His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kerala

Landmark judgment · Constitution & fundamental rights — Parliament can amend the Constitution but cannot destroy its basic structure.

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
24 April 1973
Judge
Justice S.M. Sikri
Neutral citation
1973 INSC 91
Reported in
[1973] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 1
Acts & sections
Article 13 Constitution, Article 368 Constitution, Article 248 Constitution

Download the official PDF

Full judgment

HIS HOLINESS KESAVANANDA BHARAT! SRIPADAGALAVAR U u. STATE OF KERALA

April 24, 1973 (S. M. SIKRI, C. J., J. M. SHELAT, K. S. HEGDE, A. N. GROVER, A. N. RAY, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, D. G. PALEK.AR, H. R. KHANNA, IC K. MATHEW, M. H. BEG, S. N. DWIVEDI, A. K. MUKHERJEA AND Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.) Constitution of India, 1950-Artick 368 before Constitution (Twenty Fourth) Amendment Act, 197!-Nature and scope of the amending power.

Article 13(2)-'Law' in 13(2) if includes amendment of the ConstitutionDistinction between legislative power and constituent power. Article 368-"Amendment" meaning of-"Amcndmcnt" if includes the power to abrogate the Constitution-If includes the power to alter the basic structure or frame-work of the Constitution, Fundamental Rights-If amendment can take away or abridge the rights guaranteed in Part III. Fundamental Righu--If inalienable natur31 rights so as to operate as restriction on the amending power. Implied and inherent limitations-Power of amendment if subject to inherent or implied limitations. Preamble-Nature-Preamble, if operates as a source of implied limitation on the power of amendment.

Constitution (Twenty Faurth) Amendment Act 1971-Validity of-Amend· mrot if enlargement of the limits of the Amending power.

Article 368-lf there are inherent or implied limitations in the article .. amended. Constitution (Twenty Fifth) Amendment Act, 1971-Validity of. Section 2(a) & (b)-Substitution of 'amount' for 'compensation'-Exclusion of article 19(l)(f) to law in article 31(2)~1£ abrogates the basic structure of the Constitution-Meaning of 'amount'-Scope of judicial review of adequacy. Section 3-lntroduction of new asticle 31C-Nature and object of the articloArticle if abrogates the essential features of the Constitution-If amounts to delegation of

amending power to state legislatures-Effect of

Declaration-Nexus

of law under the article to the directives in article 39(b) and (c), if subjedl to judicial review. Directive Principles of State Policy-Importance in the constitutional schcmc-

Rclation with fundamental rights. Property, right to-Nature of the right.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1973] Supp. s.c.R.

Constttutron (Twenty Ninth) Amendment Act, 1972-Validity of-Article 31B and 31A-lf interrelated.

Judicial Revietu-Limits of-Place of judicial review in the constitutional

scheme. ·, Interpretation-Rules of Constitutional interpretation-Constituent Assembly Debates, relevancy of. The question whether the fundamental rights set out in Part III of the C:Onstitution could be taken away or abridged by amendment of the Constitution was first considered by this Court in Sankari Prasad v. Union of India, [1952] S.C.R. 89. In Sankari Prasad the validity of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951, was challenged. The First Amendment made changes in articles 15 and 19 of the Constitution and inserted articles 31A and 31B. The principal contention was that the First Amendment in so far as it purported to take away or abridge the rights conferred by Part _III of the Constitution fell within the prohibition of article 13(2) of the Constitution. The Court unanimously held that the word 'law' in article 13(2) was relatable to exercise of ordinary legislative power and not amendments to the Constitution and that the terms of article 368 were general to empower Parliament to amend the Constitution without any exception. The question came up again in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 938, wherein the validity of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act 1964, was challenged. The majority view in Sa;jan Singh was that article 368 plainly and unambiguously meant amendment of all provisions of the Constitution and that the ward •iaw' in article 13(2) did not take in Constitution Amendments. Thereafter, in Golaknath v. State of Punjab, the Court, six against live, hdd that an amendment of the Constitution was 'law' within the meaning of article 13(2); therefore, if an amendment took away or abridged the fundamental rights it was void, that the Constitution First1 Fourth and Seventeenth Amendments abridged fundamental rights but were valid on the application of the doctrine of prospective overruling or acquiescence and that Parliament had no power from the date of the decision to amend any of the provisions of Part III so as to take away or abridge the fundamental rights. One of the amendments affecting the right to propeny was the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. The Amendment Act had enacted that no law providing for compulsory acquisition or requisitioning "shall be called in question in any Court on the ground that the compensation provided by that law is not adequate". The amendment was passed to get over the interpretation given by the Court in State of West Bengal v. Bela Baoerju, [1954] S.C.R. 674, to the word 'compensation' viz., just equivalent or full indemnification for the property expropriated. The effect of the amendment was considered by this Court in Vairavdu Mudaliar v. Del'Uty Collector, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 614. The Court took the view that the fact that Parliament used the same expressions, namely, 'compensation' and 'principles', as were found in article 31 before the amendment, was clear indication that Parliament accepted the meaning given by the Court to tho.9e expressions in Bela Banerjee's case. In Union of India v. Metal Corporation, [ 1967] 1 S.C.R. 255 the Coun struck down the Metal Corporation (Acquisition of Undertaking) Act 1965, because the principles for determining the: compens.ation laid down in the Act did not represent the just equivalent of the property taken. Later, in State of Guiarat v. Shanti/al Mangal Das, [1969] 3 S.C.R. 341, the Court overruled the decision in Metal Corporaticm case. The Court held that a challenge to a statute that the principles specified by it did not a\\·ard a just equivalent would be in clear violation of the Constitutional declaration that adequacy of conlpensation provided was not justiciable, that just equivalent was not c.apable of precise determination by the application of any recognised principles and that "''apart from the practical difficulties the law declared by this Court also placed

KESAVANANDA f/, XEaALA

serious obstacles in giving effect to the directive principles of State policy incorporated in article 39". Thereafter, in R.. C. Cooper v. Union of India (The Bank Nationalisation Case) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530 the Court by a majority, ten against one, held that even after the Fourth Amendment jjCompcnsation"

meant "the equivalent i~ terms of money of the property comp1:1lsorily acquired'' "according to r.elevant principles which principles must be appropriate to the determination of compensation for the particular class of property sought to be acquired". Arguments were addressed mainly in W iit Petition No. 135 of 1970. In this Writ Petition the petitioner had challenged the validity of the Kerala Land Reforms Amendment Art 1969 and the Kcrala Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1971, for ·the .reason that some of the provisions thereof violated articles 14, 19(l)(f), 25, 26 and 31 of the Constitution. During the pcndency of the Writ Petition Parliament passed_ three constitution amendments, namely the Constitution Twenty Fourth, Twenty Fifth and Twenty Ninth Amendment Acts. The Constitution Twenty Fourth Amendment Act amended article 368. It

enacted that Parliament may, in exercise of its constituent power, amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of the Constitution in accordance with the procedure laid down in that article. The other part of the amendment is that nothing in article 13 shall apply to any amendment under article 368°.

• Atticle 368 · before amendment. Procedure for amendment •f tho Constitution: An amendmont of Ibis Com· titution may be initiated only by the introducion Of a Bill for the purpose in either House of Parliament. when the Bill is passed in each House by a majority Of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two thirds of 1lhe members of that H""" present and voting, it shall bo presented to President for his auent and upon such assent beina: a:iven to the Bill. the Consti· tution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill. Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any cban,ge in:(a) article 54, article 55, article 73, article 162 or article 241; or (b) Chapter IV of Part V. Chapter V of Pan VJ, or Chapter I of Part XI, or (c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Scbcdule, or (d) the representation of States in Parliament, or (e) thci provisions of this article, the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States by resolution to that effect passed by those Legislatures before the Bill making provisiori for such amendment is presented to the President for absent Article 368 after amendment-Article 368 of the Constitution shall be re-num· bered as clause (2) thereof, and (a) for the marginal heading of that article, the following marginal heading shall be substi!uted, nomcly : ..Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure therefor". (b) before clause (2) as so re-numbered, the foHowing c1ause shall be insert· ed, namely:"Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament may in exercise !l! its cons~tuent PJ?We.r a.IJ?.end by way ·of ~di tion, variation or repeal any prov1s1on of this Constitution 1n accordance with the procedure laid down in this article". (c) in claus~ (2) aS so . re-numbered, for the words "it shall be prcsent.ed to the President for his assent and upon such assent being given to the Bill", the words "if shall be presented to the President who shall give bis assent to the Bill and thersupon" shall be substituted; (d) ·after clause (2) as so re-numbered, the fo1lowing clause shall be inserted namely:"(3) Nothing in Article 13 shall apply to any amendment made under this articleu.

SUPREME COU1T REPOR'n (1973]

Supp. S.C.R.

The Constitution Twenty Fifth Amendment Att amended article 31(2) and article 31(2-A). Section 2 of the Amendment Act substituted the word "amount" for the word "compensation" and excluded the applicatioo of article 19(1)(f) to a law under article 31(2). It was also made clear that no such law shall be called in question in any court on the groond that the whole or any port of such amount is to be given othlcrwise than in cash. Section 3 introduced new article 31C. It empowered Parliament and State Legislatures to enact law giving effect to the J;><>licy of the State towards securing the directive principles. in clause (b} or cl. (c) of article 39 and no such law could be questioned on the ground that it took away or abridged any of the rights conferred by articles 14, 19 and 31. Further, the amendment laid down that 11no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in ~stion in any court on the ground that it docs not give effect to such policy' . The provisions of the article were not to be applied to a law made by the Legislature of a state unless such law received the assent of the President. The Constitution (Twenty Ninth). Amendment Act included the Kerala and Reforms Acts in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution making them immune from attack on the ground of violation of the fundamental rights. The Petitioner challenged the validity of the three Constitution Amendment Acts. HELD : (By Full Court) : Thie Constirution (Twenty Fourth) amendment Act, Section 2(a) md 2(b) of the Constirution (Twenty Fifth) Amendment Act and the Constirution (Twenty Ninth) Amendment Act arc valid.

By maj<>rity : .Per Hegdc, Ray, Jaganmohan Reddy, Palckar, Khanna, Mathew, Beg, Dwivedi, Mukhcrjea and Chandrachud, JI : The decision of the majority in Golaknath that the word "law" in article 13(2) included amendments to tlle Constitution and the article operated as a limitation upon the power to amend the Constitution in article 368 is erroneous and is overruled.

By majority: Per Ray, Palekar, Khanna, Mathew, Beg, Dwivedi and Chandrachud, JJ : The power of amendment is plenary. It includes within itself the power to add, alter or re.peal the various articles of the Constitution including

those relating to fundamental rights.

By majority: Per Sikri, C.J. and Shelat, Hegde, Grover, Khanna, Jaganmohan Reddy and Mukherjea, JJ. (Ray, Palekar, Mathew, Beg, Dwivcdi and Chandrachud, JJ. dissenting) : The power to amend does not include the power to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution so as to change its identity.

By majority: Per Ray, Palekar, Khanna, Mathew, Beg, Dwivcdi and Chandrachud

JJ. (Sikri, C.J. and Shelat, Hcgdc, Grover, Mukherjca, JJ. holding contra

and Jaganmohan Reddy, J. leaving the question open) : The~ arc no inherent or implied limitations on the power of amendment under arttcle 368.

By majority: The first pa". ?£article 31C. is valid••'f!>e seco~d. part of the article, viz., "and no law conta1nmg a declaration that tt ts for giving e~ct ~o such policy s'Na,11 be called.~, qu~tion. in any court on the ground that it docs not give effect to such policy 1s invalid.

[Sikri, C.J. and Shelat, Hegde, Grove.r and Mukherjca, JJ. hel4 both the parts of article 31C invalid. Ray, Palekar, Ma~hew, Beg, Dwivedi and Chandrachud, JJ. held both the ports of the article valid.

K:ESAVANANDA V. El!RALA (Sikn, C.J.)

s

Jaganmohan Reddy J, held the second part of the article invalid and the

fust part of the article valid subject to the severance of the words "inconsistent with or takes away" and the words "article 14" therein. Khanna J. held the first part of the article valid and the second part invalid.]

Per Sikri, . C. /. : The Con;titution Twenty Fourth Amendment is valid, Section 2 of Constitttion Twenty Fifth Amendment is valid. Section 3 of Constitution Twenty Fifth Amendment is void. The Constitution Twenty Ninth Amendment is ineffective to protect the impugned sections if they abrogate or take away fundamental rights. The Golaknath case (1967) 2 S.C.R. 762 did not decide the ambit of article 368 with respect to the powors of Parliament to amend Article 13(2) or to amend Article 368 itself. Nor did it determine the exact meaning of the expression "amendment of this Constitution". The leading majority did not express -any opinion on the contention that in exercise of the power of amendment Parliament cannot destroy the fundamental structure of the Constitution but can -0nly modify provisions thereof within the framework· of the original instrument for its better effectuation. The conclu.sion in Golaknath's case tl1at the power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution is derived from Article 245, 246 and 248 of the Constitution and not from Article 368 thereto and that amend· ment is a legislative process docs not survive for discussion any longer;. because, it was rightly admitted on behalf of the petitioners that the Constitution 24th Amendment Act, 1971, in so far as it tran.sfcrs the power to amend the Cons· titution from the residuary entry (Entry 97 List I) or Article 248 of the Constitution to Article 368, is valid. In other words Article 368 of the Constitutioo as now amended by the 24th amendment deals not only with the procedure for amendment but also with the express powers of Parliament to amend the Constitution. It is not necessary to discuss the merits of the question whether amendment is 'law' within the meaninz of Article 13 as the same result follows in this case even if it be assumed in favour of the respondents that an amendment <>f the Constitution is not 'law' within Art. 13(2) of the Constitution. (p. 96].

I C. Golaknath v. State of Puniab (1967) 2 S.C.R. 672, Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of BU.ar (1952) S.C.R. 89 and Saiian Singh v. State of Raiasthan (1965) 1 S.C.R. 933 discussed. A. K. Gopa/an v. The State of Madras (1950) S.C.R. 88 at p. 100, referred to. The expression 'Amendment of the Constitution' does not enable Parlia· ment to abrogate or take away fundamental rights or to completely change the fundamental features of the Constitution so as to destroy its identity. Within these limits Parliament can amend every article:

(i) ID construing the expression amendment of the Constitution' one mwt

look at the whole scheme of the Constitution. It is not right to construe words in vacuum and then insert the meaning into article. [p. 101].

'I

"

Bidie v. General Accident, Fire anti Life Assurance Corporation (1948) 2 All E.R. 995-998, Bourne v. Norwich Crematorium (1967) 2 All E.R. 576-578, Towne v. Elsner 245 U.S. 418; 425-62 L. ed. 372-376 and obsecvations of Gwyer C.J. in The Central Provinces & Bmr Act 1939 F.C.R. at page 42 and Lord Wright in James v. Commonwealth of Australia 1936 A.C. 578 at page 613,

relied oa.

SUPU:M! COUllT 11.EPORTS [ 1973]

Supp. s.c.R.

In the Constitution the word 'amendment' or 'amend' has been used in various places to mean different things. In view of. the great variation of the phrases used throughout the Constitution it follows that the word 'amendment' must derive its oolou.r from Article 368 and the rest of the provisions of the Constitution. It is not intended. that the whole Constitution could be repealed. [p. 103, 107].

Mangal Singh v. Union of India (1967) 2 SCR 109 & 112 and Holmes v. Tennison (10) L. ed. 579: 594, rdied on.

If on reading article 368 in the context of the Constitution the word 'amendment' is found to be ambiguous, one can refer to the preamble to find which construction would fit in with the preamble. Therefore, the preamble of our Constitution is of extreme impor-..ance and the Constitution should be read and interpreted in the light of the grand and noble vision exprcssocd in the preamble. The Court was wrong in holding in the Berubari's case that the preamble is not a part of the Constitution. It was expressly voted to be a part of the Constitution. In some cases limitations have been derived froril the preamble. [pp. 112, 114, 116]. Re. Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclave> (1960) 3 SCR 250; 281-82, Golaknoth v. Punjab (1967) 2 SCR 762; 838 and 914, Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of Bombay (1955) 1 SCR 613 at p. 653, In re. The Kera/a Education Bill 1957 (1959) SCR 995; 1018-1019, Saiian Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1965) I SCR 933, 968, Attomcy.General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover ( 1957) A.C. 436; 460 and State of Vicwria v. The Commonwealth 45 A.L.J. 251, referred to. It is impossible to equate the directive principles with fundamental rights. To say that Directive Principles give a directive to take away fundamental rights in order to achieve what is directed by the directive principles seems to be a contradiction in terms. While our fundamental rights and directive .principles were being fashioned and approved by the Constituent Assembly on December 10, 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Declaration may 'not be a binding instrument but it shows how India understood the nature of the human rights. In view of art. 51 of the directive principles this Court must interpret the language of the Constitution, which is after all a municipal law, in the light of the United Nations Charter and the solemn declaration subscribed to by India. [p. 123].

Corocraft v. Pan American Airways (1969) 1 All. E.R. 82, 87, referred to. The work of the Advisory Committee and the Minorities Committee of the Constituent Assembly shows that no one ever contemplated that the fundamental rights appertaining to the minorities would be liable to be abrogated by an amendment of the COnstitution. The same is true about the proceedings in the Constituent Assembly. There is no hint anywhere that abrogation of minorities' rights was ever in the contemplation of the important members of the Constituent Assembly. In the context of the British. Plan, the setting up o'f Minorities Subcommittee, the Advisory Committee and the proceedings of these c.ommittces as well as the proceedings in the Constituent Assembly, it is impossible to read the expression "Amendment of the Constitution" as empowering Parliament to abrogate the rights qf minorities. It is a sound rule of construction that speeches made by members of legislature in the course of· debates rdating tQ the enactment of the statute cannclt be used as aids for interpreting any of the provisions of the statute. The same

.I

!f ll.S,1.VANiNJ>A V. KERALA (Sikri, C.J.)

rule must be applied to the provisions of the Constitution. The speeches can be relied on only in order to see if the course of the progress of a particular provision or provisions throws any light on the historical background or shows that a common understanding or agreement was arrived at between certain sections of the people. [pp. 13l, 133].

Stat< of Travancore.Cochin and Others v. Bombay Co. Ltd. (1952) SCR 1112; 1121, Adminittrator-General of Bengal v. Prem Nath (1895) 22 I.A. 107Jl8, Gopalan's case (1950) SCR 88, Golaknath's case (1967~ 2 SCR 762; 792; 922, H. H. Maharaiadhiraia Madhav Rao v. Union of India (1971) 3 SCR. 9 and Union of India v. H. S. Dhillon (1972) 2 SCR 33, referred to. The guarantee of fundamental rights extends to numerous rights and it could not have been intended that all of them would remain completely unalterable even if article 13(2) of the Constitution be taken to include constitutional amendments. A more reasonable inference to be drawn from the whole scheme of the Constitution is that some other meaning of 'Amendment' is more appropriate. This conclusion is also reinforced by the concession on behalf of the respondents· that the whole Constitution cannot be abrogated or repealed and a new one substituted. In other words the expression •Amendment' of this Constitution docs not include a revision of the whole Constitution. If this is true then which is that meaning of the -\vord 'amepdment' that is most appropriate and fits in with the whole schieme of the Constitution. That meaning would be appropriate which would enable the country to achieve -a social and economic revolution without destroying the democratic structure of the Constitution and the basic inalienable rights guaranteed in Part III and without going outside the contours delineated in the Preamble. [p. 140].

The Bribery Com,nissioner v. Pedrick Ranasinghe (1%5) A.C. 172, MCCawley" v. The King (1920) A.C. 691, and In re. The Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada (1932) A.C. 54 at p. 70, referred to.

,

The same conclusion is arrived at by another line of reasoning. In a written Constitution it is rarely that everything is said expressly. Powers and limitations arc implied from necessity or the scheme of the Constitution. The Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the Union of India conceded that implications can arise: from a Constitution, but said that no implication necessarily arises under the provisions of article 368. Reading the preamble, the fundamental importance of the freedom of individual, indeed its inalienability, the importance of the economic, social and political justice mentioned in the preamble, the importance of the directive principles-, the non-inclusion in article 368 or provisions like articles 52, 53 and various other provisions, an irresistible conclusion emerges that it was not the intention to use the word "amendment' in the widest sense. It was the common understanding that fundamental rights would remain in substance as they are and they would not be amended out of existence. It semis also to have been a common understanding that the fundamental features of the Constitution, namely secularisn1, democracy, and the freedom of the individual would always subsist in the wdfare state. In view of the above reasons, a necessary implication a.rises that there are implied limitations on the power of Parliament, that the expression 'Amendment of the Constitution' has .conseq,,.ntly a · timited meaning in our Constitution, and not the meaning suggested by the respondents. [pp. 141, 163; 164 ].

SUPREME COURT REPOllTS

[1973) Supp, S.C.R.

The Bn"bery Commissioner v. Pedrick RllfUUinglie (1965) A. C. 172, Mangal Sinth v. Uniun of India (1967) 2 SCR 109112, Taylor v. The Attornry-General of Queensland 23 C.L.R. 457, and In "· The Initiative and R<f.,...dum Acl (1919) A.C. 935, applied.

Hawk• v. Smith 64 L. Ed. 871, Rhode Island v. Palmer 64 L. Ed, 946, Uniled States of America v. William H. Soragu1 (75) L. Ed. 640, Commissioner of Stamps, Straits Settlements v. Oei Tjong Swan (1933) A.C. 378; 389, Bank of Toronto v. Iambe (1887) 12 A.C. 575-587 and Th• State (at the prosecution of Jeremiah Ryan) v. Captain Michael Lennon and others (1935) Irish Reports 170, discinguishcd. If the argument that there is no limit to the power of

Parliament

to

amend the Constitution is accepted, Article 368 can itself be amended to make the Constitution completely flexible or extremely rigid and unamendablc. If this is so a political party with a two-third majority in Parliament for a few years could so amend the Constitution as to debar any other party from

functioning, establish totalitarianism, enslave the people and after having effected these purposes make the Constitution unamcndablc or cxucmcly rigid. For the· aforesaid reasons, one is driven to the conclusion that the expression "Amendment of this Constitution" in Article 368 means any addition or change in any of the provisions of the Constitution within the broad contours of the Preamble and the Constitution to carry out the objectives in the Preamble a,nd the Directive Principles. Applied to fundamental rights it would mean that while fundamental righis cannot be abrogated reasonable abridgements of fundamental rights can be effected in the public interest. It is of course for Parliament to decide whether an amendment is nec.essa_ry. The courts will not be concerned with the wisdom of the amendment. This meaning would enable Parliament to adjust fundamental rights in order to secure whiat the Directive Principles direct ro be accomplished, while maintaining the freedom and dignity of every citizen. [p. 164 ].

(ii) Amendment within the contours of the Preamble and the Constitution cannot be said to be a vague and unsatisfactory idea which Parliamentarians and the public would not be able to understand. The true position is that every provision of the Constitution can be amended provided in the result the basic foundation and the basic structure of the Constitution remains tlM! same. Basic -structure may be said to consist of the following features: (a) Supremacy of the Constitution (b) Republican and democratic form of government (c) Secular character ofi the Constitution (d) Separation of powers bctwen the leigslaturc, the executive and the judiciary (c) Federal character of the Constitution. The above structure is built on the basic foundation, that is, the dignity and freedom of the individual. This is of supreme importance. This cannot by any form of amendment be destroyed. T~ above foundation and the above basic features arc easily discernablc not only from the Preamble but the whole scheme of the Constitution. [p. 165]. (iii) The provisions of articles 33, 358 and 359 and the uoe of the words 'rights conferred' in article 13(2) cannot support the proposition that some of the rights in Part III arc not natural or inalienable righu. India was a party to the Universal Declaration of Right1 and that declaration describes some fundamental rights as inalienable. Various decisions of this Court describe fundamental rights as 'natural rights' or 'human rigau'. [p. 167].

-

, USAVANANDA I/, Jtl!RALA (Sikri,

C.J.)

(iv) If Parliament hu power to pass the impugned amendment Acts, there . i1 no doubt that the wisdom of the policy of the Pai:liament cannot be questioned. jlut if the net result of the above interpretation is to prevent Parliament from abrogating the fundamental rights or the basic structure outlined above it is impossible to appreciate that any uncertainty, friction or confusion will · necessarily result. [p. 174]. (v} It was righ<tly concedc,d that Parliament could validly amend article 368 to transfer the source of '1"ending power from List I Entry 97 to Article 368. The amendments indicating that the source of amending power will be found in article 368 itself and · the amendment making it obligatory on the President to give his assent to anr. bill duly passed under the article were within the amending power of the Parliament. It is not necessary to go into the question whether Subba Rao, Chief Justice, rightly decided that the amending power was in List I Entry 97 or article 248 because nod:ting turns on it now.

It is not. legitimate to interpret article 368 as pehnitting Parliament to en· larging its power to amend the Constitution. Clause ( c) of the proviso does not give any different power than what is contained in the main article. The meaning of the expression 'amendment of the .Constitution~ docs not change when one reads the provision. Article 368 can only be amended so as not to change its identity completely. Parliament, .for instance could not make the Constitution uncontrolled by changing the prescribed two third majority to simple majority. Similarly it cannot get rid of the true meaning of the expression ~'Amendment of t1le Constitution" so as to derive power to abrogate fundamental righ.ts. If the words 'notwithstanding anything in the Constitution' arc designed to/widen the meaning of the word 'amendment of the Constitution' it would have to be held void as beyond the amending power. But they must not be read to mean this. They are inserted to get rid of the argument that article 248 and Entry 97 List I contains power of amendment. Similarly, the insertion of the words "in exercise of its constituent power only serves to exclude article 248 and Entry 97 List I and tmphasisc that it is not ordinary legislative rower that Parliament is exercising under .Article 368 but legislative pov,;er o amending the Constitution. It cannot be said that if Parliament cannot increase its power of amendment clause ( d} of Section 3 of the 24th. amendment which makes article 13 inapplicable to an amendment of the Constitution would be bad. There was no force in this contCntion. Anicle 13(2) as it existed previous to the 24th amendment as interpreted by the majority in GolaJcnath's case prevented legislatures from taking away ·or abridging the rigljts conferred by Article 13. In other words any law whi.ch abridged a fund~mcntal _right even to a small extent was liable to be struck down. Under Article 368 Parliament can amend every article of the Constitution as long as the result is within the limits laid down in this judgment. The amendment of article 13(2) docs not go beyond the limits laid down 1:5ecau~ Parliament cannot even after the amendment abrogate or authorise abrogation or the taking away of fu!ldamental rights. After the amendment a law which. !las the effect of merely abridging a right while remaining within the limits laid down would not be liable to be struck down. [pp. 192, 193, 194].

Section 2 of the Constitution Twenty fifth Amendment Act, 1971, has been validly enacted. There cannot be any doubt that the object of Section 2 of the Constitution Twonty Fifth Amendment Act is to modify the decision given by this Court in RUllOm Cavtuiief COOf'<' v. UtJi.on of India (1970) 3 SCR 530 where it was .held by ten judgos that the .Balling Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1973] Supp. s.c.R.

Undertakings) Act violated the guarantee of compensation under article 3!(2) in that it provided for giving certain amounts determined according to principles which were not relevant in the determination of compensation of the undertaking of the named Banks and by the method prescribed the amounts so declared could not. be .regarded as-· compensation. Since the word compensation has been deliberately omitted and substituted by the word 'amount' in the amended article 31(2), it is not possible to give to the word "amount" the figurative meaning, that is, the full value. Article 3!(2) postulates that in some cases principles may be laid down for determining the amount and these principles may lead to an adequate amount or an inadequate amount. So this shows that the vrord •amount' here means something to be given in lieu of the property to be acquirt.d but this amount has to and can be worked out by laying down certain principles. The principles must then have a reasonable relationship to the property which is sought to be acquired. If this is so die amount ultimately arrived at by applying the principles must have some reasonable relationship with the property to be ;icquired, otherwise the principles laid down by the Act could hardly be principles within the meaning of Article 31 (2 ). Similarly when the alrtount is fixed by law the amount so fixed must ialso be fixed in accordance with some principles because it could not have been intended that if the amount is fixed by law, the legislature would fix the amount arbitrarily. When the government places the legislation fixing the amount before the legislature it will have to show that it has been fixed according to some principles. These principles cannot be different from the principle which the legislature would lay down. The change effected by the amendment in article 31(2) is that a person whose property is acquired can no longer claim full compensation or just compensation but he can still claim that the law should lay down principles to determine the amount which he is to get and these principles must have a rational relation to the property sought to be acquired. If article 31(2) were to be interpreted as meaning that even an arbitrary or illusory or a grossly low amount could be given, which would shock not only the judicial conscience but the conscience, of every reasonable human being, a serious question would arise whether Parliament has not exceeded its amending power under article 368 of the Constitution. The substance of the fundamental right to property under article 31 consists of three things: First, the property shall be. acquired by or under a valid law; S«ondly, it shall be acquired only for a public purpose; and thirdly, a person whose property has been acquired shall he given an amount in lieu thereof, which is nor arbitrary, illusory or shocking to the judicial conscience or to the conscience of mankind. Parliarnent has no power under the article 368 to abrogate the fundamental rights but can amend or rer,ulate or adjust them in its. exercise of amending power without destroying them. Applying this to the fundamental right of property, Parlia. ment cannot c-n1power legislatures to fix an arbitrary amount or illusory amount or an amount th.at virtually amounts to confiscation, taking all the relevant circumstances of the acquisition into consideration. Same considerations apply to the manner of payment. It cannot be interpreted to mean that an arbitrary manner of payment is contemplated. If discretion is conferred it must be excr. ciscd reasonably. [pp. 195, 196, 197]. Robberts v. Hopu•ood (1925) A.C. 578; 590 and fames Laslie Williams Haines Thomas (1911) A.C. 381, referred to.

v.

Article 31 (2B), the effect of which is to make article l9(!)(f) inapplicable, cannot be said to be an unreliSonablc abridgement of right under article 19(1)(£). While passing a law fixing principles, the legislatures arc bound to provide a procedure for the detenninatiori of the amount and if the procedure is arbitrary that provision may well be struck down under Article 14. [p. 199].

KE$AVANANDA v. KEllALA. (Sikri, C.J.)

Sec#on 3. of the ·Constitution Twenty Fifth Amendment Act, 1971, is vo;iJ as it dekgates power to legi'slatures to amend the Constitution. Articl~ 368 doi!s not enable Parliament in its Constituent capacity to delegaie ;u function of amending the Constitut.,-on to another legislature or to itself in its ordinary legiilative capaa"ty. The . expression 'notwithstanding anything contained in article 13' with which article 31C open• canMt mean that not only fundamental rights like article 19(1)(f) and article 31 arc excluded but funda:ncntal rights belonging to the .Minorities and religious groups are also excluded. The article purports to save laws which a State may make towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) or (c) of article 39 from being challenged on the ground that the law is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by articles 14, 19 or 31. This is the only ground on which they cannot be challenged. (p. 199]. The article. provides that if the law contains a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy, it shall not be called in question in any court on the ground that it docs not give effect to such policy. In other words once a declaration is given no court can question the law on the- grou.nd that il has nothing to do with giving effect to the policy; whether it gives effect to sOme other policy is irrelevant. Further a law may contain some provision dealing with principles specified in clause (b) or (c) of article 39 while other sections may have nothing to do with it, yet on the language it denies any court power or. jurisdiction to go into this question. In the f:tcc of the dcdaration this Court would be unable to test the validity of incidental provisions which do not constitute an essential and integral -part of the policy directed to give ef!cct to article 39(b) and article 39(c) (p. 200].

Article 31C dif!crs in nature from article 31A. In article 31A the subject maner of the legislation is clearly provided, namely, the acquisition by the State _pf any estate or any rights therein. [art. 31A(a) J Similarly the subject matter of legislation is specifically provided in clauses (b),' (c) and (d) of article 31A. But in article 31C the sky is the limit because it leaves it to each State to. adopt measures towards securing principles specified in clauses (b) and (c) of article 39. The wording of articles 39(b) and 39(c) is vety wide. The expression· "economic system" in article 39(c) may well include professional and other services. It would be difficult to resist the contention of the State that each provision in the law had been taken for the purpose of giving effect to the policy of the State. (pp. 201, 202]. In effect article 31C enables States to adopt any policy they like •brogate article 14, 19 and 31 of the COnstitution at will.

and

Parliament cannot under article 368 abrogate fundamental rights. Parlia• ment equally cannot enable the legislatures to abrogate them. This provision enables legislatures to . abrogate fundamental rights and therefore must be declar.ed .unconstitutional. [p. 204],. Article 368 of the C.Onstitution itself provides that amendment may be initiated only by the introduction of a bill for the purpose in either House of .Parliament ln _other word.s Article 368 docs not contemplate any <;>!her mode ·of amen\ll)lcn\ by Patli.ill)cllt aQ.d. it docs not equally contemplate Parliament to set up .an~t body .to aq;.nd 'the C.Onstitution. It is ~IL settled ,i,ii. India that Parliament canruit deltgate its essential legisl•tive functions. [p. 21Jof!!

SVPUMK coo.T llEPORTS (1973] Supp. s.c.a.

Since the State legislates under article 31C and the law abrogo,tes. or takes away fundamental rights, the11: cease to have any eflect. The amendment ii not then made by Parliament as the extent of the amendment is not known till the State legislates. It is when the State legislates that the extent of the abrogation or abridgement of the fundamental rights becomes clear. To all intents and purposes it seems that it is State legislation that effects an amendment of the Constitution. If it be assumed that article 31C does not enable the State to amend the Constitution then article 31C would be ineflective because the law which in effect abridges or takes away the fundamental rights would have been passed not in the form required by article 368, that is by two third majority of the Parliament but by another body which is not recognised in article 368 and would be void on that ground. [p. 210]. What article 31C does Is that it empowers legislature subject tn the condition laid down in article 31 C itself to· take away or abridge the rights conferred by article ')4, 19 and 31. At any rate, if it is to be deemed an amendment of article 368 it is beyond the powers conferred by article 368 itself. Article 368 docs not enable the Parliament to constitute another legislature to amend the Constitution in its exercise of the power to amend article 368 itself. For the aforesaid reasons it must be held that section 3 of th~ Constitution 25th Amendment Act is void as it delegates power to the legislatures to amend the Constitution. [P. 211].

Akadasi. Padhan v. State of Orissa (1963) Supp. 2 SCR 691-707, R. C. Coop.,. v. Union of lndU. (1970) 3 SCR 530-582, In re. lnitilllive nd Rql!1'en• dum Act (1919) A.C. 935, Attorney-General of Nova Scotia v. Attorney Genl!ral of Canada (1951) S.C.R.-Canada 31 Nadan v. The King (1926) A.C. 482, The Queen v. Burah, 5 I.A. 178 (1878) 3 A.C. 889; 904; 905, and Mohamed Samsudeen Kariappl!r v. S. S. Vijesinluzl (1968) A.C. 717, 743, rcfcrrcd tn. The Constitution Twenty Ninth Amendment Act is

i~ectitJe

to

protect the impugned Acts if they abrogate or take away funda)nenllll rights:

The argument that article 31B is limited by what is contained· in article 31A cannot be accepted. [p., 213].

State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh (1952) SCR 889; 914-15, Sibnath Banerii's case (1945) F.C.R. 19, Visweshwar Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952) SCR 1020-1037 and N. B. /eejeebhoy v. Assistant Collector Thana (1965) I SCR 636-6411, referred to. Article 368 does not enable the Parliament tn abrogate or take away fundamental rights. If this is so it does not enable Parliament tn do this by any means including the device of article 31B and the Ninth Schedule. This device of article 31B and the 9th schedule is bad in so far it protect statutes even if they take away fundamental rights, Therefore, it is nea:ssary to declare that the Constitution (Twenty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1971 is incffcctive tn protect the impugned Acts if they take away fundamental rights. [p. 214 J.

art!cle

Broadly speaking consti~tional amendments hi~hcrto made in. and anicle 15 and the agrarian laws enacted by vanouo S12tes furnish illustration ,f>f reasonable abridgement of fundamental rights in the public interest. /

XESAVANANDA V. KllALA (She/at, J.)

Proprietary Articles Trade Ass0<iation v. Attorney General for Canada (1931) A. C. 310; 317, and Att0<ney General for Australia v. The Queen and the Boilermakers' Society of Auttralia (1957) A.C. 288; 323, referred to. The fact that it takes years before the validity of an enactment is finally determined is not a good reason to deprive pcnons of their fundamental rights. There are other ways available to the government to expedite_ the decision. It may, for example, propose ordinary legislation to enable parties to approach the Supreme Court for transfer of such cases to this Court for determination of substantial questions of interpretation of the Constitution. [p. 215].

She/at and Grover, JI: The Constitution Twenty Fourth and Twenty Ninth Amendments arc valid. Section 3 of the Twenty Fifth Amendment must be declared un·

constitutional and invalid. The decision in Golak,nath has become academic, for, even if it be assumed that the majority holding that the word 'law' in Article 13(2) covered constitu· tional amendments was not correct, the result on the questions, wider than those

raised in Golaknath, now raised before the Court, would be just the Same. [p. 217]. Though the power to amend cannot be narrowly construed and ertentlt to all the articles, it is not unlimited so as to include the power to abrogate or change the identity of the Constitution or its basic features.

Even if the amendint power includes the power to amend article 13(2), a question not decided in Golaknath, the power is not so wide as to £nclude the power to abrogate or take away the fundamental freedoms.

While interpreting constitutional provisions it is necessary to determine t;heir width or reach ; in fact the area of operation of the power, its minimum and maximum dimensions cannot be demarcated or determined, without fully examining the rival claims. Unless that is done the ambit, content, scope and extent of the amending power cannot be properly and correctly decided. The Constitution being supreme all the organs and bodies owe their existence to it. None can claim superiority over the other and each of. them has to function

within the four corners cf the constitutional provisions. All the functionaries, be they legislators, members of the executive or the judiciary take oath of allegiance to the Constitution and derive their authority and jurisdiction _from its provisions. The Constitution has entrusted- to the judicature in this Country the task of construing the provisions of the Constitution and of safeguarding the fundamental rights. It is a written .and controlled Constitution. It can be amended only to the extent of and in accordance with the provisions contained therein, the principal provision being article 368. [pp. 220, 221]. With regard to the position of the judiciary the British model has been ' adopted inasmuch as the appointment of Judges both of the Supreme Court and of the High Court is kept free from political controversies. Their independence has been assured. But the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty as it obtains in England docs not prevail here except to the extent provided Tiy the Constitution. The entire scheme of the Constitution is such that it ensures the sovereignty and integrity of the Collntry as a republic and the democratic way of life by · parliamentary institutions based on free and fair elections. [p. 221).

SUPRP.¥E COuRT REPORts [1973]

Supp. s.CJI.

The word 'amendment' has been used in the Constitution in various articles, .sometimes in a narrow and sometimes in a wider sense. The meaning of the word 'amendment' must be interpreted on the basis of its use in our own Constitution. It would be purely speculative or conjectural to rely on the use of the word 'amcnd 1 or 'amendment' in the C-onstitution of another Countty unless the entire scheme of amending section or article is also kept in mind. The position which emerges from an examination of the speeches in the Constituent Assembly docs not lead to any clear and conclusive result. The speeches show that our Constitution was to be an amendable one and much rigidity was not intended. (pp 228, 234 ]. It is not possible to accept the argument on behalf of the respondent that the word 'amendment' can have only one meaning. The word has several meanings and the Court will have to determine its true meaning as used in the context of article 368 by taking assistance from the other permissible aids to construction. A Constitution is not to be construed in any narrow and pedantic sense. A broad and liberal spirit should inspire those whose duty is to interpret it. (pp. 234, 235]. In re C.P. & Berar Sol-es of Motor Spirit & Motor Lubricants ·Taxatjon Act~ 1938, [1939] F.C.R. 18, Attorney General for New So#th Wales v. The Brewery employees Union of New South Wales etc., (1908] 6 CL.R. 469, 611-012, fames v. Commonw<alth of Australia, (1936] A.C. 578 and Bidis v. General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, (1948]2 All E.R. 998, referred to. Apart from the historical backgronnd and the scheme of the Constitution the use of Preamble has always been made and is permissible i£ the word 'amendment' has more than one meaning. The Constitution makers gave to the Preamble the pride of place. It embodied in a solemn form all the ideals and aspirations for which the Country had struggled during the British regime and a Constitution was sought to be enacted in ac.cordaru:c with the gcniw of the Indian people. It is not without significance that the Preamble was passed only after the draft articles of the Constitution had been adopted with such modifications as were approved by the Constituent Assembly. The Preamble was, there~ fore, meant to embody in a very few and well-defined words the key to under~ standing of the Constitution. [pp. 235, 236]. Behram Khurshid Pesikaka's case [1955] 1 S.C.R. 613, Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tar Rajasthan [ 1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 528, In re Kera/a Education Bill, 1957, (1959] S.C.R. 995, Rer v. Hm, (1949) Dom. L. R. 199, john Switzman v. Freda Elbing & Attorney General of tAe Prov;nce of Qubec, (1957] Canada L.R. 285, 326 (S.C.), Re Alberta Statutes, (1938] S.C.R. 100 {Canada), Attornry General for Alberta v. Attornry General for Conada, [1939] A.C. 117, McCawley v. The King [1920] A.C. 691, 711 and In re: Berubari Union and Erchonge of Enclaves, [1960] 3 S.C.R., referred to. It hardly makes any substantial difference whether the Preamble is part of the Constitution or not. The Preamble serves several important purposes. Firstly, it indicates the source from which the Constitution comes, v;z,, the people of India. Next, it contains the enacting clause which brings into force the Con!ltitution. In the third place, it declares the great rights and freedoms which the people of India intended to secure to all citizens and the basic type· of

KESAVANANllA v, KllALA (She/at, J,)

government and polity which was io be established. Fr<lm aft these, if any provision of the Constitution had to be interpreted and if the expressions used therein were ambiguous, the preamble would certainly furnish ·valuable guidance in the matter, particularly when the question is of the correct ambit, scope and width of a power intended to be conferred by article 368. [p. 242]. The contention that the Preamble can be varied, altered and repealed is an extraordinary one. It. QJ.3.Y be tru.e about ordinary statutes but it cannot possibly be sustained in the light of the historic background, the Objectives Resolution which formed the basis of the Preamble and the fundamental position which the Preamble occupies in our Constitution. It constitutes a land.mark in India's history and sets out as a matter of historical fact what the people of India resolved to do for moulding their future destiny. It is unthinkable that the Constitution makers ever conceived of a stag.c when it would be claimed that even the Preamble could be abrogated or wiped out. [p. 242]. ·

Where two constructions arc possible, the Court must adopt that which will C..'lsure smooth and harmonious working of the Constitution and

eschew

the

other which will lead to absurdity or give rise to practical inconvenience or make well-established provisions of existing bw nugatory. The conscqucnccs and effect of suggested construction have to be taken into account as 'has been frequently done by this Court [p'. 244]. State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh, [1953] S.C.R. 254, 264, Liyanage v. The Queen [1967] I A.C. 259, The Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (1887) 12 A.C. 575, referred to. It is not for the Courts to enter into the wisdom or policy of a p3rticular provision in a Constitution or a statute, That is ,Jor the Constitution makers or

the Parliament or the legislature. But it is well settled that the real consequences can be taken into account while judging.width of the power. The·Court cannot ignore the consequences to which a particular constructltin can lead while ascertaining the limits of the provisio_ns granting the power. [p. 245]. The amending body has been created by the Constitution itself. It can only exercise those powers with which it has been invested and if that power · has limits it can· be exercised only within those limits. Article 368 cannot be so amended as to remove these limits nor can it be amended so as to take away the voice of the States in the amending process. If the Constitution makers arc inclined to confer the full pc>wC1'. of a Constituent Assembly, it could have been easily provided in suitable terms. !f however the original power was limited to some extent it could not be enlarged by the body possessing the limited power. That being .so even where an amending power is expressed in wide terms it has to be exerct.cd within the framework of the eon.titution. It cannot abrogate the Constitution or frame ill.new Constitution or alter or change the essential elements of the constitu~tructure. It cannot be overlooked tha~ the basic theory of our Constitution •is that "Pouvoir Constituent" is vested in the people and was exercised for and on their behalf by the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the Constitution. [p. 251 J.• .The true distinction between controlled and uncontrolled constitution lies · not. merely in the difference. in. the procedure of amendment but in the fact tha1 · in tontrolled Constitutions the Constitution has a higher status by whose touch'. stone the validity of a law made by the legislature and the organ set up by it is subjea.d to the process of judicial · review.' · Where there is a 'e'Ji~n

SOPIWdJI COtJllT llEPOllTS [ 1973] Supp. s.c.11.

Constitution which adopts the (irwnble of smereignty in the people then: is, firstly no question of the law-making body being a sovereign body, for that body possesses only those powers which are conferml on it. Secondly, however representative it may be it cannot be equated with the people. This is specially so where the Constitution contains a Bill of rights for such a Bill imposes

restraints on that body, that is, it negates the equation of that body with the people. [p. 252].

The meaning of the words "amendment of this Constitution" as used in the article 368 must be such as accords with the true -intention of the Constitution makers as ascertainable from the historical background, the Preamble, the entire scheme of the Constitution, its structure or framework and the intrinsic evidence in various articles including article 368. It is neither possible to give it a narrow meaning nor can such a wide meaning be given as will enable the amending body to change subsrantially or entirely the structure and identity of the Consti·

tu tion. The concession by the respondents that the whole constitution· cannot be abrogated or repealed and a new one substituted supports the conclusion the widest possible meaning cannot be given to it. [p. 255].

that

Bribery Commissioner v. Pedrick, (1965] A.C. 172, 193-94, Rhode Island v. A. Mitchel Palmet, 64 L. Ed. 946, /. /.Dhillon v. R. W. Gloss, 65 L. Ed. 994, United States v. William H. Sprague & William /. Howey, 75 L. Ed. 640, 644, Howard /oseph Whitehill, 19 L. Ed. 2nd 228 and Hawi{e v. Smith, 64 L. Ed. 871, referred to. There is ample evidence in the Constitution itself to indicate that it creates a system oi checks and balances by reason of which powers are so distributed that none of the three organs can bccoJ;ne so predominant as to disable the others from exercising and discharging powers and functions entrusted to them. Though the Constitution does not lay down the principle of separation of powors in all its rigidity as is the case in the United States Constitution, it cnvisaaes such a separation to a degree as was found in RanasingAe's case. The judi.Clal review provide(! expressly in the Consaitution by article 226 and 32 is one ol. the features on which hinges the system of checks and balances. Apart from that the necessity for judicial decision on the competence or otherwise of an Act arises from the very federal nature of a Conscitution. The function of inter· pretation of a Constitution being thus assigned to the judicial power of the State the question whether the subject of a law is within the ambit of one or more powers in lcgislaturej conferred by the Constitution has always been a question of interpretation of the Constiaution. It may be -added that at no stage the' respondents contested the proposition that the validity of ,a Constitution amendment can be the subject of review by this Court. Judicial review cannot be undemocratic in our Constitution because of the provisions relating to the appointment of Judges, the specific restrictions to which the fundamental rights are made subject, the deliberate exclusion of the due process clause in article 21 and the affirmation in article 141 that Judges declare but no< make law. To this may be added the none - rigid arncndatory process which authorises by means of two third majority and the additional requiremcot of ratification. [p. 278]. Bribery Commissioner ~. Pedrick RanasingAe, [1965] A.C. 172, Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Australia v. Colonial Sugar, [1914] A. C. 237 and West v. Commissioner of Tara#on (N.S.W.) (1936-37) C.L.R. 657, relied on. Case law discussed. The correct approach to the question of limitation which may be implied in any legislative provisions including a constitutional document hao to be made from the point, of view of interpretation. It is not a novel theory

XESAVANANDA fl, KEllALA (She/at,

J.)

or doctrine which has to be treated as innovation of those who evolve heterodox methods to substantiate their own thesis. The argument that there arc no implied limitations because there are no exptcSI limitations is • contradiction in terms. The implied limitations can only arise where there arc no express limitations. The contention that no implications can be read in an. amending power in a Constitution must be therefore repelled. [p. 279].

The whole scheme underlying the Constitution is to bring about economic and r.ociai changes without taking away the dignity of the individual. Indeed the same has been placed on such a. high pedestal that to ensure &eedom etc. from infringement has been justicfable by the highest court in the land. The dictum of Da~ C.J., in Kera/a Educllhon Bill "points the true picture in which there must be harmony between Parts III and IV ; indeed the picture will get distorted and blurred if any vital provision out of them is cut out or denuded of its identity. [p. 280].

The basic structure of the Constitution is not a vague concept and the apprehensions expressed on behalf of the respondents that netither the citizen nor the Parliament would be able to understand it are unfounded.

If the historical background, the Preamble, the entire scheme of the Constitution, the relevant provisions thereof including Art. 368 arc kept in mind there can be 110 difficulty in discerning that the following can be regarded as illustrating the basic clements of the constitutional structure : (I) The supremacy of the Constitution; (2) Repulillcan democratic form of government and soverignty~the Coontry; ( 3) Secular and federal character of the Constitution ; ( 4) Demarcation of power between the legislature, and executive and the judiciary ; (5) The dignity of individual secured by the various freedoms and basic righu in Part III and the mandate to build a welfare State contained in Part IV and ( 6) The unity and the integrity of the nation. (p. 280]. The 24th Amendment does no more than to clarify in express language that which was implicit in the unamended article 368 ahd it docs not or cannot add to the power originally conferred thereunder. 'fhc entire discussion from the point of view of the meaning of the ec:prcssion "amendment' as implied in article 368 and the limitations which arise by implication leads to the result that the amending power under attidc 368 i• neither narrow nor unlimited. On this footing the ,validity of the 24th amend ment can be sustained if article 368 as it originally -stood and after the amendment is read in the above manner. The insertion of article 13( 4) and 368 and other provisions made will not a!Iect the result, vis., that the power in article 368 i• wide enough to permit amendment of each and every article of the Constitution by way of addition, variation or repeal so long as its basic clements arc not abrogated or denuded of their identity. [p. 281 ].

Sectioo 2 of the 25th Amendment is ••lid Clause (2) of article 31 as substituted by s. 1 of the 25th Amendment doe. llot abrogate any basic clement of the Constitution nor docs it denude it of it. identity because. (a) the fiution or the detemiination of the 'amount' under that article has to be based on oorne norm or principle which must be relevant for die purpme of arriving at amount payable in respect of the property

t1i"

acquind or requisitioned ;

:!,-'6 S.C. tlld<-/13

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1973

J Supp. s.c.R.

(b) the amount need not be the market value but it should have a reasonable

relationship with the Value of such property ;

(c) the amount should neither be illusory nor fixed arbitrarily; {d) though the courts arc debarred from going into the question of the ~dcquacy of the a~ou~t and would give due weight to legislative Judgment, the cxam1natton of all the matters in (a), (b) and (c) above is open to judicial review. As regards clause (2B) inserted in article 31 which makes article 19(1)(!) inapplicable, there is no reason trJ suppose that for determination of the amounr 'OD. the ~rinciplcs laid do,vn in the law any such procedure will be provided which will be unreasonable or opposed to the rules of natural justice. [pp. 291 292]. ,

Section 3 of Constitution Twenty Fifth Amendment is unconstitutional and

involid The validity of section 3 of the 25th Amendment cannot be sustained because the said article suffers from two vices. The first is that it enables abrogation of the basic clements of the Constitution inasmuch as the fundamental rights contained in articles 14, 19 and 31 can be completely taken away and, secondly, the power of a1nendmcnt contained in article 368 is of a special nature which has been exclusively conferred on Parliament and can be exercised only in the ·manner laid down !n that article. The same could· not be delegated to any other legislature in the Country. Section 3 must therefore be declared to be: wnconstitutional and invalid. [ p. 292 J.

The 29th Amendment is valid

Tne question whether the articles included in the Ninth Schedule by that amendment or any provision of those Act abrogates any of the basic elements of die constitutional structure or denudes them of .their identity will have to be examined when the \'alidiry of those Acts comes up for consideration, Hegde and Mukherjea, /l. The Constitution 1'wc-nty Fourth and Twenty Ninth. ~mcndments arc v•lid. Section 2 of the Constitution Twenty Fifth Amendment is valid. Section 3 of the Constitution Twenty Fifth Amendment is invalid.

The power to amend the Constitutjon u-lt.Jer"Art. 368 a.r it stood before its amendment empowe~ed, the Parliament by foll<>wing the form an4 manner laid down in that ':Article, to amend each nd et1dy Article and each and every Part of the _Constitutjon. The view taken in Sankari Pi-asad's case, Saifan. Singh'~ case as well as Gol.alf..nath's case that the .(>f?r-"Cr .to amend is to be found in article 368 is thC -correct view. It is difficult to accept the view that the power to amend the CPnstitritiOO · is 'not to bC fou'nci even by· necessary implication in article 368

but m~st 'he !ound c1sc\vhere. . Our .Constitutioh .makers, whq were _keenly conscious of the importance of the provision relatiflt~ to the amendment of the .Constitution and .d~bated that question for several days would not have !cf! this in>portant power . :hidden in Entry 'Y7 or ,,ist I leaving it to the of'! cha~ of the, courts locating that power in that Entry. The reasoning in suppo;t of the view fails to give due weight ti>, the fact that the <l!'°!cisc of th~ power under arti<lc 245, 2~6 anc 248 is "sub!l!<:t.' ta ·the·, pt'OV!OJOn$, of ,th!S Constitution". Most amendments of the Const1t\1t1on .must· nccq~rily .un?IJge,

!K.ESAVANANDA ,,. KERALA (Hegde,

J.)

on one or the other of the existing provisions of the Constitution, Article 248 as well as the Lists in the 7th schedule merely deal with the legislative ~wer and not with the amending power. [p. 299]. Article 368 docs not expressly i:onftr the power to amend; the power is necessarily implied in the article.. The Article contains both the power and the procedure for an1cnding the ConstitUtion. The article opens by saying "An a1nend1ncnt of the Con!-.titution" which means an amendment of each and every provhion an<l part of the Constitution. There is nothing in that article to restrict its scope. If article 3~$. is read by itself, there could be no doubt that the power of an1<.:ndr.nent implied in that article can reach each and every article as well as every part of the Coostitutfon. [pp. 299, 300].

Th< exprmion 'law' in Articl< 13(2) <v<n b<for< Art. 13 was ammd<d by the 24th Amendment Act did not include amendments to the Constitution.

A Constitution is cxprc.tcd tc endure for a long time. Therefore, it must necessarily he elastic. Society cannot be placed in a strait jacket. When society grows, it~ requirements change. The Constitution and the laws may have to be changed to suit those needs. No single gcn¢ation can bind the cOurse of generations to come. Hence every Constitution wisely drawn up provides for its own amendment. [p. 305]. To implement the duties imposed on the State' under Part IV, it may be necessary to abridge in certain respects the rights conferred on the citizens or, individuals under Part Ill, as in the case of incorporation ,of .clause 4 in Article 15 to benefit the backward classes and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the amendment of Artkle 19(2) with a view to maintain effectively public order and friendly relations \.vith foreign· States. Hence; the ar)lending power should not be construed iri a narrow or pedantic ·man&cr~ The .power, must receive a broad and libcr~.l interpretation. How large it Should be is' a qpcs-tion that requires closer examination. Both on prin~iplc as -well as on the language of Anide 3~ it was impossible to aq::cdc to the contention that no right guaranteed by Part III, can be abridged. [p. '305]. It is not cle:ir why the Drafting Committee deleted the reference to the amendment of the Constitution in Article 13(2). It is possible that they were of the opinion that in view of the plain 'language of' the provision relating to the amendment of the Constitution, that is draft Article 304, it wa·s unnecessary. to provide in Article 13(2) that the amendment of the .Constitution docs not .c.;qme within its scope•

. ThiS Court i11 al~vs reluctant to overrule its ~lier. decisio~s. There must be compciling reasOns for overruling a·n earlier decision of this Court. There are already conflicting decisions as to the scope . of Article 36$. As for back as l~l, in Sankari &asad's case, this Court took. the view .that. the pO~er of amendment confcireq under article. 368 . included· 'in itself the power to abridge a.nd take away the fundamental. right. incorporated in Part 'III of the 'Constitution. ·The correctness of that· view was hot cha1lcngcd:. in several oth~.r de.cisio~S~. ·Th~~ same. V~eW ·wa' taken in S~ii'!n. Singh's 'rJse. ·'That view w~s negatived i.n GOlQknath'.j'c:asc by a very .~arrbw majority:, [p. 3061. · . ·.One other. circumsiilnccs of' gr~t signifitanec·ifthat the first ·;t;n1en<lmertt

to the Constitution was carried out by the prl>V!Sli>nal Par!Wlien~ which. eon'

•isted of the very members who were the members of th~ C<instituent Assembly.

SUPREME COURT llEPOl\TS

[1973} Supp. s.c.a.

It should be ·remembered that members of the Constitucot Assembly continued as the members of the provisional Parliament till the general election in 1952. They must have been :nvarc of the intention with which article 368 was enacted. [p. 306].

Though the power to amend the Constitution untler Article 368 is • very wide power, it does not include the power to destroy or emascuate the basic elements or the fUndamental features of the Constitution. Since the word ament.hncnt in Article 368 is not a word of precise import and has not been used in various articles and parts of the Constitution to convey always the same precise meaning it is necessary to cake the aid of other relevant rules of construction to find out. the intention of the Constitution-makers.

If the nature of the power granted is clear and beyond doubt the fact that it may be misused is '"'holly irrclcva~t. But, if there is a reasonable doubt as. to the nature of the powe:: granted then the Court has to rake into consideration the consequences that might ensue by interpreting the same as an unlimited power. Since the word 'amendment' has more than one meaning it is necessary to examine the consequences of accepting the contention of the· Union and the States. [p. 313]. It is difficult to ac\:cpt the contention that our Constitution makers after making in1mrnsc. sacrifices for achieving certain ideals made provisions in the Constitution itself for the destruction of those ideals. There is no doubt as men of experience and round political knowledge they must have known that social, econon1ic and political changes are bound to come with the passage of time and the Constitution must be capable of being so adjusted as to be able to respond to those new demands. Our Constitution is not a- mere political document. It is essentially a social document. It is based on a social philso· phy and every social philooophy like every religion has two main features, namely, basic and circurnc;tantial. The former remains constant but the latter is subject to change. The core of religion always remains constant but the practices associated with it may change. Likewise a Constitution like ours contains certain features which arc so csscntial that they cannot be changed or destroyed. In any event it cannot be destroyed from within. In other words, one cannct legally use the Constitution to destroy itself. Under Article 36S the amended Constitution must remain "the Constituti'on"- whiCh means the original Constitution. \Vhcn we speak of the 'abro~ation or 'repeal' of the Constinnion we do not refer to any form but to substance. If one or more of the basic features of the Constitution arc taken away to that extent the Constitution is abrogated or repealed. If some other provisions inconsistent with those features arc incorporated it cannoll still remain the Constitution referred to in Article 368. The personality of the Co. ·•titution must remain unchanged. [p. 314].

It is also necessary to bear in mind that the power to amend the Constitution -is conferred on Parliament, a body constituted und"cr the Constitution. The people as such are not associated with the amendment of the Constitution. The Preamble shows it i< the people of this country who conferred this Coosti· tution on themselves. The statement that the people of this country conkrrcd the Constitution on themselves is not open to challenge before the Court. Its factual corrtttncss cannot be gone into by this Court which again is a creature of the Constitution. n •• facts set out in the preamble have to be acuptcd hr· this Court u correct. [ p. 315 J.

USAVANANDo\ II. ULU-4

(Hegde, J.)

When a power to amend a Constitution is given to the people its contents can be construed to be larger than when that power is given to a body ' constituted under that Constitution. Two-thirds oI the members of the twe Howes of Parliament nrcd not neccasarily represent even the majority of the people of this country. Our electoral system is such that even a minority of · vOO:rs can elect more than 2/3 of the members of the either House of Parliament. That is seen from our· c:xpericncc in the ~st. That apart, our Constitution wat· framed on the basi~ of consensus and not on the basis of majority votes. It provides for the protection of the· minorities. If the majority opinion is taken as the guiding factor then the guarantee given to the minorities may )>ecomc valueless. It is wcll~known that the representatives of rhc minorities in the Constituent .Assembly gave up their claim for special protection which they were demanding -in the past because of the guarantee of the Fundamental Rights. Therefore, the contention en behalf of the Union and the States that the two third nujority -·of the members of the two houses of Parliament arc always authorised to speak on behalf of the entire people of this country is unacceptable. [p. 315]. Implied limitations on the power conferred under a statute constitute a general feature of all statutes. The position cannot be different in the case of powers conferred under a Constitution. A grant of power in general terms or even in· absolute terms may be qualified by other express provisions in the same enactment or may be qualified by· the implications in the context or even by oonsiderations arising out 0£ what appears to be the general scheme of the statute. Several of the powers conferred under our Constit•Jtion have been held to be subject to implied limitations though those powers arc expressed ift general terms or even iu ~bsolute terms. The amending power is one of ~he powers conferred under the Constitution whatever the nature of that power might be. [pp. 316, 317]. It is clear that the amending power under article 368 is also subject to in1plied H1nitations. The contention that a power to amend the Constitution cannot be subject to any implied limitation is negatived by the observations of the Judicial Committee in the Bribery Commissioner v. Rana Singhe. [p. -318]. The position as re~rds the ascertainment of basic clements or fundamental features of the Constitution can by no means be more difficult than the dif&.. culty of the legislature<; to determine before hand the constitutionality of legislation made under various other heads. Argument based on the difficulties likely to be faced by the legislatures arc of very little importance and they arc essentially arguments against judicial review. [p. 320]. Under our electoral system it is ·possible for a party to get two thir• majority in the two houses of Parliament even if that party does not get an absolute majority of votes cast at the election. That apart, when a party goes to election it presents to the electorate diverse programmes and holds out 'Yarious promises. The programmes presented or the promises held out need not necessarily include proposals for amending the Constitution. During the gcntral elections to Parliament in 1952, 1957, 1962 and 1967 no proposal to amend the Constitution appears to have been placed before the electorate, Even when proposals for an1C'ndment of the Constitution arc placed before the c:lcctoratc, as was done by the Congress party in 1971, the proposed amendments arc not usually placed before the electorate. Under the!< circumstances the claim. that the electorate had given a mandate to the party to amend the Constttution in any particular manner is unjustified. Further a parliamentary

SUPREME COUaT REPORTS

[1973] Supp. s.c.R.

democracy like ours functions on the basis of the p:lity system. The mechanics of the opcracion of the party system as well as the system of Cabinc~ goyernmcnt are such that the people as a whole can have little 'ontrol in the matter of detailed law making. [p. 321]. 11ic assertion that either the majority of the members of Parliament or even two third member~ of Parliament can speak on behalf o! the nation has no basis in fact. Indeed it may he possible for the ruling party to carry through important constitutional amendments even a~tcr it has lost the confidence of the electorate. Members of the Lok Sabha arc elected for a !<rm of five years, 1'hc 1uling party and its members may or may not enjoy the confidence of the electorate throughout their time of office ; therefore it will not be correct to say that whenever Parliament amends the Constitution it must be held to have done it as desired by the people. [p. 321 ],

There is a further fallacy in the contention that whenever the Constitution is amended we should presume that the amendment in question was made ia order to adapt the Constitution to respond the growing needs of the people. By using the amendment power it is theoretically possible for Parliament to extend its own life indefinitely a<: also to amend the Constitution in such a manner as to make it eiLlicr JcJr.lily or practically unamcndable ever afterwards. The power which is capable of being used against the people themselves cannot he considered as a power exercised on behalf of the people or in their intere9t. On a careful consideration of the various aspects of the case it must be held that Parliament has no power to abrogate or emasculate the basic clements or fundamental features of the Constitution such as the sovereignty of lndit, the democratic character of our polity, thC unity of the country and the essential features of the individual freedoms secured to the citizens. Nor has the Parliament the power to revoke the mandate to build a Welfare State and egalitarian society. These limitation' arc only illustrative and not c:r:baustivc. Despite these limitations there can be no question that the amending power is a wide power and it reaches every article and every part of the Constitution to fulfil the obligations imposed on the State. It can also he used to reshape tl-.e Constitution within the limits mentioned earlier to make it an effective instrwncnt for social good. It is not possible to agree- with the ·contention that in order to build J Welfare State, it is necessary to destroy some of the human freedoms. That, :it li.ny rate, is not the perspective of our Constitution. Our C"nstitution envisages that the State should wihout delay make available to all the citizens of the Country the real benefits of those freedoms in a democratic way. Human freedoms arc lost gradually and imperceptibly and their destruction is generally followed by authoritarian rule. That is what history has taught us. Struggle between liberty and power is eternal. Vigilance is the price that we, like every other democratic society, have to- pay to safeguard the dcmocradc values enshrined in our Constitution. Even the best of .fOVernments arc -not averse to have 1nore and more power to carry out their plan and programmes which they rnay sincerely believe to be in public inf.crest, but freedom once lost is hardly regained except by revolution. Every encroachment on freedoms sets a pattern for further encroachments. Our Constitutional plan is to eradicate poverty \Vithout destruction of individual freedoms. In the result the contention of the petitioners that the word 'amendment' in article 368 carries with it certain limitations and further that the power conferred under article 368 is subject to certain limitations must he upheld though that power is quite large. [p. 322].

DSAVANANDA "· XEIW.A (Hegae,

Th< 241h

Parlia~ent.

J.)

Am.,.Jm.,.t did not . ffllarc• th< amffldinc pow.r o/

·It merely made erplicit what was implicit in ·th~ original ArticltJ Henee it is valid.

Since Article 368 as it originally stood comprehended both power as well as procedu1e to :upend the Constitution, the change effected in the marginal note has no significance. · The power though .described as constituent power still . continues to be: an amending poWer and therefore the content of power has not \!ndergonc any~ change. 1 he power conferred under the original article being a lirnited pow~r to amend the Constitution the constituent power to amend Constitution r~erred to in the amended article must also be held to carry with it tPe limitations to which that power was subjected earlier. The new words 'addition', 1variation' or'· 'repeal' only prescribe the modes or manner by which an 'amcndmc~t' may be madd, but they do not determine the scope of the power of 'amendment'.'. The provision in the new article that the President shall not· withhold hi• as9Cllt cannot be said to have damaged or destroyed any basic elementS of the Constitution. In fact under our Constitution the President is only a Constitutional head. He has to act on the advice of the cabinet. There is no possibility of the Constitution being amended in opposition to the "'ishes of the 'cabinet. Aniclcs 13( 4) and 368(3) make explicit what was implicit. Parliament . cannot acquire a power which it otherwise doca not possess. Clause ( c) to the proviso of article 368 does not confer a power on Parliament to enlarge its own power. The :powCr to amend the Constitution as well as the ordinary procedure to an1end any part of the Constitution was contained in the main part of the Constitution. ·The proviso merely places further restrictions on the procedure to amend the Articles mentioned therein. ·Lim.itations on the power to amend the Constitution would operate even when Article 368 is amended. A lllnitcd power cannot be used to enlarge the same power into an absolute power. Parliament .cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly. }ience the mere claim in the statement of objects and reasons to certain power docs not go to· show that Parliament either endorsed that claim or could have conferred on itself such a poWer. It must be deemed to have exercised only such powe:r as it pos~sses. It is ~he well accepted rule of construction that if a provision is: reasop.ably capable of two interpretations the court must accept that interpretation which makes the provision valid. If the power conferred on Parliament to, dmend the Constitution under article 368 as it originally stood is a limited power Parliainent cannct enlarge the scope of that power. For these reasons the· scope of Parliament's power to amend

the Consti:.

tu ti on fir any part thereof must be held to have remained as it was before the

24th Amendment notwithstanding the alterations made in the phraseology of Article 368. [pp. 325, 326, 327].

Th< newly substitut<d Articl< 31(2) Jo<S not d<stroy th< right tr1 property -b.cauS< (i) th< fixation of 'amount' und.r that articl< should haV< reasonabl< r.Zationship with th< valu< of th< prop'1'ty acquir.J qr r.quisi• tioned; (ii) the principlu laid down must b< rd<vant fqr th< purpose of arriving at th< 'amount' payabl< in mp.ct of th< propmy acquired or r.quisitioned; (iii) th< 'amount' fixed should not b< illusory; and (iv) the sam• should not b< fi«d arbitrarily. The question whether the 'amount' in quc.stion has been fixed arbitrarily or the <amc is illuso1Y or 1hc principles laid down for the determination of the same arc relevant to the subject matter of acquisition or requisition as about the

SUPREME coon REPOUS

[1973] Supp. s.c.a.

aime when the property in question is acquired or requisitioned arc open to judicial review. But it is no more open to the court to consider whether the 'amount' fixed or to be determined on the buis of the principles laid down i1 adequate, [p. 356].

Clause 2(b) of rh• 25rh Am•ndm<nt Act which incorporaud Arlie/, 31(2B) is also valid as it did not damage or destroy any essential features of th1 Conslitution. [p. 356]. Clause (3) of the 25th AmenJ.ment Act which introduced into the Constitution Artillt 31C is invalid for two reasons i.e. (i) it wa1 beyond the amending power of Parliament in so far as the amendment in question permits Jestruc· tion of several basic elements or fundamental features of C.onititution and (ii) it tmpowtrs the Parliamept and the State Legislatives to pro tanto amend certain human freedoms guaranteed to the citizens by the exercise of their ordinary legislativ. pow.r. [p. 356]. The 29th Amendment Act is valid but the Acts which were brought into the IXth Schedule -by that amendment or any provision in any of them abrogate tany of the basic clements or essential features of the Constitution will have to be examined when the validity of those Acts is gone into. [p. 357].

Ray, /.-The Constitution Twenty Fourth, Twenty Fifth and Twenty Ninth Amendments arc valid. Law in arlic/e 13(2) means laws .na;:UJ by th< Ugis/atatur< subject to the provj1ions cf the Constiturion. An amendment of the Coostitution is not 'law' tvithin th• meaning of articl• 13(2). Amendment of the Constitution is Mn exercise of Constituent power. The Constitutional mandate in article 368 does not admit or provide any tcopc fa< any conflict with any other article of the Constitutioo. The legality of an amendment is no more open to attack than of the Constitution itself. The opening part of unamended article 368 tliz., "[aJn amendment ot this constitution may be initiated" and its concluding part before the proviso viz., "''the Constitution shall stand _amended" show clearly that the whole con,. titution can be an1ended and no part of the Constitution is excluded freril .amendment. Therein lies the distinction between the Constitution and ordinary la\v, The distinction lies in the criterion of validity. The validity .of an ordinary law can be ques.tioned and when questioned it must be justified by reference to a higher-law. In the case of the constitution the validity is inhetent and lies within itself. The constitution generates its own validity; the validity lie'! in the social fact of its acceptance by the community. There is a clear demarcation between ordinary law made in exercise of legisl3tivc power and constitutional law made in exercise of constituent power. There~ fore, the power to amend a constitution is different from the power to amend ordinary law. The distinction bct\veen legislative power and constituent power is vital in a rigid or controlled constitution, because, it is that di,. tinction which brings in the doctrine that a law ultra vjres the constitution is void. When Parliament is engaged in the amending process it is not legislating; it is exercising a particular power which is sui generis lx-:stowed 11rn it by the amending clause in the Constitution. Thus, an amendment <1 the Constitution under article 368 is constituent 'law' and not 'law' within the meaning of article 13(2) and law as defined in article (13)(3)(a). Law in article 13(2) could only mean that law which needs validity from

DSAVANANDA "· DlALA (Iav

J.)

a higher source . and which can and ought to be regarded as invalid when

it comes in conSict with higher law. It cannot possibly include a law which ii self validating and

which is never invalid. The

distinctio~

~~c~n

constituent and legislative power is brought out by the feature in a r1g1d constitution that the amendment is by a different procedure than that by which ordinary law may be altered. The amending power is therefore said to be a recreation of thC Constituent Assembly every time Parliament amends the Constitution in accordance with article 368. [pp. 364, 365; 374]. View contra in Golaknath v. State of Punjab, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 672, held incorrect.

McCawley v. King, [1920] A.C. 691 and Bribery Commissioner v. Ped· rick Ramuinghe, [1965] A.C. 172, held inapplicable. Article 368 in the unamended form contains power as welJ as self executjng procedures which if followed by the p:·escribed authorities, would result in an

11mn1dment of the Constitution. The power to amend meant the fJOWer to add

•lter or repral any provision of the Constitution. The power is unlimited so long the re.iult is an amended .Constitution, that is to say, an organic instrfli.. rnent which /'1'0vides for the making, interpretation and implementation of Jaw. Under proviso (2) to the unamended article the power of amendment could be increa.sed, There are no express or implied limiiations on the power·· of amendment. There is no distinction ·between essential and non-essen.titlt features of th~ ConstitutiOn to raise any impediment to the exerciie of th< power of amendment. The Preamble does not operate as a limitation on th1 power of amendment. di

., Amendment is a form of growth of the Constitution and the term amendment' connotes definite and formal processes of constitutional change. These processes of change are the evolution of the Constitution. The force of tradition and custom and judicial interpretation may all affect the organic structure of the State. The object of amendment is to sec that the constitution is pre~rved. Rebellion or revolution is an illegal channel of giving expression to change. The "consent of the governed" is that each generation has a right to establish its own law. The people expressed in the Preamble gave the Constitution including the power to amend the constitution to the bodies mentioned in article 368. These bodies represent the people. If a Coristitution provides the method of amendment that method alone is 1egal. Any method ·other than the method provided in article 368, as for example, ..convening constituent Assembly or Referendum would be revolutionarr. Article 368 restricts only the procedure or the manner and form required for amendment but not the kind or character of the amendment that may be made. The deliberative and restrictive processe) "!nd 1 procedure. ensure a. change i~ the ~nstitution in an orderly fashion 1n order to give expression to social necessity and to give permanence to the Constitution .. [pp. 374, 392].

...

""/

. The ~xpr~ssion "amendment of this Constitution" has a clear substan· tive mcan1ng 1n t~e ~ontcxt of a written constitution and it means that any ~art of '!>~ Constitution can be amended by changing the samr. by variation, add1t1on or repeal. The words 4'amendmcnt .of this Constitution may be initiated" and the words 1'the Constitution shall -stand amended in ac~ cordancc with the terms of the Bill" in article 368 indicate that the wurd

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1973] Supv. s.c.R.

amendment is used in an unambiguous and clear manner. The word' amcnd' is used in a Constitution to denote any kind of change. The various. amendments which have already been made to the Constitution indicate that. provisions have been added varied or repealed. The meaning and sco.pe ot the amending power j,, in the object and necessity for amendment .tn a. \Vrittcn Constitution i.e. for changing the Constitution in an or?crly manner and for making changes in the fundamental law or organic la\V . t.o change the fundamental or basic ~principles in the Co~stitution. The background in which ar.ticlc 368 was enacted by the Constltutcnt Assembly has an important aspect on the meaning and scope of the power of amendment.. The Constituent Assembly made no distinction between essential and nonessential features. No one in the Constituent Assembly said that fundamental rights could not be amended. Even in the debate on. the Constitution: First Amendment Act no one doubted the power of Parliament to amend fundamental rights. Proceedings in the Constituent Assembly show thatt the whole Constitution was .taken in broad perspective and the amendments suggested fell under three categories providing for simple majority, or tw0< thirds majority, or two-thirds majority and ratification by the States. These· different procedures were thought of to avoid rigidity. The conclusion is that the meaning of the word 'amendment' is wide and not restricted•. ·If there arc no limitations on the power it is the whole power. [pp. 391, 396, 397~ 398].

There are no inherent or implied limitations on the amending povrer.. The theory of inherent and implied limitations on the amending po\"lrer is based on the assumption of a narrow and restricted meaning of the word 'amendment' to suggest that the basic features or the essential features of the democratic republican character of the Constitution cannot be damaged and destroyed. This Court in Berubari case f(1960) 3 S.C.R. 250] said that the Preamble has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power, because such po'vcrs are expressly granted in the body of the Constitution. This Court said, 11What is true about powers is equally true about prohibitions and limitations". The petitioner's contention that the Preamble is not a part of the Constitution, and so, being unalterable, other provisions which gave effect to the Preamble cannot be amended has no force. The contention that the Preamble is not a part of the Constitution is nUllified by the petitioner's reference and reliance on the Preamble as the source of all inherent limitations. The Preamble in a Constitution refers to the frame of the Constitution at the time of the Preamble and, therefore, it can possibly have no relevance to the Constitucn.t power in the future when that constitution itself can be changed. The position would be the same so far as the preamble is concerned whether the constituent power is exercised by the amending body provided for by the people themselves in the Constitution or by referendum, if so provided for in the Constitution. Clear constitutional provisions nre imperative both on the legislatures and the cour:ts. Where a constitutional provision is comprehensive in sco~·and leaves no room for interpretation the Court is without power to amend add to or detract from the constitutional provision or to create exceptions thereof bf implication \Vhere the people express themselves in careful and measured terms in fran'l· ing the Constitution and they leave little to implications, amendments or ch.an~es in the existing order or conditions cannot be left to inserting im~ltcations by. reference to the. preamble which is an expression of the intention at the time of the framing of the Constitution. The power to arnend' the Constitution is, therefore, not restricted and controlled by the PrCamblc.. [pp. 401, 402, 404, 405].

I

USAVANANDA I/, KERALA (Ray,

J.)

Berubari call, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 250, t;;opalan v. State of Madras, [1950} S.C.R. 88, Kmla ttlucotian Bill, 1957, [1959] S.C.R. 995, BaJhesh1r Nath v. Th• CJ.T., Dtlhi, ,[1955] Supp. 1 S.C:R. 528, Coal Bming Artas Act cast, [1962] 1 S.C.R. 44, Stat• ~f Rai•stha~ v. Lttla rain, [1965] .1. S.C.R. 276, Stcrttary of State for India in Council v. Mah1ra1ah of Bobbil1, I.L.R. H Mad. 529, Attornty Gtntral v. Prine. Ernest Augustus of Hano•ar, [ 1951J A.C. 436 and Htnmng Jacobson v. Commonwtalth of Mauachusettus, 197 U.S. 11 referred to. ,

The theory of implied limitations is a subtle attempt t~ annihilate the a~­ The maxim expressum facit cessare tacztum 1• one of the salutary principles of statutory construction. [p. 406). mativc power. of amendment.

. R. v. Burah, 3 A.C. 889, Wtbb v. Outrim, [1907] A.C. 89, Fielding Thomas, [1896) A.C. 66, Whittman v. Sad/tr, [1910] A.C. 514, referred to.

v.,

The entire approach of the pcthioncr to the power of amc~d~cnt . contained in article 368 ignores the fact that the object of the Const1tut1on tS , tc>

provide £Or the organs of state like the judicature, legislature and the cxecut:ivc

for the governance of the Country. Great and wide powers arc conferred ,for the governance by great sovereign countries and such powers cannot be withheld on ihc ground that they may be used externally or oppressively. \".ell settled principles of construction in interpreting constitutions preclude limiting the language of the Constitution by political, juristic or social concepts indcpcn• dcntly of the language of the constitution to be interpreted. [pp. 406, 407]. Dttp Chand v. Statt of Uttar Pradtth, [1959) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 8, Quun v. Burah, [1887] 5 I.A. 179, A11ornty Gtntral for Ontario v. Attorn•y Gtntral for Canada, [1912] A.C. 571, Gopalan Cm, [1950] S.C.R. 88, Kuh•an M•dha••~ Menon v. State of Bombay, [ 1951 J S.C.R. 228 and Bmoari Lal Sharm• case, 72 I.A. 57, rcfcfrcd to. All provisions, 0£ the Constitution arc essential and no distinction can IJe. m<!dc between essential and non-essential features from the point of view of amendment unless the makers of Constitution make it expressly clear in the

Constitution itself. The theory of implied and inherent limitation!! cannot be allowed to act as a boa constrictor to the clear and unambiguou!I power af amendment. When certain restrictions arc imposed in article 368 it is not in·

tended that other undefined restrictions should be imposed by implication. The provisions Of the Constitution, in the Hght of historical background and special problems of the Country will show that no provision can be considered non· essential. The character of the provisions which are ,amendable under the ~rovisq to article 368 itself shows that the petitioner's submission that cssen· tzal features arc unamcndablc is a baseless vision. To find out essential or non-essential features is an eXercise in irqponderables. If there are no indicationr in the Constitution as to what the essential features arc, the task of amend· mcnt of the Constitution becomes an unpredictable and indeterminate task. There must be an objective standard by which it can be predicted as to what is essential and what is not csseniial. If Parliament cannot judge these features Parliament cannot amend the Constitution, [pp. 407, 408, 409, 410]. There is no foundation for the analogy that just as Jucigcs test reason· ablcncss in law the judicial mind will find out the essential features on the test of reasonableness.

Reasonableness in law is treated as an objective criterion.

SUPREME COUJ.T REPOP.TS ( 1973)

Supp. S.CJl,

hccausc reason inheres in man as rational being. The crucial point i1 that in_ contradistinction to the American Constitution where rights arc couched in wick j,?encral terms leaving it to the Courts to evolve necessary limitations, our Constitution limited it by precise words of limitation. [p. 410].

Gopalan case, referred to When article 368 speaks of changes in the provisions of the Constitution/ as arc set out in els. (a) to {d) of the proviso it is manifest that the makers .. of the Constitution expressed their intention with unerring accuracy that fca~· lures which can broadly be described as federal features, and from that point · of view essential features, could be amended. The proviso confers that_ power with relation to the judiciary, die executive and the legislature, none of which could be said to be non-essential. The contention about unamendability of essential features do not take into consideration that the extent and character oi any change in the provisions of the Constitution is to be determined by legislatures as amending bodies under article 368 and as representatives of the people in a democracy and it is not the function of the courts to make any such determination. (pp. 411, 412]. The 24th amendnlent made explicit what the judgment in Shankari Prasad and the majority judgment in Sajja• Singh and the dissenting judgment in Golak Nath said, namely, that Parliament has the cons'tituent power to amend the Constitution. Certain obscrvatious in Golaknath raiScd a doubt as to the meaning of the word 'amendment'. The 24th am~ndment has expressly clarified that doubt. [p. 413]. . Article 368 in the unamended term contained power as well as self execut· ing procedures which if followed by the prescribed authorities would result in an amendment of the constitution. The ··-words 11Constitution shall stand amended" in article 368 will exclude a simple repeal, that is, without substituting anything in place of the repealed Constitution. An amendment of the Constitution is an amendment of some thing which provides a system according to which a state or a nation is governed. {p. 414]. An amendment of the Constitution is to make fundamental changes in the Constitution. Fundamental or basic principles can be changed. However radical the change the amendment must provide for the mode in which the:: state is constituted or organised. The. power of amendment is unlimited so long as t~e resul~ is an amended ~on~titution, t~at is to say, an organic instrun1ent '-'1 h1ch pro.vides for the making interpretation and implemen_tation of law. [p. 415]. The question whether under proviso ( e} to the unamended article 368 the power of amendment could be increased has to be answered in the affirmative. First, under article 368 proviso ( e) any limitation on the power of amendment alleged to be found in any other article of the Constitution can be removed. Secondly, judicial decisions show that by amending the article conferring the power of amendment a greater power to amend the Constitution can be obtained than was conferred by the original article. Thirdly, the power to a.mend the amending power must include the power to add, alter or l'!Cpcal any part of that article and there is no reason why the addition cannot confer a power of amendment which the authorities named in article 368 did not possess. [pp. J!l5, '416].

Ryan's case, [1935] Ir. Rep. 170 and Ranasinghe's case, [1965] A.C. 172, f'eferred to.

KESAVANANDA ti. lillALA (Rily, }.)

The contention that the people reserved the power to themselves 'to amend the essential features of the Constitution and if any such amendment were to be made it should be referred to the people by refrcndum is without merit. If essential features could be amended by the people the very fact that the Constituent Assembly did not include referendum- as one of the methods of amendments and the fact that the Constitution -makers excluded no part of the Constitution from amendment establishes that the amendment of a written Constitution can be legally done only by the method prescribed by the Constitution. If the method of referendum be adopted for the purpose of amendment that would be extra-constitutional or revolutionary. The amending body represents the will of the people. Therefore as long as article 368 may be amended under proviso ( e) any amendment of the Constitution by recourse to referendum would be revolutionary. The concept of popular sovereignty is well settled in parliamentary democracy and it means that the people express their will th.rough their representatives elected by them at the general election as. the amending body prescribed by the Constitution. [p. 418]. TJaerc is intrinsic evidence in the provisions of Part III itself that our Constitution docs not adopt the theory that fundamental rights arc natural right> or moral rights which every human being is at all times to have. The basic concept of fundamental right is a social one and it has a social functiona These rights arc conferred by the Constitution. The nature of the restrictions. on fmdamcntal rights shows that there is nothing natu.ral about those rights. The Constitution is the higher law and ·it attains a form which makes possible the attribution to it -of an entirely new set of validity, the validity of a statute emanating from the soverign people. Invested with statutory form and implemented by judicial review the higher law becomes juristically the n1ost fruitful foe the people. [p. 419, 421]. BASheshar Nath v. CJ.'f., Delh~ [1959] Supp. I S.C.R: 528, referred to.

If the power of amendil)ent of the Constitution is co-extensive with thepower of the judiciary to invalidate laws, the democratic pr0ttss anO the coordinate nature of the great departments of State arc maintained. The process· harmonises with the theory of our Constitution that the three great departments of' State the legislature, the judiciary and the exo:;utive arc co-ordinate and none is superior to the other. If the power of amendment does not contain any limitation and if the power is denied by reading into the Constitution inherent limitations to. extinguish the validity of all amendments on the principle of csscn~I features of the Constitution which arc undefined and· unttrmed, the Courts will have to lay down a new Constitution. The framers of the Constitution ~id. no~ put any limitation on the amending power because the end of a Constitu!lon IS the safety, the greatness and du~ well-being of a people. Changes in the Constitution serve these great ends and carry out the real purposes of the Constitution•. [pp. 422, 423].

'The doc!rine of ronscquences has no application in ronstruing a grant of power ronfcrred by a Constitution. 1be argument that the O>nstitutioa of India could be subverted or dcstr?Ycd .,Uight have hortativc appeal but it is not "!'!'portable by the a~ expcflcncc in our ~ntry. The two basic postulates ID democracy are faith ID human reason and faith in human nature. There is no hi11hcr faith than faith in the aClllOCrltic process. Bctwccn 1951 when this Court rcc.opiicd in Shinklri PNJllJ unlimit<d power of. ainendment till

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1973] Supp. S.C.ll.

.Golaknath decision in 1967 the normal democratic process functi~cd .;ts pro·vided by the Constitution. In considering a gr~t of power the wides~ meaning should be given to the words of the power 1Il order to· effc_ctuate 1t fully. The two exceptions to this rule are : first, in order to reconolc powers cx,c:lusively conferred on different legislatures, a narrower meaning ca~ be g~ven

.to one of the powers in order that both may operate as fully a.t is possible. Second, technical terms must be given their technical meaning even thoug? it is narrower than the ordinary or popular meaning. The theory of conscquen. ce:.: i! misconstrued if it is taken to mean that considerations of policy, wisdom and social or economic policies arc included in the theory of consc.qucnccs. If power is conferred which is in clear and ambiguous language and docs not admit of more than one construction there can be no scope for narrowing the clear meaning and width of the power by .considering the consequences of the exerciSC' of the power and by so reading down the power. The very :basis of parliamentary democracy is that the exercise of power is always subject to the popular will and control. The theory of implied and inherent lirnita· ·tions is a repudiation of this democratic process. [pp. ~24, 425, 426]. Vacher & Sons v. London Soci.iy of Composirors, [1913] A.C. 107, C. P. Berar case, [1938] F.C.R. 18, Province of Madras v. Governor-General, 72 I.A. 93, State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd., [1959] S.C.R. 379, Attorney General for Ontario v. AttC»'ney General for Dominions, [1912] A.C. 571, Bank of Toronto v. Lambe [1887] 12 A.C. 575, Bihar Land Reforms case, [1952] S.C.R. 889, Grundt case, [1948] Ch. 145, Rori v. lllison, [1930] A.C. l, Demscl/e Howard v. I/Unoi1 C1'11tral Rail Road Co., 207 U.S. 463, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45; 49 L.Ed. 937, referred to. &

The amending provisions in the Constitutions of the United States, Canada, Australia, Ireland and Ceylon and judicial decisions on the power -of amend· ment in those Countries do not lend support to the submissi.ons that a restricted meaning should be attributed to the word 'amendmcne and that implied and inherent limitations should be read into the meaning and power of amend· ment. [p. 426]. Rhoile Island v, Palmer, 253 U.S. 350; 64 1. Ed. 947, Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, Lesser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, United States v. Sprague, 222 U.S. 716, referr~d to. Initiative and Referendum case, [1919] A.C. 935, Switzman v. Elbing, 1957 Canada La_;v. Reports 285, Rer v. Hess [1949] 4 Dominion Law Reports 199, Saumur v. City of Quebec and Attorney G1'11cral of Quebec, [1953] D.L.R. 641, Chabot v. School Commissioners of La.morandiere and Attorney General for Quebec, [1958] 12 D.L.R. 796, Hodge v. Queen, 9 App. Cas. 117, Re Alberta Legislation, [1938]. 2 D.L.R. 81, Taylor v. Attorney General of Queensland, 23 C.L.R. 457, Victoria v. Commanwealth, 45 Australian Law Journal 251 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. ftd., [1920] 2S C.L.R. 129, Moore If'" Ors. v. Attorney General for the Irish Free State & ()rs,, Jl935] A.C. 484, Liyanage v. Queen [1967] l A.C., 259, Kariapur case, [1968] A.C. 71~, Ranasinghe c~se, [.1965] A.C. 172, lbrclebbe case, [1964] A.C. 900, ex· plamed and held mapphcable. · The word "amount" in article 31(2) after the Twenty Fifth Ame»dmcnt means ~ sum. of money. The, prin_ciple which tnay. he acted .upon Ir; the legi~ lature tn fix•nt t/Je amou'lft m11y include considerations of social juitice. f11r1,

I

KESAVANANDA V. KERALA

(Ray, ).)

ill and Part JV of the Constitution touch and modify each other. The ade-quacy of amo#nt fixed on the principles specified or the manner as. to hocv _such amount is to be given otherwise than in cash -:annot be the sub1ect mutter .of iudicial review-Article 31(2) is self contained and articles 31(2) and to be read with articles 31A. 19(1) (f) are mutually exclusive-Article 31(2) -31B and 31C-Article 31C is an application of the princJ'ples underlying articl~s 31(4) and 31(6) and 31A to the sphere of industry-The article creates a.legisJ11tive field with reference to the object of legislation. In removing restnctwns ·Of Part Ill in respect of a latv undt-r article 31C there is no delegation of any power to amend the Constitution-Courts can go_ into th~ g~estion_ '!"heth~r legislation containing a declaration has nexus tvtth the directive prinetples in .article 39(b) and (c).

is

The framers of the Constitution envisaged social structure which would .avoid the acquisitive economy of private capitalism and the regimentation . of ·totalitarian State. The Constitution -was framed with the object of effecting social revolution and the core of commitment to social revolution lies in Part Ill and Part IV of the Constitution. The directive principles are also fundamental and they can be effective only if they arc to prevail over the fundamental rights of a few in order to subscrve the common good and do not allow the economic system result in the common detriment. A fundamental right may be regarded as fundamental by one generation; it may be consi-dered to be inconvenient limitation upon legislative power by another. Popular soYcreignty means that the interest which prevails must be the interest of the mass of men. If rights are built upon property· those who have no property will have no rights. Therefore the state has to balance the interest of the individual with the int<rest of the society. [pp. 441, 445]. The word 'amount' in article 31(2) after the Twenty fifth Amendment is to be read in the entire c~llocation of words. In article 31(2) the use of the word "amount" in conjunctiQn with payment in cash sho\VS that a sun1 _ of money is being spoken of. The quantum cannot be a matter of judicial review. If the legislature docs not fix the amount but specifics the principles for determini~g the amoun~ the relevancy of the principles cannot be irnpugned nor can the reasonableness of the principles be impeached. Any attempt to find out :as to v.·hy · the particular amount is fixed or how that amount has .been fixed by law will be examining the adequacy which is forbidden by the Constitutional m2.Ildate. The quantum of the amount if directly fixed by the law and the principles for its quantification arc matters for legislative judgment. In fixing the amount the legislature will act On the . general nature of the legislative· pD\YCr. _ The principle which may be acted upon by the legislature ,in fixing the -amount may include considerations of social justice. Considerations of soc~l justice . will incl1J:dc the relevant directive priiiciple, particularly .under article 39(b) ·a.nd (c). Article 19(1~(£) is excluded from article 31(2) m order to m.ake article 31(2) self contained. The right to hold property ca.nnot_.~o-cxi.st. with the rig~t of ~e state to acquire property. That is why article 31(2) is to be read with articles 31A, 31B and 31C all the articles ' being under the h<ading "Right to property". [pp. +17, 448]. There w;is_ no flexibili~- of. social interest _in article 31(2) as it originally stood. Every ,c~ncCpt of social. interest became .Irrelevant by the scope of. article n(2}. It is this miSthief which was sought to be remedied by the. 25th Amendmel)-t. Part III an.d IV of the' Constitution touch ,arid modify each other~ They are l)~t parallel to each other. Diflcrent legislation. will bring in different social printiples; ThC.C will not be permi,.il>le without social content operating

SUPREME. COUll.T REPOKTS

fl973J Supp, S.C.L

in a Bex~bl~ manner, That is why in the 25th Amendment article 31(2) is ded to ehmmate the concept of market value £or pr ty .,.L . ~den ··· d opcr wuu.:u 11 acqwrc oJ· rcquis1t1onc . If compensation tncans an amount de•·· · d · · 'f social · ti th ·11 be · =mme on prmc1pies o JUS ce ere WI general harmony between Parts Ill and JV, [p. 455]. Dissenting view in the Bank Nationalisation case, affinp.ed.

F. N. Rana v. State of Gujarat, [1964} 5 S.C.R. 294 and S. N. Nantli v. State of West Bengal, A.LR. 1971 S.C. 961, referred to. The pre.eminent feature of article 31C is that it protccu only law. Law in article 31C must have the same meaning as it bas in other articles, gene~ rally, namely, a statute passed by the legislature. The article is inextricably bound up with article 39(b) and ( c) because the purpose and the phraseology in both the articles are essentially identical. Law contemplated in article 31C will operate on the ownership and control of the material resources of the com~ munity to be distributed as best, tcT subservc comrilon good. In order to decide whether a statute is within article 31C the Court may examine the nature and character of legislation and the matter dealt with as to whether there is any nexus of the law to the principles mentioned in articles 39(b) and. {c). If .it appears that there is no nexus between the legislation and the Objectives and principles mentioned in article 39(b) and (c), the legislation will not be within the protective umbrella. The Court can tear the veil to decide the real nature of the statute if the facts and circumstances warrant such a course. [pp. 450, 451, 452].

The moson for excepting Articles 14, 19 and 31 from article 31C is the same as in article 31A. The exclll9ion of article 14 is to evolve new principla of equality in the light of the directive principles. The exclusion of article 19 is on the footing that laws which ate to 1ive effect to directive principles will constitute reasonable restrictions on the individual's liberty. The exclusion of Article 31(2) is to introduce the consideration of aocial justice in the matter of. acquisition. Directive Principles arc not limited to agrarian rcfomu. ·Directiw Principles are necessary for the uplift and growth of industry in the Country. [p. 452]. Article 31C creates a legislative field with reference to the object of legislation. The article substantially operates in the same manner in the industrial sphere a• article 31A operates in the agrarian sphere. The problem. arc similar in nature though of di£!i,rent magnitude. The article is an application of the principles, underlying articles 31(4) and 31{6) and 31A to the sphere of industry [p. 453].

Jn removing restrictions of Part Ill in respect of a law under articl~ 31C there is no delegation of any power to amend the Constitution. M a .....tr of the 25th ;mendment the existing legislative field is £reed from the fetten of some provisions of Part III on the legislative power. A class of legislation can be identified and the legislative field can be carved out from the <>peratlolr of fundamental righu or. some of those can be excluded by a provision of the Constitution. The entire process of ~ of the legislative field from the orration of some of the articles relating to fundamental righu is the manda• o the Constitution. [pp. 453, 454 ].

The successive amendmenu of the Constitution mordy carried out the principle embodied in article 31 clauses ( 4) and ( 6) that i.pialioa designed to secure public good and to implement the difecti•et unolrt atticle 39(b) and ( c) •hould have priority over individual rights and cltal t1-fcrc fundamenr.i rights were to be suborcfm= to Oit'eCtlves Oii S- ,..U.,.. {p 4~}.

XESAVANANDA .V. Ell!RALA

The <onclusivene,. of the declaration ini.·oduccd by the Twenty-fifth Amendment in a law unda article 31C is to be appreciated in the entire context of article 31C. The· declaration is for the purpose of excluding the process of evaluation of: legislation on a consideration of the virtues and defects with a View to seeing if the laws have led to the result intended. If a- question arises as to whether a piece of legislation with such declaration has nexus with the directive principles in article 39(b) and (c), the Court can go into the question for the purpose of identification of the legislative measure on a consi~ deration of the scope and object and pith and substance of the legislation. [pp. 458, 459)

State of 'West Bengal v. Bela Banerjee, [1954) S.C.R. 558, Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spg. & W•g.'Co. Ltd.. [1954) S.C.R. 674, Babu BarkJa Thakur v. State of Bombay, [1961) I S.C.R. 128 and Smt, Somavanti l!t Ors. v. The State of Punjab, [1963) 2 S.C.R. 774, referred to. The inclusion of Kera/a Act 35 of 1969 and the Kera/a Act 25 of 1971 in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution Twenty Ninth Amendmrot u valid-Article 31B is independent of article 31A. (Mathew, )., concurring) : The validity of the Twentyninth Amendment lies within ~ narrow compa9S. Article 31B has lfcn f<"ld by this Court to be a valid amendment. It has also been held to be an inllependent provision. The ~rticle has no connection with article 31A and, therefore, the contention cannot be accepted that before the Acts can be included in the Ninth Schedule the requirements of article 31A arc to be complied with. [p. 460)

Jeeji' Bhoy v. Assistant Collectar, [1965). I S.C.R. 616 and Bihar Li.ntl Reforms ease, [1952) s,C.R. 889. J•ganmohan Reddy, J.: The Constitution Twenty Fourth Amendment is valid. Section 2 of Constitution Twenty Fifth Amendment is valid. The new article 31C introduced by Constitution Twenty Fifth Amendment is .valid only if the words "inconsistent with or takes away or", the words "Article 14'" and the declaration portion are severed. Twenty Ninth Amondment is valid. [pp. 555, 556)

The

Constitudon

What the leading majority in Golaknath did not decide was whether article 368 it>Clf could be amended under the proviso of that article conferring a power to amend the whole constitution. "The ratio of the decision in· the Goltzknath case is that an amendment under article 368 is 'law' within the meaning of article 13(2) and tllat under Article 368, Parliament could not amend the Constitution to take away or abridge any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III uf the Constitution. That question will ,assume importance if this Court comes to the conclusion that Parliament cannot amend art. 368 under proviso (e) thereof to take away or abridge any of the fundamental rights or amend article 13(2) making it subject to an amendment under article 368. If such a power exists, the question whether an amendment in article 368 is a 'law' within the meaning of article 13(2} may not prima faci~ be of significance. There arc, two aspects to this problem. First, whether 'law' in article 13(2} includes an amendment of the COnstitution under article 368; and secondly if this Court holds that 1aw' in article 13(2) does not include' an amendment under article 368, then the question would· be, has the Constitution Twenty Fourth Amcndm.;nt, purported to exercise a power not granted under article 368; or, in other words, arc there any implied limitations to the amending power under Article 368. [pp. 462-'180] 3-36 S.C. lndla/13

SUPREME COURT REPO~TS

[1973] Supp. s.c.R.

On the construction filaced on articles 12, 13 and other provisions of Part Ill ~nd a;,ti~le 36~, article 1~(2) does. not place an embargo on article 368. tn artzd~ 13(2) ts that wluch may be made by the ordinary legisla·

!Aw

ttve organs. [p. 480 J

Article 13(2) does not place an embargo on article 368 for amending any rights in Part Ill. To limit the extent and ambit of the power under article 368 in which there is no reference to a law, by including within the ambit of the definition of law in article 13(3)(a) for purposes of article 13(2) an amendment effected under article 368, is to restrict the power of amendment by a strained construction or to impute to the framers of the Constitution a lack of respect to the amending power by making the bar of article 13(2) applicable to it by mere implication when in respect of minor instruments they were careful enough to include them in the definition of 'law'. A consideration of the conspectus of the various rights in Part III when read with article 13(2) would prohibit the taking away or abridging of these sights by a law made by the Parliament, by the legislature of a State, or by executive action. This conclusion v1ill be substantiated if article 13(2) is read along with each of the articles in Patt Ill. The object of incorporating article 13(2) was to avoid its repetition in each of the articles conferring fundamental rights. Jn reading the articles in Part III with article 13(2) the words 1law' 'in accordance with law' or 'authority of law' clearly indicate that 'law' in article 13(2) is that which may be made by the ordinary legislative organs. The assumption of Hidayatullah J. in Golaknath that the word 'State' in article 12 would mean all the agencies of the Govern· ment jointly or separately is not justified. The prohibition in Article 13(2) is against each of them acting separately. The framers of the Constitution distin· guished the 'Constitution' from 'law' or 'laws' making evident their intention by using the word 'law' in contradistinction to the 'Constitution' indicating thereby that the word 'law' wherever referred to mean only, ordinary l.egisla· tive la\v, while 'Constitution' means somCthing distinct from it. Article. 13(2) has .a purpose and that purpose is to emphasize the importance and the commanding position of the fundamental rights. (p. 480] The Court, in a constitutional matter, where the intent of the framers of the Constitution as embodied in the written Constitution is to be ascertained, should look into the proceedings and the relevant date including any speech which may throw light on ascertaining it. Unlike a statute, a Constitutio!1 is a working instrument of Government; it is drafted by people who wanted It to be a national instrument to subserve successive generations. The various stages of the Constituent Assembly proceedings, while considering the draft articles 8 and 304, corresponding to articles 13 and 368 respectively, woll:ld show t~at attempts were made to introduce amendments to both these articles to danfy that the embargo in article 13(2) does not apply to an amendment. made under article 368. Besides, it would appear from the proviso to draft article 8. before it was deleted, if read with clause (2) of the a.rticle, as also from the note showing the purpose for which it was incorporated that . the law referred to therein was a legislative law. It could not by any. stretch of language be co-?s-trUed as including an amendment under draft a.rttde ~04, bc;causc, the proviso was making the restriction in clause (2) of article 8 1nappltcable to the State from making any la~ for the removal. o~ any inequ~lity, ?ispari1ty, ~isadvanta~c or discrimination arising out of any existing law. If State ~nd law have ~ be given a particular meaning in the proviso the same mean.1ng has to be. riv.en to th'em in clause (2) and since the proviso, clearly envisages .a lcgis at.Ive law it furnishes the key to th~ interpretation ?f the _word law 1n cl. (2) of draft article 8 that it is also a legislative law that 1s therem referred. (pp. 475-480]

ltl!SAVANANDA fl, KEl!ALA

(On ~ view taken and having rzgard to the maJonty decision in

Golaknath that the power of amendment is to be found in article 368 itself his Lordship did not consider it necessary to go into the question whether :he leading maiority in Golaknath was right in finding the power of amendment in the residuary entry 97 bf List I of Schedule VII]. [p. 480] Sankoiri Prasad v. Urtian ff India & State of Bihar (1952] S.C.R. 89; Saijan Singh v. State of RajtMthan; [J96J] (1) S.C.R. 933, Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950 J S.C.R. 87 referred tO.

The word 'amendment' iq Att. 368 docs not include repeal. Parliament could amend Art. 368 and Art. 13 and also all the fundamental rights. Though the power of amendment is wide, it is not wide enough to totally abrogate or cm3sculatc or damage any of the fundamental rights or the essential clements in the basic structure of the Constitution or of destroying the identity of the Constitution. Within· these limits, Parliament can amend every article of the Constitution. Parliament cannot under Art. 368 expand irs power of amendment so as to confer on itself the power to repeal or abrogate the Constitution or damage, emasculate or destroy any of the fundamental rights or essential elements of the basic structure of the Constitution or of destroying the identity of the Constitution. The Twenty fourth Amendment has not changed the nature anQ scope of the amending power as it existed before the Amendment. (pp. 497-512] This Court has during the last over two decades forged an approach of its own and set out the rules applicable to the interpretation of the Con~titution. There is no constitutional matter which· is not in some way or the other involved with political, social or economic questions and if the Constitution makers have vested in this Court a power of judicial review, and while so vesting, have given it a prominent place describing it as the heart and soul of the Constitution this Court will not be deterred from discharging that duty merely because the validity or otherwise of the legislation will affect the political or social philosophy underlying it. The basic approach of this court has been and must always be, that the legislature has the exclusive power to determine the policy and to translate it· into law, the constitutionality of which is to be presumed. In this regard the legislature, the executive, as well as the judiciary are bound by the paramount instrument. The bona fides of all the three of them has been the basic assumption and though all of them may be liable to error it can be corrected in the manner and by the method prescribed under the Constitution and subject to such limitations as may be inherent in the instrun1ent. When Courts declare law they do not mortgage the future with intent to bind the interest of the unborn generations to come. The Courts have a duty and h3.ve indeed the-.power to re-examine and re·state the law vvithin the limits of its interpretative function in the fulness of the experience during \Vhich it was in force so that it conforms with the socio-economic change and the jurisprudential outlook of that generation. The difficulty which foreign cases or even cases decid'ed within the Commonwealth, where the common Law forms the basis of the legal ·structure of that unit, is that they are more often· than not concerned with expounding and interpreting provisions of law which are not in pari materia with those we arc called upon to consider. The problems which confront those courts in the background of the state of the society! the socia~ and. ccopomic set up, tI1C requirements of people with a totally different ethic, philosophy, temperament and outlook differentiate them from the problems. and out}ook which confront the courts in this country. It is not a case of shutting out hght where that could profitably enlighten and benefit us•. The concern is rather to safeguard against the possibility of being blinded by it. [pp. 4,85-4"87]

SUPREME COUllT REPGRTS

[1973] Supp. s.c.11.

In re. The C•ntral Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV of 1938 [1939] F.C.R. 18, Special Reference I of 1964 [1965] I S.C.R. 413, at 487 referred to. The facts that the Preamble professed in unambiguous terms that it ;., the people of India who have adopted, enacted and "given to themselves tht. Constitution"; that the Constitution is being acted upon unquestioned for the last over twenty three years and every power and authority is purported . to be exercised under the Constitution; and that the vast majority of the people have, acting under the Constitution, elected their representatives to Parliament and the State legislatures in five general elections, make the proposition indisputable that the source and the binding force of the Constitution is the sovereign will of the people of India. 0<1 this assumption no state need have unlimited powet and indeed in federal politics no such doctrine ;., sustainable. [p. 494) · The amending power is a facet of the Constituent power but not the whole of it. The power under article 368 after the amendment ;., still described as amending power. The Twenty Fourth Amendment makes this explicit because it did not want a. doubt to linger that because the same body, namely, Parliament makes both the ordinary law in terms of the grant in article 245 to 348 an.cl an amendment in terms of article 368, it should not be considered that both these are legislative law within the meaning Of art. 13(2). On the view taken that article 13(2) is confined only to the ordin"l)' legislative laws and not one made under article 368, the addition of clause ·(1) to article 368 in so far as it declares that when Parliament exercises the power un4cr that provision, it exercises its ccinstitucnt poWer and makes u:plicit what was implicit. The amendmeot, therefore, makes no change in the position which prevailed before the amendment. It is not DCCC"'"')' to consider the q11Cstion of the existence or non-existcnc.c of implied or inherent limitations, bcca\lSC if the amending power is wide and plenary, those limitations can be ovC1ITiddcn as indeed the non-obslant. clause in the amended clause (I) of article 368 was intended to subserve that <"1d. What has ID be considered is whether the word tamendment' is wide enough tO' confer a plenitude Of power including the power to repeal or abrogate. The outstanding question, then is, what is ~e meaning of the word 'amendment' ?-whether it has wide or a restricted meaning, whether it includes repeal or revision and whether having regard to the other provisions of the Constitution or the c.ontext of the word 'amendment' in article 368 itself it has a restricted meaning, so as not to roofer a power to damage or destroy the essential features of the Constitution. If the word 'amendmeot' has a restricted meaning, has that power been eolargcd by the use of the word• "amend by way of addition, variation or repeal" or do dtcy mean the same u amendment ? If they arc wider than amendment, could Parliament in cxcrcioe of its amending power in article 368 enlarge that power I [pp. 495, 496] It is necessary ID ascertain from the background of our national aspirations, the objectives adopted by the Constituent Assembly as translated into a worliing organic instrument which established a sovereign democratic Republic

with a

Parliamentary system of Government, whcreunder individual rights of citizens, the duties 1Dwards the community which the State wa< enjoined to discharge the diffusion of legislativ< power between Parliament and State Legislatures and the provision for its amendment, etc, are provided tor. All tht:se. aspects were sought to be well balanced as in a ship built for fair weather as wcll as for foul, Thi• then will Ix: the proper approach•. The recognition of the trWsia that power corrupts and a~oolutc power corrupts absolutely has been the wt.dam that made practical men of cicpcricnoe in not only drawing up a written constitution limiting power of the legiolativc organs hut in s«UNnt to all citizens

ltESAVANANDA ti, KERALA

certain basic rights against the State. If the faith in the rulers is so great and the faith in the people to curb excessive exercise of. power or abuse of it is "" potent, then one needs no elaborate Constitution, because, 11ll that is required is to make Parliament omnipotent and omni-sovereign. This the framers did not do and hence the question will be wheJier by an amendment under Art. 368 Parliament can effect a metamorphosis of power by making itself the supreme sovereign. It is against abuse of power that a constitutional structure of power relationship with checks and balances is devised and safeguards provided for whether expressly or by necessary implication. The question is whether there are any such in our constitution, and if so, whether they can· be damaged or destroyed by an amending power. (pp. 506, 507]

The substitution of the word "'amcndm.cnt' by the expression 1amcnd by way of addition, variation or repeal' maK.Cs no difference as it bears the same meaning as the word "amendment". It is apparent from the meaning of the' word amcndment" that it does not include repeal or abrogation nor is it the same as revision. A repeal of a provision of. law is different from the repeal of the law itself. The Constitution itself has, in various articles, made a distinction between the amendment of the law and repeal of .the law. The word 'amendment' as used in article 368 does not connote a plcntitudc of power. The word, read with the other provisions, indicates that it is used in the sense of empowering a change in contradistinction to destruction which a repeal or abrogation would imply. Art. 368 empowers only a change in the Constitution as is evident from the proviso which requires that where the provisions specified in . clauses (a) to (e) have to be amended they have to be ratified by thP resolution of not less than one half of the Legislatures of the States. This proviso furnishes a key to the meaning of the word 'amendment' that they can be changed without dcstroving them jusu the same way as the entire Constitution cannot be abrogated :ttid new Constitution substituted therefor. The amplitude of the power of amendment in Art. 368 cannot be enlarged by amending power under proviso ( e) to Art. 368. [pp. 508 to 512]

Goiaknath v. State of Punjab (1967] 2 S.C.R. 762, Queen v. Burah, 1877-78 P.C. 179 referred to; Rhode Island v. Palmer (National Prohibition Case) 64 L. ed. 946 explained.

•

If the entire Constitution cannot be abrogated, can all the provisions of the Constitution leaving the Preamble, or one article, or a few articles of the original Constitution .be repcabl and in . th~ place other prov~sion~ ~placed, v1hcrcby the entire structure of the Coosa.tun.on, the power rclanonsh1p inter se three Departments, the federal character of the ~tau;, "?d the rights .of t.hc citizens vis-a~vis the State arc abrogated and new mstJ.tunons, power relationsh1ps and the fundamental features substituted therefor I Such an attempt would equally amount to abrogation of the Constitution, because any such ,ev;;cise of the ~er will merely !cave the husk and will .amount to the subsl:!tutton of an cnttrely new Constitution which it is not denied, cannot be done under art. 368. (p. 512]

The Preamble to the Constitution dcclareo the purposes and objectives which the Constitution is intended to subservc. The Preamble ~ill furnish a guide to the construction of the statute wh<rc the word~ are ~bi~us or elcavend where the words are unambiguous to aid a comtruetton which ~ ~O! to absurdity. W)icrc ~·preamble c~vcys a clcai; and definite ~d'J..i:ew:'~ , prevail over the cnact.tng words which are relau~cly oblCUtC or "! which fits the words are capable of more than one constrUCllOll, the constrUction &'I d the preamble may be preferred. In in re Beruhari Union ca~ court~ to refer to and consider the view that the p«amble can be to

SUPREME COURT :RE~ORTS [1973] Supp. s.c.R.

the nature, extent and d1~ applicatio~ of the po~crs or that the preamble can

be resorted to prevent obY10UJ absurdity or to a direct overthrow of the intention expressed therein. [pp. 512 to 516]

. In Re: Berubari. Union & E~fhange of Enclaves [1961] S.C.R., Saijan Singh v. State of Pun1ab, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933, Allorn"l.()enerol v. Prince Barnell Augustus of Hanover, [1957] A.C. 436 and Bowell v. Knnpton Park Rac«aum Co. LJJ. [1899] A.C. 143, referred to,

If a Constitution is considered as a mechanism or an organism or a piece of Constitutional engineering it must have a structure or a composition or a base or a foundation. The clements of the basic structure arc indicated in the preamble and translated in the various provisions of the preamble. There is nothing vague or unasccrtainablc in the preamble. The edifice of our constitution is built-upcm and stands on several props; remove any one of them, the Constitution collapses. These are: (I) Sovereign Democratic Republic; (2) Justice social economic and political; (3) liberty of thought expression, faith, belief and worship; (4) Equality of status and of opportunity. Each one of these is important and collectively they assure a way of life t.o the people of India which the Constitution guarantees. If any of these clcrncnts is withdrawn the structure wil not survive and it will not be the same constitution nor can it maintain its identity if something quite different is substitutc:d in iu place which the sovereign will of the people alone can do. What then are the essential features or the basic elcmcnu comprising t™' structure of the constitution need not be considered in detail as thclc will fall for consideration in any concrete case where they arc said to have been abrogated and made nion-cxistcnt. A sovereign democratic republic, parliamcn~ tary democracy and the three organs of the State certainly constitute the basic structure. In the sense in which Sovereign Democratic Republic is understood it cannot be said that the structure of the Constitution as an organic instrument establishing Sovereign Democratic Republic as envisaged in the preamble will remain the same if Part lII and IV or either of them are totally abrogated. [pp. 517, 518] T~ object of the fundamental rights is to ensure the

ideal of political

democracy and prevent authoritarian rule, while the object of the Directive Principles of State Poljcy is to establish a welfare state where there is econon1ic

and social freedom without which political democracy has no meaning. What is ·implicit in the Constitution is that there is a duty on the courts to interpret

Constitution and the laws to further the Directive Principles which under article 37 are fundamental in the governance of the country. To say that the Directive Principles give a directive to take away fundamental rights seems a contradiction in terms. There is no rationale in the argument that the Direstive Principles can only be given cfftct to if fundamental righu arc abrogated. The interest· cf the community and of the •ociety can be adjusted without abrogating, damaging, emasculating or destroying the fundamental rights in such a way 11 to amo\lnt to abrogation of these righu. The guarantee in clause 4 of Article 32 could be conceived of only against amending power, for no ordinary law can suspend a right given by the Constitulfon unless permitted by the Constitution itself. When clause 4 of Article 32 does 11ot even permit suspension of the right under Article 32 except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, that is, by Article 359, it is highly unthinkable that by an amendment this right could be abrogated. This pivotal feature of the Fundunental Rights demonstrates that this basic structure cannot be damaged or destroyed. When a remedy cannot be abrogated, it should follow that the fundamental rights cannot be abrogated for the reason that tht existence of a remedy would be meaningless without the rigku. [pp. 518-520]

KESAVANANDA I/. x.nALA.

Sectir>n· 2 of Twenty Fifth Amendment ;, •a/id Ever since the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act this Court hat con• · sistendy held that where what i' given in lieu of expropriating property of a citiun is illusory, arbitrary, or cannot be regarded as compcnation, and bears no reasonable relation to the property acquired, the Coun can go into it, and, secondly, where principles arc Jixed for determining the compensation, it can· examine the quostion whtrhet they arc relevant to the oubject-matter nf the acquiaition. Tlic position has not in any way been alfcctcd by the amendment b1 merely mbstituting the word 'amount' for 'compensation'. If the amount is illusory or arbitrary and is such that it shocks the conscience of any reasonable man, and bears no reasonable relation to the value nf the property acquired, the Court is not precluded from aamining it. The legisla~, even in cases where it Jixci an amount for the acquisition or requisition of a property, must be pre· sumcd to have fixed it on some basis, or applied some criteria or principles to detenninc the amount so fixed, and, therefore, where the law is challenged on .the ground of arbitrariness, illusoriness or of having been based on irrelevant principles or any other ground that may be open to challenge by an expropriated owner, the Court will have to go into these questions; this will be so even in respect to the manner of payment. [pp. 523, 524 J Clause (2B) provides that "nothing in sub.clause (f) of clause (1) of article 19 shall affect any ouch law as is referred to clause (2)"; Docs this mean that the fundamental riglit to reasonable restriction of ploccdural nature under article 19(l)(f) available is abrogated• or dcstroycdl The answer to this would depend upon what is the meaning to be given to the word "affect". Two constructions are possible; one is that article 19(1)(f) will not be available at all to an expropriated owner under a law ol acquisition made under article 31(2), secondly cl. (2B) is intended to provide that the law of acquisition or requisition will not be void on the ground that it abridges or affects the right under article 19(1)(£). The second construction is more in consonance with the amendment, because what the amendment provides for is that that ·article 19(1)(£) shall not affect any such law and this would imply that the bar against the application of article 19(l)(f) to ouch a Jaw may vary from a slight or partial encroachment to total prohibition or inapplicability. But since an amc11dmcnt cannot totally abrogate a fundamental right, it can only be read bv the adoption of the doctrine of "sevcrability in application" and accordingly clause (2B) must be held to be restricted only to the abridgement of, as distinct from abrogation, destroying or damaging the right under Article 19{l)(f). That apart there is nothing in cl. (2B) to prohibit principles of natural justice which arc part of the law of the land wherein the rule of law reigns supreme, from being applicable when the liberty of the individual or his property' is affected by a law. [pp. 524 to 526]

R. C. Cooper v. Union of India, [1970) 3 S.C.R. 530, Si.u of W111 Bento/ v. Mn. Bela Banerjee, [1954) 3 S.C.R. 558, P. 'Vajrau1lu Mudaliar v. Sp«iol De['flly Collector, MadrGJ & Anr., [1965) 1 S.C.R. 614, Union of India v. Thi Mel41 Corpowion of Indio Lid., onil Anr. [1967] 1 S:C.R. 255, Sldlt of Guj11r111 v. Shanlilal Mon1ald01 & Or1. [1969] 3 S.C.R. 341, Cooptr v. TAI Vlod1wortA Board of Wiirk1, 14 C.B. (N.S.) 180, referred to New Art. 31C is only valid if the words. "inconsi<tent with or takes away or", the words 11artide 1-t" and the declaration portion "and no law containing a" decalaration that it is for giving effect! to "such policy shall be called in question in any court" on the gr:ound that it doc~ not give e~ to "such policy" arc severed, u they arc scvcrabl~. What remains after severing can be

SUPRE1'IE COURT REPORTS (

1973 j Supp. S.CJl.

operative and effective on the interpretation given .. to the applicability of Art !' . and 31, so as to enable laws made under Art. 31C to further the directives enshrined in Art. 39 (b) & (c). [p. 553] The Directives under Art. 39(b) and (c) arc wide and indeterminate. It is !"'ccssary to keep in ~nind the :"'~de field of governmental activity enjoined in article 39(b) and (c) m dctermmmg the racb of the means to achieve the ends and the impact of these means on the fundamental rights which article 31C affects, Though. the Cour~ have no function in the evaluation of the policies of the State or 1n dcterm1.n1ng whether they arc good or bad for the community, they have, however, in examining the legislative action taken by the state in furthering the ends, to ensure that the means adopted do not conflict with the provisions of the Constitution within which state action has to be confined. [pp. 535, 536] Article 31C has four elements: (i) it permits the legislature to make a law giving effect to article 39(b) and (c) incontistnll with any of the rights conferred by arts. 14, 19 and 31; (ii) it permits the legislature to make a law giving effect to article 39(b) and Art. 39(c) tak,ing away any of the rights conferred by Arts. 14, 19 and 3); (iii) it permits the legislature to make a law giving effect to art. 39(b) and (c) abridging any of the rights conferred by articles 14, 19 and 31; and (iv) it prohibits the calling in question in any Court such a law, if it contains a declaration that it is for giving effect to the policy of State towards securing the principles specified in clauses (b) and (c) of Art. 39, on the ground that it does not give effect to such a policy of the State. The first clement would be u/trJJ vim the amending power conferred by article 368 if it compreh..,ds within it th'< damaging or dcJtruction of the fundamental rights. The second, namely, taking aw•y of the fundamental rights would be llhra vim the amending power, for, taking away of these fundamental rights is synonymous with destroying them. The third, namely, abridging of these rights is not the same thing as damaging and the validity will have to be examined and considered separately in respect of each of the fundamental rights. An abridgement ceases to be an abridgement when it tends to af!cct the basic or essential content of the right and reduces it to a mere right only in name and in such a case it would be ultra vires the power under article 368. In so far as article 31C authorises or permits abridgement of the rights conferred by article 19 it would be intra vires the amending power as thereby damaging or emasculating of these rights is not authorised. (pp. 537, 53&] The guarantee of equality in article 14 has ina>rporated the principle of 'liberty' and 'equality' embodied in the Preamble to the Constitution. Two con· cepts are inherent in this guarantee, one, of 'equality before the law', a negative one, and the other, equal protection of the laws, a positive one. The i.mpoct of the negative content on the positive aspect has not so far been clearly diicetned in the decisions of this Court which· has been mostly concerned with the pooitiV1' upect. [pp. 538, 539] The lifting of the embargo of Art. 14 on any law made by. Parliament or the ugislaturc of a State under Art. 31C would abrogate that right al~er. It may be that the objective of article 39(b) and (c) may form a basis of classification depending on the nature of the !aw1 the ~ for which it was enacted and the impact wliich it has on the rightl of ciazen; but the right to equality before the law and equal protec:tion of laws in article 14 cannot be disembowelled by classification. In so far as the abric!Fncnt of the right con· fierred by article 14 is concerned it would be ""'- ,,;,.,, for the reason that • mere violation of this right amounts to taking away ot damagini the right. It is clear that the very nature of the objectiva in article 39 (b} and (c) is mch

ltESAVANANDA V, KJ!llALA

"1-t ltticle 14 ii in•pplicable. The only purpooe which the exclusion of article

14. will serve would be to facilittte arbitrariness, inequality in distribution or to eiiable the conforment of patronage. The right under article 14 will only be avtilable to the .P"rson or clHs of persons who would be entitled to receive 'the benefiu of dutribution under the law. In fact the availability of article 14 in respect of ltws under trticle 31C would ensure 'distributive justice' or -economic justice which without it would be thwarted. In this view of article 31C vis+vis Azt. 14, tny tnalogy between article 31C and art. 31A which is •ough.t to be drtwn is milconceived, bectuse, under the latter provision the -exclusion of Art. 14 was necessary. to protect the subject-matter of legislation permissible thereunder in respec( of compensation payable to the expropriated owner. Further, in article 31A the exclusioh of art. 14 was confined only to .acquisition etc. of the property and not to the distribution aspect which is not

the subject-matter of that article, whereas, the exclusion of art. 14 affects distri'bution which is the subject-matter of article 39(b) and (c). It cannot be presumed that Parliament by exercising its amending power under art. 368 intended to confer a right on Parliament and the legislatures of the states to discriminate persons similarly situated or deprive them 0£ equal protection of laws. The objectives sought '-<> be achieved under article 39(b) and (c) can be achieved even if th-. wotds "article 14" is severed. [pp. 540 to 544] The law under article 31C will only operate on 11matcrial resources" "concen· tration of wealth" and "means of production", therefore, the rights i~ article 19(1)(•) to (e) would have no relevance and arc inapplicable. [p. 549]

In so far as article 31(2) is concerned section 2 of the Twenty Fifth ·Amendment Act has already abridged the right conttined in articles 31(2) and a further abridgement of this right authorised by article 31C may trnount in a given case to the destruction or abrogation of that right and it may then have to be considered in each c;:asc whether a particular law provides for such an ~mount as would constitute an abrogation or the emasculation of the right under article 31(2) as it stood before the Constitution (Twenty Fifth) Amendment. IPP· 549, 550] [On the fourth element his lordship agreed with the reasoning and conclusion of Khanna ). in so far it related only to the severence of the part relating to the d«:laration.] [p. 550] Akdati P~dhan v. Stale of Oriua, [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R.. 691, The Provincial Trantport Service v. State lndu1tria/ Court, [1963] 3 S.C.R. 650, The State of Bihar v. Maharaiodhiraia Sir Kameshwar Singh & Ors., [1952] S.C.R. 889 at p. 997, State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 14 at p. 34, Uz&hman D•t on behalf of Firm T11ak Ram Ram Bux v. State of Punjab, [ 1963] 2 S.C.R. 353, Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri futtice S. R. Tendolkar & On, [1959] S.C.R. 279, Madhya Pradesh v. G. C. Mandawar, [1955] I S.C.R. 599, Balmadies Plan· llltions Lid. and Others v. Stau of Tamil Nadu, [1972] 2 S.C.R. 133 Nag(1Ur lmprovtment Tf'ust v. Vithal Rao and State of Bombay and Another' v, P. N. llll111ra, {1951] S.C.R. 682. referred to

The first part of article 31 C may be held to be intra 111'rts the amending power only if those portions of the article which makes it ultra viret the amend· illg power are severed from the rest of it. The portions that may h;ave to be tevered arc the words 0 is inconsiJtcnt with or takes away, or 0 and the words Marticle I 4" and part dealing with declaration by reason of. which judicial review k eK<hded. The oeverability of these portions is permissible in view of the

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1973]

Supp. s.c.11.

principles laid down by this Court in R. M. D. Chamerbaugwalla v. Usion of lnd1a. In the result, on the construction of article 31C after severing the portions' indicated, s. 3 of Twenty Fifth Amendment is valid. [p. 550] Puniszb Province v. Dau/at Singh & Ors., [1945] 73 Indian App.als 59; (1946] F.C.R. 1 RMD. ChamerbaugwaUa v. The Union of India, (1957] S.C.R. 930, In &. The Hindu Woman's Rights to Property Act, [1941 J F.C.R. 12, Corporation of Calcutta v. Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd., [1964] 5 S.C.R. 25, and Kamesluvar Prasad v. State of Bihar, [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 369. referred to State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ranojirao Shinde & Anr., [1968) 3 S.C.R. 489, distinguished.

[On the view taken, his lordship did not find it necessary to consider the question whether article 31C delegates the power of amendment to the State Legislatures and Parliament.] [p. 537] The Constitution (Twenty Ninth) Amendment is valid.

But whether the Acts which were brought into the Ninth Schedule by that

amc~dmcnt or any provision in any of them abrogate a~y of the basic clements

or essential features of the Constitution will have to be examined when the validity of those acts is gone into. Further, the contention that article 31B is intimately connected with article 31A is unacceptable and must be rejected. [pp. 554, 556]

Palekar, /. The Constitution Twenty Fourth, Twenty Fifth and Twenty Ninth Amendment Acts are valid. [p. 632 J The power and procedure for amendment of the C<>nstitution were con-

tained in the unamended Article 368. The proceu which bring about the result of amendment of the Constitution is the exercise of Constituent power. [pp. 561, 566, 632] The Constitution is n:ot an indigenous product. When our Constitution was

framed in 1949 the framers of the Constitution knew that there were two COil· trastcd types of democratic Constifutions in vogue in the world-one the 1Bezible'

type which could he amended by the ordinary procedure governing the making of a law and the other the 'rigid' type which could be so amended but required a special procedure -for its amcniJment, From the special provision made in article 368 for the arri,e:ndment of the Constitution it follows that our Constitution

is a rigid or controlled constitution because the Constituent Assembly has 'left a special direction a1s to how the Constitution is to be amended'. In view of article 368 when the special procedure is successfully followed, the proposed amendment automatically becomes a part of the Constitution or, in other words, it writes itself into the Constitution. The Constitution of India gives specine powers of ordinary, legislation to the Parliament and the State legislatures In respect of well demarcated subjects. Since the result of following the special procedure under article 368 is the amendment of the Constitution the process which brings about the result is known as the exercise of constituent power by the bodies associated in th~ ,task of amending the Constitution. Therefore, when

the Parliament and the State legislatures function in accordance with. article 368 with a view to amend the Constitution, they exercise constituent power as dis- ·

tinct from ,their ,ordinary legislative power under Articles 245 to 248. Article 3~8 is not entirely procedural, The clear mandate that on the procedure being followed

,,,

IU!SAVANANDA v. KEllALA

(PaJekar, J.)

4~

the proposed amendment shall become part of the Constitution is the substantivcpart of the article. Then:fore, the special power to amend the Constitution is too be sought in article 368 only and not elsewhere. [pp. 558 to 563]

Automobile Tra1"port Ltd. v. State of Roiasthan, [1963) 1 S.C.R. 491 and Mc Cawley v. The King, 1920 A.C. 691, referred to. '" [The view of the leading majority in Golai{nath that the power to amend the Constitution is to be found in article 248 read with the entry 97 List I held incorrect.) [pp. 565, 566)

By describing the power as 'Sovereign' Constituent power it is not the intcn· tion to declare that legal sovereignty lies in this or that body. The word 'sovereign' is used as a convenient qualitative description of the power to high· light its superiority over other powers conferred under the Constitution. The word, therefore, simply stands as a description of a power which is superior to every one of the .other powers granted to its instrumentalities by the Cons~­ tution. The amplitude and effectiveness of the constituent power arc not impaired because it is exercised by this or that representative body or by the people in a referendum. And, the power to amend does not become more or less in content according to the nature of the body which makes the amendment. The people thcnisclvcs having withdrawn from the process of amendment and entrusted the task to the Parliament, instead of to any other representative body, it is obvious that the power of the authorities designated by the Constitution for amending the Constitution must be co-extensive with the power of a convention or a Constituent Assembly, had that course been permitted by the Constitution. The raiton d'etre for making provision for the amendment of the Constitution is the need for orderly change. Between the two coordinatesJ namely, the need for orderly government and the demands for orderly change, boili in accordance with the Constitution., the makers of the Constitution provide for its amendment · to the widest possible limit. Whichever way one looks at the amending power in a Constitution there can be hardly any doubt that the exercise of tliat power must correspond with the amplitude of the power unless there are express or necessarily implied limitations on the exercise of that power. The meaning of the wotd 'amendment of the Constitution' cannot be less than ' 1amcndment" by way of addition variation or repeal, of any provision of the Constitution which is the clarification of that expression accepted by the Constitution Twenty Fourth Amendment. [pp. 567 to 573) Dodge v. Woolsey, (1866] 18 How 331 at 348, United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 223, British Coal Corporation v. The King, 1935, A.C. 500 and Edwards v. Attarney-Qeneral for Canada, 1930 A.C. 124, 136, referred to. The grant of power under artitle 368 was plenary, unqualified and without any limitations except as to the special proceJure to be followed. [pp. 603, 604, 632] .. The range of a!"e~dment was 'this Constitution' 'which meant all the provmons of the Constltutton. If any part of the Constitution was intended to be excluded from the operation of the power to amend it would have normally fonnd a place in or below article 368. When the people, through the Con•tituent Assembly, granted the power to amend, they made no reservations in favour of the 'people. When the Constituent Assembly directed that amendments of the Constitution must be made by a prescribed method they necessarily excluded CVCl'f other method of amending the Constitution. The grant of power under uticlc-

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1973) Supp. s.c.R.

368 is plenary, unquaiified and without any limitations except as to the speeial procedure to be followed. All provisions in a Constitution must be conceded the same character and it is not possible to say that one is more, important and the other is less important. If the object of a Constitution is orderly government and orderly change in accordance with the law, it must be conceded that all Constitutions whether Bexible or rigid, must have the power to amend the Constitution to the same degree. The amending power in a rigid constitution may, therefore reach all provisions whether important or unimportant, essential .or non-essential. Ha"Ving regard to the object of providing an amendment clause in a modern Constitution amendment must stand for alteration or change in its provisions. That thi~: was intended is clear from the wording of article 368. The proviso to the article clearly implies that an amendment under the article seeks to make a change in the provisions of the Constitution. Having regard to the importance of the ~tmcnding clause in our constitution an amendment contcm~ plates changes in the provisions of the constitution which are capable of being effected by adding, altering or repealing them, as found necessary from time to time. Thus, so far as: the wording of article 368 itself is conccrnC'd there is nothing in it which limits the power of amendment expressly or by necessary implication. Consequences of wrccklcss use of power are political in character with which the court is not <:onccrned. Consequences may be considered in fixing the scope and ambit of a power where the text of the statute creating the power is unclear or ambiguous, Where, it is clear and unambiguous courts have to implement the same without regard to consequences good or bad. just or unjust. [pp. 582 to 585]

Edwards v. Lesueur, South Western Reporter Vol. 33, 1130, Livermore v. Waite, 102 Ca, 118, Er-parte Dillon, 262 Federal Reporter 563 decided in 1920, Dillon v. Gloss, 65 Law edn. 994. Er-parte Mrs, D. C. Kerby, 103 Or. 612. Sklte v. Cor, 8 Ark. 436, Downs v. City of Birmingham, 198-Southern Reporter, 231, Schneiderman v. United Skltes of Amef'ica, 87 Law ed. 1796, Rhode ls/and v. Palmef', 64 Law ed. 946, Ullmann v. United Skltes, 100 Law ed. 511, Whitehill v. Elkins, 19 Law ed. 2d. 228, State v. Fulton, 124 N.E. 172 and Vacher's case 1913 A.C. 107, referred to.

•

Article 13(2) did not operate as an erpress limikltion on the amending power. Amendment of th( Constitution is not 'law' within tAe munint .of artide 13. [pp. 591, 632] i The· Constitution or its amendment is neidier a law ln force within the meaning of article 13(1) continued under article 372(1) nor can it bC regarded as a 'law' made by the State within the meaning of article 13(2). The bat under article 13(2) is not merely against law but a law made by the State, The de6nition of the word 'state' includes all organs or agencie1 operating under the Constitution owing superior obligation to the Constitution. It would be, therefore, wrong to identify 'state' in article 13(2) with anything more than the instrumentl created or adopted by the Constitution and which are required to work in conformity with the Consti,tution. By its very definition a body or set of bodies .exercising sovereign Constituent power, whether in a 'Bexible' or in a 'cipf Constitution, is not a governmental organ owing supreme obli,-ti.on to the .Constitution. The body or bodies operate not under the Constitution but over the Constitution. They do no~ while amending the Constitution, function u governmental organs and therefore cannot be regarded as the StallO for the put· pose of Part III of the Constitution. If fu~damental rights in Part ,III were, !"'" amendable nothing would have been caner than to make a specific pnmnon about it i~ Part XX which dealt specifically with the subject ol amendment of the Constitution. [PP• 586 to 591]

KESAVANANDA f). KERALA

(Palekar, J.)

Sri Venkataramana v. The State of Mysore, [1958] S.C.R. 6115 and Rana Singhe's case, [1965] A.C. 172, referred to. [The decision of the majority in Golaknath that Constitution Amendment is 'law" within the meaning of article 13(2) held incorrect.] [p. 597]

There were no implied or inherent limitations on the amending power under the unamended article 368 in .its operation Ot1er the fundamental n·ghts~ T/kre can be none after its ·amendment. [p. 632] Th~ Twenty Fourth Amendment docs no more than give effect ta PadiamCnt's acceptance of the view taken in Sank_ari Prasad's case, the majority in Sajjan \Singh's case and the minority in Golak. Nat!l's c:asc with regard to_ the amen<llng power in relation to fundamental rights. It is clarificatory of the orimnal a~tide 368. What was implicit in Article 368 is now made explicit and the, _cs~ncc of Articles 368 is retained. Therefore there can be no objection to the Z4th Amendment on the ground that any essential feature of the C.ons\itution .is affected. Since article 13(2) docs not control an amendment of the C:onstitu~n it follows that any an1endment of the Constitution cannot be challenged on that ground and that would be true not only of tht 24th Amendment but also the 25th Amendment and the 29th Amenoment. It may appear as ~ry odd ~at while the framers of the Constitution did not think it necessary to expressty. exclude even one provision of the Constitution from being amended they still i/ltcnded that this Court as the guardian of the Constitution should make pa~s of it unamendable by implying limiu.tions on the amending powct\ This Court cannot constitute itself a guardian against change constitutionalq. effccte<l. [pp. 598, 599]

So far as the right to prope:rty is concerned the Constitution in a.rticle· 39(b) and (c) expressly declared ·\ts determination, in the interest of common good, to break up concentration of\~lth and means of production in every form and to arrange for redistribution: ,of ownership and control of the material resources of the community. If anything in the Constitution deserves to be called an essential feature this determination is one. That is the Central issue in this case. In a real sense concentration of wealth in the form of agricultural lands was broken and community resources were distributed. Article 31(4)(6) and article 31A clearly show that community interests were regarded as supreme and those articles were only a step in the implementation of the Directive Principles in article 39(b) and (c). The object of the 25th amendment is the same viz., implementation of article 39(b) and (c ). In principle there is no difference in article 31A and the new article 31C inserted by the 25th Amendment. From the conclusion that the power of amendmenr I'Clnains unqualified by whomsoever it is exercised it .follows that there can· be no implied or inherent limitations on the amending power. And, where· power is granted to amend the amending power there is DQ limit to the extent this may be done. It may be curtailed or enlarged. Article 368 permits the amendment . of all the provisions of the Constitution expressly and if that power is to be cut down by something that is said in soriie other provision of the Constitution the latter must be clear and specific.· Where the tezt is clear apd unambiguous there can be no recourse to the context or the ochcme of the Act ; nor can the context or the scheme be utilised to makt ambiguous what is clear and unambiguous. The word 'amendment' used in the contcJ:t of a Constitution is clear and unambiguous. [pp. 600 to 609J

SUPREME COUllT REPOllTS [ 1973]

Supp. s.c.11.

State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, (1952) S.C.R. 889, Rayn v. Lannox, 1935 Jrish Reports, 170, Moore v. Attorney General for the Irish Stai., 1935 A.C. 484, Warburton v. Loveland, [1831) II Dow & Clark, 480, Bttntky v. Routherham, 1876-77, 4 Ch.D 588 (592), Reg v. Burah, [1878) 3 App. (a) 889, Attorney-GenerraZ- for the Province of Ontario v. Attorney.General for Dominion of Canada [1912] App. Cas. 571, Webb v. Outrim [1907) A.C. 81, The Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. The Adelaide Steamship Company Limii.d and .oth«"s, 28 C.L.R.' 129, The Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves, [1960) (3) S.C.R. 250 and Secretary of State v. Maharajah of Bobbili, 43 Madras 529, 536 (P.C.), referred to. Fundamental rights are not inalienable natural rights. Articles 13 and 32 -show that fundamental rights are rights which the people have 'conferred' upon themselves. Even the rights conferred arc not in absolute· terms. They arc hedged in and .restricted in the interest of the general public> public order, public 1norality, security of the State, and the like which show that social and political considerations are more import.ant in our organised society. The core philosophy of the Constitution lies in social, economic and political justice. The Directive Principles of State policy which the Constitution commands should be fundamental in the governance of the Country require the State. to direct its policy towards securing to tht: citizens adequate means of liveli~ hood. The mandate in article 39 is as importanc for the state ai- to maintain individual freedoms. It is always a continuous endeavour of the State having the common good of the people at heart. So to harmonize the Directive Principles and the fundamental rights that so far as property rights arc .ccncerned, the unlirnited freedom to hold it would have to undergo an adjustn1ent to the demands of the State Policy dictated by the Directive Principles. The attribute of 'scaredness' of property vanishes in an egalitarian society. Once this is accepted and deprivation and expropriation arc rcCog· nised as inevitable in the interest of a better social organisation in which the reality of liberty and freedom can be more widely achieved the claim made ,on behalf of property that it is an inmutable natural right loses force. Nor is it correct to describe the fundan1ental rights, including the right to property, as rights reserved by the people to themselves. What the Constitution confer~ red was made revoc:i1ble, if necessary by the a1nendatory process. [pp. 593 to 596, 600 to 603]

No implied limitations c:,an be inferred. from the Preamble. The Preamble is a part of the Constitution and is amendable under article 368. The subn1ission that the fundamental rights arc ...an elaboration of the Preamble is an overstatement and a half truth. Most of the fundamental rights may be traced, to the principles of Liberty and Equality mentioned in the Preamble. But ·whereas the concept~· of Liberty and Equality are mentioned in absolute terms in the Preamble the fundamental rights including the several freedoms arc not couched in absolute terms. They reflect the concepts of Liberty and Equality in a very attenuated form with several restrictions imposed in the interest of orderly and peaceable Government. The Preamble read as a whole docs not contain the implication that in any genuine implementation of the Directive Principles a fundamental right will not suffer any diminution. Nor is there anything in the preamble to suggest that the power to amend the fundarncn!al right to property is cut down. The Preamble, it is noW well settled, can neither increase nor decrease the power granted in plain and clear words in the enacting parts of a statute. [pp. 609 to 613) A Constitution is an organic instrument continuously growing in utility and the question of its repeal never arises as long as orderly change is poasible.

XESAVUANDA v. ~ (Palekar,

J.)

It is the nature and character ·Of the Constitution as a growing, organic, penna11ent iovcrcign instrUmcnt of .government which exclude the repeal of the Constitution as a : wqolc and not the nature and character of the amending power. [p. 619]

If it is the Court that is · to decide what arc the essential and nonessential provisions, what stable standard will guide the Court in deciding which provision· is -~sscntial and- ·which -is not essential. The difficulty assumes pttr proporti0n when an amendment is challenged on ·the ground that the core ·of an essential feature·· is either damaged or destroyed. Apart from the difficulty in determining where the 'core' of an 'essential feature' lies, fantastic may· follow .in working the Constitution. The Court cannot be .mvitcd to determine the spirit of the Constitution. When concepts of social or economic jD;Sticc arc _offered for our examination in theii interaction on .provisions rclatirig 'to right to property, mancrs traditionally left to legislative; .policy :and· wisdom, we are bound to flounder 'in labyrinths to the .character of which we· have ncnuflicicnt gilidcs." [pp. 620-022]

Fults

. . ..On a conlideration therefore, of the nature of the amending power and

,the unquali6ed mannel' in which it is given in article 368 of the Constitution .it is impossible to imply. any !imitations on the power to amend the fu~da­ m:cntal . rights. ·Since there arc no limitations express or implied, on 'the amending power it must be conceded that all the amendments which are in q~on must be deemed to be valid. The Court cannot question their policy 'or tll•ir wisdom. [p. 625] .. State of Bihizr v. Kameshwar Singh, [1952] S.C.R. 889, Ryan v. Lennox, '[193H Irish J?eports, 170, Moore v. Attorney General for the Irish Stat<, ··[19~5,J1.C. 484, Warburton v. Loveland, [1831] II Dow & Clark, 480 Bentley ~. ;Rptherha,,,, [1876-77] 4 Ch. D .. 588, 592, Reg v. Burah, [1878] 3 App. Cas. .-'.8~, . -Attorney.General for the Province of Ontan·o v. Attorney-Gen~al for the Dominion of Canada, [1912] App. Cas. 571, Webb v, Outrim; [1907] A.C. 81, ·The Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. The Adelaide

Steamship Company

.:·Limited ·rmd Ors., 28 C.L.R. 129, .The Berubari Union and Exchange 'of ·Enclaves, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 250 and Secretary of Staie v; Maharaia of Bobbili, 43 Madras 529, 536 (P.C.), In re: The Initiative and Referendum Act, [1919] A.C. 935; Mangal Singh v. Union of India, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 109 112 and In re.: The National Prohibition cases, 65 Law, Edn., 994, referred to.' Victoria v; The Corn,monwealth, 45 A.L.J.R, 251, distinguished. . Don John Francis Douglas Liyanage & Ors v. ·.nng,he's case, [1965] A.C. 172, held inapplicable.

The Queen, and

Section of 2 of the Constitution Twenty Fifth valid. [pp. 625, 626]

Amendment

Rana-

Act

is

A_n :'-mcndm~t to the Constitution cannot become invalid because the ~ns~tutlon auth~nscs th~ legislatures to fix an 'amount' or to specify the principles .on, which t?e. amount' .is .to be detcrmin~d instead of fixing the . compcnsauon or spec1fy1ng the prmc1ples for determining 1compensation'. All that· the amendment has done is to negative the interpretation put by this Court on t?e c:on~ept of co~pcnsation. Whether a particular law fixes an amount \Vh1ch. ts illusory .or 1s otherwise a fraud on · !X>Wer denying the fundamental nght to receive an amount specifically conferred by clause (2),

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1973)

Supp. S.C.Jt,

will depend upon the law when made and is tested on the basis of clause (2). The possibility of abuse of a power given by an amendment of the Constitution is not deterrn.inative of the validity of the amendment. The new clause 2R excluding the application of article 19(1)(£) to a I.aw referred IC> in clause (2) of article 31 is merely a restatement of the law laid down by thif Court after the Constitution came into force. [p. 626]

Bank of Toronto v. Lambe 1887, Vol. XII- Appeal Cases 575, 586-587 and Sitabati Debi & Anr. v. State of w..,, Bengal & Anr. (1967] 2 S.C.R. 949, referred to. Article 3IC included by section Amendment Act is valid.

of the Constitution Twenty Fiftlt

\Vhat is saved by article 31C is a law i.e. a law made by a competent legislature and since r.he article comes under the specific heading 'Right to· property' in Pan III the law must involve right to property. The effect of the first part of article 31C is the same as if a proviso had been inserted below 2rticle 13(2) or each of the several articles 14, 19 and 31 excluding their application to the particular types of law mentioned in article 31C. If the law docs not genuinely purport to give effect to the specified directive principles it will not be secure against the challenge under articles 14, 19 and 31. [pp. 627, 628]

Article 31C docs not prevent judicial review.

What the court will have

to consider is whether it is a law which can reasonably be described as a law gi,ing effect to the policy of the state towards securing the aims of article-

39(b) or (c). That i~ an issue which is distinct from the other issue whether the law does not -give effect to the policy of the state towards securing the said aims. A law reasonably calculated to- serve a particular aim or purpose may not actually serve that aim or purpose; and it is this latter issue whicD is excluded from judicial review. In that view of the true nature of· article31C it cannot be said that the amendment is invalid. [pp. 629 to 631]

Beautharanis v. lllinois 343 U.S . .250, Charles Russell v. The Queen, 188? (VUI) Appeal Cases 829 (838.840) and Attorney-General v. Queen. lns#rtmcr Co. 1878 (3) Appeal Cases, 1090, referred to. The Constitution Twenty Ninth Ameodment Act is valid. [p. 632) The argument that unless the Acts included in the Ninth Schedule rela· ted to agrarian reforrns the protection of article 31B will not be availablehas been rejected by this Court previously. The T\vcnty Ninth Amendment is Ilot different from several similar amendments made previously by which statutes were added from time to time to the Ninth Schedule and whose validity has been upheld by this Court, [p. 632]

N. B. feeieebhoy "· Assistant Collector, Thana (1965] I S.C.R. 636, referred t<J. Khanna, /. : The Constitution Twenty Fourth Amendment -is valid. The amendment made in article 31(2) by the Constitution Twenty Fifth Amendment is valid. The first part of article 31C introduced by the Constitution Twenty Fifth Amendment is valid. The second part of article 31C viz., :•and no· h'1\V containing a declaration that it is for giving effcc~ to such po!tcy 1hall be called in question in any court nn the ground that tt does not give effe~t to stich policy" is invalid and therefore has to be struck down~ The Consn-tution Twenty Ninth Amendment Act is valid. (pp. 759, 760]

KESAVANAND+\. ti. llRALA (Khllnna,

J.)

Article . 368 before Constitution Trve.nty Fourth Amendment eonldio not only the procedure for the amendmeoJ of the Conttitution INt also confers the power of amending the Constitution. [p. 757] The words in Article 368 "The Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the bill" clearly indicate that the article provides not 1ncrcly the procedure for amending the Constitution but also contains the power to amend Article 368. By the very nature of things the power to amend the Constitution cannot be in the residuary entry in a federal constitution, because, the power to amend the Constitution will also include the power to alter the distribution of subjects mentioned in different entries. Such a power cannot obviously be a legislative power. Irrespective of the source of power the words in Article 368. that "the Constitution shall stand amended" indicate that the process of making amendment prescribed in article 368 is a 11elf-exccuting process. The article shows that once the procedure prescribed in that article has been complied with the end product is the amendment of the Constitution. [pp. 646-648[

The word "law" in Artii:le 13(2) does not in<!lude an amendment of tb~ Constitution. [p. 758] An amendment of the Constitution made in accolldance with Article 368 docs not constitute "law" for the purpose of article 13(2). The word "law", although referred to in a .large number of other articles of the Constitu'tion, finds no mention in article 368. What follows as a result of the compliance with Article 368 is an amendment of the Constitution and not law in the ocnse of ordinary legislation. There is a clear distinction betw<cn statutory law made in exercise of legislative power and constitufional law made in curcise of _constituent power. A Constitution is a famdamcntal and basic law and provides the authority under which ordinary law is made. If it had been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the law in

article 13 would also include constitutional law including laws relating to the

amendment of the Constitution, it is not explained as to why they did not e>pressly so state in clause (a) of article 13(3). . The

Constitution

itself

contains indications of the distinction between the Constitution and the laws framed under the Constitution. It is difficult to accede to the contention that even though the framers of the Constitution put no express limitation in Article 368 on the power to make amendment, they curtailed that power by im~lica.tion under article, 13(2) .. In. order to find the true scope of article 13(2) m the context of 1ts possible unpact on the power of amendment it should not be read in isolation but should be read along with article 368. The rule of construction is to read the actual words used 11not in vacuo but

as occurring in a single complex instrument'· ln whiCh ·one

part may throw

light on another". A combined reading of article 13(2) and article 368 clearly points to the condusion that the cxtinguishment or abridgement of fundamental rights contained in Part III of the Constitution is not beyond the amcnda~ry ~wer conferred by article 368. The alleged conflict between ~~ ~ articles ts apparent ~d ~ot real because the two provisions operate m different fi~lds and deal w;th diflc.rc~t ~bjects. Article 368 is independent and self.ainta1ned. If there " any ltm1ta11on on the power of amendment it must be found in article 368 itself which is the sole fountalli-hcad of power to amend, and not in other provisions dcaling with ordinary legislation. [pp. 655 to 660]

Tiie United Pt'Ollin«s v. Mn. Aliqa Begum & On [1940] 2 F.C.R. 110; /.,,us v. Commonwe.W. of Australia, [l9J6i >.£. 578, Rfemd to. 4-36 S.C. India/73

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1973]

Supp. s.c.L

Tiie pou1er of amendment undeir unamended article 368 does not inc/uje the power to abrogate the Constitution nor does it include the (JOwer zo alter the basic structure or frame-work of the Constitution. Subject to the retention of t/Je basic structure or frame-work of the Constitution the power of amendment is plen'11'y and includes within itself the power .to amend the variou! articles of the Constitution, including those relating to fundamental rights as u1ell as those which may be said to relate to essential features. No part of a fundamental right can claim immunit1 from amendatoty process by being described as the essence ar core of that right. The power- of amendment would also include within itself fhe power to add to alter or repeal the various articles. [pp. 758, 759]

There are no words in Article 368 to indicate that a limitation was intended on the power of making amendment of Part III with a view to take .away or abridge fundamental rights. The words "the Constitution shall stand amended" plainly cover the various articles of the Constitution. It is difficult in the face of those clear and unambiguous words to exclude from their ope_ration the articles relating to fundamental rights. It is an elemental rule of c.onstruction that while dealing with a Constitution every word is to be expounded in its plain obvious and cominonsense unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify or enlarge it and there li:annot be imposed upon the words any recondite meaning or any extraordinary gloss. It has not yet been erected into a legal maxim of Constitutional construction that words are meant to conceal thoughts. It cannot be said that the framers <>f the Constitution deliberately used words which cloaked their real intention \vhen it would have been so simple a matter to make the intention clear beyond any possibility' of doubt. There is clear indication that the drafting· Committee was conscious ef the need for having express provision regarding limitation on the power of amendment in case such limitation was desired. This is clear from article 305 of the draft Constitution which immediately followed article 304 corresponding to article 368 of the Constitution as finally ~cloptcd. The speech of Dr. Ambcdkar made on September 17, 1949 while dealing with the provision relating to amendment of the Constitution makes it clear that the divided the various articles of the Constitution into three .categories. There was nothing in his speech to show that apart from the three categories of articles there was a fourth category of articles contained in Part III which was not amendable and as such could not be the subicct <if amendment. The Constitution (First Amendment} Act, 1951, which abridged and amended certain fundamental rights contained in article 19, was passed by the provisional parliament which had also acted as the constituent assembly for the drafting of the O>nstitution. The First Amendment is a contemporaneous practical aposition of the power of amendment under article 368. The contemporaneous practical exposition furnished considerable ~d in resolving the doubt in construing the provision of the article. [pp. 648 to 653] Queen v. Buran, [1878] 3 Appeal Cam 889 and William Mcpheron v. Robbert R. Blac/r.er, 146 U.S. !. referred to. This Court has now accepted the view in its decisions since Golak Natli'l <ase that the speeches made in the Constituent Assembly can be r;c£errcd to :while dealing with the provisions of the Constitution. The speeches can be referred to for finding the history of the Constitutional provision and the background against which the provisions were drafted. The speeches cannot form the basis for construing the provisions of the Constitution. [p. 654]

?·

I. C. Golak Nath & Ors. v. State of 'Puniab, [1967] 2 S.C.R., 762, H. Maharaiadhirai• Mad.hav Rao fiwaii Rao Scindia Bahadur & Ors. v. Union of India, [1971] 3 S.C.R. 9, Union of India v. H. S. Dhillon, (1972] 2 S.C.R. 333.

KESAVANANl>A v. llllALA (Kh1111na,

J.)

The amending clause is the most important part of a Constitution. Upon. its existence and truthfulness. th3;t is, its correspondence with real and natural conditions, depend• the question as to whether the State shall develop with peaceable continuity or shall suffer alternations of stagnat:ion, retrogression .and revolution. The framers of our Constitution were conscious of the desirability o! rc.:ondling the urge for change with the need for continuity.. They were not oblivious of the phenomenon writ large in human history that change ~ithOut cClntinuity can be anarchy ; change with continuity can mCan progress ; and continuity without change can mean no progress. The Constitution makers have, therefore, kept the balance between the danger of Aaving an unamendable constitution and- a constitution which is easily amendable. No generation has monopoly of wisdom nor has any generation a right to place fetters -on future gene.rations to mould the machinery of Govern· ment and the laws according to their requirements. The grant of power of amendment is based upon the asswnption that as in other human affairs, so ja. constitutions, there are no absolutes and that the human mind can never reconcile itself to fetters in its quest for a better order of things. I£ it is not permissible under article 368 to so amend the constitution as to take away or abridge the fundamental rights in Part III the conclusion would follow that the only way to take away or abridge fundamental rights is to resort to extra constitutional methods like revolution. Between peaceful amendment ·through means provided by the constitution and the extra constitutional .method with it.s dangerous potentialities the former method is to be preferred. [pp. 663 to 670] The consequences which would follow from the acceptance of the view that there is no power under article 368 to· abridge or take away fundamental rights would be chaotic. It is one of the well settled rules of construction that if the words of a statute arc in themselves precise and unambiguous, no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the legislature. It is also well settled that where alternative constructions are equally open that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working ot the system which the statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion into the working of the system. These principles of construction apply with greater force 'vhen dealing with provisions of a Constitution. As the language of article 368 is plain and unambiguous it is not possible to read therein a limita· tion on the power of Parliament to amend the provisions of ~Part III of the Consutution so as to abridge or take away fundamental rights. It is also not permissible in the face of the plain language of article 368 to ascertain by 3.ny process akin to speculation the supposed intention of the constitution makers. If .the words are plain and free from any ambiguity the constitution makers should be takeh to have incorporated their intention in those words.

Collector of Customs, Baroda v. DigviidJingh;i Spinning & Weavin.f! Mil/J· Ltd.• [1962] l S.C.R. 896, referred to. [pp. 670 to 671] The argument that an amendment of Part III is possible by making a law for convening a Constituent A. ssembly or for holding a referendum cannot be accepted. If Parliament by a two third majority in each house and by follo,ving the procedure laid down. in article 368 cannot am~nd Part III of the Constitution so as to take away- or abridge fundamental rights it is difficult to understand how the same Parliament can by law create a body which can make the requisite amendment. If it is not within the power of Parliament to take away or abridge fm!damental rights even by a vote of the. two thirds majority in each hou,se, would it be permissible for the same Parliament ·to enaet l•gislation under entry 97 List I of the Seventh Schedule by ·simple

S2

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1973]

Supp. s.c.11..

majority for creating a Constituent Assembly in order to take away or abridge fundamental rights. A body created by Parliament cannot have a power greater than those vested in thC'. Parliament. If something is impermissible, it would continue to be so even though two steps are taken instead of one for bringing about the result which is not permitted. Again, the argument that provisions cculd be made for referendum is equally facile. Our oonstitution makcn rejected the method of referendum. In a country whctc there arc religious and linguistic minorities, it was not considered a proper method of dccidirig vital issues. Thus apart, it is not permissible to resort to the method of refcren. dum unless there be a constitutional provision for such a course in the amend· mcnt provision. The selection of the method of amendment having been made by the Constituent Assembly it is not for the Court to express preference for another method of amendment. There is no warrant for the proposition that since the amendments under Article 368 arc brought about by the prescribed 111ajority of the two houses of Parliament and in certain cases arc ratified by the State Legislatures and since

the

amendments

arc

not

brought about

through referendum or passed in a Convention, the power of amendment under article 368 is on that account subject to limitation:;. [pp. 671-078]

G<t>Tge S. Hawkes v. Hervey C. Smith, 64 L Ed. 871, f?Aode lslanJ v. Mitchell, 64 L Ed. 946 and United States v. Sprague, 282, U.S. 716, referred to. Parliament cannot be denied the power to· amend the Constitution as te take away or abridge the fundamental rights by complying with the procedure of article 368 because of any supposed fear or possibility ol! the abuse of power. That power may be abwcd furnishes no ground for denial of its existence. The fact that a prescribed majority of the peoples' representatives is required for bringing about the amendment is itself a guarantee that the power would not be abused. The best safeguard against the abuse or extravagant use of power is public opinion and not a fetter on the right of people's rcprcscntatives to change the constitution by following the procedure laid down in the . Constitution itself. For seventeen years from 1950 till 1967 when Go/aknath case was decided the accepted proposition was that Parliament had the power 1D amend Part Ill of the C.onstitution so as to take away or abridge fundamental rights. Despite the possession of that power no attempt was made by Parliament to ta.kc away or abridge fundamental rights relating to cherished values like liberty of person and freedom of expression. · If it was not done in the past why should it be assumed that the majority of members ot Parliament, in future, would acquire sudden aversion and dislike for these values-. Then: is a vital distinction between vesting of power, the exercise of the power and the manner of its exercise. What is in issue is whctlicr, on a true cOnstruction of article 368, Parliament has or .has not the power to ainend the Constitution so as to take away or abridge fundamental 'rights. The answer should be in the affirmative as long as the basic structure of the Constitution is retained. [pp. 678 to 682]

Prividence Bank v. A.lpheus Billings, 29 U.S. 514, /ohn L. Rapier, E:rpart•, IS U.S. 93, Bank of Toronto and Lambe, 12 A.C. 575 Mauouri Kansu ond Texas Railway Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, n:ferrcd to. The power to amend under article 368 docs not include the power to completely abrogate Constitutio'.' and rcplac;c it by an entirely new Consti!"ti?n. -..An1endment" of the Constituuon necessarily contcmolatcs that the Constitunon has not to be abrogated but only changes have to be made in it. The word "amendment" postulates that the old Constitution survives without loss of its identity despite the change and continues even though it has been subj~ t.o alb:rations. The retention of the old Constitution means retention of the bu1c

I

IWAVANANl>A ti. K.EllALA

(Khanna, J.)

1tn1ctUre or frame-work of tho old Con1titution. Although it is pumissiblo 11Dder the power of amendment to elJect changes howsoever important and to adapt tho 1ystem to the requiremenu of changing conditiono, it ii not putnissible te touch the foundation or to alter the basic institutional pattern. The words "amendment of tho Con•titution" with ·all their wide sweep and amplitude cannot have the effect of destroying or abrogating tho buic llr\lcturc or framework of the Constitution. It would not be competent under the garb of amendment, for ·instance, to change the democratic Government into dictatot.. ship or hereditary monarchy, nor would it be permissible to abolish the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. The secular character of the State according to which the State shall not decriminate against any citizen on the ground of religion only cannot likewise be done away with. Provisions regarding the amendment does not furnish a pretence for subverting the slr\lcture of the Constitution nor can article 368 be so conslr\led as te embody the death wish of the Constitution or provide sanction for what may perhaps be called iu lawful Hara Kiri. The words "amendment of this Constitution" and "the Constitution shall stand amended", in article 368 show that what is amended , is the existing Constitution and what emerges as a result of amendment is not a new and different Constitution but the existing Constitution though in an amended form. Subject to the retention of the basic structure or framework of the Constitution the power of amendment is plenary and would include within itself the power to add, alter ot repeal the various article including thOlC relating to fundamental rights. "Amendment" in article 368 has been used to denote change. This is a clear from the opening words of the proviso, to ortide 368. The word 'change' has a wide amplitude and would necessarily cover case of repeal and replacement of earlier provisions by new provisions of different nature. The denial of such a broad and comprehensive power would introduce such rigidity in the Constitution as might break the Constitution must contain ample provision for experiment and trial in the task of administration. It is not a document for fastidious dialectics but the means of ordering the life of a , people. It has its roots in the past, its continuity is rcftcctcd in the present and it is intended for the unknown future. [pp. 685, 686, 688-690, 693] The Court in judging the validity of all amendment would not enter into the arena of controversy but would concern itself with the question as to whether the constitutional requirements for making the amendment have been satisfied. An amendment of the Constitution in compliance · with the procedure prescribed by Article 368 cannot be struck down by the Court on the ground that it is a change for the worse. [ p. 694]

A. K. Gopa/an v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88, British Coal Corporalion v. The King, [1935] A.C. 500 Lochn.,. v. New York [1904] 198 U.S. 45 and Ferguson v. Skrupa, [1963] 372 U.S. 726, referred to.

So far as the expression essential features" means the basic. structure or irame-work of the Constitution the power to amend does not include within ~f the power to change the basic structure or frame-work of the Constitution. The di!ercntiation between fundamental right and the essence or core of that fun~en~.1 right an over-refinement which is not permissible and cannot otand JUd1C1al scrutmy. The essence or core of a fundamental right must in ~e nature or things ~ its integral part and cannot claim a status or protection di!ercnt from and higher than that of a fundamental right of which it ii oupposcd to be the essence or core. There is also no objoctive standard to ':1ctcnninc as to what is the core of fundamental right and what distinguishes It from the periphery. The absence of such a standard is bound to introduce

!•

SUPllEME COUl.T - T S {1973] Sapp. $.C.R.

uncertainty in a matter of so vital an importance .as the amendment of the Coostitution. The provisions of the Constitution "'garding the power of making amendment arc clear and unambiguous and contain no limitation OD that power. [pp. 706, 707]

Thn-e art no implied or inhe1·ent limJ'tations 01J the power of amendmetlt apart from those which inhere anli are impliCit in the tv<lf'd "amendment". The power ca.nnot be re1trictetl by reference to natural cw hUman righ't;. [p. 759] So far as the limitation which flows by necessary implication from aa express provision of the. Constitution is concerned, the concept derives its 'force and is founded upon a principle of interpretation of statutes. In the absence of any compelling reason it may be said that a constitutional provision is not exempt from the operation of such principle. It is not possible to disccr.a in the language of article 368 or other relevant articles any implied limitation on the po,vcr to make amendment contained in that article. So far as the limita· tion based upon higher values which are very dear to the human heart aml arc considered essential traits of civilised existence is concerned, one obviout objection which must strike every one is that the Constitution of India is one of the lengthiest Constitutions of the World. If it was intended that limita· tions should be read on the power of making amendment the question would necessarily arise as to why the framers of the Constitution refrained from txpressly incorporating such limitation on the power of amendment in the Constitution itself. The theory of implied limitation is based on a doctrinaire approach and not on what is essential for the purpose of construing and working a constitution, viz., a pragmatic and practkal approach. As the concept of implied limitations on the power- of amendment based on higher values is not based upon some express provision of the constitution, it must be regarded as el'sentially nebulous. Th~ concept has no definite contours and its acceP" tancc would necessarily introduce an elcmeat of uncertainty and vagueness in a matter of so vital an importance as that pertaining to the amendment of the Constitution. It is difficult to accede to the submission that the framers of the Constitution, after having made such detailed provision~ for different subjects, left something co be decided by implication, that in addition to what was said there were things which were not said· but which were intended to be as effective as things said. The quest for things not said but which were to be as effective as things said, would take us to the realm of speculation and theorising and must bring in its wake the uncertainty which inevitably is there in all such spe1:ulation and theorising. Natural rights have no proper place outside the Constitution and the statute. Independently of the Constituuon and the laws of the State, natural rights can have no legal sanction and cannot be enforced. The binding force of Constitutional and statutory -provisions can· not be taken away :o.or can their amplitude and width be restricted by irivoking the concept of natural rights. The. rights, as such, cannot be deemed to be supreme or of superior validity to the enactments made by the State and not subject to the amendatory process. The power to amend the provisions of the Constitution relating to fundan1cntal rights cannot, therefore, be denied by describing the fundamental rights as natural rights or human rights. [pp. 695 te 700, 728 to 735J

Mangal Singh v. Union of India, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 109. Alberta Prm case, [1938] Sup. C~ Reports 100 {Canada), Switmand v. Elbing, [1957] Sup. Ct. &ports 285 (Canada), Attorney General of Novo Scoha v. Attorney Generol of Canada, [1950] Sup. Ct. Reports 31 (Canada) Bribery Commi.,ioner •· Pedrick.. Ran• Singh< [1965] A.G. 172, Mccawley v. The King, 1920 A.G. 691 Attorney Generdz for N.S.W. v. Trethowan, [1932]. A.G. 256 and State of Victoria v. Commonwealth, 45 A.I.J.R. 251·, held mappltcable.

) KESAVANANDA "· ltEllALA (Khanna,

J.)

5S

Liya,,.te v. The Qwem, [ 1'66] AU E.ll.. 650, distinpished. Notionol Prohibition Cose, 65 L. Ed. 994, fermish Ry.. v. Coptain Mich•el Leoon, (1935] A.C. Irish Reports 170 and Moore & Ors v, Attorney Generol for Irish Free Srate, [1935) A.C. 494, re£emd to. Apart from the part of the Preamble which relates to the basic structure or frame-worfr. of the Constitution, the Preamble 4oe1 not restrict the power of amen4mmt. [p. 759] The Preamble docs not control the power of amendment. There is positive evidoncc in the debates of the Constituent Assembly to show that the Preamble is part of the Constitution. As preamble is part of the Constitution its provi· lions other than ,those relating to the basic structure or framc·work, it may well be argued, are as much subject to the amendatory process contained in article 368 as other parts of the Constitution. If the Preamble itself is amendable its provision other than those relating to basic structure cannot impose any implied limitation on the power 0£ ·amendment. The principle of construction. is that reference can be made to preamble for purpose of construing when the words of a. statute or constitution arc ,ambiguous and admits of two alternative constructions. When the language of a section or article is plain and suffers from no ambigriity or obscurity, no gloss can be put on the words of the section or article by invoking the Preamble. The preamble cannot confer any power per sc : it can never amount, by implication, to an enlargement ot any power expressly given. It can never be the legitimate source of any implied power, when otherwise withdrawn from the Constitution. Its true office is to expound th~ nature a~d CXtcnt and application of the powers actually conferred hv the Constitution and not substantively to create them. [pp. 710-713]

In re. The Berubari Union and Erchange of Enclaves, [1963] S.C.R. 250 and Att<>rney General v. H.R.H. Prin<e Ernest, (1957] A.C. 436, referred to . .Right to fJroperty doet not pertain to basic structure or frame~work of tlle Constitution. · Although the Preamble gives a prominent place to securing the objective of socia~ economic and politkal justice to the citizens there is nothing in it which

• '

gives primacy to claims of individual right to property over the claims of social, cc.onomic and political justice. There is· no clause ·or indication in the Preamble -which stands in the way of abridgement of right to property for occuring socia~ economic and political justice. Indeed the dignity of the individual upon which also the preamble .has laid stress can only be assured by . 1eeuring the objective of social, economic and political justice. The Directive Principles embody a commitment which was imposed by the Constitution maker~ on the State to bring about economic and social regeneration of the tteminj! millions who arc steeped in poverty, ignorance and social backwardncs1. They incorporate a pledge· to the coming generations of what the state would try to u.sher in. The stress in the impugned amendments to the Constitution upon changing the economic structure by narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor is not a recent phenomenon. This has been the objective of the national leaders since before the dawn of independence and was one of the undorlying . reasons for the first and fourth Amendments of the Constitution. The approach adopted was that there should be no reluctance to abridge or rcgulat• the fundamental right to property if it wu felt necessary to do so

SUPREME COUP.T REPoRTS

[1973] Supp. s.c.R.

f.or changing the economic structure ,and to attain the objectives contained ia the Directive Principles. So far u the quCJtion is concerned u to whether the right to property can be said to pertain to ba1ic llructure or frame-woik ef the Constitution the answer should plainly be in the neptive. Basic 11rUC!Ufe or frame-work indicates the broad outlines of ,the Co.Dsatution while the riabt to property is a matter of detail. [pp. 716 to 720]

Parliament can by amendment of Ille ConnilUtion enlar1e ill

°""' power1.

Amendment of the Constitution, in the very nature of things, can mult jn the conferment of powers on or the enlargement of powers of one of the organs of the State. There is nothing in the Constitution which prohibill or in an} other way prevents the enlargement of powers of Parliament as a result of constitutional amendment and such an amendment cannot be held to be impermissible or beyond the purview of article 368. Article 368 itaclf gives, inter .Jia, the power to amend article .368 .and an amendment of arliclc 368 which has been brought about in the manner prescribed by that .. article would not suffer from any constitutional or tegal infirmity. [pp. 721 to 723]

/ermish Ryan v. Mischael Lennon, [ 1935] Irish Reports 170, referred to. The Constitution Twenty Fourth Amendment Act 111111 ('llll<d in aecortanu with the pro<edu~ laid down in Artick 368 of .Ille, C0111ti1Ution 111 it existed bef<>re the passing of the said, Act. The Aci doe1 nor suffer from any infirmity and 111 such is valid. [l'P· 737, 759]

J

The amendmenll in article 31(2) and the addition of d. 2(B) of the Constitution Twenty Fifth Amendment Act are permissibk under tll'#,Z, 368 and are, theref<>re, valid. [pp. 739, 741, 759] The amendment made in atticle 31(2) by substituting the word "amount" for the word "compensation" is necessarily intended to- get over the difficulty caused by the use of the word "compensation". What.ever may be the connotation ol the word 'amount' it would not affect the validity of the amendment made in article 31(2). There is no infirmity in the changes made in article 31(2). [p. 739]

Bela Banerjee, [1954] S.C.R.'558, Vl>jravelu Mudaliar, (1965] l, S.C.R. 614, Shanll1al Manga/das, [1969] 3 S.C.R. 341 and R. C. Cooper, [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530, referred to. By the addition of cl. (2B) the amendment seeks. to overcome the effect of the decision of this Court in R. C. Cooper v. Union of India, [19701 3 S.C.R. 530 that article 19(1)(£) and 31(2) arc not mutually exclusive. The change made by the addition of clause (2B) in atticle 31(2) is permissible un.dcr article 368 .and cannot be held to be invalid. [ p. 741]

The first part of artick 31C introduced by ConstilUtion Twenty Fifth Amendmeal i1 valid. [p. 759] The first part of article 31C is similar to article 31A except in respect o! the subject matter. Both articles 31A and 31C deal with right to ptaperty. The objective of article 31C is to prevent concentration of wealth and means of ·production :ind to ensure the dillribution of ownership and the aintrol of the material resources of the community for the common gi>od. Article 31C is thus essentially an extension of the principle accepted in article 31A. Article 31A having been held to be valid during all these years its validity

•

I I

KESAVANANDA "· KllllALA

(Khanna, J.)

ainnot now be questioned on account of the doctrine of start Je,isis. The pound which sustained the validity clause (!) of Article 31A would equally ..stain the validity of the first part of article 31C. (pp. 743, 744]

Sankari Prasad v. Union of India, (1952 JS.C.R. 89 and Lmer v. Garnet, 258 U.S. 130 referred to.

·~

!I

The second part of article 31C contains the seed of nau·onal disintegration and is invalid on the grounds: (i) It giv<S a carte blanche to the kgislllture to make any Jaw (liolotive of artkkt 14, 19 and make it immune from attack by inst1·ting tJie requisite declaration. Article 31C taken along with its second part, gives in effect the power to the legislature, including a State Legislature to amend the Constitution in important respects; and (ii) it goes beyond the permissible limits of what constitutes amendment under article 368 since the exclusion of even limited judicial rtview strikes at the basic structure of the Constitution. [pp. 759, 760] The effect of the second part of article 31C is that even though a law is in substance not in fustherence of the objects mentioned in articles 39(b) and (c) and has only a· slender connection with those objects, the declaration made by tile legislature would stand in the way of a party challenging it on the ground that it is not for the furthcrcncc of those objects, A power is thus conferred to make a declaration in rcspcc_t of any law made in violation of the provisions of articles 14, 19 and 31', and, in further ~powering the state legislature to make laws immune from attack on the ground of being violative of articles 14, 19 and 31 by inserting the requisite _declaration, the authority vested with the power to make amendment under Uticle 368 has in cffCct delegated or granted the power of amendment in important respect to a state legislature. The power of amendment being of such vital importance c.an neither be delegated nor can those vested with the authority tCJ amend abdicate that power in favour of another body. Article 31C taken along with the second part relating to the declaration departs from the scheme of article 31A, becaui..e, while the protection afforded by article 31A is to laws ma~~ ~or specified subject the immunity granted under article 31C can be a\. ...ucd of even by laws which have not been made for the specified objects. Judicial review is an integral part of the constitutional system. It is open to the authority amending the Constitution to exclude judicial review regarding the , validity of an existing statute. It is like-wise open to the authority to exclude judicial review regarding the validity. of a statute which might be enatctcd by the legislature in ~ture in respect of a specified subject. In such an event judicial review is not excluded for finding whether the statute has been enacted in respect of the specified subject. Both the above types of Constitutional amendments arc permissible under article 368. What is not permissible is a third type of Constitutional amendment according to which the amending authority not merely exclude judicial review regarding the validity of a statu~ which might be enacted by the legislature in future in respect of a specified ...bjcct, but also exclude judicial review for finding whether the statute enactea by the legislature is in respect of the subject for which judicial review has been excluded. The position under article 31C is that though judicial review has been excluded by the authority making the Constitutional amendment the law in respect of which judicial review has been excluded is one yet to be passed by the legislatures. In view of the conclusive nature of the declaration it would be straining the language of article 31C to hold that a court can, despite the requisite declaration, go into the question that it docs not give effect to the policy of the State to\vards securing the principles. specified in

SUPll!ME OOURT RJ!PORTs

[1973] Supp. s.c.a.

clauses {b) or {c) of article 39. Therefore, the second part of article 31C goes beyond the permissible limit of what constitute amendment under arti(:le 368 and strikes at the basic structure of the Constitution, The second par,t of the article and its invalidity will not affect the validity of the remaining part. [pp. 745 to 756]

The Constitution (Twenty Ninth) Amendmmt Act does not •·uf]er from any infirmity and as such is valid. [p. 760] The oontcntion that articles 31B and 31A arc linked together and that only such enactments can be included in the Ninth Schedule as falf within the ambit of article 31A was repelled by this Court in fuieebhoy v. Assistant Co/. lector, Thana (1965] I S.C.R. 636. There is no cogent ground to take a different view. [p. 757]

Mathew, f. : The Constitution Twenty Fourth, Twenty Fifth and Twenty Ninth Amendments arc valid. [pp. 856, 857] The dec,Jion .in the Golaknath ca1e that Parliament haJ no power to amend fundamental rights in such a way as to take away or abridge them wru wrong. The pow"' to amend under article 368 as it stood before the Twenty Fourth Amendmnit was plenary in character and extended to all provisions •f the Constl:tution. The Twenty Fourth Amendment did not add anything to the content of ortl'cle 368 as it stood before the amendment. The amendment is d«laratory in character except as regards the compulsory nature of the astent of the President to a Bill for amendment. Under the article as amended all th1 provisiont of the Con1titution can be amended by way of addition, variall'on or repeal. The only limita#on it that the Constitution cannot be refealed or abrogated in the exercise of the power of Rmendment without substituting • mechanism by which the State is constituted and Mganised. That limitation flowt from the language of the article itself. rp. 857] Although the word amendment has a variety of meanings we have to ascribe to it in the article a meaning which is appropriate to the function te be played by it in an instrument apparently intended to endure for ages te rome and to meet the various crises to which the body politic will be subject. The nature of that instrument demands awareness of_ certain presuppositioo. The Constitution has no doubt its roots in the past but was designed prima~ily for the unknown future. No existing constitution has reached its final form and shape and become, as it were, a fixed thing incapable of further growth. In interpreting a Constitution the Court should avoid a narrow and pcndanbc approach. Everything turns upon the spirit in which a Judge approaches the question before hiin. The words he must construe arc, generally speaking, mere vessels in which he can pour nearly anything he will. Seeing therefore that it is a "Constitution that we arc expounding" and that the Constitution makcn had before them several Constitutions where the word "amendment" « "alteration" is used to denote plenary power to change the fundamentals of the Constitution, the word amendment cannot be given a narrow meaning; but being a familiar c:xprcssion it was used in its familiar ,.J.cgal sense. The power to amend under that article included the power to add any provision to theConstitution, to alter any provision, substitute any other provision in its plaoe and delete any other provision. But, when the article said that on tht bill far the amendment of the Constitution receiving the President's assent "the Coutitution shall stand amended" it seems to be fairly clear that a simple repe81 or abrogation of the Constitution without substituting anything in the place of the repealed Constitution would be beyond the soope of the amending power, for it, a Constitution were simply repealed it would not st.and amended. [pp. 766 to 769f

'

KESAVANANDA v. KERALA (Khanna,

J.)

;)9

Sankari Prasad v. The Union of India, [1952] S.C.R. 89, Saiian Singh •· The State of Rajasthan, [1965] I S.C.R. 93.l, Golaknath v. State of Punjab, (1967] 2 S.C.R. 762, Rhodt Island v. Polmer, 253 U.S. 360, State (At the Prosecution of Jeremiah Ryan and Others) v. Captain Michsel Lannon and Others, [1935] Irish Reports 170, Re the Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motar Spirit and Lubricants Taxation· Act, 1938, etc. [1939] F.C.R. 18, The Queen v. Buroh [1878] 3 A.C. 889, 904-905, Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorne7 Gen<ral for Canada (1912] A.C. 571 at 583, referred to. In a rigid Constitution there is a limitation upon the power of the legislature by something outside itself. There is a greater law than the law of dit: ordinary legislature and that i$ the law of the Constitution which is of superior obligation ~nknown to a flexible Cons.titution. If a special procedure is prescribed by the Constitution for amending it, different from the procedure for pas<ing the ordinary law, then the Constitution is rigid. [p. 770]

Arti~le 368 as it stood before the Twenty Fourth Amendment contained not only the procedure but also the substantive power of amendment. As the article laid down a procedure different from the· procedure for passing ordinary law our Constitution is a rigid one and the power to amend a Constituent power. The vital distinction between Constitutional law and ordinary law in a rigid Constitution lies in the criterion of the validity of the ordinary law. An ordinary law, when questioned, must be justified by reference to the higher law embodied in the Constitution; but in the case of a Constitution its validity is, generally speaking, inherent and lies within itself. Once it is realised that a Constitution differs from law in th.at a law is valid only if it is in conformity with the Constitution and that the body which makes the ordinary law ii not sovereign, but derives its power from the Constitution, an amendment to the Constitution has the same validity as the Constitution itself, although the question whether the amendment has been made in the manner and form and within the power· conferred by the Constitution is always -justiciable. Just as an ordinary law derives its validity from its conformity with the Constitution, so also, an amendment of the Constitution derives its validity from the Cons· titution. An amendment of the Constitution can be ultra vires just as an ordinary law can be. [pp. 769, 771, 772] The word law in Article 13(2), in the context could only mean an ordinary law. If the power to amend was to be found within article 368 and not under Article 248 read with entry 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule, it stands to reason to hold that the Constituent power for amendment of the Constitution .is distinct from Legislative power. The legislative power of Parliament under entry 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule is exclusive and the power to amend cannot be located in that entry because in respect of the matters covered by the proviso to. article 368 Parlia1nent has no exclusive power to amend the Cont~ titution. Apart, 'the power to amend a rigid Constitution not being an ordinary legislative power but a Constituent one, it would be strange that the Constitution n1akers put it su/J..silentio in the residuary legislative entry. Article 368 was clear that when the procedure prescribed by the article was followed, wluit resulted was an amendment of the Constitution. The ·article prescribed a proce· dure different from the legislative procedure prescribed in article 107 to 111 read with article 100. [pp. m-7751 There is a distinction bctwccn a general power to legislau: and a poto lcgislat<: by special legislative procedure and the result of the exercise ti the two powers are different. Mc Cawley v. The King and The Bribery Com· missioner v. Pedrick Rana Singhe do not •how that the power to amend tile

SUPREME COUJ!.T REP?llTS [ 1973]

Supp. s.c.ll.

<Anstitution is a legislative power. The substance of the decision in Ra~• SingAe's case is that though the Ceylon Parliament has plenary power ,. ordinary legislation, in the exercise of its Constituent power it was subject to the special procedure laid down in s. 29{4). The decision therefore makes a clear distinction between lcgisl_ativc and Constituent powers. Again, there is no analogy between power of amendment in Omada which is le&islativc in character and the power of amendment under article 368 which is a Constituent power. Under a Controlled C-onstitution like ours the power to amend cannot. be a legislative power; it can only be a Constituent power. [pp. 776-779) The argument that if fundamental righu were intended to be amended in such a way as to abridge or taken them away considering the paramount importance of the rights the procedure required by the proviso to article l68 would have been made mandatory overlooks the purpose of the proviso. The purpose of the proviso is that ~ rights, powers and privileges of the States or their status as states should not be taken away or impaired without their participation to some extent in the amending process. [p. 779)

Golaknath case [ 1967] 2 S.C.R. 762, held incorrect. Mc Cawley v. The King [1920) A. C. 691, The Bribery Commissioner •· Pedrick Ranasinghe [1964) 2 W.L.R. 1301; [1965) · A.C. 172, explained. Contemporaneous practical exposition is a valuable aid to the mcllDing of a provision of the Constitution or a statute. The Constitution (First Amendment} Act amended the Fundamental rights under Article 15 and 19 in such a way as to abridge thCJn, Even the strong opponents 0£ the amendments never made a whisper of a suggestion in their speeches that fundamental rights were not amendable. If the debates in the Constituent Assembly can be looked into to understand the legislative his::ory of a provision of the Constitution including its derivation, that is, the various steps leading upto and attending its enactment to ascertain the inten~on of the makers of the Constitution, it is difficult to see why the debates arc inadmissible to throw light on the purpose and gmcral intent of the provision. After all, legislative history only tends to reveal the legislative purpose in enacting the provision arid thereby sheds light upon legislative intent. That it was Dr. Ambedakar's view that all the articles could be amended is clear from his speeches in the Constituent Assembly. He refuted the suggestion that fundamental rights should be absolute and unalterable. The framers of the Constitution would have specifically provided for an cxccption in article 368 if they wanted that the fundamental rights should not be amended in such a way as to take away or abridge thctn. [pp. n9 to 785]

A. K. Gopalan v. The Stat< of Madras, [1950) S.C.R. 88, StaJ< of Tr•uan"'..Cochin and Oth'ers v. The Bombay Co. Ltd. etc., [1952) S.C.R. 1112, Golaknath Case, [1967) 2 S.CR. 762, 791 Madhav Rao v. Union of India, [1971) 3 S.C.R. 983, Union of India v. Harbhaian Singh Dhillon, [1971) 2 S.C.C. n9, n:ferrcd to. It was necessary to incorporate article 13{2) in the Constit""'"' to indicate the extent of the invasion of the fundamental right which w·-t•ld make the impugned law void. Every limitation upon a fundamental right would ~ot be an abridgement of it. Whether a specific law operates to abridge • s1>ecilically given fundamental right cannot be answered by any dogma whcthe~ of • priori assumption or of mechanical jurisprudence. The Court ~ust amvc at a value judgment as to what it is that is to be protected from abr1dgc_mcnt and then it must make a further value judgment as to whether the law impugned

XESAVANANl>A "· KUALA

(Mathew, J.)

rally amounts to an abridgancnt of that right. In this process the Court will have to look to the Direclive Principles in Part IV to sec what exactly is the conientof the fundamental right. The Court would generally be more astute to protect personal rights than· property rights. [PP: 785, 786]

.A.. _K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88 .

. .'TAtrt .,., no implied or inA~I limitations upon the power of •"""""""'

uildtr .Fticle 368. [p. 857]

. The basic premise of the argument that there are inl¥orcnt and implied limitations is that the ultimate legal sovereignty under the Constitution resides in ·the peaple. The Constitution was framed by an assembly elected indirectly on .. A limited ,franchise. and .the Assembly did not represent the vast majority ol the people of the Country. It does not follow that because the people of India dld. not frame the . Constitution or ratify it, the Constitution has no legal validity. If the legal source for the validity of the Constitution is not that it was framed by the people, the amending provision bas to be construed on its own ~nguagc without reference to any extraneous c.onsidcration as to whet.her tlie people did or did not delegate all their Constituent power to the amending body or that. the people reserved to themselves the fundamental rights. Even on the assumption that it was the people who framed the Constitution could it be said that after the· Constitution was fra.m<d the people still retain and can exercise their sovereign constituent power to amend or modify the basic slriicture or the essential features of the Constitution by virtue of their legal sovereignty I [pp. 78&.790] Seeing however that the people have no constitutionill or legal powa assigned to than under the Constitution and that by virtue of their political supremacy, they can unmake the Constitution only by a method not sanctioned by the ;uridical order, namely, revolution, it is difficult to agree that the kglll

soverdgnty under the Constitution resides in the people or that as the ultimate legal sovereign the people can constitutionally change the basic structure of the Constitution even when the Constitution provides for a specific mechanism for its amendment. If sovereignty is said to exist in any sense at all it must exist in the amending body. Under the Constitution the people have delegated the power to amend the instrument which they created to the amending body. It was in the exercise of the constituent power that the people framed the COnstitution arid invested the amending body with the power to amend the very instrument they created with a superadded power to amend that very 1'9Wer. The instrument they created, by necessary implication, limits the further curcise of the power by them, though, not the possession of it. There is a disti~ction between possession of a right or power and the exercise of it. The people having delegated the power of amendment that power cannot be esercised in any way other than that prescribed nor by any instrumentality otl\er than that desi~nated for that purpose by the Constitution. The Consti~nt .power is the power exercised in establishing a Constitution, that .is, the fundamental decision on tcvolutionary reasons tcr the org:anisation and limitation of a new. Government. From this Constituent oowcr must be distinguished die. amending ·~~r which_ changes an existing Constitution in form provided bf. the. Constitution itself. for the amending power is itself . a constituted aulhority. To. say that a nation can still exercise unlimited constituent power • having framed· a constitution vesting plenary power of amendment under ir'·in'.•, ...para.te l?od.Y· is only to say that the people have the political power t9 the ei<istiiig order by means of revolution. But this doctrine cannat

#9se

a

J Supp. s.c.l.

SUPREME COUltT REPORTS [ 1973

be advanced to t"lacc implied limitations upon the amending power provided in a written constitution. It is only in a revolutionary sense that one can distinguish between Constituent power and amending power. It is based on the assumption that the constituent power cannot be brought within the fram.e~;ork of the Constitution. The proposition that an unlimited amending authority cannot make any basic change and that the basic change can be made only by a revolution is something extra legal nt> Court can countenance. Under the Indian Constitution the original sovereign-the people-crea~d by the amending clause of the Constitution a lesser sovereign almost co-extensive in power with itself. It might be open to the amending body to amend article 368 itself and provide for referendum or any other method for ascertaining the will ot ·the people in the matter of amendment of fundamental rights or any other provision of the Constitution. If the basic and essential features of the Constitution can be changed only by the people and not by a Constitutional authority like the Amending body, was it open to the amending body, or would it be open to the amending body today to amend article 368 in such a way as to invest the people with that power to be exercised by ~ferendum or any otlier popular device ? [pp. 791 to 796]

Mc Cu/loch v. Maryland, [1819] 4 Wheat 316, State of Wen Bmgal "· Union of India, [1961] I S.C.R. 371, 396-398, Chii/iolm v. G<Drgia, [1793] 2 Dallas 419, 470'471, Huth v. Clarks [1890] 25 Q.B.D. 391, 395; Dodge"· Woolsey [1856] 18 How. 331, 348, and Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat (19 U.S.) 264, 381, referred. to.

The Preamble is part of the Constitution. That being so there ;. no valid reason why the preamble cannot be amended. The broad concepts of justicosocial, economic and political, equality and liberty thrown large upon the canvas of the preamble as eternal verities are mere moral adjudication with only that content which each generation must pour into them anew in the light of its own experience. An independent judiciary cannot seek to fill them from its own bosom. If it were to do so, in the end it will o:asc to be independent. For a country struggling to build up a social order for freeing its teeming millions from the yoke of poverty and destitution, the Preamble cannot, afford any due to the priority value of these concepts inter se. And, for makini the experiment for building up the social order which the dominant ~ of the community desires, these delphic concepts can offer no sol11noo in respect of their priority value as among themselves. They olfcr no guide in what proportion should each of them contribute, or which of them sha\dd suffer subordination or enjoy dominance in that social order. How then am one of them operate as implied limitation upon the power of amendsiicllt wbcA lhe object of th<: amendment' is to give priority value to the otbel' Of et.bal , [jip; 796 to

?!leJ

Betubari Case [1960] 3 S.c.R. 250, 281, 282; Aod'1'10fO v. Dful• 6 'Wi. 204; 206 U.S. 1821; referred to. The theory of implied limitation propounded might .;;,vi~.~ ~ <hat "it is an interpretation of the Constitution depending ,Oil an ·;n,plicldaii which is formed on. vague, .indiyidu";i ~n~ption of the lpirit of the: ~' Whenever the quesaon of unphed limitaaon upon the power of ....,;,,~~· was raised courts have not countenanced the contention.- There is. no ~ tO think that the word 'amendment' was used in any narrow 9CllSC in articlt1l. and that the power to amend un<IQ- that article was in an1 ·wa1 limi. , · .• there is power the fact tha. t it might obuse. . cl is 110 ground .fm. cuainJ .~ iti. width. Tb< <~111il>n that if.fh,e ·~. t() ,ainell'I fliil~tal • such a way as to take away or abridge them ;. to Vest in Parliament, be.

rt-w.iui.r

KESAVANANDA ~. JCER.\LA

(Mllthew, J.)

•ing about ,catastrophic conscqucnus has an air of unreality when tosted In lhe light of what has happened between 1951 when S•nlc.ari PrasaJ's case recog-

nised the power of the Parliament to amend the fundamental rights and 1967 ,.bcn the Gol./r..1lllth case was decided. It should be remembered that Parliament when it exercises its power to amend fwidamental rights is as much the pardian of the liberties of the people as the Courts. [pp. 799 to 814]

Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350, explained. Leser v. Garnetl, 258 U.S. 130, U. S. v. Sprague, 262 U.S. 716, Sch•eiderman U. S. 320 U.S. 118, 137-145, U. S. v. Dennis, 183 Federal Reporter 2d. 201, Ind Whiuhill v. Elkins, [1967] 189 U.S. 54, 57, referred to.

Y,

Ryan's case, [1935] Irish Reports, 170, Moore v. Ateorney General for the lri1h Stat<, [1935] A.C. 448, referred to. Liyanag< v. The Queen, [1967] 1 A.C. 259, explained. Web v, Outrim, [1907] A.C. 81 (P.C.) referred to, Alberta Prm Case, [1938] 2 D.L.R. 81, Saumur v. City Quebec, [1953] 4 D.L.R. 641, &. th< Initiative and Referendum Act, (1919) A.C. 935, 945, A. G. Ontario v. A. G. Canada, [1912] A. C. 571, Shannon v. Lower Mainland D.;ry Products Board, [1936] A.C. 708, Taylor v. Attorney General of Qu=i" lond, 23 C.L.R. 457, held inapplicable. Mangal Singh v. Union of India, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 109, l\Cld inapplicable. Victoria v. Commonwealth, 45 Australian Law Journal, 251 and Amalga••14d Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Suamship Co. Ltd. [1920] 28, C.L.R. 129, referred to.

Queen v. Burah, [1878] 3 A.C. 889, held inapplicable. Mc Culloch v. Marylanil [1819] 4 Wheaten 316, Essendon Corporation v. Cril<rion Theatres, [1947} 74 C.L.R. 19-22 and State of West Bengal v. Union II/ India, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1241, referred to. Vacher •nd Sons v. London Society. of Compositors, [1913] A.C. 107, at p. 121 & 128, Bank of Tot"onto v. Lambe, [1887] 12 A.C. 575', 586, Ez-parte Crostman, 267 U.S. 120, 12, referred to. To appreciate the argument that there is inherent limitation on the power

oi Parliament to amend fundamental rights it ;. ncceosary to undcrstatld the source from which these rights arise and the reason for their fundamentalness. Natural rights are those rights which arc appropriate to man as a rational and moral being and which are necessary for a guod life. Although called 'rights' they arc per se enforceable in Courts unless recognised by the positive law of a State. The word 'right' has to be reserved for those claims rccog· ailed and protected by law. There arc rights which inhere in human beings .Lcausc they arc human beings; whether you call them natural rights or by lllJle other appellation is imruaterial. As the Preamble indicates, it was to ..auc the basic human rights !\kc liberty and equality that the people gave thetnse!Yes the Constitution and these basic rights are an essential feature tho Constitution; the Constitution was also enacted by the people to sc.curc jlistile;, ,,political, .ocial . and economic. Therefore, the moral rights embcidied , in Part IV of the Constitution arc equally an essential feature of it, the only

w

SUPiEMJ! COUJ.T llEPOllTS

[1973) Supp. S.CJl,

differeace being ·that the moral rights embodied in Part IV arc not spocilically enforceable as against the State by a citiun in a Court of law in case tho State fails lo implement its duty ; but nevertheless, they are fundamental in tho governance of the country and all the organs of the State, including the judiciary, are bound to enforce tloose directives. The Fundamental Rights themselves haft .no fixed content ; most of them are mere empty vessels into which each ·generation must pour its content in the light of its ~pcricncc. Rcstrictiom, abridgement, curtailment, and even abrogati9n of these rights in circumstanca, not visualized by the Constitution makers might !xcomc ncc.cssary; their claim to supremacy or priority is liable to be overborne at particular stages in the history of the nation by the moral claims embodied in Part IV. Whether at a particular moment in the history of the nation, a particular Fundamental Right should have priority over the moral claim embodied in Part IV or mWt yield to them is a matter which must be left to bC decided by each gencratioa in the light of its experience and its values. And, if Parliament, in its capacilJ as the Amending Body, decides to amend the Constitution in such a way. • to take away or abridge a Fundamental Right· to give priority value to d!e moral claims embodied in Part IV of the Constitution, the Court cannot adjudge the constitutional amendment as bad for the reason that what was intended to be subsidiary by the Constitution makers has been made dominaat. Judicial review of a constitutional amendment for the reason that it gives priority value to. the moral claims embodied in Part IV over the Fundamental Rights embodied in Part III iJ impermissible. Many of the articleJ, whether .ia Part III or Part IV, · represent moral rights which they have recognis<d • .inherent in every human being in this country. Taking for granted that, ..,. and large Fundamental Rights arc the extensions, permutations and· combinations of natural rights in the sense explained, ft docs not follow that then: ii any inherent limitation by virtue of their origin or character 'in their bcins taken away or abridged for the common good. The source from which tbao rights derive their moral sanctiOn and transcendental character, namely, IS natural law, itself recognlzes that natural rights are only prim11 fad• rip. liable to be taken away or limited in special circumstances for scCuring higher values in a society or. for it.s common good. But. the responsibility ol. Parliament in taking away or abridging a Fundamental Right is an aweoomo one and whenever a question . of constitutional amendment which will ha.,. the above effect comes up for consideration, Parliament ~wt be aware this they are the guardians of the rights and liberties of the people in a 2IU*"' degree than the courts, as the Courts cannot go into the validity o1 diio amendment on any substantive ground. [pp. 814 to 836]

State of W•st B.ntal v. Subodh GopaJ (1954) S.C.R. 58i, 596, Bas•hisNir Nath v. Commission.,. of Jm:om• Tar, Delhi, "'" [1959] Supp. 1 S,C.R. 521, 605, State of Miuiras v. Cham{Nlkam [1951) S.C,R. 525, Rom.,A Tn.fM! J: State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 594, State of Bihor v. Shailahala D"1i [l952J ·s.c.R. 654, LJch,,.,. v. New York 198 U.S. 45, State of Madras v. V. G. R..,. [1952] S.C.R. 597, foint Anti-Fascist &fugee Committe• v. Me GraiJ. 341 t/'.S. 123, Munici[Nll Committee v. The State of Punjab [1969) 3 S.C.R,:4471 4~, Collator of CYstoms v. Sampathu [ 1962] 3 S.C.R. 786, 816, Abbqs v. Uni<>*~ India [1971) 2 S.C.R. 446, 470, Quamhi v. S141te of Bih11r. [1959J S.C.R. , Namth v. State of M11Aarasl11ra [1966) 3 S.C.R. 744, C.,.,... v. T'!"'l 177 J.1 442., 447, referred tD.

a

Thus, there were no apress or implied limitations upon the .poooer Parliament to amend the Fundamental Rights in such a ""'Y u tD ~ er damage eYen the core or essence of the ripu. Tbe 24th A""""-t.. " .

KESAVANANDA

v. Kl!RALA (Mathew, J.)

its language, makes it clear beyond doubt. Ju the majority decision in the Golaknath case negatived the constituent power of the Parliament to amend the Fundamental Rights in such a way as to take away or abridge them which,. according to the Amending Body, was wrong, the Amending Body passed the amendment to make it clear that the power to amend is located in the article,

that it is a constituent power and. not a legislative power as held by the majority decision in the Golaknath case, that the power is plenary in character and that article 13(2) is not a bar to the amendment of the Fundamental Rights in such a way as to take away or abridge them under article 368. That the object of the amendment was declaratory in character is clear from the statement of Objects and Reasons for the Amendment. - An Amending Body can in the exercise of its power to amend, if the power to amend is plenary, make an

amendment in order to make clear what was implicit in the article and correct

a judicial erri>r in the interpretatioa of the article. [pp. 836, 837]

Even if it be assumed that the actual power for amendment under the arti<:le was limited, the article gave the Amending Body a potential power, to cnlarp

or contract the limit of the actual power. The potential power, when exe1cise.d by the Amending Body, makes the actual power either enlarged or contracted, (p. 837]

The word 'amount' in article 31(2) as amended by Constitution Twenty Fifth Amendment does not convey the idea of tlflJ norm. The fixation of the amounf or the principle for determining the amoum is 11 matter within the absolute discretion of the Parfument or the State l<gi1latwes. The Court cannot go into the question whether the omount fized by law or the prfn ... ciple; laid down for determining the amount is adequak M relevant. [p. 846]'.

It is a mistake to speak of property as jf it were an institution having a. fixed content constantly remaining the same; whereas, in reality it has assumed most diverse forms and is still susceptible to great unforeseen modifications. It is necessary to distinguish at least three forms at private property ; (I) property in durable and non durable consumer goods; (ii) property in the mean• of production worked by their owners; and (iii) property With means of produc=. tion not worked or directly managed liy the ow~rs, especially th<! accumulations. of masses of property of this kind in the band& of a relatively narrow class.. While the first two forms of property can be justified as nccesaary conditios. of a free and purposeful life, the third For this type of property Hive•. power not only over thing>, but through t:Nngs ovu pc:nons. It is open io.. the charge made that any form of propetty whieh givts man power over nw> is not an instrument of freedom, but, of "'rvitude. AJ>y defence of the right to own and hold property must essentially be the defence of a wclJ distributed. property and not an abstract right that can, in practice, be cxerciS<d only by· the few. [pp. 840, 841] ·

=-·

When· property is acquired for implementing the directive principles under article 39(b) or 39{c), is there an ethical obligation upon the State to pay tlte full market value? AJl adequate theory of social justice should enable one ta. draw the line between justifiable and unjustifiable cases of confiscation. The whole purpose of the amendment is to exclude judicial review of the question·· whether the 'amount' fixed or the principle laid down by law is adequate or relevant. Fixation of the amount or the laying clown of the principles for

fixing it is left to the absolute discretion of the Parliament or the St.au: Legislatures ?n .the ~asis of con;;ide:ati~~s of social justice. And, the principle of social JUsllce will not furmsh 1ud1aally manag<able st1ndards either for testing the· adequacy of the amount on the n:levmcy of the principle. [pp. 842 to 846] S-36 S.C. India/71

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1973] Supp. s.c.R.

[His lordship did not find it necessary to go into the question whether a law fixing an amount which is illusory or which is a fraud on the Constitution can be struck down by Court. [p. 847] The declaration vizualized by article 31C that the law gives effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution would not oust the jurisdiction of the Court to go J·nto the question whether- the law gives effect to the policy. The jurisdiction of Parliament or the- State legislatures to incorporate the declaration in a law is conditioned upon the circumstance that the law is one few giving ~ffect to the State policy towards securing the aforesaid pn·nciples. [pp. 854, 855]

If the 24th amendment which enables Parliament to make an amendment of the fundamental rights in such a way as to take away or abridge them is valid, what is there to prevent Parliament from enacting a Constitutional amendment making it possible for Parliament or state ,legJ;latures to pass laws for implementing the Directive Principles specified in article 39(b) and 39(c) which would be immune from attack on the ground that those laws violate articles 14, 19 and 31 I Article 31C is a proviso to article 13(2) in that it enables Parliament or State Legislatures to pass laws of a particular type which would not be deemed to be void even if they violate the provisions of articles l4, 19 and 31. Artic:le 31C merely carves out a legislative field with reference to a particular type of law and exempts that law from the ambit of article 13(2) in some respects. Merely because a law passed by the Parliament or the State Legislatures to give effect to the policy of the State towards securing the Directive Principles specified in article 39(b) and {c) in pursuance to valid legislative entries in the appropriate lists, might violate the fundamental rights under article 14, 19 and 31 and such a law is deemed not void by virtue of article 31C, it would not follow that article 31C has invested Parliament in its legislative capacity or the State Legislatures with power to amend the Constitution. It is not for the Court to prescribe for the society or deny the right of experimentation to it within very wide limits. [pp. 854, 855] A law which will never give effect to the State policy towards securing the principles in article 39(b) and article 39(c) will enjoy no immunity if any of its provisions violates these articles. The legislative jurisdiction to incorporate a declaration that the law gives effect to the policy of the State is conditioned upon the circumstance that the law gives effect to the policy of the State towards securing the directive principles specified in article 39(b) and (c). The declaration can never oust the jurisdiction of the court to see whether the law is <inc for giving effect to such a policy, as the jurisdiction of the legislature to incorporate the declaration is founded on the law being one to give effect to the policy of the State towards securing these principles. In order k> decide whether a law gives. effect to the policy of the State towards Securing the Directive Principles specified in articles 39(b) or (c) a Comt will hawe to examine the pith and substance, the true nature and character of- the law as also its design and the subject matter dealt with by it together \vith its object and scope. [pp. 855, 856] Beg. /: Concurring with Ray. Palekar, Mathew and Dwivedi, II: The Constitution Twenty Fourth, Twenty Fifth and Twenty Ninth Amendments are valid. [pp. 885, 886]

We should approach the questions placed before us from the pragmatic angle of the changing nC.ds of social and economic orders visualised by those who were or are the final judges of those needs in exercise of the constituent power. [p. 882]

XESAVANANDA V. KERALA

(Beg, J.)

It is clear from lhe Preamble as well as the provisions of Part III and IV uf our constitution that it seeks to express the principle SaluJ Pofuli Supre'ma Lex. In other words, the good ·of the mass of citizens of our country is lilic supreme law embodied in our constitution. The voice of the people ~king through the Constituent Assembly, ·constituted a new "Republic" which w'as both "Sovereign and Democratic... It sought to secure the noble objectives laid down in the Preamble primarily through both the fundamental rights foun~ in Part lII and the Directive Principles of State Policy found in Part IV of th¢ Constitution. It would not be correct to ch',aracterisc the fundamental rights 3$: merely the means and the directive principles as the ends of the endeavours of the people. lndecd, from the point of vieVf of the Preamble both fundamental rights and directive principles are means of attaining the objectives which were meant to be served both by the fundamental rights and Directive principles. Perhaps, the best way of describing the relationship between the two would be to look upon the Directive Principles as laying down the path of the country's progress towards the obiectives stated in the Preamble, with fundamental rights as limit of that path, like the banks of a flowing river, which could be amended or mended by displacements, replacements or curtailments or enlargements of any part according to the needs of those who are to use that path. A careful reading of the debates in the Constituent Assembly leads to this premise or assmuption. If the path needed widening or narrowing or changing the limits could be changed. The nlandate of article 37 is primarily addressed to the Parliament and State legislatures. But in so far as courts of justice can indulge in some judicial law making, within the interstices of the Constitution or any statute before them for construction, the Courts too are bound by th.is mandate. Another valid and significant distinction is that whereas the fundamental rights are 11conferred" upon citizens with corresponding obligations of the State, the Directive Principles lay down specific duties of the State organs. In conferring fundamental rights freedom of individual citizens, reviewed as individuals, were sought to be protected, but in giving specific directives 'to state organs, the needs of social welfare, to ·which individual freedoms may have to yield, were put in the forefront. A reconciliation between the two is to be always attempted whenever this is reasonably possible. But there could be no doubt, in cases of possible conflict, which of the two had to be subordinated, when found embodied in laws properly made. [pp. 861 to 865] Motilal v. Government of the Stale of Ullar Pradesh, A.LR. 1951 S.C. 257, 296; Balwanl Rai v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1968 All. 14, referred to.

There is a well known distinction between "political sovereignty" and "legal sovereignty". Legally the British Parliament transferred the whole of its legal sovereignty over the people and territories of this Country to the Constituent Assembly. Thus legal sovereignty was vested in the Constituent Assembly whereas the people of India may be said to be only politically "sovereign". The political sovereign operated outside the ambit of law, yet, made its impact and effect felt upon the legal sovereign, the Constituent Assembly. In recognition of this fact and to bring out that it was really speaking on behalf of the people of India the Constituent Assembly began the Preamble with the words

we the people of India". This meant nothing more than that the Constituent

Assembly spoke for the people of India even though it was vested with the legal authority to shape the destiny of the Country. through the Constitution framed by it. Th

Related judgments

More Supreme Court judgments

Search all Supreme Court and High Court judgments

Reproduced from the official court copy published on eCourts (Indian Court Judgments open dataset, CC-BY-4.0). Not legal advice.