Bachan Singh ETC. ETC. v. State of Punjab ETC. ETC.

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
9 May 1980
Judge
Justice Y.V. Chandrachud
Neutral citation
1980 INSC 120
Reported in
[1983] 1 S.C.R. 145
Result
Disposed off
Acts & sections
Section 354 CrPC, Section 302 IPC, Article 19 Constitution, Article 32 Constitution, Section 235 CrPC
Subject
Criminal

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Full judgment

BACHAN SINGH ETC. ETC•

. v. l

STATE OF PUNJAB ETC. ETC. May 9, 1980/August 16, i982·

[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., P.N. BHAGWATI, R.S. SARKARIA, A.C. GUPTA AND N.L. UNTWALIA, JJ.]

C.

(A} Death Penalty, whether' -constitutionally valid ?-Right to live, whether the provisions of section 302, Penal Code, offends Article 19 of the Constilution-' Distinctiop between "Public order" and "Law and Order''-Whether section 302, Penal Code, violates Article 21, the basic structure of the Constitution and Article 6(I) of the lnternatlona_/ Covenant on Civil .and Political Rights as adoPted by the General Assembly of the United Nations and reiterated in the Stockholm Declara-

tion.

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(B) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, section 354(3)-1/ section 302, Pertal Code, is constitution(ll, whether the sentencing procedure provided in sec- , lion 354(3) of the Code4 Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act Tl of 1974) is u~consti· tutional on the ground that it invests with unguided and untrainmelled discretion 'and allows death sentence to he arbitrarily or freakishly imposed on a person fou~ · guilty of murder or any other capital offence punishable under the Indian Penal . Code with death. or, In the alternative with bnprisonment for life.

(CJ Powers' of the Supreme Court to lay down standards or norms restricting the area of imposition of death perialty JO a narrow category of murders.

Upholding the constitutionality of section 302, Penal Code, and section 354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code. the Court. HELD : Per majority. Sarkaria, J, [On behalf of Cbandracbud, N.L. Untwalia, JJ. and on his own behalf],

C.J.,

AC.

Gupta,

The right to Jife is not one of the rights mentioned in Article 19 (J) of the Constitution and the six fundamental freedoms guarailteed under Article 19(1) are not absolute rights. The condition precedent for the applicability of Article 19 is that the activity which the impugned law prohibits~and penalises, must be within the purview of and protectioµ of Article 19 (!). [173 E, 174 A, B·CJ

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1983] l S.C.R.

State of Bombay.v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, [1957] SCR 874@ 920; Fatechand Himmatlal and Ors. v. State af Maharashtra, [1977] 2 SCR 828@ 840 ; A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, (1950] 1 SCR 88, followed.

2. The Indian Penal Code, particularly those of its provisions which cannot be justified on the ground of unreasonableness with reference to any of the specified heads, such as "public order" in clauses (2), (3) and (4) is not a law imposing restrictions on any of the rights conferred by Article 19 (1). The_re are . several offences under the Penal Code, such as, theft, cheating, ordinary assault, which do not violate or affect "public order", but only "law and order". These offences injure only speci_tic individuals as distinguished from the public at large. It is now settled that "public order" means "even tempo of the life of the com· munity". That being so, even all murders do not disturb or affect "public order". Some murders may be of pure'ty privat~ significance and the injury or harm resulting therefrom affects only specific individuals, and, consequently. "such n1urders may not be covered by "public order" within the conten1plation of clauses (2), (3) and (4) of Article 19. Such Inutders do not lead tO public dis.order but to disorder simpliciter. Yet, no rational being can say that punishment of such murderers is not in the general public interest. It may· be noted that geJ?eral public interest is not specified as a head in clauses (2) to (4) on which restriction on the rights mentioned in clause (i) of the Article may be justified. ,[181D.H,182 A-BJ The real-distinction between the areas of "law arid order" and "public order'' lies nofmerely in the nature or-quality of the act, but in the degree and ex.tent. Violent crimes similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. A murder committed in given circumstances may caUse only a slight tremor, the wave length of which does not extend beyond the parameters of law and order. Another murder committed in different context and circumstances may unleash a tidal wave of such intensity~ 'iravity and magnitude, that its i1npa<:t throws out of gear the even flow of life. Nonetheless, the fact remains that for such murders which do not affect •!_public order~', even the provision for life imprisonmen~ in section 302, Indian Penal Code, as an alternative punisbm~nt, would not be justifiable under clauses (2), (3) and (4) as a reasonable restriction in the interest of "public order". Such a construction must, therefore, be avoided. Thus construed, Article 19 will be attracted only to such laws, the provisions of which are capable of being tested und<r clauses (2) lo (5) of Article 19, (182 B-E]

oi

R. S. Cooper v. Union ,India, [19701 3 SCR 530; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of Indio; [1978] 2 SCR 621 ; Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia's case, [19t6) l SCR 709; Hardhan Saha and Anr. v. State of West Bengal, [1975] 1 SCR 778@ .784, followed.

3. From the decided cases of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the test of direct ·and in,direct effect was not scrapped. Indeed; there is no dispute that the test of "pith and substarice" of the subject-1natter and of direct aOd of incidental effect of legislation is a very useful test to determine the question of Jegislative compete~~~:~·~.·-~ i.~ ~sc;:~rtainin~ wh~ther ~n Act f~lls 1_.1n~er one Entry

BACHAN SINGH v. PUNJAB

while incidentally encroaching upon ailother Entry. Even for determining fhe validity of a legislation On the grouod of infrlngemen~ of fundamental rights, the subject- n1atter and the object of the legislation are not altogether irrelevant. For instance, if the subject· matter of the legislation directly covers any of th.e fundamental freCdoms mentioned in Article 19 (I). 1t must pass the test of reasonable: ness under the relevant head in clauses (2) to (6) of that Article. If the legislation does not directly deal with any of the rights in Article 19 (1), that inay not conclude the enquiry. It \viii have to be ascertained....further whether by its direct and immediate operption, the impugned legislation abridges any of the rights . enumerated in Article 19 (I). [189 B-D] The mere fact th3.t the impugned law incidentally, remotely or collaterally has the effect of abridgiug or abrogating those rights, will no·t satisfy the test. If the answer to the above queries be in the affirmative, the impugned law in order to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness under Article lf>. BUt ·if the impact of the law on any of the rights under clause (1) of Article 19 is.merely in~idental, indirect, remotC or collateral and is dependent upon factors which may or' may not come into play, the anvil of Article 19 will not be available for judging· its validity. [190 A-CJ R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 3 SCR 530; Maneka Gandhi v. Union

R

of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621; Subrahmanyam_ Chattiar's case, [1940] FCR 188; Ram Singh v. State of Delhi,. [1951] SCR 451; Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. and Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors., [1959) SCR 12; Minnesota Ex. Rel. Olson, [1930) 283 U.S. 697@ 698; Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. and Ors. v. The Union of India, [1962) 3 SCR 842; Naresh Shridhar Mirojkor and Ors. v. State ofMaharnshtraond Anr., [1966] 3 SCR 744; Bennett Coleman's case, AIR 1973 SC 106, ref~rred to: 4. Sec~ion 299 defines "culpable Jl,omicide" and section 300 defines culpable homicide amounting to murder. Section 302 prescribeS death or impri~ sonment for life as "Penalty for murder. It cannot, reasonably or rationally, be contended that any of the rights mentioned in Article 19 (I) of the Constitution.' • confers the freedom. to commit murder or, for the matter of that, the freedom to oeommit any offence whatsoever. -Therefore, penal laws, that is to say Jaws which <!efine offences and prescribe punishment for the con1mission Or off~nces 'do not :attrac.t the application of Article 19 (I}. It cannot be said that the object of the penal laws is generaJly such as not to inv.olve·anY violation of the rights conferred 'by Article 19 (I) because after the decision of this Court in the Bank Nalionalisa· · tion case the theory, that (he object and form of the State action alone deterrpine the extent of protection th3t may be claimed by an individual and that the effect of the State actiOn on the fundamental right of the individual is irreleva~t; stands discredited. But the point· of the matter is that, in pith and substaOce, penal laws do not deal with the subject~matter of rights enshrined in ·Article 19 (1). That again is not enough for the purpose of deciding upon the applicability of Article 19, because eyen if a law does not, in its pith and subStanc~. deal with any of the fundamental rights conferred by Article' -19 (I), if the direct and irievitable' effect of the law is such ·as to abridgC or abrogate any of those rights, Article 19 (I) shall have to be attracteQ.. ~t W.~lJ~~ ~h~D; l?~~Q~~ necessary tQ t.est th~.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1983] I S.C.R.

validity of even a penal law on the touchstone of that Article. On this latter aspect of the matter 1 it is clear that the deprivation of freedom consequent upon

an order of conviction and sentence is not a direct and inevitable consequence of the penal Jaw but is merely incidental to the order of conviction and sentence that is to say, which may or may not be passed. Section 302 of the Penal Code, therefore, does not have to stand the test of Article 19 (1) of the Constitution. [190 C-H, 191 A-BJ

~hich may or may not come into play.

The onus of satisfying the requirements of Article 19, assuming that the Article applies. lies on the person challenging its validity. There is initial presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the statute and the burden of rebutting that presumption is thrown on the party who challenges the constitutionality on the ground of Article 19. Behind the view that there is a presumption of .constitutionality of a statute and the onus to rebut the same lies on those who challenge the legislation, ·is the rationale of judicial restraint, a re~ognition of the limits of judicial review, a respect for the boundaries of legislative and judicial functions, and the judicial responsibility to ·guard the trespass from one side or the other. The primary function of thC courts is to interpret and apply the laws according to the will of those who made them and not to transgress into the legislative domain of policy-making. Even whete the burden is on the State to show that the restriction imposed by the impugned statute is reasonable and in public interest, the extent and -the manner of discharge of the burden necessarily depends on the subject-matter of the legislation, the nature of the inquiry, and the scope and limits of judicial review. [192 C-D, 193 A, C-D, 194 D-E]

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' Saghir Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1955] l SCR 707 ; Kh}"erbari Tea Co. v. State of Assam &: Ors., A.LR. 1964 SC 925; B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan, [1975] 2 SCR 774 @ 787 ; Pathumma v. State of Kera/a, [1978] 2 SCR 537; · Denriis v. United States, 341US494. 525: 95 L.Ed. 1137: 71 S. Ct. 857; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 US 153: 49 L.Ed. 2nd 859; State of Madras v._ V.G. Rao, (1952] SCR 597 @ 607; Jagmo/1an Singh v. State of U.P., [1973] 2 SCR 541, referred

1,..

to.

5. Statistical attempts to assess the true penological value of capital punishment remain inconclusive. Firs1ly, statistics of deterred potential murderers are hard to obtain. Secondly, th~ approach adopted by the Abolitionists is ove; simplified at the cost of other relevant but imponderable factors, the appreciation of which is es.sential to asstss the true renological value of capital punishment. The number of such factors is infinitude, .their character variable, duration transient and abstract formulation difficult. Conditions change from country to country and time to time. Due to the inconsistancy of social conditions, it is not scientifically potsible to assess with any degree of accuracy, as to whether the variatioll in the incidence of capital Crime is attributable to the presence or pbsence of death penalty in the penal law of that c~untry for sucb crimes. (215 E-H, 216 Al

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BACHAN SINGH V, PUNJAB

J

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6. To sum up, the question whether or not death penalty serves any penological purpose is a difficult, complex and 'intractable issue. It has evoked strong, diver-gent views. For the purpose of testing the constitutionality of the impugned provision as to death penalty in sec;tion 302, Penal Code, on the ground of reasonableness ,in the light of Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution, it is not necessary to express any categorical opinion, one way or the other, as to. which of th~se two antithetical views, held by the Abolitionists and Retei:itionists, is correct. It is sufficient to say that the very fact that persons of reason. learning and light are rationally and deeply divided in their opinion on this issue, is a ground among others, for rejecting the petitioners' argument that retention of death penalty in the. impugned provision, is totally devoid of reason and purpose. If, notwithstanding the view of the Abolitioriists to the contrary, a very Jarge segment of people the world over, including sociologists, legislators, ·jurists, judges and administrators still firmly believe in the worth and necessity of capital punishment for the protection of society, if in the perspective of prevailing crinie conditions in India,,.contemporary public opinion chanatised through the "people's representatives in Parliament, has repeatedly in the last three decad~s, rejected all attempts, including the one made recently, to abolish or specifically restrict the· area of death penalty, if death penalty is still a recognised legal sanction for murder or some types of murder in most of the civilised countries in the world, if the framers of the Indian Consti.. tution were' fully aware of the existence of death penalty· as punishment for murder, under the Indian Penal Code, if the .35th Report and subsequent Reports of the Law Commission suggesting retention of death penalty, and recommending revision of the Criminal Procedure Code and the insertion of the new sections 235 (2) and 3S4 (3) in that Code providing for pre--sentence hearing and sentencing procedure on conviction for murder another capital offences were before the Parliament and presumably considered by it when in 1972-73 it took up revision of the Code of 1898, and replaced it by the~.,. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, it cannot be Said that the provision of cleath penalty as an alternative punishment for Inurder, in section 302, Penal Code, is unreasonable aiid not in public interest. Therefore, the impugned provision in section 302, violates neither the letter nor the ethos of Article 19. [221 B-H, 222 Al

7. -(I) Neither the new interpretative dimensions given to Articles 19 and 21 by the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi, [1978] 2 SCR 621, and Charles Sobraj v. The SuperinttJndent, Central Jail, Tihar, New Delhi, [1979] 1 SCR 512, nor the acceptance by India of the International Covenant on Civil. and Political Rights, make'J any change in the prevailing standards pf decency and human dignity. The International Covenant does not outlaw capital punishment for murder altogether. [225 C-E] (ii) In accordance with the interpretative princiPie indicated by the Supreme Court in A1aneka's case, Article 21 will read as "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberly except according to fair, just and reasonable procedure establlshed by valid law" or in its converse positive form as HA person may be deprived of his life or personal liberty in accordance With fair, just and reasonable procedure established by valid law." Article 21, thus, clearly

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[1983] J S.C.I!..

li.iJPllEME COIJJ.<T REPOl!.TS

brings out the itnplication, that the Founding Fathers reco"gnised the right of the State to c.Ieprive a person .of his life .or personal liberty in accprdance with fair, just and reaSonable procedure established by valid law. In vieW of the ·constitutional provisions-Entries I and 2 in List III Concurrent List of Seventh Schedule Articles 72 (J) (c), 161 and 134-it cannot be said that death penalty under section 302, Penal c'ode, per se or because of its execution by hanging, constitutes an unreasonable, cruel or unusual punishment. By reason of the same constitutional postulates, it cannot be said that the framers of the Constitution considered death sentence for murdl!r or the prescribed traditional mode of its execution as a degrading punishment whi~h would defile athe dignity of the individual'' within the conten1pla1ion of tht: Preamble to the Constitution. On parity of reasoning, it cannot be said that death penalty for the offence of murder violates the basic structure of the Cons~itution. [222 E~H, 223 A-B, F·H]

(iii) Clauses (1) and (2) of Afticle 6 of the International ·covenant on Civil and Political Rights do not abolish or prohibit ihe imposition of death penalty in all circumstances. All that they require is that, firs1ly, death penalty shall not be arbitrarily inflicted; secondly, it sh11l be imposed only for most ··serious crimes in accordance with a law which shall not be an ex post facto legis· lation. Thus, the requirements of these clauses are sUb'stantially the same as the guarantees or prohibitions contained_ in Articles 20 and 21 of our Constitution. India's commitment, therefore, does not go beyond what is provided in the Cons~ titulion and the Indian Penal Code and the Crimini!l Procedure Code, The Penal Code prescribes de~th penalty as an alternati~e punishment cnly for heinous crimes which are not more than seven in number. Section 354 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code,'1973 in keeping with the spirit of the Internationa·l C6venant 1 has further restricted the area of dealh penalty. Illdia's penal laws, including the impugned provisions and their application, are thus entirely in accord with its international ·commitment. [224 G-H, 225 A-C]

8. The procedure provided in Criminal Pro6edure Code for imposing capital punishment for murder and' some other capital crimes under the Penal Code canndt, by any reckoning, be said to be unfair, unreasonable or unjust. Nor can it be said that this sentencing discretion, with which the Courts are invested, amounts to delegation of its power Of legislation by Parliament. The impugned provisions do not Violate Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. [238 B, G·H, 239 A-BJ

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Section 235 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes not only explicit what aq:ording to the decision in Jagmohan' s case was in1plicit in the scheme of the Code, but also bifurcates the trial by providing two hearings, one at the preconviction stage and another at the pre-!.entence stage. And, section 354 (3) of the Code marks a significant shift in the legislative policy .under lying the Code, 1898, as in force immediately before April 1, IS74, according to whi"ch both the alternative sentences of death or imprisonment for life provided for mui'der and for certain other capital offences under the Penal Code, were normal senienccs. Now, according to this changed legislative policy which is patent on · the face of section 354 (3), the normal punishment for murder and six other capital offences under the Penal Code is imprisonment foe life (ot iinprisonment for a term of years) and d~ath penalty is an exception. [229 F-0, AMB]

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BACHAN SINGH V. PUNJAB

AlthOugh sub-section _(2) of section 235 of the Code does not Contain a specific provision as to evidence and provides only for hearing of the accuSed as to sentence, yet it is ·implicit id this provision that if a request is made in that beh<ilf by ~ither the prosecution or the accused, or by b9th, the Judge should give., the party or parties _concerned an opporturiity of producing evidence or material relating to the various factors.bearing on the question of sentence. [230 E-F]

Jagmohan·Singh v, State o[ U.P., [1973] 2 SCR 541, reiterated. Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1973 SC 2385, referred to.

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9. The expression "special reasons" in- the context of section 354 (3) obviously means "exceptional reasons" founded on the exceptionally grave circumstances of the particular case relating to crime as well as criminal. Thus, the legislative policy now writ Jarg~ and clear on the face of section 354 (3) is that on conviction of murder and other capital offences punishable in the alternat~vc with death under the Penal Code, the extren1e penalty Should be imposed only in extreme cases. [236 C-D] ~

.

Bo/want Singh v. State of Punjab, [1976] 2 SCR 684, referred to.

10. Section· 235 (2) of the Code provides for a bifurcated trial and specifically gives the accused person a right of pre~sentence hearing, at which stage: he can bring on record ma~edal or evidence, Which may not be strictly relevant to or connected with the pilrticul'ar crime under inquiry, but nevertheless have: consistently with the policy underlined in section 354 (3), a bearing on the choice of sentence. The present legislative policy dis~ernible from section 235(2) read with section 35 4(3) is that in fixing the degree of punishment or making lhe choice of senterice for Various offences, including one under section 302, Penal Code, t~e Court should D.ot confine its coD.sideration "''princip3.Jly" or "merely" to the circumstances connected with the particular crime, but also give due con. sideration to.the circumstances of the criminal. l237 CPE]

E.

11. The Supreme Colirt shot.ild not venture to formulate rigid standards in an area in which the Legislature so warily treads. Only broad guidelines consis. tent with the policy indicated· by the Legislature can be laid down. But this much can be said that in order to qualif). for inclusion in the cate8ory of "a8gra· vating circumstances~' which may form the basis of "special reasons" in section 354(3), circumstances found on the fa..:ts of a particular case, must evidence aggravation of an abnormal or special degree. [243 &F, 254.B-C] ·

Gurbakash Singh Sibbia and Ors. v, State of Punjab, [1980] 3 SCR p. 383, applied.

Hy"man and Anr. v. Rose, [1912] AC 623, referred to.

12. Sections' 354 (3) and 235 (2) and. other related provisions of the Code of 1973 make!t clear that for making the choice of punishment or for. ascertai~ing I

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SUPREME COURt REPORTS

[198~1 I

s.c.a.

the existence or absence of Hspecial reasons" in that context, the Court must pay due regard both to the critne and the criminal. What is the relative weight to be . given to the aggravating and mitigating factors, depends on the facts and circum· stances of the particular case. More often than not, these two aspects are so intertwined that it is difficult to give a separate treatment to each of them. This is so because "style is the man." In many cases, the extremely cruel or beastly manner of the commission of murder is itself a demonstrated index of the depraved character of the perpetrator. That is why, it is not desirable to consider · the circumstances of the crime and the circumstances of the criminal in two separate water-tight compartments. In a sense, to kill is to be cruel and therefore all murders are cruel. But such cruelty may vary in its degree of culpability. And it is only when the Culpability assumes the proportion of extreme depravity that "special reasons" can legitimately be said to exist. . [251 G·H, 252 A-CJ Rajemfra Pra&ad v. State of U.P. [1979J 3 SCR p. 78, Bishnu Deo Shaw v. State of West Bengal, [1979]3 SCR p. 355, overruled.

13. · There are numerous other circumstances justifying the passing of~ the lighter sentence, as there are countervailing circumstances of aggravation. "We cannot obviously feed into a judicial computer all such situations since they are astrological imponderables in an imperfect and undulating_society." Nonetheless, it cannnot be over emphasised that the scope and concept of mitigating factors in the" area of death penalty must receive a liberal and expansive construction by the courts in accord with the sentencing policy writ large in section 354 (3). Judges should never be blood-thirsty. Hanging of murderers has never been too good for them. Facts and figures, albeit incomplete, furnished ·by the Union of India, show that in the past, Courts have inflicled the extreme penalty with extreme infrequency-a fact which attests to· the caution and compassion which they have always brought to bear on the exercise of their sentencing discretion in. so grave a matter. It is, therefore, imperative to voice the concern that Courts, aided by the broad illustrative guidelines indicated by the Supreme Court, will discharge the onerous function with evermore scrupulous care and humane concern, directed along the highroad of legislative policy outlined in section 354 (3), viz., that for persons convicted of murder life imprisonment is tlie rule and death sentence an exception. A real and abiding concern for the dignity of human life postulates resistance to taking a life through law's instrumentality. That ought LOt to 1Je done save in the rarest of rare cases when the alternative option is unquestion~bly foreclosed. l255 E-H, 256 A-C] Per Bhagwotl J. (Dissenting)

,, 1:1. Ordinarily, on the principle of stare decisis, Judges would hold them· selves bound by the view· taken in an earlier case and resist any attempt at reconsideration of the same issue. But, for several weighty and given considera·tions, the Court can depart from this ·precedential rule in any particular case.

(258 A-BJ

1:2. The rule of adherence to precedence is not a rigid and inflexible ,. rule of Jaw, but it is a rule of practice adopted by the Courts for the purpose of ensuring uniformity and stability in the law. Otherwise there will be no certainty and pre(!ictability in the law,.Ieading to chaos and confusion and in the process

BACHAN SINGH v. PUNJAB

destroying the rule of law, and increasing the labour of judges. But this rule of adherence to precedents,' though a necessary tool "in the legal smithy," is only a useful servant and can not be allowed to turn into a tyrannous master. If the ruie of stare decisis were followed ·blitldly and mechanically, it would dwarf and stultify the growth of the law and affect its capacity to adjust itself to the changing needs of the society·. [258 B-C, D,E,F] 1:3 There are certain issues which transcend technical considerations of stare decisis and if such an issue is _brought before the Court,' it would be nothing short of abdication of its constitutional duty for the Court to refuse to consider such issue by taking refuge under the doctrine of stare decisis. The C0urt mRy refuse to entertain such an issue like the constitutional validity of death penalty because it is satisfied that the previous decision is correct but it c"nnot decline to consider it on the ground that it is barred by the rul~ of adherence to precedents. (259 E-G]

In the present Case, there are two other supervening circumstances which ·justify; may compel, re-consideration of the decision in Jagmohan's ca~e. The first is the introduction of the new Code of. .Criminal . Procedure in 1973, which by section 354, sub-section (3) has made life sentence the rule, in case of offences punishable with death or in the altern.ative imprisonment for life and provided for imposition of sentence of death only in exceptional cases for special reasons. The second and the still more important circumstance which has supervened since the decision in Jagmohan"s case is the new dimension of Articles 14 and 21 unfolded by the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (l978) 2 SCR 663. This new dimension of Articles 14 and 21 rendefs the death penalty· provided in section 302 of the Indian Penal Code read with section 354 (3) of the Code of· Criminal Procedure vulnerable to attack on a ground not available at the time when Jagmohan's case waS decided. Furthermore~ since Jagmohan's case was decided, India bas ratified two international instruments on Human Rights and particularly the International Covenant on civil and political rights. (259 G·H, 260 A·D] Jagmohan v. State of U.P.

A.I.R.1973 SC 947, dissented from:

State of Washington v. Dawson and Company 264 U.S. 646; 68 L. Edn. 219 dissenting judgment quoted with approval.·

_..,.,--

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978] 2 SCR 663 applied.

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2:1. The constitutional validity of the death penalty·provided as an alternative punishment in section 302 of the ·Indian Penal Code read with· section 354 sub-section (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be -sustained. Death penalty does not serve any social purpose or advance any constitutional value . and is totally arbitrary and unreasonable so as be violative of Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution, (256 F, 257 El

Jagmohan Singlt v. State of Uttat Pradesh, AI~ 1973 SC 947, not followed. /

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1983) 1 s.c.R.

2:2 The culture and ethos of the natio·n as gathered from its history, it8 tradition and . its literature would clearly be relevant factors in adjudging the constitutionality of death penalty and so would the ideals and values embodied in the Constitution which Jays down the basic frame-work of 1hc social and political structure of the country, and which sets out the objectives and goals· to be pursued by the people in a common endeavour to secure happiness and welfare of every member of tpe society. So ~lso standards or norms set by International organisations and bodies have .relevance in determining the constitutional validity of death penalty and equally important in construing_ and applying the equivocal . formulae of the Constitution would be the "wealth of non-legal learning and experienceJhat encircles and illuminates" the topic of death penally. l261 B-E]

• 2:3. The objective of the United Nations has been and that is the standard set by th~ world body that capital punishment should be .abolished io. all countri'es. This nonnative standai"d set t·y the world body must be taken into account in determining whether the death penalty can be regarded as arbitrary, excessive and· unreasonable so as to be·con,stitutionally invalid. [268 B-C] 2:4. The Constitution of India is a unique document. It is not a mere pedantic legal text but it embodies certain human values, cherished principles, - and spiritual norms and recognises and upholds the dignity of man. It accepts the individual as the focal point of all development and regards his material, moral and spiritual development as the chief concern of its various provisions. It does not treat the individual as a cog in the mighty all-powerful machine of the State but places him at the centre of the constitutional scheme and focuses on the fullest development of his personality. The several provisions enacted in the constitutions for the purpose of ensuring the digni~y of the individual and providing for bis material, moral and spiritual development would be meaningless and iiieffeclual unless there is rule Of law to invest them with life and force. (268 C-D, G-H)

· 2:5. The rule of law permeates the entire fabric of the Constitution and indeed forms one of its basic fe<:tlures. T~e rule of law excludes arbitrariness; its postulate is 'intelligence without passion' and 're-ason freed from desire'. Wherever we find arbitrariness or unreasonableness there -is denial of the rule of law. "Law" in the context of the rule of law, does not mean any Jaw enacted by the legislative authority, howsoever arbitrary or despotic it may be. Other· wise even under a dictat.orship it would be possible to say that there is rule of Jaw, because every law made by the dictator howsoever arbitrary and unre!lson· able has to be obeyed and every action has to be taken in conformity with such law. In such a case too even where the political -se.t up is dictatorial, it is law that governs the relationship between men and men and between men and the State. But still it is not a fule of law as understood_ in modern jurisprudence because in jurisprudential teri:ns, the law itself in such a case being an emanation from the absolute will of the dictator~ (tis in effect and substance the rule of man and not of"law which prevails in such a situation. What is a necessary element of the ruJ,~ of J(lw is thal the law nH;st not be nrbitrary and irrational and it must Satisfy the test or rea·son and the democratic form of polity seeks to ensure this element by making the framers of the law accountable to the people. [269 9 A-E)

BACHAN SINGH V. PUNJAB

2:6. The rule of law has much greater vitality under our Constitution than it has in other countries like the United Kingdom which has no constitutionally enacted Fundamental Rights. The rule of law has really three basic and fundamental assumptions; one is that law making must be essentially in the haods of a democratically elected legislature, subjec_t of course to any p<Jwer in tbe executive in an emergent situation to promlllgatc ordinance effective for a short duration while fhe legislf\tion i<i not in session as also to enact delegated legislation in accordance With the guidelines laid down by the legislature; the other is that, even in the hands' of a democratically elected legislature, there should not be unfetter7 ed legislative power; and lastly there must be an independent ju~iciary to protect the citizen against excesses .of executive and legislative power and we have in our country all .these three elements essential to the rule of law. It is plain and indisputable that under our Constitution law cannot be arbitrary or irrational and if it is, it would be clearly invalid, whether under Article 14 or Article 19 or Article 21, whichever be applicable. [275 E-H. 276 A:B] ·

Minerva Mill's case [1981] l SCR 206; Maneka Gandhi's case [1978) 2 SCR 621; Airport Avthority oj J11dia's case f1979J 3 SCR 1014; A.K. Gopalon's case [1950) SCR 88; F.C. Mullen's case [1981) 2 SCR 516 referred to.

2:7. The Constitution does not in so many terms prohibit capital punish-

I..

ment. In fact, it recognises death sentence as one of the Penalties which may be imposed by la_w. Apart from Article 21, Clause (C)of Article 72 also recogiiises the possibility of a sentence of death being_ imposed ou a person convicted of an offence inasmuch as it provides that the President shall have the power to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person who 'is convicted of an offence and sentenced to death, Thereiore, the imposition of death sentence fOr conviction of an offence is not in all coses forbidden by the Constitution. But that does not· mean that the infliction of .death penalty is blesse~ by the Constitution or that it has the imprimatur or seal of approval of the Constitution. The Constitution is not a transien~t ·docuriient but it is meant to endure for a long, time to .come and during its life, situations may ~rise where death penalty may be . found to serve a social purpose an~ its prescriptio~ may not be liable to be regarded as arbitrary or unreasonable and therefore to meet such situatiOns, the Constitution had to make a provision and this it did in Article 21 and clause (c) of Article 72 so that, even where death penalty is prescribed by any Jaw and it is otherwise not unconstitutional, it must still comply with the requirement of Article 21 and it would be subject to the clemency power of the P1esident under clause (c) of Article 72. [276 D·H, 277 A-Bl

2:8. From 'the legislative histofy of the relevant provisLons of the lndian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is clear that in our country there has been a gradual shift against the imposition of death penalty. Life sentence is now the rule and it is only in exceptional cases, for special reasons, that death sentence can be imposed. The legislature has howe·ver not indicated what are the special reasons fOr which departure can be made from the normal rule and death penaHY may be inflicted. The legislature has not giv<:n any guidance as to what are those exceptional cases in which', deviating from the normal

IS6

SUPREME COURT REPoRTS

[1983) I S.C.R.

rule, death sentence may be imposed. This is left entirely to the unguided discretipn of the Court, a-feature, which has lethal con~equences sO'far as the constitutionality of death penalty is concerned. [277 C-D, 278 E-G)

Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P. [1979] 3 S.C.R. 646, referred to.

B.

2:9. The pro.blem of constitutional validity of death penalty cannot be appreciated in its proper perspective without an adequate understanding of the true nature Of death penalty and What it involves in terms of hU.man anguish and suffering. In the first place, death penalty is irrevocable; it cannot be recalled. It extinguishes the flame of life for ever and is plainly destructive of the right to

life, the most precious right of all, a right without which enjoyment of no other rights i.s possible. If a person is sentenced to imprisonment, even 'if it be for life, and subsequently it is found that he was innocent and was wrongly convicted, he can be set free. Of course, the imprisonment that hi has suffered tip then Cannot be undone and the time he has spent in the prison cannot be given back to him in specie but he can come back and be restored to normal life with bis honour vindicated, if he is found innocent. But that is not possible where a person has been wrongly convicted and sentenced to death and put out-of existence in pursuance of the sentence of death. In his case, even if any mistake is subsequently discovered, it will be too late, in every way and for every purpose it will be too late, for he cannot be brought back to life. The execution of the sentence of death in such a case makes miscarriage of justice irrevocable. [281 F-H, 282 A-D]

2:10. Howsoever careful may be the procedural safeguards, erected by the Jaw before death penalty can .be imposed, it is impossible to eliminate the chance of judicial error. No possible judicial safeguards can p~event conviction of the innocent. It is indeed a very live possibility and it is n"ot at all unlikely that so long as death penalty remains a constitutionaly valid alternative, the Court or the State acting thrOugh the instrumentality of the Court may have on its conscience the blood of an innocent man. (283 D-E. G-H] 2:11.- Judicial error in imposition of death penalty would indeed be a crime beyond punishment. This is the drastic nat'ure of death penalty, terrifying in its consequences, which has to be taken into account in determining its constitutional validity. Death penalty is barbaric and inhuman in its effect, mental and physical upon the condemned man and is positively cruel. Its psychological effect oil the prisoner in the Death Row is disastrous. (284 E-F]

Furman v. Georgia 408 US 238; .Io Re Kemmler 136 US 436; In Re Medley 134 US 160; quoted with approval. 2:12. Penological goals also do not justify the imposit.ion of death penalty for the offence of murder. The prevailing standards of human decency are also incompatible with death penalty. The standards of human decency with reference to which the proportionality of the punishment to the offence is required to be judged vary from society to societr depending on the c~lturaJ and spiritual

•

• BACHAN SlNGH V. PUNJAB

tradition of the society, its history and philosophy and its sense of moral and ethical values. [302 A-Bl

• Moreover, it is difficult to see how death penalty can be regarded as proportionate to the offence of murder when legislatively it has been ordained that life sentence shall be the rule and it is only in exceptional cases for special reasons that death renalty may be imposed, It is oDvious from the provision enacted in section 354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure" that de~th sentence

is legiStativeJy regarded as disproportionate and excessive in most cases of murder

'

and it is only in exceptional cases that it can at all be contended that death sentence is proportion.ate to the offence of murder.. But, then the legisla· ture does not indicate as to what are those exceptional cases in which death sentence may be re'garded as proportionate to the _offence and, therefore, reasonble and just. Death penalty cannot be regarded as proportionate to the offence of murder, merely• because the murder is brutal, heinous or shocking. The nature and magnitude of the offence or the motive find purposes underlying it.or the manner and extent of its commission cannot have any relevance to the proportionality of death penalty.to the offence. [304 H, 305 A-D, 306 D-E]

2:13 The, historical course through which death penalty has passed in the last 150 years shows that the theory· that death penaJty acts as a greater deterrent· than life imprisonment is wholly unfounded. Even the various studies carried. out"clearly establish beyond doubt that death penalty does not have any special deterrent effect which life sentence does not possesS and that in any event there is no evidence at all to suggest that death penalty has any such special · deterrent effect. [316 A, 321 G-H]

. .I

2:14. Death pena)ty as provided Under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code read with section 354 sub-section (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 does not sub-serve any legitimate end.of punishment, since by killing the murderer it totally rejects the reformation purpose and it has no additional deterrent effect which life sentence does not possess abd it is therefore not justified by the deterrence theory of punishment. Though retribution or denunciation is regarded by some as a proper end of punishment, it cannot have 3.ny legitimate place in an enlightened philosophy of .punishment. There~ ·.fore, death penalty has no rational penological purpose and it is arbitrary and irrational and hence violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. ,

F'

[340 D-F] 2:15.' On a plain reading of section ~02 of the Indian Penal Code which

provides death penalty as alternative punish1uent of murder it is clear that it leaves it entirely to the discretion of the Court whether to impose death sentence or to award only life in1prisonolent to an accused convicted of the offence of 1nurder. Section 302 does n;t lay. down any standards or principles to guide the discretion of the Court in the matter' of imposition of death penalty. The critical choice between physical liquidation and life Jong incarceration is left to the discretion of the Court and no legislative light is shed as to bow this

' •

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1983] 1 S.C.R.

. deadly disQretion iS to be exercised. The court is ~eft free to navigate in cha·rtered sea without any compass or directional gi..Jidance. (341 A·C] 2:16. Actually section 354 (3) Of the Criminal Procedure Code. tnakes the exercise of discretion more difficult and uncertain. It is left to the Judge to grope in the dark for himself and i'n the ·{xe~cise of his unguided and unfettered discretion decide what reasons may be considered as 'special reasons+ justifying award of death penalty and whether in a given case· any such special reasons exist which should persuade the Court to depart from the normal rule and inflict death penalty on the accused. There being no legislative policy or principle to guide the Court in exercising its discretion in this delicate and sensitiVe. area of life and death, the exercise of discretion of the Court is bound to vary from judge to judge. What may apJ,ear as special reasons to one judge may not so appear to another. and the decision i.o. a- given case whether to impose the death senterice or to let off the offender only with life imprisonment would, to large extent, depend upon who is the judge caHed upon to make the decision. The reason for his uncertainty in the sentencing process is two-fold. Firstly, the nature of the sentencin~ proce:s;s is such that it involves a highly delicate task calling for skills and talents very much different from those ordiriarily expected of lawyers. Even if considerations relevant to capital sentencing were provided by the legislature, it would be a difficult exercise for the judges to decide whether to impose the death penalty or to. award the Jife sentence. But without any such guidelines given by the legislature, the task of the judges becomes much nlore arbitrary and the sentencing dechion is bound to vary with each judge. Secondly, when unguided discretion is confetred upon the Court to choose bctwet:n life and death, by providing. a totally vague and indefinite criterion of 'special reasons' without laying down any principles or guidelines for determining wh<1t should be considered to be 'special reasons', the choice is bound to be influenced by the subjective philosophy of the judge called upon to pass the sentence and on his value system and social philosophy will dcp~nd whether the accused shall live or die. No doubt the judge will have to give 'special reasons' if he opts in favour of inflicting the death pcnaitY, but that does not eli1ninatc arbitrariness and caprice, fir~tly because there being no guidelines provided by the legislature, the re2sons whicb may appeal to one judge as 'special reasons' ~ay not appeal to another, and secondly, because reasons can always be found for a conclusion that the judge instinctively wishes .to reach aqd tile judge can bona fide and conscientiously fin~ such reasons to be 'special reasons'. lt is now recognised on all hands that judicial conscience is not a fixed conscience; it varies froni judge lo judge depending upon his attitudes and approaLhcs, his predilections and prejud;ces, his habits of mind and thought and in short all that goes wi1h the exp1cssioo "social philosophy". Furiller, the \·aric·u~ decisions in which special reasor::s liave been given singly and cu1nula1ively indicate not merely that 1hcre is an enormous pOtential of arbitrarY award of death penally by the High Court and the Supreme Court but that, in iact, death sentence have been awarded arbitrarily and freakishly. (341 G, E·H, 342 E-H. 343 A·B, 353 E-F]

a

..

.H

2:17. But wh..:re :he discretion granted to the Court is to choose between Ufe and dt:a1h without any standards or guide-lines provided by the legislature,

'

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BACHAN SINGH v. PUNJAB

thC: death Penalty does bcc:ome, arbitrary and unr~asonable. T_he death penalty is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisOnment. Whether a sentence of imprisonment is for two yeaes or five years or for life, it is qualitatively the same, namely, a sentence of imprisonment, but the death penalty is totally of different. It is irreversible; it is beyond recall or reparation; it extinguishes life. It is the choice between life and death wt.ich the court is required to make ·and this is left to its-sole discretion unaided and unguided by any legislative yardStick to determine.the choice. [356 G·H. 357 A-BJ · •

..,

-~

2:18. 'The only yardstick which may be said to have been provided by the legislature is tliat life sentence shall be the rule and iris only in exceptional cases for special reasons that death penaltf may be awarded, but it is no where indicat-ed by the !egislature as to what should b~ regard'ed as 'special reasons' justifying imposition of death -penalty. The awesome and. fearf~1 discretion whether to-kill a man or to let.him live is vesled in the Court and the cOUrt is called upon to exercise this discretion guided only by its own perception of what may be r~garded as 'special reasons' without any 1ight shed by the legislature. It is difficult.to app_reciate how a law which confers· such unguided discretio'n · on the Court without any standards or guidelines on so vital an issue jlS the choice beiween life and de3.th can be regarded as constitution.ally valid. [357B-D]

• •

\.

/\

I)

2:19. Death penalty· in its actual operation is discrirpinatory, for it strikes, mosfly against the poor and deprived sections o( tJ:te community and the rich and the aftluent usually escape from its clutches. This circumstance also adds to the arbitrary and capricious nature of the death penalty and renders it unconstitutional as being vio'iative of Articles 14_and 21. (3660-H]

,,

3:1. When a law is chailenged on the' ground that it imposes restrictions on !he freedo~ guaranteed by one or the other sub-clause of clause (1) of Arlicle 19 and the restrictions are shown to exist by the petitioner, the burden of estabiishing that the restrictions fall within any of the pennissive clauses (2) to (6) which may be applicable, must rest upon the State. ThC State would have to produce ·material for satisfyiQg the Court that the restrictions in1posed by the impugned law fall w.ith the appfopriate permissive clause from out of clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 Of course there ma'y be cases where the nature of the legislation and 1he restrictions imposed by it may be such that the Court may, without more, e~en. in the absence of any positive n1aterial produced by 'the State, conclude that the restrictions fall within. the permissible category, as for example, Y.here a Jaw is enacted by the IE:gislature for giving effect to one of the Directive Principles of State Policy nod prirna facie, the restrictions imposed by it do not appet'-r to b~ arbitrary or excessive. Where such is the position, the burden would again shift a di! would ·be-for the petitioner to show that the restric~ions are arbitrary Or excessive and go beyond what is required in public interest. But once it is shown by the p.:titioner that the impugned law imposes restrictions-which ,'infringe one or the other .sub-clause of ·clause (I)' of Article t 9, the burden of shoWing that such restrictions are reasonable 8.nd fall within the permissible category must ~ e on the State and this burden the State may discharge either by pro_ducing socio econopli'!= ~~tti- b~fore the Court or op. ~onsi9efatiop of .the provisions in the impugned

SUREME COURT REPRTS

(1983] I S.C.R,

flaw read in the light of the constitutional goals set out in the Directive Principles of State Policy. The test to be applied for the purpose of determining whether the restrictions imposed by the impugned law are reasonable or not cannot be cast in a rigid formula of universal application. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed. ihe ex· tent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied, the value of human life. the disproportion ofthe imposition, the· social philosophy of the ConStitution and the prevailing conditions at the time would all enter into the judicial verdict. And in evaluating such elusive factors and forming his own conception of what is reasonable in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale ot Values of the judge participating in the decision would play a very important part. [293 G-H, 294 A-G)

{

State of Madras v. V.J. Row [1952] SCR 597. Shagir Ahmed v. Slate of U.P. [1955) .J SCR 707 followed.

Khyerbari Tea Co. v. State of Assam [1964] S SCR 97S; B. Baner}t:e v. Anita Pan [1975] 2 SCR 774; Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tandolkar & Ors. [1959) SCR 279; State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala [1957) SCR 874; Mahd. Hanifv. State of Bihar [1959] SCR 629; discussed and distinguished.

Pathumma v. State of Kera/a (1978] 2 SCR 537 referred to. 3:2. The position in regard to oLus of proof in a case where the challenge is under Article 21 is much clearer and much more free from or doubt or debate than in a case where the complaint is of violation of clause (1) of Article 19. Wherever there is deprivation of life, i.e. not only physical existence, but also use of any faculty or limb through which life is enjoyed and basic human dignity, or , of any aspect of personal 1iber1y, the burden must rest on the State to establish by producing adequate material or otherwise that the procedure prescribed (or such deprivation is not arbitrary but is reasonable, fair and just Where therefore a law authorises deprivation of the right to Hfe, the reasonableness, fairness and justness of_ the procedure prescribed by it for such deprivation must be establi. sh~d by thC State. The burden must lie upon the State to show that death penalty is not arbitrary and unreasonable and serves a legitimate social purpose, despite the posgibility of judicial error in convicting and sentencing an innocent man and the brutality and pain, mental as well as physical, which death sentence invariably inflicts upon the condemned prisoner. The State must place the nece· sary material on record for. the purpose of discharging this burden which lies upon it and if it fails to show by presenting ad(quate evidence before the Court or otherwise that death peoalty·is not arbitrary and unreasonable.and does serve a legitimate social purpose, the impositio~ of d:!ath penalt.y under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code read with section 354 sub.section (3) of the Code of Crimi· nal Procedure would have to be struck down as violative of thC protection of Article 21. (295 A-C, 296 D.E] 3:3. There is a presumption iri favour of lhe constitutionality of a statute and the burden of showing that it is arbitrary or discriminatory lies npon the petitioner, because it" must be presumed tba,t tbe Je~islature '111derstand.s and

t

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\ BACHAN SINGH v. PUNJAB

correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. It would be a wise rule to adopt to presume the constitutionality of a statute unless it is ·shown to be invalid. But this ·rule is not a rigid inCxorable rule applicable at all times and in all situations. 'I)lere may conceivably be cases where having regard to the nature and character of the legislation. the importance of the right affected and the gravity the injury caused by it and the moral and social issqe involved in the determination, the Court may refµse t.o proceed on the basis of presumption of constitutionality and demand from the State justification of the legislation wHh aview to establishing that ·it is not arbit· rary or discriminatory. [296 G-H, 298 C-E] The burden rests on the State to establish by producing material before the Court or authorities, that death penalty" has greater deterrent effect than life sentence in order to justify its -imposition uD.der the law. If the State faiJs to discharge this burden which rests upon it, the Court would have to hold that · death penalty has not beCn shown to have greater deterrent effect and it does not thcref9re serve a rational legislative purpose. [315 F-H]

•

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 273 of 1979. Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated . the 14th August, 1978 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 234 of 1978)

WRIT PETITIONS NOS. 564, 165, 179, 168, 434, 89, 754, 756 & 976 of 1979. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) AND

,

Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 1732 of 1979

R.K. Jain, R.P. Singh, Shiv Kumar Sharma, Suman Kapoor and Sukumar Sahu for the Petitioner. in WY. 564/79. Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Mukul Mudga/ and A.K. Ganguli for the Petitioner in W.P. No. 165 of 1979. ;

Vimal Dave and Miss Kai/ash Mehta W.P. 179 of 1979. WP. Nos. 168 & 89 of 1979 :.

for the Petitioner in

Jail Petitions . . ' .'

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(1983] I s.c.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

H.K. Puri, A.C. for the Appell8i:tt in Cr!. Appeal.

'

I

S.S. Khanduja and La/it Kumar Gupta for the Petitioner in W. P. No. 434 of 1979. L.N. Gupta for the Petitioner in S. L.P.

L.M. Singhvi and S.K. Jain for the Petitioner in WP. 754 f79. Harbans Singh for the Petitioner .in W.P. 756/79.

N.'D. Garg for Mr. S.K. Bisaria and T.L. Garg for the Petitioner in WP. 976 of 1979, Soli J. Sorabjee, Sol: Genl. in \VP. 564 & 165- U.R. La/it, in WP. 564 ; for U.0.1., R.N. Sachthey, for U.O.I., Gujarat, Haryana States, M.L. Shroff' for Gujarat, Haryana . & Maharashtra, Miss A. Subhashini, and Mr. K.N. Bhatt, for U.O.~. for Respondent No. I in WPs. 554, 179, R. 2 in WPs. 434' & 754, R. l in WP. 165, R. 3 in WP. 756, R. 2 in WPs. 564 & 165. R in 168 & 89; RR I & 2'in WP. 756 and RR I and 3 in WP. 754 of 1979. D.P. Singh Chauhan, Addi. Advocate General, U.P. and O.P. Rana for R. 2 in WP. 179. R.S. Sodhi and Hardev Singh for R. I in WP. · 434 & Respondent in Crl. A.'273 of 1979. R.S. Sodhi for Respondent No. 3 in WP. 434/79.

·· R.L. Kohli and R.C. Kohli for the compalinant in WP. 754/79. D.P. Mukhe1jee for the Intervener No. I. Dr. LM Singhvi f~r the Intervener No. 2. " person .

•

Intervener 'No. 3 in

i

V.J. Francis for the intervener No. 4. R.K. Ga~g and R. K. Jain for the intervener No. 5.

FOR THE ADVOCATES GENERAL:

J. Andhra Pradesh ;

P. Ramachandrq Reddy, Advocate General A.P. Rao and G. Narayana

., '!

+

'·

' BACHAN SINGH v. PUNJAli (Sarkaria, J.) .

2. Gujarat

'

.i

\

I ,

D.V. Patel, (Maharashtra)

&

3. Maharashtra

R.N. . Sachthey, (Gujarat) Gujarat & Maharashtra

4. Jam mu &

Alta/ Ahmed

M.N, Shroff,

Kashmir

5. Madhya

s:K. Gambhir

Pradesh

r ' ..,

~

:/~

6. Punjab

R ..S. Sodhi and Hardev Singh

7. Orissa

' G.B. Patliaik, Advocate General ·and

R.K. Mehta

8. Tamil Nadu ;.- 9. West, Bengal

A.V. Rangam · Sukumar G~osh and G.S. Chatterjee

The following Judgments were delivered : SARKARIA, J. This reference to the Constitution Bench raises a question in regard to the constitutional validity of death penalty for murd~r proyided in Section 302, Penal Code, and the sentencing procedure embodied in sub-section (3) of Section 354 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. '

The reference has arisen in these circumstances : Bachan Singh, appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 273 of 1979, was tried and conviCted and sentenced to death. under Section 302, Indian Penal Code for the murders of Desa Singh, Durga Bai and Veeran Bai by the Session~ Judge. The High Court con.firmed his. death sentence and dismissed his appeal.

1.,

Jr

.F

Bachan Singh's appe~l by special leave, came up for hearing before a Bench of this· Court (consisting of Sarkaria and Kailasam,. . G JJ.). The only question for consideration in t~e appeal was, whether the facts found by the Courts below would be · "special · reasons" for awarding the death sentence as requi~ed under Section ~ 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 ..

Shri H.K. Puri, appearing as. Amicus Curiae on behalf of the appellant, Bachan· Siniih, in criminal Appeal ,No. 273 of 19791.

"

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· SUPRBMB COURT RBPOllTS

(1983) 1 s.c.a..

contended that in view of tile ratio of Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P.,(1) the Courts below were not competent to impose the extreme ' penalty of death. on the appellant. It was submitted that neither the circumstance that the appellant was previously convicted for murder and committed these murder after he had served out the life sen· tence in the earlier case, not the fact that these three murders were extremely heinous and in.human, constitutes a "special reason" for ·ip:iposing the death sentence within the meaning of Section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. Reliance for this argument was placed on Rajendra Prasad (ibid) which according to the counsel, was on facts very similar, if not identical; to that case. Kailasam, J. was of opinion that the majority view in Rajendra Prasad taken by V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., who spoke for himself and D.A. Desai, J., was contrary to the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Jagmohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh('), inter alia, on these aspects : (i) In Rajendra Prasad, V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. observed: "The main focus of our judgment is on this poignant gap in 'human rights jurisprudence' within the limits of the Peul Code, impregnated by the Constitution. To put it pithily, a world order voicing the worth of the human person, a cultural legacy charged with compassion; an interpretative liberation from colonial callousness to life and liberty, a concern for social justice as setting the sights of individual. justice, interest with the inherited text of the Penal Code to yield the goals desiderated by the Preamble and Articles 14, 19 and 21." According to Kailasam, J., the challenge to the award of the death sentence as violative of Articles 19, 14 and 21, was repelled by the Constitution Bench in Jagmohan's case.

(iil

In Jagmohan' s case, the Constitution Bench held :

"The impossibility of'laying down standards (in the matte'r of sentencing) is at the very core of criminal law as administered in India which invests the judges with a

o> [t979J 1 sec 646, 12> [t973J 2 s,c,R. 54!,

I<

BACHAN SINGH v. PUNJAB (Sarkaria, J.)

very wide discretion in the matter of fixing the degree of punishment and that this · di-scretion in the matter of sen-· · tence is liable to· be corrected by superior Courts... The exercise of judicial discretion on well recognised principles is, in the final . analysis, the safest P.ossible safeguard for the

accused." In Rajendra Prasad, the majority decision characterised the above observations in'/ agmohan as: "incidental observations without concentration on the sentencing criteria", and said that they are not the ratio of the decision, adding._ "Judgments are not Bible for every line to be venerated."

(iii) ·in Rajendra Prasad, the .plurality observed : "It is constitutionally permissible to swing a criminal out of corporeal existence only if. the security of State and . society, public order and the interests of the general public compel that course as provided in Article 19(2) to (6)." •

This view again, according to Kailasam, J., is inconsistent with the 1aw laid down bi the Constitution Bench in Jagmohan, wherein it was held that deprivation of life is constitutionally permissible if that is done according to "procedure established by law".

(iv) In Rajendra P!asad, the majority has further opined : "The only correct approach is to read into Section 302~ I.P.C. and Section 354(3) Cr. P.C., .the human rights and humane trends in the Constitution. So examined, the rights to life and the fundamental freedoms is deprived when he is hanged to death, -his dignity is defiled when his neck is noosed and strangled.':

•

Against the above, Kailasam; J. commented : 'The only change after the Constitution Bench delivered its' judgment is the introduc_tion of Section 354(3) which requires special reasons to be given if the Court is to award the death sentence. If without the restriction of stating sufficient reasons death sentence could be constitutionally awarded under the I.P.C. and Cr. P.C. as it stood before the amendment, it is difficult to perceive how by r~quiring special reasons to

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS '

[1983) 1 s.c.R:

.

be given the amended section would be· unconstitutional unless the "sentencing sector is made most restrictive and ']east vag~rious ". (v) In Rajendra. Prasad, the majority has held that :

IE

"Such extraordinary grounds alo.ne Constitutionally qualify as special reasons as leave no option to the Court ' offender i.f State and society are to sur' but to execute the· vive. One stroke of murder hardly qualifies for this drastic requirement, however, gruesome the killing or {lathetic the situation, unless tbe inherent· testimony coming from that act is irresistible that the murderous appetite of the convict is too chronic arid deadly that ordered life in a given locality or s~ciety or in prisqn itself would be gon~ if this man were now or later to .be at large. If he is an irredeemable, like a bloodthirsty tiger, he bas to quit his terrestrial tenancy," · According to Kailasam, J., what is extracted above, runs directly counter t'o and cannot be reconciled with the following observations in Jagmohan' s case : "But some (murders) at least are. diabolical in conception and cruel in execution.. In some others where the victim is a person of h,igh s\anding in the country, sodety is liable to be recked to its very foundation. Such murders cannot be simpiy wished aw~y by finding alibis in the social maladjustment of the _ murderer. Prevalence of such crimes spea~s, in the opinion of iµany, for the inevitability of death penalty not only by way of deterrence but as a token of emphatic disapproval by the society ... , A very responsible body ·(Law Commission) has come io the conclusion after considering all the relevant factors. On the conclusions thus offered to us, it will be difficult to hold that capital punishment as such is unreasonable or not required in the public interest."

(vi) Kailasam, J. was further of the opinion that it is equally beyond the functions of a Court to evolve · "working rules for imposition of death sentence bear' ing the markings of enlightened flexibility and social -"sensibility" or to make law · "by cross-fertilisation

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iiAi::iIAN SINGH i•. PUNiAB (Sarkaria, J.)

i 67

from sociology, history, cultural anthropology and curfent national perils - and developmental goals and, above all, constitutional ·currents''.· Thi~ function, in his view, belongs only to Patliament. The .Court must administer the law a's it stands. {vii) The learned Judge bas further expressed ·that the view taken by V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. in Rajendra Prasad that " 'special reasons' necessary for imposing death penalty must relate· not to t_he crime as such, but to the crimin~l" is not warranted by the law as it stands today.

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Without expressing his own opinion on the various qullstions raised in ·that case including the one with regard to the scope, amplification ·and application' of Section 354 (3) _of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1974, Sarkaria, J., in agreement with Kailiisam, J., directed the records of the case to be submitted to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, for constituting a large Bench "to resolve the a~d inconsistencies pointed out by Kailasam, J." doubts,. difficulties , In the meanwhile, several persons convicted of murders and · sentenced to death; filed writ p~titions (namely, Writ Petitions 564, 165, 179, 434, 89, 754, 756 and 976 of 1979) under Article 32 of the <:;onstitution directly challenging the constitutional validity of the death penalty pr,ovided in Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code t'or the offence of murder, and the sentencing procedure provided in Section 354 (3) of the Code· 6f Criminal Procedure, 1974. Tllat is how, the matter has now come up before this larger Bench of five ' Judges.

"

At the outset, Shri.R.K. G~rg.submitted with some vehcmance and ·persistence, that Jagmohan' s case needs · reconsideration by a larger Bench if riot by the Full Court. Reconsideration of Jagmohan, according to the learned counsel, is necessitated because of subsequent events and changes in law. Firstly, it is pointed out that when .G Jagmohan wa• decided in 1972, the then extant Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 left the choice between death and life imprisonment as punishment for murder entirely to the discretion of the Court. This position has since undergone a complete change and under · ··section - 354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 197 3, death sentence bas ceased to be the normal penalty.for murder. Secondly,

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[1983) I s.c.11.

it is argued, the seven-Judge decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v, Union of India(') Las given a new interpretative dimension of the provisions of Articles 21; 19 and 14 and their inter-relation·. · ship, and according to this new interpretation every law of punitive detention both in its procedural and substantive aspects must pass the test of all the three Articles. It is stressed that an argument founded on this expansiv~ interpretatio!I of these Articles was not available when Jagmohan was decided. Thirdly, it is submitted that India has since acceded to the international Covenant of Civil and Political Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which came into force in December 16, 1976. By virtue of this Covenant. India and the other 47 countries who are a party to it, stand committed to a policy for abolition of the 'death penalty'. Dr. L.M. Singhvi submitted that the question of death penalty cannot be foreclosed for ever on the .abstract doctrine· of stare decisis by a previous decision of this Court. It-is emphasised that the very nat~re of the problem is such that it must be the subject . · of review from time to time so as to be in tune with the evolving standards of decency in a maturing society. The learned Solicitor-General, Shri Soli Sorabji opposed the request of Shri Garg for referring the matter to a larger Bench · because .such a course would only mean avoidable delay in disposal of the matter. At the same time, the learned counsel made it clear that since the constitutionality of the death ·penalty for murder was now sought to be challenged on additional arguments based on subsequent events and changes in law, he would have no objection on the ground of Slare decisis, to a fresh consideration of the whole problem by this very Bench. In view of the concession made by Shri Sorabji, we proceeded to hear the counsel for the parties at length, and to deal afresh with the constitutional questions concerning death penalty raised in these writ petitions. We have heard the arguments of Shri R.K. Garg, appearing for the writ-petitioners in Writ Petition No. 564/79 for more than three weeks and also those of Dr. L.M. Singhvi, Dr. Chitaley and (I) [1978] 2 S.C,R. 621.

•

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BACHAN SINGH v. PUNJAB (Sarkaria, J.)

J S/Shri Mukhoty, Dave and R.K. Jain, appearing for iriterveners or". for the other writ-petitioners. We have also heard the arguments of Sbri Soli Sorabji, Solicitor-General, appearing for the Union of India and Sbri Patel appearing for the State of Maharashtra and the other counsel appearing for the respondents.

The principal questions that fall to be considered in this case are! • (I)

Whether death penalty provided for the offence of murder in Section 302, Penal Code is unconstitu• tional.

• (II)

If the answer to the foregoing question be in the negative, whether the . sentencing procedure provided in . Section 354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974) is unconstitutional on the ground that it invests the Court with unguided and untrammelled discretion and allows death sentence to be .arbitrarily or freakishly imposed on a person found guilty of murder. or any other capital .offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code ·with death or, in the alternative, with imprisonment for life.

We will first take up Question No. i'll relating to the cbnstitu!ional validity of Section 302, Penal Code.

Question No. (/) :

Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to have a short._survey of.the legislative hi~tory of the provisions of the Penal Code which permit the imposition of death penalty for certain offences. The Indian Penal Code was drafted by the First Indian Law Commission presided over by M~. Macaulay. The draft underwent further revision at the hands of well-known jurists, like Sir Barnes Peacock, and was completed in 1850. The Indian Penal Code was

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[19~3] i s.c.lt.

passed by the then Legislature on October 6, 1860 and was enacted as Act No XLV of 1860. Section 53 of the Penal Code enumerates punishments to which offenders are 'liable under the provisions of this Code. Clause Firstly of the Section mentions 'Death' as one of such punishments. Regarding 'death' as a punishment, the authors of the Code say : "We are convinced that it ought to be very sparingly infli.cted, and we propose to employ it only in cases whe.re either murder or the highest offence against the State has been com milted." Accordingly; under the. Code, death is the punishment that must be awarded for murder by ·a person under sentence 'of imprisonment for life (Section 303). This apart, the Penal Code prescribes 'death' as an alternative punishment to which the offenders may be sentenced, for tl1e following seven offences : • (I). Waging war against the Government of India< (s. . 121) . . ~

(2) Abetting mutiny actually committed.

(s. 132)

(3) Giving or fabricating fa.lse evidence upon which an innocent person suffers death. (s., 194) /

(4) Murder which may be punished with death or life imprisonment. (s. 302) (5) Abetment of suicide of a minor or insane, or intoxicated person. (s. 305) (6) Dacoity accompanied with murder. '(s. 396)

(7) Attempt to mu~der by a person under sentence of imprisonment for life if hurt is caused. (s. 307) In the instant cases, the impugned provision of the Indian Penal Code is Section 302 which says : '"Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and. also . be liable to fine." The related provisions are contained in Sections 299 and 300. Section 299 . defines 'culpable homicide'. Section 300 defines 'murder'. Its material part runs as follows : "Except in the cases hereinafter ·excepted, culpable homicide. is , -'murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or

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BACHAN SINGH v. PUNJAB

(Sarkaria, J.)

Secondly-If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause death of . the person, to whom the harm is caused, or

·Thirdly-If it is do~e with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause dea,th, or

Fourthly-If the person committing the act knows that 1t 1s so imminently dangerous that it must, in all orobability, cause death, or sucb bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits, such act without any excuse for incurring tlic risk of causing death . or such injury as aforesaid."

The first contention of Shri Garg is that the provision of death penalty in Section 302, Penal Code offends Article 19 of the Consti· tution. ·It is submitted that the right to live 'is basic to the enjoyment of all the six freedoms guaranteed in clauses (a) to (e) and (g) of Article 19 (!)of the Constitution and death penalty. puts an end to all these freedoms ; ·that since death penalty serves no social purpose and its value as a deterrent remains unproven and it defiles the dignity.·or the individual so solemnly vouchsafed in the Prea!"ble ?f the Constitution, its imposition must be regarded as an 'unreasonable.restriction' amount.ing to total prohibition, on the six freedoms guaranteed in Article, 19 (1).

Article 19, as in force today, reads as under : "19 (! ). All citizens shall have the right-

(a) to freedom of speech and expression ;

.(b) to assemble peaceably and without. arms ; (c) to form associations or unions ; • (d) to move freely throughout the territory of India ;

(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; (f)

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(g) to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. (2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (I) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law_ imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. (3) Nothing in sub-clause (bl of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, ~easonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said subclause.

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(4) l'!othing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right , conferred by the said subclause. (5) Nothing in sub-clauses (d) and (e) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restricti.ons on the exercise of any of the rights, conferred by the said sub·clau.ses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Ttibe. (6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it i~poses, or prevents the State from making any law imposing; in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right con-

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BACHAN SINGH v. PUNJAB (Sarkaria, J.)

ferred by the said sub-clause, and in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause, shall affect the operatipn of any existing law in so far as it relates , to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,-

·.

(i) the professional or technical qualifications neces. sary for practising any profession or .carrying on a 0y occup!ltion, trade or. business, or

(ii) the carying on by the State, or by a corporation

owned or controlled by the State, of any tra<le, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or . partial, of citizens or other-

wise.''

""'

It will be seen that the first part of the Article declares the rights in clause (I) comprising of six sub-clauses namely, (a) to (e) and (g). The second part of the Article' in its five clauses (2) to (6) specifies the limits upto which the . abridgement of the rights declared in one or more of the sub-clauses of clause (!), may be · permiUed: Broadly speaking, Article 19 is intended to protect the rights to the freedoms specifically enumerated in the six sub-clauses of clause(!) against State action, other than in the legitimate exercise of its power to regulate these rights in the public interest relating to heads specified in clauses (2) io (6). The six fundamental freedoms · guaranteed under Article 19 (1) are not absolute rights. Firstly, they are subject to inherent restraints stemming from the reciprocal obligation of one member of a civil society to .so use his rights as not to infringe or injure similar rights of another. This is on the principle sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. Secondly, under clauses (2) to (6) these rights have been expressly made subject to the power of the State to impose reasonable restrictions, which may even extend to prohibition, on the exercise of those righrs. \.

•

The power, if properly exercised, is itself a safeguard of the freedoms guaranteed in clause (!). The conferment of this power is founded on the fundamental truth that uncontrolled liberty entirely freed from restraint, degenerates into a licence, leading to anarchy and chaos; that libertine pursuit of liberty, absolutely free, and .free for all, may mean liberticide for all. "Liberty has, tllerefore," lls

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1983] I ,s.c.R.

A_~ Justice Patanjali Sastri. put it, "to be limited in order to be effectively possessed." It is important to note that whereas Article 21 expressly deals with the right to life and personal liberty, Article 19 does not. The right to life is not one of the rights mentioned in Article 19 (1).

' The first point under Question (I) to be considered is whether Article-19 is at all applicable for judging the validity of the impugned · provision in Section 302, Penal Code. As rightly pointed out by- Shri Soli Sorabji, the' condition

c· pr.ecedent for the applicability of Article 19 is that the activity which

the impugned law prohibits and penalises, m'ust be within the purview and protection of· Article 19 (1). Thus considered, can any one say that be bas a legal right or fundamental freedom under Article 19 (I) to practise the profession of a hired assassin or to form associations - or unions or engage in a conspiracy with the object of committiqg murders or dacoities. The argument that the provisions of the Penal Code, prescribing death sentence as an alternative penalty for murder have to be tested the ground of Article 19, appears to proceed on t!ie fallacy that t.he freedoms guaranteed by Article 19 ( l) are absolute freedoms and they cannot be curtailed by law imposing reasonable restrictions, which may amount to total prohi- · .. bition. Such· an argument was advance~ before the Constitution Bench in The State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala.(') ·In that case the constitutional validity of certain provisions 'of the Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competition Control Act, 1952, as amended by Bombay Act No. XXX of 1952, was challenged on the ground, inter alia, that it infringes the fundamental rights of the. promoters of such competitions under Article 19 (l) (g), to carry on their trade or business and that- the restrictions imposed by the said Act cannot possibly be supported as reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public permissible under Article 19 (b). It was. contended that the woi"ds "trade" or ·"business" or "commerce" in sub-clause ·(g) of Article 19 (a} should be read in their widest amplitude as any activity which is undertaken or carried on with a view to earning profit. since there is nothing irr Article I 9 (I) (g) which may qualify or cut down the meaning of the critical words ; that ther<> is no justi~cation for. excluding from the meaning

on

(1) [1957] S.C.R. 874 at p. 920, .

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BACHAN SINGH \', PUNJAB

(Sarkaria, J.)

of those words activities which may be looked upon with disfavour by the State or the Court as injurious to public morality or public interest. Speaking for the Constitution. Bench, S.R. Das, C.J. repelled this contentio!', in these terms : "On this argument it will follow that criminal activities undertaken and carried on with a view to earning profit will ·be protected as fundamental rights until they are restricted by 1aw. Thus there be a guaranteed right to , .carry on a business of hiring out goondas to ·commit assault or even murder,' or house-breaking; or selling obscene pictures, ·of trafficking in women and so on until the law curbs or stops such activities. This appears to us to be completely unrealistic and incongruous, We have no doubt that there are certain activitie.s which can. under no circumstance be regarded as trade or business, or commerce , although the usual forms ~nd instruments are employed therein. To exclude those activities from the meaning of those words is not to cut down their meaning at all but.to say only that they are not within the true meaning of those

wm

I

words." This approach to the problem still holds the field. The observations in Chamarbaugwala, extracted above, were recently quoted with approval by V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., while defivering "the judgment of the Bench in FC!_tehchand Himmatlal & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra('). In A.K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras (2 ), all the six learned Judges constituting the Bench held that punitive detention or imprisonment awarded as punishment after conviction for an offence under the Indian Pelial Code is outside the scope of Article 19, although this conclusion was reached by them by adopting more or. less different approaches to. the problem. · · It was contended on b~half of A.K. Gopa/an !hat since the preventive detention order results in the detention of the detenu in a cell, his rights-specified in clauses (al to (e) and {g) of Article 19 {I) · have been infringed. .

.

(1))1977] 2 SCR 828 at p, 840. sq. 88,

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<2) [ 9603 1

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(1983) J S.C.R,

Kania, CJ. rejected this argument, inter a/ia, on these grounds : (i)

Argument would have been equally applicable to a case of punitive detention, and its acceptance would lead to absurd results. "In spite of the.saving clauses (2) to (6), permitting abridgement of the rights connected with each ·other, punitive detention under several sections of !he Penal Code, e.g. for theft, cheating, forgery and even ordinary assault, will· be illegal, (because the reasonable restrictions in the interest of "public order" mentioned in clauses (2) to (4) of the Article would not cover these ~(fences and many other crimes under the Penal Cqde which injure specific individuals and do ·not affect the community or the public at large). Unless such cimclusion necessarily follows from the article, it is obvious that such construction ' should be avoided. In my opinion, such result is clearly not the outcome of the Constitution." (The underlined words within brackets supplied.) page JOO of the Report)

(ii)

(At

Judged by the test of direct and indirect effect on the rights referred to in article 19 (1), the Penal Code is not a law imposing restrictions on these rights, The test is that "the legislation to be examined mu.st be directly in respect of one of the rights mentioned in the subclauses. If there is a legislation directly attempting to control a citizen's freedom of speech or expression or his right to assemble peaceably and without arms, etc., t)le question whether that legislation is saved by the relevant saving clause of Article 19 will arise. If, however, the legislation is not directly in respect of any of these subjects, but as a result of the operation of other legislation, for instance, for punitive ,or pre· ventive detention, his right under any of these.subclauses is abridged, the question of lhe application of Article 19 does not arise. The tme approach is only to consider the directness of the legislation and not what will be the result of the detention otherwise valid, on the mode of the detenu's life." (Pages 100-!0I).

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BACHAN SINGH ... PUNJAB (Sarkaria, J.)

(iii)

"The contents aJ!d subject-matter of articles 19 and 21 are thus no( the same ... " (Page 105). "Article 19 (5) cannot apply to a substantive law depriving a citizen of personal liberty." "Article 19 (1) does not purport to cover all aspects of liberty or of personal liberty. Personal liberty would primarily mean liberty of the physical body. The rights given under article 19 (I) ~ot directly come under that descdption. lo that Article only certain phases of liberty are dealt with". (Page 106) "In my ·opinion therefore, Article 19 should be read as a separate complete Article". (Page 107).

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Patanjali Sastri, J., also, opined "that lawful deprivation of personal liberty on conviction and sentence for' committing a crime, or by a lawful order of preventive detention is "not within the purview of Article 19 at all, but is dealt with by the succeeding AJticles 20 and 21." . (Page 192). Iµ tune with Kania, C.J., the learned Judge observed: "A construction which would bring within Article 19 imprisonment in punishment of a ·crime committed or in prevention of a crime threatened would, as it seems to me, make a reductio ad absurdum of that provision. If imprisonment were to be regarded as a 'restriction' of the right mentioned in article 19 (I) (d),. it would. equally. be a restriction on the rights mentioned by the. other sub-clauses of clause (I), with the result that all penal laws providing for imprisonment as a· mode o~ punishment would have to run the gauntlet of clauses (2) to (6) before their validity could b.e accepted. For instance, the law which imprisons for theft would cin that view, fall-'to be justified under clause (2) as a law sanctioning restriction of freedom of speech and exl?ressioa." (Page 192).

"Article 19 confers the rights therein specified only on the citizens of India, while article 21 ext~nds the protection of life and personal liberty to all persons citizens and non-citizens alike. Thus, the two Articles do not operate in a cotermiuous field." (Page 193).

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"(Personal liberty) was used in Article 21 as a sense which excludes the freedoms dealt in Article.19 ... " Rejecting the argument of the Attorney General, the learned Judge held that clause~ (4) to (7) of Article 22 do not form a complete

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(i983} 1 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS'

Code and that "the ·language of Article 21 is perfectly general and covers deprivation of personal liberty· or incarceration, both for pnnitive and preventive reasons." (Page 207). · .

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Mahajan, J., however, adopted a different approach. In his. judgment, "an exruJ!ination of the provisions of Article 22 clearly . _suggests that the intention was to make it self-contained as regards the Jaw of preventive detention and that the validity of a law on the subject .of preventi~e detention cannot be examined or controlled either by the provisions of Article 21 or by the provisi?ns of Article'· ' 19(5)." (Page 229). . Mukerj~e,' J. explained the relative scope , this group, thus: 0 To me

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"

of the Articles in

it seems that Article 19 of the Constitu-

. tion giv~s a list of individual liberties and prescribes in the various clauses the restraints that may be placed upon thein by law so that they may not conflict with public welfare or general morality. On . the other hand, Articles 20, 21 and 22 are primarily concerned with penal enactments or other laws under which personal safety or liberty of persons could be taken away in the interests of the society and they set down the limits within which the State control should be exercised. ·· In my opinion, the ~roup of articles 20 to 22 embody the entire protection guaranteed by/ the Constitution. in relation to deprivation of life and personal liberty' both with regard to substantive as well ~s to procedural law." (Page 255).

.

."The only proper way of avoiding these anomalies is to interpret the two provisions (articles 19 aod 21) as applying to. different subject_s. It is' also unnecessary to enter into a, discussion on the question •. :as to whether article 22 by itself is a self-contained Code ' with regard to the law of Preventive Detention." (Page 257). , .

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.• · S.R. Das, J., also, rejected the argument that the whole of the Indian Penal Code is a law imposing reasonable restriction on the rights conferred ·by Article 19 (1); with these observations (at Page 303): .·~

I

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"To ·say that every. crime undermines the security of 'the State and, therefore, every section of the Indian Penal Code, irrespective of whether it has any reference to speech . .or expression, is a law ..within ·the meaning of this clause is wholly unconvincing and betrays only a vain and forlorn

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BACHAN SINGH v. PUNJAB (Sarkaria, J.)

·-

attempt to find an explanation for meeting the argument that any .. conviction by a Court of law must necessarily infringe article 19 (I) (a). There can be no getting away from the fact _that a detention as a result of a conviction impairs the freedom of speech for beyond what is permissible under clause (2) of article 19. Likewise, a detention on lawful conviction impairs each pf the other personal rights mentioned in sub-clauses (3) tt> (6). The argument that every section of the Indian -.Penal Code irrespective of whet lier it has any reference to any of the rights referred to in sub-clauses (b) toie) and (g) is a law imposing reasonable restriction on those several rights has· not even the _merit of plausibility. There can be no doubt that a detention as a result of lawful conviction must necessarily impair the fundamental personal rights guaranteed by articfe ,19 (1) -far beyond what is permissible under clauses (2) to (6) of that article and yet nobody can think of questioning the validity of the detention or of the section of the Indian Penal Code under which the sentence was passed."

(ii) Das, i. then gave an additional reason as to why · validity of punitive detention or of the sections of the Penal Code under which the sentence was passed, cannot be challenged on the ground of article 19, thus:

"Because the freedom of his person having been law-· fully taken away, the convict ceases to be entitled to exercise .. any of the .. rights protected by ·clause (1) of article 19."

(iii) The learned Judge also held that "article I9 protects some of the important attributes of personal· liberty as indepeDdent rights and the

expression ~personal Jiberty'

has been used in article . 21 as a compendious term including within its meaning all the varieties of rights which go to make up the person~! liberties of men." (Page 299)

Fazal Ali, J. dissented from the majority. In his opinion : "It cannot be said that articles 19, 20, 21 and 22 do not to some extent 0 verlap each other. T_he case of a person who is convicted of Ill\

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[I ()83] I s.c.R.

offence will come under article 20 and 2 I a_nd also undpr article 22 sp far as his arrest and detention in custody before trial are concerned. Preventive detention, which is dealt with in article 22, also amounts to deprivation of personal liberty which is referred to in article 19 (I) (d)." (Page 148).

- Fazal Ali, J. held that since preventive- detention, unlike punitive detention, directly infringes the right under Article 19(1)(d); it inust pas~. the test of clause (5). According to the learned Judge, only those laws are required to .be tested on the anvil of Article 19 _ which directly restrict any of the rights guaranteed in Article 19(1). Applying this test (of direct and indirect effect) to the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, -tne_ learned Judge pointed out that the Code "does not primarily or necessarily impo~e restrictions on the freedom of movement, and_ it is not correct to say that it is a law - imposing restrictions on the right to move freely. Its primary object is to punish crime and not to restrict movement. The punishment may consist in imprisonment or a pecuniary penalty. If it consists in a pecuniary penalty, it obviously involves no restriction on movement, but if it consists -in imprisonment, ihere is a restriction on movement. This restraint is imposed not under a law imposing restrictions on movement out under a law defining crime and making ii· punishable. The punishm~nt is correlated with the violation of some other person's right and not with the right of movement possessed by the offender himself. In my opinion, therefore, fhe Indian Penal Code -does not come within the ambit of the words "law imposing restriction on the right to move freely." (Pages 145-146) •. In applying the above test, which was the same as adopted by Kania, C.J., _Fazal Ali, J. reached a conclusion contrary to that reached by the Chief Justice, on the following reasoning : "Punitive detention is however essentially different from preventive detention. A person is punitil'ely detained only after trial for committing a crime and after his guilt has been e.Stablished in a competent court of justice. A person so convicted can tak'e his case to the State High Court and sometimes bring it to this Court also; and he can in the course of the proceedings connected with his trial take all pleas available to him including the plea of want of jurisdiction of the Court oi trial and the invalidity, of ti;!~ law

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BACHAN SINGH v. PUNJAB {Sarkaria, 1.)

under which he has been prosecuted. The final. judgment in the criminal trial will thus constitute a serious obstacle in his way if he chooses to assert even after his conviction that his right un1ler article 19(1)(d) has been violated. But a person.who is preventively detained has not to face such an obstacle whatever other obstacle may be in his way." '

(Page 146)

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•

We have copiously extracted from the jtldgments in A.K. Gopa/an' s case, to show that all the prop.ositions propounded, arguments and reasons employed or approaches adopted by the learned· Jildges in that case, in reaching the conclusion that thelndian Penal· Code, particularly those of its provisions which do not have a direct impact on the rights conferred by Article 19(1), is not a law imposing restrictions on those rights,. have not been overruled or rendered bad by the subsequent pronouncements ·of this Court in B~nk Nationalizaton(') case Of in Maneka" Gandhi's case. For instance, the proposition laid down by Kania, C.J.; Fazal Ali, Patanjali Sastri, and S.R. Das, J.J. that the Indian Penal Code particularly those of its ptovisions which cannot. be justified on the ground on reasonableness with reference to any of the specified heads, such as "public ' order" in clauses (2), (3) and (4), is not a law imposing restrictions on any of the rights conferred by Article 19( I), still holds the field. Indeed, the re.asoning, explicit, or implicit in the judgments of Kania, C.J., Patanjali Sastri and S.R. Das JJ .. tbat such a construction which treats every section of the Indian Penal Code as a law· impoiing 'restriction' on the rights in Article 19(1), will lead. to absurdity is unassailable. There are several offences under the Penal Code, ·such as theft, cheating, ordinary assault, which do not violate· or effect 'public order,' 'but only law and· order'. These offences injure only. specific individuals as distinguished from the publfc at large. · II is by now settled that 'public order' means 'even tempo of the life of the community.'· That being so, even all mu~ders do not disturb or affect 'public order'. Some murders may be of purely private significance and the injury or harm resulting therefrom· affects only specific individuals and, consequently; such. murpers may not .be· covered by "public ofder" within the contemplation of clauses (2), (3·) and (4) of article 19. Such murders do not lead to public disorder but to disorder simpliciter. Yet, no rational being can say (I) [1970] 3 SCR 530.

i)

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[!983] i s.c.it

that punishment of such murders is not in the general public interest. It may be noted that general public interest is not specified as a head in clauses (2) to (4) on which restriction on the rights mentioned in clause ( l) of the Article may be justified. It is true, as was pointed out by Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) in Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia's(') case, and in several other decisions that followed it; that' the real distinction between the areas of 'law and order' and 'public order' lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in , the degree jand extent. Violent crimes similar in nature, but committed in dilferent contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. A murder committed in given circµmstances may cause only a slight tremor, the wave length of which does not extent beyond the parameters of law and order. Another mu,der committed in different context and circumstances may unleash a tidal.wave of such intensity, gravity and magnitude, that its impact throws out of gear the even flow of life. Noneiheless the fact remains that for such murders which do not affect "public • order", even the provision for life imprisonment in Section 302; Indian Penal Code, as as alternative punishment, would not be justifiable under clauses (2), (3) and ( 4) as a reasonable restriction in the interest of 'Public Order'. Such a construction must, therefore, be avoided. Thus construed, Article 19 will be attracted only to such laws, the provisions of which are capable of being tested under clauses (2) to (5) of Article 19 .

.

• This proposition was recently (1975) reiterated in Hardhan Saha & Anr. v. State of West Bengal('). In accord with this line of reasoning in A.K. Gopalan' s case, a Constitution Bench of this Court in Hardhan.Saha' s case restated the principle for the applicability of Article'l9 by drawing a distinction between a law of preventive detention and a law providing punishment for commission of crimes, thus: "Constitution has conferred rights under Article 19 and ·also. adopted preventive detention to prevent the greater evil of elements imperilling the security, the safety of a State and the welfare of the nation. It is not possible to think that a person who is detained will yet be free to move CI> [I!T66J I s.c.R. 709. (2) [1975J 1 s.c.R. 778 at p. 784.

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BACHAN SiNGH v. PUNJAB (Sarkaria,

i)

tfd

'or assemble or form association or unions or have the right to reside in any part of India or have the freedom of speech • or expression. Suppose a person is convicted of an offence of cheating and prosecuted (and imprisoned) after trial, it is not open to say that the imprisonment should be tested. with reference to Article, 19 for its reasonableness. A law which attracis Article 19 therefore must be such as is capable of being tested to be reasonable under clauses (21 to 5 of Article 19."

'A

(emphasis and parenthesis supplied.)

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The last sentence which has been underlined by us, appears to lend implicit approval to the rule of construction adopted by the majority of the learned Judges in A.K. Gopalan' s case, whereby they excluded from the - purview of Article 19 certain provisions of the Indian Penal Code providing punishment for certain offences which - could not be tested on the specific grounds-embodied in clauses (2) . to (5) of that Article. This proposition enunciated in.A.K. Gopalan's case is only a product of ,the application of the basic canon that a construction which would lead to absurdity, should be eschewed. In R.C. Cooper v. Union of India (popularly known as Bank Nationalization case), the majority adopted the two-fold test for determining as to when a law violated fundamental rights, namely : "(!) It is not the object of the authority making the law impairing the right of a citizen, nor the form of action that determines the protection he can claim. · (2)-It is the effect of the law and of the action upon the right which . attract· the jurisdiction of the Court to grant relief. 'The direct operation 'of the act upon the rights forms the real test."

Ill

In Maneka Gandhi'v. Union of India (ibid), Bhagwati, J. explained the scope of the same test by saying that a law or and order made thereund~r will - be hit by article 19, ·if the direct and inevitable consequence of such law or order is to abridge or take away any one or more of the freedoms guaranteed by Article 19(1). If the effect and operation of the statute· by itself, upon a person's _ fundamental rights is remote or dependent upon !'factors which may or may not come into play", then such-statute is not u/tra-vires on the ground of its being· violative of that fundamental right. Bhag-

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[1983] I s.c.R.

wati J. described this proposition as "the doctrine of intended and real effect" while Cbandrachud, J. (as he then was) called it "the . test of proximate effect and operation of the statute." The question is, whether R.C. Cooper & Manek.a Gandhi have given a complete go-by to the 'test of direct and indirect effect, sometimes described as form and object test' or 'pith and substance rule', which was adopted by Kania, C.J. and Fazal Ali, J. in A.K. · Gopa/an' s case. In our opinion, the answer to this question cannot be in the affirmative. In the first place, there is nothing ~uch in the name. As Varadachariar, J. put it in Subrahmanyan Chettiar's(') ~ase, such rules of interpretation were evolved only as a matter of reasonableness and common sense and out of the necessity of satis. factorily solving conflicts from the inevitable overlapping of subjects in any distribution of powers. By the same yardstick of common sense, the 'pith and substance rule' was applied to resolve the question of the constitutionality of a law assailed on the ground of its being violative of a fundamental right.

'

Secondly, ·a survey of the decisions of this Court since A. K. Gopalan, shows that the criterion of directness whicli is the essence of the test of direct and indirect effect, ha; n~ver been totaliy a.bandoned. Only the mode of its application has been modified and its scope amplified by judicial ,activism to maintain its efficacy for solving new constitutional problems· in tune with evolving concepts of rights and obligations in a strident 'democracy. The test of direct and indirect effect adopted in A. K. Gopalan was.approved by the Full Court in Ram Singh v. State of Delhi.(') Therein, Patanjali Sastri, J. quoted with approval the passages (i) and (ii) (which .we have extracted earlier) from the judgment of Kania, C. J. Altho~gh Mahajan and Bose, JJ. differed on the merits, there was no dissent on this point among all the learned Judges. · The first decision, which, though purporting to follow Kania, C. J's. enunciation in A. K. Gopalan, imperceptibly added another dimension to the test of directness, was Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.(') In that case, the cons(!) [1940] FCR 188. '(2) [1951] SCR 451. (Jl [1959] SCR 12.

. ...

BACHAN SINGH v, PUNJAB (Sarkaria, J.)

'

ISS

titutional validity of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955, and the legality of the decision of the Wage Board, constituted thereunder, were challenged. The impugned Act, which had for its object the regulation of the conditions of service of working journalist• and other persons· employed in newspaper establishments, provided, i~ter alia, for the payment of gratuity to '} working journalist who bad b~en in continuous service for a certain period. It also · regulated hours of _work and le.ave and provided for ret_renchment compensation. Section 9 (I) laid down the pri~ciples that the Wage Board was to follow in fixing the rates of wages of working journalists.

•

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.One of the. contentions of the petitioners in that case was that impugned Act violated their fundamental rights under Articles 19 (I) (a), 19 (I) (g), 14 and 32 of the Constitution and that the decision of the Wage Board fixing the rates and scales of wages wh'ich imposed too heavy a fihancial burden ·on the industry and spelled its total ruin, was illegal and void. It was contended by the learned Attorney General in that case that since the impugned . legislation was not a direct -legislation on the subject of freedom of speech and expression. Art. 19 (!)(a) would have no application, the test being ncjt the effect or result of legislation but its subject-matter. In support of his contention, he relied upon the observations on this point of Kania,· C. J. in A. K. Gopalan. It was further- urged that the object of the · impugned Act was only to regulate certain conditions of service of working journalists ',and other persons employed i~ the newspaper . establishments and not to take away or abridge the freedom of speech. or expression enjoyed by the petitioners-and, therefore, the impugned' ·Act could not come within the prohibition of Article 19 (l) (a) read with Article 32 of the Constitution.-

. On the other hand, the petitioners took their stand on a passage in the decision of.the Supreme Court of United States in Minnesot:· Ex Rel., O/son,( 1 }'which was as under : "With respect to these contentions it is enough to say that in passing upon constitutional questions the 'Court has regard to substance and not to mere/matters·of form,-and_ , that, in acc_ordance with familiar principles, the statute must be tested by its operation and effect." ·

(I) [1930] 283 US 697 at p. 708 •

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(1983) I s.c.k.

It was further submitted that in all such cases, the Court has to look behind the names, forms and appearances to discover the true character and nature of the legislation .. Thus considered, 'proceeded the argnment, the Act by laying a direct and preferential burden ·an the press, wonld tend to curtail the circulation, narrow the scope of dissemination of information and fetter the petitioners' freedom to choose the means of exercising their rights of free speech (which includes the freedom of the press). It was further submitted that those· newspaper employers who were marginally situated niay not be able to bear the strain and have to disappear after closing down their establishments.

N .H. Bhagwati, J. who delivered the unanimous Judgment of the Constitution Bench, after noting that the object of the impugned legislation is to provide for the amelioration or' the conditions of the workmen in the newspaper industry, overruled this contention of the employers, thus :

,

ff

."That, however would be a consequence which would be extraneous and not within the contemplation of the legislature. It could therefore hardly be urged that the possible effect ,of the impact of these measures in conceivable cases would vitiate the legislation as such. All the consequences which have been visualized in the behalf by the petitioners, viz., the tendency to curtail circulation and ·thereby narrow , the scope of dissemination of informatJon, fetters on the petitioners' freedom to choose the means of exercising the · right, likelihood of the independence .of the press being nndermined ·by having to seek government aid; the imposition of penalty on the petitioners' right to choose the instruments for exercising the freedom or compelling them to seek alternative· media, etc., would .be remote and depend upon various factors which may or may not come into play. Unless these were the direct 1Jr inevitable consequences of the meatlures enacted in the impugned Act, it would not ·be possible to strike down the legislation as having that effect and operation." _, (emphasis added) The learned Judge further observed that the impugned Act could be "legitimately characterised as a measure which affects the press", but its "intention or the proximate effect and operation" was not such as would take away or abridge the right of freedom of speech and

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BACHAN SINGH v. PUNJAB (Sarkaria, J.)

·i

18?

expression guaranteed iri Article 19 (I) (a), therefore, it could not be held invalid on that ground. The impugned decision of the Wage Board, hOwever, was held to be ultra vires the Act and contrary to the principles of natural justice. It may be observed at this place that the manner in which. the test of direct and indirect effect was applied ~y N.H. Bhagwati, J., ·was not very different from the mode in Which Fazal Ali,· J. applied it-to punitive detention as punishment after conviction for an offence under the Indian Penal Code. N.H. Bhagwati, J., did not discard the test adopted by Kania, C.J., in A.K. Gopalan, in its entirety; he merely extended the application ?f the criterion of, directness to the operation and effect of the impugned legi~tion.

Again, in Sakal Papers (P) Ltd.· & Ors. v. The Union of India(') this Court, while considering the constitutionat validity of the Newspaper (Price and Page) Act, 1956 and Daily Newspaper (-Price and Page) Order, 1960, held that the "direct and immediate" effect of the impugned Order would be to restrain a newspaper from publishing any number of pages for carrying its news and views, which it has a fundamental right' under Article 19 (I) (a) and, therefore, the Order was violative of the right of· the• newspapers guaranteed by Article 19 (I) (a), and as such, invalid. In this case, also, the emphasis had shifted from the object and subject-matter of the impugned State action to its direct and immediate effect.

,

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In Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtr.a & Anr.,( 2 ) an order prohibiting the publication of the evidence of a witness iri a defamation case, passed by a learned Jndge (Tarkunde, J.) of the Bombay High Court, was impngned on the. ground that it violated the petitioners' right to free speech and expression guara_nteed by Article 19 (I) (a). Gajendragadkar, C.J., lWanchoo, Mudholkar; Sikri and Ramaswami, JJ., concurring) repelled this contention with these illuminating observ.ations : "The argument that the impugned order affects the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 19 (I), is based on a complete m'isconception about the true nature and (I) [1962] 3 SCR 842.

(2) [1966] 3 SCR 744.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

l 1983] I s.c.k.

charaeter of judicial process and of judicial decisions. When a Judge deals with matters brought before him for his adjudication, he first decides questions of fact . on which the parties are at issue, and then .applies. the relevant law to the said facts. Whethe.r the findings of fact recorded by the Judge are right.or wrong, and whether the conclusion of law drawn by him suffers from any infirmity, can be · considered and decided if the party aggrieved by the decision of the Judge takes the matter up before the . appellate Court. But it is singularly inappropriate to assume that a judicial decision pronounced by a Judge of competent jurisdiction in or in relation to matter brought before him for adjudicati'¥! can affect the fundamental rights of the citizens under Article 19 (I). What the judicial decision purports to do is to decide the controversy between the parties bfougl;it before the court and nothing more. if this basic and essential aspect of the judicial process is borne in mind, it would be plain that the judicial verdict pronounced by court in or in relation to a matter brought before it for its decision cannot be said to affect the fundamental rights of citizens under Article 19 ( !)."

\.

.,

"It is well-settled ,that in examining .the validity· of legislation, it is legitimate to consider whether the impugned legislation is a legislation directly in respect of the subject covered by any particular article of the Constitution, or touches the said article only incidentally or indirectly'.'

"If the test of direct effect and object which is sometimes described as the pith and substance test, is thus applied in considering the validity of' legislation, it would not be inappropriate to apply the same test to judicial decisions ·iike the one with which we are concerned in th« present proceedings. As we have already indicated, the impugned order was directly concerned with giving·such protection to the witness as was thought to be necessary in order to obtain true evidence in the case with a. view to do justice between the parties. If, incidentally, as a·result of this-order, the p.etitioners were not able to report what they heard in court, that cannot be said to make the impugned order invalid under Article 19 (I) (a)."

'

BACHAN Sllj9H v. PUNJAB (Sarkaria, J.)

,

We have already mentioned briefly how the test of· directness was developed and reached its culmination ill Bank Nationalization's case and Maneka Gandhi's case •.

.

•

From the above conspectus, it· is clear that the test of direct· and indireci. effect was not scrapped. Indeed, there is no dispute that the test of 'pith and substance' · of the ·subject-matter' and of direct and of incidental effect of legisla\ion is a very u1efuf test to determine the question of legislative comp'eten ce Le., in ascertaining whether an Act· falls under one Entry while incidentally encroaching ·upon another Entry. Even for determining the validity of a legislation on the ground of infringement of fundamental rights, the subject. matter and the ·object of the ·legislation are not altogether irrelevant. For instance, if the subject,matter of the legislation directly cc;wers any of.the fundamental freedo.ms mentioned in Ariicle 19 (I), it must pass the test of reasonableriess under the relevant head in clauses (2) to (6) of that Article. If the legislation do~s not directly deal with any of the rights in Article 19 (1), that may not conclude the enquiry. It will have to be ascertained further whether by its . ditect and immediate operation, the impugned legj~lation abridges any of.the rights enumerated !n Article 19 (!). · ·

In Bennett Coleman,(') Mathew, J. in his dissenting judgment referred with approval to the test as expounded in Express Newspapers. He.further observed that "the 'pith and 'substance' test, though not strictly appropriate; must serve a· useful purpose in the proce~s of deciding whether the .provisions in question which work .same interference with the freedoin of speech, are essentially- regulatory in character". · '

From a survey of the cases noticed above, a comprehensive test wh.ich can be formulated, may be re-stated as under :

.,

Does the impugned law, in its pith and substance, whatever may .be its form and ·object, deal with any of the fundamental rights conferred by Article 19 (l) ? If it does, does it abridge or abrogate any of those rights ? And even if it does not, in its pith an.d substance, deal with any of thefundame~tal rights conferred by Article 19 (I), is the

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(I) A.IR 1973 S.C. 106.

StJPRBMB COURT REPORTS

[1983] 1 s.c.a.

direct and inevitable effect of the impugned law such as to abridge or abrogate any of those rights ? '1

B'

The mere fact that the impugned law incidentally, remotely or collaterally has the effect of abridging or abrogating those rights, will not satisfy the test·. If the answer to the above queries be in the affirmative, the impugned law in order to be valid, must pass the test of reasonableness under Article 19. But if the impact of the law qn any of the rights under clause (1) of Article 19 is merely incidental, indirect; remote or collateral and is dependent upon factors which may or may not come into play, the anvil of Article 19 will not be avilable for judging its validity. · Now, let us apply this test to tlje provisions of the Penal Code in question. Section 299 defines 'culpable homicide' and Section 300 defines culpable .homicide amounting to murder. Section 302 prescribes death or imprisonment for life as penalty for murder .. It cannot, reasonably or·rationally, be contended that any of the rights mentioned in Article 19(1) of the Constitution confers the freedom to commit murder or, for the matter of that, the freedom to commit any offence whatsoever. Therefore, penal laws, that is to say, laws which define offences and prescribe punishment for the commission of offences do not attract the application of Article 19(1). We cannot, of course, say that the o15ject of penal laws is generally such a:s not to involve any violation of the rights conferred by Article 19(1) beca~se after the decision of this Court in the B~nk Nationalization case the theory, that the object and form of the State action alone determine t)le extent of protection that may be claimed by an individual and that the effect of the State action on the fundamental right of the individual is irrelevant, stands discredited. But the point of the matter is that, in pith and ·Substance, penal Jaws do not deal with the subject matter of rights enshrined in Article J9(1). That again is not enough for the purpose of deciding upon the applicability of Article 19 because as the test formulated by us above shows, even if a Jaw does not, in its pith and substance, deal with any of the fundamental rights conferred by Article 19(1), if the direct and inevitable effect of the law is such as to abridge or abrogate any of those rights, Article 19(1) shall have been attracted. It would then become necessary to test the validity of even a penal law on the touchstone of that Article. On this latter ashct of the matter, we are of the opinion that the d~privation of freedom consequent upon an order of conviction and sentence is n'ot a direct ,

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' BACHAN SINGH v. PUNJAB (Sarkaria, J.) '

.,. . ,

and inevitable consequence of the penal law but is merely incidental to the order of conviction and sentence which may or may not come into play, that is to say, which may or may not be passed. Consj· dering therefore the test formulated by ·us in its dual aspect, we are of the opinion that Section 302 of the Penal Code does not have to stand the test of Article 19(1) of the Constitution.

•

This is particularly true of crimes, inherently vicious and per· nicious, which under the English 'Common Law were classified as crimes ma/a in se as distinguish~d from crimes ma/a prohibita crimes ma/a in se embrace acts immoral or wrong in themselves, such as, murder, rape, arson, burglary, larceny (robbery and dacoity); while crimes.ma/a prohibita embrace things pr~hibited by statute as infring· · ing on others' rights, though no moral turpitude attaches to such crimes. Such acts constitute crimes only because they ar~ so prohi· bited. (See .Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. IO). While crimes ma/a in se do not per se, or in operation directly and inevitably impinge on the rights under Article 19(1), cases under the other category of crimes are conceivable where the law relating to them directly restricts or abridges such rights. The illustration given by Shri Sorabji will make the point clear. Suppose, a law is enacted which provides that it shall be an offence' to level any criticism, whatever, of the Government established by law and makes a further provision prescribing five years' imprisonment as punishment for such an offence. Such a law (i.e. its provision defining the offence) will directly and foevitably impinge upon the right guaranteed under clause (a) of Article 19(1). Therefore, to be valid, it must pass the test of reasonabl.eness embodied in clause (2) of the Article. .But this cannot be said in regard to the provisions of the Penal Code with which we are concerned. Assuming arguendo, that th~ provisions of the Penal Code, particularly those. ·providing death penalty as an alternative punish-' ment for murder, have to satisfy the requirements of reasonableness and public interest under Article 19 the golden strand of which according to the ratios of Maneka Gandhi runs through the basic structure of Article 21 also the further questions to be determined, in this connection, will be: On whom will the onus of satisfying the requirements under Article 19, lie ?' Will such onus lie on the State or the person challenging its validity ? And what will be the nature ofjhe onus?

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[1983] 1 s.c.R.

w'ith regard to onus, no hard and fast rule of universal application in all situations, can be deducted from the decided cases. In some decisions, such as, Saghir Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh(') and Khyerbari Tea Co. v. State of Assam & Ors. (2) it was laid dowD" by this Court that if the writ petitioner succeeds in showing that the impugned law. ex facie abridges or transgresses the rights. coming under any of the sub-clauses of clause (1) of Article 19, the onus shifts on the respondent state to show that the legislation comes within the permissible limits imposed by any of the clauses (2) to (6) as may be applicable to the case, and, also to place material before ihe court in support of that contention. If the State does nothing in that respect, it is not for the petitioner to prove negatively that it is not covered by any of the permissive clauses.

.

Acontrary trend, however, is discernible in the recent decisions , of this Court, which sta~t with the initial presumption in . favour of the constitutionality of the statute and. throw the burden of rebutting that presumption on the party who challenges its constitutionality on the ground of Art. 19.

. In B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan (') this Court, speaking through

•. ,

V.R. Krishna Iyer, J.,. reiterated the ratio of Ram Krishna Dalmia's case,(')-that :

·"there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attack it to sbow that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles"; and· ~-.

_G

"that.it must be presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by ·experience and that its. discriminations are based on adequate grounds." It was emphasised that "Judges act not by hunch but on hard facts . properly brought on· record an~ sufficiently strong to rebuff the (1) [1955] l SCR 707.

(2) AIR 1964 SC 925. (3) (1975] 2 SCR 774 at p. 787, (4). [1959] SCR 279, 297~propositions (b) & (c).

•

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BACHAN SINGH v. PUNJAB (Sarkaria, J.)

initial presumption of constitutionality of legislation. Nor is the Court a third Chamber of the House to weigh wh'ether it should draft the clause differently". Referring, inter alia, to the decision of this Court in R.M.D. Chamarbaugw~la (ibid), and Seervai's 'Constitutional Law of India', Vol. I, page 54, it was recalled, "Some courts have gone to the extent of holding that there is a presumption in . . favour of constitutionality, and a law will not be declared unconsti· tutional unless the case is so clear as to be free from doubt; and to doubt the constitutionality -of a law is to resolve it in favour of its va,lidity". Similar view was taken by a· Bench of seven learned Judges of this Court· in Pathumma v. State of Kerala.(')

Behind the view that there is a presumption of constitutionality of a statute and the · onus to rebut the same lies on t\lose who . challenge the legislation, is the rationale of judicial restraint, a recognition of the limits of judicial review; a respect for the boundaries of legislative and judicial fu,nctions, and the judicial-responsibility to guard the trespass from one side or the other. The primary function of the courts is to interpret and apply the laws according to the will of those who made them and not to transgress into the legislative domain of policy-making." -.'The job of a Judge is judging. and not law-making". In Lord Devlin's words:.· "Judges.are the' keepers of the. law and the keepers of these boundaries cannot, also, be among out-riders."

A similar warning was echoed by the Supreme Court of the United States iµ Dennis v. United States(') in these terms : "Courts are not -representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society .. Their judgment is best informed, and therefore most dependable, within narrow limits. Their essential quality is detachment, founded on independence. History teaches. that the independence of th.e judiciary is jeopardized when . courts become embroiled in the p!Cssions of the day and assume primary responsibility in choosing between competiog political, economic and social pressures." ' (I) [1978] 2 S.C.R: 547

(2) 341 Os 494, 5i5:.95 L. E<I. 1137; 71 S; <;t, 857

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In Gregg v, Georgia,(') one of the principal questions for consideration was, whether capital punishment provided in a statute for certain cdmes was .a "cruel and unusual" punishment. In that context, the nature of the burden which rests on those who attack the constitutionality of the statute was 'explained by Stewart, J., thus: "We may not require the legislature to select the least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is not cruelly inhnmane or disproportionate to the crime involved. And a heavy burden rests on those who would attack the judgment of the representatives of the people. This is true in part because the constitutional test is intertwined with an assessment of contemporary standards and the legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards. In a democratic society legislatures', not conrts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of . the people." Even where the burden is on the State to show that the restriction imposed.by .the impugned statute is reasonable and in public interest, the extent and the manner of discharge of the burden necessarily depends on the subject-matter of ·the legislation, the nature of · the inquiry, and the scope and ·limits of judicial review. (See the observations of Sastri. J. in State of Madras v. V.C. Rao,( 2) reiterated in Jagmohan). '

In th'e instant case, the State has discharged its burden primarily by producing for the persuill of the Court, the 35th Report of the Law Commission, 1967, and the judgments of this Court in Jagmohan Singh and in several subsequent cases, in which it·has been recognised that death penalty SCI ves as a deterrent. It is, therefore, for the petitioners to prove and establish that the death sentence fdr n1urder is so outinoded, unusual or excessive as to be devoid of any

rational nexus with the purpose and object of the legislation. The Law Commission of India, after making an intensive and extensive study of the subject of death penalty in India, published

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(1) 428 us 153: 49 L. Ed. 2<! 859 (2) [1952] S:C.R. 797 at 607.

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and submitted its '35th Report in 1967 to the Government. After examining, a wealth of evidential material and considering the arguments for and against· its retention, that high-powered Body summed up its conclusions at page 354 of its Report, as follows : "The issue of aboliti~n or retention has to be decided on a balancing of the various arguments for and against retention. ·No single argument for abolition or retention can decide the issue. In arriving, at any conclusion on the subject, the need for protecting society· in. general and individual human beings must be borne in mind.

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It is difficult to rule ont the validity of, of the strength behind, many of the arguments for abolition nor does, the Commission treat lightly the argument based on the irrevocability of the sentence of death, the need for a modern approach, the severity of capital punishment and the strong feeling shown by certain sections of public opinion in stres· sing deeper ques.tions of human values. Having regard, however, to the conditions in India, ·to the variety of the social up-bringing of its inhabitants, to the disparity in the level of morality and education in the country, to the vastness of its area, to diversity of its population and to the paramount need ·for maintaining law and order in the country at the present juncture, India cannot risk the experiment of abolition of capital punishment.''

This Report was, also, considered by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Jagmohan. It waS'the main piece of evidence on the basis of which the challenge to th~ constitutional validiiy of Section 302 of the Penal Code, on the ground of its being violative of Article 19, was repelled. Parliament 'must be presumed to have considered these views of the Law Commission and the judgment of this Court in Jagrnohan, and must also have been aware of the principles crystallised by judicial precedents in the matter of sentencing when it took up revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1973, and inserted in it, Section 354(3) which indicates that death penalty c~n be awarded in exceptional cases for murder and for some other offences under the Penal Code for special reasons to be recorded. . Death penalty has been . the subject of an age·old debate between Abolitionists and . Retenfj\)pjsts~ ;ilthough recently thQ

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controversy h.as come in sharp focus. Both the groups are deeply · anchored in their antagonistic views. Both· firmly an·d sincerly believe in the righteousness of their respective stands, with overtones of sentiment and emotion. Both the camps can claim among them eminent thinkers, penologists, sociologists, jurists; judges, legislators, administrators and law enforcement officials. The chief arguments of the Abolitionists, which have been substantially adopted by the learned counsel for the petitioners, are · as under: . /

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(a) The death penalty is irreversi\ile. Decided upon according to fallible processes of law by fallible human beings, it can be-and actually has been-inflicted upon people innocent of any crime. (b) There is no convincing evidence to show that death

(i) Its deterrent effect remains unproven. It has not been shown that incidence of murder has increased in countries where death .penalty has been abolished, after its abalition.

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penalty senes any penological purpose :

(ii)

Retribution in the sense of vengeance, is no longer an . acceptable end of punishment.

(iii)

On the contrary, reformation of the criminal and his rehabilitation is the primary purpose of punishment. Imposition of death penalty nullifi.es .that purpose .

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(c) Execution by whatever means and for whatever offence is a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.

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It is proposed fo deal with- these arguments, as far as possible, in their serial order.

Regording (a) : It is true that death penalty. is irrevocable and a few instances, can be cited. including-some from England, of persoqs who after their conviction and execution for murder, were discovered to be innocent. But this, according to the Retentionists is -not a reason fPr abolition of the death penalty, but an argument for reform of the judicial system a11d the sentencing procedure. Theore-

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. tically, such errors of judgment cannot be absolutely eliminated from any system of justice, devised and worked by human beings, but their incidence can be infinitesimally reduced by providing adequate safeguards and checks. ,We will presently see, while dealing with the procedural aspect of the problem, that in India, ample safeguards have been provided by law and the {;onstitution which almost eliminate the chances of an innocent person being convicted al)d executed for a. capital offence. Regarding (b) 1 purpose.

Whether death

penalty

ser.ves any peno/ogical

. Fir~tly, in most of the countries in the world, Including India, a very large segment onhe population, including ngtable penologists judges, jurists, legislators .and other enlightened people still belieye that death .penalty for murder and certain other capital offences does serve as a deterrent, and a greater deterrent tha11 life' imprisonment. We will set out very briefly, by way of sample, opinions of some of these distinguished.persons.

In the first pl.ace, we will. notice a few decisions of Courts wherein the deterrent value of death penalty has been judicially · recognised. In Paras Ram v. State of Punjab,(')_ the facts were that Paras • Ram, who was a fanatic devotee of t)le Devi, used to hold Satsangs at which bhajans were sung in praise of the Goddess. .Paras Ram .ceremonially beheaded liis four year old boy at the crescendo of the morning bhajan. He was tried, convicted and sentenced to death for the. murder. His death sentence was confirmed by the High / Court. -He filed a petition for grant of special leave to appeal t& this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. It was contended on behalf of Paras Ram that the ve~y monstrosity of the crime provided proof of his insanity ~ufficient to exculpate the offender· under Section 84, Indian.Pena!' Code: or material for mitigation of the sentence of death. V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for-the . Bench, to which one of us (Saikaria, J.) was a party, refused to grant special leave and summarily dismissed the petition with these · observations : '

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"The poignantly pathological grip of macabre superstitions on some crude Indian minds in the shape of desire to I do human and animal sacrifice, in defianca of the ieientifie ethos of our cultural heritage and the scientific impact of our technological century, shows up in crimes of primitive horror such as the one we are dealing with now, where a blood-curdling butchery of one's own beloved son was perpetrated, aided by other 'pi!)us' criminals, to propitiate some blood-thirsty diety. Secular India, speaking through the · Court, must administer shock therepy to such anti-social 'piety' when the manifestation is in terms of inhuman and criminal violence. When the disease is social, deterrence through court sentence must, perforce, operate through the individual culprit coming up before court. Social justice has many . facets and Judges have a sensitive, secular and civilising role in suppressing grievous injustice t.o humanist values by. inflicting condign punishment on dangerous deviants."

(emphasis added) In Jagmohan, also, this Court took due note of the fact that for certain types of murders, death penalty alone is considered an adequate deterrent :

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"A large number of murders is undoubtedly of the common type. But some at least afe diabolical in conception and cruel in execution. In some others where the victim is a person of hlgh standing in the country society is liable to be rocked to its very foundation. Such murders cannot simply be wished away by finding alibis in the s.ocial maladjustment of the murderer. Prevalence of such crimes speiiks, in the opinion of many, for the inevitability of death penalty n.ot only by way of deterrence but as a token of emphatic disapproval of the society."

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-Examini'ng whether life imprisonment ·was an adequate substitute for death penalty, the Court observed :

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"Jn the context of our criminal law which punishes murder, one cannot ignore the fact that life imprisonment works out in most cases to a dozen years of punishment, and it may be seriously questioned whether that sole alter·

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v. PU Ni AB (Sarkaria, J.) ·

native will be an adequate substitute for the death penalty." In Ediga Anamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh,('rv.R. Krishna Iyer, J., ·speaking for the Bench to wbich one of us (Sarkaria, J.,) was a party, observed that "deterrence through threat of death may still be a promising strategy iu some frightful° areas of murderous crime." It was further observed that "horrendous features of the ' crime and the hapless and helpness state of the victim steel the heart of law for the sterner sentence." ,

In Shiv Mohan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration),(') the same learned Judge, speaking for the Court, reiterated the deterrent effect of death penalty by referring to his earlier judgment in Ediga Annamma' s case, as follows : "In Ediga Annamma this Court, while noticing the social and personel circumstances possessing an extenuating impact, has equally clearly highlighted that in India under present conditions deterrence through death penalty may not be a time-barre.cl punishment in-some frightful areas of barbarous murder." Again, in Char/ea Sobraj v. T~e Superintendent, Central Jail, Tihar, New Delhi,(') the same learned Judge, speaking for a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court, reiterated that deterrence was 'one of the vital considerations of punishment. I11 Trop v. Dul/eh,(') Brennan, J. of the Supreme Court of the . Unjted States, concurring with the majority, emphasised the deterrent end of punishment, ·in these words :

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"Rehabilitation is but one . of 'the several . purposes of the penal law. Among other purposes are deterrents of the wrongful act by th'e threat. of punishment and insulation of society · from dangerous individuals by imprisonment or eXecution." ·

(!) A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 799

(2) [19771 3 s.c.R. 112 (3) [1979] 1 s.c.R. s12 (4) 256 us 86

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In Furman v. Georgia, Stewart, J. took the view _that death penalty serves a deterrent as well as retributive purpose. Jn his view, certain criminal conduct is so atrocious that society's interest in deterrence and retribution wholly outweighs any considerations of reform or rehablitation of the perpetrator, and that, despite the ineonclusive empirical evidence, only penalty of death will provide . maximum deterrence. · Speaking for the majority,. in Gregg v. Georgia, Stewart, J. reiterated his views with regard to the deterrent and retributive effect of death penalty.

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Now, we may notice by way of.specimen, the views of some jurists and scholars of note. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, the. gre.at jurist, ·who was concerneil with the drafting of the Indian Penal Code, also, was a strong exponent of the view that capital punishment has the greatest value ~s a deterrent for murder and other capital offence. To quote his words :

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.,.. ''.No other punishment deters men so effectually from committing crimes as the punishment of death. This is one of those propositioqs which it is difficult to prove, simply because they are in themselves more obvious than any proof can make them. It is possible to display ingenuity · in arg!ling against it, but' that is all. The whole experience of mankind is in the other direction. The threat of instant death is the one to which resort has always been made when there was an absolute necessity for producing some result. No one goes to certain inevitable death except by compulsion. Put the matter the other the way. Was there ever yet a criminal who, wheri sentenced to death and br_ought out to die, would refuse te offer of commutation of his sentence for the severest secondary punishment ? Surely not. Why is this ? · It can only be because 'All that a man has will he give for .his life'. In any secondary punishment, however terrible, there is hope; but death is death; its terrors cannot be described more forcibly." · · Even Marchese De Cesare Bonesana Beccaria, who can be called the fath~r of the modern Abolitionist movement, concedes in his treatise, "Del Delilli a de/la Pana" (1764), that capital puniShmeut would be justified in two instances : Firstly, in an execution

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would prevent a revolution against popularly established Gpvernment; and, secondly, if an execution ·was the only way to deter others from committing a crime. The adoption of double standards for capital punishment in the rMlm of conscience is considered by some.. scho)ars as the biggest infirmity in the Abolitionists' case.

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Thorsten Sal/in is one of the penologists who has mad~ a scientific study of the subject of capital punishment and compiled the views of various scholars of the 19th and 20th centuries. In his book "Capital Punishment<• he has · made an attempt to assemble the arguments for and against the death penalty. He has also given extracts from the Debates in the British House of Commons in 1956 and, also, in March and April 1966, in the Candian House of Commons. In the last. part of his book, the learned J?ditor summarises. his ideas about capital punishment. _ In his.· opinion, Retribution seems to be outdated and unworkable. It is neither efficient nor equitably administered. "Justice is a relative concept that changes with the times". A retributive philosophy alone is not now socially acceptable."In the last analysis, the only utiHtarianargument that has . being to be given attention is the one that defends capital punishment as a uniquely powerful means of protecting the community." He ends his book with 'the observation : "I have attempted to show that, as now used, capital punishment performs. none of the utilitarian functions claimed by its supporters, nor can it ever be made to serve such functions. It is an archaic custom of primitive origin that has disappeared in most civilized countries and is. withering away in the rest." '- ·

In his article appearing in "Criminology Review Year Book" (1979) Vol. I, ·compiled.by Sheldon L. Messinger & Egon Bittner('), Isaac Ehrlich,. after' surveying the past literature on the relation between ·capital punishment and capital crimes, has (at pp. 31-33) pointed out the following shortcomings in the thesis of Sellin·,

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"The principal shortcoming of the work by Sellin and others using bis me!bodo!ogy i&, that the· approach taken and the methods applied do not permit a systematic examination of the main implications emanating from the general theory of deterrence. · The shortcoming is basic, because the impiications following from the general deterrence

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(1) Published. by Sage. PubJicaHon_s .IN<; Ltd., '275 Beverly HiJ1s, <?alifornia 90212. _ -

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hypothesis are what Sellid was chailenging. Yet his work n~ither develops nor tests the full range of implications following from the theory he attempts to reject; nor does he develop or test a competing theory. In additio.n, to my knowledge, Sellin never reported in any of his studies the results of any systematic (parametric or non-parametric) statistical tests that could jastify his strong and unqualified

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"Another fundamental shortcoming of Sellin's studies is their failure to account systematically for other factors that are expected by the deterrence hypothesis to affect the frequency of murder in the population, apart from the relevant risk of execution. These are variables such as the probability of apprehension, the conditional probability of conviction given apprehension, the severity of alternative punishments for murder, the distribution of income, the · probability of unemployment, and other indicators of differential gains from criminal activities occurring jointly with murder. Since, as I shall argue later, some of these variables are expected to be highly correlated with the conditional probability / of execution given conviction of mnrder, their exclusion from the statistical analysis can serio- . · usly bias estimates of the partial deterrent effect of capital punishment. Aware 'of the problem, Sellin attempted to compare states that are as. alike as possible in all other respects. However, his "matching procedure", based on the assumption that neighbouring states can satisfy such pre-requisites without any explicit stan'ilardization, is simply insufficie!lt for any valid inferen- · ces. Pairs of states, such as New York, and Rhode Island, Massachusetts and Maine, or. Illinois and Wisconsin all included in his comparisons, differ in their economic and demographic characteristics, in their law enforcement activities, and in the opportunities they provide for the commission of other crimes. Moreover, the direction of the causal relationship between the murder rate and the overall risk of punishment-be it the death penalty or any other sanction -is not self-evident because, for example, states with high murder rates are expected to and, in fact do devote more

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resources to apprehend, convict and execute offenders than . do states with lower rates. Specifically, variations in the legal or practical status of the death penalty occasionally may be the result of, rather than the cause for, changes in the murder rate, and thus may give rise to an apparent positive association between these two variables. The same general point applies in connection with the identification of the effect of any other variable which is a product of law enforcement activity or private protection against crime. For these reasons, the true deterrent effect of a sanction such as the death penalty cannot be readily inferred from simple comparisons pf the sort performed by Sellin."

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The learned author then (at page 33) · arrives at this conclu"'·

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sion : "If investigations indicate that probability and length of imprisonment do impart significant deterrent effects, then failure of the research to demonstrate specifically the deterrent efficacy of capital punishment may be taken more as evidence . for shortcomings in the research design and methodology or in the measures of the theoretically relevant variables used than as a reflection on the validity of, the deterrence theory itself."

The scholar then stresses another purpose of capital pnnishn:wnt, namely, .incapacitation 'of the offender, which, in fact, is another aspect of its deterrent effect.· To quote his words : "There is an additional point worth stressing. Even if punishment by execution or imprisonment does not have any deterrent effect, surely it must exert some incapacitative effect on punished offenders by reducing or eliminating the ,possibility of recidivism on their_ part." · This eminent ·social scientist, Prof. Ehrlich(') whose views we have extracted, has made intensive studies of the deterrent effect of capital punishment. Then, a result of his study was also published (I) See Ehrlich's, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 65 AM Econ. Rev. 397 (1975). And also the comments of Peter Passell in his article / "The J?eterrent Effect of the Death :penalty" in Stanford Law Review: November 1975, pp. 62-64 .

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in the American Economic Review in June, 1975. He includes a specific test for the presence of a deterrent effect of capital punishment to the results of earlier studies. He has in his study(') claimed to identify , a significant reduction in. the murder rate due to the use of capital punishment.. A version of his detailed study is said to have been filed with the l!nited States Supreme Court on March 7, 1975 in the case of Fowler v. North Carolina._(')

In 1975, Robert Martinson, a sociologist, published the results of a s_tudy he had made in New York regarding the rehabilitation of of prisoners. Among the conclusions he drew : "The prison which makes every effort at rehabil.itation succeeds uo better than the prison which leaves its inmates to rot... The certainty of punishment. rather than the severity,. is the most effective crime deterrent. We should make plain that prisons exist to punish people for crimes committed."

(Quoted in Encyclopaedia Britannica 1978 Book of the Year, pp. 593-594)

Many judges-especially in Britain and the United States; where rising crime rates are the source of much public concern -have expressed grave doubts about the wisdom of the view that reform ought to take priority in dealing with offenders. "They have argued that the courts must reflect a public abhorrence of crime and that justice demands that some attempt be made to imp9se punishment fitting to the crime." (Encyclopaedia Britannica, ibid.)

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Professor· Jean Graven, Judge of the Court of Appeal of Geneva, and a distinguished jurist, maintains in his learned analysis, (see the Postscript in reply to A World View of Capital Punishment by. James Avery Joyce), of the views of Camus 'and Koestler, that neither of these two authors has faced up· to the really basic objection to the abolitionist's case. According to Graven, there are two groups oFpeople, which are n~t .covered by the abolitionist's case and Camus and Koestler have therefore left their cause open to attack at its

(1) See· Lee S. Friedman's article at pages 61M87; Review Year Book, 1979, ~ ~ . I ~ ' · com.piled by Messingei"and Bittne11. (2) '428 US 904~49 L. Ed. 1212 (1976): '.

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weakest point. "The true problem", as Graven sees it, "is the protection of the organized, civilized community",, the legitimate defence ·of society against criminal attacks made upon it by those anti-social elements which can be stopped only by being eliminated; in the "last resort". "For such, the death penally should be preserved, and only for such". .

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. Professors Graven's second challenge is, wh.ich the abolitionist must accept, the existing division between civil and military protection. According to him, in doing so, the abolitionist cannot avoid applying double standard arid two mutually destructive criteria to their approach. to the death penalty. "For if the death penalty is accepted as protective in princlple to society, then it should be so in ~II cases and in all circumstances in troubled times as well as in peaceful times, in respect of the traitor, the spy, the .deserter, or the hostage, as well as or' the brigand, the "gangster", or the professional killer. We must be logical and just at the same time. In the realm of conscience and of 'principles', there cannot be two weights and measures. There cannot be a morality for difficult times and another morality for easy times; one standard for military justice and another for civil justice. What then should be done with those individuals .who have always been. considered proper subjects for elimination? If the capital sentence is objectionable and illegal...If the death penalty must be absolutely repudiated because it 'degrades man, · (quoting Camus) then we accept the position. But, in that case, no right to kill exisfs any longer ... the greatest war criminals, those responsible conscious of' what they have done and intended to dofor the worst crimes of genocide, who gassed, incinerated in ovens or buried in.quicklime a million innocent victims, or allowed them to perish in mines and mars bes ... Society . has not the right then to kill ·even these ''Monsters". -

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(Quoted in A World View of Capital Punish!llent, by James Avery Joyce). J. J. Maclean, a ·Parliamentarian, articulated bis· ·views with regard to the deterrent, value of capital punishment in the Can~dian House of Commons in the March-April, Debates 1966, as follows:

"Whether it (capital punishment) is a greater or lesser deterrent than life imprisonment: This is an argument that 1>annot be . proven on either side but I would not like to

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have to try to convince any one that capital punishment is not a deterrent. Statistically this cannot be proven because the deterrent effect on .both capital punishment and life imprisonment is obscured by the fact that most criminals plan a crime on the basis that they are.going to avoid anv penalty ... ! say, the deterrent value is with respect to people who did not commit crimes, who were deterred from becomi11,g murderers by the fact that capital punishment or some other heavy penalty would be meted out to them if caught."

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(Quoted in Sellin's Capital Punishment). The Law Commission of India in its 35th Report, after carefully sifting all the materials collected by them, recorded their views regarding the deterrent effect of capital punishment as follows : "In our view capiial punishment does act as a deterrent. We have already discussed in detail several aspects of this topic. We state below, very briefly, the main poi~ts that have weighed with us in arriving at. this conclusion :

(a) Basically, every human being dreads death. (b} Death, as a penalty, stands on a totally different · level from imprisonment for life or any otber punishment.·· The difference is one of quality,.and not merely of degree.

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(c) Those who are specifically qualified to express an opinion on the subject, including particularly the majority of the replies received from State Governments, Judges, Members of Parliament and Legislatures and Members of the Bar and poiice officers-are definitely· of the view that the deterrent object of capital punishment is achieved in a fair measure in India. (d) As to conduct of prisoners released from jail (after undergoing imprisonment for life), it would be difficult 'to come to a conclusion, without studies extending over a long period of -years.

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(e) Whether any other punishment can. possess all the advantages of capital punishment is a matter of doubt. · · · (f) Statisties of other countries are inconclusive on the subject If they are not regarded, as proving the deterrent effect; neither can they be regarded as conclusively disproving it." . Views of the British Royal Commission :

The British Royal Commission, after making an exhaustive .study of the issue of capital. punishment and its deterrent valu~, in their Report (1949-53), concluded : "The general conclusion .which we.reach, after careful review of all the evidence we have· been able to obtain as to the deterrent effect of capi tat punishment, may be stated as follows. Prima facie the penalty of death is likely to have a stronger effect as a deterrent to normal human beings than any other form of punishment, and there is some evidence (though no ·convincing statistical evidence) that this is in fact so. But this effect does not operate universally or uniformly, and there are many offenders on whom it is limited and may'often be negligible."

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We may add that whether or not death penalty in actual practice acts as a deterrent, cannot' be statistically proved, either way, "because statistics as to how many potentisim murderers· were deterred from committing murders, but for the existence of capital punishment for murder, are difficult, if not altogether impossible, to collect. Suet, statistics of deterred potential murderers are difficult to unravel as they remain hidden. hi the innermost recesses _of their mind. Ret,ibution in the sense of reprobation whether a totally rejected concept of punishment.

'Ev~n retribution in the sense of soc.iety's reprobation for the worst of crimes, i.e., murder, is not an altogether outmoded concept. This view is· held by many distinguished sociologist, jurists and judges. · J,ord Ju~tice Denning, Master of the Rolls of the Court of

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Appeal in England, appearing before tbe British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, stated his views on this point as under : "Punishment is the way in which society expresses its denunciation of wrong-doing, and, in order to maintain respect for law, it is essential that the punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great majority of citizens for them. : It is a mistake to consider the objects of punishment as being 'deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else ... The truth is that some crimes are so outrageous that society insists. on adequate punishment,. because the wrong-doer deserves it, irrespective of whether it is a deterrent or not," That retribution is still socially acceptable function of punishment, was also the view expressed by Stewart, J., in Furman v. Georgia, at page 389, as follows :

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" ... I would say only that I cannot agree that retribution is a constitutionally impermissible ingredient in the imposition of punishment. The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instant, in the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stabi!ity of a society governed by law: When people begin to believe that organized society is.unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they 'deserve', then there are sown the seeds of anarchy of self help, vigilant justice, and lynch law." Patrick Devlin, the eminent juri.st and judge, in •his book, "The Judge", emphasises the retributive aspect of the purp_ose of· punishment and criminal justice, thus:

"I affirm that justice means retribution and nothing else. Vindictiveness is the emotional outflow of retribution and justice has uo concern with that. But it is concerned with the measurement of deserts. The point was put lucidly and simply by the .Vicar of Longton in a letter to The Times, from which with his permission I quote : Firstly, far from pretending that retribution should have no place in our penal system, Mr. Levin should recognize that it is

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' logically impossible to remove it. If it were removed, all punishments should be rendered unjust. What could be more im.moral than to inflict imprisonm.ent on a criminal for · the sake of deterring others, if he does not deserve it ? Or would it be justified to subject him to a compulsory attempt to reform which includes a denial of liberty unless, · again he deserves .it ? Retribution and deterrence are not two divergent enM of capital punish~eni. ' They are convergen't goals which uitimately i;nerge into \me.' How these ends of punishment cpalesce into one was described by the 'Law Commission of India; thus : ;.

"The retributive object, of capital punishment has been the subject-matter of sharp attack at the hands• of- tbe abolitionists. We appreciate that many persons would regard the i~stinct of revenge ·as barbarous. · How , far it- should form part of the penal philosophy in modern times will always remain a matter of controversy. No useful purpose will be served by. a discussion as to whether the instinct of retribution is or is not commendable. The fact remains, however, that whenever.there is a serious crime, the society feels a sense of disapprobation. If there is any element'of retribution in· the law, ·as admihistered now, it is not the instinct of the man of .jungle but rather · a refined evolution of that instinct the feeling prevails in the public is a fact of which notice is to be taken. The Jaw does not encourage it, or exploit it for any undesirable ends. Rather, by reserving tbe death penalty for murder, and thus visiting this gravest crime with the gravest punishment,· the law helps ;the element of retribution merge into · the element of deterrence." · . ·

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[Para 265 (18j, 35th Report]

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Earlier in 1949-1953, the.British Royal Commission in Para 59 .of its Report spoke in a somewhat similar strain ; ' \

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,"We think it is reasonable to suppose that t~e deterrent force of capital punishment .operate• not only by affecting , the conscious thoughts of individuals tempted ·to ·commit murder, but also by lmilding up in the ~ommunity, over a I

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long period of time, a deep fe~ling of peculiar abhorrence for the crime of murder. The fact that m'en are hung for murder is one great reason why murder is considered so dreadful a crime. This widely diffused effect on the moral consciousness of society is impossible to assess, but it must be at least as important as any direct part which the death penalty may play as a deterrent in the calculations of potential murderers." According to Dr. Ernest Van Den Haag, a New York psychologist arid author, and· a leading proponent of death penalty, "a very strong symbolic value" ·attaches to executions. "The motives for the death penalty may indeed include vengeance. Legal vengeance solicjifies social solidarity against law-breakers and probably is the only alternative to the disruptive private revenge of those who feel harmed." · , (See The Voice (USA) June 4, 1979) . . I The views of Lloyd George, who was the. Prime Minister· of . England during the First World .War, have been referred to· in the book "Capital Punishment" (1967) by Thorsten Sellin at page 65, as below:

"The first function of capital punishment is to give emphatic expression to society's peculiar abhorrence of murder... It is important that murder should be regarded with peculiar horror.... I believe that capital ·punishment does, in ·the present state of society, both ex~ress and s.ustain the sense of moral revulsion•for murder."

This view is not without respectable support in the iurisprudent.ial literature of. today, despite an opinion to the contrary. (See also the Royal Commission's Report, 1949-53). In relying, inter a/ia, upon the evidence before it, in~luding that of Lord Denning, the Royal Commission recognised a strong and widespread demand for retribution. It is a common phenomenon in all the civilized countries that. some murders are so shockingly offensive that there is a general outcry from the public for infliction of the ultimate. penalty on the cri~inal. In regard to the retributive aspect of capital punishment, we. may cite \in~ re~ent i1lustration showing l\ow demand for retribu_,

BACHAN SINGE! v. PUNJAB

(Sarkaria, J.)

tion, in the sense of society's instinctive disappro.val of the out. rage'ous conduct of the murderer is indelibly ingqined in conlempora:ry'·public opini?n even in advanced countries. In November 1978, George Moscone (Mayor) and Harvey Milk (Supervising Officer) of San Francisco were cruelly, assassinated by Dan White, police-man. Si~ months later, on May 22, 1979, a jury of seven men and five women rejected the. charge of firstdegree murder, and in consequence, did not .award capital punishment to Dan White for this heinous double murder.·· .Public opinion reacted sharply. .Public protest against this decision spontaneously manifested itself, in a. burst of flame. and fury. Thousands of ' outraged demonstrators rampaged through the Civic Centre, ~mashing windows, burning police cars, chanting : "We want justice" Writing in 'The Voice', a local paper from San Franscisco, in its issue of June 4, 1979, Lawrence Mullell, fired at the jury a v.olfey of questions, to which the agitated public would demand answers;

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"What comment did the jury make on the value of life? Was the tragedy of the execution-style murders the central issue, or was the jury only concerned with technicalities, absurdities and loopholes of the law? Was i'ustice considered not revenge' but justice ? High' irony, Dan Whfte's strong belief in capital punishment has found thousands of new converts. From now on, a lot of ·people will die because Dan White lives. Are we so insensitive, callous and inhuman that we accept or excuse violence and brutality? Consider White's defence lawyer, Douglas Schmidt'.s reference to that tragic Mon.day in November : "It was a tragedy. Now it's behind us." '

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. "For those who.loved and still miss George Moscone and Harvey Milk, for those who were cast into darkness a,nd cried for justice, fo~ those who still seek answers; the lawyer's words are a chilling reminder that we must not forget-that we must not 'put it behind .IJS' ."

The for!Der cop, a law and order. and capital punishment advocate driven by his passion, by his lack of reason, . . to destroy those wlw Ile disagreed with, and by· doing so

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.demonstrated the greatest human failure-.. tbe inability to co-exist. "Daii White symbolizes the violence and brutality 'that is undermining civilization."

Dan White's case and the spontaneous .reaction of the public , opinion that followed, show that opposition to capital punishment bas (to use the words of Raspberry),"(') much more appeal whe.n the discussion is merely academic than when the community ·is confronted with a crime, or a series of crimes, so gross, so heinous, so cold-blooded that anything short of death s.eems an inadequate response''. The Editor of 'Capital Punishment', Thorsten Sellin has noted at page 83 of his compilation, the following views of an outstanding ,Justice of the Ontario Appeal Court:

"The irrevocable ~haracter of the death penalty is a reason why all possible measures should be taken against injustice-not for .its abolition. ,Now a days, with the advent of armed criminals and the substantial increase in armed robberies, criminals of long standing if arrested, . ·must expect long sentences. However, if they run no risk of hanging, when fo'und guilty of murder,,. they will kill police men and witnesses , with the prospec.t of a future no more unhappy, as one of them put it, than being fed, lodged, and clothed· for the rest of their lives. In addition, Oiice in prison, such people who · are capable of· anything ' could kill their guards and their fellow inmates with relat· tive impunity.''· .J.J, Maclean, the Canadian Parliamentarian: justifies, from another angle, the right of the State to award capital punishment for .murder:

· "lf the State has the right and the duty to defend the community against outside aggression, sllch •as in time of war, and within the country, for instance, in case of treason (1) Raspberry, Death Sentence~ th~ Washington Post, March 12t 1976, P; 2? · ~ols. 5-6. • ·

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·crimes against the State, etc.; and that to the extent of taking the life of the aggressors and guilty parties, .if the citizen wants to. protect his own life by killing whoever attacks him without .any reason, the State can do the same when a criminal attacks and endangers the life of the com· munity by deciding to eliminate summarily another human being. Capital punishment must be retained to prove the san~tity of that m·ost precious thing whicp. · is ihe gift of life; it embodies the revulsion and horror that we feel for the greatest of crimes.,. For most people, Jife is P!iceless and they will. do anything and suffer. the worst privations to preserve.it, even when life itself does not hold.many coniolations or bright prospects for the future. As a deterrent, the death ·penalty is piayi~g its part for which there is 'no substitute ... I suggest that statistics do not. prove much, . either on one side or the other ... There are too many variations, too many changes as regards circumstances, condition between one period and. the other, to ,enable us to make worthy comparisons."

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(See page 84 of Sellin's Capital Punishment).

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-Some penologists justify capital penalty and fife imprisonment .on the 'isolation'. or 'elimination' theory of criine and punishment. · Vernon Rich in bis "Law & the administra'lion of justice" (Second Eilition, at page 10), says : · .·'

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"The isolation theory of crime and punishment is that the criminal law is a device for identifying persons dangerous to society who are then punished hy being isolated from society as a whole, so that they cannot commit other antisocial acts, The isolation theory is used to justify the death penalty and long-term imprisonment. Obviously, this theory is effective in preventing criminal acts by those execuied or permanently incarcerated." While the Abolitionists fook upon death penalty as something which is per se immoral and inhuman, the Retentionists apprehened that if we surrender even the risk of the last remaining horrifying det~rrent by which t.o frighten the toughts of the underworld, we may I

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easily tip the scales in. favour of the anti-social hoodlums. They fear that abolition of capital punishment, will result in increase of murders motivated by greed, and in affable "crime passionelle.'' "It is· feared", wrote George A. Floris,(1 ) "the most devastating effects of the abolition will, however, show themselves in the realm of political murder. An adherent of political extremism is usually convinced that the victory of bis cause is just round the corner: So, for him long term imprisonment holds no fear. He is confident thai the coming ascendency of bis friends will soon liberate him." To prove' this proposition, Floris cites the instance of Von Paper's Government who in SeJ:!tember 1932, reprieved. the death sentence passed on two of Hitler's storm-troopers for. brutal killing of one of their political opponents. The Retentionists believe that the dismantling of .the gallows will almost 'everywhere enhance the hit and run attacks on political opponents. On this ·premise, they argue that c.apital punishment is the most formidable safeguard against terrorism.

The argument cannot be rejected out of band.· A number of instances can be.cited where abolitionist States feeling the inadequacy of their penological armour to combat poli!ically motivated gangsterism, have r:trieved and used their capital weapon which they bad once thrown away. Despite their traditional abhorrence of death· penalty, the Norwegians executed Major Vedkun Quisling after World War II. The Belgians, too, executed no less than 242 collaborators' and traitors after the liberation, ·although in their country, the death penalty ~as otiose since .1880. In England, death pe11alty was retained for high treason in the Silverman Bill of 1956. Even at present, for that offence, death penalty is a valid sanction in England. In the aftermath of assaS·

sination of Prime Minister Bandernaike in 1959, Ceylon hurriedly reintroduced capital punishment for murder. Owing to similar considerations, Israel sanctioned death penalty for crimes committed against the Jewish people, and executed the notorious'Jew-baiter, Adolf Eichmann in 1962. Recently, on April 9, 1979, confronted with a wave of violent incidents after the signing of Egypt· • I;raePlllfieace Treaty. Israel sanciioned the ·use of death penalty "for"acts of inhuman cruelty". (1) Sunday Tribune, December 8, 1963.

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BACHAN siNoli v. PUNJAB (Sarkaria; .J.) /

Jn' India, very few scientific studies in r~gard to crime and punishment in general, and capital punishment, in particular, have been made. Counsel for the petitioners referred us to Chapter VI, • captioned 'Capital Punishment, in the book, 'Quantum of _Punish- · ment in' Criminal Law 'in India, written· by Dr. Kripal Singh Chhabra, now on the staff of G.N. University, Amritsar. ·In this article, which was primarily meant as LL. D. thesis, the learned '·author concludes : ·

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"bn the basis of statistics both. of India and abroad, U.N.O. findings and .other weighty arguments, we can safely conclude that· -death penalty is not sustainable on merits .. Innately it has no reformative element. It has, been proved that death penalty as operative carries no · . deterrent value and crime of murder is governed by factors other. than death penalty. Accordingly, I feel that the death penalty should be abolished."

It will' be seen, in the first place, that the analysis by Dr. Chhabra in coming to fhe conclusion, that ·death penalty is of no penological value, is based on stale, incomplete and inadequate statistics. · .This is more particularly true of ,the data relating to India, which does:not cover the period subsequent to 1961. Secondly, the approach to the problem adopted by him, like the other Aboli· tionists referred to by him, is mainly, if not merely, statistical.

As already noticed, the proponents of tlie opposite view of capital punishment, po,int out that statistics alone are not determinative of the question whether or not death penalty serves any deterrent or other penological purpose. · Firstly, statistics of deterred potential murderers are hard, to obtain. s'econdly, the approach adopted by the Abolitionists is oversimplified. at the cost of other relevant but imponderable factors, the appreciation of which is essential, to assess the true peno.logical value of capital punishment. The number of such factors ·is infinitude, their ·character variable. duration. transient and abstract formulation difficult. Conditions change from country to country and .ti'me to iime. Due to the inconstancy of social conditions, it is not scientifically possible to assess with any degree of ·accuracy, as to whether the variation in the incidence of capital crime is attributable to the presence or absence of death penalty hi the penal law of that country for such crimes.

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[19831 1 s.c.lt.

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That is why statistical attempts to assess the true penological value of capital punishment, remain inco!lclusive. · Pursued beyond a certain point, both the Abolitionists and the Retentionists retreat into their own conceptual bunkers firmly entren· ched in.their respective "faiths". We need not take sides with either ·.of them. - T~ere is always . a danger in adhering too rigidly to COD· cepts. As Prof. Brett has pointed out "all' concepts are. abstraction.s from reality, and that in the process of abstraction something of the reality is bound to be lost''('). We must therefore, view the problem against the perspective of the hard realities of the time and !he c~n­ ditions prevailing in the world, particularly in our own country.

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A review. of the wo~ld events of the last seven or eight 'years, as evident from Encyclopaedia Britannica Year Books and other material ·referred· to by the learned cou~sel, would show that m~st countries in the world are in the grip of an ever-rising tide of violent crime. · Murders ·for monetary gain or from misdirected political motives, robbery, rape assault are on the increase. India is no exception. . The Union of India has produced for our perusal a statement of facts and figures showing the incidence of violent ~rime, including murder, dacoity and robbery, in the various· States of India, duri.ng the years 1965 to 1975. Another statement has been furnished showing the number of persons ~onvicted of murder and other capital offences and sentenced to .death 'in some of the States of India during the period 1974 ·to .1978. This statement however, is incomplete and i11adeq\Jate. On account of that deficiency and for the general reasonft set ont above, it cannot, even statistically ' show conclusively or with any degree of certainty, that capital punishment has no penological worth. But the first statement does bring out clearly the stark.reality that the crimes of murder, dacoity · and r~bbery in India are since 1965 increasing.

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Now, looking.-around at the world during the last decade, we may ~ecall ·that in Furman v. Georgia {decided on June 29, 1976), the Supreme Court of the United States held by a majority, that the imp~sition and carrying out of the death penalty constituteS 'cruel and unusual' punishment, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth

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An Enquiry into Cdminal Guilt by Prof. Peter Brett, 1963 Edn. Mel· bourne, page 13.

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Amendments. . Bren'rian and Marshall, JJ. (differing froni the plurality) we11t to the extent'of holding that death penalty was per se unconstitutional as it was a cruel'.and unusual punishment. In so ho,lding, these learned Justices purported t-0 adopt the coqtemporary . standards of decency prevailing among the enlightened public of the United States. Justice Marshall ruled that "it was morally unacceptable to the people of the United States''" This opinion of the learned Justices was sharply rebuffed by the people of the United States through their .chosen ,representatives. Soon after the decision . in Furman, bowit{g to the ihrust of public opinion, the LegiSlatures of not less than 32 · States, post-haste revised their penal laws and reinstituted death 'penalty for murder and certain other crimes. Public opinion polls then· taken\show that approximately 70 per.cent oL Americans 'have been in favour of death I?enalty, (See 'The Voice'; supra). In 1976, a Gallup Poll taken in' the Unitted States showed that more than 65 per cent ·of those polled · preferred to have an operative death penalty.

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Incidently, the rejection by the people of the approach adopted . by the two learned Judges in Furman, furnishes proof of the fact that judicial opinion does not necessarily reflect the morai attitudes .of the people. At the·same time, it'is a reminder that Judges should not take upon themselves the responsibility of becoming ·oracles or spokesmen of public opinion : Not being representatives of the-. people, it is often · bfitter~

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matter of judicial. restraint~ to· leave

the 'function of assessing public opinion to the chosen representatives of the people in the legislature concerned. r

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Coming back to the revi6w of the world crime situation, during'• the last decade, Saudi Arabia and some other countries·Mve reinsta-. · ·led death penalty or enacted harsher punishm.ents not only for murder but some other crimes, also. In America, apart froni 32 States which reinstated death penalty under revised laws after Furman, the ·legislatures of some of the remaining I5 States .have either reinstituted or are considering to -reintroduce death penalty: Currehtly, a f~deral legislation for reinstituting or prescribing capital punishment for a · larger range of offences of homicide is under consideration of United States' Congress. According , to the report of the Amnesty International,'.in U.S.A., as on May I, 1979, death penalty can be imposed for aggravated murder' -in 35 States. Attempts have been made in, other countries, · nlso to reintroduce death penalty .. In Britain, in

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the wake of serious violent incidents of terrorism, a Bill was moved in .l'arliament to reintroduce capital punishment for murder and certain other offences. It was defeated by a free vote on April 19, 1979. Even so, no less than 243 Members ofParliament ·bad voted in favour of this .rneaslire. We have noted that Israel has also recently reinstituted death penalty for certain criminal 'acts 'o( in human cruelty'. In .People's Republic Of China, a new legislation was adopted on·July l, 1979 by China's Parliament, according to Article 43 of which, death penalty .can be. imposed "for the most heinous crimes". In Argentina, the death penalty was reintroduced in l 976. · Similarly, Belgium reintroduced death penalty and increased the number of crimes ·punishable with death'. In France, in 1978 a movement in favour of abolition initiated by the French bishops failed·to change the law under which death penalty is a valid sanction for murder and certain other offences. In Japan,_ death penalty is a legal sanction for 13 crimes. In Greece and Turkey, death penalty can be imposed for murder and other capital offences. In' Malaysia and the Republic of Singapore under the Drugs Act of May, 1979, misuse of drugs is also punishable with death. Cuba introduced a new penal code in·· February 1978, which provides punishmen! of death by shooting for crimes ranging from some types of murder and robbery to hijacking and rape.

In the U.S.S.R. (Russia),.as many as 18 offences are punishable with death. In Russia, at present; the following offences committed in peacetime are punishable with death under the RSFSR Criminal Code :

"Treason (Article 64); espoinage (Article 65); terrqrism (if the offence includes the killing of an official (Article 66); terrori.sm against representative of foreign State (if the offence includes the killing of such a representative· "for the purpose of provoking war or international complications") (Article 67); sabotage (Article 6SJ; organizing the commission of any of the above-named offences (Article 72); commission of any of the above-named offences against other Working People's State (Article 73); banditry (Article 77); actions disrupting the work of corrective labour institutions (Article 77~ I); making or passing counterfeit money or securities (when the ojfence is committed as a form of business) (Article 87); viol~tion of rules for currency transactions (when committed as a form of business or on ,

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BACHAN SINOR v. PUNJAB

(Sarkaria, J.)

a large· scale, or by a person previously convicted under tbis Article) (Art. 88); stealing of State property bn an especially large scale, regardless of the manner of stealing (Article 93"1); intentfonal homicide with aggravating circumstances (Article 102); rape, when committed by a group of persons or by an especially_ dangerous recidivist, or resulting in especially grave consequences, or the rape of a minor (Article 117); taking a bribe, with especially aggra.vating circumstances (~rticle 173); infringing the life of a policeman or People's Guard, 'with aggravating circumsiances (Article. 191-2); hijacking an aircraft, if th~ offence results in ~ath or serious physical injuries (Article 213-2); resisting a superior or compelling him to-violate official duties, an offence .applicable only to military personnel, and carrying the death penalty in peace-time if committed in ; c~njunction with intentional homicide of a superior or any other person performing military duties (Article 240)." • (Vide, Report of Amnesty International, 1979) Our object in making the.above survey is to bring out the hard fact that in spite , of the Abolitionist movement, onJy 18 States (as on 30 [\fay 1979) in the world have abolished the death penalty for all offences, while 8 more have retained it for specific offences committed in time of war, only, (See Amnesty International Report (1979) page 92). This means, most of the countries in the modern world still retain death penalty as a 'legal sanction for certain specified offences. The countries which retain death penalty in their penal laws, such as, Russia, U.S.A., France, Belgium, Malaysia, China and Japan, etc., cannot, by any standard, be called uncivilized nations or immature societies. Surveyors and students of world events and· current trends believe that the reversal of the attitudes towards criminals and their judicial punishments.in general, and capital p~nishment in particular in several countries of the world, is partly due to the fact that milder sanctions or correctiv~ processes, or even the alternlltive of imprisonment, have been found inadequate and wantjlif io stem the mounting tide of serious crime. Writing in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1978 -Book of the Year 'under the caption, 'Changing Attitudes Towards Criminals', Richard Whittingham sums ·Up the cause th1J.t has led to the adoption of this New Hard Line, thus :

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"Horror Story after horror story of dangerous c'riminals sent" back into society on bail or parole from a penitentiary or (in many cases) release from a mental institution to . commit further crimes hav.e forced people to say that enough is enbugh. The. consensus seemed to be that there must be no repetition of such situations as the one described by Chicago Sun-Times Columnist Roger Simon in a September 4, 1977, article abouf a ·man who had just been convicted of a p'articularly despicable crime." Faced with the spectre. of rising ,rime, people and sociologists alike, have started questioning the rehabilitation policy. "In California another study from the Rand Cooperation, suggests that keeping habitual· criminals Jocked Up would 00 more to reduce ·Crime than any rehabilitation efforts. Despite treatment or preventive meiisur~s, habituarcriminaJsl commonly go back to crime after they are released from prison, the study showed. In addition, tne study found that deterrence to crime ~as in. direct proportion to the relative certainty of going to jail, after being caught." .

According .to Encyclopaedia Britannica Year Book 1979, In 1978 also penologists were seriously divided in their views about the end of punishment. So~e penologists argued that "It is not possible to punish and reform simultaneously": while "ot.hers would prefer to strip punish!nent of its moral overtones", "While many Legis-· lators and most penologists have supported the idea that reform ought to take priority in gealing with offen?ers, ma11y Judges esp.ecially in Britain and the United States, where rising crime rates are the source of much public concern have expressed grave ,doubts about' the wisdom of this view. They have argued that the courts · m.ust reflect a public abhorrence of crime and that justice demands that some attempt be made to impose punishment fitting to the crime". I India also, as the statistics furnished by the re8pondent (Union • of India) show, is afflicted by a rising rate of violent crime, parti-· cularly murder, armed robbery and dacoity etc., and this has been · the cause of much public concern. All attempts made by individual · membed to move Bills in the Parliament for abolition or restriction of the area of· death penalty have ended in failure. At least four of such unsuccessful attempts were ·made after India wou Indepen~ence, in 1?49, 1958, 1961 and 1978. It may be noted that the last of

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BACHAN SINGHY. PUNJAB (Sarkaria, J.)

these cttempts was only to restdct the death penalty to a few types of murders sp'ecified in 'the Bill. Though it was passed by the Rajya Sab.ba ~fter • being recast, it ·bas not , been passed by Lok Sabha. ,i . To sum up, the question whether or not death penalty .serves any penological purpose is a difficult, complex and intractable issue. It has evoked strong,· divergent views. For the.purpose of testing the constitutionality of the impugned. provision as to death penalty in Section 302', .Penal Code on the ground of reasonableness in the ' I light of Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution, it is not necessary for us to express any categorical opinion, one way or .th~ other, as to which of these two antithetical views, held by the Abolitionists and Retentionists, is correct. It is sufficient to· say that the very fact that persons of reason, learning and light are rationally and deeply divided in their opinion on this issue, is a ground among . others, for rejecting the petitioners argument that retention .of death :p~nalty in the im'pugned provision, is. totally devoid of reason and purpose. If, notwiihstanding the view of the Abolitionists to the contrary, a very. large segment of people, the world 'over, .includiftg sociologists, legislators, jurists, judges and administrators' still firmly believe in the .worth and necessity of capital punishment for the protection Of society, if in the perspective Of prevailing crime Conditions in India, contemporary public opinion. cbanalised through the .people's representatives in Parliament, has repeatedly in the last three decades, rejected all attempts, including the one made recently to abolish' or specific'ally restrict the area of death penalty, if death penalty is still a recognis.ed legal sanction for murder or •ome types of murder in most of th.e civilised .countries in the world, if the framers of the Indian Constitution were fully aware as we shall presently show.they were of the existence of death penalty as punishment for m~rder, under fhe Indian Penal Code, if the 3Stb Report. ·and subsequent Reports of the Law Commission sugges~ing retention of death penalty, ,and reco~mending revision of the Criminal Proce-. dure Code an,d the insertion of the new Sec.lions 235' (2) and 354 (3) in ibat Code providing for pre-sentence bearing and sentencing ·pro1ced.ure on c0nviction for murder and other ~apital offences Were· before the Parliament and · prcsum.ably considered by it When in 1972-1973 it tock. up revision ofthe Code of. 1898 and replaced it by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, it is not possitle to hold that the provision of death penalty as an alternative punishment for murder, in Section 302, Pen<1l Code is unreasonable and not in the

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. public interest.. We would, therefore, c~nclude that the impugned provision in Section 302, violates neither the letter nor the ethos of Article 19. We will now consider the issue whether the .impugned limb of the provision in Section 302, Penal Code contravenes Article 21 of the Constitution. Before dealing with.the contention canvassed on the point, it will be proper to notice briefly the principles which should inform the interpretation of Article 21.

In Maneka Gandhi's case, which was a decision by a Bench of seven learned Judges, it was held by Bhagwati, J. in bis concurring judgment, that the expression 'personal liberty' in Article 21 is of the widest amplitude 1md it covers a variety of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man and some of them have been raised to the status of distinct fundamental rights under Article 19. It ~as further observed that. Articles 14, I 9 and 21 are not to be interpreted i~ water-tight compartments, and consequently,. a law depriving a person of personal liberty and prescribing a procedure for that purpose within the meaning of Article 21 has to stand the . test of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred under · Article 19 which may be applicable in a given situation, ex-hypothesi it must also be li,able to be tested with reference to Article 14. The principle of reasonableness pervades ail· the three Articles, with the result, that the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must be 'right and just and fair' and not 'arbitrary' fanciful, or 'oppressive', otherwise, it should be no procedure at all and the requirement o"f Article 21.would not be satisfied. Article 21 reads as under: "No person shall be deprived "f his life or personal . liberty except.according to procedure estabhshed by law.;'

If this Article is expanded in accordance with the interpretative principle indicated in Maneka Gandhi, it will read as follows : "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to fair, just at\d reasonable proce· dure established by valid law."

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· Jn the converse positive form, the expanded Article will read .as below;

"A peron may be deprived of his life or personal liberty in'accordance with fair, just and reasonable procedure estab)ished by. valid law."

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Thus expanded_ and read for interpretative purposes, Article 21 . clearly bring• out the implication, that the Founding Fathers recognised the right of the State to deprive a person of his life or personaL liberty ' in accordance with fair, just and reasonable procedure established by valid law. There are several other- indications, also, in the Constitution which show that the Constitution-makers .were fully cognizant of the existence of death pel)alty for murder and' f certain other offences in the Indian Penal Code. ·Entries I and 2 in List III-Concurrent List-of the Seventh Schedule, specifically refer to the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure .as in force at the commencement of ·the Constitution. Article 72 (I) (c) specifically invests the President wfth . power to suspend, r~mit or commute the se0 tence of any person convicted of any offence, and, also "in aH cases where' the sentence is· a sentence ·of death"·. -Likewise, under Article 161, the Governor of a State has been given power to suspend, remit pr commute, inter alia the sentence of death .of any person convicted of murder or other capital offence relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends. Article 134, in terms, gives a· right of appeal to the Supreme Court to a person who, on appeal, is sentenced to death by the High Court, after revers'al of bis acquittal by the. trial Court. Under the successive Criminal ·Procedure Codes which have been in force for about I 00 years, a sentence of death is to be carried out by hanging. ·In view of the aforesaid constitut.ional postulates, by_ no· stretch of imagination can it be., said that death penalty under Section 302, Penal Code, either per se or because of its executi)m by. hanging, constitutes an unreasonable, crue.1 or unusual punishment. By reason of the same constitutional postulates, it cannot be 'said that the framers of the Constitution considered death sentence for murder or the prescribed traditional mod~ of' its execution a~ a degrading punishment which would defile "the dignity of the individual" within the contemplation of the Preamble to the Constitution. -On parity of reasoniiig, it cannot besaid that death penalty for the olfence of mur<Jer violates th~ l/asic structure of the <;:onstitution •

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. . Before we pass on to the main Question No. Ii, we may dispose of another·contention convassed by Dr. L.M. Singhvi.

It i• pointed out that Indja, as a member of the International Community, was a participating delegate at the international con- · ference ·that made the Stockholm Declaration on December 11, 1977, that India has also accepted the International Covenant on Civil. and Political Rights adopted by the. Centr.al Assembly of the United Natior.s, which came into force on March 23, 1966, and. to which some 47 countries, including India, are a Party. This being the position, it is stressed, India stands committed to the abqlition of the death penalty. It is contended that the constitutional validity and interpretation of the impugne~ ·limb of Section 302, Peria! Code, and the sentencing procedure for capiial cases provided in Section 354 (3) Of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, must be considered in the light of the aforesaid Stockholm Declaration and the international Covenant, which represent the evolving attitudes and standards of decency in a maturing world. Let us examine this contention. The European Convention of Human Rights came into force on September l, 1953, and 18 countries.had signed this Convention on November !I, i950. India ·acceded to this Resolution of the Convention on March - 27, 1979. The'lnternational Covenant on Civil.and Political Rights, i711er alia, provides:

Article 6 (!) Everylrnman being has the 'lnherent right to .life. This ~ight .shall be protected by law, No one shall be arbitratily deprived of his life. · (2) In countries which have not abolished· the death . penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for fhe most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of, the commission of the crime ... " .

It will be seen that clauses (I) and (2) of Article 6 do not abolish or prohibii the imposition of death. penalty in all circumstances.. All that they require is that, firstly, death penalty shall not be arbitrarily · inflicted; secondly, it shall be imposed only for most serious crimes in accordance with a law, which shall not be an ex post facto legislation, Thus, the requirements of these clauses are substantially

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the same as the guarantees or prohibitions contained in Articles 20 and 21 of our Constitution. India's commitment therefore does not go beyond what is providecl in the Co;stitution and the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code. The Penal Code prescribes death penalty as an alternative punishment only for heinous crimes which are not more than seven in number. Section 354 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, as we shall presently discuss, in keeping with the spirit of the Internaiional Covenant, has further restricted the area of death penalty. India's penal laws, including the impugned- provisions and their application, are thus entirely in accord with its international commitment. It will be pertinent to note that most of the countries including those who have subscribed to this International covenant, retain death penalty for murder and certain other crimes even to the present day in their penal laws. Neither the new interpretative dimensions gi_ven to Articles 19 and 21 by this Court in Maneka Gandhi and Charles Sobraj v. The Superintende11t Central Jail, Tihar, New Delhi(') nor the acceptance by India of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, makes any change in the prevailing standards of decency and human dignity by which counsel require us to judge the constitutioual validity of the impugned provisions. The International Covenant, as already noticed, does not outlaw capital punishment for murder, altogether •.

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For all the foregoing reasons, we would' answer the first main question in the negative. This takes us to Question No. II. Question No. II.

Are the provisions of Section 354 (3) of the Code of Crim_inal J'rocedure, 1973 unconstitutional ? That is the question. The constit_utional validity of section 354 (3) is assailed on these grounds : (i) (a) Section 354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, delegates to the Court the_ duty to legislate the field of 'special reasons' for choo_sing between life and death, and

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(b) permits imposition of death penalty in an arbitrary and whimsical manner in as much as it does not lay down any rational principies or criteria for invoking this extreme sanction. (Reliance has been placed on Furman v. Georgia (ibid).

(ii) If Section 354 (3) is to be saved from the vice of unconstitutionality, the Court should so interpret it and define its scope that the imposition of death penalty comes to be restricted only to those types of grave murders and capital offences which· imperil the very existence and security of the State. (Reliance for this argument has been placed on Rajendra Prasad's case (ibid) ).

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As against this, the learned Solicitor-General submits that the policy of the law in the matter of imposition of death sentence is writ large and clear in Section 354 (3), namely, that life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence an exception ; that the correct approach should be to apply this policy to the relevant facts of the particular case, bearing on tbe question of sentence, and to find out the death if there are any exceptional reasons justifying imposition penalty, as a departure from the normal rule.

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It is submitted that conferment of such sentencing discretion on the courts, to be exercised judicially, in no sense, amounts to delegation of the legislative powers by Parliament.

Shri Sorabji further submits that there is no inherent impossibility in formulating broad guidelines consistent with the policy indicated by the legislature, for the exercise of the judicial functions under Section 354 (3). He emphasises that only broad guideline~. as distinct from rigid rules, can be laid down by the Court. Since the discretion-proceeds the argument-is to be exercised judicially after .taking into consideration ail the aggravating and mitigating circumstances relating to the crime and the· criminal in a particular case, and ample safeguards by way of appeal and reference to the superior courts against erroneous or arbitrary .exercise of the sen·' tencing discretion have been provided, Section 354 (3) cannot be said to be violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 or anything else in the Constitution. '

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Before embarking upon a discussion of the arguments advanced on both sides, it is necessary to have a peep into the history and the legislative background of the procedurll provisions relating to sen-. tencing in the Code of criminal Procedure. Under the Code ·of Criminal Procedure, 1898, as it stood before its amendment by Act No. 26 of 1955, even for the seven offences mentioned earlier, which are punishable in the alternative with death, the normal sentence was the death sentence, and if the Court wanted to depart from this rule, it had to give reasons for doing so. This requirement was embodied in sub· section (5) of Section 367, which, as it then stood, was as follows : "If the accused is convicted of an offence punishable with death and the Court sentences him to any punishment other • than death, the Court shall in its judgment state the reason why sentence of death was not passed.

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The Law Commission in its 35th Report (Vol. I), made the following comments on this provision : " ... a considerable body of opinion is in favour of a provision requiring the court to state its reasons for imposing the punishment either of death or of imprisonment for life. Further, this would be good safeguard to ensure that the lower .courts examine the case as elaborately from the point of view of sentence as from the point of view of guilt ... It would increase the confidence of the people, in the courts, by showing that the discretion is judicially exercised. It would also facilitate tbe task of the High Court in appeal or in proceedings for confirmation in respect of tl;ie sentence (where the ~entence awarded is that of death) or in proceedings in revision for enhancement of the sentence (where the sentence awarded is One of impriSOl)ment of life." In deferance to this recommendation, section 66 of the Code of ··criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1955 (XXVI of 1955) deleted old sub-section (5) of Section 367 with effect from January l, 1956, and thereafter, for such capital offences, it was left to the Court, on the facts of each ca~, to pass, iq its discretion, for reason to be

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recorded, the sentence of death or the lesser sentence. This led to some difference of opinion whether, even after the Amendment of 1955, in case of murder the normal punishment was death or imprisonment for life (See A.LR. Commentaries on the \:ode of· · Criminal Procedure, Vol. 3, page 565, by D.V. Chitaley and S. Appu Rao). Overruling its earlier decision, the Bombay High Court in the State v. Vali Mohammad,(') held that death ·is not a normal penalty for murder. As against this, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Veluchami Thevar,( 2 ) held that death was the normal punishment where there were ilo extenuating circumstances. The third set of cases held that both the sentences were normal but the discretion as regards sentence was to ~ exercised in the light of facts and circumstances of the case. This view appears to be in accord with the decision of this Court in Iman Ali & Anr. v. State of Assarn.(3 ) In that case, there was a clear finding by the Court of Session which had been upheld by the High Court, that each of the two appellants therein, committed a cold-blooded murder by shooting two inmates of the house simply with the object of facilitating commission of dacoity by them. Those persons were· shot and killed even though they had not tried to put up any resistence. It was held by this Court (speaking through Bbargava, J.) that in these circumstances where the murders were committed in cold-blood with the sole object of committing dacoity, the Sessions Judge bad not exercised bis discretion judicially in not imposing the death sentence, and the High Court was justified in enhancing the sentence of the appellants from life imprisonment to death, Jagmohan Singh's case, which we shall notice presently in further detail, proceeds on the hypothesis that even after the deletion of sub-section (5) of Section 367 in the. Code of 1898, both the alternati.ve sentences provided in Section 302, Penal Code are normal punishment for murder, and the choice of either sentence rests· in the discretion of the Court which is to be exercised judicially, after taking into account all the relevant circumstances of the case. (l) AIR 1959 Born, 294 (299).

(2) A.I.R. 1965 Mad, 48 at p. 49,

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(3) (1968] 3 S.C.R. 6t0.

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Section 354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, marks a significant shift in the legislative policy underlying the Code of 1898, as in force immediately before Apr. l, 1974, according to which both the alternative sentences of death or imprisonment for life provided for murder and for certain other capital offences under the Penal Code, were normal sentences. Now, according to this changed legislative policy which is patent on the face of Section 354 (3), the , normal punishment for murder and six other capital offences under the Penal Code, is imprisonment for life (or imprisonment for a term of years) and death penalty is an exception. The Joint Committee of Parliament in its Report, stated the object and reason of making this change, as follows : "A sentence of death is the extreme penalty of law and it is but fair that when a Court awards that sentence in a case where the alternative sentence of imprisonment for life is also available, it should give special reasons in support of the sentence "

Accordingly, sub-section (3) of Section 354 of the current Code provides : "When the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative, with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence awarded, and, in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons for such sentence.''

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In the context, we may also notice Section 235. (2) of the Code of 1973, because it makes not only explicit, what according to the decision in Jagmohan' s case was implicit in the scheme ·of the Code, but also bifurcates the trial by providing for two hearings, one at the pre-conviction stage and another at the pre-sentence stage. It requires that :

"If the accused is convicted, the Judge shall, unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of Section 360, hear the· accused on the question of sentence, and then pass sentence on him according to faw."

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The Law Commission on its 48th Report had pointed out this deficiency in the sentencing procedure : "45. It is now being increasingly recognised that a rational and consistent sentencing policy requires the removal or several deficiencies in the present system. One such deficiency. is the lack of comprehensive information as to characteristics and background of the offender. The aims of sentencing 1-Themselves obscurebecome all the more so in the absence of information on which the correctional process is to operate. The public as well so the courts themselves are in the dark about judicial approach in this regard._

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We are of the view that the taking of evidence as to the circustances relevant to sentencing should be encouraged and both the prosecution and the accused should be allowed to cooperate in the process."

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By enacting Section 235 (2) of the New Code, Parliament has accepted that recommendation of ihe Law Commission. Although sub-section (2) of Section 235 does not contain a specific provision as to evidence and provides only for hearing of the accused as to sentence, yet it is implicit in this provision that if a request is made in that behalf by either the prosecution or the accused, or by both, the Judge should give the party or parties concerned an opportunity of producing evidence or material relating to the various factors bearing on the question of sentence. "Of course", as was pointed out by this Court in Santa Singh v. State of Punjab,(') "care would have to be taken by the Court to see that this hearing on the question of sentence is not turned into an instrument for unduly protracting the proceedings. The claim of due and proper hearing would have to be harmonised with the requirement of expeditious disposal of proceedings." We may also notice Sections 432, 433 and 433A, as they throw light as to whether life imprisonment as currently administered in (I) A.I.R. 1976 SC. 2286.

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India, can be considered an adequate alternative to the capital sentence even in extremely heinous cases of murder. Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of 1973 continue Sections 401 and 40~ of the Code of 1898, with necessary modifications which bring them in tune with Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution. Section 432 invests the "appropriate Government" (as defined. in sub-section (7) of that Section) with power to suspend or remit sentences. Section 433 confers on the appropriate Government power to commute sentence, without the consent of the person sentenced. Under clause (a) of the Section, the appropriate Governmen(may commute a sentence of death, for any other punishment provided by the Indian Penal Code.

With effect from December 18, 1978, the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1978, inserted new Section 433A, which runs as under : "433A. Restriction on powers of remission or commutation In certain cases-Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 432, where a sentence of imprisonment for life · is imposed on conviction of a person for an offence for which death is one of the punishments. provided by law or where a sentence of death imposed on a person has· been commuted under Section 433 into one of imprisonment for life, such person shall not be released from prison unless he had served at least fourteen years of imprisonment." It may be recalled that in Jagmohan this Court had observed that, in practice, life imprisonment amounts to 12 years in prison. Now Section 433A restricts the power of remission and commuta' . tion conferred on the appropriate Government under Sections 432 and 433, so that a person who is sentenced to imprisonment for life or whose death sentence is comO)uted to imprisonment for life must ser.ve actual imprisonment for a minimum of 14 years.

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We may next notice other provisions of the extent Code (corresponding to Sections 374, 375, 376 and 377 of the repealed Code) bearing on capital punishment. Section 366 (i) of the Code requires the Court passing a sentence of death to submit the proceedings to the High Court, and further mandates that such a sentence shall not be execilted unless it is confirmed by the High Court. On such a

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reference for confirmation of death sentence, the High Court is required to proceed in accordance with Sections 367 and 368. Section 367 gives power to the High Court to direct further inquiry to be made or additional evidence to be taken. Section 368 empowers the High Court to confirm the sentence 9f death or pass any other sentence warranted by law or to annul or alter the conviction or ord~.r a new trial or acquit the accused. Section 369 enjoins that in every case So submitted, the confirmation of the sentence, or any new sentence or order passed by the High Court, shall, when such court consists of two or more Judges, be made, passed and signed by at least two of them. Section 370 provides that where any such case is heard before a Bench of Judges and such Judges are equally divi-· ded in opinion, the case shall be referred to a third Judge.

In this fasciculus of Sections relating to confirmation proceedings in the High Court, the Legislature has provided valuable safeguards of the life and liberty of the subject in cases of capital sentences. These provisions seek to ensure that where in a capital case, the life of the convicted person is at stake, the entire evidential material bearing on the innocence or guilt of the accused apd the question of sentence . must be scrutinised with utmost caution and care by a superior Court. The High Court has been given very wide powers under these provisions to prevent any possible miscarriage of justice. In State of Maharashtra v. Sindhi, (') this Court. reiterated, with emphasis, that while dealing with a reference for confirmation of a sentence of death, the High Court must consider· the proceedings in llll their as· pects reappraise, reassess and reconsider the entire facts and law and, if necessary, after taking additional evidence, come to its own conclusions on the material on record in regard to the conviction of the accused (and the sentence) independently of the view expressed by the Sessions Judge. Similarly, where on appeal, the High Court reverses an acquit· tal and convicts the . accused person and sentences. him to death, Section 379 of the Code of 1973, gives him a right of appeal to tile Supreme Court. Finally, there is Article 136 of the Constitution under which the Supreme Court is empowered, in its discretion, to

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entertain an appeal on behalf of a person whose sentence of death awarded by the Sessions Judge is confirmed by the High Court. In the light of the above conspectus, we will now consider the effect of the aforesaid legislative changes on the authority and efficacy of the propositions laid down by this Court in Jagmohan's case. These propositions may be summed up a's under : (i) The general. legislative policy that underlines the struc· ture of our criminal law, principally contained in the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, is to define an offence with sufficient clarity and to p.rescribe only the maximum punishment iherefor, and to allow a very . wide discretion to the Judge in the matter of fixing the degree of punishment.

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With the solitary exception of Section 303, the same policy permeates Section 302 and some other sections of the Penal Code, where the maximum punishment is the death penalty. · (ii) (a) No exhaustive enumeration of aggravating or mitigating circumstances which should be considered when sentencing an offender, is possible. "The infinite variety of cases and facts to each case would make general standards either meaningless 'boiler plate' or a statement of the obvious that no Jury (Judge) would need." (Referred to McGauthe v. Ca/ifornia(l) (b) The impossibility of laying down standards is at the very core of the criminal law as administered in India which invests the judges with .a very wide discretion in the matter of fixing the degree of punishment.

(iii) The view taken by the plurality in Furman v. Georgia decided by the Supreme Court of the United States; to the effect, that law Which gives uncontrolled and un-

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guided discretion to the Jury (or the Judge) to choose arbitrarily between a sentence of death and imprisonment for a capital offence, violates the Eighth Amend· ment, is.not applicable in India. We do not have in our Consti\ution any provision like the Eighth Amendment, nor are we at liberty to apply the test of reason· ableness with the freedom with which the Judges of the Supreme Court of America arc accustomed to apply "the due process" clause. There are grave doubts about the expediency of transplanting western experience in our country. Social conditions are different and so also the general intellectual level. Arguments which would be valid in respect of one area of the world may not hold good in respect of another area.

(iv)

(a) This discretion in the matter of sentence is to be exercised by the Judge judicially, after balancing all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances' of the crime. (b) The discretion is liable to be corrected by superior courts. The exercise of judicial discretion on well-recognised principles is, in the final analysis, the safest possible safeguard for the accused.

In view of the above, ft will be impossible to say that there would be at all any discrimination, · since crime as crime may appear to be superfi· cially the same but the facts and . circumstances of a crime are widely different. Thus considered the provision in Section 302, Penal Code is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground that it confers on the judges an unguided and uncontrolled discretion in the matter of awarding capital punishment of imprisonment for life.

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(a) Relevant facts and circumstances impinging on the nature and circumstances of the crime can be brought before the Court at the preconviction

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stage, notwithstanding the fact that no formal procedure for producing evidence regarding such . facts and circumstances had been specifically provided. Where counsel addresses the Court with regard to the character and standing of the accused, they are duly considered by the Court unless there is something in the evideqce itself which belies him or the Public Prosecutor challenges the . facts.

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(b) It is to be emphasised that in exercising its discretion to choose either of the two alternative sentences provided in Section 302, Penal Code, "the Court is principally concerned with the facts and circumstances whether aggravating or mitigating, which are connected with the particular crime under inquiry. All such facts and circumstances are capable of being proved in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act in a trial regulated by the Cr. P.C. The trial does not come to an end until all the relevant facts are proved and the counsel on both sides have an opportunity to address the Court. The only thing that remains is for the Judge to decide on the guilt and punishment and that is what Sections 306(2) and 309(2) Cr. P.C. purport to provide for. These provisions are part of the procedure established by law and unless it is shown that they are invalid for any other reasons they must be regarded as valid. No reasons are offered to show that they are constitutionally invalid and hence the death sentence imposed after trial in accordance with · the procedure established by law is not unconstitutional ·under Article 21." (emphasis added) A study of the propositions set out above, will show that in substance, the authority of none of them bas been affected by the legislative changes since the decision in Jagmohan' s case. Of course, two of them require to be adjusted and attuned to the shift in the

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legislative policy. The first of those propositions is No. (iv) (a) which postulates, that according to the then extant Code of Criminal Procedure both the alternative sentences provided in Section 302, Penal Code are normal sentences, and the Court can, therefore, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the particular case, in its discretion, impost!' either of those sentences. This postulate has. now been modified by Section 354(3) which mandates the Court convicting a person for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative !Vith imprisonment for life or imprfsonment for a term of years, not to impose the sentence of death on that person' unless there are "special reasons" -to be recorded-for such sentence, The expression "special reasons" in the context of this provision, obviously means "exceptional reasons" founded on the exceptionally grave circumstances of the particular case relating to the crime as well as the criminal. Thus, the legislative policy now writ large and clear on the face of Section 354(3) is that on conviction for murder and other capital offences punishable in the alternative with death under the Penal Code, the extreme penalty should be imposed only in extreme cases. In this view we are in accord with the dictum of this Court in Ba/want Singh v. State of Punjab ('), wherein the interpretation of Section 354(3) first came up ·for consideration. After surveying the legislative background, one of us (Untwalia, J,) speaking for the Court, summed up the scope and implications of Section 354 {3), thus: "Under this provision the Court is required to state the reasons for the sentence awarded· and in the case of sentence of death, special reasons are required to be stated. It would thus be noticed that awarding of the sentence other than the sentenceJof death is the general rule now and only special reasons that is to say, special facts and circumstances in a given case, will warrant the passing of the death sentence. It is unnecessary nor is it possible to make a catalogue of the special reasons which may justify the passing of the death sentence in a case." While applying proposition (iv) (a), therefore, the Court has to bear

H' (!) A.I.R. 1976 SC 231=[1976) 2 SCR 684.

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in mind this fundamental principle of policy embodied in Section 354(3).

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Another proposition, the application of which, to an extent, is affected by the legislative changes, is No. (v). In portion (a) of that proposition, it is said that circumstances impinging on the nature and circumstances of the crime can be brought on record before the pre-conviction stage. In portion (b), it is emphasised that while making choice of the sentence under Section 302, Penal Code, the Court is principally concerned with the circumstances con· nected with the particular crime under inquiry. Now, Section 235(2) provides for a bifurcated .trial and specifically gives •the accused person a right of pre-sentence hearing, at which stage, he can bring on record material or evidence, which may not be strictly relevant to or connected with the particular crime under inquiry, but never· theless, have, consistently with the policy underlined in Section 354(3), a bearing on the choice of sentence. The present legislative policy discernible from Section 235(2) read with · Section 354(3) is that in fixing the degree of punishment or making the choice of ·sentence for various offences, including one under Section 302, .Penal Code, the Court should not confine its consideration princi· pally" or merely to the circumstances connected with the particular crime, but also give c!ue consideration to the circumstances of the criminal.

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Attuned to the legislative policy delineated in Sections 354(3) and 235(2), propositions (iv) (a) and M (b) in Jagmohan, shall have to be recast and may be stated as below : (a) The normal rule is that the offence of moder shall be punished with the sentence of life imprisonment. The court can depart from that rule and impose the sentence of death only if there are special reasons for doing so. Such reasons must be recorded in writing before imposing the death sentence. (b) While considering the question of sentence to be impo· sed for the offence of murder under Section 302 Penal Code, the court must have regard to every relevant circumstance relating to the crime as well as the crimi!lal, If the court finds, but -not otherwise, that the

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offence is of an excepti~nally depraved and heinous character and constitutes, on account of its design and the manner of its execution, a source of grave danger to the society at large, the court may impose the death sentence.

The soundness or application of tbe other propositions in Jagmohan, and the premises on which they rest, are not affected in any way by the legislative changes since effected. On the contrary these changes reinforce the reasons given in Jagmohan, for holding that the impugned provisions of the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code do not offend Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Now, Parliament has in Section 354(3) given a broad and clear guideline which is to serve the purpose of lodestar to the court in the exercise of its sentencing discretion. Parliament has advisedly not restricted this sentencing discretion further, as, in its legislative judgment, it is neither possible nor desirable to do so. Parliament could not but be aware that since the Am.ending Act 26 of 1955, death penalty has been imposed by courts on an extremely small percentage of persons convicted of murder-a fact which demonstrates that courts have generally exercised their discretion in inflicting this extreme penalty with great circumspection, caution and restraint. Cognizant of the past experience of the administration of death penalty in India, Parliament, in its wisdom, thought it best and safe to leave the imposition of this gravest punishment in gravest cases of murder, to the judicial discretion of the courts which are manned by persons of reason, experience and standing in the profession. The exercise of this sentencing discretion cannot be said to be untrammelled and· unguided. It is exercised judicially in accordance with well-recognised principles crystalised by judicial decisions, directed along the broad contours of legislative policy towards the signposts enacted in Section 35.4(3). The new Section 235 (2) adds to the number of several other safeguards which were embodied in the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 and have been re-enacted in the Code of 1973. Then, the errors in the exercise of this guided judicial discretion are l.iable to be corrected by the superior courts. The procedure provided in Criminal Procedure Code for imposing capital punishment for murder and some other capital crimes under the Penal Code can· not, by any reckoning, be said to be unfair unreasonable and unjust.

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BACHAN SINGH v, PUNJAB (Sarkaria, J.)

Nor can it be said that this sentencing discretion, with which the courts are invested, amounts to delegation of its power of legislation by Parliament. The argument to that effect is entirely misconceived. We would, therefore, re-affirm the view taken by this Court in Jagmohan, and hold that the impgned provisions do not violate '' Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitiltion.

Now, remains the question whether this Court can lay down standards or norms restricting the area of the imposition of death penalty tci a narrow category of murders, Dr. Chitale contends that the wide observations in Jagmohan)as to the impossibility of laying down standards or norms in the matter of segtencing are too sweeping. It is submitted that soon after the · .decision .in Furman, several States in U.S.A. amended their penal statutes and brought them in conformity with the requirements of Furman, Support has also been sought for .this argument from Gregg v. Georgia, wherein the Supreme Court of the United States held that the concern expressed in Furman decision that death penalty may not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner could be met by a carefully drafted statute ensuring that the sentencing authority was given -adequate guidance and information for determining the appropriate sentence, a bifurcated sentencing proceeding being preferable as a general proposition. If by "laying down standards", it is meant that 'murder' should be categorised before han·d according to the degrees of its culpability and all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances should be exhaustively and rigidly enumerated so as to- exclude all free-play of discretion, the argument merits rejection.

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As pointed out in Jagmohan, such "standardisation" is wellnigh impossible. Firstly, there is little agreement· among penologists and jurists

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as to what information about the crime and criminal is relevant and what is not relevant for fixing th.e dose of punishment for a person convicted of a particular offence. According to Cessare Beccaria, who is supposed to be the intellectual progenitor of today's fixed sentencing movement 'crimes are only to be measured by the injnry done to socie1~'. But t)le 20th Century sociologists do not wholly asree

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[!983) 1 s.c.a.

with this view. In the opinion of Von Hirsch, the "seriousness of. a crime depends both on the harm done (or risked) by the act and degree of the actor's culpabilitf'. But how. is the degree of that . · culpability to be. measured. Can any thermometer be devised to measure its degree ? This is a very baffling, difficult and intricate problem. ' Secondly, criminal cases do not· fall into set-behavioristic patterns. Even within a single-category offence there. are infinite, unpredictable and unforceable variations. No two cases are exactly identical. There are countless permutations and combinations which are beyond the anticipatory capacity of the human calculus. Each case presents its own distinctive features, its peculiar combinations of events and its unique ·configuration of .facts. · "Simply in terms of blame-worthiness or dessert criminal cases are diferent from one another in ways that legislatures cannot anticipate, and limitations of language prevent the precise description of differences that can be anticipated."(') 'This is particularly true of murder. "Th~re is probably no offence", observed Sir Ernest Growers, Chairman of the Royal Commission, "that varies so widely both in character and in moral guilt as that which falls within the legal definition of murder." The futility of attempting to lay down exhaustive standards was demonstrated by this Court in Jagmohan by citing the instance of the Model Penal Code which was presented to the American Supreme Court in McGoutha.

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Thirdly, a standardisation of the sentencing process which leaves little room for judicial discretion to take account of variations in culpability wlthin single-offence category ceases to be judicial. It tends to sacrifice justice at the alter of blind. uniformity. Indeed, there is a real danger of such mechanical standardisation degenerating into a bed of procrust"ean cruelty.

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Fourthly, standardisation or sentencing discretion is a policy matter which belongs to the sphere of legislation. When· Parliament as a matter of sound legislative policy, did not deliberately restrict, control or standardise the sentencing discretion any further than that incoropassed by the broad contours delineated in Section 354 (3). (I) Messinger and Bittner'• Crimonology Year Book (Ibid) Albert W. Alcberler's article at page 421.

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. BACHAN SINGH v. PUNJAB (Sarkaria, J.)

the Court would not by over-leaping its bounds rush to do what· Parliament, in its wisdom, varily did not do. / ·

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We, must leave upto the things that are Legis. the Legislature, . lature's. "The highest judicial duty is to recognise the limits on judicial power and to permit the democratic processeS'to deal with · matters falling outside of those limits". As Jlldges, we have io resist the temptation to. substitute our own value choices for the will of the peoJ?le. Since substituted judicial 'made-to-order' standards, howso.ever painstakingly made, do not bear the peoples imprimatur, they may not have the same authenticity and efficacy as the silent zones and green belts designedly marked out and left open by Parliament in its legislative plannirig for fair-play of judicial discretion to take . care of the variable, unpredictable circumstances _of the individual cases, relevant to Individualised sentencing. When judges, acting individually or colJectively; ·in their benign anxiety. to do what they ' take upon . themselves, the.resthink is morally j!Ood for the people, ponsibility of setting down social norms of conduct. There is every danger, despite their effort to make a rational guess of the notions of right and wrong prevailing. in the community at large and despite their intention to abide by the, .dictates gf mere reason, that they might write their own peculiar view or personal pre-dilection •into the Jaw, sincerely mistaking that changeling for what they perceive to be the community ethic. The perception of · 'community' standards or ethics may vary from Judge to Judge. In this sensitive, highly controversi.al area of death penalty, with all its'complexity, vast implications and manifold ramifications, even all the Judges sitting cloistered in this Court and acting unanimously, cannot assume the role which properly belongs to the chosen repre- · sentatives of the people in Parliament, particularly when Judgesbave no divining rod to divine accurately the will of the people. In Furman, the Hon'ble Judges claimed.to articulate .the contemporary standarJls of morality among the· American peopie. But speaking through public referenda, Gallup polls and the state legislatures, the American people sharply rebuffed them. We must draw a lesson· from the same.

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What the iearned Chief Justice, who is amongst us in this case has s.Vd · recently in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and others v. State of Punjab(') in. the context of laying down standards in the d'iscre- · (I)

Criminal AppeaJs·Nos, 33? et!'. 9f 1977 ~11d 81 and 82of1978, /

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SuPREME CoiJRT REPORTS

[1983) Ls.c.R.

·tionary area of anticipatory bail, comes in as a timely reminder. In principle, these ·observations aptly apply to the desirahility and feasibility of laying down standards in the area of sentencing discre· tion, also. Let us therefore, hark to the same: /

"Generalisations on matters which rest on \liscretion and the attempi to discover formulae of universal application when facts are bound to differ from case .to case frustrate the very purpose of conferring discretion. No two cases are alike on facts and, therefore, Courts have to be allowed a little free play in the joints if the conferment of. discretionary power is to be meaningful. There is no risk involved in entrusting a wide discreiion to the Court of Session and the High Court in granting anticipatory. bail because, firstly, .these are higher courts manned by experienced persons, secondly, their orders are not final -but are open to appellate o.r revisional scrut'iny an<! above all because, discretion has always to be exercised --by courts judicially and not according to whim, caprice or fancy. On the other band, there is a risk .in foreclosing categories of cases in which anticipatory bail may be allowed because life throws uP unforeseen possibilities and offers new challenges. Judicial di.scretion has to. be free enough to be able to take these possibilities in its stride and to meet these challenges.. While dealing with the necessity for preserving judicial discretion unhampered by rules of general application, Earl Loreburn L.C. said in •Hyma~ and Anr. v.• Rose('). "I desire in the first instance to point out that the discretion given by the section is v~ry wide .. Now it seems to me that when the Act is so express to provide a wide discretion .. it is not advisable to lay dow~ any rigid rules for·guiding that discretion. I do not doubt that the rules enunciated by the Master of the Rolls in the present case are useful maxims in general, and that in general they reflect the point of view from which judges would regard an application for relief. But I thi.nk it. ought to be distinctly understood that there may be cases in which any. or all of them may be disregarded. If it were otherwise, tbe ,free discretion given by the statute would be fettered by limita· tions which have nowhere been en'acted. It is one thing to decide ~hat is the true meaning of the language contained (I) [19J2j A.C. 623,

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BACHAN SINGH v. PUNJAB (Sarkaria, J.J

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in an Act of Parliament. It is quite a .different thing to place cond,itions upon a free discretion enttusted by.statute to the Court where the conditions ·are not based upon statutory enactment at all. It is not safe.' I think, to say' tbat the Court must and will always insist upon certain things when the Act does not require them, and the facts of some unforeseen case may make the Court wish it had kept' a free band."

"Judges have to decide cases as they come before ·them, mind· ful of the need to keep passions and prejudices out of the.ir decisions. · And it will be strange if, J:>y employing judicial artifices and techniques, -C we cut down the discretion so wis.ely conferred upon the Cou.rts, by' devising a formula which will confine the power to grant anticipatory bail wiihin a strait-jacket. While laying down cast-iron rules in a matte~ like granting anticipatory bail, as .the High Court has done, itis apt to be overlooked that even Judges can have but an imperfect awareness of the needs of new situations. Life is never, s.tatic and every situation has to be assessed in the context of emerg· jng· concerns as and when it arises. Therefore, even if we were to frame a 'Code for the grant of anticipatory bail', which really is the business ofthe legislature, it can at best furnish broad guidelines and cannot compel .blind adherence." '

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From what has been extracted above, it is. clear that this Court should not venture to formulate rigid standards in an area in which the Legislature so warily . treads. Only broad guidelines consistent with the policy indicated by the Legislatu.re in Section 354(3) can be laid down .. Before we come to this aspect of the matter, it will be fair to notice briefly the decisions of the Supreme Court of ·U.S.A. in Gregg v. Georgia and companion cases. Sopn ·after th'e .decision in Furman, the Georgia Legislature ·amended .·its statutory scheme. The· amended statute retains the death penalty for six categories of crime: murder, kidn_apping for. ransom or where victim is harmed, armed robbery, rape,' treason, and aircraft hijacking. The statutory aggravating circumstances; the existence of any of which may justify the imposition of the extreme penalty of. death, as provided in that statute, are :· .

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"(l)

The '01f~n9~

of murder, rape, armed robberr, Of

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(198.3) I s.c.R.

kidnapping was committed by a person with a prior record· of conviction for a cacpital felony, (or the offence of murder was committed by a person who bas a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions).

(2) The offence of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission- of another capital felony, or aggravated battery, or the offence of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of burglary or arson in the first degree. '

(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a publlc place by means of weapon or device whicli would normally' be hazaradous to the lives of more ihan one person. '

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(4) The offender committed the· offence of murder for ' himself or another, for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value. ,,(5) The murder of a judicial 'officer, former judicial officer, district-attorney or solicitor or former district attorney or solicitor during or because of the . exercise of his official duty. (6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as an agent or employee of another person.

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(7) The offence of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageiously or want only vile horrible or 'iohun:ian in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim. · (8) The offence of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections empioyee or fireman whiie engaged in the performance or his official duties. •

(9) The offence of murder was committed by a person _ in, or who has escaped from, the lawful custody of a peace · ptficer or place of lawful confinement.

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MCHAN SINGH v. PUNJAB (Sarkaria, J.)

(IO) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or

another."

The Supreme Court of.,Georgia in Arnold v. State ('),held .unconstitutional the portion (within brackets) of the first circumstances encompassing persons who have a "substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions" but did not set clear and objective standards. The amended statute, also, provided for a bifurcated trial and a pre-sentence hearing. It also provides for an automatic appeal of death sentence to the Supreme Court of Georgia, which may or may not affirm the death sentence. The appellate court is also required . to include reference to similar cases that the court considered.

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The defend~nt (accused) in· that case was convicted of two . counts of armed robbery and 'two counts of murder. The accused. had committed the murders for the purpose of receiving money and an automobile of one of the victims. Afte~iewing ·ihe tri'al record, . the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and the imposi- · tion of death sentences for murder, only, The constitutional validity of the amended statutory scheme of Georgia was challenged before the Supreme Court of U.S.A .. on the ground that the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of ·murder under the Georgia statute violated the prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusaal punishment unde~ the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

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Likewise in the companion case Proffitt v. Florida ('), the Florida Legislature adopted new statutes that authorised the imposition of the death penalty on those convicted of first-degree murders. Under the new Florida statutes, if a defendant (accused) is found guilty of first-degree murder, a separate presentence hearing is held before the jury, where arguments may be presented and where any evidence deemed relevant .to sentencing may be admitted and must include matters· relating to eight aggravating and seven mitigating circumstances sp~cified in the statutes, the jury is directed to weigh· such circumstances and return an advisory verdict as to the sentence. (I) 236 Ga 534, 540, 224 SE 2d 386, 391 (1976) (2) 428 US 242, 49 r,. Ed 2d 913 (1976),

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

'(1983) I S.C,R,

The actual sentence is, however, determined by tbe \ria! judge, who is also directed to' weigh the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. If a death sentence i.s imposed, the trial court must set forth in writing its fai:t findings that· sufficient statutory aggravating circumstances exist and· are not outweighed by statutory mitigating circumstances. Just as in the Georgia statute, a death sentence is to b'e· automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court of Florida. ·Under this new statutory scheme, the Florida Court found Proffitt (defendant) guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death on the finding that these aggravating circumstances were established : · /

: "(!) The murder was premeditated and ·occurred in ·the

course of a felony (burglary) ; (2) the defendant had ihe propensity to commit murder ; (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel; and

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(4): ·the defendant knowingly, through his intentional act, had created a great risk of serious bodily harm and death to many pers\:ms;"

The trial judge also found specifically that none of the statutory mitigating circumstances existed. The S~preme Court of Florida affirmed the death sentence. Before the Supreme Court of U,S,A. the constitutio.nal validity of the imposition of death penalty for.the crime of murder under the Florida statutes was challenged on the . same ground as in Gregg v. Georgia, The Supreme Cour! of U.S.A. in both the aforesaid cases negatived the challenge to the statutes· and upheld their validity. It\may be recalled that in Furman, that Court had held that if Clear, definite and articulate standards' channeling the sentencing discretion for Imposition ,of the death penalty are not laid down ·in a statute, it would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments: It may be noted that the aggravating circumstance No. (7) is couched in a very wide and elastic language, The expressions "outrageously or wantonly vile'', "horrible or inhuman" employed therein a~e of the widest amplitude and give this aggravating circu!"stance the character of an omnibus clause. Likewise,

llACHAN ~INGll v. PUNJAB (Sarkaria, J.)

in the Florida .statute, the.scope of the words ·"especially heinous, atrocious and ~rue!" was equally large and imprecise. It can b~\ seriously questioned whether these extremely elastic. - standards really exclµde the uncontrolled' exercise of sentencing discretion so as to meet the requirements of Furman.

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In Gregg v. Georgia, the petitioner attacked the seventh statutory aggravating circumstance which authorises imposition of the death penalty if the murder was "outrageously, or wanfonly vile, horrible or inhuman" on the ground that-it was so broad that capital punishment could be imposed by its application in any. murder case . Stewart, J., speaki.ng for himself and for Powell and Stevens, JJ .., goi over this attack, in three ways : Firstly, by reading down the concerns expressed. in Furman. In this connection, Stewart, J. said, all that Furman mandate's is that· discretion in s~ grave a mattermust b.e ·sµitably directed "so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." This was, if we may say so with respect, an admi.ssion of the fact that a considerable range of sentencing discretion bas perforce to be left - with the sentepcing body to be exercised by it according to its own good, sense and reason, and that no .standards howsoever meticulo· . usly drafted can .totally exclude scope for arbitrary .and capricious · action.

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The second reason given to parry this attack was of a general nature. It was observed : "As a general proposition these concerns (expressed in Furman) are best met by a system . that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at w.hicb the sentencing au(hority is apprised of the Information releva.nt to the imposition of sentence and provided 'with standards to guide its use of ,the ~nfo~matio.n."

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The third course adopted t~ foil the attack was : '- . "It is, of course, arguable that any murder involves depravity of mind or an ·aggravated battery. But this language need not be construed in this way, and. there is • no reason to assume that the Supreme Court' of Georgia will adopt such an open-ended· construction,'"

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(1983) 1 s.C.R,

·White, J. with whom the Chief Justice and Rehnquist, J. joined, negatived the change of these standards being vague and · incomplete, with these observations :

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"The argument is considerably overstated .. The Georgia Legislature has plainly made an effortto guide the jury in the exercise of its discretion, while at the· same time permitting the jury to dispense mercy on the basis of factors too intangible .to write into a statute, and I cannot_ accept the naked assertion that the effort is bound to fail. As the types of murders for which the death penalty may be imposed became more narrowly defined and are limited to those which are particularly serious or for which the death penalty is particularly appropriate as . they are in Georgia by reasons of the ag11rvating-circumstance requirement, it becomes reasonable to . expect ..... that Georgia's current system would escape the ·infirmities which invalidated its previous system under Furman. Indeed, if the Georgia Supreme Court properly performs the task assi_gned to it under the Georgia statutes, death sentences ...

imposed wantonly or freakishly for any given category of crime will be set aside."

Similarly, in Proffit v. Florida, it was contended that the enumerated aggravating and mitigating circumstances ill'the Florida statute are so vague and so broad that virtually "any capital defendant becomes a candidate for the death penalty''. In particular, the petitioner attacked the eighth and third statutory aggravating circumstances which authorise the dealh penalty to be imposed if the crime is "especially heinous, atr~cious, or cruel" or if ''the defen. dant knowingly created a great risk of death to .many persons". Agreeing with the Supreme Court of Florida, the Supreme Court of U.S.A. recognised that "while it is arguable that all killing are atrocious, still we believe that the Legisl_ature intended something especially heinous, atrocious

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