Jindal Stainless LTD. & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors.

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
11 November 2016
Judge
Justice T.S. Thakur
Neutral citation
2016 INSC 1019
Reported in
[2016] 10 S.C.R. 1
Result
Directions issued
Acts & sections
Article 304 Constitution, Article 301 Constitution, Article 246 Constitution

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Full judgment

120161 JO S.C.R. l

.JINDAL STA!NLESS TTD. & ANR.

v.

STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 3453 of 2002) NOVEMBER 11. 2016

IT. S. THAKUR, C.ll, A. K. SIKRl, S. A. BOBDE, SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, N. V. RAMANA, R. BANUMATHI, A. M. KIJANWILKAR, DR. D. V. CIIANDRACIJUD AND ASllOK BHlJSHAN, .I.I.I Constitution of India: Arts.301. 304 · Taxes sirnpliciter are not within the contemplation o( Part XIII of the Constitution-· Word 'Free' used in :ln.301 does not mean "free .fim11 taxation" - Only such taxes as al'(' discriminalorr in nature are prohihired ''Y Art.304(a) - hfi>ll01r.1· that lny o( a no11-di.1·criminalon· tax would 110! co11stit11fe an infi·action of/lrt.301 -·Decisions o/thi.1· Court in Atiabari. Automobile Transport and .Jindal case.1· and all otherjudgmenrs that /bl/ow these pm11011nce111e11/s are to the extent o{ s1.1ch reliance overruled - Entry fox. (Per maiority) Art.30-'l{a).(h) - Clm1ses (a) and (h) of Art.301 to he read disiw1ctivelv. (Per majoritvj Art.304(a). (h) /I /ei:r that 1·iolates Art.304(a} cannot he sm·ed ei·e11 i( the pmcedure ul·lrt.31N(h) or the pro1·iso thereunder is satisfied. (Per majority)

Cm11pen.1·atorv tax thenrv - Held: Th{' Compensatorv Jax theory evolved in Automobile Transport case and suhsequemly modified i11 Jinctars case hos no juristic basis and is rejected. (Per maf o ri I)') ilrr . .l(M - .1 tax 011 entn· ofp,oods into a local area fbr use, sale or consumption therein is pennissihle even H'hen similar good' are nor produced wi1hi11 the taxing Stale - Art.301/ (a) .fi"mrns upon disai111i11ation (of a hostile nature in the protectio12ist sense) and not 011 mere differentiation - Therefore. incentives. set-offs etc . .~ra111ed to a specified class of dealers (or a limited period ·of rime

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in a non-hostile fashion with a view to developing economical!)' backward areas would not violate ;lrt.304(a) - The question i,·hether the levies in the present case indeed satisfl' this test is !efi to he determined hv the i·egular benches hearing the matters. (Per majoritv)

llrt.304 - States are well within their right to design their fiscal legislations lo ensure that the lax hurden on good1· imported .fi·o111 other States and good~ produced within the State fall equallv - Such measures if taken would 1101 contravene Art. 304(a) - The q11es1irm · H·hether the le Pies in the present case indeed satislr this C test is left to he deter111ined by the regular benches hearing the matters. (Per majoritv)

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Sch. VJJ Dst II Entry 52 - E1111y Tax - 1/1e questions whether the entire State can he notified as a local area and whether entrv tax can he levied on ,<_?,oods entering the landmass of India fimn another countrv left open to he determined in appropriate proceeding,.1·. (Per majoritv) Sovereignll' - Power to tax - Held: ft is essential attrihute of s0Fereig11tv - Exercise o( s01·ereign power is however subject to co11stit11tional li111i1atio11 - Poirer to le1y taxes heing a sovereign pmver controlled 011/p /Jv Constitution, limitation on that poiver must /Jc express. (Per T S. Thak111; CJ/for himself and for A.K. Sikri and A.M. Khamrilkar. J.1.)

Arts.245, 246 and 304(a) - State\· power to levy tax - Held: Crmstiwtionallr vested pmver to /epy tax can he regulated or F controlled onlv hv specific Constitutional limitations, if any Applving this principle to the case at ha11d, there is 110 specific limitation on the State'.\· power to few taxes on the import of goods .fi"om other States except the one re/erred to in Art.304(a) - That limira1io11 is confined to lev.v of discriminatory taxes within the comprehension of Art.304(a) - So long as taxes are 11011G discriminarorr and. therefi1re, consistent with Art.304(a}, there is no limitation leave alone any express limitation on the States· legislative power to levv any tax 011 the import ofgood1ji·o111 another State - The pmver to /e1y a tax in terms of Arts.245 and 246 read v.oith E11t1T 52 of Us! Ii no/ heing in dispute in the cases at hand, the

JINDAL STAINLESS LTD. v. STATE Of HARYANA

ahsence of am• specific limitatio11 forhidding the exercise of' such /!ower whether fiJr the sake o(fi-'ee rrade, commerce and i11tercourse or othenvise simplr 111ea11s that the Stare legislatures are ,fl-ee to le1~v laxes that are non-discriminatorr in nature (Per T S. Thak111; CJl j(Jr himself and for A.K. Sikri and A.M Khanwilkm; JJ.)

An.301 - Whether unreasonah!y high rate of' tax could hy i1sel/'co11.1·tit11te restriction offensh·e to ,.Jrt.301 - Held: Taxes whether high or 1011· do not constiture restricrion.1· on the freedom of' trade and co11m1erct' - Mert' .fact that a tax casts a heavy hurden is no reason .fin· holding that it is a restriction on the .fi'eedom of trade and commerce - Any such excessive tax hurden may he open to challenge under Part 111 of the Constitution hut the extent of /Jurden mmld not h1• itselfjustifi• the levv being srruck dmn1 as a restriction rnntrm:i· to Art.301 of the Constitution. (Per 'l: S. Thakw; CJlfor hi111sell a11d for A.K. Sikri and A.M. Khanwi!km; JJ.)

Arrs.301, 304(h) .. ls the Entrv fox levied hy the States in D the present hatch of cases violatiFe of' Art.301 of the Constiflltion and in particular have the impugned State enactments relating to rntrv tax to he tested wirh reference to hoth Arrs. 304(a} and 304(h) .for deter111i11ing their rnlidity - Held: The re.1·n·ictio11s referred to in ilrt.304(h) ore nr!/l~fiscal in nature - Constirutiona! validizv of anv taxing statute has, theref{1re, to he tesred only on the anvil of' Art. E 304(a) and if the /cnr is found to he 11011-discriniinatory, it can he declared to he crmstitutional!]' valid without the legislation having to go through the test or the process envisaged /Jy Art.304(/1) Should, howeve1; the statute fc.1il the test of non-discrimination under .'1rt.304(a) it must he struck drn1:n fiJl· the same cannot he sustained F e\'en if it had gone through 1he process stipulated hy Art.304(h) That is hccause H'hat is constitutionally impermissible in terms of' . lrr.304!a) cannot he validated and sanctioned through the medium of Art. 304 (h) - ,.f. fiscal statute shall he open to challenge only under Art.304(a) ·withow being suhjected to the te.1·1 of Art.304(h) either in rerms of rhe exis1ence of puh!ie interest or reasono/1lene.1·s of' the lev\' - Court ought to examine whether the differentiation made is intended or inspired hv an element of' zmf'avoura/Jle hias in favour of the good1· produced or manufactured in rhe Stote as against those imported fiwn outside. (Per T. S. Thakw: CJl for himself and for

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Arts.3()1, 3()2, 3()3 and 3()4-Scope of-Held: A plain reading of Art.3()] 11'011ld show that fi·eedom of trade, commerce and intercourse is hr no means absolute, the same being subject to the other provisions of' Part Xiii ol the Constitution - The ahsolute character of the .fi"eedom of trade, commerce and intercourse is lost hy reason of 11rt.302 itself empowering Parliament to impose such restrictions as it may consider necessarv in puhlic interest - Art.303, in turn. places restrictions 011 the legislative powers of the Parliament and of the States - A conjoint reading of Cl. (I) and (2) of Art.303 show.\· that 1-vhile Parliament/Legislature of' a State shall have no power to make a lmr imposing restriction on trade, .commerce and intercourse, hy giving or authorizing the giving of any preference to one State over the otho; such /imitation on the legislative power ol Parliament shall not extend to giving of any preference or making or authori::.ing any discrimination il it is declared hy law that a situation has arisen out of scarcity ofgoodv that makes it necessarv to do so - Government ol india Act, 1935 - s.297. (Per 1: S. l71ak11r, CJ! for hi111sell and for A.K. Sikri and A.M. Khanwilkw; JJ.) Art.301 - !merpretation of - Held: Art.301 hegin.1· with the phrase 'Suhject to other provisions ol thi.1· Part.' - 171is phrase gives an initial indication as to what to expect - The position of this phrase should he taken into consideration - Even hefi1re the declaration of.fi"eedom of Trade. Commerce and intercourse, it is heing suhjected to limitations - Further the opening words ol Art.301, namely, 'suhject to the provisions of' this part· require that all the Articles of' the Part Xiii have to he read together so as to understand the width and meanini~ o(the Part )(]JJ - 'Suhject to' is the dominant expression so far as Art.301 is concerned - It indicates suhservience to at least Arts.302. 303 and 304 - Arts.302 to 304 embody a restatement ofpov.·ers uhlrt.246 r/w the State List under the VII Schedule Each restated power hv itself overrides the freedom of trade in Art.301. (Per N. V Ramana, J.) Art.301 - Legislative intent behind enactment - Held: The Co11stirution-maker.1· desired free flow ol trade and commerce in India as they realized that economic unity and integration of' the country provided the main sustaining force for the stahility and

JINDAi. STAINLESS LTD. \. STATF OF HA RY ANA

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progress of the political anJ economic unity of the nation, and that the count1}' shouldfimction as one sin;;le economic '1111i(v without harriers on internal trade -- A rt. 30 I was incorporated in the Co11sti111rio11, in order to ensure that the State Legislat11re.1· suhjected to local and regional pulls did not create trade harriers in fi1t11re. (Per f?. Ramnnathi, J.)

Art.301 - Entrr tax - J,evy. if violative of Art.301 - Held: l:'mrv tax is not collected at the hehest of m1111ir'ipality or a pa11chayat attached to a checkpost It is payahle hr the asses.1·ee hv filing !heir re111rn.1· - Imposition of En!!)' taY is not merely "on movement or transport of goods": consideratio11 o{Ent1T 52, /,ist fl of Seventh C Schedule shows tho! ta.rnhle event in the case of enlry tax is entrv of'gornl' into the local area where if is to he used. consumed or sold !herein -- !(the goods mcreir e!7ler inw a local area and then move 10 another destination heyonJ that local area, no tax can he levied 1111der Entrr 52 -- fo attract a levv under Entry 52. Ust 11. the good\· ]) must come w rest in the local area where they are taxed in the sense 1/wl their firrther mo1•e111ent and transport stands terminated and the goods are supposed to he used, consumed or sold in thal local area - Since rn11:r tax is leviahle at the termination of the movement of' trade and the good1· have entered the local area fiJr the purpose or use, {'0/1S11111ption or sale. the levv of entry tax does not restrict E .flow of'trade, co1111nerce or intercourse and is not violative of Art.301 of' the Constitution. (Per R. Banumathi, J.) Arts. 30/ lo 304 - interpretation ol- Held: Art.301 ought not to he read as .fi'eedom .fi'mn tax lent'.\' - Tax legislation.1· can he challenged on the ground that they in/i'inge the Fundamental l?ight.1· 1111der Part Ii1 hut that does not however mean that there is fi'eedom fi·o111 toxation or that tax is per se a restriction on Fundamental Rights or ji·eedom of' trade. commerce and intercourse - Taxes nre levied i11 puhlir: interest and hence. cannot he considered a restriction per se on the enjoyment of' a11v fi-eedom contemplated hy the Constitution. (Per R. Ba1111111athi. J.) Art.303 - Whether use of' the expression "hy virtue of any entrr relating to trade and commerce" appearing in Art.303 are· wide enough to include entries relating to levy of' laxes also - Held: 'f/1c consfit11tio11ol scheme is s11ch that a taxing enflJ is disti11ctfi·om

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other entries und levy of tax is possihle onZv if there is an entry vrhich authorises the competent legislature to levy the same - The entries relating to Trade. and Commerce hy themselves are 1101 sufficient to empower the legislature to lev)' ta.~es. (Per T S. 77wkw; C.!Jj(Jr himself andfor A.K. Sikri and A.M Khanwilkm; JJ.)

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Art. 303 - Scope of - Held: Art.303 is m1 exception to Art. 302, inasmuch as it limits the power co11ceded to the Parliament under Art. 302 to impose restrictions onji-eedom of Trade, Commerce and fnterco11rse in puh!ic interest - The power exercised hy Art.302 cwmol he so exercised as to give preference to one State over a11other except under a situation covered by Art. 303(2) namely situation arising fi·o111 scarcity of good1· in any part of the territory of India. (Per T S /7wlw1~ CJ!j(H himself and for A.K.Sikri and A.M. Khanwilkar, JJ)

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Art.304(a) - Whether Art.304(a) is violated if the goods suhjected to levy of entr)' tax are not produced or manufactured within the State le1ying the fax - Held: 771e essence of the guarantee in Art.304(a) lies in the same or similar good1· heing treated similarZv in the maffer of taxation - 771e guarantee is not violated if the goods suhjected to levy of Entrr tax are not produced or manufactured 1dthi11 the State levvi11g the tax - ?his is hecause there is no question of anr discrimination if goods ji"Oln outside the State are not al a disadvantage vis-a-vis good1· produced or 111am1factured within that State (Per T S lliakw: CJ! /(Jr himself andfilr A.K.Sikri and A.M. Khanwilkm: JJ.)

Art.304(a) - Whether Art.304(h) treats taxes as a restriction so that anv such levy mayfctllfoul of Art.301 - Held: Art.304(u) far .fi·o111 freafinp, raxes as a restriction per se, .1pecifical11• recognises the State legislature:\' povo,>er to impose the same on good~ imported fimn other States or Union Territories - ft is true that the source of .power avai!ahle to the State legislature to levv a tax is frmnd in Ci .-lrts.245 and 246 of the Constitution but, the availabi!i~J' of such power .frir raxinp, goods imported fi·om other Stares or Union Territories is c!earlv recognised hy Art.304(a) - The expression 'ma)' ,r,y law impose· is certainlv nor a restriction 011 the pov.-'er 10 tax. (Per T S. Thakur, CJJ for himself and for A.K.Sikri and A.M. Kh«mv-:ilkm: JJ.)

JlNDAL STAINLESS IJ'D. v. STATE OF HARYANA

Art.304(a) - !11te1pretatio11 al- J,evv al enfrJ tax ·when good~ A similar to those imported are 1101 produced - Held: Art.304(a) imposes two conditions: .firstly, that a law 111av impose 011 goods i111ported fi'om other States, 'any tax' to which "'similar goods 111mwfi1crured or produced' in that State are subject - This clearly implies that the good1· imported .fimn other States nwv he suhjected tn a tax Vl·here similar good\" are in fact, manufactured or produced in the i111por1i11g State and are suhjected to tax - Jn other words, (a) the good1· importedfi·om other States must be similar to (h) the good1· 1111111u/"acl11red or produced in the importing State and (c) the goods so locallr m1111u/i.1ctured or produced must he suhject to tax - The sr'{"(md condition is the tax that is imposed on imported goods should no! discriminare hctwee11 the imported goods and goods mm111/i1ct11red or produced in the importing State. (Per SA. Bohde,

J.)

Art.3(N(a) - Leµ.islative intention hehind enactment - Held: The inte11tio11 of" the 11rt.304(a) is that ivhere a tax exists on goods imported into a Stale, there should he no discrimination het1ree1z such a tax and u tax 011 similar good1· nw1111f"actured or produced in the importing State - The effect ol such a co11struction is that the imported goods cannot he taxed where similar goods are not 111111111/"actured or produced in the importing State and are there(rJre, nor suhjected to similar tax and that seems to he the clear intention of this Article - This interpretation would also .fi1rther economic prop,ress and the unhindered availahility of" goodv in States which dn not have 111an11/"acturing capacities and may not he ahle to de\'(: lop it. having regard to lack of natural resources or other ,;;eo,f!,raphicc;l limitations. (Per SA. Bohde, J.) Arr. 304(a} - Compensatmy tax theorv - Held: Since, in the matter o/" levr of" taxes the compensatory rhemy is no more relevant. the State Legislatures arefi·ee to exercise their taxing powers without 1hc 11eed of declaring and showing that taxes imposed hy them 011 outside goods are f(Jr the henc/"it of concerned traders or 11111mdil{"fl/rers - But such tax must he, in essence, 11011-discriminatorv, hoth, in the ultimate tax /Jurden and in 111achine1y provisions. (Per Shirn Kirti Singh, J) An.304(a) - interpretation of'- Held: Art.304(a) should he

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interpreted keeping in mind the ha lanced ·development of the cou111rv. tt11ich is an impor/anf part o( economic integration Art.3(M(a) is not a limitation on the legislature of a State to impose such tax 011 goods imported - The onlv condition envisaged under Art.304 (a) is, same tax is imposahle on the good1· importedfi'0711 other States as v.dl as good1· if manufaC!ured in that State It is not correct to say that since goods· heing taxed are not produced in the Slate, the power to levy a tax gets ohlitera/ed, that is lo say, that A rt. 3 () ..f (a) does nor lwr levr of tm· if the gooll.1· are not nwnufactured or prod11ced within the State. (Per N. V. Ramana, J.) Art. 30,1 - Wonil' "mav hy law" - lnrerpretation of- State\· pott·er ro levv tax · Held: The wordy "may hy lm..v" is an option ,f!,iven to the Sia/es in case it decides to levy any lax on the good1· importedfi·o111 other States ·· The source of legislalive poiver resides in Art.245 rlw Arl.246 - This power is not suhject to any implied limitation ·· The plain reading would show that in a given situatio11, the State may hy choice decide not to levv any tax imported from other Stares or opt to levv taxes 011 certain goods imported fi'om other States. (Per NV. Ramana, J.) Art.304(a) - Difference in the rate of tax 011 goodv locally 11w1111factured a11d those imported - Whether fall foul of Art.304(a} - Held: Every differentiation is not discrimination -'Any difference in the rate of tax on good1· locally manufactured and those imported, such difj{!rence nor heing discriminat01:v does not fall foul under Al't.30-i(a) - Any incentivelhenefits of concession in the rate of tax given to the local 11wmifact11rers/producers in order to encourage the local 111anufauurers/production in the State cannot he said to he discriminarorv - Any difference in the rate of'tax on goocf.1· locally nw1111/{1ctured and those imported. such difference not heing discriminatorv does not fall foul of Art. 304(a}. (Per R. Banumathi, .J.)

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Art.304 (a) and (h} - Whether Cl. (a) and (hj have to he read conjunctivelv - Held: Cl. (a) and (h) o/Art.304 deal with two distinct suhjects and mus/, thaefore, he u11derstood to he independent of each other ... While Cl. (a) deals entirelv vvith imposition of taxes on go(}(/.1· importedji·om othel' States, Cl. (h} deals with imposition of rcasonahle restriction in puhlic i11terest - The use of the word 'and'

.TINDAi, STAINLESS r:rn. V, STATE Of HARYANA

hl•t1we11 cl. (o) and (h) does 11ot admit of an interpretation that may A impose an ol!ligation 11pon the legislat11re to necessarily impose a lax and a re.1·trie1ion together - The word 'and' can mean 'or' as irell as 'and· depemlin.~ upon the con/ext in which the law enacted In• the legisla!ure uses the some. (Per T S. Thakw; CJ! f(>r himself cmdji>r .1.K Sikri and .1.M. Kha11wil!a11: .!.!.) Art.301(a}, (h) - Use of 11·ord 'and' afier semicolon ln!erpretation of: in the context o(Ar!.304 - Held: It ivifl have to he read as 'or· rTeatin,t; u disjunctive reading of' Art.304(a} und ,.Jr1.3M(h! indicminp, thar the State Legislature can exercise ils poH·er cilher under 11rl.304(a) or Art.3M(h! or hoth. (Per R. Bammwthi, ./) Ar!.30 1/(h). proviso - Requirement of' Presidential sanction in /erms u( pm1·i.1·0 - Held: Clause (h) dealing 1vith reaso11ah/e rcs1riuiom· mus/ 11ecessarilv applv to restriction.\· other tha11 those h1· 11·av of/axes - !tfi.Jl!ows that.for /e1y of't(LlCS prior Presidenlial .1·m1c1io11 in rer111s u( proviso under Art.304(h) is whollv w111ecessarv. (Per 7: S. Thakur, C.JJ .for himself and/or A.K. Sikri and A.M. Klwnwilkm; JJ.) Art.304(h) - Restrictions mentioned u/Art.304(h} do not include tax. (Per N. V Ramano, .!.)

.1rt.304(h! ·- Applicahilitv ol- Held: Applica/Jle 011~v to 11011fiscal laH·.1· ond nor 10 /ax laws - Arr.301(h) deals with 11011~/iscal i<'.~is/a1io11 i111posi11g rcaso1111h/e res1riclio11s i11 puhlic inreresl and lrn /a11·1· arl' 1101 included under //n.304(hi. (Per R. Banw11arhi, .!.) .·ln.3114(h) - Presiclenrial assent - .Judicial review - Held: Art.3114(/J) re/ares 10 11011~/isca/ laws of' the Srares -- The assen/ of' !he f'residen/ envisaged in proviso ro Arr.304(h) v.,·011/cl he some1vhar akin to rhe assent conternplated in Art254 - Such assents are not judicial!v reviewahle. (Per R. 13a11umathi. .!.)

Arls.304(a), (h} - l"ocal area - When the entry tax is levied In· the Entl)' Tax //ct enacted In· the State Legislature, the term 'a local area' co111emplated hy Entry 52 may cover the 'whole Srate' or 'a local area' as notified in the legislation - From the point of view of entn· tax. !he Sra1e is a compendium of local areas and 11·here the

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local areas contemplated hy the Act cover the entire State, the diffi:rence hctwee11 the State and 'a local area' practically disappears. (Per R. Ban11111athi, J.) Taxi11g power of the Unio11 and the States - Held: Are 11111t11alzv excl11si1•e - While the Parliament ca11no1 legislate 011 the sub;ects re.1·e1Tedfor the States. the States ca1111ot similarZv tre.1pass onto the taxil1g prrwers of the Union - If the Constitutional scheme does not al!mt· !he Parlia111e111 lo usurp the taxing powers of" the Slate f,L',t,:islat11re1·. such process of usurpation cannot also he permitted lo lake place in the garh of making U11ion executive :1· concurrence cm essential pre-req11isitefor any taxing !egis!ation.(Per 'l: S. 11wklll; CJ! for himself a11dfi1r A.K.Sikri and A. M. K!zanv.:ilkar, JJ.) Part XIII - Diffr;rence hetween Part XIJI and s.297 of Governmelll of India Act, 1935 - Held: 17ie essence offf"eedom of trade. commerce a11d intercourse as recognized in 1935 Act and in !he Co11slit11tio11 under !,art XIJJ is same - The onlv difference is that 1he principles enunciated in s.297 were extended to Union Govern111ent and Union Parlia111el7/ and to the territory IVhich had after 111e1y,er hecome port of India - Government of India Act, 1935 - s.]97. (Per T S. Thak111; CJI for himself and for A.K.Sikri and A. /If Kha1111·ilkw~ JJ.) Par! XII! - 'fo.r laH".\" - The co11111wn thread in Port XIII is the achievcmrnl ol economic 1111itv and paril}' which does not altogether preclude differentiation .fin· j11s1ifiahle and rational reasons wherever 11ece.1·rnn· - The heurt and soul of Part XIII is to dissolve hostile discri111inalio11 H"ilhin the territo1T ol India - Part Xlll does not contempla!e lax !mvs within i/.1· amhit except to the extent of Ar1.3(N(a) of" !he Constitution. (Per N. V Romana. J.)

l'art Xi JI - There is a vital difference he tween mere "dif/erenliation' and 'discriminalion' - fr is discrimination not differentiarion that is sought to he prevented rhrough Part XIII Ar1.304(a) prorects jimn discrimination (for protectionis111) and not mere diff'erentialion. (Per N. V Ramona. J.) Sevemh Schedule Ust ff Entrv 52 - Concept of Compensatory lax ewJ!ved in Automobile case - Held: The nomenclawre of ·cmnpensa10rv · ascri hed to the taxes levied hy the State Govemment

JINDAL STAINLESS Ll'D. v. STATE Of HARYANA

1111der E11trr 52 . .Ust II pursuant to Automobile is wnmrranted - The concept of' compensaton· tax was evolved 50 years hack through judicial pronou11ceme11ts - lt has withstood the test of" time and thus, any suhsc>quent judicial pro1101111cement like the instant case should 1101 prejudice the in1ere.1·t o(lhe parties inl'Olved - State Go1•erm11ents should not suffer mJV loss of revenue solely hecause <~/"judicial i11rerpre1ations and innovation.1· in Automobile case and the cases \'llhsequent lo ii·· Suhject ro passing the muster of .lrt.304(a), e11trv lax let"ied hv the States under Enll} 52. Ust 11 even though termed a.1· rnmpensatory lax docs notfall.fiml o/Art. 301 - ft is not neces.1·m)' tlzal the 111011ey realized hy the levy should he put into a separate Fund or that the lev1• should he proportionate to the expe11dit11re There is no har to suhsumption ol the reve1n1e realized ji·om regulatorr!co111pensatorv taxes into the Consolidated Fund of' the Stiltc as thei· are 110 differenrfimn other taxes of a general nature Mnrem·c1: the quantum of' expenditure incurred in achievi11g the ohjecl hehind a compensatorv le1•v ca11not he inquired into. (Per R. !Ja111111w1hi, J.)

Seventh Schedule Ust fl EntrJ' 52 - Import of goods and customs clearance and the entry of good1· into the local areas fo.Yah!e event f-feld: The 11vn events are disti11c/ - ]11 the case o/' r:11.1·101n.1· d11t1', the /Uxahle ei·ent is entrv of' good1· i11to the territorv of Indio .. 1he /a.rnhle e1·ent ullder Em1y 52, List JI is the entrv ol .!!.nods ill to !oral area ./or conswnplioll, use or sale therein - The 1n·o taxahle events are distinct in lavv and there is 110 overlap Ullder our Constitution, there is no overlapping ill the taxing power J71e Constitution gives indepe11dellt powers o/ taxation to the Unioll and the Siates - The /axing power of' the Ullion and of' the States ill'!' mutually e.Yclusive · This avoid1· the dilficul1ie.1··which have arisell 1111der other Federal Constitutions. (Per R. Banumathi, .J.) Se1·enth Schedule List JI Enny 52 -- Entrv tax levied In· W1rious States termed as a 'co111pensatorv 1ax' 1vhe1herfa/l.fi)//l of'Art.301 -f-leld: EllflY lax ji1/li11p, wit hill the domain ol Entrr 52, List 11, is a /(fX simplicitcr. even though hy nome11clat11re it is termed as a ·compenrn1orv tax· - Suhiect to passing the muster of Art. 304(a), enn:r lax levied hv the States under Emrv 52, List JI even though lel"lned as C!il11pell.1·otm:i- tax does not fall.fi)U/ of' Art. 301. (Per

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[20161 JO S.C.R.

R. Ba1111mathi, J.) Seventh Schedule List I a11d 11 -· Taxation entries are to he .fimnd 01111• in Usts I a11d II. indicating that in our Co11stilutio11al schcnw. ta.rntirm pm1•ers o/ the Centre and the States are 11111/uallv exclusi1·e - There are 110 Entries in the Concurrent List which gives poi1·cr o/ la:rntion This heing the case, the moment the levy contained in a !axing slalute transgresses inlo a prohihitedfield, it is liahle to he .1·truck down. (Per N. V Ramano, J.) /17/erpretation of' Statutes:

Interpretation which is hoth textual and c;ontextual has always heen found to he more acceptahle ~ An interpretation that makes the texlllal motch the contextual meaning of' the provision is preferred hy courts over one that prefers 011e at the cost of' tlze othe1: (Per 7'. S. Thak111: CJ.I.for himself' and.for A.K.Sikri and A.M. Kha11wilka1; .IJ) An i111e1pretation that supports and p11m10tes federalism tt'hile upholding the Central supremacy as contemplated hy some ol the :1rticles 11111st he prelerred. (Per T S. Thakw; CJ! for himself' and for ,LK.Sikri. and A.M. Khanwilkm; JJ.) Ce11/re-Sta1c relationship in legislative and fiscal matters Harmonious relationship - Held: A narrow interpretation that may have the potential or tendency to subvert the delicate halance which the .fi"m11ers of' the Consritution had in mind while distrihuting legislatiFe husinesses including the sovereign power to levy taxes 11111st he amided and a construction that is most heneficial for a harmonious relationship between different limhs of' the State i1ll'l11di11.'-' that het1veen rhe Cemre and the States or Stales inter se adopred. (Per T S. lhalun; CJ! for himself' and for A.K.Sikri and ..J.M. Khanwilkw: ./J.J Constitution of India - fVhile interpreting the Constitution. the emphasis must he rm reading it as a whole. and in a manner that the intent and object of' no part ol the Co11stitlltio11 is defeated - In this regard. there 111u.1·t he a holistic approach toward~ the provisions of the Constiturion. ff'er R. Bammwthi, .!.) Proviso - Interpretation ol - Held: Proviso is i11fended to

JINDAL STAINLESS !TD. v. STATE OF 1-IARYANA

e.rploin rhe main op1n1rin.'.; /Jar! of rhc .·lrticle -- Jr is never used or

ifllcrprctcrl as expanding rlre operative part of" the provision. (Per .Y r-: /? m nwru. .!. ! .J11diciol Rei·iew·

Poll er of Srate to erul("t tax laiu·

l"egislatil'e p1H1·ers

especial/\· taxin:' povt·crs cannot he tested hr implication - L'n/rss

rlrcrc is nprcss li111itation 011 tl1c JHJ11·er of the State to enact the S111t1' hm, ir

not the p1rn·i11ce of' the Courr to curtail the power of" rlw Srore hy i111erprctaril·c pmcess. (Per N. V Ramano, ./.)

fo.ri!lr:wrion:

!:"sscnlial chara!"fcristics of" a tux -- Jr is imposed undi'I" a ,·tofu/on poircr \\"i1ho111 rhe taxpayer\· <:onsent and the pav1111-'11f is rn/im·ed h1· /mr: it is an imposition nwdcfor puhlic purpose without 1cfi.'!"!'11r·c ro onr spi'l"iol hcm:fir lo he conferred rm the payer of" rhe lo.\"." ond ii is pon of the co111mon huf"den. (Per R. Bamonathi, .!.)

o/ tm

fo_y,""J(1xotwn: Pwpose o( imposing la.\" and essenrial elcmenr.\· lli,1·1 ·11ssed. r!-'er 1V V Rm1w11a, .J.)

l111pnsition o/: propriel\' - Held: f fi.~lr1i'.rnrhi111nt r11le of tux //!/Jou.eh .\"111/<'s on' c:1np01n'n·d lo lox under 1he Constil//lion, it does no1 11ecc.1·1m·il1· . 111ea11 rha1 tin"\" . should la.\" al exorbitant rates -- A rcsponsii>I<' gm·r.,.11111c111 in a demo1;rarT should ahw1vs strive lo keep

raxes as low os possihlc so Iha! no hean' burden is placed 011 tire

i11dh"iduals.

(Per ;V. 1'. l?m1w1w, J.)

Unjust f'nrid11nenl The co11cep1 o( u11j11sl enric/r111c11r is applicahlc fiJr considering ( l11les.1· rhe assessees estahlish 1hat ther iwn' nor pusscd 1111 1he rax lmrden lo rhc cn11.rn1ne1"s, they ca111101 11/ukc a clai111 .for refinul and 1111j111·1h enrich 1/remselves. (Per I?. Hu1111111mlri. .!)

rhe 11uestio11 of refimd

fl>im/.1· and Plrrmes:

"!Ji.1crimination' and 'difli'rel7liotion · - Distinction herii:een. u'i.1·1·11.1·sul. I fJeT" J: S. riwk.111; C:IJ /or himself' and.tin· A.K.Sikri and . I. M. l\ha1111·ilkar; .!.!.)

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[2016] 10 S.C.R.

Import - Mea11i11g of discussed. (Per R. Banumathi . .!.) DISSENTING VIEW: Constitution of India:

Arts.301. 30-1 - It is 1111/enable to postulate as a general B pri11cip/e that it is 011/)1 a discriminatory tax falling withi11 the a111hit t!f Art.304(a) that is suhjecl lo Part X!ll of the Constitution Art.304(a) elaborates that a particular form of taxalion. a 1w11discrimina101:JJ lax on goods . .shall not be construed lo Fiolate Arl.301 - But Art.304(a) ca11110/ be a basis for holding that every fiscal measure (apart ji·om a discriminatorv Im) lies outside the pun:iew c <~f Part XIII - For one thing. the rate of tax is bw 011e eleme111 of taxation - There are other eleme111s in a jiscal exaction i11c!udi11g assessment, the machinery for culleL·tiun and set offs and exemptions ·which can have a11 important hearing 011 whether the tax operates in a ma1111er that i111pedes the freedom of inter-State trade and D commerce - Moreover, a discri111inatorv tax otherwise than 011 goods, does not a/tract the prol'isions of Arr. 304 (a) - Finally, a 11011discri111i11alory lax may also become an impediment on the ji·eedom of trade and commerce where the lax is so high as tu render it cu11.fiscatury - Hence, a discri111i11atoryfiscal i111positiu11 of the nature E which offends Art.304{a) is illustrative <if hut not exhaustive of.fiscal impediments mt the freedom of trade and co11imerce. (Per D1'. D. Y. Chandrachud. J.J Art.30./(b) - Reasonableness of restriction -- Held: A tax may amount to a restriction where its direct and inevitable effect is lo F restrict the freedum of trade. c:ommerce and intercourse - The burden to establish this is on the person who seeks lo assail the validity (if a particular tax on the ground that it amounts to a restriction on the ji·eedom guaranteed by Art. 301 -- Unless this threslzo/d is crossed. the proviso to Arr.30./(b) will have no applicalion for, it is only whe11 there is a restriction that the question of its reaso11ahle11ess G can arise. (Per Dr. D..Y. Chandrachud, .!.)

Formal and s11bstanti1•e equality - Art.3114(a) comprehemis both formal and substantive notiom of equality - Formal equality 'rvould be met when the same rare of tax is prescribed fur goods imported from other Stales as is levied 011 goods produced cmd

JINDAL STATNLESS !TD. v. STATE OF HARYANA

11w11uf{1ctured 1rithin Suhstantive equality recognises the needfiJr the develop111c111 of 1111derde1·eloped areas ol the cou11trv - A ha lance lws lo lw slmck he tween rite rn11eer11s ol hothfiJr111al and s11hs1antive equalitr. (!'er D1: JJ. Y Chamlrachud, J)

Direct a11d immediale effecl lest - The States and the Union in the exercise o( their legislative pmrers, utilise taxation no/ onlv as o means of raising rc1·e1111es to support their developmental activities h111 also as ll lll('llSllr!' or achieving social o/Jjecls - Whether the p11rsuil of 1ho1·c social ohiects or the pursuit o( social regulation in/ring.es 11po11 the area oj"ji-ee trade and commerce cannot he decided a priori - The pmrer o/ taxation is capoble ol heing used ill a manner which can constitute, ill a given case, a restraint or impediment on the freedom ol trade and commerce - Jn determining as to when taxes can constitl//e a restriction on the fi"eedo111 ol !rade ond commerce, !he direct and immediate eflect test (as refined s11hse11ue11tlr) pro1·ides a judicially manageable ji-mnework - The tes/ of direc/ and immediate effect was enunciated in the judgments in i\liabari and ;\ulomobik Trnnsport - The test isfirmlv entrenched as a par/ of our j11rispmdence. (Per D1: D. }'. Chamlrachud, J.) Art.301 J,evr of a 11on-discri111i11a101y tax 1nay constitute infi·uction of"Art.301 if ii impedes the fi"eedom u/ trade, commerce and intercourse A II taxes ll'hich contain restrictions to trade, commerce and intercourse. discriminator)' or non-discriminatory infi·in,c,e Arr.301 unless they are saved u!Arts.302 to 304 - Jn the event, the s11hmission is accep!ed that all taxes are outside Part Xlll except nm1-discrimina1on' taxes as pe11nitted u/Art.304(a}, the same ivill lead 10 giving righl ro the Parliament and State f,egisla!ure to pass f(1ciall.v 11011-discriminatmy lcrws but creating restrictions on trade and comnwrr·e hv other means hy providing arhitrary procedure and various other kind ol restraints - The taxation which can impede the trade. co111111erce and intercourse thus cannot he nmfined 011/r to 11011-di.1·1Tilni11aton· taxation. (Per Asl10k Bhushan, Ji

C

.frrs 304(aJ and (h) - ls the Emrv Tax levied hy the States in the presem hatch of" cases violative of Arr.301 and in particular hm•e the i111p11gned State enac/rnents relating to ent1y tax to he tested irirh re/in·11ce to hoth Arts.304(a) and 304(h) for determining their

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[2016] 10 S.C.R.

rn/iditr ·· Held: li>fi77d 0111 m· to whether F,'ntry Tax levied hy different Stales in !he presenl ha1ch of cases viola/es Ar!.301, each slat11te has lo he looked info - A law made hy Slate Legislature complying clause(a) of Art.301 and 77ot containing any restriction on the .fi·eedom of trade, commerce and inlercourse need not comply !lrt.304(h) - Howeve1; a law evell !hough complies with Art.304(a) Im! l'077tai77s reslriclions 011 fi·eedom o/ trade. commerce and intercourse has lo he routed through prMiso to clause (h) o/Art.301 The comp/ianr:c o/ Ari. 304(h) proviso whelher required or not shall depellll on !he 11alure and conlelll of the State legislation The proFiso o{ Arl.301(h} is part of Constitutional Scheme which is neither agaim·t the fi'deral stmr·rure of the Constitution nor affi'Cts the State '.v sovercig77tr · Word 'reszriclion' used ill Art.304(h) is wide e17011gh to include restrictions placed hoth hy fiscal or non~/isca/ /m1·, (Per :ls/wk !Jh11shol7, J)

c;

Can a ta.\' 11·hich is compensatorv in nature also fcill foul ..Jrt.301 of the Consliflltion and what are the tests for determinillJ!. 1rhe1her the tax or /evv is cm!lpc11sui01T in nature -· Held: ft is an accepred proposition rlwt one of the charncteristics of tax is that it is an imposition made fi>r p11hlic purpose without reference to any special henefit lo he conferred on the payer of the tax - The taxes imposed hy the Legislature, apart fi-0111 heing source of Revenue is also expended for various p11hlic welfare measures and 11·hc11 it\· ohjccr is in no Wal' connected H'ilh the puhlic interest or puhlic welf{ire it loses its character of taxation and hecomes a levy which is 1mr·onstilW ional - The ji'amers of the Conslit11tion after pmviding fi1r.freedo111 oftrnde. wm111erce and imercourse in Art.301 laid dmn1 exceptions to the saidfi·eedmn in Art.302 to 31!() - The excep1io11s loid do11·11 in the constifl(/irmal scheme arc se/f~conrained and no ne11· exceprion can he added hy judicial interpretation "- Mere fan that a rm: stm111e compensates 1he paver of the 1m· does 1101 rake our the statute hewmd Parr Xiii. all laxes. heing ji;r one or other p11h/ic J!lll'}JO\'CS The tax legislation ,,.hich professes /0 co111pe11sare the paver cannot lake the lax /egis/a1ion m1 a higher pedestal heyond !he reach of Part XI//. 111akin5~ s11ch legislation "not suhject to Cons1i1111ion" - !Vhen all legislative power is "sl(hjccl to Constitution" as per Arts.215 and 24() of' the Constitution. a legislation, namelr. rn111pensato1:r tax legislation cannot be said to

JINDAL STAINLESS !TD.\'. STATE or HARYANA

he hevond Part )Off·- A1n- swh interpretation is clearly against the

co11stitutio11al sche1ne · Howeve1; it is always open to scrutinize the tmc nature 1111d character or legislatio11 to decipher as to whether it contains any restriction on ji·eedom of trade, commerce and intercourse vio/atinp, Arr.301 -·A legislatio11 which is compensatmy i11 nature may shed light while determining whether it contains restriction 011 trade, co111111erce and intercourse orfacilitate the trade, co111111erce and intercourse - But all legislations he it a co111pe11sat01y tax legislation or otherwise has to he tested in accordance with prrwisions of Port XJIJ of the Constitution. (Per Ashok Bhushan, J.)

Answering the reference, the Court

HELD: PER T. S. THAKCR, C.JI (FOR UJMSELF AND A. K. SIKH.I AND A. M. KllANWILKAR •. J.J.) Whether non-discriminatory fiscal measures impede free trade, commerce and intercourse and thereby fall foul of Article 301 of the Constitution.

1.1 While the power to levy taxes is an attribute of sovereignly, exercise of that power is col1trollecl by the Constitution. This is evident from the provisions of Article 265 which forbids levy or recovery of any tax except by the authority of law. The authority of law must be traceable to a provision in the Constitution especially where the legislative powers are shared by the Centre and the States as is the case with our Constitution which provides for what has been described as quasi federal system of governance. The source of power to enact laws is contained in Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution. !Para 1811181-A-B, DJ

Raja .Jagannath Baksh Singh v. State of UP & Am: 1963 SCR 220 : AlR 1962 SC 1563; Dena Bank v. Bhikhahhai Prahlmdas Parekh & Co. 2000 (3) SCR 509 : (2000) 5 SCC 694; Income Tax. Udiapur, Rajasthan v. MCdowel! and Co. Ltd. 2009 (8) SCR 983 : (2009) 10 SCC 755: State of West Bengal v. Kesoram

lR

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12016J 10 S.C.R.

Industries Ud. 2004 (1) SCR 564 : (2004) 10 SCC 201; State of Kera/a and ors. v. Mar Appraem Kuri Co. Ltd. and Am: 2012 (4) SCR 448 : (2012) 7 SCC 106 relied on. Ta:w1io11 - ViJlu111e 1 (4'" Edition) Chapter 2 by Cooley -- re fer red to.

1.2 Exercise of sovereign power is, however, sub,ject to Constitntional limitations especially in a federal system like ours where the States also to the extent permissible exercise the power to make laws including laws that levy taxes, duties and fees. The powe1- to levy taxes, being a sovereign power controlled only by the Constitution, any limitation on that power must be express. fParas 20, 2811184-D; 188-R-Ff

Svnthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and Ors. v. State of U.P and Ors. 1989 (l) Suppl. SCR 623 : (1990) 1 SCC 109 - relied on.

Mis. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. 1983 (3) SCR 130: (1983) 4 SCC 45; Maharaj Umeg Singh v. State of Bombay 1955 SCR 164 : AIR 1955 SC 540; Firm Bansidhar Premsukhdas v. State of Rajasthan 1966 Suppl. SCR 81 : AIR 1967 SC 40 - affirmed.

1-1

1.3 Before commencement of the Constitution nearly 2/3"0 of the country was rnled by the British while the remaining 1/3"" was ruled by the Princes also known as native States that enjoyed varying degrees of sovereignty over their respective territories. These rulers had the power to impose taxes and to regulate the flow of trade, commerce and intercourse. Some of them had erected trade barriers thereby impeding free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse. With the merger of these Princely States into the dominion of India to constitute one single political entity, that part of the country that was ruled by the British came

JINDAi. STAJNLESS !TD. v. STATE Of HARYANA

to be known as Part A State while the native States became Part I~ States. Even after the merger of these States, the Constitution had to acknowledge the existence of trade barriers and make transitional provisions with a view to eventually abolishing the same. It was in that background that the Constitution by Article 301 provided for the abolition of all such trade barriers consequent upon the entire geographical boundaries of .India being knit into one political unit. IP;ua 4411209-G-II; 210-A-C]

S. R. Bmnmai v. Union offndia 1994 (2) SCR 644 : 1994 (3) SCC I; Re: Under Article 143. Constitution olfndia (5/x'cia! Reference No. 1 of 1964) 1965 SCR 413 : AlR 1965 SC 745; M.P V S1111derara111ier v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1958 SCR 1422 : AIR 1958 SC 468 -- relied on.

C

Constitutional validity of Compensatory Tax theory prnpoundcd by ma.iority judgment in Automobile Transport case. 1.4 Compensatory taxes would fall outside Part XIII of the Constitution only if tax payers receive benefits and facilities commensurate to the levy. Any and every benefit howsoever remote or distant, would not save the levy from an attack on the ground of violation of Article 301. Three distinct aspects touching the question whether the Compensatory Tax Theory is indeed sustainable arc: Firstly, the concept of compensatory taxes is not recognised by the Constitution. A tax is a compulsory exaction of money for general public good. If taxes are eventually meant to serve larger public good and for running the governmental machinery and providing to the people the facilities essential for civilized living, there is no question of a tax being noncompensatory in character in the broader sense. Secondly, because the concept of compensatory tax. obliterates the distinction between a tax and a fee. The essential difference between a tax and a fee is that while a tax has no element of quid prfl quo, a fee without that element cannot be validly levied. Thirdly, and lastly, the concept of Compensatory taxes being outside Part

l-1

('

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(2016] IO S.C.R.

XUI, is difficult to apply in actual practice. Most of the legislations enacted by the States in these cases have described the entry tax levied under the same to be compensatory in character. This may have been done to take the levy outside the mischief of .\rticle 301 of the Constitution. The question, however, is whether tax amount collected in terms of the said legislation is really used by the State for the purpose of providing or maintaining services and benefits to the tax payers and whether the Courts can follow the money trail to determine whether the State concerned has actually used the amount for the avowed purpose underlying the legislation. This prncess is fraught with serious difficulties. Actual application of the Compensatory Tax Theory, therefore, runs into difficulties to an extent that the theory at some stage breaks down. The Compensatory Tax Theory was legally unsupportable and deserved to be abandoned. [Paras 63, 64 and 65)[238-E; 239-B; 240-F-G; 241-C-Ei

(I

Co111111issirme1: Hindu Religious Endoivments, Madras \'. Sri !.aksh111indra Thirtlw Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt 1954 SCR 1005 : AIR 1954 SC 282; Mahant Sri Ja,c,annalh Rama1111j Das & Am: v. Stale of Orissa & ilm: 1954 SCR 1046: AIR 1954 SC 400; 77ie HingirRamp11r Coal Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa 1961 SCR 537 : AIR 1961 SC 459; Co1poratio11 of Calcutta and am: 1: !Jher1_1' Cinema 1965 SCR 477 : AIR 1965 SC 1107; Kewal Krishna Puri and Am: v. State of Punjah 197'> (3) SCR 1217: (1980) I SCC 416; Krishi Upaj Mandi Samili and Ors. v. Orient Paper and Industries Ltd. 1994 (5) Suppl. SCR 392 : (1995) 1 SCC 655; Stare of Gujarat and Anr. v. Akhil Gujarat Pravasi V.S. Mahamendal 2004 (3) SCR 956 : (2004) 5 SCC 155; Stale of' Wes/ Bengal v. Kesoram industries Ltd & Ors. 2004 (1) SCR 564 : (2004) 10 SCC 201 - referred to. l71e /,m1· of foxarion by Thomas M Cooley; The Major /,aw Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar - Vol. 6 - 4'h Edition - Page Nos.6678 and 6679; Blackwell on Tax llrles as cited in 'Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. State

JTNDAL STAJNLFSS LJ'D. v. STATE OF J-IARYANA

of Bihar, AIR 1991 Patna 75, 81; Black'.\' Law Dictionmy, 7'" Edn., P. 1469; Seervai '.I' hook (Vol. 3, Page 2607) -· referred to.

J .5. l A plain reading of Article 301 would show that freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse is by no means absolute, the same being subject to the other provisions of Part XIII of the Constitution. Amongst those provisions arc Articles 302, 303 and 304 which have a direct bearing on the nature and the extent of restrictions snhjcc.t to which only is the right to freedom of trade, commerce ancl intercourse referred to in Article 301 C exercisable. Reading Articles 301 and 302 together, it is evident, that freedom of trndc, commerce and intercourse is subject to restrictions which Parliament may hy law impose in public interest. The absolute character of the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse is flrns lost by reason of Article 302 itself empowcl"ing D Parliament to impose such restrictions as it may consider necessary in public interest. Article 303, in turn, places restrictions on the legislative powers of the Parliament and of the States. A careful reading of Article 303 would show that not withstanding the power vested in the Parliament under Article 302, it shall not make any law giving, or authorising the giving of E any preference to one State over another, or making, or authorising the making of, any discrimination between one State and another, by virtue of any entry relating to trade and commerce in any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule. A conjoint reading of Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 303 would thus make it clear that F while Parliament/ Legislature of a State shall have no power to make a law imposing restriction on trade, commerce and intercourse, by giving or authorizing the giving of any preference to one State over the other, such limitation on the legislative power of Parliament shall not extend to giving of any preference or making or authorizing any discrimination if it is declared by law that a situation has arisen out of scarcity of goods that makes it necessary to do so. In other words, while the Parliament may impose restrictions in public interest under Article 302, the restriction so imposed shall not be in the nature of giving J-1

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[2016] 10 S.C.R.

preference or discrimination between one State or the other except when the law declares that scarcity of goods in any part of India necessitates such preference or discrimination. [Paras 66, 68][242-B-C, F; 243-D-ll; 244-A-BI I.5.2 Article 304 starts with a "no11-obsta11te" clause. Article 304(a) far from treating taxes as a restriction per se, specifically recognises the State legislature's power to impose the same on g,oods imported from other States or Union Territories. The expression 'may by law impose' is certainly not a restriction on the power to tax. That does not, however, mean that the power to tax goods imported from other States or Union Territories is unqualified or unrestricted. There are two restrictions on that power. The words "to which similar good.s manufactured or produced in that State are subject" impose the first restriction on the power of the State legislature to levy any such tax. These words would imply that a tax on import of goods from other States will be justified only if similar goods manufactured or produced in the State are also taxed. The second restriction comes from the expression "so, however, as not to discriminate between goods so imported and goods so manufactured or produced". The State legislature cannot in the matter of levying taxes discriminate between goods imported from other States and those manufactured or produced within the State levying such a tax. The net effect of Article 304(a), therefore, is that while levy of taxes on goods imported from others State and Union territories is clearly recognised as constitutionally permissible, the exercise of such power is subject to the two restrictive conditions. That does not however detract from the proposition that levy of taxes on goods imported from other States is constitutionally permissible so long as the State legislatures abide by the limitations placed on the exercise of that power. [Para 69] 1244E-F, G-11; 245-A-EJ 1.6 Question is whether Clauses (a) and (b) have to be read conjunctively. Clauses (a) and (b) of Article 304 deal with two distinct subjects and must, therefore, be understood to be independent of each other. While Clause (a) deals entirely with imposition of

.JINDAL STAINLESS LTD. '. STATE OF HARYANA

taxes on goods imported from other States, Clause (b) deals with A imposition of reasonable restriction in public interest. It is trite that levy of a tax in terms of Article 304(a) may or may not be" accompanied by the imposition of any restriction whether reasonable or unreasonable. The use of the word 'and' between clauses (a) and (h) docs not admit of an interpretation that may impose an obligation upon the legislature to necessarily impose a tax and a 1·es!riction together. The law may simply impose a tax without any restriction reasonable or otherwise or it may simply impose a reasonable restriction in public interest without imposing any tax whatsoever. lt may also levy a tax and impose such reasonable restriction as may be considered necessary in public c interest. All the three situations are fully covered and permissible under Article 304 in view of the phraseology used therein. The word 'and' can mean 'or' as well as 'and' depending upon the context in which the law enacted by the legislature uses the same. Levy of taxes do not constitute a restriction under Part XHI except D in cases where the same are discriminatory in nature. Once Article 304 (a) is understood in that fashion, Clause (b) dealing with reasonable restrictions must necessarily apply to restrictions other than those b~' way of taxes. It follows that for levy of taxes prior Presidential sanction in terms of the proviso under Article 304(h) will be wholly unnecessary. This view is reinforced on the plain language of proviso to Article 304(b), which is limited lo law relating to reasonable restrictions referred to in clause (b). [Paras 70, 711[245-F-G; 246-C-HJ 2. An interpretation that makes the textual match the contextual meaning of the provision is preferred by Courts over one that prefers one at the cost of the other. The question is whether the textual interpretation placed on Articles 301 to 304 matches the contextual. The contextual interpretation of Part XIII must, out of necessity, start with the historical perspective of that Part. Part XIJI had a historical precursor in the form of Section 297 of the Government of India Act, 1935 that governed what was then called the British India comprising the territory of India subject to British Rule. The rest of the territories were at that time Princely States who claimed sovereign rights within th~ limitations imposed by the paramount power. The power to levy

J)

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[2016] 10 S.C.R.

taxes was one such power wielded by the Princely States which led to erection of customs barriers impeding the flow of trade, commerce and intercourse. Section 297 aimed at removing such trade harriers. It provided for a prohibition against enactment of any law or taking of any executive action by the provincial legislature that restricted the entry into or export from the province goods of any class or description. More importantly, in terms of clause (b) of Section 297(1) of Government of India Act, 1935, no provincial legislature or Government could impose any tax, ccss, toll or due which discriminated between goods manufactured or produced in the provinces and goods not so manufactm·ed or produced or between goods manufactured or produced outside the province discriminated between goods manufactured or produced in one locality and similar goods manufaclu1·cd or produced in another locality. With India attaining its freedom, Part XIII of the Constitution adopted by it, was aimed at bl"inging about economic unity. The object underlying Part XIII was to make movement and exchange of goods free throughout the territory of India. This was achieved by Article 301 to Article 304 adopting substantially the scheme underlying the 1935 Ad. The only difference between the said provisions and Section 297 of the 1935 Act was that the principles enunciated in the latter were extended to the Union Government and the Union Parliament and to the territory which had after merger become a 1rnrt of India. The essence of the freedom of trade commc1·cc and intercourse as recognized in the 1935 Aet and in the Constitution under Part XIU remained the same. !Paras 73, 76 and 77][248-C; 249-B-ll; 250-A-B)

Reserve Bank o(Jndia \'. Peerless General Finance and lnvestmrnt Co. /Jd. 1987 (2) SCR 1 : (1987) 1 SCC 424 - relied on.

Constit11rio11al Lmv ol lndia ( 4"' Edition) by H.M. Secrvai - referred to.

3.1 Legislative competence of the State legislatures can

JlNDAL STAINLESS r:rD. v. STATE or HARYANA

be circumscribed only by exp1·ess provisions or the Constitution and unless lhei-e is an express limitation on the plenary taxing power of the States. there is no other feHcr on the exercise of n1al power. Applyint: this principle to the case at hand, there is no specific limitation on the State's power to levy taxes on the import of goods from other States except the one referred to in Article 304(a) of the Constitution. That limitation is confined lo levy of disc.-iminatory taxes within the comprehension of Article 304(a). The power to levy a tax in terms of A.rticles 245 and 246 read with Entry 52 of list ll not being in dispnte in the cases at hand, the absence of any specific limitation forbidding the exercise of such power whether for the sake of free trade, commerce and intercourse or otherwise simply means that the State legislatures arc free to levy taxes that arc non-discriminatory in nature. [Paras 79, 80]!251-D-G]

3.2 The provisions of our Constitution are aimed at vesting and maintaining with the States substantial and significant powers in the kgislalivc and cxccntive fields so that Slates enjoy their share of autonomy and sovereignty in their sphere of governance. This e1n in turn be done by interpreting the prnvisions of the Constitution including those found in Part XIII in a manner that preserves and promotes the federal set-up instead of diluting or undermining the same. An approach which tends to dilute the federal characte1· of our Constitutional scheme must·. therefore, he avoided and one that supports and promotes the concept of federalism preferred hy the courts while interpreting the provisions of the Constitution. Taxing power of the Union and the States arc mutually exclusive. While the Parliament cannot kgislatc on the subjects reserved for the States, the States cannot similarly trespass onto the taxing powers of the Union. If the Constitutional scheme docs not allow the Parliament to us111·p the taxing powers of the State Lcgislatun:s, such process of usurpation cannot also be permilled to take place in the garb of making Union executive's concurrence an essential p1·c-rcquisitc for an~· taxing lq!i~latinn. [Paras 81. 83 and 841 1252-B-C; 254-E,

Ci

C-H: 2:'i5-AI ;\./1» lnremutio110/ fo11rist Corpom1i1m & ors. v. Sww

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of Harvana a11d Ors. 1981 (2) SCR 364: (1981) 2 SCC 318; ITC Umited ''· ilgricultuml Produce Market Co1111nittce and Ors. 2002 (1) SCR 441 : (2002) 9 SCC 232 ·- relied on. Constirutirm Assemblv Debates (Vol. IX Page 1131) rcfen-ed to.

3.3 The expression 'subject to other provisions of this Part' appearing in Article 301 and the non-obstante clause appearing in Article 304 do not traverse in different directions. There is no conllict in the two provisions on account of the use of the said expressions. Interpreted individnally or conjointly, the two expressions simply mean that Article 304 takes precedence over Article 301. [Para 9111260-F-Gl

3.4 It is fairly well settled by now that Courts show considerable deference to the legislature in the matter of quantum of tax that may be levied as also the subjects and individuals upon whom the same may be levied. .Just because room for challenge to a fiscal statute is limited is no reason to hold that levy of taxes otherwise within the competence of the legislature imposing the same should be seen as a restriction on free trade and commerce guaranteed under Article 301 which Article does not either textually or contextually recogn'ize levy of taxes as impediments except in cases where the same are discriminatory in nature thereby being offensive to Article 304 (a) of the Constitution. [Para 9611264-C-E]

Ramjilal v. IT7come fox Officer, Mohindargarh 1951 SCR 127: AIR 1951 SC 97: Kunnathat Thathu11ni Moopi/ Nair v. 17ze State of' Kera/a & Anr. 1961 SCR 77: AIR 1961 SC 552; Laxmanappa Hanumantappa Jomkhandi v Union of India AIR 1955 SC 3 - relied on. 1\!l/1-. Bhugatrnm Rajee1' Kumar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, MP and Ors. 1994 (6) Suppl. SCR 91 :

l-l

JINDAL STAINLESS ITD. v. STATE OF IIARYANA

1995 Suppl. (l) SCC 673; State of Bihar and Ors. v. Rihar Cham her of Commerce and Ors. 1996 (2) SCR 184 : (1996) 9 SCC 136; Jindal Stripe !JJ. and Am: v. State of Hwyana and Ors. 2003 (4) Suppl. SCR 154 : (2003) 8 sec 60: Jaiprakash Associates Limited v. State of /\i!adhya Pradesh and Ors. 2008 (17) SCR 1282 : (2009) 7 sec 339; Jindal Stainless Limited and Am: v. Stale off-Jarrana and Ors.2010 (4) SCR 743: (2010) 4 SCC 595; Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1965 SCR 908: AlR 1965 SC 1636; GK. Krishnan v. State of fomil Nadu 1975 (2) SCR 715 : (1975) 1 SCC 375; Kihoto Hollo/um v. Zachillhu 1992 (1) SCR 686 : (1992) Supp 2 SCC 651; Tlv!A. Pai Foundation and others 1-: Stale of Karnataka 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 587 : (2002) 8 SCC 481; Chi el.Justice of Andhra Pradesh and others. v. L V A. Dixi111/11 and others 1979 (1) SCR 26 : (1979) 2 SCC 34; Ke.rn\'Gnanda Bharati v. State ol Kera/a 1973 Suppl. SCR 1 : (1973) 4 SCC 225; Ku/deep Nair v. Union of India and Ors. 2006 (5) Suppl. SCR 1 : (2006) 7 SCC l; Smt. U1)a111 Bai " State of Uttar Pradesh 1963 SCR 778: AlR 1962 SC 1621 - referred to.

3.5 The ''direct and immediate" effect test evolved by the pronouncement of the Australian High Court has itself been watered down and diluted. The current view in Australia is that only such taxes as are discriminatory introduced by way of a protectionist measure operate as restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse. !Para 102]1268-B-Ci

.James r. Cmmnmni:ealth o(Ausrralia (1936) A.C. 578; Cmmnomi:eallh of /1 l!Stralia and others F. Bank of Nnv South I-Vales m1d others 119501 A.C. 235; Co111mrm11'calth ol Australia and Ors. v. Bank ol New South Wales and Ors. [1950] A.C. 235; McCulloch v. Marv/and, 17 US 316 (1819) - referred to.

(.!

;\

Il

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[20l6l l0 S.C.R.

" I freatise 011 the Co11stit11/io11al J,imitation.1·" (8'" Edn. 1927 Vol. II Page 986) by Thomas M Cooley referred to.

3.6 Simpl,v because the tax is high is no reason for it to change its character and take the form of a restriction within the meaning •tf Part XI 11, no matter any one aggrieved of such heavy burden shall have the liberty to assail the same on all such grounds a' may be available to him under Part Ill of the Constitution. !Para 1l6J J278-BJ

St{{/e o/ lvf{{dru.1· '" J\'. K. i\'{{/{{raja Mudalior l 968 SCR 829 : A IR 1%9 SC 147 - relied on.

I)

I'

Rojo .Joganno!h Hoksh Singh v. Stale of' UP 1963 SC R 220 : A I H. l 962 SC 1563; Federa1io11 o( Hotel & Rc.1·taura11/ .·l.\·sn. of Indio etc. 1·. U11io11 ol l11dia & Ors.

198'l (2) scR 918: (1989) 3 sec 634; Y

v

Sri11i1·asa11111rtln· and ors. 1·. Stoic of' 1'vlrsore and /lm: AIR 1959 SC 894; 0 G Gose & Co. (Agents) (P! Ltd v. Stole of Kera/a {//Id am: 1980 (I) SCR 804 : (1980) 2 SCC 410; A S11resh and olilt'rs 1·. State o/11V and another 1996 (8) Suppl. SCR 947: (1997) l SCC 319- referred to.

4.1 Whether the use of the expression "by virtue of any entry 1·clating to trade and commc1·cc" appearing in Article 303 arc wide enough to include entries relating to lev:v of taxes also.

(i

II

The entries relating to Trade and Commerce by themselves are no! snfficicnl to cmpowc1· till' legislature lo levy taxes. The constitutional scheme is such that a taxing entry is distinct from other entries and a levy of tax is possible on!~· if there is an entry which authorises lhP cornpcknt legislature to levy the same. :\rticle 303 is an exception lo Article 302, inasmuch as it limits the po\\ er conceded to the Parliament under Article 302 to impose restrictions on freedom of Trade, Commerce and Intercourse in public interest. The power exercised by Article 302 cannot be

JJNDAL STAINLESS !TD. v. STATE Of HARYANA

so exercised as to give preference to one state over another except under a situation covered by Article 303(2) namely situation arising from scarcity of goods in any part of the territory of India. !Paras 117-11911278-E, G-H; 279-A; 280-E-F]

M. P V Sunderammier \·'. State of Andhra Pradesh 1958 SCR 1422 : AlR 1958 SC 468 - relied on.

4.2 Whether the levy of entry tax on import of goods from outside the local area i11 the State will be per sc discriminatory if goods so imported or similar arc not produced or manufactured within the State.

C

1\t-ticlr 304(a) strikes at discriminatory taxation implying thereby that the levy falls unequally as between goods produced or manufactured within the State and those being imported from D outside. The essence of the guarantee in Article 304(a) lies in the same or similar goods being treated similarly in the matter of taxation. The question, therefore, is whether that guarantee is violated if the goods .rnbjected to levy of ei1try tax arc not produced or manufactured within the State levying the tax.Answer is in the negative. This is because there is no question of any discrimination if goods from outside the State are not at a disadvantage vis-a-vis goods produced or manufactured within that State. His true that a levy on goods that arc not produced or manufactured in the State is likely to make such goods costlier but that is not enough for the levy to be considered F unconstitutional. A responsive Government aware of the needs of its constituents will be under tremendous pressure to keep such taxes low enough for its constituents to be able to afford the same. Dcmocrat.ic processes and pressures within the system of governance that we have will itself take care of any aberration in G this regard. What is absolutely clear, however, is that Article 304(a) will not frown at a levy simply because same or similar goods as are taxed are not produced or manufactured in the State. !Para 1221[282-C-G]

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;\

Ka!rani Stores v. State of' Orissa (1966) 1 SCR 865 held inapplicable.

ll

(i

II

4.3 The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 was enacted pursuant to the Sixth Amendment Act, 1956 whereby taxes on sale and purchase of goods in the course of inter-state trade and commerce were expressly brought within the purview of the legislative competence of Parliament. This included the 1wwcr to impose rcst.-ictions upon the power of the State legislature insofar as levy of taxes of sale or purchase of goods of special importance is concerned. F:ntry 92-A added by the Sixth .\mendment Act 1956 empowered the Parliament to levy taxes on the sale and purchase of the goods other than newspapers in the course of trade and commerce. Entry 54 of the State List by the same amendment was redrawn to make the taxes on the sale and purchase of goods subject to Entry 92-A of List I. The States' power is made subservient to the powers of the Parliament under Entry 92-A. Section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, t.herefore, has overriding effect vis-a-vis any State Law authorizing imposition of taxes on sale/purchase of declared goods. In t.his perspective, Parliament has limited the legislative power of the Stat.c insofar as taxes on declared goods arc concerned. The imposition of restrictions on the State's power of taxation in regard to declared goods is not suggestive of taxes themselves being restrictions for purposes of Part XIII oft he Constitution. Not only that, Article 286(3) provides the source of power for the Parliament to impose any restriction on the State authority t.o leV)' a tax on goods of special importance declared by Parliament. A non-discriminatory tax does not per se constitute a rest1·iction on the right to free trade, commerce and intercourse guaranteed under Article 301. !Paras 124-12611283-D-J•'; 284-A-C; 285-A-B]

Atiuhari Tea Co. Ltd. \'. Srare of'Assam & Ors. 1961 SCH 809 : Am 1961 SC 232; Automohile 1/'a11.1porf (Rajasrhan; Lrd. ere. v. Swre of' Rajastlwn & Ors.1963

JlNDAI. STAINl .FSS lTD. v. STATF OF HARYANA

SC R 491 : A IR 1962 SC 1406; Jindal Swinless Ltd ( J) and ,.Jnr. 1·. Swre ol Harvana and Ors. 2006 (3) SCR 1095: (2006) 7 SCC 241 - overruled.

5.1 ls the Entry Tax levied by the States in the present hatch of cases yiolativc of Article 301 of the Constitution and in particular have the impugned State enactments relating to entry tax lo be tested with reference to both Articles 304(a) and 304(b) of the Con.~titution for determining their validity? The restrictions referred to in Article 304(b) arc non-fiscal in nature. Constitutional validity of any taxing statute has, therefore, to he tested only on the anvil of Article 304(a) and if the law is found to be non-discriminatory, it can be declared to be constitutionally valid without the legislation having to go through I.he test or the process envisaged by Article 304(b ). Should, however, the statute fail the test of non-discrimination under Article 304(a) it must he struck down for the same cannot be sustained even if it had gone through the process stipulated by Article 304(b). That is because what is constitutionally impermissible in terms of Article 304(a) cannot be validated and sanctioned through the medium of Article 304(b). A fiscal statute shall be open to challenge only under Article 304(a) of the Constitution without being subjected to the test of Article 304(b) either in terms of the existence of public interest or rcasonah!rness of the lcv~·. !Para 12911174-C; 285-F-II; 286-A-

BJ Video t.'lectronics v. State of Punjab 1989 (2) Suppl. SCR 731 : (1990) 3 SCC 87 - affirmed.

5.2 The Court ought to examine whether the differentiation made is intended or inspired by an element of unfavourable bias in favour of the good~ produced or manufactured in the State as against those impor1ecl from outside. Sn long as the differentiation made b~· the States is not intended lo create an unfavourable bias and so long as the differentiation is intended to benefit a distinct

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class of industries and the life of the benefit is limited in terms of period, the benefit must be held to flow from a legitimate desire to promote industries within its territory. Grant of exemptions and incentives in such cases must be deemed to have been inspired by considerations which in the larger context help achieve the Constitutional goal of economic unity. !Pam 133] [289D; 290-C-DI

Shree Mahavir Oil Mills and Anr. v. Stale of Jammu and Kashmir and Ors. (1996) 2 SCC 39 - distinguished. Kathi Raninp, Rawat l'. The State of Saurashtra 1952 SCR 435: AJR 1952 SC 123 - affirmed.

Mk Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, MP. and Ors. 1994 (6) Suppl. SCR 91 : 1995 Suppl. (1) sec 673; State of Bihar and Ors. V. Bihar Chamber of Commerce and Ors. 1996 (2) SCR 184 : (1996) 9 sec 136; Ji11dal Stripe Ltd and Am: V. State of' Hwyana and Ors. 2003 (4) Suppl. SCR 154 : (2003) 8 SCC 60; Jaiprakash Associates Limited v. Stale of Madhva Pradesh and Ors. 2008 (17) SCR 1282 : (2009) 7 SCC 339; Jindal Stainless Limited and Am: v. State of Harvana and Ors. 2010 (4) SCR 743: (2010) 4 SCC 595; [<eshav ivlil!.1· Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1965 SCR 908 : AIR 1965 SC 1636: GK Krishnan v. State of fomil Nadu 1975 (2) SCR 715 : (1975) 1 SCC 375; Kihoto Hollo/um v. Zachi/lhu 1992 (1) SCR 686 : (1992) Sup1>l. 2 SCC 651; TM.Ii. Pai Foundation and others l'. State ofKamataka 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 587 : (2002) 8 SCC 481; Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and others. v. L. V. A. Dixitulu a11d others 1979 (1) SCR 26 : (1979) 2 SCC 34; Kesavananda Blwrati v. State of Kera/a 1973 Suppl. SCR l : (1973) 4 SCC 225; Ku/deep Nair v. Union ojlndia and Ors. 2006 (5) Suppl. SCR 1 : (2006) 7 SCC l; S1111. Ui/am Bai v. Stale uf U1tar Pradesh 1963 SCR 778 : AIR 1962 SC 1621 referred to.

.JJNDAL STAINLESS LTD. \'. STATE or HARYANA

5.3 Courts have almost universally accepted the principle that keeping in view the inherent complexities of fiscal adjustments and the diverse elements and inputs that go into such exercise a greater latitude is due to the legislature in taxation ·related legislations. So long as the intention behind the grant of exemption/adjustment/credit is to equalize the fall of the fiscal burden on the goods from within the State and those from outside the State such exemption or set off will not amount to hostile rliscrirninati.on offensive to Article 304(a). Whether the impugned enactment achieve the object of such equalization or lead to a sit nation that exposes goods from outside the state to suffer any disadvantage vis-a-vis those produced or manufactured in the taxing State is left open for examination by the regular benches hearing the matters. !Paras 137, 1411[291-G; 297-E]

Ma/i1tlal i: Union of India 1996 (10) Suppl. SCR 585: l 997 (5) SCC 536; Khandige Sham Bhat v. Agrl. /JV 1963 SCR 809 : AIR 1963 SC 591; V Gun1viah Naidu and Sons and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors.1977 (1) SCR 1065 : (1977) 1 SCC 234; Malwa /3111· Se111ice (Private) Ltd. v. State of P.unjah and Others 1983 (2) SCR 1009: (1983) 3 SCC 237; Maharaj Umeg Singh v. State of !3omhav, 1955 SCR I 64 : AIR

1955 SC 540 - referred to. Cole v. Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360 - referred to.

PER S. A. BOBDE, .J. (Concurring) Taxes arc not restrictions on Trade. 1. Tax is predicated on freedom of trade and commerce. It is pa1·ticularly true of entry tax. Entry tax is an impost levied on transactions which are entered into in the course of that freedom. In fact, but for such freedom of trade, there would be no transaction and no occasion for the levy of a tax. The levy of a tax is a distinct event from the transaction. Trade and commerce must take place to attract a tax. Undoubtedly a tax may make

/\

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the transacHon less profitable to the extent of the tax. Bnt that is rar from being an impediment on the transaction which is part of trade, the freedom which is guaranteed under Article 301. It is not possible to readily conceive of a tax, which in itself, restricts or impedes the freedom of trade. !Para 2] [298-C-D] 2. Article 304(a).

I)

The levy of entry tax on import of goods from outside the local area in the State will be per se discriminatory if goods similar to those imported are not produced or manufactm·ed within the State. Article 304 recognizes the power of a Legislature to a State to impose the tax on the imported goods so, however, as not to discdminatc between goods so imported and goods so manufactured or produced. The Article imposes two conditions: firstly. that a law may impose a tax on goods imported from other States, "any tax' to which "similar goods manufactured or produced' in that Stale are subject. This clearly implies that the goods imported from other States may be subjected to a tax where simib1r goods a1·c in fact, manufactured or produced in the imporfing State and arc subjected to tax. In other words, (a) the goods imported from other States must be similar to (b) the goods manufactured or produced in the importing State and (c) the goods so locally manufactured or produced must be subject to tax. The second condition is the tax that is imposed on imported goods should not discriminate between the imported goods and goods manufactured or produced in the importing State. The intention of the Article thus, clearly is that where a tax exists on goods impot"ted into a State, there should be no discrimination between such a tax and a tax on similar goods manufactured or produced in the importing State. The reference point for tax on imported goods is the tax on locally manufactured goods. It is not possible to construe the prohibition against discrimination where there is no tax upon similar goods manufactured or produced in the importing State. Undoubtedly, the effect of such a construction is that the imported goods cannot be taxed where similar goods are not manufactured or produced in the importing State and arc therefo1·e, not subjected to similar tax and that seems to be the clear· intention of this Article. !Paras 4, 6 and 711299-C; 300-D-

JINDAL STAINLESS LTD. v. STA.TE OF HARYA.NA.

II; 301-A-BI

3. Jn the normal course, a State in which certain goods arc not manufactured would rely on the supply of such goods from other States and the effect of this provision would he to make the goods so imported available without the additional burden of tax. In sum, the premise on which lax can be imposed is the existence of no! mere taxes on goods produced or manufactured locally, or the thcon:tical possibility of taxation, to avoid the prohibition under Article 304 (a), hut the actual production or manufacture of similar goods, that are subject to like or similar tax. Absent this condition, the levy would fall foul of Article 304 (a) since it would constitute an additional burden (the goods already having suffered some form of taxation in the producing state). This interpretation would also further economic progress and the unhindered availahili!y of goods in states which do not have manufacturing capacities and may not be able to develop it, having regard to lack of natural resources or other geographical limitations. I! also furthers the aims underlying Article 301 of the Constitution of India. (Para 8]1301-C-F]

Stall' of'Assam & Ors. 1961 SCR 809 : AIR 1961 SC 232 - referred to.

f1riahari ](,a Co. Ud.

3)

1:

McC11lloch v. Mwyla11d. 17 lJS 316 (1819) - referred to.

PER SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, .I. (Concurring)

r

Challenge to various taxing statutes enacted by several States to impose Entry Tax on goods in exercise of specific power available lo the State legislature under· Entry 52 of List II in the 7th Schedule of the Constitution.

I. Since, in the matter of levy of taxes the compensatory theory is no more relevant, the State Legislatures are free to ('Xercise their taxing powers without the need of declaring and showing that taxes imposed by them oi1 outside goods arc for the benefit of concerned traders or manufacturers. But such tax must

SUPREME COURT REPORl'S

r'

12016] I0 S.C.R.

be, in essence, non-discriminatory, both, in the ultimate tax burden and in machinery provisions. To muster compliance with Part XIII of the Constitution, the lax must pass the twin tests embodied in Article 304(a) - (i) Similar goods produced locally must also be subjected lo similar tax and (ii) such state action should not attract the vice of discrimination between the two varieties of goods. I Para 611303-0-Fl 2. The entire discussion leads to a fair conclusion that the views summarized by Sinha, CJI in paragraph 18 of his judgment in Atiabari case depict the law emanating from Part XIII of the Constitution in the correct perspective. However same cannot he said of observations in paragraph 16 where His Lordship used the expression - "If a law is passed by the legislature ...... . imposing a high tariff wall----------assumes the character of a trade barrier which it was the intention of the Constitution makers to abolish by Part XUJ." These observations do create practical difficulties of insurmountable proportions. Hence these deserve to be treated as obiter or interpreted in the light of the entire passage, to mean such taxes which impose an impediment to the free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse by creating discriminatory tariff wall/trade barrier (emphasis supplied). For Part Xlll there can be no real impediment through tax unless the so called wall or barrier is one of hostile discrimination between local goods aud outside goods. !Para 711303-G-ll; 304A-Bl

Atiahari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam & Ors. 1961 SCR 809 : AIR 1961 SC 232; Auromobi!e Transport (Rajasthan) Ud etc. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. 1963 SCR 491 : AIR 1962 SC 1406 - not good law.

PER N. V. RAMANA, J. (Concurring) 1.1 It is a settled proposition that generally the construction of the Constitution must be most beneficial and widest possible amplitude. The court must gather from the spirit of the II

.JINDAL STAINLESS !TD. v. STATE OF HARYANA

Constitution and 1he language must not be construed in a narrow A and pedantic manner. Equally important point is that legislative powers especially taxing powers cannot be tested by implication. Unless there is express limitation on the power of the State to enact the State law, it is not the province of the court to curtail the power of the slate by interpretative process. Every law must B he tested with reference to preamble and Directive Principles of State Policy. !Paras 5.2, 5.3]1316-D-E, G; 317-A]

Kesavananda Bharti v. State o( Kera/a 1973 Suppl. SCR l : 1973 (4) SCC 225 · relied on.

RH/ v. Pearle.1·.1· General Finance AIR 1987 SC 1023: 1987 (2) SCR 1: In re CP and Berar Act, 1938, 1939 FCR 18; Aram Prakash v. State of Harvana 1986 (1) SCR 399 : 1986 (2) SCC 249; State o( 11/est Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. 2004 (1), SCR 564 : AIR 2005 S.C. 1646; Ci. K. Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu 1975 (2) SCR 715: AIR 1975 S.C 583; RC Cooper v. UOJ, 1970 (3) SCR 530 : (1970) l SCC 248; Madho Rao .Jimii Scimlia l'. Cnion oflndia 1971 (3) SCR 9: (1971) 1 sec 85 - referred to.

Constituent Asscmhly Dehote Vol. IX, September 8, 1949 - referred to.

1.2 In a democratic system, the elected Governments are always responsible for its people. If there is any high taxation which is affecting their life, this puts pressure on the Governments lo reduce taxes and elected Governments are answerable to public every five years. No Government can raise tax which would cause public inconvenience. In this context, Sovereignty is no more endless power, rather it is responsibility. A responsible government in a democracy should always strive to keep taxes as low as possible, so that no heavy burden is placed on tbe individuals. Although States arc empowered to tax under the Constitution. it does not necessarily mean that they should tax at

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exorbitant rates. Tax is a way uf apportioning the cost of government among those who in some measure are privileged to enjoy the benefits and must therefore bear its burdens. A tax is a burden or charge imposed by a competent legislature upon persons or property, to raise money for public purposes. Important clements of a tax may be said to be first, that it is a compulsory exaction; secondly, it is payable to the State or to some public authority on its behalf; and thirdly, that it is an exaction .for purposes of public interest. Our Constitution has demarcated the taxing powers between the Center and States. Taxing power of the Union as well as the States resides in Article 245 read with c 246 of the Constitution. Article 246 of the Constitution, lays down that Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any matter enumerated in Union List (List I of schedule VII). The States have complete power to make laws with respect to ~my matter enumerated in the State List (List II of schedule VII) and both Parliament and State Legislature have power to make laws with respect to any matter enumerated in the Concurrent List (List IU of schedule VU). As per Article 265, no taxes shall be levied or collected except by the authority of law. Taxation entries are to be found only in lists I and II, indicating that in our Constitutional scheme, taxation powers of the Centre and the States are mutually exclusive. There ar·c no Entries in the Concurrent List which gives power of taxation. This being the case, the moment the levy contained in a taxing statute transgresses into a prohibited field, it is liable to be struck down. !Paras 6.1, 6.211324-C-F; 325-A-E)

Raja .!agannath Baksh Singh v. State of U.P & Am: 1963 SCR 220: AIR 1962 SC 1563; Dena Bank v. Bhikhahhai Prahhudas Parekh & Co. 2000 (3) SCR 509 : (2000) 5 sec 694; c.rr.. Udaipur Rajasthan V. McdoH·e!l & Co. Lrd. 2009 (8) SCR 983 : 2009 (10) sec 755 - referred to. Coole1' on taxation Vol. 1, 4'" ed., Ch.2 - referred to.

1-1

JINDAL STATNLESS ITD. v. STATE Of HARYANA

2.1 The freedom of tniclc, commerce and intercourse A throughout the territory of India is assured, but such freedom of trade is subject to Part XIII of the Constitution. 'When evaluating the impact of Article 301 on the plenary taxing power of the Sovereign State, the opening words become significant. The dissi;ct.ion of A1·tielc 301 shows that it bas three significant parts or p h rascs. T hcse are, 's ul~iect to other provisions of this part', and 'Trade, Commerce and intercourse throughout territory (}( India', '.~hall befi·ee'. \Vhichever way one r·eads, the plain meaning of this is that trade, commerce and intercourse, shall be free, subject to Articles 302 to 307 of the Constitution. The two sets or the provisions which are mainl:o-· contemplated in the phrase c 'subject to other provisions' are Articles 302, 303 and 304 (a) and (h). The Pl1rliamcnt may by law restrict the freedom of trade in puhlic interest and such law would lJe free from Article 301. Article 301 of the Constitution begins with the phrase 'Subject tn othl'r prnvisions of this Part'. This phrase gins an initial D indication as lo what to expect? The position of this phrase should be taken into consideration. Even before the declaration of freedom of Trade, Commerce and Lntercourse, it is being sub.iected to limitations. Further the opening words of Article 301, namely, 'sub.ice! to the provisions of this part' require that all the Articles of the Part XIII have to be read together so as to understand the width and meaning of the Part Xlll. 'Subject to' is the dominant expression so far as Article 301 is concerned. It indicates subservience to at least Articles 302, 303 and 304. Articles 302 to 304 embody a restatement of powers under Article 246 r/w the State List under the VII Schedule. Each restated F power by itself overrides the freedom of trade in Article 301. [Paras 7.3-7.511328-D, E-H; 329-A-BI 2.2 A1·ticlc 301 loses its prime place, if States make laws under any of the taxing entries, erecting reasonable restrictions or imposing tax on the free trade. Such power oYer-ridcs freedom of trade and commerce. Thus, the general declaration by Article 301 is relaxed in favor of Parliament by Article 302 and in favor of the States by Articles 303 and 304. Article 304 starts with a 11011-ohstallle clause whereas Article 302 does not have a nonobstanle clause. As the freedom of trade in Article 301 is itself

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subjecl to 302 and 304, the intention of the framers appears to be clear. The Constitution guards and protects the State legislations under Arliclc 304(a) and (b) from overemphasized effect on freedom of trade under Article 301.IPara 7.6] 1329-C-DJ 3. It is a sound principle of jurisprudence that entire statute has to be construed as a whole and not in isolation. While doing so, no clause in any provision can be ignored especially when interpreting the Constitution which is 's11pre111a lex'. The difference between the power of the Union and the States vis-a-vis Article 301 is that Article 302 does not have application to tax laws like Article 304(a), but under Article 304(a), tax can be imposed on the goods imported from other States. From the legislative history and Constituent Assembly Debates, propositions that emerge arc: It is clear from a comparison of Clause 16, 243, 244 and 245 of the draft Constitution with Articles in Part XA (now Part XIII) that they were not merely arranged in seriatim but were substantially altered. That freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse is not a fundamental right. That trade, commerce and intercourse in India is not absolutely free. That the discriminatory tax (like erstwhile custom duties imposed by certain independent states) is harmful for the federation. [Paras 7.7, 7.1711329-E-F; 335-B-EJ

F1111dame11tal Rights by Dr. K. M. Munshi B. Shiva Rao. The Fmming of India :1· Co11stit111ion, Vol. II, p. 69 (1967) (B. Shiva Rao); Sir Alladi Krislmaswami Jye1; B. Shiva Rao, p.68; Co11stitue111 Assemhlv Dehate, Vol. IX, 8th September 1949 - referred to.

4. The main inspiration for Part XIII has been American and Austrnlian models. These models present before the Constituent Assembly were re-designed and expanded by the framers of the Constitution in India according to the needs of Indians. The interpretation provided by other countries are Just indicative. They may have persuasive value because the context and history has been quite different as compared to India. At f-l

JINDAL STAINLESS LTD. v. STATE Of HARYANA

least in relation to Part XUJ of the Constitution an indigenous interpretation should be provided without placing heavy reliance on the foreign cases as they may be subject to change which will inevitably stir !he matter once again. Moreover, our constitutional ~tructm·e is quite different from those provided under Australian and American Constitutions. ln Australia and the U nitcd States of America, giving textual meaning to the applicable Constitutional provisions, the Courts interpreted the 'commerce clause' or 'free trade clause' in such a manner that the (federal units) were completely barred lo levy any taxes o·n inter-state trade and commerce. Fortunately off late, in these jurisdictions, the law has been dilutl'd to enable the· federal units to regulate inter-state trade and commerce even by imposing levies. This would be clear by bi-icf reference lo !he case law governing interstate trade in Australia, Canada and the United States of America. !Paras 7.19, 7.201[336-B-Ej

Gold Seal Ud. referred to.

1·.

Alherta AG (1921) 62 SCR 424 --

Cole 1·. Whitfield (1988) I 63 CLR 360; Castlemaine foohey.1· Ud v. South A 1.11·tralia ( 1990) 169 CLR 436; Bct/(1ir Pty Ud v. Western Australia (2008) 234 CLR 418; Common wealth\'. Bank ofrww South H'ltlcs, (1949) 79 CLR 497; Brmvn v. Mw).Zand 25 lJ.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827); i'vicCulloch 4 Wheal. 316 (1819); Freeman 1·. Hc11·irt. 329 U.S. 249 (1946); Comp/Pie Auto fransit '" Hrndr 430 U.S. 274 (I 977); D.H. Holmes C01npa11v Lid. 1·. Shirln Mc1Vamara 486 lJ.S. 24 (1988); C11111111om1·ealrh Edison Company '" Srate of lvlontana 453 U.S. 609 (1981) - referred to. Constitutiomt! /,aw of Canada, Peter rV Hogg. Vol.l, pg. 857 referred lo.

c;

5. There is no gainsaying that the law made by Parliament or State legislature is subject to Constitutional limitations. A law

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which abridges fundamental rights is rendered void by reason of Article 13. ;\ law hy the Union or the States relating to a sub.ice! matter outside the powers assigned under Articles 245 read with Article 246 and relevant legislative entries in the Seventh Schedule would be ultra vires as legislatively incompetent. Apart from these limitations, the law of the Union or the States is also subject to other Constitutional limitations. The provisions of Part XIII, especially, Article 304(a) and (b) also act as a limitation on the legislative .i uriscliction of the Union and the States. The power endowed under Articles 245 and Article 246 to a competent legislature to make laws is 'subject to the provisions of the Constitution'. Nonetheless, if a State makes law under Article 245( 1) read with A1·ticle 246(3) in respect of the subjects enumerated in Entries 45 to 63 of List II in the Seventh Schedule, it is doubtful whether it can be invalidated only on the ground that it does not comply with Articles 301 and 304(a). Indeed various provisions of the Constitution dealing with fiscal measures in Part XII, for instance Articles 265, 269, 276 and 286, spccilically deal with taxes, but in Part XJJI, except A1·ticle 304(a), no other Article deals with taxes. Further Chapter I of Part XII of the Constitution specifically deals with provisions regarding •Finance', whereas Part XIII deals with ·Tracie, Commerce and Intercourse' within the territory of India. Thus, these two Parts are kept distinctly separate. Though every law is made subject to all provisions of the Constitution, it does not mean that every tax law made by the State must be made answerable to the general provisions relating to trnde, commerce and intercourse. The JJro,·isions of the Constitution, the Constituent Assembly Debates and the p1·eccdents, lead to such a conclusion.IPara 7.40]1351-Fll; 352-A-C I

Maharaj Umeg Singh and Others v. The State al Bomhar and Others 1955 (2) SCR 164; Khverbari Tea Company v. State of'Assam (1964) 5 SCR 975 : AIR 1964 SC 925 - referred to. Concise OxfiJrd Dictionarv, p. 474 (10th Ed.) - referred to.

JINDAL STAlNLFSS LTD. v. S IArE OF HARYANA

PART-VIII : ARTICLE 304 OF THE CONSTITUTION

6.1 Whether a law levying tax on cntr~· of goods needs to he test.ed with reference to Article 304(a) and (b) of the Constitution'? In order to appreciate the implication of Article :104 of the Constitution, it is necessary to hear in mind the historical background of these provisions. The Government of l ndia Act. 1935 envisaged a federal Constitution for the whole of British India. The Government imposed restriction on the legislature of the States to legislate in relation to internal trade 1111de1· Section 297. The prohibition contained in section 297 applied only to I'n>Vincial Governments and Provincial legislatures with reference to entries in the legislative list relating lo trnde and commerce and to production, supply and distribution of commodities. This section dealt with prohibitions or restrictions in respect of import into or export from a Province, of goods generally. It also dealt with the power lo impose laxes etc. and prohibited discrimination against goods manufactured or produced outside a Province or goods produced in different localities. The proviso empowered the 'Unit' to impose by Jaw, reasonable restrictions in the interest of the public order, morality or health. !Paras 8.1, 8.2 and 8.4] [354-G-IJ; 355-A, F-G; 356-C] 6.2 Another important question is whether State enactments relating lo levy of entry tax have to be tested with reference to both clauses (a) and (b) of Article 304 or only with reference to clause (a) of Article 304 of the Constitution'! The history, the context and the plain words indicate that Article 304 (a) and (h) an'. disjunctive in nature. A levy of tax need not be tested with reference lo Article 304 (b) of the Constitution. The n~asons for reading Article 304 (a) and (b) of the Indian Constitution disjunctively arc: First, the legislative history and the intention of the framers clearly point out that taxes were never treated as restrictions in the first place. Secondly, Article 304(a) docs not bar or limit State power to levy non-discriminatory taxes on the goods imported from other States. What is restricted is levy of discriminatory tax only, so to say, similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are also subjected to tax, so as not to discriminate between the goods imported and goods

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manufactured or produced in the State. Thirdly, the two clauses of Article 304 are connected by the word 'and'. Sub-clause (a) puts a restriction on the State to not impose a discriminatory tax, whereas sub-clause (b) deals with other restrictions relating to trade, commerce and intercourse. Fourthly, Article 304 (a) and (b), on a careful reading would show that Article 304 (a) and (b) are disjunctive. This is made clear by the proviso, which is to the effect that a Bill for the purpose of Article 304 (b) can be moved by the Legislature of the States, only by the previous sanction of the President. If Clauses (a) and (b) are not disjunctive, then the language of the proviso would have been certainly different and the Bill for the purpose for Clause (a) would have been mentioned. Conspicuous absence of reference to 304(a) in the proviso would certainly lend support to the view that Clause (a) and (b) of Article 304 are distinct and dis,junctivc. The proviso, it is well settled, is intended to explain the main operating part of the Article. lt is never used or interpreted as expanding the operative part of the provision. Fifthly, if one reads Clauses (a) and (b) of Article 304 conjunctively, then it would not subserve the federal nature of the Constitution which is a basic structure. [Para 8.141 [364-Bll; 365-A-B]

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B. Shiva Rao. Fmming of Jndia :\' Constitution, A Study (2"" Ed.), p. 699 to 707; R. Shiva Rao, Fm111ing of India :1· Co11sri111tio11, Vol. Ill, p.9 (2"" Ed.); R. Shiva Rao, Frn111i11g of Jndia '.\· Constitution, Vol. IV, p.329 refetTcd to.

6.3 There is a vital difference between mere 'differentiation' and "discrimination. It is discrimination not differentiation that is sought to he prevented through Part XIII. . The principle laid down in Video Electronics is that. if a backward area in a State needs impetus for the development, and in such circumstances incentives are given for the industry to develop whether by way of subsidies or tax exemptions for a certain period of time as desi1·ed by the competent legislature, the same would be

JINDAL STAINLESS LTD. v. STATE OF HARYANA

permissible and would fall outside the scope of Article 304 (a). A Such State enactment is not inherently discriminatory, but rather aims to ensure economic equality which is a facet of economic unity. A State law directed towards development of a particular region is permissible under Part XIII. The common thread in Part XII.I is the achievement of economic unity and parity which B does not altogether preclude differentiation for justifiable and rational reasons wherever necessary. The heart and soul of Part XIII is to dissolve hostile discrimination within the territory of India. T!Je second facet is that Article 304 (a) is a limitation to impose any tax on goods imported from other States. This power is subject to the condition that the goods manufactured or c produced within the State are also subjected to tax, so as not to discriminate between the goods imported from outside the State. Article 304(a) is not a limitation on the legislature of a State to impose such tax on goods imported. The only condition envisaged under Article 304 (a) is, same tax is imposable 011 the goods D imported from other States as well as goods if manufactured in that State. (Paras 8.17, 8.19, 8.20, 8.21 and 8.22] (368-A; 369-Fll; 370-A; 371-A-C] Video Electronics v. State of Punjah 1989 (2) Suppl. SCR 731 : (1990) 3 SCC 87 - affirmed.

Constituent Assemh/y Dehates, 1949. Vol. IX, Pages 1125, 1145 - referred to.

6.4 Taxing power lies in Article 245 read with 246.

The words "may by law'' appearing in Article 304 is not source of legislative power. ll is an option given to the Stales in case it decides to levy any tax on the goods imported from other States. The source of legislative power resides in Article 245 read with Article 246 which is indisputable. This power is not subject to any implied limitation. The 1>lain reading would show that in a given situation, the State may by choice decide not to levy any tax imported from other States or, 'opt to levy taxes on certain goods imported from other States. Indeed in all the entry tax laws, the charging section enables the·levy'of entry tax only

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on the scheduled goods. The scheduled goods are goods declared as attracting entry tax. [Para 8.23) [371-D-F'I 6.5 Discrimination is a relative concept; in order to discriminate a reference point is required. Article 304(a) rather than being an enabling provision to allow the State to impose tax, is a restricting provision, which prevents such levy of tax on goods as would result in discrimination between goods imported from other States and similar goods manufactured or produced within the State. The object is to p1·cvent discrimination against imported goods by imposing tax on such goods at a rate higher than that borne by local goods since the difference between the two rates would constitute a tariff wall or fiscal barrier and thus impede the free flow of inter-State trade and commerce. It does not prohibit levy of tax as such in the situation wherein the goods are not produced or manufactm·ed in the Stale itself and does not affect the authority of the State to tax the imported goods. It only bars discrimination on the basis of taxing the products manufactured within the Slate v;s-1i-vis imported goods which will only occur if the precondition of manufacturing in the taxing State is satisfied. [Para 8.24] (371-G-ll; 372-A-B] 7. There was good amount of debate on the doctrine of compensatory tax evolved by this Court in Automobile. The concept of compensatory tax has neithe1· any juristic basis nor a part of Indian Constitutional law. At the stage of drafting, at the stage of consideration by the Sub-Commillcc as well as Advisory Committee and when lhe Part XA (now Part XIII) was adopted by the Constituent Assembly, never even for a moment, the principle of compensatory tax was thought of. f Para 8.26] (372C-E]

pl

.lriahari Tea Co. J.td. v. Srate of Assam & Ors. 1961 .SCR 809 : AIR 1961 SC 232; Automohile Transport r1?(1j{;,·th111iJ L1d. ere v. _\·1ate pf Rajas1ha11 & Ors. 1963 ·s~:R 491 :. Ali{ '1962 ~f 1406'- not good ~~~v.

en:

Blwgatram Rajee1· Kumar v. .MP 1994 (6)·SuppL. SCR 91 : 1995 Suppl. (l) SCC 1636; State of Bihar E

JINDAL STAINLESS !TD. v. STATE OF HARYANA

Bihar Chamher oj' Commerce and Ors. 1996 (2) SCR 184: (1996) 9 SCC 136; Jindal Stainless Ltd. And Am: v. SI ale of Haryana and Ors. 2006 (3) SCR 1095 : AIR 2006 SC 2550; Jaiprakash Associates v. Slate of MP 2008 (17) SCR 1282 : 2009 (7) sec 339; Jindal Stainless Ud. and .Im: v. Slate of J-farvana 2010 (4) SCC 595; Jindal S1rips Lrd. v. Srare of Ha1Jana 12003 j 129 S.'J'.C 534; .Jindal S1ripe Ud. v. Slate of Harvana 2003 (4) Suppl. SCR 154: 2003 (8) SCC 60; Jindal S1rip.1· Limited 1·: Stale of Har)'ana 2006 (3) Suppl. SCR 569 : 2006 (7) SCC 271; Indian Oil Cmporation 1: Stale of' Harvana (2009) 21 V.S.T 10 (P&ll); A. Laksluninarh, PrecC'denl in India (3"• Ed.} p.178 (2009); In re Sea Customs 1lct 1964 SCR 787 : AIR 1963 SC J 760; Stale Trading, Corp. o( India Ltd. v. CTO 1964 SCR 99 : AIR .1963 SC 1811; Golaknath v. State of P1111jah 1967 SCR 762: AIR 1967 SC 1643; Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. Stale of Maharastra 1966 SCR 744 : AIR 1967 SC 1; S11ptd. And Remembrancer o(' f,e,'..!,al Affc1ir v. Corp. of Calculla 1967 SCR 170 : AIR 1967 SC 997; Ahmedahad Sr. Xavier College Sociclv v. State of Gujarat 11)75 (1) SCR 173 : (1974) 1 SCC 717; Indira Sa11 hney 1.: UOJ 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 215; Supreme Co11rl Advocalc.1· on Record Association \'. UOI 1993 (3) SCR 669 : (1993) 4 sec 441; SR Ho111111ai v. UOJ (1994) 3 SCC I; Attorney General of India 1.: Amritlal Pmjvandm· (1994) 5 SCC 54; Mafatlal llld11stries v. UOJ 1996 (10) Suppl. SCR 585 : 1997 (5) SCC 536; <Vi'v!DC v. Stare of Punjab 1996 (10) Suppl. SCR 472 : (1997) 7 sec 339; TMA Pai Foundation Case 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 587 : (2002) 8 SCC 481 (11 .iudge bench); J.R. Coelho v. State of TN 2007 (1) SCR 706 : (2007) 2 SCC 1; Central Board of DaV1·oodi Bohra Community & ,Jnr. v. State of !vlaharashtrn & Am: 2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 1054 : 2005 (2) SCC 673: Keshav .\!fills Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1965 SCR 908 : A.IR I 965 SC I 636; Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. 1'. Union Of India & Ors. 1980 AIR 1789: 1981

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(1) SCR 206; State of West Bengal v. U11ion of India 119641 1 SCR 371; S.R. Bommai v. Union of India 119781 2 SCR 1; Special Reference No.I of 1964) 1965 SCR 413: AIR 1965 SC 745; ITC Limited v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee and Ors. 2002 (1) SCR 441 : (2002) 9 SCC 232 - referred to. J,ord De1111i11g, Familv Storv, p. 207 (1999) - referred lo.

I)

f

PER R. HANUMATill, .J. (Concurring) 1.1 The underlining idea in making trade, commerce and intercourse throughout lhe territory of India free is to emphasize on the economic unity of India and to ensure that unity of the country may no! be broken by internal barriers. In order to ensure that the Slate Legislatures sub.jected to local and regional pulls did no! create trade barriers in future, Art. 301 was incorporated in !he Constitution. Art. 301 in general enacls that "subject to the other provisions of this Part, trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free". After having declared the general nature of the freedom of trade and commerce, Part XIII of the Constitution sets out the limitations to this freedom, in Articles 302 to 304 which re-state the powers of the Parliament and the State Legislatures in imposing restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse. !Paras 15, 161 1382-A-H, D-EI Ji11dal Stai11/ess Ltd. (2) and Am'. v. State of Haryana and Ors. 2006 (3) SCR 1095 : (2006) 7 SCC 241 overruled. K. T Plantation Private Limited and Another v. State of Karnataka 2011 (13) SCR 636 : (2011) 9 SCC 1; State of Kera/a a11d Ors. v. ivlar Appraem Kuri Company Limited and .for. 2012 (4) SCR 448 : (2012) 7 SCC 106; Ma hara; Umeµ; Singh and Ors. v. The State of Bomhay a11d Ors. 1955 SCR 164: AIR 1955 SC 540 referred to.

JINDAL STAINLESS r;rD. v. STATE or HARYANA

1.2 Ar!.302 empowers the Parliament to impose restrictions A on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse provided 1hey arc required in pnhlic interest The purpose of this provision is lo allow !he Government of India to restrict the movement of goods so as to safeguard a well-balanced economy and for proper organization or supply of goods and services. Famine may be B raging in one par! of the country while there is plenty in another part, as has been the past experience of the country in regard to food. If Parliament has no effective powers to impose restrictions in such situations on freedom of trade and commerce, then it will undermine the unity of nation. It is reasonable to presume that !he Parliament, people's representative is a bet!er judge of public c interest and that its Judgment must have primacy over any other judgment, including that of the courts. !Para 17] [382-G-H; 383-

Al 1.3 Ar!. 303(1) of the Constitution prohibits Parliament and the Slate Legislature from making "any law giving or authorizing the giving of, any preference to one State over another, or making or authorizing the making or, any discrimination het ween Slate and another, by virtue of any entry relating to trade and commerce in any of the Usts in Seventh Schedule". P1·cfcrence or discrimination amounts to a restriction on the freedom guaranteed under Ar!. 301 of the Constitution only if it is a law made by virtue of any entry relating to trade and commerce in any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule. Application of Art. 303(1) is to specific entries on trade and commerce and not to be confused with the general application of Art. 301 to all the legislative entries other than the entries relating to trade and commerce. But when any part of the country is suffering from scarcity of goods, Parliament may, to meet such a situation; pass even a discriminatory law [Art. 303(2)]. Art. 303(2) is an exception to Art. 303(1) inasmuch that the limitations of Art. 303(1) lose operation when aforesaid preference and discrimination is made for the purpose of dealing with situation arising from scarcity of goods, and the Parliament may in these situations enact a law that gives or authorises giving preference or makes or authorises making of any discrimination. [Para 18] [383-C-E]

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1.4 As per Art. 304(a), a State Legislature may impose any tax on goods imported from other States or Union Territories to which similar goods produced in that State are also subject, so as not to discriminate between the goods so imported and goods so manufactured or produced within the Stale. A State Legislature is also authorised to impose reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade and commerce with or within that State as may be required in public interest, subject to the condition that no Hill or Amendment shall be moved in the Legislature of a State without previous sanction of the President !Art. 304(b)I. Art. 304 begins with non-obstantc clause and is intended to override both Art. 30 I and Art. 303. Art. 304(a) does not prevent taxation of goods; it only prohibits taxes that discriminate between the goods imported from other States and similar goods that are manufactured or produced within the taxing State. [Para 19] [383F-ll; 384-Al 1.5 Part XII and Part XIII of the Constitution lay down the parameters within which State Governments can exercise their right to enact laws/impose tax, restricting the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse. Puq>0se of including Part XIII (as it stands today) in the Constitution as emerges from Section 297 of the Government of India Act, 1935 was to confer a freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse, subject to restrictions and nondiscriminatory tax laws. In this respect, Art.301 does not confer any higher right. Even the Constitutional Assembly Debates show that the framers did not intend to confer any absolute freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse. They did not adopt the expression "absolutely free" as found in the Australian Constitution. The purpose of including Part XIII in the Constitution as emerges frqm the Constituent Assembly Debates was to ensure the interest of the larger economy of the nation and to prevent unreasonable trade barriers in the free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse, impeding economic growth. Framers of the Constitution considered flow of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India as important for economic unity, but they did not deify trade, commerce and intercourse nor they entertained any fetish for it. In fact, freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse was initially meant to be a

JlNDAL STAINLESS LTD. v. STATE OF HARYANA

fundamental right but was removed from the part pertaining to 'Fundamental Rights' as it was considered that it did not have any great content as a fundamental right. !Paras 21, 25]1384-EF; 387-U; 388-A-B]

Jindal Stripe Ltd. and Am: v. State of Haryana and Ors. 2003 (4) Suppl. SCR 154 : (2003) 8. sec 60; Jaiprakash Associates Limited v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. 2008 (17) SCR 1282 : (2009) 7 SCC 339; Jindal Stainless Limited and Anr. v. State of Harvana and Ors. 2010 (4) SCR 743: (2010) 4 SCC 595 - referred to.

"'Constituent Assemhly De hates 30. 07. 1949 to 18. 09. 19,19 " - referred to.

Freedom under Art. 301 is sub.iect to Part Xlll and other parts of the Constitution Parts viz. III, IV and XII etc.: 2.1 Interpretation of the Constitution should emerge from a reading of the whole of the Constitution to ensure that the overall objectives are achieved. Part XIII as a whole is based on a balanced scheme and it should be interpreted with reference to other parts of the Constitution including Part Ill, Part XII and Articles 38 and 39 of the Directive Principles of State Policy. Each of these Parts must be read not in isolation or as water tight compartments but harmoniously as a logical whole. The Constitution must be treated as a logical whole and provisions are not to be read in isolation. !Para 31 I [392-G-H; 393-A) 2.2 Object of Part Xlll is not to make inter-State trade, commerce and intercourse absolutely free. Part XIII will have to be rcl!d along with other Parts of the Constitution namely, Parts Ill, IV and XII along with the basic features of sovereignty and federalism. Free trade, commerce and intercourse is subject to the other provisions of Part XIII as well as other constitutional provisions. A1·t. 301 does not use the word subject 'only' to Part XIII. The word "free" in Art. 301 is to be read not in isolation or in the limited context of Part XIII, but has to be read as part of

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the Constitution as a whole. The word "free" cannot be given a meaning which renders the legislative powers of the State ineffective. Articles 302 to 304 are neither exceptions nor provisos to Art. 301 and therefore, the principles of interpreting a proviso cannot be applied to them. But both Atiabari and A utomohile proceeded on the footing that Art. 302 is in the nature of exception to Art. 301. [Paras 33, 34] J394-D-E, G]

Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kera/a 1973 Suppl. SCR 1 : (1973) 4 SCC 225 - followed.

Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu 1992 (1) SCR 686 : (1992) Suppl. 2 SCC 651; TM.A. Pai Foundation and others F. State of Karnataka 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 587: (2002) 8 sec 481 - relied on.

Can the levy of a non-discriminatory tax per se constitute infraction of Article 301 of the Constitution of India? Power to Tax is an incident of State Sovereignty:3.1 Entries relating to taxation and levy of duty under the State List, Seventh Schedule are Ent.ries 46-62 and under the Concurrent List, Seventh Schedule arc Entries 35, 43 and 44. The power to tax is a sovereign right of the State and is essent.ial to the very existence of a Government. Any fetters on the power of the State to generate revenue through taxes have a direct r · impact on the autonomy and governance of the State. The term 'tax' is ordinarily used to express the exercise of the sovereign power to raise revenue for the expenses of the Government. Subject t.o the Constitution and its inherent restrictions, the power of taxation is regarded as political and supreme. Without taxes, for lack of source of revenue, the Government would become· paralyzed. How much revenue is to be drawn and from which source is a matter of fiscal policy and wholly depends on the needs of a State. [Paras 36, 37 and 40) J397-B-C; 399-F)

.JINDAL STAINLESS LfD. v. STATE or HARYANA

Raja Jagamwth Baldi Singh v. The State of U.P and Anr. (1963) 1 SCR 220; State of WB. v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. and Others 2004 (1) SCR 564 : (2004) 10 SCC 201; Yadlapati Ve11kateswarl11 v. State of A.P. 1990 (1) Suppl. SCR 381 : 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 74, Stale of U. I' & Am: v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. & ,Jnr. ( 1991) 4 SCC 139; Amrit Banaspmi Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Pun/ah and .1nr. 1992 (2) SCR 13 : (1992) 2 sec 411; Dena Bank V, Bhikhahhai Prahhudas Parekh & Co. and Ors. 2000 (3) SCR 509 :

(2000) 5 sec 694 - relied on. Constilutional Law of India. 4'h Edition, Volume 3; Coole_\', fo.wlion (4'h E(lition) Pages. 72, 149, 150; Referred to in the Article Power to Tax by Herman

M. Knoellcr reported in Market Law Review Volume 22 Issue 3 April, 1938 - referred to. 3.2 Parts XI and XII of the Constitution deal with "Relations between the Union and the States" and "Finance, Property, Contracts and Suits" respectively. Part XII dealing with finance etc. has been treated as Part dealing with the sovereign power of the States to impose taxes, which must always mean imposing hurden on citizens and others in public interest. The power of taxation is vested in a sovereign State to carry on with the affairs of the Government. Our Constitution had laid the foundation of a Welfare State, very much extending the activities of the Government and the administration thus making it necessary for the State to impose taxes on a large scale and in much wider fields. The legislative competence of the Parliament or of the State Legislatures can only be circumscribed by express prohibition contained in the Constitution itself. The plenary powers of legislation vested in the Union and State Legislatures by the Constitution are not subject to any limitations other than those imposed by the Constitution itself. !Para 42] 1400-D-F]

r:

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Elel Hotels & Investments Lrd. and Others v. Union of 117dia J989 (2) SCR 880 : (1989) 3 SCC 698 - referred to.

Freedom in Art. 301 does not mean freedom from taxation. 3.3 Exemption from tax power of Parliament /State Legislature must be provided expressly and unambiguously. Art.289(2) shows that the trade and business carried on by or on behalf of the Government of the State can also be subjected to tax and the tax could be "to such an extent'', if any, as Parliament may by law provide. When even the trade or business carried on by or on behalf of the Government of the State can also be subjected to tax, it would be erroneous to hold trade, commerce and intercourse carried on by private individuals and companies in the country free from tax; and that too, by implication. Even Fundamental Rights in Part HI of the Constitution are not immune from taxation and taxation has been held to be "not a restriction". [Paras 49, 50] [403-A-C]

Indian Express Newspapers (Bomhay) Pvt. Ltd and Ors. etc. v. Union of India and Ors. etc. 1985 (2) SCR 287 : (1985) 1 sec 641 - relied on.

3.4 While the States have legislative power to levy taxes on goods imported from other States, Art. 304(a) imposes restrictions on this power of the States to levy a tax on goods that would result in discrimination between goods imported from other States and similar goods manufactured or produced within the States. The non-obstante clause in Art. 304 with respect to Art. 301, actually indicates that since tax does not fall within the purview of Art. 301, therefore, Art. 304(a) was brought in to provide against discrimination based on source or destination of goods. Art. 304(a) is thus a restriction on the tax powers of the States, not to discriminate between the goods imported into the State with similar goods manufactured or produced within the

.TlNDAL STAINLESS ITD. v. STATE Of HARYANA

taxing State. [Para 531 1405-E-FI

3.5 The Constituent Assembly Debates indicate that the framers of the Constitution while intending to guarantee free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse did not deify it. At the time nf drafting Constitution, provision containing freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse which was initially shown as B Fundamental Rights; but after debates, it was shifted to a separate Part !Part XIII!. The framers of the Constitution did not intend that trade, commerce and intercourse is free from taxation. Art. 304 provides for the power of the States to impose taxes, subject of course, the levy is not discriminatory. Hence, Art. 301 ought c not to be read as freedom from tax laws. A tax legislation could be challenged on the ground of legislative competence as well as violation of Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part Ill of the Constitution. Tax legislations can be challenged on the ground that they infringe the Fundamental Rights under Part Ill but that docs not however mean that there is freedom from taxation or D that tax is per sc a restriction on Fundamental Rights or freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse. !Paras 54, 56 and 57] [405G, II; 406-A; 407-B; 409-DJ All Bihar Schools Association and Am: v. State of Bihar and Ors. 1988 (2) SCR 49 : (1988) l SCC 206; Printers (Mrsore) Ltd. and Am: 1.: Asstt. Commercial Tax Officer and Ors. 1994 (1) SCR 682 : (1994) 2 SCC 434 affirmed.

r Tax is not a restriction per sc. 4. Under Art. 246(3) of the Constitution, a State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List 11 of the Seventh Schedule. Art. 246(3) is subject to clauses (1) and (2) of Art. 246 i.e. matters enumerated in Lists l and Ill of the Seventh Schedule. As per Art. 265, a tax can be imposed only under authority of law and there is no role of the Executive. It is a sovereign power of compulsory exaction as a part of any burden hy public authority for public purposes enforceable by law. The

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taxing power of the State stands independently fortified by Parts XI and XII of the Constitution of India and can only be challenged on the ground of reasonableness. Power of States to levy taxes for the purpose of governance and carrying out its welfare activities is a necessary attribute of State's sovereignty and in that sense it is a power of supreme attribute. It is well-settled that taxes are levied in public interest and hence, cannot be considered a restriction per se on the enjoyment of any freedom contemplated by the Constitution. The essential characteristics of a tax arc that: (i) it is imposed under a statutory power without the taxpayer's consent and the payment is enforced by law; (ii) it is an imposition made for public purpose without reference to any special benefit to be conferred on the payer of the tax; and (iii) it is part of the common burden. [Paras 58-60] [409-F-G, H; 410-A-DJ

Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri f,akshmindra l71irtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt 1954 SCR 1005; Indian Medical Association v. VP Santha and Ors. 1995 (5) Suppl. SCR 110 : (1995) 6 SCC 651; State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Akhil Gujarat Pravasi VS. Mahama11da! and Ors. 2004 (3) SCR 956 : (2004) 5 SCC 155; Federation of Hotel a11d Restaurant Association of Jndia. Etc. v. Union of India and Ors. J 989 (2) SCR 918 : (1989) 3 SCC 634; Express Hotels Private Umited v. State of Gujarat and Am: 1989 (2) SCR 893: (1989) 3 SCC 677; Hari Krishna Bhargav v. Union of India and Anr. 1966 SCR 22 : AIR 1966 SC 619; Rai Ramkrislma and Ors. V. me State of Bihar (1964) 1 SCR 897 - relied on.

MaJority view in Atillbari and Automobile: Need of re-appreciation. 5.1 Art. 301 guarantees freedom of trade and commerce from "restrictions" and not freedom from all "laws". In Atiabari, by application of "direct and immediate test", rather than

JINDAL STAlNLESS !TD. v. STATE Of HARYANA

examining the powers of the State Legislature to enact legislation with reference to the entries in List II, the majority has gone into the effects of the Iegislat.ion. As per ma.iority view of Atiabari, Art. 301 is a limitation upon the exercise of legislative powers of the State, which negates or limits the legislative power of the States expressly granted under various entries in List ll of the Seventh Schedule. In Atiabari and A11tomobile, there was no detailed n'ference lo Constituent Assembly Debates which throw considerable light on the scope of Part XIU. The view taken in Atiabari and A11to111obile that taxes may and do amount to restriction, is flawed. Taxing power of the State stands independently fortified by Part XII of the Constitution and can be challenged only on the ground of reasonableness.[Paras 72, 731[420-C-E]

Freedom in Art. 301 is not freedom from taxationnon-discriminatory taxes are outside the purview of Art. 301. 5.2 The views taken in Atiabari and Automobile in the light of the Australian cases represent a mechallical implantation of a foreign concept into the Indian legal system, not keeping in view the distinct features of Indian Polity and the Constituent Assembly Debates. Majority view in Atiabari and A11to111obile do not appear to have taken note of the historical background of merger of 'i'<ative States' with their individualities, with British India, and the federal nat111·e of the Indian Constitution while discussing the fundamental question as lo whether 'Freedom' in Art. 301 meant freedom from tax. The majority appears to have begun with the presumption of tax laws being subservient to Art. 301 and later concluded that if all the tax laws are hr.ought in Art. 301, State's legislative power to tax would be destroyed. Thereafter, in an attempt to save the taxing power of the State, they borrowed 1he concepts of 'direct and immediate test' and 'compensatory tax' from the Australian and American Cases. [Para 82] [426-C-

li:I Com111omveal1h of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales (1949) 79 CLR 497 : 119501 AC 235: James v Stale of So1//h llustralia (1927) 40 CLR 1; James v. Cou.·m1 (1932) AC 542; James v. Commo1rwealth o('Australia

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(1936) AC 578; Cole v. Whitfield (1988) 78 ALR 42; Betfc1ir Pty Ud v We.item Australia (2008) 244 ALR 32; Freeman v. Hewit 329 US 249 (1946), Complete Auto Transit. Inc. v. Charles R. Brady [19771 USSC 54: (1977) 430 lJS 274 · referred to.

Constitutional Assembly Debates, Volume IX,· I'agc.1142, dated 30.07.1949- 18.09.1949 - referred to.

('

c;

II

Art.304 (a) and (b) must be read disjunctively. 5.3 As the word "restrictions" in the marginal note of Art. 304 suggests plurality of powers and indicates that Clauses (a) and (b) of Art. 304 confer distinct powers. Art. 304(a) deals with tax; Art. 304(b) deals with restrictions that are reasonable and in public interest. Constitution framers could not have intended to include tax in Art. 304(b ); since the elements of "reasonableness" and "public interest". are inhe1·cnt in a tax. The use of the word "and" does not assist the interpretation that the provisions are conjunctive. It only means that:- (i) the State can impose taxes on goods coming from outside so as not to discriminate between the goods imported and goods manufactured or produced within the State [Art. 304 (a)I -and- (ii) It can also in addition impose other restrictions that arc reasonable and in public interest [Art. 304 (b) I subject to the assent of the President. That Articles 304(a) and (b) are dis,junctive, is also clear from the fact that the proviso to A1·t. 304(b) i.e. the p1·csidential sanction· is referable to Art. 304(b) only and nol to a law imposing tax on goods imported from other States contemplated under Art. 304(a). This is because, Art. 304(a) has an inbuilt safcguanl, inasmuch the taxes imposed on the goods coming from another State cannot be discriminatory and, therefore, no presidential sanction is required. The word "and" is used after semi colon in Art. 304(a}. While it is correct to say that the word "and" normally is conjunctive, it is also often constrned as disjunctive on the basis of the legislative intent as gathc1·ed from the wm·ds of the prnviso under context in which it was used. Since the expression ·and' is used in Art.

.11NDAL STAINLESS LTD. v. STATE Of HARYANA

304 after semi-colon, it will have to be read as 'or' creating a disjunctive reading of Art. 304(a) and Art. 304(b) indicating that the State Legislature can exercise its power either under Art.304 (a) or Art. 304 (b) or both. [Paras 90-92] [430-F-H; 431-A-D; 433-G-U]

lvfalwrishi Mahesh Yogi Vedic Vislrwavidvalaya v. State of Afadhya Pradesh and Others 2013 (13) SCR 464 : (2013) 15 SCC 677; A.K. Gopa/011 v. State of Madras

1950 SCR 88 : AIR 1950 SC 27 - relied on.

Whether A1·t. 304(b) coupled with the proviso is applicable to tax laws-.! udicial Approach. 5.4 In Atiabari, majority held that "tax laws" fall within the comprehension of Art. 301 and, therefore, any legislation whether taxing or otherwise which imposes any direci restriction on the movement or transport of goods attracts the provisions of Art. 301, and its validity can be sustained only if it satisfies the requirements of Art. 302 or Art. 304. According to the above view in Atiabari, it is not possible for the State Legislature to pass any law at all with respect to some of the tax entries viz. sales tax (entry 54, List II); law relating to gambling (entry 34, List 11) or tax on betting and gambling (entry 62, List 11); and tax on the can-iage of goods or passengers by road or inland waterways (entry 56, List II). If the legislations under the above entries arc challenged on the ground that they operate as a direct restriction on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse, as per the view in Atiabari, these legislations may have to be justified under Art. 304(b). Atiabari approach would totally take away the sovereign powers of the State Legislature to enact laws in exercise of its powers under various taxing entries of List II, which could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution. [Para 93] 1434-B-D]

f

Art.304(b) is applicable only to non-fiscal laws and not to lax la,vs.

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6. Art.304(a) and Art.304(b) are two distinct powers and freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse is sub,jcct to them. Art. 304(b) relates to reasonable restrictions imposed in public interest. Art. 304(b) deals with non-fiscal legislation imposing reasonable restrictions in public interest and tax laws are not included under Art. 304(b). Levy of taxes is the economic lifeline of the State. Framers of the Constitution never intended to include tax within the fold of Art. 304(b). To give the Centre a veto over the plenary power of the State to levy the tax would completely distort the Centre-State balance and cooperative federalism. Such an interpretation has no basis in the Constitutional Assembly c Debates and is liable to be rejected. The rationale for the sanction of President contemplated by proviso to Art. 304(b) is apparent from the fact that trade and commerce with foreign countries and inter-State trade and commerce are subject matters in List I of the Seventh Schedule (entries 41 and 42, List I). Further, trade and commerce in production, supply and distribution of industry controlled by the Union, food stuffs, including edible oils, seeds and oils; cattle fodder; raw cotton, cotton seed; and raw jute are subject matters in entry 33, List HI. Entry 34, List Ill deals with price control. Only intra-State trade and commerce is in List II (entry 26, List II) subject to entry 33, List III, as stated therein. Parliament has thus occupied an overwhelming space with respect to trade and commerce within the State also. It is in this backdrop that the State has been given power to impose reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse with or within that State with the proviso requiring presidential f assent. before the Bill is introduced. The rationale, therefore, is that a non-fiscal law of the State with respect to freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse would be entrenching upon either the exclusive legislative field of the Parliament in List I or the occupied field of the Parliament in List Ill. It follows that Art. Ci 304(b) relates to non-fiscal laws of the States. In the above context, the assent of the President envisaged in proviso to Art.304(b) would be somewhat akin to the assent contemplated in Art. 254. Such assents are not judicially reviewablc. IParns 94, 99 and 1001 1434-E-F; 438-F-H; 439-A-H]

JINDAL STAINLESS Ll'D. \'.STATE or HARYANA

Kaiser-i-l!i11d (P) Ud. a11d A111: v. National Textile Corp11. (Maharashtrn North) Ltd. and Others (2002) 8 sec 182 - affirmed.

Atiahari Tea Co. Ud. v. State ofAssam & Ors. 1961 SCR 809 : AIR 1961 SC 232; Auto111ohil.e Transport (Rajasthan) Ud. etc. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. 1963 SCR 491 : AIR 1962 SC 1406; Jindal Stainless Ltd. (2) & A11r. v. State of Harvana & Ors. 2006 (3) SCR 1095: (2006) 7 SCC 241 - overruled. Consti111tional Law o( India. 4th Edition, Volume 3 referred to.

ls the entry tax levied by the States in the present batch of cases violative of Ari. 301 of the Constitution and in particular have the impugned slate enactments relating to entry tax to be tested with reference to both Articles 304(a) and 304(b) of the constitution for determining their validity? 7.1 A bare reading of Entry 52, List ll would show that entry tax can be levied only on the satisfaction of the conditions in l~ntry 52 of List II namely: (i) the tax to be levied on the entry of goods into local area; (ii) entry of goods into the local area is for consumption, use or sale therein. Entry tax is not collected at the behest of municipality or a panchayat attached to a checkpost. It is payable by the assesses by filing their returns. Ent.ry tax is a Stale level levy, levied by Slate Legislature upon entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein. The local authorities themselves cannot levy the tax. The power is that of State Legislature and of no one. Imposition of entry tax is not n1crcly "on movement or transport of goods"; consideration of Entry 52, Lisi II of Seventh Schedule shows that taxable event in lhe case of entry tax is entry of goods into the local area where it is to be used, consumed or sold therein. If the goods merely enter into a local area and then move to another destination beyond that local area, no tax can be levied under Entry 52. Since lhc taxable event under Entry 52 is not the mere entry of the goods into the local area, but the fact that the ·goods are also to

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be used, consumed or sold, the necessary sequiter is that the movement of goods is terminated in that local area. Power to levy entry tax lies within the competence of a State Legislature. Since entry tax is leviable at the termination· of the movement of trade and the goods have entered the local area for the purpose of use, consumption or sale, the levy of entJ·y tax does not restrict flow of trade, commerce or intercourse and is not violative of Article 301 of the.Constitution. [Paras 104, 110 and 1121 1440-Gll: 441-A, C; 443-G-II; 445-H; 446-A-Cj

Diamond Sugar Mills Limited v. State of U.P 1961 (3) SCR 242; M. 0. Sha111sudhi11 v. State of' Kera/a 1995 (2) SCR 900 : (1995) 3 SCC 351; Bzmnah Shell Oil Storage and Disturhing Co. of' India Ltd. Belgaum v. Belgaum Borough M1111ir:ipalitv Helga11111 Ce/11963 SCR Suppl. (2) 216 - referred to.

Rn try Tax levied only on goods imported from other States: No levy of Entry Tax on the goods manufactured inside the State - Whether discriminatory.

7.2 The term 'any tax' means any exaction by any impost or levy. The effect of all the taxes levied on the goods imported from other States and the ones manufactured within the State must be such that no discrimination is caused either to the imported goods or locally manufactured goods. Unlike Section 92 of t.he Australian Constitution, Art. 304(a) does not talk of uniformity. Section 92 of the Australian Constitution reads as follows:- "On the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce, and intercourse among the States, whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free." No such restr-iction is imposed on the legislative power of the States in India to ensure uniformity in levy of a particular tax. The raison cl' etre for use of the expression "so, however, as not to discriminate" is to prohibit protectionism. Moreover, Constitution of India does not contain a provision similar to Section 55 of the Australian Constitution which mandates one tax law on one subject. In India, the State Legislature is nowhere

JINDAL STAINLESS !TD. v. STAl'E Of HARYANA

obligated by the Constitution to ensure that the.law imposing tax deals with one subject of taxation only. !Paras 114, 116] 1447-C, G-H; 448-A-B]

J11dia11 Cnnent and Ors. v. State of".1.ndhra Pradesh and Ors. 1988 (2) SCR 574 : (1988) 1 SCC 743; Western Electronic and Am: v. State al Gujarat and Ors. 1988 (3) SCH 768 : (1988) 2 SCC 568 - referred to.

7.3 The chai·gcablc event in the case of entry tax is entry of goods into a local area. By its very nature, entry tax does not contemplate impost on indigenous goods. Goods imported into a local area from another State are subjected to entry tax but goods entering into a local area from another local area of the same State do not attract entry tax. In this way, it may appear that goods imported from outside the State are put to a disadvantageous position but in terms of tax treatment the1·e is no discrimination. The essence of Art. 304(a) lies in ensuring equality of fiscal burden and absence of discrimination. In terms of Art. 304(a), the only requirement is that the goods imported into the local area should not be discriminated against. In tax treatment there is no discrimination between the goods. !Para 117][448-C-E] 7.4 The expression 'any tax' used in Art. 304(a) is generic in nature and covers all taxes on goods which a State is competent to impose by virtue of Articles 245 and 246 read with List II of Seventh Schedule. A Scheme adopted by a State Legislature whereby several taxes are levied on the goods (either locally Jlroduced or imported from other States) under different heads, cannot be faulted with if it conforms to the principle of equivalence and non-discrimination. For e.g., both sales tax levied under Entry 54, List II and entry tax levied under Entry 52, List II are taxes on goods. It is the burden of the tax which can discriminate and not the form. States are free to equalise the burden of entry tax on the goods imported from other States by giving them set-off against the sales tax paid by them in the exporting State. In such

/\

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a manner, equivalence can be hrought about in the tax burden borne by the goods imported from other States and the locally manufactured/produced goods. The contention of the assessees that the term 'any tax' used in Art. 304(a) refers to every tax distinctly, thereby prohibiting imposition of entry tax on imported goods unless, entry tax is imposed on locally manufactured/ (Hoduced goods, does not lead to just and reasonable interpretation of Art. 304(a). The wholesome effect of the laxes levied under distinct heads needs to be taken into account. The lax burden borne by the goods form a part of the price of the goods and if both, locally manufactured/produced goods and imported goods are subjected lo similar tax burdens, irrespective of the heads under which the taxes are levied, say entry tax or sales tax etc., then no discrimination can be said to have been caused. In case if entry tax not levied to equalize tax burden on the local goods and goods imported from outside, there will be huge trade diversion to low-rate tax State, causing loss of revenue to the high-rate tax Stales, where the goods are used or consumed. !Paras 118, 119] 1448-F-H; 449-A-C] 7 .5 Any difference in the rate of tax on goods locally manufactured and those imported, such difference not being discriminatory does not fall foul of Art. 304(a). Any incentive/ benefits of concession in the rate of tax given to the indigenous manufacturers in order to encourage the manufacture/production in the State cannot be said to be discriminatory.f Para 1451 1469-

G!

Kathi Ra11i11g Rawat v. 777e State ol Saurashtra (1952) SCR 435 - affirmed. Firm ATB Mehtah Majid & Co v. State of Madras & Am: I 963 Suppl. SCR 435 : AIR 1963 SC 928; State of Madras v. N.K. Nataraja Muda!iar (1968) 3 SCR 829; State ol Kera/a v. Ahdul Qadir and Others 1970 (1) SCR 700 : (1969) 2 SCC 363 - referred to. Prof: D.D. Basu in Comparative Federalism. Prentice Hall of India, 1987 ·-referred to.

JINDAL STAINLESS TTD. v. STA.TE OF HARYANA

Repercussions of Art. 304(a) when no local goods are produced.

8. A State law that imposes a tax on imported goods where similar goods arc not manufactured or produced in that State, will meet the requirement of Art.304(a) and there would not arise any question or discrimination. lt is true that when similar goods arc not manufactured inside the State, there are chances of a higher rate of lax on such goods brought into the taxing State from other States but that docs not mean that there should be a blanket protection of such goods from tax. Power of the State to lax the goods imported cannot be whittled down on the ground that there are no similar goods manufactured or produced within the taxing State. Exorbitant taxation of such goods will remain open to challenge under Part Ill in Ari. 19(1)(g) read with Art. 19(6) and Art. 14. !Paras 150, 1511 1470-A; 472-F-ll]

C

Kolwmi Stores v. State of' Grisso and Others 1966 1 SCR 865 - not good law.

Levy of Entry Tax on lm1Jorted Goods. 9.1 "Import" means bringing or taking by sea or air across any customs frontier. Goods imported in a vessel/aircraft require payment of customs duty before they are cleared into the country. I mporl of goods and customs clearance and the entry of goods into the local areas are two distinct events. In the case of customs duty, the taxable event is entry of goods into the territory of India. The taxable event under Entry 52, List 11 is the entry of goods into local area for consumption, use or sale therein. Two taxable t'venh are distinct in law and there is no overlap. Under our Constitution, there is no overlapping in the taxing power. The Constitution gives independent powers of taxation to the Union and the States. The taxing power of the Onion and of the States are mutually cxclusin. This avoids the difficnlties which have arisen under other J•'edcral Constitutions. !Paras 155, 160, 161 and 1661 [473-B; 474-H; 475-F-G; 476-E-F; 478-.FI

f

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[2016] 10 S.C.R.

Hoechst Pharmaceuticals v. Stale of Bihar l 983 (3) SCR 130 : (1983) 4 sec 45; Stale of rVi:st Bengal V. Kesoram !11d11slries 2004 (1) SCR 564 : (2004) IO SCC 201; G11jara1 /lni/111/a Ce111e11t J,td. v. Union of India 2005 (2) SCR 1038: (2005) 4 sec 214 - relied on.

Fl

P Ramanatha Aivar \· "17ze Major J,aw Lexicon", 4'" l<:dition 2010 - referred to.

9.2 According to F:ntry 83, List I as well as the Customs Act, 1962 the taxable event is 'import' or 'bringing of the goods into India' and it is distinct from the taxable event of Entry 52, List IL The taxable events under F:nlry 83, List I and I<:ntry 52, List II are distinct; any movement of the imported goods to the warehouse in the factory unit would not prevent the State from levying and collecting entry tax when such goods enter a local area of the Slate for consumption, use or sale therein. !Paras 171, 1761 1481-F:; 482-G-II; 483-AI

Province of Madras v. Bodd11 Paidanna & Sons AIR 1942 FC 33 : l 942 FCR 90; State of Bomhay v. FN. Balsam (CB) AIR 1951 SC 318; State of TravancoreCochin v. S!za111n11gha Vilas Cashew Nut Facton' (1954) SCR 53; Gramophone Company of India Ltd. v. Birendra Bahad11r Pander 1984 (2) SeR 664 : (1984) 2 sec 534 - relied on.

Prol frihe 011 American Co11stitutio11al Law States referred to.

9.3 When the entry tax is levied by the Entry Tax Act enacted by the State Legislature, the term 'a local area' contemplated by Entry 52 may cover the 'Whole State' or 'a local area' as notified in the legislation . .From the point of view of entry tax that the Stale is a compendium of local areas and whe1·c the local areas contemplated by the Acl cover the entire State, the diffei-cncc between lhe State and 'a local area' practically

JINDAL STAINLESS LTD. v. STATE Of I-IARYANA

disappears. Articles 304(a) and 304(h) are to be read dis.iunctivcly; both apply to different sub.ice! matters; while Art . .104(a) deals with tax, Ar!. 304(b) deals only with non-fiscal matters. !Para 1771 1483-C-EI

State of fJihar and Ors. v. Bihm· Chamber of Commerce and Ors. 1996 (2) SCR 184 : (1996) 9 SCC 136 affirmed.

9.4 Where there is equivalence in terms of tax treatment between the locally produced goods and the ones imported from other States, levy of entry tax on the goods imported from other States when there is no such levy on the locally produced goods is not discriminatory. Every differentiation is not discrimination. Any difference in the rate of tax on goods locally manufactured and those imported, such difference not being discriminatory does not fall foul under Art.304(a). Any incentive/benefits of concession in the rate of tax given to the local manufacturers/producers in order to encourage the local manufacturers/production in the State cannot he said to be discriminatory. !Para 1771 1483-F-ll; 484-AI

Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd. and Am: v. State of Pzmjah ,111</ A111: 1989 (2) Suppl. SCR 731 : (1990) 3 sec 87; Sri Dip,vi;av Cement Company Limited and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan and Others 1999 (5) Suppl. SCR 428 : (2000) l sec 688 - affirmed. Shri Mahavir Oil Mills and 11111: v. State of J&K and Others 1996 (9) Suppl. SCR 356 : (1996) 11 sec 39; Stme of UP. and .1111: v. La.rn1i Paper Marr and Ors. 1997 (1) SCR 914 : (1997) 2 SCC 697 - not good law.

f

Can a tax which is compensatory in nature also fall foul of Ar·ticle 301 of the Constitution of India'? What are the tests for determining whether the tax or levy is compensatory in nature? 10.1 The concept of 'compensatory tax' is a judicially

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evolved concept. Majority in Atiabari held that taxes may and do amount lo rcsl.rictions and hence tax legislation is subject. to scrutiny under Art. 301. In Atiabari, the test of "direct and immediate effect on trade, commerce and intercourse" was evolved. The majority in Atiabari had thus completely read down State's taxing power under Entry 52, List ll thereby holding that State's legislative power is subject to the freedom clause in Art. 301. This had an adverse effect OI) the legislative power of the State to levy tax and its financial autonomy. (Para 178) (484-D-F( 10.2 All the taxes arc intended for public purpose and are levied in public interest. Levy of tax is not to fill the State coffers but to perform various functions including public welfare for which said funds are required. Taxation is not a profit-making exercise for the St.ates; the States perform several functions for which they require funds and have the power to levy tax to raise revenues and thus virtually all taxes are monies paid for services or facilities provided by the State. Art. 266(1) provides that all revenue including that from taxes received by a State Government shall form one consolidated fund-the Consolidated Fund of the State. This fund is a reservoir and resources placed in it are a part of the whole. All revenue is subsumed in ii and cannot be delineated. The Consolidated Fund of a State is a single unified account for the State and withdrawal of money from the same is protect.eel by the requirement of passing an Appropriation Act. Further, Art. 266(3) by stating that 'no money out of any Consolidated Fund shall be appropriated except in accordance with law - for the purposes and in the manner provided in the Constitution' provides another safeguard in lieu of ensuring legitimate use of public money. The manner of appropriation of money collected in the Consolidated Fund of the State falls under Part VI, Chapter Ill, ranging from Articles 202 to 206 of the Constitution. There are sufficient constitutional safeguards for the apprnpriation of money collected in Consolidated Fund. The revenue generated by the States in the form of entry tax has to necessarily form part of this Fund, and once it so subsumed, States cannot be asked to show a 'proximate quid pro quo' by furnishing 'quantifiable data' as to their expenditure. It may not be possible for the States to show with mathematical precision a direct link

JINDAL STAINLESS LTD. v. STATE or HARYANA

between the expenditure incurred in individual cases and the corresponding levy imposcd.[Para 18711492-D-H; 493-AI

10.3 The entry tax levied by various States, falling within the domain of entry 52, List II, is a tax simpliciter, even though by nomenclature it is termed as a 'compensatory tax'. Subject to passing the muster of Art. 304(a), entry tax levied by the States B under entry 52, List JI even though termed as compensatory tax docs not fall foul of Art. 301. The narrnw approach in Jindal Stai11less Ud. (2) equating compensatory laxes to 'fee' and mandating the States to prove 'proximate quid pro quo' by 'quanliliahk data approach' is not correct. Since taxes arc held C lo be outside the purview of Art. 301, taxes in the name of 'compensatory taxes' arc also outside the purview of Art. 301. To uphold a regulatory or compensatory tax, comprehensive parameters cannot he laid down as they may vary depending upon the nature of the levy. Automobile case itself has laid down parameters of compensatory laxes. It is not necessary that the ]) money so collected should be put into a separate fund or that the lev~' should be proportionate to the expenditure. Insofar as levy of entry tax is concerned, enactments of some Slates facial!)' declare that they are compensatory. The compensatory tax so levied is subsumed in the Consolidated Fund of the Slate~ Once E there is intermingling in the Fund and money is spent for public purposes of development of various local areas like construction, maintenance of roads and bridges, and for other amenities which facilitate trade, there will always be a link between the liability of the tax borne by the traders and benefits enjoyed by them either directly or indirectly. 1Parns 188-1901 1493-B, D-lll

8/wgatram Rajeev Kumar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax. M.1' and Ors. 1994 (6) Sup1)l. SCR 91 : 1995 Suppl. (1) SCC 673 - affirmed.

State of" Tamil Nadu v. TVL South Indian Sugar Mill~ Association 2015 (9) SCR 148 : (2015) 13 SCC 748, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti and Others v. Orient Paper & Industries Jtd. 1994 (5) Suppl. SCR 392 : (1995) 1

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[2016J 10 S.C.R.

SCC 655 and Krishna Das v. Town Area Committee, Chil;e,aon 1990 (2) SCR 13 : (1990) 3 SCC 645; GK. Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu 1975 (2) SCR 715 : (1975) l SCC 375; lntemational Tourists Corporation and Ors. v. Stale of Harvana and Ors. 1981 (2) SCR 364 : (1981) 2 SCC 318; Governor General of Council \'. Provi11ce of Madras AIR 1945 PC 98 : 58 LW 228; Ram Krisha11 Ram Na!h Agarwal 1•. Secretan', Municipal Committee, Kamptce, Union of India 1950 SCR 15 : AIR 1950 SC 11 ·- referred to.

Refund and unjust enrichment:-

II

11. It is well-seUlcd that a claim of refund can be allowed only when the claimant establishes that he has not passed on the tax burden to the consumers. No refund can be granted so as to cause windfall gain to any person when he has not suffered the burden of tax. The possibility of the tax burden having been passed on to the consumers by the assessees cannot be ruled out in the present case. In the present case, the assessees cannot claim refund irrespective of whether the impugned legislations are declared valid or unconstitutional. Unless the assessees establish that they have not passed 011 the tax burden to the consumers, they cannot make a claim for refund and unjustly enrich themselves. [Para 1981 [498-G-H; 499-A]

Mafi11lal Industries Ltd v. Union of India 1996 (10) Suppl. SCR 585: (1997) 5 SCC 536; Godji·ey Philips India Ltd. v. Stale of UP 2005 (1) SCR 732 : (2005) 2 sec 515 - relied on. S\'llthetics & Chemicals v. State of UP (1990) 1 SCC 109; Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Slate of Bihar 1999 (1) Suppl. SCR 146: (1999) 9 SCC 620 -referred to.

JINDAL STAJNLESS ITD. v. STArE or HARYANA

PER DR. D. Y. CHANDRACIJUD, .I. (Partly dissenting)

Part XIII of the Constitution: Text and Context 1.1 In framing Article 301, the framers of the Constitution made a deliberate departure from the text of the Australian and US Constitutions. One of the aspect of A1·ticle 301 in which a conscious departure was made from the US and Australian Constitutions is that the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse extends, in our Constitution, throughout the territory of India and not merely among the states. The expression 'among the states' would cover a movement inter-State or across State boundaries. In discarding the expression "among the states" C (which is used in Section 92 of the Australian Constitution) and "among several states'' (which is used in Article 1 Section 8 of the US Constitution), Article 301 guarantees a more comprehensive coverage to the freedom to include both intcrStat e and intra-State trade, commerce and intercourse. D 'Throughout the territory of India', means in every part of India. !Paras IO, 121 1507-C-D; 508-D-F]

1.2 The provisions of Part XIII of the Constitution contain an elaboration of the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse and the restrictions which the Constitution contemplates as being within the legislative powers of Parliament and the slate legislatures. The legislative power conferred upon Parliament can restrict the arnhit of the freedom to the extent that is specified in Articles 302 and 303. Similarly, the slate legislatures arc subject to the limitations contained in Article 303 (1) and Article 304. Parliament as well as the state legislatures are subject lo constitutional limitations on the exercise of their law making power in restricting the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse. The extent of the freedom under Article 301 has in this manner been made subject to the provisions of Part Xlll. Those provisions of Part XIII define the extent to which a 1·estriction can be imposed by law as well as the limitations on the power of Parliament and the state legislatures while p1·cscribing a rcstTiction. [Paras 18, 19] [512-D-F]

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A Consiitutional history as a guide

[2016] I 0 S.C.R.

2. The deliberations in the Constituent Assembly surrounding the introduction of Part XIII leave little ambiguity about the constitutional philosophy underlying the introduction of the guarantee of free trade, conunerce and intercourse. The H guarantee of that freedom was guided by the ob.iect of fostering economic development. Towards achieving that goal, the founding faH1ers recognised the need to weave the nation into one economic entity. At the same lime, regional interests representing the diversity prevalent within the states had to be recognised by c allowing a regulator~· role for the states. While recognising the importance of the state legislatures in relation to trade, commerce and intercourse, the founding fathers had evident concerns about what they described as parochial interests or narrow provincial policies posing a clanger to the economic development of the nation. Ileuce, the Union Government was conferred with a power I) of intervention which was qualitatively different from the regulatory power conferred upon the states. It was in that background that !he proviso to Article 304 (b) mandated the prior sanction of the President to a bill or amendment introduced in the state legislature for imposing reasonable restrictions in the E public interest on the freedom that was guaranteed by Part Xlll. !Paras 3311519-F-II; 520-A-C]

Fu11da111ental Rights by Dr. K.M. Munshi B. Shiva Rao, The Framing uf" India '.1· Constitution, Vol. II, p. 69(1967) (B. Shiva Rao); Sir Alladi Krishnaswa111i l_ver, B. Shiva Rao, p.68.; Co11stituent Assemhly Debate. Vol. IX, 8th September 1949 - referred to.

Compensatory Taxes 3.1 Compensatory taxes which are in the nature of a charge for the use of trading facilities \\Ould not be regarded as being a hindrance to the freedom of trade, so long as they are reasonable. Ry first devising the concept and then placing it beyond the pale

JINDAL SlAINLESS I.TD. v. STAfE OF HARYANA

of Article 301, the Court in Automobile Transport ensured that compensatory taxes would not be subject In the constitutional grind of Article 304(a). A class of tax legislation bearing a compensator.v character was carved out of Part XIII. The principle that Automohile Transport enunciates is that the freedom under 1\i-ticle 301 is consistent with facilitative regulations which ('nhancc, rathe1· than hinder trade. Second, though the power to lax is an essential attrihute of government, it is subject to constitntional limitations including amongst them Part Xlll of the Constitution. As a consequence, tax laws are not as a matter of principle outside the ambit of Article 301. Third, the test to be applied in determining whether a law infringes the freedom guaranteed by Article 301 is whether the direct and immediate effect is to hinder the movement of trade. A law which has that effect, including a tax law must, where it has been enacted by the state legislature be subject to the provisions of Article 304. Fourth, compensatory taxes which are imposed in consideration of the facilities which are provided hy the state to trade and commerce are outside the ambit of Article 301. Fifth, a compcnsator.v tax does not hinder the freedom of trade and commerce and need not compl_v with the requirements of the proviso to Article 304(b) of the Constitution. !Paras 71, 7611544E-F; 549-H-El

Khverhari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam (1964) 5 SCR 975; SK Madar Saheh 1·. State of AP 1972 (2) SCR 853 : 1972 (4) SCC 635; Boiani Ores J.td v. State of Orissa 1975 (2) SCR 138: 1974 (2) SCC 777; GK. Krishnan v. State of TN 1975 (2) SCR 715: 1975 (1) sec 375 ; MA International Tourist Corporation & Ors. v. State of Harrana and Ors. 1981 (2) SCR 364 : (1981) 2 SCC 318 ; lvlalwa Bus Service (Private) Ltd. 1•. State of Punjah and Others 1983 (2) SCR l 009 : (1983) 3 SCC 237; Meenakshi v. State of Karnataka 1983 AIR 1283 : 1984 Suppl. SCC 326; B.A. Jayaram v. Union of India 1983 (3) sen. 624 : 1984 (I) SCC 168; Mis. Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar v.

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[2016] IO S.C.R.

Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P and Ors. 1994 (6) Suppl. SCR 91 : 1995 Supp ill SCC 673; State of Kamataka v. llan.1·a Corp. 1981 (1) SCR 823 : 1980 (4) SCC 697; India Cement Ud i: State of Tamil Nadll 1989 (I) Suppl. SCR 692 : 1990 (1) SCC 12; State of Maharashtra 1·. Jvladhukar Balkrishna Badiya 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 482 : 1988 (4) SCC 290; Jindal Stripe Ltd. a11d Am: v. State ofHmyana and Ors. 2003 (4) Suppl. SCR 154 : (2003) 8 SCC 60; Jindal Stainless Ltd. (2) and .·lnr. v. State of Han·mw and Ors. 2006 (3) SCR 1095 : (2006) 7 sec 241 -- referred to.

Doctrinal concerns and inconsistencies

3.2 The theory of compensatory taxes was evolved in Automohile Transport to assimilate doctrinal concerns at several levels. Fr-cedom of trade and commerce under Article 301 of the Constitution is expressly made subject to the provisions of Part XIII. The deliberate use of the expr·cssion 'fr.cc' instead of "absolutely free" (the latter expression being adopted in the Australian Constitution) coupled 11 ith the language of Article 301 which subjects its 1>rovisions to Part Xlll is indicative of the fact that the freedom which is guaranteed is subject to legislative control. Articles 302, 303 and 304 are a part of the constitutional scheme which, while defining the ambit of the freedom in Article 301 subjects it to restrictions under Articles 302 and 304. The nature of the restrictions and the limitations on the power of Parliament and of the state legislatures while legislating to impose restrictions is conditioned by constitutional parameters. The conditions are based on the fulfilment of substantive and pn1cedural norms: substantive such as the principle of nondiscrimination, the element of public interest and reasonableness; and procedural (if it can be regarded as a matter of procedure) by requiring the sanction of the President prior to the introduction of a Bill in the state legislature. Compensatory taxes were envisaged as a doct.-inal concept to prcser-ve an area where the sovereignty of the state legislatures in fiscal matters could operate without the constraining influence of a prior Presidential sanction.

JINDAL S1AINLESS U'D. v. STATE OF HARYANA

Such taxes would not fall within the ambit of Article 301. Their position was reconciled with freedom on the ground that a compensatory tax for the use of facilities is not a hindrance to trade hut facilitates it. !Paras 96, 99]1563-F-ll; 564-A-B; 565-C-

ll]

,11/ India Federation of fox Practitioners v. Union of' India 2007 (9) SCR 147: 2007 (7) SCC 527; State of' A.P v. NTPC 2002 (3) SCR 278 : 2002 (5) sec 203; Sri Digvi;av Cemrnt Company Umited and Ors. v. State of Rajastlum and Others 1999 (5) Suppl. SCR 428 : (2000) l sec 688; State of Bihar and Ors. V. Bihar C/wn1her of Commerce and Ors. 1996 (2) SCR 184 : (1996) 9 sec 136 - referred to.

3.3 As this batch of appeals indicates, the state legislatures have amended their entry tax legislation to incorporate specific D sfalul<ff)' prnvisions indicating the manner in which the proceeds of the tax would he utilized so as to enable the tax to approximate a compensatory tax. Once the state legislature has done so, by adopting statutory provisions, would the Court have either the expertise or the competence to second guess the basis which E has been made by the state legislature? The answer to that would necessarily have to be in the negative. The Court cannot assume the character of an accountant overseeing the balance sheets of income and expenditure and enquiring into capital account investments made by the states. Such matters do not lie within the competence or ken of judicial review. More fundamentally, F all tax revenues are utilised by the state for public purposes. All taxation being in aid of lhe creation of conditions of social order, a compensatory element can never be disassociated from taxation. Equally insofar as fees are concerned, the payment which is required to be made is not always voluntary. The contribution G exacted from trade and commerce may not always be for the actual use of a facility but may be for the provision of the facility which trade and commerce is entitled to use. The state expends large budgets on providing expenditure to maintain law and order and security. The distinction between a tax and a fee has become

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blurred in 0111· jurisprndcnce and Courts have found it difficult to find a clear dividing line. !Para 1031f569-B-Fl 3.4 A doctrinal irrationality which the theory of compensatory taxes fails to meet is a discriminatory compensatory tax. Discriminatory taxes which single out goods originating in other states to hostile discrimination violate Article 304(a). If compensatory taxes as a class fall outside Part XIII, this would include even those compensatory taxes which are discriminatory. While holding that compensatory taxes fall outside Part XIII, the theory propounded by this Court did not account for the position that discriminatory compensatory taxes constitute an impediment to trade and commerce, thereby violating Article 301. Hence, the notion of compensatory taxes is beset with doctrinal problems. The concept has led to uncertainty and vagueness and has produced inconsistencies in constitutional adjudication. Constitutional adjudication must avoid these uncertainties which result in a multiplication of litigation and uncertainty both lo the revenue and to the tax payer. Uncertainty in the application of fisca'I legislation leads to a situation where tax compliance is beset with interprctational and practical difficulties. A concept which is replete with such evident problems is best eschewed. !Paras 104, 10511569-F-G; 570-A-BJ The content of freedom : goods, services, persons and capital

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4. Article 301 has guaranteed the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse (subject to the provisions of Parl XIIJ). Article 19(1 )(g) guarantees to every citizen the right to carry on any occupation trnde or business. At a certain level, a distinction can be drawn between the two sets of freedoms. Article 19(1)(g) guarantees individual freedom. Article 301, on the other hand, looks al trade, commerce and intercourse as a whole. Such a distinction however may have its own limitations. Individual rights of all citizens protected by Article 19 lead to the establishment of a constitutional democratic order governed by the rule of Jaw and based on human freedom. The dichotomy that Article 301 in its perspective looks at trade and commerce as a whole (as distinguished from an individual right) may also have its own

JINDAL STAJNIJ-:ss JTD. v. STATE OF HARYANA

limitations. The freedom recognised by Artidc 301 is enforceable. Enforceability is a( the behest of an individual. The freedoms guaranteed by Article 301 arc enforceable at the inslance of individuals who arc aggrieved by state action. Thus, a distinction hctwcen Article I 9(1)(g) and Article 301 on the basis of the former reflecting an individual right as opposed to a collective entitlement nnder the latter may not be completely accurate. Though, one is an enforceable fundamental right of a citizen while the other is a rccop.nition of the free. flow of trade, commerce and intercourse, hotb in essence are enforceable, and enforceable at the hehcst of aggrieved in!livid1t;1ls. ll'ara 106]1570-C-Ul

Taxation :rnd Federalism

S.1 The doctrine ol' the basic structure of tht lndian Constitution has evolved to incorporate federalism as one of its integral features. The guarantee that trade, commerce and intercourse shall he free throughout the territory of lndia is subject to the provisions of Part Xlll. The meaning of the expression "thrnughout the territory of India" is elucidated by Article 1 of the Constitution which stipulate!; that "India, that is Bharat, shall be a lJnion of Sh!tes". The Union which the Constitution postuiatcs is .defined in terms of a pol;tic;.l union and an economic uniou which brought together the erstwhile 1>rovinccs of British India and the princely states. Th;: fn.•edom under Article 301 comprehends, the free movement of goods, sen ices, persons and capital. These are essential ingredients in the creation of a common market as an incident of an economic union. The freedom under Article 301 is not absolute for, the constitutional guarantee is subject to the provisions of Part XIII. The provisions of Article 302 to Article 304 bring about a balance hctwecn the guarantee of lrecdom on one hand and legislative control over trade and commerce on the other hand. While doing so, those articles define lhe powers of Parliament :md the ~tate legislatures. while subJecting then; to restraints that arc intended to preserw the power of rc1~uiating trade and commc1·ce. !Paras 109, 1101[572-C-F] 5.2 While the Constitution docs in that sense subordinate the freedom under Article 301 to the provisions of Part XIII, it

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would not be correct to read the provisions of Part XIII in isolation. Part XIII is an integral element of the Constitution, but so are the other Parts under which executive and legislative powers are constitutionally conferred upon the structures of governance in the Union and the States. While construing the provisions of the Constitution it is necessary to construe the text in the context of the organic nature of the constitutional document. The linkages between various Parts of the Constitution contribute to the creation of a composite whole. No segment of the Constitution can he read in isolation. The scheme of the Constitution must hence be understood having regard to its history, text and context. c Words of the Constitution "cannot be read in isolation and have to be read harmoniously to provide meaning and purpose". The judgment of Justice Gajendragadlrnr, speaking for the majority in Atillbari, however construed the language of Article 30 I to mean that the guarantee of freedom wus subject only lo the provisions of Purt XIII. This docs not constitute an appropriate approach to constitutional interpretation since it leads to a construction of Part XIII in isolation from other provisions which have a significant bearing on the nature of the freedom and its relationship with the structures of governance. To consider the guarantee under Article 301 as being subject only to Article 302 to 304 overlooks the rclationshiIJ of Part XIII with other provisions of the Constitution. l<'n•cdom is integral to that relationship. [Paras Ill, 112, 1131[572-G-H: 573-A-B, F-G; 574-

AJ

Kihoto Hollolwn v. Zadzill!w 1992 (I) SCR 686: (1992) Supp 2 SCC 651; T.lvf.A. Pai Foundation and others v. State of Karnataka 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 587 : (2002) 8 sec 481 - relied on.

5.3 In interpreting the text of the Constitution, the Court must construe the text in a manner that would preserve the carefully crafted balance betwem the Union and the states. Where the language of the text permits, the effort of constitutional interpretation should be to ensure that the states arc not subordinated to the Union in an·as reserved to them. Yet it is equally a matter of constitutional doctrine that \Yherc a particular

JINDAL STAINLESS LID. v. STATE Of HARYANA

provision (such as the pro\'iso to Article 304(b) imposes a specific requirement (assent of the President before a Bill is introduced in the state legislature) which subjects the legislative power of the states to constitutional limitations, it would not be open to the Court to ignore the plain meaning and effect of such a provision. The text of the Constitution cannot be subverted on the basis of an abstract notion or hypothesis. While creating a federal structure, the draftsmen of the Constitution were conscious of the need for preserving a political and economic Union. lf, as a part of that constitutional scheme, the text of the document has incorporated specific provisions, they must be given their plain meaning and effect. It would riot be open to the Court to dilute the meaning of the text on the basis of a priori considerations. !Para 120]1578-E-ll; 579-A]

State of West Bengal v. Union of India [1964] 1 SCR 371; Special Reference 1 of 1964 (1961) I SCR 413; S.R. Bommai 1·. Union of India 1994 (2) SCR 644 : 1994 p) SCC 1; JTC Umited v. Agricultural Produce Market Commillee and Ors. 2002 (1) SCR 441 : (2002) 9 SCC 232; Ku/dip ."lawU" 1·. Union of" Jndia 2006 (5) Suppl. SCR 1 : (2006) 7 SCC 1 - referred to.

Taxing powers

Article 245 and constitutional limitations 6.1 Article 245 of the Constitution provides for the extent of laws made h:v Parliament and the legislatures of the states. Clause 1 of Article 245 enables Parliament. "subject to the pn1visio11s of this Constitution" to make laws for the whole or an;. part of the territory of India and for the legislature of a state to make laws fm- the whole or any part of the state. Article 245 is the fountainhead of legislative power. It makes legislative powers subject to constitutional limitations. The distribution of legislative powers is embodied in Article 246 which deals with the subject matter of laws made by the Parliament and by the state legislatures. Parliament has exclusive powers to make laws with n:specl to mattc.-s cnnrnerntcd in List I of the Seventh Schedule. Subject to the law making powers of Parliament in List .I, the

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Icgisl:.it urc of a state has exclusive power to enact Jaw for the state with respect to any of the mat1ers enumerated in List 11. Parliament and the state legislatures have concurrent powers to enact legislation in i-cspecl of matters enumerated in List Ill. Article 245 is the source of legislative power. Article 246 distributes legislative powers between Parliament and the state legislatures on the basis of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule. Article 245, in the conferment of legislative powers upon Parliament and the state legislatures makes them subject to the provhions of the Constitution. The power to enact laws is a manifestation of sovereignty. The Constitution while conferring legislative powers upon the Union and the states makes them subject to constitutional limitations. The sovereignty of the legislature is subject to the norms of the written constitution. The power to tax is subsumed in legislative power. Like all legislative power, fiscal legislation is subject to the mandate of the written constitution. This is the plain consequence of the opening words of Article 245(1) under which the conferment of legislative powers is made subject to the provisions of the Constitution. [Paras 121, 122]1579-B-Il; 580-AI 6.2 The entries in the legislative lists of the Seventh Schedule arc not sources of legislative power but only define the subjects or heads of legislation entrusted to the law making competence of Parliament and the state legislatures. Read together, Articles 245 and 246 confer legislative power upon the Union and the states in the first place and distribute that powe1· between them to enact legislation on the fields of legislation entrusted to their competence. Though Article 245 is made expressly subject to the provisions of the Constitntion while there arc no such similar words in Article 246, both Articles arc subject to the other provisions of the Constitution. The language of Article 245 which subjects the conferment of legislative power to constitutional provisions is a recognition of the doctrinal principle that all constitutional power vesting in the organs of the state is subject to const.itutional limitations. The Constitution which entrusts power conditions the entrustment to the. observance of constitutional safeguards and limitations. All legislative power is subject to constitutional limitations. The limitations on the

JINDAL STAlNLESS l:l'D. v. STATE OF HARYANA

exercise of k ;,:islativc power emanate from (i) guarantees of A freedom under l'arl IJJ of the Constitulion containing fundamental rights; (ii) the requirement that the law making authorily must possess legislative competence to enact a law on the subject on which it legislates; and (iii) other constitutional limitations. Part XIIJ of the Comlitulion is one of those constitutional limitations. B The constitutional limitation emanating from Part XIII arises from the recognition which it contains of the guarantee of free trade, commerce and intercourse. Hence the first premise upon which legislative powers are conferred upon and distributed between the Centre and the states is that though the enactment of law is a manifestation of sovereignty, law making authority under the c Indian Constitutior. is subject to constitutional restraints. Absolute power does not dwell in any constitutional authority which is subject to a written constitution. The legislative entries in the Lists of the Seve11th Schedule to the Constitution delineate general fields of legislation separately from taxing heads. In the D Union List taxing entries are contained from Entries 82 to 92C. The residual entry, Entry 97 deals with m"atte1·s not enumerated in the state or concurrent lists, including any tax not mentioned in either of those lists. In the state list taxes are comprised in Ii:ntrics 46 to 62. Fees are dealt with under separate heads: in Entry 96 of List I, Entry 66 of Lisi II and Entry 47 of List UI. !Paras 123, 125, 126][580-B-D; 581-B-F] StatP of' Kera/a and ors. v. Mar Appraem Kuri Co. Ltd and Anr. 2012 (4) SCR 448 : (2012) 7 SCC 106 referred to.

Sovereignty and constitutional limitations 7.1 The legislative power of the states to impose taxes is subject, in general, to the same constitutional parameters which govern the exercise of all legislative power. The containment of legislative power follows from three constitutional precepts. First, legislation is valid if it is enacted by a legislature which has competence to enact law on the subject Second, the enumeration of fundamental rights by Part Ill of the Constitution operates as a restraint on the sovereign power vesting in the legislatures to enact law. Article 13. of the Constitution stipulates that the state

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shall not cnad law which violates the freedoms guaranteed by the Chapter on fundarnental rights. A law whether made before or after the advent of the Constitution is void to the extent of its inconsistenc\ with Part XIII. Third, other constitutional limitations or restrictions may contain the law making power including in the field of taxation. f Para 1301f585-E-F, G-H; 586-A-B] 7.2 ln the field of taxation, I.he containment of legislative powers vesting in the states may take place through provisions which are in the nafure or: (i) abstraction; (ii) eclipse; and (iii) limitations or rest1·ictions. These categories arc convenient reference points for understanding the source of constitutional restrictions. An illustration of an abstn1ctio11 of legislative power is contained in Entry 54 of the State List which provides for taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, subject to the provisions of Entry 92(A) of the Union List. Entry 92(A) of the U11ion List was introduced hy the Sixth amendment to the Constitution in 1956 to provide for taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, where such sale or puHhase takes place in the course of inter-state trade or commerce. Under U'.nt1·y 54 of the State List as it originally stood, the states possessed an unfctlered area for imposing taxes on till' sale or purchase of goods othc1· than newspapers. Article 286 stipulates that a state law shall not impose or authorize the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of goods, where the sale or purchase takes place outside the state or in the course of import or export from or outside the territoi-y of India. Arlicle 286(1) provides an express har. Article 269(3) empowers Parliament by law to formulate principles for determining when a sale or purchase or consignment of goods takes place in the course of inter-state trade or c1immercc. Parliament, in exercise of its powers under Article 269(3) enacted the Central Sales Tax Act 1956. Sections 14 and 15 of that Act provide a list of goods of special importance, the manner of imposing taxes and the restrictions on the power of imposing taxes. The second source of eontainment on the legislative powers of the states in the area of taxation is Article 253 of the Constitution under which Parliament, notwithstanding anything contained in the earlie1· provisions of Chapter 1 of Part XI is entrusted with the power to enact legislation for the entire

JINDAL STAINLESS LTD. v. STATE OF HARYANA

territory of 1.ndia for implementing a treaty, agreement or A convention with one or more countries or to implement a decision at an international conference association or other body. The nonnhstanlc provision of A1·ticlc 253 operates in relation to Articles 245 to 252. Hence, the legislative powers of the stales including in the area of taxation may be eclipsed where Parliament has enacted a law to effectuate India's international obligations in pursuance of Article 253. The third source of constitutional containment on the legislative power of a state is in the form of limitations of which Clause 3 of Article 286 provides an illustration. Under Clause 3, Parliament provides the restrictions and conditions in regai·d to "the system of levy, rates and other c incidents of tax" upon which a law enacted by a state providing for a tax of the nature specified in sub-clause (a) and (b) is subject. Sub-clause (a) deals with a tax on the sale or purchase of goods declared to be of special importance in inter-state trade or commerce by a law enacted b)' Parliament. Sub-claus~ (b) deals D with a tax on the sale or purchase of goods falling under subclauses (b), (c) and (d) of Article 366(29A). Among other things, a tax on contracts for hire purchase and involving transfer of the righ1 to use goods is subject to the restrictions and conditions which arc provided by a law enacted by Parliament in regard to the system of levy rates and other incidents of tax. The constitutional containment of the legislative powers of the states also originates in the provisions of Part Xlll which enable Parliament and the state legislatures to impose restrictions on inle1·-state trade or commerce subject to defining parameters. !Paras 131-135H586-C-E, G-ll; 587-A-Gl

Rai Ramkrislrna v. State of Bihar 1963 AIR 1667: 1964 SCR 897; Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh v. State of UP & Am: 1963 SCR 220: AIR 1962 SC 1563; Amrit Ban{/.\pati Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Anr. 1992 (2) SCR 13 : (1992) 2 SCC 411; Dena Bank v. Bhikhahhai Prahhudas Parekh & Co. and Ors. 2000 (3) SCR 509 : (2000) 5 SCC 694 ; Maharaj Umeg Singh v. State of Bomhay, 1955 SCR164 : AIR 1955

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SC 540; Finn Bansidhar Premsukhdas v. State of Rajasthan 1966 Suppl. SCR 81 : AIR 1967 SC 40; Thakur Jagmmath Baksh Sinp,h v. United Provinces (1946) FCR 111 - referred to.

All taxes are not impediments

8. The free movement of goods, services, persons and capital requires the existence of public order and conditions which allow for trade and commerce to take place unhindered. Neither trade nor commerce can flourish amidst violence, unrest and social disorder. Taxes provide revenue for the state to sustain manifold activities which are geared to providing conditions of social order. Tax revenues form an essential part of the requirements necessary for states to govern. Taxes are required by Article 265 to be imposed by a law enacted by Parliament or the state legislatures. Without the power to raise revenues, the ability of the state to create conditions requisite for trade and commerce to exist would be denuded. Hence, as a matter of first principle it cannot be postulated that taxation in whatever form is a burden on trllde, commerce and intercourse and that every tax necessarily hinders trade. Such a wide construction cannot be accepted simply because by raising revenues through the means of taxation, the state provides a political and legal order based on the rule of law where contractual transactions can be executed effectively. fPara 13911589-G-IJ; 590-A-C]

Indian Express Newspapers (Bomhay) Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. etc. v. Union of India and Ors. etc. 1985 (2) SCR 287 : (1985) I sec 641; Government of Tamil Nadu v. A!w/Jilo Matam 1987 (1) SCR 232: 1987 (1) SCC 38; A II Bihar Christian Schools 'Association v. State of Bihar (1988) l SeC 266; Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Assn. of India etc. v. Union of India & Ors. 1989 (2) SCR 918 : (1989) 3 sec 634; Express Hotels Private Lim ired 1·. State of Gujarat and Anr. 1989 (2) SCR 893 : (1989) 3 sec 677; Pankaj Jain Agencies V. Union of

JINDAL STAINLESS LTD. v. STATE OF HARYANA

India 1994 (1) Suppl. SCR 602: 1994 (5) SCC 198; Vrajlal Manila/ & Co. v. State of M.P (1986) Suppl. 1 SCC 201; 7/Je Bengal Immunity Company v The State of Bihm· (1953) 1 BL.JR 48; NMDC v. State of 1'11l1jah 1996 (10) Suppl. SCR 472: (1997) 7 SCC 339 - referred to.

Articles 302, 303 and 304 9. Articles 302, 303 and 304 provide for restrictions on trade and commerce. The marginal note to each of the three articles specifically contemplates restrictions on or with regard to trade and commerce. The marginal note to Article 302 refers to the power of Parliament to impose restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse. Under Article 302, Parliament is empowered by law to impose restrictions in the public interest on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse between one state and another or within any part of the territory of the India. Consequently, Parliamentary power under Article 302 to impose restrictions is not only confined to inter-state trade but extends to restrictions within any part of the territory of India. However, Article 303 imposes a limitation both on Parliament and the state legislatures. Under Article 303, neither Parliament nor the legislatu1·e of a state can enact a law giving or authoring the giving of a preference to one state over another or making or authorising the making of discrimination between one state and another, by virtue of any entry relating to trade and commerce in any of the lists in the Seventh Schedule. Article 303 has a non-obstante provision which overrides Article 302. The non-obstante clause in Article 303 is evidently inapposite in relatioJJ' to the legislature of a state because Article 302 does not apply to a state legislature in the first instance. Evidently the non-obstante provision can have meaning only in relation to Parliament because it has the effect of stipulating that the power of Parliament to impose restrictions in the public interest under Article 302 is subJect to the principle of non-discrimination and non-grant of preferences to one state over another under Article 303. The effect of the norm which Article 303 enunciates is that neither Parliament nor

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the legislature of a state can grant preferences while enacting law to one state over another or make any discrimination. Article 303 concludes with the words "by virtue of any entry relating to trade and commerce in any of the lists in t.he Seventh Schedule." I Paras 143, 14411592-B-Hi

M.P V Su11deroramia i.: Stale of Andhra Pradesh 1958 SCR 1422: AIR 1958 SC 468; State o/iv!adras 1·. N.K. :Vataraja 1v!mlaliar 1968 SCR 829: AIR 1969 SC 147; State o/ Jli111i! Nadu and Others l'. Sitolaxmi Mills and Others 1974 (3) SCR 1 : 1974 (4) SCC 408 - referred to.

Construing A1·ticle 304

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10. The use of the non-obstantc clause in Article 304 in its application to Article 301 has been debated. That is because while Article .:rn1 makes the guarantee of freedom of trade and commerce subject to the other provisions of Part XIII, Article 304 commences with a non-obstantc provision which operates notwithstanding what is contained in Article 301. A reasonable construction or meaning would have to he attributed to these two prnvisions. So construed, Article 304, in its non-ohstante prn,·ision, must mean that it would permit what is contemplated by Clauses (a) and (h) even though it would otherwise be within the ambit of the freedom guaranteed hy Article 301. Similarly, in its application to Article 303, the 11011-obstante clause in Article 304 indicates that despite the prohibition that is contained in Article 303, the state legislature is empowered to do something of the nature that falls within the ambit of the provision. The 11011obstantc provision of A1·ticlc 304 governs both Clauses (a) and (h) that follow. By virtue of Clause (a), the legislature of a State can, despite the provisions of Article 301, impose a nondiscriminatory tax. The power to impose a tax is not conferred h~· Clause (a) of A1·ticle 304 hut is a power which is traceable to the legislative power of the states under Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution read with the legislative entries in the State List.

.JINDAL STAINLESS !TD. v. STATE OF HARYANA

Article 304(a) is a clear indication that though a tax may constitute a restriction within the meaning of Article 301, the imposition of a non-discriminatory tax is permissible to the state legislature. Article 304(a) lifts an embargo that would otherwise have existed hut for the non-obstantc provision. Article 304(a), however, mandates that a tax which is being imposed on goods imported from other States or Union territories must be a tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that state arc subject. Moreover, the tax shall not discriminate between goods that are imported and goods so manufactured and produced. !Para 15611603-B-C]

So11rh !11diu11 Cmporation (P) Ud. v Board of" Revenue (1964) 4 SCR 280; State of' Bomhay v. The united Alo/ors (India) Ltd. (1953) 4 SCR 1069; Clwndavarkar Sita Raina Rao v. Asha/ala S. Guram 1986 (3) SCR 866 : 1986 (4) SCC 447; South India Corporation v. Board of Revenue (1964) 4 SCR 280 - referred to .

.Justice G P Singh in his seminal treatise, 'Principles of S10111101:r Interpretation' 14th Edition - referred to.

Conjunctive or dis_junctive : 'may'; 'and' 11. l Article 304 provides that the legislature of a state may by law (a) impose a non-discriminatory tax as provided in clause (a); and (b) impose reasonable restrictions on the freedom of t.radc, commerce or intercourse. The npression 'may' in the prefatory part of Article 304 has to be read together with the expression 'and' which separates clauses (a) and (b). The use of the expression ·may' is indicative of the intent that the legislature of a state is not bound to levy an impost on goods imported from other states (though if it does so, the tax has to be nondiscriminatory). Similarly, the state legislature has an enabling power to impose restrictions under clause (b). The legislature 'may' do so. It has the discretion whether to impose a tax or to impose a rcsfriction and is not bound to do so. The word 'and' is

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normally used in the conjunctive sense. However, this is not always the case. Coupled with the use of the expression 'may, the expression 'and' in Article 304 should be construed to mean and/or. In other words, the legislature of a state may take recourse to both clauses (a) and (h) of Article 304 or either of them. In the context of Article 304(a) the use of the expression 'may' in the prefatory part together with 'and' which separates clauses (a) and (b) indicates that the true meaning and intent is conveyed by the joint and several and/or. The state legislature may impose a tax falling under clause (a) as well as a reasonable restriction falling under clause (b). Alternately it may impose one of them. These being enabling provisions, the legislature may not take recourse to either. However, when it imposes a tax and/or a restriction, the state legislature has to abide by the conditions of clauses (a) and (b) respectively. [Paras 158, 159, 160][604-G-Il; 605-A-C; 606-D-EJ ..Statutorv /1Jte17Jretation ·· by Ruth Sullivan - referred to.

Article 304(a) not the universe of taxation

11.2.J A discriminatory tax is prohibited by Article 304(a). There is intrinsic material in the constitutional text to indicate that Article 304(a) does not exhaust the universe of taxation for the purposes of Part XIII. First, Article 304(a) provides that the legislature of a state may by law impose on goods imported from other states or union territories any tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that state are subject. The ambit of dause (a) is a tax on goods, the origin of the goods being a state other than the state which is imposing the tax. Article 301 (over which the 11011-obstante clause contained in Article 304 operates) has a geographical coverage which extends throughout the territory of India. Article 301 guarantees the freedom of trade and commerce not only across state boundaries but equally freedom within any part of the territory of India. If the freedom of trade and commerce is restricted by a discriminatory tax - as Article 304(a) postulates is the case - the imposition of a discriminatory tax on internal movement within a state must by the same logic breach the freedom guaranteed by Article 301.

JINDAL STAINLESS TTD. v. STAfE or HARYANA

Since Article 304(a) covers only a tax on goods imported from other states, a discriminatory tax on goods which do not traverse state ho11nda1·ies would not fall within the ambit of Article 304(a). Yet it would offend Article 301. A state may conceivably have a .iustifica!ion in the public interest in doing so or for imposing such a tax and if it were to do so, it must meet the requirements of Article 304(b ). lf Article 304 (b) were to be construed to not include taxes, such a course of action would be barred, however legitimate be the state interest. !Paras 162][607-B-E]

11.2.2 There is a second reason why the language and scheme of Part XI ll must lead to the conclusion that it is not only discriminatory taxes of the nature contemplated by Article 304(a) which fall within the ambit of the Part. Article 304(a) only covers a tax on goods (goods imported from other states as seen above). A tax imposed by the state legislature otherwise than on goods, docs not fall within the ambit of Article 304(a). The taxing entries of List II of the Seventh Schedule include various taxes that fall within the legislative competence of the state legislatures other than a tax on g,oods. Among the taxing entries of List II (entries 46 to 62) are several which deal with aspects of taxation of goods. Article 304(a) applies only to taxes on goods. A tax which is not on goods or on aspects bearing on goods is not governed by Article 304(a). A discriminatory tax which is not on goods is not within the prohibition of that article. Similarly, Article 304(a) will not apply to a tax on passengers carried on roads or inland waterways under Entry 56. Since the ambit of Article 304(a) is a non-discriminatory tax on goods imported from other states, it is evident that this provision is not exhaustive even of those discriminatory taxes which will offend Article 301. There are taxes which fall within the legislative competence of the states, other than on goods, which are outside the purview of Article 304(a). If those taxes impede the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse they would infringe Article 301 though they do not fall within Article 304(a). Third, Article 302 has been held to enable Parliament to impose Central Sales Tax. The expression "restrictions" in Article 302 has been construed not to exclude a restriction by way of a taxing measure. If the expression 'restriction' for the purposes of Article 302 does not exclude a

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legislative measure by way of a fiscal imposition, i1 cannot evidently be excluded from the ambit of the phrase 'restrictions' in Article 304. [Paras 163, 164JJ607-F-II; 608-D-IIJ 11.2.3 Fourth, this conclusion is buttressed by the nonobstantc provision contained in Article 304. The plain meaning of the non-obstante provision is that state legislatures may enact legislation in exercise of their law making authority under A1·ticles 245 and 246, of the nature contemplated by clauses (a) and (b) of Article 304, despite the fact that such a legislative measure would otherwise fall within the ambit and purview of Article 301. The non-obst:inte provision in Article 304(a) refers to Article 301. Obviously, unless something falls within the ambit of Article 301, there is no reason to incorporate the non-obstante clause in Article 304(a). Despite Article 301, it is permissible in view of Article 304(a). Article 304(a) lif1s the embargo. The use of 1he clause of s11hjeclio11 in Article 301 and the non-obstante provision in Article 304 have been criticised as a case of inartistic draftsmanship. A clause which makes a conslitutional provision or, for that maHe1·, a statutory provision subject to another makes the provision in which that clause is contained subordinate to the provision to whi.ch it is subjected. On the other hand, a non-obstante provision commencing with the word 'notwithstanding' is intended to indicate that the text in which the provision is contained overrides another. JI'aras 165, 16611609-A-E] 11.2.4 The guarantee of freedom under Article 301 is subject to Part XII I. Article 304 enables a state legislature in the exercise of its legislative power (under Articles 245 and 246) to enact a law despite the fact that it may otherwise fall within the ambit of Articles 301 or 303. Article 303 contains the mandate that neither Parliament nor the legislature of the state can grant prcfc1·cnces to one state over another or discriminate between one slate and another hy virtue of the entries relating to trade and commerce in the lists of the ScYcnth Schedule. Article 303 poslulales (in n~lation lo Parliament) that the power confert"ed upon Padiarncnt under Article 302 to impose restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse, in the public interest between one state and another or over any part of the teuitory of

JINDAL STAINLESS LJ'D. v. STATE OF l-lARYANA

India cannot he exercised so as to grant preferences or to A discriminate between one state and another. However, this embargo is lifted by clause (2) of Article 303 when Parliament is dealing wilh a situation of scarcity of goods in any part of the territory of India. ln relation to the legislature of the state, Article 303(1) imposes the same mandate against the grant of preferences between states or the making of any discrimination. However, clause (2) of Article 303 docs not apply to the state legislatures. Clause (1) of Article 303 is a restraint on discriminating between one state over another or from granting preferences between them. Article 303(1) is akin to a provision in international trade parlance conferring a 'most favoured nation' treatment. Under c such an •mfn' clause, treatment extended to one nation state has to be extended to the other. Article 303(1) embodies a similar pl"ineiple inter .1·e bdween the states so as to ensure a uniformity of treatment between states when Parliament or the state legislatures enact a l:iw in exercise of their law making power. A D state legislature which enacts a law is required to confer a parity of treatment to other states and is prevented from granting preferences to one state over another or from making discrimination between one slate and another, by the operation of Article 303(1). Article 304(:i), however, allows the legislature nf a state 1o impose a tax on goods imported from other states or union territories so long as the tax is one which is imposed on similar goods nrnnufacturcd or produced in that state. The clause nf subjection in Article 301 and the non-obstante clause of Article 304 can hence be harmonised. [Para 167)1609-F-H; 610-A-F] 12. Article 306 as it was originally incorporated into the Constitution provided :i clear indicator tlrnt the founding fathers did not intend to use the expression 'restrictions' in conlrndistinction to taxes or duties on the import or export of goods bcl ween states. !Para 16911611-Fl 13.1 Article 304(a) elaborates that a particular form of taxation - a non-discriminatory tax on goods -· shall not be construed to violate Article 301. But Article 304(a) is not exhaustive of the universe of taxation. Article 304(a) has three defining characteristics. The first is that the tax is a tax on goods.

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The second is that it is a tax on goods imported from other states. The third is the non-discrimination norm in relation to similar goods produced or manufactured in the state. A tax which fails to meet the yardstick embodied in Article 304(a) will violate Article 301. But Article 304(a) cannot be a basis for holding that every fiscal measure (apart from a discriminatory tax) lies outside the puniew of Part XII I. For one thing, the rate of tax is but one clement of taxation. There arc other elements in a fiscal exaction including assessment, the machinery for collection and set offs and exemptions which can have an important bearing on whether the tax operates in a manner that impedes the freedom of interstate trade and commerce. Moreover, a discriminatory tax otherwise than on goods, does not attract the provisions of Article 304(a). Finally, a non-discriminatory tax may also become an impediment on the freedom of trade and commerce where the tax is so high as to render it confiscatory. Hence, a discriminatory fiscal imposition of the nature which offends Article 304(a) is illustrative of but not exhaustive of fiscal impediments on the freedom of trade and commerce. !Para 170][611-F-H; 612-A-C] 13.2. The Constituent Assembly, while adopting Article 304 incorporated a marginal note which describes the ambit of the provision as : "restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse amongst states". The marginal note is a broad indicator of cc11,stitutional intent. It is a constitutional indicator of the position that a restriction on the freedom of trade and commerce can be fisi;al or non-fiscal in origin. The marginal note evidently utilizes the expression "restrictions" in relation to the entirety of the article. Though a marginal note cannot override constitutional text nor can it control the specific meaning of the words used in the text, it is a broad indicator or pointer to the meaning intended. For these reasons, it would be untenable to postulate as a general principle that it is only a discriminatory tax falling within the ambit of Article 304(a) that is subject to Part XIII of the Constitution. !Paras 171, l 72]1612-D-F] Tax legislation - .Judicial review and Part XIII Taxation and Part XII

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14.J A law which imposes a tax is not immune from

,--JDAL STAlNLFSS LTD. v. STATE Of HARYANA

conslitulional challenge merely because taxation is a manifestation of the sovereign power of the slate or because there is a presumption that a tax is imposed by the legislature in lJUblic interest. Taxing legislation is sub,ject to constitutional restraints originating in lhe legislative competence of the legislature to enact lhc law, the guarantees of fundamental freedoms contained in Part Ill and constitutional limitations originating in the provisions of the Constitution. !Para 1761[614-E-Fl

The standard of judicial review 14.2 The standard of .iudicial review in relation to taxing legislation however recogni;~cs that there inheres in the legislature the power to determine the ob,jects on which a tax should he levied and lo classify persons or properties for the purposes of the levy. Uthe classification is rational, a taxing statute cannot be challenged merely because different rates of taxation arc prescribed fo1· different categories of persons or objects. The validity of a taxing statute cannot be challenged merely on the ground that the rate of taxation is excessive. However, if the statute is a colourable piece of legislation or a fraud on legislative power, ii would be open to challenge on the ground that while enacting the law, the legislature has adopted a cloak or devise to confiscate the property of a citizen who is taxed. But such a conclusion cannot be reached merely on a finding that the tax which is imposed is unreasonably high or excessive. Conccpt.nally, the availability of judicial review in regard to taxing legislation is distinct from the standard of judicial review. Taxing legislation is nol immune from constitutional challenges based on a lack of legislative competence, a breach of fundamental rights or a violation of a constitutional limitation or provision. But the standard of judicial 1·eview in relation to fiscal statutes recognizes that lhe legislature must possess a wide latitude to classify persons or objects for the purposes of the levy. [Paras 177, 178]!614-G; 615-A-D]

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Office1; S)1ecial !11vestigatio11 Officer 1962 (2) SCR 983; Chhotahhai Jethahhai Patel & Co. v. Union of India (1962) Supp. (2) SCR ] ; Raja Jagan11ath Baksh Singh i: State of' UP (1963) I SCR 220; Federation of' Hotel & Restaurant Assn. of flldia etc. v. Union of India & Ors. 1989 (2) SCR 918 : (1989) 3 SCC 634 - referred to.

14.3 Taxation is indeed a manifestation of the sovereign power of the slak to raise revenues for public purposes. Bui the exercise of sovereignty is subject lo the constitutional limitations of a written constitution. Enactment of law by a law making body which possess a legislative competence over the subject maUer upon which it legislates is one of the constitutional limitations. The Constitution distributes legislative powers between the lJ nion and States. \Vhile doing so it carves out fields of legislation which arc reserved to the Union and the States respectively. Legislative powers in relation to taxation are also distributed between the Union and the States. Uenee, all legislative power (of which the legislative power to impose a tax is a part) is subject to the distribution provided in the Constitution. Exercise of sovereign power is governed by the norms of a written Constitution. Taxing statutes, like other legislation, arc subject to co11stil11tio11al limitations including those contained in Part XIII. Hence, the general notion that taxation is a manifestation of sovereign pow('rs must also comprehend within that conceptualisation, the limitations which the Constitution imposes upon all legislative power of which the taxing power is a part. !Para 18011616-G-II; 617-A-C! 14.4 Article 245 mandates that all laws are subject to the provisions of the Constitution. From that basic premise, it must follow that the l~mitations on the taxing power are not only those which are referable to Part XII. A sub.ject such as taxation may be referable to a specific part of the Constitution, such as Part XII.. This does not mean that its validity must be assessed only with reference In the provisions of that Part. The provisions of the Constitution are not isolated 01· watertight compartments.

JINDAL STAINLESS LTD. v. STATE OF HARYANA

Constitutional provisions do not rest in silos.· As regards the A third rationale undoubtedly, the revenues which the state raises from fiscal exactions generate resources which arc also utilized to augment trade and commerce. This, however, does not confer an immunity from a challenge that a law which is enacted in pursuance of the taxing 110wer breaches specific provisions of B the Constitution. [Paras 181, 18211617-D-F'] 14.5 While the concept of public purpose is implicit in tax law, it is also implicit in all legislation which is presumed to be in the public interest. Yet the presumption of constitutionality or of legislation being in the public interest docs not confer a protection or immunity against a specific challenge on the ground that it violates a constitutional limitation such as that originating in legislative competence, the fundamental rights or constitutional proYisions. !Para 18311617-G] Presidential sanction : the proviso to Article 304(b) 15. Article 303 prohibits both Parliament and the legislature of a state from enacting laws granting preferences to one state over another or making discrimination between one state over another. Article 303(2) makes an exception in respect of Union legislation enacted to deal with a situation of scarcity of goods in any part of the territory of India. The prohibition contained in clause 1 of Article 303 is, hence, lifted in the case of Parliament by clause 2. In the case of a state legislature, Article 303(1) is attracted where it grants preferences or makes a discrimination between one slate and another. Article 304 in its non-obstante clause refers inter a!ia to Article 303. Consequently, where a state legislature seeks to enact legislation granting a preference to one state over another or to make a discrimination of the nature referred to in Article 303(1), it must comply with the requirements of a Presidential sanction under the proviso to Article 304(b ). Where the law enacted by the state legislature would result in a preference or discdmination prohibited under Article 303(1), the embargo can be lifted upon obtaining the previous sanction of the President under the proviso to Article 304(b ). [Paras 185, 186]1618-D-G]

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Article 304(a) : The principle of non-discrimination 16. While understanding Article 304 (a), this Court has to analyse the meaning of the expressions (i) 'goods imported from other states'; (ii) 'any tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that state m·e subject'; and (iii) 'so, however, as not to discriminate between goods so imported and goods so manufactured'. \Vhilc defining the meaning of these cxp1·cssions, judici:1l 1·cview is confronted with the basic question of when Article 304(a) would apply and the situations in which the requirement of a non-discriminatory ta1' is fulfilled. An important aspect of Article 304(a) is whether it permits a classification by the state legislature based on the need to achieve the economic development of the state. If development is a legitimate priority, to what extent docs Article 304(a) condition the power of the state legislature to encourage the growth of its own industries by the grant of incentives. rebat.es and exemptions through fiscal legislation'? !Para 18711618-11; 619-B-D]

5;1ate of Madhava Pradesh v. Ahdeali 1963 SCR 704 : AIR 1963 SC I 237; Firm .L TB. lvlehtah Majid v. State of :\1adrm· (1963) Suppl. (2) SCR 435; A Hajee Abdul Shakoor i: State of' i'v!adms 1964 AJR 1729: 1964 SCR 217; State of Madras v. :V.K. Na/arajo Muda!iar (1968) 3 SCR 829; Ka!wmi Stores v. l/1e State o/Orissa (1966) 1 SCR 865; Srat<' ofKemlc1 v..·1.B. Ahdul Khadir (1970) I SCR 700; Ra/Ian Lui de Co. v. The .·1ssessing Authority ( 1969) 2 SCH 544; V G11ruviah .Vaid11 and Sons v. State of fomi! Nadu 1977 (1) SCR 1065 : 1977 (1) SCC 234; Stale of Kamawka v. Hansa Cmporation 1981 (I) SCR 823 : 1980 (4) SCC 697; Wes/Un Electronik.I· '" Slate of Gujarat 1988 (3) SCR 768 : 1988 (2) SCC 568; Video Electronics v. State al Punjab 1989 (2) Suppl. SCR 731 : (1990) 3 SCC 87; Shree Mahavir Oil Mi11s v. State of J&K 1996 (9) Suppl. SCR 356 : 1996 (11) sec 39 ·- referred to.

JINDAL STAINLESS LTD. v. STATE Of HARYANA

Article 304(a) and reasonable classification

17.l Does Article 304(a) prohibit a state from making a reasonable classification? Article 303 contains a prohibition on the legislature of a state granting a preference to one state over another and for making a discrimination. Article 304 operates, inter alia, as an exception to the norm contained in Article 303 as B a result of its 11011-obsta11te provision. Under clause (a) of Article 304 a state may impose on goods which are imported from other states "any tax" to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that state are subject. This is followed by the further requirement that the imposition of such a tax shall "so however'' C not discriminate between goods so imported and goods so manufactured or produced. The principle which underlies clause (a) of Article 304 is non-discrimination between goods imported from another state and goods produced or manufactured within. Clause (a) enables the state legislature to impose a tax on goods imported, in the exercise of its legislative power, so long as that D tax is imposed also on similar goods manufactured or produced within. The latter part of clause (a) which contains a mandate against discrimination must have some meaning. In drafting the provision, the founding fathers evidently did not confine it merely to a norm providing a parity of taxes between imported goods E and similar goods produced or manufactured within. While stipulating that "any tax" to which similar goods produced or manufactured in the state are subject can be imposed on goods imported into the state from other states, clause (a) contains the mandate that there should be no discrimination between goods, I hat ar·c imported and goods that are manufactured within. The .iudgmcnt in Video Electronics construed Article 304(a) as not precluding a state from taking steps to promote the growth of its own nascent industry. Jn the case of the State of Punjab, the defence of the State was that a reduced rate of sales tax was imposed to boost the electronics manufacturing industry and to G stop existing industrial units shifting to neighbouring states, particularly having regard to "the prevailing peculiar circumstances of PunJab". Moreover, while states, such as GuJarat and Maharashtra were fully developed industrial states, Pun.iah at that stage was backward in terms of industrial growth. H

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These factors undoubtedly weighed wilh this Court in sustaining the notification. !Para 207] f636-E-H; 637-A-D] 17.2 A state docs have a legitimate concern and interest in ensuring the growth and development of its own industry. Levels of indnstrial growth and economic development arc not uniform across the countr~'· A state legislature can have a legitimate interest, in the exercise of its law making power, to ensure balanced development and growth of its industry, particularly, in the nascent stage of industrial development. Yet, while doing so and granting incentives the legislature or as its delegate, the state government must ensure that the grant of incentives is carefully structured so as not to defeat the underlying spirit and object of Article 304(a). Moreover, when the grant of such an incentive is challenged, it is for the state to justify it with reference to circumstances which have a bearing on legitimate state interest. [Para 208][637-D-Ff

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Formal and substantive equality

18.J Equality and non-discrimination are elements of the same universe. Equality has both a formal and substantive content. In a formal sense, equality perceives of governance under the same legal regime and the application of the same legal principles. Uniform application of law fulfills the norm of formal equality. Substantive equality looks beyond formal equality. That which may satisfy the requirements of formal equality may be inadequate and insufficient to meet the vision of substantive equality. S11bsta1ifive equality recognises that there are histories of discrimination based on social background, gender and access to resources. They determine the pursuit of opportunity. Hence, formal equality may not necessarily result in just outcomes. Treating all individuals alike may perpetuate deprivation and denial of economic opportunity to those for whom the social order· has not provided equal access to education or to the resources necessary for economic advancement. Hence, substantive equalit~' is premised on the foundation that in order to produce just outcomes and a real equality between individuals who are unequally situated, the legal regime must comprehend an understanding of their past histories of discrimination, disability

JINDAL STAINLESS J;l'D. v. STATE OF HARYANA

and injustice. !Para 209]!637-G-ll; 638-A-C] 18.2 Regions within a nation arc not equal in a real sense in terms of economic advancement and social development. Typically, economic development has spread along areas which dcvclo1>cd around the availability of infrastructure and resources. As ports and rnilways developed over the last century and a half, the benefits of development permeated to regions where economic opportunity was available. Yet, other areas of the country have remained in a state of comparative under-development as a result of circumstances such as geographical isolation and the absence of developed means of communication. Many regions have suffered from the absence of education and unavailability of access to health and sanitation. Social deprivation and discrimination have been the defining characteristic of large swathe8 of the nation. In this background, substantive equality like its mirror image-non-discrimination-construes the need for development in terms of mitigating regional histories of suffering and strife, and of denial, deprivation and discrimination. !Para 210)1638-D-F] 18.3 Article 304(a) is an amalgam of formal as well as substantive norms of equality. At a formal level, the provision requires that when a state imposes a tax on imported goods, the tax must likewise be imposed on similar goods which are manufactured or produced in the state. Parity of tax between domestic goods produced and manufactured in a state with those which are imported from other states is the first and formal requirement. But beyond this, Article 304(a) brings into focus substantive principles by embodying a norm of non-discrimination in its latter stipulation. Non-discrimination in a substantive sense requires a level playing-field. Two states in the nation may not be comparable in terms of social development and economic advancement. One state may be industrialised with a growth of capital investment in urban infrastructure while another state may be predominantly agricultural. Article 304(a) does not prohibit a state from taking steps that are necessary for development and growth within its territories. [Pua 211]1638-G-ll; 639-A-BJ

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Produclion and manufacture within the home state 19. Another aspect which needs close analysis is whether under Article 304(a), it is necessary that a state must actually produce or manufacture goods similar to goods imported from other states which arc sought to he taxed. The crucial words are "any tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that state arc subject". Art.icle 304(a) is not in the nature of a countervailing duty. The words "similar goods manufactured or llroduced" arc common to both Article 304(a) and Entry 51. llowever, the notion of a countervailing duty under Entry 51 (as the judgment in Kalyani Stores explains) is intended to counterbalance the duty of excise levied on articles which arc produced or manufactured in the state. The countervailing duty is imposed on articles which arc produced or manufactured elsewhere in India. Jn the context of a countervailing duty, this Court in Kalyani Stores held that it postulates the actual production or manufacture of goods. This principle cannot be extrapolated to Article 31l4(a) where the tax which is imposed is not in the nature of a countervailing duty. Article 304(a), when it refers to a tax on goods, covers taxes on any aspect of goods which fall within the legislative competence of the state legislature. The latter part of Article 304(a) which contains the words "so however as not to discriminate between goods so imported and goods so manufactured and produced" is not a surplusage. The object of the latter part is to ensure that there is no discrimination between goods which are produced or manufactured in the state and goods which are imported from other states. If a particular rate of duty is levied on goods which arc produced or manufactured in a state, a higher rate of duty cannot be levied on goods imported from othe1· states. This, however, does not preclude a state from imposing a duty on imported goods where it does not actually produce or manufacture goods of that description. The ohservations of this Court in Kalyani Stores were made in the context of a countervailing duty under Entry 51 of List IJ which is distinguishable. H a state does not manufacture or produce goods similar to the imported goods on which a tax is imposed, no question of disuimination will arise. The object of Article J04(a) is to prevent disparity of freatment between goods that

JINDAL STAINLESS LTD. v. STATE Of HARYANA

are produced or manufactured in a state and goods which a state ·A imports from other states. \Vhere a state docs not actually prnduce or manufacture goods of that description, no issue of discdmination qua Article 304(a) would arise. !Paras 212, 213] [639G; 640-D-ll; 641-A-DI Entry Tax/Octrois and Terminal taxes

20. Entry 52 of List II to the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution provides for " Taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein." The legislative history surrounding the incorporation of Entry 52 is a significant guide to interpreting its provisions. Section SOA of the C Government of India Act, 1915 defined the powers of the provincial legislatures. In the Government of India Act, 1935, Entry 49 of the legislative lists (list 11) provided as follows: " Ccsses on entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use Ill" sale therein. Terminal taxes were placed in List I." In the Government of India Act, 1935, Entry 49 used the expression "entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein", instead and in place of "octroi'' (as contained in the Devolution Rules under the Act of 1915). The Constitution incorporated Entry 52 in List ll in language which corresponds to Entry 49 of List II under the Government of India Act, 1935 E but with the difference that the expression 'taxes' is used instead of 'cesses'. Octroi was a tax levied on the entry of goods into areas which were administered by local bodies. When the draftsmen of the Constitution incorporated Entry 52 in List II, it was with the knowledge that the expression 'local area' had been used in the Government of India Act, 1935. Moreover, it could not but have been present to the minds of the framers that the expression ·octroi' which was used in the Devolution Rules had heen replaced subsequently in Entry 49 of List II in the Government of India Act of 1935 with a description rather than label : the label being descriptive of the entry of goods into a local area; the purpose being consumption, use or sale therein. The exp1·ession 'therein' also indicates that the goods enter for the purpose of being used, consumed or sold within the local area. Entry 52 having used the expression "local area" rather

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than "area", the Constitution did not intend that the entry of goods into just any area in the state would attract the entry. The entry had to be into a local area. A local area is an area administered by a local authority such as a municipality, a district or a local board or a panchayat or some other body constituted by law for administering the governance of local affairs in any part of the s1atc.f Paras 214, 215, 216, 218, 2201[641-E-F, G-11; 642-CE; 643-B-C; 645-A-BJ

Ranga1ore Woo/1e11 Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. Corporation of the City ol Bangalore (1961) 3 SCR 707; Burnwh She1! Oil Storage and Distrilmtion Co. India /Jd. v. 771e !Jelgium Borough Municipality (1963) Supp. 2 SCR 216 - referred to.

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Enti-y taxes and Article 304(a) 21. The first significant as1>ect of the matter is the interplay between entr-y tax legislation and Article 304 (a). The interface between the two arises hccause entry tax is levied on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein. If the goods odginate in any other. state, the imported goods would upon entry into a local area he liable to entry tax since the charging event is the entry of the goods into the local area for consumption, use or sale. Issues of discrimination arise on whether similar goods produced or manufactured within the state arc sub_jcct to entry tax. Article 304 permits the state legislature to impose on goods importe~ from another state any tax to which similar goods produced or manufactured in the state arc sub.icct. The object is to ensure that there is no discrimination between the goods "so imported" and the goods "so produced or manufactured". The critical requirement of Article 304 (a) is that the tax must be origin neutral. Hence, where the state legislature levies an entry tax on goods entering a local area (without making any discrimination based on whether or not the goods originate in the state or are imported from outside) the mandate of Article 304(a) would be met. The issue is whether

JINDAL STAINLESS Ll'D. v. STA.TE Of HARYANA

Article 304 (a) would be breached by imposing an entry tax only A upon goods that are imported from other states. Plainly, if a tax is imposed on goods which are imported from other states without subjecting similar goods produced or manufactured within the state to the tax, there would be a violation of Article 304(a). This would constitute an unconstitutional discrimination between goods imported from other states which are subject to I.ax and goods produced or manufactured within the state which are not subject to the levy. Such an act of discrimination may take place, for instance, in a situation where state law defines the entire area of the state as a local area or by incorporating a specific definition of the expression dealer or importer lo mean an importer of goods c from outside the state. For instance, goods may be subject to entry tax only when they cross the state boundary. Movement of goods exclusively within the state, is not sub.ject to entry tax. Alternative!~', the expression local area may be defined with reference to the entire state. If the legislation imposes a tax only D upon the entry of goods originating outside the state into the state, while goods produced and manufactured within the state are not sub.iect to the levy, this would constitute a hostile discrimination prohibited by Article 304 (a). [Paras 227, 228, 22911648-A-HJ

Meaning of 'Local area' 22. The Seventy-third amendment to the Constitution has incorporated Part IX which deals with Panchayats while the Seventy fourth amendment has incorporated Part IXA which deals with Municipalities. Article 243(d) defines Panchayats as institutions of self-government constituted under Article 243(b) for the rural areas. Article 243(b} requires the constitution in eve1·y state of Panchayats at the village, intermediate and district levels. Article 24311 (a) empowers the legislature of a state by law lo authorize a Panchayat to levy, collect and appropriate such taxes, duties, tolls and fees in accordance with such procedure and subject lo such limits. Article 243Q provides for the constitution of a Nagar Panchayat, a Municipal Council and a Municipal Corporation. Article 243X empowers the legislature of a state by law to authorize a Municipality to levy, collect and

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appropriate such taxes duties, tolls and fees in accordance with such procedure and subject to such limits. With these amendments, local areas now have assumed a constitutional context and significance. In the judgment in Diamond Sugar Mills, the Constitution Bench emphasized that in i1sing the expression local area, the framers of the Constitution were aware of the previous legislative history and meant an area administered by a body (such as !Vlunicipalities, Panchayats or local board) constituted under the law for the governance of local affairs in any part of the stale. This statement of principle in the decision in Diamond S11Kar Mills now stands fortified in view of the constitutional amendments brought by the insertion of Parts IX and IXA into the Constitution. A local area cannot be defined with reference to the entire state but will comprehend within the state, an area that is administered by a local body constituted under the law. [Paras 231, 232][650-B-G] Diamond Sugar Mills /Jd v. 7/1c Stale al Uttar Pradesh (1961) 3 SCR 242; Shaktik11mar M. Sancheti v. State of Maharashtra 1994 (6) Suppl. SCR 98 : 1995 (1) sec 351 -- relied on.

Sevcrability 23. A discrimination between goods imported from outside the slate and goods produced or manufactured within the state for the levy of a tax would be violative of Article 304(a). Where the state legislature has committed an act of hostile discrimination hy imposing a tax only upon goods originating outside the state upon their entry within it, the court must strike down such a provision which violates Article 304(a). The provision cannot be re-written by judicial interpretation to mean that the tax will be levied both on goods originating outside the state and goods originating within the state and entering a local area. Re-writing a legislative provision is impermissible in the exercise of judicial review. [Para 233][650-11; 651-C-E] Equality of lax burdens

24.1 Article 304(a) refers to the imposition of any tax on

JINDAL STAINLhSS LTD. v. STATE Of HARYANA

goods. The provision is not either a source of legislative power A nor docs it prescribe fields of legislation. The expression "any tax on goods" is of a generic nature and covers. all taxes which a state is competent to impose on any aspect of goods under Articles 245 and 246 read with List JI of the Seventh Schedule. The expression 'any tax' would mean any exaction in the nature of an B impost or levy which the state legislature is competent to enact by virtue of its legislative powers. The expression 'any tax' must mean what it says: it means an~· levy which the state is constitutionally competent to legislate. The second aspect of Article 304(a) is the latter 1rnrt which provides that the state shall ad : "so, however, as not to discriminate between goods so c imported or goods so manufactured or produced." The fundamental reason fo1· the incorporation of this provision is to prohibit discrimination being practiced by the state against imported goods by embarking upon protectionist policies. A state cannot impose taxes in a manner that would make the goods of D another state non-competitive so as to effectively bar the inflow of trade by utilizing fiscal exactions. Thirdly, the latter part of Article 304(a) is prefaced by the expression "so however". In \:Vords and Phrases, the expression however has been explained as indicating "an alternative intention, a contrast with a previous clause and a modification or it under circumstances". The latter part or Article 304(a) follows upon the first which enables the state to impose on goods which are imported from other states any tax to which the goods produced or manufactured within the stale arc subject. The latter part constitutes a positive reaflirmation that in any case, at all events and at any rate there F shall be no discrimination between goods manufactured or prnduced within the taxing state and goods imported from other states. This narrative is the dominant theme of Article 304 (a). Fourthly, an expression of some significance that is used in the latter part or Article 304(a) is "between". That expression has G been employed so as to mandate that there shall be no discrimination between goods imported into the taxing state from other states and goods that are manufactured and produced within. The use of the expression "so" in the latter part is an obvious reference to the imported goods and the goods

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manufactured or produced within, referred to in the first part. The expression 'between' postulates that imported goods and local goods must be allowed a level playing field in the taxing slate. Imported goods from another state cannot be placed at a comparative disadvantage. The expression 'between' also signifies that goods produced or manufactured within the taxing stale should also not be discriminated against. In seeking parity of treatment, it is as much the obligation of the taxing state to ensure that there is no discrimination against goods originating in other states, as much as it is its concern to ensure that domestic goods ;ire not discrirninalcd against. The former is a matter of constitutional obligation. However, il does not exclude a similar obligation and concern of the taxing state in respect of goods produced and manufactured within its territorial limits. Both must go hand in hand. Discrimination both in a positive manner against imported goods and a reverse discrimination against domestic goods arc within the ambit of Article 304(a). The fifth important principle which requires emphasis is that our Constitution does not embody a requirement that the state legislature while enacting a legislation must legislate separately in respect of each subject of legislation contained in List JL A law enacted by the state legislature imposing a fiscal levy may cover more than one subject of legislation falling within its legislative competence in List II. In contrast, Section 55 of the Australian Constitution mandates that there shall be one tax law on one subJect. The Indian Constitution does not. impose such a restriction on the states. Considered from a different perspective, "rag-bag" legislation is constitutionally permissible under the Indian Constitution and it is open to a single enactment to draw sustenance from more than one entry which falls within the legislative competence of the enacting legislature. !Paras 240, 241, 242)[653-E-H; 654-AG; 655-A-II; 656-A)

Ujagar Prints (ll) v. Union of India 1988 (3) Suppl. SCR 770 : 1989 (3) SCC 488 - relied on. Wordl" and Phrases Permanrnl Eel. Vol. 19A , Oxford dictionary; P Ramanatha Aiyar's Lcrw Lexicon 4th Ed. Vol. III, Id. at p. 3134 -- referred to

JINDAL STAINLESS LID. v. STAl'E OF HARYANA

24.2 As a matter of constitutional doctrine, there is no A restraint on the plenary powers of Parliament as well as the state legislatures which requires the legislative body enacting a statute to legislate only upon one head of legislation falling within its competence. The legislature can distribute or allocate its regulatory or law making requirements (both fiscal and non-fiscal) in a manner which best sub-serves its needs and concerns. Once this be the position, its impact upon the interpretation of Article 304(a) is that it is open to the state legislature to have due regard to the equality of tax burdens, when it legislates to impose "any tax" so long as it does not breach the notion of non-discrimination as between goods that arc imported from other states and goods c which are produced or manufactured within. It is legitimately entitled to ensure that the tax burden should not discriminate between locally produced or manufactured· goods of that state and goods originating in other states. The substance must prevail over form. Once there is no constitutional necessity that the form D in which legislation is enacted in India must cover only one legislative entry, the legislature is entitled to devise a law in a suitable manner which while being consistent with the norm of non-discrimination also preserves a parity of tax burden between goods imported and domestic goods. This is t.he foundation of the theory of equivalence. (Para 24311656-B-EJ 24.3 The burden of establishing that there is a discrimination against goods which are imported from other states lies on the person who sets up such a plea. In answering a plea of discrimination, it would be open to the state to establish that the legislative provision which it has enacted maintains the principle of non-discrimination between goods produced and manufactured within the state and goods imported from other states while at the same time bringing about parity in terms of tax burden between domestic and imported goods. Sales tax is referable to Entry 54 of List II ("taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, subject to the provisions of Entry 92A of List I"). Enlry tax is referable to Entry 52 of List II ("taxes on the entry of goods into a local a1·ea for consumption, use or sale therein"). Both sets of taxes fall within the competence of the state legislature. Tax11ble events under entries both entries are distinct

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: in the case of one the sale of goods and in the case of the other, entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein. Both deal with separate aspects of the taxation of goods; the taxable events being proximate though distinct. The expression "any tax" recognises the full panoply of taxes on goods falling within List II. If a law can cover Entry 52 and Entry 54 of List II, there is no reason to prohibit the state Jaw making authority from having due regard to the tax burdens imposed on domestic goods and goods imported from other states under entry tax and sales tax legislation, taken as a composite whole. "Any tax" docs not mean a tax under one ent.ry of List II as a discrete and isolated legislation independent of any another entry. Any adjustment, exemption or set off based on the payment of sales tax may be intended to avoid double taxation and discrimination. Whether this objt1ct has been legitimately achieved by the enacting law is a matter to be determined on its interpretation and application. !Para 244]1656-F-G; 657-A-DJ 24.4 It is trite Jaw that every discrimination involves a differentiation hut every differentiation docs not implicate discrimination. The enquiry into whether a state has practiced discrimination against goods imported from other states will commence with an investigation into whether the state legislation has made any differentiation between the two sets of goods. This is not merely in terms of the rate of tax but there arc other important aspects including: proccdui-cs and machinery including aspects such as licencing, recognition and compliance: J\ieasure of the tax; and Exemptions or set offs; Beyond this enquiry, the court would need to analyse the reasons for the differentiation and then to determine a~ to whether there has been a discrimination violative of Article 304(a). fP.ara 245)[657-D-GI Entry tax and imported goods

II

25.1 Entry 83 of List I provides for "duties of customs including export duties". The taxable event referable to a Jaw enacted under Entry 83 of List l (in relation to an import customs duty) is the act of import by which goods originating in a foreign country ai·e hrought into India. Section 2(23) of the Customs Act, 1962 defines the expression import to mean "bringing into India

JINDAL STAINLESS LTD. v. STATE OF HARYANA

from a place outside India". The ex1Jression imported goods is defined to mean "any goods brought into India from a place outside India" but so as not to include goods which have been cleared for home consumption. Section 2(26) defines the expression importer in relation to any goods at any time between their importation and the time when they arc cleared for home consumption, to include any owner or any person holding himself out to be an importer. !Paras 246, 24711658-B, D-E]

25.2. The Constitution distributes subjects of legislation including, amongst them, those covering fiscal matters between the Union and the States. The fields or subjects of legislation are elaborately defined so as to exclude the possibility of overlapping bet ween entries in List I and those in List IL Even where the fields may appear to overlap, they must be construed to be mutually exclusive. Entry 83 of List I and Entry 52 of List II have separate and distinct fields of operation. Entry 41 of List I deals with trade and commerce with foreign countries; import and export across customs frontiers; and definition of customs frontiers. The distribution of powers with reference to the taxing entries in List I and ll is mutually exclusive. The principle of law is hence wellsettled : the taxing powers of the Union and the states are mutually exclusive. [Paras 249, 250 and 2561[659-D-E, F-G; 663-G-H]

Province of' Madras l'. Messrs. Boddu Paidanna & Sons 1942 F.C.R.90; Governor General i11 Council v. Province ol Madras AIR (1945) PC 98; Kamptee, Union ol 111dia 1950 SCR 15 : AIR 1950 SC 11; The Jiyajeerao Collon Mills Ltd v. State ol Madhya Pradesh (1962) Supp. 1 SCR 282; D G Gose & Co. (Agents) (P) J,td. v. State ol Kera/a and am'. 1980 (l)· SCR 804 : (1980) 2 SCC 410; Union of India v. HS Dhillon 1972 (2) SCR 33 : 1971 (2) SCC 779; Lt. Col. Sawai Bhawani Singh v. Stale of Rajasthan 1996 (2) SCR 145 : 1996 (3) SCC 105; Mh RR Engineering Co. v. Zila Parishad Bareillv 1980 (3) SCR 1 : 1980 (3) SCC 330; Hoechst Pharmaceuticals v. State of Bihar (2004) 10 SCC 2011; Stare of Wesr Bengal" Kesoram Industries (1963) 3 SCR 787 - referred to.

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25.3 Entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein attracts the charging provision of entry tax legislation. The levy which is referable to Entry 52 of List II is attracted the moment the goods enter a local area for consumption, use or sail'. The Customs Act, 1962 has made a beneficial provision for allowing goods to be deposited in public or private warehouses and for the clearance of goods for home consumption. These provisions cannot and do not dclract from the power of the state legislatures under Entry 52 nor do they denude the states from levying an entry tax once the taxable event under state law has occurred. The taxable event for the imposition of a duty of customs is distinct from the taxable event in respect of an cnt1·y tax, which is the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use and sale therein. !Paras 257, 259]1664-E-G; 665-C-D I Direct and inevitable effect test

26.l \Vhether taxes per .~e constitute an impediment upon the freedom of trade, comme1·cc and intercourse is an issue which has resu!lcd in two contrary positions, neither of which has been subscribed to in this judgment. At one end of the spectrum is the theory that all taxes impede the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse. If this theory were to he accepted, the entire tax regime and the state taxing power would he controlled by Part XIII of the Constitution. The stales which arc sovereign within their own sphere would in the exercise of their constitutional powc1· to raise revenues by way of taxation be subject to the dgours of Part XII I. Such an extreme view is not acceptable either from the stand point of textual construction or from its consequence for the federal structure of the Constitution. All taxes do not impede the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse. In fact, taxes provide the means by which revenues can be raised under a regime of law made by law making bodies at the federal and state level. Absent a taxing power, the states would be bereft of revenues needed for maintaining order and governance. Trade, commerce and intercourse cannot survive in the abstract and without conditions of stability and order created by the state. Moreover. the revenues which arc made available to the state

JINDAL STAINLESS lTD. v. STATE OF HARYANA

provide the basis for creating infrastructure and amenities, both direct and incidental, through which trade and commerce can effectively be transacted and can flourish. Hence, the extreme proposition that all taxes constitute a restriction or impediment upon trade has been eschewed. !Para 260]1665-E-H; 666-A-B)

26.2 At the other end of the spectrum lies the view that B taxes do not constitute a restriction upon the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse. If this view were to be accepted, Part XUI would have no role as a constit.utional limitation on taxing legislation save and exce1>t for discriminatory taxes of the kind that arc prohibited by Article 304(a). The position that Article c 304(a) constitutes the entire universe of taxation for the purpose of Part XIII has been rejected by this judgment on the ground that it suffers from fundamental fallacies and is contrary to the text of Part XIII. The grounds for so holding arc : Laws for the purposes of Part XIII must mean all laws and not to the exclusion of taxing legislation; The constitutional validity of Parliamentary D legislation imposing sales tax has been upheld on the basis of the provisions of Article 302 which enables Parliament to impose restrictions on the freedom of trade and commerce in the public interest. If taxing legislation is regarded as a restriction for the purposes of Article 302, there is no reason to exclude the same E interpretation for the purposes of Article 304; Article 304(a) deals with a specific area of taxation - taxation of goods. The legislative powers of the state legislatures in List 11 of the Seventh Schedule enables them to tax persons, activities or things. Article 304(a) covers only the last category namely a tax on goods. It does not cover taxes 011 persons (profession taxes or luxury tax) or taxes on activities (betting and gambling); Article 301 guarantees free trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India. Inter-state trade as well as trade and commerce within a state is guaranteed. Article 304(a) covers only taxes imposed on goods imported from other states. Article 304(a) in other words G docs not cover imposts on goods traversing within a state; Article 306 of the Constitution, as it stood 1>rior to its repeal contemplated that restrictions could take the form of duties and imposts; and The expression '1·cstrictions' has been utilized in Part XIII of the Constitution, as the provisions of Articles 302, 303, 304 and H

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SUPREME COURT RFPORTS

[2016] 10 S.C.R.

306 would indicate in a manner that would not exclude taxing legislation. jI'ara 261 j j666-C-II; 667-A-C] 26.3 Near!~', five decades of jurisprudence lrnving developed in support of the above principle, there is neither any rationale of constitutional principle or law that should leave this Court to make a departure from the position and to hold that taxes can in no circumstances constitute a restriction on the freedom of trade and commerce. Moreover, it has been accepted even as a matter of judicial precedent that taxation serves not only the purpose of raising revenues but is also a powerful instrument of social control. The states and the Union in the exercise of their lcgislatin powers, utilise taxation not only as a means of raising revenues to support their developmental activities but also as a measure of achieving social objects. Whether the pursuit of those social objects or the pursuit of social regulation infringes upon the area of free trade and commerce cannot he decided a priori. The power of taxation is capable of being used in a manner which can constitute, in a given case, a restraint or impcdirncnt on the freedom of trade and commerce. In determining as to when taxes can constitute a restriction on the freedom of trade and commerce, the direct and immediate effect test (as refined subsequently) provides a judicially manav;eable framework. The test of direct and immediate effect was enunciated in the judgments in Atiabari and Automobile Transport. The test is firmly entrenched as a part of our jurisprudence. jParas 262, 26311667-G; 668-A-DI A liahari Tea Compa11v Ltd. v. The Stale of Assam (1961) I SCR 809; A11to111ohile 71-ansport (Rajasthan) Ud. 1·. The State of Rajasthan (1963) I SCR 491 -

partly affirmed.

Godfi·ey Philips India Ltd v. State ol U.P 2005 (1) SCR 732 : (2005) 2 SCC 515; R C Cooper v. Union o{ lndia (1970) l SCC 248; il K Gopalan v. The State of Madras (I 950) 1 SCR 88; Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union oflndia 1973 (2) SCR 757 : 1972 (2) SCC 788; Maneka Gandhi i·. Union of India 1978 (2) SCR 621 J 978 (1) sec 248 - referred to.

JINDAL STAINLESS ITD. v. STATE OF HARYANA

26.4 In order to determine whether a law providing for the A imposition of a tax constitutes a restriction on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse, the principle that must be applied is whether the direct and inevitable effect or consequence of the law is to impede trade and commerce. The burden must lie on the person who alleges that such is the effect of the tax to B plead and establish to the satisfaction of the court that the consequence which is alleged docs in fact exist. The direct and inevitable consequence for the purposes of Part Xlll of the Constitution is not the same as an infringement of the fundamental right to carry on an occupation trade or business under Article 19(l)(g). Under Article 19 (l)(g), it is the individual's right to c carry on trade or business which is guaranteed as a fundamental freedom. When a legislative measure seeks to curtail that freedom, the test is whether the right of the individual has been infringed or cviscernted. In the context of Part Xlll, the matter is looked at. from the perspective of trade and commerce as a D whole. Hence, in a case which falls under Part XIII of the Constitution it is for the petitioner to demonstrate and establish that the direct and inevitable effect of the law imposing a tax is to impede or restrict the flow of trade and commerce. The mere fact lhat the activity which is taxed is related to the flow or movement of trade and commerce is not sufficient in itself to lead to the inference that a tax on that activity impedes or restricts il. Businessmen and traders must and do necessarily factor in lhc requirement of tax compliance as a part of an overall business plan. Hence, the mere fact lhat the lax is imposed with reference to an activity or thing which constitutes an aspect of trade or F comme1·cc is not sufficient in itself lead to the consequence that it is a restriction or impediment of trade and commerce. The petitioner with such a gi-ievance must cross the threshold of establishing in cogent terms before the Court that the direct and inevitable effect of the tax law is to constitute an impediment of G lrade and commerce. [Paras 265, 2661[670-C-H; 671-A] 26.5 In the context of entry tax, it is said on behalf of the petitioners that, there cannot be an entry into a local area of goods for consumption, use or sale unless the tax is paid. If the tax is not paid there can be no entry of goods. This is the basis for

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SUPREME C'. >URI REPOIUS

[2016] 10 S.C.R.

urging that entry tax constitutes a direct impediment or restriction on the freedom of trade and commerce. This approach to the issue cannot be accepted. In the regulatory sphere, adherence to a regulatory statute may be made a condition precedent to engaging in a particular line of activity involving business, trade or commerce. However, the requirement of compliance docs not by itself render the statute an impediment of trade and commerce. Similarly, in the fiscal arena, the fact that a tax liability has to be discharged as an incident of or a pre-condition for engaging in a line of activity does not by itself - and without actual proof of impediment or restraint - constitute a restriction. A conclusion that the inevitable consequence and effect of the legislation is to impede or restrict trade and commerce can be drawn only on the basis of demonstrable material that establishes that the impact of the tax is to result in that consequence. The burden to establish this is on the person who seeks to do so as a ground for relief. In a regulatory area as well as in a fiscal context, the legislature may prescribe the fulfilment of certain requirements subject to which a line of business, trade or commerce may be pursued. The fulfilment of those requirements may be set down as a condition precedent. A statutory regulator may for instance stipulate requirements of liccncing or registration before a commercial activity which it regulates can be undertaken. Licencing or registration norms may stipulate financial and other requirements which-need to be fulfilled as a pre-condition for carrying on an activity or business. The fact that a statute allows for or prescribes such norms which constitute a condition precedent is not reason enough to hold that they constitute restrictions in themselves or an impediment of trade and commCl"ce. The right to carry on trade and commerce is not a right to be free from regulation that ensures orderly conditions for the pursuit of the activity. Nor can a right be exercised in such a manner as would create chaos through unregulated actions of numerous participants. In other words, the fact that a requirement operates as a pre-condition is not sufficient in itself to hold that it impedes or restricts trade. In order to constitute an impediment, the condition must be demonstrated to cause, as a direct and inevitable consequence of its operation a restriction

.JINDAL STAINLESS r.:rD. v. STATE Of HARYANA

of trade or commerce. Every regulalo1·y requirement does nol restrict or impede trade and commerce even if at the threshold, its fulfilment is a condition enabling a person or entity to engage 111 a regulated activity. [Paras 267, 26811671-B-ll; 672-A-BI

26.6 Jn a fiscal context, the payment of an impost or levy is attracted when lhc taxing event occurs. The lax may be on 13 persons, activities or things. It is the taxing event which incurs the charge or liability to tax. The charge may be associated with an aspect of an activity or thing. The mere fact that this aspect is connected with the flow or movement of trade or commerce does not in itself lead to the conclusion that the tax constitutes an c impediment or restriction. The impediment does not lie in the aspect of the activity or thing which is the subject of the tax but in ils consequence. Every tax or movement on entry does not impede trade or commerce. The volume of trade in a commodity is determined by numerous variables including the nature of the product, availability of raw material, transportation and D infrastructure, the nature and exten

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