Common Cause (a Regd. Society) v. Union of India & Another
Landmark judgment · Constitution & fundamental rights — Right to die with dignity; living wills and passive euthanasia recognised.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 9 March 2018
- Judge
- Justice Dipak Misra
- Neutral citation
- 2018 INSC 223
- Reported in
- [2018] 6 S.C.R. 1
- Result
- Disposed off
- Acts & sections
- Article 21 Constitution, Article 226 Constitution, Section 309 IPC, Section 306 IPC, Section 305 IPC
- Subject
- Criminal
Full judgment
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. [2018] 6SOCIETY) S.C.R. 1 v. UNION OF INDIA
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY)
v. UNION OF INDIA & ANOTHER (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 215 of 2005) MARCH 09, 2018 [DIPAK MISRA, CJI, A. K. SIKRI, DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, ASHOK BHUSHAN AND A. M. KHANWILKAR, JJ.] Constitution of India – Art.21 – Passive Euthanasia – Right to die with dignity – Held: The right to life with dignity includes the smoothening of the process of dying when the person is in a vegetative state or is living exclusively by the administration of artificial aid that prolongs the life by arresting the dignified and inevitable process of dying – Here, the issue of choice also comes in – Such a right should come within the ambit of Art.21 of the Constitution – As part of right to die with dignity in case of dying man who is terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative state only passive euthanasia would come within the ambit of Art.21 and not the one which would fall within the description of active euthanasia in which positive steps are taken either by the treating physician or some other person. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]) Constitution of India – Art.21 – Right to refuse treatment – A patient (terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative state) exercising the right to refuse treatment may ardently wish to live but, at the same time, he may wish to be free from any medical surgery, drugs or treatment of any kind so as to avoid protracted physical suffering – Any such person who has come of age and is of sound mind has a right to refuse medical treatment – This right stands on a different pedestal as compared to suicide, physician assisted suicide or even euthanasia – When a terminally ill patient refuses to take medical treatment, it can neither be termed as euthanasia nor as suicide – A patient refusing medical treatment merely allows the disease to take its natural course and if, in this process, death occurs, the cause for it would primarily be the underlying disease and not any self initiated act – All adults with capacity to consent have the right of
self- determination and autonomy – The ‘Emergency Principle’ or the ‘Principle of Necessity’ has to be given effect to only when it is not practicable to obtain the patient’s consent for treatment and his/her life is in danger – But where a patient has already made a valid Advance Directive which is free from reasonable doubt and specifying that he/she does not wish to be treated, then such directive has to be given effect to.(Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]) Constitution of India – Art.21 – Right to refuse treatment – Continuing treatment against the wishes of a patient is not only a violation of the principle of informed consent, but also of bodily privacy and bodily integrity that have been recognised as a facet of privacy – Just as people value having control over decisions during their lives such as where to live, which occupation to pursue, whom to marry, and whether to have children, so people value having control over whether to continue living when the quality of life deteriorates. (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) Constitution of India – Art.21 – Dignity of life must encompass dignity in the stages of living which lead up to the end of life – Dignity in the process of dying is as much a part of the right to life under Art.21 – To deprive an individual of dignity towards the end of life is to deprive the individual of a meaningful existence – Hence, the Constitution protects the legitimate expectation of every person to lead a life of dignity until death occurs. (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) Constitution of India – Art.21 – Right to refuse treatment – An adult human being of conscious mind is fully entitled to refuse medical treatment or to decide not to take medical treatment and may decide to embrace the death in natural way. (Per Ashok Bhushan, J.) Constitution of India – Art.21 – Decision for withdrawal of life saving treatment in case of a person who is incompetent to take an informed decision – Held: Right of patient who is incompetent to express his view cannot be outside of fold of Art.21 of the Constitution – When an adult person having mental capacity to take a decision can exercise his right not to take treatment or withdraw from treatment, the above right cannot be negated for a
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA
person who is not able to take an informed decision due to terminal illness or being a Persistent Vegetative State (PVS) – When the right of an adult person who expresses his view regarding medical treatment can be regarded as right flowing from Art.21 of the Constitution, the right of patient who is incompetent to express his view cannot be outside the fold of Art.21 of the Constitution – In cases of incompetent patients who are unable to take an informed decision, it is in the best interests of the patient that the decision be taken by competent medical experts and that such decision be implemented after providing a cooling period at least of one month to enable aggrieved person to approach the Court of Law – The best interest of the patient as determined by medical experts shall meet the ends of justice – The medical team by taking decision shall also take into consideration the opinion of the blood relations of the patient and other relevant facts and circumstances. (Per Ashok Bhushan, J.)
Constitution of India – Art.21 – Right to life – As the process of dying is an inevitable consequence of life, the right to life necessarily implies the right to have nature take its course and to die a natural death – It also encompasses a right, unless the individual so wishes, not to have life artificially maintained by the provision of nourishment by abnormal artificial means which have no curative effect and which are intended merely to prolong life. (Per A.K. Sikri, J.)
Constitution of India – Art.21 – Concept of human dignity – Ideology of different religions – Hinduism doesn’t recognize human beings as mere material beings – Its understanding of human identity is more ethical-spiritual than material – That is why a sense of immortality and divinity is attributed to all human beings in Hindu classical literature – Even in Islam, tradition of human rights became evident in the medieval ages – Being inspired by the tenets of the Holy Koran, it preaches the universal brotherhood, equality, justice and compassion – Islam believes that man has special status before God – Because man is a creation of God, he should not be harmed – The Bhakti and Sufi traditions too in their own unique ways popularized the idea of universal brotherhood – It revived and regenerated the cherished Indian values of truth, righteousness, justice and morality. (Per A.K. Sikri, J.)
Constitution of India – Art.21 – Right to live with dignity – Dignity implies, apart from a right to life enjoyment of right to be free of physical interference – At common law, any physical interference with a person is, prima facie, tortious – When it comes to medical treatment, even there the general common law principle is that any medical treatment constitutes a trespass to the person which must be justified, by reference either to the patient’s consent or to the necessity of saving life in circumstances where the patient is unable to decide whether or not to consent. (Per A.K. Sikri, J.) Constitution of India – Art.21 – Right to receive or deny medical treatment and euthanasia – Rights with regard to medical treatment fall essentially into two categories: first, rights to receive or be free of treatment as needed or desired, and not to be subjected involuntarily to experimentation which, irrespective of any benefit which the subjects may derive, are intended to advance scientific knowledge and benefit people other than the subject in the long term; secondly, rights connected incidentally with the provision of medical services, such as rights to be told the truth by one’s doctor – Having regard to this right of the patients in common law, coupled with the dignity and privacy rights, it can be said that passive euthanasia, under those circumstances where patient is in PVS and he is terminally ill, where the condition is irreversible or where he is brain dead, can be permitted. (Per A.K. Sikri, J.) Constitution of India – Art.21 – Right to health – Held: It is a part of Art.21 of the Constitution – At the same time, it is also a harsh reality that everybody is not able to enjoy that right because of poverty etc. – The State is not in a position to translate into reality this right to health for all citizens – Thus, when citizens are not guaranteed the right to health, the questions that arise are can they be denied right to die in dignity - because of rampant poverty where majority of the persons are not able to afford health services, should they be forced to spend on medical treatment beyond their means and in the process compelling them to sell their house property, household things and other assets which may be means of livelihood – Secondly, when there are limited medical facilities available, should a major part thereof be consumed on those patients who have no chances of recovery – Judicial notice. (Per A.K. Sikri, J.)
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA
Constitution of India – Arts.14, 21 – Human dignity – How philosopher-jurist Dworkin perceived interpretative process adopted by a Judge – Discussed – Interpretation of statutue. (Per A.K. Sikri, J.) Constitution of India – Art.21 – Gian Kaur case, analysis of – Reference to Airedale’s case – In Gian Kaur, validity of s.306 was challenged – The Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur clearly held that when a man commits suicide, he has to undertake certain positive overt acts and the genesis of those acts cannot be tested to or be included within the protection of the expression “right to life” under Art.21 of the Constitution – It was also observed that a dignified procedure of death may include the right of a dying man to also die with dignity when the life is ebbing out – This is how the pronouncement in Gian Kaur has to be understood – It was also not the ratio of the authority in Gian Kaur that euthanasia has to be introduced only by a legislation – What was stated in paragraph 41 of Gian Kaur is what has been understood to have been held in Airedale’s case – The Court has neither expressed any independent opinion nor has it approved the said part or the ratio as stated in Airedale – There was only a reference to Airedale’s case and the view expressed therein as regards legislation – Therefore, the perception in Aruna Shanbaug that the Constitution Bench has approved the decision in Airedale was not correct – Thus, Gian Kaur has neither given any definite opinion with regard to euthanasia nor has it stated that the same can be conceived of only by a legislation – Euthanasia.(Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]) Constitution of India – Art.21 – Aruna Shanbaug case, analysis of – The two-Judge Bench in Aruna Shanbaug noted that Gian Kaur has approved the decision of the House of Lords in Airedale and observed that euthanasia could be made lawful only by legislation – This perception is not correct as Gian Kaur does not lay down that passive euthanasia could be made lawful only by legislation. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.])
Euthanasia – Passive euthanasia – Social Morality, medical ethicality and State Interest – Withdrawal of treatment in an irreversible situation is different from not treating or attending to a patient – Once passive euthanasia is recognized in law regard being had to the right to die with dignity when life is ebbing out and when
the prolongation is done sans purpose, neither the social morality nor the doctors’ dilemma or fear will have any place – It is because the sustenance of dignity and self-respect of an individual is inhered in the right of an individual pertaining to life and liberty and there is necessity for this protection – And once the said right comes within the shelter of Art.21 of the Constitution, the social perception and the apprehension of the physician or treating doctor regarding facing litigation should be treated as secondary because the primacy of the right of an individual in this regard has to be kept on a high pedestal – Constitution of India – Art.21. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]) Euthanasia – Intention to cause death – Distinction between active euthanasia and passive euthanasia – A distinction arises between active and passive euthanasia from the provisions of the Penal Code – Active euthanasia involves an intention on the part of the doctor to cause the death of the patient – Such cases fall under the first clause of s.300 – Mens rea requires a guilty mind; essentially an intent to cause harm or injury – Passive euthanasia does not embody an intent to cause death – A doctor may withhold life support to ensure that the life of a patient who is in the terminal stage of an incurable illness or in a permanent vegetative state, is not prolonged artificially – The decision to do so is not founded upon an intent to cause death but to allow the life of the patient to cease at the end of its natural term – A decision not to prolong life by artificial means does not carry an intention to cause death – In a case involving passive euthanasia, the affliction of the patient is not brought about either by an act or omission of the doctor – The creation of the condition of the patient is outside the volition of the doctor and has come about without a covert or overt act by the doctor – The decision to withhold medical intervention is to prevent pain, suffering and indignity to a human being who is in the end stage of a terminal illness or of a vegetative state with no reasonable prospect of cure – Thus, both in a case of a withdrawal of life supporting intervention and withholding it, the law protects a bona fide assessment of a medical professional – There being no intent to cause death, the act does not constitute either culpable homicide or murder – Moreover, the doctor does not inflict a bodily injury – Death emanates from the pre-existing medical condition of the patient
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA
which enables life to chart a natural course to its inexorable end – The law protects a decision which has been made in good faith by a medical professional not to prolong the indignity of a life placed on artificial support in a situation where medical knowledge indicates a point of no return – Neither the act nor the omission is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.299, 300. (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Euthanasia – Active and passive Euthanasia – Distinction between – Legality of passive euthanasia – Held: There is an inherent difference between active euthanasia and passive euthanasia as the former entails a positive affirmative act, while the latter relates to withdrawal of life support measures or withholding of medical treatment meant for artificially prolonging life – In active euthanasia, a specific overt act is done to end the patient’s life whereas in passive euthanasia, something is not done which is necessary for preserving a patient’s life – It is due to this difference that most of the countries across the world have legalised passive euthanasia either by legislation or by judicial interpretation with certain conditions and safeguards – Post Aruna Shanbaug, the 241st report of the Law Commission of India on Passive Euthanasia has also recognized passive euthanasia, however, no law as such has been enacted. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]) Euthanasia –Protection under s.92 IPC – Withdrawing life support to a person in a permanently vegetative state or in a terminal stage of illness is not ‘prohibited by law’ – Such an act would also not fall outside the purview of s.92 for the reason that there is no intentional causing of death or attempt to cause death – In a situation where passive euthanasia is non-voluntary, there is an additional protection which is also available in circumstances which give rise to the application of s.92 – Where an act is done for the benefit of another in good faith, the law protects the individual – Penal Code, 1860 – s.92. (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) Euthanasia – Active euthanasia in India, Legality of – The intentional taking away of the life of another is made culpable by the Penal Code – Active euthanasia falls within the express prohibitions of the law and is unlawful. (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Euthanasia – Passive euthanasia – The decision by a treating doctor to withhold or withdraw medical intervention in the case of a patient in the terminal stage of illness or in a persistently vegetative state or the like where artificial intervention will merely prolong the suffering and agony of the patient is protected by the law – Where the doctor has acted in such a case in the best interest of the patient and in bona fide discharge of the duty of care, the law will protect the reasonable exercise of a professional decision. (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) Euthanasia – Passive euthanasia – Legal principles governing criminal law on passive euthanasia – Report by Justice M Jagannadha Rao as Chairperson of 196 th Report of Law Commission of India, elucidated. (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) Euthanasia – In Gian Kaur case, the Constitution Bench held, while affirming the constitutional validity of s.306 of the Penal Code (abetment of suicide), that the right to life does not include the right to die – Gian Kaur case does not conclusively rule on the validity of passive euthanasia – The two Judge Bench decision in Aruna Shanbaug proceeds on an incorrect perception of Gian Kaur – Moreover, Aruna Shanbaug has proceeded on the basis of the actomission distinction which suffers from incongruities of a jurisprudential nature – Aruna Shanbaug has also not dwelt on the intersection between criminal law and passive euthanasia, beyond adverting to ss.306 and 309 of the Penal Code – Aruna Shanbaug has subordinated the interest of the patient to the interest of others including the treating doctors and supporting caregivers – The underlying basis of the decision in Aruna Shanbaug is flawed – Hence, it is necessary for this Court in the present reference to revisit the issues raised and to independently arrive at a conclusion based on the constitutional position – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.306,309. (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) Euthanasia – Restraints on judicial power – Active/Passive euthanasia - whether in the form of withholding or withdrawing treatment - has the effect of removing, or as the case may be, not providing supportive treatment – Its effect is to allow the individual to continue to exist until the end of the natural span of life – On the other hand, active euthanasia involves hastening of death: the life span of the individual is curtailed by a specific act designed to
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA
bring an end to life – Active euthanasia would in the light of penal law as it stands constitute an offence – It is only Parliament which can in its legislative wisdom decide whether active euthanasia should be permitted – Passive euthanasia on the other hand would not implicate a criminal offence since the decision to withhold/withdraw artificial life support after taking into account the best interest of the patient would not constitute an illegal omission prohibited by law. (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Euthanasia – Voluntary passive euthanasia, where death results from selective non-treatment because consent is withheld, is legally permissible while voluntary active euthanasia is prohibited. (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Euthanasia – Impact of, at the institutional, governmental and societal level – Discussed. (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) Euthanasia – Distinction between legality of active and passive euthanasia – Discussed. (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) Euthanasia – Passive euthanasia – Direction to set up committees to exercise a supervisory role and function – Besides lending assurance to the decision of the treating doctors, the setting up of committees and the processing of a proposed decision through the committees would protect the ultimate decision that is taken from an imputation of a lack of bona fides – Committees. (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Euthanasia – Law on Euthanasia in other countries – Discussed. (Per Ashok Bhushan, J.) Euthanasia – Passive euthanasia – Legality of – The decision not to take life saving medical treatment by a patient, who is competent to express his opinion cannot be termed as euthanasia, but a decision to withdraw life saving treatment by a patient who is competent to take decision as well as with regard to a patient who is not competent to take decision can be termed as passive euthanasia – On the strength of the precedents in this country and weight of precedents of other countries, such action of withdrawing life saving device is legal – Thus, such acts, which are commonly expressed as passive euthanasia is lawful and legally permissible in this country – The act of withdrawal from live-saving devices is an independent
right which can lawfully be exercised by informed decision. (Per Ashok Bhushan, J.) Euthanasia – Active Euthanasia – Legality of – No one is permitted to cause death of another person including a physician by administering any lethal drug even if the objective is to relieve the patient from pain and suffering. (Per Ashok Bhushan, J.) Euthanasia – Gian Kaur case – The Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur case held that the “right to life: including right to live with human dignity” would mean the existence of such right up to the end of natural life, which also includes the right to a dignified life upto the point of death including a dignified procedure of death – Gian Kaur case did not express any binding view on the subject of euthanasia – The Constitution Bench, however, noted a distinction between cases in which physician decides not to provide or continue to provide for treatment and care, which could or might prolong his life and those in which he decides to administer a lethal drug even though with object of relieving the patient from pain and suffering – The latter was held not to be covered under any right flowing from Art.21 – Constitution of India – Art.21. (Per Ashok Bhushan, J.) Euthanasia – Passive euthanasia and death with dignity are inextricably linked – The opportunity to die unencumbered by the intrusion of medical technology and before experiencing loss of independence and control, appears to many to extend the promise of a dignified death – When medical technology intervenes to prolong dying like this it does not do so unobtrusively – Nowadays patients insist on more than just a right to health care in general – They seek a right to choose specific types of treatment, able to retain control throughout the entire span of their lives and to exercise autonomy in all medical decisions concerning their welfare and treatment.(Per A.K. Sikri, J.) Euthanasia – Morality of medical science – Hippocratic Oath, coupled with ethical norms of medical profession, stand in the way of euthanasia – It brings about a situation of dilemma insofar as medical practitioner is concerned – On the one hand his duty is to save the life of a person till he is alive, even when the patient is terminally ill and there are no chances of revival – On the other
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA
hand, the concept of dignity and right to bodily integrity, which recognises legal right of autonomy and choice to the patient (or even to his relations in certain circumstances, particularly when the patient is unconscious or incapacitated to take a decision) may lead to exercising his right of euthanasia – Medical science. (Per A.K. Sikri, J.)
Advance Directives – Safeguards to be followed as to who can execute the advance directive and how; what should it contain; how should it be recorded and preserved; when and by whom can it be given effect to; what if permission is refused by the medical board; revocation or inapplicability of advance directive – Principles relating to the procedure for execution of Advance Directive and the guidelines to give effect to passive euthanasia in both circumstances, namely, where there are advance directives and where there are none laid down in exercise of the power under Art.142 of the Constitution and the law stated in Vishaka case – The directive and guidelines to remain in force till the Parliament brings a legislation in the field – Constitution of India – Art.142 – Legislation, need for. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]) Advance Directives – Principles in vogue across the globe governing Advance Health Directives – Various jurisdictions, discussed. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]) Advance Directives – A failure to legally recognize advance medical directives may amount to non-facilitation of the right to smoothen the dying process and the right to live with dignity – A study of the position in other jurisdictions shows that Advance Directives have gained lawful recognition in several jurisdictions by way of legislation and in certain countries through judicial pronouncements – Though the sanctity of life has to be kept on the high pedestal yet in cases of terminally ill persons or PVS patients where there is no hope for revival, priority shall be given to the Advance Directive and the right of self-determination – In the absence of Advance Directive, the procedure provided for the said category shall be applicable. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.])
Advance Directives – If permission to withdraw medical treatment is refused by the Medical Board, it would be open to the executor of the Advance Directive or his family members or even the treating doctor or the hospital staff to approach the High Court by way of writ petition under Art.226 of the Constitution.(Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]) Advance Directives – Meaning of – Held: Advance directives are documents a person completes while still in possession of decisional capacity about how treatment decisions should be made in the event she or he loses decision making capacity in future – Mental Healthcare Act 2017. (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) Advance Directives – Recognition of advance directives as part of a regime of constitutional jurisprudence is an essential attribute of the right to life and personal liberty under Art.21 – That right comprehends dignity as its essential foundation – Quality of life is integral to dignity – As an essential aspect of dignity and the preservation of autonomy of choice and decision-making, each individual must have the right on whether or not to accept medical intervention – Such a choice expressed at a point in time when the individual is in a sound and competent state of mind should have sanctity in the future if the individual were to cease to have the mental capability to take decisions and make choices – Yet, a balance between the application of the substituted judgment standard and the best interest standard is necessary as a matter of public interest – This can be achieved by allowing a supervisory role to an expert body with whom shall rest oversight in regard to whether a patient in the terminal stage of an illness or in a permanent vegetative state should be withheld or withdrawn from artificial life support – The directions in regard to the regime of advance directives have been issued in exercise of the power conferred by Art.142 and shall continue to hold the field until a suitable legislation is enacted by Parliament to govern the area – Constitution of India – Art.142. (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) Advance Directives – Forms of advance directive – A Living Will which indicates a person’s views and wishes regarding medical treatment and a Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care or Health care Proxy which authorises a surrogate decision maker to make medical care decisions for the patient in the event she or he is incapacitated – Although there can be an overlap between these
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA
two forms of advance directives, the focus of a durable power is on who makes the decision while the focus of a living will is on what the decision should be – A “living will” has also been referred as “a declaration determining the termination of life,” “testament permitting death,” “declaration for bodily autonomy,” “declaration for ending treatment,” “body trust,” or other similar reference. (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Advance Directives – When a patient is brought for medical treatment in a state of mind in which he or she is deprived of the mental capacity to make informed choices, the medical professional needs to determine the line of treatment – One line of enquiry, which seeks to protect patient autonomy is how the individual would have made a decision if he or she had decision-making capacity – This is called the substituted judgment standard – An advance medical directive is construed as a facilitative mechanism in the application of the substituted judgment standard, if it provides to the physician a communication by the patient (when she or he was in a fit state of mind) of the desire for or restraint on being provided medical treatment in future – Conceptually, there is a second standard, which is the caregiver standard – This is founded on the principle of beneficence – The second standard seeks to apply an objective notion of a line of treatment which a reasonable individual would desire in the circumstances – The difference between these two standards is that the first seeks to reconstruct the subjective point of view of the patient – The second allows for “a more generic view of interests”, without having to rely on the “idiosyncratic values and preference of the patient in question”. (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) Advance Directives – Meaning and purpose – An advance medical directive is an individual’s advance exercise of his autonomy on the subject of extent of medical intervention that he wishes to allow upon his own body at a future date, when he may not be in a position to specify his wishes – The purpose and object of advance medical directive is to express the choice of a person regarding medical treatment in an event when he looses capacity to take a decision – Use and operation of advance medical directive is to confine only to a case when person becomes incapacitated to take an informed decision regarding his medical treatment – So long as
an individual can take an informed decision regarding his medical treatment, there is no occasion to look into advance medical directives. (Per Ashok Bhushan, J.) Advance Directives – Revocation of – A person has unfettered right to change or cancel his advance medical directives looking to the need of time and advancement in medical science – Hence, a person cannot be tied up or bound by his instructions given at an earlier point of time. (Per Ashok Bhushan, J.) Advance Directives – Possibility of misuse – Autonomy of an individual gives him right to choose his destiny and, therefore, he may decide before hand, in the form of advance directive, at what stage of his physical condition he would not like to have medical treatment, and on the other hand, there are dangers of misuse thereof as well – At the same time, possibility of misuse cannot be held to be a valid ground for rejecting advance directive, as opined by the Law Commission of India as well in its 196th and 241st Report – Instead, attempt can be made to provide safeguards for exercise of such advance directive – Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 – s.5 – Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act, 1994 – s.3. (Per A.K. Sikri, J.) Doctrines/Principles – Sanctity principle – “life should not always be maintained at any and all cost” – Euthanasia. (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) Interpretation of Statutes – Liberal construction – The language employed in the constitutional provision should be liberally construed, for such provision can never remain static – It is because fixity would mar the core which is not the intent. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]) Jurisprudence – Liberty impels an individual to change and life welcomes the change and the movement – Life does not intend to live sans liberty as it would be, in all possibility, a meaningless survival – There is no doubt that no fundamental right is absolute, but any restraint imposed on liberty has to be reasonable – Individual liberty aids in developing one’s growth of mind and assert individuality – She/he may not be in a position to rule others but individually, she/he has the authority over the body and mind. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.])
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Jurisprudence – Dignity – If a man is allowed to or, for that matter, forced to undergo pain, suffering and state of indignity because of unwarranted medical support, the meaning of dignity is lost and the search for meaning of life is in vain. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.])
Living Will – Specific guidelines laid down to test the validity of a living will, by whom it should be certified, when and how it should come into effect, etc. – The guidelines also cover a situation where there is no living will and how to approach a plea for passive euthanasia – Guidelines. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.])
Living Will – Whether a ‘living will’ or ‘advance directive’ should be legally recognised and can be enforced – Held: It is undisputed that Doctors’ primary duty is to provide treatment and save life but not in the case when a person has already expressed his desire of not being subjected to any kind of treatment – It is a common law right of people, of any civilized country, to refuse unwanted medical treatment and no person can force him/her to take any medical treatment which the person does not desire to continue with – Advance directives are instruments through which persons express their wishes at a prior point in time, when they are capable of making an informed decision, regarding their medical treatment in the future, when they are not in a position to make an informed decision, by reason of being unconscious or in a PVS or in a coma – A medical power of attorney is an instrument through which persons nominate representatives to make decisions regarding their medical treatment at a point in time when the persons executing the instrument are unable to make informed decisions themselves – Clause 11 of the draft Treatment of Terminally-III Patients (Protection of Patients and Medical Practitioners) Bill, 2016 states that advance directives or medical power of attorney shall be void and of no effect and shall not be binding on any medical practitioner – This blanket ban, including the failure even to give some weight to advance directives while making a decision about the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is disproportionate – It does not constitute a fair, just or reasonable procedure, which is a requirement for the imposition of a restriction on the right to life (in this case, expressed as the right to die with dignity) under Art.21.(Per A.K. Sikri, J.)
Mental Healthcare Act 2017 – Advance directives for persons with mental illness – Held: The Act recognises an advance directive – The Act provides that while making an advance directive, the maker should be major and indicate the manner in which he or she wishes or does not wish to be cared for and treated for a mental illness; and the person he or she appoints as a nominated representative – An advance directive is to be invoked only when the person who made it ceases to have the capacity to make mental healthcare treatment decisions – It remains effective until the maker regains the capacity to do so. (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) Medical profession – Medical ethics – History of ethical principles – Discussed. (Per Ashok Bhushan, J.) Words and Phrases – Advance medical, living will, advance medical power of attorney – Meaning of – Advance medical directive is, “a legal document explaining one’s wishes about medical treatment if one becomes incompetent or unable to communicate” – A living will, on the other hand, is a document prescribing a person’s wishes regarding the medical treatment the person would want if he was unable to share his wishes with the health care provider – Another type of advance medical directive is medical power of attorney – It is a document which allows an individual (principal) to appoint a trusted person (agent) to take health care decisions when the principal is not able to take such decisions. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]) Words and Phrases – Killing and letting die – Difference between, discussed. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]) Words and Phrases – Involuntary euthanasia, non-voluntary euthanasia, voluntary euthanasia, active euthanasia and passive euthanasia – Meaning of – Discussed. (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Disposing of the Writ petition, the Court HELD: Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]
1.1 The Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur’s case has referred to the decision in Airedale that has been recapitulated
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in Aruna Shanbaug case which was a case relating to withdrawal of artificial measures of continuance of life by the physician. The Constitution Bench noted that Airedale held that in the context of existence in the persistent vegetative state of no benefit to the patient, the principle of sanctity of life, which is the concern of the State, was not an absolute one. The bench further noticed that in Airedale, it had been stated that in such cases also, the existing crucial distinction between cases in which a physician decides not to provide or to continue to provide, for his patient, treatment or care which could or might prolong his life, and those in which he decides, for example, by administering a lethal drug actively to bring his patient’s life to an end, was indicated. Thereafter, while again referring to Airedale case, the bench observed that it was a case relating to withdrawal of artificial measures for continuance of life by the physician. [Para 40][96C-F]
1.2 A careful reading of Gian Kaur shows narration, reference and notice of the view taken in Airedale case. The Court was concerned with the constitutional validity of Section 309 IPC that deals with attempt to commit suicide and Section 306 IPC that provides for abetment to commit suicide. The Constitution Bench, while distinguishing the case of a dying man who is terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative state and his termination or premature extinction of life, observed that the said category of cases may fall within the ambit of right to die with dignity as a part of right to life with dignity when death due to termination of natural life is inevitable and imminent and the process of natural death has commenced. The Constitution Bench further opined that the said cases do not amount to extinguishing the life but only amount to accelerating the process of natural death which has already commenced and, thereafter, the Bench stated that the debate with regard to physician assisted suicide remains inconclusive. The Bench has reiterated that the cases pertaining to premature extinction of life during the process of certain natural death of patients who are terminally ill or in persistent vegetative state were of assistance to interpret Article 21 of the Constitution to include therein the right to curtail the natural span of life. Gian Kaur has not decried euthanasia as a concept. On the contrary, it gives an indication that in such situations, it is the acceleration of
the process of dying which may constitute a part of right to life with dignity so that the period of suffering is reduced. There is a distinction between a positive or overt act to put an end to life by the person living his life and termination of life so that an individual does not remain in a vegetative state or, for that matter, when the death is certain because of terminal illness and he remains alive with the artificially assisted medical system. In Gian Kaur, while dealing with the attempt to commit suicide, the Court clearly held that when a man commits suicide, he has to undertake certain positive overt acts and the genesis of those acts cannot be tested to or be included within the protection of the expression “right to life” under Article 21 of the Constitution. It was also observed that a dignified procedure of death may include the right of a dying man to also die with dignity when the life is ebbing out. This is how the pronouncement in Gian Kaur has to be understood. It is also not the ratio of the authority in Gian Kaur that euthanasia has to be introduced only by a legislation. The Court has neither expressed any independent opinion nor has it approved the said part or the ratio as stated in Airedale. There has been only a reference to Airedale’s case and the view expressed therein as regards legislation. Therefore, the perception in Aruna Shanbaug that the Constitution Bench has approved the decision in Airedale is not correct.[Para 42][97-DH; 98-A-E] Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996) 2 SCC 648 : [1996] 3 SCR 697 – analysed.
1.3 The two-Judge Bench in Aruna Shanbaug. noted that Gian Kaur has approved the decision of the House of Lords in Airedale and observed that euthanasia could be made lawful only by legislation. This perception is not correct. [Para 43][98-G-H] Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug v. Union of India and others (2011) 4 SCC 454 : [2011] 4 SCR 1057 – Partly incorrect. Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. and others [1964] 1 SCR 332 : AIR 1963 SC 1295; Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another (1975) 2 SCC 148 : [1975] 3 SCR 946; People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India
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and another (1997) 1 SCC 301 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 321; P. Rathinam v. Union of India and another (1994) 3 SCC 394 – referred to.
Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland (1993) 2 WLR 316 : (1993) 1 All ER 821, HL – referred to 2.1 Right to refuse treatment: Any adult person of sound mind has a right to refuse medical treatment. This right stands on a different pedestal as compared to suicide, physician assisted suicide or even euthanasia. When a terminally ill patient refuses to take medical treatment, it can neither be termed as euthanasia nor as suicide. Albeit, both suicide and refusal to take treatment in case of terminal ailment shall result in the same consequences, that is, death, yet refusal to take treatment by itself cannot amount to suicide. In case of suicide, there has to be a self initiated positive action with a specific intention to cause one’s own death. On the other hand, a patient’s right to refuse treatment lacks his specific intention to die, rather it protects the patient from unwanted medical treatment. A patient refusing medical treatment merely allows the disease to take its natural course and if, in this process, death occurs, the cause for it would primarily be the underlying disease and not any self initiated act. [Para 131][134F-H; 135-A] Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health 111 L Ed 2d 224 : 497 US 261 (1990) : 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990); Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General) 85 C.C.C. (3d) 15 : (1993) 3 S.C.R. 519; Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] 2 WLR 140: [1990] 3 All ER 930 : [1991] Fam 33; Washington v. Glucksberg 138 L Ed 2d 772 : 521 US 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill 138 L Ed 2d 834 : 521 US 793 (1997); In the matter of Claire C. Conroy 98 N.J. 321 (1985) : (1985) 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J.); F v. West Berkshire Health Authority [1989] 2 All ER 545 : [1990] 2 AC 1; Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582 : [1957] 2 All ER 118; Re Quinlan 355 A. 2d 647 : (1976) 70 NJ 10; Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz (1977) 373 Mass 728: 370 N.E. 2d 417
(1977); In re F (Mental Patient : Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 : [1989] 2 WLR 1025 : [1989] 2 All ER 545; In re B (A Minor) (Wardship : Medical Treatment)[1981] 1 WLR 1424 : [1990] 3 All ER 927; In re J (A Minor) (Wardship : Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam 33 : [1990] 3 All ER 930 : [1991] 2 WLR 140; R (on the application of Pretty) v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2002] 1 All ER 1 : [2001] UKHL 61; In re B (Consent to Treatment – Capacity) [2002] 1 FLR 1090 : [2002] 2 All ER 449; R (on the application of Nicklinson and another) v. Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38; Hunter and New England Area Health Service v. A [2009] NSWSC 761; Brightwater Care Group (Inc.) v. Rossiter [2009] WASC 229 : 40 WAR 84; Australian Capital Territory v. JT [2009] ACTSC 105; Auckland Area Health Board v. Attorney-General [1993] NZLR 235; Messiha v. South East Health [2004] NSWSC 1061; Carter v. Canada (Attorney General) (2015) SCC 5; Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital (1914) 105 NE 92 : (1914) 211 NY 125; F v. R (1983) 33 SASR 189 at 193; Rogers v. Whitaker [1992] HCA 58 : (1992) 175 CLR 479 at 487; Malette v. Shulman 67 DLR (4 th) 321 (1990) : 72 OR (2d) 417; Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services (NT) v. JWB and SMB (1992) 66 AJLR 300 : (1992) 175 CLR 218; Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] EWCA Civ 3093 : [1997] 2 FLR 426; Pretty v. United Kingdom (application no. 2346/02) [2002] ECHR 423 (29 April, 2002); Hass v. Switzerland (application no. 31322/07) [2011] ECHR 2422 : (2011) 53 EHRR 33; Lambert and others v. France (application no. 46043/14) [2015] ECHR 185 – referred to. 3.2 There is a presumption of capacity whereby an adult is presumed to have the capacity to consent to or to refuse medical treatment unless and until that presumption is rebutted. The consent may be vitiated if the individual concerned may not have been competent in law to give or refuse that consent; or even if the individual was competent in law, the decision has been obtained
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by undue influence or some other vitiating means; or the apparent consent or refusal does not extend to the particular situation; or the terms of the consent or refusal are ambiguous or uncertain; or if the consent or refusal is based on incorrect information or incorrect assumption. In circumstances where it is practicable for a medical practitioner to obtain consent to treatment, then, for the consent to be valid, it must be based on full information, including as to its risks and benefits. Where it is not practicable for a medical practitioner to obtain consent for treatment and where the patient’s life is in danger if appropriate treatment is not given, then the treatment may be administered without consent. This is justified by what is sometimes called the “emergency principle” or “principle of necessity”. Usually, the medical practitioner treats the patient in accordance with his clinical judgment of what is in the patient’s best interests. [Paras 134, 135][135-E-G; 136-A-B]
4.1 Passive Euthanasia in the context of Art.21 of the Constitution: The word ‘liberty’ is the sense and realization of choice of the attributes associated with the said choice; and the term ‘life’ is the aspiration to possess the same in a dignified manner. The two are intrinsically interlinked. Liberty impels an individual to change and life welcomes the change and the movement. Life does not intend to live sans liberty as it would be, in all possibility, a meaningless survival. No fundamental right is absolute, but any restraint imposed on liberty has to be reasonable. Individual liberty aids in developing one’s growth of mind and assert individuality. She/he may not be in a position to rule others but individually, she/he has the authority over the body and mind. The liberty of personal sovereignty over body and mind strengthens the faculties in a person. [Para 138][136G-H; 137-A-B]
Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni and others (1983) 1 SCC 124 : [1983] 1 SCR 828; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and another (1978) 1 SCC 248 : [1978] 2 SCR 621; State of Andhra Pradesh v. Challa Ramkrishna Reddy and others AIR 2000 SC 2083 : (2000) 5 SCC 712 : [2000] 3 SCR 644 – relied on.
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital 261 US 525, 568(1923) – referred to. 4.2 The interpretation of the Constitution, especially fundamental rights, has to be dynamic and it is only such interpretative dynamism that breathes life into the written words. As far as Article 21 is concerned, it is imperative to mention that dynamism can, of course, infuse life into life and liberty as used in the said Article. The language employed in the constitutional provision should be liberally construed, for such provision can never remain static. [Paras 145, 149][139-C-D; 141-F] Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and another v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another (1986) 3 SCC 156 : [1986] 2 SCR 278; M. Nagaraj and others v. Union of India and others (2006) 8 SCC 212 : [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336; V.C. Rangadurai v. D. Gopalan and others (1979) 1 SCC 308 : [1979] 1 SCR 1054 – relied on. 5.1 Individual Dignity as a facet of Article 21: Dignity of an individual has been internationally recognized as an important facet of human rights in the year 1948 itself with the enactment of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Human dignity not only finds place in the Preamble of this important document but also in Article 1 of the same. Law gladly takes cognizance of the fact that dignity is the most sacred possession of a man. And the said possession neither loses its sanctity in the process of dying nor evaporates when death occurs. As part of the right to die with dignity in case of a dying man who is terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative state, only passive euthanasia would come within the ambit of Article 21 and not the one which would fall within the description of active euthanasia in which positive steps are taken either by the treating physician or some other person. [Paras 150, 155, 159][141-G-H; 142-A; 144-G; 147-D-E] K.S. Puttaswamy and another v. Union of India and others (2017) 10 SCC 1 : [2017] 10 SCR 569 – followed. Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh and others (2012) 8 SCC 1 : [2012] 8 SCR 651; Vikas Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2016) 9 SCC 541
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: [2016] 8 SCR 872; Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 1 SCC 608 : [1981] 2 SCR 516; National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and others (2014) 5 SCC 438; Shabnam v. Union of India and another (2015) 6 SCC 702 : [2015] 8 SCR 289 – relied on.
Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 588; S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 – referred to. 5.2 The law must take cognizance of the changing society and march in consonance with the developing concepts. The immediate needs are required to be addressed through the process of interpretation by the Court unless the same totally falls outside the constitutional framework or the constitutional interpretation fails to recognize such dynamism. The right to life with dignity has to include the smoothening of the process of dying when the person is in a vegetative state or is living exclusively by the administration of artificial aid that prolongs the life by arresting the dignified and inevitable process of dying. Here, the issue of choice also comes in. Thus analysed, such a right should come within the ambit of Article 21 of the Constitution. [Para 160][147-F-H; 148-G-H] 6. Right of self-determination and individual autonomy: As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, it is generally clear that whenever there is a conflict between a capable adult’s exercise of the right of self-determination and the State’s interest in preserving human life by treating it as sanctimonious, the right of the individual must prevail. In the United States, the aspect of self-determination and individual autonomy is concretised in law as all fifty States along with the District of Columbia, the capital, which is commonly referred as Washington D.C., have passed legislations upholding different forms of Advance Directives. The Canadian Criminal Code asserts and protects the sanctity of life in a number of ways which directly confront the autonomy of the terminally ill in their medical decision making. However, the Supreme Court of Canada in Reibl v. Hughes approved an oftquoted statement of Cardozo J. in Scholoendorf that “every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body” and Chief Justice Laskin in Reibl has further added that battery would lie where surgery or treatment was performed without consent or where apart from emergency situations, surgery or medical treatment was given beyond that to which there was consent. Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada suggested that competent adults have the right to make their own medical decisions even if such decisions are unwise. Enquiring into common law and statutory rights of terminally ill persons in other jurisdictions would indicate that all adults with the capacity to consent have the common law right to refuse medical treatment and the right of self determination. However, doctors would be bound by the choice of self-determination made by the patient who is terminally ill and undergoing a prolonged medical treatment or is surviving on life support, subject to being satisfied that the illness of the patient is incurable and there is no hope of his being cured. Any other consideration cannot pass off as being in the best interests of the patient. [Paras 164, 165, 166, 168, 169][150-A-B, F-G; 151-C-E] Reeves v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360, 379; Re Jobes (1987) 108 N.J. 394; Reibl v. Hughes [1980] 2 SCR 880 – referred to.
7.1 Social Morality, medical ethicality and State Interest: The society at large may feel that a patient should be treated till he breathes his last breath and the treating physicians may feel that they are bound by their Hippocratic oath which requires them to provide treatment and save life and not to put an end to life by not treating the patient. The members of the family may remain in a constant state of hesitation being apprehensive of many a social factor which include immediate claim of inheritance, social stigma and, sometimes, the individual guilt. The Hippocratic oath taken by a doctor may make him feel that there has been a failure on his part and sometimes also make him feel scared of various laws. There can be allegations against him for negligence or criminal culpability. In this regard, two aspects are to be borne in mind. First, withdrawal of treatment in an irreversible situation is different from not treating or attending to a patient and second, once passive euthanasia is recognized in law regard being had to the right to die with dignity when life is ebbing out and when the
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prolongation is done sans purpose, neither the social morality nor the doctors’ dilemma or fear will have any place. It is because the sustenance of dignity and self-respect of an individual is inhered in the right of an individual pertaining to life and liberty and there is necessity for this protection. And once the said right comes within the shelter of Article 21 of the Constitution, the social perception and the apprehension of the physician or treating doctor regarding facing litigation should be treated as secondary because the primacy of the right of an individual in this regard has to be kept on a high pedestal.[Paras 170, 171][151-F-H; 152A-C]
7.2 Passive euthanasia fundamentally connotes absence of any overt act either by the patient or by the doctors. It also does not involve any kind of overt act on the part of the family members. It is avoidance of unnecessary intrusion in the physical frame of a person, for the inaction is meant for smooth exit from life. It is paramount for an individual to protect his dignity as an inseparable part of the right to life which engulfs the dignified process of dying sans pain, sans suffering and, most importantly, sans indignity. There are philosophers, thinkers and also scientists who feel that life is not confined to the physical frame and biological characteristics. But there is no denial of the fact that life in its connotative expanse intends to search for its meaning and find the solution of the riddle of existence for which some lean on atheism and some vouchsafe for faith and yet some stand by the ideas of an agnostic. However, the legal fulcrum has to be how Article 21 of the Constitution is understood. If a man is allowed to or, for that matter, forced to undergo pain, suffering and state of indignity because of unwarranted medical support, the meaning of dignity is lost and the search for meaning of life is in vain. [Paras 172, 173][152-C-F] 8. Advance Directive/Advance Care Directive/Advance Medical Directive: In order to overcome the difficulty faced in case of patients who are unable to express their wishes at the time of taking the decision, the concept of Advance Medical Directives emerged in various countries. Advance Directives for health care go by various names in different countries though the objective by and large is the same, that is, to specify an
individual’s health care decisions and to identify persons who will take those decisions for the said individual in the event he is unable to communicate his wishes to the doctor. The agent appointed to deal with such issues can interpret the principal’s decisions based on their mutual knowledge and understanding. [Paras 177, 178, 180][154-B, D-E, G] 9. Advance medical directive ideal in our country
9.1 Advance Medical Directive cannot operate in abstraction. There are certain safeguards for operating it. It can be executed only by an adult who is of a sound and healthy state of mind and in a position to communicate, relate and comprehend the purpose and consequences of executing the document. It must be voluntarily executed and without any coercion or inducement or compulsion and after having full knowledge or information. It should have characteristics of an informed consent given without any undue influence or constraint. It shall be in writing clearly stating as to when medical treatment may be withdrawn or no specific medical treatment shall be given which will only have the effect of delaying the process of death that may otherwise cause him/her pain, anguish and suffering and further put him/her in a state of indignity. It should clearly indicate the decision relating to the circumstances in which withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment can be resorted to. It should be in specific terms and the instructions must be absolutely clear and unambiguous. It should mention that the executor may revoke the instructions/authority at any time. It should disclose that the executor has understood the consequences of executing such a document. It should specify the name of a guardian or close relative who, in the event of the executor becoming incapable of taking decision at the relevant time, will be authorized to give consent to refuse or withdraw medical treatment in a manner consistent with the Advance Directive. In the event that there is more than one valid Advance Directive, none of which have been revoked, the most recently signed Advance Directive will be considered as the last expression of the patient’s wishes and will be given effect to. [Para 191][158-D-H; 159-A-E] 9.2 The document should be signed by the executor in the presence of two attesting witnesses, preferably independent, and
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA
countersigned by the jurisdictional Judicial Magistrate of First Class (JMFC) so designated by the concerned District Judge. The witnesses and the jurisdictional JMFC shall record their satisfaction that the document has been executed voluntarily and with full understanding of all the relevant information and consequences. The JMFC shall forward one copy of the document to the Registry of the jurisdictional District Court for being preserved. Additionally, the Registry of the District Judge shall retain the document in digital format. The JMFC shall cause to inform the immediate family members of the executor, if not present at the time of execution, and make them aware about the execution of the document. A copy shall be handed over to the competent officer of the local Government or the Municipal Corporation or Municipality or Panchayat, as the case may be. The JMFC shall cause to handover copy of the Advance Directive to the family physician, if any. In the event the executor becomes terminally ill and is undergoing prolonged medical treatment with no hope of recovery and cure of the ailment, the treating physician, when made aware about the Advance Directive, shall ascertain the genuineness and authenticity thereof from the jurisdictional JMFC before acting upon the same. The instructions in the document must be given due weight by the doctors. However, it should be given effect to only after being fully satisfied that the executor is terminally ill and is undergoing prolonged treatment or is surviving on life support and that the illness of the executor is incurable or there is no hope of him/her being cured. If the physician treating the patient (executor of the document) is satisfied that the instructions given in the document need to be acted upon, he shall inform the executor or his guardian/close relative, as the case may be, about the nature of illness, the availability of medical care and consequences of alternative forms of treatment and the consequences of remaining untreated. He must also ensure that he believes on reasonable grounds that the person in question understands the information provided, has cogitated over the options and has come to a firm view that the option of withdrawal or refusal of medical treatment is the best choice. The physician/hospital where the executor has been admitted for medical treatment shall then constitute a Medical Board consisting of the Head of the treating Department and at
least three experts from the fields of general medicine, cardiology, neurology, nephrology, psychiatry or oncology who, in turn, shall visit the patient in the presence of his guardian/close relative and form an opinion whether to certify or not to certify carrying out the instructions of withdrawal or refusal of further medical treatment. This decision shall be regarded as a preliminary opinion. In the event the Hospital Medical Board certifies that the instructions contained in the Advance Directive ought to be carried out, the physician/hospital shall forthwith inform the jurisdictional Collector about the proposal who shall then immediately constitute a Medical Board comprising the Chief District Medical Officer of the concerned district as the Chairman and three expert doctors. They shall jointly visit the hospital where the patient is admitted and if they concur with the initial decision of the Medical Board of the hospital, they may endorse the certificate to carry out the instructions given in the Advance Directive. The Board constituted by the Collector must beforehand ascertain the wishes of the executor if he is in a position to communicate and is capable of understanding the consequences of withdrawal of medical treatment. In the event the executor is incapable of taking decision or develops impaired decision making capacity, then the consent of the guardian nominated by the executor in the Advance Directive should be obtained regarding refusal or withdrawal of medical treatment to the executor to the extent of and consistent with the clear instructions given in the Advance Directive. The Chairman of the Medical Board nominated by the Collector, that is, the Chief District Medical Officer, shall convey the decision of the Board to the jurisdictional JMFC before giving effect to the decision to withdraw the medical treatment administered to the executor. The JMFC shall visit the patient at the earliest and, after examining all aspects, authorise the implementation of the decision of the Board. It will be open to the executor to revoke the document at any stage before it is acted upon and implemented. [Para 191][159-E-G; 160-A-H; 161-A-G; 162-CD] 9.3 If permission to withdraw medical treatment is refused by the Medical Board, it would be open to the executor of the Advance Directive or his family members or even the treating
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doctor or the hospital staff to approach the High Court by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court will be free to constitute an independent Committee consisting of three doctors. [Para 191][162-E-F]
9.4 Revocation or inapplicability of Advance Directive: An individual may withdraw or alter the Advance Directive at any time when he/she has the capacity to do so and by following the same procedure as provided for recording of Advance Directive. Withdrawal or revocation of an Advance Directive must be in writing. An Advance Directive shall not be applicable to the treatment in question if there are reasonable grounds for believing that circumstances exist which the person making the directive did not anticipate at the time of the Advance Directive and which would have affected his decision had he anticipated them. If the Advance Directive is not clear and ambiguous, the concerned Medical Boards shall not give effect to the same and, in that event, the guidelines meant for patients without Advance Directive shall be made applicable. Where the Hospital Medical Board takes a decision not to follow an Advance Directive while treating a person, then it shall make an application to the Medical Board constituted by the Collector for consideration and appropriate direction. [Para 191][163-B-F] 10. There will be cases where there is no Advance Directive. The said class of persons cannot be alienated. In cases where there is no Advance Directive, the procedure and safeguards are to be same as applied to cases where Advance Directives are in existence and in addition there to, the following procedure shall be followed:- (i) In cases where the patient is terminally ill and undergoing prolonged treatment in respect of ailment which is incurable or where there is no hope of being cured, the physician may inform the hospital which, in turn, shall constitute a Hospital Medical Board. In the event the Hospital Medical Board certifies the option of withdrawal or refusal of further medical treatment, the hospital shall immediately inform the jurisdictional Collector. The jurisdictional Collector shall then constitute a Medical Board who shall visit the hospital for physical examination of the patient and, after studying the medical papers, may concur with the opinion of the Hospital Medical Board. In that event, intimation shall be
given by the Chairman of the Collector nominated Medical Board to the JMFC and the family members of the patient. The JMFC shall visit the patient at the earliest and verify the medical reports, examine the condition of the patient, discuss with the family members of the patient and, if satisfied in all respects, may endorse the decision of the Collector nominated Medical Board to withdraw or refuse further medical treatment to the terminally ill patient. There may be cases where the Board may not take a decision to the effect of withdrawing medical treatment of the patient on the Collector nominated Medical Board may not concur with the opinion of the hospital Medical Board. In such a situation, the nominee of the patient or the family member or the treating doctor or the hospital staff can seek permission from the High Court to withdraw life support by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The directions with regard to the Advance Directives and these safeguards shall remain in force till the Parliament makes legislation on this subject. [Paras 193, 194][163-G-H; 164-A-E; 165-A, E] Vishaka and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others (1997) 6 SCC 241 : [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404 – relied on.
State of Himachal Pradesh and another v. Umed Ram Sharma and others (1986) 2 SCC 68 : AIR 1986 SC 847 : [1986] 1 SCR 251; Maruti Shripati Dubal v. State of Maharashtra 1987 Cri LJ 473 : (1986) 88 Bom LR 589; R.C. Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 2 SCC 298 : AIR 1970 SC 1318 : [1971] 1 SCR 512; Vikram Deo Singh Tomar v. State of Bihar (1988) Supp. SCC 734 : AIR 1988 SC 1782 : [1988] Suppl. SCR 755; Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India (1990) 1 SCC 613 : [1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 597; State of Kerala and another v. N.M. Thomas and others (1976) 2 SCC 310 : [1976] 1 SCR 906 – referred to.
Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. - 1. Patient’s consent – Consent gives an individual the ability to choose whether or not to accept the treatment that is offered. But consent does not confer on a patient the right to demand that a particular form of treatment be administered, even in the quest for death with
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dignity. Voluntary passive euthanasia, where death results from selective non-treatment because consent is withheld, is therefore legally permissible while voluntary active euthanasia is prohibited. Moreover, passive euthanasia is conceived with a purpose of not prolonging the life of the patient by artificial medical intervention. Both in the case of a withdrawal of artificial support as well as in non-intervention, passive euthanasia allows for life to ebb away and to end in the natural course. In contrast, active euthanasia results in the consequence of shortening life by a positive act of medical intervention. It is perhaps this distinction which necessitates legislative authorisation for active euthanasia, as differentiated from the passive. [Para 45][196-E-G]
Sushila Rao, “India and Euthanasia: The Poignant Case of Aruna Shanbaug”, Oxford Medical Law Review, Volume 19, Issue 4 (1 December 2011), at pages 646–656; “Humanization and Decriminalization of Attempt to Suicide”, Law Commission of India (Report No. 210, 2008); Rajeev Ranjan, et al, “(De-) Criminalization of Attempted Suicide in India: A Review”, Industrial Psychiatry Journal (2014), Vol. 23, issue 1, at page 4–9; D Benatar, “Should there be a legal right to die?” Current Oncology (2010), Vol. 17, Issue 5, at pages 2-3; Richard Delgado, “Euthanasia Reconsidered-The Choice of Death as an Aspect of the Right of Privacy”, Arizona Law Review (1975), Vol. 17, at page 474; Ratna Kapur, “The Spectre of Aruna Shanbaug”, The Wire (18 May 2015), available at ht tps :// t hew ire .in/2005/ the -spect re- of- arun ashanbaug/; Hazel Biggs, “Euthanasia, Death with Dignity and the Law”, Hart Publishing (2001), at page 12; James Rachels, “Active and Passive Euthanasia”, New England Journal of Medicine (January 9, 1975), at page 78-80; James Rachels, End of Life: Euthanasia and Morality (Oxford University Press, 1986); Bruce R. Reichenbach, “Euthanasia and the Active-Passive Distinction”, Bioethics (January 1987), Volume 1, at pages 51–73; Len Doyal and Lesley Doyal, “Why Active Euthanasia and Physician Assisted Suicide
Should Be Legalised/ If Death Is in a Patient’s Best Interest Then Death Constitutes a Moral Good”, British Medical Journal (2001), at pages 1079–1080; Rohini Shukla, “Passive Euthanasia in India: a critique”, Indian Journal of Medical Ethics (Jan-Mar 2016), at pages 35-38; Aparna Chandra and Mrinal Satish, “Misadventures of the Supreme Court in Aruna Shanbaug v Union of India”, Law and other Things (Mar 13, 2011), available at http:// lawandotherthings.com/2011/03/misadventures-ofsupreme-court- in-aruna/; Roop Gurusahani and Raj Kumar Mani, “India: Not a country to die in”, Indian Journal of Medical Ethics (Jan- Mar 2016), at pages 30-35; Anne J. Davis, “Dilemmas in Practice: To Make Live or Let Die”, The American Journal of Nursing (March 1981), Vol. 81, No. 3, at page 582; Heike Baranzke, “Sanctity-of-Life”—A Bioethical Principle for a Right to Life?”, Ethic Theory Moral Practice (2012), Vol. 15, Issue 3, page 295 – referred to. 2. Though the sanctity principle prohibits “the deliberate destruction of human life, it does not demand that life should always be prolonged for as long as possible”. While providing for an intrinsic sacred value to life “irrespective of the person’s capacity to enjoy life and notwithstanding that a person may feel their life to be a great burden”, the principle holds that “life should not always be maintained at any and all cost”. Ethical proponents of the sanctity of life tend to agree that when “medical treatment, such as ventilator and probably also antibiotics, can do nothing to restore those in permanent vegetative state to a state of health and well-functioning, it is futile and need not be provided”. [Para 60][203-C-E] 3. Life and natural death: The defenders of the sanctity principle place sacred value to human life from “conception to natural death”. The word “natural” implies that “the only acceptable death is one that occurs from natural causes”. Life is only “sacred insofar as it ends by natural means”. Medical advancements, however, have brought uncertainty about the definition of death? “what constitutes death, in particular a
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“natural” death”. Medical advances have “complicated the question of when life ends”. There exists no natural death where artificial technology is concerned. Technology by artificial means can prolong life. In doing so, technology has re-shaped both human experience as well as our values about life in a natural state and its end by natural causes. Modern medicine has found ways to prolong life and to delay death. But, it does not imply that modern medicine “necessarily prolongs our living a full and robust life because in some cases it serves only to prolong mere biological existence during the act of dying”. This may, in certain situations result in a mere “prolongation of a heart-beat that activates the husk of a mindless, degenerating body that sustains an unknowing and pitiable life-one without vitality, health or any opportunity for normal existence-an inevitable stage in the process of dying”. [Paras 66, 67, 68][209-B-C, D, F-G; 210-A]
4.1 The sanctity of human life lies in its intrinsic value. It inheres in nature and is recognised by natural law. But human lives also have instrumental functions. Our lives enable us to fulfil our needs and aspirations. The intrinsic worth of life is not conditional on what it seeks to or is capable to achieve. Life is valuable because it is. The Indian Constitution protects the right to life as the supreme right, which is inalienable and inviolable even in times of Emergency. It clearly recognises that every human being has the inherent right to life, which is protected by law, and that “No person shall be deprived of his life… except according to procedure established by law”. It, thus, envisages only very limited circumstances where a person can be deprived of life. [Para 73][212-D-F]
Pt. Parmanand Katara v. Union of India AIR 1989 SC 2039 – relied on. Great Ormond Street Hospital v. Constance Yates, Christopher Gard, Charlie Gard (by his guardian), [2017] EWHC 1909 (Fam) – referred to.
John Keown, The Law and Ethics of Medicine: Essays on the Inviolability of Human Life (Oxford University Press, 2012), at page 3; John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (ed. P. Laslett) (Cambridge University
Press, 1988); Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia (Harper Collins, 1993), at pages 73-74; John Finnis, Human Rights and Common Good (Oxford University Press, 2011), at page 221; Alexandra Mullock, End-Of-Life Law And Assisted Dying In The 21st Century: Time For Cautious Revolution? (PhD Thesis, University of Manchester, 2011), at page 24; Luis Kutner, “Euthanasia: Due Process for Death with Dignity; The Living Will”, Indiana Law Journal (Winter 1979), Vol. 54, Issue, 2, at page 225; Sushila Rao, “The Moral Basis for a Right to Die”, Economic & Political Weekly (April 30, 2011), at page 14; Alexandra Mullock, EndOf-Life Law And Assisted Dying In The 21st Century: Time For Cautious Revolution? (PhD Thesis, University of Manchester, 2011), at page 25; John Keown, “The Legal Revolution: From “Sanctity of Life” to “Quality of Life” and “Autonomy”, Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1995) Vo. 14, Issue 2, at page 281; Margaret A. Somerville, “The Song of Death: The Lyrics of Euthanasia”, Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1993), Vol. 9, Issue 1, at page 67; Jessica Stern, Euthanasia and the Terminally Ill (2013), retrieved from Florida State University Libraries; Roger S. Magnusson, “The Sanctity of Life and the Right to Die: Social and Jurisprudential Aspects of the Euthanasia Debate in Australia and the United States”, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, Vol. 6, No. I, at page 40; Peter Singer, “Sanctity of Life or Quality of Life”, Pediatrics (1983), Vo. 72, Issue 1, at pages 128-129; Sanctity of life vs. quality of life”, Los Angeles Times (June 7, 2015), available a http://www.latimes.com/opinion/ readersreact /la-le-0607-sunday-assisted-suicide20150607-story.html; Jessica Stern, Euthanasia and the Terminally Ill (2013), available at https:// fsu.digital.flvc.org/islandora/object/fsu:209909/ datastream/PDF; John Breck, “Euthanasia and the Quality of Life Debate”, Christian Bioethics (1995),
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Vol. 1, No.3, at pages 322-337; Michael A Weingarten, “On the sanctity of life”, British Journal of General Practice (April 2007), Vol. 57(537), at page 333; Alecia Pasdera, The Rhetoric of the Physician-Assisted Suicide Movement: Choosing Death Over Life (2014), available at https://ou.monmouthcollege.edu/_resources/pdf/ academics/mjur/ 2014/Rhetoric-of-the-PhysicianAssisted-Suicide-Movement-Choosing-Death-OverLife.pdf, at page 68; Arval A. Morris, “Voluntary Euthanasia”, Washington Law Review (1970), Vol. 45, at page 240; Lady Justice Arden, Law of medicine and the individual: current issues, What does patient autonomy mean for the courts?, (Justice KT Desai Memorial Lecture 2017) – referred to.
4.2 Human dignity has been “considered the unique universal value that inspires the major common bioethical principles, and it is therefore considered the noyau dur of both international bio law and international human rights law”. The first idea considers dignity as the foundation of human rights? “that dignity relates to the intrinsic value of persons (such that it is wrong to treat persons as mere things rather than as autonomous ends or agents)”. According to this premise, every person, from conception to natural death, possesses inherent dignity. The other interpretation of dignity is by the supporters of euthanasia. For them, right to lead a healthy life also includes leaving the world in a peaceful and dignified manner. Living with dignity, in this view, means the right to live a meaningful life having certain quality. This interpretation endorses the “quality of life” proposition. [Paras 74, 75][213-A-C, E] Stefania Negri, “Universal Human Rights and End-ofLife Care” in S. Negri et al. (eds.), Advance Care Decision Making in Germany and Italy: A Comparative, European and International Law Perspective, Springer (2013), at page 18; Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion (London: HarperCollins, 1993) as quoted in Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, “Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Human Genetics”, Modern Law Review (1998), Vol. 61, at pages 665-666; Deryck
Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, “Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Human Genetics”, Modern Law Review (1998), Vol. 61, at page 666; Stefania Negri, “Ending Life and Death” in A. den Exter (eds.), European Health Law, MAKLU Press (2017), at page 241; Sebastian Muders, Autonomy and the Value of Life as Elements of Human Dignity (Oxford University Press, 2017); LW Sumner, “Dignity through Thick and Thin”, in Sebastian Muders, Human Dignity and Assisted Death (Oxford University Press, 2017); Aneeta A Minocha, Arima Mishra and Vivek R Minocha, “Euthanasia: A Social Science Perspective”, Economic & Political Weekly (December 3, 2011), at pages 25-28 – referred to. 5.1 Under our Constitution, the inherent value which sanctifies life is the dignity of existence. Recognising human dignity is intrinsic to preserving the sanctity of life. Life is truly sanctified when it is lived with dignity. There exists a close relationship between dignity and the quality of life. For, it is only when life can be lived with a true sense of quality that the dignity of human existence is fully realized. Hence, there should be no antagonism between the sanctity of human life on the one hand and the dignity and quality of life on the other hand. Quality of life ensures dignity of living and dignity is but a process in realizing the sanctity of life. [Para 80][216-F; 217-A] 5.2 Human dignity is an essential element of a meaningful existence. A life of dignity comprehends all stages of living including the final stage which leads to the end of life. Liberty and autonomy are essential attributes of a life of substance. It is liberty which enables an individual to decide upon those matters which are central to the pursuit of a meaningful existence. The expectation that the individual should not be deprived of his or her dignity in the final stage of life gives expression to the central expectation of a fading life: control over pain and suffering and the ability to determine the treatment which the individual should receive. When society assures to each individual a protection against being subjected to degrading treatment in the process of dying, it seeks to assure basic human dignity. [Para 81][217-B-D]
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5.3 Dignity in the process of dying as well as dignity in death reflects a long yearning through the ages that the passage away from life should be bereft of suffering. These individual yearnings are enhanced by the experiences of sharing, observing and feeling with others: the loss of a parent, spouse, friend or an acquaintance to the cycle of life. Dignity in death has a sense of realism that permeates the right to life. It has a basic connect with the autonomy of the individual and the right to selfdetermination. Loss of control over the body and the mind are portents of the deprivation of liberty. As the end of life approaches, a loss of control over human faculties denudes life of its meaning. Terminal illness hastens the loss of faculties. Control over essential decisions about how an individual should be treated at the end of life is hence an essential attribute of the right to life. Corresponding to the right is a legitimate expectation that the State must protect it and provide a just legal order in which the right is not denied. In matters as fundamental as death and the process of dying, each individual is entitled to a reasonable expectation of the protection of his or her autonomy by a legal order founded on the rule of law. A constitutional expectation of providing dignity in death is protected by Article 21 and is enforceable against the State. [Para 82][218-B-E] 6.1 The nine-judge Bench decision of this Court in Justice K.S. Puttuswamy case held privacy to be the constitutional core of human dignity. The right to privacy was held to be an intrinsic part of the right to life and liberty under Article 21 and protected under Part III of the Constitution. [Para 83][218-F] Justice KS Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 – followed. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 : [1978] 2 SCR 621; Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 1 SCC 608 : [1981] 2 SCR 516 – relied on. 6.2 The protective mantle of privacy covers certain decisions that fundamentally affect the human life cycle. It protects the most personal and intimate decisions of individuals that affect their life and development. Thus, choices and decisions on matters such as procreation, contraception and marriage have been held
to be protected. While death is an inevitable end in the trajectory of the cycle of human life, individuals are often faced with choices and decisions relating to death. Decisions relating to death, like those relating to birth, sex, and marriage, are protected by the Constitution by virtue of the right of privacy. The right to privacy resides in the right to liberty and in the respect of autonomy. The right to privacy protects autonomy in making decisions related to the intimate domain of death as well as bodily integrity. Continuing treatment against the wishes of a patient is not only a violation of the principle of informed consent, but also of bodily privacy and bodily integrity that have been recognised as a facet of privacy by this Court. Just as people value having control over decisions during their lives such as where to live, which occupation to pursue, whom to marry, and whether to have children, so people value having control over whether to continue living when the quality of life deteriorates. [Paras 84, 85][220-B-D] Richard Delgado, “Euthanasia Reconsidered-The Choice of Death as an Aspect of the Right of Privacy”, Arizona Law Review (1975), Vol. 17, at page 474; TL Beauchamp, “The Right to Privacy and the Right to Die”, Social Philosophy and Policy (2000), Vol. 17, at page 276; 70 N.J. 10; 355 A.2d 647 (1976); Peter J. Riga, “Privacy and the Right to Die,” The Catholic Lawyer (2017) Vol. 26: No. 2 , Article 2 – referred to. 7. Privacy recognises that the body and mind are inviolable. An essential attribute of this inviolability is the ability of the individual to refuse medical treatment. [Para 90][223-B] 8. Socio-Economic Concerns – One of the limitations of contemporary debates on euthanasia is that they do not take into consideration “certain socio-economic concerns that must necessarily be factored into any discourse”. This has been criticised as making the debate around ending life “incomplete” as well as “elitist”. The inadequacies of the range and reach of Indian healthcare may lead to a situation where euthanasia/active euthanasia may become “an instrument of cost containment”. [Paras 91, 92][223-C; 224-E] S Nagral, “Euthanasia: Cost Factor is a Worry”, The Times of India (June 19, 2011), available at http:// www.timesofindia.com/home/sunday/Euthanasia-cost-
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factor-is-a-worry/articleshow/7690155.cms – referred to. 9. Restraints on judicial power: It is only Parliament which can in its legislative wisdom decide whether active euthanasia should be permitted. Passive euthanasia on the other hand would not implicate a criminal offence since the decision to withhold or withdraw artificial life support after taking into account the best interest of the patient would not constitute an illegal omission prohibited by law. [Para 93][225-C] Noel Douglas Conway v. The Secretary of State for Justice (2017) EWHC 2447 (Admin) – referred to. S Balakrishnan and RK Mani, “The constitutional and legal provisions in Indian law for limiting life support”, Indian Journal of Critical Care Medicine (2005), Vol. 9, Issue 2, at page 108 – referred to.
10.1 Penal provisions: The legality of and constitutional protection which is afforded to passive euthanasia cannot be read in isolation from the provisions of the Penal Code. Physicians are apprehensive about their civil or criminal liability when called upon to decide whether to limit life-supporting treatment. A decision on the constitutional question cannot be rendered without analyzing the statutory context and the impact of penal provisions. The decision in Aruna Shanbaug did not dwell on the provisions of the Penal Code (apart from Sections 306 and 309) which have a vital bearing on the issue of euthanasia. Undoubtedly, constitutional positions are not controlled by statutory provisions, because the Constitution rises above and controls legislative mandates. But, in the present reference where no statutory provision is called into question, it is necessary for the court to analyse the relationship between what the statute penalizes and what the Constitution protects. The task of interpretation is to allow for their co-existence while interpreting the statute to give effect to constitutional principle. This is particularly so in an area such as the present where criminal law may bear a significant relationship to the fundamental constitutional principles of liberty, dignity and autonomy. [Para 95][226-H; 227-A-C] 10.2 Our law of crimes deals with acts and omissions. Section 32 of the Penal Code places acts and omissions on the same plane.
An illegal omission (unless a contrary intent appears in the Code) is proscribed when the act is unlawful. The language of the statute which refers to acts applies, unless a contrary intent appears in the text, to omissions. The next aspect is about when an act or omission is illegal. Section 43 explains the concept of illegality. Here again, being legally bound to do something is the mirror image of what is illegal to omit doing. Section 43 comprehends within the meaning of illegality, that (i) which is an offence; or (ii) which is prohibited by law; or (iii) which furnishes a ground for a civil action. Section 81 protects acts which are done without a criminal intent to cause harm, in good faith, to prevent or avoid other harm to person or property. The law protects the action though it was done with the knowledge that it was likely to cause harm if a three-fold requirement is fulfilled.[Para 95][227-D, F; 228-A, C] 10.3 Section 92 protects an individual from a consequence which arises from the doing of an act for the benefit of another in good faith, though a harm is caused to the other. What was done is protected because it was done in good faith. Good faith is distinguished from an evil design. When a person does something to protect another from a harm or injury, the law protects what was done in good faith, treating the harm that may result as a consequence unintended by the doer of the act. This protection is afforded by the law even in the absence of consent when the circumstances are such that it is impossible for the person for whose benefit the act was done to consent to it. This may arise where the imminence of the apprehended danger makes it impossible to obtain consent. Another eventuality is where the individual is incapable of consenting (by being incapacitated in mind) and there is no person in the position of a guardian or person in lawful charge from whom consent can be obtained in time to perform the act for the benefit of that person. However, the first proviso to Section 92 makes it clear that the exception does not extend to the intentional causing of death or attempt to cause death to the individual, howsoever it may be for the benefit of the other. Abetment embodies a three-fold requirement: first an intentional aiding, second the aiding of an act or illegal omission and third, that this must be toward the doing of that thing. It presupposes a course of conduct or action which facilitates another
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to end life. Hence abetment of suicide is an offence expressly punishable under Sections 305 and 306 of the IPC. [Paras 95, 96][229-A-E, F; 230-A-B]
10.5 Active euthanasia involves an intention on the part of the doctor to cause the death of the patient. Such cases fall under the first clause of Section 300. There also exists a distinction between active and passive euthanasia. This is brought out in the application of the doctrine of ‘double effect’. Active euthanasia involves an intention to cause the death of the patient. Passive euthanasia does not embody an intent to cause death. A doctor may withhold life support to ensure that the life of a patient who is in the terminal stage of an incurable illness or in a permanent vegetative state, is not prolonged artificially. The decision to do so is not founded upon an intent to cause death but to allow the life of the patient to continue till and cease at the end of its natural term. Placing such a person on life support would have been an intervention in the natural process of death. The crucial element in Section 299 is provided by the expression “causes death”. In a case involving passive euthanasia, the affliction of the patient is not brought about either by an act or omission of the doctor. Hence, a decision by the doctor based on what is in the best interest of the patient precludes an intent to cause death. Similarly, withdrawal of artificial life support is not motivated by an intent to cause death. What a withdrawal of life support does is not to artificially prolong life. The end of life is brought about by the inherent condition of the patient. [Paras 97, 98][230-G; 231-D, G; 232-A-C, E] “Doctrine of Double Effect”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (July 28, 2004), available at https:// plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/ - referred to. 10.6 Section 43 of the Penal Code defines the expression illegal to mean “…everything which is an offence or which is prohibited by law, or which furnishes ground in a civil action”. Withdrawing life support to a person in a permanently vegetative state or in a terminal stage of illness is not ‘prohibited by law’. Such an act would also not fall outside the purview of Section 92 for the reason that there is no intentional causing of death or attempt to cause death. Where a decision to withdraw artificial
life support is made in the caregiver of the patient, it fulfils the duty of care required from a doctor towards the patient. Where a doctor has acted in fulfilment of a duty of care owed to the patient, the medical judgment underlying the decision protects it from a charge of illegality. Such a decision is not founded on an intention to cause death or on the knowledge that it is likely to cause death. An act done in pursuance of the duty of care owed by the doctor to a patient is not prohibited by law. The intent in passive euthanasia is not to cause death. A decision not to prolong life beyond its natural span by withholding or withdrawing artificial life support or medical intervention cannot be equated with an intent to cause death. [Paras 99, 100][233-B-D, G] 11. In 2006, the Law Commission of India submitted its 196th Report titled “Medical Treatment to Terminally Ill Patients (Protection of Patients and Medical Practitioners)”. The report by Justice M Jagannadha Rao as Chairperson contains a succinct elucidation of legal principles governing criminal law on the subject. Some of them are explained as follows: An informed decision of a patient to refuse medical treatment is accepted at common law and is binding on a treating doctor. While a doctor has a duty of care, a doctor who obeys the instructions of a competent patient to withhold or withdraw medical treatment does not commit a breach of professional duty and the omission to treat will not be an offence; The decision of a patient to allow nature to take its course over the human body and, in consequence, not to be subjected to medical intervention, does not amount to a deliberate termination of physical existence. Allowing nature to take its course and a decision to not receive medical treatment does not constitute an attempt to commit suicide within the meaning of Section 309 of the Penal Code; Once a competent patient has decided not to accept medical intervention, and to allow nature to take its course, the action of the treating doctor in abiding by those wishes is not an offence, nor would it amount to an abetment under Section 306. Under Section 107, an omission has to be illegal to constitute an abetment. A doctor bound by the instructions of a patient to withhold or withdraw medical treatment is not guilty of an illegal act or an abetment. The doctor is bound by the decision of the patient to refuse medical intervention; A doctor who withholds
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or withdraws medical treatment in the best interest of a patient, such as when a patient is in a permanent vegetative state or in a terminal state of an incurable illness, is not guilty under Section 299 because there is no intention to cause death or bodily injury which is likely to cause death. The act of withholding or withdrawing a life support system in the case of a competent patient who has refused medical treatment and, in the case of an incompetent person where the action is in the best interest of the patient would be protected by good faith protections available under Sections 76, 79, 81 or, as the case may be, by Section 88, even if it is construed that the doctor had knowledge of the likelihood of death; and The decision of the doctor, who is under a duty at common law to obey the refusal of a competent patient to take medical treatment, would not constitute a culpable act of negligence under Section 304A. When the doctor has taken such a decision to withhold or withdraw treatment in the best interest of the patient, the decision would not constitute an act of gross negligence punishable under Section 304A. Introducing a structural safeguard, in the form of a Medical Board of experts can be contemplated to further such an objective. The Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act 1994 provides for the constitution of Authorisation Committees under Section 9(4). Authorisation Committees are contemplated at the state and district levels and a hospital board. Once the process of decision making has been arrived at by fulfilling a mandated safeguard (the prior approval of a committee), the decision to withdraw life support should not constitute an illegal act or omission. The setting up of a broad-based board is precisely with a view to lend assurance that the duty of care owed by the doctor to the patient has been fulfilled. Once due safeguards have been fulfilled, the doctor is protected against the attribution of a culpable intent or knowledge. It will hence fall outside the definition of culpable homicide (Section 299), murder (Section 300) or causing death by a rash or negligent act (Section 304A). [Paras 101, 102][234-A-H; 235-A-E]
12.1 Advance Directives: A patient, in a sound state of mind, possesses the ability to make decisions and choices and can legitimately refuse medical intervention. However, a patient may not always have the opportunity to grant or withhold consent
to medical treatment. An unforeseen event may deprive the individual of the ability to indicate a desire to either receive or not to have medical treatment. An occasion necessitating treatment in sudden cases where a person suffers an accident, a stroke or coronary episode may provide no time for reflection. In anticipation of such situations, “where an individual patient has no desire to be kept in a state of complete and indefinite vegetated animation with no possibility of recovering his mental and physical faculties, that individual, while still in control of all his/her faculties and his ability to express himself/herself”, could still retain the right to refuse medical treatment by way of “advance directives”. [Paras 103, 104][235-F; 236-F-G; 237-AB] Schloendorff v. Society of NY Hospital 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) – referred to.
12.2 There are two forms of advance directives: (i) A Living Will which indicates a person’s views and wishes regarding medical treatment. (ii) A Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care or Health care Proxy which authorises a surrogate decision maker to make medical care decisions for the patient in the event she or he is incapacitated. Although there can be an overlap between these two forms of advance directives, the focus of a durable power is on who makes the decision while the focus of a living will is on what the decision should be.[Para 105][237-B-D] 12.3 The principles of patient autonomy and consent are the foundation of advance medical directives. A competent and consenting adult is entitled to refuse medical treatment. By the same postulate, a decision by a competent adult will be valid in respect of medical treatment in future. Advance directives are thus documents a person completes while still in possession of decisional capacity about how treatment decisions should be made in the event she or he loses decision making capacity in future. They cover three conditions: (i) a terminal condition; (ii) a persistently unconscious condition; and (iii) an end-stage condition. A terminal condition is an incurable or irreversible condition which even with the administration of life-sustaining treatment will result in death in the foreseeable future. A persistently unconscious condition is an irreversible condition,
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in which thought and awareness of self and environment are absent. An end-stage condition is a condition caused by injury, disease or illness which results in severe and permanent deterioration indicated by incompetency and complete physical dependency for which treatment of the irreversible condition would be medically ineffective. [Paras 107-109][239-A, D-F]
Luis Kutner, “Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, a proposal”, Indian Law Journal (1969), Vol. 44, Issue 4, at page 539; “Advance Directives and Substitute Decision-Making”, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (24 March 2009), available at https:// plato.standford.edu/entries/advance-directives/; James C Turner, “Living Wills – Need for legal recognition”, West Virginia Law Review (1976), Vol. 78, Issue 3, at page 370 – referred to. 12.4 The reasons which may lead a person in a sound state of mind to refuse medical treatment are inscrutable. Those decisions are not subject to scrutiny and have to be respected by the law as an essential attribute of the right of the individual to have control over the body. The state cannot compel an unwilling individual to receive medical treatment. While an individual cannot compel a medical professional to provide a particular treatment (this being in the realm of professional medical judgment), it is equally true that the individual cannot be compelled to undergo medical intervention. The principle of sanctity of life thus recognises the fundamental liberty of every person to control his or her body and as its incident, to decline medical treatment. The ability to take such a decision is an essential element of the privacy of the being. Privacy also ensures that a decision as personal as whether or not to accept medical treatment lies exclusively with the individual as an autonomous being. The reasons which impel an individual to do so are part of the privacy of the individual. The mental processes which lead to decision making are equally part of the constitutionally protected right to privacy. Advance directives are founded on the principle that an individual whose state of mind is not clouded by an affliction which prevents him or her from taking decisions is entitled to decide whether to accept or not accept medical intervention. If a decision can be made for the present, when the individual is in a sound
state of mind, such a person should be allowed to decide the course of action which should be followed in the future if he or she were to be in a situation which affects the ability to take decisions. If a decision on whether or not to receive medical treatment is valid for the present such a decision must be equally valid when it is intended to operate in the future. [Paras 110, 111][239-H; 240-A-E] 12.5 When a patient is brought for medical treatment in a state of mind in which he or she is deprived of the mental capacity to make informed choices, the medical professional needs to determine the line of treatment. One line of enquiry, which seeks to protect patient autonomy is how the individual would have made a decision if he or she had decision-making capacity. This is called the substituted judgment standard. An advance medical directive is construed as a facilitative mechanism in the application of the substituted judgment standard, if it provides to the physician a communication by the patient (when she or he was in a fit state of mind) of the desire for or restraint on being provided medical treatment in future. Conceptually, there is a second standard, which is the caregiver standard founded on the principle of beneficence. The second standard seeks to apply an objective notion of a line of treatment which a reasonable individual would desire in the circumstances. The difference between these two standards is that the first seeks to reconstruct the subjective point of view of the patient. The second allows for “a more generic view of interests”, without having to rely on the “idiosyncratic values and preference of the patient in question”. [Paras 112, 113][240-G-H; 241-A-B; 242-B] 13.1 The sanctity of an advance directive is founded upon the expression of the will of an individual who is in a sound state of mind when the directive is executed. Underlying the consensual character of the declaration is the notion of the consent being informed. Undoubtedly, the reasons which have weighed with an individual in executing the advance directive cannot be scrutinized (in the absence of situations such as fraud or coercion which implicate the very basis of the consent). However, an individual who expresses the desire not to be subjected to a particular line of treatment in the future, should she or he be
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ailing in the future, does so on an assessment of treatment options available when the directive is executed. For instance, a decision not to accept chemotherapy in the event that the individual is detected with cancer in the future, is based on today’s perception of the trauma that may be suffered by the patient through that treatment. Advances in medical knowledge between the date of the execution of the document and an uncertain future date when the individual may possibly confront treatment for the disease may have led to a re-evaluation by the person of the basis on which a desire was expressed several years earlier. Another fundamental issue is whether the individual can by means of an advance directive compel the withholding of basic care such as hydration and nourishment in the future. Protecting the individual from pain and suffering as well as the indignity of debility may similarly raise important issues. Advance directives may hence conceivably raise ethical issues of the extent to which the perception of the individual who executes it must prevail in priority to the best interest of the patient.[Para 117][244-D-H; 245-A]
13.2 Advance directives provide moral authority for the family of the patient that the decision which has been taken to withdraw or withhold artificial life support is in accord with the stated desire of the patient expressed earlier. But the ethical concerns may warrant a nuanced application of the principle. The decision on whether to withhold or withdraw medical treatment should be left to a competent body comprising of, but not restricted to medical professionals. Assigning a supervisory role to such a body is also necessary in order to protect against the possibility of abuse and the dangers surrounding the misuse of an advance directive. An advance directive should not be utilized as a subterfuge to fulfil unlawful or unethical purposes such as facilitating a succession to property. [Para 119][245-E-H; 246-A] 13.3 The recognition of advance directives as part of a regime of constitutional jurisprudence is an essential attribute of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. That right comprehends dignity as its essential foundation. Quality of life is integral to dignity. As an essential aspect of dignity and the preservation of autonomy of choice and decision-making, each
individual must have the right on whether or not to accept medical intervention. Such a choice expressed at a point in time when the individual is in a sound and competent state of mind should have sanctity in the future if the individual were to cease to have the mental capability to take decisions and make choices. Yet, a balance between the application of the substituted judgment standard and the best interest standard is necessary as a matter of public interest. This can be achieved by allowing a supervisory role to an expert body with whom shall rest oversight in regard to whether a patient in the terminal stage of an illness or in a permanent vegetative state should be withheld or withdrawn from artificial life support. [Para 120][246-A-D] Re AK (Adult Patient) (Medical Treatment: Consent) [2001] 1 FLR 129; HE v. A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 FLR 408; Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1942] 4 All ER 649; Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment)[1994] 1 All ER 819; St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1998] 3 WLR 936; Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449 – referred to. Alexander Ruck Keene, “Advance Decisions : getting it right?”, available at http://www.39essex.com/ docs /articles/advance_decisions_paper_ark_december_2012.pd; Elizabeth Wicks, The State and the Body : Legal Regulation of Bodily Autonomy, Hart Publishing (2016); A S Kessel and J Meran, “Advance directives in the UK: legal, ethical, and practical considerations for doctors”, British Journal of General Practice (1998), at page 1263; Are advance directives legally binding or simply the starting point for discussion on patients’ best interests?”, BMJ (28 November 2009), Volume 339, page 1231 – referred to. 14.1 The Mental Healthcare Act 2017, which was assented to by the President of India on 7 April 2017, enacts specific provisions for recognising and enforcing advance directives for persons with mental illness. The Act recognises an advance directive. An advance directive has to be in writing. The person subscribing to it must be a major. While making an advance
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directive, the maker indicates the manner in which he or she wishes or does not wish to be cared for and treated for a mental illness; and the person he or she appoints as a nominated representative. An advance directive is to be invoked only when the person who made it ceases to have the capacity to make mental healthcare treatment decisions. It remains effective until the maker regains the capacity to do so. [Para 130][252-G; 253C-D]
Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v. James and Others [2013] UK SC 6 – referred to. 14.2 Advance directives are capable of being revoked, amended or modified by the maker at any time. The Act specifies that an advance directive will not apply to emergency treatment administered to the maker. Otherwise, a duty has been cast upon every medical officer in charge of a mental health establishment and a psychiatrist in charge of treatment to propose or give treatment to a person with a mental illness, in accordance with a valid advance directive, subject to Section 11. Section 11 elucidates a procedure which is to be followed where a mental health professional, relative or care-giver does not desire to follow the advance directive. In such a case, an application has to be made to the Board to review, alter, cancel or modify the advance directive. In deciding whether to allow such an application the Board must consider whether the advance directive is truly voluntary and made without force, undue influence or coercion; The advance directive should apply in circumstances which are materially different; The maker had made a sufficiently well informed decision; The maker possessed the capacity to make decisions relating to mental health care or treatment at the time when it was made; and The directive is contrary to law or to constitutional provisions. A duty has been cast to provide access to the advance directive to a medical practitioner or mental health professional, as the case may be. In the case of a minor, an advance directive can be made by a legal guardian. The Act has specifically granted protection to medical practitioners and to mental health professionals against being held liable for unforeseen consequences upon following an advance directive. [Paras 133, 134][253-F-G; 254-A-E]
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241 : [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404 – relied on. Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996) 2 SCC 648 : [1996] 3 SCR 697; P Rathinam v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 394 – referred to.
Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug v. Union of India (2011) 15 SCC 480 – Not correct law. Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland (1993) 2 WLR 316 (H.L) – referred to.
“The Dilemmas of Euthanasia”, Bio-Science (August 1973), Vol. 23, No. 8, at page 459; Margaret A. Somerville, “Legalising euthanasia: why now?”, The Australian Quarterly (Spring 1996), Vol. 68, No. 3, at page 1; Christopher N. Manning, “Live And Let Die: Physician-Assisted Suicide And The Right To Die”, Harvard Journal of Law and Technology (1996), Vol. 9, No. 2, at page 513; Alan Norrie, “Legal Form and Moral Judgement: Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide” in R.A. Duff, et al (ed); The Structures of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2011), at page 134; Elizabeth Wicks, The Right to Life and Conflicting Interests (Oxford University Press, 2010), at page 199; Elizabeth M. Andal Sorrentino, “The Right To Die?”, Journal of Health and Human Resources Administration (Spring,1986), Vol. 8, No. 4, page 361; Atul Gawande, Being Mortal: Medicine and What Matters in the End (Hamish Hamilton, 2014), at page 260; Henry Marsh, Admissions: A Life in Brain Surgery, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2017), at page 265-266; Randy Pausch and Jeffrey Zaslow, The Last Lecture, (Hodder & Stoughton, 2008), at page 17 – referred to. PER ASHOK BHUSHAN, J: 1.1 In Western World “Hippocrates” is regarded as “father of western medicine”. Hippocratic period dates from 460 BC. “Corpus Hippocraticum” comprises of not only general medical prescription, description of diseases, diagnosis, dietary recommendations but also opinion of professional ethics of a physician. Thus, those who practiced
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medicine from ancient time were ordained to follow some ethical principles. For those who follow medical profession ‘Hippocratic Oath’ was always treated to be Oath to which every medical professional was held to be bound. The noticeable portion of the Hippocratic Oath is that medical practitioner swears that he will not give a lethal drug to anyone nor he will advise such a plan. [Paras 7, 8][266-B-C; 267-B]
1.2 Although on one hand medical professional has to take Hippocratic Oath that he shall treat his patient according to his ability and judgment and never do harm to anyone and he will not give any lethal drug to anyone even he is asked for, on the other hand Greek philosopher Plato held that those who has sickly constitution and intemperate habits should not be helped by medicine. Thus, the cleavage in views regarding ethics of a medical professional as well as not supporting medical treatment for those who are thoroughly diseased is found from ancient time in Greek thoughts itself. The dilemma of medical professional still continues to this day and medical professionals are hesitant in adopting a course which may not support the life of a patient or lead to patient’s death. [Paras 11-12][267-G-H; 268-A-B] 2.1 The only statutory provision in our country which refers to euthanasia is statutory regulations framed under Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, namely The Indian Medical Council (Professional Conduct, Etiquette & Ethics) Regulations, 2002. The Law Commission of India had stated and submitted a detailed report on the subject in 196th report on “Medical Treatment to Terminally Ill Patients (Protection of Patients and Medical Practitioners)”. Law Commission examined various provisions of Indian Penal Code and other statutory provisions, judgments of this court and different courts of other countries and had made certain recommendations. [Paras 26-27][272-B, F] 2.2 The 196 th Report was again revised by the Law Commission of India in 241 st Report dated August, 2012. The 2006 draft bill was redrafted by Law Commission. The above bill however could not fructify in a law. The Ministry of health and family welfare had published another draft bill namely The Medical Treatment of Terminally Ill Patients (Protection of Patients & Medical Practitioners) Bill, 2016, as a private member bill which
was introduced in Rajya Sabha on 5th August 2016, which is still pending. Thus, the only statutory provision on euthanasia is regulation 6.7 of the 2002 Regulations. The regulations prohibit practicing euthanasia and declare that practicing euthanasia constitute unethical conduct on behalf of the medical practitioner. The regulation however carves an exception that on specific occasion, the question of withdrawing supporting devices to sustain cardio-pulmonary function even after brain death, shall be decided only by a team of doctors and not merely by the treating physician alone. The regulation further provides that team of doctors shall declare withdrawal of support system. The withdrawal of medical treatment of terminally ill Persons is complex ethical, moral and social issue with which many countries have wrestled with their attempt to introduce a legal framework for end of life decision making. In absence of a comprehensive legal framework on the subject the issue has to be dealt with great caution. [Paras 29-31][274-C-G] Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996) 2 SCC 648 : [1996] 3 SCR 697; P. Rathinam v. Union of India & Anr. (1994) 3 SCC 394; Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug v. Union of India & Ors. (2011) 4 SCC 454 : [2011] 4 SCR 1057 – explained. 3.1 Law on subject in other countries: The laws of different countries expresses thoughts of people based on different culture, philosophy and social conditions. Assisted suicide was always treated as an offence in most of the countries. Physician assisted suicide is also not accepted in most of the countries except in few where it gain ground in last century. In several countries including different States of U.S.A., European Countries and United Kingdom, various legislations have come into existence codifying different provisions pertaining to physician assisted suicide. The right to not commence or withdraw medical treatment in case of terminally ill or PSV patients, advance medical directives have also been made part of different legislations in different countries. Switzerland, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and American States of Oregan, Washington, Montana and Columbia has permitted physician assisted suicide with statutory regulations.
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[Paras 39, 40][279-G-H; 280-A, C]
3.2 Euthanasia is criminal offence in the United Kingdom. According to Section 2(1) of the Suicide Act, 1961, a person assisting an individual, who wish to die commits an offence. The provision states that it is an offence to aid, abet, counsel or procure the suicide of another or an attempt by another to commit suicide, however, it is not a crime if it is by their own hands. There has been large parliamentary opposition to the current United Kingdom Law concerning assisted suicide but there has been no fundamental change in the law so far. [Para 41][280-D-E]
Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland (1993) 1 All ER 821; Ms. B v. An NHS Hospital Trust 2002 EWHC 429; Regina (Pretty) v. Director of Public Prosecutions (Secretary of State for the Home Department intervening) (2002) 1 AC 800 – referred to.
3.3 The State of New York in 1828 enacted a statute declaring assisted suicide as a crime. New York example was followed by different other States. [Para 48][287-F]
Schloendroff v. Society of New York Hospital 211 N.Y. 125; Nancy Beth Cruzan Vs. Director, Missouri Department of Health 497 U.W. 261; Washington, Et Alv v. Harold Glucksberg Et Al, 521 US 702 equivalent to 138 L.Ed 2d 772; Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of New York Et Al. v. Timothy E. Quill Et Al, 521 US 793 – referred to . 3.4 Section 241(b) of the Canada Criminal Code provides that everyone who aids or abets a person in committing suicide commits an indictable offence. In Switzerland the assisted suicide is allowed only for altruistic reasons. A person is guilty and deserved to be sentenced for imprisonment on assisted suicide when he incites someone to commit suicide for selfish reasons. The Netherlands has the most experience with physician-hastened death. Both euthanasia and assisted suicide remain crimes there but doctors who end their patients’ lives will not be prosecuted if legal guidelines are followed. The pre-dominant thought as on date prevailing in other part of the World is that assisted suicide is a crime. No one is permitted to assist another person to commit
suicide by injecting a lethal drug or by other means. In India, Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code specifically makes it an offence. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Gian Kaur has already upheld the constitutional validity of Section 306, thus, the law of the land as existing today is that no one is permitted to cause death of another person including a physician by administering any lethal drug even if the objective is to relive the patient from pain and suffering. [Paras 58-61]292-E; 293-AC, E-F] 3.5 The Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur noted a difference between cases in which physician decides not to provide or to continue to provide for medical treatment or care and those cases where he decides to administer a lethal drug activity to bring his patient’s life to an end. The judgment of House of Lords in Airedale’s case was referred to and noted in the above context. The Airedale’s case was cited on behalf of the appellant in support of the contention that in said case the withdrawal of life saving treatment was held not to be unlawful. The Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur did not express any binding view on the subject of euthanasia. [Paras 68, 69][298-C-E] Airedale N.H.A. Trust v. Bland 1993 (2) W.L.R. 316 (H.L.) – referred to. New Webster’s Dictionary (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) – referred to.
4. In recent times, three principles had gained acceptance throughout the world they are: 1. Sanctity of life 2. Right of selfdetermination 3. Dignity of the individual human being. The sanctity of life is one thought which is philosophically, religiously and mythologically accepted by the large number of population of the world practicing different faiths and religions. Sanctity of life entails it’s inviolability by an outsider. Sanctity of life is the concern of State. Right of self-determination also encompasses in it bodily integrity. Without consent of an adult person, who is in fit state of mind, even a surgeon is not authorised to violate the body. Sanctity of the human life is the most fundamental of the human social values. The acceptance of human rights and development of its meaning in recent times has fully recognised
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the dignity of the individual human being. These three principles enable an adult human being of conscious mind to take decision regarding extent and manner of taking medical treatment. An adult human being of conscious mind is fully entitled to refuse medical treatment or to decide not to take medical treatment and may decide to embrace the death in natural way. Euthanasia as the meaning of the word suggest is an act which leads to a good death. Some positive act is necessary to characterise the action as Euthanasia. Euthanasia is also commonly called “assisted suicide” due to these reasons. [Paras 73-75][300-B-F]
K.S. Puttaswamy and Another v. Union of India and Others (2017) 10 SCC 1 – followed. 5.1 WITHDRAWAL OF LIFE SAVING DEVICES: Withdrawal of medical assistance or withdrawal of medical devices which artificially prolong the life cannot be regarded as an act to achieve a good death. Artificial devices to prolong the life are implanted, when a person is likely to die due to different causes in his body. Life saving treatment and devices are put by physicians to prolong the life of a person. The Law Commission of India in its 196th Report on “Medical Treatment to Terminally Ill Patients (Protection of Patients and Medical Practitioners)” was of the opinion that withdrawing life supporting measures of patient terminally ill is a concept, different from Euthanasia. The opinion of Cardozo, J., rendered more than hundred years ago that every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body, is now universally accepted principle. The judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court and House of Lords also reiterate the above principle. [Paras 76-77][300-G-H; 301-B-C] 5.2 The decision not to take life saving medical treatment by a patient, who is competent to express his opinion cannot be termed as euthanasia, but a decision to withdraw life saving treatment by a patient who is competent to take decision as well as with regard to a patient who is not competent to take decision can be termed as passive euthanasia. Such acts, which are commonly expressed as passive euthanasia is lawful and legally permissible in this country. This Court is not a legislative body nor is entitled or competent to act as a moral or ethical arbiter.
The task of this Court is not to weigh or evaluate or reflect different believes and views or give effect to its own but to ascertain and build the law of land as it is now understood by all. Message which need to be sent to vulnerable and disadvantaged people should not, however, obliviously to encourage them to seek death but should assure them of care and support in life. The act of withdrawal from live-saving devices is an independent right which can lawfully be exercised by informed decision. [Paras 80, 81 and 82][302-B-E] 6. Decision for withdrawal of life-saving treatment in case of a person who is incompetent to take an informed decision In case of a person who is suffering from a disease and is taking medical treatment, there are three stake holders; the person himself, his family members and doctor treating the patient. In cases of incompetent patients who are unable to take an informed decision, it is in the best interests of the patient that the decision be taken by competent medical experts and that such decision be implemented after providing a cooling period at least of one month to enable aggrieved person to approach the Court of Law. The best interest of the patient as determined by medical experts shall meet the ends of justice. The medical team by taking decision shall also take into consideration the opinion of the blood relations of the patient and other relevant facts and circumstances. [Paras 84, 85][303-B; 304-E-F] 7.
Advance medical directive
7.1 The advance medical directive has been recognised first by Statute in United States of America when in the year 1976, State of California passed “Natural Death Act”. It is claimed that 48 states out of 50 in the United States of America have enacted their own laws regarding Patient’s Rights and advance medical directives. Advance medical directive is a mechanism through which individual autonomy can be safeguarded in order to provide dignity in dying. [Para 87][305-D-E] 7.2 Advance medical directives are not exclusively associated with end of life decisions. However, it is vital to ensure that form of an advance medical directive reflects the needs of its author and is sufficiently authoritative and practical to enable
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its provisions to be upheld. In most of the western countries advance medical directives have taken a legalistic form incorporating a formal declaration to be signed by competent witnesses. The laws also make provisions for updating confirmation of its applicability and revocation. Protecting the individual autonomy is obviously the primary purpose of an advance medical directive. The right to decide one’s own fate pre-supposes a capacity to do so. The answer as to when a particular advance medical directive becomes operative usually depends upon an assent of when its author is no longer competent to participate in medical decision making. So long as an individual can take an informed decision regarding his medical treatment, there is no occasion to look into advance medical directives. A person has unfettered right to change or cancel his advance medical directives looking to the need of time and advancement in medical science. Hence, a person cannot be tied up or bound by his instructions given at an earlier point of time. [Para 87][305F-H; 306-A, D]
7.3 The concept of advance medical directive originated largely as a response to development in medicines. Many people living depending on machines cause great financial distress to the family with the cost of long term medical treatment. Advance medical directive was developed as a means to restrict the kinds of medical intervention in event when one become incapacitated. The foundation for seeking direction regarding advance medical directive is extension of the right to refuse medical treatment and the right to die with dignity. When a competent patient has right to take a decision regarding medical treatment, with regard to medical procedure entailing right to die with dignity, the said right cannot be denied to those patients, who have become incompetent to take an informed decision at the relevant time. The concept of advance medical directive has gained ground to give effect to the rights of those patients, who at a particular time are not able to take an informed decision. Another concept which has been accepted in several countries is recognition of instrument through which a person nominates a representative to make decision regarding their medical treatment at a point of time when the person executing the instrument is unable to make
an informed decision. This is called attorney authorisation leading to medical treatment. In this country, there is no legislation governing such advance medical directives. It is, however, relevant to note a recent legislation passed by the Parliament namely “The Mental Healthcare Act, 2017”, where as per Section 5 every person, who is not a minor has a right to make an advance directive in writing regarding treatment to his mental illness in the way a person wishes to be treated. Section 6 of the Act provides that an advance directive shall be made in the manner as has been prescribed by the regulations made by the Central Authority. In the draft Medical Healthcare Regulation published by Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, a form is prescribed in which advance directive may be made. Other aspects of medical directive have also been dealt with by draft regulation. Thus, in our country, recognition of advance directives regarding medical treatment has started to be recognised and are in place relating to specified field and purpose. Another legislation which also recognise some kind of advance directive relating to a person’s body is Section 3 of the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act, 1994. The rules have been framed under Section 24 of the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act, 1994 namely Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Rules, 2014 where form of authorisation for organ or tissue pledging is Form 7, which provides an authorisation by donor in presence of two witnesses which is also required to be registered by Organ Donor Registry. The statutory recognition of the authorisation in two statutes is clear indication of acceptance of the concept of advance medical directive in this country. [Paras 88-91][306-EH; 307-A-B, H; 308-A-B] 7.4 The concept of advance medical directive has gained ground throughout the world. Different countries have framed necessary legislation in this regard. The republic of Singapore has passed an enactment namely Advance Medical Directive Act (Act 16 of 1996). Section 3(1) of the Act empowers a person who is not mentally disordered and attained the age of 21 years to make an advance directive in the prescribed form. Other provisions of Statute deals with duty of witness, registration of directives, objections, revocation of directive, panel of specialists,
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA
certification of terminal illness, duty of medical practitioner and other related provisions. The Belgian Act on Euthanasia, 2002, Swiss Civil Code 1907 and Mental Capacity Act, 2005 (England) and Pennsylvania Act 169 of 2006 contemplate for an advance directive. In our country, there is yet no legislation pertaining to advance medical directive. However, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare by its order dated 06.05.2016 uploaded the Law Commission’s 241st report and solicited opinions, comments on the same. [Para 95][311-B-D, F]
Per A.K. SIKRI, J. 1.1 Section 306 IPC makes abetment to suicide as a punishable offence. Likewise, Section 309 IPC makes attempt to commit suicide as a punishable offence. Intention to commit suicide is an essential ingredient in order to constitute an offence under this provision. Thus, this provision specifically prohibits a person from terminating his life and negates right to die. Constitutional validity of this provision, on the touchstone of Article 21, was the subject matter of Gian Kaur’s case. The Court held Sections 306 and 309 IPC to be constitutionally valid. While so holding, the Court observed that when a man commits suicide, he has to undertake certain positive overt acts and the genesis of those acts cannot be traced to, or be included within the protection of the ‘right to life’ under Article 21. The significant aspect of ‘sanctity of life’ is also not to be overlooked. Article 21 is a provision guaranteeing protection of life and personal liberty and by no stretch of imagination can ‘extinction of life’ be read to be included in ‘protection of life’. Whatever may be the philosophy of permitting a person to extinguish his life by committing suicide, the Court found it difficult to construe Article 21 to include within it the ‘right to die’ as a part of the fundamental right guaranteed therein. ‘Right to life’ is a natural right embodied in Article 21 but suicide is an unnatural termination or extinction of life and, therefore, incompatible and inconsistent with the concept of ‘right to life’. [Paras 38][331-G; 332-A-C]
Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996) 2 SCC 648 : [1996] 3 SCR 697 – referred to. 1.2 There has been a significant advancement in medical science. Medical scientists have been, relentlessly and
continuously, experimenting and researching to find out better tools for not only curing the disease with which human beings suffer from time to time, noble attempt is to ensure that human life is prolonged and in the process of enhancing the expectancy of life, ailments and sufferings therefrom are reduced to the minimal. There is, thus, a fervent attempt to impress the quality of life. It is this very advancement in the medical science which creates dilemma at that juncture when, in common perception, life of a person has virtually become unlivable but the medical doctors, bound by their Hippocratic Oath, want to still spare efforts in the hope that there may still be a chance, even if it is very remote, to bring even such a person back to life. The issue, therefore, gets compounded having counter forces of medical science, morality and ethical values, the very concept of life from philosophical angle. In this entire process, the vexed question is to be ultimately decided taking into consideration the normative law, and in particular, the constitutional values. [Para 40][333-FH; 334-A-C] 2. Whether passive euthanasia, voluntary or even, in certain circumstances, involuntary, is legally permissible? As the process of dying is an inevitable consequence of life, the right to life necessarily implies the right to have nature take its course and to die a natural death. It also encompasses a right, unless the individual so wishes, not to have life artificially maintained by the provision of nourishment by abnormal artificial means which have no curative effect and which are intended merely to prolong life. Insofar as concept of human dignity is concerned, it dates back to thousands of years. Historically, human dignity, as a concept, found its origin in different religions which is held to be an important component of their theological approach. Later, it was also influenced by the views of philosophers who developed human dignity in their contemplations. Hinduism doesn’t recognize human beings as mere material beings. Its understanding of human identity is more ethical-spiritual than material. That is why a sense of immortality and divinity is attributed to all human beings in Hindu classical literature. Even in Islam, tradition of human rights became evident in the medieval ages. Being inspired by the tenets of the Holy Koran, it preaches the universal brotherhood, equality,
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA
justice and compassion. Islam believes that man has special status before God. Because man is a creation of God, he should not be harmed. Harm to a human being is harm to a God. God, as an act of love, created man and he wishes to grant him recognition, dignity and authority. Thus, in Islam, human dignity stems from the belief that man is a creation of God – the creation that God loves more than any other. The Bhakti and Sufi traditions too in their own unique ways popularized the idea of universal brotherhood. It revived and regenerated the cherished Indian values of truth, righteousness, justice and morality. [Paras 64, 72, 73, 76 and 77][345-C-D; 348-H; 349-A, E; 350-C-E] Lochner v. New York 198 US 45, 76 (1905) – referred to. 3.1 Constitutional perspective of dignity: The most important lesson which was learnt as a result of Second World War was the realization by the Governments of various countries about the human dignity which needed to be cherished and protected. It is for this reason that in the U.N. Charter, 1945, adopted immediately after the Second World War, dignity of the individuals was mentioned as of core value. The almost contemporaneous Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) echoed same sentiments. Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions explicitly prohibits “outrages upon personal dignity”. There are provisions to this effect in International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 7) and the European Convention of Human Rights (Article 3) though implicit. The ICCPR begins its preamble with the acknowledgment that the rights contained in the covenant “derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”. And some philosophers say the same thing. Even if this is not a connection between dignity and law as such, it certainly purports to identify a wholesale connection between dignity and the branch of law devoted to human rights. One of the key facets of twenty-first century democracies is the primary importance they give to the protection of human rights. From this perspective, dignity is the expression of a basic value accepted in a broad sense by all people, and thus constitutes the first cornerstone in the edifice of human rights. Therefore, there is a certain fundamental value to the notion of human dignity, which some would consider a pivotal right deeply rooted in any
notion of justice, fairness, and a society based on basic rights. [Paras 85, 86][352-F-H; 353-A-C] 3.2 Within two years of the adoption of the said Universal Declaration of Human Rights that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, India attained independence and immediately thereafter Members of the Constituent Assembly took up the task of framing the Constitution of this Country. The Constitution Makers did so by incorporating a Chapter on Fundamental Rights in Part III of the Constitution. However, there is no mention of “dignity” specifically in this Chapter on Fundamental Rights. So was the position in the American Constitution. In America, human dignity as a part of human rights was brought in as a Judge-made doctrine. Same course of action followed as the Indian Supreme Court read human dignity into Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. [Para 88][353-F-H; 354A] 4.1 Dworkin, being a philosopher – jurist, was aware of the idea of a Constitution and of a constitutional right to human dignity. In his book, Taking Rights Seriously, he noted that everyone who takes rights seriously must give an answer to the question why human rights vis-a-vis the State exist. According to him, in order to give such an answer one must accept, as a minimum, the idea of human dignity. In his Book, “Is Democracy Possible Here?” Dworkin develops two principles about the concept of human dignity. First principle regards the intrinsic value of every person, viz., every person has a special objective value which value is not only important to that person alone but success or failure of the lives of every person is important to all of us. The second principle, according to Dworkin, is that of personal responsibility. According to this principle, every person has the responsibility for success in his own life and, therefore, he must use his discretion regarding the way of life that will be successful from his point of view. [Paras 90, 91][354-C, E-F] 4.2 When speaking of rights, it is impossible to envisage it without dignity. In his pioneering and all inclusive “Justice for Hedgehogs”, he proffered an approach where respect for human dignity, entails two requirements; first, self-respect, i.e., taking the objective importance of one’s own life seriously; this represents the free will of the person, his capacity to think for
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA
himself and to control his own life and second, authenticity, i.e., accepting a “special, personal responsibility for identifying what counts as success” in one’s own life and for creating that life “through a coherent narrative” that one has chosen. According to Dworkin, these principles form the fundamental criteria supervising what we should do in order to live well. They further explicate the rights that individuals have against their political community, and they provide a rationale for the moral duties we owe to others. This notion of dignity, which Dworkin gives utmost importance to, is indispensable to any civilised society. It is what is constitutionally recognised in our country and for good reason. Living well is a moral responsibility of individuals; it is a continuing process that is not a static condition of character but a mode that an individual constantly endeavours to imbibe. A life lived without dignity, is not a life lived at all for living well implies a conception of human dignity which Dworkin interprets includes ideals of self-respect and authenticity. [Para 92][354-G; 355-A-D] 4.3 In his Article, Life’s Dominion, Ronald Dworkin, while building the hypothesis on dignity concept, exhorts that people must decide about their own death, or someone else’s in three main kind of situations, namely, (i) conscious and competent: it is a situation where a person is suffering from some serious illness because of which he is incapacitated but he is still conscious and also competent to decide about his fate, he should be given a choice to decide as to whether he wants to continue to get the treatment; (ii) unconscious: where the patient is unconscious and dying, doctors are often forced to decide whether to continue life support for him or not under certain circumstances relatives have to take a decision. However, at times, unconscious patients are not about to die. At the same time, they are either in coma or in PVS. In either case, they are conscious. In such a situation, where recovery is impossible, it should be left to the relatives to decide as to whether they want the patient to remain on life support (ventilator, etc.); and (iii) conscious but incompetent.[Para 97][358-D-G]
K.S. Puttaswamy and Another v. Union of India and Others (2017) 10 SCC 1 : [2010] 10 SCR 569 – relied on.
5.1 Right to health is a part of Article 21 of the Constitution. At the same time, it is also a harsh reality that everybody is not able to enjoy that right because of poverty etc. The State is not in a position to translate into reality this right to health for all citizens. Thus, when citizens are not guaranteed the right to health, can they be denied right to die in dignity? [Para 99][359-B] National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 438 – relied on.
5.2 Dworkin specifically discussed the issues pertaining to abortion and euthanasia with emphasis that both supporters and critics accept the idea of sanctity of life. Decisions regarding death – whether by abortion or by euthanasia – affect our human dignity. In Dworkin’s opinion, proper recognition of human dignity leads to the recognition of the freedom of the individual. Dignity is, thus, the core value of life and dying in dignity stands recognised in Gian Kaur. It becomes a part of right of self determination. The important message behind Dworkin’s concept of human dignity can be summarised in the following manner: (1) He describes belief in individual human dignity as the most important feature of Western political culture giving people the moral right “to confront the most fundamental questions about the meaning and value of their own lives”. (2) In an age when people value their independence and strive to live independent and fulfilled lives it is important “that life ends appropriately, that death keeps faith with the way we want to have lived”. (3) Death is “not only the start of nothing but the end of everything” and, therefore, it should be accomplished in a manner compatible with the ideals sought during life. [Paras 102-104][359-G; 360-B-E] 5.3 The elements of dignity (in the context of death with dignity) are: (i) Encompasses self-determination; implies a quality of life consistent with the ability to exercise self-determined choices; (ii) Maintains/ability to make autonomous choices; high regard for individual autonomy that is pivotal to the perceived quality of a person’s life; (iii) Self-control (retain a similar kind of control over dying as one has exercised during life – a way of achieving death with dignity); (iv) Law of consent: The ability to choose - orchestrate the timing of their own death; (v) Dignity may be compromised if the dying process is prolonged and
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA
involves becoming incapacitated and dependent; (vi) Respect for human dignity means respecting the intrinsic value of human life; (vii) Avoidance of dependency; (viii) Indefinite continuation of futile physical life is regarded as undignified; (ix) Dignity commands emphatic respect; Reason and emotion are both significant in treatment decisions, especially at the end of life where compassion is a natural response to appeals made on the basis of stifled self-determination; Compassion represents a collision of “imaginative insight” and empathy; and Compassion is here distinguished from pity, which is regarded as “inappropriate to the dignity of the autonomous person, especially its overtones of paternalism”, because compassion is believed to provoke an active, and by implication positive, response. (x) Dignity engenders a sense of serenity and powerfulness, fortified by “qualities of composure, calmness, restraint, reserve, and emotions or passions subdued and securely controlled without being negated or dissolved”; and (x) Observer’s Dignity aspect: a person possessed of dignity at the end of life, might induce in an observer a sense of tranquility and admiration which inspires images of power and self- assertion through restraint and poised composure; and dignity clearly does play a valuable role in contextualizing people’s perceptions of death and dying, especially as it appears to embody a spirit of self-determination that advocates of voluntary euthanasia crave. [Para 105][360-E-G; 361-A-G; 362-A-B]
6.1 Passive euthanasia and death with dignity are inextricably linked, which can be summed up with the following pointers: The opportunity to die unencumbered by the intrusion of medical technology and before experiencing loss of independence and control, appears to many to extend the promise of a dignified death. When medical technology intervenes to prolong dying like this it does not do so unobtrusively; (ii) Today many patients insist on more than just a right to health care in general. They seek a right to choose specific types of treatment, able to retain control throughout the entire span of their lives and to exercise autonomy in all medical decisions concerning their welfare and treatment; (iii) A dreadful, painful death on a rational but incapacitated terminally ill patient are an affront to human dignity. [Para 106][362-B-E]
6.2 Certain moral dilemma as to what is the exact stage when such a decision to withdraw medical support, would still remain. At times, a physician would be filled with profound ethical uncertainties when a person is suffering unbearable pain and agony, the question would be as to whether such suffering has reached the stage where it is incurable and, therefore, decision should be taken to allow such person to pass away in peace and dignity of hastening the process of death or the situation may be reversible, though chances thereof are far remote. [Para 107][362-F-G] Dr. R. R. Kishore MD, LLB – End of Life Issues and the Moral Certainty: A Discovery through Hinduism – referred to. 7.1 Hippocratic Oath, coupled with ethical norms of medical profession, stand in the way of euthanasia. It brings about a situation of dilemma insofar as medical practitioner is concerned. On the one hand his duty is to save the life of a person till he is alive, even when the patient is terminally ill and there are no chances of revival. On the other hand, the concept of dignity and right to bodily integrity, which recognises legal right of autonomy and choice to the patient (or even to his relations in certain circumstances, particularly when the patient is unconscious or incapacitated to take a decision) may lead to exercising his right of euthanasia. Dignity implies, apart from a right to life enjoyment of right to be free of physical interference. At common law, any physical interference with a person is, prima facie, tortious. If it interferes with freedom of movement, it may constitute a false imprisonment. If it involves physical touching, it may constitute a battery. If it puts a person in fear of violence, it may amount to an assault. For any of these wrongs, the victim may be able to obtain damages. When it comes to medical treatment, even there the general common law principle is that any medical treatment constitutes a trespass to the person which must be justified, by reference either to the patient’s consent or to the necessity of saving life in circumstances where the patient is unable to decide whether or not to consent. [Paras 110, 111, 112][365-B-F] 7.2 Rights with regard to medical treatment fall essentially into two categories: first, rights to receive or be free of treatment
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA
as needed or desired, and not to be subjected involuntarily to experimentation which, irrespective of any benefit which the subjects may derive, are intended to advance scientific knowledge and benefit people other than the subject in the long term; secondly, rights connected incidentally with the provision of medical services, such as rights to be told the truth by one’s doctor. Having regard to this right of the patients in common law, coupled with the dignity and privacy rights, it can be said that passive euthanasia, under those circumstances where patient is in PVS and he is terminally ill, where the condition is irreversible or where he is braindead, can be permitted.[Paras 113, 114][365F-G; 366-A-B]
Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug v. Union of India & Ors. (2011) 4 SCC 454 : [2011] 4 SCR 1057 – referred to. 8.1 When considering the matter of euthanasia in the context of economic principles, it becomes another reason to support the aforesaid conclusion. This aspect can be dealt with in two ways. First, because of rampant poverty where majority of the persons are not able to afford health services, should they be forced to spend on medical treatment beyond their means and in the process compelling them to sell their house property, household things and other assets which may be means of livelihood. Secondly, when there are limited medical facilities available, should a major part thereof be consumed on those patients who have no chances of recovery? [Paras 116-117][366C-D] 9. Whether a ‘living will’ or ‘advance directive’ should be legally recognised and can be enforced? If so, under what circumstances and what precautions are required while permitting it? 9.1 It is undisputed that Doctors’ primary duty is to provide treatment and save life but not in the case when a person has already expressed his desire of not being subjected to any kind of treatment. It is a common law right of people, of any civilized country, to refuse unwanted medical treatment and no person can force him/her to take any medical treatment which the person
does not desire to continue with. [Para 124][369-E-F] Refusal of Medical Treatment (1992) 4 All ER 649; (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) (2002) 2 All ER 449; Crazan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Malette v. Shulam 67 DLR (4th) 321 – referred to. 9.2 Nature of Living Will or Advance Directive: Advance directives are instruments through which persons express their wishes at a prior point in time, when they are capable of making an informed decision, regarding their medical treatment in the future, when they are not in a position to make an informed decision, by reason of being unconscious or in a coma. A medical power of attorney is an instrument through which persons nominate representatives to make decisions regarding their medical treatment at a point in time when the persons executing the instrument are unable to make informed decisions themselves. Clause 11 of the draft Treatment of Terminally-III Patients (Protection of Patients and Medical Practitioners) Bill, 2016 states that advance directives or medical power of attorney shall be void and of no effect and shall not be binding on any medical practitioner. This blanket ban, including the failure even to give some weight to advance directives while making a decision about the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is disproportionate. It does not constitute a fair, just or reasonable procedure, which is a requirement for the imposition of a restriction on the right to life (in this case, expressed as the right to die with dignity) under Article 21. [Para 130][379-E-H] 9.3 On the one hand autonomy of an individual gives him right to choose his destiny and, therefore, he may decide before hand, in the form of advance directive, at what stage of his physical condition he would not like to have medical treatment, and on the other hand, there are dangers of misuse thereof as well. At the same time, possibility of misuse cannot be held to be a valid ground for rejecting advance directive, as opined by the Law Commission of India as well in its 196th and 241st Report. Instead, attempt can be made to provide safeguards for exercise of such advance directive. For example, Section 5 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 recognises the validity of advance directives
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA
for the treatment of mental illness under the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017. The draft Mental Healthcare Regulations have recently been made available for public comment by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. These prescribe the form in which advance directives may be made. Part II, Chapter 1 of the Regulations allow a Nominated Representative to be named in the Advance Directive. An advance directive is to be in writing and signed by two witnesses attesting to the fact that the Directive was executed in their presence. A Directive to be registered with the Mental Health Review Board. It may be changed as many times as desired by the person executing it and the treating mental health professional must be informed of such change. Similarly, Section 3 of the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act, 1994 allows persons to authorise the removal of human organs and tissues from their body before death. The form in which this authorisation is to be made is prescribed in Form 7 of the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Rules, 2014. This is also to be in writing and in the presence of two witnesses. A copy of the pledge is to be retained at the institution where the pledge is made and the person making the pledge has the option to withdraw the pledge at any time. Where such authorisation had been made, the person lawfully in charge of the donor’s body after his death is required to grant the concerned medical practitioner all reasonable facilities for the removal of human organs or tissues, unless such person has reason to believe that the donor had substantially revoked his authority. [Paras 131132][380-A-B; 381-D-H; 382-A-B]
Vishaka and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others (1997) 6 SCC 241 : [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404; Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors. [1964] 1 SCR 332; C.E.S.E. Limited and Others v. Subhash Chandra Bose and Others (1992) 1 SCC 441 : [1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 267; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248 : [1970] 3 SCR 530; P. Rathinam v. Union of India & Anr. (1994) 3 SCC 394; National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 438; Shivashakti Sugars Ltd. v. Shree Renuka Sugar Limited and Other (2017) 7 SCC 729 – referred to.
Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland (1993) 2 WLR 316 (HL); Lochner v. New York 198 US 45, 76 (1905); Refusal of Medical Treatment (1992) 4 All ER 649; (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) (2002) 2 All ER 449; Crazan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Malette v. Shulam 67 DLR (4th) 321 – referred to. Case Law Reference Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.] [1964] 1 SCR 332 referred to Para 7 [1975] 3 SCR 946 referred to Para 7 [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 321 referred to Para 7 [2011] 4 SCR 1057 partly incorrect Para 10 (1994) 3 SCC 394 referred to Para 14 [1986] 1 SCR 251 referred to Para 15 (1986) 88 Bom LR 589 referred to Para 15 [1971] 1 SCR 512 referred to Para 15 [1996] 3 SCR 697 analysed Para 18 [1988] Suppl. SCR 755 referred to Para 26 [1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 597 referred to Para 34 [1976] 1 SCR 906 referred to Para 34 [1983] 1 SCR 828 relied on Para 141 [1978] 2 SCR 621 relied on Para 142 [2000] 3 SCR 644 relied on Para 143 [1986] 2 SCR 278 relied on Para 145 [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336 relied on Para 147 [1979] 1 SCR 1054 relied on Para 148 (2017) 10 SCC 1 followed Para 152 [2012] 8 SCR 651 relied on Para 154 [2016] 8 SCR 872 relied on Para 155 [1981] 2 SCR 516 relied on Para 156 (2014) 5 SCC 438 relied on Para 157 [2015] 8 SCR 289 relied on Para 158
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA
[1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404
relied on
Para 196
Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. [1996] 3 SCR 697 referred to (2011) 15 SCC 480 not correct law (1994) 3 SCC 394 referred to AIR 1989 SC 2039 relied on [1978] 2 SCR 621 relied on (2017) 10 SCC 1 followed [1981] 2 SCR 516 relied on [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404 relied on
Para 18 Para 18 Para 18 Para 73 Para 82 Para 82 Para 82 Para 137
Per Ashok Bhushan, J. [1996] 3 SCR 697 (1994) 3 SCC 394 [2011] 4 SCR 1057 (2017) 10 SCC 1
Para 32 Para 32 Para 35 Para 78
explained explained explained followed
Per A. K. Sikri, J. [1996] 3 SCR 697 [2011] 4 SCR 1057 [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404 [1964] 1 SCR 332
referred to referred to referred to referred to
Para 4 Para 4 Para 24 Para 35
(2017) 10 SCC 1
relied on
Para 35
[1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 267
referred to
Para 35
[1970] 3 SCR 530
referred to
Para 37
(1994) 3 SCC 394
referred to
Para 94
(2014) 5 SCC 438
relied on
Para 100
(2017) 7 SCC 729
referred to
Para 120
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 215 of 2005. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
Prashant Bhushan, Rohit Kr. Singh, Amiy Shukla, Shakti Vardhan, Sudhaker T., Cheryl, Advs. for the Petitioner. P.S. Narasimha, ASG, A. Mariarputham, Advocate General, Arvind Datar, Sanjay R. Hegde, Sr. Advs., S.S. Shamshery, Ms. Madhvi Divan, Ms. Nidhi Khanna, Ayush Puri, B.V. Balaram Das, G.S. Makkher, Ms. Sushma Suri, Ms. Dhvani Mehta, Ms. Nivedita Saksena, Rauf Rahim, Nitin Mishra, Nausher Kohli, Arun Sharma, Pranjal, Jay Kishor Singh, Devansh A. Mohta, A.P. Mayee, Nilakanta Nayak, A. Selvin Raja, Chirag Jain, Shuvodeep Roy, Sayooj Mohandas. M., Sapam Biswajit Meitei, Naresh Kumar Gaur, Ashok Kumar Singh, Raja Chatterjee, Chanchal Kr. Ganguli, Ms. Runa bhuyan, Merusagar Samantaray, S. Santosh Rebole, Ms. Lhingneivah, Ms. Veddusshi, Avishak Chaturvedi, Praveen Khattar, Sudhir Naagar, K. N. Madhusoodhanan, T. G. N. Nair, C. K. Sasi, Bhupesh Narula, K.V. Jagdishvaran, Mrs. G. Indira, Ms. Bhuvneshwari Pathak, Ms. Shilpi Satyapriya Satyam, Rahul Kaushik, V. G. Pragasam, S. Prabu Ramasubramanian, Manu Sundaram, S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Mrityunjai Singh, Gopal Singh, Manish Kumar, Rituraj Biswas, K.V. Vijaya Kumar, Ms. Maitreyee Mishra, Ms. Uttara Babbar, Ms. Akanksha Choudhary, Anil Kumar Jha, R. K. Ojha, Ms. Aruna Mathur, Avneesh Arputham, Ms. Anuradha Arputham, Ms. Simran Jeet (For M/s. Arputham Aruna & Co.), Ruchi Kohli, Balaji Srinivasan, Guntur Prabhakar, Nirnimesh Dube, B. Balaji, Abhisth Kumar, Sunil Kumar Jain, Dr. R.R. Kishore, Advs. for the appearing parties. The Judgments of the Court were delivered by DIPAK MISRA, CJI [for himself and A.M. Khanwilkar, J.] I N D E X* S. No.
Heading
Page No.
A.
Prologue
B.
Contentions in the Writ Petition
* Ed. note: The pages mentioned in the index above giving the scheme of the judgment denotes the page number of the original judgment.
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI] C.
Stand in the cou nter affidavit and the applications for intervention
D.
Background of the Writ Petition
D.1
D.2
D.3
D.4
P. Rathinam’s case – The question of unconstitutionality of Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code Gian Kaur’s case – The question of unconstitutionality of Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code The approach in Aruna Shanbaug qua Passive Euthanasia vis-à-vis In dia The Reference
Our analysis of Gian Kaur
F.
Our analysis of Aruna Shanbaug qua legislation The Distinction between Active and Passive Euthanasia
Euthanasia : International Position
H.1
U.K. Decisions:
H.1.1
Airedale Case
H.1.2
Later Cases
H.2
H.3
The Legal position in the United States Australian Jurisdiction
H.4
Legal position in Canada
H.5
Other Jurisdictions
H.6
International considerations and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
I
The 241st Rep ort of The Law Commission of India on Passive Euthanasia
J.
Right to refuse treatment
H.
o.
E.
G.
K.
Passive Euthanasia in the context of Article 21 of the Constitution.
K.1
Individual Dignity as a facet of Article 21
L
Right of self-determination and individual autonomy
M.
Social morality, medical ethicality and State interest
N.
Submissions of the States
O.
Submissions of the Intervenor (Society for the Right to Die with Dignity)
P.
Advance Directive/Advance Care Directive/ Advance Medical Directive
(a)
Who can execute the Advance Directive and how
(b)
What should it contain?
(c)
How should it be recorded and preserved
(d)
When and by whom can it be given effect to
(e)
What if permission is refused by the Medical Board
(f)
Revocation or inapplicability of Advance Directive
Q.
Conclusions in seriatim
A. Prologue:
Life and death as concepts have invited many a thinker, philosopher, writer and physician to define or describe them. Sometimes attempts have been made or efforts have been undertaken to gloriously paint the pictures of both in many a colour and shade. Swami Vivekananda expects one to understand that life is the lamp that is constantly burning out and further suggests that if one wants to have life, one has to die every
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
moment for it. John Dryden, an illustrious English author, considers life a cheat and says that men favour the deceit. No one considers that the goal of life is the grave. Léon Montenaeken would like to describe life as short, a little hoping, a little dreaming and then good night. The famous poet Dylan Thomas would state “do not go gentle into that good night.” One may like to compare life with constant restless moment spent in fear of extinction of a valued vapour; and another may sincerely believe that it is beyond any conceivable metaphor. A metaphysical poet like John Donne, in his inimitable manner, says:-
“One short sleep past, we wake eternally, And death shall be no more; death, thou shalt die”. Some would say with profound wisdom that life is to be lived only for pleasure and others with equal wise pragmatism would proclaim that life is meant for the realization of divinity within one because that is where one feels the “self”, the individuality and one’s own real identity. Dharmaraj Yudhisthira may express that though man sees that death takes place every moment, yet he feels that the silence of death would not disturb him and nothing could be more surprising than the said thought. Yet others feel that one should never be concerned about the uncertain death and live life embracing hedonism till death comes. Charvaka, an ancient philosopher, frowns at the conception of re-birth and commends for living life to the fullest. Thus, death is complicated and life is a phenomenon which possibly intends to keep away from negatives that try to attack the virtue and vigour of life from any arena. In spite of all the statements, references and utterances, be it mystical, philosophical or psychological, the fact remains, at least on the basis of conceptual majority, that people love to live – whether at eighty or eighteen – and do not, in actuality, intend to treat life like an “autumn leaf”. As Alfred Tennyson says:-
“No life that breathes with human breath has ever truly longed for death.” 2. The perception is not always the same at every stage. There comes a phase in life when the spring of life is frozen, the rain of circulation becomes dry, the movement of body becomes motionless, the rainbow of life becomes colourless and the word ‘life’ which one calls a dance in space and time becomes still and blurred and the inevitable death comes near to hold it as an octopus gripping firmly with its tentacles so
that the person “shall rise up never”. The ancient Greet philosopher, Epicurus, has said, although in a different context:“Why should I fear death? If I am, then death is not.
If death is, then I am not. Why should I fear that which can only exist when I do not?”
But there is a fallacy in the said proposition. It is because mere existence does not amount to presence. And sometimes there is a feebleness of feeling of presence in semi-reality state when the idea of conceptual identity is lost, quality of life is sunk and the sanctity of life is destroyed and such destruction is denial of real living. Ernest Hemingway, in his book ‘The Old Man and the Sea’, expounds the idea that man can be destroyed, but cannot be defeated. In a certain context, it can be said, life sans dignity is an unacceptable defeat and life that meets death with dignity is a value to be aspired for and a moment for celebration. 3. The question that emerges is whether a person should be allowed to remain in such a stage of incurable passivity suffering from pain and anguish in the name of Hippocratic oath or, for that matter, regarding the suffering as only a state of mind and a relative perception or treating the utterance of death as a “word infinitely terrible” to be a rhetoric without any meaning. In contradistinction to the same, the question that arises is should he not be allowed to cross the doors of life and enter, painlessly and with dignity, into the dark tunnel of death whereafter it is said that there is resplendence. In delineation of such an issue, there emerges the question in law – should he or she be given such treatment which has come into existence with the passage of time and progress of medical technology so that he/she exists possibly not realizing what happens around him/her or should his/her individual dignity be sustained with concern by smoothening the process of dying. 4. The legal question does not singularly remain in the set framework of law or, for that matter, morality or dilemma of the doctors but also encapsulates social values and the family mindset to make a resolute decision which ultimately is a cause of concern for all. There is also another perspective to it. A family may not desire to go ahead with
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
the process of treatment but is compelled to do so under social pressure especially in a different milieu, and in the case of an individual, there remains a fear of being branded that he/she, in spite of being able to provide the necessary treatment to the patient, has chosen not to do so. The social psyche constantly makes him/her feel guilty. The collective puts him at the crossroads between socially carved out ‘meaningful guilt’ and his constant sense of rationality and individual responsibility. There has to be a legalistic approach which is essential to clear the maze and instill awareness that gradually melts the idea of “meaningful guilt” and ushers in an act of “affirmative human purpose” that puts humanness on a high pedestal.
5. There is yet another aspect. In an action of this nature, there can be abuse by the beneficiaries who desire that the patient’s heart should stop so that his property is inherited in promptitude and in such a situation, the treating physicians are also scared of collusion that may invite the wrath of criminal law as well as social stigma. The medical, social and ethical apprehensions further cloud their mind to take a decision. The apprehension, the cultural stigma, the social reprehension, the allegation of conspiracy, the ethical dilemma and eventually the shadow between the individual desire and the collective expression distances the reality and it is here that the law has to have an entry to alleviate the agony of the individual and dispel the collective attributes and perceptions so that the imbroglio is clear. Therefore, the heart of the matter is whether the law permits for accelerating the process of dying sans suffering when life is on the path of inevitable decay and if so, at what stage and to what extent. The said issue warrants delineation from various perspectives.
B. Contentions in the Writ Petition: 6. The instant Writ Petition preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by the petitioner, a registered society, seeks to declare “right to die with dignity” as a fundamental right within the fold of “right to live with dignity” guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution; to issue directions to the respondents to adopt suitable procedure in consultation with the State Governments, where necessary; to ensure that persons of deteriorated health or terminally ill patients should be able to execute a document titled “My Living Will and Attorney Authorisation” which can be presented to the hospital for appropriate action in the event of the executant being admitted to the hospital with
serious illness which may threaten termination of the life of the executant; to appoint a committee of experts including doctors, social scientists and lawyers to study into the aspect of issuing guidelines as to the “Living Wills”; and to issue such further appropriate directions and guidelines as may be necessary.
7. It is asserted that every individual is entitled to take his/her decision about the continuance or discontinuance of life when the process of death has already commenced and he/she has reached an irreversible permanent progressive state where death is not far away. It is contended that each individual has an inherent right to die with dignity which is an inextricable facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. That apart, it is set forth that right to die sans pain and suffering is fundamental to one’s bodily autonomy and such integrity does not remotely accept any effort that puts the individual on life support without any ray of hope and on the contrary, the whole regime of treatment continues in spite of all being aware that it is a Sisyphean endeavour, an effort to light a bulb without the filament or to expect a situation to be in an apple pie order when it is actually in a state of chaos.
8. It is put forth that the concept of sustenance of individual autonomy inheres in the right of privacy and also comes within the fundamental conception of liberty. To sustain the stand of privacy, reliance has been placed on the decisions in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. and others 1, Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another 2 and People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India and another3. Inspiration has also been drawn from the decision of the United States in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health4. It is averred that due to the advancement of modern medical technology pertaining to medical science and respiration, a situation has been created where the dying process of the patient is unnecessarily prolonged causing distress and agony to the patient as well as to the near and dear ones and, consequently, the patient is in a persistent vegetative state thereby allowing free intrusion. It is also contended that the petitioner-society is not claiming that the right to die is a part of the right to life but asserting the claim that the right to die with dignity is an inseparable and inextricable facet of the right to live with dignity. The execution of a living will or issuance of
(1964) 1 SCR 332 : AIR 1963 SC 1295 (1975) 2 SCC 148 (1997) 1 SCC 301 111 L Ed 2d 224 : 497 US 261 (1990) : 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990)
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
advance directive has become a necessity in today’s time keeping in view the prolongation of treatment in spite of irreversible prognosis and owing to penal laws in the field that creates a dilemma in the minds of doctors to take aid of the modern techniques in a case or not. A comparison has been made between the fundamental rights of an individual and the State interest focusing on sanctity as well as quality of life. References have been made to the laws in various countries, namely, United Kingdom, United States of America, Australia, Denmark, Singapore, Canada, etc. The autonomy of the patient has been laid stress upon to highlight the right to die with dignity without pain and suffering which may otherwise be prolonged because of artificial continuance of life through methods that are really not of any assistance for cure or improvement of living conditions.
C. Stand in the counter affidavit and the applications for intervention: 9. A counter affidavit has been filed by the Union of India contending, inter alia, that serious thought has been given to regulate the provisions of euthanasia. A private member’s Bill and the 241st report of the Law Commission of India have been referred to. It has been set forth that the Law Commission had submitted a report on The Medical Treatment of Terminally-ill Patients (Protection of Patients and Medical Practitioners) Bill, 2006 but the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare was not in favour of the enactment due to the following reasons:-
“a) Hippocratic oath is against intentional/voluntary killings of patient. b) Progression of medical science to relieve pain, suffering, rehabilitation and treatment of so-called diseases will suffer a set back.
c) An individual may wish to die at certain point of time, his/her wish may not be persistent and only a fleeting desire out of transient depression. d) Suffering is a state of mind and a perception, which varies from individual to individual and depends on various environmental and social factors. e) Continuous advancement in medical science has made possible good pain management in patients of cancer and other terminal
illness. Similarly, rehabilitation helps many spinal injury patients in leading near normal life and euthanasia may not be required. f) Wish of euthanasia by a mentally ill patient/in depression may be treatable by good psychiatric care.
g) It will be difficult to quantify suffering, which may always be subject to changing social pressures and norms. h) Can doctors claim to have knowledge and experience to say that the disease is incurable and patient is permanently invalid?
i) Defining of bed-ridden and requiring regular assistance is again not always medically possible. j) There might be psychological pressure and trauma to the medical officers who would be required to conduct euthanasia.”
10. The counter affidavit further states that after the judgment was delivered by this Court in Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug v. Union of India and others5, the Ministry of Law and Justice opined that the directions given by this Court have to be followed in such cases and the said directions should be treated as law. The Law Commission in its 241st Report titled “Passive Euthanasia – A Relook” again proposed for making a legislation on “Passive Euthanasia” and also prepared a draft Bill titled The Medical Treatment of Terminally Ill Patients (Protection of Patients and Medical Practitioners) Bill. The said Bill was referred to the technical wing of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (Directorate General of Health Services-Dte. GHS) for examination in June 2014. It is the case of the Union of India that two meetings were held under the chairmanship of Special Director General of Health Service which was attended by various experts. A further meeting was held under the chairmanship of Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, on 22.05.2015 to examine the Bill. Thereafter, various meetings have been held by experts and the expert committee had proposed formulation of legislation on passive euthanasia. 11. Counter affidavits have been filed by various States. We need not refer to the same in detail. Suffice it to mention that in certain affidavits, emphasis has been laid on Articles 37, 39 and 47 which require the States to take appropriate steps as envisaged in the said Articles for apposite governance. That apart, it has been pronouncedly stated that
(2011) 4 SCC 454
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
the right to life does not include the right to die and, in any case, the right to live with dignity guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution means availability of food, shelter and health and does not include the right to die with dignity. It is asseverated that saving the life is the primary duty of the State and, therefore, there is necessity for health care. It is also contended that the introduction of the right to die with dignity as a facet of the right under Article 21 will create a right that the said constitutional provision does not envisage and further it may have the potential effect to destroy the said basic right.
12. An application for intervention has been filed by the “Society for the Right to Die with Dignity” whose prayer for intervention has been allowed. The affidavit filed by the said society supports the concept of euthanasia because it is a relief from irrecoverable suffering of which pain is a factor. It has cited many an example from various texts to support passive euthanasia and suggested certain criteria to be followed. It has also supported the idea of introduction of living will and durable power of attorney documents and has filed a sample of living will or advance health directive or advance declaration provided by Luis Kutner. Emphasis has been laid on peaceful exit from life and the freedom of choice not to live and particularly so under distressing conditions and illhealth which lead to an irrecoverable state. The management of terminally ill patients has been put at the centre stage. It has been highlighted that determination of the seemly criteria will keep the element of misuse by the family members or the treating physician or, for that matter, any interested person at bay and also remove the confusion.
We have heard Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel for the petitioner. Mr. P.S. Narasimha, learned Additional Solicitor General for Union of India, Mr. Arvind P. Datar learned senior counsel and Mr. Devansh A. Mohta, learned counsel who have supported the cause put forth in the writ petition.
D. Background of the Writ Petition: 13. Before we engage ourselves with the right claimed, it is requisite to state that the present litigation has a history and while narrating the same, the assertions made in the Writ Petition and the contentions which have been raised during the course of hearing, to which we shall refer in due course, are to be kept in mind. D.1 P. Rathinam’s case – The question of unconstitutionality of
Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code:
14. Presently, it is necessary to travel backwards in time, though not very far. Two individuals, namely, P. Rathinam and Nagbhushan Patnaik, filed two Writ Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution which were decided by a two-Judge Bench in P. Rathinam v. Union of India & another6. The writ petitions assailed the constitutional validity of Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) contending that the same is violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The Court posed 16 questions. The relevant ones read thus:“(1) Has Article 21 any positive content or is it merely negative in its reach?
(2) Has a person residing in India a right to die? x
x
x
x
(12) Is suicide against public policy?
(13) Does commission of suicide damage the monopolistic power of the State to take life? (14) Is apprehension of ‘constitutional cannibalism’ justified? (15) Recommendation of the Law Commission of India and followup steps taken, if any.
(16) Global view. What is the legal position in other leading countries of the world regarding the matter at hand?”
15. Answering question No. (1), the Court, after referring to various authorities under Article 21, took note of the authority in State of Himachal Pradesh and another v. Umed Ram Sharma and others7 wherein it has been observed that the right to life embraces not only physical existence but also the quality of life as understood in its richness and fullness within the ambit of the Constitution. In the said case, the Court had held that for residents of hilly areas, access to road was access to life itself and so, necessity of road communication in a reasonable condition was treated as a constitutional imperative. P. Rathinam perceived the elevated positive content in the said ruling. Answering question No. (2), the Court referred to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Maruti Shripati Dubal v. State of Maharashtra8 that placed
(1994) 3 SCC 394 (1986) 2 SCC 68 : AIR 1986 SC 847
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
reliance on R.C. Cooper v. Union of India9 wherein it had been held that what is true of one fundamental right is also true of another fundamental right and on the said premise, the Bombay High Court had opined that it cannot be seriously disputed that fundamental rights have their positive as well as negative aspects. Citing an example, it had stated that freedom of speech and expression includes freedom not to speak and similarly, the freedom of association and movement includes freedom not to join any association or move anywhere and, accordingly, it stated that logically it must follow that the right to live would include the right not to live, i.e., right to die or to terminate one’s life.
16. After so stating, this Court approved the view taken by the Bombay High Court in Maruti Shripati Dubal and meeting the criticism of that judgment from certain quarters, the two-Judge Bench opined that the criticism was only partially correct because the negative aspect may not be inferable on the analogy of the rights conferred by different clauses of Article 19 and one may refuse to live if his life, according to the person concerned, is not worth living. One may rightly think that having achieved all worldly pleasures or happiness, he has something to achieve beyond this life. This desire for communion with God may rightly lead even a healthy mind to think that he would forego his right to live and would rather choose not to live. In any case, a person cannot be forced to enjoy the right to life to his detriment, disadvantage or disliking. Eventually, it concluded that the right to live of which Article 21 speaks of can be said to bring in its trail the right not to live a forced life. 17. Answering all the questions, the Court declared Section 309 IPC ultra vires and held that it deserved to be effaced from the statute book to humanize our penal laws. D.2 Gian Kaur’s case – The question of unconstitutionality of Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code: 18. The dictum laid down by the two-Judge Bench in P. Rathinam did not remain a precedent for long. In Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab10, the Constitution Bench considered the correctness of the decision rendered in P. Rathinam. In the said case, the appellants were convicted by the trial Court under Section 306 IPC and the conviction was assailed on the ground that Section 306 IPC is unconstitutional and to sustain the
1987 Cri LJ 473 : (1986) 88 Bom LR 589 (1970) 2 SCC 298 : AIR 1970 SC 1318 (1996) 2 SCC 648
said argument, reliance was placed on the authority in P. Rathinam wherein Section 309 IPC was held to be unconstitutional being violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. It was urged that once Section 309 IPC had been held to be unconstitutional, any person abetting the commission of suicide by another is merely assisting in the enforcement of the fundamental right under Article 21 and, therefore, Section 306 IPC penalizing abetment of suicide is equally violative of Article 21. The two-Judge Bench before which these arguments were advanced in appeal referred the matter to a Constitution Bench for deciding the same. In the course of arguments, one of the amicus curiae, Mr. F.S. Nariman, learned senior counsel, had submitted that the debate on euthanasia is not relevant for deciding the question of constitutional validity of Section 309 and Article 21 cannot be construed to include within it the so-called “right to die” since Article 21 guarantees protection of life and liberty and not its extinction. The Constitution Bench, after noting the submissions, stated:“17. … We, therefore, proceed now to consider the question of constitutional validity with reference to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Any further reference to the global debate on the desirability of retaining a penal provision to punish attempted suicide is unnecessary for the purpose of this decision. Undue emphasis on that aspect and particularly the reference to euthanasia cases tends to befog the real issue of the constitutionality of the provision and the crux of the matter which is determinative of the issue.” 19. Thereafter, the Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur (supra) scrutinized the reasons given in P. Rathinam and opined that the Court in the said case took the view that if a person has a right to live, he also has a right not to live. The Court in Gian Kaur (supra) observed that the Court in P. Rathinam (supra), while taking such a view, relied on the decisions which relate to other fundamental rights dealing with different situations and those decisions merely hold that the right to do an act also includes the right not to do an act in that manner. The larger Bench further observed that in all those decisions, it was the negative aspect of the right that was involved for which no positive or overt act was to be done. The Constitution Bench categorically stated that this difference has to be borne in mind while making the comparison for the application of this principle. 20. Delving into the facet of committing suicide, the larger Bench
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
observed that when a man commits suicide, he has to undertake certain positive overt acts and the genesis of those acts cannot be traced to or be included within the protection of the ‘right to life’ under Article 21. It also held that the significant aspect of ‘sanctity of life’ should not be overlooked. The Court further opined that by no stretch of imagination, extinction of life can be read to be included in protection of life because Article 21, in its ambit and sweep, cannot include within it the right to die as a part of fundamental right guaranteed therein. The Constitution Bench ruled:-
“‘Right to life’ is a natural right embodied in Article 21 but suicide is an unnatural termination or extinction of life and, therefore, incompatible and inconsistent with the concept of “right to life”. With respect and in all humility, we find no similarity in the nature of the other rights, such as the right to “freedom of speech” etc. to provide a comparable basis to hold that the “right to life” also includes the “right to die”. With respect, the comparison is inapposite, for the reason indicated in the context of Article 21. The decisions relating to other fundamental rights wherein the absence of compulsion to exercise a right was held to be included within the exercise of that right, are not available to support the view taken in P. Rathinam qua Article 21.” 21. Adverting to the concept of euthanasia, the Court observed that protagonism of euthanasia on the view that existence in persistent vegetative state (PVS) is not a benefit to the patient of terminal illness being unrelated to the principle of “sanctity of life” or the “right to live with dignity” is of no assistance to determine the scope of Article 21 for deciding whether the guarantee of “right to life” therein includes the “right to die”. The “right to life” including the right to live with human dignity would mean the existence of such a right up to the end of natural life. The Constitution Bench further explained that the said conception also includes the right to a dignified life up to the point of death including a dignified procedure of death or, in other words, it may include the right of a dying man to also die with dignity when his life is ebbing out. It has been clarified that the right to die with dignity at the end of life is not to be confused or equated with the “right to die” an unnatural death curtailing the natural span of life. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to state:-
“25. A question may arise, in the context of a dying man who is
terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative state that he may be permitted to terminate it by a premature extinction of his life in those circumstances. This category of cases may fall within the ambit of the “right to die” with dignity as a part of right to live with dignity, when death due to termination of natural life is certain and imminent and the process of natural death has commenced. These are not cases of extinguishing life but only of accelerating conclusion of the process of natural death which has already commenced. The debate even in such cases to permit physicianassisted termination of life is inconclusive. It is sufficient to reiterate that the argument to support the view of permitting termination of life in such cases to reduce the period of suffering during the process of certain natural death is not available to interpret Article 21 to include therein the right to curtail the natural span of life.”
[Emphasis supplied]
22. In view of the aforesaid analysis and taking into consideration various other aspects, the Constitution Bench declared Section 309 IPC as constitutional. 23. The Court held that the “right to live with human dignity” cannot be construed to include within its ambit the right to terminate natural life, at least before the commencement of the process of certain natural death. It then examined the question of validity of Section 306 IPC. It accepted the submission that Section 306 is constitutional. While adverting to the decision in Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland11, the Court at the outset made it clear that it was not called upon to deal with the issue of physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia cases. The decision in Airedale’s case (supra), was relating to the withdrawal of artificial measures for continuance of life by a physician. In the context of existence in the persistent vegetative state of no benefit to the patient, the principle of sanctity of life, which is the concern of the State, was stated to be not an absolute one. To bring home the distinction between active and passive euthanasia, an illustration was noted in the context of administering lethal drug actively to bring the patient’s life to an end. The significant dictum in that decision has been extracted in Gian Kaur (supra) wherein it is observed that it is not lawful for a doctor to administer a drug to his patient to bring about his death even though that course is promoted by a humanitarian desire to end his suffering and however
(1993) 2 WLR 316: (1993) 1 All ER 821, HL
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great that suffering may be. Further, to act so is to cross the rubicon which runs between the care of the living patient on one hand and euthanasia - actively causing his death to avoid or to end his suffering on the other hand. It has been noticed in Airedale that euthanasia is not lawful at common law. In the light of the demand of responsible members of the society who believe that euthanasia should be made lawful, it has been observed in that decision that the same can be achieved by legislation. The Constitution Bench has merely noted this aspect in paragraph 41 with reference to the dictum in Airedale case.
24. Proceeding to deal with physician assisted suicide, the Constitution Bench observed:“42. The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington12, which reversed the decision of United States District Court, W.D. Washington reported in 850 Federal Supplement 1454, has also relevance. The constitutional validity of the State statute that banned physician-assisted suicide by mentally competent, terminally ill adults was in question. The District Court held unconstitutional the provision punishing for promoting a suicide attempt. On appeal, that judgment was reversed and the constitutional validity of the provision was upheld.” And again:“43. This caution even in cases of physician-assisted suicide is sufficient to indicate that assisted suicides outside that category have no rational basis to claim exclusion of the fundamental principles of sanctity of life. The reasons assigned for attacking a provision which penalises attempted suicide are not available to the abettor of suicide or attempted suicide. Abetment of suicide or attempted suicide is a distinct offence which is found enacted even in the law of the countries where attempted suicide is not made punishable. Section 306 IPC enacts a distinct offence which can survive independent of Section 309 in the IPC. The learned Attorney General as well as both the learned amicus curiae rightly supported the constitutional validity of Section 306 IPC.”
Eventually, the Court in Gian Kaur (supra), apart from overruling
49 F 3d 586
P. Rathinam (supra), upheld the constitutional validity of Section 306 IPC. D.3 The approach in Aruna Shanbaug qua Passive Euthanasia vis-à-vis India: 25. Although the controversy relating to attempt to suicide or abetment of suicide was put to rest, yet the issue of euthanasia remained alive. It arose for consideration almost after a span of eleven years in Aruna Shanbaug (supra). A writ petition was filed by the next friend of the petitioner pleading, inter alia, that the petitioner was suffering immensely because of an incident that took place thirty six years back on 27.11.1973 and was in a Persistent Vegetative State (PVS) and in no state of awareness and her brain was virtually dead. The prayer of the next friend was that the respondent be directed to stop feeding the petitioner and to allow her to die peacefully. The Court noticed that there was some variance in the allegation made in the writ petition and the counter affidavit filed by the Professor and Head of the hospital where the petitioner was availing treatment. The Court appointed a team of three very distinguished doctors to examine the petitioner thoroughly and to submit a report about her physical and mental condition. The team submitted a joint report. The Court asked the team of doctors to submit a supplementary report by which the meaning of the technical terms in the first report could be explained. Various other aspects were also made clear. It is also worth noting that the KEM Hospital where the petitioner was admitted was appointed as the next friend by the Court because of its services rendered to the petitioner and the emotional bonding and attachment with the petitioner. 26. In Aruna Shanbaug (supra), after referring to the authority in Vikram Deo Singh Tomar v. State of Bihar13, this Court reproduced paragraphs 24 and 25 from Gian Kaur’s case and opined that the said paragraphs simply mean that the view taken in Rathinam’s case to the effect that the ‘right to life’ includes the ‘right to die’ is not correct and para 25 specifically mentions that the debate even in such cases to permit physician-assisted termination of life is inconclusive. The Court further observed that it was held in Gian Kaur that there is no ‘right to die’ under Article 21 of the Constitution and the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity but in the case of a dying person who is terminally ill or in permanent vegetative state, he may be allowed a
1988 Supp. SCC 734 : AIR 1988 SC 1782
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
premature extinction of his life and it would not amount to a crime. Thereafter, the Court took note of the submissions of the learned amicus curiae to the effect that the decision to withdraw life support is taken in the best interests of the patient by a body of medical persons. The Court observed that it is not the function of the Court to evaluate the situation and form an opinion on its own. The Court further noted that in England, the parens patriae jurisdiction over adult mentally incompetent persons was abolished by statute and the Court has no power now to give its consent and in such a situation, the Court only gives a declaration that the proposed omission by doctors is not unlawful.
27. After so stating, the Court addressed the legal issues, namely, active and passive euthanasia. It noted the legislations prevalent in Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, U.K., Spain, Austria, Italy, Germany, France and United States of America. It also noted that active euthanasia is illegal in all States in USA, but physician-assisted death is legal in the States of Oregon, Washington and Montana. The Court also referred to the legal position in Canada. Dealing with passive euthanasia, the twoJudge Bench opined that passive euthanasia is usually defined as withdrawing medical treatment with a deliberate intention of causing the patient’s death. An example was cited by stating that if a patient requires kidney dialysis to survive, not giving dialysis although the machine is available is passive euthanasia and similarly, withdrawing the machine where a patient is in coma or on heart-lung machine support will ordinarily result in passive euthanasia. The Court also put non-administration of life saving medicines like antibiotics in certain situations on the same platform of passive euthanasia. Denying food to a person in coma or PVS has also been treated to come within the ambit of passive euthanasia. The Court copiously referred to the decision in Airedale. In Airedale case, as has been noted in Aruna Shanbaug, Lord Goff observed that discontinuance of artificial feeding in such cases is not equivalent to cutting a mountaineer’s rope or severing the air pipe of a deep sea diver. The real question has to be not whether the doctor should take a course in which he will actively kill his patient but whether he should continue to provide his patient with medical treatment or care which, if continued, will prolong his life.
28. Lord Browne–Wilkinson was of the view that removing the nasogastric tube in the case of Anthony Bland cannot be regarded as a positive act causing death. The tube by itself, without the food being
supplied through it, does nothing. Its non-removal by itself does not cause death since by itself, it does not sustain life. The learned Judge observed that removal of the tube would not constitute the actus reus of murder since such an act by itself would not cause death. 29. Lord Mustill observed:-
“Threaded through the technical arguments addressed to the House were the strands of a much wider position, that it is in the best interests of the community at large that Anthony Bland’s life should now end. The doctors have done all they can. Nothing will be gained by going on and much will be lost. The distress of the family will get steadily worse. The strain on the devotion of a medical staff charged with the care of a patient whose condition will never improve, who may live for years and who does not even recognise that he is being cared for, will continue to mount. The large resources of skill, labour and money now being devoted to Anthony Bland might in the opinion of many be more fruitfully employed in improving the condition of other patients, who if treated may have useful, healthy and enjoyable lives for years to come.”
30. The two-Judge Bench further observed that the decision in Airedale by the House of Lords has been followed in a number of cases in U.K. and the law is now fairly well settled that in the case of incompetent patients, if the doctors act on the basis of notified medical opinion and withdraw the artificial life support system in the patient’s best interest, the said act cannot be regarded as a crime. The learned Judges posed the question as to who is to decide what is that patient’s best interest where he is in a PVS and, in that regard, opined that it is ultimately for the Court to decide, as parens patriae, as to what is in the best interest of the patient, though the wishes of close relatives and next friend and the opinion of medical practitioners should be given due weight in coming to its decision. For the said purpose, reference was made to the opinion of Balcombe J. in Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment)14 whereby it has been stated that the Court as representative of the Sovereign and as parens patriae will adopt the same standard which a reasonable and responsible parent would do. 31. The two-Judge Bench referred to the decisions of the Supreme
[1991] 2 WLR 140: [1990] 3 All ER 930: [1991] Fam 33
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
Court of United States in Washington v. Glucksberg15 and Vacco v. Quill 16 which addressed the issue whether there was a federal constitutional road to assisted suicide. Analysing the said decisions and others, the Court observed that the informed consent doctrine has become firmly entrenched in American Tort Law and, as a logical corollary, lays foundation for the doctrine that the patient who generally possesses the right to consent has the right to refuse treatment.
32. In the ultimate analysis, the Court opined that the Airedale case is more apposite to be followed. Thereafter, the Court adverted to the law in India and ruled that in Gian Kaur case, this Court had approved the decision of the House of Lords in Airedale and observed that euthanasia could be made lawful only by legislation. After so stating, the learned Judges opined:“104. It may be noted that in Gian Kaur case although the Supreme Court has quoted with approval the view of the House of Lords in Airedale case, it has not clarified who can decide whether life support should be discontinued in the case of an incompetent person e.g. a person in coma or PVS. This vexed question has been arising often in India because there are a large number of cases where persons go into coma (due to an accident or some other reason) or for some other reason are unable to give consent, and then the question arises as to who should give consent for withdrawal of life support. This is an extremely important question in India because of the unfortunate low level of ethical standards to which our society has descended, its raw and widespread commercialisation, and the rampant corruption, and hence, the Court has to be very cautious that unscrupulous persons who wish to inherit the property of someone may not get him eliminated by some crooked method.”
33. After so stating, the two-Judge Bench dwelled upon the concept of brain dead and various other aspects which included withdrawal of life support of a patient in PVS and, in that context, ruled thus:“125. In our opinion, if we leave it solely to the patient’s relatives or to the doctors or next friend to decide whether to withdraw the life support of an incompetent person there is always a risk in our country that this may be misused by some unscrupulous persons
138 L Ed 2d 772 : 521 US 702 (1997) 138 L Ed 2d 834 : 521 US 793 (1997)
who wish to inherit or otherwise grab the property of the patient. Considering the low ethical levels prevailing in our society today and the rampant commercialisation and corruption, we cannot rule out the possibility that unscrupulous persons with the help of some unscrupulous doctors may fabricate material to show that it is a terminal case with no chance of recovery. There are doctors and doctors. While many doctors are upright, there are others who can do anything for money (see George Bernard Shaw’s play The Doctor’s Dilemma). The commercialisation of our society has crossed all limits. Hence we have to guard against the potential of misuse (see Robin Cook’s novel Coma). In our opinion, while giving great weight to the wishes of the parents, spouse, or other close relatives or next friend of the incompetent patient and also giving due weight to the opinion of the attending doctors, we cannot leave it entirely to their discretion whether to discontinue the life support or not. We agree with the decision of Lord Keith in Airedale case5 that the approval of the High Court should be taken in this connection. This is in the interest of the protection of the patient, protection of the doctors, relatives and next friend, and for reassurance of the patient’s family as well as the public. This is also in consonance with the doctrine of parens patriae which is a well-known principle of law.”
34. After so laying down, the Court referred to the authorities in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India17 and State of Kerala and another v. N.M. Thomas and others18 and further opined that the High Court can grant approval for withdrawing life support of an incompetent person under Article 226 of the Constitution because Article 226 gives abundant power to the High Court to pass suitable orders on the application filed by the near relatives or next friend or the doctors/hospital staff praying for permission to withdraw the life support of an incompetent person. Dealing with the procedure to be adopted by the High Court when such application is filed, the Court ruled that when such an application is filed, the Chief Justice of the High Court should forthwith constitute a Bench of at least two Judges who should decide to grant approval or not and before doing so, the Bench should seek the opinion of a Committee of three reputed doctors to be nominated by the Bench after consulting such medical authorities/medical practitioners as it may deem fit.
(1990) 1 SCC 613 (1976) 2 SCC 310
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Amongst the three doctors, as directed, one should be a Neurologist, one should be a Psychiatrist and the third a Physician. The Court further directed:-
“134. … The committee of three doctors nominated by the Bench should carefully examine the patient and also consult the record of the patient as well as take the views of the hospital staff and submit its report to the High Court Bench. Simultaneously with appointing the committee of doctors, the High Court Bench shall also issue notice to the State and close relatives e.g. parents, spouse, brothers/ sisters, etc. of the patient, and in their absence his/her next friend, and supply a copy of the report of the doctor’s committee to them as soon as it is available. After hearing them, the High Court Bench should give its verdict.
135. The above procedure should be followed all over India until Parliament makes legislation on this subject. 136. The High Court should give its decision speedily at the earliest, since delay in the matter may result in causing great mental agony to the relatives and persons close to the patient. The High Court should give its decision assigning specific reasons in accordance with the principle of “best interest of the patient” laid down by the House of Lords in Airedale case. The views of the near relatives and committee of doctors should be given due weight by the High Court before pronouncing a final verdict which shall not be summary in nature.” 35. We must note here that the two-Judge Bench declined to grant the permission after perusing the medical reports. For the sake of completeness, we think it apt to reproduce the reasoning:“122. From the above examination by the team of doctors, it cannot be said that Aruna Shanbaug is dead. Whatever the condition of her cortex, her brainstem is certainly alive. She does not need a heart-lung machine. She breathes on her own without the help of a respirator. She digests food, and her body performs other involuntary functions without any help. From the CD (which we had screened in the courtroom on 2-3-2011 in the presence of the counsel and others) it appears that she can certainly not be called dead. She was making some sounds, blinking, eating food put in her mouth, and even licking with her tongue morsels on her mouth.
However, there appears little possibility of her coming out of PVS in which she is in. In all probability, she will continue to be in the state in which she is in till her death.” D.4 The Reference:
36. The aforesaid matter was decided when the present Writ Petition was pending for consideration. The present petition was, thereafter, listed before a three-Judge Bench which noted the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner and also that of the learned Additional Solicitor General on behalf of the Union of India. Reliance was placed on the decision in Aruna Shanbaug. The three-Judge Bench reproduced paragraphs 24 and 25 from Gian Kaur and noted that the Constitution Bench did not express any binding view on the subject of euthanasia, rather it reiterated that the legislature would be the appropriate authority to bring the change. 37. After so holding, it referred to the understanding of Gian Kaur in Aruna Shanbaug by the two-Judge Bench and reproduced paragraphs 21 and 101 from the said judgment:“21. We have carefully considered paras 24 and 25 in Gian Kaur case and we are of the opinion that all that has been said therein is that the view in Rathinam case that the right to life includes the right to die is not correct. We cannot construe Gian Kaur case to mean anything beyond that. In fact, it has been specifically mentioned in para 25 of the aforesaid decision that ‘the debate even in such cases to permit physician-assisted termination of life is inconclusive’. Thus it is obvious that no final view was expressed in the decision in Gian Kaur case beyond what we have mentioned above. x
x
x
x
“101. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab held that both euthanasia and assisted suicide are not lawful in India. That decision overruled the earlier twoJudge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in P. Rathinam v. Union of India. The Court held that the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution does not include the right to die (vide SCC para 33). In Gian Kaur case the Supreme Court approved of
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
the decision of the House of Lords in Airedale case and observed that euthanasia could be made lawful only by legislation.”
(Emphasis supplied) 38. Commenting on the said analysis, the three-Judge Bench went on to say:-
“13. Insofar as the above paragraphs are concerned, Aruna Shanbaug aptly interpreted the decision of the Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur and came to the conclusion that euthanasia can be allowed in India only through a valid legislation. However, it is factually wrong to observe that in Gian Kaur, the Constitution Bench approved the decision of the House of Lords in Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland. Para 40 of Gian Kaur, clearly states that :
“40. … Even though it is not necessary to deal with physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia cases, a brief reference to this decision cited at the Bar may be made.”
(Emphasis supplied) Thus, it was a mere reference in the verdict and it cannot be construed to mean that the Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur approved the opinion of the House of Lords rendered in Airedale. To this extent, the observation in para 101 of Aruna Shanbaug is incorrect.” 39. From the aforesaid, it is clear that the three-Judge Bench expressed the view that the opinion of the House of Lords in Airedale has not been approved in Gian Kaur (supra) and to that extent, the observation in Aruna Shanbaug (supra) is incorrect. After so stating, the three-Judge Bench opined that Aruna Shanbaug (supra) upholds the authority of passive euthanasia and lays down an elaborate procedure for executing the same on the wrong premise that the Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur (supra) had upheld the same. Thereafter, considering the important question of law involved which needs to be reflected in the light of social, legal, medical and constitutional perspectives, in order to have a clear enunciation of law, it referred the matter for consideration by the Constitution Bench of this Court for the benefit of humanity as a whole. The three-Judge bench further observed that it was refraining
from framing any specific questions for consideration by the Constitution Bench as it would like the Constitution Bench to go into all the aspects of the matter and lay down exhaustive guidelines. That is how the matter has been placed before us. E. Our analysis of Gian Kaur:
40. It is the first and foremost duty to understand what has been stated by the Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur’s case. It has referred to the decision in Airedale (supra) that has been recapitulated in Aruna Shanbaug case which was a case relating to withdrawal of artificial measures of continuance of life by the physician. It is relevant to mention here that the Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur categorically noted that it was not necessary to deal with physician–assisted suicide or euthanasia cases though a brief reference to the decisions cited by the Bar was required to be made. The Constitution Bench noted that Airedale held that in the context of existence in the persistent vegetative state of no benefit to the patient, the principle of sanctity of life, which is the concern of the State, was not an absolute one. The larger bench further noticed that in Airedale, it had been stated that in such cases also, the existing crucial distinction between cases in which a physician decides not to provide or to continue to provide, for his patient, treatment or care which could or might prolong his life, and those in which he decides, for example, by administering a lethal drug actively to bring his patient’s life to an end, was indicated. Thereafter, while again referring to Airedale case, the larger bench observed that it was a case relating to withdrawal of artificial measures for continuance of life by the physician. After so stating, the Court reproduced the following passage from the opinion of Lord Goff of Chieveley:“... But it is not lawful for a doctor to administer a drug to his patient to bring about his death, even though that course is prompted by a humanitarian desire to end his suffering, however great that suffering may be : See Reg v. Cox, (unreported), 18 September (1992). So to act is to cross the Rubicon which runs between on the one hand the care of the living patient and on the other hand euthanasia - actively causing his death to avoid or to end his suffering. Euthanasia is not lawful at common law. It is of course well known that there are many responsible members of our society who believe that euthanasia should be made lawful; but that result could, I believe, only be achieved by
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
legislation which expresses the democratic will that so fundamental a change should be made in our law, and can, if enacted, ensure that such legalised killing can only be carried out subject to appropriate supervision and control....”
(Emphasis supplied in Gian Kaur) 41. After reproducing the said passage, the Court opined thus:“41. The desirability of bringing about a change was considered to be the function of the legislature by enacting a suitable law providing therein adequate safeguards to prevent any possible abuse.” 42. At this stage, it is necessary to clear the maze whether the Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur had accepted what has been held in Airedale. On a careful and anxious reading of Gian Kaur, it is noticeable that there has been narration, reference and notice of the view taken in Airedale case. It is also worth noting that the Court was concerned with the constitutional validity of Section 309 IPC that deals with attempt to commit suicide and Section 306 IPC that provides for abetment to commit suicide. As noted earlier, the Constitution Bench, while distinguishing the case of a dying man who is terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative state and his termination or premature extinction of life, observed that the said category of cases may fall within the ambit of right to die with dignity as a part of right to life with dignity when death due to termination of natural life is inevitable and imminent and the process of natural death has commenced. The Constitution Bench further opined that the said cases do not amount to extinguishing the life but only amount to accelerating the process of natural death which has already commenced and, thereafter, the Constitution Bench stated that the debate with regard to physician assisted suicide remains inconclusive. The larger Bench has reiterated that the cases pertaining to premature extinction of life during the process of certain natural death of patients who are terminally ill or in persistent vegetative state were of assistance to interpret Article 21 of the Constitution to include therein the right to curtail the natural span of life. On a seemly understanding of the judgment in Gian Kaur, we do not find that it has decried euthanasia as a concept. On the contrary, it gives an indication that in such situations, it is the acceleration of the process of dying which may constitute a part of right to life with dignity so that the period of suffering is reduced. We are
absolutely conscious that a judgment is not to be construed as a statute but our effort is to understand what has been really expressed in Gian Kaur. Be it clarified, it is understood and appreciated that there is a distinction between a positive or overt act to put an end to life by the person living his life and termination of life so that an individual does not remain in a vegetative state or, for that matter, when the death is certain because of terminal illness and he remains alive with the artificially assisted medical system. In Gian Kaur, while dealing with the attempt to commit suicide, the Court clearly held that when a man commits suicide, he has to undertake certain positive overt acts and the genesis of those acts cannot be tested to or be included within the protection of the expression “right to life” under Article 21 of the Constitution. It was also observed that a dignified procedure of death may include the right of a dying man to also die with dignity when the life is ebbing out. This is how the pronouncement in Gian Kaur has to be understood. It is also not the ratio of the authority in Gian Kaur that euthanasia has to be introduced only by a legislation. What has been stated in paragraph 41 of Gian Kaur is what has been understood to have been held in Airedale’s case. The Court has neither expressed any independent opinion nor has it approved the said part or the ratio as stated in Airedale. There has been only a reference to Airedale’s case and the view expressed therein as regards legislation. Therefore, the perception in Aruna Shanbaug that the Constitution Bench has approved the decision in Airedale is not correct. It is also quite clear that Gian Kaur does not lay down that passive euthanasia can only be thought of or given effect to by legislation. Appositely understood, it opens an expansive sphere of Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, it can be held without any hesitation that Gian Kaur has neither given any definite opinion with regard to euthanasia nor has it stated that the same can be conceived of only by a legislation. F. Our analysis of Aruna Shanbaug qua legislation:
43. Having said this, we shall focus in detail what has been stated in Aruna Shanbaug. In paragraph 101 which has been reproduced hereinbefore, the two-Judge Bench noted that Gian Kaur has approved the decision of the House of Lords in Airedale and observed that euthanasia could be made lawful only by legislation. This perception, according to us, is not correct. As already stated, Gian Kaur does not lay down that passive euthanasia could be made lawful only by legislation. In paragraph 41 of the said judgment, the Constitution Bench was only
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
adverting to what has been stated by Lord Goff of Chieveley in Airedale’s case. However, this expression of view of Aruna Shanbaug which has not been accepted by the referral Bench makes no difference to our present analysis. We unequivocally express the opinion that Gian Kaur is not a binding precedent for the purpose of laying down the principle that passive euthanasia can be made lawful “only by legislation.”
G. The Distinction between Active and Passive Euthanasia: 44. As a first step, it is imperative to understand the concept of euthanasia before we enter into the arena of analysis of the expanded right of Article 21 in Gian Kaur and the understanding of the same. Euthanasia is basically an intentional premature termination of another person’s life either by direct intervention (active euthanasia) or by withholding life-prolonging measures and resources (passive euthanasia) either at the express or implied request of that person (voluntary euthanasia) or in the absence of such approval/consent (non-voluntary euthanasia). Aruna Shanbaug has discussed about two categories of euthanasia - active and passive. While dealing with active euthanasia, also known as “positive euthanasia” or “aggressive euthanasia”, it has been stated that the said type of euthanasia entails a positive act or affirmative action or act of commission entailing the use of lethal substances or forces to cause the intentional death of a person by direct intervention, e.g., a lethal injection given to a person with terminal cancer who is in terrible agony. Passive euthanasia, on the other hand, also called “negative euthanasia” or “non-aggressive euthanasia”, entails withdrawing of life support measures or withholding of medical treatment for continuance of life, e.g., withholding of antibiotics in case of a patient where death is likely to occur as a result of not giving the said antibiotics or removal of the heart lung machine from a patient in coma. The twoJudge Bench has also observed that the legal position across the world seems to be that while active euthanasia is illegal unless there is a legislation permitting it, passive euthanasia is legal even without legislation, provided certain conditions and safeguards are maintained. The Court has drawn further distinction between voluntary euthanasia and nonvoluntary euthanasia in the sense that voluntary euthanasia is where the consent is taken from the patient and non-voluntary euthanasia is where the consent is unavailable, for instances when the patient is in coma or is otherwise unable to give consent. Describing further about active euthanasia, the Division Bench has observed that the said type of
euthanasia involves taking specific steps to cause the patient’s death such as injecting the patient with some lethal substance, i.e., sodium pentothal which causes, in a person, a state of deep sleep in a few seconds and the person instantly dies in that state. That apart, the Court has drawn a distinction between euthanasia and physician assisted dying and noted that the difference lies in the fact as to who administers the lethal medication. It has been observed that in euthanasia, a physician or third party administers it while in physician assisted suicide, it is the patient who does it though on the advice of the doctor. Elaborating further, the two-Judge Bench has opined that the predominant difference between “active” and “passive” euthanasia is that in the former, a specific act is done to end the patient’s life while the latter covers a situation where something is not done which is necessary in preserving the patient’s life. The main idea behind the distinction, as observed by the Bench, is that in passive euthanasia, the doctors are not actively killing the patient, they are merely not saving him and only accelerating the conclusion of the process of natural death which has already commenced. 45. The two-Judge Bench, thereafter, elaborated on passive euthanasia and gave more examples of cases within the ambit of passive euthanasia. The learned Judges further categorized passive euthanasia into voluntary passive euthanasia and non-voluntary passive euthanasia. The learned Judges described voluntary passive euthanasia as a situation where a person who is capable of deciding for himself decides that he would prefer to die because of various reasons whereas non-voluntary passive euthanasia has been described to mean that a person is not in a position to decide for himself, e.g., if he is in coma or PVS. 46. While scrutinizing the distinction between active and passive euthanasia, the paramount aspect is “foreseeing the hastening of death”. The said view has been propagated in several decisions all over the world. The Supreme Court of Canada, in the case of Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General)19, drew the distinction between these two forms of euthanasia on the basis of intention. Echoing a similar view, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the said distinction on the basis of “intention” in the case of Vacco (supra) wherein Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that the said distinction coheres with the fundamental legal principles of causation and intention. In case when the death of a patient occurs due to removal of life-supporting measures,
85 C.C.C. (3d) 15 : (1993) 3 S.C.R. 519
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
the patient dies due to an underlying fatal disease without any intervening act on the part of the doctor or medical practitioner, whereas in the cases coming within the purview of active euthanasia, for example, when the patient ingests lethal medication, he is killed by that medication.
47. This distinction on the basis of “intention” further finds support in the explanation provided in the case In the matter of Claire C. Conroy20 wherein the Court made an observation that people who refuse life-sustaining medical treatment may not harbour a specific intent to die, rather they may fervently wish to live but do so free of unwanted medical technology, surgery or drugs and without protracted suffering. 48. Another distinction on the basis of “action and non-action” was advanced in the Airedale case. Drawing a crucial distinction between the two forms of euthanasia, Lord Goff observed that passive euthanasia includes cases in which a doctor decides not to provide, or to continue to provide, for his patient, treatment or care which could prolong his life and active euthanasia involves actively ending a patient’s life, for example, by administering a lethal drug. As per the observations made by Lord Goff, the former can be considered lawful either because the doctor intends to give effect to his patient’s wishes by withholding the treatment or care, or even in certain circumstances in which the patient is incapacitated from giving his consent. However, active euthanasia, even voluntary, is impermissible despite being prompted by the humanitarian desire to end the suffering of the patient. 49. It is perhaps due to the distinction evolved between these two forms of euthanasia, which has gained moral and legal sanctity all over, that most of the countries today have legalized passive euthanasia either by way of legislations or through judicial interpretation but there remains uncertainty whether active euthanasia should be granted legal status.
H. Euthanasia : International Position: H.1 U.K. Decisions: H.1.1 Airedale Case:
50. In the obtaining situation, we shall now advert to the opinions stated in Airedale case. In the said case, one Anthony Bland, a supporter of Liverpool Football Club, who had gone to Hillsborough Ground,
98 N.J. 321 (1985) : (1985) 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J.)
suffered severe injuries as a result of which supply to his brain was interrupted. Eventually, he suffered an irreversible damage to the brain as a consequence of which he got into a condition of persistent vegetative state (PVS). He became incapable of voluntary movement and could feel no pain. He was not in a position to feel or communicate. To keep him alive, artificial means were taken recourse to. In such a state of affairs, the treating doctors and the parents of Bland felt that no fruitful purpose would be served by continuing the medical aid. As there were doubts with regard to stoppage of medical care which may incur a criminal liability, a declaration from the British High Court was sought to resolve the doubts. The Family Division of the High Court granted the declaration which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. The matter travelled to the House of Lords. 51. Lord Keith of Kinkel opined that regard should be had to the whole artificial regime which kept Anthony Bland alive and it was incorrect to direct attention exclusively to the fact that nourishment was being provided. In his view, the administration of nourishment by the means adopted involved the application of a medical technique. 52. Lord Keith observed that in general, it would not be lawful for a medical practitioner who assumed responsibility for the care of an unconscious patient simply to give up treatment in circumstances where continuance of it would confer some benefit on the patient. On the other hand, a medical practitioner is under no duty to continue to treat such a patient where a large body of informed and responsible medical opinion is to the effect that no benefit at all would be conferred by continuance of treatment. Existence in a vegetative state with no prospect of recovery is, by that opinion, regarded as not being a benefit, and that, if not unarguably correct, at least forms a proper basis for the decision to discontinue treatment and care. He was of the further opinion that since existence in PVS is not a benefit to the patient, the principle of sanctity of life is no longer an absolute one. It does not compel a medical practitioner to treat a patient, who will die if not treated, contrary to the express wishes of the patient. It does not compel the temporary keeping alive of patients who are terminally ill where to do so would merely prolong their suffering. On the other hand, it forbids the taking of active measures to cut short the life of a terminally ill patient. 53. Lord Keith further stated that it does no violence to the principle
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
of sanctity of life to hold that it is lawful to cease to give medical treatment and care to a PVS patient who has been in that state for over three years considering that to do so involves invasive manipulation of the patient’s body to which he has not consented and which confers no benefit upon him. He also observed that the decision whether or not the continued treatment and care of a PVS patient confers any benefit on him is essentially one for the practitioners in charge.
54. Lord Goff of Chieveley also held that the principle of sanctity of life is not an absolute one and there is no absolute rule that the patient’s life must be prolonged by such treatment or care, if available, regardless of the circumstances. 55. Lord Goff observed that though he agreed that the doctor’s conduct in discontinuing life support can properly be categorised as an omission, yet discontinuation of life support is, for the present purposes, no different from not initiating life support in the first place as in such a case, the doctor is simply allowing his patient to die in the sense that he is desisting from taking a step which might, in certain circumstances, prevent his patient from dying as a result of his pre-existing condition; and as a matter of general principle, an omission such as this will not be unlawful unless it constitutes a breach of duty to the patient. 56. The learned Law Lord further observed that the doctor’s conduct is to be differentiated from that of, for example, an interloper who maliciously switches off a life support machine in the sense that although the interloper performs the same act as the doctor who discontinues life support, yet the doctor, in discontinuing life support, is simply allowing his patient to die of his pre-existing condition, whereas the interloper is actively intervening to stop the doctor from prolonging the patient’s life, and such conduct cannot possibly be categorised as an omission. This distinction as per Lord Goff appears to be useful in the context as it can be invoked to explain how discontinuance of life support can be differentiated from ending a patient’s life by a lethal injection. Lord Goff stated that the reason for this difference is that the law considers discontinuance of life support to be consistent with the doctor’s duty to care for his patient, but it does not, for reasons of policy, consider that it forms any part of his duty to give his patient a lethal injection to put the patient out of his agony.
57. Emphasising on the patient’s best interest principle, Lord Goff
referred to F v. West Berkshire Health Authority21 wherein the House of Lords stated the legal principles governing the treatment of a patient who, for the reason that he was of unsound mind or that he had been rendered unconscious by accident or by illness, was incapable of stating whether or not he consented to the treatment or care. In such circumstances, a doctor may lawfully treat such a patient if he acts in his best interests, and indeed, if the patient is already in his care, he is under a duty so to treat him. 58. Drawing an analogy, Lord Goff opined that a decision by a doctor whether or not to initiate or to continue to provide treatment or care which could or might have the effect of prolonging such a patient’s life should also be governed by the same fundamental principle of the patient’s best interest. The learned Law Lord further stated that the doctor who is caring for such a patient cannot be put under an absolute obligation to prolong his life by any means available to the doctor, regardless of the quality of the patient’s life. Common humanity requires otherwise as do medical ethics and good medical practice accepted in the United Kingdom and overseas. Lord Goff said that the doctor’s decision to take or not to take any step must be made in the best interests of the patient (subject to his patient’s ability to give or withhold his consent). 59. Lord Goff further stated that in such cases, the question is not whether it is in the best interests of the patient that he should die, rather the correct question for consideration is whether it is in the best interests of the patient that his life should be prolonged by the continuance of such form of medical treatment or care. In Lord Goff’s view, the correct formulation of the question is of particular importance in such cases as the patient is totally unconscious and there is no hope whatsoever of any amelioration of his condition. Lord Goff opined that if the question is asked whether it is in the best interests of the patient to continue the treatment which has the effect of artificially prolonging his life, that question can sensibly be answered to the effect that the patient’s best interests no longer require such a treatment to be continued. 60. Lord Goff opined that medical treatment is neither appropriate nor requisite simply to prolong a patient’s life when such treatment has no therapeutic purpose of any kind and such treatment is futile because the patient is unconscious and there is no prospect of any improvement in his condition. Thereafter, the learned Law Lord observed that regard
[1989] 2 All ER 545 : [1990] 2 AC 1
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
should also be had to the invasive character of the treatment and to the indignity to which a patient is subjected by prolonging his life by artificial means which, in turn, causes considerable distress to his family. In such cases, Lord Goff said that it is the futility of the treatment which justifies its termination and in such circumstances, a doctor is not required to initiate or to continue life- prolonging treatment or care keeping in mind the best interests of the patient.
61. Lord Goff, referring to West Berkshire Health Authority (supra), said that it was stated therein that where a doctor provides treatment to a person who is incapacitated from saying whether or not he consents to it, the doctor must, when deciding on the form of treatment, act in accordance with a responsible and competent body of relevant professional opinion on the principles set down in Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee22. Lord Goff opined that this principle must equally be applicable to decisions to initiate or to discontinue life support as it is to other forms of treatment. He also referred to a Discussion Paper on Treatment of Patients in Persistent Vegetative State issued in September, 1992 by the Medical Ethics Committee of the British Medical Association pertaining to four safeguards in particular which, in the Committee’s opinion, should be observed before discontinuing life support for such patients, which were: (1) every effort should be made at rehabilitation for at least six months after the injury; (2) the diagnosis of irreversible PVS should not be considered confirmed until at least 12 months after the injury with the effect that any decision to withhold lifeprolonging treatment will be delayed for that period; (3) the diagnosis should be agreed by two other independent doctors; and (4) generally, the wishes of the patient’s immediate family will be given great weight. 62. According to him, the views expressed by the Committee on the subject of consultation with the relatives of PVS patients are consistent with the opinion expressed by the House of Lords in West Berkshire Health Authority (supra) that it is good practice for the doctor to consult relatives. Lord Goff observed that the Committee was firmly of the opinion that the relatives’ views would not be determinative of the treatment inasmuch as if that would have been the case, the relatives would be able to dictate to the doctors what is in the best interests of the patient which cannot be right. Even so, a decision to withhold lifeprolonging treatment such as artificial feeding must require close
[1957] 1 W.L.R. 582 : [1957] 2 All ER 118
co-operation with those close to the patient and it is recognised that, in practice, their views and the opinions of doctors will coincide in many cases. 63. Thereafter, Lord Goff referred to American cases, namely, Re Quinlan23 and Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz24 wherein the American Courts adopted what is called the substituted judgment test which involves a detailed inquiry into the patient’s views and preferences. As per the substituted judgment test, when the patient is incapacitated from expressing any view on the question whether life-prolonging treatment should be withheld, an attempt is made to determine what decision the patient himself would have made had he been able to do so. In later American cases concerning PVS patients, it has been held that in the absence of clear and convincing evidence of the patient’s wishes, the surrogate decision-maker has to implement as far as possible the decision which the incompetent patient would have made if he was competent. 64. However, Lord Goff acknowledged that any such test (substituted judgment test) does not form part of English law in relation to incompetent adults on whose behalf nobody has power to give consent to medical treatment. In contrast, England followed a straightforward test based on the best interests of the patient coined by the House of Lords in West Berkshire Health Authority (supra). He opined that the same test (patient’s best interest) should be applied in the case of PVS patients where the question is whether life-prolonging treatment should be withheld. The learned Law Lord further observed that consistent with the best interests test, anything relevant to the application of the test may also be taken into account and if the personality of the patient is relevant to the application of the test (as it may be in cases where the various relevant factors have to be weighed), it may be taken into account as was done in Re J. (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) (supra). But where the question is whether life support should be withheld from a PVS patient, it is difficult to see how the personality of the patient can be relevant, though it may be of comfort to his relatives if they believe, as in the present case, and indeed may well be so in many other cases, that the patient would not have wished his life to be artificially prolonged if he was totally unconscious and there was no hope of
355 A. 2d 647 : (1976) 70 NJ 10 (1977) 373 Mass 728 : 370 N.E. 2d 417 (1977)
COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) v. UNION OF INDIA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
improvement in his condition.
65. As regards the extent to which doctors should, as a matter of practice, seek the guidance of the court by way of an application for declaratory relief before withholding life-prolonging treatment from a PVS patient, Lord Goff took note of the judgment of Sir Stephen Brown P, the President of the Family Division, wherein he held that the opinion of the court should be sought in all cases of similar nature. Lord Goff also noted that Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. in the Court of Appeal expressed his agreement with Sir Stephen Brown P. in the following words:-
“This was in my respectful view a wise ruling, directed to the protection of patients, the protection of doctors, the reassurance of patients’ families and the reassurance of the public. The practice proposed seems to me desirable. It may very well be that with the passage of time a body of experience and practice will build up which will obviate the need for application in every case, but for the time being I am satisfied that the practice which the President described should be followed.” 66. It is worthy to mention that Lord Goff was of the view that there was a considerable cost involved in obtaining guidance from the court in cases of such nature. He took note of the suggestions forwarded by Mr. Francis, the counsel for the respondents, to the effect that reference to the court was required in certain specific cases, i.e., (1) where there was known to be a medical disagreement as to the diagnosis or prognosis, and (2) problems had arisen with the patient’s relativesdisagreement by the next of kin with the medical recommendation; actual or apparent conflict of interest between the next of kin and the patient; dispute between members of the patient’s family; or absence of any next of kin to give consent. Lord Goff said that the President of the Family Division should be able to relax the present requirement so as to limit applications for declarations only to those cases in which there is a special need for the procedure to be invoked. 67. Lord Mustill observed that an argument had been advanced that it was in the best interest of the community at large that Anthony Bland’s life should end. The doctors had done all they could have done. It was a lose-lose situation as nothing would be gained by continuing Bland’s treatment and much would be lost. The distress of Bland’s
family members would steadily get worse and so would be the strain of the medical staff charged with the care of Bland despite the fact that Bland’s condition would never improve and he would never recognize that he was being cared for. Further, the learned Law Lord observed that large resources in terms of skill, labour and money had been applied for maintaining Bland in his present condition which, in the opinion of many, could be fruitfully employed in improving the conditions of other patients who, if treated, may have useful, healthy and enjoyable lives for years to come. 68. Lord Lowry, agreeing with the reasoning of Lord Goff of Chieveley with whom the other learned Law Lords were also in general agreement, dismissed the appeal. In coming to this conclusion, Lord Lowry opined that the court, in reaching a decision according to law, ought to give weight to informed medical opinion both on the point whether to continue the artificial feeding regime of a patient in PVS and also on the question of what is in the best interests of a patient. Lord Lowry rejected the idea that informed medical opinion in these respects was merely a disguise which, if accepted, would legalise euthanasia. Lord Lowry also rejected the Official Solicitor’s argument that the doctors were under a “duty to feed” their patients in PVS as in the instant case, the doctors overwhelmingly held the opposite view which had been upheld by the courts below. The doctors considered that it was in the patient’s best interests that they should stop feeding him. Lord Lowry observed that the learned Law Lords had gone further by saying that the doctors are not entitled to feed a patient in PVS without his consent which cannot be obtained. 69. Lord Lowry further opined that there is no proposed guilty act in stopping the artificial feeding regime inasmuch as if it is not in the interests of an insentient patient to continue the life- supporting care and treatment, the doctor would be acting unlawfully if he continued the care and treatment and would perform no guilty act by discontinuing it. There is a gap between the old law on the one hand and new medicine and new ethics on the other. It is important, particularly in the area of criminal law which governs conduct, that the society’s notions of what the law is and what is right should coincide. One role of the legislator, as per Lord Lowry, is to detect any disparity between these notions and to take appropriate action to close the gap.