Indian Young Lawyers Assn. v. State of Kerala 561 Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors.v. the State of Kerala & Ors.

Landmark judgment · Constitution & fundamental rights — Women of all ages allowed to enter the Sabarimala temple.

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
28 September 2018
Judge
Justice Dipak Misra
Neutral citation
2017 INSC 1040
Reported in
[2018] 9 S.C.R. 561
Result
Appeal(s) allowed
Acts & sections
Article 25 Constitution, Article 15 Constitution, Article 26 Constitution, Article 9 Constitution
Subject
Family

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Full judgment

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN.561 v. STATE OF KERALA

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION & ORS.

v. THE STATE OF KERALA & ORS. (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 373 of 2006) SEPTEMBER 28, 2018 [DIPAK MISRA, CJI, R. F. NARIMAN, A. M. KHANWILKAR, DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD AND INDU MALHOTRA, JJ.] Constitution of India: Arts. 25, 26 and 15 –Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 – ss. 3, 4 – Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 – r. 3(b) – Sabarimala temple wherein idol of Lord Ayyappa installed – r 3(b) protecting custom and usage which prohibit entry of women between the age of 10 to 50 years to Sabrimala temple, based upon a biological ground of menstruation – Validity of – Held: (Per Dipak Misra, CJI) s. 3 being a non-obstante clause stipulates that every place of public worship shall be open to all classes and sections of Hindus, women being one of them, irrespective of any custom or usage to the contrary – Language of both the s. 3 and the proviso to s. 4(1) clearly indicate that custom and usage must make space to the rights of all sections and classes of Hindus to offer prayers at places of public worship – Any interpretation to the contrary would annihilate the purpose of the 1965 Act and incrementally impair the fundamental right to practise religion guaranteed u/Art. 25(1) – Thus, r. 3(b) is ultra vires the 1965 Act – Rule 3(b) is also ultra vires s. 4 of the 1965 Act as the proviso to s. 4(1) creates an exception to the effect that the regulations/rules made u/s. 4(1) shall not discriminate, in any manner whatsoever, against any Hindu on the ground that he/she belongs to a particular section or class – Said practise is violative of the fundamental right of Hindu women to freely practise their religion under Art. 25(1) and exhibit their devotion towards Lord Ayyappa – This denial denudes them of their right to worship – Held: (Per Nariman, J.) Custom or usage of prohibiting women between the ages of 10 to 50 years from entering the Sabarimala temple is violative of Art. 25(1), and violative of the

1965 Act – r. 3(b) whereby women by custom and usage are not allowed to enter a place of public worship, is unconstitutional being violative of Art. 25(1) and Art. 15(1) – Practice or usage of keeping out women is violative of s. 3 and is struck down – Since proviso to the Section is not attracted on the facts of the case, and since the said Act is clearly a measure enacted u/Art. 25(2)(b), any religious right claimed on the basis of custom and usage as an essential matter of religious practice u/Art. 25(1), will be subject to the law made u/ Art. 25(2)(b) – Held: (Per Chandrachud, J.) Notifications issued by the Devaswom Board, prohibiting the entry of women between the ages of ten and fifty, are ultra vires s. 3 of the 1965 Act and are even otherwise unconstitutional – Hindu women constitute a ‘section or class’ of Hindus u/s. 2 – Rule 3(b) of enforces a custom contrary to s. 3, which directly offends the right of temple entry established by s. 3, thus, is ultra vires the 1965 Act – Claim for the exclusion of women from religious worship, even if it be founded in religious text, is subordinate to the constitutional values of liberty, dignity and equality – Exclusionary practices are contrary to constitutional morality – Practice of excluding women from the temple at Sabarimala is not an essential religious practice – Social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status, is a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values – Held: (Per Indu Malhotra J.: Dissenting) Denial of entry of women in the age group of 10 to 50 years in Sabarimala temple is not violative of Art. 14 – Sabarimala temple constitutes a religious denomination – Practise of restricting entry of women between the age group of 10 to 50 years is an essential religious practise of the devotees of Lord Ayyappa at Sabarimala Temple – r.3(b) is a statutory recognition of a pre-existing custom and usage being followed by this Temple – r. 3(b) is within the ambit of the proviso to s. 3. Art. 26 – Religious denomination – Determination of – Devotees of Lord Ayyappa, if constitute a religious denomination – Held: (Per Dipak Misra, CJI) Devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not have an identified group or sect – They do not have common religious tenets peculiar to themselves, which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well–being, other than those which are common to the Hindu religion – Thus, the devotees of Lord Ayyappa are exclusively Hindus and do not constitute a separate religious

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

denomination – Held: (Per Nariman, J.) There is no distinctive name given to the worshippers of Sabrimala temple; there is no common faith in the sense of a belief common to a particular religion or section thereof; or common organization of the worshippers of the Sabarimala temple so as to constitute the said temple into a religious denomination – Also, there are over a thousand other Ayyappa temples in which the deity is worshipped by practicing Hindus of all kinds – Thus, Article 26 not attracted – (Per Chandrachud, J.) Worship of the presiding deity is not confined to adherents of a particular religion – Practices associated with the forms of worship do not constitute the devotees into a religious denomination – Considering the inability of the collective of individuals to satisfy the judicially-enunciated requirements, the set of individuals who refer to themselves as “Ayyappans” or devotees of Lord Ayyappa as a ‘religious denomination’ cannot be recognized – Held: (Per Indu Malhotra J.: Dissenting) If there are clear attributes that there exists a sect, which is identifiable as being distinct by its beliefs and practices, and having a collection of followers who follow the same faith, it would be identifiable as a religious denomination – On facts, respondents have made out a strong and plausible case that the worshippers of the Sabarimala Temple have the attributes of a religious denomination, or sect thereof.

Arts. 25 and 26 – Essential Religious Practices under Art. 25 – Determination of – Practice of exclusion of women of the age group of 10 to 50 years being followed at the Sabarimala Temple – Held: (Per Dipak Misra, CJI) There seems to be no continuity in the exclusionary practice followed at the Sabarimala temple and thus, it cannot be treated as an essential practice – On the contrary, it is an essential part of the Hindu religion to allow Hindu women to enter into a temple as devotees and followers of Hindu religion and offer their prayers to the deity – Moreso, in the absence of any scriptural or textual evidence, the exclusionary practice followed at the Sabarimala temple, cannot be accorded the status of an essential practice of Hindu religion – By allowing women to enter into the Sabarimala temple for offering prayers, it cannot be imagined that the nature of Hindu religion would be fundamentally altered or changed in any manner – Held: (Per Nariman, J.) Only the essential part of religion, as distinguished from secular activities,

is the subject matter of the fundamental right – Matters essential to religious faith and/or belief are to be judged on evidence before a court of law by what the community professing the religion itself has to say as to the essentiality of such belief – One test would be to remove the particular belief stated to be an essential belief from the religion, would the religion remain the same or would it be altered – In case religious activities are mixed up with secular activities, the dominant nature of activity test is to be applied – Court to take a common sense view and be actuated by considerations of practical necessity – Held: (Per Chandrachud, J.) In determining the essentiality of a practice, it is to be considered whether the practice is prescribed to be of an obligatory nature – If a practice is optional, it cannot be said to be ‘essential’ to a religion – If there is a fundamental change in the character of the religion, only then can such a practice be claimed to be an ‘essential’ part of that religion – Texts and tenets do not indicate that the practice of excluding women is an essential part of the religion – Practice of excluding women is not uniform and militates against a claim that such practice is obligatory – Hence, no fundamental change in character of religion – Essential religious practices test enables the Court to adopt a reformist vision of religion even though it may conflict with the views held by the religion – Competence of the Court to do so and the legitimacy of the assumption of that role may be questionable – Test merits a closer look in future – Held: (Per Indu Malhotra J.: Dissenting) ‘Essential practises test’ have to be determined by the tenets of the religion itself – Practises followed since time immemorial, which may have been scripted in the religious texts of this temple, are to be regarded as “essential”, and afforded protection u/Art. 25 – Thus, the practise of restricting entry of women between the age group of 10 to 50 years is an essential religious practise of the devotees of Lord Ayyappa at Sabarimala Temple. Art. 25(1) – Expression ‘all persons under’ – Meaning of – Held:(Per Dipak Misra, CJI) Expression ‘all persons’, demonstrates that the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion is available, though subject to the restrictions delineated in Art. 25(1) itself, to every person including women – Rights guaranteed u/Art. 25(1) has nothing to do with gender – Held: (Per Nariman, J.) Art. 25 recognises a fundamental right in favour of “all persons” which has reference to natural persons –

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

Every member of a religious community has a right to practice the religion so long as he does not, in any way, interfere with the corresponding right of his co-religionists to do the same. Art. 25(1) – Expression – Held: (Per Chandrachud, J.] ‘all persons under’ – By all persons, the Constitution means that every individual in society without distinction of any kind is entitled to a freedom of conscience and to freely profess, protect and propogate religion – Three defining features of clause (1) of Article 25 are, first, the entitlement of all persons without exception; second, the recognition of an equal entitlement; and third, the recognition both of the freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propogate religion. Art. 17 – Untouchability– Denial of entry to women in the age group of 10 to 50 in the Ayyappa temple at Sabarimala, if a manifestation of “untouchability” and thus, violative of Art. 17 – Held: (Per Chandrachud, J.) Art. 17 prohibits the practice of “untouchability”, which is based on notions of purity and impurity, “in any form” – Notions of “purity and pollution”, which stigmatize individuals, can have no place in a constitutional regime - Prejudice against women based on notions of impurity and pollution associated with menstruation is a symbol of social exclusion – It is a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values – Held: (Per Indu Malhotra J.: Dissenting) Limited restriction on the entry of women during the notified age-group does not fall within the purview of Art. 17 – Art. 17 refers to practice of untouchability as committed in the Hindu community against Harijans or people from depressed classes, and not women – Restriction on women within a certain age-band, is based upon the historical origin and beliefs and practices of the sabrimala temple, on the unique characteristic of the deity, and not founded on any social exclusion – Women of the notified age group are allowed entry into all other temples of Lord Ayyappa. Art. 25(1) – Term ‘morality’ in Art. 25(1) – Held: (Per Dipak Misra, CJI) Cannot be viewed with a narrow lens so as to confine the sphere of definition of morality to what an individual, a section or religious sect may perceive the term to mean – Since the Constitution has been adopted and given by the people of this country to themselves, the term public morality in Art. 25 has to be appositely understood as being synonymous with constitutional

morality – Notions of public order, morality and health cannot be used as colourable device to restrict the freedom to freely practise religion and discriminate against women of the age group of 10 to 50 years by denying them their legal right to enter and offer their prayers at the Sabarimala Temple. Art. 25(1) – Term ‘morality’ – Held: (Per Chandrachud, J.) Popular notions about what is or is not moral may in fact be deeply offensive to individual dignity and human rights – Individual dignity cannot be allowed to be subordinate to the morality of the mob and should not vary in accordance with the popular fashions of the day – Overarching sense of constitutional morality with the quest for human dignity, liberty and equality must prevail. Arts. 25(2)(b) and 26(b) – Right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion under Art. 26 – Held: (Per Nariman, J.) Right granted u/Art. 26 to be harmoniously construed with Art. 25(2)(b) – Right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion granted by Art. 26(b), to be subject to laws made u/Art. 25(2)(b) which throw open religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus – Thus, even though the entry of persons into a Hindu temple of a public character would pertain to management of its own affairs in matters of religion, yet such temple entry would be subject to a law throwing open a Hindu religious institution of a public character owned and managed by a religious denomination or section thereof to all classes or sections of Hindus – However, religious practices by the religious denomination or section thereof, which do not have the effect of either a complete ban on temple entry of certain persons, or are otherwise not discriminatory, may pass muster u/Art. 26(b). Art. 25(2)(b) and 26(b) – Right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion u/Art. 26 – Held: (Per Chandrachud, J.) Absence of a clause of subjection in Article 26 does not lead to the conclusion that the freedom of a religious denomination exists as a discrete element, divorced from the others freedoms – Article 26 is one among a large cluster of freedoms which the Constitution has envisaged as intrinsic to human liberty and dignity – Freedom of religious denominations under Article 26 must be read in a manner which preserves equally, other individual freedoms – Dignity of women which an emanation of Article 15 and a reflection of Article 21

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

cannot be disassociated from the exercise of religious freedom under Article 26.

Art. 32 – Writ petition under – Issue that women who happen to be between the ages of 10 and 50, not allowed entry into the temple at Sabarimala – Plea raised that that the Court should not decide this case without any evidence being led on both sides – Held: (Per Nariman, J.) Evidence is very much there, in the form of the writ petition and the affidavits filed in the writ petition by the petitioners as well as by the Board, and by the Thanthri – Writ petition filed is itself not merely a pleading, but also evidence in the form of affidavits that are sworn. Arts. 25 and 26 – Engagement of essential religious practices with constitutional values – Exclusion of women between the age group ten and fifty from the Sabarimala temple – Held: (Per Chandrachud, J.) Exclusion is destructive of dignity – To exclude a woman from the might of worship is fundamentally at odds with constitutional values – Physiological features of a woman have no significance to her equal entitlements under the Constitution – Menstrual status of a woman cannot be a valid constitutional basis to deny her the dignity of being and the autonomy of personhood – Menstrual status of a woman is deeply personal and an intrinsic part of her privacy – Constitution must treat it as a feature on the basis of which no exclusion can be practised and no denial can be perpetrated. Art. 13 – Term ‘laws in force’ – Custom or usage if falls within the ambit of ‘laws in force’ u/Art.13(1) – Plea that the exclusion of women from the Sabarimala temple constitutes a custom, independent of the Act and the 1965 Rules – Held: (Per Chandrachud, J.) Carving out ‘custom or usage’ from constitutional scrutiny, denies the constitutional vision of ensuring the primacy of individual dignity – Decision in Narasu case that custom or usage not included in the ambit of laws in force, is based on flawed premises – Custom or usage cannot be excluded from ‘laws in force’– Decision in Narasu case, in immunizing uncodified personal law and construing the same as distinct from custom, overlooked the wide ambit that was to be attributed to the term ‘laws in force’. Arts. 25 and 26 – Deity as a bearer of constitutional rights – Held: (Per Chandrachud, J.) Word ‘persons’ in certain statutes have

been interpreted to include idols – Merely because a deity has been granted limited rights as juristic persons under statutory law does not mean that the deity necessarily has constitutional rights – Deity may be a juristic person for the purposes of religious law and capable of asserting property rights – However, deity is not a ‘person’ for the purpose of Part III. Arts. 32, 25 and 14 – PIL filed challenging the practise of restricting the entry of women in the age group of 10 to 50 years in the Sabarimala Temple – Maintainability and justiciability of – Held: (Per Indu Malhotra J.: Dissenting) Right to move the Supreme Court u/Art. 32 for violation of fundamental rights, must be based on a pleading that the petitioners’ personal rights to worship in this Temple have been violated – This is an essential requirement to maintain the challenge – Courts normally do not delve into issues of religious practises, especially in the absence of an aggrieved person from that particular religious faith, or sect – In matters of religion and religious practises, Art. 14 can be invoked only by persons who are similarly situated, that is, persons belonging to the same faith, creed, or sect – Petitioners–association/Intervenors do not claim to be devotees of Lord Ayyappa in the Sabarimala Temple, who are aggrieved by the practises followed in the Sabarimala Temple. Art. 14 – Matters of religion and religious practice – Applicability of Art. 14 – Denial of entry to women in age group of 10 to 50 years in Sabrimala temple – Held: (Per Indu Malhotra J.: Dissenting) Is not violative of Art. 14 – Religious customs and practises cannot be solely tested on the touchstone of Article 14 and the principles of rationality embedded therein – Religious community is to decide as to what constitutes essential religious practice – Equality in matters of religion to be viewed in the context of the worshippers of the same faith – It is not for the courts to determine which of these practises of a faith are to be struck down, except if they are pernicious, oppressive, or a social evil – Right to gender equality to offer worship to Lord Ayyappa is protected by permitting women of all ages, to visit temples where he has not manifested himself in the form of a ‘Naishtik Brahamachari’, and there is no similar restriction in those temples. Art. 15 – Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion,

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

race, caste or sex – Applicability of Art. 15 – Submission that Sabrimala temple would be included in phrase ‘places of public resort – Held: (Per Indu Malhotra J.: Dissenting) Cannot be accepted – Conscious decision by the Constituent Assembly not to include ‘places of worship’ or ‘temples’ within the ambit of draft Article 9, to be given due consideration.

Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965: r.3(b) – Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act 1965 – s. 3 – r. 3(b) whereby women by custom and usage not allowed to enter a place of public worship – r. 3(b) if ultra vires s. 3 of the 1965 Act, whereby places of worship to be open to all section and classes of Hindus – Held: (Per Dipak Misra, CJI) r. 3(b) is ultra vires the 1965 Act – Rule 3(b) is also ultra vires s. 4 of the 1965 Act – Held: (Per Nariman, J.) Rule 3(b) is ultra vires of s. 3 of the 1965 Act, and is hit by Art. 25(1) and by Art.15(1) as this Rule discriminates against women on the basis of their sex only – Held: (Per Chandrachud, J.) Term ‘includes’ in s.2(c) has to be given a broad interpretation – The expression ‘section or class’ includes women – Proviso to s.3 creates an exception – Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a religious denomination and the Sabrimala temple is not a denominational temple – Hence, notifications issued by the Board prohibiting the entry of woman between ages ten and fifty-five, are ultra vires s.3 – Rule 3(b) gives precedence to customs and usages which allow the exclusion of women “at such time during which they are not allowed to enter a place of public worship” – In laying down such a prescription, Rule 3(b) directly offends the right of temple entry established by Section 3, thus, r. 3(b) is ultra vires the Act – Held: (Per Indu Malhotra J.: Dissenting) r. 3(b) is not ultra vires s. 3 of the 1965 Act, since the proviso carves out an exception in the case of public worship in a temple for the benefit of any religious denomination or sect thereof, to manage their affairs in matters of religion – Declaration that places of public worship shall be open to Hindus of all sections and classes is not absolute, but subject to the right of a religious denomination to “manage its own affairs in matters of religion” – r.3(b) is a statutory recognition of a pre-existing custom and usage being followed by this Temple – r. 3(b) is within the ambit of the proviso to s. 3.

r. 3(b) whereby women not allowed to enter a place of worship – Challenged to, as being violative of constitutional morality – Held: (Per Indu Malhotra J.: Dissenting) Constitutional Morality in a pluralistic society and secular polity would reflect that the followers of various sects have the freedom to practise their faith in accordance with the tenets of their religion – Equality and nondiscrimination are facet of Constitutional Morality, which cannot be viewed in isolation – Balance is to be struck between the principles of equality and non-discrimination on the one hand, and the protection of the cherished liberties of faith, belief, and worship guaranteed by Arts 25 and 26 to persons belonging to all religions in a secular polity, on the other hand – Constitutional morality requires the harmonisation or balancing of all such rights, to ensure that the religious beliefs of none are obliterated or undermined – It is the Constitutional duty of the Court to harmonise these rights. Judicial Review: Matters concerning religion and religious practice under the secular constitutional set up – Role of courts – Held: (Per Indu Malhotra J.: Dissenting) Is to afford protection u/ Art. 25(1) to those practises which are regarded as “essential” or “integral” by the devotees, or the religious community itself – Art. 25(2)(b) permits the State to redress social inequalities and injustices by framing legislation –Art. 25(2) permits State made law on the grounds specified therein, and not judicial intervention – On facts, practice of exclusion of women of the age group of 10 to 50 years being followed at the Sabrimala temple are considered to be essential or integral to that Temple – Any interference with the same would conflict with their right guaranteed by Art. 25(1) to worship Lord Ayyappa in the form of a ‘Naishtik Brahmachari’ – Judicial review of religious practises ought not to be undertaken, as the Court cannot impose its morality or rationality with respect to the form of worship of a deity – Doing so would negate the freedom to practise one’s religion according to one’s faith and beliefs – It would amount to rationalising religion, faith and beliefs, which is outside the ken of the courts. Allowing the Writ Petition, the Court HELD: Per Dipak Misra CJI (for himself and Khanwilkar J.):

Followers of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a religious

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

denomination: 1.1 In view of the law laid down by this Court in Shirur Mutt’s case and S.P. Mittal’s case, the devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a separate religious denomination. They do not have common religious tenets peculiar to themselves, which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, other than those which are common to the Hindu religion. Therefore, the devotees of Lord Ayyappa are exclusively Hindus and do not constitute a separate religious denomination. [Para 144 (i)][673-D-E] 1.2 For any religious mutt, sect, body, sub-sect or any section thereof to be designated as a religious denomination, it must be a collection of individuals having a collective common faith, a common organization which adheres to the said common faith, and last but not the least, the said collection of individuals must be labeled, branded and identified by a distinct name. The most important condition for a religious denomination, i.e., the collection of individuals ought to have a system of beliefs or doctrines which they regard as conducive to their spiritual wellbeing. For a religious denomination, there must be new methodology provided for a religion. Mere observance of certain practices, even though from a long time, does not make it a distinct religion on that account. [Paras 94, 96][655-E-F; 656-A-C] 1.3 The submission that the pilgrims coming to visit the Sabarimala temple being devotees of Lord Ayyappa are addressed as Ayyappans and, therefore, the third condition for a religious denomination stands satisfied, is unacceptable. There is no identified group called Ayyappans. Every Hindu devotee can go to the temple. There are other temples for Lord Ayyappa and there is no such prohibition. Therefore, there is no identified sect. Thus, the Sabarimala temple is a public religious endowment and there are no exclusive identified followers of the cult. [Para 95][655-F-H] S.P. Mittal v. Union of India and others (1983) 1 SCC 51 : [1983] 1 SCR 729; The Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thritha Swaminar of Sri Shirur Mutt [1954] SCR 1005 – relied on.

Nallor Marthandam Vellalar and others v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment and others (2003) 10 SCC 712 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 920 – referred to. Enforceability of Fundamental Rights u/Art. 25(1) against the Devaswom Board 2.1 Having stated that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a religious denomination within the meaning of Article 26 and that Sabarimala Temple is a public temple by virtue of the fact that Section 15 of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 vests all powers of direction, control and supervision over it in the Travancore Devaswom Board which, has been unveiled as ‘other authority’ within the meaning of Article 12, resultantly fundamental rights including those guaranteed under Article 25(1) are enforceable against the Travancore Devaswom Board and other incorporated Devaswoms including the Sabarimala Temple. [Para 97][656-D-E] 2.2 Article 25(1), by employing the expression ‘all persons’, demonstrates that the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion is available, though subject to the restrictions delineated in Article 25(1) itself, to every person including women. It needs to be understood that the kernel of Article 26 is ‘establishment of a religious institution’ so as to acclaim the status of religious denomination. Whereas, Article 25(1) guarantees the right to practise religion to every individual and the act of practice is concerned, primarily, with religious worship, rituals. The right guaranteed under Article 25(1) has nothing to do with gender or, for that matter, certain physiological factors, specifically attributable to women. Women of any age group have as much a right as men to visit and enter a temple in order to freely practise a religion as guaranteed under Article 25(1). [Paras 98, 99, 100][656-F-H; 657-B] Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others (1977) 1 SCC 677 : [1977] 2 SCR 611; The Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thritha Swaminar of Sri Shirur Mutt [1954] SCR 1005 – referred to.

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

2.3 The practice of exclusion of women from entry into religious places violates the right of women to visit and enter a temple to freely practise Hindu religion and to exhibit her devotion towards Lord Ayyappa. The denial of this right to women significantly denudes them of their right to worship. The right guaranteed under Article 25(1) is not only about inter-faith parity but it is also about intra-faith parity. Therefore, the right to practise religion under Article 25(1), in its broad contour, encompasses a non-discriminatory right which is equally available to both men and women of all age groups professing the same religion. [Paras 101][657-C-E]

Nar Hari Shastri and others v. Shri Badrinath Temple Committee AIR 1952 SC 245 : 1952 SCR 849; Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and others v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta (1983) 4 SCC 522 : [1984] 1 SCR 447 – referred to.

2.4 The impugned Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, framed in pursuance of the 1965 Act, stipulates exclusion of entry of women of the age group of 10 to 50 years, is a clear violation of the right of such women to practise their religious belief which, in consequence, makes their fundamental right under Article 25(1) a dead letter. It is clear as crystal that as long as the devotees, irrespective of their gender and/or age group, seeking entry to a temple of any caste are Hindus, it is their legal right to enter into a temple and offer prayers. The women, in the case at hand, are also Hindus and so, there is neither any viable nor any legal limitation on their right to enter into the Sabarimala Temple as devotees of Lord Ayyappa and offer their prayers to the deity. The said rule of exclusion cannot be justified on the ground that allowing entry to women of the said age group would, in any way, be harmful or would play a jeopardizing role to public order, morality, health or, for that matter, any other provision/s of Part III of the Constitution, for it is to these precepts that the right guaranteed under Article 25(1) has been made subject to. [Paras 104, 105][658-F-H; 659-A-B]

2.5 The term ‘morality’ occurring in Article 25(1) cannot be viewed with a narrow lens so as to confine the sphere of

definition of morality to what an individual, a section or religious sect may perceive the term to mean. When there is a violation of the fundamental rights, the term ‘morality’ naturally implies constitutional morality and any view that is ultimately taken by the Constitutional Courts must be in conformity with the principles and basic tenets of the concept of this constitutional morality that gets support from the Constitution. [Paras 106][659-C-D] Manoj Narula v. Union of India (2014) 9 SCC 1 : [2014] 9 SCR 965; Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India and others (2018) 8 SCALE 72; Navtej Singh Johar and others v. Union of India and others (2018) 10 SCALE 386 – referred to. 2.6 The right guaranteed under Article 25(1) has been made subject to, by the opening words of the Article itself, public order, morality, health and other provisions of Part III of the Constitution. All the three words, that is, order, morality and health are qualified by the word ‘public’. Neither public order nor public health will be at peril by allowing entry of women devotees of the age group of 10 to 50 years into the Sabarimala temple for offering their prayers. As regards public morality, it is made absolutely clear that since the Constitution was not shoved, by any external force, upon the people of this country but was rather adopted and given by the people of this country to themselves, the term public morality has to be appositely understood as being synonymous with constitutional morality. The notions of public order, morality and health cannot be used as colourable device to restrict the freedom to freely practise religion and discriminate against women of the age group of 10 to 50 years by denying them their legal right to enter and offer their prayers at the Sabarimala temple for the simple reason that public morality must yield to constitutional morality. [Paras 110, 111][661-A-D] Whether exclusionary practice is an essential practice as per Hindu religion 3.1 In no scenario, it can be said that exclusion of women of any age group could be regarded as an essential practice of Hindu religion and on the contrary, it is an essential part of the Hindu religion to allow Hindu women to enter into a temple as

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

devotees and followers of Hindu religion and offer their prayers to the deity. In the absence of any scriptural or textual evidence, the exclusionary practice followed at the Sabarimala temple, cannot be accorded the status of an essential practice of Hindu religion. By allowing women to enter into the Sabarimala temple for offering prayers, it cannot be imagined that the nature of Hindu religion would be fundamentally altered or changed in any manner. Therefore, the exclusionary practice, which has been given the backing of a subordinate legislation in the form of Rule 3(b), framed by the virtue of the 1965 Act, is neither an essential nor an integral part of the Hindu religion without which Hindu religion, of which the devotees of Lord Ayyappa are followers, will not survive. [Paras 122-123][665-D-G]

3.2 Nobody can say that essential part or practice of one’s religion has changed from a particular date or by an event. Such alterable parts or practices are definitely not the ‘core’ of religion where the belief is based and religion is founded upon. It could only be treated as mere embellishments to the non-essential part or practices. [Para 124][665-G-H] 3.3 Where a practice changes with the efflux of time, such a practice cannotbe regarded as a core upon which a religion is formed. There has to be unhindered continuity in a practice for it to attain the status of essential practice. It is further discernible from the judgment of the High Court in S. Mahendran’s case that the Devaswom Board had accepted before the High Court that female worshippers of the age group of 10 to 50 years used to visit the temple and conducted poojas in every month for five days for the first rice feeding ceremony of their children. The Devaswom Board also took a stand before the High Court that restriction of entry for women was only during Mandalam, Makaeavilakku and Vishnu days. The impugned exclusionary practice in question is a ‘custom with some aberrations’ as prior to the passing of the Notification in 1950, women of all age groups used to visit the Sabarimala temple for the first rice feeding ceremony of their children. Therefore, there seems to be no continuity in the exclusionary practice followed at the Sabarimala temple and in view thereof, it cannot be treated as an essential practice. [Paras 125, 126][666-A-D]

3.4 In view of the law laid down by this Court in the second Ananda Marga case, the exclusionary practice being followed at the Sabarimala Temple cannot be designated as one, the nonobservance of which will change or alter the nature of Hindu religion. Besides, the exclusionary practice has not been observed with unhindered continuity as the Devaswom Board had accepted before the High Court that female worshippers of the age group of 10 to 50 years used to visit the temple and conducted poojas in every month for five days for the first rice feeding ceremony of their children. [Para 144(viii)][674-F-H] Commissioner of Police and others v Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and another (2004) 12 SCC 770 : [2004] 2 SCR 1019 – relied on. S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, Thiruvananthpuram and others AIR 1993 Kerala 42 – approved. John Vallamattom and another v. Union of India (2003) 6 SCC 611 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 638; The Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thritha Swaminar of Sri Shirur Mutt [1954] SCR 1005; Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar AIR 1958 SC 731 : [1959] SCR 629; State of West Bengal and others v. Ashutosh Lahiri and others AIR 1995 SC 464 : [1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 515 ; Durgah Committee, Ajmer and others v. Syed Hussain Ali and others AIR 1961 SC 1402 : 1962 SCR 383; N. Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board and others (2002) 8 SCC 106 : [ 2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 76; Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and others v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta (1983) 4 SCC 522 : [1984] 1 SCR 447 – referred to. Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun (1904) AC 515 – referred to. Analysis of the 1965 Act and Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules 4.1 As per Section 2(a) of the 1965 Act, the term ‘Hindu’ includes a person professing Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina religion.

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

The word ‘person’ occurring therein for the pure and simple reason of logic, must include all genders.Clause (c) defines ‘section or class’ as any division, sub-division, caste, sub-caste, sect or denomination whatsoever. Nowhere the definition of section or class suggests being limited to male division, subdivision, caste and so forth. [Para 128][666-E; 667-B-C]

4.2 Section 3 of the Act being a non-obstante clause declares that every place of public worship which is open to Hindus generally or to any section or class thereof shall be open to all sections and classes of Hindus and no Hindu, of whatsoever section or class, shall be prevented, obstructed or discouraged from entering such place of public worship, or from worshipping, offering prayers or performing any religious service at such place of public worship in the like manner and to the like extent as any other Hindu of whatsoever section or class may so be eligible to enter, worship, pray or perform. A careful dissection of Section 3 reveals that places of public worship in the State of Kerala, irrespective of any contrary law, custom, usage or instrument having effect by virtue of any such law or any decree or order of Court, shall be open to all sections and classes of Hindus. The definition of ‘section or class’ and ‘Hindu’ has to be imported, for the purposes of Section 3, from the definition clauses 2(a) and 2(c) which, includes all the genders, provided they are Hindus. The right provided under Section 3 due to its non-obstante nature has to be given effect to regardless of any law, custom or usage to the contrary. [Paras 130, 131][667-G-H; 668-A-D] 4.3 The proviso to Section 3 stipulates that in case the place of public worship is a temple founded for the benefit of any religious denomination or section thereof, then the rights warranted under Section 3 becomes subject to the right of that religious denomination or section to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. Having stated that devotees and followers of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a religious denomination and, therefore, the proviso to Section 3 cannot be resorted to in the case at hand. [Para 132][668-D-E] 4.4 The importance and the gravity of the right stipulated under Section 3 of this Act, for all sections and classes of Hindus which include women, is very well manifest and evident from the

fact that its violation has been made penal under Section 5 of the 1965 Act. Section 4 confers the power to make regulations for the maintenance of order and decorum and performance of rites and ceremonies with regard to places of public worship in Kerala. The proviso to Section 4 being an exception to Section 4(1) is an example where the exception is more important than the rule itself. The language of the proviso to Section 4, in very clear and simple terms, states that the regulations made under Section 4(1) shall not discriminate against any Hindu on the ground that he/ she belongs to a particular section or class. A particular section or class includes women of all age groups, for Hindu women of any age group also constitute a class or section of Hindus. [Paras 133-135][668-G-H; 669-B-C; 670-A-B] 4.5 The law is well-settled on the point that when a rulemaking power is conferred under any statute on an authority, the said power has to be exercised within the confines of the statute and no transgression of the same is permissible. The exclusionary practice, which has been given the backing of a subordinate legislation in the form of Rule 3(b), framed by the virtue of the 1965 Act, is neither an essential nor an integral part of the religion.A cursory reading of Rule 3(b) divulges that it is ultravires both Section 3 as well as Section 4, the reason being that Section 3 being a non-obstante provision clearly stipulates that every place of public worship shall be open to all classes and sections of Hindus, women being one of them, irrespective of any custom or usage to the contrary. That apart, Rule 3(b) is also ultravires Section 4 as the proviso to Section 4(1) creates an exception to the effect that the regulations/rules made under Section 4(1) shall not discriminate, in any manner whatsoever, against any Hindu on the ground that he/she belongs to a particular section or class. [Paras 137, 141, 142, 144(ix)][670-F-G; 675-A; 672-F-G; 673-A] Union of India and ors v. S. Srinivasan (2012) 7 SCC 683 : [2012] 6 SCR 34; General Officer Commandingin-Chief v. Dr. Subhash Chandra Yadav AIR 1988 SC 876 : [1988] 3 SCR 62; Kunj Behari Lai Butail and ors v. State of H.P. AIR 2000 SC 1069 : [2000] 1 SCR 1054; Global Energy Limited and anr v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (2009) 15 SCC 570

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

: [2009] 9 SCR 22; State of T.N. and anr v. P. Krishnamurthy and ors (2006) 4 SCC 517 : [2006] 3 SCR 396 – referred to.

4.6 The language of both the provisions, that is, Section 3 and the proviso to Section 4(1) of the 1965 Act, clearly indicates that custom and usage must make space to the rights of all sections and classes of Hindus to offer prayers at places of public worship. Any interpretation to the contrary would annihilate the purpose of the 1965 Act and incrementally impair the fundamental right to practise religion guaranteed under Article 25(1). It is clear as crystal that the provisions of the 1965 Act are liberal in nature so as to allow entry to all sections and classes of Hindus including Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. But framing of Rule 3(b) under the garb of Section 4(1) would violate the very purpose of the 1965 Act. Thus, Rule 3(b) is ultra vires the 1965 Act. [Paras 143, 144(xii)][673-A-C; 675-F] Indian Young Lawyers Association and others v. State of Kerala and others (2017) 10 SCC 689; Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay [1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 496; Raja Bira Kishore Deb v. State of Orissa (1964) 7 SCR 32; Shastri Yagnapurushadiji and others v. Muldas Bhundardas Vaishya and another (1966) 3 SCR 242 ; Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali (1962) 1 SCR 383; Sri Venkatramana Devaru v. State of Mysore and others [1958] SCR 895; Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University and another (1989) 2 SCC 145 : [1989] 1 SCR 689; Shayara Bano v. Union of India and others (2017) 9 SCC 1 : [2017] 7 SCR 797; Anuj Garg and others v. Hotel Association of India and others (2008) 3 SCC 1 : [2007] 12 SCR 991; Charu Khurana and others v. Union of India and others (2015) 1 SCC 192 : [2014] 12 SCR 259; National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and others (2014) 5 SCC 438; Justice K. S. Puttaswamy and another v. Union of India and others (2017) 10 SCC 1; Vishaka and others v. State of Rajasthan and others (1997) 6 SCC 241 : [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404; Seshammal and others v. State of

Tamil Nadu (1972) 2 SCC 11 : [1972] 3 SCR 815; Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam and others v. Government of Tamil Nadu and others (2016) 2 SCC 725 : [2015] 11 SCR 1110; T.M.A. Pai Foundation and others v. State of Karnataka and others (1995) 5 SCC 220 : [1995] 2 Suppl. SCR 608; Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar and others AIR 1957 SC 133 : [1956] SCR 756; Sri Radhakanta Deb and another v. Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa (1981) 2 SCC 226 : [1981] 2 SCR 826 – referred to. Eyes and Ears 1813-1887 by Henry Ward Beecher– referred to. Per R.F. Nariman, J. (Concurring):

1. The custom or usage of prohibiting women between the ages of 10 to 50 years from entering the Sabarimala temple is violative of Article 25(1), and violative of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 made under Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution; and that Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 is unconstitutional being violative of Article 25(1) and Article 15(1) of the Constitution. [Para 32][723-E-F] 2.1 Article 25 of the Constitution recognises a fundamental right in favour of “all persons” which has reference to natural persons. This fundamental right equally entitles all such persons to the said fundamental right. Every member of a religious community has a right to practice the religion so long as he does not, in any way, interfere with the corresponding right of his coreligionists to do the same. The content of the fundamental right is the fleshing out of what is stated in the Preamble to the Constitution as “liberty of thought, belief, faith and worship”. Thus, all persons are entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion. The right to profess, practice, and propagate religion will include all acts done in furtherance of thought, belief, faith, and worship. The content of the right concerns itself with the word “religion”, which would mean matters of faith with individuals or communities, based on a system of beliefs or doctrines which conduce to spiritual

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

well-being. It does not have to be theistic but can include persons who are agnostics and atheists. [Paras 21.1-21.5][709-D-G]

2.2 It is only the essential part of religion, as distinguished from secular activities, that is the subject matter of the fundamental right. Superstitious beliefs which are extraneous, unnecessary accretions to religion cannot be considered as essential parts of religion. Matters that are essential to religious faith and/or belief are to be judged on evidence before a court of law by what the community professing the religion itself has to say as to the essentiality of such belief. One test that has been evolved would be to remove the particular belief stated to be an essential belief from the religion, would the religion remain the same or would it be altered. Equally, if different groups of a religious community speak with different voices on the essentiality aspect presented before the Court, the Court is then to decide as to whether such matter is or is not essential. Religious activities may also be mixed up with secular activities, in which case the dominant nature of the activity test is to be applied. The Court should take a common-sense view and be actuated by considerations of practical necessity. [Para 21.6][709-G-H; 710A-C] 2.3 The exceptions to the individual right are public order, morality, and health. “Public order” is to be distinguished from “law and order”. “Public disorder” must affect the public at large as opposed to certain individuals. A disturbance of public order must cause a general disturbance of public tranquility. The term “morality” is difficult to define. For the present, it refers to that which is considered abhorrent to civilized society, given the mores of the time, by reason of harm caused by way, of exploitation or degradation. Health would include noise pollution and the control of disease. [Para 21.7][710-C-E] 2.4 Another exception to the fundamental right conferred by Article 25(1) is the rights that are conferred on others by the other provisions of Part III. This would show that if one were to propagate one’s religion in such a manner as to convert a person of another religious faith, such conversion would clash with the other person’s right to freedom of conscience and would, therefore, be interdicted. Where the practice of religion is

interfered with by the State, Articles 14, 15(1), 19, and 21 would spring into action. Where the practice of religion is interfered with by non-State actors, Article 15(2) and Article 17 would spring into action. Article 25(2) is also an exception to Article 25(1), which speaks of the State making laws which may regulate or restrict secular activity, which includes economic, financial or political activity, which may be associated with religious practice. Another exception is provided under Article 25(2)(b) which is in two parts. Any law providing for social welfare and reform in a religious community can also affect and/or take away the fundamental right granted under Article 25(1). A further exception is provided only insofar as persons professing the Hindu religion are concerned, which is to throw open all Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. [Paras 21.8-21.10][710-E-F; 711-A-C] 2.5 Contrasted with the fundamental right in Article 25(1) is the fundamental right granted by Article 26. This fundamental right is not granted to individuals but to religious denominations or sections thereof. A religious denomination or section thereof is to be determined on the basis of persons having a common faith, a common organization, and designated by a distinct name as a denomination or section thereof. Believers of a particular religion are to be distinguished from denominational worshippers. Thus, Hindu believers of the Shaivite and Vaishnavite form of worship are not denominational worshippers but part of the general Hindu religious form of worship. [Para 21.11][711-D-E]

2.6 Four separate and distinct rights are given by Article 26 to religious denominations or sections thereof, namely to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and to administer such property in accordance with law.” In Article 25, only essential religious matters are protected. [Para 21.12][711-F-G; 712-A]

2.7The fundamental right granted under Article 26 is subject to the exception of public order, morality, and health. However, since the right granted under Article 26 is to be harmoniously construed with Article 25(2)(b), the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion granted by Article 26(b), in particular, will

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

be subject to laws made under Article 25(2)(b) which throw open religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. Thus, it is clear that even though the entry of persons into a Hindu temple of a public character would pertain to management of its own affairs in matters of religion, yet such temple entry would be subject to a law throwing open a Hindu religious institution of a public character owned and managed by a religious denomination or section thereof to all classes or sections of Hindus. However, religious practices by the religious denomination or section thereof, which do not have the effect of either a complete ban on temple entry of certain persons, or are otherwise not discriminatory, may pass muster u/Article 26(b). Examples are that only certain qualified persons are allowed to enter the sanctum sanctorum of a temple, or time management of a temple in which all persons are shut out for certain periods. [Paras 21.13, 21.14][712-A-E]

S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, Thiruvananthpuram and others AIR 1993 Kerala 42 – referred to.

2.8 All the older religions speak of the phenomenon of menstruation in women as being impure, which therefore, forbids their participation in religious activity.The reasons given for barring the entry of menstruating women to the Sabarimala temple are considered by worshippers and Thanthris alike, to be an essential facet of their belief. [Paras 24-25][715-G-H; 719-B-C] Old Testament, in Chapter 15, Verse 19 Leviticus 15:19 (King James Version); Dharmasutras – The Law Codes Of Apastamba, Gautama, Baudhayana, And Vasistha 264 (Translation by Patrick Olivelle, Oxford University Press, 1999); Srimad Bhagavatam – Sixth Canto (Translation by A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada, The Bhaktivedanta Book Trust, 1976); The Qur’an – with Annotated Interpretation in Modern English, 2:222 (Translation by Ali Ünal, Tughra Books USA, 2015); Gospel of Mark 5.25-34 (King James Version); The Bundahishn – “Creation” or Knowledge from the Zand (Translation by E. W. West, from Sacred Books of the East, vol. 5, 37, and 46, Oxford University

Press, 1880, 1892, and 1897); The Selections of Zadspram (Vizidagiha I Zadspram) (Joseph H. Peterson Ed., 1995) (Translation by E. W. West, from Sacred Books of the East, vol. 5, 37, and 46, Oxford University Press, 1880, 1892, and 1897); Sri Guru Granth Sahib: English Translation of the Original Text 466-467, 975 (Translation by Dr. Gopal Singh, Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2005) [which translates Raga Asa, Shaloka Mehla 1 at p. 472, 1022 of the original text of Sri Guru Granth Sahib]; Kitáb-i-Aqdas by Bahá’u’lláh, note 106 at p. 122 (Translation by Shoghi Effendi, Bahá’í World Centre, 1992) – referred to. 2.9 As regards, the question that arises is whether the Sabarimala temple can be said to be a religious denomination for the purpose of Article 26, three things are necessary in order to establish that a particular temple belongs to a religious denomination. The temple must consist of persons who have a common faith, a common organization, and are designated by a distinct name. In answer to the question whether Thanthris and worshippers alike are designated by a distinct name, any answer cannot be found. When asked whether all persons who visit the Sabarimala temple have a common faith, the answer given was that all persons, regardless of caste or religion, are worshippers at the said temple. From this, it is also clear that Hindus of all kinds, Muslims, Christians etc., all visit the temple as worshippers, without, in any manner, ceasing to be Hindus, Christians or Muslims. They can therefore be regarded, as has been held in Sri Adi Visheshwara case, as Hindus who worship the idol of Lord Ayyappa as part of the Hindu religious form of worship but not as denominational worshippers. The same goes for members of other religious communities. [Para 26][719-C-F] Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. (1997) 4 SCC 606 : [1997] 2 SCR 1086 – relied on. Durgah Committee, Ajmer and others v. Syed Hussain Ali and others AIR 1961 SC 1402 : 1962 SCR 383; S.P. Mittal v. Union of India and others (1983) 1 SCC 51 : [1983] 1 SCR 729 – referred to.

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

2.10 There is no distinctive name given to the worshippers of this particular temple; there is no common faith in the sense of a belief common to a particular religion or section thereof; or common organization of the worshippers of the Sabarimala temple so as to constitute the said temple into a religious denomination. Also, there are over a thousand other Ayyappa temples in which the deity is worshipped by practicing Hindus of all kinds. Therefore, Article 26 does not get attracted.[Para 27][720-D-E]

2.11 Even if it is assumed that there is a custom or usage for keeping out women of the ages of 10 to 50 from entering the Sabarimala temple, and that this practice is an essential part of the Thanthris’ as well as the worshippers’ faith, this practice or usage is clearly hit by Section 3 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965. Since the proviso to the Section is not attracted on the facts of this case, and since the said Act is clearly a measure enacted under Article 25(2)(b), any religious right claimed on the basis of custom and usage as an essential matter of religious practice under Article 25(1), will be subject to the law made under Article 25(2)(b). The said custom or usage must therefore, be held to be violative of Section 3 and hence, struck down. [Para 28][720-F-G; 721-C-D] 2.12 Even otherwise, the fundamental right of women between the ages of 10 and 50 to enter the Sabarimala temple is undoubtedly recognized by Article 25(1). The fundamental right claimed by the Thanthris and worshippers of the institution, based on custom and usage under the selfsame Article 25(1), must necessarily yield to the fundamental right of such women, as they are equally entitled to the right to practice religion, which would be meaningless unless they were allowed to enter the temple at Sabarimala to worship the idol of Lord Ayyappa. The submission that all women are not prohibited from entering the temple can be of no avail, as women between the age group of 10 to 50 are excluded completely. Also, the submission that such women can worship at the other Ayyappa temples is no answer to the denial of their fundamental right to practice religion as they see it, which includes their right to worship at any temple of their choice. On this ground also, the right to practice religion, as claimed by the Thanthris and worshippers, must be balanced with and must yield

to the fundamental right of women between the ages of 10 and 50, who are completely barred from entering the temple at Sabarimala, based on the biological ground of menstruation. Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 is ultra vires of Section 3 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965, and is hit by Article 25(1) and by Article 15(1) of the Constitution of India as this Rule discriminates against women on the basis of their sex only. [Para 29][721-D-H; 722-A, D] 2.13 The instant case raises grave issues relating to women generally, who happen to be between the ages of 10 to 50, and are not allowed entry into the temple at Sabarimala on the ground of a physiological or biological function which is common to all women between those ages. Since this matter raises far-reaching consequences relating to Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India, it is necessary to decide this matter on merits. Consequently, the technical plea that the instant writ petition, which is in the nature of a PIL, is not maintainable inasmuch as no woman worshipper has come forward with a plea that she has been discriminated against by not allowing her entry into the temple as she is between the age of 10 to 50 cannot stand in the way of a constitutional court applying constitutional principles to the case at hand. [Para 30][722-E, H; 723-A-B] Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam & Ors. v. Government of Tamil Nadu & Anr. (2016) 2 SCC 725 : [2015] 11 SCR 1110 – referred to.

2.14 A fervent plea was made by some of the counsels for the Respondents that the Court should not decide this case without any evidence being led on both sides. Evidence is very much there, in the form of the writ petition and the affidavits that have been filed in the writ petition, both by the Petitioners as well as by the Board, and by the Thanthri’s affidavit. A writ petition filed under either Art. 32 or 226 is itself not merely a pleading, but also evidence in the form of affidavits that are sworn. [Para 31][723-B-D] Bharat Singh and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors. [1988] Supp 2 SCR 1050 – relied on.

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

The Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thritha Swaminar of Sri Shirur Mutt [1954] SCR 1005; Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay & Ors. [1954] SCR 1055; Sri Venkatramana Devaru v. State of Mysore and others [1958] SCR 895; Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay [1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 496; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. [1964] 1 SCR 561; Seshammal and others v. State of Tamil Nadu (1972) 2 SCC 11 : [1972] 3 SCR 815; Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others (1977) 1 SCC 677 : [1977] 2 SCR 611; Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and others v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta (1983) 4 SCC 522 : [1984] 1 SCR 447; Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. (1997) 4 SCC 606 : [1997] 2 SCR 1086; N. Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board and others (2002) 8 SCC 106 : [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 76; Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. State of T.N. & Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 75 : [2014] 1 SCR 308; Riju Prasad Sharma & Ors. v. State of Assam & Ors. (2015) 9 SCC 461; Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam & Ors. v. Government of Tamil Nadu & Anr. (2016) 2 SCC 725 : [2015] 11 SCR 1110 – referred to.

Per Dr. D Y Chandrachud, J. (Concurring): 1. The devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not satisfy the judicially enunciated requirements to constitute a religious denomination under Article 26 of the Constitution. A claim for the exclusion of women from religious worship, even if it be founded in religious text, is subordinate to the constitutional values of liberty, dignity and equality. Exclusionary practices are contrary to constitutional morality. In any event, the practice of excluding women from the temple at Sabarimala is not an essential religious practice. The Court must decline to grant constitutional legitimacy to practices which derogate from the dignity of women and their entitlement to an equal citizenship. The social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status, is a form of untouchability which is an anathema

to constitutional values. Notions of “purity and pollution”, which stigmatize individuals, have no place in a constitutional order. The notifications issued by the Devaswom Board, prohibiting the entry of women between the ages of ten and fifty, are ultra vires Section 3 of the 1965 Act and are even otherwise unconstitutional. Hindu women constitute a ‘section or class’ of Hindus under clauses (b) and (c) of Section 2 of the 1965 Act. Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules enforces a custom contrary to Section 3. This directly offends the right of temple entry established by Section 3. Rule 3(b) is ultra vires the 1965 Act. [Para 119][839-E-H; 840-A-C] 2.1 The framers had before them the task of ensuring a balance between individual rights and claims of a communitarian nature. The Constituent Assembly recognised that the recognition of a truly just social order situated the individual as the ‘backbone of the state, the pivot, the cardinal center of all social activity, whose happiness and satisfaction should be the goal of every social mechanism.’ In forming the base and the summit of the social pyramid, the dignity of every individual illuminates the constitutional order and its aspirations for a just social order. Existing structures of social discrimination must be evaluated through the prism of constitutional morality. The effect and endeavour is to produce a society marked by compassion for every individual. [Para 113][837-B-D] 2.2 Inhering in the right to religious freedom, is the equal entitlement of all persons, without exception, to profess, practice and propagate religion. Equal participation of women in exercising their right to religious freedom is a recognition of this right. In protecting religious freedom, the framers subjected the right to religious freedom to the overriding constitutional postulates of equality, liberty and personal freedom in Part III. The dignity of women cannot be disassociated from the exercise of religious freedom. In the constitutional order of priorities, the right to religious freedom is to be exercised in a manner consonant with the vision underlying the provisions of Part III. The equal participation of women in worship inheres in the constitutional vision of a just social order. [Para 114][837-D-F] 2.3 The discourse of freedom in the Constitution cannot be denuded of its context by construing an Article in Part III

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

detached from the part within which it is situated. Even the right of a religious denomination to manage its own affairs in matters of religion cannot be exercised in isolation from Part III of the Constitution. The primacy of the individual, is the thread that runs through the guarantee of rights. In being located in Part III, the exercise of denominational rights cannot override and render meaningless constitutional protections which are informed by the overarching values of a liberal Constitution. [Para 115][837-GH; 838-A]

2.4 The Constitution seeks to achieve a transformed society based on equality and justice to those who are victims of traditional belief systems founded in graded inequality. It reflects a guarantee to protect the dignity of all individuals who have faced systematic discrimination, prejudice and social exclusion. Construed in this context, the prohibition against untouchability marks a powerful guarantee to remedy the stigmatization and exclusion of individuals and groups based on hierarchies of the social structure. Notions of purity and pollution have been employed to perpetuate discrimination and prejudice against women. They have no place in a constitutional order. In acknowledging the inalienable dignity and worth of every individual, these notions are prohibited by the guarantee against untouchability and by the freedoms that underlie the Constitution. In civic as in social life, women have been subjected to prejudice, stereotypes and social exclusion. In religious life, exclusionary traditional customs assert a claim to legitimacy which owes its origin to patriarchal structures. These forms of discrimination are not mutually exclusive. The intersection of identities in social and religious life produces a unique form of discrimination that denies women an equal citizenship under the Constitution. Recognizing these forms of intersectional discrimination is the first step towards extending constitutional protection against discrimination attached to intersecting identities. [Para 116][838B-E]

2.5 In the dialogue between constitutional freedoms, rights are not isolated silos. In infusing each other with substantive content, they provide a cohesion and unity which militates against practices that depart from the values that underlie the

Constitution-justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. Substantive notions of equality require the recognition of and remedies for historical discrimination which has pervaded certain identities. Such a notion focuses on not only distributive questions, but on the structures of oppression and domination which exclude these identities from participation in an equal life. An indispensable facet of an equal life, is the equal participation of women in all spheres of social activity. The quest for equality is denuded of its content if practices that exclude women are treated to be acceptable. The Constitution cannot allow practices, irrespective of their source, which are derogatory to women. Religion cannot become a cover to exclude and to deny the right of every woman to find fulfillment in worship. Sixty eight years after the advent of the Constitution, it has been held that in providing equality in matters of faith and worship, the Constitution does not allow the exclusion of women. [Para 117][838-F-H; 839-A-C] 2.6 Liberty in matters of belief, faith and worship, must produce a compassionate and humane society marked by the equality of status of all its citizens. The Constitution sought to break the shackles of social hierarchies. In doing so, it sought to usher an era characterized by a commitment to freedom, equality and justice. The liberal values of the Constitution secure to each individual an equal citizenship. This recognizes that the Constitution exists not only to disenable entrenched structures of discrimination and prejudice, but to empower those who traditionally have been deprived of an equal citizenship. The equal participation of women in every sphere of the life of the nation subserves that premise. [Para 118][839-C-E] Essential Religious Practices

3.1 In its jurisprudence on religious freedom, this Court has evolved a body of principles which define the freedom of religion under Article 25 and Article 26 to practices ‘essential’ to the religion. The Constitution has been held to protect not only freedom of religious belief, but acts done in pursuance of those beliefs. While the views of a religious denomination are to be taken into consideration in determining whether a practice is essential, those views are not determinative of its essentiality. The Court has assumed a central role in determining what is or

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is not essential to religious belief. Intrinsic to the role which the Court has carved out, it has sought to distinguish between what is religious and what is a secular practice, even if it is associated with a religious activity. Going further, the Court has enquired into whether a practice is essential to religion. Essentiality of the practice would, as the Court has held depends on whether the fundamental character of a religion would be altered, if it were not observed. Above all, there is an emphasis on constitutional legitimacy, which underscores the need to preserve the basic constitutional values associated with the dignity of the individual. The ephemeral distinction between religion and superstition becomes more coherent in terms of the need to preserve fundamental constitutional values associated with human liberty. [Para 47][768-G-H; 769-A-C]

3.2 In determining the essentiality of a practice, it is crucial to consider whether the practice is prescribed to be of an obligatory nature within that religion. If a practice is optional, it has been held that it cannot be said to be ‘essential’ to a religion. A practice claimed to be essential must be such that the nature of the religion would be altered in the absence of that practice. If there is a fundamental change in the character of the religion, only then can such a practice be claimed to be an ‘essential’ part of that religion. [Para 48][769-C-E] 3.3 Where the protection of denominational rights would substantially reduce the right conferred by Article 25(2)(b), the latter would prevail against the former. This ensures that the constitutional guarantee under Article 25(2)(b) is not destroyed by exclusionary claims which detract from individual dignity. That a practice claimed to be essential has been carried on since time immemorial or is grounded in religious texts, does not lend to it constitutional protection unless it passes the test of essentiality. [Para 48][769-H; 770-A-B] Durgah Committee, Ajmer and others v. Syed Hussain Ali and others AIR 1961 SC 1402 : [1962] SCR 383; Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay [1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 496; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. [1964] 1 SCR 561 – relied on.

Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thritha Swaminar of Sri Shirur Mutt [1954] SCR 1005; Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay & Ors. [1954] SCR 1055; Sri Venkatramana Devaru v. State of Mysore and others [1958] SCR 895; Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar AIR 1958 SC 731 : [1959] SCR 629; Shastri Yagnapurushadiji v. Muldas Bhundardas Vaishya and another (1966) SCR 242; Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and others v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta (1983) 4 SCC 522 : [1984] 1 SCR 447; Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. (1997) 4 SCC 606 : [1997] 2 SCR 1086; N. Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board and others (2002) 8 SCC 106 : [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 76; Commissioner of Police and others v Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and another (2004) 12 SCC 770 : [2004] 2 SCR 1019; Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam and others v. Government of Tamil Nadu and others (2016) 2 SCC 725 : [2015] 11 SCR 1110 ; Shayara Bano v. Union of India and others (2017) 9 SCC 1 : [2017] 7 SCR 797; Javed v State of Haryana (2003) 8 SCC 369 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 947 – referred to. Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Incorporated v The Commonwealth of Australia [1943] HCA 12 – referred to. The engagement of essential religious practices with constitutional values 4.1 The Court must lean against granting constitutional protection to a claim which derogates from the dignity of women as equal holders of rights and protections. In the ethos of the Constitution, it is inconceivable that age could be a rational basis to condition the right to worship. The ages of ten to fifty have been marked out for exclusion on the ground that women in that age group are likely to be in the procreative age. The physiological features of a woman have no significance to her equal entitlements under the Constitution. All women in the age group of ten and

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fifty may not in any case fall in the ‘procreative age group’. But that is again not a matter of substance. The heart of the matter lies in the ability of the Constitution to assert that the exclusion of women from worship is incompatible with dignity, destructive of liberty and a denial of the equality of all human beings. These constitutional values stand above everything else as a principle which brooks no exceptions, even when confronted with a claim of religious belief. To exclude women is derogatory to an equal citizenship. [Para 54][774-B-F] 4.2 There is an assumption which cannot stand constitutional scrutiny. The assumption in such a claim is that a deviation from the celibacy and austerity observed by the followers would be caused by the presence of women. Such a claim cannot be sustained as a constitutionally sustainable argument. Its effect is to impose the burden of a man’s celibacy on a woman and construct her as a cause for deviation from celibacy. This is then employed to deny access to spaces to which women are equally entitled. To suggest that women cannot keep the Vratham is to stigmatize them and stereotype them as being weak and lesser human beings. A constitutional court such as this one, must refuse to recognize such claims. [Para 55][774-GH; 775-A-B] 4.3 Human dignity postulates an equality between persons. The equality of all human beings entails being free from the restrictive and dehumanizing effect of stereotypes and being equally entitled to the protection of law. Our Constitution has willed that dignity, liberty and equality serve as a guiding light for individuals, the state and this Court. Though the Constitution protects religious freedom and consequent rights and practices essential to religion, this Court will be guided by the pursuit to uphold the values of the Constitution, based in dignity, liberty and equality. In a constitutional order of priorities, these are values on which the edifice of the Constitution stands. They infuse constitutional order with a vision for the future – of a just, equal and dignified society. Intrinsic to these values is the anti-exclusion principle. Exclusion is destructive of dignity. To exclude a woman from the might of worship is fundamentally at odds with constitutional values. [Para 56][775-B-D]

4.4 The stigma around menstruation has been built up around traditional beliefs regarding the impurity of menstruating women. They have no place in a constitutional order. These beliefs have been used to shackle women, to deny them equal entitlements and subject them to the dictates of a patriarchal order. The menstrual status of a woman cannot be a valid constitutional basis to deny her the dignity of being and the autonomy of personhood. The menstrual status of a woman is deeply personal and an intrinsic part of her privacy. The Constitution must treat it as a feature on the basis of which no exclusion can be practised and no denial can be perpetrated. No body or group can use it as barrier in a woman’s quest for fulfilment, including in her finding solace in the connect with the creator.[Para 57][775-E-G] Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India and others (2018) 8 SCALE 72; S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, Thiruvananthpuram and others AIR 1993 Kerala 42; Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal v. Government of Tamil Nadu and others (2016) 2 SCC 725 : [2015] 11 SCR 1110; Commissioner of Police and others v Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and another (2004) 12 SCC 770 : [2004] 2 SCR 1019; Navtej Singh v. Union of India and others (2018) 10 SCALE 386; Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thritha Swaminar of Sri Shirur Mutt [1954] SCR 1005 - referred to. Religious Denominations 5. The ingredients for a set of individuals to be regarded as a religious denomination are a common faith, a common organisation and a distinctive name brought together under the rubric of religion. A common thread which runs through them is the requirement of a religious identity, which is fundamental to the character of a religious denomination.[Para 64][781-E-F] Sri Venkatramana Devaru v. State of Mysore and others [1958] SCR 895; Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thritha

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Swaminar of Sri Shirur Mutt [1954] SCR 1005; S.P. Mittal v. Union of India and others (1983) 1 SCC 51 : [1983] 1 SCR 729; Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and others v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta (1983) 4 SCC 522 : [1984] 1 SCR 447; Bramchari Sidheswar Shai v State of West Bengal (1995) 4 SCC 646 : [1995] 1 Suppl. SCR 745; Nallor Marthandam Vellalar and others v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment and others (2003) 10 SCC 712 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 920 – referred to.

Do the devotees of Lord Ayyappa constitute a religious denomination? 6. Adherence to a ‘common faith’ would entail that a common set of beliefs have been followed since the conception of the particular sect or denomination. A distinctive feature of the pilgrimage is that pilgrims of all religions participate in the pilgrimage on an equal footing. Muslims and Christians undertake the pilgrimage. A member of any religion can be a part of the collective of individuals who worship Lord Ayyappa. Religion is not the basis of the collective of individuals who worship the deity. Bereft of a religious identity, the collective cannot claim to be regarded as a ‘religious denomination’. To be within the fold of Article 26, a denomination must be a religious sect or body. Worship of the presiding deity is not confined to adherents of a particular religion. Coupled with this is the absence of a common spiritual organisation, which is a necessary element to constitute a religious denomination. The temple at which worship is carried out is dedicated to the public and represents truly, the plural character of society. Everyone, irrespective of religious belief, can worship the deity. The practices associated with the forms of worship do not constitute the devotees into a religious denomination. Considering the inability of the collective of individuals to satisfy the judicially-enunciated requirements, the set of individuals who refer to themselves as “Ayyappans” or devotees of Lord Ayyappa as a ‘religious denomination’ cannot be recognised. [Para 69][785-E-H; 786-A] S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, Thiruvananthpuram and others AIR 1993

Kerala 42; Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay [1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 496 – referred to. Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun (1904) AC 515 – referred to.

Article 17, “Untouchability” and the notions of purity 7.1 The society is governed by the Constitution. The values of constitutional morality are a non-derogable entitlement. Notions of “purity and pollution”, which stigmatize individuals, can have no place in a constitutional regime. Regarding menstruation as polluting or impure, and worse still, imposing exclusionary disabilities on the basis of menstrual status, is against the dignity of women which is guaranteed by the Constitution. Practices which legitimise menstrual taboos, due to notions of “purity and pollution”, limit the ability of menstruating women to attain the freedom of movement, the right to education and the right of entry to places of worship and, eventually, their access to the public sphere. Women have a right to control their own bodies. The menstrual status of a woman is an attribute of her privacy and person. Women have a constitutional entitlement that their biological processes must be free from social and religious practices, which enforce segregation and exclusion. These practices result in humiliation and a violation of dignity. Article 17 prohibits the practice of “untouchability”, which is based on notions of purity and impurity, “in any form”. Article 17 certainly applies to untouchability practices in relation to lower castes, but it will also apply to the systemic humiliation, exclusion and subjugation faced by menstruating women. Prejudice against women based on notions of impurity and pollution associated with menstruation is a symbol of exclusion. The social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status, is but a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values. As an expression of the anti-exclusion principle, Article 17 cannot be read to exclude women against whom social exclusion of the worst kind has been practiced and legitimized on notions of purity and pollution. Article 17 cannot be read in a restricted manner. But even if Article 17 were to be read to reflect a particular form of untouchability, that article will

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not exhaust the guarantee against other forms of social exclusion. The guarantee against social exclusion would emanate from other provisions of Part III, including Articles 15(2) and 21. Exclusion of women between the age groups of ten and fifty, based on their menstrual status, from entering the temple in Sabarimala can have no place in a constitutional order founded on liberty and dignity. [Para 81][804-E-F; 805-A-E]

7.2 The issue for entry in a temple is not so much about the right of menstruating women to practice their right to freedom of religion, as about freedom from societal oppression, which comes from a stigmatized understanding of menstruation, resulting in “untouchability”. Article 25, which is subject to Part III provisions, is necessarily therefore subject to Article 17. To use the ideology of “purity and pollution” is a violation of the constitutional right against “untouchability”. [Para 82][805-F-G] National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights v. Union of India (2017) 2 SCC 432 : [2016] 9 SCR 122; Devarajiah v B Padmanna AIR 1958 Mys 84; Jai Singh v Union of India AIR 1993 Raj 177; State of Karnataka v Appa Balu Ingale (1995) Supp 4 SCC 469 : [1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 284; Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam and others v. Government of Tamil Nadu and others (2016) 2 SCC 725 :[2015] 11 SCR 1110; K.S. Puttaswamy and another v. Union of India and others (2017) 10 SCC 1 – referred to. Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, Oxford University Press (1999), at pages xii-xiii; Politics and Ethics of the Indian Constitution Rajeev Bhagava (ed.), Oxford University Press (2008), at page 15; B Shiva Rao, The Framing of India’s Constitution: A Study, Indian Institution of Public Administration (1968), at page 202-205; Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, (Vasant Moon ed.) Government of Maharashtra, Vol. 1 (2014), at pages 39, Vol. 12 (2014), at pages 661-691, Vol. 5 (2014), at pages 9-18, Vol. 1 (2014), at pages 5-6, Vol. 1 (2014), at pages 23-96, (2014), Vol. 1, at pp 3-22; India Dissents: 3,000 Years of Difference, Doubt and

Argument, (Ashok Vajpeyi ed.), Speaking Tiger Publishing Private Limited (2017), at pages 86-88; Sujatha Gidla, Ants among Elephants: An Untouchable Family and the Making of Modern India, Harper Collins (2017), at p 114; Diane Coffey and Dean Spears, Where India Goes: Abandoned Toilets, Stunted Development and the Costs of Caste, Harper Collins (2017), at pp 74-79; Rajesh Ramachandran, Death for Moustache, Outlook (16 October 2017) – referred to. The ultra vires doctrine

8.1 The devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a religious denomination and the Sabarimala temple is not a denominational temple. The proviso to section 3 has no application. The notifications which restrict the entry of women between the ages of ten and fifty in the Sabarimala temple cannot stand scrutiny and plainly infringe Section 3. They prevent any woman between the age of ten and fifty from entering the Sabarimala temple and from offering prayers. Such a restriction would infringe the rights of all Hindu women, recognized by Section 3. The notifications issued by the Board prohibiting the entry of women between ages ten and fifty-five, are ultra vires Section 3. [Para 87][810-E-G] 8.2 Hindu women constitute a ‘section or class’ of Hindus under clauses (b) and (c) of Section 2 of the 1965 Act. The proviso to Section 4(1) forbids any regulation which discriminates against any Hindu on the ground of belonging to a particular section or class. The mandate of Section 3 is that if a place of public worship is open to Hindus generally or to any section or class of Hindus, it shall be open to all sections or classes of Hindus. The Sabarimala temple is open to Hindus generally and in any case to a section or class of Hindus. Hence, it has to be open to all sections or classes of Hindus, including Hindu women. Rule 3(b) gives precedence to customs and usages which allow the exclusion of women “at such time during which they are not… allowed to enter a place of public worship”. In laying down such a prescription, Rule 3(b) directly offends the right of temple entry established by Section 3. Section 3 overrides any custom or usage to the contrary. But Rule 3 acknowledges, recognises and enforces a

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

custom or usage to exclude women. This is plainly ultra vires.The object of the Act is to enable the entry of all sections and classes of Hindus into temples dedicated to, or for the benefit of or used by any section or class of Hindus. The Act recognizes the rights of all sections and classes of Hindus to enter places of public worship and their right to offer prayers. The law was enacted to remedy centuries of discrimination and is an emanation of Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution. The broad and liberal object of the Act cannot be shackled by the exclusion of women. [Para 90][812F-G; 813-A-D]

Ardeshir H Bhiwandiwala v State of Bombay [1961] 3 SCR 592; CIT v Taj Mahal Hotel, Secunderabad (1971) 3 SCC 550; Geeta Enterprises v State of U P (1983) 4 SCC 202 : [1983] 3 SCR 812; Gopal Krishna Agrawal v State of U P (1982) All. L.J. 607; Regional Director, ESIC v High Land Coffee Works of P.F.X. Saldanha & Sons (1991) 3 SCC 617 : [1991] 3 SCR 307; Union of India v Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd. (2001) 4 SCC 139 : [2001] 1 SCR 221; Additional District Magistrate v Siri Ram (2000) 5 SCC 451 : [2000] 3 SCR 1019; Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Education v Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27 – referred to.

The ghost of Narasu 9.1 The decision in Narasu, in restricting the definition of the term ‘laws in force’ detracts from the transformative vision of the Constitution. Carving out ‘custom or usage’ from constitutional scrutiny, denies the constitutional vision of ensuring the primacy of individual dignity. The decision in Narasu, is based on flawed premises. Custom or usage cannot be excluded from ‘laws in force’. The decision also opined that personal law is immune from constitutional scrutiny. This detracts from the notion that no body of practices can claim supremacy over the Constitution and its vision of ensuring the sanctity of dignity, liberty and equality. This also overlooks the wide ambit that was to be attributed to the term ‘laws in force’ having regard to its inclusive definition and constitutional history. The decision in Narasu, in immunizing uncodified personal law and construing

the same as distinct from custom, deserves detailed reconsideration in an appropriate case.[Para 101][826-B-C, E] The State of Bombay v Narasu Appa Mali AIR 1952 Bom 84 – disapproved.

9.2 In the quest towards ensuring the rights guaranteed to every individual, a Constitutional court such as ours is faced with an additional task. Transformative adjudication must provide remedies in individual instances that arise before the Court. In addition, it must seek to recognize and transform the underlying social and legal structures that perpetuate practices against the constitutional vision. Subjecting personal laws to constitutional scrutiny is an important step in this direction. In the denial of equal access, the practice denies an equal citizenship and substantive equality under the Constitution. The primacy of individual dignity is the wind in the sails of the boat chartered on the constitutional course of a just and egalitarian social order. [Para 102][826-F-G; 827-B-C] A K Gopalan v State of Madras [1950] SCR 88; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248 : [1970] 3 SCR 530; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248 : [1970] 3 SCR 530; Maneka Gandhi v Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 : [1978] 2 SCR 621; Special Courts Bill Reference (1979) 1 SCC 380 : [1979] 2 SCR 476; K.S. Puttaswamy and another v. Union of India and others (2017) 10 SCC 1; The United Provinces v Mst. Atiqa Begum AIR 1941 FC 16; Ardeshir H Bhiwandiwala v State of Bombay [1961] 3 SCR 592; CIT v Taj Mahal Hotel, Secunderabad (1971) 3 SCC 550; Geeta Enterprises v State of U P (1983) 4 SCC 202 : [1983] 3 SCR 812; Regional Director, ESIC v High Land Coffee Works of P.F.X. Saldanha & Sons (1991) 3 SCC 617 : [1991] 3 SCR 307; Sant Ram v Labh Singh [1964] 7 SCR 756; Shayara Bano v. Union of India and others (2017) 9 SCC 1 : [2017] 7 SCR 797 – referred to. Indira Jaisingh, ‘The Ghost of Narasu Appa Mali is stalking the Supreme Court of India’, Law yers Collective, 28 May, 2018; Matrimonial Laws and the

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Constitution by A M Bhattacharjee, Eastern Law House (1996) at p 32; Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G P Singh, Lexis Nexis (2016) at p 198; The Framing of India’s Constitution by Shiva Rao, Vol III, at pp 520, 521, Vol IV, at pages 26, 27 - referred to.

Deity as a bearer of constitutional rights 10.1 The word ‘persons’ in certain statutes have been interpreted to include idols. However, to claim that a deity is the bearer of constitutional rights is a distinct issue, and does not flow as a necessary consequence from the position of the deity as a juristic person for certain purposes. Merely because a deity has been granted limited rights as juristic persons under statutory law does not mean that the deity necessarily has constitutional rights. [Para 105][828-D-E] 10.2 A religious denomination or any section thereof has a right under Article 26 to manage religious affairs. This right vests in a collection of individuals which demonstrate (i) the existence of a religious sect or body; (ii) a common faith shared by those who belong to the religious sect and a common spiritual organisation; (iii) the existence of a distinctive name and (iv) a common thread of religion. Article 25 grants the right to the freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion. Conscience, as a cognitive process that elicits emotion and associations based on an individual’s beliefs rests only in individuals. The Constitution postulates every individual as its basic unit. The rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution are geared towards the recognition of the individual as its basic unit. The individual is the bearer of rights under Part III of the Constitution. The deity may be a juristic person for the purposes of religious law and capable of asserting property rights. However, the deity is not a ‘person’ for the purpose of Part III. The legal fiction which has led to the recognition of a deity as a juristic person cannot be extended to the gamut of rights under Part III of the Constitution. [Para 106][829-F-H; 830-A-B] 10.3 In any case, the exclusion of women from the Sabarimala temple affects both, the religious and civic rights of

the individual. The anti-exclusion principle would disallow a claim based on Article 25 and 26 which excludes women from the Sabarimala Temple and hampers their exercise of religious freedom. This is in keeping with the over-arching liberal values of the Constitution and its vision of ensuring an equal citizenship. [Para 106][830-B-C] Pramatha Nath Mullick v Pradyumna Kumar Mullick (1925) 27 Bom LR 1064; Yogendra Nath Naskar v Commissioner of the Income-Tax, Calcutta (1969) 1 SCC 555 : [1969] 3 SCR 742; A S Narayana Deekshitulu v State Of Andhra Pradesh 1996 9 SCC 548 : [1996] 3 SCR 543; Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thritha Swaminar of Sri Shirur Mutt [1954] SCR 1005 – referred to. A road map for the future 11.1 By reserving to itself the authority to determine practices which are essential or inessential to religion, the Court assumed a reformatory role which would allow it to cleanse religion of practices which were derogatory to individual dignity. Exclusions from temple entry could be regarded as matters which were not integral to religion. While doing so, the Court would set up a progressive view of religion. This approach is problematic. The rationale for allowing a religious community to define what constitutes an essential aspect of its religion is to protect the autonomy of religions and religious denominations. Protecting that autonomy enhances the liberal values of the Constitution. By entering upon doctrinal issues of what does or does not constitute an essential part of religion, the Court has, as a necessary consequence, been required to adopt a religious mantle. The Court would determine as to whether a practice is or is not an essential part of religion. This has enabled the Court to adopt a reformist vision of religion even though it may conflict with the views held by the religion and by those who practice and profess the faith. The competence of the Court to do so and the legitimacy of the assumption of that role may be questionable. The Court discharges a constitutional (as distinct from an ecclesiastical) role in adjudication. Adjudicating on what does or

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does not form an essential part of religion blurs the distinction between the religious-secular divide and the essential/inessential approach. The former has a textual origin in Article 25(2)(a). The latter is a judicial creation. [Para 108][831-D-H; 832-A-C] 11.2 The right to freedom of religion which is comprehended in Articles 25-28 is not a stand alone right. These Articles are an integral element of the entire chapter on fundamental rights. Constitutional articles which recognise fundamental rights have to be understood as a seamless web. Together, they build the edifice of constitutional liberty. Fundamental human freedoms in Part III are not disjunctive or isolated. They exist together. It is only in cohesion that they bring a realistic sense to the life of the individual as the focus of human freedoms. The right of a denomination must then be balanced with the individual rights to which each of its members has a protected entitlement in Part III. [Para 109][832-E-G] 11.3 The co-existence of a group right in a chapter on fundamental rights which places the individual at the forefront of its focus cannot be a matter without significance. It would be impossible to conceive of the preservation of liberal constitutional values while at the same time allowing group rights to defy those values by practicing exclusion and through customs which are derogatory to dignity. This apparent contradiction can be resolved by postulating that notwithstanding the recognition of group rights in Article 26, the Constitution has never intended that the assertion of these rights destroy individual dignity and liberty. Group rights have been recognized by the Constitution in order to provide a platform to individuals within those denominations to realize fulfilment and self-determination.[Para 110][833-C, D-F] 11.4 A deferential approach to what constitutes a part of religious tenets would free the court from the unenviable task of adjudicating upon religious texts and doctrines. The deference, however, that is attributed to religion is subject to the fundamental principles which emerge from the quest for liberty, equality and dignity in Part III. Both Article 25(1) and Article 26 are subject to public order, morality and health. Acting under the rubric of these limitations even the religious freedom of a denomination is subject to the anti-exclusion principle. The anti-exclusion principle allows for due-deference to the ability of a religion to

determine its own religious tenets and doctrines. At the same time, the principle postulates that where a religious practice causes the exclusion of individuals in a manner which impairs their dignity or hampers their access to basic goods, the freedom of religion must give way to the over-arching values of a liberal constitution. The essential religious practices test should merit a close look, in an appropriate case in the future. [Paras 111112][835-G; 836-A-B, D-F] Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thritha Swaminar of Sri Shirur Mutt [1954] SCR 1005; Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay & Ors. [1954] SCR 1055; Durgah Committee, Ajmer and others v. Syed Hussain Ali and others AIR 1961 SC 1402 : [1962] SCR 383; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. [1964] 1 SCR 561; Sastri Yagnapurushadji v. MuldasBhudardas Vaishya [1966] 3 SCR 242; Commissioner of Police and others v Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and another (2004) 12 SCC 770 : [2004] 2 SCR 1019 – referred to. Freedom from community: Individual rights, group life, state authority and religious freedom under the Indian Constitution by Gautam Bhatia, Global Constitutionalism, Cambridge University Press (2016) pp 374, 382; The Politics of Recognition in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition C Taylor, (A Gutmann ed.) Princeton University Press (1994); Introduction Multiculturalism in Multiculturalism, Liberalism and Democracy R Bhargava (R Bhargava et al. eds), Oxford University Press (2007); Freedom of Religion in India: Current Issues and Supreme Court Acting as Clergy by Faizan Mustafa and Jagteshwar Singh Sohi Brigham Young University Review (2017); Definitional imbroglios: A critique of the definition of religion and essential practice tests in religious freedom adjudication Jaclyn L Neo, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 16 (2018) at pages 574-595 - referred to.

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

Per Indu Malhotra, J. (Dissenting):

Maintainability and Justiciability 1.1 Writ Petition does not deserve to be entertained for want of standing. The grievances raised are non-justiciable at the behest of the petitioners and Intervenors involved. [Para 16(i)][897-D] 1.2 The right to move the Supreme Court under Article 32 for violation of Fundamental Rights, must be based on a pleading that the Petitioners’ personal rights to worship in this Temple have been violated. The Petitioners do not claim to be devotees of the Sabarimala Temple where Lord Ayyappa is believed to have manifested himself as a ‘Naishtik Brahmachari’. To determine the validity of long-standing religious customs and usages of a sect, at the instance of an association/Intervenors who are “involved in social developmental activities especially activities related to upliftment of women and helping them become aware of their rights”, would require this Court to decide religious questions at the behest of persons who do not subscribe to this faith. The right to worship, claimed by the Petitioners has to be predicated on the basis of affirmation of a belief in the particular manifestation of the deity in this Temple. [Para 7.2][856-C-E] 1.3 The absence of this bare minimum requirement must not be viewed as a mere technicality, but an essential requirement to maintain a challenge for impugning practises of any religious sect, or denomination. Permitting PILs in religious matters would open the floodgates to interlopers to question religious beliefs and practises, even if the petitioner is not a believer of a particular religion, or a worshipper of a particular shrine. The perils are even graver for religious minorities if such petitions are entertained. [Para 7.3][856-E-F] 1.4 In matters of religion and religious practises, Article 14 can be invoked only by persons who are similarly situated, that is, persons belonging to the same faith, creed, or sect. The Petitioners do not state that they are devotees of Lord Ayyappa, who are aggrieved by the practises followed in the Sabarimala Temple. The right to equality under Article 14 in matters of religion and religious beliefs has to be viewed differently. It has

to be adjudged amongst the worshippers of a particular religion or shrine, who are aggrieved by certain practises which are found to be oppressive or pernicious. [Para 7.4][857-A-B] 1.5 The right of an individual to worship a specific manifestation of the deity, in accordance with the tenets of that faith or shrine, is protected by Article 25(1) of the Constitution. If a person claims to have faith in a certain deity, the same has to be articulated in accordance with the tenets of that faith. In the instant case, the worshippers of this Temple believe in the manifestation of the deity as a ‘Naishtik Brahmachari’. The devotees of this Temple have not challenged the practises followed by this Temple, based on the essential characteristics of the deity. [Para 7.5][857-C-D] 1.6 The right to practise one’s religion is a Fundamental Right guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution, without reference to whether religion or the religious practises are rational or not. Religious practises are Constitutionally protected under Articles 25 and 26(b). Courts normally do not delve into issues of religious practises, especially in the absence of an aggrieved person from that particular religious faith, or sect. [Para 7.6][857-E-F] 1.7 Precedents under Art. 25 have arisen against State action and not been rendered in PIL. [Para 7.7][858-A] Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta & Ors. [1955] 1 SCR 1284; Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thritha Swaminar of Sri Shirur Mutt [1954] SCR 1005; Sri Venkatramana Devaru v. State of Mysore and others [1958] SCR 895; Mahant Moti Das v. S.P. Sahi, The Special Officer In Charge of Hindu Religious trust & Ors. [1959] Supp 2 SCR 563; Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali [1962] 1 SCR 383; Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay [1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 496; Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors. (1986) 3 SCC 615 : [1986] 3 SCR 518 – referred to. Constitutional Law of India : A Critical Commentaryby H.M. Seervai Vol. II (4th Ed., Reprint 1999) - referred to.

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

Applicability of Article 14 in matters of religion and religious practice

2.1 The equality doctrine enshrined under Article 14 does not override the Fundamental Right guaranteed by Article 25 to every individual to freely profess, practise and propagate their faith, in accordance with the tenets of their religion. [Para 16(ii)][897-E] 2.2 Religious customs and practises cannot be solely tested on the touchstone of Article 14 and the principles of rationality embedded therein. Article 25 specifically provides the equal entitlement of every individual to freely practise their religion. Equal treatment under Article 25 is conditioned by the essential beliefs and practises of any religion. Equality in matters of religion must be viewed in the context of the worshippers of the same faith. [Para 8.1][859-D-E] 2.3 The difficulty lies in applying the tests under Article 14 to religious practises which are also protected as Fundamental Rights under our Constitution. The right to equality claimed by the Petitioners under Article 14 conflicts with the rights of the worshippers of this shrine which is also a Fundamental Right guaranteed by Articles 25, and 26 of the Constitution. It would compel the Court to undertake judicial review under Article 14 to delineate the rationality of the religious beliefs or practises, which would be outside the ken of the Courts. It is not for the courts to determine which of these practises of a faith are to be struck down, except if they are pernicious, oppressive, or a social evil, like Sati. [Para 8.2][859-G-H; 860-A] 2.4 The submission of the petitioners and intervenors that the age group of 10 to 50 years is arbitrary, and cannot stand the rigours of Article 14, cannot be accepted, since the prescription of this age-band is the only practical way of ensuring that the limited restriction on the entry of women is adhered to. [Para 8.4][860-C] 2.5 The right to gender equality to offer worship to Lord Ayyappa is protected by permitting women of all ages, to visit temples where he has not manifested himself in the form of a ‘Naishtik Brahamachari’, and there is no similar restriction in

those temples. It is pertinent to mention that the Respondents, in this context, have submitted that there are over 1000 temples of Lord Ayyappa, where he has manifested in other forms, and this restriction does not apply. The prayers of the Petitioners if acceded to, in its true effect, amounts to exercising powers of judicial review in determining the validity of religious beliefs and practises, which would be outside the ken of the courts. The issue of what constitutes an essential religious practise is for the religious community to decide. [Paras 8.5-8.6][860-D-F] Applicability of Article 15 3. The submission that the Sabarimala Temple would be included in the phrase “places of public resort”, as it occurs in Article 15(2)(b), cannot be accepted. The Constituent Assembly considered it fit not to include ‘places of worship’ or ‘temples’ within the ambit of Draft Article 9 of the Constitution. The conscious deletion of “temples” and “places of worship” from the Draft Article 9(1) has to be given due consideration. [Para 9.1-9.2][860-H; 862-C-D] Draft Constitution of India, Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly of India (Manager Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1948); Statement of K.T. Shah, Constituent Assembly Debates (November 29, 1948); Statement of Vice-President, Constituent Assembly Debates (November 29, 1948); Statement of Mr. Mohd. Tahir, Constituent Assembly Debates (November 29, 1948) – referred to. Role of Courts in matters concerning religion 4.1 The role of Courts in matters concerning religion and religious practises under our secular Constitutional set up is to afford protection under Article 25(1) to those practises which are regarded as “essential” or “integral” by the devotees, or the religious community itself. [Para 10.1][862-E] 4.2 The Constitution lays emphasis on social justice and equality. It has specifically provided for social welfare and reform, and throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus through the process of legislation in Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution. Article 25(2)(b) is an enabling provision which permits the State to redress social inequalities and injustices by framing legislation.

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

It is therefore difficult to accept the contention that Article 25(2)(b) is capable of application without reference to an actual legislation. What is permitted by Article 25(2) is State made law on the grounds specified therein, and not judicial intervention. [Para 10.8][872-A-B] 4.3 The 1965 Act is a legislation framed in pursuance of Article 25(2)(b) which provides for the throwing open of Hindu places of public worship. The proviso to Section 3 of the 1965 Act carves out an exception to the applicability of the general rule contained in Section 3, with respect to religious denominations, or sect(s) thereof, so as to protect their right to manage their religious affairs without outside interference. Rule 3(b) gives effect to the proviso of Section 3 insofar as it makes a provision for restricting the entry of women at such times when they are not by custom or usage allowed to enter of place of public worship. The Respondents claim the right to worship in the Sabarimala Temple under Article 25(1) in accordance with their beliefs and practises as per the tenets of their religion. These practises are considered to be essential or integral to that Temple. Any interference with the same would conflict with their right guaranteed by Article 25(1) to worship Lord Ayyappa in the form of a ‘Naishtik Brahmachari’. In other jurisdictions also, where State made laws were challenged on grounds of public morality, the Courts have refrained from striking down the same on the ground that it is beyond the ken of the Courts.Judicial review of religious practises ought not to be undertaken, as the Court cannot impose its morality or rationality with respect to the form of worship of a deity. Doing so would negate the freedom to practise one’s religion according to one’s faith and beliefs. It would amount to rationalising religion, faith and beliefs, which is outside the ken of Courts.[Paras 10.9, 10.10, 10.11, 10.13][872-C-G; 873C-D] Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors. (1986) 3 SCC 615: [1986] 3 SCR 518; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (1964) 1 SCR 561; Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali [1962] 1 SCR 383; Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thritha Swaminar of Sri Shirur Mutt [1954] SCR 1005; Ratilal

Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay & Ors. 1954 SCR 1055; Shayara Bano v. Union of India and others (2017) 9 SCC 1 : [2017] 7 SCR 797; S.P. Mittal v. Union of India and others (1983) 1 SCC 51 : [1983] 1 SCR 729- referred to.

Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Incorporated v. The Commonwealth 67 CLR 116; Regina v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment & Ors. [2005] UKHL 15; Eddie C. Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division 450 U.S. 707 (1981); United Statesv. Edwin D. Lee 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Robert L. Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Alfred L. Smith 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah 508 U.S. 520 (1993) – referred to.

Constitutional law of India: A Critical Commentary by H.M. Seervai; Religion, Law and the State in India by J. Duncan M. Derett (1968) p. 447; Constitutional Law of India: A Critical Commentaryby H.M. Seervai Vol. II (4th Ed., Reprint 1999) paragraph 12.18 at p. 12671268– referred to.

Constitutional morality in matters of religion in a secular polity

5. The concept of Constitutional Morality refers to the moral values underpinning the text of the Constitution, which are instructive in ascertaining the true meaning of the Constitution, and achieve the objects contemplated therein. Constitutional Morality in a pluralistic society and secular polity would reflect that the followers of various sects have the freedom to practise their faith in accordance with the tenets of their religion. It is irrelevant whether the practise is rational or logical. Notions of rationality cannot be invoked in matters of religion by courts. Equality and non-discrimination are certainly one facet of Constitutional Morality. However, the concept of equality and non-discrimination in matters of religion cannot be viewed in isolation. Under our Constitutional scheme, a balance is required

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

to be struck between the principles of equality and nondiscrimination on the one hand, and the protection of the cherished liberties of faith, belief, and worship guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26 to persons belonging to all religions in a secular polity, on the other hand. Constitutional Morality in a secular polity would imply the harmonisation of the Fundamental Rights, which include the right of every individual, religious denomination, or sect, to practise their faith and belief in accordance with the tenets of their religion, irrespective of whether the practise is rational or logical, to ensure that the religious beliefs of none are obliterated or undermined. It is the Constitutional duty of the Court to harmonise the rights of all persons, religious denominations or sects thereof, to practise their religion according to their beliefs and practises. [Paras 11.5-11.8][874-C-H; 875-FG]

Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited & Ors. v. Securities and Exchange Board of India & Anr (2012) 10 SCC 603 : [2012] 12 SCR 256; Subramaniam Swamy v. Union of India, Ministry of Law & Ors. (2016) 7 SCC 221: [2016] 3 SCR 865; Acharya Maharajshri Narendra Prasadji Anandprasadji Maharaj & Ors. v. The State of Gujarat & Ors. (1975) 1 SCC 11 : [1975] 0 Suppl. SCR 145 – referred to.

Religious denomination 6.1 The Respondents and the Intervenors have made out a plausible case that the Ayyappans or worshippers of the Sabarimala Temple satisfy the requirements of being a religious denomination, or sect thereof, which is entitled to the protection provided by Article 26. The issue whether the Sabarimala Temple constitutes a ‘religious denomination’, or a sect thereof, is a mixed question of fact and law. It is trite in law that a question of fact should not be decided in writ proceedings. The proper forum to ascertain whether a certain sect constitutes a religious denomination or not, would be more appropriately determined by a civil court, where both parties are given the opportunity of leading evidence to establish their case. [Para 12.10, 16(iv)][897G; 881-A-B]

6.2 Article 26 guarantees that every religious denomination, or sect thereof, shall have the right inter alia to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. This right is made subject to public order, morality, and health. Article 26 refers not only to religious denominations, but also to sects thereof. A religious denomination or organisation enjoys complete autonomy in matters of deciding what rites and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of that religion. The only restriction imposed is on the exercise of the right being subject to public order, morality and health under Article 26. [Paras 12.2-12.3][876-B-D] Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thritha Swaminar of Sri Shirur Mutt [1954] SCR 1005; S.P. Mittal v. Union of India and others (1983) 1 SCC 51 : [1983] 1 SCR 729; Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay [1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 496 – referred to. 6.3 The meaning ascribed to religious denomination by this Court in Shirur Mutt case and subsequent cases is not a straitjacket formula, but a working formula. It provides guidance to ascertain whether a group would fall within a religious denomination or not. If there are clear attributes that there exists a sect, which is identifiable as being distinct by its beliefs and practices, and having a collection of followers who follow the same faith, it would be identifiable as a religious denomination. [Para 12.7-12.8][878-C-D] 6.4 Respondents have made out a strong and plausible case that the worshippers of the Sabarimala Temple have the attributes of a religious denomination, or sect thereof.The submission that since the visitors to the temple are not only from the Hindu religion, but also from other religions, the worshippers of this Temple would not constitute a separate religious sect, cannot be accepted since it is not uncommon for persons from different religious faiths to visit shrines of other religions. This by itself would not take away the right of the worshippers of this Temple who may constitute a religious denomination, or sect thereof. The Constitution ensures a place for diverse religions, creeds, denominations and sects thereof to co-exist in a secular society. It is necessary that the term ‘religious denomination’ should

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

receive an interpretation which is in furtherance of the Constitutional object of a pluralistic society. [Paras 12.9, 12.1212.13]879-D; 881-F-H; 882-A]

Arya Vyasa Sabha & Ors. v. Commissioner of Hindu Charitable and Religious Institutions & Endowments, Hyderabad & Ors. (1976) 1 SCC 292; Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. State of T.N. & Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 75 : [2014] 1 SCR 308 – referred to.

Essential Practises Doctrine 7.1 The ‘essential practises test’ in its application would have to be determined by the tenets of the religion itself. The practises and beliefs which are considered to be integral by the religious community are to be regarded as “essential”, and afforded protection under Article 25. The only way to determine the essential practises test would be with reference to the practises followed since time immemorial, which may have been scripted in the religious texts of this temple. If any practise in a particular temple can be traced to antiquity, and is integral to the temple, it must be taken to be an essential religious practise of that temple. The Temple Thanthri, the Travancore Devaswom Board, and believers of Lord Ayyappa have submitted that the limited restriction on access of women during the notified age of 10 to 50 years, is a religious practise which is centralandintegral to the tenets of this shrine, since the deity has manifested himself in the form of a ‘Naishtik Brahmachari’. [Paras 13.6-13.7][886E-H] 7.2 The practise of celibacy and austerity is the unique characteristic of the deity in the Sabarimala Temple. Hindu deities have both physical/temporal and philosophical form. The same deity is capable of having different physical and spiritual forms or manifestations. Worship of each of these forms is unique, and not all forms are worshipped by all persons. The form of deity in any temple is of paramount importance. Worship has two elements – the worshipper, and the worshipped. The right to worship under Article 25 cannot be claimed in the absence of the deity in the particular form in which he has manifested himself. Religion is a matter of faith, and religious beliefs are held to be sacred by those who share the same faith. Thought, faith and belief are internal,

while expression and worship are external manifestations thereof. In the case of the Sabarimala Temple, the manifestation is in the form of a ‘Naishtik Brahmachari’. The belief in a deity, and the form in which he has manifested himself is a fundamental right protected by Article 25(1) of the Constitution. The phrase “equally entitled to”, as it occurs in Article 25(1), must mean that each devotee is equally entitled to profess, practise and propagate his religion, as per the tenets of that religion. The celibate nature of the deity at the Sabarimala Temple has been traced by the Respondents to the SthalPurana of this Temple chronicled in the ‘Bhuthanatha Geetha’. Evidence of these practises are also documented in the Memoir of the Survey of the Travancore and Cochin States written by Lieutenants Ward and Conner published in two parts in 1893 and 1901. The religious practise of restricting the entry of women between the ages of 10 to 50 years, is in pursuance of an ‘essential religious practise’ followed by the respondents. The said restriction has been consistently, followed at the Sabarimala Temple, as is borne out from the Memoir of the Survey of the Travancore and Cochin States published in two parts in 1893 and 1901. [Paras 13.9-13.13][889-D-E; 890-A-E] 7.3 In the present case, the character of the temple at Sabarimala is unique on the basis of centuries old religious practises followed to preserve the manifestation of the deity, and the worship associated with it. Any interference with the mode and manner of worship of this religious denomination, or sect, would impact the character of the Temple, and affect the beliefs and practises of the worshippers of this Temple. Based on the material adduced before this Court, the Respondents have certainly made out a plausible case that the practise of restricting entry of women between the age group of 10 to 50 years is an essential religious practise of the devotees of Lord Ayyappa at the Sabarimala Temple being followed since time immemorial. [Paras 13.14-13.15][891-B-D] Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thritha Swaminar of Sri Shirur Mutt [1954] SCR 1005; Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali [1962] 1 SCR 383; Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay & Ors. [1954] SCR 1055; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

of Rajasthan & Ors. [1964] 1 SCR 561; Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors. (1986) 3 SCC 615 : [1986] 3 SCR 518; S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, Thiruvananthpuram and others AIR 1993 Kerala 42; Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. State of T.N. & Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 75 : [2014] 1 SCR 308; Daryao & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [1962] 1 SCR 574 – referred to. Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Incorporated v. The Commonwealth 67 CLR 116; Carlos Frank v. State of Alaska 604 P.2d 1068 (1979) – referred to. Article 17 8.1 Article 17 refers to the practise of Untouchability as committed in the Hindu community against Harijans or people from depressed classes, and not women. The limited restriction on the entry of women during the notified age-group does not fall within the purview of Art. 17 of the Constitution. [Paras 14.5, 16(v)][[893-E-F; 898-A] 8.2 All forms of exclusion would not amount to untouchability. Article 17 pertains to untouchability based on caste prejudice. Literally or historically, untouchability was never understood to apply to women as a class. The restriction on women within a certain age-band, is based upon the historical origin and beliefs and practices of the sabrimala temple. In the present case, women of the notified age group are allowed entry into all other temples of Lord Ayyappa. The restriction on the entry of women during the notified age group in this Temple is based on the unique characteristic of the deity, and not founded on any social exclusion. The analogy sought to be drawn by comparing the rights of Dalits with reference to entry to temples and women is wholly misconceived and unsustainable. The right asserted by Dalits was in pursuance of right against systematic social exclusion and for social acceptance per se. In the case of temple entry, social reform preceded the statutory reform, and not the other way about. The social reform was spearheaded by great religious as well as national leaders like Swami Vivekananda and Mahatma Gandhi. The reforms were based upon societal morality, much before Constitutional Morality came into place. [Paras 14.2-14.3][891E-F; 893-A-B]

Sri Venkatramana Devaru v. State of Mysore and others [1958] SCR 895 – referred to. Constitutional Law of India: A Critical Commentary by H.M. SeervaiVol. II (4th Ed., Reprint 1999) para 9.418 at p 691; Indian Constitutional Lawby M.P. Jain (6 th Ed., Revised by Justice Ruma Pal and Samaraditya Pal; 2010) at p. 1067 – referred to. Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules is not ultra vires the Act 9.1 Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules is not ultra vires Section 3 of the 1965 Act, since the proviso carves out an exception in the case of public worship in a temple for the benefit of any religious denomination or sect thereof, to manage their affairs in matters of religion. [Para 16(vi)][893-A-B] 9.2 The provisions of the main section would be subject to the right of a religious denomination or section to manage its own affairs in the matters of religion. The proviso to Section 3 of the 1965 Act provides that no such regulation shall discriminate in any manner whatsoever, against any Hindu on the ground that he belongs to a particular section or class. [Para 15.1][895-G-H; 896-B] 9.3 Theproviso carves out an exception to the Section 3 itself. The declaration that places of public worship shall be open to Hindus of all sections and classes is not absolute, but subject to the right of a religious denomination to “manage its own affairs in matters of religion”. Section 3 must be viewed in the Constitutional context where the legislature has framed an enabling legislation under Article 25(2)(b) which has been made expressly subject to religious practises peculiar to a denomination under Article 26(b). [Para 15.2][896-C-D] 9.4 Rule 3(b) is within the ambit of the proviso to Section 3 of the 1965 Act, as it recognises pre-existing customs and usages including past traditions which have been practised since time immemorial qua the Temple. The Travancore Devaswom Board submits that these practises are integral and essential to the Temple. [Para 15.3][896-D-E] 9.5 The Notification dated November 27, 1956 issued by the Travancore Devaswom Board restricts the entry of women between the ages of 10 to 55 years as a custom and practise

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

integral to the sanctity of the Temple, and having the force of law under Article 13(3)(a) of the Constitution. These practises are protected by the proviso to Section 3 of the 1965 Act which is given effect to by Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules. [Para 15.5][896-F; 897-A-B] Raja Bira Kishore Deb Hereditary Superintendent, Jagannath Temple, P.O. and District Puriv. State of Orissa (1964) 7 SCR 32; Bennett Coleman & Co. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1972) 2 SCC 788: [1973] 2 SCR 757; Riju Prasad Sharma & Ors. v. State of Assam & Ors. (2015) 9 SCC 461; Ewanlangki-ERymbai v. Jaintia Hills District Council & Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 748 : [2006] 3 SCR 497; Bhimashya & Ors. v. Janabi (Smt) Alia Janawwa (2006) 13 SCC 627 : [ 2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 628 ; Salekh Chand (Dead) by LRs v. Satya Gupta & Ors. (2008) 13 SCC 119 : [2008] 3 SCR 833; Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam & Ors. v. Government of Tamil Nadu & Anr. (2016) 2 SCC 725 : [2015] 11 SCR 1110 – referred to. The Process of Pilgrimage: The Ayyappa Cultus and Sabarimalai Yatra by Radhika Sekar (Faculty of Graduate Studies, Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario; October 1987); Memoir of the Survey of the Travancore and Cochin States by Lieutenants Ward and Conner,(First Reprint 1994, Government of Kerala) at p. 137 – referred to. Case Law Reference In the judgment of Dipak Misra, J: (2017) 10 SCC 689 referred to Para 6 AIR 1993 Kerala 42 approved Para 125 [1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 496 referred to Para 17 [1964] 7 SCR 32 referred to Para 17

[1966] 3 SCR 242

referred to

Para 17

[1983] 1 SCR 729

relied on

Paras 92, 144(i)

[1954] SCR 1005

relied on

[1962] 1 SCR 383 [1958] SCR 895 [1989] 1 SCR 689 [2017] 7 SCR 797 [2007] 12 SCR 991 [2014] 12 SCR 259 (2014) 5 SCC 438 (2017) 10 SCC 1 [2004] 2 SCR 1019 [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404 [1972] 3 SCR 815 [2015] 11 SCR 1110 [1995] 2 Suppl. SCR 608 [1956] SCR 756 [1981] 2 SCR 826 [2014] 9 SCR 965 [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 920 [1977] 2 SCR 611 [1952] SCR 849 (2018) 8 SCALE 72 (2018) 10 SCALE 386 [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 638 [1959] SCR 629 [1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 515 [1962] SCR 383 [1984] 1 SCR 447 [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 76 [2012] 6 SCR 34 [1988] 3 SCR 62 [2000] 1 SCR 1054 [2009] 9 SCR 22

referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to relied on referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to

Paras 92, 144(i) Para 21 Para 25 Para 29 Para 30 Para 31 Para 31 Para 33 Para 33 Para 125 Para 38 Para 51 Para 62 Para 65 Para 67 Para 67 Para 74 Para 93 Para 99 Para 102 Para 108 Para 109 Para 112 Para 115 Para 116 Para 117 Para 119 Para 120 Para 137 Para 138 Para 138 Para 138

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

[2006] 3 SCR 396 referred to In the judgment of Nariman, J.: [1954] SCR 1005 referred to [1954] SCR 1055 referred to [1958] SCR 895 referred to [1962] SCR 383 referred to [1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 496 referred to [1964] 1 SCR 561 referred to [1972] 3 SCR 815 referred to [1977] 2 SCR 611 referred to [1983] 1 SCR 729 referred to [1984] 1 SCR 447 referred to [1997] 2 SCR 1086 relied on [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 76 referred to [2014] 1 SCR 308 referred to (2015) 9 SCC 461 referred to [2015] 11 SCR 1110 referred to AIR 1993 Kerala 42 referred to [1988] Supp 2 SCR 1050 relied on

Para 140 Para 4 Para 5 Para 6 Para 7 Para 9 Para 11 Para 12 Para 13 Para 14 Para 15 Para26 Para 17 Para 18 Para 19 Para 20 Para 21 Para 31

In the judgment of Chandrachud, J. [1970] 3 SCR 530 referred to

Para 14

[1950] SCR 88

referred to

Para 14

[1978] 2 SCR 621

referred to

Para 14

AIR 1993 Kerala 42

referred to

Para 27

[1954] SCR 1005

referred to

Para 29

[1954] SCR 1055

referred to

Para 30

[1958] SCR 895

referred to

Para 31

[1959] SCR 629

referred to

Para 33

[1962] SCR 383 [1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 496 [1964] 1 SCR 561

relied on relied on relied on

Para 34 Para 36 Para 39

[1966] 3 SCR 242 [1984] 1 SCR 447 [1997] 2 SCR 1086 [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 76 [2004] 2 SCR 1019 [2015] 11 SCR 1110 [2017] 7 SCR 797 [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 947 (2018) 8 SCALE 72 [2015] 11 SCR 1110 (2018) 10 SCALE 386 [1983] 1 SCR 729 [1995] 1 Suppl. SCR 745 [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 920 AIR 1958 Mys 84 AIR 1993 Raj 177 [1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 284 [2015] 11 SCR 1110 (2017) 10 SCC 1 [1961] 3 SCR 592 (1971) 3 SCC 550 [1983] 3 SCR 812 (1982) All. L.J. 607 [1991] 3 SCR 307 [2000] 3 SCR 1019 (1984) 4 SCC 27 [1950] SCR 88 [1970] 3 SCR 530 [1979] 2 SCR 476 [1961] 3 SCR 592 (1971) 3 SCC 550 [1983] 3 SCR 812 [1991] 3 SCR 307

referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to

Para 40 Para 41 Para 42 Para 43 Para 44 Para 45 Para 46 Para 46 Para 49 Para 51 Para 53 Para 62 Para 63 Para 63 Para 80 Para 80 Para 80 Para 80 Paras 80, 94 Para 84 Para 84 Para 84 Para 84 Para 84 Para 89 Para 89 Para 94 Para 94 Para 94 Para 96 Para 96 Para 96 Para 96

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

[1964] 7 SCR 756 referred to AIR 1952 Bom 84 disapproved (1925) 27 Bom LR 1064 referred to [1969] 3 SCR 742 referred to [1996] 3 SCR 543 referred to In the judgment of Indu Malhotra, J: [1958] SCR 895 referred to [1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 496 referred to [1964] 7 SCR 32 referred to [1983] 1 SCR729 referred to [1973] 2 SCR 757 referred to AIR 1993 Kerala 42 referred to (2015) 9 SCC 461 referred to [2006] 3 SCR 497 referred to [2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 628 referred to [2008] 3 SCR 833 referred to [1964] 1 SCR 561 referred to [1954] SCR 1005 referred to [1962] 1 SCR 383 referred to

Para 97 Para 101 Para 104 Para 104 Para 105 Para 2 Para 2 Para 2 Para 2 Para 2 Para 4 Para 4 Para 5 Para 5 Para 5 Para 5 Para 5 Para 5

[2014] 1 SCR 308

referred to

Para 5

[2015] 11 SCR 1110

referred to

Para 6

[1955] 1 SCR 1284

referred to

Para 7

[1954] SCR 1005

referred to

Para 7

[1958] SCR 895

referred to

Para 7

[1959] Supp 2 SCR 563

referred to

Para 7

[1962] 1 SCR 383

referred to

Para 7

[1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 496

referred to

Para 7

[1986] 3 SCR 518

referred to

Para 7

[1954] SCR 1055 [2017] 7 SCR 797 [2012] 12 SCR 256

referred to referred to referred to

Para 12 Para 10.6 Para 11.8

[2016] 3 SCR 865 referred to Para 11.8 [1975] 0 Suppl. SCR 145 referred to Para 11.8 [1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 496 referred to Para 12.3 (1976) 1 SCC 292 referred to Para 12.10 [1954] SCR 1055 referred to Para 13.2 [1962] 1 SCR 574 referred to Para 13.7 CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 373 of 2006. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. Raju Ramachandran (AC), Ms. Indira Jaising, Dr. K. P. Kylasanatha Pillay, K. Ramamoorthy, P. V. Surendranath, K. Radhakrishnan, Jaideep Gupta, V. Giri, K. Parasaran, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Sr. Advs., K. Parameshwar (AC), Ishwar Mohanty (AC), Ms. Hansini Shankar (AC), R. P. Gupta, Dr. Laxmi Shastri, Ms. Prerna Kumari, Ms. Bhawna Singh Dev, Bhakti Pasricha Sethi, Sunil Fernandes, Ms. Nehmat Kaur, Ms. Ajita Sharma, Paras Nath Singh, Ms. Nupur Kumar, Ms. Anju Thomas, Ms. Astha Sharma, Ms. Priyansha Sharma, A. Venayagam Balan, V. S. Lakshmi, Ms. Shoba Ramamoorthy, Sri Ram J. Thalapathy, V. Adhimoolam, Shilp Vinod, Pushkin Rajkumar, Ms. Reemitha R. Chandran, Ms. Lekha Sudhakaran, V. K. Sidharthan, P. V. Yogeswaran, Ashish Kr. Upadhyay, Bhuwan Jayant, Y. Lokesh, Ms. V. Susheatha, Ms. Vanitha Chandrakant Giri, K. V. Jagdishvaran, Ms. G. Indira, G. Prakash, Jishnu M. L., Mrs. Priyanka Prakash, Mrs. Beena Prakash, Kunal Chatterjee, Sanand Ramakrishnan, Rajeev Mishra, Madan Mohan Bora, K. V. Mohan, K. V. Balakrishnan, Ms. Aditi Dani, Ms. Bina Madhavan, S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Ms. Akanksha Mehra, PDT Achary, Nidhiram Sharma, Azeem Samuel, Narinder Neel (For M/s. Lawyer S Knit & Co.), Sreegesh M. K., Bhavani Shankar V. Gadnis, Vishwanath B. Gadnis, Ms. Radni V. Gadnis, Krishna Kumar Singh, M/s. Ap & J Chambers, Shaijan C. George, Vaibhav Joshi, Ramesh P., Suhaas Ratjna Joshi, V. K. Biju, Hiren Dasan, Chand Qureshi, Ankur Raghav, Abhay Pratap Singh, Vijay K. Verma, Tarun Verma, V. K. Verma, P. V. Saravanaraja, Naresh Kumar, Gautam Talukdar, Nishe Rajen Shonker, Anjani Kumar Mishra, Abhilash M. R., Simanta Kumar, Sayooj Mohandas, Ranjan Kumar, Piyush Dwivedi, Manav Vohra, Amith Krishnan, Krishna Dev Jagarlamudi, Svadha Shankar, Mohammed Sadique T. A., Kuriakose Varghese, Ranjith Shankar, V. Shyamohan, Deepak Grover, Willa Mathews, Ginesh P., Devendra Kumar Tiwari,

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA

Paul John Edison, Shaji Sebastian, Shree Pal Singh, J. Sai Deepak, Eshaan Ghosh, Suvidutt M. S., Avinash K. Sharma, Ashutosh Nagar, Ms. Anzu, Yogmaya, K. V. Muthu Kumar, Amith J., Akshay R., Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Ms. Usha Nandini V., Biju P. Raman, M. S. Vishnu Sankar, Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Ankit Agarwal, Advs. for the appearing parties. Swami Omji (Applicant-in-person). Mukesh Jain (Applicant-in-person). The Judgments of the Court were delivered by DIPAK MISRA, CJI (FOR HIMSELF AND A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.) Introduction The irony that is nurtured by the society is to impose a rule, however unjustified, and proffer explanation or justification to substantiate the substratum of the said rule. Mankind, since time immemorial, has been searching for explanation or justification to substantiate a point of view that hurts humanity. The theoretical human values remain on paper. Historically, women have been treated with inequality and that is why, many have fought for their rights. Susan B. Anthony, known for her feminist activity, succinctly puts, “Men, their rights, and nothing more; women, their rights, and nothing less.” It is a clear message. 2. Neither the said message nor any kind of philosophy has opened up the large populace of this country to accept women as partners in their search for divinity and spirituality. In the theatre of life, it seems, man has put the autograph and there is no space for a woman even to put her signature. There is inequality on the path of approach to understand the divinity. The attribute of devotion to divinity cannot be subjected to the rigidity and stereotypes of gender. The dualism that persists in religion by glorifying and venerating women as goddesses on one hand and by imposing rigorous sanctions on the other hand in matters of devotion has to be abandoned. Such a dualistic approach and an entrenched mindset results in indignity to women and degradation of their status. The society has to undergo a perceptual shift from being the propagator of hegemonic patriarchal notions of demanding more exacting standards of purity and chastity solely from women to be the cultivator of equality where the woman is in no way considered frailer, lesser or inferior to man. The law and the society are bestowed with the Herculean task to act as levellers in this regard and for the same, one has to remember the wise

saying of Henry Ward Beecher that deals with the changing perceptions of the world in time. He says: “Our days are a kaleidoscope. Every instant a change takes place in the contents. New harmonies, new contrasts, new combinations of every sort. Nothing ever happens twice alike. The most familiar people stand each moment in some new relation to each other, to their work, to surrounding objects. The most tranquil house, with the most serene inhabitants, living upon the utmost regularity of system, is yet exemplifying infinite diversities.”1 3. Any relationship with the Creator is a transcendental one crossing all socially created artificial barriers and not a negotiated relationship bound by terms and conditions. Such a relationship and expression of devotion cannot be circumscribed by dogmatic notions of biological or physiological factors arising out of rigid socio-cultural attitudes which do not meet the constitutionally prescribed tests. Patriarchy in religion cannot be permitted to trump over the element of pure devotion borne out of faith and the freedom to practise and profess one’s religion. The subversion and repression of women under the garb of biological or physiological factors cannot be given the seal of legitimacy. Any rule based on discrimination or segregation of women pertaining to biological characteristics is not only unfounded, indefensible and implausible but can also never pass the muster of constitutionality. 4. It is a universal truth that faith and religion do not countenance discrimination but religious practices are sometimes seen as perpetuating patriarchy thereby negating the basic tenets of faith and of gender equality and rights. The societal attitudes too centre and revolve around the patriarchal mindset thereby derogating the status of women in the social and religious milieu. All religions are simply different paths to reach the Universal One. Religion is basically a way of life to realize one’s identity with the Divinity. However, certain dogmas and exclusionary practices and rituals have resulted in incongruities between the true essence of religion or faith and its practice that has come to be permeated with patriarchal prejudices. Sometimes, in the name of essential and integral facet of the faith, such practices are zealously propagated. The Reference 5. Having stated so, we will focus on the factual score. The instant writ petition preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution seeks issuance of directions against the Government of Kerala, Devaswom Board of

Henry Ward Beecher, 1813-1887 - Eyes and Ears

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

Travancore, Chief Thanthri of Sabarimala Temple and the District Magistrate of Pathanamthitta to ensure entry of female devotees between the age group of 10 to 50 years to the Lord Ayyappa Temple at Sabarimala (Kerala) which has been denied to them on the basis of certain custom and usage; to declare Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 (for short, “the 1965 Rules”) framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 4 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 (for brevity, “the 1965 Act”) as unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14, 15, 25 and 51A(e) of the Constitution of India and further to pass directions for the safety of women pilgrims. 6. The three-Judge Bench in Indian Young Lawyers Association and others v. State of Kerala and others2, keeping in view the gravity of the issues involved, sought the assistance of Mr. Raju Ramachandran and Mr. K. Ramamoorthy, learned senior counsel as Amicus Curiae. Thereafter, the three-Judge Bench analyzed the decision and the reasons ascribed by the Kerala High Court in S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, Thiruvananthpuram and others 3 wherein similar contentions were raised. The Bench took note of the two affidavits dated 13.11.2007 and 05.02.2016 and the contrary stands taken therein by the Government of Kerala. 7. After recording the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the respondents as well as by the learned Amicus Curiae, the three-Judge Bench considered the questions formulated by the counsel for the parties and, thereafter, framed the following questions for the purpose of reference to the Constitution Bench: “1. Whether the exclusionary practice which is based upon a biological factor exclusive to the female gender amounts to “discrimination” and thereby violates the very core of Articles 14, 15 and 17 and not protected by ‘morality’ as used in Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution? 2. Whether the practice of excluding such women constitutes an “essential religious practice” under Article 25 and whether a religious institution can assert a claim in that regard under the umbrella of right to manage its own affairs in the matters of religion?

3. Whether Ayyappa Temple has a denominational character and, if so, is it permissible on the part of a ‘religious denomination’

(2017) 10 SCC 689 AIR 1993 Kerala 42

managed by a statutory board and financed under Article 290-A of the Constitution of India out of the Consolidated Fund of Kerala and Tamil Nadu to indulge in such practices violating constitutional principles/ morality embedded in Articles 14, 15(3), 39(a) and 51-A(e)?

4. Whether Rule 3 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules permits ‘religious denomination’ to ban entry of women between the age of 10 to 50 years? And if so, would it not play foul of Articles 14 and 15(3) of the Constitution by restricting entry of women on the ground of sex?

5. Whether Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965 is ultra vires the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 and , if treated to be intra vires, whether it will be violative of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution?”

8. Because of the aforesaid reference, the matter has been placed before us.

9. It is also worthy to note here that the Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala, in S. Mahendran (supra), upheld the practice of banning entry of women belonging to the age group of 10 to 50 years in the Sabarimala temple during any time of the year. The High Court posed the following questions: “(1) Whether woman of the age group 10 to 50 can be permitted to enter the Sabarimala temple at any period of the year or during any of the festivals or poojas conducted in the temple.

(2) Whether the denial of entry of that class of woman amounts to discrimination and violative of Articles 15, 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India, and (3) Whether directions can be issued by this Court to the Devaswom Board and the Government of Kerala to restrict the entry of such woman to the temple?”

10. The High Court, after posing the aforesaid questions, observed thus: “40. The deity in Sabarimala temple is in the form of a Yogi or a Bramchari according to the Thanthri of the temple. He stated

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI] that there are Sasta temples at Achankovil, Aryankavu and Kulathupuzha, but the deities there are in different forms. Puthumana Narayanan Namboodiri, a Thanthrimukhya recognised by the Travancore Devaswom Board, while examined as C.W. 1 stated that God in Sabarimala is in the form of aNaisthikBramchari. That, according to him, is the reason why young women are not permitted to offer prayers in the temple. 41. Since the deity is in the form of a Naisthik Brahmachari, it is therefore believed that young women should not offer worship in the temple so that even the slightest deviation from celibacy and austerity observed by the deity is not caused by the presence of such women.”

And again: “… We are therefore of the opinion that the usage of woman of the age group 10 to 50 not being permitted to enter the temple and its precincts had been made applicable throughout the year and there is no reason why they should be permitted to offer worship during specified days when they are not in a position to observe penance for 41 days due to physiological reasons. In short, woman after menarche up to menopause are not entitled to enter the temple and offer prayars there at any time of the year.” 11. Analysing so, the High Court recorded its conclusions which read thus: “(1) The restriction imposed on women aged above 10 and below 50 from trekking the holy hills of Sabarimala and offering worship at Sabarimala Shrine is in accordance with the usage prevalent from time immemorial.

(2) Such restriction imposed by the Devaswom Board is not violative of Articles 15, 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. (3) Such restriction is also not violative of the provisions of Hindu Place of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 since there is no restriction between one section and another section or between one class and another class among the Hindus in the matter of entry to a temple whereas the prohibition is only in respect of women of a particular age group and not women as a class.”

Submissions on behalf of the Petitioners 12. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners have alluded to the geographical location, historical aspect along with the Buddhist connection of the Sabarimala temple and the religious history of Lord Ayyappa. They have, for the purpose of appreciating the functioning of the Sabarimala temple, also taken us through the history of Devaswom in Travancore. As regards the statutory backing of the Devaswom Boards, the petitioners have drawn the attention of this Court to the ‘Travancore - Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950’, Section 4 of the said Act contemplates a Devaswom Board for bringing all incorporated and unincorporated Devaswoms and other Hindu religious institutions except Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple. 13. It has been put forth by them that the aforesaid enactment has been subject to various amendments over a period of time, the last amendment being made in the year 2007 vide Amending Act of 2007 [published under Notification No. 2988/Leg.A1/2007 in K.G. ext. No. 694 dated 12.04.2007] which led to the inclusion of women into the management Board. The petitioners have also referred to Section 29A of the said Act which stipulates that all appointments of officers and employees in the Devaswom Administrative Service of the Board shall be made from a select list of candidates furnished by the Kerala Public Service Commission. It has been submitted by the petitioners that after the 1950 Act, no individual Devaswom Board can act differently both in matters of religion and administration as they have lost their distinct character and Sabarimala no more remained a temple of any religious denomination after the take over of its management. 14. As far as the funding aspect is considered, it is contended that prior to the adoption of the Constitution, both the Travancore and Tamil Nadu Devaswom Boards were funded by the State but after six years of the adoption of the Constitution, the Parliament, in the exercise of its constituent power, inserted Article 290-A vide the 7th Amendment whereby a sum of rupees forty six lakhs and fifty thousand only is allowed to be charged upon the Consolidated Fund of the State of Kerala which is paid to the Travancore Devaswom Board. It has been asseverated by the petitioners that after the insertion of Article 290-A in the Constitution and the consequent State funding, no individual ill-practice could be carried on in any temple associated with the statutory Devaswom Board even in case of Hindu temple as this constitutional amendment has been made

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

on the premise that no ill-practice shall be carried on in any temple which is against the constitutional principles.

15. It is urged that since all Devaswoms are Hindu Temples and they are bound to follow the basic tenets of Hindu religion, individual illpractice of any temple contrary to the basic tenets of Hindu religion is impermissible, after it being taken over by statutory board and state funding in 1971. It is propounded that for the purpose of constituting a ‘religious denomination; not only the practices followed by that denomination should be different but its administration should also be distinct and separate. Thus, even if some practices are distinct in temples attached to statutory board, since its administration is centralized under the Devaswom Board, it cannot attain a distinct identity of a separate religious denomination. 16. It is contended that in legal and constitutional parlance, for the purpose of constituting a religious denomination, there has to be strong bondage among the members of its denomination. Such denomination must be clearly distinct following a particular set of rituals/practices/ usages having their own religious institutions including managing their properties in accordance with law. Further, the petitioners have averred that religious denomination which closely binds its members with certain rituals/practices must also be owning some property with perpetual succession which, as per the petitioners, the Constitution framers kept in mind while framing Article 26 of the Constitution and, accordingly, religious denominations have been conferred four rights under clauses (a) to (d) of Article 26. These rights, it is submitted, are not disjunctive and exclusive in nature but are collectively conferred to establish their identity. To buttress this view, the petitioners have placed reliance on the views of H.M. Seervai4 wherein the learned author has stated that the right to acquire property is implicit in clause (a) as no religious institution could be created without property and similarly, how one could manage its own affairs in matters of religion under clause (b) if there is no religious institution. Thus, for a religious denomination claiming separate and distinct identity, it must own some property requiring constitutional protection.

17. The petitioners have pressed into service the decisions of this Court in Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay5,

Third Edition, Vol. 1, 1983 pg. 931 [1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 496

Raja Bira Kishore Deb v. State of Orissa6, Shastri Yagnapurushadiji and others v. Muldas Bhundardas Vaishya and another7 and S.P. Mittal v. Union of India and others8 wherein the concept of religious denomination was discussed by this Court. It is the stand of the petitioners that some mere difference in practices carried out at Hindu Temples cannot accord to them the status of separate religious denominations. 18. The contention of the petitioners is that Sabarimala Temple is not a separate religious denomination, for the religious parctices performed in Sabarimala Temple at the time of ‘Puja’ and other religious ceremonies are akin to any other practice performed in any Hindu Temple. It does not have its separate administration, but is administered by or through a statutory body constituted under the ‘Travancore - Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950’ and further, as per Section 29(3A) of the said Act, the Devaswom Commissioner is required to submit reports to the government, once in three months, with respect to the working of the Board. 19. They have placed reliance on the decision of this Court in The Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thritha Swaminar of Sri Shirur Mutt9 wherein it was observed thus: “The contention formulated in such broad terms cannot, we think, be supported. In the first place, what constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. If the tenets of any religious sect of the Hindus prescribe that offerings of food should be given to the idol at particular hours of the day, that periodical ceremonies should be performed in a certain way at certain periods of the year or that there should be daily recital of sacred texts or ablations to the sacred fire, all these would be regarded as parts of religion and the mere fact that they involve expenditure of money or employment of priests and servants or the use of marketable commodities would not make them secular activities partaking of a commercial or economic character; all of them are religious practices and should be regarded as matters of religion within the meaning of article 26(b).”

(1964) 7 SCR 32 (1966) 3 SCR 242 : AIR 1966 SC 1119 (1983) 1 SCC 51 [1954] SCR 1005

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

20. As per the petitioners, this Court in Shirur Mutt (supra), while giving freedom under clauses (a) and (b) of Article 26, made it clear that what is protected is only the ‘essential part’ of religion or, in other words, the essence of ‘practice’ practised by a religious denomination and, therefore, the petitioners submit that before any religious practice is examined on the touchstone of constitutional principles, it has to be ascertained positively whether the said practice is, in pith and substance, really the ‘essence’ of the said religion.

21. The petitioners have also cited the judgment in Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali10 wherein Gajendragadkar, J. clarified that clauses (c) and (d) do not create any new right in favour of religious denominations but only safeguard their rights. Similarly, in matters of religious affairs, it is observed that the same is also not sacrosanct as there may be many ill-practices like superstitions which may, in due course of time, become mere accretions to the basic theme of that religious denomination. After so citing, the petitioners have submitted that even if any accretion added for any historical reason has become an essence of the said religious denomination, the same shall not be protected under Article 26(b) if it is so abhorring and is against the basic concept of our Constitution. 22. It is also the case of the petitioners that discrimination in matters of entry to temples is neither a ritual nor a ceremony associated with Hindu religion as this religion does not discriminate against women but, on the contrary, Hindu religion accords to women a higher pedestal in comparison to men and such a discrimination is totally anti-Hindu, for restriction on the entry of women is not the essence of Hindu religion. It has also been submitted by the petitioners that even if Sabarimala temple is taken as a religious denomination, their basic tenets are not confined to taking of oath of celibacy for certain period of pilgrimage as all pilgrims are allowed freely in the temple and there is no such practice of not seeing the sight of women during this period. 23. Further, mere sight of women cannot affect one’s celibacy if one has taken oath of it, otherwise such oath has no meaning and moreover, the devotees do not go to the Sabarimala temple for taking the oath of celibacy but for seeking the blessings of Lord Ayyappa. Maintaining celibacy is only a ritual for some who want to practise it and for which even the temple administration has not given any justification.

(1962) 1 SCR 383

On the contrary, according to the temple administration, since women during menstrual period cannot trek very difficult mountainous terrain in the dense forest and that too for several weeks, this practice of not permitting them has started. 24. It is averred by the petitioners that though no right is absolute, yet entry to temple may be regulated and there cannot be any absolute prohibition or complete exclusionary rule from entry of women to a temple. For substantiating this view, the petitioners have pressed into service the judgment of this Court in Shirur Mutt (supra), the relevant portion of which reads thus: “We agree, however, with the High Court in the view taken by it about section 21. This section empowers the Commissioner and his subordinate officers and also persons authorised by them to enter the premises of any religious institution or place of worship for the purpose of exercising any power conferred, or any duty imposed by or under the Act. It is well known that there could be no such thing as an unregulated and unrestricted right of entry in a public temple or other religious institution, for persons who are not connected with the spiritual functions thereof. It is a traditional custom universally observed not to allow access to any outsider to the particularly sacred parts of a temple as for example, the place where the deity is located. There are also fixed hours of worship and rest for the idol when no disturbance by any member of the public is allowed. Section 21, it is to be noted, does not confine the right of entry to the outer portion of the premises; it does not even exclude the inner sanctuary the Holy of Holies” as it is said, the sanctity of which is `zealously preserved. It does not say that the entry may be made after due notice to the head of the institution and at such hours which would not interfere with the due observance of the rites and ceremonies in the institution. We think that as the section stands, it interferes with the fundamental rights of the Mathadhipati and the denomination of which he is head guaranteed under articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.”

25. The judgment of this Court in Sri Venkatramana Devaru v. State of Mysore and others11 has been cited to submit that a religious denomination cannot completely exclude or prohibit any class or section for all times. All that a religious denomination may do is to restrict the

(1958) SCR 895 : 1958 AIR 55

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

entry of a particular class or section in certain rituals. The relevant portion of Devaru (supra) reads as under:

“We have held that the right of a denomination to wholly exclude members of the public from worshipping in the temple, though comprised in Art. 26(b), must yield to the overriding right declared by Art. 25(2)(b) in favour of the public to enter into a temple for worship. But where the right claimed is not one of general and total exclusion of the public from worship in the temple at all times but of exclusion from certain religious services, they being limited by the rules of the foundation to the members of the denomination, ,then the question is not whether Art. 25(2)(b) over-rides that right so as to extinguish it, but whether it is possible-so to regulate the rights of the persons protected by Art. 25(2)(b) as to give effect to both the rights. If the denominational rights are such that to give effect to them would substantially reduce the right conferred by Art. 25(2)(b), then of course, on our conclusion that Art. 25(2)(b) prevails as against Art. 26(b), the denominational rights must vanish. But where that is not the position, and after giving effect to the rights of the denomination what is left to the public of the right of worship is something substantial and not merely the husk of it, there is no reason why we should not so construe Art. 25(2)(b) as to give effect to Art. 26(b) and recognise the rights of the denomination in respect of matters which are strictly denominational, leaving the rights of the public in other respects unaffected.”

(Emphasis is ours) 26. After referring to Sections 3 and 4 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Act, 1965 and Rule 3 (b) framed thereunder, the petitioners have submitted that the expression ‘at any such time’ occurring in Rule 3(b) does not lead to complete exclusion/prohibition of any woman. In other words, if at such time during which, by any custom or usage, any woman was not allowed, then the said custom or usage shall continue and to substantiate this claim, the petitioners have cited the example that if during late night, by custom or usage, women are not allowed to enter temple, the said custom or usage shall continue, however, it does not permit complete prohibition on entry of women. Further, the petitioners have submitted that any other interpretation of Rule 3(b) would render the said rule open to

challenge as it would not only be violative of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965 but also of Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution read with Articles 14 and 15. Submissions on behalf of Intervenor in I.A No. 10 of 2016

27. It has been submitted on behalf of the intervenor that the exclusionary practice of preventing women between the age of 10 to 50 years based on physiological factors exclusively to be found in female gender violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India, for such a classification does not have a constitutional object. It is also the case of the applicant/intervenor that even if it is said that there is classification between men and women as separate classes, there cannot be any further sub-classification among women on the basis of physiological factors such as menstruation by which women below 10 years and above 50 years are allowed. 28. It has been averred by the applicant/intervenor that as per Article 14, any law being discriminatory in nature has to have the existence of an intelligible differentia and the same must bear a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The object as has been claimed is to prevent the deity from being polluted, which, in the view of the applicant/intervenor, runs counter to the constitutional object of justice, liberty, equality and fraternity as enshrined in the Preamble to our Constitution. That apart, the applicant/intervenor has submitted that though the classification based on menstruation may be intelligible, yet the object sought to be achieved being constitutionally invalid, the question of nexus need not be delved into. 29. Referring to the decision of this Court in Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University and another12, the applicant/intervenor has submitted that the exclusionary practice per se violates the sacrosanct principle of equality of women and equality before law and the burden of proving that it does not so violate is on the respondent no. 2, the Devaswom Board, which the said respondent has not been able to discharge. 30. It has also been asseverated by the applicant/intervenor that the exclusionary practice is manifestly arbitrary in view of the judgment of this Court in Shayara Bano v. Union of India and others13 as it is solely based on physiological factors and, therefore, neither serves any

(1989) 2 SCC 145 (2017) 9 SCC 1

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

valid object nor satisfies the test of reasonable classification under Article 14 of the Constitution.

31. It has also been put forth by the applicant/intervenor that the exclusionary practice per se violates Article 15(1) of the Constitution which amounts to discrimination on the basis of sex as the physiological feature of menstruation is exclusive to females alone. In support of the said submission, the applicant/intervenor has placed reliance upon the judgments of this Court in Anuj Garg and others v. Hotel Association of India and others14 and Charu Khurana and others v. Union of India and others15, to accentuate that gender bias in any form is opposed to constitutional norms. 32. It is also the case of the applicant/intervenor that exclusionary practice has the impact of casting a stigma on women of menstruating age for it considers them polluted and thereby has a huge psychological impact on them which resultantly leads to violation of Article 17 as the expression ‘in any form’ in Article 17 includes untouchability based on social factors and is wide enough to cover menstrual discrimination against women. It has further been submitted by applicant/intervenor that Article 17 applies to both State and non-State actors and has been made operative through a Central legislation in the form of Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955. The judgment of the High Court in S. Mahendran (supra), in the view of the applicant/intervenor, is not in consonance with the provisions of the 1955 Act. 33. Drawing support from the decisions of this Court in National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and others 16 and Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and another v. Union of India and others17, the applicant/intervenor has averred that the exclusionary practice pertaining to women is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution as it impacts the ovulating and menstruating women to have a normal social day to day rendezvous with the society including their family members and, thus, undermines their dignity by violating Article 21 of the Constitution. 34. It has also been submitted that the exclusionary practice violates the rights of Hindu women under Article 25 of the Constitution as they have the right to enter Hindu temples dedicated to the public. As per the

(2008) 3 SCC 1 (2015) 1 SCC 192 (2014) 5 SCC 438 (2017) 10 SCC 1

applicant/intervenor, there is a catena of judgments by this Court wherein the rights of entry into temples of all castes have been upheld on the premise that they are Hindus and similarly, women who assert the right to enter the Sabarimala temple are also Hindus. 35. The applicant/intervenor has referred to Section 4 of the Kerala Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Act, 1965 and Rule 3(b) made under the said section which disentitles certain categories of people from entering any place of public worship and this includes women who, by custom or usage, are not allowed to enter a place of public worship. It has further been submitted by the applicant/intervenor that Rule 3(b) is ultra vires the 1965 Act and is also unconstitutional for it violates Articles 14, 15, 17, 21 and 25 of the Constitution in so far as it prohibits women from entering a public temple. The said Rule 3(b), as per the applicant/intervenor, is not an essential practice protected under Article 26 of the Constitution for it is not a part of religion as the devotees of Lord Ayyappa are just Hindus and they do not constitute a separate religious denomination under Article 26 of the Constitution as they do not have a common faith or a distinct name. To substantiate this view, the applicant/intervenor has drawn the attention of this Court to the judgment in S.P. Mittal (supra). 36. It has been submitted by the applicant/intervenor that even if we assume that Sabarimala is a religious denomination, the exclusion of women is not an essential practice as it does not satisfy the test of essential practice as has been laid down by this Court in Commissioner of Police and others v Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and another 18. 37. Referring to the judgment of this Court in Devaru (supra), the applicant/intervenor has submitted that the right to manage its own affairs conferred upon a religious denomination under Article 26(b) is subject to be rights guaranteed to Hindu women under Article 25(2)(b). As per the applicant/intervenor, a harmonious construction of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution reveals that neither Article 26 enables the State to make a law excluding any women from the right to worship in any public temple nor does it protect any custom that discriminates against women and, thus, such exclusion amounts to destruction of the rights of women to practise religion guaranteed under Article 25.

(2004) 12 SCC 770

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

38. The applicant/intervenor has also drawn the attention of this Court to the Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the fact that India is a party to this Convention for emphasizing that it is the obligation of the State to eradicate taboos relating to menstruation based on customs or traditions and further the State should refrain from invoking the plea of custom or tradition to avoid their obligation. The judgment of this Court in Vishaka and others v. State of Rajasthan and others19 has been cited to submit that international conventions must be followed when there is a void in the domestic law or when there is any inconsistency in the norms for construing the domestic law.

Submissions on behalf of Intervenor in I.A No. 34/2017 39. The intervenor, All India Democratic Women’s Association, has filed I.A No. 34/2017 wherein it has submitted that the meaning of the Constitution cannot be frozen and it must continuously evolve with the changing times. Further, the applicant submits that merely because Article 26 does not specify that it is subject to Part III or Article 25 of the Constitution, it cannot be said that it is insulated against Part III and especially Articles 14, 15 19, 21 and 25 of the Constitution. To emphasize the same, the applicant/intervenor has relied upon the observations made in Devaru case where the Court has stated that the rule of construction is well settled that when there are two provisions in an enactment which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect could be given to both. The Court observed that applying this rule of harmonious construction, if the contention of the appellants is to be accepted, then Art. 25(2)(b) will become wholly nugatory in its application to denominational temples, though, as stated above, the language of that Article includes them. The Court further observed that if the contention of the respondents is accepted, then full effect can be given to Article 26(b) in all matters of religion, subject only to this that as regards one aspect of them, entry into a temple for worship, the rights declared under Article 25(2)(b) will prevail and therefore while, in the former case, Article 25(2)(b) will be put wholly out of operation, in the latter, effect can be given to both that provision and Article 26(b) and, hence, it must be accordingly held that Article 26(b) must be read subject to Article 25(2)(b).

(1997) 6 SCC 241

Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 1 40. The State of Kerala, the first respondent herein, as indicated earlier, had taken contrary stands at different times. An affidavit was filed on 13.11.2007 which indicated that the Government was not in favour of discrimination towards any woman or any section of the society. The said stand was changed in the affidavit dated 5.2.2016 taking the stand that the earlier affidavit was contrary to the judgment of the Kerala High Court. On 7.11.2016 on a query being made by the Court, the learned counsel for the State submitted that it wanted to place reliance on the original affidavit dated 13.11.2007. It is contended by Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing for the State of Kerala, that the 1965 Act and the Rules framed thereunder are in consonance with Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution. Reference has been made to Section 3 of the Act, for the said provision deals with places of public worship to be open to Hindus generally or any section or class thereof. The concept of prohibition is not conceived of. It is urged by Mr. Gupta that there is no restriction in view of the legislation in the field. In essence, the stand of the State is that it does not conceive of any discrimination as regards the entry of women into the temple where male devotees can enter. Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 2

41. The respondent no. 2 has submitted that Sabarimala is a temple of great antiquity dedicated to Lord Ayyappa who the petitioner avers to be a deity depicting “a hyper masculine God born out of the union of two male Gods Shiva and Mohini, where Mohini is Vishnu in a female form.” 42. Thereafter, the respondent no. 2 reiterated the submissions of the respondent no. 4 pertaining to the observance of 41 days ‘Vruthum’ and the fact that the Sabarimala Temple is supposed to depict ‘Naishtika Brahmacharya’. In addition to this, the respondent no. 2 has also referred to a Ph.D thesis by Radhika Sekar in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario in October 1987 titled “The Process of Pilgrimage : The Ayyappa Cultus and Sabarimala Yatra” which has established the very raison d’etre for the existence of the denominational Temple of Sabarimala based upon deep penance, celibacy and abstinence by all visitors, male and female. The respondent no. 2 has also drawn the attention of the Court to the fact that the Sabarimala temple is open only during specific defined periods, that is, on the Malayalam month viz. 17th November to 26th December, for the

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

first five days of each Malayalam month which starts approximately in the middle of each English calendar month and also during the period of Makar Sankranti, viz. approximately from January 1 to mid-January of each year.

Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 4 43. At the outset, the respondent no. 4 has drawn the attention of the Court to the history of Kerala in general and Sabarimala in particular and has highlighted the existence of stone inscriptions which state that the priest Kantaru Prabhakaru had made an idol consecration at Sabarimala years back and after the rampage of fire at Sabarimala, it was Kantaru Shankaru who consecrated the existing idol in Sabarimala. The respondent no. 4 has submitted that the Thantri is the vedic head priest of Hindu temples in Kerala and the popularity of any temple depends to a great extent on the Thantri and Santhikkaran (Archaka) who must be able to induce a spiritual reverence among worshippers and explain the significance of the Mantras they recite and poojas they perform. 44. The respondent no. 4 has averred that the custom and usage of young women (aged between 10 to 50 years) not being allowed to enter the Sabarimala temple has its traces in the basic tenets of the establishment of the temple, the deification of Lord Ayyappa and His worship. As per the respondent no. 4, Ayyappa had explained the manner in which the Sabarimala pilgrimage was to be undertaken emphasizing the importance of ‘Vrutham’ which are special observances that need to be followed in order to achieve spiritual refinement, and that as a part of the ‘Vruthum’, the person going on pilgrimage separates himself from all family ties for 41 days and during the said period either the woman leaves the house or the man resides elsewhere in order to separate himself from all family ties. Thereafter, the respondent no. 4 has pointed out that the problem with women is that they cannot complete the 41 days Vruthum as their periods would eventually fall within the said period and it is a custom among all Hindus that women do not go to temples or participate in religious activities during periods and the same is substantiated by the statement of the basic Thantric text of temple worshipping in Kerala Thantra Samuchayam, Chapter 10, Verse II.

45. The respondent no. 4 has emphasized that the observance of 41 days Vruthum is a condition precedent for the pilgrimage which has been an age old custom and anyone who cannot fulfill the said Vruthum

cannot enter the temple and, hence, women who have not attained puberty and those who are in menopause alone can undertake the pilgrimage at Sabarimala. The respondent no. 4 has also averred that the said condition of observance of 41days Vruthum is not applicable to women alone and even men who cannot observe the 41 days Vruthum due to births and deaths in the family, which results in breaking of Vruthum, are also not allowed to take the pilgrimage that year. 46. The respondent no. 4 has also drawn the attention of the Court to the fact that religious customs as well as the traditional science of Ayurveda consider menstrual period as an occasion for rest for women and a period of uncleanliness of the body and during this period, women are affected by several discomforts and, hence, observance of intense spiritual discipline for 41 days is not possible. The respondent no. 4 has also contented that it is for the sake of pilgrims who practise celibacy that young women are not allowed in the Sabarimala pilgrimage. 47. The respondent no. 4, thereafter, contends that the prohibition is not a social discrimination but is only a part of the essential spiritual discipline related to this particular pilgrimage and is clearly intended to keep the mind of the pilgrims away from the distraction related to sex as the dominant objective of the pilgrimage is the creation of circumstances in all respects for the successful practice of spiritual self-discipline. 48. The respondent no. 4 has also averred that for climbing the 18 holy steps, one has to carry the irumudikettu (the sacred package of offerings) and for making the pilgrimage really meaningful, austerities for a period of 41 days have to be observed and, hence, for a meaningful pilgrimage, it is always prudent if women of the forbidden age group hold themselves back. 49. The respondent no. 4 further submits that ‘devaprasanam’ is a ritual performed for answering questions pertaining to religious practices when the Thantris are also unable to take decisions and that ‘devaprasanams’ conducted in the past also reveal that the deity does not want young women to enter the precincts of the temple. As per the respondent no. 4, the philosophy involved in evolving a particular aspect of power in a temple is well reflected in the following mantra chanting during the infusion of divine power: “O the Supreme Lord! It is well known that You pervade everything and everywhere’ yet I am invoking You in this

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI] bimbhamvery much like a fan that gathers and activates the allpervading air at a particular spot. At the fire latent in wood expresses itself through friction, O Lord be specially active in this bimbhamas a result of sacred act.” 50. The respondent no. 4 is of the view that it is the particular characteristic of the field of power, its maintenance and impact which the ‘Devaprasanam’ deals with and ‘Devaprasanam’ confirms that the practice of women of particular age group not participating in the temple should be maintained. 51. To bolster his stand, the respondent no. 4 has also placed reliance upon the decision of the Kerala High Court in S. Mahendran (supra) wherein the then Thantri Shri Neelakandaru had deposed as C.W 6 and he stated that the present idol was installed by his paternal uncle Kantaru Shankaru and he confirmed that women of age group 10 to 50 years were not allowed to enter the temple even before 1950s. The said witness also deposed that his paternal uncle had instructed him and the temple officials to follow the old customs and usages. 52. The respondent no. 4 has also drawn the attention of the Court to the opinion of this Court in Seshammal and others v. State of Tamil Nadu20, wherein it was observed that on the consecration of the image in the temple, the Hindu worshippers believe that the divine spirit has descended into the image and from then on, the image of the deity is fit to be worshipped and the rules with regard to daily and periodical worship have been laid down for securing the continuance of the divine spirit and as per the Agamas, an image becomes defiled if there is any departure or violation of any of the rules relating to worship.

53. The respondent no. 4 has also submitted that the deity at Sabarimala in the form of ‘Naishtik Brahmachari’ and that is also a reason why young women are not allowed inside the temple so as to prevent even the slightest deviation from celibacy and austerity observed by the deity.

Submissions on behalf of Intervenor in I.A Nos. 12 and 13

54. Another applicant/intervenor has filed I.A Nos. 12 and 13 and his main submission is that this Court may remove the restriction which bars women between the age group of 10 to 50 years from entering the

(1972) 2 SCC 11

Sabarimala temple for all days barring the period between 16th November to 14th January (60 days) as during the said period, Lord Ayyappa sits in the Sabarimala temple and Lord Ayyappa visits other temples all across the country during the remaining days. The applicant/intervenor further highlights that during the said period, the pilgrims coming to the temple must strictly follow the rituals which includes taking a 41 days Vruthum and one of the rituals pertains to not touching the ladies including daughters and wives as well. The applicant/intervenor has further submitted that if the restriction under Section 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965 is allowed to operate only for the said period of 60 days, it would not amount to any violation of Articles 14, 15 and 17 of the Constitution and it would also be well within the ambit of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Rejoinder Submissions on behalf of the Petitioners

55. In reply to the contention of the respondent no. 2-Devaswom Board that the writ jurisdiction does not lie in the present matter, the petitioners submit that the validity of Section 3(b) could not have been challenged in suit proceedings as the present writ petition has been filed against the State authorities and the Chief Thantri who has been impleaded as the respondent no. 4 is appointed by a Statutory Board; and since now ‘custom and usage’ fall under the ambit of Article 13, they have become subject to the constitutional provisions contained in Part III whose violation can only be challenged in writ jurisdiction. 56. Thereafter, the petitioners have submitted that the respondent no. 2 has merely pressed the theory of intelligible differentia to justify encircling of women of prohibited age without elaborating the object sought to be achieved and whether the differentia even has any nexus with the object and the object of preventing deflecting of the idol from the stage of celibacy cannot be achieved from the present classification. 57. Further, the petitioners have submitted that the respondent no. 2 has wrongly stated that the Sabarimala temple is a religious denomination, for any temple under a statutory board like a Devaswom Board and financed out of the Consolidated Fund of Kerala and whose employees are employed by the Kerala Service Commission cannot claim to be an independent ‘religious denomination’. 58. Besides, the petitioners have contended that several ill-practices in existence and falling within the ambit of religion as cited by the

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

respondent no. 2 may not be acceptable today and the said practices have not come up before this Court and should not be taken cognizance of. Further, it is the view of the petitioners that the said practices cannot be held to be the essence of religion as they had evolved out of convenience and, in due course of time, have become crude accretions. To prove its point, the petitioners have cited the examples of the practices of dowry and restriction of women from entering mosques which, although had come into existence due to certain factors existing at the relevant time, no longer apply.

59. Thereafter, the petitioners have contended that if Sabarimala does not come in the category of religious denomination, then it cannot claim the right under Article 26 and it would come within the purview of Article 12 making it subject to Articles 14 and 15 and, hence, the State would be restrained from denying equal protection of law and cannot discriminate on the basis of sex. Even if it is concluded that Sabarimala is a religious denomination, then as per the Devaru case, there has to be a harmonious construction between Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution and, thus, to completely deny women of the age group of 10 to 50 years from entering the temple would be impermissible as per the Devaru case. Finally, the petitioners have submitted that in legal and constitutional parlance, after coming into effect of the Constitution of India, ‘dignity of women’ under Article 51A(e) is an essential ingredient of constitutional morality.

Rejoinder Submissions on behalf of Intervenor in I.A No. 60. The applicant/intervenor has submitted that the law relating to entry into temple for darshan is separate and distinct from the law relating to management of religious affairs. The former is governed by Article 25 and the latter is governed by Article 26. Further, the applicant/ intervenor has pointed out that even those institutions which are held to be denominations and claim protection under Article 26 cannot deny entry to any person for the purpose of darshan and the ex facie denial of women between the age group of 10 to 50 years violates Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 of the Constitution.

61. Thereafter, the applicant/intervenor has averred that the question whether Sabarimala is a denomination or not is irrelevant for

the reason that even if it is concluded that Sabarimala is a denomination, it can claim protection of only essential practices under Article 26(b) and denial of entry to women between the age of 10 to 50 years cannot be said to be an essential aspect of the Hindu religion. Further, the applicant/intervenor has also averred that Sabarimala does not satisfy the test of religious denomination as laid down in S.P. Mittal (supra). 62. The applicant/intervenor has also submitted that the respondents, by referring to the practice as a custom with aberrations, have themselves suggested that there has been no continuity in the applicability of the said custom and that it has also been established in the evidence before the High Court that women irrespective of their age were permitted to enter the Sabarimala for the first rice feeding ceremony of their children and it is only since the last 60 years after the passing of the Notification in 1955 that women between the age of 10 to 50 years were prohibited from entering the temple. The applicant/intervenor has also pointed out that even if the said practice is considered to be a custom, it has to still pass the test of constitutional morality and constitutional legitimacy and the applicant/intervenor has relied upon the decision of this Court in Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam and others v. Government of Tamil Nadu and others 21 wherein it was observed: “48. Seshammal vs State of T.N., (1972) 2 SCC 11] is not an authority for any proposition as to what an Agama or a set of Agamas governing a particular or group of temples lay down with regard to the question that confronts the court, namely, whether any particular denomination of worshippers or believers have an exclusive right to be appointed as Archakas to perform the poojas. Much less, has the judgment taken note of the particular class or caste to which the Archakas of a temple must belong asprescribed by the Agamas. All that it does and says is that some of the Agamas do incorporate a fundamental religious belief of the necessity of performance of the poojas by Archakas belonging to a particular and distinct sect/group/denomination, failing which, there will be defilement of deity requiring purification ceremonies. Surely, if the Agamas in question do not proscribe any group of citizens from being appointed as Archakas on the basis of caste or class the sanctity of Article 17 or any other provision of Part III of the Constitution or even theProtection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 will

(2016) 2 SCC 725

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI] not be violated. What has been said in Seshammal [Seshammal v. State of T.N., (1972) 2 SCC 11] (supra) is that if any prescription with regard to appointment of Archakas is made by the Agamas, Section 28 of the Tamil Nadu Act mandates the trustee to conduct the temple affairs in accordance with such custom or usage. The requirement of constitutional conformity is inbuilt and if a custom or usage is outside the protective umbrella afforded and envisaged by Articles 25 and 26, the law would certainly take its own course. The constitutional legitimacy, naturally, must supersede all religious beliefs or practices.” 63. In reply to the contention of the respondents that the basis for exclusion of women is that women cannot observe the 41 days Vruthum and also on the ground that Ayyappa is a celibate God, the applicant/ intervenor has submitted that the meaning of celibacy is the abstinence from sex and the respondents by suggesting that women cannot practice Vruthum which requires abstinence from sex are stigmatizing women and stereotyping them as being weak and lesser human beings than men. Hence, the classification, in view of the applicant/intervenor, is not based on intelligible differentia. 64. The applicant/intervenor has also submitted that menstruating women and untouchables are being treated as similar in terms of entry to temple and, hence, the custom in dispute amounts to ‘untouchability’. 65. The applicant/intervenor has, thereafter, drawn the attention of the Court to the fact that although the respondents aver that they do not intend to discriminate on the basis of gender, yet the Court has to test the violation of the fundamental rights not on the basis of intention but the impact of the impugned action. The applicant/intervenor has stated that the respondents have wrongly placed reliance upon the decision in T.M.A. Pai Foundation and others v. State of Karnataka and others 22 as in the present case, the issue is not one pertaining to the rights of minorities but concerning the unconstitutional acts of the majority. 66. The applicant/intervenor has also submitted that the age-old practice of considering women as impure while they are menstruating amounts to untouchability and stigmatizes them as lesser human beings and is, therefore, violative of Articles14, 15, 17 and 21 of the Constitution.

(1995) 5 SCC 220

Submissions of learned Amicus Curiae, Sr. Advocate Mr. Raju Ramchandran, assisted by Mr. K. Parameshwar 67. It is submitted on the behalf of learned Senior Advocate Mr. Raju Ramchandran, that the Sabarimala Sree Dharma Sastha Temple, Kerala is a public temple being used as a place of worship where members of the public are admitted as a matter of right and entry thereto is not restricted to any particular denomination or part thereof. As per the learned Amicus, the public character of the temple gives birth to the right of the devotees to enter it for the purpose of darshan or worship and this universal right to entry is not a permissive right dependent upon the temple authorities but a legal right in the true sense of the expression. To advance this view, the learned Amicus has relied upon the decisions of this Court in Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar and others23 and Sri Radhakanta Deb and another v. Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa24. 68. As regards the nature of the right claimed by the petitioners herein, learned Senior Advocate, Mr. Raju Ramchandran, the learned Amicus, has submitted that it is the freedom of conscience and the right to practise and profess their religion which is recognized under Article 25 of the Constitution of India. This right, as per the learned Amicus, encompasses the liberty of belief, faith and worship, pithily declared as a constitutional vision in the Preamble to the Constitution of India. 69. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Raju Ramchandran, the learned Amicus, submits that the right of a woman to visit and enter a temple as a devotee of the deity and as a believer in Hindu faith is an essential aspect of her right to worship without which her right to worship is significantly denuded. Article 25 pertinently declares that all persons are ‘equally’ entitled to freely practise religion. This, in view of the learned Amicus, implies not just inter-faith but intra-faith parity. Therefore, the primary right under Article 25(1) is a non-discriminatory right and is, thus, available to men and women professing the same faith. 70. Further, it has been put forth that the constitutional intent in keeping the understanding of untouchability in Article 17 open-textured was to abolish all practices based on the notion of purity and pollution. This Article proscribes untouchability ‘in any form’ as prohibited and the

AIR 1957 SC 133 (1981) 2 SCC 226

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

exclusion of menstruating women from religious spaces and practices is no less a form of discrimination than the exclusion of oppressed castes. After referring to Section 7(c) of the Civil Rights Act, 1955, which criminalizes the encouragement and incitement to practise untouchability in ‘any form whatsoever’ and the Explanation II appended to the said Section, the learned Amicus has submitted that untouchability cannot be understood in a pedantic sense but must be understood in the context of the Civil Rights Act to include any exclusion based on the notions of purity and pollution.

71. It is also the view of the learned Amicus that the phrase ‘equally entitled to’ in Article 25(1) finds resonance in Section 3(a) of the Civil Rights Act, 1955 which criminalizes exclusion of people to those places which are “open to other persons professing the same religion or any section thereof, as such person” and prevention of worship “in the same manner and to the same extent as is permissible to other persons professing the same religion or any section thereof, as such persons”. That apart, the learned Amicus has drawn our attention to Section 2(d) of the 1955 Act which defines ‘place of public worship’ to mean, inter alia, ‘by whatever name belonging to any religious denomination or any section thereof, for the performance of any religious service’ and, therefore, the Amicus submits that a temple is a public temple and irrespective of its denominational character, it cannot prevent the entry of any devotee aspiring to enter and worship. 72. After placing reliance on the decision of this Court in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), the Amicus has submitted that the exclusionary practice in its implementation results in involuntary disclosure by women of both their menstrual status and age which amounts to forced disclosure that consequently violates the right to dignity and privacy embedded in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 73. It has also been submitted by the Amicus Curiae that Article 25(2)(b) is not a mere enabling provision but is a substantive right as it creates an exception for laws providing for social reform or throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus and thereby embodies the constitutional intent of abhorring exclusionary practices. Further, referring to the judgment of this Court in Devaru (supra), the learned Amicus has submitted that Article 25(2)(b) does not merely seek to prevent exclusionary practices on the basis of caste only, for the rights under Part III of the Constitution

must be given a broad meaning and any exception must be given a narrow construction. 74. Further, it has been submitted by the learned Amicus that the exclusionary practice in the present case cannot be justified either on the grounds of health, public order or morality for the term ‘morality’ used in Article 25 or 26 is not an individualized or sectionalized sense of morality subject to varying practices and ideals of every religion but it is the morality informed by the constitutional vision. The judgments of this Court in Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam (supra), Manoj Narula v. Union of India25 and National Legal Services Authority (supra) have been pressed into service by the Amicus to accentuate that any subjective reading of the term ‘morality’ in the context of Article 25 would make the liberty of faith and worship otiose and the exclusion of women as in the present case is a matter of institutional practice and not morality. 75. The Amicus has also cited the judgments of this Court in Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta (supra) to submit that in order to claim protection of the doctrine of essential religious practices, the practice to exclude women from entry to the Sabarimala temple must be shown by the respondents to be so fundamental to the religious belief without which the religion will not survive. On the contrary, no scriptural evidence has been led by the respondents herein to demonstrate that the exclusion of women is an essential part of their religion. 76. After referring to Section 3 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Act, 1965 which makes a place of worship open to all sections and classes, Mr. Raju Ramchandran, learned senior counsel, is of the view that the said Section is nothing but a statutory enunciation of rights embodied under Article 25(2)(b) and similarly, the emphasis on the word ‘like’ in Section 3 is the statutory reflection of the phrase ‘equally’ found in Article 25(1). That apart, it is the case of the learned Amicus curiae that the expression ‘section’ or ‘class’ in Section 2(c) of the 1965 Act must necessarily include all sexes if Section 3 is to be in consonance with a woman’s right to worship under Article 25 and in consonance with Article 15. As per the learned Amicus, women between the age of 10 to 50 years are a section or class of Hindus who are within the inclusive provision of Section 3 and the proviso to Section 3 brings in the right conferred in Article 26, for the

(2014) 9 SCC 1

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

inter-play between Section 3 and the proviso must be governed by how Articles 25(2)(b) and 26 are reconciled by the judgment of this Court in Devaru (supra).

77. It have been asseverated by Mr. Raju Ramchandran, learned senior counsel, that Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965 is ultra vires Sections 3 and 4 of the 1965 Act, for the reason that it protects ‘custom and usage’ which may prohibit entry when Section 3 expressly overrides custom and usage. The said rule, in view of the learned Amicus, discriminates against women when Section 4 makes it clear that rules made under it cannot be discriminatory against any section or class. It is submitted that the power entrusted under the 1965 Act to make rules, inter alia, for due observance of religious rights and ceremonies is for the furtherance of a devotee’s right to worship under Article 25, whereas to the contrary, Rule 3(b), by saving ‘custom and usage’, militates against the very purpose of the 1965 Act which is to protect the right to worship guaranteed under Article 25. 78. It has also been pointed out that there is another Rule, similar to Rule 3(b), in the form of Rule 6(c) framed under the 1950 Act, which was relied upon by the High Court and this Rule 6(c) has not been assailed by the petitioners in the present writ petition, but in view of the learned Amicus, this Rule 6(c) would also be unconstitutional for the same reason that Rule 3(b) is unconstitutional. 79. The burden to prove that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa form a denomination within the meaning of Article 26, as per the learned Amicus, is on the respondents, which they have failed to discharge as none of the three tests for determination of denominational status, i.e., (i) common faith, (ii) common organization and (iii) designation by a distinctive name, have been established by the respondents. Further, the Amicus has submitted that the decision of the Kerala High Court in S. Mahendran (supra) does not indicate finding of a denominational status. 80. It is also submitted by the learned Amicus that Devaswom Board in its counter affidavit before the Kerala High Court in S. Mahendran (supra), had asserted, as is reflected vide para 7 of the judgment, that there was no such prohibition against women entering the temple and that there was no evidence to suggest any binding religious practice and, likewise, the High Court, in its judgment vide para 34, found

the exclusionary practice as just a usage and not a religious custom or essential religious practice. 81. The learned Amicus also averred that even if we are to assume that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa constitute a separate denomination, the rights conferred under Article 26 being subject to the constitutional standard of morality, exclusion of women from entry would violate this standard of morality for a denomination’s right to manage its affairs in matters of religion under Article 26(b) is subject to Article 25(2)(b) as has been succinctly explained by this Court in Devaru (supra) by observing thus: “And lastly, it is argued that whereas Article 25 deals with the rights of individuals, Article 26 protects the rights of denominations, and that as what the appellants claim is the right of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins to exclude those who do not belong to that denomination, that would remain unaffected by Article 25(2)(b). This contention ignores the true nature of the right conferred by Article 25(2)(b). That is a right conferred on “all classes and sections of Hindus” to enter into a public temple, and on the unqualified terms of that Article, that right must be available, whether it is sought to be exercised against an individual under Article 25(1) or against a denomination under Article 26(b). The fact is that though Article 25(1) deals with rights of individuals, Art. 25(2) is much wider in its contents and has reference to the rights of communities, and controls both Article 25(1) and Article 26(b).” Submissions of learned Amicus Curiae, Senior Advocate Mr. K. Ramamoorthy 82. It has been asseverated by learned Senior Advocate Mr. K. Ramamoorthy, learned Amicus curiae, that in all prominent Hindu temples in India, there had been some religious practices based on religious beliefs, which are essential part of the Hindu religion as considered by people for a long time. It has been submitted that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa could also be brought within the ambit of religious denomination who have been following the impugned religious practice which has been essential part of religion. 83. Mr. K. Ramamoorthy, learned senior counsel, has submitted that the petitioners herein have not disputed that the impugned religious

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

practice in Sabarimala temple is not a religious practice based on religious belief for several centuries, rather the petitioners have only argued that such a practice is violative of Article 25 of the Constitution. It is also submitted by Mr. K. Ramamoorthy that in any of the judgments cited by the petitioners, the question never arose as to what the religious practice on the basis of religious belief is and, accordingly, the question as to whether religious practices based on religious beliefs in all prominent temples in India are violative of Articles14, 15, 17, 21 and 25 of the Constitution is to be considered herein.

84. It has been put forth by Mr. K. Ramamoorthy that the protection of Articles 25 and 26 are not limited to the matters of doctrine or belief, rather they extend to acts done in pursuance of religion and, therefore, contain a guarantee for rituals, observations, ceremonies and modes of worship which are integral parts of religion. It has been submitted that what constitutes an essential part of a religious practice is to be decided with reference to the practices which are regarded by a large section of the community for several centuries and, therefore, would have to be treated as a part of the religion. 85. It has also been averred that Ayyappa temple by itself is a denomination as contemplated under Article 26 having regard to the nature of worship and the practices followed by the temple and similarly, the devotees of Ayyappa temple would also constitute a denomination who have accepted the impugned religious practice based on religious belief which has been in vogue for several centuries unbroken and accepted by all sections of Hindus. 86. It has been submitted that it is too late in the day to contend that religious practice based on religious faith, adhered to and followed by millions of Hindus for so long in consonance with the natural rights of men and women is violative of fundamental rights. It is also the case of the Amicus Mr. K. Ramamoorthy that to project such a religious practice as being contrary to natural law is a shock to the judgment of the community, as calling such a religious practice contrary to fundamental rights amounts to offending the common sense and wisdom of our ancestors in faithfully following the command of the divine. Further, no group or individual can force other Hindus to follow their view in the domain of religious faith. 87. As regards the challenge raised by the petitioners against Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of

Entry) Rules, 1965, it is asseverated by Mr. K. Ramamoorthy that the question which arises is whether the State Government, with reference to such a religious practice, could make a rule so that the general public would know the denominational character of the temple and the religious practice followed by the temple.

Followers of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a religious denomination

88. Article 26 of the Constitution of India guarantees to every religious denomination the right (a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law. However, these rights are subject to public order, morality and health. 89. The important question that emerges is as to what constitutes a religious denomination. The said question has been the subject matter of several decisions of this Court beginning from Shirur Mutt (supra) wherein the Court observed thus: “As regards Article 26, the first question is, what is the precise meaning or connotation of the expression “religious denomination” and whether a Math could come within this expression. The word “denomination” has been defined in the Oxford Dictionary to mean ‘a collection of individuals classed together under the same name: a religious sect or body having a common faith and Organisation and designated by a distinctive name. It is well known that the practice of setting up Maths as centres of the logical teaching was started by Shri Sankaracharya and was followed by various teachers since then. After Sankara, came a galaxy of religious teachers and philosophers who founded the different sects and sub-sects of the Hindu religion that we find in India at the present day. Each one of such sects or sub-sects can certainly be balled a religious denomination, as it is designated by a distinctive name, in many cases it is the name of the founder, -and has a common faith and common spiritual organization. The followers of Ramanuja, who are known by the name of Shri Vaishnabas, undoubtedly constitute a religious denomination; and so do the followers of Madhwacharya and other religious teachers. It is a fact well established by tradition that the eight UdipiMaths were

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI] founded by Madhwacharya himself and the trustees and the beneficiaries of these Maths profess to be followers of that teacher. The High Court has found that the Math in question is in charge of the Sivalli Brahmins who constitute a section of the followers of Madhwacharya. As article 26 contemplates not merely a religious denomination but also a section thereof, the Math or the spiritual fraternity represented by it can legitimately come within the purview of this article.” 90. In S.P. Mittal (supra), the challenge was with regard to the validity of the Auroville (Emergency) Provisions Act, 1980 as being violative of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Sri Aurobindo postulated the philosophy of cosmic salvation and along with the disciples found the Aurobindo Society for preaching and propagating the teachings of Sri Aurobindo and The Mother through its centres in India as well as abroad. After the death of Sri Aurobindo, the Mother proposed an international cultural township, Auroville, in the then Pondicherry. The society received funds as grants from the Central Government, State Government and other organizations in India as well as from outside India for development of the township at Auroville. Upon the death of the Mother, the Government started receiving complaints about the mismanagement of the society and, accordingly, enacted the Auroville (Emergency) Provisions Act, 1980. The Supreme Court, by a majority of 4:1, ruled that neither the society nor the township of Auroville constituted a religious denomination, for the teachings and utterances of Sri Aurobindo did not constitute a religion and, therefore, taking over of the Auroville by the Government did not infringe the society’s right under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. 91. The Court referred, inter alia, to the MoA of the society along with Rule 9 of the Rules and Regulations of Sri Aurobindo Society which dealt with membership and read thus: “9. Any person or institution for organisation either in India or abroad who subscribes to the aims and objects of the Society, and whose application for membership is approved by the Executive Committee, will be member of the Society. The membership is open to people everywhere without any distinction of nationality, religion, caste, creed or sex.”

After so referring, the Court opined thus: “The only condition for membership is that the person seeking the membership of the Society must subscribe to the aims and objects of the Society. It was further urged that what is universal cannot be a religious denomination. In order to constitute a separate denomination, there must be something distinct from another. A denomination, argues the counsel, is one which is different from the other and if the Society was a religious denomination, then the person seeking admission to the institution would lose his previous religion. He cannot be a member of two religions at one and the same time. But this is not the position in becoming a member of the Society and Auroville. A religious denomination must necessarily be a new one and new methodology must be provided for a religion. Substantially, the view taken by Sri Aurobindo remains a part of the Hindu philosophy. There may be certain innovations in his philosophy but that would not make it a religion on that account.”

92. The Court in S.P Mittal (supra) reiterated and concurred with the definition of ‘religious denomination’ which was also accepted in Shirur Mutt (supra) and observed as under: “The words ‘religious denomination’ in Article 26 of the Constitution must take their colour from the word ‘religion’ and if this be so, the expression ‘religious denomination’ must also satisfy three conditions:

(1) It must be a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs or doctrines which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, that is, a common faith;

(2) common organisation, and (3) designation by a distinctive name.”

93. In the case of Nallor Marthandam Vellalar and others v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment and others26, the question that arose before the Court was whether the temple at Nellor owned by the Vellala Community of Marthandam constituted a ‘religious denomination’ within the meaning of Article 26 of the Constitution. It was argued in this case that the Vellala Community observed special religious practices and beliefs which are integral part

(2003) 10 SCC 712

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

of their religion and that the front mandappam of the sanctorium is open to access only to the members of their community and no one else and outsiders can offer worship from the outer compound. The Court held that the temple at Nellor owned by the Vellala Community of Marthandam did not constitute a religious denomination as there was no evidence to prove that the members of the Vellala Community had common religious tenets peculiar to themselves other than those which are common to the entire Hindu community and further, the Court, following the principle laid down in S.P. Mittal (supra), observed:

“It is settled position in law, having regard to the various decisions of this Court that the words “religious denomination” take their colour from the word `religion’. The expression “religious denomination” must satisfy three requirements – (1) it must be collection of individuals who have a system of belief or doctrine which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, i.e., a common faith; (2) a common organisation; and (3) designation of a distinctive name. It necessarily follows that the common faith of the community should be based on religion and in that they should have common religious tenets and the basic cord which connects them, should be religion and not merely considerations of caste or community or societal status.” 94. As is decipherable form the above decisions of this Court, for any religious mutt, sect, body, sub-sect or any section thereof to be designated as a religious denomination, it must be a collection of individuals having a collective common faith, a common organization which adheres to the said common faith, and last but not the least, the said collection of individuals must be labeled, branded and identified by a distinct name. 95. Though, the respondents have urged that the pilgrims coming to visit the Sabarimala temple being devotees of Lord Ayyappa are addressed as Ayyappans and, therefore, the third condition for a religious denomination stands satisfied, is unacceptable. There is no identified group called Ayyappans. Every Hindu devotee can go to the temple. We have also been apprised that there are other temples for Lord Ayyappa and there is no such prohibition. Therefore, there is no identified sect. Accordingly, we hold, without any hesitation, that Sabarimala temple is a public religious endowment and there are no exclusive identified followers of the cult.

96. Coming to the first and the most important condition for a religious denomination, i.e., the collection of individuals ought to have a system of beliefs or doctrines which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, there is nothing on record to show that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa have any common religious tenets peculiar to themselves, which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, other than those which are common to the Hindu religion. Therefore, the devotees of Lord Ayyappa are just Hindus and do not constitute a separate religious denomination. For a religious denomination, there must be new methodology provided for a religion. Mere observance of certain practices, even though from a long time, does not make it a distinct religion on that account. Enforceability of Fundamental Rights under Article 25(1) against the Travancore Devaswom Board

97. Having stated that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a religious denomination within the meaning of Article 26 and that Sabarimala Temple is a public temple by virtue of the fact that Section 15 of the 1950 Act vests all powers of direction, control and supervision over it in the Travancore Devaswom Board which, in our foregoing analysis, has been unveiled as ‘other authority’ within the meaning of Article 12, resultantly fundamental rights including those guaranteed under Article 25(1) are enforceable against the Travancore Devaswom Board and other incorporated Devaswoms including the Sabarimala Temple. We have also discussed the secular character of the Indian Constitution as well as the broad meaning assigned to the term religion occurring in various Articles of the Constitution including Article 25(1).

98. Now adverting to the rights guaranteed under Article 25(1) of the Constitution, be it clarified that Article 25(1), by employing the expression ‘all persons’, demonstrates that the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion is available, though subject to the restrictions delineated in Article 25(1) itself, to every person including women.

99. It needs to be understood that the kernel of Article 26 is ‘establishment of a religious institution’ so as to acclaim the status of religious denomination. Whereas, Article 25(1) guarantees the right to practise religion to every individual and the act of practice is concerned, primarily, with religious worship, rituals and observations as held in Rev.

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others27. Further, it has been held in Shirur Mutt (supra) that the logic underlying the constitutional guarantee regarding ‘practice’ of religion is that religious practices are as such a part of religion as religious faith or doctrines.

100. The right guaranteed under Article 25(1) has nothing to do with gender or, for that matter, certain physiological factors, specifically attributable to women. Women of any age group have as much a right as men to visit and enter a temple in order to freely practise a religion as guaranteed under Article 25(1). When we say so, we are absolutely alive to the fact that whether any such proposed exclusion of women from entry into religious places forms an essential part of a religion would be examined at a subsequent stage. 101. We have no hesitation to say that such an exclusionary practice violates the right of women to visit and enter a temple to freely practise Hindu religion and to exhibit her devotion towards Lord Ayyappa. The denial of this right to women significantly denudes them of their right to worship. We concur with the view of the Amicus Curiae, learned senior counsel, Mr. Raju Ramachandran, that the right guaranteed under Article 25(1) is not only about inter-faith parity but it is also about intra-faith parity. Therefore, the right to practise religion under Article 25(1), in its broad contour, encompasses a non-discriminatory right which is equally available to both men and women of all age groups professing the same religion. 102. Though not in reference to men or women, yet in the context of any Hindu worshipper seeking entry in a temple which is a public place of worship for Hindus, the observations of the Supreme Court in Nar Hari Shastri and others v. Shri Badrinath Temple Committee28 are quite instructive wherein the Court opined thus: “It seems to us that the approach of the court below to this aspect of the case has not been quite proper, and, to avoid any possible misconception, we would desire to state succinctly what the correct legal position is. Once it is admitted, as in fact has been admitted in the present case, that the temple is a public place of worship of the Hindus, the right of entrance into the temple for purposes of ‘darshan’ or worship is a right which flows from the nature of the institution itself, and for the acquisition of such rights, no custom

(1977) 1 SCC 677 AIR 1952 SC 245

or immemorial usage need be asserted or proved…..” And again:

“The true position, therefore, is that the plaintiffs’ right of entering the temple along with their Yajmans is not a precarious or a permissive right depending for its existence upon the arbitrary discretion of the temple authorities; it is a legal right in the true sense of the expression but it can be exercised subject to the restrictions which the temple committee may impose in good faith for maintenance of order and decorum within the temple and for ensuring proper performance of customary worship. In our opinion, the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration in this form.” 103. Another authoritative pronouncement in regard to the freedom to practise a religion freely without with any fictitious and vague constraint is the case of Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta (supra), wherein the Court observed thus:

“The full concept and scope of religious freedom is that there are no restraints upon the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of one’s conscience or upon the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion save those imposed under the police power of the State and the other provisions of Part II of the Constitution. This means the right to worship God according to the dictates of one’s conscience. Man’s relation to his God is made no concern for the State. Freedom of conscience and religious belief cannot, however, be, set up to avoid those duties which every citizen owes to the nation; e.g. to receive military training, to take an oath expressing willingness to perform military service and so on.” 104. Therefore, it can be said without any hesitation or reservation that the impugned Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules, framed in pursuance of the 1965 Act, that stipulates exclusion of entry of women of the age group of 10 to 50 years, is a clear violation of the right of such women to practise their religious belief which, in consequence, makes their fundamental right under Article 25(1) a dead letter. It is clear as crystal that as long as the devotees, irrespective of their gender and/or age group, seeking entry to a temple of any caste are Hindus, it is their legal right to enter into a temple and offer prayers. The women, in the case at hand, are also Hindus and so, there is neither any viable nor any legal

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

limitation on their right to enter into the Sabarimala Temple as devotees of Lord Ayyappa and offer their prayers to the deity.

105. When we say so, we may also make it clear that the said rule of exclusion cannot be justified on the ground that allowing entry to women of the said age group would, in any way, be harmful or would play a jeopardizing role to public order, morality, health or, for that matter, any other provision/s of Part III of the Constitution, for it is to these precepts that the right guaranteed under Article 25(1) has been made subject to. 106. The term ‘morality’ occurring in Article 25(1) of the Constitution cannot be viewed with a narrow lens so as to confine the sphere of definition of morality to what an individual, a section or religious sect may perceive the term to mean. We must remember that when there is a violation of the fundamental rights, the term ‘morality’ naturally implies constitutional morality and any view that is ultimately taken by the Constitutional Courts must be in conformity with the principles and basic tenets of the concept of this constitutional morality that gets support from the Constitution. 107. In Manoj Narula (supra), this Court has reflected upon the predominant role that the concept of constitutional morality plays in a democratic set-up and opined thus: “The principle of constitutional morality basically means to bow down to the norms of the Constitution and not to act in a manner which would become violative of the rule of law or reflectible of action in an arbitrary manner. It actually works at the fulcrum and guides as a laser beam in institution building. The traditions and conventions have to grow to sustain the value of such a morality. The democratic values survive and become successful where the people at large and the persons-in-charge of the institution are strictly guided by the constitutional parameters without paving the path of deviancy and reflecting in action the primary concern to maintain institutional integrity and the requisite constitutional restraints. Commitment to the Constitution is a facet of constitutional morality.”

108. That apart, this Court, in Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India and others29, observed thus:

(2018) 8 SCALE 72

“Constitutional morality in its strictest sense of the term implies strict and complete adherence to the constitutional principles as enshrined in various segments of the document. When a country is endowed with a Constitution, there is an accompanying promise which stipulates that every member of the country right from its citizens to the high constitutional functionaries must idolize the constitutional fundamentals. This duty imposed by the Constitution stems from the fact that the Constitution is the indispensable foundational base that functions as the guiding force to protect and ensure that the democratic setup promised to the citizenry remains unperturbed.”

109. Elaborating further, in Navtej Singh Johar and others v. Union of India and others30, this Court observed: “The concept of constitutional morality is not limited to the mere observance of the core principles of constitutionalism as the magnitude and sweep of constitutional morality is not confined to the provisions and literal text which a Constitution contains, rather it embraces within itself virtues of a wide magnitude such as that of ushering a pluralistic and inclusive society, while at the same time adhering to the other principles of constitutionalism. It is further the result of embodying constitutional morality that the values of constitutionalism trickle down and percolate through the apparatus of the State for the betterment of each and every individual citizen of the State.”

And again: “115. The society as a whole or even a minuscule part of the society may aspire and prefer different things for themselves. They are perfectly competent to have such a freedom to be different, like different things, so on and so forth, provided that their different tastes and liking remain within their legal framework and neither violates any statute nor results in the abridgement of fundamental rights of any other citizen. The Preambular goals of our Constitution which contain the noble objectives of Justice, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity can only be achieved through the commitment and loyalty of the organs of the State to the principle of constitutional morality”

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INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

110. The right guaranteed under Article 25(1) has been made subject to, by the opening words of the Article itself, public order, morality, health and other provisions of Part III of the Constitution. All the three words, that is, order, morality and health are qualified by the word ‘public’. Neither public order nor public health will be at peril by allowing entry of women devotees of the age group of 10 to 50 years into the Sabarimala temple for offering their prayers. As regards public morality, we must make it absolutely clear that since the Constitution was not shoved, by any external force, upon the people of this country but was rather adopted and given by the people of this country to themselves, the term public morality has to be appositely understood as being synonymous with constitutional morality.

111. Having said so, the notions of public order, morality and health cannot be used as colourable device to restrict the freedom to freely practise religion and discriminate against women of the age group of 10 to 50 years by denying them their legal right to enter and offer their prayers at the Sabarimala temple for the simple reason that public morality must yield to constitutional morality.

Whether exclusionary practice is an essential practice as per Hindu religion 112. We have, in the earlier part of this judgment, determined that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa, who though claim to be a separate religious denomination, do not, as per the tests laid down by this Court in several decisions, most prominent of them being S.P. Mittal (supra), constitute a separate religious denomination within the meaning of Article 26 of the Constitution. This leads us to a mathematical certainty that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa are the followers of Hindu religion. Now, what remains to be seen is whether the exclusion of women of the age group of 10 to 50 years is an essential practice under the Hindu religion in the backdrop of the peculiar attending circumstances attributable to the Sabarimala temple. For ascertaining the said question, we first need to understand what constitutes an essential practice for a particular religion which has been the subject matter of several decisions of this Court. Article 25 merely protects the freedom to practise rituals, ceremonies, etc. which are an integral part of a religion as observed by this Court in John Vallamattom and another v. Union of India31. While saying so, the Court ruled that a disposition towards making gift for charitable or religious

(2003) 6 SCC 611

purpose can be designated as a pious act of a person, but the same cannot be said to be an integral part of any religion. 113. The role of essential practices to a particular religion has been well demonstrated by Lord Halsbury in Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun32 wherein it was observed:

“In the absence of conformity to essentials, the denomination would not be an entity cemented into solidity by harmonious uniformity of opinion, it would be a mere incongruous heap of, as it were, grains of sand, thrown together without being united, each of these intellectual and isolated grains differing from every other, and the whole forming a but nominally united while really unconnected mass; fraught with nothing but internal dissimilitude, and mutual and reciprocal contradiction and dissension.”

114. This Court, in Shirur Mutt (supra), for the first time, held that what constitutes an essential part of a religion will be ascertained with reference to the tenets and doctrines of that religion itself. The Court had opined thus: “In the first place, what constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself.”

115. In Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar33, this Court rejected the argument of the petitioner that sacrifice of cow on Bakr-id was an essential practice of Mohammedan religion and ruled that it could be prohibited by the State under Clause 2(a) of Article 25. 116. Similarly, in State of West Bengal and others v. Ashutosh Lahiri and others34, this Court, while approving the judgment of the High Court, observed that the State of West Bengal had wrongly invoked Section 12 of the West Bengal Animal Slaughter Control Act, 1950 on the ground that exemption of slaughtering healthy cows was required to be given for the Muslim community. While holding so, the Court opined thus: “...before the State can exercise the exemption power under Section 12 in connection with slaughter of any healthy animal covered by the Act, it must be shown that such exemption is

(1904) AC 515 AIR 1958 SC 731 AIR 1995 SC 464

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necessary to be granted for sub-serving an essential religious, medicinal or research purpose. If granting of such exemption is not essential or necessary for effectuating such a purpose no such exemption can be granted so as to by-pass the thrust of the main provisions of the Act.”

117. In Durgah Committee, Ajmer and others v. Syed Hussain Ali and others35, the Court, although speaking in the context of Article 26, warned that some practices, though religious, may have sprung from merely superstitious beliefs and may, in that sense, be extraneous and unessential accretions to religion itself and unless such practices are found to constitute an essential and integral part of a religion, their claim for protection as essential practices may have to be carefully scrutinised; in other words, the protection must be confined to such religious practices as are an essential and an integral part of the religion and no other.

118. The Court, in this case, has excluded such practices from protection which, though may have acquired the characteristic of religious practices, are found, on careful scrutiny, to be an outcome of some superstitious beliefs which may render them unessential and not an integral part of the religion. 119. In Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and others v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta36, popularly known as the first Ananda Marga case, this Court held that Tandav dance in processions or at public places by the Ananda Margis carrying lethal weapons and human skulls was not an essential religious rite of the followers of Ananda Marga and, therefore, the order under Section 144 Cr.PC. prohibiting such processions in the interest of public order and morality was not violative of the rights of the Ananda Marga denomination under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution more so when the order under Section 144 Cr.PC. did not completely ban the processions or gatherings at public places but only prohibited carrying of daggers, trishuls and skulls which posed danger to public order and morality. 120. In N. Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board and others37, the Court very succinctly laid down as to what should be the approach of the court for deciding what constitutes an essential practice of a religion in the following words:

AIR 1961 SC 1402 (1983) 4 SCC 522 (2002) 8 SCC 106

“The legal position that the protection under Article 25 and 26 extend a guarantee for rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are integral parts of religion and as to what really constitutes an essential part of religion or religious practice has to be decided by the Courts with reference to the doctrine of a particular religion or practices regarded as parts of religion...” (Emphasis is ours)

121. In Commissioner of Police and others v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and others (supra), being the second Ananda Marga case, the Court has elaborately discussed the true nature of an essential practice and has further laid down the test for determining whether a certain practice can be characterized as essential to a particular religion in order to guarantee protection under the Constitution. The Court has opined: “The protection guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution is not confined to matters of doctrine or belief but extends to acts done in pursuance of religion and, therefore, contains a guarantee for rituals, observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are essential or integral part of religion. What constitutes an integral or essential part of religion has to be determined with reference to its doctrines, practices, tenets, historical background etc. of the given religion. (See generally the Constitution bench decisions in The Commissioner v. L T Swamiar of Srirur Mutt 1954 SCR 1005, SSTS Saheb v. State of Bombay 1962 (Supp) 2 SCR 496, and Seshammal v. State of Tamilnadu : [1972]3SCR815 , regarding those aspects that are to be looked into so as to determine whether a part or practice is essential or not). What is meant by ‘an essential part or practices of a religion’ is now the matter for elucidation. Essential part of a religion means the core beliefs upon which a religion is founded. Essential practice means those practices that are fundamental to follow a religious belief. It is upon the cornerstone of essential parts or practices the superstructure of religion is built. Without which, a religion will be no religion. Test to determine whether a part or practice is essential to the religion is - to find out whether the nature of religion will be changed without that part or practice. If the taking away of that part or practice could result in a fundamental change in the

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

character of that religion or in its belief, then such part could be treated as an essential or integral part. There cannot be additions or subtractions to such part. Because it is the very essence of that religion and alterations will change its fundamental character. It is such permanent essential parts is what is protected by the Constitution. Nobody can say that essential part or practice of one’s religion has changed from a particular date or by an event. Such alterable parts or practices are definitely not the ‘core’ of religion where the belief is based and religion is founded upon. It could only be treated as mere embellishments to the non-essential part or practices.”

122. In the light of the above authorities, it has to be determined whether the practice of exclusion of women of the age group of 10 to 50 years is equivalent to a doctrine of Hindu religion or a practice that could be regarded as an essential part of the Hindu religion and whether the nature of Hindu religion would be altered without the said exclusionary practice. The answer to these questions, in our considered opinion, is in the firm negative. In no scenario, it can be said that exclusion of women of any age group could be regarded as an essential practice of Hindu religion and on the contrary, it is an essential part of the Hindu religion to allow Hindu women to enter into a temple as devotees and followers of Hindu religion and offer their prayers to the deity. In the absence of any scriptural or textual evidence, we cannot accord to the exclusionary practice followed at the Sabarimala temple the status of an essential practice of Hindu religion.

123. By allowing women to enter into the Sabarimala temple for offering prayers, it cannot be imagined that the nature of Hindu religion would be fundamentally altered or changed in any manner. Therefore, the exclusionary practice, which has been given the backing of a subordinate legislation in the form of Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules, framed by the virtue of the 1965 Act, is neither an essential nor an integral part of the Hindu religion without which Hindu religion, of which the devotees of Lord Ayyappa are followers, will not survive.

124. Nobody can say that essential part or practice of one’s religion has changed from a particular date or by an event. Such alterable parts or practices are definitely not the ‘core’ of religion where the belief is based and religion is founded upon. It could only be treated as mere embellishments to the non-essential part or practices.

125. This view of ours is further substantiated by the fact that where a practice changes with the efflux of time, such a practice cannot, in view of the law laid down in Commissioner of Police and others (supra), be regarded as a core upon which a religion is formed. There has to be unhindered continuity in a practice for it to attain the status of essential practice. It is further discernible from the judgment of the High Court in S. Mahendran (supra) that the Devaswom Board had accepted before the High Court that female worshippers of the age group of 10 to 50 years used to visit the temple and conducted poojas in every month for five days for the first rice feeding ceremony of their children. The Devaswom Board also took a stand before the High Court that restriction of entry for women was only during Mandalam, Makaeavilakku and Vishnu days. The same has also been pointed out by learned Senior Counsel, Ms. Indira Jaising, that the impugned exclusionary practice in question is a ‘custom with some aberrations’ as prior to the passing of the Notification in 1950, women of all age groups used to visit the Sabarimala temple for the first rice feeding ceremony of their children. 126. Therefore, there seems to be no continuity in the exclusionary practice followed at the Sabarimala temple and in view of this, it cannot be treated as an essential practice. Analysis of the 1965 Act and Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules

127. We may presently deal with the statutory provisions of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965. Section 2 of the said Act is the definition clause and reads as under: “2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,(a) “Hindu” includes a person professing the Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina religion;

(b) “place of public worship” means a place, by whatever name known or to whomsoever belonging, which is dedicated to, or for the benefit of, or is used generally by, Hindus or any section or class thereof, for the performance of any religious service or for offering prayers therein, and includes all lands and subsidiary shrines, mutts, devasthanams, namaskara mandapams and nalambalams, appurtenant or attached to any such place, and also

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI] any sacred tanks, wells, springs and water courses the waters of which are worshipped or are used for bathing or for worship, but does not include a “sreekoil”;

(c) “section or class” includes any division, sub-division, caste, sub-caste, sect or denomination whatsoever. “ 128. As per clause (a) of Section 2, the term ‘Hindu’ includes a person professing Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina religion. The word ‘person’ occurring in this clause, for the pure and simple reason of logic, must include all genders. Clause (c) defines ‘section or class’ as any division, sub-division, caste, sub-caste, sect or denomination whatsoever. Nowhere the definition of section or class suggests being limited to male division, sub-division, caste and so forth.

129. Section 3 of the Act stipulates that places of public worship will be open to all sections and classes of Hindus and reads thus: “Section 3 : Places of public worship to open to all sections and classes of Hindus.-Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force or any custom or usage or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law or any decree or order of court, every place of public worship which is open to Hindus generally or to any section or class thereof, shall be open to all sections and classes of Hindus; and no Hindu of whatsoever section or class shall, in any manner, be prevented, obstructed or discouraged from entering such place of public worship, or from worshipping or offering prayers thereat, or performing any religious service therein, in the like manner and to the like extent as any other Hindu of whatsoever section or class may so enter, worship, pray or perform: Provided that in the case of a place of public worship which is a temple founded for the benefit of any religious denomination or section thereof, the provisions of this section shall be subject to the right of that religious denomination or section, as the case may be, to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. “

130. Section 3 of the Act being a non-obstante clause declares that every place of public worship which is open to Hindus generally or to any section or class thereof shall be open to all sections and classes of Hindus and no Hindu, of whatsoever section or class, shall be prevented,

obstructed or discouraged from entering such place of public worship, or from worshipping, offering prayers or performing any religious service at such place of public worship in the like manner and to the like extent as any other Hindu of whatsoever section or class may so be eligible to enter, worship, pray or perform.

131. A careful dissection of Section 3 reveals that places of public worship in the State of Kerala, irrespective of any contrary law, custom, usage or instrument having effect by virtue of any such law or any decree or order of Court, shall be open to all sections and classes of Hindus. The definition of ‘section or class’ and ‘Hindu’ has to be imported, for the purposes of Section 3, from the definition clauses 2(a) and 2(c) which, as per our foregoing analysis, includes all the genders, provided they are Hindus. It further needs to be accentuated that the right provided under Section 3 due to its non-obstante nature has to be given effect to regardless of any law, custom or usage to the contrary.

132. The proviso to Section 3 stipulates that in case the place of public worship is a temple founded for the benefit of any religious denomination or section thereof, then the rights warranted under Section 3 becomes subject to the right of that religious denomination or section to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. Having said so, we have, in the earlier part of this judgment, categorically stated that devotees and followers of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a religious denomination and, therefore, the proviso to Section 3 cannot be resorted to in the case at hand. 133. The importance and the gravity of the right stipulated under Section 3 of this Act, for all sections and classes of Hindus which include women, is very well manifest and evident from the fact that its violation has been made penal under Section 5 of the 1965 Act which reads as under: “Section 5 : Penalty Whoever, in contravention of Section 3,-

(a) prevents or attempts to prevent any person belonging to any section or class of Hindus from entering, worshipping or offering prayers, performing any religious service, in any place of public worship; or

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSN. v. STATE OF KERALA [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

(b) obstructs, or causes or attempts to cause obstruction to, or by threat of obstruction or otherwise discourages, any such person from doing or performing any of the acts aforesaid, shall be publishable with imprisonment which may extent to six months, or with fine which may extent to five hundred rupees, or with both:

Provided that in a case where a sentence of fine only is awarded, such fine shall not be less than fifty rupees. “

134. Proceeding ahead, Section 4 of the 1965 Act confers the power to make regulations for the maintenance of order and decorum and performance of rites and ceremonies with regard to places of public worship in Kerala:

“Section 4 : Power to make regulations for the maintenance of order and decorum and the due performance of rites and ceremonies in places of public worship (1) The trustee or any other person in charge of any place public worship shall have power, subject to the control of the competent authority and any rules which may be made by that authority, to make regulations for the maintenance of order and decorum in the place of public worship and the due observance of the religious rites and ceremonies performed therein: Provided that no regulation made under this sub-section shall discriminate in any manner whatsoever, against any Hindu on the ground that he belongs to a particular section or class.

(2) The competent authority referred to in sub-section (1) shall be,(i) In relation to a place of public worship situated in any area to which Part I of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 (Travancore-Cochin Act XV of 1950), extends, the Travancore Devaswom Board; (ii) in relation to a place of public worship situated in any area to which Part II of the said Act extends, the Cochin Devaswom Board; and

(iii) in relation to a place of public worship situated in any other area in the State of Kerala, the Government.”

135. The proviso to Section 4 being an exception to Section 4(1) is a classic example of a situation where the exception is more important than the rule itself. It needs to be borne in mind that the language of the proviso to Section 4 of the 1965 Act, in very clear and simple terms, states that the regulations made under clause (1) of Section 4 shall not discriminate against any Hindu on the ground that he/she belongs to a particular section or class. As stated earlier, a particular section or class for the purposes of this Act includes women of all age groups, for Hindu women of any age group also constitute a class or section of Hindus. 136. The State of Kerala, by virtue of clause (1) of Section 4, has framed the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965. The relevant rule which is also the most prominent bone of contention in the present case is Rule 3(b). The relevant part of Rule 3 reads thus: “Rule 3. The classes of persons mentioned here under shall not be entitled to offer worship in any place of public worship or bath in or use th

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