High Courts.
ADDL. DIST. ivIAGISTRA"I[ l'. s.
s. s11t;.,,;.1_A (i·~ny, ('.J.)
The respondents filed applications in different High Courts for the isSue of writ of habeas corpus. They challenged in some cases the validity of the 38th and the 39th Constitution Amendment Acts, the Proclamation of Emergency by the President under Article 352 of the Constitution made on 25 June, 1975. They challenged the legality and validity of the orders of their detention in all the cases. I•
The State raised a preliminary objection that the Presidential Order dated 27 June, 1975 made under Article 359 of the Constitution suspending the detenus right to enforce any ol the rights conferred by Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution and the continuance of emergency during which by virtue of Article 358 all rights conferred by Article 19 stand suspended are a bar at the threshold for the responoents to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and to ask for writs of habeas corpus.
The judgments are of the High Courts of Allahabad, Bombay (Nag-· µ~r Bench), Delhi, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Rajasthau. ·
The High Courts held that notwithstanding the continuance of . emergency and the Presidential Order suspending the enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by Articles 14, 21 and 22 the High Courts can examine whether an order of detention is in accordance with the D provisions of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), which constitute the conditions precedent to the exercise of powers thereunder excepting those provisions of the Act which are merely procedural or whether the order was made malafide or was made on the basis of relevant materials by which the detaining authority could have been satisfied that the order was l].ecessary. Tht: High Courts also held that in spite of suspension of enforcement of E fundamental rights conferred by Arlicles 21 and 22 of the Constitution a person's right to freedom from arrest or detention except in accordance with law can be enforced only where such arrest and detention are not in accordance with those provisions of the statute which form the conditions precedent to the exercise of power under that statute as distinguished from merely procedural provisions or are malafide or are not based on relevant materials by which the detaining anthority could F have been satisfied that the order of detention was necessary.
t
The High Courts held that the High Courts could not go into the questions whether the Proclamation of Emergency was justified or whether the continuance thereof was malafide. The High Courts did not decide about the validity of the 38th and the 39th Constitution Amendment Acts. The 38th Constitution Amendment Act amended Articles 123, 213, 239(b), 352, 356, 359 and 360. Broadly stated, the 38th Constitution Amendment Act renders the satisfaction of the President or the Governor in the relevant Articles final and conclusive and to be beyond any question in any Court on any ground. As for Article 359 clause (IA) has been inserted by the 38th Constitution Amendment Act. The 39th Constitution Amendment Act amended Articles 71, 329. 329(A) and added Entries after Entry 86 in the Ninth Schedule.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] SUPPLEMENTARY
No arguments were advanced on these Constitution AmenJment Acts and nothing thereon falls for determination in these appeals. His appropriate to mention here that on 3 December, 1971 in exercise of powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution the President by Proclamation declared that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India is threatened by external aggression.
On 25 June, 1975 the President in exercise of powers conferred by clause ( 1) of Article 352 of the Constitution declared that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India is threatened by internal disturbances.
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On 27 June, 1975 in exercise of powers conferred by clause ( 1) of Article 359 the President declared I.hat the right of any person including a foreigner to move any Court for the enforcement of the r:ghts conferred by Article 14, Article 21 and Article 22 of the Constitution and all proceedings pending in any Court for the enforcemem of the above-mentioned rights shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamations of Emergency made under clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution on 3 December, 1971 and on 25 June, 1975 are both in force. The Presidential Order of 27 June, 1975 further stated that the same shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any Order made before the date of the aforesaid Order under clause (1) of Article 359 of the Constitution. It should be noted here that on 8 January. 1976 there was a notification that in exercise of po\ven~ conferred by c]ausc ( 1) of i\.rticle 359 of the Constitution the President declares that the right of any person to move any Court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 19 of the Constitution and all proceedings pending in any Court for the enforcement of the above-mentioned rights shall remain suspended for" the period during which the Proclamation of Emergency made under clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution on 3 December, 1971 and on 25 June, 1975 arc in force. The questions which fall for consideration are two . First, whether in view of the Presidential Orders dated 27 June, 1975 and 8 January, 1976 under clause (1) o[ Article 359 of the Constitution any writ petition under Article 226 before a High Court for habeas corpus to enforce the right to perso1rnl liberty of a person detained under the Act on the ground that the order of detention or the continued detention is for any reason not under or in compliance with the Act is maintainable. Second, if such a petition is maintainable what is the scope or extent of .iudicial scrutiny particularly in view of the Presidential Order dated 27 June, 1975 mentioning. inter alia, Article 22 of the Constitution and also in view of sub-section (9) of section 16A of the Act. The Attorney General contended that the object and purpose of emergency provisions is that the Constitution provides special powers to the Executive because at such times of emergency the considerations of State assume importance. It has been reco~nised that times of grave national emergency demand grant of special power to the Executive. Emergency provisions contained in Part XVIII including Articles 358,
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359(1) and 359(1A) are constitutional imperatives. The validity of law cannot be challenged on the ground of infringing a fundamental right mentioned in the Presidential Order under Article 359(1). Similarly, if the Executive took any action depriving a person of a fundamental right mentioned in the Presidential Order by not complying with the law such Executive action could not be challenged because such challenge would amount in substance to and would directly impinge on the enforcement of fundamenlal rights mentioned in the Presidential Order. The reason given by the Attorney General behind the principle is that in times of emergency the Executive safeguards the life of the nation. Challenge to Executive actions either on the ground that these are arbitrary or unlawful bas been negatived in England in Liversidge v. Anderson(') and Greene v. Secretary of State for Horne Affairs(') and also by this Court in Sree Mohan Chowdhury v. The Chief Commissioner, Union Territory of Tripura( 3 ) and Makha11 Singh v. State of Punjab('). The contentions of the respondents are as follows : The arguments on behalf of the State mean that during the emergency there is no right to life or liberty. Article 358 is more extensive as the fundamental right itself is suspended. The Presidential Order under Article 359 ( 1) does not suspend any fundamental right.
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Second, the object of Article 359(1) is to bar moving the Supreme Court under Article 32 for the enforcement of certain specified rights without affecting in any manner the enforcement of common law and >tatutory rights to personal liberty under Article 226 before the High Court. Third, Article 359 ( 1) removes the fetter in Part III but does not remove the fetters arising from the principles of limited power of the Executive under the system of checks and balances based on separation of powers. Fourth, while the Presidential Order operates only in respect of fundamental rights mentioned in the Presidential Order it would not affect the rights of personal liberty at common law or under statute law or under natural law.
Fifth, Arlicle 359 (1) is not to protecl illegal orders of the Executive. The Executive cannot flout the command of Parliament relying on a Presidential Order under Article 359(1). The suspension of fundamental right or of its enforcement cannot increase the power of the Executive vis-a-vis the indiuidual.
Six'.h, there is no reason to equate the State with the Executive. The suspension of the fundamental right or the right to enforce it has only this consequence that it enables the Legislature to make laws violative of the suspended fundamental rights and the Executive to implement such laws. The suspension of the fundamental right does not enable the Executive to flout legislative mandates and judicial decisions.
(1) [i942] A. C. 206. ()) [1964] 3 S. C. R. 442.
(2) [19c2] A. C. 284. (4) [1964] 4 S. C.R. 797.
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Seventh, the Executive can act to the prejudice of citizens only to the extent permitted by valid laws. The Proclamation of Emergency docs not widen the Executive power of the State under Article 162 so as to empower the State to take any Executive action which it is not otherwise competent to take.
Eighth, the right to arrest is conferred by the Act on the States and their o!ftcers only if the conditions laid down under section 3 of the Act are fulfilled. Therefore, if the conditions laid down under section 3 of the Act are not complied with by the detaining authority then the order of detention would be ultra l'ires the said Act.
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Ninth, Habeas corpus is a remedy not only for the enforcement of the right to personal liberty, whether under natural law or a statute. but is also a remedy for the enforcement of the principle of ultra vires, viz., when the detaining authority has failed to comply with the conditions laid clown in section 3 of the Act. In such a case the High Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus for the enforcement of the principle of riltm vires. In England it was the practice in times of danger to the State to pass what were popularly known as Habeas Corpus Suspension Acts. Suspension did not legalise illegal arrest; it merely suspended a partictdar remedy in respect of particular offences. Accordingly it was the practice in England at the close of the period of suspension to pass an Indemnity Act in order to protect otliri<d> conccrnrci from the consequences of any incidental illegal acts which they might have committed under cover of the suspension of the prerogative writ.
In England the Defence of the Realm Acts 1914-18 empowered the Executive to make regulations by Order in Council for securing the public safety or for the defence rf <he realm. Jn The King v. !/"1!/idu_r Ex parte Zadiq(') the House of Lords held that a regulation was valid which authorised the Secretary of State to detain a British subject on the grounds of his hostile origin or association. It was contended on behalf of Zadiq that there was no provision for imprisonment without trial. The substantial contention was that general words in a statute could not take away the vested right of a subject or alter the fundamental law of the Constitution because it would be repugnant to the constitutional tradition of the country. The majority of the court swept aside these arguments and held that on the constrnction of the /\ct the Executive had unrestricted powers.
During the Second World War the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, l 939 in England empowered the making of regulations for the detention of persons by the Secretary of State in the interests of the public safety or the defence of the realm. and for authority to enter and search any premises.
Although acccs~ to the courts was not barred during the Second World War in England the scope for judicial review of executive action I I) [19171 A. C. 260.
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"as limited. The courts could not consider whether a particular regulation is necessary or expedient for the purpose of the Act which authorised it. The question of necessity or expediency was one for the Government to decide. The court could, however, hold an act to be illegal as being not authorised by the regulation relied upon to justify it.
1t was open to the subject in England to challenge detention by application for a writ of habeas corpus, but such application had little chance of success in view of the decision of the House of Lords in Liversidge's case (supra). The House of Lords took the view that che power to detain could not be controlled by the cot1rts, if only because considerations of security forbade proof of the evidence upon which detention was ordered. It was sufficient for the Home Secretary to have a belief which in his mind was reas"onable. The courts would not enquire into the grounds for his belief, although apparently they might examine positive evidence of mala fides or mistaken identity. In Greene·s case (supra) the House of Lords held that a mistake on the part of tile advisory committee in failing, as was reqnired by the regulation. to give the appellant correct reasons for his detention did nol invalidate the detention order. It is noticeable how the same House expressed this view without auy dissent.
Dicey states that this increase in the power of the Executive is no trifle, but it falls far short of the process bown in some foreign countries as "suspending the constitutional guarantees" or in France as the .. proclamation of a State of siege". Under the ACi of 1881 the Irish executive obtained the absolute power of arbitrary and preventive arrest, and could without breach of law detain in prison any person arrested on suspicion for the whole period for which the Act continued in force. Under the Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act, 1882 the Irish Executive was armed with extraordinary powers in the case of · certain crimes to abolish right to trial by jury. The Act of Indemuity in England is a retrospective statute which frees persons who had broken the law from responsibility for its breach, and thus make acts lawful which Wlien they were committed were unlawful. A Habeas Corpus Suspension Act does not free any person from civil or criminal liability for a violation of the law. The suspension, indeed, of the Habeas Corpus Act may prevent the person arrested from taking at the moment any proceeding against the Secretary of State. While the suspension lasts, he will not be able to get himself discharged from prison. If the prisoner has been guilty of no legal offence then on the expiration of the Suspension Act the Secretary of State and his subordinates are liable to actions or indictments for !heir lllegal conduct. . Dicey. stated that the unavowed object of a Habeas Corpus Suspension Act is .to enable the Gove~nment to do acts which, though politically expedient may not be stnctly legal. The Parliament which suspe_n?s one o'. the guarantees. for individual freedom must hold that a cns1~ has ~nsen when the nghts of individuals must be postponed to cons1derat1ons of State. A Suspension Act would in fact, fail of its
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main object, unless the officials felt assured that, as long as they bonafide, and uninfluenced by malice or by corrupt motives, carried out the policy of which the Act was visible sign, they would be protected from penalties for conduct which, though it ;night be technically a breach of law, was nothing more ,han the free exertion for the public gcod of that discretionary power which the suspension of Habeas Corpus Act was intended to confer upon the execulive. The position in America is described in Cooley on the General Principles of Constitutional Law in the U.S.A. Fourth Edition. In America the right to the Writ of .Habeas Corpus is not expressly declared in the Constitution, but it is recognised in the provision Article 1 in section 9 clause (2) that the privilege of writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. In America the power to suspend the privilege is a legislative power and the President cannot exercise it except as authorised by law. The suspension does not legalise what is done while it cont>nues. It merely suspends for the time this par.icular remedy. All other remedies for illegal arrests remain, and may be pursued against the parties making or continuing them. Liberty is confined and controlled by law, whether common law or statute. It is in the· words of Burke a regulated freedom. It is not an abstract or absolute freedom. The safeguard of liberty is in the good sense of the people and in the system of representative and responsible government which has been evolved. If extraordinary powers are given, they are given because the emergency is extraordinary, and are limited lo the period of the emergency.
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Unsuitability of a court of law for determining matters of discretionary policy was referred to by Lord Parker in the Zamora(') case and Lord Finlay in the Zadiq case (supra). In the Liversidge case (supra) it was held that the court is not merely an inappropriate tribunal, but one the jurisdiction of which is unworkable and even illusory in these cases. A court of law could not have before it the information on which the Secretary acts still less the background of statecraft and national policy what is and what must determine the action which he takes upon it. The Liversidge case (supra) referred to these observations in the Zadiq case (supra) "However precions the personal liberty of the subject may be, there is something for which it may well be, lo some extent, sacrificed by legal enactment, namely, national success in the war or escape from national plnnder or enslavement''. Liberty is itself the gift of the law and may by the law be forfeited or abridged. There is no record of any life of an individual being taken away either in our country during emergency or in England or America dnring emergency in their countries. It can never be reasonably assumed that such a think will happen. Some instances from different countries were referred to by some counsel for the respondents as to what happened there when people were murdered in gas chambers or (I) [1916] 2 A. C. 107.
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people were otherwise murdered. Such instances are intend to produce a kind of terror and horror and are hortative in character. People who have faith in themselves and in their country will not paint pictures of diabolic distortion and mendacious malignment of the governance of the country. Quite often arguments are heard that extreme examples are given to test the power. If there is power, extreme examples will neither add to the power nor rob the same. Extreme examples tend only to obfuscate reason and reality. I f
The reffect of the Suspension of Habeas Corpus Acts and of Indemnity Acts in England has been to give every man security and confidence in periods of public danger or apprehension. Rarely, however, has this been suffered without jealousy, hesitation and remonstrance . Whenever the perils of .he State have been held sufficient lo warrant this sacrifice of personal J:berty, no Minis1cr or Magistrate bas been suffered to tamper with the law at his discretion. Where the Government believes the State to be threatened by traitorous conspiracies during times of grave emergencies the rights of individuals of ordinary times become subordinate to considerations of the State.
The pre-eminent questions are four. First, is the Presidential Order under Article 359 a bar at the threshold Second, is Article 21 the sole repository of right to life and personal liberty Third, is the Presidential Order subject to the rubric of Rule of Law? Fouch, is section 16A(9) of the Act a rule of evidence?
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The first question turns on the depth and content of the Presidential Order. The vital distinction between Article 358 and Article 359 is that Article 358 suspends the rights only under Article 19 to the extent that the Legislature can make laws contravening Article 19 during the operation of a Proclamation of Emergency and the Executive can take action which the Executive is competent to take under such laws. Article 358 does not suspend any fundamental right. While a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation the Presidential Order under Article 359 ( 1) can suspend the enforcement of any or all fundamental rights. Article 359(1) also suspends any pending proceedings for the enforcement of such fundamental right or rights. The purpose and object of Article 359(1) is that the enforcement of any fundamental right mentioned in the Presidential Order is barred or it remains suspended during the emergency. Another important distinction between the two Articles is that Article 358 provides for indemnity whereas Article 359(1) does not, Article 359(1A) is on the same lines as Article 358 but Article 359(1A) now includes all fundamental rights which may be mentioned in a Presidential Order and is, therefore, much wider than Article 358 which includes Article 19 only. A person can enforce a fundamental right both in the case of law being made in violation of that right and also if the Executive acts in non-compliance with valid laws or acts without the authority of law. It cannot be said that the scope of Article 359 (l) is only to restrict the application of the Article to the 'Legislative field and not to the acts of the Executive. The reason is that any enforcement of the fundamental rights mentioned in the Presidential Order is barred
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and any challenge eilber to law or to any act of the Executive on the ground that it is not in compliance with the valid law or without authority of bw will amount to enforcement of fundamental rights and will, therefore, be within the mischief of the Presidential Order. The effect of the Presidential Order suspending the enforcement of fundamental right amounts to bar the locus stalldi of any person to move the court on the ground of violation of a fundamental right. The Constitution is the mandate. The Constitution is the rule of law. No one can arise above the rule of Jaw in the Constitution. The decisions of this Court in Molu111 Chowdhury's (supra) case, Makhan Singlz's (supra) case and Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar & Ors.(') are that any court means all courts including this Court and I Iigh Courts and the right to initiate legal proceedings. A person can enforce fundamental rights in this Court under Article 32 as well as in the High Courts under Article 226. It is idle to suggest that the object or Article 359 (1) is that the right to move this Court only is barred and not the right to move any High Court. Article 226 does not provide a guaranteed fundamental right like Article 32. This guaranteed right under Article 32 itself may be suspended by a Presidential Order under Article 359(1). In such a case it could not be said that the object of the makers of the Constitution is that a person could not move this Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights mentioned in the Presidential Order but could do so under Article 226. The bar created by Article 359 (1) applies to petitions for the enforcement of fundamental rights mentioned in the Presidential Order whether by way of an application under Article 32 or by way of any application under Article 226. [Sec Mak/um Singh's case (supra) and Ram Manolwr Lo/Jia's case (supra)]. It is incorrect to say that the jurisdiction and powers al this Court under Article 32 and of the High Courts under Article 226 are virtually abolished by the Presidential Order without any amendment of the Constitution. No amendment of the Constitution is necessary because no jurisdiction and power either of this Court or of the High Court is taken away. When a Presidential Order tacks away the locus standi of the detenus to move any court for the enforcement of fundamental rights for the time being the jurisdiction and powers of this Court and of the High Courts remain unaltered Article 359 ( 1) is not directed against any court. Ir is directed against an individual and deprives him of his locus standi. The courts cannot either increase or curtail the freedom of individuals contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. The courts Interpret the Constitution an~ the la"'.s in accordance with law and i.udicial conscience and not emotion. Tt ts wrong to say that the Executive has asked or directed any one not to comply with the conditions of the Act. The question is not whether the Eexcutive should comply or should not comply with the Act but whether a detenu has a locus sta1u1i to move any court for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions or the Act. -
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(1) [1966] 1 S. C.R. 709.
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In period. of public danger or apprehension the prote-.:tive law which gives every man security and confidence in times of tranquillity, has to give way to interests of the State. The opinion in England has been that when danger is imminent, the liberty of the subject is subordinated to the paramount interests of the State. Ring leaders are seized and outrages anticipated. Plo!s are disconcerted, and the dark haunts of conspiracy filled with disturst and terror (See May-Constitutional History of England, Vol. I, pp. 130-135). While the courts of law are in normal times peculiarly competent to weigh the competing claims of individuals and govermnent, they are ill equipped to determine whether a given configuration of events threatens the life of the community and thus constitutes an emergency. Neither are they equipped, once an emergency has been recognised particularly a war emergency or emergency on account of security of the country being threatened by internal aggression to measure the degree to which the preservation of the life of the community may require governmental control of the activities of the individual. Jurists do not have the vital sources of information and advice which are available to the executive and the legislature; nor have they the burden of formulating and administering the continuing programme of the government, and the political responsibility of the people, which, although intangibles, are of crucial importance in establishing the context within which such decisions must be made. Article 359(1) makes no distinction between the threat to the security of India by war or external aggression on one hand and threat to the security of India by internal disturbance on the other. In fact, both situations are covered by the expression "grave emergency" in Article 352(1). Apart from Article 359(1) all provisions of the Constitution laying down the consequences of a Proclamation of Emergency under Article 352(1) would apply to both situations. The conseque11ces of a Proclamation of Emergency under Article 352(1) of our Constitution are much wider than in England or America. Article 353 provides that the executive power of the Union shall extend to giving of directions to any State as to manner in which the executive power thereof is to be exercised. The exercise of such exeoutive power by the Union totally displaces the provisions of Article 162. Non-compliance with directions of the Union Executive under Article 353 by any State Executive may attract the provisions of Article 356 and the President's Rule may be imposed on that State. In such an event, Parliament may, under Article 357 ( f) confer on the President the power of the Legislature of that State to make laws or to delegate such legislative power tb lilly other authority. In such a situation, the federal structure and representative Government on which the Constitution is based, mav be completely chan[ed in the State 0r states concerned. Article 250 provides that dnring the op~ratioR of Prnclamation of Emergency Parliament may make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List. The Federal structure and representative government may suffer its full place in that ~itua:!oo.
17-833 SCI/76.
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On the expiry of the operation of the Presidential Order under Article 359(1), the infringement of the fundamental rights mentioned in the Order, eilher by the legislative enactment o.i: by an executive action, may be challenged iu a court of law and if after such expiration Parliament passes an Act of Indemnity, the validity and the effect of such legislation may have to be scrutinised. [See Mak!zan Singh's case (supra) at 813]. The provisions in our Constitution relating to emergency are of wide amplitude. The Executive is armed with special powers because individual interests are subordinated to State security. If law is invalid vis-a-vis fundamental rights there cannot be any challenge during the operation of Articles 358 and 359 on the ground that law violates fundamental rights. It is contradictory to say that there can yet be challenge to orders under that law as being not in accordance with law. Article 19 is a prohibition against law. Article 19 has nothing to do with the Executive. Law under Article 21 can be punitive or preventive. Jn Article 22 reference is made to grounds and representation in cases of preventive detention. If enforcement of Article 22 is suspended one is left with Article 21.
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The Act in the present case is law. The Executive orders are under that law. Any allegation that orders are not under that law will not rob the orders of the protective umbrella of Article 359. The challenge by a detenu that law is broken will be enforcement of Article 21 because law contemplated nnder Article 21 is substantive as well as procedural law. A law can be broken either of substantive or procedural parts. Neither enforcement of nor relief to personal liberty is based on Article 19. No executive action is valid unless backed by law. In the present cases there is law authorising detention. In the present cases, the writs questioned the validity of detention. The Legislature under Article 358 is authorised to act in breach of Article 19. The executive can act only in terms of that law. If this is prcemergency law it has to satisfy Part III of our Constitution. If it is emergency law it can violate Article 19 because it is protected by Article 358. . Under Article 359 the Presidential Orders have been of two types. On 3 November, 1962 in exercise of powers conferred by clause {I) of Article 359 of .the Constitution the President declared that "the right of any person to move any conrt for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 21 and Article 22 shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation of Emergency issued under clause (l) of Article 352 on 26 October, 1962 is in force, if such a person has been deprived of any right under the Defence of India Ordinance 1962 or of any rule or order made thereunder". 111e 1975 Presidential Order under Article 359(1) does not have the words "if snch a person has been deprived of any such right under the Defence of India Ordinance 1962 or any rule or order made thereunder". In other words, the 1962 Presidential Order is limited to the condition of deprivation of rights under the Defence of India Ordinance or any rule or order made thereunder whereas in the 1975 Presidential Order no statute is mentioned. The illegality of orders was challenged in
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Makhan Singh's case (supra) in spite of the Presidential Order under the 1962 Proclamation on the ground that the impeached orders are not in terms of the statute or they are made in abuse of law.
The decisions of this Court in Mohan Chowdhury's and Makhan Singh's cases (supra) are that duriug the operation of a Proclamation of Emergency no one has any locus stand! to move any court for the enforcement of any fundamental rights mentioned in the Presidential B Order. The ratio must necessarily apply to Executive acts because Executive acts are challenged on the grounds of beiug contrary to law and without the authority of law. The submission 6f the respondents that a person in detention can come to a court of law in spite of the Presidential Order under Article 359(1) and contend that a habeas corpus should be issued for his release or that the Executive should answer the detenu's challenge that the Act complained of is without authority of law or the challenge of the detenu that the provisions of the Legislative Act under which the detention has been made have not been complied with are all rooted in the enforcement of fundamental rights to liberty under Articles 21 and 22. If courts will in spite of the Presidential Order entertain such applications and allow the detenus to enforce to start or continue proceedings or enforce fundamental rights, Article 359 (1) will be nullified and rendered otiose.
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This Court in Makhan Singh's case (supra) said that if there was challenge to the validity of the detention order based on any right other than those mentioned in the Presidential Order tha! detenu's right to move any court could not be suspended by the Presidential Order because the right was outside Article 359(1). This was explained by stating that if the detention was challenged on the ground that it con!ravened the mandatory provisions of the relevant Act or that it was malafide and was proved to be so, the bar of the Presidential Order could have no application. This observation in Makhan Singh's case (supra) is to be understood in the context of the question that arose for decision there. Decision on a point not necessary for the purpose of or which does not fall to be determined in that decision becomes an obiter dictum [See Maharaiadhiraia Madhav Rao Jiwaji Rao Scindia Bahadur & Ors. v. Union of India('). In Makhan Singh's case (supra) !he detention orders which were the subject matter of the judgment were orders made by the Executive under the Defence of India Ordinance or Act and rules and orders made thereunder which was the express condition for detention in respect of which the Presidential Order of 1.962 under Article 359(1) applied. The Presiden!ial Order in the present case is on the face of it an un-conditional order and as such there is the vital and telling difference between the effect of the Presidential Order of 1962 and the present Presidential Order. It is obvious that the Government fully conscious of the Presidential Order of 1962 and its effect as determined by the decisions of this Court in Makhan Singh's case (supra) and subsequent (l) [1971] S. C.R.~ at pp. 97-98, !93-194.
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cases deliberately made the present Presidential Order an un-conditional order under Article 359 ( 1). Reference may be made to State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Pm1durang Sangzgiri and Anr. (') which clearly pointed out that the Presidential Order of 1962 was a conditional one and therefore if a person was deprived of his personal liberty not under the Act or rules and orders made thereunder but in contravention thereof, his right to move the courts in that regard would not be suspended. The decision of this Court in Pandurang's case (supra) is by the Constitution Bench of five learned Judges, three of whom were on the Constitution Bench of seven learned Judges deciding Makhan Singh's case (supra). In Fandurang's case (supra) the ratio was that if a person was deprived of his personal liberty not under the Act or rules and orders made thereunder but in contravention thereof, his right to move the courts in that regard was not suspended. It, therefore, follows from the decisions in Pandurang's case and Makhan Singh's case (supra) that the ratio in both the cases was that the 1962 Presidential Order being a conditional one the enforcement of rights under Articles 21 and 22 was suspended only to the extent of the conditions laid down in the Presidential Order and the suspension could not operate in areas outside the conditions. There is no aspect what" ever of any condition in the present Presidential Order. Therefore, the decisions in Makhan Singh's case (supra) and subsequent cases following it have no application to the present cases where the suspen!lion is not hedged with any condition of enforcement of any right under Articles 21 and 22. The conclusion for the foreging reasons is that the Presidential Order is a bar at the threshold.
The contentions of the Attorney General are two-fold. First, the legal enforceable right to personal liberty for violation thereof by the Executive is a fundamental right conferred by the Constitution and is embodied in Article 21. Second, apart from Article 21 the right to personal liberty against the Executive is neither a common law right nor a statutory right nor a natural right. He relies on three decisions. The earliest is Girindra Nath Banerjee v. Birendra Nath Pa/( 2 ). The others are King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee( 3 ) and Makhan Singh's case (supra). In the first two decisions it has been held that the right to habeas corpus is only under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In Makhan Singh's case (supra) it has been said that this right under section 491 became embodied in Article 21. The statutory right under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure bas been deleted from the new Code of Criminal Procedure which came into effect on 1 April, 1974.
(1) [1966] I S. C. R. 702. 12) I. L. R. 54 Cal 727. (3) 72 I. A. 241.
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The heart of the matter is whether Article 21 is the sole repository of the right to personal liberty. If the answer to that question be in the affirmative the Presidential Order will be a bar.
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The arguments on behalf of the respondents are that the right to life and personal liberty is not only in Article 21 but also under common law and statutes for these reasons. The right to personal liberty is contained in Articles 19, 20 and 22, and, therefore, Article 21 is not the sole repository to personal liberty. The respondents rely on the decision in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India(') where it was said that the ruling in A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras(') that Articles 19 and 22 are mntually exclu·sive no longer holds the field. The respondents also rely on the decisions in Shambhu Nath Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.("), Haradhan Saha & Anr. v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.(') and Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.( 5 ) in support of 1he proposition that these decisions followed the ruling in the Bank Nationaiisation case (supra). The respondents contend lhat the Presidential Order bars enforcement of rights under Articles 14, 19, 21 and 22 but it is open to the respondents to enforce violation of rights under Article 20. The other reasons advanced by the respondents are dealt with hereinafter.
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Ihe majority view in Flis Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kera/a(') is that there are no natural rights. Fundamental rights in our Constitution are interpreted to be what is ·commonly said to be natural rights. The only right to life and liberty is enshrined in Article 21.
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In A. K. Gopalan's case (supra) it has been said that to read law .as meaning natural law is to lay down vague standards. Law means law enacted by the State. Law must have some firmness. Law means positive State made law. Article 21 has been interpreted in A. K. Gopalan's case (supra) to include substantive as well as procedural law in the phrase "procedure established by law". The reason is obvious. A Jaw providing for procedure depriving a person of liberty must be a law made by statute. P. D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India Ltd.(') held that Article 21 is prohibition against unauthorised ·executive action. In Shrimati Vidya Verma through next friend R. V. S. Mani v. Dr. Shiva Narain Verma( 8 ) law in Article 21 has been held to mean State made law. In Makhan Singh's case (supra) it was decided that during the subsistence of the Presidential Order suspending the enforcement of fundamental rights neither a petition under Article 32 nor a petition under Article 226 could be moved invoking habeas corpus. An application invoking habeas corpus under section 491 of the Code of Crimimd Procedure cannot similarly be moved in the High Court. Part III of our Constitution confers fundamental rights in positive :as well as in negative language. Articles 15(1), 16(1), 19, 22(2), (I) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530. (2) [1950] 3 S. C. R. 88. (3) [19HJ I S. C. R. I. (4) [1975! I S. C. R. 778.
(5) [1975! 2 S. C. R. 832. (6) [1973] Supp. S. C. R. I. (7) [1952] S. C. R. 391. '(8) [1955] 2 s. c. R. 983.
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22(5), 25(1), 26, 29(1), 30 and 32(1) can be described to be Articles in positive language. Articles 14, 15(2), 16(2), 20, 21, 22(1), 22(4), 27, 28(1), 29(2), 31(1) and (2) are in negative language. It is apparent that most categories of fundamental rights are in positive as well as in negative language. A fundamental right couched in negative language accentuates by reason thereof the importance of that right. The negative language is worded to emphasise the immunity from State action as a fundamental right. [See The State of Bi/wr v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of J)arbhanga and Ors. (1) .] These fundamental rights conferred by our Constitution have taken different forms. Some of these fundamental rights are said to have the texture of Basic Human Rights (See A. K. Gopalmz's case (supra) at pp. 96-97, 248, 249, 293 and Bank Na~ionalisation case (supra) at pp. 568-71, 576-78). Article 31 (!) and (2) subordinate the exercise of the power of the State to the concept of the Rule of Law enshrined in the Constitution. (See Bank Nationalisation case (supra) at p. 568). Similarly, Article 21 is our Rule of Law regarding life and liberty. No other rule of law can have separate existence as a distinct right. The negative language of fundamental right incorporated in Part III imposes limitations on the power of the State and declares the corresponding guarantee of the individual to that fundamental right. The limitation and guarantee are complementary. The limitation of State action embodied in a fundamental right couched in negative form is the measure of the protection of the individual. Personal liberty in Article 21 includes all varieties of rights which go to make personal liberty other than those in Article 19 (1 )( d). (See Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors.('). The Bank Nationalisatio11 case (supra) merely brings in the concept of reasonable restriction in the law. In the present appeals, the Act is not challenged nor can it be challenged by reason of Article 358 and Article 359(1A) and the Presidential Order mentioning Article 19 as well. If any right existed before the commencement of the Constitution and the same right with its same content is conferred by Part III as a fundamental right the source of that right is in Part III and not in any pre-existing right. Such pre-Constitution right has been elevated by Part III as a fundamental right. The pre-existing right and the fundamental right have to be grouped together as a fundamental right conferred by the Constitution. See Dhirubha Devisingh Gohil v. The State of Bombay('). If there is a pre-Constitution right which is expressly embodied as a fundamental right under our Constitution, the common law right has no separate existence under our Constitution. (See B. Shankara Rao Badami & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Anr.( 4 ). If there be any right other than and more extensive than the fundamental right in Part III, such right may continue to exist under Article 372. , 1) [19521 S. C. R. 889· at 988-89. 12) [1964] 1 S. C.R. 332. (3) [1955] I S. C .R. 691 at 693-97. (4) [1969] 3 S. C. R. I at 11-13.
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ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE V. S. S. SHUKLA
••
(Ray, C.J.)
Before the commencement of the Constitution the right to personal liberty was contained in Statute Jaw, e.g. the Indian Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code as also in the common law of Torts. In the event of any wrongful infringement of the right to personal liberty the person aff.ected could move a competent court by way of a suit for false imp_risonment and claim damages.
Suits for false imprisonment are one of the categories of Jaw of Torts. The common Jaw of Torts prevailed in our country before the Constitution on the basis of justice, equity and good conscience. (See Waghela Rajsanfii v. Shiekh Masludin & Ors.(') Satish Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Doyal De( 2 ) and Baboo s/o Thakur Dhabi v. Mt. Subanshi w/o Mangal Dhobi( 3 ). This principle of justice, equity and good conscience which applied in India before the Constitution is generally known as the English Common Law. Apart from the Jaw of Torts, there was no civil remedy for unlawful infringement of the right to personal liberty in India before the Constitution.
After the amendment of section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1923, the right to obtain a direction in the nature of a habeas corpus became a statutory right to a remedy in India. After 1923 it was not open to any party to ask for a writ of habeas corpus as a matter of common law. (See Makhan Singh's case (snpra) at pp. 818-19; District Magistrate, Trivandrum v. K. C. Mammen Mappillai(4), Matthen v. District Magistrate, Trivandrum(' 5 ), Girindra Nath Banerjee's case (supra) and Sibnath Banerjee's case (supra). The previsions of section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code have been repealed recently as being superfluous in view of Article 226. (See 41st Report of Law Commission of India (Vol. I) p. 307). The present appeals arise from petitions filed in High Courts for writs in the nature of habeas corpus. The statutory right to remedy in the nature of habeas corpus under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be exercised now in view of the repeal of th:i,t section. Even if the section existed today it could not be exercised as a separate right distinct from the fundamental right, the enforcement of which is suspended by the Presidential Order as was held by this Court in Makhan Singh's case (supra) at pp. 818-825. There was no statutory right to enforce the right to personal liberty o\her than that in seetion 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the commencement of the Constitution which could be carried over after its commencement under Article 372. Law means enacted law or statute law. (See A. K. Gopalan's case (supra) at pp. 112, 199, 276, 277, 288, 307, 308, 309, 321, 322). It follows that law in Article 21 will include all post-constitutional statute law including the Act in the present case and by virtue of Article 372 all pre-constitutional statute Jaw including the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code. The expression "procedure established by law" includes substantive as well as procedural Jaw. (See A. K. Gopalan's case (supra) at p. 111 and S. Krishnan & Ors. v. The State of Madras( 6 ). It means (I) 14 I. A. 89 at 96. (3) A.I.R. 1942 Nag. 99. (5) L.R. 66 I.A. 222.
(2) I.L.R. 48 Cal. 388 at 407-10, 425. 426. (4) l.L.R. [1939] Mad. 708. (6) [1951] S. C. R. 621 at p. 639.
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some step or method or manner of procedure leading upto deprivation of personal liberty. A law depriving a person of personal liberty must be a substantive and procedural raw authorising such deprivation. It cannot be a bare law authorising deprivation of personal liberty. The makers of the Constitution bad the Criminal Procedure Code in mind. The repealed Criminal Procedure Code as well as the present Criminal Procedure Code bas substantive as well as procedural provisions. The substantive as well as the procedural parts in a law depriving a person of personal liberty must be strictly followed. There is no distinction between the expression "save by authority of law" in Article 31 (I) and the expression "except by authority of law" in Article 265. Laws under Article 31 ( 1) must lay down a procedure containing reasonable restrictions. Law under Article 265 also lays down a procedure. Therefore, there is po difference between the expression "except according to procedure established by law" in Article 21 and the expression "save by authority of law" in Article 31 (1) or the expression "except by authority of law" in Article 265. When Article 21 was enacted it would be a blunder to suggest that the founding fathers only enshrined the right to personal liberty according to procedure and did not frame the constitutional mandate that personal liberty could not be takea except according to law. The Attorney General rightly submitted at the outset that Article 21 confers a fundamental right against the Executive and law in that Article means State law or statute law. In the present appeals, the respondents allege that section 3 of the Act bas not been complied with. In the present appeals the Act is not challenged nor can it be challenged on the ground of infringement of Article 19 by reason of Articles 358. 359(1) and the Presidential Order. It has been pointed out earlier that non-compliance with the provisions of the Act cannot be chaJlengcd as Jong as the Presidential Order is in force. Article 20 states that no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. The present appeals do not touch any aspect of Article 20. The reason why reference is made at this stage to Article 20 is to show that Article 20 is a constitutional mandate to the Judiciary and Article 21 is a constitutional mandate to the Executive. The respondents contend that "State" in Article 12 will· also include the Judiciary and Article 20 is enforceable against the Judiciary in respect of iJlegal orders. The answer is that Article 20 is a prohlbition against the Judiciary in the cases contemplated there. If a person is detained after the Judiciary acts contrary to the provisiom in Article 20 such detention cannot be enforced against the Judiciary. In the event of the Judiciary acting contrary to the provisions in Article 20 such detention can be challenged by moving the court
t
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against the Executive for \Vrongfu1 detention. or conviction or punish-
ment as the case may be. The expression "No person shall be prosecuted for the same offence more than once" in Article 20 would apply only to the Executive. The decision in Makhan Singh's case (supra) is that fundamental rights cannot be enforced against the Judiciary in case of illegal
Y
ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE v. S. S. SHUKLA
-0rders.
(Ray, C.J.)
The decision in Ram Narayan Singh v. The State of Delhi
& Ors.(1) is no authority for the proposition that fundamental rights
·.can be enforced against the Judiciary. This Court held that the -detention of Ram Narayan was illegal because Ram Narayan was being detained without any order of remand by the Magistrate. In Ram Narayan's case (supra} there was no aspect of the bar under Article 359. It is not correct to say that the suspension of fundamental rights or of their enforcement can increase the power of the Executive. The effect of suspension or enforcement of fundamental rights is that an individual cannot move any court for the enforcement of his fundamental right to personal liberty for the time being. Reference to Articles 256, 265 and 361 was made by the respondents to show that Article 21 is not the repository of rights to life and liberty. These references are irrelevant. Article 256 does not confer any right on any person. It deals with relations between the Union and the State. Article 265 has nothing to do with the right to personal liberty. Article 3 61 ( 3) refers to the issue of a process from any court which is a judicial act and not any Executive action. In any event, these Articles have no relevance in the present appeals.
Reference was made by the respondents to an accused filing a" appeal relating to criminal proceedings to show that Artie!~ 21 is not the sole respository of right to life and liberty. In a criminal proceeding the accused defends himsel! against the accusation of a'l -0ffence against him.
He does_ not move any court for the enforce-
ment of his fundamental right of personal liberty. In an appeal against the order of conviction the accused challenges the correctness ·of the judicial decision. An appeal or revision is a continuation of the original proceeding. (See Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury(') and Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Ram
Taha! Ramnand & Ors.(').
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,
The respondents posed the question whether a decree given against the Government could be enforced because of the Presidential Order. This is irrelevant. However, a decree conolusively determines the rights of the parties in the suit and after a decree is passed the right o~ the decree-holder is not founded on the right which is recognised by the decree but on the decree itself. This right arising from a decree is not a fundamental right, and, therefore, will not be prima facie eovered by a Presidential Order under Article 359 ( 1) . The other examples given by the respondents are seizure of property by Government, requisition by Government contrary to Arti~ des 31 and 19(1)(f). If any seizure of property is illegal or an acquisition or requisition is challenged it will depend upon the Presidential Order to find out whether the proceedings are for the enforcement of fundamental rights covered by the Presidential Order. (I) [19531 S. C. R. 652. (2) (1957] S. C. R. 488. (3) [1973] 1 s. c. R. 185.
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Fundamental rights including the right to personal liberty are conferred by the Constitution. Any pre-Constitution rights which are included in Article 21 do not after the Constitution remain in existence which can be enforced if Article 21 is suspended. If it be assumed that there was any pre-constitutional right to personal liberty included in Article 21 which continued to exist as a distinct and separate right then Article, 359 (I) will be an exercise in futility. In Makhan Singh's case (supra) there was not suggestion that apart from Article 21 there was any common law or pre-Constitution right to personal liberty.
.'
The theory of eclipse advanced on behalf of the respondents is 1mtenable. Reliance was placed on the decision in Bhikaji Narain D!wkms & Ors. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.(T). The theory of eclipse refers to pre-constitutional laws which were inconsistent with fundamental rights. By reason of Article 13 (1) such Jaws did not become void but became devoid of legal force. Such laws became eclipsed for the time being. The theory of eclipse has no relevance to the suspension of the enforcement of fundamental rights wider Article 359 ( 1). The constitutional provisions conferring fundamental rights cannot be said to be inconsistent with Article 13 (1).
•\ •
Article 21 is not a common law right. There was no pre-existing common law remedy to habeas corpus. Further, no common law right which corresponds to a fundamental right can exist as a distinct right. apart from the fundamental right. See Dhirubha Devisingh Go/zil v. The State of Bombay (supra) and B. Sha11kar Rao Badami's c1se (supra). In Gohil's case (supra) the validity of the Bombay Act of 1949 was challenged on the ground that it took away or abridged fundamental rights conferred by- the Constitution. The Act was held to be beyond question in view of Article 31-B which had been inserted in the Constitution by the First Amendment and the Act being mentioned as Item 4 of the 9th Schedule. It was said that one of the rights secured by Part III of our Constitution is a right that the property shall be acquired for a public purpose and um!er a law auhorising such acquisition and providing for compensation. That is also the very right which was previously secured to a person under section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935. This Court said that what under the Government of India Act was a provision relating to the competency of the Legislature, was aisD' clearly in the nature of a right of the person affected. The right under Article 299 which was pre-existing, became along with other fundame[\tal rights for the first time secured by our Constitution when grouping them together as fundamental rights.
The respondents gave the example that although section 12(2)' of the Act makes it obligatory on the Executive to revoke the detention order and if the Executive does not do so such Executive action will amount to non-compliance with the Act. Here again, the detenu (I) [1955] 2 S. C. R. 589.
ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE V. S. S. SHUKLA (Ray, C.J.)
cannot enforce any statutory right under the Act for the same reason that it will amount to enforce his fundamental right to personal liberty by contending that the Executive is depriving him of his personal liberty not according to "procedure established by law". Similarly, the example given of an illegal detention of a person by a Police Officer will be met with the same plea. f
••
An argument was advanced on behalf of the respondents that if pre-existing law is merged in Article 21 there will be conllict with Article 372. The expression "law in force" in Article 372 cannot include laws which are incorporated in the Constitution viz., in Part III. The expression "law" in Articles 19 ( 1) and 21 takes in statute law.
The respondents contended that permanent law cannot be repealed by temporary law. The argument is irrelevant and misplaced. The Presidential Order under Article 359 ( 1) is not a law. The Order does not repeal any law either. The suggestion that Article 21 was intended to afford protection to life and personal liberty against violation by private individuals was rejected in Shamdasani's case (supra) because there cannot be any question of one private individual being authorised by law to deprive another of his property or taking away the life and liberty of any person by procedure established by law. The entire concept in Article 21 is against Executive action. In Vidya Verma' s case (supra) this Court said that there is no question of infringement of fundamental right under Article 21 where the detention complained of is by a private person and not by a State or under the authority or orders of a State.
The Act in the present case is valid law and it has laid down procedure of applying the law. The validity of the Aci has not been challenged and cannot be challenged. The Legislature has competence to make the law. The procedure, therefore. cannot be challenged because Articles 21 and 22 cannot be enforced. The suggestion of the respondents that the power of the Executive is widened is equally untennble.
. The suggestion on behalf of the respondents that the right to pnvate defence is available and if any one resorted to private defence in ~esisting _detention there might be civil war is an argument to excite emotw~. If there are signs of civil war, as the respondents suggested, tt 1~ for the Government of our country to deal with the s~tuation. It 1s because of these aspects that emergency is not justiciable because no court can have proper standard to measure the problems of ~mergency in the country. If any person detained finds that the_ official has the _authority to. arrest him no question of resistanc:e anses and 1f there 1s no authority the same cannot be challenged durmg Hie operatwn of the Pr'."ide~tial Order but the person shall have hrs remedy for any false rmpnsonment after the expiry of the Presidential Order. Th_e respondents su~mitted. that if Article 21 were the repository of a nght to personal liberty 1t would mean that Article 21 destroyed pre-existing rights and then made a fresh grant. There is no
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f J 976] SUPPLH1E'ITARY
question of destruction of any right. Our fundamental rights came into existence for the first time under the Constitution. The fact that section 491 of the old Criminal Procedure Code has been abolished in the new Code establishes that the pre-existing right was embodied as a fundamental right in the Constitution. The right to personal liberty became identified with fundamental right to personal liberty under Article 21. The third question is whether Rule of Law overrides the Presidential Order. The Presidential Order does not alter or suspend any law. The rule of law is not a mere catchword or incantation. Rule of law is not a law of nature consistent and invariable at all times and in all circumstances. The certainty of law is one of the elements in the concept of the Rule of Law but it is only one element and, taken by itself, affords little guidance. The essential feature of Rule of Law is that the judicial power of the State is, to a large extent, separate from the Executive and the Legislature. Rule of Law is a normative as much as it is a descriptive term. It expresses an ideal as much as a juristic fact. The Rule of Law is not identical with a free society. If the sphere of the Rule of Law involves what can be called the "Existence of the Democratic System" it means two things. In the first place the individual liberties of a democratic system involve the right of the members of each society to choose the Government under which they live. In the second place come freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of association. These are not absolute rights, Their exceptions are justified by the necessity of rccu"ciling the claims of different individuals to those rights. The criterion whereby this reconcilliation can be effected is the concern of the law to ensure that the status and d'gnity of all individuals is to the greatest possible extent observed. Freedom of speech may be limited by conceptions as "clear and present danger", "attack on the free democratic order". The institutions and procedures by which the fundamental regard for the status and dignity of the human person can be effected is that rights and remedies are complimentary to the other. The phrases such as "equality before law" or "equal protection of the laws" are in themselves equivocal. Th~e supremacy of the law means that the faith of civil liberty depends on the man who has to administer civil liberty much more than on any legal formula. Aristotle, pointed out that the rigid certainty of law is not applicable to all circumstances. This plea would be echoed by the modern administrator called upon to deal with the ever changing circumstances of economic and social life of the nation. The respondents contend that all executive actions which operate to the prejudice of any person must have the authority of law to support it. Reliance is placed on the decisions in Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur & Ors. v. The State of Punjab('). M. P. State v. Bharat Singh( 2 ) Collector v. Ibrahim & Co. ( 3 ). Bennet Coleman & Co. v. Union of
[1955] 2 s. c. R. 225. (2) [196i] 2 s. c. R. 454. (J) f19i0] 3 S. C. R. 498. ( t)
•\ \
,.
ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE V. S. S. SHUKLA
(Ray, C.J.)
India(") and Meenakshi Mills v. Union of lndia('). This is amplified by the respondents to mean that the Executive cannot detain a person otherwise than under any legislation and on the suspension of Article 21 or the right to enforce it, the Executive cannot get any right to act contrary to law.
The Executive cannot detain a person otherwise than under valid legislation. The suspension of any fundamental right does not effect this rule of the Constitution. In normal situations when there is no emergency and when there is no Presidential Order of the type like the present the situation is different. In Bharat Singh's case (supra) this Court was concerned with the pre-emergency law and an order of the Executive thereunder. It was held that the pre-emergency law was void as violative of Article 19, and, therefore, such a law being pre-emergency law could not claim the protection under Article 358.
i •
The ratio in Bharat Singh's case (supra) is this : Executive action which operates to the prejudice of any person must have the authority of law to suppor it. [See also Ram Jawaya Kapur's case (supra)]. The provisions of Article 358 do not detract from that rule. Article 358 expressly authorises the State to take legislative or Executive action provided such action was competent for the State to make or take but for the provisions contained in Part III of our Constitution. Article 358 permits an Executive action under a law which may violate Aricle 19 but if th law is void or if there be no law at all, the Executive action will not be protected by Article 358. Bharat Singh's case (supra) considered the effect of Article 358 so far the Executive action is concerned, but was not concerned with any Executive action taken infringing any fundamental right mentioned in a Presidential Order under Article 359 ( 1). -I
lbrahim's case (supra), the Bannett Coleman case (supra) and the Meenakshi Mills case (supra) follow Bharat Singh's case (supra) regarding the proposition that the terms of Article 358 do not detract from the position that the Executive cannot act to the prejndice of a person without the authority of law.
i
l
The ratio in Bharat Singh's case (supra) is that the Madhya Pradesh Public Security Act was brought into force before the Emergency. Article 358 emj:>owers the legislatnre to make a law violating Article 19. Article 358 does not mean that a pre-emergency law violating Article 19 would have constitutional validity during the period of emergency. The Executive action which was taken dnring the emergency on the basis of the pre-emergency law did not have the authority of law inasmuch as the Madhya Pradesh Act of 1959 was a void law when it was enacted in violation of Article 19. fo Ibrahim's case (supra) the Sugar Control Order 1963 permitted allocation of quotas of sugar. The State Government ordered that the sugar allocated to the two cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad were in entirety to be given to the Co-operative Stores. Under Article (!) 11973] 2 S. C. R .757.
(2) [1974] 2 s. c. R. 398.
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358 the respondents there could not challenge an Executive action which, but for the provisions contained Article 19, the State was competent to take. But the Executive order there was one which had the effect of cancelling the licences of the respondents which could be done only after an enquiry according to the procedure prescribed in the order. The Executive order there was contrary to the provisions contained in the Sugar Control Order. In other words, the Executive action which was in breach of the order could not be immune from attack under Article 358. In the Bennet Coleman case (supra) it was said that the Newsprint Control Order could not authorise the number of pages. In the Meenakshi Mills case (supra) it was said that the Yarn Control Order could not be resisted on the ground that it had no direct intpact on the rights of the mills.
' I
In these four cases referred to there was no question of enforcement of fundamental right mentioned in the Presidential Order. These four cases were not concerned with any Executive action taken infringing any fundamental right mentioned in a Presidential Order under Article 359.
The suspension of right to enforce fundamental right has the effect that the emergency provisions in Part XVIII are by themselves the rule of law during times of emergency. There cannot be any rule of law other than the constitutional rnle of law. There cannot be any preConstitution or post-Constitntion Rule of Law which can run counter to the rule of law embodied in the Constitution, nor can there be any invocation to any rule of law to nullify the constitutional provisions during the times of emergency.
The respondents relied on the decision in Eshugbayi Eleko v. Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria(') in support of the proposition that Rule of Law will always apply even when tllerc is Presidential Order. It has to be realised that the decision in Es!;,,qbav·1 Eleko cannot over-reach onr Constitution.
Article 358 does not permit the Executive action to harn the authority of law. Article 359 prevents the enforcement of the fundamental rights mentioned in the Presidential Order. It bars enforcement against any legislation or executive! action violating a fundamental right mentioned in the Presidential Order. The principle in Eshugbayi Eleko's case (supra) will no: apply where Article 359 is the paramount and supreme Jaw of the cvuntry. There is no question of amendment of the concept of rule of law or any suggestion of destruction of rule of Jaw as the respondents contended because the Presidential Order under Article 359 neither nullifies nor suspends the operation of any law. The consequence of the Presidential Order is of a higher inlport than the suspension of any law because the remedy for the enforcement of fundamental rights is barred for the time being because of grave emergency. (!) .[1931] A. C. 662.
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~
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ADDL. DIST. MAGISTRATE v. S. S. SHUKLA (Ray,
C.J.)
The respondents contend that if an individual officer acts outside his authority, it will be an illegal act and the High Court under Article 226 can deal with it. Reliance is placed on the English decision in Christie & Allr. v. Leachinsky(') in support of the proposition that the action of an individual officer will be an Executive action when he acts within the scope of his authority.
.
The decision in Leachinsky' s case (supra) is an action for false imprisonment ~nd damages against two persons of Liverpool City Police for wrongfully arresting a person without informing that person of the grounds for arrest. That case has no relevance here.
An individual officer acting within the scope of his official duty would not cease to be so if he makes an order which is challenged to be not in compliance with the statute under which he is authorised to make the order. Any challenge to the order of detention would come within the fold of breach of fnndamental right under Article 21, namely, deprivation of personal liberty.
C
The obligation of the Executive to act in accordance with the Act is an obligat\on as laid down in Article 21. If such an obligation is not performed, the violation is of Article 21. It will mean that the right of the person affected will be a violation of fundamental right.
The expression "for any other purpose" in Article 226 means for • any purpose other than the enforcement of fundamental rights. A > petition for habeas corpus by any person under Article 226 necessarily involves a question whether the detention is legal or illegal. An Executive action if challenged to be ultra vires a statute cannot be challenged by any person who is not aggrieved by any such ultra vires action.
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Section 18 of the Act has been argued by the respondents to mean that a malafide order of detention cannot be regarded as an order made under the Act. Section 18 has also been challenged to suffer from the vice of excessive delegation. Section 18 has been amended by the words "in respect of whom an order is made or purported to be made under section 3" in substitution of the words "detained under this Act". The result is that no person in respect of whom and order is made or purported to be made under section 3 shall have any right to personal liberty by virtue of natural Jaw or common Jaw, if any. It has been earlier held that there is no natural law or common law right to habeas corpus. The respondents rely on the decisions in Poona Municipal Corporation v. D. N. Deodher(2), Kala Bhandar v. Munc. Committee('), Indore Municipality v. Niyamatulla(4) and Joseph v. Joseph(') in support of the proposition that the expression "purports" means "has the effect of". The respondents contend that
o l f!947l A c., 573. (2) (19641 8 S. C. R. 178. (3) [1965]