Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India

Landmark judgment · Constitution & fundamental rights — 10% reservation for economically weaker sections (103rd Amendment) upheld.

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
7 November 2022
Judge
Justice Uday Umesh Lalit
Neutral citation
2022 INSC 1175
Reported in
[2022] 14 S.C.R. 1
Result
Disposed off
Acts & sections
Article 16 Constitution, Article 14 Constitution, Article 368 Constitution, Article 15 Constitution, Article 334 Constitution, Article 46 Constitution
Subject
Service

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Full judgment

[2022] 14 S.C.R. 1

JANHIT ABHIYAN

v. UNION OF INDIA (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 55 of 2019) NOVEMBER 07, 2022

[UDAY UMESH LALIT, CJI, DINESH MAHESHWARI, S. RAVINDRA BHAT, BELA M. TRIVEDI AND J.B. PARDIWALA, JJ.] Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019 – Challenge to – Vide said amendment, Arts. 15 and 16 of the Constitution were amended by adding two new clauses viz., clause (6) to Art.15 with Explanation and clause (6) to Art.16; and thereby, the State was empowered, inter alia, to provide for a maximum of ten per cent reservation for “the economically weaker sections” (EWS) of citizens other than “the Scheduled Castes”, “the Scheduled Tribes” and the non-creamy layer of “the Other Backward Classes” – The amendment did not mandate but enabled reservation for EWS and prescribed a ceiling limit of ten per cent – Challenge to said amendment essentially on three-fold grounds: first, that making of special provisions including reservation in education and employment on the basis of economic criteria is entirely impermissible and offends the basic structure of the Constitution; second, that in any case, exclusion of socially and educationally backward classes i.e., SCs, STs and non-creamy layer OBCs from the benefit of the special provisions for EWS is inexplicably discriminatory and destroys the basic structure of the Constitution; and third, that providing for ten per cent additional reservation directly breaches the fifty per cent ceiling of reservations already settled by decisions of Supreme Court and hence, results in unacceptable abrogation of the Equality Code which, again, destroys the basic structure of the Constitution – Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019 – Validity of – Held (per 3:2 majority) (Majority opinion contained in separate judgments rendered by Dinesh Maheshwari, Bela M. Trivedi and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.) : Valid – Held (per Dinesh Maheshwari, J.): Reservation is an instrument of affirmative action by the State so as to ensure all-inclusive march towards the goals of

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an egalitarian society while counteracting inequalities; it is an instrument not only for inclusion of socially and educationally backward classes to the mainstream of society but, also for inclusion of any class or section so disadvantaged as to be answering the description of a weaker section – In this background, reservation structured singularly on economic criteria does not violate any essential feature of the Constitution and does not cause any damage to the basic structure of the Constitution – Exclusion of the classes covered by Arts.15(4), 15(5) and 16(4) from getting the benefit of reservation as economically weaker sections, being in the nature of balancing the requirements of non-discrimination and compensatory discrimination, does not violate Equality Code and does not in any manner cause damage to the basic structure of the Constitution – Reservation for economically weaker sections of citizens up to ten per cent in addition to the existing reservations does not result in violation of any essential feature of the Constitution and does not cause any damage to the basic structure of the Constitution on account of breach of the ceiling limit of fifty per cent because, that ceiling limit itself is not inflexible and in any case, applies only to reservations envisaged by Arts.15(4), 15(5) and 16(4) of the Constitution – The 103rd Constitution Amendment cannot be said to breach the basic structure of the Constitution by permitting the State to make special provisions, including reservation, based on economic criteria or by permitting the State to make special provisions in relation to admission to private unaided institutions or in excluding the SEBCs/OBCs/SCs/STs from the scope of EWS reservation – Held (per Bela M. Trivedi, J.) (Concurring with Dinesh Maheshwari, J.): The impugned amendment enabling the State to make special provisions for the “economically weaker sections” of the citizens other than the scheduled castes/schedules tribes and socially and educationally backward classes of citizens, is required to be treated as an affirmative action on the part of the Parliament for the benefit and for advancement of the economically weaker sections of the citizens – Treating economically weaker sections of the citizens as a separate class would be a reasonable classification, and cannot be termed as an unreasonable or unjustifiable classification, much less a betrayal of basic feature or violative of Art.14 – Just as equals cannot be treated unequally, unequals also cannot be treated equally – Treating unequals as equals would as well offend the doctrine of

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equality enshrined in Arts.14 and 16 of the Constitution – The impugned amendment creates a separate class of “economically weaker sections of the citizens” from the general/unreserved class, without affecting the special rights of reservations provided to the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe and backward class of citizens covered under Art.15(4), 15(5) and 16(4) – Therefore, their exclusion from the newly created class for the benefit of the “economically weaker sections of the citizens” in the impugned amendment cannot be said to be discriminatory or violative of the equality code – Such amendment could certainly be not termed as shocking, unconscionable or unscrupulous travesty of the quintessence of equal justice – The limitations- substantive or procedural - imposed on the exercise of constituent power of the State under Art.368 could not be said by any stretch of imagination, to have been disregarded by the Parliament – Neither the procedural limitation i.e. the mode of exercise of the amending power nor the substantive limitation i.e. the restricted field has been disregarded, which otherwise would invalidate the impugned amendment – What is visualised in the Preamble and what is permissible both in Part-III and Part-IV of the Constitution cannot be said to be violative of the basic structure or basic feature of the Constitution – In absence of any obliteration of any of the constitutional provisions or any alteration or destruction in the existing structure of equality code or in the basic structure of the Constitution, neither the width test nor the identity test as propounded in Kesavananda case can be said to have been violated in the impugned Amendment – Accordingly, the challenge to the constitutional validity of the 103rd Amendment fails, and the validity thereof is upheld – However, there is a need to revisit the system of reservation in the larger interest of the society as a whole, as a step forward towards transformative constitutionalism – If a time limit is prescribed, for the special provisions in respect of the reservations and representations provided in Arts. 15 and 16 of the Constitution, it could be a way forward leading to an egalitarian, casteless and classless society – Held (per J.B. Pardiwala, J.) (Concurring with Dinesh Maheshwari, J.): Reservation is not an end but a means – a means to secure social and economic justice – The longstanding development and the spread of education have resulted in tapering the gap between the classes to a considerable extent – As larger percentages of backward class members attain acceptable standards

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of education and employment, they should be removed from the backward categories so that the attention can be paid toward those classes which genuinely need help – In such circumstances, it is very much necessary to take into review the method of identification and the ways of determination of backward classes, and also, ascertain whether the criteria adopted or applied for the classification of backward is relevant for today’s conditions – Reservation should not continue for an indefinite period of time so as to become a vested interest – The impugned amendment is valid and in no manner alters the basic structure of the Constitution – Held (per S. Ravindra Bhat, J. (for Uday Umesh Lalit, CJI and himself) (Minority opinion): The States’ compelling interest to fulfil the objectives set out in the Directive Principles, through special provisions on the basis of economic criteria, is legitimate – That reservation or special provisions have so far been provided in favour of historically disadvantaged communities, cannot be the basis for contending that other disadvantaged groups who have not been able to progress due to the ill effects of abject poverty, should remain so and the special provisions should not be made by way of affirmative action or even reservation on their behalf – Therefore, special provisions based on objective economic criteria (for the purpose of Art.15), is per se not violative of the basic structure – However, the framework in which it has been introduced by the impugned amendment – by excluding backward classes -– is violative of the basic structure – The impugned amendment and the classification it creates, is arbitrary, and results in hostile discrimination of the poorest sections of the society that are socially and educationally backward, and/or subjected to caste discrimination – Insertion of Art.15(6) and 16(6) is struck down, and is held to be violative of the equality code, particularly the principle of non-discrimination and non-exclusion which forms an inextricable part of the basic structure of the Constitution – ss.2 and 3 of the Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019 which inserted clause (6) in Art.15 and clause (6) in Art.16, respectively, are unconstitutional and void on the ground that they are violative of the basic structure of the Constitution – Constitution of India – Arts. 15 and 16. Doctrines/Principles – Doctrine of basic structure – Vide Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019, Arts. 15 and 16 of the Constitution was amended by adding two new

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clauses viz., clause (6) to Art.15 with Explanation and clause (6) to Art.16; and thereby, the State was empowered, inter alia, to provide for a maximum of ten per cent reservation for “the economically weaker sections” (EWS) of citizens other than “the Scheduled Castes”, “the Scheduled Tribes” and the non-creamy layer of “the Other Backward Classes” – The amendment did not mandate but enabled reservation for EWS and prescribed a ceiling limit of ten per cent – Whether the doctrine of basic structure could be invoked for laying a challenge to the 103rd Amendment – Held (per Dinesh Maheshwari, J.): No – Using the doctrine of basic structure as a sword against the amendment in question and thereby to stultify State’s effort to do economic justice as ordained by the Preamble and DPSP and, inter alia, enshrined in Articles 38, 39 and 46 of the Constitution cannot be countenanced – Provisions contained in Arts. 15 and 16 of the Constitution, providing for reservation by way of affirmative action, being of exception to the general rule of equality, cannot be treated as a basic feature – Moreover, even if reservation is one of the features of the Constitution, it being in the nature of enabling provision only, cannot be regarded as an essential feature of that nature whose modulation for the sake of other valid affirmative action would damage the basic structure of the Constitution – Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019.

Constitution of India – Art.368 – Power to amend the Constitution availing under Art.368 – Held (Per Dinesh Maheshwari, J.): Is recognized as a constituent power and is subject to various safeguards intrinsic to Art.368, including the procedural safeguards.

Constitution of India – Art.368 – Doctrine of Basic Structure and Constitutional Amendments – Discussed – Held (Per Dinesh Maheshwari, J.): The power to amend the Constitution essentially vests with the Parliament and when a high threshold and other procedural safeguards are provided in Art.368, it would not be correct to assume that every amendment to the Constitution could be challenged by theoretical reference to the basic structure doctrine – As exposited in Kesavananda case, the amending power can even be used by the Parliament to reshape the Constitution in order to fulfil the obligation imposed on the State, subject, of course, to the defined limits of not damaging the basic structure of the Constitution

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– Again, as put in Kesavananda case, judicial review of constitutional amendment is a matter of great circumspection for the judiciary where the Courts cannot be oblivious of the practical needs of the Government and door has to be left open even for ‘trial and error’, subject, again, to the limitations of not damaging the identity of the Constitution – The expressions “basic features” and “basic structure” convey different meaning, even though many times they have been used interchangeably – Basic structure of the Constitution is the sum total of its essential features – As to when abrogation of any particular essential feature would lead to damaging the basic structure of Constitution would depend upon the nature of that feature as also the nature of amendment – As regards Part-III of the Constitution, every case of amendment of Fundamental Rights may not necessarily result in damaging or destroying the basic structure – The issue would always be as to whether what is sought to be withdrawn or altered is an inviolable part of the basic structure – Mere violation of the rule of equality does not violate the basic structure of the Constitution unless the violation is shocking, unconscionable or unscrupulous travesty of the quintessence of equal justice – If any constitutional amendment moderately abridges or alters the equality principles, it cannot be said to be a violation of the basic structure. Doctrines / Principles – Doctrine of equality – Reasonable classification – Discussed – Held (Per Dinesh Maheshwari, J.): Equals must be treated equally while unequals need to be treated differently – A classification to be valid must necessarily satisfy two tests: first, the distinguishing rationale should be based on a just objective and secondly, the choice of differentiating one set of persons from another should have a reasonable nexus to the object sought to be achieved – However, a valid classification does not require mathematical niceties and perfect equality; nor does it require identity of treatment – If there is similarity or uniformity within a group, the law will not be condemned as discriminatory, even though due to some fortuitous circumstances arising out of a particular situation, some included in the class get an advantage over others left out, so long as they are not singled out for special treatment – In spite of certain indefiniteness in the expression ‘equality’, when the same is sought to be applied to a particular case or class of cases in

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the complex conditions of a modern society, there is no denying the fact that the general principle of ‘equality’ forms the basis of a Democratic Government – Democracy – Constitution of India – Arts. 14 to 18.

Reservation – Affirmative Action by ‘Reservation’: Exception to the General Rule of Equality – Affirmative action by way of compensatory discrimination – Held (Per Dinesh Maheshwari, J.): In a multifaceted social structure, ensuring substantive and real equality, perforce, calls for consistent efforts to remove inequalities, wherever existing and in whatever form existing – Hence, the State is tasked with affirmative action – And, one duly recognised form of affirmative action is by way of compensatory discrimination, which has the preliminary goal of curbing discrimination and the ultimate goal of its eradication so as to reach the destination of real and substantive equality – This has led to what is known as reservation and quota system in State activities – The ‘doctrine of equality’, as collectively enshrined in Arts.14 to 18, happens to be the principal basis for the creation of a reasonable classification whereunder ‘affirmative action’, be it legislative or executive, is authorised to be undertaken – The constitutional Courts too, precedent by precedent, have constructively contributed to evolution of what may be termed as ‘reservation jurisprudence’ – Reservation jurisprudence – Constitution of India – Arts. 14 to 18. Reservation – For economically weaker sections – Economic Disabilities and Affirmative Action – Held (Per Dinesh Maheshwari, J.): The expression ‘economically weaker sections of citizens’ is not a matter of mere semantics but is an expression of hard realities – Poverty is not merely a state of stagnation but is a point of regression – Providing for affirmative action in relation to one particular segment or class may operate constructively in the direction of meeting with and removing the inequalities faced by that segment or class but, if another segment of society suffers from inequalities because of one particular dominating factor like that of poverty, the said segment could not be denied of the State support by way of affirmative action of reservation only because of the fact that that segment is otherwise not suffering from other disadvantages – In the State’s efforts of ensuring all-inclusive socio-economic justice, there cannot be competition of claims for affirmative action based

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on disadvantages in the manner that one disadvantaged section would seek denial of affirmative action for another disadvantaged section – Justice – Socio-economic justice. Doctrines /Principles – Principle of “Distributive Justice” – Discussed – Mandate of the Constitution – Held (Per Dinesh Maheshwari, J.): Principle of “Distributive Justice” is a bedrock of the provisions like Art.46 as also Arts. 38 and 39 of the Constitution – The mandate of the Constitution to the State is to administer distributive justice; and in the law-making process, the concept of distributive justice connotes, inter alia, the removal of economic inequalities – There could be different methods of distributive justice – The philosophy of distributive justice is of wide amplitude which, inter alia, reaches to the requirements of removing economic inequalities; and then, it is not confined to one class or a few classes of the disadvantaged citizens – The wide spectrum of distributive justice mandates promotion of educational and economic interests of all the weaker sections, in minimizing the inequalities in income as also providing adequate means of livelihood to the citizens – In this commitment, leaving one class of citizens to struggle because of inequalities in income and want of adequate means of livelihood may not serve the ultimate goal of securing all-inclusive socioeconomic justice – Constitution of India – Art.46, 38 and 39 – Words and Phrases – “Distributive Justice”. Constitution of India – Doctrine of Basic Structure and Constitutional Amendments – Held (Per Dinesh Maheshwari, J.): There is no, and there cannot be any, cut-and-dried formula or a theorem which could supply a ready-made answer to the question as to whether a particular amendment to the Constitution violates or affects the basic structure – The nature of amendment and the feature/s of the Constitution sought to be touched, altered, modulated, or changed by the amendment would be the material factors for an appropriate determination of the question – Doctrine of basic structure cannot be readily applied to every constitutional amendment – Supreme Court has applied the same only against such hostile constitutional amendments which were found to be striking at the very identity of the Constitution, like direct abrogation of the features of judicial review (Kesavananda, Minerva Mills and P. Sambhamurthy cases); free and fair elections (Indira Nehru Gandhi

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case); plenary jurisdiction of constitutional Courts (L. Chandra Kumar case); and independence of judiciary (NJAC Judgment case) – Most of the other attempts to question the constitutional amendments have met with disapproval of the Court even when there had been departure from the existing constitutional provisions and scheme.

Constitution of India – Interplay of amending powers of the Parliament and judicial review by the Constitutional Court over such exercise of amending powers – Reason for minimal interference by Supreme Court in the constitutional amendments – Held (Per Dinesh Maheshwari, J.): In our constitutional set-up of parliamentary democracy, even when the power of judicial review is an essential feature and thereby an immutable part of the basic structure of the Constitution, the power to amend the Constitution, vested in the Parliament in terms of Art.368, is equally an inherent part of the basic structure of the Constitution – Both these powers, of amending the Constitution (by Parliament) and of judicial review (by Constitutional Court) are subject to their own limitations.

Reservation – Compensatory discrimination – Exclusion of Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBCs) / Other Backward Classes (OBCs) / Scheduled Castes (SCs)/ Scheduled Tribes (STs) from Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) reservation – Held (Per Dinesh Maheshwari, J.): Compensatory discrimination, wherever applied, is exclusionary in character and could acquire its worth and substance only by way of exclusion of others – Such differentiation cannot be said to be legally impermissible; rather it is inevitable – Exclusion of Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBCs) / Other Backward Classes (OBCs) / Scheduled Castes (SCs)/ Scheduled Tribes (STs) from Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) reservation is compensatory discrimination of the same species as is exclusion of general EWS from SEBCs/OBCs/ SCs/STs reservation. Reservation – Reservation by affirmative action – Held (Per Dinesh Maheshwari, J.): Economic backwardness of citizens can also be the sole ground for providing reservation by affirmative action.

Equality – Indian constitutional jurisprudence – Equality clause in the Constitution – Held (Per Dinesh Maheshwari, J.):

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Guarantee of equality is substantive and not a mere formalistic requirement – Equality is at the nucleus of the unified goals of social and economic justice. Reservation – Exception to the general rule of equality – Held (Per Dinesh Maheshwari, J.): For the socio-economic structure which the law in our democracy seeks to build up, the requirements of real and substantive equality call for affirmative action – Reservation is recognised as one such affirmative action, which is permissible under the Constitution; and its operation is defined by a large number of decisions of this Court, running up to the detailed expositions in Dr. Jaishri Patil case – However, reservation is nevertheless an exception to the general rule of equality and hence, cannot be regarded as such an essential feature of the Constitution that cannot be modulated. Constitution of India – Art.46 – Phraseology of Art. 46 – Expression “other weaker sections” in Art.46 – Meaning of – Held (Per Dinesh Maheshwari, J.): The broader expression “other weaker sections” in Art.46 is disjointed from the particular weaker sections (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribe); and is not confined to only those sections who are similarly circumstanced to SCs and STs – It cannot be said that the expression “other weaker sections” is not to be given widest possible meaning or that this expression refers only to those weaker sections who are similarly circumstanced to SCs and STs – Reservation. Constitution of India – Amendment to – Scope for judicial review –Held (per Bela Trivedi, J.): Any amendment made by the Parliament is open to judicial review and is liable to be interfered with by the Court on the ground that it affects one or the other basic feature of the Constitution. Constitution of India – Amendment to – Challenge to, on ground of being discriminatory – Held (per Bela Trivedi, J.): A Constitutional amendment cannot be struck down as discriminatory if the state of facts are reasonably conceived to justify it. Constitution of India – Interpretation of – Distinction from interpretation of statutes – Held (per J.B. Pardiwala, J.): If there is an apparent or real conflict between two provisions of the Constitution, it is to be resolved by applying the principle of

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harmonious construction – The rules of the interpretation of the Constitution have to take into consideration the problems of government, structure of a State, dynamism in operation, caution about checks and balances, not ordinarily called for in the interpretation of statutes.

Constitution of India – Amendment of – Scope and limitations – Held (per J.B. Pardiwala, J.): Since the power to amend the Constitution is a derivative power, the exercise of such power to amend the Constitution is subject to two limitations, namely, the doctrine of Basic Structure and lack of legislative competence – If an amendment is to be struck down under the ‘basic structure’ formulation, the central principle of these inter-related provisions should be at threat – A mere violation of one of the enabling provisions would not be of much consequence under the doctrine of Basic Structure as long as such violation does not infringe upon the central thesis of equality – Redress for marginal encroachment cannot be found under the ‘Basic Structure Doctrine’ – Doctrines/ Principles – Doctrine of ‘Basic Structure’.

Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019 – Challenge to – Vide said amendment, Arts. 15 and 16 of the Constitution was amended by adding two new clauses viz., clause (6) to Art.15 with Explanation and clause (6) to Art.16; and thereby, the State was empowered, inter alia, to provide for a maximum of ten per cent reservation for “the economically weaker sections” (EWS) of citizens other than “the Scheduled Castes”, “the Scheduled Tribes” and the non-creamy layer of “the Other Backward Classes” – Held (per J.B. Pardiwala, J.): The new concept of economic criteria introduced by the impugned amendment for affirmative action may go a long way in eradicating caste-based reservation – It may be perceived as a first step in the process of doing away with castebased reservation. Doctrines/ Principles – Doctrine of basic structure – Enabling provision – Effect of – Held (per Ravindra Bhat, J. (for Uday Umesh Lalit, CJI and himself): It is inaccurate to say that provisions that enable, exercise of power, would not violate the basic structure of the Constitution – The court’s inquiry therefore, cannot stop at the threshold, when an enabling provision is enacted – Its potential for

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violating the basic structure of the Constitution is precisely the power it confers, on the legislature, or the executive. Constitution of India – Judicial review of constitutional amendments – Scope – Held (per Ravindra Bhat, J. (for Uday Umesh Lalit, CJI and himself): Appropriate test or standard of judicial review of constitutional amendments is not the same as in the case of ordinary laws – In constitutional amendment judicial review, the court would consider the history of the provision amended, or the way the new provision impacts the identity, or character, or nature of the Constitution. Constitution of India – Fraternity – Relevance of – Held (per Ravindra Bhat, J. (for Uday Umesh Lalit, CJI and himself): People cannot be assured of Justice, Liberty or Equality, unless Fraternity in one form or another, to some degree, is felt by individuals at each level of our social order, and economic system – Weakening fraternity therefore undermines justice, liberty, and equality – The value of fraternity is as much a part of the equality code, and its facets – equality of opportunity, the principle of non-discrimination and the non-exclusionary principle, as it inextricably binds them with the concepts of liberty and freedom.

Words and Phrases – “basic features” and “basic structure” – Meaning of – Held (per Dinesh Maheshwari, J.): Basic structure of the Constitution is the sum total of its essential features.

Words and Phrases – Words “other than” in Arts. 15(6) and 16(6) of the Constitution – If to be read as “in addition to”, so as to include SCs/STs/OBCs within Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) – Held (per Dinesh Maheshwari, J.): The suggested construction is plainly against the direct meaning of the exclusionary expression “other than” as employed in, and for the purpose of, the said Arts. 15(6) and 16(6) – Constitution of India – Arts. 15(6) and 16(6).

Words and Phrases – “compensatory discrimination” and “reservation jurisprudence” – Discussed (per Dinesh Maheshwari, J.). Words and Phrases – “economically weaker sections of citizens” – Meaning of – Discussed (per Dinesh Maheshwari, J.).

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Equality – Real and substantive equality – Economic justice vis-à-vis social justice – Discussed (per Dinesh Maheshwari, J.).

In the instant writ petitions and other proceedings the following three questions came up for consideration:Question 1: Whether the 103 rd Constitution Amendment can be said to breach the basic structure of the Constitution by permitting the State to make special provisions, including reservation, based on economic criteria? Question 2: Whether the 103rd Constitution Amendment can be said to breach the basic structure of the Constitution by permitting the State to make special provisions in relation to admission to private unaided institutions? Question 3: Whether the 103 rd Constitution Amendment can be said to breach the basic structure of the Constitution in excluding the SEBCs/OBCs/SCs/STs from the scope of EWS reservation?

Disposing of the Writ petitions and other proceedings, the Court HELD: Per COURT (3:2 majority) In view of the decision rendered by the majority consisting of Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheshwari, Hon’ble Ms. Justice Bela M. Trivedi and Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.B. Pardiwala, the challenge raised to 103 rd Amendment to the Constitution fails and the decision rendered by Hon’ble Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat remains in minority. [Para 2]

Per DINESH MAHESHWARI, J. HELD: 1. The power to amend the Constitution availing under Article 368 has been a significant area of the development of Constitutional Law in our country. This power, recognised as a constituent power, is subject to various safeguards which are intrinsic to Article 368, including the procedural safeguards. [Para 34][96-D-E]

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2. The expressions “basic features” and “basic structure” convey different meaning, even though many times they have been used interchangeably. It could reasonably be said that basic structure of the Constitution is the sum total of its essential features. As to when abrogation of any particular essential feature would lead to damaging the basic structure of Constitution would depend upon the nature of that feature as also the nature of amendment. [Paras 39.4, 39.5][124-D-E] 3. In a nutshell, the principle of equality can be stated thus: equals must be treated equally while unequals need to be treated differently, inasmuch as for the application of this principle in real life, one has to differentiate between those who being equal, are grouped together, and those who being different, are left out from the group. This is expressed as reasonable classification. Now, a classification to be valid must necessarily satisfy two tests: first, the distinguishing rationale should be based on a just objective and secondly, the choice of differentiating one set of persons from another should have a reasonable nexus to the object sought to be achieved. However, a valid classification does not require mathematical niceties and perfect equality; nor does it require identity of treatment. If there is similarity or uniformity within a group, the law will not be condemned as discriminatory, even though due to some fortuitous circumstances arising out of a particular situation, some included in the class get an advantage over others left out, so long as they are not singled out for special treatment. In spite of certain indefiniteness in the expression ‘equality’, when the same is sought to be applied to a particular case or class of cases in the complex conditions of a modern society, there is no denying the fact that the general principle of ‘equality’ forms the basis of a Democratic Government. [Para 44][127-A-D] 4. In the multifaceted social structure, ensuring substantive and real equality, perforce, calls for consistent efforts to remove inequalities, wherever existing and in whatever form existing. Hence, the State is tasked with affirmative action. And, one duly recognised form of affirmative action is by way of compensatory discrimination, which has the preliminary goal of curbing

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discrimination and the ultimate goal of its eradication so as to reach the destination of real and substantive equality. This has led to what is known as reservation and quota system in State activities. [Para 48][129-A-C]

5. The ‘doctrine of equality’, as collectively enshrined in Articles 14 to 18, happens to be the principal basis for the creation of a reasonable classification whereunder ‘affirmative action’, be it legislative or executive, is authorised to be undertaken. The constitutional Courts too, precedent by precedent, have constructively contributed to the evolution of what one may term as ‘reservation jurisprudence’. However, reservation, one of the permissible affirmative actions enabled by the Constitution of India, is nevertheless an exception to the general rule of equality and hence, cannot be regarded as such an essential feature of the Constitution that cannot be modulated; or whose modulation for a valid reason, including benefit of any section other than the sections who are already availing its benefit, may damage the basic structure. [Paras 50, 56][129-F-G; 130-A; 133-D] 6. In almost all references to real and substantive equality, the concept of economic justice has acquired equal focus alongside the principles of social justice. In giving effect to the rule of equality enshrined in Article 14, the Courts have also been guided by the jurisprudence evolved by the U.S. Supreme Court in the light of the amendments made to their Constitution, which were founded on economic considerations. This is to highlight that the economic backwardness of citizens can also be the sole ground for providing reservation by affirmative action. Any civilized jurisdiction differentiates between haves and have-nots, in several walks of life and more particularly, for the purpose of differential treatment by way of affirmative action. If an egalitarian socio-economic order is the goal so as to make the social and economic rights a meaningful reality, which indeed is the goal of our Constitution, the deprivations arising from economic disadvantages, including those of discrimination and exclusion, need to be addressed to by the State; and for that matter, every affirmative action has the sanction of our Constitution, as noticeable from the frame of

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Preamble as also the text and texture of the provisions contained in Part III and Part IV. [Paras 64, 65, 67][138-F, G; 139-A, E-F] 7. The expression ‘economically weaker sections of citizens’ is not a matter of mere semantics but is an expression of hard realities. Poverty is not merely a state of stagnation but is a point of regression. Of course, mass poverty cannot be eliminated within a short period and it is a question of progress along a time path. In Kesavananda case, building a Welfare State is held to be one of the main objectives of the Constitution. In the Welfare State, public power becomes an instrumentality for the achievement of purposes beyond the minimum objectives of domestic order and national defence. It is not enough that the society be secured against internal disorder and/or external aggression; a society can be thus secured and well-ordered but, could be lacking in real and substantive justice for all. Equally, providing for affirmative action in relation to one particular segment or class may operate constructively in the direction of meeting with and removing the inequalities faced by that segment or class but, if another segment of society suffers from inequalities because of one particular dominating factor like that of poverty, the question arises as to whether the said segment could be denied of the State support by way of affirmative action of reservation only because of the fact that that segment is otherwise not suffering from other disadvantages. The answer could only be in the negative for, in the State’s efforts of ensuring all-inclusive socioeconomic justice, there cannot be competition of claims for affirmative action based on disadvantages in the manner that one disadvantaged section would seek denial of affirmative action for another disadvantaged section. [Paras 69, 70][140-B, F-H; 141A-B] 8. On a contextual reading, it could reasonably be culled out that the observations, wherever occurring in the decisions of this Court, to the effect that reservation cannot be availed only on economic criteria, were to convey the principle that to avail the benefit of this affirmative action under Articles 15(4) and/or 15(5) and/or 16(4), as the case may be, the class concerned ought to be carrying some other disadvantage too and not the economic disadvantage alone. The said decisions cannot be read to mean

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that if any class or section other than those covered by Articles 15(4) and/or 15(5) and/or 16(4) is suffering from disadvantage only due to economic conditions, the State can never take affirmative action qua that class or section. In view of the principles discernible from the decisions as also the background aspects, including the avowed objective of socio-economic justice in the Constitution, the observations of this Court in the past decisions that reservations cannot be claimed only on the economic criteria, apply only to class or classes covered by or seeking coverage under Articles 15(4) and/or 15(5) and/or 16(4); and else, this Court has not put a blanket ban on providing reservation for other sections who are disadvantaged due to economic conditions. [Paras 72, 73][156-D-G]

9. The mandate of the Constitution to the State is to administer distributive justice; and in the law-making process, the concept of distributive justice connotes, inter alia, the removal of economic inequalities. There could be different methods of distributive justice; and it comprehends more than merely achieving the lessening of inequalities by tax or debt relief measures or by regulation of contractual transactions or redistribution of wealth, etc. It is more than evident that the philosophy of distributive justice is of wide amplitude which, inter alia, reaches to the requirements of removing economic inequalities; and then, it is not confined to one class or a few classes of the disadvantaged citizens. In other words, the wide spectrum of distributive justice mandates promotion of educational and economic interests of all the weaker sections, in minimizing the inequalities in income as also providing adequate means of livelihood to the citizens. In this commitment, leaving one class of citizens to struggle because of inequalities in income and want of adequate means of livelihood may not serve the ultimate goal of securing all-inclusive socio-economic justice. In fact, the argument that the State may adopt any poverty alleviation measure but cannot provide reservation for EWS by way of affirmative action proceeds on the assumption that the affirmative action of reservation in our constitutional scheme is itself reserved only for SEBCs/OBCs/SCs/STs in view of the existing text of Articles

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15(4), 15(5) and 16(4) of the Constitution. Such an assumption is neither valid nor compatible with our constitutional scheme. This line of argument is wanting on the fundamental constitutional objectives, with the promise of securing ‘JUSTICE, social, economic and political’ for ‘all’ the citizens; and to promote FRATERNITY among them ‘all’. Thus viewed, the challenge to the amendment in question fails on the principle of distributive justice. [Paras 74.1.1, 74.1.2]P158-B-H] 10. Though, the text and the order of expressions used in the body of Article 46 have been repeatedly recounted on behalf of the petitioners to emphasise on the arguments based on ejusdem generis principle of interpretation but, as aforesaid, that principle does not fit in the interpretation of an organic thing like the Constitution. This apart, when traversing through the principles of interpretation, it could also be noticed that in case of any doubt, the heading or sub-heading of a provision could also be referred to as an internal aid in construing the provision, while not cutting down the wide application of clear words used in the provision. What is interesting to notice is that in the heading of Article 46, the chronology of the description of target groups for promotion of educational and economic interests is stated in reverse order than the contents of the provision. The heading signifies ‘Promotion of educational and economic interests of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other weaker sections’ whereas the contents of the main provision are framed with the sentence ‘interest of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes’. A simple reading of the heading together with the contents would make it clear that the broader expression “other weaker sections” in Article 46 is disjointed from the particular weaker sections (Schedule Castes and Scheduled Tribe); and is not confined to only those sections who are similarly circumstanced to SCs and STs. [Para 74.2.3][159-G-H; 160-A-D] 11. The amendment in question could be correlated with any other provision of the Constitution, including the Preamble as well as Articles 38 and 39. Moreover, it is not the requirement

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of our constitutional scheme that an amendment to the Constitution has to be based on some existing provision in DPSP. In fact, an amendment to the Constitution (of course, within the bounds of basic structure) could be made even without any corresponding provision in DPSP. In the aforesaid view of matter, there appears no reason to analyse another unacceptable line of arguments adopted by the petitioners that the amendment in question provides for compensatory discrimination in favour of the so-called forward class/caste. Suffice it to observe that the amendment in question is essentially related to the requirements of those economically weaker sections who have hitherto not been given the benefit of such an affirmative action (particularly of reservation), which was accorded to the other class/classes of citizens namely, the SEBCs/OBCs/SCs/STs. Viewing this affirmative action of EWS reservation from the standpoint of backward class versus forward class is not in accord with the very permissibility of compensatory discrimination towards the goal of real and substantive justice for all. The challenge to the amendment in question on the ground that though the State could take all the relevant measures to deal with poverty and the disadvantages arising therefrom but, the affirmative action of reservation is envisaged by the Constitution only for socially and educationally backward class of citizens; and economic disadvantage alone had never been in contemplation for this action of reservation, is required to be rejected. In any case, any legitimate effort of the State towards all-inclusive socio-economic justice, by way of affirmative action of reservation in support of economically weaker sections of citizens, who had otherwise not been given the benefit of this affirmative action, cannot be lightly interfered with by the Court. [Paras 74.3, 75, 76][160-F-H; 161A-B, D-E]

12. EWS reservation itself is another form of compensatory discrimination, which is meant for serving the cause of such weaker sections who have hitherto not been given any State support by way of reservation. SEBCs/OBCs/SCs/STs are having the existing compensatory discrimination in their favour wherein the presently supported EWS are also excluded alongwith all other excluded classes/persons. As a necessary corollary, when EWS

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is to be given support by way of compensatory discrimination, that could only be given by exclusion of others, and more particularly by exclusion of those who are availing the benefit of the existing compensatory discrimination in exclusion of all others. Put in simple words, the exclusion of SEBCs/OBCs/SCs/STs from EWS reservation is the compensatory discrimination of the same species as is the exclusion of general EWS from SEBCs/OBCs/ SCs/STs reservation. As said above, compensatory discrimination, wherever applied, is exclusionary in character and could acquire its worth and substance only by way of exclusion of others. Such differentiation cannot be said to be legally impermissible; rather it is inevitable. [Para 82.1][165-E-F] 13. The fact that exclusion is innate in compensatory discrimination could further be exemplified by the fact that in Indra Sawhney, this Court excluded the creamy layer of OBCs from the benefit of reservation. In the complex set-up of formal equality on one hand (which debars discrimination altogether) and real and substantive equality on the other (which permits compensatory discrimination so as to upset the disadvantages), exclusion is as indispensable as the compensatory discrimination itself is. In fact, ‘creamy layer’ principle itself was applied to make a true compact of socially and educationally backward class. Two features strikingly come to fore with creamy layer principle. One is that to make a real compact of socially and educationally backward class, economic factors play an equally important role; and then, the exclusionary principle applies therein too. These two features, when applied to the present case, make it clear that the use of economic criteria is not contra- indicated for the exercise of reservation, rather it is imperative; and second, to make the exercise of compensatory discrimination meaningful so as to achieve its desired result, exclusion of every other class/person from the target group is inevitable. Thus viewed, the amendment in question remains unexceptionable in the accepted principles of constitutional law presently in operation. [Paras 83, 83.1][166B-E] 14. Having examined the permissible limits of affirmative action in light of the possible harm of preferential treatment qua other innocent class of competitors, i.e., general merit candidates,

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this Court has expressed the desirability of fifty per cent as the ceiling limit for reservation in education and public employment but, all such observations are required to be read essentially in the context of the reservation obtaining under Articles 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4) or other areas of affirmative action like that in relation to local self- government and cannot be overstretched to the reservation provided for entirely different class, consisting of the economically weaker sections. [Para 93][178-B-D]

15. In the ultimate analysis, it is beyond doubt that using the doctrine of basic structure as a sword against the amendment in question and thereby to stultify State’s effort to do economic justice as ordained by the Preamble and Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) and, inter alia, enshrined in Articles 38, 39 and 46, cannot be countenanced. This is essentially for the reason that the provisions contained in Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India, providing for reservation by way of affirmative action, being of exception to the general rule of equality, cannot be treated as a basic feature. Moreover, even if reservation is one of the features of the Constitution, it being in the nature of enabling provision only, cannot be regarded as an essential feature of that nature whose modulation for the sake of other valid affirmative action would damage the basic structure of the Constitution. Therefore, the doctrine of basic structure cannot be invoked for laying a challenge to the 103rd Amendment. [Para 101][182-E-G] 16. Reservation is an instrument of affirmative action by the State so as to ensure all-inclusive march towards the goals of an egalitarian society while counteracting inequalities; it is an instrument not only for inclusion of socially and educationally backward classes to the mainstream of society but, also for inclusion of any class or section so disadvantaged as to be answering the description of a weaker section. In this background, reservation structured singularly on economic criteria does not violate any essential feature of the Constitution of India and does not cause any damage to the basic structure of the Constitution of India. [Para 102][183-B-C]

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17. Exclusion of the classes covered by Articles 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4) from getting the benefit of reservation as economically weaker sections, being in the nature of balancing the requirements of non-discrimination and compensatory discrimination, does not violate Equality Code and does not in any manner cause damage to the basic structure of the Constitution of India. [Para 102][183D] 18. Reservation for economically weaker sections of citizens up to ten per cent. in addition to the existing reservations does not result in violation of any essential feature of the Constitution of India and does not cause any damage to the basic structure of the Constitution of India on account of breach of the ceiling limit of fifty per cent because, that ceiling limit itself is not inflexible and in any case, applies only to the reservations envisaged by Articles 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India. [Para 102][183-E-F] 19. The 103rd Constitution Amendment cannot be said to breach the basic structure of the Constitution by permitting the State to make special provisions, including reservation, based on economic criteria. [Para 104][184-A] 20. The 103rd Constitution Amendment cannot be said to breach the basic structure of the Constitution by permitting the State to make special provisions in relation to admission to private unaided institutions. [Para 104][184-B]

21. The 103rd Constitution Amendment cannot be said to breach the basic structure of the Constitution in excluding the SEBCs/OBCs/SCs/STs from the scope of EWS reservation. [Para 104][184-B]

Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala and Anr. (1973) 4 SCC 225: [1973] Suppl. SCR 1; Bhim Singhji v. Union of India and Ors. (1981) 1 SCC 166 and Minerva Mills Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1980) 3 SCC 625: [1981] 1 SCR 206 – relied on. State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan AIR 1951 SC 226: [1951] SCR 525; K.C. Vasanth Kumar and Anr.

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v. State of Karnataka 1985 Supp SCC 714: [1985] Suppl. SCR 352; Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. (2017) 10 SCC 1: [2017] 10 SCR 569; People’s Union for Democratic Rights and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1982) 3 SCC 235: [1983] 1 SCR 456; Jolly George Varghese and Anr. v. The Bank of Cochin (1980) 2 SCC 360: [1980] 2 SCR 913; Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan and Ors. (1997) 11 SCC 121:[1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 548; State of Kerala and Anr. v. N.M. Thomas and Ors. (1976) 2 SCC 310; P. Sambhamurthy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. (1987) 1 SCC 362: [1987] 1 SCR 879; Lingappa Pochanna Appelwar v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (1985) 1 SCC 479: [1985] 2 SCR 224; T. Devadasan v. Union of India and Anr. [1964] 4 SCR 680; Indra Sawhney and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217; M. Nagaraj and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 212:[2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336; Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India and Ors. (2008) 6 SCC 1:[2008] 4 SCR 1; M.R. Balaji and Ors. v. State of Mysore and Ors. [1963] Supp 1 SCR 439; Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (2000) 1 SCC 168:[1999] 5 Suppl. SCR 229; R. Chitralekha and Anr. v. State of Mysore and Ors. [1964] 6 SCR 368; Janki Prasad Parimoo and Ors. v. State of J&K and Ors. (1973) 1 SCC 420: [1973] 3 SCR 236; Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and Anr. [1952] SCR 89; Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan [1965] 1 SCR 933; I.C. Golak Nath and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr. [1967] 2 SCR 762; E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. (1974) 4 SCC 3: [1974] 2 SCR 348; Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India and Ors. (2020) 4 SCC 727: [2020] 2 SCR 727; B.K. Pavitra and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2019) 16 SCC 129:[2019] 7 SCR 1086; Dr. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. Chief Minister and Ors. (2021) 8 SCC 1; Dayaram Khemkaran Verma v. State of Gujarat 2016 SCC Online Guj 1821; Madhav Rao Scindia

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Bahadur etc. v. Union of India (1971) 1 SCC 85:[ 1971] 3 SCR 9; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India and Anr. (2018) 8 SCC 501: [2018] 7 SCR 1; T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (2002) 8 SCC 481; V.V. Giri v. D.S. Dora [1960] 1 SCR 246; Saurav Yadav and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (2021) 4 SCC 542; Waman Rao and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1981) 2 SCC 362: [1981] 2 SCR 1; Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. State of Bihar and Ors. (1995) 5 SCC 403: [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 269; Subhash Chandra and Anr. v. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board and Ors. (2009) 15 SCC 458:[2009] 12 SCR 978; Raghunathrao Ganpatrao v. Union of India 1994 Supp (1) SCC 191: [1993] 1 SCR 480; Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India and Anr. (2012) 6 SCC 1; Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (Registered) and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2014) 8 SCC 1; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain and Anr. 1975 Supp SCC 1; State of Karnataka v. Union of India and Anr. (1977) 4 SCC 608: [1978] 2 SCR 1; Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Ors. 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651: [1992] 1 SCR 686; L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors. (1997) 3 SCC 261: [1997] 2 SCR 1186; K. Krishna Murthy (Dr.) and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. (2010) 7 SCC 202: [2010] 6 SCR 972; Supreme Court Advocates-onRecord Association and Anr. v. Union of India (2016) 5 SCC 1: [2015] 13 SCR 1; Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Ors. (1974) 2 SCC 402: [1975] 1 SCR 1; Chairman and Managing Director, Central Bank of India and Ors. v. Central Bank of India SC/ST Employees Welfare Association and Ors. (2015) 12 SCC 308: [2015] 1 SCR 55; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Dr. Dina Nath Shukla and Anr. (1997) 9 SCC 662: [1997] 1 SCR 750; M/s Shantistar Builders v. Narayan K. Totame and Ors. (1990) 1 SCC 520; Association of Unified Tele Services Providers and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2014) 6 SCC 110: [2014] 9 SCR 780; People’s Union for Civil

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Liberties (PUCL) and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr. (2003) 4 SCC 399: [2003] 2 SCR 1136; M/s Frick India Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors. (1990) 1 SCC 400: [1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 570; Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India and Ors. (1981) 1 SCC 246: [1981] 2 SCR 185 and R. D. Upadhyay v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. (2007) 15 SCC 337: [2006] 3 SCR 1132 – referred to.

Corocraft v. Pan American Airways 1969 (1) All ER 82 – referred to. Per BELA M. TRIVEDI, J. (Concurring with DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.) HELD: 1. It is very well-established proposition of law that it is the Constitution and not the constituent power which is supreme. It is axiomatic that the Parliament has been conferred upon the constituent power to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of the Constitution under Article 368 of the Constitution, and the same is required to be exercised in accordance with the procedure laid down in the said Article. The Constitution is said to be a living document or a work in progress only because of the plenary power to amend is conferred upon the Parliament under the said provision. Of course, as laid down in plethora of judgments, the said power is subject to the constraints of the basic structure theory. Deriving inspiration from the Preamble and the whole scheme of the Constitution, the majority in Kesavananda Bharati case held that every provision of the Constitution can be amended so long as the basic foundation and structure of the Constitution remains the same. Some of the basic features of the constitutional structure carved out by the Court in the said judgment were, the supremacy of the Constitution, Republican and democratic form of government, separation of powers, judicial review, sovereignty and the integrity of the nation, Federal Character of Government etc. A multitude of features have been acknowledged as the basic features in various subsequent judicial pronouncements. Accordingly, any amendment made by the Parliament is open to the judicial review

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A and is liable to be interfered with by the Court on the ground that it affects one or the other basic feature of the Constitution. [Paras 5, 6][188-B-C; 189-A-B] 2. As transpiring from the Statements of Objects and Reasons for introducing the Bill to the impugned amendment, B the Parliament has taken note that the economically weaker sections of the citizens have largely remained excluded from attaining the higher educational institutions and public employment on account of their financial incapacity to compete with the persons who are economically more privileged. The benefits of existing reservations under Clauses (4) and (5) of C Article 15 and Clause (4) of Article 16 are generally unavailable to them unless they meet with the specific criteria of social and educational backwardness. It has been further stated that vide the Constitution (Ninety-third Amendment) Act, 2005, Clause (5) was inserted in Article 15 of the Constitution which enables the D State to make special provision for the advancement of any social and educational backwardness of citizens, or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes, in relation to their admission in higher educational institutions. Similarly, Clause(4) of Article 16 of the Constitution enables the State to make special provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any E backward class of citizens which in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State. However, economically weaker sections of citizens were not eligible for the benefit of reservation. Therefore, with a view to fulfil the ideals lying behind Article 46, and to ensure that economically weaker F sections of citizens to get a fair chance of receiving higher education and participation in employment in the services of the State, it was decided to amend the Constitution of India. [Para 19][194-A-E] 3. As well settled, it must be presumed that the legislature understands and appreciates the needs of its own people. Its laws are directed to the problems made manifest by experience, and its discriminations are based on adequate norms. Therefore, the constitutional amendment could not be struck down as discriminatory if the state of facts are reasonably conceived to

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justify it. In the instant case, the Legislature being aware of the exclusion of economically weaker sections of citizens from having the benefits of reservations provided to the SCs/STs and SEBCs citizens in Clauses(4) and (5) of Article 15 and Clause(4) of Article 16, has come out with the impugned amendment empowering the State to make special provision for the advancement of the “economically weaker sections” of citizens other than the classes mentioned in Clauses(4) and (5) of Article 15 and further to make special provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of the economically weaker sections of the citizens other than the classes mentioned in Clause(4) of Article 16. The impugned amendment enabling the State to make special provisions for the “economically weaker sections” of the citizens other than the scheduled castes/schedules tribes and socially and educationally backward classes of citizens, is required to be treated as an affirmative action on the part of the Parliament for the benefit and for the advancement of the economically weaker sections of the citizens. Treating economically weaker sections of the citizens as a separate class would be a reasonable classification, and could not be termed as an unreasonable or unjustifiable classification, much less a betrayal of basic feature or violative of Article 14. Just as equals cannot be treated unequally, unequals also cannot be treated equally. Treating unequals as equals would as well offend the doctrine of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. [Para 20][194-F-H; 195-A-C]

4. The Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and the backward class for whom the special provisions have already been provided in Article 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4) form a separate category as distinguished from the general or unreserved category. They cannot be treated at par with the citizens belonging to the general or unreserved category. The impugned amendment creates a separate class of “economically weaker sectionsof the citizens” from the general/unreserved class, without affecting the special rights of reservations provided to the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe and backward class of citizens covered under Article 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4). Therefore, their exclusion from the newly created class for the benefit of the “economically weaker sections of the citizens” in the impugned amendment cannot be said to be discriminatory or violative of the equality code. Such amendment

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could certainly be not termed as shocking, unconscionable or unscrupulous travesty of the quintessence of equal justice as sought to be submitted by the petitioners. [Para 21][195-D-F] 5. The sum and substance is that the limitations – substantive or procedural – imposed on the exercise of constituent power of the State under Article 368 could not be said by any stretch of imagination, to have been disregarded by the Parliament. Neither the procedural limitation i.e. the mode of exercise of the amending power has been disregarded nor the substantive limitation i.e. the restricted field has been disregarded, which otherwise would invalidate the impugned amendment. What is visualised in the Preamble and what is permissible both in PartIII and Part-IV of the Constitution could not be said to be violative of the basic structure or basic feature of the Constitution. In absence of any obliteration of any of the constitutional provisions and in absence of any alteration or destruction in the existing structure of equality code or in the basic structure of the Constitution, neither the width test nor the identity test as propounded in Kesavananda could be said to have been violated in the impugned Amendment. Accordingly, the challenge to the constitutional validity of the 103rd Amendment fails, and the validity thereof is upheld. [Para 22][195-G-H; 196-A-B] 6. What was envisioned by the framers of the Constitution, what was proposed by the Constitution Bench in 1985 and what was sought to be achieved on the completion of fifty years of the advent of the Constitution, i.e. that the policy of reservation must have a time span, has still not been achieved even till this day, i.e. till the completion of seventy-five years of our Independence. It cannot be gainsaid that the age-old caste system in India was responsible for the origination of the reservation system in the country. It was introduced to correct the historical injustice faced by the persons belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and other backward classes, and to provide them a level playing field to compete with the persons belonging to the forward classes. However, at the end of seventy-five years of our independence, we need to revisit the system of reservation in

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the larger interest of the society as a whole, as a step forward towards transformative constitutionalism. [Para 28][199-D-F]

7. As per Article 334 of the Constitution, the provisions of the Constitution relating to the reservation of seats for the SCs and the STs in the House of the People and in the Legislative Assemblies of the States would cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of eighty years from the commencement of the Constitution. The representation of Anglo-Indian community in the House of the Parliament and in the Legislative Assemblies of the States by nomination, has already ceased by virtue of the 104thAmendment w.e.f. 25.01.2020. Therefore, similar time limit if prescribed, for the special provisions in respect of the reservations and representations provided in Article 15 and Article 16 of the Constitution, it could be a way forward leading to an egalitarian, casteless and classless society. [Para 29][199-FH; 200-A]

Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala & Anr. (1973) 4 SCC 225; K.C. Vasanth Kumar and Anr. v. State of Karnataka, (1985) Suppl. SCC 714 : 1985 (1) Suppl. SCR 352 and Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6 SCC 1 : 2008 (4) SCR 1 – relied on.

Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu & Ors. (1992) Suppl. 2 SCC 651: [1992] 1 SCR 686; Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji v. Union of India & Ors. (1981) 1 SCC 166; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) Suppl. SCC 1: [1976] 2 SCR 347; State of Kerala & Anr. v. N.M. Thomas & Ors. (1976) 2 SCC 310: [1976] 1 SCR 906 and Waman Rao & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1981) 2 SCC 362:[1981] 2 SCR 1; M. Nagraj & others v. Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 212: [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336 and State of Gujarat and Another v. & The Ashok Mills Co. Ltd. Ahmedabad and Another (1974) 4 SCC 656: [1974] 3 SCR 760 – referred to.

Per J.B. PARDIWALA, J. (Concurring with DINESH MAHESWHARI, J.) HELD:1. Article 21 encompasses the right to live with dignity. Article 21 has been given wide connotation and expression

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by the courts, particularly, by this Court to give effect to the constitutional policy of welfare state. The decision of this Court in Unni Krishnan is an authority on this aspect where the Court confirmed that right to education is implicit under Article 21 and proceeded to identify the content and parameters of this right to be achieved by Articles 41, 45, and 46 in relation to education. Understood in this context, Article 46 gives not only solemn protection to the weaker sections of the people at par with the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes but speaks of special care to be taken by the State of this section of people. Further, the expression “educational and economic interests” in Article 46 concludes the whole legal position in relation to Article 46 to mean that the State must endeavour to do welfare especially of this section of people. The endeavour of the State to give the weaker section of the people a life of dignity is the link between Articles 46 and 21. The conjoint reading of both the provisions puts constitutional obligation on the State to achieve the goal of welfare of the weaker sections of the people by all means. Article 46 is not based on social test but on the means test. It speaks of “educational and economic interests” of “weaker sections”. The expression “weaker sections” and their “economic interests” are correlative and denote the means status of the people who are to be taken care of. Although, the phrase “economic interests” is not to be read alone but in consonance with the expression “educational” used in Article 46; yet to confuse Article 46 with the “social status” would be to put a strain and nullify otherwise the pure object of Article 46. The distinction can be explained with the aid of Article 15(4). Article 15(4) gives impetus to the social and educational “advancement” of Backward Classes or the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. It is an enabling provision for the State to make special provisions for the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes. The emphasis here is on the upliftment of three constitutionally earmarked classes i.e., Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward classes. However, Article 46 is wide in expression. The object of welfare under Article 46 is towards those educationally and economically weak. Thus, it is evident from the aforesaid that there can be reservation for certain weaker sections other than the SCs/STs

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and socially and educationally backward classes. The impugned amendment is meant for weaker sections of the society who are economically weak and cannot afford to impart education to their children or are unable to secure employment in the services of the State. [Para 81, 82][263-G-H; 264-A-H; 265-A-C]

2. The interpretation of a Constitution involves more than a passing interest concerning the actual litigants and being a pronouncement of the Courts on the government and administration, has a more general and far-reaching consequence. If there is an apparent or real conflict between two provisions of the Constitution, it is to be resolved by applying the principle of harmonious construction. The rules of the interpretation of the Constitution have to take into consideration the problems of government, structure of a State, dynamism in operation, caution about checks and balances, not ordinarily called for in the interpretation of statutes. [Para 86, 87, 90][266-A-B, F; 267-F]

3. Since the power to amend the Constitution is a derivative power, the exercise of such power to amend the Constitution is subject to two limitations, namely, the doctrine of Basic Structure and lack of legislative competence. The doctrine of Basic Structure is brought in as a window to keep the power of judicial review intact as abrogation of such a power would result in violation of basic structure. When one speaks of discrimination or arbitrary classification, the same constitutes violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. There is a distinction between constitutional law and ordinary law in a rigid Constitution like ours. The said distinction proceeds on the assumption that ordinary law can be challenged on the touchstone of the Constitution. Therefore, when an ordinary law seeks to make a classification without any rational basis and without any nexus with the object sought to be achieved, such ordinary law could be challenged on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. However, when it comes to the validity of a constitutional amendment, one has to examine the validity of such amendment by asking the question as to whether such an amendment violates any overarching principle in the Constitution. What is overarching principle? Concepts like secularism,

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democracy, separation of powers, power of judicial review fall outside the scope of amendatory powers of the Parliament under Article 368. If any of these were to be deleted, it would require changes to be made not only in Part III of the Constitution but also in Article 245 and the three Lists of the Constitution resulting in the change of the very structure or framework of the Constitution. When an impugned Act creates a classification without any rational basis and having no nexus with the objects sought to be achieved, the principle of equality before law is violated undoubtedly. Such an Act can be declared to be violative of Article 14. Such a violation does not require re-writing of the Constitution. This would be a case of violation of ordinary principle of equality before law. Similarly, “egalitarian equality” is a much wider concept. It is an overarching principle. The term “egalitarianism” has distinct definition that all people should be treated as equal and have the same political, economic, social and civil rights or have a social philosophy advocating the removal of economic inequalities among the people, economic egalitarianism or the decentralisation of power. [Para 154][287C-H; 288-A-B] 4. Article 14 has two clear facets which are invalid. One is over- classification and the other is under-classification, which is otherwise, over- inclusiveness or under-inclusiveness. The judicial review of over-classification should be undertaken very strictly. In the cases of under-classification when the complaint is either by those who are left out or those who are in i.e. that the statute has roped him in, but a similarly situated person has been left out, it would be under-inclusiveness. It is to say that you ought to have brought him in to make the classification reasonable. It is in such cases that the courts have said that ‘who should be brought in’ should be left to the wisdom of the legislature because it is essentially a stage where there should be an element of practicability. Therefore, the cases of under-inclusion can be reviewed in a little liberal manner. The under-inclusion argument should not be very readily accepted by the courts because the stage could be experimental. For instance, in the case on hand, the argument in the context of 103rd Constitution Amendment is that SCs, STs and OBCs have been left out, the Court would say

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that it is under-inclusiveness. The Legislature does not have to bring any and everybody to make it reasonable. The case on hand is not one of active exclusion. The SCs, STs and OBCs who have been left out at the first instance are telling the Court that they ought to have been included. In such circumstances, the test would be very strict, not that it would be impervious to review. Had they been included in clause (6) of Article 15 & clause (6) of Article 16 resply at any point of time and thereafter, excluded, it would be legitimate for them to argue that having treated them as one, they cannot be excluded in an arbitrary manner. [Para 164][293H; 294-A-E]

5. Each one of the Constitutional provisions that are categorised as rights under Part III has intrinsic value content. Many of these rights are a part of the mechanism geared towards realising a common constitutional principle. For example, Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution are committed to the common principle of equality. Reasonably then, if an amendment is to be struck down under the ‘basic structure’ formulation, the central principle of these inter-related provisions should be at threat. A mere violation of one of these enabling provisions would not be of much consequence under the doctrine of Basic Structure as long as such violation does not infringe upon the central thesis of equality. Redress for marginal encroachment cannot be found under the ‘Basic Structure Doctrine’. In considering the effect of an amendment on the constitutional core, it is important to keep in mind the widest ramifications of the amendment. It is imperative to contemplate and consider every way in which the ‘basic structure’ of the Constitution might be threatened through the impugned amendment. The amendment would stand as constitutional only after a satisfactory understanding as to its effect on the constitutional core is reached by the courts. To sustain itself, the amendment should not violate such core in the widest interpretation given to it. [Para 186][310-D-G]

6. The new concept of economic criteria introduced by the impugned amendment for affirmative action may go a long way in eradicating caste-based reservation. It may be perceived as a first

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step in the process of doing away with caste-based reservation. [Para 187][310-H] 7. Reservation is not an end but a means – a means to secure social and economic justice. Reservation should not be allowed to become a vested interest. Real solution, however, lies in eliminating the causes that have led to the social, educational and economic backwardness of the weaker sections of the community. This exercise of eliminating the causes started immediately after the Independence i.e., almost seven decades back and it still continues. The longstanding development and the spread of education have resulted in tapering the gap between the classes to a considerable extent. As larger percentages of backward class members attain acceptable standards of education and employment, they should be removed from the backward categories so that the attention can be paid toward those classes which genuinely need help. In such circumstances, it is very much necessary to take into review the method of identification and the ways of determination of backward classes, and also, ascertain whether the criteria adopted or applied for the classification of backward is relevant for today’s conditions. The idea of Baba Saheb Ambedkar was to bring social harmony by introducing reservation for only ten years. However, it has continued past seven decades. Reservation should not continue for an indefinite period of time so as to become a vested interest. [Para 190][311-H; 312-A-D] 8. In the result, the impugned amendment is valid and in no manner alters the basic structure of the Constitution. [Para 191][312-D-E]

Minor A. Peeriakaruppan v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others (1971) 1 SCC 38: [1971] 2 SCR 430 – relied on. Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala and Anr. (1973) 4 SCC 225: [1973] Suppl. SCR 1; The State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan & Another AIR 1951 SC 226: [1951] SCR 525; Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra AIR 1952 SC 123: [1952] SCR 435; State of Kerala and Another v. N.M. Thomas and Others (1976) 2 SCC 310 : [1976] 1 SCR 906; E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another AIR

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1974 SC 555: [1974] 2 SCR 348; Govt. of Andhra Pradesh v. P.B. Vijaykumar and another AIR 1995 SC 1648; T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Others v. State of Karnataka and Others (2002) 8 SCC 481: [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 587; Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association and another v. Union of India AIR 2016 SC 117: [2015] SCR 975; Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC 2299: [1975] Suppl. SCC 1; S.R. Bommai and others etc. etc. v. Union of India and others etc. etc. AIR 1994 SC 1918: [1994] 2 SCR 644; I.R. Coelho (dead) by L.Rs. v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 2007 SC 861: [2007] 1 SCR 706; The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar [1952] 0 SCR 284; State of Gujarat and Another v. Shri Ambika Mills Ltd. Ahmedabad and Another (1974) 4 SCC 656: [1974] 3 SCR 760; Mohammad Shujat Ali and others v. Union of India and others Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan AIR 2002 SC 1533; Mohini Jain (Miss) v. State of Karnataka and Others (1992) 3 SCC 666: [1992] 3 SCR 658; Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India and Another (2012) 6 SCC1: [2012] 2 SCR 715; Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (Registered) and Others v. Union of India and Others (2014) 8 SCC 1: [2014] 11 SCR 712; M. Nagaraj and Others v. Union of India and Others (2006) 8 SCC 212: [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336; M.R. Balaji and Others v. State of Mysore [1963] Supp 1 SCR 439 and Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. and Another v. Union of India and Others (1996) 10 SCC 104: [1996] 1 Suppl. SCR 825; State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa and others AIR 1974 SC 1: [1974] 1 SCR 771; Ram Singh and Others v. Union of India (2015) 4 SCC 697: [2015] 5 SCR 670; M/s Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame and Others (1990) 1 SCC 520; Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (2008) 6 SCC 1: [2008] 4 SCR 1; M.P.V. Sundararamier & Co. v. State of A.P. and Others [1958] SCR 1422; State of West Bengal v. Shaik Serajuddin Batley [1954] SCR 378; Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R.

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Tendolkar and Others [1959] SCR 279; R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India and Others 1994 Supp (1) SCC 324 : [1993] 1 SCR 891; Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651: [1992] 1 SCR 686; Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 2006 SC 3127: [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 1; Glanrock Estate Private Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu (2010) 10 SCC 96: [2010] 12 SCR 597; Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (1983) 1 SCC 147: [1983] 1 SCR 1000; S. Seshachalam and Others v. Chairman, Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Others (2014) 16 SCC 72 : [2014] 12 SCR 465; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan and Another (2011) 7 SCC 639: [2011] 6 SCR 443; Ajit Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Others (1999) 7 SCC 209: [1999] 2 Suppl. SCR 521; C.A. Rajendran v. Union of India & Others [1968] 1 SCR 721; Indra Sawhney and Others v. Union of India and Others 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 : [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454; Unni Krishnan, J.P. and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others (1993) 1 SCC 645: [1993] 1 SCR 594; Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1965 SC 845: [1965] 1 SCR 933 and Golak Nath and Others v. State of Punjab and Another 1967 AIR SC 1643: [1967] 2 SCR 762 – referred to. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan and Another v. The State of Madras AIR 1951 Madras 120; Padmraj Samarendra v. the State of Bihar, Patna High Court, Special Bench, 1978 SCC OnLine Pat 64 : 1979 PLJR 258 : AIR 1979 Pat 266; State of Kerala v. R. Jacob Mathew and others, AIR 1964 Kerala 316 – referred to. James v. Commonwealth of Australia (1936) A.C. 578, 614; Central Provinces Case (1939) F. C. R. 18; United States v. Patrick B. Classic [1941 SCC OnLine US SC 112: 313 US 299 (1941)] ; Missouri, K & T Rly v. May, 194 US 267 (1904), 269 – referred to.

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA

Per S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. (for UDAY UMESH LALIT, CJI and himself) (Minority opinion)

1. Our Constitution does not speak the language of exclusion. The 103rd Constitution Amendment, by the language of exclusion, undermines the fabric of social justice, and thereby, the basic structure. [Para 1][314-E] 2. The addition, or insertion of the ‘economic criteria’ for affirmative action in aid of the section of population who face deprivation due to poverty, in furtherance of Article 46 of the Constitution, does not per se stray from the Constitutional principles, so as to alter, violate, or destroy its basic structure. As long as the State addresses deprivation resulting from discriminatory social practices which have kept the largest number of our populace in the margins, and continues its ameliorative policies and laws, the introduction of such deprivation-based affirmative action, is consistent with constitutional goals. What, however, needs further scrutiny, is whether the manner of implementing – i.e., the implicit exclusion of those covered under Art. 15(4) and 16(4) [Scheduled Castes (“SC”), Scheduled Tribes (“ST”), and socially and educationally backward classes (“SEBC”)], cumulatively referred to as ‘backward classes’] violates, or damages the basic structure or essential features of the Constitution. [Para 2][314-F-H; 315-A] 3. The appropriate test or standard of judicial review of constitutional amendments is not the same as in the case of ordinary laws; the test is whether the amendment challenged destroys, abrogates, or damages the “identity”, or “nature” or “character” or “personality” of the Constitution, by directly impacting one or some of the “overarching principles” which inform its express provisions. Further in constitutional amendment judicial review, the court would consider the history of the provision amended, or the way the new provision impacts the identity, or character, or nature of the Constitution. The standard of judicial review of constitutional amendments, draws upon distinct terminologies – identity, personality, nature and character to see if the constitutional identity undergoes a fundamental change, as to alter the Constitution into something it can never

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be. Or, differently put, the test is whether the impact of the amendment is to change the Constitution, into something it could never be considered to be. Each of the terms, i.e. identity, nature, personality, character, and so on, are methods of expressing the idea that some part of the Constitution, either through its express provisions, or its general scheme, and yet transcending those provisions, are embedded as overarching principles, which cannot be destroyed or damaged. [Paras 29, 30][332-C-G] 4. The application of the doctrine classification differentiating the poorest segments of the society, as one segment (i.e., the forward classes) not being beneficiaries of reservation, and the other, the poorest, who are subjected to additional disabilities due to caste stigmatization or social barrier based discrimination – the latter being justifiably kept out of the new reservation benefit, is an exercise in deluding ourselves that those getting social and educational backwardness based reservations are somehow more fortunate. This classification is plainly contrary to the essence of equal opportunity. If this Constitution means anything, it is that the Code of Articles 15(1), 15(2), 15(4), 16(1), 16(2), and 16(4) are one indivisible whole. Articles 16(1) and 16(4) are facets of the same equality principle. That one needs Article 15(4) and 16(4) to achieve equality of opportunity guaranteed to all in Articles 15(1) and 16(1) cannot now be undermined, through this reasoning, to hold that the theory of classification permits exclusion on this very basis. [Para 80][356-D-F] 5. The basis of classification in the impugned amendment, enacted in furtherance of Article 46 – is economic deprivation. Applying that criterion, it is either income, or landholding, or value of assets or the extent of resources controlled, which are classifiers. The social origins, or identities of the target group are thus irrelevant. That there is some basis for classification, whether relevant or irrelevant, which is sufficient to differentiate between members of an otherwise homogenous group, is no justification. The economic criteria, based on economic indicators, which distinguish between one individual and another, would be relevant for the purpose of classification, and grant of reservation

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benefit. The Union’s concern that SC/ST/OBCs are beneficiaries of other reservations, which set apart the poorest among them, from the poorest amongst other communities which do not fall within Articles 15(4) and 16(4), cannot be a distinguishing factor, as to either constitute an intelligible differentia between the two, nor is there any rational nexus between that distinction and the object of the amendment, which is to eliminate poverty and further the goal of equity and economic justice. [Para 84, 87][358-F; 360C-E]

6. None of the materials placed on the record contain any suggestion that the SC/ST/OBC categories should be excluded from the poverty or economic criteria-based reservation, on the justification that existing reservation policies have yielded such significant results, that a majority of them have risen above the circumstances which resulted in, or exacerbate, their marginalization and poverty. There is nothing to suggest, how, keeping out those who qualify for the benefit of this economiccriteria reservation, but belong to this large segment constituting 82% of the country’s population (SC, ST and OBC together), will advance the object of economically weaker sections of society. [Para 91][362-B-C]

7. The characterisation of including the poor (i.e., those who qualify for the economic eligibility) among those covered under Articles 15(4) and 16(4), in the new reservations under Articles 15(6) and 16(6), as bestowing “double benefit” is incorrect. What is described as ‘benefits’ for those covered under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) by the Union, cannot be understood to be a free pass, but as a reparative and compensatory mechanism meant to level the field – where they are unequal due to their social stigmatisation. This exclusion violates the non-discrimination and the non-exclusionary facet of the equality code, which thereby violates the basic structure of the Constitution. [Para 100][365F-G]

8. The impugned amendment creates paths, gateways, and opportunities to the poorest segments of our society, enabling them multiple access points to spaces they were unable to go to, places and positions they were unable to fill, and opportunities they could not hope, ever to ordinarily use, due to their destitution,

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economic deprivation, and penury. These: destitution, economic deprivation, poverty, are markers, or intelligible differentia, forming the basis of the classification on which the impugned amendment is entirely premised. To that extent, the amendment is constitutionally indefeasible. However, by excluding a large section of equally poor and destitute individuals – based on their social backwardness and legally acknowledged caste stigmatization – from the benefit of the new opportunities created for the poor, the amendment practices constitutionally prohibited forms of discrimination. The overarching principles underlying Articles 15(1), 15(2), and Articles 16(1), 16(2) is that caste based or community-based exclusion (i.e., the practice of discrimination), is impermissible. Whichever way one would look at it, the Constitution is intolerant towards untouchability in all its forms and manifestations which are articulated in Articles 15(1), (2), Articles 16, 17, 23 and 24. It equally prohibits exclusion based on past discriminatory practices. The exclusion made through the “other than” exclusionary clause, negates those principles and strikes at the heart of the equality code (specifically the nondiscriminatory principle) which is a part of the core of the Constitution. [Para 101][365-H; 366-A-D] 9. Equality of opportunity in public employment – a specific facet of the equality code – is a guarantee to each citizen. The equally forthright prohibition in Article 16(2), enjoining discrimination on various grounds, including caste, is to reinforce the absoluteness of equality of opportunity, that it cannot be denied. The only departure through Article 16(4) is to give voice to hitherto unrepresented classes, discriminated against on the proscribed grounds. This link- between providing equal opportunity, and representation through reservations, was the only exception, permitted by the Constitution, to further equality in public employment. The impugned amendment snaps the link between the idea of providing reservation for backward classes to ensure their empowerment and representation (who were, before the enactment of Article 16(4), absent from public employment). The entire philosophy of Article 16 is to ensure barrier-free equal opportunity in regard to public employment. Article 16(4) – enables citizens belonging to backward classes access to public

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employment with the superadded condition that this is to ensure their “adequate representation”. Important decisions of this court: Indra Sawhney, M. Nagaraj, Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta and BK Pavitra (II) v. Union of India have time and again emphasized that reservations under Article 16 are conditioned upon periodic adequate representation review. [Paras 129, 130][378-E-H; 379-A]

10. The introduction of reservations for economically weaker sections of the society is not premised on their lack of representation (unlike backward classes); the absence of this condition implies that persons who benefit from the EWS reservations can, and in all probability do belong to classes or castes, which are “forward” and are represented in public service, adequately. This additional reservation, by which a section of the population who are not socially backward, and whose communities are represented in public employment – violates the equality of opportunity which the Preamble assures, and Article 16(1) guarantees. [Para 131][379-B-C] 11. The impugned amendment results in treating those covered by reservations under Article 16(4) with a standard that is more exacting and stringent than those covered by Article 16(6). For instance, if the poorest citizens among a certain community or that entire community, is unrepresented, and the quota set apart for the concerned group (SC) as a whole is filled, the requirement of “representation” is deemed fulfilled, i.e., notwithstanding that the specific community has not been represented in public employment, no citizen belonging to it, would be entitled to claim reservation. However, in the case of non-SC/ ST/OBCs, whether the individual belongs to a community which is represented or not, is entirely irrelevant. This vital dimension of need to be represented, to be heard in the decision-making process, has been entirely discarded by the impugned amendment in clause (6) of Article 16. Within the amended Article 16, therefore, lie two standards: representation as a relevant factor (for SC, ST and OBC under Article 16(4)), and representation as an irrelevant factor (for Article 16(6)). [Para 132][379-D-F] 12. The introduction of this reservation in public employment violates the right to equal opportunity, in addition to the non-

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discriminatory facet of equality, both of which are part of the equality code and the basic structure. [Para 133][379-G] 13. The characterisation of reservations for economically weaker sections of the population (EWS) as compensatory and on par with the existing reservations under Articles 15(4) and 16(4), is without basis. The endeavour of the Constitution makers was to ensure that past discriminatory practices which had, so to say, eaten the vitals of the Indian society and distorted it to such an extent that when the republic was created, an equal society was merely an illusion, which compelled them to enact special provisions such as Article 16(4) – and later Article 15(4), to ensure equality. It was not compensatory but also reparatory. They continue to compensate, definitionally and in reality, because even as on date, the acknowledged position is that reservations are necessary for SCs/STs and OBCs who are not part of the creamy layer. On the other hand, the EWS category, was consciously not made beneficiaries of reservations at the time of the framing of the Constitution, because perhaps the framers felt that the enacted provisions (including the soon to be added Articles 31A and 31B) and the slew of economic reforms which were enacted were sufficient to remove economic disparities. That hope however, did not materialise. Economic disparities (unconnected with social and educational backwardness) continued – and perhaps were even exacerbated to such an extent that as of now almost 25% of the population continue to live in abject poverty. Indra Sawhney acknowledged that measures taken for their purpose would only result in “poverty alleviation”. [Para 168][398-B-F] 14. The principles of non-discrimination, non-exclusion and equality of opportunity to all is manifested in the Constitution through the equality code, which is part of its basic structure. Their link with fraternity, which the Preamble assures is intrinsic to “dignity of the individual and unity and integrity of the nation”, is inseparable. The framers of our constitution recognised that there can be no justice without equality of status, and that bereft of fraternity, even equality would be an illusion as existing divisions and “narrow domestic walls” would fragment society. [Para 180][402-F-G]

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15. The fraternal principle is deeply embedded to this nation’s ethos and culture. The specific provisions which form part of the Equality Code, are inextricably intertwined with fraternity as well.

People cannot be assured of Justice, Liberty or Equality, unless Fraternity in one form or another, to some degree, is felt by individuals at each level of our social order, and economic system. Weakening fraternity therefore undermines justice, liberty, and equality. [Paras 181, 182, 183][403-B, F, H] 16. One-ness, inclusiveness, humanism and the idea that not only are all equal, and should have equal opportunities, and the content of each one’s rights be no different from the other, but also that all stand together, and for each other, is a powerful precept. This precept suffuses every provision of Part III of the Constitution, especially Articles 14-18, 38-39 and 46. The value of fraternity is as much a part of the equality code, and its facets – equality of opportunity, the principle of non-discrimination and the non-exclusionary principle, as it inextricably binds them with the concepts of liberty and freedom. [Paras 185, 186][404-H; 405A, B-C] 17. The exclusionary clause (in the impugned amendment) that keeps out from the benefits of economic reservation, backward classes and SC/STs therefore, strikes a death knell to the equality and fraternal principle which permeates the equality code and non-discrimination principle. [Para 187][405-D-E] 18. The concepts which our Constitution fosters, and the principles it engenders – equality, fraternity, egalitarianism, dignity, and justice (at individual and social levels) are all inclusive, all encompassing. The equality code in its majestic formulation (Article 14, 15, 16 and 17) promotes inclusiveness. Even provisions enabling reservations foster social justice and equality, to ensure inclusiveness and participation of all sections of society. These provisions assure representation, diversity, and empowerment. Conversely, exclusion, with all its negative connotation – is not a constitutional principle and finds no place in our constitutional ethos. Therefore, to admit now, that exclusion of people based on their backwardness, rooted in social practice,

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is permissible, destroys the constitutional ethos of fraternity, nondiscrimination, and non-exclusion. [Para 188][405-E-G] 19. On Question 1, it is held that the states’ compelling interest to fulfil the objectives set out in the Directive Principles, through special provisions on the basis of economic criteria, is legitimate. That reservation or special provisions have so far been provided in favour of historically disadvantaged communities, cannot be the basis for contending that other disadvantaged groups who have not been able to progress due to the ill effects of abject poverty, should remain so and the special provisions should not be made by way of affirmative action or even reservation on their behalf. Therefore, special provisions based on objective economic criteria (for the purpose of Article 15), is per se not violative of the basic structure. [Para 189][405-H; 406-A-B]

20. However, the framework in which it has been introduced by the impugned amendment – by excluding backward classes -– is violative of the basic structure. The identifier for the new criteria-is based on deprivation faced by individuals. Therefore, which community the individual belongs to is irrelevant. An individual who is a target of the new 10% reservation may be a member of any community or class. The state does not – and perhaps justly so - will not look into her background. Yet in the same breath, the state is saying that members of certain communities who may be equally or desperately poor (for the purposes of classification identification) but will otherwise be beneficiaries of reservation of a different kind, would not be able to access this new benefit, since they belong to those communities. This dichotomy of on the one hand, using a neutral identifier entirely based on economic status and at the same time, for the purpose of exclusion, using social status, i.e., the castes or socially deprived members, on the ground that they are beneficiaries of reservations (under Article 15(4) and 16(4)) is entirely offensive to the Equality Code. [Para 190][406-C-F]

21. A universally acknowledged truth is that reservations have been conceived and quotas created, through provision in the Constitution, only to offset fundamental, deep rooted generations of wrongs perpetrated on entire communities and castes. Reservation is designed as a powerful tool to enable equal

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access and equal opportunity. Introducing the economic basis for reservation – as a new criterion, is permissible. Yet, the “othering” of socially and educationally disadvantaged classes – including SCs/ STs/ OBCs by excluding them from this new reservation on the ground that they enjoy pre-existing benefits, is to heap fresh injustice based on past disability. The exclusionary clause operates in an utterly arbitrary manner. Firstly, it “others” those subjected to socially questionable, and outlawed practices – though they are amongst the poorest sections of society. Secondly, for the purpose of the new reservations, the exclusion operates against the socially disadvantaged classes and castes, absolutely, by confining them within their allocated reservation quotas (15% for SCs, 7.5% for STs, etc.). Thirdly, it denies the chance of mobility from the reserved quota (based on past discrimination) to a reservation benefit based only on economic deprivation. The net effect of the entire exclusionary principle is Orwellian, (so to say) which is that all the poorest are entitled to be considered, regardless of their caste or class, yet only those who belong to forward classes or castes, would be considered, and those from socially disadvantaged classes for SC/STs would be ineligible. Within the narrative of the classification jurisprudence, the differentia (or marker) distinguishing one person from another is deprivation alone. The exclusion, however, is not based on deprivation but social origin or identity. This strikes at the essence of the non-discriminatory rule. Therefore, the total and absolute exclusion of constitutionally recognised backward classes of citizens - and more acutely, SC and ST communities, is nothing but discrimination which reaches to the level of undermining, and destroying the equality code, and particularly the principle of nondiscrimination. [Para 191][406-F-H; 407-A-D]

22. On question 3, it is clear that the impugned amendment and the classification it creates, is arbitrary, and results in hostile discrimination of the poorest sections of the society that are socially and educationally backward, and/or subjected to caste discrimination. For these reasons, the insertion of Article 15(6) and 16(6) is struck down, is held to be violative of the equality code, particularly the principle of non-discrimination and non-

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exclusion which forms an inextricable part of the basic structure of the Constitution. [Para 192][407-E-F] 23. While this reasoning is sufficient to conclude that Article 16(6) is liable to be struck down, there are additional reasons due to which this court is compelled to clarify that while the ‘economic criteria’ per se is permissible in relation to access of public goods (under Article 15), the same is not true for Article 16, the goal of which is empowerment, through representation of the community. [Para 193][407-F-G] 24. On the point of Question 2, it is true that unaided private educational institutions would be bound under Article 15(6) to provide for EWS reservations, however, given that the analysis under Question 3 on ‘exclusion’ leads to the conclusion that the Amendment is violative of the basic structure, the question herein has been rendered moot. [Para 194][408-A-B]

25. Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019 which inserted clause (6) in Article 15 and clause (6) in Article 16, respectively, are unconstitutional and void on the ground that they are violative of the basic structure of the Constitution. [Para 195][408-B-C]

State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan 1951 SCC 351: [1951] SCR 525; M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore [1963] Supp 1 SCR 439; T. Devadasan v. Union of India (1964) 4 SCR 680; State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas (1976) 2 SCC 310: [1976] 1 SCR 906; Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217: [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454; Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust v. Union of India (2014) 8 SCC 1; Chebrolu Leela Prasad Rao v. State of A.P. (2021) 11 SCC 401; Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 8 SCC 1; Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225: [1973] Supp SCR 1; Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625: [1981] 1 SCR 206; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain 1975 Supp SCC 1: [1976] 2 SCR 347; P. Sambamurthy v. State of A.P (1987) 1 SCC 362: [1987] 1 SCR 879; Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651: [1992] 1 SCR 686;

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA

L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261: [1997] 2 SCR 1186 ; Raghunathrao Ganpatrao v. Union of India 1994 Supp (1) SCC 191: [1993] 1 SCR 480; I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) 2 SCC 1: [2007] 1 SCR 706; Waman Rao v. Union of India (1981) 2 SCC 362: [1981] 2 SCR 1; Indra Sawhney (2) v. Union of India (2000) 1 SCC 168: [1999] 5 Suppl. SCR 229; Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Ors. (2019) 11 SCC 1: [2018] 9 SCR 561; Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association (SCAORA) v. Union of India (2016) 5 SCC 1: [2015] 13 SCR 1; Roop Chand Adlakha v. Delhi Development Authority (1989) Supp (1) SCC 116: [1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 253; State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) 1 SCC 1: [1952] SCR 284; Mohammad Shujat Ali and Ors. v. Union of India (1975) 3 SCC 76: [1975] 1 SCR 449; Bhim Singhji v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 166; M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 212: [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336; Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (2008) 6 SCC 1: [2008] 4 SCR 1; K. Krishna Murthy v. Union of India (2010) 7 SCC 202: [2010] 6 SCR 972; R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India 1994 Supp (1) SCC 324: [1993] 1 SCR 891; Air India v. Nargesh Mirza (1981) SC 1829 : [1982] 1 SCR 438; Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241: [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404; Anuj Garg and Others v. Hotel Association of India and Others, (2008) 3 SCC 1: [2007] 12 SCR 991; National Legal Services Authority v UOI and Others (2014) 5 SCC 438: [2014] 5 SCR 119; Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma & Others (2020) 9 SCC 1: [2020] 10 SCR 135; Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya & Others (2020) 7 SCC 469: [2020] 3 SCR 833; Lt. Col. Nitisha & Others v. Union of India & Others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 261; State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale (1995) Supp (4) SCC 469: [1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 284; Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Dean, Seth G.S. Medical College & Ors. (1990) 3 SCC 130: [1990] 2 SCR 843; Valsamma Paul & Ors. v. Cochin University & Ors. (1996) 3 SCC 545:

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 14 S.C.R.

[1996] 1 SCR 128; Abhiram Singh and Ors. v. C.D. Commachen (2017) 2 SCC 629: [2017] 1 SCR 158; Saurabh Chaudri & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2003) 11 SCC 146; [2003] Supp 5 SCR 152; S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1: [1994] 2 SCR 644 ; Vikas Sankhala & Ors. v. Vikas Kumar Agarwal & Ors (2017) 1 SCC 350: [2016] 7 SCR 639; Samatha v. State of A.P. & Ors. (1997) 8 SCC 191: [1997] Supp 2 SCR 305; Indian Medical Association & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2011) 7 SCC 179: [2011] 6 SCR 599; Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1: [2012] 2 SCR 715; State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors. (1974) 1 SCC 19: [1974] 1 SCR 771; Pattali Makkal Katchi v. A. Mayilerumperumal and Ors 2022 SCC Online SC 386; Col. A.S. Iyer v. V. Balasubramanyam (1980) 1 SCC 634: [1980] 1 SCR 1036 ; Lachhman Das v. State of Punjab [1963] 2 SCR 353; National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India & Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 438: [2014] 5 SCR 119; Charu Khurana v. Union of India (2015) 1 SCC 192: [2014] 12 SCR 259; State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar [1952] 1 SCR 284; Nandini Satpathy v. PL Dani [1978] 3 SCR 608; Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta (2018) 10 SCC 396: [2018] 10 SCR 663; BK Pavitra (II) v. Union of India (2019) 16 SCC 129: [2019] 7 SCR 1086; T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) SCC 481: [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 587; Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600: [1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 142; K.C. Vasant Kumar v. State of Karnataka (1985) Supp SCC 714: [1985] Suppl. SCR 352; State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambika Mills (1974) 4 SCC 656: [1974] 3 SCR 760; S. Seshachalam & Ors. v. Chairman Bar Council of TN (2014) 16 SCC 72: [2014] 12 SCR 465; R.K. Garg v. Union of India (1981) 4 SCC 675: [1982] 1 SCR 947 and Prathvi Raj

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA

Chauhan v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC 727: [2020] 2 SCR 727 – referred to.

Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1891) and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) – referred to.

Case Law Reference In the judgment of DINESH MAHESHWARI, J. [1964] 4 SCR 680

referred to

Para 7.2

(1976) 2 SCC 310

referred to

Para 7.2

1992 Supp (3) SCC 217

referred to

Para 7.2

[1963] Supp 1 SCR 439

referred to

Para 7.2

[2020] 2 SCR 727

referred to

Para 7.4

[2019] 7 SCR 1086

referred to

Para 8.2

[2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336

referred to

Para 9.2

(2021) 8 SCC 1

referred to

Para 9.2

[1951] SCR 525

referred to

Para 10

[2008] 4 SCR 1

referred to

Para 10

[1974] 2 SCR 348

referred to

Para 11

[1973] Suppl. SCR 1

relied on

Para 13

[1971] 3 SCR 9

referred to

Para 13

[2018] 7 SCR 1

referred to

Para 15.4

[1985] Suppl. SCR 352

referred to

Para 15.4

[1981] 1 SCR 206

relied on

Para 16.1

[1999] 5 Suppl. SCR 229

referred to

Para 16.2

(2002) 8 SCC 481

referred to

Para 17.1

[1960] 1 SCR 246

referred to

Para 17.1

[2017] 10 SCR 569

referred to

Para 18.1

(2021) 4 SCC 542

referred to

Para 19

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 14 S.C.R.

[1964] 6 SCR 368

referred to

Para 24.1

[1981] 2 SCR 1

referred to

Para 24.1

[1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 269

referred to

Para 24.3

[2009] 12 SCR 978

referred to

Para 24.3

(1981) 1 SCC 166

relied on

Para 24.3

[1993] 1 SCR 480

referred to

Para 25.1

(2012) 6 SCC 1

referred to

Para 25.5

(2014) 8 SCC 1

referred to

Para 25.5

1975 Supp SCC 1

referred to

Para 26

[1952] SCR 89

referred to

Para 35

[1965] 1 SCR 933

referred to

Para 35

[1967] 2 SCR 762

referred to

Para 35

[1978] 2 SCR 1

referred to

Para 36.1

[1987] 1 SCR 879

referred to

Para 37.5

[1992] 1 SCR 686

referred to

Para 37.6

[1997] 2 SCR 1186

referred to

Para 37.8

[2010] 6 SCR 972

referred to

Para 37.11

[2015] 13 SCR 1

referred to

Para 37.13

[1975] 1 SCR 1

referred to

Para 45.1

[2015] 1 SCR 55

referred to

Para 53

[1997] 1 SCR 750

referred to

Para 61

[1980] 2 SCR 913

referred to

Para 62

[1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 548

referred to

Para 63.1.1

[1983] 1 SCR 456

referred to

Para 63.1.2

[1973] 3 SCR 236

referred to

Para 71.3

(1990) 1 SCC 520

referred to

Para 71.5

[1985] 2 SCR 224

referred to

Para 74.1

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA

[2014] 9 SCR 780

referred to

Para 74.2.1

[2003] 2 SCR 1136

referred to

Para 74.2.1

[1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 570

referred to

Para 74.2.3

[1981] 2 SCR 185

referred to

Para 92.4

[2006] 3 SCR 1132

referred to

Para 99.1

In the judgment of BELA M. TRIVEDI, J. (1973) 4 SCC 225

relied on

Para 5

[1992] 1 SCR 686

referred to

Para 7

(1981) 1 SCC 166

referred to

Para 9

[1976] 2 SCR 347

referred to

Para 10

[1976] 1 SCR 906

referred to

Para 11

[1981] 2 SCR 1

referred to

Para 12

[2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336

referred to

Para 13

[1974] 3 SCR 760

referred to

Para 14

1985 (1) Suppl. SCR 352

relied on

Para 26

2008 (4) SCR 1

relied on

Para 27

In the judgment of J.B. PARDIWALA, J. [1973] Suppl. SCR 1

referred to

Para 5

[1951] SCR 525

referred to

Para 13

[1952] SCR 435

referred to

Para 14

AIR 2002 SC 1533

referred to

Para 15

[1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454

referred to

Para 19

AIR 1974 SC 1631

referred to

Para 29

[1976] 1 SCR 906

referred to

Para 31

[1974] 2 SCR 348

referred to

Para 33

AIR 1995 SC 1648

referred to

Para 34

[1992] 3 SCR 658

referred to

Para 36

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 14 S.C.R.

[1993] 1 SCR 594

referred to

Para 37

[2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 587

referred to

Para 38

[2012] 2 SCR 715

referred to

Para 39

[2014] 11 SCR 712

referred to

Para 47

[2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336

referred to

Para 49

[1963] Supp 1 SCR 439

referred to

Para 49

[1996] 1 Suppl. SCR 825

referred to

Para 55

[1974] 1 SCR 771

referred to

Para 60

[2015] 5 SCR 670

referred to

Para 61

(1990) 1 SCC 520

referred to

Para 78

[2008] 4 SCR 1

referred to

Para 81

[1958] SCR 1422

referred to

Para 91

[1954] SCR 378

referred to

Para 92

[1959] SCR 279

referred to

Para 93

[1993] 1 SCR 891

referred to

Para 94

[1992] 1 SCR 686

referred to

Para 95

[2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336

referred to

Para 96

[1965] 1 SCR 933

referred to

Para 108

[1967] 2 SCR 762

referred to

Para 115

[1975] Suppl. SCC 1

referred to

Para 135

[1994] 2 SCR 644

referred to

Para 139

[2007] 1 SCR 706

referred to

Para 141

[2015] SCR 975

referred to

Para 148

[2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 1

referred to

Para 149

[2010] 12 SCR 597

referred to

Para 151

[1974] 3 SCR 760

referred to

Para 165

[1952] SCR 284

referred to

Para 167

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA

[1983] 1 SCR 1000

referred to

Para 169

[2014] 12 SCR 465

referred to

Para 171

[2011] 6 SCR 443

referred to

Para 178

[1999] 2 Suppl. SCR 521

referred to

Para 185

[1968] 1 SCR 721

referred to

Para 185

[1971] 2 SCR 430

relied on

Para 189

In the judgment of S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. [1951] SCR 525

referred to

Para 6

[1963] Supp 1 SCR 439

referred to

Para 6

[1976] 1 SCR 906

referred to

Para 8

[1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454

referred to

Para 9

[2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336

referred to

Para10

[2008] 4 SCR 1

referred to

Para 10

[2010] 6 SCR 972

referred to

Para10

(2014) 8 SCC 1

referred to

Para 10

(2021) 11 SCC 401

referred to

Para 10

(2021) 8 SCC 1

referred to

Para 10

[1973] Supp SCR 1

referred to

Para 12

[1981] 1 SCR 206

referred to

Para 12

[1976] 2 SCR 347

referred to

Para 13

[1987] 1 SCR 879

referred to

Para 16

[1992] 1 SCR 686

referred to

Para 16

[1997] 2 SCR 1186

referred to

Para 16

[1993] 1 SCR 480

referred to

Para 16

[1981] 2 SCR 1

referred to

Para 22

[1993] 1 SCR 891

referred to

Para 24

[2015] 13 SCR 1

referred to

Para 26

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 14 S.C.R.

[1982] 1 SCR 438

referred to

Para 40

[1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404

referred to

Para 40

[2007] 12 SCR 991

referred to

Para 40

[2014] 5 SCR 119

referred to

Para 40

[2018] 9 SCR 561

referred to

Para 40

[2020] 10 SCR 135

referred to

Para 40

[2020] 3 SCR 833

referred to

Para 40

[1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 284

referred to

Para 49

[1990] 2 SCR 843

referred to

Para 50

[1996] 1 SCR 128

referred to

Para 51

[2017] 1 SCR 158

referred to

Para 52

[1999] 5 Suppl. SCR 229

referred to

Para 53

[2003] Supp 5 SCR 152

referred to

Para 64

[1994] 2 SCR 644

referred to

Para 65

[2007] 1 SCR 706

referred to

Para 66

[2016] 7 SCR 639

referred to

Para 68

[1997] 2 Suppl. SCR 305

referred to

Para 69

[2011] 6 SCR 599

referred to

Para 70

(1981) 1 SCC 166

referred to

Para 72

[2012] 2 SCR 715

referred to

Para 74

[1952] SCR 284

referred to

Para 81

[1974] 1 SCR 771

referred to

Para 82

[1975] 1 SCR 449

referred to

Para 83

[1980] 1 SCR 1036

referred to

Para 85

[1963] 2 SCR 353

referred to

Para 86

[2014] 5 SCR 119

referred to

Para 88

[2014] 12 SCR 259

referred to

Para 90

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA

[1952] 1 SCR 284

referred to

Para 124

[1978] 3 SCR 608

referred to

Para 124

[2018] 10 SCR 663

referred to

Para 130

[2019] 7 SCR 1086

referred to

Para 130

[2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 587

referred to

Para 134

[1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 142

referred to

Para 140

[1985] Suppl. SCR 352

referred to

Para 161

[1974] 3 SCR 760

referred to

Para 163

[2014] 12 SCR 465

referred to

Para 163

[1982] 1 SCR 947

referred to

Para 163

[1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 253

referred to

Para 164

[2020] 2 SCR 727

referred to

Para 186

ORIGINAL/CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No. 55 of 2019.

Petition for challenging the validity of the Constitution(One Hundred and Third) Amendment Act. With T.C.(C) No. 8/2021, W.P.(C) Nos. 596, 446, 427, 331, 343, 798, 732, 854 of 2019, T.C. (C) Nos. 12, 10, 9 of 2021, W.P.(C) Nos. 73, 72, 76, 80, 222, 249, 341 of 2019, T.P.(C) Nos. 1245, 2715 of 2019, T.P.(C) No. 122/2020, SLP(C) No. 8699/2020, T.C.(C) Nos. 7, 11 of 2021, W.P.(C) Nos. 69, 122, 106, 95, 133, 178, 182, 146, 168, 212, 162, 419 of 2019, W.P.(C) No. 473/2020, W.P.(C) No. 493/2019. K.K. Venugopal, AG, Tushar Mehta, SG, Sanjay Jain, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, ASGs, Saurabh Mishra, Ajay Bansal AAGs., R. Bala Subramanian, Mahesh Jethmalani, Dr. K.S. Chauhan, Maninder Singh, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Jayanth Muth Raj, Gopal Sankaranarayanan, P. Wilson, ADN Rao, Salman Khurshid, S. Niranjan Reddy, Prof. Ravi varma Kumar, Prof. (Dr.) Ravi Varma Kumar, Jaideep Gupta, Sr. Advs., Yadav Narender Singh, Ajay Sharma, Gulab Chandra Yadav, Sudhir Singh, Varun Mishra, Abhishek Yadav, Ashutosh Yadav, Ms. Shraddha Deshmukh, Ankur Talwar, Kanu Agarwal, Ms. Chinmaee Chandra, Apoorva Kurup,

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 14 S.C.R.

Padmesh Mishra, Ms. Sujatha Bagadhi, Amrish Kumar, Ms. Vanshaja Shukla, Digvijay Dam, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Aman Sharma, Manvendra Singh, L.N. Shivani, Ms. Shivika Mehra, Ms. Shagun Thakur, Ms. Poornima Singh, Ms. Shreya Jain, A.K. Sharma, Sajal Singhai, Rajender Singh Chaudhry, Hitesh Kumar Sharma, S.K. Rajora, Akhileshwar Jha, Ms. Deepti Hooda, Ms. Sawati Singh, Sanjay Singh, Amit Kumar Chawla, Ms. Manju Jetley, Sunny Choudhary, Ms. Yashraj Singh Bundela(G.A.), Sandeep Sharma, Prof.(Dr.) K. Elumalai, Ajit Kumar Ekka, Ravi Prakash, Abhishek Chauhan, Ajit Kumar, Shuvodeep Roy, Arnav Singh Deo, Prabhash Bajaj, Ajay Sabharwal, Ms. Ashita Chawla, Raghav Tewari, Prasanna S., Rahul Narayan, Tushar Arora, Chandra Tanay Choubey, Gautam Bhatia, Ms. Malavika Jayanth, Ms. Ranji Ohri Lal, Yaduinder Lal, Himinder Lal, Senthil Jagadeesan, Ms. Jhanvi Dubey, Ms. Ishita Chowdhury, Ms. Shivani Vij, Ms. Tanya Srivastava, Ms. Aditi Gupta, Vishnu Sharma, R. Nedumaran, Apoorv Malhotra, Ashutosh Dubey, Amit P. Shahi, Ms. Rajshri A. Dubey, D. Shiva Shankar, Ms. Agrimma Singla, Manish Dhingra, Ms. Ritambhara, H.B. Dubey, Ms. Asifa Rashid Mir, Ms. Aadya Mishra, Ms. Maria Kousar, Mrs. Naghma Imtiaz, Zangham Ahmed, Saif Naseem for M/s Equity Lex Associates, Mahfooz A. Nazki, Polanki Gowtham, Shaik Mohamad Haneef, T. Vijaya Bhaskar Reddy, K.V. Girish Chowdary, Ms. Rajeswari Mukherjee, Ms. Akhila Palem, Abhishek Sharma, Sahil Raveen, Jaimon Andrews, Piyo Harold Jaimon, Ameen Hassan, Ms. Aswathi M.K., Lal Pratap Singh, Shobhit Tiwari, Umesh Pratap Singh, Vishal Singh, R. C. Kohli, Prashant Shukla, Praveen Gaur, Sampriti Baksi, Suyash Srivastava, Baani Khanna, Shreya Mishra, Aaina Walia, Subodh S. Patil, Ms. Sampriti Bakshi, Suyash Srivastava, Ms. Baani Khanna, Karam Murugan, Ms. Shreya Mishra, Shankar Singh, Ms. Aaina Walia, Satyajeet Kumar, Ms. Sudhansu Palo, Ms. Ipsita Behura, Gautam Das, Raj Kumar Yadav, Sanjeev Kumar, Budhadev Palo, Ms. Padmaja Choudhury, Abhilash Kr. Tripathy, B. Jagannath Rao, Dinesh Kumar Jha, Nirmal Kumar Ambastha, Ms. Ashmita Bisarya, Damodar Solanki, Ms. Manju Sharma Jetley, Prof.(Dr.) G. Mohan Gopal, Shishir Pinaki, Muzaffar Khan, Vijendra Mishra, V. Ramchander Goud, Ms. Mallika Das, Ramakrishna, Kasoju Mahesh Acharya, D. Mahesh Babu, Dr. M.P. Raju, S.S. Nehra, P.I. Jose, Rajendra Verma, Subhash Chandra Sagar, Hemant Sagar, Mahendra Singh, Manoj Swarup, Dr. K.S. Bhati, E.C. Viyasagar, Ms. Sharada Bai, Ms. Belle Ravivarma, Ms. Sindhu Acharya, Ms. Priyanka Yavagal, Giridhar Gangothri, Ms. Shikha Jaihind Yadav, Vinayak Mohan, M. Vijaya Bhaskar, Murari Lal, R.S.M. Kalky, S.P. Singh, Randhir Singh, Sumit Kishore, Pratik R. Bombarde, Reepak

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA

Kansal, Aakarsh Kamra, Jitendra Kumar, Abhishek Kumar, D.D. Verma, Renjith B. Marar, Zulfiker Ali P. S, Satya Mitra, Purvish J. Malkan, Ankur Mittal, P. A. Noor Muhamed, Shereef K.A., Rakesh Kumar, Sanjay Kr. Yadav, Pukhrambam Ramesh Kumar, Karun Sharma, Ms. Anupama N., W. Inmanuel Meitei, Haris Beeram, Mushtaq Satine, Usman Ghani Khan, Azhar Assees, Radha Shyam Jena, V.N. Raghupathy, Shadan Farasat, Ms. Hrishika Jain, Ujwala Uppaluri, Bharat Gupta, Shourya Dasgupta, Aman Naqvi, Dhruv Bhatnagar, Ms. Ujjwala Uppaluri, Sachin Patil, Geo Joseph, Risvi Muhammed, Durgesh Gupta, Kailas Bajirao Autade, Namit Saxena, Mrs.Niranjana Singh, Ms. Somyashree, Ms. Sarvshree, Dinesh P. Rajbhar, KasojuMahesh Chary, Ms. Anzu. K. Varkey, Himanshu Tyagi, Ayush Negi, Saurabh Kumar, Ms. Disha Mittal, Akash Kakade, Somanatha Padhan, Ashok Anand, Rakesh Kumar Singh, Miss Sukhada Kakade, Swetab Kumar, Milind Singh, S. Gowthaman, Ms. M. Venmani, Abhisar Thakral, Deepak Vuttsya, Raunak Vuttsya, D. Venkata Krishna, M. Venmani, A.N.Rajan Babu, Roy Abraham, Ms. Reena Roy, Ms. Seema Jain, Akhil Abraham Roy, Ms. Rajni Ohri Lal, Arun Dagar, Rahul Nehra, Annam Venkatesh, Sanjay Parikh, Shashank Singh, Adil Sharfuddin, Ms. Disha Wadekar, Anupam Chaudhary, Satwik Parikh, Mubarak Ali, Mohd. Asad Khan, V. K. Biju, Ms. Ria Sachthey, Chetanya Singh, Amlendu Kumar Akhilesh Kumar Jha, Dr. Ranjeet Bharti, Abhay Pratap Singh, Ms. Rubina Jawed, Parthsarithi M. Saraf, Kavitha K.T., Subhash Chandran, N.P. Rakeshpaniker, Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, V. N. Raghupathy, Siddharath Dharmadhikari, Aaditya A. Pande, Bharat Bagla, D.Kumanan, Sheikh F Kalia, Ms. Racheetha Chawala, Gaurav Sharma, Dhawal Mohan, Prateek Bhatia, Ms. Tushika Goel, Ms. Savita Singh, K. V. Mohan, K.V. Balakrishnan, Rahul Kumar Sharma, Ms. Diya Kapur, Ms. Liz Mathew, Siddharth Nath, Raghav Kumar, Aditya Lodha, Ms. Sonali Jain, Ms. Vasudha Jain, Ms. Khushboo Hora, Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, A. Karthik, Kaleeswaram Raj, Mohammed Sadique T.A., Mrs. Anu K. Joy, Alim Anvar, Ms. Thulasi K. Raj, V.K. Biju, Ms. Swathi H. Prasad, Ranjeet Bharti, K.K.L. Gautam, Ms. Saroj Bala, Ms. Vaishali Nariyala, Kaushal Jeet Kait, Kritagya Kumar Kait, Manoj Sharma, Rahul Mohod, Abhishek Gurawa, Ms. Vasundhara Rana, Aditya Agarwal, Vinod Kumar Agarwal, Sanjeev Malhotra, Gaurav Yadava, Ms Veena Bansal, Sourav Jindal, Varun Thakur, Brajesh Pandey, Sudhir Singh, Varinder Kr. Sharma, Ms. Madhavi Khandelwal, Shashank Patro, Pawan Prakash Pathak, Ravi Chandran Iyar, Amol B.Karande, Rajsaheb Patil, Vikrant Yadav, A. Selvin Raja, A. Raja Mohammed, A. Mohammed Yusuff, Ms. V. Shahira Banu, S.A.S. Alandeen, Ms. Nikita

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Kumari, Dr. Charu Mathur, Ms. Tanvi Dubey, Rahul Unnikrishnan, Malak Bhatt, Sanjay Kumar Dubey, Sandeep S. Deshmukh, Raj Bahadur Yadav, Naresh Kumar, Advs. For the appearing parties. Prakash Sharma, Adv. (in person), Mrinal Shashi Shekhar Chakravorty (Petitioner-in-person), Intervenor-in-person. The following Judgments# and Order* of the Court were delivered: DINESH MAHESHWARI, J. Contents** Preliminary and Brief Outline......................................................3 The Referral and the Questions Formulated.............................5 Rival Submissions.......................................................................7 In challenge to the amendment in question...................................7 In part challenge to the amendment in question..........................33 In support of the amendment in question....................................36 Points for Determination............................................................44 Relevant Constitutional Provisions..........................................45 Doctrine of Basic Structure and Constitutional Amendments..54 Expanding Doctrine of ‘Equality’..............................................85 Affirmative Action by ‘Reservation’: Exception to the General Rule of Equality.........................................................................89 Economic Disabilities and Affirmative Action...........................95 Whether Economic Criteria as Sole Basis for Affirmative Action Violates Basic Structure...........................................................102 EWS Reservation Not Availing to Certain Classes: Whether Violates Basic Structure..........................................................125 Breach of Fifty Per Cent. Ceiling of Reservations and Basic Structure..................................................................................136 Other Factors and General Summation..................................146 Conclusions.............................................................................152 Acknowledgments...................................................................154 Ed. Note # There were four seperate judgments- one judgment each rendered by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheshwari, Hon’ble Ms. Justice Bela M. Trivedi, and, Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.B. Pardiwala; and a judgment rendered by Hon’ble Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, for himself and on behalf of Shri Uday Umesh Lalit, Hon’ble the Chief Justice. * Common order of the Court. ** Pagination in the Contents is as per the Original judgment.

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] Preliminary and Brief Outline 1. In this batch of transferred cases, transfer petitions, writ petitions and the petition for special leave to appeal, the challenge is to the Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 20191, which came into effect on 14.01.2019, whereby the parliament has amended Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India by adding two new clauses viz., clause (6) to Article 15 with Explanation and clause (6) to Article 16; and thereby, the State has been empowered, inter alia, to provide for a maximum of ten per cent. reservation for “the economically weaker sections”2 of citizens other than “the Scheduled Castes”3, “the Scheduled Tribes”4 and the non-creamy layer of “the Other Backward Classes”5. At the outset, it needs to be stated that the amendment in question does not mandate but enables reservation for EWS and prescribes a ceiling limit of ten per cent. 2. In a very brief outline of the forthcoming discussion, it could be noticed that the challenge to the amendment in question is premised essentially on three-fold grounds: first, that making of special provisions including reservation in education and employment on the basis of economic criteria is entirely impermissible and offends the basic structure of the Constitution; second, that in any case, exclusion of socially and educationally backward classes6 i.e., SCs, STs and noncreamy layer OBCs from the benefit of these special provisions for EWS is inexplicably discriminatory and destroys the basic structure of the Constitution; and third, that providing for ten per cent. additional reservation directly breaches the fifty per cent. ceiling of reservations already settled by the decisions of this Court and hence, results in unacceptable abrogation of the Equality Code which, again, destroys the basic structure of the Constitution. Per contra, it is maintained on behalf of the sides opposing this challenge that the amendment in question, empowering the State to make special provisions for the economically weaker sections of citizens, is squarely within the four corners of the Constitution of India; rather making of such provisions is necessary to achieve the Preambular goal of ‘JUSTICE, social, Hereinafter also referred to as ‘the amendment in question’ or ‘the 103rd Constitution Amendment’ or simply ‘the 103 rd Amendment’. ‘EWS’, for short. ‘SC’, for short. ‘ST’, for short. ‘OBC’, for short. ‘SEBC’, for short.

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economic and political’ in real sense of terms. It is also asserted that there is no discrimination in relation to the classes that are excluded from EWS for the simple reason that the existing special provisions of affirmative action in their relation continue to remain in operation. As regards the breach of fifty per cent. ceiling of reservations, the contention is that the said ceiling is not inflexible or inviolable and in the context of the object sought to be achieved, ten per cent. has been provided as the maximum by way of the enabling provision. 3. With the foregoing outline, we may usefully take note of the reference made to the Constitution Bench for determination of the substantial questions of interpretation of the Constitution, as are involved in these matters and the questions formulated while commencing the hearing. The Referral and the Questions Formulated

4. By an order dated 05.08.2020, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court took note of the issues arising in these matters and referred the same for determination by a Constitution Bench while observing, inter alia, as under: “…..By virtue of the impugned amendments, very Constitution is amended by inserting new clauses in Articles 15 and 16 thereof, which empower the State to make reservations by way of affirmative action to the extent of 10% to economically weaker sections. It is the case of the petitioners, that the very amendments run contrary to the constitutional scheme, and no segment of available seats/posts can be reserved, only on the basis of economic criterion. As such, we are of the view that such questions do constitute substantial questions of law to be considered by a Bench of five Judges. It is clear from the language of Article 145(3) of the Constitution and Order XXXVIII Rule 1(1) of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, the matters which involve substantial questions of law as to interpretation of constitutional provisions they are required to be heard a Bench of five Judges. Whether the impugned Amendment Act violates basic structure of the Constitution, by applying the tests of ‘width’ and ‘identity’ with reference to equality provisions of the Constitution, is a matter which constitutes substantial question of law within the meaning of the provisions as referred above. Further, on the plea of ceiling of 50% for affirmative action, it is the case of the respondent-Union of India

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] that though ordinarily 50% is the rule but same will not prevent to amend the Constitution itself in view of the existing special circumstances to uplift the members of the society belonging to economically weaker sections. Even such questions also constitute as substantial questions of law to be examined by a Bench of five Judges….” 5. Pursuant to the order aforesaid, this batch of matters has been referred to this Constitution Bench for determination of the issues arising from the challenge to the 103rd Amendment. On 08.09.2022, after perusing the issues suggested by learned counsel for the respective parties, this Court noted, amongst others, the issues suggested by the learned Attorney General for India as follows: “(1) Whether the 103rd Constitution Amendment can be said to breach the basic structure of the Constitution by permitting the State to make special provisions, including reservation, based on economic criteria? (2) Whether the 103rd Constitution Amendment can be said to breach the basic structure of the Constitution by permitting the State to make special provisions in relation to admission to private unaided institutions? (3) Whether the 103rd Constitution Amendment can be said to breach the basic structure of the Constitution in excluding the SEBCs/OBCs/SCs/STs from the scope of EWS reservation? (4) Whether the cap of 50% referred to in earlier decisions of the Supreme Court can be considered to be a part of the basic structure of the Constitution? if so, can the 103rd Constitution Amendment be said to breach the basic structure of the Constitution?” 5.1. Having taken note of the relevant facets of the matter, this Court found that the first three issues suggested by the learned Attorney General were the main issues arising in the matter while the other issues were essentially in the nature of supplementing and substantiating the propositions emerging from the said three issues. Accordingly, this Court proceeded with the hearing with respect to the first three issues aforesaid, while leaving it open to the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties to advance their submissions touching upon other facets in aid of the said three issues.

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6. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners, the respondents, and the interveners at substantial length and have also permitted them to submit written notes on their respective submissions. The principal and material submissions advanced in these matters could be usefully summarised, while avoiding unnecessary repetition of the same line of arguments. Rival Submissions In challenge to the amendment in question

7. Prof. (Dr.) G. Mohan Gopal led the arguments on the side of the petitioners challenging the amendment in question and also wrapped up the submissions in rejoinder. 7.1. The learned counsel has, while extensively relying on the Constituent Assembly Debates, Preamble, and Article 38 of the Constitution which enjoins the State to secure and protect “a social order in which justice, social, economic and political shall inform the institutions of the national life”, stressed that it was to ensure this social justice and the ethos of the Constitution that special provisions were envisioned under Article 15(4) and reservations in employment were provided under Article 16(4). He argued that it was due to certain primordial practices that a section of population was marginalised and was deprived of material resources and educational opportunities. The people in the lowest strand of social hierarchy were ostracised and stigmatised from public life and were deprived of basic liberties and equality. It was to address these historical inequalities that, as a vehicle of positive discrimination, the socially oppressed sections were provided reservations and special provisions so as to give them a voice in administration, access to resources such as education and public employment. Therefore, the idea of ensuring social equality and justice was a congenital feature of the Constitution shaping its basic structure. 7.2. The learned counsel has argued that this basic structure has been violated by the amendment in question which seeks to empower the privileged sections of society, who are neither socially and educationally backward nor inadequately represented. He also submitted that the amendment in question has introduced those section of people as economically weaker who were never subjected to any discrimination, whether historically or otherwise; and were not backward, socially and educationally. The learned counsel quoted Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Mr. V.I.

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

Muniswamy Pillai and Mr. Sardar Nagappa, from the Constituent Assembly Debates, to support his contention that reservation should not be used by the forward class as a self-perpetuating mechanism depriving the disadvantaged. The equation of the victims of social discrimination with those responsible for their victimisation, for the purpose of conferring benefits, was a contortion of the Constitution and no less than playing a fraud on it. He relied on decisions of this Court in T. Devadasan v. Union of India and Anr.: (1964) 4 SCR 680, State of Kerala and Anr. v. N.M. Thomas and Ors.: (1976) 2 SCC 310 7 and Indra Sawhney and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.: 1992 Supp (3) SCC 2178 to submit that this Court has discerned reservations and special provisions as an effective affirmative action to mitigate inequalities and ensure social justice and equality of opportunity. The learned counsel has further relied on the decision of this Court in M.R. Balaji and Ors. v. State of Mysore and Ors.: 1963 Supp (1) SCR 4399, which held that latent or covert transgression of the Constitution by abusing an ostensible power granted by it will amount to ‘fraud on the Constitution’.

7.3. The learned counsel has further submitted that the non obstante clause in Articles 15(6) and 16(6), while granting reservation to already privileged and adequately represented class of citizens, has vetoed the pre-requisite of being socially and educationally backward or inadequately represented, which was the kernel to philosophy of reservation. The Constitution puts forth social ‘and’ educational backwardness and not social ‘or’ educational backwardness as a criterion to determine positive discrimination in favour of a class. This foundation of social justice for historically marginalised and disadvantaged people is completely obliterated by the amendment in question, which removes that criterion. He argued that backward class included those classes from the forward class that were socially and educationally backward, hence making them eligible for benefits of reservation. He exemplified this by stating that there were numerous communities, traditionally belonging to the so-called ‘forward’ class, in several States and several of those are not professing any religion, but are recognised as OBC on the ground that they are socially and educationally backward.

7.4. On the point of exclusion of SCs, STs and OBCs, the learned counsel has argued that the concept of Fraternity, as envisaged in the

Hereinafter also referred to as ‘N.M. Thomas’. Hereinafter also referred to as ‘Indra Sawhney’. Hereinafter also referred to as ‘M.R. Balaji’.

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Constitution, informs Articles 15 and 17, giving shape to equality while prohibiting discrimination and discriminatory practices prevalent in our society. Inclusion of forward class and exclusion of disadvantaged class from the protection and benefit of reservation violate the basic structure of the Constitution. Learned counsel has relied on the decision of this Court in Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India and Ors.: (2020) 4 SCC 727 to highlight the place and role of Fraternity in the scheme of polity and society. Further he has stated that such exclusion of SCs, STs and OBCs was primarily based on caste because it is indeed undisputed that a large chunk of population so excluded are also economically backward along with being socially and educationally backward. Hence, he would submit that the basic principle of equality forming the basic structure of the Constitution stands abrogated by excluding those who are socially and educationally backward and also are part of systemic poverty/labour under abject poverty. 7.5. The learned counsel has yet further argued that the purpose of positive discrimination was to put an end to monopoly of certain classes and create an inclusive society so as to ensure equality of opportunity to the marginalised sections. However, the amendment in question creates a perpetual monopoly by providing reservation to that section of population whose identification is imprecise and is based on their individual traits more so, when these classes have been enjoying and are still enjoying control over resources and public employment. 7.6. Lastly, the learned counsel would submit that the amendment in question is not based on economic condition, which is multi-dimensional, but on financial incapacity which is transient in nature, rewarding poor financial behaviours and is, therefore, not a reliable criterion for giving reservation. There are two wings of reservation - social and educational backwardness, which cover the people who are economically weaker but not those who are financially incapable. Economic weakness goes hand-in-hand with social and educational backwardness. EWS is individual-centric in contrast to Article 38(2) of the Constitution, which talks about inter-group inequalities. Thus, the learned counsel has submitted that the 103rd Amendment deserves to be set aside, being violative of the principle of equality, which is the basic structure of the Constitution. 8. The learned senior counsel, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, elucidating on the twin objectives of Equality Code enshrined under Articles 14 to

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

17 of the Constitution as to the formal equality and substantive equality, has submitted that these provisions are to ensure that those sections of society who have been kept out of any meaningful opportunity, participation in public life and decision making, on the grounds enumerated under Article 15(1), be uplifted through positive discrimination, giving flesh and blood to the Equality Code, and essentially enabling the substantive equality. Emphasizing on the efficiency in services as under Article 335, she would submit that the positive discrimination has to be read alongwith other guardrails provided by the Constitution, ensuring identification of the protected group by constitutionally sanctioned bodies. The absence of these guardrails and safeguards in the newly created class of EWS through the amendment in question strikes at the core of the Equality Code, violating the basic structure of Constitution.

8.1. Stressing further on the argument of social and educational backwardness and inadequacy in representation being the bedrock for grant of reservations, the learned counsel has submitted that the communities, whom the amendment in question aims to protect, are duly represented in all walks of life and hence, even from the angle of adequacy in representation, they are not eligible to avail benefit of reservation under Articles 15 and 16. She has placed reliance on decisions of this Court in M.R. Balaji and Indra Sawhney to submit that it is social ‘and’ educational backwardness and not social ‘or’ educational backwardness that is to be considered by the legislature to grant the benefit of reservation. Furthermore, she has submitted that backwardness is sine qua non and the lynchpin for special provision or reservation; and as stated by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, backwardness was designed as a qualifying phrase to ensure that the ‘exception does not eat the rule’. 8.2. Moving on and while relying on the decisions of this Court in Indra Sawhney, N.M. Thomas, M.R. Balaji and B.K. Pavitra and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.: (2019) 16 SCC 129, the learned counsel has submitted that the purpose of reservation was to enable the backward classes to have a level playing field with the forward class so that they can participate in public life with them on an equal basis. Also, this Court has held that no one criterion such as caste could be the sole basis for grant of reservation. In the amendment in question, the economic criteria is the sole basis for grant of reservation without considering the concept of representation; and this prescription is not only against the judicial pronouncements but also against the Preambular vision of casteless society, hitting the basic structure of the Constitution.

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8.3. The learned counsel has further contended that for classes that are socially and educationally backward, there are constitutionally devised commissions and guardrails to ensure that the benefits are extended only to the deserving sections, who are actually socially and educationally backward but the amendment in question is bereft of any such guardrails or safeguards. The amendment is limited to those classes that are neither identifiable nor have any constitutionally devised mechanism for their identification. 8.4. The learned counsel would further submit that economic status is transient in nature and would keep on changing unlike the status of backwardness, which is based on age-old caste practices and oppressions that are immutable. The newly protected class under the amendment in question lacks historic and continuing lack of adequate representation caused by structural or institutional barriers, so as to be eligible for positive discrimination. Further, the reservation is intended to be operative only until there is inadequacy in representation of those classes and not in perpetuity. However, the present amendment prescribes essentially no end to reservation as there would always be people poorer than others. Since the need for reservation has been delinked from inadequacy of representation and the need to show backwardness, there is no natural guardrail or end point to reservations connected with poverty. This constitutes a clear violation of the Equality Code and of the basic structure of the Constitution. 8.5. In the alternative, the learned counsel has argued that even if this Court were to accept poverty and income as valid criteria for the grant of reservation then too, the amendment to the extent of ‘other than the class mentioned in clause (4) [and (5)]’ should be severed from Articles 15(6) and 16(6) so as to include the poor of all classes without any exclusion or discrimination. 9. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Sanjay Parikh, has relied extensively on the Constituent Assembly Debates to contend that the Assembly was of the clear opinion that the word ‘backward’ should precede ‘class of people’. Therefore, despite being aware of the rampant poverty in the country, the focus of reservations was predominantly on the social stigma attached to the group. Reservation in public employment was given because the framers wanted the backward classes to share State power and for that matter, they had to be provided equal opportunity. The Assembly intended to extend the benefits of affirmative action to

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

only those socially and educationally backward groups who had been excluded from mainstream national life due to historic injustice, stigma and discrimination and thus, bringing in any other criteria, excluding the communities who have suffered such stigmatisation, would be a blatant violation of not only the Equality Code but also the very principles of democracy (sharing of power being necessary to sustain democracy), both of which form part of the basic structure of the Constitution.

9.1. The learned counsel would submit that the criteria for ‘backwardness’ was always ‘social’ in nature and ‘economic’ backwardness was never accepted as the sole criteria. Placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Indra Sawhney, he has contended that by the majority of 8:1, it was held that economic criteria cannot be the sole basis to grant reservation under Article 16. Drawing attention to the theory of ‘Substantive Equality’ propounded by Prof. Sandra Fredman, the learned counsel has submitted that reservation solely on economic criteria would violate the principles of substantive equality ingrained in the Constitution, which was directed against identity-based historic marginalisation. 9.2. Learned counsel has further placed reliance on Indra Sawhney to draw distinction between backward class and weaker sections discussed under Articles 16(4) and 46, respectively. It has been argued that the latter has no limitations and thus, Article 46 cannot be the basis for providing reservation. He has also urged that exceeding fifty per cent. limit would violate the twin tests of width and identity, as propounded by this Court in M. Nagaraj and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.: (2006) 8 SCC 21210 and result in disturbance of equality; and that fifty per cent. limit cannot be breached under any circumstance except if a law is protected under the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution, which the amendment in question is not. He supported his argument citing Indra Sawhney and Dr. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. Chief Minister and Ors.: (2021) 8 SCC 1 11, wherein it was held that reservation under Article 16(4) should not exceed fifty per cent. 10. Traversing through the history of reservation policy since the year 1872 and the decision of this Court in State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan: AIR 1951 SC 226 12, Prof. Ravivarma

Hereinafter also referred to as ‘M. Nagaraj’. Hereinafter also referred to as ‘Dr. Jaishri Patil’. Hereinafter also referred to as ‘Champakam’.

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Kumar, learned senior counsel, has submitted that the ratio of decision of this Court in Champakam, that classification on the basis of religion, race, caste, language or any of them was against the ethos of Constitution, has been followed unanimously and consistently by this Court in M.R. Balaji and Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India and Ors.: (2008) 6 SCC 113. However, the 103rd Amendment reinstates the communal Government Order set aside in Champakam. 10.1. Elucidating further on formal and substantive equality, the learned counsel has submitted that despite ensuring equal opportunity to all, it was still felt necessary to prohibit discrimination specifically on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth so as to halt all inequality and create a more egalitarian society, protecting the interests of every individual through Articles 15, 16, 17, 23, 24 and 35. In order to highlight the intensity of caste-based discrimination in India, he exemplified the prejudices and discriminations faced by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and M.K. Gandhi and submitted that unless caste is destroyed in the country, equality cannot be attained in true sense of the term. 10.2. The learned counsel has further contended that the term “socially and educationally” backward has been employed in Article 15(4) and the expressions employed are not “socially or educationally” or “socially or economically”. The intention behind this was to protect those classes of population who have been historically disadvantaged by birth and not by loss of wealth or by accident. Further, the substantive equality enshrined through Articles 15 and 16 not only makes the provisions to bridge the gap but it also provides the means by which this gap can be bridged. Likewise, under Article 340, the first Backward Classes Commission laid down 22 parameters for the identification of a backward class. The amendment in question does not have any such machinery employed within its ambit for the identification of population who would fall under the EWS category. Relying upon the census report, he has submitted that the population who would fall under the EWS would be around five per cent., and providing ten per cent. of reservation for such a small population, more so to the forward class, is manifestly arbitrary and fraud on the Constitution. Further, this positive discrimination is taking away the rights from rest of the population. 10.3. The learned counsel has further argued that as per the grounds of discrimination in Article 15, the Constitution has provided a

Hereinafter also referred to as ‘Ashoka Kumar Thakur’.

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

bridge for all the grounds but there, economic deprivation is not mentioned, which clarifies that it was not considered as a basis for discrimination. Applying the principle of ejusdem generis to Article 46, he contended that the measures contemplated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amendment in question are in favour of SCs and STs and those weaker sections who are similarly circumstanced to SCs and STs; and definitely is not meant for those castes and sections which are at the other end of the pendulum in the society.

10.4. Relying on the decision of this Court in Indra Sawhney, the learned counsel has posited that economic criteria cannot be the sole basis to provide reservation. He would further submit that a class should be homogenous, have a common origin, and have the numerical strength. The EWS created by the amendment in question does not fulfill any of the criteria and hence, cannot be called a class for any State action, particularly the affirmative action. He further emphasised on this argument by intensively reading the opinion of Justice Sahai in Indra Sawhney. 10.5. The learned counsel has further submitted that the amendment in question fails on all the anvils of Equality Code because, if poverty is the rationale behind it and it aims at providing jobs for the poor by way of reservation then, the amendment fails to address as to how the poverty of the forward class is different from that of the SCs, STs and OBCs. Hence, the amendment in question fails the twin test of rationality and nexus, and violates the basic structure of Constitution. 11. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Salman Khurshid, has submitted that in India, reservation formed a special part of affirmative action. It is within the larger affirmative action circle that reservation finds its place. Drawing analogy with countries like U.S.A., Israel and Germany, the learned counsel has submitted that indeed affirmative action can be an answer, but it is not the only answer. There are, therefore, many ways of addressing the issue of economic disadvantage other than reservation, as has been done by these countries. He would further submit that the limit for such reservation cannot exceed fifty per cent. except in cases where compelling reasons arise. Arguing on the Equality Code, learned counsel has relied on the classification laid down by this Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr.: (1974) 4 SCC 3, to submit that the present amendment neither has any reasonable classification nor such classification has any nexus with the object to be achieved,

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hence is violative of Article 14. Entire list of reserved categories of citizens is caste-based and the amendment did not include any metric or indicator, ignoring the marginalisation criteria entirely while granting reservation. He has also quoted the works of John Rawls to submit that each person has the same indefeasible right over every claim.

12. “One law for lion and ox is oppression”, Mr. P. Wilson, learned senior counsel, quoting William Blake, has contested the amendment in question on four grounds. First, granting reservation to upper caste is violation of the basic structure of Constitution as the basis of reservation must be rooted in identified past discrimination which impeded access to public administration and education opportunities. Relying on the decision of this Court in Indra Sawhney and judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Dayaram Khemkaran Verma v. State of Gujarat: 2016 SCC Online Guj 1821 wherein similar reservations on the basis of economic criteria were quashed by this Court and the High Court respectively, he has submitted that economic criteria cannot be the sole basis for providing reservation, and the reservation cannot exceed fifty per cent. limit. Second, he submitted that reservation in the favour of forward class violates the basic structure of the Constitution and is, therefore, unconstitutional. Third, classification of EWS is neither reasonable nor valid. The reason for providing reservation to SC, ST and OBC communities was historical and perpetual discrimination and stigmatisation. It was the structural barrier that kept them from the mainstream. Reservation cannot be used as a poverty alleviation scheme. Hence, such classification violates the Equality Code under Article 14. Fourth, the amendment in question fails the width test laid down by this Court in M. Nagaraj as there are no limitations or indicators that have been devised to identify the people falling under the EWS. Whereas, for each category, be it SC, ST or OBC, the Constitution is overseeing the reservation by virtue of Articles 366(24), 366(25), 338, 340, 341 etc. Hence, the amendment in question fails the guided power test.

13. Learned senior counsel, Mr. K.S. Chauhan, while placing reliance on Constituent Assembly Debates and decision of this Court in Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala and Anr.: (1973) 4 SCC 22514, has argued that the 103rd Amendment violates the basic structure of the Constitution as it changes the identity of the Constitution. He would again submit that providing reservation solely on

Hereinafter also referred to as ‘Kesavananda’.

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

economic criteria is against the decision of this Court in Indra Sawhney and also against the facet of democracy, as democracy ought to be representative. The learned counsel would argue that economic criteria is transient in nature whereas the inclusion of backward classes under Article 16(4) was on the ground of historical exclusion. In our society, discrimination finds its root in caste, religion, race, etc. and not in economic condition of a person. The classification under Article 14 has to have reasonable nexus and intelligible differentia which the amendment in question, because of all the aforesaid reasons, fails to achieve. He has also submitted that indeed forward class must have faced some discrimination, but the intensity of discrimination is not enough to justify reservation. To support his submission, he has relied on the judgment of this Court in Madhav Rao Scindia Bahadur etc. v. Union of India: (1971) 1 SCC 85 wherein it was held that constitutional philosophy is the obligation of the executive; if a particular class is eligible for identification in a category and it is not identified as such, the constitutional scheme will be destroyed; and if under the constitutional scheme, an obligation is given to a wing and if that wing is not discharging the function, it is a fraud on the Constitution.

14. Learned counsel, Mr. Yadav Narender Singh, while referring to Sinho Commission Report, has submitted that the report, on the basis of which the amendment was enacted, itself stated that economic criteria would not result in homogenous class. Learned counsel has argued that in the absence of quantifiable data, one could not create a class for which protective measures are to be taken. The said Report concluded that if poverty is kept as a base-line for reservation, then it should have in its ambit all, irrespective of their class, more so because the poor of SCs, STs and OBCs are worse-off than those of general category. He has further argued that the condition precedent for a protective clause is existence of discrimination. Hence, protective action for a class that is neither a homogenous class nor is discriminated against, is violative of the basic structure of the Constitution. Learned counsel has relied upon the decision of this Court in Indra Sawhney, to submit that economic criteria cannot be the sole basis for classification. He has further argued, in the alternative, that even if reservation on grounds of economic criteria is to be given, EWS ought to include those who are living below the poverty line (BPL). 15. Learned counsel, Mr. Shadan Farasat, while adding on to the submissions already advanced by the preceding counsel for petitioners,

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posited that the originalist understanding of reservation is that it can solely be granted as an anti-discriminatory measure and not as an antideprivation measure. Hence, the amendment in question cannot sustain itself, as it addresses the deprivation faced by an individual and not discrimination.

15.1. The learned counsel would further argue that even if it is assumed that reservation can be granted as an anti-deprivation measure, still the amendment violates the Equality Code as it excludes the SCs, STs and OBCs, who are poorer than the poor of forward class, without any intelligible differentia and its nexus with the object sought to be achieved. Opposing the justification that these classes are already protected by way of Articles 15(4) and 16(4), he has submitted that the purpose of Articles 15(4) and 16(4) is to protect a ‘group’ and to counter the historical wrong/oppression done to them. Whereas, the amendment in question deals with situational deprivation, mainly economic criteria, and is intended to protect an individual. Purposes and entities of both the protections being different, inclusion of SCs, STs and OBCs in one cannot mean their exclusion from the other.

15.2. The learned counsel has re-emphasised on the submissions that statistically, the backward class poor are worse off than forward class poor and their poverty is deeper, more intense and likely to be stickier and persistent. He has relied on Sinho Commission Report, NITI Aayog Multi-dimensional Poverty Index, along with other reports; and has argued that the question before the Sinho Commission was whether there could be reservation for general category people not covered in any other category. The Report itself stated that the backward class poor are poorer than the upper-class poor. He would underscore the point that poverty is deeply linked to the caste of an individual and the perception surrounding that status. 15.3. The learned counsel has further submitted that grant of reservation as a measure of affirmative action is a way for reparation and does not lead to economic upliftment. The object of economic upliftment of deprived sections of society can be achieved through other measures of poverty alleviation but reservation is not the answer. While contending that Articles 15(1) and 16(1) are part of the basic structure of Constitution and that it is only in furtherance of substantive equality that formal equality can be breached, he has submitted that exclusion on the basis of caste straightaway breaches formal equality. Further,

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

exclusion of those who are arguably more impacted by this criterion violates substantive equality too, hitting the Equality Code, and resultantly violating the basic structure of the Constitution.

15.4. In another line of arguments, the learned counsel has put forth the proposition that the words “other than” in Articles 15(6) and 16(6) should be read as ”in addition to”, thereby including SCs, STs and OBCs within them and furthering the basic structure. He has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India and Anr.: (2018) 8 SCC 501 to submit that if two interpretations are possible - one which destroys the basic structure and the other which enhances it - then purposive approach enhancing the basic structure of the Constitution is to be taken and not the literal approach. He has concluded the submissions while quoting from the judgment of this Court in K.C. Vasanth Kumar and Anr. v. State of Karnataka: 1985 Supp SCC 71415 that lower the caste, the poorer are its members. 16. Learned counsel, Ms. Diya Kapoor, while stressing upon the Equality Code and it being part of the basic structure, has argued on two facets. First, as to whether the inclusion of new class of reservation solely on the basis of economic criteria was constitutionally permissible; and second, as to whether the exclusion of SCs, STs and OBCs from this newly created class, was constitutionally permissible. She mapped the historical background of reservations for backward classes since 1917 until the Constituent Assembly Debates, where Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Mr. K.M. Munshi supported the use of the term ‘backward’ so as to grant special benefits to the classes qualifying that criterion and to neutralize the oppression faced by them. She would submit that such classification was based on long continuing historical oppression faced by these classes. Thus, to ensure their representation, reservations were provided as a means to foster the equality and fraternity of the country, with various checks and safeguards. 16.1. The learned counsel has further argued that reservation is for participation and representation and cannot be used for poverty alleviation. Reservation in public employment is to reverse discrimination and to equalize representation. Providing government jobs cannot pave a way for economic upliftment whereas, other ways of providing subsidies etc., is a kind of affirmative action to eliminate poverty. Indeed, poverty

Hereinafter also referred to as ‘Vasanth Kumar’.

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alleviation is a goal for the State to strive for as per Directive Principles of State Policy16 but, reservation is not a way to alleviate poverty, as is evident from the statistics that despite decades of reservation in favour of SCs, STs and OBCs, they are still poor. Relying on the decision of this Court in Minerva Mills Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.: (1980) 3 SCC 62517, she would submit that alleviation of poverty has to be done without trampling on Fundamental Rights. Welfare steps can be taken under DPSP but it cannot be done under Article 15 unless there has been discrimination on the grounds mentioned in Article 15(1), as otherwise, the character of Article 15 is changed and results in abrogating the Fundamental Rights. As iterated by this Court in Indra Sawhney, Article 16(4) has to be in consonance with and in furtherance to Article 16(1). Similarly, Article 16(6) also has to be in furtherance of equality of opportunity under Article 16(1). So, if Article 16(6) is violative of Article 16(1), it cannot sustain itself in the scheme of the Constitution. 16.2. Further relying upon 3-Judge bench decision of this Court in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India: (2000) 1 SCC 168, the learned counsel has submitted that by providing reservation to forward class, the identity of backward class is erased and therefore, such reservation is illegal, hitting at the roots of the Constitution. Moreover, if the forward class becomes backward, it can come under OBC so as to benefit from reservation. She would reason that the 103rd Constitution Amendment is discriminatory to SCs and STs as the people falling in EWS are approximately five per cent. and for these five per cent. of people ten per cent. of reservation is provided. The learned counsel would further submit that the amendment in question is arbitrary too, for there is no mechanism/procedure laid down for it, as under Article 340, for identification of genuine EWS. 17. Learned counsel, Dr. M.P. Raju, has based his submission on the ground that the amendment in question is a caste-based reservation that excludes the historically oppressed groups (SC/ST/OBC) from its coverage and is thus, destructive to the aim of ‘casteless society’, which is the Preambular vision forming the basic structure of the Constitution. Learned counsel has submitted that this amendment has created two levels of classification - first, between the classes already covered under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) (socially and educationally backward classes)

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‘DPSP’, for short. Hereinafter also referred to as ‘Minerva Mills’.

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

and those who were not (forward class/non-reserved), which has resulted in caste-based classification; second, within the forward class between those who were economically weaker and those who were not. Such classification, in his opinion, not only defeats the goal of casteless society, as envisaged by the Constituent Assembly, but also attempts to create vertical reservation inside a vertical reservation, which is not permitted under the Constitution.

17.1. The learned counsel has further submitted that, as held by this Court in Indra Sawhney, if castelessness is an ideal of the Constitution, and if this ideal goes into the basic identity of the Constitution, then the constitutional amendment, even if passes the test of equality, violates the basic structure. He has also urged that the condition of ‘adequate representation’ that controlled Article 16(4) is intentionally excluded from Articles 15(6) and 16(6). Reservation, once starts, has to end. It cannot be in perpetuity. He has further argued that the amendment in question is violative of the Constitution inasmuch as grant of reservation to already sufficiently represented classes while excluding those who were inadequately represented (SC/ST/OBC) offends not only the Equality Code but also the principle of Fraternity, as recognised in the Preamble to the Constitution. He has supported his contentions while relying upon decisions of this Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors.: (2002) 8 SCC 481 and V.V. Giri v. D.S. Dora: (1960) 1 SCR 246. 18. Learned counsel, Mr. Kaleeswaram Raj, has based his submissions on modern jurisprudence citing academic scholarship18 to submit that two things are to be considered while dealing with discrimination law. First, the immutability and second, it should constitute fundamental choice. Relativity of poverty is antithetical to immutability. He has further submitted that the 103rd Amendment in the context of exclusion, made the forward communities as protected group and the backward class as cognate group, which is impermissible. The amendment in question strips off the right of backward class candidates to contest the seats kept in open category, to which they are entitled to. The learned counsel has argued that this amendment fails the preference test by giving preferential treatment to forward class and taking it away from backward class who are inadequately represented. He has further ‘A Theory of Discrimination Law’ by Tarunabh Khaitan, Oxford University Press 2015.

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submitted that the ‘living tree’ approach should be applied to interpret the Constitution as per the changing circumstances of the society. 18.1. Learned counsel has also argued that Fundamental Rights are individualistic in nature; and while relying on the decision of this Court in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors.: (2017) 10 SCC 1, he would submit that the individual is the focal point because it is only in the realization of individual rights, that the collective well-being of the group can be determined and hence, it remains baseless to say that collective rights have been provided to the SC/ST/OBC as a group. 19. Learned counsel, Mr. Pratik Bombarde, has submitted that the amendment in question changes the identity of Fundamental Rights while omitting to take into account the crucial factor that social backwardness was a ‘cause’ of economic backwardness and not its ‘consequence’. While relying on the decision in Saurav Yadav and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.: (2021) 4 SCC 542 which held that open category is open to all and horizontal and vertical reservations are methods of ensuring representation in public places, he has argued that the right to equality of the persons belonging to SC, ST and OBC communities is impacted by reducing their seats in open category. He would reiterate that rule of ejusdem generis shall apply while reading Article 46. Lastly, he has submitted that confining each social category to its extent of reservation would result in communal reservation, which, in turn, would result in breach of Equality Code and thereby, damage the basic structure of the Constitution. 20. Learned counsel, Mr. Akash Kakade referred to the phraseology of the provisions under consideration and submitted that while Articles 15(4) and 15(5) refer to socially and educationally backward classes, Article 16(4) is directed towards backwardness and inadequate representation. According to him, the impugned provisions of Articles 15(6) and 16(6) have left aside the key elements of “social backwardness” and “inadequate representation” while providing for EWS reservation. These provisions, therefore, are rather antithetical to the spirit of the existing provisions. The learned counsel has again urged that Article 46 should be read under the rule of ejusdem generis and by excluding SC, ST and OBC communities, the said rule is violated. According to the learned counsel, keeping SC, ST and OBC communities outside of its scope and bringing in economically weaker sections within it was never

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

the idea of Article 46. He has also submitted that no constitutionally recognised commission has been set up for determination of the financial incapacity/capacity of a candidate, as in the case of OBCs.

21. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Shekhar Naphade, has argued that there was no dimension of equality, other than what was rooted in Articles 14 to 16 of the Constitution. Relying on passages of judgments of A.N. Ray, C.J. and P. Jaganmohan Reddy, J. in Kesavananda, which indicated that new dimensions of equality could be discerned having regard to new challenges, he has submitted that those observations were not endorsed by other judges. As a result, the amendment cannot sustain itself on the ground that it gives shape to another facet or dimension of equality. Learned counsel has further contended that economic criteria cannot be the sole criteria for the basis of classification, and if it is to be taken as a sole criterion, Indra Sawhney has to be revisited, which cannot be done by this Bench of 5 Judges. 22. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Jayant Muthuraj, in addition to the arguments already advanced, would submit that ten per cent. reservation in open category in favour of forward class reduces the availability of seats in open category for other classes and communities, in particular the persons belonging to the creamy layer category in SEBCs/OBCs. This, according to him, would damage the basic structure of the Constitution. 23. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Ravi K. Deshpande, and the learned counsel, Mr. Sachin Patil, Mr. Shashank Ratnoo, Mr. Varun Thakur, Mr. P.A. Noor Muhammad and Mr. A. Selvin Raja have also made their submissions as interveners. All of their submissions, which are akin to the submissions already noticed above, need not be elaborated. However, in sum and substance, their additional submissions had been that the amendment in question, which states ‘not more than ten per cent. of the total seats in each category’ has to be interpreted as providing ten per cent. reservation for EWS in each category. One of the interveners provided the statistics as to the percentage of people working in each category to submit that the exclusion of SCs, STs and OBCs is invalid as they are still inadequately represented in State services. Further they submitted that the current strength of Bench is not competent to overrule Indra Sawhney wherein it was explicitly held that reservation cannot be based solely on economic criteria. Yet further, discussing the power of Parliament under Article 368, it was posited that

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the Parliament has the power to amend the Constitution by way of ‘addition, variation or repeal’ and not by breaking down the basic structure of the Constitution. In part challenge to the amendment in question

24. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan has taken a stance different than other petitioners, and has contended that the amendment in question is violative of basic structure of the Constitution only to the extent of the words ‘in addition to the existing reservation and’ which need to be severed and that the rest of the part, which provides classification on the economic criteria for extension of special provisions for the advancement of economically weaker sections excluding classes already covered under Articles 15(4) and 16(4), was permissible. 24.1. The learned counsel has, otherwise, supported the amendment in question on two grounds. First, that the insertion of the Economically Weaker Sections is perfectly valid as a class for the extension of special provisions for their advancement, admissions and for reservations in posts. He has submitted that the classification on the basis of economic criteria has been recognised in plethora of measures introduced by the State from providing housing, admission in schools or hospitals, to several statutes for their upliftment. Further, this Court in M.R. Balaji, R. Chitralekha and Anr. v. State of Mysore and Ors.: (1964) 6 SCR 368 and Vasanth Kumar has accepted poverty as an indicator of backwardness, while considering reservation. It has been argued that the present constitutional amendment has removed the basis of Indra Sawhney (bar on using economic criteria as a sole determinative of backwardness); and in fact, such an amendment would further the goal of economic justice, thus strengthening the basic structure of the Constitution. The learned counsel has supported his submission with reference to the decision in Waman Rao and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.: (1981) 2 SCC 36219. 24.2. Second, at divergence from other submissions regarding exclusion of SC, ST and OBC communities, he has argued that such an exclusion is permissible as the exclusion is not of ‘castes’ but of ‘classes’ who are already receiving the benefit of special provisions. Further, the SCs, STs and OBCs receive political reservations

Hereinafter also referred to as ‘Waman Rao’.

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

as well without having any ceiling limits as such whereas, EWS reservation is capped at ten per cent. and is not extended to political reservation, thereby providing a balance with sufficient guardrails and safeguards. Therefore, this amendment was long due, stepping away from caste-based reservation to provide reservation for that class of persons who had hitherto been overlooked.

24.3. Advancing his submission that the amendment in question, to the extent of ‘in addition to existing reservation’, is violative of the basic structure of the Constitution, the learned counsel has given threefold reasoning. First, the expression ‘in addition to’ cements reservation, perpetuating the existing reservations within the Constitution as a permanent feature which violates basic structure of the Constitution as laid down in various decisions including those in Champakam, M.R. Balaji, Indra Sawhney, Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. State of Bihar and Ors.: (1995) 5 SCC 403 and Subhash Chandra and Anr. v. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board and Ors.: (2009) 15 SCC 458. Secondly, the amendment in question inserts enabling provision “in addition to”, making EWS reservation reliant on those of SCs, STs and/or OBCs, which effectively converts enabling provisions in Articles 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4) into enabled provisions, inconsistent with the ethos and guiding principles of the Constitution. Lastly, on the extent of reservation, he would submit that the amendment providing reservation “in addition to existing reservation” breaches the fifty per cent. ceiling limit, which is now not only a part of constitutional interpretation of reservation provisions but is also a part of basic structure of the Constitution. He has further emphasised that in more than 54 judgments of this Court in over 60 years, it has been repeatedly stated that fifty per cent. ceiling limit must be maintained when reservations are activated while interpreting Articles 15 and 16. This, as per his contention, lends enough strength for fifty per cent. ceiling limit to be a basic feature of the Constitution. In support of his submission on the extent of reservations, learned counsel has relied upon the decisions in Bhim Singhji v. Union of India and Ors.: (1981) 1 SCC 16620, M. Nagaraj and Dr. Jaishri Patil.

In support of the amendment in question 25. Learned Attorney General for India, Mr. K.K. Venugopal, has posited that the 103rd Amendment does not violate the basic structure

Hereinafter also referred to as ‘Bhim Singhji’.

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of the Constitution, rather fosters it. Second, the exclusion of those classes already covered under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) from the proposed reservation did not breach the Equality Code. Third, the fifty per cent. limit is not a sacrosanct rule. Lastly, the benefit to EWS with respect to admission in private aided or unaided educational institutions does not violate Article 14, as has been settled by this Court. 25.1. While quoting from Bhim Singhji, the learned Attorney General has submitted that a mere violation of Article 14 does not violate the basic structure of the Constitution unless ‘the violation is shocking, unconscionable or unscrupulous travesty of the quintessence of equal justice’. Relying on M. Nagaraj, he has submitted that a constitutional amendment can be struck down only when it changes the identity of the Constitution. In support of his submissions, he has also relied on the decisions of this Court in Raghunathrao Ganpatrao v. Union of India: 1994 Supp (1) SCC 19121, Ashoka Kumar Thakur and Minerva Mills. 25.2. Learned Attorney General has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in M. Nagaraj, as to dynamic interpretation of the Constitution to strengthen its Preambular vision; and has submitted that Articles 38 and 46 along with Preamble to the Constitution enjoin a duty on the State to eliminate social, economic and political inequalities and to promote justice. He has further argued that this Court has, over the years, repeatedly recognised that it was desirable to use poverty as the only basis for affirmative action and that it is poverty or economic deprivation that results in social and educational backwardness. He has relied on the decisions of this Court in Vasanth Kumar and Ashoka Kumar Thakur to support his contention. He has further submitted that the creation of new class fosters the vision of ‘Economic Justice’, as set out in the Preamble, hence strengthening the basic structure of the Constitution. 25.3. Learned Attorney General has further contended that the exclusion of already covered classes does not violate Equality Code as the EWS among the SC, ST and OBC communities are already enjoying the benefit of affirmative action in their favour by way of reservations in educational institutions and public employment, seats in Legislature, etc., to attain an equal status - socially and educationally. However, the EWS among the classes not covered under any of provisions preceding Articles

Hereinafter also referred to as ‘Raghunathrao’.

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

15(6) and 16(6) do not have any special provision made in their favour except for reservation by way of the present amendment. Further, this ten per cent. carved out for EWS is in addition to the existing reservation in favour of SEBCs; meaning thereby that it does not in any way affect the reservation upto fifty per cent. for the SEBCs/OBCs/SCs/STs.

25.4. As to the extent of reservation, learned Attorney General has submitted that the fifty per cent. cap as laid down in Indra Sawhney is for the classes covered under Articles 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4). Therefore, extending the benefit of ten per cent. to these classes would exceed the reservation made for them beyond fifty per cent. and that would be violative of Indra Sawhney. He has also contended that this fifty per cent. rule could be breached in extraordinary situation, as held by Indra Sawhney; and is, therefore, not an inviolable rule or part of the basic structure of the Constitution.

25.5. On the question of private unaided educational institutions, learned Attorney General has relied on the decision in Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India and Anr.: (2012) 6 SCC 1 which upheld twenty-five per cent. reservation in favour of EWS under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, which was further affirmed the by 5-Judge Bench in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (Registered) and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.: (2014) 8 SCC 122. 26. Learned Solicitor General of India, Mr. Tushar Mehta, has submitted that to set aside a constitutional amendment, very high judicial threshold is needed. He would submit that a constitutional amendment may even touch upon the basic structure but unless it is shown that it fundamentally alters the basic structure or basic features of the Constitution, it cannot be struck down under judicial review. In support of his contentions, learned Solicitor General has placed reliance on the said decisions in Raghunathrao, Bhim Singhji and Kesavananda as also on the decision in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain and Anr.: 1975 Supp SCC 123. He has further argued that the amendment in question, instead of hitting or disturbing the basic structure, rather strengthens the Preambular vision of the Constitution i.e., of providing economic justice to its people along with social and political justice.

Hereinafter also referred to as ‘Pramati Trust’. Hereinafter also referred to as ‘Indira Nehru Gandhi’.

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26.1. Learned Solicitor General has further argued that the exclusion of classes already covered under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) does not violate the Equality Code; and that from the time of the decision in Champakam to the recent decision in Dr. Jaishri Patil, the understanding and concept of equality and reservation have changed and evolved with time, and the reservation itself has been treated as a part and parcel of the Equality Code that furthers substantive equality. The Constitution has recognised different zones of affirmative action, whereby it extends reservation and special provisions as to the needs of each section of the society. For instance, all SEBCs do not have any reservation in Parliament, however, SCs and STs have been given a secured representation in Parliament. Learned Solicitor General has also submitted that except for the open category, the SCs, STs and OBCs are not permitted to migrate to the other vertical reservations; and similarly, the Constitution has created another vertical zone for EWS category, which exists outside the fold of pre-existing reservations. Further, he would submit that ten per cent. reservation in favour of EWS would result in miniscule delimitation of the available seats in favour of SC, ST and OBC communities (SC: reduces from 65 per cent. to 55 per cent.; ST: reduces from 57.5 per cent. to 47.5 per cent.; and OBC: reduces from 77 per cent. to 67 per cent.). 26.2. On the question of fifty per cent. ceiling limit, learned Solicitor General has again submitted that this percentage could be exceeded in exceptional circumstances for, being neither a fundamental tenet of the Constitution nor a part of its basic structure. He lastly contended that the validity of a constitutional amendment cannot be tested on possible apprehensions or absence of guardrails. 26.3. Mr. Kanu Agrawal, learned counsel, has supplemented the submissions of learned Solicitor General that the amendment in question has guardrails inbuilt in it by having the upper limit of reservation fixed at ten per cent. unlike Articles 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4). He further submitted that exclusion of other classes is inherent in the concept of reservation and therefore, the exclusion of SC, ST and OBC communities already covered under preceding provisions is not violative of Equality Code. Thus, the exclusion clause ‘other than’ is an “opportunity cost” which does not violate the basic structure of the Constitution. Further, he has submitted that Pramati Trust is squarely applicable to Article 15(6) as well as to making of special provisions in relation to admission to the private unaided institutions.

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

27. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Mahesh Jethmalani, has submitted that the amendment in question takes into account the changing conditions of society as iterated in M. Nagaraj and hence, purposive interpretation of the Constitution has to be resorted to. He has further submitted that, as held in Dr. Jaishri Patil, there must be harmony between Fundamental Rights and DPSP, which the amendment seeks to strike. Further, learned counsel would submit that the challenge in Indra Sawhney was to an Office Memorandum and the view of the Court that economic criteria cannot be the sole basis ran contrary to its own view of excluding creamy layer from OBCs on economic basis. Further, Indra Sawhney tested the Office Memorandum on the tenets of Article 16 alone. Here, the amendment in question, being a constitutional amendment, has to be tested on the threshold of violation of basic structure to an extent that it changes the identity of the Constitution.

28. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Niranjan Reddy, has submitted that neither the entitlement to reservation nor exclusion therefrom is part of the basic structure of the Constitution; and that reservations are enabling provisions, temporary in nature and do not hold within them the feature of permanence, so as to form part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Indra Sawhney, staged 30 years ago, dealt with ‘schematic interpretation’ of Articles 16(4) and 15(4). He further emphasized on the balance to be maintained between the competing claims that keeps on changing with the needs of the society. He based his argument principally on the premise that economic criteria by itself can be a determinative factor for backwardness. He has supported his contention by quoting Indra Sawhney, which mentioned R. Chitralekha (supra), where occupation-cum-means test was employed so as to determine social backwardness. On the issue of exclusion of SCs, STs and OBCs, he has submitted that there is already an affirmative action in the form of reservation and special provisions operating in their favour. Their “opportunity quotient” including the reserved and open category exceeds fifty per cent. Hence, the ten per cent. in favour of EWS, in no way violates the Equality Code. According to the learned counsel, in fact, exclusion of SCs, STs and OBCs perfectly fits the constitutional scheme so as to avoid double benefit to them; and thus, exclusion is a part of reasonable classification. 29. Learned senior counsel, Ms. Vibha Dutta Makhija, has submitted that the ‘Living Tree’ approach has to be applied while interpreting the Constitution so as to further a more inclusive and

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progressive society. Learned counsel has argued that right of the EWS category arises from Article 21 of the Constitution, which provides for the right of dignity; and poverty affects dignity. She has also emphasised on various international obligations namely Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which the Constitution caters under Articles 46, 51(c) and 253, so as to submit that it is the duty of the State to eradicate poverty in order to ensure economic justice; and in that context too, the amendment in question becomes an empowering measure for those who are in systemic poverty. She has further referred to the works of economist Mr. Amartya Sen, to elucidate upon the concept and effect of poverty. 29.1. Learned counsel has further argued that the Constitution does not impede the Parliament to protect a new section of people in order to further the Preambular vision of economic justice, different from the traditional approach of caste-based affirmative action. Learned counsel has further exemplified, by referring to U.P. Constables, teachers and Shiksha-Mitra recruitments, that OBCs are already in good position now, earning seats in meritorious category as well as in reserved category and it is the EWS who are suffering and being deprived of the seats. She lastly contended that the basis of classification in the amendment in question is ‘intersecting disadvantages’ if not ‘generational disadvantages’; and there is no bar or violation of basic structure of the Constitution in addressing these intersecting disadvantages. 30. Learned counsel, Mr. V.K. Biju, on the basis of various reports and statistical data, has argued that reservation on the basis of economic criteria is the need of the hour and the stepping stone to achieve economic and social justice, moving away from caste-based reservations, as also vocalised by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in Constituent Assembly Debates. He has further argued that even in Indra Sawhney, the Court took a conscious note that there may be a group or class of people, who can qualify for benefits of reservation irrespective of caste. Points for Determination 31.Three major issues to be answered in these matters by this Bench have been noticed at the outset. In order to answer those issues and in view of the variety of submissions urged as also the subject-matter, following principal points arise for determination:

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

(a) As to whether reservation is an instrument for inclusion of socially and educationally backward classes to the mainstream of society and, therefore, reservation structured singularly on economic criteria violates the basic structure of the Constitution of India?

(b) As to whether the exclusion of classes covered under Articles 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4) from getting benefit of reservation as economically weaker sections violates the Equality Code and thereby, the basic structure doctrine?

(c) As to whether reservation for economically weaker sections of citizens up to ten per cent. in addition to the existing reservations results in violation of basic structure on account of breaching the ceiling limit of fifty per cent.?

31.1. All these points are essentially structured on three important components namely, (i) the general rule of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution; (ii) the reservations enabled in Articles 15 and 16 as exception to the general rule of equality; and (iii) the doctrine of basic structure that defines and limits the power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution.

Relevant Constitutional Provisions 32. Any process of determination of the points aforesaid would invariably require an insight of the constitutional provisions. The relevant provisions could be usefully reproduced as follows:

32.1. Preamble to the Constitution of India, in its present form, reads as under: “WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens: JUSTICE, social, economic and political;

LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all

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FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation; IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION.”

32.2. The underlying attribute of all the points and questions arising in these matters is as to whether the 103rd Amendment violates the basic structure of the Constitution. The discussion, therefore, revolves around the power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution and for this purpose, we need to have a close look at the provisions contained in Article 368 of the Constitution. 32.2.1. Article 368, as originally adopted, read as under: “368. Procedure for amendment of the Constitution.-

An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the introduction of a Bill for the purpose in either House of Parliament, and when the Bill is passed in each House by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting, it shall be presented to the President for his assent and upon such assent being given to the Bill, the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill: Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change in—

(a) article 54, article 55, article 73, article 162 or article 241, or (b) Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or Chapter I of Part XI, or (c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or

(d) the representation of States in Parliament, or (e) the provisions of this article, the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislature of not less than one-half of the States specified in Parts A and B of the First Schedule by resolution to that effect passed by those

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] Legislatures before the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the President for assent.” 32.2.2. Article 368 has undergone several amendments, some of which had been the subject matter of debates in this Court, including the cases of Kesavananda and Minerva Mills. Leaving aside other details, we may reproduce the relevant of the provisions now contained in Article 368 as under: “368. Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure therefor.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament may in exercise of its constituent power amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of this Constitution in accordance with the procedure laid down in this article. (2) An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the introduction of a Bill for the purpose in either House of Parliament, and when the Bill is passed in each House by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting, it shall be presented to the President who shall give his assent to the Bill and thereupon the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill: Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change in—

(a) article 54, article 55, article 73, article 162, article 241 or article 279-A, or (b) Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or Chapter I of Part XI, or

(c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or (d) the representation of States in Parliament, or (e) the provisions of this article,

the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislature of not less than one-half of the States by resolution to that effect passed by those Legislatures before the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the President for assent.

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(3) Nothing in article 13 shall apply to any amendment made under this article.

***

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*** “24

32.2.3. After the amendments approved in Kesavananda, Article 368 starts with a non obstante clause and further to that, subclause (3) thereof re-emphasises that nothing in Article 13 would apply to any amendment made under Article 368. In this context, a look at Article 13 of the Constitution is apposite, which otherwise declares void every law which is inconsistent with or is in derogation of Fundamental Rights but, the inserted sub-clause (4) keeps its operation away from the amendment made under Article 368. Article 13 reads as under: -

“13. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights.—(1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.

(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.

(3) In this article, unless the context otherwise requires,— (a) “law” includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law;

(b) “laws in force” includes laws passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously

Clauses (4) and (5) inserted by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 were declared invalid by this Court in Minerva Mills. They read as under: “(4) No amendment of this Constitution (including the provisions of Part III) made or purporting to have been made under this article whether before or after the commencement of Section 55 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 shall be called in question in any Court on any ground. (5) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that there shall be no limitation whatever on the constituent power of Parliament to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal the provisions of this Constitution under this article.”

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] repealed, notwithstanding that any such law or any part thereof may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas.

(4) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution made under article 368.” 32.3. By way of the amendment in question, sub-clause (6) and Explanation have been added to Article 15 and sub-clause (6) has been added to Article 16 of the Constitution of India. These two Articles, 15 and 16, being the subject of the amendment in question and forming the core of controversy before us, need a closer look. For the purpose, it is relevant to indicate at this stage itself that these Articles have undergone several changes from time to time. For the purpose of the present discussion, worthwhile it would be to take note of these Articles as originally adopted and as now existing after various amendments, including the 103rd Constitution Amendment25

As noticed, the provisions in question have been inserted to Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India by way of the Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019. This amendment was made after passing of the Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Amendment) Bill, 2019 by the Parliament. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for introduction of the said Bill read as under: -

“STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS At present, the economically weaker sections of citizens have largely remained excluded from attending the higher educational institutions and public employment on account of their financial incapacity to compete with the persons who are economically more privileged. The benefits of existing reservations under clauses (4) and (5) of article 15 and clause (4) of article 16 are generally unavailable to them unless they meet the specific criteria of social and educational backwardness. 2. The directive principles of State policy contained in article 46 of the Constitution enjoins that the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. 3. Vide the Constitution (Ninety-third Amendment) Act, 2005, clause (5) was inserted in article 15 of the Constitution which enables the State to make special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens, or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes, in relation to their admission in higher educational institutions. Similarly, clause (4) of article 16 of the Constitution enables the State to make special provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State.

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32.3.1. Articles 15 and 16, in their original form were as under:“15. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. — (1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.

(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to— (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or (b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public. (3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children. 16. Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. —(1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State.

(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office under the State.

4. However, economically weaker sections of citizens were not eligible for the benefit of reservation. With a view to fulfil the mandate of article 46, and to ensure that economically weaker sections of citizens to get a fair chance of receiving higher education and participation in employment in the services of the State, it has been decided to amend the Constitution of India.

5. Accordingly, the Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Amendment) Bill, 2019 provides for reservation for the economically weaker sections of society in higher educational institutions, including private institutions whether aided or unaided by the State other than the minority educational institutions referred to in article 30 of the constitution and also provides for reservation for them in posts in initial appointment in services under the State. 6. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects.”

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] (3) Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any law prescribing, in regard to a class or classes of employment or appointment to an office under any State specified in the First Schedule or any local or other authority within its territory, any requirement as to residence within that State prior to such employment or appointment. (4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State.”

32.3.2. These Articles 15 and 16, as now existing after various amendments, including the amendment in question, read as under: “15. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. —(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.

(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to— (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or

(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of general public. (3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children. (4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.

(5) Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 19 shall prevent the State from making any special provision, by law, for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the

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Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provisions relate to their admission to educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other than the minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of article 30.

(6) Nothing in this article or sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 19 or clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent the State from making,—

(a) any special provision for the advancement of any economically weaker sections of citizens other than the classes mentioned in clauses (4) and (5); and (b) any special provision for the advancement of any economically weaker sections of citizens other than the classes mentioned in clauses (4) and (5) in so far as such special provisions relate to their admission to educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other than the minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of article 30, which in the case of reservation would be in addition to the existing reservations and subject to a maximum of ten per cent. of the total seats in each category. Explanation.—For the purposes of this article and article 16, “economically weaker sections” shall be such as may be notified by the State from time to time on the basis of family income and other indicators of economic disadvantage. 16. Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.— (1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State.

(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office under the State.

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] (3) Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any law prescribing, in regard to a class or classes of employment or appointment to an office under the Government of, or any local or other authority within, a State or Union territory, any requirement as to residence within that State or Union territory prior to such employment or appointment.

(4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State. (4-A) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for reservation in matters of promotion, with consequential seniority, to any class or classes of posts in the services under the State in favour of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinion of the State, are not adequately represented in the services under the State. (4-B) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from considering any unfilled vacancies of a year which are reserved for being filled up in that year in accordance with any provision for reservation made under clause (4) or clause (4-A) as a separate class of vacancies to be filled up in any succeeding year or years and such class of vacancies shall not be considered together with the vacancies of the year in which they are being filled up for determining the ceiling of fifty per cent. reservation on total number of vacancies of that year. (5) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any law which provides that the incumbent of an office in connection with the affairs of any religious or denominational institution or any member of the governing body thereof shall be a person professing a particular religion or belonging to a particular denomination. (6) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any economically weaker sections of citizens other than the classes mentioned in clause (4), in addition to the existing reservation and subject to a maximum of ten per cent. of the posts in each category.”

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32.3.3. Articles 14, 17 and 18, forming the integral part of Equality Code along with the afore-mentioned Articles 15 and 16, could also be taken note of as under: “14. Equality before law.—The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. ***

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***

***

17. Abolition of Untouchability.—”Untouchability” is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of “Untouchability” shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law. 18. Abolition of titles.—(1) No title, not being a military or academic distinction, shall be conferred by the State.

(2) No citizen of India shall accept any title from any foreign State. (3) No person who is not a citizen of India shall, while he holds any office of profit or trust under the State, accept without the consent of the President any title from any foreign State.

(4) No person holding any office of profit or trust under the State shall, without the consent of the President, accept any present, emolument, or office of any kind from or under any foreign State.”32.4. Various provisions in Part IV of the Constitution of India laying down Directive Principles of State Policy also require a close look, including Article 46, which has been referred to in the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the purpose of the amendment in question. Articles 38, 39 and 46 of the Constitution of India read as under: “38. State to secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people. —(1) The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life. (2) The State shall, in particular, strive to minimise the inequalities in income, and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst individuals

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] but also amongst groups of people residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations.

39. Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State.— The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing— (a) that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood;

(b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good; (c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment;

(d) that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women; (e) that the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children are not abused and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their age or strength; (f) that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment. ***

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46. Promotion of educational and economic interests of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other weaker sections.—The State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.”

Doctrine of Basic Structure and Constitutional Amendments

33. It is hardly a matter of debate that the challenge herein is not to any executive order or even to an ordinary legislation. The challenge is to a constitutional amendment. There has not been any question as regards fulfilment of all other requirements of Article 368 of the Constitution of India while making the amendment in question and insertion

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of the relevant clauses to Articles 15 and 16. The challenge is founded on, and in fact could only be founded on, the premise that the amendment in question violates the basic structure of the Constitution in the manner that it destroys its identity. According to the principal part of challenge, the Equality Code, an essential feature of the Constitution, gets abrogated because of reservation structured only on economic criteria and because of exclusion of classes covered under Articles 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4) from its benefit. Therefore, the entire challenge is essentially required to be examined on the anvil of the doctrine of basic structure. 33.1. In the aforesaid view of the matter, before entering into the concepts relating to the equality as also the reservation, it shall be apt and apposite to take into account all the vital elements of the doctrine of basic structure, as developed and hitherto applied to the constitutional amendments; and the discernible principles which are to be applied to the amendment in question. 34. The power to amend the Constitution availing under Article 368 has been a significant area of the development of Constitutional Law in our country. This power, recognised as a constituent power, is subject to various safeguards which are intrinsic to Article 368, including the procedural safeguards. The political process from time to time that resulted in various constitutional amendments, some of them radical in nature, gave rise to several debates in this Court as regards the width and amplitude as also the limitations of this amending power of the Parliament. Thus, Article 368 and the power of the Parliament had been the subject-matter of various decisions, some of which being of farreaching consequences. Before embarking upon a survey of the relevant decisions and the principles discernible therefrom, particularly after the locus classicus of Kesavananda and the later expositions (which had their genesis in the nature of amendment and which were relatable to the given set of facts and circumstances), it would be profitable to put a glance at a few background aspects. 35. The doctrine of basic structure was not as such discussed in the Constituent Assembly while formulating the enabling provisions for amending the Constitution. Then, at the initial stages of Constitutional Law development, the proposition of challenging an amendment to the Constitution, as mooted in the case of Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and Anr.: 1952 SCR 89 as also in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan: (1965) 1 SCR 933 did not meet with approval of

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this Court. However, first reference to the idea of ‘basic feature’ was made by Justice Mudholkar in Sajjan Singh (supra)26. Then, the idea that certain Parts of the Constitution were unamendable was accepted by the 11-Judge Bench in I.C. Golak Nath and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr.: (1967) 2 SCR 762. However, in Kesavananda, the 13Judge Bench of this Court, while partially overruling Golak Nath by a majority of 7-6, held that though any part of the Constitution could be amended by the Parliament, its basic structure could not be damaged.

36. A precursor to the developments aforesaid could be traced to the year 1965 when a German jurist, Prof. Dietrich Conrad (1932- 2001), gave a lecture on ‘Implied Limitations of the Amending Power’ at the Banaras Hindu University wherein he, inter alia, asked: “Could the amending power be used to abolish the Constitution, and reintroduce, let’s say, the rule of a Moghul emperor or the Crown of England?” 27

The learned Judge referred to the facts that the Constituent Assembly, consciously enacted a written Constitution; created three organs of State; enacted a federal structure; recognised certain rights as fundamental and provided for their enforcement; and prescribed forms of oath of Office which would require the Members of the Union Judiciary and of the higher judiciary in the State, to uphold the Constitution; and above all, formulated a solemn and dignified Preamble which, ‘appears to be an epitome of the basic features of the Constitution’. The learned Judge, thereafter, posed the points to ponder over thus: “…..Can it not be said that these are indicia of the intention of the Constituent Assembly to give a permanency to the basic features of the Constitution? It is also a matter for consideration whether making a change in a basic feature of the Constitution can be regarded merely as an amendment or would it be, in effect, rewriting a part of the Constitution; and if the latter, would it be within the purview of Article 368?”

The contribution of Prof. Conrad in Origination and Development of doctrine of basic structure has been pertinently underscored in A.G. Noorani’s, ‘Constitutional Questions and Citizens’ Rights, Oxford University Press (2006) in the first chapter titled as “Sanctity of the Constitution: Dieter Conrad- The man behind the ‘basic structure’ doctrine”, inter alia, in the following words: “There is, sadly, little acknowledgment in India of that debt we owe to a distinguished German jurist and scholar steeped in other disciplines beyond the confines of law–Professor Dietrich Conrad, formerly Head of the Law Department, South Asia Institute of the University of Heidelberg, Germany. In Golak Nath’s case, the doctrine of any implied limitations on Parliament ’s power to amend the Constitution was not accepted. The majority felt that ‘there is considerable force in this argument’ but thought it unnecessary

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Later, he wrote an article titled ‘Limitations of Amendment Procedures and the Constituent Power’ published in the Indian Year Book of International Affairs wherein he described the limits on the amending power as follows:“The functional limitations implied in the grant of amending power to Parliament may then be summarized thus: No amendment may abrogate the constitution. No amendment may effect changes which amount to a practical abrogation or total revision of the to pronounce on it. ‘This question may arise for consideration only if Parliament seeks to destroy the structure of the Constitution embodied in provisions other than in Part III of the Constitution.’ The argument of implied limitations had been advanced at the Bar by M.K. Nambyar, one of India’s leading constitutional lawyers. Few people knew then that he owed the argument to Professor Conrad. In February 1965, while on a visit to India, Conrad delivered a lecture on ‘Implied Limitations of the Amending Power’ to the Law Faculty of the Banaras Hindu University. A paper based on the subject was sent to Professor T.S. Rama Rao in Madras for his comments. Nambyar’s attention was drawn to this paper which he read before the Supreme Court, though with little result. Professor Conrad’s lecture, delivered in February 1965, showed remarkable perceptiveness besides deep learning. He observed: ‘Perhaps the position of the Supreme Court is influenced by the fact that it has not so far been confronted with any extreme type of constitutional amendments. It is the duty of the jurist, though, to anticipate extreme cases of conflict, and sometimes only extreme tests reveal the true nature of a legal concept. So, if for the purpose of legal discussion I may propose some fictive amendment laws to you, could it still be considered a valid exercise of the amendment power conferred by Article 368 if a two-thirds majority changed Article 1 by dividing India into two States of Tamilnad and Hindustan proper? ‘Could a constitutional amendment abolish Article 21, to the effect that forthwith a person could be deprived of his life or personal liberty without authorization by law? Could the ruling party, if it sees its majority shrinking, amend Article 368 to the effect that the amending power rests with the President acting on the advice of the Prime Minister? Could the amending power be used to abolish the Constitution and reintroduce, let us say, the rule of a Moghul emperor or of the Crown of England? I do not want, by posing such questions, to provoke easy answers. But I should like to acquaint you with the discussion which took place on such questions among constitutional lawyers in Germany in the Weimar period–discussion, seeming academic at first, but suddenly illustrated by history in a drastic and terrible manner.’ A more detailed exposition of Professor Conrad’s views appeared after the judgment in Golak Nath’s case (Limitation of Amendment Procedures and the Constituent Power, Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 1966–7, Madras, pp. 375–430).”

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] constitution. Even partial alterations are beyond the scope of amendment if their repercussions on the organic context of the whole are so deep and far reaching that the fundamental identity of the constitution is no longer apparent…...”28 36.1. Thus, even the origin of the submissions before this Court leading to the expositions on the doctrine of basic structure could be traced to the thought-process stimulated by the thinkers like Prof. Conrad. However, as shall be unfolding hereafter, there had been voices of concern about the exact nature and implication of this doctrine. For example, concern was expressed in the case of State of Karnataka v. Union of India and Anr.: (1977) 4 SCC 608 in rather intriguing terms as follows: “120. …In Kesavananda Bharati case this Court had not worked out the implications of the basic structure doctrine in all its applications. It could, therefore, be said, with utmost respect, that it was perhaps left there in an amorphous state which could give rise to possible misunderstandings as to whether it is not too vaguely stated or too loosely and variously formulated without attempting a basic uniformity of its meaning or implications…” 36.2. However, when the enquiry itself is into the effect of amendment of the supreme and organic document, which is fundamental to everything related to the country, the amorphous state of the doctrine of basic structure, obviously, leaves every option open for purposive approach, in tune with the dynamics of change while ensuring that the fundamental ethos remain unscathed29. 37. It shall now be appropriate to delve a bit deeper into some of the significant and important cases in which the doctrine of basic structure was employed/applied in the context of a constitutional amendment 30.

The Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 1966-7, at p. 420.

The acclaimed and honourable jurist O. Chinnappa Reddy would define this journey in these words: “Since there are no signposts signalling basic features of the Constitution, every attempt to discover a basic feature becomes a ‘voyage of discovery’.” [The Court and the Constitution of India: Summits and Shallows; Oxford University Press 2008 – at p.54].

The extractions hereinbelow are of the relevant passages/paragraphs, which may not be in continuity but the disjoining signs after end of the passage/paragraph have been generally avoided to maintain the continuity of discussion.

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37.1. In Kesavananda, this Court outlined the basic structure doctrine of the Constitution. In fact, in Kesavananda, this Court, by a 76 majority, went several steps ahead in asserting its power of judicial review so as to scrutinize any amendment to see if it violated the basic structure of the Constitution; and asserted its right to strike down amendments to the Constitution that were in violation of the fundamental architecture of the Constitution. Factually, the case was a challenge to the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 which interfered with petitioner’s rights to manage property under Article 26. Furthermore, the Twentyfourth, Twenty-fifth and Twenty-ninth constitutional amendments were also challenged. By Twenty-fourth Amendment, Articles 13 and 368 were amended to exclude constitutional amendments from the definition of law under Article 13; the Twenty-fifth Amendment excluded judicial review by providing that the law giving effect to principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of Article 39 could not be questioned by the Court; and the Twenty-ninth Amendment put certain land reform enactments in the Ninth Schedule. The present discussion need not be over-expanded with reference to the variety of opinions expressed therein. For the present purpose, a few relevant opinions could be extracted as follows: Sikri, C.J.

“209…..In other words, the expression ‘Amendment of this Constitution” does not include a revision of the whole Constitution. If this is true — I say that the concession was rightly made — then which is that meaning of the word “Amendment” that is most appropriate and fits in with the whole scheme of the Constitution. In my view that meaning would be appropriate which would enable the country to achieve a social and economic revolution without destroying the democratic structure of the Constitution and the basic inalienable rights guaranteed in Part III and without going outside the contours delineated in the Preamble. 284. In view of the above reasons, a necessary implication arises that there are implied limitations on the power of Parliament that the expression “amendment of this Constitution” has consequently a limited meaning in our Constitution and not the meaning suggested by the respondents.

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] 395. It was said that if Parliament cannot increase its power of amendment clause (d) of Section 3 of the 24th Amendment which makes Article 13 inapplicable to an amendment of the Constitution would be bad. I see no force in this contention. Article 13(2) as existing previous to the 24th Amendment as interpreted by the majority in Golak Nath’s case (supra), prevented Legislatures from taking away or abridging the rights conferred by Article 13. In other words, any law which abridged a fundamental right even to a small extent was liable to be struck down Article 368 can amend every article of the Constitution as long as the result is within the limits already laid down by me. The amendment of Article 13(2) does not go beyond the limits laid down because Parliament cannot even after the amendment abrogate or authorise abrogation or the taking away of fundamental rights. After the amendment now a law which has the effect of merely abridging a right while remaining within the limits laid down would not be liable to be struck down.

469. I have held that Article 368 does not enable Parliament to abrogate or take away fundamental rights. If this is so, it does not enable Parliament to do this by any means, including the device of Article 31-B and the Ninth Schedule. The device of Article 31-B and the Ninth Schedule is bad in so far as it protects Statutes even if they take away fundamental rights. Therefore, it is necessary to declare that the TwentyNinth Amendment is ineffective to protect the impugned Acts if they take away fundamental rights.

Shelat, J. and Grover, J.

546. The meaning of the words “amendment of this Constitution” as used in Article 368 must be such which accords with the true intention of the Constitution-makers as ascertainable from the historical background, the Preamble, the entire scheme of the Constitution, its structure and framework and the intrinsic evidence in various articles including Article 368. It is neither possible to give it a narrow meaning nor can such a wide meaning be given which can enable the amending body to change substantially or entirely the structure and identity of the

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Constitution. Even the concession of the learned AttorneyGeneral and the Advocate-General of Maharashtra that the whole Constitution cannot be abrogated or repealed and a new one substituted supports the conclusion that the widest possible meaning cannot be given to it.

583. The entire discussion from the point of view of the meaning of the expression “amendment” as employed in Article 368 and the limitations which arise by implications leads to the result that the amending power under Article 368 is neither narrow nor unlimited. On the footing on which we have proceeded the validity of the 24th Amendment can be sustained if Article 368, as it originally stood and after the amendment, is read in the way we have read it. The insertion of Articles 13(4) and 368(3) and the other amendments made will not affect the result, namely, that the power in Article 368 is wide enough to permit amendment of each and every article of the Constitution by way of addition, variation or repeal so long as its basic elements are not abrogated or denuded of their identity.

Hegde, J. and Mukherjea, J.

666. On a careful consideration of the various aspects of the case, we are convinced that the Parliament has no power to abrogate or emasculate the basic elements or fundamental features of the Constitution such as the sovereignty of India, the democratic character of our polity, the unity of the country, the essential features of the individual freedoms secured to the citizens. Nor has the Parliament the power to revoke the mandate to build a Welfare State and egalitarian society. These limitations are only illustrative and not exhaustive. Despite these limitations, however, there can be no question that the amending power is a wide power and it reaches every Article and every part of the Constitution. That power can be used to reshape the Constitution to fulfil the obligation imposed on the State. It can also be used to reshape the Constitution within the limits mentioned earlier, to make it an effective instrument for social good. We are unable to agree with the contention that in order to build a Welfare State, it is necessary to destroy some of the human freedoms. That, at any rate is not the perspective of

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] our Constitution. Our Constitution envisages that the State should without delay make available to all the citizens of this country the real benefits of those freedoms in a democratic way.… Every encroachment on freedoms sets a pattern for further encroachments. Our constitutional plan is to eradicate poverty without destruction of individual freedoms.

Khanna, J. 1416. Argument has then been advanced that if power be held to be vested in Parliament under Article 368 to take away or abridge fundamental rights, the power would be, or in any case could be, so used as would result in repeal of all provisions containing fundamental rights. India, it is urged, in such an event would be reduced to a police state wherein all cherished values like freedom and liberty would be non-existent. This argument, in my opinion, is essentially an argument of fear and distrust in the majority of representatives of the people. It is also based upon the belief that the power under Article 368 by two-thirds of the members present and voting in each House of Parliament would be abused or used extravagantly. I find it difficult to deny to the Parliament the power to amend the Constitution so as to take away or abridge fundamental right by complying with the procedure of Article 368 because of any such supposed fear or possibility of the abuse of power. I may in this context refer to the observations of Marshall, C.J., regarding the possibility of the abuse of power of legislation and of taxation in the case of Providence Bank v. Alpheus Billings: “This vital power may be abused; but the Constitution of the United States was not intended to furnish the corrective for every abuse of power which may be committed by the State Governments. The interest, wisdom, and justice of the representative body, and its relations with its constituents furnish the only security where there is no express contract against unjust and excessive taxation, as well as against unwise legislation generally.” 1535. In exercising the power of judicial review, the Courts cannot be oblivious of the practical needs of the government. The door has to be left open for trial and error.

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Constitutional law like other mortal contrivances has to take some chances. Opportunity must be allowed for vindicating reasonable belief by experience. Judicial review is not intended to create what is sometimes called Judicial Oligarchy, the Aristrocracy of the Robe, Covert Legislation, or Judge-made law. The proper forum to fight for the wise use of the legislative authority is that of public opinion and legislative assemblies. Such contest cannot be transferred to the judicial arena. That all constitutional interpretations have political consequences should not obliterate the fact that the decision has to be arrived at in the calm and dispassionate atmosphere of the court room, that judges in order to give legitimacy to their decision have to keep aloof from the din and controversy of politics and that the fluctuating fortunes of rival political parties can have for them only academic interest. Their primary duty is to uphold the Constitution and the laws without fear or favour and in doing so, they cannot allow any political ideology or economic theory, which may have caught their fancy, to colour the decision. The sobering reflection has always to be there that the Constitution is meant not merely for people of their way of thinking but for people of fundamentally differing views. As observed by Justice Holmes while dealing with the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: “The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics…Some of these laws embody convictions or prejudices which judges are likely to share. Some may not. But a Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.”….” (emphasis supplied)

37.2. In Indira Nehru Gandhi, using the doctrine of basic structure, the Thirty-ninth Constitutional Amendment Act was struck down whereby the election of the President, the Vice President, the

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

Prime Minister and the Speaker of the Lok Sabha were put beyond the judicial scrutiny. Such an amendment was held to be destroying the basic feature of the Constitution.

37.3. In Minerva Mills, again, using the doctrine of basic structure, clauses (4) and (5) of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 were struck down with the following, amongst other, observations: -

Chandrachud, C.J. “56. The significance of the perception that Parts III and IV together constitute the core of commitment to social revolution and they, together, are the conscience of the Constitution is to be traced to a deep understanding of the scheme of the Indian Constitution. Granville Austin’s observation brings out the true position that Parts III and IV are like two wheels of a chariot, one no less important than the other. You snap one and the other will lose its efficacy. They are like a twin formula for achieving the social revolution, which is the ideal which the visionary founders of the Constitution set before themselves. In other words, the Indian Constitution is founded on the bedrock of the balance between Parts III and IV. To give absolute primacy to one over the other is to disturb the harmony of the Constitution. This harmony and balance between fundamental rights and directive principles is an essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution. 57. ….. The goals set out in Part IV have, therefore, to be achieved without the abrogation of the means provided for by Part III. It is in this sense that Parts III and IV together constitute the core of our Constitution and combine to form its conscience. Anything that destroys the balance between the two parts will ipso facto destroy an essential element of the basic structure of our Constitution.”

(emphasis supplied)

37.4. In Waman Rao, it was held that the First Constitution Amendment Act, that introduced Articles 31-A and 31-B, as well as the Twenty-fifth Amendment Act that introduced Article 31-C were constitutional, and did not damage any basic or essential features or the basic structure of the Constitution. Herein, this Court examined the validity

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of Article 31-A and Article 31-B of the Constitution of India with respect to the doctrine of basic structure introduced in Kesavananda and observed that all the decisions made prior to the introduction of the doctrine shall remain valid. The impact of this decision had been that all the acts and regulations that were included under Ninth Schedule to the Constitution prior to the Kesavananda decision were to remain valid while further amendments to the Schedule could be challenged on the grounds of violation of the doctrine of basic structure. The relevant observations in this case read as under: Chandrachud, C.J.

“14. … We would like to add that every case in which the protection of a fundamental right is withdrawn will not necessarily result in damaging or destroying the basic structure of the Constitution. The question as to whether the basic structure is damaged or destroyed in any given case would depend upon which particular Article of Part III is in issue and whether what is withdrawn is quintessential to the basic structure of the Constitution. 29. The First Amendment is aimed at removing social and economic disparities in the agricultural sector. It may happen that while existing inequalities are being removed, new inequalities may arise marginally and incidentally. Such marginal and incidental inequalities cannot damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. It is impossible for any government, howsoever expertly advised, socially oriented and prudently managed, to remove every economic disparity without causing some hardship or injustice to a class of persons who also are entitled to equal treatment under the law. Thus, the adoption of ‘family unit’ as the unit of application for the revised ceilings may cause incidental hardship to minor children and to unmarried daughters. That cannot, in our opinion, furnish an argument for assailing the impugned laws on the ground that they violate the guarantee of equality. It seems to us ironical indeed that the laws providing for agricultural ceilings should be stigmatised as destroying the guarantee of equality when their true object and intendment is to remove inequalities in the matter of agricultural holdings.

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] 49. We propose to draw a line, treating the decision in Kesavananda Bharati as the landmark. Several Acts were put in the Ninth Schedule prior to that decision on the supposition that the power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution was wide and untrammelled. The theory that the Parliament cannot exercise its amending power so as to damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution, was propounded and accepted for the first time in Kesavananda Bharati. This is one reason for upholding the laws incorporated into the Ninth Schedule before April 24, 1973, on which date the judgment in Kesavananda Bharati was rendered. A large number of properties must have changed hands and several new titles must have come into existence on the faith and belief that the laws included in the Ninth Schedule were not open to challenge on the ground that they were violative of Articles 14, 19 and 31. We will not be justified in upsetting settled claims and titles and in introducing chaos and confusion into the lawful affairs of a fairly orderly society. 51. Thus, insofar as the validity of Article 31-B read with the Ninth Schedule is concerned, we hold that all Acts and Regulations included in the Ninth Schedule prior to April 24, 1973 will receive the full protection of Article 31-B. Those laws and regulations will not be open to challenge on the ground that they are inconsistent with or take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Acts and Regulations, which are or will be included in the Ninth Schedule on or after April 24, 1973 will not receive the protection of Article 31-B for the plain reason that in the face of the judgment in Kesavananda Bharati, there was no justification for making additions to the Ninth Schedule with a view to conferring a blanket protection on the laws included therein. The various constitutional amendments, by which additions were made to the Ninth Schedule on or after April 24, 1973, will be valid only if they do not damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. 54. Apart from this, if we are right in upholding the validity of Article 31-A on its own merits, it must follow logically that the unamended Article 31-C is also valid. … Whatever we have said in respect of the defined category of laws envisaged by Article

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31-A must hold good, perhaps with greater force, in respect of laws passed for the purpose of giving effect to clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39. It is impossible to conceive that any law passed for such a purpose can at all violate Article 14 or Article 19. Article 31 is now out of harm’s way. In fact, far from damaging the basic structure of the Constitution, laws passed truly and bona fide for giving effect to directive principles contained in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 will fortify that structure. We do hope that the Parliament will utilise to the maximum its potential to pass laws, genuinely and truly related to the principles contained in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39. The challenge made to the validity of the first part of the unamended Article 31-C therefore fails.”

(emphasis supplied)

37.5. In P. Sambhamurthy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr.: (1987) 1 SCC 36231 this Court examined Article 371-D inserted by the Constitution (Thirty-second Amendment) Act, 1973 and struck down its clause (5) with proviso, as being violative of the basic structure since it conferred power on the State Government to modify or annul the final order of the Administrative Tribunal, which was against the concept of justice and principle of rule of law. 37.6. In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Ors.: 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651, the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution introduced by the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985, was assailed. Though, the majority opinion did not find the entire amendment unconstitutional but the Court declared invalid Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, which excluded judicial review of any matter connected with the disqualification of a member of a House in terms of the provisions contained in that Schedule, essentially for want of ratification in accordance with the proviso to clause (2) of Article 368. 37.7. In Raghunathrao, the validity of the Constitution (Twentysixth Amendment) Act, 1971 which removed privy purses was brought into question, inter alia, on the ground that it violated the basic structure and essential features of the Constitution of India and was, therefore, outside the scope and ambit of the powers of the Parliament to amend

Hereinafter also referred to as ‘P. Sambhamurthy’.

JANHIT ABHIYAN v. UNION OF INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

the Constitution. This Court denied interference while observing, inter alia, as under: -

“96. Permanent retention of the privy purse and the privileges of rights would be incompatible with the sovereign and republican form of Government. Such a retention will also be incompatible with the egalitarian form of our Constitution. That is the opinion of the Parliament which acted to repeal the aforesaid provisions in exercise of its constituent power. The repudiation of the right to privy purse privileges, dignities etc. by the deletion of Articles 291 and 362, insertion of Article 363-A and amendment of clause (22) of Article 366 by which the recognition of the Rulers and payment of privy purse are withdrawn cannot be said to have offended Article 14 or 19(g) [sic 19(1)(f)] and we do not find any logic in such a submission. No principle of justice, either economic, political or social is violated by the Twenty-sixth Amendment. Political justice relates to the principle of rights of the people, i.e. right to universal suffrage, right to democratic form of Government and right to participation in political affairs. Economic justice is enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution. Social justice is enshrined in Article 38. Both are in the directive principles of the Constitution. None of these rights are abridged or modified by this Amendment. We feel that this contention need not detain us any more and, therefore, we shall pass on to the next point in debate. 107. O

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