Justice K S Puttaswamy (retd.), and ANR. v. Union of India and ORS.
Landmark judgment · Constitution & fundamental rights — Right to privacy is a fundamental right under Article 21.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 24 August 2017
- Judge
- Justice J.S. Khehar
- Neutral citation
- 2017 INSC 801
- Reported in
- [2017] 10 S.C.R. 569
- Result
- Reference answered
- Acts & sections
- Article 20 Constitution, Article 372 Constitution, Article 51 Constitution
Full judgment
[2017] 10 S.C.R. 569
JUSTICE K S PUTIASWAMY (RETD.),
AND ANR. v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of2012)
AUGUST 24, 2017 [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI, J. CHELAMESWAR, S. A. BOBDE, R. K. AGRAWAL, R. F.. NARIMAN, ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND S. ABDUL NAZEER, JJ.]
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Constitution of India - A11.21 - Right to privacy - Privacy is a constitutionally protected right in India - The decision in M. P. Sharma which holds that the right to privacy is not protected by the Constitution stands over-ruled - The decision in Kharak Singh to the extent that it holds that the right to privacy is not protected by D the Constitution stands over-ruled - Right to privacy is protected · as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Art.21 and as a part of the freedom guaranteed by Part Ill of the Constitution - Aadhar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016, (Per Court) Constitution of India -Art.21 - Right to privacy - MP Sharma . judgment - Correctness of - Held: The judgment in M P Sharma holds essentially that in the absenc~ of a provision ·similar to the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution, the right to privacy cannot be read into the pmvisions of An.20(3) of the Indian Constitution - F The judgment does not specifically adjudicate on whether a right to privacy would arise from any of the other provisions of the rights guaranteed by Part lTl including Art.21 and Art.19- The observation that privacy is not a right guaranteed by the Indian Constitution is not reflective of the correct position - M P Sharma is overruled to the extent to which it indicates to the confrary. G (Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.) Constitution of India - Art.21 ..:. Right to privacy - Kharak · Singh judgment - Correctness of - Held: In the first part of decision in Kharak Singh, it was correctly held that the content of the expression
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'life' under Art.21 means not merely the right to a person's "animal existence" and that the expression 'personal liberty' is a guarantee against invasion into the sanctity of a person's home or an intrusion into personal security - Kharak Singh also correctly laid down that the dignity of the individual must lend content to the meaning. of 'personal liberty' - Thus, the first part of the decision in Kharak Singh which invalidated domiciliary visits at night on the ground that they violated ordered liberty is an implicit recognition of the right to privacy - The second part of the decision, however, which holds that the right to privacy is not a guaranteed right under our Constitution, is not reflective of the correct position - Kharak Singh to the extent that it holds that the right to privacy is not protected under the Constitution is overruled. (Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Constitution of lndici - Art.21 - Dignity - Jurisprudence on dignity - Dignity as a constitutional value findf expression in the Preamble - The constitutional vision seeks the realisation of justice D (social, economic and political); liberty (of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship); equality (as a guarantee against · arbitrary treatment of individuals) and fraternity (which assures a life of dignity to every indil'idual) - These constitutional precepts exist in unity to facilitate a humane and compassionate society The individual is a focal point of the Constitution because it is in E the realisation of individual rights that the collective well being of the community is determined - To live is to live with dignity - Privacy • with its attendant values assures dignity to the individlial and it is only when life can be enjoyed with dignity can liberty be of true substance - Privacy ensures the fulfilment of dignity and is a core F value which the protection of life and liberty is intended to achieve - Jurisprudence. (Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.) Constitution of India - Art.21 - Privacy as intrinsic to freedom and liberty - The submission that recognising the right to privaly is an exercise which would require a. constitutional amendment and G cannot be a matter of judicial interpretation is not an acceptable doctrinal position - The argument assumes that the right to privacy is independent of the liberties guaranteed by Part Ill of the Constitution - There lies the error-The right to privacy is an element of human dignity - The sanctity of privacy lies in its functional relationship with dignity - Privacy ensures that a human being can
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
lead a life of dignity by securing the inner recesses of the human personality fromunwanted intrusion - Privacy recognises the autonomy of the individual and the right of every person to make essential choices which affect the course of life - In doing so. privacy recognises that living a life of dignity is essential for a human being to fulfil the liberties and ft-eedoms which are the cornerstone of the Constitution. (Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud. J.)
Constitution of India - Art.21- Even in the absence of Art.21, it would not have, been permissible for the State to deprive a person of his life and liberty without the authority of the law. (D1: D. · Y. Chandrachud, J.)
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Constitution of India - Art.21 - Right to privacy, whether an absolute right- Like other rights which form part of the fundamental ft-eedorns protected by Part Ill, including the right to life and personal liberty under Art.21, privacy is not an absolute right -A law which encroaches upon privacy will have to withstand the touchstone of permissible. restrictions on fundamental rights - In the context of D Art.21, an invasion of privacy must be justified on the· basis of a law which stipulates a procedure which is fair, ji1st and reasonable - The law must also be valid with reference to the encroachment on life and personal liberty under Art.21 - An invasion of life or personal liberty must meet the three-fold requirement of (i) legality, E which postulates the existence of law; (ii) need, defined in terms of a legitimate state aim; and (iii) proportionality which ensures a rational nexus between the objects and the means adopted to achieve them. (Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.) Constitution of India - Art.21 - Informational privacy is a F . facet of the right to privacy - The dangers to privacy in an age of information can originate not only from the State but from nonState actors as well - The Union Government entrusted to put into· place a robust regime for data protection - The creation of such a regime requims a careful and sensitive balance between individual interests and legitimate concerns of the State - The legitim.ate aims G of the State would include for instance protecting national security, preventing and investigating crime, encouraging innovation and the spread of knowledge, and preventing the dissipation of social welfare benefits - These are matters of policy to be considered by tl1e Union government while designing a carefully structured regime H
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for the protection of the data.(Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Constitution of India - Art.21 - Deprivation of life or personal liberty - A person cannot be deprived of life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by .law - Art.14 as a guarantee against arbitrariness infuses the entirety of Art.21 - lnterB relationship between the guarantee against arbitrariness and the protection of life and personal liberty operates in a multi-faceted plane - First, it ensures that the procedure for deprivation must be fair, just and reasonable - Second, Art.14 impacts both the procedure and the expression 'law' - A law within the meaning of Art.21 must be consistent with the norms of fairness which originate C in Art.14. (Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.) Constitution of India - Art.21 - Right to privacy - Inalienable right - The international covenants and declarations to which India was a party, namely, the 1948 Declaration and the 1966 Covenant both spoke of the right to life and liberty as being "inalienable" D Given the fact that this has to be read as being part of Art.21, it is clear that Art.21 would, therefore, not be the sole repository of these human rights but on(v reflect the fact that they were "inalienable"; that they inhere in every human being by virtue of the person being a human being - s.2( I )(d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, E 1993 recognises that the right to life, liberty, equality and dignity referable to international covenants and enforceable by Courts in India are "human rights" - And international covenants expressly state that these rights are 'inalienable' as they inhere in persons because they are human beings - Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 - s.2(1 )(d). (R. F. Nariman, J.) Constitution of India - Art.21 - Right to privacy - The fundamental right of privacy, which has so many developing facets, can only be developed on a case to case basis - Depending upon the particular facet that is relied upon, either Art.21 by itself or in conjunction with other fundamental rights would get attracted G But this is not to say that such a right is absolute - This right is . subject to reasonable regulations made by the State to protect legitimate State interests or public interest - However, when it comes to restrictions on this right, the drill of various Articles to which the right relates ,must be scrupulously followed - The balancing act H that is to be carried out between individual, societal and State
JUSTICE K S PUITASWAMY (RETD.) y. UNION OF INDIA
interests must be left to the training and experti~e of the judicial mind. (R. F. Nariman, J.)
Constitution of India - Art.21 - Right to privacy ~"Liberty" i11 the Preamble to the Constitution, is said to be .of thought, expre~sion, belief, faith and worship - This cardinal ~alue can be found strewn all over the fundamental rights chapter - But most B important of all is the cardinal value of fraternity which assures the dignity of the individual - The dignity of the individual encompasses the right of the individual to develop to the full extent of his potential - And this development can only be if an individual has autonomy over fundamental personal choices and control over dissemination of personal information which may be infringed through an C unauthorised use of such iriformation - Art.2 I more than any of the other Articles in the fundamental rights chapter, reflects each of these constitutional values in full and is to be read in consonance with these values and with the international covenants.(R. F. Nariman, J.) D Constitution of India - Art.21 - Right to privacy - The inalienable fundamental right to privacy resides in Art.21 and other fundamenta.l freedoms contained in Part Ill of the Constitution of India - M.P. Sharma case and the majority in Kharak Singh case, to the extent that they indicate to the contrary, stand overruled - The E later judgments of Supreme Court recognizing privacy as a . fundamental right do not need to be revisited - These cases are, thereft1re: sent back for adjudication on merits to the original Bench · of 3 honourable Judges of this Court in light of the judgment. (R.F. Nariman, J.) Constitution of India -Arts.21, 14, 19 or 25 - Right to privacJ; - M.P. Sharma case - Effect of - The question whether the right to privacy is implied in any other fandamental right guamnteed under Arts.21, 14, 19 or 25 was not examined in M.P. Sharma case - Thus, M.P. Sharma is not an authority for a proposition that there is no right of privacy under our Constitution. (J. Chelameswar, J.) Constitution of India- -Ar.i..:' I - Kharak Singh case - Effect of - Kharak Singh per majority took the view that the impugned regulation insofar as it provided for 'domiciliary visits at night' is unconstitutional whereas the minority opinedJhe impugned
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regulation is in its entirety unconstitutional - Kharak Singh per majority opined that "the right of privacy is not a guaranteed right under 011.r Constitution", and therefore the same cannot be read into Art.21'- 'if1e approach adopted by the majority is illogical and against settled principles of interpretation of even an ordinary statute and wholly unwarranted in the context of constitutio11al interpretation. (J. Chelameswar, J.)
Constitution of India -Arts 21, 19(1) - Expression 'liberty' Connotation of- The expression 'liberty' is capable of taking within its sweep not only the right to move freely, guaranteed under Art.19( I)( d); but also each one of the other freedoms mentioned C under Art.19(1) - Personal liberty takes within its sweep not only the right not to be subjected to physical restraints, but also the freedom of thought, belief, emotion and sensation and a variety of other freedoms - The most basic understanding of the. expression 'liberty' is the freedom of a11 individual to do what he pleases. D (J. Chelameswar, J.) Constitution of India - Art.21 - Scope of - Held: The expression 'liberty' in Art.21 is wide enough to take in not only the various freedoms enumerated in Art. 19( I) but also many others which are not enumerated. (J. Chelameswm; J.)
CollStitution of India - Art.21 - Right to privacy - Held: The right to privacy consists of three facets i.e. repose, sanctuary and intimate decision - Each of these facets is so essential for the liberty of human beings that there is no reason to doubt that the right to privacy is part of the liberty guaranteed by our Constitution F Fundamental rights are the only constitutional firewall to prevent States interference with those core freedoms constituting liberty of a human being - The right to privacy is certainly one of the core freedoms which is to be defended - It is part of liberty within the meaning of that expression in Art.21. (J. Chelameswm; J.)
Constitution of lndia - Art.21 - Right to privacy, limitations Held: No legal right can be absolute - Every right has limitatiollS Therefore, even a fundamental right to privacy has limitations The limitations are to be identified on case to case basis depending upon the nature of the privacy interest claimed - The optiollS for limiting the right to privacy are (i) a just, fair and reasonable basis
·JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
(that is substantive due process) for limitation per Art.21 and (ii) a jusi, fair and reasonable ba;Hs (that is substantive due process) for limitation per Art.21 plus the amorphous standard of 'compelling State interest'. (J. Chelameswar, J.)
Constitution of India - Art.21 - An inalienable constitutional right to privacy inheres in Part Ill of the Constitution - M.P. Sharma and the majority opinion in Kharak Singh overruled to the extent that they indicate to the contrary- The right to privacy is inextricably bound up with all exercises of human liberty, both as it is specifically enumerated across Part Ill, and as it is guaranteed in the residue under Art.21 - It is distributed across the various Articles in Part Ill and, mutatis mutandis, takes the form of whichever of their enjoyment its violation curtails -Any interference with privacy·by an entity covered by Art.12's description of the 'State' must sati:,fy the tests applicable to whichever one or more of the Part Ill freedotm the interj'erence affects. (S.A. Bahde, J.) Constitution of India - Art.21 - Privacy's connection to Dignity and Liberty - The first and natural home for a right of privacy is in Art.21 at the very heart of 'personal liberty' and life itself - Liberty and privacy are integrally connected in a way that privacy is often the basic condition necessary for exercise of the right of personal liberty - There are innumerable activities which are virtually incapable of being perj'ormed at all and in many cases . with dignity unless an individual 'is left alone or is otherwise empowered to ensure his or her privacy - Privacy is necessary in both its mental and physical aspects as an enabler of guaranteed freedoms - It is difficult to see how dignity, whose constitutional significance is acknowledged both by the Preamble and by Supreme Court in its exposition of Art.21, among other rights, can be assured to the individual without privacy - Both dignity and privacy are intimately .intertwined and are natural conditions for· the birth and death of individuals, and for many significant events in life between these events - Necessarily, then, the right of privacy is an integral part of both 'life' and 'personal liberty' under Art.21, and is intended to enable the rights bearer to develop potential to the falle.~t extent made possible only in consonance with the constitutional values expressed in the Preamble as well as across Part 111.(S.A. Bobde, J.)
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Constitution of India - Right to life - Neither life nor liberty are bounties conferred by the State nor does the Constitution create these rights - The right to life has existed even before the advent of the Constitution - In recognising the right, the Constitution does not become the sole repository of the right. (Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.) Constitution of India - Substantive due process - History surrounding the drafting of Art.21 and changes made in original draft of Art.21, discussed - Substantive challenge to the validity of laws encroaching upon the right to life or personal liberty - Case laws discussed. (Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Constitution of India - Constitution of the world and of India - The Constitution of any country reflects the aspirations and goals of the people of that count1y voiced through the language of the few chosen individuals entrusted with the respom·ibility of framing its Constitution - Such aspirations and goals depend upon the history D of that society - History invariably is a product of various forces emanating from religious, economic and political events - The Constitution of any country is a document which contains provisions specifying the rules of governance in its different aspects - It defines the powers of the legislature and the procedures for law making, E the powers of the executive to administer the State by enforcing the law made by the legislature and the powers of the judiciary - The underlying belief is that the Constitution of any country contains certain core political values and beliefs of the people of that country which cannot normally be tinkered with lightly, by transient public opinion. (J. Chelameswar, J) Constitution of India - Forms of Privacy Rights - Common right and fundamental right - Distinction between - Held: Common law rights are horizontal in their operation when they are violated by one'.~ fellow man, he can be named and proceeded against in an ordinary court of law - Constitutional and fundamental rights, on G the other hand, provide remedy against the violation of a valued interest by the 'State', as an abstract entity, whether through legislation or otherwise, as well as by identifiable public officials, being individuals clothed with the powers of the State - Where the inteiference with a recognized interest is by the State or any other H like entity recognized by Art.12, a claim for the violation of a
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
fundamental right would lie - Where the author of an identical A interference is a non-State actor, an action at common law would lie in an ordinary court. (S. A. Bobde, J.) Constitution of India - Privacy - Whether solitude is essential to privacy - Held: Privacy has a deep affinity with seclusion (of our physical persons and things) as well as such ideas as repose, B solitude, confidentiality and secrecy (in our communications), and intimacy - But this is not to suggest that solitude is always essential to privacy - ft is in this sense of an individual's liberty to do things privately that a group of individuals, however large, is entitled to seclude itselffrom others and be private. (S. A. Bobde, J.)
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Constitution of India - Part III - Privacy is the necessary condition precedent to the enjoyment of any of the guarantees in Part Ill - As a re~ult, when it is claimed by rights bearers before constitutional courts, a right to privacy may be situated not only in Art.21, but also simultaneously in any of the other guarantees in D Part Ill. (S. A. Bobde, J.) Constitution of India - Right to privacy of any individual is essentially a natural right, which inheres in every human being by birth and remains with the human being till he/she breathes last - It is indeed inseparable and inalienable from human being - One cannot conceive an individual enjoying meaningful life with dignity without such right - However, it is not an absolute right but is subject to certain reasonable restrictions, which the State is entitled to impose on the basis of social, moral and compelling public interest in accordance with law. (Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.) Constitution of India - Dignity of an individual - The Preamble to the Constitution lay emphasis on dignity of the individual - The expression "Dignity" carries with it moral and spiritual imports - ft also implies an obligation· on the part of the Union to respect the personality of every citizen atid create the conditions in which every citizen would be left free. to find himself/herself and attain selffulfillment- Dignity of the individual is, therefore, always considered the prime constituent of the fraternity, which assures the dignity to every individual. (Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.)
Constitution of India'- Unity and integrity of the Nation cannot survive unless the dig11ity of every individual citizen is guaranteed H
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The expressions "liberty", "equality" and "fraternity" incorporated in the Preamble are not separate entities - They have to be read in juxtaposition while dealing with the rights of the citizens. (Abhay Mal!ohar Sapre, J.)
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Constitutioll of India - Right to privacy - Privacy is not just B a commol! law right, but a fundamelltal right falling in Part Ill of the Constitution of India - Although an issue like privacy could never have been anticipated to acquire such a level of importance when the Constitution was being contemplated, yet today, the times we live in, necessitate that it be recognised /lot only as a valuable right, but as a right fundamental in constitutional jurisprudence c The Constitution and its all encompassing spirit forever grows but never ages. (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.)
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Constitution of India - Data Regulation - Duty of State Held: The State must e11Sure that infonnation is not used without the consent of users and that it is used for the purpose and to the extent it was disclosed. (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.)
Co11Stitution of India - Right of privacy is a fundamental right - It is a right which protects the inner sphere of the individual from interference from both State, and non-State actors and allows the individuals to make autonomous life choices .:.. The technology has E made it possible to enter a citizens house without knocking at his/ her door and this is equally possible both by the State and nonState actors - It is an individuals choice as to who enters his house, how he lives and in what relationship - · The privacy of the home must protect the family, nuirriage, procreation and sexual orientation F which are all important aspects of dignity - If the individual permits someone to enter the house it does not mean that others can enter the house - The only check and balance is that it should not hann the other individual or affect his or her rights - This applies both to the physical form and to technology - In an era where there are wide, varied, social and cultural norms and more so in a count1y G like ours which prides itself on its diversity, privacy is one of the most important rights to be protected both against State and nonState actors and be recognized as a fundamental right - How it thereafter works out in its inter-play with other fundamental rights and when such restrictions would become necessary would depend H on the factual matrl>: of each case - That it may give rise to more
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JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
litigation can hardly be the reason not to recognize this important, natural, primordial right as a fundamental right. (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.)
Constitution of India - Test of popular acceptance - The guarantee of constitutional rights does not depend upon their exercise being favourably regarded by majoritarian opinion - The B test of popular acceptance does not furnish a valid basis to disregard rights which are conferred with the sanctity of constitutional protection - Discrete and insular minorities face grave dangers of discrimination for the simple reason that their views, beliefs or way of life does not accord with the 'mainstream' - Yet i'n a democratic Constitution founded on the rule of law, their rights are as sacred C as those conferred on other citizens to protect their freedoms and liberties. (Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.) Constitution of India - Rig/it to privacy - Majoritarian concept - Held: The right of privacy cannot be denied, even if there is a miniscule fraction of the population which is affected - D The majoritarian concept does not apply to Constitutional rights and the Courts are often called up on to take what may be categol'i>zed as a non-majoritarian view, in the check and balance of :P.ower envisaged under the Constitution of India. (Sanjay Ki9han Kaul, J.) Constitution of India - A living document - The Constitution was not drafted for a specific time period or for a certain generation - It was drafted to stand firm, for eternity - It sought to create a Montesquianframework that would endear in both war time and in peace time - The founders of the Constitution were aware of the fact that Constitution would need alteration to keep up with the trends of the age - This was precisely the reason that an unrestricted amending power was sought to be incorporated in the text of the Constitution in Part xx of Art.368. (Sanjay Kislzan Kaul, J) Constitution of India - Art.145(3) - When a substantial question as to the interpretation of the Constitution arises, it is Supreme Court alone under Art.145(3) that is to decide what the interpretation of the Constitution shall be, and for this purpose the Constitution entrusts this task to a minimum of 5 Judges of Supreme Court - Interpretation of Constitution. (R. F. Nariman, J.)
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International law - India '.I' commitment - Where there is a contradiction between international law and a domestic statute, the Cou11 would give effect to the latter - In the present case, there is no contradiction between the international obligations which have been assumed by India and the Constitution - The Court will not readily presume any inconsistency - On the contrary, constitutional provisions must be read and interpreted in a manner which would enhance their conformity with the glObal human rights regime India is a responsible member of the international conununity and the Court must adopt an interpretation which abides by the international commitments made by the country particularly where c its constitutional and statutory mandates indicate no deviation. (Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.)
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International law - Binding effect - Held: In the absence of any specific prohibition in municipal law, international law forms part of Indian law and consequently must be read into or as part of our fundamental rights. (R. F. Nariman, J.)
Interpretation of Constitution - Constituent Assembly and privacy - limits of originalist interpretation - The interpretation of the Constitution cannot be frozen by its original understanding The Constitution has evolved and must continuously evolve to meet E the aspirations and challenges of the present and the future - The framers were conscious of the widespread abuse of human rights by authoritarian regimes in the two World Wars separated over a period of two decades - The framer.~ were equally conscious of the injustice suffered under a colonial regime and more recently of the horrors of partition - The backdrop of human suffering furnished F a reason to preser11e a regime of governance based on the rule of law which would be subject to democratic accountability against a violation of fundamental freedoms - The content of the fundamental rights evolved over the cotlrse of our constitutional history and any discussion of the issues of privacy, together with its relationship G with liberty and dignity, would be incomplete without a brief reference to the course of history as it unravels in precedent - By guaranteeing the freedoms and liberties embodied in the fundamental rights, the Constitution has preser11ed natural rights and ring-fenced them from attempts to attenuate their existence. (Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.)
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Interpretation of Constitutio11 - The Constitµtion is a sacred A living document lind, heizce susceptible to appropriate i11terpreuitfrm of its provisions based on changing needs of the society - While interpreting any provision of the Constitution; the Preamble to the Constitution may be relied on as a remedy for mischief or/and to find out the true meaning of the relevant provision as the case may B'. •'' be. (Abhay Mano/Jar Sapre, J.) Interpretation of Constitution - Necessity of doctrine of flexibility while dealing with Constitution - Case laws discussed. (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) Privacy - Privacy. not an elitis(can,1·trucr~ fr.ivary is not a pril'ilege for thefew + Every individual in society irrespective of social class or economic status is entitled to the intimacy and autonomy which privacy protects. (01: D. Y. Chandrachud, J.)
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Privacy - Privacy, not just a .common law right - The Constitution recognises the right simply because it is an incident of D a fundamental freedom or liberty which the draftsperson considered to be so sign(ficant as to require constitutional protection - Once privacy is held to be an incident of the protection of life, personal liberty and of the liberties guaranteed by the provisions of Part Ill of the Constitution, the submission that privacy is only a right at common law is misplaced - The central theme is that privacy is an E intrinsic part of life, pe1wnal liberty and of the freedom~ guaranteed by Part Ill which entitles it to protection as a core of constitutional doctrine - The protection of privacy by the Constitution liberates it, as it were, from the uncertainties of statutory law which is subject to the range of legislative annulments open to a rnajoritarian F government. (D1: D. Y. Chandrachud, J.) Primcy - Concept of privacy in other jurisdictions - Each country is governed by its own constitutional and legal structure Constitutional structures have an abiding connection with the histot)', culture, political doctrine and values which a society considers as its founding principles - Foreign judgments must hence be read with circumspection ensuring that the text is not read isolated ftvm its context. (Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Privacy - Comparative Law on Privacy (from England, the US, South Africa, Canada, the European Court of Human Rights . H
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and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights) - Various criticisms of the privacy doctrine - from Bork, Posner and feminist critics Discussed. (Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.) Privacy - Types of privacy - Nine primary types of privacy depicted in a seminal article published in 2017 titled "A Typology of privacy" published in the Uni,versity of Pennsylvania Journal of International law, discussed. (Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.) Privacy - Privacy - right to control information - Privacy assists in preventing awkward social situations and reducing social frictions - An individual has a right to control one's life while submitting personal data for various facilities and services - The truthful information that breaches privacy may also require protection. (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) Privacy - Informational privacy - right to control existence on internet - Right to privacy in this modern age emanate certain other rights such as tlze right of individuals to exclusively commercially exploit their identity and personal information, to control information that is al'Uilable about them on the 'world wide web' and to disseminate certain personal information for limited pu1poses alone. (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) Rights ~ Natural and inalienable rights - Natural rights are not bestowed by the State - They inhere in human beings because they are human - They exist equally in the individual irrespective of class, strata, gender or orientation. (D1: D Y Chandrachud, J.) Rights - Natural and inalienable rights - How natural and inalienable rights developed in Indian scenario - Discussed. (Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.) Rights - Natural and inalienable rights - Life and personal liberty are inalienable rights - These are rights which are inseparable from a dignified human existence - The dignity of the individual, equality between human beings and the ques(for liberty are the foundational pillars of the Indian Constitution. (D1: D. Y. Chandrachud, J.) Reference - Scope of - Held: Reference Court cannot travel beyond the reference made and is confined to answer only those questions that ai·e referred. (Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.)
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
A scheme was propounded by the Government oflndia popularly known as the Aadhar card scheme. Under the said scheme, the Government of India collects and compiles both demographic and biometric data of the residents of this country to be used for various purposes. In the instant reference, the ground of attack on the said scheme is that the very collection of such data is violative of the "Right to Privacy". The issue reaches out to the foundation of a constitutional culture based on the protection of human rights and presents challenges for constitutional interpretation.
Answering the reference, the Court HELD:
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PER COURT: (i) The decision in M.P. Sharma which holds that the right to privacy is not protected by the Constitution stands overruled; (ii) The decision in Kharak Singh to the extent that it holds that the right to privacy is not protected by the C~.nstitution stands D over-ruled; (iii) The right to privacy is protected as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 and as a part of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution; (iv) Decisions subsequent to Kharak Singh which have enunciated the position in (iji) above lay down the correct E position in law. [Para 2][998-G-H; 999-A-B]
PER DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.: . 1. Natural and inalienable rights: Privacy is a concomitant of the right of the individual to exercise control over hi.s or her personality. It finds an origin in the notion that there are certain F ·rights which are natural to or inherent in a human being. Natural rights are inalienable because they are inseparable from the human personality. The human element in life is impossible to conceive without the existence of natural rights. Natural rights are not bestowed by the State. They inhere in human beings G because they are human. they exist equally in the individual. irrespective of class or strata, gender or orientation. All human beings retain their inalienable rights (whatever their situation, whatever their acts, \yhatever their guilt or innocence). The concept of natural inalienable rights secures autonomy to human l
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beings. But the autonomy is not absolute, for the simple reason that, the concept of inalienable rights postulates that there arc some rights which no human being may alienate. While natural rights protect the right of the individual to choose and preserve liberty, yet the autonomy of the individual is not absolute or total. As a theoretical construct, it would otherwise be strictly possible to hire another person to kill oneself or to sell oneself into slavery or servitude. Though these acts .arc autonomous, they would be in violation of inalienable rights. [Paras 40, 44-45][667-E; 669-FG; 670-A-B]
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Second Treatise of Government (1690) by John Locke; Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765) by William Blackstone; American Declaration of Independence (1776); Declarat.ion of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789); Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, Marshall Jones Company (1921); Roscoe Pound, "The Revival of Natural Law", Notre Damne Lawyer (1942), Vol. 27, No 4; A Pragmatist Looks at Natural Law and Natural Rights (1955) by Edwin W Patterson; Taking Rights Seriously (1977) by Ronald Dworkin - referred to.
2. Evolution of the privacy doctrine in India: The right to privacy has been traced in the decisions which have been rendered over more than four decades to the guarantee of life and personal liberty in Article 21 and the freedoms set out in Article 19. As Indian society has evolved, the assertion of the right to privacy has been considered by this Court in varying F contexts replicating the choices and autonomy of the individual citizen. The deficiency, however, is in regard to a doctrinal formulation of the basis on which it can be determined as to whether the right to privacy is constitutionally protected. M P Sharma need not have answered the question; Kharak Singh dealt G with it in a somewhat inconsistent formulation while Gobind rested on assumption. [Paras 91, 92][711-H; 712-D-F]
A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27 : [1950] SCR 88; Rustom Cavasji Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 1 sec 248 : [1970] 3 SCR 530; Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1975) 2 sec 148 : [1975]
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA · 585
3 SCR 946; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 : [1978] 2 SCR 621; R Rajagopal v.. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6 SCC 63~ : [1!194] 4 .Suppl .. SCR 353; People'.~ Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (1997) 1 SCC 301 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 321; Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D Ramarathnam [1967] 3 SCR 525; RM Malkani E State of Maharashtra (1973) .. 1 SCC 471; !vfalak Singh v. State of Punjab and Harvana (1981) 1 Sec 420 : [1981] . . 2 SCR 311; State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar (1991) 1 SCC 57; Life Insurance Corporation of India P. Prof Manubhai D Shah (1992) 3 SCC 637 : [1992] 3 SCR 595; Indian Express 'Newspapers(Bombay) Pvt Ltd v. Union 9f India (1985) 1 SCC 641 : [1985] 2 SCR 287; Mr. X v. Hospital Z (1998) 8 SCC 296 : [1998] 1 Suppl. SCR 723; PUCD v. Union of India (1997) 1 SCC 301 : [1996]-ll} Stipp!. s·cR 32-1; ·State of Karnataka v. Krishnappa (2000) 4 SCC 75 : [2000] 2 SCR 761; Sudhansu Sekhar Sahoo v. State of Orissa (2002) 10 SCC 743 : [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 536; Sharda v Dharmpal (2003) 4 SCC 493 : [2003] 3 SCR 106; District Registrar and Collector;. Hyderabad v. Canara Bank (2005) 1 SCC 496 : [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 833; P R Metmni v. Commissioner of Income Tax (2007) 1 SCC 789 : [2006] 9 Suppl. SCR 1; Directorate of Revenue v. Mohd Nisar Holia (2008) 2 SCC 370 : [2007] 12 SCR 906; Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India (2008) 3 SCC 1 : [2007] 12 SCR 991; Hinsa Virodhak Sangh v. Mirzapur Moti Kuresh Jamat (2008) 5 SCC 33 : [2008] 4 SCR 1020; State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah (2008) 13 SCC 5 : [2008] 12 SCR 1083; Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009) 9 SCC l; Bhavesh Jayanti Lakhani v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 9 SCC 551 : [2009] 12 SCR 861; Selvi v. State of Kamataka (2010) 7 SCC 263 : [2010] 5 SCR 381; Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Orissa State Commission for Women (2010) 8 SCC 633 : [2010] 9 SCR 457; Amar Singh v. Union of India (2011) 7 SCC 69 : [2011] 6 SCR 403; Ram Jethmalani
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v. Union of India (2011) 8 SCC 1 : [2011] 8 SCR 725; Sai1joy Narayan v. High Court of Allahabad (2011) 13 SCC 155 : [2011] 10 SCR 781; Ramlila Maidan Incident I'. Home Secretary, Union of India (2012) 5 SCC 1 : [2012] 4 SCR 971; Bihar Public Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi (2012) 13 SCC 61 : [2012] 11 SCR 1032; Lillu @Rajesh v. State of Harya11a (2013) 14 SCC 643; Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Limited v. State of Kerala (2013) 16 SCC 82 : [2013] 14 SCR 475; Manoj Narula v. Union of India (2014) 9 SCC 1 : [2014] 9 SCR 965; National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014) 5 SCC 438; ABC v. The State (NCT of Delhi) (2015) 10 SCC 1 : [2015] 8 SCR 422; Supreme Court Advocates on Recotd Association v. Union of India (2016) 5 SCC 1 : [2016] 11SCR419 - referred to. Boyd v. United States 116 US 616 (1886); Wolf v. Colorado 338 US 25 (1949); Griswold v. Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965); Jane Roe v. Henry Wade 410 US 113 (1973) - referred to.
3.1 Human dignity is an integral part of the Constitution. Reflections of dignity are found in the guarantee against arbitrariness (Article 14), the lamps of freedom (Article 19) and in the right to life and personal liberty (Article 21). Life is precious in itself. But life is worth living because of the freedoms which enable each individual to live life as it should be lived. The best decisions on how life should be lived are entrusted to the F individual. They are continuously shaped by the social milieu in which individuals exist. The duty of the state is to safeguard the ability to take decisions • the autonomy of the individual • and not to dictate those decisions. 'Lif'e' within the meaning of Article 21 is not confined to the integrity of the physical body. The right G comprehends one's being in its fullest sense. To live is to live with dignity. The draftsmei:i of the Constitution defined their vision of the society in which constitutional values would be attained by emphasising, among other freedoms, liberty and dignity. So fundamental is dignity that it permeates the core of the l"ights guaranteed to the individual by Part III. Dignity is the core which H unites the fundamental rights because the fundamental rights
JUSTICE KS PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
seek to achieve for each individual the dignity of existence. Privacy with its attendant values assures dignity to the individual and it is only when life can be enjoyed with dignity can liberty be of true substance. [Paras 96, 106 and 107](714-B; 718-B-E]
Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1965] 1 SCR 933; Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225 : [1973] Suppl. SCR 1; Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration (1980) 3 SCC 526 : [1980] 3 SCR 855; Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 1 SCC 608 : [1981] 2 SCR 516; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 161 : (1984] 2 SCR 67; Khedat Mazdoor Chetna Sangath v. State of MP (1994) 6 SCC 260; M Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006) 8 sec 212 : (2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336; Maharashtra University of Health Sciences v. Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal (2010) 3 SCC 786 : (201013 SCR 91; Dr Melunood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh (2012) 8 SCC 1 : [2012] 8 SCR 651; Shabnam v. Union of India (2015) 6 SCC 702; Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 761 : [2016] 4 SCR 638 - referred to.
3.2 The fundamental rights, are primordial rights which have traditionally been regarded as natural rights. In that character these rights are inseparable from human existence. They have been preserved by the Constitution, this being a recognition of their existence even prior to the constitutional document. [Para 108][719-F] Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (1967] 2 SCR 762; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) 1 Suppl. SCC 1; Minerva Mills Ltd v. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625 : (1981] l SCR 206 - relied upon. Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of Bombay [1955] 1 SCR 613 - referred to.
4.1 Privacy as intrinsic to freedoni and liberty: The submission that recognising the right to privacy is an exercise which would require a constitutional amendment arid cannot be a matter of judicial interpretation is not an acceptable doctrinal
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position. The argument assumes that the right to privacy is independent of the liberties guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. There lies the error. Privacy recognises the autonomy of the individual and the right of every person to make essential choices which affect the course of life. In doing so privacy . ' rc~ogniscs that living a life of dignity is essential for a human ht!ing to fulfil the liberties and freedoms which are the cornerstone .<?f° tlie Constitution. To recognise the value of privacy as a constitutional entitlement and interest is not to fashion a new funda.mental right by a process of amendment through judicial fiat 7 Neither are the judges nor is the process of judicial review C entrusted with the constitutional responsibility to amend the Constitution. [Para 113][726-D-F] Unnikrishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) 1 SCC
645 : [1993] 1 SCR 594 - relied on• .4.2 The Constitution was drafted and ado1Jted in a historical context. The vision of the founding fathers was enriched by the histories of suffering of those who suffered oppression and a violation ot' dignity both here and elsewhere. Yet, it would be difficult to dispute that many of the problems which contemporary · societie~' face would not have been present to the minds of the E most perspicacious draftsmen. No generation, including the present, can have a monopoly over solutions or the confidence in its ability to foresee the future. As society evolves, so must constitutional doctrine. The institutions which the Constitution has created must adapt flexibly to meet the challenges in a rapidly growing knowledge economy. Above all, constitutional F interpretation is but a process in achieving justice, liberty and · · dignity to every citizen. [Para 116][728-B-D]
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4.3 Undoubtedly, there have been aberrations. In the evolution of the doctrine in India, which places the dignity of the '• "fndiviclttal and freedoms and liberties at the forefront, there have G been few discordant notes. Two of them are· ADM .Jabalpur and Suresh Koushal. The judgments rendered by all the four judges constituting the majority in ADM .Jabalpur arc seriously flawed. Life and personal liberty are inalienable to human existence. These rights are primordial rights. They constitute rights under H natural law. Dignity is associated with libe.rty and freedom. No .
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
civilized State can contemplate an encroachment upon life and personal liberty without the authority oflaw. Neither life nor liberty are bounties conferred by the State nor does the Constitution create these rights. The right to life has existed even before the advent of the Constitution. In recognising the right, the Constitution does not become the sole repository of the right. It would be preposterous to suggest that a democratic Constitution without a Bill of Rights would leave individuals governed by the state without either the existence of the right' to live or the means of enforcement of the right. The right to life being inalienable to each individual, it existed prior to the Constitution and continued in force under Article 372 of the Constitution. The recognition of the right to life and personal liberty under the Constitution does not denude the existence of that right, apart from it nor can there be a fatuous assumption that in adopting the Constitution the people of India surrendered the most precious aspect of the human persona, namely, life, liberty and freedom to the state on whose mercy these rights would depe~d. Such a construct is contrary to the basic foundation of the rule of law which imposes restraints upon the powers vested in the. modern state when it deals with the liberties of the individual. ADM Jabalpur must be and is accordingly overruled . .£Paras '111, 119 and 121][728-E; 734-A-E; 735-B]
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ADM Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla (1976) 2 SCC 521 : [1976] Suppl. SCR 172; Union of India v. Bhanudas Krishna Gawde (1977) 1 SCC 834 : [1977] 2 SCR
719 - overruled. l R Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) 2 SCC l :
[2007] 1 SCR 706 - referred to. Korematsu v. United States 23 US 214 (1944) - referred
to. 4.~ The observation in Suresh Koushal that "a miniscule G fractiun 9f the. country's populatio~ cons.titutes lesbians~ gays, bisexuals or transgenders" is not a sustainable basis to deny the right- to privacy. Sexual orientation is an essential attribute of privacy. Discrimination against an individual on the basis of sexual· orientation is deeply offensive to the dignity and self-worth of
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A the individual. Equality demands that the sexual orientation of each individual in society must be protected on an even platform. The manner in which Koushal has dealt with the privacy - dignity based claims of LGBT persons is unsustainable. [Paras 126, 128][737-E, G; 738-A, G]
Suresh Kumar Koushal v. NAZ foundation (2014) 1 SCC 1 : [2013) 17 SCR 116 - disapproved.
5.1 India's commitments under International law: The recognition of privacy as a fundamental constitutional value is part of India's commitment to a global human rights regime. c Article 51 of the Constitution which "forms part of the Directive Principles requires the State to endeavour to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognises the right to privacy. Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) was D adopted on 16 December 1966 and came into effect on 23 March 1976. India ratified it on 11 December 1977. The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 which has been enacted by Parliament refers to the ICCPR as a human rights instrument. The ICCPR casts an obligation on states to respect, protect and fulfil its norms. E The duty of a State to respect mandates that it must not violate the right. The duty to protect mandates that the government must protect it against interference by private parties. [Paras 129, 130][739-B; 740-C] p
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684; Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241 referred to.
5.2 It is well settled that where there is a contradiction between international Jaw and a domestic statute, the Court would give effect to the latter. In the present case, there is no G contradiction between the international obligations which have been assumed by India and the Constitution. The Court will not readily presume any inconsistency. On the contrary, constitutional provisions must be read and interpreted in a manner which would . enhance their conformity with the global human rights regime. India is a responsible member of the international community
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and the Court must adopt an interpretation which abides by the international commitments made by the country particularly where its constitutional and statutory mandates indicate no deviation. [Para 133][741-G; 742-A-B]
Comparative Law 6. Each country is governed by its own constitutional and B legal structure. Constitutional structures have an abiding connection with the history, culture, political doctrine and values which a society considers as its founding principles. Foreign judgments must hence be read with circumspection ensuring that the text is not read isolated from its context. The decisions of c the European Court of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights are indicative of the manner in which the right to privacy has been construed in diverse jurisdictions based on the histories of the societies they govern and the challenges before them. The US Constitution does not contain an express right to privacy. D But American privacy jurisprudence reflects that it has been protected under several amendments of the US Constitution. In South Africa, the right to privacy has been enshrined in Section 14 of the Bill Rights in the 1996 Constitution. Although the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 does not E explicitly provide for a right to privacy, certain sections of the charter have been relied on by the Supreme Court of Canada to recognise a right to privacy. [Para 134)(742-C-G; 750-F; 770-C; 776-H; 777-A] · Peter Semayne v. Richand Gresham 11 ER 194; Prince Albert v. Strange (1849) 41 ER 1171; Kaye v. Robertson (1991] FSR 62; R v. Director of Seriou.~ Fraud Office, ex parte Smith (1993] AC 1; Wainwright v. Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406; Douglas v. Hello Ltd. [2001] QB 967; Campbell v. MGN (2004] 2 AC 457; A v. B Inc (2003] QB 195; Douglas v. Hello ltd [2006] QB 125; Associated Newspapers Limited v. His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales-[2006] EWCA Civ 1776; Murray v. Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2008] 3 WLR 1360; R v. The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2011] UKSC 21; JS v. News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC
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26; Boyd v. United States 116 US 616 (1886); Meyer v. Nebraska 262 US 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Siste1:5 (268) US SlO (192S); Olmstead v. United States 277 US 438 (1928); Griswold v. Connecticut 381 US 479 (196S); Katz v. United States 389 US 347 (1967); Stanlev v. Georgia 394 US SS7 (1969); Eisenstadt v. Baird 40S US 438 (1972); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton 413 US 49 (1973); Roe I'. Wade 410 US 113 (1973); United States v. Miller42S US 43S (1976); Carey v. Population Services International 431 US 678 (1977); Smilh v. Maryland 442 US 73S (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Casey SOS US 833 (1992); Minnesota v. Carter S2S US 83 (1998); Minnesota v. Olson 49S US 91 (1990); Ky/lo v. United States S33 US 27 (2001); Lawrence 1-: Texas S39 US SS8 (2003); Bowers v. Hardwick 478 US 186 (1986); NASA v. Nelson S62 US 134 (2011); Whalen v. Roe429 US S89 (1977); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services 433 US 42S (1977); United States v. Jones S6S US 400. (2012); Florida v. Jardines S69 US 1 (2013); Riley v. California S73 US (2014); Obergefell v. Hodges S76 US (2015); National Media Ltd v. Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (A); Bernstein v. Bester and Others 1996 (2) SA 7S1 (CC); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equali(v v. Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC); Investigating Directorate: Serious Offences v. Hyundai Motor Distributors Ltd 2001 (1) SA 54S (CC); Minister of Home Afj'ai1:5 and Another v. Fourie and Another 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC); NM and Others v. Smith and Others 2007 (S) SA 2SO (CC); United States v. Miller42S US 43S (1976); Sand Marper v. United Kingdom [2008) ECHR 1S81; Escher et al v. Brazil Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 200; Hunter v. Southam Inc [1984] 2 SCR 145; R v. .Plant [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281; Her Majesty, The Queen v. Walter Tessling (2004) SCC 67; R v. Spencer (2014) SCC 43 - referred to.
7. The fundamental notions of privacy have been depicted in a scmin.al article publish1;d in 2017 titled "A Typology of
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
privacy" published in the University of' Pennsylvania Journal of International law. The articll:' contained diagrammatical representation presenting two primary axes which emphasised two aspects of' freedom: the freedom to be let alone and the freedom for self-development. According to the diagram, the nine primary types of privacy are (i) bodily privacy which reflects the privacy of'the physical body. Implicit in this is the negative freedom of being able to prevent others from violating one's body or from restraining the freedom of bodily movement; (ii) spatial privacy which is reflected in the privacy of a private space through which access of others can be restricted to the space; intimate relations and family life are an apt illustration of spatial privacy; (iii) communicational privacy which is reflected in enabling an individual to restrict access to communications or control the use of information which is communicated to third parties; (iv) proprietary privacy which is reflected by the interest of a person in utilising property as a means to shield facts, things 01· information from others; (v) intellectual privacy whieh is reflected as an individual interest in the privacy of thought and mind and the development of ·opinions and beliefs; (vi) decisional privacy reflected by an ability to make intimate decisions primarily . consisting one's sexual or procreative nature and decisions in respect of intimate relations; (vii) associational privacy which is reflected in the ability of the individual to choose who she wishes to interact with; (viii) behavioural privacy which recognises the privacy interests of a person -even while conducting publicly visible activities. Behavioural privacy postulates that even when access is granted to others, the individual is entitled to control the extent of access and preserve to herself a measure of freedom from unwanted intrusion; and (ix) informational privacy which reflects an interest in p1·eventing information about the self from being disseminated and controlling the extent of access to information. [Para 142][799-G; 800-A, E-G; 801-A-C]
8.1 Constituent Assembly and privacy: limits of originalist interpretation: There was a debate during the course of the drafting of the Constitution on the proposal to guarantee to every citizen the right to secrecy of correspondence in clause 9(d) and the protection to be secure against unreasonable searches and
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seizures in their persons houses, papers and assets. The debates of the Constituent Assembly indicate that the proposed inclusion (which was eventually dropped) was in two specific areas namely correspondence and searches and seizures. From this, it cannot be concluded that the Constituent Assembly had expressly resolved to reject the notion of the right to privacy as an integral element of the liberty and freedoms guaranteed by the f~ndamental rights. [Para 148][801-C; 804-D, G]
8.2 The interpretation of the Constitution cannot be frozen by its original understanding. The Constitution has evolved and must continuously evolve to meet the aspirations and challenges C of the present and the future. Nor can judges foresee every challenge and contingency which may arise in the future. This is particularly of relevance in an age where technology reshapes our fundamental understanding of information, knowledge and human relationships that was unknown even in the recent past. D Hence as Judges interpreting the Constitution today, the Court must leave open the path for succeeding generations to meet the challenges to privacy that may be unknown today. [Para 149][805-D-E] 8.3. Even at the birth of the Constitution, the founding E fathers recognised in the Constituent Assembly that, for instance, the freedom of speech and expression would comprehend the freedom of the press. Hence the guarantee of free speech and expression has been interpreted to extend to the freedom of the press. Recognition of the freedom of the press does not create by judicial fiat, a new fundamental right but is an acknowledgment F of that, which lies embedded and without which the guarantee of free speech and expression would not be complete. Similarly, Article 21 has been interpreted to include a spectrum of entitlements such as a right to a clean environment, the right to public health, the right to know, the right to means of G communication and the right to education, besides a panoply of rights in the context of criminal law and procedure in matters such as handcuffing and speedy trial. [Para 150][806-D-F]
Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D Ramarathnam APO New Delhi [1967] 3 SCR 525; Suni( Batra v. Delhi Administration (1978) 4 SCC 494 : [1979] 1 SCR 392;
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
595.
Charles Sobraj v. Supdt. Central Jail (1978) 4 SCC 104 : [1979) 1 SCR 512; M H Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra (1978) 3 SCC 544 : [1979) 1 SCR 192; Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81 : [1979) 3 SCR 169; Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administ1'ation (1980) 3 SCC 526 : [1980] 3 SCR 855; Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra (1983) 2 SCC 96 : [1983) 2 SCR 337; A G of India v. Lachrna Devi (1989) Suppl. 1 SCC 264; Paramanand Katara v. Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 286 : [1989] 3 seR 997; Shantistar Builders v. N K Totame (1990) 1 sec 520; Virender Gaur v. State of Haryana (1995) 2 SCC 577 : [1994) 6 Suppl. SCR 78; Rudal Sah v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 sec 141 : [1983) 3 SCR 508; Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2013) 10 SCC 591 : [2013) 14 SCR 213; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Co1poration (1985) 3 SCC 545 : [1985) 2 Suppl. SeR 51; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Adminisiration (1978) 4 SCC 494 : [1979] 1 SCR 392 - affirmed.
8.4 Technology today is far different from what it was in the Ii ves of the generation which drafted the Constitution. Today's technology renders models of application of a few years ago obsolescent. Hence, it would be an injustice both to the draftsmen of the Constitution as well as to the document which they sanctified to constrict its interpretation to an originalist interpretation. [Para 151][808-F] 9. Is the statutory protection to privacy reason to deny a constitutional right?
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The purpose of infusing a right with a constitutional element is precisely to provide it a sense of immunity from popular opinion and, as its reflection, from legislative annulment. To negate a '.constitutional right on the ground that there is an available G statutory protection is to invert constitutional theory. As a matter of fact, legislative protection is in many cases, an acknowledgment and recognition of a constitutional right which needs to be effectuated and enforced through protective laws. But when a right is conferred with an entrenched constitutional status in Part H
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A III, it provides a touchstone on which the validity of executive decision making can be assessed and the validity of law can be determined by judicial review. [Para 153][809-E-F] 10. Not an elitist construct 10.1 The submission that the right to privacy is an elitist B construct which stands apar~ from the needs and aspirations of the large majority constituting the rest of society, is unsustainable. This submission betrays a misunderstanding of the constitutional position. Our Constitution places the individual at the forefront of its focus, guaranteeing civil and political rights in Part III and c embodying an aspiration for achieving socio-economic rights in Part IV. The refrain that the poor need no civil and pqlitical rigbts and are concerned only with economic well-being has been utilised though history to wreak the most egregious violations of human rights. Above all, it must be realised that it is the right to c1uestion, the right to scrutinize and the right to dissent which D enables an informed citizenry to scrutinize the actions of government. [Para 154][810-C-E] 10.2 Socio-economic entitlements must yield true benefits to those for whom they are intended. Conditions of freedom and a vibrant assertion of civil and political rights promote a constant E review of the justness of socio-economic programmes and of their effectiveness in addressing deprivation and want. Scrutiny of public affairs is founded upon the existence of freedom. Hence civil and political rights and socio-economic rights are complementary and not mutually exclusive. [Para 155][811-B-C]
10.3 Privacy is not a privilege for the few. Every individual in society irrespective of social class or economic status is entitled . to the intimacy and autonomy which privacy protects. It is privacy as an intrinsic and core feature of life and personal liberty which enables an individual to stand up against a programme of forced G sterilization. Then again, it is privacy which is a powerful guarantee if the State were to introduce compulsory drug trials of nonconsenting men or women. The sanctity of marriage, the liberty of procreation, the choice of a family life and the dignity of being are matters which concern every individual irrespective of social strata or economic well being. The pursuit of happiness is founded
JUSTICE KS PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
upon autonomy and dignity. Both are essential attributes of A privacy which makes no distinction between the birth marks of individuals. [Para 157][814-B-C] 11. Not just a common law right Once privacy is held to be an incident of the protection of life, personal liberty and of the liberties guaranteed by the B provisions of Part III of the Constitution, the submission that privacy is only a right at common law misses the wood for the trees. The central theme is that privacy is an intrinsic part of life, personal liberty and of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III which entitles it to protection as a core of constitutional doctrine. The c protection of privacy by the Constitution liberates it, as it were, from the uncertainties of statutory law which is subject to the range of legislative annulments open to a majoritarian government. Any abridgment must meet the requirements prescribed by Article 21, Article 19 or the relevant freedom. The Constitutional right is placed at a pedestal which embodies both D a negative and a positive freedom. The negative freedom protects the individual from unwanted intrusion. As a positive freedom, it obliges the State to adopt suitable measures for protecting individual privacy. [Para 158][814-D-G] Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Comparative Constitutional Law (2015) - referred to. 12.1 Substantive Due Process: The constitutional history surrounding the drafting of Article 21 contains an abundant retlection of a deliberate and studied decision of the Constituent Assembly to delete the expression 'due process of law' from the draft Constitution when the Constitution was adopted. In the Constituent Assembly, the Drafting Committee chaired by Dr B R Ambedkar had included the phrase but it came to be deleted after a careful evaluation of the vagaries of the decision making process in the US involving interpretation of the due process clause. Significantly, present to the mind of the framers of our Constitution was the invalidation of social welfare legislation in the US on the anvil of the due process clause on the ground that it violated the liberty of contract of men, women and children to offer themselves for work in a free market for labour. This model
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A evidently did not appeal to those who opposed the incorporation of a similar phrase into the Indian Constitution. Evidently 'due process' was substituted with the expression 'procedure established by law'. 'Liberty' was qualified by 'personal'. [Para 1631{815-C; 826-F-G; 827-A-B]
12.2 A person cannot be deprived of life or personal liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by law. Article 14, as a guarantee against arbitrariness, infuses the entirety of Article 21. The inter-relationship between 'the guarantee against arbitrariness and the protection of life and liberty operates in a multi-faceted plane. First, it ensures c personal that the procedure for deprivation must be fair, just and reasonable. Second, Article 14 impacts both the procedure and the expression "law". A law within the meaning of Article 21 must be consistent with the norms of fairness which originate in Article 14. As a matter of principle, once Article 14 has a connect with D Article 21, norms of fairness and reasonableness would apply not only to the procedure but to the law as well. Above all, it must be recognized that judicial review is a powerful guarantee against legislative encroachments on life and personal liberty. To cede this right would dilute the importance of the protection granted to life and personal liberty by the Constitution. Hence, E while judicial review in constitutional challenges to the validity of legislation is exercised with a conscious regard for the presumption of constitutionality and for the separation of po\Yers between the legislative, executive and judicial institutions, the constitutional power which is vested in the Court must be retained F as a vibrant means of protecting the lives and freedoms of individuals.· [Paras 163, 165 and 166][829-D-H; 830-A]
Mithu v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 277 : [1983] 2 SCR 690; State of Madras v. V.G. Row [1952] SCR 597; A K Roy I'. Union of India (1982) 1 sec 271 : [1982] 2 SCR 272; Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar (1984) 4 sec 90 : [19851 1 SCR 303; Mohd. Arif v. Supreme Court (2014) 9 SCC 737 : [2014] 11SCR1009; Rajbala v. State of Haryana (2016) 2 SCC 445 : [2015] 12 SCR 1106 - referred to.
12.3 The danger of construing this as an exercise of
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
'substantive dlfe process' is that it results in the incorporation of A a concept from the American Constitution which was consciously not accepted when the Constitution was framed. Moreover, even in the country -0f its origin, substantive due process has led to vagaries of judicial interpretation. [Para 167][830-B] 13.1 Essential nature of privacy
Privacy postulates the reservation of a private space for the individual, described as the right to be let alone. The concept is founded on the autonomy of the individual. The ability of an · individual to make choices lies at the core of the human pcrson~lity. The notion of privacy enables the individual to assert and cimtrol c the human clement which is inseparable from the personality of the individual. Without the ability to make choices, the inviolability of the personality would be in doubt. Recognizing a zone of privacy is but an acknowledgment that each individual must be entitled to chart and pursue the course of development of personality. Hence privacy is a postulate of human dignity itself. Privacy D protects the individual from the searching glare of publicity in·. matters which arc personal to his or her life. Privacy attaches to ·the person and not to the place where it is associated. Privacy constitutes the foundation of all liberty because it is in privacy that the individual can decide how liberty is best exercised. E' Individual dignity and privacy arc inextricably linked in a pattern woven out of a thread of diversity into the fabric of a plural culture. [Para 168][830-D-G; 831-B-C] 13.2 The Constitution does not contain a separate article telling us that privacy has been declared to be a fundamental right. Nor have we tagged the provisions of Part III with an alpha suffixed right of privacy: this is not an act of judicial redrafthrn. Dignity cannot exist without privacy. Both reside within the inalienable values of life, liberty and freedom which the . Constitution has recognised. Privacy is the ultimate expression of the sanctity of the individual. It is a constitutional value which straddles across the spectrum of fundamental rights and protects for the individual a zone of choice and self-determination. [Para 169][832-E-F]
14 Informational privacy
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14.1 The age of information has resulted in complex issues for informational privacy. These issues arise from the nature of information itself. Information has three facets: it is nonrivalrous, invisible and recombinant. Information is nonrivalrous in the sense that there can be simultaneous users of the good - use of a piece of information by one person does not make it less available to another. Secondly, invasions of data privacy are difficult to detect because they can be invisible. Information can be accessed, stored and disseminated without notice. Its ability to travel at the speed of light enhances the invisibility of access to data, "information collection can be the swiftest theft of all". c Thirdly, information is recombinant in the sense that data output can be used as an input to generate more data output. [Para 173][835-C-E] 14.2 Formulation of a regime for data protection is a complex exercise which needs to be undertaken by the State after a careful D balancing of the requirements of privacy coupled with other values which the protection of data sub-serves together with the legitimate concerns of the State. While it intervenes to protect legitimate state interests, the state must nevertheless put into place a robust regime that ensures the fulfilment of a three-fold requirement. These three requirements apply to all restraints E on privacy (not just informational privacy). They emanate from the procedural and content-based mandate of Article 21. The first requirement that there must be a law in existence to justify an encroachment on privacy is an express requirement of Article 21. For, no person can be deprived of his life or personal liberty F except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The existence of law is an essential requirement. Second, the requirement of a need, in terms of a legitimate state aim, ensures that the nature and content of the law which imposes the restriction falls within the zone of reasonableness mandated by Article 14, which is a guarantee against arbitrary state action. G The pursuit of a legitimate state aim ensures that the law does not suffer from manifest arbitrariness. Legitimacy, as a postulate, involves a value judgment. Judicial review does not re-appreciate or second guess the value judgment of the legislature but is for deciding whether the aim which is sought to be pursued suffers
JUSTICE KS PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
from palpable or manifest arbitrariness. The third requirement ensures that the means which arc adopted by the legislature are proportional to the object and needs sought to be fulfilled by the law. Proportionality is an essential facet of the guarantee against arbitrary state action because it erisures that the nature and quality of the encroachment on the right is not disproportionate to the purpose of the law. [Paras 179, 180][838·A, G; 839-A-E]
14.3 Apart from national security, the state may have justifiable reasons for the collection and storage of data. In a social welfare state, the government embarks upon programmes which provide benefits to impoverished and marginalised sections of society. There is a vital state interest in ensuring that scarce C public resources arc not dissipated by the diversion of resources to persons who do not <1ualify as recipients. Allocation of resources for human development is coupled with a legitimate concern that the utilisation of resources should not be siphoned away for extraneous purposes. Data mining with the object of D ensuring that resources are properly deployed to legitimate beneficiaries is· a valid ground for the state to insist on the collection of authentic data. But, the data which the state has collected has to be utilised for legitimate purposes of the state and ought not to be utilised unauthorizedly for extraneous purposes. This will ensure that the legitimate conccms of the E state are duly safeguarded while, at the same time, protecting privacy concerns. Prevention and investigation of crime and protection of the revenue arc among the legitimate aims of the state. Digital platforms arc a vital tool of ensuring good governance in a social welfare state. Information technology - legitimately F deployed is a powerful enabler in the spread of innovation and knowledge. [Para 181][839-F-H; 840-A-B]
M P Sharma v. Satish Cha11dra, District Magistrate, Delhi [1954] SCR 1077; Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1964] 1 SCR 332 - partly overruled.
a
Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (2002) 5 SA 721 (CC) - referred to. B. Shiva Rao, The Framing of India's Constitution, Indian Institute of Public Administration (1967), Vol.
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2, at page ·75; Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, Oxford University Press (2000), at page 180; Amartya Sen, "The Country of First Boys'', OxfordUniversity Press, Pg.80-81; Edwin Cameron and Max Taylor, "The Untapped Potential of the Mandela Constitution" ,Public Law (2017); Anna Jonsson Cornell, "Right to Privacy", Thomas Cooley, Treatise on the Law of Torts (1888), 2"d edition - referred to. PERR. F. NARIMAN, J.
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1. It is well settled that in the absence of any specific prohibition in municipal law, international law forms part oflndian law and consequently must be read into or as part of 'our fundamental rights. [Para 29] [866 • D-E] Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684; Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi & Ors. (1981) 1 SCC 608 : [1981] 2 SCR 516; Vishaka & 01:1'. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (1997) 6 SCC 241 : [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404; National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014) 5 SCC 438
- relied on.
Semayne's case 77 ER 194; Huckle v. Money 95 ER 768 (1763); Entick v. Carrington 95 ER 807 (1765); Da Costa v. Jones 98 ER 1331 (1778); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co. 285 U.S. 393 at 406 (1932) -
referred to 2. Given the fact that M.P. Sharma judgment dealt only with Article 20(3) and not with other fundamental rights; given the fact that the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights containing the right to privacy was not pointed out to the Court; given the fact that it was delivered in an era when fundamental rights had to be read disjunctively in watertight compartments; G and given the fact that Article 21 as we know it today only sprung into life in the post Mancka Gandhi era, this judgment is completely out of harm's way insofar as the grounding of the right to privacy in the fundamental rights chapter is concerned. The majority judgment of 4 Judges in Kharak Sillgh case struck down H the sub-clause (b) of Regulation 236 pertaining to domiciliary
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
visits at night. This Court said that "life" used in Article 21 must A mean something more than mere animal existence and "liberty" something more than mere freedom from physical restraint. The majority judgment held that Article 19(1) and Article 21 arc to be read separately, and so read held that Article 19(1) deals with particular species or attributes of personal liberty, whereas Article B 21 takes in and comprises the residue. If the passage in the judgment dealing with domiciliary visits at night and striking it down is contrasted with the later passage upholding the other clauses of Regulation .236, it becomes clear that it cannot be said with any degree of clarity that the majority judgment upholds the right to privacy as being ~ontained in the fundamental rights C chapter or otherwise. As the majority judgment contradicts itself on this vital aspect, it would be correct' to say that it cannot be given much value as a binding precedent. In any case, the majority · judgment is good law when it speaks of Article 21 being designed to assure the dignity of the individual as a most cherished human D value which ensures the means of full development and evolution of a human being. The majority- judgment is also correct in pointing out that Article 21 interdicts unauthorized intrusion into a person's home. Where the majorityjudgment goes wrong is in holding that fundamental rights arc in watertight compartments and in holding that the right of privacy is not a guaranteed right E under the Constitution. [Paras 36, 37 and 42][872-A-E; 875-BE]
A.K. Gopala11 1'. State of Madras [1950] SCR 88; Mohd. Arif v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India & Ors. (2014) 9 SCC 737 : [2014] 11SCR1009; R.C. Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248 : [1970] 3 SCR 530; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 : [1978] 2 SCR 621; Gobind v. State of Madhya Prade.~h, (1975) 2 sec 148 : [1975] 3 SCR 946; t,J.:tra Judl. Exec. Victim Families Association & Am: v. Union of India & Ors. (2017) 8 SCC 417; District Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad & Am: v. Canara Bank etc. (2005) 1 SCC 496 : [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 833 - relied · on. Jolly George Vargliese v. Bank of Cochin (1980) 2 SCC
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360 : [1980] 2 SCR 913; Charles Sobraj v. Delhi Administration (1978) 4 SCC 494 : [1979] 1 SCR 392; Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration (1980) 3 SCC 526 : [1980] 3 SCR 855 - referred to.
3.1 Statutory law can be made and also unmade by a simple B Parliamentary majority. In short, the ruling party can, at will, do away with any or all of the protections contained in a statute. Fundamental rights, on the other hand, are contained in the Constitution so that there would be rights that the citizens of this country may enjoy despite the governments that they may elect. This is all the more so when a particular fundamental right like C privacy of the individual is an "inalienable" right which inheres in the individual because he is a human being. The recognition of such right in the fundamental rights chapter of the Constitution is only a recognition that such right exists notwithstanding the shifting sands of majority governments. Statutes may protect D fundamental rights; they may also infringe them. In case any existing statute or any statute to be made in the future is an infringement of the inalienable right to privacy, this Court would then be required to test such statute against such fundamental right and if it is found that there is an infringement of such right, without any countervailing societal or public interest, it would be E the duty of this Court to declare such legislation to be void as offending the fundamental right to privacy. [Para 56][883-G-H; 884-A-C]
Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Kamataka (1995) J SCC 574 : [1994] 4 Suppl. SCR 477; Krishna Kumar Narula v. State of Jammu and Kashmir [1967] 3 SCR 50; Har Shankar v. The Dy. Excise and Taxation "co11um:
(1975) 1 SCC 737 : [1975] 3 SCR 254 - referred to.
Miller v. United States 425 US 435 (1976); Stanley v. Georgia 22 L.Ed. 2D 542; Katz v. United Stutes 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Minnesota v. Carte 525 U.S. 83, 119 S.Ct. 469 at 477; Kyllo v. United States 533 U.S. 27,
121 S. Ct. 2038 at 2043 (2001) - referred to. 3.2 The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test was laid down by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Though this test
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION. OF INDIA
has been applied by several subsequent decisions even in the A United States, the application of this test has been criticised. It is clear therefore, that in the country of its origin, this test though followed in certain subsequent judgments, has been the subject matter of criticism. There is no doubt that such a test has no plausible foundation in the text of Articles 14, 19, 20 or 21 of our Constitution. Also the test is circular in the sense that there is B no invasion of privacy unless the individual whose privacy is invaded had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Whether such individual will or will not have such an expectation ought to depend on what the position in law is. Also, this test is intrinsically linked with the test of voluntarily parting with information, inasmuch as C if information is voluntarily parted with, the person concerned can reasonably be said to have no expectation of any privacy interest. [Paras 57, 59][884-C-D; 886-A-B] 4. In our Constitution, it is not left to all the three organs of the State to interpret the Constitution. When a substantial question as to the interpretation of the Constitution arises, it is this Court and this Court alone under Article 145(3) that is to decide what the interpretation of the Constitution shall be, and for this purpose the Constitution entrusts this task to a minimum of 5 .Judges of this Court. [Para 66][892-B-C]
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AsJwk Tanwar & Am: v. State of H.P. & Ors. (2005) 2 SCC 104 : [2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 1065; l.R. Coelho (dead) by LRs v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. (2007) 2 SCC 1 : [2007] 1 SCR 706; M. Nagaraj & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 212 : [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336 - relied on.
Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay [1955] 1 SCR 613; Basheshar Nath v. CIT [1959] Suppl. 1 SCR 528; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545 : [1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 51 - referred to •.
5. "Liberty" in the Preamble to the Constitution, is said to be of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship. This. cardinal value can be found strewn all over the fundamental rights chapter. It can be found in Articles 19(1)(a), 20, 21, 25 and 26. As is well
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A known, this cardinal constitutional value has been borrowed from the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789. But most important of all is the cardinal value of fraternity which assures the dignity of the individual. The dignity of the individual encompasses the right of the individual to develop to the full extent of his potential. And this development can only be if an individual has autonomy over fundamental personal choices and control over dissemination of personal information which may be infringed through an unauthorised use of such information. It is clear that Article 21 more than any of the other Articles in the fundamental rights chapter, reflects each of these constitutional c values in full and is to be read in consonance with these values and with the international covenants. The fundamental right of' privacy, which has so many developing facets, can only be developed on a case to case basis. Depending upon the particular facet that is relied upon, either Article 21 by itself or in conjunction D with other fundamental rights would get attracted. But this is not to say that such a right is absolute. This right is subject to reasonable regulations made by the State to protect legitimate State interests or public interest. However, when it comes to restrictions on this right, the drill of various Articles to which the right relates must be scrupulously followed. For example, if the E restraint on privacy is over fundamental personal choices that an individual is to make, State action can be restrained under Article 21 read with Article 14 if it is arbitrary and unreasonable; and under Article 21 read with Article 19(1)(a) only if it relates to the subjects mentioned in Article 19(2) and the tests laid down by this Court for such legislation or subordinate legislation to pass muster under the said Article. Each of the tests evolved by this Court, qua legislation or executive action, under Article 21 read with Article 14; or Article 21 read with Article 19(1)(a) in the aforesaid examples must be met in order that State action tJass muster. In the ultimate analysis, the balancing act that is to be G carried out between individual, societal and State interests must be left to the training and expertise of the judicial mind. [Paras 84, 85 and 86][907-H; 908-A-B, E-F; 909-A-E] · R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6 SCC 632 : [1994] 4 Suppl. SCR 353; PUCL v. Union of India
JUSTICE KS PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
(1997) 1 sec 301 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 321; Sharda v. Dharmpal (2003) 4 SCC 493 : [2003] 3 SCR 106 - relied on. Munn i-: Illinois 94 U.S. 113 (1876); Wolf v. Colorado 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Olmstead v. United States 277 U.S. 438 at 474; Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 . (1965); Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1, 12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma 316 U.S. 535, 541-542, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113-1114, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942); Eisenstadt v. Baird 405 U.S. 438, 453-454, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 1038-1039, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944); Pierce 1'. Society <>f Siste1:s 268 u.s; 510, 535, 45 s.ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1010 (1925); United States v. Jones 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Whalen v. Roe 429 U.S. 589 at 598 and 599; NM & Ors. v. Smith & 01:s. 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC) - referred to.
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6. The Inaliena-ble nature of the Right to privacy. It is clear that the international covenants and declarations to which .India was a party, namely, the 1948 Declaration and the i966 Covenant both spoke of the right to life and liberty as being E "inalienable". Given the fact that ttiis has to be read as being part of Article 21, it is clear that Article 21 would, therefore, not be the sole repository of these human rights but only reflect the fact that they were "inalienable"; that they inhere in every human being by virtue of the person being a human being. Secondly, · F developments after this judgment have also made it clear that the majority judgments are no longer good law and that Khanna, J.'s dissent is the correct version of the law. Section 2(1)(d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 recognises that the right to life, liberty, equality and dignity referable to internatiomtl covenants and enforceable by Courts in India are "human rights"· G And international covenants expressly state that these rights are 'inalienable' as they inhere in persons because they are human beings. [Para 90, 92][916-G-H; 917-A-D] . Additional District Magistrate, Jabaipur v. S.S. Shukla
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(1976) 2 sec 521 : [1976] Suppl. SCR 172 overruled. Thalappalam Service Co-operative Bank Limited & Ors., v. State of Kera/a & Ors. (2013) 16 SCC 82 :
[2013] 14 SCR 475 - affirmed.
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7. The inalienable fundamental right to privacy resides in Article 21 and other fundamental freedoms contained in Part III of the Constitution of India. M.P. Sharma and the majority in Kharak Singh cases, to the extent that they indicate to the contrary, stand overruled. The later judgments of this Court recognizing privacy as a fundamental right do not need to be revisited. These cases are, therefore, sent back for adjudication on merits to the original Bench of 3 honourable .T udges of this Court in light of the judgment. [Para 94][920-D-F] M. P. Sharma and others v. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi, and others 1954 SCR 1077; Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. (1964) 1 SCR 332 - partly
overruled. PER CHELAMESWAR, .T. 1.1
The issue which fell for the consideration of this Court E in M.P. Sharma was - whether seizure of documents from the custody of a person accused of an offence would amount to "testimonial compulsion" prohibited under Article 20(3) of the Constitution. The expression "testimonial compulsion" is not found in in Article 20(3) of the Constitution. The mandate F contained in Article 20(3) came to be described as the rule against testimonial compulsion. The question whether the rule against "testimonial compulsion'', entrenched as a fundamental right under our Constitution create a right of privacy or whether the right of privacy is implied in any other fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 21, 14, 19 or 25 etc. was not examined G in M.P Sharma. The question whether a fundamental right of privacy is implied from these Articles, is therefore, res integra and M.P. Sharma is no authority on that aspect. [Paras 4-7][921D-E; 922-A; 923-F] M.P. Sharma & Others v. Satish Chandra &
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
Others [1954] SCR 1077 : AIR 1954 SC 300 distinguished.
1.2 The issue in Kharak Singh was the constitutionality of police regulations of UP which inter alia provided for 'surveillance' of certain categories of people by. various methods, such as, domiciliary visits at night', 'verification of movements and absences' etc. Two judgments (4:2) were delivered. Majority took the view that the impugned regulation insofar as it provided for 'domiciliary visits at night' is unconstitutional whereas the minority opined the impugned regulation is in its entirety unconstitutional. The Kharak Singh majority opined that the impugned regulation insofar as it provided for 'domiciliary visits' is plainly "violative of Article 21". Their Lordships relied upon the English Common Law maxim that "every man's house is his castle". In substance domiciliary visits violate liberty b'llaranteed under Article 21. The logical inconsistency in the judgment is that while on the one hand their Lordships opined that the maxim "every man's house is his castle" is a part of the liberty under Article 21, concluded on the other, that absence of a provision akin to the U.S. Fourth Amendment would negate the claim to the right of privacy. Both statements are logically inconsistent. When it came to the constitutionality of the other provisions impugned in Kharak Singh, their Lordships held that such· provisions are not violative of Article 21 since there is no right to privacy under our Constitution. In substance Kharak Singh declared that the expression "personal liberty" in Article 21 takes within its sweep a bundle of rights. Both the majority and minority are ad idem on that conclusion. The only point of divergence is that the minority opined that one of the rights in the bundle is the right of privacy. In the opinion of the minority the right to privacy is "an essential ingredient of personal liberty". Whereas the majority opined that "the right of privacy is not a guaranteed right under our Constitution", and therefore the same cannot be read into Article 21. The approach adopted by the majority i~ illogical and against settled principles of interpretation of even an ordinary statute; and wholly unwarranted in the context of constitutional interpretation. [Paras 8-12][924-A-B, E-G; 925-BD; 926-B-D]
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Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. & Others [1964) SCR
332 : AIR 1963 SC 1295 - referred to. Boyd v. United States 116 US 616; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) - referred to.
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1.3 Constitution is the fundamental law adumbrating the powers and duties of the various organs of the State and rights of the SUBJECTS and limitations thereon, of the State. The provisions purportedly conferring power on the State are in fact limitations on the State power to infringe on the liberty of SUBJECTS. In the context of the interpretation of a Constitution the intensity of analysis to ascertain the purpose is required to be more profound. [Para 12][926-F; 927-A-B]
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AK Gopalan v. State of Madras [1950) AIR 27: [1950) SCR 88; R.C. Cooper v. Union of India [1970) 3 SCR 530 : (1970) 1 SCC 248; Maneka Gandhi ~: Union of India [1978) 2 SCR 621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248; Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kera/a [1973) Suppl. SCR 1 : (1973) 4 SCC 225 - referred to.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 US 25; Semayne's case (1604) 5 Coke 91; The Melbourne Corporation v. The Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31 - referred to.
2.1 To embrace a rule that the text of the Constitution is the only material to be looked at to understand the purpose and scheme of the Constitution would not only be detrimental to F liberties of SUBJECTS but could also render the administration of the State unduly cumbersome. Fortunately, this Court did not adopt such a rule of interpretation barring exceptions like Gopalan and ADM Jabalpur. Else, this Court could not have found the freedom of press under Article 19(1)(a) and the other rights which were held to be flowing from the guarantee under Article G 21. This Court by an interpretive process read the right to earn a livelihood, the right to education, the right to speedy tria, the right to protect one's reputation and the right to havl! an environment free of pollution in the expression 'life' under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. Similarly, the right to go abroad H and the right tp speedy trial of criminal cases were read into the
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
expression liberty occurring under Article 21. This court found A delayed execution of capital punishment violated both the rights of life and 'liberty' guaranteed under Article 21 and also perceived reproductive rights and the individual's autonomy regarding sterilization to being inherent in the rights of life and liberty under Art. 21. None of the above-mentioned rights are to be found anywhere in the text of the Constitution. [Paras 13, 15 and 16][928- B . C-D; 929-D-E; 930-A-B]. Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Others etc. v. Union of India, [1962] SCR 842 : AIR 1962 SC 305; Ramesh Thappar \I. State of Madras [1950] SCR 594 : AIR 1950 SC 124; Mithu Etc. v. State of Punjab Etc. Etc. [1983] 2 SCR 690 : AIR 1983 SC 473; Olga Tellis JI. Bombay " · Municipal Corporatio [1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 51 : (1985) 3 SCC 545; Mohini Jain JI. State of Karnataka [1992] 3 SCR 658 : (1992) 3 SCC 666; Um1i Krishnan. J.P v. State of A.P. [1993] 1 SCR 594 : (1993) l SCC 645; Man.rnkhlai Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 705 : (1997) 7 SCC 622; State of Bihar v. Lal Krishna Advani [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 844 · , : (2003) 8 SCC 361; Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame (1990) 1 SCC 520; M.C. Mehfo :v. Kamal Nath (2000) 6 SCC 2013; Satwant Singh Sawhney \I. Asst. Passport Officer [1967] 3 SCR 525; Hussainara Khatoon \I. Home Secy, State of Biluu; [1979] 3 SCR 169 : (1980) 1 SCC 81; Vatheeswaran, T. V. v. State of T. N. [1983] 2 SCR 348 : (1983) 2 SCC 68; Devika Biswas v. Union of India (2016) 10 SCC 726 - relied on.
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ADM Jabalpur v. S.S. Shukla [1976] Suppl. SCR 172 : AIR 1976 SC 1207 - referred to. . .
2.2 Constitution is not merely a document signed by 284 members of the Constituent Assembly. It is a politically sacred instrument and cannot be seen as a document written in fok to replace one legal regime by another. It is a testament created for securing the goals professed in the Preamble. Part-III of the Constitution is incorporated to ensure achievement of the objects contained in the Preamble. [Para 18][931-A-C]
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ln re, The Kera/a Education Bill, 1957 [1959] SCR 995 : AIR 1958 SC 956; Bidi Supp(v Co. v. Union of India & Others, [1956] SCR 267 : AIR 1956 SC 479 - relied on.
2.3 The Constitution of India is one such piece of legislation. B Comparable are constitutions of United States of America, Canada and Australia to mention only some. All such Constitutions apart from containing provisions for administration of the State, contain provisions specifying or identifying certain rights of citizens and even some of the rights of non-citizens (both the classes of persons could be collectively referred to as SUBJECTS). Such C rights came to be described as "basic", "primordial", "inalienable" or "fundamental" rights. Such rights arc a protective wall against State's power to destroy the liberty of the SUBJECTS. Irrespective of the nomenclature adopted in different countries, such rights are believed in all democratic countries to D be rights which cannot be abridged or curtailed totally by ordinary legislation and unless it is established that it is so necessary to abridge or curtail those rights in the larger interest of' the society. Several Constitutions contain provisions stipulating various attendant conditions which any legislation intending to abridge such (fundamental) rights is required to comply with. [Para E 20][932-C-F] 2.4 The scheme of our Constitution is that the power of the State is divided along a vertical axis between the Union and the States and along the horizontal axis between the three great branches of governance, the legislative, the executive and the F judiciary. Such division of power is believed to be conducive to preserving the liberties of the people of India. The very purpose ·of creating a written Constitution is to secure justice, liberty and equality to the people of India. J<'ramers of the Constitution believed that certain freedoms are essential to enjoy the fruits of G liberty and that the State shall not be permitted to trample upon those freedoms except for achieving certain important and specified objectives in the larger interests of society. Therefore, the authority of the State for making a law inconsistent with fundamental rights, is cabined within constitutionally proclaimed limitations. [Para 22][933-D-E]
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JUSTICE KS PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v.. UNION OF . . . ' INDIA
3.1 The· expression 'liberty' ·is· c~pabte of taking within its A sweep not only the right to move freely, guaranteed·irnder Article 19(l)(d); but also each one of the other freedoms mentioned under Article 19(1). l•erson:il iibcrty takes withih its sweep not· only · the right not to be subjected to physical restraints, bnt also the freedom of thought, 'belief; emotion and sensation and a variety of other freedoms. The most basic understanding of the expression liberty is the free<Jom of an individual to do what he pleases. But the idea of liberty is more complex than that. [Para 27][935-D-E] 3.2 The question now arises as to what is the purpose the framers of the Constitution sought to achieve by specifically C enumerating some of the freedoms which otherwise would form part of the expression 'liberty'. The Constituent Assembly thought it fit that some aspects of liberty require a more emphatic declaration so as to restrict the authority of the State to abridge or curtail them. The need for such an emphatic declaration arose D from the history of this nation. The purpose sought to be achieved is two-fold. Firstly, to place the expression 'liberty' beyond the argumentative process of ascertaining the meaning of the expression liberty, and secondly, to restrict the authority of the State to abridge those enumerated freedoms only to achieve the purposes indicated in the corresponding clauses (2) to (6) of E Article 19. The authority of the State to deprive any person of the fundamental right of liberty is textually unlimited as the only rec1uircment to enable the State to achieve that result is to make a 'law'. When it comes to deprivation of the freedoms under Article 19(1), the requirement is: (a) that there must not only be F a law but such law must be tailored to achieve the purposes indicated in the corresponding sub-Article; and (b) to declare that the various facets of liberty enumerated in Article 19(1) are available only to the citizens of the country but not all SUBJECTS. The rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 are not confined only to citizens but available even to non-citizens aliens or G incorporated bodies even if they are incorporated in India etc. [Para 28][936-B-D; 937-A-C] Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta and Others [1955] SCR 1284
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: AIR 1955 SC 367; State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. l'. The Commercial Tax Officer and Others. [1964] SCR 9 : AIR 1963 SC 1811; lndo-Clzina Steam NaFigation Co. Ltd. I'. Jmjit Singh, Addiiional Collector of Customs, Calcutta and Others [1964] SCR 594 : AIR 1964 SC 1140; Charles Sobraj 11. Supdt. Central Jail, Tilwr, New Delhi, AIR 1978 SC 104; Louis De Raedt v. Union of India and Others [1991] 3 SCR 149 : (1991) 3 sec 554 - relied on Gobind v. State of M.P. [1975] 3 SCR 946 : (1975) 2
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sec 148 - referred to. Abraham Lincoln's statement 'Gettysburg Speech' referred to.
3.3 The question is whether SUBJECTS who are amenable to the laws of this country have a Fundamental Right of Privacy D against the State. The text of the Constitution is silent in this regard. Therefore, it is required to examine whether such a right is implied in any one or more of the Fundamental Rights in the text of the Constitution. The right to privacy consists of three facets i.e. repose, sanctuary and intimate decision. Each of these facets is so essential for the liberty of human beings that there is E no reason to doubt that the right to privacy is part of the liberty guaranteed by our Constitution. Concerns of privacy arise when the State seeks to intrude into the body of SUBJECTS. Corporeal punishments were not unknown to India, their abolition is of a recent vintage. Forced feeding of certain persons by the State F raises concerns of privacy. An individual's rights to refuse life prolonging medical treatment or terminate his life is another freedom which fall within the zone of the right of privacy. The issue is pending before this Court. But in various other jurisdictions, there is a huge debate on those issues though it is still a grey area. A woman's freedom of choice whether to bear a G child or abort her pregnancy are areas which fall in the realm of privacy. [Para 32, 33, 36 and 38][938-G; 939-A-B; 940-D; 941C-D] Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors v. State Of Kera/a & Others [1986] 3 SCR 518 : (1986) 3 SCC 615 - relied on.
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
Griswold v. Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965) 487; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Williams v. Fears, 119 U.S. 270 (1900) - referred to.
Gary Bostwick, 'A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision' (1976) 64 California, Law Review 1447 - referred to.
3.4 Similarly, the freedom to choose either to work or not and the freedom to choose the nature of the work are areas of private decision making process. The right to travel freely within the country or go abroad is an area falling within the right of c privacy. The text of our Constitution recognised the freedom to travel throughout the country under Article 19(1)(d). This Court has already recognised that such a right takes within its sweep the right to travel abroad. A person's freedom to choose the place of his residence once again is a part of his right of privacy recognised by the Constitution of India under Article 19(1)(e) D though the pre-dominant purpose of enumerating the above mentioned two freedoms in Article 19(1) is to disable both the federal and State Governments from creating barriers which are incompatible with the federal nature of our country and its Constitution. The choice of appearance and apparel are also E aspects of the right of privacy. The freedom of certain groups of SUBJECTS to determine their appearance and apparel (such as keeping long hair and wearing a turban) are protected not as a part of the right of privacy but as a part of their religious belief. Such a freedom need not necessarily be based on religious beliefs falling under Article 25. Informational traces are also an area which F is the subject matter of huge debate in various jurisdictions falling within the realm of the right of privacy, such data is as personal as that of the choice of appearance and apparel. Telephone tappings and internet hacking by State, of personal data is another area which falls within the realm of privacy. The instant reference d arises out of such an attempt by the Union of India to collect biometric data regarding all the residents of this country. The abovementioned are some of the areas where some interest of privacy exists. The examples given above indicate to some extent the nature and scope of the right of privacy. Freedom of social and
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political association is guaranteed to citizens under Article 19(1)(c). Pers~nal association is still a doubtful area. The decision · ·making pr:ocess· regarding the freedom of association, freedoms ·of travel and re~idence are'purely private and fall within the realm of the. right of· privacy. It is one of the most intimate decisions. [Paras 38, 39 and 40][941-E; 942-A-G; 943-A] 3.5 All libetal ·democracies . . believe that the State should not have unqualified authority to intrude into certain aspect's of human life and that the authority should be limited by parameters co.ns'titutionally fixed. Fundamental rights are the only constitutional firewall to prevent State's interference with those core freedoms constituting liberty of a human being. The right to privacy is certainly one of the core freedoms which is to be defended. It is part of liberty within the meaning of that expression in Article 21.[Para 40][943-B-C]
4.1 It goes without saying that no legal right can be D absolute. Every right has limitations. Therefore, even a 'fundamental right to privacy has limitations. The limitations are to be identified on case to case basis depending upon the nature of the privacy interest claimed. There are different standards of review to test infractions of fundamental right~. While the concept E of reasonableness overarches Part III, it operates differently across Articles (even if only slightly differently across some of them). [Para 42][943-D-E] 4.2 The options canvassed for limiting the right to privacy inelude : (i) Article 14 type reasonableness enquiry; (ii) limitation F as per the express provisions of' Article 19; (iii) a just, fair and reasonable basis (that is, substantive due process) for limitation per Article 21; and (iv) a just, fair and reasonable standard per Article 21 plus the amorphous standard of 'compelling state interest'. The last of these four options is the highest standard of scrutiny that a court can adopt. It is from this menu that a standard G of review for limiting the right of privacy needs to be chosen. At the very outset, if a privacy claim specifically flows only from one of the expressly enumerated provisions under Article 19, then the standard of review would be as expressly provided under Article 19. However, the possibility of a privacy claim being H entirely traceable to rights other than Art. 21 is bleak. Without
JUSTICE KS PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
discounting that possibility, it needs to be noted that Art. 21 is , A the bedrock of the privacy guarantee. If the spirit of liberty permeates every claim of privacy, it is difficult if not impossible to imagine that any stand:ird <if limitation, oth~r than the one under Article 21 applies. For this reason, the available options is restricted in this judgment to the latter two from the above B described four. [Paras 43, 44][[943-F-G; 944-A-C] 4.3 The just, fair and reasonable standard of review under Article 21 needs no elaboration. It has also most commonly been used in cases dealin'g with a privacy claim hitherto. Gobi11d resorted to the compelling state interest standard in addition to the Article 21 reasonableness enquiry. l!'rom the United States C where the terminology of 'compelling state interest' originated, a strict standard of scrutiny comprises two things- a 'compelling state interest' and a requirement of 'narrow tailoring' (narrow tailoring means that the law must be narrowly framed to achieve the objective). As a term, compelling state interest .docs not have D definite contours in the US. Hence, ~t is critical that this standard be adopted with some clarity as to whe11 a11dbi what types ofprivacy claims it is to be used. Only in privacy claims which deserve the strictest scrutiny is the standard of compelling State interest to be used. As for others, the just, fair and reasonable standard under Article 21 will apply. When the compelling State interest standard E is to be employed must depend upon the context of concrete cases. [Para 45][944-D-F]
T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah AIR 1983 AP 356; Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar Clwdha [1985] 1 SCR 303 : AIR 1984 SC 1562; E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1974) 2 SCR 348 : AIR 1974 SC 555; District Registrar & Collector, Hyderabad v. Canara Bank [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 833 : AIR 2005 SC 186; State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti. Lal Shah [2008) 12 SCR 1083 : (2008) 13 SCC 5 - referred to.
United States v. Carotene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938) - referred to.
Chapter 15.11 of the American Constitutional Law by Laurence H. · Tribe - 2nd Edition - referred to.
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PER S. A. BOBDE, J.
1. .Effect of M.P. Sharma and_ Kharak Singh: The question whether Article 21 encompasses a fundamental right to privacy did not fall for consideration before the 8 Judgi.;s in the M.P. Sharma Court. Rather the question was whether an improper B search and seizure operation undertaken against a company and its directors would violate the constitutional bar against testimonial compulsion contained in Article 20(3) of the Constitution. Neither the majority Kharak Singh furnish a basis for the proposition that no constitutional right to privacy exists. Therefore, nothing in M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh supported c the conclusion that there is no fundamental right to privacy in our Constitution. [Paras 4, 5, 6 and 9][946-D-E; 947-A; 948-C-
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M P Sharma v. Satish Chandra 1954 SCR 1077; Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1963 SC 1295 : [1964] SCR 332 - partly overruled. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [1978] 2 SCR 621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248; AK Gopalan v. State of Madras 1950 AIR 27 : [1950] SCR 88 - referred to.
Semayne'.1· case (1604) 5 Coke 91 - referred to.
2. The Form of the Privacy Right: Privacy has the nature , of being both a common law right as well as a fundamental right. Its content, in both forms, is identical. All that differs is· the incidei1ce of burden and the forum for enforcement for each form. F It is perfectly possible for an interest to simultaneously be recognized as a common law right and a fundamental right. Where lite interference with a recognized interest is by the state or any other like entity recognized by Article 12, a claim for the violation of a fundamental right would lie. Where the au.thor of an identical interference is a non-state actor, an action at c_ommon law would G lie in an ordinary court. [Paras 11, 17, 18][948-F][952-C-E]
Kesavananda Bharati 11. State of Kera/a [1973] Suppl. SCR 1 : (1973) 4 SCC 225 ,... relied on.
Mmtin Loughlin, The Foundations of Public Law 34446 (2010) - referred to.
JUSTICE KS PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
3. The Content of the Right of Privacy: 3.1 Every individual is entitled to perform his actions in private. In other words, she is entitled to be in a state of repose and to work without being disturbed, or otherwise observed or spied upon. The entitlement to such a condition is not confined only to intimate spaces such as the bedroom or the washroom -but goes with a person wherever he is, even in a public place. Privacy has a deep affinity with seclusion (of our physical persons and things) as well as such ideas as repose, solitude, confidentiality and secrecy (in our communications), and intimacy. But this ii; not to suggest that solitude is always essential to privacy. It is in this sense of an individual's liberty to do things privately that a group of individuals, however large, is entitled to seclude itself from others and be private. In fact, a conglomeration of individuals in a space to which the rights of admission are reserved - as in a hotel or a cinema hall -must be regarded as private. Nor is the right to privacy lost when a person moves about in public. The law requires a specific authorization for search of a person even where there is suspicion. Privacy must also mean the effective g\1arantce of a zone of internal freedom in which to think. The disconcerting effect of having another peer over one's shoulder while reading or writing explains why individuals would choose to retain their privacy even in public. n is important to be able to keep one's work without publishing it in a condition which may be described as private. The vigour and vitality of the various expressive freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution depends on the existence of a corresponding guarantee of cognitive freedom. [Paras 19, 22)[952-E; 954-A-E] People's Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India [2005] 1 SCR 494 : (2005) 2 SCC 436; Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India [2012] 2 SCR 715 : (2012) 6 SCC 1; District Registrar and Collector i< Canara Bank [2004] 5 Suppl. - SCR 833 : (2005) l SCC 496 - affirmed.
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3.2 It is not possible to truncate or isolate the basic freedom to do an activity in seclusion from the freedom to do the activity itself. The right to claim a basic condition like privacy in which
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A guaranteed fundamental rights can be exercised must itself be regarded as a fundamental right. Privacy, thus, constitutes the basic, irreducible condition necessary for the exercise of 'personal liberty' and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. It is the inarticulate major premise in Part III of the Constitution. [Para B 25]
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James 5:16 The Bible; Black's Law Dictionary (Bryan Garne1; ed.) 3783 (2004); Samuel D. ITT1rren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890); Kautilya 's Arthashastra189-90 (R. Shamasastri, trans., 1915), AA Maududi, Human Rights in Islam 27 (1982); Thessalonians 4:11 The Bible - referred to. 4. Privacy's Connection to Dignity and Liberty:
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4.1 The first ~nd natural home for, a right of privacy is in Article 21 at the very heart of 'personal liberty' and life itself. Liberty and privacy are integrally connected in a way that privacy is often the basic condition necessary for exercise of the right of personal l.iberty. There are ·innumerable activities Which are virtually incapable of being performed at all and in many cases with dignity unless an individual is left alone or is otherwise empowered to ensure his or her privacy. Birth and death are events when privacy is required for ensuring dignity amongst all civilized people. Privacy is thus one of those rights "instrumentally required if one is to enjoy" rights specified and enumerated in the constitutional text. [Para 26, 28][955-E; 957-B-C] Seminal On Liberty (1859); John Stuart Mill, On Liberty And Other Essays 15-16 (Stefan Collini ed., 1989) (1859); Laurence H. Tribe and Michael C. Dorf, Levels Of Generality In The Definition Of Rights, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1057 (1990) at 1068 - referred tQ.
4.2 Privacy is necessary in both its mental and physical aspects as an enabler of guaranteed freedoms. It is difficult to see how dignity - whose constitutional significance is acknowledged both by the Preamble and by this Court in its exposition of Article 21, among other rights, can be assured to H the individual without privacy. Both dignity and privacy arc
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) ·v. UNION·OF INDIA
intimately intertwined and are nutural conditions for the birth and death of individuals, and for many significant events in life between these events. Necessarily, ~hen, the right of' pl'ivacy is an integral part of both 'life' and 'personal liberty' under Article 21, and is intended to enable the rights bearer to develop her potential to the fullest extent made possible only 'in consonance with the constitutional values expressed in the Preamble as well as across Part III. [Paras 29, 30][958-F-H; 959-A]
Sunil Batra (!) v. Delhi Administration [1979] l SCR 392 : (1978) 4 SCC 494; Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi [1981] 2 SCR 516 : (1981) 1 SCC 608 - referred to.
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Munn v. Illinois, (1877) 94 US 113 (Per Field, J.) referred to.
5. Privacy as a Travelling Right 5.1 Freedom of speech and expression is always dependent D on the capacity to think, read and write in private and is often exercised in a state ·of privacy, to the exclusion of those not intended- to be spoken to or communicated with. A peaceful . assembly requires the exclusion of elements who may not be peaceful or who may have a different agenda. The freedom to E associate must necessarily be the freedom to associate with those of one's choice and those with common objectives. The requirement of privacy in matters concerning residence and settlement is too \vell-known to rec1uire elaboration. Finally, it is not· possible to conceive of an individual being· able to practice a profession or carry on trade, business or occupation without the ·F right to privacy in practical terms and without the right and power . to keep others away from his work. Ex facie, privacy is essential · to the exercise of freedom of conscience and the right to profess, · practice and propagate religion vide Article 25. The further right of every religious denomin.ution to maintain institutions for G , religious and charitable purposes, to manage its own affairs and , to own and administer property acquired for such purpo~d vide · Article 26 also requires privacy, in the sense of non-interference from the state. Article 28(3) expressly recognizes the right of a student attending an educational institution recognized by the
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A state, to be left alone. Such a student cannot be compelled to take part in any religious instruction imparted in any such institution unless his guardian has consented to it. [Paras 31, 32][959-B-F] 5.2 The right of' privacy is also integral to the cultural and B educational rights whereby a group having a distinct language, script or culture shall have the right to conserve the same. It has also always been an integral part of the right to own property and has been treated as such in civil law as well as in criminal law vide all the offences and torts of trespass known to law. Privacy is the necessary condition precedent to the enjoyment of any of the C guarantees in Part III. As a result, when it is claimed by rights bearers before constitutional courts,· a right to privacy may be situated not only in Article 21, but also simultaneously in any of the other guarantees in Part III. In the current state of things, Articles 19(1), 20(3), 25, 28 and 29 are all rights helped up and D made meaningful by the exercise of privacy. This is not an exhaustive list. [Paras 33, 34][959-G-H; 960-A-B] 6. Judicial Enumeration of the Fundamental Right to Privacy
6.1 By the process of enumeration, constitutional courts merely give a name and specify the core of guarantees already present in the residue of constitutional liberty. Over time, the Supreme Court has been able to imply by its interpretative process, that several fundamental rights including the right to privacy emerge out of' expressly stated Fundamental Rights. Privacy is be a right or condition, "logically presupposed" by rights expressly recorded in the constitutional. text, if they are to make sense. As a result, privacy is more than merely a deriv~tive constitutional right. It is the necessary and unavoidable logical entailment of rights guaranteed in the text of the constitution. [Para 35][960-C; 961-E] 6.2 There is no warrant for the assumption or for the conclusion that the fundamental right to privacy is an absolute right which cannot be reasonably restricted given a sufficiently compelling state interest. [Para 38][962-D] Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P. [1993] 1 SCR 594 : (1993) 1 sec 645 - relied on.
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
Satwant Singh v. D. Ramarathnam A.P. 0., New Delhi [1967] 3 SCR 525; Gobind v. State of M.P.. (1975) 2 . SCC 148; Griswold v. Connecticut 381 US 479; Charles Sobhraj v. Supdt. (Central Jail) [1978] 4 SCR 104; MH Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra [1979] 1 SCR 192: (1978) 3 SCC 544; Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secy, State of Bihar [1979] 3 SCR 169: (1980) l SCC 81; Prem Shankar v. Delhi Administration [1980] 3 SCR 855 : (1980) 3 SCC 526; TV Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu execution [1983] 2 SCR 348 : (1983) 2 SCC 68; Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra [1983] 2 SCR 337 : (1983) 2 SCC 96; A.G. of India v. Lachrnadevi (1989) Suppl. 1 SCC 264; Paramananda Katra v. Union of India [1989] 3 SCR 997 : (1989) 4 SCC 286; Santistar Builder v. N.Kl. Totarne (1990) 1 sec 520 - affirmed.
"incipient rights" SALMOND, at p. 228 - referred to.
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7. The Test for Privacy: 7.1 To exercise one's right to privacy is to choose and specify on two levels. It is to ciioose which of the various activities that are taken in by the general residue of liberty available to her she would like to perform, and to specify whom to include in one's circle when performing them. It is also autonomy in the negative, and takes in the choice and specification of which activities not to perform and which persons to exclude from one's circle. Exercising privacy is the signaling of one's intent to these specified others - whether they are one's co-participants or simply one's audience - as well as to society at large, to claim and exercise the right. To check for the existence of an actionable claim to privacy, all that needs to be considered is if such an intent to choose and specify exists, whether directly in its manifestation in the rights bearer's actions,,or otherwise. [Para 43][963-F-H; 964-A]
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Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar [1956] SCR 756 - referred to. 7.2 Such a formulation would exclude three recurring red herrings in the Respondents' arguments. Firstly, it would not admit
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· example, persons aside. .to .converse at a, . " .taking. . one. or . more . . . . . ' whisper even in a public place would clearly signal a claim to privacy, just as broadcasting one's words by a loudspeaker would signal the opposite intent. Secondly, thi~ formulation would not B reduce privacy to solitude. Reserving the rights to admission at a large gathering place, such as a cinema hall or club, would signal a claim to privacy. Finally, neither would such a formulation mean that private information must be information that is inaccessible to all others. [Para 44][964-B-C] ~·
8. Standards of Review of Privacy Violations: There is no doubt that privacy is integral to the several fundamental rights recognized by Part III of the Constitution and must be regai·ded as a fundamental right itself. The relationship between the right of privacy and the particular fundamental right (or rights) involved would depend on the ·action iritcrdicted by a particular law. At a D minimum, since privacy is ahvay.s integrated with personal liberty, the constitutionality of the,law which is .alleged to have invaded into a rights bearer's privacy must be tested by the same standards by which a law which invades personal liberty under Article 21 is liable to be tested. Once it is established that privacy imbues every constitutional freedom with its efficacy and that it E can be located in each of them, it must follow that interference with it by the state must be tested against whichever one or more Part III guarantees whose enjoyment is curtailed. As a result, privacy violations will usually have to answer to tests in addition to the one applicable to Article 21. [Paras 45, 46][964-D-G]
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R. C. Cooper v. U1;io11 4 ln'dia [i970] 3' SCR 530 : (1970) 1 SCC'248 - relied on. · · Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation [1985] 2 Supp.I. SCR 51 : (1985) 3 SCC 545; Paramanand Katara. v. Union of India [1989] 3 SCR 997; Gobind v. State of M.P. [1975) 3 SCR 946 : (1975) 2 SCC 148 - referred to. PJ Fitzgerald, Salmond on .Jurisprudence 217 (twelfth edition, 1966); Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law 88 (1921) - referred to.
. JUSTitE K. s PUrtASWAMY (RETO.) v. UNION OF INDIA '
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, , , ~ J ..T~~. Jp_i;?,r.por:i~~!Jn _pf. exp.ressio~ ,.''.Dignity of the iudivid11ar• in the Preamble· was aimed essentially to show explicit : repudiation of what people of this Country had inherited from the ·past. Dignitfof"tbe individual ·was, therefore, ·always considered :"the-·priine constituent'nflhe fraternity; which 'assureil the dignity B . ·to every i'ndlvidnal •. Both expressions: are Interdependent ·and intertwined, Thus; U~ity and integrity Qf.the Nation·cannot survive . ; .unless the dignity of every individual citizen is guaranteed. The exprcssions.."/iberty", "equality" and "fraternity'? i.ncprporated . in the .Preambie ;ire n~t !\~par;ite '.entitie~. '.fh~y .~ave to b~ rt;ad in juxtaposition ,\,bil~· dealing ·•with 'the right~ of the citizens. They, C ·in fact, furn\ a unfon. If these expressions are divorced from each other, it will defeat the very purpose of democracy. In other words, liberty cannot· be' divorced· from equality ~o ·also equality cannot be divorced from liberty•and 'nor can liberty and equality be divorced from fraternity. The meaning assigned. to these D expressions. has to be given.due wcightage while interpreting Articles of Part III of the Constitution. It is, therefore, the duty of the Courts and especially this Court as. sentinel on the q11i vive to strike a balance between the changing needs of the Society and the protection of the rights of the citizens as and when the issue relating to the infringement of the rights of the citizen comes E up for consideration. Such a balance can be achieved only through securing and protecting liberty, equality and fraternity with social and political justice to all the citizens under rule of law. [Paras 8· 13][966-G-H; 967-A-E] S.S. Bqla & Ors. v. B.D. Sardana & Ors. [1997] 2
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Suppl. _SCR 507 : (1997) 8 SCC 522 - affirmed.
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2. Our Constitution has recognized certain existing cherished rights of an individual. These rights arc incorporate\! in different Articles of Part III of the Constitution under the heading-Fundamental Rights. In so doing, some rights were incorporated and those, which were not incorporated, were read in Part III by process of judicial interpretation depending upon the nature of right asserted by the citizens on case-to-case basis. It was not possible for the framers of the Constitution to incorporate each and every right be that a natural or common law
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A right of an individual in Part III of the Constitution. [Paras· 14, 15][967-F-H] 3. The Court should always make attempt to expand the reach and ambit of the fundamental rights rather than to attenuate their meaning and the content by process of judicial construction. B [Para 20][968-H] Rustom Cava.1jee Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248 : [1970] 3 SCR 530; His Holiness
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Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala & Anr. [1973] Suppl. SCR 1 : (1973) 4 sec 225 -
affirmed.
4. It is true that while interpreting our laws, the English decisions do guide in reaching to a particular conclusion arising for consideration. However, in the last seven decades, this Court has interpreted our Constitution keeping in view the socio, D economic and political conditions of the Indian Society, felt rieed of, We, the People of this Country and the Country in general in comparison to the conditions prevailing in other Countries. [Paras 22, 23][969-D-F]
Hind Overseas (P) Ltd. vs. Raghunath Prasad Jhunjhunwala & Anr. [1976] 2 SCR 226 : (1976) 3
sec 259 - affirmed. 5. "Right to privacy of any individual" is essentially a natural right, which inheres in every human being by birth. Such right remains with the human being till he/she breathes last. It is F indeed inseparable and inalienable from human being. One cannot conceive an individual enjoying meaningful life with dignity without such right. Indeed, it is one of those cherished rights, which every civilized society governed by rule of law always recognizes in every human being and is under obligation to recognize such rights in order to maintain and preserve the dignity G of an individual regardless of gender, race, religion, caste and creed. It is, of course, subject to imposing certain reasonable restrictions keeping in view the social, moral and compelling public interest, which the State is entitled to impose by law. [Paras 25, 26][969-H; 970-A-C]
•
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
6. "Right to privacy" is not defined in law· except in the A · dictionaries. The Courts, however, by process of judicial interpretation, .has assigned meaning to this right in the· context of specific issues involved on case-to-case basis. The most popular meaning of "right to privacy" is - "the right to be let alone". "Right to privacy" is a part of fundamental right of a citizen B guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. However, it is not an absolute right but is subject to certain reasonable restrictions, which the State is entitled to impose on the basis of social, moral and compelling public interest in accordance with law. [Paras 27, 28, 35][970-C-D] Gobind v. State of Ma.dhya Pradesh & Anr. [1975) 3 SCR 946 : (1975) 2 SCC 148; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Anr. [1978) 2 SCR 621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248; People'.s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India & Anr. [1996) 10 Suppl. SCR 321 : (1997) 1 SCC 301; Mr. "X" v. Hospital 'Z' [1998) 1 Suppl. SCR 723 : (1998) 8 SCC 296; District Registrar & Collector. Hyderabad & Am: v. Canara Bank & Ors. [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 833 : (2005) 1 SCC 496; Thalappalam Service Coop. Bank Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Kera/a & 01:1·. [2013) 14 SCR 475 : (2013) 16 SCC 82 - affirmed.
7. The submission that the law laid down by this Court in some earlier decided cases though not referred for consideration be also overruled while answering the questions referred to this Bench is not entertained. It is well settled that the reference Court cannot travel beyond the reference made and is c1infined to answer only those questions that are referred. As and when any of these questions arise in any case, the appropriate Bench will examine such questions on its merits in accordance with law. [Paras 39, 40, 41][972-E, G-H] Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Am: [1966] 3 SCR 744 - affirincd.
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M.P. Sharma and others v. Satisft Cha11dra, District Magistrate Delhi & Ors. [1954] SCR 1077 : AIR 1954 SC 300; Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [1964] SCR 332 : AIR 1963 SC 1295; A. K.Gopalan
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v, State of Madras [195q]. SCR 88: AJR.195Q SC ~7; Mohd Arif @ Ashfr1q v.. Registrar, Supreme <;.ourt of India [2014] 11 SCR 1009 : (2014) 9 SCC 737 referred to. PER SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
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1.1 Privacy is not just a common law right, but a fundamental right falling in Part III of the Constitution of India as privacy is a primal, natural right which is inherent to an individual. The importance of privacy may vary from person to person dependent on his/her approach fo society and his concern for being left alone or not. That some people do not attach importance to their privacy cannot be the basis for denying recognition to the right to privacy as a basic hu'nian right. [Paras 1, 4][973-C, G]
1.2 H is not India alone, but the world that recognises the right of privacy as a basic human right. The Universal Declaration· D of Human Rights to which India is a signatory, recognises privacy as an international human right. Privacy is an inherent right. It is thus not given, but already exists. It is about respecting an · individual and it is undesirable to ignore a person's wishes without a ~onwelling reason to do so. There is nothing wrong in individuals limiting access and their ability to shield from E unwanted access. This aspect of the right to privacy has assumed particular significance in this information age and in view of technological improvements. A person-hood· would be a protection of one's personality, individuality and dignity. However, no right is unbridled and so is it with privacy. We live in a society/ F community. Hence, restrictions arise from the interests of' the community, state and from those of others. [Paras 5, 10, 11][973H; 974-A, F-G; 975-A]
The History of Freedom and Other Essays (1907), p 587; The Right to Privacy 4 HLR 193; Daniel Solove, '10 Reasons Why Privacy Matters' published on January 20, 2014 - referred to. 2. PRIVACY & TECHNOLOGY 2.1 The access to information, which an individual may not want to give, needs the protection of privacy. The right to privacy
JUSTICE KS PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
is claimed qua the State and non-State actors. Recognition and enforcement of claims qua non-state actors may require legislative intervention by the State. [Para 12][975-B-C]
2.1.1 Privacy Concerns A'gairtst The State : The' growth and development of technology has crcatc<f new instruments for the possible invasion of privacy by the State, including through B surveillance, profiling and data collection. and processing .. Survcillancc is not ~cw, but.technology bas PCJ,"mittc!l surveillance. in ways that arc unimaginable. One tcclmiquc l:Jcing adopted by States is 'profiling'. The European Union Regulation.of 2016 on data privacy defines 'Profiling' as any form· of autom;itcd: : processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data C to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person's performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements. Such profiling can result in. discrimi~ation based D on religion, ethnicity and caste. However, 'profiling' can also be used to further public interest and for the benefit of nationa'l security. The security environment, not only in our country, but throughout the world makes the safety of pen;ons and thci State a · matter to be balanced against this right to privacy. [Para 13][975E D-F; 976-A-B]
Regulation (EU) 20161679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of' such data, and repcalirig Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) - referred to.
2.1.2 Privacy Concerns Against Non-State Actors : T.hc capacity of non-State actors to invade the home, and privacy has also been enhanced. Technological development has facilitated journalism that is mote intrusive than ever before. In this digital G age, individuals ·arc constantly generating valuable data whicl,i can be used by non"State actors to track tI:ieir moves, choices and preferences. Data is &ei,.crated ~ot just by activ,c sharing of information, but also passively, with every click on the 'world wide web'. As we move towards becoming a digital economy and H .. . , . -
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increase our reliance on internet based services, we arc creating deeper and dcepr digital footprints - passively and actively. Knowledge about a person gives a power over that person. The personal data collected is capable of effecting representations, influencing decision making processes and shaping behaviour. It can be used as a tool to exercise control over us like the 'big brother' State exercised. This can have a stultifying effect on the expression of dissent and difference of opinion, which no democracy can afford. Thus, there is an unprecedented need for regulation regarding the extent to which such information can be stored, processed and used by non-state actors. There is .also a need for protection of such information from the State. [Paras 16, 17, 19 and 20][976-B-D, G; 977-C-E]
State of West Bengal 11. Anwar Ali Sarkar 1952 AIR 75 : [1952] SCR 284; Kesavana11da Bllarati 11. State of Kentla [1973] Suppl. SCR 1 : (1973) 4 SCC 225 relied on. Michael L. Rustad, Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the right to be forgotten to enable transatlantic data flow, 28 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 349; https:// tee h crunch .co m/2015/03/03/in-t he-age- of· disintcrmediation-the-battle-is-all-for-the-customerinterfacc/ Tom Goodwin 'The Battle is for Customer Interface'; Dhananjay Keer, Dr.Ambedkar: Life and Mission, Bombay: Popular Prakashau, 1971 [1954], p.410.); Kadhim Shubber, Ulackberry gives Indian Government ability to intercept messages published by Wired on 11 July, 2013 http://www.wircd.eo.uk/ article/blackbcrry-iudia - referred to.
2.2 The Constitution was not drafted for a specific time period or for a certain generation. It was drafted to stand firm, for eternity. It sought to crate a Montes<1uian framework that G would endear in both war time and in peace time. The founders of the Constitution were aware of the fact that Constitution would need alteration to keep up with the trends of the age. This .was precisely the reason that an unrestricted amending power was sought to be incorporated in the text of the Constitution in Part H 20 under Article 368. Therefore, the theory of original intent itself
JUSTICE KS PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
supports the stand that the original intention of the makers of A the Constitution was to ensure that it does not get weighed down by the originalist interpretation but changes and evolves to suit the felt need of the times. [Para 29, 32 and 33][978-G; 979-D-F] 3. · Privacy is essential to liberty and dignity: Privacy is also the key to freedom of thought. A person has a right to think. The thoughts arc sometimes translated into speech but confined to the person to whom it. is made. Ji'or example, one may want to criticize someone but not share the criticism with the world. [Para 52][985-C; 986-G]
Geoffrey Robertson, QC and Andrew Nicol, QC, Media Law fifth edition p. 265; Campbell v. MGN Ltd. 2004 UKHL 22 - referred to.
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4. Privacy - Right To Control Information : An individual has a right to protect his reputation from being unfairly harmed and such protection of reputation needs to exist not only against D falsehood but also certain truths. It cannot be said that a more accurate judgment about people can be facilitated by knowing private details about their lives - people judge us badly, the~ judge us in haste, they judge out of context, they judge without hearing the whole story and they judge with hypocrisy. Privacy lets people protect themselves from these troublesome E judgments. There is no justification for making all truthful . information available to the public. The public does not have an interest in knowing all information that is true. [Paras 56, 57][986H; 988-B-D] The Second Circuit's decision in Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953) penned by Judge Jerome Frank defined the right to publicity as "the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture"; Mark P. McKennu, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 282 (2005); · William l. Pmsse1; Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960); Arthur R. Mille1; The University of Michigan Press - referred. to. 5. INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY: The European Union Regulation of 2016 has recognized what has been termed as 'the
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right to be forgotten'. This does not mean that all aspects of earlier existence are to be obliterated, as some may have a social ramification. If we were to recognize a similar right, it would only mean that an individual who is no longer desirous of his personal data ~o be processed or stored, should be able to remove it from the system where the personal data/ information is no longer necessary, relevant, or is incorrect and serves no legitimate interest. Such a right cannot be.exercised where the information/ data .i.<l necessary, for exercising the right of freedom of expression and information, for compliance with legal obligations, for the performance of a task carried out in public interest, on the grounds C · of public interest in the area of public health, for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes, or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims. Such justifications would be valid in all cases of breach of privacy, including breaches of data privacy. [Para 62, 69)[991-D-F]
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Patricia Scinclzez Abril, Blurred Boundaries: Social Media· Privacy and the Twenty-First-Century .Empfoyee, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 63, 69 (2012); Ravi Antani, THE RESISTANCE OF MEMORY; Michael L. Rustad, Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the right to be forgotten to enable transatlantic data flow, 28 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 349 - referred to. 6. Data Regulation: The State must ensure that information is not used without the consent of users and that it is used for the purpose and to the extent it was disclosed. Thus, for e.g. , if the posting on social media websites is meant only for a certain audience, which is possible as per t,ools available, then it cannot be said that all and sundry in ·public have a right to somehow access that information and make use· of it. [Para 70][992-B] 7. Test: Principle of Proportionality and Legitimacy: The right to privacy is not absolute. The right to privacy as falling in part III of the Constitution may, depending on its variable facts, vest in one part or the other; and would thus be subject to the restrictions of exercise of that particular fundamental right. National security would thus be an obvious restriction, so w~uld the prQvisos to different funda~cntal. rights, dependent on where
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
the right to privacy would arise. The Public interest element would A be another aspect. [Para '72][992-F:G] 8. Report of Group of Experts on Privacy: The concerns about privacy have been left unattended for quite some time and thus an infringement of the right of privacy cannot be left to be formulated by the legislature. It is a primal natural right which is B only being recognized as a fundamental right falling in part III of the Constitution of India.[Para 76][995-G-H] ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla [1976] Suppl. SCR 172: (1976) 2 sec 521 - overruled. l.R. Coelho v. The State of Tamil Na.du [2007] 1 SCR 706. c : (2007) 2 sec 1 - relied on.
Union of India v. Naveen Jindal [2004] 1 SCR 1038 : . (2004) 2 SCC 510; National Textile Workers Union v. P.R. Ramakrish11a11 [1983] 1 SCR 922 .: (1983) 1 SCC 228; Sureslz Kumar Kaushal v. Naz. Fmlndation . [2013] 17 SCR 116: (2014) 1 SCC 1 - referred .to .. Mosleyy. News Group Papers Ltd. (2008) EWHS 1777 (QB) - referred to. · Case Law Reference . PER DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, .T. · Para.3 [1954] SCR 1077 partly overruled [1964] 1 SCR 332 partly overruled Para3 [1950] SCR 88 referred to Para3 [1970] 3 SCR 530 referred to Para3 [1975] 3 SCR 946 referred to Para 3 referred to Para4 [1978] 2 SCR 621 Para4 p994] 4 Suppl. SCR 353 referred to [1973] 2 SCR 417 referred to Para 47 [1981] 2 SCR 311 referred to Para 51 referred to Para 52 (1991) 1 sec 57 Para 53 · [1992] 3 SCR 595 · referred to [1985] 2 SCR 287
referred to
[1998] 1 Suppl. SCR 723
referred to
D
Para 53 P'ara 56 H.
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[1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 321
referred to
Para 59
[2000] 2 SCR 761
referred to
Para 62
[2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 536
referred to
Para 62
(2003] 3 SCR 106
referred to
Para 63
[2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 833
referred to
Para 65
[2006] 9 Suppl. SCR 1
referred to
Para 67
(2007] 12 SCR 906
referred to
Para 67
[2007] 12 SCR 991
. referred to
Para 68
. [2008] 4 SCR 1020
referred to
Para 69
[2008] 12 SCR 1083
referred to
Para 70
(2009) 9 sec 1
referred to
Para 71
[2009] 12 SCR 861
referred to
Para 73
[2010] 5 SCR 381
referred to
Para 74
[2010] 9 SCR 457
referred to
Para 75
[2011] 6 SCR 403
referred to
Para 76
[2011] 8 SCR 725
referred to
Para 77
[2011] 10 SCR 781
referred to
Para 78
[2012] 4 SCR 971
referred to
Para 79
[2012] 11 SCR 1032
referred to
Para 80
(2013) 14 sec 643
referred to
Para 81
[2013] 14 SCR 475
referred to
Para 82
[2014] 9 SCR 965
referred to
Para 83
(2014) 5 sec 438
referred to
Para 84
[2015] 8 SCR 422
referred to
Para 85
[2016] 11 SCR 419
referred to
Para 86
[1965] 1 SCR 933
referred to
Para 94
[1973] Suppl. SCR 1
referred to
Para 95
[1980] 3 SCR 855
referred to
Para 97
[1981] 2 SCR 516
referred to
Para 98
[1984] 2 SCR 67
referred to
Para 99
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
(1994) 6 SC~ 260
referred to
Para 100.
[2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336
referred to
Para 101
[2010] 3 SCR 91
referred to
Para 102
[2012] 8 SCR 651
referred to
Para 103
(2015) 6 sec 102
referred to
Para 104
[2016] 4 SCR 638
referred to
Para 105
[1967] 2 SCR,762
relied on
Para 108
(1975) 1 Suppl. sec 1
relied on
Para 110
[1981] 1 SCR 206
relied on
Para 111
[1955] 1 SCR 613
referred to
Para 112
[1985] 2 Suppl. SCR51
referred to
Para 114
[1993] 1 SCR 594
relied on
Para 115
[1976] Suppl. SCR 172
overruled
Para 118
[1977] 2 SCR 719
overruled
Para 122
[2007] 1 S_CR 706
referred to
Para 122
[2013] 17 SCR 116
disapproved
Para 124
(1980) 2 sec 684
referred to
Para 131
(1997) 6 sec 241
referred to
Para 132
[1967) 3 SCR 525
affirmed
Para 150
(1979] 1 SCR 392
affirmed
Para 150
[1979] 1 SCR 512
affirmed
Para .150.
(1979] 1 SCR 192
affirmed
Para 150
[1979] 3 SCR 169
affirmed
Para 150
[1980] 3 SCR 855 ·
affirmed
Para 150
[1983] 2 SCR 337
affirmed
Para 150
(1989) 1 suppl. sec 264
affirmed
Para 150
[1989] 3 SCR 997
affirmed
Para 150
(1990) 1 sec 520
affirmed
Para 150
[1994] 6 Suppl. SCR 78
·affirmed
Para 150
[1983] 3 SCR 508
affirmed
Para 150
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[2013) 14 SCR 213
affirmed
Para 150
[1985) 2 Suppl. SCR 51
affirmed
Para 150
[1979) 1 SCR 392
affirmed
Para 163
[1983] 2 SCR 690
referred to
Para 164
[1982] 2 SCR 272
referred to
Para 164
[1985] 1 SCR 303
referred to
Para 164
[2014) 11 SCR 1009
referred to
Para 164
[2015) 12 SCR 1106
refc1·red to
Para 165
[1952] SCR 597
referred to
Para 165
,[1954] SCR 1077
partly overruled
Para 2
[1964] 1 SCR 332
partly overruled
Para3
[1970) 3 SCR 530
relied Oil
Para3
[1978] 2 SCR 621
relied Oil
Para3
[1'975) 3 SCR 946
relied Oil
Para 8
[1950) SCR 88
relied on
Para 21
[2014] 11 SCR 1009
relied on
Para 22
(1980) 2 sec 684
relied on
Para 29
[1981) 2 SCR 516
relied on
Para 29
[1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404
relied on
Para 29
(2014) 5 sec 438
relied on
Pam29
(2017) 8 sec 417
relied on
Para 31
[2003] 3 SCR 106
relied on
Para 34
[2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 833
relied on
[1980] 2 SCR 913
referred to
Para 34 Para 48
[1979) 1 SCR 392
referred to
Para 48
[1980] 3 SCR 855
referred to
Para 48
[1994] 4 Suppl. SCR 477
referred to
Para 54
[1967) 3 SCR 50
referred to
Para 54
[1975] 3 SCR 254
referred to
Para 54
PERR. F. NARIMAN, J.
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
[1955(1 SCR 613
referred to
Para 60
[1959] Suppl. 1 SCR 528
referred' to
Para 60
[1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 51
referred to
Para 60
[2004] 6 Suppl. SCR i065
relied on
Para 62
[2007] 1 SCR 706
relied on
. Para 63
[2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336
.relied on
Para 64
[1994] 4 Suppl. SCR 353
relied on
Para 74
[1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 321
relied on
Para 75
[2013] 14 SCR 475
affirmed
Para 88
[1976] Suppl . .SCR 172 ·
overruled
Para 91
/
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PER .J. CHELAMESWAR, .J. ,.. . . . [1954] SCR 1077 · distinguished '.
[1964] SCR 332 . (1950) AIR 27 [1970] 3 SCR 530 [1978] 'z SCR 621 [1973) Suppl. SCR 1 [1976) Suppl. SCR 172 [1962] ' . SCR . (1950] SCR 594 [1983] 2 SCR 690 [1985) 2 Suppl. SCR 51 [1992] 3 SCR 658 [1993] 1 SCR 594 [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 705 [:2003) 3 Suppl. SCR 844 (1990) 1 sec 520 (2000) 6 sec 2013 [1967] 3 SCR 525 [1979) 3 SCR 169 [1983] 2 SCR 348
Para4
referred to referred to referred to referred to referred ·to · referred to relied on
Para4 Para 9 Para 9 Para9 Para 12 Para 13 Para 13
relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on
·Para 13 ·Para 14 Para 15 Para 15 Para 15 Para 15 Para 15 Para 15 Para 15 Para 15 Para 15 Para 16
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AIR 19S3 AP 356
relied on referred to relied on referred to
Para 16 Para lS Para 20 Para 2S Para 2S Para 2S Para 2S Para 2S Para 31 Para 37 Para 40
[19S5] 1 SCR 303
referred fo
Para 40
[1974] 2 SCR 34S
referred to
Para 43
[2004] 5 Suppl. SCR S33
referred to
Para 45
[200S] 12 SCR 10S3
referred to
Para 45
[1954] SCR 1077
partly overruled
Para 1
[1964] SCR 332
partly overruled
Para 1
[1970] 3 SCR 530
relied on
Para7
[197SJ 2 SCR 621
referred to
Para7
[1950] SCR SS
referred to
Para 7
[19S5] 2 Suppl. SCR 51
referred to
Paras
[1989] 3 SCR 997
referred to
Paras
[1975] 3 SCR 946
referred to
Para 10
[1973] Suppl. SCR 1
relied on
Para 16
[2005] 1 SCR 494
affirmed
Para 16
[2012] 2 SCR 715
affirmed
Para 16
[2004] 5 Suppl. SCR S33
affirmed
Para 20
[1979] l SCR 392
referred to
Para 29
[1959] SCR 995 [1956] SCR 267 [1955] SCR 12S4
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[1964] SCR 9 [1964] SCR 594 AIR 197S SC 104 [1991] 3 SCR 149 [1975] 3 SCR 946 [1986] 3 SCR 51S
relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on
PER S.A. BOBDE, J,
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
[1981] 2 SCR 516
referred to
Para 29
[1993] 1 SCR 594
relied on
Para 35
[1967] 3 SCR 525
affirmed
Para 35
(1975) 2 sec 148
affirmed
Para 35
[1978] 4 SCR 104
affirmed
Para 35
[1979]1 SCR 192
aflirmed
Para 35
[1979] 3 SCR 169
affirmed
Para 35
[1980 ] 3 SCR 855
affirmed
Para 35
[1983] 2 SCR 348
affirmed
Para 35
[1983] 2 SCR 337
aflirmed·
Para 35
(1989) Supp. 1 sec 264
aflirmed
Para 35
[1989] 3 SCR 997
aflirmed
Para 35
(1990) 1 sec 520
affirmed
Para 35
[1956] SCR 756
referred to
Para 41
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. PER ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. [1954] SCR 1077
referred to
Para3
[1964] SCR 332
referred to
Para3
[1997] 2 Suppl. SCR 507
affirmed
Para 13
[1950] SCR 88
referred to
Para 17
[2014] 11 SCR 1009
referred to
Para 17
[1970] 3 SCR 530
affirmed
Para20
[1973] Suppl. SCR 1
affirnled
Para 20
[1976] 2 SCR 226
affirmed
Para 24
[1975] 3 SCR 946
aflirmed
Para 28
[1978] 2 SCR 621
affirmed
Para 29
[1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 321
affirmed
Para 29
[1998] 1 Suppl. SCR 723
affirmed
Para 29
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A . [2004) 5 Suppl. SCR 833
affirmed
Para 29
[2013) 14 SCR 475
affirmed
Para 29
[1966) 3 SCR 744
affirmed
Para 40
[1952) SCR 284
relied on
Para 34
[1973) Suppi. SCR 1
relied on
Para 35
[2004) 1 SCR 1038
referred to
Para 37
[1983) 1 SCR 922
referred to
Para 44
[2013) 17 SCR 116
referred to
Para 80
. [1976) Suppl. SCR 172
overruled
Para 82
[2007] 1 SCR 706
relied on
Para 82
PER SANJAY KISHAN' KAUL, J.
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CIVIL ORIGINAL AND CRIMINAL APPELLATE D JURISDICTION: W~it Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. WITH
T.C. (C) Nos. 151 and 152 of 2013, W.P. (C) Nos. 833, 829 and 932 of2013. Contempt Petition (C) No. 144 of20l4 in W.P.(C) No. 494 of2012, T.P. (C) Nos. 313 and 312 of2014, S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 2524 of 2014. W.P. (C) Nos. 37 and 220 of 20J 5, Contempt Petition (C) No. 674 of2015 in W.P.(C) No.829 of2013, T.P. (C) No. 921 of2015. Contempt Petition (C) No. 470 of 2015 in W.P. (C) No.494 of 2012, Contempt Petition (C) No. 444 of 2016 in W.P. (C) No. 494 of 2012, Cont~mpt Petition (C) No. 608 of 2016 in W.P. (C) No.494 of 2012, W.P. (C) No.797 of2016,Contempt Petition (C) No. 844 of2017 in W.P. (C) No. 494 of2012, W.P. (C) No. 342 of2017 and W.P. (C) No. 372 of2017.
K. K. Venugopal, AG, Tushar Mehta, ASG, Jugal Kishore Gilda,· Adv. General, D. K. Singh, Shiv Mangal Sharma, AAGs, Arvind Datar, G Ms. MeenakshiArora, Anand Grover, Shyam Di van, Gopal Subramanium, C. A. Sundaram, Rakesh Dwivedi, Sajan Poovayya, Jayant Bhushan, J. S. Attri, Kap ii Sibal, P.V. Surendra Nath, Sr. Ad vs. Anish Kumar Gupta, Avdhesh Kr. Singh, R.K. Rajwanshi, Chandra Shekhar Suman, Ms. Deep Shikha Bharti, Ms. Geetha Kovilan, Rahul Narayan, Apar Gupta,
JUSTICE KS PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA
Ms. Ananya, Shashwat Goel, Ms. Bhavna, Gautam Bhatia, Ms. Krutika, A Shadan Farasat, Ms. Tripti Tandon, Ms. Lorraine Misquith, Ms. Srinidhi Rao, Ms. Priyam Cherian, Prasanna S, Suraj, Vijayant Singh, Nipun Saxena, Anando Mukherjee, Pratap Venugopal, Udayaditya Banerjee, Prasanna S, Ms. Niharika, Anuj Sharma, Ms. Kanika Kalaiyarasan, Ms. Sameeksha G, Ms. Kritika Bhardwaj, Apar Gupta (For Mis K. J. B John & Co.), Vipin Nair. P. B. Suresh, S. Prasanna. Ms. Samiksha Godiyal, Abbay Pratap Singh, Govihd Manoharan, V. K. Biju, Ms. Nidhi Khanna, Dr. Abhishek Atrey, Ravindra Lokhande, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, Ms. Neha Meena, Jaideep Singh, Anirban Sen, Ms. Tani ya, Mis Meharia & Co., Jaideep Singh, Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, TalhaAbdul Rahman, Prateek Chaddha, Ankur Kashyap, Pavan Bhushan, Zulnoor Ahmed, C Jayavardhan Singh, Eklavya Vasudev, Ms. Ankita Chaudhary, Ms. Radhika Sharma, Prashant Bhushan, Chittaranjan Mishra, Bhanu Pratap Singh, Sarthak Chodhury, Pranaya Kumar Mahapatra, Zoheb Hossain, Raj at Nair, KanuAgrawal, Manan Popli, Ms. Shraddha Deshmukh,Ankur Talwar, Piyush Goyal, Ms. Devika Jain, Anil Kr. Gulati (For Mrs. Anil D Katiyar), Rajat Nair, Manan Popli, Kanu Agrawal, Ankit Lal, Mishra Saurabh, Nishant R. Katneshwarkar, Ms. Rohini Musa, Abhishek Gupta, Zafar Inayat, Apoorv Tripathy, Arpit Rai, Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Ms. Jesal Wahi, Ms. Shodhika Sharma, Apoorva Garg, Ms. Sansriti Pathak, Amit Sharma, Dipesh Sinha, Ms. Ayiala Imti, Saransh Kumar, Priyadarshi Bane1jee, Pratibhanu S. Kharola, Saransh Jain (For E. C. Agrawala), E Ms. Reeja Verghese, Ketan Paul, Kuldeep S. Parihar, H.S. Parihar, Adarsh Upadhyay, Ms. Komal Mundra, Saurabh Agrawal, Varinder Kumar Sharma, Chandra Nand Jha, Parmanand Gaur, J. M. Kalia, D.S. Mahra, Lal it Bhasin, Ms. Nina Gupta, Mudit Shamia, Soumitra G. Chaudhuri, Chanchal K. Ganguli, Ms. Vimla Sinha (for Mr. Gopal Singh), F S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Mrityunjai Singh, Ranjan Mukherjee, Guntur Prabhakar, Ms. Prerna Singh, Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Zeeshan Diwan, Ms. Savita Singh, Ms. Veera Mahuli, Shruthanjaya Bharadwaj, Jayant . Mohan, Dr. Arghya Sengupta, Sanjay Kapur, T. G Narayanan Nair, Ms. Nitya Madhusoodhanan, Puducherry V. G. Pragasam, Prabu Ramasubramanian, Karan Bharihoke, Jagjit Singh Chhabra, Jatinder G Kumar Bhatia, Ashutosh Kumar Sharma, Sanjay Kumar Visen, A. P. Mayee, A.Selvin Raja, Avnish M. Oza, Chirag Jain, Shrey Kapoor, T.A. Rehman (For Ms. Ruchi Kohli), Tapesh Kr. Singh, Sukant Vikram, Mohd. Waquas, Aditya Pratap Singh, Nishe Raj en Shanker, Mohammed
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A Saddique, Ms. Resmitha R. Chandran, Ms. Anu K. Joy, M. Shoeb Alam, Ms. Fauzia Shakil, Ujjwal Singh, Mojahid Karim Khan, K. V. Jagdishvaran, Mrs. G. Indira, Sapam Biswajit Meitei, Naresh Kr. Gaur, Ashok Kr. Singh, Gopal Singh, Rituraj Biswas, Manish Kumar, Pranab Prakash, Shivam Singh, Aditya Raina, Shreyas Jain, Kumar Mil ind, B Ms. Ambika Gautam, Chandan Kumar, J. K. Bhatia, Ashutosh Kr. Sharma, Mrs. K. Enatoli Serna, Edward Belho, Amit Kumar Singh, K. Luikang Michael, Ms. Elix Gangmei, Z. H. Isaac Haiding, S. Mukerjee, Manoj K. Mishra, Umesh Dubey, Ms. Meghna Kalra, Ms. Neela Gokhale, Aliam P, Ms. K. S. Mehlwal, R. Sudhinder, Ashok Mathur, Ms. Amrita Sarkar, Nikhil Nayyar, Ms. Julian George,Arjun Ranganathan, C Yatinder Garg, Yashwant Prasad, Pradeep Gupta, Parinav Gupta, Mrs. Mansi Gupta, Moazzam Ali (For Dr (Mrs.) Vipin Gupta), Advs. for the appearing parties. The following Judgments and Order of the Court were delivered by D
DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.
This judgment has been divided into sections to facilitate analysis. They are: A The reference
B Decision in M P Sharma C Decision in Kharak Singh D Gopalan doctrine: fundamental rights as isolated silos E Cooper and Maneka: Interrelationship between rights
F Origins of privacy G Natural and inalienable rights H Evolution of the privacy doctrine in India I The Indian Constitution
• Prearnble •Jurisprudence on dignity • Fundamental Rights cases
.JUSTICE KS PUITASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] • No waiver of Fundamental Rights
• Privacy as intrinsic to freedom and liberty • Discordant Notes
: (i) ADM .Jabalpur (ii) Suresh Koushal
J India's commitments under International law
K Comparative law on privacy (i) UK decisions
(ii) US Supreme Court decisions (iii) Constitutional right to privacy in South Africa
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(iv) Constitutional right to privacy in Canada (v) Privacy under the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Charter (vi) Decisions of the Inter-American Cou1t of Human Rights
D
L Cdticisms of the privacy doctrine a Thomson's Reductionism b Posner's Economic critique c Bork's critique
d Feminist critique M Constituent Assembly and privacy:limits of originalist interpretation N Is the statutory protection to privacy reason to deny a . F constitutional right? 0 Not an elitist construct P Not just a common law right Q Substantive Due Process
R Essential nature of privacy S Informational privacy T Conclusions
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A The reference 1. Nine judges of this Court assembled to determine whether
privacy is a constitutionally protected value. The issue reaches out to the foundation of a constitutional culture based on the protection of human rights and enables this Court to revisit the basic principles on which our B Constitution has been founded and their consequences for a way of life it seeks to protect. This case presents challenges for constitutional interpretation. If privacy is to be construed as a protected constitutional value, it would redefine in significant ways our concepts of liberty and the entitlements that flow out of it~ protection.
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2. Privacy, in it~ simplest sen~e, allows each human being to be left alone in a core which is inviolable. Yet the autonomy of the individual is conditioned by her relationships with the rest of society. Those relationships may and do often pose questions to autonomy and free choice~ The overarching presence of state and non-state entities regu\ates aspects of social existence which bear upon the freedom of the individual. D The preservation of constitutional liberty is, so to speak, work in progress. Challenges have to be addressed to existing problems. Equally, new challenges have to be dealt with in terms of a constitutional understanding of where liberty places an individual in the context of a social order. The emergence of new challenges is exemplified by this case, where the E debate on privacy is being analysed in the context of a global information based society. In an age where information technology governs virtually every aspect of our lives, the task before the Court is to impart constitutional meaning to individual liberty in an interconnected world. While we revisit the question whether our _constitution protects privacy as an elemental principle, the Court has to be sensitive to the needs of F and the opportunities and dangers posed to liberty in a digital world.
3. A Bench of three judges of this Court while considering the constitutional challenge to the Aadhaar card scheme of the Union government noted in its order dated 1I August 2015 that the norm~ for and compilation of demographic biometric data by government was G · questioned on the ground that it violates the right to privacy. The Attorney General for India urged that the existence of a fundamental right of .'privacy is in cjoubt in vie..y oft~o deCisions: the first-MP Sharma v Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi1("M P Sharma") was rendered by a Bench of eight judges and the second, in Kharak Singh H v State ofUttar Pradesh 2 ("Kharak Singh") was rendered by a Bench
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]
of six judges. Each of these decisions. in the submission of the Attorney A General, contained observations that the Indian Constitution does not specifically protect the right to privacy. On the other hand, the submission of the petitioners was that MP Sharma and Kharak Singh were founded on principles expounded in A K Gopalan v State of Madras 3 ("Gopalan"). Gopalan, which construed each provision contained in B the Chapter on fundamental rights as embodying a d.istinct protection, was held not to be good law by an eleven-judge Bench in Rustom Cavasji Cooper v Union of lndia4 ("Cooper"). Hence the petitioners submitted that the basis of the two earlier decisions is not valid. Moreover, it was also urged that in the seven-judge Bench decision in Maneka Gandhi v Union oflndia5 ("Maneka"), the minority judgment ofJustice C Subba Rao in Kharak Singh was specifically approved of and the decision of the majority was overruled. 4. While addressing these challenges, the Bench of three judges of this Court took note of several decisions of this Court in which the right to privacy has been held to be a constitutionally protected fundamental D right. Those decisions include : Gobind v State of Madhya Pradesh6 ("Gobind"), R Rajagopal v State of Tamil Nadu7 ("Rajagopal") and People's Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India 8 ("PUCL"). These subsequent decisions which affirmed the existence of a constitutionally protected right of privacy, were rendered by Benches of a strength smaller than those in MP Sharma and Kharak Singh. Faced E with this predicament and having due regard to the far-reaching questions of importance involving interpretation of the Constitution, it was felt that. institutional integrity andjudicial discipline would require a reference to a larger Bench. Hence the Bench of three learned judges observed in its order dated 11August2015: "12. We are of the opinion that the cases on hand raise far reaching questions of importance involving interpretation of the Constitution. What is al stake is the amplitude of the fundamental rights including '(1954) SCR 1077 '(1964) I SCR 332 'AIR 1950 SC 27 • (1970) 1 sec 248 '(1978) 1 sec 248 (1975) 2 sec 148 (1994) 6 sec 632 • (1997) 1 sec 301
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that precious and inalienable right under Article 21. If the observations made in M.P. Sharma (supra) and Kharak Singh (supra) are to be read literally and accepted as the law of this country, the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India and more paiticularly right to liberty under Article 21 would be denuded of vigour and vitality. At the same time, we are also of the opinion that the institutional integrity and judicial discipline require that pronouncement made by larger Benches of this Court cannot be ignored by the smaller Benches without appropriately explaining the reasons for not following the pronouncements made by such larger Benches. With due respect to all the learned Judges who rendered the subsequent judgments - where right to privacy is asse1ted or referred to their Lordships concern for the liberty of human beings, we are of the humble opinion that there appears to be certain amount of apparent unresolved contradiction in the law declared by this Court. 13. Therefore, in our opinion to give a quietus to the kind of controversy raised in this batch of cases once for all, it is better that the ratio decidendi of M.P. Sharma (supra) and Kharak Singh (supra) is scrutinized and the jurisprudential correctness of the subsequent decisions of this Court where the right to privacy is either asserted or referred be examined and authoritatively decided by a Bench of appropriate strength." 5. On 18 July 2017, a Constitution Bench presided over by the learned Chief Justice considered it appropriate that the issue be resolved by a Bench of nine judges. The order of the Constitution Bench reads thus: "During the course of the hearing today, it seems that it has become essential for us to determine whether there is any fundamental right of privacy under the Indian Constitution. The determination of this question would essentially entail whether the decision recorded by this Court in M.P. Sharma and Ors. vs. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi and Ors. - 1950 SCR 1077 by an eight-Judge Constitution Bench, and also, in Kharak Sfngh vs. The State of U.P. and Ors. - 1962 (I) SCR 332 by a sixJudge Constitution Bench, that there is no such fundamental right, is the correct expression of the constitutional position.
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD. J.] Before dealing with the matter any further, we are of the view that the issue noticed hereinabove deserves to be placed before the nine-Judge Constitution Bench. List these matters before the Nine-Judge Constitution Bench on 19.07.2017." ·
6. During the course of hearing, we have been ably assisted on behalf of the petitioners by Mr Gopal Subramanium, Mr Kapil Sibal, Mr B Arvind Datar, Mr Sh yam Divan, Mr Anand Grover, Ms Meenakshi Arora, Mr Sajan Poovayya and Mr Jayant Bhushan, learned senior counsel. Mr J S Attri, learned senior counsel supported them on behalf of the State of Himachal Pradesh. On behalf of the Union of India, the Court has had the benefit of the erudite submissions of Mr K K Venugopal, Attorney General for India. He has been ably supported by Mr Tushar' C Mehta, Additional Solicitor General. Mr Rakesh Dwivedi, senior counsel for the State of Gujarat, Mr Aryama Sundaram for the State of Maharashtra, Mr Gopal Sankaranarayanan and Dr Arghya Sengupta respectively. While some state governments have supported the stand of the Union government, others have supported the petitioners. D 7. The correctness of the decisions in MP Sharma and Kharak Singh, is to be evaluated during the course of the reference. Besides, the jurisprudential correctness of subsequent decisions holding the right to privacy to be a constitutionally protected right is to be determined. The basic question whether privacy .is a right protected under our Constitution requires an understanding of what privacy means. For it is when we understand what interests or entitlements privacy safeguards, that we can determine whether the Constitution protects privacy. The contents of privacy need to be analysed, not by providing an exhaustive enunciation or catalogue of what it includes but by indicating its broad contours. The Court has been addressed on various aspects of privacy including: (i) Whether there is a constitutionally protected right to privacy; (ii) If there is a constitutionally protected right, whether this has the character of an independent fundamental right or whether it arises from within the existing guarantees of protected rights such as life. and personal liberty; (iii) the doctrinal foundations of the claim to privacy; (iv) the content of privacy; and (v) the nature of the regulatory power of the state.
B Decision in M P Sharma
8. An investigation was ordered by the Union government under
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A the Companies Act into the affairs of a company which was in liquidation on the. ground that it had made an organized attempt to embezzle its funds and to conceal the true state of its affairs from the share-holders and on the allegation that the company had indulged in fraudulent transactions and falsified its records. Offences were registered .and search warrants were issued during the course of which, records were seized. The challenge was that the searches violated the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 19(1)(f) and Article 20(3) of the Constitution. The former challenge was rejected. The question which this Court addressed was whether there was a contravention of Article 20(3). Article 20(3) mandates that no person accused of an offence c shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Reliance was placed on a judgment9 of the USSupreme Court holding that obtaining incriminating evidence by an illegal search and seizure violates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the American Constitution. While tracing the history ofindian legislation, this Court observed that provisions for search were contained in successive enactments of the Criminal Procedure D Code. Justice Jagannadhadas, speaking for the Bench, held that a search or seizure does not infringe the constitutional right guaranteed by Article 20(3) of the Constitution:
" ... there is no basis in the Indian law for the assumption that a search or seizure of a thing or document is in itself to be treated as compelled production of the same. Indeed a little consideration will show that the two are essentially different matters for the purpose relevant to the present discussion. A notice to produce is addressed to the party concerned and his production in compliance therewith constitutes a testimonial act by him within the meaning of Article 20(3) as above explained. But a search warrant is addressed to an officer of the Government, generally a police officer. Neither the search nor the seizure are acts of the occupier of the searched premises. They are acts of another to which he is obliged to submit and are, therefore, not his testimonial acts in any sense. " 10 9. Having held that the guarantee against self-incrimination is not offended by a search and seizure, the Court observed that : ' Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 (1886) MP Sharma (Supra note 1), at page 1096
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]
"A power of search and seizure is in any system of jurisprudence A an overriding power of the State for the protection of social security and that power is necessarily regulated by law. When the Constitution makers have thought fit not to subject such regulation to constitutional limitations by recognition of a fundamental right to privacy, analogous to the Fourth Amendment, we have no justification to import it, into totally different fundamental right, by some process of strained construction. Nor is it legitimate to assume that the constitutionalprotection under Article 20(3) would be defeated by the statutory provisions for searches." 11 (emphasis supplied)
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10. These observations - to be more precise in one sentence - C indicating that the Constitution makers did not subject the regulation by law of the power of search and seizure to a fundamental right of privacy, similar to the Fourth amendment of the US Constitution, have been pressed in aid to question the existence of a protected right to privacy D under our Constitution. C Decision in Kharak Singh 11. After being challaned in a case of dacoity in 1941, Kharak Singh was released for want of evidence. But the police compiled a "history sheet'' against him. 'History sheets' were defined in Regulation 228 of Chapter XX of the UP Police Regulations as "the personal records E of criminals under surveillance". Kharak Singh, who was subjected to regular surveillance, including midnight knocks, moved this Court for a declaration that his fundamental rights were infringed. Among the measures of surveillance contemplated by Regulation 236 were the following: "(a) Secret picketing of the house or approaches to the houses . of suspects; (b) domiciliary visits at night; (c) thorough periodical inquiries by officers not below the rank of sub-inspector into repute, habits, associations, income, expenses and occupation;
(d) the reporting by constables and chaukidars of movements and absences from home; 11 Ibid, at page 1096-97
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(e) the verification of movements and absences by means of inquiry slips;
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(f) the collection and record on a history-sheet of all information bearing on conduct."
12. This Court held that the freedom to move freely throughout the territory of India, guaranteed by Article 19(1 )( d) was not infringed by a midnight knock on the door of the petitioner since "his locomotion is not impeded or prejudiced in any manner".
13. When the decision in Kharak Singh was handed down, the principles governing the inter-relationship between the rights protected C by Atiicle 19 and the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 were governed by the judgment in Gopalan.Gopalan considered each of the articles in the Chapter on fundamental rights as embodying distinct (as opposed to over-lapping) freedoms. Hence in Kharak Singh, the Court observed : D
"In view of the very limited nature of the question before us it is unnecessary to pause to consider either the precise relationship between the "liberties" in Article 19(l)(a) & (d) on the one hand and that in Article 21 on the other, or the content and significance of the words "procedure established by law" in the latter Article, both of which were the subject of elaborate consideration by this Court in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras." 12 .
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14. The decision in Kharak Singh held that clause (b) of Regulation 236 which provided for domiciliary visits at night was violative of Article 21. The Court observed:
"Is then the word "personal liberty" to be construed as excluding from its purview an invasion on the part of the police of the sanctity of a man's home and an intrusion into his personal security and his right to sleep which is the normal comfort and a dire necessity for human existence even as an animal? It might not be inappropriate to refer here to the words of the preamble to the Constitution that it is designed to "assure the dignity of the individual" and therefore of those cherished human values as the means of ensuring his full development and evolution. We are referring to these objectives of the framers merely to draw
Kharak Singh (Supra note 2), at page 345
JUSTICE KS PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]
attention to the concepts underlying the constitution which would A point to such vital words as "personal liberty" having to be construed in a reasonable manner and to be attributed that sense which would promote and achieve those objectives and by no means to stretch the meaning of the phrase to square with any pre-conceived notions or doctrinaire constitutional theories." 13 15. In taking this view, Justice RajagopalaAyyangar, speaking for a majority of five judges, relied upon the judgment ofJustice Frankfurter, speaking for the US Supreme Court in Wolf v Colorado 14, which held.: "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police ... is basic to a free society... .
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We have no hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment." 15 (emphasis supplied) I)
While the Court observed that the Indian Constitution does not contain a guarantee similar to the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution, it proceeded to hold that : "Nevertheless, these extracts would show that an unauthorised intrusion into a person's home and the disturbance caused to E him thereby, is as it were the violation of a common law right of a man an ultimate essential of ordered liberty, if not of the very concept of civilisation. An English Common Law maxim asserts that ''every man's house is his castle" and in Semayne case [5 Coke 91 : 1 Sm LC (13th Edn) 104 at p. 105] where this was applied, it was stated that "the house of everyone is to F him as his castle and fortress as well as for his defence against injury and violence as for his repose". We are not unmindful of the fact that Semayne case [(1604) 5 Coke 91 : I Sm LC (13th Edn) 104 at p. 105] was concerned with the law relating to executions in England, but the passage extracted has a validity G quite apart from the context of the particular decision. It embodies an abiding principle which transcends mere protection of property rights and expounds a concept of "personal liberty" 13 Ibid, at pages 347-348
338 us 25 ( 1949) " Cited in Kharak Singh (Supra note 2), at page 348
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which does not rest on any element of feudalism or on any theory of freedom which has ceased to be of value." 16 (emphasis supplied) 16. Kharak Singh regards the sanctity of the home and the
protection against unauthorized intrusion an integral element of "ordered This is comprised in 'personal liberty' guaranteed by Article 21. liberty". The decision invalidated domiciliary visits at night authorised by Regulation 236 (b ), finding them to be an unauthorized intrusion into the home of a person and a violation of the fundamental right to personal liberty. However, while considering the validity of clauses (c),( d) and (e) which provided for periodical enquiries, reporting by law enforcement personnel c and verification of movements, this Court held as follows : " ... the freedom guaranteed by A1ticle 19( 1)( d) is not infringed by a watch being kept over the movements of the suspect. Nor do we consider that Article 21 has any relevance in the context as was sought to be suggested by learned Counsel for the petitioner. As already pointed out, the right of privacy is not a guaranteed D right under our Constitution and therefore the attempt to ascertain the movements of an individual which is merely a manner in which privacy is invaded is not an infringement of a fundamental right guaranteed by Part 111.m7 (emphasis supplied)
In the context of clauses (c), (d) and (e), the above extract indicates the view of the majority that the right of privacy is not guaranteed under the Constitution.
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17. Justice Subba Rao dissented. Justice Subba Rao held that the rights conferred by Part III have overlapping areas. Where a law is challenged as infringing the right to freedom of movement under Article 19( I)(d) and the liberty of the individual under Article 21, it must satisfy the tests laid down in Article 19(2) as well as the requirements of Article 21. Justice Subba Rao held that: "No doubt the expression "personal liberty" is a comprehensive one and the right to move freely is an attribute of personal liberty. It is said that the freedom to move freely is carved out of personal liberty and, therefore, the expression "personal liberty" in Article 21 excludes that attribute. In our view, this is not a correct
16 Ibid, at page 349
Ibid, at page 351
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]
approach. Both are independent fundamental rights. though there A is overlapping. There is no question of one being carved out of another. The fundamental right of life and personal liberty have many attributes and some of them are found in A1ticle 19. If a person's fundamental right under Article 21 is infringed, the State can rely upon a law to sustain the action; but that cannot be a B complete answer unless the said law satisfies the test laid down in Article 19(2) so far as the attributes covered by Article 19(1) are concerned. In other words, the State must satisfy that both the fundamental rights are not infringed by showing that there is a law and that it does amount to a reasonable restriction within the meaning of Article 19(2) of the Constitution. But in this case no C such defence is available, as admittedly there is no such law. So the petitioner can legitimately plead that his fundamental rights both under Article 19(l)(d) and Article 21 are infringed by the State." 18 18. Justice Subba Rao held that Article 21 embodies the right o.f the individual to be free from restrictions or encroachments. In this view, though the Constitution does not expressly declare the right to privacy as a fundamental right, such a right is essential to personal liberty. The dissenting opinion places the matter of principle as follows:
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"In an uncivilized society where there are no inhibitions, only physical restraints may detract from personal liberty, but as civilization advances the psychological restraints are more effective than physical ones. The scientific methods used to condition a man's mind are in a real sense physical restraints, for they engender physical fear channelling one's actions through anticipated and expected grooves. So also the creation of conditions which necessarily engender inhibitions and fear complexes can be described as physical restraints. Further, the right to personal liberty takes in not only a right tci be free from restrictions placed on his movements, but also free from encroachments on his private life. It is true our Constitution does not expressly declare a right to privacy as a fundamental right, but the said right is an essential ingredient of personal liberty. Every democratic country sanctifies domestic life; it is expected to give him rest, physical happiness, peace of mind and security. In the last resort,
" Ibid, at pages 356-357
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a person's house, where he lives with his family, is his "castle"; it is his rampart against encroachment on his personal liberty. The pregnant words of that famous Judge, Frankfurter J., in Wolf v. Colorado [[1949] 238 US 25] pointing out the importance of the security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police, could have no less application to an Indian home as to an American one. If physical restraints on a person's movements affect his personal liberty, physical encroachments on his private life would affect it in a larger degree. Indeed, nothing is more deleterious to a man's physical happiness and health than a calculated interference with his privacy. We would, therefore, define the right of personal liberty in Article 21 as a right of an individual to be free from restrictions or encroachments on his person, whether those restrictions or encroachments are directly imposed or indirectly brought about by calculated measures. If so understood, all the acts of surveillance under Regulation 236 infringe the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 21 of the Constitution." 1" (emphasis suppl,ied)
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Significantly, both Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar for the majority and Justice Subba Rao in his dissent rely upon the observations of Justice Frankfurter in Wolf vColorado which specifically advert to privacy. E The majority, while relying upon them to invalidate domiciliary visits at night, regards the sanctity of the home as part of ordered liberty. In the context of other provisions of the regulation, the majority declines to recognise a right of privacy as a constitutional protection. Justice Subba Rao recognised a constitutional by protected right to privacy, considering F it as an ingredient of personal liberty. · D Gopalan doctrine : fundamental rights as isolated silos 19. When eight judges of this Court rendered the decision in MP Sharma in 1954 and later, six judges decided the controversy in Kharak Singh in 1962, the ascendant and, even well established, doctrine governing G the fundamental rights contained in Part III was founded on the Gopalan principle. In Gopalan, Chief Justice Kania, speaking for a majority of five of the Bench of six judges, construed the relationship between Articles 19 and 21 to be one of mutual exclusion, In this line of enquiry, what was comprehended by Article 19 was excluded from Article 21.
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Ibid, at pages 358-359
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]
The seven freedoms of Article 19 were not subsumed in the fabric of A life or personal liberty in Article 21. The consequence was that a law which curtailed one of the freedoms guaranteed by Article 19 would be required to answer the tests of reasonableness prescribed by clauses 2 to 6 of Article 19 and those alone. In the Gopalan perspective; free speech and expression was guaranteed by Article 19(l)(a) and was B hence excluded from personal liberty under Article 21. Article 21 was but a residue. Chief Justice Kania held : "Reading Article 19 in that way it appears to me that the concept of the right to move freely throughout the territory oflndia is an entirely different concept from the right to "personal libe.rty" contemplated by Article 21. "Personal liberty" covers many mo.re rights in one sense and has a restricted meaning in another sense. For instance, while the right to move or reside may be covered by the expression, "personal liberty" the right to freedom of speech (mentioned in Article 19(1)(a)) or the right to acquire, hold or dispose of property (mentioned in l 9(l)(t)) cannot be considered a part of the personal liberty of a citizen. They form part of the liberty of a citizen but the limitation imposed by the word ''personal" leads me to believe that those rights are not covered by the expression personal liberty. So read there is no conflict between Articles 19 and 21. The contents and subject-matters of Articles 19 and 21 are thus not the same and they proceed to deal with the_ rights covered by their respective words from totally different angles. As already mentioned in respect of each of the rights specified in sub-clauses of Article 19(1) specific limitations in respect of each-is provided, while the expression "personal liberty" in Article 21 is generally controlled by the general expression "procedure established by law"." 20
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'Procedure established by law' under Article 21 was, in this view, not capable of being expanded to include the 'due process oflaw'. Justice Faz! Ali dissented. The dissent adopted the view that the fundamental rights are not isolated and separate but protect a common thread of G liberty and freedom: "To my mind, the scheme of the Chapter dealing with the fundamental rights does not contemplate what is attributed to ii, namely, that each article is a code by it~elf and is independent of 20 Gopalan (Supra note 3), at pages 36-37
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the others. In my opinion, it cannot be said that Articles 19,20, 21 and 22 do not to some extent overlap each other. The case of a person who is convicted of an offence will come under Articles ·20 and 21 and also under Article 22 so far as his arrest and detention in custody before trial are concerned. Preventive detention, which is dealt with an Article 22, also amount~ to deprivation of personal liberty which is referred to in Article 21, and is a violation of the right of freedom of movement dealt with in Article 19(1 )( d) ...
It seems clear that the addition of the word "personal'' before
"liberty" in Article 21 cannot change the meaning of the words used in Article 19, nor can it put a matter which is inseparably bound up with personal liberty beyond its place ... "21
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20. In Satwant Singh Sawhney v D Ramarathnam22 ("Satwant Singh Sawhney"), Justice Hidayatullah. speaking for himself and Justice RS Bachawat, in the dissenting view noticed the clear lines of distinction between the dissent of Justice Subba Rao and the view of the majority D in Kharak Singh. The observations of Justice Hidayatullah indicate that if the right of locomotion is embodied by Article 21 of which one aspect is covered by Article 19(l)(d), that would in fact advance the minority view in Kharak Singh: "Subba Rao J. (as he then was) read personal liberty as· the antithesis of physical restraint or coercion and found that Articles 19(1) and 21 overlapped and Article 19(1 )( d) was not carved out of personal liberty in Article 21. According to him, personal liberty could be curtailed by Jaw, but that Jaw must satisfy the test in Article 19(2) in so far as the specific rights in Article 19(1 )(3) are concerned. In other words, the State must satisfy that both the fundamental rights are not infringed by showing that there is a law and that it does not amount to an unreasonable restriction within the meaning of Article 19(2) of the Constitution. As in that case there was no law, fundamental rights, both under Article 19( l )(d) and Article 21 were held to be infringed. The learned Chief Justice has read into the decision of the Court a meaning which it does not intend to convey. He excludes from Article 21 the right to free motion and locomotion within the territories of India and puts the right to travel abroad in Article 21. He wants to
Ibid, at pages 52-53 1967) 3 SCR 525
22 (
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JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]
see a law and if his earlier reasoning were to prevail, the law A should stand the test of Article 19(2). But since clause (2) deals with matters in Article 19(1) already held excluded, it is obvious that it will not apply. The law which is made can only be tested on the ground of articles other than Article 19 such as Articles 14, 20 and 22 which alone bears upon this matter. In other words, the B majority decision of the Court in this case has rejected Ayyangar J.'s view and accepted the view of the minority in Kharak Singh case ... This view obviously clashes with the reading of Article 21 in Kharak Singh case, because there the right of motion and locomotion was held to be excluded from Article 21. In other words, the present decision advances the minority ~'iew in Kharak Singh case above the majority view stated in that case." 23
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E Cooper and Maneka: Interrelationship between rights
21. The theory that the fundamental rights are water-tight D compartments was discarded in the judgment of eleven judges of this · Court in Cooper. Gopalan had adopted the view that a law of preventive detention would be tested for its validity only with reference to Article 22, which was a complete code relati'ng to the subject. Legislation on preventive detention did not, in this view, have to meet the touchstone of Article l 9(l)(d). The dissenting view of Justice Fazl Ali in Gopalan E was noticed by Justice J C Shah, speaking for this Court, in Cooper. The consequence of the Gopalan doctrine was that the protection afforded by a guarantee of personal freedom would be decided by the object of the State action in relation to the right of the individual and not upon its effect upon the guarantee. Disagreeing with this view, the F Court in Cooper held thus : " .. .it is necessary to bear in mind the enunciation of the guarantee of fundamental rights which has taken different forms. In some cases it is an express declaration of a guaranteed right: Articles 29(1 ), 30(1), 26, 25 and 32; in others to ensure protection of G individual rights they take specific forms of restrictions on State · action - legislative or executive -Articles 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22(1), 27 and 28; in some others, it takes the fonn of a positive declaration and simultaneously enunciates the restriction thereon: 23 Ibid, at page 554
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Articles 19(1) and 19(2) to (6); in some cases, it arises iis an implication from the delimitation of the authority of the State, e.g. Articles 31 (1} and 31 (2); in still others, it takes the form of a general prohibition against the State as well as others: Articles 17, 23 and 24. The enunciation of rights either express or by implication does not follow a uniform pattern. But one thread runs through them: they seek to protect the rights of the individual or groups of individuals against infringement of those rights within specific limits. Part III of the Constitution weaves a pattern of guarantees on the texture of basic human rights. The guarantees delimit the protection of those rights in their allotted fields: they do not attempt to enunciate distinct rights." 24 (emphasis supplied)
22. The abrogation of the Gopalan doctrine in Cooper was revisited in a seven-judge Bench decision in Maneka. Justice P N D Bhagwati who delivered the leading opinion of three Judges held that the judgment in Cooper affirms the dissenting opinion of Justice Subba Rao (in Kharak Singh) as expressing the valid constitutional position. Hence in Mancka, the Court held that:
"It was in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.[AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 329] that the question as to the proper scope and meaning of the expression "personal liberty" came up pointedly for consideration for the first time before.this Court. The majority of the Judges took the view "that "personal Iibe1ty" is used in the article as a compendious term to include within itself all the varieties of rights which go to make up the "personal liberties" of man other than those dealt with in the several clauses of Article 19( 1). In other words, while Article 19( 1) deals with particular species or attributes of that freedom, 'personal liberty' in Article 2 I .takes in and comprises the residue. The minority Judges, however, disagreed with this view taken by the majority and explained their position in the following words: "No doubt the expression 'personal liberty' is a comprehensive one and the right to move freely is an attribute of personal liberty. It is said that the freedom to move freely is carved out of personal liberty and, therefore, the expression 'personal liberty' in Article 24 Cooper (Supra note 4), at page 289 (para 52)
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD. J.]
21 excludes that attribute. In our view, this is not a correct A approach. Both are independent fundamental rights, though there is overlapping. There is no question of one being carved out of another. The fundamental right of life and personal liberty has many attributes and some of them are found in Article 19. If a person's fundamental right under Article 21 is infringed, the State B can rely upon a law to sustain the action, but that cannot be a complete answer unless the said law satisfies the test laid down in Article 19(2) so far as the attributes covered by Article 19( I) are concerned." There can be no doubt that in view of the decision of this Court in R.C. Cooper v. Union of India [(1970) 2 SCC 298 : (1971) 1 SCR 512] the minority C view must be regarded as correct and the majority view must- be held to have been overruled." 25 (emphasis supplied) 23. Following the decision in Maneka, the established constitutional - doctrine is that the expression 'personal liberty' in Article 21 covers a D variety of rights, some of which 'have been raised to the status of distinct fundamental rights' and given additional protection under Article 19. Consequently, in Satwant Singh Sawhney, the right to travel abroad was held to be subsumed within Article 21 as a consequence of which any deprivation of that right could be only by a 'procedure established by law'. Prior to the enactment of the Passports Act, 1967, there was no E law regulating the right to travel abroad as a result of which the order of the Passport Officer refusing a passport was held to be invalid. Th~ decision in Mancka carried the constitutional principle of the over-lapping nature of fundamental rights to its logical conclusion. Reasonableness which is the foundation of the guarantee against arbitrary state action F under Article 14 infuses Article 21. A law which provides for a deprivation of life or personal liberty under Article 21 must lay down not just any procedure but a procedure which is fair, just and reasonable. 24. The decisions in M P Sharma and Kharak Singh adopted a doctrinal position on the relationship betweenA1ticles 19 and 21, based on the view of the majority in Gopalan. This view stands abrogated particularly by the judgment in Cooper and the subsequent statement of doctrine in Maneka. The decision in Maneka, in fact, expressly recognized that it is the dissenting judgment of Justice Subba Rao in 2-'
Maneka (Supra Note 5), at page 278 (para 5)
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Kharak Singh which represents the exposition of the correct constitutional principle. The jurisprudential foundation which held the field sixty three years ago in MP Sharma and fifty five years ago in Kharak Singh has given way to what is now a settled position in constitutional law. Firstly, the fundamental rights emanate from basic notions of libe1ty and dignity and the enumeration of some facets of liberty as distinctly protected rights under Article 19 does not denude Article 21 of its expansive ambit. Secondly, the validity of a law which infringes the fundamental rights has to be tested not with reference to the object of state action but on the basis of its effect on the guarantees of freedom. Thirdly, the requirement of Article 14 that state action ipust c not be arbitrary and must fulfil the requirement of reasonableness, imparts meaning to the constitutional guarantees in Part III.
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25. The doctrinal invalidation of the basic premise underlying the decisions in M P Sharma and Kharak Singh still leaves the issue of whether privacy is a right protected by Part III of the Constitution open· for consideration. There are observations in both decisions that the Constitution does not contain a specific protection of the right to privacy. Presently, the matter can be looked at from the perspective of what actually was the controversy in the two cases. M P Sharma was a case where a law prescribing a search to obtain documents for investigating into offences was challenged as being contrary to the guarantee against self-incrimination in Article 20(3). The Comt repelled the argument that a search for documents compelled a person accused of an offence to be witness against himself. Unlike a notice to produce documents, which is addressed to a person and whose compliance would constitute a testimonial act, a search warrant and a seizure which follows are. not testimonial acts of a person to whom the warrant is addressed, within the meaning of Article 20(3). The Court having held this, the controversy in MP Sharma would rest at that. The observations in MP Sharma to the effect that the constitution makers had not thought it fit to subject the regulatory power of search and seizure to constitutional limitations by recognising a fundamental right of privacy (like the US Fourth amendment), and that there was no justification to impart it into a 'totally different fundamental right' are at the highest, stray observations. 26. The decision in M P Sharma held that in the absence of a · provision like the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution, a right to privacy cannot be read into the Indian Constitution. The decision in MP
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JUSTICE KS PUTTASWAMY (~ETD.).v. UNION OF INDIA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]
Sharma did not decide whether a constitutional right to privacy is .A protected by other provisions contained in the fundamental rights including among them, the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. Hence the decision cannot be construed to specifically exclude the protection of privacy under the framework of protected guarantees including those in Articles 19 or 21. The absence of an express constitutional guarantee .. 'B of privacy still begs the question whether privacy is an element ofliberty and, as an integral. part of human dignity, is comprehended within the protection oflife as well. 27. The decision in Kharak Singh is n~tew.orthy because whi.Je : · invalidating Regulation 236(b) of the Police Regulations which provided for nightly domiciiiary visits; the .majority construed, this to be. an c unauthorized intrusion into a person's home and a violation of ordered liberty. While arriving at this conclusion, the majority placed reliance on the privacy doctrine enunciated by Justice Frankfurter, speaking forthe US Supreme Court in Wolf v Colorado (the extract from Wolf cited in the majority judgment specifically adverts to 'privacy' twice). Having D relied on this doctrine to invalidate domiciliary visits, the majority in , Kharak Singh proceeded to repel the chailenge to other clauses of Regulation 236 on the ground that the right of privacy is not guaranteed under the Constitution and hence Article 21 had no applica.tion. This part of the judgment in Kharak Singh is inconsistent with . the earlier ·E. .. part of the decision. The decision: of the majority in.Kliarak Singh suffers· from an internal in~~nsistency. · · · · •" :, '
F Origins of priV?CY, · 28. An evaluation of the origins ofprivacy is essential in order to.' understand whether (as the Union oflndia postulates), the concept is so F amorphous as to defy description. The submission of the government is that the Court cannot recognize a juristic concept which is so vague and uncertain that it fails to withstand constitutional scrutiny. This makes it necessary to analyse tbe origins.of privacy and to trace its.evolution. 29. The.Greek philosopher Aristotle spokl'. of a .divisio~ between G the public sphere of political affairs (which he termed the polis) an(j the" personal sphere of human life (termed oikos). This dichotomy may· provide an early recognition of "a confidential zone on behalf of the citizen" 26 • Aristotle's distinction between the public and private realms can be regarded as prov.iding a basis for restricting governmental authority
_6,_6'f. '1_•• , ..
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to activities falling within the public realm. On the other hand, activities
in the private realm are more appropriately reserved for "private reflection, familial relations and self-determination"27 • · · · 30. At a certain level, the evolution of the doctrine of privacy has followed the public ·- private distinction. Wiliiam Blackstone in his B ·Cornrnentarfos on the Laws of Englan.d (1765) spoke about this d.istinction while dividing wrongs into private wrongs and public wrongs. Private wrongs are an infringement merely of particular rights concerning individuals and are in the.miture of civil injuries. Public wrongs constitute a breach of general and public rights affecting the whole community and according to him, are called crimes and misdemeanours.
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31. John Stuart Mill in his essay, 'On Liberty' (1859) gave expression to the need to preserve a wile within which the liberty of the citizen would be free from the authority of the state. According to Mill : . ';
D . ;._
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• i
"'Ihe only part of the conduct of fll1Y one, for which he is amenable to s~ietY:,is_th~t v;J:iic~ f pncerns. others .. In the part which merely concerns itlmself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.""
a
•While speaking·of "struggle between liberty and authority""', Mill posited that the (yranny the. majority could be reined by the recognition of cNiJ rights such as the individual right to privacy, free speech, assembly and expression.
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32. Austin in his Lectures on Jurisprudence (1869) spoke of the distinctjon betw~en the public and the private realms :jus publicum and jus privatum. (
The distinction between the public and private real ms has its limitations. If the- ·reasoii for ·pr9tecting 'prihcy is the dignity of the individual, the rationafo.f9r its exiS'ten~e does not cease merely because the individual has int~ra~t with others Jn the public arena. The extent to which an individual expects privacy in a public street may be different from that which she expects i~ the sanctity of the home. Yet if dignity is
to
:?6Michael C. James. NA Comparative.Analysis of the Right to Prtvacy in the United States, Canada and Europe~. Connecticut Journal oflntemational Law (Spring 2014),
·Vol. 29, Issue 2, at page 261 "'Ibid, at page 262 "John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Batoche Books (1859), at page 13 29 Ibid, at page 6 ·
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JUSTICE K S PUTTASWf..MY (RETD.) v. UNI(JN OF INJ?IA [DR. D. Y. CijAND~ACHUD, J.]
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the underlying feature, the basis of recognising the right to privacy is not denuded in public spaces. The extent of permissible state regulation may, however, differ based on the legitimate concerns of governmental authority.
33. James Madison, who was the architect of the American Constitution, contemplated the protection of the faculties of the citizen as an incident of the inalienable property rights of human beings. In his words: "In the fonnersense, a man's land, or merchandize, or money ·is called his property. In the latter sense, a man has property in his. opinions and the free communication of them... ·
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He has an equal property interest in the free use of his faculties and free choice· of the objects on which to·empfoy them. In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights. Where an excess power prevails, property of no sort is duly respected. No man is D safe in his opinions, his person, his faculties or his possessions ...
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Conscience is the most sacred of all property; other property depending in part on positive law; the exercise of that, being a natural and inalienable right. To guard a man's house as his castle, to pay public and enforce private debts with the most exact faith, .E can give no title to invade a man's conscience which is more sacred than his castle, or to withhold from it that debt of protection, for which the public faith is pledged, by the very natw·e and original conditions of the social pact.''30 Madison traced the recognition of an inviolable zone to an inalienable right to property. Property is construed in tht< broadest sense to include tangibles and intangibles and ultimately to control over one's conscience itself. 34. In an article published on 15 December 1890 in the Harvaro Law Review, Samuel D Warren and Louis Brandeis adverted to the evolution· of the law to incorporate within it, the right to life as "a recognition of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect" 31 • As legal rights were broadened, the right to life had "come to mean the
James Madison, "Essay on Property", in Gaillard Hunt ed., The Writings of James
Madison (1906), Vol. 6, at pages 101-103.
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A right to enjoy life- the right to be let alone". Recognizing that "only a part of the pain, pleasure and profit of life lay in physical things" and that "thoughts, emotions, and sensations demanded legal recognition", Warren and Brandeis revealed with a sense of perspicacity the impact of technology on the right to be let alone: "Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right "to be let alone". Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that "what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops." For years there has been a feeling that the law must afford some remedy for the unauthorized circulation of portraits of private persons ...
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The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury." 32
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In their seminal article, Warren and Brandeis observed that: ''The principle which protects persona1 writings and all other personal productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication in any form, is in reality not the principle of priYate propel\y, but that of an inviolate personality."33 (emphasis supplied)
The right "to be let alone" thus represented a manifestation of "an inviolate personality", a core of freedom and liberty from which the G human being had to be free from intrusion. The technology which provided a justification for the need to preserve the privacy of the individual was the development of photography. The right to be let alone was not so Warren and Brandeis, ''The Right to Privacy", Harvard Law Review (1890), Vol.4, No. 5, at page 193 · 32 Ibid, at pages 195-196 H 33 Jbid, at page 205
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JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]
much an incident of property as a reflection of the inviolable nature of A the human personality. 35. The ringing observations of Warren and Brandeis on the impact of technology have continued relevance today in a globalized world dominated by the internet and information technology. As societies have · evolved, so have the connotations and'ambit of privacy. 36. Though many contemporary accounts attribute the modern conception of the 'right to privacy' to the Warren and Brandeis article, :·. historical material indicates that it was Thomas Cooley who adopted : the phrase "the right to be let alone", in his Treatise on the Law of Torts 34• Discussing personal immunity, Cooley stated: c "the right of one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity; the right to be alone." 35 Roscoe Pound described the Warren and Brandeis article as having done "nothing less than add a chapter to our law" 36 • However, another writer on the subject states that:
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"This right to privacy was not new. Warren and Brandeis did not even coin the phrase, "right to privacy," nor its common soubriquet, "the right to be let alone''." 37 The right to be let alone is a part of the right' to enjoy life: The E right to enjoy life is, in its turn, a part of the fundamental right to life of the individual. · 37. The right to privacy was developed by Warren and Brandeis in the backdrop of the dense urbanization which occurred particularly in the East Coast of the United States. Between 1790 and 1890, the US population had risen from four million to sixty-three million. The population of urban areas had grown over a hundred-fold since the end of the civil war. In 1890, over eight million people had immigrated to the US. Technological progress and rapid innovations had led to theprivate realm being placed under stress :
Thomas Cooley, Treatise on the Law of Torts (1888), 2"' edition . 35 Ibid, at page 29 36 Dorothy J Glancy, "The Invention of the Right to Privacy", Arizona Law Review (1979) Vol. 21, No. I, at page I. The article attributes the Roscoe Pound quotation to "Letter from Roscoe Pound to William Chilton (1916)" as quoted in Alpheus Mason, Brandeis : A Free Man's Life 70 (1956). 37 Ibid, at pages 2-3.
G.
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" ... technological progress during the post-Civil War decades had brought to Bo.ston Md. the rest of the United States "countless, . little-noticed revolutions" in the f9rm of a. 1.'ariety of inventions which made the personal lives and p.ersona!ities· of individ.uals increasingly accessible to large numbers of others, irrespective of acquaintance, social or economic class; or the customary constraints of propriety. Bell invented the telephone in Boston; the first t;:ommercial telephone exchange opened there in 1877, while Warren and Brandeis were students ·at the Harvard Law School. I;ly 1890 there were also telegraphs, fairly inexpensive portable cameras, sound recording devices, and better and cheaper methods bf making window glass. Warren and Brandeis n;cogni~ed that these advances in technology•. coupled with . intensified newspaper enterprise, increased the vulnerability of individuals to having their actions, words, images, and personalities communicated without their consent beyond the protected circle of family and chosen friends." 38
Coupled with this was the trend towards 'newspaperization' 39, the increasing presence ofthe'Print lnedia in American soC:iety. Six months before the publication of the Warren and Brandeis' articJe; EL God.kin, a newspaper man had published an article on the same subject in Scribner's magazine in July 1890. Godkin, however, suggested no realistic E remedy for protecting privacy against intrusion, save and except "by the cudgel or the horsewhip"40 • It was Warren and Brandeis who advocated· the use of the common law to vindicate the right to privacy. 41 38. Criminal libel actions were resorted to in the US during a part of the nineteen!~ century but by 189.0, they had virtually ceased to be "a F ' viable protection for individlial privaci"42 • The Sedition Act of 1789 expired in 1.801. Before truth came to. be accepted as a defence in . defamation actions, criminal libel prosecutions flourished in the State courts. 43 Similarly, truth was not regarded as a valid defence to a civil libel activn in much of the nineteenth century. By the time Warren and G Brandeis wrote their article in 1890, publication of the truth was perhaps
" Ibid, at pages 7-8 " Ibid, at page 8 • 0 Ibid, at page 9 41 Ibid, at page 10 42 Ibid, at page 12 Ibid, at page 14
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JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY(RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA ·, · 667 .. [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] '.·
no longer actionabJe. under the law of defamation. It was this breach or. : A ·' lacuna that they sought to fill tip by speaking of the right to privacy which would prciteCt the control of the individual over her personality. 44 · • . , The right to privacy evolved as a ''leitniotif' r~presenting ·'the long . · · tradition of Americ;iry individualism". 45. 39. Conscious as we are of the limitations with which comparative frameworks 46 oflaw and history sh6uld be evalUated, the above account is of significance. It reflects tqe basic need of every individual tp live with dignity. Urbanization: and economic development lead to .a replacement of traditional' social structures. Urban ghettos' replace the tranquillity of self-sufficient rural livelihoods. The need to protect the priyacy of the being is no less when development and technological change continuously threaten to place the person into public gaze and pmtend to .' submerge the individual into a seamless web of inter-connected lives. '
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G Natural and inalienable rights .
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40. Privacy is a concomitant of the right of the individual to exerc,i.~e. , r) control over his or qer personality. It finds an origin in the notion that ., there are certain rights which are natµr&l to. pr inherent in a human ' .' .. being. Natural rights are inalienable. b~cause they are inseparable from· · , .•, the human personality. The human element in life is impossible to conceiv.e .. without the existence of natutctl rights. In l690, John Locke had in his, ..., · Second Treatise of Government observed that the lives, liberties and ·. E · estates of individuals are as amatter of funtlamental natural law, a priV.ate :: : ·, preserve. The idea of a private preserve· was ·to create barriers from · ' • outside interference. In 1765, William Blackstone in his, Commentaries on the Laws of England spoke of a "natural liberty:'L ' · There were, in his view;absolute right~ which were vested in the individual '' f;" by the immutable laws· of nature. These absolute rights were divided ' · into right~ of personill security, 'personal liberty and property. The right of personal security involved a legal and uninterrupted enjoyment oflife, " Ibid, at Pages 15-16 "Id at Pages 21-22 "'Illustratively, the Centre for Internet and Society has two interesting articles tracing G · the origin of privacy within Classical Hindu Law and Islamic Law. See Ashna Ashesh and Bhairav Acharya ,"Locating Constructs of Privacy within Classical Hindu Law", The Centre for Internet and Society, available at https://cis-india.orn/internetgovernance/blog/loading-constructs-of-privacy-within-classical-hindu-law. See also Vidushi Marda and Bhairav Acharya, "Identifying Aspects of Privacy in Islamic Law'', Tile Centre for Internet cmd Society, available at https://cis-india.org{intemet- · governance/blog/identifying-aspects-of-privacy-in-islamic-law H·
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A limbs, body, health and reputation by an individual. 41. The notion that certain rights are inalienable was embodied in the American Declaration of Independence (1776) in the following tenns:., . B'' . .
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created eqiial, that they are endowed by their Creator with cei:tain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness". (emphasis supplied)
The term inalienable rights was incorporated in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) adopted by the French C National Assembly in the following tenns: "For its drafters, to ignore, to forget or to depreciate the rights of man are the sole causes of public misfortune and government corruption. These rights are natural rights, inalienable and sacred, the National Assembly recognizes and proclaims them-it does not grant, concede or establish them-and their conservation is the reason for all political communities; within these rights figures resistance to oppression". (emphasis supplied)
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42. In 1921, Roscoe Pound, in his work titled "The Spirit of the Common Law'', explained the meaning of natural rights:
"Natural rights mean simply interests which we think ought to be secured; demands which human beings may make which we think ought to be satisfied. It is perfectly true that neither law nor statecreates them. But it is fatal to all sound thinking to treat them _as legal conceptions. For legal rights, the devices which law employs to secure such of these interests as it is expedient to recognize, are the work of the law and in that sense the work of the state." 47
Two decades later in 1942, Pound in "The Revival of Natural Law" . propounded. that: . .
"Classica·l natural law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had three postulates. One was natural rights, qualities of the ideal or perfect man in a state of perfection by virtue of which he ought to have certain things or be able to do certain things. These
Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, Marshall Jones Company ( 1921 ), at
. JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] .
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were a guarantee stability because the natural rights were A taken to .be immutable and inalienable. (2) The social compact, a postulated contract basis of civil society. Here was a guide to change. (3) An ideal law of which positive laws were only declaratory; an ideal body of perfect precepts governing human relations and ordering human conduct, guaranteeing the natural B rights and expressing the ·social compact."48 (emphasis supplied) 43. In 1955, Edwin W Patterson in "A Pragmatist Looks At Natural Law and Natural Rights" observed that rights which individuals while making a social compact to create a government, reserve to themselves, are natural rights because they originate in a condition of nature and survive the social .compact. In his words:
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. ' · "The basic right~ of the citi~en in our political society are regarded as continuing from a prepolitical condition or as arising in society independently of positive constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions, which merely seek to "secure" or "safeguard" rights D already reserved. These rights are not granted by a benevolent despot to his grateful subjects. The "natural rights" theory thus provided a convenient ideology for the preservation of such important rights as freedom of speech, freedom of religion and procedural due process of law. As a pragmatist, I should prefer E to explain them as individual and social interests which arise or exist normaily in our culture and are tuned into legal rights by being legally protected." 49 44. Natural rights are not bestowed by the state. They inhere in human beings bej:ause they are human. They ~xi st equally in the individual irrespective of class or strata, gender or orientation. 45. Distinguishing an inalienable right to an object from the object itself emphasises the notion of inalienability. All human beings retain their inalienable rights (whatever their situation, whatever their acts, whatever their guilt or innocence). The concept of natural inalienable rights secures autonomy to human beings. But the autonomy is not absolute, for the simple reason that, the concept of inalienable rights Roscoe Pound, "The Revival of Natural Law", Noire Damne Lawyer(1942), Vol. 27, No 4, at page 330 49 Edwin W. Patterson, "A Pragmatist Looks At Natural Law and Natural Rights", in . Arthur L. Harding ed., Natural Law and Natural Rights ( 1955), at pages 62-63
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A postulates that there are some rights which no human being may alienate.· While natural rights protect the right of the individual to choose aiid preserve liberty, yet the autonomy of the individual is not a~solute or total. As a theoretical construct, it would otherwise be 'strictly possible to hire another person to kill oneself or to sell oneself into slavery or servitude. Though these acts are autonomous, they would be in violation · of inalienable rights. This is for the reason that:
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" ... These acts, however autonomous, would be in violation of inalienable rights, as the theories·would have it. They wouli:I be morally invalid, and ineffective actually to alienate inalienable rights. Although self-regarding, they pretend to an autonomy that does not exist. Inalienable rights are precisely directed against such false autonomy. Natural inalienable rights, like othernatural rights, have long rested upon what has been called the law of nature of natural law. Perhaps all of the theories discussed above could be called law of nature or natural law theories. The American tradition, even as early as 1641, ten years before Thomas Hobbes published Leviathan. included claims of natural rights, and these claims appealed to the law of nature, often in terms. Without a moral order of.the law of nature sort, natural inalienable rights are difficult to pose. "'It is . from natural law, and from it alone, that man obtai.ns those rights we refer to as inali(fnable and inviolable.: .Human rights can have no foundation other than natural law." 50 46. The idea.that individuals can have rights against the State'that are prior to rights created by explicit legislation has ·been developed as part of a liberal theory of law propounded by Ronald Dworkin. 'In his seminal work titled "Taking Rights Seriously" 51 (1977), he states that: "Individual rights arc political trumps ·Mld-"by indivfdua'Is. Individuals have rights when, for some reason, a collective goal is not a sufficient justification for denying them what they wish, as individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or injury upon them." 52 (emphasis supplied) Dworkin asserts the existence of a right against the government so Craig A. Ster and Gregory M. Jones, "The Coherence of Natural Inalienable Rights",
UMKC Law Review (2007-08), Volume 76 (4), at pages 971-972 ,,. Ronald Dworkin, 'faking Rights Seriously. Duckworth (1977) " Ibid, at page x.i
JUSTICE KS PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] as essential to protecting the dignity of the individual:
"It makes sense to. say that a man has a fundamental right . · against the Government, in the strong sense, like free speech, if that right is necessary to protect his dignity, or his standing. as ~qually entitled to concern arid· respect, or · some othet personal value of like consequen&'.'"53 · . · (emphasis suppiied) Dealing· with the question whether the Government l,ll~Y ()bridge the rights of others to act when their acts might simply increase the risk,, by however slight or speculative a margin, that some person's right t9 · life or prop'e,rty"'will be violated, Dworkin says : ..
. 671 :
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"But no society that purports to recognize a variety of ri~hts, op the ground that a man's dignity or equality may be invaded in a variety of ways, can accept such a principle54 ••• If rights make sense, then the degrees of their importance cannot be so ·different that some count not at all when others are · D mentioried55 ••• If the; Government does not take rights.seriously, then it does not ·. ; • . ' '6 . • '• •.•
take Jaw seriously either5 ...."
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· Dworkin states that judges should decide.how widely an individual's rights extend: He 'states: . ' .. ~'Indeed, the suggestion that rights can. be demonstrated by a process of history ratlier than by an ,appeal 'io principle shows . either a confusion or no rear' concern tibout what riglits are ...
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Thi~ ·hds'tieen a complex argument, and:I wailr to summai'iz1Ht. F Oor constitutional system rests on a particular moral theory; ·namely, that men have moral rights against the state. The'Clifferentclauses ' "of the Bill of Rights, like the due•pmcess and· equal protection · · clauses, must be understood ·as appealing to moral concepts rather than' l'aying dbwn particular concepts; therefore, a court that undertakes the burden of applying these clauses.fully as law mustbe G. an activist court, in the sense that it must be -prepared to frame Ibid, at page 199 " Ibid, at page 203 " Ibid, at page 204 ,. Ibid, at pag~ 205 · · ·
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and answer questions of political morality ... " 57
A later section of this judgment deals with how natural and inalienable rights have been developed in Indian precedent.
H Evolution of the privacy doctrine in India
47. Among the early deCi.sions of this Court following Kharak Singh was R M Malkani v State of Maharashtra58 . In that case, this Court held that Section 25 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 was not violated because : "Where a person talking on the telephone allows another person to record it or to hear it, it cannot be said that the other person who is allowed to do so is damaging, removing, tampering, touching machinery battery line or post for intercepting or acquainting himself with the contents of any message. There was no element of coercion or compulsion in attaching the tape recorder to the telephone." 59
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This Couit followed the same line of reasoning as it had in Kharak Singh while rejecting a privacy based challenge under Article 21. Significantly, the Court observed that: "Article 21 was invoked by submitting that the privacy of the appellant's conversation was invaded. Article 21 contemplates procedure established by law with regard to deprivation of life or personal liberty. The telephone conversation of an innocent citizen will be protected by Courts against wrongful or high handed interference by tapping the conversation. The protection is not for the guilty citizen against the efforts of the police to vindicate the law and prevent corruption of public s~rvants ..It must not be understood that the Court will tolerate safeguards f<;ir the protection of the citizen to be imperilled by permitting the police to proceed by unlawful or irregular methods." 60 ·
In other words, it was the targeted and specific nature of the G interception which weighed with the Court, the telephone tapping being directed at a guilty person. Hence the Court ruled that the telephone conversation of an innocent citizen will be protected against wrongful 57 Ibid, at page 14 7
sec 471 Ibid, at page 476 (para 20) 60 Ibid, at page 479 (para 31) 58 (1973) 1
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] interference by wiretapping.
48. In Gobind61 , a Bench of three judges of this Court considered a challenge to the validity of Regulations 855 and 856 of State Police Regulations under which a history sheet was opened against the petitioner who had been placed under surveillance. The Bench of three judges adverted to the decision in Kharak Singh and to the validation of the B Police Regulations (other than domiciliary visits at night). By the time the decision was handed down in Gobind, the law in the US had evolved and this Court took note of the decision in Griswold v Connecticut62 ("Griswold") in which a conviction under a statute on a charge of giving information and advice to married persons on contraceptive methods was held to be invalid. This Court adverted to the dictum that C specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights have penumbras which create zones of privacy. The Court also relied upon the US Supreme Cour.t decision in Jane Roe v Henry Wade 63 in which the Court upheld the right of a married woman to terminate her pregnancy as a part of the right of personal privacy. The following observations ofJ ustice Mathew, D who delivered the judgment of the Court do indicate a constitutional recognition of the right to be let alone :. "There can be no doubt that the makers of our Constitution wanted _ to ensure conditions favourable to the pursuit of happiness. They certainly realized as Brandeis, J. said in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States64 , the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect and that only a part of the pain, pleasure, satisfaction of life can be found in material things and therefore, they must be deemed to have conferred upon the individual as against the government . . a sphere where . he should be let alone". .
.These observations follow upon a reference to the Warren and Brandeis article; the two decisions of the US Supreme Court noted earlier; the writings of Locke and Kant; and to dignity, liberty.and autonomy. · 49. Yet a close reading of the decision in Gobind would indicate that the Court eventually did not enter a specifa: finding on the existence G of a right to privacy under the Constitution. The Court indicated that if " (1975) 2 sec 148 381 us 479 (1965) •i410 US 113 (1973) .. 277 us 438 (1928) 65 Supra note 6, at page 155 (para 20)
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tile court cioes find that a particular right sho~ld be protected as a fundamental privacy right, it could be overridden only subject to a C0t}1pelling interest of the State: "There can be no doubt that privacy-dignity claims deserve to be examined with care and to be denied only when an importa.nt countervailing interest is shown to be superior. If the Court does find that a claimed right is entitled to protection as a fundamental privacy right, a law infringing it must satisfy the compelling State interest test. '.fhen the question .would be whether a State interest is of such paramount importance w.ould justify an infringement of the right.'' 66 (emphasis supplied)
as
While emphasising individual autonomy and the dangers of individual privacy being eroded by new de','.elopments that "will make it p~ssible to be heard in the, &treet what is whispered in the closet", the Court had obvious concerns about adopting a broad definition of privacy since the right of privacy "is not explicit in the Constitution". Observing D that the concept of privacy overlaps with liberty, this Court noted thus:
"Individual autonomy, perhaps the central concern of any system oflimited govemnient, is protected in part under our Constitution by explicit constitutional guarantees. In the application of the Constitution our contemplation cannot only be of what has been but what may be. Time works changes and brings irito existence new conditions. Subtler and far reaching means of invading privacy will make it possible to be heard in the street what is whispered in the closet. Yet, too broad a definition of privacy raises serious questions about the propriety .of judicial reliance on a right that is not explicit in the Constitution. Of course, privacy primarily concerns the individual. It therefore relates to and overlaps with the concept of liberty. The most serious advocate of privacy must confess that there are serious problems of defining the essence and scope of the right. Privacy interest in autonomy must also be placed in the context of other rights and values.'' 67 (emphasis supplied) Justice Mathew proceeded to explain what any right of privacy must encompass and protect and found it to be implicit in the concept of 66 Ibid, at page 155 (para 22)
67 Ibid, at page 156 (para 23)
JUSTICE KS PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] ordered liberty:
"Any right to privacy must encompass and protect the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation and child rearing. This catalogue approach to the question is obviously not as instructive as it does not give an analytical picture of the distinctive characteristics of the right of B privacy. Perhaps, the only suggestion that can be offered as unifying principle underlying the concept has been the assertion that a claimed right must be a fundamental right implicit in the ·concept of ordered liberty." 68 In adverting to ordered liberty, the judgment is similar to the statement in the judgment of Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar in Kharak Singh which found the intrusion of the home by nightly domiciliary visits a violation of ordered liberty. The Court proceeded to hold that in any event, the right to privacy will need a case to case elaboration. The following observations were carefully crafted to hold tliat even on the "assumption" that there is an independent right of privacy em.anating from personal liberty, the right to movement and free speech, the right is not absolute: "The right to privacy in any event will necessarily have to go . through a process of case-by-case development. Therefore, even assuming that the right to personal liberty, the right to move freely throughout the territory of India and the freedom of speech create an independent right of privacy as an emanation from them which one can characterize as a fundamental right, we do not think that the right is absolute."69 (emphasis supplied)
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Again a similar "assumpti~n" was made by the Court in the following observations: " ... Assuming that the fundamental rights explicitly guaranteed to ·.a citizen have penumbra! zones and that the right to privacy is itself a fundamental right, that fundamental right n'mst be subject to restriction on the basis of compelling public interest.· As Regulation 856 has the force of law,· it cannot be' said that the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 21 has been
Ibid, at page 156 (para 24) Ibid,'at page 157 (para 28)
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violated by the provisipns contained in it : for, what is guaranteed under that Article is that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except by the procedure established by 'l~w·. We think that the procedure is reasonable having regard to the provisions of Regulations 853 (c) and 857."70 (emphasis suppiied)
The Court declined to interfere with the regulations.
50. The judgment in Gobind does not contain a clear statement of principle by the Court of the existence of an independent right of privacy or of such a right being an emanation from explicit constitutional guarantees. The Bench, which consisted of three judges, may .have C been constrained by the dictum in the latter part of Kharak Singh. Whatever be the reason, it is evident that in several places Justice Mathew proceeded on the "assumption" that if the right to privacy is protected under the Constitution, it is a part of ordered liberty and is not absolute but subject to restrictions tailor-made to fulfil a compelling state interest. This analysis of the decision in Gobind assumes significance because D subsequent decisions of smaller Benches have proceeded on the basis that Gobind does indeed recognise a right to privacy. What the contours of such a right are, emerges from a reading of those decisions. This is the next aspect to which we now turn. ·
51. Malak Singh v State of Punjab arid Haryana 71 ("Malak Singh") dealt with the provisions of Section 23 of the Punjab Police Rules .under which a surveillance register was to be maintained among. other persons, of all convicts of a particular description and petsons who were reasonably believed to be habitual offenders whether or not, they were convicted. The validity of the rules was not questio·n~d in view of the decisions in Kharak Singh and Gobind. The rules provided for modalities of surveillance. Justice 0 Chinnappa Reddy speaking for a Bench of two judges of this Court recognised the need for surveillance on habitual and potential offenders. In his view:
"Prevention of crime is one of the prime .purP.oses of .the constitution of a police force. The preamble to the Police Act, 1861 says: "Whereas it is expedient to reorganise the police imd to make it a more efficient instrument for the prevention and detection of crime." Section 23 of the Police Act prescribes it as the duty of police officers "to collect and communicate intelligence
Ibid, at page 157-158 (para 31)
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JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]
affecting the public peace; to prevent the commission of offences A and public nuisances". In connection with these duties it will be necessary to keep discreet surveillance over reputed bad characters, habitual offenders and oth~r potential offenders .. Organised crime cannot be successfolly fought without close watch of suspects. But, surveillance may be intrusive and it may so B seriously encroach on the privacy of a citizen as to infringe his fU;ndamental right to personal liberty guaranteed by Article'~zt. of the Constitution and the freedom of'movement guarartteed by,Articje 19( 1)( d). That cannot be 'permitted. This is recognii~ifby .the Punjab Police Rules themselves. Rule 23.7, ·i' whichprescripes,tne rriode of sur\reill.ance, permits fu.¢close \vatch · C. · over th.e mtiveriients of the person under surVei.llance butwitho~1t • · any illegal':intcirf¢rence. Permissible surveillance is only t9 the· . extent\)ffclose ·;vatch'qver.the Tl).oveme~ts of the person under · · surveillance ahd no i:rore: So Jong ·as surveillance is for the purpos·e of preventing· crime and is confined to the limits prescribed by D Rule 23:7 we do not think a person whose name is included in the surveillance register can have a genuine cause for coi~plaint. We may notice here that interference in accordance with law and for the prevention of ~isorder and crime is an exception recognised even by European Convention of Human Rights to the right to respect for a person's private and family life. Article 8 of the E Convention reads as follows: •
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"(l) Everyone's right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence shall be recognised. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right, except such as is in accordance with law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of nt1tional security, public safety, for the prevention of disorder and crime or for the protection of health or morals.""72 (emphasis supplied)
The Court dW n,ot consider it unlawfulfoqhe PQlice to-cond\tCJ,. surveillance so long a's·it was for, the purpose of preventing c~ime arid · G· was confined.to the limits presciibed by Rule 23.7 which, while authorising a close watch on the movement' of a person under surveillance, contained . a condition that this should be without any illegal interference. The object being to prevent crime, the Court held that the person who is subject to
Ibid, at pages 424-425 (para 6)
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surveillance is not entitled to access the register nor was a pre-decisional hearing compliant with natural justice warranted. Confidentiality, this Court held. was required in the interest of the public, including keeping in confidence the sources of infonnation. Again the Court held: "But all this does not mean that the police have a licence to enter the names of whoever they like (dislike?) in the surveillance register; nor can the surveillance be such as to squeeze the fundamental freedoms guaranteed to all citizens or to obstruct the free exercise and enjoyment of those freedoms; nor can the surveillance so intrude as to offend the dignity of the individual. Surveillance of persons who do not fall within the categories mentioned in Rule 23.4 or for reasons unconnected with the prevention of crime. or excessive surveillance falling beyond the limits prescribed by the rules, will entitle a citizen to the court's protection which the court will not hesitate to give. The very Rules which prescribe the conditions for making entries in the surveillance register and the mode of surveillance appear to recognise the caution and care with which the police officers are required to proceed. The note following Rule 23.4 is instructive. It enjoins a duty upon the police officer to construe the rule strictly and confine the entries in the surveillance register to the class of persons mentioned in the rule. Similarly Rule 23.7 demands that there should be no illegal interference in the guise of surveillance. Surveillance, therefore, has to be unobtrusive and within bounds." 73
The observations in Malak Singh on the issue of privacy indicate that an encroachment on privacy infringes personal liberty under Article 21 and the right to the freedom of movement under Article 19(1 )( d). F Without specifically holding that privacy is a protected constitutional value under Article 19 or Article 21, the judgment of this Court indicates that serious encroachments on privacy impinge upon personal liberty and the freedom of movement. The Court linked such an encroachment with the dignity of the individual which would be offended by surveillance G bereft of procedural protections and carried out in a manner that would obstruct the free exercise of freedoms guaranteed by the fundamental rights.
52. State of Maharashtra v Madhukar Narayan Mardikar74 73 Ibid, at page 426 (para 9)
JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]
is another decision by a two-judge Bench which dealt with a case of a A police inspector who was alleged to have attempted to have nonconsensual intercourse with a woman by entering the hutment where she lived. Following an enquiry, he was dismissed from service but the punishment was modified, in appeal, to removal so as to enable him to apply for pensionary benefits. The High Court quashed the punishment B both on the ground of a violation of the principles of natural justice, and by questioning the character of the victim. Holding that this approach of the High Court was misconceived, Justice AM Ahmadi (as the learned Chief fostice then was) held that though the victim had admitted "the dark side of her life", she was yet entitled to her privacy : ''The High Court observes that since Banubi is an unchaste woman C it would be extremely unsafe to allow the fortune and career of a government official to be put in jeopardy upon the uncorroborated version of such a woman who makes no secret of her illicit intimacy with another person. She was honest enough to admit the dark side of her life. Even a woman of easy virtue is entitled to D privacy and no one can invade her privacy as and when he likes. So also it is not open to any and every person to violate her person as and when he wishes. She is entitled to protect her person if there is an attempt to violate it against her wish. She is equally entitled to the protection of law. Therefore, merely because she is a woman of easy E virtue, her evidence cannot be thrown overboard. At the most the officer called upon to evaluate her evidence would be required to administer caution unto himself before accepting her evidence." 75 (emphasis supplied) As the above extract indicates, the issue before this Court ·was F essentially based on the appreciation of the evidence of the victim by the High Court. However, the observations of this Court make a strong statement of the bodily integrity ofa woman, as an incident of her privacy. 53. The decision In Life Insurance Corporation of India v ProfManubhai D Shah76 , incon-ectly attributed to the decision in Indian G Express Newspapers(Bombay) Pvt Ltd v Union of lndia 77 the principle that the right to free expression under Article 19(l)(a) includes "(1991) 1sec57 75 Ibid, at pages 62-63 (para 8)
"(1992) 3 sec 637 (1985) 1 sec 641
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A the privacy of communications. The judgment of this Cou1t in Indian Express cited a U N Report but did no more. 54. The decision which has assumed some significance is Rajagopal7 8 • Jn that case, in a proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution, a writ was sought for restraining the state and prison B authorities from interfering with the publication of an autobiography of a condemned prisoner in a magazine. The prison authorities, in a communication to the publisher. denied the claim that the autobiography had been authored by the prisoner while he was confined to jail and opined that a publication in the name of a convict was against prison rules. The prisoner in question had been found guilty of six murders and C was sentenced to death. Among the questions which were posed by this Court for decision was whether a citizen could prevent another from writing about the life story of the former and whether an unauthorized publication infringes the citizen's right to privacy. Justice Jeevan Reddy speaking for a Bench of two judges recognised that the right of privacy D has two aspects: the first affording an action in t01t for damages resulting from an unlawful invasion of privacy, while the second is a constitutional right. The judgment traces the constitutional protection of privacy to the decisions in Kharak Singh and Gobind. This appears from the following observations:
" ... The first decision of this Court dealing with this aspect is Kharak Singh v. State ofU.P. [(1964) 1 SCR 332: AIR 1963 SC 1295 : ( 1963) 2 Cri LJ 329] A more elaborate appraisal of this right took place in a later decision in Gobind v.State ofM.P.[(1975) 2 SCC 148: 1975 SCC (Cri) 468] wherein Mathew, J. speaking for himself, Krishna Iyer and Goswami, JJ. traced the origins of this right and also pointed out how the said right has been dealt with by the United States Supreme Court in two of its well-known decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut [381 US 479 : 14 L Ed 2d 510 (1965)] and Roe v. Wade [410 US 113 : 35 L Ed 2d 147 (1973)] ... "79 The decision in Rajagopal considers the decisions in Kha