Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction and ANR. ETC.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 8 February 1995
- Bench
- Justice P.B. Sawant, Justice S. Mohan, Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy
- Neutral citation
- 1995 INSC 105
- Reported in
- [1995] 1 S.C.R. 1010
- Result
- Disposed off
- Acts & sections
- Article 19 Constitution, Article 129 Constitution, Section 54 Transfer of Property Act, Article 32 Constitution, Article 142 Constitution
- Subject
- Property & land
Full judgment
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DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
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v. SKIPPER CONSTRUCTION AND ANR. ETC. FEBRUARY 8, 1995
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[P.B. SWANT, S. MOHAN AND B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, Jl]
Constitution of India : Articles 129 and 142-Contempt of Court-Respondents violating directions of Court-Also filing suit in High Court in respect of same subject matter regarding which their special leave petition had been dismissed-Suo Motu notice to respondents by Court-Contemnors tendering japology-Held, respondents' actions amounted to Contempt of Court-Apology is not a weapon to defence forged to purge guilt of offences-Contemnors sentenced to simple imprisonment-However, sentence defe"ed subject to conditions.
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Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 : ss.2(a) & 2(c)-contempt of Court-Criminal contempt-Motive-Contemnors filing suit in High Court after dismissal of special leave petition on same subject matter by Supreme Court-Held, to file a suit and pray for injunction after dismissal of special leave petition, would clearly constitute criminal contempt-A wilful action on E part of contemnor~ to undennine dignity of Supreme Court and the majesty of law-Conduct of Contemnors tends to bring authority and administration of law into disrespect or even disregard-It equally tends to interfere with or prejudice litigants during litigation-In the case of criminal contempt intention or motive is i"elevant-So called bona fides as filling of suits because of p "legally opined" are totally i"elevant. The petitioner, Dclhi Development Authority held an auction of a Commercial towers plot on 8.10.1980. The bid of the Respondent-Company being the highest i.e. Rs.9.82 Crores was accepted and the respondents G deposited 25% of the bid amount. Th~ DDA confirmed the bid and asked the respondents to make the balance payment of 75% of the bid amount within 90 days as per the conditions of the auction. The respondents went on delaying the payment. In 1987, the parties entered into an agreement ~ereunder the respondents agreed to pay the amount in instalments by 15.9.89. However, the respondents did not pay the money and continued to H delay the payment by approaching the Government for directions to the
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DDA. The respondents further protracted the delay and filed a suit and A thereafter a writ petition before the High Court. Inspite of directions of the High Court, the respondent did not deposit the amount. Ultimately, the suit and the writ petition were dismissed. The respondent filed a special leave petition before this Court against the judgment of the High ·Court dismissing the writ petition.
On 29.1.1991 this Court passed an interim order to the effect that the respondents would deposit the required amount with the DDA and that the respondents would not induct any person in the property or create any right in favour of any third party. Inspite of this, the respondents issued advertisement in newspapers on 4.2.1991 seeking to create third party rights in respect of the said property. The special leave petition was dismissed on 25.1.1993 and the DDA took possession of the property free from all encumbra:ices and the monies paid by the respondents were forfeited.
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After dismissal ~f their special leave petition, the respondents once again filed a suit before the High Court claiming permanent injunction D restraining the DDA from interfering with the title and possession of the property and for a declaration that all dues had been paid by the respondents to the DDA. The DDA filed application for rejection of the plaint contending that the suit was barred by resjudicata. It also issued notice for auction of the property. The High Court allowed the auction to proceed E with, but restrained the DDA from accepting or confirming the bid. Ag~ grieved, the DDA filed the Special leave petition.
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While disposing of the special leave petition of the DDA, the Court, exercising suo motu powers, issued notice to the partners of the respon· dent-Company to show cause as to why they should not be punished for contempt of Court for their acts of instituting a suit in the High Court in respect of the same subject matter after this Court confirmed the order of the High Court, and entering into agreement, handing over possession and creating interests in third parties in respect of premises in dispute in defiance of the order of this Court. ·
Contemner No. 1 filed an affidavit stating that the suit was filed on legal advice a~d that he did not create any third party interests in the property himself in an much as on Company's advertisement, the DDA also advertised in the newspapers about the order of the Court, and the persons' who entered into agreement with the Company were fully aware of the H
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A litigation and as such no third party rights were created. The contemnors also· tendered unconditional and unqualified apology. I
Disposi~g of the Contempt Petition, this Court
ff.ELD 1:1. Abuse of the process of court calculated to hamper the due course of judicial proceeding or the orderly administration of justice is a contempt of court. Taking into account the entire course of conduct of the contemners it is clear that their action amounted to contempt of court. The contemners are guilty of criminal contempt as defined under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971. [1028-F, 1029-F] \
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1.2. I a case of contempt of Supreme Court, the Court can issue notice suo motu and initiate contempt proceeding under Article 129 of the Constitution. [1025-B]
Shri C.K Daphtary v. Shri 0.P. Gupta, [1971) 1 SCC 626 and Sukhdev
D Singh Sodhi v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the Pepsu High Court, [1954) SCR 454, relied on.
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. Advocate-General State of Bihar v. M/s. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries, [1980) 3 SCC 311; Bloom Dekor v. Subhash Himmatlal Desai, [1994) 6 SCC 322 and St. James's Evening Post, (1742) 2 Atk. 409, referred to. 2.1. After disposal of the special leave petition with regard to property in dispute when DDA had taken physical possession of the plot, to file a suit and pray for injunction in respect of the very sa~e subject matter would clearly constitute criminal contempt. Similarly, the other prayers in the suit are aimed at atta~ng directly or indirectly the adverse finding rendered by the High Court in the writ petition against which the speci?I ·leave petition was med and which was dismissed. [1027-H, 1028-A] 2.2. The filing of the suit in the High Court after dismissal of the
G special leave petition is nothing but a wilful action on the part of the contemners to undermine the dignity of this Court and the majesty of law. The conduct of the contemners tends to bring the authority and admiiiistration of law into disrespect or even disregard. It equally tends to interfere with or prejudice the litigants during the li!igation. [1028-F]
2.3. In the case of a criminal contempt, the intention or motive is
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irrelevant. Therefore, even assuming bona fi!_ie the contemners thought they A could file the suit because it was "legally opined" that the writ was not a substitute, the so- called bona tides are totally irrelevant. [1028-E] Rachapudi Subba Rao v. Advocate General, Andhra Pradesh, [1981] 2
sec 577, relied on. Hoshiar Singh v. Gurbachan Singh, AIR (1962) SC 1089, referred to.
3.1. The object of the advertisement was noting more than to create rights in favour of third parties. It is somewhat surprising that the contemners' ingenuity grows by the passage of time. There was booking for only 870 flats but later it gets increased and ultimately that figure has swollen to 2,750. There are agreements entered into even after the order of 29.1.91 as evidenced by the statement in the additional affidavit filed by the contemnor. It cannot be said that by merely entering into agreement no interest is created in the immovable property. or course, this stems from Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. The agreement holder has a right to get another document, namely, the sale deed. Equally, he can further enforce the agreement and seek specific performance thereof. [1030-F-H] 3.2. Clause (iv) of the order dated 29.1.1991 has been flouted. This is not a case of a stray act but deliberate repetitive acts by making hard bargains by dubious methods. This is an intentional act to cheat the public with an evil design. [1031-B] 3.3. The letters written by the contemnor to the different buyers and the acknowledgment of the money received clearly show that there is a wilful disobedience of the order dated 29.1.91.
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4. No doubt, the contemnors have tendered apology. This apology is coming forth after sensing that the adventures have turned out to be misadventures realising that the contemners have ended up in cul-de-sac. An apology is not a weapon of defence forged to purge the guilt of the offences nor is it intended to operate as a universal panacea. It is intended to be evidence of real contriteness, the manly consciousness of a wrong done, of an injury inflicted, and the earnest desire to make such reparation as lies in the wrong-doer's power. The apology does not seem to be so in this case. The conduct of contemners is highly reprehensive. [1033-G-H]
5. The second respondent is the wife of the first respondent. She does
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A not seem to have played any active role in all these transactions and evens ..
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As an Indian wife, dutiful and obedient, she seems to have only followed the dictates and desires of her husband. In the process she had done no more than lending her name both as a Directo,r to the Skipper as well as to the various acts done by him in the name of the company. It will be unrealistic to ignore this fact against our social background. A pragmatic view of the matter is to be taken and her case to be distinguished from that of her husband as far as punishment to be imposed on them is concerned. Such a distinction will in no way minimise the gravity of the contempt that she has committed. [1034-B-C] 7.1 Contemner-respondent No. 1, is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000. Contemnerrespondent No. 2 is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month and to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000. [1034-D] 7.2. All the properties and the bank accounts standing in the names
D of the contemners and the Director ofM/s. Skipper Construction Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. and their wives, sons and unmarried daughters will stand attached. [1034-F]
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8. However, the sentence of imprisonment imposed on both the contemners is deferred subject to the conditions and till the time stated below: [1034-HJ
(1) The contemners shall furnish bank guarantee in favour of the Registrar General of this Court in the amount of Rs. 11 crores on or before 31st M~rch, 1995. The bank guarantee will be given for a period of one year from the date of furnishing the bank guarantee. [1035~AJ
(2) The contemners shall deposit the entire amount of Rs. 11 crores by a Bank Draft in the Registry of this Court on or before 30th November, 1995. Ifthey fail to do so the bank guarantee will become encashable and will be encashed forthwith after 30th November, 1995. [1035-B] (3) If the contcmners fail to give the bank guarantee by 31st March, 1995 as aforesaid, the sentence of imprisonment will become enforceable at one. [1035-C]
(4) No application for extension of time either to furnish the bank guarantee or to make the payment will be entertained by this Court. [1035-DJ
D.D.A v. SKIPPER CONSTN.
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(5) The contemners shall not leave the country without the express permission of this Court. (1035-E]
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(6) The attachment of properties and the bank accounts shall stand raised on the contemners furnishing the bank guarantee as aforesaid. [1035-G] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: I.A. Nos. 3 & 14of1994.
IN S.L.P. (C) No. 21000of1993. From the Judgment and Order dated 9.12.93 of the Delhi High Court in Suit No. 770 of 1993.
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Suo Moto Contempt Petition No. 256 of 1994. Arun Jaitely, G. Ramaswamy, Gopal Subramaiam, V.A. Bobde, Arvind K. Nigam, Ms. K. J aiswa~. Ms. Indra Sawhney, L.K. Gupta, Arun Khosla, R. Ashok, S. Rajappa, D.D. Sharma, S. Sukuraman, S.D. Singh for JBD & Co., Ms. Sangeeta Kumar, L.R. Singh, R.S. Suri, K.C.Dua, P.P. Juneja and Suman J. Khaitan for the Appearing. parties.
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The following Order of the Coui:t was delivered : The facts leading to contempt proceedings are as under : On 8.10.1980, an auction was held by the Delhi Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the 'DDA') of the Commercial Tower Plot, Jhandewalan, Block E, New Delhi ad measuring about 2540 sq. mtrs. The first respondent, M/s. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the 'Skipper') was the highest bidder, its bid being Rs.9.82 crores. As per the conditions of the auction, Skipper deposited 25% of the bid amount. The ·said bid was confirmed by the ODA on 14.10.1980. Skipper was called upon to make the balance of payment of 75% of the bid amount within 90 days as per the conditions of the a~ction. The Government of India issued directions to the DDA to accept the request of Skipper and to grant an indulgence to it and directed the ODA to reschedule the recovery of 75% of the bid amount with interest
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· [1995] 1 S.C.R.
A from the Skipper. Consequent to this, DDA called upon the Skipper to enter into· fresh agreement, licence agreement and furnish bank guarantees in compliance with the directions of the Central Government. On 11.8,1987, Skipper entered into a licence agreement, paid 50% of the original bid and secured payment of the balance 50% of the bid and B interest at the rate of 18% per. annum thereon by submitting bank guarantee for Rs. 9.28 crores, in terms of which a sum of approximately 1.944 crores was required to be paid as each instalment. A total of 5 instalments was payable every six months, the first being due on 15.9.1987 and the last on or about 15.9.1989.
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Against the first instalment of Rs. 1.944 crores falling due on 15.9.1987, DDA recovered about Rs. 88.76 lacs by encashment of the bank guarantee on 7.12.1987. Thereafter the first respondent did not pay in · terms of the agreement. On 4.10.1988, the Lt. Governor issued a direction at the request of Skipper, deferring recovery from Skipper of the> 2nd instalment as per the agreement dated 11.8.1987 till one month after the sanctioning of the building plans.
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In August, 1989, the first respondent filed writ petition in the High
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in the writ petition related to sanctioning of building plans and permission for construction. An interim order was passed directing the Skipper to furnish fresh bank guarantee since the bank guarantee furnished earlier had lapsed. The DDA did not encash the fresh bank guarantee which was defective. Time and again the DDA represented to the Court that the monies were outstanding from the Skipper and no indulgence ought to be shown to them till the payments were made. The question of payment of the outstanding amount of over Rs.8 crores under the principal sum itself was deferred from time to time.
On 16.2.1990 the Lt. Governor revoked the order dated 4.10.1988 deferring the payment of instalments. As a result the entire sum became ··payable in one lump sum. However, this order of the U. Governor was stayed by the Court. Thus, it become necessary for the DDA to grant conditional and provisional sanction to plans of the building subject to the H payment of monies due to the DDA. ·
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D.D.A v. SKIPPER CONSlN.
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On 19.3.1990, an interim order was passed by the Delhi High Court A by which Skipper was permitted. t~ commence construction without first depositing the dues of the ODA.I Against this order an appeal was preferred. The Division.Bench direct~d the payment of a token sum of Rs. 5 lacs which was offered by the Skipper as a gesture of goodwill within 2 days; a sum of Rs. 15 lacs within 15 days and· Rs. 1.944 crores within oue B month to the ODA. It was further directed that the quantum of monies and the mode of payment will be decided at the time of final disposal of the writ petition. Even this order was not complied with. Notwithstanding this, the Skipper approached the Court once ag~n f'Or extension of time to make C payment and for direction to construct. The Court extended the time by one month on 16.4.1990, affording liberty to the DOA to encash the bank guarantee. The bank guarantee could not be encashed because it was conditional. By then the entire monies had fallen due. Those amounts had not been paid. The DOA filed SLP (C) Nos. 6338-6339 of 1990 against the D interim order dated 19.3.1990 and 16.4.1990 passed by the High Court of Delhi. By an order dated 3.5.1990 this Court stayed further construction and made it conditional upon payment of Rs. 1.944 crores. Suit No. 1875 of 1990 was filed by the Skipper for a direction that the DOA ought not to insist upon payment by cash or draft and ought to be directed to cncash bank guarantee. The learned Vacation Judge issued orders directing the DOA to invoke the bank guarantee. However, the suit was ultimately dismissed.
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On 21.12.1990, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dismissed CWP No. 2371 of 1989 directing Skipper to pay the DOA by cash or demand draft a sum of Rs. 8,12,68,789 within 30 days; to stop construction till payment is made; and in the event of non-payment by the Skipper DOA would be entitled to enter upon the property and forfeit the monies received by the ODA.
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On 14.1.1971, detailed reasons for its operative order came to be G rendered by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court with further direction given effect to clause 15 of the licence agreement dated 11.8.1987 that in the event of non-compliance of the payment by the Skipper the property shall stand vested in the ODA, free from all encumbrances, in addition to the. forfeiture of the monies. .H
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Against the dismissal of CWP No. 2371 of 1989 Skipper filed SLP (C) No. 186 of 1991 before this Court. · . On 29.1.1991, a Division Bench of this Court passed an interim order (in which one of us, P.B. Swant, J., was a party). It inter alia reads as under:
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"(i) That the petitioners herein shall deposit a sum of Rs. 2.5 crores (Rupees two crores and fifty lacs only) in cash/bank draft with the Delhi Development Authority within one month from today and the petitioners will further deposit similar amount by cash/bank draft by 8th April, 1991. (ii) That the petitioners shall be permitted to resume the construction of the building in question only after making the first deposit as stated in clause (1) above. (iii) That if the petitioners fail to deposit the amounts as aforesaid, the Delhi Development Authority will be free to act in accordance with the impugned order dated 21st December, 1990 of High Court in CWP No. 2371 of 1980. (iv) That the petitioners shall not induct any person in the building or create any right in favour of any third party.
E (v) That the matter be listed for further orders before this Court on 9th April, 1991."
On 4.2.1991, in violation of the agreement and ·in gross contempt of the above order, the Skipper issued advertisement in the leading newspapers seeking to create 3rd party rights.
On 25.1.1993, SLP(C) No. 186 of 1991 was dismissed by this Court. By virtue of the above order, the DOA on 10.2.1993 re-entered and took physical possession of the said property, free from all encumbrances; monies paid by the Skipper were forfeited. Notwithstanding all these, Skipper filed yet another suit on the original side of the High Court of Delhi, being Suit No. 770 of 1993 for the reliefs of:
(i) permanent injunction restraining the DOA from interfering with
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D.D.A. v. SKIPPER CONSTN.
the title and possession of the property;
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(ii) for mandatory injunction directing the DDA to recompute the principal amount and interest payable by Skipper; (iii) for a declaration that the present calculations are wrong;
(iv) for a declaration that re-entry/re-possession and determination of the rights of Skipper are bad in law and.non-est; -~
(v) for a declaration that all dues have been paid by skipper to the ODA; and
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(vi) a declaration that clause 15 of the Licence Agreement dated 11.8.1987 is non-est andbad in law. On service of notice, DDA filed _application, I.A. No. 8500 of 1993 in Suit No. 770 of 1993, for rejection of the plaint as all the issues raised by Skipper were res judicata and even otherwise the plaint was barred by law. The said application is pending disposal.
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On 8.11.93, DOA issued notices for auction of the said property. The 2nd respondent sought to implead itself in the suit and on 1.12.1993 filed an application for stay of auction which was opposed by ·the DDA.
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On 9.12.1993, a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court allowed the auction to proceed with and restrained the ODA from accepting or confirming. the bid at the auction scheduled for 10.12.1993. Aggrieved by this Order DOA filed SLP (C) No. 21000 of 1993 against the interim order of the Delhi High Court.
I.A. 3 of 1994 is an application for intervention filed on behalf 'Jf DOA. While disposing of SLP (C) No.21000of1993 and the said I.A. No.3 of 1994 we issued notice on 29.11.94 by exercise of our Suo Moto powers directing Tejwant Singh and Mrs. Surinder Kaur to show cause as to why should not be punished for contempt of court for their following acts :
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"(a) Instituting suit being Suit No. 770 of 1993 in the Delhi High Court in respect of the same subject matter after this Court confirmed the orders of the said High Court dated 21.12.1990 and 14.1.1991, by its order dated 23.1.1993.
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(b) Entering into agreements for and handing over possession of and receiving monies and creating interests in the premises in the building under construction in the suit property, viz., the Commercial Tower Plot, Jhandewalan Block C, New Delhi, admeasuring about 2540 sq. mtrs. with constructions thereon which are already made, in defiance of the order of this Court passed on 29th January, !991. Notice returnable on 3rd January, 1993." In response to this notice, Tejwant Singh Contemner No. 1, filed an affidavit expressing unconditional and unqualified apology. After so expressing, he sets out several facts to offer an explanation and not a justification for the steps which were taken by him. According to him, the purpose of filing Suit No. 770 of 1993 in the Delhi High Court was to make payment of reasonable amount. Although the prayers given an impression that there could be no bar in filing of a suit in civil court, he would add that the intention of the deponent was not to indulge in litigation which was already concluded by the Supreme Court. The intention was to see that as far as the quantum of interest was concerned that can be scaled down and the DOA could be persuaded to realise reasonable interest instead of exorbitant interest. The deponent, on legal advice and in order to protect the property
E by making the payments in instalments, instructed his counsel to file suit
in the High Court of Del!ii for mandatory injunction and declarations. An application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of Civil Procedure Code was also filed in the suit under the bona fide belief that the same could be filed under law in order to ensure that during the pendency of the suit also efforts should continuously be made to settle the matter ·amicably. The deponent instructed the counsel to make averment that the company is ready and willing to make the payment. The counsel has cat~gorically stated in the application that the company is ready and willing to pay the amount to DOA as demanded by them in instalments.
The company also wrote a letter dated 10th July, 1993 to all its valued customers apprising them about the dispute with DOA. In the letter also the company made it amply clear that the matter can be resolved amicably and for that purpose funds are required. It was requested that the valued customers shall make the payment of amounts due against them. The bank i \ ( , draft/cash order be sent to the company in the name of DDA. The H company wanted to hand over the drafts to DDA.
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D.D.A v. SKIPPER CONSTN.
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On this explanation, it is urged that there is no intentional or deliberate flouting of the order dated 29.1.1991 passed by this Court. The order by 29.1.1991 was passed after the counsel for Delhi Development Authority expressed an apprehension that the answering respondent would sell away or otherwise dispose of the plot to a third party and abscond. The answering respondent-· deponent was personally present in the Court on 29.1.1991. On that date, permission to construct had been with them barely for less than a year (w.e.f. 19.3.1990) from this Court. It was in that context that the injunction was interpreted. He did not create any third party right himself. However, he noticed that in respect of one Khosla, the papers annexed to I.A. No. 3 show that his son had signed some documents evidencing induction of Khosla. He says that there is no other case in relation to which any such impropriety has been committed. Surinder Kaur, wife of Tejwant Singh, Contemner No. 2, would urge that she has nothing to do with the day to day running of the company nor has she ever acted or represented anywhere in regard thereto. She has not signed any paper or document in relation to the transactions connected with the present proceedings. An Additional Affidavit was filed on 27.1.1995 by Tejwant Singh, Contemner No. 1. Paragraph 3 of the said additional affidavit states :
"With respect to the act of entering ·into agreements for and handing over possession of and receiving monies and creating interests in the premises in the building under construction in the suit property viz., the Commercial Tower Plot, Jhandewalan, Block E, New Delhi, admeasuring about 2540 sq. meters with construetions thereon which are already made in defiance of the order of Hon'ble Supreme Court passed on 29.1.1991 it is respectfully necessary at this stage to explain the context in which the order dated 29.1.1991 was passed, understood and acted upon by the answering respondent. The answering respondent is explaining the collective contemporaneous understanding of both the parties and respectfully submitted to this Hon'ble Court that there was no intentional or deliberate flouting of the order. The order of 29.1.1991 was passed after the counsel for Delhi Development Authority expressed an apprehension that the answering respondent would sell away or otherwise disposed of the plot to a third
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party and abscond. The answering respondent/deponent was per- . sonally present in the court on 29.1.1991. On that date permission to construct had been with them barely for less than a year (w.e.f. 19.3.1990) from the Hon'ble Delhi High Court. As on 29.1.1991, the construction on the plot has barely commenced and only a part of the basement had been done. No building was in existence. To preclude the answering respondent from in any manner giving away ph_ysical possession of either the plot or the proposed building (yet to come up) the order of 29.1.1991 was passed. It is most respectfully submitted that at no time during the proceedings, was any reference made or intended to prohibit or in any manner fetter the booking of space in the building or collecting money in respect thereof. The fact was that this was the common collective and collided understanding of all the parties including the Delhi Development Authority is evident from the fact that the bookings were done before January, 1991 and after January, 1991 to the knowledge of everyone without any objection, protest and demur. Indeed in the numerous court proceedings in different courts including the Hon'ble Supreme Court after 1991 not the slightest grievance was made and no contempt petition was ever moved by Delhi Development Authority (till the present last round of proceedings). Indeed; it is most respectfully submitted that had answering respondent known or remotely contemplated that even booking sought to be fettered, it would have either moved the .Hon'ble Court for clarification or would have immediately desisted."
Paragraph (k) reads thus : "After 29.1.1991 the company entered into agreement with various persons/parties. The copies of the agreements entered into with them are annexed herewith and are collectively marked as Annexures 'A' and 'B'. It is pertinent to mention that the company openly advertised in the Newspapers and the next day DDA also advertised in the Newspapers about the Court's order dated 29.1.1991. It is only after seeing both the advertisements the speculative buyers came forward to book the flats and each and every person who entered into the agreements with the company
D.D.A. v. SKIPPER CONSTN.
1023
were fully aware of the pendency of the litigation and hence no third party rights were created." · Mr. G. Ramaswamy, learned senior counsel for the contemners submits, before filing Suit No. 770 of 1993, the contemners took legal advice. It was opined that the Civil Writ Petition No. 2371 of 1989 filed before the High Court was not a substitute for suit. The fact that writ petition was dismissed and the SLP thereon was also dismissed will not take away the right to file an independent suit. It was only because of that the contemners filed the suit. There was no deliberate intention to obstruct the course of justice. May be, the contemners were misguided. Whatever might have been the conduct of the contemners they had offered unqualified apology in both the affidavits.
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Actually, the contemners do not want the learned counsel to advance arguments in defence of their conduct. They are only kneeling before the Court and praying for mercy. As regards the alleged flouting of the order dated 29.1.1991, three questions would arise :
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(1) Whether there is disobedience of the order dated 29.1.91? (2) If it is answered in the affirmative, whether the disobedience is wilful?
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(3) If wilful, what is the consequence? In his submission, legal advice is a factor to decide whether a disobedience is wilful or not. He is prepared to disclose even the name of the senior counsel who had given the opinion. As a matter of fact, in Hoshiar Singh v. Gurbachan Singh, AIR 1962 SC 1089 this Court found fault with the contemners therein for not disclosing the name of the counsel who gave the legal opinion. It could never have been the intention of the contemners to openly flout the order dated 29.1.1991: By entering into agreements contemners were not creating rights in favour of third parties. The speculative purchasers being fully aware of the legal proceedings yet chose to purchase the property which agreements, if ultimately, did not fructify into sale, they would be entitled to only refund. Before 29.1.1991 1,000 agreements were entered into and after 29.1.1991 1,750 agreements were entered into. Out of these 1,750 agreements, the agreements in
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A respect of 835 cases were executed while in the case of remaining 915, th.e. agreements have not been executed. This is the factual position. Since the ODA did not take out the contempt application, the contemners were lulled into the belief that what they were doing was right. Further, the exact scope of the order that the contemners should not even enter into contract was not understood by the contemners properly. Creation of right could only mean, in the context, an obligation to refund.
The notice for contempt has been issued practically after nearly three years. if such a notice had been issued by the High Court he could have pleaded limitation contained under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts C Act, 1971, as a defence. However, as regards exercise of suo moto powers of this Court under Article 129 of the Constitution of India the contemners \ are not raising any such plea. I
Mr. Arun Jaitley, learned counsel for the DOA would submit that the filing of suit No. 770/93 is nothing but an abuse of process of court. D The matter had reached finality by orders of this Court. Yet to say the suit was filed to protect the rights of the contemners is ingenious. By filing a suit (No. 770 of 1993) and obstructing the course of justice after this Court dismissed SLP (C) No. 186 of 1991, is a clear case of criminal contempt as laid down in Advocate-General, State of Bihar v. M/s. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries, (1980] 3 SCC 311 at 315. This Court had come down heavily E upon persons who indulged in obstructionist methods to defeat or delay justice as laid down in Bloom Dekor v. Subhash Himmatlal Desai, [1994] 6 sec 322 at page 327.
In this case, there is a deliberate disobedience of the order dated 29.1.1991. The agreement dated 11th August, 1987 between contemners and ODA clearly postulates that legal possession and ownership shall remain with the licensor until full payment of the bid amount along· with interest payable thereon has been made by the licensee. Therefore, the creation of rights in favour of third parties was never contemplated. and there was no scope for misunderstanding the order dated 29.1.1991. During the state of CWP No. 2371 of 1989 before the High Court the contemners came forward with a plea that there were 870 buyers of flats but this figure goes on increasing from time to time. Ultimately, at the stage of Suit No. 770 of 1993 the number of buyers came to 2,700 .. In the agreements entered into after the order dated 29.1.91 there is a clear recital that possession is delivered. If this cannot amount
(
D.D.A. v. SKIPPER CONSTN.
1025
to creating rights in favour of third parties nothing else would.
A
We will now proceed to consider the merits of the above contentions.
....
·-"
. -..\...
The contempt proceedings in this case have been initiated under Article 129 of the Constitution of India. The said Article reads as follows: "Supreme Court to be a court of record. The Supreme Court shall be a court of record and shall have all powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself." This Court in Shri C.K. Daphtary v. Shri O.P. Gupta, [1971) 1 SCR 626 pointed out that it cannot be disputed that in a case of contempt of Supreme Court, the Court issued notice suo moto.
C
About the nature of power, this Court referring to the Privy Council ruling in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the Pepsu High Court , [1954) SCR 454 at page 461, held :
-"'-
"Finally, in Parashuram Detaram v. Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 134 at 136 the Privy Council said that "this summary power of punishing for contempt..... is a power which a court must of necessity possess." In this case, as the notice dated 29.11.1994 indicates, it consists of:
D
E
(1) Civil Contempt and (2) Criminal Contempt. Civil contempt is defined under Section 2(b) of the Act. Thus, any wilful disobedience to the order of the court to do. or abstain from doing any act is prima facie a civil contempt. Civil Contempt arises where the power of the Court is invoked and exercised to enforce obedience to orders of the Court.
On the contrary, criminal contempts are criminal in nature. It may include outrages on the Judges in open Court, defiant disobedience to the Judges in Court, libels on Judges or Courts or interfering with the courts of justice or any act which tends to prejudice the courts of justice.
Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) posits criminal contempt to mean:
1026
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995) 1 S.C.R.
Publication (a) by words spoken or written ; (b) or written or by signs; ( c) or by visible representations or otherwise or any matter;
(d) or any other act whatsoever which (i) (a) scandalizes or tends to scandalize, (b) or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court; or
C
(ii) prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceedings; or (iii) (a) interferes or tends to interfere with, (b) or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice in
D any other manner. It can be categorically stated that the power as a court of record to punish for contempt is beyond dispute. In dealing with the scope of the said Section this Court observed in E Rachapudi Subba Rao v. Advocate General, Andhra Pradesh, [1981] 2 SCC · ' . 577 at 583 as follows :
"It is noteworthy, that in the categorisation of contempt in three sub-clauses (i) to (iii), only category (ii) refers to 'judicial proceedings'. Scandalising of court in its administrative capacity will also be coYered by sub-clauses (i) and (iii). The phrase "administration of justice" in sub-clause (iii) is far wider in scope than "course of any judicial proceeding''. The last words "in any other manner" of sub-clause (iii) further extend its ambit and give it a residuary character. Although sub-clauses (i) and (iii) describe three distinct species of "criminal contempt" they are not always mutually exclusive. Interference or tendency to interfere with any judicial proceeding or administration or justice is a common element of sub-clauses (ii) and (iii). This element is not required to be established for a criminal contempt of the kind falling under sub-clause (i)."
~-
..
D.D.A. v. SKIPPER CONSTN.
1027
In a case of criminal contempt, intention or motive is not the criterion. Of course, they may be considered for a mitigation or aggravation of sentence as the case may be.
A
From the narration of the above, it is clear that on 25.1.1993, SLP (C) No. 186 of 1991 was dismissed thereby confirming the judgment of the Delhi High Court rendered in CPW No. 2371 of 1989 dated 14.1.1991 B reported in Skipper Constitution Co. (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. D.DA. & Ors., 43(1991) Delhi Law Times 636. Thereafter, Suit No. 770 of 1993 was filed practically for the same relief which formed the subject-matter of the earlier writ petition, CWP No. 2371 of 1989. After the dismissal of SLP (C) 186of1991, the DDA re-entered and took physical possession of the property on 10.2.1993, free from all encumbrances, forfeiting the monies paid by the contemners. Yet prayer No. 1 in the suit is for injunction restraining the DDA from interfering with title and possession.
c
D
Under the terms of the licence deed dated 11th August, 1987 entered into between (the licensor) and the contemners (licensee), it was clearly stipulated at paragraphs 1 and 2 as under : "1. That the licensee shall have.licence to enter upon the plot described hereinabove for a period of two and half years from the date of execution of this licence only for purposes of starting construction of the building in accordance with the sanctioned buildipg plans.
2. That the licencee shall not be deemed to have any right, title or interest in the said plot nor shall be have any right to grant such a right in favour of any persons. Legal possession and ownership of the said plot shall remain with the licensor until full payment of the bid amount alongwith interest payable thereon has been made by the licensee."
E
Of course, in this case, possession was handed over to the contemners when they had not even cleared the first instalment. That itself had been criticised by us and relegated to an enquiry. But, in this case, after disposal of SLP(C) 186 of 1991 when DDA has taken physical possession of the plot, to file a suit and pray for injunction, as stated above, would H
1028
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995) 1 S.C.R.
A clearly constitute criminal contempt. Similarly, the other prayers are aimed at attacking directly or indirectly the adverse finding rendered by the High ·court in CWP No. 2371 of 1989. The High Court, in no uncertain terms, held at paragraph 26 of its judgment reported in 43 (1991) Delhi Law times as under:
c
"We, therefore, reject all submissions made on behalf of the petitioners had hold that the D.D.A. is entitled to the recovery the entire amount of Rs. 8,12,68,789 as on 1.7.1990 in lump sum in cash or through bank draft. The decision of the Supreme Court in Dunlop (supra) entitles the D.D.A. to insist upon cash payment and to reject the bank guarantee. Since there is a deliberate breach of the obligations under the Licence Deed and the Agreement dated 11.8.1987 by the petitioners legal consequence, as mentioned in terms 15 of the Licence Deed, spring into action. Yet, the prayers, above stated, are made in the suit. The only
D semblance of defence that is put forth is the suit came to be filed armed with the legal advice. We are afraid such a plea is worthless. As stated above, . in the case of a criminal contempt, the intention or motive is irrelevant. Therefore, even assuming bona fide the contemners thought they could file the .suit because it was "legally opined" that the writ was not a E substitute, the so-called bona fides are totally irrelevant. The filing of the suit No. 770 of 1993 is nothing but a wilful action on the part of the contemners to undermine the dignity of this Court and the majesty of law. The conduct of the contemners tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect or even disregard. It F equally tends to interfere with or prejudice the litigants during the litigation. Abuse of the process of court calculated to hamper the due course ' of judicial proceeding or the orderly administration of justice is a contempt of court. In Advocate General, State of Bihar v. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries, (1980) 3 SCC 311 at page 315, this Court observed :
''While we are conscious that every abuse of the process of court may not necessarily amount to contempt of court, abuse of the process of the court calculated to hamper the due course of a judicial proceeding or the orderly administration of justice, we must say, is a contempt of court. It niay be that certain minor abuses of the process of the court may be suitably dealt with as
D.D.A v. SKIPPER CONSTN.
1029
between the parties, by striking out pleadings under the provisions A of Order 6, Rule 16 or in some other manner. But, on the other hand, it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and effects the interest of the public in the administra- B tion of justi~." Again as stated by Sir John Donaldson in Attorney General v. Newspaper Publishing Pie, C.J'. Miller Contempt of Court 1989 Clarendon Press, Oxford : "An action for contempt of court arose :
c
'where the conduct complained of is specifically intended to impede or prejudice the administration of justice. Such an intent cannot be expressly avowed or admitted, but can be inferred from all the circumstances including the foreseeability of the consequen- D ces of the conduct'." At this stage, it is worthwhile for us to quote Lord Hardwicke, L.C., St. James's Evening Post, (1742) 2 Atk. 409 at p. 471: "There cannot be anything of greater consequence than to keep the streams of justice clear and pure, that parties may proceed with safety both to themselves and their characters." Thus, we are clearly of the opinion that the contemners are guilty of criminal contempt as defined under Section 2(c) of the Act.
E
Now we come to other part of contempt as to whether there has been a disobedience of our order dated 29.1.91. That order in clause (iv) specifically stated (it is worthwhile repetition) : "That the petitioners shall not induct any person in the building or create any right in favour of any third party."
The contemners had cause the advertisement dated 4.2.91 as follows: SKIPPER. GROUP OF COMPANIES
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1030
(1995) 1 S.C.R.
(ANNOUNCES)
A
ISSUE of Commercial Flats for retired/Retiring Personnel/Professionals/Self employed & other persons in our BAU MAKHAN SINGH HOUSE JHANDEWALAN TOWER, JHANDEWALAN EXTN. at highly concessional rates
It is once in a lifetime opportunity to own a commercial property of your own in "Bau Malchan Singh House"
C
A prime project in the middle of high business environment. ·The location of tower is as rare as the offer itself. (SALIENT FEATURES) * Ultra modem multi storeyed commercial complex (Shopping cum office complex)
D
* Ground to 3rd Floor centrally air conditioned with escalators. (
E
* Excellent quality of construction. * Interest free payment schedule linked with construction. *Excellent investment returns."
The.object of this is nothing more than to creat~ rights in favour of third parties. It is somewhat surprising that the contemners' ingenuity F grows by the passage of time. As rightly contended by Mr. Arun Jaitley at the time when the writ petition came to be filed before the High Court, as the High Court had noted in the above extract, there was booking for only 870 flats but later it gets increased and today, that figure has swollen to 2,750. As Mr. G. Ramaswamy admits there are agreements entered into even after !he order of 29.1.91 as evidenced by the statement in sub-paraG graph (k) of the additional affidavit extracted above. A curious argument was put forth that by mere entering into agreement no interest is created in the immovable property. Of course, this stems from Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. But, does not the agreement holder have a right to get another document, namely, the sale deed? Equally, does he not have H a right to enforce the agreement and seek specific performance thereof?
... •
r' D.D.A v. SKIPPER CONSTN.
1031
It. is ·freposterous to suggest that speculative purchasers came forward to A purchase the prollerty and their right is only to refund as per the terms of the agreement. For a moment, we are not on the nature of rights of the unintending purchasers. The question in whether the said clause (iv) of the order dated 29.1.91 has been flouted? This is not a case of a stray act but. deliberate repetitive by making hard bargains by dubious methods. It is B fallacious to contend that because of legal opinion the contemners thought of entering into such agreements, would not amount to inducting any person in the building or would not amount to creation of any right in favour of any third party. This is an intentional act to cheat the public with an evil design. As on 29.1.1991 the construction on the plot has barely commenced and only a part of the basement had been done. No building C was in existence. To preclude the answering respondent from, in any manner, giving away physical possession of either the plot or the· proposed building (yet to come), the order dated 29.1.1991 was passed.
It is submitted that the order passed by this Court dated 29.1.1991 D was an order of restraint against the document not to induct any personnel in the building to create any right in favour of any third party in the meantime. It is submitted that the purpose of this injunction was to ensure that the deponent did not alienate the building in favour of a third person to relieve himself from the liability to make payment of the dues and vanish from the scene. E The above statement in the affidavit of the contemptner No. 1 in our considered opinion, is a clear attempt to circumvent the order.
-.::.-
It is difficult to appreciate as to how the contemners could contend that they were lulled into the belief that they could enter into the agreements as otherwise the ODA would have moved the court by way of contempt proceedings.
It is rather strange that as late as 25.11.92 the followiD.g letters should be written by the contemners: "Mrs. Anjana Khosla, 602, Hemkunt Tower, 6, Rajendra Place, New Delhi
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1032
A
(1995) 1 S.C.R.
Respected Madam,
We are pleased to handover you vacant peaceful physical possession of shops No.3 and 4, measuring super area Jhandewalan
~-
I\..
. Extension, New Delhi.
c
D
We assure you that the aforesaid shops No.3 and 4 are free from all kinds of sales, encumbrances, disputes, litigations, stays and orders and you are the only rightful owner of aforesaid shops No. 3 and 4. ~--""'
Thanking you, Your faithfully, For and on behalf of Skipper Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd. sd/(Director)" "Mrs. Anjana Khosla 602, Hemkunt Towers, 6, Rajendra Place, New Delhi.
E
(Emphasis supplied) Date 25.11.95
-,.--
Respected Madam,
We are pleased to handover you vacant peaceful physical possession of shops 3 and 4, measuring super area Jhandewalan Exten-
sion, New Delhi against total pa}"llent of Rs. 19,12,163 made by you to us as under :
L-Date
Mode of Payment
Amount
07.08.87
Cash
1,32,000,00
25.08.87
Cash order No. 04165 drawn on Punjab National Bank, Rajendra Place, New Delhi being the full and final payment.
17,80,163.00
(Rupees Nineteen Lac Twelve Thousand
~
1033
D.D.A v. SKIPPER CONSTN.
One Hundred and Sixty Three)
19J2,163.00
We assure you that the aforesaid shops No. 3 and 4 are free from all kinds of sales, encumbrances, disputes, litigations, stays and orders and you are the only rightful owner of aforesaid shops No. 3 and 4.
A
Thanking you, Yours faithfully, for and on behalf of Skipper Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd .
.-""
c
sci/(Director)" (
(Emphasis supplied)
However, this is sought to be got over by saying Contemner No. 1 was not responsible but his son did it. This argument has to be stated to be rejected. The plea to support six other similar agreements, with Khosla D family, as if entered into by mistake, cannot hold water. When our order dated 29.1.91 is clear and unambiguous, to support these agreements on the so-called "collective contemporaneous understanding of both the parties", is mischievous. Thus, we have no doubt in our mind that there is a wilful disobedience of our order dated 29.1~91. In considering whether the action of the contemners amounted to contempt of court we take into account the entire course of conduct of the contemners. As our order dated 25.1.95 would disclose, the contemners have indulged in judicial adverturism by raiding one court or the other. Each of such raids is a clear abuse of process of court calculated to obstruct the due course of judicial proceeding and the administration of justice. Thus, we conclude that the contemners are guilty of contempt of court. No doubt, the contemners have tendered apology. This apology is coming forth after sensing that the adventures have turned out to be misadventures, realising that the contemners have ended up in a cul-de-sac. An apology is not a weapon of defence forged to purge the guilt of the offences nor is it intended to operate as a universal panacea. It is intended to be eVidence of real contritenses, the manly consciousness of a wrong done, of an injury inflicted, and the earnest desire< to make such reparation as lies in the wrong-doer's power." We do not find the apology to be so in this case. The co~duct of contemners is highly reprehensive. The question
E
1034
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995] 1 S.C.R.
A now is what sentence we should impose on the contemners. Here, it is necessary to bear in mind that the second respondent is the wife of the first respondent. She does not seem t_o have played any active role in all these transaction and events. As an Indian wife, dutiful and obedient, she seems to have only followed the dictates and desires of her husband. In the process she has done no more than lending her name both as a Director B to the Skipper as well as to the various acts done by him in the name of the company. It will be unrealistic to ignore this fact against our social background. We must therefore take a pragmatic view of the matter and distinguish her case from that of her husband as far as the punishment to be imposed on them is concerned. Such a distinction will in no way C minimise the gravity of the contempt that she has committed.
.;__,.
We, therefore, invoke our power under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution and order as follows :
D
E
We sentence contemner-respondent No.1, Tejwant Singh to undergo simple imprisonment for six month and to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only). We further sentence· contemner-respondent No.2, Surinder Kaur to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month and to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only). In default of payment of fine, the eontemners shall further undergo simple imprisonment for one month. The payment of fine shall be made within one month from to-day.
,-
All the properties and the bank accounts standing in the names of the contemners and the Directors of Mis. Skippe( Construction Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. and their wives, sons and unmarried daughters will stand attached. Before parting with this case, we may add :
:.'~
Judiciary is the bed rock and hand-maid of orderly life and civilised society. If the people would lose faith in justice imparted by the highest court of the land, woe be to orderly life. The fragment of civilised society would get broken up and crumble down.
At the r_equest of Shri G. Ramaswamy, the learned counsel appearing for the conteniners, we defer the sentence of imprisonment imposed on bo~h the contemners subject to the conditions and till the time _stated H below:
~
1035 .
D.D.A v. SKIPPER CONSTN.
(1) The contemners shall furnish bank guarantee in favour of the A Registrar General of this Court in the amount of Rs. 11 crores (Rupees eleven crores only) on or before 31st March, 1995. The guarantee will be of a nationalised bank or any foreign bank operating in India. The bank guarantee will be given for a period of one year from the date of furnishing the bank guarantee.
(2) The contemners shall deposit the entire amount of Rs. 11 crores by a Bank Draft in the Registry of this Court on or before 30th November, 1995. If they fail to do so, the bank guarantee will bec~me encashable and will be encashed forthwith after 30th November, 1995. (3) If the contemners fail to give the bank guarantee by 31st March, 1995 as aforesaid, the sentence of imprisonment will become enforceable at once.
c
(4) No application for extension of time either to furnish the bank guarantee or to make the payment as aforesaid, will be entertained by this D Court. (5) The contemners shall not leave the country without the express permission of this Court. (6) List of properties given by the contemners is taken on record. E The contemners will also file a list of properties held by their sons and unmarried daughters within one week from today. (7) If and ·when any property that is attached under this Order is sought to be alienated or encumbered to raise money to pay the liability of Rs.11 crores stated above, the contemners will be at liberty to approach the Court for permission to do so. (8) The attachment of the properties iand the bank a~unts shall stand raised on the contemners furnishing thel bank guarantee as aforesaid.
.
!
(9) The order with regard to the disb~sal of the aI\1.0unt deposited will be passed after the amounts are deposit~d as aforesaid. The Contempt petition is ordered in the above terms.
R.P.
Petition disposed of.
A
THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND ' . BROADCASTING, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND ORS. v. CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BENGAL AND ORS. AND VICE VERSA FEBRUARY 9, 1995 [P.B. SAWANT, S. MOHAN AND B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, JJ.)
C
Constitution of India'-Articles 19(1)(a), 19(2)--Freedom of speech and expression-Right to telecast live events over airwaves through satellite uplink facility-Whether part of freedom of speeclt-Held, per curiam; yes-Held further, as airwaves are public property the n'ght is subject to in-built restrictions. Constitution of lnditr-Articles 19(1) (a), 19(2)-Whether the right to
D telecast events· includes right to agency of one's choice-Right to establish
E
private telecasting facilities-Held, (Per Majority) the organisers had a right to sell the telecasting rights to any agen~eld, (Per minority) public broadcasting is implicit in the right, private broadcasting is noHn the absence of a licence, the organisers· had no right to telecast by an agency of their choice.
Constitution of Inditr-Articles 19(1) (a), 19(2), 14-Telegraph Act, 1885 S.4(1)-Reasonable restrictions on the right-Organisers of event selling telecasting rights to foreign agency-Organisers not obtaining licence for. telecast but paying charges for uplinking facility-No demand made for F utilising frequencies controlled by government agencies-Government agencies refusing licence or permission to telecast-Whether refusal of licence to telecast malafide and arbitrary-Held (per Majority) Doordarshan could not reJu,se to telecast particularly since there was no lack of frequency; refusal could be only on grounds specified in· Article 19 (2)--Per minority-The G objection to a foreign agency telecasting even without a licence was not .arbitrary or malafide.
Constitution of India Article 19(1) (a), 19(2)-Telecastingfrom Indian soil- Whether monopoly in favour of Doordarshan violative of the freedom of speeclt-Held, (per minority), Monopoly unacceptabl~leld (per curiam) control to be in hands of an autonomous public C01JJOration.
1036
_( MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKEf ASSN. OF BENGAL
,Ir
_,
~
-I-.
1037
Constitution of Indi~Article 19(1) (a}-Telecasting of events by organisers through foreign agency-Whether the right is in fact a commercial right traceable to Article 19 (1) (g)-He/d (Per Majority) organisers are not seeking to enforce a commercial right-Held, (per minority) the right is sought really by the foreign agency and therefore question of violation of such right under article 19 (l)(a) does not arise.
A
The Cricket Association of Bengal (CAB) organised an international cricket tournament in which India and four other countries participated. The CAB wrote to Doordarsban (DD), the official television network, in March 1993 inviting an offer for the amount they would be willing to pay CAB for live television coverage of the cricket matches in either of the alternatives : where Doordarshan would create the host broadcaster signal and undertake live telecast or where any other party would create the host broadcaster signal and DD would purchase the rights to telecast in India. CAB made it clear that in either situation CAB would retain the foreign 1V rights. By a subsequent letter CAB informed DD that they were D agreeable to DD creating the host broadcaster signal and granting to it the exclusive right for India without Star 1V getting it and that the charges for the same would be US$ 800,000. Doordarshan replied quoting a figure of Rs. 1 crore. CAB decided to sell the worldwide 1V rights to The Trans World International (1WI) a foreign 1V network. On October 18, 1993 CAB informed Doordarshan that it was expecting an offer of at least Rs. E 2 crores from DD and that they had received much higher offers from agencies abroad including 1WI. However, it offered to DD the right to telecast some of the matches directly and jointly With 1WI on condition that DD would allow advertising time which CAB would at liberty to sell to advertisers. DD rejected this offer stating that they would never agree F to any joint production with 1WI. CAB then offered to sell to Doordarshan the rights of telecast on payment of access fees. DD responded stating that CAB had to pay Rs. S lakhs per match as technical charges and that DD would have exclusive rights for the signals generated. With no agreement materialising, Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited (VSNL) withdrew from 1WI the uplink facility to the INTELSAT Satellite. The permission to import G equipment for the telecast was also withdrawn.
c
J.:CAB then approached the Calcutta High Court with a writ Petition seeking a mandamus to the Government agencies and DD to ensure uninterrupted telecast of the tournament. A Single Judge made an interim
1038
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995] 1 S.C.R.
A order directing the respondents to provide all assistance and cooperation to the petitioners or their agency for.uninterruptedtelecast and restrai~ed the respondents from tampering with, removing, seizing or dealing with any equipment relating to the telecast. The equipment seized .by the Customs Authorities were directed to be released.
In the appeal by the government agencies, a Division Bench of the High Court directed the CAB to pay DD immediately a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs to enable DD' to immediately telecast the matches. It directed the Secretary, Ministry of Telecommunication, Government of India, to consider and grant provisional permission or licence under Telegraph Act to CAB or C 1WI within three days from the date of the order. The government agencies appealed. to this Hon'ble Court. A Writ Petition was also filed by CAB. By the tiine matters was finally heard, the matChes has been telecast pursuant to and in accordance with the interim directions issued by this Court.
D On beh~df of the CAB it was contended that there was implied permission under Telegraph Act granted for uplinking facilities since VSNL had already accepted the fees for the purpose; the action of DD in refusing the telecast of the matches was malafide and authoritarian; the E organiser in exercise of its freedom of speech was free to have an agency of its choice for telecasting the matches - DD did not have and could not claim a monopoly in this regard; if an application was made under Section -4 of the Telegraph Act the appropriate authority was bound to grant the same unless it could justify refusal of any of the condition under Article 19(2) of the Constitution.
The Union of India submitted that there was no licence granted to CAB and there was no quesiion of any implied permission; in the absence of a licence VSNL could not have granted any uplinking facility; the Government of India had taken a policy decision that satellite uplinking from Indian soil should be in the exclusive competence of the Government which in turn could market the rights to other parties; in as much as by telecasting the event by selling its rights, CAB was asserting a right relatable to commerce under Article 19(1)(g) and not under Article 19(l)(a); and that public interest demanded that foreign agencies should not be freely permitted to set up telecasting facilities in India and that state monopoly was a· device to ensure use of the resource for public good.
\.
MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKEf ASSN. OF BENGAL
1039
Disposing of the appeals and writ petition, this Court
A
HELD: Per majority (Swant J. for himself anti Mohan J.):
.
t:l. The freedom of speech and expression incfndes right to acquire info['.mation and to disseminate it. Freedom of speech and express.ion is necessary, for self expre.ssion which is an important means of free conscience and self fulfilment.
1.2. The right to communicate includes right to communicate through any media that is available whether print or electronic or audio· visual. The freedom of speech and expreS9ion includes freedom of the C press. The freedom of the press in terms includes right to circulate and also to determine the volume of such circulation. This freedom includes the freedom to communicate or circulate one's opinion without interference to as large a population in the country as well as abroad as is possible to reach. This fundamental right can be limited only by reasonable restrictions under a law made for the purposes mentioned in Article 19(2) D of the Constitution. Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras, [1950) SCR 594; Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, [1950) SCR 605; Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan, Delhi v. Union of India, (1960) 2 SCR 671; Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (962) 3 SCR 842; Bennett Coleman and Co. v. Union of India, (1972} 2 ~CC 788; Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1985) 1 SCC 641; Odyssey Communications Pvt. Ltd. v. Lokvidayan Sanghatana, [1988) 3 SCC 410; S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram and Ors., [1989) 2 SCC 574; Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. Asst. Commercial Tax Officer, [1994) 2 SCC 434 and Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Professor Manubhai D. Shah~ (1992) 3 SCC 637, referred to. . Ex parte Jackson (96) US 727; Lovell v. City of Griffin, (303) US 444; Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 236," US 230 1915; Burstyn v. Wilson, (343) US 495; Schenck v. United Stales, (249) US 47; Temiiniello v. Chicago, (93) L.ed. 1131: 337 US 1 (1949) and National Broadcasting Company v. United States ofAmerica, 319 US 190-238: 87 L.ed. (1344), referred to.
1.3 There is a built-in limitati(!n on the use of electronic media because the airwaves are a public property and are controlled by the
E
1040
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995] 1 s.c.R:
Government or are not available on account of the scarcity, costs and · competition. .
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 US 367: 23 L. ed. 2d 371; Columbia Brpadcasting System v. Democratic · National Committee, 412 US 94: 36 L.Ed. td 772; Federal Communications B Commission v. WNCN Listeners Guild 450 US 582: 67 L.Ed. 2d 521; City of Los Angeles & Depaltment of Water and Power v. Prefe"ed Communication Inc., 476 US 488: 90 L.ed. 2d 480; FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 US 726 and Third Television Case, 57 B Verf GE 295, (1981), referred to.
C
Civil Liberties & Human Rights authored by David Feldman; Eric Barendt, Broadcasting Law, 1993 Edn.; Lee Bol#nger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access; Rationale of Public Regulation of Media and Df!mpcracy. and the Mass Media, (C~1_11bridge, 1990), referred to. 1.4 The rest:rictions which the electronic media suffers in addition
D to those suffered by the print media, are that (i) the airwaves are a public property and they have to be used for the benefit of the society at large, (ii) the frequencies are limited and (iii) media is subject to pre-censorship. The other limitation, viz., the reasonable restrictions imposed by law made for the purposes mentioned in Article 19 (2) is common to all. the media.
E
1.5. If the right to freedom of speech and expression includes the ri~t to disseminate information to· as wide a section of the population as is po.ssible, the access which enables the right to be so exercised is also an integral part of the said right. 2.1. To have a representative central agency to ensu~ the viewers' . right to be informed adequately and truthfully is a part of the right of the viewers under Article 19(1)(a).
2.2. Since the airwaves/frequencies are a public property and are also limited, they have to be used in the best interest of the society and this can G be done either by a central authority by establishing its own broadcasting network or regulating the grant of licences to other agencies, including the privaJe agencies. '
2.3 The Central Government shall take immediate steps to establish an independent autonomous public authority representative of all sections and interests in the society to control and regulate the use of the airwaves.
MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL
/'T
1041
2.4 The contention that on that account the restrictions to be im- A posed on the right under Article 19(1)(a) should be in addition to those permissible under Article 19(2) and dictated by the use of public resources in the best interests of the society at large, is to misconceive both the content of the freedom of speech and expression and the problems posed by the element of public property in, and the alleged scarcity of, the frequencies as well as by the wider reach of the media. 3.1 What CAB was claiming was Got a commercial right to exploit the event. 3.2 when a telecaster desires to telecast a sporting event, the free speech element is not absent from his right. The degree of the element will depend upon the character of the telecaster who claims the right.
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3.3 If while pursuing their objective of popularising the sports by selecting the best available means sports organisers incidentally earn some revenue, that will not convert them either into commercial organisations D or the right claimed by them to explore the said means, into a commercial right or interest. 4.1. Doordarshan could not refuse to telecast the event except for reasons of non-availability of frequencies or for grounds available under Article 19(2) or for considerations of public interest involved in the use of E the frequencies as public property. 4.2. The fact that Doordarshan was prepared to telecast the events only on its terms shows that the frequency was available. Hence, scarcity of frequencies or public interest cannot be pressed as grounds for refusing to telecast. 4.3. The organisers of the events had every right to create terrestrial signals of their event and to sell it to whomsoever they thought best so long as such creation of the signal and the sale thereof was not violative of any law made under Article 19(2) and was. not an abuse o~ t~e frequencies which are a public property. ~
5. The decision to form the nodal m~istry to coordinate the activities of all the concerned ministries and· departments was unexceptionable. But the time of taking the decision and its background was not without its signiticance. H~wever, there was no adequate material on record to estab-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.. 1042
"(1995) 1 S.C.R.
A lish a nexus between the MIB/DD and the aforesaid actions of the other authorities. 6. The order of the High Court was emi(!ently in the interests of the viewers whatever its merits on the other aspects of the matter. The High Court would apportion between the CAB and the DD the revenues B generated by the event after hearing the parties. Per Jeevan Reddy, J. (Broadly agreeing with the majority view) :
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1.1 Public broadcasting is implicit in Article 19(l)(a), private broadcasting is not.
1.2 The free speech right guaranteed to every citizen of this country does· not encompass the right to use .these airwaves at his choosing. Conceding such a right would be detrimental to the free speech rights of the body of citizens inasmuch as only the privileged few - powerful D economic, commercial and political interests • would come to dominate the media.
E
1.3 The right to establish the operate a private 1V station does not flow from Article 19(l)(a); such a right is not implicit in it. The question whether such right should be given to the citizens of lhis country is a matter of policy for the Parliament. Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Manubhai D. Shah, [1992) 3 SCC 637 and Odyssey Communications Pvt. Ltd. v. Lokvidayan Sanghatana, [1988) 3 sec 410, referred to.
Burstyn v. Wilson 343 US 495; Los Angeles v. Prefe"ed Communica99 L.ed. 2d 480; Columbia Broadcasting System tions, 476 U.S. 488 Democratic National Committee, 412 US 94 : 36 L.Ed. 2d 371; The Third TelevisiOn Case, 57 B Verf GE 295 (1981); Decision 59/60 (1960) Giurisprudenza Constituzionale 759; Decision 225/74 (1974) Giurisprudenza G Constitutuzionale, 1975; Decision 202176 (1976) Giurizprudenza Constituzionale 1276; Informationsverein Lentia v. Austria • 15 Human Rights Law Journal 31 ·judgment dated 24th November, 1993; N.B.C. v. U.S. (319 US 190 (1943); Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. F.C.C. 395 US 367: 23£ Ed. 2d. 37); F.C.C. v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 US 775; Miami Herald Publishing Company v. Tomi/lo, (1974-418 U.S.241); New H York Times v. United States, [1971) 403 U.S. 713; United States v. Nixon,
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v.
MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL
,_,1--r
1043
(1974) 418 U.S. 683; Bowman v. Secular Society Ltd., (1917) A.C. 406; Castells v. Spain, (14 EHRR 445) and Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Com. of Ohio, 236 US 230 : 59 L.ed. 442, referred to. 2.1 Monopoly of the broadcasting media, whether by Government or by an individual, body or organisation is unacceptable. Clause (2) of Article 19 does not permit a monopoly in the matter of freedom of speech and expression as is permitted by clause (6) of Article 19 vis-a-vis the right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g).
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2.2. The broadcasting media should be under the control of the public as distinct from Government. This is the command implicit in Article 19(1)(a). It should be operated by a public statutory corporation whose composition must be such as to ensure its impartiality in political, economic and social matters and on all other public issues. It must be required by law to present news, views and opinions in a balanced way ensuring pluralism and diversity of opinions and views. It' they must provide equal access to all the citizens and groups to avail of the medium. D
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2.3. Airwaves being public property, it is the duty of the State to see that airwaves are so utilised as to advance the free speech right of the citizens which is served by ensuring plurality and diversity of views, opinions and ideas. This is imperative in every democracy where freedom of speech is assured. 3. The right to telecast the matches, including the right to import, instal and operate the requisite equipment, was really sought by the foreign agencies and not' by the petitioners~ Hence, the question of violation of their right under Article 19(1) (a) resulting from refusal of licence/permission to such foreign agencies did not arise.
E
4.1 The charge of malafides or for that matter, the charge of arbitrary or authoritarian conduct levelled against the governmental al_lthorities is unacceptable.
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4.2 Neither the CAB nor its foreign agent had applied for or obtained the licence/permission under Section 4(1). The permissions granted by other departments were no substitute for the licence under the proviso to Section 4(1). 4.3 In the absence of such a licence, the CAB had no right in law to
1044
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995] 1 S.C.R.
A have its matches telecast by an agency of its choice. 4.4. The objection to a foreign agency coming in and telecasting such events without even obtaining a licence under the proviso to Secti"on ;~(1) of the Telegraph Act was ma/afide or arbitrary.
4.5 There was nothing to show that seizure of imported equipment by customs authorities was at the instance of Doordarshan. CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1429-30of1995.
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From the Judgment and Order dated' 12.11.93 of the Calcutta High ,Court in F.MA.T. Nil of 1993.
WITH Writ Petition (C) No. 836 of 1993.
D (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)
E
Dipankar Gupta, Harish N. Salve, Aron Jaitley, Kapil Sibal, Rajiv Mehta, Kailash Vasdev, Ms. Meen~hi Grover, U.N. Banerjee, B.V. Desai, M. Sharma, P. Malik, Ms. Radha Rangaswamy and Naveen Chawla for the appearing parties.
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The Judgments of the Court were delivered by SAWANT, J. Leave granted.
It will be convenient to answer the questions of law that arise in the present case, before we advert to the factual controversy between the parties. The questions of law are :
~
(1) Has an organiser or producer of any event a right to get the event telecast through an agency of his choice whether national or foreign? (2) Has such organiser a choice of the agency of telecasting, particularly when the exercise of his right, does not make demand on any of the frequencies owned, commanded or controlled !Jy the Government or · the Government agencies like the Videsh SanChar Nigam Limited (VSNL) or Doordarshan (DD)?
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MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSI'. OF BE:\GAL [SA WANT, J.J
1045
(3) Can such an organiser be prevented from creating the terrestrial signal and denied the facility of merely uplinking the terrestrial signal to the satellite owned by another agency whether foreign or national? (4) What, if any, are the conditions which can be imposed by the Government department which in the present case is the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MIB) for (a) creating terrestrial signal of the event and (b) granting facilities of uplinking to a satellite not owned or controlled by the Government or its agencies?
A
On answers to these questions depend the answers to the incidental questions such as (i) whether the Government or the Government agencies C like DD in the present case, have a monopoly of creating terrestrial signals and of telecasting them or refusing to telecast them, (ii) whether the Government or Government agencies like DD can claim to be the host broadcaster for all events whether produced or organised by it or by anybody else in the country and can insist upon the organiser or the agency D for telecasting engaged by him, to take the signal only from the Government or Government agency and telecast it only with its permission or jointly with it. 2. To appreciate the thrust of the above questions and the answers to them, it is necessary first to have a proper understanding of what E 'telecasting' means and what its legal dimensions and consequences are. Telecasting is a system of communication either audio or visual or both. We are concerned in the present case with audio-visual telecommunication. The first stage in telecasting is to generate the audio-visual signals of the events or of the information whi~h is sought to be communicated. When F the event to be telecast takes place on the earth, necessarily the signal is generated on the earth by the requisite electronic mechanism such as the audio-visual recorder. This stage may be described as the recording stage. The events may be spontaneous, accidental, natural or organised. The spontaneous, accidental and natural events are by their nature uncontrollable. But the organised events can be controlled by the law of the land. G In our country, since the organisation of an event is an aspect of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression protected by Article 19 (1) (a), the law can be made to control the organisation of such events only for the purposes of imposing reasonable restrictions in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of the country, the security of the H
1046
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995) 1 S.C.R.
A State, friendly relations with foreign State, public order, decency 0r morality or in relation to contempt of co.urt, defamation or incitement to an offence as laid down under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution. Although, therefore, it is not possible to make law for prohibiting the recording of spontaneous, accidental or natural events, it is possible for the reasons B mentioned in Article 19 (2), to restrict their telecasting. As regards the organised events, a law can be made for restricting or prohibiting the organisation of the event itself, and also for telecasting it, on the same grounds as are mentioned in Article 19(2). There cannot, however, be restrictions on producing and recording the event on grounds not permitted by Article 19 (2). It, therefore, follows that the organisation or production of an event and its recording can~ot be prevented except by law permitted by Article 19(2). For the same reasons the publication or communication of the recorded event through the mode of cassettes cannot be restricted or prevented except under such law. All those who have got the apparatus of video cassette recorder (VCR) and the television screen D can, therefore, view and listen to such recorded event (hereinafter-referred to, for the sake of convenience, as 'viewers'). In this process, there is no demand on any frequency or channel since there is no live-telecast of the event. The only additional restriction on telecasting or live-telecasting of such event will be the lack of availability of the frequency or channel.
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3. Since in the present case, what is involved is the right to livetelecast the event, viz., the cricket matches organised by the Cricket Association of Bengal, it is necessary to understand the various issues involved in live telecasting. It may be made clear at the outset, that there may as well be a file telecast (i.e., telecasting of the events which are already recorded by the cassette). The issues involved in file-telecasting will also be more or less the same and therefore, that subject is not dealt with separately. Telecasting live or file necessarily involves the use of a frequency or a channel. The telecasting is of three types, (a) terrestrial, (b) cable and (c) satellite. In the first case, the signal is generated by the camera stationed at the spot of the event, and the signal is then sent to the earthly telecasting station such as the T.V. Centre which in tum relays it though its own frequencies to all the viewers who have T.V. screens/sets. In the second case, viz., cable telecasting, the cable operator receives the signals from the satellite by means of the parabolic dish antenna and relays them to all those
._,..!-·
MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL [SAWANT, J.)
,,,/1
1047
T.V. screens which are linked to his cable. He also relays the recorded file programmes or cassettes through the cable to the cable-linked viewers. In this case, there is no restriction on his !eceiving the signals from any satellite to which his antenna is adjusted. There is no demand made by him on any frequency or channel owned or controlled by the national government or governmental agencies. The cable operator can show any event occurring in any part of the country or the world live through the frequen~ cies if his dish antenna can receive the same. T~e only limitation from which the cable T.V. suffers is that the programmes relayed by it can be received only by those viewers who are linked to the dish antenna concerned. The last type, viz., satellite T.V. operation involves the use of a frequency generated, owned or controlled by the national Government or the Governmental agencies, or those generated, owned and controlled by other agencies. It is necessary to bear in mind the distinction between. the frequencies generated, owned and controlled by the Government or Governmental agency and those generated and owned by the other agencies. This is so because__,generally, as in the present case, one of the contentions against the right to access to telecasting is that there are a limited number of frequencies and hence there is the need to utilise the limited resources for the benefit -of all sections of the society and to promote all social interests by giving them priority as determined by some central authority. It follows, therefore, that where the resources are unlimited or the right to telecast need not suffer for want of a frequency, objection on the said ground would be misplaced. It may be stated .here that in the present case, the contention of the MIB and DD against the right to telecast claimed by the Cricket Association of Bengal (CAB)/Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) was raised only on the ground of the limitation of frequencies, ignoring the fact that the CAB/BCCI had not made demand on any of the frequencies generated or owned by the MIB/DD. It desired to telecast the cricket matches organised by it through a frequency not owned or controlled by the Government but owned by some other agency. The only permission that the CAB/BCCI sought was to uplink to the foreign satellite the signals created by its own cameras and the earth station or the camera or the cameras and the earth station of its agency to a foreign satellite. This permission was sought by the CAB/BCCI from VSNL which is the Government agency controlling the frequencies. The permission again cannot be refused except under law made in pursuance of the provisions of Article 19 (2) of the Constitution.
A
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D
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1048
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995) 1 S.C.R.
A Hence, as stated above, one of the important questions to be answered in the present case is whether the permission to uplink to the foreign satellite, the signal created by the CAB/BCCI either by itself or through its agency can be refused except on the ground stated in -the law made under Article 19(2).
4. This takes us to the content of the fundamental right to the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a) and the implications of the restrictions permitted to be imposed on the said right, by Article 19(2). We will first deal with the decisions of this Court where the dimensions of the right are delineated.
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In Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras, [1950) SCR 594, the facts were that the Provincial Government in exercise of its powers under Section 9(1-A) of Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, by an order imposed a ban upon the entry and circulation of the petitioner's journal 'Cross Roads'. The said order stated that it was being passed for the purpose of securing the public safety and the maintenance of public order. The petitioner approached this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution claiming that the order contravened the petitioner's fundamental right to freedom of speech and ~xpression. He also challenged the validity of Section 9 (1-A) of the impugned Act. The majority of the Court held that the freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of propagation of .ideas and that freedom is ensured by the freedom of circulation. In support of this view, the Court referred to two decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court viz., (i) Ex parte Jackson (96 US 727) and (ii) Lovell v. City of Griffin (303 US 444) and quoted with approval the following passage therefrom : " Liberty of circulation is as essential to that freedom as the liberty of publication. Indeed, without circulation the publication wo'.lld be of little value". Section 9 (1-A) of the impugned Act authorised the Provincial Government, "for the purpose of securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order, to prohibit or regulate entry into or the circulation, sale or distribution in the Province of Madras or any part thereof or any document or class of documents". The question that the Court had to answer was whether the impugned Act insofar as it contained the aforesaid provision was a law relating to a matter which undermined the security of, or tended to overthrow the State. The Court held that "public order" is an expression of wide connotation and signifies that state of tranquility which prevails among the members of a political
( MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL (SAWANT, J.)
1049
society as a result of the internal regulations enforced by the Government A which they have established. The Act was passed by the Provincial Legislature under Section 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935, read with Entry I of List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act. That Entry, among others, comprised "public order" which was different from "public safety" on which subject the Provincial Legislature was not competent to make a law. The Court distinguished between "public order" and "public safety" and held that public safety was a part of the wider concept of public order and if it was intended to signify any matter distinguished from and outside the content of the expression "public order", it would not have been competent for the Madras Legislature to enact the provision so far as it related to public safety "Public safety" ordinarily means security of the public or their freedom from danger. In that sense, anything which tends to prevent danger to public health may also be regarded as securing public safety. The meaning of the expression must, however, vary according to the context. The Court then rejected the argument that the securing of the public safety or maintenance of public order would include the security of the State D which was covered by Article 19(2) and held that where a law purports to authorise the imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right in language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative actions affecting such right, it is not possible to uphold it even insofar as it may be applied within the constitutional limits as it is riot severable. So long as the possibility of its being E applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out, it may be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void. In other words, clause (2) of Article 19 having allowed the imposition of restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression only in cases where danger to the State is involved, an enactment which .is capable of being applied to cases where no such danger could arise, cannot be held to be constitutional and valid to any extent.
c
The above view taken by this Court was reiterated in Brij Bhushan &Anr. v. The State of Delhi, [1950] SCR 605 where Section 7 (1) (c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949 as extended to the Province of Delhi, G providing that the Provincial Government or any authority authorised by it in this behalf, if satisfied that such action was necessary for preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order, may pass an order that any matter relating to a particular subject or class of subjects shall before publication be submitted for . H
1050
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995] 1 S.C.R.
A · .scrutiny, was held as unconstitutional and void. The majority held that the said provision was violative of Article 19 (1) (a) since it was not a law relating to a matter which undermined the security of, or tended to overthrow the State within the meaning of the then saving provision contained in Article 19 (2). The Court further unanimously held that the B imposition of pre-censorship of a journal was a restriction on the liberty of the press which was an essential part of the right to freedom of speech and expression declared by article 19(1)(a).
C
D
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In Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan, Delhi & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., [1960) 2 SCR 671, the Court held that the object of the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954 was the prevention of self-medication and self-treatment by prohibiting instruments which may be used to advocate the same or which tended to spread the evil. Its object was not merely the stopping of advertisements offending against morcllity and decency. The Court further held that advertisement is no doubt a form of speech but true character is reflected by the object for the promotion of which it is employed. It is only when an advertisement is concerned with the expression or propagation of ideas that it can be said to relace to freedom of speech but it cannot be said that the right to publish and distribute commercial advertisements advertising an individual's personal business is a part of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. The provisions of the Act which prohibited advertisements commending the efficacy, value and importance in the treatment of particular diseases of certain drugs and medicines did not fall under Article 19 (l)(a) of the Constitution. The scope and object of the Act, its true nature and character was not interference with the right of freedom of speech but it dealt with trade and business. The provisions of the Act were in the interest of the general public and placed reasonable restrictions on the trade and business of the petitioner and were saved by Article 19(6). The Court further held that the first part of Section 8 of the impugned Act which empowered any person authorised by the State Government to seize and detain any document, article or thing which such person had reason to believe, contained any advertisement contravening the provisions of the Act imposed an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights of the petitioner and was unconstitutional. According to the Court, the said operation of Section 8 went far beyond the purposes for which the Act was enacted and failed to provide proper safeguards in regard to the exercise ~ of the powers· of seizure and detention· as had been provided by the
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MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASI1NG v. CRICKET ASSN. Ol'BENGAL [SAWANT, J.]
,.,,:·1·
1051
legislature in other statutes. However, if this operation was excised from the section the remaining portion would be unintelligible and could not be upheld.
A
In Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. The Union of India, [1962) 3 SCR 842 what fell for consideration was the Newspaper (Price and Page) Act, 1956 which empowered the Central Government to regulate the prices of newspapers in relation to their pages and size and also to regulate the allocation of space for advertising matters and the Central Government order made under the said Act, viz, the Daily Newspaper (Price and Page) Order, 1960 which fixed the maximuin number of pages that might be published by the newspaper according to the price charged and prescribing the nature of supplements that could be issued. The Court held that the Act and the Order were void being violative of Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution. They were also not saved by Article 19 (2). The Court asserted that the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a) included the freedom of the press. For propagating his ideas a D citizen had the right to publish them, to disseminate them and to circulate them, either by word or mouth or by writing. The right extended not merely to the matter which he was entitled to circulate but also to the volume· of circulation. Although the impugned Act and the Order placed restraints on the volume of circulation, their very object was directed against circulation. Thus· both interfered with the freedom of speech and expression. The E Court also held that Article 19 (2) did not permit the State to abridge the . said right in the interest of general public. The Court also held that the State could not make a law which directly restricted one guaranteed freedom for securing the better enjoyment of another freedom. Freedom of speech could not be restricted for the purpose of regulating the comF mercial aspect of the activities of newspapers. In this connection, the following observations of the Court are relevant:
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"Its object thus is to regulate something which, l!-S already stated, is directly related to the circulation of a newspaper. Since circulation of a newspaper is a part" of the right of freedom of speech the Act must be regarded as one directed against the freedom of speech. It has selected the fact or thing which is an essential and basic attribute of the conception of the freedom of speech, viz., the right to circulate one's views to all whom one can reach or care to reach for the imposition of a restriction. It seeks to achieve its
A
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object of enabling what are termed the smaller newspapers to secure larger circulation by provisions which Without disguise are aimed at restricting the circulation of what are termed the larger papers with better financial strength. The impugned law far from being one, which merely interferes with the right· of freedom of speech incidentally, does so directly though it seeks to achieve the end by purporting to regulate the business aspect of a newspaper. Such a course is not permissible and the courts must be ever vigilant in guarding perhaps the most precious of all the freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution. The reason for this is obvious. The freedom of speech and expression of opinion is of paramount importance under a democratic Constitution which envisages changes in the composition of legislature and governments and must be preserved. No doubt, the law in question was made upon the recommendation of the Press Commission but since its object is to affect directly the right of circulation of newspapers which would necessarily undermine their power to influence public opinion it cannot but be regarded as a dangerous weapon which is capable of being used against democracy itself.
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[1995] 1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1052
x
x
x
x
x
x
The legitimacy of the result intended to be achieved does not necessarily imply that every means to achieve it is permissible; for even if the end is desirable and permissible, the means employed must not transgress the limits laid down by the Constitution, if they directly impinge on any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution it is no answer when the constitutionality of the measure is challenged that apart from the fundamental right infringed the provisions is otherwise legal. Finally it was said that one of its objects is to give some kind of protection to small or newly started newspapers and, therefore, the Act is good. Such an object may be desirable but for attaining it the State cannot make inroads on the right of other newspapers which Art. 19(1) (a) guarantees to them. There may be other ways of helping them and it is for the State to search for them but the one they have chosen falls foul of the Constitution. To repeat, the only restrictions which may be imposed on the \
MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL [SAWANT,J.]
1053
rights of an individual under Art. 19(1)(a) are those which cl. (2) of Art 19 permits and no other" .
A
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In Bennett Coleman & Co. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., f1972] 2 SCC 788, the majority of the Constitution Bench held that newspapers should be left free to determine their pages, their circulation and their new edition within their quota which has been fixed fairly. It is an abridgment of freedom of expression to prevent a common ownership unit from starting a new edition or a new newspaper. A common ownership unit should be free to start a new edition out of their allotted quota· and it would be logical to say that such a unit can use its allotted quota for changing its page structure and circulation of different editions of same paper. The compulsory reduction to ten pages offends Article 19(1)(a) and infringes the freedom of speech and expression. Fixation of page limit will not only depriv~ the petitioners of their economic viability, but will also restrict the freedom of expression by reason of the compulsive reduction of page level entailing reduction of circulation and including the area of coverage for news and views. Loss of advertisements may not only entail the closing down, but will also affect the circulation and thereby impinge on freedom of speech and expression. The freedom of press entitles newspapers to achieve any volume of circulation. It was further held that the machinery of import control cannot be utilised to curb or control circulation or growth or freedom of newspapers. The news print control policy was in effect a newspaper control policy and a news paper control policy is ultra vires the Import Control Act and the Import Control Order. The majority further held that by the freedom of press is meant the right of citizens to speak and publish and express their views. The freedom of the press embodies the right of the people to read and it is not anti-thetical to the right of the people to speak and express. The freedom of speech and expression is not only in the volume of circulation but also in the volume of news and views. The press has the right of free publication and their circulation without any obvious restraint on publication. If the law were to single out press for laying down prohibitive burdens on it that would restrict circulation, penalise freedom of choice as to personnel, prevent newspapers from being started and compel the press to Government aid. This would violate Article 19(1) (a) and would fall outside the protection afforded by Article 19(2). The First Amendment to the American Constitution contains no exception like our Article 19(2). Therefore, American decisions have evolved their own exceptions. The American decisions establish that a Government
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regulation is justified in America as an important essential Government . interest which is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. The true test is whether the effect of the impugned action is to take away or abridge fundamental rights. The object of the law or executive action is irrelevant when it is established that the petitioner's fundamental right is infringed.
In Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1985) 1SCC641, the Court held that the expression "freedom of the press" has not been used in Article 19, but it is comprehended within Article 19(l)(a). This expression means a freedom from interference from authority which would have the effect of interference with the content and C circulation of newspapers. There cannot ·be any interference with that freedom in the name of public interest. The purpose of the press is to advance the public interest by publishing facts and opinions without which democratic electorate cannot make responsible judgments. Freedom of the press is the heart of social and political intercourse. It is the primary duty D of the Courts to uphold the freedom of the press and invalidate all laws or administrative actions which interfere with it contrary to the constitutional mandate. The freedom of expression has four broad social purposes to serve; (i) it helps an individual to attain self fulfilment, (ii) it assists in the discovery of truth, (iii) it strengthens the capacity of an individual in participating in decision-making and (iv) it provides a mech~sm by which E it would be possible to establish a reasonable balance between stability and social change. All members.of the society should be able to form their Qwn beliefs and commtinicate them freely to others. In sum, the fundamental principle involved here is the people's right to know. Freedom of speech .and expression should, therefore, receive a generous support from all those F who believe in the participation of people in the administration. It is on account of this special interest which society has in the freedom of speech and expression that the llPProach of the Government should be more cautious while levying taxes on matters concerning newspaper industry than while levying taxes on other matters. The Courts are there always to strike down curtailment of freedom of press by unconstitutional means. The G delicate task of determining when it crosses from the 'area of profession, occupation, trade, business or industry into the area of freedom of expression and interferes with that freedom is entrusted to the Courts. In deciding the reasonableness of restrictions imposed on any fundamental right the Court should take into consideration the nature of the right alleged to have H been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the
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MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL [SAWANT, J.)
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1055
disproportion of the imposition and the prevailing conditions including the A social values whose needs are sought to be satisfied by means of the restrictions. The imposition of a tax like the custom duty on news print is an imposition of tax on knowledge and would virtually amount to a burden imposed on a man for being literate and for being conscious of his duty as a citizen to inform himself of the world around him. The pattern of the law B imposing custom duty and the manner in which it is operated, to a certain extent, exposes the citizens who are liable to pay the custom duties to the vagaries of executive discretion. In Odyssey Communications Pvt. Ltd. v. Lokvidayan Sanghatana and others, [1988) 3 sec 410, it was held that the right of citizens to exhibit
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films on Doordarshan subject to the terms and conditions to be imposed by .the Doordarshan is a part of the fundamental· right of freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a) which can be curtailed only under circumstances set out under Article 19(2}. The right is similar to the right of citizen to public his views through any other media· such as D newspapers, magazines, advertisment hoardings etc. subject to the terms and conditions of the owners of the media. The freedom of expression is a preferred right which is always very zealously guarded by the Supreme Court. However, on the question whether a citizen has a fundamental right to establish a private broadcasting station or T.V. Centre, the Court reserved its opinion for decision in an appropriate case. The matter had E come up before this Court against an interim injunction order issued by the High Court as a result of which 12th and 13th episodes of the film "Honi-Anhoni" could not be telecast on the scheduled dates. The Court held that it not the case or"the writ petitioners before the High Court that the exhibition of the said serial was in contravention of any specific F law or direction issued by the Government. They had also not alleged that the Doordarshan had shown any undue favour to the· appellant and the sponsoring institutions resulting in any financial loss to the public exchequer. The objection to the exhibition of the film had been raised by them on the basis that it was likely to spread false or blind beliefs among the members o( the public. They had not asserted any right conferred on them G by any statute or acquired by them under a contract which entitled them to secure an order of temporary injunction. The appellant before this court had denied that the exhibition of the serial was likely to affect prejudicially the wellbeing of the people. The Union of India and Doordarshan had pleaded that the serial was being telecast after following the prescribed H
was
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[1995] l $.C.R.
A procedure and taking necessary precautions. The writ petitioners had not
produced any material apart from their own statements to show that the exhibition of the serial was prima facie prejudicial to the community. This court held that the High Court had overlooked that the issue of an order of interim injunction would infringe the fundamental right of the producer of a serial. In the absence of any prima facie evidence of gross prejudice that was likely to be caused to the public generally by the exhibition of the serial, it was not just and proper to issue an order of temporary injunction.
In S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram & Ors., [1989] 2 SCC 574, it was held that the freedom of speech under Article 19(1) (a) means the right to C express one's opinion by words of mouth, writing, printing, picture or in other manner. It would thus include the freedom of communication and their right to propagate or publish opinion. The communication of ideas could be made through any medium, newspapers, magazine or movie. But this right is subject to reasonable restriction in the large interests of the D community and the country set out in Article 19(2). These restrictions are intended to strike a proper balance between the liberty guaranteed and the social interests specified in Article 19(2). This is the difference between the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 19 of our Constitution. The decisions bearing on the First Amendment are, therefore, not useful to us except the broad principle and purpose of the E guarantee. The Court, in this connection, referred to the U.S. decisions in Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 236 US 230 (1915), Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 US 495 and Schenck v. United States, 249 US 47. The Court further held that there should be a compromise between the interest of freedom of expression and social uiterests. The Court cannot simply balance the two interests as if they are of. equal weight. The Court's F commitment to freedom of expression demands that it cannot be suppressed unless the situations created by allowing the freedom are pressing and the community interest is endangered. The anticipated danger should not be remote, conjectural or far-fetched. It should have proximate and direct nexus with the expression. The exi}ression of thought · should be G intrinsically dangerous to the public interests. It should be inseparably locked up with the action contemplated like the equivalent of a "spark in . a powder keg." Though movie enjoys the guarantee under Article 19(1)(a), there is one significant difference between the movie and other modes of communication. Movie motivates thought and action and assures a high degree of attention and retention. In view of the scientific improvements H in. photography and production, the present movie is a powerful means ,9f_
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1057
rommunication. It has a unique capacity to disturb and arouse feelings. It A has much potential for evil as it has for good. With these qualities and since it caters for mass audience who are generally not selective about what they watch, the movie cannot be equated with other modes of communication. It cannot be allowed to function in a free marketplace just as does the newspaper or magazines. Censorship by prior restraint is, therefore, not only desirable but also necessary. But the First Amendment to the U.S. B Constitution does not permit any prior restraint, since the guarantee offree speech is in unqualified terms. Censorship is permitted mainly on the ground of social interests specified under Article 19 (2) with emphasis on maintenance of values and standards of society. Therefore, censorship with prior restraint must necessarily be reasonable that could be saved by the C well accepted principles of judicial review. The standard to be applied by the board or courts for judging the film should be that of an ordinary man of common sense and prudence and i:.ot that of an out of the ordinary or hypersensitive man. The board should exercise considerable circumspection on movies affecting the morality or decency of our people and cultural heritage of the country. The moral values in particular, should not be D allowed to be sacrificed in the guise of social change or cultural assimilation. The path of right conduct shown by the great sages and thinkers of India and the concept of 'Dharam' (righteousness in every respect), which are the bedroCk of our civilisation, should not be allowed to be shaken by unethical standards. But this does not mean that the censors should have an orthodox or conservative outlook. Far from it, they must be responsive E to social change and they must go with the current climate. However, the censors may display more sensitivity to movies which will have a markedly deleterious effect to lower the moral standards of those who see it.
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However, the producer· may project his own message which the F others may not approve of it. But he has a right to 'think out' and put the counter-appeals to reason. It is a part of a democratic give-and-take to which one could complain. The State cannot prevent open discussion and open expression, however hateful to its policies. Everyone has a fundamental right to form his own opinion on any issue of general concern. He can G form and inform by any legitimate means. The democracy is a government by the people via open discussion. The democratic form of government itself demands its citizens an active and intelligent participation in the affairs of the community. The public discussion with people's participation is a basic feature and a rational process of democracy which distinguishes H
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A it from all other forms of government. Dealing with the film in question, the Court further observed that the f;ilm in the present case suggests that the existing method or reservation on the basis of caste is bad and reservation on the basis of economic back. wardness is better. The film also deprecates exploitation of people on caste consideration. This is the range and rigours of the film. There is no warrant for the view that the expression in the film by criticism of reservation policy or praising the colonial rule will affect the security of the State or sovereignty and integrity of India. There is no utterrance in the film threatening to overthrow the government by unlawful or unconstitutional C means or for secession; nor is there any suggestion for imparing the integration of the country. Two Revising Committees have approved the film. The members thereof come from different walks of life with variegated experiences. They represent the cross-section of the community. They have judged the film in the light of the objectives of the Act and the D guidelines provided for the purpose. There is nothing wrong or contrary to Constitution in approving the film for public exhibition. The producer or as a matter of fact, any other person has a right to draw the attention of the government and people that the existing method of reservation in educational institutions overlooks merits. ~ether this view is right or wrong is another matter altogether and at any rate, the Court is not E concerned with its correctness or usefulness to the people. The Court is only concerned whether such a view could be. advocated in a film. To say that one should not be permitted to advocate that view goes against the first principle of our democracy. If the film is unobjectionable and cannot constitutionally be restricted under Article 19(2), freedom of expression p cannot be suppressed on account of threat of demonstration and processions or threats of violence. That would tantamount to negation of the rule of law and a surrender to blackmail and intimidation. It is the duty of the State to protect the freedom of expression since it is a liberty guaranteed against the State. The State cannot plead its inability to handle the hostile audience problem. Freedom of expression which is legitimate and constituG tionally protected cannot be held to ransom by an intolerant group of people. The fundamental freedom under Article 19{1)(a) can be reasonably restricted only for the purposes mentioned in Article 19(2) and the restriction must be justified on the anvil of necessity and not the quicksand of convenience of expediency. Open criticism of governm.ent policies and · H operations is not a ground for restricting expression.
MIN. OP INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OP BENGAL (SAWANT,J.)
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5. The views taken by this Court in the aforesaid decisions have A thereafter been.repeated and. reproduced in the subsequent decisions. In Printers (Mysore) Ltd. & Ar.r. v. Asst. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors., [1994] 2 SCC 434, it is reiterated that the special treatment given lo
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the newspapers has a philosophy and historical background. Freedom of press has been placed on a higher footing than other enterprises. Though freedom of press is not expressly guaranteed as a fundamental right, it is implicit in the freedom of speech and expression.. Freedom of press has always been a cherished right in all democratic countries. Therefore, it has rightly been described as the Fourth Estate, the democratic credentials of a State are judged today by the extent of freedom the press enjoyed in that State. This decision quotes from the opinion of Douglas, J. in Terminiello v. Chicago, [93 L.ed 1131: 337 US 1 (1949)) that "acceptance by Government of a dissident press is a measure of the maturity of the nation". In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Professor Manubhai D. Shah, [1992] 3 SCC 637, the respondent-Executive Trustee of the Consumer Education and Research Centre (CERC), Ahmedabad, after making research into the working of the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC), publi.Shed a study paper portraying the discriminatory practice adopted by the LIC by charging unduly high premia from those taking out life insurance policies and thus denies access to insurance coverage to a vast majority of people who cannot· afford to pay the high premium. A member of the LIC wrote a counter article and published it in the daily newspaper "Hindu". The respondent replied to the same in the said newspaper. The member of LIC then published his counter-reply in LIC's house magazine. J'he respondent requested the LIC to publish his rejoinder also in the said magazine. That request was turned down. On these facts, the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the action of the UC, among other things, on the ground that his fundamental right under Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution was violated by UC by refusing to publish his reply. The High Court held that under the pretext and guise of publishing a house magazine, the LIC cannot violate the fundamental rights of the petitioner. This Court endorsing the view taken by the High Court held that the LIC is 'State' within the meaning of Article 12. The LIC Act requires it to function in the best interest of the community. The community is, therefore, entitled to know whether or not this requirement of the statute is being satisfied in the functioning of the LIC. The respondent's
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A efforts in preparing the study paper was to bring to the notice of the community that the LIC had strayed from its path by pointing out that its premium rates were unduly high when they could be low if the LIC avoided the wasteful indulgences. The endeavour was to enlighten the community of the drawbacks and shortcoming of the LIC and to pin-point the area where improvement was needed and was possible. By denying to the B policy-holders, the information contained in the rejoinder prepared by the respondent, the LIC cannot be said to be acting in the best interest of the community. There was nothing offensive in the rejoinder which fell within the restriction clauses of Article 19(2). Nor was it prejudicial to the members of the community or based on imaginary or concocted material. C On the basis of the fairness doctrine the LIC was under an obligation to publish the rejoinder. The respondent's fundamental right to speech and expression clearly entitled him to insist that his views on the subject should reach those. who read the magazine so that they have complete picture before them instead of a one-side or distorted picture. The Court also D pointed out that the attitude of the LIC in refusing to publish the rejoinder in their magazine financed from public funds, can be described as both unfair and unreasonable - unfair becal,lSe fairness demanded that both view-points were placed before the readers and unreasonable because there was no justification for refusing publication. The monopolistic State instrumentality which survives on public funds cannot act in an arbitrary E manner on the specious plea that the magazine is an in-house one and it is a matter of its exclusive privilege to print or refuse to print the rejoinder. • By refusing to print and publish the rejoind~r, the LIC had violated respondent's fundamental right. The Court must be careful to see that it does not even unwittingly aid the effort· to defeat the parties' right. Every F free citizen has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public. Freedom to air one's views is the lifeline of any democratic institution and any attempt to stifle, suffocate or gag this right would sound a death-knell to democracy and would help usher in autocracy or dictatorship. This Court has always placed a broad interpretation on the value and content of Article 19 (1) (a), making it subject only to the G restrictions permissible under Article 19 (2). Efforts by intolerant authorities to curb or suffocate this fre~dom have always been firmly repelled, more so when public authorities have betrayed autocratic tendencies. The Court then went on to observe :
"....... The words 'freedom of speech and expression must be
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broadly construed to include the freedom to circulate one's views A by words of mouth or in writing or through audio- visual instrumentalities. It, therefore, includes the right to propagate one's views through the print media i.e., periodicals, magazines or journals or through any other communication channel e.g. the radio and the television. The right extends to the citizen being permitted to use B the media to answer the criticism levelled against the view propagated by him. The print media, the radio and the tiny screen play the role of public educators, so vital to growth of a healthy democracy. These communication channels are great purveyors of news and views and make considerable impact on the minds of the readers and viewers and are known to mould public opinion on C vital issues of national importance. Modern communication mediums advance public interest by informing the public of the events and developments that have taken place and thereby educating the voters, a role considered significant for the vibrant functioning of a democracy. Therefore, in any set-up, more so in a D democratic set-up like ours, dissemination of news and views for popular consumption is a must and any attempt to deny the same must be frowned upon unless it falls within the mischief of Article 19 (2). This freedom must, however, be exercised with circumspection and care must be taken not to trench on the rights of other citizens or to the jeopardise public interest. E A constitutional provision is never static, it is ever-evolving and ever-changing and, therefore, does not admit of a narrow, pedantic or syllogistic approach. The Constitution-makers employed broad phraseology while drafting the fundamental rights so that they may be able to cater to the needs of a changing society. Therefore, constitutional provisions must receive a broad interpretation and the scope and ambit of such provisions, in particular the fundamental rights, should not be cut down· by too astute or too restricted an approach, unless the context otherwise requires.
The facts in the other case which W?S disposed of simultaneously by the same judgment were that the Doordarshan refused to telecast a documentary film on the Bhopal Gas Disaster titled 'Beyond Genocide' produced by the respondent-Cinemart Foundation on the grounds that (i) the film was outdated, (ii) it had lost its relevance, (iii) it lacked moderation
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A and restraint, (iv) it was not fair and balanced, (v) political parties were raising various issues concerning the tragedy, (vi) claims for compensation ·by the victims were sub judice, (vii) the film was likely to create commotion in the already charged atmosphere and (viii) the film criticised the action of the State Government and it was not permissible under the guidelines. The respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court on the ground of B violation of his fundamental right under Article 19 (l)(a) and for a mandamus to the Doordarshan to telecast the film. The High Court held that the respondent's right under Article 19(1)(a) obliged the Doordarshan to telecast the film and directed the Doordarshan to telecast the film at a time and date oonvenient to it keeping in view the public interest, and on such C terms and conditions as it would like to impose in accordance with the law. In the appeal against the said decision filed in this Court, the Court held that once it has recognised that the film maker has the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) to exhibit the film, the onu5 lies on the party which claimS that it was entitled to refuse enforcement of this right by virtue of D law made under Article 19(2) to show that the film did not conform to requirements of that law. Doordarshan being a State-controlled agency funded by public funds could not have denied access to screen except on valid grounds. The freedom conferred on a citizen by Article 19 (l)(a) includes the freedom to communicate one's ideas or thoughts through a E newspaper, a magazine or a movie. Traditionally, prior restraints, regardless of their form, are frowned upon as threats to freedom of expression since they contain within themselves forces which if released have the potential of imposing arbitrary and at times direct conflict with the right of another citizen. Censorship by prior restraint, therefore, seems justified for the protection of the society from the ill-effects that a motion picture F may produce if unrestricted exhibition is allowed. Censorship is thus permitted to protect social interests enumerated in Article 19(2) and Section 5-B of the Cinematograph Act. For this reason, need for prior restraint. has been recognised and our laws have assigned a specific role to the censors, as ~uch is the need in a rapidly changing societal structure. But since G permissible restrictions, albeit reasonable, are all the same restrictions, they are bound to be viewed as anathema, in that, they are in the nature of curbs or limitations on the exercise of the right and· are, therefore, bound to be viewed with suspicion, thereby throwing a heavy burden on the authorities that seek to impose them to show that the restrictions are reasonable and permissible in law. Such censorship must be reasonable and must answer .
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the test of Article 14.
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. 6. In this connection, it will be interesting also to know the content of the right tQ freedom ·of speech and expression under the First Amendment to the American Constitution where the freedom of press is exclusively mentioned as a part of the said right unlike in Article 19(1) (a) of our Constitution. Further, the restrictions on the right are not spelt out as in B our Constitution under Article 19 (2). But the U.S. Supreme Court has been reading some of them as implicit in the right. In principle, they make no difference to the content of the right to the freedom of speech and expression under our Constitution.
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In National Broadcasting Company v. United States of America, (319 US 190-238: 87 L.ed 1344), it was held inter alia, that the wisdom of regulations adopted the Federal Communications Commission is not a matter for the courts, whose duty is at an end when they find that the action of the Commission was based upon fmdings supported by evidence, and was made pursuant to authority granted by Congress.
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In Joseph Burstyn v. Lewis A. Willson, (343 US 495: 96 L ed 1098) a licence granted for the exhibition of a motion picture was rescinded by the appropriate New York authorities on the ground that the picture was "sacrilegious" within the meaning of the statute requiring the denial of a E licence if a film was "sacrilegious". The statute was upheld by the State courts. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the decision of the State Courts. Disapproving a contrary theory expressed in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Com. of Ohio, [236 US 2230: 59 L.ed 442), six members of the,: Supreme Court in an opinion of Clerk, J. held that the basic principles of · F freedom of speech and press applied to motion pictures, even though their production, distribution, and exhibition is a large scale business conducted for profit. The Court recognised that motion pictures are not necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other particular method of expression, but found it not necessary to decide whether a State may censor motion pictures under a clearly drawn statute, and limited its decision to G the holding that the constitutional guarantee of free speech and press prevents a state from banning a film on the basis of a censor's conclusion that it is "sacrilegious". Reed, J. in a concurrent opinion emphasised that the question as to whether a state may establish a system for the licensing of motion pictures was not foreclosed by the court's opinion. Frankfurter, H
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A J. with Jackson and Burton, JJ. held that the term "sacrilegious" as used in the statute was unconstitutionally vague.
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In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. ~tc. et. al. v. Federal Communication Commission et. al. and United States et. al. v. Radio Television News Directors Association et. al., [395 US 367: 23 Led. 2d 371} which two cases were disposed of by common judgment, the facts wer·e that in the first case, the Broadcasting-Company carried as a part of "Christian Crusade" series, a 15-minute broadcast in which a third person's honestly and character were attacked. His demand for free reply time was refused by the broadcasting station. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued a declaratory order to the effect that the broadcasting station had failed to meeting its obligation under the FCC's fairness doctrine. The Court upheld the FCC's directions. In the second case, the FCC after the commencement of the litigation in the same case made the personal attack aspect of the fairness doctrine more precise and more readily enforceable. The Court upheld the FCC's rules overruling the view taken by the Court of Appeals that the rules were unconstitutional as abridging the freedom of speech and press. The Court dealing with the two cases held:
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"Just as the Government may limit the use of sound-amplifying equipment potentially so noisy that it drowns out civilized private speech, so may the Government limit the of broadcast equipment. The right of free speech of a broadcaster, the user of a sound track, or any other individual does not embrace a right to snuff out the free speech of others. xxxxxxxxx
.......... Beyond this, however, because the frequencies reserved for public broadcasting were limited in number, it was essential for the government to tell some applicants that they could not broadcast at all because there was room for· only a few. xxxxxxxxx
Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit
MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL (SAWANT, J.J
1065
an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable A to the right of over individual to speak, write, or publish. If 100 persons wa!'t broadcast licences but there are only 10 frequencies to allocate, all of them may have the same "right" to a license; but if there is to be any effective communication by radio, only a few can be licensed and the rest must be barred from the airwaves. It would be strange if the First Amendment, aimed at protecting and furthering communications, prevented the government from making radio communication possible by requiring licenses to broadcast and by limiting the number of licenses so as not to overcrowd the spectrum. This has been the consistent view of the Court. Congress unquestionably has the power to grant and deny licenses and to eliminate existing stations... No one has a First Amendment right to license or to monopolize a radio frequency; to deny a station license because "the public interest" requires it "is not a denial of free speech."
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By the same token, as far as the First Amendment is concerned those who are licensed stand no better then those to whom licenses are refused. A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no Constitutional right to the one who holds the licensee or to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment whieh prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves. This is not to say that the First Amendment is irrelevant to public broadcasting. On the contrary, it has a major role to play as the Congress itself recognized, which forbids FCC interference with "the right of free speech by means of radio communication." Because of the scarcity of ratio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favour of others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their
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collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendme~L It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right -of the broadcasters, which is paramount.....
It is the purpose -of the First Amendment to preserve an uninln"bited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, · whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee....• It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by eon&ress or by the FCC..• ......... As we have said, the Frrst Amendment confers no right on licensees to prevent others from broadcasting on 'their' frequencies and no right to an unconditional monopoly of a scarce resource which the Government has denied others the right to use. -
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Nor can we say that it is inconsistent with the Frrst Amendment goal of producing an informed pnblic capable of conducting its own affairs to require to personal attacks occurring in the course of diScussing controversial issues, or to require that the political opponents of those endorsed by the station be given a chance to communicate with the public. OtherWise, station owners and a few networks would have unfettered power to make time available only to the highest bidders, to communicate only their own views on public issues, people and candidates, and to permit on the air only -- ' those with whom they agreed. There is no sanctuary in the Frrst Amendment for unlimited private censorship operating in a - medium not upon to all 'Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the Frrst Amendment does not sanction repres-sion of that freedom by private interests. · . X .X
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....... · It does not violate the Frrst Amendment to treat licensees given the privilege of Using scarce radio freq~ncies as proxies for
MIN. OP INFORMAT.:ON AND BROAIY'..ASTINGw. CRICKET ASSN. OFBENGALfSAWAHI',J.) '
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the entire community, obligated to give suitable time and attention A to matters of great public concern. To condition the granting or renewal of license~ on a \\illingness to present repre5ent3tive community views on controversial issues is consistent with the ends · and purposes. of those constitutional provisions forbidding ·the abridgment of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. ConB need not stand idly by and permit those with licenses to ignore the problems which beset the people or to exclude from the airwayi; anything but their ·own views of fundamental questions ·-····
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licenses to broadcast do not confer ownership of designated frequencies, but only the temporary privilege of using them.'
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Referring to the contention that although at one time the lack of available frequencies for all who wished to .use them justified the Government's choice of those who would best serve the public interest by acting proxy for those who W.Juld present differing views, or by giving D the latter access directly to broadcast facilities, the said condition no longer prevailed to invite continuing contro~ the Court held :
as
'ScarCity is not entirely a thing of the past. Advances in technology, such as. micr~wave transmission, have Jed to more efficient utilisation of the frequency spectrum, but uses for that spectrum. have aiso grown apace. Porfuns of the spectrum must be rc:Served for vital ll3es unconnected with human communication, such as radiQ-navigational aids.used by aircraft and vessels. Conflicts have even emerged between such vital functions as defense preparedness and experimentation in methods of averting midair collisions through radio warning devices. "Land mobile services' such as · police, ambulance, fire department, public utility, and other communications systems have been occupying an increasingly crowded portion of the frequency specirum and there are, apart from licensed aniateiir radio operators' equipment, 5,000,000 transmitters operated on the 'Citizens' band' which is also increasingly , congested. . Among the various uses for radio frequency space, including marine, aviatio,',, amateur, military, and collll'llon Carrier users, there are easily enough claimants to permit use of the whole with an even smaller allocation to broadcast radio and television uses than now exists. ,
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Comparative hearings between competing applicants for broadcast spectrum space are by no means a thing of the past. The radio spectrum has become so · congested that at times it has been necessary to suspend new applications. The very high frequency television spectrums, in the country's major markets, almost entirely occupied, although space reserved for ultra high frequency television transmission, which is a relatively recent developm~nt as a commercially viable alternative, has not yet been completely filled. The rapidity with which technological advances succeed one another to create more efficient use of spectrum space on the one hand, and to create new uses for that space by ever growing numbers of people on the other; makes it unwise to speculate on the future allocation of that space. It is enough to say that the resource is one of considerable and growing importance whose scarcity impelled its regulation by an agency authorised by Congress. Nothing in this record, or in our own researches, convinces us that the resource is no longer one for which there are more immediate and potential uses than can be accommodated, and for which wise plannfu.g is essential. This does not mean, of course, that every possible wavelength must be occupied at every hour by some vital use in order to sustain the congressional judgment. The substantial capital investment required for many uses, in addition to the potentiality for confusion and interference inherent in any scheme for continuous kaleidoscopic reallocation of all available space may make this unfeasible. The alloeation need not be made at such a breakneck pace that the objectives of the allocation are themselves imperiled. Even where there are gaps in spectrum utilization, the fact remains that existing broadcasters have often attained their present position because of their initial government selection in competition with others before new technological advances opened new opportunities for further uses. Long experience in broadcasting, confirmed habits of listeners and viewers, network affiliation, and other advantages in program procurement give existing broadcasters a substantial advantage over new entrants, even where new entry is technologically possible. These advantages are the fruit ·of ·
MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL [SAWANT, J.]
1069
a preferred position conferred by the Government. Some present A possibility for new entry by competing stations is not enough, in itself, to render unconstitutional the Government's effort to assure that a broadcaster's programming ranges widely enough to serve the public interest. In view of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Government's role in allocating those frequencies, and the legitimate claims of t,hose unable without governmental assistance to gain access to those frequencies for expression of their views, we hold the regulations and ruling at issue here are both authorized by statute and constitutional".
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In Columbia Broadcasting System etc. etc. v. Democratic National Committee etc. etc., [412 US 94: 36 L.Ed 2d 772], in separate decisions rejecting the contentions that the general policy of certain radio and television broadcast licensees of not selling any editorial advertising time to individuals or groups wishing to speak out on public issues violated the D Federal Communications Act of 1934 and the First Amendment, such contentions having been asserted in actions instituted by a national organisation of business opposed to United States involvement in Vietnam and by the Democratic National Committee, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the Commission. However, the E US Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. Burger, CJ. expressing the views of the six members of the Court held : ".......... (1) the First Amendment issues involved in the case at bar had to be evaluated within the framework of the statutory and regulatory scheme that" statutory and regulatory scheme that had F developed over the years, affording great weight to the decisions of Congress and the experience of the Federal Communications Commission, and (2) under the Federal Communications Act and the Commission's "fairness doctrine," broadcast licensees had broad journalistic discretion in the area of discussion of public G issues. It was also held, expressing the views of the five members of the court (Part IV of the opinion); that (3) neither the public interest standards of the Federal Communications Act nor the First Amendment, assuming that there was governmental action · H
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for First Amendment purposes, required broadcasters to accept . editorial advertisements, notwithstanding that they accepted Commercial advertisement, and (4) the Commission was justified in concluding that the public interest would not.be served by a system affording a right of access to broadcasting facilities for paid editorial advertisements, since such a .system would be heavily weighted in favour of the financially affluent, would jeopardize effective operation of the Commission's "fairness doctrine", and would increase government involvement in broadcasting by requiring the Commission's daily supervision of broadcaster's activities ......... a broadcaster's refusal to aceept any editorial advertisements was not governmental action for purposes of the First Amendment, since private broadcasters, even though licensed and regulated to some extent by the government, were not instrumentalities or "partners" of the Government for First Amendment purposes, and since the Commission, in declining. to reject the broadcasters' policies against accepting editorial advertisements, had not fostered or required such policy".
\ It may be mentioned here that unlike in this country, in United States, the private individuals and institutions are given licenses to have · their own broadcasting stations and hence the right of the private broadcasters against the right of others who did not own the broadcasting E stations but asserted their right of free speech and expression were pitted against each other in this case and the decision has mainly turned upon the said balancing of rights of both under the First Amendment. It was in substance held that any <Urection to the private broadcasters by the Government to sell advertising time to speak out on public issues violated F the protection given by the First Amendment to the private broadcasters against Government control.
hi Federal Communications Commission et al. v. WNCN Listeners Guild et al., (450 Us 582: 67 L ed 2d 521), a number of citizen groups interested in fostering and preserving particular entertainm~nt formats G petitioned for review of the Policy Statement of Federal Communications ·Comnlission (FCC) in the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court held that the Policy Statement was contrary to the Communications Act of 1934. The US Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals by majority, holding, inter alia, that the H Policy Statement wa5 not inconsistent with the Communications Act since
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MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING•· CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL [SAWANT, J.J
1071
the FCC provided a rational expla,n,ation for its conclusion that reliance on A the· market was the best method of promoting diversity in entertainment formats and that FCC's judgment regarding how the public interest in best served was entitled to substantial judicial deference and its implementation . of the public interest standard, when based on -a rational weighing of competing policies was not to be set aside. Marshall and Brennan, JJ., B however, held that in certain limited circumstances, the FCC may be obliged to hold a hearing to consider whether a proposed change in a licensee's entertainment programme format is in the public interest and that the FCC's Policy Statement should be vacated since it did not contain a safety va!ve procedure that allowed the FCC the flexibility to consider applications for exemptions based on special circumstances and since it C failed to provide a rational explanation for distinguishing between enter~ tainment and not entertainment programming for purposes of requiring commission review of format changes. In City of Los Angeles & Department of Water and Power v. Prefe"ed D Communication, Inc., 476 US 488: 90 L ed 2d 480, a cable television company asked a public utility and the city of Los ~geles's water and power department for permission to lease space on their utility poles in order to provide cable television service to part of the city. The respondent-company was told that it was first obtain franchise from the appellant City which refused to grant one on grounds that the company had failed E to participate in an auction that was t.o award a single franchise in the area. The respondent sued claiming violation of his right under the free speech clause of the First Amendment It was alleged in the complaint that there was sufficient physical capacitY and the economic demand in the area at issue to accommodate more than one cable company and that the city's F auction process allowed it to discriminate among applicants. As against this, the appellant argued that lack of space on public utility structures, the limited economic demand, and the practical and aesthetic disruptive effects on the public right of way justified its decision. The District Court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the US Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The US Supreme Court affirmed the G Court of Appeals. Rehnquist, J. expressing the unanimous decision of the Court held: "... (1) that the cable television company's complaint should not have been dismissed, since the activities in which it allegedly sought
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to engaged plainly implicated First Amendment interests where they included the communication of messages on a wide variety of . topics and in a wide variety of formats, through origin&! programming or by exercising editorial discretion over which stations or programs to include in its repertoire, but (2) that it was not desirable to express any more detailed views on the proper resolution of the First Amendment question without a more thoroughly developed record of proceedings in which the parties would have an opportunity to prove those disputed factual assertions upon which they relied." 7. The position of law on the freedom of speech and press has been explained in (16 Am Jur 2d 343) as under: "The liberty of the press was initially a right to publish without a license that which formerly could be published only with one, and although this freedom from previous restraint upon publication could not be regarded as exhausting the guarantee of liberty, the prevention of that restraint was a leading purpose in the adoption of the First Amendment. It is well established that liberty of the press historically considered and taken up by the Federal Constitution, means principally, although not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorships. Stated differently, the rule is that an essential element of the liberty of the press is its freedom from all censorships over what shall be published and exemption from control, in advance, as to what shall appear in print...... . xxxxxxxxx
The freedom of speech and press embraces the right to distribute literature, and necessarily protects the right to receive literature which is distributed. It is said that liberty in· circulating is as essential to the freedom as liberty of publishing, since publication without circulation would be of little value.
The right or privilege of free speech and publication, guaranteed by the Constitutions of the United States and of the several states, has its limitation and is not an absolute right, althoughlimitations are recognised only in exceptional cases.
MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL (SAWANT, J.)
1073
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The question of when the right of free speech or press becomes wrong by excess is difficult to determine. Legitim~te attempts to protect the public, not from the remote possibie effects of noxious ideologies, but from present excesses of direct, active conduct are not presumptively bad because they interfere with and in some of B their manifestations restrain the exercise of the First Amendment rights. The issue in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about substantive evils, which the federal or state legislatures have a right to prevent; it is C a question of proximity and degree. xxxxxxxxx
The freedoms of speech and press are not limited to particular media of expression. Verbal expression is, of course, protected, but the right to express one's views in an orderly fashion .extends to the communication of ideas by handbills and literature as well as by the spoken word. Picketing carried on in a nonlabor context, when free from coercion, intimidation, and violence, is constitutionally guaranteed as a right of free speech."
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8. In "Civil Liberties & Human Rights" authored by David Feldan, the justification for and limits of freedom of expression are stated in the following words:
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The liberty to express one's self freely is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, self expression is significant instrument of freedom of conscience and self-fulfilment. Second justification concerns epistemology. Freedom of expression enables people to contribute to debates about social and moral values. The best way to find the best or truest theory or model of anything is to permit the widest possible range of ideas to circulate. Thirdly, the freedom of expression allows political discourse which is necessary in any country which aspires to democracy. And lastly, it facilitates artistic scholarly endeavours of all sorts. The obvious connection between press freedom and freedom of speech is that the press is a medium for broadcasting information and
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A opinion. Firstly, media freedom as a tool of self-expression is a significant
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instrument of personal autonomy. Secondly, as a channel of communication, it helps to allow the political discourse in a democracy. Thirdly, it helps to provide one of the essential conditions in scholarships making possible the exchange and evaluation of theories, explanations and dis.coveries, and lastly, it help to promulgate a society's cultural values and facilitates the debate about them, advancing the development and survival of civilisation. Referring to the reasons for regulating the broadcasting media, the learned author has stated that, first, the Government realises the potential of channels of mass communication for contributing to. democracy or undermining it. They hoped to foster a public service ethos in broadcasting so that it would be a medium for education and improving the population. Serondly, in order to do this it was necessary to keep the media of mass communications from having programme policy dictated entirely by market forces. A strong public sector and regulation of the independent sector when one started to operate, were called for. Thirdly, when comm.ercial broadcasters appeared on the scene, and a regulatory scheme was being developed for them, it was thought to be important to preserve a diversity of ideas by preventing oligopolistic concentrations of power in the hands of a few, usually rich and conservative media magnates, and to ensure that licences were granted only to people who could be expected not to abuse the privilege. The need to preserve propriety has been a motivating factor in the regulation of commercial broadcasting ov~r much of the world. Fourthly, government hoped to ensure that civilised standards were maintained, to uphold social values. Fifthly, wave lengths for broadcasting were limited. This purely technical consideration shar~ distinguishes broadcasting from newspapers, and justifies a higher level of regulation. In theory, if not in practice there is nothing to prevc;nt any number of newspaJYers being published simultaneously. The only controlling mechanism needed is that of market forces. This is not true of broadcasting. Some control over the allocation of wavelengths is needed order to ensure that there are sufficient for all legitimate broadcasters. Lastly, another legitimate object of national regulation is to protect the intellectual . property rights of programme makers and broadcasters.· It is permissible on this ground for an organisation to prevent people from setting access to programmes without paying proper licence fees. One way of preventing
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MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL [SAWANT, J.)
1075
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[1995] 1 S.C.R.
/
A · where an authority must give permission before roads can be dug up for laying cable. The learned author states that the case is unconvincing for it infers that it is right for the Government to regulate broadcasting from the fact that it has opportunity to do this. It would be perfectly possible for Government to allocate frequencies for cable franchises without B · programme conditions on the basis of a competitive tender and allow the resale by the purchaser. The argument, according to the author, therefore, does not work. It does not justify broadcasting regulations but almost explains how it is feasible. The author, however, does not accept the objection to this reason for regulation that thereby Government acts imC properly by using their licensing power to purchase broadcasters' constitutional right to speech. According to the author, this argument is less persuasive as it assumes that broadcasters enjoy the same constitutional rights of free speech as individuals talking in a bar or leafletting iµ a high street. The author then deals with the second reason given for regulation D of broadcasting, viz., scarcity of frequencies and points out that this argument referred to in Red Lion Broadcasting case (supra) is less clear than appears at first sight. Since it is not clear whether the scarcity of frequencies refers to the limited number allocated by the Government as available for broadcasting or to the actual numerical shortage of broadcasting stations. If it is the former, the scarcity is an artificial creation of the E Government rather than a natural phenomenon ~ince it reserves a number • of frequencies for the use of the army, police and other public services. The Government is then not in a good position to argue for restrictions on broadcasters' freedom. The author then points out that as far as the actual scarcity of broadcasting stations is concerned, there has been an increase F in the last 20 years in the broadcasting stations in the United States while there are fewer newspapers than there used to be. Similar developments have occurred in European Countries in the same period, especially, since the advent of cable and satellite. Further the scarcity argument cannot be divorced from economic considerations. The shortage of frequencies and G the high cost of starting, up broadcasting channel explain their dearth in comparison with the number of newspapers and magazines in 1961. However, it is now probably as difficult to finance a new newspaper as it is a private television channel, if not more so. Lastly, the author points out that the scarcity argument is much less tenable than it used to be. Cable and H satellite have significantly increased the number of available or potentially
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MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL [SAWANT, J.]
1077
available channels so that there are more broadcasting outlets than there A are national or local daily newspapers. Dealing with the third reason advocated for giving differential treatment to the broadcasting, viz., the character of the broadcasting media, the author points out that it is said that television and radio, are more influential on public opinion than the press, or at least are widely thought to be so. The majority of the US B Supreme Court in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 US 7'1£J said that they intrude into the home and are more pervasive and are more difficult to control than the print media. In particular, it is hard to prevent children from being exposed to broadcast while it is relatively easy to stop them looking at magazines and papers which in any case they will not be able to read ·or purchase. These grounds underpin the extension of legal control C in Britain over violent and sexually explicit programmes through the establishment of Broadcasting Standard Council and the strengthening of the impartiality rules. In Third Television Case 57 B Verf GE 295, 322-3 [1981) the German Constitutional Court dealing with a different version of this argument has held that regulation is necessary to guarantee pluralism and D programme variety, whether or not there is a shortage of frequencies and other broadcasting outlets. The free market will not provide for broadcasting the same variety found in the range of press and magazine titles. Hence programme content should be regulated and the media monopolies should be cut down by the application of anti-trust laws. Thus both the US and the E German arguments lay stress on the power of television and its unique capacity to influence the public. According to the learned author, the arguments are difficult to assess. Broadcasting does not intrude into the home unless listeners and viewers want it to be. From the point of view of constitutional principles it is not easy to justify imposition of greater limits on the medium on the ground that it is more influential than the written words. It F cannot be right to subject more persuasive types of speech to greater restraints than those imposed on less effective varieties. The author, however, accepts the view of the majority of the US Supreme Court in Pacifica case (supra) which regarded broadcasting, particularly television, as a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of most people. More time is spent G watching television than reading. The presooce of sound and picture in any home makes it an exceptional potent medium. It may also be harder to stop children having access to 'adult material' on television than to pornographic magazines. This may not apply to subscription channels, enjoyment of which is dependent on a special decoder. He also agrees that experience in the H
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A United States and more recently in Italy suggests that a free broadcasting . market does not produce the same :variety as the press and book publishing markets do. However, the author states that these three justifications for broadcasting regulation are inconclusive and it is doubtful whether the case is powerful enough to justify the radically different legal treatment of the B press and broadcasting media. A separate question, according to the author, is whether it is appropriate to continue to treat radio in the same way as television since there is generally a large choice of local, if not national radio programmes and it is hard to believe that it exercises a dominating influence on the formation of public attitudes. The same question arises in respect of cable television. Although a licence has to be obtained from a ·licensing C authority, several franchises may be physically accommodated and a wide band cable system may be able to carry upto 30 or 40 or even more channels. The scarcity rational, therefore, seems inapplicable to cable, and further it is hard to believe that this mode of broadcasting exercises such a strong influence that stringent programme regulation is justifiable. Dealing with the D last reason advocated by a leading American scholar, Lee Bollinger in his article "Freedom of the Press and Public Access" and his essay "The Rational of Public Regulation of the Media" and in "Democracy and the Mass Media" Cambridge (1990] for the divergent treatment of the press and broadcasting media, the author points out that Bollinger accepts that there is no funE damental difference in the character of the two mass media, but argues that broadcasting being still relatively new means of mass communication, it is understandable that society has wanted to regulate it just as it has treated that cinema with more caution than it has the theater. This argument of Bollinger is based on the history of the two media. Bollinger's second arguF ment is that society is entitled to remedy the deficiencies of an unregulated press with a regulated broadcasting system which may be preferable to attempting to regulate both sectors. According to Bollinger, regulation poses the danger of government control, a risk which is reduced if one branch of the media is left free. The author attacks this reason given by Bollinger and states that it is an unsatisfactory compromise. If the regulation of the press G · is always wrong and perhaps unconstitutional and if there is no significant difference between the two media, it follows that the latter should also be wholly unregulated .. The author also points out that Bollinger's argument attempts to justify the unequal treatment of the liberties of the broadcasters and newspaper proprietors and editors when in all material respects, their H position is identical.
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MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL [SAWANT, J.]
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The author then refers to the rights of viewers and listeners which is referred to in Red Lion Broadcasting case (supra) by White, J. of the US Supreme Court in the following words : "But the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."
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The author concludes by pointing out that the cases from a variety of jurisdictions show that the broadcasters' programme freedom when exercised within the constraints imposed by the regulatory authority, has priority over the rights claimed by viewers to see a particular programme or to retain a particulars series in the schedule. On the other hand, the interests of viewers and listeners justify the imposition of programme standards which would not be countenanced for the press or publishing. It D is recognised by the constitutional courts of European countries that viewers and listeners have interest, and they should be taken into account in the interpretation of broadcasting freedom. But the balancing of the rights of the broadcasters and viewers is done by regulatory authority. Courts are understandably reluctant to contemplate the interference with administrative discretion which would result from their recognition of E individual rights.
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Dealing .with the right to .access to broadcasting, the author points out that the theoretical argument in this connection is that freedom of speech means freedom to communicate effectively to a mass audience and nowadays that entails access to the mass media. The rights to access provide some compensation for the expropriation by the public monopoly of the freedom to broadcast. In the absence of a justification for that monopoly, there would be a right to broadcast in the same way that everyone has a right to say or write what he likes in his own home. This would justify the recognition of access to both public and private char.nels. The author states that these arguments are unacceptable. Freedom of speech does not entail any right to communicate effectively in the sense that a citizen can call upon the State or provide him with the most effective means for the purpose. He points out that no legal system provides its citizens with the means and opportunities to address the public in the way
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[1995] 1 S.C.R.
A each considers most appropriate. Moreover, to grant everyone a right to use an access channel, even if available all the time, would be to give every adult a worthless right to use it for a second a year. Limited access rights, enjoyed only by important political and social groups may be more valuable. But even their recognition would involve sqme interference with the B editorial freedom of channel controllers and programme schedulers and it may be more difficult as a consequence to achieve a balanced range of programmes. Further, a channel might find it hard to create any clear identity for itself, if it had to devote a substantial amount of time to relaying the programmes made by pressure groups. There are also practical objections to access rights. It may be very difficult to decide, for example, which C groups are to be given access, and when and how often such programmes are to be shown. There is a danger that some grounds will be unduly privileged. There points weigh particularly heavily against the recognition of constitutional rights, for courts are not competent to formulate them with any precision. Dealing with the constitutional rights of access to the D broadcasting media, the author concludes that individuals and groups do not have constitutional rights of access to the broadcasting media. Access rights can only be framed effectively by legislature or by specialist administrative agencies. It does not mean that statutory or other access rights do not have a constitutional·dimension. The courts may lay down that some provisions should be made for access as a matter of constitutional policy. E This, however does not mean that there are individual constitutional rights to accef..:;.
In this connection, the author also. points out that the development of cable poses new access problems. Operator of the cable may himself have rights of free speech which would be infringed by requirement to honour access claims. The scarcity and economic arguments which are employed to justify broadcasting regulation and, therefore, access provision, may be less applicable in the context of cable. 11. We may now summarise the law on the freedom of speech and
G expression under Article 19 (1) (a) as restricted by Article 19 (2). The freedom of speech and expression includes right to acquire information and to disseminate it. Freedom of speech and expression is necessary, for self expression which is an important means of free conscience and self fulfilment. It enables people to contribute to debates of social and moral issues. It is the best way to fmd a truest model of anything, since it is only H thro"ugh it, that the widest possible range of ideas can circulate. It is the
MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING•. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL [SAWANT. J.]
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only vehicle of political discourse so essential to democracy. Equally important is the role it plays in facilitating artistic and scholarly endeavours of all sorts. The right to communicate, therefore, includes right to communicate through any media that is available whether pr:int of electronic or audio-visual such as advertisement, movie, article, speech etc. That is why freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of the press. The freedom of the press in terms includes right to circulate and also to determine the volume of such circulation. This freedom includes the freedom to communicate or circulate one's opinion without interference to as larg~ a population in country as well as abroad as is possible to reach. This fundamental right can be limited only by reasonable restrictions under a law made for the purposes mentioned in Article 19(2) of the Constitution.
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The burden is on the authority to justify the restrictions. Public order is not the samt; thing as public safety and hence no restrictions can be placed on the right to freedom of speech and expression on the ground D that public safety is endangered. Unlike in the American Constitution, limitations on fundamental rights are specifically spell out under Article 19(2) of our Constitution. Hence no restrictions can be placed on the right to freedom of speech and expression on grounds other those specified under Article 19 (2) ..
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12. What distinguishes the electronic media like the televii;ion from the print media or other media is that has both audio and visual appeal and has a more pervasive presence. It has a greater impact on the minds of the viewers and is also more readily accessible to all including children at home. Unlike the print media, however, there is a built-in limitation on the use of electronic media because the airwaves are a public property and hence are owned or controlled by the Government or a central national authority or they are not available on account of the scarcity, costs and competition.
13. The next question to be answered in this connection is whether G there can be a monopoly in broadcasting/telecasting. Broadcasting is a means of communication and, therefore, a medium of speech and expression. Hence in a democratic polity, neither any private individual, institution or organisation nor any Government or Government organisation can claim exclusive right over it. Our Constitution also forbids monopoly either .H
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A in the print or electronic media. The monopoly permitted by our Constitu-
tion is only in respect of carrying on a trade, business, Industry or service under Article 19(6) to subserve the interests of the general public. However, the monopoly in broadcasting and telecasting is often claimed by the Government to utilise the public resources in the form of the limited frequencies available for the benefit of the society at large. It is justified by the Government to prevent the concentration of the frequencies in the hands of the rich few who can monopolise the dissemination of views and information to suit their interests and thus in fact to control and manipulate public opinion in effect smothering the right to freedom of speech and expression and freedom of information of others. The claim to monopoly made on this ground may, however, lose all 'its raison d'etre if either any section of the society is unreasonably denied an access to broadcasting or the governmental agency claims exclusive right to prepare and relay programmes. The ground is further not available when those claiming an access either do not make a demand on the limited frequencies controlled by the Government or claim the frequency which is not utilised and is available for transmission. The Government sometimes claims monopoly also on the ground that having regard to all pervasive presence and impact of the electronic media, it may be utilised for purposes not permitted by law -and the damage done by private broadcasters may be irreparable. There is much to be said in favour of this view and it is for this reason that the regulatory provisions including those for granting licences to private broadcasting where it is permitted, are enacted. On the other hand, if the Government is vested with an unbridled discretion to grant or refuse to grant the license or access to the media, the reason for creating monopoly will lose its validity. For then it is the government which will be enabled to effectively suppress the freedom of speech and expression instead of protecting it and utilising the licensing power strictly for the purposes for which it is conferred. It is for this reason that in most of the democratic countries an independent autonomous broadcasting authority is created to control all aspects of the operation of the electronic media. Such authority is representative of all sections of the society and is free from control of the political and administrative executive of the State.
In this country, unlike in the United States and some European countries, there has been a monopoly of broadcasting/telecasting in the Government. The Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 [hereinafter referred to as the ''Telegraph Act" ] creates this monopoly and vests the power of regulat-
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ing and licensing broadcasting in the Government. Further, the A Cinematograph Act, 1952 and the Rules made thereunder empower the Government to pre-censor films. However, the power given to the Government to license and to pre-censor under the respective legislations has to be read in the context of Article 19(2) of the Constitution which sets the parameters of reasonable restrictions which can be placed on the right to B freedom of speech and. expression. Needless to emphasise that the power to pre-censor films and to grant licences for access to telecasting, has to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of Article 19(2). It is in this context that we have to examine the provisions ef Section 4 (1) of the Telegraph Act and the action of the MIB/DD in refusing access to telecast the cricket matches in the present case. The relevant Section 4 of the C Telegraphs Act reads as follows :
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"4. (1) Within India the Central Government shall have the exclusive privilege of establishing, maintaining and working telegraphs : /
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Provided that the Central Government may grant a Licence, on such conditions and in consideration of such payments as it thinks fit, to any person to establish, maintain or work a telegraph within any part of India : Provided further that the Central Government may, by rules made under this Act and published in the Official Gazette, permit, subject to such restrictions and conditions as it thinks fit, the establishment, maintenance and working -
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(a) of wireless telegraphs on ships within India territorial waters and on aircraft within or above India or Indian territorial ·waters and
(b) of telegraphs other than wireless telegraph within any part of India.
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(2) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, delegate to the telegraph authority all or any of its powers under the first proviso to sub-section (1). The exercise by the telegraph authority or any power so delegated shall be subject to such restrictions and conditions the
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Central Government may, by the notification, think fit to impose." · Section 3(1) of the Act defines 'telegraph' as under :
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"3. (1) "telegraph" means any appliance, instrument, material or apparatus used or capable of use for transmission or reception of signs, signals, writing, images and sounds or intelligence of any nature by wire, visual or other electromagnetic emissions, Radio waves Hertzian waves, galvanic, electric or magnetic means. Explanation.- "Radio waves" or "Hertzian Waves" means electromagnetic waves of frequencies lower than 3,000 giga-cycles per·second propagated in space without artificial guide."
It is clear from a reading of the provisions of Sections 4 (1) and 3(1) together that the Central Government has the exclusive privilege of establishing,_;naintaining and working appliances, instruments, material or apD parafus used of-capable of use for transmission or reception of signs, signals, images and sounds or intelligence of any nature by wire, visual or other electro-magnetic emissions, Radio waves or Hertzian waves, galvanic, electric or magnetic means. Since in the present case the controversy centres round the use of airwaves or hertzian waves [heremafter will be called as "electro-magnetic waves"], as is made clear by Explanation to E section 3(1), the Central Government can have monopoly over the use of the electo-magnetic waves only of frequencies lower than 3000 giga-cycles ·per second which are propagated in space with or without artificial guide. In other words, if the electro-magnetic waves of frequencies of 3000 or more giga-cycles per second are propagated in space with or ·without p artificial guide, or if the electro-magnetic waves of frequencies of less than 3000 giga-cycles per second are propagated with an artificial guide, the Central Government cannot claim an exclusive right to use them or deny its user by others. Since no arguments were advanced on this subject after the closure of the arguments and pending the decision, we had directed the parties to give their written submissions on the point. The submissions G sent by them disclosed a wide conflict which would have necessitated further oral arguments. Since we are of the view that the present matter can be decided without going into the controversy on the subject, we keep the point open for decision in an appropriate case. We will presume that in the present case the dispute is with regard to the use of electro-magnetic H waves of frequencies lower than 3000 giga-cycles per second which are
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,. · MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL (SAWANT, J.]
1085
propagated in space without artificial guide. The first proviso to Section 4(1) states that the Central Government may grant licence on such conditions and in consideration of such payment as it thinks fit, to any person, to establish, maintain or work a telegraph within any part of India. We are not concerned here with the permission to establish or maintain a telegraph because in the present case the permission is sought only for operating a telegraph and that too for a limited time and for a limited and specified purpose. The purpose again is non-commercial. It is to relay the specific number of cricket matches. It is only incidentally that the CAB will earn some revenue by selling its right to relay the matches organised by it. The CAB is obviously not a business or a commercial organisation nor can it be said that it is organising matches for earning profits as a business proposition. As will be pointed out later, it is a sporting organisation devoted to the cause of cricket and has been organising cricket matches both of internal and international cricket teams for the benefit of the sport, the cricketeers, the sportsmen present and prospective and of the viewers of the matches. The restrictions and conditions that the Central Government is authorised to place under s.4(1) while permitting non-wireless telegraphing can, as stated earlier, only be those which are warranted by the purposes mentioned in Article 19 (2) and none else. It is not and cannot be the case of the Government that by granting the permission in question, the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign State, public order, decency or morality or either of them will be in jeopardy or that the permission will lead to the contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. On the other hand, the arguments advanced are specious and with· them we will deal a little later.
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14. It is then necessary to understand the nature of the respondent organisation, namely, CAB. It cannot be disputed that the BCCI is a non-profit making organisation which controls officially organised game of cricket in India. Similarly, Cricket Association of Bengal (CAB) is also non-profit making organisation which controls officially organised game of cricket in the State of West Bengal. The CAB is one of the Founder Members of BCCI. Office bearer and Members of the Working Committees of both BCCI and CAB are all citizens of India. The primary object of both the organisations, amongst others, is to promote the game of cricket, to foster the sprit of sportsmanship and the ideals of Cricket, and
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A to impart education through the media of Cricket, and for achieving the
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said objects, to organised and stage tournaments and matches either with the members of International Cricket Council (ICC) or other organisations. According to CAB, BCCI is perhaps the only sports-organisation in India which earns foreign exchange and is neither controlled by any Governmental agency nor receives any financial assistance or grants, of whatsoever nature. It cannot be disputed further that to arrange any international cricket tournament or series, it is necessary and a condition- precedent, to pay to the participating member countries or teams, a minimum guaranteed amount in foreign exchange and to bear expenses incurred for travelling, boarding, lodging and other daily expenses for the participating cricketeers and the concerned accompanying visiting officials. A huge amount of expenses has also to be incurred for organising the matches. In addition, both BCCI and CAB annually incur large amount of expenses for giving subsidies and grants to its members to maintain, develop and upgrade the infrastructure, to coach and train players and umpires, and to pay to them when the series and matches are played. 15. Against this background, we may now examine the questions {)f law raised by the parties. The contention of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MIB) is that there is a difference between the implications of the right conferred under Article 19(1) (a) upon (i) the broadcaster i.e. the person operating the media, (ii) the person desiring access to the media to project his views including the organiser of an event, (iii) the viewer and (iv) a person seeking uplinking of frequencies so as to telecast signals generated in India to other countries. The contention of CAB that denial of a license to telecast through a media of its choice, based (according to MIB) upon the commercial interests, infringes viewers' right under Article 19(1) (a) is untenable. It is further contended that the commercial interests of the organizer are not protected by Article 19 (l)(a). However, the contention of the CAB results indirectly in such protection being sought by resort to the following steps of reasoning : (a) the Board has a right to commercially exploit the event to the maximum, (b) the viewer has a right to access to the event through the television. Hence the Board has the right to telecast t)irough an appropriate channel and also the right to insist that a private agency, including a foreign agency, should be allowed
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MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL [SA WANT, J.)
1087
all the sanctions and permissions as may be necessary therefor. According to MIB the aforesaid contention is untenable because even if it is assumed that entertainment is a part of free speech, the analogy of the right of the press under article 19(1) (a) vis-a-vis the right under Article 19(1)(g), cannot be extended to the right of sports associations. The basic premise underlying the recognition of the rights of the press under Article 19(1)(a) i5: that the economic strength is vitally necessary to ensure independence of the press, and the even the 'business' elements of a newspaper have to some extent a 'free speech' protection. In other words the commercial element of the press exists to subserve the basic object of the press, namely, free dissemination of news and views which enjoys the protection of free speech. However, free speech element in telecast of sports is incidental. According to the MIB, the primary object o( the telecast by the CAB is to raise funds and hence the activities are essentially of trade. The fact that the profits are deployed for promotion of sports is immaterial for the purpose.
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It is further urged that a broadcaster does not have a right as such to access to the airwaves without a license either for the purposes of telecast or for the purposes of uplinking. Secondly, there is no general right to a license to use airwaves which being a scarce resourcf<, have to be used in a manner that the interests of the largest number are best served. The E paramount interest is that of the vie..yers. The grant of a license does not confer any special right inasmuch as the refusal of a license does not result in the denial of a right to free speech. Lastly, the nature of the electronic media is such· that it necessarily involves the marshalling of the resources for the largest public good. The state monopoly created as a device to use the resource is not per se violative of the right to free speech as long as the F paramount interests of the viewers are subserved and access to the media is governed by the fairness doctrine. According to the MIB, the width of the rights under Article 19(1)(a) has never been considered to be wider than that conferred by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It is also urged that the licensing of frequencies and consequent regulation of G telecast/broadcast would not be a matter covered by Article 19(2). The right to telecast/broadcast has certain inherent limitations imposed by nature, whereas Article 19(2) applies to restrictions imposed by the State. The object of licensing is not to cast restrictions on the expression of ideas, but to regulate and marshall scarce resources to ensure their optimum enjoyment by all including those who are not affluent enough to dominate H
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A the media. It is next urged that the rights of an organiser to use airwaves as a medium to telecast and thereby propagate his views, are distinct from his right to commercially exploit the event. Although it is conceded that an organiser cannot be denied access on impermissible grounds, it is urged B that he cannot further claim a right to use an agency of his choice as a part of his right of free speech. In any event no person can claim to exercise his right under Article 19 (1) (a) in a manner which makes it device for a non-citizen to assert rights which are denied by the Constitution. According to MIB, it is the case of the BCCI that to promote its commercial interest, C it is entitled to demand that the Government grants all the necessary licenses and permissions to any foreign agency of its choice and a refusal to do so would violate Article 19 (l)(a). According to MIB, this is an indirect method to seek protection of Article 19(1) (a) to the non-citizens.
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It is then contended that a free-speech right of a viewer has been recognised as that having a paramount importance by the US Supreme Court and this view is all the more significant in a country like ours. While accepting that the electronic media is undoubtedly the most powerful media of communication both from the perspective of its reach as well as its impact, transcending all barriers including that of illiteracy, it is conE tended that it is very cost-intensive. Unless, therefore, the rights of the viewers are given primacy, it will in practice result in the affluent having the sole right to air their views completely eroding the right of the viewers. The right of viewer can only be safeguarded by the regulatory agency by controlling the frequencies of broadcast as it is otherwise impossible for F viewers to exercise their right to free speech qua the electronic media in any meaningful way.
Lastly, dealing with the contention raised on behalf of the CAB and BCCI that the monopoly conferred upon DD is violative of Article 19(1) (a), while objecting to the contention on the ground that the issue does not arise in the present proceedings and is not raised in the pleadings, it is submitted on behalf of MIB that the principal contentions of the CAB/BCCI are that they are entitled to market their right to telecast event at the highest possible value it may command and if the DD is unwilling to pay as much as the highest bidder, the CAB/BCCI has the right not only to market the event but to demand as of right, all the necessary licences
MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL [SAWANT, J.)
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and permissions for the agency including foreign agency which has purchased its rights. According to MIB these contentions do not raise any free-speech issues, but impinge purely on the right to trade. As far as Article 19(1)(g) concerned, the validity or the monopoly in favour of the Government is beyond question. Secondly, in the present case, the DD did not refuse to telecast the event per se. It is then submitted that the CAB/BCCI are not telecasters. They are only organisers of the events sought to be telecast and when the agency like DD which has access to the largest number of viewers agrees to telecast the events, their right as well as the viewers' right under Article 19(1) (a) is satisfied. No organiser, it is contended, can insist that his event be telecast on terms dictated by him and refusal to agree to his term constitutes, breach of his right under Article 19(1)(a). If it is accepted that the Government has not only the right but the duty to regulate the distribution of frequencies, then the only way it can be done is by creating a monopoly. A mere creation· of the monopoly-agency to telecast does not per se violate Article 19 (1) (a) as long as the access is not denied to the media either absolutely or by imposition of term~ which are unreasonable. Article 19(1) (a) proscribes monopoly in ideas and as long as this is not done, the mere fact that the access to the media is through the Government-controlled agency, is not per se violative of Article 19 (l)(a). It is further urged that no material has been placed before the Court to show that the functioning of the DD is such as to deny generally, an access to the media and the control exercised by the Government is in substance over the content on the grounds other than those specified in Article 19(2) or a general permission to all who seek frequencies to telecast, would better subserve the principle underlying Article 19(1) (a) in the socio-economic scenario of this country and will not result in passing the control of the media from the Government to private agencies affluent enough to buy access.
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16. As against these contentions of the MIB, it is urged on behalf of CAB and BCCI as follows :
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The right to organise a sports event inheres in the entity to G which the right belongs and that entity in. this case is the BCCI and its members which include the CAB. The right to produce event µicludes the right to deal with such event in all manner and mode which the entity chooses. This includes the right to telecast or not to telecast the event, and by or through whom, and on what . H
1090
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terms and conditions, No other entity, not even a department of the Government can coerce or influence this decision or. obstruct the same except on reasonable grounds mentioned under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. In the event the entity chooses to televise its own events, the terms and conditions for televising such events are to be negotiated by it with any party with whom it wishes to negotiate. There is no law, bye-law, rule or regulation to regulate the conduct of the BCCI or CAB in this behalf. In the event, BCCI chooses to enter into an agreement with an agency having necessary expertise and infrastructure to produce signals, and transmit and televise the event to the quality that BCCl/CAB desires, the terms and conditions to be negotiated with such an entity, are the exclusive privilege of BCCl/CAB. No department of the Government and least of all, the MIB or DD is concerned with the same and can deny the BCCI or CAB same, the benefit of such right or claim, much less, can the MIB or DD can insist that such negotiation and finalisation only be done with it or not otherwise. In the event the BCCI or CAB wishes to have the event televised outside India, what is required is that the required cameras and equipments in the field send signals to the earth station which in turn transmits the same to the appointed satellite. From the satellite, the picture is beamed back which can be viewed live by any person who has a TV set and has appropriate access to receive footprints within. the beaming zone. In such case DD or the Ministry of Communications is not to provide any assistance either in the form of equipments or personnel or for that matter, in granting uplinking facility for televising the event.
It is further that the right to disseminate information is a part of the fundamental right to freedom of expression. BCCI/CAB have the fundamental right to televise the game of cricket organised and conducted by them for the benefit of public at large and in particular citizens of India who are either interested in cricket or desire to be educated and/or entertained. The said right is subject only to the regulations and restrictions as provide by Article 19(2) of the Constitution. At no other stage either the DD or MIB stated that reasonable restrictions as enumerated in Article 19(2) are being sought to be imposed apart from the fact that such plea could not have been taken by them in the case of telecasting sports events like cricket matches. It is urged that
MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL [SAWANT,J.]
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the sole ground on which DD/MIB is seeking to obstruct and/or refuse the A said fundamental right is that the DD· has the exclusive privilege and monopoly to broadcast such an event and that unless the event is produced, transmitted and telecast either by DD itself or in coilaboration with it on its own terms and conditions and after taking signal from it on the terms and conditions it may impose, the event cannot be permitted to be produced, transmitted and telecast at all by anybody else. It is also urged that there is no exclusive privilege or monopoly in relation to production, transmission or telecasting and such an exclusivity or monopoly, if claimed, is violative of Article 19(1) (a).
The BCCI and CAB have a right under Article 19 (1) (a) to produce, C transmit, telecast and broadcast their event directly or through its agent. The right to circulate information is a part of the right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). Even otherwise, the viewers and persons interested in sports by way of education, information, record and entertainment have a right to such information, knowledge and entertainment. The content of D the right under Article 19 (1) (a) reaches out to protect the information of the viewers also. In the present case, there is a right of the viewers and also the right of the producer to telecast the event and in view of these two rights, there is an obligation on the part of the Department of Telecommunication to allow the telecasting of the event.
E It is then contended that the grant of a licence under section 4 of the
Act is a regulatory measure and does not entitle MIB either to deny a license to BCCl/CAB for the purposes of production, transmission and telecasting sports events or to impose any condition unrelated to Arti~le 19(2). If such denial or imposition is made, it would amount to proluoition. Hence the MIB is obliged and duty-bound in law to grant licence against payment of fees related to and calculated on the basis of user of time only, as has been standardized and not otherwise. Any other method applied by MIB/DD would be violative of Article 19 (l)(a). The grant of license under section 4 of the Act has thus to be harmohiously read with the right of the citizen under Article 19 (l)(a). The Constitution does not visualize any monopoly in Article 19(1) (a). Hence DD cannot claim the same nor can the commercial interest of DD or claim of exclusivity by it of generation of signals be a ground for declaring permission under section 4 of the Act. Hence the following restrictions sought to be imposed fall outside the ambit of Article 19(2) and are unconstitutional. The restrictions are:
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(a) That unless BCCI or CAB televises the matches in collaboration with DD, a license shall not be granted. · (b) The DD alone will be the host broadcaster of the signals and. BCCl/CAB .or its agency must take the signal from DD alone and
(c) Unless the BCCI or CAB accepts the terms and conditions imposed by DD, the production of signal and transmission and telecast thereof shall not be permitted.
It is further contended that there is no monopoly in relation to what viewer must today view and the American decision relied upon on behalf C of MIB have no bearing on the present state of affairs, Satellite can beam directly on to television sales through dish antenna, all programmes whose ·footprints are receivable in the country. Further, any one can record a programme in India and then telecast it by sending the cassette out as is being done in the case of several private TV channels. Various foreign news D organizations such as the BBC and the CNN record directly Indian events and then transmit their own signals after a while to be telecast by their organizations.
Further, the non-availability of channel is of no consequence in the present days of technological development. Any person intending to E telecast/broadcast an event can do so directly even without routing signal through the channels of DD or MIB. What is required to ensure is that ·secured channel are not interfered with or overlapped. On account of the availability of innumerable satellites in the Geo-Stationary Orbit of the Hemisphere, the signals can directly be uplinked through any of the p available transponders of satellite whose footprint can be received back through appropriate electronic device. As a matter of fact, beaming zone of only 3 satellites parked 3000 Kms. above the surface of the earth can cover the entire Hemisphere. Moreover, due to technological developments, frequency is becoming thinner and thinner and as a result, availability of frequencies has increased enormously and at present there G are millions of frequencies available. In order to ensure that none of the footprints of any satellite overlaps the footprint of other satellite, each and every satellite is parked at a different degree and angle. Hence, there is no resorce crunch or in-built restriction on the availability of electronic media, as contended by MIB. In this connection it is also pointed out that H there is a difference in the right spelt out by Article 19 (1) (a) of our
the
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MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL (SAWANT, J.]
1093
Constitution and that spelt out by the First Amendment of the American Constitution. It is also contended that in no other country the right to televise or broadcast is in the exclusive domain of any particular body. In this connection, a reference is mode to various instances in other countries where the host broadcaster has been other than the domestic network, which instances are not controverted. It is also urged that there is no policy of the Government of India as urged on behalf of the MIB that telecasting of sporting events would be within the exclusive domain and purview of DD/MIB who alone would market their rights to other authorities in whole or in part. It is pointed out that the extract from the minutes of the meeting of the Committee of Secretaries held on 12th November, 1993 relied upon by the MIB for the purpose is not a proof of such policy. The said minutes are 'executive decision' of a few secretaries of the various departments of the Government.
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It is also urged that even public interest or interest of general public cannot be a ground for refusal or for the imposition of restrictions or for claiming exclusivity in any manner whatsoever. Such restriction, if imposed will be violative of Article 19(1)(a). To suggest that power to grant a license,, shall not be exercised under any circumstances because of the policy of the Government, is arbitrary inasmuch as the power conferred is not being E used for the purpose for which it has been conferred. It is then contended that both BCCI and CAB are non-profit making organizations and their sole object is to promote the game of cricket in this country and for that purpose not only proper and adequate infrastructures are required to be erected, build and maintained, but also huge expenses have to be incurred to improve the game which includes, amongst others, grant of subsidies and grants tO the Member Associations, upgradation of infrastructure, training of cricketeers from school level, payments to the cricketeers, insurance and benevolent funds for the cricketeers, training of umpires, payments of foreign participants, including guarantee money etc. The quantum of amount to be spent for all these purposes has increased during the course of time. These expenses are met from the amounts earned by the BCCI and CAB since they have no other continuous source of income. The earnings of BCCI and CAB are basically from arranging various tournaments, in stadia advertisements and licence fee for permit-
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(1995) 1 S.C.R.
A ting telecast and censorship. At least 70 per cent of the income earned through the advertisements 'and generated by the TV network while telecasting of the matches, is paid to the organizer apart from the minimum guaranteed money as is apparent from the various agreements entered by and between BCCl/CAB as well as DD with other networks. The DD in B effect desires to snatch away the right of telecast for its own commercial interest through advertisement, and at the same time also demand money from the organizers as and by way of production fee. Merely because an organization may earn profit from an activity whose character is predominantly covered under Article 19(1) (a), it would C not convert the activity into one involving Article 19(1)(g). The test of predominant character of the activity has to be applied. It has also to be ascertained as to who is the person who is utilizing the activity. If a businessman were to put in an advertisement for simpliciter commercial activity, it may render the activity, the one covered by Article 19 (1) (g). D But even newspapers or a film telecast or sports event telecast will be protected by Article 19 (1) (a) and will not become an activity under Article 19(1)(a) merely because it earns money from advertisements in the process. Similarly, if the cricket match is telecast and profit is earned by the licensing of telecasting right and receipts from advertisements, it will be an essential element for utilization and fulfillment of its object. The said E object cannot be achieved without such revenue.
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Rebutting the argument that the organisation of sports is an industry and, therefore, monopoly under Article 19(6) is permissible, it is pointed ' out that even if, in matters relating to business and profession, the State F can' create'monopoly'under Article 19 (6), it can still not infringe Article ' 19(1)(a), while the State may monopolise the textile industry, it cannot prohibit the publication of books and articles on textiles. . .
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It is also contended that the exercise of right claimed in the present case is by BCCI/CAB and its office bearers who are citizens of India. G ·Merely because foreign equipment and technical and personnel are used as Collaborators to exercise".the said right more effectively, it does not dilute the'·co~tent of Article 'i9 (1) (a) nor does it become an exercise of riglit'bla'n.oi:J.':.citi.Ze'ns:'fu this connection, it is emphasised that the DD is ~so7iisiiigWorldtel, a foreign agency. Most of the newspapers in India are H printed on machines imported from aboard. A newspaper may also have:a.,
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I MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKEI' ASSN. OF BENGAL (SAWANT, J.)
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foreigner as its manager. However, that does not take away the right of the A newspaper under Article 19 (1) (a). They are only instances of technical collaboration. Apart from its, every citizen has a right to information as the same cannot be taken away on grounds urged by the MIB. 17. It will be apparent from the contentions advanced on behalf of MIB that their main thrust is that the right claimed by the BCCl/CAB is not the right of freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a), but a commercial right or the right to trade under Article 19(1) (g). The contention is based mainly on two grounds viz., there is no free speech element in the telecast of sports and secondly, the primary object of the BCCI/CAB in seeking to telecast the cricket matches is not to educate and entertain the viewer but to make money.
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It. can hardly be denied that sport is an expression of self. In an athletic or individual event, the individual expresses himself through his individual feat. In a team event such as cricket, football, hockey etc., there D is both individual and collective expression. It may be true that what is protected by Article 19 (1) (a) is an expression of t~ought and feeling and not of the physical or intellectual process or skill. It is also true that a person desiring to telecast sports events when he is not himself a participant in the game, does not seek to exercise his right of self expression. However, the right to freedom of spe~ch and expression also includes the E right to educate, to inform and to entertain and also the right to be educated, informed and entertained. The former is the right of the telecaster and the latter of the viewers. The right to telecast sporting event will therefore also mclude the right to educate and inform the present and the prospective sportsmen interested in the particular game and also to F inform and entertain the lovers of the game. Hence, when a telecaster desires to telecast a sporting event, it is incorrect to say that the free speech element is absent from his right. The degree of the element will depend upon the character of the telecaster who claims the right. An organiser such as the BCCI or CAB in the present case which are indisputably devoted to the promotion of the game of cricket, can9ot be placed in the G same scale as the business organisations whose only intention is to make as large a profit as can be made by telecasting the game. Whereas it can be said that there is hardly any free speech element in the right to telecast when it is asserted by the latter, it will be a warped and cussed view to take when the former claim the same right, and contend that in claiming the H
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A right to telecast the 'cricket matches organised by them, they are asserting . the right to make business out of it. The sporting organisations such as BCCl/CAB which are interested in promoting the sport or sports are under I an obligation to organise the sports events and can legitimately be accused of failing in their duty to do so. The promotion of sports also includes its B popularization through all legitimate means. For this purpose, they are duty bound to select the best means and methods to reach the maximum number of listeners and viewers. Since at present, radio and TV are the most efficacious methods, thanks to the technological development, the sports organisations like BCCl/CAB Will be neglecting their duty in not exploring the said media and in not employing the best means available to them to C popularise the game. That while pursuing their objective of popularising the sports by electing the best available means of doing so, they incidentally earn some revenue, will not convert either them into commercial organisations or the right claimed by them to explore the said means, · into a commercial right or interest. It must further be remembered that sporting · D organisations such as BCCl/CAB in the present case, have not been established only to organise the sports events or to broadcast or telecast them. The organisation of sporting events is only a part of their various objects, as pointed out earlier and even when they organise the events, they are primarily to educate the sportsmen, to promote and popularise the sports and also to inform and entertain the viewers. The organisation of E such events involves huge cosfs. Whether surplus is left after defraying all the expenses, is ploughed back by them in the organisation itself. It will be taking a deliberately distorted view of the right claimed by such organisations to telecast the sporting event to call it an assertion of a commercial right. Yet the MIB has chosen to advance such contention which ean only ,,.P be described as most unfortunate. It is needless to state that we are, in the circumstances, unable to accept the ill-advised argument. It does no credit to the Ministry or to the Government as a whole to denigrate the sporting organisations such as ·BCCI/CAB by placing them on par with business organisations sponsoring sporting events for profit and the access claimed by them to telecasting as assertion of commercial interest.
The second contention of MIB is based upon the propositions laid down by the US Supreme Court, viz., there are inherent limitations imposed .on the right to telecast/broadcast as there is scarcity of resou~ces, i.e.. of frequencies,· and therefore the need to use them in the interest of H the largest number. There is also a pervasive presence of electronic media
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MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL (SAWANT, J.)
1097
such as TV. It has a greater impact on the minds of the people of all ages A and strata of the society necessitating the prerequisite of licensing of the programmes. It is also contended on that account that the licensing of frequencies and consequent regulation of telecasting/broadcasting would not be a matter governed by Article 19 (2). Where as Article 19(2) applies to restrictions imposed by the State, the inherent limitations on the right B to telecast/broadcast are imposed by nature.
1'
In the first instance, it must be remembered that all the decisions of the US Supreme Court relied upon in support of this contention, are on the right of the private broadcasters to establish their own broadcasting stations by claiming a share in or access to the airwaves or frequencies. In C the United States, there is no Central Government-owned or controlled broadcasting centre. There is only a Federal Commission to regulate broadcasting stations which are all owned by private broadcasters. Secondly, the American Constitution does not explicitly state the restrictions on the right of freedom of speech and expression as our Constitution does. D Hence, the decisions in question have done on more than impliedly reading such restrictions. The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, therefore, in the context of the right claimed by the private broadcasters are irrelevant for our present purpose. In the present case what is claimed is a right to an access to telecasting specific events for a limited duration and during limited hours of the day. There is no demand for owning or controlling a E frequency. Secondly, unlike in the cases in the US which came for consideration before the US Supreme Court, the right to share in the frequency is not claimed without a license. Thirdly, the right to use a frequency for a limited duration is not claimed by a business organisation to make profit and lastly and this is an important aspect of the present case, to F which no reply has been given by the MIB, there is no claim to any frequency owned and controlled by the Government. What is claimed is permission to uplink the signal created by the organiser of the events to a foreign satellite. There is no doubt that since the airwaves/frequencies are a public G property and are also limited, they have to be used in the best interest of the society and this can be done either by a central authority by establishing its own broadcasting network or regulating the grant of licences to other agencies, including the private agencies. What is further, the electronic media is the most powerful media both because of its audio-visual impact, H
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A and its widest reach covering the section of the society whether the print
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.media does not reach. The right to use the airwaves and the co.ntent of the programmes, therefore, needs regulation for balancing it and as well as to prevent monopoly of information and views relayed, which is a potential danger flowing from the concentration of the right to broadcast/telecast in the hands either of a central agency or of few private affluent broadcasters. That is why the need to have a central agency representative of all sections of the societY free from control both of the Government and the dominant influential sections of the socif,!ty. This is not disputed. But to contend that on that account the restrictions to be imposed on the right under Article 19 (l)(a) should be in addition to those permissible under Article 19 (2) and dictated by the use of public resources in the best interests of the society at large, is to misconceive both the content of the freedom.of speech and expression and the problems posed by the element of public property in, and the alleged scarcity of, the frequencies as well as by the wider reach of the media. If the right to freedom of speech and expression includes the right to disseminate information to as wide a section of the population as is possible, the access which enable the right to be so exercised is also an integral part of the said right. The wider range of circulation of information or its greater impact cannot restrict the content of the right nor can it justify its denial. The virtues of the electronic media cannot become its enemies. It may warrant a greater regulation over licensing and control and vigilance on the content of the programme telecast.. However, this control can only be exercised within the framework of Article 19 (2) and the dictates of public interests. To plead for other grounds is to plead for unconstitutional measures. It is further difficult to appreciate such contention on the part of the Government in this country when they have a complete control over the fre9uencies and the content of the programme to be telecast. They control the sole agency of telecasting. They are also armed with the provisions of Article 19(2) and the powers of pre-censorship under the Cinematograph Act and Rules. The only limitations on the said right is, therefore, the limitation of resources and, the need to use them for the benefit of all. When, however, there are surplus or unlimited resources and the public interests so demand or in any case do not prevent telecasting, the validity of the argument based on limitation of resources disappears. It is true that to own a frequency for the purposes of broadc:aSting is a costly affair and even when there are surplus or unlimited frequencies, only the affluent few will own them and will be in a position
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MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL [SAWANT,J.]
1()99
to use it to subserve their own interest by manipulating news and views. A That also poses a danger to the freedom of speech and expression of the have-nots by denying them the truthful information on all sides of an issue which is so necessary to form a sound view on any subject. That is why the doctrine of fairness which is evolved in the U.S. in the context of the private broadcasters licensed to share the limited frequencies with the central B agency like the FCC to regulate the prograinming. But this phenomenon occurs even in the case of the print media of all the countries. Hence the body like the Press Council of India which is empowered to enforce, however imperfectly, the right to reply. The print media further enjoys as in our country, freedom from pre-censorship unlike the electronic media.
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As stated earlier, we are not concerned in the present case with lhe right of the private broadcasters, but only with the limited right for telecasting particular cricket matches for particular hours of the day and for a particular period. It is not suggested that the said right is objectionable on any of the grounds mentioned in Article 19 (2) or is against the proper use D of the public resources. The only objection taken against the refusal to grant the said right is that of the limited resources. That abjection is completely misplaced in the present case since the claim is not made on any of the frequencies owned, controlled and utilised by the DD. The right claimed is for uplinking the signal generated by the .BCCl/CAB to a satellite owned by another agency. The objection, therefore, is devoid of E any merit and untenable in law. It< also displays a deliberate obdurate approach. The thifd contention advanced on behalf of the MIB is only an extended aspect of the first contention. It is based on the same distorted p interpretation of the right claimed. It proceeds on the footing that the BCCl/CAB is claiming a commercial right to exploit ·the sporting event when they assert that they have a right to telecast the event through an agency of their choice. It is even contended on behalf of the MIB that this amounts to a device for a non-citizen to assert rights under Article 19(1) (a) which are not available to him. It is unnecessary to repeat what we have stated while dealing with the first contention earlier, with regard to the character of BCCI/CAB, the nature of and the purpose for which the right to access to telecast is claimed by them. As pointed out is not possible to hold that what the
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A BCCl/CAB are in the present cast claiming is commercial right to exploit
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the event unless one takes a perverse view of the matter.. The extent of perversity is apparent from the contention raised by them that to engage a foreign agency for the purpose is to make' it a device for a non-~itizen to assert his rights under Article 19(1)(a). It cannot be denied that the right I to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) includes the right to disseminate information by the best possible method through an agency of one's choice so long as the engagement of such agency is not in contravention of Article 19(2) of the Constitution and does not amount to improper or unwarranted use of the frequencies. Hence the choice of BCCI/CAB of a foreign agency to telecast the matches, cannot be objected to. There is no suggestion in the present case that the engagement of the foreign agency by the BCCI/CAB is violative of the provisions of Article 19(2). On the other hand, the case of MIB, as pointed out earlier, is that the BCCI/CAB want to engage the foreign agency to maximise its revenue and hence they are not exercisi£g their right under Article 19(1) (a) but their commercial right under Article 19(1) (g). We have pointed out that argument is not factually correct and what 'in fact that BCCI/CAB is asserting is a right under Article 19(1)(a). While asserting the said right, it is incidentally going to earn some revenue. In the circumstances, it has the right to choose the best method to earn the maximum revenue possible. In fact, it can be accused of negligence and may be attributed improper motives, if it fails to explore the most profitable avenue of telecasting the event, when in any case, in achieving the object of promoting and popularising the sports, it has to endeavour to telecast the cricket matches. The record shows that all applications were made and purported to have been made to the various agencies on behalf of CAB for the necessary licences and permissions. All other Ministries and Departments understood them as such and granted the necessary permission and licences. Hence, by granting such permission, the Government was not in fact granting permission to the foreign agency to exercise its right under Article 19(1)(a). If, further, that was the only objection in granting permission, a positive approach on the part of the MIB could have made it clear in the permission granted that it was being given to CAB. In fact, when all other Government Departments had no difficulty in construing the application to that effect and granting the necessary sanctions/permissions at th~ir end, it is difficult to understand the position taken by the MIB in that behalf. One wishes that such a contention was not advanced.
r MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL [SAWANT, J.)
1101
The fourth contention is that, as held by the US Supreme Court, the A freedom of speech has to be viewed also as a right of the viewers. which has a paramount importance, and the said view has significance in a country like ours. To safeguard the rights of the viewers in this country, it is necessary to regulate and restrict the right to access to telecasting. There cannot be any dispute with this proposition. We have in fact referred to B this right of the viewers in another context earlier. True democracy cannot exist unless all citizens have a right to participate in the affairs of the polity of the country. The right to participate in the affairs of the country is meaningless unless the citizens are well informed on all sides of the issues, in respect of which they are called upon to express their views. One-sided information, disinformation, misinformation and non-information all equal- C ly create an uninformed citizenry which makes democracy a farce when medium of information is monopolised either by a partisan central authority or by private individuals or oligarchic organisations. This is particularly so in a country like ours where about 65 per cent of the population is illiterate and hardly 1-1/2 per cent of the population has an D access to the print media which is not subject to pre-censorship. When, therefore, the electronic media is controlled by one central agency or few private agencies of the rich, there is a need to have a central agency, as stated earlier, representing all sections of the society. Hence to have a representative central agency to ensure the viewers' right to be informed E adequately and truthfully is a part of the right of the viewers under Article 19(1)(a). We are, however, unable to appreciate this contention in the present context since the viewers' rights are not at all affected by the BCCl/CAB, by claiming a right to telecast the cricket matches. On the other hand, the facts on record show that their rights would very much be trampled if the cricket matches are not telecast through the D.D., which F has the monopoly of the national telecasting network. Although, there is no statistical data available (and this is not a deficiency felt only in this arena), it cannot be denied that a vast section of the people in this country is interested in viewing the cricket matches. The game of cricket is by far the most popular in all parts of the country. This is evident from over-flow- G ing stadia at the venues wherever the matches are played and they are played all over the country. It will not be an exaggeration to say that at least one in three persons, if not more, is interested in viewing the cricket matches. Almost all television sets are switched on to view the matches. Those who do not have a T.V. set of their own, crowd around T.V. sets of . H
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A other when the matches are on. This is not to mention the number of
transistors and radios which are on during the match-hours. In the face of these revealing facts, it is difficult to understand why the present contention with regard to the viewers' right is raised in. this case when the grant of access to BCCl/CAB to telecast cricket matches was in the interest of the viewers and would have also contributed to promote their rights as well.
The last argument on behalf of the MIB is that since in the present case, the DD has not refused to telecast the event, its monopoly to telecast cannot be challenged and in fact no such contention was raised by the BCCl/CAB. We are afraid that this will not, be a proper reading of the C contentions raised by BCCl/CAB in their pleadings both before the High Court and this Court. Undisputed facts on record show that the DD claimed exclusive right to create host broadcasting signal and to telecast it on the terms and conditions stipulated by it or not at all. MIB even refused to grant uplinking facilities when the terrestrial signal was being creating D by the CAB with their own apparatus, i.e., the apparatus of the agency which they had engaged and when the use of any of the frequencies owned, controlled or commanded by DD or the Government, was not involved. Since BCCI/CAB were the organisers of the events, they had every right to create terrestrial signals of their event and to sell it to whomsoever they thought best so long as such creation of the signal and the sale thereof was E not violative of any law made under Article 19 (2) and was not an abuse of the frequencies which are a public property. Neither DD nor any other agency could impose their terms for creating signal or for telecasting them unless it was sought through their frequencies. When the DD refused to telecast cricket matches except on their terms, the BCCl/CAB turned to F another agency, in the present case a foreign agency, for creating the terrestrial signal and telecasting it through the frequencies belonging to that agency. When the DD refused to telecast the matches, the rights of the viewers to view the matches were in jeopardy. Only the viewers in this country who could receive foreign frequencies on their TV sets, could have viewed the said matches. Hence it is not correct to say that the DD had G not refused to telecast the events. To insist on telecasting events only on one's unreasonable terms and conditions and not otherwise when one has the monopoly of telecasting, is nothing but refusal to telecast the same. The DD could not do it except for reasons of non- availability of frequencies or for grounds available under Article 19(2) of the Constitution or for H considerations of public interest involved in the use of the frequ~ncies as
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MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL (SAWAl'<"T, J.]
1103
public property. The fact that the DD was prepared to telecast the events A only on its terms shows that the frequency was available. Hence, scarcity of frequencies or public interests cannot be pressed as grounds for refusing to telecast.or denying access to BCCl/CAB to telecasting. Nor can the DD. plead encroachment on the right of viewers as a ground since the telecasting of events on the terms of the DD cannot alone be said to safeguard the B right of viewers in such a case and i~ fact it was not so. 18. Coming to the facts of the present case, which have given rise to the present proceedings, the version of MIB is as follows : On March 15, 1993, the CAB wrote a letter to the Director General C of Doordarshan that a Six-Nation International Cricket Tournament will be held in November, 1993 as a part of its Diamond Jubilee Celebrations and asked DD to send a detailed offer for any of the two alternatives, namely, (i) that DD would create 'Host Broadcaster Signal' and also undertake live telecast of all the matches in the tournament or (ii) any other D party may create the 'Host Broadcaster Signal' and DD would only purchase the rights to telecast in India. CAB in particular emphasised that in either case, the foreign T.V. rights would be with CAB. The CAB also asked DD to indicate the royalty amount that would be paid by the DD. On March 18, 1993 the Controller of Programmes {Sp~rts), DD, replied to the letter stating amongst other things that during the meeting and E during the telephonic conversation, fAB's President Dalmia had agreed to send them in writing the amount that he expected as rights fee payable to CAB exclusively for India, without the Star TV getting it. On March 19, 1993, CAB informed DD that they would be agreeable to DD creating the Host Broadcaster Signal and also granting DD exclusive right for India F without the Star TV getting it and the CAB would charge DD US $800,000 {US Dollars eight lakh) for only the same. The CAB, however, made it clear that they would reserve the right to sell/license the right world wide, excluding India and Star TV. The CAB also stated that DD '!\'Ould be under an obligation to .provide a picture and commentary subject to payment of DD's technical fees. On March 31, 1993, DD sent its bid as 'Host .G Broadcaster' for a sum of Rs. 1 crore stating inter alia, that CAB should grant signals to it exclusively for India without the Star TV getting it. The DD also stated that they would be in a position to create the 'Host Broadcaster Signal' and offer a live telecast of all the matches in the tournament. Thereafter, on May 4, 1993, the DD by a fax message .H
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A reminded the President of CAB about its offer of March 31, 1993. To that CAB replied on May 12, 1993 that as the Committee of CAB had decided to sell/allot worldwide TV rights to one party, they would like to know whether DD would be interested in the deal and, if so, to send their offer for worldwide TV rights latest by May 17, 1993, on the following basis, B namely, outright purchase of TV rights and sharing of rights fee. On May 14, 1993 DD by its fax addressed to CAB stated that it was committed to its earlier bid of Rs.I crore, namely, exclusive TV right in India alone. The DD also stated that as there was a speculation that Pakistan may not participate in the tournament, which may affect viewership and consequent commercial accruals. DD would have to rethink on the said bid also, in C such an eventuality and requested CAB to reply to the said letter at the earliest. On June 14, 1993, according to the MIB, without obtaining the required clearances from the Government for telecasting, the CAB entered D into an agreement with the World Production Establishment (WPE) representing the interests of TWI (Trans World International), telecasting all the matches. The said agreement provided for grant of sole and exclusive . right to selVlicence or otherwise exploit throughout the world 'Exhibition Rights' in the tournament. CAB shall only retain radio rights for the territory of India. The CAB under the agreement was to receive not less E than US $550,000 as guaranteed sum. If any income from the rights· fee is received in excess of the guaranteed sum, it was to be retained wholly by WPE until it was eventually split into 70:30 per cent as per the agreement. If the rights fee/income received was less than guaranteed sum, WPE was to pay the difference to CAB. The WPE was to pay, where possible, F television license fee in advance of the start of the tournament. On June 18, 1993, DD sent a fax to CAB stating therein that from the press reports, it had learnt that CAB had entered into an agreement with TWI for the TV coverage of the tournament, and the DD had decided not to telecast the matches of the tournament by paying TWI, and that DD G was not prepared to enter into any negotiations with TWI to obtain the television rights for the event. On June 30, 1993, DD also informed similarly International Management Group, Hong Kong. On september 2, 1993, the Department of Youth Affairs and Spor~s,
H Ministry of Human Resources Development, addressed a letter to the CAB
--"'-' MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL (SA WANT, J.]
>
1105
informing it that the Government has no objection to the proposed visit of A the Cricket Teams of Pakistan, South Africa, Sri Lanka, West Indies and Zimbabwe, to India for participation in the tournament. The Department further stated that no foreign national shall visit any restricted/protected/ prohibited area of India without permission from the Ministry of Home Affairs. It was also clarified that the sanction of foreign exchange was B subject to the condition that CAB would utilize only the minimum foreign exchange required for the purpose and shall deposit foreign exchange obtained by it by way of fee, sponsorship, advertisements, broadcasting rights, etc. through normal banking channels under intimation to the Reserve Bank of India. On September 17, 1993 on the application of CAB made on September 7, 1993, VSNL advised CAB to approach the respec- C tive Ministries and the Telecom Commission for approval (a) regarding import of earth station and transmission equipment and (b) for frequency clearance from Telecom Commission. The Satellite to be used for the transmission coverage, was also required to be specified. It was further stated that CAB should approach VSNL for uplinking signal to INTEL- D SAT at Washington. The TWI was advised to apply VSNL for necessary coordination channels, and DD phone facility covering each location. On October 9, 1993, TWI wrote to VSNL seeking frequency clearance from the Ministry of Communications. The TWI informed VSNL that they will be covering the tournament and that they were formally applying for its permission to uplink their signal as per the list attached to the letter. They E also sought frequency clearance for the walkie- talkie. On October 13, 1993, the Ministry of Home Affairs informed the CAB that the Ministry had 'no objection' to the filming of the cricket matches at any of the places mentioned in the CAB's letter and that the 'no objection' pertains to the filming of the matches on the cricket grounds only. The Ministry also gave F its 'no objection' to the use of walkie-talkie sets in the play grounds during the matches subject to the permission to be obtained from WPC. On October 18, 1993, the CAB addressed a letter to DD for telecasting matches mentioning its earlier offer of rights for telecasting and pointed out that the offer of Rs. 10 million made by DD vide its fax message dated March 31, 1993 and on the condition the CAB sh,lUld not grant any right to Star TV was uneconomical, and considering the enormous organizational cost, they were looking for a minimum offer of Rs. 20 million. The CAB also pointed out that the offers received by them from abroad including from TWI, wer~ much higher than Rs. 20 million and that the payment.
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A under the offers would be made in foreign exchange. The CAB also stated · that they were given to understand that DD was not interested in increasing their offer and hence they entered into a contract with TWI for telecasting the matches. However, they were still keen that DD should come forward to telecast the matches since otherwise people in India would be deprived of viewing the same. Hence they had made TWI agree to co-production B with DD and they also prayed the DD for such co- production. The CAB's letter further stated that during a joint meeting the details were worked out including the supply of equipment list by the respective parties, and it was decided in principle to go for a joint production. The CAB stated that it was also agreed that DD would not claim ~xclusive right and CAB would C be at liberty to sell the rights to Star TV. Thereafter CAB learnt from newspaper reports that DD had decided not to telecast the matches. Hence they had written a letter to DD dated September 15, 1993 to confirm the authenticity of such news, but they had not received any reply from DD. It was pointed that in the meanwhile they had been repeatedly approached D by Star TV, Sky TV and other network to telecast matches to the Indian audience and some of them on an exclusive basis. But they had not taken a decision on their offers, since they did not want to deprive DD's viewers. It was further recorded that the CAB had also learnt recently that DD would be interested in acquiring the rights of telecast provided it was ' allowed to produce the matches directly, and the matches produced by' E TWI were made available to it live, without payment of any technical fees. After recording this, the CAB made fresh set of proposals, the gist of which was as follows :
1. TWI and Doordarshan would cover 9 (nine) matches each in the tournament independently, which are as follows: Trans World International November
08 South Africa v. Zimbabwe, (Bangalore) 11 India v. S. Africa, (Delhi - Chandigarh) 13 W. Indies v. S. Africa (Bombay, Brabourne) 16 Pakistan v. S. Africa, (Cuttack) l9 SAfrica v. Sri Lanka (Guwahati) 21 India v. Pakistan, (Chandigarh) 23 First Semi Final (Culcutta)
MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL [SAWANT, J.]
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Second Semi Final (Culcutta) Final (Culcutta) ·
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Doordarshan November
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07 India v. Sri Lanka (Kanpur) 09 W. Indies v. Sri Lanka, (Bombay, Wankhede) 15 Sri Lanka v. Zimbabwe, (Patna) 16 India v. W. Indies (Ahmedabad) 18 India v. Zimbabwe (Indore) 21 W. Indies v. Zimbabwe (Hyderabad)
2. TWI will do the coverage of these matches with their own equipment, crew and commentators. Similarly Doordarshan will also have their own crew, equipmr.nt and commentators for the matches produced by them.
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3. Doordarshan will be at liberty to us~ their own commentators for matches produced by TWI for telecast in India. Similarly, TWI may also use their own commentators if they televised matches produced by Doordarshan in other networks. 4. TWI will allow Doordarshan to pick up the Signal and telecast live within India, free of charges. Similarly, Doordarshan will allow TWI to have the signal for live/recorded/highlights telecast abroad, free of charges.
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5. Doordarshan will not pay access fees to CAB, but shall allow 4 minutes advertising time per hour (i.e. 28 minutes in 7 hours}. The CAB will be at liberty to sell such time slot to the advertisers and the proceeds so received will belong to CAB. 6. Contract will be entered upon by the CAB and Doordarshan directly for the above arrangements. TWI will give a written undertaking for the coverage break-up as mentioned in point 1. 7. Score Card and Graphics shall be arranged by CAB and the expenses for such production or income derived from sponsorship shall be on the account of CAB. Both TWI and Doordarshan will use such.
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Score Cards and Graphics as arranged b~ CAB.
.,.
The CAB requested DD to communicate their final decision in the matter before October 21, 1993.
On October 26, 1993, sent a communication to INTELSAT at Washington seeking information of uplinking timings for TV transmission asked for by CAB/TWI. On October 27, 1993 the Telecommunications Department sent a letter to the Central Board of Excise and Customs on the question of temporarily importing electronic production eqwpment required for transmission of one-day matches of the tournament and C conveying 'no objection' of the Ministry of Communications to the proposal, subject to the organizers coordinating with WPC (DOT) for frequency clearance, from the "Standing Advisory Committee on Frequen' cy Allocation (SACFA)", for TV up-linking from different places and coordinating with VSNL, Bombay for booking TV transponders.
D
On October 27, 1943, DD informed CAB with reference to its renewed offer of October 18, 1993 that the terms and conditions of the offer were not acceptable to it and that they have already intimated to them that DD will not take signal from TWI - a foreign organisation. They also made .it clear that they had not agree to any joint production with TWI. E On October 29, 1993, CAB replied to DD that they were surprised at the outright rejection of the various alternative proposals they had submitted. They had pointed out that the only reason given for rejection was that DD will not take signals from TWI, which was a foreign organization. Since they had also suggested production of live matches by DD the question of F taking signal from TWI did not arise. CAB further stated that purely in deference to DD's sensitivity about taking signal, from TWI, CAB would be quite happy to allowed DD to produce its own picture of matches and DD may like to buy rights and licenses from CAB at a price which will be mutually agreed upon, and that these rights would be on non-exclusive basis on Indian Territory. On October 30, 1993, DD sent a message to CAB G stating that DD will not pay access fee. to CAB to telecast the matches. However, for DD to telecast the matches live, CAB has to pay technical charges/production fee at Rs.5 lakh per match. In that case DD. will have exclusive rights for the signal generated and the parties interested to take the signal will have to negotiate directly with the DD. On October 31, 1993 H DD sent a fax message to CAB to the same effect. ·
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MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL [SAWANT, J.]
1109
On November 1, 1993 VSNL deputed its engineers/staff to be at the A venues where the matches were being played to coordinate with TWI for TV coverage. On November 2, 1993, TWI paid US $29,640 and (Pounds) 121,400 to VSNL as fees. for INTELSAT charges. On the same day, the Finance Ministry permitted the equipment of TWI to be imported on certain conditions by waiving the customs and additional duties of customs. On November 4, 1993, CAB addressed a letter to DD referring to DD's fax message of October 31, 1993 asking for certain clarification on the offer made by DD. In this letter, CAB stated that since DD had asked for fees for production and telecast of matches, it was presumed that all revenue generated from the matches or entire time slot for advertisements, would belong to CAB and that they shall have the right to charge access fees C including other charges from parties abroad, and DD would telecast those matches for which CAB will pay ihe charges. The choice of the matches to be telecast by DD would be determined by CAB. On November 5, 1993, the DD rejected the terms.
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On November 8, 1993, CAB filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court praying, among others, that the respondents should be directed to provide telecast and broadcast of all the matches and also provide all arrangements and facilities for telecasting and broadcasting of the matches by the agency appointed by the CAB, viz., TWI. Interim reliefs were also sought in the said petition. On the same day, the High Court directed the learned advocate of the Union of India to obtain instructions in the matter and in the meanwhile, passed the interim orders making it clear that they would not prevent DD from telecasting any match without affecting the existing arrangements between CAB and TWI. The writ petition was posted for further hearing on November 9, ~993 on which day, the learned Single Judge confirmed the interim orders passed on November 8, 1993 and respondents were restrained from interfering with the frequency lines given to respondents No. 10 (TWI). On 10th November, 1993, VSNL advised INTELSAT at Washington seeking cancellation of its request for booking. On November 11, 1993, the learned Judge partly allowed the writ by directing All India Radio to broadcast matches. On November 12, 1993 in the appeal filed by the Union of India against the aforesaid orders of the Division Bench, the High Court passed interim order to the following effect: (a) that CAB would pay DD a sum of Rs. 5 lakh per match and
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the revenue collected by DD on account of sponsorship will be kept in separate accou.nt. (b) that DD would be the host broadca~ter.
(c) that Ministry of Telecommunication would consider the question of issuing a license to TWI under the Telegraphs Act and decide the same within three days.
On November 12, 1993, the Film Facilities Officer of the MIB informed the Customs Department at New Delhi, Bombay and Calcutta airports, that as TWI had not obtained required clearances from the C Government for the coverage of the tournament, they should not be permitted to remove exposed film outside India till it was cleared by the Government. On the same day, DD asked the CAB providing various facilities at each match venue as this tvas pre-requisite for creating host broadcaster signal in India. CAB sent a reply on the same day and called .D upon the DD to telecast matches within India pursuant to the High Court's order. On the same day again the Collector of Customs, Bombay. called upon CAB to pay customs duty on the equipment as there was a breach in the terms of the exemption order. On the same day, i.e., November 12, again the Committee of E Secretaries decided that the telecast of all sporting events would be within the exclusive purview of the DD/MIB. It was also decided that for the purpose of obtaining necessary clearances for telecasting different types of events for the country, a Single Window service would be followed where the concerned Administrative Ministry would be the 'Nodal' Ministry to F which the application will be submitted and it would thereafter be the function of the 'Nodal' Minist}y to obtain permissions froin the concerned "' Ministry/Agencies. On 14th November, 1993, the High Court in clarification of its order of November 12, 1993 directed, among others, as follows : (a) In case the signal is required to be generated by TWI separately, ·such necessary permission should be given by DD and/or other competent authorities. (b) The differences with regard to the placement of Cameras etc., if
H any, between cricket authority and DD should be mutually worked out, and
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I MIN. OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING v. CRICKET ASSN. OF BENGAL [SAWANT, J.]
1111
if this cannot be done, the dispute should be decided by the Head of the Police in the place whether the match was being played. (c). The equipment of TWI which had been seized by the Custo~s authority should be released upon undertaking that the same would not be used for any other purpose and
A
(d) The VSNL should take proper steps for uplinking, and should not take any steps to defeat the orders of the Court. The TWI should comply with all financial commitments to VSNL. On November 15, 1993, the CAB and another filed the present Writ Petition No. 836 of 1993. On November 15, 1993, this Court passed an order directing the Secretary, Ministry of Communications to hold meeting on the same day by 4.30 P.M. and communicate his decision by 7.30 P.M. The Customs Authorities were directed to release to equipments. On the same day at night another order was passed partly staying the orders of the Chairman, Telecommunications and Secretary, Dot. TWI was per- D mitted to generate its own signals and Customs Authorities were directed to release the goods forthwith.
c
. .t
The DD filed Contempt Petition in the High Court on the same day against CAB and another for non-compliance with the orders of the High Court. The DD also filed the present Special Leave Petitions in this Court on the same day.
E
What emerges from the above correspondence is as follows. The CAB as early as on 15th March, 1993, had offered to the DD two alternatives, viz., either the DD would create host broadcaster signal and undertake live telecast of all the matches in the tournament or any other party F may create the host broadcaster signal and DD would purchase from the said party the rights to telecast the said signal in India. The CAB made it clear that in either case, the foreign TV rights would remain .it. The CAB also asked the DO to indicate the royalty that it will be willing to pay in either case. To that, on 18th March, 1993, the DD rejoined by asking in G turn the amount of royalty that the CAB expected if the rights were given to it exclusively for India without the Star TV getting it. On 19th March, 1993, the CAB informed the DD that they would charge US$8 lakhs for giving the DD the right to create the host broadcaster signal and also for granting it exclusive right for India without the Star TV getting it. It was, however, emphasised that the CAB would reserve the right to sell/license H
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(1995] 1 S.C.R.
A the right of broadcasting worldwide excluding India and the Star TV. The
c
D
CAB also stated that the DD would be under an obligation to provide a picture and commentary subject to payment of DD's technical fees. On 31st March, 1993, the DD sent it:; bid as host broadcaster for a sum of Rs.1 crore (i.e., about US $3.33 lakhs at the then exchan