H. H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jiwaji Rao Scindia Bahadur & Ors. v. Union of India

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
15 December 1970
Judge
Justice M. Hidayatullah
Neutral citation
1970 INSC 250
Reported in
[1971] 3 S.C.R. 9
Result
Appeal(s) allowed
Acts & sections
Article 32 Constitution
Subject
Service

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H. H. MAHARAJADIDRAJA MADHAV RAO JIWAJI RAO SCINDIA BAHADUR & ORS. .

v.

UNION OF INDIA December 15, 1970 (M .. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., J.C. SHAH, S. M. SIKRI, J.M. SHELAT, V. BHARGAVA, G. K. MITTER, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, K. S. HEGDE, A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY AND I. D. DUA, JJ.J

Constitution of India, 1950-Article 366(22)-Scope of-Recognition of Rulers by President-Order by President "derecognising'' all RulersValidity of order-Power, if political-If exercise of paramountcy rights. Constitution of India 1950--Article 291-Article if cremes an obligation to pay Privy Purse-Repudiation of obligation if act of State-"Charged on . ... the Consolidated Fund of India'', meaning of-Article if a provision "relating to" covenant within the n1eaning of Article 363. Constitution ,of India, 1950-Article 363-Exclusion of jurisdiction of Courts--Scope of exclusionary clauses-Determining the nieaning of articles 366(22), 291, 362 and 363, if within bar of Article 363-"Dispute arising out of provision of the Constit11Uon relating to covenant", meaning -Article. if "recreation'' of para1nountcy. Constitution of India, 1950--Article 362-lf a provision "relating to" Covenent etc. within the -1neaning of Article 363.

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Constitution of India, 1950--Articles 19(1) (/) and 31 and Article 32-0rder of President under Article 36.§(22)-0rder of President under Article 366(22) "derecognising" Rulers-Repudiation of liability to pay Privy Purse and denial of rights and privileges-If violation of fundamental rights-Maintainabi/i.'y of petition-Privy Purse-If property.

On the promulgation of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the Princely States adjoining the Dominion of India merged with the Dominion of India. The instruments of merger provided for .the integration of the States and guaranteed to the Rulers the Privy Purse, succession according to law and custom to the gaddi of the State and personal rights, privileges, dignities and titles. These instruments were concurred in and guaranteed by the Dominion of India. Later, the States integrated with the Union of India under the Constitution of India, 1950, the Rulers abandoning all authority in regard to their territories. Special provisions were enacted in the Constitution regardin¥ Privy Purses and the rights and privileges of the erstwhile Rulers. By article 291, the sums guaranteed by the Dominion of India to any Ruler as Privy Purae under any covenant or agreement was to be charge<l on and paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India and the sums so paid were to be exempt from all taices on income. Ry article 362 the Parliament, the State Legislatures and the executive of the Union and the States were enjoined to have due regard to the guarantees and assurances under the covenants and agreements between the Governments of the Dominion of India and the heads df the former Indian States. Also, provisions were made in various statutes conferring on the "Rulers" certain privileges and benefits. By Art. 366(22) a "Ruler" was defin,,d t<> mean the prince, chief or other peraon by whom covenant and agreements were entered into and who "for the time being" was recognised by the President as the Ruler and included any person who "for the time being"

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was recognised by the President as the successor of such Ruler. Article 363 excluded the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and all other courts "in respect of any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, ·agreement, covenant etc." or in any dispute "in respect of any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of any of the provisions of the Constitution relating to any such treaty, agreement, covenant" etc.

On September 2, 1970, a Bill intituled the Constitution (Twenty Fourth Amendment) Bill, 1970, and providing that "Articles 291 and 362 of the Constitution and clause (22) of article 366 shall be omitted" was introdnced in the Lok Sabha. The Bill was declared passed. On September 5, 1970, the motion for, copsideration of the Bill did not obtain in the Rajya Sabha the requisite majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting as required by Art. 368 of the. Constitution. The motion for introduction of the Bill was declared lost. A few hours thereafter the President of lndia, purporting to exercise power under cl. (22) df Art. 366 of the Constitution signed an instrument withdrawing recognition of all the Rulers. A communication to the effect was sent to all Rulers in India who had been previously recognised under art. 366(22) of the Constitution.

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The petitioners moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging the order of the PreSident "<!erecogni>ing" them as unconstitutional, ultra vires and void. · They contended that the President had no power to withdraw recognition of Ruler once recognised; that assuming the President had such power, exercise of the power was coupled with duty to recognise his successor; that the order of the President "derecognsing" all the Rulers en masse amounted to arbitrary exercise of power for a collateral purpose; that the Order violated the constitutional mandates in articles 291 and 362; that article 291 created an obligation in the Union , of India to pay the Privy Purse and Privy Purse was property; and that the Order being one without authority of law infringed the guarantee of the fundamental rights under Arts. 19(1) (f), 21 and 31 of the Constitution. ·The Union of India contended, inter alia, that the petition was not maintainable, because, the source of the right to receive the Privy Purse and to be accorded the privileges claimed was a political agreement and the privy purse was in the nature of a political pension; that in recognising or derecognising a ruler the President exercised a political power which was a sovereign power and that the rights and obligations were liable to by varied or repudiated in accordance with "State policy"; that the jurisdiction of the Courts to enforce rights and obligations arising out of the c:ovenant was excluded, because, the rights and obligations arose out of act of state; that the concept of paramountcy of the British Crown was inherited by the Union of India and therefore recognition of Rulership was a "gift of the President"; and further that the petitioners stood excluded bv article 363, for, they were seeking either to enforce the covenants and al!"eements or were seeking to enforce the provisions of the Constitution "relating to" such convenants.

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HELD : Per Hidayatullah, C.J. Shah, Vaidialingam, Hedge, Grover and Dua. JJ. (Mitter and Ray, JJ. dissenting).

The oTti.\·r Of the President "derecognising" the Rulers is ultra vires and illegal. [69 G; 100 C] (Per Hiday<>tullah, CJ. (i) The action of the President withdrawing recognition of all Rulers is ultra vires article 366(22) and a nullity. Article 366(22) neither e:.;pressly nor by implication places the power in the hands of the President to say that although a Ruler is in existence or

MADHAV RAO V. UNION

a successor is available there shall be no ruler of any particular state. The definition contemplates the existence of the Ruler "for the time bein&". The phrase "for the time ·being" cannot mean that any person can be ap• pointed who has no claim )Vhatever or that temporary appointments may be made or that no appointment nee.d be made. The continuity of a Ruler of an Indian State_ is obligatory so long as the Ruler is alive or a successor can be found. The obligation to recognise a Ruler is bound up with the other guarantees contained in articles 291 and 362 and the definition in a'rticle 366(22) is merely the key to find a particular Ruler. The withdrawal of recognition from all the Rulers renders the guarantees, as also the relevant articles of the Constitution, inoperative. [58 A-HJ (ii) The right to recognise a ruler, from out of several claimants, is not an act of paramountcy. The selection has to be in accordance with law and custom. The Constitution gave the right to the President to recognise a Ruler for the time being; but it cannot be stretched to give a paramountey of the same character as that enjoyed by the British Crown. To claim such a paramountcy one has to ignore ~ompletely the arrangements by which the Rulers parteg · with their territories and ruling rights and were assured of their privy purses and privileges. The rights became constitutionally protected rights which so long as the Ruler's line was not extinct belonged to the Ruler "for the time being. In short, when the guarantees were given by the Constitution, paramountcy if any, went out. Article 362 is the converse of paramountcy inasmuch as it compels the t\\'Olimbs of government to have "due regard'' to the guarantees and assurances given to the Rulers. Nor can article 363 be said to "recreate" paramountcy. That article was intended to keep certain matters outside the jurisdiction of the courts. The Rulers are citizens of India and the President or the Government of India cannot invoke the doctrine of paramountcy to su~p lain an illegal inroad upon the rights of citizens. [51 H-52 BJ (iii) The argument based on act <If state ;s not of any more validity. An 'Act of State' is not available against a citizen. It is a sovereign act .which is neither grounded in law nor does it pretend to be so. l\ is "a catastrophic change constituting a new departure". Since there .ire no sovereign or political powers under our Constitution every action of the executive limb of government must seek justification in some law. The very existence of article 363, which it is said incorporates some kind of paramountcy or act of state, shows that there is no political power outside the law; otherwise an additional bar would hardly have been neces· sary, rS3 BJ

Salarnan v. Sec~etary of Stale for India, [1966] 1 K.B. 613, State of Sauravhtra v. Menon Haii Ismail, [1960J 1 S.C.R. 537 and Secretary of State in Council for India· v. Karnachee Boye Sahaba, [18591 13 Moore P.C. 22, referred to.

(iv) Covenants and agreeme.1ts cannot be said to create "imperfect obligations" since the Constitution takes the matter into itself and gives them its own guarantees. In so far as those guarantees became a part of our Constitution and were included in various statutes they would be enforceable according to the tenor of the Constitution and other laws subject of course, to any bar created by article 363. L55 GJ '

fl· Gibson & Ors. Assignees of J, Mal/andaino, Bankrupt v. The £u India Co., 1,32, E:R. 1105, Peter Pazmany University, (Series A/B No, 61 p. ~31) Junsd1ction of the Courts qt Danzing, Advisory Opinion No. 15, Series B. No. 15 and Sttite of Raiasthnn v. Shyatn Lal t\964J 7 S:C.R. 174 referred to. 2-L744Sup CI/71

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(v) It is not open to the petitioner to describe the action of the President as wanting in good faith without pleading any collateral fact. Further, the reasons for a decision by the President cannot be probed into in view of articles 74(2) and 361(1). L56 EJ

(vi) The argument on behal'i of the Union of India that article 291 only lays down the source and manner of payment but creates no right to claim, 'receive or enforce payment is a complete misreading of th~ article. Article 291 makes the amount payabJe to the Ruler and, therefore, creates B a right in him to demand it. The words "shall be charged and paid out of etc." make the payment obligatory and when expanded the words read "shall be charged on and shall be paid out of" etc. The direction to pay is in no uncertain terrris. The recipient is mentioned in cl. (b) where the article says 'and the sums so paid to any Ruler' and this shows who is to . be paid. Therefore, the Article in addition tc the source and manner also lays down that it shall be paid and paid free of taxes on income to the Ruler. The article is self-supporting and self-ordaining. The result .of cha1ging a sum on the Consolidated Fund is to provide that this destination shall not be altered even by vote of Parliament and the charging is sufficiently effective for ensuring the right application. [62 D-63 BJ

(vii) Article 363 does not bar relief to the petitioners. The words provisions of this C'~nstitution' in the latter part of article 363 are not left unqualified. The draftsmen would have referred to the numbers of the articles i'f disputes of eve'fy kind under those articles stood excluded. The requirement is that it must be.a provision "relating" to a treaty, covenant etc. The words 'relating to' mean that the provision IDJ,JSt bear upon treaties etc. as its dominant purpose or theme; it is not suffiCient if treaties are menJioned there for some coilateral purpose. So tested, (65 D-E] (a) Article 362 is a provision relatin1 to a treaty, covenant etc. Its dominant theme is 'the rights, privileges and dignities of the Rulers under covenants and agreements and, therefore the provision is one relating to covenants and agreements. [65 G-H] (b) Article 366(22) has for its dominant purpose the selection of Rulers through the application of the covenant and agreements. When the President acts within the four corners of his authority 'the matter is barred by article 363. What the President has done is to take .away recognit'.on from all Rulers and such a power does not flow from article 366(22) _and the bar of article 363 does not apply to such a dispute. The dispute arises neither from the covenants etc. nor from the provisions of the Constitution. Therefore, it ceases to have the protection of article 363. [66 C HJ ( c) Article 291 is not a provis\on relating to covenams and agreements but a special provision for the source of payment of Privy Purse by charging them on the Consolidated Fund and for making the payment free of taxes ; ..,_ incon1e; it does not in its dominant purpose and theme answer the description in the latter part of article 363. The mention in Art. 291 of covenants and agreements is for its· own purpose so that the amounts need not be specified. L67 H-68 BJ [His Lora,hip did not express any opinion on the question whether withdrawal of recognition on grounds which are sound and sufficient is capable of being questioned in a court of law.]

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MADRAY RAO V. UNION

(viii) The petitions are maintainable under article 32 of the Constitution. The obligation to pay the Privy Purse being absolute the right' to claim when due subsists in each ruler.

As soon as an appropriation Act

is passed there is established credit-debt and the outstanding Privy Purse becomes the property of the Ruler in the hands of the government. It is also a s~m certain and absolutely payable. Therefore Privy Purse is property and any action to deprive the Rulers of their Privy Purses must be an infringement of articles 19 and 31. [60 F; 62 0. 59 HJ H.H. The Maharana Sahib Shri Bhagwat Singh Bahadur of Udaipur v. The State of Rajasthan, [1964] 5 S.C.R. I, Madhaorao Phalka v. State of Madhya Bharat, [19611 I S.C.R. 967, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ranojirao Shinde & Anr., [1968] 3 S.C.R. 489 and Standard Marine Insurance Co. v. Board of Assessors, 128 La. 717, referred to.

Langdell, Summary of the Law of Contract, P. 124 Blackstone Commentries Vol. II XXV pp. 390-398, referred to. (Per Shah, Sikri, Shela!, Bhargava, Vaidialingam, Grover and Dua, JJ.)

(i) By the provisions enacted in article 366(22), 291 and 362 of the Constitution) the privileges of Rulers are made an integral part of the-

Constitution and they cannot be deprived of these privileges arbitrarily. Granting that under clause (22) of Art. 366 the President may withdraw the recognition of a person a~. a Ruler, the power to nullify important: provisions of the Constitution does not fl.ow 'from that clause. The power

conferred by the clause has to be exercised consistently with and in aid of the constitutional scheme. The power may be exercised, in the case

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of first recognition, only in favour of a person who has signed the Covenant, and in favour of his successor having regard to the customs and laws governing the state if the Ruler dies or becomes incapable df functioning or his recognition is withdrawn. By the use of the expression "for the

time being" in cl. (22) Art. 366 the President is not invested with an authority to accord a temporary recognition to a Ruler nor with authority to recognise or not to recognise a Ruler arbitrarily; the exp·ression predi-

cates that there shall be a Ruler of the Indian State, that if the first recognised Ruler dies or ceases to be a Ruller a successor shall be ·a-ppointed and

that there shall not be more rulers at a given time. By the express injunction in Art. 53( I) the executive power vested in the President i• directed

to be exercised in accordance with the Constitution. Therefore, the power is intended to be exercised in aid of and not to destroy constitutional insti-

tutions.

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The power is plainly couefled with duty-a duty, to maintain con-

stitutional institutions, the constitutional provisions, the constitutional :;cheme and the sanctity of the solemn agreements entered into by the ptedecessor df the Union Government, which are accepted, recognised and incorpo-

rated in the Constitution.

An order merely "derecognising" a Ruler with-

out providing 'for continuation of the institution of Rulership, which is an

integral part of the Constitutional scheme, gal. [74 C; 81 H-82 D, E; 83 Al

is,

therefore,

plainly ille-

[The Court did not express any final opinion on the question whether the expression "for the time being" in relation to the persons who had entered into covenants

or agreements.

and in relation to the suc-

cessor, implies that the President has the power in appropriate cases and for adequate reasons to withdraw recognition. Also, the Court did not decide the question whether in certain exceptional circumstances the President may in granting recognition to a successor

depart in the larger interest of the country from the strict rule of custom governing succession to the gaddi.] [74 B-C; 82 G-H]

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(ii) The President is not invested with any political power, transcending the Constitution which he may exercise to the prejudice of citizens. The Constitutional mechanism in a democratic polity does not contemplate existence of any function which may qua the citizens be designated as political. The history of negotiations whlch culminated in the integration of the territories of the Princely States before the commencement of the Constitution clearly indicates that tluo recognition of the status of the Rulers and their rights was not temporary and also not liable to be varied or repudiated in accordance with "State policy". Nor does the Constitution invest the executive branch of the Union with the power to abolish the concept of Rulership, Privy Purse and the privileges on the plea that these have become incompatible with "democracy, equality and social justice". The power of the President to determine the status of the Rulers by cancelling or withdrawing recognition to effectuate the policy of the Government to abolish the,concept of Rulers)Jip is therefore liable to be challenged in these petitions. (75 D; 76 BJ ·

Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur and Others v. State of Punjab, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 225 and Jayantilal Amrit/al Shodhan v. F. N. Rana. [1964] 5 S.C.R. 294, referred to. Naivab Usman Ali Khan v. Sagarma/, L1965] 3 S.C.R. 201 and Kunvar Shri Vir Ra;endra Singh v. Un,on of India and Others. [1970] 2 S.C.R. 631 distinguished. (iii) An action not authorised by Jaw against tho citizens of the Union cannot be supported under the shelter of paramountcy. After the withdrawal of British power and the extinction of paramountcy of the British the Dominion Government of India did not and could not exercise any paramountcy over the States. The functions of the President of India stem from the Constitution, not from a "concept of the British Crown" identified or unidentified. What the Constitution does not authorise, the President cannot grant. Rulershlp is therefore not a privilege which the President may in the exercise of his discr,.~ion bestow or withhold. [94 C-D] (i ... ) Clause (a) of article 291 which enacts that the Privy Purse "shall be charged on and be paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India" clearly raise an obligation to pay the Privy Purse. A charge gives a right to receive payment out of a specified fund or property in preference over others: Jn the absence of clear indications to lhe c0ntrary it would be difficult to hold that the expression "charge" used in the context of the. financial 111atters of the state has a different meaning. '.The Constitution does not recognise any sequence of priorities. But that does not alter the fundam.ental character of a charge that it specifies a fund out of which satisfaction of the expenditure charged must be made and that !Ile prescribed expenditure shall have priority in payment to the person for whose benefit the expenditure is charged on the Fund. The Constitutional obligation to proceed in the manner set out in Arts. 112, 113 & IJ4 imposed upon the President and the Parliament, implies, a right in. the person or persons in respect of whom the expenditure is to be incurred. That view is supported by other provisions fr!, the Constitution. Clauses ·(a) & (b) of Art. 291 must be read with articles 112, 113 and 114; they are parts of a single scheme. 'they contemplate that the Privy Purse shall be included in the financial statement as charged upon the Consolidated Fund; it shall be beyond the voting power of the Parliament; its destination shall not be altered: It shall be paid to the Ruler after the Appropriation Bill is passed, and

MADHAV RAO V. UNION

~hen paid it shall be free from liability to p;iy taJ<es on inCQ_me. T!iis 1s an mtegrated process, which cannot be interrupted without dislocating · the constitutional mechanism. [87 A; 88 B; 88 E & 89 DJ G//vind c;handra Pal v. Dwarka Nath Pal l.L.R. 35 Cal. 837 and Raja Sri Shiva Prasad v. Deni Madhab, l.L.R: 1 Pat. 387, referred to.

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(v) Article 291 does not merely incorporate recognition of the obligation to pay privy purse under covenants incurred by the Government of the Dominion of India; it gives rise to a liability de hors the cove-. nants. After the Constitution, .the obligation to pay privy purse ·rested upon the Union of Ind:a not because it was inherited from the Dominion of India but because of the constitutional mandate under Art. 291. The source of the obligatio>:1 is in Art. 291 and not in the convenant~ and agreements. Reference to the covenants and agreements in the article is for defining :he privy purse. The obligation which arose out of the merger agreement and was on that ae1:ount an act of state shed its original character on acceptance by the Constitution. The Union of India cannot plead act of state as defence against claim by the Rulers to Privy Purse. [89 F; 90 B-D] Doss v. Secretary of State for India in Council, [187] L.R. 19 Eq. 509, Sa/eman v.. Secretary of State for India, [1906) 1 K.B. 613 and Union of India & Ors. v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Weaving) Co. Ltd. & Anr., [1964] 1 S.C.R. 892, held inapplicable.

(vi) An obligation which arises out of a constitutional provision to pay to the citizens sums of money i!l recognition of obligations of· the predecessor · Government may scarcely be called imperfect. A perfect obligation pertains to the domain of law and justice and imperfect obli· gation to the domain of benevolence. [89 EJ (vii) The courts have jurisdiction to interpret and to determine tile true meaning of articles 366(22), 291, 36.2 and 363 and the tar to the jurisdiction of the courts by article 363 is a limited bar. Article 363 excludes the jurisdiction Of the courts only in respect Of the matter specified therein. A provision which purports to. exclude the jurisdiction of the courts in certain matters and to deprive the aggrieved party of the normal remedy will be strictly construed, for, it is a principle not to be whittled down that an aggrieved party will not, unless the jurisdiction of the Court.s is by clear enactm.eQt or necessary implication barred, be denied recourse to the courts for determination of his rights. It is within the province of the Court alone, to determine what the dispute brought before it is, and to determine, whether the jurisdiction of the Court is, because it falls within one of the two limbs of article 363, excluded qua that dispute. Jurisdiction to try a proceeding is barred nnder the first limb of article 363 if the dispute "arises" out of the provision of a covenant; it is barred under the second limb of the article if the court holds that the dispute is with respect to a right arising ont of a provision of the Constitution . relating to a covenant. A dispute that an order of an executive body is unauthorised, or a legislative measure is ultra vires, is not one arising out of any coven.ant. unrler the first limb of article 363, merely because the order or the measure v10lates t~e right of the citizen which, but for the act or measu~e, v:ere not ID question. The dispute in such a case. relates to the va,hd\lY. of. t~e Act or the vires of the measures. Exclusion of the Court' 1unsd1cllon by the teffilS of the relevant word> in the second lin;ib of Art. 363 lies _in a narrow field. The expression "provisions of this Conslltut10n relating

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to" means provisions having a dominant' and immediate connection with; it does not mean merely having a reference to. If the constitutional provision relating to a covenant is the source of the right claimed to accrue, or liability claimed to arise, then clearly under the second Jimb the jurisdiction of the court to entertain a dispute with respect to the right or obligation is baned [94 H-95 D; 96 B-E, 99 FJ

(viii) It cannot be urged that the jurisdiction of the courts to enforce rights a_~d obligations arising out of the covenants was excluded because the rights and obligations arose out of acts of State and by constitutional provision that exclusion was affirmed and extended after the Constitution. There can be no act of State against its own citizens by the State. The Rulers who were before integration of their States aliens qua the Dominion Government are now citizens. Their r.ights and obligations which arose from an act of State are now recognised and accepted by the Union of India. An act of state vanishes when the new sovereign recognises either expressly or by implication !\14.! rights flowing therefrom. Enforcement of those ri~hts and obligations is governed by the municipal laws, and unless the jurisdiction of the Courts is excluded in respect of any dispute, the courts will be competent :o grant relief. [93 A-CJ

State of Gujarat v. Vora Fida/Ii Badruddin Mithibhanvala, [1964] 6 S.C.R. 461, referred to. (ix) Article 366(22) is a provision relating to recognition of Rulers and that is the direct- and only purpose of the provision. It is not a provision relating to a covenant and the reference to the covenant-or the agreement of the nature mentione4 in article 291 is only for determining who may be recognised as a Ruler. The limited excl~sion cif -the jurisdiction of courrs in article 363 does not operate upon the claim for a privy purse relving upon article 291. [97 C-E; 98 E]

Nawab Usman Ali Khan v. Sagarmal, [1965] 3 S.C.R. 201 and Kunvar Shri Vir Rajendra Singh v. Union of India and O/':as, f,1970] S.C.R. 631 distinguished and explained. [The observations in Nawab Usman Ali Khan that the essential political character of the guarantee for the payment of privy purse is preserved by article 363, and the obligation cannot be enforced in any municipal court held unnecessary for. the purpcse of the <lecision in that case and incorrect.] [98 D-EJ (x) Reference to the covenant in article 291 merely identifies the sum payable as privy purse; it does not make the article a provision relating to the covenant. The source of the right to receive the privy purse is the constitutional mandate; it is not the covenant. A dispute as to the right to receive the privy purse is therefore not a dispute arising out of the covenant within the first limb of article 363 nor is it a dispute with regard to a right accruing or obligation arising out of the provisions of a constitution relating to a covenant. [99 B-C] (xi) Article 362 is plainly a provision relating to covenants within the meaning of article 363., A claim to enforce the rights, privileges and dignities under the covenants will therefore be barred by the first limb of article 363 and a claim to enfon:e the recognition of rights and privileges recognised by article 362 will be barred under the second limb of article 363. Jurisdiction of the courts will however not be excluded where the relief claimed is founded on a statutory provision enacted to give effect to perional rights under article 362 [99 DJ

MADHAV RAO V. UNION

(xii) Therefore, the Court will give effect to the constitutional mandate in art. 363 oniy if satisfied that the dispute arises out of any provision of a covenant which is in force and was entered into or executed be'fore the commencement of the Constitution and to which ••the predecessor of the Government of India was a party, or that it is in respect of rights, liabilities or obligations accruing or arising under any provision of the Constitution in relation to a covenant; but since the right to privy purse arises under

article 291 the dispute in. respect of which does not fall in either clause, the jurisdiction of the court is not excluded. Again, the jurisdiction of the Court is not excluded in respect of disputes relating to personal rights and privileges which are granted by statutes. [99 F-Hl (xiii) Since the order of the President is without authority of law there is a clear infringement of the guarantee of the fundamental rights under articles 19(l)(f), 21 and 31(1) of the Constitution. [72 HJ The Court did not express any opm1on (i) on the question whether a dispute that an executive act or legislative measure operating upon a right accuring pr llability arising .out of a provision is invalid, falls within the second limb of article 363 and (ii) on the plea that the order was made for a collateral purpose. On the view taken, the Court did not deal with the plea that Rulership was "property" and the Order of the President deprived the petitioners of that property without authority of law.] [73 A] Per Hedge, J. (i) The meaning given to the expression 'Ruler' in article 366(22) is only for the purpose of the Constitution and not for any other purpose. Rulers of Indian States disappeared as soon as their territories were merged with Iociia and all those quondam Rulers became

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citizens of India. Their rulership is merely a status entitling them to Privy Purse and certain privileges. Articles 291, 362 and 366(2)(a) and (b) (before its deletion), as well as entry J4 of List I of Schedule Vil referred to RUiers and, therefore, it became necessary to define that expression. (160 E-G; 161 A] (ii) Article 366(22) imposes a constitutional duty on the President and for that purpose has conferred on him certain powers. The power is one coupled with duty. The President cannot create a successor; he can only recognise the successor. Recognition n1eans the pct\\·er to looate. Hence the power conferred on the President under the second part of article 366( 22) is a very limited p<:>wer. The power has to be exercised in accordance with law; in other words it has to be exercised as a quasi-judicial power. The expression "for the time being" in the second part of the article is relevant as the question of recognition of a new ruler arises on the death of each Ruler. The expression contemplates the continuity of Rulership so long as the Ruler who entered into covenant or agreement or a successor of his is in existence. (164 G, B-C) (iii) The power to recognise the Rulers does not include the power nvt to recognise. The President cannot do indirectly what the legislature cannot do directly. Ruler as referred to in some of the provisions of the G>nstitution is an entity created by the Con•titution to further certain purposes recOl!inised by the Constitution. That entity cannot be abolished either by the executive or by the legislature. Therefore, it is not possible to spell out a power to abolish the Rulership under Article 366(22). [165 G, HJ

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[1971]3 s.c.R.

[His Lordships did not go into the question whether a Ruler once recognised can be derecognised by the President and, if so, under what circumstances.] (iv) The power of recognition of the Rulers cannot be claimed to be a facet of the paramountcy enjoyed by the British Crow)l·, Paramountcy is 1he very antithesis of nile of law and the goyernment of India c.annot consider itself a superior. power in its relationship with the citizens' of this country. Nature and scope of the power exercisable by the President under a provision of the Constitution must be spelled out from tjle language of the provision iiod from the purpose intended to be served by the proviS(on. (166 ~G] (v) The plea of State policy is irrelevant iii the context of this case. If the Constitution has laid down a policy, that policy cannot be departed from either by the legislature .or by the executive. Neither the Iegislature nor the executive can have a policy which runs counter to the ' policy' laid down by the Constitution. [159 El (vi) The stand taken by thr. Union of India that the concept of Rulership, Privy ~™' and the privileges guaranteed to the Rulers have become. incompatibale with "democracy equity and social justice" raise political issues. This Court is not the forum for going into political issues, nor is it concerned with political passions surrounding the issues arising for decision in this case. [159 Bl

C

(vii) (liidayatullah, C.J. concurring). There is nothing like a political power under our. Constitution in the matter of relationship between the exec\ltive and the citizens. The Constitution recognises only three p!)wer viz., the legislative, judicial and executive. The executive cannot exercise any sovereignty over its citizens.

The legal sovereignty

vests )Yith the Constitution and the political sovereignty with the people.

The President is a creature of the Constitution; he can only ar:t in accord-

ance with the Constitution. [D-FJ Kunwar Shri Vir Rajendra Singh v. Union of India & Ors .. [1970] 2 S,C.R. 631. distinguished.

(viii) The President on the advice of the Cabinet has disregarded the mandate of arts. 53(i), 73(1), 291, 362 and 366(22). That being so, his order must be held (a be ultra vires the Constitution; hence a nullity. [168 Bl (ix) The impugned order is also unconstitutional for the reason that the power conferred .under art. 366(22) is exercised for a collateral purpose. The circumstances under which the impugned order came to be made show that there was attempt to do indirectly what the government could not do directly. Such an exercise of power is impermissible under article 366(22). If the Constitution or any of its provisions have ceased to serve the needs of the pc@ple, ways must be found to change them but it is impermissible to bypass the Constitution or its provisions. For that reason also the impugned orders must be held to be ultra vires art. 366(Z2). [167 BJ Balaji v. State of Mysone, [1963] Supp. 1. S.C.R. 439.

(x) Article 363 has to 'be read harmoniously with a:rticles 291 ·and 366(22). For the purpose of giving necessary direction to th~ Union and State executive as · well as to the Union and State legislatures.

...

MADHAV RAO V. UNION

19·

the Constitution recognised the rights accruing and liabilities and obli· gations arising under various agreements and covenants ·which recognition made those right, liabilities and obligations enforceable. But without article 363 article 362 womd have opened the flood gate of litigation. The Constituent Assembly evidently wanted to avoid that situation. That appears to have been the main reason for enacting article 363. [185 F-G & 186 A-CJ . Rajendra Singh's case, State of Seraikella v. Union of India ana Anr. etc., [1951] S.C.R. 474, Visweshwar Rao v. The State of Madhya PrGdesli, L1962] S.C.K. 1020, Sri Sudhons11 Shekhar Singh Dro v. Thi Sl/Jte of Orissa, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 779, H.H. The.Maharana Sahib Shrl B,,.,. wot Singh Bahadur of Udaipur v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. [1964} 5 .~C.R. 1 and Suite of Gujarat v. Vora Fiddali Badruddin Mlthlbarwo/o, [1964] 6 S.C.R. 461, held inapplicable. Nawab Usmanali Khan v. Sagarmal, [1965] 3 S.C.R. 201. dislin· guished. Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad v. Karnanl Industrial Bank C.td., 58 I.A. 21S: referred to.

j

(xi) Article 363 excludes the jurisdiction of courts only in respect of matters coming under article 362. The contention that article 363 excludes also the right arising from article 291 becans. article 291 allO protects personal righ\s falling within the scope of article 362, has no force. Privy Purse was taken out for special treatment by the Comlitution under article 291 and therefore it is excluded from the general provision in article 362. Further, there was no purpose in guaranteeing the payment of Privy PuJSe under article 291 and then taking away the right to recover them under article 363. In the case of most of tbeRulers the right to receive Privy Purse was an enforceable right even before article 291 came into force. It is not easy to accept the contention that what was an enforceable right was made unenforceable by the Constitution, [184 H-185 DJ (xii) The liability undertaken under article 291 is a new liability and not an affirmation of an existing liability arising under the covenants and agreements. The article is in no way linked with covenants and agreements. The covenants and agreements only continue as evidence as to matters mentioned in the first part of ' article 291. After article 291 came into force there is no legal relationship between the covenants and agreements and that article. The article read with Art. 366(2~) constitute a sell contained code in the matter of payment of Privy Purses and those articles operate o~ their own force. [177 D, E] (xiii) It is not possilile to accept the eontention that the expresSlon "charged on ...... the Consolidated Fund of India" in article 291 merely means that the amounts payable as Privy Purse are not votable and that the expression neither creates a right in favour of the person in whose benefit the charge is created nor is the Consoli4ated Fund pledged for the payme~t of the Privy Purse. If an item of expenditure charged on the Consohdated Fund merely means that the expenditure is nonvotable then there was no need to provide in article 113 that "so much of the estimate as. relates to expenditure charged uoon the Consolidated Fund of India shall not be submitted to the vote Parliament" That J?art of article 113 was evidently enacted to make effective the siatutory hen over the Consolidated Fund created in favour Of' the penon to-

of

[1971)3 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

-~

whom the payment had to be made. It emphasises the fact that the pledge created in favour of the person for whose benefit the charge is created by the Constitution, cannot be taken away even by th_e ParliaNo sooner the President recognises 'the Ruler of a11 Indian State,

ment.

he becomes entitled to the Privy Purse guaranteed under article 291 from the date the Constitution came into fqrce. Every constitutional sanction for payment is necessarily a mand.ate to pay if that sanction relates· to, the discharge of an obligation; it is an enforceable mandate. Besides the executive cannot take the stand that it will not respect a mandate of the Constitution unless that mandate is enforceable in a court of law. Whether a particular constitutional mandate is enforceable or not, ·it is all the same binding on all the organs of the State. [177 E-H; 182 C-D! (xiv) A dispute whether the President has the power to abolish ell Rulers under article 366(22) quite plainly cannot be held to be a dispute in respect of "any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of any of the provisions of the Constitution r~lating ti> any such

treaty,

agreement,

coven_ant ...... "

within the

meaning

The word means "to bring

into

relation",

at

the second part of article 363. What is in !lispute is the true scope of the power of the President under article 366(22). Power is an authority whereas a right in the context in which it is used in article 363 signifies property. A disp\lte as regards the interpretation of a provision of the Constitution is not a dispute within the contemplation of the second limb of article 363 as it is qot a dispute in respect of any right, liability or obligation. The wora "relating to" is a word of wide import but jn the context in which it is used in article 363, it must have a narrower, meaning.

'

or

"establish relation between". In other words. the prov-ision of. the Constitution in question must be linked wlth the merged agreements or covenants directly and immediately. It must have no independent existence. Article 366(22) is an independent provision. It has nothing to do with the agreements- and covenants. [186 G-187 G] (xv) Article 362 clearly links itself with the agreements and cove-

'

nants and it has no independent existence apart from the agreements

and covenants; [182 G]

·

[His Lordship did not find it necessary to go into the scope of article

3QJ (xvi) The petitionerS have established that their rights under articles 31 and 19(1)(f) have been contravened. The right to receive the Privy Purse under article 291, being a legal right, i! a right enforceable through the courts of law. That right is undoubtedly property. The denial of those benefits which had been afforded the Rulers under statutes is again a contravention of the petitioners' fundamental right to property. [194 E, G] State of M.P. v. Ranojirao Shinde and Aw. [ 1968] 3 S.C.R. 489 and Madhaorao Phalke v. State of Madhya Bharat. [1961] I S.C.R. 957, referred to. (Per Mitter, J. dissen!ing). The Order of the President though unjustified. is not liable to be challenged. because, art!cle 363 is a bar to the maintainab,ility of the petitions. [152 G-H] (i) Article 366(22) implies n.ot merely a right or power but a duty or obligation to recogni~e a person as a Ruler both at the com~ence­ ·ment of the Constitution and even afterwards so long as the hnc of

t

MADHAV RAO V. UNION

Rulers lasted and the choice of a person as a Ruler tq succeed another has to be made applying the law and custom attaching to the gaddi of a particular state. Unless a Ruler can be identified for the purp<J!ie of the Constitution articles 291, 362 and 363 cannot be. applied. Clause · (22) fixes the identity of the Ruler for the purposes of the Constitution as a prince, cl!_ief or other person by whom any covenant or agreement as is referred to in clause (1) of article 291 was entered into. The power or duty to withdraw recognition must be confined to cases when the first recognition was not proper. Maharaja Pravir Chandra Bhanj Deo K~katiya v. Madhya Pradesh, [1961] 2 S.C.R. 501 held inapplicable.

The State of

(ii) The pqwer of recognition is not a political power in the paramountcy field. In strict legal theory whatever paramountcy there was before the 15th August 1947 in the British Government lapsed with the passing of the Indian Independence Ac\. Paramountcy de facto there undoubtedly was but no legal sanction can be ascribed to such paramountcy.

Virendra Singh & Others v. State of U.P., [1951] I, S.C.R. 415, Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1959] S.C.R. 729, Secretary of State v. Komachee Boyee Shiba, 7 M.I.A. 476, Doss v. Secretary of State L.R. 19 Equity 509 and Solomon v. Secretary of the Slate, ,[1906] 1 K.B. 613, distinguished. (iii) Once the Rulers ceded their territories and accepted the Consti-

tution of India they became citizens of India and the plea of continuance Of an act of state as against them cannot be accepted.

I

(iv) The recognition of Rulership is not an exercise of political power vested in the President; Kunwar Shri Vir Rajendra Singh v. Union of India, L1970] 2 S.t.R. 631, explained.

r

(v) Article 291 is meant to put the guarantee as'to payment of Privy Purse contained in the Covenants and agreements on a firm and sure footing. It is not a mere declaration of pious intention which the executive could disregard a,i Jts whim or pleasure; so long as it finds a place in the Constitution it is to be acted upon. (vi) Article 363 imposes an absolute bar on the jurisdiction of all courts to adjudicate upon disputes covered by it. The object of the article was as much to save the Rulers who had entered into covenants or agreements etc. from their rivals or kinsmen c,oming to court to upset the covenants or agreements as to shield the Government of India from attempts on the part of Rulers to rip open the covenants. To see whether any dispute falls within the second limb of the article one must examine the content of the right or the limit of the Jiabilitv or obligation arising out of any constitutional provision which proVision in its tum must relate to apy treaty, agreement etc. Thtf exptession relate to" means, inter alia, "stand in some relation, to have bearing or concern, to pertain, to refer to, bring into association with or connection with''. [127 E-H]

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1971 )3 S.C.R.

State of Seraike/la & Others v. Union of India and Another, [1951 o S.C.R. '174, Sudhcnsu Shekhar Singh Deo v. The State of Orissa, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 779, Nawab Usmana/i Khan v. Sagarmal, [1965] 3 S.C.R. 201, Di.1hambar Nath v. Nawab Jmdad Ali Khan, 17 I.A. 181, Nawab B•·hadur of Mushidabad v. Karnani Industrial Bank Ltd., 58 I.A. 215, referred to. (vii) Article 291 is a provision of the Constitution relating to covenants or merger agreements. It is not a provision merely for finding our !lie amount of the liability of the Dominion of India by way of privy purse to Ruler. It expressly refen; to covenants or agreements entered into by the Rulers under which payment of sums free of tax has been guaranteed or assured by the government of the Dominion of India as Privy Purse and gives the term as to Privy Purse a new shape and form. The artjcle seeks to instil life and vigour into the term for payment 1f Pr.ivy Purse in the covenant by c:reating a new channel leading out of the guarantee of the government of the Dominion of India which was no longer in existence and making it flow along a constitutional course by putting the liability of the Union of India for payment of the sums beyond controversy. So considered any dispute as to payment of privy purse would come under the bar of article 363. [136 G; 140 D; 141 D; 142 D; 143 CJ

a

Kunwar Shri Vir Rajendra Singh v. Union of India, [1970] 2 S.C.R. 631, referiec! to. (viii) Since the Eresi<lent's power or right or duty or obligation to recognise a person as a RUier arises not merely out of the pr_ovisions in article 366(22) but also the covenants, merger agreements or instruments of accession the dispute is one which arises out a provision of tile Consti(ution relating to a treaty, agreement, covenant etc. in terms of article 363. [151. D-El (ix) It cannot be urged that if the act complained of is ultra vires or a nullity the jurisdiction of the courts would not be ·excluded. A constitutional provision of the kind of article 363 transcends this kind of consideration. All that the Court has to see is whether the dispute falls within either limb of the article. If the dispute is so cove'red the court is precluded from examining' whether the contention of the party asserting a right was genuine or of 1eal substance. Equally, the bar will r.pply where a party denying the right asserted or contesting the claim ,put torward is guilty of action which on the face of things appears to be urbitrary if there be some scope for raising the pica in denial or contradiction .. [151 Cl

(

Pratap Singh v. The State of Punjab, [1964] 4 S.C.R. 773 and Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1964] 4 S.C.R. 797, explained. R. _M. Lohia v. State. [1966] 1 S.C.R. 709, Ram Swantp v. Shikar Chand, [1966] 2 S.C.R, 553, Sadanandan v. Kera/a [1966] 3 S.C.R. 590, Jaidiand Lal v. West Bengal, [!%Ii] Suppl. S.C.R. 464, Raja Anand v. U.P. State, (1967] 1 S.C.R. 373, Ohulabhci v. Madhya Pradesh, [1968] 3 S.C.R. 662, The General Assembly of Free Church of Scotland v. ford Over Town, [1904] A.C. 515, R. v. Bryant, (1956] 1 A.E.R. 341, Anismbninic Ltd. v. Foreign Co1npensation Con1n1ission arrd another, [1969] 1 AE.R. 208, Secretary of State v. Mask & Co., 67 I.A. 222, Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford; f1859] 6 C.B. (N.S.) 336. Neville v. London "Express" Newspaper, [.1919] A.C. 368, Ciri:o's Coffee Co. v. State of Mysore, 19 S.T.C. 66 and C. T. Santhul1,.than Chettiar v. Madras, C.A. 1045 of 1966 decided on 20th July, 1967, referred to.

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MAD&V RAO V. UNION

.

Raleigh Jnvestme,ir Co. Ltd, v, Governor-General in Council, 74 I.A. 50, disapproved. (x) Notw1thstading the wide sweep of the proviii.on fo,r ousting the jurisdic:ion of courts as regards disputes covered by it, arllcle 363 gave express 11ower to the President to have the opinion of this Court to guide himself &v, and when disputes of such public importance were agitating the minds of members of Parliament and of the Cabinet it was not only his right but his duty fo consult this Court. [152 Al Per Ray, J. (dissenting), that the petitions fail and are dismissed, (i) Article 363 embodies the principles of Acts of state. The entire relationship of the Dominion of India vis-a-vis the Indian states was in the domain of Act of State and the instruments, merger agreements and covenants uid not have any constitutional sanction and obligation and were totally uuenforceable in municipal courts. This Court has in several decisions so held. Article 363 and the other allied articles really reflect what the makers of the Constitution picked up from the historical past ond inserted in the Constitution, [206 G, 207 Hl St.lie of Seraikel/a v. Union of India & Anr. [1951] S.C.R. 474, l'irendra Singh & Ors. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [1955) 1 S.C.R. 415, Mis. Daln1ic Dadri Cen1ent Co. l...,td. v. The Commissioner of [ncCtme· tax, [1959) S.C.R. 729. The Stat<e of Saurasht'ra v. Memon Haji Ismail Ha]i, [1960) 1 S.C.R. 537, State of Gujarat v. Vora Fiddali Badruddin Mitlubarwak, [1964] 6 S.C.R. 416 and Nawab Usmanali Khan v. Sagar. ma/, ,!1965) 3 S.C.R. 2bl, referred to. (ii) The. pov,:er of recognition of Ru1ership is political, because. it is exercised by the President in relation to prince or chief by \vhom any covenant or merger agreement V.'as entered into and the necessity for

recognition arises from the covenants and merger agreements. It is poll· tical abo because it is not limited only to the law of succession dr cus· tom. The reasons of state policy will enter the field. It is not a compulsive power. The considerations which moves the President are matters on which the Co1irt will find no standard for resolving it iudicially, [210

FJ

(iii) The rights accruing under or obligations arising out of the provisions of the Constitution relating to covenonts or merger agreements are imperfect rights. There are no legal rigli.ts as to recognition of rulership, payment of Privy Purse and enjoyment of rights and privileges, [208 Gl (iv) Recognition of a Ruler under article 366(22) is only for the hmited purpose of payment of privy purse and. it has no other reference. There cannot be any legal right to recognition because, the power of the Pre;ident to recognise for the time being repels any concept of a legal right to Rulership. Since the obligation to recognise a Ruler arises only from the covenants and agreements and there cannot be any legal enforceable right to recognition under the covenant, no legal right to Ruler~hip arises under. article 366(22) ~ither. This is potjtical power denoting power belonging to the State, 1ts government and policy and thei: is no judicial process to adjudicate upon such considerations. It is sophistry to speak of Rulership as an institution. When institutions are recognised the Constitution has specifically designated and recognised them. The President has power to derecognise. The Constituti0n does not say that the President is bound to recognise a Ruler. It follows therefore that after del'ecognition he is not equally bound to recognise another petson as Ruler. [213 H; 214 H; 214 C; 2'6 Al

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1971 J3 S.C.R.

Maharaja Pravir Chandra Bhanj Deo Kaktiya v. The State of Madh.va Pradesh, [1961] 2 S.C.R. 501, Umrao Singh Ajit Singh Ji & ~nr. v. Bhc'gwati Singh Ba/bir Singh & Ors., A.LR. 1956 S.C. 15 and Kunwar Shti Vir Rajertdra Singh v. The Union of India & Ors., [1970] 2 S.C.R. 631, referred to. (v) Article 363 is a non obstante clause and it is a constitutional mandate. The non obsrante clause must be allowed to operate with. full vigour in its o.wn field. [211 A; 212 A] N. P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namckkal Constitiuency &

Ors., fl952] S.C.R. 218, Aswini Kumar Ghosh and Anr. v. Arabind Bose and Anr. f1953] S.C,R: I and Dominion of India and Anr. v. Shrinbai A. Irani, [1955) I S.C.R. 206, referred to. (vi) Article 363 is a positive rule of unenforceability of certain rights and obligations. This Court has held that the article is a bar in any dispute relating to covenants and merger agreements, that the privy purse is a political pension and that the article constitutes a bar to interference by court in a dispute arising by reason of recognitic~o of Rulership. [209 Hl State of Seraikel/a v. Union of India & Anr.. ,[1951] S.C.R. 474, Sl'<lte of Gujarat v. Vora Fiddali Badruddin Mithibarwala, [1964] 6 S.C.R. 416 and Kunwar Shri Vir R<}endra Singh v. The Union of India & Ors. ,[1970) 2 S.C.R .. 631. referred to. (vii) The. dispute as to jurisdiction of the President is not in vacuo but is a dispute as to right of recognition of Ruler for the purpose of payment of Privy Purse and enjoyment of rights and privileges. The dispute is whether the President has or has .not the power to make the order imp~gned in these proceedings. [213 Bl United Provinces v. Governor-General in Council, [1949] F.C.R. 124 referped to. (viii) Article 366(22) relates to covenants or agreements. No person can be recognised as a Ruler until first be entered into a covenant referred to in article 291, or secondly, he is recognised by the President as the successdr of the Ruler recognised under the first part of clause ( 22). Thertfore, the claim to be recognised as a Ruler can only 11,rise if he or his predecessor signed the covenant 1nd thus th.ere is express and direct relation to covenants. Article 366(22) has been put in relation to article 291 and article 362 and one cannot r.bstract article 366(22) from the collection of those articles. All these ''iree articles viz., 291 362 and 366(22) stem from the covenants and merger agreements. Ruler in article 366(22) is description of the person referred to in article 291 and 36Z. If the petitioner challenges the power o( the President to derecog. nise him he claims that he has a right to continue as a Ruler and this is a right related to covenants. [216 E-0, B-D] (ix) The proposition that if the order is _a nullity there is no bar of jurisdiction, is inapplicable to the present case where the question for consideration is of the Constitution which under some articles confers jurisdiction on this Court and in another art!cle excludes the juriSdiction of the Court. A privative clause of this nature in the Constitution stands on an entirely different footing from a clause of that nature in other statutes. The f~llacy of the petitione'rs' submission that because the order of the President is a .nullity the petitioners' property rights are invaded and hence the jurisdiction of this Court is attracted, is. in totally overlooking the provisions of article 363 which excludes· in express and unambiguous terms the jurisdiction of this Couft "notwithstanding" any provision of the .Constitution. When the Constitution which invests ·this

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MADHAV RAO V. UNION

Court with jurisdiction with one hand divests it of jurisdiction with another in specifically designed disputes the attempt to overreach the article which bars the jurisdiction of the Court will be totally impermissible. [219 C, F-H]

·"

Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1963] l S.C.R. 778, S. Pralap Singh v. The State of Punjab, (1964] 4 S.C.R. 733, Maknan Singh v. Stale of Punjpb, [1964] 4 S.C.R. 779, Lala Ram Swarup & Ors. v. Shikar Chand and Anr., [1966] 2 S.C.R. 533, Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, [1969] 2 A.C. 147, Dhulabhai and Ors. v. The St!ite of Madhya Pradesh, [1968] 3 S.C.R. 662 and Communications Assns. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, referred to. (x) Article 291, being a constitutional recognition of the guarantee regarding Privy Purse mentioned in covenants and agreements, does not create any new and independent right of payment of Privy Purse; therefore the article is related to covenants. It embodies the constitutional rec0gnition for the fulfilment of the guarantees and assurances given by the Government of India in respect of Privy Purses and provides for necessary adjustments in respect of Privy Purse entailed by changed circumstances and conditions. A Ruler of an Indian State without being reco2nised a Ruler bv the President. cannot prefer any claim to Privv Purse under article 291. The Ruler of an Indian State mentioned in the first Part of article 291 is different from Ruler mentioned in 291(b). The latter refers to the Ruler defined under article 366(22) and recognised by the President. It is because of the combined effect of articles 291, 366(22) and 363 that this Court held in Nawab Usman Ali Khan's case the privy purse was paid on political consideration that it was not a ri~ht legally enforceable in any municipal court and that the political character was preserved by article 363 by taking privy purse beyond the reach of courts of law/ [221 B. H; 222 E-Hl Nawab Usman Ali Khan v. Sagarmal, :[,1965] 3 S.C.R. 201 relied on. Communications" Assns. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, H. H. The Maharaja Sahib Shri Bhagwat Singh Bahadur of Udaipur v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors. [1964} 5 S.C.R. 1 and Shri Sudhansu Shekhar Singh Deo v. The State of Orissa and An'>'., P961] 1 S.C.R. 779. referred to. (xi) Because the payment of privy purses was to be free of all taxes under the covenants and agreements whereas under the Constitution it is exempt from all taxes on income, article. 291 cannot be said to create a new right. The words "the sums so paid" in cl. (b) of the article relate to the sum guaranteed under the covenants and agreements and to the same sum charged on the Consolidated Fund. One has to turn to the covenants and merger agreement to have all the particulars of persons, sums guaranteed and assured. The Jons et origo is the guarantee in the covenants and agreements. [227 F]

(xii) The words "charged on and paid out of the Consolidated Fund" in article 291 do not mean that a security is created in respect of privy purse and therefore a new and independent right is created. Under the article effect is to be given to the covenants and merger agreements where payment of any sum has been guaranteed. The charge is only in respect of the right and obligation under the covenant an it is therefore neither a new nor 'n independent right. [223 Dl (xiii) The words "charged on and pa\d out of the Consolidated Fund" mean that the sums shall not be submitted to the vote of Parliament and article 113 (I) makes a provision to that effect. If it were a charge it

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1971 ]3 .S.C.R.

would be a debt which would be assignable and there cannot be any legal validity for such assignment. Charge on the Consolidated Fund is an accoµnting arrangement before Parliament and charge is meant for expenditure. The words "'paid out of the Consolidated Fund" denote the' source from which the expenditure would be met. The right to payment arises de-hors the <harge on the Consolidated Fund, the right arises from recognition by article 291 of guarantee of payment of privy purses under a covenant. [224 D; 225 G-H]

(xiv) Therefore, article 362 ts not the only article which falls within .article 363. Article 363 uses the word provisions of the. Constitution. The word provisions indicate more than one article. It has to be em"phasised that article 291, 363 and 366(22) have a most direct and visible relation to article 363. [228 B-CJ (xv) "Rights, liabilities and obligations" in articles 294(b) and 295 ( 1) (b) of •he Constitutio11 refer to other legal rights. which were enforceable in a court of Jaw. Ptivy purses under. the covenants and merger agreements were no such legal rights enforceable in a court of )aw for the obvious reason that if prior to the Constitution the covenants and merger agreements were sought to be enforced in a municipal court, the .government would have demurred on the plea of Act of State. That plea in bar would be available to the Government of India as a defence to anv claim under artic,Jes 294(b) and 295(1)(b): Articles 294(b) and 295 (I) (b) deal with devolution of liabilities of the dominion and part B States respectively. The Constitution has de,alt with privy purses and covenants in separate articles. Therefore, .articles 294(b) and 295(1) (b) can have no application to privy purses and privileges. [229 E-F] Union of India and Ors, v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Weaving) Co. Ltd. and Anr:, {19641 7 S.C.~. 892 and The Soath India Corporation (P) Ltd. v. The Secretary, Board of Revenue. T:·ivandram and Anr., [1964] 4 S.C.R. 280, referred to.

!xvi) In sum, the agreement to pay privy purses and to continue privileges of the Princes which were guaranteed by the Government of Jn_dia before the Constitution were all politic.al agreements born out of political bargains to achieve integration of Indian States with the Dominion of India. . This political bargain was carried into the Constitution by the insertion of article 291 for payment of privy purse, article 362 for continuance of privileges and article 366(22) for recognition of Princes and the political character was preserved by inserting article 363· which bar the jurisdi~tion of the. court in respect of disputes arising out of covenants and agreements and tQese articles which are related to the covenants and agreements. [229 G] (xvii) The petitioners cannot claiJ:? that the Order affects their ~ghts under the various statutes. If the rights are denved from recogml!on of rulership by the President under article 366(22) and if the recognition cannot be impeached no right arises. [230 El (xviii) Recognition of rulership is not a legal right nor is it a right to property. . Privy Purses is not a legal right to property and there is no fundamental right to privy purses. There is no fundamental right to rn!ership. The decision~ of this Court whic~ have held !11.at article 363 is a bar to rights to privy purse. personal rights and privileges and re· cognition of rulership from being agitated in courts, have spoken the words of the Constitution. [231 Cl

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MADHA V RAO V. UNION

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION :

Writ Petitions Nos. 376 to 383 of

1970.

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Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of tndia for the enforcement of fundamental rights. N. A. Palkhivala, M. C. Setalvad, B. G. Murdeshwar, R. l.Jopala' krishnan, J. B. Dadachanii. Ravin1er Narain and 0. C. Mathur, for the petitioners (in W.P. No. 376 of 1970). M C. Setalvad, B.G. Murdeshwar, R. Gopalakrishnan, J. B. Dadachanii, Ravinder Narain, O.C. Mathur and Suroja Gopalakrlshnan for the petitioners (in W.P. No. 377 of 1970). M. C. Chafl/a, B. G. Murdeshwar, J.B. Dadachanji, R. Gopalakri.rhnan and Suroja Gopalakrlshnan, for the petitioners (in W.P. No. 378 of 1970). M. K. Nambyar, B. G. Murdeshwar. J. B. Dadachanil and R ..Gupafa,. krlshnan, for the petitioners (in W.P. No. 379 of 1970), N, A. Palkhlvala, M. C. S•talvad, B. C. Murdtshwar, J, B. Dadachan/I R. Go,a'akrlshnan and R. N. Banerjte, for the petitioners (in W.P. No. 380 of 1970). M. C. Setalvad, B. G. Murdeshwar, I. B. Dadachanii and R. Gopalakrlshnan, for the petitioners (in W.P. No. 381 of 1970).

M. C. Setalvad, B. G. Murdeshwar, J. B. Dadachanii and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the petitioner (in W.P. No. 382 of 1970). M. K. Nambyar, B. G. Murdeshwar, I. B. Dadachan;i, R. Gopalakrishnan She/andra Swarup and B. Dutta, for the petitioner (in W.P. No. 383 of 1970).

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Niren De, Attorney-General, Jagadish Swarup, Sollcitor-General, S. T. Desai, Amiva K. 8'1.'iu N. H. Hineorani, R. H. Dhebar, S. P. Nayar, for the respondents (in W.P. No. 376 of 1970)·, Niren De, Attorney.General Jaoa-lish Swarup, Solicitor-Genera/ fi. R. Gokhale, R. H. Dhebar, 1S. K. Dholakia and S. P. Nayar, for the respon· dents (in W.P. No. 377 of 1970). Niren De, Attorney-Genera/, lagad/sh Swaruo, Solicitor-Genera/, V, A. Sevil Muharnma-1 R. H Tl~ebar and S. P. Nayar, for the respondenu (in W .P. No. 378 of 1970). Niren De, Attorney-General, Jagadish Swaruo, Solicitor-Genera/ R. ll. Dhebar and S. P. Nayar, for respondents (in W.P. No. 379 of 1970). Niren De, A 'torney-General. Ja<1adish Swarup, Solicitor-Gtnt!rtl/ R. H. Dhehar. 5 P Wayar and S. Chakravarti, for the respondenls (in WP. No. 380 of 1970). Niren De. Attorney-General, Ja<1a'1ish Swarup, Solicitor-General, R. H. Dhebar and S. P. Navar, for the resPOndent (in W.P. No. 381 of 1970).

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Jagadlsh Swarup, Soliritor-General. Rameshwar Nath and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent (in W. P. No.. 382 of 1970). S. Mohan Kumaramam1alam. Ram Murthl. 8am Panjuwani and S; P. Nayar, for the respondents (in W.P. No, 383 of 1970). 3- 744 Sup. Cl/71

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R. M. Hazarnavis, R. N. Sachthey and Vineet Kumar, ror the Advocate-Cioneral, Maharashtra. M. M. Abdul Khadar, Advocate-General of Kera/a and K. M. K. Nair, for the Advocate-General for the State of Kerala.

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Lal Narayan Sinha rj.dvocate-General, for the State of Bihar, D. P.

Singh, R. K. Garg and $. C. Agarwala, for the Advocate for the State of Bihar. B. Das, Advocate-General, for the State of West Bengal, S. S. Ray, G. S. Chatterjee and Sukumar Baru, for the Advocate-General for the State of West Bengal. Ashok Das, Advocate-General, for the State of Orissa, S1ntosh Chatterjee and G, S. Chatterjee, for. the Advocate-General for the State of Orissa. G. S. Kasliwal, Advocate-General for the State of Rajasthan land K, Baldev Mehta, for the Advocate-General for State of Rajasthan,

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H. L. Sijabal, the Advocate-General for the State of Punjab and R. N. Sachthey, for the Adyocate-General for the State of Punjab. A. C. Gulati, Rajinder Jain, D. P. Ghosh and G. Banerjee, for the intervener (in W.P. No. 376 of 1970)

HmAYATULLAH, C.J. delivered a separate concurring Judgment. The Judgment of SHAH, S!KRI, SHELAT, BHARGAVA, VAIDIALINGAM, GROVER and DUA, JJ. was delivered by SHAH, J. HEGDE, J. delivered a separate concurring judgment. MITTER and RAY, JJ. gave dissenting Opinions.

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Hidayatullah, C.J.-Ori September 6, 1970, the President of India passed a laconic order in respect of each of the Rulers of former Indian States. The order was served by a Secretary to Government of ~ndia. A sample order issued to the Ruler of Gwalior State may be read here :

No. 21/14/70-Poll.III Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs New Delhi the 6th September I 970

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ORDER In exercise of the power vested in him under Article 366 (22) of the · Constitution, the President hereby directs that with effect from the date of this Order His Highness Maharajdhiraia Madhav Rao Jiwaji Rao Scindia· Bahadur do cease to be recognised as the Ruler of Gwalior.

By order and in the name of the President. Sd./L. P. SINGH Secretary to the Government of India

MADRAY RAO

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v. UNION (Hidayatul/ah, C.J.)

All these orders were notified together in the Gazette of India of September 19, 1970, Part II. They resulted in the forthwi.th stoppage of the Privy Purse.s received by the Rulers and the dis· continuance of their personal privileges.

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These writ petitions under Article 32 of the Cmstitution were filed by some of the Rulers as test cases to question the orders. They ask for a writ, direction or order, declaring the Presidential Order to be unconstitutional, mala fide, ultra vires and void, and for quashing it, a writ, direction or order declaiing that the several petitioners continue to be Rulers and thm to be entitled to th.~ir respective Privy Purses and personal rights and piivileges and a further writ, direction or order directing the Union of India to continue to pay the Privy Purses as before and to recognise the personal rights to privileges and to observe the provisions of the Covenants and Merger Agreements. 1bis .iudgmetrt and order will govern all these petitions. Since the issues involved in all the petitions are eommon and there are only minor differences in the steps before the States merged with othe Indian Union, it is sufficient if an illustrative petition is dealt with. In this judgment I shall refer to the petition filed by the Ruler of Gwalior which is first on my list and embraces almost all the varying aspects of the question. The other petitions are identical except for some details which are special to a particular Ruler .but are not material for the discussion of the issues involved. The Ruler of the Gwalior State succeeded to the gaddi of the State on July 16, 1961 on the demise of his father. On August 15, 1947 the father had signed an Instrument of Accession of \his state to the Dominion of India, as then established, and it was accepted by the Governor-General of India on the following day. This Instrument ·of Accession .was similar to those which the other Rulers signed on diverse dateS. It is to be found at p. 165 of the White Paper on Indian States and is exhibited witl!. the Petition as Ex. A. On April 22, 1948 the father, as Ruler, signed a Covenant with other Ru!e•s of this area and the United States of Madhya Bharat was formed on June 15, 1948. On the coming into force of the Constitu•ion of In9ia, the S•ate of Madhya Bharat became a Part B State. On the passinl( of the Constitution (Seyenth Amendment) Act 1956, Madhya Bharat State ceased to be a Part B S!ate and was integrated with the State of Madhya Pradesh as provided under the States Reorgani5ation Act, 1956. I shall now say something in more detail about these several steps. The Instruments of Accession were executed in furtherance of the Indian Independence Act, 1947.i On June 3, 1947 the

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British Government announced their plan of transfer of power in India. The Government of India formed a Ministry of States under Sardar Valiabhbhai Pa:tel and it was decided to secure the accession of Indian States on three subjects : External Affairs; and Communications. The Act provided for lapse of sovereignty of the British Crown in India over the Indian S:ates and they were free to accede to any of the two Dominions of India or Pakistan or to continue as independent sovereigns. A reference to the Indian Independence Act, 1947 appears necessary at this stage. The preamble of the Act stated that the Act was to make provision for the setting up in India of two independent Dominions and to provide for matters consequential on or connected with the setting up of those Dominions and to substitute certain provisions in the Government of India Act 1935. Section 1 of the Ac( fixed the 15th day of August, 1947 as the appointed date, from which the two independent Dominions were to come into existence. Section 2 demarcated their territories, but without pre· judice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section ( 3) of that section,· the accession of Indian States to either of. the two Dominions was not to be prevented. Immediately afterwards the India (Provisional Constitution) Order 1947 was promulgated and certain subsiitutions were made in the Government of India Act 1935 by the Governor-General by virtue of subsection (2) of Section 8 read with secti~ 9 of the Indian Independence Act. Sections 5 and 6 of the Government of India Act 1935 were replaced by the following sections :

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"5. Establishment of the Dominion : ( 1) The Dominion of India established by the Indian Independence Act, 1947, shall as from the fifteenth day of August 1947, be a Union comprising:--

(a) the Provinces hereinafter called Governors' Provinces; (b) the Provinces hereinafter called Chief Commissioners' Provinces. ( c) the Indian States acceding to the Dominion in the manner hereinafter provided, and

( d) any other areas that may with '!he consent of the Domllllon oe 1uciuoeo m the Dominion. ( 2) The said Dominion of India is hereafter in this Act referred to as "the Dominion" and the said fifteenth day of August is hereafter in this Act referred to as 'the date of the establishment of the Dominion'.

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MADHAV RAO v. UNION

(Hidayatu/lah, C.J.)

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6. Accession of Indian States-( 1) An Indian State shall be deemed to have acceded to the Dominion if the Governor General has signified his acceptance of an Instrument of Acces·ion executed by the Ruler thereof whe1eby the Ruler on behalf of the State : (a) declares that he accedes to the Dominion with the intent that the Governor-General; the Dominion Legislature, the Federal Court and any oth.~r Dominion authority established for the purposes of the Dominion shall, by virtue of his Instrument of Accession but subject always to the terms thereof, and for the purpo es only of the Dominion exercise in P~lation to the State such functions as may be vested in them by order under this Act: and

( b) assumes the obligati!Jn of ensuring that ctue effect is given within th.~ State to the provisions of this Act so far as they are applicable therein by virtue of the Instrument of Accession.

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( 2) An Instrument of Accession shall specify the matters which the Ruler acceo•s as matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for the State and the limitations. if any, to which the power of the Dominion Legislature to make laws for the State, and the exercise of the executive authority the Dominion in the State, are respectively to be subject.

( 3) A Ruler may, by a supplementary Instrument executed by him and accepted bv the Governor General vary the Instrument of Accession of his State by extending the functions which bv virtue of that Instrument are exercisable by any Dominion authority in relation to his State.

( 4) References in this Act to the Ruler of a State include references to any persons for the time being exercising the powers of the Ruler of the State whether bv reason of the Ruler's minority or for any other reason.

( 5) In this Act a State which has acceded to the Dominion is referred to as an acceding State and the Instrument by virtue of which a State has so acceded

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construed together with any supplementary Instrument executed under this section, is referred to as the Instrument of Accession of that State. ( 6) As soon as may be after an Instrument of Accession or supplementary instrument has been accepted by the Govemor-General under this Section, copits of the Instrument and of the Gover!lor-General's acceptance thereof shall be laid before the Dominion Legislature and all courts shall take judicial notice of e.very such instrument and acceptance." In furtherance of these new provisions, the Instruments of Accessio, were executed on cjifferent dates, after negotiations between the Government of India and the Rulers, but nothing t;urns apon the date of an Instrument. Many Rulers had immediately 1igned Instruments of Merger, transferring full and exclusive authority,' jurisdiction and powers in relation to the governance of lheir States to the Government of India. They were merged with the existing Provinces or were set up as Chief Commissioner's Provinces. \ Some others signed Instruments of Accession first and [mtruments of Merger later. The remaining at first formed themselves into different Unions of States, making over the administration of their .States to a Rajpramukh of the Uniori of th~ States vesting in him all rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler which appertained to or were incidental to the Government of the Covenanting States. In this way several Unions of States or United States emerged. A brief reference to the Instru· ment of Accession, the Covenants and the Instruments of Merger is necessary at this stage, The Ruler of Gwalior, father ' of tho present petitioner, joiped the United State of Madhya Bharat as already indicated. : I can therefor~ conveniently study the Instru· ment of Acce~sion ·and the Covenant executed by him as i!lustra· tive of the documents signed by the Rulers, I begin with the In•trument of Accession. In the Preamble to the Instrument the Ruler observed that he was executing it in the exercise of his sovereignty in and over his State. He declared that he was acceding to the Dominion of India and authofred the Gove· nor-General of India. the Dominion Legislature. the Federal Court and anv other Dominion Au•hnri•v. estahl;shed for the purposes of the Dominion to exerci•e in relation to hi• S•ate fu"ctiom vest.ed in them bv or under the Govef"ment of India Act 1935 r1s in force on the 15th AuPust 1947. On his part he undertook the obli<>Rtion of ensurin!! thqt effect wn< given to the provisions of the Governrne'1t of Indh Act 193'i in his Sta•e. He accented that the Dominion Le11isJaturP, would make law~ with respect to matters specified in the Schedule to his Instrument.

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MADHAV RAO v. UNION

(Hidayatu//ah, C.J.)

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These topics have only a historical significance and need no men· tion here. There were certain reserva.ions, particularly in iegard to any future constitution of India affecting the continuance or his sovereignty in and over the State, and the exercise of any powers, authority and rights then enjoyed by him as Ruler. The Governor-General accepted the Instrument of Accession and signed it in token thereof. The Ruler of Gwalior next signed a Covenant with certain Rulers 'in the former Madhya Bharat area and agreed' to fo1m a United State of Madhya Bharat. The covenant contains 18 articles and 4 schedules. This covenant is a detailed document and is reproduced in the White Paper and is also exhibited in the case before me. It is not necessary to refer to all its terms but the relevant ones may be noted here. The Covenanting States agreed to unite and integrate their territories into one State with common Executive. Legislature and Judiciary. Ro~m wa> kept for other, Rulers to join later if they were so minded. The Covenant established a Council of Rulers, with a right to elect a President (to be called the Rajpramukh of the Unitej State) and one Senior Vice-President and two Junior Vice-Presidents. The President and the Senior Vice-President were to hold office during their lifetime and the Junior Vice-Presidents for a term of five years. The Rajpramukh was to be aided and advised by a Council of Ministers to be chosen by him and they were to hold office during his pleasure. July l, 1948 was fixed for making over the administration of the Covenanting States to the Rajpramukh including a transfer of all assets and liabilities of the Sta:e and of the Scheduled Areas. The Rajpramukh had jurisdiction to make laws for the peace and good Government of those are1s whether with or without consultation with his Council of Ministers but subject to direction or instructions of the Government of India. The Rajpramukh was to execute by 15th June 1948 a fresh Instrument of Accession in place of the separate Instruments already executed by the Covenanting Rulers. Bv that Instrument he was to accept the mi.king of laws by the Dominion Legislature on ail matters mentioned in Lists I and Ill of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act 1935 except the entrie> in List I relating to any tax or duty. The Ra/oramukh and the Vice· Presidents were to enter upon their dut(es on 11th May 1948. The Raioramukh and the Vice-President were to be paid . Rs. 2.50 000 per year as consolidated allowances and the Junior Vice Presidents were to be paid such allowances as the Rajpramukh was to fix. The executive authority Of the United State (subiect to the provisions of the Covenant ,and a Comtitution to be framed lat.er) was ~o be exercised bv the Rnjpram11kh and the c<'mpetant Legislature of the United StMe was to be given the cC'mpetence to confer functions upon the subordinate authori1ies bm the Covenant

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was not to· be deemed to transfer to the Rajpramukh any functions conferred by any existing law on any Court, Judge, officer or local or other authority in a Covenanting State. The Covenant next provided for the setting up, as soon as possible, of a Constituent Assembly in the manner set out in the Third Schedule to the Covenant to frame a Constitution of a unitary type for the United State within the f1 amework of the Covenant and the Constitution of India and for providing a Government responsible to. the Legislature. The Rajpramukh was to ~onstitute not later than August 1, 1948 an interim Legislative Assembly for the United State in accordance with the provisions set out in Schedule IV till the formation of rhe Constituent Assembly which was then to pe1form legislative fa 1ctions as well. The Rajpramukh was also given power to promulgate Ordinances. Anicles XI tu XV were as follows :

ARTICLE XI ( 1) The Ruler of each Covenanting S•ate shall be entitled to receive annually from the revenues of the United States. for his privy purse the amount specified against that Covenanting State in Schedule I :

Provided that the sums specified in the Schedule

In respect of the Rulers of Gwalior and Indore shall be payable only to the present Ruters of the1e States and not to their successors for whom provision will be made subsequently. (2) The said aml1unt is intended to cover all the expenses of the Ruler and his family including expen~es of his residence, marriages and other ceremonies, etc. and shall subject to the provisions of paragraph ( 1) neither be increased nor reduced for any reason whatsoever.

( 3) The Rajpramukh shall cause the said amount to f.e paid to the Ruler in four equal instalments at the ix;ginning o_f each quarter in advance. ( 4) The said amount shall be free of all taxes .whether imposed by the Government of the United State or by the Government of India.

MADHAV RAO v. UNION (Hidayatul/ah, C.J.)

ARTICLE XII

( 1) The Ruler of each Covenanting State shall be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties (as distinct from State properties) belonging to him on the date of his making over the administration of that State to the Raj Pramukh. (2) He shall furnish to the Raj Pramukh before the first day of August 1948 an inventory of all immovable properties, securities and cash balances held by him as such private property.

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( 3) If any dispute arises as to whether any item of property is the private property of the Ruler or State property, it shall be referred to such person as the Government of India may nominate in consultation with the Raj Pramukh and th.e decision of that person shall be final and binding on all parties concerned : Provided that no such dispute, shall be so referable after the first day of July 1949.

ARTICLE XIII

The Ruler of each ·covenanting Siate, as also the members of his family, shaU be entitled to all the per~onal privileges, dignities and titles enjoyed by them, whether within or outside the territories of the State, lmmediat>:ly before the 151th day of August 1947. AR,TICLE XIV

(I ) The succession, according to law and custom to the gaddi of each Covenanting State, and to the personal rights, privileges, dignities and titles of the Ruler thereof, is hereby guaranteed. (2) Every question of disputed succession in regard to a Covenanting Stat.~ shall be decided bv the Council of Rulers after referring it to a bench consisting of all the available Judges of the Hi!?h Court of the United State and in accordance with the opinion given by the High Court." Article XV gave corr.plete immunitv to the Ruler in respect of past acts and omissions. The next two articles gu~ran•eed t~e continuance in servic~ of the perm"nent members of the pubhc service of the States on conditions not less advantageous than those exis•ing on April 1S. 1948 or navment lo them of reasonable compensation. There were .other guarantees and also

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immunity for past acts or omissions in the execution of duty as a Public servant. Article XVIII continued in their respective States the prerogative of suspension, remission or commutation of death sentences enjoyed by the former Rulers of Gwalior and Indore. Schedule I then stated the Privy Pmses of the Ru'ers. It was divided into two sections-Salute States and Non-Salute States. They ranged from Rs.. 25.00.000 to the Ruler of Gwalior to Rs. 6,000 to the Ruber of Mathwar. The rest of the provisions are not material for my discussion.

Tl1P, Covenant was signed by all the Rulers of the Covenanting States and the Government of India enuorsed on it their acceptance thus :

"The Government of India hereby concur in the above Covenant and guarantee all its provisiom. In confirmation whereof Mr. Vapal Pangunni Menon, Secretary to the Governn:-;nt of India in the Ministry of States, apnencls his signature on behalf and with the authority of, the Government of India.

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Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of States". Further agreements were devised for each of such other States as 'mi~ht join later and the Government of India concurred in the same way with such agreements.

A fresh Instrument of Accession was executed by the Rajpramukh on behalf of the United State of Madhva Bharat. Special provi~ions were made for avoiding legisla•ive conflict, and for any future agreemP.nt between the RajpNmukh and the Government of India. Such agreements were to form part of the Instrument of Accession. It was however expressly provided by clause 6 as follows:

"6. The terms of this Instrument of Acces·ion shall not be varied bv any amendm~nt of the Act or of the Indian Independence Act. 194 7. unless such amendment is accented bv the Raj Pramukh of the United Sta>~ by an Instrument supplementary to this Instru-

me11 ... "

The Governor-General of India accented thi< Instrument of Accessioi:i on Sentember 13. 1948. By the,, 23 Rnl~rs had joined the Umte? S'.ate .. On _Nov.~mher. 24, 1949. on the pas<ing of tht; Constitution of India, the Ra1pramukh issued a Proclamation after

MADRAY RAO v. UNION

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(Hidayatullah, C.J.)

a resolution of the Covenanting Rulers. It affirmed the 'constitutional relationship' between the United State and the Dominion of India and provided as follows : "PROCLAMATION FOR MADHYA BHARAT Gwalior, the 24th November 1949

WHEREAS with the inauguration of the new Constitution for the whole of India now being framed by the Constituent Assembly of India, the Government of India Act, 1935, which now gcYems the cons'itutional relationship between this State and thr. Dominion of India, will stand repealed; AND WHEREAS, in the best interests of the State of Madhya Bharat, which is closely linked with the rest of India by a community of interests in the economic, political and other fields, it is desirable that the constitutional relationship established between this State and the Dominion of India, should not only be continued as between this State a.nd the con•emp ated Union of India but further strengthened, and the Comtitu•ion of India as drafted by :the Constituent Assembly of Ind;a, which includes duly appoin•ed representatives of this State, provides a suitable basis for doing so; I, Jiwajirao Madhavrao Scindia, Raj Pramukh of the Madhya Bharat, now hereby declare and directThat the Constitution of India shortly to be adopted by the Constitu.~nt Assembly of India shall be the Constitution for the Madhya Bharat as for the other parts of India and shall be enfor~ed as such in accordance with the tenor of its provisions; · That the provisions of the said Constitution shall, as from the date of its commencement, supersede and abrogate 'all other constitutional provisfons inconsistent therewith which are at present in force in this State.

This in short is the con•titutional history of the States which united to form the United State of Madhya Bh•rat. It is apparent that the Instrument of Accession and the Covenants ope·ated as a constitution in little for the g;overnan~e of the United State. The identity of the United State as a s.~mi-indepenclent unit was preserved an<1 the constitutional framework of this State was indicated. The CoveMnt was an Act of State on the ;:i•rt of the Rulers. lt may be re<r•rded also as such bv the Govef!lment of India alth011Qh no volition. beyon<l c'>ncurrence, of th. Government played any part whatever might have been the diplomatic

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consultations between the acceding United State and the Government of· India. The Government of India merely accorded them recognition and guaranteed its provisions. If treated as an Act of State it ended with the recognition. It was also an Act· of State on the part of the Rulers who surrendered their rights but the provisions that they evolved for the joint governance of their territories made a constitution proper of which the Courts were to take judicial notice and apply according to their tenor as occasion demanded. From the5e documents flowed consequ~nces which were binding alike upon the Covenanting States, the United State of Madhya Bharat and the Gov.~rnment of India and the Courts. None of them could avoid these consequences. The Merger agreements were much simpler documents. As an illustration I may refer to the Bilaspur Merger agreement; It was executed on th.~ 15th August 1948 by the Raja of Bilaspur. It consisted of five alticles. By the first article the Raj l C'°Aed to the Dominion government full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the governance of the State, agreeing to transfer the administration on October 12, 1948. By article 2 the Raja wa< to receive annually a sum of Rs. 70,000/as privy purse free of taxes. The sum included Rs. 10,00C)./- as an allowance for the Yuvraj. These amounts wei;.~ to cover all expenses and were not to be increased nor reduced for any reason whatsoever. By article 3 the Raja was entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties (as distinct from State· prope• ties) belongillg to him, and he was to furnish an inventory of such proper•ies. In case of dispute the matter was to be referred to such officers with judicial experbnee as tl.e Dominion government might nominate and the decision was to b.~ binding on both parties. By article 4, the Raja, the Rajmata, the Yuvrai and the Yuvrani were to enjoy all personal privileges enjoyed, by them within and without the territories immediately before the 15th day of August 1947. By article 5 the Dominion government guaranteed the succession, according. to hw and custom. to the w1Ui of the State and to the R"j1'< personal rights, privile11e<. digni•ie< and titles. The Merger agreement wa< signe<l bv the Raja and Mr. V. P. Menon, Secretary in the Ministry of States. Although the Merg.~r Agreement of the Raja of Bilaspur sufficiently illustrates the line followed it may be mentioned here that some of the Merger Agreements had more clau<e< than the one noticed. In the Merget Agreement of the Maharao of Kutch there were o•her articles such as immu~itv for past acts of the Maharao in his personal capacity or otherwise and also a guarantee for continuance in service of the permanent members of the Public services of Kutch and for their conditions of service, pensions

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MADHAV RAO v. UNION

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(Hidayatullah, C.J.)

and leave salaries and immunity for past acts. In the Bhopal Merger Agreement the Nawab was to receive Rs. 11,00~000/- as Privy Purse but each of his successors ~as to rece1v~ only Rs. 9 00,000/-. Article IY however provided that the mcome deriv~d annually from the share of the Nawab in the original investment by Qudsia Begum in the Bhopal State Railway, which share was agreed to be Rs. 5,50,000, was to be treated as 'the pe1sonal income of the Nawab and to be paid by the Government of India to the Nawab and his sucessors. Article VII provided that the succession to the throne of Bhopal State would be governed by and regulated in accordance with the provisions of the Act known as "The succession to the Throne of Bhopal Act of 1947", and then in force in the Bhopal State. The Government of India further agreed that all rights and piivileges secured by the Agreement to th.~ Nawab would be continued to his successor. The course of historical events is different according to the States emerged in or merely acceded to the Dominion. The merged States were either incorporated in the e)Cisting Govenor's Provinces or, were administered centrally as Chief Commissioner's Provinces. I am not concerned with these historical events and, therefore, I refrain from saying anything here. The next step in the chain of historical events in regard to Gwalior came with the Constitution which was accepted by the Rajpramukh in his Proclamation. Special provisions were incorporated in the Constitution to which reference may be made here. Four Articles in the Constitution are only relevant and are quoted here. Article 291 was amended by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 by deleting clause (2) but is quoted here as it was before the Amendment : "291 (1) Where under any covenant or agreement entered into by the Ruler of any Indian State before the commencement of this Constitution, the payment of any sums, free of tax, has been j!Uaranteed or assured by the Government of the Dominion of India to any Ruler of such State as Privy Purse. (a) such ~urns shall be charged on, and paid out of, the Consolidated Fund of India; and (b) the sums so paid to any Ruler shall be exempt from all taxes on income.

(2) Where the territories of any such Indian State as aforesaid are comorised within a State specified in Part A or Part B of the First Schedule. there ~hall be charged on, and paid out of, the Consolidated Fund of

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that State such contribution, if any, in.; respect of the payments made by the Government of India under clause ( l) and for such period as max, subject to any agreement ente.eq into in that behalf •der clause ( I} of article 278, be determined by ord1f Of the President".

This Article does not apply to the State of .\lmmu and Kashmir. Article 366 contained a definition in (21) ~ch was deleted by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 1956. This definition may be read here : "366. In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires, the following expressions have the meanings he1eby respectively assigned to them, that is to say-

(21) "Rajpramukh" means-

( a) in relation to the State of Hyderabad, the person who for the time being is recognised by the President as the Nizam of Hyderabad; ( b) in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir or the State of Mysore, the person who fer the time being is recognised by the President as the Maharaja of that State; and ( c) in relation to any other State specified in Part B of the First Schedule, the person who ror the time being is recognised by the President as the Rajpramukh of the State, and includes in relation to any of the said States any person for the time being recognised by the President as competent to exercise the powers of the Rajpramukh in relation to that State;" · These two repeals were occasioned by the constitutional readjustment of States when Part B States disappeared. The definitions became obsolete after the Reorganisation and hence they were deleted. Article 366 contained other definitions in (15) and (22) which may be quoted :

"(l 5) 'Indian State' means anv territory which the Government of the Don1inion of India recognised as such a State." "(22) 'Ruler' in rehtion to an Indian State means the

Prince, Chief or other person by whom any such cove. nant or agreement as is referred to in clause ( 1) of

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article 291 was entered into and who for the time being is recogni:ed by the President as the Ruler of the State, and includes any person who for the ti!jle being is recogn:sed bit the President as the success6r of sucn Ruler;" ~

They are intact till today. So also two other Artic;les, namely, 362 and 363. Of these the fonner does not apply to the S:ate of Jammu and Kashkmir, but the latter does. They may be quoted here:

'G

"362. In the exercise of the power of Parliament .or of the Legislature of a State to make laws or in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State due regard shall be had to the guarantee or assurance given under any such covenant or agreement as is referred to ih clause ( 1) of article 291 with respect to the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of aii Indian State. 363 ( 1). Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution but subject to the provisions of article 143, neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall have jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which was entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State and to which the Government of the Dominion of India or any of its predecessors Governments was a party and which has or has been continued in operation after such commencement, or in any dispute in respect of any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of any 'If the provisions of this Constitution relating to any such treaty, agreement, covenant, engagi:ment, sanad or other smilar instrument. ( 2) In this articl~ (a) 'Indian State' means any territory recognised before the commencement -0f this Constitution by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as being such a State; and

(b) 'Ruler' includes the Prince, Chief or other person • • recognised before such commencement of His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as the Ruler of any Indian State."

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The intention behind the definitions in 2(a) and (b) specially included here was to bind even those Rulers who were recognised before and who might not have. been recognisoo by the President under article 366 (22). The Indian States formed a significant but separate part of India before they merged with the rest of India. It is common B knowledge .that the aim of the Government of India Act, 1935 was to associate the Indian States with British India as equal partners in a loose federation. When India became independent by the Indian Independence Act 1947, British paramountcy in resoect of the Indian States lapsed. In theory the Rulers became independent but, as shown above, in actual fact, almost all the Rulers signed almost immediately, Instruments of Accession in c August 1947 surrendering Defence, External Affairs and Communications. The Rulers immediately after Independence became · divided into four classes : ' ' . (a) those who had 'signed Tnstruments of Accession; (b) those who hat!. signed instruments of Merger; ( c) those who had formed themselves into Unions and the Unions had signed Instruments of Accession; (d) Hyderabad, Mysore and Jammu and Kashmir. The merged States were either directly administered by the Dominion Government as Chief Commi>sioner's Provinces or E were handed over to the neighbouriilg Provinces. Thm 216 States merged in •the adjoining Provinces, 61 States were converted into centrally administered areas and 275 States form.'!CI Unions. Only three States retained their integrity; but when the Constitution came into force, they too became part of 1he Union of India on a later date. They were Hyderabad, Mysore and Jammu and F Kashmir. The Indian States covered about 48 per cent of the area of the Indian Dominion. The population of this area fmmed 28 per cent of the total population of the Dominion. All the Rulers (including the Raipramukhs bf the Unions) issued proclamations of which refer.ence has earlier been made in relation to Gwalior. G pn the merger or integration of the States with the Union of India the. Rulers were left with a Privv PuT'e and a few of their personal privileees and properties. The Privy Purses we·e fixed with aue regard to the incomes of the Rulers before integration with a ceiling of Rs .. 10 lakhs. Eleven Rulers were to be paid more than that sum as a personal Privy Purse. The total amount H of the Privv Purses came to Rs. 5.8 crores. Todw th~ highest Privv Pur<:e i• Rs. ?ll Takhs per annum tn •h~ Ruler of Mysore and the low.est is Rs. 192 per annum to the Ruler of Kotodia.

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The Privileges of the Rulers included many items. A memorandum on these privileges was issued by the Ministry of States in 1949. It did not contain an exhaustive list but was drawn up to infonn Provincial and Union Governments about them. It contained an itemised list of 34 privileges. They included seve: ral exemptions from the operation of lndian Laws, the enjoyment of Jagir and personal property of the Rulers and members of their families, the payment by the States of the marriage expenses of the brothers and sisters of the Rulers, immunity from .some processes of courts of Jaw, 1immunity from requisitioning of the private properties of the Rulers and their families and so on and so forth. During the negotiations letters were written to the Rulers to assure them that the Privy Purse was fixed in prepatuity and the freedoms enjoyed by them would be continued.

The Privy Purses and the Privileges were continued till 6th September 1970. Their payment or enjoyment was a part of the ~arantee of the Constitution. However the All India Congress . Committee passed a Resolution on 25th June 1967 for their aboliD tion. In furtherance of this resolution the Union Home Ministry held several conferences with the representatives of the Rulers. Although shorn of all but a shadow of their former power and panoply, the Rulers seemed to regard themselves as something different from the people or perhaps, as princes in exile. They had their Concorcl, their Intendant-General and Conciliar Committee, thereby evoking a certain measure of hostility among persons who w.:re oblivious of the constitutional transition in India. The summary of the proceedings of these conferences were marked collectively as Annexur.~ A annexed to the affidavit of the Union of India. It shows six meetings between November 3, 1967 and January 8, 1970. There were perhaps a number of informal meetings and consultations. Nothing seems to have l>~en F achieved. Government of India repeated their intention of withdrawing the recognition of the Rulers a.nd stoppage of the Privy Purses and Privileges, and was µrepared only for a negotiated settlement as to th.~ tenns on which the abolition should take place. The Concord of Princes was not prepared to enter into any negotiations artd were chary of a fresh settlement which might G be broken. just· as simply as the past solemn engagements and assurances. The Rulers who, before Independence. had always displayed the sentiment Ego et rex meus had realised that Princes were not the only people in whose word trust should not be placed.

The Government of India acted rapidly. The President in his speech to the Houses gave expression to the policy of Government. A Resolution recommending the abolition was moved and passed in the Rajya Sabha. A Bill was then moved in the Lok 4-L744Sup.Cl/71

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Sabha intituled. The Constitution (Twenty Fourth Amendment) Bill 1970. It consisted of three clauses and a short statement of Objects and Reasons. The Statement read : "The concept of rulership, with Privy Purses and Special Privileges unrelated to any current functions and social purposes, is incompatible with an egalitarian social order. Government have therefore decided to terminate the Privy Purses and Privileges of the Rukrs of former Indian· States. Hence this Bill. 14-5-1970

Y. B. CHA VAN"

The Address of the President to the Joint Session of Parliament, the Resolution above referred to and the Statement of Objects and Reasons all gave identical reasons. The Bill was voted upon in the Lok Sabha on September 2, 1970. 332 votes for and 154 votes aaginst it, were cast. It was considered in the Rajya Sabha on s.~ptember 5, 1970 and was defeated, 149 voting for and 75 against it. It failed 'in the Rajya Sabha to reach the requisite majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting. The Bill originally gave no indication of the date when the Act was to come into operation but in the Lok Sabha an amendment was accept.~d by which it was to come into force from Octo.ber 15, 1970. By the second clause the Bill omitted Article 291 and 362 of the Constitution and foe third clause omitted Article 366(22). The same evening the Cabinet is said to have met and to have decided to advise the President to withdraw the recognition of the Rulers. The same night the President signed at Hyderabad an instrument withdrawing recognition of all the Rulers. Separate orders were issued to all the Rulers on the 6th September 1970 and th.~y were also notified in the Gazette as already mentioned. · On September 7, 1970, the Finance Minister laid on the table of the Rajya Sabha a statement. He claimed that the power of the President to withdraw the recognition of the Rulers was unquestioned and had also been suggested as alternative to the amem~ment of the Constitution, and that Government was in fact going to use the power after t~e adoption of the Bi!l ~end!ng the Constitution. He gave as his reason for the Presidents aetmn that the Bili amending -the Constitution was lost by a fraction of a vote in one of the Houses, th~t there was widespre~d suppoi;t against this 'out-moded and antiquated system of Pnvy Purses, that even those who opposed the Bill supported the abolition and

MADRAY RAO v. UNION I

(Hidayatullah, C.J.)

that it was Government's policy to put an end to the concept of Rulership and the abolition of Privy Purses and the Privileges. He hinted that arrangements would be made to enable Rulers to make adjustments in the transitory period. These petitions wer~ then filed to question the action of the President and tke Government of India. The petitioners put at the forefront the sentiments express.~d at the time of the Merger of the Indian States. The Princes were then described as imbued with imagination, foresight and patriotism and as co-architects of a democratic and united India. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel as the Minister in the newly formed Ministry of States made a speech on October 12, 1949 in the Constituent Assembly (Ex. C) in which he pointed out that the Madhya Bhara't Rajpramukh alone gave sufficient cash assets which, if invested, would cover payments to the Rulers as Privy Purses. and that the payments to the Rulers represented one-fourth of what they were previously enjoying. He said that there was noihing by which the Rulers could be forced to merge their_ States with India and that the Privy Purses were quid pro quo for parting with the ruling power by the Rulers and the dissolution of their Stai.es as separa•e units. He regarded this as a small price for the bloodless revolution and avoidance of mischief. He exhorted the Consti:aent Assembly that the Indian Peoples on their part should ensure fully the guarantee given to them and concluded: "Our failure to do so would be a breach of faith and seriously prejudice the stabilization of the New Order".

The same sentiments were reiterated by Mr. V. P. Menon (who was the Secretary to the Ministry) in his recent book "The Story of the Integration of the Indian States" (1961) pp. 461 and 462. He catalogued the number of villages, palaces, museums, buildings, stables garages, fleets of motor cars, aeroplanes etc. surrendered by the Rulers. He pointed out that cash balances were to the tune of Rs. 77 crores and that palaces in Delhi alone were worth several lakhs of rupees. According to him, the price paid as Privy Purses was not too high for integratiqn and indeed it was insignificant when compared with what the Rule1s had lost. .. The petitions are long argumentative documents and the reply affidavit equally so. The verbosity of the petitions (which qre almost identical) and the reply affidavit (which is comm0n to all petitions-) does not render the task of the Court in this important case any the easier. It is, therefore, necessary to place in their proper perspective the respective cases of the parties.

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A, According to the petitioners, the failure to amend the Constitution resulted in the retention in it, of the articles relevant to the Rulers' rights. These Articles, particularly Articles 291 and 362' continued the obligation of the Government to pay the Privy Purses and also to recognise the Privileges. The Privy Purses stood charged on and were to be paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India and even Parliament could not vote upon them. B The assurances and guarantees being that of the people in their Constitution, the Executive Government could not by the indirect device of withdrawing the recognition of the Rulers avoid the obligation created by the Constitution. The>e assurances and guarantees of the Constitution, the Accession and Integration were but steps and the fixation of Privy Purses and the recognition of the d Privileges was not doubt a historical fact but the guarantees flowed from the Constitution and were independent of the historical fact, and had thus to be ca,rried out according to the constitutional provisions. They based their claim not on the agreements or the covenants but on the constitutional provisions. According to them, the order of th.e President was in violation of the spirit D and meaning of Articles· 366(22), 291 and 362 and was an affront to Parliament which had turned down the move for amendment of these articles. The Presi<!ent's action robbed the articles of their content which Parliament did not allow to be done and thus the order of the President indirectly had the effect of amending the Constitution. The President's order itself was said to be ma/a fide, ultra vires since his power was to recognise a Ru1·~r at E a time and for the time being or to withdraw recognition '.rom a Ruler for cogent and valid reasons, naming in his place a successor, and not to withdraw recogni~ion from all Rules en masse for no reason except th~t the concept of Rulership was cons!dered outmoded or that some persons held the view that it should not be continued. According to the petitioners the gaddi of a Ruler F had to be filled in accordance with the law and custom of the family and could not be left vacant. The vast power to withdraw recognition from all the Rulers at the same time without nominating any successor could not and did not flow from the definition of a Ruler in Article 366(22) which contemplated the continuance of a Ruler who had signed the Merger Agreement or his G successor. The President was thus guilty of a breach of his duties under the Constitution and acted outside his iurisdiction. The act of the President was thus said to offend Articles 53, 394, 295, 291 and 362 of the Constitution .

. In 'l_1moor!ing thflir petition under Article 32, the petitioners claimed that. important ~uestions of deprivation of property and of personal liberty were involved. As illustrations the petitioners contended that the right to receive Privy Purses was a right to

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property of which the Rulers stood deprived as also of other personal properties and benefits of exemptions under diverse laws was also an inroad upon property rights. Since there was no authority of law and no compensatiOµ, the action was said to offend Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution. They also claimed that Government was prevented by promissory estoppel and had acted in breach of a fiduciary duty.

In the reply affidavit filed by Mr. Asoka Sen (Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs) all the allegations and submissions (besides the patent facts) were denied. The main contentions in reality were 'that this Court lacked jurisdiction to enter upQn this dispute in view of the express bar of Article 363 that the petitions did not lie as no righ~ of property or personal liberty of c the petitioners was jeopardised and lastly that the action of the Pr.~sident was perfectly valid and binding as it was a political act in th.: exercise of the sovereignty of India, as to which this Court could say nothing being ouside its jurisdiction. Article 363, it was claimed, barred the jurisdiction of all Courts (including the Supreme Court of India) in any dispute arising out of any proviD sion of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which was executed before the commencement of the Constitution and to which the'Government of the Dominion of India or any of its predecessor Governments was a party and which had or had been continued in operation or in any dispute in respect of any right accrning under or any liability arising out E of any of the provisions of the Constitution relating to any such treaty etc. and the preseµt was such a dispute. Since the article began with the words "Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution'', the article could only be read by itself and even the chapter on Fundamental Rights was excluded. The reason given was that these instruments were political agreements between High ConF tracting Parties and the Municipal Cour~ had no say in matters which were political or Acts of State. The Covenants were not self-executing and created imperfect obligations and depended for their enforceability upon the willingness of Governments to implement them. Since the claim was based upon what was_ recognised in these instruments, this Court could not give any relief as it had no jurisdiction to do so. The President's powers to recogG nise a Ruler, which carried with it the power to withdraw such recognition flowed from Article 366(22) and this power being an incident of sovereignty and a political act was not questionable in Courts of Law. The bar of Article 363 covered :;uch a case also becaus.~ there was nothing to show that any recognition carrying with it a Privy Purse and Privileges was ever intended to be perennial even when the State policy demanded an abolition. The Privy Purse itself being in the nature of a political pension, a claim to it was not property and no claim could arise if it was

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stopped. Article 291 did not create any legal right but only laid down the source and method of payment of Privy Purse guaranteed by the Dominion of India and even if it were assumed· that it was private property or that other property rights were affected by the withdrawal of the recognition, the matter was not justiciable because of the bar of Article 363 which applied to Articles 291 ·· and 362. The pleadings in the case are long but the points are few. The case involves a positive and a negative approach in so far as this Court is concerned. ·The positive approach involves the consideration of the reliefs that can be granted and the negative approach the bar operating under Article 363. The first approach requires consideration of the validity of the action of the President, It is obvious that if the 'action of the President is valid and operative, the implications of that action must necessarily follow. If it is invalid, for any reason, then the question of the bar of the jurisdiction of the Court to give relief will arise. The Union Government however places the bar at the very threshhold and contents that the dispute is such as is expressly barred by Article 363, but the petitioners contend that there is no dispute at all under Articles 291 and 362 or it ;.; not of the kind contemplated by that Article. The Union Government asks that the question of jurisdiction be decided first because in their opinion it is conclusive, while the other side contends that there is no dispute once the invalidity of the President's order is established, since articles 291 hnd 362 would then speak for themselves. · I imend considering first the question of the validity of.the order of the President because everything turns on it. The arguments for and against that action may, therefore, be considered. According to the Union of India the act is political and in the exercise of sovereignty and paramountcy. It cannot therefore, be questioned in a Court of Law. According to the petitioners it is not, and is a plain executive order open to question like any oth.~r such act and the bar of article 363 does not apply to such a dispute. The Union government invokes the .analogy of the British Crown Paramountcy which lapsed on the Indian Independence. In this connection the claim is that the provisions of Article 363 and 366( 15) and (22) preserve the paramountcy of the Crown in the President. This argument is inaependent of the question of bar of jurisdiction under Art. 363. It seeks to put tl}e President's act outside the jurisdiction of the Court by reasGn of the nature of tJl~act. A word may. therefore, be said aboui the para. mountcy of the British Crown and what is ;neant. Reference was made in this connection by the Attorney General to the White

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Paper on Indian States, Mr. V. P. Menon's book already referred to, and the account contained in a recent book 'The Great Divide' by Mr. Hodson. He traced the paramountcy of the British Crown in India. I do not consider it necessary to refer to them. The best exposition of British Paramountcy is to be found in a famous letter by Lord Reading Viceroy of India addressed to the Nizam of Hyderabad when the latter claimed right> of kingship. It is printed as Appendix I to the White Paper. This is what foe Viceroy said :

"4. The Sovereignty of the British Crown is supreme in India, and therefore no ruler of an Indian State can justifiably claim to negotiate with the British Government on an equal footing. Its supremacy is not based only upon treaties and engagements, but exists independently of them and, quite apart from its prerogative in matters relating to foreign powers and policies, it is the right and duty of the British Government, while scrupulously respecting all treaties and engagements with the Indian States, to preserve peace and good order throughout India. The consequences that follow are so well known, and so clearly apply no less to Your Exalted Highness than to other Rulers, that it seems hardly necessary to point them out. But if illustrations are necessary. I would remind Your Exalted Highness that the Ruler of Hyderabad along with other Rulers received in 1862 a Sanad declaratorv of the British Government's desire for the perpetuation of his House and Government, subject to continued loyalty to the Crown : that no succession in the Masnad of Hyderabad is valid unless it is recognised by His Majesty the King-Emperor : and that the British Government is the only arbiter in cases of disputed succession. 5. The right of the British Gover~ment to i~tervene in the internal affairs of Indian States 1s another mstance of the consequences necessarily involved in the supremacy of the British Crown. The British Government have indtc: · · :.., ;;~in ~nd again that they have no desire to exercise this right without grave _reason.- But the internal, no Jess than ·the external secunty which the Ruling Princes enjoy is due ultimately to the protecti~g power of the British Government, and where Imperial interests are concerned, or the general welfare of the people of a State is ~eriously and grievously affected by the action of its Government, it is with the Paramount Power that 'the ultimate responsibility of taking remedial action, if necessary, must lie. The varying degrees of

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internal sovereignty which the Rulers enjoy are all sub- . ject to the due exercise· by the Paramount Power of this responsibility. · Other illustration\ could be added no less inconsistent than the foregoing with the suggestion that except in matters relating to foreign powers and• policies, the Government of Your Exalted Highness and the British Government stand on a plane of equality. But I do not think I need pursue the subject fl!rther. I will merely adcf that the title "Faithful Ally" which Your Exal!ed Highness enjoys has not the effect of putting Your Gov.~rnment in a category separate fr!Jm that of ,other States under paramountcy of the British Crown". The 1858 Act had recognised all treaties made by the East India Company with the Rulers, as binding on the Crown. Lord Canning in his despatch of April 30, 18 60 recommended 1he Jl'~r­ petuation of the rule of the Princes over their States. This was accepted and a spetial power of adoption was recognised and new sanads were issued. The policy of annexation started by Lord Dalhousie then ceased. The Ruler could, thereafter, be punished only for extreme bad conduct but even so the territory was not' anne)l;ed. The Ruler was deposed but a successor was recognized in his pla~e.

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This1position continued down to 1935. In 1927 the Buµer E Committee clearly recognised the claim of the Princes that maktng any transfer of the Crown's rights and obligations in relation to the States, to persons not under the Crown's authority, would be conditional on the agreement of the States. This was particularly directed against art Indian Government responsibL~ to the Indian Legislature. To keep the Indian Government away from the F S:ates, afiet the advent of the Government of India Act, 1935 the old political dl)j)artment under the charge of.the Governor-General disappear.~. Previously the Governor-General's Executive Council had left the States entirely to the Governor.-General. The Act of 1935 formed the basis of a persona\ relationship between the States and the rest of India. This meant a reversal of the policy G and the British Indian Executive was slowly deprived of all con. stitutional status vis-a-vis the States. A Crown Representative was introduc.~d as the link between the States and British India. The Government of India Act 19S5 had visualised a federation between British India and the Indian States but that scheme did not materialise. The Indian States were anxious· to create soverei2n States but the Crown prerogatives i.n respect of th.~m conti- H .nued. Lord 'J.,inlithgow's declaration promised no commitment about the States without their consent in any future constitution

MADRAY RAO v. UNION

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that the Indians might frame for themselves. This was implemented by instructions to the Governor-General not to hand over paramountcy to the future Indian Government and paramountcy, so long as it lasted was that of the Crown and not of the Government of India. When the Constitution came paramountcy had already lapsed. The Indian States were able to make several reservations in their own fa;iour. They were anxious to frame their own Constitutions but many States could not withstand pressure of the Ministry of States and thought better of merging with such reservations as the Merger Agreements made in their favour. The other States like Hyderabad, Mysore and Jammu & Kashmir on the one hand and the United States or Union of States on the other also dropped the idea oi separate Constitutions for themselves (except Jammu & Kashmir) and integrated wl.th India, accepting the Indian Constitution. The Rulers were allowed to get a Privy Purse free of taxes on income and to enjoy personal property and privileges. Articles 291, 362, 366(15) and (22) were included to recognise those conditions on which surender of power had taken place. Article 363 was included to keep certain matters away from Courts and now the most important question is what was granted to the Rulers by the Constitution and how for their rights could be enferced in a Court of Law. Paramountcy as such was no more as there was no paramount power and no vassal. The Rulers had lost their territories and their right to rule and administer them. They were left only a recognition of their original title, a privy purse, their private properties and a few privileges. These rights were !he only indicia of their former soveignty but they enjoyed th.em by the force of the Constitution although in every respect they were ordinary citizens and not potentates. The paramountcy which the Crown exercised over them was different. Then the Crown had an absolute freedom to make and unmake Rulers in the exercise of paramountcy. The Constitution ensured the position of the Ruler and his successor with regard to the ~rivy Purse and privileges, although leaving the President the nght to confer that status on a Ruler by recognition. This result was reached by treaties, covenants and .agreements. The source or origin of paramountcy of the Crown was not 1!1e treaties, sanads or agreements. There were no paramountcy nghts by reason of which the British were paramount but because they were paramount, therefore, they had paramountcy rights. When paramountcy lapsed it did not fall on the shoulders of Indian Government. The right to recognise a Ruler out of several claimants was not an act of paramountcy. The seil'.dion bad to be in accordance with Jaw and custom. It was not the arbitrary power which made the conferral of Ruiership a gift

from

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[1971 ]3 S.C.R.

from the Crown. There is no provision to that effect in the Constitution or even the Covenants and Agreements. That the Constitution gave the right to the President to recognise a Ruler for the time beipg, is apparent enough but it cannot be stretched to give a paramountcy of the same character as that enjoved by the British crown. To claim such a parmountcy one has to ignore completely the arrangements by which the Rulers parted with their territories and Ruling rights and were assured of their Privy Purses and privileges. These rights became constitutionally protected rights which so long as the Ruler's line was not extinct belonged to the Ruler for the time being, In one sentence when the guarantees were given by the Constitution, paramountcy, if any, went out. If it was intended that rightful claims could be disregarded, at any tine, a very clear provision authorising that they be overridden would have been included. On the other hand article 362 says in admonitory terms that in the exercise of the power of Parliament or of the Legislature of a State to make laws or in the exercise of executive power of the Union or of a State, due regard shall be had to the guarantee or assurance given in any 'such Covenant or Agreement as is referri:d to in clause (1) of Article 291 with respect to the personal rights, privileges, and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State. This provision is Jather the converse of paramountcy in as much as it compels the two limlJs of Government to have 'due regard' to the guarantees and assurances given to the Rulers. There can be no paramountcy against a citizen of India and the Rulers today are not potentiates they were. They are citizens of India like other citizens albeit with some privileges and privy purses which other citizens do not get. That is an accident of history and with the concurrence of the Indian People in their Constituent Assembly .. The power that has been exercised against them must, therefore, be justified under the Constitution and the laws and not by invoking a nebulous doctrine of paramountcy which Lord Jowitt describes in his Dictionary of English Law thus: "The relationship of the Sovereign as Emperor of India to the rulers of the nativ.~ States, terminated by the Indian Independence Act, 1947". The Attorney General contended that article 363 'recreated' paramountcy. That article was intended to keep certain matters outside the jurisdiction of the Court. It must be construed according to its own terms. No meaning, beyond what the wo~ds c~nvey, can be attributed to tn:::>>e words by resorting to the impenal doctrine. What those words mean I shall consider later but I

C

MADHAV RAO v. UNION

,;3

reject the claim that the President or th'! Government of India-. can invoke the doctrine to sustain an illegal inroad upon the rights of citizens. Nor is the argument that this was some kind of an 'act of State' of any more validity. This Court has .ruled on !llore t~a_n one occasion that an 'act of State' is not available agamst a c1!izen. An act of State is a sovereign act which is neither grounded on law nor does it pretened to be so. H was described by me, quoting from Fletcher-Moulton L. J. Salaman v. Secretary of State for lndia(l) as 'a catastrophic change constituting a new departure', in the State of Saurashtra v. Menon Haji Ismai/(2). I have not been able to better that expression. I further pointed out that 'in civil commotion or even in war or peace, the State cannot act 'catastrophically' outside the ordinary law and there is legal remedy for its wrongful acts against its own subjects or· even a friendly alien within the State". I may again reaffirm the observations in that case based upon the statement of the Jaw by Lord Kingsdown in Secretary of State in Council for India v. Kamachee Boyl Sabha ( 3 ). This is what I Said :

"The question thus is always : Did the State or its agents purport to act 'catastrophically' or subject ito the ordinary course of the Law? This question was posed in Secretary of State iii Council for India v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba by Lord Kingsdown in these words : "What was the real character of the act done in this case? Was it a seizure by arbitrary power . on behalf of the Crown of Great Britain, of the dominations and property of a· neighbouring State, an act not affecting to justify itself on grounds of Municipal Law~ Or was it, in whole or in part, a possession taken by the Crown under colour of legal title of the property of the late Raja of Tanjore, jn trust for those who, by law, might be entitled to· it on the death of the last possessor? If it were the l~tter, the defence set up, of course, has nu foundation."

. The .defence. i.s not available, if there is only a colour of legal title agamst a c11Izen. In that event, the action must fail unless supported by law. Since there are no sovereign or political powers under our Constitution every action of the Executive limb o( Government must seek justification in some law. The very existence of article 363, which is said to incorporate some kind of

)

)

'

(Hidayatullah, C.J.)

(I) [1966] 1 K.B. 613 at 640 (2) [1960] 1 S.C.R. 537 at 544 (3) (1859] 13 Moore P.C. 22.

SUPREME COURT REPO!TS

[1971 J3 S.C.R.

-paramountcy or act of State, shows that there is no political power .outside the law, otherwise an additional bar would hardly have been necessary.

The learned Attorney General when faced by th.e rulings on the act of State of this Court and the English Courts, gave up the attempt for justification as such and pleaded that the Covenants B .and Agreements created 'imperfect obligations'. The phrase 'imperfect obligations' is more often to be met with in the Law of Contract but it was applied by Tindal, C.J. to political trewties in G. Gibson & Ors. Assigness of J. Mallandaino Bankrupt v. The East India Co. C1). There the claim was made by a retired Military Officer for pension against the Directors of the East c India Company based_ on certain treaties. It was held that such agreements- lacked vinculum juris. The phrase 'imperfect obli~ns' was thus used in regard to individuals as subjects of internationiil rights and duties. The recognition in an international ·treaty or other Jnstrument of rights enuring to the benefit of indiyiduals other· than the parties to the agreement, is sometimes ·held not to confer the right of enforceability at the instance of D :such other persons. Therefore, the beneficiary under these right.s cannot take measures to enforce them by his own independent steps. In the Petef Pazmany University(') case the Permanent ·Court of Interrtatibnal Justice obserwd : "11 is scarcely necessary to point out that the capacity to possess civil rights c.oes not necessarily imply the capacity to exercise those rights oneself". Thus ·a rule of-International Law formerly held the field that are incapable of asserting them in ·the international sphere or in th.e Municipal <:;ourts. The instrument may make them owners of rights and yet itake away the remedy from them. This is the sense in which Tindal C.J. used 1he phrase 'lacking in vinculum juris'.

person~ holding such rights

This position has now altered and ·there is a rethinking on the subject. It is now gradually gaining recognitfon that if there be ·some municipal legislation giving enforceability to the right, then the right can be claimed in a Municipal Court. This change ·of view followed the Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzing. in tlie matter of Railway officials in Danzing. ( 1) The rights given by a treaty rl!Ceived a broader acceptance there. This case :gave an exposition of the rights of individuals in the international .(1) 132 E.R. 1105

(2) Series A/B No. 61 p. 231 (I) Ad'isory·Opinion No. 15, series B No. IS.

MADHAV RAO v. UNION

•

I

''·

ff

(Hldayatullah, C./.)

5~

sphere and the Municipal Courts. The argument of Poland in the case was that the. agreement between Poland and Danzing regulating the conditions of employment of the Railway officials taken over in Railway Service, created rights only between Poland and Danzing and as that agreement was not incorporated in the laws of Poland, it created no rights for individuals, and that the Danzing Courts had. no jurisdiction to decide in respect of those rights. The Court did not accept the contention. It observed :

"It may be readily admitted that, accorcrmg to a well-established principle of international law,. the Beam-tenabkommen, oeing an international agreement, cannot, as such, create direct rights and obligations for private individuals. But it cannot be disputed that the very object of an international agreement, according to the intention of the contracting parties, may be the adoption by the Parties of some definite rules, creating individual rights and obligations and enforceable by the national Courts. That there is such an intention in the present case can be established by reference to the terms of the Beamtenabkommen." (Page 17) Before dealing with the position of the Rulers themselves, let me illustrate the application of this observation in our country in relation to third parties, safeguarded by an intenational agreement. The Covenants and Merger Agreements contained clauses guaranteeing continuance of service to the Civil Servants and of their pensions. Those Civil servants would not have been able to enforce these agreements in Municipal Courts by their own individual steps if there was no law or the rights were not otherwise recognised. But when they shared with the Civil servants of the former British India, the benefits of Articles 309-311 of the Constitution and the Rules governing such services, it is not possible to deny to them the benefits that the Constitution and the Rules confer. The Covenants, cannot then be said to create 'imperfect obligations' since the Constitution takes the matter into itself and gives them is own guarantees. The individual rights and obligations no doubt originally flowed from a contract between High Contracting Parties arid might not have create a yincu/um juris. in favour of third parties but the Constitution hav1~g granted r!ght~ and created corresponding obligations, those nghts .and obhgattons are enforceable in our Courts. This Court has tuled .on many' occasio~ t~~t a recognition of rights by law or otherw1s~ makes them 1usuc1able : see for example State of Rajasthan v. Shyam La/(1). · (I) [1964) 7 S.C.R. 174.

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[l 971 ]3 S.C.R.

The case of the Rulers in a fortiori for they are the contracting :parties. In so far as those guarantees became a part of our Constitiltii>n and were included in various statutes passed by Parliament such as the Incomeotax Act, the Wealth-tax Act etc., they would be enforceable according to the' tenor of the Constitution and the other laws (subject of course to such bar as the ConstitutiOn creates by Article 363). Then no question of an 'act of State' or of 'imperfect obligations' arises. To sustain the President's act repudiating the rights and obligations on the basis of a discarded theory of 'imperfect obligations' would drain the constitutio.n and the laws' of their efficacy by an executive act without amendment of the Constitution or the laws and that cannot be 1Jermitted. This is not a right for enforcement in foro Conscientiae to make good, or of which the performance could only be sught for by petition, memorial or remonstrance. This is a case for an a<:tion in a Court of Law if the dispute is not barred by the Constitution itself. Therefore there is no bar to the jurisdiction of this Court except that created by Article 363. The ambit of that bar will be worked out by me on the terms of that article later but bdore that bar can be applied one must know what is it that is in controversy here. The main dispute is as to the validity of the action of the President in withdrawing recognition from the Rulers without an exception. The petitioners question the power, authority and jurisdiction of the President to do so. They characterise the act as mala fide, ultra vires and therefore a nullity. I will consider the matter in the same order. The charge of /nala fide action in this conl!ection can only mean want of good faith. Good faith according to the definition in the General Clauses Act means a thing which is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently· or not. In other words an act done honestly musf be deemed to be done in good faith. Mr. Palkhivala described the act as wanting in good faith and relying on many cases contended that want of good faith must avoid the. act. It is hardly necessary to refer ,to those cases here as -it is well-settled that lack of bona fides unravels every transaction. I do not think that it is open to Mr. Palkhiv:.,:a to describe the act as wanting in good faith without pleading any collateral fact. Further it is not open to me to probe the reasons for a decision by the President. To begin with under Article 74(2) the question, whether any and if so what, advice was tendered by the Ministers to the President cannot be inquired into by any Court. Again by Article 361( 1) the President is not answerable to any Court for the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of his office or for any act done or purporting to be done by him in the exercise of those powers and duties

MADHAV RAO v. UNION

(Hidayatullah, C.J.)

; I

except in an investigation of a charge under Article 61. All that is saved is that appropriate proceedings against the government of India can be taken. Therefore, whether the President acted rightly or wrongly in the matter may be decided against the Government of India without questioning the conduct of the President. Therefore, the only question open is whether the act of the President was ultra vires the Constitution. The question of ultra vires was put thus by the petitioners :

J

"An executive exercise of power must be in aci:ordance with the Constitution under Article 5 3. Article 3 62 says that the President must exercise the power with due regard to the guarantees and assurances. The President in his action has completely disregarded Articles 291 and 362 and by withdrawing the recognition of the Princes has acted ultra vires the Constitution. Under Article 73 the Executive power of the Union is co-terminous with the Jaw making power of Parliament. When Parliament refused to amend the Constitution, the President's power did not extend that far by executive action. By his executive act the President has denuded articles 291 and 362 of their content for ever. The President was required to recognise the Rulers and has with one stroke withdrawn the recognition. . He. is trying to do indirectly what Parliament refused to do_ directly that is to say remove articles 291,362 and 366(22) from the Constitution. This has been done without a hearing to the Rulers and is in breach of accepted principles of natural justice. The rule of law prevails and no unconstitutional act of any authority, unsupported by law, can avail( 1). The action is not only against the Constitution but it also affects a large body of tax and other concessions. Prominent among them are Wealth Tax Act 1957 Ss.2 ( p) and 5 (I )(iii), Gift Tax Act 1958 S. 5 ( 1) (xiv), Hindu Succession Act, 1956 S. 5(iii), Income·tax Act 1922 Section 4(3)(x); Income-tax Act 1961S.10(19), Estate Duty Act 1953, Section 33 ( 1)(1); Part B States (Taxation Concessions) Order 1950, Clause 15. Sea Customs Act 1878 Section 23. Freedom from prosecutions and Civil suits to -a certain extent is assured respectively by the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 S. 197A and the Code of Civil Procedure l 9QS S. 87A and 87B read with sections 85 and 86. These privileges have fallen with Rulership and it could not have been (1) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 454, 460.

~8

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(1971]3 S.C.R

intended that these laws would be rendered nugatory by the expedient ·of removing the Princes."

The power to withdraw recognition from a Ruler is claimed by the Attorney General to be implidt in Article 366(22) because it defines a Ruler in terms of recognition 'for the time being' by the President. It is also contented that the power to recognise, R i!Self includes the power to withdraw recognition. It is, therefore, necessary to see. how far the President can go on the words of the article. The critical words in the. article are 'for the time being.' These words show that the Ruler is a person, who, to be consillered as a Ruler must, at any given moment of time, be recognised by the President whether he be the qriginal signatory of a Covenant or Agreement or his successor. \TI\e words thus indicate that only one person at a time can be recognised as the Ruler of a State. It also shows a continuity of succession so that a,n interregnum is avoideJ. It· does show that Rulership cannot be permanent since the continuance as Ruler depends upon th.e continuance of the recognition. But the definition neither expressly nor by implication places the power the hands of the President D to say that although a Ruler was in existence or a successor was availaQle that, there shall be no Ruler of any particular State. Such a power does not flow from the definition which contemplates the existence of a Ruler for the time being. The phrase 'for the time being' cannot mean that any person can be appointed who has no claim whatever or that temporary appointments may be E made or that no appointment need be made. The cominuity of a Ruler of an Indian State is obligatory so long as the Ruler is alive or a successor can be found. It may be that where the line becomes extinct (as happened in some cases) or no suitable successor could be found that no Ruler need be recognised. But where the Ruler exists or there is a suitable successor the power to E recognise a Ruler is implicit just as much as the power to· withdraw recognition. in suitable cases. The Union Government cannot escape. this obligation by invoking paramountcy or some state policy. The obligation to recognise a Ruler is bound up with the other guarantees contained in articles 291 and 362. The definition in article 366(22) is merely the key to find a particular Ruler. The withdrawal of recognition from all the Rulers renders G the guarantees as also the relevant articles of the Constitution inoperative. It could never be the intention of the Constitution that by an Executive act the operation of those aricles would come to a stop. The action of the President has the indirect effect not only of abrogating these articles but also of rendering certain provisions in the Income-tax Act, Wealth Tax Act, the Gift Tax Act, H the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedures etc., completely otiose. Executive action can never be allowed to have that effect unless

in

''

.

MADHAV RAO v. UNION • I

(Hidayatullah, C.J.)

the power is explicitly conferred. The intention of Article 366(22) is c:xactly the converse of what the Union Government understands it to be. The answer of the first question is that the power of the President was wholly outside Article 366(22). However wide that power, it dces not extend to wi'lhdrawing recognition of all the Rulers by a mid-night order. The President was incompetent to do so and, therefore, his act must be treated as a nullity. This question is independent of Article 363 and has no bearing upon any Covenant etc. It relates only to the power of the President in behalf of recognition of Rulers and withdrawal of recognition. The Court is, therefore, free from Article 363 to consider whether the act can be sustained or not. That Article only applies to acts within the four corners of the Article and not to acts wholly outside. I will show later how that bar can operate on Article 366(22) when I consider Article 363. For the preSl!nt I state my conculsion that having considered the matter I am satisfied that the act must be declared to be ultra vires and a nullity. This answers the first ground of attack in favour of the petitioners. The question, is however, reserved for answer whether I am barred by article 363. Before I consider the matter from the angle of the Articles of the Constitution bearing upon the controversy and the bar of Article 363 I wish to dispose of one matter which is also, in a manner of speaking, a bar at the very threshold. That bar would arise if this is not a petition covered by Article 32. The petitioners seem to base their claim to relief on four grounds : (a) That the order of the President is a nullity;

(b) that by the oraer of the President their privy puruses are stopped and that is an infringement articles 19 (1 )(f) and 31; ( c) t~at the order also deprives them of their priVJleges and some are property rights and some affect personal liberty; and ( d) that statutory rights under certain sta'tutes (already mentioned above) are destroyed and ~ey result in deprivation of property through illegal taxes. It .is .sufficient for this purpose to find out if any right of propert~: is .mvolved. 1:he most outstanding effect of the order is the depnva.tion of the Pnvy Pu~es. These Privy Purses are charge on and. paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India, free of an taxes on mcome (Art. 291 ). If the payments are obligatory and they

5-L744Sup Cl/71

[1971 J3 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

can be regarded as JJroperty a petition under Article 32 will lie as the action to deprive the Rulers of their Privy Purses must be an infringement of Articles 19 and 31. Therefore, I need begin only with the Privy Purses, the stoppage of which is the direct consequence of the order withdrawing recognition. A preliminary point arises und~r article 19 whether the Rulers can be regarded as citizens. I have assumed this so far as I cannot see how otherwise they can be described. In H.H. the Maharana Sahib Shri Bhagwat Singh Bahadur of Udaipur v. The State of Rajasthan(I) it is laid down that : "The appellant has also, since the Constitution, been a citizen of India, and his recognition as Ruler under Art. 366(22) of the Constitution has not altered his status, but as a citizen he is undoubtedly assured a privileged position." Therefore, the matter 19 and Article 31.

can be considered bath

under Article

In two cases of the Court Madhaorao Pha/ka v. State of Madhya Bharat( 2 ) and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ranajirao Shinde and Anr.( 8 ) pensions and cash grants ..wre regarded as property. The reason for the decision is not as fuily given as th.~ ·importance of the subject required and, therefore, I permit myself to say a few words here. I shall show later that the obligation to pay the Privy Purse to a Ruler is absolute and the right to claim it when due subsists in . each Ruler. This is a petition for 1the enforcement of Fundamental Right to property and therefore the petitioners must show that a right to property js infringed or is in imminent danger of being threatened. The learned Attorney General qur.stioned the competency of these petitions and the claim that property rights were involved. According to him the right is one to continue to receive a payment dt! futuro and no more. A right to reooive payment is not, according to him, a right to property. The attempt is to equate the periodic payments as being in the nature of payments of debts. It is said that this creates a right in personam and nota right in rem. Therefore, there is enforcement of an obligation in pers01uim but nQt a right to reach property which can be ·said to belong to the Rulers. I do not acc.~pt the contention of the learned Attorney-General. (\) [\95i] 5 S.C.R. I, at p1ge 6 (2) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 957 (3) [1968) 3 S.C.R. 489

',

•

MADRAY RAO v. UNION

(Hidayatu/lah, C.J.)

In his summary of the Law of Contract (p. 124) Langdell remarked that 'a debt. . . . . . according to the popular conception of the term, is a sum of money belonging to one person (the creditor), bnt in the possession of another (the debtor). He questioned this approach. Blackstone contrasted property in possession and property in action and held contracts to be within the latter (1). He was in effect thinking of a debt. According to him property in ·action exists :

"Where a man hath not the occupation, but merely a bare right to occupy the thing in question, the possession whereof may, however, be recovered by a suit or action at law ........ " He was of opinion that till then the thing or its equivalent, remains in suspense, and the injured party has' only the right and not the occupation. It being a thing in potentia and not in esse it is only a thing in action and not possession. Sohm (The Institutes) also says that till the fulfilment of the obligations the creditor has right only against the debtor and not against a thing.

This old concept of property is no longer held to be true. Mark by ( 2 ) regards the liability of the promisor as itself a thing which is capable of being bought. and sold, assigned and '!fans, fen:ed and if of money value, may itself be regarded as an object of ownership. An obligation according to him is as much a res as any other property and the only difference is in !he mode of enjoyment.· The ·creditor realizes this ownership by compelling the debtor to perform his obligation. As illustration he gives a catalogue of passive rights of ownership. Anson (Principles of Law Contract) supports him by pointing out that an obhgation is a right of control exercisable by one person over others for F acts which have a money value.

The dynamic theory of obligations regards a debt as a claim to 'an equivalent in a value to a floating charge against the generality of things which are the properties of the debtor'. From this is developed the notion of a credit-debt where property rights arise from a promise, express or implied in respect of ascertained or readily ascertained sums of money. Thus a debt or a liability to pay money passes through four stages. First there is a debt not ye~ du,e. The debt has .no~. yet become ~ part of the obliger's thmgs because no net hab1hty has yet ansen. The second stage . is when the liability may have arisen but is not either ascertained or admitted. Here again the amount due has not become a part of the obliger's things. The third stage is reached when the liabi(1) (See Commentaries Vol. II XX" pp. 396-398) (2) (Elements of Law 1871 6th Edition p. 320)

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1971 J3 S.C.R. 1.,

!ity is both ascertained and admitted. Then it is property proper of the debtor in the creditor's hands. The law begins to recognise such property in insolvency, in dealing with it in fraud of creditors, fraudulent preference of one creditor against another, subrogation, equitable estoppel, stoppage intransitu etc. A credit-debt is then a debt fully provable and which is fixed and absolutely owing. The last stage is when the debt becomes a judgment debt by reason of a decree of a Court. Thus an American Judge held 'outstanding uncollected accounts' as property. Standard Marine Insurance Co. v. Board of Assessors(1). It is because of this that the French Law includes such obligations in mobiles. Applying these tests to the Privy Purses, it is clear 'that they woyld be property. As soon as an Appropriation Act is passed there is established a credH-debt and the outstanding Privy Purse becomes the property of the Ruler in the hands of Government. It is also a sum certain and absolutely payable. The learned Attorney-General however contends that Article 291 which charges the Privy Purse on the Consolidated Fund of India, to be paid to the Ruler free o.f all taxes on income does not provide that it shall be paid and, therefore, the Article only Jays down the source and manner of payment but creates no right .to claim, receive or enforce payment. In my judgment this is a complete misreading of the Article. The word 'charged', is a term of art. In gen~ral law 'a charge' creates a pledge and also a priority in payment. The word also denotes in Parliamentary practice non-votability. The latter meaning distinguishes it from those items which are payable indiscriminately from the same fund: The result of charging a sum cm the Consolidated Fund is to provide that its destination shall not be altered even by vote of Parliament and ihe charging is sufficiently effective for ensuring the right application. It also sometime~ creates priorities as in the Constitutions of some other countries. In our Constitution numerous ite'11S of payment are charged on the Consolidated Fund but no priority inter se is established. Yet Article 291 makes the ...... , ... amount payable to the .Ruler and, therefore, creates a right in him to demand it. The words of the Article are 'shall be charged on and paid out of etc'. The article makes the payment obligatory. The words when expanded read 'shall be charged on and shall be paid out of etc'. The direction to pay is in no uncertain tem1s. The article is thus self-ordaining. The recipient is mentioned in (b) where (I) I 23 L1 717, 720.

A.

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MADHAV RAO v. UNION

I

r

•

(Hidayatullah, C.J.)

the Article says 'and the sums so paid to any Ruler' and this shows who is to be paid. Therefore, the article in addition to the source and manner also lays down that it shall be paid and paid free of taxes on income to the Ruler. The Article thus not only creates a liability but also a right in the Ruler. It is selfsupporting and self-ordaining. The learned Attorney-General contends that even accepting all this as a valid construction of the article 291 of the Constitution, the petitioners must fail because they are seeking either to enforce the Covenants and Agreements or on seeking to enforce a provision of the Constitution relating to such Covenants and Agreements. The same argument is also raised in respect of articles 362 and 366(22). According to him the petitioners stand excluded by, Article 363. This is the crux of the case before us. The answer to this question depends on the meaning to be attributed to the four article in question, and determines the fate of these petitions. I begin with article 363. That article was quoted In extenso earlier. The learned Attorney-General used the historical events as background for his contention that Article 363 must be construed as giving an exclusive right of determination to the President on the subject of recognition and withdrawal of recogntion. He submitted that just as an act of State cannot be questioned in a Municipal Court so also the withdrawal of recognition cannot be called in question. He cited a large number of authorities in support of his case that an act of State is not subject to the scrutiny of the Courts. The question here is not one of an act of State. Nor can any assurance be drawn from the doctrine of act of State. What we have to do is to construe the article. It bars jurisdiction of Courts. If has no bearing upon the rights of the Rulers as such. It :.either increases nor reduces those rights by an iota. I shall presently attempt to find out its meaning. Before I do so I must say that it is a well-known rule of interpretation of provisions barring the jurisdiction of Civil Courts that they must be strictly construed for the exclusion of the jurisdiction of a Civil Court, and least of all the Supreme Court, is not to be lightly inferred. The gist of the present dispute is whether the article bars the relief to the petitioners although as held by me, the order of the President is 11/tra vires. The article commences with the opening words 'notwithstanding anything in this Constitution'. These exclusionary words are no do14 potent enough to exclude every consideration arising

64.

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[l 971 ]3 S.C.R

from the other provisions of the Constitution including the A Chapter on Fundamental Rights, but for that reason alone we musit determine the scope of the articles strictly. The artid~ goes on to say that jurisdiction of all Courts' including the Supreme Court is barred except that the President may consult the Supreme Court. Having said this the articles goes on to specify the matters on which the jurisdiction is barred. This it does in two parts. The B fiist part 'is : 'in any .dispute arising out of any provision of a tre~ty etc. which was entereo into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State to wh.~h. the Government of the Dominion of India was a party and which has or has been continued in operation after such commencement'. ThL shows that a dispute relating to the enforce- c ment,' interpretation or breach of any treaty etc. is barred from the Coutts' jurisdiction. The words 'arising out of the provisions of a; tteaty etc.'.limit the words. Thus if a treaty, covenant etc. is characterised as forged by any party, that would not be a dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, covenant etc. That dispute would be whether there is a genuine treaty or not. This illus- D tration is given by me to show that the exclusion is not all-embracing. The dispute to be barred must be arise from a provision of the treaty etc. The second part bars the Courts' jurisdiction "in any dispute in respect of any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of any of the provisions of this Constitution relating to E any such treaty etc.' FJere the dispute must be in respect of a right which accrues under a provision of foe Constitution or the liability or obligation must arise similarly from a provision. The words 'provisions of this Constitution' •re not left unqualified. They could not be left unqualified for then the latter part would have barred every dispute from the Courts. The provisions had F to be pointed out. Thtl artfcle however does not refer to any article by its 'number. If the article had said 'in any dispute in respect of any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of articles 291,362 and 366(22)' all controversy in this case v.ould have been at an end. But the article uses a qualifying phrase which does not name but describes the provisions. A G search has, therefore, to be made with a view to determining which provision answers the description and which does not. In other words, we have to satisfy ourselves, before we deny out jurisdiction, that of the articles 291,362,366(22) which one, or all of them answer the description. The requirement is that the article must be a provision 'relating to' a :reaty coveriant etc. I must therefore examine each of the three articles 291,362,366(22) to H - discover if all of them and, if not, which of thern would fit in with those words. I'

MADHAV RAO v. UNION (Hidayatullah, C.J.)

6S

The learned Attomey..Oeneral practically read every word through some dictionary or other. The words are 'relating to. They mean that the provisions must bear upon treaties etc. as its dominant purpose or theme. It is not sufficient if the tr~­ ties etc. are mentioned there for some collateral purpose. Durmg the course of arguments I illustrated my meaning by referring to B Article 102 which provides that a person is disqualified if he is an undischarged insolvent and asked the question whether the provision could be said to be relating to 'membership' or to 'insolvency' and got the obvious answer that it is the former. The fact that it mentions 'insolvency', 'insanity' etc.· does not make it any other than a provision relating to membership of parliament. c The dominant purpose and theme of the article is one and one only and that has to be discovered before one can say that it is 'relating to' this or that. A similar illustration is to be found in article 105 ( 3) where a provision is to be found relating to powers etc. of Indian Parliament and not to those of the House of Commons. Therefore, in trying to find out whether any provision is D 'relating to' a treaty etc. it is not enough to find a mention of treaty etc, That may be for a subsidiary purpose, not sufficient to qualifiy for consideration as the dominant theme. It is the dominant purpose and theme which alone determines the quality of the provision.

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I shall now apply this test to article 291,362 and 366(22) beginning with article 362 since to my mind it is the plainest of all and is definitely within the description. It provide directly for the enforcement of guarantees and assurances by requiring Parliament, the Legislatures and the Executive Governments of the Union and the States to have 'due regard' for those guarantees and assurances. The article can only be used to support a claim to rights, priV;ileges and dignities. Its dol\tinant theme is the rights, privileges and dignities of the Rulets under Cov.~nants and Agreements and therefore, the provision is 'relating to' Covenants and Agreements. The reference to Article 291 does not influence the application of the test to Article 291 because that is merely a legislative device and does not tie the two Articles together. It only saves repetition of certain ]lhrases already used in Article 291. If Article 362 were earlier in the Constitution the· phrase would have occurred in it and would have been referred to in the other article. Thereforn no conclusion can be drawn from ·,his description in Article 362. Therefore article 362 is one of the provision relating to a treaty, covenant etc. A litigant invoking its aid really relies on a provision relating to a Coveant etc.

t shall now consider Article 366(22). That is only a definition clause. It is intended to point out who is the Ruler of

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which State. It does so by saying that a Ruler is a person (a) who entered into a Covenant or Agreement before the commencement of the Constitution and the payment of any sum free of tax had been guaranteed or assured by the 09vernment of the Dominion of India as; privy purse or ( b) the successor of such Ruler. For purposes of (a) the same repetition is again avoided by the same legislative device of referring to articLe 291 for B brevity. This Article renders the certainty of assumption of Rulership to <jepend upon recognition and that recognition is worked out primarily under Covenants and Agreements. The clominant and Immediate purpose and application of the Article depends upon Covenants and Agreements. I have earlier said that the President in recognising a Ruler or withdrawing his re- c cognition does not act arbitrarily but in the light of Covenants and Agreements. All such instruments mention Jaw 11nd custom of the family except the Bhopal Agreement where a local s~atute has .to be observed. The selection of a Ruler's successor thus has to be worked out under a Covenant or Agreement. The Article, therefore, has for its dominant purpose the selection of Rulers D tbrough the application of the Covenants and Agreements. After the President has exercised his jurisdiction and power to recognise a Ruler according to his understanding of the implications of a Covenant etc, no one else has jurisdiction to enter upon the same question unless it can be proved that the act was null and void in toto. 'Vhen the President acts within the four corners of his authority the matter is barred by Article 363. If this were E not so then the recognition of a Ruler or successor by the Presidell't would be subject to further confirmation by the Courts and that ls not the meaning of article 366 (22). During the course of arguments I pointed out that if the Maharja of Jhind were recognised as the Nizam of Hyderabad, there would be no application of Article 366(22) and the action so wholly arbitrary as not to be protected by Article 363. The answer was that the President would never do so. But who would have thought in 1950 that recognition of all the Rulers would be withdrawn by a single order? . Therefore, extr.eme examples are necessary to solve extreme ca\es,·..,J have questioned the action of the President because the ..Qar of Article 363 does not ope!·ate. Neither is the recognition of an original signatory of a Covenant or Agreement involved, nor the recognition of a sucessor. The act is not even one which the Court leaves alone because the dis. cretion is exercised in a manner and to the extent a President in the proper discharge of his functions can go. What is done is to take away recognition from all Rulers and as such power does not flow from Article 366(22), the bar of Article 363 does not apply to such a dispute. It arises neither from the Covenants etc.

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MADHAV RAO v. UNION

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(Hidayatullah, C.J.)

nor from the provisions of the Constitution. It ceases to have the protection of Article 363. ArticLe 363 immediately follows Article 362. Although not much significance can be attached to the collocation of the articles, it is to be noticed that the exclusionary article wants us to search for a provision relating to a treaty etc. before staying our hands. It does leave the matter open when it could have ruled· out the mystery by naming the articles under which relief was to be barred. By applyin~ the test, I have indicated, the provision is located. One such provision is article 366(22) when the President acts within the discretion given by Covenants and Agreements. There remains Article 291 to consider. That article was read and re-read before us. Ev.ery word in that article was commented upon and dictionaries were consulted. I do not propose !Cl .refer to dictionaries at all. The words of the article are plain enough to me and I have only to discover its doininant and immediate purpose or theme to say whether it is a provision relatin¥ to Covenants or Agreements. It, no doubt, begins by mentioning Covenants and Agreements but that is not all. We cannot from that fact alone bar ourselves. The ~lationship between the dominant purpose of the provision and the Cd\•enants and Agreements still remains to be established and their involvement in the dispute must be found. In this connection we must ask the question : Is this provision in reality and substance a provision on the subject matter of Covenants and Agr.eements? It is not enough tha:f it refers to the Covenants and Agreements. It should make them the subject matter of enactment and decision. The Article when carefully analysed leads to these conclusions : The main and only purpose of the provision is to charge Privy Purses on the Consolidated Fund of India and make obligatory their payment fr.ee of taxes on income. It narrows the guarantee of the Dominion Government from freedom from all taxes to freedom only from taxes on income. Earlier I had occasion to show that the Princes had guaranteed to themselves their Privy Purses free of all taxes. The Dominion Government had guaranteed or assured the same freedom. The Constitution' limits t)te freedom to taxes on income and creates a charge on the Consobdated Fund. There were other guarantees as in the Merger Agreements of Bilaspur and Bhopal (quoted earlier) which are ignored by the Article. The guarantee of the Dominion Government is thus continued in a modified form. The reference to Covenants and Agreements is casual and subsidiary. The immediate and dominant purpose of the provision is to ensure payment of Privy Purses, to charge them on the Consolidated Fund

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and to make them free of taxes on income. The argument of' A the learned Attorney-General that it indicates only the source and manner of payment rather destroys the case for the al'plication of article 363 than lends support to it. Th.e mention therein of Covenants and Agreements is for its own purpose so that the amounts need not be specified. In this connection there is no difference between Art. 290A and 291 although the learned B Attorney-General made much of the mention of the name of the Travancore Devasom Fund in the former and absence of the names of the Rulers in the latter, or again the mention of a ~pecifio sum in the former and no sum in the latter. The article is self sustaining and self-ordaining. Its purpose is not relating to Covenants etc. but to something else. Article 291 differs from c Articles 362 and 366(22) in this that the Privy, Purses have already been settled and one has not to enforce the Covenants at all. One does not enforce the Covenants but the mandate of the Article itself. Whenever the Privy Purse is modified under the terms of a Covenant, the Article is again invoked ab extra. That dispute is not related to Article 291 and the bar of Article 363 operates. That matter is outside the jurisdiction of Courts. It D is only when the Privy Purse is a s.ettled fact of which the Courts can ·take notice, without having to construe the Covenants for itself that the bar of Article 363 is avoided. In that case the Article does not an~wer the description of 'a dispute' or of the latter part of' Article 363.

My conclusions on articles 291, 362, and 366(22) are that article 291 is not a provision relating to C::ovenants and Agreements but a special provision for the source ·of payment of privy purses by. charging them on the Consolidated Fund and for making the 'l'ayment free of taxes on income. It does not in its dominant purpose and theme answer the description in the latter pan of Article 363. Article 362 is within the bar of Article 363 be. cause its dominant purpose is to get recognised the Covenants and Agreements with Rulers However, 1n so far as the same guarantees find place in legislative measures the provisions of Article 362 need not be invoked and the dispute decided on the basis of those statutes. Such a case may not attract article 362 and consequently the bar of Article 363 may not also apply. Article 366(22) is within the description so long as the President in recognising a Ruler or a successor is effectuating the provisions of a Covenant or Agreement. It may apply when the discreti~n excrcis~ is relatable to his powers flowing from the Covenants read with the Article. However where the President acts wholly outside the provisions of Article 366(22) his action c~~ be que~tioned because the bar applies to bona fide and legl't1mate action and not to ultra vires actions.

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MADHAV RAO v. UNION

(Shah, J.)

The error in the case of th.e Union of India arises from certain circumstances. The first is to think that the paramountcy of the Crown descended upon the President on Indian Government. ln that paramountcy the recognition of a Ruler was a gift from the Crown. In view of the history of integration of States and the provisions of the Constitution in Articles 291, 362 and 366(22), there is no paramountcy left at all, if paramountcy could at all be exercised against citizens. The only discretion left is to select a suitable successor to a Ruler and perhaps to withdraw recognition on grounds which are sound and sufficient. Whether such another kind of withdrawal of recognition may be equally capable of being questioned in a Court of law, is a matter on which I do not express an opinion. Therefore the President cannot claim a total immunity for his acts from the scrutiny of the Court. Nei1he:the paramountcy of the Grand Moghul who could give Subehdarships to his Generals as he pleased nor the paramountcy of the British Crown has descended to him. This eorror is further enhanced by too facile a reading of Article 363. Any tenuous connection between an Article and the Covenant or Agreement, however remote, is not to be considered sufficient to make a provision fall within the description in the latter part of Article 363. Due regard was not paid to the fact that the draftman would have referred to numbers of Articles if the disputes of every k1nd under those article stood excluded. The learned Attorney-General relied in particular on some cases which he said )lad lajd down that the act of recognition is a political act, that it canot be questioned before a Court of Law. He also referred ~o cases in which the question of the application of article 363 had arisen. My brother Hegde in his judgment has sufficiently considered them and I am in such agreement with him that I find it unnecessary to repeat what he has said there. I adopt his reasoning. In conclusion I hold the orders of the President to be ultra vires and do~clare 'them to be so. In consequence a writ of mandamus shall issue not to enforce the orders. The petitions are

allowed with costs.

Shah, J. On August 15, 1947, Maharajadhiraja Jivaj: Rae> Scindia of GMilior-hereinafter called 'Jivaji Rao'--executed in instrument of accession stipulating that the Governor-General e>f India, the De>minion Legislature, the Federal Coun of India, and other Dominion authorities shall for the purpose of the Dominion, exer6.;c in relatie>n to the State of Gwalior, such functions as may be ·1e1ted in them by the Government of India Act, 1935, in respect of Defence, External Affairs, Communications and matters ancillary thereto.

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On April 22, 1948, twenty beads of States in the Madhya Bharat region executed a covenant to form the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa. The covenant guaranteed to each head of covenanting State payment of the amount specified therein as his privy purse out of the revenues of the United State; to full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties belonging .to him on the date of making over the administration of the State to the Rajpramukh; to succession to the gaddi of the State accord.ing to law and custom; and to all personal privileges, dignities and titles enjoyed by him within and outside the territories of his State .immediately before the 15th day of August, 1947. Five more States joined the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat) with effect from July 1, 1948. On July 19, 1948, Jivaji Rao executed on behalf of the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat) a revised instrument of accession. Pursuant to the merger agreements, it was proclaimed on November 24, 1949, that the United State of Madhya Bharat atlopted the Constitution of India as the Constitu·tion of the United State. The Constitution of India was promulgated on November 26, 1949, and was brought into force (except for certain articlts specified in Art. 394) with effect from · .January 26, 1950. The President of India recognized Jivaji Rao as the Ruler of Gwalior. The Government of India continued to pay the privy purse and accoredd to him the privileges specified iµ tL mstrument of ~~cession and the merger agreement, except those l'.'hich were modified by statutes. After the death of Jivaji Rao the 'President recognized Madhav Rao--petitioner herein-as the Ruler of Gwalior.

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Under the Madhya Bharat Gangajali Fund Trust Act, 1954, enacted by the State Legislature the Ruler bf the State of Gwalior is one of the three trustees authorised to manage the Ganga jali Fund seUfed by the State and to apply the income thereof for charitable purposes.

On September 2, 1970, a Bill intituled the Constitution (Twenty fourth Amendment) Bill, 1970, and providing that ·'Articles 291 and 362 of the Constitution and clause (22) of Article 366 shall be omitted" ~as introduced in the Lok Sabh~. The Bill was declared passed with fue amendment that the provisions thereof shall come into oporeation with effect from October J 5, J 970. On September 5, 1970, the motion for consideration of the Bill did not obtain, in the Rajya Sabha, the requisite m~jo­ rity of not Jess than two-thirds of the ~~bers present ~n? votmg :as required by Art. 368 of the Constttut1on. The motion for

MADHAV RAO v. UNION

(Shah, /.)

introduction of the Bill was declared lost. A few hours thereafter the President of India purporting to exercise power under clause (22) of Art. 366 of the Constitution signed an instrument withdrawing recognition of all the Rulers. A communication to the effect was issued "by Order and in the nall).e of the President" was received by the petitioner stating that : "In exercise of the powers vested in him under Article 366(22} .of the Constitution, the President hereby directs that/with effect from the date of this Order His Highness Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahiidur do cease to be recognised as the Ruler of Gwalior." Similar orders were communicated to. ~~I other Rulers in India who had been previously recognized under Art. 366(22) of the Constitution. -

The Union Finance Minister laid on the table of the. Rajya, Sabha, on September 7, 1970, a statement, inter alia, that: ". . . . . . Government is fortified in the belief that there is widespread support in the country for putting an end to an out-moded and antiquated system which permitted the enjoyment of privileges and privy purses by a small section of our people without any corresponding social obligations on their part.

As it has been Government's declared policy to· abolish these privileges and privy purses and also to put an end to the very concept of Rulership, Government felt they would. be justified in de-recognising the Rulers and thus putting an end to a period of political an~ other uncertainties so undersirable in a matter of this nature. Accordingly, Preside.nt has decid:d to dc;recognise all the Ru~e~s and th~reby.. term!nate their privy purses and pnv1leges · with immediate . ~ffe~~­ Orders have been issued in pursuance of the dec1S1on. Madhav Rao Scindia moved a petition on. ~ptemb_er. 11, 1970, in this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution cla1mmg( a) a declaration that the order d~te.~ SeptemJ;ler ~. 1970 ~as "unconstitutional, ultra vires and v01d a~d. a d1recu~n quashi~ that order; (b )a declaration that t~e peution~r conunues to the Ruler of Gwalior and to be entltled ro pnvy purse . and to personal rights and privileges ac_corded to. him as Rulerthand <.c) a direction to the Union of India to contmue to pay • e pnvy

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purse and to _continue to recognise the Rulership and the personal rights and privileges of the petitioner and to implement and observe the provisions of the-_covenant and the merger agreement. He claimed that in making the order 1fue President acted without authority of law; that the order was made for collateral purpose; and that by the order the rights guaranteed to the petitioner under Arts. 14, and 19 and 31 of the Constitution were infringed. The petition was later amended with leave of the Court and it was claimed that the order infringed the guarantee under Art. 21 of the Constitution also.

The Union of ·india by their affidavit contended, inter a/ia, that the petition was not maintainable because the source of the right to receive the privy purse and to be accorded the privileges C claimed was a political agrement and the privy purse was in the nature of a political pension; that Art. 291 did not impose any obligation upon the Union to pay the privy purse; that Arts. 291 and 362 of the Constitution did not invest the petitioner and the other Rulers with any enforceable rights; that recognition of the Rulers under Art. 366(22) was a "matter of State policy" and D the President was competent to pass the order dated September 6, 1970; that the order was not made for a collateral purpose as alleged; and that by the order the guarantee of Arts. 14, 19(1)(f), 31 (1) or any other article of the Constitution was not infringed. By the order of the President withdrawing his recognition as E a Ruler, the petitioner is denied the right to 'the privy pu·~., and to the personal rights, privileges and dignities accorded to him as a Ruler; he is also denied the benefit of the exemption from liability to pay income-tax under s. 10 ( 1a) of the Incom~-tax Act, 1961; Wealth-We under s. 5 (1 )(iii) & (xiv) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957; Gift-tax under s. 5(1)(xiv) of 1the Gift-tax, 1958; F and of the exemption from liability to pay duty under the Sea Customs Act, 1878, which remains operative under the Customs Act, 1961: he is also deprived of°the statutory protection that he shall not be sued without the consent of the Central Government under s. 87-B of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and 1hat cognizance of any offence alleged to have been committed by him shall not be taken by any Court without the previous sanction G under s. 197-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. 'The petitioner is also disentitled to the management and administration of the Gangajali Fund Trust. By his.order dated August 22, 1961, the President recognised the petitioner as the Ruler of Gwalior. If the order of the President is without authority of law, as the petitioner contends it is, t!tere is a clear infringement of the guarantee of the fundamental nghts under Arts. 19(1)(f), 21 and 31(1) of the Constitution.

MADHAV RAO v. UNION (Shah; /;)

It is unnecessary in· the\ view we take, to deal with the plea railed by Mr. Palkhivala that Rulership is "property" and the order of the President deprives the petitioner of that property without authority of law. ·

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Validity of the order of the President is challenged on the grounds that-( l) the Pre5ident has no power to withdraw recognition of a Ruler once recognised; (2) exercise of the power to withdraw recognition, assuming that the President. has such power, is coupled with the duty to recognise his sutcessor and an order made without recognising a successor is invalid; (3) the order of the President "de-recognising" all the Rulers en masse amounted to arbitrary exercise of power; and (4) in any event, the order was made for a collateral purpose, that is, to give effect to the "policy of the Government" after the Government was unable to secure the requisite majority in the Parliament to ·the Constitution Amendment Bill. Article 366(22) of the Constitution reads :

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"In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires, the foliowing expressions have the meanings hereby respectively assigned to them, that is to say(22) "Ruler" in relation to an Indian State means the Prince, Chief or other person by whom any such covenant or agreement as is referred to in clause ( 1) of article 291 was entered into and who for the time being is recognised by the President as the Ruler of the State, and includes any person who for the time beln& is reco11nised by the President as the successor of sucli luler.'r

Clause (1 S) of Art. 366 defines an "Indian State" as meaning "any territory which tbe Government of the Dominion of India recognised as such a State." Article 291, as amended by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, reads as follows: "Where under any covenant or agreement entered in by the Ruler of any Indian State before the commencement of this Constitution, the payment of any sums, free of tax, has been guaranteed or assured by the Government of the Dominion of India to any Ruler of such State as privy purse( a) such sums shall be charged on, and paid out of, the Consolidated Fund of India; and (b) the sums so paid to the Ruler shall be exemept from all taxes on income."

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The definition of "Ruler" in cl.. (22) of Art. 366 is in two parts :

a person is a Ruler if he being (a) a rrince, Chief or other pemon who had entered into _the covenant or agreement as is referred to in cl. ( 1) of Art. 291, is for the time being recognised by the President as the Ruler; or (b) if he is for the time being recognised by the Presidenfas the successor -of the Ruler mentioned in part (a). Use of the expression "for the time being" in relation to the persons who had entered into covenants or agreements, and in relation to the successor, may perhaps imply that the President has the pawer in appropriate cases and for adequate reasons to w;thdraw recognition, but that is a matter on which it is unnecessary for the purpose of this petition to express any final opinion.

Granting that the President may withdraw recognition of a Ruler once. granted, the power conferred by Art. 366(22). is exercisable only for good cau_se, i.e. because of any personal disqualifications incurred by a Ruler. By the provisions enacted in Arts. 366(22), 291 and 362 of the Constitution the privileges of Rulers are made _an integral part of the constitutional scheme. Thereby a class of citizens are, for· historical reasons, accorded special privileges. They cannot be derprived of those priviieges arbi_trarily, for th~ foundation of our Constiution is firmly laid in the Rule of Law and no instrumentality of the Union, not even the President as the head of the Executive, is invested with arbitrary authority. In the affidavit on behalf of the Union of India it was averred that "the concept of Rulership, the privy purse and the privileges without any relatable function or responsibility have become incompatible with democracy, equalit)'. and social justice in the context of India of today"; and that since "the commencement of ~he Constitution many things have changed, many hereditary rights and unearned income have been restricted and many privileges and vested interests have been done away with and many laws have been passed with the object of checking the concentration of economic power-both rural and industrial, the Union of India have decided that the concepr of Rulership, the privy purse and the privileges should be abolished." Thereby the executive arrogates to itself power whic,h it does not possess : our Constitution does not invest the power claimed in the executive branch of the Union. The plea that in recognising or "de-recognising" a person as a Ruler the President exercises "1J9litical power which is a soverei~ power" and that afte~ ar:i order of de-recognition. "no erstwhile Ruler can make a claim in respect of the Rulership or the privy purse or any of the pti\-ileges" since the relev~nt covenants under which the rights pf the Rulers were recogmsed were

MADHAV RAO v. UNION (Shah~./.)

"political agreements" and the rights and obligations thereunder were liable to be varied o~ repudiated in accordance with "State J?Olicy" in the interests of the peopl~ also receives no countenance · from our Const1tut10n. . The first branch of the argument is inconsistent with the basic concept under our Constitution of division of State functions; the second is inconsistent with the history of events between D4 7 and 1949, and the third reC'eives, for reasons to be presently stated, no support from the relevant constitutional provisions. Whether the Parliament may by a constitutional amendment abolish the rights and privileges accorded to the Rulers is not, and cannot be, debated in this petition, for no such constitutional amendment has been made. The petitioner challenges the authority of the President by an order purporting to · be made under Art. 366(22) to withdraw recognition of Rulers so as.to deprive them of the rights and ·privileges to which they arc entitled by virtue of their status as Rulers.

The functions of the State are classified as legislative, judicial and executive : the executive function is the residue which does not fall within the other two functions. Constitutional mechanism in a democratic policy does not contemplate existence of any function which may qua the citizens be designated as political and orders made in exercise whereof are not liable to be t~sted for their validity before the lawfully constitn~q courts : Rai Sahib

Ram Jawaya Kapur and Others v. State of Punjab;(') layanti/a/ Amrit/a/. Shodhan v. F. N. Rana;(') and Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd Ecin., Vol. 7, Art. 409, at p. 192. Observations made in two judgments of this Court, on which· the Attorney-General relied, do not support a contrary view; In Nawab Usman A Ii Khan v. Sagarma/(3) this Court held that the amount payable to the Ruler of Jaora "on account of the privy purse" was exempt from attachment in execution of the decree Civil Court, because it was a "political pension" within the meaning of s. 60 (I) ( g). of the Code of Civil Procedure. · The Court in determining the true nature of the privy purse, characterised the sanction for payment as "political and not legal". That has, however, no bearing on the question in issue here. In Kunvar Shri Vir Rajendra Singh v. Union of India and Others(') this Court negatived the claim of an applicant that his right to prope~ty was violated because the Presido~nt accepted another claimant to the gaddi of Dholour as Ruler. The Court observed that the ~ecognition of Rulershio by the President,· in exercise of his · political power , did not amount to recognition of any right to private properties of the Ruler. The Court (ll (1955] 2 S.C.R. 225 (3) [1965] 3 S.C.R. 201

6-744Sup.CI/71

(2\ [1964] 5 SC R. 294 (4) [1970] 2 ·s C.R. 631

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did not attempt to classify the exercise of the Presidential fun~on under Art. 366(22) as distinct from executive functions: that IS clear from the dictum that the exercise of the President's power was "an instance of purely executive function". The history of negotiations which culmiuated in the integration of the territories of the Princely States before the commencement of the Constitution clearly indicates that the recognition of the status of the Rulers and their' rights was not temporary, and also not liable! to be varied or repudiated in accordance with "State polir.y". Power of the President to determine the status of the Rulers by cancelling or withdrawing recognition to effectuate the policy or the Government to abolish the concept of Rulership is therefore liable to be challenged in these petitions.

The'circum. tances in which the constitutional provisions under els. (15) and (22) of Art. 366, and Arts. 291 and 362 were · iricorporated may be briefly set out.

In the era before 1947 the term "State" applied to a political community occupying a territory in India of defined boundaries and subject to a single Ruler who enjoyed or exercised, as belongillg to him, any of the functions and attributes of - internal sovereignty duly recognised by the British Crown. There were in India more than 560 States : forty out of those States had treaty relations with the Paramount Pow6r : a larger number of States had some form of engagements or sanads, and the remaining enjoyed in one or the other form recognition of their status by the British Crown. The treaties, engagements and sanads covered a wide field, and the rights and obligations of the States arlslng out of those agreements varied from State to State. The rights that the British Crown as the Paramount Power exercised In relation to the States covered authority In matters external as well as internal. The States had no international personality, the Paramount Power had exclusive authority to make peace or war or to negotiate or communicate with foreign States. The Paramount Power had the right of intervention in internal affairs which could be exercised for the· benefit of the head of the State, of India as a whole, or for giving effect to international commitments. The Government of India Act, 1935, was a step in the. direction of achieving a political unity over the entire sub-contme~t: it envisaged a constitutional relationship between .the Indian States and Provinces in British India on a federa! bastS. ~ut t~e concept of a loose federation of disparate con~utuent umts. m bich the power and authority of the Federation were to differ ~tween one constituent unit and another was soon aban<lon~ as inherently impracticable. The Second World War awakene

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MADHAV RAO v. UNION

(Shah, /.)

a new consciousness which regarded colonialism as an anachronism. With the object of transferring power to a Dominion, several schemes were evolved by the British authorities from time to time. There was the Cripps Plan, followed by the Simla Conference of 1945, and the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946. The Cabinet Mission issued a Memorandum dated May 12, 1946, in regard to the States' Treaties and to Paramountcy : it affirffied that the rights of the States which flowed from their relationship with the Crown will no longer exist and.that the rights surrendered by the States to the ParalJlount Power will revert to· the States. The void caused by the lapse of paramountcy, it was said, may be filled either by the States entering into a federal relationship with the successor Government or Governments in British India, or by entering into a particular arrangements with it or them. On May 16, 1946, the Cabinet Mission announced its Plan for the entry of the States into the proposed Union of India. They simultaneously declared that the paramountcy of the British Crown could not be retained nor transferred to the new Government. The British Parliament decided to set up the two Dominions of India and Pakistan, and promulgated ~July 18, . 1947, thr Indian Independence Act, 1947. Bys. l, t<ito new mdependent Dominions of India and. Pakistan were set up as fr-Om August 15, 1947, and s. 7 of the Act provided :

'

"( 1) As from the appointed day-

( a) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have no responsibility as respects the government of any of the territories which, immediately before that day, were included in British India; (b) the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States, all obligations· of His Majesty at that date, towards Indian States or the rulers thereof and all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction exercisable by His Majesty at that date in or in relation to Indian States by treaty, grant. usage, suffrance or other-wise; and "Provided that, notwithstanding anything in paragraph (b) or paragraph ( c) of the sub-section, <.fleet shall, as nearly as may be continued to be given tc

SuPIU!MB COURT REPORTS

[1971 )3 S.C.R.

the provisions of any such agreement as is therein referred to which. relate to Cus.toms, transit \and communications, posts and telegraphs, or other like matters, until the provisions .in question are denounced • by the ruler of the Indian State or person having authority in the tribal areas on the one hand, or by the Dominion or Province or other part thereof con1 cemed on the other hand, or are superseded by subsequent agreements, · (2) The assent of the Parliament of the United Kingdom is hereby given to the omission from the Royal Style and T,itles of the words "Indiae Impera- . tor" and the. words "Emperor .of India''.; and to the ~ssue by His Majesty for that purpose of His Royal -Proclamation under the Great Seal of the Realm." .By the Indian (ProvisionaI Consti.tutipn) Order, 1947, ss. 5. .& 6 of .the Government of India Act, 1935., were extensively .amended;· setting up machitlery for the Indian States to accede to ilie Dominion of India. Promulgation. of the Indian lnde· .. ~iwkQce Act · generatcp great political activity. On July 5, 1947, Sai:dar Vallabhbhai Patel,. Minister for Home Affairs, ·made a statement defining the policy of the Government of · India, and inviting the Princes to accede to the Dominio1~ on three subjects-Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications, in which the common interests of the country were involved. He assured the Princes that the policy of the States Department (which had been set up in place of the Political Dep< ~<ment) was not to conduct the relations with the States in a manner ·savouring of domination of one over the other; the domination, if any, would be the domination of mutual interests and welfare. He expressed the hope that the Princes· would bear in mind that the alternative to cooperation in the general interest was anarchy and chaos which would over-whelm the ~eat as we;] as the small in a common ruin, if the States and Provinces were unable to .act together in the minimum of common tasks. On July 25, 1947, at a special meeting of the Princes, Lord Mountbattenthc Crown representative--advised the princes to accede to the aopropriate Dominion in regard to the three subjects of Defeilce, External Affairs and Communicat10ns, and assur~d them that their accession on those subjects would involve no financial liability and in other matters there would be no encroachment on their internal sovereignty. Tlie nlea for accession met with a favourable resoonse. Neeotiations for accession of the States were soon comnleted and instruments of accession were executed by the heads of the Indian States. Simultaneously, Standstill Agreements, the

MADHAV RAO v. UNION (Shah, /.)

acceptance qf which was made by the Governme.nt of India a condition of accession by the States concerned, were also entered into be:ween the Dominion Governme;nt and the ac' ~ding States. The Standstill Agreements recited : "Whereas it is to the benefit and advantage of the Dominion of India .as~ell as of the Indian States that existing agreements and administrative arrangements in the matters of common concern, should co~inue fgr th!l time being between the Dominion of Indilt or any part thereof and the Indian States : Now therefo~ it is agreed between the State and the Domillion of India that :"l. (1) Until new agree'lne,its in this behal.f are made, all agreements and administrative arrangements as to matters qf common concern now ,existing between thd Crown and any Indian State shall, insofar as may be appropriate, continue as between the OOminion of India, .or, as the case may be, the pan thereof, and the State. ( 2) In, particular, and without derogation from t~

generality of sub-clause ( 1) of this clause the matters referred to above shall include the matters specified in the Schedule to this Agreement. ·

3. Nothing in this agreement includes the exercise of any paramountcy functions."

By the instruments of accession the Princes were assured that .the terms of the instrument .will not be varied by any amendment of the Government of India Act, 1935, · or the Indian Independence Act, 1947, unless such amendment be accepted by G the Prince by a ,supplementary instrument; .that notI.ing. in the instrument shall be deemed to commit the Prince in any way to acceptance of any future Constitution of India or to . fetter his discretion to enter into agreements with the ~nt of India under any such future Constitution, and that JlllliDng in the instrumeni shall atfect the. continu8!10$ of the Princes sownip~ ty in and over the State, or. save as provided by <>r under the instrument, the exercise of any powers, authority an'd ri~ts en~ joyed by the Prince as head of the siate or the validity of any law in force in the State. ·

so

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[l 971 )3 S.C.R.

~.was a. significant step in the direction of forging a vital -constitutional link between the Dominion of India and the States. It was foUowed by the next phase cuhuinating in integration of some .States in the Provinces, consolidation of other States into sizable administrative units, and some other States executing agreements integrating with the Dominion. The process of integration of States varied from State to State. 216 out ··of the States merged with the existing Provinces; 61 States were taken over as Centrally administered areas; and 275 States were integrated in five Unions of States, Saurashtra, Madhya Bharat, Rajasthan, Pepsu and Travancore-Cochin. Merger of the States with the Provinces was achieved initially in name only, because the autl1ority-executive, legislative and judicial-was still exer~ under the Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act by the Provlnces within which the States were initially merged. The merger agreements of the Unions of States were to operate as their pro· visional Constitutions. Even the Centrally administered areas did not become part of the Dominion territory.

The instrwnents of merger provided for the integration of States and for transfer of power from the Princes and guaranteed to the Princes the privy purse, succession to the gaddi, rights and privileges, and full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties belonging to them as distinct from State. properti~s. The covenants for establishing Unions of States and the. agreements of merger contained provisions guaranteeing to the heads of merged States or integrated States payment of privy purses. These instruments were concurred in and guaranteed by the Co;>ernment <Jf the Dominion of India.

The next phase was of assimilation and c'):-,solidation of the unity achieved till then. In the case of the "Provincially merged" and _-"Centrally administered" States, authority ·for exercising the powers of administration and legislation origin illy derived from the Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947, was later exer· cisable by virtue of orders issued under ss. 290A and 290B in· corporated in the Government of India Act, 1935, with effect from January 15, 1949. By an order issued under s. 290A diverse steps were taken for integration of the former .State into the Provinces. To ensure an organic unity of India, the Princes were invited to accede to the Dominion, and later to integrate with India under a Constitution with a Republican form of Government. The Princes, some out of patriotism and others from motives of selfinterest, agreed to merge their territories an~ to abandon ~I authority in regard to their territories in consideration of certam special concessio,ris. To give constitutional sanction to the n:ierger agreements, special provisions were expressly incorporated m the

I

!

I

MADHAV RAO v. UNION

(Shah, J.)

draft Constitution recognising the status of the Princes, the obligation to pay the privy purse, and the personal rights and privileges guaranteed to them. The territories of the States after integra· tion retained no political or legal identity. Special recognition was given to the status of the Princes and to their rights and the obligations of the Union, and for that purpose, Arts. 366(15), 366(22), 291 and 362 were incorporated in the Constitution. In Art. 366 (15) the expression "Indian State" was defined as meaning ar.y territory which the Government of the Dominion of India recognised as such a State; and in Art. 366(22) a special defi:. nition of the expression "Ruler" wa9 evolved for the purpose of the Constitution; by Art. 291 the privy purse was charged on, and made payable out of, the Consolidated Fund of India, and the sum so paid as privy purse to the Ruler was declared exempt from all taxes on income. By Art. 362 the Parliament, the State Legislatures and the executive of the Union and the States were enjoined to have "due regard to the guarantees and assurances" under the covenants and agreements between the Government e>' the Dominion of India and the heads of the f-;;rmer Indian States. The stage was then set for the promulgation of the Constitution. A few days before November 26, 1949, a large majority of the States proclaimed that the Constitution of India will be the Constitution for their respective territories, and shall be enforced as such in accordance with its provisions, and that the provisions of that Constitution shall, as from the date of its commencement> supersede and abrogate all other existing constitutional provisions inconsistent therewith. Merger agreements were executed to give effect to the proclamations. The proclamation and the execution of the merger agreements resulted in complete extinction of the States and Unions of States as separate units. The Princes ~eased to retain any vestigage of sovereigu rights or authority qua their former States. They acquired the status of citizens of India.

The plea raised by the Union must be considered in the light of these developments. The negotiations, the assurances given by leading statesmen, and the ternlS of the covenants and a~ ments were certainly not intended to be an exercise in · futility. The argument that the parties to the instruments were entering into solemn undertakings intending the arrangements to be temporary, and liable to be set at naught by the unilateral act of the Union of India, must be rejected.

v~sts the President with authority to recognize a pe~ as a Ruler.

In form Art. 366(22) is a definition clause: It howe:*er in-

Ciranting that under Art. 366(22) the President may withdraw the recognition of a person as a Ruler, the power to nullify impor· tant provisions of the Constitution does not flow from that clause.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1971]3 S.C.R.

The. pie.a raised by the Attorney-General that tecognition of Rulersh1p was a "gift of the President" or was "in the gift of the President" is not borne out by the position of and the nature of the powers and functions of the President under our constitutional scheme. Presiden! is made by the Constitution repository of the power to recogmse the Rulers. That power may be exercised consistently with and in aid of the constitutional scheme. A democratic Constitution founded in the Rule of Law does not envisage 'luthority in any instrumentality of the Union reminiscent of autocracy. The power to recognise a Ruler may be exercised in the case of first recognition only in favour of a person who has signed the covenant, and in favour of his successor having regard to the custom and laws governing the State if the Ruler dies, or becomes incapable of functioning or his recognitiefn is withdrawn. By the use of the expression "for the time being" in cl. ( 22) of Art. 366 the President is not invested with authority to accord a temporary recognition to a. Ruler, .nor with authority to recognise· QI' not to recognise a Ruler arbitrarily : the expression "for the time being" predicates that there shall be a Ruler of the Indian State, t4!!t if the first recognised Ruler dies, or ceases to be a Ru~, a successor· shall be appointed, and that there shall not be ll).()re Rulers than one at a given time.

By express, injunction in Art. 53 (1) of the Constitution the executive power vested in the President is directed to be exercised . "in accordance with the Constitution". That power is intended to be exercised \in aid of and not to destroy constitutional institutions. Granting that power to recognise a Ruler carri~ with it . the power to withdraw recognition of the Ruler, the power must be exercised bona fide, and in the larger interest of the people consistently with. the provisions of the constitution to maintain the··institution of Rulership. Power may therefore be exercised in the course of and for recognising·another person as a successor F to the Ruler, having regard to the laws and customs governing the State. The President js not competent to recognise a person as a Ruler who is not by the custom and laws governing succession to Rulership qualified to be a Ruler. · The President cannot obvious. ly withdraw recognition of a Ruler and recog;1ise another person as a:/matter of political patronage. Nor can be lawfully depart G from the Jaws and customs. governing succession so as to introduce a person as a Ruler ivho is not by ties of blood or affiliation related to the previous Ruler. Whether 1in certain exceptional circumstances the President may in ~anting recognition to a successor depart .in the larger .interest of the country from the strict rule or custom governing succe~ion to ~e gaddi, is a questi~n H which need not be decided. But i,mquesbonably the President is not investi:d with authority to recognize a stranger as successor to the gaddi, or m;>t to recognise any person at all as a successor

MADHAV llAO V. UNION (Shah, J.)

-

if he so .chooses. The power of the President is plainly coupled with a duty; a duty to maintain the constitutional institution, the constitutional provisions, the constitutional scheme, and the sanctity of solemn agreements entered into by the predecessor of the Union Government which are accepted, recognised and incorporated in the Constitution. An order merely "de-recognising" a Ruler without providing for continuation of the institution of Rulership which is an integral part of the constitutional scheme is, therefore, plainly illegal. Clause ( 22) of Art. 366 is intended to invest the President with authority to recognise Rulers : see Kunvar Shri Vir Rajendra Singh v. Union of India('1 ). The clause incorporates the history of momentous events which took place in India between 1947 and 1949 leaving a lasting impression upon our national and constitutional structure. Articles 291, 362 and Part VII of tht Comtitution were when incorporated intended to grant recognition to the solemn promises on the strength of which the former Princes were invited by those at the helm of affairs to join llhe experiment for achieving for the millions their dream of securing a truly democratic form of Government .in a united independent India, and clauses (15) & (22) of Art. 366 were intended to serve the purpose oi identifying the persons who remained entitled to the benefits of thosi: constitutiQJlal guarantees. A brief reference may be made to what was said in the Constituent Assembly by the Minister for Home Affairs who was in charge of the States when he moved for adoption Art. 291. He used memorable words : "These guarantees (merger agreements) form part of the historic settlements which enshrine in them the consummation of the great ideal of geographical, political and economic unification of India, an ideal which for centuries remained a· diStanct dream and which appeared as remote and as difficult of attainment as ever even after the advent of Indian independence. Human memory is proverbially short. Meeting in October, 1949, we are apt to forget the magnitude of the problem which confronted us in August, 1947. . . . . . . the so-called lapse of paramountcy was a part of the Plan announced on June 3. 1947, which was accepted by the Congress. We agreed to this arrangement in the same manner as we agreed to the partition of India. We accepted it because we had no option to act otherwise. While there was recognition in the (1)

11970] 2 S CR. 631

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(1971 J3 S.C.R.

various announcements of the British Government of the fundamental fact that each State should link up its future. with that Dominion with which it was goographically contiguous, the Indian Independence Act released the States from all their obligations to the British Crown. In ;;1eir various ·authoritative pronouncements, the British spokesmen recognised that with the lapse of paramountcy, technically and legally the States would become independent. . . . . . . The situation was indeed fraught with immeasurable potentialities of disruption, for some of the Rulers did wish to exercise their technical ,right to declare independence and others to join the neighbouring Dominion. .

(c)

It was against this unpropritious background that the Government of India invited the Rulers of the States to accede on three subjects of Defence. External Affairs and Communications. IAt the time the proposal was p•Jt forward to the Rulers, an assurance was given to them that they would ~etain the status quo except for accession on these subjects. It had been made clear to them that ...... · there was no intention either to encroach on the internal autonomy or the sovereignty of the States or to fetter their discretion in respect of their acceptance of the new Constitutio·' of India. These commitments had to be borne in mirtd when the States Ministry approached the Rulers for the integration of their States. There was nothing to compel or induce the Rulers to merge the identity of their States. Any use of force would have not only been against our professed principles but would have also caused serious repercussions. . . . . . . The minimum which we could offer to them ils quid pro quo for parting with their ruling powers was to guarantee to them privy purses and certain privileges on a reasonable and defined basis. 11!.e privy purse settlements are therefore in the nature of consideration for the surrender by the Rulers of all their ruling powers and also for the dissolution of the States as separate units ........ . "The Rulers have now discharged their part of the ·obligations by transferring all ruling powers and by agreeing to the integration of their States. The main part of our obligation under these agreements, is to ensure that the g11arantees given by us in respect of privy purse

MADHAV RAO v. UNION

(Shah, }.)

are fully implemented. Our failure to do so would be a breach of faith and seriously prejudice the stabilisation of the new order." In the larger interest of achieving the unity of the country our

,,

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statesmen chose to appeal to the patriotism of the Princes and not to rely upon the force of arms or methods of political agitation within the States. Negotiation of a friendly settlement was in the circumstances then prevailing the only advisable course. A discontented group of Princes was a serious threat to a smooth and orderly transition. The Constituent Assembly resolved to honour, without reservation, the promises made to the Princes frow. time to time. Clauses in the draft Constitution relating to the obligation of the Union to pay the privy purses and recognising certain rights, privileges and dignities till then enjoyed by the Princes, were intended to incorporate a just quid pro quo for surrender by them of their authority and powers and dissolution of their States. A legislative mechanism was devised to grant the benefit to the former p, ·,ces by making a provision for recognising them as Rulers, and of incorporating in the Constitution the guarantees of the privy purse and personal rights and privileges. Th~ former Princes were accordingly recognised as a class of citizens with specfal privileges grant'ed to them because they had surrendered their powers, privileges a_nd authority. The argument that the President as the head of the .Executive may, in exercise of his ex· ecutive power, destroy that institution, is plain!)'. contrary to the fundamental concept of the Rule of Law. ·' There are many analogous provisions In the Constitution which confer upon the President a power coupled with n duty. We may refer tt> two such provisions. 1he President has under Arts .. 341 and 342 to specify Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes; and he has done so. Specification so made carries for the mem· bers of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes certain special benefits, e.g., reservation of seats in the House of the People, and in the State Legislative Assemblies by Arts. 330 and 332, and of the numerous provisions made in Schedules V & VJ. It may be noticed that expressions Scheduled Cast;is and Scheduled Tribes are specially defined for the purposes of the Constitution by Arts. 366(24) and 366(25). If power to declare certain classes of dtizens as belonging to Scheduled Castes and .Scheduled Tribes includes power to withdraw declaration without substituting a fresh declaration, the President will be destroying the constitutional scheme. The power to specify may carry with it the power to withdraw specification, but it is coupled with a duty to specify in a manner which makes the constitutional provisions operative.·

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Article 3 66(21 ) before it was

[1971 ]3 S.C.R.

deleted by the Constitution

~Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, defined "Rajpramukh" as mean

mg:-

(a) in relation to the State of Hyderabad, the person who for the time being is recognised by the President as the Nizam of Hyderabad; (b) in relation to the State of Jammu and K,ashmir, or the State of 'Mysore, the person who for the time being is recognized by the President as the Maharaja of that State; and (c) in relation to any other State specified in Part B of the First Schedµle, the person who for the time being is recognised by the President as the Rajpramukh of that State, and includes in relation. to atfy of the said States any person for the time being recognised py the President as competent to exercise the powers of the Rajpramukh in relation to that State;" ·

C

The first two clauses contemplated recognition, of the Nizam of Hyderabad and the Maharaj as of J ammu & K,ashmir and of Mysqre · to be the Rajpramukh. There can be no dispute that ,the Ruler of Hyderabad was the Nizam, and the Rulers of Jammu and Kashmir and )4'.ysore were the Maharajas of those States. Assuming that power to recognise a person as the Nizam or Maharaja may carry with it the power ~o withdraw recognition, ii carried with it , a duty to recognize the successor. If no successor was recognized the constitutional scheme of administration of Part B States would be-destroyed. Such a result could never have been contemplated. By Art. 291 payment of any sum free of tax guaranteed or assured under any covenant or agreement with a Ruler of an Indian State flS·privy purse, is charged on and is made payable out of the Consolidated Fund of India, and the sum so paid to any Ruler is exempt from .all taxes on income. The Attorney-General said t'hat the recognition by Art. 291 of the existence of the guarantees and assurances under the covenants and agreements gives rise to no obligation to pay the privy purse, thar even if the constitutional provisions raise an obligation of the Union, they do not raise corresponding rights in the Rulers; that in any event the covenants being acts of State violation of their terms will not because of Art. 363, first limb and also on general principles of law found an action in the Municipal .Courts. He finiilly submitted that the dispute with respect to the rights claimed to accrue in favour of the Rulers arises out of the provisions of the Constitution relating to the covenants, and on that account the jurisdiction of the Courts is excluded in re~ to~~~

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MADHAV RAO v. UNION

-

(Shah, /.)

The Constitution in terms recognizes and accepts the obligation of the Union to pay the privy purse· ro the Rulers. Clause (a) of Art. 291 enacts that the privy purse shall be charged on and be paid out of the Consolidated F!!J1d of India. The words clearly raise an obligation of the Union to pay the privy purse.

The second bra!Jc_h of the argument is also without force. Article 266 provides that all revenues received by the Government of India, all loans raised by thp issue of treasury bills, loans or ways and means advances, and all moneys received in repayment of loans shall form the Consolidated Fund of India. By Art. 112(2) the President is required in respect of every financial year to cause to be laid before the Houses of Parliament the annual financial statec ment of the estimated receipts and expenditure of the Government of India showing separately-(a) sums required to meet expenditure charged upon the Consolidated Fund of India; and (b) sums required to meet c;ither expenditure proposed to be made from the Consolidated Fund of India. Clause (3) of Art. 112 categorizes heads of expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund of India. So much of the estimates as relate to expenditure charged upon the Consolidated Fund are by Art. 113(1) open to discussion in. but not to be submitted to the vote of the Houses of Parliament. After demands in respect of sums required to meet other expenditure have been made and assented to by the liouse of the People, a Bill is introduced to provide for appropriation out of the Consolidated Fund of India of all moneys required to meet the expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund of India and the grants : Art. 114(1 ). No amendment may be proposed in e - House to vary the amounts or to alter the destination of the gram or the expenditure charged.

In support of his contention that by using the expression "charged" in Arts. 291 and 112(2) it is only intended t<? enact that the. expenditure is not subject to the vote o( the. Parl!l!Jllent and that no priority in payment in respect of expeno1ture 1s de~lar~d, and in any event the expression "charged" creates no obhga~io.n enforceable at the instance of the person for whose benefit 1t 1s charged, the Attorney-General invited our att7ntio:n to . different provisions of the Constitution in each of which there 1s both a G charge on the Consolidated Fund of an item ?f expenditure and an express direction for payment -0f the pre~cnbed sum! a~d contended that Art. 291 which merely recogmzes the obhgat1ons of the Union Government to abide by the pre-existing covenants, creates no obligation for payment of the privy purse to the ~ers He urged that the word "charge" in the ~<?nsti~ulion _in dealing with State financial procedure has the meamng 1t ha~ m. accou.ntancy practice· it merely specifies the source fr9m which payment is to be made' and does not create a right in the Ruler or any en-

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1971]3 S.C.R.

forceable obligation al:llinst the Union. Under the general law A relating to transfer of property, a charge does not give rise to a right in rem : itb.e right is however more than a mere personal ob. ligation, for it is a jus ad rem a right to payment out of property specified : Govind Chandra Pal v. Dwarka Nath Pal(1). Raja Sri Shiva Prasad v. Beni Madhab( 2 ). A charge gives a right to pay· ment out of a specific fund or property, and a right to prior pay- B ment; but it does not create a right in rem in <the fund or the property. A charge therefore gives rise to a right to receive payment, out of a specified fund or property in preference over others. ~in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary, it would be difficult to hold that the expression "charged" used in the context of financial matters of the State, has a different meaning. Our Con- c stitution-makers borrowed the concept of a Consolidated Fund from the ~riti~ system. That has also been adopted in the Constitutions of Canada, Australia, South Africa and other Commonwealth Countries. C~rtain Acts in the United Kingdom and elsewhere prescribe a sequence of priorities in payment of different heads of expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund : s. l Consolidated Funds Act, 1816; s. 1 The House of Commons (Speaker) D Act, 1932; ss. 103, 104 & 105 of the British North America Act, 1867; ss. 117, 119 Constitution of the Union of South Africa, 1909; ss. 81 & 82 of the Australian Constitution 1900. Our Constitution does not recognize any seqµence of priorities. But that does not alter the fundamental character of a char$e that E it specifies a fund out of which satisfaction of the expenditure char.ed must be made, and the prescribed expenditure shall have priority in payment to the person for whose benefit the expenditure 1s charged on the Fund. The constitutional obUgation to proceed in the manner set out in Arts. 112, 113 & 114 imposed upon the President and the Parliament implies a right in the person or per.. F sons in respect of whom the expenditure is to be incurred. That view ·is· supported by other provisjons in the Constitution. The expression "shall be charged on arid paid out of the Consolidated Fund" is used in Arts. 29,0, 290A and 291. Articles 290 and 291 do not expressly designate the payee : Art. 290A designates the payee. Article 273 merely.. uses the e~p~sion "shall be charged" G in dealing with the grants-in-aid to t~:States of Assam, Bihar, Orissa and West ~engal, without a.ny direction for payment. Article 275(1) deals .with grants-in-aid to the revenues of such States as the Parliament may determine : it is only the provisions dealing with. the capital and rec~rring sums which refer to the obli~ation to pay, but in respect of these heads of expenditure there is no charge. There are also other prov~sions in the C:onstitution which H charge expenditure on the Consohdated Fund, e.g. Art. 148(6); (ll I.L.R. 35 Ca,I. 837, 843.

(2) 1.L.R. I Pat. 387

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MADHAV RAO v. UNION

..

(Shah, J.)

Art. 146(3); Art. 299(3) and Art. 332, without any express provisions in the Constitution relating to payment. By leaving the payee innominate in Art. 291(a) no intention to raise an obligation without a corresponding right is disclosed. The expression "shall be charged on, and paid out of nQe Consolidated Fund" in Art. 291, is intended to enact that the privy purse "shall be charged on, and shall be paid out of the Consolidated Fund". The expression "sums so paid to any Ruler" does not mean "sums if paid to any Ruler" : it means that "sums when paid to any Ruler". Clauses (a) and (b) of Art. 291 read with Arts. 112, 113 & 114 are, in our juogment, parts of a. single scheme; they contemplate that the privy purse shall be included in the financial statement as charged upon the Consolidated Fund : it shall be beyood the voting power of the Parliament : its destination shall not be altered : it shall be paid to the Ruler after the Appropriation Bill is passed, and when paid it shall be free from liability to pay taxes on income. This is an integrated process, which cannot be interrupted without dislocating the constitutional mechanism . The Attorney-General said that Art. 291 raises an "imperfect obligation". An imperfect obligation is used to describe a moral duty-for instance, a duty to pay a debt of honour, or a debt barred by limitation, but is properly left to the free will of him whose duty it is to discharge the obligation. A perfected obligation pertains to the domain of Jaw & justice : an imperfect obligation to the domain of benevolence. An obligation which arises out of a constitutional provision to pay to the citizens sums of money in rel:ognition of obligations of the predecessor Government may scarcely be called imperfect. Article 291 does not merely incorporate recognition of the obligation to pay the privy purse under covenants incurred; by the Government of the Dominion of India : it gives rise to a liability dehors the covenants. Under the covenants and agreements the obligation to pay the privy purse was undertaken in the case ol all Princes (bar the the heads of the States of Bhopal, Hyderabad and Mysore) to be made out of the revenues of their respective States. The Government of India concurred in and guaranteed payment of the amount of the privy purse under the terms of the agreements constituting the Unions. By the States Merger (Governors' Provinces) Order, 1949, this liability was imposed upon the Provinces when the States merged with those Provinces. In the case of a Uni® of States the liability to pay the privy purse to a head of State lay upon the Union of States to be discharged out of the revenues of the State. In the case of Centrally merged States the Dominion Government had to pay the privy purse out of the revenues of the State.

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[ 1971 J3 S.C.R.

Even after the integration of States, the obligations under the covenants were to be met out of the revenues of the respective States. The covenants and the various stages through which ultimate integration was achieved probably remained acts of State. The rights and obligation accruing or arising under those acts of State could be enforce<! only if the Union of India acc.epted those rights and obligations. After the Consritution the obligation to pay the privy purse rested upon the Union of India, not because it was inherited from th" Dominion of India; but because .of the constitutional mandate under Art. 291. The source of the obligation was in Art. 291, and not in the covenan(3 and the agreements. Reference to the covenants and agreements in Art. 291 was for defining the privy purse : the obligations of the Pro' vinces in respect of the "Provincially merged States'', and obligation of the Union of States in respect <Jf the States merged in such Unions, ceased by recognition to retam their original character. The obligation which arose out of the merger agreement and was on that account an aCt of State shed its original character on acceptance by the Constitution. The entity obliged to pay the privy purse did not after the Constitution remain the same; the source out of which the obligation was to be satisfied was not the original source; the incident relating to exemption from payment of tax was vitally altered, and the amount also was in some cases different. Whereas th.e liability to pay the privy purse to the Rulers under the merger ag,eements was assured by the Dominion Government, the Constitution imposed upon the Union Govern.men! a directive to pay the privy purse.

•

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In support of his contention that even if Art. 291 it5elf gives rise to a fresh obligation, 1he Union of India has the same defences against the claim by the Rulers which the predecessor Goverftin.ent had, and on that account if the Dominion Government could plead an act of State as a defence, the Union of India could do so, the Attorney-General relied upon two decisions : Doss v. Secretary of State for India in Counci/;(1) and Saliman v. Secretary of State for India('). These cases were decided on the interpretation of the Government of India Act, 1958, which by s. 67 enacted that treaties and al! contracts, covenants, liabilities and engagements of the East India Company made before the Act of 1858 were declared enfom~able against the Secretary of State as they might have been by and against the East India Company, if the Government of India Act, 1858, had not been passed. There is no. such reservation in Art. 291, or in Art. 294(1) (b) and 295(l)(b) of the Constitution. The cases of Doss (supra) a.nd Salaman (supra) have therefore no application. (!) [137] L.R. 19 Eq. 50~

(2) [1905] 1 K.B. 613

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MADHAV RAO V. UNION

(Shah, J.)

The judgment of this Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Weaving) Co. Ltd. & Another( 1 ) has also no bearing on the character of the obligation arising by virtue of Art. 291. In that case a company which had entered into an agreement with the State of Gwalior in 1947, whereby t!ie State of Gwalior granted exemption from liability to taxation of certain industries started in the State, claimed to enforce that right against the Union of India after integration of the State. This Court held that by virtue of the agreement the Central. Legislature was not deprived of its legislative power to impose taxes, and on that account after the extension of the Income-tax Act, 1922, the exemption granted under the agreement of 1947 must fall and that the Company was entitled only to such concessions as may be provided by the State law applicable thereto after the integration. That The structure of Art. 362 is somewhat different. Article imposes restrictions upon the exercise of legislative and executive functions. Recognition of the personal rights and privileges of the Rulers arising out of the covenants is not explicit, but the injunction that in the exercise of legislative and executive power due regard shall be had to the guarantees, clearly implies acceptance and recognition of the personal rights, privileges and dignities. The Constitution thereby aflirtns · the binding force of the guarantees and assurances under the covenants, of personal rights, privileges and dignities, but unlike the guarantee of payment of the privy purse in Art. 291, the guarantee under Art. 362 is of the obligations under the original covenants ·and agreements executed by the Rulers, barring those regarding which there is express legislation enacted to give effect to certain personal rights and privileges, e.g., Wealth-tax Act, 1957. Gift-tax Act, 1958, notifications under the Sea Customs Act, 1878, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. A Ruler seeking. to enforce privileges which parliamentary statutes have recognised relies for right to relief upon the mandate of the statutes, and not of the covenant. Article 363 of the Constitution provides : " ( 1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution but subject to the provisions of article 143 neither the S~p!em~ Court _nor any. ~tiler court shall have jurisd1ct1on m any dispute ansmg out .of any provisi~n of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar ins1rument which was entered into or executed before the commenceme11t of this Constitution OJ [1964] 7 R.C.R. 892

7-L744 Sup Ci/71

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

.

[19 71 J3 s.c.R.

by any Ruler of an Indian "State and to which the Government of the Dominion of India or any of its predecessor Governments was a party and which has or has been continued in operation after such commencement, or in dispute in respect of any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of any of the provisions of this Constitution relating to any .such treaty, agreement.. covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument.

•

( 2) In this article(a) "Indian State" means any territory recognised before the commencement of this Constitution by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as being such a State; and (b) "Ruler" includes the Prince, Chief or other person recognised before such commencement by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as the Ruler of any Indian State." Exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Courts is emphasized by the non-obstante clause with which the Article commences. Notwithstanding the investment of jurisdiction upon this Court by Art. 32, notwithstanding the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts by Art. 226, and notwithstanding the competence of all Civil Courts t() decide disputes in respect of the obligirtions of the Union, it is declared that the Courts have no jurisdiction in respect of the two classes of disputes. )'he exception carved out of the exclusion in respect of the jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by Art. 143 is not a real exception for the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 143 is merely advisory. The nonobstante clause however does not enlarge the field of exclusion of judicial authority. The Attorney-General urged that the jurisdiction of · the Courts to enforce rights and obligations arising out of the covenants entered into by the Rulers to which the Government of the Dominion or the predecessor Governments were parties, was excluded, because the rights and obligations arose out of acts of State, and by constitutional provision that exclusion was affirmed and extended after the Constitution. An act of State need not, it is true, arise out of war ·or conquest : It may be the resii!'t of an agre~m.ent, and the terms of the agreements and the obligations flowing only from such agreements may not be enforced in the Municipal Courts of either State, unless the rights and obligations

•

MAOHAV RAO V. UNION

(Shah, J.)

are recogniz:d and accepted by the States, or unless the document evidencing the act of State is itself the Copstitution of the State or States. But there can b~ no act of state against its own citizen by the State. The Rulers who were before integration of their States aliens qua the Dominion Government are now citizens. Their rights and obligations which arose frbm an act of state are now recognized and accepted by the Union of India. Enfori;:ement of those rights and obligations is··govemed by the municipal Jaws, and unless the jurisdiction of the Courts is excluded in respect of any dispute, the Courts will be competent to grant relief. An act of state vanishes when the new sovereign recognizes either expressly or by implications the rights flowing therefrom: State of Gujarat v. Vora Fiddalti Badruddin Mithibanvala (1) . We are unable to agree with the Attorney-General that "old unidentified concept of paramountcy of the British Crown" was inherited by the Union, by reason of the instruments of accession and merger agreements, and that "recognition of Rulership was a 'gift of the President', and not a matter of- legal right, existing as it did in the area of paramountcy and remaining with the Governni!ent of India". The British Crown did not acquire paramountcy rights by any express grant, cession or transfer: it exercised paramountcy because it was the dominant power. Paramountcy had no legal origin, and no fixed concept: its dimensions depended upon what in a given situation the representatives Of the British Crown thought expedient. Paramountcy meant those powers which the British authorities by the might of anns, and in disregard of the sovereignty and a!lthOrity of the States chose to exercise. But that paramountcy lapsed with the Indian lndependen~ Act, 1947: even its shadows disappeared with the integratiO)l -of the States with the Indian Union. After the withdrawal of ~ British power and extinction of paramountcy of the Britisi1 power the Dominion Goverrun,ent of Indian did not and could not exercise any paramountcy over the States. In clause 3 of the Standstill Agreement it was expressly recited that "Nothing in the agreement ipcludes the exercise of any paramouncy functions". The relations between the States and the Dominion Government were strictly governed by the instrum,ents executed from time to tune. Subject. to the power conferred in respect. of certain matters of common interest to legislate and ,exercise executive authority, the Princes had sovereignty within their territories, With the advent of the Constitution the States ceased to exist, and the Princes and Chiefs who were recognized as Rulers were left with no sovereign authority in them. It is difficult to conceive of the 0) [1964] 6 S.C. R 401

l

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

· (1971]3 S.C.R.

govern.ment of a democratic Republic exercising against its citizens "paramountcy" claimed to be inherited from an Imperial Power. The power and authority which the Union may exercise against its citizens and even aliens spring from and are strictly circumscribed by the Constitution.

The fundamentals on which paramountcy rested-i.e. the compulsion of geography and the essentials for ensuring, security and special responsibility of the Government of India to protect all territories in India survived the enactment of the In.dian Independence Act, for between August 15, 1947 and the date of integration of the various States, the Government of India was the only fully sovereign authority. But paramountcy with its brazen-faced autocracy no longer survived the enactment of the Constitution. Under our Constitution an action not authorised by I.aw against the citizens of the Union cannot be supported under the shelter of paramountcy. The functions of the President of India stem from 1the Constitution-not from a "concept of the paramountcy of the British Crown" identified or unidentified. What the Constitution does not' authorise, the President cannot grant. Rulership is therefore not a privilege which the President may in the exercise of his discretion bestow or withhold.

Jurisdiction of the Courts in matters specified is excluded not because the Union of India is a ~uccessor to the p~ramountcy of the British Crown, nor because the rights and obligations accepted and recogriired by the Constitution may still be regarded as flowing from acts' of State : it is only excluded in respect of specific matters by the express prevision in Art. 363 of the Coustitution. Jurisdiction of the Courts even in those matters is not barred "at the threshold" as contended by the Attorney-General. The President cannot lay down the extent of this Court's jurisdiction. He is not made by the Constitution the arfilter of the extent of his authority; nor of the validity of his acts. Action of the President is liable to be tested for its validity before the Courts unless their jurisdiction is by express enactment or clear implication barred. To accede to the claim that the jurisdiction of the Court is barred in respect ()f whatever the executive asserts is valid, is plainly to subvert the Rule of Law. It is therefore within the province of the Court alone to determine what the dispute brought before it is, and to determine whether the jurisdiction of the Court is, because it falls within one of the two limbs of Art. 363, excluded qua that disputt'

In dealing with the dimensions of exclusion of the exercise of judicial power under Art. 363, it is necessary to bear in mind certain broad considerations. The proper forum under our Constitution for uetermining a legal dispute is the Court which is by

•

MADHAV RAO v. UNION

(Shah, J.)

training and experience, assisted by properly qualified advocates, fitted to perform that task. A provision which purports to ex· elude the jurisdiction of the Courts in c.!rtain matters and to deprive the aggrieved party of the nonnal remerly will be strictly construed, for it is a principle not to be whittled down that an aggrieved party will not, unless the jurisdiction of the Courts is B by clear enactment or necessary implication barred, be denied recourse to the Courts for determination of his rights. The Court will interpret a statute as far as possible, agrreably to jus· ti:ce and reason and that in case of two or more interpretations, one which is more reasonable and just will be adopted, for there is always a presumption against the Jaw maker intending injusc tice and unreason. The Court will avoid imputing_ to th~ Legislature an intention to enact a provision which ftouts notions of justice and norms of fairplay, unless a contrary intention is manifest from words plain and unambiguous. A provision in 11 statute ;will not be construed to defeat its manifest purpose and general values whkh animate its structure. ln an avowedly democratic polity, statutory provisions ensuriqg the security of D fundamental human rights including the right to property will, unless the contrary mandate be precise and unqualified, be C08'· trued liberally so as to uphold the right. nese rules apply to the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions alike. Article 366(22) defuws a "Ruler" as a Prince, Chief or other person who has entered into a covenant or agreement as is referred to in Art. 291, and is recognized for the tim~ being by the President and includes the successor of such Ruler. Article 291 in defining the sum guaranteed or assured to the Ruler as privy purse refers to covenants and agreements .entered into by the Rulers which guarantee or assure the payment of sums as r privy purse free from tax. It was contended on behalf of the Union that the expressiC'n "relating to" in Art. 363 means "referring to'', and since Arts. 291, 362 and 366(22) refer to covenants, the Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain disputes with respect to rights arising from those provisions. In support of that argument counsel for the Union referred us to the diverse G meanings in which the expression "relating to" is used. But a constitutional provision will not be interpreted in the attitute of a lexicographer. with one eye on the provision and the other on the lexicon. The meaning of a word or expression used in the Constitution often is coloured by the context in whic)l it occurs: tbil simpler and more common the word or expression, the more m~nings and shades of meanings it has. It is the duty of the II Cpurt to detennine in what particular meaning and particular sltade of meanin11 the word of expression was used by the Constitution makers, and in discharging the duty the Court will take

I (

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SUPREME COUl.T REPORTS

[1971]3 S.C.R.

into account the context in which it occurs, the object to serve which it was used, its collocation, the general congruity with the concept or object it was intended to articulate and a host of other considerations. Above all, the Court will avoid repugnancy 1Vith acceptetl norms of justice and reason. The expression "provisions of this Constitution relating to" in Art's. '363 rneans. provisions having a dominant and immediate connection with": it 'does not mean merely having a reference to. A wide nu:aning of the expression may exclude disputes from the jurisdiction of the Courts in respect of rights or obligations, however indirect or tenuous the connection between the constitutional provision and the covenant may be. Jurisdiction to try a proceeding is barred under the first lin:\b of Art. 363 if the dispute arises out of the provision ·of a covenant : it is barred under the second limb of Art. 363 if •the Court holds that the dispute is with respect to a right arising_out of a provision of the Constitution relating to a covenant. A dispute that an order of an executive body is unauthorised, or a legislative measure is ultra vires, is not one arising out of any covenant under the firm limb of Art. 363, merely because the order or the measure violates the rights of the citizen which, but for the act or measure, were not in question. The dispute in such a case relates to the validity of the act or .the vires of the measure. Exclusion of the Court's jurisdiction by the termt of the relevant words in the second limb lies in a narrow field. If the constitutional provision relating to a covenant is the source of the right claimed to accrue, or liability claimed to arise, then clearly under the second limb the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a dispute.carising with respect to the right or obligation is barred. We need in the present case express no opinion on the question whether a dispute that an executive act or legislative measure operating upon -a right accruing or liability arising out of a provision is invalid falls within the second limb of Art. 363. As a quid pro quo for agreeing to surrender their power and authority, it was enacted in the Constitution that the Princes who had signed the covenant of the nature specified will be recognized as Rulers. But under the treaties, covenants and agreements executed by the former Princes, there was no provision for recognition of Rulers. The President was invested by the Constitution with power to recognise Rulers uncler Art. 366(22). The status of the Rulers under the Constitution is not the status which the Princes had: their rights, privileges and functions are fundamentally different from those of the former Princes. Some degree of obscurity is introduced by the use of the expression "Ruler" and "Ruler of an Indian State" in the Articles. But the mean-

MADHAV RAO v. UNION (Shah, /.)

...

ing is reasonably plain. Ruler as defined in Ad. 366(22) is a former Prince, Chief or other person who was on or after Janu· ary 26, 1950, recognised as a Ruler, he having signed the covenant, or his successor. The Ruler of an Indian State means a Prince, or Chief who was recognized befom the Constitution by · the British Crown. The Ruler of an Indian State had sovereign B authority over his State. The Ruler recognized by the President rules over no territory, and exercises no sovereignty over any subjects. He has no status of a potentate and no privileges which are normally exercised by a Jl.iltentate. He is a citizen of India with certain privileges accordi<t to him because he or his predecessor had surrendered his territory, his powers and his c sovereignty. Article 366(22) is, in our judgment, a provision relating to rec

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