In Re: Article 370 of the Constitution v. .

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
11 December 2023
Judge
Justice D.Y. Chandrachud
Neutral citation
2023 INSC 1058
Reported in
[2023] 16 S.C.R. 1
Result
Disposed off
Acts & sections
Article 370 Constitution, Article 3 Constitution, Article 356 Constitution, Article 367 Constitution, Article 1 Constitution, Article 32 Constitution, Article 368 Constitution, Article 73 Constitution

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[2023] 16 S.C.R. 1 : 2023 INSC 1058

CASE DETAILS (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1099 of 2019) DECEMBER 11, 2023 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI, SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, SANJIV KHANNA, B. R. GAVAI AND SURYA KANT, JJ.] HEADNOTES Issues for consideration: Article 370 of the Constitution of India incorporated special arrangements for the governance of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The President issued Constitutional Orders 272 and 273 during the subsistence of a Proclamation under Article 356(1)(b) which orders had the effect of applying the entire Constitution of India to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and abrogating Article 370. Contemporaneously, the Parliament enacted the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act 2019 which bifurcated the State into two Union territories, namely, the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and the Union Territory of Ladakh. The petitioners challenged the constitutionality of these actions. CO 272 was issued under Article 370(1)(d) and sought to amend clause (3) of Article 370. The petitioners challenged CO 272 as being ultra vires Article 370(1)(d) on the grounds that: a. It modified Article 370, which could only be done on exercise of power under Article 370(3); and b. Only the State Government may accord “concurrence” to the President under the second proviso to Article 370(1)(d). Further, the exercise of power under Article 370(3) in issuing CO 273 was challenged. The questions for determination were: a. Whether the provisions of Article 370 of the Constitution were temporary in nature or whether they acquired a status of permanence in the Constitution; b. Whether the amendment to Article 367 of the Constitution in exercise of the power under Article 370(1)(d) so as to substitute the reference to the “Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in clause (3) of Article 370 by the words “Legislative Assembly of the State” was constitutionally valid; Ed. Note: Hon’ble Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship, Hon’ble Mr. Justice B R Gavai and Hon’ble Mr Justice Surya Kant, while Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjiv Khanna pronounced their separate judgments.

c. Whether the entire Constitution of India could have been applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir in exercise of the power under Article 370(1)(d); d. Whether the abrogation of Article 370 by the President in exercise of the power under Article 370(3) was constitutionally invalid in the absence of a recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as mandated by the proviso to clause (3); e. Whether the proclamation of the Governor dated 20 June 2018 in exercise of power conferred by Section 92 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir and the subsequent exercise of power on 21 November 2018, under Section 53(2) of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir to dissolve the Legislative Assembly were constitutionally valid; f. Whether the Proclamation which was issued by the President under Article 356 of the Constitution on 19 December 2018 and the subsequent extensions were constitutionally valid; g. Whether the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act 2019 by which the State of Jammu and Kashmir was bifurcated into two Union Territories (Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and Union Territory of Ladakh) was constitutionally valid bearing in mind: (i) The first proviso to Article 3 which requires that a Bill affecting the area, boundaries or name of a State has to be referred to the legislature of the State for its views; and (ii.) The second proviso to Article 3 which requires the consent of the State legislature for increasing or diminishing the area of the State of Jammu and Kashmir or altering the name of boundary of the State before the introduction of the Bill in Parliament; h. Whether during the tenure of a Proclamation under Article 356, and when the Legislative Assembly of the State is either dissolved or is in suspended animation the status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a State under Article 1(3)(a) of the Constitution and its conversion into a Union Territory under Article 1(3)(b) constitutes a valid exercise of power. Federalism – Asymmetric federalism – Constitutional integration of Indian States – Accession of Jammu and Kashmir – Article 370 of the Constitution of India incorporated special arrangements for the governance of the State of Jammu and Kashmir – Whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir possessed sovereignty – Meaning of sovereignty.

Held (per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, B.R. Gavai and Surya Kant, JJ.): The State of Jammu and Kashmir does not retain any element of sovereignty after the execution of the Instrument of Accession (IoA) and the issuance of the Proclamation dated 25 November 1949 by which the Constitution of India was adopted – The State of Jammu and Kashmir does not have ‘internal sovereignty’ which is distinguishable from the powers and privileges enjoyed by other States in the country – Article 370 was a feature of asymmetric federalism and not sovereignty. [Para 514] – Held (per Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.): In light of the Supreme Court’s prior finding in Prem Nath Kaul case, the State of Jammu and Kashmir retained an element of internal sovereignty despite Maharaja Hari Singh signing the IoA with the Dominion – Art.370 of the Constitution recognized this internal sovereignty by recognizing the Constituent Assembly of the State. [Para 112] – Held (per Sanjiv Khanna, J.): The abrogation of Article 370 does not negate the federal structure, as the citizens living in Jammu and Kashmir do and will enjoy same status and rights as given to citizens residing in other parts of the country. [Para 2] Constitution of India – Art. 356 – Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir – s.92 – Proclamations issued under Article 356 of the Constitution of India and s.92 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir – Constitutional validity of. Held (per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, B.R. Gavai and Surya Kant, JJ.): The petitioners did not challenge the issuance of the Proclamations under Section 92 of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution and Article 356 of the Indian Constitution until the special status of Jammu and Kashmir was abrogated – The challenge to the Proclamations does not merit adjudication because the principal challenge is to the actions which were taken after the Proclamation was issued. [Para 514] Constitution of India – Art. 356 – Presidential Proclamation – Exercise of power by President or Parliament under Article 356 – Limitations on, if any – Standard to assess actions taken under Article 356 after issuance of Proclamation. Held (per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, B.R. Gavai and Surya Kant, JJ.): The exercise of power by the President after the Proclamation under Article 356 is issued is subject to judicial review – The

exercise of power by the President must have a reasonable nexus with the object of the Proclamation – The person challenging the exercise of power must prima facie establish that it is a mala fide or extraneous exercise of power – Once a prima facie case is made, the onus shifts to the Union to justify the exercise of such power – The power of Parliament under Article 356(1)(b) to exercise the powers of the Legislature of the State cannot be restricted to law-making power thereby excluding non-law making power of the Legislature of the State – Such an interpretation would amount to reading in a limitation into the provision contrary to the text of the Article. [Para 514] – Held (per Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) (Concurring with Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI): President’s rule can be imposed after the dissolution of the State Assembly since the Presidential emergency was predicated on the failure of the constitutional machinery, which took place prior to the Governor’s rule and the dissolution of the Assembly by the Governor of Jammu & Kashmir was only a subsequent consequence – Once the Presidential proclamation has been approved by both Houses of Parliament, so as to reflect the will of the people, the President has the power under Article 356 to make irreversible changes, including the dissolution of the State Assembly – The imposition of an emergency highlights an extraordinary situation and in the absence of the State Government and State Legislature, the power of these elected organs must lie with any other competent authority – Article 357 does not bar the President from exercising the non-legislative powers of the State Legislature, and Article 356(1)(b) allows the Union Parliament to exercise all powers of the State Legislature without distinguishing between legislative and non-legislative powers of the State Legislature – Therefore, the President is permitted to exercise both legislative and non-legislative functions of the State Legislature – However, a proclamation of emergency is bound by judicial and constitutional scrutiny to ensure the exercise of emergency powers is not unfettered and absolute. [Para 112] – Sanjiv Khanna, J. concurring with Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI. Constitution of India – Art. 370 – Scope and interpretation of – Art.370 incorporating special arrangements for governance of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, if a temporary provision – Historical context to the Article – Placement of Art.370 in Part XXI of the Constitution – Effect of.

Held (per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, B.R. Gavai and Surya Kant, JJ.): It can be garnered from the historical context for the inclusion of Article 370 and the placement of Article 370 in Part XXI of the Constitution that it is a temporary provision. [Para 514] – Held (per Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) (Concurring with Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI): A combination of factors, such as Article 370’s historical context, its text, and its subsequent practice, indicate that Article 370 was intended to be a temporary provision. [Para 112] – Held (per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) (Concurring with both Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.): Article 370 was enacted as a transitional provision and did not have permanent character. [Para 2] Constitution of India – Art. 370 – Effect of dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir on the scope of powers under Art.370(3). Held (per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, B.R. Gavai and Surya Kant, JJ.): The power under Article 370(3) did not cease to exist upon the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir – When the Constituent Assembly was dissolved, only the transitional power recognised in the proviso to Article 370(3) which empowered the Constituent Assembly to make its recommendations ceased to exist – It did not affect the power held by the President under Article 370(3). [Para 514] – Held (per Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) (Concurring with Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI): Article 370(3) contained the mechanism to bring the temporary arrangement to an end, and in turn, to de-recognize the internal sovereignty of the State and apply the Constitution of India in toto – Since Article 370 is meant to be a temporary arrangement, it cannot be said that the mechanism under Article 370(3) came to an end after the State Constituent Assembly was dissolved – The power of the President under Article 370(3) was unaffected by the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir – The President could exercise their power anytime after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir, in line with the aim of full integration of the State. [Para 112] – Sanjiv Khanna, J. concurring with Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J. Constitution of India – Art. 370 – Amendment of Art. 370 through Art. 370(1)(d) – Application of the Constitution of India to the State

of Jammu and Kashmir through exercise of power under Art. 370(1) (d) – Amendment to Article 367 of the Constitution in exercise of the power under Article 370(1)(d) so as to substitute the reference to the “Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in clause (3) of Article 370 by the words “Legislative Assembly of the State” – Validity of modification of Art. 367 – The President issued Constitutional Orders 272 and 273 during the subsistence of a Proclamation under Article 356(1)(b) – These orders had the effect of applying the entire Constitution of India to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and abrogating Art.370 – Challenge to the Constitutional Orders 272 and 273 (C.Os 272 and 273). Held (per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, B.R. Gavai and Surya Kant, JJ.): Article 370 cannot be amended by exercise of power under Article 370(1)(d) – Recourse must have been taken to the procedure contemplated by Article 370(3) if Article 370 is to cease to operate or is to be amended or modified in its application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir – Paragraph 2 of CO 272 by which Article 370 was amended through Article 367 is ultra vires Article 370(1)(d) because it modifies Article 370, in effect, without following the procedure prescribed to modify Article 370 – An interpretation clause cannot be used to bypass the procedure laid down for amendment – However, the exercise of power by the President under Article 370(1)(d) to issue CO 272 is not mala fide – The President in exercise of power under Article 370(3) can unilaterally issue a notification that Article 370 ceases to exist – The President did not have to secure the concurrence of the Government of the State or Union Government acting on behalf of the State Government under the second proviso to Article 370(1)(d) while applying all the provisions of the Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir because such an exercise of power has the same effect as an exercise of power under Article 370(3) for which the concurrence or collaboration with the State Government was not required – Paragraph 2 of CO 272 issued by the President in exercise of power under Article 370(1)(d) applying all the provisions of the Constitution of India to the State of Jammu and Kashmir is valid – Such an exercise of power is not mala fide merely because all the provisions were applied together without following a piece-meal approach – The President had the power to issue a notification declaring

that Article 370(3) ceases to operate without the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly – The continuous exercise of power under Article 370(1) by the President indicates that the gradual process of constitutional integration was ongoing – The declaration issued by the President under Article 370(3) is a culmination of the process of integration and as such is a valid exercise of power – Thus, CO 273 is valid – The Constitution of India is a complete code for constitutional governance – Following the application of the Constitution of India in its entirety to the State of Jammu and Kashmir by CO 273, the Constitution of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is inoperative and is declared to have become redundant. [Para 514] – Held (per Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) (Concurring with Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI): The power of the President under Article 370(3) was unaffected by the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir – The President could exercise their power anytime after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir, in line with the aim of full integration of the State – Hence, C.O. 273, which declares that Article 370 shall cease to operate except as provided, and was issued under Article 370(3), is valid – The power to issue C.O. 272 without the concurrence of the Government of the State is valid, as the power of the President is not limited by the concurrence of the Government of the State in this case – The power under Article 370(1)(d) read with Article 367 cannot be used to do indirectly, what cannot be done directly – The power to make modifications under Article 370(1)(d) cannot be used to amend Article 370 and Article 367, which is an interpretation clause, cannot be used to alter the character of a provision – Therefore, Paragraph 2 of C.O. 272, which amends Article 367(4) is ultra vires Article 370 – However, the President had the power to apply all provisions of the Constitution of India to Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370(1)(d), which is similar to the power under Article 370(3) – Therefore, the remainder of Paragraph 2 of C.O. 272 is valid. [Para 112] – Held (per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) (Concurring with both Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.): Paragraph (2) of C.O. 272 by which Article 370 was amended by taking recourse to Article 367 is ultra vires and bad in law, albeit can be sustained in view of the corresponding power under Article 370(1)(d) – Most importantly, Article 370 has been made inoperative in terms of clause (3) to Article 370 – Lastly, C.O. 273 is valid. [Para 2]

Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act 2019 – s.14 – Parliament enacted the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act 2019 which bifurcated the State of Jammu and Kashmir into two Union territories, Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and Union Territory of Ladakh – Challenge to the Reorganisation Act on substantive grounds and on procedural grounds – Contours of the power under Art. 3 of the Constitution of India – Parliament’s exercise of power under the first proviso to Art.3 – Suspension of the second proviso to Art.3 as applicable to Jammu and Kashmir – Constitution of India – Art.3. Held (per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself, B.R. Gavai and Surya Kant, JJ.): The views of the Legislature of the State under the first proviso to Article 3 are recommendatory – Thus, Parliament’s exercise of power under the first proviso to Article 3 under the Proclamation was valid and not mala fide – The Solicitor General stated that the statehood of Jammu and Kashmir will be restored (except for the carving out of the Union Territory of Ladakh) – In view of the statement, it is not necessary to determine whether the reorganisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir into two Union Territories of Ladakh and Jammu and Kashmir is permissible under Article 3 – However, the validity of the decision to carve out the Union Territory of Ladakh is upheld in view of Article 3(a) read with Explanation I which permits forming a Union Territory by separation of a territory from any State – Steps to be taken by the Election Commission of India to conduct elections to the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir constituted under s.14 of the Reorganisation Act by 30 September 2024 – Restoration of Statehood shall take place at the earliest and as soon as possible. [Para 514] – Held (per Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) (Concurring with Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI): The challenge to Section 4 of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act on the touchstone of Article 3 is not required to be debated on account of the assurance on behalf of the Government of India that the Statehood of Jammu & Kashmir would be restored on elections being held – It is imperative to ascertain the ‘views’ of the State Legislature under the first proviso to Article 3 if the proposed Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of the State – However, in the instant case since the State of Jammu & Kashmir was under President’s Rule and the State Legislature was already dissolved, the functions of the State Legislature were performed by the Union Parliament – Hence, it was not possible to ascertain the views of the State

Legislature – It follows that Section 3 of the Reorganization Act is valid. [Para 112] – Held (per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) (Concurring with Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI): Union Territories are normally geographically small territories, or may be created for aberrant reasons or causes – Conversion of a State into Union Territory has grave consequences, amongst others, it denies the citizens of the State an elected state government and impinges on federalism – Conversion/creation of a Union Territory from a State has to be justified by giving very strong and cogent grounds – It must be in strict compliance with Article 3 of the Constitution of India. [Para 6] Human Rights – Jammu and Kashmir – Held Per Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J, Recommendation made by for setting up of an impartial truth and reconciliation Commission to investigate and report on violation of human rights both by State and non-State actors in Jammu & Kashmir at least since the 1980s and recommend measures for reconciliation. [Para 120] LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES In the judgment of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1 : [1994] 2 SCR 644 and Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) 3 SCC 184 : [2007] 1 SCR 317 – relied on. Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017) 3 SCC 1 : [2017] 5 SCR 160; Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu & Kashmir [1969] 2 SCR 365; Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India (1971) 1 SCC 85 : [1971] 3 SCR 9 and Raghunathrao Ganpatrao v. Union of India (1994) 1 Supp SCC 191 : [1993] 1 SCR 480 – explained. Dr Shah Faesal v. Union of India (2020) 4 SCC 1 : [2020] 3 SCR 1115; Prem Nath Kaul v. State of Jammu & Kashmir [1959] Suppl 2 SCR 270; Mohd Maqbool Damnoo v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1972) 1 SCC 536 : [1972] 2 SCR 1014; Thiru K.N. Rajagopal v. Thiru M. Karunanidhi, (1972) 4 SCC 733; State Bank of India v. Santosh Gupta (2017) 2 SCC 538 : [2016] 9 SCR 985; D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 378 : [1987] 1 SCR 798; Union of India v. Sukumar Sengupta, (1990) Supp SCC 545 : [1990] 3 SCR 24; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1975) Supp SCC 1 : [1976] 2 SCR 347; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India (2018) 8

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India (2011) 13 SCC 344 : [2011] 11 SCR 527 and Babulal Parate v. State of Bombay AIR 1960 SC 51 : [1960] 1 SCR 605 – referred to. Balraj Kunwar v. Jagatpal Singh, ILR 26 All 392 and Emperor v. Sadashiv AIR 1947 PC 82 – referred to. Dicey, Law of the Constitution (8th ed. 1915); Austin, Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1873); John Dickinson, A Working Theory Of Sovereignty I, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 42, Issue 4, December 1927, Pages 524–548; Lester B Orfield, The Amending of the Federal Constitution (2012); Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, ‘Sovereignty’ Oxford Public International Law and Shiva Rao, The Framing of India’s Constitution, IV, pp. 3-4; Constituent Assembly Debates on November 17, 1948, Speech by Mr. KT Shah, Book 2, Pgs. 437-438; 25 October 1956, and 7 November 1956, Debates of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir; “Looking Back” by Shri Mehr Chand Mahajan, Har-Anand Publications Private Limited reprint 2023; “The Story of the Integration of the Indian States” by VP Menon, Orient Longmans (1961); B. Shiva Rao, The Framing of India’s Constitution; Justice G P Singh’s “Principles of Statutory Interpretation” – referred to. In the judgment of Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J. Prem Nath Kaul v. State of J&K [1969] Supp 2 SCR 270; State of West Bengal v. Union of India [1964] 1 SCR 371 and Babulal Parate v. State of Bombay [1960] 1 SCR 605 – relied on. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1 : [1994] 2 SCR 644 – explained. R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India (1994) 1 Supp SCC 324; Sampat Prakash v. State of J & K [1969] 2 SCR 365; Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225 : [1973] Suppl. SCR 1; Dr. Shah Faesal and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. (2020) 4 SCC 1 : [2020] 3 SCR 1115; Promod Chandra Deb v. State of Orissa [1962] Supp 1 SCR 405; Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India (1971) 1 SCC 85 : [1971] 3 SCR 9; State Bank of India v. Santosh Gupta (2017) 2 SCC 538 : [2016] 9 SCR 985; Delhi Laws Act, In Re. (1951) SCC 568 : [1951] SCR 747; Puranlal Lakhanpal v. President of India [1962] 1 SCR 688; Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2017) 3 SCC 1 : [2017] 5 SCR 160; K.N. Rajgopal v. M.

Karunanidhi (1972) 4 SCC 733; Raghunathrao Ganpatrao v. Union of India (1994) 1 Supp SCC 191 : [1993] 1 SCR 480; Mohd. Maqbool Damnoo v. State of Jammu & Kashmir (1972) 1 SCC 536 : [1972] 2 SCR 1014; Haji Abdul Ghani Khan v. Union of India 2023 SCC OnLine SC 138; Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) 3 SCC 184 : [2007] 1 SCR 317; Puranlal Lakhanpal v. Union of India [1955] 2 SCR 1101; Thiru K.N. Rajgopal v. Thiru M. Karunanidhi & Others (1972) 4 SCC 733; Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006) 2 SCC 1 : [2006] 1 SCR 562 and Vishaka and Others v State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241 : [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404 – referred to. Manohar Lal v. Union of India AIR 1970 Del 178 – referred to. Miller v. Queen (2019) UKSC 41 and Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras (Ser. C) No. 4 (IACHR) 1988 – referred to. Rajatarangini (The River of Kings) of Kalhana and Nilamatpurana, believed to be composed by Candra Deva; P.N.K Bamzai, Culture and Political History of Kashmir: Ancient Kashmir, vol. 1 (M.D. Publications Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi 1994) 16; A.R. Nazki, ‘In Search of Roots’ in S.S. Toshkhani & K. Warikwoo (eds.), Cultural Heritage of Kashmiri Pandits (Pentagon Press 2009) 145; Iqbal Chand Malhotra & Maroof Raza, Kashmir’s Untold Story, (Bloomsbury India 2019) 1-2, 46, 80, 98, 100, 102-103; Walter R. Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir (Oxford University Press 1895) 284, 296, 300, 302; Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy (Picador 2008) 44, 60, 63, 69, 248; Bipin Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee & Aditya Mukherjee, India After Independence 1947-2000 (Penguin Books 2007) 92, 93-94, 418-419; Rekha Chowdhary, ‘Kashmir in the Indian Project of Nationalism’ in Nyla Ali Khan (ed.), The Parchment of Kashmir: History, Society and Polity (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 154, 171-172; A.G. Noorani, The Kashmir Dispute 19472012, vol. 2 (Tulika Books 2013) 44, 77-80, 401, 543; A.G. Noorani, Article 370: A Constitutional History of Jammu and Kashmir (Oxford University Press, India 2014) 16-17, 48, 49, 50-78, 95, 111-113, 117-120, 217-223; V.P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States (Orient Longmans Pvt. Ltd. 1956) 391; Durgaprasad (ed.), The Rajatarangini of Kalhana, vol. 2 (1894) 408; Monier-Williams, Modern India and the Indians (3rd edn., Trübner and Co. 1879) 151; A.R. Nazki, ‘In Search of Roots’ in S.S.

Toshkhani & K. Warikwoo (eds.), Cultural Heritage of Kashmiri Pandits (Pentagon Press 2009)2; Anita Medhekar & Farooq Haq, ‘Promoting Kashmir as an Abode of Peace Tourism Destination by India and Pakistan’ in Alexandru-Mircea Nedelea & Marilena-Oana Nedelea, Marketing Peace for Social Transformation and Global Prosperity (IGI Global 2019) 34; Justice A.S. Anand, The Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir: Its Development & Comments (3rd edn., Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd. 1998) 41, 42, 44, 50, 51; David E. Lockwood, ‘Kashmir: Sheikh Abdullah’s Reinstatement’ (1975) 31(6) The World Today, 250; Surinder Mohan, ‘Democracy in Jammu and Kashmir 1947-2008’ 2012 16(3) World Affairs, 112-113, 104; P.N.K Bamzai, Culture and Political History of Kashmir: Modern Kashmir, vol. 3 (M.D. Publications Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi 1994) 852; Black’s Law Dictionary, (VI Edition, 1990); Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, Pg 34 and M. Klinkner and H. Davis, The Right to the Truth in International Law: Victim’s Rights in Human Rights and International Criminal Law; A.Sachs, Strange Alchemy of Life and Law, 155 (OUP, 2009) and 4 RG Tietel, Transitional Justice and Transformation of Constitutionalism in Globalizing Transitional Justice, (OUP, 2014) – referred to. In the judgment of Sanjiv Khanna, J. S.R. Bommai and Others v. Union of India and Others. (1994) 3 SCC 1 : [1994] 2 SCR 644 and Rameshwar Prasad and Others (VI) v. Union of India and Another (2006) 2 SCC 1 : [2006] 1 SCR 562 – referred to. OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED ORDER AND APPEARANCES ORIGINAL WRIT/APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1099 of 2019. Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India In Re: Article 370 of The Constitution With Writ Petition (C) Nos. 871 of 2015, 722 of 2014, SLP (C) No. 19618 of 2017, Writ Petition (C) Nos.1013, 1082, 1068, 1037, 1062, 1070, 1104, 1165, 1210, 1222 of 2019, 396, 756 of 2017, 398, 924, 1092, 1162 of 2018, 1048, 1268 and 1368 of 2019.

Appearances: R Venkataramani, Attorney General for India, Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, K M Nataraj, Vikramjit Banerjee, A.S.Gs., D.C. Raina, Advocate General/Sr. Adv., Shailesh Madiyal, A.A.G., Muzaffar. H. Baig, Ms. Nitya Ramakrishnan, Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Kapil Sibal, C U Singh, Shekhar Naphade, Prashanto Chandra Sen, Gopal Subramanium, Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Dushyant Dave, Ravindra Kumar Raizada, Rakesh Dwivedi, Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Zafar A. Shah, Harish Salve, V. Giri, Mahesh Jethmalani, S Guru Krishna Kumar, Bimal Roy Jad, Vikram Sharma, Pranav Kohli, Dinesh Dwivedi, Ms. Nitya Ramakrishnan, P.V. Surendarnath, Sr. Advs., Aftab Ali Khan, Murtaza. A. Khan, Ms. Safina Baig, M. Z. Chaudhary, Ali Safeer Farooqi, S. Mansoori, Aakarsh Kamra, N. Sai Vinod, Prasanna S, Ms. Malavika Prasad, Shadan Farasat, Ms. Rupali Samuel, Archit Krishna, Vibhor Jain, M. V. Mukunda, Ms. Swati Arya, Yuvraj Singh Rathore, Dr. Aniruddha Rajput, Anirudh Sharma, Sridhar Potaraju, Pattabhiram, Nachiketa Joshi, Praneet Pranav, Yashraj Singh Bundela, Barun Kumar Sinha, Mrs. Pratibha Sinha, Rakesh Mudgal, Pankaj Kumar Shukla, Niraj Kumar, Sneh Vardhan, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Anil Kumar Jha, Binay Kumar Das, Vijayendra Misra, Ms. Y. K. S. Chauhan, Ms. Vijayalakshmi Jha, Ms. Priyanka Das, Ms. Jyothi Pathak Jha, Ms. Neha Das, Ravi Shankar Ravi, Sanjay Kumar Lal Das, Navin Jha, M. C. Dhingra, Vikrant Yadav, Gaurav Dhingra, Ankur Prakash, Manish Vashishtha, Syed Imtiyaz Ali, Mrs. Kamakshi Mehlwal, Ashok Kumar, Mohnish Nirwan, Ms. Aparna Singh, Ms. Shivani Vij, Ms. Tanya Srivastava, Ms. Aditi Gupta, Ms. Trisha Chandran, Ms. Jhanvi Dubey, Ms. Ishita Chowdhury, Satyajit Sarna, Shrutanjaya Bhardwaj, Vikramaditya, Vishal Sinha, Ms. Charu Ambwani, Soayib Qureshi, D. Mahesh Babu, Shishir Pinaki, Muzaffar Iqbal Khan, Dhanaeswar Gudapalli, Ms. Aparajita Jamwal, Nizam Pasha, Rishabh Parikh, Desam Sudhakara Reddy, Ms. Mallika Das, D. Siva Rami Reddy, K. Venkateshwara Prasad, Medi Yadaiah, Dr. Saif Mahmood, D. Abhinav Rao, Mayank Mikhail Mukherjee, Amjid Maqbool, Ms. Bidya Mohanty, Arjun Krishnan, Ankur Singh, Pratik Patnaik, Kaustav Som, Ms. Aishwarya Dash, Dr. Prashant Pratap, Ms. Farah Hashmi, Ms. Somya Yadava, Ms. Shruthi Parasa, Ms. Akshita Chhabra, Ms. Khyati Jain, Ranvir Singh, Gautam Bhatia, Ms. Malavika Prasad, Ms. Ujwala Uppaluri, Jayavardhan Singh, Ms. Hima Lawrence, Pawan Bhushan, Lakshay Laroiya, Ms. Pritha

Srikumar, Sulabh Rewari, Aditya Chatterjee, Ms. Mansi Binjrajka, Binit Agrawal, P. V. Dinesh, Jaimon Andrews, Ms. Anna Oommen A, Prashant Bhushan, Ms. Ayushi, Akshat Malpani, Mohd. Irshad Hanif, Ms. Jyotika Kalra, Dr. Charu Wali Khanna, Joydeep Mukherjee, Ms. Annwesha Deb, Tripurari Ray, Balwant Singh Billowria, Anirudh Ray, Vivekanand Singh, Nithyananda Murthy P, Mrs. Bhanu Prabha, N Suresha, Dr. Nisha Kant Ojha, Rajinder Singh, Suresh Kumar Sharma, Atul Wadera, Ms. Shilpa Singh, Dileep Kumar Dubey, Rajeev Pandey, Surjeet Singh, Adarsh Upadhyaya, Sarthak Raizada, Pankaj Jamthani, Mukesh Kumar Verma, Anant Sangal, Shivam Singhania, Ms. Divya Roy, Pallav Mongia, Vishnu Shankar Jain, Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay, Ashwani Kumar Dubey, Chandra Shekhar, Ajit Kumar Pathak, Eklavya Dwivedi, Utkarsh Pratap, Lavkesh Bhambhani, Harshwardhan Thakur, Vidur Dwivedi, Akashdeep Panday, Sazid Sr Shah, Amod Kumar Bhidurdi, Saquib Siddiqui, Mehmood Umar Faruqui, Shahbaaz Jameel, Ali Muzaffar, Ms. Sarika Verma, Kausar Raza Faridi, Dharmendra Kumar Sinha, J. N. Shaheen, M. A. Ronga, Bashir Sadiq, Onkar Prasad, Sunil Prakash Sharma, Ajay Amitraj, Dr. Ritu Bhardwaj, Raju Sonkar, Ms. Baby Bonia, Abhimanue Shrestha, Kanu Agrawal, Rajat Nair, Ankur Talwar, Ms. Shraddha Deshmukh, Madhav Sinhal, Anandh Venkataramani, Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Venkataramani, Vinayak Mehrotra, Ms. Mansi Sood, Chitvan Singhal, Ms. Sonali Jain, Abhishek Kumar Pandey, Raman Yadav, Kartikey Aggarwal, Pranatap Singh, Gaurang Bhushan, Aman Mehta, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Sanjay Kumar Tyagi, Ajit Yadav, Surjeet Singh, Sarthak Raizada, Alabhya Dhamija, Mithun Shashank, Sudipto Sircar, Ms. Divya Roy, Rahul G. Tanwani, Anantha Narayana M.G., Manan Sanghai, Ms. Suveni Bhagat, Harshad Sundar, Ms. Vishwaja Rao, Rahul Narang, Prashant Singh, V.C. Shukla, Shubendu Anand, Ayush Anand, Ritvik Banot, Anant Sangal, Deepak Goel, Ms. Rao Vishwaja, Anantha Narayan, Vipin Kumar Sexana, Chaman Rana, Ms. Alka Goyal, Ms. Urvashi Sharma, Kumar Kartikay, Mukesh Verma, Vipin Kumar, Vibhu Shanker Mishra, Ms. Samta Pushkarna Mishra, Mani Shanker Mishra, Kamal Kumar Pandey, Jitendra Bharti, Ms. Baby Devi Bonia, Anil Kaushik, Ravi Sharma, Ms. Mugdha Pandey, Ajay Awasthi, Mrs. Aditi Tripathi, Ms. Kanika Singhal, Himadri Haksar, Santosh Kumar, Sayooj Mohandas M., Bhaskar Gautham, Vishal Arun, Ms. Serena Jethmalani, Yash Raj Singh Bundela, Amit Sharma, Rajan Kumar Chourasia, Vishnu Kant, Rajeev Ranjan, Pavan Kumar, Aviral

Saxena, Ms. Kavitha K T, Ashwin K, Gopal Jha, Tadimalla Bhaskar Gowtham, Siddharth Sinha, Rajesh K. Singh, Shyamal Kumar, Bitu Kumar Singh, Sunil Kumar Tomar, Ajay Kumar Pandey, Sandeep Singh, Dr. Brij Bhushan K. Jauhari, Ms. Riddhi Jad, O.P. Singh, Suresh Kumar Bhan, Kumar Ji Bhat, AK Kaul, N B Vishen, Harsh Mahan, Deepak Jyoti Ghildiyal, Ms. Purnima Jauhari, Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, Ms. Aditi Tripathi, Ms. Sindoora Vnl, Kumar Prashant, Parmod Kumar Vishnoi, Avnish Dave, Vaibhav Dwivedi, Ms. Riya Sethi, Aadhar Saha, V. K. Biju, Mrs. Ria Sachthey, Chetanya Singh, Abhay Pratap Singh, Aniruddha Purushotham, Shaji George, Mayank Pandey, Ms. Shalaka Srivastava, Dr. Ranjeet Bharti, Dr. Vivek Sharma, Mrs. Rubeena Jawed, Ms. Vijay Lakshmi, Mrs. Deepa Joseph, Vineet Kumar Singh, Sahil Tagotra, Prem Sadotra, Ms. Abhivyakti Banerjee, Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Parth Awasthi, Ms. Maitreyee Jagat Joshi, Astik Gupta, Akshay Kumar, Vaibhav Sabharwal, Ms. Akanksha Tomar, Ritik Sharma, Eklavya Dwivedi, Ashwani Kumar Dubey, Rajesh Bhushan, Nitin Sangra, Ms. Shweta Singh Parihar, Dr. Charu Mathur, Siddharth Praveen Acharya, Ujjwal Mishra, Ms. Anisha Agarwal, Ravi Kant Purohit, Dharmendra Kumar Sinha, Onkar Prasad, Sunil Prakash Sharma, Ajay Amitraj, Dr. Ritu Bhardwaj, Raju Sonkar, J. N. Shaheen, M. A. Ronga, Bashir Sadiq, K. K. Mohan, Prateek Dwivedi, Nishant Singh, Prasanna S., Ms. Malavika Prasad, Archit Krishna, Vibhor Jain, Ms. Rupali Samuel, Syed Iqbal Tahir, Ms. Swati Arya, Yuvraj Singh Rathore, Shaunak Dutta, Utkarsh Pratap, Lavkesh Bhambhani, Harshwardhan Thakur, Yash Tiwari, Shakti Kanta Pattanaik, Ms. Warisha Farasat, Shadan Farasat, Harshit Anand, Aman Naqvi, Prasana S, Ms. Hrishika Jain, Ms. Natasha Maheshwari, Ms. Mreganka Kukreja, Satyajeet Kumar, Ms. Taruna Ardhendumauli Prasad, Ms. Adeeba Mujahid, Shailesh Madiyal, Mustafa Sajad, Siddharth Thakur, Mahesh Thakur, Ms. Keerti Jaya, Ranvijay Singh Chandel, Mrs. Geetanjali Bedi, Shivamm Sharrma, Ms. Anusha R., Ms. Sanjivani Aggarwal, Ms. Jyoti Aggarwal, Pradeep Shekhavat, Ms. Filza Moonis, Ninad Dogra, Ashok Mathur, Anupam Raina, Sunando Raha, Nishant Kumar, Osheen Bhat, Abhimanyu Tewari, Apoorv Shukla, B. K. Satija, Prashant Rawat, P. S. Sudheer, Rishi Maheshwari, Bharat Sood, Ms. Anne Mathew, Ms. Miranda Solaman, K. V. Muthu Kumar, Talha Abdul Rahman, Ms. Manju Jetley, Omprakash Ajitsingh Parihar, Satya Mitra, Charanjeet Singh Chanderpal, Anil Kumar, Manoj K. Mishra, Ms. Rajshree Rai, Vinay Rai, J.K. Mishra,

Amrendra Kumar Singh, Umesh Dubey, Vaibhav Tiwari, Piyush Singh, Vishal, Ms. Madhulika, Harvinder Chowdhury, G. Sivabalamurugan, Vasantha Kumar A, Sanchit Vashisthe, Ms. Nidhi Vashistha, Purnendu Bajpai, Mudit Chaudhry, Himanshu Nagarwal, Gaurav Kumar, Rohit Nagar, Deepak Chauhan, Ms. Ankita Goutham, Abinav Upadhyaya, Vikram Kumar Singh, Ms. Satamita Ghosh, Raghav Sabharwal, Ms. Tanvi Dubey, Anukrit Gupta, Sanjay Kumar Dubey, Varun Byreddy, Mekala Ganesh Kumar Reddy, Riju Raj Singh Jamwal, Ms. Madhusmita Bora, Ms. Resmitha R. Chandran, Subhash Chandran K.R., Mukesh Kumar Pandey, Vipin Kumar Mishra, Sawan Kumar Shukla, K. Krishna Kumar, Soayib Qureshi, Ms. Disha Singh, Shivendu Gaur, Mrs. Nidhi Sharma, Mohit, R.K Kashyap, Sumit R. Sharma, Irshad Ahmad, Mohit Chaudhary, Advs. for the appearing parties. Petitioner-in-person Applicant-in-person Intervenor-in-person. JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI Table of Contents* A. Background .............................................................................. 8 B. Reference ................................................................................ 14 C. Submissions ............................................................................ 17 i. Submissions of the petitioners ............................................. 18 ii. Submissions of the Union of India...................................... 45 D. Issues ....................................................................................... 59 E. Analysis ................................................................................... 61 i.

The State of Jammu and Kashmir did not possess sovereignty ....................................................................... 61

* Ed. Note: Pagination is as per the original judgment.

a.

The meaning of sovereignty ......................................... 62

b.

The history of the Union of India and Jammu and Kashmir..........................................................................66

c.

Neither the constitutional setup nor any other factors indicate that the State of Jammu and Kashmir retained an element of sovereignty .................................................. 94

ii.

The Constitutional validity of the Proclamations issued under Article 356 of the Constitution of India and Section 92 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir ...........112

iii.

Limitations on the exercise of power by President or Parliament under Article 356 ........................................115 a.

Presidential Proclamation under Article 356 ...............116

b.

Interpreting Article 356 in the aftermath of SR Bommai .................................................................... 120

c.

SR Bommai on validity of exercise of power after the Proclamation ................................................................127

d.

Interpretation of Part XVIII ........................................ 134 I.

Comparison of executive power held by the President under Articles 352 and 356 ..................................... 135

II.

Interpretation of Article 356 ................................... 139

III. The argument of ‘irrevocability’: Interpreting Article 357(2) and Krishna Kumar Singh ...........................145 IV. The distinction between legislative and constitutional functions of the Legislature .....................................152 e.

The standard to assess actions taken under Article 356 after the issuance of Proclamation ...................................... 160

[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

iv. Article 370: a temporary provision? .................................. 160 a.

The historical context to Article 370 ............................... 160 I.

Accession of Jammu and Kashmir ............................. 161

II.

The constitutional integration of Indian States ........... 176 a)

Internal Constitutions of States .............................. 176

b)

Procedure for Indian States to ratify the Constitution. 183

III. Debates in the Constituent Assembly on Article 370 . 187 IV. b.

Inference ..................................................................... 194

Scope of provisions in Article 370 .................................. 198 I.

Placement in Part XXI of the Constitution and Marginal Note to Article 370...................................................... 198

II.

Interpretation of Article 370 ....................................... 214

III. Inference ..................................................................... 224 v.

The effect of dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir on the scope of powers under Article 370(3) .................................................................................. 226 a.

The judgment in Sampath Prakash .................................. 228

b.

The limited power of the Constituent Assembly under Article 370 ................................................................. 233 I. The structure of Article 370(1) and 370(2) ..................... 234 II.

c. vi.

The structure of Article 370(3) ................................... 241 Inference.......................................................................... 242

The Challenge to CO 272 .................................................. 251 a.

Amendment of Article 370 through Article 370(1)(d) .... 251 I.

The application of the Constitution to the State of Jammu and Kashmir ................................................................ 251

II.

Paragraph 2 of CO 272 ............................................... 256

III. The substance or effect of a provision is more important than its form ................................................................ 258 IV. The validity of modification of Article 367 ................ 265 V.

Previous Constitutional Orders which modified Article 367 .............................................................................. 278 b.

Applying the entire Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir through exercise of power under Article 370(1)(d) 288

c.

Securing the concurrence of the Union Government under the second proviso to Article 370(1)(d)........ 290

vii. The Challenge to CO 273 .................................................. 295 viii. The status of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. 318 ix.

The challenge to the Reorganisation Act on substantive grounds ............................................................................... 321 a.

The constitutional history of States and Union territories and the reason for the existence of Article 3 .......................... 323

b.

The contours of the power under Article 3...................... 326 I.

Federalism, representative democracy, and the significance of States...................................................................... 326

II.

The reason for the creation of Union territories ..... 330

III. The journey of Union territories: 1956 to 2023 ..... 335 IV. The scope of Article 3 ............................................ 337 x.

The Challenge to the Reorganization Act on procedural grounds ............................................................................... 343

[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

F.

a.

Parliament’s exercise of power under the first proviso to Article 3 ........................................................................ 343

b.

Suspension of the second proviso to Article 3 as applicable to Jammu and Kashmir........................................................ 347 Conclusion .......................................................................... 348

1. This judgment is enriched by the discussions with my distinguished colleagues - Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice Bhushan R Gavai and Justice Surya Kant - during the course of oral arguments and thereafter. Their inputs to the judgment have led to a synthesis of thought resulting in a unanimous outcome. We record our deep appreciation for the scholarship of senior counsel during the course of arguments and in the written briefs, assisted by an able team of junior counsel. A*. Background 2. Article 370 of the Constitution of India incorporated special arrangements for the governance of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The President issued Constitutional Orders 272 and 273 during the subsistence of a Proclamation under Article 356(1)(b). These orders have the effect of applying the entire Constitution of India to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and abrogating Article 370. Contemporaneously, Parliament enacted the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act 20191 which bifurcated the State into two Union territories. The petitioners have challenged the constitutionality of these actions. 3. The State government in Jammu and Kashmir was formed by an alliance of the Peoples’ Democratic Party2 with the Bharatiya Janata Party in 2015. The Chief Minister of the State, Ms Mehbooba Mufti, belonging to the PDP, resigned on 19 June 2018 after the Bharatiya Janata Party withdrew support. The next day, the Governor issued a Proclamation under Section 92 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, which entrusts power to the Governor to assume all the powers and functions of the Government of the *

Ed. Note: PART A. “Reorganisation Act” “PDP”

State in the event of a failure of the constitutional machinery in the State. A Proclamation under Section 92 requires the concurrence of the President of India under clause (5). Under clause (3) of Section 92, the Proclamation ceases to exist after six months. The promulgation of Governor’s rule in the State was made with the concurrence of the President. On 21 November 2018, the Governor dissolved the Legislative Assembly of the State under Section 53(2) of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. 4. On 28 November 2018, the Governor submitted a report to the President recommending the invocation of Article 356 of the Constitution since six months since the issuance of the Proclamation under Section 92(3) was to end. On 19 December 2018, the President issued a Proclamation under Article 356 promulgating President’s rule in the State upon considering the report from the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir and other information. The Proclamation, inter alia, contained the following declarations: a.

The functions of the Government of the State and the powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor of that State under the Constitution of India and the State Constitution are assumed by the President;

b.

The powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament; and

c.

The fi rst proviso and second provisos to Article 3 of the Constitution stand suspended.

5. The Proclamation was approved by the Lok Sabha on 28 December 2018 and by the Rajya Sabha on 3 January 2019. On the same day, the President issued another order stating that the functions of the Government of the State and the powers vested in the Governor which shall be exercisable by the President in view of the above Proclamation shall be exercisable also by the Governor subject to the superintendence, direction, and control of the President. 6. The extension of President’s rule was approved by the Lok Sabha on 28 June 2019 and by the Rajya Sabha on 1 July 2019. President’s rule was extended on 3 July 2019. The duration of President’s rule in terms of Article 356(4) in its application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir was

[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

six months after the second of the resolutions was passed by the Rajya Sabha on 3 July 2019. 7. On 5 August 2019, the President issued CO 272, the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order 2019. By the CO, the President in exercise of powers under Article 370(1), applied: a.

All the provisions of the Constitution of India by superseding all previous Constitution Orders by which select provisions of the Constitution were made applicable to Jammu and Kashmir either with or without modifications; and

b.

Article 367(4) in which a modification was made, changing the term “Constituent Assembly” in the proviso to Article 370(3) to “Legislative Assembly.”

8. On 5 August 2019, Parliament undertook the following exercise in its capacity as the legislature of the State, since the Proclamation under Article 356 was subsisting: a.

The Rajya Sabha recommended to the President under Article 370(3) that all clauses of Article 370 shall cease to operate: “That this House recommends the following public notification to be issued by the President of India under Article 370 (3): ‘ In exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (3) of article 370 read with clause (1) of article 370 of the Constitution of India, the President, on the recommendation of the Parliament, is pleased to declare that, as from [*date*], all clauses of the said article 370 shall cease to be operative except clause (1) thereof which shall read as under, namely: “All provisions of this Constitution, as amended from time to time, without any modifications or exceptions, shall apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir notwithstanding anything contrary contained in article 152 or article 308 or any other article of this Constitution or any other provision of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir or any law, document, judgement, ordinance, order, bye-law, rule,

regulation; notification, custom or usage having the force of law in the territory of India, or any other instrument, treaty or agreement as envisaged under article 363 or otherwise.” b.

Simultaneously, the Rajya Sabha expressed its views on the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill 20193 which was sent to the House under the proviso to Article 3, in the following terms : “That the President of India has referred the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill, 2019 to this House under the proviso to article 3 of the Constitution of India for its views as this House is vested with the powers of the State Legislature of Jammu and Kashmir, as per proclamation of the President of India dated 19 December, 2018. This House resolves to express the view to accept the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill, 2019.”

c.

Simultaneously, the Lok Sabha also accepted the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill 2019 in terms of the following resolution: “That the President of India has referred the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill, 2019 to this House under the proviso to article 3 of the Constitution of India for its views as this House is vested with the powers of the State Legislature of Jammu and Kashmir, as per proclamation of the President of India dated 19 December, 2018. This House resolves to express the view to accept the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill 2019”

d.

The Rajya Sabha passed the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act 20194.

9. On 6 August 2019, Parliament discharged its functions as the legislature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and proceeded with the following legislative business:

“Reorganisation Bill” “Reorganisation Act”

[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] a.

The Lok Sabha recommended to the President under Article 370 (3) that the special provision in Article 370 shall cease to be operative and the provision would instead apply all the provisions of the Constitution to the State of Jammu and Kashmir without any modifications and exceptions: “That this House recommends the following public notification to be issued by the President of India under Article 370(3): Declaration under Article 370(3) of the Constitution. In exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (3) of article 370 read with clause (1) of article 370 of the Constitution of India, the President, on the recommendation of the Parliament, is pleased to declare that, as from the date on which the President of India signs the Declaration and published in the official Gazette, all clauses of the said article 370 shall cease to be operative except clause (1) thereof which shall read as under; namely:“All provisions of this Constitution; as amended from time to time, without any modifications or exceptions, shall apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir notwithstanding anything contrary contained in article 152 or article 308 or any other article of this Constitution or any other provision of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir or any law, document, judgement, ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation; notification, custom or usage having the force of law in the territory of India, or any other instrument, treaty or agreement as envisaged under article 363 or otherwise.”

b.

The Lok Sabha passed the Reorganisation Act.

10. Both Houses of Parliament passed the Reorganisation Bill (after expressing their views in favour of such an exercise as stipulated in the proviso to Article 3) bifurcating the State of Jammu and Kashmir into: a.

the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir with the Legislative Assembly; and

b.

the Union Territory of Ladakh without the Legislative Assembly.

11. The Appendix to the Reorganisation Bill contained a Schedule listing out central legislations enacted under the Union List and the Concurrent List by Parliament which would thereafter be applicable to the two Union Territories. Amendments have also been carried out to existing state legislations to bring them in conformity with the Constitution. 12. On 6 August 2019, pursuant to the recommendation by the Lok Sabha, the President of India issued CO 273 under Article 370(3) of the Constitution as amended by CO 272 by which Article 370 ceased to apply with effect from 6 August 2019. On 9 August 2019, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs issued a notification, S.O. 2889 (E), in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 2(a) of the Reorganisation Act bringing the provisions of the Act into force with effect from 31 October 2019 following Presidential assent. Pursuant to this notification, the State of Jammu and Kashmir stood bifurcated on 31 October 2019 into the Union Territory of Ladakh and the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. President’s rule was revoked. B*. Reference 13. On 19 August 2019, the jurisdiction of this Court was invoked under Article 32 of the Constitution in Dr Shah Faesal v. Union of India.5 14. When a batch of petitions challenging the constitutional validity of CO 272 and CO 273 came before a Constitution Bench, the petitioners sought a reference to a larger bench. The submission was that in Prem Nath Kaul v. State of Jammu & Kashmir,6 a Constitution Bench had held that Article 370 was temporary in nature. According to counsel, subsequently in Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu & Kashmir,7 another Constitution Bench held (without considering the earlier decision in Prem Nath Kaul (supra)) that Article 370 is not a temporary provision because: a.

*

Neither the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir nor the President had ever made a declaration that Article 370 ceased to be operative; and

Ed. Note: PART B. Writ Petition (c) No. 1099 of 2019 1959 Suppl (2) SCR 270 (1969) 2 SCR 365

[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] b.

In view of the proviso to Article 368 as it applied to Jammu and Kashmir, the President is required to exercise powers from time to time under Article 370 to bring into effect constitutional amendments made under Article 368 in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

15. A reference to a larger Bench was also sought on the ground that the subsequent decision of the Constitution Bench in Mohd Maqbool Damnoo v. State of Jammu and Kashmir8 ignored the interpretation of Article 370 in Prem Nath Kaul (supra) and, in any event, the judgment does not decide whether Article 370 can continue to operate after the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir was adopted. The Constitution Bench in Dr Shah Faesal (supra) framed three questions: “(i) When can a matter be referred to a larger Bench? (ii) Whether there is a requirement to refer the present matter to a larger Bench in view of the alleged contradictory views of this Court in Prem Nath Kaul case [Prem Nath Kaul v. State of J&K, AIR 1959 SC 749] and Sampat Prakash case [Sampat Prakash v. State of J&K, AIR 1970 SC 1118] ? (iii) Whether Sampat Prakash case [Sampat Prakash v. State of J&K, AIR 1970 SC 1118] is per incuriam for not taking into consideration the decision of the Court in Prem Nath Kaul case [Prem Nath Kaul v. State of J&K, AIR 1959 SC 749] ?” 16. The Constitution Bench, while rejecting the plea for a reference to a larger Bench, adduced three reasons which emerge from the extract of the judgment set out below: “42. First, it is worth highlighting that judgments cannot be interpreted in a vacuum, separate from their facts and context. Observations made in a judgment cannot be selectively picked in order to give them a particular meaning. The Court in Prem Nath Kaul case [Prem Nath Kaul v. State of J&K, AIR 1959 SC 749] had to determine the legislative competence of the Yuvaraj, in passing a particular enactment. The enactment was passed during

(1972) 1 SCC 536

the interregnum period, before the formulation of the Constitution of State of Jammu and Kashmir, but after coming into force of the Constitution of India. The observations made by the Constitution Bench in this case, regarding the importance given to the decision of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir needs to be read in the light of these facts” 43. Second, the framework of Article 370(2) of the Indian Constitution was such that any decision taken by the State Government, which was not an elected body but the Maharaja of the State acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers which was in office by virtue of the Maharaja’s proclamation dated 5-3-1948, prior to the sitting of the Constituent Assembly of the State, would have to be placed before the Constituent Assembly, for its decision as provided under Article 370(2) of the Constitution. The rationale for the same is clear, as the task of the Constituent Assembly was to further clarify the scope and ambit of the constitutional relationship between the Union of India and the State of Jammu and Kashmir, on which the State Government as defined under Article 370 might have already taken some decisions, before the convening of the Constituent Assembly, which the Constituent Assembly in its wisdom, might ultimately not agree with. Hence, the Court in Prem Nath Kaul [Prem Nath Kaul v. State of J&K, AIR 1959 SC 749] indicated that the Constituent Assembly’s decision under Article 370(2) was final. This finality has to be read as being limited to those decisions taken by the State Government under Article 370 prior to the convening of the Constituent Assembly of the State, in line with the language of Article 370(2). 44. Third, the Constitution Bench in Prem Nath Kaul case [Prem Nath Kaul v. State of J&K, AIR 1959 SC 749] did not discuss the continuation or cessation of the operation of Article 370 of the Constitution after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of the State. This was not an issue in question before the Court, unlike in Sampat Prakash case [Sampat Prakash v. State of J&K, AIR 1970 SC 1118] where the contention was specifically made before, and refuted by, the Court. This Court sees no reason to read into Prem

[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

Nath Kaul case [Prem Nath Kaul v. State of J&K, AIR 1959 SC 749] an interpretation which results in it being in conflict with the subsequent judgments of this Court, particularly when an ordinary reading of the judgment does not result in such an interpretation.” C*. Submissions 17. Mr Kapil Sibal, Dr Gopal Subramanium, Mr Zafar A Shah, Dr Rajeev Dhavan, Mr Dushyant Dave, Mr Shekar Naphade, Mr Dinesh Dwivedi, Mr CU Singh, Mr Sanjay Parikh, Mr PC Sen, Ms Nitya Ramakrishnan, Dr Menaka Guruswamy, Mr Muzaffar H Baig, and Mr Gopal Sankaranarayanan appeared for the petitioners. Mr Manish Tiwari, and Mr Warisha Farasat also appeared for the petitioners. Mr Irfan Hafeez Lone and Dr Zahoor Ahmad Bhat were the parties in person. 18. Mr R Venkataramani, Attorney General, Mr Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General; Mr. Harish Salve, Mr Rakesh Dwivedi and Mr V Giri, Mr Mahesh Jethmalani, Mr Gurukrishna Kumar, Mr Ravindra Kumar Raizada, Mr Bimal Jod senior counsel; Mr KM Nataraj and Vikramjit Banerjee, Additional Solicitor Generals appeared on behalf of the respondents. Mr. Kanu Agrawal, Ms Archana Pathak Dave, Mr VK Biju, Mr Vikram Sharma, Dr Aniruddha Rajput, Mr DV Raina, Mr Rahul Tanwani, Mr Eklavya Dwivedi, Mr Rajesh Bhushan, and Dr Charu Mathur also appeared for the respondents. i. Submissions of the petitioners 19. The Governor’s Proclamation under Section 92 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir dated 20 June 2018 is challenged as being void. The mandatory pre-condition of the satisfaction of the Governor that the State government cannot be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, was not fulfilled.9 It was a political act, in violation of the Constitution, brought about with the intention to ultimately abrogate Article 370.10 Governor’s rule was imposed on 20 June 2018, a day after the Bharatiya Janata Party withdrew from the coalition on 19 June 2019. No opportunity was afforded to the other parties to demonstrate strength in the

* Ed. Note: PART C. 9 Written Submissions on Behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal, Senior Advocate. 10 Written Submissions on Behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal, Senior Advocate.

house. Other parties – the Congress, the PDP and the National Conference – had, in a fax to the Governor expressed willingness to form a coalition.11 It was incumbent upon the Governor to reach out to the parties and explore the possibilities of forming a government.12 20. Section 92 of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution envisages a mandatory maximum period of six months of Governor’s rule, which cannot be extended any further. Successive imposition of the President’s rule after Governor’s rule defeats the scheme of Section 92 and amounts to a fraud on the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution and the Indian Constitution.13 The manner in which the Union Government has acted and the decisions of the Governor and the President were all political stratagems to achieve outcomes that are unconstitutional. 14 21. The President’s Proclamation under Article 356 dated 19th December 2018 is void ab initio for the following reasons: a.

After the Proclamation under Section 92, the Proclamation under Article 356 was issued by the President. This was also without basis as the report of the Governor showing the failure of constitutional machinery was not placed before Parliament15. The debates in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha show that the motion approving the Proclamation was passed without debate and without the Governor’s report16; and

b.

A unilateral exercise of the powers under Article 356 sets a dangerous precedent and raises the apprehension that such a treatment can be extended to any other state of the country in the exercise of emergency powers under the Constitution. It renders the federal structure susceptible to the whims of the political party in power. It can also be used to undermine the

11 Written Submissions of Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Senior Advocate. 12 Written Submissions on behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal, Senior Advocate. 13 Submissions By Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Senior Advocate.; Rejoinder on behalf Of Mr. Kapil Sibal Sr. Advocate. 14 Rejoinder on behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal Sr. Advocate. 15 Written Submissions of Mr. Dushyant Dave, Senior Advocate; S.R. Bommai vs Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1. 16 Submissions By Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Senior Advocate.

[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

special provisions under the Constitution designated for the special interests of the North-Eastern States of India.17 22. The impugned actions taken when the Proclamation issued under Article 356 was in force are void. There are limits on the exercise of power by the President after the issuance of a Proclamation for the following reasons: a.

Once the Legislative Assembly of the State is dissolved, as was the case in the state, after the Proclamation of Governor’s rule, there was no occasion for the President to exercise the power under Article 356. This renders the Proclamation dated 19 December 2018 and all consequential actions – the impugned COs and suspension of the second proviso to Article 3 applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir void ab initio18;

b.

The purpose of Article 356 is to restore governance in the State.19 Article 356 is housed in Part XVIII of the Constitution of Indiawhich deals with ‘Emergency provisions’. The President must be satisfied that the government cannot be carried out in accordance with “this Constitution”. The emphasis on “this” indicates the nature of the power. The object of the exercise is to ensure that constitutional government is possible in the state20;

c.

Article 357(2) stipulates that the laws made by the President or the Parliament, in the exercise of the power of the state legislature, shall continue, after the Proclamation has ceased to operate, until altered or repealed or amended “by a competent Legislature or other authority.” These words presume the power

17 Written Submissions on behalf of Impleader by Manish Tewari & Mr. Abhimanyu Tewari, Advocate. 18 Thiru K.N. Rajagopal v. Thiru M. Karunanidhi, (1972) 4 SCC 733 [5 Judges], Submissions on Behalf of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate; Written Submissions By Sh. Sanjay Parikh, Senior Advocate; Written Submissions of Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Senior Advocate on Behalf of the Petitioner; Rejoinder on behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal Sr. Advocate. 19 SR Bommai (Paras 108,113, 288, 289), 20 Outline of Submissions on Behalf of the Petitioners by Raju Ramachandran, Senior Advocate.

of the restored legislature to alter or undo the changes made by the Union in respect of the State’s affairs. Article 357(2) allows the subsequent State Legislature to alter or repeal any laws made by the Parliament in the exercise of such powers. Thus, the Parliament cannot make irreversible changes in the exercise of this temporary power during the Proclamation under Article 356.21 Dr. BR Ambedkar clarified that the purpose of the power under Articles 356 and 357 was to ensure that the “form of constitution” was maintained22; d.

Article 250(2) states that laws shall cease to have effect after six months from the date when the Proclamation ceases to operate23. Considering the restorative purpose and the temporary nature of the power, the President could not have, in the exercise of this power effected a permanent change to the Constitution by way of the impugned actions;

e.

In accordance with Article 356(1), the power of the Legislature and the Executive of the State are transferred to the Parliament and the President respectively. However, Article 356 does not envisage a transfer of the constituent power to the President or to Parliament. Constituent power cannot be transferred unless the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir specifically provides for it. The President does not acquire the power of the State Government under Article 370(1)(d), to give concurrence, and Parliament does not acquire the constituent powers of the Legislative Assembly to recommend a Presidential notification under Article 370(3)24;

21 Written Submissions of Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Senior Counsel; Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramanium, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner; Written Submissions on Behalf of The Intervenor By Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Senior Advocate; Written Submissions of Ms. Nitya Ramakrishnan, Senior Advocate on behalf of Intervenors; 22 Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramanium, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner. 23 Outline of Submissions on Behalf of the Petitioners by Raju Ramachandran, Senior Advocate. 24 Outline of Submissions on Behalf of the Petitioners by Raju Ramachandran, Senior Advocate; Synopsis and Written Submissions/ Arguments.

[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

f.

This Court in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar25 has held that the President’s ordinance-making power cannot be treated as a constitutional equivalent of ordinary legislative power, notwithstanding a deeming provision which confers the same force and effect on it. Similarly, the functions of the Union executive or legislature cannot be treated as constitutional equivalents of the powers of the state executive or legislature, due to a “democratic deficit”26; and

g.

Articles 75 and 164 of the Constitution stipulate that the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the Legislature. The State Legislature is vested with certain non-legislative functions such as questions and debates. Such non-legislative functions vested in the State Legislature cannot be exercised by Parliament during President’s rule27.

23. The will of the people finds no expression in the purported concurrence of the State Government, essentially the Governor, since there was no Council of Ministers in place. Thus, the COs are undemocratic for want of public will and public reason.28 24. Article 370 must be interpreted keeping in mind the following principles: a.

Article 370 envisages three modes of cooperation between the Union and the State of Jammu and Kashmir: the lowest degree is under the first proviso to Article 370(1)(d) where only consultation with the State Government is required; the second degree is under Article 370(1)(b)(ii) and the second proviso to Article 370(1)(d), where consent of the Government of the State is required; and the highest degree is under Article 370(3) where the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir is required29;

(2017) 3 SCC 1 Written Submissions by Mr Gopal Subramanium, Senior Advocate. Written Submissions of Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Senior Advocate. Outline of Submissions on Behalf of The Petitioners by Muzaffar H. Baig, Senior Advocate; Rejoinder on behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal Sr. Advocate. 29 Written Submissions on Behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal.

b.

Article 370 must be interpreted in the context of three pillars namely- asymmetric federalism30, autonomy, and consent.31 Asymmetrical federalism, that is differential rights to certain federal sub-units is a part of the Indian federal scheme. It is a part of the basic structure, as is federalism32;

c.

Article 370 reflects the agreement between two contracting parties namely the acceding State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Dominion of India, under which the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir was given the power to finally determine the state’s affiliation to the Union and its limits. Once this relationship was crystallised by the Constitution of the State, there was no scope of change, since the Constituent Assembly, solely empowered to change the relationship, ceased to exist33; and

d.

Article 370 recognized the constituent power of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir articulated through the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir or otherwise, to make or remake the Constitution of the state, subject to Article 1 of the Constitution of India.34

25. The marginal note to Article 370 and the placement of the provision in Part XXI of the Constitution cannot be used to hold that the provision is temporary for the following reasons: a.

Since the Maharaja or his successors did not sign a merger agreement with the Union of India, the State retained residual sovereignty and Article 370 was incorporated in the Indian Constitution as a recognition of the same.35 The reason for

Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade. Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramanium, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner. Submissions on behalf of the petitioners by Senior Advocate Prashanto Chandra Sen. Outline Of Submissions on Behalf Of The Petitioners By Muzaffar H. Baig, Senior Advocate. 34 Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramanium, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner. 35 Submissions by Mr Zaffar Shah, Senior Advocate.

[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

placing Article 370 in Part XXI of the Constitution of India was that the Constituent Assembly of India assumed that as and when the Constituent Assembly of the State will be established, it would recommend the abrogation of Article 370, and thereby fully integrate the state into the Union. It cannot be said that by reason of being placed in Chapter XXI of the Constitution of India, Article 370 could have been abrogated at any time by the President. This is apparent also from the fact that the provision was kept out of the purview of Article 368 of the Constitution, and a mechanism for its abrogation was provided in Article 370(3).36 Thus, it was temporary only insofar as the Constituent Assembly was not in place at the time of its incorporation into the Indian Constitution. It was a permanent provision of the Indian Constitution notwithstanding its placement in Chapter XXI of the Constitution and the state was to be governed by two Constitutions37; and b.

The word ‘temporary’ in the marginal note, does not refer to the limited duration of time, after which the Article would cease to exist. It implies that unless the specific conditions of its repeal, that is, convening of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir cannot be secured, the Article will continue to operate irrespective of the duration of time.38

26. Upon the enactment of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, the Constituent Assembly became functus officio and as such, Article 370 became permanent. Absent the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly, Article 370 could not be amended and the Legislative Assembly could not substitute the Constituent Assembly.39 27. Article 370 could only have been repealed by the Constituent Assembly between 1950 and1957. After that, that is after the Constituent Assembly of the State ceased to exist, it can only be amended by way of

Submissions by Mr Zaffar Shah, Senior Advocate. Submissions by Mr Zaffar Shah, Senior Advocate. Submissions by Mr Zaffar Shah, Senior Advocate. Written Submissions on Behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal.

the procedure specified under Article 368, followed by its extension to the State of Jammu and Kashmir by Article 370(1)(d). After the enactment of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir and the consequent cessation of the Constituent Assembly of the State, Article 370(1) alone survives since the only mechanism of its repeal i.e. Article 370(3) could not be resorted to, without the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly. As such, the dual constitutional arrangement between the State and the Union attained finality.40 28. Contrary to the position taken by the senior counsel for certain Petitioners that Articles 370(1) and 370 (3) are permanent facets of the Constitution of India, after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, Mr Dinesh Dwivedi, senior counsel argues that Article 370 was a temporary provision. The interim arrangement in the form of Article 370 ceased to operate after the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir was enacted. Article 370 ceased to be a source of power for the President, as was originally intended.41 Mr Dinesh Dwivedi disagreed with the proposition that since the Constituent Assembly chose to not recommend the abrogation of Article 370, Article 370(3) would continue to operate after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly.42 He challenges the impugned actions on the ground that any power under Article 370 could no longer be exercised. A temporary provision could not be made a permanent source of power to bring about the impugned Constitutional Orders or the Reorganisation Act. After January 1957, no provisions of the Constitution of India could be applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir could not be repealed, being entirely independent from the Constitution of India.43 29. Unlike the other States, the State of Jammu and Kashmir retained a part of the sovereignty even while acceding to the Dominion of India: a.

There was no merger agreement between the Dominion of India and the State of Jammu and Kashmir, unlike other states. The terms of their relationship were defined in the Instrument of Accession44 whereby though certain matters were acceded to the Union; residual

40 Written Submissions Of Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Senior Counsel. 41 Written Submissions By Shri Dinesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate. 42 Written Submissions By Shri Dinesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate. 43 Written Submissions By Shri Dinesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate. 44 “IoA”

[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

sovereignty was retained by the Maharaja in accordance with Clause 8 of the Instrument. This position – that the residual sovereignty vested with the Maharaja was affirmed by this Court as well45; b.

The very recognition of a separate Constituent Assembly for a state by the Constitution of India indicates that the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir which was the creation of a sovereign body, represented the sovereignty of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Once the Constituent Assembly ceased to exist, the sovereignty was transferred to the Constitution. This sovereignty is recognised by Article 370(3)46;

c.

The sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir is clear also from Article 370(2) which effectively states that if any proposal for conferring additional powers to the Union Parliament is mooted once the Constituent Assembly comes into existence, it should be placed before the Constituent Assembly and not before the State government.47 Once the Constituent Assembly ceased to exist, the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir assumed sovereignty. The Constitution of the state and the Legislative Assembly of the State created by the Constitution, are permanent.48 The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir is an independent, perpetual document. Since it was not created by the Constituent Assembly, it was neither subordinate to the Constitution of India, nor to Article 370. It cannot be substituted or repealed by an act of the Union Government49;

d.

This Court has recognised that internal sovereignty may be divided by a distribution of legislative powers, which is an essential feature of federalism50; and

45 Zaffar Shah; Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramanium, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner; Written Submissions of Mr. Dushyant Dave, Senior Advocate; Written Submissions By Shri Dinesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate. 46 Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate. 47 Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate. 48 Submissions on behalf of the Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate. 49 Written Submissions By Shri Dinesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate. 50 SR Bommai vs Union of India; para 97 Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate.

e.

The sovereignty of the Ruler was recognised in the 1939 Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, and contrary to the Respondents’ argument (that the Ruler’s sovereignty ended after he executed the IoA), the sovereignty continued even after the IoA or the 1949 Declaration.51 Read with other proclamations and the IoA, the Declaration did not take away the Ruler’s sovereignty52. The power of the Union flowed from the IoA with respect to the three subjects therein. It was later extended to cover all the entries in List I by the Ruler in 1991. In 1991, Section 5 of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution was modified to end the sovereignty of the Ruler and to adopt the principle of collective sovereignty of the legislature. However, this 1991 Amendment should be viewed in light of the Parliament’s limited power until the enactment of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir.

30. CO 272 issued under Article 370(1)(d) is unconstitutional for the following reasons: a.

Article 370(1)(d) refers to the modification of the Constitutional provisions and their application to India. However, CO 272 goes beyond mere modification of the provisions of Article 367 and their application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It vests the power of a certain kind, meant to be exercised by a certain body, in a completely different body. This is tantamount to changing the fundamental basis of Article 370(3)53 which could have only been done through an amendment of Article 370(3). The expression “Constituent Assembly” cannot be substituted with “Legislative assembly” in view of Article 370(2) which ascribes a specific meaning to the former term.54 The expression ‘Constituent

51 Rejoinder by Mr. Dinesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate. 52 Rejoinder by Mr. Dinesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate. 53 Submissions by Mr Zaffar Shah, Senior Advocate; Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramanium, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner; Written Submissions of Gopal Sankaranarayanan Senior Advocate on Behalf of the Petitioner; Written Submissions On Behalf Of The Intervenor By Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Senior Advocate. 54 Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate; Written Submissions of Gopal Sankaranarayanan Senior Advocate on Behalf of the

[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

Assembly’ is not ambiguous and no other meaning can be ascribed to it55. The Constituent Assembly is completely different from the Legislative Assembly. The latter is neither a substitute nor the successor of the former.56 CO 272 is thus a colourable exercise of the President’s power57; b.

Article 367 is an interpretation clause. The CO does not merely change the manner of interpretation but substitutes the provision by conferring constituent power of the Constituent Assembly on the Legislative Assembly. This amounts to an amendment of Article 370(3)58;

c.

The Legislative Assembly had no power under the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir to amend any provision of the Constitution of India, according to Section 147 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. Consequently, neither the Legislative Assembly nor the Governor could have given consent to CO 272. CO 272 is invalid because it vests in the Legislative Assembly a power that the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir expressly bars59;

d.

Article 370 recognizes the unique constitutional status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. As such, the provision contains a provision for its own amendment in Article 370(3). When such a specific provision exists, the amendment cannot be done in any other manner60;

e.

Article 370(1)(d) is for application of provisions “other” than Articles 1 and 370 to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Since CO 272 pertains to Article 370, any amendment to the provision

Petitioner. 55 Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate. 56 Written Submissions On Behalf Of The Intervenor By Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Senior Advocate. 57 Written Submissions On Behalf Of The Intervenor By Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Senior Advocate. 58 Submissions by Mr. Zaffar Shah, Senior Advocate; Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate. 59 Written Submissions by Sh. Sanjay Parikh, Senior Advocate. 60 Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramanium, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner.

can only be done through Article 370(3) and not through Article 370(1)(d); f.

Article 370 was previously amended through the exercise of power under Article 370(3). COs 48 and 72 were issued under Article 370(1)(d), and they added and amended sub-clause 4 to Article 367. However, unlike CO 272, COs 48 and 72 did not contain any references to Article 370. They were purely clarificatory orders. They did not make any substantive changes to Article 370.61 However, CO 272 makes amendments to Article 370, through the backdoor62;

g.

The Respondents’ argument that the proviso to Article 370(3) and the requirement of a recommendation of the Constituent Assembly ceased to exist after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly is incorrect. While the powers under Article 370(1)(b) are in the nature of amending powers, the power under Article 370(3) is a constituent power. Considering the limitations placed on both, to accept the Respondents’ argument would lead to an inconsistent conclusion that the amending provision would be more onerous than abolishing it under Article 370(3). Thus, Article 370(3) could only be abrogated by a Constituent body and no less63;

h.

Article 370 could have been amended only by resorting to Article 370(3), subject to the proviso thereto. This was reiterated by this Court in Prem Nath Kaul v. State of J&K64, which was decided after the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir had ceased to exist;

i.

In the alternative, Article 367 does not apply to Article 370(3) because the latter starts with a non-obstante clause. Impliedly,

61 Mohd Maqbool Damnoo vs State of Jammu and Kashmir, (1972) 1 SCC 536; Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramanium, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner. 62 Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramanium, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner. 63 Rejoinder on behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal Sr. Advocate pg 18-19 para 41; Brief Written Submissions in Rejoinder on Behalf of Ms. Warisha Farasat, Advocate for the Intervenor. 64 1959 Supp (2) SCR 270.

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Article 367 cannot be used to make any changes to Article 370(3)65; j.

The Constitution cannot be amended by an executive order. Only Parliament in exercise of its constituent power can amend the Constitution of India. The CO, which effectively amends the Constitution, could not be affected by an executive order 66;

k.

CO 272 made CO 1954 inapplicable. It was issued with the due concurrence of the Constituent Assembly of the state, which was in existence at the time. As such, the Governor had no jurisdiction to concur to make such a CO, issued with the concurrence of the Constituent Assembly nonapplicable 67;

l.

The wholesale application of the Constitution of India suffers from a lack of application of mind – which was a mandatory pre-condition. Article 370(1)(d) contemplates a situation where, based on the exigencies of the situation, and upon due application of mind, certain specific provisions of the Constitution are extended to the State of Jammu and Kashmir in order to address the said exigencies. CO 272 applies the provisions of the entire Constitution of India to the state. No deliberations took place to decide the suitability of those provisions for the state. Such wholesale application of the whole Constitution, in one go, is apparently without any deliberation68;

m.

The Respondents have erroneously relied on Mohd. Maqbool Damnoo v. The State of Jammu and Kashmir69 to argue that the Constituent Assembly and the Legislative Assemblies are interchangeable. In the said case, the Court had held that the

65 Written Submissions On Behalf Of Mr. Kapil Sibal, Sr. Adv; Submissions by Mr. Zaffar A Shah, Senior Advocate Rejoinder. 66 Written Submissions Of Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Senior Counsel. 67 Submissions by Mr Zaffar Shah, Senior Advocate. 68 Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramanium, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner. 69 (1972) 1 SCC 536

Governor, being the successor to Sadr-i-Riyasat, can exercise the same powers as the latter. The reliance on this case is misplaced70; and n.

The IoA was meant to accede to the Union. The State retained sovereignty on matters except those stipulated in the IoA. The Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir was the fulfilment of the promise to the people of the State that the issue of accession would be referred to them for ratification. Therefore, treating the Legislative Assembly as a substitute for Constituent Assembly of the State, would violate the terms of the IoA as well as the very integration of the state into the Union on its own terms.71

31. CO 272 is unconstitutional because the President could not have secured his own concurrence to fulfil the second proviso to Article 370(1)(d): a.

CO 272 has been issued purportedly with the concurrence of the State Government. However, since the Legislative Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was dissolved by the Governor when CO 272 was issued, the Council of Ministers was not in place and no such concurrence could have been sought. The Governor was not acting on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. This is not only against the mandate of the Governor’s powers under the Constitution of India, but also, does not fulfil the concurrence requirement under the second proviso to Article 370(1)(d);

b.

The President usurped the power of the State Government. The provisos to Article 370(1)(d) distinguish between matters specified and not specified in the IoA. Article 370(1) begins with a nonobstante clause. Therefore, notwithstanding any other provisions of the Constitution of India, including Article 356, the President has the power to extend the application of certain provisions to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This power is subject to the second proviso. Notably, Article 356 does not contain any non-obstante clause. Impliedly, considering the importance of non-obstante clauses, the

70 Rejoinder on behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal Sr. Advocate. 71 Written Submissions of Ms. Nitya Ramakrishnan, Senior Advocate.

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concurrence can only be given by the State Government and not the President. The State Government was not in existence at the time CO 272 was issued. Absent such concurrence as required by the second proviso, CO 272 could not have been issued72; and c.

Without prejudice to the above, even if the State Government’s functions could be validly exercised by the President according to Article 356, Article 356(1)(a) permits the President to exercise the “functions” and not the “privileges” of the State Government. To concur with the President in accordance with Article 370(1) (d) is a privilege and not a function and thus could not have been exercised by the President, even under Article 356.73

32. CO 273 dated 6 August 2019 is unconstitutional for the following reasons: a.

CO 273 states that the President, on the recommendations of the Parliament, had declared that all the clauses of Article 370 have ceased to be operative, except a clause that effectively applies the Constitution of India mutatis mutandis to the State of Jammu and Kashmir74;

b.

Consequent to the invalidity of CO 272, CO 273 is void ab initio for the same reasons as stated above in respect of CO 27275;

c.

CO 273 was issued in exercise of power under Article 370(3). However, there was no “recommendation” from a representative body competent to issue such a recommendation under the

72 Written Submissions of Gopal Sankaranarayanan Senior Advocate on Behalf of the Petitioner; State Bank of India vs Santosh Gupta (2017) 2 SCC 538, Written Submissions On Behalf Of The Intervenor By Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Senior Advocate; Written Submission On Behalf Of Impleader By Manish Tewari & Mr. Abhimanyu Tewari. 73 Written Submissions of Gopal Sankaranarayanan Senior Advocate on Behalf of the Petitioner. 74 Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramanium, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner. 75 Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramanium, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner; Written Submissions On Behalf Of The Intervenor By Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Senior Advocate.

proviso to Article 370(3). Since the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly is mandatory under the proviso to Article 370(3), and no such recommendation could have been obtained in view of the non-existence of the Constituent Assembly at the relevant time, CO 273 is ultra vires Article 370(3).76 The proviso to Article 370(3) was included to give power to the people of the State to decide whether they wanted to integrate with India77; d.

The Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir was the sole authority to determine whether Article 370 ought to continue to exist. After its dissolution, no such determination could have been made. The Constituent Assembly had already expressed its desire to not abrogate the special status of Jammu and Kashmir. Therefore, the President had no power to act contrary to the desire of the Constituent Assembly.78 The intention was to make it a temporary power exercisable only by the Constituent Assembly, and (without prejudice), by the people of the State to abrogate Article 37079;

e.

Even assuming CO 272 was valid to the extent that it substituted the Constituent Assembly with the Legislative Assembly, even then the requirement of recommendation was not satisfied since CO 273 was issued at a time when the Proclamation under Article 356 was in force and the Legislative Assembly was not in existence80;

76 Outline of Submissions on Behalf of the Petitioners by Raju Ramachandran, Senior Advocate. 77 Written Submissions on Behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal. 78 Sampat Prakash Vs State of Jammu and Kashmir 1969 2 SCR 365, “This clause clearly envisages that the article will continue to be operative and can cease to be operative only if, on the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State, the President makes a direction to that effect…. “This makes it very clear that the Constituent Assembly of the State did not desire that this article should cease to be operative and, in fact, expressed its agreement to the continued operation of this article by making a recommendation that it should be operative with this modification only.” Written Submissions of Mr. Dushyant Dave, Senior Advocate. 79 Rejoinder on behalf Of Mr. Kapil Sibal Sr. Advocate. 80 Outline of Submissions on Behalf of the Petitioners by Raju Ramachandran, Senior Advocate.

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f.

Unlike other states which acceded to the Constitution of India, the State of Jammu and Kashmir had a separate Constitution and had not merged with the Union. It had acceded to India only on the terms agreed to by way of the IoA. CO 273 has invalidated the IoA81;

g.

CO 273 (along with CO 272) amounts to the destruction of the basis of Article 370 by a unilaterally reneging by the Union of India, of the compact made with the people of Jammu and Kashmir82; and

h.

The Respondents argue that since the Constituent Assembly was dissolved, recourse to the proviso to Article 370(3) was not possible and the maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia (that is, law does not compel the doing of impossibilities) justifies the impugned actions without recommendations from the Constituent Assembly. This is not tenable in view of the above arguments based on Article 370(2) and the difference between the Constituent and Legislative Assembly.83

33. The Reorganization Act is unconstitutional for the following reasons: a.

The Presidential Proclamation issued under Article 356 suspended the first proviso to Article 3 of the Constitution to the extent that it relates to the reference by the President to the Legislature of the state for its views and the whole of the Second proviso to Article 3 as it applies to the State of Jammu and Kashmir by which a Bill under Article 3 could be initiated only with the consent of the Legislature of the State. A law which brings permanent changes cannot be brought into force by temporarily suspending the provisos to Article 3. Since the Proclamation under Article 356 itself was void (for reasons mentioned above), the suspension of Article 3 was similarly void. Even otherwise, the suspension of the provisos to Article 3 was neither an incidental nor consequential

81 Submissions by Mr Zaffar Shah, Senior Advocate. 82 Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramanium, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner; Rejoinder on behalf Of Mr. Kapil Sibal Sr. Advocate. 83 Rejoinder on behalf Of Mr. Kapil Sibal Sr. Advocate.

exercise of powers under Article 356(1). It was beyond the President’s power conferred under Article 356(1)(c), which cannot be to abrogate the State itself. The Reorganisation Act is not a law which the Parliament would be competent to make under Article 357(1) and Article 35684; b.

The suspension of the proviso to Article 3 prescribing a mandatory reference to the State Legislature by the President had the effect of suspending the will of the people, protected under the proviso. The purpose of the proviso is the mandatory ascertainment of the will of the people, before changing the boundary, name or area of the state. The President was thus required to ensure that their “wishes have been consulted”, and that, only at the instance of the state legislature, such a change could be effected85;

c.

In any case, even if the second proviso to Article 3 was validly suspended, it was merely an acknowledgment of the territorial integrity of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and not the source of it. The territorial integrity of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and its continued existence is dehors the second proviso to Article 3. The territorial integrity of the State of Jammu and Kashmir stems from the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, and was permanent, sovereign, and recognized by the Constitution of India. The proviso to Article 3 was merely a formal recognition of the territorial integrity86;

d.

The Reorganisation Act has bypassed the mandatory procedures and safeguards under Article 368 by resorting to Article 3. When there is a particular course of action under particular provisions, it cannot be bypassed by recourse to a general provision that does not directly deal with the subject matter. Article 4 states that the laws referred to in Articles 2 or 3 shall contain provisions for amending the first and the fourth schedule, as may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of the law and may contain

84 Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate. 85 Written Submissions on Behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal, Senior Advocate. 86 Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate.

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supplemental, incidental or consequential provisions, as the Parliament may deem fit. However, Article 4(2) states that no such law shall be deemed to be an amendment of the Constitution for the purpose of Article 368. Article 4(2) implies that Article 3 cannot be used to supplant Article 368, which is a specific provision in respect of constitutional amendments 87. The Reorganisation Act violates Article 3; e.

The text and the structure of Article 3 do not support the degradation of a state into a Union Territory. There is no categorical power to degrade a state into an Union Territory and consistent state practice indicates movement in the direction of greater federal self-governance, rather than less. Sub-clauses (b) to (e) of Article 3 deal with areas, boundaries, and names; sub-clause (a) read with Explanation 2 sets out the broader power to form a new state or Union Territory. There are a number of ways in which this is permissible and none of them entail the degradation of a state into a Union Territory. 88 Article 3 has to be read in a manner that is consistent with the principles of federalism. It cannot be invoked in order to fulfil the political objectives of the party in power at the Centre89;

f.

The 2019 Act is unrelated to the nature of powers prescribed by Article 3 of the Constitution. Article 3 does not deal with the reorganization of a State into a Union Territory. Unlike the other elements of Article 3 (clauses a-e), the reorganization of a state into Union Territories involves a drastic transfer of legislative and executive power. The Constituent Assembly would have not intended that such a transfer be affected by Parliamentary legislation 90;

87 Written Submissions of Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Senior Counsel. 88 Written Submissions of Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Senior Counsel; Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate. 89 D.C. Wadhwa Vs State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 378. Written Submissions Of Mr. Dushyant Dave, Senior Advocate. 90 Written Submissions of Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Senior Counsel.

g.

The Reorganisation Act has the effect of bringing the following changes: Article 73 of the Constitution of India on the State, erasing the executive powers under Article 162; depriving the entire territory of Ladakh of its rights under Article 54 and 55, altering the representation of the territory in the Council of States; excluding the territory from the electoral college of the Rajya Sabha – all of these changes fall squarely under the clauses (a) to (e) of the proviso to Article 368 (2). Thus, these changes could have been affected only by recourse to Article 368(2), subject to procedural safeguards such as ratification by states.91 A law that, inter alia, denudes the state of its legislative assembly such as the impugned Act cannot be brought under Article 392;

h.

There is a qualitative difference between the reduction of a state into a Union Territory as opposed to the situations envisaged in Article 3 – each of the sub-clauses of Article 3 refers to a situation where as a result of a law, citizens may find themselves living in an existing or a new state. The federal representative democracy enjoyed by the citizens under these provisions is either constant or enhanced. As opposed to this, the degradation of a State into a Union Territory causes a diminishment or a loss of representative democracy93;

i.

The purpose of Article 3 must be read in accordance with the State Reorganisation Report 1955. The Report suggested that the demarcation of Indian States into Part A, B, C and D states was not feasible. Thus, the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 195694 removed these distinctions and introduced the concept of Union Territories. From 1955 onwards, through various legislations under Article 3 the present states of Goa, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur etc. were converted from Union Territories to States95;

Written Submissions of Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Senior Counsel. Written Submissions of Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Senior Counsel. Written Submissions of Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Senior Counsel. “Seventh Constitution Amendment” Written Submissions of Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Senior Counsel.

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j.

There were historical and cultural reasons to designate certain territories as Union Territories and not full-fledged states96. In certain cases, it was not deemed reasonable to create a fullfledged state for a small area, and the cultural differences of the people in these territories meant that they could not be subsumed in the neighbouring states. Such territories were considered fit to be centrally administered. However, in due course of time, these territories came to be designated as states – which was a progressive step towards federalism. However, in the history of Independent India, an existing state has never been retrograded into a Union Territory. This leads to a diminishment of representative democracy and federalism. The Indian understanding of federalism is not to treat states as mere administrative units. The adage that India is an “indestructible union of destructible states” only means that the states can be reorganized by the Parliament; but they cannot be extinguished or retrograded into the Union Territories, in violation of the federal structure97; and

k.

Article 1(1) states that India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States. The power under Article 3 cannot be used by Parliament to create a ‘Union of Union Territories’. The issue is not whether Parliament would in fact do that. The power of the Union under Article 3 thus clashes with the principle of federalism.98

34. The Reorganisation Act did not represent the people of Jammu and Kashmir because: a.

Any alteration to the existing units, their territories, boundaries, and names should come not from the Centre but from the people familiar with the unit concerned. The people affected by the alteration should desire such an alteration. The

96 Written Submissions on Behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal. 97 Written Submissions of Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Senior Counsel; Written Submissions on Behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal. 98 Written Submissions of Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Senior Counsel.

Centre which is not aware of the local conditions and relevant considerations for such a course, should leave the alteration of such boundaries to the competent bodies such as the Boundary Commission99; b.

The Rajya Sabha expressed its views in support of the Reorganisation Bill. Only 4 out of the 240 members of the Rajya Sabha were from Jammu and Kashmir. Therefore, the Rajya Sabha cannot be said to be representative of the will of the people of the State. The will of the people could have been expressed only through the Legislative Assembly of the State. The Assembly was dissolved and elections to the Assembly were deliberately not held only with a view to enact the impugned Act100; and

c.

The people of the state of Jammu and Kashmir must initiate change rather than the Parliament, which is not the true representative of the people of the state. If the people do not feel the need to abrogate or modify Article 370, they would have done so through their representatives. Just as Parliament cannot decide the members of the Rajya Sabha on behalf of the states, it cannot decide on behalf of the people of the state. Bicameralism and shared sovereignty would prohibit this unilateral non-democratic process wherein the people of the State are excluded.101

ii. Submissions of the Union of India102 35. The process of constitutional integration of Jammu and Kashmir bears all the resemblance with the process of constitutional integration of

99 (Constituent Assembly Debates on November 17, 1948, Speech by Mr. KT Shah, Book 2, Pgs. 437-438); Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate. 100 Submissions On Behalf of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate. 101 Written Submissions of Ms. Nitya Ramakrishnan, Senior Advocate, Rejoinder. 102 Mr R Venkataramani, the Attorney General for India made prefatory submissions which are recorded in the initial six paragraphs below. Thereafter the substantive submissions were made by Mr Tushar Mehta which are encapsulated after the submissions of the Attorney General.

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various territories of India, namely democratization combined with merger of small states, formation of union of states, the idea of having constituent assemblies for framing constitutions, etc. There was no distinct or special compact between Union of India and Jammu and Kashmir as far as the constitutional integration process was concerned.103 36. It was open to the President to take a final stock of the exercise of the authority under Article 370(1)(d), and to decide as to whether there is a need of updating exercise at all, or there is a need for any other invocation of Article 370(1)(d). This power of the President is not limited or conditioned by any practice in relation to Article 370 in the past.104 37. Article 370 was conceived and designed to aid the constitutional integration process on the same lines as it happened with other states. Its continued exercise over a period cannot be seen as a cloud over or distortion of its original purpose.105 38. Border states are a distinct class of territories and their reorganisation under Article 3 ought to receive distinct consideration.106 39. Neither asymmetrical federalism nor any other federal features have been infringed.107 40. No rights in relation to representative democracy have been taken away.108 41. Article 370 is the only provision in the Constitution which the Constitution itself declares to be “temporary”. This understanding that it is temporary is furthered from the drafting history of the article, debates in the Constituent Assembly, Parliamentary debates, the gradual issuance of constitution orders. The other provisions of the Part XXI are named either “special provisions” or “transitory provisions”.109

103 Written Submissions of Mr. R. Venkataramani, Attorney General for India 104 Written Submissions of Mr. R. Venkataramani, Attorney General for India 105 Written Submissions of Mr. R. Venkataramani, Attorney General for India 106 Written Submissions of Mr. R. Venkataramani, Attorney General for India 107 Written Submissions of Mr. R. Venkataramani, Attorney General for India 108 Written Submissions of Mr. R. Venkataramani, Attorney General for India 109 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

42. The effect of Article 370(1) was to permit two organs under the Constitution of India, by way of an Executive Order, to create, amend or destroy, any part/provision of the Constitution of India [except Article 1] at their free will and apply such tailored constitutional provisions to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The expansive width of this power shows it could not have been intended to be a permanent provision – either by efflux of time or in any other manner.110 43. The impact of Article 370 was to be deprive the residents of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh from being treated at par with their fellow citizens in the rest of India. Article 370 deprived them of several fundamental and statutory rights without any legislative or parliamentary process. Such a consequence would obviously be known to the framers of the Constitution and therefore, the framers could have never intended for it to be a permanent provision.111 44. The abrogation of Article 370 brings the residents of Jammu and Kashmir at par with the citizens residing in the rest of the country, confers them with all rights flowing from the entire Constitution as well as hundreds of beneficial legislations. Therefore, applying the Constitution of India to the State can never be an “arbitrary act”.112 45. This is the only provision in the Constitution where the application of (i) the provisions of the Indian Constitution; and (ii) the application of beneficial legislations to the residents of Jammu and Kashmir, is made dependent upon the Government of the day agreeing to the application. Such an arrangement could never have been conceived by the framers of the Constitution.113 46. Article 370 is the only provision which provides for a mechanism (by way of Article 370(3)) by which it would cease to be in existence. A provision intended to be permanent would not have such an “inbuilt extinguishing clause”.114

110 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India 111 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India 112 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India 113 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India 114 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

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47. The proviso to Article 370(3) was to remain in operation only during subsistence of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir because:115 a.

When the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly was formed, Article 370 of the Constitution of India was already in existence. Being aware of Article 370(3) the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir could have, at the time of its dissolution –

i.

Recommended to the President not to exercise his powers under Article 370(3);

ii.

Recommended some exceptions and modification with which Article 370 could have remained in force;

iii.

Recommended the deletion of sub-clause (3) and consequently sub-clause (2), making Article 370(1) permanent;

iv.

It could have changed the marginal note substituting the word “temporary” with “permanent” and “Constituent Assembly” with “Legislative Assembly” in Article 370(3);

v.

Recommended the deletion of Article 370(1)(d), freezing the relationship between the State and the Union as it existed when the Constitution [Application to Jammu and Kashmir] Order, 1954 was passed by CO 48 by the President of India; and

vi.

Despite these powers of recommendation being available and despite being conscious of the availability of the power, the Constituent Assembly chose not to do any of this and was dissolved.

b.

Once the State Constituent Assembly ceased to exist, the proviso to Article 370(3) itself ceases to exist and the President becomes the sole repository of powers under Article 370(3). He has a duty to exercise this power in the interests of the residents of the State even in the absence of a recommendation.

115 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

48. The petitioners’ assertion that the decision to abrogate Article 370 was taken purely by executive feat is incorrect. The process followed clearly reflects the participation of the entire nation through their chosen representatives both in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. 116 49. If the President cannot exercise the powers under Article 370(3), it would mean that the existence and exercise of power of the President of India provided for in the Indian Constitution is dependent upon a decision or a lack of it by a body outside the Constitution of India.117 50. If the mere absence of the Constituent Assembly mentioned in the proviso to clause 3 of Article 370 is treated as rendering the power of the President of India nugatory and redundant, it would mean that under Article 370(1)(b) and 370(1)(d), any provision of the Constitution of India can be amended and applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Even the provisions which are part of the basic structure of the Constitution can be modified and applied to Jammu and Kashmir or even stultified and eradicated in its application to Jammu and Kashmir – as has happened in the past. This interpretation would amount to placing Article 370 above even the basic structure of the Constitution of India. 51. Even if the State Constituent Assembly was currently in existence, the limited role envisaged for it was to merely make a “recommendation”. Such a recommendation was not binding upon the President.118 52. Considering the limited role that the State Constituent Assembly was to play, its replacement with the “Legislative Assembly” and the recommendation by Parliament in place of the State Legislative Assembly passes muster. Parliament is not an undemocratic body and along with the Council of States, it represents federal aspirations.119 53. Parliament is the repository of the democratic will of the entire nation and in a situation which concerns the relationship of one federal unit with other federal units, the apt constitutional authority to exercise

116 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India 117 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India 118 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India 119 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

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democratic powers as per the Constitution would be Parliament. The question concerns all States in the federal setup and not merely Jammu and Kashmir.120 54. The power of the President under sub-clause (3) of Article 370 is unfettered because (a) Article 370 begins with a non-obstante clause “notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution of India”; and (b) Sub-clause (3) of Article 370 begins with a non-obstante clause “notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Article”. The exercise of powers by the President is, thus, not controlled either by any constitutional provisions including the provisions of Article 370. 121 55. The replacement of the term “Constituent Assembly” with “Legislative Assembly” was necessary to democratize the decision-making process of the President.122 56. Parliament had to exercise the powers of the Legislative Assembly because:123 a.

Of the Emergency under Article 356(1)(b);

b.

Considering the strategic significance of the State from the point of view of the sovereignty and integrity of nation, it is desirable that every federal unit should, through its representatives, both at the Lok Sabha and at the Rajya Sabha, participate in the decision-making process; and

c.

The Constituent Assembly of India was exercising constituent power while the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir was exercising “legislative” power.

57. Clause (3) of Article 370 is an extraordinary, unique and unprecedented clause. A provision in the nature of Article 370(3) is not present in any constitutional document or any provision of the Indian Constitution. It is not possible to classify the power under clause (3) under a specific nomenclature. The power under clause (3) of Article 370

120 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India 121 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India 122 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India 123 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

is a plenary Presidential power, specially designed for a “temporary” provision.124 58. The position as far as the State of Jammu and Kashmir is concerned, even prior to the coming in to force of Article 1 and the Constitution of India, was:125 a.

By the IoA, the ruler surrendered his authority; and

b.

By the proclamation dated 25 November 1949, the ruler surrendered his absolute power in regard to the affairs of the State.

59. The Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir was formed by a ruler who himself had surrendered his sovereignty. The document called the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir and the body framed for its creation cannot claim any equivalence with the Constitution of India and the Constituent Assembly of India. This is because the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir and the resultant Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir:126 a.

Were formed in 1951 by the Proclamation of the Maharaja who had already acceded to India;

b.

Were formed after the Constitution of India already included the State of Jammu and Kashmir under the Schedule to Article 1 thereby making it a part of India, devoid of any sovereignty;

c.

Were not framed in their classical sense as documents for a new nation or for providing an independent model of governance. It was only a legislative enactment for the internal governance of the State and subject to the Constitution of India; and

d.

Had a limited mandate and could not have overridden the provisions of the Indian Constitution qua Jammu and Kashmir.

60. The State Constitution does not establish a republican form of government in its entirety as it was dependent on the real sovereign document i.e., the Constitution of India.127

124 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India 125 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India 126 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India 127 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

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61. The Indian Constitution clearly establishes the Union of India as a sovereign democratic republic. The State Constitution neither establishes sovereignty nor does it claim to do so. The Preamble is indicative of this fact.128 62. To become a fundamental document, a Constitution must necessarily include several facets of undisputed sovereignty including the power to acquire new territory [which, in itself include power to “cede” its own territory]. This is absent in the State Constitution as it was already a part of the Indian Constitution under Article 1.129 63. The power of President under Article 370(3) necessarily pre-supposes the repeal of every document which is required to be repealed to ensure that the entire Constitution of India is made applicable to Jammu and Kashmir without any hinderance or legal hurdle. This power necessarily inheres in the President of India under Article 370(3). 130 64. There can only be one supreme document known as the Constitution flowing from the power conferred by the people of India. All other enactments [whether known as a constitution or otherwise] are subordinate to the Constitution of India and the body creating such other documents is also subordinate to the Constitution of India. 131 65. Article 367 has previously been utilised to modify Article 370. This is a legitimate route to modify Article 370. 132 66. When the Reorganisation Act was enacted, the second proviso to Article 3 (which applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir alone) was not in force. This is because CO 272 issued by the President made the entire Constitution applicable to the State in supersession of any previous Constitutional Orders. As a result, all the ‘modifications’ of the Constitution were superseded and only the first proviso was

128 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India 129 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India 130 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India 131 SBI v. Santosh Gupta, (2017) 2 SCC 538; Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India; Written Submissions of Mr. V K Biju, Advocate 132 List of Dates by Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

in force. Hence, there was no requirement to comply with the second proviso. 133 67. The power of Parliament under Article 3 is a plenary power which may be exercised during the subsistence of a proclamation under Article 356. States have previously been reorganised during the subsistence of a State Emergency. 134 68. Under Article 3, Parliament has the power to convert a State into two Union territories. 135 69. The suffi ciency of the material which necessitated a decision under Article 3 lies beyond the realm of judicial review. 136 70. The petitioners did not challenge the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly and the issuance of the Proclamation declaring an Emergency under Article 356. They only challenged the actions taken during the subsistence of the Proclamation.137 71. It is impermissible for this Court to read in limitations on the powers under Article 356(1)(b).138 72. The President has previously exercised powers under Article 370 even when Governor’s rule or President’s rule was in force.139 73. The term “modifi cation” used in Article 370(1) cannot be interpreted in a narrow manner. It gives the President the power to amend the Constitution in its application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Therefore, the addition of clause (4) to Article 367 by CO 272 is valid.140 74. The continuity of constituent power having been exercised by the legislative assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir by virtue

133 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India 134 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India 135 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India; Written Submissions of Ms. Divya Roy, Advocate 136 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India 137 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India 138 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India 139 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India 140 Written Submissions of Mr. Vikramjeet Banerjee, Additional Solicitor General of India

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of Section 147 of the State Constitution, the legislative assembly is equally competent to provide the requisite recommendation under Article 370(3). 141 75. The erstwhile States ceased to be independent with the advent of the Constitution. In fact, every vestige of their sovereignty was abandoned with the execution of the Instruments of Accession and the States stood fully assimilated and integrated with the Dominion of India.142 76. Article 370(3) contains a non-obstante clause, overriding Article 370(1) and (2), providing for the cessation of Article 370 itself when the conditions are right.143 77. Article 35-A, introduced through CO 48 of 1954, seeks to provide special rights to permanent residents of Jammu and Kashmir. It affects several fundamental rights, impacting the basic structure of the Constitution. However, it goes beyond the scope of “exceptions and modifications” under Article 370(1)(d).144 78. The constitutional scheme under Section 6 of the Constitution of J & K is in flagrant violation of the constitutional scheme under Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution of India.145 79. The non-obstante clause under Article 370 must give way to the non- obstante clause of Article 368 of the Constitution.146 80. The provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution create a number of problems, particularly in regard to the right to hold property, right to citizenship, and right to settlement.147 81. The actions of the Union of India are in conformity with the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the understanding of 141 Written Submissions of Mr. Vikramjeet Banerjee, Additional Solicitor General of India 142 Written Submissions of Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate 143 Written Submissions of Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate 144 Written Submissions of Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate 145 Written Submissions of Ravindra Raizada, Senior Advocate with Divya Roy, Advocate 146 Written Submissions of Ravindra Raizada, Senior Advocate with Divya Roy, Advocate 147 Written Submissions of Mr. Bimal Roy Jad, Senior Advocate

Article 370 as expressed by the representatives from the State of Jammu and Kashmir.148 82. The views of the Legislative Assembly of the State are required to be obtained only when a new State is formulated and not in case of formation of new Union Territories.149 83. All the powers of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir were being exercised by legislature of State. Therefore, by necessary implication, the word ‘Constituent Assembly’ in Article 370(3) should have been construed as ‘Legislative Assembly.’ This interpretation was given statutory form by virtue of CO 272.150 84. Article 370 is not a part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India.151 85. Article 35A is in violation of fundamental rights of the citizens of other parts of the country.152 D*. Issues 86. The reference before the Constitution Bench raises the following questions for determination: a.

Whether the provisions of Article 370 were temporary in nature or whether they acquired a status of permanence in the Constitution;

b.

Whether the amendment to Article 367 in exercise of the power under Article 370(1)(d) so as to substitute the reference to the “Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in clause (3) of Article 370 by the words “Legislative Assembly of the State” is constitutionally valid;

c.

Whether the entire Constitution of India could have been applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir in exercise of the power under Article 370(1)(d);

d.

Whether the abrogation of Article 370 by the President in exercise

* Ed. Note: PART D. 148 Written Submissions of Mr. Aniruddha Rajput, Advocate 149 Written Submissions of Mr. Apoorv Shukla, Advocate 150 Written Submissions of Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, Advocate 151 Written Submissions of Mr. Rahul Tanwani, Advocate 152 Written Submissions of Ms. Madhusmita Bora

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of the power under Article 370(3) is constitutionally invalid in the absence of a recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as mandated by the proviso to clause (3); e.

Whether the proclamation of the Governor dated 20 June 2018 in exercise of power conferred by Section 92 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir and the subsequent exercise of power on 21 November 2018, under Section 53(2) of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir to dissolve the Legislative Assembly are constitutionally valid;

f.

Whether the Proclamation which was issued by the President under Article 356 of the Constitution on 19 December 2018 and the subsequent extensions are constitutionally valid;

g.

Whether the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act 2019 by which the State of Jammu and Kashmir was bifurcated into two Union Territories (Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and Union Territory of Ladakh) is constitutionally valid bearing in mind: i.

The first proviso to Article 3 which requires that a Bill affecting the area, boundaries or name of a State has to be referred to the legislature of the State for its views; and

ii. The second proviso to Article 3 which requires the consent of the State legislature for increasing or diminishing the area of the State of Jammu and Kashmir or altering the name of boundary of the State before the introduction of the Bill in Parliament; h.

Whether during the tenure of a Proclamation under Article 356, and when the Legislative Assembly of the State is either dissolved or is in suspended animation the status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a State under Article 1(3)(a) of the Constitution and its conversion into a Union Territory under Article 1(3)(b) constitutes a valid exercise of power.

E*. Analysis i. The State of Jammu and Kashmir did not possess sovereignty *

Ed. Note: PART E.

87. Some petitioners urged that the State of Jammu and Kashmir retained an element of sovereignty when it joined the Indian Union. They argued that the IoA ceded ‘external sovereignty’ to the Union of India by ceding control over the subjects of defence, foreign affairs, and telecommunication but the State retained ‘internal sovereignty’ because of: a.

The history of the relationship between Jammu and Kashmir and India;

b.

The formation of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir;

c.

The adoption of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir; and

d.

The power to enact laws on all subjects except defence, foreign affairs, and telecommunication.

They urged that Article 370 subsumed the sovereignty retained by the State. In response, the Union of India advanced the argument that any sovereignty which vested with the State was ceded with the signing of the IoA. The Union argued that the constitutional scheme (of both the Indian Constitution and the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir) does not indicate that any element of sovereignty was retained by the State. The question of whether the State retained any element of sovereignty is a primary issue which will bear upon the other issues before this Court. a. The meaning of sovereignty 88. Sovereignty has different connotations in political theory, law and philosophy. Even within these fields, there is no definitive meaning about its content. European philosophers, from Hobbes to Locke to Rousseau deliberated upon sovereignty, and its meaning has evolved over centuries. While it was initially considered as residing within a person (generally, the monarch), it is now thought to rest within a body or group. 89. Despite the absence of agreement on its precise content, there is broad agreement that legal sovereignty exists when a body has unlimited or unrestricted legislative power or authority and when none other is superior to it.153 This

153 See, for instance, Dicey, Law of the Constitution (8th ed. 1915); Austin, Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1873); John Dickinson, A Working Theory Of Sovereignty I, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 42, Issue 4, December 1927, Pages 524–548;

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indicates that a sovereign authority has the supreme power to make laws and is not subordinate to another entity. In Law of the Constitution, Dicey stated: “It should, however, be carefully noted that the term ‘sovereignty,’ as long as it is accurately employed in the sense in which Austin sometimes uses it, is a merely legal conception, and means simply the power of law-making unrestricted by any legal limit”154 The emphasis on the unlimited nature of the power available to a body has diminished with the development of international law and other modern limits on the exercise of power.155 While the expression ‘sovereignty’ was previously understood to mean that the sovereign could enact any type or form of law in exercise of sovereign power, modern legal systems limit the nature of the laws that can be enacted by constitutional or other interdicts. Hence, the aspect of sovereignty which requires no subordination to another body is of greater significance as compared to the traditional aspect that requires power to be unlimited. 90. The meaning of sovereignty elucidated in the preceding paragraph is descriptive not of external sovereignty but internal sovereignty. The former is commonly understand to mean the independence of a nation in relation to other nations whereas the latter is the relationship of the “sovereign within the state to the individuals and associations within the state.”156 External and internal sovereignty are not entirely distinct concepts but are different facets. They have gradually come to be regarded as two sides of the same coin.157 Dicey’s comment (extracted above) is evidently with reference to internal sovereignty because the unrestricted power to make laws concerns individuals and associations within a state, as opposed to the relationship between two nations. 91. Orfield undertook a study of the literature on the subject of sovereignty. The study listed five leading characteristics of internal sovereignty:

154 Dicey, Law of the Constitution (8th ed. 1915) at 70 155 Union of India v. Sukumar Sengupta, 1990 Supp SCC 545 156 Lester B Orfield, The Amending of the Federal Constitution (2012) 157 Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, ‘Sovereignty’ Oxford Public International Law <https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/ law-9780199231690-e1472>

a.

It exists as a matter of fact or as a matter of fact and law. Though the law of a state need not necessarily recognize, it may recognize the sovereign;

b.

Sovereign power is absolute in that a law may be passed on any subject;

c.

It is indivisible;

d.

The law passed by the sovereign need not be enforced in particular cases; and

e.

The legal sovereign is determinate. It may be a single person or a group of persons.

92. In India, sovereignty vests in the people of India.158 The Preamble to the Constitution of India states that “We, the people … hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this Constitution.” The Constitution was not adopted by an external authority such as a colonial power or its monarch. The Constitution does not owe its existence to an internal authority such as the rulers of the Princely States. 93. The voice of the people echoed in the Constituent Assembly though it was not formed by an election based on adult suffrage. On 16 May 1946, the Cabinet Mission Plan stated that though the “most satisfactory method” of constituting the Constituent Assembly would be through adult suffrage, it would lead to a “wholly unacceptable delay”. Thus, the Plan stipulated that the most “practicable course” is to “utilize the recently elected Provincial Legislative Assemblies as the electing bodies.” The Cabinet Mission proposed the following plan for the constitution of the Assembly: a.

To allot to each Province a total number of seats proportional to its population, roughly in the ratio of one to a million, as the nearest substitute for representation by adult suffrage;

b.

To divide its provincial allocation of seats between the main communities in each Province in proportion to their population; and

158 Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC 1; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 501

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To provide that the representatives allotted to each community in a Province shall be elected by the members of that community in its Legislative Assembly.

Muslims, Sikhs, and ‘General’ (all persons who were not Muslims or Sikhs) were recognised as the three main communities. However, since the interests of smaller minorities would not be adequately represented through this method, it was proposed that the Advisory Committee on the rights of citizens, minorities, and tribal and excluded groups should “contain full representation of the interests affected, and their function will be to report to the Union Constituent Assembly upon the list of Fundamental Rights, the clauses for the protection of minorities, and a scheme for the administration of the tribal and excluded areas, and to advise whether these rights should be incorporated in the Provincial, Group or Union Constitution.” 94. Even after the Constituent Assembly was elected, the general public were engaged in the process of the drafting of the Constitution. In February 1948, the Draft Constitution of India 1948 prepared by the Drafting Committee was published and widely disseminated. Copies of the Draft Constitution were sold for one rupee, inviting comments from a wide range of civic bodies including the public.159 Thus, the people of India – as a whole – exercised their sovereign political power to adopt, enact, and give to themselves the Constitution through the Constituent Assembly. Consequent on the adoption of the Constitution, the people exercise the power of sovereignty through their elected representatives.160 95. The question which is being considered by this Court when it adjudicates whether Jammu and Kashmir retained sovereignty is two-fold: first, did the State of Jammu and Kashmir retain sovereignty as distinct from its people? If not, is the exercise of sovereign power by the people of Jammu and Kashmir different from the exercise of sovereign power by the citizens of India who reside in different states? The answer to these and related issues will have be understood in the context of historical events which have shaped our past and continue to have an impact on the present.

159 Shiva Rao, The Framing of India’s Constitution, IV, pp. 3-4 160 State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 501

b. The history of the Union of India and Jammu and Kashmir 96. In 1834, Zorawar Singh, the General commanding the army of Gulab Singh, the Maharaja of Jammu invaded Ladakh. Ladakh came under Dogra rule and was incorporated into the State of Jammu and Kashmir in 1846. In the course of the Sino-Sikh War in 1841-42, the Qing empire invaded Ladakh but the Sino Tibetan army was defeated. On 9 March 1846, the Treaty of Lahore was executed between the Maharaja of Lahore and the British Government, resulting in the transfer of certain territories to the East India Company. At Partition in 1947, Ladakh was a part of Jammu and Kashmir and was administered from Srinagar. 97. Following the Treaty of Lahore, the British Government executed the Treaty of Amritsar on 16 March 1846 in terms of which the hilly mountainous country with its dependencies situated to the east of the river Indus and west of the Ravi, including Chamba, and excluding Lahaul were transferred by the British Government to Maharaja Gulab Singh of Jammu. Maharaja Gulab Singh died on 30 June 1857 and was succeeded by his son Maharaja Ranbir Singh. Initially, the State was ruled as a monarchy and as a consequence, sovereignty vested in the monarch. 98. Following the passage of the Government of India Act 1858 on 2 August 1858, territories formally in the possession or under the control of the East India Company were vested in the British Monarch in whose name India was to be governed. Maharaja Ranbir Singh died in 1885 and was succeeded by Maharaja Pratap Singh. 99. On 30 August 1889, the British Parliament enacted the Interpretation Act 1889. Section 18(4) defined the expression British India to comprise of : “all territories and places withing Her Majesty’s dominions which are for the time being governed by Her Majesty through the GovernorGeneral of India…” 100. The term “India” was defined in Section 18(5) as comprising of : “British India together with any territories of native prince or chief under the suzerainty of Her Majesty exercised through the GovernorGeneral of India…” The suzerainty of the colonising British over the territory of Jammu

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and Kashmir was such that external sovereignty rested with the Crown. 101. Maharaja Pratap Singh was succeeded in 1925 by Maharaja Hari Singh, the last Ruler of the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir. On 20 April 1927, the expression “State Subject” was defined in a notification issued by Maharaja in terms of which ‘State Subjects’ were classified into four categories which were subsequently to become the basis of the definition of the expression “Permanent Residents” of Jammu and Kashmir under Article 35A of the Constitution of India as it applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 102. Maharaja Hari Singh enacted Regulation No 1 of Samvat 1991 on 22 April 1934 which established a Legislative Assembly called the ‘Praja Sabha’ for the State of Jammu and Kashmir. While delegating certain legislative functions to the Praja Sabha, Maharaja Hari Singh retained supremacy over all legislative, executive and judicial matters. This was indicative of internal sovereignty, in terms of its meaning discussed in the preceding section. 103. By the Government of India Act, 1935 which was enacted by the British Parliament on 2 August 1935, India was established as a federation comprising of the Governors’ Provinces, Chief Commissioners’ Provinces and the Indian States which had or would accede to the Federation of India. Part II was titled the ‘Federation of India’ and Chapter I of the Part provided for ‘Establishment of Federation and Accession of Indian States’. Section 5 provided for the Proclamation of the Federation of India.161 Section 6 enabled

161 Section 5 – Proclamation of Federation of India (1) It shall be lawful for His Majesty, if an address in that behalf has been presented to him by each House of Parliament and if the condition hereinafter mentioned is satisfied, to declare by Proclamation that as from the day therein appointed there - shall be united in a Federation under the Crown, by the name of the Federation of India(a) the Provinces hereinafter called Governors’ Provinces ; and (b) the Indian States which have acceded or may thereafter accede to the Federation; and in the Federation so established there shall be included the Provinces hereinafter called Chief Commissioners’ Provinces. (2) The condition referred to is that States(a) the Rulers whereof will, in accordance with the provisions contained in Part II of the First Schedule to this Act, be entitled to choose not less than fifty-two members of the Council of State; and (b) the aggregate population whereof, as ascertained in accordance with the said provisions,

the Ruler of an Indian/Princely State to execute an IoA declaring that he acceded to the Federation of India subject to the terms of the Instrument. The State of Jammu and Kashmir was not a part of British India. Hence, the provisions of the Government of India Act 1935 would apply to it only upon the execution of an IoA by the Maharaja in accordance with Section 6. 104. The Jammu and Kashmir Constitution Act 1939 was promulgated on 7 September 1939. While Maharaja Hari Singh retained sovereignty and supremacy over all legislative, executive and judicial functions, Section 23 of the Act empowered the Praja Sabha to make laws for the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir or any part of it subject to the conditions specified in Section 24. The Act vested executive functions with a Council consisting of a Prime Minister and other Ministers appointed by the ruler. The Act provided for the High Court (which had been established in 1928) to be a Court of Record with jurisdiction over civil suits and civil, criminal and revenue appeals. 105. In May 1946, the British Cabinet Mission issued a Memorandum titled ‘State’s Treaties and Paramountcy’ which affirmed that upon the establishment of an independent government in India, the paramountcy of the British monarch over Indian States would lapse and paramount power over their respective territories would return to the respective Princely States. It envisaged that the States could enter into a federal relationship with the successor government. On 16 May 1946, a Statement was issued by the Cabinet Mission. According to paragraphs 15(1) and 15(4) of the Statement, the Cabinet Mission Plan recommended a Union of India where the Union would have control over defence, foreign affairs and communications while the States would retain jurisdiction over all other subjects which were not ceded to the Union. 106. Meanwhile, the Constituent Assembly was elected and came together to deliberate upon the form of governance for the country and frame a Constitution for it. The Constituent Assembly comprised of a broad-based representation from across the country in which the representatives of the Princely States continued to join. In terms of the Cabinet Mission Plan, the

amounts to at least one-half of the total population of the States as so ascertained, have acceded to the Federation.

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Constituent Assembly of India met for its first session on 9 December 1946. 107. On 22 January 1947, the Constituent Assembly unanimously adopted the Objectives Resolution which declared the “firm and solemn resolve to proclaim India as an Independent Sovereign Republic.” Paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 7 declared that: “(2) WHEREIN the territories that now comprise British India, the territories that now form the Indian States, and such other parts of India as are outside British India and the States, as well as such other territories as are willing to be constituted into the Independent Sovereign India, shall be a Union of them all; and (3) WHEREIN the said territories whether with their present boundaries or with such others as may be determined by the Constituent Assembly and thereafter according to the law of the Constitution, shall possess and retain the status of autonomous units, together with residuary powers, and exercise all powers and functions of government and administration, save and except such powers and functions as are vested in or assigned to the Union or as are inherent or implied in the Union or resulting therefrom; and (4) WHEREIN all power and authority of the Sovereign Independent India, its constituent parts and organs of government, are derived from the people; and … (7) WHEREIN there shall be maintained the integrity of the territory of the Republic and its sovereign rights on land, sea, and air according to justice and the law of civilized nations; …” (emphasis supplied) 108. The Objectives Resolution is significant to the discussion of whether Jammu and Kashmir retained an element of sovereignty because it reflects the understanding of the framers of the Constitution as to the consequences of acceding to India. Undoubtedly, the rulers of the Princely States, had a contemporaneous and parallel understanding of the

consequences of accession – the loss of sovereignty. Indeed, this was one of the factors (if not the main factor) which caused some of the Princely States (such as Hyderabad) to hesitate in acceding to India. The following portions of the Objectives Resolution are of particular significance: a.

Paragraph 2 indicated that the territories which acceded would be acceding to the sovereign country of India;

b.

Paragraph 3 indicated that the acceding territories would retain some level of autonomy (which is different from sovereignty);

c.

Paragraph 4 indicated that the sovereignty of India was derived from its people as a whole. This included the people of the acceding territories; and

d.

Paragraph 7 reinforced that the centrality of sovereignty vests with the people of the country as a whole.

109. On 20 February 1947, Clement Attlee, the Prime Minister of United Kingdom announced that: a.

The British Government would grant full self-government to British India by 30 June 1948; and

b.

The future of the Princely States would be decided after the date of final transfer was determined.

110. On 3 June 1947, representatives of the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League and the Sikh Community came to an agreement with Lord Mountbatten, the agreement being known as the ‘Mountbatten Plan’. The Mountbatten Plan inter alia envisaged: a.

The partition of British India;

b.

Grant of Dominion status to successor governments;

c.

Autonomy and sovereignty to India and Pakistan;

d.

Adoption of Constitutions by both the nations; and

e.

An option to Princely States to either join India or Pakistan.

111. On 13 June 1947, a meeting was convened by Lord Mountbatten with Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel, Acharya Kripalani, Muhammad Ali Jinnah,

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Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Abdul Nishtar and Sardar Baldev Singh, at which the creation of a States’ Department was envisaged. It was envisaged that: “That it would be advantageous if the Government of India were to set up a new Department, possibly called the “States Department”, to deal with matter of common concern with the States; that, if this were done, the new Department should be divided into two sections, ready for the partition of the country and that the existing Political Department and the Political Adviser should give all possible assistance and advice in the formation of this new Department” 112. On 15 June 1947, the Congress Working Committee on States repudiated the British perspective that the lapse of paramountcy would result in the creation of independent states. It stated that : “The committee does not agree with the theory of paramountcy as enunciated and interpreted by the British Government; but even if that is accepted, the consequences that flow from the lapse of paramountcy are limited in extent. The privileges and obligations as well as the subsisting rights as between the States and the Government of India cannot be adversely affected by the lapse of paramountcy. These rights and obligations have to be considered separately and renewed or changed by mutual agreement. The relationship between the Government of India and the States would not be exhausted by lapse of Paramountcy. The lapse does not lead to the independence of the States.” The British Government and Indian bodies evidently disagreed on whether paramountcy would lapse. 113. On 25 June 1947, the Interim Cabinet of India issued a press communique on 27 June 1947 for the setting up of a States’ Department chaired by Sardar Vallabhai Patel to deal with matters arising between the central Government and Indian states. The communique stated that : “In order that the successor Government will each have an organisation to conduct its relations with the Indian States when the Political Department is wound up, His Excellency the Viceroy, in consultation with the Cabinet, has decided to create a new Department called the States Department to deal with matters arising between the Central Government and the Indian States. This Department will be

in charge of Sardar Patel, who will work in consultation with Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar. The new Department will be organised in such a way and its work so distributed that at the appropriate time it can be divided up between the two successor Governments without any dislocation.” 114. On 3 July 1947, Sardar Patel wrote to Maharaja Hari Singh stating that “the interests of Kashmir lie in joining the Indian Union and its Constituent Assembly without any delay” and that “its past history and tradition demand it, and India looks up to you and expects you to take this decision”. 115. The States Department was a part of the Ministry of Home Affairs headed by Sardar Patel. On 5 July 1947, Sardar Patel issued the following statement: “I have a few words to say to the rulers of Indian States among whom I am happy to count many as my personal friends. It is the lesson of history that it was owing to her political fragmented condition and our inability to make a united stand that India succumbed to successive waves of invaders. Our mutual conflicts, and internecine quarrels and jealousies have in the past been the cause of our downfall and our falling victims to foreign domination a number of times. We cannot afford to fall into those errors or traps again. We are on the threshold of independence. … But there can be no question that despite this separation a fundamental homogeneous culture and sentiment reinforced by the compulsive logic of mutual interests would continue to govern us. Much more would this be the case with that vast majority of States which owing to their geographical contiguity and indissoluble ties, economic, cultural and political, must continue to maintain relations of mutual friendship and co-operation with the rest of India. The safety and preservation of these States as well as of India demand unity and mutual co-operation between its different parts. … I do not think it can be their desire to utilise this freedom from domination in a manner which is injurious to the common interests of India or which militates against the ultimate paramountcy of popular interests and

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welfare or which might result in the abandonment of that mutually useful relationship that has developed between British India and Indian States during the last century. This has been amply demonstrated by the fact that a great majority of Indian States have already come into the Constituent Assembly. To those who have not done so, I appeal that they should join now. The States have already accepted the basic principle that for Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications they would come into the Indian Union. We expect (sic) more of them than accession on these three subjects in which the common interests of the country are involved. … Nor would it be my policy to conduct the relations of the new Department with the States in any manner which savours of the domination of one over the other; if there would be any domination, it would be that of our mutual interests and welfare. … Let not the future generations curse us for having had the opportunity but failed to turn it to our mutual advantage. Instead, let it be our proud privilege to leave a legacy of mutually beneficial relationships which would raise this Sacred Land to its proper place amongst the nations of the world and turn it into an abode of peace and prosperity.” 116. On 10 July 1947, during the second reading of the Indian Independence Bill, Prime Minister Attlee made the following statement: “A feature running through all our relations with the states has been that the Crown has conducted their foreign relations. They have received no international recognition independent of India as a whole. With the ending of the treaties and agreements, the states regain their independence. But they are part of geographical India, and their rulers and peoples are imbued with a patriotism no less great than that of their fellow Indians in British India. It would, I think, be unfortunate if, owing to the formal severance of their paramountcy relations with the Crown, they were to become islands cut off from the rest of India. The termination of their existing relationship with the Crown need have no such consequence.

… It is the hope of His Majesty’s Government that all states will, in due course, and their appropriate place within one or other of the new dominions within the British Commonwealth, but until the constitutions of the Dominions have been framed in such a way as to include the states as willing partners, there must necessarily be a less organic form of relationship between them, and there must be a period before a comprehensive system can be worked out.” (emphasis supplied) Even within the British Government, there was uncertainty as to the precise practical effects of the lapse of paramountcy. 117. On 18 July 1947, the British Parliament enacted the Indian Independence Act 1947. In terms of Section 1(1), two independent Dominions – India and Pakistan - were to be established from 15 August 1947. Section 7(1)(b) stipulated that following independence, the sovereignty of the British monarch over Indian States would lapse and return to the rulers of those States. Consequently, as sovereign States, 562 Princely States had the choice to remain independent or to accede to either of the two Dominions established by this Act. Section 8 enunciated that as a transitional measure, the provisions of the Government of India Act 1935 would continue to apply to the two Dominions subject to conditions. In pursuance of the provisions of Section 9, the Governor-General of India issued the India (Provisional Constitution) Order 1947 which made certain provisions of the Government of India Act 1935 applicable to India until other provisions were made applicable by the Constituent Assembly. Section 6 dealt with the accession of Princely States to India through the execution of an IoA. Section 6 provided as follows: “Section 6. Accession of Indian States:(1) An Indian State shall be deemed to have acceded to the Dominion if the Governor-General has signified his acceptance of an Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler thereof whereby the Ruler on behalf of the State:(a) declares that he accedes to the Dominion with the intent that the Governor-General, the Dominion Legislature, the Federal Court

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and any other Dominion authority established for the purposes of the Dominion shall, by virtue of his Instrument of Accession, but subject always to the terms thereof, and for the purposes only of the Dominion, exercise in relation to the State such functions as may be vested in them by order under this Act; and (b) assumes the obligation of ensuring that the effect is given within the State to the provisions of this Act so far as they are applicable therein by virtue of the Instrument of Accession. (2) An Instrument of Accession shall specify the matters which the Ruler accepts as matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for the State, and the limitations, if any, to which the power of the Dominion Legislature to make laws for the State, and the exercise of the executive authority of the Dominion in the State, are respectively to be subject. (3) A Ruler may, by a supplementary Instrument executed by him and accepted by the Governor-General vary the Instrument of Accession of his State by extending the functions which by virtue of that Instrument are exercisable by any Dominion authority in relation to his State.” A Draft Common IoA and Standstill Agreements were drawn up by the Department of States. 118. India obtained independence on 15 August 1947. Partition resulted in the establishment of the two Dominions of India and Pakistan. British paramountcy lapsed. Those of the Princely States which had not executed an IoA with either Dominion became independent States. These were Junagarh, Hyderabad and Jammu and Kashmir. Once again, the sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir rested in the ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh. 119. The Government of Jammu and Kashmir signed a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan. On 27 September 1947, Nehru addressed a letter to Sardar Patel underlining that “the Pakistani strategy is to infiltrate Kashmir now and to take some big action as soon as Kashmir is more or less isolated because of coming winter.”

120. Shortly thereafter, on 26 October 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh addressed a communication to Lord Mountbatten requesting the immediate assistance of his government. The letter noted that the Maharaja wanted time to decide to which Dominion he should accede or whether it would be in the best interest of both the Dominions as well as Jammu and Kashmir for the State to “stand independent.” The Maharaja noted the grave danger to Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan in spite of the Standstill Agreement. 121. Adverting to the conditions in the State and the “great emergency of the situation as it exists,” the Maharaja stated that he had no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion, accepting at the same time that India could not send the help asked for by him without Jammu and Kashmir acceding to the Dominion of India. The Maharaja decided to accede to the Union of India. The offer of accession noted that if the State of Jammu and Kashmir “has to be saved immediate assistance must be available at Srinagar.” 122. Maharaja Hari Singh signed the IoA on 26 October 1947. The Maharaja stated that he was doing so in terms of the provisions of the Government of India Act 1935 enabling any Indian State to accede to the Dominion of India by the execution of an IoA by the Ruler. The Maharaja acceded to the Dominion of India “in the exercise of my sovereignty in and over my said State.” As a consequence, the independence attained by the State when British paramountcy lapsed was ceded to the Union of India. The IoA contains the following declaration in paragraph 1: “I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India with the intent that the Governor General of India, the Dominion Legislature, the Federal Court and any other Dominion authority established for the purposes of the Dominion shall by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession but subject always to the terms thereof, and for the purposes only of the Dominion, exercise in relation to the State of Jammu & Kashmir … such functions as may be vested in them by or under the Government of India Act, 1935, as in force in the Dominion of India, on the 15th day of August 1947…” 123. In terms of Paragraph 3, the Maharaja accepted matters specified in the Schedule “as the matters with respect to which the Dominion

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Legislature may make laws for the State.” Paragraph 5 stipulated that the terms of the IoA shall not be varied by any amendment “of the Government of India Act 1935 or the Indian Independence Act 1947 unless such an amendment is accepted by the Maharaja by an Instrument supplementary to the Instrument.” Paragraph 7 provided that: “7. Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit in any way to acceptance of any future constitution of India or to fetter my discretion to enter into agreement with the Government of India under any such future constitution.” 124. Paragraph 8 provided that nothing in the IoA would affect the continuance of the sovereignty of the Maharaja in and over the State, the exercise of any powers, authority and rights enjoyed by him as Ruler save as otherwise provided by the Instrument and the validity of any law which was in force. 125. The IoA was accepted by the Governor-General on 27 October 1947. The Governor-General stated that in response to the Maharaja’s appeal for military aid, action has been taken to send the troops of the Indian Army to Kashmir “to help your own forces to defend your territory and to protect the lives, property and honour of your people.” 126. On 5 March 1948, Maharaja Hari Singh issued a Proclamation establishing an Interim Government for the State of Jammu and Kashmir pending the framing of a Constitution for the State. 127. Before the Constitution of India came into force, the process of integrating Princely States with the Dominion of India was progressively being achieved. Many Princely States executed IoA and Standstill Agreements. 128. The White Paper on States (1951) contains an illuminating discussion on territorial integration: “224. One of the important consequences of the adoption of the new Constitution is the completion of the process of the territorial integration of States. The States geographically contiguous to the Dominion of India, as they existed before the Constitution of India became operative, could be divided into two main categories:

(i) the acceding States, and (ii) the non-acceding States. There were only two non-acceding States, namely, Hyderabad and Junagadh. The acceding States could be sub-divided into the following groups:(a) States which were not affected by the process of integration and continued as separate units. i.e. Mysore and Jammu and Kashmir; (b) Unions of States; (c) Centrally-merged States; (d) Provincially-merged States; and (e) Khasi Hill States Federation. Under the new Constitution, all the constituent units, both Provinces and States-the latter term includes non-acceding States-have been classified into three classes, viz: (1) Part A States which correspond to the former Governors’ Provinces, (2) Part B States which comprise the Unions of States and the States of Hyderabad, Mysore and Jammu and Kashmir and (3) Part C States which correspond to the former Chief Commissioners’ Provinces. The new Constitution effects the territorial integration of States by means of a of a two-fold process. Firstly, Article 1 of the Constitution defines the territories of India to include the territories of all the States specified in the First Schedule, including Part B States. This is an important departure from the scheme embodied in the Act of 1935 in that, while section 311(1) of that Act defined India to include British India together with all territories of Indian Rulers, the Act did not define the territories of the Indian Federation. Secondly, with the inauguration of the new Constitution, the merged States have lost all vestiges of existence as separate entities. This will be clear from the position set out in the paragraphs which follow.”

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129. As regards the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Para 221 of the White Paper provides: “Special provisions regarding the State of Jammu and Kashmir 221. The State of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India on October 26, 1947. The form of the Instrument of Accession executed by the Rule of the State is the same as that of the other Instruments executed by the Rulers of other acceding States. Legally and constitutionally therefore the position of this State is the same as that of the other acceding States. The Government of India, no doubt, stand committed to the position that the accession of this State is subject to confirmation by the people of the State. This, however, does not, detract from the legal fact of accession. The State has therefore been included in Part B States.” (emphasis supplied) 130. The White Paper notes Jammu and Kashmir was incorporated as a Part B State. Moreover, with the inauguration of the Constitution, all the merged entities “have lost all vestiges of existence as separate entities”. The White Paper noted that in view of the special problems which were arising in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and bearing in mind the assurance of the Government of India that its people would themselves finally determine their political future, the provisions of Article 370 were introduced. However, the legal fact of accession had resulted in the transfer of sovereignty from the Maharaja to India. The White Paper states: “The effect of this provision is that the State of Jammu and Kashmir, continues to be a part of India. It is a unit of the Indian Union and the Union Parliament will have jurisdiction to make laws for this State on matters specified either in the Instrument of Accession or by after additions with the concurrence of the Government of the State. An order has been issued under Article 370 specifying (1) the matters in respect of which the Parliament may make laws for the Jammu and Kashmir State and (2) the provisions, other than Article 1 and Article 370, which shall apply to that State (Appendix LVl). Steps will be taken for the purpose of convening a Constituent Assembly which will go into these matters in detail and when it comes to a decision on them, it

will make a recommendation to the President who will either abrogate Article 370 or direct that it shall apply with such modifications and exceptions as he may specify.” 131. In June 1949, Maharaja Hari Singh issued a Proclamation delegating his power and authority to Yuvraj Karan Singh who would function as the ruler of the State. Following his appointment as the ruler, Yuvraj Karan Singh nominated four representatives from Jammu and Kashmir to the Constituent Assembly of India. On 16 June 1949, Sheikh Abdullah joined the Constituent Assembly together with three other representatives from the State of Kashmir namely Mirza Mohammed Afzal Baig, Maulana Mohammed Sayeed Masoodi and Moti Ram Bagda. 132. At this time, several Princely States entered into covenants to form single units. The Princely States of Bhavnagar, Porbandar, Junagadh and others formed the United State of Saurashtra. Gwalior, Indore and eighteen other Princely States formed the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat). Similar covenants led to the formation of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU), the United State of Rajasthan and the United State of Travancore and Cochin. 133. In July 1949, a note prepared by the Ministry of States regarding the Indian States specifically noted that Jammu and Kashmir would be treated as a part of Indian Territory: “The Government of India have considered the matter in its various aspects and are of the opinion that in view of the present peculiar situation in respect of Jammu and Kashmir State it is desirable that the accession of the State should be continued on the existing basis till the State could be brought to the level of other States. A special provision has therefore to be made in respect of this State on the basis suggested above as a transitional arrangement.” (emphasis supplied) This note expressly clarifies the position that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir was to continue on the then-existing basis till the State could be brought to the level of other States; the State would be treated as a part of Indian Territory until Parliament made all the provisions of the Constitution (which were applicable to the States specified in Part III of

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Schedule I to the Constitution) applicable to Jammu and Kashmir. The power of Parliament to make laws for the State would be limited to those matters specified in the IoA reflecting the power of the Dominion of India to legislate. The special provision for Jammu and Kashmir was not, therefore, indicative of the fact that it retained an element of sovereignty. Rather, it was necessitated by the conditions in the State at the time and was intended to continue until the State could be brought on par with other States. 134. On 14 October 1949, Jammu and Kashmir was included among Part III States under Article 1 with a territory comprising of the corresponding Indian States immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. The Part III States were: “1. Hyderabad 2. Jammu and Kashmir 3. Madhya Bharat 4. Mysore 5. Patiala & East Punjab States Union 6. Rajasthan 7. Saurashtra 8. Travancore-Cochin 9. Vindhya Pradesh” There were nine Part III States including Jammu and Kashmir. 135. On 15 October 1949, four seats were allocated in the Constituent Assembly to Kashmir. The re-allocation of seats in the Constituent Assembly to various States was necessitated because between December 1946 and November 1949: a.

Many of the smaller States merged with the provinces;

b.

Many other States were united to form Unions of States; and

c.

Some States came to be directly administered as Chief Commissioners’ Provinces.

136. These changes required a re-adjustment of the representation of the States. The modalities which were followed were thus: a.

For States which were merged in Provinces, the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly was authorised to hold elections and to notify the persons elected or nominated to the Constituent Assembly;

b.

Where the States were united to form a Union of States and for Hyderabad, Mysore and Jammu and Kashmir, the Rajpramukh or Ruler was entrusted with this function; and

c.

In the case of States which were constituted into Chief Commissioners’ Provinces, the function was entrusted to the Chief Commissioner.

137. On 17 October 1949, four seats were allotted to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, among other States, in the Council of States. The allocation of seats of all states was as follows: “REPRESENTATIVES OF STATES FOR THE TIME BEING SPECIFIED IN PART III OF THE FIRST SCHEDULE States/ Total Seats 1 Hyderabad 11 2 Jammu & Kashmir 4 3 Madhya Bharat 6 4 Mysore 6 5 Patiala & East Punjab States Union 3 6 Rajasthan 9 7 Saurashtra 4 8 Travancore-Cochin 6 9 Vindhya Pradesh 4 Total: 53 TOTAL OF ALL SEATS. 205”

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138. Draft Article 306A, which later became Article 370 on the adoption of the Constitution, was debated in the Constituent Assembly on 17 October 1949. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, while participating in the debate, furnished the rationale for Article 370. Ayyangar’s speech has been read and re-read numerous times in the course of submissions. Ayyangar stated that: “Sir, this matter, the matter of this particular motion, relates to the Jammu and Kashmir state. The house is fully aware of the fact that that State has acceded to the Dominion of India. The history of this accession is also well known. The accession took place on the 26th October, 1947. Since then, the State has had a chequered history. Conditions are not yet normal in the state. The meaning of this accession is that at present that state is a unit of a federal state namely, the Dominion of India. This Dominion is getting transformed into a Republic, which will be inaugurated on the 26th January, 1950. The Jammu and Kashmir State, therefore, has to become a unit of the new Republic of India. As the House is aware, accession to the Dominion always took place by means of an instrument which had to be signed by the Ruler of the State and which had to be accepted by the GovernorGeneral of India. That has taken place in this case as the House is also aware, instruments of accession will be a thing of the past in the new Constitution. The States have been integrated with the Federal Republic in such a manner that they do not have to accede or execute a document of accession for the purpose of becoming units of the Republic, but they are mentioned in the Constitution itself; and, in the case of practically all States other than the State of Jammu and Kashmir, their constitutions also have been embodied in the Constitution for the whole of India. All those other states have agreed to integrate themselves in that way and accept the constitution provided.” (emphasis supplied) 139. On 25 November 1949, a Proclamation was issued for the State of Jammu and Kashmir by Yuvraj Karan Singh. The Preamble to the Proclamation notes that the Constituent Assembly which was drafting the Constitution of India included representatives of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Preamble states that:

“Whereas with the inauguration of the new Constitution for the whole of India now being framed by the Constituent Assembly of India, the Government of India Act, 1935 which now governs the constitutional relationship between this State and the Dominion of India will stand repealed; And Whereas, in the best interests of this State, which is closely linked with the rest of India by a community of interests in the economic political and other fields, it is desirable that the constitutional relationship established between this State and the Dominion of India, should be continued as between this State and the contemplated Union of India; and the Constitution of India as drafted by the Constituent Assembly of India, which included duly appointed representatives of this State, provides a suitable basis for doing so; …” 140. The Proclamation stated that the provisions of the Constitution shall govern the constitutional relationship between the State and Union of India, and that it shall supersede all other constitutional provisions which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution: “I now hereby declare and directThat the Constitution of India shortly to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India shall in so far as it is applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, govern the constitutional relationship between this State and the contemplated Union of India and shall be enforced in this State by me, my heirs and successors in accordance with the tenor of its provisions That the provisions of the said Constitution shall, as from the date of its commencement, supersede and abrogate all other constitutional provisions inconsistent therewith which are at present in force in this State.” (emphasis supplied) 141. The Proclamation by the ruler made it abundantly clear that: a.

The constitutional relationship between the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Union of India would be governed by

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the Constitution of India upon its adoption by the Constituent Assembly; b.

The Constitution would be enforced in the State of Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with its provisions; and

c.

The Constitution would upon its commencement supersede and abrogate all other constitutional provisions of the State which were inconsistent with it.

The Proclamation is of particular significance in addressing the argument of the petitioners that Jammu and Kashmir retained sovereignty because it did not enter into an agreement of merger with the Union of India. The declaration that the Constitution of India would not only supersede all other constitutional provisions in the State which were inconsistent with it but also abrogate them achieves what would have been attained by an agreement of merger. We may recall that paragraph 7 of the IoA provided that nothing in the Instrument shall be deemed to commit to acceptance of any future constitution of India. The Proclamation accepted the Constitution of India in no uncertain terms. Paragraph 7 of the IoA therefore ceased to have legal import. The acceptance of the Constitution was not a conditional, temporary or reversible act. Paragraph 8 of the IoA provided that nothing in it would affect the continuance of the sovereignty of the Maharaja in and over the State, the exercise of any powers, authority and rights enjoyed by him as Ruler save as otherwise provided by the Instrument and the validity of any law which was in force. With the issuance of the Proclamation, paragraph 8 ceased to be of legal consequence. The Proclamation reflects the full and final surrender of sovereignty by Jammu and Kashmir, through its sovereign ruler, to India – to her people who are sovereign. 142. The Constitution of India was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 26 November 1949 and came into force on 26 January 1950, repealing the Indian Independence Act 1947 and the Government of India Act 1935. 143. On 1 May 1951, a Proclamation was issued by Yuvraj Karan Singh directing the establishment of an elected Constituent Assembly to draft a Constitution for the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Constituent

Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir was convened on 31 October 1951. In his statement before the Constituent Assembly, Sheikh Abdullah adverted to the circumstances leading up to the signing of the IoA by the Maharaja, categorically adverting to the invasion from the side of Pakistan which would have otherwise led to the occupation of the whole state by Pakistani troops and tribesmen: “The overwhelming pressure of this invasion brought about a total collapse of the armed force of the State as well as its administrative machinery leaving the completely defenseless people at the mercy of invaders. It was not an ordinary type of invasion, inasmuch as no canons of warfare were observed. The tribesmen, who attacked the State in thousands, killed, burned, looted and destroyed whatever came their way and in this savagery no section of the people could escape. Even the nuns and nurses of a Catholic Mission were either killed, or brutally maltreated. As these raiders advanced towards Srinagar, the last vestige of authority, which lay in the person of the Maharaja, suddenly disappeared from the Capital. This created a strange vacuum, and would have certainly led the occupation of the whole state by Pakistani troops and tribesmen, if, at this supreme hour of crises, the entire people of Kashmir has not risen like a solid barrier against the aggressor. They halted his onrush, but could not stop him entirely as the defenders, had not enough experience training to fight back effectively. There is no doubt that some of them rose to great heights of heroism during these fateful days. Who can help being moved by the saga of crucified Sherwani, Abdul Aziz, Brigadier Rajendra Singh, Prem Pal, Sardar Rangil Singh early militia boys like Poshkar Nath Zadoo, Somnath Bira Ismail, among scores of other named and unnamed heroes of the all communities. But we, through rich in human material, lacked war equipment and trained soldiers. When the raiders were fast approaching Srinagar, we could think of only one way to save the state from total annihilation-by asking for help from a friendly neighbour. The representative of the National Conference, therefore, flew to Delhi to seek help from the Government of India. But the absence of any constitutionalities between our State and India made it impossible for her to render us any effective

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assistance in meeting the aggressor. As I said earlier, India had refused to sign a Stand Still Agreement with the state on the ground that she could not accept such a Agreement until it had the approval of the people. But now, since the people’s representatives themselves sought an alliance, the Government of India showed readiness to accept it. Legally the instrument of Accession had to be signed by the ruler of the state. This the Maharaja did. While accepting that accession, the Government of India said that she wished that “as soon as law and order have been restored in the Kashmir and her soil cleared of the Invader, the question of the state’s accession should be settled by reference of the people.” 144. In the course of his address to the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah highlighted the following reasons in support of acceding to India: a.

The adoption of democracy, as a consequence of which “there is no danger of a revival of feudalism and autocracy” if Jammu and Kashmir were to accede to India;

b.

In the previous four years, the Government of India had made no attempt to interfere in the internal autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir;

c.

The Indian Constitution provided for a secular democracy based on the precepts of justice, freedom and equality;

d.

The Indian Constitution had repudiated the concept of a religious state by guaranteeing the equality of citizens irrespective of religion, colour, caste and class;

e.

The national movement in Jammu and Kashmir gravitated towards these principles of secular democracy;

f.

The economic advantages of aligning with India; and

g.

The potential of achieving land reforms under the Indian Constitution.

145. Sheikh Abdullah noted that the most powerful argument in favour of acceding to Pakistan was that the Pakistan was a Muslim state and a

large majority of the people in Jammu and Kashmir professed the religion. Repelling the argument, Sheikh Abdullah observed: “The most powerful argument which can be advanced in her favour is that Pakistan is a Muslim State, and a big majority of our people being Muslim the State must accede to Pakistan. This claim of being a Muslim state is of course only a camouflage. It is a screen to dupe the common man, so that he may not see clearly that Pakistan is a feudal State in which a clique is trying by these methods to maintain itself in power. In addition to this, the appeal to religion constitutes a sentimental and a wrong approach to the question. Sentiment has its own place in life, but often it leads to irrational action. Some argue, supposedly natural corollary to this that our acceding to Pakistan our annihilation or survival depends. Facts have disproved this; right thinking man would point out that Pakistan is not an organic unity of all the Muslims in this subcontinent. It has on the contrary, caused dispersion of the Indian Muslims for whose benefit it was claimed to have been created. There are two Pakistan at least a thousand miles apart from each other. The total population of western Pakistan which is contiguous to our State is hardly 25 million, while the total number of Muslims resident in India is as many as 40 million. As one Muslim is as good as another, the Kashmiri Muslim if they are worried by such considerations should choose the 40 million living in India.” 146. On 10 June 1952, the Basic Principles Committee of the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly submitted its interim report recommending that: a.

The form of the future Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir would be wholly democratic;

b.

Hereditary rulership shall be terminated and;

c.

The Head of State shall be elected.

147. In 1952, the Delhi Agreement was entered into between the Government of India and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. In terms of the Agreement, the Union Government agreed that while residuary powers of the Legislature vested in Parliament in respect of other States, in

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the case of Jammu and Kashmir, the residuary powers vested in the State itself because of the consistent stand taken by the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution that “sovereignty in all matters other than those specified in the IoA reside in the State”: “in view of the uniform and consistent stand taken up by the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly that sovereignty in all matters other than those specified in the Instrument of Accession continues to reside in the State, the Government of India agreed that, while the residuary powers of legislature vested in the Centre in respect of all states other than Jammu and Kashmir, in the case of the latter they vested in the State itself” 148. In the meantime, the President issued Constitutional Orders from time to time as discussed in the other parts of the judgment. The process of integration of Jammu and Kashmir was a gradual one. This was necessitated due to the special conditions which prevailed in the State, as discussed in this segment. The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, too, was meant to play a role in this gradual process of integration. As evinced by the discussion of the historical trajectory of the relationship of Jammu and Kashmir with the Union of India, sovereignty was surrendered in part with the signing of the IoA and in full, with the issuance of the Proclamation by Yuvraj Karan Singh in November 1949. It remains to consider whether the Constitution of India or the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir lead to the conclusion that the State retained an element of sovereignty. c.

Neither the constitutional setup nor any other factors indicate that the State of Jammu and Kashmir retained an element of sovereignty

149. Article 1 of the Constitution of India provides that India is a Union of States. The immutability and import of Article 1 in its application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir may be gleaned from many provisions: a.

Article 1 (as it then stood) referenced Part III States, and Jammu and Kashmir was listed as a Part III State in the First Schedule to the Constitution of India;

b.

Article 370(1)(c) of the Indian Constitution reiterates that Article 1 shall apply to the State. While Article 370 contains provisions

for applying other provisions of the Constitution with modification or exceptions to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, there is no provision for the modification or abrogation of Article 1; and c.

Section 3 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir declares that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India: “Relationship of the State with the Union of India The State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India.”

d.

Section 147 prohibits any amendment to Section 3.

These provisions, too, contradict the argument that an agreement of merger was necessary for Jammu and Kashmir to surrender its sovereignty. The Constitution, once adopted and in force, became the supreme governing document of the land. The merger of Jammu and Kashmir with the Union of India was an unequivocal fact, as evinced from these provisions. 150. On 17 November 1956, the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir approved and adopted the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. The Preamble to the Constitution states: “WE, THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR, having solemnly resolved, in pursuance of the accession of this State to India which took place on the twenty-sixth day of October, 1947 to further define the existing relationship of the State with the Union of India as an integral part thereof.” (emphasis supplied) Three aspects of the Preamble are of significance: a.

The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir was not adopted independently of the Union of India but was adopted in pursuance of the accession of the State to India;

b.

The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir was only to further define the relationship between the Union of India and the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The relationship was already defined by the IoA, the Proclamation issued by Yuvraj Karan Singh in

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November 1949 and more importantly, by the Constitution of India; and c.

That the State of Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of the Union of India was reiterated in the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir.

151. The debates of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir also reveal that sovereignty lay with the people of India (which included the people of Jammu and Kashmir) and not with the State or its people alone: a.

Shri Kushuk Bakula stated: 162 “…That we are thus made an integral party of India, that great country of high ideas and glorious traditions to which the nation of the world look for guidance and which is the one potent factor for the maintenance of world peace at the present day cannot but be a matter for unlimited jubilation for all of us…”163 (emphasis supplied)

b.

Shri Kotwal Chuni Lal stated: “We again stand by the pledge of the National Conference that Kashmir is an inseparable part of India.”164

c. Mrs Isher Devi Mani stated: “The first point I want to emphasis is that we all must be aware that Kashmir is an integral part of India. We have acceded to India of our own free will and I see no reason why we should not be happy and jubilant over this.”165 d. The President of the State Constituent Assembly, GM Sadiq stated: “We are an integral part of India and shall remain so forever. (Loud applause). You stick to your decision. Today we are

162 Shri Kushuk Bakula made his remarks in Bodhi. The Secretary of the Constituent Assembly read out an English version of his speech. 163 25 October 1956, Debates of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir 164 7 November 1956, Debates of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir 165 17 November 1956, Debates of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir

not alone or unarmed today we are with India and 360 million Indians.”166 This is a reiteration of the understanding of the members of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir that accession to India was complete and that sovereignty was surrendered. 152. There is a noticeable difference between the Preamble to the Indian Constitution167 and the Preamble to the Constitution of the State of Jammu and Kashmir which has been extracted above. The Preamble to the Indian Constitution states, “We the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a sovereign, socialist, secular and democratic republic…” There is a clear absence in the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir of a reference to sovereignty. While the Constitution of India emphasises in its Preamble that the people of India resolved to constitute India into a sovereign, socialistic, secular, democratic, republic, the basic purpose of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir as set out in the Preamble is to define further the relationship of the State with the Union though as an integral part of India. Section 2(a) of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir provides that “the Constitution of India means the Constitution as applicable in relation to this State”. Section 4 defines the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to comprise of all the territories which on 15 August 1947 were under the sovereignty or suzerainty of the Ruler of the State. Section 5 defines the extent of the executive and legislative power of the State in the following terms: “5. Extent of executive and legislative power of the State The executive and legislative power of the State extends to all matters except those with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws for the State, under the provisions of the Constitution of India.”

166 25 January 1957, Debates of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir 167 The Preamble to the Indian Constitution: “WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens: JUSTICE, social, economic and political; LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all; FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation…”

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153. Section 5 defines the extent of the legislative and executive power of the State by relating it to matters over which Parliament has power to make laws for the State. In other words, the residual power which is left after excluding the domain which falls within the ambit of the legislative power of Parliament in relation to the State, would be within the legislative and executive domain of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Section 5 however recognises that the legislative domain of Parliament in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir would be prescribed by the Constitution of India and necessarily therefore not by the Constitution of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 154. Section 6 of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution provides for Permanent residents: “Permanent residents (1) Every person who is, or is deemed to be, a citizen of India under the provisions of the Constitution of India shall be a permanent resident of the State, if on the fourteenth day of May, 1954. (a) he was a State subject of class I or of class II: or (b) having lawfully acquired immovable property in the State, he has been ordinarily resident in the State for not less than ten years prior to that date. (2) Any person who, before the fourteenth day of May, 1954 was a State subject of Class I or of Class II and who, having migrated after the first day of March, 1947, to the territory -now included in Pakistan, returns to the State under a permit for resettlement in the State or for permanent return issued by or under the authority of any law made by the State Legislature shall on such return be a permanent resident of the State. (3) In this section, the expression “State subject of Class I or of Class II” shall have the same -meaning as the State Notification No I-L/84 dated the twentieth April. ‘1927, read with State Notification No 13/L dated the twenty- seventh June, 1932.” It is important to note that permanent residents do not possess dual citizenship – one of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and another of the

Union of India. Rather, they are citizens only of one sovereign unit, that is, the Union of India.168 155. Part IV of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution provides for the Directive Principles of State Policy; Part V for the Executive consisting of the Governor and the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister; Part VI for the State Legislature comprising of the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council. Part VI provides for the High Court and the “subordinate courts”. Part VIII provides for Finance, Property and Contracts; Part IX for the Public Services; Part X for Elections and Part XI for Miscellaneous Provisions; Part XII for Amendment of the Constitution. None of these provisions indicate that the State is sovereign. 156. Section 147 which provides for the amendment of the State Constitution is in the following terms: “147. Amendment of the Constitution An amendment of this constitution may be initiated only by the introduction of a Bill for the purpose in the Legislative Assembly and when the Bill is passed in each House by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total membership of at the House, it shall be presented to the Sadar-i-Riyasat for his assent and, upon such assent being given to the Bill, the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill: Provided that a Bill providing for the abolition of the Legislative Council may be introduced in the Legislative Assembly and passed by it majority of the total membership of the Assembly and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of the Assembly present and voting: Provided further that no Bill or amendment seeking to make any change in: (a) this section; (b) the provisions of the sections 3 and 5; or

168 SBI v. Santosh Gupta, (2017) 2 SCC 538

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(c) the provisions of the Constitution of India as applicable in relation to the State; shall be introduced or moved in either house of the Legislature.” 157. The power of the Legislative Assembly to amend the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir was subject to the constraints provided in the second proviso in terms of which the Legislative Assembly could not amend: a. Section 147 itself; b. The provisions of Sections 3 and 5; and c. The provisions of the Constitution of India as applicable in relation to the State. 158. These provisions are significant. The power of amending the State Constitution which was entrusted to the Legislative Assembly (subject to the assent of the Governor) had thus three major qualifications: firstly, the position that the State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India was unamendable; secondly, the executive and legislative domain of the State which depended upon the domain entrusted to Parliament under the provisions of the Constitution of India over which it would make laws for the State of Jammu and Kashmir was unamendable by the State Legislative Assembly; and thirdly, the provisions of the Constitution of India as applicable in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir were unamendable by the State Legislative Assembly. These restraints which were imposed on the amending power of the State Legislative Assembly made it abundantly clear that Jammu and Kashmir being an integral part of the Union of India was a matter of permanence and unalterable. Moreover, any modification in the relationship of the State of Jammu and Kashmir with the Union of India would have to be brought about within the framework of the Constitution of India and that Constitution alone. 159. In adopting the Constitution of India, “We, the people” constituted India into a sovereign republic. The State of Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of the India. The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir recognized that position by acknowledging the permanence of Jammu and Kashmir as a constituent State in the sovereign republic of India. In attempting to “further define” the relationship between the State of Jammu and Kashmir

with the Union of India, the use of the expression “further” conveys the intendment that the defining characteristics of that relationship were not exclusively embodied in the Constitution of the State. The State being an integral part of the Union of India, the executive and legislative domain of the State relates to the Constitution of India. The territorial integrity of the Union of India, which encompassed as one of the constituent units, the State of Jammu and Kashmir, was beyond the domain of the authorities in the legislative and executive sphere constituted by the State Constitution. The defining contours of the relationship between the State and the Union lay beyond the framework of the State Constitution and would be governed by the Constitution of the Union. 160. Any restraints on the power to modify the relationship of the Union with the State would thus have to be traced to the Constitution of India and not the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. Significantly, the Constitution of the State of Jammu and Kashmir did not contain an elaboration of the subjects on which the State could legislate in view of the provisions of Section 5. The legislative domain of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was a remainder or the residue left after the legislative domain of Parliament to make laws for the State of Jammu and Kashmir as defined in the Constitution of India. 161. The Preamble of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, Sections 3, 5 and 147 of the State Constitution, coupled with Article 1 of the Constitution of India read with the First Schedule as well as Article 370 indicate in no uncertain terms that a system of subordination (as understood by the definition of sovereignty) exists by which the State is subordinate to the Indian Constitution first and only then to its own Constitution. The Constitution of India was and is the supreme governing document of all States including the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The discussion of the provisions of the two Constitutions in the preceding paragraphs is indicative of this fact. 162. In SBI v. Santosh Gupta,169 this Court rejected the argument that the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir has a status that is equal to the Constitution of India: 169 (2017) 2 SCC 538

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“12. … the State does have its own separate Constitution by which it is governed in all matters, except those surrendered to the Union of India. Amendments that are made in the Constitution of India are made to apply to the State of Jammu & Kashmir only if the President, with the concurrence of the State Government, applies such amendments to the State of Jammu & Kashmir. The distribution of powers between the Union and the State of Jammu & Kashmir reflects that matters of national importance, in which a uniform policy is desirable, is retained with the Union of India, and matters of local concern remain with the State of Jammu & Kashmir. And, even though the Jammu & Kashmir Constitution sets up the District Courts and the High Court in the State, yet, the supreme authority of courts to interpret the Constitution of India and to invalidate action violative of the Constitution is found to be fully present. Appeals from the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir lie to the Supreme Court of India, and shorn of a few minor modifications, Articles 124 to 147 all apply to the State of Jammu & Kashmir, with Articles 135 and 139 being omitted. The effect of omitting Articles 135 and 139 has a very small impact, in that Article 135 only deals with jurisdiction and powers of the Federal Court to be exercised by the Supreme Court, and Article 139 deals with Parliament’s power to confer on the Supreme Court the power to issue directions, orders, and writs for purposes other than those mentioned in Article 32(2). We may also add that permanent residents of the State of Jammu & Kashmir are citizens of India, and that there is no dual citizenship as is contemplated by some other federal Constitutions in other parts of the world. All this leads us to conclude that even qua the State of Jammu & Kashmir, the quasi-federal structure of the Constitution of India continues, but with the aforesaid differences. It is therefore difficult to accept the argument of Shri Hansaria that the Constitution of India and that of Jammu & Kashmir have equal status. Article 1 of the Constitution of India and Section 3 of the Jammu & Kashmir Constitution make it clear that India shall be a Union of States, and that the State of Jammu & Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India.” 163. Parliament has the power to enact laws on all matters which are not listed in Lists II and III by virtue of Article 246 read with Entry 97 of

List I of the Seventh Schedule. However, Entry 97 was not extended to the State of Jammu and Kashmir by any Constitution Order issued under Article 370(1)(b). Thus, unlike other states, the State of Jammu and Kashmir had residuary legislative powers in view of Section 5 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. At this juncture, it is important to refer to the Delhi agreement where it was decided that the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall have the residuary legislative powers because of the “consistent stand taken by the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir” that sovereignty with respect to all matters other than those stipulated in the IoA continues to reside in the State. This is not indicative of the sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir. Residual legislative powers cannot be equated to residual sovereignty. It instead reflects the value of federalism and the federal underpinnings of the Constitution of India. Neither Parliament nor any of the States have the unrestricted power to make laws. Each has its own sphere of legislation, as demarcated by the three lists in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Each is supreme in its own sphere. The States have the plenary power to enact laws but this alone cannot be taken as a sign of sovereignty of individual States. 164. It is true that many commentators refer to these aspects of federalism as ‘internal sovereignty.’ By whatever name so called, it is clear that all States in the country have legislative and executive power albeit to diff ering degrees. The Constitution accommodates concerns specific to a particular State by providing for arrangements which are specific to that State. Articles 371A to 371J are examples of special arrangements for different States. This is nothing but a feature of asymmetric federalism,170 which Jammu and Kashmir too benefits from by virtue of Article 370. The State of Jammu and Kashmir does not have ‘internal sovereignty’ which is distinguishable from the powers and privileges enjoyed by other States in the country. In asymmetric federalism, a particular State may enjoy a degree of autonomy which another State does not. The difference, however, remains one of degree and not of kind. Different states may enjoy different benefits under the federal setup but the common thread is federalism.

170 State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India, (2023) 9 SCC 1

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165. If the position that Jammu and Kashmir has sovereignty by virtue of Article 370 were to be accepted, it would follow that other States which had special arrangements with the Union also possessed sovereignty. This is clearly not the case. As noticed by this Court in other segments of this judgment, the special circumstances in Jammu and Kashmir necessitated a special provision, that is, Article 370. Article 370 is an instance of asymmetric federalism. The people of Jammu and Kashmir, therefore, do not exercise sovereignty in a manner which is distinct from the way in which the people of other States exercise their sovereignty. In conclusion, the State of Jammu and Kashmir does not have ‘internal sovereignty’ which is distinguishable from that enjoyed by other States. 166. In Prem Nath Kaul (supra), a suit was filed by the appellant against the State of Jammu and Kashmir for a declaration that the Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estate Abolition Act 2007 was “void, inoperative and ultra vires of Yuvraj Karan Singh who enacted it” so that the appellant could retain possession of his lands. The suit was dismissed and the High Court in appeal confirmed the dismissal. The Constitution Bench, speaking through P B Gajendragadkar, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) noted two developments which had taken place. First, Maharaja Hari Singh who had succeeded Maharaja Pratap Singh as the Ruler of Kashmir issued Regulation 1 of 1991 (1934) in response to a public agitation in Kashmir for the establishment of responsible government. Section 3 of the Regulation provided that all powers - legislative, executive and judicial in relation to the State were declared to be inherent in and possessed and retained by the Maharaja. Section 30 provided that no measure would be deemed to be passed by the Praja Sabha until the Maharaja had signified his assent. Secondly, in 1939, the Maharaja promulgated the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution Act 14 of 1996 (1936). As a consequence, Regulation 1 of 1991 (1934) was overhauled. Section 5, like Section 3 of Regulation 1 of 1991, recognized and preserved all the inherent powers of the Maharaja. The Constitution Bench noted that with the passing of the Indian Independence Act 1947, the suzerainty of His Majesty over Indian States lapsed together with all agreements and treaties in force. With the lapse of British Paramountcy, Jammu and Kashmir, like other Indian States, was theoretically free from the limitations imposed by the paramountcy of the British Crown subject to the proviso to Section 7(1)(b) which prescribed that effect shall continue

to be given to the provisions of any earlier agreement in relation to the subjects enumerated in the proviso until the provisions are denounced by the Rulers of the Indian States or by the Dominion on the other hand and are superseded by subsequent agreements. 167. In the course of the judgment, the Constitution Bench adverted to the events leading up to the execution of the IoA by the Maharaja on 25 October 1947, the replacement of a popular interim government by a Proclamation dated 5 March 1948 which envisaged the convening of a National Assembly which would frame a Constitution, the issuance of a Proclamation on 20 June 1949 by which he entrusted to Yuvraj Karan Singh all his functions whether legislative, judicial or executive, the Proclamation issued on 25 November 1949 by Yuvraj Karan Singh that the Constitution of India shortly to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India shall, insofar as it is applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, govern the relationship between the State and the Union of India and shall be enforced in the State by him, his heirs and successors in accordance with the tenure of its provisions. Moreover, the provisions of the Constitution would, according to the Proclamation, supersede and abrogate all other constitutional provisions inconsistent with it which were then in force in the State. 168. The Proclamation was followed by the issuance of the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order 1950 (CO10) on 26 January 1950. The legislation in question was promulgated by Yuvraj Karan Singh on 17 October 1950 in exercise of the powers vested in him by Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of 1934 and the proclamation of the Maharaja dated 20 June 1949. Thereafter, on 20 April 1951, the Yuvraj directed the constitution of a Constituent Assembly for the framing of a Constitution for the State of Jammu and Kashmir. An elected Constituent Assembly was constituted which framed the Constitution for the State. As a result of the Constitution, hereditary rule was abolished and a provision was made for the election of a Sadar-i-Riyasat to be the Head of the State. On 13 November 1952, the Yuvraj was elected to the office of the Sadar-i-Riyasat ending the dynastic rule in the State. The validity of the State legislation was questioned on the ground that Yuvraj Karan Singh had no authority to promulgate the Act.

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169. The Constitution Bench noted that prior to the passing of the Independence Act 1947, the sovereignty of the Maharaja over the State was subject to such limitations as were constitutionally imposed by the paramountcy of the British Crown and by the treaties and agreements entered into with the British Government. However, the Maharaja was “an absolute monarch” as regards the internal administration and governance of the State and was vested with all executive, legislative and judicial powers. The Court rejected the submission that the sovereignty of the Maharaja was affected by the provisions of the IoA, holding: “26 … But it is urged that the sovereignty of the Maharaja was considerably affected by the provisions of the Instrument of Accession which he signed on October 25, 1947. This argument is clearly untenable. It is true that by clause 1 of the Instrument of Accession His Highness conceded to the authorities mentioned in the said clause the right to exercise in relation to his State such functions as may be vested in them by or under the Government of India Act, 1935 as in force in the said Dominion on August 15, 1947, but this was subject to the other terms of the Instrument of Accession of the sovereignty of His Highness in and over his State. We must therefore, reject the argument that the execution of the Instrument of Accession affected in any manner the legislative, executive and judicial powers in regard to the Government of the State which then vested in the Ruler of the State.” This Court rejected the argument that the Monarch lost plenary legislative powers upon the establishment of a popular interim government by the Proclamation dated 5 March 1948 observing that the Cabinet still had to function under the overriding powers of the Monarch: “… the Maharaja very wisely chose to entrust the actual administration of the Government to the charge of a popular Cabinet; but the description of the Cabinet as a popular interim Government did not make the said Cabinet a popular Cabinet in the true constitutional sense of the expression. The Cabinet had still to function under the Constitution Act 14 of 1996 (1939) and whatever policies it pursued, it had to act under the overriding powers of His Highness. It is thus clear that until the Maharaja issued his proclamation on June 20, 1949,

all his powers legislative, executive and judicial as well as his right and prerogative vested in him as before. That is why the argument that Maharaja Hari Singh had surrendered his sovereign powers in favour of the Praja Sabha and the popular interim Government, thereby accepting the status of a constitutional monarch cannot be upheld.” After analysing the provisions of Article 370, the Court observed: “38. On the said construction the question which falls to be determined is: Do the provisions of Article 370(1) affect the plenary powers of the Maharaja in the matter of the governance of the State? The effect of the application of the present article has to be judged in the light of its object and its terms considered in the context of the special features of the constitutional relationship between the State and India. The Constitution-makers were obviously anxious that the said relationship should be finally determined by the Constituent Assembly of the State itself; that is the main basis for, and purport of, the temporary provisions made by the present article; and so the effect of its provisions must be confined to its subject-matter. It would not be permissible or legitimate to hold that, by implication, this article sought to impose limitations on the plenary legislative powers of the Maharaja. These powers had been recognised and specifically provided by the Constitution Act of the State itself; and it was not, and could not have been, within the contemplation, or competence of the Constitution-makers to impinge even indirectly on the said powers. It would be recalled that by the Instrument of Accession these powers have been expressly recognised and preserved and neither the subsequent proclamation issued by Yuvaraj Karan Singh adopting, as far as it was applicable, the proposed Constitution of India, nor the Constitution order subsequently issued by the President, purported to impose any limitations on the said legislative powers of the Ruler. What form of Government the State should adopt was a matter which had to be, and naturally was left to be, decided by the Constituent Assembly of the State. Until the Constituent Assembly reached its decision in that behalf, the constitutional relationship between the State and India continued to be governed basically by the Instrument of Accession. It would therefore be unreasonable to

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assume that the application of Article 370 could have affected, or was intended to affect, the plenary powers of the Maharaja in the matter of the governance of the State. In our opinion, the appellant’s contention based on this article must therefore be rejected.” (emphasis supplied) 170. The Constitution Bench, therefore, rejected the challenge to the constitutional validity of the provisions of the State enactment. The court in Prem Nath Kaul (supra) had to decide on the validity of the Estate Abolition Act. The limited question before the Constitution Bench in Prem Nath Kaul (supra) was whether the Monarch held plenary legislative powers after the Constitution of India as it applied to Jammu and Kashmir was adopted in the State but before the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir was adopted. A decision is an authority for the proposition which it decides. The question of whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir retained sovereignty upon integration with the Dominion of India did not arise in that case. The legislation in question was promulgated by Yuvraj on 17 October 1950 before the Constituent Assembly of the State was constituted and the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir was adopted. When the Constitution of India was adopted, all the provisions of the Constitution did not automatically apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. By virtue of Article 370(1)(c), only Articles 1 and 370 applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir when the Constitution was adopted. Upon the adoption of the Constitution of India, the State of Jammu and Kashmir like all other States adopted a democratic form of Government. However, in the absence of Constitutional provisions to that regard, the form of Government already in the State continued to have force. Upon the adoption of the Constitution, the provisions of the Indian Constitution relating to the establishment of a Legislative Assembly for States in Part B of the First Schedule and by which the ruler was designated as the Rajpramukh did not extend to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Since the form of the Government in Jammu and Kashmir was yet to be put in force by the Government and the Constituent Assembly of the State, the form of Government already in existence continued to be in force until such necessary provisions could be made for the State. This is evident from the observation that the Monarch did not become a Constitutional Monarch upon the establishment of a popular interim Government by the Proclamation

dated 5 March 1948 because the Cabinet still had to act under the overriding powers of the Monarch and it was only with the adoption of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir that hereditary rule was abolished. ii.

The Constitutional validity of the Proclamations issued under Article 356 of the Constitution of India and Section 92 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir

171. On 19 June 2018, Mehbooba Mufti resigned as Chief Minister after the Bharatiya Janata Party withdrew from the alliance with the Jammu and Kashmir Peoples’ Democratic Party. On the next day, the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir with the approval of the President imposed Governor’s rule in the State of Jammu and Kashmir in exercise of power under Section 92 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. The Proclamation issued under Section 92 would cease to operate on the expiry of six months from the date on which it was issued. Section 92 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, unlike Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, does not permit the extension of the Proclamation beyond six months. Thus, Governor’s rule would have come to an end on 19 December 2018. The President issued a Proclamation under Article 356 on 19 December 2018. The Proclamation was approved by the Lok Sabha on 28 December 2018 and the Rajya Sabha on 3 January 2019. On 28 June 2019 and 1 July 2019, the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha extended President’s rule for another six months. 172. No challenge was mounted to the Proclamations under Section 92 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir until after the tenure of the Proclamation had ended. No challenge was made to the Proclamation under Article 356 of the Constitution of India immediately after it was issued. When the Proclamation was in the force, the President issued COs 272 and 273 by which Article 370 and the special constitutional status of Jammu and Kashmir was in effect repealed. The petitioners mounted a challenge to the abrogation of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir by challenging the validity of COs 272 and 273 and to the Proclamations issued by the Governor and the President in 2018 and the extension of the Presidential Proclamation in 2019. 173. The Solicitor General of India argued that (a) neither the imposition of Governor’s rule nor President’s rule was challenged contemporaneously in 2018 and the petitioners have been unable explain the cause for the

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delay; (b) the petitioners in their writ petitions have not pleaded grounds for challenging the Proclamations; and (c) the challenges to the Proclamations were initiated only after Article 370 was abrogated. The Proclamations, it was urged, were not independently challenged and they were challenged only because the impugned actions were taken during the subsistence of the Proclamations. 174. The power of the President under Article 356 to issue a Proclamation is of an exceptional nature which has wide ramifications on the autonomy of the State and the federal framework at large. Thus, laches in challenging the Proclamations cannot by itself be a valid ground to reject a constitutional challenge to the Proclamations issued under Article 356 of the Constitution and Section 92 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. However, we are of the opinion that the challenge to the validity of the Proclamations does not merit adjudication because: a.

The pleadings of the petitioners in the writ petitions indicate that their principal challenge is to the abrogation of Article 370 and whether such an action could have been taken during President’s rule.171 The challenge is to actions taken during the subsistence of President’s rule and not independently to President’s rule by itself; and

b.

Even if this Court holds that the Proclamation could not have been issued under Article 356, there would be no material relief which can be given in view of the fact that it was revoked on 31 October 2019. We are conscious that this Court in SR Bommai (supra) held that status quo ante can be restored upon finding that the Proclamation is invalid and the Court has the power to validate specific actions which were taken when the Proclamation was in force. The petitioners have assailed the specific actions which were taken when the Proclamation was in force on the ground that these actions breach the constitutional limitations on the exercise

171 WP (C) 1068 of 2019 assails the validity of the 2018 Proclamation and its extension but does not mention any grounds for the challenge. WP (C) 1099 of 2019 and WP (C) 1165 of 2019 have challenged the suspension of the proviso to Article 3 by the 2018 Proclamation but not the 2018 Proclamation itself. One of the grounds in WP (C) 1165 of 2019 is that the 2018 Proclamation is invalid but no reasons are mentioned.

of power after a Proclamation under Article 356 is issued. These substantive challenges which form the fulcrum of the case of the petitioners are being considered in the section below. iii. Limitations on the exercise of power by President or Parliament under Article 356 175. It now falls upon us to address the argument of the petitioners that the impugned COs could not have been issued and the Reorganization Act could not have been enacted when Article 356 was in operation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The petitioners submit that the State’s executive and legislative power cannot be exercised by the Union under Article 356 to: (a) take irrevocable decisions when the Proclamation has a limited shelf life. The power must be limited to actions that restore the constitutional machinery in the State along with orders which are necessary for the purposes of daily administration; and (b) unsettle constitutional safeguards in favour of States. 176. On the other hand, the Union Government contends that to read any further limitations on the exercise of the powers of the President or of Parliament under Article 356, in addition to the limitations expressly provided in the Constitution, would amount to this Court undertaking an exercise of redrafting the provision. 177. The issues that fall for consideration are whether (a) there are any limits on the exercise of executive and legislative power of the States by the Union after a Proclamation is issued under Article 356; and (b) if so, the scope of judicial review of such exercise of power. a. Presidential Proclamation under Article 356 178. Article 355 provides that it is the duty of the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance, and to “ensure that the government of every State is carried in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.” 179. Article 356 deals with a failure of constitutional machinery in a state. Clause 1 of Article 356 outlines both the substantive threshold for the invocation of President’s rule and the legal powers that are delegated to the President and Parliament upon the invocation of President’s rule.

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The relevant portion of Article 356 is extracted below: “356. Provisions in case of failure of constitutional machinery in States: (1) If the President, on receipt of a report from the Governor of a State or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by Proclamation— (a) assume to himself all or any of the functions of the Government of the State and all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor or any body or authority in the State other than the Legislature of the State; (b) declare that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament; (c) make such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the President to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the Proclamation, including provisions for suspending in whole or in part the operation of any provisions of this Constitution relating to any body or authority in the State: Provided that nothing in this clause shall authorise the President to assume to himself any of the powers vested in or exercisable by a High Court, or to suspend in whole or in part the operation of any provision of this Constitution relating to High Courts. […]” 180. Article 356 accounts for a situation where there is a breakdown – a ‘failure’ as the Article states - of the constitutional machinery in the State. Though this phrase is found in the marginal note of the provision and not its text, judgments of Constitution Benches of this Court have held that Article 356 must be interpreted with reference to the marginal note. 172 For the President to issue a Proclamation under Article 356, two pre-conditions

172 State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977) 3 SCC 392 and SR Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1

have to be fulfilled, which are: (a) the satisfaction of the President that a situation has arisen in which the government of a State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution; and (b) the satisfaction that such a situation has arisen must be formed either on the basis of a report sent by the Governor of the State or otherwise. If these two conditions have been fulfilled, the President by a Proclamation may: (a) assume to himself “all or any” functions of the Government of the State and “all or any” powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor or any other authority in the State; (b) declare that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament; and (c) make “incidental and consequential” provisions which are “necessary or desirable” for giving effect to the object of the Proclamation. This would also include the power to suspend in whole or in part, a provision of the Constitution relating to any body or authority in the State. However, the President is barred from exercising the powers of High Courts or suspending any provision of the Constitution related to High Courts. 181. The subsequent clauses of Article 356 prescribe conditions relating to the tenure of the Proclamation. Every Proclamation must be laid before Houses of Parliament, and unless approved by a resolution by both the Houses shall cease to operate within two months.173 However, where the Council of States approves the resolution in two months but the House of People is dissolved, the Proclamation ceases to operate on the expiry of thirty days from the date on which the House of People first sits after reconstitution unless a resolution approving the Proclamation is passed by the House of People before that.174 Article 356(4) states that an approved Proclamation has a life of six months from the date of the issuance of the Proclamation (not the date of approval) unless another Proclamation approving the continuance of the Proclamation is passed. This Proclamation also has a life of six months.175 Thus, Parliament may approve the Proclamation in the first instance (which then has a life of six months) and thereafter also approve its continuance, which shall extend the life of the Proclamation by another six months. However, Parliament shall not pass a resolution

173 Article 356(3) 174 Article 356(4) 175 Article 356(4)

[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

approving a Proclamation for a period beyond one year since the date of issuance of the Proclamation unless (a) a national emergency under Article 352 is in operation in the whole of India or whole or any part of the State; and (b) the Election Commission of India certifies that it is necessary that the Proclamation continues to be in force because of the difficulties in holding general elections.176 However, in no circumstances shall the Proclamation remain in force for more than three years since the date it was first issued.177 182. Where a Proclamation under Article 356 declares that the power of the legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament, Article 357 enunciates the consequences. In such a situation, Parliament which has been conferred with the “powers of the legislature of the State” may confer on the President the power of the legislature to “make laws”, and authorise the President to delegate the power to any other authority, subject to any conditions which the President may impose. Parliament or the President or any other authority to whom the power to make laws has been delegated may enact laws conferring powers and imposing duties upon the Union or its officers and authorities. When the House of the People is not in session, the President may authorise expenditure from the Consolidated Fund pending the sanction of Parliament. Article 357(2) states that the law enacted by Parliament or the President or any other authorised body which it otherwise would not have been competent to enact but for the Proclamation under Article 356 shall continue to remain in force even after the Proclamation ceases to operate. It shall continue to remain in force unless the State legislature or any authority alters, repeals or amends the law. b. Interpreting Article 356 in the aftermath of SR Bommai 183. This Court has in earlier judgments interpreted the scope of the power of the President to issue a Proclamation under Article 356. The approach of this Court towards interpreting the scope of this unique power of the Union Government which correspondingly reduces the autonomy of States has undergone a sea-change from the decision of a seven-Judge Bench

176 Article 256(5) 177 First proviso to Article 356(4)

in State of Rajasthan v. Union of India178 to a decision of a nine-Judge Bench in SR Bommai v. Union of India179. 184. The factual matrix in State of Rajasthan (supra) was as follows: the candidates of the Congress party were defeated in the elections to the Lok Sabha in nine Congress-ruled States in the elections of 1977 held after the end of the national Emergency in 1975. The Home Minister of the Union Government which was headed by a coalition of parties under the banner of Janata alliance wrote to the Chief Minister of each of the States to consider advising the Governor to dissolve the legislative assembly. Six States (Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, and Orissa) filed suits seeking a declaration that the letter of the Home Minister was ultra vires the Constitution, and sought an injunction restraining the Union Government from resorting to Article 356 of the Constitution. This Court while dismissing the writ petitions and suits held: a.

The actions of the Governor under Article 356 can be both “preventive or curative” because Article 355 vests the Union Government with a duty to ensure that the Government of the State is carried out in accordance with the Constitution;180

b.

The grounds for judicial review of a Proclamation under Article 356 are limited. The Court can only interfere with the decision on grounds of mala fides or if there were extraneous considerations;181

c.

The independence of States only lasts when the State executive and legislature have not violated their constitutional duties. If they have, the Union is capable of enforcing its views on such matters to enable the Constitution to work in a manner that the Union Government wants it to;182

d.

The President while exercising power under Article 356 can “take over all the functions of the Governor” to themselves,183 and “can do

178 (1977) 3 SCC 392 179 (1994) 3 SCC 1 180 Chief Justice Beg (paragraph 45) 181 Justice Bhagwati (paragraph 150) 182 Chief Justice Beg (paragraph 37) 183 Chief Justice Beg (paragraph 66)

[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

whatever the Governor could in exercise of such power.”184 It would be immaterial if the consequence of the exercise of power is final and irrevocable. This includes the power to dissolve the Legislative Assembly of a State; and e.

A resolution by both Houses of Parliament approving the Proclamation is not a condition precedent for the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly of a State. Even if such a resolution is not passed, the Proclamation has a minimum shelf life of two months because immediate actions are required to be taken in urgent situations.185 Irrevocable actions taken in those two months such as dissolving the assembly and holding fresh elections cannot be remedied even if the Proclamation is declared unconstitutional186 In fact, the power to dissolve the State legislature is implicit in Article 356(1)(b).187

185. In State of Rajasthan (supra), the seven-Judge Bench of this Court read Article 356 widely to grant untrammelled executive power to the Union Government without Parliamentary oversight. In essence, the Union Government (acting through the President) could unilaterally remove the Government of the State and dissolve the legislative assembly of the State completely abrogating the federal interests and the democratic rights of the residents of the State. Though this Court held that the exercise of power to issue a Proclamation under Article 356 is open to judicial review, the grounds for review were limited to mala fide or extraneous considerations. 186. The decision of this Court in SR Bommai (supra) changed the position of law significantly. In this case, a nine-Judge Bench of this Court placed restraints on the exercise of power by the President under Article 356 by emphasising the significance of Parliamentary control over the Proclamation and expanding the scope of judicial review of the ‘subjective satisfaction’ of the President under Article 356. 187. In SR Bommai (supra), this Court extensively dealt with the scope of the Presidential power under Article 356. On numerous questions of law,

184 Justice Bhagwati (paragraph 146) 185 Chief Justice Beg (paragraph 89); Justice Bhagwati (paragraph 146) 186 Justice YV Chandrachud (paragraphs 125 and 126) 187 Justice Fazl Ali (paragraph 218)

the Bench disagreed with the reasoning in State of Rajasthan (supra). One of the chief reasons which lead to the tectonic shift in the Court’s approach to the scope of the President’s powers under Article 356 was the abuse of the power under Article 356. When the Constituent Assembly was discussing the draft of Article 356 in the present form, Dr. BR Ambedkar observed that he hoped that the power under Article 356 would never be called into operation and that it would remain a dead letter.188 However, by the time this Court decided SR Bommai (supra), the President had exercised the power under Article 356 more than ninety times.189 While the members of the Constituent Assembly hoped that the power under Article 356 would only be used in extraordinary situations, history indicated that the power has been misused frequently to achieve political ends. In the Constituent Assembly Debates, Mr. Santhanam observed that it is only strong conventions that will prevent the misuse of power under Article 356.190 This Court in SR Bommai (supra) placed limitations on the power of the President to issue a Proclamation under Article 356 and expanded the scope of judicial review of a Presidential Proclamation. This Court’s interpretation of Article 356 in SR Bommai (supra) has prevented its misuse, creating strong conventions on the exercise of power under the provision. 188. For the purpose of discussing the ratio decidendi in SR Bommai (supra), we will refer to the opinion of Justice Sawant who authored the opinion for himself and Justice Kuldip Singh, with whom Justice Jeevan Reddy (writing for himself and Justice Agarwal) substantially agreed except on one crucial point. Justice Pandian agreed with the opinion of Justice Jeevan Reddy. The ratio decidendi of the opinion of the majority is summarised below:

188 “In fact I share the sentiments expressed … that the proper thing we ought to expect is that such articles will never be called into operation and that they would remain a dead letter. If at all, they are brought into operation, I hope the President, who is endowed with all these powers, will take proper precautions before actually suspending the administration of the provinces. I hope the first thing he will do would be to issue a mere warning to a province that has erred, that things were not happening in the way in which they were intended to happen in the Constitution.” (Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. IX, p. 177) 189 The judgments of Justice Jeevan Reddy and Justice Ahmadi expressly record this. 190 Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 9, 03 Aug 1949

[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI] a.

The satisfaction of the President under Article 356 must be based on objective material either through the Governor’s report or ‘otherwise’;

b. The Proclamation issued by the President under Article 356(1) is subject to judicial review. Article 74(2) only bars the court from enquiring if any advice was given but does not bar scrutiny of the material which formed the basis of the advice. The Court must determine if there was any material to indicate the failure of constitutional machinery in the State. While the sufficiency of the material cannot be questioned by courts, the legitimacy of the inference drawn from such material is open to judicial review. Once the petitioner makes a prima facie case challenging the Proclamation, the burden shifts to the Union Government to prove that the Proclamation was backed by relevant material; c.

Article 356(3) which mandates that the Proclamation be approved by both Houses of Parliament is a check on the power of the President to issue a Proclamation. The President cannot exercise powers under Article 356(1) to take ‘irreversible’ actions unless both the Houses have approved the Proclamation. It is for this reason that the President cannot dissolve the legislative assembly (which is an irreversible action) until “at least” both Houses of Parliament approve the Proclamation;

d. Dissolution of the legislative assembly is not a “natural consequence” of the issuance of Proclamation; e.

The resolution approving the Proclamation cannot save the Proclamation and the actions taken under it if the Court holds that the Proclamation is invalid. If the Proclamation is invalid, then it would be open to the Court to restore status quo ante which would also include restoration of the Legislative Assembly if it has been dissolved; and

f.

The Court/legislative assembly/Parliament has the power to review, repeal and modify such actions or laws which were taken

when the Proclamation was in force.191 The Court can validate specific actions which are capable of being validated such as restoring the legislative assembly.192 189. It is important for this Court to address the decisions in State of Rajasthan (supra) and SR Bommai (supra) at length because the shift in the approach of interpreting the power of the President to issue a Proclamation under Article 356 would also impact the determination of whether there are any limits on the power of the President and Parliament after the Proclamation has been issued. The following conclusions are drawn from the decision in SR Bommai (supra), which brought about a metamorphosis from the position in the State of Rajasthan (supra): a.

This Court in its seven-Judge decision in State of Rajasthan (supra) opted for an interpretation of Article 356 which had a centripetal impact, that is, it had a centralising tendency which led to an accumulation of power with the Centre and away from the federating states. This is evident from the narrow scope of judicial review of the exercise of power by the President under Article 356, and the holding that the President can take irrevocable actions (including dissolving the Legislative Assembly) even before the Proclamation is approved by both Houses of Parliament under Article 356(3). However, this Court in a larger combination of nine judges in SR Bommai (supra) opted for an interpretation which had a centrifugal impact, that is, an interpretation which leads to enhancing the autonomy of the federating states. In fact, the opinion of Justice Sawant expressly notes that an interpretation which preserves and not subverts the constitutional fabric must be opted. This is evident from this Court expanding the scope of judicial review of the Proclamation and the holding that irrevocable actions cannot be taken before Parliament approves the Proclamation. The interpretation of Article 356 in SR Bommai (supra) was in furtherance of the constitutional principles of federalism and legislative (and not executive) supremacy. The decision in SR

191 Justice Reddy (paragraph 292) 192 Justice Sawant (paragraph 114)

[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

Bommai (supra) holds the field because it was rendered by a Bench of nine Judges while the decision in State of Rajasthan (supra) was rendered by a Bench of seven Judges; and b. The standard of judicial review laid down in State of Rajasthan (supra) of whether extraneous considerations led to the exercise of power under Article 356 focused only on the purpose of (or the reasons for) issuing a Proclamation. The Union did not have to show that the purpose indeed existed. The decision in SR Bommai (supra) by expanding the scope of judicial review of the Proclamation shifted the onus on the Union Government to justify the exercise of power. The Union through the submission of material was required to show that there was a breakdown of constitutional machinery as claimed. This change in the standard of review indicates a shift from a culture of deference to a culture of justification. It flows from (a) that the Court while deciding if the Union Government has justified its actions must also assess the impact of the Proclamation issued under Article 356 on the federal structure. c. SR Bommai on validity of exercise of power after the Proclamation 190. The majority in SR Bommai (supra) devised a more stringent standard to test the validity of a Proclamation under Article 356. The primary focus of the decision is on the standard to be applied to judicially review the validity of a Proclamation under Article 356. However, in addition to it, this Court made certain observations on the limits on the exercise of power after a Proclamation is issued. One of the issues before this Court in SR Bommai (supra) was whether Article 356(1)(a) places any limitation on the exercise of legislative and executive power by the Union after a Proclamation has been issued and more specifically, whether dissolution of the Legislative Assembly of the State and the political executive is a natural consequence of the exercise of power under Article 356(1). This Court observed this question in the following manner: a.

Justice Sawant observed that it would be open to the President to only suspend the political executive and the legislature of the State and not dissolve them. This interpretation, it was held, is consistent with a reading of Article 356(1)(c) which states that incidental and consequential provisions to give effect to the objective of the

Proclamation shall be made. It was further observed that it would be permissible for the President to assume some of the functions of the Government without suspending or removing them: “108. […] To appreciate the discussion on point, it is necessary to realise that the removal of Government and the dissolution of Assembly are effected by the President, if he exercises powers of the Governor under Article 164(1) and 174(2)(b) respectively under sub-clause (a) of Article 356(1), though that is neither necessary nor obligatory while issuing the Proclamation. In other words, the removal of the Ministry or the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly is not an automatic consequence of the issuance of the Proclamation. The exercise of the powers under sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Article 356(1) may also co-exist with the mere suspension of the political executive and the Legislature of the State. Sub-clause (c) of Article 356(1) makes it clear. It speaks of incidental and consequential provisions to give effect to the objects of the Proclamation including suspension in whole or part of the operation of any provision of the Constitution relating to anybody or authority in the State. […] Legally, therefore, it is permissible under Article 356(1), firstly, only to suspend the political executive or anybody or authority of the State and also the Legislature of the State and not to remove or dissolve them. Secondly, it is also permissible for the President to assume only some of the functions of the political executive or of anybody or authority of the State other than the Legislature while neither suspending nor removing them.” (emphasis supplied) b. Justice Reddy while answering the above issue agreed with the observations of Justice Sawant to the extent that dissolution of the Legislative Assembly is not an automatic consequence. The learned Judge observed that the President should not dissolve the legislature of the State merely because he has the power to do so. The power, in his opinion, must not be exercised invariably but only after taking into consideration all the relevant facts and circumstances:

[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, C

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