DR. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. The Chief Minister & Ors.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 5 May 2021
- Judge
- Justice Ashok Bhushan
- Neutral citation
- 2021 INSC 284
- Reported in
- [2021] 15 S.C.R. 715
- Result
- Disposed off
- Acts & sections
- Article 342A Constitution, Article 366 Constitution, Article 368 Constitution, Article 16 Constitution, Article 32 Constitution, Article 15 Constitution, Article 14 Constitution, Article 142 Constitution
- Subject
- Labour
Full judgment
[2021] 15 S.C.R. 715
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL
v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ORS. (Civil Appeal No.3123 of 2020) MAY 05, 2021
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, L. NAGESWARA RAO, S. ABDUL NAZEER, HEMANT GUPTA AND S. RAVINDRA BHAT, JJ.] Reservation – Constitution of India – Arts. 15 and 16 – Constitution (Eighty-first Amendment) Act, 2000 – Socially and educationally backward class (SEBC) – Reservation in favour of backward class citizens – On 16.11.1992, a nine-Judge Constitution Bench of Supreme Court delivered a judgment in Indra Sawhney case laying down law pertaining to principle of reservation under the Constitution – Six separate judgments were delivered in the case including one judgment of Justice Jeevan Reddy, which was for himself and three other judges – Whether judgment in case of Indra Sawhney needs to be referred to larger bench or require re-look by the larger bench in the light of subsequent Constitutional Amendments, judgments and changed social dynamics of the society etc. – Held, No – Held [per Ashok Bhushan, J. (for himself and S. Abdul Nazeer, J.)] with Ravindra Bhat, J., L. Nageswara Rao, J. and Hemant Gupta, J. concurring : The greatest common measure of agreement in six separate judgments delivered in Indra Sawhney is: (i) Reservation under Article 16(4) should not exceed 50%. (ii) For exceeding reservation beyond 50%, extra-ordinary circumstances as indicated in paragraph 810 of Justice Jeevan Reddy should exist for which extreme caution is to be exercised – The 50% rule affirmed in Indra Sawhney is to fulfill the objective of equality as engrafted in Article 14 of which Articles 15 and 16 are facets – 50% is reasonable and it is to attain the object of equality – To change the 50% limit is to have a society which is not founded on equality but based on caste rule – The cap on percentage of reservation as laid down in Indra Sawhney is with the object of striking a balance between the rights under Article 15(1) and 15(4) as well as Articles 16(1) and 16(4) – The cap on percentage is to
achieve principle of equality and with the object to strike a balance which cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable – The Constitution (Eighty-first Amendment) Act, 2000 by which subclause (4B) was inserted in Art.16 makes it clear that ceiling of 50% “has now received constitutional recognition” – The judgment of Indra Sawhney has stood the test of the time and has never been doubted by any judgment of Supreme Court – No substance in any of the grounds urged for revisiting and referring the judgment of Indra Sawhney to a larger Bench – Held (per S. Ravindra Bhat, J. supplementing, with Hemant Gupta, J. concurring therewith): The ceiling of 50% with the “extraordinary circumstances” exception, is the just balance that allows the State sufficient latitude to ensure meaningful affirmative action, to those who deserve it, and at the same time ensure that the essential content of equality, and its injunction not to discriminate on various proscribed grounds (caste, religion, sex, place of residence) is retained – To dilute the 50% benchmark further, would be to effectively destroy the guarantee of equality, especially the right not to be discriminated against on the grounds of caste (under Articles 15 and 16). Reservation – Constitution of India – Arts. 15 and 16 – Socially and educationally backward class (SEBC) – Reservation in favour of backward class citizens – Identification of Maratha community as SEBCs – State Government set up a backward class commission to ascertain the social and educational status of the community – By its report (the Gaikwad Commission Report), the Commission recommended that the Maratha community be declared as SEBC – This led to enactment of the SEBC Act, 2018 giving effect to the recommendations of the Gaikwad Commission, resulting in reservation in favour of that community; consequent to which, the aggregate reservations exceeded 50% – Whether the SEBC Act, 2018 as amended in 2019 granting reservation for the Maratha community in addition to 50% social reservation in educational institutions and in public services and posts is covered by exceptional circumstances as contemplated by Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney’s case – Held, No – The High Court found existence of the extra-ordinary situations with regard to exceeding 50% ceiling in respect to grant of separate reservation to Maratha because the population of backward class is 80% and reservation limit is only 50%, and containing the Maratha in pre-existing reservation for
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR.
OBC shall not be justice to them, which circumstances is not covered under the parameters indicated in Indra Sawhney’s case as extraordinary circumstance to breach 50% ceiling – No extraordinary circumstances made out in granting separate reservation of Maratha Community by exceeding the 50 per cent ceiling limit of reservation – Maharashtra State Reservation (of Seats for Admission in Educational Institutions in the State and for appointments in the public services and posts under the State) for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018.
Reservation – Constitution of India – Arts. 15 and 16 – Socially and educationally backward class (SEBC) – Reservation in favour of backward class citizens – Representation of Marathas in State services – Whether the State Government on the strength of Maharashtra State Backward Commission Report chaired by M.C. Gaikwad made out a case of existence of extraordinary situation and exceptional circumstances in the State to fall within the exception carved out in the judgment of Indra Sawhney – Held, No – The Constitution pre-condition for providing reservation as mandated by Article 16(4) is that the backward class is not adequately represented in the public services – The Commission labored under misconception that unless Maratha community is not represented equivalent to its proportion, it is not adequately represented – Indra Sawhney has categorically held that what is required by the State for providing reservation under Article 16(4) is not proportionate representation but adequate representation – The constitutional precondition as mandated by Article 16(4) being not fulfilled with regard to Maratha class, both the Gaikwad Commission’s report and consequential legislation are unsustainable – Sufficient and adequate representation of Maratha community in public services is indicator that they are not socially and educationally backward. Reservation – Constitution of India – Arts. 15, 16 and Art.342A r/w Art.366(26C) – Constitution 102nd Amendment – Socially and educationally backward class (SEBC) – Reservation in favour of backward class citizens – Whether the Constitution 102nd Amendment deprives the State Legislature of its power to enact a legislation determining the socially and economically backward classes and conferring the benefits on the said community under its enabling power and Whether, States power to legislate in relation to “any
backward class” under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) is anyway abridged by Article 342A read with Article 366(26C) of the Constitution – Held (per Ravindra Bhat, J., with L. Nageswara Rao, J. and Hemant Gupta, J. concurring) (majority opinion): The two points of reference are inter-related – By introduction of Articles 366(26C) and 342A through the 102nd Constitution Amendment, the President alone, to the exclusion of all other authorities, is empowered to identify SEBCs and include them in a list to be published under Article 342A (1), which shall be deemed to include SEBCs in relation to each State and Union Territory for the purposes of the Constitution – The States can, through their existing mechanisms, or even statutory commissions, only make suggestions to the President or the Commission under Art.338B, for inclusion, exclusion or modification of castes or communities, in the list to be published under Art.342A(1) – The States’ power to make reservations, in favour of particular communities or castes, the quantum of reservations, the nature of benefits and the kind of reservations, and all other matters falling within the ambit of Arts.15 and 16 – except with respect to identification of SEBCs, remains undisturbed – Held (per L. Nageswara Rao, J. supplementing, with Hemant Gupta, J. concurring therwith): There is only one list that can be issued by the President specifying the socially and educationally backward classes and only those classes are treated as socially and educationally backward classes for the purposes of the Constitution – It is apparent from Article 342A(1) and (2) that there is no scope for any list of socially and educationally backward classes, other than the list to be notified by the President – Held [per Ashok Bhushan, J. (for himself and S. Abdul Nazeer, J.)](minority opinion): Parliamentary intention discernible from Select Committee report and statement of Minister of Social Justice and Empowerment is that the intention of the Parliament for bringing Constitutional amendment was not to take away the power of the State to identify backward class in the State – The use of word ‘Central’ in Article 342A(2) was only with the intent to limit the list issued by the President to Central services. Reservation – Constitution of India – Arts. 15(4) and 16(4) – Socially and educationally backward class (SEBC) – Reservation in favour of backward class citizens – Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act challenged, on ground that it violated the basic
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR
structure, or essential features of the Constitution – Article 342A of the Constitution was brought by the Constitution 102nd Amendment – Whether, Article 342A abrogates States power to legislate or classify in respect of “any backward class of citizens” and thereby affects the federal policy / structure of the Constitution of India – Held [per Ashok Bhushan, J. (for himself and S. Abdul Nazeer, J.)]: Article 342A was brought by Constitution 102nd Amendment to give constitutional status to National Backward Classes Commission and for publication of list by the President of socially and educationally backward classes which was to be Central List for governing employment under Government of India and the organisations under it – The Constitution 102nd Amendment Act does not violate any basic feature of the Constitution and is constitutionally valid – Held (per Ravindra Bhat, J., with L. Nageswara Rao, J. and Hemant Gupta, J. concurring): Alteration of the content of state legislative power in an oblique and peripheral manner would not constitute a violation of the concept of federalism – It is only if the amendment takes away the very essence of federalism or effectively divests the federal content of the constitution, and denudes the states of their effective power to legislate or frame executive policies (co-extensive with legislative power) that the amendment would take away an essential feature or violate the basic structure of the Constitution – Applying such a benchmark, the power of identification of SEBCs hitherto exercised by the States and now shifted to the domain of the President (and for its modification, to Parliament) by virtue of Article 342A does not in any manner violate the essential features or basic structure of the Constitution – The 102nd Amendment is also not contrary to or violative of proviso to Article 368 (2) of the Constitution – Article 342A of the Constitution by denuding States power to legislate or classify in respect of “any backward class of citizens” does not affect or damage the federal polity and does not violate the basic structure of the Constitution of India.
Maharashtra State Reservation (of seats for admission in educational institutions in the State and for appointments in the public services and posts under the State) for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018 – s.2(j) – Held: s.2(j) of the Act, 2018 insofar as it declares Maratha community Educationally and Socially Backward Category is ultra vires to the Constitution and struck down.
Maharashtra State Reservation (of seats for admission in educational institutions in the State and for appointments in the public services and posts under the State) for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018 – s.4(1)(a) – Held: s.4(1)(a) of Act, 2018 as amended by Act, 2019 insofar as it grants reservation under Art.15(4) to the extent of 12% of total seats in educational institutions including private institutions whether aided or unaided by the State, other than minority educational institutions, is ultra vires to the Constitution and struck down – Constitution of India – Art.15(4). Maharashtra State Reservation (of seats for admission in educational institutions in the State and for appointments in the public services and posts under the State) for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018 – s.4(1)(b) – Held: s.4(1)(b) of Act, 2018 as amended by Act, 2019 granting reservation of 13% to the Maratha community of the total appointments in direct recruitment in public services and posts under the State, is ultra vires to the Constitution and struck down. In the instant matters, questions of seminal importance relating to contours and extent of special provisions for the advancement of socially and educationally backward class (SEBC) of citizens as contemplated under Article 15(4) of the Constitution and contours and extent of provisions of reservation in favour of the backward class citizens under Article 16(4) of the Constitution, arose for consideration. The State of Maharashtra promulgated an Ordinance in the year 2014, which granted reservation to the Maratha community in public employment and in the field of education. Later, the Ordinance was given the shape of an Act, which was challenged before the High Court. The court stayed the operation of the enactment. The State Government then set up a backward class commission to ascertain the social and educational status of the community. By its report dated 13.11.2018 (the Gaikwad Commission Report), the Commission recommended that the Maratha class of citizens be declared as a Socially and Educationally Backward Class (“SEBC”). This soon led to the enactment of the Maharashtra State Reservation (of Seats for Admission in Educational Institutions in the State and for
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR
appointments in the public services and posts under the State) for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018, giving effect to the recommendations of the Gaikwad Commission, resulting in reservation in favour of that community; consequent to which, the aggregate reservations exceeded 50%.
Subsequently, writ petitions were filed before the Bombay High Court, challenging the identification of Marathas as SEBCs, the conclusions of the Commission, which culminated in its adoption by the State of Maharashtra and enactment of the SEBC Act, the quantum of reservations, and the provisions of the Act itself, on diverse grounds. By the impugned judgment, the High Court turned down the challenge and upheld the identification of Marathas as SEBCs, and further upheld the reasons presented before it, that extraordinary circumstances existed, warranting the breach of the 50% mark, which was held to be the outer limit in the nine-judge decision of this court in Indra Sawhney case. Six separate judgments were delivered in the case including one judgment of Justice Jeevan Reddy, which was for himself and three other judges. The Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act, 2018 also came to be challenged before this Court, on the ground that it violated the basic structure, or essential features of the Constitution. The Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act, 2018 was brought into force on 15.08.2018 adding Article 338B, 342A and 366(26C).
The following six questions accordingly arose for consideration before this Court: 1. Whether judgment in case of Indra Sawhney needs to be referred to larger bench or require re-look by the larger bench in the light of subsequent Constitutional Amendments, judgments and changed social dynamics of the society etc.? 2. Whether Maharashtra State Reservation (of seats for admission in educational institutions in the State and for appointments in the public services and posts under the State) for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018 as amended in 2019 granting reservation for Maratha community in addition to 50% social reservation is covered by exceptional circumstances as contemplated by Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney’s case?
3. Whether the State Government on the strength of Maharashtra State Backward Commission Report chaired by M.C. Gaikwad has made out a case of existence of extraordinary situation and exceptional circumstances in the State to fall within the exception carved out in the judgment of Indra Sawhney?
4. Whether the Constitution One Hundred and Second Amendment deprives the State Legislature of its power to enact a legislation determining the socially and economically backward classes and conferring the benefits on the said community under its enabling power?
5. Whether, States power to legislate in relation to “any backward class” under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) is anyway abridged by Article 342(A) read with Article 366(26C) of the Constitution of India? 6. Whether, Article 342A of the Constitution abrogates States power to legislate or classify in respect of “any backward class of citizens” and thereby affects the federal policy / structure of the Constitution of India? Disposing of the matters, the Court per Ashok Bhushan, J. (for himself and for S. Abdul Nazeer,
J.) HELD:1.1. The greatest common measure of agreement in six separate judgments delivered in Indra Sawhney is: (i) Reservation under Article 16(4) should not exceed 50%. (ii)For exceeding reservation beyond 50%, extra-ordinary circumstances as indicated in paragraph 810 of Justice Jeevan Reddy should exist for which extreme caution is to be exercised. [Para 444][940C-D] 1.2. The 50% rule spoken in Balaji and affirmed in Indra Sawhney is to fulfill the objective of equality as engrafted in Article 14 of which Articles 15 and 16 are facets. 50% is reasonable and it is to attain the object of equality. To change the 50% limit is to have a society which is not founded on equality but based on caste rule. 1.3. The cap on percentage of reservation as has been laid down by Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney is with the object of striking a balance between the rights under Article 15(1) and
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR
15(4) as well as Articles 16(1) and 16(4). The cap on percentage is to achieve principle of equality and with the object to strike a balance which cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. [Para 444][940-D-F]
1.4. Providing reservation for advancement of any socially and educationally backward class in public services is not the only means and method for improving the welfare of backward class. The State ought to bring other measures including providing educational facilities to the members of backward class free of cost giving concession in fee, providing opportunities for skill development to enable the candidates from the backward class to be self-reliant. [Para 444][940-G] 1.5. There can be no quarrel that society changes, law changes, people changes but that does not mean that something which is good and proven to be beneficial in maintaining equality in the society should also be changed in the name of change alone. [Para 444][940-H; 941-A]
1.6. When the Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney held that 50% is upper limit of reservation under Article 16(4), it is the law which is binding under Article 141 and to be implemented. [Para 444][941-A-B] 1.7. The Constitution Bench judgment in Indra Sawhney is also fully applicable in reference to Article 15(4) of the Constitution of India. [Para 444][941-B] 1.8. The setting aside of 50% ceiling by eleven Judge Bench in T.M.A. Pai Foundation case as was laid down by St. Stephen’s case i.e. 50% ceiling in admission in aided Minority Instructions has no bearing on the principle of 50% ceiling laid down by Indra Sawhney with respect to reservation. The judgment of T.M.A. Pai was in reference to rights of minority under Article 30 and is not relevant for Reservation under Articles 16(4) and 15(4) of the Constitution. [Para 444][941-C-D]
1.9. The Constitution (Eighty-first Amendment) Act, 2000 by which sub-clause (4B) was inserted in Article 16 makes it clear that ceiling of 50% “has now received constitutional recognition”. [Para 444][941-D]
1.10. The extraordinary situations indicated in paragraph 810 were only illustrative and cannot be said to be exhaustive. However, it cannot be said that paragraph 810 provided only a geographical test. The use of expression “on being out of the main stream of national life”, is a social test, which also needs to be fulfilled for a case to be covered by exception. [Para 444][941E-F] 1.11. There is no substance in any of the 10 grounds urged for revisiting and referring the judgment of Indra Sawhney to a larger Bench. [Para 444][941-F-G]
1.12. What was held by the Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney on the relevance and significance of the principle of stare decisis is clearly binding. The judgment of Indra Sawhney has stood the test of the time and has never been doubted by any judgment of this Court. The Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Indra Sawhney neither needs to be revisited nor referred to a larger Bench for consideration. [Para 444][941-G-H] 1.13. The Constitution Bench in M. Nagaraj does not contain any ratio that ceiling of 50% reservation may be exceeded by showing quantifiable contemporary data relating to backwardness. The Commission has completely misread the ratio of the judgment, when the Commission took the view that on the quantifiable data ceiling of 50% can be breached. [Para 444][942A-B]
1.14. The Commission and the High Court found existence of the extra-ordinary situations with regard to exceeding 50% ceiling in respect to grant of separate reservation to Maratha because the population of backward class is 80% and reservation limit is only 50%, containing the Maratha in pre-existing reservation for OBC shall not be justice to them, which circumstances is not covered under the parameters indicated in Indra Sawhney’s case as extra-ordinary circumstance to breach 50% ceiling. [Para 444][942-C]
1.15. No extraordinary circumstances were made out in granting separate reservation of Maratha Community by exceeding the 50 per cent ceiling limit of reservation. The Act, 2018 violates the principle of equality as enshrined in Article 16. The exceeding of ceiling limit without there being any extra-
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR
ordinary circumstances clearly violates Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution which makes the enactment ultra vires. [Para 444][942-D-E]
1.16. The proposition is well settled that Commissions’ reports are to be looked into with deference. However, one of the parameter of scrutiny of Commission’s report as approved by this Court is that on the basis of data and materials referred to in the report whether conclusions arrived by the Commission are justified. [Para 444][942-E-F] 1.17. The measures taken under Article 15(4) and 16(4) can be examined as to whether they violate any constitutional principle, and are in conformity with the rights under Article 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution. The scrutiny of measures taken by the State, either executive or legislative, thus, has to pass test of the constitutional scrutiny. [Para 444][942-F-G] 1.18. The word ‘adequate’ is a relative term used in relation to representation of different caste and communities in public employment. The objective of Article 16(4) is that backward class should also be put in mainstream to enable to share power of the State by affirmative action. To be part of public service, as accepted by the Society of today, is to attain social status and play a role in governance. [Para 444][942-G-H; 943-A] 1.19. The representation of Marathas in public services in Grade A, B, C and D comes to 33.23%, 29.03%, 37.06% and 36.53% computed from out of the open category filled posts, is adequate and satisfactory representation of Maratha community. One community bagging such number of posts in public services is a matter of pride for the community and its representation in no manner can be said to not adequate in public services. [Para 444][943-B-C] 1.20. The Constitution pre-condition for providing reservation as mandated by Article 16(4) is that the backward class is not adequately represented in the public services. The Commission labored under misconception that unless Maratha community is not represented equivalent to its proportion, it is not adequately represented. Indra Sawhney has categorically held
that what is required by the State for providing reservation under Article 16(4) is not proportionate representation but adequate representation. [Para 444][943-C-D] 1.21. The constitutional precondition as mandated by Article 16(4) being not fulfilled with regard to Maratha class, both the Gaikwad Commission’s report and consequential legislation are unsustainable. [Para 444][943-E] 1.22. Having disapproved the grant of reservation under Article 16(4) to Maratha community, the said decision becomes relevant and shall certainly have effect on the decision of the Commission holding Maratha to be socially and educationally backward. Sufficient and adequate representation of Maratha community in public services is indicator that they are not socially and educationally backward. From the facts and figures as noted by Gaikwad Commission in its report regarding representation of Marathas in public services, the percentage of Marathas in admission to Engineering, Medical Colleges and other disciplines, their representation in higher academic posts, it is seen that conclusion drawn by the Commission is not supportable from the data collected. The data collected and tabled by the Commission as noted in the report clearly proves that Marathas are not socially and educationally backward class. [Para 444][943F-H; 944-A] 1.23. The elementary principle of interpreting the Constitution or statute is to look into the words used in the statute, when the language is clear, the intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the language used. The aid to interpretation is resorted to only when there is some ambiguity in words or expression used in the statute. The rule of harmonious construction, the rule of reading of the provisions together as also rule of giving effect to the purpose of the statute, and few other principles of interpretation are called in question when aids to construction are necessary in particular context. [Para 444][944-B-C] 1.24. The shift from literal rule to purposive and objective interpretation of a constitutional document is adopted since the Constitution is not to be interpreted in static and rigid manner,
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR
the Constitution is an organic and living document which needs to be interpreted with cardinal principals and objectives of the Constitution. The shift from literal to purposive method of interpretation has been now more and more, being adopted for interpreting a constitutional document. [Para 444][944-D-E]
1.25. The law is well settled in this country that Parliamentary Committee reports including speech given by the Minister in the Parliament are relevant materials to ascertain the intention of Parliament while construing constitutional provisions. [Para 444][944-E-F]
1.26. The consultation by the State on all policy matters affecting the socially and educationally backward classes is now mandatory as per sub-clause (9) of Article 338B which mandatory requirement cannot be by-passed by any State while the State takes any major policy decision. Sub-clause (9) of Article 338B uses the expression ‘consultation’. It is true that the expression ‘consultation’ is not to be read as concurrence but the ‘consultation’ has to be effective and meaningful. The object of consultation is that ‘consultee’ shall place the relevant material before person from whom ‘consultation’ is asked for and advice and opinion given by consulting authority shall guide the authority who has asked for consultation. [Para 444][944-F-H]
1.27. It is, thus, clear as sun light that Parliamentary intention discernible from Select Committee report and statement of Minister of Social Justice and Empowerment is that the intention of the Parliament for bringing Constitutional amendment was not to take away the power of the State to identify backward class in the State. [Para 444][945-A-B] 1.28. When the Parliamentary intention is discernable and admissible as aid to statutory interpretation, there is no reason not to interpret Article 342A in manner as per the intention of the Parliament noticed above. [Para 444][945-B]
1.29. The word ‘Central’ in Article 342A (2) was used for purpose and object. The use of ‘Central’ was only with the intent to limit the list issued by the President to Central services. It is well settled rule of interpretation that no word in a statute or
Constitution is used without any purpose. Word ‘Central’ has to be given meaning and purpose. [Para 444][945-C-D] 1.30. When Article 342A is interpreted to mean that Article 342A refers to ‘Central List’ which is prepared for services under the Government of India and organisations under the Government of India, the definition given under Article 366(26C) which specifically refer to Article 342A has to be read together and list of backward classes which is not Central List shall not be governed by the definition under Article 366(26C). Since, (26C) has been inserted in the context of Article 342A, if the context is list prepared by the State and it is State List, definition under (26C) shall not govern. [Para 444][945-D-F] 1.31. Article 342A was brought by Constitution 102nd Amendment to give constitutional status to National Backward Classes Commission and for publication of list by the President of socially and educationally backward classes which was to be Central List for governing employment under Government of India and the organisations under it. [Para 444][945-F-G] 1.32. The Constitution 102nd Amendment Act does not violate any basic feature of the Constitution. The constitutional validity of Constitution (One Hundred and second Amendment) Act is upheld. [Para 444][945-G-H] 2.1. Section 2(j) of the Act, 2018 insofar as it declares Maratha community Educationally and Socially Backward Category is held to be ultra vires to the Constitution and struck down. [Para 444][946-C-D]
2.2. Section 4(1)(a) of Act, 2018 as amended by Act, 2019 insofar as it grants reservation under Article 15(4) to the extent of 12% of total seats in educational institutions including private institutions whether aided or unaided by the State, other than minority educational institutions, is declared ultra vires to the Constitution and struck down. [Para 444][946-D-E]
2.3. Section 4(1)(b) of Act, 2018 as amended by Act, 2019 granting reservation of 13% to the Maratha community of the total appointments in direct recruitment in public services and posts under the State, is held to be ultra vires to the Constitution and struck down. [Para 444][946-F]
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR
T.M.A. Pai Foundation and others v. State of Karnataka and others, (2002) 8 SCC 481 : [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 587 and S.V.Joshi v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 7 SCC 41 – distinguished.
M. Nagraj and others v. Union of India & Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 212 and M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 649 : [1963] Suppl. SCR 439 – explained.
Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT, AIR 1965 SC 1636 : [1965] SCR 908 – held applicable. Ram Singh and others v. Union of India, (2015) 4 SCC 697 : [2015] 5 SCR 670 – affirmed. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 Suppl. (3) SCC 217 : [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454]; Jarnail Singh and others v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta and others, 2018 (10) SCC 396 : [2018] 10 SCR 663; Barium Chemicals ltd. and another v. The Company Law Board and others, AIR 1967 SC 295 : [1966] Suppl. SCR 311; Dinesh B. v. Union of India and others, T. Devadasan v. Union of India and another, AIR (1964) SC 179 : [1964] SCR 680; State of Punjab v. Hiralal and others, (1970) 3 SCC 567 : [1971] 3 SCR 267; State of Kerala and others v. N.M. Thomas and others, (1976) 2 SCC 310 : [1976] 1 SCR 906; Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh, (Railway) v. Union of India and others, (1981) 1 SCC 246 : [1981] 2 SCR 185; K.C. Vasant Kumar and another v. State of Karnataka, (1985) Supp. (1) SCC 714; Union of India and others v. Rakesh Kumar and others, (2010) 4 SCC 50: [2010] 1 SCR 483; Vikas kishanrao Gawali v. The State of Maharashtra, (2021) SCC Online SC 170; St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi, (1992) 1 SCC 558 : [1991] 3 Suppl. SCR 121; Kalpana Mehta and others v. Union of India and others, (2018) 7 SCC 1 : [2018] 4 SCR 1; Rajnarain Singh v. Chairman, Patna Administration Committee, Patna and another, AIR 1954 SC 569 : [1955] SCR 290; Re Delhi Laws Act, 1912, Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947 v. Part ‘C’ States(Laws) Act, 1950, AIR 1951
SC 332 : [1951] SCR 747; General Manager, Southern Railway, Personnel Officer (Reservation), Southern Railway v. Rangachari, AIR 1962 SC 36 :[1962] SCR 586; State of Kerala and another v. N.M. Thomas and others, 1976 (2) SCC 310 : [1976] 1 SCR 906; T. Devadasn v. Union of India and another, AIR 1964 SC 179 : [1964] SCR 680; Akhil Bharatiya Sochit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) Represented by its Assistant General Secretary on behalf of the Association v. Union of India and others, (1981) 1 SCC 246 : [1981] 2 SCR 185; K.C. Vasanth Kumar and another v. State of Karnataka, 1985 (Supp) SCC 714 : [1985] Suppl. SCR 352; State of Punjab and Hira Lal and others, 1970 (3) SCC 567 : [1971] 3 SCR 267; N.M. Thomas, Akhil Bharatiya Karamchari Sangh and State of Punjab S.V. Joshi and others v. State of Karnataka and others, (2012) 7 SCC 41; Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education & Research, Chandigarh and others v. Faculty Association and others; Chebrolu Leela Prasad Rao & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Ors., 2020 (7) SCALE 162; Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1975) Suppl. SCC 1 : [1976] SCR 347; His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala and another, (1973) 4 SCC 225 : [1973] Suppl. SCR 1; K.S. Puttaswamy and another v. Union of India and others, 2017 (10) SCC 1 : [2017] 10 SCR 569; Supreme Court Advocateson-Record Association and others v. Union of India, 1993 (4) SCC 441 : [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 659; Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India and others, 2008 (6) SCC 1 : [2008] 4 SCR 1; All India Reporter Karamchari Sangh and others v. All India Reporter Limited and others, 1988 Supp SCC 472 : [1988] SCR 774; Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab, 1995 (6) SCC 614 : [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 16; The State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, AIR 1951 SC 226 : [1951] SCR 525; B. Venkataramana v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another, AIR 1951 SC 229; Minerva Mills limited and others v. Union of India and others, (1980) 3 SCC 625 : [1981] 1 SCR 206; St. Stephen’s College case, (1992) 1 SCC
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR
558 : [1991] 3 Suppl. SCR 121; Society for Un-aided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India and another, (2012) 6 SCC 1: [2012] 2 SCR 715; K. Krishna Murthy and others v. Union of India and another, (2010) 7 SCC 202 : [2010] 6 SCR 972; Jarnail Singh and others v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta and others, 2018 (10) SCC 396 : [2018] 10 SCR 663; State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur, Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat and others, (2005) 8 SCC 534 : [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 582; Union of India and others v. Rakesh Kumar and others, (2010) 4 SCC 50 : [2010] 1 SCR 483; M.R. Balaji v. The State of Mysore and others, AIR (1963) SC 649 : [1963] Suppl. SCR 439; The State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. U.S.V. Balram, etc., (1972) 1 SCC 660 : [1972] 3 SCR 247; Barium Chemicals v. Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295 : [1966] Suppl. SCR 311; B.K. Pavitra and others v. Union of India and others, (2019) 16 SCC 129 : [2019] 7 SCR 1086; Mukesh Kumar and another v. State of Uttarakhand and others, (2020) 3 SCC 1; ITC Ltd. v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee and others, (2002) 9 SCC 232 : [2002] 1 SCR 441; State of Travancore, Cochin and others v. Bombay Company Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 366 : [1952] SCR 1112 ; Aswini Kumar Ghose and another v. Arabinda Bose and another, AIR 1952 SC 369 : [1953] SCR 1; His Holiness Kesvananda Bharati v. State of Kerala and another, (1973) 4 SCC 225 : [1973] Suppl. SCR 1; R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, 1984 (2) SCC 183 : [1984] 2 SCR 495; Minerva Mills Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others, (1980) 3 SCC 625 : [1981] 1 SCR 206; Chandramouleshwar Prasad v. The Patna High Court and others, (1969) 3 SCC 56 : [1970] 2 SCR 666; Union of India v. Shankalchand Himatlal Sheth and another, (1977) 4 SCC 193 : [1978] 1 SCR 423; Indian Administrative Services (S.C.S.) Association, U.P. and Others, (1993) Suppl. 1 SCC 730: [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 389; Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association and others v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441 : [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 659; State (NCT) of Delhi v. Union of India and another, 2018 (8)
SCC 501 : [2018] 7 SCR 1 and Abhiram Singh v. C.C. Commachen (Dead) By Legal Representatives and others, (2017) 2 SCC 629 : [2017] 1 SCR 158 – referred to. The Central Province and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxations Act, 1938, AIR 1939 Federal Court 1 – referred to. Granville Austin in “The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation” and Justice G.P. Singh in 296 ‘Principles of Statutory Interpretation’, 14th Edition – referred to.
per S. Ravindra Bhat, J. [Concurring with Ashok Bhushan, J. on question Nos.1,2,3 and also supplementing in relation to question No.1] 1.1. Re Point No. 1: Indra Sawhney does not require to be referred to a larger bench nor does it require reconsideration in the light of subsequent constitutional amendments, judgments and changed social dynamics of the society, for the reasons set out by Ashok Bhushan, J. and my reasons, in addition. [Para 188][1064-F-G] 1.2. A careful reading of the judgments in Indra Sawhney, clarifies that seven out of nine judges concurred that there exists a quantitative limit on reservation – spelt out @ 50%. In the opinion of four judges, therefore, per the judgment of B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J., this limit could be exceeded under extraordinary circumstances and in conditions for which separate justification has to be forthcoming by the State or the concerned agency. However, there is unanimity in the conclusion by all seven judges that an outer limit for reservation should be 50%. Undoubtedly, the other two judges, Ratnavel Pandian and P.B. Sawant, JJ. indicated that there is no general rule of 50% limit on reservation. In these circumstances, given the general common agreement about the existence of an outer limit, i.e. 50%, the petitioner’s argument about the incoherence or uncertainty about the existence of the rule or that there were contrary observations with respect to absence of any ceiling limit in other judgments (the dissenting judgments of K. Subbarao, in T. Devadasan v Union of India, the judgments of S.M. Fazal Ali and Krishna Iyer,
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR
JJ. in State of Kerala v N.M. Thomas and the judgment of Chinnappa Reddy, J. in K.C. Vasanth Kumar v. State of Karnataka) is not an argument compelling a review or reconsideration of Indra Sawhney rule. [Para 10][951-F-H; 952-A-B]
1.3. The idea of a definitive and objective principle, in the form of a 50% ceiling on limitation, emerges on an overall reading of Indra Sawhney. The argument made by the respondents was that this court should not go by such a ceiling limit, but rather, while exercising its judicial review power, proceed on a case-bycase approach, and resting its conclusions on fact dependent exercises, using other criteria, such as reasonableness, proportionality, etc. for judging excessive reservations. However, what constitutes reasonableness and what is proportionate in a given case, would be unchartered and indeterminate areas. It is one thing to try persuading the court to discard a known principle, in the light of its loss of relevance, yet for that argument to prevail, not only should the harm caused by the existing principle be proved, but also a principle that is sought to be substituted, should have clarity, or else, the argument would be one asking the court to take a leap in the dark. It is not enough, therefore to resort to observations such as “the length of the leap to be provided depends upon the gap to be covered” or the proportionality doctrine (deployed to judge validity of an executive or legislative measure), because they reveal no discernible principle. Reasonableness is no doubt a familiar phrase in the constitutional lexicon; yet there is considerable subjectivity and relativity in its practise. [Para 31][962-G; 963-A-C] 1.4. The ceiling of 50% with the “extraordinary circumstances” exception, is the just balance- what is termed as the “Goldilocks solution” - i.e. the solution containing the right balance that allows the state sufficient latitude to ensure meaningful affirmative action, to those who deserve it, and at the same time ensures that the essential content of equality, and its injunction not to discriminate on the various proscribed grounds (caste, religion, sex, place of residence) is retained. This court in M. Nagaraj v. Union of India observed that “a numerical benchmark is the surest immunity against charges of
discrimination.” To dilute the 50% benchmark further, would be to effectively destroy the guarantee of equality, especially the right not to be discriminated against on the grounds of caste (under Articles 15 and 16). [Para 34][964-D-F] 2. Re Point No 2: The Maharashtra State Reservation (of seats for admission in educational institutions in the State and for appointments in the public services and posts under the State) for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018 as amended in 2019 granting 12% and 13% reservation for Maratha community in addition to 50% social reservation is not covered by exceptional circumstances as contemplated by Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney’s case. [Para 188][1064-GH; 1065-A-B] 3. Re Point No. 3: The State Government, on the strength of Maharashtra State Backward Commission Report chaired by M.C. Gaikwad has not made out a case of existence of extraordinary situation and exceptional circumstances in the State to fall within the exception carved out in Indra Sawhney. [Para 188][1065-B-C] 4. Re Point No 4: Whether the Constitution One Hundred and Second Amendment deprives the State Legislature of its power to enact a legislation determining the socially and economically backward classes and conferring the benefits on the said community under its enabling power?; and Re. Point No. 5 Whether, States’ power to legislate in relation to “any backward class” under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) is anyway abridged by Article 342(A) read with Article 366(26c) of the Constitution of India. On these two interrelated points of reference, conclusions are as follows:
(i) By introduction of Articles 366 (26C) and 342A through the 102nd Constitution of India, the President alone, to the exclusion of all other authorities, is empowered to identify SEBCs and include them in a list to be published under Article 342A (1), which shall be deemed to include SEBCs in relation to each state and union territory for the purposes of the Constitution. [Para 188]
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR
(ii) The states can, through their existing mechanisms, or even statutory commissions, only make suggestions to the President or the Commission under Article 338B, for inclusion, exclusion or modification of castes or communities, in the list to be published under Article 342A(1). [Para 188][1065-D-H]
(iii) The reference to the Central List in Article 342A(2) is the one notified by the President under Article 342A(1). It is to be the only list for all purposes of the Constitution, in relation to each state and in relation to every union territory. The use of the term “the Central List” is only to refer to the list prepared and published under Article 342A (1), and no other; it does not imply that the states have any manner of power to publish their list of SEBCs. Once published, under Article 342A (1), the list can only be amended through a law enacted by Parliament, by virtue of Article 342A (2). [Para 188][1066-A-C]
(iv) In the task of identification of SEBCs, the President shall be guided by the Commission set up under Article 338B; its advice shall also be sought by the state in regard to policies that might be framed by it. If the commission prepares a report concerning matters of identification, such a report has to be shared with the state government, which is bound to deal with it, in accordance with provisions of Article 338B. However, the final determination culminates in the exercise undertaken by the President (i.e. the Central Government, under Article 342A (1), by reason of Article 367 read with Section 3 (8) (b) General Clauses Act). [Para 188][1066-C-E] (v) The states’ power to make reservations, in favour of particular communities or castes, the quantum of reservations, the nature of benefits and the kind of reservations, and all other matters falling within the ambit of Articles 15 and 16 – except with respect to identification of SEBCs, remains undisturbed. [Para 188][1066-E-F] (vi) The Commission set up under Article 338B shall conclude its task expeditiously, and make its recommendations after considering which, the President shall expeditiously publish the notification containing the list of SEBCs in relation to states
and union territories, for the purpose of the Constitution. [Para 188][1066-F-G] (vii) Till the publication of the notification mentioned in direction (vi), the existing lists operating in all states and union territories, and for the purposes of the Central Government and central institutions, continue to operate. This direction is issued under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. [Para 188][1066G-H] 5. Re Point No. 6: The alteration of the content of state legislative power in an oblique and peripheral manner would not constitute a violation of the concept of federalism. It is only if the amendment takes away the very essence of federalism or effectively divests the federal content of the constitution, and denudes the states of their effective power to legislate or frame executive policies (co-extensive with legislative power) that the amendment would take away an essential feature or violate the basic structure of the Constitution. Applying such a benchmark, this court is of the opinion that the power of identification of SEBCs hitherto exercised by the states and now shifted to the domain of the President (and for its modification, to Parliament) by virtue of Article 342A does not in any manner violate the essential features or basic structure of the Constitution. The 102nd Amendment is also not contrary to or violative of proviso to Article 368 (2) of the Constitution of India. Article 342A of the Constitution by denuding States power to legislate or classify in respect of “any backward class of citizens” does not affect or damage the federal polity and does not violate the basic structure of the Constitution of India. [Paras 187, 188][1064-C-E; 1067-AB] 6. The appeals and writ petitions are therefore, disposed of in terms of the operative order of Bhushan, J. in para 444 of his Judgment. [Para 189][1067-B-C]
Indra Sawhney v Union of India (1992) 3 Supp SCC 217 : [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454; T. Devadasan v Union of India [1964] 4 SCR 680; State of Kerala v N.M. Thomas 1976 (2) SCC 310 : [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454; K.C. Vasanth Kumar v. State of Karnataka [1985] 1 Suppl. SCR 352; M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore 1963 Suppl. 1 SCR 439; P. Rajendran v. State of T.N. [1968]
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR
2 SCR 786; A Peeriakaruppan v. State of T.N. (1971) 1 SCC 38: [1971] 2 SCR 430; State of A.P. v. USV Balram (1972) 1 SCC 660: [1972] 3 SCR 247; State of U.P. v. Pradeep Tandon (1975) 1 SCC 267 : [1975] 2 SCR 761; Janki Prasad Parimoo v. State of J&K (1973) 1 SCC 420 : [1973] 3 SCR 236; Krishena Kumar and Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (1990) 4 SCC 207 : [1990] 3 SCR 352; Union of India v Raghubir Singh [1989] 3 SCR 316; Barium Chemicals v. Company Law Board [1966] Suppl. 3 S.C.R. 311; Mukesh Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand (2020) 3 SCC 1; In re Kerala Education Bill [1959] SCR 995; T.M.A Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka 2002 (8) SCC 481 : [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 587; R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India 1994 Supp (1) SCC 324 : [1993] 1 SCR 891; State of Punjab v. Hiralal [1971] 3 SCR 267; M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 212 : [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336; Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust v. Union of India 2014 (8) SCC 1 : [2014] 11 SCR 712; B.K. Pavitra v. Union of India (2019) 16 SCC 129: [2019] 7 SCR 1086; State of Travancore-Cochin v. Bombay Company Ltd, [1952] SCR 1112; Aswini Kumar Ghose & Anr. v. Arabinda Ghose & Anr. AIR 1953 SC 75: [1953] SCR 215 P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (1998) 4 SCC 626 : [1998] 2 SCR 870; Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Anr. [1983] 1 SCR 1000; Kalpana Mehta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2018) 7 SCC 1 : [2018] 4 SCR 1; Soosai Etc v. Union of India [1985] Suppl 3 SCR 242; Bhaiya Lal v. Harikishan Singh [1965] 2 SCR 877; Basavalingappa v Munichinnappa [1965] 1 SCR 316; Kishori Lal Hans v. Raja Ram Singh 1972 (3) SCC 1 : [1972] 2 SCR 632; Bir Singh v. Delhi Jal Board (2018) 10 SCC 312 : [2018] 10 SCR 513; Champakam Dorairajan v. State of Madras AIR 1951 SC 226 : [1951] SCR 525; State of Karnataka v. Union of India [1978] 2 SCR 1; GVK Industries Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer (2011) 4 SCC 36 : [2011] 3 SCR 366; Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006) 7 SCC 1 : [2006]
5 Suppl. SCR 1; G. Narayanaswami v. G. Panneerselvam (1972) 3 SCC 717 : [1973] 1 SCR 172; Pushpa Devi v. Milkhi Ram (1990) 2 SCC 134: [1990] 1 SCR 278; Karnataka State Financial Corporation. v. N. Narasimahaiah (2008) 5 SCC 176 : [2008] 4 SCR 853; Laurel Energetics (P) Ltd. v. Securities Exchange Board of India (2017) 8 SCC 541 : [2017] 5 SCR 1005; Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) 2 Suppl. SCC 651 : [1992] 1 SCR 686; Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Dean, Seth G.S. Medical College (1990) 3 SCC 130 : [1990] 2 SCR 843; State of Maharashtra & Anr v. Union of India & Anr. (1994) 5 SCC 244 : [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 714; 20th Century Finance Corpn. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2000) 6 SCC 12: [2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 120; Builders’ Association of India v. Union of India (1989) 2 SCC 645 : [1989] 2 SCR 320; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Willamson Financial Services (2008) 2 SCC 202 : [2007] 13 SCR 376; Tata Consultancy Services v. State of A.P. (2005) 1 SCC 308 : [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 1040; Bimolangshu Roy v. State of Assam (2018) 14 SCC 408 : [2017] 13 SCR 301; Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (2008) 6 SCC 1 : [2008] 4 SCR 1; New Delhi Municipal Council v. State of Punjab (1997) 7 SCC 339 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 472; Shivraj Singh Chauhan v. Speaker, Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly 2020 SCC Online SC 363 141; DTC Mazdoor Congress v. Delhi Transport Corporation [1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 142; Balram Kumawat v. Union of India (2003) 7 SCC 628 : [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 24; Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen (2017) 2 SCC 629 : [2017] 1 SCR 158; Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, (1990) 3 SCC 682 : [1990] 3 SCR 111; P. Kasilingam v PSG College of Technology 1995 Supp (2) SCC 348 : [1995] 2 SCR 1061; Black Diamond Beverages v Commercial Tax Officer 1998 (1) SCC 458 : [1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 133; Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Co v State of Maharashtra 2014 (3) SCC
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR
430 : [2014] 2 SCR 203; K. Lakshminarayanan v. Union of India (2020) 14 SCC 664 : [2018] 14 SCR 689; Raghunathrao Ganpatrao v. Union of India 1994 Suppl. (1) SCC 191 : [1993] 1 SCR 480; Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana, 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1260; State of Rajasthan v. Union of India 1978 1 SCR 1; Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala [1973] Suppl. SCR 1; Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan [1965] 1 SCR 933; and Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 166 : [1985] 1 Suppl. SCR 862 – referred to. Harksen v. Lane 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC); BBC Enterprises v. Hi-Tech Xtravision Ltd., 1990) 2 All ER 118; City Council of Pretoria v. Walker 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Penal 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Canadian National Railway Co v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) [1987] 1 SCR 1114; Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v Ontario (Ministry of Health) (1994) 21 CHRR (Ont CA) D/ 259 and R. (Baiai) v. Home Secretary, [2006] EWHC 823 (Admin). – referred to. Rabindranath Tagore’s Gitanjali, Verse 35; Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy, p.132; Michael Kirby, Indian and Australian Constitutional Law: A Recent Study in Contrasts’, 60 JILI (2018) 1, p. 30 and Herbert Weschler, ‘Towards Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law’, (1959) 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 – referred to. per L. Nageswara Rao, J. [Concurring with Ashok Bhushan, J. on question Nos.1, 2 and 3, and concurring with S. Ravindra Bhat, J. on question Nos.4, 5 and 6] 1. It is difficult to agree with the submissions made on behalf of the Respondents that the use of words ‘central list’ would restrict the scope and amplitude of the notification to be issued under Article 342A(1). There is only one list that can be issued by the President specifying the socially and educationally backward classes and only those classes are treated as socially
and educationally backward classes for the purposes of the Constitution. Taking cue from the National Commission for Backward Classes Act, 1993, the Respondents argued that the words ‘Central list’ is with reference only to appointments to Central services and admission in Central educational institutions. Reading ‘Central list’ in that manner would be curtailing the width of Article 342A(1). If so read, the sweep of Sub-Clause (1) shall be minimized. Moreover, to achieve the said meaning, words which are not in Article 342A(1) have to be read into it. Contextually, the words Central list in Article 342A(2) can be only with reference to the list contained in the notification which may be issued under Article 342A(1). It is well settled law that the provisions of the Constitution have to be harmoniously construed and it is apparent from Article 342A(1) and (2) that there is no scope for any list of socially and educationally backward classes, other than the list to be notified by the President. As the other expressions ‘for the purposes of the Constitution’ and ‘unless the context otherwise requires’ have been dealt with by Justice Bhat, there is nothing more to add to the construction placed by him on the said expressions. [Para 25][1077-F-G; 1078-A-C] 2. Only those backward classes included in the public notification under Article 342A shall be socially and educationally backward classes for the purposes of the Constitution. [Para 26][1078-E] Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006) 7 SCC 1 : [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 1; G. Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam (1972) 3 SCC 717 : [1973] 1 SCR 172; South Asia Industries Private Ltd v. S. Sarup Singh and others [1965] 3 SCR 829; Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse (1997) 6 SCC 312 : [1997] 2 Suppl. SCR 267; J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan (2003) 5 SCC 134 : [2003] 2 SCR 933; Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, [1958] 1SCR 360; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India (2018) 8 SCC 501 : [2018] 7 SCR 1; R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay (1984) 2 SCC 183 : [1984] 2 SCR 495; Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay (2002) 4 SCC 297 : [2002] 2 SCR 945; Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR
v Managenment of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, [1958] SCR 1156; M/s New India Sugar Mills Ltd v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar [1963] 2 SCR Suppl. 459; C. I. T v. N. C. Budharaja and Co.(1994)1 SCC Suppl. 280: [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 185; Kalpana Mehta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2018) 7 SCC 1 : [2018] 4 SCR 1; Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court (1990) 3 SCC 682 : [1990] 3 SCR 111; P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology, (1995) 2 Suppl. SCC 348; Indra Sarma v. V. K. V. Sarma (2013) 15 SCC 755 : [2013] 14 SCR 1019; Sudha Rani Garg v. Jagdish Kumar (2004) 8 SCC 329; Nyadar Singh v. Union of India (1988) 4 SCC 170 : [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 546 and Union of India v. Sankalchand Himmat Lal Seth [1977) 4 SCC 193 : [ 1978] 1 SCR 423 – referred to. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); Adams Express Company v. Commonwealth of Kentucky 238 US 190 (1915); United States v. Goldenberg 168 US 95 (1897); Jones v D.P.P. [1962] AC. 635; R. v. Oakes [1959] 2 Q.B. 350; Aron Soloman v. Soloman & Co. 1897 AC 22; Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart 1993 AC 593; R v. DPP ex-parte Duckenfield [1999] 2 All ER 873; Black-Clawson International Ltd. 1975 AC 591; Assam Railways and Trading Co Ltd v. Inland Revenue, 1935 AC 445; Letang v. Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232; Gough v. Gough, (1891) 2 QB 665; Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288; East End Dwellings Co. Ltd v. Finsbury Borough Council [1952] AC 109 and Towne v. Eisner 245 U.S. 425 (1918) – referred to. Purposive Interpretation in Law by Aharon Barak; Benjamin Cardozo, the Nature of Judicial Process, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 13th Edn., 1946), 141; Craies on Legislation, 9th Edition and Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, 5th Edition – referred to. Case Law Reference In the judgment of Ashok Bhushan, J. [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454 referred to Para 14 (2006) 8 SCC 212 explained Para 21
[2018] 10 SCR 663 [1963] Suppl. SCR 439 [1966] Suppl. SCR 311 [1964] SCR 680 [1971] 3 SCR 267 [1976] 1 SCR 906 [1981] 2 SCR 185 (1985) Supp. (1) SCC 714 [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 587 (2012) 7 SCC 41 [2010] 1 SCR 483 [1991] 3 Suppl. SCR 121 [2018] 4 SCR 1 [1955] SCR 290 [1951] SCR 747 [1962] SCR 586 [1976] 1SCR 906 [1964] SCR 680 [1981] 2 SCR 185 [1985] Suppl. SCR 352 [1971] 3 SCR 267 (2012) 7 SCC 41 2020 (7) SCALE 162 [1976] SCR 347 [1973] Suppl. SCR 1 [2017] 10 SCR 569 [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 659 [2008] 4 SCR 1 [1988] SCR 774 [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 16 [1951] SCR 525 AIR 1951 SC 229 [1981] 1 SCR 206
referred to explained referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to distinguished distinguished referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to
Para 45 Para 55 Para 63 Para 84 Para 84 Para 84 Para 84 Para 84 Para 84 Para 84 Para 84 Para 85(vii) Para 101 Para 122 Para 122 Para 136 Para 138 Para 141 Para 143 Para 144 Para 146 Para 148 Para 152 Para 154 Para 166 Para 167 Para 168 Para 171 Para 178 Para 179 Para 186 Para 186 Para 192
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR
[1991] 3 Suppl. SCR 121 referred to [2012] 2 SCR 715 referred to [2010] 6 SCR 972 referred to [1965] SCR 908 held applicable [2018] 10 SCR 663 referred to [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 582 referred to [2010] 1 SCR 483 referred to [1972] 3 SCR 247 referred to [1966] Suppl. SCR 311 referred to [2019] 7 SCR 1086 referred to (2020) 3 SCC 1 referred to [2015] 5 SCR 670 affirmed [2002] 1 SCR 441 referred to [1952] SCR 1112 referred to [1953] SCR 1 referred to [1973] Suppl. SCR 1 referred to [1984] 2 SCR 495 referred to [1981] 1 SCR 206 referred to [1970] 2 SCR 666 referred to [1978] 1 SCR 423 referred to [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 389 referred to [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 659 referred to [2018] 7 SCR 1 referred to [2017] 1 SCR 158 referred to In the judgment of S. Ravindra Bhat, J. [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454 referred to [1964] 4 SCR 680 referred to [1985]1 Suppl. SCR 352 referred to [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 439 referred to [1968] 2 SCR 786 referred to [1971] 2 SCR 430 referred to [1972] 3 SCR 247 referred to [1975] 2 SCR 761 referred to
Para 199 Para 201 Para 211 Para 216 Para 217 Para 218 Para 239 Para 265 Para 269 Para 273 Para 274 Para 311 Para 345 Para 350 Para 351 Para 352 Para 356 Para 359 Para 392 Para 393 Para 394 Para 395 Para 402 Para 407 Para 7 Para 10 Para 10 Para 13 Para 13 Para 13 Para 13 Para 13
[1973] 3 SCR 236 [1990] 3 SCR 352 [1989] 3 SCR 316 [1966] Suppl. 3 SCR 311 (2020) 3 SCC 1 [1959] SCR 995 [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 587 [1993] 1 SCR 891 [1971] 3 SCR 267 [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336 [2014] 11 SCR 712 [2019] 7 SCR 1086 [1987] 1 SCR 1114 [1952] SCR 1112 [1953] SCR 215 [1998] 2 SCR 870 [1983] 1 SCR 1000 [2018] 4 SCR 1 [1985] Suppl 3 SCR 242 [1965] 2 SCR 877 [1965] 1 SCR 316 [1972] 2 SCR 632 [2018] 10 SCR 513 [1951] SCR 525 [1978] 2 SCR 1 [2011] 3 SCR 366 [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 1 [1973] 1 SCR 172 [1990] 1 SCR 278 [2008]4 SCR 853 [2017] 5 SCR 1005 [1992] 1 SCR 686 [1990] 2 SCR 843 [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 714
referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to
Para 13 Para 15 Para 21 Para 22 Para 23 Para 29 Para 29 Para 30 Para 31 Para 34 Para 38 Para 41 Para 63 Para 79 Para 79 Para 79 Para 79 Para 81 Para 87 Para 91 Para 91 Para 91 Para 91 Para 93 Para 108 Para 109 Para 109 Para 109 Para 110 Para 111 Para 112 Para 114 Para 116 Para 117
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR
[2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 120 referred to [1989] 2 SCR 320 referred to [2007] 13 SCR 376 referred to [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 1040 referred to [2017] 13 SCR 301 referred to [2008] 4 SCR 1 referred to [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 472 referred to [1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 142 referred to [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 24 referred to [2017] 1 SCR 158 referred to [1990] 3 SCR 111 referred to [1995] 2 SCR 1061 referred to [1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 133 referred to [2014] 2 SCR 203 referred to [2018] 14 SCR 689 referred to [1993] 1 SCR 480 referred to [1978] 1 SCR 1 referred to [1973] Suppl. SCR 1 referred to [1965] 1 SCR 933 referred to [1985] 1 Suppl. SCR 862 referred to In the judgment of L. Nageswara Rao, J. [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 1 referred to [1973] 1 SCR 172 referred to [1965] 3 SCR 829 referred to [1997] 2 Suppl. SCR 267 referred to [2003] 2 SCR 933 referred to [1958] 1SCR 360 referred to [2018] 7 SCR 1 referred to [1984] 2 SCR 495 referred to [2002] 2 SCR 945 referred to [1958] SCR 1156 referred to [1963] 2 SCR Suppl. 459 referred to [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 185 referred to [2018] 4 SCR 1 referred to
Para 121 Para 122 Para 123 Para 125 Para 129 Para 130 Para 131 Para 142 Para 145 Para 146 Para 150 Para 150 Para 150 Para 150 Para 153 Para 168 Para 175 Para 179 Para 180 Para 186 Para 6 Para 6 Para 6 Para 6 Para 6 Para 6 Para 9 Para 10 Para 10 Para 11 Para 12 Para 12 Para 15
[1990] 3 SCR 111 referred to Para 19 (1995) 2 Suppl. SCC 348 referred to Para 19 [2013] 14 SCR 1019 referred to Para 19 (2004) 8 SCC 329 referred to Para 21 [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 546 referred to Para 23 [1978] 1 SCR 423 referred to Para 23 CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3123 of 2020. From the Judgment and Order dated 27.06.2019 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in PIL No. 175 of 2018. With Civil Appeal Nos. 3124, 3133, 3134, 3131, 3129 Of 2020, Writ Petition (C) Nos. 915, 504, 914 of 2020, Civil Appeal Nos. 3127, 3126, 3125, 3128, 3130 of 2020, Writ Petition (C) No. 938 of 2020. K. K. Venugopal, S.C. Verma, Sathish Chanda Verma, Vivek Kolhi, Amit Kumar, AGs., Ravindra Lokhande, Nalin Kohli, Abhinav Mukerji, Arunabh Choudhary, Krishnaraj Thakker, AAGs., Vinay Arora, DAG., Tushar Mehta, SG., N. Venketaraman, ASG., Sathish Chanda Verma, Rajiv Ranjan, Prabhuling Navadgi, Advs. Gen., Baldev Raj Mahajan, Sr. Adv.(AG)., K.N. MohamBalgopal, Sr. Adv.(A.G.)., Vijay Narayan, Sr. Adv. (AG)., Arvind P. Datar, Pradeep Sancheti, Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Shyam Divan, Sidharth Bhatnagar, Dr. Rajiv Dhawan, B.H. Marlapalle, Mukul Rohatgi, Shekhar Naphade, P.S. Patwalia, V.A. Thorat, Kapil Sibal, C.U. Singh, A.M. Singhvi, Rafique A. Dada, Ms. Mahalakshmi Pavani, Ranjit Kumar, Ms. Somya Chakraborti, Ms. Malvika Trivedi, S. Niranjan Reddy, Jaideep Gupta, Dr. Manish Singhvi, Jayanth Muth Raj, Sr. Advs., Ms. Pooja Dhar, Surutanjaya Bhardwaj, Rahul Unnikrishnan, Ms. Pallavi Bali, Prathamesh Kamat, Arjun A.P. Apoorva, Ms. Janvi Dubey, Vishal Sinha, Amit Anand Tiwari, Vivek Singh, Rahul Arya, S. Mahesh Sahasranaman, Pratap Shankar, Ms. Mary Mitzy, K.K. Singh, Sagar Saxena, Ms. Devyani Gupta, Premlal Krishnan, Utsav Trivedi, Anurag Mankar, Vinayak Bhandari, Ashish Choudhary, Aditya Sidhra, Nadeem Afroz, Ms. Bharti Tyagi, Rameshwar F. Totla, Ashutosh Dubey, Ms. Rajshri Dudey, Arun Nagar, Rahul Totla, Abhishek Chauhan, Ms. Ravleen Chhabra, V.S. Rawat, Samrudhi Bendbhar, Amit Kumar, Siddhartha Chowdhury, Dr. Gunratan Sadavarte, Pankaj Kumar Singh, Makrand Pratap Singh, Pawan Kumar Shukla, Kamal Kumar Pandey, Raj Singh Rana, S.B. Talekar, Vipin Nair, P.B. Suresh, Karthik Jayashankar, Sughosh Subramanyam, Ms. Pradyna Talekar, Ms. Madhavi
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR
Ayyappan, Anshumaan Bahadur, R.K. Deshpande, Hrishikesh S. Chitaley, Ashwin Deshpande, Vijay Kari Singh, Samir Malik, Govind Jee, Krishna Kumar Singh, Sanjay V. Kharde, Satyajeet S. Kharde, Kailas Bajirao Autade, Ms. Sheetal Patil, Prashant Shantaram Chaudhari, Amol B. Karande, Dilip B. Rode, Sandesh R. Patil, Mahesh B. Karande, Pritam C. Rajput, Dilip Annasaheb Taur, Rajesh Tekale, Ashish Gaikwad, Ramesh Dube Patil, Rishi Kumar Singh Gautam, Sanjay Kharde, Vishal Kadam, Satyajeet Kharde, Samrat Shinde, Ms. Shraddha Deshmukh, Ms. Chinmayee Chandra, Rajat Nair, Kanu Agrawal, Navanjay Mahapatra, Amrish Kumar, Sachin Patil, Rahul Chitnis, Akshay Shinde, Vaibhav Sugdare, Ms. Misha Rohatgi Mohta, Ms. Harshika Verma, Ms. S. Lakshmi Iyer, Aaditya A. Pande, Geo Joseph, Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, Mahesh P. Shinde, Anil Golegaonkar, Rajesh Tekale, Ashish Gaikwad, Madhur Golegaonkar, Ms. Rucha Pande, Ms. Bhavana Khichi, Bhagwan Gavali, Ms. Pooja Dhar, Surutanjaya Bhardwaj, Rahul Unnikrishnan, Ms. Pallavi Bali, Prathamesh Kamat, Arjun A.P. Apoorva, Abdulrahiman Tamboli, Rahul Joshi, Tapesh Kumar Singh, Aditya Pratap Singh, Ms. Bhaswati Singh, Nishant Sharma, Ms. Adviteeya, Rakesh K. Sharma, Prashant Shrikant Kenjale, Sandeep Sudhakar Deshmukh, Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, Shriram P. Pingle, Ms. Rashmi D. Dhongde, Abhijit Patil, Sandeep Dere, Ms. Pooja Thorat, Nilesh Lonkar, Ms. Manisha Jain, Rajesh Inamdar, Ms. Namisha Jain, Shivaji M. Jadhav, Brij Kishor Sah, Anish R. Shah, Ms. Qurratulain, Aditya S. Jadhav, Nicholas Choudhury, Ms. Joyshree Barman, Rajat Joseph, Ravi Bharuka, Ajit Pravin Wagh, Ms. Astha Prasad, Ms. Prabhleen Kaur, Ms. Ishita Farsaiya, Apoorv Shukla, Dhairyashil Salunkhe, Ms. Buva Mrunal Dattatraya, Manu T. Ramachandran, Suhas Kumar Kadam, Ms. Manju Jetley, Samrat Krishnarao Shinde, Amol Nirmalkumar Suryawanshi, Mareesh Pravir Sahay, Pranav P. Patil, Krishna Kumar, Dr. Vipin Gupta, V.K. Biju, Neeleshwar Pawani, Amlendu Kumar Akhilesh Kumar Jha, Abhay Pratap Singh, Shaji George, Ms. Vijay Laxmi, Ms. Rubina Jawed, Shreyas Gacche, Anerao Pandit, T.R.B. Sivakumar, Yadav Narender Singh, Rajsaheb Patil, Ravi Prakash Jadhav, Ms. Akshata Jadav, Ms. Swati Vaibhav, Prashant Shrikant Kenjale, Farrukh Rasheed, A. Karthik, Ms. Smrithi Suresh, Arsh Khan, Ms. Sreepriya K., Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, Jaiprakash Babasaheb Chavan, Sideshwar Namdev Biradar, Yash Prashant Sonawane, Yogesh Ramesh Joshi, Ashok Arora, Rajeev Kumar Bansal, Girish Patel, Abhishek Sharma, Dinesh P. Rajbhar, Ms. Anzu K. Varkey, Akash Avinash Kakade, Somanatha Padhan, Swetab Kumar, Ms. Sukhada Omprakash Kakade, Dr. Rajesh Pandey, Sumeer
Sodhi, Ms. Prachi Misra, Chaitanya, Kartik Pant, Ms. Aswathi M.K., Ms. Jaikriti S. Jadeja, S. Hari Haran, Amit A. Pai, Ms. Pankhuri Bharadwaj, Ms. Bhavana Duhoon, Ms. Ranu Purohit, Shakul R. Ghatole, Dr. A.P. Singh, V.P. Singh, Ms. Geeta Chauhan, Ms. Richa Singh, Sharwan Kumar Goyal, Jai Gopal Saboo, Sadashiv, Shankar Chillarge, Kaleeswaram Raj, Mohammed Sadique T.A., Ms. Thulasi K. Raj, Ms. Maitreyi S. Hegde, Ms. Uttara P.V., Ms. Sheryl Sebastian, Ms. Sneha Ravi Iyer, Amol B. Karande, Vikrant Yadav, Mahesh B. Karande, Sandesh R. Patil, Ankit Yadav, Mahfooz A. Nazki, Polanki Gowtham, Shaik Mohamad Haneef, T. Vijaya Bhaskar Reddy, Amitabh Sinha, Shrey Sharma, Abhimanyu Tewari, Ms. Eliza Bar, Ms. Diksha Rai, Shuvodeep Roy, Ms. Palak Mahajan, Shuvodeep Roy, Rahul Raj Mishra, Manish Kumar, Harpreet Singh, Sahil Raveen, Sahil Chandra, S.C. Verma, Ms. Prachi Mishra, Sumeer Sodhi, Hussain Ali, Chaitanya, Kartik Pant, Chirag M. Shroff, Ms. Abhilasha Bharti, Sushant Dogra, Kanu Agarwal, Aniruddha P. Mayee, Mrs. Bihu Sharma, Ms. Pratishtha Vij, Arun Bhardwaj, Dilbag Singh, Dr. Monika Gusain, Vishwa Pal Singh, Ms. Pragya Baghel, Vishnu Sharma, Kumar Anurag Singh, Parthiv Goswami, Abhishek Roy, Ms. Aastha Shreshtha, Ms. Tulika Mukherjee, Ms. Taruna Ardhendumauli Prasad, Aman Bhatnagar, Parth Awasthi, Jishnu M.L., Ms. Priyanka Prakash, Ms. Beena Prakash, Ms. Anandita Mitra, Supratik Sarkar, G. Prakash, Shubhranshu Padhi, Ashish Yadav, Rakshit Jain, Vishal Banshal, Pukhrambam Ramesh Kumar, Ms. Anupama Ngangom, Karun Sharma, Siddhesh Kotwal, Ms. Bansuri Swaraj, Divyansh Tiwari, Ms. Ana Upadhyay, Ms. Manya Hasija, Nirnimesh Dube, Mrs. K. Enatoli Sema, Amit Kumar Singh, Nitya Nambair, Vitso Rio, Karan Bharihoke, Ms. Neha Sahai Bharihoke, Siddhant Sharma, D.K. Devesh, Sameer Abhyankar, Nalin Talwar, Amish Tandon, Ayush Beotra, Varun Tandon, Dipin Tamang, Uddhav Khanna, Ms. Shafali Jain, M. Yogesh Kanna, Raja Rajeshwaran S., Ms. Lakshmi Iyer, Aditya Chadha, Ms. Uma Prasuna Bachu, P. Venkat Reddy, Prashant Tyagi, P. Srinivas Reddy, M/s Venkat Palwai Law Associates, Shuvodeep Roy, Rahul Raj Mishra, Apoorv Singhal, Aashish Prasad, Suhaan Mukerji, Vishal Prasad, Nikhil Parikshith, Abhishek Manchanda, Sayandeep Pahari for M/s PLR Chambers & Co., Avijit Mani Tripathi, Shaurya Sahay, Aditya Shankar Pandey, Pradeep Misra, Suraj Singh, Amit Tiwari, Amit Yadav, Amit Sharma, Ms. Ruchira Gupta, Shishir Deshpande, Anurag Sharma, Ms. Mona Sinha, Abhishek Kumar Srivastava, K.V. Jagdishvaran, Mrs. G. Indira, V.G. Pragasam, S. Prabhu Ramasubramanian, Advs. for the appearing parties.
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR The Judgments of the Court were delivered by
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. (for himself and S. Abdul Nazeer, J.), L. Nageswara Rao, J. Hemant Gupta, J. and S. Ravindra Bhat have also concurred on Question Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 1. This Constitution Bench has been constituted to consider questions of seminal importance relating to contours and extent of special provisions for the advancement of socially and educationally backward class (SEBC) of citizens as contemplated under Article 15(4) and contours and extent of provisions of reservation in favour of the backward class citizens under Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India. The challenge/interpretation of the Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act, 2018 is also up for consideration. 2. All the above appeals have been filed challenging the common judgment of the High Court dated 27.06.2019 by which judgment several batches of writ petitions have been decided by the High Court. Different writ petitions were filed before the High Court between the years 2014 to 2019, apart from other challenges following were under challenge: The Ordinance No. XIII of 2014 dated 09.07.2014 providing 16% reservation to Maratha. The Ordinance No.XIV of 2014 dated 09.07.2014 providing for 5% reservation to 52 Muslim Communities. The Maharashtra State Reservation (of seats for appointment in educational institutions in the State and for appointment or posts for public services under the State) for educationally and socially backward category (ESBC) Act, 2014 and Maharashtra State Socially and Educationally Backward Class (SEBC) (Admission in Educational Institutions in the State and for posts for appointments in public service and posts) Reservation Act, 2018 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 2018”). 3. The High Court by the impugned judgment upheld Act, 2018, except to the extent of quantum of reservation provided under Section 4(1)(a), 4(1)(b) over and above 12% and 13% respectively as recommended by Maharashtra State Backward Class Commission. The writ petitions challenging the Ordinance XIII and XIV of 2014 as well as Act, 2014 were dismissed as having become infructuous. Few writ petitions were also allowed and few detagged and other writ petitions have been disposed of.
4. Writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, namely, Writ Petition(C) No. 938 of 2020 (Shiv Sangram & Anr. vs. Union of India & Anr.) has been filed questioning the Constitution (102 nd Amendment) Act, 2018. 5. While issuing notice on 12.07.2019, a three-Judge Bench of this Court directed that the action taken pursuant to the impugned judgment of the High Court shall be subject to the result of the SLP. It was made clear that the judgment of the High Court and the reservation in question shall not have any retrospective effect. The three-Judge Bench after hearing the parties, on 09.09.2020, while granting leave passed following order: “17. In view of the foregoing, we pass the following orders: -
(A) As the interpretation of the provisions inserted by the Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act, 2018 is a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, these Appeals are referred to a larger Bench. These matters shall be placed before Hon’ble The Chief Justice of India for suitable orders. (B) Admissions to educational institutions for the academic year 2020-21 shall be made without reference to the reservations provided in the Act. We make it clear that the Admissions made to Post-Graduate Medical Courses shall not be altered. (C) Appointments to public services and posts under the Government shall be made without implementing the reservation as provided in the Act. Liberty to mention for early hearing. “
6. A Three-Judge Bench referring the matter to Constitution Bench has referred all the appeals and the order contemplated that the matter shall be placed before the Chief Justice for the suitable orders. Referring order although mention that the interpretation of Constitution (One Hundred and Second Amendment) Act, 2018 is substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution but the reference was not confined to the above question. The learned counsel for the parties have made elaborate submissions in all the appeals as well as the writ petitions filed under Article 32. Elaborate submissions were addressed on the
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
impugned judgment of the High Court. We thus have proceeded to hear the parties and decide all the appeals and writ petitions finally.
7. After appeals being referred to a larger Bench by order dated 09.09.2020, Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India has constituted this Constitution Bench before whom these appeals and writ petitions are listed. This Constitution Bench after hearing learned counsel for the parties passed an order on 08.03.2021 issuing notice to all the States. The Bench by order further directed the States to file brief notes of their submissions. 8. The hearing commenced on 15.03.2021 and concluded on 26.03.2021. At this stage, we may indicate the headings in which we have divided to comprehensively understand the issues, submissions, our consideration, our conclusion and operative part of the judgment. The following are the heads of subjects under which we have treated the entire batch of cases: (1)
Questions Framed.
(2)
Background Facts.
(3)
Points for consideration before the High Court.
(4)
Submissions of the parties.
(5)
The 10 grounds urged for referring Indra Sawhney judgment to a larger Bench.
(6)
The status of Reservation at the time of Enactment of Act, 2018.
(7)
Consideration of 10 grounds urged for revisiting and referring the judgment of Indra Sawhney to a larger Bench.
(8)
Principle of Stare Decisis.
(9)
Whether Gaikwad Commission Report has made out a case of extra-ordinary situation for grant of separate reservation to Maratha community exceeding 50% limit?
(10) Whether the Act, 2018 as amended in 2019 granting separate reservation for Maratha community by exceeding the ceiling limit of 50% makes out exceptional circumstances as per the judgment of Indra Sawhney?
(11) Gaikwad Commission Report – a scrutiny. (12) Whether the data of Marathas in public employment as found out by Gaikwad Commission makes out cases for grant of reservation under Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India to Maratha community ?
(13) Social and Educational Backwardness of Maratha Community. (14) The Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act, 2018. (15) Conclusions.
(16) Order. 9. On 08.03.2021 the six questions which were proposed to be considered were enumerated in the following manner: (1)Questions Framed.
“1. Whether judgment in case of Indra Sawhney v. Union of India [1992 Suppl. (3) SCC 217] needs to be referred to larger bench or require re-look by the larger bench in the light of subsequent Constitutional Amendments, judgments and changed social dynamics of the society etc.?
2. Whether Maharashtra State Reservation (of seats for admission in educational institutions in the State and for appointments in the public services and posts under the State) for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018 as amended in 2019 granting 12% and 13% reservation for Maratha community in addition to 50% social reservation is covered by exceptional circumstances as contemplated by Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney’s case?
3. Whether the State Government on the strength of Maharashtra State Backward Commission Report chaired by M.C. Gaikwad has made 12 out a case of existence of extraordinary situation and exceptional circumstances in the State to fall within the exception carved out in the judgment of Indra Sawhney? 4. Whether the Constitution One Hundred and Second Amendment deprives the State Legislature of its power to enact
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
a legislation determining the socially and economically backward classes and conferring the benefits on the said community under its enabling power?
5. Whether, States power to legislate in relation to “any backward class” under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) is anyway abridged by Article 342(A) read with Article 366(26c) of the Constitution of India? 6. Whether, Article 342A of the Constitution abrogates States power to legislate or classify in respect of “any backward class of citizens” and thereby affects the federal policy / structure of the Constitution of India?”
(2)Background Facts. 10. We need to first notice certain background facts relevant for the present case and details of various writ petitions filed in the High Court. The “Maratha” is a Hindu community which mainly resides in the State of Maharashtra. After the enforcement of the Constitution of India, the President of India in exercise of power under Article 240 appointed a Commission to investigate the conditions of all such socially and educationally backward classes, known as Kaka Kalelkar Commission, the first National Commission for backward classes. The Kaka Kalelkar Commission submitted its report on 30.03.1955 where it observed - Vol.I “In Maharashtra, besides the Brahman it is the Maratha who claimed to be the ruling community in the villages, and the Prabhu, that dominated all other communities”. Thus, the first Backward Classes Commission did not find Maratha as other backward class community in the State of Bombay. 11. On 01.11.1956, a bilingual State of Bombay under the State Re-organisation Act was formed with the addition of 8 districts of Vidharbha (Madhya Bharat) and 5 districts of Marathwada (Hyderabad State). On 14.08.1961 through Ministry of Home Affairs while declining to act on the Kaka Kalelkar Commission Report informed all the State Governments that they had discretion to choose their own criteria in defining backward classes and it would be open for State Governments to draw its own list of other backward classes. On 14.11.1961 acting on the directives of the Government of India, the Government of Maharashtra appointed B.D.Deshmukh Committee for defining OBC and to take steps for their developments. The B.D. Deshmukh Committee
submitted its report on OBC to the Government of Maharashtra on 11.01.1964. It did not find Maratha as backward class. On 13.08.1967, the State of Maharashtra issued unified list of OBC consisting of 180 castes for the entire State which did not include Maratha. At serial No.87, Kunbi was shown. The President of India on 31.12.1979 appointed the second National Backward Classes Commission within the meaning of Article 340 of the Constitution popularly known as Mandal Commission. In the report of second National Backward Classes Commission with regard to the State of Maharashtra while distributing percentage of Indian population by castes and religious groups, estimated other backward classes as 43.70 per cent, whereas in the category of forward Hindu castes and communities the Marathas were included with 2.2 per cent. The population of other backward classes of remaining Hindu Castes groups was estimated as 43.7% and backward non-Hindu classes as 8.40 per cent and total approximate backward class of Hindu including non-Hindu castes was estimated as 52%. At page 56 of volume of report under heading percentage of the castes and religious groups under subheading forward Hindu castes and communities following table given: III. Forward Hindu Castes & Communities
12. The Maratha, thus, was included in forward Hindu caste, by the second National Backward Classes Commission.
13. A request was received by the National Commission for Backward Classes for inclusion of “Maratha” in the Central List of Backward Classes for Maharashtra along with Kunbi as backward class of Maharashtra. The National Commission for Backward Classes conducted public hearing at Mumbai and after hearing Government
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
officials, Chairman of the Maharashtra State Backward Classes Commission submitted a detailed report dated 25.02.1980 holding that Maratha is not a socially and educationally backward class community but a socially advanced and prestigious community. It is useful to refer to paragraph 22 of the report (last paragraph) which is to the following effect:
“22. In view of the above facts and position, the Bench finds that Maratha is not a socially backward community but is a socially advanced and prestigious community and therefore the Request for Inclusion of “Maratha” in the Central List of Backward Classes for Maharashtra along with Kunbi should be rejected. In fact, “Maratha” does not merit inclusion in the Central List of Backward Classes for Maharashtra either jointly with “Kunbi” or under a separate entry of its own.” 14. On 16.11.1992 a nine-Judge Constitution Bench of this Court delivered a judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India [1992 Suppl. (3) SCC 217] (hereinafter referred to as “Indra Sawhney’s case”), apart from laying down law pertaining to principle of reservation under Constitution this Court also issued directions to the Government of India, each of the State Governments to constitute a permanent body for entertaining, examining and recommending upon on requests for inclusion and complaints of over inclusion of other backward classes of citizens.
15. The Maharashtra State OBC Commission headed by Justice R.M. Bapat submitted a report on 25.07.2008 conclusively recording that Maratha could not be included in the OBC list because it is a forward caste. The report in the end concluded: “It was agreed with majority that the resolution, stating that it would not be appropriate from social justice perspective to include Maratha community in the ‘Other Backward Class’ category, has been passed with majority in the commission’s meeting convened in Pune on 25/07/2008. And it was agreed with majority that such a recommendation should be sent to the government. The opposite opinion in relation to this has been separately recorded and it has been attached herewith.” 16. The Maharashtra State Other Backward Classes Commission on 03.06.2013 rejected the request of the State Government to review the findings recorded by the State OBC Commission in its report dated
25.07.2008 holding the Maratha caste as forward community. Despite the existence of statutory State OBC Commission, the Government of Maharashtra appointed a special Committee headed by a sitting Minister, Shri Narayan Rane to submit a report on the Maratha Caste. On 26.02.2014 Rane Committee submitted its report to the State and recommended that for the Maratha special reservation under Article 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India be provided. On 09.07.2014 Maharashtra Ordinance No.XIII of 2014 was promulgated providing for 16% reservation in favour of the Maratha caste. Writ Petition No.2053 of 2014 (Shri Sanjeet Shukla vs. State of Maharashtra) along with other writ petitions were filed where two separate Ordinances promulgated on 09.07.2014 providing for reservation for seats for admissions in aided and non-aided institutions of the State and appointment to the post to public service under the State a separate 16% reservation in which Maratha was included, was challenged. The Government resolution dated 15.07.2014 specifying the Maratha community as the community socially and economically backward entitled for 16% reservation was challenged. 17. The Division Bench of the High Court by an elaborate order considering the relevant materials including the reports of National Backward Classes Commission and State Backward Classes Commission and other materials on record stayed the operation of Maharashtra Ordinance No.XIII of 2014 and Resolution dated 15.07.2014. However, it was directed that in case any admission has already been granted in educational institution till that date based on Ordinance No.XIII of 2014 the same shall not be disturbed and the Students shall allow to complete their respective courses. 18. The SLP(C)Nos.34335 and 34336 were filed in this Court challenging interim order dated 14.11.2014 which SLPs were not entertained by this Court with request to decide the writ petitions at an early date. 19. The Maharashtra Legislature passed the Act, 2014 on 23.12.2014 which received the assent of the Governor on 09.01.2015, and was deemed to have come into force with effect from 09.07.2014. In Writ Petition (C)No. 3151 of 2014 and other connected matters the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court passed an order on 07.04.2015 staying the implementation of the provisions of the Act 1 of 2015 providing 16% reservation to Maratha. The interim order, however, directed that appointment to 16% reservation for Maratha under Act 1 of 2015 in the
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
advertisements already issued shall be made from open merit candidates till final disposal of the writ petition and appointment shall be made subject to the outcome of the writ petition. 20. On 30.06.2017 the State Government made a reference to State Backward Classes Commission to submit a report on the facts and the observation made in the reference to the Government regarding Maratha. On 02.11.2017 Justice M.G. Gaikwad came to be appointed as Chairman of State Backward Classes Commission. On 14.08.2018 the National Commission for Backward Classes (Repeal) Act was passed repealing the National Commission for Backward Classes Act, 1993. On 15.08.2018 the Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act, 2018 was brought into force adding Article 338B, 342A and 366(26C). Article 338, sub-clause (10) was also amended. On 15.11.2018, the State Backward Classes Commission submitted its report on social and educational and economic status of Maratha. The Commission recommended for declaring Maratha caste of citizens as social and economic backward class of citizens with inadequate representation in services. The Commission also opined that looking to the exceptional circumstances and extraordinary situations on declaring Maratha class as SEBC and their consequential entitlement to the reservation benefits, the Government may take decision within the constitutional provisions. The Government after receipt of the above report enacted Act, 2018 which was published on 30.11.2018 and came into force from that day. PIL No.175 of 2018 (Dr. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil Vs. The Chief Minister and Ors.) and other writ petitions and PILs were filed challenging the Act, 2018. The High Court in the impugned judgment has noticed the pleadings in three writ petitions being PIL No.175 of 2018 giving rise to C.A.No.3123 of 2020, W.P.(LD.) No.4100 of 2018 (Sanjeet Shukla vs. The State of Maharashtra) giving rise to C.A.No.3124 of 2020 and PIL No.4128 of 2018 (Dr. Uday Govindraj Dhople & Anr. vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.) giving rise to C.A.No.3125 of 2020. Before us in C.A.No.3123 of 2020 and C.A.No.3124 of 2020 most of the volumes and written submissions have been filed. It shall be sufficient to notice these three Civil Appeals, apart from the details of few other cases which shall be noted hereinafter. C.A.No. 3123 of 2020 (Dr. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil Vs. The Chief Minister and Ors.) 21. This appeal has been filed against the judgment of the High Court in PIL NO.175 of 2018 filed by Dr. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil
questioning the 16% separate reservation given to Maratha under Act, 2018 published on 30.11.2018. The writ petitioner pleaded that providing reservation to Maratha community to the extent of 16% amounts to breach of Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and also bypassing ceiling of reservation of 50%. Referring to judgment of this Court in Indra Sawhney’s case and law laid down in Mr. Nagraj and others vs. Union of India & Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 212, it was pleaded that the reservation is not permissible beyond 50%. Various grounds had been taken in the writ petition questioning the 16% reservation for Maratha. During the pendency of the writ petition subsequent events occurred resulting into enlarging the scope of the petition, in the writ petition several applications for intervention and impleadment have been filed seeking to justify the Act, 2018. The High Court allowed the applications for intervention and they were directed to be added as party respondents. C.A.No. 3124 of 2020 (Sanjeet Shukla vs. The State of Maharashtra) 22. This appeal arises out of the judgment in Writ Petition (C) No.4100 of 2018. In the writ petition an extensive challenge was made to the Backward Classes Commission report which was basis for Act, 2018. The same writ petitioner i.e. Sanjeet Shukla has earlier filed Writ Petition (C) No.3151 of 2014 challenging the Ordinance promulgated by the Government of Maharashtra in the year 2014. The interim order dated 14.11.2014 was passed in the Writ Petition No.3151 of 2014. The petitioner has also pleaded that the Act, 2014 was also stayed by the High court on 07.04.2015. It was pleaded that Maratha community is a powerful community in the State of Maharashtra with proved dominance in Government Service, Co-operatives, Sugar Co-operatives etc. reference of earlier National Backward Class Commission and State Backward Class Commission was made wherein the claim of Maratha to be included in OBC was rejected. The comments have also been made on the aggressive tactics adopted by the Maratha community by agitation, dharna for the grant of reservation to them. It was also pleaded that Act, 2018 is passed without complying with the requirement of Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act, 2018. In the writ petition following prayers have been made: “(a) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction of that nature thereby
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
quashing and striking down Maharashtra State Socially and Educationally Backward (SEBC) Class (Admission in Educational Institutions in the State and for posts for appointments in public service and posts) Reservation Act, 2018, as being invalid and violative of the provisions of the Constitution of India;
(b) During pendency of the petition, this Hon’ble Court be pleased to say to the operation, implementation and effect of the Maharashtra State Socially and Educationally Backward (SEBC) Class (Admission in Educational Institutions in the State and for posts for appointments in public service and posts) Reservation Act, 2018;
b1. during pendency of the present petition, this Hon’ble Court be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction that no appointments should be made under Maharashtra State Socially and Educationally Backward (SEBC) Class (Admission in Educational Institutions in the State and for posts for appointments in public service and posts) Reservation Act, 2018; b2. during pendency of the present petition, this Hon’ble Court be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction of that nature that no posts should be kept vacant by reference to the Maharashtra State Socially and Educationally Backward (SEBC) Class (Admission in Educational Institutions in the State and for posts for appointments in public service and posts) Reservation Act, 2018; b3. during pendency of the present petition, this Hon’ble Court be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction of that nature that no advertisements for vacancies should be placed reserving any posts under Maharashtra State Socially and Educationally Backward (SEBC) Class (Admission in Educational Institutions in the State and for posts for appointments in public service and posts) Reservation Act, 2018; b4. during pendency of the present petition, this Hon’ble Court be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction of that nature that no admission in educational institutions should be made under reserved category as per Maharashtra State Socially and Educationally Backward (SEBC) Class (Admission in Educational
Institutions in the State and for posts for appointments in public service and posts) Reservation Act, 2018; b5. during pendency Court be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction of that nature that no Caste Certificates should be issued under Maharashtra State Socially and Educationally Backward (SEBC) Class (Admission in Educational Institutions in the State and for posts for appointments in public service and posts) Reservation Act, 2018;” C.A.No.3125 of 2020 (Dr. Uday Govindraj Dhople & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr.) 23. This appeal arises out of Writ Petition (LD.)No.4128 of 2018 filed by Dr. Udai Govindraj Dhople. The writ petition was filed in representative capacity on behalf of the similarly situated medical students/medical aspirants who are adversely affected by the Act, 2018. 24. The writ petitioners seek quashing of Act, 2018 and in the alternative quashing and setting aside Sections 2(j), 3(2), 3(4), 4,5,9(2),10 and 12 of the Act, 2018. The petitioner pleads that reservation system has become a tool of convenience for the Government and politicians in power for their vote bank. It is further pleaded that Maratha was never treated as backward class community and earlier their claim was rejected. It was further pleaded that the impugned enactment seriously prejudices the chances of open candidates in all fields of education as well as in service. It was further pleaded that Gaikwad Commission’s report is not based on fiscal data. There was inadequacy of data base. A community which was found not to be backward for last 50 years is now declared as backward class without any change of circumstances. The writ petitioner, pleads that enactment shall have an adverse effect which shall divide the society by caste basis on communal line. The impugned enactment is claimed to be violative of the basic structure and fundamental value of the Constitution capitulated in Article 14, 16 and 19 of the Constitution. C.A.Nos. 3133, 3134 and 3131 of 2020 25. These appeals have been filed by the appellants who were not parties in the PIL No.175 of 2018, against the High Court judgment praying for permission to file SLP which has already been granted. 26. C.A.No. 3129 arising out of PIL(ST)No.1949 of 2019 whereby 16% reservation to Maratha under Act, 2018 has been challenged.
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
27. Writ Petition (C)No. 915 of 2020 has been filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India praying for directing the respondents that all the admission to Post Graduate Medical & Dental Courses in the State of Maharashtra for the academic year 2020-21 shall be made subject to the outcome of the SLP(C)No.15735 of 2019 and connected petitions.
28. Writ Petition (C) No. 504 of 2020 filed under Article 32 has been filed seeking mandamus direction to the respondents that provisions of Act, 2018 should not be made applicable to the admission to Post Graduate Medical & Dental Courses in the State of Maharashtra for the academic year 2020-21. 29. Writ Petition (C) No. 914 of 2020 filed under Article 32 prays for writ in the nature of certiorari or any other writ or order or direction to hold the impugned Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018 as unconstitutional and violative of Article 14, 16 & 19 of the Constitution of India and further Act, 2018 should not be made available to the medical admission process for Post-graduate students for the academic year 2020-21 in the State of Maharashtra. 30. C.A.No. 3127 of 2020 arises out of Writ Petition (C)No.4128 of 2018. The prayer of which writ petition has already been noticed by C.A.No.3125 of 2020. 31. C.A.No. 3126 of 2020 has been filed against the impugned judgment of the High Court in Writ Petition (C)No.3846 of 2019 (Mohammad Sayeed Noori Shafi Ahmed & Ors. vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.). Writ Petitioners were challenging the Act, 2018 as well as the Maharashtra State Backward Class Commission Report on the Social, Educational, Economic Status of the Marathas and Allied Aspects, 2018. The question was also raised about inaction on the part of the State of Maharashtra in not acting upon the report of Maharashtra State Minority Commission (2011) recommending special reservation to certain Muslim communities and failure to introduce a Bill on the floor of the State Legislature providing for 5% reservation to 52 Muslim communities in Maharashtra.
32. C.A.No. 3128 of 2020 arising out of Writ Petition (C) No.4269 of 2018(Vishnuji P. Mishra vs. The State of Maharashtra) wherein similar reliefs have been claimed as in PIL No.175 of 2018.
33. Writ Petition (C) No. 938 of 2018 has been filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India challenging the validity of Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act, 2018. Writ Petition notices that issue regarding Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act, 2018 is pending in SLP(C)No.15737 of 2019(C.A.No.3123 of 2020). The writ petitioner also claimed to have filed an I.A.No.66438 of 2020 for impleadment in SLP(C) No. 15737 of 2019. The petitioner’s submission is that if the effect of Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act, 2019 is to take away power of State Legislature with respect to identification of OBC/SEBC, it is obvious that Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act, 2018 has taken away the legislative powers of State Legislature with respect to some areas of law making power. The petitioner, further, submits that the procedure prescribed by the proviso to clause (2) of Article 368 of the Constitution of India has not been followed since no ratification by the legislatures of not less than one-half of the States by Resolution was obtained. In the writ petition following prayers have been made: “a) This Hon’ble Court be pleased to hold and declare that the 102nd Amendment of the Constitution of India published in the Gazette of India dated 11.08.2018 is unconstitutional being in violation of proviso to clause (2) of Article 368 and also being violative of the right guaranteed under Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. b) This Hon’ble Court please to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other writ, order or direction directing that the 102nd Amendment of the Constitution of India shall not be enforced hereafter as a result of its being violative of Article 368 as also the basic structure of the Constitution of India and also being violative of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.” 34. In the writ petitions before the High Court, the State of Maharashtra has filed affidavit in reply dated 16.01.2018 in Writ Petition No.4100 of 2018 supporting the Act, 2018, which has been extensively relied by the High Court in the impugned judgment. The affidavits were also filed by the intervenors and affidavits were filed in support of Chamber Summons. The High Court after perusing the writ petitions, affidavits, applications filed by the interveners, Chamber Summons and supporting other materials and after hearing counsel appearing for the respective parties has broadly capitulated following points for consideration:
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.] (3) Points for consideration before the High Court.
35. “(III) Whether the impugned Act of 2018 is constitutionally invalid on account of lack of legislative competence on the following sub-heads:(a) The subsisting interim order passed by the Bombay High Court in Sanjeet Shukla vs. State of Maharashtra (WP 3151/2014) thereby granting stay to a similar enactment and ordinance of the State, which is pending for adjudication before this Court. (b) The 102nd (Constitution) Amendment, 2018 deprives the State legislature of its power to enact a legislation determining the Socially and Educationally Backward Class and conferring the benefits on the said class in exercise of its enabling power under Article 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution. (C) The limitation of 50% set out by the Constitution bench in Indra Sawhney in form of constitutional principle do not permit reservation in excess of 50%. (IV) Whether the State has been able to establish the social and educational backwardness and inadequacy of representation of the Maratha community in public employment on the basis of the report of MSBCC under the Chairmanship of Justice Gaikwad on the basis of quantifiable and contemporaneous data ?
(V) Scope of Judicial Review for interference in the findings, conclusions and recommendation of the MSBCC. (VI) Whether the reservation carved out for Maratha community by the State Government in form of impugned legislation satisfies the parameters of reasonable classification under Article 14 of the Constitution ? (VII) Whether the ceiling of 50% laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India, is to be taken as a constitutional principle and deviation thereof violates the basic tenet of equality enshrined in the Constitution? (VIII) Whether the State is able to justify existence of exceptional circumstances or extra-ordinary situation to exceed the permissible limit of 50% within the scope of guiding principles laid down in Indra Sawhney ?
(IX) Whether in the backdrop of the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the MSBCC report, whether the State Government has justified exercise of its enabling power under Article 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution ?” 36. The High Court in paragraph 177 of the judgment has summarised its conclusion to the following effect: “177. In the light of the discussion above, we summarize our conclusions to the points which we have formulated in the proemial of the judgment and deliberated in the judgment. We summarize our conclusions in the same sequence :
[1] We hold and declare that the State possess the legislative competence to enact the Maharashtra State Reservation for Seats for Admission in Educational Institutions in the State and for appointments in the public services and posts under the State (for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes) SEBC Act, 2018 and State’s legislative competence is not in any way affected by the Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act 2018 and the interim order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 3151 of 2014. We resultantly uphold the impugned enactment except to the extent of quantum of reservation as set out in point no. 6.
[2] We conclude that the report of the MSBCC under the Chairmanship of Justice Gaikwad is based on quantifiable and contemporaneous data and it has conclusively established the social, economical and educational backwardness of the Maratha community and it has also established the inadequacy of representation of the Maratha community in public employment / posts under the State. Accordingly we uphold the MSBCC report.
[3] We hold and declare that the classification of the Maratha class into “Socially and Educationally Backward Class” complies the twin test of reasonable classification permissible under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, namely, (a) intelligible differentia and (b) rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved.
[4] We hold and declare that the limit of reservation should not exceed 50%, however in exceptional circumstances and extraordinary situations, this limit can be crossed subject to availability of quantifiable and contemporaneous data reflecting
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
backwardness, inadequacy of representation and without affecting the efficiency in administration.
[5] We hold and declare that the report of the Gaikwad Commission has set out the exceptional circumstances and extra-ordinary situations justifying crossing of the limit of 50% reservation as set out in Indra Sawhney’s case. [6] We hold and declare that the State Government in exercise of its enabling power under Articles 15(4)(5) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India is justified, in the backdrop of report of MSBCC, in making provision for separate reservation to Maratha community. We, however, hold that the quantum of reservation set out by the Maharashtra State Reservation for Seats for Admission in Educational Institutions in the State and for appointments in the public services and posts under the State (for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes) SEBC Act, 2018, in section 4(1)(a) and 4(1)(b) as 16% is not justifiable and resultantly we quash and set aside the quantum of reservation under the said provisions over and above 12% and 13% respectively as recommended by the Commission.” In view of the conclusions, the High Court passed following order in the batch of writ petitions: “: O R D E R : [A] In the light of summary of conclusions above, we dispose of the following writ petitions / PILs by upholding the Impugned Act of 2018 except to the extent of quantum of reservation prescribed by section 4(1)(a) and 4(1)(b) of the said Act :
1] PIL No. 175 of 2018, 2] WP (stamp No.) 2126 of 2019 3] WP (stamp No.) 2668 of 2019 4] WP (stamp No.) 3846 of 2019
5] PIL No. 140 of 2014 6] WP (Lodg. No.) 4100 of 2018 7] WP (Lodg. No.) 4128 of 2018. 8] WP (Lodg. No.) 4269 of 2018
9] PIL No. 6 of 2019.
10] WP (Lodg No.) 969 of 2019.
[B] The following writ petitions / PILs seeking implementation of the Impugned Act of 2018, are also disposed of in view of the Impugned Act being upheld except to the extent of quantum of reservation prescribed by section 4(1)(a) and 4(1)(b). 1] PIL No.19 of 2019 :- The petition is allowed in terms of prayer clause (a).
2] PIL No.181 of 2018 :- The petition is allowed in terms of prayer clause (a). As far as prayer clause (b) is concerned, we grant liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh petition in case cause of action survives. [C] The following writ petitions are rendered infructuous on account of the passing of SEBC Act of 2018 which has repealed the earlier ESBC Act of 2015. 1] Writ Petition (Stamp No.) 10755 of 2017 2] PIL No. 105 of 2015 3] PIL No. 126 of 2019
4] PIL No. 149 of 2014 5] PIL No. 185 of 2014 6] PIL No. 201 of 2014 7] Writ Petition No. 3151 of 2014.”
[D] The following writ petitions are de-tagged from the present group of petitions as they claim reservation for the Muslim communities. 1] Writ Petition No. 937 of 2017
2] Writ Petition No. 1208 of 2019 3] PIL No.209 of 2014 4] PIL (Stamp No.) 1914 of 2019. [E] WP No.11368 of 2016:- The Petition is dismissed as far as prayer clause (A) is concerned. As far as prayer (B) is concerned
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
the petitioner is at liberty to file an appropriate Writ Petition seeking said relief.
[F] PIL (Stamp No.) 36115 of 2018 :- The is disposed of since the recommendation of the commission are implemented in form of the impugned SEBC Act, 2018. [G] In the light of disposal of above writ petitions and PILs, all pending civil applications / notice of motions / Chamber Summons taken out in these writ petitions and PILs do not survive and the same are accordingly disposed of.” 37. Aggrieved with the impugned judgment of the High Court dated 27.06.2019, the appellants have filed the Civil Appeals noted above in this Court. 38. We have heard Shri Arvind P. Datar, learned senior counsel, Shri Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel, Shri Gopal Sankaranarayanan, learned senior counsel, Shri Pradeep Sancheti, learned senior counsel, Dr. Rajiv Dhawan, learned senior counsel, Shri Sidharth Bhatnagar, learned senior counsel, Shri B.H. Marlapalle, learned senior counsel, Shri R.K. Deshpande, learned counsel, Dr. Gunratan Sadavarte, learned senior counsel, Shri Amit Anand Tiwari, learned counsel and Shri S.B. Talekar, learned counsel for the appellants. Shri Amol B. Karande, learned counsel, has been heard in support of Writ Petition No.938 of 2020. 39. We have heard Shri K.K. Venugopal, learned Attorney General for India and Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General. Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel, has appeared for the State of Maharashtra and Chhattisgarh. Shri Shekhar Naphade, learned senior counsel, and Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel, have also appeared for the State of Maharashtra. Shri Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel, has appeared for the State of Jharkhand. Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned senior counsel, has also appeared for the respondent No.3 in C.A. No.3123 of 2020. 40. We have also heard several learned counsel appearing for different States. Shri Manish Kumar, learned counsel has appeared for the State of Bihar, Shri Karan Bharihok, has appeared for the State of Punjab, Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned senior counsel, has appeared for the State of Rajasthan. Shri C.U. Singh, learned senior counsel, has appeared for the respondents. Shri Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, learned counsel has appeared for some of the respondents, Shri V. Shekhar,
learned senior counsel has appeared for the State of Maharashtra, Shri S. Niranjan Reddy, learned senior counsel, has appeared for the State of Andhra Pradesh, Shri Shekhar Nephade, learned senior counsel and Shri Jayanth Muth Raj, learned senior counsel have appeared for the State of Tamil Nadu. Shri Jaideep Gupta, learned senior counsel has appeared for the State of Karnataka. Shri Vinay Arora, learned counsel, has appeared for the State of Uttarakhand. Shri Arun Bhardwaj, learned counsel, has appeared for the State of Haryana. Shri Amit Kumar, learned counsel, has appeared for the State of Meghalaya. Shri Pradeep Misra, learned counsel, has appeared for the State of U.P. and Shri Tapesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel, has appeared for the Madhya Pradesh Public Service Commission. Ms. Diksha Rai, learned counsel, has appeared for the State of Assam. 41. We have also heard Mrs. Mahalakshmi Pavani, learned senior counsel, Shri A.P. Singh, learned counsel, Mr. Shriram Pingle, learned counsel, Shri V.K. Biju, learned counsel, Shri Hrishikesh s. Chitaley, learned counsel, Shri Mr. Kaleeswaram Raj, learned counsel, and Shri Ashok Arora for intervenors. Mr. Akash Avinash Kakade has also appeared for the interveners. 42. Learned counsel for the parties have made elaborate submissions on the six questions as noted above. Learned counsel for the parties have also made their respective submissions on the points for consideration as was formulated by the High Court in the impugned judgment. The elaborate submissions have also been made by the petitioners challenging the various provisions of Act, 2018. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners have made scratching attack on the Gaikwad Commission’s report, various data and details have been referred to by the petitioners to support their submissions that Maratha community is not a socially and educationally backward class. 43. We shall now proceed to notice the submission advanced by learned counsel including submissions of Attorney General for India in seriatim.
(4) Submissions of the parties. 44. Shri Arvind Datar, learned senior counsel, led the arguments on behalf of the appellant. Shri Datar submits that there is no need to refer the judgment of Constitution Bench of this Court in Indra Sawhney to an Eleven-Judge Bench. Reference to larger Bench can be made
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
only for compelling reasons. No judgment of this Court has doubted the correctness of nine-Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in Indra Sawhney’s case. On the other hand 50% limit for reservation has been reiterated at least by four Constitution Bench judgments of this Court rendered after judgment in Indra Sawhney’s case. All the High Courts have uniformly accepted the limit of 50% reservation. In some States where for political reasons 50% limit had been breached, it was struck down repeatedly. The limit of 50% reservation laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Indra Sawhney is now an integral part of the trinity of Article 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution. Any legislative or executive legislations against it are void and have to be struck down. Shri Datar has specifically referred to the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in M. Nagaraj vs. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212 in which case the Constitution Bench of this Court laid down that the State cannot obliterate the Constitutional requirement of ceiling limit of 50%. It was held that if the ceiling limit of 50% is breached the structure of quality and equality in Article 16 would collapse.
45. It was further held that even the State has compelling reason, the State has to see that its reservation provision does not lead to excessiveness so as to breach the limit of 50%. The request to refer the judgment of Nagaraj has been refused by subsequent Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Jarnail Singh and others vs. Lachhmi Narain Gupta and others, 2018(10) SCC 396. The parameters, when this Court revisits its judgments have been clearly laid down in which the present case does not fall. The judgment delivered by nine-Judge Bench needs to be followed under the principle of stare decisis. More so for the last more than 28 years no judgment of this Court had expressed any doubt about the law laid down by this Court in Indra Sawhney’s case. A very high threshold is to be crossed when reference is to be made to eleven-Judge Bench. In law, certainty, consistency and continuity are highly desirable. The Parliament has not touched 50% limit laid down under Article 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution for the last several decades.
46. The impugned judgment of the Bombay High Court is liable to be set aside as it is contrary to the clear principle laid down in the Indra Sawhney’s case. The High Court has not given any reason as to how extra-ordinary situations as mentioned in paragraph 810 in Indra Sawhney case is made out in the context of reservation for the Maratha caste/
community in Maharashtra. Exception and certain extra-ordinary situations to the 50% principle carved out in Indra Sawhney does not cover the case of Maratha since such “rule is confined to far flung and remote areas, where they are out of main stream of national life”. Indra Sawhney has also mandated extreme caution for going beyond 50%. The reservation limit of 50% has also been applied in the decisions rendered in the context of Article 243D and 243T of the Constitution of India relating to Panchayats and Municipalities. The earlier reports of National Commission for Backward Classes has rejected claim of Maratha to be included in backward class. The opinion of National Commission for Backward Classes cannot be disregarded by the State and in the event it had any grievance remedy of review was provided. 47. The Maratha community has been found to be socially advanced and prestigious caste. It is submitted that limit of 50% is essential right on part of equality which is part of basic structure. Even members of Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes who qualify on merit can continue to enjoy the benefit of merit quota. The limit of 50% as laid down in Indra Sawhney, only a Parliamentary amendment is contemplated. Whenever Parliament wanted to get over 50% ceiling limit laid down by Indra Sawhney, the constitutional Amendments were brought, namely, Constitution 77th Amendment and Constitution 81st Amendment. 48. Shri Datar has referred to various paragraphs of judgment of this Court in Indra Sawhney. In support of his submission that majority has laid down upper ceiling of 50% for providing reservation under Article 16(4) and 15(4), Shri Datar submits that the judgment of Indra Sawhney cannot be confined only to Article 16(4) but the law was laid down taking into consideration Article 15(4) and 16(4). 49. Shri Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel for the appellant/ writ petitioner submits that social and financial status of Maratha community has been examined by successive Commissions or Committees up to June 2013 and each of the Commission and Committee did not recognise members of Maratha community as deserving for reservation as backward class. Shri Divan has referred to Kalelkar Commission Report (1955), Mandal Commission Report (1980) and National Backward Class Commission Report (2000). He has also referred to the Deshmukh Committee report which did not include the Maratha Community in the list of backward communities. Reference
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
has also been made to the Khatri Commission (1995) and Bapat Commission (2008).
50. It is submitted that when the Maharashtra State Commission for backward class declined to reconsider in the matter of reservation of Maratha, the State Government appointed Narayan Rane Committee who was a Minister in the State Government which submitted a report in 2014 that although Maratha Community may not be socially backward but it recommended a new Socially and Economically Backward Class (SEBC). Shri Divan has submitted that Gaikwad Commission which submitted its Report on 15.11.2018 concluding that Maratha Community in Maharashtra are socially, educationally and economically backward and are eligible to be included in backward class category is completely flawed. It was not open for the Gaikwad Commission to ignore determination by National Commission and State Committees/Commission until June 2013 holding that Maratha are forward class in the State of Maharashtra. The report failed to recognize the consequences of Maratha Community being politically organised and being the dominant political class in Maharashtra for several decades. Politically organised classes that dominate government are not backward in any Constitutional sense. 51. Coming to the Constitution (One Hundred and Second Amendment), 2018, Shri Divan submits that 102nd Constitution Amendment now contemplates identification by National Commission of Backward Classes. The Constitutional scheme which is delineated by Article 341 and 342 has also been borrowed in Article 342A. The identification of backward classes is now centralized. Shri Divan has also highlighted adverse impact of the impugned act on medical admission in the State of Maharashtra. 52. Law laid down by Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney’s case that reservation under Article 15(4) and 16(4) should not exceed the upper limit of 50 percent has been followed and reiterated by several judgments of this Court including Constitution Bench judgments. The Gaikwad Commission report and the reason given by the report does not make out any case for exception regarding Maratha Community to fall in extraordinary circumstances as contemplated in paragraph 810 of the judgment in Indra Sawhney’s case.
53. Shri Gopal Sankaranarayanan, learned senior Counsel has made his submission on the Constitution (One Hundred and Second
Amendment), 2018. Shri Narayanan submits that after the Constitution (One Hundred and Second Amendment), 2018, the State legislature could not have passed the 2018 Act. Article 338B and 342A brought by the Constitution (One Hundred and Second Amendment), mark see change in the entire regime regarding identification of backward classes. The power of the National Commission of Backward Classes as per Article 338B sub-clause (5) includes power to make reports and recommendations on measures that should be taken by the Union or any State. The National Commission for Backward Class is also required to be now consulted both by the Union and the State. Article 366(26) states that the phrase ‘Socially, Educationally and Backward Classes’ means such Backward Classes as are so deemed under Article 342A, for the purposes of this Constitution which provision does not permit Socially, Educationally and Backward Classes to have any other meaning. The purposes of this Constitution, as occurring in Article 366(26C) shall also apply to Article 16(4). After the Constitution (One Hundred and Second Amendment), the States have no power to identify socially, educationally and backward classes. The State Governments are still left free to decide the nature or extent of provision that may be made in favour of socially and educationally backward classes identified in accordance with Article 342A. When the power to determine SCs and STs have always been centralized, it is absurd to suggest that allowing the same procedure for identification of socially, educationally and backward classes shall violate federalism. 54. Shri Gopal Sankaranarayanan further submitted that the reliance on Select Committee Report of Rajya Sabha is unwarranted. In the Select Committee Report which was submitted in July 2018, there were several dissents, since many members of the Select Committee understood that the Constitution (One Hundred and Second Amendment), shall take away the power of the State to prepare their own list of socially, educationally and backward classes. Article 342A has been brought in the Constitution to achieve uniformity and certainty and not due to any political reasons. There is no ambiguity in Article 342A which requires any external aid for interpretation. 55. Shri Sidharth Bhatnagar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant also adopts the submissions of Mr. Datar and Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan and submits that the judgment of this Court in M.R. Balaji versus State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 649, had laid down that
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
reservation under Article 15(4) shall be less than 50 percent which principle finds its approval in Indra Sawhney’s Case.In Indra Sawhney’s Case, Eight out of Nine Judges took the view that reservation cannot exceed 50 percent. He submits that judgment of Indra Sawhney need not be referred to a larger Bench.
56. Mr. Pradeep Sancheti, learned senior Advocate, has confined his submissions to the Gaikwad Commission Report. He submits that due difference to the opinion of the Commission does not mean that opinion formed is beyond the judicial scrutiny. He submits that backwardness has to be based on objective factors where inadequacy has to factually exist. The Court while exercising power of Judicial Review has to consider the substance of the matter and not its form, the appearance or the cloak, or the veil of the executive action is to be carefully scrutinized and if it appears that Constitutional power has been transgressed, the impugned action has to be struck down.
57. Shri Sancheti submitted that three National Backward Class Commissions and three State Backward Class Commissions did not include Maratha Community as backward community which findings and reasons could not have been given a goby by Gaikwad Commission constituted in the year 2017. The Gaikwad Commission (hereinafter referred to as Commission), survey, data results, analysis suffers from various inherent flaws. The sample survey conducted by the Commission is skewed, unscientific and cannot be taken as a representative sample. Sample size is very small. Out of 43,629 persons surveyed, only 950 persons were from the Urban Area. Mumbai was excluded from the Survey. Sample size of total population was well below 0.02 percent. The Commission assumes that the Maratha form 30 percent of the State’s population. Without there being any quantifiable data, the Commission picked up and chose certain parameters whereas conveniently left out many of the parameters where Maratha Community is better off. The Commission has not provided a comparable State average for at least 28 of the parameters used in the study. When the State Average is not on the record, treating those parameters as parameters of backwardness is wholly unfounded. The High Court in the impugned judgment has also not met the submissions which were brought on record before the High Court regarding the serious flaws committed by the Commission. 58. The marking system adopted by the Commission was not rational; the Constitution of the Commission and experts was loaded in
favour of the Maratha community since the majority of the members of the Commission were all Marathas. It is submitted that Marathas are the most dominant community not only in politics but also in other fields such as educational institutions, sugar factories, agriculture etc. which aspects are relevant criteria for identifying backwardness of a community. The sample size was so small that no quantifiable data could have been found. 59. Referring to Chapter 10 of the Commission’s report, Shri Sancheti submits that no extraordinary situation as contemplated in paragraph 810 of judgment of Indra Sawhney’s case could be made out, even if all the findings given by the Commission are accepted to be true. The Commission has relied on outdated data for holding that ‘Marathas’ were ‘Shudras’. When an unscientific survey is done, an unrealistic result is bound to come. There has been adequate representation of Maratha Community in the Public Services. The Commission erred in holding that the representation is not proportionate and recommended reservation under Article 16(4). The Commission has not even adverted to the requirement regarding efficiency as contemplated under Article 335 of the Constitution of India. 60. Shri Sancheti submits that more than 40 percent Members of Parliament and 50 percent of Members of Legislative Assembly are Marathas. Shri Sancheti submits that the Commission’s report is only paperwork which could not be accepted by the Court, while the Act, 2018, purports to create reservation for socially and economically Backward Classes but in effect the enactment is reservation for only Maratha which enactment is not sustainable. 61. Shri Sancheti submits that from the various data regarding representation in jobs of Maratha community itself make it clear that Maratha community is adequately represented in Public Services and there is no Constitutional requirement for providing reservation under Article 16(4). Shri Sancheti submits that the Commission has given undue importance to the suicide by the Maratha farmers. He submits that from the data given in the report, the proportion of suicide of Maratha comes to 23.56 percent which is even less from the proportion of 30 percent as claimed by the Commission. The High Court by wrong appreciation of facts concludes that those who committed suicide, 80.28 percent were Marathas. There is no basis to attribute farmer suicide to Maratha Backwardness. Shri Sancheti submits that undue weightage has been
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
given to the percentage of Maratha in ‘Dubbeywala class’ which cannot be any relevant consideration.
62. Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, appearing on behalf of the appellant, submits that no case has been made out to review or refer the judgment of this Court in Indra Sawhney’s case which is based on principles of equality and reasonableness. Dr. Dhavan submits that in fact Indra Sawhney should be strengthened to make 50 percent strict subject to dire restrictions and stronger judicial review. The Indra Sawhney should be treated as a comprehensive decision on various aspects of reservation as a whole and the attempt of the respondents to distinguish Indra Sawhney on the basis that it was a decision only on Article 16(4) is spurious. 63. Dr. Dhavan, however, submits that in the judgment of Indra Sawhney, a weak test for judicial scrutiny in matters within the subjective satisfaction of the scrutiny was laid down i.e. test as laid down by this Court in Barium Chemicals ltd. and another versus The Company Law Board and others, AIR 1967 SC 295. Dr. Dhavan submits that there ought to be a strict scrutiny test and this Court may tweak this aspect of Indra Sawhney so that the strict scrutiny test applies. The 50 percent test as has been articulated in the Indra Sawhney is based on the principle of giving everyone a fair chance. 50 percent ceiling is based on principle of equality to prevent reverse discrimination which is as much a principle that the Constitution records to equality as anything else. The direction of Indra Sawhney that list of Other Backward Classes be reviewed periodically is not being followed. Dr. Dhavan, however, submits that the entire power of reservation has not been taken away from the State. 64. Elaborating his submissions on the Constitution (One Hundred and Second Amendment) Act, 2018, Dr. Dhavan submits that the essence of 102nd Amendment as exemplified in Article 342A results in the monopoly of identification even though implementation is left to the State. His submission is that this is contrary to the basic structure of federalism of the Constitution. In that it deprived the States of the crucial power of identification which was a very important power of the State under Article 15, 16 and 46. The obligation of the State in Article 15, 16 and 46 continue to be comprehensive. 65. Alternate submissions advanced by Dr. Dhavan is that Article 342A can be read down to describe the power of the Centre in relation
to the Central Services and leaving the identification and implementation power of the States intact. Dr. Dhavan, however, submits that Maharashtra legislature had the competence to enact the 2018 Act, even though the Constitution (One Hundred and Second Amendment) had come by that time. He, however, submits that any legislation which is enacted will still be subject to Indra Sawhney and Nagraj principles. 66. Dr. Dhavan submits that various reports of Maharashtra in fact found that it is not necessary to include Maratha despite their persistent efforts. He submits that the test to be applied is “what has happened since the last report negating inclusion of Maratha that now requires a change to include them”. He submits that the logic of the principle is that if the Marathas were not backward for over Seventy years, how they have suddenly become backward now. Dr. Dhavan reiterates his submission that there is no judgment which has questioned Indra Sawhney’s case. He submits that reservation under political pressure, social pressure need not to be taken. A political obligation to the electorate is not a constitutional obligation. He further submits that object of Article 16(4) is empowerment i.e. sharing of the State power. He submits that Maratha are not deprived of sharing power; hence, no case is made out for granting reservation under Article 16(4). 67. Shri B.H. Marlapalle, learned senior counsel, has also submitted that doctrine of extraordinary circumstances cannot be applied to a dominant class of Society. He submits that the representation of Maratha in the Legislative Assembly of the State is more than 50 percent and in the Cabinet of the State they are more than 50 percent. After enforcement of the Constitution, Marathas were never regarded as an Other Backward Community. Three Central Commission and three State Commissions have rejected the claim of the Marathas to be backward. 68. Shri S.B. Talekar, appearing in Civil Appeal No.3126 of 2020 has submitted that Writ Petition No.3846 of 2019 was filed by Mohd. Saeed Noori & Others, claiming reservation for Muslims. The High Court although noted the submissions but had made no consideration. Learned Counsel contended that the State has no legislative competence to enact the 2018 Act. He submits that power to legislate on the subject has been taken away by virtue of 102nd Constitutional Amendment by adding Article 342A in the Constitution of India. He also questioned the composition of Gaikwad Commission.
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
69. Shri R.K. Deshpande, appearing for the appellant has also contended that by Article 342A, a separate mechanism has been introduced for the purpose of identification of backward class. He submits that there cannot be any State list of ‘Socially and Educationally Backward Class’ after the 102nd Constitutional Amendment. He submits that identification of the caste was never the exclusive domain of the States.
70. Shri Amit Anand Tiwari, appearing in writ petition i.e. W.P. No.504 of 2020, referring to the Order dated 09.09.2020 contends that Three-Judge Bench having refused the prayer to refer the Indra Sawhney judgment to a larger Bench, the Said prayer needs no further consideration. Shri Tiwari submits that present is not a case covered by any exceptional circumstances as mentioned in the Indra Sawhney’s judgment. Historically, Marathas have been treated as a forward class who are socially, economically and politically well-of. Prior to the report of Gaikwad Commission, as many as six Commissions have held Marathas are not entitled to be treated as a backward class. There has been no change in the circumstances to include Maratha Community in the list of Backward Classes. With respect to 102nd Constitutional Amendment, shri Tiwari submits that now States are not empowered to notify a class of persons as socially and educationally backward for the purposes of the Constitution. However, State’s power to confer benefits on an already identified class of persons as SEBC as identified under Article 342A remains intact. The High Court committed an error in holding that States still have power to identify class as SEBC. The High Court erred in not appreciating the import of Article 366(26C).
71. We may also notice the submission of writ petitioner in W.P.(civil) No.938 of 2020, challenging the 102 nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 2018.
72. Shri Amol B. Karande, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in event Article 342A read with Article 366(26C) of the Constitution of India takes away the power of the State to identify a backward class, the said Constitutional Amendment shall be violative of basic feature of the Constitution, i.e. Federalism.
73. He further submits that by the Constitutional Amendment, the power of the State to legislate under various Entries under List-II and List-III have been taken away, hence, it was obligatory to follow the procedure as prescribed in Proviso to Article 368(2) of the Constitution
of India, which having not done, the Constitutional Amendment is not valid. 74. Learned Counsel submits that Article 366(26C) requires certain clarification since there is no clarity regarding Central List and State List. He submits that States shall have still power to legislate on the identification of the backward class. 75. Learned Attorney General, Shri K.K.Venugopal, has made submissions on the 102nd Constitutional Amendment. Shri Venugopal submits that he shall confine his arguments on the 102nd Constitutional Amendment only. Referring to Article 12 of the Constitution, the learned Attorney General submits that the definition of the “State includes Government and Parliament of India and Government and Legislature of each State.” Under Article 15(4) and 16(4), the State has power to identify the ‘Socially and Educationally Backward Class/Backward Class’ and take affirmative action in favour of such classes which power has been regularly exercised by the State. 76. Learned Attorney General submits that the Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney held that there ought to be a permanent body, in the nature of a Commission or a Tribunal to which inclusion and non-inclusion of groups, classes and Sections in the list of Other Backward Classes can be made. The Constitution Bench directed both the Union Government and the State Government to constitute such permanent mechanism in the nature of a Commission. 77. Learned Attorney General submits that it is inconceivable that no State shall have power to identify backward class, the direction issued by the Nine-Judge Bench still continuing. He has referred to the judgment delivered by Justice Jeevan Reddy for himself and three other Judges and judgment delivered by Justice Thommen and submits that the above directions were the directions of the majority. Learned Attorney General submits that no such amendment has been made by which the effect of Article 15(4) and 16(4) have been impacted. He submits that National Backward Class Commission Act, 1993 was passed in obedience of direction of this Court in Indra Sawhney’s case. He submits that Section 2(C) of 1993 Act refers to a Central list. Learned Attorney General has also referred to Maharashtra Act No.34 of 2006, especially Section 2(C), 2(E) and Section 9(1) which refers to State List. He submits that Article 342A was to cover the Central list alone, the 1993 Act, having been
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repealed on 14.08.2018. The Attorney General has also referred to Select Committee Report dated 17.07.2017, paragraph 12, 18, 19 and 55 and submits that Select Committee Report indicate that the intention of Constitutional Amendment was not to take away the State’s power to identify the Backward Class, the Select Committee Report clearly indicate that State’s Commission shall continue to perform their duties.
78. Learned Attorney General submits that Central List as contemplated under Article 342A (2) relates to employment under the Union Government, Public Sector Corporation, Central institutions in States where Central list was to be utilized. He submits that State Government identification of Backward Class/Socially and Educationally Backward Classes is not touched by Article 342A. 79. Referring to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes learned Attorney General submits that the power was given to the President under the Constitutional Scheme and States had no concern at all with Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes. He submits that Article 342A deals with the Central List for its own purpose whereas in every State, there is a separate State list of Other Backward Class. There was no attempt to modify Articles 15(4) and 16(4) by the Parliament. Unless Articles 15(4) and 16(4) are amended, the State’s power cannot be touched. 80. Learned Attorney General had also referred to an affidavit filed on behalf of Government of India in Writ Petition (Civil) No.12 of 2021, Dinesh B. versus Union of India and others, in which affidavit Union of India with respect to the Constitution (One Hundred and Second Amendment) Act, 2018 has pleaded that power to identify and specify the Socially and Educationally Backward Class list lies with Parliament, only with reference to Central List of Socially and Educationally Backward Class. It is further pleaded that the State Government may have their separate State list for Socially and Educationally Backward Class for the purposes of providing reservation to the recruitment to State Government Services or admission to the State Government Educational Institutions. Learned Attorney General reiterates the above stand in respect of the Constitution (One Hundred and Second Amendment) Act, 2018.
81. Referring to the Other Backward Caste list, with regard to the State of Punjab, the learned Attorney General submits that in the Central list, there are 68 castes and whereas in the State list, there are
71 castes. Learned Attorney General submits that the question of validity of the Constitution (One Hundred and Second Amendment) shall arise only when the State’s power is taken away. Replying to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner in W.P.No.938 of 2020, learned Attorney General submits that in the Constitution (One Hundred and Second Amendment), there was no applicability of proviso to Article 368(2). He submits that insofar as legislation under List-III is concerned, since Parliament by legislation can override the States, hence, by Constitutional Amendment, the same can very well be taken away.
82. Referring to Entry number 41 of List-II, the learned Attorney General submits that Entry 41 has no concern with identification of backward class. The Constitution (One Hundred and Second Amendment) does not amend the lists under Schedule VII; hence, there is no requirement of ratification by the States.
83. Shri Mukul Rohtagi, learned senior counsel, appearing for the State of Maharashtra has led the arguments. Shri Rohtagi has articulated his submissions in a very effective manner. Shri Rohtagi states that his submission shall be principally confined to question No.1.
84. Shri Rohtagi submits that there are several reasons which require that the Constitution Bench judgment in Indra Sawhney be revisited, necessitating reference to the larger Bench of Eleven Judges. Shri Rohtagi during course of submission has handed over a chart giving history of judgments on reservation. The chart makes reference of the relevant paragraphs of judgments of this Court in M.R.Balaji versus State of Mysore(Supra),T. Devadasan versus Union of India and another, AIR (1964) SC 179, State of Punjab versus Hiralal and others, (1970) 3 SCC 567; State of Kerala and others versus N.M. Thomas and others, (1976) 2 SCC 310; Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh, (Railway) versus Union of India and others, (1981) 1 SCC 246; K.C. Vasant Kumar and another versus State of Karnataka, (1985) supp. (1) SCC 714; T.M.A. Pai Foundation and others versus State of Karnataka and others, (2002) 8 SCC 481, M. Nagaraj and others versus Union of India and others, (2006) 8 SCC 212; S.V.Joshi versus State of Karnataka, (2012) 7 SCC 41; Union of India and others versus Rakesh Kumar and others, (2010) 4 SCC 50; K. Krishnamurthy and others versus Union of India and another ,(2010) 7 SCC 202; Chebrolu Leela Prasad Rao versus State of Andhra Pradesh, (2020) SCC Online SC 383; Vikas
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
kishanrao Gawali versus The State of Maharashtra, (2021) SCC Online SC 170 and Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Indra Sawhney. The Chart also indicates the reasons why Indra Sawhney’s judgment requires a review. The Chart in a comprehensive manner discloses the law on reservation prior to Indra Sawhney and subsequent thereto. 85. We may now notice the Groundswhich have been emphasized by Shri Mukul Rohtagi for referring the judgment of Indra Sawhney to a larger Bench. (5)The 10 grounds urged for referring Indra Sawhney judgment to a larger Bench. i) In the judgment of Indra Sawhney, there is no unanimity, in view of different reasoning adopted in six separate judgments delivered in the case. He submits that the judgments are in three groups – one containing the judgment of Justice Jeevan Reddy, which is for himself and three other judges, which held that while 50 percent is the rule but in certain extraordinary situations, it can be breached. Shri Rohtagi submits that Justice Pandian and Justice Sawant have held that 50 percent can be breached, hence, the majority opinion is that 50 percent can be breached. It is only Justice Thommen, Justice Kuldip Singh and Justice R.M. Sahai who have held that 50 percent cannot be breached. He submits that the judgment of majority opinion in Indra Sawhney is being wrongly read as holding that 50 percent is the ceiling limit for reservation. ii) Different judges from 1963 till date have spoken in different voice with regard to reservation under 15(4) and 16(4) which is a good ground to refer Indra Sawhney judgment to a larger Bench. iii) The Balaji has held that Article 15(4) is an exception to Article 15(1) which theory has not been accepted by this Court in N.M. Thomas as well as Indra Sawhney, the very basis of fixing the ceiling of 50 percent has gone. Shri Rohtagi submits that the Constitution of India is a living document. The ideas cannot remain frozen, even the thinking of framers of the Constitution cannot remain frozen for times immemorial.
iv)
Neither Article 16(4) nor Article 15(4) contains any percentage. The Court cannot read a percentage i.e. 50 percent for effecting reservation under Article 15(4) and Article 16(4), providing a ceiling by number is cutting down the Constitutional provisions of Part-III and Part-IV. Indra Sawhney’s judgment has restricted the sweep of Article 15 and Article 16 of the Constitution. The Constitutional provisions cannot be read down which principle is applicable only with regard to statutes.
v)
Judgment of Indra Sawhney is a judgment on Article 16(4) and not on Article 15(4), hence, the ratio of judgment cannot be applied with regard to Article 15(4). He submits that Indra Sawhney itself states that Article 15(4) and Article 16(4) are distinct and different provisions.
vi)
The judgment of Indra Sawhney does not consider the impact of Directive Principles of State Policy such as Article 39(b)(c) and Article 46, While interpreting Article 14, 16(1) and 16(4).
vii)
The 50 percentage ceiling limit was followed by Constitution Bench of this Court in St. Stephen’s College versus University of Delhi,(1992) 1 SCC 558, by upholding the procedure for admission of students in aided minority educational institutions which ceiling limit of 50 percent has been set aside by 11-Judge Bench judgment in T.M.A. Pai Foundation (Supra). 11-Judge Bench judgment in T.M.A. Pai judgment indicates that the ceiling of 50 percent is no longer available to be relied on even for purposes of Article 15 and Article 16.
viii)
The Constitutional 77th and 81st Amendment Act inserting Article 16(4)(A) and Article 16(4)(B) have the effect of undoing in part the judgment of Indra Sawhney and thus mandating a re-look.
ix)
The 103rd Constitutional Amendment by which 10 percent reservation have been provided for Economically Weaker Sections in addition to reservation given under Article 15(4) and Article 16(4) is a clear pointer of overruling of 50 percent ceiling for reservation under 15(4) and 16(4).
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The extraordinary circumstances as indicated in paragraph 810 of Indra Sawhney’s case is not exhaustive, far flung and remote areas mentioned therein are only illustrative. There may be other exceptions where states are entitled to exceed the 50 percent ceiling limit.
86. Shri P.S. Patwalia, appearing for the State of Maharashtra has advanced the submissions on rest of the questions. Shri Patwalia has advanced submissions supporting the report of Gaikwad Commission. He submits that Gaikwad Commission was appointed under the 2005 Act at the time when the challenge to 2014 Act was pending in the Bombay High Court. He submits that there was no challenge to the constitution of Gaikwad Commission before the High Court at any stage. He submits that if 30 percent Maratha are to be fit in 27 percent OBC reservation, we will be giving them a complete mirage. Shri Patwalia has taken us to the different chapters of the report and submits that the Commission has mentioned about procedure, investigations and evidence collected. He submits that quantifiable data was collected by the Commission through experts and three agencies appointed by the Commission. Experts were also engaged to marshal the data and submit their opinion. Chapter 10 of the report dealt with the exceptional circumstances regarding Marathas justifying exceeding 50 percent ceiling limit for reservation. He submits that the Commission has assessed the Maratha population as 30 percent.
87. Shri Patwalia submits that the scope of judicial review of a Commission’s report is very limited. This Court shall not enter into assessment of evidence to come to a different conclusion. He submits that the Gaikwad Commission report is a unanimous report. After the receipt of the report, the Act, 2018 was passed unanimously by the Legislative Assembly. The subjective satisfaction of the State Government to declare a community as socially and educationally backward is not to be easily interfered by the Courts in exercise of Judicial Review Jurisdiction. 88. On the basis of the Commission’s report, the State Government arrived at the satisfaction that Maratha are socially and educationally backward class which satisfaction need not be tested in Judicial Review Jurisdiction. Formation of the opinion by the State is purely a subjective process. This Court has laid down in several judgments that the Commission’s report needs to be treated with deference. The High Court
in the impugned judgment has elaborately considered the Gaikwad Commission’s report and the other material including the reservation which was granted to Other Backward Community in the year 1902 by Sahuji Maharaj. He submits that the High Court had considered the effect of reports given by the earlier Commissions in the impugned judgment and gave reasons why earlier reports cannot operate detriment to the Marathas. 89. It is submitted that method and manner of survey is to be decided on by the Commission. No contrary data of any expert or technical body has been placed before this Court by the appellants to come to the conclusion that the data considered by the Commission was not relevant. The choice of parameters is essentially to be decided by the expert body appointed to determine the backwardness. The statistics of population of Maratha community is credible and rightly been accepted by the Commission. 90. The Commission had given a common questionnaire to maintain uniformity for social, economical and educational backwardness. The Commission has given relevant parameters. The Commission had considered the number of representations received and collected. The Commission also considered the objection for inclusion of Maratha as backward class in Other Backward classes category and otherwise. 91. Shri Patwalia with respect to 102nd Constitutional Amendment states that he adopts the submissions of learned Attorney General completely. He submits that Article 342A and mechanism which has been brought in force only relate to the Central list which is for the purposes of appointment in posts under the Central Government or Educational Institutions under the control of the Central Government. Shri Patwalia further submits that the Select Committee report relied by the High Court is fully admissible for deciphering the history of legislation and the intention of the Parliament. He further submits that today there is no central list, hence, there is no question of affecting the State list. He submits that it is premature to set aside the said action. 92. Shri Shekhar Naphade, learned senior counsel, appearing for the State of Maharashtra, has elaborately dealt with the judgment of this Court in M. R. Balaji(Supra). He submits that all subsequent judgments providing a ceiling of 50 percent are based on Balaji’s Case and there being several flaws in the said judgment, the case needs to be referred to larger Bench. He submits that 50 percent ceiling on reservation for
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Class is a judicial legislation which is impermissible. He further submits that reservation cannot exceed 50 percent is not the ratio of judgment of Balaji. It is submitted that Balaji has not considered the effect of the non obstante clause contained in Article 15(4). Shri Naphade has also dealt with the judgments of this Court in T.Devadasan(Supra), N.M. Thomas (Supra) and Indra Sawhney.
93. Shri Naphade elaborating his submissions on Article 342A submits that the State has legislative competence to prescribe reservation to backward class. He has referred to Entry 25 of List-III and Entry 41 of List-II. He submits that a careful perusal of Article 342A indicates that the scheme of this Article is substantially different from Article 341 and 342. The difference in the language of clause (2) of Article 342A as compared to clause (2) of Article of 341 and 342 makes all the difference. The view canvas by petitioners that 102nd Constitutional Amendment takes away the legislative competence and legislative power of the States runs counter to the basic structure of the Constitution and the scheme of distribution of power between the State and Centre. It is settled principle of interpretation that by construing any provision of Act of Parliament or Constitution, the legislative history of the relevant subject is necessary to be seen. 94. Shri Kapil Sibal, senior advocate, appearing for the State of Jharkhand has advanced the submissions on all aspects of the matters which are under consideration in the present batch of cases. He submits that how balance for Article 14, 15 and 16 shall be maintained is matter within the domain of the executive/State legislature. No Court should fix the percentage for Article 15 and 16. In Indra Sawhney’s case, there was no data for imposing a ceiling of 50 percent. Justice Jeevan Reddy did not rely on the Mandal Commission’s report. Mr. Sibal submits that 50 percent was not an issue in the Indra Sawhney. He submits that parameters for Article 15(4) and Article 16(4) are entirely different where Article 15 is eligibility and Article 16 is ability to get a job. Apart from Balaji, all other judgments are on Article 16. He submits that question No.VI framed in Indra Sawhney’s case could not have been answered without looking into the statistics. The concept of equality will differ from State to State. There cannot be a strait Jacket formula. Why stop reservation to only 50 percent when matter relates to affirmative action by the State which is felt required by the concerned State. Limiting
access to education to 50 percent will cause more problems than solved. It is the State which has to look at the relevant percentage to be followed in a particular case. In Indra Sawhney’s case, the Court was dealing with Office Memorandum issued by Government of India where reservation was less than 50 percent. The observation regarding 50 percent is only an Obiter. By the judgment of this Court in N.M. Thomas, the basis of Balaji Case that Article 15(4) is an exception to Article 15(1) has gone. The whole judgment could not be relied on as a precedent anymore. Whether a particular quota of reservation is violative of Article 15(1) depends on facts of each case. The State ought to be given a free hand to pick the percentage as per need and requirement of each State. There is no judicial power to pick a percentage. 95. Shri Sibal giving illustration of Kendriya Vidyalaya submitted that General students cannot come and those institutions cater only to the employees of Government, Army; and the General can only come when the seats are vacant. He submits that the balance has to be done by the executive and not by the Court. These are the issues which need to be decided by a larger Bench. These issues having never been addressed before this Court in Indra Sawhney’s case, the matter needs to be referred to a larger Bench. 96. The Constitution of India is a living, transformative document. The Court cannot shackle the legislature. Shri Sibal submits that 50 percent limit for reservation prescribed in Indra Sawhney is no longer a good law after 103rd Constitutional Amendment which inserted Article 15(6) and Article 16(6) into the Constitution. Several States have already provided for reservation beyond 50 percent to Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Socially and Educationally Backward class. In the above circumstances, it is necessary that these matters may be referred to a larger Bench for fresh adjudication. 97. Shri Sibal on Article 342A submits that under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) the Union and the States have co-equal powers to advance the interest of socially and educationally backward classes. Any exercise of power by the Union cannot encroach upon the power of the State to identify and empower the socially and educationally backward classes and determine the extent of reservation required. The expression, “for the purposes of this Constitution” can therefore only be construed within the contours of power that the Union is entitled to exercise with respect
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
to entities, institutions, authorities and Public Sector Enterprises under the aegis and control of the Union.
98. The expression “Central List” in Article 342A(2) relates to the notification under Article 342A(1), wherein the Central List will include identification of socially and educationally backward classes for the purposes of entities, institutions, authorities and public sector enterprises in a State, but under the aegis or control of the Union. Any other interpretation would allow an executive act to whittle down the legislative power of the States to provide for the advancement of the socially and educationally backward classes, under Articles 15(4), 15(5) as well as in Article 16(4), which are an integral part of the chapter on fundamental rights. 99. Article 342A and Article 342A(1) and 342A(2) must be interpreted in the historical context and developments both pre and post Indra Sawhney, where the identification of the socially and educationally backward classes in the State lists was the basis for determining the extent of reservations. In this regard, the use of the word “Central list” is of significance, as opposed to Articles 341 and 342, which only use the expression “list” in the context of identification of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. This is because historically, Scheduled Castes and Tribes were identified by the Government of India and accepted by the States. 100. Learned Solicitor General Shri Tushar Mehta, submits that he adopts the submissions made by learned Attorney General. He submits that 102ndConstitutional Amendment shall not dilute the power of the State. Article 342A (1) is only enabling provision. The Act, 2018, does not violate 102ndConstitutional Amendment. 101. Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, appearing for the respondent submits that State’s power was never intended to be taken away. He submits that material including discussion in reports of Parliamentary Committee are fully admissible and has to be relied for finding the intent and purpose of a Constitutional provision. Dr. Singhvi has elaborately taken us to the proceedings of the Select Committee and its report. Dr. Singhvi has cited the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Kalpana Mehta and others versus Union of India and others, (2018) 7 SCC 1.He has also referred to the Statements of objects of 123rdBill which notices that there were State lists prior to Indra Sawhney. The Central list was confined to Central Institutions and Central Government
posts. Shri Singhvi has also referred to 1993 Act and submits that in the said Act Section 2(C) referred to a list which was only a Central list. Article 342A(2) uses the same Central list and interpretation of Article 342A(2) has to be made taking the same meaning of Central list as was known and understood under the regime prior to 102 nd Constitutional Amendment Act. This Court shall not annotate the State’s power under some interpretive exercise. Dr. Singhvi further submits that today there is no Central list under Article 342A, there being no occupied field, it its premature and academic. 102. Shri C.U. Singh, learned senior Advocate, appearing for respondents has referred to Gaikwad Commission’s report in detail. He has referred to data collected and reflected in the report and submit that the Commission on the basis of quantifiable data has determined Maratha as socially and educationally backward community. He has also referred to Chapter 10 of the report which carves out exceptional circumstances for exceeding 50 percent limit. Shri C.U. Singh has taken the Court to various tables and charts regarding representation of Maratha Community in the Public services, Universities and Higher Institutions. Shri C.U. Singh submits that the representation in the public services is not in accordance with the proportion of population of Maratha. He submits that backwardness has to come from living standard, job. The Commission has found that Marathas to be more in Agriculture and in Agricultural labour. He submits that we need to take into consideration the overall situation. 103. Learned Counsel for the State of Bihar, State of Punjab, State of Rajasthan, State of Andhra Pradesh, State of Tamil Nadu, State of Kerala, State of Assam, State of Uttar Pradesh, State of Haryana have also advanced the similar submissions as advanced by the State of Maharashtra that 102nd Constitutional Amendment shall not take away power of the legislative/executive power of the State to identify OBC and to take measures for implementation of reservation. All State’s counsel submitted that there has always been two lists i.e. Central List and State List. It is submitted that any other interpretation shall violate the federal structure as envisaged in the Constitution of India. 104. Shri Amit Kumar, learned Advocate General, Meghalaya, submits that in State of Meghalaya there are about 85.9 percent tribal population. He submits that reservation allowed in State of Meghalaya is in accord with paragraph 810 of the Indra Sawhney’s judgment.
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
105. Shri Vinay Arora, learned counsel appearing for State of Uttarakhand, submits that State has two lists one drawn by State and another Central list. He adopts the arguments of learned Attorney General. Shri Vinay Arora submits that judgment of Indra Sawhney need not to be referred to a larger Bench. He submits that affirmative action under Articles 16(4) and 15(4) are facets of Article 14.
106. We have also heard various counsel appearing for interveners. Most of the interveners have adopted the submissions of the State of Maharashtra. However, learned counsel Shri A.P.Singh and Shri B.B. Biju, appearing for different interveners submits that judgment of Indra Sawhney need not be referred to larger Bench. They submitted that after seventy years, there has been upliftment. The reservation is affecting the merit as well as the society.
107. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 108. All the relevant materials which were before the High Court have been compiled in different volumes and filed for convenience. Learned counsel for the parties during submissions have referred various materials including necessary relevant enactments and reports. From various volumes a master index containing all details of volumes has also been prepared and submitted. Before we enter into submissions of the learned counsel for the parties on six questions framed by us and the impugned judgment of the High Court including points for consideration noted in the judgment of the High Court, we need to first look into the statutory provisions pertaining to reservation in force at the time when Act, 2018 was enacted.
(6)The status of Reservation at the time of commencement of Enactment of Act, 2018 109. The State of Maharashtra has issued a unified list of OBC consisting of 118 castes on 13.08.1967. On 10.09.1993 after the judgment of this Court in Indra Sawhney case, the Central List of OBC was issued by the Ministry of Welfare, Government of India notifying the Central List of OBC consisting of more than 200 castes. The Central List of OBC as on date contains about 252 OBC. The Government of Maharashtra by its Government decision dated 07.12.1994 created
special backward category containing several castes and communities. The Maharashtra State Public Services Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Special Backward Category and other Backward Classes) Act, 2001 was enacted which was published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette on 22.01.2004. Section 2(b) defines De-notified Tribes. Section 2(f) defines Nomadic Tribes. Section 2(g) defines Other Backward Classes and Section 2(k) defines reservation and Section 2(m) defines Special Backward Category. Sections 2(b), 2(f), 2(g), 2(k) and 2(m) are as follows: “Section 2(b) “ De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis) “ means the Tribes declared as such by the Government from time to time; 2(f) “Nomadic Tribes “ means the Tribes wandering from place to place in search of their livelihood as declared by Government from time to time ;
2(g) “Other Backward Classes” means any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens as declared by the Government and includes Other Backward Classes declared by the Government of India in relation to the State of Maharashtra ; 2(k) “reservation” means the reservation of post in the services for the members of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Special Backward Category and Other Backward Classes; 2(m) “Special Backward Category” means socially and educationally backward classes of citizens declared as a Special Backward Category by the Government.” 110. Section 4 provides for reservation and percentage. Section 4(2) is as follows:
Section 4(2) Subject to other provisions of this Act, there shall be posts reserved for the persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Special Backward Category and Other Backward Classes, at the stage of direct recruitment in public services and posts specified under clause (j) of section 2, as provided below:-
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
______________________________________________
Description of Caste/Tribe/
Percentage of
Category/Class
vacancies reservation Or seats to be reserved
______________________________________________ (1) Scheduled Castes
..
13 per cent.
(2) Scheduled Tribes
..
7 per cent.
(3) De-notified Tribes (A)
..
3 per cent.
(4) Nomadic Tribes (B)
..
2.5 per cent.
(5) Nomadic Tribes (C)
..
3.5 per cent.
(6) Nomadic Tribes (D)
..
2 per cent.
(7) Special Backward Category
..
2 per cent.
(8) Other Backward Classes
..
19 per cent.
_____________ Total
..
52 per cent.
_____________________________________________” 111. The Maharashtra State Commission for Backward Classes Act, 2005 was enacted by the State Legislature providing for constitution of State level Commission for Backward Classes other than the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 2(e) defined the Lists in following words: “Section 2(e) “Lists” means the Lists prepared by the State Government, from time to time, for the purposes of making provision for the reservation of appointments or posts, in favour of the backward classes of citizens who, in the opinion of the State Government, are not adequately represented in the services under the State Government and any local or other authority within the State or under the control of the State Government;”
112. Section 9 of the Act deals with functions of the Commission in the following words:
“Section 9.(1) It shall be the function of the Commission,— (a) to entertain and examine requests for inclusion of any class of citizens as a backward class in the Lists ;
(b) to entertain, hear, enquire and examine complaints of over-inclusion or under-inclusion of any backward class in such Lists and tender such advice to the State Government as it deems appropriate; (c) to take periodical review and make recommendations to the State Government regarding the criteria and methodology of determining the backward class of citizens ; (d) to cause studies to be conducted on a regular basis through and in collaboration with reputed academic and research bodies for building of data about the changing socio-economic status of various classes of citizens; (e) to regularly review the socio-economic progress of the backward class of citizens ; and (f ) to perform such other functions as may be prescribed. (2) The advice given or recommendations made by the Commission under this section shall ordinarily be binding on the State Government and the State Government shall record reasons in writing, if, it totally or partially rejects the advice or recommendations or modifies it.” 113. Another Enactment, namely, Maharashtra Private Professional Educational Institutions (Reservation of seats for admission for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes(Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes and Other Backward Classes) Act, 2006 was enacted which was published in Maharashtra Gazette on 01.08.2006. Section 2 defines various expressions including Nomadic Tribes and Other Backward Classes in other words. Section 4 provided that in every Aided Private Professional Educational Institution, seats equal to 50% shall be reserved for candidates belonging to the Reserved Category. Section 4 of the Act is as follows: “Section 4. (1) In every Aided Private Professional Educational Institution, seats equal to fifty per cent. of the Sanctioned Intake of each Professional Course shall be reserved for candidates belonging to the Reserved Category.
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(2) The seats reserved for candidates belonging to the Reserved Category under sub-section (1) shall be filled in by admitting candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes and Other Backward Classes, respectively, in the proportion specified in the Table below :–
__________________________________________________ Description of Caste/Tribe/
Percentage of
Category/Class of Reserved
reservation
Category
__________________________________________________ (1)
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
13%
Castes converts to Buddhism (2)
Scheduled Tribes
7%
(3)
De-notified Tribes(A)
3%
(4)
Nomadic Tribes(B)
2.5%
(5)
Nomadic Tribes(C)
3.5%
(6)
Nomadic Tribes(D)
2%
(7)
Other Backward Classes
19% _______________ Total 50%
________________________________________________” 114. As noted above, at the time of enactments of above 2001 and 2006 Acts, list containing Other Backward Classes had been existing which was issued by the State Government from time to time. By GR dated 26.09.2008, the State of Maharashtra extended the list of OBC to include 346 castes. We have already noticed that the Maharashtra State Reservation (of seats for admission in educational institutions in the State and for appointments or posts in the public services under the State) for Educationally and Socially Backward Category (ESBC) Act, 2014 was enacted by the State Legislature which received the assent of the Governor on 09.01.2015. In the said Act Maratha community was
declared as Educationally and Socially Backward Category (ESBC). The implementation of the Act was stayed by the High Court by its order dated 07.04.2015 passed in Writ Petition No.3151 of 2014 which continued in operation till the writ petition was dismissed as infructuous by the impugned judgment. From the Acts 2001 and 2006 as noted above, it is clear that the percentage of reservation in the State of Maharashtra in Public Services was 52% whereas percentage of reservation of seats for admission for SC and ST, De-notified Tribes and Nomadic Tribes and Other Backward Classes in Private Professional Educational Institutions was 50% at the time of enactment of Act, 2018. We may also notice certain relevant provisions of Act LXII of 2018. The Preamble of the Act reads: “An Act to provide for reservation of seats for admission in educational institutions in the State and for reservation of posts for appointments in public services and posts under the State, to Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of Citizens (SEBC) in the State of Maharashtra for their advancement and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. WHEREAS it is expedient to provide for reservation of seats for admission in educational institutions in the State and for reservation of posts for appointments in public services and posts under the State to Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of Citizens (SEBC) in the State of Maharashtra for their advancement and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto ; it is hereby enacted in the Sixty-ninth Year of the Republic of India, as follows:—” 115. Section 2(1)(j) provides that Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of Citizens (SEBC) includes the Maratha community. Section 2(1)(j) is as follows: “2(1)(j) “Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of Citizens (SEBC)” includes the Maratha Community declared to be Educationally and Socially Backward Category (ESBC)in pursuance of the Maharashtra State Reservation (of seats for admission in educational institutions in the State and for appointments or posts in the public services under the State) for Educationally and Socially Backward Category (ESBC) Act, 2014.”
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116. Section 3 provides for applicability to all the direct recruitments, appointments made in public services and posts in the State which is as follows:
“3. (1) This Act shall apply to all the direct recruitments, appointments made in public services and posts in the State except,—
(a) the super specialized posts in Medical, Technical and Educational field ; (b) the posts to be filled by transfer or deputation ; (c) the temporary appointments of less than forty-five days duration ; and
(d) the post which is single (isolated) in any cadre or grade. (2) This Act shall also apply, for admission in educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or un-aided by the State, other than the minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of article 30 of the Constitution of India. (3) The State Government shall, while entering into or renewing an agreement with any educational institution or any establishment for the grant of any aid as provided in the explanation to clauses (d) and (e) of section 2, respectively, incorporate a condition for compliance with the provisions of this Act, by such educational institution or establishment. (4) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that nothing in this Act shall affect the reservation provided to the Other Backward Classes under the Maharashtra State Public Services (Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Special Backward Category and Other Backward Classes) Act, 2001 and the Maharashtra Private Professional Educational Institutions (Reservation of seats for admission for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes and Other Backward Classes) Act, 2006.”
117. Section 4 deals with seats for admission in educational institutions and appointments in public services and posts under the State or SEBC. Section 4 is as follows:
“4. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any Court or other authority, and subject to the other provisions of this Act,— (a) sixteen per cent. of the total seats in educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other than minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of article 30 of the Constitution of India ; and (b) sixteen per cent. of the total appointments in direct recruitment in public services and posts under the State, shall be separately reserved for the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) including the Maratha Community: Provided that, the above reservation shall not be applicable to the posts reserved in favour of the Scheduled Tribes candidates in the Scheduled Areas of the State under the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution of India as per the notification issued on the 9th June 2014 in this behalf. (2) The principle of Creamy Layer shall be applicable for the purposes of reservation to the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) under this Act and reservation under this Act shall be available only to those persons who are below Creamy Layer. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, the expression “Creamy Layer” means the person falling in the category of Creamy Layer as declared by the Government in the Social Justice and Special Assistance Department, by general or special orders issued in this behalf, from time to time.” 118. We have already noticed that in the writ petitions filed before the High Court, Act, 2018 was challenged being invalid and violative of the provisions of the Constitution of India.
(7) Consideration of 10 Grounds urged for revisiting and referring the judgment of Indra Sawhney to a larger Bench. 119. Shri Mukul Rohtagi as well as Shri Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel have submitted that judgment of Indra Sawhney needs to be revisited and refer to a larger Bench of eleven Judges.
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
120. We shall proceed to consider the grounds given by Shri Mukul Rohtagi in seriatim which shall also cover the grounds raised by Shri Sibal. 121. First ground of Shri Rohatgi is that it is only three Judges, Justice T.K. Thommen, Justice Kuldip Singh and Justice R.M. Sahai who held that 50% reservation cannot be breached whereas other six Judges have held that 50% can be breached, hence, majority opinion in Indra Sawhney does not hold that 50% is the ceiling limit for reservation. For considering the above submission we need to notice the opinion expressed in each of the six judgments delivered in Indra Sawhney’s case. 122. Before we proceed to notice the relevant paragraphs of the judgment of Indra Sawhney, we need to first notice method of culling out the majority opinion expressed in a judgment where more than one judgments have been delivered. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Rajnarain Singh vs. Chairman, Patna Administration Committee, Patna and another, AIR 1954 SC 569, had occasion to find out the majority opinion of a seven-Judge Bench judgment delivered by this Court in Re Delhi Laws Act, 1912, Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws)Act, 1947 vs. Part ‘C’ States(Laws) Act, 1950, AIR 1951 SC 332. The Constitution Bench laid down that opinion which embodies the greatest common measures of the agreement among the Bench is to be accepted the decision of the Court. Thus, for culling out the decision of the Court in a case where there are several opinions, on which there is greatest common measure of agreement is the decision of the Court. 123. We now revert back to the judgment of Indra Sawhney to find out what is the greatest common measures of the agreement between the Judges with regard to the reservation to the extent of 50%. Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy for himself, M.H. Kania, CJ, M.N.Venkatachaliah, A.M. Ahmadi, JJ., has elaborately dealt with the extent of the reservation under Article 16(4). In paragraph 809 conclusion was recorded by the Court that reservations contemplated under Article 16(4) should not exceed 50%. In paragraph 810 it was observed that in certain extraordinary circumstances, some relaxation in this strict rule of 50% may become imperative. Paragraphs 809 and 810 are to following effect: “809. From the above discussion, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that the reservations contemplated in clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.
810. While 50% shall be the rule, it is necessary not to put out of consideration certain extraordinary situations inherent in the great diversity of this country and the people. It might happen that in far flung and remote areas the population inhabiting those areas might, on account of their being out of the mainstream of national life and in view of conditions peculiar to and characteristical to them, need to be treated in a different way, some relaxation in this strict rule may become imperative. In doing so, extreme caution is to be exercised and a special case made out.”
124. Justice S. Ratnavel Pandian while delivering a separate judgment has expressed his disagreement with the proposition of fixing the reservation for socially and educationally backward classes at 50% as a maximum limit. In paragraph 243(9) following was laid down by Justice Pandian:
“243(9) No maximum ceiling of reservation can be fixed under Article 16(4) of the Constitution for reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens “in the services under the State”. The decisions fixing the percentage of reservation only up to the maximum of 50% are unsustainable.”
125. Justice Thommen, Justice Kuldip Singh and Justice R.M. Sahai took the view that reservation in all cases should remain below 50% of total number of seats. Paragraph 323(8) of Justice Thommen’s opinion is as follows:
“323(8) Reservation in all cases must be confined to a minority of available posts or seats so as not to unduly sacrifice merits. The number of seats or posts reserved under Article 15 or Article 16 must at all times remain well below 50% of the total number of seats or posts.” 126. Justice Kuldip Singh also in paragraph 384(i) expressed his opinion in accord with Justice R.M. Sahai which is as follows:
“384(i) that the reservations under Article 16(4) must remain below 50% and under no circumstance be permitted to go beyond 50%. Any reservation beyond 50% is constitutionally invalid.” 127. Justice R.M. Sahai in paragraph 619(i) held that reservation should in no case exceed 50%. Justice T.K. Thommen, Justice Kuldip Singh and Justice R.M. Sahai delivered dissenting opinion.
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128. Now, we come to the judgment delivered by Justice P.B. Sawant who delivered concurring opinion. Two paragraphs of the judgment of Justice Sawant are relevant to notice. In paragraph 518 justice Sawant observed that there is no legal infirmity in keeping the reservations under clause(4) alone or under clause (4) and clause (1) of Article 16 together, exceeding 50%. However, validity of the extent of excess of reservations over 50% would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In the same paragraph Justice Sawant, however, observed that it would ordinarily be wise and nothing much would be lost, if the intentions of the Framers of the Constitution and the observations of Dr. Ambedkar, on the subject be kept in mind. Justice Sawant obviously referred to speech of Dr. Ambedkar dated 30.11.1948 where Dr. Ambedkar has categorically stated that reservation under Article 16(4) shall be confined to minority of seats. However, in paragraph 552 justice Sawant has recorded his answers and in answer to Question No.4 following was stated:
“552........
Question 4: Ordinarily, the reservations kept both under Article 16(1) and 16(4) together should not exceed 50 per cent of the appointments in a grade, cadre or service in any particular year. It is only for extraordinary reasons that this percentage may be exceeded. However, every excess over 50 per cent will have to be justified on valid grounds which grounds will have to be specifically made out.” 129. The above opinion of Justice Sawant is completely in accord with the opinion expressed by Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy in paragraphs 809 and 810. The opinion of Justice Sawant expressed in the above paragraph is that ordinarily, the reservations under Article 16(1) and 16(4) should not exceed 50% and it is only in extra-ordinary circumstances that this percentage may be exceeded which is also the opinion expressed by Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy. Applying the principle of Constitution Bench of this Court in Rajnarain Singh (supra), the opinion embodies the greatest common measure of agreement between the opinions expressed. Thus, the majority opinion, the ratio of judgment of Indra Sawhney as expressed by the majority is one which is expressed in paragraphs 809 and 810 of the judgment of Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy. The submission of Shri Mukul Rohtagi cannot be accepted that majority
opinion of Indra Sawhney is that 50% can be breached. The majority opinion as noted above is that normally reservation should not exceed 50% and it is only in extra-ordinary circumstances it can exceed 50%. What can be the extra-ordinary circumstances have been indicated in paragraph 810.
130. Alternatively if we again look to the opinion in all six judgments, we notice : (a)
Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy (for himself and three other Judges) held in paragraph 809 that the reservation contemplated in clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%.
(b)
Justice Thommen, Justice Kuldip Singh and Justice Sahai in their separate opinion held that reservation under Article 16(4) should not exceed 50%.
131. Thus greatest common measure of agreement in six separate judgments delivered in Indra Sawhney is that: (i)
Reservation under Article 16(4) should not exceed 50%.
(ii)
For exceeding reservation beyond 50% extraordinary circumstance as indicated in paragraph 810 of the judgment of Justice Jeevan Reddy should exist, for which extreme caution is to be exercised.
132. The above is the ratio of Indra Sawhney judgment.
133. We, thus, do not find any good ground to revisit Indra Sawhney or to refer the same to a larger Bench on the above ground urged. 134. Now, we come to the second ground pressed by Shri Rohtagi is that different Judges from 1993 till date have spoken in different voices with regard to reservation under Article 15(4) and 16(4) which is a good ground to refer Indra Sawhney to a larger Bench.
135. We may notice the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in M.R. Balaji and others vs. State of Mysore and others, AIR 1963 SC 649, in which this Court while considering Article 15(4) had laid down that reservation under Article 15(4) ordinarily, speaking generally and in a broad manner special provision should be less than 50%, how much less than 50% would depend upon the prevailing
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
circumstances in each case. The Constitution Bench in the above case was considering the challenge to order passed by the State of Mysore that 68% of the seats available for admission to the Engineering and Medical Colleges and to other technical institutions were reserved and only 32% remain available to the merit pool. The question about the extent of the special provision which would be competent to State to make under Article 15(4) was also examined by the Constitution Bench. The Constitution Bench speaking through Justice P.B. Gajendra Gadkar stated following in paragraph 34:
“34..........A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4) must be within reasonable limits. The interests of weaker sections of society which are a first charge on the States and the Centre have to be adjusted with the interests of the community as a whole. The adjustment of these competing claims is undoubtedly a difficult matter, but if under the guise of making a special provision, State reserves practically all the seats available in all the colleges, that clearly would be subverting the object of Article 15(4). In this matter again, we are reluctant to say definitely what would be a proper provision to make. Speaking generally and in a broad way, a special provision should be less than 50%; how much less than 50% would depend upon the present prevailing circumstances in each case.” 136. The Constitution Bench also after noticing the judgment of this Court in General Manager, Southern Railway, Personnel Officer(Reservation), Southern Railway vs. Rangachari, AIR 1962 SC 36, observed that what is true in regard to Article 15(4) is equally true in Article 16(4). Following observations were made in paragraph 37: “37. ….Therefore, what is true in regard to Article 15(4) is equally true in regard to Article 16(4). There can be no doubt that the Constitution-makers assumed, as they were entitled to, that while making adequate reservation under Article 16(4), care would be taken not to provide for unreasonable, excessive or extravagant reservation, for that would, by eliminating general competition in a large field and by creating wide-spread dissatisfaction amongst the employees, materially affect efficiency. Therefore, like the special provision improperly made under Article 15(4), reservation
made under Article 16(4) beyond the permissible and legitimate limits would be liable to be challenged as a fraud on the Constitution. …” 137. The reservation ought to be less than 50% was spoken in the above Constitution Bench judgment.
138. The next Constitution Bench judgment which noted the judgment in M.R. Balaji (supra) and applied the percentage of 50% on the carry forward rule is T. Devadasan. The first judgment in which a discordant note with regard to 50% limit of reservation was expressed is the judgment of this Court in State of Kerala and another vs. N.M. Thomas and others, 1976 (2) SCC 310, In the above case the Constitution Bench had occasion to examine Rule 13-AA of Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958 which empower the State to grant exemption for a specific period to any member or member belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from passing the test referred to in Rule 13 and Rule 13-A. The State of Kerala granted exemption to member of SC and ST from passing of the test, N.M. Thomas, respondent had filed writ petition in the High Court asking for declaration that the Rule 13-AA as unconstitutional. The grievance of the respondent was that by virtue of exemption granted to members of the SC they have been promoted earlier than the respondent, although they had not passed the test. The High Court allowed the writ petition against which judgment the State of Kerala had come up in appeal. The appeal was allowed and Rule 13-AA was held to be valid. The Constitution Bench judgment of the Court was delivered by Chief Justice, A.N. Ray with whom Justice K.K. Mathew, Justice M.H. Beg, Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer and Justice S. Murtaza Fazal Ali concurred by delivering separate opinions. Two Judges, namely, Justice H.R. Khanna and Justice A.C. Gupta delivered dissenting opinion. With regard to extent of reservation upto 50% only two Judges, namely, Justice Fazal Ali and Justice Krishna Iyer has expressed the opinion. Justice Beg noticed the Constitution Bench judgments of this Court in M.R. Balaji and T.Devadasan, which had held that more than 50% reservation for backward class would violate the principle of reasonableness. No opinion of his own was expressed by Justice Beg. Justice Fazal Ali also in his judgment had noted 50% ceiling of reservation but observed that the above is only rule of caution and does not exhaust all categories. In paragraph 191 Justice Fazal Ali considered the question and following was laid down:
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
“191. This means that the reservation should be within the permissible limits and should not be a cloak to fill all the posts belonging to a particular class of citizens and thus violate Article 16(1) of the Constitution indirectly. At the same time clause (4) of Article 16 does not fix any limit on the power of the Government to make reservation. Since clause (4) is a part of Article 16 of the Constitution it is manifest that the State cannot be allowed to indulge in excessive reservation so as to defeat the policy contained in Article 16(1). As to what would be a suitable reservation within permissible limits will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down, nor can this matter be reduced to a mathematical formula so as to be adhered to in all cases. Decided cases of this Court have no doubt laid down that the percentage of reservation should not exceed 50 per cent. As I read the authorities, this is, however, a rule of caution and does not exhaust all categories. Suppose for instance a State has a large number of backward classes of citizens which constitute 80 per cent of the population and the Government, in order to give them proper representation, reserves 80 per cent of the jobs for them, can it be said that the percentage of reservation is bad and violates the permissible limits of clause (4) of Article 16? The answer must necessarily be in the negative. The dominant object of this provision is to take steps to make inadequate representation adequate.”
139. Justice Krishna Iyer in paragraph 143 of the judgment expressed his concurrence with the opinion of Justice Fazal Ali that arithmetical limit of 50% in any one year set by some earlier rulings cannot perhaps be pressed too far. Following observations were made in paragraph 143: “143. ... I agree with my learned Brother Fazal Ali, J., in the view that the arithmetical limit of 50 per cent in any one year set by some earlier rulings cannot perhaps be pressed too far. Overall representation in a department does not depend on recruitment in a particular year, but the total strength of a cadre. I agree with his construction of Article 16(4) and his view about the “carry forward” rule. 140. With regard to 50% reservation limit, above are only observations made by two Hon’ble Judges in seven-Judge Constitution
Bench. It is true that Justice Fazal Ali expressed his discordant note with the ceiling of 50% but the observations as noted above were not the decision of the seven-Judge Constitution Bench judgment. 141. In T. Devadasn vs. Union of India and another, AIR 1964 SC 179, a Constitution Bench of this Court had occasion to examine the carry forward rule in a recruitment under the Union of India. This Court had noticed M.R. Balaji and held that what was laid down in M.R. Balaji would apply in the above case. Referring to M.R. Balaji following was laid down in paragraph 16 to the following effect: “16. The startling effect of the carry forward rule as modified in 1955 would be apparent if in the illustration which we have taken there were in the third year 50 total vacancies instead of 100. Out of these 50 vacancies 9 would be reserved for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, adding to that, the 36 carried forward from the two previous years, we would have a total of 45 reserved vacancies out of 50, that is, a percentage of 90. In the case before us 45 vacancies have actually been filled out of which 29 have gone to members of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes on the basis of reservation permitted by the carry forward rule. This comes to about 64.4% of reservation. Such being the result of the operation of the carry forward rule we must, on the basis of the decision in Balaji case [AIR 1963 SC 649] hold that the rule is bad. Indeed, even in General Manager Southern Railway v. Rangachari [(1962) 2 SCR 586] which is a case in which reservation of vacancies to be filled by promotion was upheld by this Court, Gajendragadkar, J., who delivered the majority judgment observed: “It is also true that the reservation which can be made under Article 16(4) is intended merely to give adequate representation to backward communities. It cannot be used for creating monopolies or for unduly or illegitimately disturbing the legitimate interests of other employees. In exercising the powers under Article 16(4) the problem of adequate representation of the backward class of citizens must be fairly and objectively considered and an attempt must always be made to strike a reasonable balance between the claims of backward classes and the claims of other employees as well as the important consideration of the efficiency of administration;….”
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
It is clear from both these decisions that the problem of giving adequate representation to members of backward classes enjoined by Article 16(4) of the Constitution is not to be tackled by framing a general rule without bearing in mind its repercussions from year to year. What precise method should be adopted for this purpose is a matter for the Government to consider. It is enough for us to say that while any method can be evolved by the Government it must strike “a reasonable balance between the claims of the backward classes and claims of other employees” as pointed out in Balaji case [AIR 1963 SC 649].”
142. In the above case Justice Subba Rao has expressed dissenting opinion. Justice Subba Rao observed that what was held in M.R. Balaji cannot be applied in the case of reservation of appointment in the matter of recruitment. Following observation was made by Justice Subba Rao in paragraph 30: “30. In the instant case, the State made a provision; adopting the principle of “carry forward”. Instead of fixing a higher percentage in the second and third selections based upon the earlier results, it directed that the vacancies reserved in one selection for the said Castes and Tribes but not filled up by them but filled up by other candidates, should be added to the quota fixed for the said Castes and Tribes in the next selection and likewise in the succeeding selection. As the posts reserved in the first year for the said Castes and Tribes were filled up by non-Scheduled Caste and non-Scheduled Tribe applicants, the result was that in the next selection the posts available to the latter was proportionately reduced. This provision certainly caused hardship to the individuals who applied for the second or the third selection, as the case may be, though the non-Scheduled Castes and non-Scheduled Tribes, taken as one unit, were benefited in the earlier selection or selections. This injustice to individuals, which is inherent in any scheme of reservation cannot, in my view, make the provision for reservation nonetheless a provision for reservation.” 143. In Akhil Bharatiya Sochit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) Represented by its Assistant General Secretary on behalf of the Association vs. Union of India and others, (1981) 1 SCC 246, Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy observed that there is no fixed ceiling to reservation or preferential treatment to the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes though generally reservation may not be far in excess of 50%. Following words were spoken in paragraph 135: “135. There is no fixed ceiling to reservation or preferential treatment in favour of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes though generally reservation may not be far in excess of fifty per cent. There is no rigidity about the fifty per cent rule which is only a convenient guideline laid down by Judges. 144. In K.C. Vasanth Kumar and another vs. State of Karnata, 1985 (Supp) SCC 714, O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. after noticing the Balaji observed that percentage of reservations is not a matter upon which a court may pronounce with no material at hand. Following observations were made by Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy in paragraph 57: “57. The Balaji [M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 649,Court then considered the question of the extent of the special provision which the State would be competent to make under Article 15(4). …… We should think that that is a matter for experts in management and administration. There might be posts or technical courses for which only the best can be admitted and others might be posts and technical courses for which a minimum qualification would also serve. The percentage of reservations is not a matter upon which a court may pronounce with no material at hand. For a court to say that reservations should not exceed 40 per cent 50 per cent or 60 per cent, would be arbitrary and the Constitution does not permit us to be arbitrary. Though in the Balaji case [M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 649 : 1963 Supp (1) SCR 439] , the Court thought that generally and in a broad way a special provision should be less than 50 per cent, and how much less than 50 per cent would depend upon the relevant prevailing circumstances in each case, the Court confessed: “In this matter again, we are reluctant to say definitely what would be a proper provision to make.” All that the Court would finally say was that in the circumstances of the case before them, a reservation of 68 per cent was inconsistent with Article 15(4) of the Constitution. We are not prepared to read Balaji [M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 649 : 1963 Supp (1) SCR 439] as arbitrarily laying down 50 per cent as the outer limit of reservation. …… (emphasis supplied)”
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
145. In the same judgment of K.C. Vasanth, Justice E.S. Venkataramiah has expressed a contrary opinion to one which was expressed by Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy in paragraph 149. Justice Venkataramiah held that 50% rule has not been unsettled by the majority in N.M. Thomas. In paragraph 149 following was laid down: “149. After carefully going through all the seven opinions in the above case, it is difficult to hold that the settled view of this Court that the reservation under Article 15(4) or Article 16(4) could not be more than 50% has been unsettled by a majority on the Bench which decided this case.” 146. The reference of Judges, who spoke in different voices are the judgments as noted above. It is relevant to notice that neither in N.M. Thomas nor in K C Basant case the decision of the Court was to disapprove 50% ceiling as fixed by M.R. Balaji. It is although true that Justice Fazal Ali, Justice O.Chinnappa Reddy and Justice Krishna Iyer have expressed their doubt about the advisability of 50% rule. Another judgment which has been referred to is the judgment of this Court in State of Punjab and Hira Lal and others, 1970(3) SCC 567, where K.S.Hegde, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench had observed that the question of reservation to be made is primarily matter for the State to decide. However, no observation was made by Justice Hegde in the above case regarding M.R. Balaji case. 147. The judgment of this Court in N.M. Thomas, Akhil Bharatiya Karamchari Sangh and State of Punjab and even dissenting judgment of Justice Krishna Iyer in Devadasan and Akhil Bharatiya Kaamchari Sangh have been referred to and considered by nine-Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in Indra Sawhney. In Indra Sawhney, Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy while considering the question No.6 noted M.R. Balaji, Devadasan, N.M. Thomas and concluded that reservation contemplated in clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%. After considering all the above cases which according to Shri Rohtagi are discordant notes, a larger nine-Judge Constitution Bench having held that the reservation contemplated in clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50% of earlier doubt raised by the Judges as noted above cannot be relied any further. The larger Bench in Indra Sawhney has settled the law after considering all earlier decisions of this Court as well as reliance of opinion of few Judges as noted and as relied by Shri Rohtagi is of no avail and cannot furnish any ground to refer judgment of Indra Sawhney to a larger Bench.
148. One more judgment delivered after Indra Sawhney has been relied by Shri Rohtagi that is S.V. Joshi and others vs. State of Karnataka and others, (2012) 7 SCC 41. Shri Rohtagi submits that this Court in S.V. Joshi in paragraph 4 referring to M.Nagaraj vs. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212, held if a State wants to exceed 50% reservation, then it is required to base its decision on the quantifiable data. In paragraph 4 following was laid down: “4. Subsequent to the filing of the above writ petitions, Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution have been amended vide the Constitution (Ninety-third Amendment) Act, 2005, and the Constitution (Eighty-first Amendment) Act, 2000, respectively, which Amendment Acts have been the subject-matter of subsequent decisions of this Court in M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 212, and Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India [(2008) 6 SCC 1] in which, inter alia, it has been laid down that if a State wants to exceed fifty per cent reservation, then it is required to base its decision on the quantifiable data. In the present case, this exercise has not been done.” 149. The observation was made in paragraph 4, as noted above, that the Constitution Bench in M. Nagaraj has laid down that if a State wants to exceed 50% reservation, then it is required to base its decision on a quantifiable data, which is clear misreading of judgment of the Constitution Bench in M. Nagaraj. In M. Nagaraj, the Constitution Bench has not laid down any proposition to the effect that if a State wants to exceed 50% reservation, then it is required to base its decision on the quantifiable data. To the contrary the Constitution Bench of this Court in M. Nagaraj has reiterated the numerical bench mark like 50% rule in Indra Sawhney’s case. Following observation was made by the Constitution Bench in paragraphs 120 and 122: “120......In addition to the above requirements this Court in Indra Sawhney [1992 Supp (3) SCC 217] has evolved numerical benchmarks like ceiling limit of 50% based on postspecific roster coupled with the concept of replacement to provide immunity against the charge of discrimination. 122. We reiterate that the ceiling limit of 50%, the concept of creamy layer and the compelling reasons, namely, backwardness, inadequacy of representation and overall administrative efficiency
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are all constitutional requirements without which the structure of equality of opportunity in Article 16 would collapse.”
150. The Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Ashok Kumar Thakur has also not laid down any proposition which has been referred in paragraph 4 of S.V. Joshi. This Court’s judgment of threeJudge Bench in S.V. Joshi case does not support the contention of Shri Rohtagi.
151. In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any substance in the second ground of Shri Rohtagi that this Court’s judgment of Indra Sawhney to be referred to a larger Bench. 152. The judgment of Indra Sawhney has been followed by this Court in a number of cases including at least in the following four Constitution Bench judgments: (1)
Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education & Research, Chandigarh and others vs. Faculty Association and others;
(2)
M. Nagaraj and others vs. Union of India and others, 2006(8) SCC 212;
(3)
Krishna Murthy (Dr.) and others vs. Union of India and anoter 2010 (7) SCC 202
Which judgment though was considering reservation under Article 243D and 243T has applied 50% ceiling as laid down in Balaji. (4)
The Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Chebrolu Leela Prasad Rao & Ors. vs. State of A.P. & Ors., 2020(7) Scale 162, reiterated the principle as referred and reiterated that outer limit is 50% as specified in Indra Sawhney’s case.
153. We move to ground Nos.3 and 4 as formulated by Shri Mukul Rohtagi to make a reference to the larger Bench.
154. The Constitution, the paramount law of the country has given to the Indian citizens the basic freedom and equality which are meant to be lasting and permanent. The Constitution of India is the vehicle by which the goals set out in it are to be achieved. The right from primitive society upto the organised nations the most cherished right which all
human beings sought was the right to equality. The Preamble of our Constitution reflects a deep deliberations and precision in choosing ideal and aspirations of people which shall guide all those who have to govern. Equality of status and opportunity is one of the noble objectives of the framers of the Constitution. The doctrine of equality before law is part of rule of law which pervades the Indian Constitution. Justice Y.V. Chandrachud in Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi vs. Raj Narain, (1975) Supp. SCC 1 has referred to equality of status and opportunity as forming part of the basic structure of the Constitution. In paragraph 664 following was observed: “664. I consider it beyond the pale of reasonable controversy that if there be any unamendable features of the Constitution on the score that they form a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, they are that: (i) Indian sovereign democratic republic; (ii) Equality of status and opportunity shall be secured to all its citizens; (iii) The State shall have no religion of its own and all persons shall be equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion and that (iv) the nation oil all be governed by a Government of laws, not of men. These, in my opinion, are the pillars of our constitutional philosophy, the pillars, therefore, of the basic structure of the Constitution.” 155. Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution which are facets of right of equality were incorporated as fundamental rights to translate the ideals and objectives of the Constitution and to give opportunities to the backward class of the society so as to enable them to catch up those who are ahead of them. Article 15(1) and Article 16(1) of the Constitution are the provisions engrafted to realise substantive equality where Articles 15(4) and 16(4) are to realise the protective equality. Articles 15(1) and 16(1) are the fundamental rights of the citizens whereas Articles 15(4) and 16(4) are the obligations of the States. Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy in Indra Sawhney in paragraph 641 has said that the equality has been single greatest craving of all human beings at all points of time. For finding out the objectives and the intention of the framers of the Constitution we need to refer to Constituent Assembly debates on draft Article 10 (Article 16 of the Constitution) held on 30.11.1948 (Book 2 Volume No,VII), Dr. Ambedkar’s reply on draft Article 10 has been referred to and quoted in all six judgments delivered in Indra Sahwney
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case. What was the objective of Article 10, 10(1) and 10(3) has been explained by Dr. Ambedkar which speech has been time and again referred to remind us the objective of the above fundamental right.
156. Dr. Ambedkar referred to Article 10(1) as a generic principle. Dr. Ambedkar observed that if the reservation is to be consistent on the sub-clause (1) of Article 10 it must confine to the reservation of minority of seats. Following are the part of speech of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly: “ If honourable Members will bear these facts in mind— the three principles, we had to reconcile,—they will see that no better formula could be produced than the one that is embodied in sub-clause (3) of article 10 of the Constitution; they will find that the view of those who believe and hold that there shall be equality of opportunity, has been embodied in sub-clause (1) of Article 10. It is a generic principle. At the same time, as I said, we had to reconcile this formula with the demand made by certain communities that the administration which has now—for historical reasons—been controlled by one community or a few communities, that situation should disappear and that the others also must have an opportunity of getting into the public services. Supposing, for instance, we were to concede in full the demand of those communities who have not been so far employed in the public services to the fullest extent, what would really happen is, we shall be completely destroying the first proposition upon which we are all agreed, namely, that there shall be an equality of opportunity. Let me give an illustration. Supposing, for instance, reservations were made for a community or a collection of communities, the total of which came to something like 70 per cent. of the total posts under the State and only 30 per cent. are retained as the unreserved. Could anybody say that the reservation of 30 per cent. as open to general competition would be satisfactory from the point of view of giving effect to the first principle, namely, that there shall be equality of opportunity? It cannot be in my judgment. Therefore the seats to be reserved, if the reservation is to be consistent with sub-clause (1) of Article 10, must be confined to a minority of seats. It is then only that the first principle could find its place in the Constitution and effective in operation.”
157. The above views of Dr. Ambedkar expressed in the Constituent Assembly for balancing the draft Articles 10(1) and 10(3) equivalent to Articles 16 and 16(4) have been referred to and relied by this Court in Indra Sawhney as well as in other cases. 158. Shri Rohtagi submits that this Court in Balaji has held subclause (4) of Article 16 as exception to Article 16(1) which was the premise for fixing 50%. In N.M. Thomas and Indra Sawhney now it is held that Article 16 sub-clause (4) is not exception to Article 16(1), the submission is that in view of the above holding in N.M. Thomas and Indra Sawhney the ceiling of 50% has to go. It is true that seven-Judge Constitution Bench in N.M. Thomas held that Article 16(4) is not an exception to Article 16(1) which was noticed in paragraph 713 of the judgment of Indra Sawhney. Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy in paragraph 733 said “At this stage, we see to clarify one particular aspect. Article 16(1) is a facet of Article 14, just as Article 14 permits reasonable classification, so does Article 16(1)”. In paragraph 741 following was laid down: “741. ....In our respectful opinion, the view taken by the majority in Thomas [(1976) 2 SCC 310, 380] is the correct one. We too believe that Article 16(1) does permit reasonable classification for ensuring attainment of the equality of opportunity assured by it. For assuring equality of opportunity, it may well be necessary in certain situations to treat unequally situated persons unequally. Not doing so, would perpetuate and accentuate inequality. Article 16(4) is an instance of such classification, put in to place the matter beyond controversy. The “backward class of citizens” are classified as a separate category deserving a special treatment in the nature of reservation of appointments/posts in the services of the State. Accordingly, we hold that clause (4) of Article 16 is not exception to clause (1) of Article 16. It is an instance of classification implicit in and permitted by clause (1)......” 159. As laid down by the Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney, we proceed on the premise that Article 16(4) is not an exception to Article 16(1). It is also held that Article 16(4) is a facet to Article 16(1) and permits reasonable classification as is permitted by Article 14. 160. In Balaji, the Constitution Bench did not base its decision only on the observation that Article 15(4) is exception and proviso to
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Article 15(1). Article 15(4) was referred to as a special provision. In paragraph 34 of Balaji it is also laid down that special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts by Article 16(4) must be within the reasonable limitation. We again quote the relevant observation from paragraph 34:
“34. ...That is not to say that reservation should not be adopted; reservation should and must be adopted to advance the prospects of the weaker sections of society, but in providing for special measures in that behalf care should be taken not to exclude admission to higher educational centres to deserving and qualified candidates of other communities. A special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4) must be within reasonable limits. The interests of weaker sections of society which are a first charge on the States and the Centre have to be adjusted with the interests of the community as a whole. The adjustment of these competing claims is undoubtedly a difficult matter, but if under the guise of making a special provision, a State reserves practically all the seats available in all the colleges, that clearly would be subverting the object of Article 15(4). In this matter again, we are reluctant to say definitely what would be a proper provision to make. Speaking generally and in a broad way, a special provision should be less than 50%; how much less than 50% would depend upon the present prevailing circumstances in each case...”
161. Both Shri Mukul Rohtagi and Shri Kapil Sibal submits that constitutional provisions contained in Articles 15 and 16 do not permit laying down any percentage in measures to be taken under Articles 15(4) and 16(4). It is submitted that fixation of percentage of 50% cannot be said to be constitutional. We need to answer the question from where does 50% rule come from? 162. The 50% rule spoken in Balaji and affirmed in Indra Sawhneyis to fulfill the objective of equality as engrafted in Article 14 of which Articles 15 and 16 are facets. The Indra Sawhney itself gives answer of the question. In paragraph 807 of Indra Sawhney held that what is more reasonable than to say that reservation under clause (4) shall not exceed 50% of the appointment. 50% has been said to be reasonable and it is to attain the objective of equality. In paragraph 807 Justice Jeevan Reddy states:
“807. We must, however, point out that clause (4) speaks of adequate representation and not proportionate representation. Adequate representation cannot be read as proportionate representation. Principle of proportionate representation is accepted only in Articles 330 and 332 of the Constitution and that too for a limited period. These articles speak of reservation of seats in Lok Sabha and the State legislatures in favour of Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes proportionate to their population, but they are only temporary and special provisions. It is therefore not possible to accept the theory of proportionate representation though the proportion of population of backward classes to the total population would certainly be relevant. Just as every power must be exercised reasonably and fairly, the power conferred by clause (4) of Article 16 should also be exercised in a fair manner and within reasonable limits — and what is more reasonable than to say that reservation under clause (4) shall not exceed 50% of the appointments or posts, barring certain extraordinary situations as explained hereinafter. From this point of view, the 27% reservation provided by the impugned Memorandums in favour of backward classes is well within the reasonable limits. Together with reservation in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, it comes to a total of 49.5%. In this connection, reference may be had to the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in V. Narayana Rao v. State of A.P. [AIR 1987 AP 53 : 1987 Lab IC 152 : (1986) 2 Andh LT 258] , striking down the enhancement of reservation from 25% to 44% for OBCs. The said enhancement had the effect of taking the total reservation under Article 16(4) to 65%.” 163. In paragraph 808, Justice Jeevan Reddy referred to speech of Dr. Ambedkar where he said that the reservation should be confined (to a minority of seats). The expression minority of seats”. When translated into figure the expression less than 50% comes into operation.
164. To change the 50% limit is to have a society which is not founded on equality but based on caste rule. The democracy is an essential feature of our Constitution and part of our basic structure. If the reservation goes above 50% limit which is a reasonable, it will be slippery slope, the political pressure, make it hardly to reduce the same. Thus, answer to the question posed is that the percentage of 50% has been
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arrived at on the principle of reasonability and achieves equality as enshrined by Article 14 of which Articles 15 and 16 are facets.
165. We may notice one more submission of Shri Rohtagi in the above context. Shri Rohtagi submits that the Constitution of India is a living document, ideas cannot remain frozen, even the thinking of the framers of the Constitution cannot remain frozen for time immemorial. Shri Rohtagi submits that due to change in need of the society the law should change. 166. Justice J.M. Shalet and Justice K.N. Grover,JJ. Speaking in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru vs. State of Kerala and another, (1973) 4 SCC 225, laid down following in paragraph 482 and 634: “482. These petitions which have been argued for a very long time raise momentus issues of great constitutional importance. Our Constitution is unique, apart from being the longest in the world. It is meant for the second largest population with diverse people speaking different languages and professing varying religions. It was chiselled and shaped by great political leaders and legal luminaries, most of whom had taken an active part in the struggle for freedom from the British yoke and who knew what domination of a foreign rule meant in the way of deprivation of basic freedoms and from the point of view of exploitation of the millions of Indians. The Constitution is an organic document which must grow and it must take stock of the vast socio-economic problems, particularly, of improving the lot of the common man consistent with his dignity and the unity of the nation. 634. Every Constitution is expected to endure for a long time. Therefore, it must necessarily be elastic. It is not possible to place the society in a straightjacket. The society grows, its requirements change. The Constitution and the laws may have to be changed to suit those needs. No single generation can bind the course of the generation to come. Hence every Constitution, wisely drawn up, provides for its own amendment.”
167. Shri Rohtagi has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in K.S. Puttaswamy and another vs. Union of India and others, 2017(10) SCC 1, wherein in paragraph 476 following was laid down:
“476. However, the learned Attorney General has argued in support of the eight-Judge Bench and the six-Judge Bench, stating that the Framers of the Constitution expressly rejected the right to privacy being made part of the fundamental rights chapter of the Constitution. While he may be right, Constituent Assembly Debates make interesting reading only to show us what exactly the Framers had in mind when they framed the Constitution of India. As will be pointed out later in this judgment, our judgments expressly recognise that the Constitution governs the lives of 125 crore citizens of this country and must be interpreted to respond to the changing needs of society at different points in time.” 168. Another judgment relied by Shri Rohtagi is in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association and others vs. Union of India, 1993(4) SCC 441, wherein in paragraph 16 following has been laid down: “16. The proposition that the provisions of the Constitution must be confined only to the interpretation which the Framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time would have placed upon them is not acceptable and is liable to be rejected for more than one reason — firstly, some of the current issues could not have been foreseen; secondly, others would not have been discussed and thirdly, still others may be left over as controversial issues, i.e. termed as deferred issues with conflicting intentions. Beyond these reasons, it is not easy or possible to decipher as to what were the factors that influenced the mind of the Framers at the time of framing the Constitution when it is juxtaposed to the present time. The inevitable truth is that law is not static and immutable but ever increasingly dynamic and grows with the ongoing passage of time.” 169. The time fleets, generations grow, society changes, values and needs also change by time. There can be no denial that law should change with the changing time and changing needs of the society. However, the proposition of law as noted above does not render any help to the submission of Shri Rohtagi that in view of needs of the society which are changing 50% rule should be given up. 170. The constitutional measures of providing reservation, giving concessions and other benefits to backward classes including socially
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and educationally backward class are all affirmative measures. We have completed more than 73 years of independence, the Maharashtra is one of the developed States in the country which has highest share in the country’s GST i.e. 16%, higher share in Direct Taxes-38% and higher contribution to country’s GDP, 38.88%. The goal of the Constitution framers was to bring a caste-less society. The directive principles of the State Policy cast onerous obligation on the States to promote welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may social order in which social justice, economic and political shall inform all the institutions of the national life. Providing reservation for advancement of any socially and educationally backward class in public services is not the only means and method for improving the welfare of backward class. The State ought to bring other measures including providing educational facilities to the members of backward class free of cost, giving concession in fee, providing opportunities for skill development to enable the candidates from the backward class to be self- reliant.
171. We recall the observation made by Justice R.V. Raveendran in Ashoka Kumar Thakur vs. Union of India and others, 2008(6) SCC 1, where His Lordship held that any provision for reservation is a temporary crutch, such crutch by unnecessary prolonged use, should not become a permanent liability. In words of Justice Raveendran paragraph 666 is as follows:
“666. Caste has divided this country for ages. It has hampered its growth. To have a casteless society will be realisation of a noble dream. To start with, the effect of reservation may appear to perpetuate caste. The immediate effect of caste-based reservation has been rather unfortunate. In the pre-reservation era people wanted to get rid of the backward tag—either social or economical. But post reservation, there is a tendency even among those who are considered as “forward”, to seek the “backward” tag, in the hope of enjoying the benefits of reservations. When more and more people aspire for “backwardness” instead of “forwardness” the country itself stagnates. Be that as it may. Reservation as an affirmative action is required only for a limited period to bring forward the socially and educationally backward classes by giving them a gentle supportive push. But if there is no review after a reasonable period and if reservation is continued, the country will become a caste
divided society permanently. Instead of developing a united society with diversity, we will end up as a fractured society forever suspicious of each other. While affirmative discrimination is a road to equality, care should be taken that the road does not become a rut in which the vehicle of progress gets entrenched and stuck. Any provision for reservation is a temporary crutch. Such crutch by unnecessary prolonged use, should not become a permanent liability. It is significant that the Constitution does not specifically prescribe a casteless society nor tries to abolish caste. But by barring discrimination in the name of caste and by providing for affirmative action Constitution seeks to remove the difference in status on the basis of caste. When the differences in status among castes are removed, all castes will become equal. That will be a beginning for a casteless egalitarian society.” 172. We have no doubt that all Governments take measures to improve the welfare of weaker sections of the society but looking to the increased requirement of providing education including higher education to more and more sections of society other means and measures have to be forged. In view of the privatisation and liberalisation of the economy public employment is not sufficient to cater the needs of all. More avenues for providing opportunities to members of the weaker sections of the society and backward class to develop skills for employment not necessary the public service. The objectives engrafted in our Constituted and ideals set by the Constitution for the society and the Governments are still not achieved and have to be pursued. There can be no quarrel that society changes, law changes, people changes but that does not mean that something which is good and proven to be beneficial in maintaining equality in the society should also be changed in the name of change alone. 173. In Ashoka Kumar Thakur vs. Union of India, (supra), Justice Dalveer Bhandari has also laid down that the balance should be struck to ensure that reservation would remain reasonable. We are of the considered opinion that the cap on percentage of reservation as has been laid down by Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney is with the object of striking a balance between the rights under Article 15(1) and 15(4) as well as Articles 16(1) and 16(4). The cap on percentage is to achieve principle of equality and with the object to strike a balance which cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable.
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174. The judgment of Indra Sawhney is being followed for more than a quarter century without there being any doubt raised in any of the judgments about the 50%, the 50% rule has been repeatedly followed.
175. We may notice one more aspect in the above respect. Granville Austin in “The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation” while discussing the topic “The judiciary and the social revolution” states: “The members of the Constituent Assembly brought to the framing of the Judicial provisions of the Constitution an idealism equalled only by that shown towards the Fundamental Rights. Indeed, the Judiciary was seen as an extension of the Rights, for it was the courts that would give the Rights force. The Judiciary was to be an arm of the social revolution, upholding the equality that Indians and longed for during colonial days, but had not gained-not simply because the regime was colonial, and perforce repressive, but largely because the British had feared that social change would endanger their rule.”
176. The Constitution enjoins a constitutional duty to interpret and protect the Constitution. This Court is guardian of the Constitution. 177. We may also quote Justice Mathew, in Keshavananda Bharati (Supra), where he reiterated that judicial function is both creation and application of law. The principle of Indra Sawhney is both creation application of law. In paragraph, 1705, Justice Mathew says: “1705. The judicial function is, like legislation, both creation and application of law. The judicial function is ordinarily determined by the general norms both as to procedure and as to the contents of the norm to be created, whereas legislation is usually determined by the Constitution only in the former respect. But that is a difference in degree only. From a dynamic point of view, the individual norm created by the judicial decision is a stage in a process beginning with the establishment of the first Constitution, continued by legislation and customs, and leading to the judicial decisions. The Court not merely formulates already existing law although it is generally asserted to be so. It does not only ‘seek’ and ‘find’ the law existing previous to its decision, it does not merely pronounce the law which exists ready and finished prior to its pronouncement. Both in establishing the presence of the
conditions and in stipulating the sanction, the judicial decision has a constitutive character. The law-creating function of the courts is especially manifest when the judicial decision has the character of a precedent, and that means when the judicial decision creates a general norm. Where the courts are entitled not only to apply pre-existing substantive law in their decisions, but also to create new law for concrete cases, there is a comprehensible inclination to give these judicial decisions the character of precedents. Within such a legal system, courts are legislative organs in exactly the same sense as the organ which is called the legislator in the narrower and ordinary sense of the term…”” 178. In All India Reporter Karamchari Sangh and others vs. All India Reporter Limited and others, 1988 Supp SCC 472, a three-Judge Bench speaking through Justice Venkataramiah held that the decisions of the Supreme Court which is a Court of record, constitute a source of law apart from being a binding precedent under Article 141. Following was laid down in paragraph 11: “11. .... Article 141 of the Constitution provides that the law declared by Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. Even apart from Article 141 of the Constitution the decisions of the Supreme Court, which is a court of record, constitute a source of law as they are the judicial precedents of the highest court of the land. ….” 179. This Court again in Nand Kishore vs. State of Punjab, 1995(6) SCC 614, laid down that under Article 141 law declared by this Court is of a binding character and as commandful as the law made by legislative body or authorized delegate of such body. In paragraph 17 following was laid down: “17. …Their Lordships’ decisions declare the existing law but do not enact any fresh law”, is not in keeping with the plenary function of the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution, for the Court is not merely the interpreter of the law as existing but much beyond that. The Court as a wing of the State is by itself a source of law. The law is what the Court says it is. Patently the High Court fell into an error in its appreciation of the role of this Court.” 180. When the Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney held that 50% is upper limit of reservation under Article 16(4), it is the law which is binding under Article 141 and to be implemented.
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181. The submission of Shri Kapil Sibal that the judgment of Indra Sawhney is shackle to the legislature in enacting the law does not commend us. When the law is laid down by this Court that reservation ought not to exceed 50% except in extra-ordinary circumstances all authorities including legislature and executive are bound by the said law. There is no question of putting any shackle. It is the law which is binding on all. 182. This Court has laid down in a large number of cases that reservation in super-specialties and higher technical and in disciplines like atomic research etc. are not to be given which is law developed in the national interest. In paragraph 838, Indra Sawhney has noticed certain posts where reservations are not conducive in public interest and the national interest. Following has been held in paragraph 838: “838. While on Article 335, we are of the opinion that there are certain services and positions where either on account of the nature of duties attached to them or the level (in the hierarchy) at which they obtain, merit as explained hereinabove, alone counts. In such situations, it may not be advisable to provide for reservations. For example, technical posts in research and development organisations/departments/ institutions, in specialities and super-specialities in medicine, engineering and other such courses in physical sciences and mathematics, in defence services and in the establishments connected therewith. Similarly, in the case of posts at the higher echelons e.g., Professors (in Education), Pilots in Indian Airlines and Air India, Scientists and Technicians in nuclear and space application, provision for reservation would not be advisable.” 182(a). If we accept the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent to the logical extent that since there is no indication in Articles 15 and 16 certain posts cannot be reserved, no such exclusion could have been made. The law as existing today is one which has been laid down in Indra Sawhney in paragraph 838 which is a law spelt out from the constitutional provisions including Article 15 and 16. 183. What has been laid down by the Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney in paragraphs 839, 840 and 859(8) is law declared by this Court and is to be implemented also by all concerned. The Parliament has passed the Central Educational Institutions Reservation and Appointment Act, 2006 providing for reservation- 15% for SC, 7-1/2%,
15%, 27% for other classes in Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006. Section 4 provides that Act not to apply in certain cases which is to the following effect: “Section 4 of the Act specifically says that the provisions of Section 3 shall (sic/not) apply to certain institutions. Section 4 reads as under: “4. Act not to apply in certain cases.—The provisions of Section 3 of this Act shall not apply to— (a) a Central Educational Institution established in the tribal areas referred to in the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution;
(b) the institutions of excellence, research institutions, institutions of national and strategic importance specified in the Schedule to this Act: Provided that the Central Government may, as and when considered necessary, by notification in the Official Gazette, amend the Schedule; (c) a Minority Educational Institution as defined in this Act;
(d) a course or programme at high levels of specialisation, including at the post-doctoral level, within any branch or study or faculty, which the Central Government may, in consultation with the appropriate authority, specify.” 184. Exclusion of reservation in above Parliamentary enactment clearly indicates that law declared by Indra Sawhney in paragraphs 839, 840 and 859 as noted above is being understood as a law and being implemented, this reinforces our view that ceiling limit of 50% for reservation as approved by Indra Sawhney’s case is a law within the meaning of Article 141 and is to be implemented by all concerned. 185. In view of the above discussion, ground Nos. 3 and 4 as urged by Shri Mukul Rohtagi do not furnish any ground to review Indra Sawhney or to refer the said judgment to the larger Constitution Bench. REASON NO. 5 186. Shri Rohtagi submits that Indra Sawhney judgment being judgment on Article 16(4), its ratio cannot be applied with regard to Article 15(4). Justice Jeevan Reddy before proceeding to answer the
DR. JAISHRI LAXMANRAO PATIL v. THE CHIEF MINISTER & ANR. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
questions framed clearly observed that the debates of the Constituent Assembly on Article 16 and the decision of this Court on Articles 15 and 16 and few decisions of US Supreme Court are helpful. The observations of the Court that decision of this Court on Article 16 and Article 15 are helpful clearly indicate that principles which have been discerned for interpreting Article 16 may also be relevant for interpretation of Article 15. Justice Jeevan Reddy has noted two early cases on Article 15 namely The State of Madras versus Champakam Dorairajan, AIR 1951 SC 226 and B.Venkataramana versus State of Tamil Nadu and Another, AIR 1951 SC 229. Justice Jeevan Reddy in paragraph 757 has observed that although Balaji was not a case arising under Article 16(4) but what is said about Article 15(4) came to be accepted as equally good and valid for the purposes of Article 16(4). Justice Jeevan Reddy said in paragraph 757:-
“757. Though Balaji was not a case arising under Article 16(4), what it said about Article 15(4) came to be accepted as equally good and valid for the purpose of Article 16(4). The formulations enunciated with respect to Article 15(4) were, without question, applied and adopted in cases arising under Article 16(4). It is, therefore, necessary to notice precisely the formulations in Balaji relevant in this behalf. ... (underlined by us)”
187. It was further held in paragraph 808 that clause (4) of Article 16 is a means of achieving the objective of equality and it is nothing but reinstatement of principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The relevant observation by Justice Jeevan Reddy in paragraph 808 is as follows: “808. It needs no emphasis to say that the principle aim of Article 14 and 16 is equality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision - though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provisions have to be harmonised keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) -conceived in the interest of certain sections of society - should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. It is relevant to point out that Dr.
Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being “confined to a minority of seats” (See his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in para 28). No other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. It is, thus clear that reservation of a majority of seats was never envisaged by the founding fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept. (underlined by us)”
188. Clause (4) of Article 15 is also a special provision which is nothing but reinstatement of the principles of equality enshrined in Article 14. The principles which have been laid down in paragraph 808 with respect to Article 16(4) are clearly applicable with regard to Article 15(4) also. In the majority judgment of this Court in Indra Sawhney, the Balaji principle i.e. the 50 percent rule has been approved and not departed with. The 50 percent principle which was initially spoken of in Balaji having been approved in Indra Sawhney. We failed to see as to how prepositions laid down by this Court in Indra Sawhney shall not be applicable for Article 15. It has been laid down in Indra Sawhney that expression “Backward Class” used in Article 16(4) is wider that the expression “Socially and Educationally Backward Class” used in Article 15(5). 189. We thus do not find any substance in submissions of Mukul Rohtagi that the judgment of this Court in Indra Sawhney need not be applied in reference to Article 15. REASON -6
190. Shri Rohtagi submits that in Indra Sawhney judgment, the impact of Directive Principles of State Policy such as Article 39(b)(c) and Article 46 have not been considered while interpreting Article 14, 16(1) and 16(4). The Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in Part-IV of the Constitution are fundamental in governance of the country. The State while framing its policy, legislation, had to take measures to give effect to the Constitutional Objective as contained in Part-IV of the Constitution. The Fundamental Rights are rights which the Constitution guarantees to the Citizen whereas Part-IV of the Constitution is the obligation of the State which it has to discharge for securing Constitutional objective. In the most celebrated judgment of this Court i.e. Keshavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru and others versus State of
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Kerala and another, (1973) 4 SCC 225, in several of the opinions, the Part-III and Part-IV of the Constitution has been dealt with. Chief Justice S.M. Sikri,in paragraph 147 of the judgment, stated that: -
“147. It is impossible to equate the directive principles with fundamental rights though it cannot be denied that they are very important. But to say that the directive principles give a directive to take away fundamental rights in order to achieve what is directed by the directive principles seems to me a contradiction in terms.”
191. In the same judgment, Justice Hegde and Mukherjea J.J, held that Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy constitute the conscience of our Constitution. Following was stated in paragraph 712: -
“712. No one can deny the importance of the Directive Principles. The Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles constitute the ‘conscience’ of our Constitution. The purpose of the Fundamental Rights is to create an egalitarian society, to free all citizens from coercion or restriction by society and to make liberty available for all. The purpose of the Directive Principles is to fix certain social and economic goals for immediate attainment by bringing about a non-violent social revolution. Through such a social revolution the Constitution seeks to fulfil the basic needs of the common man and to change the structure of bur society. It aims at making the Indian masses free in the positive sense.” 192. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Minerva Mills limited and others versus Union of India and others, (1980) 3 SCC 625, has also elaborately dealt both Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy. The question which arose before the Constitution bench in context of Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy was noticed by Justice Chandrachud, C.J., in paragraph 40 as:“40. The main controversy in these petitions centres round the question whether the directive principles of State policy contained in Part IV can have primacy over the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. That is the heart of the matter. Every other consideration and all other contentions are in the nature of by-products of that central theme of the case. The competing
claims of parts III and IV constitute the pivotal point of the case because, Article 31C as amended by section 4 of the 42nd Amendment provides in terms that a law giving effect to any directive principle cannot be challenged as void on the ground that it violates the rights conferred by Article 14 or The 42nd Amendment by its section 4 thus subordinates the fundamental rights conferred by Articles 14 and 19 to the directive principles.” 193. It was held that both Part-III and Part-IV of the Consti