Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab
Landmark judgment · Criminal law — TADA upheld with safeguards against misuse.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 11 March 1994
- Judge
- Justice S. Ratnavel Pandian
- Neutral citation
- 1994 INSC 112
- Reported in
- [1994] 2 S.C.R. 375
- Result
- Disposed off
- Acts & sections
- Article 21 Constitution, Article 14 Constitution, Section 9 CrPC, Section 164 CrPC, Section 438 CrPC, Section 167 CrPC, Article 50 Constitution, Section 406 CrPC
- Subject
- Criminal
Full judgment
' KART AR SINGH
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v. STATE OF PUNJAB AND K.IRP A SHANKAR RAJ
v.
STATE OF U.P. MARCH 11, 1994
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[S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN, M.M. PUNCHHI, K. RAMASWAMY, S.C. AGRAWAL AND R.M. SAHA!, JJ.]
17ie Terrorist and Dismptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987: Act 28 of 1987-Constitutional validity of 17ie Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984 : Act 61 of 1984-Constitutional validity of
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17ie Terrorist and Dismptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 (Act 31 of 1985)-Constitutional validity of Central Legislature-Legislative competence of-Held Acts fall within the competence of Parliament-Acts held covered by Entry 1 of List I oj Seventh Schedule to Constitution. Terrorism is not mere 'Public Order'-It contemplates grave emergent situation affecting sovereignty and integrity of country.
Substantive Offences under the Acts require intention on the part of persons committing terrorist acts-Principle of speedy trial is contemplated and manifested under TADA Acts. 'Public Order'--Scope of-!t is confined to disorders of lesser gravity having impact within boundaries of State-Activities of serious nature threatening security and integrity of the country are related to defence of India. 17ie Terrorist and Dismptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987: Section 2( J)(a)(i}-'Abetment'-What iS-Clause held impermissibly vague-lntention is necessary to prove abetment
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Section 2(l)(f)-'Notified area'-Declaration as to- Government should make pen·odic review.
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Section 3 (as amended by TADA (Prevention) Amendment Act, 1993) and Section 4-Te"orist Acts-Dismptive Activities-Offences also covered by ordinary laws-Provision for harsh punishment under TADA Act-In view B · of the object and purpose of Act Sections held not violative for absence of guiding principle whether to proceed under ordinary law or TADA. Section 5-Mere possession of arms and ammunition-Whether sufficient to prove offence.
Section 8-Provision for foifeiture of property-Held not violative of Articles 14 and 21. Section 9-Designated Courts-Validity of-Held not violative of Entry 65-List II and Articles 233, 234 and 235 of Constitution.
Section 9(7}-Designated Court-Judge-Superannuation-Provision for continuance after superannuation-Held not violative of Article 21-Provision does not affect independence of judiciary-However at the time of appointment it should be ensured that Judge has sufficient tenure.
Section 11(2)(3)-Held not violative of Article 14-Designated Courts-Order of transfer of cases-Concurrence of Chief Justice of India is sine qua non-According of concurrence by GI is a statutory function and not a Judicial function-According of concu"ence though imperative but passing of transfer order by Government is not imperative-Concurrence by GI is not open to Judicial Review but final order of transfer passed by Government is subject to Judicial Review. Section 15(As amended by TADA (Amedment) Act, 1993)-Confession-What is-Confession to Police Officer not below in rank of Superintendent of Police-Admissibility of-Fairness in recording the confessionSection 15 held not violative of Articles 14 and 21--Duty of Court deciding admissibility of confession-What is-Oppressive and bmtal behaviour in obtaining confession deprecated-Guidelines for ensuring fairness in obtaining confession laid down-Amendments in Act & Rules suggested Section 16(1) (As it stood prior to its amendemnt in 1993).
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KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
Designated Court-Conduct of proceeding m Camera-Legality of-Right to open trial is not absolute.
Section 16(2) (3}-Designated Court-Withholding the identity rf witnesses by-Legality of-Held there is no constitutional or statutory constraint against keeping the identity of witnesses secret in extraordinary circumstances.
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Section 19-f'rovision for direct appeal to Supreme Courf-Held valid-In view of the abnonnal procedure-Necessary amendment of Section suggested. Section 20(3}-Executive Magistrate-Power to record confession-Section :1e/d not violative of Articles 14 and 21 empowering Executive Magistrate to record confession is not contrary to criminal jurispmdence.
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Section 20(4) (As amended by Act 43 of I993}-Provision for transmission of accused to Executive Magistrate and extendi11g the pe1iod of detention-Held not ultra vires.
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Section 20(7}-0ffences punisltable under TADA-Exclusion of anticipatory bail in respect of-Held not violative of personal liberty. Section 20(8}-Bail in respect of TADA offences-imposition of conditions for grant of bail in addition to existing conditions under the Code of Criminal Procedur,,_Held not unreasonable.
Section 22-Provision that identification ofproclaimed offenders on the basis of photograph shall have same evidentiary value as evidence of test identification parade held invalid. The Terrorist Affected Area< (Special Courts) Act, 1984 :
Section 2( 1)(i}-'Terrorist affected areas'-Declaration of-State
Govenunent should niake periodic review as to.
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Section 3-Central Government-Power to declare 'terrorist affected' area-constitution of Judicial Zone-Section held not vague and without G guidelines-Declaration of terrorist affected areas-Essential prequisites for--What are. Constitution of India, 1950 : Articles 245, 246 and 248-Sevemh Schedul,,_List I--Ent1ies I, 2, 2A
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[1994) 2 S.C.R.
A and 97-List II--Ent1ies I, 2 and 97-List III-Entries I and 2-Scope of Seventh Schedule-Legislative Entires-Principles of constructionEntries should not be constmed in a ntllToW and pedantic mannel'-Widest amplitude should be given to entries-Duty of court-Examination with refererice to doctrine of 'Pith and substance'.
Doctrine of 'Pith and substance'-What is. Article 14-Classification-Test of-What is-£.xistence of two procedures-One procedure harsh and oppressive against othel'-Reasonableness and validity of
Legislantre-Power to make classification of 'offences and offenders'-· Classification of offences and offenders under TADA held not discriminatory. Article 20(3/-Testimonial compulsio1t-Protection against-Scope of
Article 21-l'ersonal libertr-Scope and object of-Exclusion of provision of anticipatory bail in respect of TADA offences-Held not violative of Article 21. Imposition of conditions for grant of bail in respect of TADA offences-Held not violative of Article 21.
Procedure established by law-Procedure as well as substantive law-Need for just and fairness in. Human Rights-Police-Extorting of confession-Use of third degree methods fo,....../Jeprecation of
Speedy trial-Need fo1'-Speedy trial is contemplated by TADA Acts. Article 5!>-Separation of Powers-Judiciary-Executive conferment of judicial functions on Executive Magistrates-Held not contrary to Article 50.
Article 226-Power to entertain bail applications in respect of TADA offences-Held High Court has jurisdiction to entertain such an application--But such power should be exercised most sparingly in rare cases-Judicial discipline and comity requires that High Courts should refrain from exercising jurisdiction in bail applications under special Acts. Doctrine of ComifrApplicability of
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KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJA!l
Article 254-Central Law Amendment to-State legislature has power to amend Central Law.
Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Sections 24 to 3()-Scope of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Section 164-Confession-Recording of-Nature and object of the Provision-Explained.
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Section 438-Anticipatory bail-Exclusion in respect of TADA Offences-Held valid. Code of Criminal Procedure (UP Amendment Act 16 of 1976} : Section 9-Deletion of provision of anticipatory bail-Held Section is not ultra vires for lack of competence of State legislature-Act is not violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21.
Interpretation of Statutes : Statute-Legislative intentiolt-Mode of ascertainment-What is.
Statut,,.....Presumption of Constitutionality-Judges can take notice of matters of common knowledge and authenticated report. Criminal Law-Offence-Mens Rea-Must be read into status unless expressly or impliedly excluded.
Maxim-'Actus Non Facit Ream Nisi Mens sitrea'-Meaning of and exceptions to. Words and Phrases-'Abet', 'Offence' and 'Compelled'-Meaning of
'Legislative power' and 'Judicial power'-Meaning of
These writ petitions, Criminal appeals and Special Leave Petitions have been filed challenging the vires of the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984, the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities G (Prevention) Act, 1985 and the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987-commonly known as TADA Act. Further, Constitutional validity of various provisions of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activties (Prevention) Act, 1987 and the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984 as well as Section 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (U.I'. Amendment) Act, 1976 was also challenged.
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Disposing the matters, this Court HELD : By the court 1. The Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984, the
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985, and The Ter·
B rorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 fall within the legislative competence of Parliament in view of Article 248 read with Entry 97 of List I and could fall within the ambit of Entry I of List I, namely, 'Defence of India'. (559 H, 560 AJ
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2. As the meaning of the word "abet" as defined under Section 2(1)(i)(a) of1987 Act is vague and imprecise, 'actual knowledge or reason to believe' on the part of a 11erson to be brought within the definition, should be read into that provision instead of reading that jlrovision down. (560 BJ
3. The power vested on the Central Government to declare any area as 'terrorist affected area' within the terms of Section 3(1) of the 1984 Act does not suffer from any invalidity. (560 CJ
4. Sections 3 and 4 of the 1987 Act are liable to be struck down on the grounds that both the Sections cover the acts which constitute offences nuder ordinary laws and that there is no guiding principle as to when a person is to be prosecuted under these Sections. [560 DJ 5. Section 8 of the 198'1 Act is not violative of Articles 14 and 21 of tbe Constitution. (560 DJ
6. The challenge to the validity of Section 9 of 1987 Act on the ground of lack of legislative competence has no merit. It is not violative of Entiy 65, List II of the Seventh Schedule and Articles 233, 234 and 235 of the Constitution; (560 EJ
7. Sub-secHon (7) of Section 9 of the 1987 Act does not offend any constitutional provision. However, the Central Govenmcnt and the State Governments at the time of appointing a Judge or an Additional Judge to the Designated Court should keep in mind that the Judge designate has sufiicient tenure of service even at the initial stage of appointment so that no one may entertain any grieVance for continuance of service of a Judge
H of the Designated Court after attainment of superannuation. [560 F]
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KARTAR v.STATEOFPUNJAB
8. The order granting 'concurrence' by the Chief Justice of India on a motion moved in that behalf by the Attorney General to transfer any case pending before a Designated Court in that State to any other Designated Court within that State or in other State, is only a statutory order and not a judicial order since there is no adjudication of any 'tis' and determina· tion of any issue. Therefore, sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 11 of 1987 Act are not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. (560 G-H, 561 A] 9. Section 15 of the 1987 Act is neither violative of Article 14 nor of 21. But the Central Government may take note of guidelines laid down for ensuring that the confession obtained in the pre-indictment interrogation is not tainted with any vice and is in strict conformity with well recognised principles and fundamental fairness and incorporate them by appropriate amendments in the Act and the Rules made therunder. (561 B] 10. The challenge made to Section 16(1) of 1987 Act does not require any consideration in view of the substitution of the newly introduced sub-section by Amendment Act 43 of 1994 giving discretion to the Desig· nated Court either to hold or not to hold the proceedings in camera; (561 C) 11. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 16 of the 1987 Act are not liable to be struck down. However, in order to ensure the purpose and object of cross-examination, the identity, names and addresses of the witnesses may be disclosed before the trial commences but subject to an exception that the Court for weighty reasons in its wisdom may decide not to disclose the identity and addresses of the witnesses especially of potential witnesses, whose life may be in danger. (561 D, E]
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12. The appeal provisions provided under Section 19 are not con· stitutionally invalid. But having regard to the practical difficulties to be faced by the aggrieved person under the appeal provisions, the Parliament may devise a suitable mode of redress by making the necessary amend· ments in the appeal provisions. (561 F)
13. Sub-sections (3) and (4)(a) of Section 20 of1987 Act do not suffer from any infirmity on account of the inclusion of the Executive Magistrate and Special Executive Magistrate within the purview of Sections 164 and 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of their application in ' relation to a case involving an offence punishable under the TADA Act or H
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any rule made thereunder. Likewise, clause (a) of Section 15 of the Special Courts Act, 1984 does not suffer from any infirmity. [561 G-H) 14. Sections 20(7) of the 1987 Act excluding the application of Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to any case under the Act and the Rules made thereunder, cannot be said to have deprived the personal liberty of a person as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. [562 A) 15. The deletion of the application of section 438 in the State of Uttar Pradesh by Section 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (U.P.) Amendment, 1976 does not offend either Article 14 or 19 or 21 of the Constitution and the State Legislature is competent to delete that Section, which is one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List (List III) of the Seventh Schedule and such deletion is valid under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. [562 B-C) 16. Sub-Section (8) of Section 20 of 1987 Act imposing the ban on release of bail of a person acmsed of any offence punishable under the Act or any rule made thereunder, but diluting the ban only on the fulfilment of the two conditions mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of that sub-section cannot be said to be infringing the principle adumbrated in Article 21 of the Constitution. (562 DJ 17. Though it cannot be said that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an application for bail under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass orders either way, relating to the cases under the Act of 1987, that power should be exercised sparingly, that too only in rare and appropriate cases in extreme circumstances. But the judicial discipline and comity of Courts require that the High Courts should refrain from exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction in such matters. (562 E-F) 18. Section 22 of the 1987 Act is struck down as being opposed to the fair and reasonable procedure enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. [562 F) 19. In order to ensure higher level of scrutiny and applicability of TADA Act, there must be a Screening Committee or a Review Committee constituted by the Central Government consisting of the Home Secretary, Law Secretary and other concerned Secretaries of the various Depart-
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~I KARTAR v.STATEOFPUNJAB
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ments to review all the TADA cases instituted by the Central Government as well as to have a quarterly administrative review, reviewing the States' action in the application of the TADA provisions in the respective States, and the incidental questions arising in relation thereto. Similarly, there must be a Screening or Review Committee at the State level constituted by the respective States consisting of the Chief Secretary, Home Secretary, Law Secretary, Director-General of Police (Law and Order) and other officials as the respective Government may think it fit, to review the action of the enforcing authorities under the Act and screen the cases registered under the provisions of the Act and decide the further course of action in every matter and so on. [522 D-E)
Quaere (i) :- Whether the three TADA Acts are unconstitutional for lack of Legislative Competence ?
Per S. Ratnaval Pandian, J. (For himself), M.M. Punchhi and S.C. Agrawal, fl.
Ramaswamy, J. (Concurring)
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1. The Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 and The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 are not ultra vires on the ground of lack of legislative competence and as such these Acts are not liable to be struck down. [462 D-E)
2. Having regard to the limitation placed by Article 245(1) on the legislative power of the legislature of the State in the matter of enactment of laws having application within the territorial limits of the State only; the ambit of the field of legislation with respect to "public order" under Entry I in the State List has to be confined to disorders of lesser gravity
having an impact within the boundaries of the State. Activities or a 1nore
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serious nature which theaten the security and integrity of the country as a whole would not be within the legislative field assigned to the States under Entry I of the State List but would fall within the ambit of Entry I of the Union List relating to defence of India and in any event under the residuary power conferred on Parliament under Article 248 read with Entry 97 of the Union List. [458 C-E)
3. The terrorism, the TADA Act contemplates, cannot be classified H
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as mere disturbance of 'Public Order' disturbing the "even tempo of the life community of any specified locality" but it is much more, rather a grave emergent situation created either by external forces particularly at the frontiers of this country or by anti-nationals throwing a challenge to the very existence and sovereignty of the country in its democratic policy. This view gets strengthened from the very definition of the expression 'terrorist act' as defined in Section 2(1)(h) and the expression 'disruptive activity' as defined under Section 2(1)(d), of the 1987 Act. Thus the submission that the preamble of the Act gives a clue that the terrorist and disruptive activities only mean a virulenl form of the disruption of public order is inconceivable and unacceptable. (459 D, E, H, 460 G]
Lakhi Narayan Dass v. Province of Bihar, A.l.R. (1950) F.C. 59; Romes/; Tl1appar v. State oj Madras, (1950] S.C.R. 594; Rev. Stainslaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1977] 2 S.C.R. 611; As/wk Kumar Di.xit v. State of U.P., A.LR. (1987) All. 235 (F.B.); Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee and Ors. v. Bank of Commerce, A.J.R. (1947) P.C. 60; Ram [(Jishana Ramnath Aganval D v. Secretwy Municipal Committee, (1950] S.C.R. 15; Kera/a Stale Electricity Board v. lndian Aluminium Co., (1976] 1 S.C.R. 552 and The Superilllendent, Celltral Prison v. Dr. Lohia, (1960] 2 S.C.R. 821, referred to.
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Observations of Hidayalullah, CJ in Arnn Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (1970] 3 S.C.R. 288, relied on. 4. The impugned legislation does not fall under Entry 1 of List II, namely, 'public order'. The impugned Act, therefore, falls within the legislative competence of Parliament in view of Article 248 read with Entry 97 of List I and it is not necessary to consider whether it falls under any of the Entries in List 1 of List III. However, the impugned Act could fall within the ambit of Entry 1 of List I, nami,fy 'Defence of India'. [460 H, 461 A]
5. The definition of the expressions 'terrorist act' and 'disruptive activity' under Section 2(1)(h) and (d) of 1987 Act respectively are conG jointly brought under the definition of the word 'terrorist act' in Act 61 of 1984. Therefore, the Act of 1984 also cannot be said to have contemplated only 'Public Order' but envisages a more grave situation threatening the sovereignity and Integrity of India. (462 C-D]
6. \~11ile examining the question of legislative competence of Parlia-
H ment to make a law, the proper approach is to determine whether the
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r KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
subject matter of the legislation falls in the State List which Parliament A cannot enter. Ir the law does not fall in the State List, the Parliament would have the legislative competence to pass the law by virtue of the residuary powers under Article 248 read with Entry 97 of the Union List and it would not be necessary to go into the question whether it falls under any entry in the Union List or Concurrent List. [454 Fl
Union of India v. H.S. Dillon, [1972) 2 S.C.R. 33; S.P. Mittal v. Union o,' India, [1983) 1 S.C.R. 729 andKhandelwal Metal Works v. Union of India, [1985] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 750, referred to. 7. The entries in the legislative lists mnst not be construed in a narrow and pedantic sense and that widest amplitude must be given to the language of these entries. Sometimes the entires in different lists or the same list may be found to overlap or to be in direct conflict with each other. In that event it is the duty of !he Court to find out its true intent and purpose and to examine the particular legislation in its 'pith and substance' to determine whether it fits in one or other of the lists. [455 B-C]
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Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of U.P., [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 623 and India Cemellt Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 692, referred to.
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8. The doctrine of 'pith and substance' is applied when the legislative competence of a legislature with regard to a particular enactment is challenged with reference to the entries in the various lists i.e. a law dealing with the subject in one list is also touching on a subject in another list. In such a case, what has to be ascertained is the pith and substance of the enactment. On a scrutiny of the Act in question, if found, that the legislation is in substance one on a matter assigned to the legislature enacting that statute, then that Act as a whole must be held to be valid notwithstanding any incidental trenching upon matters beyond its competence i.e. on a matter included in the List belonging to the other legislature. To say differently, incidental encroachment is not altogether forbidden. [455 D-E]
Prafu/la Kumar Mukherjee and Ors. v. Bank of Commerce, Khulna, A.I.R. 34 (1947) P.C. 60; Sztbramanyan Chettiar v. Muttuswamy Goundan, (1940) F.C.R. 188; re. 17ie Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV of 1938, A.LR. (1939) FC 1; Governor-General in Council v. Province of Madras, A.I.R. (1945) P.C. 98; Union of India v. H.S. Dhillon, [1972] 2 SCR 33 and
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J&K State v. M.S. Farooqui, (1972) 3 SCR 881, referred to.
Speedy Trial is contemplated by TADA Acts.
9. Though there is no explicit manifestation of the expression, 'speedy trial' either in the preamble or in any of the provisions of the TADA Acts as in 1984 (Special Courts) Act, the scope and intendment of the various provisions of these TADA Acts perceivably conveys that the TADA Acts also contemplate speedy trial of cases. In fact, the 'Statement of Objects and Reasons' of 1985 Act reading, "This is a new and overt phase of terrorism which requires to be taken serious note of and dealt with effectively and expeditiously" makes it clear that the Constitution of Designated Courts was for the speedy and expeditious trial of offences under the impugned legislation. (463 G-H, 464 A) 10. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speeedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result from impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the commission of the offence till it consummates into a finality, can be averted. [465 E-F) 11. The right to a speedy trial is not only an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration, to minimise anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation and to limit the possibility of impairing the ability of an accused to defend himself but also there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial. This right has been actuated in the recent past and the courts have laid down a series of decisions opeing up new vistas of fundam.,ntal rights. [464 H, 465 A)
12. of course, no length of time is per se too long to pass scrutiny under the principle of Speedy Trial nor the accused is called upon to show G the actual prejudice by delay of disposal of cases. On the other hand, the Court has to adopt a balancing approach by taking note of the possible prejudices and disadvantages to be suffered by the accused by avoidable delay and to determine whether the accused in a criminal proceeding has been deprived of his right of having speedy trial with unreasonable delay H which would be identified by the factors; (1) Length of delay, (2) the
KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
justification for the delay, (3) the accused's assertion of his right to speedy A trial and (4) prejudice casued to the accused by such delay. However, the fact of delay is dependent on the circumstances of each case because reasons for delay will vary, such as delay in investigation on account of the wide-spread ramification of crimes and its designed network either nationally or internationally, the deliberate absence of witness or witnesses, crowded dockets on the file of the Court etc. [467 B-D) 13. When the issue under debate is examined in the light of the above enunciated principle of speedy trial, the said principle, expressly contemplated in the 1984 Act and manifested in the other two TADA Acts under vaious provisions is evidently incorporated as the essential feature of those Acts. There can be no controversy or difference of opinion in invoking the speedy trial of cases under the impugned Acts. [467 El 14. Keeping in view the doctrine of 'speedy trial' which is read into Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution and which concept is manifested in the Special Courts Act, 1984 and TADA Act, 1987, the Designated Courts should dispose of the cases pending before them without giving room for any complaint of unreasonable delay. The Government concerned should ensure that no vacancy of Presiding Officer of the Designated Court remains vacant and should take necesary steps to fill up the vacancy as soon as any vacancy arises and also if necessitated, should constitute more Designated Courts so that the undertrials charged with the provisions of TADA do not languish in jail indefinitely and the cases are disposed of expeditiously. (562 G-H, 563 A)
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Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 S.C.R 621; Hussainara F Khatoon and Ors. (I) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 S.C.C. 81; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, [1979] 1 SCR 392; Hussainara Khatton and Ors. v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1979) 3 S.C.R 169; Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna, (1979) 3 SCR 532; Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. v. Home Secretary State of Bihar, Govt. of Bih01; G Patna, (1979) 3 SCR 1276; Karda Pahadia v. State of Bihar, (1983) 2 SCC 104; T. V. Vathesswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1983) 2 SCR 348 andAbdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992] 1 SCC 225, referred to. Beavers v. Haubert, 198 US 77, 87 [1905); Strunk v. United States, 412 US 434 (1973) and United States v. Mac Donald, 485 U.S. 850 [1977], H
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referred to. Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) p.1400, referred to.
Role of Police in implementation of TADA Acts.
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15. It is heart-rending to note that day and day out Courts come across with the news of blood-curdling incidents of police brutality and atrocities, alleged to have been committed, in utter disregard and in all breaches of humanitarian law and universal human rights as well as in total negation of the constitutional guarantees and human decency. Courts are undoubtedly committed to uphold human rights even as a part of longstanding heritage and as enshrined in out constitutional law. This perspective needs to be kept in view by every law enforcing authority because the recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of the citizens is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. If the human rights are outraged, then the Court should set its face against such violation of human rights by exercising its majestic judicial authority. (558 G-H, 559 A] 16. The protection that the citizens enjoy under the Rule of Law are the quintessence of two thousand years of human struggling from Adams. It is not commonly realised how easily this may be lost. There is no known method of retaining them but by eternal vigilance. There is no institution to which the duty can be delegated except to the judiciary. If the law enforcing authority becomes a law breaker, it breeds contempt for law, it invites every man to become a law unto himself and ultimately it invites anarchy. (559 B-C]
Per Sahai, J. (Concuning) :
1. The furee TADA Acts-Act 61 of1984, Act 31 of 1985, and Act 28 of 1987 liave been validly enacted by the Parliament in exercise of its power under Entry 1 of List III of the Constitution. (627 A]
2. Power to frame or enact law for the governance of the country by the supreme body exercising the sovereign power is known as legislative power. In a democrary which has opted for federal structure of governance with a written constitution the legislative powers either of the Central or the State Legislature are derived from the Constitution itself. In our
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KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
Constitution the Legislatures under Articles 246 have plenary powers. A Both are snpreme in their sphere. But the field of legislative activity of the two soveign legislatures is regulated and is exercised in consonance with Entry in List I and II of the VII Schedule. Apart from exclusive field of activity provision is made empowering both the legislatures to exercise legislative power in respect of any of the matters enumerated in List III in B the Seventh Schedule known as concurrent list. [610 F ·H; 611 A] 3. From the language used in Entry I of List III it is apparent that the Entry is couched in very wide terms. The words following the expression 'criminal law' enlarge the scope to any matter which can validly be con· sidered to be criminal in nature. The exercise of power under this entry, C therefore, has to be construed liberally so as to give full play to the legisla· tive activity. The width of the entry, however, is controlled by the latter expression which takes away the power of either legislature to legislate in respect of offences against laws with respect to any of the matters specified in List I or List II. Since this part restricts and narrows the ambit of the D entry it has to be construed strictly. Since under the Federal structure the law made by the Parliament has supermacy any enactment made in exercise of power under Entry in concurrent list shall have over-riding effect subject to restrictions that may be spelt out from the entry itself. A legislation by . Union Parliament to be valid under this entry must satisfy two requirments; one, that it must relate to criminal law and the offence should not be such E as has been or could be provided against laws with respect to any of the matters specified in List II. [611G-H,612 A-Bl Union of India v. H.S. Dhi//011, A.I.R. (1972) S.C. 1061, referred to.
4. What is a crime in a given society at a particular time has a wide connotation as the concept of crime keeps on changing with change in political, economic and. social set-op of the conntry. Various legislations dealing with economic offences or offences dealing with violation of industrial activity or breach of taxing provision are ample proof of it. The Constitution makers foresaw the eventuality; therefore, they conferred such powers both on Central and State Legislatures to make laws in this regard. Such right includes power to define a crime and provide for its punishment. Use of the expression 'including all matters included in the Indian Penal Code at the commencement of the Constitution' in Entry I of List III is unequivocal indication of comprehensive nature of this entry.
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A It further empowers the legislature to make laws not only in respect of matters covered by the IPC but any other matter which could reasonably and justifiably be considered to be criminal in nature. Terrorist or disruptive activity is criminai in content, reach and effect. The Central and State Legislature both, therefore, are empowered to legislate in respect of such B an activity in exercise of the power conferred under Entry 1 of the concurrent list. But this wide power is otherwise controlled and restricted by the latter part of the entry. It carves out an exception by precluding either of the legislatures from exercising the power if it is in respect of offence against laws with respect to any of the matters specified in List I or II. The controversy, narrows dmm to if the offences under the TADA are such in respect of which the State Legislature could make a law. In other words if the legislation relating to TADA c.an fall in Entry 1 of List II then the State legislature would have competence to make a law under this entry and create offences for violation of such law under item 64 of List II and the Central Legislature would be precluded from making any law. But that D would happen if it is held that law relating to TADA is either in fact or in pith and substance a law relating to 'public order'. (612 D-H, 613 A-BJ
5. 'Terrorism constitute a direct repudiation of liberal and human values and principles, and that terrorist ideology is ... and constantly deployed in a struggle to defame and discredit democracy'. The terrorism with which our country is faced is sponsored terrorism. Terrorism whether it is sponsored or revolutionary or even political by it.• nature cannot be considered to be public order as explained by this Court. Conceptually public order and terrorism are ~ifferent not only in ideology and philosophy but also in cause or the mens rea, the manner of its commission and the effect or result of such activity. Public order is well understood and fully comprehended as a problem associated with low and order. Terrorism is a new crime far serious in nature, more graver in impact, and
highly dangerous in conseqence. One pertains to law and order problem whereas the other may be political in nature coupled with unjustifiable use of force threatening security and integrity of the State. The submission thus advanced on legislative com1ietence, more as a matter of form than with any feeling of conviction and belief in its merit, does not appear to be sound. [613 F-H, 614 A-Bl Ramesh Thapar v. State of Madras, A.I.R. (1950) S.C. 124; Ram
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KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar&Anr., [1966J 1 S.C.R. 709=A.I.R. (1966) SC 740 and Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia v. Union of India, A.LR. (1970) SC 1453, referred to.
6. TADA having been enacted under Entry 1 of List III of the Seventh Schedule, it did not suffer from lack of legislative competence. [614 CJ 7. Any law of punitive or preventive detention has to be tested on the touchstone of the constitutional assurance to every person that he shall not be deprived of his liberty except in accordance with procedure established by law. It is declaration of deep faith and belief in human rights. In the pattern of guarantee woven in Chapter III of the Constitution, personal liberty of a man is at the root of Article 21. [614 DJ
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8. Article 21 is a constitutional command to State to preserve the basic human rights of every person. Existence of right and its preservation has, thus to be construed liberally and expansively. As a corollary to it the exercise of power by the State has to be construed narrowly and restriclively. It should be so understood and interpreted as not to nullify the basic purpose of the gua!""ntee. No legislative or executive action can be permitted to get through unless it passes through the judicial scanning of it being not violative of the cherished right preserved constitutionally. If the Article is construed as empowering the State to make a law and deprive a person as the Constitution permits it then the entire concept of personal liberty shall stand frustrated. A political party voted to power may adopt repressive measures against its political foes by enacting a law and it may well be said that deprivation being in accordance witl) procedure established by law it is within constitutional frame up. The procedure adopted by State either legislatively or executively must therefore satisfy the basic and fundamental requirement of being fair and just. Procedure established by law extends both, to the substantive and procedural law. Futher mere law is not sufficent. It must be fair and just law. (615 G-H, 616 A-CJ 9. Each expression used in Article 21 enhances human dignity and value. It lays foundation for a society where rule of law bas primacy and not arbitrary or capricious exercise of power. 'Life' dictionarily means 'state of functional activity and continual change peculiar to organised matter, aud especially to the portion of it constituting an animal or plant
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before death, animate existence, being alive'. But used in the Constitution
it may not be mere existence. 'Truncate liberty in Article 21 and several H
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A other freedom fade out automatically'. (614 G-H, 615 A·D)
Munn v. Illinois, [1877) 94 US 113; Khadak Singh v. State of UP., [1964] 1 S.C.R. 332; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 392; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978) 2 S.C.R. 621; Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, [1981] 2 SCR 516 and Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, A.l.R. (1976) S.C. 1207, referred to. Quaere (ii) :- lt'hether Section 2(J)(a)(i)of 1987 Act is vague and imprecise ? Whether Mens Rea is necessary element of abetment ?
Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (For himself M.M. Punchhi and S.C. Agrawal, !.)-
Ramaswamy, J, (Concurring): 1. Section 2(1) (a) (i) of 1987 Act is blissfully and impermissibly vague
D and imprecise. Even an innocent person who ingeniously and undefiledly
communicates or associate without any knowledge or having no reason to believe or suspect that the person or class of persons with whom he has communicated or associated is engaged in assisting in any manner ter· rorists or disruptionists, can be arrested and prosecuted by abusing or misusing or misapplying this definition. In ultimate consummation of the proceedings, perhaps that guiltless and innoxious innocent person may also be convicted. (478 F-G] 2. The exclusion of 'mens rea' or intention or knowledge on the part of the person who communicates or associates with any person who is engaged in assisting in any manner terrorists or disruptionists cannot be countenanced in view of the fact that the substantive offences require, by express provisions the intention on the part of the abettor. The substantive offences require intention on the part of the person committing the terrorist act or the disruptive act . [478 H, 479 A, 477 G] 3. Therefore in order to romove the anomaly in the vague and imprecise definition of the word 'abet' the person who is indicated of communicating or associating with any person or class of persons who is engaged in assisting in any mannt:r terrorists or disrupi.ionists should be
shown to have actual knowdege or to have reason to believe that the person
H or class of persons with whom he is charged to have communicated or
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' KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
associated is engaged in assisting in any manner the terrorists and dis· ruptionists. [479 CJ
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4. The expressions 'communication' and 'association' deployed in the definition should be qualified so as to save the definition, in the sense that 'actual knowledge or reason to believe' on the part of a person to be roped in with the aid of that definition should be read into it instead of reading it down and clause (i) of the definition in Section 2(1) (a) should be read as meaning the communication or association with any person or class of persons with the actual knowledge or having reason to belive that such person or class of persons is engaged in assisting in any manner terrorists or disruptionists" so that the object and purpose of that clause may not otherwise be defeated and frustrated. [479 D·F] Brand v. Wood, 62 TLR 462-463; Sherras v. De Rutzcn, 1 B 918; Nichols v. Hall, L.R. [1873] 8 CP 322; State of Maharashtra v. M.H. George, A.LR. (1965) SC 722; Nathu Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.LR. (1966) SC 43; Srinivas Mall v. King Emperor, A.I.R. (1947) PC 135; Hariprasada Rao v. State, [1951] S.C.R. 322; Sarjoo Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1963] 3 SCR 324; State v.Abdul Aziz, A.l.R. (1962) Vol. 49 Born. 243; Inder Sen v. State of Punjab, (1973] 2 SCC 372 and A.K Roy v. Union of India, [1982] 2 SCR 272, referred to. Sarju Prasad v. State of U.P., [1961] 3 S.C.R. 324; Pukhraj v. D.R. Kohli, [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 866; Nathulal v. State of M.P., A.l.R. (1966) SC 43; Dr. T.S. Pannar v. Shri Hira Singh Paul, [1959] Supp. 1 SCR 213; State of Maharashtra v. Mayar Hans George, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 123; Jagdish Prasad v. State of West Bengal, [1972] 2 SCR 845 and Collector of Customs v. Chetty [1962] 3 SCR 786, distinguished.
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·• Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. I p.306; referred to.
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5. In a criminal action, the general conditions of penal liabilities are indicated in old maxim "actus non facit rea111/nisi mens sitrea" i.e. the act alone does not amount to guilt, it must be accmr;ianied by a guilty mind. G But there are exceptions to this rule and the reasons for this is that the legislature, under certain situations and circumstances, in its wisdom may think it so important, in order to prevent a particular act from being committed, to forbid or rule out the element of mens rea as a constitutent part of a crime or of adequate proof of intention or actual knowledge. H
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However, unless a statute either expressly or by necessary implication rules out 'niens rea' in cases of this kind, the element of 'mens rea' must be read into the provisions. of the Statute. The question is not what the word means but whether there are sufficient grounds for inferring that the Partilament intended to exclude the general rule that mens rea is an essential element for bringing any person under the definition of 'abet'. [474 D-E] 6. Generally, it is one of the essential principles of Criminal jurisprudence that a crime is not committed if the mind of a person doing the act in question, is innocent. Therefore, to constitnte a crime, the intent and act must both concur. [476 H, 477 A] 7. Though normally the plain ordinary grammatical meaning of an enactment affords the best guide and the object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature enacting it, other methods of extracting the meaning can be resorted to if the language is contradictory, ambiguous or leads really to absurd results so as to keep at the real sense and meaning. [473 G-H]
South Asia Industries (Pvt.j Ltd. v. S. Sarup Singh, AIR (1966) SC 346; S. Narayanaswami v. G. Panneerselvam, A.LR. (1972) SC 2284 and Direc-
E torate of Enforcement v. Deepak .Mahajan & Anr., (1994) 1 JT 290, referred to. Salmond : ''Jurisprudence'~ 11th Edition, p. 152; referred to.
8. It is the basic principle of legal jurisprudence that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important values. It is insisted or emphasised that laws should give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity
to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague Jaws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Such a law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen and also Judges for resolution on an adhoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. More so uncertain and undefined words deployed inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone ... that if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked'. [478 D-E]
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KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
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Per Sahai, J. (Concuning)
The definition of word 'abet' in sub-clause (i) of Section 2(i)(a) should be amended in order to avoid the ambiguity and make it immune from arbitrariness. [616 G]
Quaere (iii) : Whether Sections 3 and 4 of 1987 Act providing hm'Sh punishment for Terrorist Acts and Dismptive Activities are invalid for want of guidelines ?
Per Ratnavel Pandian, J. (For himself) M.M. Punchhi and S.C. Agrawal, ff. Ramaswamy, J. (Concuning)
1. True, the offences arising out of the acts, enumerated in Sections
3 and 4 of 1987 Act may be similar to the offences falling under the ordinary penal laws. They provide severe punishment and also prescribe minimum sentence for some acts constituting offences faUing within the
two provisions. The Act tends to be vary harsh and drastic containing the stringent provisions and provides minimum punishments and to some
other offences enhanced penalties also. The provisions prescribing special procedures aiming at speedy disposal of cases, departing from the procedures prescribed under the ordinary procedural law are evidently for the reasons that the prevalent ordinary procedural law was found to be inadequate and not sufficiently effective to deal with the offenders indulging in terrorists and disruptive activities; secondly that the incensed offences are arising out of the activities of the terrorists and disruptionists which disrupt or are intended to disrupt even the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or which may bring about or support any claim for the cession of any part of India or the cessation of any part of India
from the lJnion, and which create terror and a sense of insecurity in the
minds of the people. •"urther the Legislature being aware of aggravated nature ol' the offences have brought this drastic change in the procedure under this law so that the object of the legislatien may not be defeated and nullified. [484 B, C, H, 485 A-Cl
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2. Having regard to the object and purpose of the Act of 1987 as reflected from the 1ireamble and the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act, the submission n1ade questioning the legality and efficaciousness of Sections 3 and 4 cannot be countenanced. There is no discrimination in
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view of the separate machinery provided for the trial of the cases under this Act to achieve the object of it. [486 C, E]
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Naranjan Singh K.S. Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya, (1990] 4 SCC 76; Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Menon v. State of Gujarat, (1988] 2 SCC 271; State of West Bengal v.Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952] SCR 284 andA.R. Antulay v. Union of India, [1988] 2 SCC 764, refrred to. Per Sahai, J. (Concurring)
Sections 3 and 4 of the 1987 Act not liable to be struck down for vaguencess. [616 G]
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Quaere (iv) : T¥hether n1ere possession of anns and amn1unitio11 is sufficient to prove the offence under Section 5 of the 1987 Act ? l'er Sahai, J.
1. The provisions of Section 5 can be invoked only when the proseculion is able to establish that there was some material on record to show that the arms and ammunition mentioned in the Section were likely to be
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used for any terrorist or disruptive activity or that they had been used as such. [627 B]
2. Mere possession of arms and ammunition specified in Section 5 has been made substantive offence. It is much serious in nature and graver in impact as it results in prosecution of a man irrespective of bis association or connection with terrorist or terrorist activity. A comparison of this Section with Seetions 3 and 4 demonstrates the arbitrariness inherent in it. Section 3 operates when a person not only intends to overawe the Government or create terror in people etc. but he uses the arms and ammunitons which results in death or is likely to cause death and damage to property etc. Similarly Section 4 applies to those activities which are directed towards disrupting sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. Thus a terrorist or a disruptionist and a person possessing any of the arms and ammunition mentioned in the Section have been placed at par. In Sections 3 and 4 the offence arises on the act having been done whereas in Section 5 it is founded only on possession. Even under sub-seclion (3) of Section 3 a person is liable to be prosecuted for abetting the offence if he assists or communicates with a terrorist. Sub-sections (5) and (6) inserted by Act 43 of 1993 to Section 3 also require that a person can
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KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
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be prosecuted only if he is found to be a member of a terrorist gang or A terrorist organisation etc. The Act, therefore, visualises prosecution of the terrorist or disruptionist for offences under Sections 3 and 4 and in others only if they are associated or related with it. That is in keeping with the objective of the Act. [617 D-G] 3. It. is ture that while defining the crime it is optn to the legislature to make provision which may serve the objective of the legislation and from a wider point of view one may say that possession of such arms, the use of which may lead to terrorist activity, should be taken as one of the offences as a preventive deterrent provision. Yet there must be some inter-relation between the two, howsoever, remote it may be. The harshness of the provisions is apparent as all those provisions of the Act for prosecuting a person including forfeiture of property, denial of bail etc. Are applicable
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to a person accused of possessing any arms and ammunition as one who
is charged for an offence under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. It is no doubt true that no one has justification to have such arms and ammunitions as
are mentioned in Section S, but unjustifiable possession does not make a D person a terrorist or disruptionist. Since both the substantive and procedural law apply to a terrorist and disruptionist or a terrorist act or a disruptive act, it is necessary that this Section if it has to be immnne from attack of arbitrariness may be invoked only if there is some material to show that the person who was possessed of the arms intended it to be used E for terrorist or disruptionist activity or it was an arm and ammunition which in fact was used. [618 A-El Quaere (v) : Whether Sectio11 8 of 1987 Act which provides for foifeiture of property of persons co11victed under TADA is violative of Articles 14 and 21?
Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (For himself M.M. Punchhi and S.C. Agrawal, !!.)-
Ramaswamy and Sahai, JJ. (Concurring):
The discretionary power given to the Designated Court nnder Section 8(1) and (2) of 1987 Act is to be exercised under strict contingencies, namely, that (i) there must be an order of forfeiture and that order must be in writing; (2) the property either movable or immovable or both must belong to the accused convicted of any offence of TADA or Rule there- H
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A uuder; (3) the property should be specified in the order; (4) even though
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attachment can be made under Section 8(2) during the trial of the case, the forfeiture can be ordered only in case of conviction and not otherwise. The very fact that the order should be in writing implies that the Designated Court must give reasons for such an order even though the Section does not specifically require the Designated Court to record its reasons for so doing, because the word 'order' even according to the lexcon meaning is that it is a decision or direction either interlocutory or preliminary or final by the Court trying the offence. Secondly under Section 19 of the Act, an appeal lies straight to the Supreme Court as a matter of right from any order not being interlocutory order both on facts and law. Therefore the contention that section 8 is violative of Articles 14 and 21 fails. [488 A-DI
Quaere (vi) : Whether the provisions contained in Section 9 of 1987 Act providing for Constitution of Designated Courts are constitutionally valid ?
D Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (For himself M.M. Punch/ti and S.C. Agrawal, JJ.)-
Ramaswamy and Sahai, JJ. (Concuning)
1. Section 9 of the 1987 Act is not violative of Entry 65, List II of the Seventh Schedule and Articles 233, 234 and 235 of the Constitution. [489 E) 2. As the impugned Act is enacted under Entry 1 of List I, the constitution of the Designated Courts by the Central Government cannot be said in violation of Entry 65 of List II which empowers the State Legislature to constitute the Courts. Under Section 9 both the Central Government and the State Governments are authorised to constitute Designated Courts by notification under sub-section (2) of Section 9. It is made clear that the Courts constituted by the Central Government either before or after the issue of the notification constituting the Designated Courts by the State Government shall have jurisdiction to try any offence committed in that area or areas and the Designated Courts constituted by the State Government shall not have any jurisdiction to try any offence committed in that area or areas. [489 B-C]
Quacre (vii) : Whether Section 9(7) of 1987 Act which makes provision H for continuance of a Judge of Designated Court after superannuation is
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KARTAR v. STATEOFPUNJAB
opposed to principle of fair tiial and independence of judicia1y ?
Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (For himself M.M. Punchhi and S.C. Agrawal, JJ.) Section 9(7) of the 1987 Act does not offend any Constitutional provision. However, the Central Government and the State Government at the time of appointing a Judge or an Additional Judge to the Designated Court with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned should keep in mind that the Judge designate has sufficient tenure of service even at the initial stage of appointment, so that no one may entertain any grievance for continnance of service of Judge of the Designated Court after attainment of superannuation. [491 C-D]
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Observatio11s of Chandrachud, CJ. pertai11ing to clause (7) of the Special Courts Bi//. In Re : Special courts Bill [1979] 2 SCR 476, held inapplicable. Per Sahai, J. (Co11curri11g) Although the provisions relating to appointment of a person as designated court are clear yet it was pointed out that some of them were appointed even after retirement. Such appointments would be in teeth of the express provisions in the Statute. Therefore, no one should be appointed as designated court who has retired from service. [627 C-D]
Per Ramaswamy, J. (Dissenti11g)
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1. Sub-section (7) of Section 9 of the 1987 Act postulates its fulcrum without mincing any word that despite the judge or additional judge of a F designated court attained the age of superannuation under rules applicable to him in the State Judicial Service, he shall be entitled to continue as such judge or additional judge by employing unequivocal language 'shall not affect his continuance as such judge or additional judge". In other words, the legislative intention is clear that though designated .iudge G attained superannuation under the relevant rules applicable to him in his normal judicial service as a sessions or additional sessions judge, he shall remain in service during the pleasure of the central or the appropriate state government. What would be its message ? Is it consistent with the independence of the judiciary? Would it create confidence in the accused that the designated judge would be of stern stuff unbending before power H
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A or lure of personal advantage ? The constitutional validity of Section 9(7)
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of the Act should be addressed from the above setting and perspectives. The concern here is not so much with the initial appointment as designated Judge but with the control and supervision over his discharge of judicial functions and as its part is he insulated from executive influence overtly or covertly. [593 C-E]
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2. The Constitution of a designated court per se may be valid but as a court pamllel to courts of Sessions and appointment of Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge as a Judge of the designated courts without administrative and judicial control of the High Court concerned and continuance in office after attaining superannuation are clearly in negation of and subversive to the independence of the judiciary, carefully conserved and given to the people of India. It would foster the "pleasure doctrine" laying the seeds to bear fruits of poisoned tree to destroy independence and impertiality of justice which the Constitution of India consciously avoided. It is, therefore, unconstitutional. [597 H, 598 A] 3. It is the basic postulate under the Indian Constitution that the legal sovereign power has been distributed between the legislatures to make the law, the executive to implement the law and the judiciary to interpret the law within the limits set down by the Constitution. The courts are intermediary between the people and the other organs of the state in order to keep the latter within the parameters delienated by the Constitution. There can be no liberty if the power of judging be not separate from the legislative and executive powers. Article 50 of the Constitution, therefore, enjoins the State and in fact separated the Judiciary from the executive in the public service of the state. [589 G]
4.Independent judiciary is the most essential attribute of rule of law and is indispensible to sustain democracy. Independence and integrity of the judiciary in a democratic system of government is of the highest importance and interest not only to the Judges but to the people at large
G who seek judicial redress against perceived legal injury or executive exces~ ses. Dispensation of justice by an impartial presiding Judge, without fear or favour, affection or m.,.m, is the cardinal creed and zealously protected by the Constitution. [589 II, 590 A] 5. Judicial review is the basic structure and independent judiciary is I-I
the cardinal feature and an assurance of faith enshrined in the constitu-
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~I KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB -~ ~
ti on. Confidence of the people in impartial dispensation of justice is the binding force for acceptance of justice delivery system. Independence is not limited to insulating the judges from executive pressures alone. Its sphere extends to many other impeccable zones of pressures or prejudices. Judges should be made of stern stuff unbending before the power, economic or political which alone would ensure fair and effective administration of justice. The officer exercising judicial power vested in him
must be, of necessity, free to act upon his own conscience and without apprehension of personal consequences to himself or lure of retiral rehabilitation. 111e judge should be made independent of most of their restraints, checks and punishments which are usually called into play against other public officers and he should be devoted to the conscientious perfor·mance of his duties. Therefore, he must be free from external as well as internal pressures. [590 8-D] 6. The need for independent and impartial judiciary manned by persons of sterling character, impeccable integrity undaunting courage and determination, impartiality and independence is the command of the constitution and call of the people. He would administer justice witout fear or favour, affection or ill-will. His sanction a11d succour are nurtured and nourished from the constitution itself. The ability and integrity of the judge to make a decision free from external interference or influence or external
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cravings is an essential component and an inbuilt assurance to shape the
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orderly life of the community. Independent and impartial judiciary thus sustain the faith of the people in the efficacy, effectivity and impartial judicial process. Independence of the judiciary has been secured by providing security of tenure and other conditions of service. Judicial independence means to_!;ll liberty of the presiding judge to try, hear and decide the cases that have come before him according to the set procedure and decide the cases and give binding decision on merits without tear or favour, affection or ill-will. (590 E-G] D.J.F.D. Lyanage and Ors. v. The Queen, (1967] 1 AC 259; Northern Pipeline Col!struction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. and United States, (73) L.Ed. 2nd 598; 458 US 50 (1982) and In re. Special Courts Bill AIR (1979) SC 478, referred to. 7. A conjoint reading sections 9, 11 and 12 of the 1987 Act does not indicate to preserve the control or supervision of the High Court over the
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Designated Court or Judges holding the posts, though they were appointed initially with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court. Appointment of sessions or additional sessions judges as judge of the designated court under section 9(1) are outside the scheme of the Constitution and the Code but a cr<ature of the Act. Though the appointment of the District or Additional Sessions Judge to the designated court by the B Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, is with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, thereafter the High Court ceases to have any administrative or judicial supervision or control over them. On appointment as a Judge of the designated court, the Sessions or Additional Sessions Judge is transposed to the administrative C control of the executive, be it the Central or State Government. This conclusion does not mean that the offences under the Act cannot be tried by the regular courts especially assigned by the High Court to the Sessions . or Additional or Joint Sessions Judges to exerice those functions or the power under the Act. Moreover, section 19 confers appellate power on this D Court. [592 F-H, 598 B-C]
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Quaere (viii) : Whether under Section 11(2) of 1987 Act an accused should be given opportunity of hearing before his case is.transfe"ed from one Designated Cowt to another ?
E Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (For himself M.M. Punchhi and S.C. Agrawal, JJ.)-
Ramaswamy and Sahai, JJ. (Concurring) : 1. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 11 of 1987 Act are not violative
F of Article 14 of the Constitution. [560 HJ
2. The concurrence by the Chief Justice of India under Sections 11 (2) and (3) of the 1987 Act is given or denied in the discharge of his statutory function on drawing the requisite subjective satisfaction on the reasons given io the motion or any material placed before him explaining the exigencies of the situation prevailing in the State which has necessitated the Central Government to obtain the concurrence and then transfer the case. Therefore, notwithstanding the power of the Parliament to exclude the application of rule of 'audi a/term partem' in exceptional circumstances, it may be open to the Chief Justice of India in an appropriate case to have the view of the accused. [498 H, 499 A]
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~I KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
A.K Kmipak & Ors. etc. v. Union of India & Or.>., [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; A In re-HK (An infant), (1967) 2 Q.B. 617; State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Devi & Ors., [1967) 2 SCR 635; Tulsi Ram Patel v. Union of India, [1985) 3 SCC 398; Satyavir Singh v. Union of India, [1985] 4 SCC 252; CB. Gautam v. Union of India, [1993) 1 SCC 78 and Bimal Kaur v. Union of India, AIR (1988) P&H 95, referred to.
3. The authority to give concurrence for transfer of a case is vested upon an independent judicial authority who is none other than the head of judiciary in India, namely, the Chief Justice of India as a persona designata. The vesting of this power in the Chief Justice oflndia is evidently with the purpose of making it known that the Central Government is not seeking to obtain the concurrence either with a motivation of bias or malafide or on being influenced by any extraneous consideration, but on a reasonable and justifiable ground taking into consideration the pre-requisite essential conditions. [495 F-G) 4. Under Sections 11(2) and 11(3) of TADA Act, the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India is sought for when the exigencies of the situation prevailing in the State is not conducive to a fair, impartial or speedy trial. The reasons for seeking such concurrence, of course, will be manifested in the motion moved by the law officers. The Chief Justice of India, while discharging his statutory function passes a statutory order and gives or refuses the concurrence on drawing his requisite subjective satisfaction on the materials placed before him in the motion. [497 C-DJ 5. It may be added, in this context that the Central Government cannot transfer any case under Section 11(2) or issue a Notification under Section 11(3) in case the Chief Justice refuses to give the concurrence. To say differently, to pass an order either under Section 11(2) or 11(3) the concurrence of the Chief Justice is sine quo non. But at the same time one should be alive to the legal position that the mere according of concurrence by itself is not an order of transfer but it only facilitates the Central Government to pass an order under either of the above provisions. The according of the concurrence though imperative does not compel the Government to pass any order, if for any other intervening causes, the Central Government even after obtaining the concurrence decides that there is no necessity of transferring any case. In that situation the concur· rence will have no effect. Therefore, the according of concurrence which is a
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1994) 2 S.C.R.
condition precedent for passing the transfer order by the Government is only a statutory .order and not a judicial order because there is no adjudicati on of any 'lis' and determination of any issue. Hence the final order passed by the Government may be open to judicial review but not the concurrence accorded which is only a statutory condition to be satisfied before passing the transfer order by the Central Government. [497 E, G, H, 498 A)
r
~
R. V. Cain R v. Schollick, [1975) 2 All ER 900 and Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers & Ors., [1977) 3 All ER 70, referred to.
,,
6. Though, there is no express provision in Article 139-A of the Constitution and in Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the effect that the Supreme Court before passing any order on the application made or moved for tranfer of cases should issue notice and hear the parties as required under Sections 24 and 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, yet on the principle of 'audi alteram partem ', notice is given to the party/parties who are likely to be affected by any final order. But the question of issuing a notice and hearing the parties may not arise if the order is passed by the Supreme Court suo moto. [497 A-Bl
•
...
Quaere (ix) : Whether Section 15 of the 1987 Act, which makes the confession made to a Police Officer not lower in rank than a Superintendent of Police admissible, is valid ? Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (For himse1f M.M. Punchhi and S.C. Agrawal, !!.)
1. Section 15 of the 1987 Act is not liable to be strnck down since that Section does not offend either Article 14 or 21 of the Constitution. [520 BJ 2. Having regard to the legal competence of the legislature to make the law prescribing a different mode of proof, the meaningful purpose and object of the legislation, the gravity of terrorism unleashed by the terrorists and disruptionists endangering not only the sovereignty and integrity of the country but also the normal life of the citizens, and the reluctance of even the victims as well as the public in coming forward, at the risk of their life, to give evidence Section 15 cannot be said to be suffering from any vice of unconstitutionality. In fact, if the exigencies of certain situation warrant such a legislation then it is constitutionally permissible provided none of the fundamental rights under Chapter III of
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KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
the Constitution is infringed. [518 D-F]
Bhuboni Sahu v. King, AIR (1949) PC 257; In re. Peryaswami Moopan, (1913) ILR 54 Mad. 75; Haricharal! Kunni & Jogi.a Hajam v. State of Bihar, [1964] 6 SCR 623; State of UP. v. Durga Prasad, AIR (1974) SC 2136; Balkishal! v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1981) SC 379; Ramesh Chandra mehta v. State of West Bengal [1969] 2 SCR 461; Poolpandi and Ors. v. B Superintendent, Central Excise and ors., [1992] 3 SCC 251; Directorate of Enforcemel!t v. Deepak Malzajal! al!d 01'., JT (1994) 1 SC 290 and Ekambaram v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) Mad. Law Weekly Cr. 261, referred to.
3. Since the recording of evidence on mechanical device can be tampered, tailored, tinkered, edited and erased etc., it si strongly felt that there must be some severe safeguards which should be scrupulously observed while recording a confession under section 15(1) so that the possibility of extorting any false confession can be prevented to some appreciable extent. [519 E] 4. The following guidelines are laid down so as to ensure that the confession obtained in the pre-indictment interrogation is not tainted with any vice but is in strict conformity of the well recognised and accepted aesthetic principles and fundamental fairness :- [520 G] 1.
2.
3.
There should be no breach of procedure and the accepted norms of recording the confession which should reflect only the true and voluntary statement and there should be no room for hypercriticism that the authority has obtained an invented confession as a source of proof irrespective of the truth and creditability; [518 G] The confession should be recorded in a free atmosphere in the same language in which the person is examined and as nar· rated by him; [520 H]
The person from whom a confession has been recorded under Section 15(1) of the Act, should be produced before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief Judicial Magistrate to whom the confession is required to be sent under Rule 15 (5) along \lith the origianl staten1cnt of confession, "!it.ten or
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
recorded on mechanical device without unreasonable delay; [521 BJ
4.
The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief Judicial Magistrate should scmpulously record the statement, if any, made by the accused so produced and get his signature aud in case of any complaint of torture the person should be directed to be produced for medical examination before a Medical Officer not lower in rank than that of an Assistant Civil Surgeon; [521 CJ
5.
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973, no police officer below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner of Police in the Metropolitan cities and elsewhere of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a Police Officer of equivalent rank, should investigate any offence punishable under the Act of 1987; [521 DJ
6.
The Police Officer if he is seeking the custody of any person for pre-indictment or pre-trial interrogation from the judicial custody, must file an affidavit sworn by him explaining the reason not only for such custody but also for the delay, if any, in seeking the police custody; [521 FJ
In case, the person taken for interrogation, on receipt of the statutory warding that he is not bonnd to make a confession and that if he does so, the said statement may be used against hinras evidence, asserts his right to silence, the police officer must respect his right of assertion 1'ithout making any compulsion to give a statement of disclosure; [521 G-HJ
8.
The Central Government may take note of these guidelines and incorporate them by appropriate amendments in the Act and the Rules. [522 AJ
[1994] 2 S.C.R.
5. An accused or a person accused of any offence is protected by the constitutional provisions as well as the statutory provisions to the extent that no self-incriminating statement made by an accused to the police officer while he is in custody, could be used against such maker. The constitutional and statutory procedural guarantees and safeguards are in
H consonance "1th the expression "according to procedure established by
KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
law" enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution within which fold the A prlnciple of just and fair trial is read into. The procedure contemplated by Article 21 is that the procedure must be 'right', 'just and fair' and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. In order that the procedure is right, just and fair, it should conform to the principle of natural justice, that is, 'fair - play in action'. [507 D, H, 508 A]
M.P. Shamia and Ors. v. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi and o,.,., [1954] SCR 1077; Raja Narayan/a/ Bansi/al v. Maneck, (1961] 1 SCR 417; State of Bombay v. Kathi Kaly Oghad, (1962] 3 SCR 10; Nandinin Satpathy v. P.L. Dani and Anr., [1978] 2 S.C.C. 424; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985] 2 Supp. SCR 51; E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1974] 2 SCR 348; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978] 2 SCR 621; M.H. Hoskol v. State of Maharashtra, (1979] 1 SCR 192; Sunil Batre v. Delhi Administration, (1979] 1 SCR 392; Sita Ram v. State of U.P., (1979] 2 SCR 1085; Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna, [1979] 3 SCR 532; Hussainara Khatoon II v. Home Secretary, Stale of Bihw; Patna, (1980] 1 SCR 81; Sunil Batra II v. Delhi Administration, (1980] 2 SCR 557; Jolly George Verihese v. Bank of Cochin, (1980] 2 SCR 913; Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (1980] 3 SCR 1338 and Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi,
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[1981] 2 SCR 516, referred to.
6. The Constitution as well as the statutory procedural law and Law of Evidence condemn the conduct of any official in extorting a confession or information under compulsion by using any third degree method. If it is shown to the Court that a conl"ession has been extorted by illegal means such as inducement, threat or promise as contemplated under Section 24 of the Evidence Act the confession thus obtained from an accused person
would become irrelevant and cannot be used in a c.;..iminal proceeding as
against the maker. Though it is entirely for the Court trying the offence to decide the question of admissibility or reliability of a confession in its judicial wisdom strictly adhering to the law, it must, while so deciding the question should satisfy itself that there was no trap, no track and no G importune seeking of evidence during the custodial interrogation and all the conditions required are fulfilled. In fact Courts have frequently dealt with cases of atrocity and brutality practised by some overzealous police officers resorting to inhuman, barbaric, archaic and drastic method of treating the suspects in their anxiety to collect evidence by hook or crook H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1994] 2 S.C.R.
A and wrenching a decision in their favour. 011 few occasions even custodial
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deaths caused during interrogation are brought to court's notice. Court is very much distressed and deeply concerned about the oppressive behaviour and the most degrading and despicable practice adopted by some of the police officers even though no general aud sweeping condemnation can be made. [516 D, B, 522 B, 517 Fl
7. The Legislature is free to make classification of 'offences' and 'offenders' in the application or a stature. The principle of legislative classification is an accepted principle whereunder persons may be classified into groups and such groups may differently be treated if there is a reasonable basis for such difference or distinction. The rule of differentiation is that in enacting laws differentiating between different persons or things in different circumstances which govern one set of persons or objects such laws may not necessarily be the same as those governing another set of persons or objects so that the question of unequal treatment does not really arise between persons governed by different conditions and different set of circmnstances. [508 D, 51l CJ Asbury Hospital v. Cases Country, [1945] 90 Law Ed. 6; Gassert v. Clear [1948] 93 Law Ed, 163 (E) and Railway Exprress Agency v. New York, [1948] 93 Law Ed. 533(F), referred to.
8. In order to consider the question as to the reasonableness of the distinction and classification, it is necessry to take into account the objective for such distinction and classification which of course need not be made with mathematical precision. Suffice, if there is little or no difference between the persons and the things which have been grouped together and those left out of the groups, the classification cannot be said to be a reasonable one. In making the classification, varions factors have to be taken into consideration and examined as to whether such a distiction or classification justifies the different treatment and whether they subserve the object sought to be achieved. [508 G, H, 509 A] Chiranjit Lal v. Union of india, [1950] SCR 869; Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, [1959] SCR 279; In re. Special Courts Bill, [1979] 2 SCR 476 and State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, A.I.R. (1951) SC 318, referred to. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952] SCR 284, distin-
KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
guished.
Constitutional Law by Prof. Willis, Edn. 1 p. 578, referred to. 9. The persons who are to be tried for offences specified under the provisions of TADA are a distinct class of persons and the procedure prescribed for trying them for the aggravated and incensed nature of offences are under different classification distinguishable from the ordinary criminals and procedure. This distinction and classification of grouping of the accused and the offences to be tried under TADA are to achieve the meaningful purpose and object of the Act as reflected from the preamble as well M the 'Statement of Object and Reasons'. [509 C-D]
10. The classification of 'offenders' and 'offences' to be tried by the Designated Court under the TADA or by the Special Courts under the Act of 1984, are not left to the arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion of the Central Government but the Act itself has made a delineated classification of the offenders as terrorists and disruptionists in TADA Act and the terrorists under the Special Courts Act, 1984 as well as the classification of offences under both the Acts. The classifications has rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the TADA Acts and Special Courts Act and consequently there is no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. [515 A-B, D]
•
Dr. N.B. Khare v. State of Delhi, [1950] SCR 519; Kathi Raming Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, [1952] SCR 435; Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal, [1954] SCR 30; State of Bombay v. RMD Chamaroaugwalal, (1957] SCR 874; Pannalal Bingraj v. Union of India, [1957] SCR 233; Talib Haji Hussain v. Madhukar P. Mondkar, [1958] SCR 1226; Kangsari Haldhar v. State of West Bengal, [1960] 2 SCR 646 and A.K Roy v. Union of India, [1982) 1 sec 271, referred to.
Per Ramaswamy, J. (Dissenting) 1. It is obnoxious to confer power on a police officer to record confession under s. 15(1). If he is entrusted with the solemn power to record a confession, the appearance of objectivity in the discharge of the statutory duty would be seemingly suspect and inspire no public confidence. If the exercise of the power is allowed to be done once, may be conferred with judicial pO\l'ers in a lesser crisis and be normalised in grave crisis, such an erosion is anathema to rule of law, spirit of judicial review
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1994] 2 S.C.R.
and a clear negation of Article 50 of the Constitution and the Constitutional creases. It is, therefore, unfair, unjust and unconscienahle, oft'ending Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. (586 F-G] 2. A superior police officH in-charge of maintaining law and order, while recording confession of a person in police custody though, ostensibly compl~ing with section 15(2) of the Act, whether would raise above the stream and transcends above the weather of the day and exhibit the even equanimity and objectivity of a trained Judicial Magistrate ? While the Code and the Evidence Act seek to avoid inherent suspicion of a police otlicer obtaining confession from the accused, does the same dust not cloud the vision of superior police otlicer ? Does such a procedure not shock the conscience of a conscientious roan and sn1ells of unfairness '!Would it be
just and fair to entrust the same duty by emplo~ng non-obstante clause in section 15(1) ? Whether mere incantation by emplo~ngnon-obstanti clause cures the vice of fore enumeration and becomes valid under Articles 14 and 21 ? The answer is "No", "absolute no no". (582 G-H, 583 A) 3. The constitutional human rights perspectives, the history in working of the relevant provisions in the Evidence Act and the wisdom behind section 164 of the Code ignites inherent invalidity of sub-section(l) of Section 15 and the court would little afford to turn the Nelson's blind eyes to the above scenario and blissfully bank on section 114(e) of the Evidence Act that otlicial acts are done according to law and put the seal that sub-section(l) of section 15 of the Act pass off the test of fair procedure and is constitutionally valid. [583 BJ Re. The Special Courts Bill, (1978) A.I.R. 179 S.C. 478; V.M. Ranga Rao v. State of A.P. (1985) 2 A.P.LJ. 361; Andrew R. Mallory v. U.SA., 354 US 449=1 L.ed. 2nd 1479; Winston Massiah v. United States, 377 US 201=12 L.ed. 246; William Malloy v. Patrick J. Hagan, 378 US 1=12 L.ed. 2d 653; William Murphy v. Wateifront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 US 52=12 L.ed. 2d 678; Ernesto A. Miranda v. State of Arizona, 16 L.Ed. 2nd US 436, 694; Edward v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) and Arizona v. Roberson, 486 US 675 (1988), referred to.
4. A police otlicer is clearly a person in authority and insistence on the accused/suspect to answer his interrogation is a form of pressure, especially in the atmosphere of police station unless certain safeguards erasing duress are adhered to. Policy or rational or object of the Act have
;·
KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
little relevance in determining the constitutional validity of the offending A provision. [581 H, 582 A] 5. An officer not below the rank of the Superintendent of Police being the head _f the Dist. Police Administration responsible to maintain law and order is expected to be keen on cracking down the crime and would take all tough steps to put down the crime to create terror in the heart of B the criminals. It is not the hierarchy of officers but the source and for removal of suspicion from the mind of the suspect and the objective assessor that built in procedural safeguards have to be scrupulously adhered to in recording the confession and trace of the taint must be absent. [586 El C 6. Tbe Legislature when has power to make the Evidence Act has ec11rnlly power to amend and alter the pre-existing procedure in the light of the changing needs of the society and that there is no vested right to procedure. The legislature can equally take away the procedure by omitting it by amendment. Court is not concerned so much with the power of the Parliament to make the law and it does possess such power under Article 248 and Entry 97 of List I. Equally it is settled law that conferment of
power in a high ranking officer is presumed to be exercised according to
law or rules. Such conferment of power may be prima facie presumed to be valid. However, the contention that the Parliament being competent to enact section 15(1) of the Act and the effect of Sections 24 to 30 of Evidence Act can equally be taken away by employing non obstante clause, the Legislaturte adopted the above device in its legislative claim to contain the escalated large scale crimes by organised terrorists and gangsters and apprehended misuse is eliminated as it was vested in high-ranking officer cannot be given acceptance. [578 G-H, 579 A, 586 H, 587 A)
7. Confession means in admission of certain facts wllich constitute
an offence or substantially all the facts that constitute the offence, made by a person charged with the offence which is the subject matter of the statement. [573 CJ
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Palvinder Kaur v. Stale of Punjab, [1953] S.C.R. 94 and Pakala Narayana Swamy v. The King Emperor, 66 Indian Appeals 66, referred to. 8. A voluntary contession is a valuable piece of evidence in proof of
the guilt of the accused. If the confession is found to have been made H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1994] 2 S.C.R.
voluntarily in penetentia, it wonld from basis for conviction. [579 B-C]
State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh @ Sukha & Ors., J.T. (1972) S.C. (1992) S.C. 73, referred to.
9. A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant if it appears to the court to have been caused by inducement, promise or threat having a reference to the charge proceeding from a person in authority. [573 El 10. The confession, therefore, is not received with an assurance, if its
source be not Omni suspicious mojes., above and free from the remotest taint of suspicion. The mind of the accused before he makes a confession c must be in a state of perfect equanamity and must not have been operated upon by fear or hope or inducement. Hence threat or promise or inducement held out to an accused makes the confession irrelevant and excludes it from consideration. A confession made to a Police Officer while the asccused is in the custody or made it before he became an accused, is not D provable against him in any proceeding in which he is charged to the commission of the said offence. Equally a confession made by him, while in the custody of the police officer, to any person is also not provable in a proceeding in which he is charged with the commissiOn of the offence unless it is made in the immediate presence of the Magistrate. Police Officer is inherently suspect of employing coercion to obntain confession. E Therefore, the confession made to a police officer under section 25 should totally be excluded from evidence. The reasons seem to be that the custody . \ of police officer provides easy opportunities of coercion for extorting· confession. Section 25 rests upon the principle that it is dangerous to depend upon a confession made to a police officer which cannot extricate F itself from the suspicion that it might have been procured by the exercise of coercion or by enticement. The legislative policy and practical reality emphasise that a statement obtained, while the accused is in police custody, truely be not the product of his free choice. So a confessional statement obtained by the law enforcement officer is inadmissible in G evidence. [574 A-El
Ram Chandra v. State of U.P., A.I.R. (1957) S.C. 381; Nazir Ahmade v. King Emperor, A.l.R. (1939) P.C. 253; Pakala Narayana Swami v. 17te King Emperor, 66 Indian Appeals 66; Tehsildar Singh v. State of U.P., A.I.R. (1959) S.C. 1012 and Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, A.l.R. (1957) S.C. H 637, referred to.
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KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
Edwin D. Driver "Confession and the Social Psychology of Coercion'~ A 82 Harv. Law Review p.42 (1968-69); Rosemary Patenden, "Should confession be co1mborated" 107 Law Qrtly. Review 318-319 (1991); Arthur E. Butnerland "Crime and Confession" 19, Harv. Law Review, p. 21-25, 32, 36-37, 39-41, 93-97 (1965-66); Kumar Amarasekara, "Confession : Recent Devleopments in England and Australia" 29, Intemational and Comparative Law Qua1terly, p. 327-339 (1980), referred to. Working Paper on "Custodial Crimes" by Law Commission of India; Suckerman, P1inciples of Oiminal Evidence, p. 302-306; Saul M.Kassin and Lwerance S. Wrightsman "The psychology of Evidence and Trial Procedure" Ed. 1 pp. 78-80, referred to. 11. Custodial interrogation exposes the suspect to the risk of abuse of his person or dignity as well as distortion or manipulation of his self-incrimination in the crime. No one should be subjected to physical violence of the person as well as to torture. Infringement thereof undermines the people's faith in the efficacy of criminal justice system. Inter-
rogation in police lock up are often done under conditions of pressure and tension and the suspect could be exposed to great strain even if he is
innocent, while the culprit in the custody to hide or suppress may be doubly susceptible to confusion and manipulation. A delicate balance has, therefore, to be maintained to protect the innocent from conviction and
the need of the society to see the offender punished. Equally every one has right against self- incrimination and a right to be silent under Article 20(3) which implies his freedom from police or anybody else. But when the police interrogates a suspect, they abuse their authority having unbriddled opportunity to exploit his moral position and authority inducing the captive to confess against his better judgment. The person in authority puts the questions and exerts pressure on the captive to comply. Silence on the part of the frightened captive seems to his ears to call for vengeance and induces a belief that confession holds out a chance to avoid torture or to
get bail of a promise 'Jf lesser punishment. The resourceful investigator
adopts all successful tactics to elicit confession. [567 A-DJ
12. Procedure which smacks of the denial of fundamental fairness ""\..
and shocks the conscience or universal sense of justice is an anathema to just, fair or reasonable procedure. Articles 14 and 21 frown against ar·
bitrary and oppressive procedure. (582 E]
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1994] 2 S.C.R.
13. Fair criminal trial is the fundamental right under Article 21. Though the state is free to regulate the procedure for investigation of a crime, to collect evidence and place the offender for trial in accordance with its own perceptions of policy, yet in its so doing ifit offends some fundamental principles of fair justice rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people, it would be classified or characterised or ranked as unjust and unfair procedure. Appearance of injustice is denial of justice. Jluilt in procedural safeguards assure a feeling fairness. When the procedure prescribed by the statute offends the principle of fair justice or established judicial ethos or traditions or shocks the conscience, it could be said that it is fundamentally unfair and violative of the undamental fairness which are essential to the very concept of justice and civilised procedure. Whether such fundamental fairness has been denied is to be determined by an appraisal of the totally of facts gathered from the seetting, the contents and the procedure which feed the end result. [582 B-D]
14. One of the gifts of democracy to mankind is the right to personal liberty. Life and personal freedom are the prized jewels under Artide 19 conjointly assured by Articles 20(3), 21 and 22 of the Constitution and Article 19 ensures freedom of movement. Liberty aims at freedom not only from arbitrary restraint but also to secure such conditions which are essential for the full development of human personality. Liberty is the E essential concomitant for other rights without which a man cannot be at his best. The essmce of all civil liberties is to keep alive the freedom of the individual subject to the limitations of social control envisaged in diverse Articles in the Chapter of frundamental rights part III in harmony with social good envisaged in the directive principles in part IV of the ConstituF tion. Thus the essence of civil liberty is to keep alive the freedom of the individual subject to the limitation of social control which could be adjusted according to the needs of the dynamic social evolution.
•
(564 B-C, 565 DJ
15. Article 21 is not intended to be a limitation upon the powers of
G the legislature which it otherwise has under the Constitution. Yet the
substantive as well as the procedural law made, modified or amended must be just, fair and reasonable. The purity of the procedure to discover truth shall always remain liar, sensitive to the needs of the society and fairly and justly protect the accused. The procedural safeguards are indispensable essence of liberty. The history of personal liberty is largely the history of
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KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
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procedural safeguards. The procedure contemplated by Article 21 of the Constitution means just and fair procedure and reasonable la\V but not formal or fanciful. l'he standard of fairness in recording confession under Section 15(1) of the Act must be within constitutionally sustainable parameters. No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by law mandated by Article 21, would mean that a person shall not be subjected to coercion which does not admit of legal justification. Though the Constitution does not guarantee any particular procedure and the legislature is left free to lay down the procedure, Articles 14 and 21 prescribe inbuilt limitation in prescribing the procedure i.e. three must be fundamental fairness in the procedure prescribed by law and should not be unconscianable or oppressive. (579 G-H, 580 A-Cl 16. The constitutional courts are sentinals on the qui vive and guardians of human rights and common man looks upon them as their protectors. Where two procedures co~exist and classify one procedure to one set of accused and another one for some other accused, both must safisfy the test of Articles 14 and 21. It is true and courts also would take judicial notice that terrorists or organised criminals have co1nmitted and have been committing murders of innocent people in countless number,
thereby rudely shaking the foundations of stable social order. Equally the lawless elements who flout the law with impunity need to be dealt with separately. But suppression of crime by harsh procedure does not meet the test of Articles 14 and 21. (580 D-F]
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17. The expression "life or personal liberty" in Article 21 of the Constitution includes right to live with human dignity which would include guarantee against torture and assault by the State. [581 D]
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, A.LR. (1978) S.C. 1675; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, A.l.R. (1980) S.C. 1579; Sheila Barse v. State of Maharashtra A.l.R. (1983) S.C. 378; Nandini Satpathy v. Dani (PL) and Ors., (1978] 3 SCR 608 and State of Bombay v. Kathi Kali Oghad, A.I.R. (1961) SC 1808, referred to. ~.,.
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18. Liberty of every citizen is an invaluable and precious right. Burden is on the State to establish that its deprivation is constitutionally valid. (579 E]
(
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1994) 2 S.C.R.
State of West Bengal v.Anwar Ali Sarkar, (1952) S.C.R. 284, referred to.
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19. The confessions recorded by any police officer below the rank of Superintendent of Police under section 15(1) and the appointment of Sessions and Addi. Sessions Judges to the designated Court under section 9(7) are unconstitutional. Yet the confession so recorded by exercising the power under section 15(1) shall remain valid and would be considered at the trial, or in appeal in accordance with law. Any judgment or order made and com'iction rendered exercising powers under the Act and sentence imposed relying thereon does not become invalid or void. It is open to the Parliament to amend sections 9(7) and 15(1) of the Act suitably. The operation of this judgment is postponed for a year from today to carry out the amendments and necessary steps be taken to have sections 15(1) and 9(7) suitably amended. If no amendments are effected within the period or extended period on and from the date of expiry of the period aforementioned, or any extended time by order of this court, sections 15(1) and 9(7) would thereafter become void. (600 B-D)
Managing Director ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar J.T. (1993) 6 SC l; Victor Linkletter v. Victor G. Walker, 414 L.Ed. 2nd 601, 381 US 618 (965); Ernesto A. Miranda v. State ofA1izona, 16 L.Ed. 2nd 694, 384 US 436; Danny Escobeoo v. Illinois, 12 L.Ed. 2nd 977, 378 US 478; Sylvester Johnson v. State of new Jersey, 16 L.Ed. 2nd 862, 384 US 719; G. Ramaraju v. Andhra Pradesh, [1981) 3 SCR 474 and Gokaraju Rangaraju etc. v. State of A.P., (1981) 3 SCR 474, referred to. Per Sahai, J. (Dissenting)
1. Section 15 of the 1987 Act which provides for recording of confession by Superintendent of Police is violative of Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution and therefore, is liable to be struck down. [622 El
2. Section 15 of the TADA throws all established norms. Our social environment was not mature for such a drastic change as has been effected by Section 15. It is destructive of basic values of the constitutional guarantee. [623 BJ 3. This Section cannot be held to be valid merely becuase it is as a
H result of law made by a body which has been found entitled to make the
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KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
law. The law must still be fair and just as held by this Court. A law which entitles a police officer to record confession and makes it admissible is thus violative of both Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution. [624 BJ
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4. The mere fact that the Legislature was competent to make the law, as the offence under TADA is one which did not fall in the State Entry, did not mean that the Legislature was empowered to curtail or erode a person of his fundamental rights. Making a provision which has the effect of forcing a person to admit his guilt amounts to denial of the liberty. The class of offence'dealt by TADA may be different than ot!ier offence but the offender under TADA is as much entitled to protection of Articles 20 and 21 as any other offender. The difference in nature of offence or the legislative competence to enact a law did not affect the fundamental rights guaranteed by Chapter III. [623 F-HJ
C
A.K Gopalan v. State of Madras, A.I.R. (1950) SC 27, referred to.
5. An offence under TADA is considered to be more serious as D compared to the one under Indian Penal Code or any other Act, Normally graver the offence more strict the procedural interpretation. But her. it is just the otherwise. What is inadmissible for a murder under Section 302 is admissible even against a person who abets or is possessed of the arms under Section 5 of the Act. How the methods applied by police in extracting E confession bas been deprecated by this Court in series of decisions need not reproduced. Bnt all that changes overnight when TADA was enacted Giving power to police officer to rrcord confession may be in line with what is being done in England and America. But that requires a change in outlook by the police. Before doing so the police force by education and training has to be made aware of their duties and responsibilities, as F observed by Police Commission. The defect lies not in the personnel but in the culture. In a country where few are under law and there is no accountability the cultural climate was not Conducive for such a drastic
":>.
change. Even when there was no Articles 21, 20(3) and 14 of the Constitution any confession to police officer was inadmissible. It has been establisbed procedure for more than a century and an essential part of criminal jurispurdence. It was, therefore, necessary to bring about change in outlook before making a provision the merits of which are attempted to be justified on law existing in other countries. [621 H, 622 A-DJ 5th National Police Commission Report, referred to.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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6. A confession is an admission of guilt. The person making it states something against himself, therefore it should be made in surroundings which are free from suspicion. Otherwise it violates the constitutional guarantee under Article 20(3) that no person accused of an ofience shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. The word 'offence' used in the Article should be given its ordinary meaning. It applies as much to an offence committed under TADA as under any other Act. The word 'compelled' ordinarily means 'by force'. This may take place positively and negatively. When one forces one to act in a manner desired by him it is compelling him to do that thing. Same may take place when one is prevented from doing a particular thing unless he agrees to do as desired. C In either case it is compulsion. A confession made by an accused or obtained from him under coercion suffers from infirmity unless it is made freely, and voluntarily. No civilised democratic country has accepted confession made by an accused before a police officer as voluntary and above suspicion, and therefore, admissible in evidence. One of the established rules or norms accepted everywhere is that custodial confession is presumed to be trained. [623 C-E]
7. There is a basic difference between the approach ofa Police Officer and a Judicial Officer. A Judicial Officer is trained and tuned to reach the final goal by a fair procedure. The basis of a civilized jurisprudence is that the procedure by which a person is sent behind the bars should be fair, honest and just. A conviction obtained unfairly has never been countenanced by a system which is wedded to rule of law. A Police Officer is trained to achieve the result irrespective of the means and method which is employed to achieve it. So long as the goal is achieved the means are irrelevant and this philosophy does not change by hierarchy of the officers. [620 D-E)
8. A Sub-Inspector of Police may be uncouth in his approach and harsh in his behaviour as compared to a Superintendent of Police or Additional Superintentdent of Police or any higher officer. But the basic G philosophy of the two remains the same. The Inspector of Police is as much interested in achieving the result by securing confession of an accused person as the Superintendent of Police. By their training approach they are different. Procedural fairness does not have much meaning for them. It may appear unfortunate that even after Independence a force which was H created to implement harsh and draconian laws of imperial regime, ruth-
KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB ~
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Iessly and mercilessly, has not changed much even in people's regime. A Dignity of the individual, and liberty of person the basic philosophy of Constitution has still not percolated and reached the bottom of the hierarchy as the constabulary is still not accountable to public and unlike British Police it is highly centralised administrative instrumentality meant to weild its stick and spread awe by harsh voice more for the executive than for the law and society. (620 E-G]
Quaere (x): Whether provisions contained in Section 16( !) of 1987 Act providing for conduct of in Camera proceeedings in Designated Court are valid? Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (for himself, M.M. Punchlzi and S.C. Agrawal, !!.)-
Ramaswamy and Sahai, JJ. (Concurring) : 1. Though open trial is an indispensable attribute of the criminal justice yet in exceptional circumstances there cannot be any legal ban in
having the trial in camera. A new sub-section is substituted to the original
Section 16(1) of the principal Act by the Amendment Act 43 of the 1993 giving discretion to the Designated Court either to hold or not to hold the proceedings in camera. Therefore, no detailed discussion against the challenge of Section 16(1) is required. (523 E-F]
A.K Roy v. Union of India, [1982) 1 S.C.C. 271 and Bimal Kaur v. Union of India, A.I.R. (1988) P&H 95, referred to.
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Quaere !xi) : Whether sub-sections(2) and (3) of Section 16 of the 1987 Act empowering the Designated Court to keep the identity and addresses of witnesses secret is valid ?
Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (For himself, M.M. Punchhi and S.C. Agrawal, JJ.)Ramaswamy am\ Sahai, JJ. (Concurring) : ~).
,.
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of the Evidence Act and the procedure prescribed under the Code, there is no imposition of constitutional or statutory constraint against keeping the identity and address of any witness secret if some extraordinary cirumstances or imperative situations warrant
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such non-disclosure of identity and address of the witnesses. [527 A] 2. Under the provisions of 1987 Act, the right of cross-examination is not taken away but the identity and addresses of the witnesses are permitted to be withheld. Under Section 16(2) the Designated Court is given only a discretionary authority to keep the identity and address of any witness secret on the specified contingencies. Sub-section (3) classifies only the measure to be taken by the Designated Court while exercising its discretion under sub-section (2). The measures are to be taken by the Designated Court under any one of the specified contingencies so that a witness or witnesses may not be subject to any harassment for having spoken against the accused. [526 F, 529 B, D, E] 3. Generally speaking when the accnsed persons are of bad character, the witnesses are unwilling to come forward to depose against such persons fearing harassment at the hands of those accused. The persons who are put for trial under this Act are terrorists and disruptionists. Therefore, the witnesses will all the more be reluctant and unwilling to depose at the risk of their life. The Parliament having regard to such extraordinary cir· cumstances has thought it lit that the identity and addresses of the wit· nesses be not disclosed in any one of the above contingencies. [529 F] 4. However, whatever may be the reasons for non-disclosure of the witnesses, the fact remains that the accused persons to be put up for trial under the Act which provides severe punishments, will be put to disad· vantage to effective cross-examining and exposing the previous conduct and character of the witnesses. Therefore, in order to ensure the purpose and object of the cross-examination, the identity, names and addresses of the witnesses may be disclosed before the trial commences; but it should be subject to an exception that the Court for weighty reasons in its wisdom may decide not to disclose the identity and addresses of the witnesses especially of the potential witnesses whose life may be in danger. (530 C, DJ Gurbachan Singh v. The State of Bombay and Anr. [1952] S.C.R. 737; Hira Nath Mishra and Ors. v, T7ie Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi and Anr., [1973] 1 SCC 805; Russel v. Duke of Norfolak, [1949] 1 All E.R. 109; Byren v. Kinematograph Re•zters Society Ltd., [1958] 2 All E.R. 579;A.K Roy v. Union of India, [1982) 2 SCC 271 and Bimal Kaur v. Union of India, A.I.R. (1988) P&H 95, referred to.
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KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
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Quaere (xii): Whether the appeal provisions prescribed in Section 19 of A 1987 Act are prejudicial or less advantageous to the accused person ? Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (For himself, M.M. Punchhi and S.C. Agrawal, !!.) 1. The existing appeal provisions are not constitutionally invalid. However, the practical difficulties faced by the aggrieved persons under the appeal provisions and how the same can be removed are adverted to so that Parliament may take note of them and devise a suitable mode of redress by making the necessary amendments in the appeal provisions. [532 E-F]
,_
2. There is no logic or convincing reasoning in providing no choice but forcing a person aggrieved by the judgment, sentence or order of the Designated Court passed only under the ordinary criminal law to prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court directly in which case the aggrieved person has to deny himself firstly, the right of appeal to the High Court and secondly, the benefit of approaching the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. If every such person aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Designated Court passed under any criminal law other than the TADA has to approach the Supreme Court from far-flung areas, many of the persons suffering front financial constraints may not even think of preferring an appeal at all but to languish in jail indefinitely on that count. The statutory compulsion, in such a situation would not only deny fair play and justice to such person but also amount to destruction of the professed object of criminal justice system in the absence of any other valid reason for an abnormal procedure. [531 G-H, 532 A-Bl
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3. This predicament and practical difficulty, an aggrieved person has to suffer can be avoided if a person who is tried by the Designated Court for offences under the TADA but convicted only under other penal provisions and is acquitted of the offences under the provisions of TADA but convicted only under other penal provisions, is given the right of preferring an appeal before the next appellate court as provided under the G Code of Criminal Procedure and if the State prefers and appeal against the acquittal of the offence under the provisions of TADA than it may approach the Supreme Court for withdrawal of the appeal or revision, as the case may be, preferred by such person to the Supreme Court so that both the cases may be heard together. [532 C-D]
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[1994] 2 S.C.R.
Syed Quasim Rizvi v. State of Hyderabad, [1953] SCR 589 and State (Delhi Admn.) v. V.C. Shukla A.LR. (1980) SC 1382, referred to.
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Per Ramaswamy, J. (Concuning)-
It is true that expeditious trial and disposal of the cases and appeals is one of the aims of the Act. But many an accused being indigent cannot effectively pursue the remedy of appeal in the Supreme Court due to oppressive distance and heavy litigation costs, conferment of appellate power on the High Court would be just and fair remedy. Yet it being a legislative policy, it would be left to the wisdom of the Parliament to decide and suitably amend the Act, keeping in view Article 39-A which itself is a fundamental right to the indigent. TI•e remedy of appeal to the High Court would be easily accessible at the State level, lest the poor may be constrained to forego the remedy of appeal. The right to approach this Court under Article 136 has constitutionally been preserved to everyone. [598 C-E]
,.
D Per Sahai, J. (Concuning)
1. Section 19 provides for an appeal as a matter of right from any judgment, sentence or order not being an interlocutory order of a designated court to the Supreme Court both on facts and law. Such provision existed in 1984 and 1985 AC! as well. Wheri 1984 Act was passed by the Legislature, it was primarily made due to grave situation prevailing in the State of Punjab. Today the 1987 Act has been extended eveu to far off States. The effect of such extension is that for every sentence, may be under Section 3 or 4 or any other section, one has to approach this Court. In many cases, the remedy of appeal may be illusory. For instance, one may be prosecuted under Sections 3, 4 and 5 or under any other section and provision. He may be acquitted for the offence under sections 3 and 4 and yet may be convicted under other sections or provision for minor ofl'ences which were tried by the designated court by virtue of Section 12 of the Act. He may not be able to approach this Court because of enormous expenditure and exorbitant legal expenses involved in approaching this Court. [624 C-E] 2. It should not be forgotten that ours is a vast country with majority on the poorer side. The knowledge of economic inability of sizable section of the society to approach this Court by way of appeal may result in arbitrary exercise of power and excesses of the police. A provision for appeal to this Court in minor cases may result in defeating the remedy
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KAR TAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
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itself. Inability to file appeal due to financial reasons in petty matters may A amount to breach of guarantee under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitutioin. It may in many cases be denial of justice. It is, therefore, suggested that it may be examined if a proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 19 can be added that a person convicted of any offence other than Sections 3 and 4 of the Act shall be entitled to file an appeal in the High Court under whose jurisdiction the designated court is situated. Further in case the State files an appeal against acquittal of the accused under Sections 3 and. 4 in this Court then the appeal of the accused filed in the High Court shall stand automatically transferred to this Court and shall be connected and heard along with appeal filed by the State. The State on such transfer, should allow the accused to have a counsel of his choice, the expenses for which should be borne by the State. [624 E-H, 625 A]
Quaere (xiii): Whether Sectioin 20(3) of 1987 Act, which empowe1' the Executive Magistrates to record confession, is violative of Articles 14, 21 and 50 of Constitution?
Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (For himself, M.M. Punchhi and S.C. Agrawal, !!.) Ramaswamy and Sahai, JJ. (Concurring):
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1. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the 1987 Act does not offened either Article 14 or 21 and hence this sub-section does not suffer from any constitutional invalidity. Merely because the Executive Magistrates and Special Executive Magistrates are included along with the_ other Judicial Magistrates in Section 164 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and empowered with the authority of recording confessioo.s in relation to the case under the TADA, it cannot be sad that it is contrary to the accepted principles of criminal jurisprudence and that the Executive Magistrates and Special Executive Magistrates are personam outside the ambit of machinery for adjudication of criminal cases. [539 D, 536 H, 537 A]
2. Though Section 20(3) is consitutionally valid yet in order to remove G the apprehension that the Executive Magistrates and the Special Executive Magistrates who are under the control of the State may not be having judicial integrity and independence as possessed by Judicial Magistrates and the recording of confessions and statements by those Executive Magistrates may not be free from any possible oblique motive, it would be H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1994] 2 S.C.R.
always desirable and appreciable Iha! a confession or statement of a person is recorded by the Judicial Magistrate whenever the Magistrate is available in preference to the Executive Magistrates unless there is compelling and justifiable reason to get the confession or statement, recorded by the Executive or Special Executive Magistrates. [539 E-F)
~ ~
3. The Indian Constitution provides for an independent judiciary in the State and in order to place the independence of the subordinate judiciary beyond question, provide> in Article 50 of the Directive Principles, for the separation of the judiciary from the executive. The Executive Magistrates while exercising their judicial or quasi-judicial functions though in a limited way within the frame of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which judicial functions arc normally performed by Judicial Magistrates can be held to be holding the Judicial Office. Therefore, the contention that the conferment of judicial functions on the Executive Magistrates and Special Executive Magistrates is opposed to the fundamental principle of governance contained in Article 50 of the ConstituD tion cannot be countenanced. [537 C, 539 CJ
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Stateman (Pvt.) Ltd. v. H.R. Deb & Ors., [1968) 3 SCR 614; Slzree Hanwnan Foundaries v. H.R. Deb & Ors., Matter No. 120/61 decided by S.C. on July 28, 1965; Sltri Kumar Padma Prasad v. Union of India and Ors., [1992] 2 SCC 428; Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1967) 1 SCR 77; Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. (1955) S.C. 549; Directorate of Enforcemellt v. Deepak Mahajan, JT (1994) 1 S.C. 290 and Subramaniam v. Commissioner of Police, A.J.R. (1964) Mad. 185, referred to. Quaere (xiv) : Whether Section 20(4) of 1987 Act providing for trans-
F mission of TADA accused before Executive Magistrate is unconstitutional?
Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (For himself, M.M. Punchhi and S.C. Agrawal, JJ.)
G Ramaswamy and Sahai, JJ. (Concuning) :
Sub-section 4(a) of Section 20 ol the 1987 Act does not suffer from any infirmity on account of the inclusion of the Executive Magistrate and Special Executive Magistrate "ithin the purview of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The modification in sub-section 4(a) is in the same line of sub-section (3); in that the Executive Magistrate and the
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KARTAR v. STAIB OF PUNJAB
Special Executive Magistrate are included along with Judicial Magistrate. A Therefore, whenever a person is arrested for an offence under the provisions of TADA Act, the arrestee can be transmitted to the Judicial Magistrate or the Executive Magistrate or the Special Executive Magistrate, though the transmission of the accused under Section 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for other offences is still only to the Judicial Magistrate. For the reasons mentioned while disposing the sub- B mission made with reference to sub-section (3) of Section 20, the criticism that the inclusion of Executive Magistrate and Special Executiv• Magistrate in sub-section (1) of Section 167 is with an ulterior motive, cannot be countenanced and this provision cannot be said to be unconstitutional. [561 G, 540 Fl
Bimal Kaur v. Union of India A.l.R. (1988) P&H 95 Disapproved. Quaere(xv): Whether Section 20(7) of 1987 Act, which provides for exclusion of provision of anticipatory bail in respect of TADA offences, is violative of Article 21?
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Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (For himself, M.M. Punchhi and S.C. Agrawal, JI). Ramaswamy and Sahai, JJ. (Concurring).
•
1. Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a new provision incorporated in the Code crating a new right. If that new right is taken away, it cannot be said that the removal of Section 438 is violative of Articles 21. Therefore, the attack made on the validity of sub-section (7) of Section 20 has to fail. [544 B-CJ Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc. v. State of Punjab, [1980) 3 S.C.R 383, distinguished.
Bimal Kaur v. Union of india, A.I.R. (1988) P&H 95, referred to.
2. Both the Parliament as well as the State Legislatures have got legislative competence to enact any law relating to the Code of Criminal Procedure. No provision relating to anticipatory bail was in the old Code and it was introduced for the first time in the present Code of 1973 on the suggestion made in the Forty- first Report of the Law Commission and the .Joint Committee Report. It can be deduced· from the reasoning of the Report of the Law Commission that where a person accused of a non-bail-
' SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1994] 2 S.C.R.
A able offence is likely to abscond or otherwise misuse his liberty while on
bail, will have no justification to claim the benefit for anticipatory bail. Can it be said with certainty that terrorists and disruptionists who create terrorism and disruption and inject sense of insecurity, are not likely to abscond or misuse their liberty if released on anticipatory bail ? Evidently, the Parliament has thought it fit not to extend the benefit of Section 438 to such offenders. [543 C, H, 544 A)
Quaere (xvi) : Whether Section 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1976, by which the U.P. Legislatyure has deleted the operations of Section 438 of Criminal Procedure Code, is valid ?
C
Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (For himself, M.M. Punchhi and S.C. Agrawal, JJ.)
Ramaswamy and Sahai, JJ. (Concurring): The U.P. Legislature has passed Act No. 16 of 1976 in exercise of
D powers under List III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule and
deleted Section 438 of the Conistitution. The amendment Act received the assent of the President of India by virtue of Article 245(2) of the Constitution and prevails in U.P. State, notwithstanding any prior law made by the Parliament. As the Act is applied throughout the State, there is no question of discrimination in the application of this provision in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Hence, in view of the discussion made in relation to Section 20(7) of the TADA and of the legislative competence of the State, the contention that the Act is violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution has no merit and as such has to be rejected. [545 A-Cl
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U.P. State Electric Supply Co. v. R.K Shukla, (1969) 2 S.C.C. 400, referred to.
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Quaere (xvii) : Whether Section 20(8) of 1987 Act, which imposes certain conditions for grant of bail to TADA accused, is violative of Articles 14 and 21?
Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (For himself, M.M. Punchhi and S.C. Agrawal, JJ)>
Ramaswamy and Sahai, JJ. (Concurring) :
1. Sub-section (8) of Section 20 of 1987 Act which imposes a complete
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KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
ban on release on bail against the accused of an offence punishable under A this Act minimises or dilutes that ban under two conditions, those being (1) the Public Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to oppose the bail application for such release; and (2) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the bail application the Court must be satisfied that the two conditions namely, (a) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person accused is not guilty of such offences and (b) be is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. If either of the two conditions mentioned therein is not satisfied, the ban operates and the accused person cannot be released on bail, but of course it is subject to Section 167(2) as modified by Section 20(4) of the TADA Act in relation to a case under the provisions of TADA. [548 C, 550 C] C 2. The conditions imposed under Section 20(8) (b) of the 1987 Act are in consonance with the conditions prescribed under clauses (i) and (ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 437 and clause (b) of sub-section (3) of that Section. Similar to the conditions in clause (b) of sub-section (8) there are provisions in various other enactments - such as Section 35(1) of ~'oreign D Exchange Regulation Act and Section 104(1) of the Customs Act to the tffect that any authorised or empowered officer under the respective Acts, if, has got reason to believe that any person in India or within the Indian Customs water bas been guilty of an offence punishable under the respective Acts, may arrest such person. Therefore, the conditfon that "there are E grounds for believing that he is not guilty of an offence", which condition in different form is incorporated in other Acts such as clause (i) of Section 437(1) of the Code and Section 35(1) of FERA and 104(1) of the Customs Act, cannot be said to be an unreasonable condition infringing the prin· ciple of Article 21 of the Constitution. [552 G-H, 553 A-BJ
Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Menon v. State of Gujarat, [1988) 2 S.C.C. 271, relied on. Balchand Jain v. State of M.P., [1977) 2 S.C.C. 52 and lshwar Chand v. State of H.P. l.L.R. (1975) H.P. 569, distinguished. Gudikanti v. Public Prosecutor, [1978) 2 S.C.R. 371, referred to.
3. The conclusion of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bimal Kaur's case holding, "therefore, the last portion of clause (b) sub-section (8) of Section 20 of the Act, which reads: 'and that he is not likely to commit
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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A any offence while on bail' alone is ultravires", is set aside. [553 CJ Bimal Kaur v. Union of India, A.I.R. (1988) P&H 95, disapproved:
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4. No doubt, liberty of a citizen must be zealously safeguarded by the Courts; nonetheless the Courts while dispensing justice in cases like the one under the TADA, should keep in mind not only the liberty of the accused but also the interest of the victims and their near and dear and above all the collective inters! of the community and the safety of the nation so that the public may not lose faith in the system of judicial administralion and indulge in private retribution. [553 D-E]
5. It is true that on many occasions, Courts have come across cases wherein the prosecution unjustifiably invokes the provisions of the TADA with an oblique motive of depriving the accused persons from getting bail and in some occasions \Wien the Courts are inclined to grant bail in cases registered under oridinary Criminal law, the investigating officers in order to circumvent the authority of the Courts invoke the provisions of the TADA. This kind of invcation of the provisions of TADA in cases, the facts of which do not warrant, is nothing but sheer misuse and abuse of the Act by the police. Unless, the public prosecutors rise to the occasion and discharge their onerous responsibilities keeping in mind that they are prosecutors on behalf of the public but not the police and unless the Presiding Officers of the Designated Courts discharge their judicial functions keeping in view the fundamental rights particularly of the personal right and liberty of every citizen as enshrined in the Consititution to which they have been assigned the role of sentinel on the qui vive, it cannot be said that the provisions of TADA Act are enforced effectively in consonance with the legislative intendment. [553 F-G, 554 A]
State of Maharashtra v. Anand Chintman Dighe, [1990] 1 S.C.C. 397, referred to. Quaere (xviii): Whether High Courts have jurisdiction under Article 226
G to entertain bail applications of TADA accused ? Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (For himself, M.M. Punchhi and S.C. Agrawal, !!.): 1. Though the High Courts have very wide powers under Article 226,
H the very vastness of the powers impose on it the responsibility to use them
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KARTAR v. STATEOFPUNJAB ~
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with circumspection and in accordance with the judicial consideration and A well established principles. Special provisions are-enacted in the Act with regard to the grant of bail and appeals arising from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Designated Court etc. The over-riding effect of the provisions of the Act (i.e. Section 25 of TADA) and the Rules made thereunder and the non-obstante clause in B Section 20(7) reading, "Nornithstanding anything contained in the Code ... ." clearly postulate that in granting of bail, the special provisions alone should be made applicable. If any party is aggrieved by the order, the only remedy under the Act is to approach the Supreme Court by way of an appeal. If the High Courts entertain bail applications invoking their extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and pass order, then the very C scheme and object of the Act and the intendment of the Parliament would be completely defeated and frustated. [556 G, H, 557 A-BJ 2. But at the same time it cannot be said that the High Courts have no jurisdiction. If the High Court is inclined to entertain any application under Article 226, that power should be exercised most sparingly and only
in rare and appropriate cases in extreme circumstances. What those rare
cases are and what would be the circumstances that would justify the entertaining of applications under Article 226 cannot be pot in straight jacket. However, the jndicial discipline and comity of Courts require that the High Courts should refrain from exsercising their jurisdiction in entertaining bail applications in respect of an accused indicted under the special Act since this Court has jurisdiction to interfere and correct the orders of the High Courts under Article 136 of the Constitution. [557 C-E] State of Maharashtra v. Abdul Hamid Haji Mohammed, [1994] 2 S.C.C. 664, reiterated. Waryam Singh andAnr. v.Amamath andAnr., [1954] S.C.R. 565; State of Gujarat etc. v. Vakhtsinghji Veghela and Ors. etc., [1968] 3 S.C.R. 592; Ahmedabad Mfg. Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Ram Tahel Ramnand and Ors., [1972] 1 S.C.R. 898; Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim and Ors., [1983] 4 S.C.C. 566; Mani Nariman Daruwala v. Phiroz N. Bhatena & Ors., [1991] 3 S.C.C. 141; Rafiq Abid Patel v. Inspector of Police, Thane, 1992 Crl. L.J. 394 and Narcotic Control Bureau v. Kishan Lal, [1991] 1 S.C.C. 705, referred to. Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Menon v. State of Gujarat, [1988] 2 S.C.C. 271, explained and distinguished.
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Per Ramaswamy, J. (Dissenting) : 1. Through the High Court has jurisdiction and power under Article 226 to issue appropriate writ or direction or order in exceptional cases at the behest of a person accusecl of an offence, triable under the Act or offence jointly triable with the offences under the Act, the High Court being amenable to appellante jurisdiction and judicial review under Article 136 to this Court and this court having been statutorily invested with the power and jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Act, Judicial Pragmatism, concommitance between this court and the High Court, the latter must observe comity and self-imosed limitation, on the exercise of the power under Article 226 and refuse to pass in order or to give direction which would inevitably result in exercising the jurisdiction and power conferred on this court under section 19 of the Act or sitting over the appellate orders passed by this Court. Exercise of the power - even in exceptional cases or circumstances is, therefore, incompatible with or inconsistent with comity. Therefore, the only check up on a court's exercise of power is one's own sense of self-restraint and due respect to comity. Judicial pragmatism, therefore, poignantly points, per force to observe constitutional propriety and comity imposing self-discipline to decline to entertain proceedings under Article 226 over the matters covered under Section 19 in respect of which remedy under Section 19 is available or taken cognizance, issue of process or prima facie case in the complaint or charge-sheet etc.; in other words all matters covered under the Act. Thus the High Court's jurisdiction got eclipsed and denuded. ot the powers over the matters covered under the Act. (606 E-H, 607 A-BJ
In re. Connolly Brothers Ltd., Wood v. Connolly Brothers Ltd., (1911) 1 Chancery Divn. 731; Imperial Tobacco Ltd. v.Attomey General, (1979) 2 All E.R. 592; Santoshi Tel Utpadak Kendra v. Dy. Commissioner of Sales Tax, (1981] 3 S.C.C. 466; Trilokchand Modichand v. H.B. Munshi, Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bombay, A.l.R. (1970) SC 898; Lakshmi Charan Sen v. A.KM. Hassan Uzzaman, (1985] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 493; State of Maharashtra v. Abdul Hazi Mohammad, Crl. Appeal No. 62 of 1994 decided by S.C. on 21.2.1994; Peter Da" v. C.P. Buiford, (339) US 200, 94 L.Ed. 791 (1949); Evel/e J. Younger v. John Harris, (401) US 37, 27, L.Ed. 2nd 669 (1971) Lawrence S. Huffman etc. v. Pursue Ltd., (420) US 592 : 43 L.Ed. 2nd 482 (1975) and United States v. Eager H. Gillock, (445 US 360, 63 L.Ed. 2nd 454 (1980), referred to.
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KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB
2. The jurisdiction and power of the High Court under Article 226 of A the Constitution is nndoubtedly constitutent power and the High Court has untramelled powers andjnrisdiction to issue any writ or order or direction to any person or authority within its territorial jurisdiction for enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or for any other purpose. The legislature has no power to divest the court of the constituent power engrafted under B Article 226. The decision or order or a writ issued by the High Court nnder Article 226 is subject to judicial review by an appeal to this Court under Article 136 whose sweep is wide and untramelled. The jurisdiction of the High Court though was not expressly excluded under the Act, yet by necessary implication it gets eclipsed not so much that it lacked constituent power but by doctriae of concomitance. [601 D, 602 C, DJ C 3. The legislature treated terrorism as a special criminal problem under the TADA Act and the ordinary criminal courts created under the Code were divested of the power and jurisdiction to try the offences governed under the Act and invested the same in the designated Court and appellate powers to this Court. From the scheme of the TADA Act there- D fore, it is clear that the offences created thereunder are exclusively triable by the designated court and conviction made or orders passed, whether final or interlocutory orders pending trial are regulated under the provisions of the Act. Right of appeal thereon has been provided by Section 19 to this Court. The High Court has jurisdiction and control over the E Court of Sessions of the Magistrate, but under the scheme of the Act there is a wall of separation and complete exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court is total. The designated court is neither subordinate to the High Court, nor the High Court has any control or supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. [600 F, H, 601 A-Bl
4. Nothing is more conspicuous than the failure of law to evolve a consistent jurisdictional doctrine or even elementary principles, if it is subject to conflicting or inconceivable or inconsistent result, which lead to uncertainty, incongruity and disbelief in the efficacy of law. [601 CJ Per Sahai, J. (Concuning) :
1. As regards jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain an application for bail under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Courts being constitutionally obliged to ensure that any authority which exercise judicial and quasi-judicial powers in its jurisdiction functions within the H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1994] 2 S.C.R.
'
A framework of law is entitled to entertain the petition to determine if the
proceedings were not an abuse of process of court. But while exercising discretion the court must not be oblivious of the sensitivity of the legislation and the social objective inherent in it and, therefore, should exercise it for the sake of justice in rare and exceptional cases, the details of which cannot be fixed by any rigid formula. [627 H, 628 A-BJ
2. The power given to High Court under Article 226 is an extraordinary power not only to correct the manifest error but also to exercise it for the sake of justice. Under the scheme of the Constitution a High Court is the highest Court for purposes of exercising civil appellate, criminal or C even constitutional jurisdiction so far as that state is concerned. The jurisdiction possessed by it before coming into force of the Constitution was reserved by Article 225 and by Articles 226 and 227 an extraordinary jurisdiction was conferred on it to ensure that the subordinate authorities act not only in accordance with law but they also function within the D framework of law. That jurisdiction of the High Court has not been taken away and in fact could not be taken away by legislation. Since the High Court under the Constitution is a forum for enforcement of fundamental right of a citizen it cannot be denied the power to entertain a petition by a citizen claiming that the State machinery was absuing its power and was acting in violation of the constitutional guarantee. Rather it has a constituE tional duty and responsibility to ensure that the State machinery was acting fairly and not on extraneous considerations. [626 B-E]
3. Thus the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 in extreme cases. What are such extreme cases cannot be put in straight jacket. But the few on which there can hardly be any dispute are if the High Court is of opinion that the proceedings under TADA were an abuse of process of court or taken for extraneous considerations or there was no material on record that a case under TADA was made out. If it be so than there is no reason why should the High Court not exercise its jurisdiction and grant bail to the accused in those cases where one or the other exceptional ground is made out. (626 F-G)
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335; Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kishan Lal, [1991) 1 SCC 705; Waryam Singh, v.Amarnath, AIR (1954) SC 215; State of Gujarat v. Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji Vaghela (dead) by LRs and Ors., [1968) 3 SCR 692; Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd.
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KARTAR v. STATEOFPUNJAB
Mustazin and Ors., [1983) 4 SCC 566; State of Maharashtra v.Abdul Hamid A Haji Mohammed, (1994) 2 JT 1 and Paras Ram v. State of Haryana, [1992) 4 sec 662, referred to. Quaere (xix) : Whether Section 22 of 1987 Act which provides for identification of proclaimed TADA offenders through photographs is unconstitutional ?
Per S. Ratnavel Pandian (For himself, M.M. Punchhi and S.C. Agrawal, !!.)-
Ramaswamy and Sahai, J. (Concurring) :
If the evidence regarding the identfication on the basis of a
photograph is to be held to have the same value as the evidence of a test identification parade, gross injustice to the detriment of the persons suspected may result. Accordingly Section 22 of the 1987 Act is struck down as being opposed to the fair and reasonable procedure enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. [557 H, 562 Fl
Quaere (xx) : Whether under section 2(1)(i) of the 1984Act and under section 2(1)(f) of the 1987 Act the Government should make periodic review for denotification of 'Terrorist Affected Areas' and 'Notified areas ? Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (For himself, M.M. Punchhi and S.C. Agrawal,
JJ.)-
Ramaswamy and Sahai, JJ. (Concuring) : Section 2(l)(i) of 1984 Act defines the expression 'terrorist affected area' meaning an area declared as a terrorist affected area under Section 3 and Section 2(1)(1) of TADA of 1987 defines 'notified area' meaning such area as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify. Some of the State Govenments have notifie1 almost all the areas of the State as 'notified area'. But no notified area seems to have been deootified after notification. Further, nothing has been brought to the notice of this Court about the denotification of any area in any State. Therefore, the State Governments should review periodically and take
decision either to denotify.-any area or continue the same as 'notified area'
and act accordingly. The Screening or Review Committee may also be empowered by the respective Governments to scrutinise the prevailing H
SUPREMECOURTREPORTS
[1994] 2 S.C.R.
A situations and the make recommendations to the State Government, recommending either to continue or to discontinue the notification. This may also to followed in the case of declaring any area as 'Terrorist affected area'. (558 8-D]
Quaere (xxi) : Whether Section 3 of 1984 Act which empowers the
B Government to declare areas as 'Terrorist affected area' is vague and without guidance ? Per S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. (For himself, M.M. Punchhi and S.C. Agrawal, !!.)-
Ramaswami and Sahai, JJ. (Concurring): 1. Unless all the three conditions, which are sine quo non for declaring any area as 'terrorist affected area' by the Central Government by virtue of the authority conferred on it under Section 3(1) of 1984 Act, are fully satisfied, the Central Government cannot invoke the power under Section 3(1) to declare any area as 'terrorist affected area'. In other words, in the absence of any of the conditions, Section 3(1) cannot be invoked. Therefore, the contention that Section 3(1) suffers from vagueness and lacks guidance is unmerited. [479 H, 480 El 2. There is some force in the contention that the Legislature considered it proper to prescribe a uniform procedure for serious offences having a direct relationship with peace and tranquility of the area in the notified area after the notified date and that serious offences which are likely to create terror and panic in the minds of the people were/are sought to be dealt with under the Act by prescribing a speedier trial so that disturbed situations could be brought under control without loss of time to prevent the situation from getting deteriorated and spreading to other areas. [480 Fl Writ Petition No. 1833 of 1984 Etc. Etc.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.) K.T.S. Tulsi, V.R. Reddy and Altaf Ahmad, Additional Solicitor Generals, Ram Jethmalani, V.M. Tarkunde, M.S. Gujral, Rajinder Sachhar, S.K. Dholakia, Hardev Singh, M.R. Sharma, Dr. N.M. Ghatate A.K. Sen, Hogeshwar Prasad, Balwant Singh Malik, R.S. Suri, Miss. A. Subhasbini,
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KARTAR v. STATEOFPUNJAB (PANDIAN,J.]
Sarvas Bisaria, Rajiv Sharma, R.S. Randhawa, Kr. Sultan Singh, Rudrakalon, D.B. Vohra, Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, Ms. Lala krishnamurthi, R.S. Sodhi, Sarup Singh, R.C. Mishra, Dr. Meera Aggarwal, Arun Kumar Sharma, Anip Sachthay, Mrs. Meenakshi Arora, Ms. Madhu Moolchandani, Harjinder Singh, Ms. Anjana Sharma, R.N. Joshi, Sudarsh Menon, Dr. B.L. Wadhera, K.V. Venkataraman, I. Subramaniam, K.V. Viswanadhan, Nagesh Reddy, K. Rajendra Chowdhary, R.K. Sharma, Shivi Sharma, V.G. Parasaran, P.S. Narsimhan, A.K. Srivastava, Shiv Pujan Singh, Mohan Pandey, Sunil K. Singh, Sreepal Singh, A.S. Pundir, Ujjal Singh, J.P. Singh, Anis Ahmed Khan, Vikrant Yadav, K.B. Rohatgi, S.K. Dhingra, Baldev Atreya, Ms. Aparna Rohtgi, Mrs. Rani Chhabra, Mrs. Rani Gupta, Advs. with them for the appearing parties.
C
The Judgments of the Court were delivered by S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN, J. The above batch of matters consisting of a number of with petitions, criminal appeals and SLP are filed challenging the vires of the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts} Act (No. 61 of 1984}, the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention} Act (No. 31 of 1985} and the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (No. 2S/87} - commonly known as TADA Acts - (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1984, Act of 1985 and Act of 1987 respectively} and challenging the constitutional validity of Section 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act No. 16 of 1976} by which the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh has deleted Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as applicable to the State of Uttar Pradesh. Though originally, a number of other matters falling under various Acts such as the U.P. Gangsters and Antisocial Activities (Prevention} Act of 1986 (Act 7 of 1986}, the Prevention of Illicit Traffic of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act of 1988 and some provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA}, were listed for hearing, we have fully and conclusively heard only the matters pertaining to the Act of 1984, Act of 1985 and Act of 1987 and U.P. Act 16 of 1976. Therefore, we are now rendering a common judgment pertaining to the vires of these three Acts and Section 9 of U .P. Act 16 of 1976. At the same time, we make it clear that the merits of the individual cases will have to be decided separately after the validity of these three Acts is decided. Before going to the question of the validity of these three Acts, we feel that a factual and archival account and exposition of the three relevant
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1994] 2 S.C.R.
A Acts may be summarised. PREFATORY NOTE OF THE THREE ACTS:
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(A) The Te"orist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984 (Act 61of1984)
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The above Act 61 of 1984, applicable to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir received the assent of the President on 31.8.1984 replacing Ordinance No. 9 of 1984 promulgated on 14th July 1984, the object of which is to provide for the speedy trial of certain offences in terrorist affected areas and for matters connected therewith. Section 2 (1) of this Act defines the expression 'terrorist affected area' as an area declared as a 'terrorist affected area' under Section 3 which provision empowers the Central Government by notification to declare any area to be 'terrorist affected area' and constitute such area into a single judicial zone or into as many judicial zones as it may deem fit provided in its opinion the offences of the nature specified in the schedule appended to that Act are being committed in any area by terrorists on such a scale and in such a manner that it is expedient for the purpose of coping with such terrorists to have recourse to the provisions of the Act. The notification issued under Section 3(1) in respect of an area should specify the period during which the area shall for the purpose of this Act be a 'terrorist affected area'. As per Section 3 (2) a notification under Section 3(1) in respect of an area specifying the period during which the area shall for the purpose of this Act, be a terrorist affected area, and where the Central Government is of the opinion that the terrorists had been committing in that area from the date earlier than the date of issue of the notification, offences of the nature specified in the Schedule on such a scale and in such a manner that it is expedient to commence the period specified in the notification from such earlier date, the period specified in the notification may commence from that date subject to the proviso thereto. This Act contains 21 Sections relating to the establishment of Special Courts, its composition, jurisdiction and appointment of Judges and provision for an appeal as a matter of right from any judgment, sentence or order (not being an interlocutory order) of a Special Court to the Supreme Court both on facts and law. Though in the original Schedule to this Act qua the definition of the expression 'Scheduled Offence' [(vide section 2 (l)(f))], various enactments including 58 sections under the Indian Penal Code of which 23 are bailable were specified, the Legislature by the Amendment Act 45 of 1985, publish-
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KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB [PANDIAN,J.]
ed in the Gazette of India, dated 26th August 1985, retained only Sections A 121, 121-A, 122 and 123 of the Indian Penal Code and sections 4 and 5 of the Anti-Hijacking Act 1982 and deleted the rest from the original Schedule.
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It has been brought to our notice by Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, the learned Additional Solicitor General that the Central Government established judicial zones in Jullundur, Patiala, Ferozepur and Chandigarh but abolished them by notification Nos. S.0. 692, S.0. 693, S.0.694 and S.0.695 dated 25th September 1985 and transferred the cases pending before those Courts to ordinary courts. Two additional courts were constituted by the Government of India for trial Hijacking cases and Golden Temple case at Ajmer and Jullundur but these two Courts were also abolished by the Government vide notification Nos. S.O. 655 (E) and S.O. 722 (E) dated 24th August 1990 and 28th September 1993 respectively. However, this Act is not repealed, but is in operation. The Terrorist and Disrnptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 (Act 31 of 1985)
This Act which received the assent of the President on 23rd May 1985 and was published in the Gazette of India, Extra., Part II, Section, dated 23rd May 1985, came into force on 24th May 1985 in whole of India for a period of two years. Though originally the proviso to sub-Section (2) to Section 1 was added reading, "Provided so much of this Act as relates to terrorist Acts shall not apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir", this proviso was omitted by Act 46 of 1985. The provisions of this Act were made applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir w.e.f. 5th June 1985. The preamble of this Act read that the special provisions of this Act were made "for the prevention of, and for coping with, terrorist and disruptive activities and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto". The Statement of Objects and Reasons of this Act read as follows:
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"Prefatory Note - Statement of Objects and Reasons - Terrorists had been indulging in wanton killings, arson, looting of properties G and other heinous crimes mostly in Punjab and Chandigarh. Since the 10th May, 1985, the terrorists have expanded their activities to other parts of the country, i.e. Delhi, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan as a result of which several innocent lives have been lost and many suffered serious injuries. In planting of explosive devices H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1994] 2 S.C.R.
in trains, buses and public places, the object to terrorise, to create fear and panic in the minds of citizens and to disrupt communal peace and harmony is clearly discernible. This is a new and overt phase of terrorism which requires to be taken serious note of and dealt with effectively and expeditiously. The alarming increase in disruptive activities is also a matter serious concern." The Bill as introduced sought to make provisions for combating the menace of terrorists and disruptionists, inter-alia, to
(a) provide for deterrent punishment for terrorist acts and disruptive activities; (b) confer on the Central Government adequate powers to make such rules as may be necessary or expedient for the prevention of, and for coping with, terrorist acts and disruptive activities; and
(c) provide for the constitution of Designated Courts for the speedy and expeditious trial of offences under the proposed legislation. In Section 2, clauses (c) and(!) the expressions 'disruptive activity' and 'terrorist act' are defined. This Act in all contains 24 Sections which are segregated into four parts i.e. Part I (Section 1 to 2), Part II (Section 3 to 6), Part Ill (Sections 7 to 16) and Part IV (Sections 17 to 24), dealing with punishment for, and measures for coping with, terrorist and disruptive activities, constitution of Designated Courts constituted under Section 7 of the Act, its jurisdiction and powers, the procedure to be followed, production of witnesses, appointment of Public Prosecutors and the provision for appeal as a matter of right from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of the Court direct to the Supreme Court both on facts and law (vide Sections 7 to 16) and other miscellaneous provisions regarding the modified application of certain prnvisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, competence of Central Government to exercise powers of State Government and delegation of powers, power of the Supreme Court of India to make rules etc. The Terrorist and Dismptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (Act 28 of 1987)
The Act 28 of 1987 was enacted as the Act 31 of 1985 was due to
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KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB (PAND!A.;"l,J.]
expire on 23rd May 1987 and as it was felt that in order to combat and A cope with terrorist and disruptive activities effectively, it was not only necessary to continue the said law but also to strengthen it further. Since both the Houses of Parliament were not in session and it was necessary to take immediate action, the President promulgated the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Ordinance, 1987 (2 of 1987) on 23rd May B 1987 which came into force w.e.f. 24th May 1987. However, this Act repealing the Ordinance, received the assent of the President of India on 3rd September 1987 and was published in the Gazette of India, Extra., Part II, Section 1, dated 3rd September 1987. The scheme of the Act 31 of 1985 and Act 28 of 1987 as reflected from their preambles is the same. The Scheme of the special provisious of these two Acts were/are "for the C prevention of, .and for coping with, terrorist and disruptive activities and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto." As per sub-section (1) of Section 1, Sections 5, 15, 21 and 22 came into force at once and the remaining provisions of this Act were deemed D to have come into force on the 24th day of May 1987. According to sub-section (4) of Section 1, this Act was to remain in force for a period of two years from 24th May 1987 but subsequently sub-section (4) was amended by virtue of the amendment Act 16 of 1989 whereby for the words "two years", the words "four years" were substituted and the validity of this Act was extended for a further period of two years. Resultantly, the Act E was to expire on 23rd May 1991. Thereafter as it was felt that the Act should continue, the President promulgated an Ordinance whereby for the words 'four years", "Six years" were substituted in sub-section (4) of Section 1. Subsequently, this Ordinance was repealed by Act 35 of 1991 thus extending the life of the Act 28 of 1987 to six years. As the Act even by F the extended period of six years was to expire on 23rd May 1993, another Amendment Act 43 of 1993 which received the assent of President on 22nd May 1993, was enacted extending the life of the Act for eight years instead of six years. Incidentally, it may be stated that some insertions, substitutions and G ommissions to some of the sections of this Act have been made. This Act contains 30 Sections grouped under four Parts i.e. Part I· (Sections 1 and 2), Part II (Sections 3 to 8), Part III (Sections 9 to 19) and Part IV (Sections 20 to 30). Part II of the Act deals with punishment for, and measures for coping with terrorists and disruptive activities. Part III deals with constitu- H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1994] 2 S.C.R.
A tion of Designated Courts, its jurisdiction, Powers, and the procedure to
be adopted. It also provides provisions for appeal to the Supreme Court both on facts and law as in the case of other Acts. The provisions under Part IV under the heading "Miscellaneous" deal with the modified application of certain provisions of the Code, presumption as to offences under Section 3, identification of accused, power of the Supreme Court to made rules etc. We give the following table of some of the provisions which are similar in the Act of 1985 and the Act of 1987:
The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985
The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987
Section 7
Section 9
Section 8
=
Section 10
Section 9(2)
Section 11(2)
Section 13
Section 16
Section 16
=
Section 19
Section 17(2)
=
Section 20(4)
Section 17(4)
=
Section 20(7)
Section 17(5)
=
Section 20(8)
A galaxy of senior lawyers, namely, M/s. V.M. Tarkunde, Ram Jethmalani, M.S Gujarat, Rajinder Sachhar, Hardev Singh, M.R. Sharma, AK. Sen, Balwant Singh assisted by a team of lawyers, M/s. R.S. Sodhi, S. Biseria, D.B. Vohra, K. Rajendra Chowdhary, AK. Srivastava, Shiv Pujan Singh, Ujjal Singh, Mohan Panday - all appearing for the petitioners/apG pe!lants made the most virulent fusillade against the constitutional validity of all the Acts in general and the various provisions of those Acts in particular mainly on the grounds that (1) that the Central Legislature has no legislative competence to enact the legislations and (2) these impugned Acts or some of the provision of these Acts are in contravention of or H ostensibly in violation of any of the fundamental rights specified in Part III
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KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB [PANDIAN,J.J
of the Constitution; they also triggered off a volley of at tacb against the A validity of the provisions of these Acts on some other grounds also. According to them, these Acts and the provisions thereto, which are in utter disregard and breach of hum>nitarian law and universal human rights, not only lack impartiality bnt also fail the basic test of justice and fairness which are well established and recognised principles of law.
After critically analysing a number of penal and procedural provisions relating to issue of arrest, investigation, bail, mode and methodology of trial, right of the accused during the trial etc. etc., the learned counsel have strenuously articulated that these Acts with which we are confronted, are draconian, ugly, vicious and highly reprehensible, the brutality of which cannot and should not be minimised of ignored though this Court is not called upon to condone the penalised conduct of the real terrorists and disruptionists. Then they made a scathing attack seriously conl~nding that the police by abusing and misusing their arbitrary and uncarmalised power under the impugned Acts are doing a 'witch-hunt' against the innocent people and suspects stigmatizing them as potential criminals and hunt them all the time and over-react and thereby unleash a reign of terror as an institutionalised terror perpetrated by Nazis to Jews.
C
The above challenges have been countervailed by the learned Additional Solicitor General, Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi assisted by Mr. R.S. Suri appear- E ing for the State of Punjab, the learned Additional Solicitor General, Mr. AJtaf Ahmed assisted by Ms. by Ms. A Subhashini appearing for the Union of Inida, Mr. V.R. Reddy, the learned Additional Solicitor General assi~ted by Mr. K.V. Venkataraman and Mr. I. Subramalliam for the State of Tamil Nadu, Mr. S.K. Dholkia for the State of Gujarat and Mr. N.M. F Ghatate for the State of U.P. contending the all the veiled attacks challengmg the validity of the Acts and the provisions thereto are mainly due to the unjustifiable hostility and sentiments and souring of respect for those Acts. According to them, the events of the past and the continuous long term threats of terrorism and disruption unleashed by a team of seasoned G criminal by spreading their wings and sharpening their claws have forced the legislature to respond to this menance without sacrificing the national values and to combat the terrorism by extending and expanding the legal powers of the State and taking steps/measures in a legalised way and that the outcome of such response is the enactmeru: of these Acts after a prolonged debate in both Houses of Parliament as the Legislature has felt H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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[1994] 2 S.C.R.
that the ordinary criminal laws - both penal and procedural - are quite inadequate to meet the challenges especially when the incidents of terrorists' and disruptionists' activities have astronomically increased. It has been submitted that it was only in the above background, the Parliament in its wisdom thought that the enactment of these Acts (TADA) is the only solution for all the ills, besetting the nation and accordingly enacted these Acts under challenge in order to put down the terrorism and the impending danger in a legalised manner and a comprehensive survey of the anatomy of the entire Acts and a dispassionate examination of them would unmistakably show that these Acts cannot be said to be, in any way, contravening any of the fundamental rights of our Constitution or suffering from lack of legislative competence.
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Supplementing the above submission, it has been very seriously contended by Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi that the terrorists are resorting to mix of specific terrorist operations including armed attacks in a very cruel, unusual and
inhumane manner for a variety of reasons, some of which being (1) to instill (a) a sense of fear and helplessness among civilians either to alienate them from the Government duly established or to make them lose faith in the Government's ability to protect them, (b) a sense of impotence among Government officials or to intimidate them as a means of neutralizing their active opposition to the terrorists groups; (2) to undermine the national economy by discouraging foreign investment, dissuading foreign tourists from visiting the country and spurring capital flight by domestic investors; and (3) to provoke harsh Governmental reprisals to gain sympathy of the population or to create an international incident to publicise their political cause and so no. He further states that all their violent activities ~are designed to get maximum media coverage of their demands including political demands and of publicity and that many times the targets of the victims of the most inhumane physical attacks are the innocent persons whether they are individuals or group of persons. Notwithstanding the merits and demerits of the submissions and
G counter-submissions, irrefutably the talented lawyers and learned Addi-
tional Solicitors General using their formidable legal skill, extensive scholarly knowledge and vast and rich ppctical experience in criminal proceedings and trials analysed the various provisions of the Acts under separate heads in the light of the well recognised principles of criminal jurisprudence with reference to human rights, but sometimes with oc-
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' KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB [PANDIAN, J.]
casional outbursts and caustic exchanges. In support of their respective A contentions advanced during their expanded arguments, they cited a long line of decisions of not only this Court and the High Courts of this country but also foreign decisi:ms ad legislations. Before we make an indepth examination of the challenges canvassed which are manifestly and pristinely legal, with regard to the impugned Acts and some of their provisions with a comprehensive and exclusive survey, it has become inevitable for us to give a brief sketch of the historical background and the circumstances which forced the legislature to enact these laws, as gathered from the Parliamentary Debates, Statement of Objects and Reasons and prefatory notes of the impugned Acts etc. etc.
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From the recent past, in many parts of the word, terrorism and disruption are spearheading for one reason or another and resultantly great leaders have been assassinated by suicide bombers and many drastardly D murders have been committed. Deplorably, determined youths lured by hard-core criminal and underground extremists and attracted by the ideology of terrorism are indulging in committing serious crimes against the humanity. In spite of the drastic action taken and intense vigilance activised, the terrorists and militants do not desist from triggering lawlessness if it suits their purpose. In short, they are waging a domestic war against E the sovereignty of their respective nations of against a race or community in order to create an embryonic imbalance and nervous disorder in the soci~ty either on being stimulated or instigated by the national, transnational or international hard-core criminals or secessionists etc. Resultantly, the security and integrity of the countries concerned are at peril and F the law and order in many countries is disrupted. To say differently, the logic of the cult of the bullet is hovering the globe completely robbing off the reasons and rhymes.· Therefore, every country has now felt the need to strengthen vigilance against the spurt in the illegal and criminal activities of the militants and terrorists so that the danger to its sovereignty is averted and the community is protected. Thus, terrorism and disruptive activities are world-wide phenomenon and India is not an exception. Unfortunately in the recent past this country has fallen in the firm grip of spiraling terrorists' violence and is caught between the deadly pangs of disruptive activities. As seen from the Objects H
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1994] 2 S.C.R.
A and Reasons of the Act 31 of 1985 "Terrorists had been indulging in wanton
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killings, arson, looting of properties and other heinous crimes mostly in Punjab and Chandigarh" and then slowly they expanded their activities to other parts of the country i.e. Delhi, Haryana, U .P. and Rajasthan. At present they have outstretched their activities by spreading their wings far and wide almost bringing the major part of the country under the extreme violence and terrorism hy letting-loose unprecedented and unprovoked repression and disruption unmindful of the security of the nation, personal liberty and right inclusive of the right to live with human dignity of the innocent Citizens of this country and destroying the image of many glitzy cities like Chandigarh, Srinagar, Delhi and Bombay by strangulating. the normal life of the citizens. Apart from many skirmishes in various parts of the country, there were countless serious and horrendous events engulfing many cities with blood-bath, firing, looting, mad- killing even without spring women and children and reducing those areas into a graveyard, which brutal atrocities have rocked and shocked the whole nation. Everyday, there are jarring pieces of information through Electronic and Print media that many innocent, defenceless people particularly poor, politicians, statesmen, Government official, police officials, army personnel . inclusive of the jawans belonging to Boarder Security Force have been mercilessly gunned down. No one can deny these stark facts and naked truth by adopting an ostrich like attitude completely ignoring the impending danger. Whatever may be the reasons, indeed there is none to deny that. The speeches made by the then Home Minister, the then Minister of State for Home Affairs and many Members of Parliament during the Debates at the time of the introduction of the Act of 1987 and at the subsequent stage of its extension and modification, would unfold the magnitude and seriousness of the terrorist and disruptive activities and their consequent dangerous impact on the security of the nation. On 8th April 1988, the then Home Minister in his speech before the Lok Sabha stated thus: "As I told in the beginning, the forces working to destabilize the country are being encouraged from outside as well as inside of the country ......................................................... According to the information received, it appears that its master mind is somewhere else
,,. .
' KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB [PANDJAN,J.]
and it is also inside." The then Minister of State for Home Affairs gave an extensive speech with regard to the commission of heinous crimes on a large scale not only threatening the security and territorial integrity of the nation but also extremely affecting the normal life of the people and stressed the importance of the enactment of law providing the special procedure and speedy trial of those offences. One of the Member of Parliament (Shri Kamal Chaudhary) expressing his view during the discussion on the Bill on the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 stated: "........ Punjab is burning. The legend goes that in the rivers of punjab milk used to flow but they are now drenched with blood. There is hatred all over. What is a democratic solution for Punjab ........ . How many women are beating their breasts every night? We feel the pinch only when our near and dear ones get killed."
Yet another Member of Parliament (Shri Anoopchand Shah) speaking on the Bill presented before the House said: "................................................... Today terrorism has not remained
confined to Punjab only. It has rather spread to every corner of E the country. The same terrorism which exists in Punjab is makings its presence felt in Delhi and Maharashtra dlso ................................. " One another Member of Parliament (Shri Jagan Nath Kaushal) taking part in the Debate on the Act of 1987 spoke thus: " ....................The hon. Members know that we are not dealing with normal peaceful times. We are dealing with extra-ordinary times. Shri Satyendra Narayan Singh has said that not only for Punjab but do something for Bihar also because in the garb of political party etc. greater terrorism is prevailing there also."
We feel that it is not necessary to swell this judgment by reproducing the entire speeches made by the then Home Minister, the Minister of State for Home Affairs and some Members of Parliament on the atrocities committed by terrorists and disruptionists and on the necessity of bringing the . Acts (TADA) to effectively prevent the consequent violence. But H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1994] 2 S.C.R.
A suffice to give the compelling reasons as shown in the Statements of
Objects and Reasons for enacting the Acts of 1985 and 1987 which are to the effect that the terrorists and disruptionists by their expanded activities have created dreadful fear and panic in the minds of the citizens and disrupted communal peace and harmony; that their activities are on an escalation in many parts of the country; that it has been felt that in order to combat and cope with such activities effectively, it had become necessary to take appropriate legal steps effectively and expeditiously so that the alarming increase of these activities which are a matter of serious concern, could be prevented and severely dealt with. The totality of the speeches made by the Ministers, Members of the Parliament during the Debates in the Parliament, the Statements of Objects and Reasons, the submissions made by the learned Additional Solicitors General converge to the following conclusions: (1) From mid eighties, the prevailing conditions have been surcharged with the terrorism and disruption posing a serious threat to the sovereignty and integrity of India as well as creating p~nic and sense of insecurity in the minds of the people. Added to that the brutality of terrorism let-loose, by the secessionists and antinationals in the highly vulnerable area of Indian territory, (prejudicial to the defence of India), is causing grave concern even about the chances of survival of the democratic polity and process; (2) there were also continuous commission of heinous offences such as gruesome mass killings of defenceless innocent people including women, children and bystanders, disturbing the peace, tranquillity and security; (3) The existing ordinary criminal laws are found to be inadequate to sternly deal with such activities perpetrated on humanity.
It was only in the above prevailing circumstances, the legislature has been compelled to bring forth these Acts (TADA) to prevent and deal with the peril of the erupting terrorism and the consequent potential disorder among others disrupting the law and order and to sternly deal with many groups lurking beneath the murky surface, aiding, abetting, nourishing and fomenting terrorism besides giving financial support and supplying sophisticated automatic lethal arms and ammunitions both from inside and
KARTAR v.STATEOFPUNJAB [PANDIAN,J.]
outside of India. It may not be out of place to mention that the facts of the A cases appealed against and set out in the writ petitions and SLP, if accepted in their entirety, reveal the multiple acts of vio:ence let-loose; and the acts of savage revenge perpetrated against individuals, group of persons or any particular community or religious sects show that the violent threat which has manifested itself is not evidently going to vanish with such inexplicable suddenness as would seem to have been visually presumed.
>· ~
In this context, a question may arise as to whether Judges can take notice of matters of common knowledge and authenticated report. This question has been examined by a Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Sukhdev Singh v. Union Territory, Chandigarh AIR (1987) P & H 5. M.M. Punchhi, J. (as he then was) speaking for the majority observed: "I know that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality of a legislative measure, the Court can take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and also assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of the legislation." To redress all the multiple dimensions of crimes - whether of national or trans-national or international - committed by individual or group of criminals, is of course a very difficult task because the crimes and criminals do not respect frontiers and the field of operation of the activities of the criminals know no territorial limits.
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The Parliament, evidently, taking note of the gravity of terrorism committed by terrorists either \vith an intention to overawe the Govern- F ment as by law established or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people or to alienate any section of the people or to adversely affect the harmony amongst different section of the people and the consequent widespread apparent danger to the nation, has felt the need of not only continuing but also further strengthening the provisions of TADA (Act 31 of 1985) in order to cope with the menace of terrorism, enacted Act 28 of G 1987 bringing drastic changes with regard to the admissibility of confessions made to police officials prescribing special procedures and providing condign punishments etc., leave apart the question with regard to the validity of these provisions to be tested on tested on the touchstone of the Constitution.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1994] 2 S.C.R.
Keeping in view the above historical background, we shall unbiasedly and without any pre-conceived notion, examine the various legal problems presented inclusive of the constitutional validity of the three Acts (TADA) in general and of the various provisions in particular of those Acts on the touchstone of the Constitution of India.
While so testing the vires of these Acts, we shall also scrupulously analyse the various penal and the procedural provisions embodied in those Acts relating to the issues of definition of certain terms, arrest, investigation, bail, mode of trial, jurisdiction of the Designated Courts, the permissible legal rights of the accused guaranteed under the Constitution etc. etc. in the light of the constitutional provisions as well as the legal provisions of the existing procedural law with the spectrum of experience so far we have gained in the field of implementation of these impugned Acts.
When Law ends, Tyranny begins;
Legislation begins where Evil begins. The function of the judiciary begins when the function of the Legislature ends,
because the law is, what the Judges say it is since the power to interpret the law vests in the Judges. Law is made not to be broken but to be obeyed and the respect for law is not retained by demonstration of strength but by better appreciation of the reasons, better understanding of its reality and implicit obedience. It goes without saying that the achievements of law in the past are considerable, its protection in the present is imperative and its potential for the future is immense. It is very unfortunate that on account of lack of respect, lack of understanding, lack of effectiveness, lack of vision and lack of proper application in the present day affairs, law sometimes falls in crisis. Where all traditional law enforcement institutions are under suspicious scrutiny, only rational application of the functions of law and a thorough understanding of its complexities and limitations can protect the integrity and survival of legal order. But it is certainly true that the probiem has received a new intensity and a new range as the law extends and variegates the range of its concerns
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KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB (PANDIAN,J.)
and application and as the interests and modes of articulation of those ministering to the law become more and more specialised and technical. Needless to stress that the life of man in a society would be a continuing disaster if not regulated. The Principle means for such regulation is the law which serves as the measure of a society's balance of order and compassion and instrument of social welfare rooted in human rights, liberty and dignity.
Emphasising the importance and potentiality of the law, Lord Chancellor Sankey once remarked: "Amidst the cross currents and shifting sands of public life the law is like a great ark upon which a may may set his foot and be safe." C.G. Weeramantry in The Law in Crisis - Bridges of Understanding Emphasising the importance of 'Rule of Law' in achieving social interest has stated thus: "The protections the citizens enjoy under the Rule of Law are the quintessence of twenty Cf?nturies of human struggle. It is not commonly realised how easily these may be lost. There is no known method of retaining them but eternal vigilance. There is no known authority to which this duty can be delegated but the community itself. There is no known means of stimulating this vigilance but education of the community towards an enlightened interest in its legal system, its achievements and its problems.
,.
Harking-back to the Acts with which we are concerned, the Act 31 of 1985 and Act 28 of 1987 have been enacted by Parliament as a piece of emergency legislation for a certain length of time which period has been extended periodically by the Parliament on revision and they have been extended to the whole of India and made they have been extended to the whole of India and made applicable to citizens of India even outside India, to persons in the service of the Government, wherever they may be; and to persons on ships and aircraft registered in India, wherever they may be. With the above brief introduction, we shall now proceed to deal with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties with reference to the main questions, firstly whether the Acts suffer from lack oflegislative competence and secondly, whether the Acts or any of the provisions
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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- A thereof contravene any fundamental right specified m Part III of the Constitution, as well as other cognate questions.
It has been serio.usly contended by Mr. Balwant Singh Malik, Senior Counsel that the Act 28 of 1987 (TADA) is ultra-vires since the Central Legislature, namely, the Parliament, lacked legislative competence under Article 246 read with the topic of legislation enumerated in List I (Union List) and List III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, to enact the TADA Act and that the subject matter of the impugned Acts in fact fell within the legislative field assigned to the States under Entry 1 of List II (State List), namely, 'Public Order' which is a most comprehensive term with widest import encompassing every activity which leads to violence or disturbs public tranquility. According to him, the subject matter of the Act (TADA) is not referable to any of the matters enumerated in List I of the Seventh Schedule and the presumptive attempt of the Union of India to rely upon Entry 1 of List III for the competency of the Parliament to enact the TADA Act cannot find favour. Entry 1 of List III read: "Criminal law, including all matters included in the Indian Pen3! Code at the commencement of this Constitution but excluding offences against laws with respect to any of the matters specified in List I or List II and excluding the use of naval, military or air forces or any other armed forces of the Union on aid of the civil power" According to him, the above Entry is left with only 'offences against laws' with respect to matters specified in subsequent Entries of the Concurrent List. As the TADA Act cannot be held to be referable to any other topic in the Concurrent List, its subject matter could not, on that basis be held to fall under Entry 1 of that List. It has been further submitted that the contents of the heading 'Criminal Law' in Entry 1 of List III are derivative in nature and carry no meaning of their own because the criminal law comprising 'offences against laws' are with respect to the matter in the three Lists. He continued to urge that the subject matter of the TADA Act which deals with the 'security of the State' and 'public safety' involving violence even of the highest degree tending to cause grave public disorder is plainly covered under Entry 1 of List II and that the individual States under Entry 64 of List II alone are competent to legislate with respect to
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KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB [PANDIAN,J.]
offences against public order.
After drawing our attention to some of the laws enacted by various States with respect to maintenance of public order, such as(1) Assam Disturbed Areas Act (19 of 1955);
(2) The Punjab Security of State Act, 1949; (3) The Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949; (4) The West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970; (5) The U.P. Gangsters and Anti-social Activities (Act 7 of 1986);
(6) 'The J.K. Enemy, Agents Ordinance No. VIII of San 2005; (7) The Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slum Lords, Bootleggers and Drug Offenders Act, 1981;
(8) The Kamataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleg.gers, Drug offenders, Goondas, Gamblers, Immoral Traffic and Slum Grabbers Act, 1985it has been said that all those laws fall within the ambit of 'public order' appearing in Entry 1 of List II. Mr. Balwant Singh Malik, in support of his contention, cited the following decisions declaring competency of the Provinces/States of the Federation/Union to make laws under 'public
order': (1) Lakhi Narayan Dass v. Province of Bihar, AIR (1950) F.C. 59; (2) Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, [1950] SCR 594; (3) Rev. Stainslaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1977] 2 SCR 611 and (4) Ashok Kumar Dixit v. State of U.P., AIR (1987) All. 235 (F.B.).
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Though, according to him, the individual States are legislatively G competent to provide for the maintenance of public order by creating new offences and by taking other measures within the States, if a situation with regard to the maintenance of public order concerns more than one State or the country as a whole, then it may be necessary for the Parliament to step in under Articles 249, 250 and 252 of the C9nstitution (which provisions have, however, not been relied upon when enacting the TADA) H
I/
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1994]2 S.C.R.
A and enact the law. Ho•vever, this will not justify giving any other meaning to Entry 1 of List III namely, 'Criminal Law' and Entry 1 in List II, namely, 'Public Order' read with Entry 64 and Entry 65 of that List.
Elaborating some of the entries of List II, it has been urged that the legislative power of the State of enact laws under 'Public Order' is contained in Entry 1 of List II and the power of the State to create the police-investigating agency - is under Entry 2 of List II and the legislative power to vest jurisdiction and confer powers on Courts to try such State offences falls under Entry 65 of List II and that a combined reading of the excluding clause of Entry 1 of List III and Entry 93 of List I and Entry 64 of List II completely exempts offences relating to· 'Public Order' from the heading, 'Criminal Law' under Entry 1 of List III. It has been further urged that the legislative power of the parliament under Articles 245 and 246(1) (2) read with List I and List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution in regard to creating offences, under Entry 93 of List I extends only to matters enumerated in that List and under Entry 1 of List III in regard to matters in subsequent entries of that List. Supplementing the above arguments, Mr. Ram Jethmalani, Senior Counsel advanced the other facet of the argument stating that this Act (28 of 1987) in 'pith and substance' relates to 'Public Order' as reflected from its preamble itself declaring the Act to be an Act to make special provisions for the prevention of and for coping with terrorist and disruptive activities and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The 'pith and substance' of the Act, according to him, is in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 to which the rest of the Sections are merely incidental to or necessary for the implementation of the paramount purpose of the Statute and that if the 'pith and substance' of the legislation of covered by a particular Entry, any incidental encroachment on some other Entry does not change the character of the Act. The amendments brought under Act 28 of 1987 creating Special Courts called Designated Courts, prescribing new procedure and inserting some provisions with regard to the admission of evidence in trials before the Designated courts, would justify that these amendments fall within Entry 2 and Entry 12 of List III whilst the Act remains as one falling under Entry 1 of List II. In support of his submission with regard to the doctrine of 'pith and
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KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB [PANDIAN,J.]
substance', he referred to the decisions in (1) Prafu/la Kumar Mukherjee and others v. Bank of Commerce, AIR (1947) P.C. 60; (2) Ram Krishna Ramnath Agarwal v. Secretary, Municipal Committee, [1950] SCR 15; and (3) The Kera/a State Electricity Board v. Indian Aluminum Co. [1976] 1 SCR 552. The learned counsel also cited two other decisions with regard to the scope of Entry 2 of List II, those being, (1) Ramesh Thappar (supra) wherein the Court after approving a pa>S_age from Stephen's Criminal Law of England has held that unlawful assemblies, riots, insurrections, rebellions etc. are all offences against public order, the difference among them being only a difference of degree and The Superintendent, Central Prison v. Dr. Lohia [1960] 2 SCR 821. Mr. Hardev Singh in his written arguments in Writ Petition No. 15432/84 which have been filed by the petitioner, Mr. Amrinder Singh as a public interest litigant challenging the constitutional validity of Act 61 of 1984 raised a similar contention that the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984 is unconstitutional for want of legislative competence.
,.
Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, the learned Additional Solicitor General in his attempt to expose the fallacy of the above submissions stated that the highly classified and strictly confidential information collected by and received from the Intelligence Organisation, which information is not to be disclosed in public interest, unmistakably enfold that the secessionists forces working to destabilize the sovereignty of India and its integrity are being encouraged by the neighbouring countries and that there are many training camps on the borders of India where training is imparted to militants and terrorists not only in the use of sophisticated and heavy weapons, including rocket launchers, machine guns, mines, explosives and wireless communications but also to indulge in illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs, and psychotropic substances which unassailable facts are a matter of common knowledge and which can be taken into consideration by way of judicial notice. Many countries across the borders, according to him, are supplying deadly arms and ammunitions and are providing sanctuary to the extremist elements as a base for their training and doctrination.
In view of the above outrageous and volcanic circumstances and situations, in pith and substance, the Act is not related to 'Public Order' falling under Entry 1 of List II but relates to the 'Defence of India' falling under Entry 1, as well as Entries 2 and 2-A of List I read with Entries 1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1994] 2 S.C.R.
A and 2 of List III. According to Mr. Tulsi, the submissions of the other side that the subject of the impugned Act falls under Entry 1 of List II, namely, 'Public Order' is incorrect and fallacious.
We shall now carefully examine the submission made by the respective parties in the light of the import and intendment of the Acts under challenge and find out as to whether this Act (TADA) falls under Entry 1 of List II, namely, 'Public Order' or under Entry 1 of List I, namely, 'Defence of India' as well as entries 2 and 2{A) of List I read with Entries 1 (Criminal Law) and 2(Criminal Procedure) of List III. But before we do so, we would briefly taken note of the constitutional scheme relating to distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States. Under clause (1) of Article 2446, notwithstanding any thing in clauses (2) and (3) of the said Article, the Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with with respect to any of the 97 subject enumerated in List I of the Seventh Schedule. Under clause (3) of the said Article, the State legislatures have exclusive powers to make laws with respect to 66 items enumerated in List II. The Powers in respect of the 47 items enumerated in List III are concurrent i.e. both the Parliament and the Legislature of any State, subject to clause (1) have power to make laws. With regard to a law made in respect of matters enumerated in the Concurrent List provision has been in article 254 which gives overriding effect to a law made by Parliament in the event of there bring any repugnancy between the said law and the law made by legislature of a State and the State law would prevail over a law made by parliament only if such state law was enacted after the law made by Parliament and has received the assent of the President. While examining the question of legislative competence of parliament to make a law, the proper approach is to determine whether the subject matter of the legislation falls in the State List which Parliament cannot enter.
If the law does not fall in the State List, the Parliament would have the legislative competence to pass the law by virtue of the residuary powers under Article 248 read with Entry 97 of the Union List and it would not be necessary to go into the question whether it falls under any entry in the Union List or Concurrent List (See Union of India v. H.S. Dillon, [1972] 2 SCR 33 at Page 61 and 67-68; (ii) S.P. Mittal v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCR 729 at Page 769-770; (iii) Khandelwal Metal Works v. Union of India,
,.,,.. ·
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' KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB [PANDIAN,J.]
Suppl. 1 SCR 750 at Page 775). It is, therefore, necessary to examine A whether the Act falls within the ambit of Entry I read with Entry 64 of the State List as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners. But before we do so we may briefly indicate the principles that are applied for construing the enteries in the legislative lists. It has been laid down that the entries must not be construed in a narrow and pedantic sense and that widest amplitude must be given to the language of these entries. Sometimes B the entries in different lists or the same list may be found to overlap or to be in direct conflict with each other. In that event it is the duty of the Court to find out its true intent and purpose and to examine the particular legislation in its 'pith and substance' to determine whether it fits in one or other of the lists. (See: Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of U.P., [1989] Suppl. 1 SCR 623 at page 672.; India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1989] Suppl. 1 SCR 692 at page 705). This doctrine of 'pith and substance' is applied when the legislative competence of the legislature with regard to a particular enactment is challenged with reference to the entries in the various lists i.e., a law D dealing with the subject in one list is also touching on a subject in another list. In such a case, what has to be ascertained is the pith and substance of the enactment. On a scrutiny of the Act in question, if found, that the legislation is in substance one on a matter assigned to the legislature · enacting that statute, then that Act as a whole must be held to be valid notwithstanding any incidental trenching upon matters beyond its com- E petence i.e., on a matter included in the List belonging to the other legislature. To say differently, incidental encroachment is not altogether forbidden. Lord Porter speaking for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Praful/a Kumar Mukherjee and Others v. Bank of Commerce, Khulna, AIR 34 (1947) PC 60 quoted with approval the observations of Sir Maurice Gwayer, C.J. in Subramanyan Chettiar v. Muttuswamy Goudan, (1940) FCR 188 to the effect:
"It must inevitably happen from time to time that legislation G though purporting to deal with a subject in one list touches also upon a subject in another list, and the different provisions of the enactment may be so closely intertwined that blind adherence to a strictly verbal interpretation would result in a large number of statutes being declared invalid because the Legislature enacting H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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them may appear to have legislated in a forbidden sphere. Hence the rule which has been evolved by the Judicial Committee, whereby the impugned statute is examined to ascertain its pith and substance or its true nature and character for the purpose of determining whether it is legislation with respect to matters in this list or in that."
, r
Thereafter, their Lordship of the Privy Council held:
"Subjects must still overlap and where they do the question must be asked what in pith and substance is the effect of the enactment of which complaint is made and in what list is its true nature and character to be found. If these questions could not be asked, much beneficent legislation would be stifled at birth, and many of the subjects entrusted to Provincial Legislation could never effectively be dealt with. Thirdly, the extent of the invasion by the Provinces into subjects enumerated in the Federal List has to be considered. No doubt it is an important matter, not, as their Lordships think, because the validity of an Act can be determined by discriminating between degrees of invasion, but for the purpose of determining what is the pith and substance of the impugned Act. Its provisions may advance so far into Federal territory as to show that it true nature is not concerned with Provincial matters, but the question is not, has it trespassed more or less, but is the trespass, whatever it be, such as to show that the pith and substance of the impugned Act is not money-lending but promissory notes or banking? Once that question is determined the Act falls on one or the other side of the line and can be seen as valid or invalid according to its true content. See also (1) re The Central Provinces and Berar, Act No. XIV of 1938 AIR (1939) FC l; (2) Governor-Genera/ in Council v. Province of Madras, AIR (1945) PC 98; (3) Union of India v. H.S. Dillon, [1972] 2 SCR 33 and (4) J and K State v. M.S. Farooqi, [1972] 3 SCR 881 wherein the dictum laid down in Subramanyan Chettear (Supra) has been referred to.
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Reference may now be made to the relevant Entries, namely Entries
H 1 and 64 of State List which are as under: ;
KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB [PANDIAN,J.]
"Enlry 1 : Public order (but nol including (the use of any navel, A military or air force or any other armed force of the Union or of any other force subject to control of the Union or of any contingent or unit thereof) in aid of the civil power). Entry 64 : Offences against laws with respect to any of the matters in this List. Under the Government of India Act, 1935, the Provincial legislature had been conferred the power to enact laws in respect of matters enumerated in the Provincial List and Item 1 of the provincial List covered the field of "public order (but not including the use of His Majesty's navel, military or air forces in aid of the civil power)". In Lakhi Narayan Das v. Province of Bihar, (1949-50) FCR 693, The expression 11 public ordcr11 has been described as a 'most comprehensive term' and it has been held that "maintenance of public order within a province is primarily the concern of that province". It has also further observed that if the legislature has not exceeded its powers, il is not for the courts to criticise the wisdom or policy of the legislature. In Ramesh T7iapper v. The State of Madras, [1950] SCR 598 while holding that "public order" is an expression of wide connotation and signifies that state of tranquility which prevails among the members of a political society as a result of the internal regulations enforced by the Government which they have established, the Court has drawn a distinction between "public order" and security of a State. After referring to Entry 3 of the Concurrent List, the Court has observed: ''The Constilution thus requires a line to be drawn in the field of public order or tranquility marking off, may be, roughly, the boundary belween those serious and aggravated forms of public disorder which are calculated to endanger the security of the State and the relatively minor breaches of the peace of a purely local significance, treating for this purpose differences in degree as if they were differences in kind."
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In Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1966] 1 SCR 709, Hidayatullah, J (as the learned Chief Justice then was) has brought out the distinction between Jaw and order\ ''public order!! and !•security of the State" in the following observation :
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"It will thus appear that just as "public order" in the rulings of this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity than those affecting "security of State", "law and order" also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting "public order". One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order, represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not security of the State." Having regard to the limitation placed by Article 245 (1) on the legislative power of the legislature of the State in the matter of enactment of laws having application within the territorial limits of the State only, the ambit of the field of legislation with respect to "public order" under Entry I in the State List has to be confined to disorders of lesser gravity having an impact within the boundaries of the State. Activities of a more serious nature which threaten the security and integrity of the country as a whole would not be within the legislative field assigned to the States under Entry I of the State List but would fall within the ambit of Entry I of the Union List relating to defence of India and in any event under the residuary power conferred on Parliament under Article 248 read with Entry 97 of the Union List. The petitioners can succeed in their challenge to the validity of the Act with regard to the legislative competence of Parliament, only if it can be said that the Act deals with activities relating to public order which are confined to the territories of a particular State. In order to ascertain, the pith and substance of the impugned enactments, the preamble, Statement of objects and Reason, the legal significance and the intendment of the provisions of these Acts, their scope and the nexus with the object that these Acts seek to subserve must be objectively examined in the background of the totality of the series of events - due to the unleashing of terrorism, waves after waves, leading to the series of bomb blasts causing extensive damage to the properties, killing of hundreds of people, the blood-curdling incidents during which the blood of the sons of the soil had been spilled over the soil of their motherland itself, the ruthless massacre of the defenceless and innocent people especially of poor as if they were all 'marked for death' or for 'human sacrifice' and the sudden outbreak of violence, mass killing of army personnel,
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KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB [PANDIAN.J.J
jawans of Boarder Security Force, Government officials, politicians, statesmen, heads of religious sects by using bombs and sophisticated lethal weapons thereby injecting a sense of insecurity in the mind of the people, with the intention of destabilizing the sovereignty or overthrowing the Government as established by law. The way in which the aliened violent crimes is shown to have been perpetrated, the manner in which they have been cruelly executed, the vulnerable territorial frontiers which form part of the scene of unprecedented and unprovoked occurrences, lead to an inescapable illation and conclusion that the activities of the terrorists and disruptionists pose a serious challenge to the very existence of sovereignty as well as to the security of India notwithstanding the fact whether such threats or challenges come by way of external aggression or internal disturbance. The terrorism, the Act (TADA) contemplates, cannot be classified as mere disturbance of 'public Order' disturbing the "even tempo of the life community of any specified locality" - in the words of Hidayatullah, CJ in Arnn Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, [1970] 3 SCR 288 but it is :nuch more, rather a grave emergent situation created either by external force particularly at the frontiers of this country or by anti-nationals throwing a challenge to the very existence and sovereignty of the country in its democratic polity. The above view gets strengthened from the very definition of expression 'terrorist act' as defined in Section 2 (1) (h) of the Act 28 of 1987 stating that the said expression "has the meaning assigned to it in sub-section (1) of Section 3" according to which the intention to commit any offence or offences specified therein should be for ofie or more clearly defined objectives as expressly mentioned in section 3(1) reading:"Whoever with intent to overawe the Government as by law estab. lished of to strike terror in the people or any section of the people or to alienate any section of the people or to adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people does any act or thing .............................. 11
Similarly, the expression 'disruptive activity' as defined under Section 2(1) (d) has the meaning assigned to it in Section 4. Section 4(1) prescribes only the quantum of punishment for disruptive activities. Section 4(2) gives the meaning of that expression thus:
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"4(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), "disruptive activity" · means any action taken, whether by act or by speech or through any other media or in any other manner whatsoever, -
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(i) which question, disrupts or is intended to disrupt, whether directly or indirectly, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India; or (ii) which is intended to bring about or supports any claim, whether directly of indirectly, for the cession of any part of India or the secession of any part of India from the Union.
" Explanation - For this purposes of this sub-section, .. (a) "cession" includes the admission of. any claim of any foreign ·. country to any part of India, and
(b) "secession" includes the assertion of any claim to determine whether a part of India will remain within the Union." The above definitions, would themselves make it clear that the expression 'Terrorist and Disruptive Activities' deploved in the preamble of the Act (28 of 1987 - TADA) contemplates the commission of any specified offence or offences with a specific intention one of which being "to overawe the Government as by law established" {Vide Section 3(1)} and "any action taken,' whether by act or by speech or through any other media or in any other'manner whatsoever, which questions disputes or is intended to disrupt whether directly or indirectly the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or which intended to bring about or supports any claim, whether directly or indirectly, for the cession of any part of India or the secession of any part of India from the Union". {Vide Section 4(2)} Therefore, the submission made by Mr. J ethmalani that the preamble of the Act gives a clue that the terrorist and disruptive activities only mean a virulent form of the disruption of public order is inconceivable and unaceeptable. In our view, the impugned legislation does not fall under entry 1 of List II, namely 'Public Order'. No other Entry of List II has been invoked. The impugned Act, therefore, falls within the legislative competence of Parliament in view of Article 248 read with Entry 97 of List I and it is not
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KAR TAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB [PANDIAN, J.]
necessary to consider whether it falls under any of the Entries in List I or List III. We are, however, of the opinion that the impugned Act could fall within the ambit of Entry 1 of List 1, namely, 'Defence of India'.
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Mr. Hardev Singh in his written arguments also challenged the vires of Act 61 of 1984 on many grounds (about which we shall deal separately while examining the various provisions of TADA Act, one of which being the legislative competence). The learned counsel has questioned the legal competence of the impugned Act on the same line of arguments as advanced by Mr. Balwant Singh Malik. In support of his contention, he cited Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar and Others, (1966] 1 SCR 709 wherein this Court while dealing with Rule 30( 1) (b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 had explained the difference between 'Public Order'.; 'Law and Order' and 'Security of India'. In Act 61of 1984, the expression 'terrorist affected area' is defined in Section 2(1) (i) as meaning an area declared as a terrorist affected area under Section 3. Section 3(1) reads thus: "3(1) If the Central Government is of the opinion that offences of the nature specified in the Schedule are being committed in any area by terrorists on such a scale and in such a manner that it is expedient for the purpose of coping with the activities of such terrorists to have recourse to the provisions of this Act, it may, by notification,-
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(a) declare such area to be a terrorist affected area; and (b) .......................... .
The word 'terrorist' is defined in Section 2(1) (h) as follows: "2(1) (h) "terrorist" means a person who indulges in wanton killing of persons or in violence or in the disruption of services or means of communications essential to the community or in damaging property with a view to-
(i) putting the public or any section of the public in fear; or
(ii) affecting adversely the harmony between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities;
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or (iii) coercing or overawing the Government established by law; or (iv) endangering the sovereignty and integrity of India''.
The above definition also requires more or less the intention as required under Section 3(1) of TADA, namely, Act 28 of 1987, and also the motive for commission of the terrorist act is akin to that of Section 4 of the TADA Act of 1987, i.e. one of the motives being to endanger the sovereignty and integrity of India. In short, the definition of the expressions 'terrorist act' and 'disruptive activity' under Section 2(1} (h} and (d) of Act 28 of 1987 (TADA) respectively are conjointly brought under the definition of the word 'terrorist act' in Act 61 of 1984. Therefore, the Act of 1984 also cannot be said to have contemplated only 'Public Order' but envisages a more grave situation threatening the sovereignty and integrity of India.
For all the reasons stated above, we hold \hat the contention the Acts 61 of 1984, 31 of 1985 and 28 of 1987 are ultravirus on the ground of suffering from lack of legislative competence and as such the entire Acts are liable to be struck down, is to be rejected and accordingly that contention is rejected as devoid of any merit. The next spinal issue arises for our deepest probe and scrutiny i:s whether the impugned Acts in general or any of the provisions thereof in particular contravene any other fundamental right specified in Part III of the Constitution. All the learned counsel who have challenged the vires of these Acts and the provisions thereof have advanced their legal arguments both topic-wise as well as with reference to the individual provisions of the Acts. To begin with their polemics, it was with reference to the proposition
G of speedy trial which is the main objective 0f these Acts under challenge.
It was the submission of the learned counsel that though the professed object of Act 61of1984 (Special Courts Act) and of TADA Acts (Acts 31 of 1985 and 28 of 1987) is for speedy trial of the scheduled offences committed within the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act 1984 and of the offences falling within the definition of "Terrorist Act" and "Disruptive Activity" under the TADA Acts, in reality these Acts make not
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KARTAR v.STATEOFPUNJAB [PANDJAN,J.]
only a drastic departure from the prevalent procedure in respect of the trial of similar offences in regular courts, but also serious inroads in the substantive rights in may respects causing irreparable erosion of the independence of judiciary and totally undermining both the Constitutional precepts and lex-scripta (statute law). According to them the procedural provisions of those Acts under the guise of speedy trial violate the venerated basic principles of fair trial, held dear all along, namely, that every person will be presumed innocent till his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt, 'according to the procedure established by law.' The procedure prescribed under these Acts does not met the requirements implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution because the said procedure is the anti thesis of a just, fair and reasonable procedure. Under the guise of providing speedy trial not only the procedural safeguards have been completely denied to the accused who are subjected to trial by Special Courts under 1984 Act or by the Designated Courts under the TADA Acts, but also the Acts have been substantially altered to the prejudice of the accused. Therefore, the procedure prescribed by the Acts which falls foul of Article 21 should be held to be arbitrary, unfair, oppressive or unreasonable. In support of the above argument,. they drew our attention to Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621 wherein it has been hold that any law which deprives a person of his life and liberty must be just and reasonable. To borrow the words of Krishna Iyer, J in that case "'procedure' in Article 21 means fair, not formal procedure. 'Law' is reasonable law, not any enacted piece."
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The preamble of Act 1984 (Special Courts) Act reads that it is "An Act to provide for the speedy trial of certain offences in terrorist affected F areas and for matters connected therewith." The object of the preamble is manifested in Sections 3(1) and 4(1) of that Act reading "For the purpose of providing speedy trial of scheduled offences committed in a judicial zone, the Central Government may est"blish, by notification, a Special Court... ............... " Though there is no explicit manifestation of such expres- G sion, 'speedy trial' found either in the preamble or in any of the provisions of the TADA Acts as in 1984 (Special Courts) Act, the scope and intendment of the various provisions of these TADA Acts perceivably conveys that the TADA Acts also contemplate speedy trial of cases. In fact, the 'Statement cif Objects and Reasons' of Act 31 of 1985 reading, "This is a new and overt phase of terrorism which requires to be taken serious note H
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A of and dealt with effectively and expeditiously" makes it clear that the constitution of Designated Courts was for the speedy and expeditious trial of offences under the impugned legislation.
Now let us examine the principle of speedy trial underlying in Act 28 of 1987 (TADA).
The constitution of one or more Designated Courts either by the Central Government or the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette for notified area/areas to try specified cases or class or group of cases (vide S. 9 of Act 28 of 1987); the procedure prescribed for disposal C of cases by making every offence punishable under the Act or any rule ma,de thereunder to be a cognizable offence within the meaning of clause (c) of Section 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (vide Section 20); the dispensation o,f the committal proceedings (vide Section 14(1); the vesting of jurisdiction on the Designated Courts to try all offences under the Act by giving precedence over the trial of any other case against the accused D in any other court (not being a Designated Court) notwithstanding anything contained in the code or any other law (vide Section 17); the conferment of power on Designated Courts to try the offences triable by them punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or with fine or with both in a summary way in accordance with the procedure prescribed E in the Code notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section ( 1) of Section 260 or 262 of the code and also as far as may be by applying the provisions of Sections 263 to 265 (vide Section 14 (2) and the vesting powers of a Court of Sessions on the Designated Courts for the purpose of trial of any offence-[vide Section 14(3)] and the empowerment of authority on the Designated courts to proceed with the trial even in the F absence of accused or pleader for the reasons to be recorded by it, but subject to the right of accused to recall witnesses for cross-examination (vide Section 14(5), the right of appeal straight to the Supreme Court as a matter of right against any judgment, sentence or order not being an interlocutory order (vide Section 19(1) etc., - all postulate the concept of G speedy trial in spirit under TADA Acts.
Speedy Trial:
The right to a speedy trial is a derivation from a provision of Magna Carta. This principle has also been incorporated into the Virgin.ia Declaration of Rights of 1776 and from there into the Sixth Amendment of the
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KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB [PANDIAN, J.]
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Constitution of United States of America which reads, "In all criminal A prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial. ................. '
It may be ·pointed out,in this connection, that there is a Federal Act of 1974 called 'Speedy Trial Act' establishing a set of time limits for carrying out the major events, e.g. information, indictment, arraignment in the prosecution of criminal cases. See Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edilion) p. 1400.
The right to a speedy trial is not only an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration, to minimise anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation and to limit the possibility of impairing the ability of an accused to defend himself but also there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial. This right is actuated in the recent past and the Courts have laid down series of d~cisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. In fact, lot of cases are coming before the Courts for quashing of proceedings on the ground of inordinate and undue delay D stating that the invocation of this right even need not await formal indictment or charge.
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The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and li"erty guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result from impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the commission of the offence till it consummates into a finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted F that the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial is properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code Criminal procedure. This Court Hussainara Khatoon and others (I) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, [1980] 1 SCC 81 p. 80 while dealing with the Article 21 of the Constitution of India has observed thus:
"No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral H
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and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would, be the consequent if a person accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21. Would he be entitled to be released unconditionally freed from the charge levelled against him on the ground that trying him after an unduly long period of time and convicting him after such trial would constitute violation of his fundamental right under Article 21." See also (1) Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, [1979] 1 SCR 392; (2) Hussainara Khatoon and Others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1979] 3 SCR 169; (3) Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna, (1979] 3 SCR 532; (4) Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Govt. of Bihar, Patna, (1979] 3 SCR 1276; (5) Karda Pahadia v. State of Bihar, (1983] 2 SCC 104; (6) T. V. Vathesswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1983] 2 SCR 348 and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, [1992] 1sec225. Thus this Court by a line of judicial pronouncements has emphasised and re-emphasised that speedy trial is one of the facets of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21 and the law must ensure 'reasonable, just and fair' procedure which has a creative connotation after the decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi (supra). It is appropriate to refer two of the decisions of the Supreme Court of United States of America dealing with the scope of speedy trial which is a gnaranteed fundamental right incorporated by the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of United States.
In Beavers v. Haubert 198 US 77, 87 (1905] the Supreme Court of U.SA. has observed thus:
"'The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is inconsistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice." Recognising the right of an accused to approach the Court for dismissal of a criminal proceeding on the ground of speedy trial, the U .S Supreme Court held in Strnnk v. United States, 412 US. 434 (1973] that the
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KARTAR v. STATEOFPUNJAB [PANDIAN,J.] ~
denial of an accused's right to speedy trial results in a decision to dismissal the indictment or in reversion of a conviction. See also United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1977]. Of course, no length of time is per se too long to pass scrutiny under this principle nor the accused is called upon to show the actual prejudice by the delay of disposal of cases. On the other hand, the Court has to adopt a balancing approach by taking note of the possible prejudices and disadvantage to be suffered by the accused by avoidable delay and to determine whether the accused in a criminal proceeding has been deprived of his right of having speedy trial with unreasonable delay which could be identified by the factor: (1) Length of delay, (2) the justification for the delay, (3) the accused's assertion of his right to speedy trial, and (4) prejudice caused to the accused by such delay. However, the fact of delay is dependent on the circumstances of each case because reasons for delay will vary, such as delay in investigation on account of the widespread ramification of crimes and its designed network either nationally or internationally, the deliberate absence of witness or witnesses, crowded dockets on the file of the Court etc.
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When the issue under debate is examined in the light of the above briefly enuciated principle of speedy trial, the said principle, expressly contemplated in the Act 61 of 1984 (Special Courts Act) and manifested in the two TADA Acts under various provisions as pointed out supra, is evidently incorporated as the essential feature of those Acts. There can be no controversy or difference of opinion in invoking the speedy trial of cases under the impugned Acts but the question is whether the procedure prescribed violates any of the fundamental rights of the Constitution. Yet another argument qua the just and fair trial read into Article 21 has been submitted firstly contending when there is no proclamation of emergency in operation and when all the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution are available for enforcement, the right to have a fair trial cannot be whittled down or militated against and; secondly even when a proclamation of emergency is in operation, the President under Article 359(1) of the Constitution of India can by order declare that the right to move any Court for the enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III and all the proceedings in any Court for the enforcement of such rights, shall remain suspended during the period of emer-
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gency but not the rights conferred by Articles 20 and 21. To put in nutshell, the enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred under Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution can be exercised and enforced even during emergency. To better understand, the legislative history with regard to the exemption of Articles 20 and 21 from operation even during emergency may be briefly recapitulated. Prior to the enactment of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 ~hich came into force w.e.f. 20th June 1979, the rights conferred by Part III including the rights under Articles 20 and 21 could be suspended during emergency. But the exemption was given by the above Amendment Act for the reasons spelt out in the 'Object and Reasons' of the Forty-forth Amendment, which read thus:
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"Objects and Reasons .'
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Recent experience has shown that fundamental rights, granted to citizens, by the Constitution are capable of being taken away by a transient majority. It is, therefore, necessary to provide adequate safeguards against the recurrence of such a contingency in the future and to ensure to the people themselves an effective voice in determining the form of government under which they ·are to live. This is one on the primary objects of this Bill.
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As a further check against the misuse of the Emergency provisions and to put the right to life and liberty on a secure footing, it would be provided that the power to suspend the right to move. the court for the enforcement of a fundamental right cannot be exercised in respect of the fundamental right to life and liberty :: ................................................................................... .
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To achieve the above objects, the Parliament by Act, 1979 substituted the words "the rights conferred by Part III (except Article 20 and 21)" in clauses (1) and (lA) of Article 359 for the ward "the rights conferred by Part !Ir'. t
KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB [PAND!AN,J.]
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Undeniably, when the three Acts Under challenge were enacted, A there was no emergency. Therefore, all the fundamental rights under part III since the enactment of Act of 1984 continued to be enforceable rights. But it is not the contention of the parties that the Acts impugned or any Act similar to them should not be enacted in the absence of proclamation of emergency. Needless to emphasise that it is for Parliament to enact any B law without infringing any of the provisions of the Constitution and within its legislative competence depending upon the need for such enactment. Now we shall examine the key questions (1) whether the procedure prescribed under the Acts of 1984 and 1987 is the antithesis of the just, fair and reasonable procedure; (2) whether the procedural safeguards to which the accused is entitled to, have been completely denied to the prejudice and disadvantage of the accused, (3) whether the Acts are tyrannical and despotical in character and discriminatory in application and (4) whether the provisions of these Acts are violative of the fundamental rights embodied under Articles 14, 19 and 21. We shall now give a close a scrutiny to all those above complicated questions of unrivalled complexity debated before us which cause considerable anxiety to the Court for reaching a satisfactory conclusion, under different topics with reference to the various provisions of the Acts by carefully scanning through the legal submissions eloquently articulated by both sides, and decide as to whether the provisions under challenge have to read them down or to read anything into them.
Definition of the 'Word', ''Abet":
It has been seriously contended that the definition of the word 'abet' F in Section 2 (l)(a) of 1987 Act is without any clarity and is an instance of the first kind of unfairness and also blissfully vague creating a state of tyranny and this imprecise definition helps in even innocent persons who are totally free from any moral blameworthiness, to be arrested, detained and prosecuted. It is further stated that the word 'abet' is adequately defined in Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code to meet every legitimate G need and purpose of criminal law, and that the definition of the word as given in the Act which smacks of arbitrariness is an instance of the first kind of unfairness within the dictum laid down in Maneka Gandhi and deserves to be struck down as being violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
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The learned Additional Solicitor General countering the above arguments stated that the expanded definition of 'abet' is to fulfill the objects of the Act during the period when the terrorists activities on escalated scale continue unabated in any notified area and in such disturbed times it is difficult for the prosecution to prove 'mens ren' or 'intention' while proving the physical facts. In continuation he stated that the submission that the definition is vague, is unfounded as the said definition is merely inclusive and illustrative and the very nature of things could not have been exhaustive. He listed a number of various provisions of a number of enactments wherein the proof of the element of mens rea is excluded, namely, (1) Sections 7 and 16 of the Food Adulteration Act of 1954; (2) Section 8(1), 23(A) and 23 (l)(A) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act; (3) Section 178-A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878; (4) Section 123 (7) of the Representation of People Act.
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He also placed reliance on a number of decisions in support of the above submission, namely, (1) Satju Prasad v. State of U.P., [1961] 3 SCR 324 at page 327; (2) Pukhraj v. D.R. Kohli, [1962] Supp. 3 SCR 866 at page 873; (3) NaOiu/al v. State of M.P., AIR (1966) SC 43; (4) Dr. Y.S. Pannar v. Shri Hira Singh Paul, [1959] Supp. 1 SCR 213; (5) State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George, [1%5] l SCR 123. (6) Jagdish Prasad v. State of West Bengal, [1972] 2 SCR 845; and (7) Collector of Customs v. Chetty, [1962] 3 SCR 786. The definition of the word 'abet' as defined under Section 2 (l)(a) of 1987 Act is as follows:
"2(1)In this Act, unless the cor:text otherwise requires, (a) 'abet', with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, includes -
(i) the communication or association with any person or class of persons \Vho is engaged in assisting in any manner terrorists ot disruptionists; (ii) the passing on, or publication of, without any lawful authority, any information likely to assist the terrorists or disruptionists and the passing on, or publication of, or distribution of, any document or matter obtained from
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KARTAR v.STATEOFPUNJAB [PANDIAN,J.]
terrorists or disruptionistS;
(iii) the rendering of any assistance, whether financial or otherwise, to terrorists or disruptionists;" The above definition is an inclusive definition. The meaning of the word 'abet' which is a verb is that whoever is in communication or association with any person or class of persons engaged in assisting in any manner terrorists or disruptionists or passes on, or publishes of, without any lawful authority, any information likely to assist the terrorists or disruptionists' or passes on or publishes or distributes any document or matter obtained from the terrorists or disruptionists and/or renders any assistance whether financial or otherwise to the terrorists and disruptionists.
In common parlance, the word 'abet' means assistance, co- operation and encouragement and includes wrongful purpose. In Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 1 at page 306, the meaning of word 'abet' is given as follows:
"To abet has been defined as meaning to aid; to assist or to give aid; to command, to procure, or to counsel; to countenance; to
encourage, counsel, induce, or assist; to encourage or to set another on to commit.
Used with 'aid'. The word 'abet' is generally used with the word 'aid' and similar words." Section 107 of/ndian Penal Code defines the word, 'abetment' (which is a noun) as follows:
"107. Abetmcnt of a thing - A person abets the doing of a thing, who First - Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly - Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes places in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or
>
Thirdly - Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
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Section 108 of the Indian Penal Code defines the word, 'abettor' thus:
"108. Abettor - A person abets an offence, who abets either the commission of an offence, or the commission of an act which would be an offence, if committed by a person capable by law of committing an offence with the same intention or knowledge as that of the abettor." ,-
The offence of 'abetment' is committed by a person either
(1) by instigating a person to commit an offence; or (2) by engaging in a conspiracy to commit it; or
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(3) by jntenlionally aiding a person to cdmmit it.
In order to bring a person abetting the doing of a thing, under any one of he clauses enumerated under Section 107, it is not only necessary to prove that the person who has abetted has tabn part in the steps of the transactions but also in some way or other he has been connected with those steps of the transactions which are criminal. The Offence of abetment depends upon the intention of the person who abets, and not upon the act - which is actually done by the person whom he abets. Section 3(1) of The General Clauses Act, 1897' gives the meaning of the word 'abet' thus:
"3(1) - 'abet', with its grammatical variation and cognate expressions, shall have the same meaning as in the Indian Penal Code ( 45 of 1860)" The lexicon meaning of the word 'abet' is given in Collins English Dictionary as, "to assist to encourage, esp. in crime or wrong doing."
The learned counsel who critically attacked the definition of the word "abet' stated that under the definition 2(2)(a) even a person who is entirely innocent of any terrorist or disruptive activities may be punished and subjected to the prescribed minimum sentence of five years, and, therefore, in order to remedy the patent deficiency or defect in this definition, the principle of 'mens rea' should be injected and read into it.
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The learned counsel in support of the above argument drew our attention to a decision of this Court in Inder Sain v. State of Punjab, [1973] 2 SCC 372 wherein this Court while disposing a criminal appeal in which the accused stood convicted under Section 9(a) of the Opium Act, 1878 on the allegations that the appellant was found in possession of a parcel which was on opening found to contain opium, held:
"........................................ Knowledge is an essential ingredient of the offence as the word 'possess' connotes, in the context of Section 9, Possession with knowledge. The legislature could not have intended to make mere physical custody without knowledge an offence. A conviction under Section 9(a) would involve some stigma and it is only proper then to presume that the legislature intended that possession must be
conscious possession. 11
On the strength of the dictum laid down in the above decision, they submitted that 'mens rea' is an essential element in every offence and· in the absence of proof of 'mens rea' none can be mulcted with any criminality especially in cases where deterrent sentence is called for. In support of their submission that the definition is very vague, our attention was drawn to a passage from the judgment of Chandrachud, CJ in A.K Roy, etc. v. Union of India and Another, (1982) 2 SCR 272 at 293 which reads as follows: ".....................The word 'established' is used in Article 21 in order to denote and ensure that the procedure prescribed by a law must be defined with certainty in order that those who are deprived of their fundamental right to life or liberty must know the precise extent
of such deprivation. " (emphasis supplied) Though normally the plain ordinary grammatical meaning of an G enactment affords the best guide and the object of interpreting a statue is to ascertain the intention of the legislature enacting it, other methods of extracting the meaning can be resorted to if the language is contradictory, ambiguous or leads really to absurd results so as to keep at the real sense and meaning. See (1) Salmond: "Jurisprndence,' 11th Edition, P. 152; (2) H
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A South Asia Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. S. Sarnp Singh, AIR (1966) SC 346, 348 and (3) S. Narayanaswami v. G. Panneerselvam, AIR (1972) SC 2284, P. 2285.
In a recent decision in Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan & Anr., (1994) 1 JT 290 at p. 302 a Bench of this Court to which one of us (S. Ratnavel Pandian, J) was a party has held that " .......... it is permissible for Courts to have functional approaches and look into the legislative . intention and sometimes may be even necessary to go behind the words and enactment and.take other factors into consideration to give effect to the legislative intention and to the purpose and spirit of the enactment so that no absurdity or practical inconvenience may result ................. " In a criminal action, the general conditions of penal liabilities are
indicated in old maxim 'Actus non facit rea1n nisi mens sitrea" i.e. the act
alone does not amount to guilt, it must be accompanied by a guilty mind. But there are exceptions to this rule and the reasons for this is that the legislature, under certain situations and circumstances, in its wisdom may think it so important, in order to prevent a particular act from being committed, to forbid or rule out the element of mens rea as a constituent part of a crime or of adequate proof of intention or actual knowledge. However, unless a statute either expressly or by necessary implication rules out 'mens rea' in cases of this kind, the element of 'mens rea' must be read into the provisions of the Statute. The question is not what the word means but whether there are sufficient grounds for inferring that the Parliament intended to exclude the general rule that mens rea is an essential element for bringing any person under the definition of 'abet'.
There are judicial decisions to the effect that it is generally necessary to go behind the words of the enactment and take other factors into cGnsideration as to whether the element of 'mens rea' or actual knowledge should be imported into the definition. See (1) Brand v. Wood 62 TLR 462-463; (2) Sherras v. De Rutzen, 1 B 918; (3) Nichols v. Hall, LR [1873] 8 CP 322; and (4) Inder Sain v. State of Punjab (Supra).
This Court in State of Maharashtra v. M.H. George, AIR (1965) SC 722 while examining a question as to whether mens rea or actual knowledge is an essential ingredient of the offence under Section 8(1) read with Section 23(1)(a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, when it was shown that the respondent (accused) in that case voluntary brought
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KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB [PANDIAN,J.]
gold in India without the permission of Reserve Bank, held by majority that A the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act is defined to safeguarding and conserving foreign exchange which is essential to the economic life of a developing country and the provisions have therefore to be stringent aiming at eliminating smuggling. Hence, in the background of the object and purpose of the legislation, if the element of mens rea is not by necessary implication invoked, its effectiveness as an instrument for preventing of smuggling would be entirely frustrated.
'
But Subba Rao, J dissented and held thus: "........ the mere fact that the object of a statue is to promote welfare activities or to eradicate grave social evils is in itself not decisive of the question whether the element of guilty mind is excluded from the ingredients of the offence. It is also necessary to enquire whether a statute by putting a person under strict liability helps him to assist the State in the enforcement of the law: can he do anything to promote the observance of the law? Mens rea by necessary implication can be excluded from a statute only where it is absolutely clear t~at the implementation of theobject of a statute would otherwise be defeated and its exclusion enables those put under strict liability by their act or omission to assist the promotion of the law. The nature of mens rea that will be implied in a statute creating an offence depends upon the object of the Act and the provisions thereof."
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Thereafter, a similar question arose in Nathu Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1966) SC 43 as regards the exclusion of the clement of mens rea in the absence of any specific provision of exclusion. Subba Rao, .I. reiterated his earlier stand taken M.H. George and observed thus:
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•••••••••• Mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence. Doubtless a statute may excluse the element of mens rea, but it is a sound rule of construction adopted in England and also accepted in India to construe a statutory provision creating an offence in conformity with the common Jaw rather than against it unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication excluded mens rea. The mere fact that the object of the statute is to promote welfare activities or to eradicate a grave social evil is by itself not decisive of the question whether the element of guilty mind is excluded
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from the ingredients of an offence. Mens rea by necessary implication may be excluded from a statute only where it is absolutely clear that the implementation of the object of the statute would otherwise be defeated." See also (1) Srinivas Mall v. King Emperor, AIR (1947) PC 135; (2)
B Hariprashada Rao v. State, (1951] SCR 322; and (3) Smjoo Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1963] 3 SCR 324.
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In this connection, we would also like to make reference to a judgment of Bombay High Court in State v. Abdul Aziz, AIR (1962) Vol. 49 Born. 243 wherein a Division Bench while dealing with Section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 under which the respondent (accused) was prosecuted has held thus: "Section 5 of the Act of 1947 by itself makes no reference to mens rea. Abetment of the contravention of the Order is coupled
together with contravention itself in the same provision. It must, therefore, be treated as standing on the same footing. In our view, therefore, the offence of abetment also would not require any kind of mens rea. 11 The above observation would be tantamount to saying that "when no
E mens rea is essential in the substantive offence, the same Is also not necessary in the abetment thereof."
• We shall now go into the question as to whether the Legislature has imported the essential ingredient of criminal offence, i.e. 'mens rea' in the substantive offences of the Act of 1987. True, the provisions of the TADA Acts are framed with very stringent provisions, of course, 'for the prevention of, and for coping with, terrorist and disruptive activities and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto'. The question may be whether effectiveness of this instrument would be entirely frustrated if the element of mens rea or the element of actual knowledge on the part of the offender is to be injected or read into the definition. Generally, it is one of the essential principles of Criminal Jurisprudence that a crime is not committed if the mind of a person doing the act in question, is innocent. Therefore, to constitute a crime, the intent
KARTAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB [PANDIAN,J.]
and act must both concur.
In the backdrop of the above legal position, we shall deal with the submissions made by the learned counsel with reference to the substantive offence or offence specified under the main Act itself.
\
In the Act of 1984, the word 'abet' is not defined. But the definition B of the word 'terrorist' in that Act requires the person indulging in the act of terrorism and to be show to have committed the terrorist act with a view of committing any of the offences enumerated under clauses (i) to (iv) of the definition of the word 'terrorist' given under Section 2(1) (h). The scheduled offences i.e. Sections 122 and 123 of the India Penal Code expressly require intention on the part of the person committing those offences, though intention is not required under Sections 121and121-A of the !PC and Sections 4 and 5 of the Anti-Hijacking Act, 1982 which are also scheduled offences in that Act. Under the note given lo the Schedule, il is stated that the offence of criminal conspiracy or attempt to commit, or abetment of, an offence specified in this Schedule shall be deemed to D be a schedule offence.
Under the Act of 1985 also, the word 'abet' is not defined. Nonetheless Sections 3 and 4 of this Act which deal with punishments for the substantive offences of terrorism and disruption respectively make the abetment of both the substantive offences also as penal offences. The definition of the word, 'abet' is given for the first time in the Act of 1987 (TADA). Section 3(1) which gives the meaning of the expression 'terrorist' specifically requires the intention on the part of the offender committing a terrorist act. Similarly, Section 4(2) (i) and (ii) also requires that the person committing the disruptive act should be shown to have intended to do that act. The provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Acts 1985 and 1987 are identical. Thus, it is very clear that the substantive offences require intention on the part of the person committing the terrorist act or the disruptive act. The abetment of the commission of these two offences come under Sections 3(3) and 4(1) of the Act of 1987. The word 'abet' does also appear under section 6(2) which deals with 'enhanced penalties'. Therefore, when the substantive provisions of the Act expressly require the intention as an essential ingredient to constitute an offenc.e, can
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it be said that the ingredient of intention should be excluded on the part of the abettor who abets those substantive offences. In other words, can it be said that the abettor has abetted the substantive offence without any guilty mind (mens rea) or without actual knowledge as to what would be tlie consequence of his designed act.
Now turning to the definition, in question, clauses (ii) and (iii) need not require any exposition since both the clauses themselves are self-explanatory. As rightly pointed out, the definition of the word, 'abet' as given in Section 2(1) (i) is with wide flexibility rather than with meticulous specificity. Therefore, we have to explore its allowable meaning so that there may not be any uncertainty inevitably leading any person in much difficulty in understanding acts prohibited by law so that he may act accordingly.
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It is the basic principle of legal jurisprudence that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important values. It is insisted or emphasised that laws should give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Such a law impermissible delegates basic policy matters to policemen and also Judges for resolution on an ad-hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. More so uncertain and undefined words deployed inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone ....... than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked'.
Let us examine clause (i) of Section 2(1)(a). This Section is shown to· be blissfully and impermissible vague and imprecise. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel, even innocent person who ingenuously and undefiledly communicates or associates without any knowledge or having no reason to believe or suspect that the person or class of persons with whom he has communicated or associated is engaged in assisting in any manner terrorists or disruptionists, can be arrested and prosecuted by
abusing or misusing or misapplying this definition. In ultimate consummation of the proceedings, perhaps that guiltless and innoxious innocent person may also be convicted. The counter submission made by learned Additional Solicitor
General justifying the exclusion of 'n1ens rea' or intention or knowledge on
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}
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the part of the person who communicates or associates with any person A who is Cngagcd in assisting in any manner terrorists or <lisruptionists cannot be countenanced in view of the fact that the substantive offences require by express provisions the intention on the part of the abettor. The decision relied upon by him cannot be of any assistance to support his plea for exclusion of intention in vie\v of the various factors inclusive of the requireB ment of the intention for the substantive offences. Therefore, in order to remove the anomaly in the vague and imprecise definition of word, 'abet', we for the abovementioned reasons, are of the view that the person who is indicted of communicating or associating with any person or class of persons who is engaged in assisting in any manner terrorists or disruptionists should be shown to have actual knowledge or to have reason to believe that the person or class of persons with whom he is charged to have communicated or associated is engaged \ · in assisting in any manner the terrorists and disruptionists. To encapsuiate, for the discussion above, the expressions 'communication' and 'association' deployed in the definition should be qualified so as to save the definition, in the sense that 'actual knowledge or person to believe' on the part of a person to be roped in with the aid of that definition should be read into it instead of reading it down and clause (i) of the definition 2(1)(a) should be read as meaning "the communication or association with any person or class of persons with the actual knowledge or having reason to believe that such person or class of persons is engaged in assisting in any manner terrorists or disruptionists" so that the object and purpose of that clause may not otherwise be defeated and frustrated.
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Section 3 of Special Courts Act, 1984 Challenging the validity of Section 3 of Act of 1984, it has been contended that the power vested under Section 3 (1) on the Central Government to declare by notification any area as 'terrorist affected area' and constitute such area into a single judicial zone or into as many judicial zones as it may deem fit, is not only vague but also without any guidance. The pre-requisite conditions which are sine-quo-non for declaring any area as 'terrorists affected area' by the Central Government by virtue of the authority conferred on it under Section 3(1) of the Act of 1984 are:
I
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(1) The offences of the nature committed m any area to be declared as 'terrorists affected area' should be one or more specified in the Schedule;
(2) The offences being committed by terrorists should satisfy the
definition of the nature of the offence mentioned in Section 2(1)(h), namely, indulging in wanton killing of persons or in violence or in the disruption of services or means of communications essential to the community or in damaging property with a view to commit any of the offences enumerated under any of the clauses (i) to (vi) indicated under the definition of the word 'terrorist'; (3) The scheduled offences committed by terrorists should be on such a scale and in such a manner that it is expedient for the purpose of coping with the activities of such terrorists to have
recourse to the provisions of this Act.Tl
Unless all the above three conditions are fully satisfied, the Central Government cannot invoke the power under Section 3(1) to declare any area as 'terrorist affected area'. In other words, in the absence of any of the conditions, Section 3(1) cannot be invoked. Therefore, the contention that the Section 3(1) suffers from vagueness and lacks guidance is unmerited.
In this regard, we would like to add that the learned Additional Solicitor General in his attempt to sustain the validity of Section 3 of the F 1984 Act, submitted that the Legislature considered it proper to prescribe a uniform procedure for serious offences having a direct relationship with peace and tranquillity of the area in the not