Executive Engineer v. M/S Haigreeva Infratech Projects LTD
- Court
- High Court of Karnataka
- Date of judgment
- 11 November 2026
- Bench
- Justice Anu Sivaraman, Justice K.s.bharath Kumar
- Case number
- COMAP No. 131 of 2024
- Result
- DISMISSED
- Acts & sections
- Section 34 Arbitration Act, Section 16 Arbitration Act, Section 37 Arbitration Act, Section 11 Arbitration Act
- Subject
- Arbitration
Full judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.S.BHARATH KUMAR COMMERCIAL APPEAL NO.131 OF 2024
BETWEEN: 1.
EXECUTIVE ENGINEER PWD AND IWTD DEPARTMENT, RAICHUR, DIST. RAICHUR - 584 101. …APPELLANT
(BY SRI. MANU K., ADVOCATE) AND:
Digitally signed by RAKSHA Location: high court of karnataka
1.
M/S. HAIGREEVA INFRATECH PROJECTS LTD., NO.101, 4TH MAIN, NGEF LAYOUT, SANJAYA NAGARA, BANGALORE - 560 094. REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORISED SIGNATORY.
2.
SRI. B.N. CHANDRASHEKHARAIAH ENGINEER-IN-CHIEF (RETD.), KARNATAKA PWD, NO.651, 12TH CROSS, 5TH MAIN,
M.C. LAYOUT, VIJYANAGAR, BANGALORE - 560 040.
…RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. HARISHCHANDRA REDDY, ADVOCATE FOR C/R1, V.O.D. 01-07-2026, NOTICE TO R2 D/W.) THIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 13(1-A) OF THE COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT, 2015 R/W SECTION 37(1)(C) OF THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996, PRAYING TO CALL FOR RECORDS FROM THE FILE OF
THE
HON'BLE LXXXIX
SESSIONS
JUDGE
AT
ADDITIONAL
BENGALURU
CITY
CIVIL
AND
(CCH-90)
IN
COM.
A.P.122/2022 ALONG WITH THE ARBITRATION RECORDS OF THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL WHICH HAVE BEEN RECEIVED ON THE FILE OF THE HON'BLE LXXXIX ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE AT BENGALURU (CCH-90) IN COM. A.P.122/2022 AND ETC.,
THIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON 05.10.2026 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT
K.S.BHARATH KUMAR, J.,
CORAM:
OF
JUDGMENT
THIS
DAY,
PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING :
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN and HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.S.BHARATH KUMAR
CAV JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.S.BHARATH KUMAR)
The appellant has preferred the instant Commercial Appeal under Section 13 (1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act,
1996,
`Arbitration
and
Conciliation
judgment
dated
(hereinafter Act'),
referred
to
as
impugning
30.01.2024, passed by
the learned
LXXXIX Addl.City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (CCH90), in Com.A.P.No.122/2022, whereby the Commercial Court dismissed the petition filed by the appellant herein under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and the Arbitral Award dated 23.11.2021 was confirmed.
2.
We have heard Sri Manu K., learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant and Sri Harishchandra Reddy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.1/claimant.
3. It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that, during the year 2011, the
Railway authorities proposed to construct a road Over Bridge No.107-A, at railway KM 568/6-7 on Raichur Bachi (Lingasugur
Road)
SH-20
Basaweshwara Circle.
in
KM
1.3500,
near
The construction of the said
approach road to new railway over bridge was entrusted to the respondent No.1 by inviting tenders. Respondent No.1 participated in the tender process and on being a successful bidder, was awarded the work in terms of the letter dated 17.05.2011.
Subsequently, an Agreement
dated 18.06.2011 was entered into between the parties for a contract value of Rs.4,96,75,052/- and work order was
issued
on
28.06.2011.
The
original
period
for
completion of the work was nine months, ending on 28.03.2012. However, the mark-out was furnished only on 12.12.2012 and, on that basis, the revised completion date was treated as 11.09.2013. The work was completed on 05.02.2014.
4. During
the execution of the said contract, the
design and specifications underwent certain changes, including enhancement of the carriageway width and
alteration of the specifications of the retaining walls, resulting in revision of the project cost. Thereafter, a Supplementary
Agreement
dated
20.11.2014
was
subsequently executed between the parties.
5. Thereafter, disputes arose between the parties with regard to the amounts claimed by respondent No.1. Hence,
respondent
No.1
sought
appointment
of
an
Arbitrator and filed C.M.P.No.200003/2019 before this Court. By order dated 22.10.2019, this Court appointed Sri.Β.Ν.Chandrashekharaiah
as
sole
Arbitrator
to
adjudicate the disputes arising out of the agreement. Respondent No.1 filed its statement of claim before the learned Arbitrator raising nine claims. After conclusion of the proceedings, by the Award dated 23.11.2021, the Arbitral Tribunal allowed six claims and an aggregate sum of Rs.4,54,89,696/- was awarded together with interest. Being aggrieved by the said Award dated 23.11.2021 passed by the learned Arbitrator, the appellant instituted Com.A.P.No.122/2022 under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
6. The Commercial Court, after hearing both parties, noticing the limited scope of interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, held that the award could not be interfered with merely because another view was possible. It further rejected the objections regarding constitution and jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal by holding that the appointment made by this Court in C.M.P.No.200003/2019 was valid and that no prejudice has been demonstrated by the appellant. Further on the question of limitation, the Commercial Court held that the claims made were within time having regard to the extension of time granted on 07.07.2015, the subsequent price
variation
bill
and
invocation
notice
dated
15.02.2018.
7. The Commercial Court further upheld the award on the final bill and price adjustment, holding that the appellant had failed to finalise the accounts and that the contractual provisions permitted price adjustment during the extended period. The partial award towards idling of machinery and labour were sustained on the ground that
the delay in handing over the site and changes in design had prolonged the work. The award towards overhead charges based on Emden's Formula, as also legal expenses and interest, was also upheld. It was consequently held that no ground under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act had been made out and the petition was dismissed with costs.
8. It is contended by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that the Commercial Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, traveled beyond the reasons
contained
in
award,
re-appreciated
material on record and supplemented the reasoning of the Arbitrator without independently considering the grounds urged by the appellant for setting aside the award.
9. It is further contended that the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal was contrary to Clause 4(a) of the Special Conditions of Contract and that the appellant's objection under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act
regarding jurisdiction of the Tribunal was rejected without assigning any reasons and on an erroneous factual premise.
10. It is further contended that the claims were barred by limitation and that the Arbitrator failed to properly adjudicate the issue framed in that regard. It is submitted that the notice invoking arbitration dated 15.02.2018 was beyond three years from the accrual of the respective causes of action. It is also contended that disputed documents and calculations were relied upon without the claimant's witness being subjected to crossexamination, thereby violating principles of natural justice.
11. As regards the final bill, it is submitted that the same was produced for the first time along with the statement of claim dated 09.01.2020, contrary to Clause 47 of the conditions of contract, remained uncertified and was also barred by limitation.
12. As regards price adjustment, it is contended that the contract did not confer such entitlement and that the
Government Orders relied upon had neither been pleaded nor produced. Particular exception is taken to the reliance placed on the Government Order dated 26.02.2016, which was neither part of the pleadings nor evidence and had been issued after completion of the contract.
13. It is further contended that the Supplementary Agreement superseded the earlier agreement and, in the absence of any reservation of claims towards the final bill, price escalation, idling or overhead charges, no such claims could thereafter be maintained under the original agreement. The claims towards idling of machinery and labour
are
unsupported
stated by
to
be
reliable
barred
by
limitation
and
evidence
of
mobilisation
or
expenditure. It is also contended that, when the site had not been handed over during the relevant period, the assumption that machinery and labour remained idle at site, was untenable.
14. It is further contended that the respondent No.1 failed to mitigate the alleged loss and produce any
material to show that the machinery could not have been deployed elsewhere. With regard to overhead charges, it is contended that no actual expenditure was proved and that application
of
Emden's
Formula
without
foundational
evidence was impermissible.
15. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant placed reliance on the following decisions:(i)
Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co.
Ltd.
Vs.
National
Highways
Authority of India, reported in (2019) 15 SCC 131; (ii)
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Banu Constructions & Anr. reported in 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 724;
(iii)
Chennai Water Desalination Ltd. Vs. Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage
Board,
reported
in
MANU/TN/5922/2022; (iv)
State of Gujarat Vs. M/s Kothari & Associates, reported in (2016) 14 SCC 761;
(v)
Unibros Vs. All India Radio, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1366;
(vi)
Batliboi Environmental Engineers Ltd. Vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1208;
(vii)
Board of Control for Cricket in India Vs. Deccan Chronicle Holding Ltd., reported in 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 834;
(viii)
Anheuser Busch InBev India Ltd. Vs. Scarpe Marketing Pvt. Ltd., reported in ILR 2022 KAR 544;
(ix)
Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. Vs. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd. & Ors, reported in (2026) 3 SCC 264;
(x)
Adavya Projects Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Vishal Structurals Pvt. Ltd. & Ors, reported in (2025) 9 SCC 686;
(xi)
Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. Vs. Siemens Ltd, reported in 2013 SCC OnLine Del 843;
(xii)
Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Interocean Shipping (India) Pvt. Ltd., reported
in
2017
SCC
OnLine
Bom
10032; (xiii)
Hindustan Cables Ltd. Vs. M/s Joy Maa Santoshi Saw Mill, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine Cal 9716, and
(xiv)
Bentwood Seating System Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Airport Authority of India, reported in 2021 SCC OnLine Del 3989.
16.
Per
contra,
learned
counsel
appearing
for
respondent No.1 sought to justify the impugned judgment passed by the Commercial Court. It is contended that the challenge to jurisdiction and constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal is untenable, particularly in view of the order dated
22.10.2019,
passed
by
this
Court
in
C.M.P.No.200003/2019, appointing the sole Arbitrator. It is contended that the proceedings were conducted on the basis of documents and submissions after affording full opportunity to both parties and hence, the appellant cannot have any grievance with regard to the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal and the judgment passed by the Commercial Court.
17. Further on the point of limitation, it is contended that the claims were not barred, since the work was completed
on
05.02.2014,
defect-liability
period
expired on 05.02.2015, extension of time was granted on
07.07.2015 without levy of liquidated damages and the claimant thereafter submitted its price-adjustment bill and issued reminders before invoking
the arbitration Clause.
It is also contended that the final accounts remained unsettled and that the disputes therefore continued to subsist. It is also contended that the appellant had committed breach of the contract by failing to hand over the site and furnish the mark-out within the stipulated time, resulting in delay in commencement and completion of the work.
18.
It
is
also
contended
that
subsequent
execution of the Supplementary Agreement and grant of extension of time without levy of liquidated damages are relied upon as acknowledging the delay attributable to the appellant. It is
further contended that the
subsequent
execution of the Supplementary Agreement and grant of time without levying liquidated damages are attributable to the appellant. It is further
contended that the
Supplementary
not
Agreement
did
extinguish
claimant's rights under the original contract.
19. It is next contended that the
claim for price
adjustment was supported by Clause 40 of the General Conditions of Contract and by the extension of time granted by the appellant, while the claims towards idling of machinery and labour arose on account of the delayed handing over of the site and prolongation of the contract. It is further contended that the Tribunal has not accepted the amounts claimed, but had partly allowed the claims only after considering the material on record and assigning reasons.
20. Further, with regard to overhead charges, legal expenses
and
prolongation
of
interest,
it
is
contract
contended resulted
in
that
additional
recurring expenditure and that the Tribunal had assessed the claims on recognised principles and the material placed before it. The award of legal expenses and interest is also sought to be sustained on the ground that the claimant
was compelled to
resort
to
arbitration for
recovery of its legitimate dues and had incurred financial liability on account of delayed payment. It is also
contended that the award is neither contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law nor vitiated by patent illegality, perversity or violation of natural justice.
21. In support of his contentions, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.1 placed reliance on the following decisions : (i)
M/s Vidyawati Construction Company Vs.
Union
of
India
reported
in
MANU/SC/0100/2025; (ii)
Welspun Specialty Solutions Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. &
Ors
reported
in
MANU/SC/1059/2021; (iii)
J.G. Engineering Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India
&
Anr
reported
in
MANU/SC/0527/2011; (iv)
McDermott International Inc. Vs. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. & Ors reported in MANU/SC/8177/2006;
(v)
Dyna
Technologies
Crompton
Greaves
Pvt. Ltd
MANU/SC/1765/2019;
Ltd.
Vs.
reported
in
(vi)
Haryana Tourism Ltd. Vs. M/s Kandhari Beverages Ltd MANU/SC/0033/2022; reported in
(vii)
Atlanta Ltd. Vs. Union of India reported in MANU/SC/0059/2022;
(viii)
Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. State of Goa reported in MANU/SC/0553/2023;
(ix)
In Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. Vs. Chenab
Bridge
Project
Undertaking
reported MANU/SC/0900/2023; (x)
M/s
Larsen
Air
Conditioning
and
Refrigeration Company Vs. Union of India
&
Ors
reported
in
MANU/SC/0876/2023; (xi)
S.V. Samudram Vs. State of Karnataka &
Another
reported
in
MANU/SC/0016/2024; (xii)
Bombay
Slum
Redevelopment
Corporation Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Samir Narain Bhojwani
reported
in
MANU/SC/0564/2024; (xiii)
Morgan Securities and Credits Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Videocon Industries reported in MANU/SC/1084/2022;
(xiv)
Somdatt
Builders-NCC-NEC
(JV)
Vs.
National Highways Authority of India & Ors reported in MANU/SC/0109/2025; (xv)
M/s C & C Constructions Ltd. Vs. IRCON International
Ltd.,
reported
in
MANU/SC/0128/2025; (xvi)
A.C. Chokshi Share Broker Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Jatin Pratap Desai & Another, reported in MANU/SC/0168/2025;
(xvii)
Ramesh
Kumar
Aluminium
Jain
Company
Vs. Ltd.
Bharat (BALCO),
reported in MANU/SC/1699/2025; (xviii)
Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Tuticorin
Port
MANU/SC/0031/2026;
Trust reported in (xix)
Madhya
Pradesh
Corporation Corridor
Ltd.
Pvt.
Road
Development
Vs.
M/s
Jabalpur
Ltd
reported
in
MANU/SC/0582/2026, and (xx)
The Executive Engineer Vs. M/s BSR Infratech India Ltd passed in COMAP No.478/2025, 09.01.2026.
by
order
dated
22. We have heard learned counsel appearing for appellant and respondent No.1 and perused the materials on records.
23. It is seen from the records that the appellant had raised an objection under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act calling in question the jurisdiction of the learned
sole
jurisdiction
of
Arbitrator.
learned
The
objections
Arbitrator
was
regarding filed
on
29.02.2020 simultaneously along with the Statement of Defence and the proceedings dated 30.10.2020 also record that the jurisdictional objection had been raised along with the Statement of Defence. Therefore, the said objections raised by the appellant was within the time stipulated under Section 16(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
Mere raising of the objections within the
stipulated time would not, by itself,
contemplate nor
establish that the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal was invalid.
24. It would be relevant to examine Clause 4 of the Special
Conditions
of
Contract,
appointment of sole Arbitrator.
which
Clause 4
deals
with
contemplates
appointment of a sole Arbitrator. Clause 4 of the Special Conditions of Contract reads as under : "4. Arbitration (Clause 24) 4.1.
The procedure for arbitration shall be as
follows : (a) In case of dispute or difference arising between the Employer and the Contractor relating to any matter arising out of or connected with this agreement, it shall be settled in accordance with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996.
The disputes
or differences shall be referred to a Sole Arbitrator. The Sole Arbitrator shall be appointed by agreement between the parties, failing such agreement, by the Appointing Authority (any one of the Organisations as per list enclosed in Annexure). (b) Arbitration proceedings shall be held at ………, Karnataka, India. (c) The
cost and
expenses of arbitration
proceedings will be paid as determined by the Arbitrator. However the expenses incurred by each party
in
connection
with
preparation,
presentation, etc., shall be borne by each party itself. (d) Performance - under the contract shall continue during the arbitration proceedings and payments due the Contractor by the Employer shall not be withheld, unless they are the subject matter of the arbitration proceedings."
On careful perusal of the said Clause 4 of the Special Conditions of the Contract (referred supra), it can be seen that the same contemplates appointment of a sole Arbitrator by agreement between the parties and failing such agreement through one of the designated appointing authorities.
25. The respondent No.1/claimant had proposed the name of Sri.B.Ν.Chandrashekharaiah and on the appellant failing to respond to the said proposal, approached this Court in C.M.P.No.200003/2019. Pursuant to service of notice and appearance by the appellant, no objection was raised to the proposed appointment and, by order dated 22.10.2019,
this
Chandrashekharaiah
Court as
appointed
sole
Sri.B.Ν.
Arbitrator.
The
appointment was made by this Court in exercise of the power under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and hence, the same cannot be treated as an unilateral appointment by respondent No.1.
26. The learned Arbitrator pursuant to filing of the application by the appellant under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act on 29.02.2020, in the proceedings held on 30.10.2020, the Arbitral Tribunal has considered the objections raised by the appellant and passed a detailed order rejecting the objections raised by the appellant with regard to jurisdiction of the sole Arbitrator.
27. Further, the Commercial Court has also examined the aspect of jurisdiction raised by the appellant as considered by the sole Arbitrator. The Commercial Court has categorically held that, in the proceedings initiated by
respondent
No.1
before
this
Court
in
C.M.P.No.200003/2019, the appellant did not choose to file their statement of objections and this Court vide order
dated
22.10.2019,
allowed
said
C.M.P.No.200003/2019
and
accordingly
appointed
Sri
B.N.Chandrashekaraiah
as
Arbitrator
as
sole
nominated by the respondent No.1 and kept all issues, including the issue relating to the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal, open for adjudication by the sole Arbitrator.
28. The Commercial Court has also given a finding stating that the contention of the appellant that the learned sole Arbitrator erroneously and without recoding any reasoning, dismissed
the application filed by the
appellant on the sole ground that the appellant had preferred the said
application subsequent to filing the
statement of defence, is wholly contrary as evidenced from the proceedings dated 29.02.2020 before the learned sole Arbitrator.
29. The appellant has not denied the letter dated 15.02.2018, issued by the respondent No.1 seeking consent of the appellant for appointment of the Arbitrator.
In spite of receipt of the said letter dated 15.02.2018, the appellant has not communicated its rejection of the request made by the claimant for appointment of Sri B.N.Chandrashekaraiah as the sole Arbitrator.
30. Further, pursuant to the appointment of the sole Arbitrator by this Court in C.M.P.No.200003/2019 and pursuant to the rejection of the objections filed by the appellant
under
Section
of
Arbitration
and
Conciliation Act, regarding jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, the appellant had availed all the opportunities provided by the Arbitral Tribunal and participated in the proceedings.
Therefore,
when
appellant
has
participated before the sole Arbitrator in the entire proceedings, at a belated stage is not entitled to raise dispute/objections regarding constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal.
31. The sole Arbitrator has duly considered the objections raised by the appellant and has rejected the said objections by assigning valid reasons and further the
Commercial Court has also considered the said aspect of the matter and has held that the learned sole Arbitrator has rightly rejected the objections filed by the appellant regarding jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal.
Since the
learned Arbitrator and the Commercial Court have duly considered
aspect
of
jurisdiction
raised
by
appellant, this Court does not find any valid reasons to interfere with the said findings under Section 37 of the Arbitrator and Conciliation Act.
32. It is next contended by the appellant that the claims raised by the claimant are barred by limitation. It is seen from the materials available on record that the work was completed on 05.02.2014, the defect-liability period expired on 05.02.2015 and extension of time was granted on 07.07.2015 without levying any penalty and further the price-adjustment
bill
was
thereafter
submitted
and
reminders were issued on 15.02.2018 prior to invoking the arbitration clause.
33. It is further seen that the final accounts had also remained unsettled. The Arbitral Tribunal has duly taken into consideration the delayed handing over of the site, changes in the scope of work, extension of time without levying penalty, subsequent
submission of the price
adjustment bill and non-finalisation of the accounts and has rightly held that the claims raised by the claimant are not barred by limitation.
34. Hence, appreciating the said reasons assigned by the learned Arbitrator, the Commercial Court has found that there
are no grounds to interfere with the said
finding regarding limitation.
Therefore, the findings
arrived at by the sole Arbitrator and the Commercial Court, on the basis of the said circumstances, cannot be characterised as suffering from patent illegality warranting interference by this Court by exercising the power under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
35. The contention relating to the final bill, price adjustment, idling charges, overheads, litigation and the
effect concern
of
Supplementary
interpretation
of
Agreement
essentially
contractual
terms
and
appreciation of the material before the Tribunal. The learned Arbitrator has not accepted the claims in their entirety, but partly allowed some claims while rejecting others. The manner in which the individual claims were dealt with also indicates that the Tribunal had considered the respective heads of claim on their merits.
36. The findings recorded by the learned Arbitrator are solely on the basis of the contractual provisions and the materials placed before the Tribunal and hence, they cannot be said to suffer from any perversity, patent illegality or jurisdictional error.
37. Further the Commercial Court has also examined at length the challenge to the Arbitral Award with reference to the grounds available under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and has found no patent illegality, perversity or violation of principles of natural justice warranting interference.
Hence, the contention
that the Commercial Court traveled beyond the Award is unsustainable.
38. The grounds raised in this appeal are those which have been urged before the learned Arbitrator as well as the Commercial Court. We find that the grounds raised by the appellant does not fall within the scope and ambit of any of the grounds enumerated in Section 34(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Further the said grounds urged by the appellant also do not amount to patent illegality
appearing
on
basis
of
record
as
contemplated under Section 34 (2-A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
39. The scope of interference by this Court in an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act has been categorically laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in MMTC Ltd., Vs. Vedanta Ltd., reported in (2019) 4 SCC 163. The Apex Court held as follows : " 11. As far as Section 34 is concerned, the position is well-settled by now that the Court does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award and may interfere on
merits on the limited ground provided under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) i.e. if the award is against the public policy of India. As per the legal position clarified through
decisions
of
this
Court
prior
to
amendments to the 1996 Act in 2015, a violation of Indian public policy, in turn, includes a violation of the fundamental policy of Indian law, a violation of the interest of India, conflict with justice or morality, and the existence of patent illegality in the arbitral award. Additionally, the concept of the "fundamental policy of Indian law" would cover compliance with statutes and judicial precedents, adopting a judicial approach, compliance with the principles of natural justice,
and
Wednesbury
reasonableness.
Furthermore, "patent illegality" itself has been held to mean contravention of the substantive law of India,
contravention
of
1996
Act,
and
contravention of the terms of the contract. 12. It is only if one of these conditions is met that
the Court may interfere with an arbitral award in terms of Section 34(2)(b)(ii), but such interference does not entail a review of the merits of the dispute, and is limited to situations where the findings of the arbitrator are arbitrary, capricious or perverse, or when the conscience of the Court is shocked, or 14. As far as interference with an order made under
Section 34, as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be disputed that such interference under Section 37
cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section
34.
In
other
words,
court
cannot
undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award, and must only ascertain that the exercise of power by the court under Section 34 has not exceeded the scope of the provision. Thus, it is evident that in case an arbitral award has been confirmed by the court under Section 34 and by the court in an appeal under Section 37, this Court must be extremely cautious and slow to disturb such concurrent findings."
40. Further these principles were reaffirmed in Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Chenab Bridge Project reported in (2023) 9 SCC 85, wherein the Apex Court held
that the jurisdiction of the court under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is akin to its jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, and that the scope of interference in an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, while examining an order setting aside or refusing to set aside an award, is restricted to and subject to the same grounds as a challenge under Section 34 the Arbitration Act. It was also held that the jurisdiction under Sections 34 and 37
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is not in the nature of normal appellate jurisdiction.
41. The narrow jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act was also laid down in UHL Power Company Ltd. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, reported in (2022) 4 SCC 116. This line of reasoning was further affirmed in Larsen Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Co. Vs. Union of India, reported in (2023) 15 SCC 472, wherein the Apex
Court held that the jurisdiction of the court under Section
of
the Arbitration Act
is limited and
extremely
circumscribed, permitting interference only on the ground of patent illegality which goes to the root of the matter and is not of a trivial nature.
42. The Apex Court in Delhi Airport Metro Express Private Limited Vs. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Limited reported in (2022) 1 SCC 131, held that a Court exercising
jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act cannot re-appreciate evidence or reassess the factual findings of the arbitral Tribunal. Mere erroneous application of law or erroneous appreciation of evidence is insufficient. A finding
of fact by the Arbitral Tribunal, even if another view is possible, cannot be interfered with so long as the view taken by the Tribunal is a plausible one.
43. The Apex Court in Punjab State Civil Suppliers Corporation Limited and Another, Vs. M/s Sanman Rice Mills and Others, reported in 2024 INSC 742, held that an
Arbitral Award is not liable to be interfered with only on the ground that the award is illegal or is erroneous in law, that too upon reappraisal of the evidence adduced before the Arbitral Tribunal.
Even an award which may not be
reasonable or is non-speaking to some extent cannot ordinarily be interfered with by the Courts. It is also well settled that even if two views are possible, there is no scope for the Court to reappraise the evidence and to take the different view other than what has been taken by the arbitrator.
44. Further, in Somdatt Builders-NCC-NEC(JV) Vs. National Highways Authority of India and Ors., reported
in 2025 INSC 113,
the Apex Court after considering the
case law on the point, held as under : " 42. As already discussed above, the Arbitral Tribunal had interpreted Clause 51 in a reasonable manner based on the evidence on record. This interpretation was affirmed by the learned Single Judge exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Therefore, Division Bench of the High Court was not at all justified in setting aside the arbitral
award
exercising
extremely
limited
jurisdiction under Section 37 of the 1996 Act by merely using expressions like 'opposed to the public policy of India', 'patent illegality' and 'shocking the conscience of the court'. As reiterated by this Court in Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. (supra), it is necessary to remind the courts that a great deal of restraint is required to be shown while examining the validity of an arbitral award when such an award has been upheld, wholly oг substantially, under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Frequent interference with arbitral awards would defeat the very purpose of the 1996 Act."
45. In the instant case, the grounds raised are not that as specifically referable to Section 34(2) or Section 34(2-A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Therefore, no error can be found in the findings, reasoning and
conclusions arrived by the Commercial Court. Since the appeal is devoid of merits, we do not find any good grounds
to
interfere
with
impugned
judgment.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
Pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
Sd/(ANU SIVARAMAN) JUDGE
Sd/(K.S.BHARATH KUMAR) JUDGE
bk/