Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (dead) Through LRS. & Ors.

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
8 February 2018
Bench
Justice Arun Mishra, Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel, Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar
Neutral citation
2018 INSC 115
Reported in
[2018] 2 S.C.R. 1
Result
Directions issued
Acts & sections
Article 283 Constitution
Subject
Property & land

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Full judgment

[2018] 2 S.C.R. 1

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 20982 of 2017) FEBRUARY 08, 2018 [ARUN MISHRA, ADARSH KUMAR GOEL AND MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, JJ.] Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: Legislative intendment of the enactment – Held: The Act addresses the concern of farmers and of those whose livelihood is dependent upon the land being acquired, while at the same time facilitating land acquisition for myriad reasons, including urbanization, rural electrification et al., in a timely and transparent manner. (Per majority) s.24(1) – Word ‘paid’ – Connotation of – Held: The word ‘paid’ in s.24 of the Act of 2013 has the same meaning as ‘tender of payment’ in s.31(1) of the Act of 1894 – They carry the same meaning – The expression ‘deposited’ in s.31(2) is not included in the expressions ‘paid’ in s.24 of the Act of 2013 or in ‘tender of payment’ used in s.31(1) of the Act of 1894 – The words ‘paid’/tender’ and ‘deposited’ are different expressions and carry different meanings within their fold – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.31(1), (2). (Per majority) s.24(2) – Failure to deposit compensation, effect – Nondeposit of compensation in court under s.31(2) of the Act of 1894 does not result in a lapse of acquisition under s.24(2) of the Act of 2013 – Due to the failure of deposit in court, the only consequence at the most in appropriate cases may be of a higher rate of interest on compensation as envisaged under s.34 of the Act of 1894 and not lapse of acquisition – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.31(2). (Per majority)

s.24(2) – Protection under, when there is refusal to accept compensation – Once the amount of compensation has been unconditionally tendered and it is refused, that would amount to

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payment and the obligation under s.31(1) stands discharged and that amounts to discharge of obligation of payment under s.24(2) of the Act of 2013 also and it is not open to the person who has refused to accept compensation, to urge that since it has not been deposited in court, acquisition has lapsed – Claimants/landowners after refusal, cannot take advantage of their own wrong and seek protection under the provisions of s.24(2) – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.31(1). (Per majority) s.24(2) – Limitation – Exclusion of period spent in litigation – Held: Provisions of s.24(2) do not intend to cover the period spent during litigation and when the authorities have been disabled to act under s.24(2) due to the final or interim order of a court or otherwise, such period has to be excluded from the period of five years as provided in s.24(2) of the Act of 2013 – There is no conscious omission in s.24(2) for the exclusion of a period of the interim order. (Per majority)

s.24(1) – Interpretation of – Held: When award under the 1894 Act has not been passed, then as per s.24(1)(a) of the Act 2013, all the provisions of the Act of 2013 relating to determination of compensation shall apply – Where, however, an award under s.11 has been made then such proceedings shall continue as per s.24(1)(b) of the Act 2013, under the Act of 1894 as if the said Act has not been repealed – However, in case physical possession of the land has not been taken, or the compensation has not been paid, the proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed; and, in case of compensation with respect to a majority of landholdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries i.e. landowners shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013 – Consequence of non-deposit of the amount, with respect to the majority of land holdings, in the account of the beneficiaries, is that the acquisition would not lapse, and only compensation under the new Act would be payable. (Per majority)

s.24(2) – Interpretation of – Expression ‘paid/deposit’ – Meaning of – Under the main part of s.24(2), the expression “compensation has not been paid” has been used – The word “deposited” is missing from main part of s.24(2), and it is only used in the proviso – The Legislature has used two different expressions

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

to carry, respectively different meanings; and, the proviso operates in a different field, where the acquisition would not lapse – The proviso is not attracted where compensation has been paid – The proviso to s.24(2) does not provide that amount of compensation has to be deposited in the court – It obviously refers to a payment deposited with LAO or in treasury – The expression “paid”, used in s.24(2) of the 2013 Act, thus, cannot carry same meaning and include in it the deposit to be made in Court under s.31(2) of the Act of 1894; it only reflects the mode of payment as envisaged under s.31(1) of the Act of 1894 i.e. “tender” – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.31.(Per majority)

s.24(2), proviso – Connotation of – ‘paid’ and ‘deposit’ – Distinction between – Held: The proviso to s.24(2) of the 2013 Act deals with ‘deposit’ of compensation in treasury or with Land Acquisition Collector with respect to the majority of holding – It contemplates that amount has not been ‘paid’ to landowners/ beneficiaries/interested persons – Thus, when scheme of entire s.24 is considered, the concept of ‘paid’ in the main s.24(2) is different from the deposit – If the deposit is included in word ‘paid’, the proviso to s.24(2), which has the different consequence of no lapse, but only higher compensation would be otiose and become redundant and repugnancy would occur – It is clear that expression ‘paid’ in s.24 is different from word ‘deposit’ which is provided in its proviso. (Per majority)

s.24(2) – Meaning of “paid in s.24(2) and in s.31 of Act of 1894 – The expression “paid” in s.31(1) of Act of 1894 and s.24(2) of Act of 2013 mean, as soon as it is offered and made unconditionally available – Merely, if a landowner refuses to accept it, it cannot be said that it has not been paid – Once amount has been tendered that would amount to payment – Thus, word “paid” does not mean actual payment to be made but whatever is possible for an incumbent to make the payment is only contemplated – It is settled that a Court cannot add or subtract a word; the expression “compensation has not been paid” is used in s.24(2); it is not open to the court to add to these words, or to substitute the said expression with any further expression, such as ‘deposit’. (Per majority) s.24(2) – Applying the rule of harmonious construction to the provisions of s.24(2) of the Act of 2013, i.e. as between the

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main part of the section and its proviso, the word “paid” occurring in the main part, has to be construed differently (with a different meaning being given to it from the word “deposited” occurring in the proviso; otherwise, inconsistency and repugnancy would be the result of the provision contained in s.24(2) as a whole; and, that is what has to be avoided – The provisions would be irreconcilable, and an anomalous result would be occasioned – A section is to be interpreted by reading all its parts altogether, and it is not permissible to omit any part thereof – In the instant case, proviso to s.24(2) cannot be ignored while interpreting the main subsection – The proviso is enacted as part of s.24(2); it is not an independent provision and applies to an acquisition made five years or before, in which amount, with respect to majority of holdings, has not been deposited in court – There has to be harmonized construction of provision of s.24(2) – Interpretation of statutes. (Per majority) s.24 – Compensation – Deposit in Court – Whether necessary – Held: The law as prevailed under the Act of 1894 never invalidated any land acquisition in the absence of amount being deposited in court since the time immemorial in most cases where reference is not sought, amount had been invariably deposited in the Treasury as provided in statutory rules framed under s.55 of Act of 1894 and other standing order issued by State Governments, and there were binding decisions which simply laid down that in case landowner is not responsible for delay in payment, at the most he may be entitled to interest on such amount, in case it has not been tendered/paid to him when possession has been taken – It would be wrong to lay down law that once amount has not been deposited in the court but in treasury, acquisitions would lapse under s.24. (Per majority) s.24 – Compensation – Deposit made in Treasury – The court is not disbursing authority of compensation when reference is not sought – Farmers/claimants are primarily concerned with the Land Acquisition Collector and for more than one century this procedure of deposit in treasury was prevailing and by and large amounts had been deposited in the treasury only and, thus, it would not be appropriate to make the operation of law to be such as to invalidate land acquisition when deposit is made in Treasury – Such an interpretation is not permissible as per the intendment of the Act of 2013. (Per majority)

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

s.24(2) and its proviso – The expression “deposited in the account of landowners” would not mean deposited in the court as envisaged in s.31(2) of the old Act, action as permissible as per the financial instructions having statutory or administrative orders having force of law as well as under the Rules framed by various State Governments in exercise of power under s.55 of Act of 1894 can always be taken – In various States, Financial Code/Order/ Rules deal with Government money and as such amount is required to be deposited in the Treasury by opening separate accounts of landowners/beneficiaries/ claimants that would be full compliance of the proviso of s.24(2) of new Act. (Per majority)

s.24 – When there is absolute vesting of the land in the State under the provisions of the Act of 1894, whether it can be divested by virtue of the provisions made in s.24 of 2013 Act – Held: When there is absolute vesting in the State it is vesting along with possession and thereafter a person who remains in possession is only a trespasser not in rightful possession – Vesting contemplates absolute title, possession in the State – “Vest” means an absolute or indefeasible right – Thus, the provisions contained under the Act of 2013 do not take vested rights away – There is no deemed lapse under s.24 in such a case – In case of urgency also before award is passed as provided in s.17(1), 17(3A) vesting takes place on fulfillment of conditions – No different intention appears from s.24 to divest the land once it has absolutely vested in the State in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1894 – Merely by obtaining interim order or keeping the litigation pending or filing it afresh that too by way of stale and belated claim after the Act of 2013 has come into force, no divesting of land is contemplated – It is only in exigencies provided deemed lapse take place either when possession not taken or compensation not paid as provided in s.24(2) and where award has not been passed, the provisions of s.24 of Act of 2013 applies. (Per majority)

s.24(2) – Accrued right – It is settled law that accrued rights cannot be taken away by repealing statutory provisions – The repealing law must provide for taking away the accrued rights expressly or by necessary implications – There is no such express provision or necessary implication – The beneficial intendment of proviso to s.24(2) is that acquiring body must have arrangement of

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money for payment of compensation with respect to majority of holding – Law does not contemplate or permit a litigant to misuse of the provisions – Law does not permit court cover to be used as shield when there is no legality in the claim and one cannot be permitted to reap the fruits of one’s own dilatory tactics, money power to litigate till eternity – The Act nowhere intends that only litigating incumbents who are not accepting acquisition have to be given the benefit of Act of 2013 – Those who have obtained interim orders under guise of prima facie case anyhow or somehow without any basis, without merit in their claim, cannot be protected by providing shelter under the protective umbrella of s.24(2) of the Act of 2013 – Repeal. (Per majority) s.24 – Delayed claims – Maintainability of – Held: Stale claims cannot be entertained even though no time limit is prescribed – Once Panchnama has been drawn and by way of drawing the Panchnama physical possession has been taken, the case cannot be reopened under the guise of s.24 of Act of 2013 – The provisions of s.24 do not invalidate those judgment/orders of the courts whereunder rights/claims have been lost/negatived, neither do they revive those rights which have become barred, either due to inaction or otherwise by operation of law – Fraudulent and stale claims are not at all to be raised under the guise of s.24. (Per majority) s.24(2) – Non-incorporation of word ‘deposit’ in s.24(2) – Whether casus omissus – Held: s.24(2) uses the expression “compensation has not been paid” – To complete the payment, deposit of payment in the court cannot be read as payment to the landowners – In case the legislature wanted the ‘deposit in Court’ to be included in ‘paid/ tender’, it could have easily said so – But it has used expressions differently, with different consequences – There is casus omissus, i.e. conscious omission made by the Legislature in main s.24(2) when the expression “deposited” has not been used in the expression “has been paid”, and it is only after amount tendered is declined, it is to be deposited in Court that too in certain exigencies as per s.31(2).(Per majority) s.24(2) – Casus omissus – Whether in the provisions of s.24, there is casus omissus – Absence of provision for excluding the period of stay/ injunction of a Court order does not at all affect the provision

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

of s.24(2) of the Act of 2013 – It intended that authority should not keep pending acquisition due to laxity on their part for five years or more – It never intended to apply in case they were not able to perform obligation due to court order or conduct of landowners – The legal provisions have to be interpreted in the light of the settled principles of common law unless they are excluded, and in case a person is litigating for several decades, non-acceptance of compensation and questioning the acquisition, cannot be permitted to ask for compensation or claim lapse under 2013 Act. (Per majority)

s.24(2) – Common law principles – It is well settled that the statutory provision would prevail upon the common law principles – The statutory provisions, contained in s.24 of the Act of 2013, do not exclude the principles of common law – The principles that can be excluded are only those in respect to which, provision has been made in the statute itself or the applicability is ousted by implication – The observations in respect of the principle of interpretation that if something is expressed in a provision, anything contrary is impliedly excluded, are themselves based on the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” – This maxim has been held to have limit of operation and is not of universal application – Thus, mere fact that in some of the provisions there is a mention about period of stay being excluded, cannot be taken to be conclusive that in other provisions with respect to the effect of stay not to be considered or common law maxims have no applicability in the context of s.24(2) of the 2013 Act – The Common Law principles, cannot be ousted, to do complete justice to parties and to prevent miscarriage of justice, within purview of s.24 of Act of 2013 – Doctrines/Principles.(Per majority) s.24(2) – Provision of lapse of acquisition, invocation of – Held: In case possession could not be taken, or compensation could not be paid or deposited, due to cover of courts’ order or conduct of land-owner, provision of lapse cannot be invoked – s.24(2), a policy of the law is not to benefit a litigant or confer undeserving benefit by involving in the lis and to reap fruits on the basis of possession on illegal basis without any right and often lis is filed in land acquisition cases one after the other and intendment of law is not to treat law-abiding incumbents differently – Litigation cannot

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be permitted to become lucrative industry for the unworthy litigant. (Per majority) Effect of repeal – Held: The repeal of the Act of 1894 by Act of 2013 has been made without prejudice or affect the general application of s.6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 – s.6 of the General Clauses Act provides that unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not revive anything not in force – s.6(b) provides that it would not affect any previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder – s.6(e) provides that it will not affect any investigation, legal proceedings or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment unless different intention appears, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, or continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed – The provisions of s.6 clearly save such proceedings and pending litigation has to be decided only on the basis of 1894 Act except as provided specifically in Act of 2013 – General Clauses Act, 1897 – s.6. (Per majority) s.24(2) – The acquisition proceedings do not lapse if the amount is deposited in the Treasury and such fact is made known to the claimants by the competent authority as required in law – Only interest is attracted, in case if the deposit is not made in Court. (Per Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J.) s.24(2) – Casus Omissus – The conscious omission referred to in paragraph 11 of the judgment in Sree Balaji does not make any substantial difference to the legal position with regard to the exclusion or inclusion of the period covered by an interim order of the Court for the purpose of determination of the applicability of s.24(2) of the 2013 Act – In fact, excluding such periods of interim stay from the calculation of the time period of five years under s.24(2) makes a reading of the Act more consistent – Interpretation of statutes – Interim order. (Per Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J.) s.24(2) – Casus Omissus – There is no bar much less absolute bar on the Court’s jurisdiction to supply casus omissus – If there is necessity, such omission can be inferred – Casus omissus must be supplied to s.24(2) of the 2013 Act due to the necessity and the

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

need for consistency – If a provision of the Act is inconsistent or ambiguous, the same needs to be clarified for bringing the meaning of the said provision consistent with the rest of the Act, if need be, by supplying meaning to such provision – In the instant case, there are many provisions in the 2013 Act which exclude periods of interim stay, such as s.19(7) and the Explanation to s.69(2) of that Act – It only makes the statute more consistent if s.24(2) is read in light of other provisions such as s.19(7) and the Explanation to s.69(2), which make interim stay orders exceptions to calculating periods of time under the Act – In this way, repugnancy and inconsistency with the rest of the statute is avoided – There is a clear necessity to read the exclusion of interim stay into s.24(2) of the 2013 Act so as to make its meaning consistent with the rest of the enactment, where in similar situations the periods of stay are excluded.(Per Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J.)

s.24(2) – The principle of “actus curiae neminemgravabit”, i.e the act of the court should not prejudice any parties, would be applicable in the present case to exclude the period covered by an interim order for the purpose of determining the question with regard to taking of possession as contemplated in s.24(2) of the 2013 Act – Doctrines/Principles. (Per Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J.) s.24(2) and its proviso – “tender”, “payment”, and “deposit” – Interpretation of – Whether these terms can be used interchangeably – Word ‘deposit’ whether synonymous with the word ‘payment’ – Held: The 2013 Act use “tender”, “payment”, and “deposit” at different places in the enactments – Tender and payment are two different terms – However, “payment” has been treated similar to “deposit” within s.24(2) itself, as well as in other provisions – A plain reading of sub-section 2 of s.24 of the 2013 Act discloses that in case either the physical possession of the land has not been taken, or the compensation has not been paid, the acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed – However, the proviso to sub-section 2 of s.24 emphasizes that after the award is made, if compensation in respect of majority of the land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiary, then the owners of minority of the land holdings will be entitled to compensation under the 2013 Act, which means that under the proviso, though the owners of a minority of the land holdings have

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received compensation under the 1894 Act, they would be getting higher compensation under the 2013 Act in case compensation has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries in respect of a majority of the land holdings – The word “deposit” in the account of beneficiaries as contained in proviso to s.24(2) of the 2013 Act would mean deposit in the account of beneficiaries in the Treasury – s.80 also recognises deposit of compensation as being equivalent to payment of compensation. (Per Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J.) s.24 – Whether the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation is per incuriam – Held: A decision is rendered per incuriam if it is made through some mistake, or under a misapprehension as to a decision or a dictum of a judge, which is the result of a material oversight – A decision, judgment or verdict can be rendered per incuriam if given without considering any provision in a statute which was not brought to the notice of the court or if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of a co-equal or larger bench; or if the decision of a High Court is not in consonance with the views of the Supreme Court – The judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation was not rendered per incuriam, as the conclusion is reached by proceeding in detail on the interpretation of relevant statutory provisions – However, the reasons assigned and conclusions arrived at by the Court in the said judgment are not acceptable – Though the Rules are not adverted to in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation, the discussion as a whole, if looked into, would make it clear that the Court while deciding the said judgment, discussed in detail about the failure to deposit in the Court, so also, about the effect of deposit in Treasury – Hence, merely because the Rules of certain States are not considered, the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation cannot be termed as per incuriam – In other words, merely because the Rules are not referred to specifically in the judgment, it cannot be said that there is non-consideration of the effect of the Rules – Thus it cannot be said that the said judgment is through want of care or inadvertence – The proper course is to refer the matter to a larger Bench. (Per Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J. – Dissenting view) s.24(2) and its proviso – Interpretation of – The proviso to sub-section 2 of s.24 does not require the State to pay the compensation in respect of minority holdings for saving acquisition –

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

It is sufficient if the compensation is deposited in respect of minimum holdings in the account for saving the acquisition – Since the proviso to sub-section 2 of s.24 does not envisage lapsing of acquisition, even if the payment is not made but is deposited that too with regard to the beneficiaries of a minority of holdings, the same would lead to the inevitable conclusion that the word “payment” as found in sub-section 2 of s.24 has a strong link or co-relation with the word “deposit” – A reading of sub-section 2 of s.24 along with the proviso would make it clear that even if the compensation in respect of minority of the land holdings is deposited in the account of such minority beneficiaries, the acquisition does not lapse – At the most, every land-loser is entitled to the higher compensation as per the provisions of the 2013 Act – Since the proviso does not refer to the words “payment of compensation” and as the main provision i.e. sub-section 2 of s.24 does not refer to the word “deposit”, the only interpretation that is possible is that, if either deposit is made in the Treasury in the name of minority holders or payment is made at least to minority holders, the acquisition does not lapse – If the word “paid” as found in sub-section 2 of s.24 is not treated as “deposited” in the account of beneficiaries, then the proviso to sub-section of s.24 would become otiose. (Per Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J.)

Land Acquisition Act, 1894: s.31 – Consequence of not depositing the amount under s.31 of the 1894 Act – The expression used in s.31 is not “paid”, it is only “tender payment” and there is obligation to pay compensation unless prevented by a cause under sub-section (2) of s.31 – In case there is dispute as to person entitled to compensation or its apportionment in between person interested or person was not even competent to make alienation of property that has been acquired it would not be necessary to tender amount as it may not be so done due to said exigencies as authority may decide not to pay it till court orders then it is to be deposited in court to save further liability of exorbitant interest under s.34 of the Act of 1894 – Apart from that s.31(2) does not cover all the exigencies and it does not require that invariably the compensation has to be deposited with the court – It is only when reference is sought that reference court comes to picture not otherwise as provided in rules/orders in case person

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refuses and seeks a reference to court it has to be deposited in court where reference would be submitted otherwise as provided in the rules it has to be deposited in treasury – Even s.31(2) comes into play to “tender payment” is obligatory provision – Tender of payment is complete when it is made unconditionally available it could not have been equated with the deposit in court under ss.31(2) or 24(2) of old and new Acts respectively as these are two different exigencies and consequence of non-payment of compensation is clearly culled out in s.34. (Per majority) ss.31, 34 – Prejudice due to non-deposit in court – Held: As per the provisions contained in s.34, a person can claim the interest in case amount is not deposited as envisaged under s.31(2) if authorities are at fault – In the given situation unless aggrieved party makes out a case of prejudice and injustice, every infraction of law would not vitiate the act. (Per majority) s.31(2), first proviso – Payment received under protest – Maintainability of reference – Held: It is open to a person, under the first proviso to s.31(2), to receive payment of compensation under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount, and such person is also entitled to maintain a reference – In case awarded amount has been accepted without protest, reference cannot be maintained under s.18.(Per majority) s.31(2) – Expression “tender”, meaning – Consequence of tender – The meaning of expression “tender”: is when a person has tendered the amount and made it unconditionally available - If the landowner refused to receive it, the person who has tendered the amount cannot be saddled with the liability, which is to be visited for non-payment of the amount. (Per majority) s.31 – Expression ‘tender’ – Whether expression “deposited” in s.31 is included in expression ‘payment’ under s.24(2) of 2013 Act – Held: The expression used in s.31 of Act of 1894 and s.77(1) of Act of 2013 is to “tender payment” – Once there is tender, then in case of refusal to accept the same,the obligation to pay under s.31(1) is complete by tender, and that tantamount to making the payment; and, that is precisely what is intended by the word “paid” in s.24(2) of 2013 Act – In s.31(2) of the 1894 Act, the word ‘deposited in Court’ is used – The deposit in Court is not payment to

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

the beneficiaries – It is only after their refusal to accept the compensation tendered under s.31(1) of the Act of 1894 that it is to be deposited in Court – Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – s.24(2). (Per majority)

s.31 – Deposit made in the court – Whether amounts to tender – Held: Deposit made in the court cannot be said to be payment made to the landowner i.e. persons interested/beneficiaries – Thus, in case deposit is directly made in the court without tender, it could not be said that it was tendered or paid – ‘Deposit in court’ simply is the discharge of Collector’s liability of making payment of interest as envisaged under s.34 of the 1894 Act, and no more; deposit in Court is not tender to landowner – Once the amount has been tendered and not accepted, obligation to pay is discharged, as envisaged under s.31(1); no penal consequences can follow and, the person who has refused to accept cannot be permitted to take an advantage of his own wrong, or in case his conduct is of filing litigations, delaying the passing of the award or obtaining stay of the proceedings; such action would tantamount to refusal to accept compensation, and the person then may not even be entitled to higher rate of interest as envisaged under s.34.(Per majority)

ss.31, 34 – Deposit in Treasury – Held: The various States have made rules for unaccepted compensation to be deposited in the Treasure as revenue deposits when the landowners do not appear on the notified date to collect their compensation – Thus, a deposit in Court is not the only legal form of deposit under the 1894 Act – Compensation was being credited to the Treasury in the past, even after the same was deposited in Court – Thus, the issue where the compensation is deposited is a matter of procedure – When the State Rules and High Court rules permit deposits in the Treasury, it falls to reason that under the scheme of the 1894 Act, failure to pay or deposit in Court under s.31(2) only had the effect of attracting interest payment as per s.34 of the 1894 Act. (Per Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J.) s.55 – Dealing with public money – Effect of Rules framed under s.55 and orders issued by State Governments – There are various state rules framed under s.55 by various state governments as well as there are instructions issued with respect to dealing with

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government money as provided in Art. 283 of the Constitution of India, and when it is the government money it has to be dealt with in accordance with the instructions issued by the state government from time to time – There are other Financial Codes/Rules/orders issued time to time by various State Governments with respect to dealing with Government money – They have the force of law – The duty of the court is to harmonize rules with provision of Act.(Per majority) s.55 – Public money – Mode of payment of compensation – Held: Art.283(1) of the Constitution of India mandates that matters pertaining to custody of the Consolidated Fund of India and the Contingency Fund of India, the payment of moneys into such Funds, the withdrawal of moneys therefrom, the custody of public moneys other than those credited to such Funds received by the Government of India etc. shall be regulated by law made by the Parliament – Art.283(2) mandates that similar matters of the States’ Consolidated Funds etc. are to be regulated by law made by the State Legislatures – States have framed rules pursuant to Art.283(2) as to how the public moneys are to be handled – s.55 of the 1894 Act empowers the State to make rules for guidance of officers – Pursuant to Art.283(2) and s.55 of the 1894 Act, various States, such as, Assam, Bihar, Orissa, Kerala, West Bengal, Delhi and Punjab have framed rules to govern the mode of payment of compensation – All of them provide for deposit into the Treasury in case the landowners are not present to receive the compensation, along with the notice to such landowners apprising them of such deposits – The Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation did not consider such rules passed by the States that direct the deposit of unclaimed compensation in the Treasury – Constitution of India – Art.283. (Per Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J.) Land Acquisition:

Role of State when landowners do not accept compensation/ acquisition – Duty of landowners/litigants – Held: State authorities are not expected to retain the money with them and run after the landowners and match with their dilatory tactics with vigil to find out that one ultimate day, the litigation would attain finality – Once by their conduct, there is refusal to accept the land acquisition itself, much less compensation, in such circumstances such landowners

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

have to inform the authorities about the outcome of the litigation and in case they have lost, to ask for compensation – Authorities are not supposed to be on vigil so as to ascertain after lapse of so much time even after decades in new generation, who has received the compensation and who has not received the compensation.(Per majority)

Mode of taking physical possession – Recording of panchnama/memorandum by Land Acquisition Officer would constitute taking possession of land – If possession is of a large tract of land, it may not be possible to take physical possession of each and every parcel of the land and it would be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by preparing appropriate document in the presence of independent witnesses and getting their signatures. (Per majority) Challenge to acquisition – Claim for damages and interest after losing the challenge – The maxim “nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria” i.e. ‘No man can take advantage of his own wrong’ – A “tender” of the amount to be paid operates as a bar upon any claim for damages and interest – Thus, when once “tender” of the amount had been made, in any of the prescribed modes, which met with refusal to accept it and/or by the conduct of indulging in incessant litigation which, in some instances, culminated into a stay/interim order, the party which thus refused to accept the amount, indulging instead in the ‘theater of the absurd’, cannot turn around and contend that the other party should now be visited with the penalty for non-payment – Maxims.(Per majority) Delay/laches – Dilatory tactics – It is a settled proposition that one cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong – The doctrine “commodum ex-injuria sua Nemo habere debet” means convenience cannot accrue to a party from his own wrong – No person ought to have advantage of his own wrong – Normally merit of lis is to be seen on date of institution – One cannot be permitted to obtain unjust injunction or stay orders and take advantage of own actions – Law intends to give redress to the just causes; at the same time, it is not its policy to foment litigation and enable to reap fruits owing to the delay caused by unscrupulous persons by their own actions by misusing the process of law and dilatory tactics – Maxims.(Per majority)

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Doctrines/Principles: Doctrine of impossibility – The maxims namely ‘nemo tenetur ad impossibilia’ regarding the impossibility of performance of an act may not be strictly applicable, as acts, under s.31 or 24, were capable of being performed but authorities were disabled to perform them as no fault on their part – However, the effect of Court orders, or the conduct of the landowners/claimants/beneficiaries, is required to be considered, it was not an ‘impossibility’ to perform the acts in question by their very nature but the said aspect is relevant and underlying principle of inability to perform has to be considered in the backdrop of fact whether it was in the control or capacity of authority to perform actions which were possible to be performed but when it was not possible to perform or were incapacitated to perform – In such event, person responsible for interdicting cannot ask him to be put in advantageous position for non-compliance of an act, which possibly would have been performed, but for such action – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.31 – Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – s.24. (Per majority) Principle of Restitution – While construing provisions of s.24(2) applicable in case of lis, the principle of restitution which enjoins a duty upon the courts to do complete justice to the party at the time of final decision is to be kept in mind – Successful party at the end of the litigation has to be placed as far as possible at the same place unless it would have been had the interim order not being passed – In doing away the effect of interim order by resorting to fact of restitution is in fact obligation of the court – Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – s.24(2). (Per majority) Interpretation of Statutes:

Addition to, or subtraction from, the Act – Permissibility – It is not open to Court to either add or subtract, a word – The legal maxim “A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum” means: from the words of law, there must be no departure – Before adding the word or omitting a word the court has to consider the intended purpose of the statute or the provision in question; that by inadvertence the draftsman and Parliament failed to give effect to that purpose in

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

the provision in question, and substance of the provision Parliament would have made, although not necessarily the precise words Parliament would have used, had the error in the Bill been noticed – Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – s.24(2).(Per majority)

Harmonious construction – While making statutory interpretation, inconsistency and repugnancy is to be avoided and harmonious construction has to be adopted – The construction to be adopted should be such, as would make the statute as a whole, a consistent enactment – Such a construction would have the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy, either within a given section or as between a particular section on the one hand and other parts of the statute on the other. (Per majority)

Different expressions – When two different expressions have been used in the same provision of a statute, there is a presumption that they are not used in the same sense.(Per majority) Purposive construction – A statute is to be read as a whole – A statute has to be understood by making construction on all the parts together and not of one part only by itself – Every clause in a statute is to be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute – This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature – An intention to produce unreasonable result is not be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available – Where, to apply words literally would defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result, something must be fed to the provision so as to achieve the obvious intention and produce rational construction – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. (Per Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J.) Interim order: Consequence of interim order – Held: When there is interim stay with respect to possession or order of status quo, everything comes to stand still till the interim order is vacated – When once the court has restrained the State authorities to take possession, or to

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maintain status quo, they cannot pay the amount or do anything further, as such the consequences of interim orders cannot be used against the State – Land acquisition. (Per majority) Effect of – Held: It is settled proposition of law that no litigant can derive the benefit of pendency of a case in a court of law – In case any interim order is passed during the pendency of litigation it merges in the final order – In case, the case is dismissed the interim order passed during its pendency is nullified automatically. (Per majority) Per incuriam – Decision in Pune Municipal Corporation case – Principle of ‘per incuriam’, applicability – The concept of “per incuriam” signifies those decisions rendered in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provisions, or of some authority binding on the Court concerned – The concept means that a given decision is in disregard of the previous decisions of the Court itself, or that it was rendered in ignorance of the terms of an applicable statute or of a rule having the force of law – In the instant case, the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation case is held per incuriam. (Per majority) Repeal – Effect of repealing law on accrued rights – Held: It is settled law that accrued rights cannot be taken away by repealing statutory provisions – The repealing law must provide for taking away such rights expressly or by necessary implications. (Per majority) Words and phrases – Vesting – Meaning of. (Per majority)

Answering the reference, the Court HELD: PER ARUN MISHRA, J. (For himself and for Adarsh Kumar Goel, J.) (MAJORITY VIEW)

1. INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 24 1.1 In case the award has not been passed then as per section 24(1)(a), compensation has to be determined under the Act of 2013. Section 24(1)(b) provides that where an award under section 11 of the 1894 Act has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Act of 1894 as if it

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

has not been repealed. However, in case physical possession of the land has not been taken, or the compensation has not been paid, the proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed; and, in case of compensation with respect to a majority of landholdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries i.e. landowners shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. [Para 24][75E-G]

1.2 In section 24(2), the expression that has been employed is “compensation has not been paid”. The expression “deposited”, which occurs in the proviso to sub-section (2), has not been used in the main section 24(2). Its proviso uses the expression “deposited in the account of the beneficiaries”, meaning thereby, in the case with respect to the majority of land holdings amount has not been deposited in the account of beneficiaries, though the acquisition would not lapse, all beneficiaries would get benefit of the compensation under the Act of 2013. Thus, the consequence of non-deposit of the amount, with respect to the majority of land holdings, in the account of the beneficiaries, is that the acquisition would not lapse, and only compensation under the new Act would be payable. Whereas, under the main part of section 24(2), it is apparent that, the expression “compensation has not been paid” has been used. The word “deposited” is missing from main part of section 24(2), and it is only used in the proviso. Thus, the Legislature has used two different expressions to carry, respectively different meanings; and, the proviso operates in a different field, where the acquisition would not lapse. The object is that a body or State Government, for whose benefit land has been acquired, must have possessed the requisite funds for payment to the landowners. The proviso is not attracted where compensation has been paid. The proviso to section 24(2) does not provide that amount of compensation has to be deposited in the court. It obviously refers to a payment deposited with LAO or in treasury. [Paras 25, 26 and 27][75-H; 76-A-E]

1.3 The expression used in section 31 of Act of 1894 and Section 77(1) of Act of 2013 is to “tender payment”. Once there is tender, then in case of refusal to accept the same,the obligation

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to pay under section 31(1) is complete by tender, and that tantamount to making the payment; and, that is precisely what is intended by the word “paid” in section 24(2) of 2013 Act. In Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act, the word ‘deposited in Court’ is used. The deposit in Court is not payment to the beneficiaries. It is only after their refusal to accept the compensation tendered under section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 it is to be deposited in Court. It is further provided in the rules that in case reference is sought, the amount is to be deposited in court where reference would be submitted otherwise it is to be deposited in the treasury. If the expression “deposited”, used in the proviso to section 24(2), and expression “paid” used in main section 24(2), are both taken as contained in expression “paid” i.e. the tender; and, on refusal it is deposited in court to make the “payment” complete; if expression “deposited” is included in expression ‘payment’ under Section 24(2), inconsistency and repugnancy would be caused as between the proviso and the main sub-section; which has to be eschewed. The Court cannot add the word “deposited” to the expression “paid”/ “tender” in Section 31 of Act 1894 or Section 24(2) of Act of 2013. [Paras 28, 29][76-F-H; 77-A-B] 2. MEANING OF “PAID” IN SECTION 31 OF THE ACT OF 1894 AND SECTION 24(2) OF THE ACT OF 2013 : 2.1 The meaning of expression “tender”: is when a person has tendered the amount and made it unconditionally available and the landowner has refused to receive it, the person who has tendered the amount cannot be saddled with the liability, which is to be visited for non-payment of the amount. “Tender” may save the tendering party from the penalty for non-payment or non-performance or penalty if another party unjustifiably refusing the tender, places the other party in default. The expression “tender” has been used in section 31. The concept of deposited in court is different from “tender” and “paid”. [Para 32][77-F-G] Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Saharanpur v. Gobind AIR 1962 SC 1500 : [1962] Suppl. SCR 618; The Management of Delhi Transport Undertaking v. The Industrial Tribunal, Delhi & Anr. AIR 1965 SC 1503; Indian Oxygen Ltd. v. Narayan Bhoumik (1968) 1 PLJR 94; N.B. Sanjana, Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Bombay & Ors. v. The Elphinstone Spinning & Weaving

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

Mills Co. Ltd. (1971) 1 SCC 337; J. Dalmia v. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi AIR 1964 SC 1866 : [1964] SCR 579 – relied on. Black’s law Dictionary – referred to. 2.2 The expression “paid” would mean in section 31(1) of Act 1894 and section 24(2) of Act of 2013 as soon as it is offered and made unconditionally available. Merely, if a landowner refuses to accept it, it cannot be said that it has not been paid. Once amount has been tendered that would amount to payment. The legal maxim “A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum” means: from the words of law, there must be no departure. When language of the provision is clear, there is no scope for reading something into it. Section 24(2) uses the expression “compensation has not been paid”. To complete the payment, deposit of payment in the court cannot be read as payment to the landowners. Deposit cannot and need not be added to expressions paid/ tender. In case the legislature wanted the ‘deposit in Court’ to be included in ‘paid/ tender’, it could have easily said so. But it has used expressions differently, with different consequences. The legislature has consciously omitted the expression “deposited” in main section 24(2), whereas, it is used in the proviso; both have different objectives. When the legislature has used different expressions with respect to past events – the word “paid” is used in a discernibly distinctive sense than the sense conveyed by the word “deposited” occurring in the proviso – both are required to be given different meanings. There is casus omissus, i.e. conscious omission made by the Legislature in main Section 24(2) when the expression “deposited” has not been used in the expression “has been paid”, and it is only after amount tendered is declined, it is to be deposited in Court that too in certain exigencies as per section 31(2). [Paras 39, 41(a), 41(b), 42][81-D; 82-B; 85-A-B, E-H; 86-A] Nali Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyamsunder Halder AIR 1953 SC 148 : [1953] SCR 533; State of Madhya Pradesh v. G.S. Dall and Flour Mills AIR 1991 SC 772 : [1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 590; State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel and Anr. (1998) 3 SCC 234 : [1998] 2 SCR 56; Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (2010) 10 SCC

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744 : [2010] 11 SCR 112; Assessing Authority cumExcise and Taxation Officer v. East India Cotton Mfg. Co. Ltd. (1981) 3 SCC 531 : [1982] 1 SCR 55; Paul Enterprises & Ors. v. Rajib Chatterjee & Co. & Ors. AIR 2009 SC 187 : [2008] 14 SCR 419; Sakshi v. Union of India (2004) 5 SCC 518 : [2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 723; Commissioner of Income Tax, Kerala v. Tata Agencies (2007) 6 SCC 429 : [2007] 8 SCR 136; Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay AIR 1959 SC 459 : [1959] Suppl. SCR 489; S.P. Gupta v. President of India AIR 1982 SC 149 : [1982] SCR 365; Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu (2001) 7 SCC 71 : [2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 60; P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries AIR 1990 SC 933 : [1990] 1 SCR 483; Royal Trust Company v. Minister Of Finance AIR 1921 PC 184 – relied on. Crawford v. Spooner (1846) 6 Moore PC 1; Lord Howard de Walden v. IRC (1948) 2 AER 825 – referred to. “Principles of Statutory Interpretation” by G.P. Singh (14th edition) – referred to. 2.3 While making statutory interpretation, inconsistency and repugnancy is to be avoided and harmonious construction has to be adopted. The construction to be adopted should be such, as would make the statute as a whole, a consistent enactment. Applying the rule of harmonious construction to the provisions of section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, i.e. as between the main part of the section and its proviso, the word “paid” occurring in the main part, has to be construed differently (with a different meaning being given to it) from the word “deposited” occurring in the proviso; otherwise, inconsistency and repugnancy would be the result of the provision contained in section 24(2) as a whole; and, that is what has to be avoided. In the instant case, proviso to Section 24(2) cannot be ignored while interpreting the main subsection. The proviso is enacted as part of section 24(2); it is not an independent provision and applies to an acquisition made five years or before, in which amount, with respect to majority of holdings, has not been deposited in court. There has to be

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

harmonized construction of provision of section 24(2). Since there is no ambiguity of drafting in the provisions contained in section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, so also none is there in those contained in sections 31(1) and 31(2) of the Act of 1894. There is no accidental omission as to the concept of payment in section 24(2) or section 31(1) of these Acts. Thus, it is not permissible to supply the word “deposited” to include in the expression “payment”. [Paras 44-48][86-F-G; 87-A-E] Raj Krushna v. Binod Kanungo AIR 1954 SC 202 : [1954] SCR 913; Sultana Begum v. Premchand Jain AIR 1997 SC 1006 : [1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 707; Kailash Chandra v. Mukundi Lal (2002) 2 SCC 67 : [2002] 1 SCR 83; CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers (2003) 3 SCC 57 : [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 387; Balasinor Nagrik Cooperative Bank Limited v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya (1987) 1 SCC 606 – relied on. Inco Europe Ltd. v. First Choice Distribution (a firm) by the House of Lords in (2000) 2 All ER 109 – referred to. 2.4 Rule of literal construction lays down that words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases, and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning. In the instant case, when giving the plain, natural and grammatical meaning to the word ‘paid’/ ‘tender’, which has been used in contradistinction to the words “deposited in court”, it is clear that tendering payment would not include deposit in court, in that it is only when payment is refused, that the same is deposited in court; obligation to pay is over as soon as amount is tendered and refused. [Paras 49(a), 50][88-A; 89-EF] Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India AIR 2002 SC 1351 : [2002] 2 SCR 369 – relied on G.P. Singh, in “Principles of Statutory Interpretation” (14th edition), at Page 91 – referred to. 2.5 When two different expressions have been used in the same provision of a statute, there is a presumption that they are not used in the same sense. This principles of statutory construction that different words to be given different meaning

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indicate that the expression ‘deposited’ cannot be added to ‘tender’/‘paid’, both carry different consequences under section 24, tender on lapse of acquisition/non-deposit higher interest under section 34 of the Act of 1894. It is a settled proposition of law that when two different expressions have been used in section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, as well as in section 31 of the Act of 1894, i.e. “paid to the landowners” and “deposited in the court”, they both carry different meanings, and have to be interpreted as used in the respective contexts. It is not the expression used that deposit in the court is payment to landowners, neither it is used that amount deposited in the treasury is the payment to the landowners. The payment indicates the obligation to pay; and, deposit is made in the court or revenue treasury only upon happening of various exigencies as provided in Section 31, and there can be several other exigencies which are not covered under section 31(2) of the Act of 1894 and in the statutory rules/ orders. [Paras 51(a), 51(d), 51(e)][89-H; 92-B-E] Member, Board of Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall AIR 1956 SC 35 : [1955] SCR 842; CIT v. East West Import & Export (P) Ltd., Jaipur (1989) 1 SCC 760 : [1989] 1 SCR 570; Kailash Nath Agarwal v. Pradeshiya Industries and Investment Corporation of Uttar Pradesh (2003) 4 SCC 305 : [2003] 1 SCR 1159; Tejmohammed Hussainkhan Pathan v. V.J. Raghuvanshi (1993) Suppl. 2 SCC 493; D.L.F. Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana (2003) 5 SCC 622 : [2003] 2 SCR 1; Pallawi Resources Ltd. v. Protos Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. (2010) 5 SCC 196 : [2010] 3 SCR 847; Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay (2002) 4 SCC 297 : [2002] 2 SCR 945; B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P. AIR 1999 SC 1867 : [1999] 2 SCR 1111; ShriIshar Alloy Steels Ltd. v. Jayaswals Neco Ltd. (2001) 3 SCC 609 : [2001] 2 SCR 36; Labour Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh v. Burhanpur Tapti Mills and Ors. AIR 1964 SC 1687 – referred to. Brighton Parish Guardians v. Strand Union Guardians 1891 QB 156 – referred to.

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

G.P. Singh, in his treatise Interpretation of Statutes (14th Edition) at page 395 – referred to.

2.6 When considering the intendment of the beneficial provisions of the Act of 2013, it addresses the concern of farmers and of those whose livelihood is dependent upon the land being acquired, while at the same time facilitating land acquisition for myriad reasons, including urbanization, rural electrification et al., in a timely and transparent manner. The legislature has not brook the delay of five years or more on part of authorities in completing the acquisition. When it says ‘timely’,it would mean without delay on the part of authorities, not delay due to dilatory tactics and conduct of land owners/interested persons. [Para 53][92-F-H]

3. EFFECT OF RULES FRAMED UNDER SECTION 55 OF 1894 ACT AND ORDERS ISSUED BY STATE GOVERNMENTS 3.1 There are various State rules framed under section 55 of the Act of 1894 by various State Governments as well as there are instructions issued with respect to dealing with Government money as provided in Article 283 of the Constitution of India, and when it is the Government money it has to be dealt with in accordance with the instructions issued by the State Government from time to time. There are other Financial Codes/Rules/orders issued time to time by various State Governments with respect to dealing with Government money. It is apparent from rules that when no reference is sought on refusal to accept, amount is to be deposited in treasury. Rules have to be harmonized with the provision in the Act, thus, it would be necessary to deposit in court when reference is sought. Thus, under section 31(2) provision of deposit in court on refusal would be attracted, when reference had been sought, as provided in rules. Section 31(2) does not come in play at all in cases of refusal to accept amount when reference has not been sought and deposit in treasury would be valid deposit even otherwise where reference is sought and person refuses to accept it only liability of non-compliance of deposit in Court would be higher interest under section 34. [Paras 54, 60][93-A-C; 98-B-C]

3.2 ‘Deposit-in-treasury’ is stipulated under the rules made

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with reference to a constitutional provision, so also framed under Section 55 of the 1894 Act, as well as under other statutory or administrative powers. The deposit in treasury is not, in any manner, invalid. If the deposit is valid, there is no reason to hold that the said deposit has to be ignored. Government finances, after all, have to be handled as per the applicable rules. The deposit in treasury is as per binding procedural rules/orders issued by Government of India and/or in exercise of the powers under Article 283 of the Constitution of India. [Para 63][99-D-F] Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh & Ors. (2016) 16 SCC 258 : [2016] 5 SCR 227 – partly dissenting. 4. PRACTICAL DIFFICULTY ON REFUSAL/NONACCEPTANCE OF COMPENSATION BY CONDUCT; PRACTICE AND LEGAL POSITION UNDER ACT OF 1894.

4.1 One mode of refusal to acceptance of compensation is when it is tendered, it is refused. Another mode is of filing a litigation to question the very land acquisition, filing application for an interim stay and contesting it for decades reflects clear conduct of non-acceptance of acquisition/compensation. State authorities cannot retain the money in their own hands in such circumstances and are bound to deposit the Government money where it is supposed to be i.e. in the treasury as provided in rules. Thus, by conduct also, there can be non-acceptance of compensation. Once compensation is accepted, right to challenge acquisition would vanish. State authorities are not expected to retain the money with them and run after the landowners and match with their dilatory tactics with vigil to find out that one ultimate day, the litigation would attain finality. Once by their conduct, there is refusal to accept the land acquisition itself, much less compensation, in such circumstances such landowners have to inform the authorities about the outcome of the litigation and in case they have lost, to ask for compensation. Same would be the position in case amount is deposited in court. They have to apply for its withdrawal. The obligation of authorities is at initial stage. At subsequent stage, unless and until there is willingness shown by landowners/interested persons to accept the compensation, authorities cannot presume that they would accept

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

it and that landowners are not going to question acquisition in the higher forum and it is not open to the authorities to offer to them compensation time and again, once amount is deposited in treasury during the pendency of litigation. In case of interim stay also authorities cannot offer the compensation as that would tantamount to violation of court’s order and after interim stay ceases to operate, it is for the landowners to apprise the authorities of their intention not to take the litigation further and their willingness to accept compensation. Section 24(2) does not provide cover to such litigation. [Para 64][99-G-H; 100-A-G]

4.2 The law as prevailed under the Act of 1894 never invalidated any land acquisition in the absence of amount being deposited in court since the time immemorial in most cases where reference is not sought, amount had been invariably deposited in the Treasury as provided in statutory rules framed under section 55 of Act of 1894 and other standing order issued by State Governments, and there were decisions of this Court which have simply laid down that in case landowner is not responsible for delay in payment, at the most he may be entitled to interest on such amount, in case it has not been tendered/paid to him when possession has been taken. Similar provisions are made under sections 77 and 80 of the Act of 2013. All of a sudden it would not be appropriate considering the statutory rules which have been framed under section 55 of the Act of 1894 and order to invalidate all such land acquisitions which have taken place in various States in the country by laying down that once amount has not been deposited in the court but in treasury, acquisitions would lapse under section 24. It will be a very harsh operation of law as old Act never provided for such a consequence since 1894 the Act was enacted till new 2013 Act came into force. When there were such anomalous situation, the statutory rules and statutory orders issued by various State Governments dealing how the Government money has to be dealt with, it would not be appropriate to unsettle the legal position. The 1894 Act never contemplated such result and by and large, it was not the practice to deposit in court. Only in those cases the amount used to be deposited in court, where reference was sought under sections 18 or 30, as provided under rules also and there was dispute as

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to person entitled to it or apportionment thereof between the claimants. Primarily it is for the Land Acquisition Collector to distribute the compensation and poor farmers are not supposed to know the court and place where the reference would be made, if it was not sought person would not know a place where it would not be submitted to court, the question of deposit in court would not arise. The court is not disbursing authority of compensation when reference is not sought. Farmers/ claimants are primarily concerned with the Land Acquisition Collector and for more than one century this procedure of deposit in treasury was prevailing and by and large amounts had been deposited in the treasury only and thus it would not be appropriate to make the operation of law to be such as to invalidate land acquisition when deposit is made in Treasury. Such an interpretation is not permissible as per the intendment of the Act of 2013. Though it is a beneficial law to benefit the incumbents it cannot be interpreted to be a law which would be to invalidate concluded transaction as per prevailing law and divest the land which has vested in State, development has taken place, possession taken, awards passed, after litigation/several rounds of litigation lost and then land cannot be ordered to revert back. The law does not intend that effect, as it may be termed as arbitrary and beyond legislative competence. Such misuse of provisions and anomalous results need to be avoided. [Para 66][101-G-H; 102-A-H; 103-A] 4.3 The spirit of the provisions of the Act of 2013 is to benefit farmers, at the same time, not to thwart the entire development which has taken place or to burden the Exchequer with such liability which is not contemplated in the Act of 2013 and invalidate acquisitions that have taken place in 1912, 1950s and 1960s onwards and have attained finality, as are sought to be reopened under the guise of 2013 Act taking advantage of the said technical aspect. Courts are duty-bound to thwart all such attempts as the land which has been acquired long back, it would not be possible to make payment of compensation as of the rate as provided in the Act of 2013 to undeserving persons at the cost of public revenue, and it would not be appropriate to interpret the provisions in such a manner to entertain stale and dead claims and to revive them on the ground of technical and procedural

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

defaults, if any, and created by landowners conduct. The intendment of section 24 is that acquisition to be completed early. If authorities for no good cause fail to take steps for five years or more on their own the lapse of acquisition under section 24 to follow. [Para 67][103-B-E]

5. PREJUDICE DUE TO NON-DEPOSIT IN COURT: It is trite law that in the given situation unless aggrieved party makes out a case of prejudice and injustice, every infraction of law would not vitiate the act. [Para 69][104-B-C]

Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa (1969) 3 SCC 392; Sunil Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal (1980) 3 SCC 304 : [1980] 3 SCR 179; State of Andhra Pradesh v. Thakkidiram Reddy (1998) 6 SCC 554 : [1998] 3 SCR 1088; Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1956 SC 116 : [1955] SCR 1140; Abdul Sayeed v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 10 SCC 259 : [2010] 13 SCR 311; State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar AIR 2012 SC 364 : [2011] 15 SCR 540; Bahamans v. State of Karnataka (2012) 9 SCC 650 : [2012] 7 SCR 909 – relied on. 6. CONSEQUENCE OF NOT DEPOSITING THE AMOUNT UNDER SECTION 31 OF THE 1894 ACT : 6.1 In case there is dispute as to person entitled to compensation or its apportionment in between person interested or person was not even competent to make alienation of property that has been acquired it would not be necessary to tender amount as it may not be so done due to said exigencies as authority may decide not to pay it till court orders then it is to be deposited in court to save further liability of exorbitant interest under section 34 of the Act of 1894. Apart from that section 31(2) does not cover all the exigencies and it does not require that invariably the compensation has to be deposited with the court. It is only when reference is sought that reference court comes to picture not otherwise as provided in rules/orders in case person refuses and seeks a reference to court it has to be deposited in court where reference would be submitted otherwise as provided in the rules it has to be deposited in treasury. It is only when court

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comes into play then deposit in reference court is required in exigencies of section 31(2) read with 32 as provided in rules. Even section 31(2) comes into play to “tender payment” is obligatory provision. Tender of payment is complete when it is made unconditionally available it could not have been equated with the deposit in court under section 31(2) or 24(2) of old and new Acts respectively as these are two different exigencies and consequence of non-payment of compensation is clearly culled out in section 34. There is a liability for payment of interest. [Para 71][105-C-G] Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh & Ors. (2016) 16 SCC 258 : [2016] 5 SCR 227; Hissar Improvement v. Smt. Rukmani Devi & Anr. AIR 1990 SC 2033; Kishan Das & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1995) 6 SCC 240 : [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 584; Seshan & Ors. v. Special Tehsildar & Land Acquisition Officer, SPICOT, Pudukkottai (1996) 8 SCC 89 : [1996] 1 SCR 1058; D Block Ashok Nagar (Sahibabad) Plot Holders’ Association (Regd.) v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1997) 10 SCC 77 : [1997] 3 SCR 1096 – relied on. 6.2 Deposit in Treasury is permissible mode of deposit under the proviso to section 24(2) and within the purview of main section 24(2). The expression “deposited in the account of landowners” would not mean deposited in the court as envisaged in Section 31(2) of the old Act, action as permissible as per the financial instructions having statutory or administrative orders having force of law as well as under the Rules framed by various State Governments in exercise of power under section 55 of Act of 1894 can always be taken. In various States, Financial Code/ Order/Rules deals with Government money and as such amount is required to be deposited in the Treasury by opening separate accounts of landowners/beneficiaries/claimants that would be full compliance of the proviso of section 24(2) of new Act.[Para 76][107-D-G] Mahavir & Ors. v. Union of India 2018(1) SCALE 174; Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor AIR 1936 PC 253 (2) – relied on.

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

7. WHETHER SECTION 24(2) DIVESTS THE STATE OF LAND 7.1 The concept of absolute vesting in the State under Act of 1894 is well settled and on award being passed, possession being taken, compensation being offered but refused, section 24 would not apply in such a situation to divest the State if the land is acquired. Merely by obtaining interim order or keeping the litigation pending or filing it afresh that too by way of stale and belated claim after the Act of 2013 came into force, no divesting of land is contemplated. It is only in exigencies provided deemed lapse take place either when possession not taken or compensation not paid as provided in Section 24(2) and where award has not been passed, the provisions of section 24 of Act of 2013 applies. [Para 79][109-C-E] State of Punjab v. Sadhu Ram 1996 (7) JT 118 : [1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 448; Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Ors. (1996) 11 SCC 698 : [1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 6; Market Committee v. Krishan Murari (1996) 1 SCC 311 : [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 787; PuttuLal (dead) by LRs. v. State of U.P. & Anr. (1996) 3 SCC 99:[1996] 2 SCR 638 – relied on. Black’s Dictionary – referred to. 7.2 When there is absolute vesting in the State it is vesting along with possession and thereafter a person who remains in possession is only a trespasser not in rightful possession. Vesting cannot be considered with any rider as to title or possession. Vesting contemplates absolute title, possession in the State. There is no deemed lapse under section 24 in such a case. In case of urgency also before award is passed as provided in section 17(1), 17(3A) vesting takes place on fulfillment of conditions. [Paras 81(d), 82][113-G-H; 117-D] Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust AIR 1957 SC 344 : [1957] SCR 1; Mosammat Bibi Sayeeda v. State of Bihar (1996) 9 SCC 516 : [1996] 1 Suppl. SCR 799; J. S. Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2011) 6 SCC 570 : [2011] 5 SCR 460 – relied on.

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7.3 It is settled law that accrued rights cannot be taken away by repealing statutory provisions. The repealing law must provide for taking away such rights expressly or by necessary implications. There is no such express provision or necessary implication. The beneficial intendment of proviso to section 24(2) is that acquiring body must have arrangement of money for payment of compensation with respect to majority of holding. Law does not permit court cover to be used as shield when there is no legality in the claim and one cannot be permitted to reap the fruits of one’s own dilatory tactics, money power to litigate till eternity. The Act nowhere intends that only litigating incumbents who are not accepting acquisition have to be given the benefit of Act of 2013. Those who have obtained interim orders under guise of prima facie case anyhow or somehow without any basis, without merit in their claim, cannot be protected by providing shelter under the protective umbrella of section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. [Para 83][117-E-G] 8. MODE OF TAKING PHYSICAL POSSESSION AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER SECTION 24(2) OF ACT OF 2013 AND THE ACT OF 1894:

When the State is involved in taking possession of the property acquired it can take possession by drawing a Panchnama. The normal rule of State possessing the land through some persons would not be applicable in such cases. On open land, possession is deemed to be of owner. When the State acquired the land and has drawn memorandum of taking possession that in the way the State take possession of large chunk of property acquired as State is not going to put other persons in possession or its police force or going to cultivate it or start residing or physically occupy it after displacing who were physically in possession as in the case of certain private persons, in case they re-enter in possession of open land, start cultivation or residing in the house. Lawful possession is deemed to be of the State. [Para 86][118-G-H; 119-A-B] Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat & Ors (1976) 1 SCC 700 : [1975] Suppl. SCR 250; Banda Development Authority, Banda v. Moti Lal Agarwal & Ors. (2011) 5 SCC 394 : [2011] 7 SCR 435; State of

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

Tamil Nadu & Anr. v. Mahalakshmi Ammal & Ors. (1996) 7 SCC 269 : [1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 451; Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust v. State of Punjab (1996) 4 SCC 212 : [1996] 2 SCR 643; P. K. Kalburqi v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2005) 12 SCC 489 : [2005] 1 SCR 545; Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana & Ors. (2012) 1 SCC 792 : [2011] 14 SCR 1113; Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi v. Lieutenant Governor, Government of NCT, Delhi & Ors. (2009) 10 SCC 501 : [2009] 14 SCR 507; Om Prakash Verma & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. (2010) 13 SCC 158 : [2010] 15 SCR 302; M. Venkatesh & Ors. v. Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority etc. (2015) 17 SCC 1 – relied on.

Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. AIR 2011 SC 1989 : [2011] 6 SCR 443 – distinguished.

Velaxan Kumar v. Union of India & Ors. (2015) 4 SCC 325 – overruled. 9. WHETHER SECTION 24 OF THE ACT OF 2013 REVIVES STALE/BARRED CLAIMS? 9.1 Section 24 cannot be used to revive the dead or stale claims and the matters, which have been contested up to this Court or even in the High Court having lost the cases or where reference has been sought for enhancement of the compensation. Compensation obtained and still it is urged that physical possession has not been taken from them, such claims cannot be entertained under the guise of section 24(2). Section 24 of the Act of 2013 does not supersede or annul the court’s decision and the provisions cannot be misused to reassert such claims once over again. Once Panchnama has been drawn and by way of drawing the Panchnama physical possession has been taken, the case cannot be reopened under the guise of section 24 of Act of 2013. [Para 98][133-D-E, G] 9.2 Section 24 is not intended to come to the aid of those who first deliberately refuse to accept the compensation, and then indulge in ill-advised litigation, and often ill-motivated dilatory

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tactics, for decades together. On the contrary, the section is intended to help those who have not been offered or paid the compensation despite it being the legal obligation of the acquiring body so to do, and/or who have been illegally deprived of their possession for five years or more; in both the scenarios, fault/ cause not being attributable to the landowners/claimants. Stale or dead claims cannot be the subject-matter of judicial probing under section 24 of the Act of 2013. The provisions of section 24 do not invalidate those judgment/orders of the courts where under rights / claims have been lost / negatived, neither do they revive those rights which have come barred, either due to inaction or otherwise by operation of law. Fraudulent and stale claims are not at all to be raised under the guise of section 24. Misuse of provisions of section 24(2) cannot be permitted. Protection by the courts in cases of such blatant misuse of the provisions of law could never have been the intention behind enacting the provisions of section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act. [Paras 99, 100][133-H; 134-A-D] Mahavir & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr. 2018 (1) SCALE 174; Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Chennai v. M. Meiyappan & Ors. (2010) 14 SCC 309 : [2010] 12 SCR 1184; Jasveer Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2017) 6 SCC 787; Dharappa v. Bijapur Co-operative Milk Producers Societies Union Ltd. (2007) 9 SCC 109 : [2007] 5 SCR 729; State of Karnataka v. Laxuman (2005) 8 SCC 709 : [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 535 – relied on.

10. Whether conscious omission referred to in paragraph 11 of judgment in Shree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu makes any substantial difference to the legal position with regard to the exclusion or inclusion of the period covered by an interim order of the Court for the purpose of determination of the applicability of section 24(2) of 2013 Act?

10.1 In Shree Balaji, this Court has opined that there is conscious omission made by the legislature in section 24(2) of Act, 2013 to exclude the period covered by the interim order of the Court staying the acquisition proceedings. It was observed that in the Act of 1894 by making amendment of the provisions

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

contained in sections 6 and 11A by providing extension of period of limitation the period during which interim order of the court has operated has been excluded. It has not been so provided in Section 24(2). [Para 101][134-E-F]

Yogesh Neema & Ors. v. State of M.P. & Ors. [2016] 6 SCC 387 – referred to. 10.2 EFFECT OF INTERIM ORDER OF A COURT: When once the court has restrained the State authorities to take possession, or to maintain status quo they cannot pay the amount or do anything further, as such the consequences of interim orders cannot be used against the State. It is basic principle that when a party is disabled to perform a duty and it is not possible for him to perform a duty, is a good excuse. The doctrine “commodum ex-injuria sua Nemo habere debet” means convenience cannot accrue to a party from his own wrong. One cannot be permitted to obtain unjust injunction or stay orders and take advantage of own actions. Law intends to give redress to the just causes; at the same time, it is not its policy to foment litigation and enable to reap the fruits owing to the delay caused by unscrupulous persons by their own actions by misusing the process of law and dilatory tactics. [Paras 104, 106][136-G-H; 137-A-B; 143-B-C] Abhey Ram (Dead) by LRs. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1997) 5 SCC 421 : [1997] 3 SCR 931; Om Parkash v. Union of India & Ors. (2010) 4 SCC 17 : [2010] 2 SCR 447; Suresh Chand v. Gulam Chisti (1990) 1 SCC 593 : [1990] 1 SCR 186; Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia (1988) 4 SCC 284 : [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 528; Shyam Sunder & Ors. v. Ram Kumar & Anr. (2001) 8 SCC 24 : [2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 115; Dau Dayal v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1959 SC 433 : [1959] Suppl. SCR 639 – relied on. 10.3 CASUS OMISSUS: Merely because certain provisions have been made in sections 19 and 69 excluding the period of stay, it would not mean that in the provisions of section 24, there is casus omissus it is not to be readily inferred. In the provisions contained in section 19 of the Act of 2013. there is prescription of the period of limitation in which a declaration has to be issued,

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it was equivalent to section 6 of the Act of 1894, as such the provision of exclusion has been made alike the previous provision, so also in section 69. Section 24 as couched did not contemplate providing cover to the litigation and its fruits to be reaped. The absence of provision for excluding the period of stay/ injunction of a Court order does not at all affect the provision of section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. It intended that authority should not keep pending acquisition due to laxity on their part for five years or more. It never intended to apply in case they were not able to perform obligation due to court order or conduct of landowners. [Para 109][144-C-F] Union of India v. Shiv Raj (2014) 6 SCC 564 : [ 2014] 8 SCR 751; Karnail Kaur & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. (2015) 3 SCC 206 : [2016] 5 SCR 227 – Not correct law. Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 533 : [2002] 2 SCR 383 – distinguished. N. Narasimhaiah v. State of Karnataka (1996) 3 SCC 88 : [1996] 1 SCR 698; State of Karnataka v. D.C. Nanjudaiah (1996) 10 SCC 619 : [1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 222; Rana Girders Ltd. v. Union of India (2013) 10 SCC 746 : [2013] 14 SCR 58; Union of India v. Sicom Limited & Ors. (2009) 2 SCC 121: [2008] 17 SCR 120 – relied on. 10.4 It is well settled that the statutory provision would prevail upon the common law principles. The statutory provisions, contained in section 24 of the Act of 2013, do not exclude the principles of common law. The principles that can be excluded are only those in respect to which, provision has been made in the statute itself or the applicability is ousted by implication. The observations in respect of the principle of interpretation that if something is expressed in a provision, anything contrary is impliedly excluded, are themselves based on the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius”. This maxim has been held to have limit of operation and is not of universal application. Thus, mere fact that in some of the provisions there is a mention about period of stay being excluded, cannot be taken to be conclusive that in

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

other provisions with respect to the effect of stay not to be considered or common law maxims have no applicability in the context of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. The Common Law principles, cannot be ousted, to do complete justice to parties and to prevent miscarriage of justice, within purview of section 24 of the Act of 2013. [Paras 113-116][148-A, F-H; 149-A-B; 150-F] Mary Angel v. State of Tamil Nadu (1999) 5 SCC 209 : [1999] 3 SCR 594; Assistant A.C.E., Calcutta versus National Tobacco Co. Ltd. of India Ltd (1972) 2 SCC 560 : [1973] 1 SCR 822 – relied on. 11. DOCTRINE OF IMPOSSIBILITY 11.1 The maxims namely ‘nemo tenetur ad impossibilia’ regarding the impossibility of performance of an act may not be strictly applicable, as acts, under section 31 or 24, were capable of being performed but authorities were disabled to perform them as no fault on their part. However, the effect of Court orders, or the conduct of the landowners/claimants/ beneficiaries, is required to be considered, it was not an ‘impossibility’ to perform the acts in question by their very nature but the said aspect is relevant and underlying principle of inability to perform has to be considered in the backdrop of fact whether it was in the control or capacity of authority to perform actions which were possible to be performed but when it was not possible to perform or were incapacitated to perform. In such event person responsible for interdicting cannot ask him to be put in advantageous position for non-compliance of an act, which possibly would have been performed, but for such action. [Para 125][156-A-C] Chander Kishore Jha v. Mahabir Prasad (1999) 8 SCC 266 : [1999] 2 Suppl. SCR 754; Mohd Gazi v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2000) 4 SCC 342 : [2000] 2 SCR 871; Industrial Finance Corporation of India Ltd. v. Cannanore Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. (2002) 5 SCC 54 : [2002] 2 SCR 1093; HUDA v. Babeswar Kanhar (2005) 1 SCC 191 : [2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 282; Re: Presidential Poll (1974) 2 SCC 33 : [1975] 1 SCR 504; Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement AIR 2005 (2) SC 2622 : [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 49 – relied on.

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11.2 The maxim “nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria” i.e. ‘No man can take advantage of his own wrong’. A “tender” of the amount to be paid operates as a bar upon any claim for damages and interest. Thus, when once “tender” of the amount had been made, in any of the prescribed modes, which met with refusal to accept it and/or by the conduct of indulging in incessant litigation which, in some instances, culminated into a stay/interim order, the party which thus refused to accept the amount, indulging instead in the ‘theater of the absurd’, cannot turn around and contend that the other party should now be visited with the penalty for non-payment.[Paras 125, 126, 127][156-DH] 12. Whether the principle of “actus curiae neminem gravabit” namely act of the Court should not prejudice any parties would be applicable in the present case to exclude the period covered by an interim order for the purpose of determining the question with regard to taking of possession as contemplated in section 24(2) of the 2013 Act? 12.1 No litigant can derive the benefit of pendency of a case in a court of law. In case any interim order is passed during the pendency of litigation it merges in the final order. In case, the case is dismissed the interim order passed during its pendency is nullified automatically. It is also settled that a party cannot be allowed to take benefit of his own wrong as ‘commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet’ i.e. convenience cannot accrue to a party from his own wrong. In case litigation has been filed without any basis and interim order is passed it would be giving illegal benefit or wrongful gain for filing untenable claim. The principle “Actus Curia Neminem Gravabit” is essence of administration of law and good sense. [Paras 129, 131(g)][157-F-G; 162-A] Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases (2014) 2 SCC 62 : [2013] 12 SCR 674 – followed.

Mrutunjay Pan v. Narmada Bala Sasmal & Anr. AIR 1961 SC 1353 : [1962] SCR 290; GTC Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (1998) 3 SCC 376; Jaipur Municipal Corpn. v. C.L. Mishra (2005) 8 SCC 423; Ram Krishna Verma v. State of U.P. (1992) 2 SCC 620 : [1992] 2

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

SCR 378; Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Calcutta (1980) 2 SCC 191; Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corporation (1995) 3 SCC 33 : [1995] 1 SCR 543; Amarjeet Singh v. Devi Ratan & Ors. (2010) 1 SCC 417 : [2009] 15 SCR 1010; Karnataka Rare Earth & Anr. v. Senior Geologist, Department of Mines & Geology & Anr. (2004) 2 SCC 783 : [2004] 1 SCR 965; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Ors. AIR 1988 SC 1531 : [1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 1 – relied on.

Suptd. of Taxes, Dhubri & Ors. v. Assam Jute Supply Ltd & Ors. (1976) 1 SCC 766 : [1975] 0 Suppl. SCR 365 – distinguished.

Neeraj Kumar Sainy & Ors. v. State of UP & Ors. (2017) SCC Online SC 258 – referred to. “Selection of Legal Maxims” by Herbert Broom – referred to. 12.2 An incumbent must succeed or fail in final decision in a pending litigation on what case he has set up in the petition. In case possession has continued under the cover of the court’s order or compensation could not be disbursed due to the courts order the provision contained in Section 24(2) cannot be invoked in such a situation, as such a situation is not covered thereunder, as holding otherwise would amount to giving a litigant premium for his dilatory tactics in spite of there is no merit in his challenge to acquisition. [Para 134][166-F-G] Uma Devi v. State of Karnataka (2006) 6 SCC 1 : [2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 548 – relied on. 12.3 The common law principles are rules of equity, justice, and sound logic. In the absence of there being prohibition in the law, these principles would be attracted. The efficacy and binding nature of such common law principles cannot be diminished or whittled down in the absence of any express prohibition in law. They are interpretation of section 24 of Act of 2013. In case possession could not be taken, or compensation could not be paid or deposited, due to cover of courts’ order or conduct of

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land-owner, such cases provision of lapse cannot be invoked. Section 24(2), a policy of the law is not to benefit a litigant or confer undeserving benefit by involving in the lis and to reap fruits on the basis of possession on illegal basis without any right and often lis is filed in land acquisition cases one after the other and intendment of law is not to treat law-abiding incumbents differently. Operation of law and beneficial provisions of law in the Act of 2013 are not meant to benefit litigants and to permit them to reap the fruits of unworthy or frivolous litigation. Litigation cannot be permitted to become lucrative industry for the unworthy litigant; it cannot be permitted to be device providing for fruits in respect of a meritless lis. The maxims nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria and actus curiae neminem gravabit etc. come into play while interpreting the provisions of section 24 including the principle of restitution. They are not excluded from the purview of section 24 of the Act of 2013. [Paras 135, 137, 138][167-C, F-H; 168-A-B] 13. PRINCIPLE OF RESTITUTION: While construing provisions of section 24(2) applicable in case of lis, the principle of restitution which enjoins a duty upon the courts to do complete justice to the party at the time of final decision is to be kept in mind. Successful party at the end of the litigation has to be placed as far as possible at the same place unless it would have been had the interim order not being passed. It is incumbent upon court not to confer benefit upon an unscrupulous litigant, not to confer undeserved gain, attempt to abuse legal provisions must be thwarted, prolonging of litigation by money power, dilatory tactics or otherwise not to confer benefit, person with merits in the case cannot succeed, perpetuation of illegality cannot be provided shelter by court to unjust enrichment to be saved, the doctrine of restitution compels court to not to provide benefit to such litigants of provisions of section 24 of Act of 2013. [Paras 139, 141][168-C-D; 178-H; 179-A-B] South Eastern Coal Field Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (2003) 8 SCC 648 : [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 651; State of Gujarat v. Essar Oil Ltd. (2012) 3 SCC 522 : [2012] 2 SCR 1127; A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam (2012) 6 SCC 430 : [2012] 4 SCR

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

74; Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India (2011) 8 SCC 161; Krishnaswamy S. Pd. & Anr v. Union of India & Ors. (2006) 3 SCC 286 : [2006] 2 SCR 390 – relied on.

14. EFFECT OF REPEAL: The Act of 2013 has repealed the Act of 1894. The repealing and saving is provided in section 114 of the Act of 2013. The repeal of the Act of 1894 has been made without prejudice or affect the general application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act provides that unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not revive anything not in force. Section 6(b) provides that it would not affect any previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder. Section 6(e) provides that it will not affect any investigation, legal proceedings or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment unless different intention appears, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, or continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. The provisions of section 6 clearly save such proceedings and pending litigation has to be decided only on the basis of 1894 Act except as provided specifically in Act of 2013. [Paras 142, 143 and 144][179-C-E; 180-C-D] Ivo Agnelo Santimano Fernandes v. State of Goa (2011) 11 SCC 506 : [2011] 2 SCR 1142; Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. (1996) 2 SCC 71 : [1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 790; Bharat Kumar v. State of Haryana & Anr. (2014) 6 SCC 586; Bimla Devi & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. (2014) 6 SCC 583 – distinguished. Union of India & Ors. v. Shiv Raj & Ors. (2014) 6 SCC 564 : [2014] 8 SCR 751; Magnum Promoters Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. (2015) 3 SCC 327; Radiance Fincap Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2015) 8 SCC 544; Working Friends Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. v. State of Punjab & Ors. (2016) 15 SCC 464; Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir

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Singh & Ors. (2016) 16 SCC 258 : [2016] 5 SCR 227; State of Haryana & Anr. v. Devander Sagar & Ors. (2016) 14 SCC 746; Aligarh Development Authority v. Megh Singh & Ors. (2016) 12 SCC 504; Sharma Agro Industries v. State of Haryana & Ors. (2015) 3 SCC 341; Pawan Kumar Aggarwal v. State of Punjab & Ors. (2016) 7 SCC 614 – referred to. 15. PRINCIPLE OF ‘PER INCURIAM’: The concept of “per incuriam” signifies those decisions rendered in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provisions, or of some authority binding on the Court concerned. The decision in Pune Municipal Corporation case, has to be held per incuriam, inter alia for the following reasons: (1) The High Court has quashed land acquisition, in Pune Municipal Corporation case, as such provisions of section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 could not be said to be applicable. It was not surviving acquisition then compliance of section 24(2) by taking possession or by payment of compensation for five years or more did not arise as acquisition had been quashed by the High Court in 2008. (2) It was not held in Pune Municipal Corporation that High Court has illegally set aside the acquisition. In case, High Court had set aside the acquisition in an illegal manner then also maxim ‘actus curiae neminum gravabit’ would have come to the rescue to save acquisition from being lapsed and a period spent in appeal in this Court was to be excluded. (3) The provisions of Section 24(2) could not be said to be applicable to the case once acquisition stood quashed in 2008 by the High Court. Thus, there was no occasion for this court to decide the case on aforesaid aspect envisaged under section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. (4) That statutory rules framed under section 55 of Act of 1894 and orders having statutory force issued under, constitutional provisions or otherwise by various State Governments were not placed for consideration before this court in Pune Municipal Corporation case. (5) Provisions of section 34 prevailing practice of deposit, and binding decisions thereunder section 34 of the Act of 1894 were not placed for consideration of this court while deciding the case. (6) The proviso to section 24(2) was not placed for consideration which uses different expression ‘deposited’ than

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

‘paid’ in main section 24(2) which carry a different meaning. (7) What is the meaning of expression ‘paid’ as per various binding decisions of this court when the obligation to pay is complete were not placed for consideration. (8) The binding decisions of the court as to the consequence of non-deposit were not placed for consideration while deciding the case. (9) The maxim “nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria” i.e. no man can take advantage of his own wrong of filing litigation and effect of refusal to receive compensation was not placed for consideration while deciding the aforesaid case. (10) There is no lapse of acquisition due to the non deposit of amount under the provisions of Act of 1894 or Act of 2013. In this regard, the provision of section 77 and 80 relating to payment and deposit under Act of 2013 which corresponds to section 31 and 34 were not placed for consideration of this court while rendering the said decision. (11) The past practice for more than a century, of deposit in treasury, as per rules/ orders and decisions were not placed for consideration. It was not open to invalidate such deposits made in treasury without consideration of the provisions, prevailing practice, and decisions under the Act of 1894. The decisions rendered on the basis of Pune Municipal Corporation case are open to be reviewed in appropriate cases on the basis of this decision. [Paras 146, 152][184-F; 189-F-G]

Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Harakchand Misirmal Solanki (2014) 3 SCC 183 – per incurium. Shree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu (2015) 3 SCC 353 – overruled. Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanahaiya Lal (1975) 2 SCC 232 : [1975] 3 SCR 834; A.R. Anutulay v. R.S. Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602 : [1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 1; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. (1991) 4 SCC 139; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur (1989) 1 SCC 101 : [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 929; Sant Lal Gupta v. Modern Coop. Societies Ltd. (2010) 13 SCC 336 : [2010] 13 SCR 621; Union of India & Ors. v. Shivraj & Ors. (2014) 6 SCC 564 : [2014] 8 SCR 751 – referred to.

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PER MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J: (partly dissenting) 1. A statute is to be read as a whole. Where, to apply words literally would defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result, something must be fed to the provision so as to achieve the obvious intention and produce rational construction. The 2013 Act use “tender”, “payment”, and “deposit” at different places in the enactments. Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act directs that the Collector “…shall tender payment…” and “…shall pay it to the beneficiaries unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the next sub-section.” Clearly, tender and payment are two different terms. However, “payment” has been treated similarly to “deposit” within Section 24(2) itself, as well as in other provisions. The word “deposit” in the account of beneficiaries as contained in proviso to section 24(2) of the 2013 Act would mean deposit in the account of beneficiaries in the Treasury. The proviso does not refer to the word “payment”, as is referred to in the main provision, i.e., sub-section 2 of Section 24 of the 2013 Act. The proviso to sub-section 2 of Section 24 does not require the State to pay the compensation in respect of minority holdings for saving acquisition. It would be sufficient if the compensation is deposited in respect of minimum holdings in the account for saving the acquisition. Since the proviso to sub-section 2 of Section 24 does not envisage lapsing of acquisition, even if the payment is not made but is deposited that too with regard to the beneficiaries of a minority of holdings, the same would lead to the inevitable conclusion that the word “payment” as found in sub-section 2 of Section 24 has a strong link or co-relation with the word “deposit”. A reading of sub-section 2 of Section 24 along with the proviso would make it clear that even if the compensation in respect of minority of the land holdings is deposited in the account of such minority beneficiaries, the acquisition does not lapse. At the most, every land-loser is entitled to the higher compensation as per the provisions of the 2013 Act. If the word “paid” as found in sub-section 2 of Section 24 is not treated as “deposited” in the account of beneficiaries, then the proviso to sub-section 2 of Section 24 would become otiose. It is well settled

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

that no provision under the act can be rendered nugatory or otiose. [Paras 14, 15][204-B-G; 205-A-F]

Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 : [1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 122 – relied on. Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. (1996) 2 SCC 71 : [1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 790; Ivo Agnelo Santiamo Fernandes v. Government of Goa (2011) 11 SCC 506 : [2011] 2 SCR 1142; Union of India v. Shiv Raj (2014) 6 SCC 564 : [2014] 8 SCR 751; Karnail Kaur v. State of Punjab (2015) 3 SCC 206; Radiance Fincap (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (2015) 8 SCC 544; Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh (2016) 16 SCC 258 : [2016] 5 SCR 227; The Working Friends Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. v. State of Punjab (2016) 15 SCC 464; Bharat Kumar v. State of Haryana (2014) 6 SCC 586; Bimla Devi &Ors. v. State of Haryana (2014) 6 SCC 583; Vijay Latka v. State of Haryana (2016) 12 SCC 487; Maharana Partap Charitiable Trust v. State of Haryana (CWP 6860 of 2007) – referred to. 2. Section 31 of the 1894 Act is akin to Section 77 of the 2013 Act. Of course, under Section 77 of the 2013 Act, the legislature has gone a step further and has mandated the Collector to pay the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested by depositing the amount in their bank accounts unless prevented by some or more contingencies provided under sub-section 2. Under Section 80 of the 2013 Act, which is akin to Section 34 of the 1894 Act, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of 9% or 15%, as the case may be, in case the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land. Thus, it is clear that Section 80 also recognises deposit of compensation as being equivalent to payment of compensation. Even under Section 34 of the 1894 Act, the land loser will be entitled to compensation with interest at the rate of 9% or 15%, as the case may be, in case the compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land. Thus, the word “deposit” is treated synonymous with the word “payment”. However, Section 31 of

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the 1894 Act states that the Collector at the first instance shall tender payment of compensation to the persons interested and pay the compensation to such interested persons unless prevented by some or more contingencies mentioned in subsection 2 of Section 31 of the 1894 Act. Three contingencies are found in sub-section 2 of Section 31 wherein the Collector will not pay the compensation to the persons interested, viz., (a) persons interested do not give consent to receive the compensation; (b) if there is no person competent to alienate the land; (c) if there is any dispute as to the title or as to the apportionment of compensation. In case any such contingencies arise, the Collector shall deposit the amount of compensation in Court to which a reference under Section 18 would be submitted. If Section 31 is to be read with Section 34 harmoniously, the same would make it clear that non-deposit or non-payment of compensation will make State liable to pay interest as prescribed. In other words, in case the Collector does not deposit the amount of compensation in Court as contemplated under Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act, at the most the persons interested may be entitled to interest of 9% or 15% as the case may be. Such act of Collector depositing the amount in the Treasury and such act of Collector in not depositing the amount in Court as mandated in sub-section 2 of Section 31 may not result in extreme consequence of lapsing of acquisition. [Paras 16, 17][205-F-H; 206-A-F] 3.1 Article 283(1) of the Constitution of India mandates that matters pertaining to custody of the Consolidated Fund of India and the Contingency Fund of India, the payment of moneys into such Funds, the withdrawal of moneys therefrom, the custody of public moneys other than those credited to such Funds received by the Government of India etc. shall be regulated by law made by the Parliament. Article 283(2) of the Constitution of India mandates that similar matters of the States’ Consolidated funds etc. are to be regulated by law made by the State Legislatures. States have framed rules pursuant to Article 283(2) of the Constitution of India as to how the public moneys are to be handled. Section 55 of the 1894 Act empowers the State to make rules for guidance of officers. Pursuant to Article 283(2) of the

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

Constitution of India and Section 55 of the 1894 Act, various States, such as, Assam, Bihar, Orissa, Kerala, West Bengal, Delhi and Punjab have framed rules to govern the mode of payment of compensation. All of them provide for deposit into the Treasury in case the landowners are not present to receive the compensation, along with the notice to such landowners apprising them of such deposits. It appears that the Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation did not consider such rules passed by the States that direct the deposit of unclaimed compensation in the Treasury. [Para 18][206-G-H; 207-A-B]

3.2 The various State Rules make it clear that the payment into the Treasury is nothing but a residuary mode of payment after efforts as per Rules have been made by the authorities to secure the attendance of the person entitled to compensation. The existence of such express provision in the rules, and the fact that this Court did not consider any of these rules in Pune Municipal Corporation, had led to a unique situation where the rules are seemingly not in conformity with the meaning given to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act and Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act by this Court in Pune Municipal Corporation. While Pune Municipal Corporation held that all unaccepted compensation must necessarily be deposited in Court for the acquisition to remain valid, the States have made rules for unaccepted compensation to be deposited in the Treasury as revenue deposits. On a combined reading of the two statutes and the State Rules, it is clear that a deposit in the Treasury is not made illegal or impermissible. In fact, deposits in the Treasury are allowed as a valid means of payment by these State Rules. The State Rules provide for deposits in the Treasury as revenue deposits when the landowners do not appear on the notified date to collect their compensation. [Para 21][210-B-E] 3.3 It is merely a matter of procedure as to where the deposit is made. Certain High Court Rules viz. Punjab & Haryana and Delhi, provide that a deposit in Court under Section 31 of the 1894 Act must be lodged into the Treasury as a Revenue or Civil Court deposit. Rule 10 of the Uttar Pradesh Rules for the Payment of Compensation for Land Taken Up Under the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894 provides for the money paid in Court to be credited

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as Civil Court Deposits, the accounts of which are ultimately kept by the Treasury (according to paragraph 355 of Chapter XV of the Financial Handbook issued by the Government of U.P.). Thus, it is not the position that a deposit in Court is the only legal form of deposit under the 1894 Act. Compensation was being credited to the Treasury in the past, even after the same was deposited in Court. Thus, the issue where the compensation is deposited is a matter of procedure. When the State Rules and High Court rules permit deposits in the Treasury, it falls to reason that under the scheme of the 1894 Act, failure to pay or deposit in Court under Section 31(2) only had the effect of attracting interest payment as per Section 34 of the 1894 Act. [Paras 2224][210-H; 211-A-E] Hissar Improvement Trust v. Rukmani Devi and Anr. (1990) Suppl. 1 SCC 806 – relied on.

Damadilal v. Parashram AIR 1976 SC 2229 : (1976) 4 SCC 855 : [1976] Suppl. SCR 645 – held inapplicable Jogesh Chandra v. Yakub Ali 29 IC 111 (Cal) – referred to.

4. “Payment” of compensation and “deposit” of compensation have been used to describe the instance where the State gives landowners their compensation. Both signify an obligation of the State. As per Section 31(1), compensation must be paid to the landowners. As per Section 31(2), if the landowners do not consent to receive compensation, the State shall deposit it in Court. It is often that when a beneficiary does not appear to collect compensation, the State has to deposit the compensation in the Treasury as per the relevant State Rules. But that does not mean that the State has shirked its obligation to compensate the affected persons. It may not always be the case that persons who do not appear on the appointed date are refusing to accept compensation. It may also be that such affected persons had consented to receive compensation, but simply could not appear or could not be traced for some reason or the other. There may be thousands of such beneficiaries. In such a case, the Collector cannot hand over compensation to each beneficiary in person, but also cannot keep the money with him. He has to keep it in

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

the Treasury. In fact, the State Rules have been framed to give notice to the landowners that their compensation has been deposited in the Treasury instead of the Court. In light of this, there is no harm done or prejudice caused if the State deposits compensation in the Treasury when landowners do not appear. In fact, the compensation deposited in Courts is often kept in the Treasury. It is merely a matter of procedure as to where the landowners who do not appear on the appointed date, or the landowners who refuse to receive compensation, shall take their compensation from the Treasury. [Para 28][212-F-H; 213-A-B]

5. The objective of directing a deposit of compensation in Court in the 1894 Act was to prevent unnecessary prolongation of the proceedings, and accumulation of the Collector’s liability to pay interest under Section 34, when compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession. The landowners cannot take advantage of their own act of refusing to receive compensation, and contend that compensation has never been paid to them, when it has actually been deposited in the Treasury. Once the State deposits the money in the Treasury, it has shown its bona fide intention to go through with the acquisition and give the beneficiaries their due compensation. In such a case, it can hardly be punished with a lapse, except that it is liable to pay interest as prescribed under the Act. Moreover, practical considerations make it clear that the Collector may not be able to individually reach out to thousands of claimants and pay them the compensation in person at the earliest. It is only reasonable that the Collector be allowed to deposit the compensation in the accounts of individual claimants in the Treasury, and to inform the claimants to get the same released. Thus, a deposit in the accounts of individual landowners in the Treasury, and informing them about such deposit for getting the same released in their favour where they do not appear to accept compensation as under the State Rules, does not result in the lapse of acquisition proceedings. [Paras 29, 30][213-C-F, G]

6.1 The judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation cannot be said to have been through lack of care, or out of ignorance of certain important factors. Per incuriam is a Latin term which means “through lack of care” or through inadvertence (of a

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judicial decision) wrongly decided, mainly because the judges were ill-informed about the applicable law. The word “incuria” literally means “carelessness”. A decision is rendered per incuriam if it is made through some mistake, or under a misapprehension as to a decision or a dictum of a judge, which is the result of a material oversight. A decision, judgment or verdict can be rendered per incuriam if given without considering any provision in a statute which was not brought to the notice of the court or if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of a co-equal or larger bench; or if the decision of a High Court is not in consonance with the views of the Supreme Court. A judgment that was decided per incuriam does not have to be followed as precedent by a court. [Paras 31, 32][213-H; 214-A-D] A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602 : [1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 1; Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra (2011) 1 SCC 694 : [2010] 15 SCR 201 – relied on 6.2 The judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation was not rendered per incuriam, as the conclusion is reached by proceeding in detail on the interpretation of relevant statutory provisions. However, the reasons assigned and conclusions arrived at by the Court in the said judgment are not acceptable. It is no doubt true that the Court in Pune Municipal Corporation was not informed about the Rules of certain States framed under Section 55 of the 1894 Act and certain Rules of High Courts on the point regarding deposit to be made in the Treasury. Though the Rules are not adverted to in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation , the discussion as a whole, if looked into, would make it clear that the Court while deciding the said judgment, discussed in detail about the failure to deposit in the Court, so also, about the effect of deposit in Treasury. Hence, merely because the Rules of certain States are not considered, the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation cannot be termed as per incuriam. In other words, merely because the Rules are not referred to specifically in the judgment, it cannot be said that there is non-consideration of the effect of the Rules. In the case of Sukhbir Singh, the Court did consider the effect of the Rules framed by Delhi, Punjab and

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

Haryana Governments. But the conclusion rendered in Sukhbir Singh was in conformity with the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation. The judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation is the first judgment on the issue in question by a three-Judge Bench of this Court. Hence, it cannot also be concluded that the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation is not in consonance with the relevant line of decisions rendered by this Court earlier. The judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation cannot be said that the said judgment is through want of care or inadvertence. Hence, the proper course is to refer the matter to a larger Bench. [Paras 35-38][215-B-H]

Pune Municipal Corporation &Anr. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki &Anr. (2014) 3 SCC 183 : [2014] 1 SCR 783 – Needs reconsideration by larger bench.

Sant Lal Gupta v. Modern Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd. (2010) 13 SCC 336 : [2010] 13 SCR 621 – relied on

Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu (2015) 3 SCC 353 : [2014] 7 SCR 799 – overruled. 7.1 Stay orders by the Court constrain the State from continuing with the acquisition proceedings. It may also lead to consequences of contempt. In such a situation, the legal position on the exclusion or inclusion of the period of stay in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act cannot be readily inferred to be against the State due to the omission of the Legislature. Sree Balaji has ruled that casus omissus cannot be supplied to the provision in question. The decision in Sree Balaji has relied on Padma Sundara Rao. However, the reason for not supplying casus omissus was different in that case. In Padma Sundara Rao, the language of Section 6(1) and its proviso are such, that it would make it difficult to have any distinction between the two limitation periods in the proviso, if the starting point of the limitation period itself was changed from the Section 4 notification to another undecided starting point by supplying casus omissus. In the facts of Sree Balaji as well as in the facts of the present case, however, there is nothing in the language of Section 24(2) that would defeat the purpose of the

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Section if the period of interim stays were excluded. [Paras 51, 52][225-F, G-H; 226-A-B] Shri Kishan Das & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1995) 6 SCC 240 – relied on.

7.2 Casus omissus means an omitted case. When a statute or an instrument of writing undertakes to foresee and to provide for certain contingencies, and through mistake, or some other cause, a case remains to be provided for, it is said to be a casus omissus. There is no bar much less absolute bar on the Court’s jurisdiction to supply casus omissus. If there is necessity, such omission can be inferred. The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words in the statute must be adhered to unless it would lead to absurdity, repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument. The Constitution Bench in Padma Sundara Rao held that casus omissus may be supplied when there is “clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself”. This means that while casus omissus must not be readily inferred, “all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute.” This applies squarely to the facts of the case on hand. Casus omissus must be supplied to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act due to the necessity and the need for consistency. Undoubtedly, the power to legislate remains with the Legislature. If a provision of the Act is inconsistent or ambiguous, the same needs to be clarified for bringing the meaning of the said provision consistent with the rest of the Act, if need be, by supplying meaning to such provision. In the present case, there are many provisions in the 2013 Act which exclude periods of interim stay, such as Section 19(7) and the Explanation to Section 69(2) of that Act. It only makes the statute more consistent if Section 24(2) is read in light of other provisions such as Section 19(7) and the Explanation to Section 69(2), which make interim stay orders exceptions to calculating periods of time under the Act. In this way, repugnancy and inconsistency with the rest of the statute is avoided. There is a clear necessity to read the exclusion of interim stay into Section 24(2) of the

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

2013 Act so as to make its meaning consistent with the rest of the enactment, where in similar situations the periods of stay are excluded. [Paras 54-56][226-D-F; 228-A-F]

Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu (2002) 3 SCC 533 : [2002] 2 SCR 383; Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers and Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 659 : [2003] 3 SCR 762; Union of India v. Dharamendra Textile Processors (2008) 13 SCC 369 : [2008] 14 SCR 13; Dr. Manjula Krippendorf v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr 2017 (8) SCALE 112; Union of India v. Shiv Raj (2014) 6 SCC 564: [2014] 8 SCR 751; Magnum Promoters v. Union of India (2015) 3 SCC 327; CIT v. National Taj Traders (1980) 1 SCC 370 : [1980] 2 SCR 268 – referred to. 7.3 No litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of the case in a Court of Law, as the interim order always merges into the final order to be passed in the case and if the writ petition is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take benefit of its own wrongs by getting an interim order and blame the Court. Ultimately, if the writ petition is found to be devoid of any merit, the same would be dismissed. In such a situation, the Court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the Court. Any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralized, as the institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a suitor from delayed action by the act of the Court. It is the duty of the Court to ensure that dishonesty or any attempt to abuse the legal process must be effectively curbed and the Court must ensure that there is no wrongful, unauthorised or unjust gain for anyone by abusing of the process of the Court. No one should be permitted to use the judicial process for earning undeserved gains for unjust profits. The Courts’ constant endeavour should be to ensure that everyone gets just and fair treatment. “Actus curiae neminemgravabit”, or the principle that an act of Court cannot prejudice any of the parties, is a settled principle of law. [Paras 57-58][228-G-H; 229-A-B] Amarjeet Singh v. Devi Ratan (2010) 1 SCC 417

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: [2009] 15 SCR 1010; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Anr. (1988) 2 SCC 602 : [1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 1 – relied on. 7.4 It is often the case in proceedings against land acquisitions that the affected parties seek an interim stay of the acquisition proceedings until the matter has attained finality. An interim stay prevents the State from acquiring the land and following subsequent procedure under the Act, be it the publication of notifications, making of the award, taking possession of the acquired land, or paying and depositing of compensation. If the State does not adhere to the stay order, it will be held up for contempt. In such a situation, it may take months and indeed years before the matter attains finality, during which the State is prevented from carrying out the acquisition proceedings. In a given case, it may take five to ten years or more before the case passes through the Single Judge of the High Court, the Division Bench of the High Court, and finally the Supreme Court, or even sent back to the High Court to be decided afresh on some point. It may well be years before possession is taken and compensation is paid to the landowners. The State is precluded from taking possession for no fault of its own. Failing to supply casus omissus will lead to a situation where the acquisition proceedings will lapse solely to the detriment of the State due to an act of the party to the litigation and at the intervention of the Court, namely an order of interim stay. Large amounts of public money will go to waste in keeping the proceedings pending. While the Act is admittedly a beneficial legislation, it cannot be that the landowners cause a validly initiated acquisition to lapse by f iling cases and continuously delaying acquisition or legal proceedings. Justice must be done to all parties to litigation. It will not serve the purpose of the enactment if the State is stopped from completing the acquisition for no mistake of its own, while certain opportunistic litigants seek to frustrate the State’s attempts at legally acquiring the land. In fact, when the Legislature has excluded interim stay orders in other provisions of the same Act, there is nothing that prevents this Court from applying these exclusions ejusdem generis to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. Thus, the period of interim stay must necessarily be excluded for the

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

purposes of calculation of the time period under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. It follows then that the absence of a specific amendment by the Legislature to Section 24(2) does not make a substantial difference to the legal position on excluding the period of interim stay for the purposes of calculating five years under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. In other words, the period of five years must necessarily exclude such period of stay orders. [Paras 59-62][229-A-C; 230-A-E]

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(2014) 3 SCC 183

per incurium

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(2015) 3 SCC 353

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Para 2

[1962] Suppl. SCR 618

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Para 34

AIR 1965 SC 1503

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Para 34

(1971) 1 SCC 337

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Para 37

[1964] SCR 579

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Para 38

[1953] SCR 533

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Para 41(b)

[2008] 14 SCR 419

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Para 41(b)

[1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 590

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Para 41(b)

[1982] 1 SCR 55

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Para 41(b)

[1998] 2 SCR 56

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Para 41(b)

[2010] 11 SCR 112

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Para 41(b)

[2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 723

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[1990] 1 SCR 483

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[1982] SCR 365

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Para 41(b)

[1954] SCR 913

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Para 44

[1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 707

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Para 44

[2002] 1 SCR 83

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Para 44

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[2018] 2 S.C.R.

[2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 387

relied on

Para 44

(1987) 1 SCC 606

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Para 45

[2002] 2 SCR 369

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Para 49 (b)

[1955] SCR 842

referred to

Para 51 (b)

[1989] 1 SCR 570

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Para 51 (b)

[2003] 1 SCR 1159

referred to

Para 51 (c)

(1993) Suppl. 2 SCC 493

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Para 51 (c)

[2003] 2 SCR 1

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Para 51 (c)

[2010] 3 SCR 847

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[2002] 2 SCR 945

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Para 51 (c)

[1999] 2 SCR 1111

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[2001] 2 SCR 36

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Para 51 (c)

AIR 1964 SC 1687

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Para 51 (c)

[2016] 5 SCR 227

partly dissenting

Para 59

(1969) 3 SCC 392

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[1980] 3 SCR 179

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Para 70

[1998] 3 SCR 1088

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Para 70

[2012] 7 SCR 909

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[2016] 5 SCR 227

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Para 71

AIR 1990 SC 2033

relied on

Para 72

[1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 584

relied on

Para 73

[1996] 1 SCR 1058

relied on

Para 74

[1997] 3 SCR 1096

relied on

Para 75

2018 (1) SCALE 174

relied on

Para 77

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AIR 1936 PC 253 (2)

relied on

Para 78

[1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 448

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Para 81 (a)

[1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 6

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Para 81 (b)

[1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 787

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Para 81 (c)

[1996] 2 SCR 638

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Para 81 (c)

[1957] SCR 1

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Para 81 (d)

[1996] 1 Suppl. SCR 799

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Para 81 (c)

[2011] 5 SCR 460

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Para 81 (f)

[1975] Suppl. SCR 250

relied on

Para 87 (a)

[2010] 12 SCR 1184

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Para 87 (b)

[2011] 7 SCR 435

relied on

Para 87 (c)

[1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 451

relied on

Para 87 (d)

[1996] 2 SCR 643

relied on

Para 87 (e)

[2005] 1 SCR 545

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Para 87 (f)

[2011] 14 SCR 1113

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Para 87 (g)

[2009] 14 SCR 507

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Para 87 (h)

[2010] 15 SCR 302

relied on

Para 87 (i)

(2015) 17 SCC 1

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Para 87 (j)

[2011] 6 SCR 443

distinguished

Para 87 (m)

(2015) 4 SCC 325

overruled

Para 89

(2017) 6 SCC 787

relied on

Para 94

[2007] 5 SCR 729

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Para 95

[2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 535

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Para 96

[2014] 8 SCR 751

not correct law

Para 102

[1997] 3 SCR 931

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Para 105

[2010] 2 SCR 447

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Para 105 (b)

[1990] 1 SCR 186

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Para 105 (d)

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[2018] 2 S.C.R.

[1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 528

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Para 105 (d)

[2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 115

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Para 105 (e)

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Para 105 (f)

[2002] 2 SCR 383

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Para 111

[1996] 1 SCR 698

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[1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 222

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[2013] 14 SCR 58

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Para 113

[2008] 17 SCR 120

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[1999] 3 SCR 594

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Para 115

[1973] 1 SCR 822

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Para 116

[1999] 2 Suppl. SCR 754

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Para 118

[2000] 2 SCR 871

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[2002] 2 SCR 1093

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Para 121

[2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 282

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Para 122

[1975] 1 SCR 504

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Para 123

[2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 49

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Para 124

(1998) 3 SCC 376

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Para 131 (a)

(2005) 8 SCC 423

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Para 131 (b)

[1992] 2 SCR 378

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Para 131 (c)

(1980) 2 SCC 191

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Para 131 (c)

[1995] 1 SCR 543

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Para 131 (d)

[2009] 15 SCR 1010

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Para 131 (e)

[2004] 1 SCR 965

relied on

Para 131 (f)

[1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 1

relied on

Para 131 (g)

[2013] 12 SCR 674

followed

Para 131 (h)

[1975] Suppl. SCR 365

distinguished

Para 132

[2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 548

relied on

Para 134

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 651

relied on

Para 140 (a)

[2012] 2 SCR 1127

relied on

Para 140 (b)

[2012] 4 SCR 74

relied on

Para 140 (c)

(2011) 8 SCC 161

relied on

Para 140 (c)

[2006] 2 SCR 390

relied on

Para 140 (d)

[2011] 2 SCR 1142

distinguished

Para 144 (a)

[1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 790

distinguished

Para 144 (a)

(2014) 6 SCC 586

distinguished

Para 145 (d)

(2014) 6 SCC 583

distinguished

Para 145 (e)

(2015) 3 SCC 327

referred to

Para 145 (f)

(2015) 8 SCC 544

referred to

Para 145 (h)

(2016) 15 SCC 464

referred to

Para 145 (i)

(2016) 14 SCC 746

relied on

Para 145 (k)

(2016) 12 SCC 504

referred to

Para 145 (l)

(2015) 3 SCC 341

referred to

Para 145 (m)

(2016) 7 SCC 614

referred to

Para 147 (a)

[1975] 3 SCR 834

referred to

Para 147 (b)

[1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 1

referred to

Para 147 (b)

(1991) 4 SCC 139

referred to

Para 147 (c)

[1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 929

referred to

Para 147 (d)

[2010] 13 SCR 621

referred to

Para 148

PER MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.: [2014] 7 SCR 799 [2014] 1 SCR 783 [1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 790 [2011] 2 SCR 1142

overruled needs reconsideration by larger bench referred to referred to

Para 1 Para 2

Para 7 Para 7

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[2018] 2 S.C.R.

[2014] 8 SCR 751

referred to

Para 7

(2015) 3 SCC 206

referred to

Para 7

(2015) 8 SCC 544

referred to

Para 7

[2016] 5 SCR 227

referred to

Para 8

(2016) 15 SCC 464

referred to

Para 9

(2014) 6 SCC 586

referred to

Para 10

(2014) 6 SCC 583

referred to

Para 11

(2016) 12 SCC 487

referred to

Para 11

[1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 122

relied on

Para 13

[1990] Supp. 1 SCC 806

relied on

Para 25

[1976] Suppl. SCR 645

held inapplicable

Para 27

[1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 1

relied on

Para 33

[2010] 15 SCR 201

relied on

Para 34

[2010] 13 SCR 621

relied on

Para 38

[2002] 2 SCR 383

referred to

Para 46

[2003] 3 SCR 762

referred to

Para 46

[2008] 14 SCR 13

referred to

Para 46

2017 (8) SCALE 112

referred to

Para 46

[2014] 8 SCR 751

referred to

Para 47

(2015) 3 SCC 327

referred to

Para 47

(1995) 6 SCC 240

relied on

Para 50

[1980] 2 SCR 268

referred to

Para 55

[2009] 15 SCR 1010

relied on

Para 57

[1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 1

relied on

Para 58

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 20982 of 2017. From the Judgment and Order dated 03.11.2014 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore, in Writ Appeal No. 166 of 2007.

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

WITH

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10742 of 2008. Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 20920, 26574-26575 and 28993 of 2011. Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 30198, 30192, 30142, 30128, 30203, 25289, 22356, 31678, 22527, 30577-30580, 27389, 27383 and 34787 of 2015.

Civil Appeal Nos. 4835 and 4836 of 2015. Special Leave Petition (C)………………CC No. 9842 of 2016. Special Leave Petition (C)..Diary No. 24901 of 2017. Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 4705, 38290, 9571, 15127, 15144, 15131, 15139, 16425, 15117, 15140, 15113, 16438, 15119, 15126, 15125, 15118, 15124, 15112, 11824, 15143, 15141, 15142, 17324, 38368, 23846, 23097, 19804-19805, 22127-22128 and 21997-21998 of 2016.

Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 10190-10200, 15213-15217 and 5182-5184 of 2017. W.P. (C) No.602 of 2017. B. K. Satija, Anil Grover, Ajay Bansal, Birendra Kumar Chaudhary, Amit Kumar, Hemant Gupta, Anish Kumar Gupta, AAGs, Ms. Indu Malhotra, P. S. Patwalia, Amrendra Sharan, Narender Hooda, Sr. Advs., Tanvir Nayar, Ms. Rakhi Mohanty, Prashant Singh, Sandeep Chhabra, Vikas Mehta, Gaurav Yadav, Sanjay Kr. Visen, Ms. Natasha Dalmia, Ms. Harshika Verma, Dhruv Sheoran, Mrs. Meenakshi Arora, Ms. Monisha Handa, Ankit Jain, Mohit D. Ram, Vishnu B. Saharya, Viresh B. Saharya, M/s Saharya & Co., Mrs. Veena Bansal, Dheeraj Gupta, Ranbir Yadav, Anzu K. Varkey, Abishek Yadav, S.Wasim A. Qadri, Jubair Ahmad Khan, Zaid Ali, Tamim Qadri, Mudasir Nabi, Saeed Qadri, L. R. Singh, Ashwani Kumar, Ravinder Naina, Naveen Kumar, Piyush Hans, Anish Kumar Gupta, Vishwa Pal Singh, Puneet Jain, Ms. Christi Jain, Pankaj Sharma, Abhinav Gupta, Ms. Ankita Gupta, Ms. Priyal Jain, Ms. Pratibha Jain, Ms. Binu Tamta, Dhruv Tamta, Amit Kumar, Vijay Pratap Yadav, Dr. Monika Gusain, Ranbir Yadav, Ms. Anzu K. Varkey, Abhishek Yadav, Ms. Manpreet Kaur Bhalla, Ms. Payal Gupta, Sudhanshu S. Chaudhari, Ms. Surabhi Guleria, Ms. Jaikriti S. Jadeja, Ms. Garima

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[2018] 2 S.C.R.

Parashad, Kuldip Singh, Siddharth Singla, Lakshmi Raman Singh, Sanjay Kapur, Baldev Atreya, Deepak Goel, Kamal Kumar Pandey, Prashant Tyagi, D. P. Mohanty, Abhiram Naik, Sarthak Gaur, M/s Parekh & Co., Deepak Thukral, Piyush Hans, Ms. Monisha Handa, Ankit Jain, Ankit Swarup, Dushyant Tiwari, Chandra Shekhar Suman, R. K. Rajwanshi, Avdhesh Kumar Singh, Ms. Deepshikha Bharati, Ms. Rita Gupta, Samar Vijay Singh, Ankur Mittal, Abhinash Jain, Satish Kumar, Ms. Noopur Singhal, Mishra Saurabh, Ankit Kr. Lal, Dr. Hans Raj Yadav, Shailendra Kr. Yadav, Brij Bhushan, Ms. Rashmi Chopra, Ms. Asiya, Siddharth Mittal, Nayan Nepal, D. K. Sharma, Ms. Monika Sharma, Rohit Vats, Rajesh Saharan, Braj Kishore Mishra, Ms. Aparna Jha, Dr. M. S. Verma, N. N. Jha, Kailash Mudgal, Mrs. Santosh Singh, Rakesh Kumar, Kedar Nath Tripathy, Vishal Chauhan, Ms. Rachana Srivastava, Sukrit R. Kapoor, Nitya Madhusoodhanan, Sandeep Narain, Ms.Anjali Agarwal, Rajesh Bhardwaj, M/s S.Narain & Co., Saurabh Mishra, Onkar Singh, Jitendra Vashisth, Puneet Sharma, Pankaj Sharma, Puneet Jain, Ms. Priyal Jain, Ms. Sujaina Srivastava, Ram S. Sharma, Toshar Mathur, Jagjit Singh Chhabra, Saksham Maheshwari, Vikas Mehta, Rajat Sehgal, Ms. Anushree Menon, Mithun Rao, Adith Nair, Gopal Sankarnarayan, Ms. Devika Mohan, Ms. Parul Shukla, E. C. Agrawala, Harsha Peechara, Ashish Tiwari, Arjun Krishnan, Rakesh Kumar, K. N. Tripathi, Dushyant Parashar, Arun Sharma, Amit Andlay, Ms. Tatini Basu, Aditya Soni, Mrs. Mayank Datta, Shree Pal Singh, Atul Kumar, Ms. Sweety Singh, Ms. Archana Kumari, Rahul Pandey, Sumit Bansal, Ms. Richa Oberoi, Prateek Kohli, Gagan Gupta, Ankit Swarup, Ms. Anu Gupta, Kamal Mohan Gupta, Atul Kumar, Siddharth Mittal, Punit Dutt Tyagi, Subhasish Bhowmick, Pradeep Misra, Rao Ranjit, Sibo Sankar Mishra, B. Krishna Prasad, Braj Kishore Mishra, Bankey Bihari, Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, Ms.Anubha Agrawal, Rabin Majumder, Advs. for the appearing parties. The following Judgments and Order of the Court were delivered by

ARUN MISHRA, J. 1. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (Dead) through LRs. & Others [C.A No.20982 of 2017] correctness of the decision of Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki [2014 (3) SCC 183] has been doubted. The main issue is interpretation of section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, ‘the Act of 2013’) and section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the Act of 1894’).

2. In Yogesh Neema & Ors. v. State of M.P. & Ors. [S.L.P. [C] No.10742 of 2008] vide order of 12.1.2016, observing that other question, that may arise undoubtedly to be considered question Nos. IV and V have been referred.

Following questions arises for consideration: I. What is the meaning of the expression ‘paid’/ ‘tender’ in Section 24 of the Act of 2013 and section 31 of the Act of 1894? Whether non-deposit of compensation in court under section 31(2) of the Act of 1894 results into a lapse of acquisition under section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. What are the consequences of non-deposit in Court especially when compensation has been tendered and refused under section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 and section 24(2) of the Act of 2013? Whether such persons after refusal can take advantage of their wrong/conduct?

II. Mode of taking physical possession as contemplated under section 24(2) of the Act of 1894. III.Whether section 24 of Act of 2013 revives barred and stale claims? IV. Whether the conscious omission referred to in paragraph 11 of the judgment in Shree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu [(2015) 3 SCC 353] makes any substantial difference to the legal position with regard to the exclusion or inclusion of the period covered by an interim order of the Court for the purpose of determination of the applicability of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act? V.Whether the principle of “actus curiae neminem gravabit”, namely act of the Court should not prejudice any parties would be applicable in the present case to exclude the period covered by an interim order for the purpose of determining the question with regard to taking of possession as contemplated in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act?

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In Re: Question No.1 3. Question that has been referred in as to meaning of the expression ‘paid’ used in section 24 of Act of 2013 and expression ‘tender’ used in section 31(1) of Act of 1894 when deposit under section 31(2) of Act of 1894 is necessary, effect of refusal to accept compensation and whether deposit in treasury is permissible and effect of non-deposit of compensation in Court. 4. In order to appreciate the various questions to be answered, it is appropriate to first consider the provisions contained in the Act of 1894 with respect to the passing of the award, together with its communication and payment; the following then is a ‘bird’s eye view’ of the same. SCHEME OF ACT & RELEVANT PROVISIONS :

5. After notification under section 4 and declaration under section 6 have been issued under the Act of 1894, the Collector is required to proceed to pass an award under section 11. Section 12 requires the Collector to give immediate notice of the award to such persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made. Section 16 deals with the power of the Collector to take possession of the land after an award has been made under section 11. It is open to the Collector to take possession of the land, which shall, thereupon, vest absolutely in the Government. Section 16 is extracted hereunder: “16. Power to take possession – When the Collector has made an award under section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. (emphasis supplied) 6. Section 17 deals with special powers in cases of urgency. The same authorizes the Collector to take possession before passing of the award as provided in section 17(1) of the Act of 1894, and on taking possession of any land, such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. Section 17 is extracted hereunder: “17. Special powers in case of urgency – (1) In cases of urgency whenever the [appropriate Government], so directs, the Collector,

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, subsection 1). [take possession of any land needed for a public purpose]. Such land shall thereupon [vest absolutely in the [Government], free from all encumbrances.

(2) Whenever owing to any sudden change in the channel of any navigable river or other unforeseen emergency, it becomes necessary for any Railway Administration to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the maintenance of their traffic or for the purpose of making thereon a river-side or ghat station, or of providing convenient connection with or accesses to any such station, [or the appropriate Government considers it necessary to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the purpose of maintaining any structure or system pertaining to irrigation, water supply, drainage, road communication or electricity,] the Collector may immediately after the publication of the notice mentioned in sub-section (1) and with the previous sanction of the [appropriate Government], enter upon and take possession of such land, which shall thereupon [vest absolutely in the [Government]] free from all encumbrances : Provided that the Collector shall not take possession of any building or part of a building under this subsection without giving to the occupier thereof at least forty-eight hours notice of his intention so to do, or such longer notice as may be reasonably sufficient to enable such occupier to remove his movable property from such building without unnecessary inconvenience.

(3) In every case under either of the preceding sub-sections the Collector shall at that time of taking possession offer to the persons interested compensation for the standing crops and trees (if any) on such land and from any other damage sustained by them caused by such sudden dispossession and not excepted in section 24; and, in case such offer is not accepted, the value of such crops and trees and the amount of such other damage shall be allowed for in awarding compensation for the land under the provisions herein contained. 3[(3A) Before taking possession of any land under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the Collector shall, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3)- (a) tender payment of eighty per

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centum of the compensation for such land as estimated by him to the person interested entitled thereto, and (b) pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in section 31, sub-section (2), and where the Collector is so prevented, the provisions of section 31, sub-section (2), (except the second proviso thereto), shall apply as they apply to the payment of compensation under that section. (3B) The amount paid or deposited under section (3A), shall be taken into account for determining the amount of compensation required to be tendered under section 31, and where the amount so paid or deposited exceeds the compensation awarded by the Collector under section 11, the excess may, unless refunded within three months from the date of Collector’s award, be recovered as an arrear of land revenue]. [(4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the [appropriate Government], the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the [appropriate Government] may direct that the provisions of section 5A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under section 6 in respect of the land at any time [after the date of the publication of the notification] under section 4, sub-section (1).” (emphasis supplied) Before taking possession of the land, it is necessary under Section 17(3A) to tender payment of 80% compensation unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 31, and where the Collector is so prevented, the provisions of section 31(2), except the second proviso, shall apply as they apply to the payment of compensation under that section. As required under section 17(3A) and section 17(3B), the amount paid or deposited under subsection (3A) shall be taken into account for determining the amount of compensation to be tendered under section 31. Section 18 of the Act of 1894 provides that any person interested, who has not accepted the award, may ask for a reference to be made to the court with respect to (1) measurement of the land; (2) the amount of compensation (3) the persons to whom it is payable or (4) the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. Under section 30, there can be a reference to the court; its scope is confined to any dispute arising as to the apportionment of the amount of compensation or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

is payable. In a reference under section 30, measurement of land and quantum of compensation cannot be questioned. There is a limitation for reference under section 18(2); whereas, the limitation is not prescribed in the Act of 1894 for seeking reference under section 30.

7. There is yet another reference under the Act of 1894, i.e. under section 28A. The provisions of section 28A aim at removal of the disparity in the matter of payment of compensation which provides for redetermination of the amount of compensation, on the basis of the award of the court, in respect of a person who had not sought reference, and had accepted the Collector’s award; such a person can seek redetermination of compensation within three months from the date of the award of the court. In case a person is not satisfied with the redetermination so made under section 28A(2), he can seek a reference to court under section 28A(3). 8. The payment of compensation and deposit of it in Court is dealt with in Part V of the Act of 1894, in section 31. Section 31 is extracted hereunder: “31. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Court. - (1) On making an award under section 11, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award and shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the next sub-section. (2) If they shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Court to which a reference under section 18 would be submitted: Provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount: Provided also that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under section 18: Provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto.

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[2018] 2 S.C.R.

(3) Notwithstanding anything in this section the Collector may, with the sanction of the [appropriate Government] instead of awarding a money compensation in respect of any land, make any arrangement with a person having a limited interest in such land, either by the grant of other lands in exchange, the remission of land-revenue on other lands held under the same title, or in such other way as may be equitable having regard to the interests of the parties concerned. (4) Nothing in the last foregoing sub-section shall be construed to interfere with or limit the power of the Collector to enter into any arrangement with any person interested in the land and competent to contract in respect thereof.” 9. The provision of section 31(2) makes it clear that only in the exigencies as provided in section 31(2), the amount has to be deposited in reference court, not in all exigencies. As discussed hereinafter rules framed under section 55 provide that in case a person seeks no reference and he refuses to accept the compensation it has to be deposited in the treasury. An attempt has to be made to harmonize the Act and the rules. The expression used in section 31(2) is that on refusal amount to be deposited in Court where reference would be submitted. When no reference is sought there is no question of it being submitted to the Court. Hence, Reference Court does not come into picture then the deposit is to be obviously made in treasury as provided in Rules/ Order discussed hereinafter. 10. Sub-section (1) of section 31 deals with “payment”, whereas, sub-section (2) of section 31 deals with “deposit” of the amount of compensation in court in certain contingencies. “Payment” of compensation is differently dealt with in section 31(1), and “deposit” is separately dealt with in section 31(2) of the Act of 1894. Section 31(1) provides tender of the amount to be the mode to pay. The provisions of sub-section (1) deal with payment, and sub-section (2) of section 31 deals with deposit in the Court “where reference would be submitted”, only in the contingencies mentioned, i.e. (1) if the person interested shall not consent to receive it, and has sought reference to Court or (2) if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or (3) if there be any dispute as to the entitlement to receive the compensation, or (4) if there be any dispute as to the apportionment of compensation between the

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

interested persons. The Collector is required to deposit the amount of the compensation in the Court to which a reference under section 18 would be submitted. It is also provided in section 31(2) that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make an application for seeking reference under section 18. It is open to a person, under the first proviso to section 31(2), to receive payment of compensation under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount, and such person is also entitled to maintain a reference. The third proviso to section 31(2) makes it clear that any person who has received the whole or any part of compensation awarded under the Act, shall still be liable to pay the same to a person who is lawfully entitled thereto. It is with the purpose as provided in section 31 when the amount is tendered it can be accepted under protest and still a reference can be maintained. In case awarded amount has been accepted without protest, reference cannot be maintained under section 18.

11. In case of incompetency of a person to alienate the land in question, amount has to be deposited in the reference court under section 31(2), and when money of such person is deposited in Court, court may order the money to be invested in the purchase of another land to be held under the like title and conditions of ownership, as the land, in respect of which, such money shall have been deposited, was held, or if such purchase cannot be effected forthwith, money can be invested in Government or other approved securities as the court shall think fit and has to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions contained in section 32. Section 33 deals with an investment of money deposited in other cases. 12. In case money is deposited in court otherwise than as provided under section 32, any party interested can apply to the court for investing the same in Government or other approved securities, is the purpose of deposit. The provisions of sections 32 and 33 of the Act of 1894 are extracted hereunder: “32. Investment of money deposited in respect of lands belonging to persons incompetent to alienate. -

(1) If any money shall be deposited in Court under sub-section (2) of the last preceding section and it appears that the land in respect whereof the same was awarded belonged to any person who had no power to alienate the same, the Court shallH

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(a) order the money to be invested in the purchase of other lands to be held under the like title and conditions of ownership as the land in respect of which such money shall have been deposited was held, or

[2018] 2 S.C.R.

(b) if such purchase cannot be effected forthwith, then in such Government of other approved securities as the Court shall think fit; and shall direct the payment of the interest or other proceeds arising from such investment to the person or persons who would, for the time being, have been entitled to the possession of the said land, and such moneys shall remain so deposited and invested until the same be applied(i)in the purchase of such other lands as aforesaid; or (ii) in payment to any person or persons becoming absolutely entitled thereto.

(2) In all cases of money deposited to which this section applies the Court shall order the costs of the following matters, including therein all reasonable charge and expenses incident thereon, to be paid by the Collector, namely: (a) the costs of such investments as aforesaid; (b) the costs of the orders for the payment of the interest or other proceeds of the securities upon which such moneys are for the time being invested, and for the payment out of Court of the principal of such moneys, and of all proceedings relating thereto, except such as may be occasioned by litigation between adverse claimants. 33. Investment of money deposited in other cases - When any money shall have been deposited in Court under this Act for any cause other than mentioned in the last proceeding section, the court may, on the application of any party interested or claiming an interest in such money, order the same to be invested in such Government or other approved securities as it may think proper, and paid in such manner as it may consider will give the parties interested therein the same benefit the reform as they might have had from the land in respect whereof such money shall have been deposited or as near thereto as may be.”

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

13. The provisions contained in section 34 deals with the exigencies where the amount of compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land. The Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon @ 9% from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited; and if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest @ 15% per annum shall follow. Section 34 of 1894 Act is extracted hereunder:

“34. Payment of interest - When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of (nine per centum) per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited: [Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date or expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry.” 14. The expression “paid”/”tender” and the expression “deposited” have both been used separately in section 31, as well as in section 34, of the Act of 1894; so also in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. They carry different meanings, and different consequences flow from them. Significantly, it is clear under Section 16 of the Act of 1894, that once award has been passed and possession has been taken, land absolutely vests in the State, and in the case of contingencies as provided in section 17(1) when possession is taken in the case of urgency, even before passing of the award, land vests absolutely in the State under section 17(3A), 80% amount is required to be tendered before taking possession under sections 17(1) and 17(2); and, the same is to be paid in the mode as provided for under section 31(1) and, in case of refusal, incompetency etc. to alienate and other such cases as provided under section 31(2), it has to be deposited in the court and in case it is not so deposited, consequences, as prescribed under section 34, shall follow i.e. from the date of taking possession 9% interest for the first year and after 1 year, 15% interest has to be paid on the amount not so paid or deposited.

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Under the provisions of the Act of 1894, there is no divesting of the land which has vested absolutely in the State; and, the consequences of nonpayment, or of non-tendering of compensation, or of non-depositing of the same in court, would only be that of the additional liability of interest as provided in section 34. The provision with respect to the payment of 15% interest has been inserted via the proviso to section 34, w.e.f. 24.9.1984, vide Amendment Act No.68/1984. 15. When we consider the provisions of the Act of 2013, vis-àvis those of the Act of 1894, it becomes apparent that Section 11 of the Act of 2013 is akin to section 4 of the Act of 1894. Section 19 deals with publication of declaration and summary of Rehabilitation and Settlement, it is equivalent to section 6 of the Act of 1894. Section 23 deals with matters to be considered while determining compensation by the Collector. 16. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 deals with land acquisition process initiated under the Act of 1894, which shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. With respect to acquisition, when award, under the Act of 1894, has not been passed, then, as per Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013, all the provisions of the Act of 2013 relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; where, however, an award under section 11 of the act of 1894 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue,as per section 24(1)(b), under the Act of 1894, as if the said Act has not been repealed. 17. Section 24(2) begins with a non-obstante clause — as notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1). The provisions of sub-section (2) of section 24 shall, under the exigencies provided therein, have the overriding effect, i.e. in case of award, under Act of 1894, has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013, but either the physical possession has not been taken, or compensation has not been paid, the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed. The proviso to section 24(2) lays down when the award has been made and compensation in respect of majority of holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, the acquisition would not lapse; however, all the beneficiaries shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. 18. When we consider the scheme of the Act of 2013 also with respect to the mode of payment of compensation, we find provisions of

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

section 77 are almost akin to those of section 31. The provisions of section 77 of the Act of 2013 are extracted hereunder:

“77. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Authority. – (1) On making an award under section 30, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award and shall pay it to them by depositing the amount in their bank accounts unless prevented by someone or more of the contingencies mentioned in sub-section (2). (2) If the person entitled to compensation shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Authority to which a reference under section 64 would be submitted: Provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount:

Provided further that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under sub-section (1) of section 64: Provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto.”

19. Section 80 of the Act of 2013, is equivalent to section 34 of the Act of 1894, the same is extracted hereunder:

“80. Payment of interest. –When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of nine percent. per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited:

Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen percent. per annum shall be payable from the date or expiry of the said

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period of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry.” 20. It is apparent, from the provisions contained in section 77 of the Act of 2013, that, the expression used in section 77 that the Collector shall “tender” payment of the compensation to landowners/interested persons, and the obligation is to pay it to them by depositing the amount in their bank accounts unless prevented by exigencies provided in section 77(2), are akin to section 31(2) of the Act of 1894. 21. In proviso to section 24(2), expression used is compensation has not been “deposited” in the account of the beneficiaries, which may be deposited separately in treasury also; whereas, in section 77, of the Act of 2013 the deposit is required, in the “bank” account of beneficiaries, unless refused. The expression “bank-account” has not been used in section 31 of the Act of 1894 or in section 24(2) of Act of 2013. In proviso to section 24(2), the expression used “deposited in account” would mean deposited only in Treasury or with the Land Acquisition collector for payment. 22. It is pertinent to mention that section 80 of the Act of 2013 also imposes a liability of interest, akin to Section 34 of the Act of 1894, upon amount not being deposited; i.e. 9% for the first year and, thereafter, 15% per annum. The Act of 2013 does not envisage the consequence of lapse of the acquisition on non-deposit of compensation in court, and neither was it so provided for in section 31 of the Act of 1894. The provision of section 24 thus does not contemplate deposit of amount in Court. In our opinion, the expression “paid” and “deposited” are separately used in both enactments, and they both carry a different meaning. The aforesaid provisions deal with tender and deposit; and, consequences are similar. INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 24 23. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 is extracted hereunder:-

“24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.–(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,—

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] (a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” 24. When we consider the provisions of section 24 of the 2013 Act, it is clear that in case of the award has not been passed then as per section 24(1)(a), compensation has to be determined under the Act of 2013. It is also clear that section 24(1)(b) provides that where an award under section 11 of the 1894 Act has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Act of 1894 as if it has not been repealed. However, in case physical possession of the land has not been taken, or the compensation has not been paid, the proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed; and, in case of compensation with respect to a majority of landholdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries i.e. landowners shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. 25. In section 24(2), the expression that has been employed is “compensation has not been paid”. The expression “deposited”, which occurs in the proviso to sub-section (2), has not been used in the main

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section 24(2). Its proviso uses the expression “deposited in the account of the beneficiaries”, meaning thereby, in the case with respect to the majority of land holdings amount has not been deposited in the account of beneficiaries, though the acquisition would not lapse, all beneficiaries would get benefit of the compensation under the Act of 2013. Thus, the consequence of non-deposit of the amount, with respect to the majority of land holdings, in the account of the beneficiaries, is that the acquisition would not lapse, and only compensation under the new Act would be payable. Whereas, under the main part of section 24(2), it is apparent that, the expression “compensation has not been paid” has been used. The word “deposited” is missing from main part of section 24(2), and it is only used in the proviso. Thus it is crystal clear that the Legislature has used two different expressions to carry, respectively different meanings; and, the proviso operates in a different field, where the acquisition would not lapse. The object is that a body or State Government, for whose benefit land has been acquired, must have possessed the requisite funds for payment to the landowners. The proviso is not attracted where compensation has been paid. 26. The proviso to section 24(2) does not provide that amount of compensation has to be deposited in the court. It obviously refers to a payment deposited with LAO or in treasury.

27. The different expression “paid”, used in section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, thus, cannot carry same meaning and include in it the deposit to be made in Court under section 31(2) of the Act of 1894; it only reflects the mode of payment as envisaged under section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 i.e. “tender”.

28. The expression used in section 31 of Act of 1894 and Section 77(1) of Act of 2013 is to “tender payment”. Once there is tender, then in case of refusal to accept the same,the obligation to pay under section 31(1) is complete by tender, and that tantamount to making the payment; and, that is precisely what is intended by the word “paid” in section 24(2) of 2013 Act.

29. In Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act, the word ‘deposited in Court’ is used. The deposit in Court is not payment to the beneficiaries. It is only after their refusal to accept the compensation tendered under section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 it is to be deposited in Court. It is further provided in the rules that in case of reference is sought, the amount is to

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

be deposited in court where reference would be submitted otherwise it is to be deposited in the treasury.If the expression “deposited”, used in the proviso to section 24(2), and expression “paid” used in main section 24(2), are both taken as contained in expression “paid” i.e. the tender; and, on refusal it is deposited in court to make the “payment” complete; if expression “deposited” is included in expression ‘payment’ under Section 24(2), inconsistency and repugnancy would be caused as between the proviso and the main sub-section; which has to be eschewed. The Court cannot add the word “deposited” to the expression “paid”/ “tender” in Section 31 of Act 1894 or Section 24(2) of Act of 2013.

30. The proviso to section 24(2) of the 2013 Act deals with ‘deposit’ of compensation in treasury or with Land Acquisition Collector with respect to the majority of holding it does obviously contemplate that amount has not been ‘paid’ to landowners/ beneficiaries/ interested persons. Thus, when Scheme of entire section 24 is considered, the concept of ‘paid’ in the main section 24(2) is different than the deposit. If the deposit is included in word paid the proviso to section 24(2), which has the different consequence of no lapse, but only higher compensation would be otiose and become redundant and repugnancy would occur. 31. It is clear that expression ‘paid’ in section 24 is different than ‘deposit’ which is provided in its proviso. The word ‘deposit’ is included in section 24 in word ‘paid’. Same is the position even under section 31(1) and 31(2). The provisions of section 24 cannot be rendered wholly unworkable by the inclusion of ‘deposit’ in ‘paid’.

MEANING OF “PAID” IN SECTION 31 OF THE ACT OF 1894 AND SECTION 24(2) OF THE ACT OF 2013 : 32. The question arises what is the meaning of the expression ‘paid’ in section 24 and ‘tender’ in section 31(2) of the Act of 1894. Whether the tender of compensation amount to discharge of obligations to make payment. The meaning of expression “tender”: is when a person has tendered the amount and made it unconditionally available and the landowner has refused to receive it, the person who has tendered the amount cannot be saddled with the liability, which is to be visited for non-payment of the amount. “Tender” has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary thus: “tender, n. (16c) 1. A valid and sufficient offer of performance; specific, an unconditional offer of money or performance to satisfy

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a debt or obligation a tender of delivery.The tender may save the tendering party from a penalty for non-payment or nonperformance or may, if the other party unjustifiably refuses the tender, place the other party in default. Cf. OFFER OR PERFORMANCE; CONSIGNATION.”

It is apparent from aforesaid that “tender” may save the tendering party from the penalty for non-payment or non-performance or penalty if another party unjustifiably refusing the tender, places the other party in default. A formal offer duly made by one party to another especially an offer of money in discharge of liability fulfills the terms of the law and of the liability. Tender is to offer of money in satisfaction of a debt, by producing and showing the amount to a creditor or party claiming and expressing verbally, willingness to pay it. The expression “tender” has been used in section 31.The concept of deposited in court is different from tender and “paid”.

33. This Court in the Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Saharanpur v. Gobind, AIR 1962 SC 1500 has held in the context of section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act where payment of one month’s wages was necessary. It was held that the payment of one-month wages can always mean that the employer has tendered his wages and that would amount to payment for otherwise a workman could always make the section unworkable by refusing to take wages. The Court observed thus: “8. Let us now turn to the words of the proviso in the background of what we have said above. The proviso lays down that no workman shall be discharged or dismissed unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. It will be clear that two kinds of punishment are subject to the conditions of the proviso, namely, discharge or dismissal. Any other kind of punishment is not within the proviso. Further, the proviso lays down two conditions, namely (i) payment of wages for one month and (ii) making of an application by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken. It is not disputed before us that when the proviso lays down the condition as to payment of one month’s wages, all that the employer

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] is required to do in order to carry out that condition is to tender the wages to the employee. But if the employee chooses not to accept the wages, he cannot come forward and say that there has been no payment of wages to him by the employer. Therefore, though s. 33 speaks of payment of one month’s wages it can only mean that the employer has tendered the wages and that would amount, for payment, for otherwise, a workman could always make the section unworkable by refusing to take the wages. So far as the second condition about the making of the application is concerned.” (emphasis supplied) 34. In The Management of Delhi Transport Undertaking v. The Industrial Tribunal, Delhi &Anr. AIR 1965 SC 1503, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court considered the question of payment of wages under the proviso to section 33(3) of Industrial Disputes Act and has taken a similar view and observed: “The proviso does not mean that the wages for one month should have been actually paid because in many cases the employer can only tender the amount before the dismissal but cannot force the employee to receive the payment before dismissal becomes effective. In this case, the tender was definitely made before the order of dismissal became effective and the wages would certainly have been paid if Hari Chand had asked for them. There was no failure to comply with the provision in this respect.”

35. This Court in Indian Oxygen Ltd. v. Narayan Bhoumik (1968) 1 PLJR 94 has discussed the concept of ‘paid’ and has observed: “4. The proviso to Section 33(2)(b) lays down that no workman shall be discharged or dismissed unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by him. Though the word used in the proviso is ‘paid’, the proviso does not mean that the employer must actually hand over or pay to the workman dismissed or discharged his one month’s wages. In (1962) 3 Suppl. S.C.R. 618] Strawboard Manufacturing Co. v. Gobind this Court while construing this proviso, observed that when it lays down the condition as to payment of one month’s wages all that the employer is required to do to carry out that condition is to tender the wages to the

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employee. But if the employee chooses not to accept them, he cannot come forward and say that there has been no payment of wages to him by the employer, Therefore, though Section 33 speaks of payment of one month’s wages, it can only mean that the employer has tendered the wages and that would amount to payment, for otherwise, a workman could always make the section unworkable by refusing to take the wages. In (1964) 2 SCR 104, 109 P.H. Kalyani v. M/s. Air France, the employer had offered one month’s wages to the workman before the order of dismissal against him came into force. The offer was held to be sufficient compliance of the said condition laid down in the proviso, [(1955) 1 SCR 998] Management of Delhi Transport Undertaking v. Industrial Tribunal, Delhi was a case where the wages were remitted by money order but the workman purposely refused to receive them. It was held that the employer could not be said not to have complied with the condition laid down by the proviso. It is thus clear that the condition as to payment in the proviso does not mean that the wages have to be actually paid but if wages are tendered or offered, such a tender or offer would be sufficient compliance for the purposes of Section 33(2)(b) proviso.” 36. The word “paid” means applied, settled or satisfied. The concept of paid has also been considered by this Court in The Benares State Bank Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Lucknow, (1969) 2 SCC 316, in the context of section 14(2)(c) of Income Tax Act, 1922. This Court observed that the expression “paid” in section 16(2) does not contemplate actual receipt of the dividend by the members of the community; in general, the dividend may be said to be paid when company discharges its liability and makes the amount of dividend unconditionally available to the member entitled thereto. The Court has observed: “5. …..This Court observed in J. Dalmia v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi 53 ITR 83 that the expression “paid” in Section 16(2) does not contemplate actual receipt of the dividend by the member : in general, dividend may be said to be paid within the meaning of Section 16(2) when the Company discharges its liability and makes the amount of dividend unconditionally available to the member entitled thereto…….” (emphasis supplied) 37. In N.B. Sanjana, Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Bombay & Ors. v. The Elphinstone Spinning & Weaving Mills Co.

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Ltd. (1971) 1 SCC 337, the court observed that literal meaning of the word “paid” need not be adopted.

38. In J.Dalmia v. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi, AIR 1964 SC 1866 at 1869, this Court has observed that the expression “paid” does not contemplate actual receipt of the dividend by the member. The dividend may be said to be paid within the meaning of section 16(2) when the company discharges its liability and makes amount unconditionally available the members entitled thereto. “The expression “paid” in s. 16(2) it is true does not contemplate actual receipt of the dividend by the member. In general, dividend may be said to be paid within the meaning of s. 16(2) when the company discharges its liability and makes the amount of dividend unconditionally available to the member entitled thereto.

(emphasis supplied) 39. The expression “paid” would mean in section 31(1) of Act 1894 and section 24(2) of Act of 2013 as soon as it is offered and made unconditionally available. Merely, if a landowner refuses to accept it, it cannot be said that it has not been paid. Once amount has been tendered that would amount to payment. Thus, word “paid” does not mean actual payment to be made but whatever is possible for an incumbent to make the payment is only contemplated. “Paid” does not mean receipt or deposited in Court. There may be refusal to receive an amount in spite of its tender. Thus, in view of the decisions of this court in CIT Kerala (supra), N.B. Sanjana (supra) and J. Dalmia (supra), the provisions of section 24(2) have to be construed to mean tender of amount would mean payment as envisaged. 40. It is settled that a Court cannot add or subtract a word; the expression “compensation has not been paid” is used in section 24(2); it is not open to the court to add to these words, or to substitute the said expression with any further expression, such as ‘deposit’. In the “Principles of Statutory Interpretation” by G.P. Singh (14th edition), it has been observed that court has to avoid addition or substitution of the words. Thus, when the word “paid” is there, it is not open to adding “deposited”, particularly when the scheme of the Act of 1894 also contains different provisions in section 31(1) with respect to tender is payment, while section 31(2)deals with deposit in the court; on non-deposit consequence in section 34, later is not a payment made to the landowner.

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The deposit is only in certain exigencies with a view to wiping off the liability of making payment of interest as provided in section 34. 41(a). While interpreting a statutory provision, no addition to, or subtraction from, the Act is permissible. It is not open to Court to either add or subtract, a word. The legal maxim “A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum” means: from the words of law, there must be no departure. The learned author in Interpretation of Statutes has referred to the Privy Council decision in Crawford v. Spooner, (1846) 6 Moore PC 1 and Lord Howard de Walden v. IRC, (1948) 2 AER 825 and other decisions of the Court and observed:

“…….(a) Avoiding addition or substitution of words

As stated by the Privy Council: “We cannot aid the Legislature’s defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction makeup deficiencies which are left there”. “It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so.” Similarly, it is wrong and dangerous to proceed by substituting some other words for words of the statute. Speaking briefly the court cannot reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate.

x xxxx

While interpreting section 621-A(1) of the Companies Act, 1956, the Supreme Court held that the Court must avoid rejection or addition of words and resort to that only in exceptional circumstances to achieve the purpose of the Act or to give a purposeful meaning to the section. Section 621-A provides for compounding, by the Company Law Board, of any offence punishable under the Act, not being an offence punishable with imprisonment only, or with imprisonment and also with fine, either before or after the institution of any prosecution. It was held that the Company Law Board has the power to compound such offences without the permission of the Court. Since the Legislature, in its wisdom, has not put the rider of prior permission in the section, addition of the words ‘with the prior permission of the court’ to the provision is not permissible.

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] Section 2(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which is in Part I of the Act, provides that ‘This Part shall apply where the place of arbitration is in India. In Bharat Aluminium Company v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court rejected the contention that Part I of the Act was also applicable to arbitrations seated in foreign countries on the ground that in such a case certain words would have to be added to section 2(2), which would then have to provide that ‘this part shall apply where the place of arbitration is in India and to arbitrations having its place out of India’. This would amount to a drastic and unwarranted rewriting or alteration of the language of section 2(2), and it is not permissible for the Court to reconstruct a statutory provision. In this case, the Constitution Bench prospectively overruled the decision of a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading SA, which had held that provisions of Part I would apply to international commercial arbitrations held outside India unless the parties, by agreement, express or implied, exclude all or any of its provisions.

x xxxx And, in construing section 14(f) of the U.P. Town Areas Act, 1914, which reads ‘A tax on persons assessed according to their circumstances and property not exceeding such rate and subject to such limitations and restrictions as may be prescribed’, the Supreme Court refused to read residence within the town area as a necessary part of the condition for imposition of the said tax. S.K. DAS, J. said, “To do so will be to read in clause (f) words which do not occur there”. Further, in interpreting section 6(a) and section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the Supreme Court refused to read a further exception in section 43 excluding its operation in cases of transfer of spessuccessionis. VENKATARAMA AIYER, J. quoted with approval the observations of LORD LOREBURN, L.C., “We are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself”.

x xxxx

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0n the same principle the House of Lords refused to read the word ‘satisfied’ in section 4 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 to mean ‘satisfied beyond reasonable doubt’. X xxxx

Sections 12(5) and 15(5) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, while providing that the Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners shall be persons of eminence in public life, with wide knowledge and experience in law, science, and technology, social science, management, journalism, mass media or administration and governance, do not further prescribe any basic qualification which such persons must have in the respective fields in which they work. As a result, the Court cannot read into the provisions of sections 12(5) and 15(5) of the Act the words that such persons must have a basic degree in their respective fields.’” (emphasis supplied) 41(b). This Court in Nali Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyamsunder Halder, AIR 1953 SC 148 at 152, State of Madhya Pradesh v. G.S. Dall and Flour Mills, AIR 1991 SC 772, State of Gujarat and Others v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel and Another (1998) 3 SCC 234, Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (2010) 10 SCC 744, Assessing Authority cum-Excise and Taxation Officer v. East India Cotton Mfg. Co. Ltd. (1981) 3 SCC 531, Paul Enterprises & Ors. v. Rajib Chatterjee & Co. & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 187, Sakshi v. Union of India (2004) 5 SCC 518, Commissioner of Income Tax, Kerala v. Tata Agencies (2007) 6 SCC 429, Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay AIR 1959 SC 459, S.P. Gupta v. President of India AIR 1982 SC 149, Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu (2001) 7 SCC 71, P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries AIR 1990 SC 933, Crawford v. Spooner (1846) 6 Moore PC 1, Royal Trust Company v. Minister of Finance AIR 1921 PC 184, Padma Sundara Rao (dead) & Ors. v. State of T. N. & Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 533 has observed that what legislation wanted has been stated in the provision. The court cannot give extended meaning to the expression. It is not open to the Court to aid defective phrasing of the Act or to make up for the deficiencies. It is not open to the Court to recast, rewrite, or reframe the provision. The court cannot assume omission and add or amend

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

words. Plain and unambiguous construction has to be given without addition and substitution of the words. The temptation of substituting words by explaining what it thought legislation is endeavoring is to be discouraged. Court has to consider what has been said and what has not been said. It is wrong and dangerous to proceed by substituting some other words for the words of the statute. When literal reading produces an intelligible result it is not open to read words or add words to statute. Making any generous addition to the language of the Act would not be a construction of the statutory provision; rather, would be an amendment thereof. While interpreting the provision the Court only interprets the law. The intention of the legislation must be found by the words used by the legislature itself. The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. When language of the provision is clear, there is no scope for reading something into it. The scenario that thus emerges in relation to an interpretationof a statute can be explained as follows. It is a salutary principle that it is not open to the Court to add or substitute some words in place of the words of the statute. The court cannot reframe the legislation. The court cannot add to, or amend, the provisions; neither can the expressions used in the statute be treated as fungible.

We need not add any word when Section 24(2) uses the expression “compensation has not been paid”. To complete the payment, we cannot read words into it to the effectthat deposit of payment in the court is payment to the landowners. It is clear that unless it is absolutely necessary to do so, it is not open to read the word “deposited” in court as part of ‘paid’ when payment is contemplated to the landowners. The consequence of nondeposit is culled out in proviso to section 24(2). It is not that section 31(2) would become meaningless. Hence, deposit cannot and need not be added to expressions paid/ tender. In case the legislature wanted the ‘deposit in Court’ to be included in ‘paid/ tender’, it could have easily said so. But it has used expressions differently, with different consequences. 42. What follows from the aforesaid enunciation is that the legislature has consciously omitted the expression “deposited” in main section 24(2), whereas, it is used in the proviso; both have different objectives. When the legislature has used different expressions with respect to past events — the word “paid” is used in a discernibly distinctive sense than the sense conveyed by the word “deposited” occurring in the

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proviso — both are required to be given different meanings. There is casus omissus, i.e. conscious omission made by the Legislature in main Section 24(2) when the expression “deposited” has not been used in the expression “has been paid”, and it is only after amount tendered is declined, it is to be deposited in Court that too in certain exigencies as per section 31(2). 43. The word “paid”, in view of the different consequences of paid and deposited, has to be given different meaning from “deposited”. Otherwise, if it were the case that ‘deposit’ is included in the ‘payment’, then there would have been no necessity of using two different expressions, in different provisions, carrying different consequences. Deposit made in the court cannot be said to be payment made to the landowner i.e. persons interested/beneficiaries. Thus, in case of deposit is directly made in the court without tender, it could not be said that it was tendered or paid. ‘Deposit in court’ simply is the discharge of Collector’s liability of making payment of interest as envisaged under section 34 of the 1894 Act, and no more; deposit in Court is not tender to landowner. Once the amount has been tendered and not accepted, obligation to pay is discharged, as envisaged under section 31(1); no penal consequences can follow and, the person who has refused to accept cannot be permitted to take an advantage of his own wrong, or in case his conduct is of filing litigations, delaying the passing of the award or obtaining stay of the proceedings; such action would tantamount to refusal to accept compensation, and the person then may not even be entitled to higher rate of interest as envisaged under section 34. 44. While making statutory interpretation, inconsistency and repugnancy is to be avoided and harmonious construction has to be adopted. The construction to be adopted should be such, as would make the statute as a whole, a consistent enactment. Such a construction would have the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy, either within a given section or as between a particular section on the one hand and other parts of the statute on the other. It is the duty of the courts to avoid “a head-on clash”, as held in Raj Krushna v. Binod Kanungo, AIR 1954 SC 202, at 203; Sultana Begum v. Premchand Jain, AIR 1997 SC 1006, at page 1109; Kailash Chandra v. Mukundi Lal, (2002) 2 SCC 67; and, CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57, at p.74.

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

45. When we apply the rule of harmonious construction to the provisions of section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, i.e. as between the main part of the section and its proviso, the word “paid” occurring in the main part, has to be construed differently (with a different meaning being given to it) from the word “deposited” occurring in the proviso; otherwise, inconsistency and repugnancy would be the result of the provision contained in section 24 (2) as a whole; and, that is what has to be avoided. As discussed, the provisions would be irreconcilable, and an anomalous result would be occasioned.

46. This Court, in Balasinor Nagrik Cooperative Bank Limited vs. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya, (1987) 1 SCC 606, held that a section is to be interpreted by reading all its parts altogether, and it is not permissible to omit any part thereof. Thus, in the instant case, proviso to Section 24(2) cannot be ignored while interpreting the main subsection.

47. The proviso is enacted as part of section 24(2); it is not an independent provision and applies to an acquisition made five years or before, in which amount, with respect to majority of holdings, has not been deposited in court. There has to be harmonized construction of provision of section 24(2).

48. Since there is no ambiguity of drafting in the provisions contained in section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, so also none is there in those contained in sections 31(1) and 31(2) of the Act of 1894. Thus, in discharging its interpretative function, to exercise the power to correct obvious drafting errors that can be done only in suitable cases where there is error of drafting. Before adding the word or omitting a word the court has to consider 3 matters : (1) the intended purpose of the statute or the provision in question, (2) that by inadvertence the draftsman and Parliament failed to give effect to that purpose in the provision in question, and (3) substance of the provision Parliament would have made, although not necessarily the precise words Parliament would have used, had the error in the Bill been noticed. As observed in Inco Europe Ltd. v. First Choice Distribution (a firm) by the House of Lords in (2000) 2 All ER 109 at 115. There is no accidental omission as to the concept of payment in section 24(2) or section 31(1) of the aforesaid Acts. Thus, it is not permissible to supply the word “deposited” to include in the expression “payment”.

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49(a). Rule of literal construction lays down that words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases, and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning. The learned author G.P. Singh, in “Principles of Statutory Interpretation” (14th edition), at Page 91 onwards, has observed:

“……..Natural and grammatical meaning. The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary.” “The true way”, according to LORD BROUGHAM is, “to take the words as the Legislature have given them, and to take the meaning which the words given naturally imply, unless where the construction of those Words is, either by the preamble or by the context of the words in question, controlled or alter “; and in the words of VISCOUNT HALDANE, L.C., if the language used “has a natural meaning we cannot depart from that meaning unless reading the statute as a whole, the context directs us to do so. In an oft-quoted passage, LORD WENSLEYDALE stated the rule thus: “In construing wills and indeed statutes and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the word is adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity, and inconsistency, but no further”. And stated LORD ATKINSON: “In the construction of statutes, their words must be interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense unless there be something in the context, or in the object of the statute in which they occur or in the circumstances in which they are used, to show that they were used in a special sense different from their ordinary grammatical sense”.28 VISCOUNT SIMON, L.C., said: “The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning”. Natural and ordinary meaning of words should not be departed from “unless it can be shown that the legal context in which the words are used requires a different meaning”. Such a meaning cannot be departed from by the judges “in the light of their own views as to policy” although they can “adopt a purposive

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] interpretation if they can find in the statute read as a whole or in material to which they are permitted by law to refer as aids to interpretation an expression of Parliament’s purpose or policy”. For a modern statement of the rule, one may refer to the speech of LORD SIMON OF GLAISDALE in a case where he said: “Parliament is prima facie to be credited with meaning what is said in an Act of Parliament. The drafting of statutes, so important to a people who hope to live under the rule of law, will never be satisfactory unless courts seek whenever possible to apply ‘the golden rule’ of construction, that is to read the statutory language, grammatically and terminologically, in the ordinary and primary sense which it bears in its context, without omission or addition. Of course, Parliament is to be credited with good sense; so that when such an approach produces injustice, absurdity, contradiction or stultification of statutory objective the language may be modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage, though no further”. The rules stated above have been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court…….”

(emphasis supplied) 49(b). This Court, in Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India, AIR 2002 SC 1351, at 1354 has observed thus : “Legislature does not waste its words. Ordinary, grammatical and full meaning is to be assigned to the words used while interpreting a provision to honour the rule — Legislature chooses appropriate words to express what it intends, and therefore, must be attributed with such intention as is conveyed by the words employed so long as this does not result in absurdity or anomaly or unless material — intrinsic or external — is available to permit a departure from the rule.” (emphasis supplied) 50. Thus, in the instant case, when we give the plain, natural and grammatical meaning to the word ‘paid’/ ‘tender’, which has been used in contradistinction to the words “deposited in court”, it is clear that tendering payment would not include deposit in court, in that it is only when payment is refused, that the same is deposited in court; obligation to pay is over as soon as amount is tendered and refused. 51(a) When two different expressions have been used in the same provision of a statute, there is a presumption that they are not used in the

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same sense. In this regard, G.P. Singh, in his treatise Interpretation of Statutes (14th Edition) at page 395, has observed thus: “…….When in relation to the same subject matter, different words are used in the same statute, there is a presumption that they are not used in the same sense.

In construing the words ‘distinct matters’ occurring in section 5 of the Stamp Act, 1899, and in concluding that these words have not the same meaning as the words ‘two or more of the descriptions in Schedule I’ occurring in section 6, VENKATARAMA AIYAR, J., observed: “When two words of different import are used in a statute in two consecutive provisions, it would be difficult to maintain that they are used in the same sense.” Similarly, while construing the word ‘gain’ under Section 3(ff) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, which used the words ‘profit or gain’, the Supreme Court relied on the dictionary meanings of the words to hold that the word ‘gain’ is not synonymous with the word ‘profit’ as it is not restricted to pecuniary or commercial profits, and that any advantage or benefit acquired or value addition made by some activities would amount to ‘gain’…….” ***14. Brighton Parish Guardians v. Strand Union Guardians, (1891) 2 QB 156, p. 167 (CA); Member, Board of Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall, AIR 1956 SC 35, p. 38: 1955 (2) SCR 842; CIT v. East West Import & Export (P.) Ltd., Jaipur, AIR 1989 SC 836, p.838 : (1989) 1 SCC 760; B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P., AIR 1999 SC 1867, p.1902 : (1999) 9 SCC 700 (‘trade and business’ in Article 298 have different meaning from ‘trade and commerce’ in Article 301); ShriIshal Alloy Steels Ltd. v. JayaswalasNeco Ltd., JT 2001 (3) SC 114, p. 119 : (2001) 3 SCC 609 : AIR 2001 SC 1161 (The words ‘a bank’ and ‘the bank’ in section 138 N.I. Act, 1881 do not have the same meaning); The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai v. Kodala, AIR 2001 SC 1832, p. 1842 : (2001) 5 SCC 175; KailashNathAgarwal v. PradeshiyaIndust and Inv. Corp. of U.P., 2003 AIR SCW 1358, p. 1365 : (2003) 4 SCC 305, p. 313. (The words ‘proceeding’ and ‘suit’ used in the same section construed differently); But in Paramjeet Singh Pathak v. ICDS Ltd, (2006) 13 SCC 322 : AIR 2007 SC 168 different view was taken therefore in Zenith Steel Tubes v. Sicom Ltd, (2008) 1 SCC 533 : AIR 2008 SC 451 case referred to a larger Bench;

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

D.L.F. Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana, 2003 AIR SCW 1046, p. 1057: AIR 2003 SC 1648: (2003) 5 SCC 622 (The expressions ‘at his own cost’ and ‘at its cost’, used in one section given different meanings)” (emphasis supplied)

51(b). The author has referred to the decisions in Brighton Parish Guardians v. Strand Union Guardians, 1891 QB 156, Member, Board of Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall, AIR 1956 SC 35 at p.38, and CIT v. East West Import & Export (P) Ltd., Jaipur, (1989) 1 SCC 760, in that case this Court has observed :

“7. The Explanation has reference to the point of time at two places: the first one has been stated as “at the end of the previous year” and the second, which is in issue, is “in the course of such previous year”. Counsel for the Revenue has emphasised upon the feature that in the same Explanation reference to time has been expressed differently and if the legislative intention was not to distinguish and while stating “in the course of such previous year” it was intended the convey the idea of the last day of the previous year, there would have been no necessity of expressing the position differently. There is abundant authority to support the stand of the counsel for the Revenue that when the situation has been differently expressed the legislature must be taken to have intended to express a different intention.”

(emphasis supplied)” 51(c). In Kailash Nath Agarwal v. Pradeshiya Industries and Investment Corporation of Uttar Pradesh, (2003) 4 SCC 305, Tejmohammed Hussainkhan Pathan v. V.J. Raghuvanshi, 1993 supp. (2) SCC 493, D.L.F. Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana, (2003) 5 SCC 622, Pallawi Resources Ltd. v. Protos Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd., (2010) 5 SCC 196, Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay, (2002) 4 SCC 297, B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P., AIR 1999 SC 1867, ShriIshar Alloy Steels Ltd. v. Jayaswals Neco Ltd., (2001) 3 SCC 609, Labour Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh vs. Burhanpur Tapti Mills and Ors. AIR 1964 SC 1687 this Court has observed that as a general rule when two different words are used by statute prima facie one has to construe different words as carrying different meanings. Rule of ‘purposive

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constructions’ would be resorted to only when the statute to observe or when read literally it leads to manifest injustice or absurdity. The Court has to keep in mind that the provision enacted by the legislature in a certain manner as had intended. Different words are used in different senses.

51(d) The aforesaid principles of statutory construction, different words to be given different meaning as also the binding precedents of this Court, indicate that the expression ‘deposited’ cannot be added to ‘tender’ / ‘paid’, both carry different consequences under section 24, tender on lapse of acquisition/non-deposit higher interest under section 34 of the Act of 1894.

51(e). It is a settled proposition of law that when two different expressions have been used in section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, as well as in section 31 of the Act of 1894, i.e. “paid to the landowners” and “deposited in the court”, they both carry different meanings, and have to be interpreted as used in the respective contexts. It is not the expression used that deposit in the court is payment to landowners, neither it is used that amount deposited in the treasury is the payment to the landowners. The payment indicates the obligation to pay; and, deposit is made in the court or revenue treasury only upon happening of various exigencies as provided in Section 31, and there can be several other exigencies which are not covered under section 31(2) of the Act of 1894 and in the statutory rules/orders. 52. In section 24 of the Act of 2013, brooks no lethargy on the part of authorities, the expression “possession of the land has not been taken” indicates a failure on the part of authorities to take for five years or more. 53. When we consider the intendment of the beneficial provisions of the Act of 2013, it addresses the concern of farmers and of those whose livelihood is dependent upon the land being acquired, while at the same time facilitating land acquisition for myriad reasons, including urbanization, rural electrification et al., in a timely and transparent manner. The legislature has not brook the delay of five years or more on part of authorities in completing the acquisition. When it says ‘timely’,it would mean without delay on the part of authorities, not delay due to dilatory tactics and conduct of land owners/interested persons.

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

EFFECT OF RULES FRAMED UNDER SECTION 55 OF 1894 ACT AND ORDERS ISSUED BY STATE GOVERNMENTS

54. There are various State rules framed under section 55 of the Act of 1894 by various State Governments as well as there are instructions issued with respect to dealing with Government money as provided in Article 283 of the Constitution of India, and when it is the Government money it has to be dealt with in accordance with the instructions issued by the State Government from time to time. There are other Financial Codes/Rules/orders issued time to time by various State Governments with respect to dealing with Government money. The Land Acquisition (Bihar and Orissa) Rules were framed under the Act of 1894 and Rule 10 thereof provided thus : “10. In giving notice of the award under section 12(2) and tendering payment under section 31(1), to such of the persons interested as were not present personally or by their representatives when the award was made, the officer shall require them to appear personally or by representatives by a certain date to receive payment of the compensation awarded to them, intimating also that no interest will be allowed to them if they fail to appear. If they do not appear, and do not apply for reference to the Civil Court under section 18, the officer shall after any further endeavour to secure their attendance that may seem desirable, cause the amounts due to be paid into the Treasury as Revenue deposits payable to the persons to whom they are respectively due and vouched for in the accompanying form (marked E). The officer shall also give notice to the payees of such deposits, the Treasury in which the deposits specifying have been made. When the payees ultimately claim payment of sums placed in deposit, the amounts will be paid to them in the same manner as ordinary revenue deposits. The officer should, as far as possible, arrange to make the payments due in or near the village to which the payees belong, in order that the number of undisbursed sums to be placed in deposit on account of non-attendance may be reduced to a minimum. Whenever payment is claimed through a representative whether before or after deposit of the amount awarded, such representative, must show legal authority for receiving the compensation on behalf of his principal.” (emphasis supplied)

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55. The Karnataka Land Acquisition Rules 1965 were also framed under section 55 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Similarly in the State of Kerala Rule 14(2) of the Land Acquisition (Kerala) Rules, 1990 were framed under section 55 of the Act of 1894 provided that the payment relating to an award shall be made or the amount credited to the court or Revenue deposit (Treasury) within one month from the date of award. 56. The state of Assam has also framed the rules dealing with deposit in exercise of power under Section 55 of the Act of 1894. Rule 9 whereof provides that on failure to collect the compensation if landowner/interested person does not appear, and do not apply for a reference to the civil court under section 18, the Collector shall after making endeavour to secure their attendance or make payment that may seem desirable, cause the amounts due to be paid into the Treasury as revenue deposits payable to the persons to whom they are respectively due, and vouched for in the form prescribed or approved by Government from time to time. He shall also give notice to the payee of such deposits, specifying the Treasury in which the deposits have been made. When no reference is sought for amount has to be deposited in treasury only. Rule 9 of Assam Rules is extracted hereunder: “9. In giving notice of the award under section 12(2) and tendering payment under section 31(1), to such of the persons interested as were not present personally or by their representatives when the award was made, the Collector shall require them to appear personally or by representatives by a certain date, to receive payment of the compensation awarded to them intimating also that no interest will be allowed to them, if they fail to appear. If they do not appear and do not apply for a reference to the Civil Court under section 18, he shall, after any further endeavour to secure their attendance or make payment that may seem desirable, cause the amounts due to be paid into the WW as revenue deposits payable to the persons to whom they are respectively due, and vouched for in the form prescribed or approved by Government from time to time. He shall also give notice to the payees of such deposits, specifying the Treasury in which the deposits have been made. When the payees ultimately claim payment of sums placed in deposit, the amount will be paid to them in the same manner as ordinary revenue deposits. The Collector should, as far as possible, arrange to make the payment due in or near the village to which

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

the land pertains in order that the number of undisbursed sum to be placed in deposit on account of nonattendance may be reduced to a minimum. Whenever payment is claimed through a representative, such representative, must show legal authority for receiving the compensation on behalf of the principal.”

(emphasis supplied)

57. Identical is the rule for Bihar and Orissa. Similar instructions have been issued by the other State Government so as to deal with public money. They have the force of law. The duty of the court is to harmonize rules with provision of Act. In State of West Bengal also similar rules had been framed under section 55 of the Act of 1894.

58. Standing Order No.28 issued in 1909 the State of Punjab is applicable to Delhi also, provides 5 modes of payment in Para 74 and 75 based on Government of India’s orders, which are extracted hereunder: “74. Methods of making payments-There are five methods of making payments:

(1) By direct payments, see paragraph 75(I) infra (2) By order on treasury, see paragraph 75(II) infra (3) By Money Order, see paragraph 75(III) infra (4) By cheque, see paragraph 75(IV) infra

(5) By deposit in a treasury, see paragraph 75(V) infra 75. Direct payments (V) By treasury deposit-In giving notice of the award Under Section 12(2) and tendering payment Under Section 31(1) to such of the persons interested as were not present personally or by their representatives when the award was made, the officer shall require them to appear personally or by representatives by a certain date to receive payment of the compensation awarded to them, intimating also that no interest will be allowed to them if they fail to appear, if they do not appear and do not apply for a reference to the civil court Under Section 18, the officer shall after any further endeavours to secure their attendance that may seem desirable, cause the amounts due to be paid to the treasury as revenue deposited payable to the persons to whom they are

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respectively due and vouched for in the Form marked E below. The officer shall also give notice to the payees of such deposits, specifying the treasury in which the deposit has been made. When then payees ultimately claim payment of sums placed in deposit, the amounts will be paid to them in the same manner as ordinary revenue deposit. The officer should, as far as possible, arrange to make the payments due in or near the village to which the payee belong in order that the number of un-disbursed sums to be placed in deposits on account of non-attendance may be reduced to a minimum. Whenever payment is claimed through a representative whether before or after deposit of the amount awarded, such representative, must have legal authority for receiving the compensation on behalf of his principal.”

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

59. In Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh & Ors. (2016) 16 SCC 258. This court with respect to mode under section 31(1) has held:

“18. Para 73 makes it clear that payment may be accepted either without protest or under protest, and Paragraph 74 makes it clear that there are five methods of making payment. The first four methods are all methods strictly in consonance with Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act in that they are all direct payments that have to be made to persons ready to accept compensation. This is clear from a reading of sub-paragraphs (I) to (IV) of paragraph 74. Even the second method, which is payment by order on the treasury, is a direct method of payment in cases where no officer is specially deputed for acquisition of land. In such cases instead of making a direct payment, a receipt is countersigned making it immediately payable at the treasury to the payee. Otherwise, in certain circumstances, payment is to be made by money order and/or by cheque. When we come to paragraph (V), it is clear that payment is made into the treasury only when persons who are served notice Under Section 12(2) are not present personally at the time the award is delivered. Even though they may not appear at that stage, the officer shall require them to appear personally or by representatives by a certain date to receive payment of compensation awarded. It is only if they fail to appear after such an intimation, and if the officer, after further endeavours to secure their attendance, cannot so secure their attendance, that amounts due are to be paid to the treasury as revenue deposited payable to persons to whom they are due. It is clear, therefore, that sub-para (V), when read in its proper perspective, is not a separate mode of payment by itself as is contended by learned Counsel for the Appellants. It is a residuary mode of payment after all necessary efforts have been made by the authorities to secure the attendance of the persons entitled to compensation, and it is only after all such methods have failed that, as a last resort, the money is then to be deposited in the treasury. In any case, such deposit in the treasury is referable only to Section 31(1) and cannot ever be a substitute for deposit before the reference court as provided Under Section 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, which applies in the circumstances mentioned in the aforesaid Sub-section.

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We agree with aforesaid part of Sukhbir Singh (supra) related to section 31(1), however, not with respect to part relating section 31(2). 60. It is apparent from rules that when no reference is sought on refusal to accept, amount is to be deposited in treasury. Rules have to be harmonized with the provision in the Act, thus, it would be necessary to deposit in court when reference is sought. Thus, under section 31(2) provision of deposit in court on refusal would be attracted, when reference had been sought, as provided in rules. Section 31(2) does not come in play at all in cases of refusal to accept amount when reference has not been sought and deposit in treasury would be valid deposit even otherwise where reference is sought and person refuses to accept it only liability of non-compliance of deposit in Court would be higher interest under section 34. 61. Though as per subsection (2) of section 31 in the certain exigencies the amount has to be deposited in court where the reference would be made, it does not cover the entire situation when it is not possible to disburse the compensation and deposit in treasury has to be made as per rules and if not deposited in Court at the most would be merely a procedural irregularity and the maximum liability would be as envisaged under section 34 of Act of 1894 in case it has not been “tendered”. Due to non deposit at the most it could be said that amount could not be invested in Government security etc. under section 32 or 33 of Act of 1894. In such securities the interest is not more than 15 % as such. 62. Moreover, the proviso to section 24(2) which prescribes amount to be deposited with respect to ‘majority of holding’, in the account of beneficiaries, it is not provided that such amount has to be deposited in court. Section 31 of the Act of 1894 does not deal with the deposit of the amount with respect to “the majority of holdings” in the court in the account of landowners. Section 31(2) of the Act of 1894 only contemplates certain exigencies i.e. (1) refusal to accept, and reference is sought (2) incompetence to alienate the land, (3) there is dispute as to entitlement or (4) apportionment and authority decides not to disburse compensation in later two exigencies. In such cases, it has to be deposited in court. It is not necessary to make tender of amount of compensation under Section 31(1) in the 3 latter exigencies provided in section 31(2) itself. The proviso to section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not envisage any of the exigencies as contemplated under section 31(2) it clearly deals with deposit of money before the Land Acquisition Collector or in

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

the treasury with respect to “majority of the holding” as the State/authority who is acquiring the land or has acquired it, must have arrangement to pay the money to the landowners and in case such money has not been deposited with the Land Acquisition Collector or with the treasury or in any other permissible mode consequence enumerated in proviso to follow, regarding payment of higher compensation under the Act of 2013 to all land holders. In the Treasury also separate accounts are opened of the landowners and money is kept in such separate accounts. As is apparent from the standing order 28 of Punjab and the rules framed under section 55 of Act of 1894 by various State Governments in case the amount has been deposited as per the proviso to section 24(2) in the treasury or with the Land Acquisition Collector with respect to majority of the holding the provisions contained in proviso to section 24(2), in our opinion, would be fully complied with.

63. A perusal of Section 24(2)of the Act of 2013 shows that the expression ‘paid’ does not include deposit in it. The expression ‘deposit’ would include deposit in terms of the rules also. Section 24(2) does not, in any manner, lay down that the amount cannot be said to have been ‘deposited’ even when a deposit is made in terms of the mandatory rules, or in accordance with the applicable instructions. ‘Deposit-intreasury’ is stipulated under the rules made with reference to a constitutional provision, so also framed under Section 55 of the 1894 Act, as well as under other statutory or administrative powers. The deposit in treasury is not, in any manner, invalid. If the deposit is valid, there is no reason to hold that the said deposit has to be ignored. Government finances, after all, have to be handled as per the applicable rules. The deposit in treasury was as per binding procedural rules/orders issued by Government of India and/or in exercise of the powers under Article 283 of the Constitution of India.

PRACTICAL DIFFICULTY ON REFUSAL/NON ACCEPTANCE OF COMPENSATION BY CONDUCT, PRACTICE AND LEGAL POSITION UNDER ACT OF 1894. 64. One mode of refusal to acceptance of compensation is when it is tendered, it is refused. Another mode is of filing a litigation to question the very land acquisition, filing application for an interim stay and contesting it for decades reflects clear conduct of nonacceptance of acquisition/ compensation. State authorities cannot retain the money in their own hands in such circumstances and are bound to deposit the Government

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money where it is supposed to be i.e. in the treasury as provided in rules. Thus, by conduct also, there can be non-acceptance of compensation. Once compensation is accepted, right to challenge acquisition would vanish. State authorities are not expected to retain the money with them and run after the landowners and match with their dilatory tactics with vigil to find out that one ultimate day, the litigation would attain finality. Once by their conduct, there is refusal to accept the land acquisition itself, much less compensation, in such circumstances such landowners have to inform the authorities about the outcome of the litigation and in case they have lost, to ask for compensation. Authorities are not supposed to be on vigil so as to ascertain after lapse of so much time even after decades in new generation, who has received the compensation and who has not received the compensation. There is no such data readily available to them. Thus once by conduct, such landowners refuse to accept the land acquisition/compensation, so as to saddle liability on authority, they have to inform the outcome/ willingness to the concerned authorities to apply for payment and to show their readiness to accept. Same would be the position in case amount is deposited in court. They have to apply for its withdrawal. The obligation of authorities is at initial stage. At subsequent stage, unless and until there is willingness shown by landowners/interested persons to accept the compensation, authorities cannot presume that they would accept it and that landowners are not going to question acquisition in the higher forum and it is not open to the authorities to offer to them compensation time and again, once amount is deposited in treasury during the pendency of litigation. In case of landowner interdict, initial offer/ tender by refusal or otherwise by questioning the land acquisition itself would mean they do not want to accept the compensation, is reflected by their conduct in the litigation. In case of interim stay also authorities cannot offer the compensation as that would tantamount to violation of court’s order and after interim stay ceases to operate, it is for the landowners to apprise the authorities of their intention not to take the litigation further and their willingness to accept compensation. Section 24(2) does not provide cover to such litigation. The intent of 2013 Act has been discussed in DDA v. Sukhbir Singh (supra) thus: “13. The picture that therefore emerges on a reading of Section 24(2) is that the State has no business to expropriate from a citizen his property if an award has been made and the necessary steps to complete acquisition have not been taken for a period of five

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.] years or more. These steps include the taking of physical possession of land and payment of compensation. What the legislature is in effect telling the executive is that they ought to have put their house in order and completed the acquisition proceedings within a reasonable time after pronouncement of award. Not having done so even after a leeway of five years is given, would cross the limits of legislative tolerance, after which the whole proceeding would be deemed to have lapsed. It is important to notice that the Section gets attracted if the acquisition proceeding is not completed within five years after pronouncement of the award.” The intent is that authority to complete acquisition within five years, the legislature frowns upon delay of more than five years. 65. In case it is held in spite of refusal to receive payment, it is necessary to deposit in Court, most of the acquisition would lapse. The acquisition of Raisina Hills in Lutyen’s zone of Delhi made in 1913 was questioned in said case but this Court never intended such misuse of the provision. There is no dearth of ingenuity left in misusing the provisions of section 24 of the 2013 Act whereas it is meant to beneficial legislation. Its intention is to resettle the incumbents to offer better compensation as compared to the 1894 Act. In the various ways, the provision has been sought to be blatantly misused. The law never envisages such absurd results as is being sought to be achieved. The beneficial provisions of 2013 Act are put to misuse that tantamounts to grossest abuse of the provisions of law to reopen such acquisitions and court has to thwart all such attempts at threshold and not to receive such cases even for consideration for a moment. We see development has taken place in the area that has been acquired, there have been several rounds of litigation which have been lost by landowners even up to this Court; thereafter some persons are filing cases on the basis of power of attorneys or sale deeds which are not permissible after land has vested in the State and purchase after issuance of notification under section 4 is illegal and void and no such right is given to such incumbents to re-open the whole gamut of issues and to even contend that acquisition has lapsed under the provisions of the 2013 Act. 66. The law as prevailed under the Act of 1894 never invalidated any land acquisition in the absence of amount being deposited in court since the time immemorial in most cases where reference is not sought, amount had been invariably deposited in the Treasury as provided in

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statutory rules framed under section 55 of Act of 1894 and other standing order issued by State Governments, and there were decisions of this Court which have simply laid down that in case landowner is not responsible for delay in payment, at the most he may be entitled to interest on such amount, in case it has not been tendered/paid to him when possession has been taken. Similar provisions are made under sections 77 and 80 of the Act of 2013. All of a sudden it would not be appropriate considering the statutory rules which have been framed under section 55 of the Act of 1894 and order to invalidate all such land acquisitions which have taken place in various States in the country by laying down that once amount has not been deposited in the court but in treasury, acquisitions would lapse under section 24. It will be a very harsh operation of law as old Act never provided for such a consequence since 1894 the Act was enacted till new 2013 Act came into force. Same is not consequence in case acquisition is made under Act of 2013 is apparent from conjoint reading of sections 77 and 80 thereof. When there were such anomalous situation, the statutory rules and statutory orders issued by various State Governments dealing how the Government money has to be dealt with, it would not be appropriate to unsettle the legal position. The 1894 Act never contemplated such result and by and large, it was not the practice to deposit in court. Only in those cases the amount used to be deposited in court, where reference was sought under sections 18 or 30, as provided under rules also and there was dispute as to person entitled to it or apportionment thereof between the claimants. Primarily it is for the Land Acquisition Collector to distribute the compensation and poor farmers are not supposed to know the court and place where the reference would be made, if it was not sought person would not know a place where it would not be submitted to court, the question of deposit in court would not arise. The court is not disbursing authority of compensation when reference is not sought. Farmers/ claimants are primarily concerned with the Land Acquisition Collector and for more than one century this procedure of deposit in treasury was prevailing and by and large amounts had been deposited in the treasury only and thus it would not be appropriate to make the operation of law to be such as to invalidate land acquisition when deposit is made in Treasury. Such an interpretation is not permissible as per the intendment of the Act of 2013. Though it is a beneficial law to benefit the incumbents it cannot be interpreted to be a law which would be to invalidate concluded transaction as per prevailing law and divest the land which has vested in State,

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

development has taken place, possession taken, awards passed, after litigation/several rounds of litigation lost and then land cannot be ordered to revert back. The law does not intend that effect, as it may be termed as arbitrary and beyond legislative competence. We have to prevent the misuse of provisions and avoid anomalous results.

67. The court has to be cautious and duty-bound to prevent such misuse of the provisions of law and to make the purposive interpretation, considering the experience and after-effect of decisions. At the same time we have to forward the intendment and spirit of the provisions of the Act of 2013 to benefit farmers, at the same time, not to thwart the entire development which has taken place or to burden the Exchequer with such liability which is not contemplated in the Act of 2013 and invalidate acquisitions that have taken place in 1912, 1950s and 1960s onwards and have attained finality, as are sought to be reopened under the guise of 2013 Act taking advantage of the aforesaid technical aspect. Courts are duty-bound to thwart all such attempts as the land which has been acquired long back, it would not be possible to make payment of compensation as of the rate as provided in the Act of 2013 to undeserving persons at the cost of public revenue, and it would not be appropriate to interpret the provisions in such a manner to entertain stale and dead claims and to revive them on the ground of technical and procedural defaults, if any, and created by landowners conduct. The intendment of section 24 is that acquisition to be completed early. If authorities for no good cause fail to take steps for five years or more on their own the lapse of acquisition under section 24 to follow.

68. It would be appropriate to refer to maxim - “Omnis Innovatio Plus Novitate Perturbat Quam Utilitate Prodest” i.e. ‘Every innovation made has to be, ultimately, adjudged from stand point of the events that follow it’; and, when we consider the after-effects of the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), the fact leaps out at us that, there being no dearth of unyielding ‘talent’ in this regard, tenacious efforts are being made at mis-utilizing the dictum contained in the said decision, by finding out ever newer and innovative methods to do so.

PREJUDICE DUE TO NON-DEPOSIT IN COURT 69. Yet another aspect arises, as to, what prejudice or injustice would be caused in case the amount is not deposited in the court and is deposited in the treasury particularly when the provision contained in

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section 31 of the Act of 1894 has to be read conjointly with those in section 34. As per the provisions contained in section 34, a person can claim the interest in case amount is not deposited as envisaged under section 31(2) if authorities are at fault. Even assuming that amount is required to be deposited only in the court where reference would be made and deposit in the treasury is not a permissible mode of deposit, as per the mode prescribed by law in section 31(2) of the Act of 1894. It is trite law that in the given situation unless aggrieved party makes out a case of prejudice and injustice, every infraction of law would not vitiate the act. This court in Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa (1969) 3 SCC 392 observed:

“5. From this material, it is argued that the principles of natural Justice were violated because the right of the appellant to have his own evidence recorded was denied to him and further that the material which was gathered behind his back was used in determining his guilt.

In support of these contentions, a number of rulings are cited chief among which are State of Bombay v. NurulLatif Khan 1966 2 L.L.J.595 State of Uttar Pradesh and another v. C.S. Sharma 1969 1 L.L.J. 509 and Union of India v. T.R. Varma 1958 2L.L.J.259

There is no doubt that if the principles of natural Justice are violated and there is a gross case, this Court would interfere by striking down the order of dismissal; but there are cases and cases. We have to look to what actual prejudice has been caused to a person by the supposed denial to him of a particular right.”

70. In Sunil Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal, (1980) 3 SCC 304, it was observed: “3. ......It may be noticed straightaway that this provision is akin to Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 and Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1974. It is now well established that mere non-examination or defective examination Under Section 342 of the 1898 Code is not a ground for interference unless prejudice is established, vide, K.C. Mathew v. State of Travancore-Cochin 1956 CriLJ 444, Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta and Anr. v. State of West Bengal 1969 CriLJ 654......”

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Similar view of the matter is taken in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Thakkidiram Reddy, (1998) 6 SCC 554; Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 116; Abdul Sayeed v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 10 SCC 259; State of Punjab v. DavinderPal Singh Bhullar, AIR 2012 SC 364; and Bahamans v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 9 SCC 650.

CONSEQUENCE OF NOT DEPOSITING THE AMOUNT UNDER SECTION 31 OF THE 1894 ACT : 71. The expression used in section 31 is not “paid”, it is only “tender payment” and there is obligation to pay compensation unless prevented by a cause under sub-section (2) of section 31. In case there is dispute as to person entitled to compensation or its apportionment in between person interested or person was not even competent to make alienation of property that has been acquired it would not be necessary to tender amount as it may not be so done due to said exigencies as authority may decide not to pay it till court orders then it is to be deposited in court to save further liability of exorbitant interest under section 34 of the Act of 1894. Collector need not tender the payment invariably. It can be deposited in the court in the exigencies as provided in section 31(2). Apart from that section 31(2) does not cover all the exigencies and it does not require that invariably the compensation has to be deposited with the court. it is only when reference is sought that reference court comes to picture not otherwise as provided in rules/ orders in case person refuses and seeks a reference to court it has to be deposited in court where reference would be submitted otherwise as provided in the rules it has to be deposited in treasury. It is only when court comes into play then deposit in reference court is required in exigencies of section 31(2) read with 32 as provided in rules. Even section 31(2) comes into play to “tender payment” is obligatory provision. Tender of payment is complete when it is made unconditionally available it could not have been equated with the deposit in court under section 31(2) or 24(2) of old and new Acts respectively as these are two different exigencies and consequence of non-payment of compensation is clearly culled out in section 34. There is a liability for payment of interest. This court in Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh & Ors. [(2016) 16 SCC 258], has considered modes of payment in section 31(1) and has held in Para 18 quoted above that deposit in the treasury is residuary mode of payment under section 31(1) of Act of 1894.

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72. This court has considered the question of effect of non-deposit in Hissar Improvement v. Smt. Rukmani Devi & Anr., AIR 1990 SC 2033 and observed that in case of compensation is not being paid or deposited in time in court before taking possession of the land, Collector has to deposit the amount awarded in section 31 failing which he is liable to pay interest as provided in section 34. The Court has observed: “5. It cannot be gainsaid that interest is due and payable to the landowner in the event of the compensation not being paid or deposited in time in court. Before taking possession of the land, the Collector has to pay or deposit the amount awarded, as stated in Section 31, failing which he is liable to pay interest as provided in Section 34. 6. In the circumstances, the High Court was right in stating that interest was due and payable to the landowner. The High Court was justified in directing the necessary parties to appear in the executing court for determination of the amount.” 73. In Kishan Das & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1995) 6 SCC 240 this Court has laid down that in case the landowners have themselves delayed in disposal of acquisition proceedings, cannot claim higher rate of interest as that would amount to payment of premium for dilatory tactics. Even the interest under section 34 cannot be claimed as a matter of right. In case a person is indulging in litigation for adopting dilatory tactics, no divesting of land is provided under the Act of 1894 in case it is not deposited in court. Neither it is so provided in section 24(1) of the 2013 Act. The obligation to pay is discharged as soon as it is tendered unconditionally and made available to the landowners. Thereafter there is no further obligation to deposit it in court so as to save the acquisition. Only to save acquiring body from liability to pay interest at exorbitant rates, it may be deposited in court in certain cases where reference court comes into picture to discharge obligation by State but deposit in Court would not be payment to landowners. In case there is failure on the part of the State authorities in depositing the compensation in court in the given exigencies then only the provisions of section 34 would be attracted and it would be then for the court to examine in each case whether it would make order for the higher rate of interest and examine if it was due to failure of the State authorities and in case possession has been taken then liability may arise to make payment of interest it cannot

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

be premium for dilatory tactics of landowners that they can claim even higher rate of interest.

74. In Seshan & Ors. v. Special Tehsildar & Land Acquisition Officer, SPICOT, Pudukkottai (1996) 8 SCC 89 this Court laid down that in case compensation is not deposited after expiry of one year, the provisions of section 34 would be attracted so as to claim the interest @ 15%, it shall be interest payable on compensation not paid or deposited after expiry of one year, and 9% for first year both from the date of taking possession till date of payment or deposit in court.

75. In D Block Ashok Nagar (Sahibabad) Plot Holders’ Association (Regd.) v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1997) 10 SCC 77, this Court has held that liability to pay interest under section 34 arises from the date of taking possession.

76. Thus, when the Act of 1894 provides the consequence of non-deposit in the in Court. In our opinion deposit in Treasury is permissible mode of deposit under the proviso to section 24(2) and within the purview of main section 24(2), the word “paid” could not have been taken to include the “deposit”, it is contemplated in proviso only, and in case with respect to the “majority of holding” the amount is not deposited in the account of beneficiary/landowner in case award has been passed before five year or more then acquisition would not lapse however all beneficiary/landowners would become entitled to higher compensation as provided in the Act of 2013. The expression “deposited in the account of landowners” would not mean deposited in the court as envisaged in Section 31(2) of the old Act, action as permissible as per the financial instructions having statutory or administrative orders having force of law as well as under the Rules framed by various State Governments in exercise of power under section 55 of Act of 1894 can always be taken. In various States, Financial Code/Order/Rules deals with Government money and as such amount is required to be deposited in the Treasury by opening separate accounts of landowners/beneficiaries/claimants that would be full compliance of the proviso of section 24(2) of new Act. In Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh & Ors. also, this court has rightly held that deposit in treasury by Land Acquisition Collector is permissible mode of deposit under section 31(1).

77. In Mahavir & Ors. v. Union of India, [SLP [C] No. 26281/ 2017] this Court has held:

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“9. Section 31(1) of the Act requires tender of compensation which is tendered in terms of section 12 of the Act. Section 12 provides a mode of informing claimants as to compensation. Section 31(2) of the Act requires Collector to deposit amount in court in case it is not received by the persons interested or there is some dispute. Under the Act, the deposit is required only with a view to avoiding liability to pay interest. Deposit in the Court is not a payment made to the owner. It is only to avoid liability to pay interest that too at higher rates on the failure of deposit. Once it is deposited the liability to pay interest ceases. Section 34 of the Act makes it clear that if the compensation is not deposited on or before taking the possession of the land, interest at the rate of nine percent shall follow from the time of so taking the possession until compensation so paid or deposited in the court. The proviso to section 34 makes it clear that in case it is not so deposited in court as per section 31(1) within a period of one year from the date of taking possession interest at the rate of 15 percent per annum shall be payable. Thus, it is clearly provided under section 34 that interest at the rate of 15 percent per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year till it is so paid or deposited. As soon as the deposit is made under Section 31(2) of the Act, liability ceases to make the payment of interest on the compensation amount so deposited.” 78. Reliance was placed by landowners on the decision in Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 (2), wherein the court observed, that “where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden”. There is no dispute with the said proposition, and the same has been followed by this Court umpteen number of times. However, the consistent practice that has been followed in land acquisition cases is that it is only when reference is sought, and the amount has not been paid for one or other reason as per section 31(2), that the amount is deposited in the court to which the reference would be submitted, and not otherwise. The action is as per rules. The amount of compensation, qua the incumbents/landowners who have not sought the reference, is ordinarily deposited in treasury, by opening accounts in their separate names; the same is apparent from the forms, rules framed under section 55 of 1894 Act and various statutory orders

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THR. LRS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

issued by various State Governments. Section 31(2) cannot be said to be covering all the exigencies of depositing amount. It was not necessary for various other exigencies to deposit the amount in the Court. Particularly in view of the Government rules and instructions in financial matters which were binding and consistently followed by making the deposit in treasury for more than 100 years since 1894.

WHETHER SECTION 24(2) DIVESTS THE STATE OF LAND 79. The question arises when there is absolute vesting of the land in the State under the provisions of the Act of 1894 whether it can be divested by virtue of the provisions made in section 24 of 2013 Act. The concept of absolute vesting in the State under Act of 1894 is well settled and on award being passed, possession being taken, compensation being offered but refused, section 24 would not apply in such a situation to divest the State if the land is acquired. No different intention appears from section 24 to divest the land once it has absolutely vested in the State in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1894. Merely by obtaining interim order or keeping the litigation pending or filing it afresh that too by way of stale and belated claim after the Act of 2013 has come into force, no divesting of land is contemplated. It is only in exigencies provided deemed lapse take place either when possession not taken or compensation not paid as provided in Section 24(2) and where award has not been passed, the provisions of section 24 of Act of 2013 applies. In a catena of decisions, this Court has laid down that as provided in section 16 of the Act of 1894, when an award is passed and possession is taken, the land vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances the only legality of procedure is open to being questioned. The provision contained in section 17(1) also provides absolute vesting in the Government free from all encumbrances in the case of urgency even before passing of an award.

80. The vested right cannot be taken away. In Black’s Law Dictionary “vested” is defined thus: “vested, adj. (18c) Having become a completed, consummated right for present or future enjoyment; not contingent; unconditional; absolute a vested interest in the estate. “Unfortunately, the word ‘vested’ is used in two senses. Firstly, an interest may be vested in possession, when there is a right to present enjoyment, e.g. when I own and occupy Blackacre.

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But an interest may be vested, even where it does not carry a right to immediate possession if it does confer a fixed right of taking possession in the future.” George Whitecross Paton, A Textbook of Jurisprudence 305 (CW. Paton & David P. Derham eds., 4th ed. 1972).

“A future interest is vested if it meets two requirements: first, that there be no condition precedent to the interest’s becoming a present estate other than the natural expiration of those estates that are prior to it in possession; and second, that it be theoretically possible to identify who would get the right to possession if the interest should become a present estate at any time.” Thomas F. Bergin 8. Paul C. Haskell, Preface to Estates in Land and Future Interests 66-67 (2d ed. 1984).”

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In Webster’s Dictionary, it is defined as:

“vested adj. [pp. of vest] 1. Clothed; robed, especially in church vestments. 2. inlaw, fixed; settled; absolute; not contingent upon anything: as, a vested interest.” 81(a). In State of Punjab v. Sadhu Ram, 1996 (7) JT 118, this Court has laid down that when possession is taken by the Government after passing of the award and co

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