I. C. Golak Nath & Ors. v. Sta Te of Punjab & Anr.s.

Landmark judgment · Constitution & fundamental rights — Held Parliament could not amend fundamental rights; later overruled by Kesavananda Bharati.

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
27 February 1967
Judge
Justice K. Subba Rao
Neutral citation
1967 INSC 45
Reported in
[1967] 2 S.C.R. 762
Result
Dismissed
Acts & sections
Article 32 Constitution, Article 3 Constitution

Download the official PDF

Full judgment

I. C. GOLAK NATH & ORS.

v. STA TE OF PUNJAB & ANRS.

(With Connected Petitions)

February 27, 1967

[K. SVBBA RAo, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J. C. SHAH, S. M. SIKRI, R. S. BACHAWAT, V. RAMASWAMJ,

J. M. SHELAT, V. BHARGAVA, G. K. MITTER AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JI.] Co11stitution of India, Arts. 13(2), 368, 245, 248, Schedule ?,-Li11 I, Entry 91-Power to amend Constitution lfhere residu-Wluther resides

in Art. 368 or in residuary power of Parlio1nent under Art. 248 read with Entry 97 List /-Fu11damenta/ Rights in Part Ill whether can be ammded and abridged by tile procedure in Art. 368-'Law' under Art. 13(2)

whether includes constitutional amendt~nJs-Scheme of ConstitutionFunda1nerrtal rights nd1ether intended to be permanent and unamendabl~Amendmen1 whether exercise of sovereign power-Amendment whether a political mptter outside the purvlew oi courts.

Constitution Seventeenth A1nend111ent Act, 1964-Whether invalid for contravention of Art. 13(2). Prospective overruling, doctrine of-Vasi agrarian changer under coru1ilutional amendmenls-Necersity of preserving pJSt while protecting lu1ur~tare decisis.

Punjab Security of Land Te11ures Act, 1953 (Act 10 of 1953)Mysore Land Reforms Act (Acr 10 of 1962) as amtnded by Act 14 of 1965-Acts contravening fundamental rights-Whether valid. The validity of the Punjab Security of Land Tenure. Act, 1953 (Act 10 of I 953) and of the Mysore Land Reforms Act (Act 10 of 1962) as amended by Act 14 of 1965 was challenged by the petitioners under Art. 32 of the Constitution. Since these Acts were included in the 9th Schedule lo the Constitution by the Constitution (Seventeenth) Ameodment Act, 1964, the validity of the said Amendment Act was also challen~cd. Jn this connection it was urged that Sankari Prasad's case in which the validity of the Constitution (First) Amendment Act, 1951 had been upheld and Sajjan Singh's case in which the validity of the Constitution (Seventeenth) Amendment Act, 1964, had been upheld by this Court, had been wrongly decided. It was contended that Parliament had no power to ame.id fundamental rights in Part Ill of the Constitution. HELD : Per Subha Rao, C.1., Shah, Sikri, Shelat and Vaidialingam. JJ. (Hidayatullah, 1. Concurrin11) : Fundamental Rights cannot be abrid~­ ed or taken away by the amending procedure in Art. 368 of tr.e Consbtution.

An amendment to the Constitution is 'law' within the meaning

of Art. 13(2) and is therefore subject to Part Jll of the Constitution. Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Unfon of Indi.l & Anr. [19521 S.C.R. 89 and Sajjarr Sin11h v. State of Rajasthan, [1965) 1 S.C.R. 933, reversed. Per Subba, Rao, C.J., Shah, Sikri, Shelat and Vaidialingam, 11. (i) Fundamental rights are the primordial rights necessary for the development of human pe™>nality. They are the rights which e.!llblc a

GOLAKNATH V. PUNJAB

/I.

man to chalk out his own life in the manner he likes best. Our Constitution, in addition to the well-known fundamental rights, also included the rights of minorities and other backward communities in such rights. [789 El The fundamental rights are given a transcendental position under our

Coostitution and are kept beyond the reach of Parliament. At the same time Parts III and IV of the Constitution constituted an integrated scheme forming a self contained code. The scheme is made so elastic that alt the Directive Principles of State Policy can rea,onably be enforced without taking awar. or abridging the fundamental rights. While recognising the immutab11ity of the fundamental rights, subject to social control, the Constitution itself provides for the suspension or the modification of fundamental rights under specific circumstances, as in Arts. 33,

34 and 35. The non--0b~tante clause with which the IO't article opens makes it clear that all the other provisions of the Constitution are subject to this provision. Article 32 makes the right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by the said Pans a fundamental right. Even during grave emergencies Art. 358 only suspends Art. 19 and all other rights are untouched except those sperifically suspended by the President under Art. 3S9. [789 H; 790 D] The Constitution has given a place of permanence to the fundamental freedoms. In giving to themselvea tho Constitution the people have r..erved the fundamental freedoms to themselves. Art. 13 merely incorporates that reservation. The Article is however not the source of the protection of fundamtntal rights but tho expression of the reservation. The importance attached to the fundamental freedoms is so transcmdental that a bill enacted by a unanimous vote of •It the members of both Houses is ineffective to derogate from its guaranteed exercise. It is not what Parliament regards at a given moment as eonducive to the public bt.nefit but what Part Ill decl;rres protected, which determines the ambit of the freedom. The incapacity of Parliament therefore in exercise of its amending power to modify, restrict, or impa'!ie fundamental freedoms in P:rrt III arises from the scheme of the Constitution and the nature of the freedoms. [792 D-F] A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88, State of Madras v.Smt. Champakam Dorairajan, [1951] S.C.R. 525, Pandit M. S. M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha, [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. 806 and Ujjam Bai v. Stat• of Uttar Pradesh, [1963] 1 S.C.R. 778, referred to.

If it is the duty of Parliament to enforce directive

there is an express provision.

principles it ia

equally its duty to enforce them without infringing the fundamental rildlts. The verdict of Parliament on the scope of the law of social control of fundamental rights is not final but justiciable. If it were not so, the whole scheme of the Constitution would break. (815 H; 816 A-Bl (ii) Article 368 in terms only prescribes various steps in the matter of amendment. The article assumes the power to amend found elsewhere. The completion of the procedural steps cannot be said to culminate in the power to amend for if that was so the Constitution makers could have stated that in the Constitution. Nor can the power be implied either from Art. 368 or from the nature of the articles sought to be amended; the doctrine of necessary implication cannot be invoked if There is no necessity to imply any such

power as Parliament has the plenary power to make any law including the law to amend the Constitution subject to the limitations laid down therein.

[793 E-0]

(iii) The power of Parliament to amend the Constitution is derived

from Arts. 245, 246 and 248 read with item 97 in List I. The residuary

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1967] 2 S.C.R·

power of Parliament can certainly take in the power to amend the Coll&· titution. [794 A-DI Though a Jaw made under Art 24S is s>1bject to the yrovisions of the Constitution it would be wrong to "'Y that every law o amendment made under it would necessarily be inconsistent with the articles sought to be amended. Ii cannot reasonably be said that a lhw llll1ending 111 article is inconsistent with it. The limitation in Art. 24S is in respect of the power to make a Jaw and not of the content of the law made within the scope of its power. (794 E-F] An order by the President under Art. 392 cannot attract Art. 368 II the amendment contemplated by the latter provisions can be initiated only by the introduction of a bill in Parliament It cannot therefore be said that if the power of amendment is held to be a legisMive power the l'f&. •ident acting under Art. 392 can amend the Constitution in terms of Art. 368. (794 G-HJ (iv) 1be Constituent Assembly. if so minded. could certainly bav.

conferred an expre~-s le8islative power on Parliament to amend the Consti-

tution by ordinary legislative proces.. There is, therefore. no inherent inconsistency berwcen legislative process and the amending one. Whether in the field of a constitutional law or statutory law amendment can be brought about only by 'law". [794 C-D) Article 13(2), for the purpose of that Article, gives an inclu<ive definition of 'law'. It does not prima /acie exclude constitutional law. The process under Art. 368 :tself closely resemble; the legislative proce5'. Article 368 is not a complett code in respect of the proeedu •., o! amendment.

The d<.1:ails of procedure in respect of other bills have to

be followed so far as possible in respeco of a Bill under Art 368 also. The rules made by the House of the People providing procedure for amendments lay down a procedure similar to that Of other bills with the addition of certain special provisions. If amendment is intended Ill be something other than law the constitutional insistence on the said legjslative process is uMecessary. The imposition of further conditiono is only a safeguard against hasty action or a protection to the Stab but does not change the legislative charac141' of the amendment (7950796 CJ Article 3 of the Constitution permit• changes in States and their boundaries bv a legislative process. Under Arts. 4 and 169 amendments lo the Constitution are made by 'law' but by a fiction arc deemed not to be amendments for the purpose of Art. J68. This shows that amendment ii law and that but for the fiction it would be an amendment within the meaning of Art. 368. [796 C-F] Therefore amendments either under Art. 368 or under olher Articlm are onlv made by Parliament by following the legislative process and are 'law' for the purpose of Art. 13(2). [798 CJ Mccawley v. The King, (1920) A.C., 691 and TM Brib"Y Commissio111!r v. Pedrick Ran.·inghe, [1964) 2 W.L.R. 1301, referred to.

f

(v) One need not cavil at the description of amending power as a wvereign power for it is sovereign only within the scope of the power conferred by a panicular Constitutl.>n which may expressly limit the pcwer of amendment both substantive and procedural. It cannot therefore he said that :tmending power can have no limitations. being a sovercigr

power. [804 B.C]

lbe argument that the amending process involves political auestion ... and is· therefore outside. the scope of jud:cial revic.v cannot alc:o he acceptecl. It may he Parliament seeks to amend the Constitution for oolilical reasons hut rht court in denying that power will not be deciding

GOLAKNATH V. PUNJAB

a political que.!tion; it will only be holding that Parliament has no power to amend particular articles of the Constitution for any purpose whatsoever, be it political or otherwise. [804 E-GJ (vi) If power to abridge the fundamental rights is denied to Parliament revolution is not a necessary result. The existence of an all comprehensive power canno~ prevent revolution if there is chaos. in t~e country brought abolit by misrule O!' abuse of power. Such cons1derat1ons are out of place in construing the provisions of the Constituti0n by a Court of law. [816 B-CJ (vii) While ordinarily this Court will be reluctant to reverse its previous decisions it is its duty in the constitution.al field to correct itself as early as possible, for othe.rwise the future progress of the country and happiness of the people will be at stake. As it was clear that the decision in Sankari Prasad's case was wrong, it was pre-eminently a typical case where this Court should overrule it. The longer it held the field the greater the scope for erosion of fundamental rights. As it contained the Seeds of destruction of the cherished rights of the poople, the sooner it was overruled the better for the country. [816. G-H] The Sup.,lnfendent and Legal Remembrancer State of West Bengal v. The Corporation of Calcutta, [1967] 2 S.C.R., 170 relied on. (viii) The Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act; 1964, inasmuch as it takes away or abridges fundamental rights was beyond the amending power of Parliament and void because of contravention of Art. 13(2). But having regard to the history of this and earlier amendment to the Constitution, their e,ffect on the social and economic affairs of the country and the chaotic situation that may be brought about by the sudden withdrawal at this stage of the amendments from the Constitution it was undesfrable to give retroactivity of this decision. The present was therefore a fit case for the application of the doctrine of "prospective overruling", evolved by the courts in the United States of America. [805 E; 807 E, G; 808 C-D] Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil & R.ef. Co. ( 1932) 287 U.S. 358 : 77 L. Ed. 360, Chicot County Drainage v. Baxter State Bank, (1940) 308 U.S. 371, Griffin \'. lllionis, (1956) 351 U.S. 12, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 : 193 L. Ed. 872, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 : 6 .L. Ed. {2nd Edn.) 1081 and Linkletter v. Walker, (1965) 381 U.S. 618, referred to. (ix) The doctrine of "prospective overruling" is a modem doctrine suitable for a fa.st moving society. It does not do av.ay with the doctrine ~f st~re decisis, but confines it to past transactions. While in strict theory 1t may be said that the doctrine involves the making of law, what the court reaHy does is to declare the law but refuse to give retroactivity to it. It is reaHy a pragmatic solution reconc "ling the two conflicting doctrines, namely, thc.t a court finds the Jaw and that it does make law. It finds law but ·restricts its operation to the future. It enables the court to bring about a smooth transition by correcting its errors without dis· turbing the impact of those errors on past transactions. By the applica~ lion of this doctrine the past may be preserved and the. future protected. [813 A-C; 814 E-F] 9ur Constituti?n does not exr;ressly or ~y necessarv in1nlica'ion speak against the doctnne of prospective overruling. Articles 32, 141 and 142 are. design.edly made comprehenc;ivc to enable the Suprenie Court to declare Jaw and to give such directions or pass such orders as are necessary to do complete justice. ·Tue expreS"Sion 'declared' in Art. 141 is wider than the words 'found or made'. The law declared by the Supreme Court is the law of the land. If so, there is no acceptable reason 'vhy

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1967) 2 S.CR.

the Coun, in declaring the law in supersession . of tbe law declared by it earlier, rould not restrict the operation of the Jaw as declared to the

A.

future and save the transactions whether st~tutory or otherwise that wera

affected on the basis of the earlier la"I. [813 F-HJ As this Coun for tho fir>t time has been called upo1. to a~ply the doctrine evolved in a different country under different circuru~tanccs, it would like to move warily in the beginning and would Jay <io"ln the following propositions : ( 1) The doctrine of prospective overruling can be invoted

only in matters arising under our Constitution; (2) it can be :ipplied only

..

by the highest coun of the country, i.e. the Suprecno Court as it h.tS the coostitutional jurisdiction to declare law binding on all the Courts in India; (3) the scope of the retrospective operation of tho law declared by the Supreme Coun superseding its earlier decisions is left to its di•· cretioo to be moulded in accordance with the justice of the cau~e or malttr

before it. (814 C-DJ

[Applying the doctrine of prospective overruling in the circwmstances of the present ca•e the Coun declared that this decision would not affect the validity of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act 1964, or oth..- amendments to the Constitution taking away or abridging the fundamental riglits. It further declared that in future Parliament will have no power to amend Part 111 of the Constitution so as to tako aY..·ay

or abridge the fundamental rights.) (814 F-0]

(ll) As according tc thr above dccis'on. the Consti'.ution (Scv.nleenth

Amendm.in1) Act held the fiel1 the validity of the two impugned Acts, namely the Punjab Security of Land Tenurct; Act, 10 of I ~53 and tho Mysore Land Reforms Act, 10 of 1962, a.s amended by Act 14 of 1965, could not be questioned on the ground that they offended Arts. 13, 14 or 31 of the Constitution. [815 E]

(xi) On the findings the followin~ que•tion• did not fall to be considered :

(a) Whether in the exercise of the power of amendment tho fun. darnental structure of the Constitution may ho changed or even destroyed or whether the power is restricted to making modifications within the framework of the original instrument

for its bener effectuation 7 (b) Whether,the amendment of fundamental rights is covered by the proviso to Art. 368? , (c) To what extent can 1he provisions of the Constitution other than fundamental rights be amended '! (d) To what extent can Pan 111 be amended otherwise than by · taking a.way or abridging the fundamental rights ? le) Whether t1-e impugned Acts could be sustained under the pr<>visions of the Constitution without the aid of Arts. 31A and 31 B of the Schedule.

Obiter : If neoessity to abridge the fundamental rights does arise the

residuary power of Parliament may be relied upon to call for a constituent assembly for making a new O>nstitution or radically changing it. The recent Ac: providin.& for a poll in Goa, Daman and Diu was an inst11ncc of analogous exercise of such residuary power by tho Parliament. [816 E-FJ Per Hidayatulla, J. : (i) The 5COpe of the amending power under the C'..onstltution is nor to be determined by tak..ing an apr•ori view of the

GOLAKNATH V. PUNJAB

•

omnicompetence of Art. 368. When there is conflict· be.t\veen that J\rticle and Art. 13(2) juridical hermeneutics requires the Court to interpret them by combining them and not hy destroying one with the aid of the other. No part in a Constitution is superior to another part unless tfie Constitution itself says so and there is no accession of strength to any provision by calling it a code. It is the context of the legal provisions that illustrates the meaning of the different parts so that among them and between them there should be correspondence and harmony. [857H-858C] (ii) It is wn:.ng to think of the Fundamental Rights as within Padiament's .giving or taking. They are secured to the people b: 1 Arts. 12, 13, 32. 136, 141. 144 and 226. The High Courts ar.d finally this Court have been made the Judge" of whether any legislative or executive action on the part of the State, considered as comprehensively as is possible, offends the Fundamental Rights and Art. 13(2) declares that legislation which s·0 offends 's to be deemed t0 he void. The general words of Art. 368 cannot be taken to mean that by calling an Act an Amendn1cnt of the Olnstitution Act a majority of the. total strengh and a 2,· 3rds rnaj:;.;rity of the members present and voting in each HoU'Se may remove not only any of the Fundamental Rights but the "'hole Chapter giving them. [860 A-D; 867 E-F] (iii) In Bri!ain there is no distinction bet·ween constitutional la\\' and ordinary law as to the procedure of their enactment. In our Constitution too in •pite of the claim that Art. 368 is a Code Arts. 4, 11 and 169 show that the amendment of the Constitution can be by the ordinary law making procedure. By this method one of the legislative limbs in a State can be removed or created. This destroys at one itroke· the claim that Art. 368 is a code and also that any special method of amendmmt of the Constitution is fundamentally necessary. [861 E-G] The only difference between constitutional law and ordinary Jaw c~n be said to arise- from the fact that constitutional Jaws are generally aroPnoi-able under a process which in vatying degrees. is more difficult or elahorate. This may give a distinct character to the Ja\>v of the Constitution but it does not serve to distinguish it from the other laws of the land for the purpose of Art. 13(2). The Article itself does not exclude co~stit11tional law which could have 'been easily done had the constitution m~L:-"'rs. so intended. [862 B; 866 Bl

An amendment to the Constitution 1s not made unJer po,ver derived from Arts. 245 or 248 of the. Constitution read with entry q7 of List I. Tlie power of amendment i.s sui generis. [900 EJ (iv) A na·rrM•: viev' neci:J "'Jt

be

taken of the

word 'amendmc;t',

By an ame,ndment new matt!'! .. may be added, old matter remnvcd or

altered. The power of amending the Constitution is however not intended to he used for experiments or as an escape.. from restrictions against undue State action enacted in the Constitution itself. Nor is the power of amendment available for the puroo:-:e of removing express or implied restrictions against the State. [862 F; 863 B..C]

Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 443 (83 L. Ed. 1385), Luth<r v. Borden. 7 How. 1(12 L. Ed. 58) and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (7 L. Ed; 2d. 633), referred to.

The State is no doubt supreme but in the supremacy of its powers it may create impediments on its own sovereignty, There is no1'hing to prevent the Sfate from placing certain matters outside ~he amendin.g proce\Vhen this happens the ordinary procedure. of amendment ceases dure,. to apply. Amendment can then only be by a freshly constituted body.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1967] 2 S.C.R

To attempt to do this otherwise is to attempt revolution which is to alter the will of the people in an iJJegal manner. Courts can interfere to nullify the revolutionary change because there is an infraction of existing JcgaJity. Democracy may be lost if there is- no liberty based on la" and law based on equality. ·rhe protection of the funda1nental rights is necessary so that we may not walk in fCM of democracy itself. [863 G; 864 A-C; 865 A-DJ (v) In Art. 13(2) the restrict'on is against the State. There is a Jiffercnce between the State and its agencies such as GovernmenJ, Parlia.. mcnt, 1he Legislature of t!1e States, and the local and other authorities. The State me.ans more than any of these or all of them put together. By making the State subject to Fundamental Right< it is clearly stated in A:t. 13(2) that any of the agencies acting alone or all the agencies acting together are not above the Fundamental Rights. Therefore when the House of the People ->r the Council of Stales introduces a Bill for the abridgement of the Fundamcn1al Rights, it ignores the injunction against it and even if the h\'O Hou~es par,s the Bill the injunction is next operotive against the President since the expression Government _of India in the General Clauses Act means the President of India. Thus the injunc1ion iri Art. 13(2) is against the whole force of the State acting either in its executive or legislative capacity. [866 E-HJ , vi) 1: i~ wrong to invoke. the Directive Principles as if there is ~ome i'1ntinomy belween them and the Fundamental R;ghls. The Directive Principles Jay down the routes of Stale aclion but 5uch action must avoid the res·rictions staled in the Fundamental Rights. It cannot be conceived that i'l. follov.·ing the Directive Principles the Fundamental Rights can be ignored. [867 G, 868 BJ (vii) Our Cons!i!ulion has given a g1Jaranteed right to the person.I who<ie fundamental rights are affcc'ed to move the Court. The guaran~ tee is worthless if the rights arc capable of being taken away. This makes our C_.onslitution unique and the American or olher foreign precedents cannot be of much a<sistance. [875 HJ

a

.•

Ho//ings\\'Orth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378, Leser v. Game//, 258 U.S. 130, Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 and Te:K v. White, 7 Wall, 700, referred to.

,~.

"':l!I

\-!

le is not that Fundamental Rights are not suhjcct to any change or mocrfication. The Constitution perm: 1 s ~ curtailment of the- exercise of most of the Fundamental Rights by stating the limits of that curtailment. It permits the Fundamental Rights to be controlled but prohibits their erasure. [878 BJ (viii) Parliament today is not 1he constituent body as the const:tucnt assembly was but a co11.s1ituted body v.·hich must hear true allegiance to the. Constilution as by lav.· eslablished. To chanjlc the Fundan1ental Part of the individual's ;ibcrty is a usurpation of 1he constituent function' because they have been placed outside the scope of the power of the con,•ituted Parliament. [870 B-DJ l1 Constitution like sC'me others has kept certain matters outside the amcna..tory procc~"S so that the people's interest may not be betrayed by 1heir representative-;;. In Art. 35 the opening \vor<ls are more than ~ nonobstanre cl;•.use. They exclude Art. 168 and even amend1nen1 of that Article under the proviso. It is therefore a ,l!reat error :o th;nk of Art. 168 a.; a code or as omnicompclcnt. [901 C-E; 902 A-BJ

•

®LAKNATH V. PUNJAB

Garnishee case, 46 C.L.R. 155, referred to. Article 368 cannot directly be amended by Parliament to confer power on itself over the fundamental rights. It would be against Art. 13 (2). Parliament cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly. [878 HJ

(ix) If it is desired to abridge the Fundamental Right.s the legal method is that the State must reproduce the power "h1ch It has chosen to put under restraint. Parlhment must amend Art. 368 to convoke another constituent assembly, pass a law under item 97 of the· List I of Schedule 7 to call a constituent assembly, and then that assembly may be able to abridge or take away the fundamental r;ghts. Any other method must be rega·rded as revolutionary. [878 D-E; 879 Bl (x) The various amendments that have been made by Parliament in Arts. 15, 16 and 19 did not abridge fundamen~l rights and were therefore valid. [879 C, 883 BJ

(xi) Our Constitution accepted the theory that Right of Property is a fundamental right though perhaps it was an error to do so if sociali•ation was desired. It treated property rights as inviolable except through law for public good and on payment of compensation. However the various amendments have significantly changed the position.

As a result

of them, except for land within the prescribed ceiling, all other land can be acquired or rights therein extinguished or modified wi'hout compensation and no i:hallenge to the law can be made under Arts. 14, 19 or 31 of· the Constitution. [887 B; 888 B.C; 896 F-G] As there is apprehension that the erosion of the right to

property

may be ·practised against other fundamental rights it is necess::i.ry to call a halt. An attempt to abridge or take away Fundamental Righ10 h)' a

constituted Parliament even through an amendment of the Constitution c;in be declared void. This Court has the power and the jurisdiction to do so. The opposite view express«! in Sajjan Singh's case was wrong. [898 B-CJ (xii) The First, Founh and Seventh amendments of the Constitution cannot now be challenged because of long acquiescence. It is good sense and sound policy for the courts to decline to take up an amendment for consider1tion after a \:onsiderabie )apse of time whe.n it was not chaHenged before or was sustained on an earlier occasion after challenge. [893 G, H; 90~ D-El Lt~"

v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922), referred to.

(xiii) In the Seventeenth Amendment, the extension of the definition

of 'estate' to include ryotwari and agricultural lands is an inroad into the Fundamen 1al Rights bu! it can_not be questioned in view of the existence of Art. 31A(l)(a) whose validity cannot now be challenged. The new definition of estate introduced by the amendment i< beyond the reach of the Courts .not because it is not law but because it is "law" and falls within that word in Art. 31(1)(2)(2A) and Art. 31-A(l). [899 C-GJ The third section of the Act is however invulid. It adds 44 State Acts to the ninth sch•dule. The Schedule is be;ng used to give advance protection to legislation which is known or apprehended to derogate from the Fundamental Rights. The power under Art. 368 was nc>t meant to ;;ive protection to S'ate statute, which offend the Constitution. The intent here is to silence the· courts and not to amend the Constitution. [900 A-DJ

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1967] 2 S.C.R'

(xiv) The two impugned Acts namely the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 and the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1962 as amended

are valid under the Constitution not- because they are inc.iudc<l in Schedule 9 of the Constitution but because they are protected by Art. 3 l-A and the

President's a;sent. [902 G-H] Per Wanchoo, Bachaw~t, Ramaswami, Bhargava and Mitter, JJ. (dissenting): Article 368 carries t1'·· power to amend all parts of the Constitution including the fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution. An amendment is not 'law· for the purpose of Art. 13(2) and cannot be tested under that Article.

Sri Svnkari Pr{lsacl Singh Dea v. Union of India, [1952] S.C.R. 89 and Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933, reaffirmed.

Pe1 Wanchoo, Bhargava and Mitter, JJ.-til The Constitution

pro-

vides a separate part headed 'Amendment of the Constitution' and

Art.

368 is the only article in that Part. There can,. therefore, be no doubt that the power to amend the Constitution must be contained in Art. 368. lf there was any doubt in the matter it is resolved by the words, namely, "the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the bill". These words can only mean that the power is there to amend the Constitution after the procedure has been followed. [826 A-DJ (ii) While there is a whole part devoted to the amendment of the

Constitution there is no specific mention of the amendment of the Consti· tution in Art. 248 or in any entry of List I. It would in the circumstances

be more appropriate to read the power in Art. 368 than in Art. 248 read with item 97 of List I. [826 H-827 A] The original intention C'f the Constitution makers \Vas to give residuary

power to the States. The mere fact that during the passage of the Constitution by the Constituent Assembly residuary power was finally ·ve:;ted in the Union would not therefore mean that it includes the power

...

to amend the Constitution. J\{oreover residuary power cannot be used to change the fundamentul la\• of the Constitution because aU legislation is

under Art. 245 "subject to the provisions of this Constitution". [827 B,

HJ

Mere accident of similarity of procedure provided in Art. 368 to that prnvi<led for ordinary legislation cannot obliterate the basic difference

r'

between constitutional law and ordinary law. It is the quality and nature l 1f wh<lt is done under Art. 368 and not its similarity to other procedure that should be stressed. What emerges after the procedure in Art. 3(,.:J has been followed is not ordinary law but fundamental law. [829 D· ~30 C-D~ . ' . . (iii) The procedure under the pmviso to Art. 111 cannot apply to a bill to amend the Constitution. If the President ref,"ed to give his assent to such a hill. the proposed amendment falls. In thiS respect at any rate the procedure under Art. 368 differs from the ordinary legislative process [831 B·El . (iv) The word 'law• has been avoided apparently with great care in Art. 368. What emerges after the procedure has been followed is not an Act but Tilt Constitution stands omended. After that the courts can o~ly soe whether the procedure in Art. 368 was followed. If it has been followed th~re is no question of testing the amendment of the Constitution on .the anvil. of _fundamental rights or in any other way as in the case of ·ordinary leg1slat1on. [83? A-G]

GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB

(v) To say that 'amendment' in law only means a change which results in· improven1ent \\'.Ould make ame·ndment impossible for \Vhat is

improvement is a matter of opinion. [834 BJ · It may be open to doubt whether the power of amendment contained in. Art. 368 goes to the extent of completely abrogating the pre.sent Constitution and substituting it by an entirely new one. But short of that t):le power to amend includes the powe·r to a<ld any provision to !he

C.Onstitution to . alter any provision and substitute any other provision ia

its place or to delete. any provision. [834 F-0] The 'Seventeenth amendment is merely in exercise of the power of amendment as indicated above and cannot be struck down on the ground that ii- goes beyond the power conferred by Parliament to amend the Constitution by Art. 368. [834 HJ

(vi) There is no express limitation on power of amendment in Art. 368 and no. limitation can or should be implied therein. If the Constitution makers intended certain basic provisions in the Constitution, and Part 111 in particular~, to be not amendable there is no reason why it was not so staid in Art: 368. The acceptance of the p·rinciple that theM is an implied bar to amendment of basic features of the Constitution would lead to the position- that any amendment tc any article would be liable to challenge before the courts on the ground thaf it amounted tc amendment of a basic feature. Constituent power like that in Art. 368 can only be subject to expteSs limitations so far as the substance of the l'l.mendments is concerned. [835 A; 836 D, G]

(vii) For interpreting Art. 368 it is not permif•ible to read the speeches made in the Con'Stituent Assembly. Historical facts namely ,what was accepted or ythat was not accepted or what was avoided in the €onstituent ~\ssembly can be looked into; but in conntction with Art. 368 no help can be got from the historical material .vailable. [838 CJ Administrator General of Bengal v. Prem Lal Mullick, ( 1895) XXII 1,A. 107, Baxter v. CommiS!(oner of Taxation, ( 1907) 4 C.L.R. 1"087, A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madrcs t1950] S.C.R. 88 and The Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, [1963] 1 S.C.R. 491, referred to.

(viii) The preamble to the Constitution cannot prohibit or control in any way or impose any im!J1ied restriction-s or limitations on the power to amend .the Constitution contained in Art. 368. [838 P.]

In re the Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves, [1960] 3 S.C.R. · 250, referred to.

.-

(ix) The word 'law' in Ait. 13(1) d0"5 not include any law in the nature of a com:tirutional provision for no such law remained in view of Art. 395 which provided that "the Indian Independence Act, 1947 and the Government of India Act, 1935, together with all enactments amending or supplementing the latter Act, but not including the Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949, ore hereby repealed". There is no reason why if the word 'law' in Art. 13 (I) relating to past laws does not include any constitutional provision the word 'law' in cl. (2) would take in an amendment of the Constitution for it would be reasonable to read th~ word in the same sense in both the clauses. [839 D-F]

Article 13(2). when it talks of the State making any law, refers to the· law made under the provisions contained in Ch. I of Pait XI of the Con!titution beginning ·with Art. 245. It .can have no reference to the

7 i '2

SGPRDIE COURT REPORTS

[1967) 2 S.C.R.

t_~onsti1t1~nt pLl\\'Cf of ~1n1l!ndmcnt under 1\rl. 368. For it is somewhat contrJdictory th:tt in Art. 368 p0Y.~r should hav.c been given to amend ;\ny p:o...-ision of the Cun~titution \\'iihout <iny limitations but indrrcctly th:it pV\\Cr shouh.I hi.; lim:tc~! by u~ing: vtords. o[ doubtful import in .r\rt. I )(2\. [841 CJ

·rhe pO\\er conferred by the \\'ordc; of Art. 368 being unfettered, in· consiqcncv bct\\·ccr· that power and the provision in Art. 13(2) must be Jvoidcd. ·Therefore in kccpir...: Ytitl1 the unfettered power in Art. 368 the \vord 'lonv' in Art. 13(~) niust he read a.; meaning law passed under the ordinary legisl.itivc pO\\'Cr and not a constitutional amendment. The wmds in Arr. 13(2) are not •pcc1fic and clear enough to be regarded as .. n express l:m1taticn on Art. 368. [842 G-HJ

(x) f\ferch· hccausc there ,,.·:is some indirect effect on Art. 226 it have been also been dircc:lv afTectc<l by the· sa:d Act and no ratification "·as required on this ground either. 1845 G-H, 846 CJ \~·Js not nccl'~~a: v that the Scvcntecn!h Amendment shc:.uld ralifi~d un<lcr the. proviso to 1\rl. 368. Ari. 245 had not

(xi) The law< added to the Ninth Schedule by the Seventeenth Amendment Aot hld already been pa'Sed by the State Legislatures and it \V;i' their constilutionJI infirmity, if any. •vhich was being cured by the device adopted in Art. 31 B read wilh the Ninth Schedule, the ame..Jmcut hcing only of the rclcv<1nt provi~ions of Part III which were com· pcndiously put in one place in Art. 31 B. Parliament could alone do it under Art. ~68 and there "'as no ncccssi:y for any raffication under the or<>viso, for amendment of Part Ill is not entrenched in the proviso. [847 BJ

In curing the infirmity of the said ]a'W'S Parliament was not encroacb. ing on the exclu~ivc leg:stative powers of the States because only Parlia· mcnt cou!d cure the infirmity. For the same reason the fal!t that the laws in question \i.·crc State laws did not make ratification obligatory. [847 GJ

C

A limited meaning cannot be given to Art. 368 because of the possibility of abuse of the power. The check is not in the courts Lo• 'J the people who elect members of Parliament. [848 F] The pov.:cr of ;1mcndment contained in a Mitlen federal constitution a safety valve "'hich to a large extent provides for stable growth and n1akes violent revolution more or less unnecessary. The fact that in the lac;t ~ixtecn years a large ncmber of amendment<; could be made and have hcen made i~ due to the accident that one party h~"' been returned by electors in sufficient strength to be able to cpmmand s;ccial majorities v:hich are required in Art. 368, not onlv at the Centre but in aU the States. But that is :to grou'ld lor limiting the clea( words of Art. 368. [850 C-D. E] i~

(xii) Though the period for which Sankari Prasad'.r case has stood unchallenged is not long. the effects "·hich have fotloi...·cd on the passing of S'ate la\vc; on the faith of that decic;ion, are so overwhelmine that the decision should not be disturbed, othcrvdse chaos will follow. 1'his is the fillclit OO'\sihlc case in which the principle of stare decisis should be applied. [851 GI Kes!1av Mills Compa11y, LM. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1965) 2 S.C.R. 908, referred to. (xiii) The doctrine of prospective overruling cannot be accepted in this country ... The doctrine accepted here is that courts declare law and that a declaration made by a court is the law of the land and talces effect

GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB

from the date the law came into force. It. would be unde•irable to give up that doctrine and superseae it with the doCtrine of prospective overruling. [852 D-FJ Moreover a law contravening Art. 13(2) is voirl ab initio as held by this Court in Deep Chand's case and Mahendra Lal Jaini's case. In the face of these decisions it is impossible to apply the doctrine of prospec-

tive overruling to ordinary laws. If constitutional law is to be treated as ordinary law the same principle applies. If however it is not treated

as 'law' under Art. 13(2) then there is no necessity of applying the principle of prospective overruling for in that case the amendment under Art. 368 does not have to be tested under A:rt. 13(2). [852 G-H; 853 BJ

Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 8 and Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of U1tar Pradesh, [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 912, referred to. .Per Bachawat J.-(i) Article 368 not only prescribes the procedure but also gives the power of amendment. It is because the power to amend is given by the article that by following its procedure the Constitution stands amended. The proviso is enacted on the assum?tion that the several articles mentioned in it are amendable; but for the proviso they would have been amendable under the main part. There is no other provision. in the Constitution wider which these articles can be amended. [904 DI Articles 4, 169, Fifth Schedule Part 1J and Sixth Schedule Para 21

empo.wer the Parliament to make amendments to certain parts of the Constitution by law, and by express provision such law is deemed not to be amendment for .the purpose of Art. 368. All other provisions of the Constitution can be amended by recourse to Art. 368 only. No other article confers the power of amending the Constitution. [904 E-F]

(ii) The power to amend the Com;titulion cannot be said to reside in Art. 248 and List I, item 97 because if amendment could be made by ordinary legislative process Art. 368 would be meaningless. Under the residual power the Parliament has no competence to make any law with

·resp<ct to any matter enumerated in Lists II and III of the 7th Schedule, but under Art. 368 even Lists II and Iii can be amended. Moreover a law passed by residual power is passed by virtue of Art. 245 and must be subject to the provisions of the Conc;titution so that it ·cannot

from the Constitution or amend it.

derOitate

Such a law would be vo;d. [905 C-F]

(iiil Article 368 gives the power of amending 'this Constitution'. This Constitution means every part of the Constitut:~n including Part III and Art. 13(2). Thus Art. 13(2) is also within the reach of the amending oower. Instead of controlling Art. 368 it is controlled by that Article. [906 C-D; HJ

(iv) The contention that a constitutional amen..:ment under Art. 368 is a law within the meaning of Art. 13 must be rejected. The distinction between the Constitution and law is so fundamental that the Constitu· tion is not regarded as a law or a legislative act. The Constitution means the Constitution as amended. An -amendment made in 1,;onformity with Art. 368 is a Tiart of the Constitution and is likewise not law. Save as

exoressly provided in Arts. 4, I 69 Fifth

Schedule

Part D

and Sixt~

Schedule para 21 no law can amend the Constitution and a law which purports to make such an amendment is void. It is for this reason that Art. , 368 avoids all reference to law meking by the Parliament. There LJ Sup. Cl/67-4 .

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[l 967] 2 S.C.R.

are also n1at;rial differences between the ordinary laW making procedure and the procedure under the Article. [907 B-F; 908 D-HJ If a constitution::il amendment creating a new fundamental ·right and incorporating it in Part III were a law, it would m>t be open to the Parliament by a subsequent am~ndment to abrogate the new fundamental right for such an amendment \.\'ould be rcpugn:..1nt to Part III. But the ctJnclusion is absurd for the body which enacted the right can surely take it away by the same process. [909 E]

Me1rhury v. Madison, (1803) 1 Cranch 137: 2 L.Ed. 60 and Riley v.• Carter, 88 A.L.R. 1008, referred to.

(v) There is no conflict between Arts. 13(2) and 368. The two articles operate in different fields, the former in the field of law, the lat,ter in that of constitutional amendment. [910 BJ (vi) The 11011-ohsrante clause in Art. 35 does not show that the • C article is not amendable.

The non-oh'itante clause is to be found also in

Arts. 258( I),, 364, 369. 370 and 371A. No one has suggested that these articles arc not amen~,able. [910 DJ (vii) The words· 'fundamental' used ;. regard to rights in Part III and the word 'guaranteed' in Art. 32 do not mean that the said rights cannot be amended. The Constitu:ion is never at rest~ it change3- with. the progress of time. The scale of values in Parts Ill and IV is not immo'!tal and the~-e· P:lrts being parts of the Constitution are not immune

from amendment under Art. 368. [910 F-GJ The impugned amendments to be Constitution w~re made to meet the

situations created by decisions of this Court and to carry out urgent agra· rian reforms. If it is held that the rights conferred by Part III cannot be abridged or taken away by constitutional amendments, all these amendments wou]d be invalid.

The Constitufion makers could not have

intended that the rights conferred by Part III could not be altered for giving effect to the policy of Part IV. Nor was it inte11ded that defects in P"rt Ill could not be cured or that oossible errors in judicial interpretations of Pan 111 could not be rectified by oonstitutiot)td1 amendments. [913 D-E] (viii) It cailnot be said that the people in cxcrci<-:e of thei·r sovereign power have placed the fundamental rights beyond the reach of the amending power. The people acting through the Constituent Assembly reserved for themielves certain rights and liberties and o·rJained that they shall not be. curtailed by ordinary legislation. But the people by the same Constitution also authorised the Parliarner\ to m·ake amendments to the Constitution.

In exercise

of

the

amending power

the

Parliament has amole anthoritv to abridge or take away ,the fundamental tights under Part 111. [915 B-CJ Merely because of possibility of abuso, the power cannot be denied. [916 HJ Webb v. Owrim, [1907j A.C. 81 and An1a/gamated Societv of Eni?ineers v. The Adelaide Steonirhlp Company Limited & Ors. 18 C.L.R. 129,

referred to.

(ix) The main part of Art 368 gives the power to amend or make chang<>s in the Constitution.

A change is

aot necessarily an. improve-

ment. Normally the change is made with the object of making an im- H provement but the experiment may fail to achieve the purpose. [916 A] Livermore v. E. G. Waite, 102 Cal. 113-25 LR.A. 312 and Nationo( J•rohihitia~ ca.W'. 253 ·U.S. 350, referred to.

-

GOLAKNATH V. PUNJAB

(x) The best exposition of the Constitution is that which it has re· ceived from contemporaneous judicial decisions and enactments. No one in Parliament doubted the proposition that fundamental rights could be amended, when the First Amendment Act of 1951 was passed. The concept of amend.ability was upheld in S. Krishnan & Ors. v. State of Madras (1951) S.C.R. 621 decided in 1951, in Sankari Prasad decided in 1952 and Sajjan Singh decided in 1964. [918 C-D]

(xi) There is no provision in the Constitution for cal.ling a convention for its revision or for submission of any proposaJ for amendment to the referendum. [918 G) (xii) The impugned amendments affected Arts. 226 and 245 only indirectly and did not require ratification under the proviso to Art. 368. [919 D-HJ

Jn validating the impugned laws Parliament was not encroaching on the State List. Jt was only validating the said laws and such constitutional validation was within its competenct>. [920 C-E] (xiii) The ·abolition of Zamindari was a necessary reform. It is the First Constitution Amendment Act that made this reform possible. No legal argument can restore the outmoded feudal Zamindari system. What has been done cannot be undone. The battle for the past is lost. (921 B.C]

(xiv) Jf the First, Fourth, Sixteenth & Seventeenth Amendment Acts are void they do not legally exist from their inception. They cannot be valid from 1951 to 1967 and invalid thereafter. To say that they were valid in the past and will be invaJid in the future is to amend .the Const!· tution. Such a naked power of amendment is not given to the Judges and e""erefore the doctrine of prospective overruling cannot be adopted. [921 D-EJ It is not possible to s&y that the First and Fourth Amend"1cnts though otiginally valid have now been validated by acquiescence. If they in· fringe Art. 13(2) they were void from their inception. If these amend, mcnts are validated by acquiescence the Scve11tccnth Amendment i"> equally validated. [921 F; 922 BJ (xv) The contention that Dr. Ambcdkar did not regard the fundamental rights as amendable is not supported by the speeches in the Constituent Assembly. [922 C-DJ

Per Ramaswami J.-(i) In a written Constitution the amendment of the Constitutiof'I is a substantive constituent act which is made i'l the exercise of the sovereign power through a predesigned procedure uncon· nected witn ordinary legislation. The amending power in Art. 36S is hence sui generis and cannot be compared to the law making power of Parliament pursuant to Art. 246 read with Lists II and Ill. It follows that the expression 'law' in Art. 13 ( 2) cannot he construed as including an amendment of the. Constitution which is achieved by Parliament in exerciSe of its sovereign constituent power, but must mean law made by Parliament in its legislative capacity under Art. 246 read with List I and lII of the 7th Schedule. It is also clear on the same line of reasoning that law. in Art. 13(2) cannot be construed so as to include 'law' made by Parliament under Arts. 4, 169, 392. 5th Schedule Part D and 6th Schedule para 21. The amending power of Parliament exercised under these Articles stands on the same pedc~tal as the constitutional amend· men! made under Art. 368 so far as Ar\. 13(2) is concerned. [930 H931 EJ (ii) The language of Art. 368 is perfectly general and cmpowe1>1 Parliament to amend the Constitution without ;;iny exception whatsoe\'er.

Sul'REME COURT REPORTS

(1967] 2 S.C.R.

The use of the word 'fundameatal' to de<eribe the rights in Part Ill and the word 'guaranteecl' in Art. 32 cannot lift the fundamental rights above the Con.stitution itself. [931 F, HJ

(ili) It is unrea.,onable to suggest that what Art. 368 provides is only the mechanics of the procedure for amendment and not the power to amend. The significant fact that a separate part has been devoted in the Constitution for "amendment of the Constitution" and there is only one Article in that Part shows that both the power and the procedure to amend are enacted in Art. 368. Again the words "the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill" in Art. 368 clearly contemplate and provide for the power to amend after the re· qui jte procehre has been followed. [932 C-EJ

(iv) The power of constitutional amendment cannot 'all within Arts. 246 and 248 read wirh item 97 of List I bei:ause it is illogical and a COD· tradiction in terms to say that the amending po· "/Cr can be exercised "subject to the provisions of the Constitution" as the power under these articles must be. [933 BJ

(v) There is no room for an implication in the construction of Art. 368. If the Constitution makers wanted certain basic f°"tures t<' be un=endable they would have said so. [933 G·HJ

State of West Bengal v. Union of India. [1964J I S.C.R. 371 and ln re The Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves [1960J 3 S.C.R. 250,

referred to.

The concepts cf liberty and equality arc changing and dynamic and hence the notion of j)Cnnanency or immutability cannot be attached to any of the fund>mental rights. The adjustment between freedom and compulsion, between the rights of individuals and the social interest and welfare must necessarily be a matter for changing needs and conditions. The proper aDproach is therefore to look upon the fundamental rights of lbe individual as conditioned by social responsibility, by the necessi· tics of the society, by the balancing of interests and not as pre-ordained and untvuchable private rights. [934 E-935 CJ (vi) It must not be forgotten that neither the rights in Art. 31 nor those in Art. 19 are absolute. The purposes for which fundamental rights can be regulated which arc specified in els. (2) to (6) could not have been assumed by the Constitution makers to be static and incapable of expansion. It cannot be a.~umed that the Constitution makers in· !ended to forge a polit!::al strait-jacket for generations to come. Today at a time when absolutes arc discredited, it must not be too readily assum· cd that there are basic features of the Constitution w~'~h shackle the amending power and which take orecedence over the general welfare of the nation and the need for agrarian and social reform. [936 B·93 7 CJ

(vii) In construing Art. 368 it is essential to r..:membcr the nature ond subject matter of that Article and to interpret it subj<ctat mattrks. lbe pow<-'r of amendment is in point of quality an adjunct of sovereignty. It is in truth the exercise of the highest sovereign oo\vcr in the State. If the 1mending power ic; an adjunct of sovereignty it does not admit of a.ay 'mitaticns. [93 7 DJ

t·nii) If the fundamental rights arc uoamcndable and if Art. 368 does not include any such power it follows that the amendment of, say, Art. 31 by in,.rtions of Arts. :;JA and 318 can only be made by a violent revolution. It is doubtful if the proceedings of a new Constituent Assembly that may be called will have any legal validity for if the

GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB

Constitution provides its own method of amendment any other method will be unconstitutional and void. [490 A-Bl

George S. Hawke v. Harvey C. Smith, 64 L.Ed. 871 and Feigmspan v. Bodine, 264 Fed. 186, referred to.

(ix) It is not permissible in the first place to assume that in a matter of constitutional amendment there will be abuse of power and then utilise it a. a test for finding out the scope of the amending power. In the last analysis political machinery and anificial limitations will not protect the people from themselves. (941 F-G]

State of West Bengal v. Union of India, [1964] l S.C.R. 371 and American Federation of Labour v. American Sash & Door Co. 335 U.S. 538, referred to.

(x) What the ·impugned Act

purpons to do is not to make

any

land legislation but to protect and validate the legislative measures passed by dilferC!!t State legislatures. This was within the legislative compe-

tence of Parliament. (942 FJ

Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, National Prohibition Cases,. 253 U.S. 350 and United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, referred to.

Articles 226 and 245 were not directly affected by the impugned Act and therefore no ratification by the St•t• Legislatures was necessary. {942 D-H; 945 DJ A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, [195CJ S.C.R. 88, Ram Singh & Ors. v. State of Delhi & Anr., [1951] S.C.R. 451, Express Newspapers (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Union of India, (19591 S.C.R. 12, Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, [19611 I S.C.R. 809 and Naresh Slzridhar Mlrajkar v. State of Maharashtra [1966] 3 S.C.R. 744, referred to. (xi) Even on the assumption that the impugned Act is unconstitt>tional thr principle of stare decisis must be applied to the present case and the plea made by the petitioners for reconsideration of Sankar/ Prasad's case and Sa/Jan Singh's case must be rejected. (948 D-EJ

On the findings it was not necessary to express an opinion doctrine of prospective overruling of legislation. [948 G-H]

on the

Writ Petition No. 153 of 1966. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of the Fundamental Rights) ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:

And

Writ Petition No. 202 of 1966.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of the Fundamental Rights) And

Writ Petition No. 205 of 1966.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of the Fundamental Rights)

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1967] 2 S.C.R.

/11 Writ l'etitio11 No. 153 of 1966.

;.

R. V. S. Mani. S. K. Meflta and K. L. Mehta, for the Petitioners. Niren De, Additional Solicitor-General of India, and R. N Sachthey, for the Respondents. Niren De, Additional Solicitor-General of India, G. R. Rajagopal, and R. H. Dhcbar, for Intervener No. I.

S. D. Banerjee, Adl'Ocate-Gencral for the State of West Bengal, B. S~1. and /'. K. Bose, for Intervener No. 7.. Lal Narain Sinlla, Advocate-General for tlie State of Bihar, Bajrani: Sa/za, M. M. Gajadhar, K. M; K. Nair, D. P. Singh, .W. K. Ramanwrt/1i, R. K. Garg, S. C. Aganva/a and G.D. Gupta. for Intervener No. 3. Mohan Kumaramangalam. Advocate-Genera/ for 1/1e State of Madras, B. Ramanwrthi and A. V. Rangam, for Intervener ~o. 4. V. D. Mahajan and R. H. Dhebar, for Intervener No. 5.

C

K. L. Mis/mt, Advocate-Ge11eral for the State of Uttar Pradesh, and 0. P. Rana, for Intervener No. 6. V. A. Seyid Muhamad, A dvocatc-General for tlie State of Kera/a, B. R. L. Iyengar, A. G. Pudissery, fo~ Intervener No. 7.

E.

Na1111i1 Lal, for Intervener No. 8. I(_

B. Mehta, for Intervener No. 9.

P. Ram Reddy and T. V. R. Tataclwri, for Intervener No. 10. M. C. Stea/rad, 11. R. L. Iyengar and R.H. Dhebar, for Intcr\'encr No. 1 I. R. Thiagarajai:, for Intervener No. 12. D. N. Mukherje.:, for Intcrv.:ners Nos. 13 a'1d 19 to 21. E. Udayaramam, S. S. Dalal and D. D. Sharma, for Inter\'Cner~ Nos. 14 and IS. R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, M. K. Ramamurthi, S. C. Aganva/a, G. n. Gupta and K. M. K. Nair, for Intervener No. 16. } . Parasara11 and K. R. Chaudhuri, for Intervener No. 17. IJasudev Prasad, K. Parasaran Intervener No. 18.

and

K. R. Chaudhuri, for

Basudev Prasad, K. Rajendra Chaudhuri, K. R. Chaudhuri and S. N. Prasad, for Interveners Nos. 22 to 24.

GOI:AKNATH V. PUNJAB

In Writ Petition No. 202 of 1966. M. K. Nambyar, K. B. Jinaraja Hegde, N. A. Subramaniam, Bhuvanesh Kumari, 0. C. Mathur, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for the Petitioner. H. R. Gokhale, B. R. G. K. Achar, R. H. JJhebar, R. N. Sachthey and S. P.. Nayyar, for Respondent No. I. Niren De, Additional So/:citor-Genera/, N. S. Bindm and · R. N. Sachthey, for Respondent No. 2. A. K. Sen, F. S. Nariman, M. L. Bhakte, S. I. Thakere, J.B. Daclachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for l11tervener No. I. N. A. Palkhiwala, F. S. Nariman, M. L. Bhakte, D. M. Popat, 0. P. Malhotra, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Na rain, for Intervener No. 2. D. M. Parulekar, B. Dutta. J. B. Dadacha11ji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for Intervener No. 3.

in Writ Petition No. 205 of 1966. M. K. Nambyar, K. B. Jinaraja Hegde, N. A. Subramaniam, Bhuvanesh Kumari, 0. C. Mathur, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for the Petitioner. H. R. Gokhale, B. R. G. K. Achar, R.H. Dhebar and S. P. Na;vyar, for Respondent No. I. S. G. Patwardhan, D. M. Paru/ekar, B. Dutta, S. K. Dhelika, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for th~ Intervener. [The Judgment of SUBBA RAo, C.J., SHAH, SIKRI, SHELAT and VAIDIALINGAM, JJ. was delivered by Su1!BA RAO, C.J. According to this Judgment-(i) the power to amend the Co-stitution is not to be found in Art. 368 but in '\rts. 245, 246 and 248 read with Entry 97 of List I; (ii) the amending power cannot be used to abridge or take away the fundamental rights guaran~eed in Part III of the Constitution; (iii) a law amending the Constitution is "Law" within the meaning of Art. 13(2) and (iv) the First, Fourth and Seventeenth Amendments though they abridged fundamental righ's were valid in the past on the bas:s of earlier decisions of this Court and continue to be valid for the future. On the application of the doctrine of "prospective over-ruling", as enunciated in the judinnent, the decision will have only prospective operation and Parliament will have no power to abridge or take away Fundamental Rights from the date of the judgment. The Judgment of WANCHOO, BHARGAVA and MITTER, JJ. was delivered by WANCHOO, J. According to this Judgment (i) the

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1967] 2 S.C.R.

power of amending the Constitution resides in Art. 368 and not in Arts. 245, ~46 and 248, read with Entry 97 of List I; (ii) there are no restrictions on tne power if the procedure in Art. 368 is followed and all the Parts of the Constitution including Part III can be amended, (iii) an amendment of the Constitution is not "law" under Art. 13(2); and (iv) the doctrine of "prospective overruling" cannot be applied in India. HIDAYATULLAH, J. delivered a separate judgment agreeing with SUBBA RAO, CJ. on the following two points: (i) that the power to amend the Constitulion cannot be used to abridge or take away fundamental rights; and (ii) that a law amending the Constitution is "law" under Art. 13 (2). He agrees with WANCHOO, J. that the power to amend does not reside in Arts. 245 and 248 read wi!h Entry 97 of List I. Art. 368, according to him, is sui generis and procedural and the procedure when correctly followed, results in an .imendment. He does not rely on the doctrine of "prospecti"e overruling". As regards the First, Fourth and Seventh Amendments, these having long enured and been acquiesced in, he does no! treat the question of their validity as being before him. As regards the Seventeenth Amendment he finds sufficient support for it in the Constitution as amended by the First, Fourth and Seventh Amendments and holds that the new definition of "estate", introduced by the Amendment, though it is "law" under Ari. 13 (2) and is an inroad into fundamental rights, is beyond the reach of the courts because it fal.Is within the word "law" in Arts. 31 ( 1), (2), 2A and 31A(I ). He, however, declares sec'.ion 3 of the Seventeenth Amendment Act ultra vires the amendin 6 process as an ille:;itimate exercise of the amending power. BACHAWAT and RAMASWAMt, JJ. delivered separate judgments concurring with WANCHOO, J.]

F'

Subbarao, C.J. These three writ petitions raise ·he important question of the validity of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964. Writ Pe!ition No. 153 of 1966, is filed by the petitioners therein against the State of Punjab and the Financial Commissioner, Punjab. The petitioners are the son, daughter and granddaughters of one Henry Golak Nath. who died on July 30, 1953. The Financial Commissioner, in revision against the order made by the Addi'ional Commissioner, Jullundur Division, held by an order dated January 22, 1962 that an area of 418 standard acres and 9! units was surplus in the hands of the petitioners under the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act X of 1953, read with s. I 0-B thereof. The pe!itioners, alleging that the relevant provisions of the said Act whcreunder the said area was

II

GOLAKNATH

v. PUNJAB (Subba Rao, C.J.)

declared surplus were void on the ground that they infringed their rights under els. ( f) and ( g) of Art. 19 and Art. 14 of the Constitution, filed a writ in this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a direction that the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, insofar as they affected their fundamental rights were unconstitutional and inoperative and for a direction that s. 10-B of the said Act X of 1953 was void as violative of Arts. 14 and 19( 1 )(f) and (g) of the Constitution. Writ Petitions Nos. 202 and 203 of 1966 were filed by different petitioners under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a declaration that the Mysore Land Reforms Act (Act 10 of 1962) as amended by Act 14 of 1965, which fixed ceilings on land holdings and conferred ownership, of surplus lands on ter.ants infringed Arts. 14, 19 and 31 c.f the Constitution and, therefore, was unconstitutional and void.

The States of Punjab and Mysore, inter alia, contended that the said Acts were saved from attack on the ground that they in. fringed the fundamental rights of the petitioners by reason of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, which, by amending Art. 31-A of the Constitution and including the said two Acts in the 9th Schedule thereto, had placed them beyond attack. In Writ Petition No. 153 of 1966, 7 parties intervened. In Writ Petition No. 202 of 1966 one party intervened. In addition, in the first petition, notice was given to the Advocates General of various States. All the learned rounsel appearing for the parties, the Advocates General appearing for the States and the learned . counsel for the interveners have placed their respective We are indebted '.o all of F viewpoints exhaustively before us. them for their thorough preparation a,d clear exposition of the difficult questions of law that were raised in the said petitions.

At the outset it would be convenient to place briefly the resJ.!ctive contentions under different heads : ( 1) The Constitution is intended to be permanent and, therefore, it cannot be amended in G a way which would injure, maim or destroy its indestructible · character. (2) The word "amendment" implies such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it wa' framed and it cannot be so construed as to enable the Parliament to destroy the permanent character of the Constitution. (3) The fundamental rights are a part of the basic structure of the ConstiH tution and, therefore, the said power ca": be exercised only to preserve rather than destroy the essence of those rig!its. ( 4) The limits on the power to amend are implied in Art. 368, for the

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

( 196 7] 2 S.C.R.

expression "amend" has a limited meaning. The wide phraseo- A logy used in the Constitution in other Articles, such as "repeal" ilnd "re-enact" indicates that art. 368 only enables a modification of the Articles within the framework of the Constitution and not a destruction of them. ( 5) The debates in the Constituent Assembly, particularly the spc~ch <.l Mr. Jawahar Lal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, and the reply of Dr. Ambedkar, who B piloted the Bill disclose ~!early that it wa' never the intention of the makers of the Comlitution by putting in Art. 368 to enable the Parliament lo repeal the fundamental rights; the circumstances under which the ame11dment moved by Mr. H. V. Karnath, one of the members of Constituent Assembly, was withdrawn and An. 368 was finally adopted. support th.z contention that amendment of c Part III is outside tlie scope of Ar'. 368. ( 6) Part III of the Constitution is a self-contained Code and its provisions are ~las­ ric enough to m~et all reasonable requirements of changing situations. ( 7 i The power to amend is sought to be derived 1. Jm three •ources. name!\', ( i) bv implication under Art. 368 it~elf; the procedure to amend culmina'ing in the amendment of the Constitu· ion necessarily implie> that power. (ii) the power and D the limits of the power to amend arc implied in the Articles sought to be amended, and (iii) Art. 368 only lays down the procedure to amer.d, but the power to amend is only the legislative power conferred on the Parliament under Arts. 245, 246 and 248 of the _Constitu!ion. ( 8) The definition of "law" in Art. 13 ( 2) of the Constitu'.ion includes every branch of law, statutory, constitu- E tional, etc., and therefore, the power to amend in whichever branch it may be classilie:I, if it takes away or abridges fundamental rights would be void thereunder. (9) Ti.e impugned amendment detracts from the jurisdiction of tlie High Court under An. 226 of the Constitution and also the legislative powers of the S.tates and therefore it falls within the scope of the proviso to An. ~68. Th.~ said summary. though not exhaustive. broadly gives the various nuances of the conter.tions raised by the learned counsel, who question the validity of the 17th Amendment. We have not noticed the other arguments of Mr. Nambiar, which are p<-.culiar to the Writ Petition No. 153 of 1966 as those questions do not arise for decision. in lhe view we are taking on the common question>.

On behalf of the Union and the States the following points were pres!'ed : (I ) A Constitutional amendment is made in exercise of the soverei1m pow~r and not legislative power of Parliament and. therefore. it partakes the quality and character of the Constitution itself. (2) The real distinction is between a rigid and a flexible Constitution. The distinction is ba~d upon the express limits of the amending power. (3) The provisions of Art.

•

GOLAKNATH

v. PUNJAB (Subba Rao, C.J.)

368 are clear and unequivocal and there is no scope. for invoking implied limitations on that power: further the doctrine of implied power has been rejected by the American courts and jurists. ( 4) The object of the amending clause in a flexible Consetitution is to enable the Parliament to amend the Constitution in order to express the will of the people according to the changing course of events and if &mending power is restricted by implied limitations, the Constitution itself might be destroyed by revolution. Indeed, it is a ;afety valve and an alternative for a violent change by revolution. (5) There are no basic and non-basic features of the Constitution; everything in the Constitution is basic and it can be amended in order to help the future growth and progress of the country. ( 6) Debates in the Constituent Assembly cannot be relied upon for construing Art. 368 of the Constitution and even if they can be, there is nothing in the debates to prove positively that fundamental rights were excluded from amen 'ment. (7) Most of the amendments are made out of political necessity: they in·volve questions, such as, how to exercise power, how to make the lot of the citizens better and the like and, therefore, not being judicial questions, they are outside the court's jurisdiction. (8) The language of Art. 368 is clear, categorical, imperative and universal; on the other hand, the language of Art. 13(2) is such as to admit qualifications or limitations and, therefore, the Court must construe them in such a manner as that Article could not control Art. 368. (9) In order to enforce the Directive Principles the Constitution was amended from time to time and the great fabric of the Indian Union has been built since 1950 on the basis that the Constitution could be amended and, therefore, any reversal of the previous decisions would introduce economic chaos in our country and that, therefore, the burden is very heavy upon the petitioners to establish that the fundamental rights cannot be amended under Art. 368 of the Constitution. ( 10) Art. 31-A and the 9th Schedule do not affect the power of the High Court under Art. 226 or the legislative power of the States though the area of their operation is limited and, therefore, they do not fall within the scope of the proviso to Art. 368. The aforesaid contentions only repre,ent a brief summary of the elaborate arguments advanced by :earned counsel. We shall deal in appropriate context with the other points mooted b.efore· ils.

It will be convenient to read the material provisions of the Constitu'ion at this stage. Article 13(1) ( 2) The State shall not make any law which takes away ar abridges the rights conferred by this part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.

SUPREMF. COliRT REPORTS

(3) In this article, rcqmres,-

[1967] 2 S.CR.

unless the context otherwise

( a) "law" includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law. A rticlc 3 I-A( l). Notwithstanding anything cont;_ined in article 13, no law providing for,

(a) the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such· rights,

shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it b inconsistent with, or takes away or <.;,ridges any of the rights conferred by article 14, article 19 or article 31. (2) (a) the expression "estate" shall, in relation to any local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenure in force in that area and shall also include,

(ii) any land held under ryotwari settlement, (iii) any land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto ..... . Article 31-B. Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in article 31-A, none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act. Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provhions of this Part, and notwith9tanding any judgment decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subj~ct to the power of any compe'.ent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force.

In the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1961, (Mysore Act IO of 1962) is included as item 51 and the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (Punjab Act 10 of 1953) is included as item 54. The definition of "estate" was amended and the Ninth Schedule was amended by includinq therein the said two Acts by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964.

OOLAKMATH

v. PUNJAB (Subba Rao, C.J.)

The result of the said amendments is that both the said Acts dealing with estates, within their wide definition introduced by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, having been included in the Ninth Schedule, are placed beyond any attack on the ground that their provisions are inconsistent with or take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by Part Ill of the Constitution. It is common case that if the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, was constitutionally valid, the said Acts could not be impugned on any of the said grounds. The question of the amendability of the fundamental rights was considered by this Court earlier in two decisions, namely. Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bi.liar(') and in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan('). In the former the validity of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which inserted, inter alia, Arts. 31-A and 31-B in the Constitution, was questioned. That amendment was made under Art. 368 of the Constitution by the Provisional Parliament. This Court held that Parliament had power to amend Part III of the Constitution. The Court came to that conclusion on two grounds, namely, ( 1) the word "law" in Art. 13 (2) was one made in exercise of legislative power and not constitutional law made in exercise of constituent power; and {ii) there were two articles (Arts. 13(2) and 368) each of which was widely phrased and, therefore, harmonious construction required that one should be so read as to be controlled iind qualified by the other, and having regard to the circumstances mentioned in the judgment Art. 13 must be read subject to Art. 368. A careful p~rusal of the judgment indicates that the whole decision turned upon an assumption that the expression "law" in Art. 13(2) does. not include constitutional law and on that assumption an attempt was made to harmonise Article 13 (2) and 368 of the Constitution. The decision in Sajjan Singh's case(') was given in the context of the question of the valid" y of the Cons•itution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964. Two questions arose in that c~se: ( 1) Whether the amendment Act insofar it purported to take away or abridge the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution fell within the prohibition of Art. 13(2) and (2) Whether Articles 11-A and 31-B sought to make chane-es in Arts. 132, 136 or 226 or in any of the lists in the Seventh Schedule and therefore the requirements of the proviso to Article 368 had to be satisfied. Both the Chief Jus~ice and Mudholkar. J. made it clear that the first coPtention was not raised before the Court. The learned counsel appearing for both the parties accepted the correctness of the decision in Sankari Prasad's case(') in that (l) [1952] S.C.R. 89. 105.

(2) [1965] I S.C.R. 933. 946, 950, 959, 961, 963

(1967] 2 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

reg_ard. Yet Gajendragadkar, C.J. speaking for the majority agreed with the reasons given in Sa11kari Prasart.i' case(') on the tirst question and Hidayatullah and Mudholkar, JJ. expressed their dissent from the said view. Bue all of them agreed, though for different reasons on the second question. Gajendragadkar, C.J. speaking for himself, Wanchoo and Raghubar Dayal, JJ. rejected the contention that Art. :168 did not confer power on Parliament to take away the fundamental rights guaranteed oy Part Ill. When a ;uggestion was made that the decision in the aforesaid case should be reconsidered and reviewed, the learned Chief Justice though he conceded that in a case where a decision had a significant impact on the fundamental rights of citizens, the Court would be inclined to review its earlier decision in the inte· rests of tt.e public good, he did not find considerations of sub· stantial and compelling character to do so in that case. But after referring to the reasoning given in Sa11kari Pra«ad's case( 1 ) the learned Chief Justice observed :

"In our opinion, che expression "am.~ndment of the Constitution" plainly and unambiguously means amend· men! of all the provisio1is of the Constitution."

Referring to Art. 13 ( 2), he restated tl:e same reasoning found in the earlier decision and added that if it was the intention of the Constitution-makers to save fundamental rights from the amending process they should have taken the precaution of making a clear provision in that regard. Jn short, the majority, speaking through Gajendragadkar, C.J. agreed that no case had been made out for reviewing the earlier decision and practically accepted the reasons given in the earlier decision. Hidayatullah J .. speaking for himself, observed:

"But I make it clear that I must not be understood to have subscribed to the view that the word "law" in Art. 13(2) does not control constitutional amendments. I reserve my opinion on that case for I apprehend that it depends on how wide is the word "law" in that Article."

'After giving his reasons for doubting t~1e correctness of the reasoning given in Sa11kari concluded thus :

Prasad's

case('),

the

learned

Judge

"I would require stronger reasons than those given in Sa11kari Prasad's case ( 1 ) to make me accept the view that Fundamental Rights were not really funda· mental but were intended to be within the powers of amendment in common with the other parts of the Con· stitution and v:ithout the concurrence of the States." 111 (19l!) S.C.R. R9.

II

OOLAKNATH

v.

PUNJAB

(Subba Rao, C.J.)

The I.earned Judge continued :

"The Constitution gives so many assurances in Part Ill that it would be difficult to think that they were the playthings of a special majority." Mudholkar, J. was positive that the result of a legislative action of a legislature could not be other than "law" and, therefore, it seemed to him that the fact that th.~ legislation dealt with the amendment of a provision of the Constitution would not make its results anytheless a "law". He further pointed out that Art. 368 did not say tha'. whenever Parliament made an amendment to the Constitution it assumed a different capacity from that of a constic tuent body. He also brought out other defects in the line of reasoning adopted in Sankari Prasad's case('). It will, there· fore, be seen that the correctness of the decision in Sankari Prasad's case(') was not questioned in Sajjan Singh's case( 2 ). Though it was not questioned, three of the learned Judges agreed with the view expressed therein, but two learned Judges were inclined to take a different view. But, as that question was not D raised, th.e minority agreed with the conclusion arrived at by the majority· on the question ·whether the Seventeenth Amendment Act was covered by the proviso to Art. 368 of the Constitution. The conflict between the majority and the minority in Sajjan Singh's case( 2 ) falls to be resolved in this case. The said conflict and the great importance of the question raised is the justification E for the.Constitution of the larger Bench. The decision in Sankari Prasad's case(') was assumed to be correct in subsequent decisions of this Court. See S. Krishnan v. State of Madras( 3 ), The State of West Bengal v. Anwar All Sarkar(') and Basheshar Nath v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi and Rajasthan('). But nothing turns upon that fact, as the correctness of the decision was not F questioned in those cases.

A correct appreciation of the scope and the place of fµnda- ./ mental rights in our Constitution will give us the right perspective for solving the problem presented before us. Its scope cannot be appreciated unless we have a conspectus of the Constitution, its objects and its machinery to achieve those objects. The objective sought to be achieved by the Constitution is declared in sonorous terms in its preamble which reads : "We the people of India having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a Sovernign, Democratic, Republic and to secure to all its citizens justice .. liberty .. equality .. and fraternity .. " (I) [1952J S.C.R. 89

(2) [1965! I S.C.R.933. (3) [1951] S.C.R. 621 at page 652. (4) [1952] S.C.R. 284, 366. (5) [1959] Supp, I S.C.R. 528, 563.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1967] 2 S.C.R

It con'.ains m a nutshell. its ideals and its aspirations. The 1'reamble is not a platitude bu~ the mode of its realisation is worked out in detail in the Constitution. The Consti'.utlon brings imo existence different constitutional entities, namely, the Union, the States and the Un:on T~rritories. It creates three major ins:rnments of power, namely. the Legislature. the Executive and the Judiciary. It demarcates their jurisdiction minutely and expects them to exercise their respective powers without overstepping their limits. They should function within the spheres ailotred to them. . Some powers overlap and some are supers, ded during emergencies. The mode of resolution of conflicts and conditions for supcrsession are also prescribed. In short, the scope of the power and the manner of its exercise are regula'ed by law. No authority created under the Constitution is supreme; the Constitution is supreme; and all the authorities function under the supreme law of the land. The rule of Jaw under the Constitution has a glorious content. It embed.es the modem concept of law evolved over the centuries. It empowers the Legislatures to make laws in respect of :na'ters enumerated in the 3 Lists annexed to Schedule VII. In Part IV of the Constitution. the Directive Principles of State Policy are laid down. It enjoins it to bring about a social order in which justice, social, economic and political-shall inform all the in'titutions of national life. It directs it to work for an egaJ:tarian society where there is no concentrat'on of wealth, where there is plenty, where there is equal opportunity for all. to education, to work, to livelihood. and wh.~re there is social justice. Bi". having regard to the past history of our country, it could not imp 1icitly believe the representatives of the peonle. for uncontrolled and unrestrict~d power might lead to an authoritarian State. It, therefore, preserves the natural rights against the State encroachmt.mt and constitutes the higher judiciarv of the State as the sentinel of the said rights and the balancing wheel between the rights. subject to social control. In shor'. the fundamental rights, subject to social control, have been incorporated in the rule of law. That is brought about bv an interesting proce<s. In the implementation of the Directive Princioles. Parliament or •he Legislature of a State makes laws in respect of matter or matters al'otted to it. But •he higher Judiciary test< their validity on certain objective criteria. namely. (i) whether the appropriate Legislature has the Ie.2islative competency to make the law; (ii) whether the said law infringes any of the fundamental rights: (iii) even if it infringes the fr.~edoms under Art. 19. whether the infringement only amounts to "reasonable restriction" on such rights in "public interest." Bv this oroc.:ss of scruti~y. the cour' maintains the validity of onlv such laws as keep a just balance between freedoms and social control. The dutv of reconciling fundamental rights in Art. 19 and the laws of social control is cast upon the courts

II

GOLAKNATH V. PUNJAB

'

(Subba Rao, C.l.)

and the touchstone or the standard is contained in the said two expressions. The standard is an elastic one; it varies with time, space and condition. What is reasonable under certain circumstances may not be so under different circumstances. The constitutional philosophy of law is reflected in Parts III and IV of the Constitution. The rule of law under the Constitution serves the needs of the people without unduly infringing their rights. It recognizes the social reality and tries to adjust itself to it from time to time avoiding the authoritarian path. Eve::y institution or political party that functions under the Constitution must accept it; otherwise it has no place under the Constitution. Now, what are the fundamental rights ? They are embodied in Part III of the Constitution and they may be classified thus : (i) right to equality, (ii) right to freedom, (iii)right against exploitation, (iv) right to freedom of religion, (v) cultural and educational rights, (vi) right to property, and (vii) right to constitutional remedies. They are the rights of the people preserved by our Constitution. "Fundamental rights" are the modern name for what have been traditionally known as "natural rights". As one author puts : "they are moral rights which every human being everywhere at all times ought to have simply because of the fact that in contradistinction with other beings, he is rational and moral." They are the primordial rights necessary for the development of human personality. They are the rights which enable a man to chalk out his own life in the manner he likes best. Our Constitution, in addition to the well-known fundamental rights, also included the rights of the minorities, untouchables and other backward communities, in such rights. After having declared the fundamental rights, our Constitution says that all laws in force in the territory. of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, insofar as they are inconsistent with the said rights, are, to the extent of such inconsistency, void. The Constitution also enjoins the State not to make any law which takes away or abridges the said rights and declares such laws, to the extent of such inconsistency, to be void. As we have stated earlier, the only limitation on the freedom enshrined in Art. 19 of the Constitution is that imposed by a valid law operating as a reasonable restriction in the interests of the public. It will, therefore, be seen that fundamental rights are given a transcendental position under our Constitution and are kept beyond the reach of Parliament. At the same· time Parts III and IV constituted an integrated scheme forming a self-contained code. The scheme is made so elastic that all the Directive Principles of State Policy can reasonably be enforced without taking

L 3 Sup. CJ/67-5

79()

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1961J 2 S.C.R.

away or abridging the fundamental rights. While recognizing the immutability of fundamental rights, subject to social control, the Constitution itself provides for the suspension or the modification of fundamental rights under specific circumstances, for instance, Art. 33 empowers Parli;unent to modify ihe rights conferred by Pan III in their application to the members of t!Je armed forces, Art. 34 enables it to impose restrictions on the rights conkrred by the said parts while martial law is in force in an area, Art. 35 confers the power on it to make laws with respect to an/ of the matters which under clause (3) of Art. 16, Clause (3) of Art. 32, Art. 33 and Art. 34 may be provided for by law. The 11011-obstante clause with which the last article opcm makes it clear that all th~ other provisions of the Constitution arc subject to this provision. Article 32 makes the right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by the said Parts a guaranteed right. Even during grave emergencies Art. 358 only 'uspends the provisions of Art. 19; and Art. 359 enables the President by order to declare the right to move any court for the enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part III as may be mentioned in that order to be suspended; that is to say, even during emergency. only Art. 19 is suspended temporarily and all other rights arc untouched except those specifically suspended by the President.

In the Uook "'Indian Constitution~):.'merstone of a Nation" by Granville Austin, the scope, origin and the object of fundamental rights have been graphically stated. Therein the learned author says : " ...... the core of the commitment to the social revolution lies in Parts III and IV, in the Fundamental Rights and in the Directive Principles of State Policy. These arc the conscience of th.:: Constitution."

Adverting to the necessity for incorporating fundamental rights in a Constitution, the learned author says : "That a declaration of rights had assumed such importance was not surprising; India was a land of communities, of minorities, racial, religious, linguistic, social and caste. For India to become a state, these minorities had to agree to be governed both at the centre and in the provinces l:y fellow Indfan-members, perhaps, of another minority-and not by a mediatory third power. the British. On both psychological and political 11rounds, therefore, the demand for writteli righls--liince nghts would provide tangible safeguards, against oppression-proved overwhelming."

GOLAKNATH

v. PUNJAB (Subba Rao, C.I.)

Motilal Nehru, who presided over the Committee called for by the Madras Congress resolution, in May, 1928 observed in his report: "It is obvious that our first care should be to have our Fundamental Rights guaranteed in a manner whicl'. will not permit their withdrawal under any circumstances ...• Another reason why great importance attached to a Declaration of Rights is the unfortunate existence of communal differences in the country. Certain safeguards are necessary to create and establish a sense of security among those who look upon each other with distrust and suspicion. We could not, better secure the full enjoyment of religious and communal rights to all communities than by including them among the basic principles of the Constitution." Pandit Jawaharlal Nehr , on April 30, 1947 in proposing for the adoption of the Interim Report on Fundamental Rights, said thus: "A fundamental right should be looked upon, not from the point of view of any particular difficulty of the moment, but as something that you want to make permanent in the Constitution. The other matter should be looked upon-however important it might be-not from this permanent and fundamental point of view, but from the more temporary point of view." P~ndit J awaharlal Nehru, who was Prime Minister at that time and who must have had an effective voice in the framing of the Constitution, made this disinction beween fundamnetal rights and other provisions of the Constitution, namely, the former were permanent and the latter were amendable. On September 18, 1949 Dr. Ambedkar in speaking on the amendment proposerl by Mr. Karnath to Art. 304 of the Draft Constitution corresponding to the present Art. 368, namely, "Any provision of this Constitution may be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal, in the manner provided in this article", said thus :

"Now, what is it we do? We divide the articles of the Constitution under three categories. The first category is the one which consists of articles which can be amended by Parliament by a bare majority. The second set of articles are articles which require two-thirds majority. If the future Parliament wishes to amend any particular article which is not mentioned in Part III or article 304, all that is necessary for them is to have two-thirds majority. Then they can amend it."

SUPREME COURT RBPOB.TS

[1967) 2 S C.R.

Therefore, m Dr. Ambedkar"s view the fundamcn:al rights were ~o important that :hey could not he amended in Ille manner provided by Art. 304 of the Draft Constitution, which correspond' to lhe present Art. 368. We have referred lO :he speeches of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Dr. Ambedkar nol with a view to interpret the provisions of Art. 368, which we propose to do on its own tenns, but only to notice the transcendental character given to the fundamental rights by two of the important architects of the Constitution. This Court also no:iccd the paramountcy of the fundamental rights in many decisions. In A. K. Gopa/an v. Staie of Madriu( 1 ) they are described as "paramount", in State of Madras v. Sm1. Champakam Dorairajan(2) as "sacro-sanci'', in Pandit M. S. M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha( 8 ) as "rights reserved by the people", in Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of VIiar Pradesh(') as "inalienable and inviolable" and in other cases as "transcendental". The minorities regarded them as the hf'drock of their political existence a11d the majority considered them as a guarantee for their way of life. This, however, does not mean that the problem is one of mere dialectics. The Constitution has given by its scheme a place of permanence to the fundament .. l freedoms. In giving to themselves the Constitution, the people have reserved the fundamental freedoms to themselves. Article 13 merely incorporates that reservation. That Article is however not the source of the protection o[ fundamenal righ's but the expression of the reservation. The importance attached to the fundamental freedoms is so transcendental that a biil enacted by a unanimous vote of all the members of both the Houses is ineffective to derogate from its guaranteed exercise. It is not what the Parliament regards at a given moment as conducive to the public benefit. but what Part III declares pro•ected, which determines the ambit of the freedom. The incapacity of the Parliament therefore in e~er­ cise of its amending power to modify, restrict or impair fundamental freedoms in Part III arises from the scheme of the Consti!ulion and the nature of the freedoms. Briefly stated, the Constitution declares certain rights as fundamental rights, makes all the laws infringing the said rights void, preserves only the laws of social control infringing the said rights and expressly confers power on Parliament and the President to amend or suspend them in specified circumstances; if the decisions in Sankari Prasad's case(') and Sajjan Singh's case(') laid down the correct law, it enables the same Parliament to abrogate them with one stroke. provided the party in power ~inely or in cor.1bination with other parties commands the neces(t) [195<1] S.C.R. 88, 198.

(l) [1959] Supp, I S.C.R. 806. (5) [1952) S.C.R. 89, JOS.

(2) (1951) S.C.R. 525. (4) [1963] I SC.R. 778 (6) (1965] S. C.R. 933.

GOLAKNATH

v. PUNJAB (Subba Rao, C.I.)

sary majori:y. While articles of less significance would require consent of the majority of the States, fundamental rights can be dropped without such consent. While a single fundamental right cannot be abridged or taken away by the entire Parliament unanimously voting to that effect, a two-thirds' majority can do away with all the fundamental rights. The entire super structure built with precision and high ideals may crumble at one false step. Such a conclusion would attribute unreasonableness to the makers of the Constitution, for, in that event they would be speaking in two voices. Such an intention cannot be attributed to the makers of the Constitution unless the provisions of the Constitution compel us to do so. With this background Jet us proceed to consider the provisions of Art. 368, vis-a-vis Art. 13(2) of the Constitution. The first question is whether amendment of the Constitution under Art. 368 is "law" within the meaning of Art. 13(2). The marginal no'e to Art. 368 describes that article as one prescril>ing the procedure for amendment. The article m terms only pre~cribcs various procedural steps in the maiter of amendment: it shall be initiated by the introduction of a bill in either House of Parliament; it shall be passed by the prescribed majority in both the Houses; it shall then be presented to the President for his assent; and upon such assent the Constitution shall stand amended. The article assumes the power to amend found elsewhere and 'ays that it shall be exercised in the manner laid down therein. The argument that the completion of the procedural steps culminates in the exercise of the power to amend may be subtle bui does not carry conviction. If that was the intention of the provisions, nothing prevented the makers of the Constitution from stating that the Constitution may be amended in the manner suggested. Indeed, whenever the Constitution sought to confer a special power to amend on any authority it expressly said so : (See Art~. 4 and 392). The alternativ~ contention that the said power shall be implied either from Art. 368 or from the nature of the articles sought to be amended cannot be accepted, for the simple reason that the doctrine of necessary implication cannot be invoked if there is an express provision or unless but for such implication the article will become otiose or nugatory. There is no ne:essity to imply any such power, as Parliament has the plenary power to make any law, including the law to amend the Constitution subject to the limitations laid down therein. Uninfluenced by any foreign doctrines let us look at the provisions of our Constitution. Under Art. 245, "subject to the provisions of the Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India ...... " Article 246 demarcates the matters in respect of which Parliament and State

SUPREME COURT RBPOllTS

(1967] 2 S.C.R.

Legislatures may make laws. In the field reserved for Parliament there is Entry 97 which empowers it to make laws in respect of "any other matter not enumerated in Lists II and ill including any tax not mentioned in either of those lists." Article 248 Cllprc&Sly states that Parliament has exclusive power to make any law with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or State List. It is, therefore, clear that the residuary power of legislation is vested in Parliament. Subject to the argument based upon the alleged nature of the amending power as understood by jurists in other countries, which we shall consider at a later stage, it cannot be contended, anJ indeed, it was not contended, that the Cons!ituent Assembly, if it were so minded, could no: have conferred· an express legislative power on Parliament to amend the Consutution by ordinary legislative process. Articles 4 and 169, and para 7 of the 5th Schedule and para 21 of the 6th Schedule have expressly conferred such power. There is, therefore, no inherent inconsistency between legislative process and the amending one. Whether in the field of • constitutional law or statutory Jaw amendment can be brought about only by law. The residuary p<'Wer of Parliament, unless there is anything contrary in the Constitution, certainly takes in the power to amend the Constitution. It is said that two Articles indicate the contrary intention. As Art. 245, the argument proceeds, is subject to the provisions of the Constitution, every Jaw of amendment will necessarily be inconsistent with the articles sought to be amended. This is !In argument in a circle. Can it be said reasonably that a law amending an article is inconsistent with the article amended ? If an article of the Constitution expressly says that it cannot be amended, a law cannot be made amending it, as the power of Parliament to make a law is subject to the said Article. It may well be that in a given case such a limitation may also necessarily be implied. The limitation in Art. 245 is in respect of the power to make a Jaw and not of the content of the Jaw made within the scope of its power. The second criticism is based upon Art. 392 of the Constitution. That provision confers power on the President to temove difficulties; in the circumstances mentioned in that provision, he can by order direct that the Constitution shall durmg such period as may be specified in that order have effect subject to such adaptations, whether by way of modification, addition or omission, as he may deem to be necessary or Cllpedient The argument is that the President's power, though confined to a temporary period, is co-extensive with legislative power and if the power to amend is a legislative power it would have to be held that the President can amend the Constitution in terms of Art. 368. Apart from the limited scope of Art. 392, which is intended only for the purpose of removing difficulties and for bringing about a smooth transition, an order made by the Presi-

I'

GOLAKNATH

v. PUNJAB (Subba Rao, C.l.)

dent cannot attract Art. 368, as the amendment contemplated by that provision can be initiated only by the introduction of a bill in the Parliament. There is no force in either of the two criticisms. Further, there is intemal evidence in the Constit\ltion itself which indicates that amendment to the Constitution is a "law" B within the meaning of Art. 245. Now, what is "law" under the Constitution? It is not denied that in its comprehensive sense it '.:icludes constitutional law and the law amending the Constitution is constitutional law. But Art. 13 (2) for the purpose of that Article gives an inclusive definition. It does not exclude Constitutional law. It prima facie takes in constitutional law. Article 368 itself gives the necessary clue to the. problem. The c amendment can be initiated by the introduction of a bill; it shall be passed by the two Houses; it shall receive the assent of the President. These are well-known procedural steps in the process of law-making : Indeed this Court in Sankari Prasad's case(') brought out this idea in clear terms. It said "in the first place, it is provided that the amendment must be initiated by the inD iroduction of. a "bill in either House of Parliament" a familiar feature of Parliament procedure (of Article 107 (I) which says •A bill may originate in either House of Parliament"). Then, the bill must be "passed in each House,"-just what Parliament does when it is called upon to exercise its normal legisfative function [Article 107(2)1; and finally, the bill thus passed must be "presented to the President" for his "assent", again a parliamentary E process through which every bill must pass before it can reach the statute-book, (Article 111). We thus find that each of the component units of Parliament is to play its allotted part in bringing about an amendment to the Constitution. We have already seen that Parliament effects ainendments of the first class mentioned above by going through the same three-fold procedure but with F a simple majority. The fact that a different majority in the same body is required for effecting the second and third categories of amendments make the amending agency a different body." In the same decision it is pointed out that Art. 368 is not a complete code in respect of the procedure. This Court said "There are gaps in the procedure as to how and after what notice a bill is to be introduced, how it is to be passed by each House and how the President's assent is to be obtained. Having provided for the Constitution of a Parliament and prescribed a certain procedure for the conduct of its ordinary legislative busine~s to be supplemented by rules made by each House {Article 118), the makers of the Constitution must be taken to have intended Parliament to follow that procedure, so far as they may be appli· cable consistently with the express provision of Art. 368, when they have entrusted to it the power of amending the Con-

ti) [1952) S. C.R. 89.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1967] 2 S.C.R.

>titution.'' The Hous.i oi the People made rules providing procedure for amendments, the same as for other Bills with the addition of certain special provisions viz., Rules 155, 156, 157 and 158. If amendment is intended to be something other than law, the constitutional insistenc.: on the sai~ legislative process is unneces.~ary. In short, amendment cannot be made otherwise than by following the legislative process. The fact that there are other cenditions, such as, a larger majority and in the ca>e of articles mentioned in the proviso a ratification by Legislatures is provide<l. does not make the amendment anytheless a law. The imposition of further conditions is only a safeguard against hasty action or 3 protection to the States, but does not change the Legislative character of the amendment. This conclusion is reinforced by the other articles of the Constitution. Article 3 enables Parliament by law to form new States and alter areas. boundaries or tho names of existing States. The proviso to that Article imposed two further conditions, namely, (iJ the recommendation of the President, and (ii) in the> circumstances mentioned therein, the views expressed by the Legislatures. Notwithstanding the said conditions it cannot be suggested that the expression "law" under the said Article is not one made by the Legislative process. Under Art. 4, such a law can contain provisions for amendment of Schedules I and IV indicating thereby that amendments are only made by Legislalative process. What is more, cl. (2) thereof introduces a fiction to the affect that such a law shall not be deemed t.> be an amend· mcnt to the Constitution. This shows that the amendment is law and that but for the fiction it would bo an amendment within the meaning of Art. 368. Article 169 which empowers Parliament by law to abolish or crea:e Legislative Councils in States, para 7 of the 5th Sch,~dule and para 21 of the 6th Schedule which enable Parliament by law to amend the said Schedules, also bring out the two ideas that the amendment is law made by legislative proce~s and that but for the fiction introduced it would attract Article 368. That apart amendments under the said provisions can be made by the Union Parliament by simple majority. That an amendment is made only by legislative process with or without conditions will be clear if two decisions of the Privy Council arc considered ir. juxta-position. They are McCawley v. Thi! King(') and The Bribery Commissioner v. Pedrick Rana· singhe('). The facts in McCaw/ey v. The King(') were these: In 1859 Queensland had been granted a Constitution in the term~ of an Order in Council made on June 6 of that year under powers derived by Her Majesty from the Imperial Statute, 18 & 19 Viet. (I) 119201A.C.691.

(2) [1964] 2 W.L.R. 1301.

'

GOLAKNATH

v.

PUNJAB

(Subba Rao, C.J.)

c. 54. The Order in Council had set up a legislature for the territory, consisting of the Queen, a Legislative Council and a Legislative Assembly, and the law-making power was vested in Her Majesty acting with the advice and consent of the Council and Assembly. Any laws could be made for the "peace, welfare and good government of the Colony". The said legislature of Queensland ;n the year 18 67 passed the Constitution Act of that year. Under that Act power was given to the said legislature to make laws for "peace, welfare and good Government of rhe Colony in all cases whatsoever". But, under s. 9 thereof a two-thirds majority of the Council and of the Assembly was required as a condition precedent to the validity of legislation altering the constitution of the Council. The Legislature, therefore. had, except in the case covered by s. 9 of the Act, an unres'.ricted power to make laws. The Legislature passed a law which conflicted with one of the existing terms of the Constitution Act. Lord Birkenhead, L.C., upheld the law, as the Constitution Act conferred an absolute power upon the legislature to pass any law by majority even though it, in substance, amended the terms of the Constitution Act.

Jn The Bribery Commissioner v. Pedrick Ranasinghe( 1 ), the

K

,

ta.;ls are these : By section 29 of the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946, Parliament shall have power to make laws for tbe "peace, order and good government" of the Island and in the exercise of its power under the said section it may amend or repeal any of the provisions of the Order in its application to the Island. The proviso to that section says that no Bill for the amendment or repeal of any of the provisions of the Order shall be presented for the Royal assent unless it has endorsed on it a certificate under the hand of the Speaker that the number of v(ltes cast in favour thereof in the House of Representatives amounted to not less than two-thirds of the whole numb.:!r of members of the House. Under s. 55 of the said Order t'1e appointment of Judicial ·Officers was vested in the Judicial Service Commission. But the Parliament under s. 41 of the Bribery Amendment Act, 1958. provided for ihe appointment of the personnel of the Bribery Tribunals hy the Governor-General 0n the advice of the Mini,;ter of Justice. The said Amendment Act was in conflict with the said s. 55 of the Order and it was passed without complying with the terms of the proviso to s. 29 of the Order. The Privy Council held thai the Amendment Act was void. Lord Pearce, after considering McCaw/ey's case(') made th~ following observations, at p. 1310:

" ...... a legislature has no power to ignore the conditions of law-making that are imposed by the (2) [!920] A.C. 691.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1967] 2 S.C.R.

instrument which itself regulates its power to make law. question whether the legislature is sovereign, as is the legislature of Ceylon, or whether the Constitution is "uncontrolled", as the Board held the Constitution of Queensland to be. Such a Constitution can, indeed, be altered or amended by the legislature, if the regulating instrument so provides and if the terms of tbo;e provisions are complied with ...... "

This restriction exists independently of the

It will be ;een from the said judgments that an amendment of the Constitution is made only by legislative process with ordinary majority or with special majority. as the case may be. Therefore, amendments either under Art. 368 or under other Articles a1e made only by Parliament by following the legislative process adopted by it in making other Jaw. In the premises, an amendment of the Constitution can be nothing but "Jaw". A comparative study of other Constitutions indicates I°.: 1t no particular pattern is followed. All the Constitutions confer an express power to amend, most of them provide for legislative procedure with special majority, referendum, convention, etc., and a few with simple majority. Indeed, Parliament of England, which Ls a 'upreme body, can amend the constitution like any other 'tatute. As none of the Constitutions contains provisions similar lo Art. 368 and Art. 13(2), neither the said Constitution5 nor the decisions given by courts thereon would be of any assistance in construing the scope of Art. 368 of our Constitution. A brief survey of the nature of the amending process adopted by various constitutions will bring out the futility of any attempt to draw inspiration from the said opinions or decisions on the ~aid constitutions. The nature of the amending power in differ· ent constitutions generally depends on the nautre of. the polity created by the constitution, namely, whether it is federal or unitary constitution or on the fact whether it is a "Titlen .or un unwritten constitution or on tho circumstances whether it is a rigid or a flexible constitution. Particularly the difference can be traced to the "spirit and ~enius of the nation in which a particular comtitution bas its birth". The following articles of the Constitution of the different countries are brought to our notice by one or other of the counsel that apprared before us. Art. 5 of the Constitution of the United States of America, /,rts. 125 and I 28 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, Art. 92 (I ) of the British North American Act, s. 152 of the South African Act, Art. 217 of the Constitution of the United States oi Brazil, Section 46 of the Constitution of Ireland, 1937, Arts. 207, 208 and 209 of the Constitution of the Union of Burma, Art. 88 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Denmark Act, Art. 90 of

I

JI

GOLAKNATH

v. PUNJAB (Subba Rao, C.J.)

the Constitution of the French Republic, 1954, Art. 135 of the United States of Mexico, Art. 96 of the Constitution of Japan, Art. 112 of the Constitution of Norway, Art. 85 of the Constitution of the Kingpom of Sweden, Arts. 118, 119, 120, 121, 122 and 123 of the Constitution of the Swiss Federation, Arts. 140, 141 and 142 of the Constitution of Venezuela, and Art. 146 of the Constitution of the Union .,; Soviet Socialist Republics, 1936 and s. 29 ( 4) of Ceylon Constitution Order in Council, 1946.

Broadly speaking amendments can be made by four methods : (i) by ordinary legislative process with or without restrictions, (ii) by the people through referendum, (iii) by majority of all the of a federal State; and (iv) by a special convention. c The units first method can be in four different ways, namely, (i) by the ordinary course of legislation by absolute majority or by special majority, (See Section 92(1) of the British North America Act, sub-section 152 South African Act, whereunder except sections 35, 137 and 152, other provisions could be an1ended by ordinary legislative process by absolute majority. Many constiD tutions provide for special majorities.); (ii) ·by a fixed quorum of members for the consideration of the proposed amendment and a special majority for its passage; (see the defunct Constitution of Rumania), (iii) by dissolution and general election on a particular issue; (see the Constitutions of Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Norway), and (iv) by a majority of two Houses of Parliament in joint session a~ in the Constitution of the South Afr'.ca. The second method demands a popular vote, referendum or plebiscite as in Switzerland, Australia, Ireland, Italy, France and Denmark. The third method is by an agreement in some form or -other of either of the majority or of all the federating units as in Switzerland, Australia and the United States of America. The fourth method is generally by creation of a special body ad hoc p for the purpose of constitution revision as in Latin America. Lastly, some constitutions inlpose express linlitation on the power to amend. (See Art. 5 of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the Fourth French Republic). A more elaborate discussion of this topic may be found n the American political Constitution by Strong. It will, therefore, be seen that the CJ power to amend and the procedure to amend radically differ from State to Stae; it is left to tM consiitution-makers to prescribe the scope of the power and the method of amendment having regard to the requirements of the particular State. There is no article in any of the constitutions referred to us similar to article 13(2) of our Constitution. India adonted a different system altogether: it empowered the Parliament to amend the Constitution by the legislaiive process subject to fundamental rights. The Indian Constitut'.on has made the amending process comparatively flexible, but it is made subject to fundamental rights.

•

(1967] 2 S.C. R

'

Now let us consider the argument that the power lo amend is a sovereign power, that the said power is supreme to the legislative power, that it does not permit any implied limitations and that amendments made in exercise of that power ihvolve political q:iestions and that, therefore, they arc outside judicial review. This wide proposition is sought to be supported on the basis of opinions of jurist; and judicial decisions. Long extracts have been read to us irom the book "The Amending of the Federal Constitution ( l 942)" by Lester Bernhardt Orfield, and particular reference was made to the following pa<;Sages :

,,

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

"At the point it may be well to note that when the Congress is engaged in the amending process it is not legislating. It is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by Article Five. This Article for the most part controls the process; and other provisions of the Constitution, such as those relating to the passage of legislation, having but little bearing." Adverting to the Bill of Rights, the learned author remarks that they may be repealed just as any other amendment and that they are no ~ore sacred from a legal standpoint than any other part of the Constitution. Dealing with the doctrine of implied limitations, he says that it is clearly untenable. Posing the question "ls !her a law about the amending power of the Constitution?", he answers, "there is none". He would even go to the extent of saying that the sovereignty, if it can be said to exist at all, is located in the amending body. The author is certainly a strong advocate of the supremacy of the amending power and an oponent of the doctrine of implied limitations. His opinion li; based upon the terms of Art. 5 of the Constitution of the United States of America and his interpretati0n of the decisions of the Supreme Court of America. Even such an extreme exponent of the doctrdie does not say that a pa1ticular constitution cannot expressly impore res•rictions on the power to amend or that a court cannot reconcile the articles couched in unlimited phraseology. Jnderd Art. 5 of the American Constitution imposes express limita1ior.: on the amending power. Some passage-; from the book "Political Science and Government" bv James Wilford Garner are cited. ' Garner points out :

R

..... II

"Ar unamcndablc constitution, said Mulford, is the "worst tyranny of time, or rather the very tyTanny of time"."

.... ut he also notices : "The provision for amendment should be neither s6 rigid as to make needed changes practically impossible nor so flexible a~ to encourage frequent and

'

GOLAKNATH

v. PUNJAB (Subba Rao, C.J.)

unnecessary changes and thereby lower the authority of che Constitution." Munro in his book "The Government of the United States", 5th Edition, l.ses strong words when he says :

'

" ...... it is impossible to conceive of an unamendable constitution as anything but a contradiction in terms." The learned author says that such a constitution would constitute "government by the graveyards." Hugh Evancfer Willis in his book "Constitutional Law of the United States" avers that the doctrine of amendability of th~ Constitution is grounded in the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people and that it has no such implied limitations as that an amendment shall not contain a new grant of power or change the dual form of government or change the protection of the Bill of Rights, or make any other change in the Constitution. Herman Finer in his book "The Theory and Practice of Modem Government" defines "constitution" as its process of amendment, for, in his view, to amend is to deconstitute and reconstitute. The learned author concludes that the amendnig clause is so fundamental to a constitutfon that he is tempted to call it the constitution itself. But the learned author recogniiies that difficulty in amendment certainly products circumstances and makes impossible the surreptitious abrogation of rights guaranteed in the constitution. William S. Livingston in "FeCleralism and Constitutional Change" says : "The formal procedure of amendment is of greater importance than the informal processes, because it constitutes a higher authority to which appeal lies on any question that may arise." But there are equally eminent authors who express a different view. In "American Jurisprudence", 2nd Edition, Vol. 16, it is stated that a statute and a constitution though of unequal dignity are both laws. Another calls the constitution of a State as one of the laws of the State. Cooley in hi£ book on :·constitutional Law" opines that changes in the fundamental laws of the State must be indicated by the people themselves. He further, implies limitations to the a!llending power from the belief in the constitution itself, such as, the republican form of Government cannot be abolished as it would be revolutionary in its character. In the same book it is further said that the power to amend the constitution by legislative action does not confer the power to break it any more than it confers the power to legislate on any other subject contrary to the prohibitions. C. · F. Strong in his book "Modem Poliical Constitutions", 1963 edition, does not accept the theory of absolute sovereignty of the amending power which does not brook any limit~tions, .or he says :

SUP!ll!MI! COUllT REPORTS

(1967} 2 S.C.ll.

"In short, it attempts to arrange for tho re-creation of a constituent assembly whenever such matters are in future to be considered, even though that assembly be nothing more than tho ordinary legislature acting under certain restrictions. At tho same time, there may be some elements of the constitution which the constituent assembly wants to remain unalterable by the action of any authority whatsoever. These elements are to be distinguished from the rest, and generally come under the heading of fundamental law. Thus, for example, the American Constitution, the oldest of the existing Constitutions, asserts that '.Jy no process of amendment shall any State, without its own consent, be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate, while among the Constitutions more recently promulgated, those of the Republics of France and Italy, each containing a clause stating that the republican fonn of government cannot be the subject of an amending proposal."

It ;, not ncc~ssary to multiply citations from text-books. A catena of American decisions have been cited before us in support of the contentioa that the amending power is a supreme power or that it involves political issues which are not justiciable. It would be futile to consider them at length, for after going through them carefully we find that there are no consider ed j•1dgments of the American Courts. which would have a \>Cr~uasive effect in that regard. In the Constitution of the United States of America, prepared by Edwards S. Corwin, Legislative Reference Service. Library of Congress, ( 1953 edn.), the following summary under the heading "Judicial Review under Article Y" is given: "Prior to 1939, the Supreme Court had ll>k~n cogni1.ance of a number of diverse objections to ihc validity of specific amendments. Apart from holding that official notice of ratification by the several States was conclusive upon the Courts, it had treated these questions as justiciable, although it had unifom1ly rejected them on the merits. In that year. however. the whole subject was thrown into confusion by the inconclusive decision •:1 Coleman v. Miller. This case came up on a writ of L ·tiorari to the Supreme Court of Kansas to review the c.e:lial of a writ of ma11damm to compel the Secretary of the Kansas Senate to erase an endorsement on a resolution ratifying the proposed child labour amendment to the Co~titution to the effect that it had been adopted by the Kansas Senate. The attempted ratification was

GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB

(Subba Rao, C.J.)

assailed . on three grounds : ( 1) that the amendment had been previously rejected by. the State Legislature;

c:

r

( 2) that it was no longer open to ratification because an unreasonable period of time, thirteen years, had elapsed since its submission to the States, and (3) that the lieutenant governor had no right to cast the decidin~ vote in the Senate in favour of ratification. Four opmions were written in the Supreme Court, no one of which commanded the support of more than four members of the Court. The majority ruled that the plaintiffs, members of the Kansas State Senate, had a su.llicient interest in the controversy to give the federal courts jurisdiction to review the case. Without agreement as to the grounds for their decision, a different majority affirm~ the judgment of the Kansas court denying the relief sought. Four members who concurred in the result had voted to dismiss the writ on the ground that the amending process "is politicw" in its entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point." Whether the contention that the lieutenant governor should have been permitted to cast the deciding vote in favour of ratification presented a justiciable controversy was left undecided, the court being equally divided on the point. In an opinion reported as "the opinion of the Court" but in which it appears that only three Justices concurred, Chief Jusitce Hughes declared that the writ of mandamus was properly denied because the question as to the effect of the previous rejection of the amendment and the lapse. of time since it was submitted to the States were political questions which sho,.Jd be left to Congress. On the same day, the Court dismissed a writ of certiorari to review a decision of the. Kentucky Court of Appeals declaring the action of the Kentucky General Assembly purporting to ratifyin:: the child labour amendment illegal and void. Inasmuch as the governor had forwarded the certified copy of the resolution to the Secretary of State before being served with a copy of the restraining order issued by the State Court, the Supreme Court found that there · was no longer a controversy susceptible of judicial detennination."

This passage, in our view, correctly summarises the American law on the subject. It will be clear therefrom that prior io 1939 the Supreme Court of America had treated the objections to the validity of sj!ecific amendments as justici;ible and that only in 1939 it rejected them in an inconclusive judgment without

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1<167] 2 S.C.R.

discussion. In this state of affairs we cannot usefully draw much from the judicial wisdom of th~ Judges of the Supreme Court nf America. One need not cavil at the description of an amending power as sovereign power, for i'. is sovereign only within tile scope of the power conferred by a particular constitution. All the author. also agree, that a particular constitution can expressly limit the power of amendment, both substantive and procedural. The only conflict lies in the fact t,hat some authors do not pennit implied limitations when the power of amendment is expressed in general words. But others countenance such limitations by construction or othllrwise: But none of the authors goes to the extent of saying, which is the problem before us, ihat when there are conflicting articles couched in widest terms, the court has no jurisdiction to construe and hannonize them. If some of the authors meant to say that-in our view, they did not-,we cannot agree with them, for, in that event this Court would not be discharging its duty.

Nor can we appreciate the arguments repeated l:efore us by learned counsel for the respondents that the amending proces; involves political questions which are, outside the swpe of judicial review. When a matter comes before the Court, its jurisdiction does not depend upon the nature of the question raised but on the question whether the said matter is expressly or by necei;sary implication excluded from its jurisdiction. Secondly, it is not possible to define what is a political question and what is not. The character of a question depends upon the circum51ances and the nature of a political society. To put it differently, the court does not decide any political question at all in the ordinary sense of the tem1, but only ascertains whether Parliament is acting within the scope of the amending power. It may be that Parliament seeks to amend the Constitution fo1 political reasons, but the Court in denying that power will not be dt<eiding on political questions, but will only be holding that Parliament has no power to amend particular articles of the tonstitution for any purpose whatsoever, be it political or otherwise. We, therefore, hold that there is nothing in the nature of the amending power which enables Parliament to override all the express or implied limitations imposed on that power. As we have pointed out earlier, our Constitution adopted a novel method in the sense that Parliament makes the amendm.~nt by legislative process subject to certain restrictions and that the amendment so made being

.. \'dw" i> subject to Art. 13(2).

The next argument ~ based upon the expression ''amendment" in Art. 368 of the Constitution and it is contended that the said

GOLAKNATll I'. PUNJAB

(S11bba Rao, C.J.)

sos

expression lvas a positive and a negative content and that in exercise of the power of amendment Parliament caflnot destroy the structure of the Constitution, but it can only modify the provisions thereof within the framework of the original instrument for its better effectuation. If the fundamentals would be amenable to the ordinary process of amendment with a special majority, the argument proceeds, the institutions of the President can be abolished, the parliamentary executive can be removed, the fundamental rights can be abrogated, the concept of federalism can be obliterated and in short the sovereign democratic republk can be converted into a totalitarian system of government. There is considerable force in this argument. Learned and lengthy arguments are advanced to sustain it or to reject it. But we are relieved of the necessity to express our opinion on this :ill important question as, so far as the fundamental rights are concerned, the question raised can be answered on a narrower basi~. This question may arise for consideration only if Parliament seeks to destroy the struc.ture of the Constitution embodied in the provisions other than in Part !II of the Constitution. We do not, therefore, propose to express our opinion in that regard. ln the view we have taken on the scope of Art. 368 vis-a-v:s the fundamental rights, it is also unnecessary to express our opinion on the question whether the amendment of the fundamental. rights is covered by the proviso to Art. 368.

It

The result is that the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, inasmuch as it takes away or abridges the fundamental rights is void under Art. 13 ( 2) of the Constitution. The next question is whether our decision should be given retrospective operation. During the period between .1950 and 1967 i.e.. 17 years, as many as 20 am~ndments were made in our Constitution. But in th·~ context or the present. petitions it would be enough if we notice the amendments affecting fundamental right to property. The Constitution came into force on January 26, 1950. The Constitution (First Amendme.it) Act. 1951, amended Arts. 15 and 19, anJ Arts. 31-A and 31-B were inserted with retro>pective effect. The object of the amendment was said to be to validate the acquisition of zamindaric; or the abolition of permanent settlemr.nt without interference lrom courts. The occasion for the amendment was that the High Court of Patna in Kameslnmi' Singh v. State of Bihar(') held that the Bihar Land Reforms Act (30 of 1950) passed by the State of Bihar was unconstitutional, while the High Courts of All.aha~ad ~nd Nagpur upheld the validity of corresponding leg1slat10ns m Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh respectively.

(I) A. I. R. 1951 Patna 91. L3Sbp.C.T./67-6

SUPREMB COURT RBPOR.TS

(1967] 2 S.C.Jl.

The amendment was made when the 11ppeals from those decisiom were pending in the Supreme Court. In Sankari Prasad's case(') the constitutionality of the said amendment was questioned but the amendment was upheld. It may be noticed that the said amendment was not made on the basis of the power to amend fundamental rights recognized by this Court, but only in view of the conflicting decisions of High Courts and without waiting for the final decision from this Court. Article 31-A was again amended by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. Under that amendment cl. (2) of Art. 31 was amended and cl. ( 2-A) was inserted therein. While in the original article 31-A the general expression "any prqvisions of his Part" was found, in the amended article the scope was restricted only to the violation of Arts. 14, 19 and 31 and 4 other clauses were included, namely, clauses providing for (a) taking over the m!lllage~nt of any property by the State for a limited period; (b) amalgamation of two or more corporations; ( c) extinguishment or modification of rights of persons interested in corporations; and ( d) extinguishment or modification of rights accruing under ·ny agreement, lease or licence relating to minerals, and the definition of "estate" was enlarged in order to include the interests of raiyats and under-raiyats. The expressed object of the amendment was to carry out important social welfare legislations o~ the desired lines, to improve the national ec.inomy of the State and to avoid serious difficulties raised by courts in that regard. Article 3 lA has further been amended by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. By the said amendment in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution entries 14 to 20 were added. The main objects of this amending Act was to distinguish the power of compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of private property and the dP.privation of property and to extend the scope of Art. 31-A to cover different categones of social welfare legislalions and to enable monopolies in particular trade or busmess to be created in favour of tlie State. Amended Art. 31 (2) makes the adequacy of compensation not justiciabll'. It may be said tbat the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 was made by Parliament as this Court recognized the power of Parliament to amend· Part Ill of the Constitution; but it can also be said with some plausibility that, as Parliament had exercised the power even before the decision of this Court in Sankari Prasad's case('), it would have amended the Constitution even if the said decision was not given by this Court. The Seventeenth Amendment Act was made on June 20, 1964. The occasion for this amendment was the decision of this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kera/a( 2 ), which struck down the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act IV of 1961 relating to ryotwari lands. Under that amendment the definition of the expression .. estate" was enlarged so as to take - (l)[i9s21s.C.R. 89, IOS

--- · - - - - (2)11962]Supp. I S.C.R. 829

GOLAKNAlH v. PUNJAB

(Subba Rao, C./.)

in any land held under ryotwari settlement and any held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purp0ses ancillary thereto, including waste land, forest land, land for pasture or sites of buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators of land, agricultural labourers and village artisans. In the Ninth Schedule the amendment included items 21 <o 65. In the c-bjects and reasons it was stated that the definition "estate/' was not wide enough, that the courts had struck down many land refo1m Acts and that, therefore, in order to give them pro!ection th.:- amendment was made. The validity of the Seventeenth Amendment Act was questioned in this Court and was held to be valid in Safjail Singh's case('). From the history of these amendments, two things appear, namely, unconstitutional laws were c made and they were protected by the amendment of the Constitution or the amendments were made in order to protect the future laws which would be void but for the amendments. But the fact remains that this Court held as early .as in 1951 that Parliament had power to amend the fundamental rights. It may, therefore, be said that the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, D al'ld the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, were based upon the scope of the power to amend recognized by this Court. Further the Seventeenth Amendment Act was also approved by this Court. Between 1950 and 1967 the Legislatures of various States mack· laws bringing about an agrarian revolution in our country -·zamindaries, inams and other intermediarv estates were abolished, vested rights were created in tenants, consolidation of holdings of villages was made, ceilings were fixed and the surplus lands transferred to tenants. All these were done on the basis of the correctness of the decisions in Sankari Prasad's case ( 2 ) and Sajian Singh's case('), namely, that Parliament had the power to amend the fundamental rights and that Acts in regard to estateS were outside judicial scrutiny on the ground they infringed the said rights. The agrarian structure of our country has been revolutionised on the basis of the said laws. Should we now give retrospectivity to our decision, it would introduce chaos and unsettle the conditions in our country. Should we hold that because of the said consequences Parliament had G power to take away fundamental rights, a time might come when we would gradually and imperceptibly pass under a totalitorian rule. Learned counsel for the petitioners as well as those for the respondents placed us on the horns of this diTemrna, for they have taken extreme positions-learned counsel for •he petitioners want us to reach the logical position bv holding that all the said Jaws are void an{! the learned counsel for the respondents persuade ~s to hold that Parliament has unlimited power and, if it chooses, it can do away with fundamental rights. We do not think that

,

(l) [1965) 1 S. C.R. ~33.

(2) [19S2j S.CR. 89,

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1%7] 2 S.C.R

1his Court is so helpless. As the highest Court in the land we must evolve .some reasonable principle to meet this extraordinary situation. There is an essential distinction between Constitution and statutes. Comparatively speaking, Constitutio'l is permanent; it j5 qn organic statute; it grows by its own inherent force. The cons!itutional concepts are couched in elastic terms. Courts are expected to and indeed should interpret, its terms without doing violence to the language to suit the expanding needs of the 'ociety. In this process and in a real sense they make laws. Though it is not admitted, the said role of this Court is effective and ~annot be ignored. Even in the realm of ordinary statutes, the 'ubtle working of the process is apparent though the approach is more conservative and inhibitive. In the constitutional field, therefore, to meet the present extraordinary situation that may be .:aused by our decision, we must evolve some doctrine which has roots in reason and prrcedents so that the past may be preserved :md the future protected. l11ere are two doctrines familiar to American Jurisprudence, is described as Blackstonian theory and the other as "prospective over-ruling ... which may have some relevance to the present enqui:y Blach<onc in his Commentaries, 69 (15th edn., 1809) stated the common law rule that the duty of the Court was "not to pronounce a new rule but to maintain and expound the old one". It means the Judge does not make law but only discovers or finds the true law. The law has always been tJ1e same. If a subsequent decision changes the earlier one, the latter deci'ion does not make law hut only discovers the correct principle of law. The result of this view is that it is necessarily re'.tospective operation. But Jurists, George F. Canfield, Robert Hill Freeman, John Henry Wigmore and Cardozo, have expounded the doctrine of "prospective over-ruling" and suggested it as "a ~sefui judicial tool". !n the words of Canfield the said expressio.i means :

•)Ile

" ...... a court should recognize a duty to announce a new and better rule for future transaction:, ·.vhenever the court has reached the conviction that an old rule (as established by the precedents) is unsound even though feeling compelled by stare decisis to apply the old and condemned rule to the instant case and to transactions which had already taken place."

Cardozo. before he became a Judge of the Supreme Court of the ll11itcd States of America, when he was the Chief Justfce of New York State addressing the Bar Association said thus :

1\w ru\e. (the Blackstonian rnle) tb.at we are a~ll.ed to apply is out of tune with the life about us. It has bten made discordant by the forces that generate a

-

GOLAKNATH

v.

PUNJAB

(Subba Rao, C.J.)

living law. We apJ,JIY it to this case because the repeal might work hardship to those who have trusted to its existence. We give notice however that any one trusting to it hereafter will do at his peril." The Sltprome Court of the United States of America, in the year 1932 after Cardozo became an Associate Justice of' that Court in Great Northern Railway v. S1111b11rst Oll & Ref. Co.,( 1 ) applied the said doctrine to the facts of that case. In that case the Montana Court had adhered to its previous construction of the statute in question but had announced that that interpretation wolud not be followed i.1 the future. It was contended before the Supreme Court of the United States of America that a decision of a court over-ruling earlier decision and not giving iis ruling retro-active operation violated the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. Rejecting that plea, Cardozo said : "This is not a case where a Court in overruling an earlier decision has come to .the new ruling of retroactive dealing and thereby has made invalid what was followd in the doing. Even that may often be done though litigants not infrequently have argued to the contrary .... This is a case where a Court has refused to make its ruling retro-active, and 1he novel stand is taken that the Constitution of the United States is infringed by the refusal. We think that tht Federal Constitution has no voice upon the subject. A state in defining the elements of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself between the princi pie of forward operation and that of relation backward. It may be so that the decision of the highest courts, though later over-ruled, was Jaw nonetheless for intermediate transactions .... On the other hand, it may hold to the ancient dogma that the Jaw declared by its Courts. had a platonic or ideal existence before the act of declaration, in which event, the discredited declaration will be viewed as if it had never been and to reconsider declaration as law from the beginning .... The choice for any state may be determined by the juristic philosophy of the Judges of her Courts, their considerations of Jaw. its origin and nature." The opinion of Cardozo tried to harmonize the doctrine of prospective over-ruling with that of stare decisis.

Jn 1940, Hughes, C.J., in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank(') stated thus : (1) (\9~2! 287 U.S. 358. 366·. 17 L. Ed. 360.

(2) (1940) 308 U.S. 371.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1%7] 2 S.C.R

"The law prior to the determination of unconstitutionality is an op~rative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration." In Griffin v. /ll!onis(') the Supr~me Court of America reaffirmed the doctrine laid down in Sunburst's case('). There, a statute required defendants to submit bills of exceptions as a pre requisite to an appeal from a conv· ;tion; the Act was held unconsl :tutional in tha: it provided no means whereby indigent dcfcnd~rt.1 <:ould sc~~re a copy of the record for this purpose. Frankfun~r. J., in that context observed :

" ...... in arriving at a new principle, the judicial process is not important to define its scope and limits. Adjudication is not a mechanical exercise nor does it compel 'either/or' determination." In Waif v. Colorado(') a majority of the Supreme Court held that ia a prosecutio:i in a State Court for a state crime, the 14th Amendment did not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure. But in Mapp. v. Ohio(') the Supreme Court reversed that decision and held that all evidence obtained by searches and seizure in violation of the 4th Amendment of the Federa! Constitution was, by virtue of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment guaranteeing the right to privacy free from unreasonable State instrusion, inadmissible in a State ccurt. In Linkierrer v. Walker(') the question arose whether the exclusion of the rule enunciated in Mapp v. Ohio(') did not apply to State Court convictions which had become final before the date of that judgment. Mr. Justice Clarke, speaking for the majority observed : "We believe that the existence of the Wolf doctrine prior to Mapp is 'an operative' fact and may have consequences whkh cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be ..:rascd by a new judicial declaration." "Mapp had --·; ils prima purpose the enfor~ement of the Fourth Amendment through the inclusion of the exclusionary rule wi'.hin its rights ............. . We cannot say that th's purpose would be advanced :-; making the rule retrospective. The misconduct vf 1he police prior to Mapp has already occurred and will -··-------

!1956J 351 U.S. 12. 2 . f2) (1932) 287 U. S .1;1,366: 77 L rd l60. (4)(19G6J 367 U.S. 643: 6 L. Ed. (3)(1948-49] 338 U.S. 25: 193 L.Ed. 872. (5) [1%5] 38> U.S. 618. (2nd Edn) lli81.

(!)

R

GOLAKNATH

v. PUNJAB (Subba Rao, C.J.)

not be corrected by releasing the prisoMrs ;nv.Jlvecl .... On the other hand, the States relied on Wolf and followed its command. · Final judgments of conviction were entered prior to Mapp, Again and again the Courr refused to reconsider Wolf and gave its implicit approval to hundreds of cases in their application of its rule. In rejecting the Wolf doctrine as to the exG!usiom.ry rule the purpose was to deter the lawless action of the police and to effectively enforce the Fourth Amendment. That purpose will not at this late date be served by the wholesale release of the guilty yictims." "Finally, there are interests in the administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial process to consider. To make the rule of Mapp retrospective would tax the administration of justice to the utmost. Hearings would have to be held on the exciudability of evidence long since destroyed, misplaced or deteriorated. lf it is excluded, the witness availab!e at the time of the original trial will not be available or if located their memory will be dimmed. To thus legitimate such an extraordinary procedural weapon that has no bearing on guilt would S'!riously disrupt the administration of justice."

This case ha.• reaffirmed the doctrine of prospective overruling and has taken a pragmatic approach in refusing to give it retroactivity. In short, in America the doctrine of prospective overruling is now accepted in all branch.es of law, including constiiutional law.· But the carving of the limits of :etrospectivity of the new rule is left to courts to be done, having regard to the requirements of jus•ice. Even in England the Blackstonian theory was criticized by Bentham and Austin. In Austin's Jurispru· dence, 4th Ed., at page 65, the learned author says : "What hindered Bfackstone was 'the childish fiction' employed by our judges, that judiciary or common law is not made by them, b1". is a miraculous something made. by nobody, existing, I suppose, from eternity, and merely declared from time to time by the Judges." Though English Courts in the past accepted the Blackstoilian theory and though the House of Lords stnctly acthered to the doctrine of 'precedent' in the earlier years, both the doc'rines were practically given up by the "Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent)" issued by the House of Lords recorded in (1966) 1 W.L.R. 1234. Lord Gardiner L.C., speaking for the House of Lords made the following observations.:

St;PRBll: COt:l\T RErORTS

81~

[1967] ~ S.CR

"'Thdr Lordship, nC\'crthelcss recognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and al.;o unduly restrict the proper development of the Jaw. They propose, therefore. to modify their pre,cm practice and. while treating former decisions of this House as normally binding. to depart fro_1_n a previous decision when it appears right to do

so.

Jn th'.·; connection they \\ill bear in mind the danger ol disturbing rctro;pcctively the basis on which contracts. settlements of property and fiscal arrangements h:ivc been entered into and also the especial need for certainty as to the criminal Jaw."

Thi' :tnnouncement is not intended to affect the u'c of precedent elsewhere than in this House." It '~ill be seen from this passage that the House of Lords hereafter in appropriate cases may depart from its p;evious decision when it appears right to do so and in so dcpaning will bear in mind the danger of giving effect to the said decisiou retroactivity. We consider that what the House of Lords means by this statement is that in differing from the precedents it will do w only without interefering with the transactions that had taken place on the basis of earlier decisiow. TI1is decision, to a large extent, modifies the Blackstonian theory and accepts, though not expressly but by necessary implication the doctrine of "prospective overruling." Let us now consider some of the objections ro this doctrine. The objections arc: (I) the doctrine involved Legislation by courts; (2) it would not encourage parties to prefer appeals as they would not get any benefit therefrom; (3) the declaration for the future would only be obiter; '. 4) it is not a desirable change; and ( 5) the doctrine of retroactivity serves as a brake on court' which otherwise might be tempted to be so fascilc in overruling. But in our view, tnese objections arc not insurmountable. If a court can over-rule its earlier decision--there cannot be any dispute now that the court can do so--.~herc cannot be any valid reason why it should not restrict it~ ruling to the future and not to the past. Even if the party filing an appeal may not be benctited by it. in similar appeals which he may file after the change in the law he will have the benefit. The decision cannot be obiter for what the court in effect does is to declare the law but on the basis of another doctrine restricts its scope. Stability in bw doe,, not mean that injustice shall be perpetuated. An illuminatini: article on the subject is found in Pennsylvania law Review [Vol. I 10 p. 650].

'

GOLAKNATH \'. PUNJAII

(Subba Rao, C./.)

It is a modern doctrine suitable for a fast moving society. It does not do away with the doctrine of siare decisis, but confine-, it to past transactions. I.t is true that in one sense the court only declares the law, either customary or statutory or personal law. While in strict theory it may be said that the doctrine involves making of law, what the court really docs is to declare the la~v but refuses to give rctroactivity to it. It is really a pragmatic solution reconciling the two conflicting doctrines, namely, that a coun finds law and that it docs make law. It finds law but restricts its operation to the future. It enables the court to bring about a smooth transition by correcting its errors without disturbing the impact of those errors on the past transactions. It is left to the discretion of the court to prescribe the limits of the retrcactivity and thereby it enable' it to mould the relief to meet the ends of justice. In India there is no statutory prohibition against thl! court refusing to give retroactivity to the law declared by it. lnd~~d, the doc!rine of res judicata precludes any scope for retroactlVlty in respect of a subject-matter that has been finally decided between the parties. Further, Indian court by interpretation reject retroactivity to statutory provisions though ccuched in general terms on the ground that they affect Vc>ted rights. The present case only attempts a further extension of the said rule against retroactivity. Our Constitution does not expressly or by necessary implicarion speak against the doctrine of prospective over-ruling. Indeed, Arts. 32, 141 and 142 are couched in such wide and elastic terms as to enable this Court to fonnulate legal doctrines to meet the ends of justice. The only limitation thereon is reason, restraint and injustice. Under Art. 32, for the enforcement of the fundamental rights the Supreme Court has the power to issue suitable directions or orders or writs. Article 141 says that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts; and Ar:. 142 enables it in the exercise of its jurisdiction to pass such decree or make such order a, is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. These articles are designedly made comprehensive to enable the Supreme Court to declare law and to give such dire lions or pass such orders as are necessary to do complete justice. The expression "declared'' is wider than the words "found or made''. To declare is to announce opinion. Indeed, the latter involves· the process. while the former expresses result. Interpretation, ascertaiament and evolution are parts of the process, while that interpreted. ascertained or evolved is declared as law. The law declared by the Supreme Court is the law of the land. If so, we do not see any acceptable reason why it, in declaring the law in superses-

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1967] 2 S.C.R..

sion of the law declared by it earlier, could not restrict the operation of the law as declared to future and save the transactions, whether statutory or otherwise that were effected on the basis of the earlier law. To deny this power to the Supreme Court on the basis of some outmoded theory that the Court only finds law but does not make it is to make ineffective the powerful instrument of justice placed in the hands of the highest judiciary of this country. As this Court for the first time has been called upon to apply the doctrine evolved in a different country under difierent ci1 c1Jmstances, we would like to move warily in the beginning. We would lay down the following propositions : ( 1) The doctrine of p~ospective over-ruling can be invol(ed only in matters arising under our Constitution; (2) it can be applied only by the highest court of the country, i.e., the Supreme Court as it has the constitutional jurisdiction to deciare J••v binding on all the courts in India; (3) the scope of the retroactive operation of the law declared by the Supreme Court superseding its earlier decisions is left to its discretion to be moulded in accordance with the j1.1stice of the cause or matter before it. We have arrived at two conclusions, namely, (I) Parliament has no power to amend Part III of the Constitution so as to take away or abridge the fundamen!al rights; and (2) this is a tit case to invoke and apply the doctrine of prospective overruling. What then is the effect of our conclusion on the instant case ? Having regard to the history of the amendments, their impact on the social and economic affairs of our country and the chaotic situati0n that may be brought about by the sudc!en withdrawal at this stage of the amendments from the Constitution, we think that considerable judicial restraint is called for. We, therefore, declare that our decision will not affect the validi•v of the Cons:itution (Sevemeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, or other amendments made to the Constitution taking away or abridging the fundamental rights. We further declare that in future Parliament will have no power to amend Part III of the Con~titution so as to take away or abridge the fundamental rights. In this case we do not prop.:>se to express our opinion on the question of the scope of the amendability of the provisions of e:te Constitution other than the fundamentai rights, as it does not arise for consideration before us. Nor arc we called upon to express out opin'on on the question regarding the scope of the amend;•hili1y of Pan Ill of the Constitution o'.herwise than by taking awJy or abridging the fundamental rights. We will not also indicatc our view one way or other whether any of the Aces uuestioncd cm be sustained under the provisions of the Constilution wilhout !he aid cf Aris. 31A, 31B and the 9th Schedule.

C

(

GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Subba Rao,

•

C.J.)

The aforesaid discussion leads to the following results : ( 1) The power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution is derived from Arts. 245, 246 and 248 of ·the Constitution and not from Art. 368 thereof which only deals with procedure. Amendment is a legislative process. (2) Amendment is 'law' within the meaning of Art. 13 of the Constitution and, therefore, if it takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part HI thereof, it is void. (3) The Coristitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, and the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act. 1964, abridge the scope of the fundamental rights. But, on the basis of earlier decisions of this Court, tiJ.ey were valid. ( 4) On th. application of the doctrine of 'prospective over-ruling', as explained by us earlier, our decision will have only prospective operation and, therefore. the said amen.dments will continue to be valid. ( 5) We declare that the Parliament will have no power from the date of this decision to amend any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution so as to take away or abridge the fundamental rights enshrined therein. ( 6) As the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act holds the field, .the validity of the two impugned Acts, namely, the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act X of 1953, and the Mysore Land Reforms Act X of 1962, as amendec1 by Act XIV of 1965, cannot be questioned on the ground that they offend Arts. 13, r 14 or 31 of the Constitution. Before we close, it would be necessary to advert to an argument advanced on emotional plane. It was said that if the provisions of the Constitution could not be amended it would lead to revolution. We have not ~aid that the provisions of the Constitution cannot be amended but what we have said is that they canG not be amuded so as to taKe away or abridge the fundamental rights. Nor can we appreciate the argument that all the agrarian reforms which the Parliament in power wants to effectuate cannot be brought about without amending the fundamental rights. It was exactly to prevent this attitude and to project the rights of ·the people that the fundamental rights were inserted in the Consiitu'ion. If it is the duty of the Parliament to enfor~e the directive principles, it jg equally its dutv to enforce them without infringing the fundamental rights. The Constitution-m'lkers thought· tlcat it could be done and we also think that the direc'.ive prin-

~ 16

SUPREME COUR r REPORTS

[1967] 2 S.C.R

ciplcs can rca,onably !>.! enforced within the sclf.·rcgulator} A machinay provided b)' Pan Ill. Indeed both Parts Ill and JV <'f the Cothtitution form an integrated scheme and is cla:;tic enough to rc,pond to the changing need> of the ;o.:icty. The verdict of the Parliament on the scope of tilt.! law ol social con· trol of fund:.1mental rights is not final. but justiciable. If not ~­ the whole scheme of the Constitution will break. Wh;tt we can- a not understand is how Jhc enforcement of the provisions c.f :he Constitution can bring about a revolution. History shows that revolutions arc b'.·ought about not by the majorities but by the minorities and some time by military coups. The existence of an all comprehensive <lmending power cannot prcvcn1 revolution.'. if there is chaos in the country brought about by mis-rule or C <tbusc of power. On tJ1e o·her hand. such a restrictive power give» stability t0 the country and prevents it from passing under a totalitarian or dictatorial regime. We cannot obviously ba.<e our decision on such hypoJhctical or extraordinary situations which may be brought a[Xlut with or withoul amendments. Indeed, a Constitution is only pennancnt and not eternal. There is nothinj! co choose be". ween <lest ruction by amendment or by revolution. I> the former " brought about by totalitarian rule, wi1ich cannot hrook con51it1,tional check> and the other by the discontentment hrought about hy mis-rule. If either happens, the constitution will be a scrap of paper. S•ich considerations arc out of place in construing the provisions of the Constitution by a courl of law. Nor arc "c in:;Jresscd by the argument chat if th<: power of C amendmcm is not all comprehensive there will be no way to change the 'tructure of our Constitution or abridge the fundamental rights even if the whole country demands for such a change. Firstly, this visualizes an extremely unforeseeable and extravagant demand: but even if such a contingency arises, the residuary power of the Parlia1aent may be relied upon to call for r a Constitu.~nt Assembly for making a new Constitution or radically chang.inj! it. The recent Act providing for a poll in Goa. Daman and Diu is an instance of analogous exercise of such residuary power by the Parliament. We do no~ express our final opinion on this important question. A final appeal is made to us that we shall not take a different view as the decision in Sankari Prasad's case(') held thc field for G many years. While ordinarily this Court will be reluctant to rcver.>e its previous decision, it is its duty in the .constitutional field to correct itself as early as possible, for otherwise the future progress .of the country and the happiness of the people will be at stake. As we are convinced that the decision in Sankari Pra.~ud's case(') is wrong, it is pre-eminently a typical case where this Court H 'houid over-rule it. The longer ii holds the field the greater will (11[1952]SC.R 89.105

GOLAKNATH I'. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, !.)

It

'

be the scope for erosion of fundamental rights. As it contains the seeds of destruction of the cherished rights of the people the 'iOOner it is over-ruled the better for the country. This argument is answered by the remarks made by this Coui;t in the recent judgment in The Superillfendent and Legal Remembranc<'t State of West Bengal v: The Corporation of Calcutta (1). ·The third contention need not detain us for it has been rejected by this Court in T/1e Benlf(ll Immunity Company limited v. The State of Bihar('). There a Bench of 7 Judp.es unanimously held that there was nothing in the Constitution that prevented the Supreme Court from departing from a previous decision of its own if it was satisfied of its error and of i's baneful effect on the general int~rest of the public. If the aforesaid rule of construction accepted by this Court is inconsistent with the legal philosophy of our Constitution, it is our Juty to correct ourselves and Jay down the right rule. In constitutional matters which affect the evolution of our polity, we must more readily do so than in other branches of law, as perpetuation of a mistake will be harmful to public interests. While continuity and consistency are conducive to the smoo'h evolution of the rule of Jaw. hesitancy to set right deviation will retard its growth. Jn this case, as we are satisfied that the said rule of construction is inconsistent with our republican polity and, if accepted, bristles with ;rnomalies. we have no hesitation to reconsider our earlier decision." In the result the petitions are dismissed. but in the circum'tances wihout costs. Wanchoo, J. This Special Bench of eleven Judges of this Court has been constituted to consider the correctness of the decision of this Court in Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India( 3 ) which was accepted as correct by the majority in Saijan Singh v. S/IJte of Rajasthan('). The reference has been made in three petitions challenging the constitutionality of the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution. In one of the petitions. the inclusion of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, (No. X of 1953) in the Nintl1 Schedule, which makes it immune from attack under any provisions contained in Part III of the Constitution, has been attacked on the ground that the SeYemeenth Amendment is in. itself unconstitutional. In the other two petitions, the inclusion of the Mysore Land Refonus Act, (No. 10 of 1962) has been attacked on the same grounds. . It is not necessary to set out the facts in -(i)i1967J fi:<::Jl.:170.176(2) [1955] 2 S.C.R.603. (3) [t952] S.C.R. 89,

(4) [1965) l.C.S.R. 933. \

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1967] 2 s.c.R.

the three petitions for nresenl purposes. The main· argument in all the three petitions has been as to the scope and effect of Art. 368 o( the Constitution and the power conferred thereby to amend the Constitution. Before we com~ to th'e specific points rJised in the present petitions, we may indicate the circumstances in which Sa11kari Prasad'.~ case( 1 ) as well as Sajja11 Si11g/z"s case(') came to be decided and "hat they actually decided. The Comtitution came into force on January 26. 1950. It provides in Part Ill for certain fundamental· rights. Article 31 which i in Part III, as it originally ,;tood, provided for compulsory acquisition of property. By clause (I) it provided that '"no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law". Clause (2) thereof provided that any law authorising taking of possession or acquisition of property must provide for compensation therefor and either fix the amount c{ compensation or specify thr. principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensaticm was to be determined and paid. Clause ( 4) made a special provision to the effect that if any Bill pending at the commencement of the Constitution in the Legislature of a State had. after it had been passed by such Legislature, been reserved for the consideration of the President and bad •eceived his assent, then such law would net be called in question thoui;h it contravened the provisions of cl. ( 2) relating to compensation. Clause ( 6) provided that any law of the State enacted not more than eighteen months before the Constitution might be submitted to the President for his certification, and if so certified, it could not be called in question on the ground that it contravened the provision of cl. (2) of Art. 31 relating to compensation. These two clauses of Art. 31 were meant lo safeguard legislation which either bad been passed by Provincial or State legislatures or which was on the anvil of State legislatures for the purpose of agrarian reforms. One such piece of legislation was the Bihar Land Refonns Act, which was passed in 1950. That Act received the assent of the President a~ required under cl. (6) of Art. 31. It was however challenged before the Patna High Court and was struck down by that court on the ground that it violated Art. 14 of the Constitution. Then there was an appeal before this Court, but while that appeal was pending, the First Amendment to the Constitution was made.

We may briefly refer to what the First Amendment provided for. It was the First Amendment which was challenged and was upheld in Sankari Prasad's case('). The First Amendment contained a number or provisions; but it is necessary for present pur· poses only to refer to those provisions which made changes in Part III of the Constitution. These changes related to Arts. 15 (!} [19S21 S.C.R. 69.

(2) [196SJ I S.C.R. 933

r

fl

GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, /.)

and 19 and in addition, provided for inse~tion of two . Articles numbered 31-A and 31-B in Part Ill. Article 31-A provided that no law providing for the acquisition by the State of an~ estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights shall be ... Jemed to be void on the ground that it was inconsistent with, or took away or abridged any of the rights conferred by any provision in part III. The word "es~ate" was also defined for the purpose of Art. 31-A. Further Article 31-B provided for validation of certain Acts and Regulations and specified such Acts and Regulations in the Ninth Sc.hedule, which was for the first time added to the Constitution. The Ninth Schedule then contained 13 Acts, all relating to estates, passed by various legislatures of the Provinces or States. It laid down that those Acts and Regulations would not be deemed to be void or ever to have become. void, on the ground that they were inconsistent with or took away or abridged any of the rights conferred by any provision of Part III. It further provided that notwithstanding any judgment. decree or order of any cou1t or tribunal to the contrary, all such Acts and Regulations subject to the power of any competent legislature to repeal or amend them, continue in force. This amendment, and in particular Arts. 31-A and 31-B were immediately challenged by various writ petitions in this Court and these came to be decided on October 5, 1951 in Sankari Prasad's case('). The attack on the validity of the First Amendment was made on various grounds; but three main grounds wb'.ch were taken were, firstly, that amendments to the Constitution made under Art. 368 were liable to be tested under Art. 13(2); secondly that in any case as Arts. 31-A and 31-B inserted in the Constitution by the First Amendment affected the power of the High Court under Art. 226 and of this Court under Articles 132 and 136, the amendment required ratification under the proviso to Art. 368; and, thirdly, that Arts. 31-A and 31-B were invalid on the ground that they related to matters covered by the State List. namely, item 18 of List H, and could not therefore be passed by Parliament. This Court rejected all the three contentions. It held that although "law" would ordinarily include constitutional law, there was a clear dcmar~ation ·between ordinary law made in the exercise of legislative power and constitutional law made in the exercise of constituent power, and in the context of Art. 13, "law" must be taken to mean rules or regulations made in exercise of ordinary legislative power and not amendments to the Constitution made in the exercise of constituent power; in consequence Art. 13 ( 2) did not affect amendments made under Art. 368. It further held that Arts. 31-A and 31-B did not curtail the power of the High Court under Art. 226 or of this court nnder Arts. 132 and 136 and did not require ratification under the (1) (1952] S.C.R. 89

$:.!U

[I 91> 7] 2 S.CR

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

provi'o contained in Ar:. 368. Finalh. 11 wa' held lhal Art>. •31-A and 31-B were esscntiaily amendments 10 the Constitution and Parliament as such had the power to enact such am~~dments. In consequence. the First Amendment to the Con,~itution wa~ upheld as valid. After this decision. !here follo1\·cd sixteen more amendment' Amendment. which was passed on June 20, 1964. There docs not seem to have been challenge to any amendment up to the Sixteenth Amendment, even though two of them. namely, the Fourth Amendment and the Sixteenth Amendment. contained changes in the provi'ions of Part III of the Constitution. Further the nature of these amendments was to add to, or ahcr or delete various other provi'ions of the Constitution contamed in Part Ill thereof. On December 5, 1961 came the decision of this Court by which the Kerala Agrarain Reforms Act (No. -l of 1961 ), passed by the Kerala legislature. wa' struck down, among other grounds. for the reason that ryotwari lands in South India \\ere not estates within the meaning of At t. 31-A and therefore 1cquisition of ryotwari land was not protected under Art. 31-A of the Constitution : [see Karimbil K11nhikoma11 v. State of Kera/a(' )I. This decision was followed by the Seventeenth Amendment on June. 20, 1964. Dy this amendment, changes were made in Art. 31-A of the Consti· 1ution and 44 Acts were included in the Ninth Schedule to g:vc them complete protection from attack under any provision of Part Ill of the Constitution. Practically all these Acts related to land tenures and were concerned with agrarian reforms. This amendment was challenged before this Court i11 Sajjan Sing/i's case{°). The points then urged were that as Art. 226 was likely to be affected by the Seventeenth Amendment, it required ratification under 'he proviso to Art. 368 and that the decision in Sankari Pramd"s case(') which had negatived this contention required reconsideration. It was also urged that the Seventeenth Amendment was legi,lation with re,pcct to land and Parliament had no right to legislate in that behalf, and further that as the Seventeenth Amendment provided that the Acts put in lhe ~inth Schedule would be valid in spite of the decision of lhe Courts. it was unconstitutional. This Court by a majority of 3 to 2 upheld the correctness of the decision in Sankari Prasad's case( 8 ). It further held unanimously that the Seventeenth Amendment did nol require ratification under the proviso to Art. 368 because of its indirect effect on Art. 226, and that Parliament in enacting the Amendment was not legislating with respect to land and that it was open to Parliament to validate legislation which had be<:n declared invalid by courts. Finally this Court held by majority

10 the Constitution till we come to the Scvenieenth

(2) 11965] I S.C.R. 933.

(I) (19621 Supp. l S.C.R. 829. (3) (1952] S.C.R. 89.

GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB· (Wanchoo, J.)

821"

that the power conferred by Art. 368 included the power to take awa; fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III and that the power to amend was a very wide power and could not be controlled by the literal dictionary meaning of the •....:>rd "amend", and that the word "law" in Art. 13(2) did not include an amendment of the Constitution made in pursuance of Art. 368. The minority however doubted the correctness of the view taken in Sankari Prasad's case(') to the effect that the word "law" in Art. 13 ( 2) did not include amendment to. the Constitution made under Art. 368 and therefore doubted the competence of Parliament to make any amendment to Part III of the Constitution. One of the learned Judges further doubted whether making a charige in the basic features of the Constitution could be regarded merely as an amendment or would, in effect, be re -writing a part of the Constitution, and if so, whether it could be done under Art. 368. It was because of this doubt thrown on the correctness of the view taken in Sankari Prasad's case(') that the present reference has been made to this Special Bench. As the question referred to this Bench is of great constitutional importance and affected legislation passed by various States, notice was issued to the Advocates General of all States and they have appeared and intervened before us. Further a number of persons who were also affected by the Seventeenth Amendment have been permitted to intervene. The arguments on behalf .of the petitioners and the interveners who support them may now be briefly summarised. It is urged that Art. 368 when it provides for the amendment of the Constitution merely contains the procedure for doing SO' and that the power to make amendment has to be found in Art 248 read with item 97 o~ List I. It is further urged that the word "amendment" in Art. 368 means that the provisions in the Constitution can be changed so as to improve upon them and that this power is of a limited character and does not authorise Parliament to make any addition to, alteration of or deletion of any provision of the Constitution, including the provision contained in Part III. So Art. 368 authorises only those amendments which have the effect of imprQving the Constitution. Then it is urged that amendment permissible under Art. 368 is subject to certain implied limitations and these limitations are that basic features of the Constitution cannot be amended at all. An attempt was made to indicate some of these basic features, as, for example, the pro~ visions in Part m, the federal structure, the republican character of the. State, elected Parliament and State Legislatures on the basis of adult suffrage, control by the judiciary and so on, and it is said that an amendment under Art. 368 is sub_iect to the implied limi(I) [1952] S.C.R. 89. L3Sup.C'l/67· -·7

S22

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1967] 2 S.C.R.

tations that these basic features and others of the kind cannot be changed. Thus in effect the argument is that t'1ere is a very limited power of amendment under the Constitution. It is further urged that apart from these implied limitation.~. there is an express limitation under Art. 13 ( 2) and the word "law" in that Article includes an amendment of the Constitution. lbe argument thus in the alternative is that as the word "law" in Art. 13(2) includes a constitutional amendment, no amendment <:an be made in Part III under Art. 368 which would actually take away or abridge the rights guaranteed under that Part. In effect. it is said that even if there are no implied limitations to amend the Constitution under Art. 368, Art. 13(2) is an express limitation insofar as the power to amend Part Ill is concerned and by virtue of Art. 13 ( 2) the rights guaranteed under Part III cannot be taken away or abridged under Art. 368, though it is conceded that Part III may be amended by way of enlarging the rights con•ained therein. Another line of argument is that in any case it was necessary to take action under the proviso to Art. 368 and as that was not done the Seventeenth Amendment is not valid. It is urged that Art. 226 is seriously aftected by the provisions contained in the Seventeenth Amendment and that amounts to an amendmnt of Art. 226 and in con.~uence action under the proviso was neces· sary. It is also urged that Art. 245 was c:qually affected by the addition of a number of Acts in the Ninth Schedule read with Art. 13(2) and therefore also it was necessary to take action under the prqviso. It is further urged that it was not competent for Parliament to amend the Constitution by putting a largo number of Acts in the Ninth Schedule as the power to legislate with respect to land is solely within the competence of State Legislatures and that is another reason why the addition to the Ninth Schedule read with Art. 31-B should be struck down. Lastly an argument had been advanced, which we may call the argument o~ fear. It is said that if Art. 368 is held to confer full powor to amend each and every part of the Constitution as has been held in Sankari Prasad's case('). Parliament may do all kinds of things, which were never intended, under this unfettered power and may, for example, abolish elected legislatures, abolish the President or change the present form of Government into a Presidential type like the United States Constitution or do away with the federal structure altogether. So it is urged that we should interpret Art. 368 in such a way that Parliament may not be able to do all these things. In effect this argument of fear has 'been put forward to reinforce the contention that this Coult should ii 1 [195~1 S.C.R. 19.

•

GOLAKNATB v. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, J.)

hold that there are some implied limitations on the amending power and these implied limitations should be that there is no power any where in the Constitution to change the basic features of the Constitution to which reference has already been made. This is in brief the subntlssio111 on behalf of the petitioners and the interveners who support them.

'

The subntlssion on behalf of the Union of India_ and the States may now be summarised. It is urged that Art. 368 not only pro· vides procedure for amendment but also contains in it the power to amend the Constitution. It is further urged that the word "'amendment" in law does not merely mean making such changes in the Constitution as would improve it but includes the power to make any addition to the Constitution, any alteration of any of the existing provisions and its substitution by another provision, and any deletion of any particular provision of the Constitution. In effect, it is urged that even if the word "amendment" used in Art. 368 does not take in the power to abrogate the "11tire Constitu· tion and replace it by another new Constitution, it certainly means that any provisions of the Constitution may be changed and this change can be in the form of addition to, alteration of or deletion of any provision of the Constitution. So long therefore as the Constitution is not entirely abrogated and replaced by a new Constitution 11t onei stroke, the power of amendment would enable Parliament to make all changes in the existing Constitution by addition;- alteration or deletion. Subject only to complete repeal being not p0ssible, the power of amendment contained in Art. 368 is unfettered. It is further urged that there can be no implied limitations on the power to amend and the limitations if any on this power must be found in express terms in the Article providing for amendment. It is conceded that there may be an express lintl· tation not merely in the Article providing for amendment but ia some other part of the Constitution. But it is said that if that is so, there must be a clear provision to that effect. In the absence of express lintltations, therefore, there can be no implied lintltations on the power to amend the Constitution contained in Art. 368 atid that power will take in all changes whether by way of addition, alteration or deletion, subject only to this that the power of amendment may not contain the power to lbrogate and repeal the entire Constitution and substitute it wit:n a new one. _

lt is then urged that there is no express provision in Art 368 itself so far as any amendment relating to the substance of the amending power is concerned; the only limitations in Art. 368 are as to procedure and courts can only see that the procedure as indicated in Art. 368 is followed before an amendment can be said to be valid. It is further urged that the word "law" in Art. I 3 does not include an amendment of the Constitution and only

82~

SUPRl!MI! COURT REPORTS

[ 1967] 2 S.C.R.

means Jaw as made under the legislative provisions contained in Chapter l of Part XI read with Chapters II and lll of Part V of the Constitution and Chapters Ill and V of Part VI thereof. In effect it is a law which is made under the Constitution which is included in the word "law" in Art. 13(2) and not an amendment to the Constitution under Art. 368. As to Articles 226 and 245 and the necessity of taking action under the proviso to Art. 368, it is urged that there is no change in Arts. 226 and 245 on account of any provision in the Seventeenth Amendment and therefore no action under the proviso was necessary. It is only direct change in Arts. 226 and 245 which would require following the procedure as to ratificaticn or at any rate such change in other Articles which would have the effect of directly compelling change in Ans 226 and 245 and that in the present case no such direct compulsion arises. Lastly as to the argument of fear it is urged that there is always a provision with respect to amendment in written federal Constitutions. Such a provision may be rigid or flexible. In our Constitution Art. 1368 provides for a comparatively flexible provision for amendment and there is no reason to make it rigid by implying any limitations on that power. Further there is no reason to suppose that all those things will be done by Parliament which are being urged to deny the power under Art. 368 which flows naturally from its terms. Besides the above. reliance is also placed on behalf of the Union of lndid and the States on the doctrine of stare decisis. It is urged that since the decision of this Court in Sankari Prasad's case('), sixteen further amendments have been made by Parliament on the faith of that decision involving over 200 Articles of the Constitution. The amendments relating to Part III have been mainly with respect to agrarian reforms resulting in transfers of title of millions of acres of land in favour of millions of people. Therefore, even though Sankari Prasad's case(') has stood only for fifteen years there has been a vast agrarian revolution effected on the faith of that decision and this Court should not now go back on what was decided in that case. Further, bc'..:des the argument based on state decisis, it is urged on the basis nr ~enain decisions of this Court that the unanimous decision in Sankari Prasad's case(') which had stood practically unchallenged for about 15 years till the decision in Sajjan Singh's case('), should not be over-ruled unless it is found to be incorrect by a large majority of the Judges constituting this Special &nch. It is urged that if the present Bench is more or less evenly divided it should not over-rule the unanimous decision in Sankari Prasnd'.1· ca~e( 1 ) by a majority of one. (ll f19'2J S.CR

~9.

GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, J.)

•

We shall first take Art. 368. It i,<; found in Part XX of the Constitution which is headed "Amendment of the Constitution" and is the only Article in that Part. That Part thus provides specifically for the amendment of the Constitution, and the first question that arises is whether it provides power for the amendment of the Constitution as well as the procedure for doing so. It is not disput~d that the procedure for amendment of the Constitution is to be found in Art. 368, but what is in dispute is whether Art. 368 confers power also in that behalf. Now the procedure for the amendment of the Constitution is this. The amendment is initiated by the introduction of a Bill in either House of Parliament. The .Bill has to be passed in each House by a l!'ajority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less twocthirds of the members of that House present and voting. After it is so passed, it has to be presented to the President for his assent. On such presentation if the President assents to the Bill, Art. 368 provides that the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill. Further there is a proviso for ratification with respect to certain Articles and other provisions of ihe Constitution including Art. 368, and those matters can only be amended if the Bill passed by the two Houses by necessary majority ~ ratified by the legislatures of not less than one-half of the States by resolutions to that effect. In such a case the Bill cannot be presented for his assent to the President until necessary ratification is available. But when the necessary ratification has been made, the Bill with respect to these matters is then presented to the President and on his assent being given, the Constitution stands· amended in accordance · with the terms of the Bill. The argument is that there is no express provision in terms in Art. 368 conferring power on Parliament to amend the Constitution, and in this connection our attention has been invited to an analogous provision in the Constitution of Ireland in Art. 46, where cl. 1 provides that any provision of the Constitution may be. amended in the manner provided in that Article, and then follows the procedure for amendment in clauses 2 to 5. Reference is also made to similar provisions in other constitutions, but it is Unnecessary to refer to them. It is urged that as Art. 368 has nothing comparable to cL 1 of Art. 46 of the Irish Constitution, the power to amend the Constitution is not in Art. 368 and must be found elsewhere. We are not prepared to accept this argument. The fact that Art. 368 i~ not in two part~. the fi'rst part indicating that the Constitution shall be amended in the manner provided theteafter, and the second part indicating the procedtire for amendment, does not mean that the power to amend the Comtitution is not contained in Art. 368 itself. The very fact that a

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1967] 2 S.C.R,

separate Part has been devoted in the Constitution for amendment thereof and there is cnly one Article in that Part shows that both the power to amend and the procedure for amendment are to be iound in Art. 368. Besides, the words "the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill" in An. 368 clearly in our opinion provide for the power to amend after the procedure has been followed. It appears that our Constitution-makers were apparently thinking of economy of words and elegance of language in enacting Art. 368 in the terms in which it appears and that is why it is not in two parts on the model of Art. 46 of the Irish Constitution. But there can in. our opinion be no doubt, when a separate Part was provided headed "Amend~ ment of the Constitution" that the power to amend the· Constitution must also be contained in Art. 368 which is the only Article in that Part. If there was any doubt about the matter, that· doubt in our opi.iion is resolved by the words to which we, have already referred, namely, "the. Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill". These words can only mean tha_t the power is there to amend the Constitution after the procedure has been followed.

•

It is however urged that t'1e power to amend the Constitution is not to be found in Art. 368 but is contained in the residuary power of Parliament in Art. 248 read with item 97 of List I. It is true that Art. 248 reRd with item 97 of List I, insofar as it provides for residuary power of legislation, is very wide in itli scope, and the a,rgument that the power to amend the Constitution is contained in this provision appears prima facie attractive in view of the width of the residuary power. But we fail to see why when there is a whole Part devoted to the amendment of the Constitution the power to amend should not be found in that Part, if it can be reasonably found there and why Art. 368 should only be confined to providing for procedure for amendment. It is true that the marginal note to Art. 368 is "procedure for amendment of the Constitution", but the marginal note. cannot control the meaning of the words in the Article itself, and we have no doubt that the words "the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill" to be found in Art. 368 confer the power of amendment. If we were to compare the language G of els. 2 to 5 of Art. 46 of the Irish Constitution which prescribes the prnccdure for amendment, wc find no words therein comparable to these words in Art. 368. These words clearly are comparable to ·cl. 1 of Art. 46 of the Irish Constitution and must be read as conferring power on Parliament to amend the Constitution. Besides it is remarkable in contrast that Art. 248 read with List If I does not in terms mention the amendment of the Constitution. While therefore there is a whole Part devoted to the amendment of the Constitution, we do not find any specific mention of the

'

GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, /.)

amendment of the Constitution in Art. 248 or in ;my entry of List I. It would in the circumstances be more appropriate to read the power in Art. 368 in view of the words which we have already referred to than in Art. 248 read with item 97 of List I. Besides it is a historical fact to which we can refer that originally the intention was to vest residuary power in States, and if that intention had been eventually carried out, it would have been impossible for any one to argue that the power to amend the Constitution was to be found in the residuary power if it had been vested in the States and not in the Union. The mere fact that during the pas8age of the Constitution by the Constituent Assembly, residuary power was finally vested in the Union would not therefore mean that it includes the power to amend the Constitution. On a comparison of the scheme of the words in Art. 368 and the scheme of the words in Art. 248 read with item 97 of List I, therefore, there is no doubt in our mind that both the procedure and power to amend the Constitution are to be found in Art. 368 and they are not to be found in Art. 248 read with item 97 of List I which provides for residuary legislative power of Parliament.

There is in our opinion another reason why the power to amend the Constitution cannot be found in Art. 248 read with item 97 of List I. The Constitution is the fundamental law and no law passed under mere legislative power conferred by the Constitution can affect any change in the Constitution unless there E is an express power to that effect given in the Constitution itself. But subject to such express power given by the Constitution itself. the fundamental law, namely the Constitution, cannot be changed by a law passed under the legislative provisions contained in the Constitution as all legislative acts passed under the power conferred by the Constitution must conform to the Constitution can F make no change therein. There are a number of Articles in the Constitution, which expressly provide for amendment by law, as, for example, 3, 4, 10, 59(3), 65(3), 73(2), 97, 98(3), 106, 120(2), 135, 137, 142(1), 146(2), 148(3), 149, 169, 171(2), 186, 187(3), 189(3), 194(3), 195, 210(2), 221 (2), 225, 22~(2), 239(1), 241(3), 283(1) and (2), 285(2), 287, 300(1), 313, 345. 373, Sch. V, c!. 7 and Sch. VI, cl. 21; G and so far as these Articles are concerned they can be amended by Parliament by ordinary law-making process. But so far as the other Articles are c0ncerned they can only b0 amended by amendment of the Constitution under Art. 368. Now Aft. 245 which gives power to make Jaw for the whole or any part of the territory of India by Parliament is "subject to the provisions of this Constiff tution" and any law made by Parliament whether under Art. 246 read with List I or under Art. 248 read with item 97 of List I must be subject to the provisions of the Constitution. If there·fore the power to amend the Constitution is contained in Art. 248

SUPllEMB COUllT llBPOllTS

(1967) 2 S.C.R.

read with item 97 of List I, that power has to be exercised subject to the provisions of the Constitution and canhot be used to cLange the tundamental Jaw (namely, the Constitution) itself. But it is argued that Art. 368 which provides a special procedure for amendment of the Constitution should be read along with Arts. 245 and 248, and so read it would be open to amend any provision of the Constitution by law passed under Art. 248 on the ground that Art. 248 is subject to Art. 368 and therefore the two together give Power to Parliament to pass a law under Art. 248 which will amend even those provisions of the Constitution which are not expressly made amendable by law passed under the legislative power of Parliament. This in our opinion is arguing in a circle. If the fundamental Jaw (i.e. the Constitution) cannot be changed by any law passed under the legislative powers contained there!n, for legislation so passed must conform to the fundamental law, we fail to see how a law passed under the residuary power, which is nothing more than legi.,lative power conferred on Parliament under the Constitution, can change the Constitution (namely, the fundamental Jaw) itself. We may in this connection refer to the follawing passage in The Law and the Constitution by W. Ivor Jennings ( 1933 Ed.) at p. 51 onwards : "A written constitution is thus the fundamental law of a country, the express embodiment of the doctrine of the reign of Jaw. All public authorities-legislative, administrative and judicial-take their powers directly or indirectly from it. ....... whatever the nature of t!1e written constitution it is clear that there "'is a fundamental distinction between constitutional law and the rest of the law ........ There is a clear separation, therefore, between the constitutional Jaw and .he rest of the law." It is because of this difference between the fundamental law (namely, the Constitution) and the law pa•sed under the legislative provisions of the Constitution that it is not possible in the absence of an express provision to that effect in the fundamental law to change the fundamental law by ordinary legislation passed thereunder, for such ordinary legislation must always conform 10 the fundamental law (i.e. the Constitution). If the power to amend the Constitution is to be found in Art. 248 read with item 97 of List I, it will mean that ordinary legislation passed under the fundamental law would amend that law and this cannot be done •nless there is express provision a• in Art. 3 etc. to that effect In the absence of such express provision any law passed under the legiSlative powers granted under the fundamental law cannot amend it. So if we were to hold that the pawer to amend the

..

GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, J.)

82il

Constitution is comprised in Art. 248, that would mean that no amendment of the Constitution would be possible at all except to the extent expressly provided in various Articles to which we have referre<: already, for the power to legislate under Art. 245 read Therefore, with Art. 248 is itself subject to the Constitution. reading Art. 368 and considering the scheme of the legislative powers conferred by Articles 245 and 248 read with item 97 of List I, this to our mind is clear, firstly that the power to amend the Constitution is to be found in Art. 368 itself, and secondly, that the power to amend the Constitution can never reside in Art. 245 and Art. 248 read with item 97 of List I, for that would make any amendment of the Constitution impossible except with respect to the express provisions contained in certain Articles thereof for amendment by Jaw. We may in this connection add that all this argument that power to amend the Constitution is to be found in Art. 245 and Art. 248 read with item 97 of List I has been based on one accidental circumstance, and that accidental circumstance is that the procedure for amendment of the Constitution contained in Art. 368 is more or less assimilated to the procedure for making ordinary Jaws under the Constitution. The argument is that constitutional amendment is also pa%ed by the two Houses of Parliament, and is assented to by the Pre3ident like ordinary legislation, with this difference that a special majority is required for certain purposes and a special majority plus ratification is required for certain other purposes. It may be admitted that the procedure for amendment under Art. 368 is somewhat similar to the procedure for passing ordinary legislation under the Constitution. Even so, as pointed out by Sir Ivor Jennings in the passage already quoted, there is a clear separation between constitutional law and the rest of the law and that must never be forgotten. An amendment to the Constitution is a constitutional law and as observed in Sankari Prasad's case(') is in exercise of constituent power; passing of ordinary law is in exercise of ordinary legislative power and is clearly different from the power to amend the Constitution. We may in this connection refer, for example, to Art. V of the U.S. Constitution, which provides for the amendment thereof. It will be clearly seen that the power contained in Art. V of the U.S. Constitution is not ordinary legislative power and no one can possibly call it ordinary legislative power, because the procedure provided for the amendment of the Constitution in Art. V differs radically from the procedure provided for ordinary legislation, for example, the President's assent is not required for constitutional amendment under Art. V of the U.S. Constitution. Now if Art. 368 also had made a similar departure from the procedure provided for ordinary legislation, it could never have been {') [l9j! I S.C. R 89.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1967] 2 S.C.R·

said that Art. 368 merely contained the procedure for amendment and that what emerges after that procedure is followed is ordinary law o[ the same quality and nature as emerges after following the procedure for passing ordinary law. If, for example, the assent of the President which is to be found in Art. 368 ha.cl not been there and the Constitution would hav,: stood amended after the Bill had been passed by the two Houses by li""'es"ai:· majority and after ratification by not less than one-half of the· States where so required, it could never have been argued that lite power to amend the Constitution was contained in Arts. 245 and 248 read with item 97 of List I and Art. 368 merely contained the procedure. We aJe however of opinion that we should look at the quality and nature of what is done under Art. 368 and not lay so much stress on the similarity of the procedure contained in Art. 368 with the procedure for ordinary law-making. If we thus look at the quality and nature of what is done under Art. 368, we find· that it is the exercise of constituent power for the purpose of amending the Constitution itself and is very different from the exercise of ordinary legislative power for passing laws which must be in conformity with the Constitution and cannot go against any provision thereof, unle>s there is e'prcss provision to that effect to which we have already reierred. If we thus refer to the nature and quality of what is done under Art. 368, we immediately see that what emcrg~s after the procedure in Art. 368 is gone through is not ordinary law which emerges after the legislative procedure contained in the Con>titution is gone through. Thus Art. 368 provides for the coming into existence of what may be called the fundamental law in the fonn of an amendment of the Constitution and therefore what emerges after the procedure under Art. 368 is gone through is not ordinary legislation but an amendment of the Constitution which becomes a part of the fundamental law itself, by virtue of the words contained in Art. 368 to the effect that the Constitution shall stand amcnJcd in accordance with the terms of the Bill. It is urged in this connection on behalf o( the Union of India that even though the assent of the Pres;dent is required under Art. 368, the President must assent thereto and cannot withhold his assent as is possible in the case of ordinary l~w in view of Art. 111 of the Constitution, for the words "that he withholds assent therefrom" found in Art. 111 are not to be founrl in Art. 368. It is however difficult to accept the argument on behalf of the Union that the President cannot withhold his assent when a Bill for amendment of the Constitution is presented to him. Article 368 provides that a Bill for the amendment of the Constitution shall be presented to the President for his assent. It further provides·

I)

It

r

GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, I.)

Ii'

that upon such assent by the President, the C0nstitution shall stand amended. That in our opinion postulates that if assent is not given, the Cohstitution cannot be amended. Whether a President will ever withhold his assent in our form of Government is a different matter alto!(ether, but as we read Art. 368 we cannot -hold that the President is bound to assent and cannot withhold his assent when a Bill for amendment of the Constitution is presented to him. We are of opinion that the President can refuse to give his assent when a Bill for amendment of the Constitution is presented to him, the result being that the Bill altogether falls, for there is no specific provision for anything further to be done about the Bill in Art. 368 as there is in Art. 111. We may in this connection refer to the different language used iii cl. s· of Art. 46 of the Irish Constitution which says that "a Bill .containing a proposal for the amendment of this Constitution_ shall be signed by the Pres~dent forthwith upon his being satisfied that the provisions of this Article have been complied with in respect thereof". It will be seen therefore that if the intention under Art. 368 had been that the President cannot withhold his assent, we would have found language similar in terms to that in cl. 5 of Art. 46 of the lrish Constitution. We thus see that in one respect at any rate Art. 358 even on its present terms differs from the power of the President in connection with ordinary legislation under the Constitution and that is if the President withholds his assent the Bill for amendment of the Constitution immediately falls. We cannot accept that the procedure provided under the proviso to Art. 111 can apply in such a case, for this much cannot be disputed that so far as the procedure for amendment of the Constitution is concerned we mt!st look to Art. 368 only and nothing else. In any case the mere fact that tlie procedure in Art. 368 is very much assimilated to the progedure for p?ssing ordinary legislation is no reason for holding that wkt emerges after the procedure under Art. J68 is followed is ordinary law and no more. We repeat that we must look at the quality and nature of what is done· under Art. 368, and that is, the amendment of the Constitution. If we look at that we must hold that What emerges is not ordinary law passed under the Constitution but something which has the effect of amending the fundamental law itself which could not be done by ordinary legislative process under the Constitution unless there is express provision to that effect. We have already referred to such express provisions in various Articles, but Art. 368 cannot be treated as such an Article, for it deals specifically with the amendment of the Constitution as a whole. It is also· remarkable to note in this connection that the word "Jaw" which has been used in so many Articles of the Consti-

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1967) 2 S.CR.

tution has been avoided apparently with great care in Art. 368. We again refer to the concluding words of the main part of Art. 36~ which says that the .. Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill''. t\ow It is "'ell-known that in the case of ordinary legislation as soon as the Bill is passed by t>Oth Houses .and has received the assent of the Prcsidznt it becomes an Act. But Art. 368 provides that as soon as the Bill for amendment of the Constitution has l :en passed in accordance with the procedure provided therein the Constitution shall stan~ amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill. These words i~ our opinion have significance of their own. It is also remarkable that these words clc:irly 'how the difference between the quality of what emerges after the procedure under Art. 368 is followed and what happens when ordinary law-making procedure is folk.~cd. Under Art. 11 J, in the case of ordinary Jaw-making whCTJ a Hill is passed by the two Houses of P;ir!iament it is prcscntc<l to the P ·esic'ent an<l the Pre"ident shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom. But it is remarkable that Art. 111 docs not ;>rovidc that when the Bill has been assented to by the President it hccomes an :\ct. The reason for this is that the Bill a"cntcd to ty the President though it mly become law is st<ll not declared by Art. 111 to be a law, for such law is open to challenge in courts on various grounds, namely, on the ground that it violates any fundamental rights, or on the ground that Parliament was not competent to pass it or on the ground that it is in breach of any provision of the Constit:ition. On the other hand we find that when a Bill for the amendment of the Constitution is passed by requisite majorily and assented tu by the President, the Constitution itself declares that the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill. Thereafter what courts can see is whether the procedure provided in Art. 368 has been followed, for if tl'.at is not done, the Constitution cannot stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill. But if the procedure ha' been followed, the Constitution siands amended, and there is no question of testing the amendment of the Constitution thereafter on the anvil of fundamental rights or in any· other way as in the case of ordinary legislation. Jn view of all this we have no doubt that even though by accident the procedure provided in the Constitution for amendment thereof is very akin <o the procedure for passing ordinary legislation, the power contained in Art. 368 is still not ordinary legislative power but constituent power for the 'I' ·ific purpose of amendment of the Consti,ution; and it is the qu • .ity of that power which determines the nature of what emerges after t!1e procedure in Art. 368 has been followed and what thus emerges is not ordinary legislation but fundamental law which cannot be tested, for example, under Art. 13 (2) of the Consti:ution or under any other provision of the Constitution.

• II

GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, J.)

533,

We may briefly refer to an argument on behalf of the Union of India that the amending power contained in Art. 368 is the same sovereign power which was possessed by the Constituent Assembly when it made the Constitution and therefore it is not subject to any fetters of any kind. We do not thin!' it necessary to enter into .the academic question as to where sovereignty resides and whether legal sovereignty is in the people and political sovereignty in the body which has the power to amend the Constitution and vice versa. In our view the words of Art. 368 clearly confer the power to amend the Constitution and also provide the procedure for doing so, and that in 0ur opinion is enough for the purpose of deciding whether th-> Seventeenth Amendment is valid or not. Further as we have already stated, the power conferred c under A1t. 368 is constituent power to change the fundamental law i.e. the Constitution, and is distinct and different from the ordinary legislative power conferred on Parliament by various other provisions in the Constitution. So long as this distinction is kept in mind Parliament would have the power under Art. 368 to amend the Constitution and what Parliament does under Art. 368 D is not ordinary law-making which is subject to Art. 13(2) or any other Article of the Constitution. What is the extent of the power c.onferred on Parliament and whether there are any limitations on it'--express or implied-will be considered by us presently. Bnt we have no doubt, without entering into the question of sovereignty and of whether Art. 368 confers the same sovereign power on Parliament as the Constituent Assembly had when framing the E Constitution, that Art. 368 does confer power on Parliament subject t0 the procedure provided therein for amendment of any provision of the Constitution. This brings us to the scope and extent of the power conferred for amendment under Art. 368. It is urged that Art. 368 only gives power to amend the Constitution. Recourse is had on behalf of the petitioners to the dictionary meaning of the word "amendment". It is said that amendment implies and means im' provement in detail and cannot take in any change in the basic features of the Constitution. Reference in this connection may be made to the following meaning of the word "amend" in the Oxford English Dictionary, namely, "to make professed improvements in G a measure before Parliament; formally, to alter in detail, though practically it may be to alter its principle, so as to thwart it". This meaning at any rate does not support the case of the petitioners that amendment merely means such change as results in improvement in detail. It shows that in law, though amendment may professedly be intended to make improvements and to alter only H in detail, in r;:ality, it may make a radical change in the provision which is amended. In any case. as was pointed out in Sajjan Singh's case(') the word "amend" or "amendment" is well under-

'

----

(I I [1%5] I S.C.R. 933.

~34

SUPREME C()URT REPORTS

! 1967] 2 S.C.R

stood in law and will certainly include any change whether by way of addition or alteration or deletion of any provision in the Constitution. There is no reason to suppose that when the word "amendment" of the Constitution wa> bcmg used in Art. 368, the intention wa' to give any meaning le;, than what we have stated above. To say that "amendment" in law only means a change which results in improvement would make amendments imp<lssible, for Y.hat is improvr.ment of an existing law is a matter of opinion and what, for example, the legislature may consider an improvem~nt may not be so considered by others. It is therefore in our opinion impossible to introduce in the concept of amendment as used in Art. 368 any idea of improvement as to details of the Constitution. The word "amendment" used in Art. 368 must therefore be given its full meaning as used in law and that means that by amendment an existing Constitution or law can be changed, and this change can take the form either of addition to the existing provisions, or alteration of existing provision> and their substitution by others or deletion of certain provisions altogether. In this connection reference has been made to contra.>! certain other provisions of the Constitution, where, for example. the word "amend" has been followed by such words as "by way of addition. variance or repeal" (~e Sixth Schedule, paragraph 21) and more or less similar expressions in other Articles of the Constitution. It is very difficult to say why this was done. But the fact that no such words appear in Art. 363 does not in our mind make any difference, for the meaning of the word "amendment" in law is clearly as indicated above by us and the presence or absence of 1!xplanatory words of the nature indicated above do not in our opinion make any difference.

C

The question whether the power r,f amendment given by Art 368 also includes the power to abrogate the Constitution completely and to replace it by an entire new Constitution, does not F really arise in the present ca~. for the Seventeenth Amendment h<l' not done any such thing a1. :l need not be considered. It ;, -.·rough to say that it may be open to doubt whether the power of amendment contained in Art. 368 goes to the extent of completely abrogating the present Constitution and substituting it b,· an ootirely new one. But short of that, we are of opinion that the G power to ~n~cnd includes the power to add any provision to the Constitution, to alter any provision and substitute any C1the~ provisim. in its place and to delete any provision. 1ne Seve~tcenlh Ame nent is merely i~ exercise of the power of amendment as indica~~d above and cannot be struck down on the ground that it goc' beyond the power conferred on Parliament to :tme,,,1 the Om,tituti-.n by Art. 368. Tr.e next question that arises ;, whether there i' any limi·tation on the rn\\'er of amendment as explained by l'S above.

.

.

GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB

(Wanclwo, ], )

S~l5

Limitations may be of two kinds. namely, express or implied. So far as express limitations are concerned, there are none such in Art. 368. When it speaks of the "amendment of this Constitution" it obviously and clearly refers to amendment of any provision thereof, including the provisions contained in Part Ill relating to fundamental rights. Whether Art. 13 ( 2) is an express limitation on the power of amendment will be considered by u.< later, but so far as Art. 368 is concerned there are no limitation" whatsoever in the matter of substance on the amending power and any provision of the Constitution, be it in Part III and any other Part, can be amended under Art. 368. The next question is whether there are any implied limitations on the power of amendment contained in Art. 368, and this brings us to the argument that there are certain basic features of the Constitution which cannot be amended at all and there is an implied limitation on the power of amendment contained in Art. 368 so far as these basic features are concerned. We mav in this connection refer to the view prevailing amongst jurists in the United States of America as to whether there are any implied limitations on the power of amendment contained in Art. V of the U.S. Constitution. There are two lines of though~ in this matter in the United States. Some jurists take the view that there are certain implied limitations on the power to amend contained in Art. V of the U.S. Constit!ltion. These are said to be with respect to certain basic features, like, the republican character of Government, the federal structure etc. On the other hand, it appears that the more prevalent view amongst .iurists in the United States :s that there are no implied limitations on the score of the amending power in Art. V of the U.S. Constitution. Willis on the Constitutional Law of the United States of America (1936 Edition) says that probably the correct position is that the amending power embraces everything; in other words there are no legal limitations whatever on the power of amend".lent, except what is expressly provided in Art. V : (see discussion on pp. 122 to 127). Even with respect to these express limitations. Munro in The Government of the United States (Fifth Edition) at p. 77 says that even these express limitations can be reroved and one of the ways of doing so is "to remove the exception by a preliminary amendment and thus clear the way for further action··. Besides, as a matter of fact there is no decision of the SuprP.mc Coon of the United States holding that there are implied limitations on the power of amendment contained in Art. V of the U.S. Constitution and all amendments so far made in the United States have been upheld by the Supreme Court there in the few cases that have been taken to it for testing the validity of the amendments.

SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS

(1967] 2 S.CR.

We have given careful consideration to the argument that certain basic features of our Constituiton can;iot be amended under Art. 368 and ha\'' colile to the conclusion that no limitations can be and should be implied upon the power of amendment under Art. 368. One reason for coming to this conclusion is that if we were to accept that certain basic features of the Constitution cannot be amended under Art. 368, ·it will lead to the position that any amendment made to any Article of the Con· stitution would be liable to challenge before courts on the ground that it amounts to amendment of a basic feature. Parliament would thus never be able to know what amendments it can mak: in the Constitution and what it cannot; for, till a complete catalogue of basic features of the Constitution is available, it would be impossible to make any amendmC11t under Art. 368 with • ,1y certainty that it would be upheld by courts. If such an implied limitation were to be put on the power of amendment contained in Art. 368, it would only be the courts which would have the pow'r to decide what are basic features of the Constitution and then to declare whether a particular amendment is valid or not on the ground that it amends a particular basic feature or not. The ~ult would be that every amendment made in the Constitution would provide a harvest of legal wrangles so much so that Parliament may never know what provisions can be amended and what cannot. The power to amend being a constituent uower cannot in our opinion for these reasons be held subject to any imnlied limitations thereon on the ground that certain basic features o[ the Constitution cannot be amended. We fail to see why if there was any intention to make any part of the Constitution unamendable, the Constituent Assembly failed to indicate it expresslv in Art. 368. If, for example, the Constitution-makers ;ntc-.jed certain provisions in the Constitution, and Part III in particular, to be not amendable, we can see no reason why it was not so stated in Art. 368. On the clear words of Art. 368 which provides for amendment of the Constitution which means any provision thereof, we cannot infer any implied limitations on the power of amendment of an; provision of the Con~tituion, be it basic or otherwise. Our conclusion is that constituent power. like that contained in Art. 368, can only be subject to express limitations and not to any imnlied limitations so far as substance of the amendments are concerned and in the absence of anything in Art. 368 making any provision of the Constitution unamendable, it must be held that the Power to amend in Art. 368 reaches every provision of the Constitution and can be used to amend anv orovision thereof. provided the procedure indicated in Art. '.168 is followed. Copious references were made durin,!! the course of argumen~s to dchatcs in r·arliamcnt and it is urgc(J that it is open· to th;s

JI

If

GOLAKNATH v. l'UNJAB (Wanchoo, J.)

Court to look into the debates in order to interpret Art. 368 to find out the inten ion of the Constitution-makers. We are of opinion that we cannot and should not look into the debates that took place in the Constituen: A>Sembly to determine the interpretation of A, t. 368 and the scope and extent of the provision contained therein. it may be conceded that his:orical background and perhaps what was accepted or what was rejected by the Constituent Assembly while the Constitu:ion was being frarried, may be taken into account in finding out the scope and extent of Art. 368. But we have no doubt that what was spoken in the debates in the Constituent Assembly cannot and should not be looked into in order to interpret Art. 368. Craies on Stamte Law· (Sixth Edition) at p. 128 say~ that "it is not permissible in discussing the meaning of an obscure enactment, to refer to 'parliamentary history' of a statute, in the sense of the debates which took place in Parliament when the statute was under consideration", and supports his view with reference to a large number of English cases. The same is the view in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, (11th Edition) p. 26. Crawford on Statutory Construction (1940 Edition) at p. 340 says that resort may not be had to debates to ascertain legislative intent, though historical background in which the legislation came to be passed, can be taken into consideration.

In Administrator General of Bengal v. Prem [,al Mullick('), the Privy Council held that "proceedings of the legislature cannot be referred to as legitimate aids to the construction of the Act in which they result."

In Baxter v. Commissioner of Taxation('\, it was said that reference to historical facts can be made in order to interpret a statute. There was however no reference to the debates in order to arrive at the meaning of a particular provision of the Constitution there in dispute.

In A. K. Gopalan v. the State of Madras( 3 ), Kania C.J. refer6ng to the debates and reports of the Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly in respect of the words of Art. 21 observed at p. 110 that they might not be read to control the meaning of the Article. In that case all that was accepted was that "due process of law" which was a term used in the U.S. Constitution, was not accepted for the purpose of Art. 21 which used the words "the procedure established by ;dw". Patanjali Sastri J. (at p. 202) also refused to look at the debates and particularly the speeches made in order to determine the meaning of Art. 21. Faz! Ali, J. (at p. 158) was of opinion that the pro(I) [189S] 221.A. 107.

(2) (1907] 4 C.L.R. J087. (3) [1950) S.C.R. 88.

LJSup.CI/67-8

au

SUPltliME COUltT llBPOll.TS

(1967] 2 S.C.R

cecclings and discussiom in the Constituent Assembly were not relevant for the purpose of construing the expressions used in Art. 21. Again in The Automobile Transport (P..ajastha11) Limited v. the Stale of Rajasthan('), this Coun looked into the historical background but refused t<,> look into the debates in order to determine the meaning of the provisions of the Constitution in dispute in that case. We are therefore of opinion that it is not possible to read the speeches made in the Constituent Assembly in order to interpret Art. 368 or 4l define its extent and scope and to determine what it. takes in and what it does not. As to the historical facts, namely. what was accepted or what was avoided in the Constituent Assem• bly in co;..nection with Art. 368, it is enou~,h to say that we have not been able to find any help from the material relating to this. There were proposals for restricting the power of amendment under An. 368 and making fundamental rights immune therefrom and there were counter proposals before the Consthuent Assembly for making the power of amendment all-embracing. They were all either dropped or negatived and iii the circumstances are of no help in determining the interpretation of Art. 368 which mYSt be interpreted on the words thereof as they finally found place in the Constitution, and on those words we have no docbt that there are no implied limitations of any kind on the power to amend given therein. An argument is also raised that limitations on the power to amend the Constitution can be found in the preamble to the Constitution. As to that we may refer only 4l in re: iirl! Berubari Union and Exclnnge of Enclaves(') with respect to the value of the preamble to the Constitution and its importance therein. It was observed in that case unanimously by a Bench of nine J udgcs thz.t "although it may be correct to describe the preamble as a key to the mind of the Constitution-makers, it forms no part of the Constitution and cannot be regarded as th., source of any substantive power which the body of the Constitution alone can confer on the Government, expressly or by implication. This is equally true to prohibitions and limitationsn. The Court there was considering whether the preatnble could in any way limit the power of Parliament to cede any pan of the national territory and held that it was not correct to say that "the preamble could ill any way limit the power of Par!iament to cede parts c>f the national territory". On a parity of reasoning we are of opinion that the preamble cannot prohibit or control in any way or impose any implied prohibitions or limitations on the power to amend the Constitution contained in Art. 368. (t) (1963] I S.C.R. 491.

(2) (£960] 3 S.C.R. 250.

GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wa11choo, J.)

tH

This brings us to the question whether the word "law" in Art. 13 ( 2) includes an amendment of the Constitution, and therefore there is an express provision in Art. 13 ( 2) which at least limits the power of amendment under Art. 368 to this extent that by such amendment· fundamental rights guaranteed by Part Ill cannot be taken away or abridged. We have already pointed out that in Sankari Prasad's case(') as well as Sujjan Si11gh's case('), it has already been held, in one case unanimously and in the other by majority, that the word "law" in An. 13(2) does not include an amendment of the Constitution, and it is the correctnes~ of this view which is being impugned before this Bench. Article 13 is in three parts. The first part lays down that "all laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void". Further all previous constitutional provhions were repealed by Art. 395 which provided that "the Indian Independence Act, 1947, and the Government of India Act, 1935, together with all enactments amending or supplementing the latter Act, but not including the Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949, are hereby repealed." Thus it is clear that the word "law" in Art. 13 (l) does not inciudo any law in the nature of a constitutional provision, for no such law remained after the repeal in Art. 395. Then comes the second part of Art. 13, which says that "the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of Ibis clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void". The third part defines the word "law" for the purpose of Art. .13; the definition is inclusive and not exhaustive. It is because of the definition in cl. ( 3) of Art. 13 being inclusive that it is urged that the word "law" in Art. 13(2) includes an amendment of the Constitution also. Now we see no reason why if the word "law" in Art. 13 ( 1) relating to past laws does not include any constitutional provision the word "law" in cl. (2) would take in an amendment of the Constitution, for it would be reasonable to read the word "law" in Art. 13 (2) includes an amendment of the 13. But apart from this consideration, we are of opinion that the word "law" in Art. 13(2) could never have been intended to take in an amendment of the Constitution. What Art. 13(2) means is that a law made under the constitutional provisions would be tested on the anvil of Part :m and if it takes away or abridges rights conferred by Part Ill it v;ould be void to the extent of the contravention. There are many Articles in the Constitution which provide directly for making law in addition to Articles 245, 246, 248, etc. ~nd the three Lists and Art. 13(2) (I) [1~52] S.C.R. 89.

(2) [1965] I S.C.R. 913.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1967) 2 S.C R.

prohibits the State fr' .n making any law under these provisions. W:~ sec no difliculty in the circumstances in holding that Art. 13 (2) when it taiks of the State making any law, refers to the law made under the provisions contained in Ch. I of Part XI of the Cons:itution beginning with Art. 245 and also other prov;sions already referred to earlier. Article 246 provides that Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India and t~ legislature ot a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the State. Article 246( I) gives exclusive power to P~rliament lo make laws with respect to subjects enumerated in List I. Article 246 ( 3) gives exclusive power to State lcgisiaturcs to make laws with respect to List II. Article 248 (I) gives exclusive power to Parliament to make laws with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or the State List. We are referring to these provisions merely to show that the various provisions in Chapter I of Part XI provide for making laws, and these IJws are all laws which are made under the legislative power conferred on Parliament or on State legislatures unc!er !he Constitution. Therefore when in Art. 13 (2) it is said that the S1a·e shall not make any law (Stale there including Parliament and legislature of each State), its meaning could only take in laws made by Parliament and Stale legislatures under the powers conferred under Chap'.er I of Part XI and also other provisions already rcferr.::d to earlier. We have already held that the power to amend the Constitution is to be found in Art. 368 along with the procedure and that such power is no: to be found in Art. 248 read item 97 of List I. Therefore an amendmcn: of the Constitution is not an ordinary law made under the powers conferred under Chapter I of Part Xl of the Constitution and cannot be subject to Art. 13(2) where the word "law" n.ust be read as meaning law made under the ordinary legislative power. We have already referred to a large number of Articles where Parliament is given the power to make law with respect to those Articles. So far as this power of Parliamen• is concerned it is ordinary legislat1ve power and it will certainly be subject to Art. 13 (2). But there can in our opinion be no doubt that when Art. 13(2) prohibits the State from makir.r; any Jaw which takes away or abridges righ~s conferred by Part Ill, it is only referring to ordinary legislative power conferred on Parliament and legislatures of States and cannot have any reference to the constituent power for amendment of the Constitution contained in Art. 368. 'Ve have already pointed out that there are no implied limitat ,11s on the power to amend under Art. 368 and it is open to Parliament under that Article to amend any part of the Constitution, inclt!ding Part Ill. It is worth remembering that a whole Part XX is devoted by the Constitution-makers to the subject of

u

GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, J.)

amendment of the Constitution. If it was their intention that Part III of the Constitution will not be liable to amendment by way of abridgeme.1t or 0tbrogation under the amending power contained in Art. 368 we see no reason why an express provision to tl>at r.ffect was not made in Art. 368. We cannot see what prevented the Constituent Assembly from making that clear by an B express provision in Art. 368. lt is however said that it was not necessary to say so in Art. 368, because the provision was already made in Art. 13.(2). We are unable to accept this contention, for we have no doubt that Art. 13 (2), when it refers to making of Jaws is only referring to the ordinary legislative power and not to the constituent power which results in amendment of the ConIn any case it seems to us somewhat contradictory that c stitution. in Art. 368 power should have been. given to amend any provision of the Constitution without any limitations but indirectly that p0w.er is limited by using words of doubtful import in Art. 13(2). It is remarKable that in Art. 13(2) there is no express pru~ision that ar:icndmcnt of the Constitution, under Art. 368, would be subject thereto_ It seems strange indeed that no express D provision was made in Part XX in this matter and even in Art. J 3(2) no express provision is made to this effect, and in both places the matter is left in a state of uncertainty. It is also remarkable tha'. in Art. 368 the word "law", which we find so often used in so many Articles of the Constitution is conspicuously avoided, and it is specifically provided that after the procedure E has oeen gone through the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms ot the Bill. This language of Art. 368 is very significant and ciearly makes a distinction between a constitutional Amendment and an ordinary law passed as an Amending Act. The validity of a law has to be determined at the time when the Bill actually matures into an Act and not at the stage while it is still a Bill. The provision in Art. 368 has the effect F that when a Bill amending the Constitution receives the assent of the President, the Constitution stands amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill. The Constitution thus stands amended in terms nf the Bill if the Bill has been introduced, passed and assented to by the President in accordance with the procedure laid down in Art. 368 and not as a result of the Bill becoming G an Amendment Act introducing amendment in the Constitution. Tl'e provision that the Con8titution shall stand amended in terms of the Bill was thus c1early intended to indicate that the amendment of the Constitution is not dependent on the Bill being treated as a law or an Act duly passed by Parliament. Thus it is clear that by indicating that the Constitution is to stand amended in H accordance with the terms of the Bill, Art. 368 clearly envisage~ that the r.ower of amendment of the Constitution stands on an entirely different footing from an Jrdinary law made by Parliament fo exercise of its legislative power.

SUPllliMB COUll.T REPORTS

(1967) 2 S.C.R.

If we keep in mind this difference bctw!Al a constitutional amendment or constitutional. law and an ordinary amending Acl or law, it should not be difficult to hold that when Art. 13 (2) speaks of the State making a law, it is referring to ordinary law made under the powers conferred by Art. 245 etc read with various Lists and various provisions of the Constitution where ~­ press provfr · ,n to that effect has been made and is not referring Lo the amendment of the Conslilution which is made under the constituent power. Once it is held that the power to amend is found in Art. 368 .ind 1s not to be fou.i.d in Art. 248 read with i1tm 97 of List I, it must follow that the power to amend the Comtitution under Art. 368 is a different power (namely, constituent power) and when Art. 13(2) speaks of making !aw, it can only refer to making ordinary law, particularly when we compare the words of Art. 13(2) (namely, the State shall not make any law) and the words of Arts. 245, 248, and 2SO (which all speak of Parliament making law. State-legislatures making law, and so on). Lastly, as the power to amend is in Art. 368 and on the words, as <hey stand in that Article, that power is unfettered and tncludes Lhe power to amend Part Ill, it is strange that that power should be limited by putting an interpretation on the word "law" in An. 13(2), which would include constitutional law also. There i·; nothing to suggest this even in the inclusive definition of the words "law" and "laws in force" in Art. 13(3). Besides it is conceded on behalf of the petitioners that Ar:, 368 gives power to amend Part III, but that power is only to amend one way, namely, towards enlargement of the rights contained therein, and net the other way, namely, for abridging or taking away the rights contained therein. We must say that it would require a very clear provision in the Constitution to read the power to amend the Constitution relating to Part m in thL~ mannti'. We cannot find that clear provision in Art. 13(2). We repeat !hat when the Constituent Assembly was taking the trouble of providing a whcle P~rt for amendment of the Constitution a11d •·1hen the words in Art. 368 clearly give the power to amend the Constitution and are subject to no implied limitations and contain no express liinirntions, it is strange indeed that it should have omitted to provide iu that very Article that Part 1:1 is not liable to amendment thcreu~dcr. Jn any c~sc if the power of amendment confened by the wonis of Art. 368 is unfe"cred, we must avoid any inconsistency bern""n that power and the provision contained in Art. 13(2). We avoid that in keeping with the unfettered power in Art. 368 by reading the word "law" in Art. 13(2) as meaning law passed under ordinary legislative power ?.nd thus not including an amendment of the Comtitution therein. The words in Art. 13 ('.!) are in our opinion not ~pccific and clear enough to take in

GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, J.)

t)J.e power of amendment under Art. 368 and must be confined ohly to the power of ordinary law-ma'.king contained in Arts. 245 etc., and other provisions of the Constitution read with various Lists. We have therefore no hesitation in agreeing with the view taken in Sankari Prasad' s case ( 1 ) which was upheld by the majority in Sajjan Singh's case(').

The next argument is that action under the proviso to Art. 368 is necessary as the Seventeenth Amendment afiects the power of the High Court contained in Art. 226. I~ is said that by including various Acts in the Ninth Schedule and making them immune from challenge under the provisions contained in Part III, the power of the High Court under Art. 226 is affected inasc much as the High Court cannot strike down any of the Acts included in the Ninth Schedule on the ground that they take away or abridge the rights conferred by Part III. So it is said that there has been a change in Art. 226 and it was necessary · that the Seventeenth Amendment should have been ratified by more than half the States under the proviso. A similar argument D was raised in Sankari Prasad' s case ( ) and was turned down unanimously.· The same argument was again raised· in Sajjan Singh's case( 2 ) and was also turned down. Now ratification is required under the proviso if the amendment seeks to make an~ change in various .provisions mentioned therein and one such provision is Art. 226. The question therefore is whetber the Seventeenth Amendment makes any change in Art. 226 and whether this change has to be a direct change in the words of Art. 226 or whether merely because the1e may be some effect by the Seventeenth Amendment on the content of the power in Art. 226 it will amount to change in Art. 226. We are of opinion that when the proviso lays down that there must be ratification when there is any change in the entrenched provisions, F including Art. 226, it means that there must be actPal change in the tenns of the provision concerned. If there · is no actual change directly in the entrenched provision, no ratification is required, even if any am~ndmen! of any other provision of the Constitution may have some effect indirectly on the entrenched provisions mentioned in the proviso. But it is urgeu that there G, may be such a change in some other provision as would seriously afiect an entrenched provision, and in such a case ratification should be necessary. This argument was also dealt with ;, the majority judgment in Sajjan Singh's case\ 2 ) where the doctrine of pith and substance was applied and it was held that where the amendment in any other Article so affects the entrenched Article as to amount to an amendment therein, then ratification may be necessary, even though the entrenehed Article may not be direct. ly touched. Perhaps the use of the doctrine of pith and substance (1) [!952] S. C.R. 89.

(2) [1965] I S.C.R. 933.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Ii%"] 2 S.CR.

:o sµch a case is not quite apt. But what was meant in Sajjan

s;,,~h·s

case( 1 ) was that if there is such an amendment of an uncntrcnc:hed Article that it will directly affect an entr~nchcd 1\riiclc and nc<.:~'.'-~itat~ a ci1angc therein, then recourse n1ust be had to ratification under the proviso. We may illustrate this hy t1vo cxamp!es. Article 226 lays down inter a/1a t\1at the High Court shall have pow~r to isrnc writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part Ill and for any other purpose. Now as1ume that Part Ill is completely deleted by amendment of the Constitution. If that takes place, it will necessitate an amendment of Art. 226 ~lso and deletion therefrom of the words "for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III". We have no doubt thut if such a contingency ever happens and Part Ill is completely deleted, Parliament will amend Art. 226 also and that will necessitate ratification under the proviso. But suppose Parliament merely deletes Part Ill and docs not make the necessary consequential amendment in Art. 226, it can then be said that de let ion of Part Ill necessitates change in Art. 226 also, and therefore in such a case ratification is necessary. even though Parliament may not have in fact provided for amendment of Art. 226. Take another example. Article 54 is 2;i entrenched Article and provides for the election of the President. So is Art. 55 which provides for the manner of election. Article 52 which lays down that there shall be a President i> on the other hand not an entrenched Article. It is said that Art. 52 may be altered and something else may be substituted in its place and that would not require ratification in terms as Art. 52 is not among the entrenched Articles. But we are of opinion that if Parliament amends Art. 52, it is bound to make consequential amendments in Arts. 54 and 55 which deal with the election of the President and the manner thereof and if it is so the entire amendment must be submitted for ratification. But suppose Parliament merely amends Art. 52 and makes no rhange in Arts. 5,· and 55 (a supposition which is impossible to visualise).. In that case it would in our opinion be right to hold that Art. 52 could not be altered by abolition of the cffice of the President without nec~ssi­ tating a change in Arts. 54 and 55 and in such a case if Art. 52 alone is altered by Parliament, to abolish the office of President, it will require ratification. These two examples will show where alteration or deletion of an unentrenched Article would necessitate amendment of an entrenched Article, and in such a case if Parliamrnt ta1'.es the incredible course of amending only the un~ntrenched Article and not amcnciing the enrrenched Article, courts can say that ratifi---·--·-

···-··

(I) [1965) t S.C.R. 933.

GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wanchao, /.)

cation is necessary even for amending the unentrenched Art!cle, for it directly necessitates a change in an entrenched Article. But short of that we are of opinion that merely because there is some effect indirectly on an entrenched Article by amendment of an une11trenched Article it is not necessary that there should be ratification in such circumstances also.

Besides, let us consider what would happen if the argument on behalf of the petitioners is accepted that ratification is necessary whenever there is even indirect effect on an entrenched Article by amending an unentrenched Article. Take the case of Art. 226 itself. It gives power to the High Com t not only to issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights but .to issue them for any other purpose. Writs have thus been issued by High Courts for enforcing other rights conferred by ordinary laws as well as under other provisions of the Constitution, like Arts. 301 and 311. On this argument if any change is made in Arts. 30 I and 3 I I there is bound to be an effect on Art. 226 and therefore ratification would be necessary, even though both Arts. 301 and 3I1 are not entrenched in the proviso. Further, take an ordinary law which confers certain rights and it is amended and those rights are taken away. Article 226 would be clearly affected. Before the amendment those rights may be enforced through Art. 226 while after the amendment the rights having disappeared there can be no enforcement thereof. Therefore, on this -argument even if there is amendment of ordinary law there would be an effec• on Art. 226 and it must therefore be amended every time even when ordinary Jaw is changed and the entire procedure under Art. 368 must be gone through including ratification under the proviso. It is however said that when ordinary law is amended, rights disappear and therefore there is no question of enforcement thereof; if that is correct with respect to ordinary Jaw, it is in our opinion equally correct with respect to the amendment of an unentrenched provision of the Co:i;.titution. The answer given in Sankari Pri:zsad's case(') to this argument was that Art. 226 remained just the same as it was before, and only a certain class of cases had been excluded from the purview of Part III and the cr:mrts could no lonf?er interfere, not because their powers were curtailtd in any manner or to any extent, but because there would be no occasion thereafter for the exercise of their power in such cases. We respectfully agree with these observations and are of opinion that merelv because there is some indirect effect on Art. 226 it was not _1ecessary that the Seventeenth Amendment shoi;;d have been ratified bv more than one half of the States. It is only in the extreme case, ihe examples of which we have given above, that an amendmen• of an unentrenched Article without amendn.ent of entrenched Article

-(I) [1952] S.C.R. 89.

SUPllEME COURT ltl!PORTS

(1967] 2 s.c.R.

might be had for want of ratification, and this is what was intended by the majority judgment in Sajjan Singh's case( 1), when it applied the doctrine of pith and substance in these circumstances. The argument that ratification is necessary as Art. 226 is indirectly affected !:as therefore no force and must be rejected. This is equally true with respect to the power of this Court under Arts. 132 and 136. Then it is urged that Art. 24S is enlarged by the Seventeenth Amendment inasmuch as State legislatures and Parliament were freed from the control of Part III in the matter of certain laws affecting, for example, ryotwari lands, :µid therefore as Art. 24S is an entrenched Article there should have been ratification under the proviso. This argument in our opinion is of the same type as the argument with respect to the effect on Art. 226 and our answer is the same, namely, that there is no direct effect on Art. 24S by the amendment and the indirect effect, if any, does not require that there should have been ratification in the present C8Se.

It is then urged that ratiucation is necessary as Art. 31-B deals with State legislation and in any case Parliament cannot make any law with respect to Acts which were put in the Ninth Schedule and therefore Parliament could not amend the Constitution in the manner in which it was done by making additions in the Ninth Schedule, both for want of ratification and for want of legislative competence. The answer to this argument was given in Sankari Prasad's case(') and it was observed there that"Article 31-A and 31-B really seek to save a certain class of laws and certain specified laws already passed from the combined operation of Art. 13 read with olhcr relevant Articles of Part III. The new Articles being t.hus essentially amendments of the Constirmion, Parliament had the power of enacti".tg them. That laws thus saved relate lo matters covered by List II does nor in any way affect the position. It was said that P~rliament could not validate a law which it had no power to enact. Tho proposition holds good where the validity of the impul!ned orovision turns on whether the subject matter, falls within or without the jurisdiction of the legislature which passed it. But to make a law which con:ravenes the Constitution. constitutionally valid is a maller of constitutional amendment and a• such it falls within the exclusive power of Parliament.'' (I) Jl96l) 1 SC.R.933.

(2) rJ952J S.C.R. 89.

GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, J.)

We respectfully agree with these observations. · They succinctly put the legal aild constitutional position with respect to the validity of Arts, 31-A and 31-B. It seems to us that Art. 31-B in particular is a legislative drafting device which compendiously puts in one place amendments which would otherwise have been added to the Constitution under various Articles in Part ill. The laws in the Ninth Schedule have by the device of Art. 31-B been excepted from the various provisions in Part III, which affected them and this exception could only be made by Parliament. The infumity in the Acts put in the Ninth Schedule was apprehended to be a constitutional infirmity on the ground that those laws might take away or abridge rights conferred by Part ill. Such a constitutional infinnity could not be cured by State legislatures in ant way and could only be cured by Parliament by constitutional amendment. What Parliament in fact did by including various Acts in the Ninth Schedule read with Art. 31-B was to amend the various provisions iJ Part Ill, which affected these Acts by making them an exception to those provisions in Part III. This could only be done by Parliament under the constituent power it had under Art. 368 and there was no question of the application of the proviso in such a case, for Parliament was amending Part III only with respect to these laws. The laws jlad already been passed by State legislatures and it was their constitutional infirmity, if any, which was being cured by the de\ice adopted in Art. 31-B read with the Ninth Schedule, the amendment being only of the relevant provisions of Part ill which was compendiously put in one place in Art. 31-B. Parliament could alone do it under Art. 368 and there was no nece5sity for any

Related judgments

More Supreme Court judgments

Search all Supreme Court and High Court judgments

Reproduced from the official court copy published on eCourts (Indian Court Judgments open dataset, CC-BY-4.0). Not legal advice.