Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (csir) v. State of Karnataka
- Court
- High Court of Karnataka
- Date of judgment
- 30 October 2026
- Judge
- Justice H.T. Narendra Prasad
- Case number
- WP No. 36218 of 2024
- Result
- ALLOWED
- Acts & sections
- Article 226 Constitution, Article 12 Constitution, Section 10 Industrial Disputes Act
- Subject
- Service, Labour
Full judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 30th DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.T. NARENDRA PRASAD WRIT PETITION NO. 36218 OF 2024 (L-RES) C/W WRIT PETITION NO. 24209 OF 2025 (L-RES) WRIT PETITION NO. 24369 OF 2025 (L-RES)
IN WP No. 36218/2024 BETWEEN: 1.
COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH (CSIR) ANUSANDHAN BHAWAN 2 RAFI AHMED KIDWAI MARG NEW DELHI-110001 REP. BY DIRECTOR GENERAL. 2. CSIR-NATIONAL AEROSPACE LABORATORIES KODIHALLI CAMPUS BENGALURU-560017 REP. BY ITS CONTROLLER OF ADMINISTRATION. …PETITIONERS
Digitally signed by DHANALAKSHMI MURTHY Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
(BY SRI. VIKRAM HUILGOL, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR SRI. ANOOP HARANAHALLI, ADVOCATE) AND: 1.
STATE OF KARNATAKA DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR REP. BY ITS DEPUTY LABOUR COMMISSIONER REGION II, KARMIKA BHAVAN NEAR DAIRY CIRCLE BENGALURU-560029.
R
2.
DEPUTY SPECIAL OFFICER (DO6) DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR KARNATAKA GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT VIKASA SOUDHA, BENGALURU-560001.
3.
UNION OF INDIA MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT REP. BY IS DEPUTY CENTRAL LABOUR COMMISSIONER (CENTRAL) SHRAM SADAN, 3RD MAIN 3RD CROSS, II PHASE YESWANTHPUR, BENGALURU-560022.
4.
WORKMEN OF NATIONAL AEROSPACE LABORATORIES REP. BY KARNATAKA GENERAL LABOUR UNION ® REP. BY ITS GENERAL SECRETARY HAVING REGISTERED OFFICE AT NO.16/7, MUNI KADIRAPPA LAYOUT GRAPHITE INDIA ROAD HOODY, BENGALURU-560048 ALSO AT : NO.19, 1ST FLOOR BHARAT BHAVAN, NO.35 INFANTRY ROAD, BENGALURU-560001.
…RESPONDENTS (BY SRI.M RAJAKUMAR, AGA FOR R1 & R2: SRI. K. ARVIND KAMATH, ASG FOR R3: SMT. MAITREYI KRISHNAN, ADVOCATE FOR R4: SRI. MURALIDHAR, AMICUS CURIAE) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950, PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED: 02.03.2024 BEARING NO. LD-IDM/115/2024 /LD.DO.6.LS PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO.2 AT ANNEXURE-A AND ETC.
IN WP NO. 24209/2025 BETWEEN: 1.
COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH (CSIR) ANUSANDHAN BHAWAN 2 RAFI AHMED KIDWAI MARG NEW DELHI-110001 REP. BY DIRECTOR GENERAL. 2. CSIR-NATIONAL AEROSPACE LABORATORIES KODIHALLI CAMPUS BENGALURU-560017 REP. BY ITS CONTROLLER OF ADMINISTRATION [REGISTERED UNDER SEC.7 OF THE CONTRACT LABOUR (REGULATION AND ABOLITION) ACT, 1970]. …PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. VIKRAM HUILGOL, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR SRI. ANOOP HARANAHALLI, ADVOCATE)
AND: 1.
STATE OF KARNATAKA DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR REP. BY ITS DEPUTY LABOUR COMMISSIONER REGION II, KARMIKA BHAVAN NEAR DAIRY CIRCLE BENGALURU-560029.
2.
DEPUTY SPECIAL OFFICER (DO6) DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR KARNATAKA GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT VIKASA SOUDHA, BENGALURU-560001.
3.
UNION OF INDIA MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT REP. BY ITS DEPUTY CENTRAL LABOUR
COMMISSIONER (CENTRAL) SHRAM SADAN, 3RD MAIN 3RD CROSS, II PHASE, YESWANTHPUR BENGALURU-560022. 4.
ENGINEERING AND GENERAL WORKERS UNION GHATE BHAVAN, VYALIKAVAL GAYATRI DEVI PARK EXTENSION BENGALURU-560003 REP. BY ITS GENERAL SECRETARY [REGISTERED UNDER TRADE UNIONS ACT, 1926] ...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.M RAJAKUMAR, AGA FOR R1 & R2: SRI. K. ARVIND KAMATH, ASG, FOR R3: SRI. V. R. DATAR, ADVOCATE FOR R4) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950, PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED: 07.10.2024 BEARING NO. LDIDM/546/2024/LD.DO.6.LS PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO.2 AT ANNEXURE-A AND ETC. IN WP NO. 24369/2025 BETWEEN: 1.
COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH (CSIR) ANUSANDHAN BHAWAN 2 RAFI AHMED KIDWAI MARG NEW DELHI-110001 REP. BY DIRECTOR GENERAL. 2. CSIR-NATIONAL AEROSPACE LABORATORIES KODIHALLI CAMPUS BENGALURU-560017 REP. BY ITS CONTROLLER OF ADMINISTRATION [REGISTERED UNDER SEC.7 OF THE CONTRACT LABOUR (REGULATION AND ABOLITION) ACT, 1970].
…PETITIONERS (BY SRI. VIKRAM HUILGOL, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR SRI. ANOOP HARANAHALLI, ADVOCATE) AND: 1.
STATE OF KARNATAKA DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR REP. BY ITS DEPUTY LABOUR COMMISSIONER REGION II, KARMIKA BHAVAN NEAR DAIRY CIRCLE BENGALURU-560029.
2.
DEPUTY SPECIAL OFFICER (DO6) DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR KARNATAKA GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT VIKASA SOUDHA, BENGALURU-560001.
3.
UNION OF INDIA MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT REP. BY IS DEPUTY CENTRAL LABOUR COMMISSIONER (CENTRAL) SHRAM SADAN, 3RD MAIN 3RD CROSS, II PHASE, YESWANTHPUR BENGALURU-560022.
4.
WORKMEN OF NATIONAL AEROSPACE LABORATORIES REP. BY KARNATAKA GENERAL LABOUR UNION ® REP. BY ITS GENERAL SECRETARY HAVING REGISTERED OFFICE AT NO.16/7, MUNI KADIRAPPA LAYOUT GRAPHITE INDIA ROAD HOODY, BENGALURU-560048 ALSO AT : NO.19, 1ST FLOOR BHARAT BHAVAN, NO.35 INFANTRY ROAD, BENGALURU-560001. [REGISTERED UNDER TRADE UNIONS ACT, 1926]. ...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.M RAJAKUMAR, AGA FOR R1 & R2: SRI. K. ARVIND KAMATH, ASG FOR R3: SMT. MAITREYI KRISHNAN, ADVOCATE FOR R4:) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950, PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED 02.03.2024 BEARING NO. LD-IDM/116/2024/LD DO.6.LS PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO.2 AT ANNEXURE-A AND ETC. THESE WRIT PETITIONS, HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 16.10.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT, THIS DAY, THE COURT, MADE THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.T. NARENDRA PRASAD CAV ORDER
These writ petitions are filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the orders dated 02.03.2024 and 07.10.2024, respectively, passed by the second respondent under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, the ‘I.D. Act’), vide Annexures-A.
2. The brief facts of the case are that petitioner No.2 is a constituent laboratory of petitioner No.1, which is an autonomous body under the administrative control of the Ministry of Science and Technology, Government of India. Petitioner
No.1
is
registered
under
Societies
Registration Act, 1860. Respondent No.4 – Labour Union raised industrial disputes on 13.09.2023, 15.09.2023 and 06.11.2023, respectively, before respondent Nos.1 and 2, seeking reinstatement of the workers represented by the Union and recognition of their status as permanent workmen. Accordingly, the second respondent issued notices dated 13.09.2023, 10.11.2023 and 30.09.2023 to
petitioners,
calling
upon
them
to
appear
on
15.09.2023, 20.11.2023 and 09.10.2023, respectively, as per Annexures-E1. Pursuant to the said notices, the petitioners appeared and filed statement of objections raising
a
preliminary
maintainability
objection dispute
regarding
before
State
Government. Thereafter, by the impugned orders, the second respondent referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Bengaluru, vide respective Annexures-A.
Being
aggrieved
by
same,
petitioners are before this Court.
3.
Sri
Vikram
Huilgol,
learned
Senior
Counsel
appearing on behalf of Sri Anoop Haranahalli, learned
counsel
for
petitioners,
raised
following
contentions:
(i) Firstly, the impugned orders at Annexures-A, passed by the second respondent under Section 10(1) of the I.D. Act, are without jurisdiction, as the Central Government
is
‘appropriate
Government’.
Since
petitioner No.1 is an autonomous body controlled by the Central Government, the orders passed by the State Government are contrary to Section 10 of the I.D. Act.
(ii) Secondly, he would submit that the definition of ‘appropriate Government’ under Section 2(a)(i) of the I.D. Act was amended with effect from 15.09.2010. Pursuant to the said amendment, in respect of an autonomous body owned or controlled by the Central Government, the Central Government is the ‘appropriate Government’.
(iii) Thirdly, under the unamended definition, prior to 15.09.2010, the Central Government was the ‘appropriate Government’ only in respect of an industry carried on by or
under
authority
of the
Central Government.
However, under the amended definition, it is no longer necessary
for
petitioners
to
establish
that
establishment functions by or under the authority of the Central Government.
(iv) Fourthly, the object of the amendment to Section 2(a)(i) of the I.D. Act was to enlarge the scope of matters falling within the sphere of Central Government. The intention of the Legislature was to broaden the definition
‘appropriate
Government’
under
unamended
provision, as entities not carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government fell within the residuary sub-clause
(ii).
Therefore, in
view of
amendment, in respect of an autonomous body owned or controlled
by
Central
Government,
Central
Division
Bench
Government is the ‘appropriate Government’.
(v)
Fifthly,
with
regard
to
judgment of this Court in Management of National Aerospace Laboratories v. Engineering & General Workers Union and Another, reported in ILR 2015
KAR 349, relied upon by the respondents, learned Senior Counsel contended that, although the judgment was delivered after the amendment, the issue before the Division Bench arose out of an award dated 30.12.2005, which was governed by the unamended provision. The Division Bench had considered whether petitioner No.2 was
functioning
under
authority
Central
Government. There was no occasion for the Division Bench to consider the expression ‘owned or controlled by the Central
Government’
introduced
by
amendment.
Therefore, the said judgment is distinguishable and is not applicable to the present case.
(vi)
Lastly,
with
regard
to
petitioners’
establishment, learned Senior Counsel relied upon the Constitution Pradeep
Bench
Kumar
judgment Biswas
v.
Indian
Apex
Court
in
Institute
Chemical Biology and Others, reported in (2002) 5 SCC 111. He contended that the Apex Court, by a majority opinion, held that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) is under the control of the
Government of India and is ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, he contended
that
second
respondent
is
not
competent authority to exercise the power under Section
I.D.
Act
in
respect
petitioners’
establishment.
Accordingly, he sought for allowing the writ petitions.
4. Per contra, Sri Arvind Kamath, learned A.S.G. for the Central Government submits that in view of the amendment to Section 2(a)(i) of the I.D. Act, the Central Government is the ‘appropriate Government’ to refer the dispute related to the petitioner – Establishment under Section 10 of the I.D. Act.
He further submitted that in
case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra), the Apex Court has held that the CSIR is under the control of the Central Government.
Hence, he sought for dismissal of the writ petitions.
5. Sri V.R.Datar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in one of the writ petitions, raised the following contentions:
(i) Firstly, the amendment to the definition of ‘appropriate Government’ under the I.D. Act must be considered in the context of industrial disputes. The judgment of the Apex Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra) was rendered in the context of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the said judgment is not applicable to the case on hand.
(ii) Secondly, the very same issue concerning the petitioners’ establishment was considered by a Division Bench
this
Court
in
Management
National
Aerospace Laboratories (supra), wherein it was held that the establishment was neither functioning under the authority of the Central Government nor was under its control. Therefore, the contention of the petitioners that the State Government is not the competent authority is unsustainable.
(iii) Thirdly, whether the petitioners’ establishment is under the control of the Central Government is a question of fact that must be determined after the parties adduce evidence. This Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot adjudicate such factual aspects. Therefore, the parties may be relegated to the Labour Court to raise all their contentions for adjudication.
(iv) Fourthly, neither the respondent-workmen nor the petitioners’ establishment are under the control of the Central
Government.
CSIR
is
an
autonomous
body
registered under the Societies Registration Act and has independent powers to appoint its employees and take decisions concerning them. The Central Government has no authority or control over the petitioners’ establishment. Therefore, the Division Bench of this Court, on an earlier occasion, rightly rejected the contentions raised by the petitioners’ establishment. In support of his contentions, he relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court in Tata Memorial Hospital Workers Union v. Tata Memorial
Centre and Another, reported in AIR 2010 SC 2943, and Balwant Rai Saluja and Another v. Air India Ltd. and Others, reported in (2014) 9 SCC 407.
Accordingly, he sought for dismissal of the writ petitions.
6. Sri Muralidhar, the learned counsel appearing as an amicus curiae, raised the following contentions:
(i) Firstly, the writ petitions filed by the petitioners are not maintainable, as all the contentions raised by them can be urged before the Labour Court. In matters relating to industrial disputes, there cannot be a piecemeal adjudication of the issues. In support of his contentions, he relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration and Others, reported in (1983) 4 SCC 293.
(ii) Secondly, the question concerning the meaning and
applicability
expression
‘appropriate
Government’ involves a mixed question of fact and law.
Neither the State Government nor this Court, in the present proceedings, can conclusively decide the issue without the parties adducing evidence. Therefore, the parties must be permitted to raise and establish their respective contentions before the Labour Court.
Accordingly, he sought for dismissal of the writ petitions.
7. Ms. Maitreyi Krishnan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in some of the writ petitions, raised the following contentions:
(i) Firstly, the judgment of the Apex Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra) was rendered in the context of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The expression ‘appropriate Government’ under the I.D. Act must be interpreted in the context of industrial disputes. According to her, the issue involves disputed questions of fact and law, which must be agitated before the Labour Court. She further contended that, in identical matters, the Labour Court had considered the issue and held that
the State Government was the appropriate authority. In support of her contentions, she relied upon the judgments
Apex
Court
in
Secunderabad
Club
v.
Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1004, and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Venkateswara Hatcheries (P) Ltd., reported in (1999) 3 SCC 632.
(ii) Secondly, under Section 33 of the I.D. Act, during
pendency
conciliation
proceedings
before
a
conciliation officer or board, or any proceedings before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial
dispute,
conditions
service
workmen are subject to the restrictions prescribed under the said provision, which has been violated by the petitioners. In support of her contention, she relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. v. Ram Gopal Sharma and Others, reported in AIR 2002 SC 643, and The Management of SKF Bearings India Ltd. v. S.M. Ravi Kumar and Others, reported in 2006 Lab. I.C. 1002.
Accordingly, she sought for dismissal of the writ petitions.
8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the writ petition papers.
9. The point that arises for consideration in this writ petition is, Whether,
under
Section
2(a)(i)
as
amended in 2010, the Central Government is the ‘appropriate Government’ in relation to the petitioner’s Establishment?
10.
The fourth respondent - Union raised industrial
disputes with respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The second respondent, after hearing both the parties under Section 10 has opined that there is an industrial dispute existing between the parties. Hence, referred the dispute to Labour Court by the impugned orders at Annexures-A. Section 10(1) of the I.D. Act confers the power on ‘appropriate Government’ to refer the dispute to the court or tribunal.
It is relevant to extract Section 10(1)(a) to (d). The same is extracted below: “10. Reference of dispute to Boards, Courts or Tribunals.(1) Where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing(a)refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof; or (b)refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Court for inquiry; or (c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication; or (d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication: Provided that where the dispute relates to any matter specified in the Third Schedule and is not likely to affect more than one hundred workmen, the appropriate Government may, if it so thinks fit, make the reference to a Labour Court under clause (c):
Provided further that where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under section 22 has been given, the appropriate Government shall, unless it considers that the notice has been frivolously or vexatiously given or that it would be inexpedient so to do, make a reference under this sub-section
notwithstanding
that
any
other
proceedings under this Act in respect of the dispute may have commenced: Provided
also
that
where
dispute
in
relation to which the Central Government is the appropriate Government, it shall be competent for the Government to refer the dispute to a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, constituted by the State Government.”
11.
From the above provision it is very clear that
where the ‘appropriate Government’ is of the opinion that, if any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may, by order in writing, refer the dispute or any other matter to the Labour Court for adjudication. The ‘appropriate Government’ as defined under Section 2(a)(i) of the I.D. Act has been extracted below: Definition before Amendment
2010 Definition after 2010 amendment
(a)"Appropriate Government"
a)
"Appropriate
Government"
means-
means-
(i) In relation to any industrial dispute concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government, or by a Railway Company (or concerning any such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government) or in relation to an industrial dispute concerning (a Dock Labour Board established under Section 5-A of the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948), or [the Industrial Finance Corporation of India Limited formed and registered under Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956)], or the Employees' State Insurance Corporation established under Section 3 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), or the Board of Trustees constituted under Section 3-A of the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948 (46 of 1948), or Central Board Trustees and the State Boards of Trustees constituted under Sections 5-A and 5-B, respectively, Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), or Life Insurance Corporation India established under Section 3 Life Insurance
(i) In relation to any industrial dispute concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority Central Government, or by a Railway Company (or concerning any such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government) or in relation to an industrial dispute concerning a Dock Labour Board established under Section 5-A of the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948), or [the Industrial Finance Corporation of India Limited formed and registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956)], or the Employees' State Insurance Corporation established under Section Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), or the Board of Trustees constituted under Section 3-A of the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948 (46 of 1948), or the Central Board of Trustees and the State Boards of Trustees constituted under Sections 5-A and 5-B, respectively, of the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), or the Life Insurance Corporation of India established under Section 3 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (31 of 1956), or [the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956)], or the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation established
Corporation Act, 1956 (31 of 1956), or [the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956)], or Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation established under Section 3 of the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation Act, 1961 (47 of 1961), or the Central Warehousing Corporation established under Section Warehousing Corporations Act, 1962 (58 of 1962), or the Unit Trust of India established under Section 3 of the Unit Trust of India Act, 1963 (52 of 1963), or the Food Corporation of India established under Section 3 or a Board of Management established for two or more contiguous States under Section 16 of the Food Corporations Act, 1964 (37 of 1964), or [the Airports Authority of India constituted under Section 3 of the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 (55 of 1994)], or a Regional Rural Bank established under Section 3 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 (21 of 1976), or the Export Credit and Guarantee Corporation Limited or the Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India [the National Housing Bank established under Section 3 of the National Housing Bank Act, 1987 (53 of 1987)], or (an air
under Section 3 of the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation Act, 1961 (47 of 1961), or the Central Warehousing Corporation established under Section 3 of the Warehousing Corporations Act, 1962 (58 of 1962), or the Unit Trust of India established under Section 3 of the Unit Trust of India Act, 1963 (52 of 1963), or the Food Corporation of India established under Section 3 or a Board of Management established for two or more contiguous States under Section Food Corporations Act, 1964 (37 of 1964), or [the Airports Authority India constituted under Section 3 of the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 (55 of 1994)], or a Regional Rural Bank established under Section 3 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 (21 of 1976), or the Export Credit and Guarantee Corporation Limited or the Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India [the National Housing Bank established under Section 3 of the National Housing Bank Act, 1987 (53 of 1987)], or (an air transport service, or a banking or an insurance company), (a mine, an oilfield), (a Cantonment Board), or a (major port, any company in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central Government, or any corporation, not being a corporation referred to in this clause, established by or under any law made by Parliament, or Central public sector undertaking, subsidiary companies
transport service, or a banking or an insurance Company), (a mine, an oilfield), (a Cantonment Board), or a (major port, the Central Government), and (ii) in relation to any other industrial dispute, the State Government.
set up by principal undertaking and autonomous bodies owned or controlled by the Central Government, the Central Government), and [(ii) in relation to any other industrial dispute, including the State public sector undertaking, subsidiary companies set up by the principal undertaking and autonomous bodies owned or controlled by State Government, the State Government: Provided that in case of a dispute between a contractor and the contract labour employed through the contractor in any industrial establishment where such dispute first arose, the appropriate Government shall be the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, which has control over such industrial establishment;]
The legislative change and its purpose 12.
The
question
regarding
appropriate
Government requires consideration in the light of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010, which came into force on 15.09.2010. The provision for consideration is Section 2(a)(i) of the I.D. Act, which defines the appropriate Government in relation to the industrial disputes specified therein.
13. Before the amendment, apart from the industries and
establishments
specifically
enumerated
in
provision, the Central Government was the appropriate Government where the industrial dispute concerned an industry carried on by or under its authority. 14. Parliament subsequently enlarged the definition by
expressly
including,
among
other
categories,
autonomous bodies owned or controlled by the Central Government.
Corresponding
provision
was
made
for
autonomous bodies owned or controlled by a State Government. The amendment also addressed disputes between contractors and contract labour through the proviso to Section 2(a). 15. The legislative materials indicate the purpose of this change. The Ministry, in its explanatory note to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Labour, stated that the definition of 'appropriate Government' was sought to be amplified and that the Central Government would be the appropriate Government for the specified Central
undertakings and autonomous bodies owned or controlled by it. The Standing Committee recorded that the proposed amplification was intended to eliminate ambiguity in identifying the appropriate Government. 16. The words introduced by Parliament must be given their ordinary and effective operation. The provision continues to cover an industry carried on by or under the authority
Central
separately identifies an controlled
by
that
Government;
however,
it
autonomous body owned
or
Government
as
well.
If
every
autonomous body falling within the latter description were also required to establish that its industry was carried on under the authority of the Central Government, the additional description would be deprived of its independent significance. 17. The words employed are 'owned or controlled'. Ownership and control are expressed as alternatives. Therefore, where an autonomous body is shown to be controlled by the Central Government within the meaning
of the amended provision, it is unnecessary to establish in addition that every asset of the body is owned by that Government. Equally, the existence of a governing body and the power to take decisions in the ordinary course do not, by themselves, exclude governmental control. The character and extent of that control must be assessed from
applicable
institutional
framework
and
material on record.
18. Therefore, the present case has to be considered in the light of the amendment to Section 2(a)(i) of the I.D. Act.
The
Division
Bench
decision
this
Court
in
Management of National Aerospace Laboratories (supra), concerned a reference made on 24.04.2001. It considered the jurisdictional objection under the provision applicable to that reference. The question arising under the separate category inserted in 2010 was therefore not before it. The decision must be respected for what it decided; however, its application to the present references must be considered in light of the subsequent statutory change.
19. The Division Bench of this Court also considered the judgment of the Apex Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Others v. National Union Waterfront Workers, reported in (2001) 7 SCC 1. The said judgment was also rendered prior to the amendment to Section 2(a)(i) of the I.D. Act. As on the date of delivery of the judgment i.e., on 30.08.2001, the definition of the term ‘appropriate Government’ was not yet amended. The expression ‘autonomous bodies owned or controlled by the Central Government’ came to be inserted only by the amendment effected from 15.09.2010. Therefore, the said judgments are distinguishable and not applicable to the facts of the present case.
20. In the present case, the institutional position of CSIR must be considered in the light of the majority judgment in Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra). The Supreme Court examined CSIR's constitution, governing structure, financial arrangements and the powers of the Government of India, and found pervasive governmental control over CSIR. The ultimate question before the
Supreme Court was whether CSIR was 'State' under Article 12; nevertheless, its findings concerning the nature of control over this very institution are relevant to the statutory inquiry now undertaken in view of the 2010 amendment.
The
relevant
paragraphs
judgment are extracted below: “40. The picture that ultimately emerges is that the tests formulated in Ajay Hasia are not a rigid set of principles so that if a body falls within any one of them it must, ex
hypothesi, be
considered to be a State within the meaning of Article 12. The question in each case would be — whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a State within Article 12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State. 41. Coming now to the facts relating to CSIR, we have no doubt that it is well within the range of Article 12, a conclusion which is sustainable when
said
judged according to the tests judicially evolved for the purpose. The formation of CSIR 42. On 27-4-1940, the Board of Scientific and Industrial Research and on 1-2-1941, the Industrial Research Utilisation Committee were set up by the Department of Commerce, Government of India with the broad objective of promoting industrial growth
in
this
country.
On
14-11-1941,
a
Resolution was passed by the Legislative Assembly and accepted by the Government of India to the following effect: “This Assembly recommends to the GovernorGeneral-in-Council that a fund called the Industrial Research Fund be constituted, for the purpose of fostering industrial development in this country and that provision be made in the budget for an annual grant of rupees ten lakhs to the fund for a period of five years.”
43.
For
purpose
coordinating
and
exercising administrative control over the working of the two research bodies already set up by the Department of Commerce, and to oversee the proper utilisation of the Industrial Research Fund, by a further Resolution dated 26-9-1942, the Government of India decided to set up a Council of Industrial Research on a permanent footing which
would
be
a
registered
society
under
Registration of Societies Act, 1860. Pursuant to the Resolution, on 12-3-1942 CSIR was duly registered. Bye-laws and rules were framed by the Governing Body of the Society in 1942 which have been subsequently revised and amended. Unquestionably this
shows
that
CSIR
was
“created”
by
Government to carry on in an organized manner what was being done earlier by the Department of Commerce of the Central Government. In fact the two
research bodies
Department
which
Commerce
were part have
since
been
subsumed in CSIR. Objects and functions 44. The 26-9-1942 Resolution had provided that the functions of CSIR would be: (a) to implement and give effect to the following resolution moved by the Hon'ble Dewan Bahadur Sir A.R. Mudaliar and passed by the Legislative Assembly on 14-11-1941 and accepted by the Government of India; … (quoted earlier in this judgment) (b)
coordination
promotion,
scientific
guidance and
and
industrial
research in India including the institution and the financing of specific researches;
(c) the establishment or development and
assistance
department scientific
to
study
special
existing
institutions institutions
problems
or for
affecting
particular industries and trade; (d) the establishment and award of research studentships and fellowships; (e) the utilisation of the results of the researches conducted under the auspices of
Council
towards
development
industries in the country and the payment of a
share
royalties
arising
out
development of the results of researches to those
who
are
contributed
considered
towards
as
pursuit
having
such
researches; (f) the establishment, maintenance and management institutes,
laboratories,
workshops,
and
organisation
to
further
scientific and industrial research and utilise and exploit for purposes of experiment or otherwise any discovery or invention likely to be of use to Indian industries; (g) the collection and dissemination or information in regard not only to research but to industrial matters generally;
(h) publication of scientific papers and a journal
industrial
research
and
development; and (i)
any
other
activities
generally
objects
to
promote
resolution
have
been
mentioned in (a) above. 45.
These
objects
which
incorporated in the memorandum of association of CSIR manifestly demonstrate that CSIR was set up in the national interest to further the economic welfare of the society by fostering planned industrial development in the country. That such a function is fundamental to the governance of the country has already been held by a Constitution Bench of this Court as far back as in 1967 in Rajasthan SEB v. Mohan Lal where it was said : (AIR p. 1863, para 6) “The State, as defined in Article 12, is thus comprehended to include bodies created for the purpose of promoting the educational and economic interests of the people.”
46. We are in respectful agreement with this statement of the law. The observations to the contrary in Chander Mohan Khanna v. NCERT relied on by the learned Attorney-General in this context, do not represent the correct legal position.
47. Incidentally, CSIR was and continues to be a non-profit-making organization and according to clause 4 of CSIR's memorandum of association, all its income and property, however derived shall be applied only “towards the promotion of those objects subject nevertheless in respect of the expenditure to such limitations as the Government of India may from time to time impose”. Management and control 48. When the Government of India resolved to set up CSIR on 26-2-1942, it also decided that the Governing Body would consist of the following members: (1) The Honourable Member of the Council
His
Excellency
General
in
charge
Governor-
portfolio
Commerce (ex officio). (2) A representative of the Commerce Department of the Government of India, appointed by the Government of India. (3) A representative of the Finance Department of the Government of India, appointed by the Government of India.
(4) Two members of the Board of Scientific and Industrial Research elected by the said Board. (5) Two members of the Industrial Research Utilisation Committee elected by the said Committee. (6)
The
Director
Scientific
and
Industrial Research. (7)
One
or
more
members
to
be
nominated by the Government of India to represent
interests
not
otherwise
represented. 49. The present Rules and Regulations, 1999 of CSIR provide that: “(a) The Prime Minister of India shall be the ex officio President of the Society. (b)
The
Minister
in
charge
ministry or department, dealing with the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research shall be the ex officio Vice-President of the Society: Provided that during any period when the Prime Minister is also such Minister, any person nominated in this behalf by the Prime Minister shall be the Vice-President.
(c) Minister in charge of Finance and Industry (ex officio). (d) The members of the Governing Body. (e) Chairman, Advisory Board. (f)
Any
other
person
or
persons
appointed by the President, CSIR.” The Governing Body of the Society is constituted by the: (a) Director General; (b) Member Finance; (c)
Directors
two
national
laboratories; (d)
Two
eminent
Scientists/Technologists, one of whom shall be from academia; (e)
Heads
two
scientific
departments/agencies of the Government of India. 50.
The
dominant
role
played
by
Government of India in the Governing Body of CSIR is evident. The Director General who is ex officio Secretary of the Society is appointed by the Government of India [Rule 2(iii)]. The submission
of the learned Attorney-General that the Governing Body consisted of members, the majority of whom were non-governmental members is, having regard to the facts on record, unacceptable. Furthermore, the members of the Governing Body who are not there ex officio are nominated by the President and their membership can also be terminated by him and the Prime Minister is the ex officio President of CSIR. It was then said that although the Prime Minister was ex officio President of the Society but the power being exercised by the Prime Minister is as President of the Society. This is also the reasoning in Sabhajit Tewary. With respect, the reasoning was and the submission is erroneous. An ex officio appointment means that the appointment is by virtue of the office; without any other warrant or appointment than that resulting from the holding of a particular office. Powers may be exercised by an officer, in this case the Prime Minister, which are not
specifically
conferred
upon
him,
but
are
necessarily implied in his office (as Prime Minister), these are ex officio. 51. The control of the Government in CSIR is ubiquitous. The Governing Body is required to administer, direct and control the affairs and funds of the Society and shall, under Rule 43, have authority “to exercise all the powers of the Society subject nevertheless in respect of expenditure to
such limitations as the Government of India may from time to time impose”. The aspect of financial control by the Government is not limited to this and is considered separately. The Governing Body also has the power to frame, amend or repeal the byelaws of CSIR but only with the sanction of the Government of India. Bye-law 44 of the 1942 Byelaws had provided “any alteration in the bye-laws shall require the prior approval of the GovernorGeneral-in-Council”. 52. Rule 41 of the present Rules provides that: “The President may review/amend/vary any of the decisions of the Governing Body and pass such orders as considered necessary to be communicated Governing
to
Body
within
Chairman
a
month
decision of the Governing Body and such order shall be binding on the Governing Body. The Chairman may also refer any question which in his opinion is of sufficient importance to justify such a reference for decision of the President, which shall be binding on the Governing Body.”
(emphasis added) 53. Given the fact that the President of CSIR is the Prime Minister, under this Rule the subjugation
of the Governing Body to the will of the Central Government is complete. 54. As far as the employees of CSIR are concerned the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules and the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, for the time being in force, are from the outset applicable to them subject to the modification that references to the “President”
and
“government
servant”
in
Conduct Rules would be construed as “President of the Society” and “officer and establishments in the service of the Society” respectively (Bye-law 12). The scales of pay applicable to all the employees of CSIR are those prescribed by the Government of India for similar personnel, save in the case of specialists (Bye-law 14) and in regard to all matters concerning service conditions of employees of CSIR, the Fundamental and Supplementary Rules framed by the Government of India and such other rules and orders issued by the Government of India from time to time are also, under Bye-law 15 applicable to the employees of CSIR. Apart from this, the rules/orders issued by the Government of India regarding reservation of posts for SC/ST apply in regard to appointments to posts to be made in CSIR (Bye-law 19). CSIR cannot lay down or change the terms and conditions of service of its employees and any alteration in the bye-laws can
be carried out only with the approval of the Government of India (Bye-law 20). Financial aid 55. The initial capital of CSIR was Rs 10 lakhs,
made
available
pursuant
to
Resolution of the Legislative Assembly on 1411-1941.
Paragraph
26-9-1942
Resolution of the Government of India pursuant to which CSIR was formed reads: “The Government of India have decided that a fund,
viz.,
Industrial
Research Fund,
should be constituted by grants from the Central revenues to which additions are to be made from time to time as moneys flow in from other sources. These ‘other sources’ will comprise
grants,
if
any,
by
Provincial
Governments, by industrialists for special or general
purposes,
universities
or
contributions
local bodies,
from
donations
or
benefactions, royalties, etc., received from the development
results
industrial
research, and miscellaneous receipts. The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research will exercise full powers in regard to the expenditure to be met out of the Industrial Research Fund subject to its observing the bye-laws framed by the Governing Body of the Council, from time to time, with the approval of the Governor-General-in-Council, and to its
annual
budget
being
approved
by
Governor-General-in-Council.”
56. As already noted, the initial capital of Rs 10 lakhs
was
made
available
by
Central
Government. According to the statement handed up to the Court on behalf of CSIR the present financial position of CSIR is that at least 70% of the funds of CSIR are available from grants made by the Government of India. For example, out of the total funds available to CSIR for the years 1998-99, 1999-2000, 2000-01 of Rs 1023.68 crores, Rs 1136.69 crores and Rs 1219.04 crores respectively, the Government of India has contributed Rs 713.32 crores, Rs 798.74 crores and Rs 877.88 crores. A major portion of the balance of the funds available is generated from charges for rendering research and development works by CSIR for projects such as
Rajiv
Gandhi
Drinking
Water
Mission,
Technology Mission on oilseeds and pulses and maize
or
grant-in-aid
projects
from
other
government departments. Funds are also received by CSIR from sale proceeds of its products, publications, royalties etc. Funds are also received from investments but under Bye-law 6 of CSIR, funds of the Society may be invested only in such manner as prescribed by the Government of India. Some
contributions
are
made
by
State
Governments and to a small extent by “individuals,
institutions governmental
and
other
agencies”.
contributions
are
The a
non-
pittance
compared to the massive governmental input. 57. As far as expenditure is concerned, under Bye-law 1 as it stands at present, the budget estimates of the Society are to be prepared by the Governing Body “keeping in view the instructions issued by the Government of India from time to time in this regard”. Apart from an internal audit, the accounts of CSIR are required to be audited by the Comptroller and Auditor-General and placed before the table of both Houses of Parliament (Rule 69). 58. In the event of dissolution, unlike other registered societies which are governed by Section 14 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, the members of CSIR have no say in the distribution of its assets and under clause 5 of the memorandum of association of CSIR, on the winding up or dissolution of CSIR any property remaining after payment of all debts shall have to be dealt with “in such manner as the Government of India may determine”. CSIR is therefore both historically and in its present operation subject to the financial control of the Government of India. The assets and funds of CSIR though nominally owned by the
Society are in the ultimate analysis owned by the Government. 59. From whichever perspective the facts are considered,
there
can
conclusion
reached
in
be
no
doubt
Sabhajit
that
Tewary
was
erroneous. If the decision of Sabhajit Tewary had sought to lay down as a legal principle that a society registered under the Societies Act or a company incorporated under the Companies Act is, by that reason alone, excluded from the concept of State under Article 12, it is a principle which has long since been discredited. “Judges have made worthy, if shamefaced, efforts, while giving lip service to the rule, to riddle it with exceptions and by distinctions reduce it to a shadow.” 60. In the assessment of the facts, the Court had
assumed
certain
principles,
and
sought
precedential support from decisions which were irrelevant and had “followed a groove chased amidst a context which has long since crumbled”. Had the facts been closely scrutinised in the proper perspective, it could have led and can only lead to the conclusion that CSIR is a State within the meaning of Article 12. 61.
Should Sabhajit Tewary still stand as an
authority even on the facts merely because it has stood for 25 years? We think not. Parallels may be
drawn even on the facts leading to an untenable interpretation of Article 12 and a consequential denial of the benefits of fundamental rights to individuals who would otherwise be entitled to them and “[t]here
is
nothing
in
our
Constitution
which
prevents us from departing from a previous decision if we are convinced of its error and its baneful effect on the general interests of the public”. (AIR p. 672, para 15)
Since on a re-examination of the question we have come to the conclusion that the decision was plainly erroneous, it is our duty to say so and not perpetuate our mistake. 62. Besides a new fact relating to CSIR has come to light since the decision in Sabhajit Tewary which
unequivocally
vindicates
conclusion
reached by us and fortifies us in delivering the coup de grâce to the already attenuated decision in Sabhajit Tewary. On 31-10-1986, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the Central Government specified 17-11-1986 as the date on and from which the provisions of subsection (3) of Section 14 of the 1985 Act would apply to CSIR “being the Society owned and controlled by Government”.
63. The learned Attorney-General contended that the notification was not conclusive of the fact that CSIR was a State within the meaning of Article 12 and that even if an entity is not a State within the meaning of Article 12, it is open to the Government to issue a notification for the purpose of ensuring the benefits of the provisions of the Act to its employees. 64. We cannot accept this. Reading Article 323-A of the Constitution and Section 14 of the 1985 Act it is clear that no notification under Section 14(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act could have been issued by the Central Government unless
employees
CSIR
were
either
appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation owned or controlled by the Government. Once such a notification has been issued in respect of CSIR, the consequence will be that an application would lie at the instance of the appellants
at
least
before
Administrative
Tribunal. No new jurisdiction was created in the Administrative Tribunal. The notification which was issued by the Central Government merely served to shift the service disputes of the employees of CSIR from the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court
under Article 226 to the Administrative Tribunals on the factual basis that CSIR was amenable to the writ jurisdiction as a State or other authority under Article 12 of the Constitution. 65. Therefore, the notification issued in 1986 by the Central Government under Article 14(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 serves in removing any residual doubt as to the nature of CSIR and decisively concludes the issues before us against it.”
21. From the judgment of the Apex Court it is very clear that CSIR is under the control of the Central Government.
Therefore, nothing is left for the Labour
Court to decide upon pertaining to that issue. In view of the above, the ‘appropriate Government’ for CSIR is the Central Government.
22. Therefore, the order of reference passed by the State Government in the present case is not an order passed by an ‘appropriate Government’ as required under Section 10(1)(i) of the I.D. Act.
23. Insofar as the objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition is concerned, Section 10 of the I.D. Act authorizes the ‘appropriate Government’ to refer an industrial dispute for adjudication. The issue in this case, as to whether the authority making the reference was competent under Section 2(a), goes to the root of its power to make the reference.
24. In National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2000) 1 SCC 371, the Apex Court recognised that a jurisdictional challenge to a reference under Section 10 can be examined by the High Court under Article 226. It further explained that the Industrial
Tribunal
derives
its
jurisdiction
from
reference and cannot examine the validity of the reference itself. Similarly, this Court in the case of Institute of Hotel
Management
Nutrition
v.
Management
Catering
Technology
Workmen
Class
Employees
IV
Institute
and Hotel
Association,
reported in 2000 SCC OnLine Kar 733, has held that, a writ
petition
under
Article
226,
challenging
jurisdiction/power of the State Government to refer the dispute to an industrial tribunal, is maintainable as a labour court cannot decide the question of competency of State
Government
establishment
is
in
making
under
reference
control
where
an
Central
Government.
25. Further, in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh, reported in (2021) 6 SCC 771, at paragraph
27,
Apex
Court
reiterated
that
availability of an alternative remedy does not exclude writ jurisdiction where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction.
26.
In the present case, the petitioners have
questioned the State Government's competence to make the impugned references, contending that the Central Government is the appropriate Government under the amended Section 2(a)(i) of the I.D. Act.
27. Accordingly, the writ petitions are maintainable for examining the competence of the authority making the impugned references.
28. In view of the above, the following order is passed:
(i)
The writ petitions are allowed.
(ii)
The orders dated 02.03.2024 and 07.10.2024 passed
by
second
respondent
vide
Annexures-A in all the petitions are set aside. 29. Since the writ petitions are allowed, the contention of the respondent raised in respect of Section 33 of the I.D. Act would not arise for consideration.
However, liberty is
reserved to the respondent to raise the same before the appropriate forum.
In view of disposal of the writ petitions, all pending IAs. stand disposed of.
The fee of the amicus curiae is fixed at Rs.8,000/-.
Sd/(H.T. NARENDRA PRASAD) JUDGE Cm/-