Jai Bhagwan & Ors. v. State of Nct of Delhi & Anr.
- Court
- High Court of Delhi
- Date of judgment
- 29 October 2026
- Judge
- Justice Sachin Datta
- Case number
- CRL.M.C. No. 7964 of 2026
- Acts & sections
- Section 498A IPC, Section 482 CrPC
- Subject
- Criminal, Family
Full judgment
$~80 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Date of Decision: 29.10.2026
% # +
CNR No. DLHC010510332026 JAI BHAGWAN & ORS. Through:
.....Petitioners Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Mr. Rakesh Kumar, Mr. Rajesh Kumar and Mr. Praveen Sehrawat, Advs.
versus STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. .....Respondents Through: Mr. Hemant Mehla, APP for State along with Mohd. Naved and Mr. Mayank Chaudhary, Advs. SI Lal Chand, PS S. B. Dairy. Mr. Rahul Luther, Mr. Deepak Rajwar, Mr. Amber Chaurasia, Mr. Sahil, Mr. Madhur Bhardwaj and Mr. Akshay, Advs. for R-2. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA SACHIN DATTA, J. (ORAL) 1.
The present petition has been filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”) [corresponding to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”)], seeking quashing of FIR No.164/2019 dated 04.04.2019, registered at Police Station Shahbad Dairy, Outer North District, Delhi, under Sections 498A/406/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”), together with all proceedings emanating therefrom. 2.
Petitioner no.1 and respondent no.2 were married on 19.02.2017 in
Delhi according to Hindu rites and ceremonies. No child was born out of the said wedlock. Petitioner no.2 is the mother of petitioner no.1; petitioner nos.3 and 4 are the sisters of petitioner no.1; and petitioner no.5 is the brother of petitioner no.1. 3.
The FIR makes serious allegations against the petitioners, inter alia, of
demands for dowry, cruelty and misappropriation of the stridhan and dowry articles of respondent no.2. It further records that the parties have been living separately since 02.09.2018. 4.
The parties have entered into a compromise deed/settlement
agreement dated 18.08.2025, which has been placed on record as Annexure P-4 to the present petition. The same reads as under:
5.
It is stated that, in terms of the settlement, the marriage between
petitioner no.1 and respondent no.2 stands dissolved by a decree of divorce, and that the settlement amount of Rs.4,00,000/- stands paid to respondent no.2 by way of demand draft at the time of recording of her statement in the
first motion. 6.
Respondent no.2 is present in Court. She affirms that the compromise
deed was executed by her out of her own free will and volition and without any undue pressure, coercion or influence. She has also filed an affidavit stating that she has no objection to the quashing of the subject FIR, and that she does not wish to proceed further against the petitioners, all disputes between the parties having been resolved amicably. 7.
The petitioners and respondent no.2 undertake to remain bound by the
terms of the aforesaid compromise deed. 8.
The concerned Investigating Officer has identified petitioner no.1 and
respondent no.2, who are physically present in Court. The remaining petitioners have appeared through video conferencing and have also been identified by the Investigating Officer. 9.
It is apposite to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gian
Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, wherein it has been observed as under: “58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the wellbeing of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet
certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.”
10.
The said principles were reiterated by the Supreme Court in Narinder
Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466, wherein it has been held as under: “29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:
29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to
great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.”
11.
Specifically in the context of matrimonial disputes, the Supreme
Court in Jitendra Raghuvanshi v. Babita Raghuvanshi, (2013) 4 SCC 58, has held as under: “14. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are wide and unfettered. In B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 848], this Court has upheld the powers of the High Court under Section 482 to quash criminal proceedings where dispute is of a private nature and a compromise is entered into between the parties who are willing to settle their differences amicably. We are satisfied that the said decision is directly applicable to the case on hand and the High Court ought to have quashed the criminal proceedings by accepting the settlement arrived at. 15. In our view, it is the duty of the courts to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes, particularly, when the same are on considerable increase. Even if the offences are noncompoundable, if they relate to matrimonial disputes and the Court is satisfied that the parties have settled the same amicably and without any pressure, we hold that for the purpose of securing ends of justice, Section 320 of the Code would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing of FIR, complaint or the subsequent criminal proceedings.”
12.
In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is noticed that the dispute
between the parties is matrimonial and essentially private in nature. The offences alleged do not fall within the category of heinous and serious offences of mental depravity, or offences such as murder, rape or dacoity, which have a serious impact on society. The parties have amicably resolved all their disputes in terms of the compromise deed; the marriage stands
dissolved by a decree of divorce by mutual consent; no child was born out of the wedlock; the parties have been living separately since 02.09.2018, i.e. for over eight years; the settlement amount stands paid; and respondent no.2, who is the complainant and the principal prosecution witness, is present in Court and has affirmed the settlement as well as her no objection to the quashing of the FIR. In these circumstances, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak. 13.
Accordingly, in view of the joint request of the parties, and
considering the law laid down in Gian Singh (supra), there is no impediment in allowing the present petition. 14.
Consequently, the present petition is allowed; FIR No.164/2019 dated
04.04.2019, registered at Police Station Shahbad Dairy, Outer North District, Delhi, under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC, and all proceedings emanating therefrom, qua all the petitioners, stands quashed. 15.
The present petition, along with all pending application(s), if any,
stands disposed of in the above terms.
OCTOBER 29, 2026/cl/sd
SACHIN DATTA, J