Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal & Ors. ETC.
Landmark judgment · Property & civil — Meaning of 'lapse' of acquisition under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 6 March 2020
- Judge
- Justice Arun Mishra
- Neutral citation
- 2020 INSC 294
- Reported in
- [2020] 3 S.C.R. 1
- Result
- Reference answered
- Subject
- Property & land
Full judgment
[2020] 3 S.C.R. 1
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
v. MANOHARLAL & ORS. ETC. (S.L.P. (C) Nos. 9036-9038 of 2016) MARCH 06, 2020
[ARUN MISHRA, INDIRA BANERJEE, VINEET SARAN, M. R. SHAH AND S. RAVINDRA BHAT, JJ.] Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: Legislative history of the Act of 2013 – Purpose of its enactment – Salient features – Departure from old Land Acquisition Act in 2013 Act relating to Social Impact Assessment, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme – Discussed . Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) – Twin requirement for the lapse – Firstly, physical possession has not been taken and secondly compensation has not been paid – Whether the conditions are cumulative i.e. both are to be fulfilled for lapsing of acquisition proceedings or the conditions are in alternative (“either/or”) – Held: s.24(2) of the Act of 2013 deals with a situation only where the award has been made five years or more before the commencement of the Act, but physical possession of the land has not been taken, nor compensation has been paid – As regards the collation of the words used in s.24(2), two negative conditions have been prescribed – General rule of statutory interpretation of positive and negative conditions are that positive conditions separated by ‘or’ are read in the alternative but negative conditions connected by ‘or’ are construed as cumulative and ‘or’ is read as ‘nor’ or ‘and’ i.e. the expression ‘or’ has to be read as conjunctive and conditions of both the clauses must be fulfilled – Thus, the word ‘or ’ used in s.24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’ – This would mean that the deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under s.24(2) takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the Act of 2013, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid – Thus,
even if one condition is satisfied, there is no lapse – Interpretation of statutes. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) – Interpreting “or” under s.24(2) of the Act of 2013 disjunctively – Effect of – Held: It would result in an anomalous situation, because, once compensation has been paid to the landowner, there is no provision for its refund – In case physical possession is with the landowner; and compensation has been paid, there is no provision in the Act for disgorging out the benefit of compensation – In the absence of any provision for refund in the Act of 2013, the State cannot recover compensation paid – The landowner would be unjustly enriched – This could never have been the legislative intent of enacting s.24(2) of the Act of 2013 – The principle of restitution, unless provided in the Act, cannot be resorted to by the authorities on their own – Absence of provision for refund in the Act of 2013 reinforces conclusion that the word “or” has to be read as conjunctively and has to be read as “and” – Doctrine of unjust enrichment and principle of restitution. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) – Purpose of – Held: To punish acquiring authority for its lethargy in not taking physical possession nor paying compensation after making award five years or more before commencement of Act of 2013 in pending proceedings providing they would lapse. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24 – Vested right under – Held: s.24 of the Act of 2013 does not intend to take away vested rights – This is because there is no specific provision taking away or divesting title to the land, which had originally vested with the State, or divesting the title or interest of beneficiaries or third-party transferees of such land which they had lawfully acquired, through sales or transfers. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: proviso to s.24(2) – Whether proviso is part of s.24(2) or s.24(1)(b) – Held: The proviso is part of the scheme of s.24(2) – The entire provision
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
of s.24(2), including the proviso, operates when there is inaction for a period of five years or more, as contemplated therein.
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) – Applicability to pending proceedings – Held: s.24(2) shall apply to the proceeding which is pending as on the date on which the Act of 2013, has been brought into force and it does not apply to the concluded proceedings – s.24(2) is not a tool to revive concluded proceedings and to question the validity of acquisition proceedings due to which possession were taken decades ago, or to question the manner of deposit of amount in the treasury – The Act of 2013 never intended revival of such claims – s.24(2) only contemplates lethargy/inaction of the authorities to act for five years or more. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) – Whether gives rise to fresh cause of action – Held: s.24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition – s.24 does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) – Exclusion of period of interim order(s) – Held: Any court’s interim order cannot be said to be inaction of the authorities or agencies; thus, time period is not to be included for counting the 5 years period as envisaged in s.24(2). Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) and its proviso – The expression ‘paid’ in the main part of s.24(2) does not include a deposit of compensation in court – The consequence of non-deposit is provided in proviso to s.24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of land holdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land acquisition under s.4 of the Act of 1894 shall be entitled to
compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013 – In case the obligation under s.31 of the Act of 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest under s.34 of the said Act can be granted – Nondeposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings – In case of non- deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date of notification for land acquisition under s.4 of the Act of 1894. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) – When compensation, tendered, as provided in s.31(1) of the Act of 1894, but not paid/deposited in court – Whether acquisition lapse – Held: In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under s.31(1) of the Act of 1894, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under s.24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court – The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under s.31(1) – Land owners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under s.24(2) of the Act of 2013 – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.31(1). Land Acquisition: Mode of taking possession – When possession of large area of land is to be taken, then it is permissible to take possession by drawing Panchnama – Possession.
Possession: Concept of possession – Held: Possession comprises the right to possess and to exclude others, essential is animus possidendi – Possession depends upon the character of the thing which is possessed – If the land is not capable of any use, mere non-user of it does not lead to the inference that the owner is not in possession – The established principle is that the possession follows title – Possession comprises of the control over the property – The element of possession is the physical control or the power over the object and intention or will to exercise the power – Corpus and animus are both necessary and have to co-exist. Delay/laches: In matters of land acquisition, delay is fatal in questioning the land acquisition proceedings – In case possession
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
has not been taken in accordance with law and vesting is not in accordance with s.16, proceedings before courts are to be initiated within reasonable time, not after the lapse of several decades – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.16.
Interpretation of Statutes: Addition or substraction of word(s) in a statute – Power of Courts – Held: While interpreting the statutory provisions, addition or subtraction in the legislation is not permissible – It is not open to the court to either add or subtract a word – There cannot be any departure from the words of law, as observed in legal maxim “A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum” – Legal maxim.
Interpretation of Statutes: When two different expressions are used in the same provision of a statute, there is a presumption that they are not used in the same sense. Interpretation of statutes: Proviso to a provision – The function of the proviso is to explain or widen the scope – The proviso cannot travel beyond the provision to which it is attached. Interpretation of Statutes: Colon (punctuation mark) – Significance of its use – The use of the colon is to introduce a subclause that follows logically from the text before it – Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – s.24(2). Judicial Notice: Judicial notice is taken of the fact that in no other Government security, rate of interest is higher on the amount being invested under ss.32 and 33 of the Act of 1894 – Higher rate of interest is available under s.34 to the advantage of landowners – Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Repeal: Applicability of the General Clauses Act – Held: When repeal is followed by a fresh enactment on the same subject, the provisions of the General Clauses Act would undoubtedly require an examination of the language of the new enactment if it expresses an intent different from the earlier repealed Act – The enquiry would necessitate the examination if the old rights and liabilities are kept alive or whether the new Act manifests an intention to do away with or destroy them – If the new Act manifests different intentions, the application of the General Clauses Act will stand excluded – General Clauses Act.
Words and phrases: Word ‘paid’, tender’, ‘vesting’ – Meaning of, discussed. Words and phrases: Word ‘paid’ and ‘deposited’ – Distinction between – Dictionary meaning and meaning in the context of s.24(2) of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. Words and phrases: Concept of vesting – Discussed. Answering the reference, the Court
HELD: 1. The Act of 2013 repeals and replaces the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, a general law for acquisition of land of public purposes, which had been in force for almost 120 years, with a view to address certain inadequacies and/ or shortcomings in the said Act. The Act of 2013 is prospective and saves proceedings already initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 before its repeal, subject to provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013, which begins with a non-obstante clause and overrides all other provisions of the Act of 2013. [Paras 6, 7][58 B-D] 2. Scope of Section 24
2.1 Section 24 begins with a non-obstante clause, overriding all other provisions of the Act of 2013 including Section 114 of the Act of 2013, dealing with repeal and saving. In terms of Section 114 of the Act of 2013, the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, except otherwise provided in the Act, has been saved. Section 6(a) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not revive anything not in force or existing at the time when the repeal has been made. The effect of the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder is also saved by the provisions contained in Section 6(b). As per Section 6(c), the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred. [Para 94][115 E-G] 2.2 Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013 read with the nonobstante clause provides that in case of proceedings initiated
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
under the Act of 1894 the award had not been made under Section 11, then the provisions of the Act of 2013, relating to the determination of compensation would apply. However; the proceedings held earlier do not lapse. In terms of Section 24(1)(b), where award under Section 11 is made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the Act of 1894. It contemplates that such pending proceedings, as on the date on which the Act of 2013 came into force shall continue, and taken to their logical end. However, the exception to Section 24(1) (b) is provided in Section 24(2) in case of pending proceedings; in case where the award has been passed five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013, the physical possession of the land has not been taken, or the compensation has not been paid, the proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed, and such proceedings cannot continue as per the provisions of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013. [Para 95][115 G-H][116 A-C]
Principles of Statutory Interpretation (14th Edition) by Justice G.P. Singh – referred to
2.3 As regards the collation of the words used in Section 24(2), two negative conditions have been prescribed. Thus, even if one condition is satisfied, there is no lapse, and this logically flows from the Act of 1894 read with the provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Any other interpretation would entail illogical results. Thus, for lapse of acquisition proceedings initiated under the old law, under Section 24(2), if both steps have not been taken, i.e., neither physical possession is taken, nor compensation is paid, the land acquisition proceedings lapse. [Paras 99, 101][119 G-H][122 B-C] Patel Chunibhai Dajibha, etc. v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar and Anr. AIR 1965 SC 1457 : [1965] SCR 328; Punjab Produce & Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, [1971] SCR 977 – relied on
Brown & Co. v. Harrison (1927) All ER Rep 195; Federal Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry 1974 (1) WLR 505 – referred to
2.4 Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is a penal provision - to punish the acquiring authority for its lethargy in not taking physical possession nor paying the compensation after making the award five years or more before the commencement of the Act of 2013 in pending proceedings, providing that they would lapse. The expression “where an award has been made, then the proceedings shall continue” used in Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 1894 means that proceedings were pending in praesenti as on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013 are not concluded proceedings, and in that context, an exception has been carved out in section 24(2). [Para 112][131 A-C] M/s. Ranchhoddas Atmaram and Anr. v. The Union of India and Ors. AIR 1961 SC 935 : [1961] SCR 718; Prof. Yashpal & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. (2005) 5 SCC 420 : [2005] 2 SCR 23; Joint Director of Mines Safety v. Tandur and Nayandgi Stone Quarries (P) Ltd (1987) 3 SCC 308 : [1987] 2 SCR 911; Samee Khan v Bindu Khan (1998) 7 SCC 59 : [1998] 1 Suppl. SCR 244; State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala [1957] 1 SCR 874; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v State of Rajasthan & Ors AIR 1963 SC 1638 : [1964] SCR 561 – relied on
Pooran Singh v. State of M.P [1965] 2 SCR 853; Sri Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (1975) 2 SCC 671 : [1976] 1 SCR 505; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Tek Chand Bhatia (1980) 1 SCC 158 : [1980] 1 SCR 910; State of Punjab v. Ex-Constable Ram Singh (1992) 4 SCC 54 : [1992] 3 SCR 634 – referred to
Marsey Docks and Harbour Board v. Coggins and Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd. LR (AC) Vol.XIII 1888 595; Re Hayden Pask v. Perry (1931) 2 Ch.333; Metropolitan Board of Works v. Street Bros (1881) VIII QBD 445 – referred to
2.5 When considering the scheme of the Act of 1894, once the award was made under Section 11, the Collector may, undertake possession of the land which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. Section 16 of the Act of 1894 enables the Collector to take possession of
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
acquired land, when an award is made under Section 11. Clearly, there can be lapse of proceedings under the Act of 1894 only when possession is not taken. The provisions in Section 11A of the Act of 1894 states that the Collector shall make an award within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration under Section 6 and if no award is made within two years, the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land shall lapse. The period of two year excludes any period during which interim order granted by the Court was in operation. Once an award is made and possession is taken, by virtue of Section 16, land vests absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances. Vesting of land is automatic on the happening of the two exigencies of passing award and taking possession, as provided in Section 16. [Paras 114, 115][131 F-H][132 C-E]
2.6 The scheme of the Act of 1894 is clear that when the award is passed under Section 11, thereafter possession is taken as provided under Section 16, land vests in the State Government. Under Section 12(2), a notice of the award has to be issued by the Collector. Taking possession is not dependent upon payment. Payment has to be tendered under Section 31 unless the Collector is “prevented from making payment,” as provided under section 31(2). In case of failure under Section 31(1) or 31(3), also Collector is not precluded from making payment, but it carries interest under Section 34 @ 9% for the first year from the date it ought to have been paid or deposited and thereafter @ 15%. Thus, once land has been vested in the State under Section 16, in case of failure to pay the compensation under Section 31(1) to deposit under Section 31(2), compensation has to be paid along with interest, and due to non-compliance of Section 31, there is no lapse of acquisition. The same spirit has been carried forward in the Act of 2013 by providing in Section 24(2). Once possession has been taken though the payment has not been made, the compensation has to be paid along with interest as envisaged under section 34, and in a case, payment has been made, possession has not been taken, there is no lapse under Section 24(2). In a case where possession has been taken under the Act of 1894 as provided by Section 16 or 17(1) the land vests absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances, if compensation is not paid, there is no divesting there will be no
lapse as compensation carries interest @ 9% or @ 15% as envisaged under Section 34 of the Act of 1894. Proviso to Section 24(2) makes some wholesome provision in case the amount has not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings, in such an event, not only those persons but all the beneficiaries, though for minority of holding compensation has been paid, shall be entitled to higher compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. The expression used is “all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act”, i.e., Act of 1894, means that the persons who are to be paid higher compensation are those who have been recorded as beneficiaries as on the date of notification under Section 4. The proviso gives effect to, and furthers the principle that under the Act of 1894, the purchases made after issuance of notification under Section 4 are void. As such, the benefit of higher compensation under the proviso to Section 24(2) is intended to be given to the beneficiaries mentioned in the notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. [Para 118][133 D-H][134 A-D] 2.7 The benefits under the Act of 2013 envisage that where the award had not been made, or award has been made, but possession has not been taken (because once possession is taken, land is vests in the State) there can be lapse of acquisition. No doubt that payment is also to be made: that issue is taken care of by the provision of payment of interest under Section 34: also, in case of non-deposit- in respect of majority of holdings in a given award, higher compensation under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to all beneficiaries as on the date of notification under Section 4 issued under the Act of 1894. There is nothing in the Statement of Objects and Reasons making specific reference to non-payment of compensation where an award has been made, and possession has been taken. While interpreting the provisions of an Act, the court to consider the objects and reasons of the legislature, which the legislature had in mind also emphasised that once vesting is complete, there is no divesting. [Para 120][134 G-H][135 A-C] Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate [1958] SCR 1156; Mukesh K.
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
Tripathi v. Senior Divisional Manager, LIC & Ors. (2004) 8 SCC 387 : [2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 127 – relied on
2.8 Interpreting “or” under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 disjunctively, would result in an anomalous situation - because, once compensation has been paid to the landowner, there is no provision for its refund. In case physical possession is with the landowner; and compensation has been paid, there is no provision in the Act for disgorging out the benefit of compensation. In the absence of any provision for refund in the Act of 2013, the State cannot recover compensation paid. The landowner would be unjustly enriched. This could never have been the legislative intent of enacting Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. The principle of restitution, unless provided in the Act, cannot be resorted to by the authorities on their own. The absence of provision for refund in the Act of 2013 reinforces conclusion that the word “or” has to be read as conjunctively and has to be read as “and.” [Para 132][150-E][151 A-B] C. Padma & Ors. v. Dy. Secretary & Ors (1997) 2 SCC 627 : [1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 158; Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh & Ors (2003) 1 SCC 335 : [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 534; Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd 2004 (7) SCC 288 : [2004] 3 SCR 854 – referred to
3. In re: Vesting and divesting Once the land vests in the State, it cannot be divested, even if there is some irregularity in the acquisition proceedings. There is nothing in the Act of 1894 to show that non-compliance thereof will be fatal or will lead to any penalty. Once vesting takes place, and is with possession, after which a person who remains in possession is only a trespasser, not in rightful possession and vesting contemplates absolute title, possession in the State. [Paras 141, 147][160-H][161-A][163 F-G] State of Punjab v. Sadhu Ram 1996 (7) JT 118; Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Ors (1996) 11 SCC 698 : [1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 6; Market Committee v. Krishan Murari (1996) 1 SCC 311 : [1995] 4 Suppl.
SCR 787; Puttu Lal (dead) by L.Rs. v. State of U.P. & Anr (1996) 3 SCC 99 : [1996] 2 SCR 638; The Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust [1957] SCR 01; 147 VKNM Vocational Higher Secondary School v. State of Kerala (2016) 4 SCC 216 : [2016] 1 SCR 343; May George v. Special Tahsildar & Ors. (2010) 13 SCC 98 : [2010] 7 SCR 204; P. Chinnanna & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Ors. (1994) 5 SCC 486 : [1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 426; Satendra Prasad Jain & Ors. v. State of U.P & Ors (1993) 4 SCC 369 : [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 336; Tika Ram and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2009) 10 SCC 689 : [2009] 14 SCR 905; Pratap & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors (1996) 3 SCC 1 : [1996] 2 SCR 1088; Awadh Bihari Yadav & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors (1995) 6 SCC 31 : [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 197 – relied on Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Modi Sugar Mills [1961] 2 SCR 189; Dattatraya Moreshwar v. The State of Bombay and Ors., AIR 1952 SC 181 : [1952] SCR 612; State of U.P. and Ors. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751 : [1961] SCR 679; Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur v. Municipal Board, Rampur, AIR 1965 SC 895 : [1965] SCR 970; State of Mysore v. V.K. Kangan, AIR 1975 SC 2190 : [1976] 1 SCR 369; Sharif -Ud- Din v. Abdul Gani Lone, AIR 1980 SC 303 : [1980] 1 SCR 1177; Balwant Singh and Ors. v. Anand Kumar Sharma and Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 433 : [2003] 1 SCR 653; Chandrika Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 2004 SC 2036 : [2004] 3 SCR 834; M/s. Rubber House v. Excellsior Needle Industries Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1989 SC 1160 : [1989] 1 SCR 986; B.S. Khurana and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 679 : [2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 357; State of Haryana and Anr. v. RaghubirDayal, (1995) 1 SCC 133 : [1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 448; GullipilliSowria Raj v. Bandaru Pavani @ Gullipili Pavani, (2009) 1 SCC 714 : [2008] 17 SCR 35 – referred to
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
Braithwaite & Co. v. E.S.I.C [1968] 1 SCR 771 – referred to
4. In re: Vested rights under Section 24 of the Act of 2013 Section 24 of the Act of 2013 does not intend to take away vested rights. This is because there is no specific provision taking away or divesting title to the land, which had originally vested with the State, or divesting the title or interest of beneficiaries or third-party transferees of such land which they had lawfully acquired, through sales or transfers. When repeal is followed by a fresh enactment on the same subject, the provisions of the General Clauses Act would undoubtedly require an examination of the language of the new enactment if it expresses an intent different from the earlier repealed Act. The enquiry would necessitate the examination if the old rights and liabilities are kept alive or whether the new Act manifests an intention to do away with or destroy them. If the new Act manifests different intentions, the application of the General Clauses Act will stand excluded. [Paras 148, 149][164 F-G][166 A-C]
State of Haryana v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd (2017) 9 SCC 463 : [2017] 9 SCR 482 – relied on Zile Singh v. State of Haryana (2004) 8 SCC 01 : [2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 400; CIT v. Sarkar Builders (2015) 7 SCC 579 : [2015] 7 SCR 56; Jawaharmal v. State of Rajasthan [1966] 1 SCR 890; Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar [1964] 1 SCR 897; K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala & Ors (1994) 5 SCC 593 : [1994] 3 Suppl. SCR 405 – relied on Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd.v L’office Chefifien Des Phosphates & Anr [1994] 1 A.C. 486; Lauri v. Renad (1892) 3 Ch. 402; Gloucester Union v. Woolwich Union (1917) 2 K.B. 374; The King v. The General Commissioners of Income Tax for Southampton (1916) 2 K.B. 249 – referred to
Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, 5th Edition (2012) – referred to
5. In re: Legislative History of Act of 2013 The Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2011 (Bill No.77 of 2011) was introduced in the Parliament. Section 24(1), as introduced originally, contained a provision with respect to award, which has not been made, but it was later on amended, and now as provided in Section 24(1)(a), there is no lapse and only higher compensation is available in case award has not been passed. The earlier Section 24(2) contained only the provision with respect to possession of the land that has not been taken. Earlier, there was no time limit prescribed, and it was proposed that the process for acquisition of land shall lapse. Debates in the Lok Sabha on 29.8.2013, were referred to during the hearings, to cite various reasons given in respect of the question why effect should be given retrospectively in cases where acquisition has not been completed. While replying to the debate, the Minister concerned had stated that there would be lapse only if in case possession has not been taken and compensation has not been paid. The emphasis right from the beginning was on possession. Thus, from the perusal of debate too, it is apparent that the word “or” had been understood as “and”. [Paras 161, 162, 164, 165][178 D-E][179 B-D][180 BC][180 G-H]
Tinsukhia Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. State of Assam & Ors., (1989) 3 SCC 709 : [1989] 2 SCR 544; C.I.T. v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57 : [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 387; Balram Kamanat v. Union of India (2003) 7 SCC 628 : [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 24; New India Assurance Co. v. Nulli Nivelle, (2008) 3 SCC 279 : [2007] 13 SCR 598; H.S. Vankani v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 4 SCC 301 : [2010] 3 SCR 485; State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.A. Mehta (Retd.) and Ors., (2013) 3 SCC 1 : [2013] 1 SCR 1 – referred to
6. In Re: Objectives of the Act
The Act of 2013 has been enacted considering the difficulties caused by the operation of the earlier laws and to subserve the public interest. Thus, the Court should interpret it in the context of the attendant circumstances. At the same time, the court should not, while ostensibly adopting a purposive or
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
liberal interpretation, affect matters which have become final, or stale. [Para 166][181 D-E]
Burrakur Coal Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [1962] 1 SCR 44; A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkatachalam Potti [1955] SCR 1196; Arnit Das v. State of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC 488; Popat Bahiru Govardhane & Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer & Anr., (2013) 10 SCC 765 : [2013] 8 SCR 241 – relied on
Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. & Ors., (2003) 2 SCC 111 : [2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 517 – referred to
7. In Re: proviso to Section 24(2): Whether the proviso is part of section 24(2) or Section 24(1). 7.1 When reading the word “or” as ‘and’ in the main part of section 24(2), it is clear that the proviso has to stay as part of section 24(2) where it has been placed by the legislature, and only then it makes sense. If ‘or’ used in-between two negative conditions of ‘possession has not been taken’ or ‘compensation has not been paid,’ disjunctively, in that case, the proviso cannot be operative and would become otiose and would make no sense as part of Section 24(2). In case of amount not having been paid the acquisition has to lapse, though possession (of the land) has been taken would not be the proper interpretation of the main part, when “or” is read conjunctively, section 24(2) provided for lapse in a case where possession has not been taken, nor compensation has been paid, in such a case proviso becomes operative in given exigency of not depositing amount with respect to majority of landholdings. [Para 171][184 D-F] 7.2 A reading of section 24(2) shows that in case possession has been taken even if the compensation has not been paid, the proceedings shall not lapse. In case payment has not been made nor deposited with respect to the majority of the holdings in the accounts of the beneficiaries, then all the beneficiaries specified in the notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 shall get the enhanced compensation under the provisions of the Act of 2013. Section 24(2) not only deals with failure to take physical
possession but also failure to make payment of compensation. If both things have not been done, there is lapse of the acquisition proceeding. Once an award has been passed and possession has been taken, there is absolute vesting of the land, as such higher compensation follows under the proviso, which is beneficial to holders. In a case where both the negative conditions have not been fulfilled, as mentioned in section 24(2), there is a lapse. Thus, the proviso is a wholesome provision and is, in fact, a part of section 24(2); it fits in the context of section 24(2) as deposit is related with the payment of compensation and lapse is provided due to non-payment along with not taking possession for five years or more whereas for non-deposit higher compensation is provided. [Para 172][184 F-H][185 A-D] 7.3 When considering the provisions of section 24(1)(b) where an award has been passed under section 11 of the Act of 1894, such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Act as if it has not been repealed. The only exception carved out is the period of 5 years or more and that too by providing a non-obstante clause in Section 24(2) to anything contained in section 24(1). The non-obstante clause qualifies the proviso also to Section 24(2). It has to be read as part of Section 24(2) as it is an exception to Section 24(1)(b). Section 24(1)(b) is a self-contained provision, and is also a part of the non-obstante clause to the other provisions of the Act as provided in sub-section (1). Parliament worked out an exception, by providing a nonobstante clause in section 24(2), to Section 24(1). Compensation is to be paid under Section 24(1)(b) under the Act of 1894 and not under the Act of 2013. As such Section 24 (2) is an exception to section 24(1)(b) and the proviso is also an exception which fits in with non-obstante clause of Section 24(2) only. Any other interpretation will be derogatory to the provisions contained in Section 24(1)(b) which provides that the pending proceedings shall continue under the Act of 1894 as if it had not been repealed, that would include the part relating to compensation too. Even if there is no lapse of proceedings under section 24(1)(a), only higher compensation follows under Section 24(1)(a). [Para 173][185 D-H][186-A]
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Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Tarun Pal Singh & Ors. (2018) 14 SCC 161 : [2017] 14 SCR 202 171 – relied on
Delhi Development Authority v. Virender Lal Bahri & Ors. – referred to 7.4 Punctuation used in Section 24(2): Parliament has used the full stop (.) after section 24(1) and colon (:) after section 24(2). It cannot be gainsaid that punctuation plays a vital role, particularly when an attempt is made to relocate any part of the provision. The use of the colon is to introduce a sub-clause that follows logically from the text before it. Though as the interpretation of the provision of Section 24(2) and its proviso needs no further deliberation regarding its placement, the same is to be read as a proviso to Section 24(2) and not Section 24(1)
(b) Use of punctuation colon reinforces conclusion and punctuation mark has been an accepted method of statutory interpretation when such a problem arises. Though sometimes punctuation can be ignored also but not generally. The full stop after section 24(1)(b) expresses deliberate intent to end a particular sentence and detach it from the next part. It is clear that the colon (:) has a reference to the previous statement and enlarges the same and extends the meaning of the sentence. The colon indicates that the text is intrinsically linked to the previous provision preceding it, i.e., Section 24(2) in this case and not section 24(1). The colon indicates that what follows. The colon proves, explains, defines describes or lists elements of what precedes it. In case the proviso is bodily lifted and placed after section 24(1)(b), section 24(2) will end with a “colon,” which is never done to end a provision. [Paras 174, 176][186 D-G][187 D-E]
Falcon Tyres Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2006) 6 SCC 530 : [2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 734; Aswini Kumar Ghosh & Anr v Arabinda Bose & Anr [1953] SCR 1; Jamshed Guzdar v. State of Maharastra (2005) 2 SCC 591 : [2005] 1 SCR 223 – relied on
State of Gujarat v. Reliance Industries Ltd. (2017) 16 SCC 28 : [2017] 13 SCR 25; State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha and Ors (1982) 1 SCC 561 : [1982] 3 SCR 121 – referred to Marshall v. Cottingham [1982] Ch 82; Dingmar v. Dingmar 2007 (2) All ER 382; Kennedy v Information Commissioner and another (Secretary of State for Justice intervening) [2012] 1 WLR 3524; Taylor v. Caribou 102 Me. 401, 67 A.2 (1907) – referred to ‘Full Stop’ and ‘Colon’, Vepa P. Sarathi in the Interpretation of Statutes, Fifth Edition; Bennion on Statutory Interpretation – referred to 7.5 The provision of section 24(1)(a) is clear that if an award has not been passed, higher compensation to follow. No lapse is provided. In case award has been passed within the window period of section 24(1)(b), inter alia, the provisions for compensation would be that of the Act of 1894. The only exception to section 24(1) is created by the non-obstante clause in section 24(2) by providing that in case the requisite steps have not been taken for 5 years or more, then there is lapse as a negative condition. The proviso contemplates higher compensation, in case compensation has not been paid, and the amount has not been deposited with respect to the majority of the holdings, to all the beneficiaries under the Act of 2013, who were holding land on the date of notification under Section 4. If the proviso is added, section 24(1)(b) will destroy the very provision of section 24(1)(b) providing proceedings to continue under the Act of 1894, which is not the function of the proviso to substitute the main Section but to explain it. It is not to cause repugnancy with the main provision. The function of the proviso is to explain or widen the scope. It is a settled proposition of law that the proviso cannot travel beyond the provision to which it is attached. The proviso would travel beyond the Act of 1894 as it is the intention of section 24(1)(b) the proceedings to govern by the Act of 1894. Thus, the proviso has no space to exist with section 24(1) (b), and it has rightly not been attached by Parliament, with Section 24(2) and has been placed at the right place where it should have been. The proviso is part of the scheme of section 24(2), and the entire
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL & ORS. ETC.
provision of section 24(2), including the proviso, operates when inaction is there for a period of 5 years or more, as contemplated therein. [Paras 185, 186][197 D-H][198-A][198 C-D]
8. In re: Proviso to be read as part of provision it is appended A proviso has to be construed as a part of the clause to which it is appended. A proviso is added to a principal provision to which it is attached. It does not enlarge the enactment. In case the provision is repugnant to the enacting part, the proviso cannot prevail. The proviso cannot nullify the provision of Section 24(1)(b) nor can it set at naught the real object of the enactment, but it can further by providing higher compensation, thus dealing with matters in Section 24 (2). Therefore, in effect, where award is not made [Section 24 (1)(a)] as well as where award is made but compensation is not deposited in respect of majority of the landowners in a notification (for acquisition) [i.e. proviso to Section 24 (2)] compensation is payable in terms of the new Act, i.e., Act of 2013. For the said reasons, considering the placement of the proviso, semi-colon having been used at the end of section 24(2), considering the interpretation of section 24(1)(b) and the repugnancy which would be caused in case the proviso is lifted which is not permissible and particularly when reading the word ‘or’ as ‘nor’ in section 24(2), it has to be placed where the legislature has legislated it, it has not been wrongly placed as part of section 24(2) but is intended for beneficial results of higher compensation for one and all where there is no lapse, but amount not deposited as required. [Paras 190, 196, 197][200 B-C] [207 C-F] State of Rajasthan v. Leela Jain & Ors [1965] 1 SCR 276; Sales-tax Officer, Circle 1, Jabalpur v. Hanuman Prasad [1967] 1 SCR 831; Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Board of Revenue, Madras and Anr. v. Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver etc AIR (1968) SC 59 : [1968] SCR 148; S. Sundaram Pillai & Ors. v. V.R. Pattabiraman & Ors (1985) 1 SCC 591 : [1985] 2 SCR 643; Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula v. Motibhai Nagjibhai [1966] 1 SCR 367; Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Haryana
State Cooperative Land Development Banks Employees Union & Anr. (2004) 1 SCC 574 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1039; Shimbhu & Anr. v. State of Haryana, (2014) 13 SCC 318 : [2013] 14 SCR 136; Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer and Ors., [1965] 3 SCR 626; Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills & Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, AIR 1961 SC 1596; Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, (1976) 1 SCC 128 : [1976[ 1 SCR 277; The Commissioner of Income-tax, Mysore, TravancoreCochin and Coorg, Bangalore v. The Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd., [1959] (Supp) 2 SCR 256; Romesh Kumar Sharma v. Union of India and Ors. (2006) 6 SCC 510 : [2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 227; Motiram Ghelabhai v. Jagan Nagar & Ors (1985) 2 SCC 279 : [1985] 2 SCR 1051; Madhu Gopal v. VI Additional District Judge & Ors. (1988) 4 SCC 644 : [1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 276; The King v. Dominion Engineering Co. Ltd. AIR (34) 1947 PC 94 – relied on Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edn. - referred to
9. In re: What is the meaning to be given to the word “paid” used in section 24(2) and “deposited” used in the proviso to section 24(2) 9.1 The provisions of Section 31 of the Act of 1894 are attracted to the interpretation of provisions of section 24(2) to find out the meaning of the words ‘paid’ and ‘deposited’. Section 31(1) makes it clear that on passing of award compensation has to be tendered to the beneficiaries and Collector shall pay it to them. The payment is provided only in section 31(1). The expression ‘tender’ and pay to them in section 31(1) cannot include the term ‘deposited.’ Section 31(2) of the Act of 1894 deals with deposit in case Collector is ‘prevented’ from making payment by one or more contingencies mentioned in section 31(2). The deposit follows if the Collector is prevented from making payment. In case Collector is prevented from making payment due to contingencies, such refusal to receive the amount, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there is a dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
as to the apportionment of it, he (i.e. the Collector) may withhold it or in case there is dispute as to apportionment, he may ask the parties to get a decision from the Reference Court i.e., civil court and to clear the title. In such exigencies, the amount of compensation is required to be deposited in the court to which reference would be submitted under section 18. Section 31(2) requires deposit in case of reference under section 18 and not the reference, which may be sought under section 30 or section 28A of the Act of 1894. [Paras 198, 199][208 B-F]
9.2 Section 24(2) deals with the expression where compensation has not been paid. It would mean that it has not been tendered for payment under section 31(1). Though the word ‘paid’ amounts to a completed event, however, once payment of compensation has been offered/tendered under section 31(1), the acquiring authority cannot be penalized for non-payment as the amount has remained unpaid due to refusal to accept, by the landowner and Collector is prevented from making the payment. Thus, the word ‘paid’ used in section 24(2) cannot be said to include within its ken ‘deposit’ under section 31(2). For that, special provision has been carved out in the proviso to section 24(2), which deals with the amount to be deposited in the account of beneficiaries. Two different expressions have been used in section 24. In the main part of section 24, the word ‘paid’ and in its proviso ‘deposited’ have been used. [Para 200][208 F-H][209A] 9.3 The consequence of non-deposit of the amount has been dealt with in section 34 of the Act of 1894. As per section 24(2), if the amount has not been paid nor possession has been taken, it provides for lapse. Whereas the proviso indicates amount has not been deposited with respect to a majority of land holdings in a case initiated under the Act of 1894 for 5 years or more. The period of five years need not have been specified in the proviso as it is part of section 24(2) and has to be read with it. Two different consequences of non-deposit of compensation are: (i) higher compensation in a case where possession has been taken, payment has been made to some and amount has not been deposited with respect to majority of the holdings, (ii) in case
there is no lapse, the beneficiaries would be entitled to interest as envisaged under section 34 from the date of taking possession at the rate of 9% per annum for the first year and after that @ 15% per annum. [Para 201][209 B-D] 9.4 The word “paid” in Section 31(1) to the landowner cannot include in its ambit the expression “deposited” in court. Deposit cannot be said to be payment made to landowners. Deposit is on being prevented from payment. However, in case there is a tender of the amount that is to mean amount is made available to the landowner that would be a discharge of the obligation to make the payment and in that event such a person cannot be penalised for the default in making the payment. In default to deposit in court, the liability is to make the payment of interest under Section 34 of Act of 1894. The concept of “deposit” is different and quite apart from the word “paid”, due to which, lapse is provided in Section 24 of Act of 2013. In the case of nondeposit for the majority of landholdings, higher compensation would follow as such word “paid” cannot include in its ambit word “deposited”. To hold otherwise would be contrary to provisions contained in Section 24(2) and its proviso carrying different consequences. [Paras 203, 204][209 G-H][210-A][210 D-E] 9.5 There is a breach of obligation to deposit even if it is taken that amount to be deposited in the reference court in exigencies being prevented from payment as provided in Section 31(2). The default will not have the effect of reopening the concluded proceedings. The legal position and consequence which prevailed from 1893 till 2013 on failure to deposit was only the liability for interest and all those transactions were never sought to be invalidated by the provisions contained in Section 24. It is only in the case where in a pending proceeding for a period of five years or more, the steps have not been taken for taking possession and for payment of compensation, then there is a lapse under section 24(2). In case amount has not been deposited with respect to majority of land holdings, higher compensation has to follow. [Para 205][210 F-H][211-A] 9.6 When amount has been tendered, the obligation has been fulfilled by the Collector. Landowners cannot be forced to
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
receive it. In case a person has not accepted the amount and wants to take the advantage of non-payment, though the amount has remained due to his own act, it is not open to him to contend that amount has not been paid to him, as such, there should be lapse of the proceedings. Even in a case when offer for payment has been made but not deposited, liability to pay amount along with interest subsist and if not deposited for majority of holding, for that adequate provisions have been given in the proviso also to Section 24(2). The scheme of the Act of 2013 in Sections 77 and 80 is also the same as that provided in Sections 31 and 34 of the Act of 1894. [Para 206][211 B-D]
9.7 Judicial notice is taken of the fact in no other Government security rate of interest is higher on the amount being invested under sections 32 and 33 of the Act of 1894. Higher rate of interest is available under section 34 to the advantage of landowners. [Para 207][211 E-F] 9.8 Under the old regime, it was open to the Collector to fix a convenient date or dates for announcement of award, and tender payment. In the event of refusal by the landowner to receive, or in other cases, such as absence of the true owner, or in case of dispute as to who was to receive it, no doubt, the statute provided that the amount was to be deposited with the court: as it does today, under Section 77. Yet, neither during the time when the Act of 1894 was in operation, nor under the Act of 2013, the entire acquisition does not lapse for non-deposit of the compensation amount in court. Thus, it would be incorrect to imply that failure to deposit compensation [in court, under Section 31 (2)] would entail lapse, if the amounts have not been paid for five years or more prior to the coming into force of the Act of 2013. Such an interpretation would lead to retrospective operation, of a provision, and the nullification of acquisition proceedings, long completed, by imposition of a norm or standard, and its application for a time when it did not exist. If the expression “deposited” is held to be included in the expression “paid” used in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, inconsistency and repugnancy would be caused as between the proviso and the main sub-section, which has to be avoided and the non-compliance of the provisions of Section 31(2) is not fatal. Even if the amount has not been
deposited, higher compensation has to follow in the exigency proviso to Section 24(2). It is apparent that “tender” of the amount saves the party tendering it from the consequence to be visited on non-payment of the amount. [Paras 208, 209, 211][211 GH][212-A-D][212-F]
The Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Saharanpur v. Gobind [1962] (Supp 3) SCR 318; The Management of Delhi Transport Undertaking v. The Industrial Tribunal, Delhi & Anr [1965] 1 SCR 998; Indian Oxygen Ltd. v. Narayan Bhoumik (1968) 1 PLJR 94; The Benares State Bank Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Lucknow (1969) 2 SCC 316 : [1970] 1 SCR 669; Bharat Aluminium Company v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (2012) 9 SCC 552 : [2012] 12 SCR 327; The Member, Board of Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall [1955] 2 SCR 842; Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi v. M/s. East West Import and Export (P) Ltd (1989) 1 SCC 760 : [1989] 1 SCR 570 – relied on
Crawford v. Spooner (1846) 6 Moore PC 1; Lord Howard de Walden v. IRC & Anr (1948) 2 AER 825 – referred to 9.9 Two different expressions have been used in Section 24(2). The expression “paid” has been used in Section 24(2) and whereas in the proviso “deposited” has been used.
“Paid” cannot include “deposit”, or else Parliament would have used different expressions in the main sub-section and its proviso, if the meaning were to be the same. The Court cannot add or subtract any word in the statute and has to give plain meaning and when compensation has not been paid under Section 24(2), it cannot mean compensation has not been deposited as used in the proviso. While interpreting the statutory provisions, addition or subtraction in the legislation is not permissible. There cannot be any departure from the words of law, as observed in legal maxim “A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum”. There is a conscious omission of the word “deposit” in Section 24(2), which has been used in the proviso. Parliament cannot be said to have
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
used the different words carrying the same meaning in the same provision, whereas words “paid” and “deposited” carry a totally different meaning. Payment is actually made to the landowner and deposit is made in the court, that is not the payment made to the landowner. It may be discharge of liability of payment of interest and not more than that. Applying the rule of literal construction also natural, ordinary and popular meaning of the words “paid” and “deposited” do not carry the same meaning; the natural and grammatical meaning has to be given to them. [Para 215][214 F-H][215 A-D]
Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh – referred to
9.10 When two different expressions are used in the same provision of a statute, there is a presumption that they are not used in the same sense. [Para 216][216 G-H][217-A] 10. In re: Rules framed under Section 55 and the Standing Orders issued by State Governments 10.1 Rules and the Standing Orders are binding on the concerned Authorities and they have to follow them. They deposit the amounts in court only when a reference (for higher compensation) is sought, not otherwise. Even if a person refuses to accept it and the amount is deposited in court or even it is not tendered, only higher interest follows under Section 34. Once Rules have prevailed since long and even if it is assumed that deposit in court is mandatory on being prevented from payment as envisaged under Section 31(1), the only liability to make the payment of higher interest is fastened upon the State. The liability to pay the amount with interest would subsist. When amounts are deposited in court, there would occur a procedural irregularity and the adverse consequence envisaged is under Section 34 of the Act of 1894. The consequence of non-deposit in the court is that the amount of the landowner cannot be invested in the Government securities as envisaged under Sections 32 and 33 of the Act of 1894, in which interest is not more 15 per cent. Thus, no prejudice is caused to the landowners rather they stand to gain and still payment is safe as it is kept in the court. Acquisition cannot be invalidated, only higher compensation would follow in case amount has not been deposited with respect to
majority of land holdings, all the beneficiaries would be entitled for higher compensation as envisaged in the proviso to Section 24(2). [Para 229][227 G-H][228 A-D] 10.2 It is clear that once land is acquired, award passed and possession has been taken, it has vested in the State. It had been allotted to beneficiaries. A considerable infrastructure could have been developed and a third-party interest had also intervened. The land would have been given by the acquiring authorities to the beneficiaries from whose schemes the land had been acquired and they have developed immense infrastructure. Merely by deposit of amount in treasury instead of court would not invalidate all the acquisitions, which have taken place. [Para 241][235 G-H][236-A] 10.3 The proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, intends that the Collector would have sufficient funds to deposit it with respect to the majority of landholdings. In case compensation has not been paid or deposited with respect to majority of land holdings, all the beneficiaries are entitled for higher compensation. In case money has not been deposited with the Land Acquisition Collector or in the treasury or in court with respect to majority of landholdings, the consequence has to follow of higher compensation as per proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. Even otherwise, if deposit in treasury is irregular, then the interest would follow as envisaged under Section 34 of Act of 1894. Section 24(2) is attracted if acquisition proceeding is not completed within 5 years after the pronouncement of award. Parliament considered the period of 5 years as reasonable time to complete the acquisition proceedings i.e., taking physical possession of the land and payment of compensation. It is the clear intent of the Act of 2013, that provision of Section 24(2) shall apply to the proceeding which is pending as on the date on which the Act of 2013, has been brought into force and it does not apply to the concluded proceedings. Section 24(2) is not a tool to revive those proceedings and to question the validity of taking acquisition proceedings due to which possession in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s were taken, or to question the manner of deposit of amount in the treasury. In case such landowners were interested in questioning the proceedings of taking possession or mode of deposit with
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
the treasury, such a challenge was permissible within the time available with them to do so. [Para 242][236 B-H]
Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa (1969) 3 SCC 392; Sunil Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (1980) 3 SCC 304 : [1980] 3 SCR 179; State of Andhra Pradesh v. Thakkidiram Reddy (1998) 6 SCC 554 : [1998] 3 SCR 1088; Ram Deen Maurya (Dr.) v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors (2009) 6 SCC 735 : [2009] 6 SCR 703; Rai Vimal Krishna and Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 401 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 358; Hissar Improvement v. Smt. Rukmani Devi and Anr (1990) Supp SCC 806; Kishan Das v. State of U.P (1995) 6 SCC 240 : [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 584; D-Block Ashok Nagar (Sahibabad) Plot Holders’ Assn. v. State of U.P. (1997) 10 SCC 77 : [1997] 3 SCR 1096 – relied on Howard v. Secretary of State for the Environment, (1975) Q.B. 235; Belvedere Court Management Ltd. v. Frogmore Developments Ltd. (1996) 3 W.L.R. 1008 – referred to 11. Mode of taking possession under the Act of 1894 11.1 Section 16 of the Act of 1894 provided that possession of land may be taken by the State Government after passing of an award and thereupon land vest free from all encumbrances in the State Government. Similar are the provisions made in the case of urgency in Section 17(1). The word “possession” has been used in the Act of 1894, whereas in Section 24(2) of Act of 2013, the expression “physical possession” is used. What was contemplated under the Act of 1894, by taking the possession meant only physical possession of the land. Taking over the possession under the Act of 2013 always amounted to taking over physical possession of the land. When the State Government acquires land and draws up a memorandum of taking possession, that amounts to taking the physical possession of the land. On the large chunk of property or otherwise which is acquired, the Government is not supposed to put some other person or the police force in possession to retain it and start cultivating it till the land is used by it for the purpose for which it has been acquired.
The Government is not supposed to start residing or to physically occupy it once possession has been taken by drawing the inquest proceedings for obtaining possession thereof. Thereafter, if any further retaining of land or any re-entry is made on the land or someone starts cultivation on the open land or starts residing in the outhouse, etc., is deemed to be the trespasser on land which is in possession of the State. [Paras 244, 245][237 G-H][238A][238 C-F] 11.2 The concept of possession is complex one. It comprises the right to possess and to exclude others, essential is animus possidendi. Possession depends upon the character of the thing which is possessed. If the land is not capable of any use, mere non-user of it does not lead to the inference that the owner is not in possession. The established principle is that the possession follows title. Possession comprises of the control over the property. The element of possession is the physical control or the power over the object and intention or will to exercise the power. Corpus and animus are both necessary and have to coexist. [Para 247][239 A-C] Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja & Ors. (1979) 4 SCC 274 : [1980] 1 SCR 323; Ram Dass v. Davinder (2004) 3 SCC 684; Bhinka & Ors. v. Charan Singh [1959] (Suppl 2) SCR 798; V. Chandrasekaran & Anr. v. Administrative Officer & Ors (2012) 12 SCC 133 : [2012] 10 SCR 603 – relied on S.M. Yaqub v. T.N. Basu AIR 1949 Pat 146 – referred to Kynoch Limited v. Rowlands (1912) 1 Ch 527 – referred to Mitra’s “Law of Possession and Ownership of Property”, 2nd Edn.; Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, West Publishing Co.; Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, Ed. 1969 – referred to 11.3 It is apparent that vesting is with possession and the statute has provided under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1894 that once possession is taken, absolute vesting occurred. It is an indefeasible right and vesting is with possession thereafter. The vesting specified under section 16, takes place after various steps,
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
such as, notification under section 4, declaration under section 6, notice under section 9, award under section 11 and then possession. The statutory provision of vesting of property absolutely free from all encumbrances has to be accorded full effect. Not only the possession vests in the State but all other encumbrances are also removed forthwith.
The title of the landholder ceases and the state becomes the absolute owner and in possession of the property. Thereafter there is no control of the land-owner over the property. He cannot have any animus to take the property and to control it. Even if he has retained the possession or otherwise trespassed upon it after possession has been taken by the State, he is a trespasser and such possession of trespasser enures for his benefit and on behalf of the owner. The word ‘vest’ has to be construed in the context in which it is used in a particular provision of the Act. Vesting is absolute and free from all encumbrances that includes possession. Once there is vesting of land, once possession has been taken, section 24(2) does not contemplate divesting of the property from the State. [Paras 256, 258][245 E-H][246 G-H][247-A] Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (1998) 4 SCC 387 : [1998] 2 SCR 339; B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P. and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 700 : [1999] 2 SCR 1111; Kailash Nath Agarwal and Ors. v. Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation of U.P. Ltd. and Anr., (2003) 4 SCC 305 : [2003] 1 SCR 1159; DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana and Ors., (2003) 5 SCC 622 : [2003] 2 SCR 1; Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi v. Lieutenant Governor, Government of NCT, Delhi and Ors., (2009) 10 SCC 501 : [2009] 14 SCR 507; Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust, Amritsar v. State of Punjab & Ors (1996) 4 SCC 212 : [1996] 2 SCR 643; P.K. Kalburqi v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (2005) 12 SCC 489; National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad & Ors 2011 (12) SCC 695 : [2011] 14 SCR 472; M. Venkatesh and Ors. v. Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority, etc. (2015) 17 SCC 1 : [2015] 15 SCR 499; Ram Singh v.
Jammu Development Authority (2017) 13 SCC 474 – relied on Ramesh Bejoy Sharma v. Pashupati Rai (1979) 4 SCC 27 : [1980] 1 SCR 6; Maguni Charan Dwivedi v. State of Orissa (1976) 2 SCC 134 : [1976] 3 SCR 76; Sri Tarkeshwar Sio Thakur Jiu v. Dar Dass Dey & Co. (1979) 3 SCC 106; Karanpura Development Co. v. Union of India (1988) Supp. SCC 488 – distinguished Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Corporation & Anr (2001) 8 SCC 143 : [2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 50; NAL Layout Residents Association v. Bangalore Development Authority Ors. v. Hindustan Petroleum (2018) 12 SCC 400 : [2017] 13 SCR 1053 – referred to Richardson v. Robertson, (1862) 6 LT 75 – referred to
11.4 Under the Act of 1894, when possession is taken after award is passed under section 16 or under section 17 before the passing of the award, land absolutely vests in the State on drawing of Panchnama of taking possession, which is the mode of taking possession. Thereafter, any re-entry in possession or retaining the possession is wholly illegal and trespasser’s possession inures for the benefit of the owner and even in the case of open land, possession is deemed to be that of the owner. When the land is vacant and is lying open, it is presumed to be that of the owner. Mere re-entry on Government land once it is acquired and vests absolutely in the State (under the Act of 1894) does not confer, any right to it and Section 24(2) does not have the effect of divesting the land once it vests in the State. [Para 272][255 GH][256 A-C] Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana (2012) 1 SCC 792 : [2011] 14 SCR 1113 – Not correct law
Kashi Bai v. Sudha Rani Ghose (2012) 5 SCC 370 : [2012] 3 SCR 841 – relied on 11.5 The court is alive to the fact that there are a large number of cases where, after acquisition, land has been handed over to various corporations, local authorities, acquiring bodies,
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
etc. After depositing compensation (for the acquisition) those bodies and authorities have been handed possession of lands. They, in turn, after development of such acquired lands have handed over properties; third party interests have intervened and now declaration is sought under the cover of section 24(2) to invalidate all such actions. As already held, section 24 does not intend to cover such cases at all and such gross misuse of the provisions of law must stop. Title once vested, cannot be obliterated, without an express legal provision; in any case, even if the landowners’ argument that after possession too, in case of non-payment of compensation, the acquisition would lapse, were for arguments’ sake, be accepted, these third party owners would be deprived of their lands, lawfully acquired by them, without compensation of any sort. [Para 277][258-H][259 A-C]
Velaxan Kumar v Union of India (2015) 4 SCC 325; Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of M.P. (2011) 7 SCC 639 : [2011] 6 SCR 443 – overuled Maria Margadia Sequeria v Erasmo Jack De Sequeria (2012) 5 SCC 370 : [2012] 3 SCR 841; National Thermal Power Ltd v Mahesh Dutta (2009) 8 SCC 339 : [2009] 10 SCR 1084; V. Chandrasekaran & Anr. v. Administrative Officer & Ors. (2012) 12 SCC 133 : [2012] 10 SCR 603 – relied on
12. The effect of interim order of Court 12.1 There are two requirements under Section 24(2), which are to be met by the Authorities, where award has been made 5 years or more prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013, if the physical possession of the land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. If possession has been taken, compensation has to be paid by the acquiring authorities. The time of five years is provided for authorities to take action, not to sleep over the matter. Lapse is provided only in case of default by Authorities acquiring the land, not caused by any other reason or order of the court. When the interpretation of the provision is clear, there was no necessity for Parliament to make such a provision under Section 24(2) for exclusion of the period of the interim order. Though it has excluded the period of interim order
for making declaration under the proviso to Sections 19(7) and exclusion has also been made for computation of the period under Section 69 of the Act of 2013, it is due to the necessity to provide so in view of the language of the provision. The provisions of Section 24 cast an obligation upon the Authorities to take steps meaning thereby that it is open to them to take such steps, and inaction or lethargy on their part has not been countenanced by Parliament. Resultantly, lapse of proceedings takes place. [Para 282][261 C-H][262-A] State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Khandaka Jain Jewellers (2007) 14 SCC 339 : [2007] 12 SCR 105; Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) & Ors. v. State of T.N. & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 533 : [2002] 2 SCR 383; Union of India v. SICOM Ltd (2009) 2 SCC 121 : [2008] 17 SCR 120 – referred to 12.2 It is not the intendment of the Act of 2013 that those who have litigated should get benefits of higher compensation as contemplated under Section 24 benefit is conferred on all beneficiaries. It is not intended by the provisions that in piecemeal the persons who have litigated and have obtained the interim order should get the benefits of the provisions of the Act of 2013. Those who have accepted the compensation within 5 years and handed over the possession too, are to be benefited, in case amount has not been deposited with respect to majority of holdings. There are cases in which projects have come up in part and as per plan rest of the area is required for planned development with respect to which interim stays have been obtained. It is not the intendment of the law to deliver advantage to relentless litigants. It cannot be said hence, that it was due to the inaction of the authorities that possession could not be taken within 5 years. Public policy is not to foment or foster litigation but put an end to it. In several instances, in various High Courts writ petitions were dismissed by single judge Benches and the writ appeals were pending for a long time and in which, with respect to part of land of the projects, efforts were made to obtain the benefit of Section 24(2). Parliament did not intend to confer benefits to such litigants for the aforementioned reasons. Litigation may be frivolous or may be worthy. Such litigants have
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
to stand on the strength of their own case and in such a case provisions of Section 114 of the Act of 2013 and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, are clearly attracted and such proceedings have to be continued under the provisions of the old Act that would be in the spirit of Section 24(1)(b) itself of the Act of 2013. Section 6(b) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, provides that repeal will not affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder. Section 6(c) states that repeal would not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. When there is a provision itself in Section 24(1)(b) of continuance of the proceedings where award has been passed under the Act of 1894, for the purposes of Section 24 as provided in Section 24(b), the provisions of Section 114 is clearly attracted so as the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, to the extent of non obstante clause of Section 24, where possession has not been taken nor payment has been made, there is a lapse, that too by the inaction of the Authorities. Any court’s interim order cannot be said to be inaction of the authorities or agencies; thus, time period is not to be included for counting the 5 years period as envisaged in Section 24(2). [Para 287][263 F-H][264 A-G]
Union of India and Ors. v. Modi Rubber Ltd (1986) 4 SCC 66 : [1986] 3 SCR 587 – relied on
Syndicate Bank v. Prabha D. Naik and Anr (2001) 4 SCC 713 : [2001] 2 SCR 714 – held inapplicable Madan Singh Shekhawat v. Union of India (1999) 6 SCC 459; State of U.P. and Ors. v. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. and Ors. (1979) 3 SCC 229 : [1979] 3 SCR 709; M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa [1961] 2 SCR 295; Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar (1988) 2 SCC 513 : [1988] 3 SCR 384 – referred to
Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher (1949) 2 K.B. 481 – referred to
12.3 In cases where some landowners have chosen to take recourse to litigation (which they have a right to) and have obtained interim orders on taking possession or orders of status quo, as a matter of practical reality it is not possible for the authorities or State officials to take the possession or to make payment of the compensation. In several instances, such interim orders also impeded the making of an award. Now, so far as awards (and compensation payments, pursuant to such proceedings were concerned) the period provided for making of awards under the Act of 2013 could be excluded by virtue of Explanation to Section 11A. Thus, no fault of inaction can be attributed to the authorities and those who had obtained such interim orders, cannot benefit by their own action in filing litigation, which may or may not be meritorious. Apart from the question of merits, when there is an interim order with respect to the possession or order of status quo or stay of further proceedings, the authorities cannot proceed; nor can they pay compensation. Their obligations are intertwined with the scheme of land acquisition. It is observed that authorities may wait in the proceedings till the interim order is vacated. [Para 297][272-B-E] Abhey Ram (Dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors (1997) 5 SCC 421 : [1997] 3 SCR 931; Om Parkash v. Union of India and Ors. (2010) 4 SCC 17 : [2010] 2 SCR 447; Suresh Chand v. Gulam Chisti (1990) 1 SCC 593 : [1990] 1 SCR 186; Shyam Sunder and Ors. v. Ram Kumar and Anr. (2001) 8 SCC 24 : [2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 115 – relied on Union of India v. Shiv Raj (2014) 6 SCC 564 : [2014] 8 SCR 751; Karnail Kaur v State of Punjab (2015) 3 SCC 206; Rajive Chowdhrie HUF v State (NCT) of Delhi (2015) 3 SCC 541 – distinguished Union of India and Ors. v. North Telumer Colliery & Ors (1989) 3 SCC 411 : [1989] 3 SCR 455 – referred to 12.4 There is no dispute with the proposition that casus omissus cannot be applied by the court and in case of clear necessity, the court has to interpret the law, if the provision of
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
law is misused and subjected to abuse of process of law. It is for the legislature to amend, modify and repeal a law, if deemed necessary. Because of the interpretation of the provisions of Section 24 itself, casus omissus is not applied in this case. [Para 309][281 A-B]
State of Karnataka v. D.C. Nanjudaiah (1996) 10 SCC 619 : [1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 222; Rana Girders Ltd. v. Union of India (2013) 10 SCC 746 : [2013] 14 SCR 58 – referred to
12.5 There is no doubt that common law principles have to be weighed upon the statutory provision and latter has to prevail, but the statutory provision itself makes it clear that in the instant matter such period has to be excluded, thus, the principles of common law also apply with full force. The maxim “lex non cogit ad impossibilia” means that the law does not expect the performance of the impossible. There are cases in which compensation was tendered, but refused and then deposited in the treasury. There was litigation in court, which was pending (or in some cases, decided); earlier references for enhancement of compensation were sought and compensation was enhanced. There was no challenge to acquisition proceedings or taking possession etc. In pending matters in this Court or in the High Court even in proceedings relating to compensation, Section 24 (2) was invoked to state that proceedings have lapsed due to non-deposit of compensation in the court or to deposit in the treasury or otherwise due to interim order of the court needful could not be done, as such proceedings should lapse. [Paras 311, 312][311 D-E][283 C-F] Mary Angel and Ors. v. State of T.N. (1999) 5 SCC 209 : [1999] 3 SCR 594; Chander Kishore Jha v. Mahabir Prasad (1999) 8 SCC 266 : [1999] 2 Suppl. SCR 754; Mohammed Gazi v. State of M.P. & Ors. (2000) 4 SCC 342 : [2012] 3 SCR 841; Industrial Finance Corporation of India Ltd. v. Cannanore Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. & Ors. (2002) 5 SCC 54 : [2002] 2 SCR 1093; HUDA and Anr. v. Dr. Babeswar Kanhar & Anr (2005) 1 SCC 191 : [2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 282 – referred to
12.6 Another Roman Law maxim “nemo tenetur ad impossibilia”, means no one is bound to do an impossibility. Though such acts of taking possession and disbursement of compensation are not impossible, yet they are not capable of law performance, during subsistence of a court’s order; the order has to be complied and cannot be violated. Thus, on equitable principles also, such a period has to be excluded. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit is founded upon the principle that due to court proceedings or acts of court, no party should suffer. If any interim orders are made during the pendency of the litigation, they are subject to the final decision in the matter. In case the matter is dismissed as without merit, the interim order is automatically dissolved. In case litigation has been filed frivolously or without any basis, iniquitously in order to delay and by that it is delayed, there is no equity in favour of such a person. Such cases are required to be decided on merits. It is not the policy of law that untenable claims should get fructified due to delay. Similarly, sufferance of a person who abides by law is not permissible. The Act of 2013 does not confer the benefit on unscrupulous litigants, but it frowns upon the lethargy of the officials to complete the requisites within five years. [Paras 314, 318, 319][284 D-E][287 F-H][288-A][288 B-C] re Presidential Poll (1974) 2 SCC 33 : [1975] 1 SCR 504; Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement (2005) 4 SCC 530 : [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 49 – relied on Superintendent of Taxes v. Onkarmal Nathmal Trust (1976) 1 SCC 766 : [1975] Suppl. SCR 365 – distinguished Neeraj Kumar Sainy v. the State of U.P. (2017) 14 SCC 136 : [2017] 4 SCR 881 – held inapplicable
Mrutunjay Pani and Anr. v. Narmada Bala Sasmal and Anr AIR 1961 SC 1353 : [1962] SCR 290 – referred to Sambasiva Chari v. Ramasami Reddi ILR (1899) 22 Mad 179; G.T.C. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (1998) 3 SCC 376; Jaipur Municipal Corporation v. C. L.
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
Mishra (2005) 8 SCC 423; Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. C.I.T (1980) 2 SCC 191 : [1980] 2 SCR 765; Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corporation (1995) 3 SCC 33 : [1995] 1 SCR 543; Amarjeet Singh and Ors. v. Devi Ratan and Ors (2010) 1 SCC 417 : [2009] 15 SCR 1010; Karnataka Rare Earth and Anr. v. Senior Geologist, Department of Mines & Geology (2004) 2 SCC 783 : [2004] 1 SCR 965; Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. National Tobacco Company of India Ltd. (1972) 2 SCC 560 : [1973] 1 SCR 822; Karnataka State v. Union of India (1977) 4 SCC 608 : [1978] 2 SCR 1 – referred to
Colquhoun v. Brooks (1889) 21 QBD 52 – referred to Lewis Sutherland’s Statutory Construction (2 nd ed.); Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition) by P. St. J. Langon – referred to
13. In Re: Principle of Restitution: The principle of restitution is founded on the ideal of doing complete justice at the end of litigation, and parties have to be placed in the same position but for the litigation and interim order, if any, passed in the matter. A wrong-doer or in the present context, a litigant who takes his chances, cannot be permitted to gain by delaying tactics. It is the duty of the judicial system to discourage undue enrichment or drawing of undue advantage, by using the court as a tool. Thus, the period for which the interim order has operated under Section 24 has to be excluded for counting the period of 5 years under Section 24(2). [Paras 332, 335, 336][298 G-H][306 E-F][307 D-E] State of Gujarat & Ors. v. Essar Oil Ltd. & Anr (2012) 3 SCC 522 : [2012] 2 SCR 1127; A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam (2012) 6 SCC 430 : [2012] 4 SCR 74; Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 161 : [2011] 9 SCR 146; Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. CIT, (1980) 2 SCC 191; Ram Krishna Verma v. the State of U.P. (1992) 2 SCC 620 : [1992] 2 SCR 378; Marshall Sons & Co.
(I) Ltd. v. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. and Anr., (1999) 2 SCC 325 : [1999] 1 SCR 311; Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania (2010) 9 SCC 437 : [2010] 10 SCR 971; Krishnaswamy S. Pd. v. Union of India (2006) 3 SCC 286 : [2006] 2 SCR 390 – relied on 14. Whether Section 24 revives stale and barred claim
14.1 The legality of concluded cases cannot be questioned under the guise of Section 24(2) as it does not envisage or confer any such right to question the proceedings and the acquisitions have been concluded long back, or in several rounds of litigation, rights of the parties have been settled. The challenge to the acquisition proceedings cannot be made within the parameters of Section 24(2) once panchnama had been drawn of taking possession, thereafter re-entry or retaining the possession is that of the trespasser. The legality of the proceedings cannot be challenged belatedly, and the right to challenge cannot be revived by virtue of the provisions of Section 24(2). [Paras 340, 342][309 F-G][312 F-G] Shiv Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors 2019 (13) SCALE 698; Mahavir and Ors. v. Union of India (2018) 3 SCC 588 : [2017] 11 SCR 553; Hari Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors AIR 1984 SC 1020 : [1984] 3 SCR 417; State of T.N. and Ors. v. L. Krishnan & Ors (1996) 1 SCC 250 : [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 663; Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd (1996) 11 SCC 501 : [1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 551; Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. Bhagwan Singh Bhati and Ors., (2008) 3 SCC 462 : [2008] 4 SCR 616; Govt. of A.P. and Ors. v. Kollutla Obi Reddy and Ors., (2005) 6 SCC 493 : [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 513; Jasveer Singh and Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2017) 6 SCC 787 : [2017] 3 SCR 921; Swaika Properties Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors (2008) 4 SCC 695 :[2008] 2 SCR 521; Haryana State Handloom and Handicrafts Corporation Ltd. and Ors. v. Jain School Society (2003) 12 SCC 538; Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur vs.
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
Bheru Lal and Ors (2002) 7 SCC 712 : [2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 512; Vishwas Nagar Evacuee Plot Purchasers Association & Ors. v. Under Secretary, Delhi Admn. & Ors. (1990) 2 SCC 268; U.P. State Jal Nigam and Anr. v. Jaswant Singh and Anr (2006) 11 SCC 464 : [2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 916; Rabindranath Bose and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors (1970) 1 SCC 84 : [1970] 2 SCR 697; Dharappa v. Bijapur Coop. Milk Producers Societies Union Ltd (2007) 9 SCC 109 : [2007] 5 SCR 729; State of Karnataka v. Laxuman (2005) 8 SCC 709 : [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 535 – relied on
State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma and Ors (2015) 5 SCC 321 : [2014] 14 SCR 1451 – referred to
14.2 There has to be legal certainty where infrastructure has been created or has been developed partially, and investments have been made, especially when land has been acquired long back. It is the duty of the Court to preserve the legal certainty. The doctrine of laches would always preclude an indolent party, who chooses not to approach the court, or having approached the court, allows an adverse decision to become final, to re-agitate the issue of acquisition of his holding. Doing so, especially in cases, where the title has vested with the State, and thereafter with subsequent interests, would be contrary to public policy. [Para 353][322 D-G] Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India and Ors (2012) 6 SCC 613 : [2012] 1 SCR 573; A.P. State Financial Corp. v. Garware Rolling Mill (1994) 2 SCC 647 – relied on Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy (1970) 1 SCC 613 : [1970] 3 SCR 830; Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty and Anr (2018) 16 SCC 228 : [2018] 3 SCR 884; Anil Kumar Gupta v. the State of Bihar (2012) 12 SCC 443; Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 44 : [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 558 – referred to
British Railway Board v. Pickin (1974) AC 765 – referred to
14.3 Section 24 cannot be used to revive dead and stale claims and concluded cases. They cannot be inquired into within the purview of Section 24 of the Act of 2013. The provisions of Section 24 do not invalidate the judgments and orders of the Court, where rights and claims have been lost and negatived. There is no revival of the barred claims by operation of law. Thus, stale and dead claims cannot be permitted to be canvassed on the pretext of enactment of Section 24. In exceptional cases, when in fact, the payment has not been made, but possession has been taken, the remedy lies elsewhere if the case is not covered by the proviso. It is the Court to consider it independently not under section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. [Para 359][325 C-E] 15. Section 101 provides that in case land is not utilized for five years from the date of taking over the possession, the same shall be returned to the original owner or owners or their legal heirs, as the case may be, or to the Land Bank of the appropriate Government by reversion in the manner as may be prescribed by the appropriate Government. Section 24 deals with lapse of acquisition. Section 101 cannot be said to be applicable to an acquisition made under the Act of 1894. The provision of lapse has to be considered on its own strength and not by virtue of Section 101 though the spirit is to give back the land to the original owner or owners or the legal heirs or to the Land Bank. Return of lands is with respect to all lands acquired under the Act of 2013 as the expression used in the opening part is “When any land, acquired under this Act remains unutilized”. Lapse, on the other hand, occurs when the State does not take steps in terms of Section 24(2). The provisions of Section 101 cannot be applied to the acquisitions made under the Act of 1894. [Paras 360, 361][325 E-F][326 A-C] Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr v Harakchand Misrimal Solanki & Ors (2014) 3 SCC 183 : [2014] 1 SCR 783; Sree Balaji Nagar Residents Association v State of Tamil Nadu (2015) 3 SCC 353 : [2014] 7 SCR 799 – overuled Yogesh Neema & Ors v State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) 6 SCC 387; Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. v. Super
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
Cassette Industries Ltd. (2008) 13 SCC 30 : [2008] 9 SCR 165; Southern Electricity Supply Co. of Orissa Ltd. v. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill (2012) 2 SCC 108 : [2011] 15 SCR 211; D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India & Ors (2003) 6 SCC 186 : [2003] 3 SCR 1209; Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors v. Smt. P. Laxmi Devi (2008) 4 SCC 720 : [2008] 3 SCR 330; Indore Development Authority v Shailendra (dead) through Lrs. & Ors. (2018) SCC Online SC 100; N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose & Ors (2009) 7 SCC 1 : [2009] 7 SCR 668; Ram Narain v. Stte of U.P. AIR 1957 SC 18 : [1956] SCR 664; Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India (2002) 3 SCC 722 : [2002] 2 SCR 369; Collector of Central Excise v. Elphinstone Spg.&Wvg.Mills Co.Ltd. (1971)1 SCC 337 : J.Dalmia v Commissioner of Income Tax AIR 1964 SC 1866 : [1964] SCR 579; Mobilox Innovations (P) Ltd v. Kirusa Software (P) L t d (2018) 1 SCC 353 : [2017] 10 SCR 1006; Sri K.C Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa [1954] SCR 11; Jagannath Temple Managing Committee v. Siddha Math (2015) 16 SCC 542 : [2015] SCR 46; Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 800 : [1977] 1 SCR 875; Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 405; Banda Development Authority v. Moti Lal Agarwal (2011) 5 SCC 394 : [2011] 7 SCR 435; Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat, (1976) 1 SCC 700 : [1975] Suppl. SCR 250; State of T.N. v. Mahalakshmi Ammal, (1996) 7 SCC 269 : [1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 451; T.N. Housing Board v. A. Viswam, (1996) 8 SCC 259 : [1996] 2 SCR 402; Om Prakash Verma & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors, (2010) 13 SCC 158 : [2010] 15 SCR 302; A.R. Antulay vs R.S.Nayak & Ors [1988] Suppl 1 SCR 01; Cardio Vascular Diseases (2014) 2 SCC 62 : [2013] 12 SCR 674; Dau Dayal v State of U.P. [1959] Supp 1 SCR 639; South Eastern Coal Field Ltd v State of M.P. & Ors. (2003) 8 SCC 648 : [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 651; Dev Sharan v State of Uttar Pradesh (2011) 4
SCC 769 : [2011] 3 SCR 728; Radhey Shyam v State of UP. (2011) 5 SCC 553 : [2011] 8 SCR 359; Bharat Sewak Samaj v. Lieutnant Governor & Ors. (2012) 12 SCC 675; Madhav Rao Scindhia v. Union of India (1971) 1 SCC 85 : [1971] 3 SCR 9 (11 Judges); Smt. Parayankandiyal Eravath v. K. Devi (1996) 4 SCC 76 : [1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 1 (2 Judges); Bharat Kumar v State of Haryana (2014) 6 SCC 586; Bimla Devi v State of Haryana (2014) 6 SCC 583; State of Haryana v Vinod Oil and General Mills (2014) 15 SCC 410 : [2014] 13 SCR 524; Sita Ram v State of Haryana (2015) 3 SCC 597; Ram Kishan v State of Haryana (2015) 4 SCC 347; Competent Automobiles Co. Ltd v Union of India AIR 2015 SC 3186 : [2015] SCR 237; Govt of NCT of Delhi v Jagjit Singh AIR 2015 SC 2683 : [2015] SCR 692; Karan Singh v State of Haryana (2014) 5 SCC 738; Shashi Gupta & Ors. v. State of Haryana (2016) 13 SCC 380; Delhi Development Authority v Sukhbir Singh (2016) 16 SCC 258 : [2016] 5 SCR 227; Ivo Agnelo Santimano Fernandes v. State of Goa (2011) 11 SCC 506 : [2011] 2 SCR 1142; Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand (2005) 3 SCC 551 : [2005] 1 SCR 1019; Central Railway Workshop v. Vishwanath (1969) 3 SCC 95; [1970] 2 SCR 726; M/s International Ore and Fertilisers (india) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Employee State Insurance (1987) 4 SCC 203 : [1987] 3 SCR 981; Seksaria Cotton mills v. State of Bombay [1953] SCR 325; Superintendent v. Anil Kumar (1979) 4 SCC 274 : [1980] 1 SCR 323; B. Gangadhar v. Rajalingam (1995) 5 SCC 238 : [1995] 1 Suppl. SCR 535; Guruchand Singh v. Kamla Singh (1976) 2 SCC 152 : [1976] 1 SCR 739 (67); Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2015) 6 SCC 222 : [2015] 5 SCR 435; The Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Parson Tools and Plants (1975) 4 SCC 22; G. Narayanswami v. G. Pannerselvam (1972) 3 SCC 71; Kuldip Nayar vs Union Of India (2006) 7 SCC 1 : [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 1; Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights vs. Union of India (1998) 2 SCC 109 : [1997] 5 Suppl. SCR 469; R.S. Nayak v A.R. Antulay
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
(1984) 2 SCC 183 : [1984] 2 SCR 495; Life Insurance Corporation v D. J. Bahadur (1981) 1 SCC 315 : [1981] 1 SCR 1083; B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal (2011) 4 SCC 266 : [2011] 3 SCR 932; Martin Burn Ltd v Corporation of Calcutta [1966] 1 SCR 543; Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax v Keshab Chandra Mandal [1950] SCR 435; State of Maharastra v Nanded Parbhani Sangh (2000) 2 SCC 69 : [2000] 1 SCR 357; Mohd. Kavi v. Fatmabal Ibrahim (1997) 6 SCC 71; M.V. Javali v Mahajan Borewell & Co. Ltd (1997) 8 SCC 72 : [1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 320; SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC 89 : [2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 371; State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh [1955] 1 SCR 893; J.K.Cotton Spg. & Wvg.Mils Ltd. v. Union of India (1987) Supp SCC 350 : [1988] SCR 700; Bengal Immunity Co.Ltd. v. State of Bihar [1955] 2 SCR 603; MIG Cricket Club v.AbhinavSahakar Education Society, (2011) 9 SCC 97 : [2011] 11 SCR 141; Ishwar Singh Bindra & Ors v State of UP [1969] 1 SCR 219 – referred to
Giward de Walden (Lord) v. IRS (1948) 2 ALL ER 825 (HL); Secretary of State for Social Security v Tunnicliffe [1991] 2 All ER 712; Howard de Walden (Lord) v. IRC, (1948) 2 All ER 825 (HL); Green v. Premier Glynrhonwy State Co. L.R (1928) 1 KB 561 – referred to Case Law Reference
(2016) 6 SCC 387
referred to
Para 2
[2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 24
referred to
Para 23
[2008] 3 SCR 330
referred to
Para 23
[2010] 3 SCR 485
referred to
Para 23
[2013] 8 SCR 849
referred to
Para 31
[1956] SCR 664
referred to
Para 31
[2002] 2 SCR 369
referred to
Para 34
(1971)1 SCC 337
referred to
Para 38
[1964] SCR 579
referred to
Para 38
[2017] 10 SCR 1006
referred to
Para 44
[1971] SCR 977
referred to
Para 44
[1969] 1 SCR 219
referred to
Para 44
[1987] 2 SCR 911
referred to
Para 44
[1955] 2 SCR 603
referred to
Para 47
[1954] SCR 11
referred to
Para 47
[2015] SCR 46
referred to
Para 47
[2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 534
referred to
Para 50
[1977] 1 SCR 875
referred to
Para 50
[2009] 14 SCR 507
relied on
Para 50
(1996) 6 SCC 405
referred to
Para 50
[2011] 7 SCR 435
referred to
Para 50
[1975] Suppl. SCR 250
referred to
Para 51
[1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 451
referred to
Para 51
[1996] 2 SCR 402
referred to
Para 51
[2010] 15 SCR 302
referred to
Para 51
[1988] Suppl 1 SCR 01
referred to
Para 52
[2013] 12 SCR 674
referred to
Para 52
[1959] Supp 1 SCR 639
referred to
Para 52
[2011] 3 SCR 728
referred to
Para 53
[2011] 8 SCR 359
referred to
Para 53
(2012) 12 SCC 675
referred to
Para 53
[1971] 3 SCR 9
referred to
Para 55
[1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 1
referred to
Para 55
(2014) 6 SCC 586
referred to
Para 58
(2014) 6 SCC 583
referred to
Para 58
[2014] 13 SCR 524
referred to
Para 58
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
(2015) 3 SCC 597
referred to
Para 58
(2015) 4 SCC 347
referred to
Para 58
[2015] SCR 237
referred to
Para 58
[2015] SCR 692
referred to
Para 58
(2014) 5 SCC 738
referred to
Para 58
(2016) 13 SCC 380
referred to
Para 58
[2016] 5 SCR 227
referred to
Para 58
[2011] 2 SCR 1142
referred to
Para 59
[2005] 1 SCR 1019
referred to
Para 63
[1970] 2 SCR 726
referred to
Para 63
[1987] 3 SCR 981
referred to
Para 63
[1953] SCR 325
referred to
Para 67
[1980] 1 SCR 323
referred to
Para 67
[1995] 1 Suppl. SCR 535
referred to
Para 67
[1976] 1 SCR 739
referred to
Para 67
[2015] 5 SCR 435
referred to
Para 67
[2007] 12 SCR 105
referred to
Para 69
(1975) 4 SCC 22
referred to
Para 70
(1972) 3 SCC 71
referred to
Para 70
[2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 1
referred to
Para 70
[1997] 5 Suppl. SCR 469
referred to
Para 73
[1984] 2 SCR 495
referred to
Para 73
[1981] 1 SCR 1083
referred to
Para 73
[2011] 3 SCR 932
referred to
Para 79
[1966] 1 SCR 543
referred to
Para 82
[1950] SCR 435
referred to
Para 82
[2000] 1 SCR 357
referred to
Para 82
(1997) 6 SCC 71
referred to
Para 82
[1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 320
referred to
Para 82
[2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 371
referred to
Para 82
[1955] 1 SCR 893
referred to
Para 84
[1988] SCR 700
referred to
Para 86
[1955]2 SCR 603
referred to
Para 86
[2011] 11 SCR 141
referred to
Para 87
[1965] SCR 328
relied on
Para 97
(1971) 2 SCC 540
relied on
Para 97
[1961] SCR 718
relied on
Para 101
[2005] 2 SCR 23
relied on
Para 101
[1987] 2 SCR 911
relied on
Para 101
[1998] 1 Suppl. SCR 244
relied on
Para 103
[1964] SCR 561
relied on
Para 104
[1957] 1 SCR 874
relied on
Para 104
[1965] 2 SCR 853
referred to
Para 106
[1976] 1 SCR 505
referred to
Para 107
[1980] 1 SCR 910
referred to
Para 108
[1992] 3 SCR 634
referred to
Para 109
[1958] SCR 1156
relied on
Para 120
[2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 127
relied on
Para 121
[1994] 3 Suppl. SCR 405
relied on
Para 125
[2004] 3 SCR 854
referred to
Para 126
[1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 158
referred to
Para 128
[2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 534
referred to
Para 128
[1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 336
relied on
Para 135
[2009] 14 SCR 905
relied on
Para 136
[1996] 2 SCR 1088
relied on
Para 137
[1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 197
relied on
Para 138
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
[1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 426
relied on
Para 139
[2010] 7 SCR 204
relied on
Para 140
[1952] SCR 612
referred to
Para140
[1961] SCR 679
referred to
Para 140
[1965] SCR 970
referred to
Para 140
[1980] 1 SCR 1177
referred to
Para 140
[2003] 1 SCR 653
referred to
Para 140
[2004] 3 SCR 834
referred to
Para 140
[1989] 1 SCR 986
referred to
Para 140
[2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 357
referred to
Para 140
[1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 448
referred to
Para 140
[2008] 17 SCR 35
referred to
Para 140
[1961] 2 SCR 189
referred to
Para 142
1996 (7) JT 118
relied on
Para 145
[1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 6
relied on
Para 146
[1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 787
relied on
Para 147
[1996] 2 SCR 638
relied on
Para 147
[1957] SCR 01
relied on
Para 147
[2016] 1 SCR 343
relied on
Para 148
[2017] 9 SCR 482
relied on
Para 149
[2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 400
relied on
Para 158
[2015] 7 SCR 56
relied on
Para 159
[1966] 1 SCR 890
relied on
Para 160
[1964] 1 SCR 897
relied on
Para 160
[2011] 15 SCR 211
referred to
Para 160
[1989] 2 SCR 544
referred to
Para 160
[2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 387
referred to
Para 160
[2003] 3 SCR 1209
referred to
Para 160
[2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 24
referred to
Para 160
[2007] 13 SCR 598
referred to
Para 160
[2008] 3 SCR 330
referred to
Para 160
[2008] 9 SCR 165
referred to
Para 160
[2009] 7 SCR 668
referred to
Para 160
[2010] 3 SCR 485
referred to
Para 160
[2013] 1 SCR 1
referred to
Para 160
[1962] 1 SCR 44
relied on
Para 166
[1955] SCR 1196
relied on
Para 166
(2000) 5 SCC 488
relied on
Para 166
[2016] 5 SCR 227
referred to
Para 166
[2002] 2 SCR 383
referred to
Para 166
[2013] 8 SCR 241
relied on
Para 166
[2011] 3 SCR 932
referred to
Para 166
[2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 517
referred to
Para 166
[2017] 14 SCR 202
referred to
Para 171
[1953] SCR 1
relied on
Para 178
[2005] 1 SCR 223
relied on
Para 179
[2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 734
relied on
Para 180
[2017] 13 SCR 25
referred to
Para 180
[1982] 3 SCR 121
referred to
Para 181
[1965] 1 SCR 276
relied on
Para 190
[1967] 1 SCR 831
relied on
Para 190
[1968] SCR 148
relied on
Para 190
[1985] 2 SCR 643
relied on
Para 191
[1966] 1 SCR 367
relied on
Para 193
[2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1039
relied on
Para 193
[2013] 14 SCR 136
relied on
Para 193
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
[1965] 3 SCR 626
relied on
Para 193
AIR 1961 SC 1596
relied on
Para 193
[1976] 1 SCR 277
relied on
Para 193
[1959] (Supp) 2 SCR 256
relied on
Para 193
[2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 227
relied on
Para 193
[1985] 2 SCR 1051
relied on
Para194
[1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 276
relied on
Para 194
AIR (34) 1947 PC 94
relied on
Para 194
[1962] (Supp 3) SCR 318
relied on
Para 212
[1965] 1 SCR 998
relied on
Para 213
[1970] 1 SCR 669
relied on
Para 214
[2012] 12 SCR 327
relied on
Para 219
[1955] 2 SCR 842
relied on
Para 221
[1989] 1 SCR 570
relied on
Para 222
[1999] 2 SCR 1111
relied on
Para 222
[2003] 1 SCR 1159
relied on
Para 222
[2003] 2 SCR 1
relied on
Para 222
(1969) 3 SCC 392
relied on
Para 231
[1980] 3 SCR 179
relied on
Para 232
[1998] 3 SCR 1088
relied on
Para 232
[2009] 6 SCR 703
relied on
Para 236
[2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 358
relied on
Para 236
(1990) Supp SCC 806
relied on
Para 237
[1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 584
relied on
Para 238
[1997] 3 SCR 1096
relied on
Para 239
[1980] 1 SCR 323
relied on
Para 251
(2004) 3 SCC 684
relied on
Para 252
[1959] (Suppl 2) SCR 798
relied on
Para 252
[2012] 10 SCR 603
relied on
Para 254
[2011] 14 SCR 472
relied on
Para 255
[2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 50
referred to
Para 257
[1996] 2 SCR 643
relied on
Para 263
(2005) 12 SCC 489
relied on
Para 264
[2015] 15 SCR 499
relied on
Para 266
(2017) 13 SCC 474
relied on
Para 267
[2017] 13 SCR 1053
referred to
Para 267
[1976] 3 SCR 76
distinguished
Para 268
(1979) 3 SCC 106
distinguished
Para 268
[1980] 1 SCR 6
distinguished
Para 269
(1988) Supp. SCC 488
distinguished
Para 269
[2011] 14 SCR 1113
Not correct law
Para 271
[2012] 3 SCR 841
relied on
Para 272
[2012] 3 SCR 841
relied on
Para 273
[2009] 10 SCR 1084
relied on
Para 274
[2012] 10 SCR 603
relied on
Para 275
[2008] 17 SCR 120
referred to
Para 281
(2015) 4 SCC 325
overuled
Para 277
[2011] 6 SCR 443
overuled
Para 277
[1961] 2 SCR 295
referred to
Para 289
[1988] 3 SCR 384
referred to
Para 289
(1999) 6 SCC 459
referred to
Para 290
[1986] 3 SCR 587
referred to
Para 291
[1979] 3 SCR 709
referred to
Para 292
[2001] 2 SCR 714
referred to
Para 294
[1997] 3 SCR 931
relied on
Para 299
[2010] 2 SCR 447
relied on
Para 300
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
[1990] 1 SCR 186
relied on
Para 301
[2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 115
relied on
Para 302
[2014] 8 SCR 751
distinguished
Para 305
(2015) 3 SCC 206
distinguished
Para 305
(2015) 3 SCC 541
distinguished
Para 305
[2014] 7 SCR 799
overuled
Para 305
[1989] 3 SCR 455
referred to
Para 306
[1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 222
referred to
Para 309
[2013] 14 SCR 58
referred to
Para 310
[1999] 3 SCR 594
referred to
Para 311
[1999] 2 Suppl. SCR 754
referred to
Para 313
[2000] 2 SCR 871
referred to
Para 313
[2002] 2 SCR 1093
referred to
Para 314
[2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 282
referred to
Para 315
[1975] 1 SCR 504
relied on
Para 316
[2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 49
relied on
Para 317
[1962] SCR 290
referred to
Para 318
(1998) 3 SCC 376
referred to
Para 321
(2005) 8 SCC 423
referred to
Para 321
[1980] 2 SCR 765
referred to
Para 321
[1995] 1 SCR 543
referred to
Para 322
[2009] 15 SCR 1010
referred to
Para 322
[2004] 1 SCR 965
referred to
Para 323
[1975] Suppl. SCR 365
distinguished
Para 325
[2017] 4 SCR 881
held inapplicable
Para 326
[1978] 2 SCR 1
referred to
Para 330
[2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 651
referred to
Para 332
[2012] 2 SCR 1127
relied on
Para 333
[2012] 4 SCR 74
relied on
Para 334
[2011] 9 SCR 146
relied on
Para 334
(1980) 2 SCC 191
relied on
Para 334
[1992] 2 SCR 378
relied on
Para 334
[1999] 1 SCR 311
relied on
Para 334
[2010] 10 SCR 971
relied on
Para 335
[2006] 2 SCR 390
relied on
Para 336
2019 (13) SCALE 698
relied on
Para 337
[2017] 11 SCR 553
relied on
Para 339
[2014] 14 SCR 1451
referred to
Para 341
[1984] 3 SCR 417
relied on
Para 344
[1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 663
relied on
Para 345
[1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 551
relied on
Para 346
[2008] 4 SCR 616
relied on
Para 346
[2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 513
relied on
Para 346
[2017] 3 SCR 921
relied on
Para 347
[2008] 2 SCR 521
relied on
Para 348
[1998] 2 SCR 339
relied on
Para 348
(2003) 12 SCC 538
relied on
Para 348
[2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 512
relied on
Para 348
(1990) 2 SCC 268
relied on
Para 348
[2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 916
relied on
Para 350
[1970] 2 SCR 697
relied on
Para 350
[2007] 5 SCR 729
relied on
Para 351
[2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 535
relied on
Para 352
[2012] 1 SCR 573
relied on
Para 353
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
(1994) 2 SCC 647
relied on
Para 353
[1970] 3 SCR 830
referred to
Para 355
[2018] 3 SCR 884
referred to
Para 355
(2012) 12 SCC 443
referred to
Para 355
[1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 558
referred to
Para 355
[2014] 1 SCR 783
overuled
Para 362
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 9036-9038 of 2016. From the Judgment and Order dated 30.11.2015 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore in Writ Appeal Nos. 514, 799 and 772 of 2006.
With Civil Appeal Nos. 4835 of 2015, 19356, 19362, 19361, 19358, 19357, 19360, 19359, 19363, 19364, 19412 of 2017, S.L.P.(C) Nos. 3057730580 of 2015, 9798-9799, 17088-17089, 37375, 37372, 16573-16605. 34752-34753 of 2016, 15890, 33022, 33114, 33127 of 2017, 30452 of 2018, 16051 of 2019, M.A. No. 1423 of 2017 in C.A. No. 12247 of 2016. M.A. No.1787 of 2017 in C.A. No. 10210 of 2016, M.A. No. 1786 of 2017 in C.A. No. 10207 of 2016, M.A. No. 45 of 2018 in C.A. No. 6239 of 2017, Diary No. 23842 of 2018, C.C. No.15967 of 2016. Tushar Mehta, SG, Ms. Pinki Anand, ASG, B.K. Satija, Ajay Bansal, AAGs, R. Balasubramanian, Shyam Divan, Manoj Swarup, Gopal Sankarnarayanan, Anoop George Chaudhari, Ms. June Chaudhari, Guru Krishna Kumar, V. Shekhar, K.S. Namdar, Shekhar Naphade, Pritesh Kapoor, Rameshwar Singh Malik, Dhruv Mehta, Anukul Chandra Pradhan, K. Shashi Kiran Shetty, Mohan Parasaran, Jayanth Muthraj, K. Radhakrishnan, Sr. Advs., Kanu Agarwal, Manan Popli, Rajeev Ranjan, Shantnu Sharma, Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Ms. Jesal Wahi, Ms. Puja Singh, Ashwani Kumar Dhatwalia, Ms. Garima Prashad, Sumit Teterwal, Ms. Saudamini Sharma, Ms. Snidha Mehra, Ms. Kriti Dua, Hemant Arya, Ms. Tanisha Samanta, Chakitan V.S. Papta, Ms. Ashita Goyal, Ankur Talwar, Prashant Singh, Raj Bahadur Yadav, Vinod Kumar, Ashwani Kumar, Ms. Peeha Verma, Ravinder Nain, Aayush Agarwala, Anuj Agarwala, Abhinav Malhotra, Sudipto Sircar, Bhav Ratan, Pramod B. Agarwala, Siddharth Batra, Gaurav Agrawal, Avishkar Singhvi, Harsh
Parashar, Nipun Katyal, Ms. Tanvi Bhatnagar, Rahul Kaushik, Dhruv Surana, R. Anand Padmanabhan, Aravind C., Shashi Bhushan Kumar, Rajeev Kumar Dubey, Kamalendra Mishra, Hitesh Kumar Sharma, S. K. Rajora, Akhileshwar Jha, Ms. Sandya Sharma, Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, Sagar N. Pahune Patil, Ms. S. Lakshmi Iyer, Abhikalp Pratap Singh, Ms. Aishwarya Dash, Durgesh Gupta, A.P. Mayee, A. Rajarajan, Sanjeev Kumar Choudhary, Jitesh Malik, Ms. Beena, Satish Kumar, Siddharth Batra, Ms. Garima Sehgal, Ms. Sugandha Sharma, Ram Sankar, Om Prakash Kumar Srivastava, Ashish Chaubey, G. Chitrakala, Ms. Maafi, R.K.V. Suhas, R.V. Kameshwaran, Mahesh Thakur, B.S. Srinivas, Mrs. Vipasha Singh, Sharan Thakur, Siddharth Thakur, Vijay Kumar Pardesi, Shailesh Madiyal, Sudhanshu Parkash, Kartik Anand, Ms. Sheffali Chaudhary, Zoheb Hossain, Ms. Adeeba Mujahid, Ms. Aditi Dani, Ashwin Kumar DS, Piyush Goyal, Vivek Gurnani, Agni Sen, Sanjeev Menon, Ms. Purbita Mitra, Ms. A. Jaswanthi, K.V. Vijayakumar, Anandh Kannan, Deepak Goel, Kamal Kumar Pandey, Baldev Atreya, Ajay Kumar Singh, Ms. Neelum Goel, Gaurav Yadava, Mrs. Veena Bansal, Sanjay Kumar Visen, Prashant Bhushan, Omanakuttan K.K., Ms. Anannya Ghosh, Abhimanue Shrestha, Pallav Mongia, Abhisth Kumar, Ms. Jaikriti S. Jadeja, Yashraj Singh Deora, Ashok Arora, Dr. Sushil Balwada, Vivek Mishra, Ms. Mansha Shukla, Chandan Kumar, Madhu Prakash, Rituraj Biswas, Rituraj Choudhary, Hemant Kushwaha, Chand Qureshi, Rajat Verma, Hiren Dasan, Sanjay Kapur, Ms. Megha Karnwal, Bharath Gangadharan, Harshal Narayan, V.M. Khanna, Ms. Shubhra Kapur, Pramod Dayal, Ms. Shashi Kiran, Dr. Satish Chandra, Ms. Usha Mishra, Manoj Jain, Shankar Chillarge (for M/s. Lawyer’s Knit & Co.), Ms. Rachana Srivastava, Vishnu B. Saharya, Viresh B. Saharya (for M/s. Saharya & Co.), Ms. Rashmi Nandakumar, Ms. Ayushma Awasthi, Shankar Narayanan, Dr. D.V. Rao, B.V. Balaram Das, Kunal Verma, Vinay Kumar Shailendra, Ms. Deepika V. Marawaha, Chandra Bhushan Prasad, Siddhartha Chowdhury, Muhammad Ali Khan, Omar Hoda, Sparsh Prasad, Anurag Singh, Gaurav Goel, S.K. Raut, R.K. Dudeja, Sachin Gupta, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Ms. Pratibha Jain, Vikas Kumar, Ajay Choudhary, M. Ram Babu, Vikrant Yadav, Puneet Chugh, Sudarsh Menon, Ravindra A. Lokhande, Samarandra Beura, Ram Gupta, Keshav Ranjan, Manish Paliwal, Senthil Jagadeesan, Ambhoj Kumar Sinha, R.V. Kameshwaran, Vikas Mehta, Apoorv Khator, Vasanth Bharani, Mithun Shashank, Abhinav Ramkrishna, Arun K. Sinha,
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL
Paramasivam, M. Yogesh Kanna, Munawwar Naseem, C.L. Sahu, Satish Kumar, Rajesh Mahale, Ritesh Khatri, Mrs. Balvinder Kaur Brar, Rajesh Kumar Jha, Dr. M.S. Verma, Ms. Ranjana Vohra, Rakesh Kumar Yadav, Ms. Alpana Malik, Dinesh K. Mudgal, Ms. Shashi Singh, Rajnish Kumar Jha, Yash Pal Dhingra, Divyakant Lahoti, Manish Kaushik, Ms. Amrita Grover, Parikshit Ahuja, Kartik Lahoti, Ms. Praveena Bisht, Madhur Jhavar, Rajiv Kataria, Ms. Debjani Das P. (for M/s. Delhi Law Chambers), K. Parameshwar, P.V. Dinesh, Ms. Sindhu T.P., Mukund P. Unny, Aniruddha Deshmukh, Rajesh Srivastava, Ms. Suresh Kumari, Yatin M. Jagtap, Rabin Majumder, Sourav Roy, Harsh Anand, Gaurav Majumdar, Ms. Devika Khanna, Yash Ahlawat, Mrs. V.D. Khanna, Manish K. Bishnoi, M/s. S. Narain & Co., Shree Pal Singh, Balaji Srinivasan, Anupam Raina, Sunando Raha, Arindam Das, Kunal Malik, Dr. Sumant Bharadwaj, Ms. Mridula Ray Bhardwaj, Amol Chitravanshi, Ms. Rinchen Wangmo, Vedant Bharadwaj, Sangam Lal Pandey, Biswajit Das, Hardeep Singh, Anamika Sharma, Abhigya, Varinder Kumar Sharma, Varun Thakur, S. Sharma, Ms. Mandakini Singh, Ms. Sukhmani Bajwa, Syed Imtiyaz Ali, Ali Safeer Farooqui, Aftab Ali Khan, M.Z. Chaudhry, Ms. Mumtaz Alam Siddiqui, Keshav Thakur, Arvind Kumar K., Aniruddha P. Mayee, R.M. Bhangde, Shivkant Mishra, Hara Prasad Sahu, Vishal Arun Mishra, Pawan Kumar, Pranay Kumar M., Ms. Binu Tamta, Dhruv Tamta, Pankaj Pandey, Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ARUN MISHRA, J. 1. The correct interpretation of Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, ‘the Act of 2013’), is the subject matter of reference to this five -Judge Bench of this Court. 2. A three- Judge Bench of this Court in Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr v Harakchand Misrimal Solanki & Ors 1, interpreted Section 24 of the Act of 2013. The order reported as Yogesh Neema & Ors v State of Madhya Pradesh2, a two--judge Bench, however doubted the decision in Sree Balaji Nagar Residents Association v State of Tamil Nadu 3 (which had followed Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and also held that Section 24 (2) of
(2014) 3 SCC 183 (2016) 6 SCC 387 (2015) 3 SCC 353
the Act of 2013 does not exclude any period during which the land acquisition proceeding might have remained stayed on account of stay or injunction granted by any court) and referred the issue to a larger Bench. Later, in another appeal (arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.2131 of 2016 (Indore Development Authority v Shailendra (dead) through Lrs. & Ors.4) the matter was referred to a larger Bench on 7.12.2017; the Court noticed that: “cases which have been concluded are being revived. In spite of not accepting the compensation deliberately and statement are made in the Court that they do not want to receive the compensation at any cost, and they are agitating the matter time and again after having lost the matters and when proceedings are kept pending by interim orders by filing successive petitions, the provisions of section 24 cannot be invoked by such landowners.”
3. The Court noticed that the reference to a larger Bench was pending, and had been made in Yogesh Neema (supra). The Court also felt that several other issues arose which it outlined, but were not considered in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra). The Court therefore, stated that the matter should be considered by a larger Bench and referred the case to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders. Indore Development Authority v Shailendra (hereafter, “IDA v Shailendra”) a Bench of three Judges was of the view that the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) did not consider several aspects relating to the interpretation of Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Since Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was a judgment by a Bench of coordinate strength, two learned judges in IDA v Shailendra opined prima facie that decision appeared to be per incuriam. 4. Later, in Indore Development Authority v Shyam Verma & Ors (SLP No. 9798 of 2016) considered it appropriate to refer the matter to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India to refer the issues to be resolved by a larger Bench at the earliest. Yet again in State of Haryana v Maharana Pratap Charitable Trust (Regd) & Anr (CA No.4835 of 2015) referred the matter to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate Bench for consideration of the larger issue. These batch appeals were referred to a five Judge Bench, which after hearing counsel, framed the following questions, which arise for consideration:
2018 SCC Online SC 100
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.] “1. What is the meaning of the expression paid’/tender’ in Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Act of 2013') and Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, LA (Act of 1894')? Whether non-deposit of compensation in court under section 31(2) of the Act of 1894 results into lapse of acquisition under section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. What are the consequences of non- deposit in Court especially when compensation has been tendered and refused under section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 and section 24(2) of the Act of 2013? Whether such persons after refusal can take advantage of their wrong/conduct?
2. Whether the word or’ should be read as conjunctive or disjunctive in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013? 3. What is the true effect of the proviso, does it form part of sub-Section (2) or main Section 24 of the Act of 2013? 4. What is mode of taking possession under the Land Acquisition Act and true meaning of expression the physical possession of the land has not been taken occurring in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013? 5. Whether the period covered by an interim order of a Court concerning land acquisition proceedings ought to be excluded for the purpose of applicability of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 ? 6. Whether Section 24 of the Act of 2013 revives barred and stale claims? In addition, question of per incuriam and other incidental questions also to be gone into.” 5. Question nos.1 to 3 are interconnected and concern the correct interpretation of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. Following questions are required to be gone into to interpret the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013: (i)
Whether the word “or” in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 used in between possession has not been taken or compensation has not been paid to be read as “and”?
(ii) Whether proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 has to be construed as part thereof or proviso to Section 24(1)(b)?
(iii) What meaning is to be given to the word “paid” used in Section 24(2) and “deposited” used in the proviso to Section 24(2)? (iv) What are the consequences of payment not made?
(v) What are the consequences of the amount not deposited? (vi) What is the effect of a person refusing to accept the compensation?
6. The Act of 2013 repeals and replaces the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, a general law for acquisition of land of public purposes, which had been in force for almost 120 years, with a view to address certain inadequacies and/ or shortcomings in the said Act. 7. The Act of 2013 is prospective and saves proceedings already initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 before its repeal, subject to provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013, which begins with a nonobstante clause and overrides all other provisions of the Act of 2013. 8. On behalf of the Union, the States and various acquiring bodies and development authorities, Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General (who led the arguments, hereafter “SG”), Ms. Pinky Anand, learned Additional Solicitor General (hereafter “ASG”), Mr. Anoop Chaudhary and Mr. Jayant Muthuraj, learned Senior Counsel, Ms. Shashi Kiran, Ms. Rachna Srivastava, Mr. R.M. Bhangade and Mr. Rajesh Mahale, learned counsel, made their submissions. 9. The learned SG, arguing that this Court should overrule the ratio in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and other judgments which followed it, contended that the Court did not consider the various interpretations of Section 31 of the (repealed) Land Acquisition Act, (“LA Act” hereafter). He urged that the provisions of the Act of 2013, vis-à-vis the timelines and consequences that would ensue if the acquisition proceeding prolongs, were not examined. He highlighted that Section 24 is a transitional provision and such provisions should be given an interpretation which accords with legislative intent, rather than so as to impose hitherto absent standards, upon past proceedings, or proceedings initiated under the previous regime, but which have not worked themselves out. He urged that there is a presumption in favour of restricted retrospective applicability of any provision in an enactment unless a contrary intention appears. It is submitted that designedly, it is the stage of passing of award under Section 11 of the LA Act, that
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
represents the determinative factor in the segregation for the applicability of the provisions of the Act of 2013 or the LA Act. It is urged that the opening part of the provision in Section 24(1) is a non-obstante clause providing for a limited overriding effect of the Land Acquisition Act, in case of the contingencies mentioned in Section 24 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act of 2013.
10. Section 24 (1) (a) contemplates that where no award under Section 11 of the LA Act has been made, but proceedings had been initiated under said Act, provisions of the Act of 2013 would apply limited to the determination of compensation. In other words, the entire exercise de novo, under the Act of 2013, will not be required to be undertaken. Therefore, Section 24 (1) (a) contemplates a limited applicability of the Act of 2013. Section 24 (1) (b) stipulates that where an award under Section 11 of the LA Act has been made, the entire proceedings would continue under that law and the provisions of the Act of 2013 would be inapplicable. Section 24 (1) (b) is the larger umbrella clause under Section 24, which protects the vested rights of the parties under the LA Act if the stage of passing of award has been crossed. It is argued that the umbrella clause Section 24 (1) (b), is followed by Section 24(2) - which provides for the exclusionary clause. Section 24 (2), the learned SG highlighted, is the only lapsing clause under the provision which brings in the rigours of the Act of 2013 in totality by mandating the land acquisition to be initiated de novo.
11. It is urged that Section 24 (2) opens with a non obstante clause carving out an exception only from Section 24 (1). It visualizes that land acquisition proceedings which had been initiated under the LA Act, an award under Section 11 of the LA Act had been made. Consequently, Section 24 (2) has no relation to Section 24 (1) (a) as it does not contemplate an award under Section 11 of the LA Act at all. It is, therefore, a limited exception to Section 24 (1) (b). Section 24 (2) consequently is umbilically related to Section 24 (1) (b) as an exception, wherein land acquisition proceedings would lapse in certain contingencies even when an award under Section 11 of the LA Act had been made.
12. It is submitted that the contingencies for lapsing in Section 24(2), are subject to an award under Section 11 of the LA Act being made five years prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013 (which is 1.1.2014). If the award is so made, two contingencies result in complete lapse -: (a) Physical possession of the land has not been taken; or (b)
compensation has not been “paid”. The provision for lapse, per Section 24(2) is, by its nature, a vital provision, inviting serious consequences, in case those contingencies arise. It is the interpretation of these “contingencies” that requires further consideration. The “contingencies” ought to be interpreted in a manner which saves the past transactions to the extent they can be saved as it is clearly not the intention of the Act of 2013 to tide over all past transactions. 13. The learned SG argued that the proviso to Section 24(2) further carves out an exception to Section 24(2) viz, in case the award has been made and compensation in respect of majority of landholdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, no lapsing will take place, but all the beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. 14. Therefore, if only a minority of the claimants are disbursed with the compensation, such claimants would get benefit of compensation under the Act of 2013 to a limited extent without lapsing. Thus, it is clear that even if the acquisition does not lapse, all the beneficiaries to whom the compensation is payable would be entitled to compensation under the Act of 2013. 15. It is submitted that Section 24(1)(a) and Section 24(2) are balancing provisions controlling the extent of retrospectivity and curtailing the effacement of rights. Such balance of protecting acquisitions under the LA Act in some defined circumstances whilst providing the enhanced compensation provisions under the Act of 2013 under some defined circumstances is the “middle path” that Parliament adopted. It is contended that Section 24(2) is, therefore, controlled by the proviso mandating again a further middle path consciously chosen by Parliament. 16. It is argued that while providing for a transitory provision or situations resulting into “lapsing” of all the steps already taken under the Act under repeal, the legislature always envisages several contingencies which emerge out of its day-to-day experience. The manner in which section 24[2] and the proviso attached therewith are drafted clearly discloses that Parliament intended certain inevitable contingencies which frequently arose in land acquisition proceedings. It was urged illustratively, that often, land acquired belongs to benami owners, who cannot put forward title, or claim compensation or identify themselves. In such
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
situations, it may not be possible for an acquiring authority to “pay” [which, as plain language indicates, would mean setting apart for being taken by the entitled persons as explained hereafter] to “all” land holders/ entitled persons. However, as is clear from the proviso to Section 24[2], if it can be shown that the amount is deposited for majority of shareholding, the acquisition would be saved and cannot lapse; the only consequence would be the determination of benefits under the Act of 2013. Parliamentary intent in the proviso clearly appears to be to ascertain the stage up to which the land acquisition proceedings under LA Act have reached. If nobody is paid the compensation or compensation is not taken by everyone though tendered and/or kept ready, the legislature contemplates such a situation to be a reversible one and, therefore, provides for lapsing of all previous stages prior to “non-payment”. However, if it can be demonstrated that though - (1) compensation was tendered to all; (2) some of them [for whatever reason] did not take the compensation; and (3) compensation is deposited in case of majority of the land holdings [viz. setting apart the share of such persons and making it available for them to take it], then, neither proceedings would lapse nor the compensation will be required to be determined under the Act of 2013. In substance, therefore, the legal situation would be akin to the one contemplated under Section 24[1][b] for all practical purposes.
17. It is submitted that during the drafting of the Bill, the legislative intent and the apprehensions of the stakeholders in the acquisition process is clearly depicted in 31st Report of the ‘Standing Committee on Rural Development’ while discussing the ‘The Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2011’ which was the precursor to the Act of 2013. The learned SG relied on extracts of the Standing Committee Reports, the draft Bill, various comments from government and public agencies and departments and other stakeholders, the stage(s) during which amendments were proposed to the draft provisions (of Section 24) and its culmination into the present form and structure. 18. The learned SG argued that the amendments proposed by the Minister while introducing the Bill - to incorporate an explanation, as to what constitutes “deposit” was not accepted in the legislative wisdom of the Lok Sabha and the Bill so passed consciously did not incorporate the Explanation (in the form of Proviso to Section 24(2)) providing for an extensive and artificial meaning of the word paid. Further, reference to “bank” account was also consciously not incorporated thereby leaving
the expression “to pay” and “to deposit” with its natural meaning and leaving it to the discretion of the acquiring authorities to deposit the compensation amount even in the treasury. It is possible that the legislature may have considered the reality of 2012-13 where crores of people did not have bank accounts. It was also urged that the rejection of the amendment is in consonance with the apprehensions expressed by other stakeholders and ministries at the said time. After the said Bill was passed in the Lok Sabha, amendments were proposed and accepted by the Rajya Sabha, giving the provision its final form. Further, it is clear that the effort at the time was towards the drafting of a balancing provision which protects the acquisitions from lapsing and at the same time provides enhanced compensation under the new Act depending upon the stage up to which the acquisition has progressed. This was the genesis behind Section 24(1)(a) and proviso to Section 24(2) which protect acquisitions from lapsing whilst providing for higher compensation under the Act of 2013 to the land owners under limited defined circumstances. It is submitted that it is necessary to read the proviso to Section 24(2) along with the same provision and not Section 24(1)(b) as the former would be in accord with Parliamentary intent. 19. It was submitted that Section 24(2) intended a limited retrospective operation: yet such retrospectivity operated and has to be construed narrowly considering the nature and width of Section 24(2) and the drastic consequences flowing from it. It is submitted that the field of retrospectivity to be given under Section 24 needs to be considered in the context of legislative intention manifested from Section 114 of the Act of 2013 and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Both Section 114 (of the Act of 2013) and Section 6 of the 1897 Act clearly point to a narrow interpretation of Section 24 with the object of saving on-going acquisition proceedings as far as possible. The learned SG referred to the provisions of UK’s Interpretation Act, 1978; he also relied on Bennion’s Statutory Interpretation Bennion’s Fifth Edition, (2012) Indian Reprint, which reads as under: “Where, on a weighing of the factors, it seems that some retrospective effect was intended, the general presumption against retrospectively indicates that this should be kept to as narrow a compass as will accord with the legislative intention”
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
20. Reliance was placed on Secretary of State for Social Security v Tunnicliffe5, to the effect that:
“Parliament is presumed not to have intended to alter the law applicable to past events and transactions in a manner which is unfair to those concerned in them, unless a contrary intention appears”. The learned SG also referred to the later judgment of the House of Lords which dealt with the said question. It is submitted that sitting in a combination of eight judges, in Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd.v L’office Chefifien Des Phosphates & Anr6, where it was held that retrospective application of a statute can be made only when it does not visit anyone with unfairness. The learned SG referred to Zile Singh v. State of Haryana7 where a three-judge Bench held that retrospectivity should not be presumed to have been given to a provision, unless it says so clearly, or through necessary implication. The guidance was given to construe provisions for determining whether such intention is expressed, in a given case. 21. It was urged that this Court, after assessing the unintended and absurd results that an amendment may result in, purposefully interpreted the provisions to be prospective in operation. It was also emphasized that Section 24(2) is retrospective in nature and cannot be
[1991] 2 All ER 712 [1994] 1 A.C. 486, where it was held that: “The rule that a person should not be held liable or punished for conduct not criminal when committed is fundamental and of long standing. It is reflected in the maxim nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. It is protected by article 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953) (Cmd. 8969). The rule also applies, but with less force, outside the criminal sphere. It is again expressed in maxims, lex prospicit non respicit and omnis nova constitutio futuris temporibus formam imponere debet non praeteritis. The French Civil Code provides that “La loi ne dispose que pour l’avenir; elle n’a point d’effet retroactif:” ….. But both these passages draw attention to an important point, that the exception only applies where application of it would not cause unfairness or injustice. This is consistent with the general rule or presumption which is itself based on considerations of fairness and justice, as shown by the passage in Maxwell quoted, ante, p. 494C–E, and recently emphasised by Staughton L.J in Secretary of State for Social Security v. Tunnicliffe [1991] 2 All E.R 712, 724..” (2004) 8 SCC 01
held to be prospective; nevertheless, the extent of retrospectivity ought to be narrowly construed while interpreting, given the harsh consequences that it results in particularly against projects of public interest. Reliance was placed on CIT v. Sarkar Builders8. 22. It is submitted that apart from the above, this Court has consistently ruled on principles guiding the retrospective operation of statutes. Though there is no bar against retrospective operation yet this Court considered the practical realities before analysing the extent of retrospective operation of the statutes. Reliance in this regard is placed on Jawaharmal v. State of Rajasthan9 and Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar 10. 23. The learned SG next submitted that a spate of decisions of this Court had followed the ratio in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra). Emphasizing that the overall interpretation of Section 24 of the Act of 2013 has to accord with its scheme, it was stated that the object of that provision was not only to declare that certain acquisitions lapsed. Learned counsel, in this context, highlighted that Section 24 (1) (a) in fact saves acquisition proceedings, where awards were not made before the advent of the Act of 2013, by declaring that the award would be made under that Act and compensation payable, in accordance with its provisions. Section 24 (1) (b) on the other hand contemplates making of award, under the old (LA) Act, but significantly states that all further “proceedings” after the award would be taken under the new Act. It was highlighted here, that Parliament clearly intended that the compensation determined under the old Act had to be paid in terms of the new Act, which is under Section 77. The learned SG submitted that given these aspects, which are expressed in Section 24 (1), the non obstante clause and the following provisions of Section 24 (2) have to be interpreted contextually, and in a purposive manner. It was submitted that Parliament did not intend that settled matters should be undone, and whatever had attained finality, in acquisition matters, should not be reopened. He cited the decisions of this Court reported as Southern Electricity Supply Co. of Orissa Ltd. v. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill 11; Tinsukhia Electric Supply Company Ltd v. State Of Assam & Ors12;
2015 (7) SCC 579 1966 (1) SCR 890 1964 (1) SCR 897 (2012) 2 SCC 108 (1989) 3 SCC 709 @ para 118-121
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers 13; D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India & Ors14; Balram Kamanat v. Union of India15; New India Assurance Co. v. Nulli Nivelle16; Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors v. Smt. P. Laxmi Devi 17; Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. v. Super Cassette Industries Ltd. 18 ; N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose & Ors 19 ; H.S Vankani v. State of Gujarat,20; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan & Ors. 21
24. It was submitted that hitherto, in accord with Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v. State of Tamil Nadu22 most decisions had accepted that the expression “or”(occurring in Section 24 (2)), where an award has been made under the old Act, 5 years before the commencement of the Act of 2013 “but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid” – is to be read disjunctively, i.e., that if either condition is satisfied, the acquisition would lapse. However, submitted the learned SG, the true and correct interpretation of the term “or” would be that it ought to be construed as a conjunctive word. 25. Learned counsel next submitted that the expression “paid” should be construed reasonably and not in a literal manner, as was done in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra). Before the Act of 2013 was brought into force, the modes of payment recognized by the law were: tendering payment, payment into court in the event no one entitled to alienate the property received it and payment into court upon disputes about the entitlement to receive payment. These three situations were visualized in Section 31 (2) of the old Act. It was emphasized that the consequence of lapse of acquisition was never contemplated, in the event of refusal to accept payment, or absence of anyone entitled to receive it, or in the contingency of a dispute regarding entitlement to receive the amount. This clearly meant that while payment of compensation was
(2003) 3 SCC 57 @ para 14-21 (2003) 6 SCC 186 para 16-18 (2003) 7 SCC 628 para 24 (2008) 3 SCC 279 @ para 51-54 (2008) 4 SCC 720 para 41 & 42 (2008) 13 SCC 30 para 132-137 (2009) 7 SCC 1 para 54-67 (2010) 4 SCC 301 para 43-48 (2011) 7 SCC 639 para 78-85 2015 (3) SCC 353
essential and mandatory, the mode of payment was not mandatory. If, for instance, the amount was tendered and not received, but instead, the landowner refused it, the appropriate government could well deposit it in the treasury, in accordance with prevailing financial rules, to facilitate disbursement, as and when the landowner or the one entitled to receive it, came forward and established entitlement. In such event, the only consequence of non-deposit (in court, under Section 31) meant that higher interest as mandated by Section 34 was to be paid. 26. The context of Section 24, learned counsel urged, is to provide for a transitory provision viz. to take care of the pending land acquisition proceedings which are ongoing under the LA Act when the Act of 2013 is brought into force w.e.f. 1.1.2014. The purpose and object of making this provision is to balance the competing rights of public projects vis-àvis holders of the land. The object and purpose was to ensure that where acquisition proceedings under LA Act have reached an advanced stage and investment of public money had already been made, firstly, the lapsing of such ongoing projects should be avoided and secondly as far as possible, the land owners also can, without disturbing the process of acquisition, be given the compensation under the Act of 2013.
27. It was reiterated that the legislature knows about the ground realities faced in land acquisition proceedings. There are very few cases where one or two land parcels are acquired in isolation. Mostly, acquisitions take place of bigger tracts of land involving more than one parcel of land and more than one person “entitled to compensation”. When Parliament provided for a transitory provision in relation to acquisitions under the old Act, it did not contemplate the possibility of the entire payment procedure to all being not processed given the practical situations arising in all such proceedings. Parliament is also presumed to be aware of the fact that in almost all cases of acquisition, the proceedings are stiffly opposed and in most of the cases, the tender of compensation is also opposed under a wrong and misplaced notion that the acceptance of the tender may be treated as acquiescence with the quantum being tendered.
28. The learned counsel argued that Parliament did not expect the acquiring authority to perform an impossible task of forcing payment to the land owners unwilling, for any reason to accept it. The legislature, therefore, does not use the expression of the land owners having “accepted” the payment. It merely uses the expression “paid”. The
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
legislature clearly tries to balance the rights of land owners only in one contingency viz. in a post award scenario and the award having been made five years prior to 1.1.2014, when the amount is not “deposited” in the accounts of the majority of the beneficiaries.
29. It was urged that on a true construction and taking the literal, natural and grammatical meaning of the provisions in the context referred above and keeping in mind the object it can safely be concluded that the words “paid” and “deposit” are expressions of the same act namely making the amount available (i.e. tendering) for being taken by those entitled to it. It was urged that if this interpretation is not given then the refusal by few persons or few persons being untraceable in the acquisition of a vast tract of land would result in the drastic consequence of lapsing of the acquisition proceedings. 30. It was urged by the learned ASG and Mr. Muthuraj, learned senior counsel that the legislature cannot be presumed to intend such an anomalous situation. The only way in which the object behind section 24 can be achieved is to give natural meaning to the words and expressions used keeping the object in mind and treating the words “paid” and “deposit” as connoting expression of the very same Act depending upon the fact situation in each case. Learned counsel submitted that by using the terms “paid” and “deposit”, Parliament consciously left a leeway to save the drastic consequence of lapsing by dealing with a particular situation in light of fact situation emerging in each case. Not treating “paid” and “deposit” as synonymous or the “deposit” so as to keep it available being the next step after “pay”, would lead to disastrous situations as the acquiring authority may have acquired vast tract of land and may have put substantial portion from it to public use by constructing infrastructural projects. Such a disastrous situation /consequence would never have been anticipated or envisaged by the legislature. Learned counsel also referred to various Standing Orders, framed as part of the financial code of several States, which provided for procedure to deposit money in the treasury, when landowners refused to accept compensation, or were untraceable, at the time the amount was to be tendered. 31. It is submitted by the learned ASG that this Court should not assume any omission or add or amend words to the statute. It is submitted that plain and unambiguous construction has to be given without addition and substitution of the words. It is submitted that when a literal reading produces an intelligible result it is not open to read words or add words
to statute. In support of this proposition, reliance was placed on some decisions23. It was therefore submitted that the word “paid” does not and cannot mean actual de-facto payment as it would amount to adding words which do not exist in the provision. Similarly, the word “deposit” cannot mean “deposit in the Court” as that was never the legislative intent nor can it be deduced from any accepted interpretive process. 32. It was submitted that this Court, whilst interpreting Section 24 of the Act of 2013, for the first time in Pune Municipal Corporation [supra] and subsequent judgments, presumed that the word “paid” occurring in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 would have to be interpreted as per Section 31 of the LA Act. It is submitted that the said presumption neither has any justification nor any such justification is examined in the said judgments. It is submitted that the said presumption has resulted in grave consequences without ascertaining the conscious omissions on the part of the Legislature. The learned SG illustrated how the terms “paid” and “deposit” have been used in different senses under the LA Act and in the Act of 2013. 33. Learned counsel submit that firstly, Section 31 of the LA Act is pari materia to Section 77 of the Act of 2013. There is neither any justification nor any requirement of interpreting Section 24 of the Act of 2013 in the shadow of Section 31 of the LA Act. It is submitted that if as an alternative argument it is assumed that the expressions “paid”/ “tender” and the expression “deposited” have both been used consciously in Section 31, as is the reason of drafting Section 24(2), an anomalous situation occurs. In the proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, expression used is compensation has not been “deposited” “in the account of the beneficiaries”, which is separate from the “deposit in Court” envisaged under Section 31(2) of the LA Act. It is submitted that the expression “bank account” has not been used in Section 31 of the LA Act at all and the expression “in the Court” has not been used in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 at all. The said omissions carry weight and cannot be ignored. 34. It is urged that if Section 24 of the Act of 2013 intended to attract the rigours and technicalities of Section 31 of the LA Act, it would have used the requisite phrase. It is submitted that the term Section 31 of the LA Act is conspicuous by its absence in Section 24 of the Act
BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552; Howard de Walden (Lord) v. IRC, (1948) 2 All ER 825 (HL); V.L.S. Finance Ltd. v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 278; and Ram Narain v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 18.
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
of 2013. Parliament intentionally used the phrases “paid” and “deposit” not in terms of their meanings under Section 31 so as to avoid the rigours of the said provision and to keep the practical exigencies of land acquisition in mind, more particularly when Section 24 of the Act of 2013 is merely a transitory provision. It was argued that it is a settled canon of interpretation that when the Legislature uses two different phrases, the meaning they carry would be different. Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India,24 is relied on.
35. It is submitted that Section 24(1) begins with a non-obstante clause, providing for a limited overriding effect of the LA Act in case of the contingencies mentioned in Section 24 (a) and (b). Section 24 (1) (a) contemplates that where land acquisition proceedings were initiated under the LA Act but no award was passed till the date the new Act came into force viz. 1.1.2014, acquisition proceedings could continue, however compensation will have to be determined under the Act of 2013. Section 24 (1) (b) provides that where an award under Section 11 of the LA Act has been made, the entire proceedings would continue under the Act of 1894, as if it were not repealed. Section 24(2) provides for an exclusionary clause which mandates the land acquisition proceedings to be lapsed and initiated de novo. 36. It was submitted that the requirements for lapsing (of acquisition) in Section 24(2), are subject to an award under Section 11 of the LA Act being made five years prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013 viz. 1.1.2014. If the award is made and the following two situations occurred, the proceedings will lapse; one, physical possession has not been taken or (to be read as “and”) and two, compensation has not been paid. 37. Elaborating on the expressions “paid”/”tender” it was urged by learned counsel that the meaning of expression “tender” is that when a person has tendered the amount and made it unconditionally available and the landowner has refused to receive it, the person who has tendered the amount cannot be saddled with the liability, which is to be visited for non-payment of the amount. Reliance is placed on the meaning of the term in Black’s Law Dictionary.
38. It is apparent from aforesaid that “tender” may save the tendering party from the penalty for non-payment or non-performance
(2002) 3 SCC 722
if another party is unjustifiably refusing the tender. The expression “paid” would mean in Section 31(1) of the LA Act and Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 as soon as it is offered and made unconditionally available. Merely, if a landowner refuses to accept it, it cannot be said that it has not been paid. Once amount has been tendered that would amount to payment. Thus, the term “paid” does not mean actual payment to be made but whatever is possible for an incumbent to make the payment is only contemplated. “Paid” does not mean receipt or deposited in court. There may be refusal to receive an amount in spite of its tender. Thus, in view of the decisions of this Court in Benares State Bank Ltd.v.CIT, 25 Collector of Central Excise v. Elphinstone Spg.&Wvg.Mills Co.Ltd.26 and J.Dalmia v Commissioner of Income Tax27, the provisions of Section 24(2) should be construed as tender of the amount. 39. It is submitted that the three Judge Bench in judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), while deciding the expression “compensation has not been paid”, held that for the purposes of Section 24(2), the compensation shall be regarded as “paid”: “if the compensation has been offered to the person interested and such compensation has been deposited in the court where reference under Section 18 can be made on happening of any of the contingencies contemplated under Section 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. In other words,the compensation may be said to have been”paid”within the meaning of Section 24(2) when the Collector (or for that matter Land Acquisition Officer) has discharged his obligation and deposited the amount of compensation in court and made that amount available to the interested person to be dealt with as provided in Sections 32 and 33.”
40. It was argued that the conclusion in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) that deposit of the amount of compensation in the Government treasury cannot amount to the said sum (amount of compensation) “paid” to the landowners or persons interested. This view was taken without dwelling on the legal connotation of the expression “paid” in Section 24(2). In the process, it has also not taken into account the binding law as held in Dalmia’s case and Benares State Bank’s
(1969) 2 SCC 316 (1971)1 SCC 337 (1964) 53 ITR 83 [AIR 1964 SC 1866]
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
case. Though Section 34 of the LA Act was mentioned in passing para 16, however it has not at all been considered. It is a very crucial provision, which deals with the consequences of compensation not having been deposited. Further, submit counsel, the matter relates to payment of compensation from out of Government funds. Handling of Government funds has to be strictly in accordance with the Standing Orders issued by the States. The effect of those Standing Orders has also not been considered in the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra). The said judgment, therefore, having been rendered without taking into consideration the aforesaid judgments, Section 34 of the LA Act and the Standing Orders is, in the submission of the counsel, per incuriam.
41. It is submitted that another aspect which arises is, whether prejudice or injustice would be caused in case the amount is not deposited in the court and is deposited in the treasury, particularly when the provision contained in Section 31 of the LA Act has to be read conjointly with those in Section 34. By reason of Section 34, (of the LA Act) one could claim interest - at a higher rate in case amounts were not deposited under Section 31(2) if the authorities were at fault.
42. Arguing about whether the expression “or” should be read as conjunctive or disjunctive, it was argued that after the stage of section 11 under the LA Act, there are two possibilities. The requisite authority may take possession of the land in terms of Section 16 of the LA Act or the said authority may proceed to tender payment under Section 31 of the LA Act. The said two possibilities may be conducted simultaneously or one after the other, there is no embargo in the LA Act regarding the same. 43. It is submitted that Section 24(2), while providing for lapsing, uses the two phrases concerning possession of the land and the tendering of payment with the disjunctive word “or” thereby making it mandatory for the acquiring authority to satisfy both contingencies in order to avoid lapsing. It is submitted that the same would be against the legislative intention of limited lapsing. Further, the said interpretation would be against the purport of the possession and the title “being vested” in the acquiring authority by virtue of the interpretation of section 16 in the LA Act [as dealt with the latter part of the submissions]. It is submitted that the intention of the Legislature could not have been to divest the acquiring authority of the land after the said has been vested “free from all encumbrances”. In line with the same, it is submitted that the word
“or” may be read as “and” so as to limit the lapsing only in cases where both, payment has not been made (subject to proviso) and possession has not been taken. 44. Reliance is placed on the judgments reported as Ishwar Singh Bindra v State of UP28, where this Court approved and extracted passages from Maxwell on Interpretation and Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary to the effect that generally, the conjunctive “and” is used in a cumulative sense, requiring the fulfilment of all the conditions that it joins together, and herein it is the antithesis of “or” and that however, sometimes, even in such a connection, it is, by force of its contents, read as “or”. Similarly, Maxwell accepted that “to carry out the intention of the legislature it is occasionally found necessary to read the conjunctions ‘or’ and ‘and’ one for the other”. Learned counsel also relied on Mobilox Innovations (P) Ltd v Kirusa Software (P) Ltd 29 which held that: “38....Even otherwise ,the word “and” occurring in Section 8(2)(a)must be read as “or” keeping in mind the legislative intent and the fact that an anomalous situation would arise if it is not read as “or” if read as “and”, disputes would only stave off the bankruptcy process if they are already pending in a suit or arbitration proceedings and not otherwise. This would lead to great hardship; in that a dispute may arise a few days before triggering of the insolvency process, in which case, though a dispute may exist, there is no time to approach either an Arbitral Tribunal or a court...”
Learned counsel also relied on several other decisions in support of the same proposition (i.e. that the disjunctive “or” has to be read contextually, and if need arises as “and”, i.e., as a conjunctive).30
1969 (1) SCR 219 (2018)1SCC 353 Brown v Harrison 1927 All ER 195 @ pp. 203, 204 (CA); Ranchhodddas Atmaram & Anr v Union of India 1961 (3) SCR 718; State of Bombay v R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala 1957 (1) SCR 874 (hereafter “RMDC”); Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v Narayanrao, 1965 (2) SCR 328; Punjab Produce & Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, 1971 SCR 977; Ishwar Singh Bindra & Ors v State of UP 1969 (1) SCR 219; Joint Director of Mines Safety v Tandur and Nayandgi Stone Quarries (P0 Ltd 1987 (3) SCC 308; Samee Khan v Bindu Khan 1998 (7) SCC 59. Prof. Yashpal & Ors v State of Chhatisgarh & Ors 2005 (5) SCC 420
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
45. Highlighting that the placement of the proviso (following Section 24 (2)) is significant, and not accidental, it was argued that the field of operation of the proviso is immediately preceding provision, i.e. Section 24 (2) and not Section 24 (1) (b). It is submitted that the proviso to Section 24 (2) contemplates a situation where with respect to majority of the holdings, compensation not deposited in the account of landowners (even though there being tendering of payment to all land owners and physical possession being taken), the benefits of the Act of 2013 qua the compensation would follow. It is argued that if the said proviso is not interpreted to be a proviso to Section 24(2), a valuable benefit extended by Parliament would evaporate. Learned counsel contended that the said proviso provides for enhanced benefit even if the twin conditions of Section 24 (2) are met. Therefore, the said proviso saves the land acquisition and furthers the purpose and the object of giving benefit of computation of compensation to all landholders. Therefore, it is evident that the proviso is appropriately treated as a proviso to Section 24 (2) and cannot be read as proviso to Section 24 (1) (b) of the Act of 2013. It was argued that Parliamentary intent is clearly discernible, because of the colon (a punctuation mark) occurring at the end of Section 24 (2), which means that the proviso constitutes an exception to that provision. Reference was made to Aswini Kumar Ghosh & Anr v Arabinda Bose & Anr31 (where it was held that “...Punctuation is after all a minor element in the construction of a statute and very little attention is paid to it by English Courts. ......When a statute is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, a weight should undoubtedly be given to the punctuation.”). Reliance was also placed on Jamshed Guzdar v State of Maharastra.32
46. It was argued by Ms. Pinky Anand, learned ASG, that payment of compensation is not a sine qua non for vesting in terms of Section 16 of the old LA Act. It is urged, in this context, that the old Act did not provide any time line for depositing compensation; nor even for taking over of possession. Ordinarily, the repeal provision under the Act of 2013 (Section 114) would prevail; however, Section 24 carves out an important, albeit a limited scope from the repeal clause. Section 24 (2) freshly introduces the concept of lapsing, in relation to acquisitions that were initiated under the old Act. Necessarily, lapsing is to be considered as a narrow concept. Supporting the learned SG’s argument
1953 SCR 1 2005 (2) SCC 591
that “or” is to be read conjunctively, she highlighted that by reason of Section 16 of the old Act, title vested in the State, upon taking of possession. Divesting under old Act was impermissible. It was urged that were the court to accept an interpretation, that either non-payment of compensation, or taking of possession – under Section 24 (2), would result in lapsing of acquisition, as held in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and other decisions, land vested in the State, and conveyed to third parties (either as allottees of housing schemes or public sector undertakings, for one development project or another, or for public purposes such as construction of roads, bridges and other public works) would be divested. 47. Under Section 16 of the LA Act once award is made and possession of land is taken, then the land vests absolutely with the Government. Therefore, the word deemed to lapse in Section 24(2) should not be interpreted to mean divesting of land from the Government which is already vested in the Government and moreover in the absence of any provision of divesting in the 1894 Act. In this context, the observations in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar33 that the legislature is presumed to be acquainted with the construction which the courts have put upon the words, and when legislature repeats the same words. This Court had, in that judgment, quoted with approval the previous decision in Sri K.C Gajapati Narayan Deo v, State of Orissa34 that
“Section of the Act empowers the State Government to declare, by notification, that the estate described in the notification has vested in the State free from all encumbrances. ….. The consequences of vesting ether by Issue of notification or as a result of surrender are described in detail in Section 5 of the Act. It would be sufficient for our present purpose to state that the primary consequence is that all lands comprised in the estate including communal lands, non-ryoti lands, waste and trees orchards pasture lands, forests, mines and minerals, quarries, rivers and streams, tanks, water channels, fisheries, ferries, hats and bazars, and buildings or structures together with the land on which they stand shall, subject to the other provisions of the Act, vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances and the intermediary shall cease to have any interest in them.”
(1955) 2 SCR 603 1954 SCR 11
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Learned counsel also relied on the judgment of this Court in Jagannath Temple Managing Committee v. Siddha Math35, at para 53, that “it is a settled principle of law that once a property is vested by an Act of legislature, to achieve the laudable object, the same cannot be divested by the enactment of any subsequent general law and vest such property under such law.”
48. It was urged that serious consequences arise when condition nos. (ii) and (iii) are to be read as not conjunctive or disjunctive. The word used to connect these two conditions is “or”; if it is not read conjunctively, disastrous consequence leading to absurd result would emanate. Once possession is taken over vesting occurs under Section 16 of the LA Act. Section 24(2) contains no stipulation that such vesting of title of land stands nullified or divested. If the intention of Parliament was to divest the State of its title that had to be stated in plain and clear language. It was emphasized that the conjunctive use of “or” in Section 24 (2) would have not only momentous consequences to the State, but innocent third parties, who would be exposed to the risk of being divested title to the lands and properties, perfected by them, as allottees or subsequent purchasers. Merely because a person who has received compensation clungs on to the possession of the land and the same shall lead to lapsing cannot be the intention of Parliament. Similarly, one who received compensation, is not obliged to return the money to the State in the event of lapsing under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. It was urged, therefore, that absence of provision to return the compensation received to Government convincingly points to Parliamentary intent that “or” should be read as “and”; thus, only if neither possession is taken (of acquired lands) nor is compensation paid, (i.e., tendered to the party or parties) would the acquisition under the LA Act lapse. Learned counsel also relied on several decisions in this context.36 49. It was highlighted by M/s Bhangde, Mr. Rajesh Mahale, and Ms. Shashi Kiran, that the consequence of literally interpreting Section 24 (2) as to mean that the conditions are disjunctive (either that “or” should be read as such) are too drastic and severe. Learned counsel
(2015) 16 SCC 542 @ para 53 Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh and Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 335; Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 800; Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi v. Lieutenant Governor, Government of NCT, Delhi and Ors., (2009) 10 SCC 501 and Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 405
pointed out that as a result of allegations of non-payment of compensation, lands which had been vested in the State and were subsequently made over to the requisitioning agencies, and in respect of which title had passed multiple times to other parties, now are exposed to the threat of divesting of title. Learned counsel submitted that a deeming fiction cannot be taken to this extent; such disastrous consequences could not have been attributed by Parliament, because even if such were the intent, there has to be a mechanism to restitute those likely to be affected. Besides, the legality of such a law, divesting or taking away the title of such innocent third-party purchasers, would be suspect, because there is absolutely no provision for restitution or any form of compensation in their favour. 50. On the question relating to the mode of taking possession, it was argued that when the State is involved in taking possession of the property acquired, it can take possession by drawing a panchnama. The normal rule of State possessing the land through some persons would not be applicable in such cases. On open land, possession is deemed to be of the owner. The way the State takes possession of large chunk of property acquired is by drawing a memorandum of taking possession as State is not going to put other persons in possession or its police force or going to cultivate it or start residing or physically occupy it after displacing who were physically in possession as in the case of certain private persons, in case they re-enter in possession of open land, start cultivation or residing in the house. Lawful possession is deemed to be of the State. A number of decisions that accepted the mode of drawing panchnama by the State consistently to be a mode of taking possession were cited. In Banda Development Authority v. Moti Lal Agarwal 37 this Court observed that preparing a panchnama is sufficient to constitute taking of possession. If acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not be possible to take physical possession of each and every parcel of the land and it would be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by preparing an appropriate document in the presence of independent witnesses and getting their signatures. Even subsequent utilisation of a portion of acquired land for public purpose was still sufficient to prove taking possession. 51. It is submitted that when the State acquires land and has drawn memorandum of taking possession that is the way the State takes possession of large tract of land acquired, it ought not necessarily to
(2011)5 SCC 394 (hereafter referred to as “Banda Development Authority”)
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
physically occupy such land after forcefully displacing those physically in possession. Possession in law is deemed to be physical possession for the State. This Court in a number of decisions has accepted the mode of drawing panchnama by the State consistently to be a mode of taking possession. It is submitted that this Court in T.N. Housing Board v. A. Viswam38 held that recording of memorandum/panchnama by the Land Acquisition Officer in the presence of witnesses signed by them would constitute taking possession of land.
Also, reliance is placed on other decisions.39 52. Dealing next with the manner by which the period covered by an interim order of Court ought to be excluded for the purpose of applicability of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013, it is argued that a settled proposition of law is that an act of a Court should not prejudice any party. In view of the maxim actus curae neminem gravabit or even in its absence, any interim order granted by the court cannot prejudice any rights of the parties. It is argued that for a proper working of the justice delivery system, once the court passes an order staying dispossession, the State cannot take possession of the land. If an order of the Court disables a person to take any action, the doctrine nemo tentur ad impossible would be applicable that is, the law in general excuses a party which is disabled to perform a duty and impossibility of performance of a duty is a good excuse. Further, the Latin maxim lexnon cogitad impossibilia, that is, the law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform. Since, it becomes impossible for the State to take possession, for the duration a stay or interim order is in operation, the consequence of an interim order cannot be used against the State. Reliance for this legal position is placed on the judgments in A.R. Antulay vs R.S.Nayak & Ors40, Sarah Mathew v Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases41 and in Dau Dayal v State of U.P42. In A.R.Antulay (supra) it was held that no party is prejudiced by the court’s mistake. Therefore, urged counsel, in cases where conduct of acquisition
(1996) 8 SCC 259 Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat, (1976) 1 SCC 700; State of T.N. v. Mahalakshmi Ammal, (1996) 7 SCC 269; T.N. Housing Board v. A. Viswam, (1996) 8 SCC 259 and Om Prakash Verma & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors, (2010) 13 SCC 158. 1988 Suppl (1) SCR 01 2014 (2) SCC 62 1959 Supp (1) SCR 639
proceedings were held up after the passing of an award, due to the interim order of any court, in the absence of any specific provision to that effect, a party who cannot perform its duties, and but for the order, could have performed its stipulated task, within the time assigned, should not be placed at a disadvantage, as that would amount to granting a premium for one’s wrongdoing, or rank speculation. It is urged, therefore, that it is imperative that the period during which the State or the acquiring authority was prohibited/ injuncted by an interim order of the court from taking possession has to be excluded. This principle, submit learned counsel, is based on settled common law principles. These are in fact rules of equity, justice and sound logic. In the absence of their being a prohibition in the law these principles would be attracted. The efficacy and binding nature of such common law principles cannot be diminished or whittled down in the absence of any express prohibition in law. Coupled with the aforesaid principle is also a principle of restitution. An interim order passed by the Court merges into the final decision, goes against the party successful at the interim stage. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the successful party at the end of the litigation would be justified in being placed in the same place in which it would have been, had the interim order not been passed. Undoing the effect of an interim order by resorting to the principle of restitution is in fact an obligation of the court. The above principles have been culled out and applied by this Court in the judgment in South Eastern Coal Field Ltd v State of M.P. & Ors.43. Learned counsel argued that general common law rules of equity, justice and sound logic would certainly apply. It is submitted that similarly, the doctrine of restitution has been discussed in several other judgments of this Court including State of Gujarat v Essar Oil Ltd44. It is, thus, submitted that the mere absence of an express provision under Section 24(2) – to exclude the period during which an interim order operates, which prevents the making of an award, or taking over of possession of acquired land, would not in law imply that such restitutionary and equitable principles would be inapplicable. Contentions on behalf of landowners
53. Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel, led the arguments on behalf of landowners. He urged that the Act of 2013 is a new, transformative and radical measure. The new law is a welfare state
2003 SCC 648 2012 (3) SCC 522
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
law, not a colonial law - unlike the Act of 1894. Mr. Divan submitted that the Act of 1894 resulted in several rounds of repeated litigation on various aspect, such as payment of compensation, lack of legislatively mandated timelines for completion of acquisition proceedings, etc. This also resulted in amendments to the Act of 1894 (notably, the amendments of 1967 and 1984) which, to some extent, sought to grant relief to landowners. However, these too got mired in litigation. Learned counsel relied on the judgments, reported as Dev Sharan v State of Uttar Pradesh45 and Radhey Shyam v State of UP46. Repeated litigation was the result of an unfair legal regime. It was submitted that such judgments of this Court highlighted that the Act of 1894 was enacted more than 116 years ago to facilitate acquisition of land and immovable properties for construction of roads, canals, railways, etc. This law was frequently used in the postindependence era for different public purposes like laying of roads, construction of bridges, dams and buildings of various public establishments/institutions, planned development of urban areas, providing of houses to different sections of the society and for developing residential colonies/sectors. In the recent years, there is acquisition of large tracts of land in rural parts of the country in the name of development and their transfer to private entrepreneurs, who utilize it to construction of multistoried complexes, commercial centres and for setting up industrial units. Similarly, large scale acquisitions were made on behalf of companies by invoking the provisions contained in Part VII of the Act. Resultantly, such acquisition led to deprivation of the source of livelihood of land owners, engaged in agricultural operations and other ancillary activities in rural areas. A large number of these people are unaware of, and unable to assert their rights, and secure fair compensation. The unrest and inequity which arose out of these deprivations, impelled the State to enact a modern law, which ensured not only fair compensation, but other rights such as rehabilitation, employment, higher solatium and a guarantee against deprivation of certain kinds of lands. Thus, the Act of 2013 ushered a new regime that starts from a fresh direction. Learned counsel also relied on Bharat Sewak Samaj v. Lieutnant Governor & Ors.,47 to say that the provisions of the Act of 1894 were outdated and were misused and were oppressive to the interest of the landowners. Hence, the Act of 2013 was enacted and that this Court ought to interpret in the spirit of
(2011) 4 SCC 769 (2011) 5 SCC 553 2012 (12) SCC 675
the new beneficial legislation. Learned counsel urged that the benefits so conferred should not be taken away by this Court by narrowly interpreting its provisions. 54. Mr. Divan relied on the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act of 2013 to say that the new law was framed, in recognition of concerns expressed by the property owners of forcible acquisition without following due process and without paying appropriate compensation affecting livelihood of such owners, many times, who are small property owners or persons having small agricultural holdings and having been dependant on the said holdings, the new Act is made. The Act aims to provide just and fair compensation, make adequate provision for rehabilitation and resettlement for the affected persons in the family, determination of compensation package on scientific methods. It was urged that being a welfare legislation, the Act of 2013 constitutes a wholesome rejection of the colonial approach. Learned counsel urged that under the new Act, unlike the Act of 1894, a Social Impact Assessment (SIA) report has to be prepared, under Section 7, as an integral component of acquisition proceedings. If acquisition is not resorted to, in a time frame, the acquisition lapses; likewise, the new Act contemplates the preparation of a rehabilitation scheme, which would note the (a) particulars of lands and immovable properties being acquired of each affected family; (b) livelihoods lost in respect of landless who are primarily dependent on the lands being acquired; (c) a list of public utilities Government buildings, amenities and infrastructural facilities which are affected or likely to be affected, where resettlement of affected families is involved and (d) details of any common property resources being acquired. 55. Learned senior counsel argued that Section 24 constitutes an exception to the general rule, i.e., lapsing of all acquisition proceedings, by reason of repeal of the Act of 1894, and operation of Section 114. Therefore, Section 24 has to be given effect to strictly, given that Parliamentary intent was to ensure that acquisition proceedings did not result in oppression and hardship. It was argued that having regard to this salient feature, the provision (Section 24) should be literally construed. Learned counsel submitted that the objective of new Act must be kept in mind to understand the scope of Sections 11, 11 (A), 12, 31 and 34 of the 1894 Act, on the one hand, and provisions of Section of 24 of the Act of 2013 on the other. Furthermore, it was argued that the non-obstante
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
clause must be allowed to operate with full vigour in its own field. It was stressed that such a provision is equivalent to saying that in spite of the provision or Act mentioned in the non-obstante clause, the enactment following it, will have its full operation of that, the provision indicated in the non-obstante clause will not be an impediment for the operation of the enactment. Decisions in this regard were cited by counsel.48
56. Mr. Divan relied upon the three stages preceding the Act of 2013 to urge that there was no doubt in the mind of Parliament, that lapsing of acquisition proceedings was intended to ensue, in the event compensation were not paid; or possession were not taken, in respect of awards made five years prior to coming into force of the Act of 2013. It was argued that Section 24 should be given a plain and literal construction, except to the extent that the term “paid” occurring in Section 24(2) would also cover cases where a deposit is made before the Reference Court in situations covered by Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act. Elaborating on this, it is urged that the first decision of this Court, i.e., Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) took note of Section 24(2) in the context of a preexisting law. The Court was alive to the fact that under the Act of 1894, where payment of compensation was tendered and the land owner refused to accept the amount, the State is nevertheless obliged to ensure that at all times, the amount should be made available, in a place or an account, not within its control. It was urged, therefore, that actual tender of the amount of compensation is a sine qua non for the act of payment to be completed. It was considered that in that event, the land owner does not accept the amount, it should be deposited with the Court, a neutral and independent authority to whom the land owner or anyone claiming under him can approach and draw the amount. It was submitted that this obligation cannot be brushed aside because aside from the question of acceptance of compensation without prejudice, even at a later stage, the land owner might wish to reconsider the compensation and avail of the amount. 57. Learned counsel submitted that the obligation to deposit the amount in the Reference Court is an independent and absolute one in that it is irrespective of whether the land owner sought a reference for higher compensation to the Court (under the Act of 1894). Learned counsel urged this Court to accept this interpretation, which according
Madhav Rao Scindhia v. Union of India 1971 (1) SCC 85 (11 Judges); Smt. Parayankandiyal Eravath v. K. Devi (1996) 4 SCC 76 (2 Judges).
to him, would give full effect to the intention of Parliament, i.e., to save intention of Parliament. It was again highlighted that Parliamentary intention was firstly to repeal the previous law to a limited extent and save ongoing acquisition proceedings – in terms of Section 24(1) and usher a new regime, i.e. Section 24(2) whereby indolence on the part of the State agencies either with respect to payment of compensation or with respect to taking over of possession, resulting in the lapse of acquisition proceedings itself. Learned counsel relied upon the decisions of this Court which followed and applied the law declared in Pune Municipal Corporation 49. 58. It was argued that the submissions on behalf of the State and the development authorities that “payment” included deposit with the treasury or some other authority other than the Reference Court, could not have been termed as compliance with the Act of 1894. Here, it was urged that Parliament was acutely alive of the fact that the previous land acquisition regime resulted in injurious and unconscionable delays in payment of compensation. Furthermore, even after awards were made, possession was never taken. This led to a great deal of uncertainty as far as the land owners were concerned because they could not move ahead in their life without compensation nor could they take any steps to acquire new lands or properties. It was precisely to address this mischief, rather a widespread one, that the Parliament wished to enact a “bright line approach” whereby all acquisitions which did not culminate either in payment of compensation or taking over of possession in respect of awards made five or more years prior to 1.1.2014 had to lapse. It was submitted that Section 24(1) provided a limited window in that it saved some acquisitions, i.e., notably where awards had been made but further proceedings had not been taken or where awards had not been made in Bharat Kumar v State of Haryana (2014) 6 SCC 586 (hereafter “Bharat Kumar”); Bimla Devi v State of Haryana (2014) 6 SCC 583 @ para 3; Union of India v Shiv Raj (2014) 6 SCC 564 at para 22; Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra) at para 14; State of Haryana v Vinod Oil and General Mills 2014 (15) SCC 410 at para 21; Sita Ram v State of Haryana (2015) 3 SCC 597 at paras 19, 21; Ram Kishan v State of Haryana (2015) 4 SCC 347 at paras 8, 9, 12; Velaxan Kumar v Union of India 2015 (4) SCC 325 at paras 15, 16, 17 (hereafter “Velaxan”); Karnail Kaur v State of Punjab (2015) 3 SCC 206 at paras 17, 18, 23; Rajive Chowdhrie HUF v State (NCT) of Delhi (2015) 3 SCC 541 at para 1; Competent Automobiles Co. Ltd v Union of India AIR 2015 SC 3186 at para 4; Govt of NCT of Delhi v Jagjit Singh AIR 2015 SC 2683 at para 3; Karan Singh v State of Haryana 2014 (5) SCC 738 at para 5; Shashi Gupta & Ors. v. State of Haryana 2016 (13) SCC 380 at para 5; Delhi Development Authority v Sukhbir Singh (2016) 16 SCC 258 at para 1 (hereafter “Sukhbir”).
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
both cases less than 5 years prior to 1.1.2014. It was only in these two limited instances that acquisition proceedings were allowed to continue or preserved. Thus, Parliamentary intent was that in cases of all awards made five years or more prior to the coming into force of the Act, if compensation was not paid or possession of the acquired land not taken, automatically, as a matter of law there was to be a lapse (of such acquisitions). This legal consequence crystallised and was in consonance with the other provisions of the Act of 2013. Arguing that if one were to take into account this perspective, there can be no doubt that the expression “paid” cannot mean anything other than tendering of compensation and in the event of its refusal, or the three contingencies contemplated under Section 31(2) of the Act of 1894, it is deposited in Court. If these eventualities were not fulfilled and the amounts were merely kept back with the Government by it, any compliance with some norms evolved as part of the treasury or financial code there could have been no payment or deposit in the eyes of law. Learned counsel submitted that this Court should affirm the decision in Sukhbir Singh. It was also submitted that unless Section 31 of the 1894 Act which postulates the performance of a public duty in a particular manner and (through stipulated three eventualities), such duty could be said to be fulfilled only and only if that procedure were followed. Learned counsel relied upon the judgment in Bharat Kumar, which noted that Section 24(2) has a beneficial intent and begins with a non-obstante clause. Therefore, urged counsel, literal meaning is to be preferred. It was highlighted that Section 24(2) achieved a two-fold purpose, i.e., to preserve acquisition proceedings initiated before the commencement of the Act and secondly, conferring rights upon the land owners and other parties which did not hitherto exist. Since these rights relate to the right to property which is guaranteed by Article 300A of the Constitution, full effect must be given to them rather than the construction which would destroy its very purpose. In support of this argument, learned counsel relied upon Union of India v. Shivraj50.
59. Learned counsel submitted that the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was itself conscious of Section 31 and the contingencies or eventualities contemplated under Section 31(2). That apart, it also relied upon Ivo Agnelo Santimano Fernandes v. State of Goa51, to say that the State cannot be – in the event of non-acceptance
(2014) 6 SCC 564. (2011) 11 SCC 506
of the compensation by the land owner or its inability to locate the land owner or in the event of a dispute – keep the compensation amount with itself and claim it to be part of same general treasury amount and proceed to utilise it. It was submitted that precisely to deal with this practice, the appeal provided that non-payment of compensation – and in the event of any of the contingencies accruing in Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act, the failure to deposit it with the Reference Court would result in lapse of entire acquisition itself. It was submitted that this interpretation is not only literal but followed the objective and purpose sought to be achieved by the Parliament through the provision. Learned counsel urged this Court that the literal interpretation in this case would also accrue with an equitable interpretation and ensure that the real benefit of the new law would accrue to land owners deprived of their properties and livelihoods for long periods without payment of compensation. Learned counsel, therefore, urged that the beneficial interpretation adopted by this Court in Velaxan Kumar (supra) should be accepted. Rajive Chowdhurie HUF (supra)52, it was argued, while interpreting Section 24 of the Act of 2013 Act, the Court should not in the guise of an interpretative exercise don the cap of a legislature. It was submitted as to the State’s argument that the disjunctive “or” in Section 24(2) should not be read as conjunctive “and”. It was argued in this regard that in all the three drafts that the Bill (which ultimately culminated in the Act of 2013) went through53, the expression used consistently was “but the physical possession”. In the three stages, the intent was to normally ensure that the acquisition proceedings pending for a long time were to lapse. It was emphasised that in the first version, i.e., the Bill introduced on 5.9.2011, all acquisitions were deemed to have lapsed regardless of whether the award was made or not, if possession were not taken and also in those cases where the awards were not made. Therefore, this Court should be cautious in interpreting the disjunctive “or” in any manner other than in the literal sense. 60. The three broad situations covered under Section 24 are (i) cases where the land acquisition process shall be deemed to have lapsed;
(2015) 3 SCC 541 Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill 2011 – introduced in Lok Sabha on 05.07.2011; Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2013 as passed by the Lok Sabha on 29.08.2013 and the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013 (as passed by both Houses of Parliament on 05.09.2013).
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
(ii) cases where the landholders are entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013; and (iii) cases where the land acquisition proceedings continue under the 1894 Act as if it had not been repealed. It was urged that the first set of cases are covered by Section 24(2). The two conditions to be fulfilled as on 1.1.2014 to trigger the deeming provision into operation, according to Mr. Divan, are firstly, there must be an award under section 11 of the 1894 Act which has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013 (i.e., an award made on or before 1.1.2009); and secondly either physical possession of the land has not been taken from the landowner or compensation had not been paid as required under the Act of 1894.
61. It was argued that the second set of cases, where enhanced compensation has to be paid, under the Act of 2013, are covered under Section 24(1) and the proviso to Section 24. Section 24(1) provides that where proceedings have not reached the stage of an award under section 11 of the 1894 Act, the provisions to determine compensation under the Act of 2013 apply. Further, the proviso to Section 24 provides for compensation in terms of the Act of 2013 where the following conditions are fulfilled, firstly an award has been made under section 11 of the 1894 Act; and secondly, compensation in respect of the majority of the land holdings has not been paid to the landowners. It was submitted that the “majority” is required to be reckoned with reference to the award passed under the Act of 1894, and that awards contemplated by the proviso are awards made within the period of five years prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013 i.e., awards made between 1.1.2009 and 31.12.2013. 62. Learned counsel stated that the third set of cases is where the land owners do not get any benefit under the Act of 2013 and the acquisition proceeds under the provisions of the Act of 1894. It was argued that these cases are covered by section 24(1)(b) and to which neither section 24 (2) nor the proviso applies. This covers situations where though an award has been passed five years prior to the commencement of the Act, neither of the conditions for deemed lapsing are present. Mr. Divan urged that the provisions of the Act of 1894 will continue to apply without any benefit in terms of increased compensation where an award is passed within 5 years of the commencement of the Act of 2013 but the majority of landholders have been paid.
63. Mr. Divan then urged that this understanding of the provisions of Section 24 is based on established rules of interpretation i.e., first, the golden rule of interpretation requiring the Court to interpret statutory provisions literally. Second, the rule of purposive interpretation was to be used, having regard to the object of the enactment, the purpose of the law in seeking to correct historical injustices and the legislative intent to confer the benefit of the Act of 2013 on certain landholders affected by the regime under the Act of 1894. The third rule to be employed, is the rule of harmonious interpretation, such that all words of the provision are given effect and no part of the provision is rendered otiose; fourth, contemporaneous understanding of administrators responsible for implementing a new law. Also an interpretation in such a manner as to avoid inserting words, subtracting words, and avoids anomalies or absurdities was necessary. Lastly it was urged that giving a deeming provision its natural effect, which in this case results in a rule of interpretation that the provisions of a beneficent legislation ought to be interpreted in the case of ambiguity in favour of the citizens. 54 64. It was submitted that the interpretation of Section 24 outlined above gives the plain and natural meaning to the key expressions used in section 24 - “physical possession”, “paid”, and “deemed to have lapsed”. He further argued that since Section 24 of the Act of 2013 must be read with section 31 of the Act of 1894, the expression “tender” is also relevant and the interpretation he has advanced is consistent with the natural meaning of “tender”. 65. Learned counsel for the landowners urged that the words ‘paid’ and ‘deposited in the account of the beneficiaries’ are two permissible modes of making compensation available to landowners. Mr. Divan contended that these are two modes of paying the money to the landowners. ‘Paid’, it was urged, means paid. It does not mean a deposit in treasury. He further submitted that ‘deposit in the account of the beneficiaries’ does not mean a deposit in the treasury. He argued that there was no reason to depart from the rule of literal interpretation, and the manner of payment, as held in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), is to be strictly in terms of Section 31 of the Act of 1894 as it is Counsel cited Pratap Singh vs. State of Jharkhand (2005) 3 SCC 551 (5 Judges); Central Railway Workshop vs. Vishwanath (1969) 3 SCC 95; and M/s International Ore and Fertilisers (india) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Employee State Insurance (1987) 4 SCC 203 in support of the rule of beneficial construction of a welfare and remedial statute.
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
an expropriatory legislation. It was contended as to the learned Solicitor General’s submission that payment in terms of Section 24 is complied with if the amount is tendered to the landowners, overlooks the obligation of payment in terms of Section 24 is only met if the amount is actually paid to the landowners. On the occurrence of the contingencies mentioned in Section 31(2) of the Act of 1894, it ought to be deposited in the Reference Court as defined under Section 3(d) of the Act of 1894. He submitted that tendering money is not payment and Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 uses the words ‘tender’ and ‘paid’ to convey different meanings and obligations. Mr. Divan argued that the judgments cited by the learned Solicitor General in this regard essentially deal with labour laws, and are inapplicable as these statutes did not contain a provision such as Section 31 of the Act of 1894, which strictly and precisely prescribes what is to be done in the event when the payment is not accepted.
66. It was argued that no rules under the Act of 1894 contemplate deposit in the treasury. Learned counsel submitted that standing orders, which are merely administrative instructions issued for conducting monetary transactions of the State, have in some cases been confused to be Rules framed under Section 55 of the Act of 1894. The Rules or the Standing Orders have not been produced and no evidence has been furnished of compliance with the requirements of Section 55, such as notification in the Gazette. All learned counsel submitted that in any case, delegated/subordinate legislation cannot be inconsistent with, or in any manner depart from the express and precise language of the parent enactment. Again, it was submitted that the State’s argument with respect to deposit of compensation amounts in the treasury, is untenable, for two strong reasons: one, that Section 31 itself directed the compensation to be deposited in the court. In the teeth of this express position, the State cannot be heard to say that it could nevertheless “deposit” the amount in the treasury, which is nothing but keeping the money with itself. It was secondly urged, that even otherwise, the Act of 1894 visualized that in regard to matters not provided expressly, rules could be made (Section 55).
67. Learned counsel submitted that the State’s argument regarding the interpretation of ‘physical possession’ to be possession as per the ratio in Banda Development Authority (supra), is incorrect. It was submitted that it is important to take note of the conscious inclusion of
the word ‘physical’ in relation to possession. An important distinction is required to be drawn in respect of de jure / constructive / deemed possession and ‘physical’ possession. Even if it is conceded that drawing of a Panchnama is a valid mode of initially taking possession of vast tracts of vacant land, the intention of the legislature is that over a period of five years, such possession must transform to evident and demonstrable ‘physical’ possession i.e., the manifestation of actual control and dominion over the subject land(s). Learned counsel relied on several decisions in support of their argument that “physical possession” should be construed as actual physical possession, and not constructive, or de jure possession, which in most cases is possession on paper. 55 68. Arguing next regarding the interpretation of the proviso to Section 24, it was stated that the same is to be read as a proviso to Section 24 and not Section 24 (1) (b). Mr. Divan submitted that a proviso may in certain cases operate as an independent provision, and the proviso to Section 24 is a stand-alone provision which operates on its own terms. To the extent it is linked to any provision in Section 24, it is linked to Section 24(1)(b) since it permits enhanced compensation (in a particular contingency of non-payment to majority of the landowners) even if an award may have been passed as contemplated in Section 24(1)(b). Mr. Divan placed reliance on the reasons given in the judgment of Delhi Development Authority v. Virendra Lal Bahri, [SLP [C] No.37375/ 2016]. 69. All counsel for landowners submitted that there is no valid reason to exclude from the period of 5 years under section 24(2), the time during which a landowner had the benefit of an interim order of a court. In support of this argument, it was argued firstly, that Parliament did not expressly exclude such a period in Section 24. Second, where in the Act of 2013, the legislature did want to exclude the period of a stay or injunction, it has done so by using express words such as in the proviso to Section 19 and the explanation to Section 69 of the Act of 2013. Third, he submitted that the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” which means that “the act of court shall prejudice no one” has no application
Seksaria Cotton mills v. State of Bombay 1953 SCR 325 Para 21; Superintendent v. Anil Kumar (1979) 4 SCC 274 (Paras11-16); B. Gangadhar v. Rajalingam (1995) 5 SCC 238 (Para 5-6) Guruchand Singh v. Kamla Singh (1976) 2 SCC 152 (Paras 21-24). Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2015) 6 SCC 222 (2 Judges) Para 11 to 15 endorsing contextual interpretation of the term
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here, as this is a maxim which is applied generally as a principle of equity in individual cases to ensure that there is no injustice. The maxim rarely, if ever, is applied to interpret a statute. Mr. Divan submitted that this Court has declined to rely on this maxim in at least two reported decisions - Padma Sundar Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu56 and State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Khandaka Jain Jewellers57. Mr. Divan further placed reliance on Snell’s Equity (33rd Edition, 2015), which states that the maxim of equity is not a specific rule of principle of law. It is a statement of a broad theme which underlies equitable concepts and principles and as a result, the utility of equitable maxims is limited. It further states that the maxim may provide some limited assistance to court in two broad types of situation:
“The first is when there is some uncertainty as to the scope of a particular rule of principle, and a court has to fall back on more basic principles to resolve that uncertainty. The second is when a court is exercising an equitable discretion, and seeks to structure that exercise by referring to broader, underlying principles.”
70. Learned counsel further placed reliance on a three-judge Bench decision of this Court in The Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Parson Tools and Plants58, where it was held that: ‘If the Legislature wilfully omits to incorporate something of an analogous law in a subsequent statute, or even if there is a casus omissus in a statute, the language of which is otherwise plain and unambiguous, the Court is not competent to supply the omission by engrafting on it or introducing in it, under the guise of interpretation, by analogy or implication, something what it thinks to be a general principle of justice and equity.’ It was submitted that there is no occasion for excluding time spent on litigation. Parliament could have specified a particular date such as 1.1.2009 as the cut-off point under section 24(2). Had a date been so specified, there would have been no occasion to exclude time. Instead of specifying a particular date, the Legislature in the Act of 2013 prescribed the cut-off point with reference to the commencement of the
(2002) 3 SCC 533 (2007) 14 SCC 339 (1975) 4 SCC 22
Act. This method of specifying the cut-off point would not attract the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit”. It was argued that the occasion for excluding time would arise only where there is a starting point and a statutory period to complete the task. In such provisions, it may be reasonable to provide for the exclusion of time by appropriate language in the section. Here, where a cut-off date is prescribed and as such there is no starting point and period for completion of the task, the notion of excluding time spent in litigations is an alien concept. It was, therefore, submitted that it is not the court’s business to stretch the words used by the Legislature to fill in gaps or omit words used in the provisions of an Act, i.e., to fill in an obvious and conscious exclusion of a contingency, or a casus omissus. In support of this submission, learned counsel relied on decisions of this Court.59 It was also argued that this Court should not also exclude any period or periods, spent in litigation, when interim orders were operating, because, firstly, in each such instance, the landowners were aggrieved by different kinds of arbitrary behaviour, such as not providing opportunity of mandatory hearing (under an absolutely absurd rejection of objections; failure to take note of actual developmental needs, and taking of lands, unconnected with a public purpose, or obvious instances of expropriation of utilities and amenities such as schools, community assets, etc. These led the courts, on a prima facie consideration to assess the merit in the challenge and grant interim orders. Such instances could not be called as frivolous litigation, warranting exclusion of time, to deprive the benefit of lapsing, enjoined by the new law. Secondly, it was argued that repeated attempts were made in Parliament to amend the law, to exclude the time, in the manner sought by the State, by use of the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit. However, such amendment could not pass muster. 71. Learned counsel contended that Parliament’s intent is to confer a benefit on landholders who were impacted by the erstwhile unfair regime. Urging that under the old law, landholders, to protect their assets from expropriation of their land at paltry amounts, were compelled to use legitimate systems of securing redress by filing cases in court, counsel urged that the correct approach, is to view litigation as a necessity under an unjust former regime and not exclude the period spent under litigation in such an unfair regime. He further urged that the deeming provision with its clear and verifiable benchmarks on the five-year cut-off period,
G. Narayanswami v. G. Pannerselvam (1972) 3 SCC 717 and Kuldip Nayar vs Union Of India (2006) 7 SCC 1- both decisions of Constitution Benches.
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physical possession and payment is easy to operate. Introducing notions such as exclusion of time due to pending litigation would complicate the working of the statute.
72. Learned counsel urged that Section 24(2) uses the expression “or”. The Legislature intended the two conditions separated by the word “or” to be alternative conditions. Four situations arise where the conditions are disjunctive: firstly, when physical possession is with the State and compensation is with the citizen, there is no deemed lapse; secondly, when physical possession is with the citizen and compensation is with the State, there is no need for restitution as the State has retained the compensation amount; thirdly, when physical possession is with the citizen, and the compensation is also with the citizen, in such scenarios, the citizen must return the compensation. It was urged that where the State has paid the money by deposit in the Reference Court and the money was lying with the Court, the State may withdraw the money on deemed lapsing. However, if the State were to decide to acquire the land afresh, the compensation already paid may be adjusted; and further since inherent in the notion of lapsing is the requirement for restitution, the State can recover the compensation, inter alia by framing suitable rules. The citizen cannot retain compensation “had and received” since this would amount to unjust enrichment. It was submitted that where the physical possession as well as compensation are with the State, i.e., where the State has taken possession without paying compensation as required under the Act of 1894, there is no absolute vesting free from all encumbrances as contemplated under Section 16. In the absence of vesting, the State is required to restore possession to the citizen. 73. Learned counsel argued that having regard to the unfair working of the Act of 1894, giving effect to the legislative intent by reading the expression “or” as “or” is the correct interpretation with beneficent consequences for the landowner. The learned counsel submitted that reading the expression “or” as “and” not only does violence to the plain language of section 24(2) but it also reduces the deeming provision down to vanishing point. Should a conjunctive reading of the conditions be combined with exclusion of the time spent in litigation or due to a stay, then the whole of section 24(2) will be robbed of content since it will apply to very rare cases. It was further submitted that Section 24 does not lay down any specific conditionality in terms of how far back in time the awards contemplated under section 24(2) could have
been made. The deeming provision under Section 24(2) operates w.e.f. 1.1.2014 and its effect would cover all cases that fulfil the conditions provided in the statute. Learned counsel cited decisions in support of the interpretation that “or” should be construed disjunctively, not conjunctively as “and”.60
74. Learned counsel stressed that there are no vested rights created in the State in any case till compensation has been paid and possession has been taken. The Act of 2013 is a beneficial legislation and a radical departure from the previous unjust and oppressive regime. It intends to confer significant benefits to the landowners and makes the exercise of the power of eminent domain compatible with our constitutional values. It ought to therefore be given an interpretation which favours the landowners. Finally, he argued that the decision in Indore Development Authority (supra) erroneously upset a consistent line of decisions which began with Pune Municipal Corporation (supra). Subsequent decisions of this Court following Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) have also considered a host of arguments/issues and there is no compelling reason to make a departure. He submitted that even a larger Bench of this Court is bound to pay due deference to the principle of Stare Decisis.
75. Supplementing the submissions, Mr. Dinesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel for the landowners, argued that the meaning of the phrase “compensation has not been paid” should be considered, given that in Section 24(2) “paid” is not used. The phrase “has not been” is used in respect of both “possession” as well as “paid”. Therefore, it must mean the same in both respects. The important factors to be borne in mind – and to distinguish the phrase “paid” from “deposit”, is whether in the court under Section 31 (2) or in the treasury under Section 31(1). It is urged that an analysis of Sections 17 (3A) & (3B), 31 (1) & (2) and Section 28 read with Section 34 of the Act of 1894 shows that these provisions clearly distinguish between tender, paid or deposit whether in the court or the treasury. 76. Learned counsel argued that three different words used in the same Act, in various provisions of the Act, cannot mean the same. It follows also from the reading of Section 19(1)(c) and (cc). In both these
Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights vs. Union of India (1998) 2 SCC 109 (5 Judges); R.S. Nayak v A.R. Antulay 1984 (2) SCC 183; and Life Insurance Corporation v D. J. Bahadur 1981 (1) SCC 315.
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
provisions word “tender” is used in contrast to word “paid” while word paid is used in contrast to word “deposit”. The word “deposit”, wherever used, is in the context of “deposit in Court” only not treasury. The expression “tender payment” under Section 17 (3A) and Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 were followed by the words “pay it to them”. Therefore, tender cannot mean “paid”. It is urged that these terms fall in Part V of the Act, titled as “Payment”. The term “pay it to them” under Section 31 after “tender” must mean an additional action or step. When after “tender” an effort is made “to pay” the compensation and the same is accepted by the beneficiary, it becomes “paid”. The “deposit” under Section 31(2) only comes in when the beneficiary declines payment. This clearly implies that “tender of payment” cannot be equated with “pay it to them” or “deposit in Court” under Section 31(1) and 31 (2). It is argued that what follows is that tender of payment by itself is not enough. The State’s interpretation is contested as incorrect because if tender is equal to being paid then why does legislature provide for “deposit in court”. The amount is deemed to be paid on tender and the obligation to pay is discharged then the question is why require “deposit in Court”. Learned counsel argued that “Tender” can never be deemed as “paid”: This is not only evident from reading of Section 19(c) where the term “paid or tendered” is depicted as alternates. Similarly, “paid or deposited” are used alternately. Likewise, Sections 17(3)(b), 19(cc) and 34 use these words alternately. As said above if “tender” would amount to “paid” and then the compensation would be deemed to be paid, resulting in discharge of obligation to pay, then why deposit in court under Section 31(2) to make it “custodia legis”. Section 31(2) would become redundant in most of the cases.
77. Learned counsel conceded that there is no doubt that on a decline of payment by the beneficiary it has to be mandatorily deposited in Court under Section 31(2). The provision uses the phrase “shall deposit” and this gives a valuable right to the payee, not only of interest in the event it is not “deposited in court” but also a right to seek investment of compensation under Section 33. These statutory rights are adversely affected if “deposit” is not in “court”. Therefore, it is amply clear that “deposit in treasury is not an option available. It cannot be a substitute for “deposit in Court”. Besides Section 31(1) and 31 (2) of the Act of 1894 present a complete code for payment and there is no gap or uncovered area to permit rules to supplement. Any deposit in treasury was in breach of Section 31 and therefore, impermissible. Also,
most of the States had no rules under Section 55. In this context, executive instructions cannot prevail over law. Law can never be interpreted with the aid of subordinate legislation or executive instructions. It was further submitted that Sections 17(3A) and (3B), 28, 31, 33 and 34 of the Act of 1894 are a clear pointer that “tender” is not “paid” and neither is “deposit”. Likewise, these provisions frequently use words “paid or deposited” which shows they are different. Deposit cannot be, therefore, equated with paid as they are more than once separated by word ‘or’. 78. It was contended that the scheme of the Act of 1894 was clear and categorical that the amount of compensations when accepted by the beneficiary is deemed to be “paid” for interest to stop running. The running of interest under Section 34 denotes non-discharge of obligation to pay, otherwise why pay interest? The “deposit in Court” may stop running of interest and therefore, may for this purpose be taken to be paid, but when it comes to actual meaning in the above provisions, “paid and deposit” are invariably separated by the use of word “or” in between them. Therefore, it is submitted that when Section 24(2) of the New Act uses the phrase “compensation has not been paid” it uses the terminology of the proviso to Section 34(proviso) and must have the same meaning “has not been paid” cannot be read as “has not been deposited”. If this is the right interpretation than the coverage of Section 24(2) also expands to cover those cases in which the compensation has not been actually paid but has been deposited in the Court. This would also be in keeping with the legislative policy contained in the Preamble, to give just and fair compensation to those whose lands have been acquired as per the Old Act. Coverage of the New Act is corelated to persons whose “land has been acquired”. The policy of Section 24 also reflects this expansive liberal approach of “just and fair compensation”. Section 24 would therefore have to be seen in the light of this liberal policy intent. 79. It was urged that these States’ arguments regarding revival of claims or resulting in impossible situations causing irreparable harm are not very relevant once the legislative policy is clear. The provision has to be interpreted in a manner that it subserves the legislative policy intent of giving just and fair compensation to those whose lands were acquired (possession taken) under the Act of 1894. Once the legislative policy or intent is clear then the objections relating to harsh consequences are not
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
really relevant. It was stated that State may be put into a difficult situation, but the solution too is provided in the last part of Section 24(2) which reflects the words “if it so chooses”, it can acquire afresh under Section 24. Learned counsel relied on Padma Sunder Rao (supra); Popat Bahiru Govardhane v. Land Acquisition Officer61 and B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal62. It was urged that the legislative policy may cause hardship or difficulties to some or the State may be put to an impossible situation; yet cannot take away from Parliamentary intent. Parliament has enough wisdom to know these difficulties, the law prevailing earlier or the ground realities. It would be deemed to be not only aware of the difficulties, but also to have assessed them while framing the liberalised policy. The question is one of intent. The intent has to be seen primarily from the words used in the text. It is only if such intent is not clear that courts have to see them with the aid of the context. The difficulties as well as harsh consequences cannot be utilized to assess the intent embedded in the provision if they are clear, otherwise from the text, or the context. Not only has Parliament not provided any clause creating any kind of exception, or extension of five years in cases of litigating land oustees who may have an interim orders in their favour, stalling the acquisition or payment of compensation. All that the provision says is “or compensation has not been paid”. The projected policy intent is broad and unencumbered by any exception. This is a clearest indicator of legislative intent to cover all such cases that may cause hardship to the State or may be due to the fault of Court or the litigious land oustee. The intent is clear and therefore, has to be read apart from difficulties or hardships.
80. It is submitted that the State’s contention with regard to a differential approach for possession and compensation is irrational and is against the very grain of Section 24(2) and is also unreasonable and discriminatory. It is unreasonable because there are hardly any cases where compensation may have been paid, yet possession may not have been taken. Most of the cases are under Section 17(1) where possession is invariably taken while compensation remains unpaid as award is not made. By reading word ‘or’ as ‘and’, the words “or the compensation has not been paid” become otiose or redundant. Parliament could have only said that lapsing would occur only if possession has not been taken, because if possession is taken then there would never be lapsing and
2003 (10) SCC 765 (2011) 4 SCC 266
there would be no need to consider “or” as “and”. Therefore, such an interpretation (i.e., reading “or” conjunctively) is contrary to every rule of interpretation and contrary to the Legislative policy indicated in the Preamble of giving just and fair compensation in cases of earlier acquisitions, which includes cases where possession has been taken.
81. Learned counsel urged that Section 24(2) would become discriminatory if “or” is read as “and”. For this, it would be necessary to analyse Section 24(1)(a). Section 24(1)(a) applies to a situation where there is no award made till the commencement of the New Act. No award primarily means “compensation has not been paid”. Importantly in a case under Section 17 of the Act of 1894, which is most frequently utilised, possession may be taken before award is made or compensation is paid. In other words, Section 24(1)(a) does visualize or cover cases where possession may have been taken but “compensation has not been paid”. It, therefore, requires re-determination of compensation under Sections 26-30 of the New Act. The problems of who to pay the enhanced compensation, as referred above, would also arise in this situation. Yet Parliament has ignored these difficulties and provided for redetermination. Section 24(1)(a) may travel back to period of five years or more, or may be 10-15 years as in case of Section 24(2). It would not be reasonable to restrict the retrospectivity of Section 24(1)(a) with the aid of Section 11A of the old Act, to 2 years before commencement. It would be incorrect because then one would be ignoring Explanation to Section 11A (proviso). The said Explanation visualises indefinite extension of the period of award from 2 years. It would not be, therefore, reasonable to exclude such cases where though possession may have been taken, but compensation may not have been paid for a very long period of time upto commencement of the new Act. Section 24(1)(a) does not contain any provision like Section 25 (proviso), Section 19(7)(proviso) and Section 69(2)(explanation) and therefore, is wide in its coverage in the absence of exceptions as above.
82. Learned counsel urged that Section 24(2) is a special provision giving higher benefit because in the cases covered by Section 24(2) “compensation has not been paid” despite award. Would it be rational to read Section 24(2) in such a manner that deprives it of its value and worth and makes it ineffective. Section 24(2) would become ineffective as a whole because there would be rarest of the rare cases, where both the conditions would be fulfilled. The experience shows in vast majority
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
of cases of acquisition under the old Act, possession is taken while award & compensation come much later. This is because Sections 9 & 17(6) of the Act of 1894 were used in vast majority of acquisitions and the Legislature was aware of it. The law does not compel doing of an act that is impossible. It is emphasized that the principle does not apply as the new Act is not requiring any such performance. The new Act after recognising the past, is providing new solutions, rights and benefits. Section 24(2) by itself does not compel performance of an impossible act. This principle could have been relevant during earlier Act but is hardly relevant for interpreting the scope of Section 24(2) of the New Act. Section 24 clearly postulates that even though the Act may be impossible of performance, or results in undue advantage to the beneficiary despite his fault in declining, yet benefit of Section 24(2) may be given without creating any exception. There is no constitutional restriction on the Legislature that such cases or situations have to be excluded. The legislature can provide benefit in the same manner to all, difficulties apart. Reliance is placed on certain decisions in support of this proposition.63 Therefore, such interpretation which excludes the benefits under Section 24(2) by resorting to such arguments of difficulties is meaningless. The giving of benefit to all by ignoring above circumstance is neither illegal nor unjust. It is neither anomalous nor absurd. It is urged that what the court feels is not important; what is relevant is the view of the legislature, to be culled out from the reading of only the text or the context; not in any other manner. For this rule, reliance was placed on Mohd. Kavi v. Fatmabal Ibrahim64 and other decisions.
83. Other learned senior counsel, i.e M/s Dushyant Dave, Gopal Shankarnarayan, Siddharth Luthra, Nakul Dewan, Manoj Swaroop, Anukul Chandra Pradhan supplemented the submissions of Mr. Divan and Mr. Dwivedi. It was argued by them that this Court should not depart from the rule of literal interpretation, because that would be both beneficial and purposive, given the oppressive nature of the Act of 1894. In this context, it was submitted that the expressions “paid” and “or” should be construed in the manner that Parliament intended, having regard to the overall intent of ensuring the acquisition proceedings, where either Martin Burn Ltd v Corporation of Calcutta 1966 (1) SCR 543; Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax v Keshab Chandra Mandal 1950 SCR 435; and State of Maharastra v Nanded Parbhani Sangh 2000 (2) SCC 69. 1997 (6) SCC 71 and M.V. Javali v Mahajan Borewell & Co. Ltd 1997 (8) SCC 72; and Nanded Parbhani Sangh (supra); and SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC 89.
compensation was not paid, or possession was not taken, in respect of awards made before 1.1.2009, should lapse. It was submitted that there is no insurmountable difficulty or impossibility, even if possession is taken (but compensation not paid) and even if vesting occurs, Section 24(2) of the new Act expressly provides for lapsing. The remedy in that case, for the appropriate Government is the option of going through the acquisition again using emergency provisions. In that event, the authorities would have to provide for rehabilitation and enhanced compensation. In any case, the court always has the option in such cases where third party rights have ensued to do complete justice, by duly compensating those whose land is acquired, without disturbing the possession of third party who has been given the land. 84. The learned counsel submit that this Court should base itself on the approach to interpret Section 24 of the Act of 2013 is that it is a savings clause with an exclusionary deeming provision. It is urged that the words “physical possession” under Section 24(2) should be read to reflect the actual state of affairs as on the date when the Act of 2013 came into force, i.e., there was actual physical possession of the land. This would also be the case in relation to the term “compensation not paid” under Section 24(2), where compensation would either have had to be paid or deposited in court; and that use of the term “or” signifies that the two conditions set out above are disjunctive. It is argued that Section 114 consists of two sections (1) a repeal clause set out in Section 114 (1); and (2) a savings clause set out in Section 114(2). It is contended that there is a distinction in the manner in which a repealing clause is construed as compared to the manner in which a savings clause is construed. While a repealing clause, followed by a new legislation on the same subject-matter would result in a line of enquiry about what rights are obliterated under the old Act by the new Act, a savings clause would be construed in a manner that resurrects a provision, which would otherwise be obliterated on account of the repeal. In relation to a repeal clause, the effect of obliterating the provisions of the previous enactment would be as if it never existed, except for vested rights, which would be protected under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, thus operated as a savings clause. Learned counsel rely on the judgment of this court in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh65 that the effect of repealing a statute was said to be to obliterate it as
(1955) 1 SCR 893
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
completely from the records of Parliament as if it had never been passed, except for the purpose of those actions, which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded while it was an existing law and that:
“A repeal therefore without any saving Clause would destroy any proceeding whether not vet begun or whether pending at the time of the enactment of the Repealing Act and not already prosecuted to a final judgment so as to create a vested right”. 85. Submitting that the effect of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, is that unless the contrary intention appears, the repeal does not affect the previous operation of the repealed enactment or anything duly done or suffered under it and any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced in respect of any right, liability and penalty under the repealed Act as if the Repealing Act had not been passed. However, in case of the Act of 2013, it is urged that Parliamentary intent was not to simply let Section 6 of the General Clauses Act operate as the savings provision. Apart from Section 6, the intent, evident from Section 114(2), was to set out a specific provision which would save proceedings. It was submitted that those would be provisions that would otherwise not have been saved by the General Clauses Act. 86. It is in this background that Section 24 of the Act of 2013 must be interpreted. While the Respondent accepts that Section 24 could have been more clearly worded to reflect the legislative intent as a savings provision, to fully appreciate the operation of Section 24 (1)(b) as a classical savings provision which saves proceedings under the Act of 1894 if an award had been made under Section 11, in a manner as if the Act of 1894 had not been repealed. Section 24(1)(a) deals with a situation where no award has been made and in providing for determination of compensation in terms of the Act of 2013 naturally would mean that proceedings under the Act of 1894 would be revived, save and except on the issue of computation of compensation. Having revived proceedings under Section 24(1), Section 24(2) provides for a deemed lapsing through a non-obstante provision for an award made five years or prior to the date of the commencement of the Act of 2013. This creates a legal fiction which, as held by this court in J.K.Cotton Spg. & Wvg.Mils Ltd. v. Union of India,66 is:
1987 Supp SCC 350
“...an admission of the non-existence of the fact deemed...The legislature is quite competent to enact a deeming provision for the purpose of assuming the existence of a fact which does not really exist.” Learned counsel also placed reliance on the decision of the Constitution Bench in Bengal Immunity Co.Ltd. v. State of Bihar67 to the following effect: “[l] egal fictions are created only for some definite purpose”and referred to the decision East End Dwellings Co.Ltd.v. Finsbury Borough Council,1952 AC 109 at paragraph 71,which reads as follows:
“if you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real,you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so,also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which,if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed,must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it.One of these in this case is emancipation from the 1939 level of rents.The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs;it does not say that having done so,you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.” (Emphasis Supplied)
87. Other decisions of this Court were also relied on, in this context.68 Learned counsel stated that given that it is a legal fiction which leads to a deemed lapsing of proceedings under the Act of 1894, Parliamentary intent under Section 24(2) ought to be construed so that “physical possession” under Section 24(2) reflects the actual state of affairs as on the date when the Act of 2013 came into force; similarly, too the term compensation not paid under Section 24(2). It was stated, that retaining amounts in the treasury, pursuant to executive rules would not suffice for compliance with the payment condition. Learned counsel also urged that this court should interpret “or” as signifying a disjunctive reading of the two conditions. Comparing this legal fiction created under Section 24(2) with the State’s obligations under the Act of 1894 would be inconsistent with the decisions of this Court, under which legal fictions
(1955)2 SCR 603 MIG Cricket Club v.AbhinavSahakar Education Society, (2011) 9 SCC 97
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
are to be read as it is i.e., the state of affairs as plainly set out in the legal fiction. Therefore, the effect of Section 24 (2) is that if either of the situations are not met, the acquisition proceedings under the Act of 1894 lapse and the State can initiate proceedings afresh in accordance with the Act of 2013. This construction, urge learned counsel is also purposive and practical. If the State has not taken physical possession of a property even if compensation has been paid for over 5 years prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013, because it no longer serves the purpose of acquisition, it can drop the proceedings as those would have lapsed. In such an event, the State would naturally be entitled to restitutory recovery. However, if the State has failed to take physical possession, it cannot be benefited by its inactions and must restart proceedings under the Act of 2013. In such a case, the compensation paid can always be re-adjusted against compensation determined under the Act of 2013. Arguendo, it is urged that even if Section 114 (2) of the Act of 2013 is construed to keep alive the State’s vested rights by virtue of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, such rights are limited by Section 24(1)(a) and Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. Thus, while ordinarily the acquisition proceedings that were pending in respect of awards passed under the Act of 1894 would have continued, the legislature by way of a creating a legal fiction, provided for the deemed lapse of these proceedings in respect of which physical possession has not been taken or compensation not paid. Learned counsel placed reliance on some decisions of this Court. 69 VKNM Vocational Higher Secondary School v. State of Kerala,70 where it was held that:
“...a vested right can also be taken away by a subsequent enactment if such subsequent enactment specifically provides by express words or by necessary intendment. In other words, in the event of the extinction of any such right by express provision in the subsequent enactment, the same would lose its value.”
88. It was submitted that in order to determine the accrued rights and incurred liabilities that have been saved under the Act of 1894, the line of inquiry is not to enquire if the new enactment has by its new provisions kept alive the rights and liabilities under the repealed law, but whether it has taken away those rights and liabilities.
Jayantilal Amrathlal v. Union of India,(1972) 4 SCC 174, T.S.Baliah v. Income Tax Officer, Central Circle VI,Madras,1969 (3) SCR 65 2016 (4) SCC 216.
89. All learned counsel supported the submission that the proviso is not restricted in its operation to Section 24 (2) only and that its placement is not determinative. It was emphasized that the proviso does not say that higher compensation would be paid, in the contingency provided by it, as an option to avoid lapsing. The absence of any reference to lapsing, or the ingredients of Section 24 (2) clearly meant that the benefit of higher compensation in the event a majority of the landowners were not paid compensation (under the old Act) was to enure to all falling in the same class, i.e., those whose lands were subjected to acquisition, whether five years prior to or less than coming into force of the Act of 2013. Relevant provisions 90. For appreciating the controversy in the present cases, it is essential to extract certain relevant provisions of the Act of 1894 as well as the Act of 2013. The provisions of the Act of 1894 are reproduced below: “12 Award of Collector when to be final.
(1) Such award shall be filed in the Collector’s office and shall, except as hereinafter provided, be final and conclusive evidence, as between the Collector and the persons interested, whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not, of the true area and value of the land, and apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.
(2) The Collector shall give immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made. ***
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“17. Special powers in case of urgency. – (1) In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government, so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1), take possession of any land needed for a public purpose. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.] [(3A) Before taking possession of any land under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the Collector shall, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3)(a) tender payment of eighty per centum of the compensation for such land as estimated by him to the persons interested entitled thereto, and (b) pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in section 31, sub-section (2), and where the Collector is so prevented, the provisions of section 31, sub-section (2) (except the second proviso thereto), shall apply as they apply to the payment of compensation under that section. (4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the [appropriate Government], the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of section 5A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1).]” 16. Power to take possession.—When the Collector has made an award under section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. ***
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31. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Court. (1) On making an award under section 11, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award, and shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the next sub-section. (2) If they shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Court to which a reference under section 18 would be submitted:
Provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount: Provided also that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under section 18:
Provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto. (3) Notwithstanding anything in this section, the Collector may, with the sanction of the appropriate Government instead of awarding a money compensation in respect of any land, make any arrangement with a person having a limited interest in such land, either by the grant of other lands in exchange, the remission of land revenue on other lands held under the same title or in such other way as may be equitable having regard to the interests of the parties concerned. (4) Nothing in the last foregoing sub-section shall be construed to interfere with or limit the power of the Collector to enter into any arrangement with any person interested in the land and competent to contract in respect thereof.” ***
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34 Payment of interest
When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount award-ed with interest thereon at the rate of 72 [nine per centum] per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited: Provid-ed that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry.”
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
The relevant provisions of the Act of 2013 are as follows:
“24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1984 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,— (a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” ***
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114. Repeal and saving.–(1) The Land Acquisition Act, LA (1 of LA), is hereby repealed.
(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act the repeal under sub-section (1) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeals.” Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads as follows:
“Section 6 - Effect of repeal Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not— (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.” Salient features of the Act of 2013
91. There can no dispute, no two opinions about the fact that provisions of the Act of 2013, were enacted with the object of providing fair compensation and rehabilitating those displaced from their land. The Introduction and Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act of 2013 are extracted hereunder:
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
“INTRODUCTION
The Land Acquisition Act, LA was a general law relating to acquisition of land for public purposes and also for companies and for determining the amount of compensation to be made on account of such acquisition. The provisions of the said Act was found to be inadequate in addressing certain issues related to the exercise of the statutory powers of the State for involuntary acquisition of private land and property. The Act did not address the issues of rehabilitation and resettlement to the affected persons and their families. There had been multiple amendments to the Land Acquisition Act, LA not only by the Central Government but by the State Governments as well. However, there was growing public concern on land acquisition, especially multi-cropped irrigated land. There was no central law to adequately deal with the issues of rehabilitation and resettlement of displaced persons. As land acquisition and rehabilitation and resettlement were two sides of the same coin, a single integrated law to deal with the issues of land acquisition and rehabilitation and resettlement was necessary. The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 addresses concerns of farmers and those whose livelihood are dependent on the land being acquired, while at the same time facilitating land acquisition for industrialization, infrastructure and urbanization projects in a timely and transparent manner. This Act represents a change in the legislative approach to land acquisition. It introduces for the first time provisions for social impact analysis, recognizes non-owners as affected persons, a mode of acquisition requiring consent of the displaced and statutory entitlements for resettlement. In addition, it has restricted the grounds on which land may be acquired under the urgency clause.
STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS The Land Acquisition Act, LA is the general law relating to acquisition of land for public purposes and also for companies
and for determining the amount of compensation to be made on account of such acquisition. The provisions of the said Act have been found to be inadequate in addressing certain issues related to the exercise of the statutory powers of the State for involuntary acquisition of private land and property. The Act does not address the issues of rehabilitation and resettlement to the affected persons and their families. 2. The definition of the expression “public purpose” as given in the Act is very wide. It has, therefore, become necessary to re-define it so as to restrict its scope for acquisition of land for strategic purposes vital to the State, and for infrastructure projects where the benefits accrue to the general public. The provisions of the Act are also used for acquiring private lands for companies. This frequently raises a question mark on the desirability of such State intervention when land could be arranged by the company through private negotiations on a “willing seller-willing buyer” basis, which could be seen to be a more fair arrangement from the point of view of the land owner. In order to streamline the provisions of the Act causing less hardships to the owners of the land and other persons dependent upon such land, it is proposed repeal the Land Acquisition Act, LA and to replace it with adequate provisions for rehabilitation and resettlement for the affected persons and their families. 3. There have been multiple amendments to the Land Acquisition Act, LA not only by the Central Government but by the State Governments as well. Further, there has been heightened public concern on land acquisition, especially multi-cropped irrigated land and there is no central law to adequately deal with the issues of rehabilitation and resettlement of displaced persons. As land acquisition and rehabilitation and resettlement need to be seen as two sides of the same coin, a single integrated law to deal with the issues of land acquisition and rehabilitation and resettlement has become necessary. Hence the proposed legislation proposes to address concerns of farmers and those whose livelihoods are dependent on the land being acquired, while at the same time facilitating land acquisition for
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.] industrialization, infrastructure and urbanization projects in a timely and transparent manner. 4. Earlier, the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 2007 and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2007 were introduced in the Lok Sabha on 6th December 2007 and were referred to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Rural Development for Examination and Report. The Standing Committee presented its reports (the 39th and 40th Reports) to the Lok Sabha on 21st October 2008 and laid the same in the Rajya Sabha on the same day. Based on the recommendations of the Standing Committee and as a consequence thereof, official amendments to the Bills were proposed. The Bills, along with the official amendments, were passed by the Lok Sabha on 25th February 2009, but the same lapsed with the dissolution of the 14th Lok Sabha. 5. It is now proposed to have a unified legislation dealing with acquisition of land, provide for just and fair compensation and make adequate provisions for rehabilitation and resettlement mechanism for the affected persons and their families. The Bill thus provides for repealing and replacing the Land Acquisition Act, LA with broad provisions for adequate rehabilitation and resettlement mechanism for the project affected persons and their families. 6. Provision of public facilities or infrastructure often requires the exercise of powers by the State for acquisition of private property leading to displacement of people, depriving them of their land, livelihood, and shelter, restricting their access to traditional resource base and uprooting them from their socio-cultural environment. These have traumatic, psychological, and socio-cultural consequences on the affected population, which call for protecting their rights, particularly in case of the weaker sections of the society, including members of the Scheduled Castes (SCs), the Scheduled Tribes (STs), marginal farmers and their families. 7. There is an imperative need to recognise rehabilitation and resettlement issues as intrinsic to the development process formulated with the active participation of affected persons and families. Additional benefits beyond monetary
compensation have to be provided to families affected adversely by involuntary displacement. The plight of those who do not have rights over the land on which they are critically dependent for their subsistence is even worse. This calls for a broader concerted effort on the part of the planners to include in the displacement, rehabilitation, and resettlement process framework, not only for those who directly lose their land and other assets but also for all those who are affected by such acquisition. The displacement process often poses problems that make it difficult for the affected persons to continue their traditional livelihood activities after resettlement. This requires a careful assessment of the economic disadvantages and the social impact arising out of displacement. There must also be holistic effort aimed at improving the all-round living standards of the affected persons and families. 8. A National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation for Project Affected Families was formulated in 2003, which came into force with effect from February 2004. Experience gained in implementation of this policy indicates that there are many issues addressed by the policy which need to be reviewed. There should be a clear perception, through a careful quantification of the costs and benefits that will accrue to society at large, of the desirability and justifiability of each project. The adverse impact on affected families-economic, environmental, social and cultural-must be assessed in participatory and transparent manner. A national rehabilitation and resettlement framework thus needs to apply to all projects where involuntary displacement takes place. 9. The National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007, has been formulated on these lines to replace the National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation for Project Affected Families, 2003. The new policy has been notified in the Official Gazette and has become operative with effect from the 31st October, 2007. Many State Governments have their own Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policies. Many Public Sector Undertakings or agencies also have their own policies in this regard.
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 10. The law would apply when Government acquires land for its own use, hold and control, or with the ultimate purpose to transfer it for the use of private companies for stated public purpose or for immediate and declared use by private companies for public purpose. Only rehabilitation and resettlement provisions will apply when private companies buy land for a project, more than 100 acres in rural areas, or more than 50 acres in urban areas. The land acquisition provisions would apply to the area to be acquired but the rehabilitation and resettlement provisions will apply to the entire project area even when private company approaches Government for partial acquisition for public purpose. 11. “Public purpose” has been comprehensively defined, so that Government intervention in acquisition is limited to defence, certain development projects only. It has also been ensured that consent of at least 80 per cent of the project affected families is to be obtained through a prior informed process. Acquisition under urgency clause has also been limited for the purposes of national defence, security purposes, and Rehabilitation and Resettlement needs in the event of emergencies or natural calamities only. 12. To ensure food security, multi-crop irrigated land shall be acquired only as a last resort measure. An equivalent area of culturable wasteland shall be developed if multi-crop land is acquired. In districts where net sown area is less than 50 per cent of total geographical area, no more than 10 per cent of the net sown area of the district will be acquired. 13. To ensure comprehensive compensation package for the land owners, a scientific method for calculation of the market value of the land has been proposed. Market value calculated will be multiplied by a factor of two in the rural areas. Solatium will also be increased upto 100 per cent of the total compensation. Where land is acquired for urbanization, 20 per cent of the developed land will be offered to the affected land owners.
14. Comprehensive rehabilitation and resettlement package for land owners including subsistence allowance, jobs, house,
one acre of land in cases of irrigation projects, transportation allowance, and resettlement allowance is proposed. 15. Comprehensive rehabilitation and resettlement package for livelihood losers, including subsistence allowance, jobs, house, transportation allowance, and resettlement allowance is proposed. 16. Special provisions for Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes have been envisaged by providing additional benefits of 2.5 acres of land or extent of land lost to each affected family; one-time financial assistance of Rs. 50,000/-; twenty-five per cent additional rehabilitation and resettlement benefits for the families settled outside the district; free land for community and social gathering and continuation of reservation in the resettlement area, etc. 17. Twenty-five infrastructural amenities are proposed to be provided in the resettlement area including schools and play grounds, health centres, roads, and electric connections, assured sources of safe drinking water, Panchayat Ghars, Anganwadis, places of worship, burial and cremation grounds, village level post offices, fair price shops, and seedcum-fertilizers storage facilities. 18. The benefits under the new law would be available in all the cases of land acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, LA, where award has not been made, or possession of land has not been taken. 19. Land that is not used within ten years in accordance with the purposes, for which it was acquired, shall be transferred to the State Government’s Land Bank. Upon every transfer of land without development, twenty per cent of the appreciated land value shall be shared with the original land owners. 20. The provisions of the Bill have been made fully compliant with other laws such as the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996; the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 and Land Transfer Regulations in Fifth Scheduled Areas.
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL [ARUN MISHRA, J.] 21. Stringent and comprehensive penalties both for the companies and Government in cases of false information, mala fide action, and contravention of the provisions of the propose legislation have been provided. 22. Certain Central Acts dealing with the land acquisition have been enlisted in the Bill. The provisions of the Bill are in addition to and not in derogation of these Acts. The provisions of this Act can be applied to these existing enactments by a notification of the Central Government. 23. The Bill also provides for the basic minimum req