Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.t.c. Mazdoor Congress

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
4 September 1990
Judge
Justice Sabyasachi Mukherji
Neutral citation
1990 INSC 265
Reported in
[1990] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 142
Result
Dismissed
Acts & sections
Article 14 Constitution, Article 12 Constitution, Article 311 Constitution, Article 21 Constitution, Article 309 Constitution, Article 13 Constitution, Article 141 Constitution
Subject
Service, Labour, Electricity

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DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. D.T.C. MAZDOORCONGRESS SEPTEMBER 4, 1990

[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, CJ., B.C. RAY, LALIT MOHAN SHARMA, P.B. SAWANT AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ.] Service Law: Delhi Road Transport Act, 1950: Section 53/Delhi Road Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952-Regulation 9(b )/Shastri Award-Para 522/ District Board Rules, 1926, Part V-Rule 1(1)/Indian Airlines Employees' Regulations-Regulation JJ/Air India Employees' Regulations-Regulation 48-Validity of-Termination of service of permanent employee without assigning any reasons and holding enquiry-Whether arbitrary, unfair, unjust, unreasonable and opposed to public policyWhether violative of Articles 12, 14, 16, 19, 31 and 311(2) of the Constitution of India, principles of natural justice arrd Section 23 of Contract Act, 1872-Statutory corporations-Power to terminate services of employees without holding enquiry-Validity of. Contract Act, 1872: Section 23-Contract providing for termination of service without notice and holding of enquiry-Whether enforceable. Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 14, 16, 19( l) (g), 21 and 3l1(2)-Termination of service of an employee without assigning reasons and holding enquiry-Whether violative of Fundamental Rights and principles of natural justice-Regulations/Rules-Validity of.

Article 141: Expressions "declared" and "found or made"-Scope and ambit of.

' Interpretation of Statutes: Internal aid to construction-Doctrine of reading down-Scope and Applicability of-Provision illegal and invalid-Whether could be validated by reading down-Where provision clear and unambiguous-Whether permissible to read down into the provision something which was not intended.

Public Policy vis-a-vis constitutionality of statute-Whether public policy can. be drawn from the Constitution-Whether constitutional policy provides an aid-Role and purpose of constitutional interpretation by apex i:ourt.

\...

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS

Administrative Law-Discretionary power-Exercise of-Limitations-Absence of arbitrary power-Fi;st essential of Rule ofLaw. Respondents No. 2 to 4, regular employees of the appellant Delhi Transpori Corporation, were served with termination notices under Regulation 9(b) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment & Service) Regulations, 1952 by the appellant Corporation on the ground that they became inefficient in their work and started inciting other members not to perform their duties. The three respondents and their Union, respondent No. 1 filed writ petition in High Court, challenging the constitutional validity of Regulation 9(b), which gave the management right to terminate the services of an employee by giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof. The Division Bench of the High Court struck down the Regulation, holding that the Regulation gave absolute, unbridled and arbitrary powers to the management to terminate the .services of any permanent or temporary employee, and •uch power was violative of Article 14 of the Constituiion. Hence, the Corporation filed ihe appeal before this Court, by special leave. The validity of similar provmons in Para 522 of the Shastri Award, rule l(i) of the District Board Rules 1926, Part V, Regulation 13 of Indian Airlines Employees' Service Regulations, Regulation 48 of Air India Employees' Service Regulations and also the clause in the contract of appointment in -respect of employees of Zilla Parishad and the

b

New India Assurance Co1npany) also came up f~r consideration in the

connected appeals and applications filed before this Court. It was contended on behalf of the Delhi Transport Corporation that there was sufficient guideline in Regulation 9(b) and the power of termination, properly read, would not be arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, that the Court would be entitled to obtain guidance from the preamble, the policy and the purpose of the Act and the power conferred under it and to see that the power was exercised only for that purpose, that even a term like 'public interest' could be sufficient guidance in the matter of retirement of a government employee, and such a provision could be read into a statute even when it was not otherwise expressly there, that it was well-settled that the Court would sustain the presumption of constitutionality by considering matters of common knowledge and to assume every slate of facts which

could be ronceived and could even read down the section, if it became

necessary to uphold the validity of the provision, that the underlying

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rationale of this rule of interpretation, or th~ doctrine of reading down of a staiilte being that when a legislature, whose powers were not unlimited, enacted a statute, it was aware of its limitations, and in the absence of express intention or clear language to the contrary, it must be presumed to have implied into the statute the requisite limitations and conditions to immunise it from the virus of unconstitutionality, that B · since every legislature intended to act within its powers, in a limited Government, the legislature would attempt to function within its limited powers and it would not be expected to have intended to transgress its limits, that the guidelines for the exercise of the power of termination simpliciter under Regulation 9(b) could be found in the statutory provisions of the 1950 Act under which the regulations had been framed. the preamble; Sections 19, 20 and 53, the context of Regulation 9(b) read with Regulations 9(a) and 15, that even for the exercise of this power, reasons could be recorded although they need not he communicated which would ensure a check on the arbitrary exercise of power and effective judicial review in a given case. ensuring efficient running of services and in public interest and the regulations in question were D parallel to, but not identical with, the exceptions carved out under proviso to Article 311(2), that even the power of termination simipliciter under Regulation 9(b) could only be exercised in circumstances other than those in Regulation 9(a), i.e. not where the foundation of the order was "misconduct', the exercise of such power could only be for purposes germane and relevant to the statute, that the principles of natural justice E or holding of an enquiry is neither a universal principle of justice nor inOexiable dogma and the principles of natural justice were not incapable of exclusion in a given situation, if importing the right to be heard has the effect of paralysing the administrative process or the need for promptitude or the urgency of the situation so demands, natural justice could he avoided; that the words "where it is not reasonably practicable F to hold an enquiry" may be imported into the regulation, that where termination took place by the exclusion of audi alteram partem rule in

circumstances which were circumscribed and coupled with the safeguard of recording of reasons which were germane and relevant, then the termination would not render the regulation unreasonable or arbitrary, and if the regulation was read in this manner it could not be said that the power was uncanalised or unguided, that under ordinary law of "master and servant" the Corporation was empowered by the Contract of Service to terminate the services of its employees. in terms thereof; the Declaration in Brojo Nath's case that such a contract was void under section 23 of the Indian Contract Act or opposed to public policy offending the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles was not.sound in law: as a master, the t:orporation had unbridled right

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS

to terminate the contract in the interests of efficient functioning of the Corporation or to maintain discipline among its employees, and if the termination, was found to be wrongful, the only remedy available to the employees was to claim damages for wrongful termination but not a declaration as was granted in Brojo Nath's case. On behalf. of "the workmen/intervenors, it was submitted that provision of any rule that service would be liable to termination on . notice for the period prescribed therein contravened Article 14 of the Constitution, as arbitrary and uncontrolled power was left in the authority to select at its will any person against whom action would he taken; that Articles 14, 19 and 21 were inter-related and Article 21 did not exclude Article 19 and even if there was a law providing a procedure for depriving a person of personal liberty and there was, consequently. no infringement of fundamental right conferred by Article 21, such law in so far as it abridged or took away any fundamental right under Article 19 would have to meet the challenge of that Article, that violation Of principle of natural justice by State action was violation of Article 14 which could be excluded only in exceptional circumstances, and. therefore, a clause which authorised the employer to terminate the

services of an employee, whose contract of service was for indefinite

period or till the age of retirement, by serving notice, and which did not contain any guidance for the exercise of the power and without recording reasons for such termination, violated the fundamental rights

guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 and principles of natural justice and wa• void under Section 2(g) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and unforceahle under Section 2(h); that since audi alteram partem was a requirement of Article 14, and conferment of arbitrary power itself was contrary to Article 14, the rule in question could not be sustained as valid; that the Constitutional guarantees under Articles 14 and 21 were for all persons and there could be no basis for making a distinction between 'workmen' to whom the Industrial Disputes Act and other industrial laws applied and those who were outside their purview, and the law applicable to the former could only add to and not detract from the rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution; that

the power to terminate the services of a person employed to serve indefi-

nitely or till the age of retirement could be exercised only in cases of proved misconduct or exceptional circumstances having regard to the

Constitutional guarantee available under Article 14, 19(l)(g) and 21 and unless the exceptional circumstances were spelt out, the power to terminate the services would cover both permissible and impermissible

grounds rendering it wholly invaiid, particularly because, the requirement of audi alteram partem which was a part of the gliaraiitee of

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Article 14 was sought to be excluded, and there could be no guidance available in the body of the law itself, since the purpose for which an undertaking was established and the provisions dealing with the same in the law could provide no guidance regarding exceptional circumstnaces under which alone the power could be exercised, that the question involved, in the instant cases was not the exercise of power which an employer possessed to terminate the services of his employee, but the extent of that power; that provisions of Regulation 9(b) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952, could not be rendered constitutional by reading the requirement of recording reasons and confining it to cases where it was not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry and reading it down further as being applicable to only exceptional cases would not be permissible construction and proper; that the Regulation conferred arbitrary power of leaving it to the DTC Management to pick and choose, either to hold an enquiry or terminate the services for the same misconduct and there was nothing in the provisions of the Act or the regulations from which the Management could find any guidance and, therefore, in order to conform to the constitutional guarantees contained in Articles 14, 19(l)(g) and 21, the regulation would have to make a distinction between cases where services were sought to be terminated for misconduct and cases of termination on grounds other than what would constitute misconduct; that regulation 9(b) deliberately conferred wide power of termination of service without giving reasonable opportunity to an employee even if he was regular or permanent employee, in addition to regulation 15 which provided for dismissal or removal after a disciplinary enquiry, thus, the intention of the regulation-making authority was clear and unambiguous; the provision was not capable of two interpretations, and consequently, the question of reading down did not arise, and reading down in the instant cases involved' not interpretation of any single word in regulation 9(b) but adding a whole clause to it, which amounted to rewriting the provisions, which courts had refused to make up for the on1ission of the legis.lature,

and would inevitably drain out Article 14 of its vitality, and the right to equality which was regarded as a basic feature of the Constitution, and subject permanent employees of the DTC to a tremendous sense of insecurity which is against the philosophy and scheme of the Constitution, that unless the provision of the Constitution itself excluded the principles of natural justice, they continued to be applicable as an integral part of the right to equality guaranteed by the Constitution, that as the employees of the DTC were not Government employees, Article 311(2) was not applicable, and Article 14 fully applied to them, including the principles of natural justice.

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D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS

On behalf of the Indian Airlines Corporation and the Air India, which filed intervention applications, it was submitted that there had been distinction between the discharge simpliciter and dismissal from service by way of punishment, that the effect of the judgments of this Court in the Central Inland Water's case and West Bengal's case was to take away the right of the employer to terminate. the services of an employee by way of discharge simpliciter, that this Court had recognised the existence of the inherent right of an employer to terminate the services of an employee in terms of the contract.of employment and also under the various labour enactments, that a plain reading of the amended Regulation 13 of the Indian Airlines Employees' Regulations and a cumulative reading of the amended regulations 48 and 44 of the Air India Employees Service Regulations clearly established that the vice, if any, of arbitrariness had been completely removed and that the power to terminate had been vested with the Board of Directors, and not with any individual, and sufficient guidelines made available to the Board to exercise the restricted and limited power available to the employer under these regulations,

On behalf of another intervenor, New India Assurance Co,, it was sub1nitted that the Central Inland Water's case was erroneous, insofar

as it made complete negation of power of the employer to terminate and rendered the termination illegal even where the employer had made all the necessary investigation and had given hearing to the employee concerned before making the order, and took in even private employment; therefore, the judgment of this Court should be read down and made applicable prospectively, In Civil Appeal No, 4073 of 1986 it was contended on behalf of the Bank employee whose services were terminated under para 522 of the Shastri Award, that mere failure of the employee to mention the loan taken by him from another branch of the Bank, which was repaid subsequently, had deprived him of his livelihood, and his services were

. terminated without charge of 'misconduct' and without an enquiry, and

paragraph 522 of the. Shastri Award gave no indication as to on what conditions this arbitrary uncontrolled power .could be used to get rid of one or more permanent employees for ''efficient management of G Banks" on subjective opinions or suspicion not tested in enquiry into facts, and that this provision ,provided for "insecurity of tenure" for lakhs of permanent employees; Articles 14, l9(l)(g) and 21 and the integrated protection of these Fundamental Rights excluded the ''doctrine of pleasure" and insisted on security of tenure "during good

behaviour", and the right to livelihood could not be rendered precari- H

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ous or reduced to a "glorious uncertainty", that no principle of interpretation permitted reading down a provision so as to make it into a different provision altogether different from what was intended by the legislature or its delegate, and there could not be any reading down which was contrary to the principles of interpretation; that if two provisi(Jns existed, firstly to remove from service after holding an enquiry on a charge of 'misconduct' and secondly, without serving a charge-sheet or holding an enquiry, all provisions for holding enquiry would be rendered otiose and would be reduced to a mere redundancy, that the Court had a duty to correct wrongs even if orders had been made which were later found to be violative of any fnndamental right and to recall its orders- to avoid injustice; that substantive provision of para 522 could not be controlled or curtailed effectively so as to confine its operation within narrow constitutional limits; that it was not the duty of the court to condone the constitutional delinquencies of those limited by the Constitution if they arrogated uncontrolled unconstitutional powers, which were neither necessary nor germane for supposed efficiency of services in the Banks as a business enterprise, and that in a system governed by rule of law, discretion when conferred upon executive authorities must be confined within clearly defined limits.

' Appeal No. lllS of 1976, the appellant-employee of the In Civil Zila Parishad contended that his services were terminated on account of the vindictiveness of some of the employees of the respondent, and without enquiry. The employer submitted that the termination order was passed on the basis of the condition in the mutually agreed terms of contract of appointment, and resolution passed by the Board, and that Rule l(i) of District Board Rules, 1926, Part V gave right to both the parties to terminate the employment on one month's notice. On the questions (i) whether Regulation 9(b) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952, was arbitrary. illegal, discriminatory and violative of audi a/teran1 partem and so constitutionally invalid and void; and (ii) whether the Regulation could be interpreted and read down in such a manner as to hold that it was not discriminatory, or arbitrary and did not confer unbriddled and uncanalised power on the authority to terminate the service of an employee, including a permanent employee, without any reason whatsoever, Dismissing Civil Appeal No. 2876 of 1986 (appeal by the Delhi Transport Corporation), allowing Civil Appeal No. lllS of 1976, and directing other matters to be placed before a Division Bench, in ac-

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS

cordance with the majority decision (per Ray, Sharma, Sawant and K. Ramaswamy, JJ.) this Court, ·

HELD: Per Ray, J.: I.I Regulation 9(b) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952 which confers powers on the authority to terminate the services of a permanent and confirmed employee by issuing a notice terminating the services or by making payment in lieu of notice without assigning any reasons in the order and without. giving any opportunity of hearing to the employee before passing the orders is wholly arbitrary, uncanalised and unrestricted violating principles of natural justice as well as Article 14 of the Constitution. There is no guideline in the Regulations or in the Delhi Road Transport Authority Act, 1950 as to when or in which cases and circumstances this power of termination by giving notice or pay in lieu thereof can be exercised. [264G, 285C] 1.2 Government Companies or Public Corporations which carry on trade and business activity of State being State instrnmentalities, are State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and as such they are subject to the observance of fundamental rights embodied in Part III as well as to conform to the directive principles in Part JV of the Constitution. Jn other words, the Service Regulations or Rules framed by them are to be tested by the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the procedure prescribed by their Rules or Regulations must be reasonable, fair and just and not arbitrary, fanciful and unjust. [264H, 265A:Bl

_,..

1.3 The 'audi alteram partem' rule which, in essence, enforces the equality clause in Article 14 of the Constitution is applicable not only to quasi-judicial orders but to administrative orders affecting prejudicially the party-in-question unless the application of the rule has been expressly excluded by the Act or Regulation or Rule which is not the case here. Rules of natural justice do no supplant but supplement the Rules and Regulations. Moreover, the Rule of Law, which permeates the Constitution of India, demands that it has to be obse.-ved both substantially and procedurely. Rule of law posits that the power to be exercised in a manner which is just, fair and reasonable and not in an unreasonable, capricious or arbitrary manner leaving room for discrimination. [2650-E]

Regulation 9(b) does not expresssly exclude the application of the

C

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'audi a/teram partem' rule and as such the order of termination of service of a permanent employee cannot be passed by simply issuing a month's notice or pay in lieu thereof without recording any reason in the order and without giving any hearing to the employee to controvert the allegation on the basis of which the purported order is made. [265F] 1.4 Considering from all these aspects Regnlation 9(b) is illegal and void, as it is arbitrary, discriminatory and without any guidelines for exercise of the power. It confers unbridled, uncanalised and arbitrary power on the authority to terminate the services of a permanent employee without recording any reasons and without conforming to the principles of natnral justice. It is also void under Section 23 of the Contract Act, as being opposed to public policy and also ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution. [265E, 265B-C, 266G]

Moti Ram Deka Etc. v. General Manager, NEF Railways, Maligaon, Pandu, Etc., [1964] 5 SCR 683; Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union '?f India, [1958] SCR 828; Shyam Lal v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., [1955] SCR 26; Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar & Ors., [1959] SCR 279; Jyoti Pershad v. The Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, [1962] 2 SCR 125; State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Devi & Ors., [1967] 2 SCR 625; A.K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [1969] 2 SCC 262; Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha and Anr., [1971] I SCR 791; Air India Corporation v. V.A. Rebello & Anr., AIR 1972 S.C. 1343; The Workmen of Sudder Office Cinnamara v. The Management, [1971] 2 Lab LJ 620; Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Workmen & Anr., [1964] 2 SCR 125; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621; E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr., [1974] 2 SCR 348; Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Malvenkar & Ors., [1978] 3 SCR 1000; Manohar P. Kharkherand Anr. v. Raghuraj & Anr., [1981] 2 LLJ 459; L. Michael & Anr. v. Johnaton Pumps India Ltd., [1975] 3 SCR 489; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagat Ram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi & Anr., [1975] I SCC 421; S.S. Muley v. J.R.D. Tata & Ors., [1979] 2 SLR 438; West Bengal State Electricity Board & Ors. v. Desh Bandhu Ghosh and Ors., [1985] 3 SCC 116; Workmen of Hindustan Steel Ltd. andAnr. v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. and Ors., [1985) 2 SCR 428; O.P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. & Ors., [1986] 4 SCC 337; Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. & Anr. v. Brojo Nath Gaizguly & Anr., [1986] 3 SCC 156 and Delhi Transport Undertakingv. Balbir Saran Goel, [1970] 3 SCR 757, referred to. 2.1 An Act can be declared to be valid wherein any tenn has been ; l

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDO()R CONGRESS

used which per se seems to be without jurisdiction, but can be read down in order to make it constitutionally valid by separating and exclu.ding the part which is invalid or by interpreting the word in such a fashion as to make it constitutionally valid and within jursidictioin of the legislature which passed the said enactment, by reading dowu the provisions of the Act. This however, does not under any circumstances, mean that where the plain and literal meaning that follows from a bare reading of the provisions of the Act, Rule or Regulations that it confers arbitrary uncanalised, unbridled unrestricted power to terminate the services of a permanent employee without recording any reasons for the same and without adhering to the princples of natural justice and equality before the law as envisaged in Article 14 of the Constitution, it can be read dowu to save the said provision from constitutional invalidity, by bringing or adding words in the said legislation, such as saying that it implies that reasons for the order oftennination have to be recorded. [271C-F] 2.2 In interpreting the provisions of an Act, it is not premissible where the plain language of the provision gives a clear and unambiguous meaning that it can be interpreted by reading dowu and presuming certain expressions in order to save it from constitutional invalidity. Therefore, it is impossible to hold by reading dowu the provisions of Regulation 9(b) framed under section 53 of the Delhi Road Transport Act, 1950 read with Delhi Road Transport (Amendment) Act, 1971 that the said provision does not confer arbitrary, unguided, unrestricted and uncanalised power without any guidelines on the authority to terminate the services of an employee without conforming to the principles of natural justice and equality as envisaged in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. [271F-H, 272A] Union of India & Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel & Ors., [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 131; Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, [1968] 1 SCR 185; Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Indore. & Ors. v. Radha/crishan & Ors., [1979] 2 SCC 249; In Re The Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, and the Hindu Women's Rights to Property (Amendment) Act, 1938 and in Re a Special Reference under Section 2 13 of the Government of India Act, 1935, [1941] FCR 12; R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. The Union of India, [1957] SCR 930; R.L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., [1964] 6.SCR 784 and The Mysore State Electricity Board v. Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd. & Ors., [1963] Supp. 2 SCR 127, Jagdish Pandey v. The Chancellor of Bihar & Anr., [1968] 1SCR231, referred to. H.N. Seervai: Constitutional Law of India, Third Edition, p. 119, referred.to.

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Per Sharma, J. J ~ J The rights of the l?arties in the present cases cannot be governed by the general principle of master and servant, and the management cannot have unrestricted and unqualified power of terminating the services of the employees. In the interest of efficiency of the public bodies, however, they should have the authority to terminate the employment of undesirable, inefficient, corrupt, indolent and disobedient employees, but it must be exercised fairly, objectively and independently; and the occasion for the exercise must be delimited with precision and clarity. Further, there should be adequate reason for the use of such a power, and a decision in this regard has to be taken in a manner which should show fairness, avoid arbitrariness and evoke credibility. And this is possible only when the law lays down detailed guidelines in unambiguous and precise terms so as to avoid the danger of misinterpretation of the situation. An element of uncertainty is likely to lead to grave and undesirable consequences. Clarity and precision are. therefore, essential for the guidelines. [272D-F]

J.2 Regulation 9(h) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority (Condition of Appointment and Service) Regulation, 1952 cannot, therefore, be upheld for lack of adequate and appropriate guidelines. [272G]

Per Sa want, J.

J. l. There is need to minimise the scope of the arbitrary use of power in all walks of life. It is inadvisable to depend on the good sense of the individuals, however high-placed they may be. It is all the more improper and unde.sirable to expose the precious rights like the rights of life, liberty and property to the vagaries of the individual whims and fancies. It is trite to say that individuals are not and do not become wise because tI;tey occupy high seats of power, and good sense, circumspection and fairness do not go with the posts, however high they may he. There is only a complaisant presumption that those who occupy high posts have a high sense of responsibility. The presumption is neither legal nor rational. History does not support it and reality does not warrant it. In particular, in a society pledged to uphold the rule oflaw, it would he both unwise and impolitic to leave any aspect of its life to be governed by discretion when it can conveniently and easily be covered by the rule oflaw. [276E-F] 1.2 Beyond the self-deluding and self-asserting righteous presumption, there is nothing to support the 'high authority' theory. This

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D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS

theory undoubtedly weighed with some authorities for some time in the past. But its unrealistic pretensions were soon noticed and it was buried without even so much as an ode to it. [278A-B]

~

1.3 The employment under the public undertakings is a public employment and a public property. It is not only the undertakings but also the society which has a stake in their proper and efficient working. Both discipline and devotion are necessary for efficiency. To ensure both, the service conditions of those who work for them must b< encouraging, certain and secured, and not vague and whimiscal. With capricious service conditions, both discipline and devotion are endangered, and efficiency i~ impaired. [276G-H, 277 A] 1.4 The right to life includes right to livelihood. The right to livelihood, therefore, cannot hang on to the fancies of individuals in authority. The employment is not a bounty from them nor can its survival be at their mercy. Income is the foundation of many fundamental rights and when work is the sole source of income, the right to work becomes as much fundamental. Fundamental rights can ill-afford to be consigned to the limb of undefined premises and uncertain applications. That will be a mockery of them. [277B]

1.5 Both the society and the individual employed, therefore, have an anxious interest in service conditions being well-defined and expli-

cit to the extent possible. The arbitrary rules which are also somet~es described as Henry VIII Rules, can have no place in any service conditions. [277C]

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Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi & Anr., [1975] 3 SCR 619; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [!978] 2 SCC 621; The Manager, Government Branch Press & Anr. v. D.R. Belliappa, [1979] 1 SCC 477; The Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Warehousing Corporation & Anr. v. Vinay Narayan Vajpayee, [1980] 2 SCR 773; A.L. Kalra v. The Project & Equipment Corporation of India Ltd., [1984] 3 SCR 646; Workmen of Hindustan Steel Ltd. & Anr. v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. & Ors., [1985] 2 SCR 428; West Bengal State Electricity Board & Ors. v. Desh Bandhu Ghosh & Ors., [1985] 2 SCR 1014; Olga Tellis & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors. etc., [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 51; Union of India & Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel & Ors., [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 131; Central Inland Water Transport Corppration Ltd. & Anr. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr. etc., [1986] 3 SCR 156; O.P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. & Ors., [1986] 4 SCC 337; N.C. Dalwadi v. State of Gujarat, [1987] 3

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[ 1990] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A SCC till; M.K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank & Ors., [1987] Supp. SCC 643 and Daily Rated Casual Labour employed under p & T Department through Bhartiya Dak Tar Mazdoor Manch etc. v. Union of India & Ors., [1988] I SCC 122, referred to.

2.1 The doctrine of reading down or of recasting the statute can be applied in limited situations. It is essentially 'used, firstly, for saving a statute from being struck down on account of its unconstitutionality. It is a~ extension of the principle that when two interpretations are possible-one rendering it constitutional and the other making it constitutional the former should be preferred. The unconstitutionality may spring from either the incompetence of the legislature to enact the statute or from its violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution. The second situation which summons its aid is where the provisions of the statute are vague and ambiguous and it is possible to gather the intention. of the legislature from the object of the statute, the context in. which the provision occurs and the purpose for which it is made. However, when the provision is cast in a definite and unambiguous language and its intention is clear, it is not permissible either to mend or bend it even if such recasting is in accord with good reason and conscience. In such circumstances, it is not possible for the Court to remake the statute. Its only duty is to strike it down and leave it to the legislature if it so desires, to amend it. If the remaking of the statute by the courts is to lead to its distortion that course is to be scrupulo11sly avoided. The doctrine can never be called into play where the statute requires extensive additions and deletions. Not only it is no part of the court's duty to undertake such exercise, but it is beyond its jurisdiction to do so. [288F-H, 289A-B] Re Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, and the Hindu Women's Rights to Property (Amendment) Act, 1938 etc., [1941] FCR 12; Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Halder & Ors., [1953] SCR 533; R. M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. The Union of India, [1957] SCR 930; Keditr Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, [1962] Supp. 2 SCR 769; R.L Arora v. State of Urtar Pradesh & Ors., [1964] 6 SCR 784; Jagdish Pandey v. The Chancellor, University of Bihar & Anr., [1968] I SCR 231; Shri Umed v. Raj Singh & Ors., [1975] I SCR 918; Mohd. Yunus Salim's case, AIR 1974 SC 1218; Sunil Batra etc. v. Delhi Administration & Ors., [1978] 4 SCC 494; Excel Wear etc. v. Union of India & Ors., [1979] 1SCR1009; Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India &. Ors., [1981] 1SCR206; Union of India & Anr. etc. v. Tulsiram Patel etc., [1985] 3 SCC 398 and Elliott Ashton Welsh, !Iv. United States, 398 US 333; 26 L.ed. 2nd 308, referred to.

1'

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" ;

~i;-

_""-I_,,,,_

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D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS

2.2 Therefore, the doctrine of reading down cannot be availed of for saving the regulation in the instant case. In the first instance, the regulation is a part of the service regulations of the employees made by the Delhi Road Transport Authority in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) read with clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 53 of the Delhi Road Transport Act, 1950, whose object is to provide for the establishment and the regulation of Road Transport Authority for the B promotion of a co-ordinated system of road transport in the State of Delhi. There is nothing either in the object of the service regulations or in the object of the Act which has a bearing on Regulation 9(b). If anything the object of the Act would require framing of such service regulations as wonld ensure dedicated and diligent employees to run the undertaking. The dedication of the employees would pre-suppose security of employment and not a constant hanging of the Democle's sword c over their head, and hence would in any case not bear the existence of such regulation. Secondly, the language of regulation is so crystal clear that no two interpretations are possible to be placed on it and hence it is not permissible to read in it any meaning other than what is clearly sought to be conveyed by it. Thirdly, the context of the regulation D makes it abundantly clear that it is meani to be a naked hire and fire rule and the authority ha• been vested with unguided and arbitrary power to dispense with the services of any category of the employees. Sub-clause (a) of the Regulation mentions elaborately the circumstances in which the services of an employee can be terminated without any notice or pay in lieu of such notice. Sub-clause (b) follows closely on its E heel and states in clear language that when the termination is made due to reduction of establishment or in circumstances other than those mentioned in sub-clause (a), one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof is all that is necessary to be given for terminating an employee's services. The intention of the rule-making authority, therefore, is more than clear. It was to give an absolute free hand without any limitations F whatsoever to terminate the services of any employee. Both the language of the regulatfon as well as the context in which it is cast leave ·no scope for reading into it any further provision. [289C-H, 290A] 2.3 Moreover, reading in the rule circumstances under which alone the rule can be used, and reading it down to read in it words or G expressions or provisions in order to save the legislation would not only distort the intention of the rule-making authority but woald also require .extensive amendment of a very vague nature to it. The reading in the regulation of a provision that the concerned employees should be given a hearing with regard to his mis-conduct will require that he shonld first he intimated of the misconduct of which he is guilty. But H

•

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that kind of a situation is taken care of by sub-clause (a) of the said regulation. There is. therefore, no need of a separate provision for the same. If, on the other hand, the services of an employee are to be terminated on grounds other than those mentioned in sub-clause (a), then those grounds being unknown to the employee, cannot be met by him even if he is given a hearing. The Court cannot read in the rule all circumstnaces where it is not possible or necesary to hold an enquiry. Such situations are capable of being formulated easily and conveniently at least in gcl'1eral ter1n~ as is done by the Constitution-1nakers in the second proviso to Article 3JJ(2). The reading of such circumstances in

,_

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(

'

the existing regulation would require its extensive recasting which is impermissible for the Court to do. There is no authority which supports such wide reading down of any provision of the statute or rule/regulalion. Therefore the doctrine of reading down is 'ingularly inapplicable to the p~esent case. [281B, 2908, 29IA-F] I

3. Clause (b) of Regulation 9 contains the much hated and abused Tule of hire and fire reminiscent of the days of laissez faire and unrestrained freedom of contract. [274E] Per Ramaswamy, J.

' I

I. I The question of security of work is of most importance. If a person 'does not have the feeling that he belongs to an organisation engaged in promotion, he will not put forward his best effort to produce more. That sense of belonging arises only when he feels that he will not he turned out of employment the next day at the whim of the management. Therefore, as far as possible security of work should be assured to the employees so that they may contribute to the maximisation of production. [300D-E]

>

Daily Rated Casual Labour v. Union of India, [!988] J SCR 598 sec 122at130-131, referred to. ' J.2 A permanent employee of a statutory authority, corporation or instrumentality under Article 12 has a lien on the post till he attained = [1988] I

superannuation or compulsorily retired or service is duly terminated in

accordance with the procedure established by law. Security of tenure enures the benefit of pension. on retirement. Dismissal, removal or termination of his/her service for inefficiency, corruption or other mis-

conduct is by way of penalty. He/She has a right to security of tenure which is essential to inculcate a sense of belonging to the service or

,..

organisation and involvement for maximum production or efficient

...

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS

service. It is also a valuable right which is to be. duly put an end to only as per valid law. [300A-G]

Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, [1968] 1 SCR 185 at 195-196; Calcutta Dock Labour Board v. Jaffar Imam, [1965] 3 SCR 463 and Sini Municipality v. Cecelia Korn Francis Tallis, [1973] 3 SCR 348, referred to.

1.3 The right to life, a bask human nght, assured by Article 21 of the Constitution comprehends some thing more than mere.animal existence; it does not only mean physical existence, but includes basic human dignity. The right to public employment and its concomitant right to livelihood receive their succour and nourishment under the canopy of the protective umbrella of Articles 14, 16(1), 19(l)(g) and 21. [296A, 297B]

Munn v. Illinois, [1876] 94 US I13 and 154, referred to.

·,,

Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., [1964] 1SCR332; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, [1985] 2 Suppl. SCR page 51 at 79; Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621; State of Maharashtra v. Chander Bhan, [1983] 3 SCR 387=Affi 1983 SC 803 and Board of Trustees, Port of Bombay v. Dilip Kumar, [1983] 1 SCR 828, referred to. 1.4 The arbitrary, unbridled and naked power of wide discretion to dismiss a pennanent employee without any guidelines or procedure would tend to defeat the constitutional purpose of equality and allied purposes. Therefore, when the Constitution assures dignity of the individual and the right to livelihood, the exercise of power hy the executive should be combined with adequate safeguards for the rights of the employees against any arbitrary and capricious use of those powers.

b

Workmen of Hindustan Steels Ltd. v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. & Ors., [1985] 2 SCR 428 and Francis Cora/lie v. U. T. of Delhi, [1981] i SCR 516 = Am 1981SC746, referred to. 1.5 It .is well settled constitutional law that different Articles in _ che Chapter on Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles in Part IV of the Constitution must be read as an integral and ·incorporeal whole with possible overlapping with the subject-matter of what is to be

protected by its various provisions, particularly the FundairtentHf

Rights. The fundamental rights, proteded by Part Ill of the Constltu· lion, out of which Articles 14. 19 and 21 are the lnost freqlientiy

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invoked to test the validity of executive as well as legislative actions when these actions are subjected to judicial scrutiny, are necessary means to devlop one's own personality and to carve out one's own life in the 1nanner one likes best. subject to reasonable restrictions imposed in the paramount interest of the society and to a just, fair and reasonable procedure. The effect of restriction or deprivation and not of the form adopted to deprive the right is the conclusive test. Thus, the right to a public employment is a constitutional right under Article 16(1). All matters relating to employment include the right to continue in service till the employee reaches superannuation or his service is duly terminated in accordance with just, fair and reasonable procedure prescribed under the provisions of the Constitution or the Rules made under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution or the statutory provision or the Rules. regulations or instructions having statutory flavour 1nadc thereunder. Rut the relevant provisions must be conformable to the rights guaranteed in Parts Ill & I\ of the Constitution .. Article 21 guarantees the right to live which includes right to livelihood, to many, the assured tenure of' service is the source. [311G; 312G-H, 313A-B]

R.C Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 3 SCR 530; Minerva Mills Ltd. v. 'union of India, [!981] I SCR 206 and Union of India & Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel & Ors., [1985] Suppl. 2 SCR 131at233 referred to.

I.6 Article 14 is the general principle while Art. 3ll(2) is a special provision applicable to all civil services under the State. Article 311(2) embodies the principles of natural justice but proviso to clause (2) of Art. 311 excludes the operation of principles of natural justice engrafted in Art. 311 (2) as an exception in the given circumstances enumerated in these clans"-' of the proviso to Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. Article 14 read with Articles 16(1) and 311 are to be harmoniously interpreted that the proviso to Art. 311 (2) excludes the application of the principles of natural justice as an exception; and the applicability of Article 3II(2) must, therefore, be circumscribed to the civil services and to be construed accordingly. In respect of all other employees covered by Article 12 of the Constitution the dynamic role of Article 14 and other relevant Articles like 21 must be allowed to have full play "·ithout any inhibition. unless the statutory rules themselves, consistent with the mandate of' Articles 14, 16, 19 and 21 provide, expressly, such an exception. [317F-H, 3ISA]

Union of India & Anr. v. Tu/siram Patel & Ors., [1985] Suppl. 2 SCR 131 at 233; A.K. Kraipak & Ors. etc. v. Union of India & Ors., [1970] 1 SCR 457 and Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha & Ors., [1971] l SCR 791, referred to.

D.T.C. '· D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS

J. 7 Article 19(1)(g) empowers every citizen right to avocation or profession etc., which includes right to be continued in employment under the State unless the tenure is validly terminated and consistent with the scheme enshrined in the fundamental rights of the Constitution. Whenever there is arbitrariness in State action,.---whether it be of the Legislature or of the Executive or of an authority under Article 12. Articles 14 and 21 spring into action and strike down such an action. The concept of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness pervades the entire constitutional spectrum and is a golden thread which runs through the whole fabric of the Constitution. [3158-D] J.8 Thus, Article 14 read with 16(1) accords right to an equality or an equal treatment consistent with principles of natural justice. Any law made or actiou taken by the employer, corporate statutory or instrumentality under Article 12 must act fairly and reasonably. Right to fair treatment is an essential inbuilt of natural justice. Exercise of unbridled and uncanalised discretionary power impinges upon the right of the citizen; vesting of discretion is no wron~ provided it.is exercised purpo5ively, judiciously and without prejudice. Wider the discretion, the greater the chances of abuse. Absolute discretion is destructive of freedom than of man's inventions. Absolute discretion marks the beginning of the end of the liberty. The conferment of absolute power to

dismiss a permanent employee is antithesis to justness or fair treatment.

The exercise of discretionary power wide of mark would bread arbitrary, unreasonable or unfair actions and would not be consistent with reason and justice. [3208-D] J.9 The right to public employment which includes right to continued public employment till the employee is superannuated as per rules or compulsorily retired or duly terminated in accordance with the procedure established by law is an integral part of right to livelihood which in turn is an integral part of right to life. assured by Art. 21 of the Constitution. Any procedure prescribed to deprive such a right to livelihood or continued employment must be just, fair and reasonable procedure and conformable,to the mandate of Articles 14 and 21. In other words, an employee in a public.employment also must not be arbitrarily, unjustly or unreasonably deprived of his/her livelihood which is ensured iit continued einploy_ment till it is terminated in accordance with just, fair and reasonable procedure. Otherwise any law or rule in violation thereof is void. [320E-F]

A.K. Kraipak & Ors. etc. v. Union of India & Ors., [1970] l SCR 457; Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha and Anr., [1971] 1 SCR 791;

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Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.), Sindri & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1981] 2 SCR 52 at 60-61; S.S. Muley v. J.R.D. Tata, [1979] 2 SLR 438 (Bombay); Superintendent of Post Office v. K. Vasayya, [1984] 3 Andhra Pradesh Law Journal 9; West Bengal Electricity Board & Ors. v. D.B. Ghosh & Ors., [1985] 2 SCR 1014; Workmen of Hindustan Steel Ltd. & Anr. v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. & Ors., [1985] 2 SCR 428; O.P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corpn. Ltd. & Ors., [1986] 4 SCC 337; A.P.S.R.T. Corpn. v. Labour Court, AIR 1980 A.P. 132; R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. State of Punjab, fi957] SCR 930; Kanhialal v. District Judge & Ors., [1983] 3 SCC 32; ,M.K. A1<arwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank & Ors., [1987] Suppl. SCC 643; All Saints High School v. Government of A.P., [1980] 2 SCR 924 & 938 e to f; Frank Anthoney Public School v. Union of India, [1987] I SCR 238 & 269 b toe; Christian Medical College Hospital Employees' Union & Anr. v. Christian Medical College Ve/lore Association & Ors., [1988] I SCR 546 & 562; Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, [1962] Suppl. 3 SCR 369 and O.K. Ghosh v. EZX Joseph, [1963] Supp. I SCR 789, referred to.

Unit~d States v, Samuel D. singleton, [1981] 109 US. 3, referred to.

I•

i

i

1.10 '{) ndoubtedly, efficiency of the administration and the discipline among the employees is very vital to the successful functioning of an institution or maximum production of goods or proper maintenance of the services. Discipline in that regard amongst the employees is its essential facet and has to be maintained. The society is vitally interested in the due discharge of the duties by the government employees or employees· of corporate bodies or statutory authorities or instrumentalities under Art. 12 of the Constitution. The government or corporate employees are, after-all, paid from the public exchequer to which everyone contributes either by way of direct or indirect taxes. The employees are charged with public duty and they should perform their public duties with deep sense of responsibility. The collective responsibility of all the oflicers from top most to the lowest maximises the efficient public administration. They must, therefore, be held to have individual as well as collective responsibility in discharge of their dnties faithfully, honestly with full dedication and utmost devotion to duty. Equally the employees must also have a feeling that they have security of tenure. They should also have an involvement on their part in the organisation or institution, corporation, etc. They iteed assurance of service and protection. The public interest and the public good demands th~t those who discharge their duties honestly, efficiently and

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D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS

with a sense of devotion and dedication to duty should receive adequate protection and security of tenure. Therefore, before depriving an employee of the means of livelihood to himself and his dependents, i.e. job, the procedure prescribed for such deprivation must be just, fair and reasonable under Arts. 21 and 14 and when infringes Art. 19(l)(g) must be subject to imposing reaso/llllhle n!S!rictions under Art. 19(5). [320G-H, 321A-O, 3220]

A·

1.11 Conferment of power on a high-rank officer is not always an assurance, in particular, when the moral standards are generally degenerated, that the power would be exercised objectively, f!!llSOnably, conscientiously, fairly and justly without inbuilt protection to an employee. Even officers who do their duty honestly and conscientiously are subject to great pressures and pulls. Therefore, the competing claims of the "public interest" as against "individual interest" of the employees are to be harmoniously blended so as to serve the societal need consistent with the constitutional scheme. (3220-E] J.12 Regulation 9(b) of the Delhi Road Transport (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952, is arbitrary, unjust, unfair and unreas()i1able offending Articles 14, 16(1), 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution. It is also opposite to the public policy and ·thereby is void under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. [330G] J.13 Under ordinary law of master and servant, whether the contract of service is for a fixed period or not, if it contains a provision for termination of service by notice, in terms thereof, it can be so determined and if the contract finds no provision to give notice and the contract of service is not for a fixed period, law implies giving of a reasonable notice. Where no notice or a reasonable notice was issued, before terminating the contract, the termination of the contract of service is wrongful and the aggrieved employee is entitled at law to sue for damages. It is,not disputed that the Delhi Road Transport Corporation is a statutory Corporation under the Delhi Road Transport Act and the Regulations are statutory and its employees are entitled to the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. The Corporation or an instrumentality or other authority under Article 12 is not free, like an ordinary master (a private employer) to terminate the servi.ces of its employees at its whim or caprices or vagary. It is bound by the Act and the Regulation and paramount law of the land, the Constitution. [292G-H; 293A-B] 1.14 Any law, much less the provisions of ~:ontract Act, which are inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of

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the Constitution, are void hy operation of Article 13 of the Constitution. The law of contract, like the legal system itself, involves a balance between competing sets of values. Freedom of contract emphasises the need for stability, certainty and predictability. But, important as values are, they are not absolute, and there comes a point when they face a serious challenge. 'fhis Court, as a court of constitutional conscience

enjoined and is jealously to project and uphold new values in establishing the egalitarian social order. As a court of constitutional functionary exercising equity jurisdiction, this Court would relieve the weaker parties from unconstitutional contractual obligations, unjust, unfair, oppressive· and unconscienabJe rules or conditions when the citizen is really unable to meet on equal terms with the State. It is to find whether the·citizen, when entered into contracts of service, was in distress need

or compelling circumstances to enter into contract on dotted lines or whether the citizen was in a pos~tion of either to "'take it or leave it" and if it finds to be so, this Court would not shirk to avoid the contract by appropriate declaration. [302G, 3038, 304H, 30SA-B] Central Inland Water Transport Company Limited v. Brojonath Ganguly, [1986) 3 SCC 156=AIR 1986 SC 1571, affirmed. Ramdas Vithaldas Durbar v. S. Amarchand & Co., 43 Indian Appeals. 164 and V. Ra!!,hunadha Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1988] 2 A.L.T. 461, referred to.

Anson's Law of Contract, p. 6 and 7 and Professor Guido Calabresi of Yale University Law School "Retractivity, Paramount power and Contractual Changes", 1961-62 71 Yale Law Journal, P. 1191, referred to.

2.1 The golden rule of statutory construction is that the words and phrases or sentences should be interpreted according to the intent of the legislature that passed the Act. All the provisions should be read together. If the words of the statutes are in themselves precise and

unambiguous, the words, or phrases or sentences themselves alone do, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words or phrases or sentences in their natural and ordinary sense. But if any doubt arises

from the terms employed by the legislature, it is always safe means of collecting the intention, to call in aid the ground and cause of making the statute, and have recourse to the preamble, which is a key to open the minds of the makers of the statute and the mischiefs which the Act intends to redress. In determining the meaning of statute the first queslion to ask always is what is the natural or ordinary meaning of that

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D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS

word or phrase in its context. It is only when that meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intent of ' the legislature, then it is proper to look for some other possible meaning and the court cannot go further. (3230-G] 2.2 The Doctrine of Reading Down is, therefore, an internal aid io construe the Word or phrase in a statute to give reasonable meaning, but not to detract, disort or emasculate the language so as to give the

supposed purpose to avoid unconstitutionality. Thus, the object of read·

ing down is to keep the operation of the statute within the purpose of the Act and constitutionally valid. [324E, 3258] 2.3 It cannot be accepted that the Courts, in the process of interpretation of the Statute, would not make law but leave it to the legislature for necessary amendments. In an appropriate case, Judges would articulate the inarticulate major premise and would give life and force to a Statute by reading harmoniously all the provisions ironing out the creezes. The object is to alongate the purpose of the Act. ,(3238]

c.

2.4 The Courts, though, have no power to amend the law by process of interpretation, but do have power to mend it so as to be in conformity .with the intendment of the legislature. Doctrine of reading down is one of the principles of interpretation of statute in that process. But when the offending language used hy the legislature is clear, precise and unambiguous, violating the relevant provisions in the constitution, resort cannot be had to the doctrine of reading down to blow life into ·the void law to save it from unconstitutionality or to confer jurisdiction on the legislature. Similarly it cannot be· taken aid of to emasculate the precise, explicit, clear and unambiguous language to confer arbitrary, nnbridled and uncanalised power on an employer which is a negation to jnst, fair and reasonable procedure envisaged under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constituiion and to direct the authorities to record ~easons, unknown or unintended procedure. ,(3268, 327A-B]

-Elliott Ashton Walsh, II v. United States, 398 U.S. 333; Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar & Ors., (1953] SCR 533 at 544-45; United States v. Wunderlick, 342 U.S. 93; S.C. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, (1967] 2 SCR 703; In re Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, (1941] FCR, 12; K.N. Singh v. State of Bihar, (1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 769; R.L. Arora v. State of U.P., (1964] 6 SCR 784; Jagdish Pandev v. Chancellor of the Bihar, [1969] l SCR 231; Amritsar Municipality v. State of Punjab, [1969] 3 SCR 447; Sunil Batra v. Delhi . Admn .. [1978] 4 SCC 494; N. C Dalwadi_v. State of Gujarat, [1987] 3

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SCC 611; Charania/ Sahu v. Union of India, [1989] Suppl. Scale I at p. 61; Delhi Transport Undertaking v. Balbir Saran Goel, [1970] 3 SCR 747; Air India Corporation v. Rebel/ow, (1972] 3 SCR 606 and Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. P.S. Malyankar, [1978] 3 SCR 1000, referred to. Federal Steam Navigation Co. v. Department of Trade and Industry, [1974] 2 All E.R. 97 at p. 100 and Saints High School, Hyderabad v. Govt. of A.P., (1980] 2 SCR 924, referred to. Craies Statute Law, 7th Ed. Ch. V, P. 64.

2.5 The language of Regulation 9(b) is not capable of two ioterpretations. This power is in addition to the normal power in Regulation 15 to conduct an enquiry into misconduct after giving reasonable opprotunity. Thereby, the legislative intention is manifest that it intended to confer such draconian power couched in language of width which hangs like Damocles sword on the neck of the employee, keeping every employee on tenter-hook under constant pressure of uncertainty, precarious tenure at all times right from the date of appointment till date of superannuation. It equally enables the employer to pick and choose an employee at whim or vagary to terminate the service arbitrarily and capriciously. Regulation 9(b), thereby deliberately conferred wide power of termination of services of the employee without following the principles of audi alteram partem or even modicum of procedure of representation before terminating the services of permanent employee. (327E-G] 2.6 No doubt, the power to take appropriate arid expeditious action to meet the exigencies of weeding out inefficient, corrupt, indo-

lent officers or employees from service should be provided and preserved to the competent authority but any action taken without any modicum of reasonable procedure and prior opportunity always generates an unquenchable feeling that unfair treatment was meted out to the aggrieved employee. To prevent lili~carriage of justice or hi

was taken behind the back of an employee without opportunity, the law must provide a fair, just and reasonable procedure as is exigible io a given circumstance as adumbrated io proviso to Art. 31}(2) of the Constitution. If an individual action is taken as per the procedure on its own facts its legality may be tested. But it would be no justification to

arrest a nursing grievance that arbitrar)' whimsiral or tapririoµs action

~

roofer power with wide discretion on any authority· without aily proce-

dure which wouid not meet the test of justness, fairness anil reasonable-

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D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS

ness envisaged under Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, conferment of power with wide discretion without any guidelines, without any just, fair or reasonable procedure is constitutionally anathema. to Arts. 14, 16(1), 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution. Doctrine of read• ing down cannot be extended to such a situation. [328A-C, 3298-C] 2. 7 In view of the march oflaw, made by Article 14 it is too late in the day to contend that the competent authority would be vested with wide discretionary power without any proper guidelines or the procedure. When it is found that the legislative intention is unmistakably clear, unambiguous and specific, the preamble, the other rules and the circumstances could not be taken aid of in reading down the provisions Of the rules or the regulations of the constitutional scheme. [330F -G] 3.1 The phrases "public policy", opposed to public policy, or "contrary to public policy" are incapable of precise definition. It is valued to -meet the PllbJic good or the public interest. What is public good or in the public interest or what W!mld be injurious or harmful to the public good or the public interest vary from time to time with the change of the circumstances. Therefore, in the absence of specific head

of public policy which covers a case, then the court must in consonance

. with public conscience and in keeping with public good and public interest invent new public policy and declare such practiee or rules that are derogatory to the constitution to be opposed to public policy. The rules which stem from the public policy must of necessity be laid to further the progress of the society, in particular when social change is to bring about an egalitarian social order through rule of law. In deciding a case which may not be covered by authority, courts have before them the beacon light of the trinity of the Constitution viz., the preamble, Part III and Part IV and the play of legal light and shade must lead on the path of justice social, economic and political. Lacking precedent, the court can always be guided by that light and the guidance thus shed by the trinity of our Constitution. [308C-D, 309G-H, 310A] 3.2 Since Constitutions are the superior law of the land, and because one of their outstanding features is. flexibility and capacity to meet changing conditions, constitutional policy provides a valuable aid in determining the legitimate boundaries of statutory meaning. Thus public policy having its inception in Constitutions may accomplish either a restricted or extended interpretation of the literal expression Of a statute. A statute is always presumed to be constitutional and where necessary, a constitutional meaning will be inferred to preserve validity. Likewise, where a statute tends to extend or preserve a constitutional

F f

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principle, reference to analogous constitutional provisions may be of great value in shaping the statute to accord with the statutory aim or objective. Therefore, when the provisions of an Act or Regulations or Rules are assailed as arbitrary, unjust, unreasonable, unconstitutional, public law element makes it incumbent to consider the validity thereof on the anvil of inter play of Arts. 14, 16(1), 19(1)(g) and 21 and of the inevitable effect of the provision challenged on the rights of a citizen and to find whether they are constitutionally valid. [310C-O, 3UE] 4. The absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law npon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by rule of· law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, most be confined within defined limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and, in general, such decisions should he predictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule it is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. [3280-E] 5. No doubt, it is open to the authorities to terminate the services of a temporary employee without holding an enquiry. But in view of the march of law made, viz., that it is not the form of the action but the substance of the order which is to be looked into, it is open to the Court to lift the veil and pierce the action challenged to find whether the said action is the foundation to impose punishment or is only a motive. The play of fair play is to secure justice procedural as well as substantive. The substance of the order, the effect thereof is to be looked into. [330C-O] Shamsher Singh v .. State of Punjab, [1975] 4 SCR 814, referred to. It is for concerned authorities to make appropriate rules or regulations and to take appropriate action even without resorting to elaborate enquiry needed consistent with the constitutional scheme. [331A]

Workmen of Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. & Ors., [1985] 2 SCR 428, referred to. Ram Chanderv. Union of India, [1986] 2 SCR 980, referred to. '

6. The ratio in Brojonath's case was correctly laid down and requires no recons\deration. [3310]

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS

Central Inland Water Transport Company Limited v. Brojonath Ganguly, [1986] 3 SCC 156=AIR 1986 SC 1517, affirmed.

Per Mukharji, CJ., (Contra) I. The constitutionality of the conferment of power to terminate services of a permanent employee without holding an enquiry is sus-

tained by reading that the power must be exercised on reasons relevant

for the efficient running of the services or performing of the job by the societies or the bodies. It should be done objectively, the reasons should be recorded, and the basis that it is not feasible or possible reasonably to hold any enqiry without disclosing the evidence which in the circumstances of the case would be hampering the running of the institution. The reasons though recorded, need not be communicated, it is only for the purpose of running of the institution. There should be factors which hamper running of the institution without the ter. mination of the employment of the employee concerned at the particular time, either because he is a surplus or inefficient, disobedient and dangerous. [235C-El

2.1 The philosophy of the Indian Constitution, as it has evolved, from precedent to precedent, has broadened the horizons of the right of the employees. and they have been assured security of! tenures and ensured protection against arbitrariness and discrimination in discharge or termination of his employment. This is the basic concept of the evolution from the different angles of law of master and servant or in the evolution of employer and employee relationship. It. is true that the law has travelled in different channels, government servants or servants or employees having status have to be differentiated from those whose relationships are guided by contractual obligations. However, the basic and fundamental question to be judged is, in what manner and

to what extent, the employees of either of semi-Government or statutory

corporations or public undertakings who enjoy the rights, privileges, limitations and inhibitions of institutions who come within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution could be affected in their security of tenure by the employers consistent with the rights evolved over the years and rights emanating from the philosophy of the Constitution as at present understood and accepted. [229D-G]

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2.2 Efficiency of the administration of these undertakings is very vital and relevant consideration. Production must continne, services most be maintained and run. Efficacy of the servic~s can be manned only by the disdplined employees or workers. Discipline, decency and

C

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order will have to be maintained. Employees should have sense of participation and involvement and necessarily sense of security in semipermanent or quasi-permanent or permanent employment. There must be scope for encouragement for good work. In what manner and in what measure, this should be planned and ensured within the framework of the Constitution and, power mingled with obligations, and duties enjoined with rights, are matters of constitutional adjustment at any particular evolved stage of the philosophy of our Constitution. [230A-C] 2.3 Arbitrary, whimsical or discriminatory action can flow or follow in some cases by the preponderance of these powers to terminate. The fact that the power is entrusted with a high ranking authority or body is not always a safe or sound insurance against misuse. At least, it does not always ensure against erosion of credibility in the exercise of the power in particular contingency. Yet discipline has to be maintained, efficiency of the institution has to be ensured. It has to be recognised that quick actions are very often necessary in running of an institution or public service or public utility and public concern. It is not always possible to have enquiry because disclosure is difficult; evidence is hesitant and difficult, often impossible. In those circumstances, the approach to the location of power, possession and exercise of which is essential for efficient running of the industries or services, has to be a matter both of balancing and adjustment, on which one can wager the salavation of rights and liberties of the employees concerned and the future of the industries or the services involved. [330D-F] 2.4 The power to terminate the employment of permanent employment must be there. Efficiency and expediency and the necessity of running an industry or service make it imperative to have these powers. Power must, therefore, be with authorities to take decision quickly, objectively and independently. Power must be assumed with certain conditions of duty. The preamble, the policy, purpose of the enacting provision delimit the occasions or the contingencies for the need for the

exercise of the power and these should limit the occasions of exercise of such powers. The manner in which such exercise of power should be made should ensure fairness, avoid arbitrariness and ma/a fide and create credibility in the decisions arrived at or by exercise of the power. All these are essential to ensure that power is fairly exercised and there is fair play in action. Reasons, good and sound, must control the exercise of power. [230G-H, 231A) Thus, for the running of the industry or the service, efficiently,

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D.T.C. '· D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS

quickly and in a better manner or to avoid dead-locks or inefficiency or friction, the vestin~_of the power in circumstances must be such that it will evoke credibility and confidence. Notice of hearing and opportunity in the form of an. enquiry may or may not be given, yet arbitrariness and discrimination. and acting whimsically must he avoided. These .powers must, therefore, be so read that the powers can be exercised on reasons, which should be recorded, though need not alw3ys be communicated, and must be by authorities who are high ranking or senior enough and competent and are expected to act fairly, objectively and independently. The occasion for the use of power must be clearly circumscribed in the above limits. These must also circumscribe that the need for exercise of those powers without holding a detailed or prolonged enq11iry' is there, [231E, F.G)

Work.men of Hindustan Steel Ltd. & Anr. v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. Ors., [1985) 2 SCR 428; West Bengal State Electricity Board and Others v. Desh Bandhu Ghosh and Others, [1985) 3 SCC 116; Moti Ram Deka v. North East Frontier Railway, [19851 5 SCR 683; S.S. Muley v. J.R.D. Tata, [1979) 2 SLR 438; Manohar P. Kharkhar v. D Raghuraj, [1981) 2 LLJ 459; Centrai"Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and Anr. v. Brojo Nath Gangu/y and Anr., (1985] 3 SCC 156; Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, (1975] 3 SCR 619; Union of India & Anr. v. Tulsi Ram Patel, [1985] Suppl. 2 SCR 131 at p. 166; Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Workmen & Anr., [1964] 2 SCR 125 at 130; L. Michael & Anr. v. M/s Johnston Pumps India E Ltd., [1975) 3 SCR 489 at 498; Delhi Transport Corporation Undertaking v. Balbir Saran Goel, [1970] 3 SCR 757 at 764; Air India Corporation, Bombay v. V.A. Rebel/ow & Anr., [1972] 3 SCR 606; Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. P.S. Malvenkar & Ors., [1978] 3 SC::R 1000 at page 1006; Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, [1968] 1 SCR 185 •at 195 D·E; Champak Lal Chiman Lal Shah v. The Union of F India, [1964] 5 SCR 190 at 204; Ram Gopal Chaturvedi v. State of M.P., [1970) 1 SCR 472 at 475; Gheru Lal Parekh v. Mahadeodas Maiva & Others, [1959] Supp. 2 SCR 406 at 440; O.P. Bhandari v. 1. T. D: C. & Ors., [1986] 4 SCC 337; The Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, [1941] FCR 12; Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union ( Regd.) Sindri and Others v. Union of India and Others, [1981] 2 SCR G at 60·61; Ajay Hasia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors. etc., [1981) 2 SCR 79at100·102; A. V. Nachane & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr., [1982] 2 SCR 246; India Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer, Bhavanipore & Ors., [1975]2 SCR 619 at 657; A. L. Kalra v. The Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd., [1984] 3 SCR 646 at 664; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India.& Ors., [1984] 2 H ~

.

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SCR 79 at 101; Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd. v. The Workmen & Ors., [1967] 1 SCR 652 at 669; The Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathe/la Sampathu Chetty, [1962] 3 SCR 786 at 825; Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. Radhakrishan & Ors., (supra); Gurdev Singh Sidhu v. State of Punjab & Anr., [1964] 7 SCR 587 at 592-593; U.P. State Electricity Board v. Hari Shankar Jain, [1979] 1 SCR 355/362-3; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Anr., [1988] 2 SCC 602; S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India and Ors., [1967] 2 SCR 703 at p. 718-19 and Kesavananda Bharati v, State of Kera/a, [1973] Supp. I SCR 1, referred to. A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay, (Connerly Instone), [1974] 1W.L.R.1308, referred to. Chitty on Contract, 46th Edition Vol. II, p. 808 or 25th Edition Vol. II p. 712 paragraph and Halsbury's Law of England, 4th Edition Vol. No. 16 paras 607 and 608, referred to.

3.1 Courts have been tempted to read down in the path of judicial law making on the plea that legislature. could not have intended to give powers to the authorities or employers which would be violative of fundamental rights of the persons involved in the exercise of those powers and, therefore, should be attributed those powers on conditions which will only make these legal or valid. Our law making bodies are not law unto themselves and cannot create or make all laws. They can only confer powers or make laws for the conferment of powers on authorities which are legal and valid. Such_powers conferred must conform to the constitutional inhibitions. [232C-D] 3.2 Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted from experience of evils. But its general language should not n.ecessarily be confined to the form that the evil had taken place. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes and new awareness

of limitations. Therefore, a principle to be valid must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is particularly true of the constitutional constructions. Constitutions are not

ephemeral enactments designed to meet passing occasions, but designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach

it. In the application of a Constitutional limitation or inhibition, the interpretation cannot be only of 'what has been' but of 'what may be'. Therefore, in the interpretation of the provisions of an Act, where two constructions are possible, the one which leads towards constitutiona-

lily of the legislation would be preferred to that which has the effect of

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D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS

destroying it. If the Courts do not read the conferment of power in the aforesaid manner, the power is liable to be struck. down as bad. l233B-D]

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3.3 The Court must proceed on the premise that the law making authority intended to make a valid law to confer power validly or which will be valid. The freedom, therefore, to search the spirit of the enactment or what is entended to obtain or to find the intention of the Parliament gives the Court the power to supplant and supplement the expressions used to say what was left unsaid. This is an important branch of judicial power, the concession of which if taken to tht extreme is dangerous, but denial of that power would be ruinous and this is not contrary to the expressed intention of the.legislature.or the implied purpose of the legislation. [234G-H; 23SA]

3.( It has been said that if the legislature has manifested a clear intention to exerc~se an unlimited power, it is impermissible to read down the amplitude of that power so as to make it limited. This cannot be agreed to. Our legislatures are limited by the constitutional inhibitions and it is made, that the Court should read their Acts and .enact- · D ments with the attribute that they know their limits and could not han intended to violate the Constitution. It is true that the Court should be loath to read down where there are clear. unambiguous and positive terms in a legislation and should procec.: with a straight forward method of striking down such legislations. But where !re statute is silent or not expressive or inarticulate, the Court must read down in the E silence of the statute and in the inarticulation of its provisions, the Constitutional inhibitions and transmute the major inarticulate premise into a reality and read down the statute accordingly. [236H, 237A-B] 3.~ The plain thrust of legislative enactment has to be found out in the inarticulate expressions and in the silence of the legislation. In doing so, to say what the legislature did not specifically say, is not distortion to avert any constitutional collision .. [237E)

. In the language of the relevant provisions of the instant cases, there is no intention of the legislature to flout the constitutional limitations. [237E]

Elliot Ashto Welsh II v. United States, 398 US 333, 26 Ed. 2d. 308, referred to. 3.6 It is not that the reading down is used for a purpose which is just the opposite which the legislature had intended. Legislature had not

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intended arbitrary or uncontrolled or whimsical power. Indeed it considered. This is not the proper way to read that power in the Regulation 9(b). Para 522 of the Shastri Award, read properly, must be circumscribed with the conditions indicated above as a necessary corollary or consequence of that power. It is also not reading to the legislature conditions which were not there in the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. [237H, 238A-B]

Union of India & Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel, [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 131, relied on.

No doubt, absolute powers cannot be regulated without essential legislative policy, but in the instant cases properly read, absolute power was not there. Power that was only constitutionally valid, that power can be presumed to have been given and if that presumption is made, conditions indicated above inevitably attach. But these conditions are necessary corollary flowing from the conferment of the power of termination in a .constitutional manner for the smooth, proper and efficient running of the industry. [238C, El 3. 7 In the circumstancs power must be there, the power must be read down in the man~er and to the extent indicated above, of terminat-

ing the services of permanent employees without holding any enquiry in the stated contingencies and this would he either by virtue of the silence of the provision indicating the contingencies of termination or by virtue of constitutional inhibitions. That reading would not violate the theory that judges should not make laws. [238F-G]

Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tandolkar, [1959] SCR 279 at 299; Jyoti Prasad v. The Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, [1962] 2 SCR 125 at 139; Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha & Anr., [1970] 2 SCC 450 at 461; N.C. Dalwadi v. State of Gujarat, [1987] 3 SCC 611 paragraphs 9 and IO at page 619; Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., Indore & Ors. v. Radhakrishan & Ors., [1979] 2 SCC 249 at 257; Olga Tellis & Ors. etc. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., [1985] Suppl. 2 SCR SI at 89; R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, [1957] SCR 930 at p. 935 and 938; Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, [1962] Supp. 2 SCR 769; R.L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1964] 6 SCR 784; Jagdish Pandev v. The Chancellor, University of Bihar & Anr., [1968] 1 SCR 231, at pages 236-237; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration & Ors., [1978] 4 SCC 494; Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam & Ors., [1989] 3 SCC 709; Charan Lal Sahu & Ors. v. Union of India, [1989] Suppl. SCALE I, at

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS

pages 53 and54, paras 101 as well asp. 61para114; Shah & Co. v. State of Maharashtra, [1967] 3 SCR 466 at 477-78; M. Pentiah and On. v. Veera-Mallappa al'!d Ors., [1961] 2 SCR 295; Ba,ngalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board etc. v. A. Rajappa & Ors., [1978] 3 SCR 207; Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors., v. Union of India & Ors., [1981] l SCR 206, at p .. 239 and 259; Elliott Ashton Welsh, II v. United States, 26 Lawyers' Edition 2nd, 308 at 327; Malinakhva Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar & Ors., [1953] SCR 533, at p. 544-545 and Municipal Committee, Amritsar & Anr. v. State of Punjab & ors., [1969] 3 SCR 447, referred to. United States of America v. E.dward A. Rumely, 91 Lawyers Edition 770 at 775; Reg. v. Sadlers Co., IO H.L.C. 404, 460 and 463; Framamus v. Film Artists Association, 196 2 QB 527 at 542 and Seaford Court Estates, [1949] 2 KB 481, referred to . .H.M. Seervaid 'Constitutional Law of India', 3rd Edn. Vol. I pages 119-120 and Lord Denning: "The discipline of Law", at p. 12, referred to.

3.8 Termination simpliciter under Regulation 9(b) of the Regulation 1952, IJelhi Road Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment and Services) or similar powers can be-exercised only in circumstances

other than those in Regulation 9(a). The exercise of such powers can only be for purposes germane and relevant to the statute, viz., the .employee is incompetent or unsuitable so as to make his continuance in the employment detrimental to the interest of the institution, or where the continuance of the employee is a grave security risk making his continuance detrimental to the interest of the Corporation and w·here because of the conduct of the employee, or there is lack of confidence in ·the employee which makes it necessary in the interest of the Corporation to immediately terminate the services of the employee etc., etc. Therefore, each case of conferment .of power inv0lved should he ju~ed on the afor.esaid basis. [236E-GJ

3,9 Having regard to the finality of the position of law and having regard to the theory that parties have adjusted their rights on the G understanding of the law as it was, justice of the situation would be met if pending litigations are examined and disposed of in the light of aforesaid principles. Where issues of damages or consequences of termination by virtue of exercise of the power are still pending adjudication in any for0m and hav~ ben been finally adjudicated, these should be .re-ex3mined by the appropriate authorities before whom these issues H

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are pending, but previous terminations, where no lis is pending, will not be reopened. To that extent, the law will be prospective. [239D-F]

4. This Court, under Article 141 of the Constitution, is enjoined to declare law. The expression 'declared' is wider than the words 'found or made'. To declare is to announce opinion. Indeed, the latter involves the process, while the former expresses result. Interpretation, ascertainment and evolution are parts· of the process, while that interpreted, ascertained or evolved is declared as a law. The law declared by this Court is the law of the land. To deny this power to this Court on the basis of some outmoded theory that the Court only finds law but does not make it, is to make ineffective the powerful instrument of justice placed in the hands of the highest judiciary of this country. Therefore. there should be a more active and creative role for the courts in declaring what the law is. [240E·G]

1. C. Go/aknath & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr., [1967] 2 SCR 762@8! I; 813/84, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLA1E JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2876 of 1986. From the Judgment and Order dated 14.5. 1986 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 1422 of 1985.

Soli J. Sorabji, Attorney General, Ashok Desai, Solicitor General, Vinod Bobade, M.C. Bhandare, M.K. Ramamurthv, R.K. Garg, Mrs. Shyamala Pappu, P.P. Rao, Mrs. J. Wad, Mrs. Aruna Mathur, Ms. A. Subhashini, P. Parmeshwaran, D.K. Garg, A.K. Sil, G. Joshi, S.K. Gupta, B.R. Sabharwal, Mrs. Seita Vidyalingam, S.K. Bisaria (NP), _Salman Kurshid, Irshad Ahmad, V.D. Phadke, A. Sharan, Lalit Bhasin, Ms. Nina Gupta, Vineet Kumar, R.C. Bhatia, P.C. Kapur (NP), B.S. Charya (NP), Vijay K. Verma,_C.M. Nayar, H.S. Munjral and A. V.S.L. Somayajulu (NP) for the appearing parties. Satnam Singh appellant in person in C.A. No. 1115 of 1976. The Judgments of the Court were delivered by

SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, CJ. These civil appeals, special leave petitions and civil miscellaneous petitions deal with the question of constitutional validity of the right of the employer to terminate the

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS [MUKHARJI. CJ.I

services of permanent employees without holding any inquiry in certain circumstances by reasonable notice or pay in lieu of notice. The facts involved in these matters are diverse but the centralquestion involved in all these is one, i.e. whether the clauses permitting the employers or the authorities concerned to terminate the employment cif the employees by giving reasonable notice or pay in liea of notice but without holding any inquiry, are constitutionally valid and, if not, what would be the consequences of termination by virtue of such clauses or powers, and further whether such powers and clauses could be so read with such conditions which would make such powers con· stitutionally and legally valid? Jn order to appreciate the question the factual matrix of these cases so far as these are relevant for the • determination of the aforesaid questions, will have to be borne in mind in the light of the actual legal provisions involved in the respective cases. It will, therefore, be proper and appropriate to deal with the relevant facts in civil appeal No. 2876 of 1986 first. The appellant herein-the Delhi Transport Corporation, is a statu(ory body formed and established under Section 3 of the Delhi Road Transport Act, 1950 read with Delhi Road Transport (Amendment) Act, 1971 (hereinafte_r called 'the Act'). The appellant carries out the objects of vital public utility, according to the appellant, i.e. transport of passengers in the Union Territory of Delhi and other areas. Respondent No. 2, Sri Ishwar Singh was appointed as conductor therein on probation for a period of 1 year in 1970. The probation period was extended thereafter for a further period of one year and thereafter he was regularised in service of the appellant. Similarly, respondent No. 3-Sri Ram Phal was appointed as Assistant Traffic Incharge and after the probation period he was regularised in service. Respondent No. 4--Sri Vir Bhan was appointed as driver and after completing the probation period he was also regularised in service.His stated that respondents Nos. 2 to 4 became, according to the appellant, inefficient in their work and started inciting other staff members· not to perform their duties. They were served with termination notices on 4th June, 1985 under Regulation 9(b) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment & Service) Regulations, 1952. On - I Ith June, 1985 respondents Nos. 2 to 4 and their Union being respondent No. 1DTC Mazdoor Congress, filed writ petition No. 1422/85 in Delhi High Court, challenging the constitutional validity of Regulation 9(b) of the Delhi Ro~d Transport Act. On llth•May, 1986 the division bench of the·High Court of Delhi allowed the said writ petition and struck down Re_gulation 9(b) of the said Regulations, and directed the appellant to

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pay back respondents' wages and benefits within 3 months from the daie of the said judgment. This is an appeal, therefrom, by special leave. The question, therefore, is, was the High Court justified i~ the view it took? It may be mentioned that regulations 9(a) & (b) were framed in exercise of the powers conferred u/s 53 of the said Act, which enables the formulation of Regulations. Regulation 9 of the said regulations, which is material for the present controversy, reads as follows: "9. Termination of service: (a) Except as otherwise specified in the appointment orders, the services of an employee of the authority may be terminated without any notice or pay in lieu of notice: (i) During the period of probation and without assigning any reason thereof. (ii) Fot misconduct,

(iii) On the completion of specific period of appointment. (iv) In the case of employees engaged on contract for a specific period, on the expiration of such period in accordance with the terms of appointment.

(b) Where the termination is made due to reduction of establishment or in circumstances other than those mentioned at (a) above, one month notice or pay in lieu thereof will be given to all categories of employees.

(c) Where a regular/temporary employee wishes to resign from his post under the authority he shall give three/one month's notice in writing or pay in lieu the.reof to the Authority provided that in special cases, the General Manager may relax, at his discretion, the conditions regarding the period of notice of resignation or pay in lieu thereof."

The said Regulat"ion, as set out hereinbefore, deals with termination of services. Four contingencies are contemplated vide clause (a) of Regulation 9, whereupon the services of employees may be terminated without any notice or pay in lieu thereof except as otherwise provided in the appointment order. Apart from these four oontingencies where termination is made due to reduction of establishment

D.T.C v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS [MUKHARJI, CJ.]

or in circumstances other than those mentioned in clause (a) above, one month's notice of pay in lieu thereof is required to be given to all categories of employees. Therefore, except in the said four cases, if thete is reduction . of establishment or there is any terminatiori uncovered by these four contingencies referred to in clause (a) the sanie shall be by giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof to all categories of employees. Clause (c) postulates when a regular or temporary employee wishes to resign from his post under the authority then in such a situation one month's notice in writing or pay in lieu thereof io the authority may be provided. The High Court in the judgment urtder appeal noted that since the filing of this petition the notices issued by D.T.C. to its various employees have beert withdrawn and all these persons have been reinstated, therefore, the court was not concerned with the validity of clause {a) of Regulation 9 but respondents Nos. 2 to 4 against whom action had been taken by the appellant by issuing notices of termination undet Regulation 9{b) had not been reinstated and the court considered the validity of Regulation 9{b ). It was held by the court that the said provision gave absolute, unbridled and arbitrary powers to the Management to terminate the services of any permanent or temporary employee. It was contended that such power was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In support of this contention, reliance had been placed, on whkh the High Court also relied upon, on the decision of this Court in Workmen of Hindustan Steel Ltd. & Anr. v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. & Ors., [1985] 2 SCR 428. In that case, Standing Order 31 of M/s. Hindustan Steei Ltd., a public sector undertaking, had prescribed for a detailed procedure for dealing with cases of misconduct; and for imposing major penalty, the employer had to draw up a chargesheet and give an opportunity to the delinquent workman to make his representation within 7 days. If the allegations were coritt<iverted, an enquiry had to be held by an .officer to be nominated by the management and in such an eriquiry reasonable opportunity of explaining and defending the alleged misconduct had to be given fo the workman. Suspension of the delinquent workman pending enquiry was also· permitted. At the ertd of the enquiry, if the charges were proved, and it was provisionally decided to impose any major penalty, the delin' quent workman had to be afforded a further reasonable opportunity to represent why the penalty should not be imposed on him .. Standing Order 32 provided for a special procedure in case a workman was convicted for a criminal offence in a court of law or where the Genetai

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[ i990] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

Manager was satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that it was inexpedient or against the interests of security to continue to employ the workmen' viz. the workman could be removed or dismissed from service without following the procedure laid down in Standing Order No. 31. There the appellant was an Assistant in the respondent's undertaking, who was removed from service on the ground that it was no longer expedient to employ him. The management dispensed with the departmental enquiry, after looking into the secret report of one of their officers that the appellant therein had misbehaved with the wife of an employee and that a complaint in respect thereof had been lodged with the police. In the reference to the Industrial Tribunal, the Tribunal held that as the employer dispensed with the disciplinary enquiry in exercise of the power conferred by Standing Order 32, it could not be said that the dismissal was unjustified, and that if there were allegations of misconduct, the employer was quite competent to pass an order of removal from service without holding any enquiry in view of the provisions contained in Standing Order 32, and rejected the reference. There was an appeal to this Court. This Court held that the reasons for dispensing with the enquiry do not spell out what was the nature of the misconduct alleged to have been committed by the appellant and what prompted the General Manager to dispense with the enquiry. As there was no justification for dispensing with the enquiry, imposition of penalty of dismissal without the disciplinary enquiry as contemplated by Standing Order 31 was illegal and invalid. It was directed that the respondent should recall and cancel the order dated 24th August, 1970 removing the appellant from service, and· reinstate him and on the same day the appellant was directed to tender resignation of his post which should be accepted by the respondent. The respondent should pay as and by way of back wages and future wages, a sum of Rs.1.5 lakhs to the appellant within 2 months which should be spread over from year to year commencing from the date of removal from service. It was reiterated that where an order casts a stigma or affected livelihood, before making the order, principles of natural justice of a reasonable opportunity to present one's case. and

controvert the adverse evidence must have full play. Even under the Constitution which permits dispensing withJhe inquiry under Article 311(2) a ·Safeguard is introduced -that the concerned authority must specify reasons for its decision why it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry. Standing Order 32 nowhere obligates the General Manager to record reasons for dispensing with· the inquiry as prescribed by Standing Order 31. On the contrary, it was held that the language of Standing Order 32 en joins a duty upon the General Managi:r to record reasons for his satisfaction why ·it was inexpedient i

'. I.

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS [MUKHARJl. CJ.]

or against the interest of the security of the State to continue to employ the workman. Reasons for dispensing with the enquiry and reasons for not continuing to employ the workman, stand wholly apart from each other. This Court finally observed thafit was time for the public sector undertaking to recast Standing Order, and to bring it in tune with the philosophy of the Constitution failing which the vires of the said Standing Order would have to be examined in an appropriate proceeding. Reliance was also placed before this Hon'ble Court on the decision of this Court in the case of West Bengal State Electricity Board and Others v. Desh Bandhu Ghosh and Others, [1985) 3 SCC 116, where this Court was concerned with regulations 33 and 34 of the West Bengal State Electricity Board. The said regulations 33(1) and 34 were as follows:

"33(1) Unless otherwise specified in tj:Je appointment order in any particular case, the services of a permanent employee of the Board may be terminated without noticeD

(i) on his attaining the age of retirement or by reason of a declaration by the competent medical authority that he is unfit for further service; or (ii) as a result of disciplinary action; (iii) if he remains absent from duty, on leave or otherwise, for a continuous period exceeding 2 years.

34. In case .of a permanent employee, his services may be

terminated by serving three months' notice or on payment of salary for the corresponding period in lieu thereof." The High Court had come to the conclusion in that case that Regulation 34 was arbitrary in nature and suffered from the vice of enabling discrimination. The High Court, therefore, struck down the first paragraph of Regulation 34 and as a consequence quashed the order terminating the services of the first respondent therein. It was contended before this court on appeal that the Regulation 34 did not offend Article 14 of the Constitution, that Sections 18-A and 19 of the Electricity Supply Act laid down sufficient guidelines for the exercise of the power under Regulation 34 and in any case the power to terminate the services of any permanent employee was vested in high rankfog officials who might be expected to exercise the same in a

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reasonable way. This Court was unable to accept that argument. This · Court was of the view that the regulation was totally arbitrary and conferred on the Board a power which was capable of vicious discrimination. This Court was of the view that it was naked 'hire and fire' rule. the time for banishing which, according to this Court in the said decision, altogether from employer-employee relationship was fast approaching. It is only parallel, this Court was of the view, to the Henry VIII clause so familiar to administrative lawyers. Reference was made to the decision of this Court in Moti Ram Deka v. North East Frontier Railway, [1985] 5 SCR 683, where Rules 148(3) and' 149(3) of the Indian Railway Establishment Code had been challenged on the ground that these Rules were contrary to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The challenge was upheld though no opinion was expressed on the question whether the rule offended Article 14 of the Constitution or not since then Article 14 has been interpreted in several decisions of this Court and conferment and exercise of arbitrary .power on and by the State or its instrumentalities have been frowned upon and struck down by this Court as offending Article 14 cit the Constitution. >

Indeed, it was noted in S.S. Muley v. J.R.D. Tata, [1979] 2 SLR 438 by this Court that, Justice Sawant, of Bombay High Court had considered at great length Regulation 48(a) of the Air India Employees' Service Regulations which conferred similar power on the Corporation as Regulation 34 confers on the Board in the present case. The learned Judge therein (Sawant, J.) had struck down that Regulation. Reliance had also been placed on another decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Manohar P. Kharkhar v. Raghuraj, [1981] 2 LLJ 459. This Court found it difficult to accept the reasoning therein. In that view of the matter the appeal was dismissed. Refe.rence in this connection may also be made to the decision of this Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and Anr. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Anr., [1986] 3 SCC 156. There the appellant-Corporation was a Government company incorporated under the Companies Act. The majority shares of the Corporation were held by the States of West Bengal and Assam. Article 51 of the Articles of Association of the Corporation conferred upon the President of India power to issue directions/instructions regarding affairs and cond1ict of the business of the Corporation or of the Directors thereof as also regarding exercise and performance of its functions pertaining to national security and public interest. Article 51-A of the I

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D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDGL'b'. CONGRESS [MUKHARJI, CJ.]

said articles entitled the President to call for returns, accounts etc. of the Corporation. Articles 14, 15, 16, 17 and 37 conferred on the Presi- A dent power to appoint and remove Chairman and the Board of Directors of the Corporation. Articles 41 and 42 were regarding the President's control over the working of the Corporation. Article 47 provided for appointment of the auditors of the Corporation to be made by the Central Government on the advice of the Comptroller B and Auditor-General of India and the nature of control to be ex~rcised by the Comptroller and Auditor-General in the matter of audit and accounts. Since another company namely the Rivers Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. was carrying on the same business as the Corporation was doing, a Scheme of Arrangement was entered into between the Corporation and that Company for dissolution of the latter and taking over of its business and liabilities by the· former. The Scheme, inter alia, stipulated that the Corporation shall take as many of the existing staff or labour as were possible and that those who could not be taken over · shall be paid by the transferor company all moneys due to them under the law and all legitimate and legal compensations payable to them either under Industrial Disputes Act or otherwise legally admissible D and that such moneys shall be provided by the Government of India to the transferor Company who would pay these dues. The Calcutta High Court approved the Scheme. Each of the respondents therein were in the service of the said company. Their seryices were taken over by the Corporation after the High Court's sanction to the Scheme of Arrangement. While the respondent Ganguly therein was appointed E as the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer and was later promoted as Manager (Finance), the respondent Sengupta was appointed as Chief Engineer (River Services) and was later promoted as General Manager (River Services). Their appointment letters were in stereotype forms under which the Corporation could without any previous notice terminate their services, if. the Corporation was satisfied that F the employee was unfit medically or if he was guilty of any insubordination, intemperance or other misconduct, or of any breach of any rules pertaining to this service or conduct or non-performance of his duties. The letters of appointment further stipulated that they would have been subject to the rules and regulations of Corporation. Rule 9(i) of the Corporation's Service, Discipline and Appeal Rules of 1979 G had provided that the services of permanent employee could be terminated on. three months' pay plus DA to the employee or on deduction of a like amount from his salary as the case might be in lieu of the notice. By confidential letter the re5pondent Ganguly was asked to reply within 24 hours to the allegations of negligence made against him. After having his representation and detailed reply, a notice under H

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Rule 9(i) was served on him terminating his services with immediate effect by paying three months' pay. Similarly a charge-sheet was issued to the respondent Sengupta intimating that a disciplinary inquiry was proposed against him under the Rules and calling upon him to file his written statement of defence. Sengupta denied the charges made against him and asked for inspection of documents and copies of statements of witnesses mentioned in the said charge-sheet. But a notice was serviced on him under Rule 9(i) terminating his services with immediate effect of paying three months' salary. Both Ganguiy and Sengupta filed Writ Petitions before High Court. A Division Bench of that Court allowed the same. The Corporation filed appeals before this Court. The main questions for determination therein were (i) whether the appellant-Corporation was an instrumentality of the State so as to be covered by Article 12 and 36 of the Constitution and (ii) whether an unconscionable term in a contract of employment entered into with the Corporation was void under Section 23 of the Contract Act and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and as such whether Rule 19(i) which formed part of the contract of employment between the Corporation and its employees to whom the said Rules applied, was void? This Court confirmed the judgment of the High Court with modification in the declaration made and dismissed the Corporation's appeal to this Court. This Court held that the appellant was State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. This Court further held that an unconscionable bargain or contract is one which is irreconcilable with what is right or reasonable or \he terms of which are so unfair and unreasonable that they shock the conscience of the Court. This Court was of the view that the doctrine of distributive justice is another jurisprudential concept which has affected the law of contracts. According to that doctrine, distributive fairness and justice in the possession of wealth and property could be achieved not only by taxation and regulatory control of private and contractual transactions even though this might involve some sacrifice of individual liberty. This Court referred to articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution so far as the test of reasonableness was concerned. The test of reasonableness or fairness of a clause in a contract where there was inequality of bargaining power is another theory recognised in the sphere of law of contacts. It was reiterate_d in that decision that the Courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract, or a clause in the contract. Reference was made to the observations of Lord Dipiock in A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay (formerly Jnstone), [1974] 1W.L.R.1308 and that test was:

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D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS [MUKHARJI, CJ.]

"Whether the restrictions are both reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of the pro- A misee and commensurate with the benefits secured to the promiser under the contract? For the purpose of this test all the provisions of the contract must be taken into consideration." Justice Madon of this Court in the said decision found that this was in consonance with right and reason, intended to -secure social and economic justice and conformed to the mandate of the equality clause in Article 14 of the Constitution. It was further recognised ihat there might be myriad situations which result in unfair and unreasonable bargains between parties possessing wholly disproportionate and unequal bargaining power. These cases can neither be enumerated nor fully illustrated. The Court must judge each case on its own facts and circumstances. The above principle would apply, this Court reiterated, where the inequality of bargaining power is the result of the disparity in the economic strength of the contracting parties ot where the inequality is the result of circumstances, whether of the creation of the D parties or not or where the weaker party is in a position in which he could obtain goods or services or means of livelih<iod only upon the terms imposed by the stronger party or go without them ot where a man had no choice, or rather no meaningful choice, but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted line in prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of rules as part of the contract, how- E

ever, unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable clause in that contract

or form or rules might be. This Court, however, reiterated that this principle would not apply where the bargaining power of the contracting parties is equal or almost equal. This principle would not apply where both parties are businessmen and the contract is a commercial transaction. The contracts of this type to which the principle formulated above applied were not contracts which were tainted with illegality but were contracts which contained terms which were so

unfair and unreasonable that they shock the conscience of the Court.

In the vast majority of cases such contracts are entered into by the · weaker party under pressure of circumstances, generally economic, which results in inequality of bargaining power. Such contracts will not G fall within the four corners of the definition· of "undue influence" given in Section 16( 1) of the Contract Act, even though at times they · are between parties one of whom holds a real or apparent authority over the other. Contracts in prescribed or standard forms or which embody a set of rules as part of the contract are entered into by the party with superior bargaining power with large number of persons or H

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a group of persons, if they are unconscionable, unfair and unreasonable, are injurious to the public interest, should be adjudged void according to Justice Madon, under Section 23 of the Contract Act on the ground of being opposed to public policy. Public policy, it was reiterated, is not the policy of any particular Government. It connotes some matter which concerns the public good and the public interest. B The principles governing public policy must be and are capable on proper occasion, of expansion or modification. If there is no head of public policy which covers a case, then the Court must in consonance with publi~ conscience and in keeping with public goods and public interest declare such practice to be opposed to public policy. In any case which is not covered by authority, courts should be guided by the Preamble to the Constitution and the principles underlying the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles. Rule 9(i) can aptly be called 'the Henry VIII Clause" this Court opined therein. It confers an absolute, arbitrary and unguided power upon the Corporati.on to exercise that power. This Court was concerned with the "Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. Service Discipline and D Appeal Rules" framed by the Corporation. The relevant provisions of the said Rule 9 relating to permanent employees therein were as follows:

.·

"9. Termination of employment for Acts other than misdemeanourE

(i) The employment of a permanent employee shall be subject to termination on three months' notice on either side. The notice )shall be in writing on either side. The c ·company may pay the equivalent of three months basic pay · and dearness allowances, if any, in lieu of notice or may deduct a like amount when the employee has failed to give due notice.

(ii) The services of a permanent employee can be terminated on the grounds of "services no longer required in the interest of the Company" without assigning any reason. A permanent employee whose services are terminated under this clause shall be paid 15 days' basic pay and dearness ·.. allowance for each completed year of continuous service in ·the Company as compensation. In addition he will be · entitled to encashment of leave to his credit."

This Court found that Rule 9(i) can be called 'the Henry VIII

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Clause'. It confers an absolute, arbitrary and unguided power upon A the Corporation. It does not even say who on behalf of the Corpora- . tion was to exercise that power. While the Rules provided for four different modes in which the services of a permanent employee could be terminated earlier than his attaining the age of superannuation, namely, Rules 9(i), 9(ii), 36(iv)(b) read with 38 and 37, Rule 9(i) is the only rule which does not state in what circumstances the power confer- B red by that rule is to be exercised. Thus even where the Corporation . could proceed. under a regular disciplinary inquiry, it is free to resort instead to Rule 9(i) in order to avoid the trouble of an inquiry. No opportunity of a hearing was at all intended to be afforded to the permanent employee whose service was being terminated in the exercise of that power. It violated audi alteram partem rule of natural justice also which was -implicit in Article 14 of the Constitution. It is not covered by any of the situations which would justify the total exclusion of the au di alteram partem rule. The view that the Board of Directors would not exercise this power arbitrarily or capriciously as it consisted of responsible and highly placed persons ignored, it was held, the fact that however highly placed a person might be, he must D necessarily possess human frailties and "power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." It was, however, held that Rule 9(i) was also discriminatory for the Corporation was given power to discriminate between employee and employee. It was stated that it could back up one employee and apply to him Rule 9(i). It could pick up another employee and apply to him Rule 9(ii). It was further E reiterated that the Corporation was a large organisation. The said Rules formed part of the contract of employment between the Corporation and its. employees who were not workmen. These employees had no powerful Union to support them. They had no voice in the framing of the said Rules. They had no choice ·but to accept the said Rules as part of their contract of employment. There was gross dispa- f rity between the Corporation and its employees, whether they be workmen or officers. The Corporation could afford to dispense with the services of an officer and will find many others to take his place but an officer cannot afford to lose his job because if he does so, there are not many jobs waiting for him. It was, therefore, held that clause 9(i) of the said regulation was against right and reasons and it was wholly G unconscionable. It had been entered into between p_arties between whom there was gross inequality of bargaining power. Rule 9(i) was a term of the contract between the Corporation and all its officers, it was noted. It affected a large number of persons and it squarely fell within the principle stated earlier. The Government and its agencies and instrumentalities constitute the largest employer in the country. A 1-i

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clause such as Rule 9(i) in a contract of employment, it was noted, affecting large sections of the public was harmful and injurious to the public interest for it tended to create a sense of insecurity in the minds of those to whom it applied and consequently against public good. Such a clause, therefore, was opposed to public policy and as such it is void under Section 23 of the Contract Act, it was held. It was further B held that it was not possible to accept the contention that this was a contract entered into by the Corporation like any other contract entered into by it in the course of its trading activities and the Court, therefore, ought not to interfere with it. The employees could not be equated with goods which could be bought and sold, nor could a contract of employment be equated with a mercantile transaction between two businessmen. much less when the contract of employment was c between a powerful employer and a weak employee. Although it was reiterated that the aforesaid rule 9(i) was supported by mutuality inasmuch as it conferred an equal right upon both the parties but considering the unequal position of the Corporation and its employees, there was no real mutuality, this Court opined. It was reiterated D that the Corporation being covered by Article 12, its actions must also be in accordance with the Directive Principles prescribed by Part IV of the Constitution. Reference may be made to paragraph 39 of the aforesaid decision where this Court noted that in the working of the Constitution, it was found that some of the provisions of the Constitution were i:iot adequate for the needs of the country or for ushering in a Welfare State and the constituent body empowered in that behal.f amended the Constitution several times. By the very first amendment made in the Constitution, namely, by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 clause (6) of Article 19 was amended with retrospec' tive effect. Under this amemdment, sub-clause (g) of Article 19(1) which guarantees to all citizens the right to carry on occupation, trade or business, was not to prevent the State from making any law relating to the carrying on by the State, or by a Corporation owned or controlA

led by the State, of any tradei business, industry or service, whether to

the exclusion, complete or partial of citizens or otherwise. This amendment also validated the operation of all existing laws insofar as these had made similar provisions. Article 298 of the Constitution, as originally enacted, provided that the executive power of the Union and of each State was to extend, subject to any law made by the appropriate legislature, to the grant, sale, disposition or mortgage of any property held for the purposes of the Union or of such State as the case may be, and to the purchase or acquisition of property for those purposes respectively, and to the making of contracts. and it .further provided that all property acquired for the purposes of the Union or of

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D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS [MUKHARJI. CJ.I

State was to vest in the Union or in such State, as the case might be. This Court referred to the decision of this Court in Sukhdev v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, [1975] 3 SCR 619, "the Governing power wherever located must be subject to the fundamental constitutional limitations." The High Court in the judgment under appeal was unable to accept the plea of alternative remedy and allowed the Writ Petition and declared regulation 9(b) of the Regulations to be illegal and ultra vires and as a consequence thereof the orders teuninating the services of respondents Nos. 1 to 4 were quashed and these respondents were deemed to be in the service of OTC and back wages and all other benefits by way of annual increments were directed to be paid. Learned Solicitor General of India contended before us that in the facts and the circumstances of this case, there was sufficient guideline in the Regulation 9(b) and the power of termination, properly read, would not be arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It may be mentioned that under the general law of contract of employment, which was commonly known as the 'law of master and servant', which is not termed as law of employer and empIoyee, whether the contract of service is for a fixed period or not, if it contained a provision for its termination by notice, it could be so terminated. If there was no provision for giving notice and the contract was not for a fixed period, the law implied an obligation to give a reasonable notice. Where no notice in the first case or no reasonable · notice in the second case was given and the contract was wrongfully terminated, such wrongful termination would give rise to a claim_ for damages. In this connection, reference may be made to the observations of this Court in the five-judge bench decision in Union of India & Anr. v. Tulsi Ram Patel, [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 131 at p. 166. This is also the position at common law. See Chitty on Contract; 26th Edition Vol. II, p. 808 or 25th Edition Vol. II p. 712, paragraph 3490. In this connection, reliance may also be placed at paragraphs 607 and 608 of Volume No. 16, 4th Edition of Halsbury's Law of England.

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Under the Industrial Law, subject to the relevant statutory provision, the services of an employee could be terminated by reasonable notice. In ·such a case it was always open to the Industrial Tribunal to . examine whether the power of termination by reasonable notice was exercised. bona fide or ma/a fide. If, however, the industrial Court was satisfied that the order of discharge was punitive, that it was ma/a fide, or that it amounted to _victimisation or unfair labour practice, the

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industrial court was competent to set aside the order and in proper cases, direct the reinstatement of the employee. Reference may also be made to the observations of this Court in Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Workmen & Anr., (1964] 2 SCR 125 at 130. If, however, the exercise of such power was challenged on the ground of being colourable or ma/a fide or on account of victimisation or unfair labour practice, the employer must disclose to the Court the ground of his impugned action, so that the same may be tested judicially. See the observations of this Court in L. Michael & Anr. v. Mis Johnston Pumps India Ltd., ( 1975] 3 SCR 489 at 498.

The relationship between a statutory corporation and its employees is 'normally governed by the relevant rules, regulations and c standing orders. A statutory Corporation is "State" within the meaning of Artide 12 of the Constitution and its action is subject to judicial review in certain cases and certain circumstances. In the facts and circumstances of these cases, we have proceeded on that basis and we are of the opinion that it is the correct basis. The exercise of such D power under regulations similar to the one impugned which has been upheld in various types of cases are instructive in their variety. It may be mentioned that the exercise of power under the very same Regulation 9(b) :.Vas upheld by the Court in a matter, wherein in an action by the employee of D.T.C., this Court in Delhi Transport Corporation Undertaking v. Balbir Saran. Goel, (1970] 3 SCR 757 at 764 held that E even if the employees of the respondent thought that he was a cantankerous man and it was not desirable to retain him in service it · was open to them to terminate his services in terms of Regulation 9(b) and it was not necessary to dismiss by way of punishment for misconduct.

Reliance was placed on this decision by the High Court in the Judgment under appeal. The High Court in our opinion rightly pointed out, however, that the decision was on a different basis and could not be availed of in deciding controversy involved in the present determination. In Air India Corporation, Bombay v. V.A. Rebe/low & Anr., ( 1972] 3 SCR 606, this Court dealing with the power of the Air India to terminate the services of a person who was alleged to have misbehaved with air hostesses, observed on page 616 of the report that the anxiety of the Legislature to effectively achieve the object of duly protecting the workmen against victimisation of unfair labour practice consistently with the preservation of the employer's bona fide right to maintain discipline and efficiency in the industry for securing the maximum production in peaceful, harmonious atmos_phere is obvious from the

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D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS IMUKHARJI, CJ.]

overall scheme of these sections. This Court on page 620 of the report observed that the record merely disclosed that the appellant had suspicion about the complainant's suitability for the job in which he was employed and this led to loss of confidence in him with the result that his services were terminated under Regulation 48. Loss of confidence in such circumstances could not be considered to be mala fide, it was held. Similarly in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. P.S. Malvenkar & Ors., [1978] 3 SCR 1000 at page 1006, where it was alleged that the services of an employee of Bombay Municipal Corporation were unsatisfactory, this Court held that the powers of dismissal after an inquiry and the powers of simpliciter termination are to distinct and independent powers and as far as possible neither should be construed so as to emasculate the other or to render it ineffective. One is the power to punish an employee for misconduct while the other is the power to terminate simpliciter the service of an employee without any other adverse consequence. It may be mentioned that the case of civil servants is, however, governed by their special constitutional position which accords them status; the legal relationship (between the Government and its servants) is something entirely different, something in the nature of status. It is much more than a purely contractual relationship voluntarily entered into between the parties. The duties of state are fixed by the law and in the enforcement of these duties society has an interest. In the language of jurisprudence status is a condition of membership of a group of which powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not by agreement between the parties concerned. See the observations of this Court in Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, [1968] I SCR 185 at 195 D-E. But even then the services of a temporary civil servant (although entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution) is subject to termination by notice. But beside the above, the government may find it necessary to terminate the services of a temporary servant if it is not satisfied with his conduct or his suitability for the job and/or his work. See. the observations of this Court in Champak Lal Chiman Lal Shah v. The Union of India, [1964] 5 SCR 190 at 204. The services of a temporary government servant, further. may be terminated on one month's notice whenever the government thinks it necessary or expedient to do so for administrative reasons. It

is impossible, this Court observed, to define before hand all the circumstances in which the discretion can be exercised. The discretion

was necessarily left to the Government. See observations of this.Court in Ram Copa/ Chaturvedi v. State of M.P., [1970] 1SCR472 at 475.

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The atoresaid position of a government servant has been analysed in depth by the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Tutsi Ram Patel, (supra), where it was reiterated that the doctrine of pleasure is not a relic of the feudal ages or based upon any special preroga· tive of the. Crown but is based on public interest and for the public good because it is as much in public interest and for public good that B government servants who are inefficient, dishonest or corrupt or have become a security risk should not continue in service and that the protection afforded to them by the Acts and the Rules made under Article 309 and by Article 311 of the Constitution be not abused by them to the detriment of the public interest and public good. It was reiterated on page 190 of the report that if in a situation as envisaged in one of the three clauses of the second proviso to Clause (2) of Article c 311 arises and the relevant clause is properly applied and the disciplinary inquiry dispensed with, the concerned government servant cannot be heard to complain that he is deprived of his livelihood. This Court reiterated that the livelihood of an individual is a matter of great concern to him and his family but his livelihood is a matter of his D private interest where such livelihood is provided by the public,excheq uer and the taking away of such livelihood is in the public interest and for the public good, and the former must yield to the latter public policy, it was reiterated, requires, public interest needs and public good demands that there should be such a doctrine. It was further reiterated that the rules of natural justice are not immutable but flexiE ble. These rules can be adopted and modified by statutes and statutory rules and also by the constitution of the Tribunal which has to decide a particular matter and the rules by which such Tribunal is governed. Not only, can the principles of natural justice be modified but in exceptional cases they can even be excluded. See the observations of this Court at page 237 G of the aforesaid report. Reference was also F made to the observations of this Court at pages 214-215 of the aforesaid report. Thus, the Constitution Bench laid down that even where a government servant enjoys constitutional status there can be exclusion of inquiry in the cases prescribed for termination of employment.

It must, however, be borne in mind that in some recent cases this Court has taken the view that a regulation providing for the termination of the service of an employee of the public corporation by notice only or pay in lieu thereof is invalid under Article 14 of the Constitution. We have referred to the decisions of the Workmen of Hindustan· Steel's case (supra); West Bengal State Electri~ity Board's case (supra) and Central Inland Water Transport Corporation's case (supra). Mr.

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS [MUKHARJI, CJ.]

Ashok Desai, learned Solicitor General of India submitted that the decisions in the West Bengal State Electricity Board's (supra) and Central Inland Water Transport Cprporation's case (supra) were incorrectly decided and the, decision proceeded on the theory of unconscionable bargains and that termination by notice is against public policy. He, how;wer. drew our attention to Gheru Lal Parekh v. Mahadeodas Maiya & Others, [1959) Supp. 2 SCR 406 and 440 where it was held. that though theoretically it may be permissible to evolve a new head under exceptional circumstances in a changing world, it is advisable in the interest of stability of society not to make any attempt to discover new heads of avoidance of such clauses in these days. Furthermore, as stated above, learned Solicitor General submitted that in the ordinary law of contrac\ t~rmination of employment by reasonable notice on ~i\hH si\!~ has never been regarded as unconscionable. Therefore, the. l@arned Solicitor General submitted that this part of the above judgments was erroneous and should be overruled. It must, however, be noted that in a later judgment of this Court, which followed this line of reasoning, it was recognised that a public corporation requires protection from employees who are inefficient or those who lacked probity or even made faulty policy decisions. Reference was made to the decision of this Court in O.P. Bhandari v. I. T, /), c;. ~ Ors,, [1986) 4 SCC 337 where this Court held that so far as some of the higher placed employees are concerned (described as 'gold ~ollar' e1T1ployees) public sector undertakings may be exposed to irreversible damage on account of faulty policy decisions or on account of lack of efficiency or probity of such employees and its very existence might be endangered beyond recall. A public corporation may not be able to cut the dead wood and get rid of a managerial cadre employee in case he is considered to be wanting in performance or integrity. Reference may be made to page 343 paragraph 5 (supra) of the report. It may be mentioned that in Moti Ram Deka's case (supra) at p. 707 of the said report, a similar rule was considered by seven learned Judges in the context of government servants in Railway. The majority judgment did not express opinion on the ,question of the Railway rule being bad on th~ ground of unguided and uncanalised power. In his judgment, Mr. Justice Das Gupta held that the rule gave no guidance and was, therefore, violative of Article 14. (See page 769 of the report). On this point Mr. Justice Shah, as the learned Chief Justice then was, in his judgment observed at page 799-800 of the aforesaid report:

"In considering the validity of an order an assumption that the power may be exercised ma/a fide and on that ground

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discrimination may be practised is wholly out of place. Because of the absence of specific directions in Rule 148 governing the exercise of authority conferred thereby, the power to terminate employment cannot be regarded as an arbitrary power exercisable at the sweet will of the autho'rity, when having regard to the nature of the employment :and the service to be rendered, the importance of the efficient functioning of the rail transport in the scheme of our public economy, and the status of the authority invested with the exercise of power would appropriately be exer. cised for the protection of public interest on grounds of ~administrative convenience. Power to exercise discretion is

·not necessarily to be assumed to be a power which will · invalidate the conferment of power. Conferment of power has necessarily to be coupled with the duty to exercise it bona fide and for effectuating the purpose and policy underlying the rules which provide for the exercise of the power. If in the scheme of the rule, a clear policy relating · to the circumstances in which the power is to be exercised is , discernible, the conferment of power must be regarded as being made in furtherance of the scheme, and is not open f to attack as infringing the equality clause. It may be remembered that the rules relating to termination of employment of temporary servants and those on probation, and . even those relating to compulsory retirement generally do not lay down any specific directions governing the exercise of the powers conferred thereby. The reason is obvious: the appointing authority must in all these cases be left with discretion to determine employment having regard to the exigencies of the .service, suitability of the employee for absorption or continuance in the cadre, and the larger interest of the public being served by retaining the public servant concerned in service."

Learned Solicitor General submitted that the question is whether it is the very existence of power which is bad or the exercise is bad in any specific case. It was submitted that the Court would be entitled to obtain guidance from the preamble, the policy and the purpose of the Act and the power conferred under it and to see that the power is exercised only for that purpose. It was submitted that even if a statute. makes no clarification Court would ascertain if the statute laid down any principle or policy. In such a case, the statute will be upheld although a given exercise may be struck down in particular cases. See

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS [MUKHARJl, CJ.]

the observations of this Court in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tandolkar, (1959] SCR 279 at 299. The guidance in the statute for the exercise of discretion may be found from the preamble read in the light of surrounding circumstances or even from the policy or the purpose of the enactment or generally from the object sought to be achieved. See the observations of this Court in Jyoti Rrasad v. The Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, (1962] 2 SCR 125 at 139. Even a term like 'public interest' can be sufficient guidance in the matter of retirement of a government employee. See the observations of this Court in Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha & Anr., (1970] 2 SCC 458 at 461 and such a provision can be read into a statute even when it is not otherwise expressly there. Learned Solicitor General draw our attention to the observations of. this Court in N. C. Dal wadi v. State of Gujarat, (1987] 3 SCC 611paragraphs9 and. JO at page 619. It is well settled and the learned Solicitor General made a point of it that the Court will sustain the presumption of constitutionality by considering matters of common knowledge and to assume every state of facts which can be conceived and can even read down the section, it was submitted, if it becomes necessary to uphold the validity of the provision. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., Indore & Ors. v. Radhakrishan & Ors., I 1979 J 2 sec 249 at 257. In the case of Olga Tellis & Ors. etc. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., (1985] Suppl. 2 SCR 51 at 89 this Court has held that considering the scheme. of the act, a.section which enabled the Cqmmissioner to remove encroachment without notice must be read to mean that notice would be given unless circumstances are such that it is not reasonably practicable to give it. This Court further held that the discretion is to be exercised in a reasonable manner so as to comply with the constitutional mandate that the procedure accompanying the performance of a public act must be fair and reasonable. We must lean in favour of that interpretation because it helps to sustain the validity , · of the law. Learned Solicitor General submitted that the appeal involved herein the power of Delhi Transport Corporation (a statutory corporation) regarding termination of service simpliciter under Regulation 9(b). These Regulations were framed as mentioned under Section 53 of the Delhi Road Transport Authority Act, 1950. The said Act was replaced by the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 but the regulations have been saved and even though in 1971 a new Corporation, viz. the Delhi Transport Corporation (the af>pellant}, was' constituted

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under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, the regulations have been continued. . The guidelines for the exercise of such power, according to the Solicitor General, could be found in the statutory provisions of th~ 1950 Act under which the rejlulations have been framed, the pream" ble; Sections 19 and 20 (equiValent to Secttons 18 and 19 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950); Section 53 (equivalent to Section 45 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950); the context of Regulation 9(b) read with 9(a) and 15. Even for the exercise of this power, reasons could be recorded although they need ncit be com" municated. This will ensure according to the Solicitor General, a check on the arbitrary exercise of power and effective judicial review in a given case. The present regulations are parallel, to b11t not identical with, the exceptions carved out under Article 311(2) pmvisg. H was submitted that even the power of termination simpliciter under Regu" lation 9(b) can only be exercised in circumstances other than those in Regulation 9(a), i.e., not where the foundation of the order is 'miscon" duct'. The exercise of such power can only be for purposes germane and relevant to the statute. It was submitted by the learned Solicitor General that these would include several cases which have been held by Courts to give rise to termination simplicitllr in~luding where the employee shows such incompetence or unsuitability as to m!!ke his continuance in employment detrimental in the interest of the Corpora, tion, where the continuance of the employee is a grave se~µrity risk making his continuance detrimental in the interest of the Corporation, if there is a justifiable lack of confidence which makes it necessary in the interest of the Corporation to immediately terminate the services. These are illustrative and not exhaustive.

It was submitted by the learned Solicitor General that the a15ove guidelines of recording reasons and confining action under Regulation 9(b) for purposes germane and relevant to the statute would prevent arbitrary action by the Corporation while enabling it to run its services efficiently and in public interest. Thus, there is no vice of arbitrariness in the regulation. The judgment of the High Court, therefore, cannot and should not be upheld according to the learned Solicitor General.

In Civil Appeal No. 2876 of 1986, the learned Attorney General urged that the settled rule judicially evolved in matters of constitu, tional adjudication is that in order to sustain the constitutloMlity of legislation, the words of a statute may be qualified, its operation limited and conditions, limitations and obligations may be implied or

,;

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS [MUKHARJI, CJ.]

read into the statute in order to make it conform to constitutional requirements. The underlying rationale, according to the learned Attorney General, of this rule of interpretation, or the doctrine of reading down of a statute is that when a legislature, whose powers are not unlimited, enacts a statute, it is aware of its limitations, and in the absence of express intention ~r clear language to the contrary, it must .be presumed to have implied into the statute the requisite limitations B and conditions to immunise it from the virus of unconstitutionality. From what the learned Attorney General submitted and what appears to be the correct that every legislature intends to act within its powers. Therefore, in a limited Government, the legislature attempts to function within its limited powers. It would not, therefore, be expected to have intended to transgress its limits. In Re The Hindu Women's Rights C to Property Act, [194I]FCR 12, the question before the Federal Court was about the meaning of the word 'property' in the Act. The Court limited the operation of the word 'property' to property other than agricultural land because otherwise the Central Legislature would have had no competence to enact the statute. The Court observed at pages 26 and 27 of the Report as follows: "No doubt if the Act does affect agricultural land in the Governors' Provinces, it was beyond the competence of the Legislature to enact it: and whether or not it does so much depend upon the meaning which is to be given to the word 'property' in the Act. If that word necessarily and inevit- E ably comprises all forms of property, including agricultural land, then clearly the Act went beyond the powers of the Legislature; but when a Legislature with limited and restricted powers makes use of a word of such wide and general import, the presumption must surely· be that it is using it with reference to that kind of property with respect F to which. it is competent to legislate and to no other. The question is thus one of construction, and unless the Act is to be regarded as wholly meaningless and ineffective, the Court is bound to construe the word 'property' as referring only to those forms of property with respect to which the Legislature which enacted the Act was competent to G legislate; that is to say, the property other than agricultural land ...... " See also the observations of Chief Justice Gwyer at pages 27 to 29 of the Report on how legislations of legislature with limited powers should be construed. See also the observations of this Court in il..M.D.

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Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, [1957] SCR 930, at p. 935 and 938. There section 2(d) of Prize Competitions Act, 1955 defined 'prize competition' as meaning any competition in which prizes are offered for the solution of any puzzle. As defined, the statute covered not only competition in which success depended on chance but also those which involved substantial degree of skill. It was conceded that the Act would be violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution if competitions which involved substantial degree of skill were included in the statutory defintion. See the observations of this Court at p. 935 of the report.' This Court rejected the argument of the petitioners therein that since the language of the definition of prize competition was wide and unqualified, it was not open to the Court to read into it a limitation which was not there. This principle was reiterated and applied by this Court in the case of Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, [1962) Supp. (2) SCR 769. The question before this Court was about the validity of s. 124A of the Indian Penal Code. This Court in order to sustain the validity of the section on the touch-stone of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, limited its application only to acts involving intention or tendency to create disorder, or disturbance of law and order, or incitement to violence. This Court held that it was well settled that if certain provisions of law construed in one way would make them consistent with the Constitution, and another interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former construction. The provisions of the sections read as a whole, along with the explanations, make it reasonably clear that the sections aim at rendering penal only such activities as would be intended, or have a tendency, to create disorder or disturbance of public peace by resort to violence.

Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in R. L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1964) 6 SCR 784 where the question was about the Constitutionality of section 41(aa) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1962. This Court upheld the validity of the section following the principle of interpreting the said rule in a way which would be consistent with the Constitution. See the observations of this Court at p. 797 of the said report.

The technique of reading down has been adopted in numerous cases to sustain the validity of the provision. For example, in Jagdish Pandey v. The Chancellor, University of Bihar & Anr., [1968) I SCR 231, at pages 236-37, this Court made resort to section 4 of the Bihar State Universities Act, 1962. It was observed that section 4 so read literally it did appear to give uncanalised powers to the Chancellor to

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS [MUKHARJI, CJ.]

-

do what he liked on the recommendation of the Commission with respect to teachers covered by it. But this Court was of the opinion that the legislature did not intend to give such an arbitrary power to the Chancellor and was of the opinion that s. 4 should be read down and if it is read down, there was no reason to hold that the legislature was conferring a naked arbitrary power on the Chancellor and that power cannot be struck down as discriminatory under Article 14 of the Constitution. See the observations of this Court in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration & Ors., I1978) 4 SCC 494. There the constitutionality of s. 30, sub-section (2) and section 56 of the Prisons Act, 1894 was in question. Krishna Iyer, J, speaking for this Court at p. 511, para 34, of the report observed that the Court does not '.rush in' to demolish provisions where judicial endeavour, amelioratively interpretational, may achieve both constitutionality and compassionate resurrection. This salutary strategy, the learned Judge observed, of sustaining the validity of the law and softening its application was of lovely dexterity. · The semantic technique of updating the living sense of a dated legislation is, in our, view, prefectly legitimate. Semantic readjustments are necessary to obviate alegicidal sequel and a validation-oriented approach becomes the philosophy of statutory construction sometimes. Similar observations were made in N. C. Dalwadi v. State of Gujarat, (supra). In Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam & Ors., [1989) 3 SCC 709, this Court upheld the validity of sections 9 and 10 of the Act by reading in several matters by necessary implication in order to sustain the validity of the sections. In Charan Lal Sahu & Ors. v. Union of India, [1989) Supp. SCALE J, at pages 53 and 54, paras 101 as well asp. 61, para 114, it was observed that this principle of reading down has been adopted in U.S. Supreme Court in several cases. See also United States of America v. Edward A. Rumely, 97 Lawyers Edition 770 at 775. The principle as enunciated in Rumely's case (supra) has been approved by this Court in Shah & Co. v. State of Maharashtra, [1967) 3 SCR 466 at 477-78. This principle of reading down or placing limited construction has been adopted by courts in England in deciding the validity of bye-laws and regulations. See Reg. v. Sadlers Co., 10 H.L.C. 404, at 460 and 463 and Faramus v. Film Artists Association, 196 2 QB 527 at 542. The courts must iron out the creases, as said Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estates, [1949) 2 KB 481. This Court has also on numerous occasions followed this practice. See the observations of this Court in M. Pentiah and Ors. v. VeeraMallappa and Ors., [1961) 2 SCR 295; Bangalore Water Srtpply and Sewerage Board etc. v. A. Rajappa & Ors., [1978] 3 stR 207. See aiso H.M. Seervai's 'Constitutional Law of India', 3rd Edn. VoL I, pages 119-120. In the background of this, the learned Attorney General also

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drew our attention that the present regulation, as mentioned hereinbefore, should be read and construed in the said manner and the reasons and conditions of its exercise can be spelt out and it may be so construed. He submitted that it sould be spelt out that the regulation requires rea5ons to be there, reasons which are germane and relevant.

The principles of natural justice or holding of an enquiry is neither a universal principle of justice nor inf!exiable dogma. The principles of natural justice are not incapable of exclusion in a given situation. For example, Article 311(2) of the Constitution which essen· ti ally embodies the concept of natural justice, itself contemplates th.at there may be situations which warrant or permit the non-applicability of the principles underlying Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the second proviso to Article 311 of the Constitution. This court has also recognised that the rule of audi alteram partem can be excluded where having regard to the nature of the action to be taken, its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant statutory provision, fairness in action does not demand its application and even ~arrants its exclusion. If importing the right to be heard has the effect of paralysing the administrative process or the need for promptitude or the urgency of the situation so demands, natural justice could be avoided. See the observations of this Court in Maneka Gandhi's case at p. 681 of the report (supra). This Court in Tulsi Ram Patel's case (supra) had in terms ruled that not only, therefore, can the E principles of natural justice be modified but in exceptional cases they can even be excluded. But the principles of natural justice must not be displaced save in exceptional cases. Consequently, the learned Attorney General submitted that the words "where it is not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry" may be imported into the regulations . • It was submitted by the learned Attorney General that the exclusion of F audi alteram partern rule in circumstances which are circumscribed and coupled with the safeguard of recording of reasons which are germane and relevant, the termination in such a situation would not render the regulation unreasonable or arbitrary. Then it could not be said that the power was uncanalised or unguided if "the regulation is construed and read down in the manner indicated above, according to the learned G Attorney General. The reading down, the learned Attorney General conceded cannot, however, be done where there was no valid reason and where it would be contrary to proclaimed purpose. See the observations of this Court in Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.; [ 1981] J SCR 206, at p. 239 and 259.

H.

On behalf of the workmen of the respondent DTC, Shri i

I,

D.T.C. v. D.T.Cc MAZDOOR CONGRESS [MUKHARJI, CJ.)

Ramamurthi, submitted that tlie Constitutional questions of great public importance arising in the present appeal, have to be examined in the light of the law laid down by the Full Court in the case of R. C. Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 3 SCR 530 at 577 and by larger Constitution Benches in the cases of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (supra), Moti Ram Deka v. Union of India (supra), State of West ·Bengal v. Union of India, (supra) and the Constitution Bench deci. sions in the cases of Olga Tellis and Others v. Bombay. Municipal Corporation and Others, (supra), Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.) Sindri and Others v. Union of India and Others, [1981] 2 SCR at 60-61, Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel and Others (supra), Sukhdev Singh & Others v. Bhagat Ram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi and Another (supra) and Ajay Hasia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors. etc., [1981] 2 SCR 79 at 100-102. According to Shri Ramamurthi these decisions are authority for the following propositions: (a) The declarations in the provisions contained in the Fundamental Rights Chapter involve an obligation imposed not merely upon the "State" but upon all persons to respect the rights declared, unless the context indicates otherwise, against every person or agency seeking to infringe them. See the observations of this Court in State of West Bengal v. Union of India, [1964] 1 SCR 371 at page 438: ·

(b) Part III of the Constitution weaves a pattern of E guarantee on the texture of basic human rights. The guarantees delimit the protection of th0se rights in their allotted field. They do not attempt to enunciate distinct right. [See R. C. Cooper's case (supra( at p. 577 of the report]. The extent of protection against impairment of a fundamental right is determined not by the object of the Legislature nor by the form o.fthe action, but by · F its direct operati6n upon the individual's rights. (c) Any person who is deprived of his right to livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law can challenge the deprivation as offending the right to life, conferred by Article 21. See the observations of this Court in Olga Tellis's case (supra( at 80-81 and 85 of the report. Therefore, the holding to the contrary in A. V. Nachane & Anr. v. Union of .India & Anr., [1982] 2 SCR 246 is no longer good law. In any event Counsel is right that the observations made at p. 259 of the report (supra) were in a different context and the challenge

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based on Articles 19(1 )(g) and 31 does not appear to have any substance in resolving the present controversy before us. Mr. Ramamurthi submitted that provision of any Rule that service shall be liable to termination on notice for the period prescribed therein contravenes Article 14 of the Constitution as arbitrary and uncontrolled power is left in the authority to select at its will any person against whom action will be taken. See the observations of this Court in Moti Ram Deka's case (supra) at p. 770 and 751 of the report.

It was submitted that Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution are inter-related and the law must, therefore, now be taken to be well settled that Article 21 does not exclude Article 19 and even if there is a law providing a procedure for depriving a person of personal liberty (this will equally apply to life) and there is, consequently, no infringement of fundamental right conferred by Article 21, such law in so far as it abridges or takes away any fundamental right under Article 19 would have to meet the challenge of the Article. See the observations of this Court in Maneka Gandhi's case (supra). Article 19(1)(g), it was urged, D confers a broad and general right which is available to all persons to do work of any particular kind and of their choice. See the observations·in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union's case (supra) at p. 60-61 of the report.

According to Mr. Ramamurthi, there is a distinction between E Public Employment or service and "pure master and servant cases". He referred to the observations of this Court in India Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer, Bhavanipore & Ors., (1975) 2 SCR 619 at 657; followed in A. L. Kalra v. The Project and Equipment Corporation of lndia Ltd., (1984) 3 SCR 646 at 664; Whenever, therefore, according to Shri Ramamurthi, there is arbitrarines in State Action F . whether it be of the Legislature or of the Executive or of an authority under Article 12, article 14 immediately springs into action and strikes down such State action. In fact, the concept of reasonableness and non/arbitrariness pervades the entire constitutional scheme and is a golden thread which runs through the whole of the fabric of the Con·stitution. See the observations of this Court in Bandhua Mukti Morcha G v. Union of Jndia & Ors., (1984) 2 SCR 79 at 101. A violation of a principle of natural justice by State action is a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, which can be excluded only in exceptional circumstances. See'the observations of this Court in Tutsi Ram Patel's case (supra) at 229, and at 233 of the report.

It was, therefore, submitted that a clause authorising the

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS [MUKHARJ!, CJ.]

employer to terminate the services of an employee whose contract of service is for an indefinite period or till the age of retirement, by

serving notice violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19( l)(g) and 21 of the Constitution for Article 21 is violated when

right to livelihood is taken away by termination of service of~ person; employed for an indefinite period or till the age of retirement except for proved misconduct. Assuming, it was argued, that in such a case right io livelihood can be taken away by termination of service by giving notice, nonetheless it could be validly done only, according to Shri Ramamurthi, if: (i) There is a fair and just procedure by way of-(1) recording of reasons and (2) notice to show cause;

(ii) And the right to terminate is restricted to exceptional grounds. When the service of a person employed for an indefinite period or till the age of retirement is terminated, Shri Ramamurthi assets, tl;1en Artice 14 is violated when there is no guidance for the exercise of power and reasons are not required to be recorded and principles of natural justice are abrogated. Similarly Article 19(1)(g) is violated, according to him, for the reasons that there is no guidance, no requirement of reasons to be recorded and there is violation of the principles of natural justice. Shri Ramamurthi reminded us that before India- became independent in 1947, the Indian Contract Act 1872 was applicable only to British India on its own force. By Merged State Laws Act, 1949 it was extended to the new provinces and merged States to the States of Manipur, Tripura by Vindhya Pradesh by Union territories Law Act 1950. It was also extended to the States merged in the States of Bombay and Punjab by Bombay Act 4 of 1950 and Punjab Act 5 of 1950. With the promulgation of the Constitution, the Indian Contract Act 1872 extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu & Kashmir. Shi Ramamurthi asserted the whatever might have been the position in regard to the provinces comprised in British India before independence, as far as other areas, forming part of the Union of India under the Constitution are concerned, only the Indian Contract Act 1872 is applicable. By article 372 of the Constitution, this Act has been continued in operation even after the Constitution came into force subject to the other provisions of the Constitution.

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A contract of service, according to Shri Ramamurthi is a species of contrac~ and will, therefore, be governed by the provisions of the Indian Contract Act 1872. This Act has been held to be an Amending as well as a Consolidating Act. Therefore, there can be no question of common law of England, as made applicable in India during the British Rule, being the basis for deciding any question relating to contract of employment after 1950. In any event any provisions of either the Indian Contract Act, 1872, or of the English Common Law Applicable in British India before the Constitution came into force would be void by reason of Article 13 of the Constitution if it infringed any of the fundamental rights contained in Part III of the Constitution, pleaded Mr. Ramamurthi before us. Under Section 2(h) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 an agreement (including an agreement of service) becomes a contract only when it is enforceable by law. If it is not enforceable in law, it would be void by reason of section 2(g) of the Contract Act. The question for consideration would, therefore, be whether a clause in an agreement of service when it is for an indefinite period or till the age of retirement providing for termination by giving notice would be enforceable? It was submitted by the workers' union that it would not be enforceable if it violates the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution. See the observations of this Court in Moti Ram Deka's case (supra) at 709 of the Report.' It was submitted that the broader submission was that under our Constitution there can be no contract of employment providing for termination of service by an employer of an employee by giving notice, when the employment is for indefinite period or till the age of retirement. In any event, such a clause cannot find a place either in the contract of service or in the statutory provisions governing the conditions of service in the case of public employment under the 'state' as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution.

Shri Ramamurthi urged that the observations contained in the judgment of this Court in Tulsiram Patel's case (supra) at 166 of the report, regarding the ordinary law of master and servant cannot be construed as laying down the proposition that under the Indian law, even if a contract of service is for an indefinite period or till the age of retirement, it can still be terminated by giving reasonable period of notice. fo any event, even in the Common Law of E~!and, a distinction is made . between public employment and "pure master and servant cases" [See the observation-s of this Court in Sukhdev Singh's case (supra) at page 657 of the report. >

Mr. Ramamurthi submitted that the doctrine of pleasure

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOO~ CONGRESS [MUKHARJI, CJ.]

advanced by the learned Solicitor General of India was confined to employment under the Union of India and States dealt with under Part XIV, Chapter I of the Constitution and cannot and do not extend to employment under local or other authorities referred to under Article 12 of the Constitution. There cannot be any pleasure by such authority in respect of employment of the permanent employee. It was submitted by Shri Ramamurthi further that even in cases of employment under the Union and the States, the pleasure doctrfoe is limited by the express provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. For that reason, according to him, it has lost some of its majesty and power. He referred us to the observations of this Court in Moti Ram Deka's case (supra) at p. 704 and Tutsi Ram Pate/s's case (supra) at page 196. In dealing with the question of validity of rules authorising the Government to terminate the services of temporary servants as upheld by this court in Champak/al Chimanlal Shah's case (supra) and Ram Gopa/. Chaturvedi's case (supra) it was submitted that it is important to note that the validity of the rules was challenged on the ground of denial of equality of opportunity in employment under the State guaranteed by Article 16 of the Constitution. In that context this Court o·bserved at p. 201 (supra) of the report that there can also be no doubt, if such a class of temporary servants could be recruited, there could be nothing discriminatory or violative of egual opportuni!Y_ if the conditions of service of such servants are different from those of permanent-employees. It is thus apparent that tl)is Court, it was submitted, had no occasion to consider the reasonableness of a provision for termination of service on giving notice under Article 14 of the Constitution and, therefore, this decision can be of no assistance to the appellants. Shri Ramamurthi submitted that since, audi alteram partem is a requirement of ArtiC!e 14, in view of recent decisions of this Court; and conferment of arbitrary power itself is contrary to Article 14, the rule in question can, according to Shri Ramamurthi, no larger be sustained as valid. As far as the de_cision in Ram Go pal Chaturvedi's case (supra) was concerned, Shri Ramamurthi submitted that the reasons given for rejecting the argument that the rufe confers an arbitrary and unguided power are not valid for in Moti Ram Deka' case (supra), where the view of. two_ learned judges of this Court who had held similar power to be arbitrary had not ever been noticed. The observation that it is impossible to define before hand all the circumstances in which the discretion can be exercised and the discretion had necessarily to be left to the Government, has not taken into consideration the circumstance

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that the denial of audi alteram partem which is a requirement of Atticle 14, can be only in exceptional circumstances and, therefore, such circumstances have necessarily to be spelt out. This Court had no occasion, according to Shri Ramamurthi, to consider the cumulative impact of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution.

Shri Ramamurthi sought to urge before us that industrial law recognises the right of the employer to exercise, bona fide, the power to terminate the services of workman by giving notice, except in case of misconduct, which is unlike the law of master and servant. Shri Ramamurthi urged that it is important to note that in all cases under C industrial law, decisions have been rendered by industrial tribunal when disputes had been raised by workmen challenging the action of the employer terminating their services by giving notice, under the terms of the contract of setvice or the Certified Standing Orders. The question was never raised, nor could it be raised, before the Tribunals that the very term in the contract of service or in Standing Orders D would have to stand the test of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution. Further a constitution bench of this Court had rejected the contention that Industrial Tribunals should make a distinction between public sector and private sector industries. Reliance was placed on the observations of this Court in Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd. v. The Workmen & Ors., (1987] 1 SCR 652 at 669. On the consideration of E the relevant material placed before us, we are asked to come to the conclusion that the same principles evolved by industrial adjudication in regard to private sector undertals:ings will govern those in the public sector undertakings having a distinct corporate existence. Therefore, all the decisions referred to by the appellant, it was argued, and interveners, were all concerned with applying the industrial law even F though some cif them dealt with employees, working in statutory corporations or public sector undertakings. It was, therefore, submitted by Shri Ramamurthi that these decisions could afford no assistance to the Court, in deciding the issues raised in the present case, where the validity of a term of employment, permitting the employer to terminate the services of a permanent employee by simply giving G notice, is challenged on the ground that such a term violates fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution. It was submitted further that the constitutional guarantees under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution are for all persons and there can be no basis for making a distinction between 'workmen' to whom the Industrial Disputes Act and other industrial laws apply and H those who are outside their purview. The laws applicable to~ t~he former

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS JMUKHARJI, CJ.]

can only add to and not detract from the rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. It was important to note that all the decisions so far rendered by this Court striking down rules and regulations or a provision in the contract of Service, authorising termination of service of permanent employees by giving notice relate to cases of non-workman arid we were referred to the decisions in West Bengal State Electricity Board's case (supra), Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. 's case (supra) and O.P. Bhandari's case (supra). There is the theory that possibility of abuse of power is no ground for striking down the law. Attention may be drawn to the observations of this Court in The Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty, [1962] 3 SCR 786 at 825 and Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pfadesh v. Radhakrishan & Ors. (supra). However, these decisions, it was submitted on behalf of the respondents, would have no relevance for the present case because the power to terminate the services of .a person employed to serve indefinitely or till the age of retirement can be exercised only in cases of proved misconduct or exceptional circum-

stances having regard to the Constitutional guarantee available under Articles 14, 19( 1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution. Unless the exceptional circumstances are spelt out the power to terminate the services

would cover both permissible and impermissible grounds rendering it wholly invalid, it was urged. This was particularly so because the requirement of audi alteram partem which is a part of the guarantee of Article·14 is sought to be excluded. There can be no guidance available in the body of the law itself because the purpose for which an undertaking is established and the pro~isions dealing with the same in the law can provide no guidance regarding exceptional circumstances under which alone the power .can be exercised. The questiO!l involved, Shri Ramamurthi emphasised, in these cases is not the exercise of power which an employer possesses to terminate the services of his employee but the extent of that power. Shri Ramamurthi drew our attention to the award and referred to paragraph 5.Q___of .the Shastri Award and other provisions of the award defining misconduct and also paragraph 522 of the Award dealing with the procedure for termination of employment and 523 onwards. Mr. Ramamurthi further submitted that provisions of Regulation 9(b) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952 cannot be rendered con·Stitutional by reading the requirement of recording reasons and confining_ it to cases where it is not reas~nably practicable to hold an enquiry

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and reading it down further. as being applicable to only exceptional cases wo~ld not be permissible construction and proper.

Shri Ramamurthi drew our attention to the true scope of Regulation 9(b) of the aforesaid Regulations in the light of the judgment of this Court in Balbir Saran Gael's case (supra). This rule, it has to be borne in mind, according to him, has been interpreted as applicable to all cases of termination including termination for misconduct as defined in the Standing Orders. In the aforesaid decision, at p. 761 of the report, this Court observed that:

"Regulation 9(b) clearly provides for termination of services in two modes: the first is where the services may be terminated without any notice or pay in lieu of notice. This ·can be done among other reasons for misconduct. The ·second mode is of terminating the services owning to !. reduction of establishment or in circumstances other than · those mentioned in clause (a) which relate to termination without notice. When termination is made under clause (b) one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof is to be given to

the employee. Thus it is clear that if the employer chooses to terminate the services in accordance with clause (b) after giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof it cannot amount to termination of service for misconduct within the ·. meaning of clause (a). It is only when some punishment is ' inflicted of the nature specified in Regulation 15 for misconduct that the procedure laid down therein for an .enquiry etc. becomes applicable."

If this was the true scope of the Regulation, Shri Ramamurthi contended, then it was obvious that it leaves the choice entirely to the OTC Management either to proceed against the person for misconduct by holding an enquiry or for the same misconduct terminate his services by giving one month's notice. It is the conferment of such a power that has been held to be unguided and arbitrary in all decisions from Moti Ram Deka's case (supra) to the more recent decisions of this Court such as West Bengal Electricity Board's case (supra), etc. Therefore, it was submitted that the argument based on the assumption that Regulation 9(b) was confined to cases under than misconduct really overlooked the interpretation placed upon this Regulation by this Court. · Shri Ramamurthi further submitted that if regulation 9(b) con-

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS [MUKHARJI, CJ.]

.-

fers this arbitrary power of leaving it to the OTC management to pick and choose then it is plain that there is nothing in the provisions of the Act or the regulations from which the OTC management can find any guidance. It was, therefore, the submission of the respondents that in order to conform to the Constitutional guarantees contained in Articles 14, 19{l)(g) and 21 of the Constitution as interpreted by this Court, the first and foremost the regulation will have to make a distinction between cases where services are sought to be terminated for misconduct and cases of termination on grounds other than what would constitute misconduct. As far as termination or dismissal on ground of misconduct is concerned, ordinarily the detailed procedure for establishing misconduct had to be followed. In cases where it is not possible to follow the detailed procedure, then at least the minimum procedure of issuing a show cause notice should be followed after recording reasons why it is not practicable to hold a full-fledged enquiry. In cases where even this requirement of the elementary principles of natural justice is not to be followed, then the regulation must itself indicate those cases in which principles of natural justice can be totally abrogated after recording reasons.

As far as termination of service of a permanent employee on grounds which do not constitute misconduct is concerned, assuming that this is held to be permissible, it can be only in very exceptional· cases and that too after observing at least the elementary principle of natural justice of asking for explanation before terminating the E services and also recording reasons. Shri Ramamurthi urged that to read all this into the regulations would literally mean re-writing the regulations which is not permissible under any of the decisions or the law. As one of the cases cover termination under The Pun jab Civil Services Rules, 1952, Shri Ramamurthi drew our attention to some of the provisions of these rules. He drew our attention to rule 3.12 which provides that unless in any case it be otherwise provided in those rules,

a Government employee on substantive appointment to any _per-

manent post acquired a lien on that post and ceased to hold any lien previously acquired on any other post. He also drew our attention to rule 3. 15( a) which provided that except as provided in clause (b) and (c) of that rule and in note under rule 3.13, a Government employee's lien on a post may, in no circumstances, be terminated, even with his consent, if the result would be to leave him without a lien or a suspended lien upon a permanent post. Clause (b) of rule 3.15 provided that notwithstanding the provisions of rule 3.14(a), the lien of a Govern-

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[1990] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

inent employee holding substantively a permanent post shall be terminated while on refused leave granted after the date of compulsory retirement under rule 6.21; or on his appointment substantively to the post of Chief Engineer of the Public Works Department. And clause (c) of this rule provided that a Government employee's lien on a permanent post, shall stand terminated on his acquiring a lien on a permanent post (whether under the Central Government or a State Government) outside the cadre on which he is borne. Note under rule 3.13 speaks about a Government employee holding substantially the post of a Chief Engineer of the Public Works Department, taking leave immediately on vacating his post he then shall during the leave be left Without a lien on any permanent post. The expression 'vacate' used in the note refers only to vacation as a result of completion of tenure of attainment of superannuation. Mr. R.K. Garg, appearing for the respondents in C.A. No. 4073 of 1986 stated that the Attorney General had rightly pointed out that employee's services were terminated under Para 522 of the Shastri Award merely because he had failed to mention a loan of Rs.1.5 lakhs taken from another Branch of the Bank. Mr. Garg pointed out that the loan had been repaid. The failure to mention this loan had deprived the appellant of his livelihood. The use of this power claimed under Para 522 of the Shastri Award was not defended by the Attorney General in this case. We had fairly conceded that he might not support this termination when the case is heard on merits. But, that does not derogate from the wide amplitude of this uncontrolled, arbitrary power claimed by the management under Para 522 of the Shastri . Award. J>owers claimed under Para 522 must, therefore, be examined in the background of the facts and circumstances of this Appeal. It was submitted that this Court must hold that nothing in Para 522 of the Shastri Award confers on the management power so far as they can get rid of permanent employees of the Banks merely after service of notice on the imaginary belief that they were doing so for "efficient Management" of the Banks. Mr. Garg reminded us that it is common knowledge that all despots act as tyrants in the firm belief that the intolerable indignities and atrocities they inflict, were necessary in public interest and to save the Society. Mr. Garg submitted that the rule of law cannot be preserved if absolute, uncontrolled powers are tolerated and fundamental rights or Directive Principles are allowed to be reduced to a "dead letter". Mr. Garg urged that the fundamental requirements of natural justice are not dispensible luxury. The express language of Para 522 of

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS IMUKHARJJ, CJ.I

the Shastri Award is totally destructive of this requirement.

The express language as mentioned hereinbefore of Para 522 of the Shastri Award provides: "(1) In cases not involving disciplinary action for misconduct and subject to clause (6) below. The employment of a permanent employee may be terminated by three months' notice or on payment of three months' pay and allowances in lieu of notice. The services of a probationer may be terminated by one month's notice or ort payment of li month's pay and allowances in lieu of notice." Rule 148(3) reads: "(3) Other (non-pensionable) railway servants shall be liable to termination on notice on either side for the periods shown below. Such notice is not, however, required in cases of dismissal or removal as a disciplinary measure after compliance with the provisions of Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution, retirement on attaining the age of superannuation, and termination of service due to mental or physical incapacity." "Note: The appointing authorities are empowered to reduce or waive, at their discretion, the stipulated period of notice to be given by an employee, but the reason justifying their action should be recorded."

·c

Rule 148(4) reads:

"In lieu of the notice prescribed in this rule, ii shall be· permissible on the part of the Railway Admirtistration fo terminate the service of a railway servant by paying him the pay for the period of notice." Rule 149(3) reads:

•

"Other railway servants: The services of other railway servants shali be liable to termination on notice on either side for the periods shown below. Such notice is not however, required in cases of dismiss8.I or removai as a disciplinary measure after compliance with the provisions

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of clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution, retirement on attaining the age of superannuation, and termination of · service due to mental or physical incapacity."

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[ 1990] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

It was urged by Mr. Garg that the services of a permanent bank employee cannot be terminated without charge of 'misconduct' and without an enquiry and the aforesaid paragraph gives no indication as to on what conditions this arbitrary uncontrolled power can be used to get rid of one or more permanent employees for "efficient management of Banks" on subjective opinions or suspicion not tested in enquiry into facts. It was further urged that this provision provides for "insecurity of tenure" for lakhs of permanent employees, Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution and the integrated protection of these Fundamental Rights excludes the "doctrine of pleasure" and insists on security of tenure "during good behaviour". The right to livelihood cannot be rendered precarious or reduced to a glorious uncertainty", it was urged by Mr. Garg. Mr. Garg submitted that the right to "hire and fire" was the prerogative claimed by the employer in the days of uncontrolled "laissez faire." This was the "doctrine of pleasure of the Crown" in case of Government servants, who held office during the pleasure of the King who had absolute powers over his subjects. Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 secure tbe rights of the citizen and act as limits on the powers of the "State" in Democratic Republic of India. Unjust, arbitrary, uncontrolled power of "premature" termination of services of permanent employees should not be tolerated according to Mr. Garg by the Constitution of free India.

In '·case of Government servants, Articles 311(1) and 311(2) of the Constitution expressly restrict the "doctrine of pleasure" contained in Article 310. Article 14 also insists on natural justice as was provided in Article 311(2), in order to prevent arbitrary use of power of termination. Articles 19(1)(g) and 21 read together require just, fair and reasonable procedure for termination of services for good cause. Without these safeguards, employees are reduced to the status of slaves of their masters. Employers are no longer masters as in the days of slavery of feudal relations, Mr. Garg tried to emphasise. He submitted that Article 14 of the Constitution did not permit permanent railway employees to be exposed to termination of their services on.notice without charge of misconduct or a reasonable opportunity to answer the charge. Rules 148 and 149 of the Railway Establishment Code which have been set only hereinbefore have the same effect, as is the effect Of para 522 of the Shastry_Award, and_both these Rules were declared unconstitutional in Moti Ram Deka's case (supra) by a seven I

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D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS [MUKHARJJ, CJ.)

Jµdges' Bench, according to Mr. Garg. RµJ~s 148 I'll~ H9 'Y~rco fo!!pd viql!!tive of Article 14 for two reasons, it was sub1J1i!te4:

(i) Railw;ty servants in the Jllatter gf termination of service co11!d not fonn separate Class from other Government servants (As per majority view, in the Judgment of Justice Gajendragadkar, in_Moti Ram Deka'~ C\lse (1964) 5 SCR 683, 729-731).

a

(ii) Rule 148 conferred unguided, uncontrolled power of tennination and, therefore, was hit by Article 14. (As per Justice Subba Rao and Justice Das Gupta, in Moti Ram Deka's case

fmp,m/,

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Mr. Garg ~011ghf tg 11rge {hqf this /Jir£/irc 4ffision '!f s~ye71 Judges' f!enc/i in Mori /?(lrn L!~l,a's (s!!pra) was applied in Gurdev Singh Sidh11 v, Slate of f11njab & Anr., [1964) 7 SCR 587 at 592-593 by D the Constitution Bench of five Judges to. strike down a Service Rule which penniited compulsory retirement on completion of lO years' services on the ground of 'inefficiency' etc. This Court held that Compulsory retirement could not be tolerated even after 10 years of service ill view of such retirement being not based on relevant considerations, inE!H!!i!1~ t~P~ft~d longivity of life of the employees in India. If the . E pPW~f pf f~IJ1PY111 !>Y 'Y!'Y qf Eompulsory retirement even after ten y~l!T8 Wl!s h~I!! Hf!Ef:!ilS!itHtiqn~l in'Gui1ev Singh's case (supra) para 522 of the Sha§tri Aw11rd was f§r 11J9r@ ~rbi!fi•ry; u11ii!~! an~ \lllrea~g'l: able, it wai; urged before us. . · ' It was reiterated before us that in view of the binding decision of s~ye9 !udges in Moti Ram Deka's Case and its application by five J11dges in 'Case of compulsory retirement after 10 years in Gurdev ~in?h's $Oas~ (~l]P.f~)! it i~ not ?Pe·n to the employees to submit that ~!fll/l!tF. powe~ c!a1111e~ f!n~.e~ P~F~S!~P~ ?2~ of the Shastri Awa:i:d, !:Vfn W!*9!'! !Jl Yco~rs' serv/F!l fgr re1119yal ~!fh<?ll! charge of 'miscon- . !!YR' i!P<I wi!hqf!t f!llquiry, can be uphelcl as constitutional on any G jlrotl!ld~ wh!llsoewr, I! c111mqt !>co upheld,as constitutional on any iin:rnmls wh~tsoever, It cam10! be dq11e :.vi!hout oi.:e_r-ru!ing Moti Ram /Jfkq's rnse Pf withrm! aq l!lfPfESs Cfl!Jslit11tional provision.like second Proviso (a), (li) Pr(~) to Article 3jl(2), w!J.ich was adopted.by the Cim~tituent A&~embly, not !JY a i;ourt of !11w, !! was reiterated before u~.

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[ 1990] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

It w~s submitted that no principle of interpretation permits reading down a provision so as to make it into a different provision altogether different from what was intended by the legislature or its delegate. (R.M.D.C.'s case (supra).

It was urged that it was established law that on reading down a provisiq,n, Court cannot preserve a power for a purpose which is just the opposite of what the legislature had intended. Para 522 of the Shastri Award was not at all intended to be used within limits expressed or implied. The Court must not legislate conditions such as were adopted by the Constituent Assembly in case of second Proviso to Article 311(2) in the Constitution of India. Even Parliament could not graft such limitations o.n Article 311(2), if second Proviso to Article 311 was n'ot there in the Constitution. This Court cannot and ought. it was submitted not to arrogate powers to legislate what was patently outside even the competence of Parliament of India. It was submitted that in Tulsi Ram Patel's Case, the majority decision could not hold second Proviso to Article 311(2) unconstitutional. In order to give effect to the express language of second Proviso to Article 311(2), Court denied the protection of Article 14 to permit the President to terminate the services without following principles of 'natural justice' in cases covered by the said Proviso. In every other case, natural justice is the command of Article 311(2) of the Constitution was submitted.

The operation of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 311(2) of the Constitution does not permit Courts to lay down essential legislative policy, such as was laid down by the Constituent Assembly to over-ride · 311(2) of the Constitution.

Mr. Garg, therefore, submitted that the requirement of defining 'misconduct' in the Standing Orders and providing by meticulous provisions foi a just, fair and reasonable enquiry into charges of 'miscon-

duct' are the mandatory requirement of Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act. (U.P State Electricity Board v. Hari Shankar Jain, [ 1979] 1SCR355/362-3).

Shri Garg urged that the I.L.0. Conventions, accepted by India, required all employers to frame Standing Orders. He further urged that the demands of natural justice, which form part of Article 14 of the Constitution have been raised to the status of 'public policy' controlling section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. On that basis, clauses in

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D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS [MUKHARJI, CJ.J

contract of ~mployment which provide for removal from service on the will of the employer have been condemned as 'The Henry VIII Clause' (see the observations of this Court in Central Inland Water Transpor(s case (supra) against the ethos of the Constitution of Socialist Democratic Republic of India. In thfs connection, reference was made to the decision of this Court in Central Inland Water Transport's case (supra) and Maneka Gandhi's case (supra). In India, Shri. Garg submitted, workers have a right to participate in the management. The participation in the management cannot exclude the 'power to be heard' and thus participate in a decision to remove a permanent employee. Government alone has power to refer to the industrial tribunal, Shri Garg submitted. He was against any reading down which is contrary to the principles of interpretation. He referred to the observations of the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmed's case [AIR 1936 PC 253]. He submitted that if two provisions exist, firstly, to remove from service after holding an enquiry on a charge of a 'misconduct'; and secondly without serving a charge-sheet or holding an enquiry all provisions for holding enquiry will be rendered otiose and will be reduced to a mere redundancy. Such an interpretation will expose workers to harsher treatment than those guilty o.f misconduct, who will enjoy greater protection than those who have committed no misconduct. Such powers are patently discriminatory.

~

Reference under section JO of the Industrial Disputes Act would serve no purpose, submitted Mr. Garg. Court has a duty, according to . E him, to correct wrongs even if orders have been made which are later found to be violative of any fundamental right and to recall its orders to avoid injustice. He referred to the decision of this Court in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Anr., [1988] 2 SCC 602. He reminded us that no draft had been submitted by the Attorney General or the Solicitor General, which could be added as a proviso to para 522 of the F Shastri Award by this Court as a piece of judicial legislation to amend the impugned para 522. Substantive provision of para 522 could not be controlled or curtailed effectively so that its operation could be confined within narrow constitutional limits. Mr. Garg_ reminded us•, that it is not the duty of the court to condone the constitutional delinquencies of those limited by the Constitution if they arrogate uncon- G trolled unconstitutional powers, which are neither necessary nor germane for suppose'd efficiency of services in the Banks as a business enterprise. Mr. Garg submitted that in a system governed by rule of law, discretion when conferred upon executive authorities must be confined within clearly defined limits. The rule of law from this point means that decisions should be made by the application of known

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[ 1990] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

principles and rules and, in general, such decisions should be prediq, able and the citizen should know where he is. Law caq only reac(j its. finest moments when it h~~ fffefl 111~!1 from th~ ~nllmiteq.discretioq of ruler. He referred to. *e obsef\'~tians of this Court in $.C. Jaising/lani .- ¥: {Jnion ri.f fndia Of!fl (),rs., [ 1967] 2 !iCR 703 at p. 718-)9.

On tiepalf of !he Interveners in Civil Appeal No. 2876, Mr. P.P. Rao submitted that the aforesaid decision in Tuls/ Ram Patel's case (supra)_was an authority for the proposition that but for clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution, the principles of natural justice could not have been excluded from the .scope of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was urged by him that the said seconq proviso to Article 311(2) being itself a constitu!iqra.l 1m1visiq1i, suc!i c exclusion was upheld by this Cp!J!"!.iq the saicl fulsi Ram Pa!e/'s case (supra), p~ge 237 and at l~~t pafa tq p, 242. Mr, Rao clr~w our atten· tion to the well-settleq n1le ofinterpret~tion ~nd submittecl that where t\\P i!J!~rpre\a!ions 'Ir~ possible, one of wlliclJ would preserve and save the constitµtion~lity of the p~rticular statutory provision while the D other would rendei' it unconstitutional and void, the one which saves and pr~serves its constitutionality should be adopted and the other should be rejected. ffe, further, submitted that unless the provision of· the Constitution itself excludes the principles of natural justice, they continue to be applicable as lln.Jntegral part of the, rigM \q egµaliiy guaranteed by the Constituti?H· / •

. It was fqf!her reiterated that as the .employees of the DTC were not Government employees, ArticJeJ 1!(2) of the Constitution was not ·applicable. Consequently, the second proviso thereof was also not applicable, with· the result that Article 14 of the Constitution fully ·applied to them and it included the principles of natural justice as held F in Tutsi Ram Patel's (supra) itself at p. 233, last paragraph. Mr. Rao submitted that it is not permissible to read down statutory_proyisioµ~ when the avowed purpose is to confer power or 'In auth9rit.¥ withoqt any limitation whatever. That would be reading down ro11trary !<J t/ie expressed or manifest intention of the legislature, He dre'V ouf attention lo tqe q~serv~tions pf !his Coµrt iq Miperya Mi/ls Limited v, Union of G India & Ors., [1981] 1 SCR20q ;i\261, Therein, at p. 259 of the report, it was reiterated that the principles of reading down could not be _;; distorted even when word~ of widtq are used Inadvertently. In the ·--_ instant case, Mr, Raq submitted, reading down wQuld amount to dis· tortion of the fight to eqµ~Jity conferred by Article 14, which was . 'regarci~cl as a ba.sic featur~ pf the Con~titution. Nothing short of an H -amendment pf !hi: Con~titut!Cl_n could cut down the scope of the basic

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D.T.C, v, D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS [MUKHARJI, CJ.]

principle of eqilaiity; submitted M.r, Rao then rel'erfed!O us .Kesa-

v1111a11tia Bhm·ati v, State of K~raia, li973] Stipp.·!· S.C.R. 1 .and submitied that arty constiiutional amendment which impairs the doctrine of equality would be iiiible to be declared unconstitutional on

..

the gMUttd of VttJlation of the basic structure of the Constitution. lil the instant case, Mt. Rao submitted, regulation 9(b) deliberately conferred wide power of terniination of service without givilig a reasonable opportunity to an empioyee even if he is a regular ot permanent employee, in addition to regulation 15 which provided for dismissal or removal after a disciplinary enquiry. Therefore, the intention of the regulation-making authority was cieat and lirtilmbiguous. The provision is not capable of two interpretations. Consequently, the question of reading down did not arise. Mr. Rao drew out attention io the observations of the Supreme Court of America ill Elliott Ashton Welsh, II v. United States, 26 Lawyers' Edition 2nd, 308 at 327. Mt, Rao submitted that the decisions referred to by the learned Attorney General were not applicable to the instant case. He submitted that the decision of the Federal Court in Re The Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act's case (supra) involved the interpretaiion of a single word in the context of legislative competence. that was not the context of the present controversy, submitted Mr. Rao. Mr. Rao stibmiited that R:M. D. Chamarbaughwalla's case (supra) was a case on severability. That was a case where the word 'competition' was interpreted. In the present case, the su)\gested reading down involves, according to Mr. Rao, not interpretation of any single word in regulation 9(b) but adding a whole clause to it which amounted to rewriting the provisions. Courts have refused to rewrite legislation to make up for the omissions of the legislature. Reliance was placed by Mr. Rao on Nalinakhya 'Bysack v. Sh yam Sunder Halder & Ors., [1953] SCR 533, at p. 544-545. Mr Rao referred to the observations of this Court in Kedat Nath Singh v. State of Bihar,)supra) involving the interpretation of section 124A !PC in the context of Article 19(!)(a) of the Constitution. The content of Article 19(1)(a) was not cut down. In the present case, the suggested reading down would inevitably drain out Article 14 of its vitality.

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Shri Rao drew our attention to the decision of this Court in R.L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh, .(supra) and submitted that the said decision did not involve cutting down the scope of a fundamental right. He also drew our attention to the decision of this Court in Jagdish Pandey v. The Chancellor, University of Bihar (supra) which did not .involve re~ading down so as to sacrifice the principle of natural justice

(1990] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

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which are considered an essential part of the rule of law. In Municipal Committee, Amritsar & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Ors., [1969] 3 SCR 44 7, this Court was concerned with the intention of the legislature and interpreted the Act consistent with the said intention. In the instant case, the intention was to confer power of termination of services of all categories of employees without any further enquiry. Sunil Batra v. B Delhi Administration (supra) was again a decision where this Court found that the intention of the legislature was not to confer arbitrary power. In the instant case, the intention was different. N. C. Dalwadi v. State of Gujarat, (supra) was a case of giving reasonable interpretation to a provision which was capable of such an interpretation. In the scheme of DTC Regulations. regulation 9(b) was not susceptable to C two interpretations. submitted Mr. Rao. According to Mr. Rao, the principle of reading down was not applicable where the intention of the law maker was to confer too wide a power intended to be exercised without giving an opportunity to the affected party to be heard. It was, therefore, submiited that the principle of reading down was not applicable and if applied would amount to cutting down the scope of Article D 14 and subjecting permanent employees of the DTC to a tremendous sense of insecurity which is against the philosophy and scheme of the Constitution.

Mr Nayar, appearing in Civil Appeal No. 1115 of 1976-(Shri Satnam Singh v. Zita Parishad Ferozepure) for the respondent, drew our attention to the fact that the appellant, Shri Satnam Singh was appointed by the respondent vide letter of appointment dated 9th the respondent, when his March, 1961 the appellant ceased to work services were terminated simpliciter vide Resolution dated 26th November, 1965. He, therefore, had worked for the respondent only for a short period of less than four years. The services of the appellant ceased on the basis of the contract, the terms of which were mutually agreed between the parties. In case he had continued to work, he would have reached the age of superannuation in the year 1984. His total emoluments with effect from !st November, 1964 to 30th September, 1984 would have been approximately Rs.2,46,464. Mr. Nayar filed a detailed statement and stated that the appellant ceased to work for the respondent with effect from 26th November, 1964 when he was discharged from service.

for

·In this case, it is necessary to bear in mind that the appellant, Shri Satnam Singh was appointed by the respondent, Zila Parishad, Ferozepure by letter of appointments dated 9th March, 196 I. The Boa~d approved his terms of appointment and the same were duly ''

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A that the discharge of the appellant amounted to dismissal and as

deafly no enquiry was held against him, the termination simpliciter

W!ls bad in law, The respondent, Zila Parishad filed an appeal in the Court of ~td Additional District Judge, Ferozepure, who vide order dated 22fid December, 1969 affirmed the decision of the trial Judge and dismissed the appeal of the respondent. The respondent filed regular appeal in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, inter alia, pleading that the appellant was validly discharged in terms bf his appointment order and rule l(i), Part V-A of the District Board Rules, 1926. The learned Single Judge of the High Court considered the

e matter in detail and referred to various judgments of this Court and

held that it could not be said that the action of termination prima facie amounted to an order of dismissal even though the appellant was at the time a confirmed employee of the respondent. The learned Single Judge found that the respondent had a contractual right to terminate the services of the appellant by giving a month's .notice or a month's salary in lieu of notice. According to Shri Garg, the removal of the appellant from service was in accordance with the terms governing his appointment. Merely because on the 7th of November, 1964, the respondent resolved to charge sheet the appellant for acts of omission and commission and ordered an enquiry, and such an enquiry never commenced, would certainly not be enough reason to hold that the termination of the appellant's services, was ordered by way of punishment and therefore, amounted to his dismissal, argued Mr. Nayar. It was submitted by Mr. Nayar that the appellant had conceded that condition no. 4 was legally good but he had argued that it was not meant to be effective after the appellant had been confirmed. Aggrieved by the order mentioned above, the appel\ant had filed Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court by an order dated 13th Septembe;-, 1972 referred the question of law for the decision of the full bench. The full bench of the High Court reframed the question of law as under: "Whether, ihe termination of services of a permanent

District Board Employee by giving him one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof in terms of the conditions of his appointment and/or rule 1 in part V-A of the District Board Rules, 1926, is bad in law and caniiot be made?

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS [MUKHARJI, CJ.]

The majority of the learned Judges, inter alia, held that the appellant not being a government servant cannot have the protection of Article 311 of the Consiitution as he was not a civil servant under the Central Government of the State Government. . He was an employee of the District Board and his tenure of appointment was governed by the provisions of the District Board's Act, 1883 and the rules framed thereunder as well as by the terms and conditions of his B appointment. The condition no. 4 gave mutual right to the District Board as well as to the appellant to terminate the service by giving one month'.s notice or pay in lieu of notice, etc. The condition in the appointment letter shall not be deemed to have been abrogated by the Pun jab Civil Services Rules. The Court held further that the condition stated in the letter of appointment of the appellant continued to bind the parties even after the appellant's confirmation and his serVices c could be terminated by an order of discharge simpliciter_in accordance with the condition no. 4 thereof as this condition was almost in the same terms as Rule I in Part V-A of the Rules. It was further held by the full bench of the High Court that the Punjab Civil Service Rules _had no over-riding effect and these rules were to apply in respect of D matters for which no provision had been made anywhere else because of the phrase used "so far as may be". Rule 8.1 of the Business Rules reads as under: "In all matters relating to the conditions of service of its employees the Board shall so far as may be follow the rules from time to time in force for servants of the Pun jab Government."

The finding of the Letters Patent Bench in this regard was as under: ·F

\

"According to Rule 8.1 ibid, the Punjab Civil Services Rules were to apply in resp_ect of matters for which no provision had been made anywhere else because of the phrase used "so far as may be". Naturally, if a provision was made anywhere else, which went counter to the Punjab Civil Services Rules, the application of the latter rules stood excluded. It thus follows that the Punjab Civil Services Rules w·ere not to apply to the appellant in respect of matters for which specific provision was made in his letter of appointment, which constituted the contra~! of se<vice ·between him and the District Board, as he _joined

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service on those terms after accepting the same." The learned Chief Justice of Punjab & Haryana High Court, however, dissented. The answer to the question, therefore, was given in the negative vide order dated 3rd April, 1974. 'rhe Division Bench of the High Court which heard the matter after the question of law was answered by the Full Bench, dismissed the appeal of the appellant vide order dated 28th October, 1974 and this appeal to this Court arises from this order.

The appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1115/76, who appeared in person before us reiterated the relevant facts and urged that his removal was bad and the rule under which he was removed may be c quashed. It may be mentioned that as regards letter of Shri Kuldip .Singh Virk to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ferozepure reg_ard.ing the charges of corruption against the appellant, a case under s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was registered. The appellant was tried for the said alleged offence and acquitted of the charges by the D SpeCial Judge Ferozepure, A further case was registered under ss. 381/ 409 of 'IPC against the appellant. Accordingly, the appellant was tried hy the Judicial Magistrate Ferozepure. The charge was framed b_y the Judicial.Magistrate against the appellant. Against the aforesaid, the appellant filed a petition 'in the High Court and the charge and the proceedings in question were thereupon quashed by the High Court in E July/August, 1967. There were three more cases tried by the Special Judge, Ferozepure and acquitted.

The appellant filed a document in this Court claiming the monetary claim on the basis that his termination was wrongful. According to the appellant, he was entitled to recover Rs.4,83,061.90 paise. However, according to the statement filed by Shri Nayar, learned counsel for the respondents in this case, the appellant.was entitled to withdraw from the District Board Rs.2,46,464.46 paise, in case he would have been in service before his date of superannuation, i.e., 30th September, 1984. There is no evidence from either side as to whether the appellant had worked somewhere else though the appellant did not work with the respondent because of his suspension. The appellant had, however, stated that he did not so _w9rk. In that view of the matter, if the contentions of the appellant a_!e accepted that the clause under which the terms of employment of the appellant was agreed and under which the termination was effected without any enquiry and further in view of the fact that the learned trial Judge before whom the appe'llant had filed the suit first and decreed the suit declaring the

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS IMUKHARJI, CJ.)

appellant to be entitled to be in service, the appellant, in our opinion. should rightly be granted a monetary claim for Rs.4,83,061.90 paise and further interest at 6% from 30th September, 1984. This would be in consonance with justice and equity in the facts and the circumstances of this case. This order, however, will have to be passed if we accept the contention on behalf of the appellant herein on the construction of the clause. In the matter of Mis Indian Airlines, which is the subject-matter. of the Application for Intervention No. 1 of 1990 in Civil Appeal No. 2846 of 1986, Mr. Lalit Bhasin, on behalf of the interveners contended that there has been distinction between the discharge simpliciter and dismissal from service by way of punishment. According to Mr. Bhasin ihe .effect of the judgments of this Court in the Central Inland Water's case (supra) and West Bengal's (supra) was to take away the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee by way of discharge simpliciter. According to Mr. Bhasin, this Court had recognised the existence of the inherent right of an employer to terminate the services of an employee in terms of the contract of employment and also under the various labour enactments. Attention of this Court was invited to the provisions of the liidusirial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, which applies to all industrial esiabiishmehts whether in the public or private sector. Under and as a part of ihe said Act, model standfog orders are set out and Standing Order No, 13 provides for simple termination of employment by giving Otie month's notice etc. Similarly, there are provisions under various Shops arid Establishments Acts of different States providing fot termihatioh Of employment of permanent employee after giving one month's notice at pay in lieu of notice. Attention of this Court was invited to s. 30 of belh\ Shops and Establishments~ct. The Iiidlisttial Disputes Act itself makes distinction between discharge and dismissal and atiention of this Court was invited to s. 2(oo) of the Ihdi.Jstrial Disputes Act, whith defines 'retrenchment'. This section expressly excludes termination of services as a ~esult of nonrenewal of contract of einploymenL Section 2(s) of the Industrial bisputes Act defines 'Workman' to indude any person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched. Section 2A distinguishes discharge, dismissal and retrenchment.

. it is pertinent to point out that the Original Regulation B of indiai\ Airlines Empioyees Service Regulations was set <out as "rrder:

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[1990] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

"13. The services of an employee are terminable at 30 days on either side or basic pay in lieu: Provided however, the Corporation will be at liberty to refuse to accept the termination of his service by an employee where such termination is sought in order to avoid disciplinary action contemplated or taken by the Management." After the decisions of this Court in Central Inland Water's case (supra), Indian Airlines initiated steps to amend its Regulation 13 and bring it in line with Article 311(2) of the Constitution as directed by this Court in Hindustan Steels Ltd" case (supra). It appears that the Board of Directors of Indian Airlines had accordingly approved of the amendments to Regulation 13 and the amended Regulation reads as under: . "(a) The services of an employee may be tenninated without assigning any reasons to him/her and without any prior notice but only on the following grounds not amounting to misconduct under the Standing Orders, namely: (i) If he/she is, in the opinion' of the Corporation (the Board of Directors of Indian Airlines) incompetent and · unsuitable for continued employment with the Corporation and such incompetence and unsuitability is such as to make his/her continuance in employment detrimental to the interest of the Corporation; OR

• If his/her continuance in employment constitutes, in the opinion of the Corporation (the Board of Directors of Indian Airlines), a grave security risk making his/her continuance in a service detrimental to the interests of the Corporation; OR if in the opinion of the Corporation (the Board of Directors of Indian Airlines) there is such a justifiable lack of confidence which, having regard to the nature of duties performed, would make it necessary in the interest of the Corporation, to immediately terminate his/her services.

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS IMUKHARJI, CJ.)

(b) The employee can seek termination of his/her employment by giving 30 days notice or basic pay in lieu:

Provided however the Corporatibn will be at liberty to refuse to accept the termination of his/her service by an employee where such termination is sought in order to avoid disciplinary action contemplated or taken by the Management." According to Mr. Bhasin, in the amended Regulation 13, Indian Airlines had taken care to set out the circumstances in which the services of an employee can be terminated by way of discharge and without holding enquiry. Mr Bhasin urged that these are eventualities which do not constitute misconduct and ·yet retention of an employee in the service by the management for any one of the grounds mentioned in the aforesaid Regulation might be considered as detrimental for the management or against public interest. Mr. Bhasin submitted that the power has been vested with the Board of Directors and not with any individual. According to Mr. Bhasin, plain reading.of Regulation 13, as amended, would clearly establish that the vice. if

any, or arbitrariness is completely removed and sufficient guidelines

are made available to the highest {unctionary, namely, the Board of Directors to exercise the restricted and limited power now available to the employer under these Regulations.

Similar submissions have been made on behalf of Air India; who are interveners. Submissions made hereinbefore were alternative submissions. The original Regulation 48 of Air India Employees Service Regulations was as follows: ''Termination:

The _services of an employee may be terminated without assigning any reason, as under: (a) of a permanent employee by giving him 30 day's notice in writing or pay in lieu of notice;

(b) of any employee on probation by giving him 7 days· notice in writing or pay in lieu of notice:

•

(c) of a temporary employee by giving him 24 hours· notice in writing or pay in lieu of notice.

""

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Explanation: For the purposes of the regulation, the word "pay" shall include all emoluments which would be admissible if he were on privilege leave."

After the decisions of this Court declaring the aforesaid Regulation as void in Civil Appeal No. 19 of 1982 in the Case of Manohar P. Kharkar & Anr. v. Kaghu Raj & Anr., Air India amended the aforesaid Regulation, which now reads as under: "(a) The services of a permanent employee may be terminated without assigning any reasons to him/her and without any prior notice but only to the following grounds not amounting to misconduct under Service Regulation 42, namely: (i) if he/she is, in the opmmn of the Corporation (the Board of Directors of Air India) incompetent and unsuitable for continued employment with the Corporation and such incompetence and unsuitability is such as to make his/her continuance in employment detrimental to the interests of the Corporation; OR

If his/her continuance in employment constitutes, in the opinion of the Corporation (the Board of Directors of Air India), a grave security risk making his/her continuance in service detrimental) to the interests of the Corporation; OR

If, in the op1mon of the Corporation (the Board of Directors of Air India), there is such a justifiable lack of confidence which, having regard to the nature of duties performed, would make it necessary, in the interest of the Corporation, to immediately terminate his/her services. (b) The services of an employee on probation may be terminated without assigning any reason to him/her but on giving 30 days notice in writing or pay in lieu thereof. (c) The services of a temporary employee may be terminated without assigining any reason to him/her but on giving 15 days notice in writing or pay in lieu thereof.

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS IMUKHARJI, CJ.]

Explanation For the purpose of this Regulation the word .. pay" shall include all emoluments which would be adrnis· sible if he were on privilege leave." The question regarding justification of the action taken by the management was touched by this Court, but since the action was based on the old Regulation 48, it had to be quashed. H was submitted on behalf of the Air India that care had been taken to suit the circumstances ·in which the services of an employee could be terminated by way of discharge simpliciter and without holding enquiry. These are eventualities which do not constitute misconduct and yet retention of an employee in the service of the management for any one of the grounds mentioned in the said Regulation might be considered as detrimental for the management or against public interest. It was submitted that the said regulation 48 has to be read with Regulation 44(A) which reads as under: "44(Al(i) Notwithstanding anything contained in these Regulations and if, in the opinion of the Corporation (the Board of Directors of Air India), it is not possible or prac-

C

ticable to hold an enquiry under the relevant provisions of

these Regulations, the Corporation may, if satisfied that the employee has been guilty of any misconduct, any one of the punishment mentioned in Regulation 43 on the emp•Joyee .concerned. Provided that before exercising his extra ordinary power, the Board shall give 30 days prior notice to the employee concerned of the act of misconducl'that the reasons why it . is not possible or practicable to hold an enquiry into such misconduct, and the punishment proposed by the Board and the employee shall be entitled to make a full written representation to the Board in response to such notice. (ii) No action shall be taken under the Regulation untii the Board has taken into consideration the representation made by the concerned employee under the prqviso to Section (i) within the notice period." The original regulation 44 was also modified. According to the interneners, th_f cumulative reading of regulation 48, as amended, and 'f.egulaHon 44, aS.:amended, would clearly establish that the vice, if any, •Of arbitrariness is completely removed and sufficient .guidelines are

'F

o

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[1990] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

made available to the Board of Directors to exercise the restricted and limited power now available to the employer under these Regulations. In C.M.P. No. 30309 of 1988, on behalf of the New India Assurance Co., the intervention application was filed. It was stated that in the courts below the writ petition No. 835 of 1975 was filed by the employee challenging his termination and the appeal filed thereon were decided on grounds available to the petitioner at that time. A special leave petition was filed by the employee concerned which has now become C.A. No. 655 of 1984. After the judgment in the Central Inland Water's case (supra), an additional ground is now being taken to contend that a contract entered into way back in the sixties when the employee concerned was an employee of the Orissa Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd., Cuttack could not be enforced now and the same ought to be declared void in view of the Central Inland Water's case (supra). The intervention was allowed on 24th January, 1990 and Smt. Shyamla Pappu, Senior Advocate submitted written submissions. It was submitted that adjudication on the merits and the consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case may be left to the Bench hearing the matter after the decision of the question of law referred to the Constitution Bench. In this connection, it may, however, be noted that the General Insurance was nationalised under the provisions of the General Insurance Provisions (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 and the said Act came into force on 20th September, 1972. Prior to this, General Insurance (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1971 was passed under the provisions of which Act ·all undertakings of all Insurers vested in the Central Government with effect from 13th May, 1971. This was pending nationalisation which took place in 1972 as aforesaid. Section 7(1) of the said Act which provided for the takeover of former employees reads as under:

"Every whole-time officer or other employee of an existing Insurer other than an Indian Insurance Company, who was employed by that insurer, wholly or mainly with his general insurance business immediately before the appointed day, shall, on the appointed day, become an officer or other employee, as the case may be, of the Insurance Company, in which the Undertaking to which the service of the officer

,.

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS [MUKHARJI, CJ.]

or. other employee relates has vested and shall hold his office or service on the same terms and conditions and with the same rights to pension, gratuity and other matters as would have been admissible to him if there had been no such vesting and shall continue to do so until his employment in the Indian Insurance Company in which the undertaking or part has vested, is terminated or until his remuneration, terms and conditions are duly altered by that Indian Insurance Company." The original terms and conditions had not been altered and the employees like the appellant in C.A. No .. 855/84 continued to be governed by the original terms and conditions of the contract at the time of termination. The original terms and conditions of employment, therefore, continued in force. The contract of service was entered into when the appellant joined the Orissa Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd. way back in 1961 and at the time of take-over by the Central Government was the Divisional Manager of the said society. After the take over by the Central Government of general insurance in 1972, a great deal of reorganisation had to be effected in order to tone up the system of general insurance which had become unwieldy due.to the mushroom growth of societies with no control whatsoever when insurance was in private hands-. It was submitted by Smt. Shyamla Pappu that there are many such cases where action was taken soon after nationalisation of general insurance in 1972._If such orders are set aside today, Smt. Shyamla Pappu posed the question, what would be the result? Would the order set aside, at this stage give the employee a right to be reinstated? If the answer to the: above is in the affirmative, would it be conducive to efficiency in the c_onduct of a public utility such as general insurance, Smt. Pappu ra.ised the question. Would it not hamper the Company's busines~ considering that the reduction/reorganisation of staff was essential for the effective functioning of the pnhlic service? Smt. Pappu asked the question would the public service not be saddled with unnecessary and/or incompetent staff, thus, burdening the public utility/service with unmanageable costs and staff that is ineffective? It was urged I.hat the New India Assurance Company had a clause, in the contract at the relevant time, which was as follows:

"in the event of the society not having any further need of any employees services, whether·permanent or temporary, which shall be decided by the board, the Principal Officer

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[ 1990) Supp. 1 S.C.R.

shall give 30 days notJce in writing for termination of his services or in lieu thereof pay such employee a sum equiva-

lent to one month pay including allowar;.ce upto the period of notice."

The above clause covered cases of retrenchment, abolition of posts and other situations which had been adjudicated upon by this Court. If, however, the Central Inland Water's case (supra) is applied, Smt. Shyamla Pappu submitted, then the management of the Intervener Company will be powerless even in a case of abolition of posts or retrenchment or any other allied situation. It is seen that the power to terminate an employee is co-existent with the power to appoint. Smt. Shyamla Pappu relied on the General Clauses Act and submitted that the Central Inland Water's case (supra) was erroneous in so far as it made a complete negation of this power. Then, it was submitted by her that in case of an employer who had made all the necessary investigation and the employee concerned ha> been fully heard before the order of termination and if the decision of Central Inland Water's case was applied, then even such a case would be a case of illegal termination, considering that there would be no power to terminate. It was submitted that the Central Inland Water's case had to be read down because paras 77, 92 and 93 of the report take in even private employment. The sweep of the judgment cannot hold good and had to be curtailed. According t-0 Smt. Pappu, what then was the position of terminations effected when the law was different? It cannot be said that they are entitled to relief now. It should be clarified that the judgment of this Court would apply prospectively, it was submitted. Past cases might be treated as concluded in view of the law prevailing at that time and also in view of the contentions urged by the parties in the courts below at various stages. In the event, this Court comes to the conclusion that even old cases would be covered by the judgment ·now rendered, the orders already passed may be upheld and a post-decisional hearing might be directed so that the management concerned h'as the opportunity of showing that there existed good reasons for termination though the same were not communicated to the employee concerned because the law then existing did not .require such a c~m­ munication. In the interest of justice, we should allow such a cours~. In the light of the provisions and in the facts and the circumstances of the case, it is, therefore, necessary to consider the validity of the power of termination of employment by the employers or authorities of the emp_loyees without holding any enquiry in the circum-

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS [MUKHARJI, CJ.]

stances noted in the several civil appeals and applications herein.

In these civil appeals. the question of actual user of power is not the main issue, but the validity of clauses or regulations containing the aforesaid power. The instances of actual user of power, however, are not wholly irrelevant on the question of the validity or extent of the power because these explain the extent and content of power and/er B occasion for such user. Firstly. we have to. in view of the facts and the circumstances of the Civil Appeal No. 2876 of 1986, consider the amplitude of the power under clause (b) of Regulation 9 of the Regulations concerned. We have noted the contents of that Regulation. We have also noted the amplitude of the expression of that power as was canvassed before the High Court in the matter under appeal and as. C noticed by the decision of this Court in Delhi Transport Undertaking v. Balbir Saran Gael's case (supra). A su(vey of the several authorities of law and the development of law from time to time would lead one to the conclusion that the philosophy of the Indian Constitution. as it has evolved, from precedent to precedent, has broaden the horizons of the right of the employees and they have been assured security of tenures D and ensured protection against arbitrariness and discrimination in discharge or termination of his employment. This is- the basic concept of

the evolution from the different angles of law of master and servant or in the evolution of employer and employee relationship. It is true that· the law has travelled in different channels, government servants or servants or employees having status have to be differentiated from those whose relationships are guided by contractual obligations. But it has to be borne in mind that we are concerned in these matters with the employees either of semi-Government or statutory corporations or public undertakings who enjoy the rights, privileges, limitati'ons and inhibitions of institutions who come within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution. It is in the background of these parameters that we must consider the question essentially and basically posed in these matters. The basic and the fundamental question to be judged is. in what manner and to what extent. the employees of these bodies or corporations or institutions could be affected in their security of tenure by the employers consistent with the rights evolved over the years and rights emanating from the philosophy of the Constitution as ai present understood and accepted. We have noted the exhaustive and the learned analysis of the background of the diverse facts projected in the several cases and appeals before us.

F.

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[ 1990] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

Efficiency of the administration of these undertakings is very vital and relevant consideration. Production must continue, services must be maintained and run. Efficacy of the services can be manned only by the disciplined employees or workers. Discipline, decency and order will have to be maintained. Employees should have sense of participation and involvement and necessarily sense of security in semi-permanent or quasi-permanent or permanent employment. There must be scope for enc9uragement for good work. In what manner and in what measure, this should be planned and ensured within the framework of the Constitution and,,power mingled with obligations, and duties enjoined with rights, are matters of constitutional a.djustment at any particular evolved stage of the philosophy of our Constitution. We have noted several decisions, numerous as these are, and the diverse facts, as we have found. We have noted that in some cases arbitrary action or whimsical action or discriminatory action can flow or follow by the preponderance of these powers. The fact. that the power so entrusted with a high ranking authority or body is not always a safe or sound insurance against misuse. At least, it does not always ensure against erosion of credibility in the exercise of the power in particular contingency. Yet, discipline has to be maintained, efficiency of the institution has to be ensured. It has to be recognised that quick actions are very often necessary in running of an institution or public service or public utility and public concern. It is not always possible to have enquiry because disclosure is difficult; evidence is hesitant and difficult, otten impossible. In those circumstances, what should be the approach to the location of power and what should be the content and extent of power, possession and exercise of which is essential for efficient running of the industries or services? It has to be a matter both of balancing and adjustment on which one can wager the salvation of rights and liberties of the employees concerned and the future of the industries or the services involved.

Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles and objects, it appears to us that the power to terminate the employment of permanent employment must be there. Efficiency and expediency and the necessity of running an industry or ·service make it imperative to have these pow.ers. Power must, therefore, with authorities to take decision quickly, objectively and independently. Power must be assumed with certain conditions of duty. The preamble, the policy, purpose of the enacting provision delimit the occasions or the contingencies for the need for the exercise of the power and these should limit the occasions

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS !MUKHARJI, CJ.]

of exercise of such powers. The manner in which such exercise of power should be made should ensure fairness, avoid arbitrariness and ma/a fide and create credibility in the decisions arrived at or by exercise uf the power. All these are essential to ensure that power is fairly exercised and there is fair play in action. Reasons, good and sound, must control the exercise of power.

We have noted the rival submissions. Learned Attorney General of India and the learned Solicitor General and others appearing for those who sought for sustaining the power by the employers or the authorities, contend that for efficiency of the industry, for the attainment of the very purpose for which institutions are created, there should be power to terminate the employment of undesirable, ineffi- C cient, corrupt, indolent, disobedient employees in those cases where holding of enquiry or prolonging these employees for that purpose whould be detrimental, difficult and frustrating. It is in this context that we should examine the power under the aforesaid Regulation 9(b). The power must be there, the power must be utilised by person or authority, high ranking enough or senior enough who can be trusted D or who can be presumed to be able to act fairly, objectively and independently. The occasion for the exercise of the power must be delimited with precision, clarity or objectivity. And those occasions must be correlated to the purpose for which the powers are sought to be exercised. In concrete terms, for the running of the industry or the service, efficiently, quickly and in a better manner or to avoid dead- E locks or inefficiency or friction, the vesting of the power in circumstances must be such that will evoke creditability and confidence. Reasons must be there, reasons must be perspectable, reasons must be relevant and the reasons niust be of authority independently, fairly and objectively arrived at. Notice of hearing may or may not be given, opportunity in the form of an enquiry inay or not be given, yet arbitrariness and discrimination and acting whimsically must be av9ided. These power must, therefore, be so read that the powers can be exercised on reasons, reasons should be recorded, reasons need not always be communicated, must be by authorities who are competent and are expected to G act fairly, objectively and independently. The occasion for the use of power must be clearly circuinscribed in the above limits. These must also circumscribe that the need for exercise of those power without holding a detailed or prolonged enquiry is there.

As we have noted,_ a good deal of controversy was that these

1[

!l!

i~

• il

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[1990] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

inhibitions or limitations or conditions are not there in the amplitude or the extent of the power enumerated or stated in Regulation 9(b) of the .aforesaid Regulations concerned or of similar provisions that we have examined in these cases. We have noted the argument, learned and interesting, on the question of judicial law making imputing to the legislatures what these have not articulated. Should the courts say or can say what the legislatures have not said'! We have noted the controversy of how should legislation of limited legislatures, Parliaments or rule making bodies, who are not expected or enjoined to make rules or laws contrary to or in derogation or the constitutional prohibitions and inhibitions be read. We have been tempted to read down in the path of judicial law making on the plea that legislature could not have intended to give powers to the authorities or employers which would be violative of fundamental rights of the persons involved in the exercise of those powers .and, therefore, should be attributed those powers on conditions which will only make these legal or valid. Our law making bodies are not law into themselves and cannot create or make all laws. They can only confer powers or make laws for the conferment of powers on authorities which are legal and valid. Such powers conferred must conform to the consitutional inhibitions. The question, therefore, is-is it possible or desirable to read down the power conferred under Regulation 9(b) or similar regulations permitting employer or the authority to terminate the employment of the employees by giving reasonable notice or pay in lieu of notice without holding enquiry with the conditions indicated or mentioned hereinbefore? Will it or will it not amount to making laws of stating which the legislature or the law making body has not stated" We have been reminded that judges should not make laws. But the,questiOn is-can the judges articulate what is inarticulate and what can be reasonably and plainly found to be inherent on the presumption that a legislature or a law making body with the limited authority would act only within limitations so as to make the legislation or law valid and the legislature must be presumed to act with certain amount of knowledge and fairness protecting the rights of people ·Concerned and aiming at fairness in action? · We have noted the rival contentions. We have noted the submission that Mr. Garg, Mr. Ramamurthi and others invited us not to read down and against legislating positively with conditions. But the question is-are those condltfori-s which we are ·invited to aitriliuie to

D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS [MUKHARJI, CJ.]

the legislature or the law making bodies contrary to or against the manifest intention of the legislature? Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from experience of evils. But its general language should not, therefore, necessarily be confined to the form that evil had taken. Time works changes, brings into .existence new conditions and purposes and new aw.areness of limitations. Therefore, a principle ·to be valid must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is particularly true of the constitutional constructions. Constitutions are not ephemeral enactments designed to meet passing occasions. These are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it. .... ". In the application of a Constitutional limitation or inhibition, our interpretation cannot be only of 'what has been''but of 'what may be'. See the observations of this Court in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (supra). Where, therefore, in the intepretation of the provisions of an Act, two constructions are possible, one which leads towards constitutionality of the legislation would be preferred to that which has the effect of destroying it. If we do not read the conferment of the power in the manner we have envisaged before, the power is liable to be struck down as bad. This, we say in spite of the argument by many including learned Solicitor General of India and Smt. Shyamla Pappu that in contractual obligations while institutions or organisations or authorities, who come within the ambit

of Article 12 of the Constitution are free to contract on the basis of 'hire and fire' and the theory of the concept of unequal bargain and the power conferred subject to constitutional ·]imitations would not be applicable. We are not impressed and not agreeable to accept that proposition at this stage of the evolution of the constitutional philosophy·of master and servant framework or if you would like to call it employer or employee relationship. Therefore, these conferments of the powers on the employer must be judged on the constitutional peg and so judged without the limitations indicated aforesaid, the power is liable to be considered as arbitrary and struck down. Whenever a statute comes. up for consideration_,jt mu_st be remembered that it is not within human powers to '.foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, anfl, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity. The English language, and for that matter any language in use today, is not an instrument .of mathematical precision. It has been said that our literature would h~ve been much the poorer if.it were.Leaving, how-

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1990] Supp. I S.C.R.

e1 er. the question of richness or poverty of our literature apart, we

must proceed on the assumption that human mind cannot foresee everything. It has, therefore, been said that when a question arises whether the power has been properly conferred and even if so, the extent of it. Lord Denning has opined that a Judge in such a situation cannot simply fold his hand and blame the draftsmen and look for new enactment. Lord Denning invites us to set to work on the construction task of finding the intention of the Parliament or the law making body and we must, however. do this not only from the language of the statute. because, as we have seen, language is an imperfect medium and very often thoughts are perpetually in search of 'broken language'. But the judge must also do it from a consideration of the social conditions which give rise to it, and of the mischief which it was intended to remedy and also in the light of the constitutional inhibitions and then supplant the written words and add to it end give 'force and life' to the intention and purpose of the legislatiure or the law making authority. A judge must not alter the material of which a law or an instrument is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases and tf one may venture to say, make articulate the inarticulate premise but make articulate only which follow from necessary compulsions of the situations and the constitutional position. See in this connection the observations of Lord Denning in .. The Discipline of Law" at p. 12.

It is true that judicial j,ealously of legislature in law making has long been outdrawn, but the strict construction remains still an . established rule. It is generally accepted principle that judges in interpreting statutes, should give effect to the legislators' intent. By doing so, the courts do recognise their subordinate position and their obligation to help the legislature to achieve its purpose. But in that effort, creativity is essential. There have been differences of opinion on the practices that the courts may employ in attempting to discover the legislative intent. In the beginning, conventional practice was only to look to the words of the statutes. Now the entire spectrum has to be examined. It has been said that judges are not unfettered glossators. 1t is true that there is no actual expression used enabling the legislation or the statute in question indicating the limitations or condillons as aforesaid. But it must proceed on the premise that the law making authority intended to make a valid law to confer power validly or which will be valid. The freedom, therefore, to search the spirit of the enactment or what is intended to obtain or to find the intention ot the Parliament.gives the Court the power to supplant and supplement the expressions used to say what was left unsaid. This is a power which

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D.T.C. v. D.T.C. MAZDOOR CONGRESS lMUK!!ARJI, O.J

is an important branch of judicial power, the concession of which if taken to the extreme is dangerous, but denial of that power would be ruinous and this is not contrary to the expressed intention of the legis, lature or the implied purpose of the legislation. It was not as Shri Ramamurthi tried to argue that legislature wanted to give an uncontrolled and absolute power to discharge employees on the part of the employers without any enquiry, in all circumstances. That cannot be and that was not intended to be as can be implied from all the circumstances. In the aforesaid view of the matter, I would sustain the constitutionality of this conferment of power by reading that the power !TlUSt be exercised on reasons relevant for the efficient running of the services or performing of the job by the societies or the bodies. It should be done objectively, the reasons should be recorded, it shouk! record this and the basis that it is not feasible or possible reasonably to hold any enquiry without disclosing the evidence which in the circumstances of the case would be hampering the running of the institution. The reasons should be recorded, it need not be communicaied·and only for the purpose of the running of the institution, there should be factors which hamper the running of the institution without the termination of the employment of the employee concerned at that particular time either because he is a surplus, inefficient, disobedient and dangerous.

Construction or interpretation of legislative or rule provisions proceeds on the assumption that courts must seek to discover and translate the intention of the legislature or the rule-making body. This is one of the legal fictions upon-the hypothesis of which the framework of adjudication of the intention of a piece of legislation or rule proceeds. But these are fictional 1]1yths to a large extent as experience F should tell us. In most of the cases legisl~(ure, that is to say, vast majority of the people who are supposed to represent the views and opinions of the people, do not have any intention, even if they have, .they cannot and do not articulate those intentions. On most of these issues their is no comprehens.ion or understanding. Reality would reveal that it is only those who are able tp exert their viewpoints, in a G common parliamentary jargon, the power lobby, gets what it wants, and the machinery is of a bureaucratic set up who draft the legislation or rule or law. So, therefore, what is passed on very often as the will of the people in a particular enactment is the handy work of a bureaucratic machine produced at the behest of a power lobby controlling the corridors of power in a particular situation. This takes the mythetical H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[ 1990] Supp. 1. S.C.R.

shape of the 'intention of the people" in the form of legislation. Again, very often, the bureaucratic machine is not able to correctly and properly transmute what was intended to be conveyed. In"such a situation, is it or is it not better, one would ponder to ask, whether the courts should attribute to the law-making body the knowledge of the values and limitations of the Constitution, and knowledge of the evils that should be remedied at a particular time and in a situation that should be met by a particular piece of legislation, and the court with the experience and knowledge of law, with the assistance of lawyers trained in this behalf, should endeavour to find out what will be the correct and appropriate solution, and costrue the rule of the legislation within the ambit of constitutional limitations and upon reasonable judgment of what should have been expressed. In reality, that happens in most of the cases. Can it be condemned as judicial usurpation of law-making functions of the legislature thereby depriving the people of their right to express their will? This is a practical dilemma which Judges must always, in cases of interpretation and construction, face and a question which they must answer.

I have noted the guidelines for the exercise of the power, preamble, relevant sections from which the reasons should be inferred and recorded, although they need not be communicate. These should be recorded in order to ensure effective judicial review in a given case. Termination simpliciter under Regulation 9(b) or similar powers can be exercised only in circumstances other than those in regulation 9(a). The exercise of such powers can only be for purposes germane and relevant to the statute. There are several illustratic;ms of that, namely, the employee is incompetent or unsuitable so as to make his continuance in the employment detrimental to the interest of the institution, where the continuance of the employee is grave security risk making his continuance detrimental to the inter.est of the Corporation and where because of the conduct of the employee, there is lack of confidence in the employee which makes it necessary in the interest of the Corporation to immediately terminate the services of the employee. These, however, are illustrative and not exhaustive. Therefore, each case of the conferment of the power invloved should be decided on the aforesaid basis.

I am conscious that clear intention as indicated in a legislation cannot be permitt

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