Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 8 November 2024
- Judge
- Justice D.Y. Chandrachud
- Reported in
- [2024] 11 S.C.R. 1647
- Result
- Reference answered
- Acts & sections
- Article 30 Constitution, Article 145 Constitution, Article 32 Constitution
Headnote
Issue for Consideration The issues were: 1) ingredients, indicia or criteria for an educational institution to be considered a minority educational institution under Article 30 of the Constitution; Muslim University (AMU) is a minority educational institution; 3) whether the Constitution Bench decision in Azeez Basha was incorrect, and 4) Whether two-Judge Bench of Supreme Court in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya erred in referring the correctness of the decision rendered in Azeez Basha directly to a
Full judgment
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1647 : 2024 INSC 856 Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 2286 of 2006) 08 November 2024
[Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud,* CJI, Sanjiv Khanna, Surya Kant,* J.B. Pardiwala, Dipankar Datta,* Manoj Misra and Satish Chandra Sharma,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration The issues were: 1) ingredients, indicia or criteria for an educational institution to be considered a minority educational institution under Article 30 of the Constitution; 2) whether Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) is a minority educational institution; 3) whether the Constitution Bench decision in Azeez Basha was incorrect, and 4) Whether two-Judge Bench of Supreme Court in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya erred in referring the correctness of the decision rendered in Azeez Basha directly to a Bench of seven Judges. Headnotes† A1. Educational Institution – No distinction between educational institutions established before and after commencement of the Constitution for purposes of Art. 30(1) – Right guaranteed by Article 30(1) is applicable to universities established before commencement of the Constitution – Constitution of India – Art.30. A2. Educational Institution – Minority institution – Indicia for ‘establishment’ of a minority educational institution – Meaning of word ‘establish’ as used in Art.30(1) – Effect of incorporation on minority character of an institution – Distinction between ‘incorporation’ and ‘establishment’ – Constitution of India – Art.30. * Author Ed. Note: There are four judgments in the matter. One judgment was pronounced by Hon’ble Dr Justice Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Chief Justice of India, on behalf of himself, Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Hon’ble Mr Justice J B Pardiwala and Hon’ble Mr Justice Manoj Misra. Hon’ble Mr Justice Surya Kant, Hon’ble Mr Justice Dipankar Datta and Hon’ble Mr Justice Satish Chandra Sharma pronounced their separate judgments.
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A3. Educational Institution – Minority institution – Declaration of an institution as one of national importance does not amount to change in minority character of the institution. A4. Educational Institution – Minority educational institution – Whether Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) is a minority educational institution. A5. Constitution of India – Art.30 – Scope of – Purpose of Art.30(1) – Special protection guaranteed by Art.30(1). A6. Constitution of India – Art.30 – Article 30(1) can be classified as both an anti-discrimination provision and a special rights provision. A7. Words and Phrases – ‘establishment’ and ‘incorporation’ of educational institutions – The words ‘incorporation’ and ‘establishment’ cannot be used interchangeably. Held [per Dr D Y Chandrachud, CJI (for himself, Sanjiv Khanna, J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.)]: 1.1. A distinction between educational institutions established before and after the commencement of the Constitution cannot be made for the purposes of Article 30(1) – Article 30 will stand diluted and weakened if it is to only apply prospectively to institutions established after the commencement of the Constitution – The adoption of the Constitution reflects a break from the system of sovereign and potentate government under the colonial regime and the dawn of governance based on the rule of law – It secures to the minority educational institutions, rights under the Constitution from the date of its commencement. [Para 83] 1.2. Upon the commencement of the Constitution, citizens received the protective cover of Part III – Article 372 read with Article 13(1) stipulates that laws which pre-date the Constitution are unconstitutional if they contravene the fundamental rights – The provisions do not stipulate that laws which pre-date the Constitution cannot receive the additional protection which the fundamental rights offer – The right to administration in Article 30(1) is one such protection. [Para 84] 2.1. ‘Incorporation’ signifies the legal existence of the institution. In contrast, ‘establishment’ signifies the founding or bringing into
[2024] 11 S.C.R. Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors. existence of the institution – The possibility of distinguishing the establishment and incorporation of universities arose with the advent of teaching Universities – Two kinds of institutions were incorporated as teaching universities – They consisted of institutions which were established and incorporated at the same time, and institutions in which the establishment of the institution predated its incorporation – Universities in the latter category, however, were teaching colleges converted into teaching universities – The instance of conversion of teaching collages to teaching universities elucidates the distinction between the ‘establishment’ and ‘incorporation’ of educational institutions. [Para 94] 2.2. The word ‘establish’ as used in Article 30(1) cannot and should not be understood in a narrow and legalistic sense – The words used in clause (1) of Article 30 have to be interpreted in view of the object and purpose of the article, and the guarantee and protection it confers – The guarantee and protection are not dependent on the basis or the manner in which the legal requirements were/are complied with, rather it concerns the persons who have founded and created the establishment – The incorporation by a statute or the procedure and requirements in law are not determinative factors – The persons behind it, that is, the promoters and founder(s) are important – They should belong to a linguistic or a religious minority – There will always be individuals and groups instrumental in catalysing and setting up the institution – Thus, giving a legal character to an educational institution through state or sovereign action, it does not ipso facto follow that the university so established deprives the group of persons/individuals the guarantee under clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution – Universities are as much educational institutions as schools and colleges – The interpretation in Azeez Basha confers a legalistic meaning to the word ‘established’, sans the context of clause (1) of Article 30 – No distinction exists between universities and other educational institutions such as schools and colleges for the purpose of Article 30(1). [Para 95] 2.3. It cannot be argued that a university was established by Parliament merely because the long title and preamble of the statute incorporating the university states that it is an Act to establish and incorporate – If such a formalistic
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interpretation is adopted, fundamental rights would be made subservient to legislative language – The courts must identify the circumstances surrounding the incorporation of the University (including through a reading of the statute) to identify who established the university – Formalism must give way to actuality and to what is real. [Para 112]
2.4. The argument that the test of whether an educational institution is a minority institution must be examined based on whether the community or the group which had established the institution was a minority at the time of its establishment in pre-independent India, is rejected – The purpose of the provision is to ensure that the minorities are able to preserve and promote their linguistic and religious culture – For this purpose, the status of the group/community, that had established the institution, on the date of commencement of the Constitution should be considered – The test of establishment will apply to future situations on the day when new educational institutions are established – The protection under clause (1) of Article 30 cannot be denied to institutions established before the commencement of the Constitution for the reason that at the time of establishment in pre-independent India, the founders were not aware that they would receive protection of Article 30(1). [Para 122] 2.5. ‘establishment’ or formation of an institution can be at any point of time and even before the commencement of the Constitution – If an institution was established before the commencement of the Constitution, the enquiry on the question of ‘establishment’ must relate back to the date when the institution was established or formed to ascertain whether it would qualify as a minority institution upon the commencement of the Constitution. [Para 134] 3.1. To determine who established the institution, the Courts must consider the genesis of the educational institution – For this analysis, the Courts must trace the origin of the idea for the establishment of the institution – The Court must identify who was the brain behind the establishment of the educational institution – Letters, correspondence with other members of the community or with government/State officials and resolutions issued could be valid proof for establishing ideation or the impetus to found and establish – The proof
[2024] 11 S.C.R. Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors. of ideation must point towards one member of the minority or a group from the community. [Para 135] 3.2. The second indicia is the purpose for which the educational institution was established – Though it is not necessary that the educational institution must have been established only for the benefit of a religious or linguistic minority community, it must predominantly be for its benefit – It is not necessary that education must be provided in the language spoken by the minority or on the religion of the minority – For example, it is not necessary that an educational institution established for the Tamils in Uttar Pradesh must necessarily prescribe Tamil as the language of instruction – However, it must be proved that the institution was established for the benefit of the tamil-speaking community – This indicia could be proved by a reference to private communication or speeches about the necessity of establishing an educational institution for the community and a recognition of the educational difficulties faced by the community. [Para 136] 3.3. The third test is tracing the steps taken towards the implementation of the idea – Information on who contributed the funds for its creation, who was responsible for obtaining the land, and whether the land was donated by a member of the minority community or purchased from funds raised by the minority community for this purpose or donated by a person from some other community specifically for the establishment of a minority educational institution are elements that must be considered – Similar questions must be asked of its other assets – Other important questions are: who took the steps necessary for establishing the institution (such as obtaining the relevant permissions, constructing the buildings, and arranging other infrastructure). It is also important to note that the state may grant some land or other monetary aid during or after the establishment of the educational institution – If the land or monies were granted after the establishment, the grant would not have the effect of changing the minority character of the institution – Minority institutions are not barred from receiving aid save at the cost of their minority status – If the land or monies are granted at the time of establishment, the circumstances surrounding the establishment must be considered as a whole to determine who established the institution – The presence of a grant must
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not be automatically interpreted as leading to the erasure of a claim to minority status. [Para 137]
3.4. An educational institution is a minority educational institution if it is established by a religious or linguistic minority – It is not necessary to prove that administration vests with the minority to prove that it is a minority educational institution because the very purpose of Article 30(1) is to grant special rights on administration as a consequence of establishment – To do otherwise, would amount to converting the consequence to a pre-condition – The right to administer is guaranteed to minority educational institutions to enable them to possess sufficient autonomy to model the educational institution according to the educational values that the community wishes to emphasise – It is not necessary that the purpose can only be implemented if persons belonging to the community helm the administrative affairs – This is so particularly because a minority institution may wish to emphasise secular education. [Para 138] 3.5. The test to be adopted by the Court is whether the administrative set up of the educational institution affirms the minority character of the institution – If the administrative structure of the educational institution does not reflect its minority character or when it does not elucidate that the educational institution was established to protect and promote the interests of the minority, it may be reasonably inferred that the purpose was not to establish an educational institution for the benefit of the minority community – [Para 139] 3.6. The test of administration should be evaluated in praesenti, that is, on the date of the commencement of the Constitution – An institution to be a minority institution must satisfy the criteria of being ‘administered’ as a minority institution on the date of commencement of the Constitution, and being a minority institution on the date of formation – Even if an educational institution was established by the minority for the purposes of the community, one must assess the impact of any subsequent events that altered the character of the institution before the commencement of the Constitution – The statutory incorporation of the institution does not ipso facto amount to a surrender of the minority character of the institution – The Court must pierce the veil to identify if the
[2024] 11 S.C.R. Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors. University was established by a minority for the purpose of promoting the interest of the community – The Court may on a holistic reading of the statutory provisions relating to the administrative set-up of the educational institution deduce if the minority character or the purpose of establishment was relinquished upon incorporation – The question is whether the regulatory measures wrest the administrative control from the founders of the institution – This is a question of fact which must be determined on the facts of each case – The Court must make that determination upon a comprehensive analysis of the administrative framework which includes host of factors such as the representation of the interests of the community in the administrative set-up. [Para 140] 3.7. Taken together, these are the main indicia which assist the Court in determining who established an educational institution under Article 30 – However, the complex nature of establishing an educational institution is not lost on us – Undoubtedly, there can be no straitjacket formula which may be applied – The above indicia of establishment must be considered as a whole, along with any relevant facts which are available to the Court – The matter must be considered in totality and competing factors must be weighed against each other depending on the facts and circumstances of each institution. [Para 141] 3.8. The above indicia must be proved through the submission of cogent material – Reliance must be placed on primary sources such as office documents, letters and resolutions or memorandums issued to implement the resolutions – Secondary sources must only be used to corroborate the primary sources – The onus to prove that the educational institution was established by a minority is on the claimants. [Para 142] 4.
The declaration of an institution as one of national importance does not amount to a change in the minority character of the institution – This is for multiple reasons – First, Entries in the Lists in the Seventh Schedule delineate the legislative competence of Parliament and of the legislatures of the States – The State may regulate various aspects of education and educational institutions – The field of legislative competence over universities does not amount
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to a surrender of minority character – The distribution of legislative competence between Parliament and the State legislatures does not bear upon the minority character of the institution – Second, as a matter of principle, nothing prevents a minority educational institution from being an institution of national importance – The qualities denoted by the terms ‘national’ and ‘minority’ are not at odds with each other nor are they mutually exclusive – The former indicates that the institution has a pan-India or national character, as opposed to relatively more local or regional institutions – It is indicative of the importance of the institution on the national stage – The latter is evidence of the religious or linguistic background of the founders and the constitutional rights which vest in them – Each term indicates distinct attributes which are not antithetical to one another – A university may well be both national and ergo, of national importance, as well as minority in character – There is no reason why a minority educational institution cannot also be an institution of national importance – Third, Entries 63 and 64 provide Parliament with the power to declare an institution to be of national importance – An interpretation that an institution of national importance cannot be a minority institution would amount to rendering the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30(1) subservient to the legislative power of Parliament – Parliament can in terms of Entries 63 and 64 declare any institution to be of national importance. [Para 148]
5.
Article 30(1) can be classified as both an anti-discrimination provision and a special rights provision – A legislation or an executive action which discriminates against religious or linguistic minorities in establishing or administering educational institutions is ultra vires Article 30(1) – This is the anti-discrimination reading of the provision – Additionally, a linguistic or religious minority which has established an educational institution receives the guarantee of greater autonomy in administration – This is the ‘special rights’ reading of the provision. [Para 160(b)]
6.
Religious or linguistic minorities must prove that they established the educational institution for the community to be a minority educational institution for the purposes of Article 30(1). [Para 160(c)]
[2024] 11 S.C.R. Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors. 7.
The right guaranteed by Article 30(1) is applicable to universities established before the commencement of the Constitution. [Para 160(d)]
8.
The right under Article 30(1) is guaranteed to minorities as defined upon the commencement of the Constitution – A different right-bearing group cannot be identified for institutions established before the adoption of the Constitution. [Para 160(e)]
9.
The incorporation of the University would not ipso facto lead to surrendering of the minority character of the institution – The circumstances surrounding the conversion of a teaching college to a teaching university must be viewed to identify if the minority character of the institution was surrendered upon the conversion – The Court may on a holistic reading of the statutory provisions relating to the administrative set-up of the educational institution deduce if the minority character or the purpose of establishment was relinquished upon incorporation. [Para 160(f)]
10.
The following are the factors which must be used to determine if a minority ‘established’ an educational institution:
11.
i.
The indicia of ideation, purpose and implementation must be satisfied – First, the idea for establishing an educational institution must have stemmed from a person or group belonging to the minority community; second, the educational institution must be established predominantly for the benefit of the minority community; and third, steps for the implementation of the idea must have been taken by the member(s) of the minority community; and
ii.
The administrative-set up of the educational institution must elucidate and affirm (I) the minority character of the educational institution; and (II) that it was established to protect and promote the interests of the minority community. [Para 160(g)]
The question of whether AMU is a minority educational institution must be decided based on the principles laid down in this judgment – The papers of this batch of cases shall be
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placed before the regular bench for deciding whether AMU is a minority educational institution. [Para 161]
Held [per Surya Kant, J.]: 1.
The minority institutions established in the pre-Constitution era are also entitled to the protection conferred by Article 30. [Para 192(g)]
2.
Educational institutions, with reference to Article 30 include universities as well. [Para 192(h)]
3.
In order to seek protection under Article 30 of our Constitution, the minority institution must satisfy the conjunctive test, namely that it was established by a minority community and has been/ is being administered by such a community. [Para 192(i)]
4.
The true import and meaning of the expressions ‘establish’ and ‘administer’, which comprise the very core of Article 30, are to be construed and understood strictly in accordance with the indicia in paragraphs 141 and 181. [Para 192(j)]
5.
The question pertaining to whether AMU satisfies the abovementioned test of ‘establish’ and ‘administer’ so as to seek protection of Article 30 of the Constitution, and which will concomitantly entail a mixed question of facts and law, will be determined by a Regular Bench. [Para 192(k)]
Held [per Dipankar Datta, J.]: 1.
While the majority opinion seems to have identified establishment as the sole indicium, Hon’ble Surya Kant and Hon’ble Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ – have laid equal stress on administration apart from establishment as the indicia – Inasmuch as the broad criteria which can be used to assess the status of an educational institution is concerned, I express my agreement with the indicia laid out by Their Lordships. [Para 54]
2.
Certain broad indicia, which are universally applicable, may be applied prospectively to facilitate identification of minority institutions – However, any indicium or the indicia, as identified or formulated, for treating an institution as a minority institution may not be exhaustive so as to cater to all situations – Previous decisions of this Court have also determined the minority
[2024] 11 S.C.R. Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors. character of educational institutions vis-à-vis Article 30, as per indicia tailored to the specific factual matrices – It could be well-nigh difficult, if not impossible, to fix indicia without regard to a whole lot of relevant facts and circumstances, which might have escaped notice or may not have been visualized – A flexible framework rather than a rigid one-size-fits-all model is always desirable and essential for accurately assessing minority institution status – Having regard to special features that each minority institution is most likely to have, a nuanced approach would be required to identify minority institutions by balancing the general guidelines with unique institutional circumstances – The indicia, which have been proposed, could partly inform classification of minority institutions but a tailored evaluation is all the more necessary to account for distinct characteristics which each such institution is associated with; more so, when AMU is unique in itself and its status is under consideration as a standalone institution. [Para 57] 3.
It is no longer res integra that even institutions established prior to the Constitution would be eligible to seek the protection of Article 30(1), as was expressed by this Court in Re: The Kerala Education Bill, 1957. [Para 67]
4.
The claim of the appellants cannot stand – AMU was neither established by any religious community, nor is it administered by a religious community which is regarded as a minority community; hence, AMU does not qualify as a minority institution – Protection under Article 30(1) of the Constitution is, thus, not available – This submission of the appellants has no historic, legal, factual, or logical basis. [Para 149]
5.
In terms of clause (5) of Article 145 of the Constitution, not only do the references not require an answer, it is also declared that AMU is not a minority educational institution and that the appeals seeking minority status for it should fail. [Para 150]
Held [per Satish Chandra Sharma, J.]: 1.
The ‘establishment’ of an institution by the minority is necessary for the said minority to claim right of administration under Article 30 – The words ‘establish’ and ‘administer’ are used conjunctively in Article 30 of the Constitution. [Para 266]
2.
The term ‘establish’ in Article 30 means ‘to bring into existence or to create’ and cannot be conflated with generic phrases
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such as ‘genesis of the institution’ or the ‘founding moment of the institution’. [Para 266]
3.
The real positive indicia for determining the question of establishment of an institution would have to be developed on a case to case basis with the following broad parameters in mind: Firstly, to claim ‘establishment’, the minority community must actually and tangibly bring the entirety of the institution into existence – The role played by the minority community must be predominant, in fact almost complete to the point of exclusion of all other forces – The indicia which may be illustrative and exhaustive in this regard may be the nature of the institution, the legal/statutory basis required for establishing the institution, whether the establishment required any ‘negotiation’ with outside forces, the role in acquiring lands, obtaining funds, constructing buildings, and other related matters must have been held completely by the minority community – Similarly, while teachers, curriculum, medium of instruction, etc. can be on secular lines, however, the decision-making authority regarding hiring teachers, curriculum decisions, medium of instruction, admission criteria, and similar matters must be the minority community – The choice of having secular education in the institution must be made expressly by the minority community, demonstrating the link between institution and the persons claiming to establish it. Secondly, the purpose of the institution must have been to predominantly serve the interests of the minority community or the sole betterment of the minority community, irrespective of the form of education provided and the mode of admission adopted – Therefore, as per the choice of the minority community, an institution may have secular education, but such secular education and the resultant institution, must be predominantly meant for the overall betterment of the minority community. Thirdly, the institution must be predominantly administered as a minority institution with the actual functional, executive and policy administration vested with the minority – The minority community should determine the selection, removal criteria, and procedures for hiring teaching, administrative staff, and
[2024] 11 S.C.R. Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors. other personnel – The authority to hire and fire staff must be from the minority community – Further, even if teaching or administrative staff may include non-minority persons, the final authority exercising functional, directional, and policy control over these authorities must be from the minority community – This ensures that the thoughts, beliefs, and ideas of the minority community regarding administration are implemented in reality – This represents the real decisionmaking authority of the institution being of the minority community – In ascertaining the above, it would be open for the Court to look at the true purpose behind each of the above factors and to pierce the veil. [Para 266] 4.
The minority community may conceptualize the idea of an institution and may advocate for the same, however, if during exchange or negotiation, the actual institution which was established had primacy of governmental efforts and control, then such institution cannot be held to be predominantly established by the efforts and actions of the minority community. [Para 266]
5.
In the pre-independence and pre-UGC era, in the absence of a provision like Section 23 of the UGC Act, 1956, it was open for any institutions to adopt the titles such as ‘university’ or in some cases ‘vidyapeeth’ or ‘jamia’ asserting their capability to grant degrees – The absence of a legislative embargo from private establishment of Universities prior to 1956 would be critical for the scope of enquiry. [Para 266]
6.
The use of the phrase ‘establish and incorporate’ by the Legislature may be relevant in the larger enquiry but cannot be said to be conclusively determinative of the factum of establishment or not by the minority community – If the intention of the Legislature is to establish or incorporate or recognise a minority University, the Legislatures have incorporated suitable provisions to colour the University with a minority identity. [Para 266]
7.
There were no rights, fundamental or otherwise, prior to the Constitution coming into force and therefore, there is no question of surrendering any right – The British Indian Government was a supreme Imperial power in the country, and the question of surrender is illusionary and does not arise in the present case – The coming into force of the Constitution
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and fundamental right after 1950, cannot alter the events that occurred during the decade of 1910-1920 which led to the establishment of the AMU. [Para 266]
8.
There is no legal requirement for the AMU ‘Court’ to be manned by the people from the minority community ever since 1951 and therefore, merely because de facto the persons from the minority community may have manned the posts in the institution, would not be relevant to adjudicate the question. [Para 266]
9.
The assertion that ‘neutral’ institutions or non-minority institutions would in the natural course of things be ‘majoritarian’ or that Article 30 contemplates constitutionally protecting certain educational spaces from such ‘majoritarianism-bydefault’ tendencies, is wholly erroneous – The purpose of Article 30 is not to create ‘minority only’ ghettos rather provide positive rights to the minorities to establish educational institutions of their choice and kind. [Para 266]
10.
Article 30, as a feature of the Constitution, provides important rights which function within the larger penumbra of fundamental rights – There is substantial interplay, intermixing and balancing of rights inter se within the fundamental rights and Article 30 is not absolute and certainly do not exist in a silo. [Para 266]
11.
The crux of Article 30(1) lies in its mandate to ensure parity between non-minority [or ‘neutral’] institutions and minority institutions – Its fundamental aim is to prevent any form of discrimination or preferential treatment to non-minority communities, thereby advocating for equal treatment under the law for one and all – This provision underscores that no specific category or type of institution should be disadvantaged or unduly favoured over another within the legal framework. [Para 266]
12.
To assume that the minorities of the country require some ‘safe haven’ for attaining education and knowledge is wholly incorrect – The minorities of the country have not just joined the mainstream but comprise an important facet of the mainstream itself. The institutions of national character of the country always serve the interests of the minorities and are diverse centers of learning. [Para 266]
[2024] 11 S.C.R. Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors. B.
Educational Institution – Minority educational institution – Status of AMU vis-à-vis minority rights – Whether the Constitution Bench decision in Azeez Basha was incorrect.
Held [per Dr D Y Chandrachud, CJI (for himself, Sanjiv Khanna, J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.)]: The view taken in Azeez Basha that an educational institution is not established by a minority if it derives its legal character through a statute, is overruled. [Para 161] Held [per Surya Kant, J.]: The Constitution Bench in Azeez Basha, when it holds that since Section 6 of the AMU Act, 1920 stipulates that degrees conferred by AMU would be recognised by the Government, it could not have been ‘brought into existence by a private individual or body’, is seemingly incorrect – There is no conflict between the seven-judge bench opinion in Kerala Education Bill and the five-judge Constitution Bench in Azeez Basha on the other – The six-judge Constitution Bench in Sidhajbhai Sabhai, laying down that the right under Article 30 is absolute and unconditional, is not the correct principle of law; the judgement is no more binding in nature and stands effectively overruled in TMA Pai, to that extent – Consequently, Azeez Basha does not suffer from any legal infirmity on the premise that it did not cite or follow Sidhajbhai Sabhai. [Para 192(a), (b) and (f)] Held [per Dipankar Datta, J.]: Not only is Azeez Basha a judicial verdict more than half a century old on the status of AMU vis-àvis minority rights, but it has a strong foundational basis and is anchored in robust legal reasoning – The view taken therein, in the given facts and circumstances, is indeed a plausible view which demands due deference rather than the view being overruled at this distance of time. [Para 14] Held [per Satish Chandra Sharma, J.]: The notion that Azeez Basha categorically prohibits minorities from establishing universities due to statutory requirements is unfounded – The bench in Azeez Basha and present bench are faced with a unique situation and needs to adopt a suitably modulated approach – The judgment in Azeez Basha does not preclude minorities from establishing universities but rather highlights the importance of legislative intent and statutory provisions in determining an institution’s character – The UGC Act or the judgment in Yashpal, in no manner, comes to the aid of the parties challenging the correctness of the judgment
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in Azeez Basha – The amendment in the NCMEI Act 2004 does not come to the aid of the parties questioning the correctness of the decision in Azeez Basha. C.
Judicial discipline – Preliminary objection to reference – Whether two-Judge Bench of Supreme Court in Anjumane-Rahmaniya could not have referred the correctness of the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench in Azeez Basha directly to a Bench of seven Judges.
Held [per Dr D Y Chandrachud, CJI (for himself, Sanjiv Khanna, J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.)]: 1.
In Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community, a Constitution Bench discussed the legal precepts which apply to orders of reference and reiterated the position of law as below:a.
Decisions of this Court rendered by a Bench of larger strength are binding on Benches of a less or equal strength;
b.
If a Bench of lower strength is doubtful about the correctness of a judgment delivered by a Bench of larger strength, it cannot disagree or dissent from the view taken by the larger Bench – In case of doubt, it can invite the attention of the Chief Justice of India to its opinion and request the Chief Justice to list the matter before a Bench, the strength of which is greater than that which delivered the judgment which has been doubted;
c.
The correctness of the view taken by any Bench can only be doubted by a Bench of equal strength – The matter will then be placed for hearing before a Bench of greater strength;
d.
There are two exceptions to the rules: i. The discretion of the Chief Justice is not bound by the rules – As the master of the roster, the Chief Justice may list any case before any Bench of any strength; ii. Despite the rules, if a particular case has come up for hearing before a Bench of larger strength and that Bench is of the opinion that the judgment of the Bench of lower strength requires reconsideration or correction, or is otherwise doubtful of its correctness, it may dispense with the need for a
[2024] 11 S.C.R. Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors. reference in the terms described above or an order of the Chief Justice and hear the matter for reasons given by it. [Para 37] 2.
The position of law laid down in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community is correct – Decisions of a larger Bench are binding precedent, and judicial discipline and propriety dictate that Benches of lower strength must adhere to such decisions – This will also avoid inconsistencies in the development of law – Questions concerning the correctness of judgments must ordinarily be referred only by a Bench which is equal in strength to the Bench whose judgment is doubted – We also agree with the two exceptions to this rule, as detailed by this Court in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community – They must remain exceptions and not transmogrify into the rule itself. [Para 38]
3.
The three issues which required an authoritative pronouncement in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya, were not directly a point of contention in Azeez Basha – However, the decision would have a bearing on them – Doubting the correctness of the opinion in Azeez Basha, without disagreeing with it, the two-Judge Bench requested that the matter may be placed before the Chief Justice of India for being heard by a Bench of seven Judges – This falls within the permissible limits laid down in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community – Further, the Solicitor General has also stated that he is not pressing the Union’s preliminary objection – The order of reference dated 12 February 2019 (wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed that the correctness of the question arising from the decision in Azeez Basha was unanswered, and then referred the matter to a seven-Judge Bench), too, noted that although a three-Judge Bench could not ordinarily refer a case directly to a seven-Judge Bench, it was doing so in this case because the question was already referred to a Bench of seven Judges but was not answered. [Para 39]
4.
The reference in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya of the correctness of the decision in Azeez Basha was valid – The reference was within the parameters laid down in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community. [Para 160(a)]
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Held [per Surya Kant, J.]: 1.1. The two-judge bench in Anjuman, after expressing doubt about the correctness of Azeez Basha and its principles, referred the matter for reconsideration to a larger bench – Additionally, the bench in Anjuman specifically stated that the larger bench reviewing Azeez Basha — A decision by a five-judge bench—Should consist of seven judges – The decision further directed that the matter be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for appropriate directions – Such a reference is not consistent with the established norms of judicial propriety. [Paras 90, 91] 1.2. The principles enunciated in Dawoodi Bohra re-enforce the provisions of the Supreme Court Rules referred to earlier, and also reiterate the well-established principles based upon doctrines of predictability, consistency, finality and the principle of stare decisis – The two-judge bench in Anjuman, ought to have understood and applied the law, consistent with these principles – The two-judge bench in Anjuman being of lesser strength than the five-judge bench in Azeez Basha, lacked the authority to explicitly question the correctness of Azeez Basha and refer the matter to a seven-judge bench. [Para 93] 1.3. In Anjuman, the bench not only referred the matter but also specified the numerical strength of the bench to which it should be referred, with a further direction that the matter be placed before the Chief Justice for the limited purpose of notifying the composition of the seven-judge bench – This effectively impaired the Chief Justice’s authority as the master of the roster – Allowing such a practice would enable benches of lesser strength, such as a two-judge bench, to undermine the decisions of larger benches, potentially even an eleven-judge bench – This would also place the Chief Justice in an untenable position, who would be bound by a judicial order while acting in an administrative role, leading to procedural complications and embarrassment. [Para 94] 2.
There is no substantial difference between ‘doubting’ or ‘disagreeing’ with a judgement – That being so, the reference by a two-judge bench in Anjuman doubting the correctness of the five-judge bench in Azeez Basha and referring it to a
[2024] 11 S.C.R. Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors. seven-judge bench suffers from multiple illegalities, including judicial impropriety. [Para 192(c)] 3.
In view of the dictum of the Constitution Bench in Dawoodi Bohra, a two-judge bench has no authority whatsoever to doubt or disagree with a judgement of the larger bench, and directly refer the matter to a bench having a numerically greater strength than the matter so doubted – The reference by the two judge bench in Anjuman is nothing but a challenge to the authority of the Chief Justice of India being the master of the roster and in derogation of the special powers enjoyed upon under Article 145 of the Constitution read with Order VII Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 (as was applicable) – Consequently, the said reference is not maintainable – However, the subsequent reference dated 12.02.2019, in which the then Hon’ble Chief Justice of India was the presiding judge, is maintainable. [Para 192(d)]
4.
The reference in Anjuman to a seven-judge bench for the reconsideration of the five-judge decision in Azeez Basha is bad in law and ought to be set aside. [Para 192(e)]
Held [per Dipankar Datta, J.]: 1.1. It has been considered uniformly to be an act of breach of judicial propriety and discipline if a bench of lesser strength [of 2 (two) Judges] casts doubt in respect of a decision rendered by a bench of greater strength [of 5 (five Judges] and a request is made to the Chief Justice of India to constitute a still larger Bench [of 7 (seven Judges] – This concept was extensively ratiocinated in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community vs. State of Maharashtra. [Para 24] 1.2. If “doubting the correctness of the opinion in Azeez Basha, without disagreeing with it” could permit the bench in Anjumane-Rahmania to request the Chief Justice of India to place the matter for being heard by a bench of 7 (seven) Judges and such a course of action were held to be permissible and within the limits of Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community, as proposed in the majority opinion - I am afraid, tomorrow, a bench of 2 (two) Judges, referring to opinions of jurists [as in Anjuman-e-Rahmania] could well doubt the ‘basic structure’ doctrine and request the Chief Justice of India to constitute a bench of 15 (fifteen) Judges – The
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reasoning in the majority opinion, with due respect, appears to be based on an incomplete reading of paragraph 12(2) of Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community – Though the second sentence of the said paragraph is a bit ambiguous, but the same read harmoniously with the other sentences would lead to the inevitable conclusion that even in case of a doubt being expressed by a bench of 2 (two) Judges in respect of the ratio laid down by a bench of 5 (five) Judges, the case on a reference being made (with sufficient reasons) ought to be first placed before a bench of 3 (three) Judges, and not to a bench of either 5 (five) or 7 (seven) Judges – If, indeed, the proposed view in the majority opinion were accepted, all the precedents referred to above would stand overruled and a legal principle, which hitherto no bench of this Court did, would be laid down and, in the process, the floodgates for unmeritorious references opened – That would be an incorrect and improper approach – Hence, the order of reference in Anjuman-e-Rahmania must be regarded as completely flawed and non-est. [Para 28]
2.
The essence of the law laid down in State of Kerala vs. Very Rev. Mother Provincial, which is a decision of the Constitution Bench of 6 (six) Judges of this Court rendered more than half a century back, and has never been doubted by any subsequent bench, is that the minority institution should have been established for the benefit of a minority community by a member of that community – Attention of the bench of 2 (two) Judges in Anjuman-e-Rahmania was not invited to this and one is left to wonder whether the reference would have at all been made if Very Rev. Mother Provincial was cited – There being no reference in Anjuman-e-Rahmania of Very Rev. Mother Provincial, a binding decision, certainly the said decision of the Constitution Bench had not been placed before the bench of 2 (two) Judges by the set of counsel appearing before it who agreed with the bench on the question of (in)correctness of Azeez Basha – Also, there cannot be any comparison of chalk and cheese – The case dealt with by Azeez Basha and the one arising for decision in Anjuman-e-Rahmania were fundamentally different and in stark contrast with each other – Therefore, even on merits, there was no good reason to make a reference for being placed before a bench of 7 (seven) Judges which Anjumane-Rahmania ordered. [Para 42]
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
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Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors. Held [per Satish Chandra Sharma, J.]: The bench of two judges in Anjuman-e-Rehmania & Ors v. Distt. Inspector of School & Ors. could not have referred the matter to a bench of seven Hon’ble Judges directly, without the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, being a part of the bench. [Para 266] Case Law Cited In the judgment of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI: S Azeez Basha v. Union of India [1968] 1 SCR 833 : AIR 1968 SC 662 – overruled. Prof. Yashpal v. State of Chhattisgarh [2005] 2 SCR 23 : (2005) 5 SCC 420 – held inapplicable. Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra [2004] Supp. 6 SCR 1054 : (2005) 2 SCC 673; TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka [2002] Supp. 3 SCR 587 : (2002) 8 SCC 481; Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay [1962] 3 SCR 837; In re Kerala Education Bill [1958] 1 SCR 995 – relied on. Dalco Engg. (P) Ltd. v. Satish Prabhakar Padhye [2010] 4 SCR 15 : (2010) 4 SCC 378 – distinguished. Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya v. District Inspector of Schools [Supreme Court decision in W.P.(C) No. 54-57 of 1981] – affirmed. Indira Sawhney (II) v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 498; A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India [1970] 3 SCR 530 : (1970) 1 SCC 248; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [1978] 2 SCR 621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248; Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Anr. [1975] 1 SCR 173 : AIR 1974 SC 1389; Rev. Father W. Proost and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. [1969] 2 SCR 73; PA Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra [2005] Supp. 2 SCR 603 : (2005) 6 SCC 537; State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial [1971] 1 SCR 734 : (1970) 2 SCC 417; Manager, St. Thomas UP School v. Commr. & Secy, to general Education Dept. (2002) 2 SCC 497; DAV College trust & Management Society v. State of Maharashtra [2013] 4 SCR 821 : (2013) 4 SCC 14; SP Mittal v. Union of India [1983] 1 SCR 729 : (1983) 1 SCC 51; The Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali [1962] 1 SCR 383 : (1962) 1 S.C.P 383; Rev. Bishop SK Patro v. State of Bihar [1970] 1 SCR 172 : (1969) 1 SCC 863; In re Special Courts Bill [1979] 2 SCR 476 : (1979) 1 SCC 380; SEBI v. Rajpur Nagpal [2022] 15
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SCR 1 : (2023) 8 SCC 274; Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay [1951] 1 SCR 228 : AIR 1951 SC 128; Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi [1975] 3 SCR 619 : (1975) 1 SCC 421; Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain [1976] 2 SCR 1006 : (1976) 2 SCC 58; S.S. Dhanoa v. MCD [1981] 3 SCR 864 : (1981) 3 SCC 431 – referred to. Dr. Naresh Agarwal v. Union of India, 2005 SCC OnLine All 1705 – referred to. Aligarh Muslim University v. Malay Shukla Judgment in Special Appeal No 1321 of 2005 and connected matters, High Court of Allahabad – referred to. St. David’s College, Lampeter v. Ministry of Education, 1951 All ER 559 – referred to. In the judgment of Surya Kant, J.: S. Azeez Basha v. Union of India [1968] 1 SCR 833 – modified and clarified to an extent. Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay [1963] 3 SCR 837 – held overruled. Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and another v. State of Maharashtra and another (2005) 2 SCC 673; Right Rev. Bishop S.K. Patro v. State of Bihar [1970] 1 SCR 172 : (1969) 1 SCC 863; A.P. Christian Medical Educational Society v. Govt. of A.P. [1986] 2 SCR 749 : (1986) 2 SCC 667; T. Varghese George v. Kora K. George [2011] 12 SCR 1070 : (2012) 1 SCC 369; Dayanand Anglo Vedic (DAV) College Trust and Management Society v. State of Maharashtra [2013] 4 SCR 821 : (2013) 4 SCC 14; St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi [1991] Supp. 3 SCR 121 : (1992) 1 SCC 558; State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial [1971] 1 SCR 734 : (1970) 2 SCC 417; Dalco Engg. (P) Ltd. v. Satish Prabhakar Padhye [2010] 4 SCR 15 : (2010) 4 SCC 378; Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain [1976] 2 SCR 1006 : (1976) 2 SCC 58; – relied on. Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal [2009] 2 SCR 907 : (2020) 13 SCC 737; TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka [2002] Supp. 3 SCR 587 : (2002) 8 SCC 481; Prof. Yashpal v. State of Chhattisgarh [2005] 2 SCR 23 : (2005) 5 SCC 420; P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra [2005] Supp. 2 SCR 603 : (2005) 6 SCC 537; Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka
[2024] 11 S.C.R. Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors. [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 474 : (2003) 6 SCC 697; Secy., Malankara Syrian Catholic College v. T. Jose [2006] Supp. 9 SCR 644 : (2007) 1 SCC 386; In re the Kerala Education Bill,1957 [1959] 1 SCR 995; Krishen Kumar v. Union of India [1990] 3 SCR 352 : (1990) 4 SCC 234; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ajay Kumar Sharma [2015] 12 SCR 627 : (2016) 15 SCC 292; Shanker Raju v. Union of India [2011] 2 SCR 1 : (2011) 2 SCC 132; SEBI v. Rajkumar Nagpal [2022] 15 SCR 1 : (2023) 8 SCC 274; Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (2008) 4 SCR 1 : (2008) 6 SCC 1; S.P. Mittal v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 51; Rev. Father W. Proost and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. [1969] 2 SCR 73; Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Anr. [1975] 1 SCR 173 : AIR 1974 SC 1389; Gandhi Faiz-e-am-College v. University of Agra and Anr. [1975] 3 SCR 810 : (1975) 2 SCC 283; Kolawana Gram Vikas Kendra v. State of Gujarat and Anr. [2009] 15 SCR 272 : (2010) 1 SCC 133; All Saints High School v. Govt. of A.P. and Ors. [1980] 2 SCR 924:(1980) 2 SCC 478 Christian Medical College Vellore Assn. v. Union of India [2020] 5 SCR 516 : (2020) 8 SCC 705; Modern School v. Union of India and Ors. [2004] Supp. 1 SCR 668 : (2004) 5 SCC 583; Father Thomas Shingare and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. [2001] Supp. 5 SCR 636 : (2002) 1 SCC 758; Andhra Kesari College of Education v. State of A.P. [2019] 12 SCR 669 : (2019) 9 SCC 457; Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India [2012] 2 SCR 715 : (2012) 6 SCC 1; Icon Education Society v. State of M.P. and Ors. [2023] 2 SCR 728 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 289; Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka and Ors. [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 474 : 2003 6 SCC 697; Cochin University of Science & Technology and Anr. v. Thomas P. John and Ors. [2008] 7 SCR 887 : (2008) 8 SCC 82; Board of Secondary Education and Teachers Training v. Jt. Director of Public Instructions (1998) 8 SCC 555; Ivy C.Da. Conceicao v. State of Goa and Ors. [2017] 1 SCR 445 : (2017) 3 SCC 619; The Manager, Corporate Educational Agency v. James Mathew and Ors. [2017] 6 SCR 498 : (2017) 15 SCC 595; R. Sulochana Devi v. D.M. Sujatha & Ors. [2004] Supp. 5 SCR 1 : (2005) 9 SCC 335; Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina and Ors. [1979] 1 SCR 820 : AIR 1979 SC 52; State of Karnataka and Anr. v. Associated Management of English Medium Primary & Secondary Schools and Ors. [2014] 5 SCR 1104 : (2014) 9 SCC 485; Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India and Anr. [2012] 2 SCR 715 : (2012) 6 SCC 1; Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
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[2014] 11 SCR 712 : (2014) 8 SCC 1; G. Vallikumari v. Andhra Education Society (2010) 2 SCC 497; Frank Anthony Public School Employees’ Assn. v. Union of India and Ors. [1987] 1 SCR 238 : (1986) 4 SCC 707; State of Karnataka and Anr. v. Associated Management of English Medium Primary & Secondary Schools and Ors. [2014] 5 SCR 1104 : (2014) 9 SCC 485 – referred to. Sehajdhari Sikh Federation v. Union of India and others, 2011 SCC Online P&H 17374; Manager, Rajershi Memorial Basic Training School v. State of Kerala, 1972 SCC OnLine Ker 111; Rt. Rev. Dr. Aldo Maria Patroni v. Assistant Educational Officer, 1973 SCC OnLine Ker 60; A. Raju and Ors. v. Manager, Nallor Narayana L.P. Basic School & Ors., 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 16483; Dipendra Nath Sarkar v. State of Bihar & Ors., 1960 SCC OnLine Pat 205; Rt. Rev. Dr. Aldo Maria Patroni v. Assistant Educational Officer, 1973 SCC OnLine Ker 60, para 7; A. Raju and Ors. v. Manager, Nallor Narayana L.P. Basic School & Ors., 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 16483 and Dipendra Nath Sarkar v. State of Bihar & Ors., 1960 SCC OnLine Pat 205 – referred to. Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya v. District Inspector of Schools. [Supreme Court decision in W.P.(C) No. 54-57 of 1981] – bad in law. In the judgment of Dipankar Datta, J.: Supertech Ltd. v. Emerald Court Owner Residents Association [2021] 10 SCR 569 : (2023) 10 SCC 817; Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay [1975] 1 SCR 1 : (1974) 2 SCC 402; Re: Kerala Education Bill [1959] 1 SCR 995; Lala Shri Bhagwan v. Shri Ram Chand [1965] 3 SCR 218; Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra [2004] Supp. 6 SCR 1054 : (2005) 2 SCC 673; Union of India v. Hansoli Devi & Ors. [2002] Suppl. 2 SCR 324 : (2002) 7 SCC 273; Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik [2001] Supp. 5 SCR 460 : (2002) 1 SCC 1; Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms v. Union of India [2017] 12 SCR 331 : (2018) 1 SCC 196 – relied on. Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 131 : (1985) 3 SCC 398; S. Azeez Basha and Anr. v. Union of India [1968] 1 SCR 833; Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal and Ors. [2020] 4 SCR 706 : (2020) 13 SCC 737; M. P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra [1954] 1 SCR 1077 : (1954) 1 SCC 385; T.M.A. Pai
[2024] 11 S.C.R. Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors. Foundation and ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. [2002] Supp. 3 SCR 587 : (2002) 8 SCC 481; Shahal H. Musaliar and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., Writ Petition (C) No. 331 of 2005; Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 474 : (2003) 6 SCC 697; P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra [2005] 2 Supp. SCR 603 : (2005) 6 SCC 537; Prof. Yashpal v. State of Chhattisgarh [2005] 2 SCR 23:(2005) 5 SCC 420; State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial [1971] 1 SCR 734 : (1970) 2 SCC 417; St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi [1991] Supp. 3 SCR 121:(1992) 1 SCC 558; A.P. Christian Medical Educational Society v. Govt. of A.P. [1986] 2 SCR 749 : (1986) 2 SCC 667; Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat [1975] 1 SCR 173:(1974) 1 SCC 717; Dayanand Anglo Vedic (DAV) College Trust and Management Society v. State of Maharashtra [2013] 4 SCR 821 : (2013) 4 SCC 14 – referred to. Anjuman-e-Rahmania and Ors. v. Distt. Inspector of School and Ors. [Supreme Court decision in Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 54-57 of 1981] – non-est in law. In the judgment of Satish Chandra Sharma, J.: S. Azeez Basha v. Union of India [1968] 1 SCR 833 – clarified. Prof. Yashpal v. State of Chhattisgarh [2005] 2 SCR 23 : (2005) 5 SCC 420 – held inapplicable. T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka [2002] Supp. 3 SCR 587 : (2002) 8 SCC 481; In Re Kerala Education Bill, 1957 [1959] 1 SCR 995; Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat [1975] 1 SCR 173 : (1974) 1 SCC 717 – relied on. Dalco Engineering Pvt. Ltd. v. Satish Prabhakar Padhye [2010] 4 SCR 15 : (2010) 4 SCC 378 – distinguished. P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra [2005] Supp. 2 SCR 603 : (2005) 6 SCC 537; St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi [1991] Supp. 3 SCR 121 : (1992) 1 SCC 558 [5-Judge Bench]; Rev. Father W Proost v. State of Bihar [1969] 2 SCR 73 [5-Judge Bench]; Right Rev. Bishop SK Patro v. State of Bihar [1970] 1 SCR 172 : (1969) 1 SCC 863 [5-Judge Bench]; Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay [1963] 3 SCR 837; A.P. Christians Medical Educational Society v. Government of Andhra Pradesh [1986] 2 SCR 749 : (1986) 2 SCC 667; Dir. of Endowments Gov.
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of Hyderabad v. Syed Akram Ali, AIR 1956 SC 60; State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial [1971] 1 SCR 734 : (1970) 2 SCC 417; Bal Patil v. Union of India [2005] Supp. 2 SCR 459 : (2005) 6 SCC 690; Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products v. Union of India [1999] Supp. 5 SCR 155 : (2000) 1 SCC 426; M. Siddiq (Ram Janambhumi Temple Reference-5J) v. Mahant Suresh Das [2019] 18 SCR 1 : (2020) 1 SCC 1; Indira Sawhney v. Union of India & Anr. [1999] Supp. 5 SCR 229 : (2000) 1 SCC 168; Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum v. Union Of India & Ors. [2006] 2 SCR 740 : (2006) 3 SCC 643; Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi [1975] 3 SCR 619:(1975) 1 SCC 421; Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay [1962] 2 Supp. SCR 496; Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Mumbai Shramik Sangha [2001] 3 SCR 208 : (2001) 4 SCC 448; Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik [2001] Supp. 5 SCR 460 : (2002) 1 SCC 1; Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P. [2002] 2 SCR 913 : (2002) 4 SCC 234; Vishweshwaraiah Iron & Steel Ltd. v. Abdul Gani (2002) 10 SCC 437; Arya Samaj Education Trust v. Director of Education (2004) 8 SCC 30; Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. [2004] Supp. 6 SCR 1054 : (2005) 2 SCC 673; Govt. of A.P. v. B. Satyanarayana Rao (2000) 4 SCC 262; Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly [2019] 16 SCR 886 : (2020) 2 SCC 595; Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Surat v. Saheli Leasing & Industries Ltd. [2010] 6 SCR 747 : (2010) 6 SCC 384; Kantaru Rajeevaru (Right to Religion, In re-9 J.) (2) v. Indian Young Lawyers Association [2019] 17 SCR 599 : (2020) 9 SCC 121; S.P. Mittal v. Union of India [1983] 1 SCR 729 : (1983) 1 SCC 51; Dayanand Anglo Vedic (DAV) College Trust and Management Society v. State of Maharashtra [2013] 4 SCR 821 : (2013) 4 SCC 14; Sakshi v. Union of India [2004] Supp. 2 SCR 723 : (2004) 5 SCC 518; Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice Cream Private Ltd. (2004) 7 SCC 288; Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab [2014] 4 SCR 1012 : (2014) 6 SCC 466; Shah Faesal v. Union of India [2020] 3 SCR 1115 : (2020) 4 SCC 1; D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab (1971) 2 SCC 269; Gandhi Faiz-e-am-College v. University of Agra [1975] 3 SCR 810 : (1975) 2 SCC 283; Rt. Rev. Msgr. Mark Netto v. State of Kerala [1979] 1 SCR 609 : (1979) 1 SCC 23; Lily Kurian v. Lewina [1979] 1 SCR 820 : (1979) 2 SCC 124; Christian Medical College Hospital Employees’ Union v. Christian Medical College Vellore Association [1988] 1 SCR 546 : (1987)
[2024] 11 S.C.R.
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Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors. 4 SCC 691; Al-Karim Educational Trust v. State of Bihar (1996) 8 SCC 330; Yunus Ali Sha v. Mohamed Abdul Kalam (1999) 3 SCC 676; Society of St. Joseph’s College v. Union of India (2002) 1 SCC 273; Secy., Malankara Syrian Catholic College v. T. Jose [2006] Supp. 9 SCR 644 : (2007) 1 SCC 386; Satimbla Sharma v. St Paul’s Senior Secondary School [2011] 10 SCR 203 : (2011) 13 SCC 760; Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali [1962] 1 SCR 383; P.S. Sathappan v. Andhra Bank Ltd. & Ors. [2004] Supp. 5 SCR 188 : (2004) 11 SCC 672; Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain [1976] 2 SCR 1006 : (1976) 2 SCC 58; S.S. Dhanoa v. MCD [1981] 3 SCR 864 : (1981) 3 SCC 431; CIT v. Canara Bank [2018] 7 SCR 866 : (2018) 9 SCC 322; Sri Jagadguru Kari Basava Rajendraswami of Govimutt v. Commr. of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments [1964] 8 SCR 252 : [1964] 8 SCR 252; Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 84; Guru Datta Sharma v. State of Bihar [1962] 2 SCR 292]; KS Puttaswamy (Privacy-9 J.) v. Union of India [2018] 8 SCR 1 : (2017) 10 SCC 1; Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay [1951] 1 SCR 228 : [1951] SCR 228 and Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India [1957] 1 SCR 233 – referred to. Hotel and Catering Industry Training Board v. Automobile Propriety Ltd (1968) 1 WLR 1526 – referred to. Anjuman-e-Rahmania and Others v. District Inspector of Schools and Others [Supreme Court decision in W.P. (C) 54-57 of 1981] – referred to. Books and Periodicals Cited In the judgment of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI: Ronald Dworkin, “The Moral Reading of the Constitution” (March 21, 1996) – referred to. In the judgment of Surya Kant, J.: Jennifer Jackson Preece, “Minority rights in Europe: from Westphalia to Helsinki” Review of International Studies (1997), Vol. 23, pp. 75– 92; Joseph B. Kelly, “National Minorities in International Law”, Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y, (1973) Vol. 3, pp. 253; Liebich, Andre. “Minority as Inferiority: Minority Rights in Historical Perspective” Review of International Studies, (2008) Vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 243–63; Greece
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Liberated– London Protocol, (United Kingdom, France & Russia) (adopted on 03 February, 1830); Mazohl, Brigitte, ‘‘Equality among the Nationalities’ and the Peoples (Volksstämme) of the Habsburg Empire”, Constitutionalism, Legitimacy, and Power: NineteenthCentury Experiences Chapter 9, Oxford University Press (2014); Holloway, Jonathan Scott,“Civilization, race, and the politics of uplift”, African American History: A Very Short Introduction, Chapter 4, (Oxford University Press) (2023); Treaty of Peace with Poland [Polish Minorities Treaty], (adopted on 28 June 1919); 11 Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Germ. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 15 (Apr. 26) (Permanent Court of International Justice); Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ Series A/B no 64, ICGJ 314 (Permanent Court of International Justice, 1935); Greco-Bulgarian “Communities”, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ Series B. No 17 (Permanent Court of International Justice, 1928); Dosabhoy Framjee, “History of the Parsis: including their manners, customs, religion and present position” Volume 2, Discovery Publishing House, (1986); Justice R. A. Jahagirdar (Retd.), “Secularism: the Road Behind and the Road Ahead,” Secularism: Collected Works, Rationalist Foundation, pp. 9; Rochana Bajpai,“Debating Difference: Group Rights and Liberal Democracy in India, Oxford University Press, (2011); Sumit Mukherjee, “Conceptualisation and Classification of Caste and Tribe by the Census of India,” Journal of the Anthropological Survey of India, (2013), Vol. 62 no. 2 pp.807; Tariq Rahman, “Punjabi Language during British Rule,” International Journal of Punjab Studies (2007); Meetika Srivastava, “Evolution of the System of Public Administration in India from the Period 1858- 1950: A Detailed Study Highlighting the Major Landmarks in Administrative History Made During this Period” (2009), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1482528. Dick Kooiman, “Communalism and Indian Princely States: A Comparison with British India” Economic and Political Weekly (1995) Vol. 30 No. 34 pp. 2123-2133; Francesca R. Jensenius, “Mired in Reservations: The Path-Dependent History of Electoral Quotas in India” The Journal of Asian Studies (2015) Vol. 74 No. 1; McMillan, Alistair, “Standing at the Margins: Representation and Electoral Reservations in India” Oxford University Press (2005); Owen, Hugh “Negotiating the Lucknow Pact”, Journal of Asian Studies, (1972) Vol. 31 No. 3 pp. 561–87; Proceedings of the Indian Round Table Conference (12th November, 1930–19th January, 1931); Krishna, K.B., The Problem of Minorities in India or Communal Representation in India, G. Allen and Unwin, (1939);
[2024] 11 S.C.R. Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors. Rochana Bajpai, “Constituent Assembly Debates and Minority Right ” Economic and Political Weekly, (2000) Vol. 35 No. 2122; Navin Pal Singh, Dr. Balvinder Singh Slathia, “Intricacies of Educational and Cultural Rights of Minorities in India: Efficacy of Constitutional Safeguards” UGC Care Journal (2020) Vol. 43, no.4; Kamlesh Kumar Wadhwa, Minority Safeguards in India, Thomas Press (India) Limited, (1975); “Partition of 1947 Continues to Haunt India, Pakistan” Stanford Report (2019) available at https://news.stanford.edu/stories/2019/03/partition1947-continues-haunt-india-pakistan-stanford-scholar-says; B Shiva Rao (ed), The Framing of India’s Constitution, Vol. I-V, Indian Institute of Public Administration, (1967); Christina George, “Begum Aizaz Rasul: The only Muslim Woman to oppose minority reservations in the Constituent Assembly” The Indian Express, (14 February, 2018), available at https://indianexpress.com/article/ gender/begum-aizaz-rasul-the-only-muslim-woman-to-opposeminority-reservations-in-the-constituent-assembly-5057096/; Constituent Assembly Debate, Speech by Mohammad Ismail Khan, (26 May 1949); Ministry of Human Resource Development, No. F.7-5/2005-MC(P) (Notified on 18 January, 2005) available at https://www.education.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/ Notification18012005.pdf; Ministry of Minority Affairs, S.O. 267(E) (Notified on 27 January, 2014) available at https://ncm.nic.in/ legislations/Gazette_JainInclusion_27Jan2014.pdf; Theodore Beck, “The Principal’s Annual Report for 1898—99” (‘Principal’s Report), (1898—99), Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College Magazine (Aligarh) (MAOCM), and Aligarh Institute Gazette (Aligarh) (AIG), New Series VII, No. 11 (15 July 1899) (At this time the two journals were temporarily merged); Shamim Akhtar, “Aligarh: From College to University” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress (2018-19) Vol. 79, pp. 623; Rafiuddin Ahmad, ‘The Proposed Muslim University in India’, The Nineteenth Century, XLIV (1898), 915-21; Sushila Rao, “The Doctrine of Eclipse in Constitutional Law: A Critical Reappraisal of its Contemporary Scope and Relevance” National Law School of India Review, (2006) Vol. 18 No. 1 pp. 49; Lukas Meyer et. Al. (ed.), Rights, Culture, and the Law, Oxford University Press (2003) pp. 181; Justice GP Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Lexis Nexis (2016), 14th edn.’ Henry Sharp, “The Development of Indian Universities” Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, (1925), Vol. 73, No. 3778 pp. 523; Indian Statutory Commission, Interim Report- Review of Growth of Education in British India, Calcutta,
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Government of India, Central Publication Branch (1929) pp. 123, available at https://archive.org/details/dli.csl.1000/page/ n157/mode/2up?view=theaterDr. Vishwanath Pandey (editor), Founder of Banaras Hindu University: Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya, Publication Cell, Banaras Hindu University (2006), pp. 19, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20120412191310/ http://www.bhu.ac.in/MMMMM.pdf – referred to. In the judgment of Dipankar Datta, J.: Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 9, 30th August 1949 (9.127.209); Lok Sabha Debates, Twelfth Session, Third Series Vol. XLIV – No. 9, 27th August 1965; Lok Sabha Debates, Twelfth Session, Third Series Vol. XLV- No. 13, 2nd September 1965; History of the Aligarh Muslim University, Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, p. 110, Idarah-i-Adbiyat-i-Delli, Delhi, 1995 and Black’s Law Dictionary 9th Edition – referred to, In the judgment of Satish Chandra Sharma, J.: Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies (OCHS), Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, and Delhi University’s Centre for Hindu Studies – referred to. List of Acts Constitution of India; Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920; Aligarh Muslim University (Amendment) Act, 1951; Aligarh Muslim University (Amendment) Act, 1965; Entry 63 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution; National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act, 2004. List of Keywords Educational institution; Minority institution; Indicia for ‘establishment’ of a minority educational institution; Aligarh Muslim University (AMU); Azeez Basha case; Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya case; Scope and purpose of Art.30(1); Special protection guaranteed by Art.30(1); Anti-discrimination provision; Special rights provision; Right guaranteed to minorities; Educational institutions established before and after commencement of the Constitution; Distinction between ‘incorporation’ and ‘establishment’; Effect of incorporation on minority character of an institution; Declaration as institution of national importance.
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Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2286 of 2006 From the Judgment and Order dated 05.01.2006 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in SA No. 1324 of 2006 With Civil Appeal Nos. 2321, 2320 and 2318 of 2006, Special Leave Petition (C) No. 32490 of 2015, Writ Petition (C) No. 272 of 2016, Civil Appeal Nos. 2861, 2316, 2319 and 2317 of 2006 and T.C. (C) No. 46 of 2023 Appearances for Parties By Courts Motion. R Venkataramani, Attorney General for India, Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, K M Nataraj, Vikramjit Banerjee, A.S.Gs., Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Nikhil Nayyar, Kapil Sibal, Rakesh Dwivedi, Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Guru Krishna Kumar, Vinay Navare, Sridhar Potaraju, Ms. Archana P. Dave, Salman Khurshid, Sr. Advs., T. V. S. Raghavendra Sreyas, N Sai Vinod, Naveen Hegde, Siddharth Vasudev, Ms. Gayatri Gulati, Gurmeet Singh Makker, V. Mohna, Ms. Sonali Jain, Kartikay Aggarwal, Abhishek Kumar Pandey, Raman Yadav, Chitvan Singhal, Gaurang Bhushan, Madhav Sinhal, Padmesh Mishra, Kanu Agrawal, Ankur Talwar, Rohit Khare, Apoorv Kurup, R Bala, Siddhartha Sinha, Prashant Rawat, Abhishek Singh, Ms. Sushma Suri, Prashant Bhushan, Debadutta Kanungo, Govind Jee, Omanakuttan K K, Ramesh Kumar Mishra, Aftab Ali Khan, Bahar. U. Barqui, Nizam Pasha, Ms. Aparajita Jamwal, Ali Safeer Farooqi, Ms. Ruppali Samuels, Ms. Sumedha Ray Sarkar, Rishabh Parikh, Mohd. Taiyub Khan, Shahid Hussain Rizvi, Mansoor Ali, Z. K. Faizan, Mohd. Yunus, Shadan Farasat, Gautam Bhatia, Aman Naqvi, Harshit Anand, Ms. Hrishika Jain, Ms. Natasha Maheshwari, Ms. Mreganka Kukreja, Abhishek Babbar, Ajesh K. Chawla, Ms. Shivangi Singh, Ms. Saket Gautam, Ms. Mahesh Sharma, Nachiketa Joshi, Vikas Chandra Shukla, Ms. Aditi Tripathi, Eklavya Dwivedi, Ms. Sanskriti Pathak, Merusagar Samanatray, Aditya Shekhar, Pashupati Razdan, Akash Vajpai, Bhakti Vardhan Singh, Vvv Pattabhiram, Atulesh Kumar, Alabhya Dhamija, T. Bhaskar Gautham, Anirudh Sharma, Aditya Kashyap, Shubhendu Anand, Amit Sharma,
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Pranaya Kumar Mohapatra, Baijnath Patel, Ms. Sneh Lata Mishra, Ms. Himadri Haksar, Narayan Dev Parashar, Santosh Kumar, Praneet Pranav, Rahul G. Tanwani, Aman Jha, Sudipto Sircar, Ms. Sindoora V.N.L, Mohit Pandey, Ms. Ankita Sharma, Yashraj Bundela, Dhruv Sharma, Ms. Shriya Gilhotra, Rishi Tutu, Raghav Agarwal, Piyush Beriwal, Sanyat Lodha, Sandeep Singh, Toshiv Goyal, R. C. Kohli, Avnish Dave, Vaibhav Dwivedi, Shuchi Singh, Gautam Singh, Aditya Sharma, Ms. Ankita Choudhary, Kumar Prashant, Ms. Rashmi Singhania, Varun Chugh, Rajan Chaurasia, Adarsh Kumar Pandey, Ayush Anand, Baij Nath Patel, Ms. Alpana Sharma, Pravartak Pathak, Ranjeet Mishra, Ms. Bharti Tyagi, Pramod Kumar Vishnoi, Akshat, Ramesh Thakur, Shaswat Nath, Shespal Sai, Gopal Jha, Sayooj Mohandas, Govind Kumar, Nisarg Choudhary, Gobind Kumar, Hrishikesh Haridas, Aishvary Vikram, Raghav Agrawal, Prakash Gautam, Anjuman Tripathi, Pankaj Singh, Ms. Ranjana Singh, Sanjay Kumar Dubey, Krishna Kant Dubey, Ujjwal Kumar Dubey, Vivek Kumar Pandey, Rakesh Kumar Tewari, Devendra Kumar Shukla, Rajeev Ranjan, Pratyush Prakash, Jitendra Kumar Tripathi, Ms. Isha Singh, Ms. Snehil Sonam, Mukesh Kumar, Arun Kanwa, Vignesh Singh, Aniruth Sharma, P. V. Yogeswaran, Ashish Kumar Upadhyay, Y. Lokesh, V. Kandha Prabhu, Ms. Maitri Goal, Sachin Kumar Verma, Neeleshwar Pavani, Prem Prakash, Ms. M. Vidhya, Dr. Vivek Sharma, Mrs. Naghma Imtiaz, Ms. Azra Rehman, Ms. Sommya Chaturvedi, Ms. Sonika Choudhary, Ms. Satakshi Mathur, Zargham Ahmed, Saif Naseem, Md Irshad Ahmed, Syed Imtiyaz Ali, Tanveer Khan, Mrs. Seema Khan, Mrs. Rubina Javed, Sheikh Imran, Ms. Sanchita Ain, (for M/S. Equity Lex Associates), M.R. Shamshad, Arijit Sarkar, Ms. Nabeela Jamil, Zaki Ahmad Khan, Sarwar Raza, Attarup Bannerjee, Sunado Raha, Pulkit Agarwal, Abu Sohel, Ms. Sampriti Baksi, Kunal Malik, Nishant Kumar Singh, Ankur Parihar, Pratyush Prasanna, Ishan Jain, Sushmit Phatale, Sudhanshu Kaushesh, Palav Agarwal, Prashant Kumar Yadav, Raghav Sehgal, Avnish Chaturvedi, Md Tasnimul Hassan, Martin G George, Gholam Mohiuddin, Anindo Mukherjee, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Ejaz Maqbool, Saif Zia, Gaurav Sharma, Dhawal Mohan, Prateek Bhatia, Paranjay Tripathi, Rajesh Raj, Ms. Ankita Dogra, Syed Mehdi Imam, Mohd Parvez Dabas, Uzmi Jamil Husain, Tabrez Ahmad, Mohammad Noorullah, Atif Shuhrawardy, Aqib Baig, Saheb, Abdul Nasir Khan, Amir Dabas, Anisul Haque, Advs. for the appearing parties.
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Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI* Table of Contents** A. B. C. D. E.
Background ....................................................................... The reference and related events .................................... Submissions .................................................................... Issues ............................................................................... Analysis ............................................................................ i. The preliminary objection by the Union of India.... ii. The scope of Article 30 ........................................... a. The purpose of Article 30(1) ................................ b. The ‘special protection’ guaranteed by Article 30(1) ........................................................ iii. Indicia for a Minority Educational Institution ......... iv. Applicability of Article 30 to a ‘University’ established before the commencement of the Constitution ............................................................. a. Article 30(1) applies to educational institutions established before the commencement of the Constitution ........................................................ b. There is no difference between ‘Universities’ and ‘colleges’ established before the commencement of the Constitution .............................................. c. The minority character of the institution is not ipso facto surrendered upon the incorporation of the University .................................................. d. ‘Minority’ as on the commencement of the Constitution ......................................................... v. Indicia for the ‘establishment’ of a minority educational institution .............................................
* For himself, Sanjiv Khanna, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Mishra, JJ. ** Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
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vi.
Impact of Entry 63 of List I on the minority status of educational institutions ..................................... 103
vii.
The decision of this Court in Prof. Yashpal ........... 107
viii. The amendment of the NCMEI Act in 2010 ............. 112 ix. F.
1.
Conclusion ........................................................................ 115
Article 30 of the Constitution of India guarantees to religious and linguistic minorities, the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The issues which arise for adjudication in this reference pertain to the criteria to be fulfilled to qualify as a minority educational institution for the purpose of Article 30(1) of the Indian Constitution. A.
2.
Registration under the Societies Registration Act ............................................................................ 114
Background
In 1977, the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College was established in Aligarh. The college was a teaching institution affiliated to the Calcutta University at first and subsequently to the Allahabad University. The imperial legislature passed the Aligarh Muslim University Act 1920.1 The enactment, as the preamble indicates, “established and incorporated” Aligarh Muslim University.2 The AMU Act was amended by the Aligarh Muslim University (Amendment) Act 19513 and Aligarh Muslim University (Amendment) Act 1965.4 The amendments related to the religious instructions of Muslim students5
“AMU Act”
“AMU”
“1951 Amendment Act”
“1965 Amendment Act”
Section 8 was amended to stipulate that it would be unlawful for the University to adopt or impose any test of religious belief for admission or recruitment except where the religious test was made a condition for benefaction. The amended proviso to the provision stipulated that nothing in the Section shall be deemed to prevent the provision of religious instruction to those who consent to it. Section 9 which empowered the Court to mandate religious instruction for Muslim students was deleted by the amendment. Section 23(1), which provided that all members of the Court would be Muslims, was also deleted.
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Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors.
and the administrative set-up of the university.6 Proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution were instituted before this Court for challenging the constitutional validity of the 1951 Amendment Act and the 1965 Amendment Act. A Constitution Bench in the decision in S Azeez Basha v. Union of India7 upheld the constitutional validity of the Amendments. The petitioners made a three-fold argument: (a) AMU was established by Muslims, who are a religious minority for the purposes of Article 30(1); (b) Article 30(1) guarantees Muslims the right to administer the University established by them; and (c) the 1951 and 1965 Amendments are violative of Article 30(1) to the extent that it infringed the right of the Muslim community to administer the institution. Article 30 is extracted below: “30. Right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions.—(1) All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. (1A) In making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of any property of an educational institution established and administered by a minority, referred to in clause (1), the State shall ensure that the amount fixed by or determined under such law for the acquisition of such property is such as would not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed under that clause. (2) The State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language.” The amendments were also impugned on the ground that they violated Articles 14, 19, 25, 26, 29 and 31 of the Constitution.
Section 23 of the AMU Act was amended to delete clauses (2) and (3). By this amendment, the powers of the Court were significantly reduced. The Court which was the supreme governing body of the University now only had the power to advise the Visitor or any other authority of the University on matters which may be referred to it for advice and exercise powers assigned to it by the Visitor. The powers of the Court were instead placed in the hands of the Executive Council. The composition of the Court (which was an all-Muslim body) was also amended. The process of constituting the Court and the Executive Council was also amended.
(1968) 1 SCR 833 : AIR 1968 SC 662
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3.
The Union of India opposed the petitions, arguing that the Muslim minority did not have the right to administer AMU since they had not established the institution. It was submitted that AMU was established by Parliament. That being the case, it was contended that the amendments were not violative of Article 30(1).
4.
A Constitution Bench dismissed the writ petitions in Azeez Basha (supra). The challenge on the ground of violation of Article 30(1) was rejected on the following grounds: a.
The phrase “establish and administer” in Article 30(1) must be read conjunctively. Religious minorities have the right to administer those educational institutions which they established. Religious minorities do not have the right to administer educational institutions which were not established by them, even if they were administering them for some reason before the commencement of the Constitution;
b.
The word “establish” in Article 30(1) means “to bring into existence”;
c.
AMU was not established by the Muslim minority for the following reasons: i.
AMU was brought into existence by the AMU Act, which was enacted by Parliament in 1920. Section 6 of the AMU Act provides that the degrees conferred to persons by the University would be recognised by the government. This provision indicates that AMU was established by the Government of India because the Muslim minority could not have insisted that the degrees conferred by a university established by it ought to be recognized by the Government. The AMU Act may have been passed as a result of the efforts of the Muslim community but that does not mean that AMU was established by them;
ii.
The conversion of the College to the University was not by the Muslim minority but by virtue of the 1920 Act; and
iii.
Section 4 of the AMU Act by which the MAO College and the Muslim University Association were dissolved, and the properties, rights and liabilities in the societies were vested in AMU shows that the previous bodies legally ceased to exist;
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Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors.
d.
Since the Muslim community did not establish AMU, it cannot claim a right to administer it under Article 30(1). Thus, any amendment to the AMU Act would not be ultra vires Article 30 of the Constitution;
e.
The argument that the administration of the University vested in the Muslim community though it was not established by them was rejected. The administration of AMU did not vest in the Muslim minority under the AMU Act for the following reasons: i.
Although all the members of the Court (which was the supreme governing body in terms of Section 23 of the AMU Act) were required to be Muslims, the electorate (which elected the members of the Court) did not comprise exclusively of Muslims;
ii.
Other authorities of AMU such as the Executive Council and the Academic Council were tasked with the administration of the University and were given significant powers. The members of these bodies were not required to be Muslims;
iii.
The Governor General (who was the Lord Rector) was also entrusted with certain “overriding” powers concerning the administration of the University. The Governor General was not required to be a Muslim. In terms of Section 28(3), the Governor General had overriding powers to amend or repeal the Statutes. The Governor General possessed similar powers with respect to amending or repealing Ordinances. In terms of Section 40, the Governor General had the power to remove any difficulty in the establishment of the University; and
iv.
The Visiting Board which consisted of the Governor of the United Provinces, the members of the Executive Council and Ministers were not necessarily required to be Muslims;
f.
The term “establish and maintain” in Article 26 must be read conjunctively, like the phrase “establish and administer” in Article 30. Assuming that educational institutions fall within the ambit of Article 26, the Muslim community does not have the right to maintain AMU because it did not establish it; and
g.
The impugned amendments do not violate Articles 14, 19, 25, 29 and 31.
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B. 5.
The reference and related events
In 1981, a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya v. District Inspector of Schools8 was faced with a question of whether V.M.H.S Rehmania Inter College is a minority educational institution. By an order dated 26 November 1981, the Bench questioned the correctness of Azeez Basha (supra) and referred the matter to a Bench of seven Judges, in the following terms: “After hearing counsel for the Parties, we are clearly of the opinion that this case involves two substantial questions regarding the interpretation of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. The present institution was founded in the year 1938 and registered under the Societies Registration Act in the year 1940. The documents relating to the time when the institution was founded clearly shows that while the institution was established mainly by the Muslim community but there were members from the non-Muslim community also who participated in the establishment process. The point that arises is as to whether Art. 30(1) of the Constitution envisages an institution which is established by minorities alone without the participation for the factum of establishment from any other community. On this point, there is no clear decision of this court. There are some observations in S. Azeez Basha & ors. Vs. Union of India 1968(1) SCR 333, but these observations can be explained away. Another point that arises is whether soon after the establishment of the institution if it is registered as a Society under the Society Registration Act, its status as a minority institution changes in view of the broad principles laid down in S. Azeez Basha’s case. Even as it is several jurists including Mr. Seervai have expressed about the correctness of the decision of this court in S. Azeez Basha’s case. Since the point has arisen in this case we think that this is a proper occasion when a larger bench can consider the entire aspect fully. We, therefore, direct that this case may be placed before
W.P.(C) No. 54-57 of 1981
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Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors.
Hon. The Chief Justice for being heard by a bench of at least 7 judges so that S. Azeez Basha’s case may also be considered and the points that arise in this case directly as to the essential conditions or ingredients of the minority institution may also be decided once for all. A large number of jurists including Mr. Seervai, learned counsel for the petitioners Mr. Garg and learned counsel for respondents and interveners Mr. Dikshit and Kaskar have stated that this case requires reconsideration. In view of the urgency it is necessary that the matter should be decided as early as possible we give liberty to the counsel for parties to mention the matter before Chief Justice.” (emphasis supplied) The above extract indicates that the following three questions were of concern to this Court: (i) the essential conditions or ingredients of a minority educational institution; (ii) whether the expression ‘establish’ in Article 30 means that the institution should be established only by a minority without any association by other communities; and (iii) whether the registration under the Societies Registration Act 1860 after the establishment of the institution alters its character. 6.
About a month after the order referring the matter to a Bench of seven Judges, the AMU Act was amended. On 31 December 1981, the Aligarh Muslim University (Amendment) Act 19819 received the assent of the President. Various provisions of the AMU Act were amended, including the long title and preamble from which the words “establish and” were omitted.10 Section 2(l) which defined the term ‘University’ was also amended.11 After the amendment, ‘University’ was defined to mean “the educational institution of their choice established by the Muslims of India, which originated as the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College, Aligarh, and which was subsequently incorporated as the Aligarh Muslim University.” The amendment included Section 5(2)(c) by which the University was required to promote “the educational and cultural advancement of the Muslims of India”.12
AMU (Amendment) Act 1981
AMU (Amendment) Act 1981, Section 2
AMU (Amendment) Act 1981, Section 3
AMU (Amendment) Act 1981, Section 4
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7.
In 2002, an eleven-Judge Bench of this Court in TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka13 heard a batch of tagged matters which included Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya (supra). This Court formulated a question which reflected the reference made in Anjuman-eRahmaniya (supra). The question was as follows: what is the indicia for an educational institution to be a minority education institution to which the rights in Article 30 would apply: “3(a) What are the indicia for treating an educational institution as a minority educational institution? Would an institution be regarded as a minority educational institution because it was established by a person(s) belonging to a religious or linguistic minority or its being administered by a person(s) belonging to a religious or linguistic minority?”
8.
Despite framing the question arising from the reference, this Court did not answer it in TMA Pai (supra). The decision stated that a regular Bench would adjudicate the question. However, the regular Bench disposed of the matters before it on 11 March 2003 without answering the question.
9.
Separately, AMU proposed a policy for admission into its postgraduate medical course by which 50% of the seats were reserved for Muslim candidates. The proposal was accepted by the Union of India. Proceedings were initiated under Article 226 for challenging the constitutional validity of the reservation policy.
10. The petitioners argued that the reservation policy by which 50% of the seats were earmarked for Muslims was unconstitutional because AMU was not a minority educational institution in view of the judgment of this Court in Azeez Basha (supra). They averred that the amendments to Sections 2(l) and 5(2)(c) of the AMU Act by the AMU (Amendment) Act 1981 attempted to overrule the judgment in Azeez Basha (supra) without altering the basis of the decision in that case. In response, AMU contended that the AMU (Amendment) Act 1981 had the effect of changing the basis of Azeez Basha (supra) and that AMU was a minority institution after the amendment, and thus was entitled to reserve seats for candidates from the Muslim community.
(2002) 8 SCC 481
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Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors.
11. A Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the decision in Dr. Naresh Agarwal v. Union of India declared the reservation policy unconstitutional on the following grounds:14 a.
The basis for the decision in Azeez Basha (supra) was Sections 3, 4, and 6. These provisions were not amended by the AMU (Amendment) Act 1981. The deletion of the word ‘establish’ from the long title and the preamble, and the amendment to the definition of the term ‘University’ in Section 2(l) are not sufficient to hold that AMU is a minority institution under Article 30;
b.
The Muslim community willingly surrendered the right to administer the University to statutory bodies;
c.
The amendment to Section 2(l) is a legislative action which encroaches on judicial power and is akin to Parliament functioning as an appellate court or tribunal. To prevent Section 2(l) from being struck down for overruling Azeez Basha (supra), it is necessary to read down the term “established” in the amended AMU Act as referring to MAO College; and
d.
AMU, not being a minority institution, is not entitled to the protection of Article 30 and shall not provide for reservation on the basis of religion as this would amount to a violation of Article 29(2).
12. The Court declared AMU’s reservation policy unconstitutional and directed the cancellation of the admissions made under this policy. It directed the University to conduct a fresh entrance examination without reservation on the basis of religion. 13. The judgement in appeal by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court was reported as Aligarh Muslim University v. Malay Shukla.15 The Division Bench affirmed the judgment of the Single Judge, with some modifications. AN Ray, C.J. speaking for the Division Bench held that: a.
When the minority status is not assumed or admitted, the factor of administration and control by non-minority groups becomes important. The indicia for the determination of whether an
2005 SCC OnLine All 1705
Judgment in Special Appeal No 1321 of 2005 and connected matters, High Court of Allahabad
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educational institution is a minority educational institution is (i) who established it; (ii) who is responsible for administration; and (iii) the purpose of the establishment; b.
By amending Section 2(l), Parliament attempted to overrule the decision in Azeez Basha (supra). This amendment does not change the basis of that decision because the incorporation of the University was not the sole factor which influenced the decision;
c.
Section 5(2)(c) is discriminatory. Further, it does not change the basis of the decision in Azeez Basha (supra);
d.
The removal of the words “establish and” from the long title and preamble of the AMU Act is impermissible because Azeez Basha (supra) held that incorporation and establishment are intimately connected. Permitting the omission of the word “establish” may give rise to doubts as to whether incorporation alone is sufficient for the surrender of the minority character of the institution;
e.
AMU is not merely a university but a field of legislative power in Entry 63 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Section 2(l) modified the definition of a word in an entry in the Seventh Schedule. The definition of a word in the Constitution cannot be altered except through a constitutional amendment. The AMU (Amendment) Act 1981 therefore suffers from lack of legislative competence; and
f.
Parliament lacks the authority to create a minority institution. Only a minority can do so and courts may declare whether a minority has succeeded in establishing an institution under Article 30.
14. Ashok Bhushan, J. concurred with AN Ray, C.J. in a separate judgment. The learned Judge observed that the institution must have been both established and administered by a minority to seek the protection of Article 30(1). The 1981 Amendment, in his view, has dealt with the establishment component of the judgment but has left the administration component untouched. Further, the learned Judge agreeing with Chief Justice Ray observed that the requirements for a minority to establish an institution cannot be secured by merely altering the definition of the institution and the long title and the preamble of
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the Act. In view of the findings detailed above, the Court declared that AMU was not a minority institution within the meaning of Article 30 and struck down Sections 2(l) and 5(2)(c) as amended by the AMU (Amendment) Act 1981. The High Court held that the removal of the words “establish and” from the long title and preamble was invalid and restored them. It affirmed the conclusion of the Single Judge that the reservation policy was unconstitutional. However, it overruled the direction issued by the Single Judge to AMU to cancel the admission of students who had already been accommodated in the University on the basis of the reservation policy. 15. On 12 February 2019, while hearing the appeal against the judgment of the Division Bench, a three-Judge Bench of this Court presided over by Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi noticed that the High Court relied on the decision in Azeez Basha (supra). It also noticed that the reference in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya (supra) on the correctness of Azeez Basha (supra) was yet to be determined. The observations in Azeez Basha (supra) that the words “establish” and “administer” in Article 30(1) must be read conjunctively were referred to. Having noticed all of the above, the three-Judge Bench observed that the correctness of the question arising from the decision in Azeez Basha (supra) is unanswered: “1. This Court in S. Azeez Basha and Anr. Vs. Union of India, inter alia, has observed as follows: “It is to our mind quite clear that Art. 30(1) postulates that the religious community will have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice meaning thereby that where a religious minority established an educational institution, it will have the right to administer that. An argument has been raised to the effect that even though the religious minority may not have established the educational institution, it will have the right to administer it, if by some process it had been administering the same before the Constitution came into force. We are not prepared to accept this argument. The Article in our opinion clearly shows that the minority will have the right to administer
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educational institutions of their choice provided they have established them, but not otherwise. The Article cannot be read to mean that even if the educational institution has been established by somebody else, any religious minority would have the right to administer it because, for some reason or other, it might have been administering it before the Constitution came into force. The words “establish and administer” in the Article must be read conjunctively and so read it gives the right to the minority to administer an educational institution provided it has been established by it. ……….We are of the opinion that nothing in that case justifies the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that the minorities would have the right to administer an educational institution even though the institution may not have been established by them. The two words in Art. 30(1) must be read together and so read the Article gives the right to the minority to administer institutions established by it. If the educational institution has not been established by a minority it cannot claim the right to administer it under Art. 30(1).” […] 8. The said facts would show that the correctness of the question arising from the decision of this Court in S. Azeez Basha (supra) has remained undetermined. 9. That apart, the decision of this Court in Prof. Yashpal and another vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others and the amendment of the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act, 2004 made in the year 2010 would also require an authoritative pronouncement on the aforesaid question formulated, as set out above, besides the correctness of the view expressed in the judgment of this Court in S. Azeez Basha (supra) which has been extracted above.” (emphasis supplied)
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16. The three-Judge Bench then referred the matter to a seven-Judge Bench. 17. When this matter was taken up for hearing, the Union of India sought to withdraw its appeal against the decision of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court.16 This Court is competent to hear the present case even if the Union of India was permitted to withdraw its appeal because the other appellants continue to press their case. C.
Submissions
18. The petitioners broadly contend that the decision in Azeez Basha (supra) is not correct, and that AMU is a minority institution. The submissions of the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners and the intervenors are summarized below. 19. Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel made the following submissions:
a.
The Union of India’s recent attempt to withdraw its appeal against the minority status of AMU contradicts its consistent position since 1981;
b.
Azeez Basha (supra) is no longer good law because: i.
It failed to recognize that the words ‘establish’ and ‘administer’ are not preconditions to define a minority but the consequential rights that flow from such a recognition;
ii.
The assumption that universities lose their minority status when recognized by a statute conflicts with the right of minorities to establish educational institutions;
iii.
It recognized the role of the Muslim community in the establishment of AMU but held that its origins and administration were rooted in legislation. This interpretation could restrict the recognition of minority institutions under Article 30;
iv.
Its restrictive interpretation of the word ‘establish’ in Article 30(1) is contrary to the expansive view adopted by subsequent judgments; and
Civil Appeal No. 2318 of 2006, Supreme Court of India
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v.
This decision has been superseded by subsequent decisions like TMA Pai (supra), which emphasized that the religious character of an institution cannot be stripped down by government interventions.
c.
Upholding Azeez Basha (supra) could jeopardize the minority status of several educational institutions, including recognized minority institutions like St. Stephen’s College and Christian Medical College;
d.
Minority rights were acknowledged by the State before the adoption of the Constitution through various legislative enactments like the Indian Councils Act of 1909, and the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935, which provided reservations to Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians in the legislature;
e.
The formation of AMU was characterized as a “movement” rather than a “surrender” by the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College. Provisions in the AMU Act, including the transfer of assets, liabilities, and special provisions for Muslim students, underscore the continuation of minority rights with the establishment of AMU;
f.
Entry 63 in the Union List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution deals with the competence of the Union to make laws regarding AMU and BHU but does not determine who established or administers the universities. Article 30, which guarantees minority rights, cannot be negated merely because the institution is of national importance in terms of Entry 63;
g.
The evolution of the AMU Act can be broken down into four phases: pre-1951 with Muslim administration, the 1951 Amendment aligning with the Constitution, the 1965 Amendment diluting minority status, and attempts to restore minority status in 1972 and 1981;
h.
While the 1951 amendment aligned the Act with the Constitution by removing compulsory religious education, the 1965 amendment diluted minority administration by reducing “the Court” to an advisory role, shifting the supreme governing authority to the “Visitor” and the President of India; and
i.
Amendments in 1972 and 1981 aimed to restore AMU to minorities. The 1981 amendment explicitly stated that AMU was “established by the Muslims of India” and aimed to
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promote Muslim educational and cultural advancement. The 1981 amendment accommodated a democratic setup, focusing on the institution’s original purpose rather than numerical representation. 20. Mr Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel made the following submissions: a.
The enactment of the Act of 1920 marked the formal recognition of the MAO “College” as the Aligarh Muslim University, reflecting a crucial legislative step in its evolution into a full-fledged University;
b.
Compliance with regulatory requirements, constitutionally grounded in Article 19(6), is crucial for university status. However, adherence to these regulations does not diminish the right guaranteed by Article 30 to minorities to establish institutions of their choice;
c.
Article 30 grants religious and linguistic minorities the autonomy to establish and administer institutions of their “choice”. Institutions covered by Article 30 have the flexibility to choose their administrative set-up, even if it includes individuals outside the minority community. This choice is solely vested in the institution;
d.
Assessing the numerical composition within the administration is inadequate to determine its minority status. Minority institutions have the prerogative to include non-minorities in their administration while maintaining their minority status. St. Stephen’s College, Delhi, despite having a Christian representation of less than 5 per cent, maintains its classification as a minority institution;
e.
The crucial factor for recognizing an educational institution as a Minority educational institution lies in its genesis, focusing on three key aspects: i.
the purpose for which it was founded (educational advancement of the minority community);
ii.
the identity of the founders and major fund providers (being substantially from the concerned minority); and
iii.
the concept’s initiation by a member of the minority,
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f.
Provisions within the AMU Act focus on governance structures, academic standards, and prevention of maladministration. These statutory measures primarily relate to the administration of the University and do not alter the constitutional fact of its establishment by a minority;
g.
“Establish” under Article 30 must be interpreted to mean ‘found’. The word does not cover the conversion process from a college to a university through the AMU Act;
h.
AMU was established with the objective of providing quality education specifically to Muslims. The exclusivity of such institutions in offering education tailored to the needs of minorities was not adequately considered by Azeez Basha (supra);
i.
The denial of reservation to institutions like AMU results in fewer degrees and job opportunities, exacerbating socio-economic disparities within minority groups;
j.
The founders of AMU satisfactorily fulfilled the five-step criteria laid down in TMA Pai (supra) to ascertain the right to administer. The criteria related to admission policies, fee structures, governance, faculty appointments and disciplinary action;
k.
The objective of establishing AMU was to obtain the status of an independent university and not demonstrate allegiance to colonial authorities;
l.
A minority institution can accede to some regulations to maintain a particular standard of education. With that, the institution also retains the right to challenge any invasive restrictions imposed on it; and
m.
The imperial government never interfered with the administration of the University after it was incorporated. MAO College was also supervised by the British government even when it was not a university. MAO College was acknowledged as a minority institution under Azeez Basha (supra).
21. Mr Salman Khurshid, learned senior counsel made the following submissions: a.
Adopting a ‘political, moral reading’ of Article 30 would facilitate a broader interpretation of the term ‘established’. Ronald Dworkin’s definition of a ‘political moral reading’ involves invoking moral
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principles about political decency and justice for interpreting constitutional provisions;17 b.
Aligarh Tehzeeb represents a distinctive cultural ethos cultivated by the AMU. This unique cultural identity encompasses traditions, values and practices that have evolved within the university;
c.
The concept of takeover in the context of educational institutions can be categorized into non-consensual and consensual takeovers. In the case of AMU, there was a consensual takeover, where changes and amendments were made to its structure and character through a process that involved the University’s participation and consent; and
d.
AMU was founded by members of the community. The societies formed for this purpose had a crucial role in the establishment and evolution of the University, contributing resources, support and a collective vision that shaped the identity and character of AMU.
22. Mr. Shadan Farasat, learned counsel submitted that: a.
The purpose of Article 30 rests primarily on two grounds: i.
The ability to retain the minority identity;
ii.
The ability to fully participate in the national mainstream;
Azeez Basha (supra) adopts an approach by which the institution could either retain the minority status or integrate into the national mainstream and lose it;
b.
The Indian secularism model allows state involvement in religious activities without compromising their character;
c.
In advocating for a broader interpretation of ‘establish’ in Article 30, there is a need to distinguish between ‘establish’ and ‘incorporate’ to better preserve constitutional protection for minority educational institutions. The AMU Act of 1920 only “incorporated” AMU. This is fundamentally different from the establishment of the institution;
d.
Stripping away the minority character of AMU would diminish its significant place in history since the institution has led to:
Reliance was placed on Ronald Dworkin, “The Moral Reading of the Constitution” (March 21, 1996).
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e.
i.
The creation of a Muslim-educated middle class; and
ii.
The education of women.
The validity of the 1981 amendment should not be considered in this case. The Parliament enacted it to reinstate AMU’s minority status, which is now being contested by the current Union government. Considering the Union’s arguments requires reassessing Parliament’s reasoning behind the law.
23. Mr MR Shamshad, learned counsel submitted that an inclusive definition of ‘minority educational institutions’ includes universities established and administered by minorities. 24. The respondents broadly submitted that Azeez Basha (supra) is good law, and that AMU is not a minority institution. They argued that AMU was established by Parliament. The submissions of the learned counsel on behalf of the respondents and the intervenors are summarized below. 25. Mr R Venkataramani, Attorney General for India appearing for the Union of India, made the following submissions: a.
The right guaranteed by Article 30 can only be exercised if there is legislation in place to enable the establishment and administration of minority institutions. This legislation should empower minorities to form institutions under constitutional provisions; and
b.
While Article 30 guarantees minorities certain rights, they are not exempt from other constitutional requirements, particularly regarding reservation.
26. Mr Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India appearing for the Union of India, made the following submissions: a.
Azeez Basha (supra) correctly recognized the choices available to AMU in 1920. It had the choice of either affiliating with another university or surrendering its minority status to the imperial government;
b.
Under the AMU Act, AMU voluntarily surrendered its minority institution status to the imperial government. This is shown by the historical context of the Aligarh Split, where the institution’s leaders chose cooperation with the British government over retaining its Muslim character;
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c.
The British government exerted control over AMU, as evidenced by provisions in the 1920 Act. The Lord Rector had significant authority in the administration of the institution. The Act dissolved the previous governing body and transferred property and decision-making authority to secular government authorities;
d.
The 1920 Act was a substantive statute which dealt with the specifics of the administration of the institution. The administration of the institution predominantly vested with the non-minority;
e.
The British government mandated that AMU should not be a religious institution and should be controlled by secular authorities;
f.
Amendments in 1951 made the 1920 Act consistent with constitutional provisions. This affirmed that AMU was established by statute, not by the minority community;
g.
Justice M.C. Chagla in the course of legislative debates in 1965 stated that AMU was neither established nor administered by minorities. Azeez Basha (supra) correctly held that AMU surrendered its minority status to the British Government;
h.
The validity of the 1981 amendment is questionable, as it is contrary to previous judicial decisions;
i.
The 1981 reference sought clarity on the definition of a minority educational institution. The reference did not include the question of whether AMU is a minority educational institution. Legal challenges in 2005 regarding reservations for Muslims in postgraduate programs led to the current reference. This reference also focused on a specific legal question without reopening factual controversies;
j.
The term “establish” under Article 30 should be interpreted to mean tangible and manifest establishment. The indicia to decide the minority character of an institution contemplated under Article 30(1) of the Constitution, must include the following: i.
The institution/university must necessarily be established and administered by the minority community; and
ii.
The institution/university should be established by the minority, for the minority and as a minority institution.
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k.
There are concerns about the potential misuse of minority status without a strict standard of actual establishment. The drafting history of fundamental rights under Articles 29 and 30 consistently uses “establish” and “administer” conjunctively and further expresses apprehensions about an over-expansive interpretation of these Articles;
l.
The genesis of an institution does not determine its minority status. Legislative enactments are the final authority on the establishment, as seen in legislations where the minority status is explicitly recognised;
m.
The reliance on St. Stephen’s (supra) is self-defeating since this Court applied the standard of administrative control as an indicia in that case. The involvement of the Government in AMU’s establishment, clear intent and specific provisions indicate the national and non-minority character of the institution;
n.
The Nation Commission for Minority Educational Institution Act 200418 and its Amendment in 2010 provide that an institution needs to be established and administered by minorities to be a minority educational institution. The said definition is not under challenge; and
o.
The consequence of recognising AMU as a minority educational institution is that seats cannot be reserved for the other categories of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes/Socially and Educationally Backward Classes.
27. Mr Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel submitted that: a.
b.
For a community to be considered a “minority,” it must fulfil three criteria: i.
It must be numerically lesser than the majority;
ii.
It cannot be the ruling group even if it is numerically smaller; and
iii.
The group itself should identify as a minority.
Muslims were not recognized as a minority during British rule, as Hindus and Muslims were considered equals. Syed Ahmed
“NCMEI Act”
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Khan, the founder of Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College, claimed in a letter that the Muslim community never considered itself as a minority and instead as rulers prior to the British government; c.
Judgments of this Court have held that Article 30(1) applies to institutions that were established before the commencement of the Constitution. However, these decisions dealt with colleges and schools and not a University. Article 30(1) does not apply to a University that was established before the commencement of the Constitution because a University before the enactment of the University Grants Commission 1956 could only have been established by the Government and not a person; and
d.
Azeez Basha (supra) was a standalone and statute-specific judgment. Overruling it would disrupt the Union’s control over AMU, constituting “public mischief”. The precedent set by the case should only be overturned if there is a substantial risk to public interest, which is not the case here.
28. Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, learned senior counsel submitted that: a.
The correctness or validity of Azeez Basha (supra) was not within the purview of the reference order, which solely aimed to clarify the meaning of “established and administered” under Article 30;
b.
Parliament cannot deny a fact by creating legal fiction in a subsequent legislation. The 1981 amendment only attempted to change who “established” the University but made no change in the provision related to the administration of the University. It attempted to rewrite history by altering the recognition of the University’s establishment;
c.
AMU’s inclusion as an institution of national importance under Entry 63 of the Union list gives the Union government sole authority over it. Altering AMU’s status would require a constitutional amendment rather than a legislative amendment; and
d.
Over the past decades, there has been no demand for minority status for AMU, as evidenced by legislative actions in 1951 and 1965. The demand for minority rights now would conflict with existing reservation rights for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Socially and Economically Backward Classes.
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29. Mr Guru Krishnakumar, learned senior counsel made the following submissions: a.
The “new sovereign,” presumably referring to contemporary legislative and executive authorities, holds the discretion to determine the approach towards minority rights. This implies that decisions regarding minority rights are subject to the interpretation and judgment of current governing bodies;
b.
H.V. Kamath in the Constituent Assembly advocated for parliamentary legislation on universities to demonstrate their impartial and non-communal nature. Similarly, Naziruddin Ahmed, a member of the Muslim League in the Constituent Assembly, asserted that universities were rightly under the Union’s jurisdiction; and
c.
A fact established by legislation cannot override a fact recognised by the Court.19
30. Mr Vijay Navare, learned senior counsel submitted that granting minority status to AMU would undermine Parliament’s authority and interfere with powers vested under Entry 63. 31. Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, learned senior counsel submitted that AMU was created ‘by the Statute’ (Act 21 of 1920) and not ‘under the Statute’. 32. Mr. Nachiketa Joshi, learned counsel submitted that the Rajya Sabha debates related to the amendments of 1981 reveal a misconception that this Court in Azeez Basha (supra) neglected AMU’s history before 1920. The amendment failed to alter the foundational aspect of Azeez Basha (supra), which is centred on the Muslim community’s concessions to the terms of the British Government. D.
Issues
33. The petitioner and the respondents disagree on whether this Bench must determine if AMU is a minority educational institution. In Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya (supra), the two-Judge Bench referred the question of the essential ingredients of a minority education institution. This was the core issue which was referred to the Constitution
Reliance was placed on Indira Sawhney (II) v. Union of India & Ors, AIR 2000 SC 498.
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Bench. The other two questions which were formulated, that is, the meaning of the phrase “establish” and the impact of registration under the Societies Registration Act 1860 after the establishment of the institution are in essence, subsets of the core issue. The question of the indicia for recognising an educational institution as a minority educational institution was reflected in question 3(a) framed in TMA Pai (supra). Thus, neither was Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya (supra) nor TMA Pai (supra) concerned with the factual situation in Azeez Basha: that is, whether AMU is a minority education institution. 34. The 2019 reference order also limits the reference to the legal aspects arising from the decision in Azeez Basha (supra) and not the factual aspects of the decision relating to AMU. This is clear from the passages from the 2019 reference order extracted above, particularly paragraphs 8 and 9. Paragraph 8 states that the correctness of the “question arising from” Azeez Basha (supra) has “remained undetermined”. The paragraph indicates that the 2019 reference order must be read along with the previous references in both Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya (supra) and TMA Pai Foundation (supra). Paragraph 9 mentions that the correctness of the view in Azeez Basha (supra) “which has been extracted above” requires an authoritative pronouncement. The paragraph from Azeez Basha (supra) extracted in the 2019 reference order deals with the question of indicia to be considered a minority educational institution. It is evident upon a reading of the reference orders that only the question of the criteria to be fulfilled to qualify as a minority educational institution is referred to this Bench. 35. From the order in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya (supra) referring the judgment in Azeez Basha (supra) to a larger Bench, the question formulated in TMA Pai (supra) and the 2019 Reference order, the question that must be decided by this Bench is what are the ingredients, indicia or criteria for an educational institution to be considered a minority educational institution under Article 30. The following issues must be answered for this purpose: a.
Whether an educational institution must be both established and administered by a linguistic or religious minority to secure the guarantee under Article 30;
b.
What are the criteria to be satisfied for the ‘establishment’ of a minority institution? Whether Article 30(1) envisages an
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institution which is established by a minority with participation from members of other communities; c.
Whether a minority educational institution which is registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act 186020 soon after its establishment loses its status as a minority educational institution by virtue of such registration; and
d.
Whether the decision of this Court in Prof. Yashpal v. State of Chhattisgarh21 and the amendment of National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act 200522 in 2010 have a bearing on the question formulated above and if so, in what manner.
E.
Analysis
i.
The preliminary objection by the Union of India
36. The Union of India advanced a preliminary objection to the reference. It argued that the order dated 26 November 1981 in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya (supra) by which the matter was referred to a Bench of seven Judges is “wholly bad in law.” It relies on the decision of a Constitution Bench in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra23 to argue that the twoJudge Bench of this Court in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya (supra) could not have referred the correctness of the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench in Azeez Basha (supra) directly to a Bench of seven Judges. It was suggested that the two-Judge Bench ought to have referred the matter to a Bench of equal strength to the decision the correctness of which is doubted, that is, a Bench of five Judges. The Union of India argued that only a Bench of five Judges could have referred the matter to a Bench of seven Judges. 37. In Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community (supra), a Constitution Bench discussed the legal precepts which apply to orders of reference and reiterated the position of law as below:24
“Societies Registration Act”
[2005] 2 SCR 23 : (2005) 5 SCC 420
“NCMEI Act”
(2005) 2 SCC 673
Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community (supra) [12]
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a.
Decisions of this Court rendered by a Bench of larger strength are binding on Benches of a less or equal strength;
b.
If a Bench of lower strength is doubtful about the correctness of a judgment delivered by a Bench of larger strength, it cannot disagree or dissent from the view taken by the larger Bench. In case of doubt, it can invite the attention of the Chief Justice of India to its opinion and request the Chief Justice to list the matter before a Bench, the strength of which is greater than that which delivered the judgment which has been doubted;
c.
The correctness of the view taken by any Bench can only be doubted by a Bench of equal strength. The matter will then be placed for hearing before a Bench of greater strength;
d.
There are two exceptions to the rules discussed above: i.
The discretion of the Chief Justice is not bound by the rules. As the master of the roster, the Chief Justice may list any case before any Bench of any strength;
ii.
Despite the rules discussed above, if a particular case has come up for hearing before a Bench of larger strength and that Bench is of the opinion that the judgment of the Bench of lower strength requires reconsideration or correction, or is otherwise doubtful of its correctness, it may dispense with the need for a reference in the terms described above or an order of the Chief Justice and hear the matter for reasons given by it.
38. The position of law laid down in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community (supra) is correct. Decisions of a larger Bench are binding precedent, and judicial discipline and propriety dictate that Benches of lower strength must adhere to such decisions. This will also avoid inconsistencies in the development of law. Questions concerning the correctness of judgments must ordinarily be referred only by a Bench which is equal in strength to the Bench whose judgment is doubted. We also agree with the two exceptions to this rule, as detailed by this Court in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community (supra). They must remain exceptions and not transmogrify into the rule itself. 39. The three issues which required an authoritative pronouncement in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya (supra), were not directly a point of contention in Azeez Basha (supra). However, the decision would
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have a bearing on them. Doubting the correctness of the opinion in Azeez Basha (supra), without disagreeing with it, the two-Judge Bench requested that the matter may be placed before the Chief Justice of India for being heard by a Bench of seven Judges. This falls within the permissible limits laid down in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community (supra) as explained in point (b) of paragraph 37. Further, the Solicitor General has also stated that he is not pressing the Union’s preliminary objection. The order of reference dated 12 February 2019, too, noted that although a three-Judge Bench could not ordinarily refer a case directly to a seven-Judge Bench, it was doing so in this case because the question was already referred to a Bench of seven Judges but was not answered. The reference order notes: “10. Ordinarily and in the normal course the judicial discipline would require the Bench to seek a reference of this matter by a Five Judges Bench. However, having regard to the background, as stated above, when the precise question was already referred to a Seven Judges Bench and was, however, not answered, we are of the view that the present question, set out above, should be referred to a Bench of Hon’ble Seven Judges. 11. Consequently and in the light of the above, place these matters before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India on the administrative side for appropriate orders.” 40. This Court will hear the questions referred to a seven-Judge Bench for these reasons. ii.
The scope of Article 30
41. The fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution do not operate in silos. In A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras,25 the majority judgment of this Court held that fundamental rights operate to the mutual exclusion of one another. In other words, each fundamental right was understood as being distinct and unrelated to the others. This view of Part III of the Constitution was later rejected in Rustom Cavasjee
AIR 1950 SC 27
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Cooper v. Union of India,26 which held that Part III “weaves a pattern of guarantees on the texture of basic human rights. The guarantees delimit the protection of those rights in their allotted fields: they do not attempt to enunciate distinct rights.”27 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India28 affirmed that Rustom Cavasjee Cooper (supra) overruled the majority judgment in A.K. Gopalan (supra). Thus, the scope of the right of “minorities to establish and administer educational institutions” must be identified in the background of the other cultural and religious rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 42. Articles 25 to 28 are placed under the heading ‘Right to freedom of religion’. Article 25(1) stipulates that all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience, the right to freely profess, practice or propagate religion. This is subject, however, to public order, morality, health and other provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Clause (2) of Article 25 provides that nothing in Clause (1) would affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from enacting a law regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or secular activity, which may be associated with religious practice, and legislation providing for social welfare reform or opening Hindu religious institutions of public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. Article 26 guarantees religious denominations or a section of them, the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, manage their own affairs in the matter of religion, to own and acquire movable and immovable property, and administer such property in accordance with law. The rights are subject to public order, morality and health. Article 27 mandates that no one shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of which are to be specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion and maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination. 43. Article 28, deals with the rights of individuals and secures to them vide clause (3), the right not to take part in any religious instructions that may be imparted in any educational institution recognised by the State or receiving aid of the State funds. The provision stipulates that a person need not attend religious worship conducted in such institution
(1970) 1 SCC 248
(1970) 1 SCC 248 [52]
(1978) 1 SCC 248
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or any premises attached thereto unless he wishes to do so, and if such person is a minor, upon the consent of his guardian. Clause (1) of Article 28 restricts educational institutions wholly maintained out of the State funds29 from imparting ‘religious instructions’. However, clause (2) to Article 28 stipulates that clause (1) will not apply to an educational institution which is administered by the State but was established under an endowment or trust which required religious instruction to be imparted in such institution. The clause recognises the distinction between ‘establishment’ and ‘administration’ of an institution. 44. Articles 29 and 30 under the heading ‘Cultural and Educational Rights’, are two provisions which specifically confer rights on a section of citizens residing in the territory of India or a part thereof, having a distinct language, script, or culture. Some would say that these are in nature of special privileges, yet in substance, they are in the nature of guarantees and protections given by the Constitution not to any specific denomination by identity, but to any section of the citizens which can be distinguished on the basis of language, script or culture. Clause (1) of Article 29 gives them the right to conserve, secure and extol their language, script or culture. The clause underscores the right to conserve and nurture the language, script or culture. Clause (2) of Article 29 is a negative right which stipulates that no citizen shall be denied admission on the grounds of religion, race, caste, language, or any of them in any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of the State funds. 45. Though the heading of Article 29 states that it is a provision for the protection of the interest of minorities, the substantive portion stipulates that the right is available to “any section of citizens” residing in India and having a distinct language, script or culture of their own. Thus, Article 29 applies to non-minorities as much as it applies to minorities, provided that the sections have a distinct language, script and culture of their own.30 Similarly, Articles 25
The expression ‘wholly maintained out of the State funds’ has been interpreted in DAV College v. State of Punjab (II), (1971) 2 SCC 269, to mean an institution which receives grants for its expenditure that may be wholly maintained out of the State funds even though it receives a fee for affiliation or holding examination as quid pro quo.
See Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat (1974) 1 SCC 717, (9J) [Chief Justice Ray writing for himself and Justice Palekar [5,6], Justice Khanna [73], Justice Mathew writing for himself and Justice YV Chandrachud [125, 126]; Rev. Father W Proost v. State of Bihar [5J] [1969] 2 SCR 73 [8,9]
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to 28 also do not make a distinction between majority and minority religious sections. The provisions guarantee the right to freedom of religion to both minorities and non-minorities. Article 25 recognises the right of all persons to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion. Article 26 recognises the right of every religious denomination or any section thereof to manage its religious affairs. The provisions of Article 28 also do not distinguish between a minority and a non-minority educational institution. The provisions apply equally to educational institutions established by religious and linguistic minorities and non-minorities.31 46. The provisions noted above, whether they refer to individual rights or denomination rights are manifestations that India is a pluralistic society with different religions, practices, cultures and languages. These provisions which are in the nature of rights and guarantees, also prescribe the ambit of State interference. 47. Article 30 consists of three clauses. Clause (1) states that all minorities whether based on religion or language, shall have a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. Clause (1)(a) deals with the provision for compulsory acquisition of any property for an educational institution established and administered by a minority. We are not concerned per se with the said clause. Clause (2) of Article 30 provides that the State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority whether based on religion or language. 48. The two crucial expressions which arise for consideration and interpretation in this decision are the words ‘establish’ and ‘administer’ used in clause (1) of Article 30. These two words and expressions have to be interpreted in the context of clause (1) to Article 30 which confers a guarantee and protection to minority communities based on religion or language.
See TMA Pai (supra) [88-90;144]; “144 […] As in the case of a majority-run institution, the moment a minority institution obtains a grant of aid, Article 28 of the Constitution comes into play. When an educational institution is maintained out of State funds, no religious instruction can be provided therein. Article 28(1) does not state that it applies only to educational institutions that are not established or maintained by religious or linguistic minorities. Furthermore, upon the receipt of aid, the provisions of Article 28(3) would apply to all educational institutions whether run by the minorities or the nonminorities. […] Just as Articles 28(1) and (3) become applicable the moment any educational institution takes aid, likewise, Article 29(2) would also be attracted and become applicable to an educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds.”
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a.
The purpose of Article 30(1)
49. A brief reference to the drafting history of the provision will help us discern the purpose of the provision. On 19 April 1947, the Minorities Sub-Committee (which was appointed to examine and propose changes to the draft clauses of the fundamental rights Committee) submitted the interim report to the Chairperson of the Advisory Committee on Minorities and Fundamental Rights.32 The Minorities Sub-Committee recommended, inter alia, the inclusion of a constitutional provision that stipulated that all minorities, whether based on religion, community or language shall be free to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.33 However, when the first Draft of the Constitution was submitted by the Drafting Committee to the President of the Constituent Assembly, the provision guaranteed a right to establish and administer educational institutions.34 This change in the language of the provision is crucial to understanding the scope of the provision. The provision guaranteed a purely negative group right to religious and linguistic minorities against the State with the use of the words “shall be free”, that is, the right to ensure that the State does not discriminate against minorities who wish to establish and administer educational institutions. However, upon the use of the phrase ‘right’, the possibility of interpreting the provision as a guarantee of a positive right arose. 50. It cannot be disputed that Article 30(1) guarantees the minority educational institutions, the right to not be discriminated. In fact, Article 30(2) is a facet of the principle of non-discrimination of minorities. The Article provides that the State shall not discriminate in granting aid to educational institutions or discriminate on the ground that it is under the management of a religious or linguistic minority. The question is whether the use of ‘right’ in Article 30(1) also guarantees a ‘special right’ in addition to the right to non-discrimination. 51. While there is no doubt that Article 30 protects the rights of minorities, this Court has in numerous judgments conceptualised varied reasons for the constitutional guarantee. In Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College
B. Shiva Rao, The Framing of India’s Constitution: Select Documents [Vol II, The Indian Institute of Public Administration] 207
Ibid[ 273]
Draft Constitution of India 1948, Article 23(a)
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Society v. State of Gujarat,35 a nine-Judge Bench discussed the objective of the provision in detail. Chief Justice Ray writing for himself and Justice Palekar observed that Article 30 ensures equality between the majority and the minority, which would be denied in the absence of a special provision.36 Justice HR Khanna cast the purpose of the provision in terms of substantive equality and observed that Article 30 guarantees ‘special rights’ to give minorities a ‘sense of security’. The learned Judge observed that the real effect of the provision was to “ensure the preservation of the minority institutions by guaranteeing the minorities autonomy […] in administration.”37 Justice Mathew, writing for himself and Justice YV Chandrachud, also traced the purpose to the guarantee to substantive equality for minorities. The learned Judge observed that it will be impossible to protect the group identity of minorities and prevent the assimilation of identities in the absence of a provision guaranteeing substantive equality.38 52. Justice Mathew referred to the Advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice on Minority Schools in Albania to draw on the purpose of providing additional guarantees for minorities.39 In this judgment, a crucial principle regarding equality and differential treatment for minority groups was articulated. The Permanent Court of International Justice observed that true equality might necessitate differential treatment to establish equilibrium between different situations: “Whereas equality in fact may involve the necessity of differential treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between different situations. It is easy to imagine cases in which equality of treatment of the majority and of the minority whose situation and requirements are different, would result in inequality. The
(1974) 1 SCC 717
Ibid [8,9]
Ibid [77]
Ibid [131-133]; “132.The problem of the minorities is not really a problem of the establishment of equality because if taken literally, such equality would mean absolute identical treatment of both the minorities and the major ities. This would result only in equality in law but inequality in fact. The distinction need not be elaborated for it is obvious that “equality in law precludes discrimination of any kind; whereas equality in fact may involve the necessity of differential treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between different situations.”
Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ Series A/B no 64, ICGJ 314 (PCIJ 1935), 6th April 1935, League of Nations; Permanent Court of International Justice.
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equality between the members of the majority and of the minority must be effective, genuine equality…” 53. This perspective underscores the imperative to enable minorities to maintain their distinctive characteristics and fulfil their specific needs. The case in question involved the abolition of all private schools, a measure challenged primarily by the minority. The Court emphasized that the rationale for the protection of minorities aimed at preserving their unique attributes. To achieve this objective, it deemed two aspects crucial. Firstly, it stressed the importance of ensuring that members of minority groups enjoy complete equality with other nationals of the state. Secondly, it emphasized the necessity of providing minority groups with appropriate means for preserving their racial peculiarities, traditions and national characteristics. 54. Distinct and diverse languages and religions have inherent value. It is also indisputable that cultures are often entangled with language and religion. The Constitution recognises that people who practise such religions or speak such languages who find themselves in the minority must not be at a disadvantage because of their numbers. 55. That being said, the purpose of Article 30 is not solely to enable religious minorities to impart religious instruction. Article 30 extends to secular education as well. That minorities may wish to impart secular and religious instruction side by side may be one aspect of the matter. Another equally relevant aspect is that minorities may wish to impart secular education in a manner that is conducive to the practice of their religion or harmonious with it, even if religious instruction does not form part of the curriculum. In this way, the right of linguistic and religious minorities to equality is protected. 56. The nine-Judge Bench in St. Xavier’s (supra) held that Article 30(1) is in pursuance of the anti-discrimination and substantive equality facets of the equality doctrine.40 In TMA Pai (supra), Chief Justice Kirpal writing for the majority of the eleven-Judge Bench observed that a law that discriminates based on whether the institution is established by a minority or a majority is unconstitutional for violation of Article 30. The Chief Justice observed that, however, the provision
St. Xavier’s (supra) Chief Justice Ray for himself and Justice Palekar [9]; Justice HR Khanna [77]; Justice Mathew for himself and Justice YV Chandrachud [131-133]
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should not lead to reverse discrimination.41 This observation on a cursory view seems to indicate that the Court has taken a volteface by shifting from a special rights/substantive equality approach of the provision to an anti-discrimination/formal equality reading of the provision. However, a closer examination reveals that the observations of the majority in TMA Pai (supra) were in line with the precedents that viewed the provision as a guarantee of a ‘special right’. This is evident from the interpretation of the interrelationship between Article 29(2) and Article 30. One of the issues in that case was whether Article 29(2) which provides that no person shall be denied admission in State aided educational institution only on the grounds of religion, race, caste, language or any of them is applicable to minority education institutions. The opinion of the majority held that the denial of admission to non-minorities in minority institutions to a “reasonable extent” is not violative of Article 29(2) since it “preserves the minority character of the institution”.42 Thus, Article 30, beyond preventing the State from discriminating against religious and linguistic minorities who wish to establish educational institutions also guarantees a ‘special protection’. b.
The ‘special protection’ guaranteed by Article 30(1)
57. This purpose of Article 30 was further expanded in PA Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra,43 where a seven-Judge Bench observed that the provision is better understood as a ‘protection’ and/ or a ‘privilege’
“138. As we look at it, Article 30(1) is a sort of guarantee or assurance to the linguistic and religious minority institutions of their right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. Secularism and equality being two of the basic features of the Constitution, Article 30(1) ensures protection to the linguistic and religious minorities, thereby preserving the secularism of the country. Furthermore, the principles of equality must necessarily apply to the enjoyment of such rights. No law can be framed that will discriminate against such minorities with regard to the establishment and administration of educational institutions vis-à-vis other educational institutions. Any law or rule or regulation that would put the educational institutions run by the minorities at a disadvantage when compared to the institutions run by the others will have to be struck down. At the same time, there also cannot be any reverse discrimination. It was observed in St. Xavier’s College case [(1974) 1 SCC 717 : (1975) 1 SCR 173] at SCR p. 192 that : (SCC p. 743, para 9) “The whole object of conferring the right on minorities under Article 30 is to ensure that there will be equality between the majority and the minority. If the minorities do not have such special protection they will be denied equality.” In other words, the essence of Article 30(1) is to ensure equal treatment between the majority and the minority institutions. No one type or category of institution should be disfavoured or, for that matter, receive more favourable treatment than another. Laws of the land, including rules and regulations, must apply equally to the majority institutions as well as to the minority institutions. The minority institutions must be allowed to do what the non-minority institutions are permitted to do.”
TMA Pai (supra) [133]
(2005) 6 SCC 537
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of the minority rather than an abstract right.44 What is the special guarantee that Article 30 provides educational institutions established by religious and linguistic minorities which is not otherwise available to non-minorities? 58. Until the judgment of the eleven-Judge Bench in TMA Pai (supra), the right to establish and administer educational institutions was interpreted as a right that was exclusively available to religious and linguistic minorities by virtue of Article 30. In TMA Pai (supra), the right of every citizen to establish and administer educational institutions was traced to Article 19(1)(g),45 which guarantees the freedom to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. The eleven-Judge Bench also traced the right of ‘every’ religious denomination (of both the majority and the minority) to establish and administer educational institutions to Article 26(a) which guarantees the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and ‘charitable’ purposes. Charitable purposes was interpreted to include education.46 59. The rights guaranteed by Articles 19(1)(g) and 26(a) can be reasonably restricted on the grounds in Articles 19(6) and 26 respectively. An educational institution established and administered by any citizen can be regulated on the grounds stipulated in Article 19(6) which includes the ground of professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade, business.47 An educational institution established by a religious
PA Inamdar (supra) [100]; Also see St. Stephen’s (supra) [28,30(1), 59]
TMA Pai (supra) [Chief Justice Kirpal 19-20]; Chief Justice Kirpal authoring the majority opinion observed that Article 19(1)(g) covers activities of citizens in respect of which income or profit is generated. The learned Judge observed that “the establishment and running of an educational institution where a large number of persons are employed as teachers or administrative staff, and an activity is carried on that results in the imparting of knowledge to the students, must necessarily be regarded as an occupation.” [para 25]
TMA Pai (supra) [Chief Justice Kirpal 26]; “26.The right to establish and maintain educational institutions may also be sourced to Article 26(a), which grants, in positive terms, the right to every religious denomination or any section thereof to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, subject to public order, morality and health. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore, religious denominations or sections thereof, which do not fall within the special categories carved out in Articles 29(1) and 30(1), have the right to establish and maintain religious and educational institutions. This would allow members belonging to any religious denomination, including the majority religious community, to set up an educational institution.”
The right of citizens of establish and administer educational institutions does not prevent the State from making any law relating to: (a) professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade, business; (b) carrying on by the State or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial of citizens or otherwise.
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denomination (without any element of profit48) can be regulated on grounds of public order, morality and health. As opposed to these two provisions, Article 30 does not circumscribe the right on any grounds. This Court has, however, consistently emphasised that the right guaranteed by Article 30 is not absolute. 60. In Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay,49 a Constitution Bench observed that Article 30 is absolute and cannot be restricted on any grounds such as in Article 19. However, in the very next sentence this Court observed that the right can be restricted on the grounds of efficiency of instruction, discipline, health, sanitation, morality and public order.50 It must be noticed that these grounds resemble the grounds for restraint prescribed in Articles 19(6) and 26. 61. The inconsistency of the observations in Rev. Sidhajbahi (supra) was set right in State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial.51 The six-Judge Bench differentiated between restrictions on the autonomy of a minority institution and the standard of education.52 The former is impermissible in view of the protection under Article 30(1). The latter was traced to the regulation of the profession which is covered by Article 19(6). Thus, regulation of a minority educational institution is permissible on the grounds in Article 19(6). However, the regulation must not infringe the minority character of the educational institution. Article 30(1) is absolute in that sense. Justice Khanna’s concurring opinion in St. Xavier’s (supra) also highlighted this point. The learned Judge observed that reasonable restrictions can be imposed to ensure that a minority educational institution is an institution of excellence. The examples given by the Judge included ensuring regular payment of salaries and audit of accounts.53 The distinction between regulation which affects the minority character and a regulation in pursuance of ‘national interest’ was also drawn by the opinion of the majority in TMA Pai (supra).54 National interest was interpreted to include public safety, national
PA Inamdar [6]
[1962] 3 SCR 837
[1962] 3 SCR 837 [849]
(1970) 2 SCC 417
Ibid [9, 10]
St. Xavier’s [91]
TMA Pai (supra) [107]
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security and national integrity, preventing the exploitation of students or the teaching community, and application of general laws such as laws on taxation, sanitation and social welfare.55 The principle that can be inferred from the above precedents is that regulations that may be justified on the grounds stipulated in Articles 19(6) and 26 may fall foul of Article 30 if they infringe the ‘minority character’ of the institution.56 This is the ‘special right’ or ‘protection’ which the Constitution guarantees minority education institutions. 62. The right to administer was considered in some depth in St. Xavier’s (supra) by Chief Justice AN Ray and Justice HR Khanna. Justice Khanna emphasised that the right to administer an institution is to effectively manage and conduct the affairs of the institution. The learned Judge held that it means shaping the institution in congruence with their vision and ideas for best serving the interests of both the community and the institution. Chief Justice AN Ray, on the other hand, observed that the right to administer has four components: (a) the right to choose its managing or governing body; (b) the right to choose the teachers; (c) the right not to be compelled to refuse admission to students; and (d) the right to use its properties and assets for the benefit of its own institutions. The right to administer as guaranteed under Article 30(1) ensures autonomy in administration and the right of choice which may not otherwise be available to a non-minority institution. The right to administration, however, does not grant a carte blanche to flout or disregard the regulations and controls established by statute, which are essential for protecting the larger public interest and maintaining educational standards. Thus, the right to administer is not impaired by factors such as rules and regulations prescribing the proper utilization of State funds, qualifications of the teachers, their remuneration and benefits, eligibility criteria for admission of students, attendance requirements and the threshold to pass the exams conducted by the board/university to which the college or school is affiliated. What is barred is the interference in the internal management and overall control of the institution. At the same time, we must clarify that a minority institution can employ non-minority employees. Non-minority individuals can be teachers or even hold the position of the academic or institution head. To
PA Inamdar (supra) [119]; TMA PAI [136]
See PA Inamdar (supra)[92,122]
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hold otherwise, would amount to interference with the choice, as envisaged by Article 30(1). 63. This proposition was clearly elucidated by the seven-Judge Bench in PA Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra57 which was formed to cull out the ratio decidendi of the eleven - Judge Bench in TMA Pai (supra). The degree of interference of the State in the administration of an educational institution differs based on whether the institution receives aid or recognition from the Government or whether the institution was established by a minority. In PA Inamdar (supra), this Court discussed the extent of State interference in an (i) unaided and unrecognised/unaffiliated minority institution; (ii) unaided minority institution seeking recognition; and (iii) aided minority institution. In the case of the first class, the seven-Judge Bench held that the minority ‘can exercise the right to heart’s content’. Institutions that fall within the first class could even fill all the seats with students from their community.58 With respect to the second class, this Court held that the State cannot interfere in the day to day administration, including the essential ingredients of management, admission of students, recruiting staff and charging of fees.59 This Court held that the regulation must be reasonable and for the purpose of ensuring that the institution is effective for the minority and others who resort to it.60 For institutions that fall within the third class, the State can only regulate the proper utilisation of the grant without diluting the minority status of the educational institution.61 64. Thus, the position that emerges is that: (i) the regulations must be relevant to the purpose of granting recognition (in the case of a Staterecognised institutions) and aid (in the case of Government aided institutions); and (ii) the effect of the regulation must not infringe the minority character of the institution. 65. From the discussion above, the following principles emerge : a.
The purpose of Article 30(1) is to ensure that the State does not discriminate against religious and linguistic minorities which
(2005) 6 SCC 537
PA Inamdar (supra) [120]; TMA Pai (supra) [145]
Ibid [121]
ibid [122]
PA Inamdar [123]; TMA Pai [143]
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seek to establish and administer educational institutions (“the non-discrimination” purpose); and b.
The purpose of Article 30(1) is also to guarantee a ‘special right’ to religious and linguistic minorities that have established educational institutions. This special right is the guarantee of limited State regulation in the administration of the institution. The State must grant the minority institution sufficient autonomy to enable it to protect the essentials of its minority character. The regulation of the State must be relevant to the purpose of granting recognition or aid, as the case may be. This special or additional protection is guaranteed to ensure the protection of the cultural fabric of religious and linguistic minorities.
iii.
Indicia for a Minority Educational Institution
66. To recall, the petitioners while challenging the 1951 and 1965 amendments to the AMU Act in Azeez Basha (supra) argued that the amendments were violative of the right to administration guaranteed by Article 30(1). The Union of India responded to the argument with the submission that the Muslim minority cannot claim the right to administration since it did not ‘establish’ the institution. Opposing this argument, the petitioners in Azeez Basha (supra) submitted that Article 30(1) guarantees the ‘right to administer’ an educational institution to minorities even if it was not established by them, if by “some process, it had been administering the same before the Constitution came into force.” The argument of the petitioners was rejected. This Court held that the words “establish” and “administer” must be read conjunctively, that is, the guarantee of the right to administration is contingent on the establishment of the institution by religious or linguistic minorities. In this context, the following observations were made: “It is to our mind quite clear that Art. 30(1) postulates that the religious community will have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice meaning thereby that where a religious minority establishes an educational institution, it will have the right to administer that. An argument has been raised to the effect that even though the religious minority may not have established the educational institution, it will have the right to administer it, if
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by some process it had been administering the same before the Constitution came into force. We are not pre-pared to accept this argument. The Article in our opinion clearly shows that the minority will have the right to administer educational institutions of their choice provided they have established them, but not otherwise. The Article cannot be read to mean that even if the educational institution has been established by somebody else, any religious minority would have the right to administer it because, for some reason or other, it might have been administering it before the Constitution came into force. The words “establish and administer” in the Article must be read conjunctively and so read it gives the right to the minority to administer an educational institution provided it has been established by it. … We are of opinion that nothing in that case justifies the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that the minorities would have the right to administer an educational institution even though the institution may not have been established by them. The two words in Art. 30(1) must be read together and so read the Article gives the right to the minority to administer institutions established by it.” (emphasis supplied) The Constitution Bench in St. Stephen’s (supra) reiterated this interpretation of the phrases ‘establish’ and ‘administer’ in Article 30(1).62 67. Let us refer to Article 19(1)(a) to understand what it means to conjunctively read two words in a provision. Article 19 guarantees the fundamental right to free speech and expression. The guarantee of the freedom of expression is, however, not dependent on the freedom of speech. They are two separate rights. However, the situation
St Stephen’s [28] “It should be borne in mind that the words “establish” and “administer” used in Article 30(1) are to be read conjunctively. The right claimed by a minority community to administer the educational institution depends upon the proof of establishment of the institution. The proof of establishment of the institution, is thus a condition precedent for claiming the right to administer the institute.”
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differs with regard to the rights to establish and administer outlined in Article 30. It is settled that the rights to establish and administer must be read conjunctively and not disjunctively. This Court has not doubted this interpretation in any of the judgments subsequent to Azeez Basha (supra).63 68. The question is whether the conjunctive reading of the words “establish” and “administer” would also mean that for an educational institution to be a minority institution, it should have been both established and administered by a minority. In Azeez Basha (supra), the Constitution Bench held that the institution must be both established and administered by the minority. The Constitution Bench framed the following three questions to determine if AMU was a minority educational institution: a.
Whether on the reading of the AMU Act, the University was established by the Muslim minority;
b.
Whether the right to administer the University ever vested in the minority; and
c.
If (b) is affirmative, whether the right to administer the University was surrendered when AMU was established.
69. The issue before this Bench is the indicia for an educational institution to be a minority educational institution. Should it be proved that the institution was established by the minority, or it was administered by the minority, or both? The petitioners and the respondents agree that the words ‘establish’ and ‘administer’ must be read conjunctively. They argue that administration is a sequitur to establishment. However, they disagree on the test to be applied to identify a minority education institution. The petitioners argue that the only indicia for a minority educational institution is that it must be established by a minority, while the respondents argue that the dual test of establishment and administration must be satisfied. 70. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to note the provisions of the NCMEI Act. The NCMEI Act was enacted in 2004 to constitute a National Commission for minority educational institutions and
Manager, St. Thomas UP School v. Commr. & Secy, to general Education Dept. (2002) 2 SCC 497; St. Stephen’s (supra); DAV College trust & Management Society v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 4 SCC 14; SP Mittal v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 51
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to provide for matters connected or incidental to it. Section 10 of the NCMEI Act was amended in 2006. The amended provision prescribed a procedure for the establishment of a minority educational institution.64 Thus, there can be no ambiguity about the minority status of educational institutions established after the enactment of NCMEI (Amendment) Act 2006. However, that is not the case for institutions which were established before the 2006 Amendment. How do we identify if an educational institution established before 2006 is a minority educational institution? 71. Article 30 does not prescribe conditions which must be fulfilled for an educational institution to be considered a minority educational institution. Article 30 confers two group rights on all linguistic and religious minorities: the right to establish an educational institution and the right to administer an educational institution. This right can be exercised by an individual belonging to a group or a collection of persons.65 As observed above, the provision guarantees both a positive and negative right. Thus, the provision, in addition to ensuring that the State does not discriminate against the minority community also guarantees the minority educational institution certain guarantees. The institution is guaranteed the right of lesser State regulation and greater autonomy in the administration of the educational institution. The right to establish an educational institution guaranteed to the minority is not a special right. That, as held in TMA Pai (supra) (as explained in the preceding section), is a right which is available to
“10. Right to establish a Minority Educational Institution.- (1) Any person who desires to establish a Minority Educational Institution may apply to the Competent authority for the grant of the no objection certificate for the said purpose. (2) The Competent authority shall, (a) on perusal of documents, affidavits or other evidence, if any; (b) after gving an opportunity of being heard to the applicant, decide every application filed under subsection (1) as expeditiously as possible and grant or reject the application, as the case may be: Provided that where an application is rejected, the Competent authority shall communicate the same to the applicant. (3) Where within a period of ninety days from the receipt of the application under sub-section (1) for the grant of no objection certificate,(a) the Competent authority does not grant such certificates; or (b) where an application has been rejected and the same has not been communicated to the person who has applied for the grant of such certificate, It shall be deemed that the Competent authority has granted a no objection certificate to the applicant. (4) The applicant shall, on the grant of a no objection certificate or where the Competent authority has deemed to have granted the no objection certificate, be entitled to commence and proceed with the establishment of a Minority Educational Institution in accordance with the rules and regulaitons, as the case may be, laid down by or under any law for the time being in force.
Mother Provincial (supra)
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every citizen under Article 19(1)(g) and to minority and non-minority religious denominations under Article 26. The special right that the provision guarantees to religious and linguistic minorities relates to the administration of educational institutions “of their choice”. The expression “of their choice” is of an expansive nature indicating that the choice extends to the full range of educational institutions. 72. Article 30(1) cannot extend to a situation where the minority community which establishes an educational institution has no intention to administer it. A religious or linguistic community may establish an educational institution and yet not administer it. This is evident from Article 28(2) of the Constitution which states that Article 28(1) will not apply to an educational institution which is administered by the State but was established under an endowment or a trust which require religious instruction to be imparted. It is quite possible that a member or a group belonging to the minority community wishes to establish an institution but intends to accept greater State regulation and lesser autonomy for the community. In that case, putting a ‘minority’ tag on such an educational institution merely because it has been established by a person or a group belonging to a religious or linguistic minority would not be permissible under Article 30(1). An educational institution established by a minority, whether linguistic or religious, can give up their right to claim the benefit under clause (1) of Article 30. The right can be given up consciously by waiver. This may occur where administration has been consciously and willingly entrusted to the State. Therefore, to determine whether an educational institution is a minority educational institution, a formalistic test such as to whether it was established by a person or group belonging to a religious or linguistic minority is not sufficient. The tests adopted must elucidate the purpose and intent of establishing an educational institution for the minority. Both the establishment and the administration by the minority must be fulfilled cumulatively for that.66 73. In Azeez Basha (supra), the Constitution Bench referred to the judgment in The Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali,67 for the proposition that even if a minority established an educational
See Section E(v) of this judgment for an expansive elucidation of the indicia.
(1962) 1 S.C.P 383
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institution, it may lose the concomitant right of administration in certain circumstances. The relevant observations are extracted below: “We should also like to refer to the observations in The Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali. In that case this Court observed while dealing with Art. 26(a) and (d) of the Constitution that even if it be assumed that a certain religious institution was established by a minority community it may lose the right to administer it in certain circumstances. We may in this connection refer to the following observations at p. 414 for they apply equally to Art. 30(1): “If the right to administer the properties never vested in the denomination or had been validly surrendered by it or had otherwise been effectively and irretrievably lost to it, Art. 26 cannot be successfully invoked.” 74. In Azeez Basha (supra), in addition to determining if AMU was established by a Muslim minority, this Court also determined whether it was ever administered by them or if the administration was validly surrendered by them, on the basis of the above observations. 75. The context of the above observations in Durgah Committee (supra) and its application to the interpretation of Article 30(1) needs to be clarified. In that case, the constitutional validity of the Durgah Khwaja Saheb Act 195568 was challenged by the Khadims of the tomb for violation of Article 26(c) and Article 26(d) of the Constitution. To offer a brief background, Khwaja Saheb was a saint who came to India at the end of the 12th Century AD and settled in Ajmer. A tomb in the form of a kutcha structure was built immediately after his death. However, there were no endowments at this time. Akbar, the Mughal emperor, took interest in the tomb and rebuilt it. Documents also indicate that eighteen villages were endowed to the Durgah. During this period, a descendant of the Saint functioned as the Sajhadanashin and Mutawalli. During the rule of Shahjahan, the office of Sajhadanashin and Mutawalli were separated. The Mutawalli was solely made responsible for the management of the properties
“Durgah Act”
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of the Durgah and was appointed by the Ruler. Over the years, this model was not altered. The Mutawalli was always appointed by the Government in power. 76. Section 4(1) of the Durgah Act dealt with the appointment of a Committee in which the administration, control and management of the Durgah Endowment would vest. The members of the Committee would be appointed by the Central Government. These two provisions were challenged on the ground they were ultra vires Article 26(c) and Article 26(d). In this context, the Constitution Bench observed that the denomination will not have a right to administer the property if it never had the right to administer it; if it had been surrendered; or if it had been irretrievably lost: “37. […] In other words, if the denomination never had the right to manage the properties endowed in favour of a denominational institution as for instance by reason of the terms on which the endowment was created, it cannot be heard to say that it has acquired the said rights as a result of Article 26(c) and (d)…If the right to administer the properties never vested in the denomination or had been validly surrendered by it or has otherwise been effectively and irretrievably lost to it Article 26 cannot be successfully invoked. […]” 77. On the facts of the case, the Constitution Bench observed that the endowments were made on such terms that did not confer the right to manage the properties to the denomination. This Court held that the right to administer the property could not be claimed if the terms of the endowment did not confer administration to the denomination. 78. Azeez Basha (supra) relied on the decision of the Constitution Bench in Durgah Committee (supra) which dealt with clauses (c) and (d) of Article 26 which guarantee the right of any religious denomination to own property and administer such property. They were not made in the context of Article 26(a) by which the right to establish and maintain institutions is conferred on religious denominations. 79. A parallel could have been drawn between the right guaranteed by Article 26(a) and Article 30(1), which is what this Court in Azeez Basha (supra) attempted to do. However, a parallel cannot be drawn between clauses (c) and (d) of Article 26, and Article 30(1).
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The rights differ in nature and scope. Article 26(d) guarantees the right to administer property in ‘accordance with law’. The provision does not confer any special right to administration as in the case of minority educational institutions. iv.
Applicability of Article 30 to a ‘University’ established before the commencement of the Constitution
80. Mr Rakesh Dwivedi, senior counsel appearing for the respondents made two submissions on the application of Article 30 to educational institutions which were established before the commencement of the Constitution. First, he urged that the claimant must prove that they were a linguistic or religious minority when the institution was established and not when the Constitution commenced; and second, before the Constitution was adopted, Universities (unlike schools and colleges which could be established by persons) could only be established by the Imperial Government. Thus, Universities which could not have been established by persons before the Constitution was adopted cannot, according to the submission, claim a right under Article 30. The observations in re Kerala Education Bill,69 Rev. Bishop SK Patro v. State of Bihar70 and St. Stephen’s (supra) that Article 30(1) applies to educational institutions which were established before the Constitution was adopted were distinguished on the ground that those cases dealt with colleges and schools, and not Universities. The learned Attorney General also made a similar argument. He submitted that in the absence of a legal competence to establish a given class of institutions (that is, universities), the question of availing of all attendant rights and claims in relation to Article 30 cannot arise. In the subsequent sections, we will answer the following two questions: a.
Whether ‘universities’ established before the commencement of the Constitution are excluded from the purview of Article 30(1); and
b.
Whether those who established an educational institution have to prove that they were a minority at the time of establishment.
[1958] SCR 995
(1969) 1 SCC 863
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a.
Article 30(1) applies to educational institutions established before the commencement of the Constitution
81. In re the Kerala Education Bill 1957 (supra), a seven-Judge Bench of this Court held that Article 30 applies to educational institutions which predate the Constitution. This Court held that the right to administer guaranteed by Article 30(1) is wide enough to cover educational institutions established both before and after the Constitution was adopted: “22. … There is no reason why the benefit of Article 30(1) should be limited only to educational institutions established after the commencement of the Constitution. The language employed in Article 30(1) is wide enough to cover both pre-Constitution and post-Constitution institutions. It must not be overlooked that Article 30(1) gives the minorities two rights, namely, (a) to establish, and (b) to administer, educational institutions of their choice. The second right clearly covers pre-Constitution schools just as Article 26 covers the right to maintain pre-Constitution religious institutions. …” 82. Although the opinion in that case was rendered in exercise of the advisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 143, it has immense persuasive value.71 The judgment in Inre Kerala Education Bill (supra) has held the field for many decades. Subsequent decisions of this Court have also relied on it. The decision in Azeez Basha (supra) observed that Article 30 would be “robbed of much of its content” if it were held to apply only to educational institutions established after the commencement of the Constitution.72 The Constitution Bench in SK Patro (supra) also held the same. In that case, an educational institution which was established in 1854 received the protection of the rights guaranteed by Article 30(1).73 In St. Stephen’s (supra), a Constitution Bench held that St. Stephen’s College which was established in 1881 is a minority educational institution for the purposes of Article 30(1).
In re Special Courts Bill, (1979) 1 SCC 380
Azeez Basha [19]
SK Patro [17]
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83. A distinction between educational institutions established before and after the commencement of the Constitution cannot be made for the purposes of Article 30(1). Article 30 will stand diluted and weakened if it is to only apply prospectively to institutions established after the commencement of the Constitution. The protection and guarantee, if made applicable to only institutions established after the commencement of the Constitution, would debase and defile the object and purpose of the provision. The adoption of the Constitution reflects a break from the system of sovereign and potentate government under the colonial regime and the dawn of governance based on the rule of law. It secures to the minority educational institutions, rights under the Constitution from the date of its commencement. 84. The Constitution annihilates the vestiges of colonial rule as reflected in Article 395. Article 395 repeals the two enactments that established the system of governance in pre-independent India: the Indian Independence Act 1947 and the Government of India Act 1935. Article 395 repudiates the chain of colonial continuity and symbolises constitutional autochthony by repealing the Indian Independence Act 1947. At the same time, Article 372 represents the thread of continuity even when a new system of governance is put in place. Article 372 stipulates that all laws which were in force in the territory of India before the commencement of the Constitution will continue in force. However, the only caveat was that the laws must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution. Laws that are violative of the provisions of Part III would be void to the extent of the inconsistency.74 It is crucial to note that Article 13(1) renders the laws to the extent of contravention void and not void ab initio. Thus, the Constitution does not fully overhaul the system of governance and administration. Rather, it only ensures that the governance is in accordance with the rules prescribed in the Constitution. To put it in legal terms, Article 13(1) has a retroactive effect and not a retrospective effect. A provision is retrospective if it alters the position of law before its enactment/commencement. It is retroactive if it imposes new results for previous actions.75 Upon the commencement of the Constitution, citizens received the protective cover of Part III.
Constitution of India, Article 13(1)
SEBI v. Rajpur Nagpal (2023) 8 SCC 274 [99-102]
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Article 372 read with Article 13(1) stipulates that laws which predate the Constitution are unconstitutional if they contravene the fundamental rights.76 The provisions do not stipulate that laws which pre-date the Constitution cannot receive the additional protection which the fundamental rights offer. The right to administration in Article 30(1) is one such protection. 85. What is the scope of Article 30 when read in the context of Article 372 read with Article 13? Any law enacted by the Imperial Legislature which discriminates against linguistic and religious minorities in the establishment and administration of educational institution would be void. This is the scope of the provision vis-à-vis Articles 372 and 13 when Article 30 is purely read as a negative right. But, this Court has also interpreted the Article as a ‘special rights’ provision guaranteeing additional protection to educational institutions established by minorities. Thus, educational institutions established by religious and linguistic minorities before the commencement of the Constitution will also receive the special protection guaranteed by Article 30(1): the right to administration without the infringement of their minority character. 86. If the argument as propounded is accepted, we will have two sets of minority educational institutions, one established before the commencement of the Constitution which is deprived of the guarantee given under Article 30(1), and those established after the commencement of the Constitution which are entitled to the benefit and guarantee given under Article 30(1). We do not think the Constitution envisages such incongruous and unpalatable differences in rights guaranteed under Article 30(1). b.
There is no difference between ‘Universities’ and ‘colleges’ established before the commencement of the Constitution
87. The next argument which needs to be addressed is whether ‘universities’ established before the commencement of the Constitution could receive the protection of Article 30(1). To recall, the petitioners argued that prior to the commencement of the Constitution, the law did not confer the power to establish a university on a person. It was argued that the power only vested in the Imperial Legislature and thus, no person could have “established” a university.
See Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 128
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88. The educational policy in pre-independent India must be referred to provide a brief context on the distinction between universities and colleges. One of the distinctions between a college and a university is the ability of the latter to confer degrees to students as evidence of their proficiency in subjects which they have studied and for which they are assessed. On 19 July 1854, the Court of Directors of the East India Company submitted a despatch77 to the Governor-General of India in Council on the subject of General Education in India. The despatch recommended the incorporation of Universities by Acts of the Legislative Council of India. The first University established in India was the University of Calcutta. It was established by Act No. II of 1857, passed by the Legislative Council of India. The preamble to the enactment provides that the University at Calcutta was to be established for the purpose of awarding academic degrees to persons who have acquired proficiency in subjects. Subsequently, the Legislative Council of India enacted Act No. XXII of 1857 to establish and incorporate the University at Bombay for the same purpose. In 1857, the University at Madras was established.78 In 1860, an Act was passed to give the Universities of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, the power of conferring degrees in addition to those degrees provided for in the earlier enactments. The Legislative Council of India passed sixteen other enactments79 for the establishment of universities before the commencement of the Constitution. 89. The University Grants Commission Act 195680 was enacted a few years after the commencement of the Constitution. The UGC Act provides the power to confer degrees even to institutions which are not established by an enactment. Section 2(f) defines a University as educational institutions established or incorporated by or under a Central Act, a Provincial Act or a State Act, and includes any such institution as may, in consultation with the University concerned, be
“Woods Despatch”
Act No. XXVII of 1987
The Punjab University Act 1992, the Allahabad University Act 1887, The Mysore University Regulation 1916, The Patna University Act 1917, The Firman of Osmania University 1918, The Lucknow University Act 1920, The Delhi University Act 1922, The Nagpur University Act 1923, The Agra University Act 1926, The Annamalai University Act 1926, University of Tranvancore Promulgation Act 1937, The Utkal University Act 1943, The Gauhati University Act 1947, The Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda Act 1949, The Gujarat University Act 1949; The Visva-Bharati Act 1951; The Jadavpur University Act 1955.
“UGC Act”
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recognized by the Commission in accordance with the regulations made in that behalf under the Act. Section 3 states that the Central Government may, on the advice of the UGC, declare by notification that any institution for higher education shall be deemed to be a University for the purposes of the Act. All the provisions of the UGC Act would apply to deemed-to-be-Universities just as they apply to universities.81 Under the UGC Act, an institution (which is not a university or deemed-to-be university) can be specially empowered by an Act of Parliament to confer degrees.82 90. Two facets emerge from the above discussion. First, only Universities can confer degrees;83 and second, before the enactment of the UGC Act, the University had to necessarily be incorporated by a legislation for the degrees conferred by them to be recognised. Thus, the argument of the petitioners narrows down to one aspect. According to the submission, a member or community belonging to a minority despite making efforts through representation, mobilisation and participation to establish a University cannot be regarded to have ‘established’ a Minority educational institution for the purpose of Article 30(1) only because the University was incorporated through a legislation. A brief analysis of the nature of Universities is necessary to unravel this paradox. 91. The Wood despatch noted that the purpose of universities upon their establishment was to confer academic degrees on students as evidence of attainment of proficiency in the branch of study.84 Universities were instituted, “not so much to be in themselves places of instruction, as to test the value of the education obtained elsewhere”.85 Affiliated colleges and other institutions educated students and sent them to universities where their proficiency was to be tested.86 This limited role of Indian Universities upon their establishment was recognised in the statutory enactments which incorporated the first three Universities in India. The preamble to Act No. II of 1857 which established and incorporated the University at
UGC Act, Section 3
UGC Act, Section 22
Also see St. David’s College, Lampeter v. Ministry of Education, 1951 All ER 559
Charles Wood, The despatch of 1854 on General education in India. [25];
Report of the Indian Universities Commission 1902 [ 7]
Willium Hunter, Report of the Indian Education Commission 1882 [25-26] “ Hunter Commission”
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Calcutta, Act XXII of 1857 which established and incorporated the University at Bombay, and Act XXVII of 1857 which established and incorporated the University at Madras stipulated that the Universities were established to ascertain (through an examination) those persons who had acquired proficiency in different branches. This was the only power conferred upon Universities.87 The enactments also provided that only candidates who were authorised through a certificate from one of the institutions authorized by them shall be a candidate for the degree.88 However, the University at Punjab incorporated in 1882 had greater scope. In 1869, an institution styled the Lahore University College (and the Punjab University College later) was established in pursuance of the wishes of the Chiefs, Nobles and influential classes of Punjab. Act XIX of 1882 incorporated the University at Punjab by which the college was converted into a University to confer degrees. The University at Punjab was, thus, the first teaching University in India. 92. On 12 January 1902, the Government of India issued a resolution to appoint a commission to “inquire into the condition and prospects of the Universities established in British India; to consider and report upon any proposals […] for improving their constitution and working […]”. The Report of the Commission discussed the necessity of establishing teaching Universities, where better provision for advanced courses of study could be made.89 In 1904, Act No. VIII of 1904 was enacted to amend the law relating to the Universities at Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Allahabad. Section 3 of the Act provided that the University shall have the power to make provision for, inter alia, the instruction of students and the power to appoint University professors and Lecturers. Universities that were incorporated subsequent to Act No. VIII of 1904 had the power to instruct students in addition to conducting examinations to confer degrees.90 However, teaching universities also had to be incorporated
See Section XIII and XIV of the enactments; Also see Section 14 of Act No. XVIII of 1887 that established the University at Allahabad
Section XII of the enactments.
Report of the Indian Universities Commission 1902 [24, 25]
See Section 4 of Osmania University Act, preamble and Section 4(1) of the Lucknow University Act 1920; preamble to the Delhi University Act 1922 which states that it established and incorporates a teaching and affiliating University; Section 4(1) of the Delhi University Act 1922; Section 4(1) of the Nagpur University Act 1923
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through a legislative enactment because they would have the power to confer degrees recognised by the Government. 93. It is in this background that we should decide if Universities established before the enactment of the UGC Act could be covered by Article 30(1). It is true that the intervention of the imperial legislature was necessary to incorporate a university before the commencement of the Constitution. The intervention of the State legislature was necessary after the commencement of the Constitution until the enactment of the UGC Act.91 The intervention of the legislative body was required to ‘incorporate’ universities because the degrees conferred by them would be recognised by the Government. This was required even for the incorporation of teaching universities. However, could it be argued that no person had the power to ‘establish’ a university merely because the intervention of the legislative body was required for the incorporation of the institution? Could it be argued that a university was ‘established’ by the legislature merely because it enacted a legislation incorporating it? 94. The words ‘incorporation’ and ‘establishment’ cannot be used interchangeably. They connote different meanings. ‘Incorporation’ signifies the legal existence of the institution. 92 In contrast, ‘establishment’ signifies the founding or bringing into existence of the institution.93 The possibility of distinguishing the establishment and incorporation of universities arose with the advent of teaching Universities. Two kinds of institutions were incorporated as teaching universities. They consisted of institutions which were established and incorporated at the same time, and institutions in which the establishment of the institution predated its incorporation. Universities in the latter category, however, were teaching colleges converted into teaching universities. The University at Punjab is one such example. The Annamalai University would also fall in this category. In the case of Annamalai University, the Hon’ble Diwan Bahadur Sir S.R.M Annamalai Chettiyar had established and was maintaining colleges around Chidambaram in Tamil Nadu. The college was converted to a University through the enactment of Annamalai
See Entry 11 of List II to the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution prior to Constitution(Forty-second Amendment) Act 1976
Oxford Dictionary defines the word ‘incorporated’ as formed into business company with legal status
Oxford Dictionary defines establish as ‘to start or create an organization, a system.’
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University Act 1928.94 The ‘establishment’ and ‘incorporation’ of these universities was distinct. The incorporation of the University was necessary to confer degrees recognised by the Government. However, there was an institution that pre-dated the incorporation of the University that continued to exist even after the incorporation. Thus, the instance of conversion of teaching collages to teaching universities elucidates the distinction between the “establishment” and “incorporation” of educational institutions. 95. The word ‘establish’ as used in Article 30(1) cannot and should not be understood in a narrow and legalistic sense. The words used in clause (1) of Article 30 have to be interpreted in view of the object and purpose of the article, and the guarantee and protection it confers. The guarantee and protection are not dependent on the basis or the manner in which the legal requirements were/are complied with, rather it concerns the persons who have founded and created the establishment. The incorporation by a statute or the procedure and requirements in law are not determinative factors. The persons behind it, that is, the promoters and founder(s) are important. They should belong to a linguistic or a religious minority. There will always be individuals and groups instrumental in catalysing and setting up the institution. Thus, giving a legal character to an educational institution through state or sovereign action, it does not ipso facto follow that the university so established deprives the group of persons/individuals the guarantee under clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution. Universities are as much educational institutions as schools and colleges. The interpretation in Azeez Basha (supra) confers a legalistic meaning to the word ‘established’, sans the context of clause (1) of Article 30. No distinction exists between universities and other educational institutions such as schools and colleges for the purpose of Article 30(1). 96. The following conclusions emerge from the discussion above: a.
The teaching universities and colleges serve the common function of educating students. No distinction between the two can be drawn for the purposes of Article 30(1) which guarantees minorities the right of greater autonomy in the administration of educational institutions to curate a model of education which best serves the interests of the community; and
See the preamble of the Annamalai University Act 1928
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b.
The submission that a person did not have the power to ‘establish’ a university before the enactment of the UGC Act is rejected. The words establishment and incorporation cannot be interchangeably used. They connote different meanings. The former refers to founding an institution, which in the case of teaching colleges that were converted to universities would refer to any person or community who undertook the efforts the establish the teaching college.
c.
The minority character of the institution is not ipso facto surrendered upon the incorporation of the University
97. The Solicitor General argued that Azeez Basha (supra) — correctly understood — holds that the Muslim minority surrendered its rights as a denominational institution before the Constitution was adopted by approaching the imperial legislature to recognise the degrees. He argued that the decision tacitly recognised the fact that two broad groups existed during the freedom struggle. The first of these groups was determined to conduct their affairs without assistance from or reference to the imperial legislature. It set up institutions which granted degrees which were not recognised by the imperial government. They did not seek recognition of the degrees granted by their institutions at that time. Instead, such institutions (and the degrees granted by them) were recognised post-independence. Examples of such universities include Shantiniketan; the predecessor of IIT Roorkee. In contrast, the second group chose to collaborate with the imperial government and sought recognition of the degrees awarded by its universities. Having approached the imperial government for such recognition, the second group surrendered their denominational status (comparable to minority status under Article 30). It was submitted that the founders of AMU formed a part of the second group. While MAO College may have been of a denominational character, it has been urged that the incorporation of the institute as AMU resulted in the surrender of rights. Since we are only dealing with the principles of law, we will address this argument without referring to the factual aspects submitted by the learned Solicitor General. In short, the argument is that the minority character of an educational institution is surrendered upon the incorporation of the institution. 98. The minority character of institutions cannot be rejected if they were conferred a legal character by a statute enacted prior to 1950. The
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enactment was necessary to award degrees recognized by the British government, allowing graduates to gain degree recognition and secure employment. The enactment of the statute is a ministerial and a legislative act, which confers juristic personality as well as legal rights in terms of the law in force. The statute grants the power to the educational institution to confer the degrees. The incorporation by way of statute is a legal requirement. That being the case, we will not accept the argument that compliance with legal requirement would tantamount to the ‘establishment’ of an institution by the Legislature, and thereby the linguistic and religious minority forgo the guarantees and protection under clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution. 99. In the same vein, the state may also provide for the mode by which educational institutions may be set up or established. For instance, it may require that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act or a public trust constituted in accordance with law is a prerequisite to establishing a school.95 The state may also issue a certificate of recognition to the school (or other educational institution) meeting the relevant criteria. It may also require schools to register with the authorities.96 Certain steps as mandated by law may be a sine qua non for setting up educational institutions. 100. In the absence of these prerequisites (such as registration with the competent authorities), the educational institution will have no
See, for instance, Section 20A of the Andhra Pradesh Education Act 1982 read with Rule 14(4) of the Andhra Pradesh Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules 2010. Section 20A: “20-A. Prohibition of individual to establish institutions.—On and from the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh Education (Amendment) Act, 1987 no individual shall establish a private institution: Provided that this section shall not have any effect on any private institution established by an individual and recognized by the competent authority prior to such commencement].” Rule 14(4): “(4) The District Educational Officer, on being satisfied that the school fulfils the norms and standards prescribed under section 19 and section 25 of the Act, shall issue the recognition certificate in Form-2 as shown in the appendix. The certificate shall be for a period of three years and shall be issued within 30 days from the date of making application for recognition. The certificate of recognition shall be issued subject to following conditions: (a) The school is run by a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), or a public trust constituted under any law for the time being in force; …”
See, for instance, Section 30 of the Karnataka Education Act 1983: “30. Educational institutions to be registered.- (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, every local authority institution and every private educational institution established on or before the date of commencement of this Act or intended to be established thereafter, shall notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, be registered in accordance with this Act and the rules made thereunder. (2) No person or local authority shall establish or as the case may be, run or maintain an educational institution requiring registration under this section, unless such institution is so registered.”
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existence in the eyes of the law. It is only upon compliance with these requirements that the institution assumes the legal form mandated by the regulatory provisions of the law. 101. It is true that many persons or groups founded universities which awarded degrees which were not recognised by the imperial government. The existence of this option and the fact that others chose this path in colonial times cannot shape the contours of the right under Article 30 in independent India. This is because the recognition of degrees was and is essential not only to the success of the university but more importantly, to the success of its graduates. Recognition of the degrees or qualifications held by persons who have completed courses from universities is essential to professional development. It is impossible to avail of employment opportunities if the degree that one holds is not recognised. 102. This interpretation has also found support in numerous judgments of this Court. Judgments of this Court have previously expounded on the importance of recognition or affiliation of a College. It is only with the affiliation of the college with the University that a student could be awarded a degree upon the completion of the course of study. The degree, beyond being a testament of a personal achievement, is necessary for their professional growth. In in re the Kerala Education Bill 1957 (supra), this Court expounded on the importance of recognition and observed as follows: “32. […] Without recognition, therefore, the educational institutions established or to be established by the minority communities cannot fulfil the real objects of their choice and the rights under Article 30(1) cannot be effectively exercised. The right to establish educational institutions of their choice must, therefore, mean the right to establish real institutions which will effectively serve the needs of their community and the scholars who resort to their educational institutions. There is, no doubt, no such thing as fundamental right to recognition by the State but to deny recognition to the educational institutions except upon terms tantamount to the surrender of their constitutional right of administration of the educational institutions of their choice is in truth and in effect to deprive them of their rights under Article 30(1). We repeat that the legislative power
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is subject to the fundamental rights and the legislature cannot indirectly take away or abridge the fundamental rights which it could not do directly and yet that will be the result if the said Bill containing any offending clause becomes law.” 103. In Rev. Sidhajbhai (supra), this Court reiterated that regulations which may impose conditions for the recognition of the educational institution must be directed towards making the institution effective, while retaining its character as a minority institution. The dual test laid down in this case to assess the validity of such regulations is that the regulations must be reasonable and regulate the educational character of the institution while being conducive to making it an effective vehicle of education. An educational institution does not lose its minority character merely because it subjects itself to regulatory measures essential to avail the benefit of recognition/affiliation, or grant in aid, provided these controls are designed to maintain the standards of education and larger public interest. 104. The decision of the seven Judge Bench in In re the Kerala Education Bill (supra)was followed by a six Judge Bench in Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai (supra). This aspect was overlooked in Azeez Basha (supra) which was decided by a bench of five judges. The importance of recognition and affiliation cannot be understated. The position of law even at the time of the decision in Azeez Basha (supra), as held in re the Kerala Education Bill 1957 (supra), was that recognition on terms tantamount to the surrender of the right to administer the institution was a violation of Article 30(1). For Azeez Basha (supra) to hold that the minority character of the institution is surrendered upon enactment by central imperial legislation is to hold that the recognition of its degrees would result in the denial of the right under Article 30, reducing the choice available to a religious or linguistic minority. This would be in the teeth of settled law on the subject as well as Article 30(1). Azeez Basha (supra) failed to notice this aspect of the decision in In re the Kerala Education Bill 1957 (supra) discussed above and the decision in Rev. Sidhajbhai (supra). 105. Further, the decisions of this Court subsequent to Azeez Basha (supra) have not disturbed the relevant part of the precedents in In
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re the Kerala Education Bill 1957 (supra) and Rev. Sidhajbhai (supra). Azeez Basha (supra) is the lone case which stands apart in the long line of cases on this subject. In St. Xavier’s (supra), the majority of the nine-Judge Bench held that an unconstitutional condition of surrendering the minority character in exchange for affiliation or recognition cannot be imposed. 106. Presently, the decision of eleven Judges in TMA Pai (supra) holds the field on the subject and is binding on this Court. It, too, unequivocally affirms the proposition of law discussed above. One of the many relevant paragraphs in this regard is extracted below: “70. … The object of establishing an institution has thus been to provide technical or professional education to the deserving candidates, and is not necessarily a commercial venture. In order that this intention is meaningful, the institution must be recognized. At the school level, the recognition or affiliation has to be sought from the educational authority or the body that conducts the school-leaving examination. … A college or a professional educational institution has to get recognition from the university concerned, which normally requires certain conditions to be fulfilled before recognition. It has been held that conditions of affiliation or recognition, which pertain to the academic and educational character of the institution and ensure uniformity, efficiency and excellence in educational courses are valid, and that they do not violate even the provisions of Article 30 of the Constitution; but conditions that are laid down for granting recognition should not be such as may lead to governmental control of the administration of the private educational institutions.” (emphasis supplied) 107. Compliance with the legal requirement to secure a benefit provided by the State cannot be on terms that require the relinquishment of fundamental rights. An interpretation that leans towards this consequence must not be adopted. Thus, the minority character of an educational institution could not have been denied merely because it was converted to a University through a legislative enactment.
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108. In Azeez Basha (supra), this Court recognised the efforts of the Muslim community towards the establishment of AMU’s predecessor, the MAO College, as well as towards the enactment of the AMU Act but held that the central imperial legislature established AMU, and not the Muslim community. In effect, it held that the enactment of the AMU Act rendered any previous action undertaken by the Muslim community towards the establishment of AMU irrelevant. 109. The reasoning of the Court hinged on the fact that the Muslim minority could have established a university and awarded degrees but could not have insisted upon governmental recognition of its degrees. The Court held that the fact that AMU was brought into existence by a statute which mandated the recognition of its degrees meant that the central imperial legislature established it. Since the correctness of the reasoning of the Court is being considered in these proceedings, it is extracted below: “22. There was nothing in 1920 to prevent the Muslim minority, if it so chose, to establish a university; but if it did so the degrees of such a university were not bound to be recognised by Government. … The Aligarh University was also in the same way established by legislation and it provided under Section 6 of the 1920 Act that “the degrees, diplomas and other academic distinctions granted or conferred to or on persons by the University shall be recognised by the Government as are the corresponding degrees, diplomas and other academic distinctions granted by any other university incorporated under any enactment”. It is clear therefore that even though the Muslim minority could have established at Aligarh in 1920 a university, it could not insist that degrees granted by such a university should be recognised by Government. Therefore when the Aligarh University was established in 1920 and by Section 6 its degrees were recognised by Government, an institution was brought into existence which could not be brought into existence by any private individual or body for such individual or body could not insist upon the recognition of the degrees conferred by any university established by it. The enactment of Section 6 in the 1920 Act is a very important circumstance which shows that the Aligarh University when it came to be established in 1920
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was not established by the Muslim minority, for the minority could not insist on the recognition by Government of the degrees conferred by any university established by it. 23. … There was no Aligarh University existing till the 1920 Act was passed. It was brought into being by the 1920 Act and must therefore be held to have been established by the Central Legislature which by passing the 1920 Act incorporated it. The fact that it was based on the M.A.O. College, would make no difference to the question as to who established the Aligarh University. The answer to our mind as to who established the Aligarh University is clear and that is that it was the Central Legislature by enacting the 1920 Act that established the said University. As we have said already, the Muslim minority could not establish a university whose degrees were bound to be recognised by Government as provided by Section 6 of 1920 Act : that one circumstance along with the fact that without the 1920 Act the University in the form that it had, could not come into existence shows clearly that the Aligarh University when it came into existence in 1920 was established by the Central Legislature by the 1920 Act. It may be that the 1920 Act was passed as a result of the efforts of the Muslim minority. But that does not mean that the Aligarh University when it came into being under the 1920 Act was established by the Muslim minority.” 110. In Azeez Basha (supra), this Court observed that the term ‘establish’ means ‘to bring into existence’ and not any of the other dictionary meanings that is, to ratify, confirm, settle, found, or create. Adopting a formalistic interpretation, the Bench held that AMU was not established by the Muslim minority since it was brought ‘into existence’ by the Central Legislature. In Mother Provincial (supra), another Constitution Bench which was decided before Azeez Basha (supra) interpreted the word ‘establish’ to mean to found an institution, which offers a broader interpretation.97 In our view, it is inconsequential
8. […] Establishment here means the bringing of an institution and it must be by a minority community. It matters not if a single philanthropic individual with his own means, founds the institution or the community at large contributes the funds.” (emphasis supplied)
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whether the word means ‘to bring into existence’ or ‘to found’. We have held above that the enactment of a legislation to incorporate a university would not repudiate the minority character. The Court must pierce the veil of the statute to identify if the institution intended to retain its minority character even upon incorporation. 111. The respondents further submitted that the long title and the preamble of the enactment must be used to determine if the minority established the institution. A comparison was drawn between the preamble of the AMU Act and statutes by which other universities were incorporated. For example, the preamble of the Annamalai University Act 1928 stipulates that the founder of the college, Shri Annamalai Chettiyar, handed over the college with the property and a fund of twenty thousand rupees to the local Government for the establishment of a University. The preamble also recognises that he and his heirs would be entitled to certain powers and privileges in the University. However, in contrast, the preamble of the AMU Act 1920 stated that it is an enactment to ‘establish’ and ‘incorporate’ a University. 112. We do not agree with this submission. It cannot be argued that a university was established by Parliament merely because the long title and preamble of the statute incorporating the university states that it is an Act to establish and incorporate. If such a formalistic interpretation is adopted, fundamental rights would be made subservient to legislative language. The preamble of the Annamalai University Act certainly provides context to the incorporation of the University and brings out the distinction between incorporation and establishment. However, the courts in the absence of such an elaborate preamble must not be ready to conclude that Parliament established the University. The courts must identify the circumstances surrounding the incorporation of the University (including through a reading of the statute) to identify who established the university. Formalism must give way to actuality and to what is real. 113. The written submissions filed on behalf of the Union of India place reliance on Dalco Engg. (P) Ltd. v. Satish Prabhakar Padhye98 to argue that the term ‘establish’ means “coming into existence by virtue of a statutory enactment”. It suggests that the institution owes
(2010) 4 SCC 378
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its existence to the legislature if the long title to an enactment states that it is an act to “establish and incorporate”. 114. In Dalco (supra), the question before this Court was whether companies incorporated in terms of the Companies Act 1956 were bound by the norm contained in Section 47 of the same enactment. Section 47 stipulated that an ‘establishment’ shall not dispense with or reduce in rank an employee who acquires a disability during their service.99 Section 2(k) of the same statute defined ‘establishment’ in the following terms: “2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— … (k) ‘establishment’ means a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, or an authority or a body owned or controlled or aided by the Government or a local authority or a government company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) and includes Departments of a Government;” (emphasis supplied) 115. After analysing the precedents, this Court held that Section 2(k) referred to companies which owe their existence to a statute. It held that without such a statute, the company would not exist. It held that the term “established by or under” in Section 2(k) referred to companies which are created by statutes and not ones which are merely governed by statutes after coming into existence. This court, therefore, held that companies incorporated and registered under the Companies Act 1956 are not necessarily established by it.
Section 47, Companies Act 1956: “47. Non-discrimination in government employment.—(1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service: Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits: Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. (2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability: Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment, by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section.”
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116. Dalco (supra) does not have a bearing on the interpretation of the term “establish” in Article 30 because it was concerned with the interpretation of the term “established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act” as it occurs in a parliamentary statute. The words “establish and incorporate” in the long title of enactments must be read together holistically to understand the import of the expression. The other cases100 relied on by the Union of India in this respect are not applicable to the question before us for similar reasons. d.
‘Minority’ as on the commencement of the Constitution
117. Mr Dwivedi submitted that an educational institution to be a minority educational institution must have been established by a linguistic or religious minority at the time of establishment. He proposed that the following tests must be satisfied to determine if the community was a minority: a.
The numerical test:101 Which community ruled the country when the university was established? Is the community which seeks to claim the right under Article 30 a minority compared to the former?
b.
The qualitative test of non-dominance:102 Even if the community which seeks to claim the right under Article 30 was in a numerical minority, was it in a non-dominant position in the state at the point of time at which the institution was established?
c.
The test of self-assessment: Did the specific persons who established the educational institute consider themselves to be a minority?
118. A preliminary question must be answered before addressing the feasibility and legality of adopting the above tests. What should be the relevant point to determine if the educational institution that was founded before the commencement of the Constitution was
100 Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi (1975) 1 SCC 421; Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain (1976) 2 SCC 58; S.S. Dhanoa v. MCD (1981) 3 SCC 431 101 See opinion of Justice Ruma Pal in TMA Pai (supra) 102 See opinion of Justice Quadri in TMA Pai (supra)
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established by a minority? Should it be determined based on the time of establishment, the time of the commencement of the Constitution, or the time when the right was claimed. 119. Before the commencement of the Constitution, there was no concept of minority institutions, both linguistic and religious. The guarantee and the protection given by the Constitution are applicable on the date when the Constitution was adopted. It is on this date that it must be determined if the right under Article 30 accrues. However, when the question of whether the educational institution was established by a linguistic or a religious minority arises, we will have to relate back to the point in time when the institution was established. It would be immaterial that back then the educational institution was not granted the status and treated as a linguistic or a religious minority institution. Thus, the details of the persons who had established the institution, though earlier in point of time, is relevant and determines the character of the institution. Such interpretation would do justice to Article 30(1) and not deny and rob minority educational institutions of constitutional guarantees. 120. The question of whether they qualify as a ‘minority’ has to be answered with reference to the date of enforcement of the Constitution. The Constitution upon its adoption guaranteed fundamental rights to specific groups such as ‘persons’, ‘citizens’, ‘religious and linguistic minorities’, ‘women’, ‘the Scheduled Castes’ and ‘Scheduled Tribes’. These groups consist of such members as conceived by the Constitution. For example, Part II of the Constitution and provisions of the Citizenship Act 1955 enacted in pursuance of the power provided under Article 11 stipulate conditions for acquiring citizenship. Only those persons who satisfy the conditions prescribed can enforce the rights guaranteed to citizens as a class. Similarly, the President in exercise of the power under Article 341 may notify castes, tribes or groups that would be Scheduled Castes for the purposes of the Constitution. 121. The only criteria that is prescribed for right-bearers under Article 30 is that they should be linguistic or a religious minorities. The courts have, however, specified what constitutes a minority. Chief Justice Kirpal, writing for the majority of the eleven-Judge Bench in TMA Pai (supra) observed that the minority must be determined
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based on the test of numerical minority within the State.103 If a group or community is required to prove that it was a religious or linguistic minority at the time of establishment of the institution (where the institution was established before the commencement of the Constitution), it would lead to a situation where the fundamental right is conferred upon a group other than the one intended by the Constitution. The demography of the Dominion of India underwent a drastic change upon partition. The Constitution, through Article 30(1), confers a right on those communities that were disadvantaged upon the commencement of the Constitution and not the group that was disadvantaged in pre-independent India. 122. We reject the argument that the test of whether an educational institution is a minority institution must be examined based on whether the community or the group which had established the institution was a minority at the time of its establishment in pre-independent India. The purpose of the provision as highlighted in the preceding sections is to ensure that the minorities are able to preserve and promote their linguistic and religious culture. For this purpose, the status of the group/community, that had established the institution, on the date of commencement of the Constitution should be considered. The test of establishment will apply to future situations on the day when new educational institutions are established. The protection under clause (1) of Article 30 cannot be denied to institutions established before the commencement of the Constitution for the reason that at the time of establishment in pre-independent India, the founders were not aware that they would receive protection of Article 30(1). 123. Having addressed the preliminary arguments on the applicability of Article 30, we will now proceed to formulate the indicia for the establishment of an educational institution. v.
Indicia for the ‘establishment’ of a minority educational institution
124. In this section of the judgment, we will answer two questions: (i) the indicia for ‘establishment’ of a minority educational institution; and (ii) the burden and degree of proof required to prove ‘establishment’ of a minority educational institution.
103 TMA Pai (supra) [81]
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125. In SK Patro (supra), the question before the Constitution Bench was whether Church Missionary Society Higher Secondary School was a minority educational institution. It was contended that the school was established by the Church Missionary Society, London and not the local residents of Bhagalpur. The Bench relied on the following evidence to conclude that the School was established by the local Christians: a.
The correspondence and resolutions indicated that a permanent home for the Boys School was set up on property acquired by local Christians and in buildings erected from funds collected by them104
b.
The institution and the land on which it was built and the balance in the local fund were handed over to the Church Missionary Society;105 and
c.
Though substantial assistance was obtained from the Church Missionary Society London, it could not be said that the school was not established by local residents only because of that.106
126. In Mother Provincial (supra), this Court observed that the intention to found an institution for the benefit of the minority community must be present. In St. Stephen’s (supra), a Constitution Bench determined whether St. Stephen’s College is a minority educational institution. St Stephen’s College is a constituent college of Delhi University. The Bench held that the college was established by the Indian Christian community based on the following material: a.
The purpose of establishing the educational institution emerged from the Report of 1878 to the Cambridge Brotherhood. The purpose of founding the college was to ensure that graduates from St. Stephen’s Mission School could be given the benefit of Christian teachings in college;107
b.
The buildings depicted the Christian orientation of the college108
104 SK Patro (supra) [15] 105 ibid [15] 106 ibid [16] 107 St Stephen’s (supra) [30] 108 Ibid [31-32] Foundation stone has the inscription :”to the glory of god, and the advancement of sound, learning and religious education”; a cross was placed in the new building.
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c.
The motto of the college is “Ad Dei Gloriam”, that is the glory of god;109
d.
There is a chapel in the college campus, where religious instruction is imparted;110
e.
The Constitution of the college reflects its Christian character. It states that the object of the college is, inter alia, to offer instruction on doctrines of Christianity,111 the original members of the society were mostly Christians,112 and the composition of the society reflects its Christian character where a large number of Christian members of the Church of North India are a part of it;113 and
f.
The Governing Body has a distinct christian character. The Supreme Council comprises of members of the Church of North India. Their role is to look after the religious and moral instruction to students.114 The administration vests with the Governing Body which predominantly consists of Christians. Though three of the thirteen members of the Governing Body may be non-Christians, that does not dilute the Christian character of the institution.
127. The decisions in Mother Provincial (supra), SK Patro (supra) and St. Stephen’s (supra) emphasise that the indicia for establishment must elucidate the minority character of the educational institution. What is the meaning of the phrase ‘minority character’? Are special rights guaranteed by Article 30(1) only if educational institutions are established ‘for’ the minorities, towards the purpose of protecting minority interests? If yes, when can the courts be certain that the above two conditions are satisfied? That is, what are the ‘core essentials’ of minority character? We will answer this by referring to judicial decisions on four questions. Clarity over the essentials of the minority character will help us ascertain the indicia for ‘establishment’ of a minority educational institution.
109 ibid [33] 110 ibid [34]
Memorandum of the Society and Rules, Clause 2
112 Memorandum of the Society and Rules, Clause 4 113 ibid [35] 114 ibid [36]
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128. The first question that arose in earlier cases was whether a minority educational institution must be established towards the conservation of the distinct language, script or culture of linguistic and religious minorities protected by Article 29(1). In Rev. Father W. Proost v. The State of Bihar,115 a Constitution Bench answered the question in the negative. The Bench held that Article 30(1) covers a minority educational institution which is established to conserve culture and language. However, that need not be the only purpose for the establishment of the institution. This Court held that the scope of Article 30(1) cannot be restricted by Article 29(1).116 In St. Xavier (supra), the majority of the nine-Judge Bench approved this interpretation.117 129. The second question that arose in earlier decisions was whether an educational institution would retain its minority character even if non-minorities are admitted in it. Would a Muslim minority education institution retain its minority character when it admits students from other faiths in the institution? In re the Kerala Education Bill 1957 (supra), a seven-Judge Bench held that a minority educational institution would not lose its minority character by merely admitting students belonging to non-minorities and that the provision contemplates an institution with a ‘sprinkling of outsiders’.118 This position was further fortified in TMA Pai (supra). In TMA Pai (supra), Article 29(2) and Article 30(1) were read harmoniously to hold that Article 29(2) would apply to a limited extent to minority educational institutions as well.119 Thus, an aided minority educational institution
115 [1969] 2 SCR 73 116 Rev. Father W Proost v. State of Bihar [5J] [1969] 2 SCR 73 117 See footnote 30 of this judgment. 118 “By admitting a non-member into it the minority institution does not shed its character and cease to be a minority institution. Indeed the object of conservation of the distinct language, script and culture of a minority may be better served by propagating the same amongst non-members of the particular minority community.” 119 “149. […] As observed quite aptly in St. Stephen’s case [(1992) 1 SCC 558] (at SCC p. 608, para 85) “the fact that Article 29(2) applies to minorities as well as non-minorities does not mean that it was intended to nullify the special right guaranteed to minorities in Article 30(1)”. The word “only” used in Article 29(2) is of considerable significance and has been used for some avowed purpose. Denying admission to non-minorities for the purpose of accommodating minority students to a reasonable extent will not be only on grounds of religion etc., but is primarily meant to preserve the minority character of the institution and to effectuate the guarantee under Article 30(1). The best possible way is to hold that as long as the minority educational institution permits admission of citizens belonging to the non-minority class to a reasonable extent based upon merit, it will not be an infraction of Article 29(2), even though the institution admits students of the minority group of its own choice for whom the institution was meant. What would be a reasonable extent would depend upon variable factors, and it may not be advisable to fix any specific percentage. The situation would vary according to
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is mandated to admit students from other faiths and that in itself does not erode the minority character of the institution. 130. The third question was whether a minority education institution would lose its minority character when secular education is taught. In In re Kerala Education Bill (supra) and St. Xavier’s (supra), this Court held that the word ‘choice’ in Article 30(1) expands the scope of the provision to include not only religious but also secular education.120 131. The fourth question was whether it is essential that religious instruction must be provided in a minority educational institution. In TMA Pai (supra), this Court held that Article 28 equally applies to minority educational institutions.121 Thus, if the minority institution has received aid from the State wholly or in part, no student can be forced to participate in religious instruction. Similarly, a minority educational institution which is fully maintained out of State funds cannot provide religious instruction. Even here, a harmonious construction of Article 28 and Article 30(1) was adopted.
the type of institution and the nature of education that is being imparted in the institution. Usually, at the school level, although it may be possible to fill up all the seats with students of the minority group, at the higher level, either in colleges or in technical institutions, it may not be possible to fill up all the seats with the students of the minority group. However, even if it is possible to fill up all the seats with students of the minority group, the moment the institution is granted aid, the institution will have to admit students of the non-minority group to a reasonable extent, whereby the character of the institution is not annihilated, and at the same time, the rights of the citizen engrafted under Article 29(2) are not subverted. It is for this reason that a variable percentage of admission of minority students depending on the type of institution and education is desirable, and indeed, necessary, to promote the constitutional guarantees enshrined in both Article 29(2) and Article 30. [emphasis supplied] 120 In re Kerala Education Bill(supra) [23] “23. […] the right conferred on such minorities is to establish educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their language only. What the article says and means is that the religious and the linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. There is no limitation placed on the subjects to be taught in such educational institutions. As such minorities will ordinarily desire that their children should be brought up properly and efficiently and be eligible for higher university education and go out in the world fully equipped with such intellectual attainments as will make them fit for entering the public services, educational institutions of their choice will necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education also.”; St. Xavier’s (supra) [Chief Justice Ray for himself and Justice Palekar, 8]; [Justice HR Khanna, 96]; [Justice Beg, 197]; [Justice Dwivedi, 236]; 121 See TMA Pai (supra) [88-90;144]; “144 […] As in the case of a majority-run institution, the moment a minority institution obtains a grant of aid, Article 28 of the Constitution comes into play. When an educational institution is maintained out of State funds, no religious instruction can be provided therein. Article 28(1) does not state that it applies only to educational institutions that are not established or maintained by religious or linguistic minorities. Furthermore, upon the receipt of aid, the provisions of Article 28(3) would apply to all educational institutions whether run by the minorities or the nonminorities. […] Just as Articles 28(1) and (3) become applicable the moment any educational institution takes aid, likewise, Article 29(2) would also be attracted and become applicable to an educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds.”
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132. The discussion above elucidates that the ‘minority character’ of the institution is not a rigid concept. The provision does not contemplate institutions which are exclusively for the benefit of members from the minority community. A minority institution established by a religious or linguistic minority need not be solely for their students or only for the purpose of teaching the tenets of their religion or language. The issue of whether an institution is a minority institution should not be determined purely on the basis of the number of their students or the teaching staff. Such an interpretation is contrary to precedent. 133. A holistic and realistic view should be taken keeping in mind the objective and purpose of the provision. Based on the above principles laid down by Benches of co-equal strength and larger Benches of this Court on the components of the ‘minority character’, the following inferences can be drawn: a.
The existence of a religious place for prayer and worship is not a necessary indicator of the minority character because institutions wholly maintained out of State funds are constitutionally barred from providing religious instructions; and
b.
The existence of religious symbols in the precincts of the educational institution are not necessary to prove the minority character because educational institutions could be established for minorities to provide secular education without imparting any lessons on religion.
134. As discussed above, ‘establishment’ or formation of an institution can be at any point of time and even before the commencement of the Constitution. If an institution was established before the commencement of the Constitution, the enquiry on the question of ‘establishment’ must relate back to the date when the institution was established or formed to ascertain whether it would qualify as a minority institution upon the commencement of the Constitution. 135. To determine who established the institution, the Courts must consider the genesis of the educational institution. For this analysis, the Courts must trace the origin of the idea for the establishment of the institution. The Court must identify who was the brain behind the establishment of the educational institution. Letters, correspondence with other members of the community or with government/State officials and resolutions issued could be valid proof for establishing
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ideation or the impetus to found and establish. The proof of ideation must point towards one member of the minority or a group from the community.122 136. The second indicia is the purpose for which the educational institution was established. Though it is not necessary that the educational institution must have been established only for the benefit of a religious or linguistic minority community, it must predominantly be for its benefit. It is not necessary that education must be provided in the language spoken by the minority or on the religion of the minority. For example, it is not necessary that an educational institution established for the Tamils in Uttar Pradesh must necessarily prescribe Tamil as the language of instruction. However, it must be proved that the institution was established for the benefit of the tamil-speaking community. This indicia could be proved by a reference to private communication or speeches about the necessity of establishing an educational institution for the community and a recognition of the educational difficulties faced by the community. 137. The third test is tracing the steps taken towards the implementation of the idea. Information on who contributed the funds for its creation, who was responsible for obtaining the land, and whether the land was donated by a member of the minority community or purchased from funds raised by the minority community for this purpose or donated by a person from some other community specifically for the establishment of a minority educational institution are elements that must be considered. Similar questions must be asked of its other assets. Other important questions are: who took the steps necessary for establishing the institution (such as obtaining the relevant permissions, constructing the buildings, and arranging other infrastructure)? It is also important to note that the state may grant some land or other monetary aid during or after the establishment of the educational institution. If the land or monies were granted after the establishment, the grant would not have the effect of changing the minority character of the institution. Minority institutions are not barred from receiving aid save at the cost of their minority status.123 If the land or monies are granted at the time of establishment, the
122 Mother Provincial (supra) 123 TMA Pai (supra) [141]
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circumstances surrounding the establishment must be considered as a whole to determine who established the institution. The presence of a grant must not be automatically interpreted as leading to the erasure of a claim to minority status. 138. The next question is whether the administrative structure of the educational institution is an indicia for the establishment of a minority educational institution. We have already held above that an educational institution is a minority educational institution if it is established by a religious or linguistic minority. We have clarified that it is not necessary to prove that administration vests with the minority to prove that it is a minority educational institution because the very purpose of Article 30(1) is to grant special rights on administration as a consequence of establishment. To do otherwise, would amount to converting the consequence to a pre-condition. The right to administer is guaranteed to minority educational institutions to enable them to possess sufficient autonomy to model the educational institution according to the educational values that the community wishes to emphasise. It is not necessary that the purpose can only be implemented if persons belonging to the community helm the administrative affairs. This is so particularly because a minority institution may wish to emphasise secular education. The founders or the minority community may choose to populate the managing board (or a comparable authority) responsible for the day-to-day administration of the institution with persons belonging to the same community. However, they are not compelled to do so. They may wish to appoint persons who do not belong to their community but who they deem fit for the proper administration of the institution. This may be the case for professional colleges which offer specialised courses such as law, medicine, or architecture, where the founders may not possess the knowledge, experience, or insight necessary to manage or administer the institution personally. 139. The test to be adopted by the Court is whether the administrative set up of the educational institution affirms the minority character of the institution. If the administrative structure of the educational institution does not reflect its minority character or when it does not elucidate that the educational institution was established to protect and promote the interests of the minority, it may be reasonably inferred that the purpose was not to establish an educational institution for the benefit of the minority community.
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140. We may specifically deal with a scenario of an educational institution established before the commencement of the Constitution. The test of administration should be evaluated in praesenti, that is, on the date of the commencement of the Constitution. An institution to be a minority institution must satisfy the criteria of being ‘administered’ as a minority institution on the date of commencement of the Constitution, and being a minority institution on the date of formation. Even if an educational institution was established by the minority for the purposes of the community, we must assess the impact of any subsequent events that altered the character of the institution before the commencement of the Constitution. We have in section E(iv)(c) held that the statutory incorporation of the institution does not ipso facto amount to a surrender of the minority character of the institution. We have held that the Court must pierce the veil to identify if the University was established by a minority for the purpose of promoting the interest of the community. The Court may on a holistic reading of the statutory provisions relating to the administrative set-up of the educational institution deduce if the minority character or the purpose of establishment was relinquished upon incorporation. The question is whether the regulatory measures wrest the administrative control from the founders of the institution. This is a question of fact which must be determined on the facts of each case. The Court must make that determination upon a comprehensive analysis of the administrative framework which includes host of factors such as the representation of the interests of the community in the administrative set-up. 141. Taken together, these are the main indicia which assist the Court in determining who established an educational institution under Article 30. However, the complex nature of establishing an educational institution is not lost on us. Undoubtedly, there can be no straitjacket formula which may be applied. The above indicia of establishment must be considered as a whole, along with any relevant facts which are available to the Court. The matter must be considered in totality and competing factors must be weighed against each other depending on the facts and circumstances of each institution. 142. The above indicia must be proved through the submission of cogent material. Reliance must be placed on primary sources such as office documents, letters and resolutions or memorandums issued to implement the resolutions. Secondary sources must only be
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used to corroborate the primary sources. The onus to prove that the educational institution was established by a minority is on the claimants. 143. One of the questions referred to this Bench was whether Article 30(1) envisages an institution which is established by minorities alone without participation from any other community? This question was based on the facts as observed by this Court in Anjuman-eRahmaniya (supra) where some persons from communities other than the Muslim community had contributed to the establishment of the educational institution. That case has been finally adjudicated and the issues which arose in it do not survive. Nothing in Article 30 prevents some persons from other communities in contributing to the establishment of an institution by a minority. There may be persons hailing from different communities who are concerned about the need for minority educational institutions and lend