Kehar Singh & Ors. v. State (delhi Admn.)
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 3 August 1988
- Judge
- Justice G.L. Oza
- Neutral citation
- 1988 INSC 200
- Reported in
- [1988] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 24
- Result
- Disposed off
- Acts & sections
- Section 109 IPC, Section 164 CrPC, Section 354 CrPC, Article 136 Constitution
- Subject
- Criminal
Full judgment
KEHAR SINGH & ORS.
v.
STATE (DELHI t\DMN.) AUGUST 3, 1988 [G.L. OZA, B.C. RAY AND K.J. SHETTY, JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 19, 21 and 136--Criminal trials-Right of access to-Open public trial-Right of an accusedSessions trial held in Tihar Jail-Whether a valid trial. Trial Court and appellate Court conclusion based on appreciation c of evidence binding on the Supreme Court. Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952: Sections 3, 4-6 and 8-Sessions Case-Whether trial Court entitled to call for statements of witnesses recorded by a Commission of Inquiry.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: Sections 9(6), 164, 194, 327, 354(3)-'Place of trial'-High Court-Whether has power to direct trial of case at place other than normal seat of the Sessions Court.
Confessions and Statements-Recording of-Omission to record in propet form-Does not render it inadmissible~Effect can be cured. Public trial-Open Court-Restrictions on access-How far valid. Death sentence-Awarding of-' Special reasons' to be given.
Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Sections 10, 145, 155, 157-Conspiracy-Proof of-Relevancy of evidence-Things said or done by conspirator with reference to common design-Generally conspiracy hatched in secrecy-Evidence as to transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful design sufficient-Credit of witness-Impeachment of.
Indian Penal Code, 1860 Sections 34, 120B, 302 and 307Assassination of Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi-Conviction and sentence of death on Satwant Singh and Kehar Singh confirmed and IJPheld-Balbir Singh acquitted.
Pracrice and Procedure Criminal trial-Access to-Whether people can assert their right.
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KEHAR SINGH v. STATE
Statutory Interpretation: 'Golden rule'-How far applicab/e'lntention' of legislature or 'purpose' of statute-Duty of Court to look for. In June, 1984 the Indian Army mounted an operation known as 'Operation Blue Star' by which Armed Force personnel entered the Golden Temple Complex at Amritsar to flush out the armed terrorists. That operation resulted in loss of life and property as well as damage to the Akal Takht in the Golden Temple Complex, which greatly offended the religious feelings of some members of the Sikh community. Bean! Singh (deceased) and Balbir Singh, Sub-Inspectors and Satwant Singh, a constable of Delhi Police posted for security duty in the office of the deceased Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi and Kehar Singh, an Assistant in the Directorate General of Supply and Disposal, New Delhi, who were sikhs by faith, had been expressing their resentment openly, holding Smt. Indira Gandhi responsible for the action taken at Amritsar. They met at various places and at various times to discuss and to listen to inflammatory speeches and recordings calculated to excite listeners and provoke them to retaliatary action against the decision of the Government to take army action in Golden Temple Complex. They thus became parties to a criminal conspiracy to commit the murder of Smt. Indira Gandhi. On October 31, 1984 Smt. Indira Gandhi had an engagement with well-known actor and writer Peter Ustinov. His crew was to record her interview for Irish Television. They were waiting at Bungalow No.I, Akbar Road, the home office of the Prime Minister. Bungalow No. I. Safdarjung Road was the official residence of the Prime Minister. The two buildings are connected by a narrow cemented pathway. They are located practically in one campus, but seperated by a sentry gate which is known as the "TMC Gate." Smt. Indira Gandhi at about 9.10 a.m. emerged from her house. Immediately behind her was Head Constable Narayan Singh (PW9) holding an umbrella to protect her against the sun. Rameshwar Dayal (PW 10) an Assistant Sub-Inspector, Nathu Ram (PW 64), her personal attendant and R.K. Dhawan, Special Assistant, were closely following Smt. Gandhi.
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In pursuance of the aforesaid conspiracy Beaut Singh and Satwant Singh, who had prior knowledge that Smt. Gandhi was scheduled to pass through the TMC Gate on the date and at the time afore-mentioned, manipulated their duties in such a manner that the former would be present at the TMC Gate and the latter at the TMC sentry booth on October 31, 1984 between 7.00 and 10.00 A.M. Bean!
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Singh got exchanged his duty with S.I. Jai Narain (PW7). Satwant Singh, who ought to be at Beat No. 4, managed to get TMC sentry booth by misrepresenting that he was suffering from dysentry. He was given that place since it was near the latrine. Thus they had managed to station themselves together near the TMC gate.
Smt. Indira Gandhi was at the head of the entourage on the cemented pathway followed by the afore-mentioned persons approaching the TMC Gate where Bean! Singh, S.I. was on the left side while Satwant Singh, Constable was on the right side. At that time Bean! Singh was armed with his service revolver while Satwant Singh had SAF carbine. When Smt. Gandhi reached near the TMC Gate, Bean! Singh fire~ five rounds and Stawant Singh 25 shots at her from their respective weapons, as a result of which Smt. Indira Gandhi sustained injuries . and fell down. She was immediately removed to the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) where she succumbed to her injuries the same day. The cause of death was certified upon a post-mortem which took place on October 31, 1984 as haemorrhage and shock due to multiD pie fire arm bullet injuries which were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The post-mortem report also opined that injuries Nos. I and 2 specified in the report were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, as well.
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At the spot of the incident both Bean! Singh and Satwant Singh
E are alleged to have thrown their arms which had been recovered. Five empties of Bean! Singh's revolver and 25 empties of SAF Carbine of Satwant Singh and 6 lead pieces were recovered from the spot. l3 live cartridges. 38 bore from the ·person of Bean! Singh and 75 live cartridges of •99 SAF carbine from the person of Satwant Singh were also recovered. Two lead pieces were recovered from the body of Smt. F Indira Gandhi during the post-mortem and two from her clothes and that the experts opined that the bullets recovered from the body and found from the spot were fired through the weapons possessed by these two accused persons.
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Rameshwar Dayal ASI (PW 10), who was following Smt. Indira Gandhi, also received injuries on his left thigh as a result of shots fired by the accused which were grieveous and dangerous to life. Both the assassins were secured by the Indo Tibetan Border Police Personnel, and taken to the guard room, where they sustained gun shot injuries as a result of which Bean! Singh died and Satwant Singh H suffered grievous injuries but recovered later on.
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KEHAR SINGH v. STATE
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The prosecution case against Kehar Singh was that he was a religious fanatic. He had intense hate against Smt. Indira Gandhi for causing damage to the Akal Takhat in Golden Temple, Amritsar by "Operation Blue Star." He was in a position to influence Beani Singh, being the uncle of Beant Singh's wife called as 'Poopha'. He converted Beaut Singh and through him Satwant Singh to religious bigotry. He made. them to undergo "Amrit Chakhan Ceremony" on October 14 and 24, 1984 respectively at Gurdwara, R.K. Puram, New Delhi. He also took Beaut Singh to Golden Temple, Amritsar on October 20, 1.984. Gold 'Kara' and 'ring' of Beaut Singh were later recovered from him.
It is alleged that Balbir Singh, like other accused had expressed his resentment openly, holding Smt. Indira Gandhi responsible for the "Operation Blue Star". He was planning to commit her murder and had discussed his plans with Beant Singh (deceased), who had similar plans to commit the murder. He also shared his intention and prompted accused Satwant Singh to commit the murder of Smt. Indira Gandhi and. finally discussed the matter with him on October 30, 1984. In the first week of September 1984, when a falcon (Bazz) happen to sit on a tree near the main Reception of the Prime Minister's House at about 1.30 P.M. Balbir Singh spoted the falcon, called Beant Singh there and pointed out the falcon. Both of them agreed that it had brought a message of the Tenth Guru of the Sikhs and that they should do something by way of revenge of the "Operation Blue Star". Thereafter both of them performed 'Ardas' then and there.
Balbir Singh was posted on duty at the Prime Minister's residence. On October 31, 1984' his duty was to commence in the evening. When reported for duty, in the usual course, he was asked to go to security lines. At about 3.00 a.m. on November 1, 1984 his house was searched arid a book on Sant Bindrawala was recovered. At about 4.00 a.m. he was taken to Yamuna Velodrome and kept there till late in the evening when he was reported to have been released. This custody i.n Yamuna Velodrome was described as 'de facto custody'. Thereafter on December, 1984 he was said to have been arrested at Najafgarh Bus Stand when his personal search was taken and certain articles were recovered from his possession including a· piece of paper containing certain entries described as "Memorandum of events" allegedly written by him.
After the investigation the charge-sheet was filed against appellants Satwant Singh, Balbir Singh and Kehar Singh. They were accused H
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of offences under ss. 120-B, 109 and 34 read withs. 302 of the IPC and also of substantive offences under ss. 302 and 307 of the IPC and ss. 27, 54 and 59 of the Arms Act.
The accused were committed to take their trial in the Court of Session. In the meanwhile the High Court of Delhi issued two notificaB lions. By one notification, the High Court directed that the trial of the case shall be held in the Central Jail, Tihar according to law. By another notification the High Court directed that "the case be tried by Shri Mahesh Chandra, Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi." In pursuance of the said notifications, the accused were tried in Central Jail, Tihar. The trial Judge found the accused guilty of all the charges against them and convicted Satwant Singh, Bean! Singh and c framed Kehar Singh of murder under s. 302 read with s. 120-B and 34 IPC as well as under s. 307 IPC and s. 27 of the Arms Act. The tri~I Judge awarded the sentence of death on all the three accused. The trial Judge also awarded other terms of imprisonment on Satwant Singh.
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Two appeals were filed in the High Court-One by Satwant Singh and the other by Balbir Singh and Kehar Singh jointly, challenging their conviction and sentence. These appeals were heard along with the Murder Reference No. 2 of 1986. The High Court accepted the Murder Reference and dismissed the appeals preferred by the accused and confirmed the conviction and the sentence of death on all the accused. The E High Court also confirmed the other sentences on Satwant Singh.
In the appeal to this Court, on behalf of the appellants it was contended; (1) that under Art. 21 of the Constitution speedy, .open and public trial is one of the constitutional guarantees of a fair and just trial and by holding the trial in Tihar Jail in the instant case this guarantee F has been affected and the accused have been deprived of a fair and open trial as contemplated under s. 327 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; (2) that in cases where the ends of justice would be defeated if the case is not heard in camera, only the trial Court, for special reasons to be recorded, could hold the trial or a part of the trial in camera. Section 327 of the Code does not confer any such authority or jurisdiction on G the High Court; (3) that the High Court has no power to direct that trial of a criminal case at a place other than the normal seat of the Court of Sessions. Section 9(6) of the Code empowers the High Court only to specify the place or places at which all or any class of the cases pertaining to a division can be heard and does not empower the High Court to specify the place or places of hearing for individual cases; (4) that in the H instant case, the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under s. 9(6)
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KEHAR SINGH '· STATE
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of the Code notified the place of trial as Tihar Jail. It indirectly did what the trial Court could have done in respect of particular part of the proceedings. By shifting the trial to Tihar Jail it could not be said to be open and public trial as the trial inside the Jail premises is the very antithesis of an open trial; (5) that the orders passed by the trial Court providing that representatives of the Press may be permitted to attent and for security, etc. the Jail authorities will regulate entry to the Court indicate that the trial was not public and open and therefoe on this ground alone the trial vitiates; (6) that the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19(l)(a) of the Constitution need not be under the mercy of the Court and that there should not be any discrimination in the matter of public access to judicial proceedings and first come first serve should be the principle no matter whether one is a press person or an ordinary citizen; (7) that under s. 194 of the Code it was not necessary for the High Court to have allotted the instant case to a particular Judge; (8) that inspite of the prayer made by the accused during the trial and also in the High Court about the copies of the statements of the witnesses who have been examined by the prosecution and were also examined before the Thakkar Commission the same were not supplied. Even the copy of the Thakkar Commission Report was not made available. Not only were the accused entitled to the previous statements of 'witnesses who were examined by the prosecution, but they were also entitled to relevant material on the basis of which they could build their defence and raise appropriate issues at the trial; (9) that the High Court has misconstrued the scope of s. 6 of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 and misunderstood the observations in Dalmia's case [1959] SCR 279; (IO) that even if the words "used against" ins. 6 of the said Act mean preventing the use of statement for the purposes of contradictions as required under s. 145 of the Evidence Act, there are other provisions by which the previous statement could be looked into for productive uses without confronting the witnesses such as first part of 145, sub-s. (I) & (2) of s. 146, s. 157 ands. 159 of the Evidence Act. The term "used against" in s. 6 was not intended to be an absolute bar for making use of such statements in subsequent proceedings; (11) that the confession of Satwant Singh being not recorded in the manner prescribed in s. 164 of the Code is inadmissible in evidence and cannot be used for convicting the accused; (12) that there is no· evidence that Beant Singh and his wife were deliberately taken by Kehar Singh to expose them to provocative Bhajans in the house of Ujagar Sandhu at· the time of celeberation of the birthday of a child; (13) that Kehar Singh being an elderly person and a devout religious Sikh was keeping company with Beant Singh to dissuade the latter from taking any drastic action against Smt. Gandhi; (14) that there is no substantive
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evidence from the testimony of Bimla Khalsa that Beant Singh took Amrit on October 14, 1984 at the instance ofKehar Singh; (15) that the finger prints fonnd on the sten-gun of accused Satwant Singh were not tested for comparison and the two bullets recovered from the body of Smt. Gandhi were not examined for traces of blood or tissues; (16) that the post-mortem examination ought to have been full and complete.
It was further contended on behalf of Balbir Singh: (i) that the document Ex. PW 26/B was not recovered from his possession; (ii) that his arrest at Najafgarh bus-stand was a make believe arrangment. He was not arrested there and indeed he could not have been arrested, since he was all along under police custody right from the day when he was taken to Yamuna Velodrome on November 1, 1984. He was not absconding and the question of absconding did not arise when he was not released at all. No question was put to him under Section 313 examination that he had absconded; (iii) that the conclusions of the High Court on all these matters were apparently unsustainable; and (iv) that there being no- charge against the accused under s. 109 IPC they are liable to be sentenced only for the offence of abetment and not for murder.
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On behalf of the Respondent-State it was contended; (l) that this Court in an appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution of India is not expected to interfere with the concurrent findings of facts arrived at by the two Courts below; (2) that there is no question·of any constitutional right under Art. 21. Article 21 only talks of procedure established by law and if today on the statute book there is s. 327 Cr. P.C. tomorrow s. 327, may be so amended that it may not be necessary for a criminal trial to be open and it does not becomes a consitutional right ~t all; (3) that the premises where the trial was held was not that part of the Jail where the prisoners are kept but was the Office block where there was an approach, people were permitted to reach, and the trail was held as if it was held in an Ordinary place; (4) that there is nothing to show that the friends and relations of the accused or any other member of the public was prevented from having access to the place where the trial was held. On t)te other hand, permission was granted to the friends and relations of the accused as well as to outsiders who wanted to have access to the Court or to see the proceedings subject, of course, to Jail Regulations. Section 2 (p) Criminal Procedure Code defines 'place' as including a house, building, tent, vehicle and vessel. So Court can be ' held in a tent, vehicle, a vessel qther than in Court. Furthermore, the proviso to s. 327, Cr. P.C. provides that the presiding Judge or Magistr ate may also at any stage of trial by Order restrict access of the public
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KEHAR SINGH v. STATE'
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in general, or any particular person in particular in the, Court room or building where the trial is held; (5) that if the confession is not recorded in proper form as prescribed by s. 164 read with s. 281 which corresponds to earlier s. 364, it is a mere irregularity, and it can be cured by s. 463 on taking evidence that the statement was recorded duly and that it has not injured the accused in his defence on merits; (6) that if the High Court had the authority to issue notification under s. 9(6) Cr. B P.C. fixing the place of sitting it was open to the High Court also to fix the place of sitting for a particular case; (7) that the language of s. 6 of the Commission of Inquiry Act is clear that a witness who is examined before a Commission, is protected and that protection is that the statement made before the Commission could not be used against him for any other purpose in any .other proceedings either Civil or Criminal. C The only exception carved out in s. 6 pertains to his prosecution for perjury. The Commission by its regulation aild notification clearly made the enquiry a confidential affair and in addition to that there was an amendment of the Act which even provided that if Government by notification decided not to place the Report of the Commission before the House of Parliament or Legislature then it was not necessary that it D Should be so placed before the House and thus the report not only was confidential but even the Parliament had no right to see the report and, therefore, neither the report nor the statements made before the Commission could be asked for by the accused for the purposes of trial; (8) that in the remand application dated December 4, 1984, it was stated that Balbir Singh had absconded and was not available for. interroga- E tion and that he was arrested at Najafgarh Bus stand on December 3, 1984. The Magistrate therefore, remanded the accused to police custody till December 6 and the order of remand was signed by the accused; The accused being a police officer did not object to the allegations made against him in the remand application; and (9) that as regards recovery of documents Ex. PW 26/B from the accused Balbir F Singh, entry No. 986 in the Malkana Register of Police Station, Tughlak Road, which contaiiis verbatim copy of the seizure memo (Ex. PW
35/A), is indicative of the fact that Ex. PW 26/B was recovered from the accused upon his arrest and.search. The Court unanimously dismissing the Appeals of Kehar Singh and Satwant Singh and allowing the Appeal of Balbir Singh,
HELD: Per Oza, J.) I. The act of the accused not only took away the life of a popular le-ader of the country but also undermines the democratic system
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which has been working in the country so well for the last forty years. There is yet another serious consideration. Beant Singh (deceased) and accused Satwant Singh were posted on the security duty of the Prime Minister to protect her from any intruder or from any attack from outside and, therefore, if they themselves resort to this kind of offence, there appears to be no reason or no mitigating circumstance for consideration on the question of sentence. Additionally, an unarmed lady was attacked by these two persons with a series of bullets and it has been found that a number of bullets entered her body. The manner in which mercilessly she was attacked by these two persons on whom confidence was reposed to give her protection repels any consideration of reduction of sentence. In this view of the matter, even the conspirator who inspired the persons who actually acted does not deserve any leniency in the matter of sentence. The death sentence awarded by the trial Court and maintained by the High Court appears to be just and proper. [115F-116B]
2. The first part of s. 194 Cr. P.C. clearly provides that the D Sessions Judge of the Division by general or special order is supposed to allot cases arising in a particular area or jurisdiction to be tried by Additional or Assistant Sessions Judges appointed in the Division, but the last part of this section also authorises the High Court to allot the case to a particular Judge keeping in view the fact that in certain cases the Sessions Judge may not .like to allot and may report to the High E court or either ofthe parties may move an application for transfer and under these circumstances it may become necessary for the High Court to allot a particular case to a particular Judge. [78G-HJ 3. F.rom the language of s. 9(6) Cr.P.C. one thing is clear that so far as the High Court is concerned it has the jurisdiction to specify the F place or places where ordinarily a Court of Sessions may sit within the · division. So far as any particular case is concerned trial at a place other than the normal place of sitting is only permissible under the second part of the sub-clause with the consent of parties and that decision has to be taken by the trial Court itself. Whatever be the terms of the notification, it is a notification issued by the Delhi High Court under s. 9 G sub-clause (6) of Cr.P.C. and thereunder the High Court could do nothing more or less than what it has the authority to do. Therefore, the High Court could be taken to have notified that Tihar Jail is also one of the places of sitting of the Sessions Court in the Sessions division ordinarily. That means apart from the two places Tis Hazari and New Delhi, the High Court by notification also notified Tihar Jail as one of H the places where ordinarily a Sessions Court could hold its sittings.
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KEHAR SINGH v. STATE
There is, therefore, no error if the Sessions trial is held in Tihar Jail after such a notification has been issued by the High Court. [79G-80E]
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4. In fact, the High Court was right when it referred to the concept of administration of justice ·under the old Hindu Law. ·But apart from it even the Criminal Procedure Code as it stood before the amendment had a provision similar to s. 327 which was s. 352 of the Old B Code and in fact it is because of this that the criminal trial is expected to be open and public. In our Constitution phraseology difference from the United States Constitution has been there. Art. 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. So far as this aspect of open trial is concerned the procedure established by law even before our Constituc tion was enacted was as is provided ins. 327 Cr.P.C. The language of s. 327 shows that any place where a criminal Conrt holds its sitting for enquiry or trial shall be deemed to be an open Court to which the public . generally may have access provided the same can conveniently contain them. The language itself indicates that even if a trial is held in a private house or is held inside Jail or anywhere no sooner it becomes a venue D of trial of a criminal case it is deemed to be in law an open place and everyone who wants to go and attend the trial has a right to go and attend the trial except the only restriction contemplated is number of persons which could be contained in the premises where the Court sits. [81C-E, 82D-E] 5. The only thing that is necessary for the appellant is to point out that, in fact, it was not an open tiral. There is no material at all to suggest that any one who wanted to attend the trail was prevented from so doing or one who wanted to go into the Court room was not allowed to do so. [82G] 6. It is very clear that Art. 21 contemplates procedure established by law and the procedure established by law was as on the day on which the Constitution was adopted and, therefore, it is not so easy to contend that by amending the Criminal Procedure Code the effect of the procedure established by law indicated in Art. 21 could be taken away. The trend of decisions of this Court has clearly indicated that the procedure G must be fair and just. Even expeditious trial has been considered to be a part of the guarantee under Art. 21. Undisputedly the procedure established by law as indicated in Art. 21 is as provided in s. 327 and unless on facts it is established that what is provided in s. 327 was prevented or was not permitted, it could not be said that merely because trial was held at a particular place it could be said to be a trial which H
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was not open to public, Merely suggesting the difficulties in reaching the Jail will not be enough, to ·say that it ceased to be a public trial. It was not that part of the Jail where the prisoners are kept but was the Office block where there was an approach, people were permitted to reach and the trial was held as if it was held in an ordinary place and in fact what the High Court did by issuing a notification under s. 9(6) was B not to fix place of trial of this particular case in Tihar Jail, but the High Court by the said notification made Tihar Jail also as one of the places where a Sessions Court could ordinarily sit and in this case, therefore, the trial was held at this place. As soon as a trial is held whatever the place may be the provisions of s. 327 are attracted and it will be an open Court and every citizen has a right to go and unless there is evidence or on record to suggest that on the facts in this particular case c material public at large was not permitted to go or some one was prevented from attending the trial or that the trial was in camera. In fact, without an appropriate order it could not be said that what is contemplated under s. 327 or under Art. 21 was not made available to the accused in this case and, therefore, it could not be contended that there is any preD judice at the trial. [83B-84C]
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7. On analysis of the provision of s. 6 of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952, it will be found that there are two restrictions on the use of a statement made by a witness before the Commission. A statement given in a Commission cannot be used to subject the witness to any E civil or criminal proceedings nor it can be used against him in any civil or criminal proceedings. and it is in the context of these restrictions the provisions of s. 145 read with s. 155(3) and s. 157 of the Evidence Act which permit the use of a previous statement of a witness and for what purpose will have to be examined. These sections clearly indicate that there are two purposes for which a previous statement can be used. One F is for cross-examination and contradiction and the other is for corroboration. The first purpose is to discredit the witness by putting him the earlier statement and contradicting him on that basis. So far as corroboration is concerned, it could not be disputed that it is none of the purposes of the defence to corroborate the evidence on the basis of the previous statement. Section 145, therefore, is the main section under G which relief was sought by the accused. The use for which the previous statement was asked for was to contradict him if necessary and if it was a contradiction then the earlier •tatement was necessary so that contradiction be put to the witness and that part of the statement can be proved. [89E-G; 9ID-E]
8. Contradiction could be used either to impeach the credit of a
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KEHAR SINGH v. STATE
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witness or discredit him or to pull down or bring down the reliability of the witness. These purposes for which the previous statements are required could not be said to be purposes which were not against the witness. The two aspects of the restrictions which s. 6 contemplates are the only two aspects which could be the result of the use of these statements. There is no other use of such previous statements in criminal proceedings. It is, therefore, clear that s. 6 prohibits the use of the previous statements at the trial either for the purpose of crossexamination to contradict the witness or to impeach his credit. Therefore, the Courts below were right in not granting the relief to the accused. [91F-92A]
9. The report of a Commission is a recommendation of the Commission for the consideration of the Government. It is the opinion of the Commission based on the statements of witnesses and other material. It has no evidentiary value in the trial of a criminal case. In the instant case, the Courts below were also justified in not summoning the reports of the Thakkar Commission. Moreover, the Commission framed regulations under s. 8 of the Act in regard to the procedure for D enquiry and Regulation 8 provided that in view of the sensitive nature of enquiry the proceedings will be in. camera unless the Commission directs otherwise. So far as recording of evidence and the proceedings of the Commission are concerned they were held in camera throughout and even the reports, interim and final were stated by the Commission itself to be confidential. Normally, the Government was supposed to E place the report of the Commission before the House of the People, but · the Government did not do that, amended the Commisson of Inquiry Act, 1952 and notified that the reports of the Thakkar Commission shall not be laid before the Hol!!le of the People in the interest of the security of the State and in public interest and the said notification was also got approved by the. House of people. [86B-87G] 10. Undisputedly Smt. Indira Gandhi died as a result of the gun shot injuries inflicted by Bean! Singh and Satwant Singh with their service revolver and carbine respectively. In view of such clear evidence about the cause of the death, the post-mortem or a fuller postmortem examination loses all its significance. It becomes important only in cases . where the cause of death is to be established and is a matter of controversy. [92D-F]
1I. Where the High Court has reached conclusions based on partly inadmissible evidence and partly on circumstances which are not justified on the basis of evidence, or partly on facts which are not borne
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out from the evidence on record it cannot be contended that in an appeal under Art. I36 of the Constitution the Supreme Court will not go into the facts of the case· and come to its own conclusions. The ca>e in hand is one of such cases and some of the findings of fact reached by the High Court could not be said to be such which are concurrent or conclusive. This Court was, therefore, put t.o the necessity of examining the eVidence wherever it was necessary. l\Iorrover, it was a case where the very popular elected leader of the people, the Prime Minister of India; was assassinated, but still this Court has all through maintained the cardinal principle of the Constitution-Equality before law and the concept of rule of law in the system of administration of Justice. [93G, 77H-78A]
Pritam Singh v. The State, [1950] AIR SC I69; Ram Raj v. State of Ajmer, [I954] SCR II33 and AIR I983 SC 753, referred to.
I2. Section I20-A I.P .C. provides that when two or more persons agree to do or cause lo be done an act which is an illegal act it is criminal O conspiracy. Section I20-B provides for the punishment for a criminal conspiracy. To prove a conspiracy it was not easy to get direct evidence. Therefore, s. IO of The Indian Evidence Act was enacted. First part of s. IO talks of where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, and it is only when this condition precedent is satisfied that the E subsequent part of the Section comes into operation and ii talks of reasonable grounds to believe that two or more persons have conspired together and this evidently has reference to s. I20-A of the I.P.C. where it is provided "when two or more persons agree to do, or cause to he done." This further has been safeguarded by providing a proviso that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount lo F criminal conspiracy. Therefore, a prima fade case of conspiracy has necessarily to be established for application of s. IO. The second part of s. IO talks of anything 'said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to the common intention after the time when such intention
was first entertained by any one of them is"relevant fact against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring as well for the purpose for G proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it. The second part of s. I 0 permits the use of evidence which othernise could not be used against the accused person. Act or 'action of one of the accused cannot be used as evidence against the other. But an exception has been carved out ins. IO in cases of conspiracy. The second part of s. IO operates only when the H first part of the section is clearly established i.e. there must be reason-
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1.
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KEHAR SINGH v. STATE
able ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together in the light of the languague of s. 120-A. It is only then the evidence of action or statements made by one of the accused could be used as evidence against the other. [94E-95E] Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. State of Maharashtra, [1964] 2 SCR 378 relied on.
13. At about 3 A.M. on November l, 1984 Balbir Singh, appelIan! was awakened from his sleep and his house was searched, but nothing except a printed book on Sant Bhindrawala was recovered. At about 4 P.M. allegedly he was taken to Yamuna Velodrome, a place where police has reserved a portion of this building to be used for interrogation and investigation. He was kept there till late in the evening when he is reported to had been released. The custody in Yamuna Velodrome is described as 'de facto custody'. But there;. no evidence or no police officer examined to say that he allowed this appellant to go in the evening on November l, 1984. The appellant is said to have been absconding since then and thereafter he is alleged to have been arrested
on December 3~ 1984 at Najafgarh Bus stand. When his personal search
I•
was taken certain articles including a piece of paper Ex. PW 26/B were recovered from his possession. The appellant denied his release from Yamuna Velodrome and challenged his arrest at Najafgarh Bus-stand and recoi'ery of any document from his possession as alleged by the prosecution. [97B-D]
14. The prosecution evidence itself indicates that on November l, 1984 late at night Balbir Singh's house was searched and a printed Book-Sant Bindrawala was seized from his house, he was brought to Yamuna Velodrome and upto the evening of the next day he was seen there. Normally when .a person or a witness is brought for interrogation
or investigation at a Police station, some record has to be made as there
is a general diary, although diaries may or may not be tilled in, but a duty is cast.on the Station House Officer of a Police Station to maintain the movements of the Police Officers and also to note down the activities, especially when it is connected with the investigation of an important case. But it appears that all about the preliminary investigation of
this case was going on at Yamuna Velodrome, witnesses and persons
were brought here, detained or kept, and interrogated but there is no further evidence in regard to this place. [98D-G]
15. This part of the prosecution story that this accused was at Yamuna Vel.odrome upto the evening of that day and thereafter be was
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
A allowed to go and then he absconded becomes very important in view of the further facts alleged by the prosecution that the investigating officer got some information through some one that this accused who was wanted would appear at the time and place indicated. But there is no ·evidence as to who asked this accused to go. He was a suspect in the criminal conspiracy. He could not have gone away of his own accord. B Some responsible officer must have taken the decision but it is unfortunate that no officer has been examined to state that "I thought that his presence was not necessary and therefore I allowed him to go." There is no evidence on this aspect of the matter at all and the only evidence is that this person was arrested at midnight in the late hours on November l, 1984, carried to Yamuna Velodrome and was seen there by some C prosecution witnesses till the ~vening of the next day. [98H-99C] 16. As regards the prosecution allegation that this appellant was absconding from !st or 2nd November till 3rd Dec. 1984, it is significant that no witness has been examined to indicate that he went to find him out either at his residence or at any other place in search of him and D that he was not available. There is also no evidence produced to indicate that inspite of the fact that during investigation police wanted to arrest him again but he was not available at his known address. It is perhaps of absence of evidence as to absconding the trial Court when examined this accused under s. 313 Cr.P.C. did not put him any question about his abscondence. It is, therefore, clear that the abscondence as a E circumstance could not be used against him. [99D-E] 17. As regards the arrest of this appellant at Najafgarh Bus stand, it was alleged that the Investigating Officer got some information that this accused was expecied to appear at that place on December 3, 1984. It was not immediately after the assassination. It was after a F month. The people could come forward to become witness. But no independent witness has been examined in support of the arrest or seizure from the accused. In all matters where the police wants that the story should be believed they always get an independent witness of the locality so that that evlilence may lend support to what is alleged by the police officers. Admittedly for this arrest at Najafgarh and for the G seizure of the articles from the person of this accused there is no other evidence except the evidence of police officers. Independent witness in this case would be all the more necessary, especially when his release after the earlier arrest is not established and his abscondence is not proved. In such a controversial situation the presence of an independent witness from the public, if not of the locality, would have lent some H support to the case of the prosecution. The accused is said to have
.
;
') KEHAR SINGH v. STATE
appeared· at the Bus-stand but it has not been shown from where he appeared. Whether he get down from a bus, if so from which bus-city or outstation bus? How he appeared there is all mystery. Nobody bothered to notice of his coming. It is said that he had a DTC bus ticket. Nobody examined it. Perhaps there was nothing to examine. If the Police Officers had gone with prior information to arrest the absconding accused who was involved in such an important crime, they could have taken an independent witness with them. It is again interesting to note that instead of searching him and performing the formalities of arrest at the place where the accused appeared, he was taken to a place said to be the office of the Electricity Board. The search and seizure took place there. Some articles were recovered from his possession. Most of the articles recovered are mere personal belongings. There was also a piece of paper since marked as Ex. PW 26/B. The Police did not think it necessary to
have an independent witness even for the seizure memo, when particu-
larly some important piece of evidence was recovered from his possession. The plea of the prosecution was that nobody was available or none was prepared to be a witness in this matter. It is unthinkable at a public place and that too at the Bus-stand. The further plea of the prosecution
was that the circumstances after the assassination of the Prime Minister were such that no witness was prepared to come forward. It appears that
I •
~
for every problem this situation is brought as a defence by the prosecution but this would not help them so far as this matter is concerned. It is very difficult to believe that more than one month after the unrest in Delhi a citizen in this capital did not come forward to be a witness for seizure memo. The arrest of the accused Balbir Singh in the circumstances appears to be only a show and not an arrest in actuality. If the release of this accused after his arrest on !st November is not established and his ahscondence is not proved, then the story of his arrest on 3rd December with the recovery of the articles loses all its significance. The arrest of the accused on 3rd December and the recovery of the alleged articles from his person have not been proved satisfactorily and therefore could not be of any consequence against this accused. The attempt of the prosecution to prove the recovery of Ex. PW 26/B on the basis of an entry in the Malkhana Register of Togiak Road Police Station is an interesting situation. There is an endorsement in the Malkhana Register stating that the DTC ticket which the accused carried and the paper containing the dates in English Ex. PW. 26/ll were not deposited. The Malkhana Register, therefore, is of no help to the prosecution. In view of these infirmities it cannot be accepted that the accused was arrested on 3rd December as alleged by the prosecution. So the recovery of Ex. PW 26/B is doubtful. [99G-101G]
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
l1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
18. The document Ex. PW 26/B is a sheet of paper containing certain entries, and if it is considered to be a "memorandum of events"
prepared by this accused relating to his conspiracy, why should he carry it in an atmosphere surcharged with emotion against the Sikhs. Not only that, this person knew that he was an accused in such an important case, absconding and carrying in his pocket such an important piece of evidence. Was it his intention that he should keep it readily available so that he could oblige the prosecution whenever they needed? There is no other possible reason why this person should keep this document with him all the time. The prosecution could not explain this strange behaviour of the accused as to why he could have thought of carrying such a piece of paper in his pocket. [101H-102C] 19. Except a mention of few dates and few events there is nothing in document Ex. PW. 26/B. It even does not indicate that with those events whether this accused was connected in any manner. It is significant that this document was not with him when his house was searched and he was arrested on the night of November I, 1984. If after that arrest he was not released at all and there was no occasion for him to go away then, one fails to understand as to how this document came in his possession. The evidence indicates that this accused was preparing to give a statement or a confession and, therefore, he was given the notes and he must have recorded those dates to facilitate the statement that he was planning or he was made to give which ultimately he choose not to give at all. [1020-Fj 20. There is no reference after the words 'felt like killing' as to who was intended to be killed, and as to whose feelings were noted in this piece of paper. There are entries in this document which refer to meetings, visits, persons, visiting somebody's house but it is not clear as
to whom they refer and what is intended when reference is made. Bean! Singh has been referred to in this document more than in one place. At one place, there is a reference to Beaut Singh with eagle. But there is no reference to a joint Ardas or this accused or Beaut Singh telling that it had brought a message or they should take revenge. The entry does not suggest that the accused Balbir Singh had anything to do with the eagle. If there is anything, it is against Beaut Singh. [102G-103A]
21. A perusal of this whole document also shows that there is no reference at all to Beaut Singh and his plan to kill the Prime Minister. Nor there is any mention about the bomb or granade with which he was planning to eliminate the Prime Minister before 15th August, 1984. There is also no referene about Beaut Singh conspiring with this
'
I
1'
KEHAR SINGH v. STATE
accused or vice-versa. Kehar Singh is not at all in the document. Satwant Singh, however, is mentioned against 30th October, but without any indication where? II03B] 22. Under these circumstances it is very clear that except the mention of 'Operation Blue Star' and 'felt like killing' there is nothiilg in this document which is of any significance. If the document is read as it is, there is nothing incriminating against accused Balbir Singh. Unfortunately it appears that the High Court read in this document what was suggested by the posecution without considering whether it could be accepted or not in the absence of evidence on record. Admittedly, there is no such evidence at all in this case. [lOJD)
•
23. Even if the document is accepted to have been written by accused Balbir Singh, still there is nothing in it on the basis of which an inference of conspiracy could be drawn. There must be evidence to indicate that the accused was in agreement with the other accused persons to do the act which was the ultimate object which was achieved on October 31, 1984. This document, therefore, although described by the High Court as very important piece of evidence, is nothing but a 'scrap of paper'. [103G]
.J ,
.,.
24. Unfortunately, the High Court while coming to the conclusion that Balbir Singh knew Bean! Singh and Satwant Singh well, has not referred to any piece of evidence which establishes that they knew each other well. The prosecution has also Ii<1t been able to point out any piece of evidence on the basis of which this could be inferred. This accused being a Sikh also is referred' to, but there were number of Sikh Officers posted at the house of the Prime Minister and merely because he was a Sikh it could not be said that he became a party to the conspiracy or he was in conspiracy or he knew Beaut Singh and Satwant Singh well. Similarly as regards the observatfons made by the High Court that Balbir Singh shared indignation of Beaut Singh against Smt. Gandhi was in a mood to avenge for the 'Operation Blue Star' there is no evidence to support it. From the evidence of SI Madan Lal Sharma, PW 30 all that could be gathered is that after the 'Operation Blue Star' Balbir Singh was in an agitated mood and he used to say that the responsibility of damaging the Akal Takht lies with Smt. Gandhi and it would be avenged by them. From this it cannot he inferred that Balbir Singh wanted to take revenge. against the Prime Minister alongwith Bean! Singh. If expression of anger or protest on the 'Operation Blue Star' could be used as a piece of evidence or a circumstance against accused then all those members of the Sikh Community who felt
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
(
A agitated over the 'Operation Blue Star' must be held as members nf the eouspiracy. [104E-105A] 25. There is no material to indicate that during the leave taken by Balbir Singh, he met Beaut Singh or anyone else or was in any manner connected with the conspiracy or was doing something in pursuance of B the agreement of conspiracy between them. Merely because on certain dates he was on leave no inference could be drawn. [105B] 26. So far as appearance of falcon and offering of Ardas is concerned, admittedly appearance of a falcon is considered, by the Sikh Community, as a sacred thing as falcon is supposed to be a representaC live of the Guru and if, therefore, this accused and Beaut Singh offered Ardas nothing could be inferred from this alone. [ IOSC] 27. The statement of Amarjit Singh PW 44 was recorded thrice during the investigation. In the first statement there is no involvement of Balbir Singh and had alleged against Bean! Singh. According to him, D he recalled bit by bit and that was the reason, he gave the subsequent two statements. If these statements are carefully perused it is clear that the entire approach of the High Court appears to be erroneous. What he did later was to improve upon his statement and indroduce Balbir Singh also or substitute Balbir Singh in place of Beaut Singh. The only other inference is that he was himself a party to that conspiracy. E Otherwise there is no explanation why he should keep on giving statement after statement, that too atler 25 days of the incident. It clearly shows that he was a convenient witness available to State whatever was desired from him. He appears to have become wiser day by day and remembered bit by bit, is certainly interesting to remember. In his first version there is nothing against Balbir Singh. In his second statemet he F has tried to introduce ihings against him. This apparently is a clear improvement. [105F-107C] 28. Even delay is said to be dangerous and if a person who is an important witness does not open his mouth for a long time his evidence is always looked with suspicion but here is a witness who even after 25 G days gave his first statement and said nothing against accused Balbir Singh and then even waited for one more month and then he suddenly chose to come out with the allegations against this accused. Such a witness could not be relied upon and even the High Court felt that it would not be safe to rely on the testimony of such a witness alone. His claim that he had so much of close association with Beaut Singh and H Balbir Singh that he used to be taken in confidence by these two persons
'
.(
KEHAR SlNGH .._ STATE
means that he is one of the conspirators or otherwise he would not have kept quiet without informing his superiors as it was his duty to do when the Prime Minister was in danger. I1070-G I
f
29. In the instant case, there is no evidence at all to establish prima facie participation of accused Balbir Singh in conspiracy or any evidence to indicate that he had entered into any agreement to do an unlawful act or to commit an offence alongwith the other accused persons. Therefore, in absence of any evidence in respect of the first part of s. IO of the Evidence Act which 'is necessary it could not be contended that the confession of Satwant Singh could be of any avail or could be used against this appellant. [107H-I08A] 30. It is clear that where PW 44 says 'agreed' and 'he' in his statement on November 24, 19S4 he had not named Balbir Singh at all. It is only now in his statement at trial that he grew wiser and made an attempt by way of this explanation. It is rather unfortunate that the High Court felt that this explanation should be accepted. [J08D]
31. The Statement against Balbir Singh coming for the first time on-December, 21, 1984 itself in the light of the settled criminal jurispru-
dence of this country ought to have been rejected outright. Even Bimla Khalsa, the wife of Beant Singh does not mentioned anything against Balbir Singh. [JOSE] 32. So far as accused Balbir Singh is concerned there is no evidence at all on the basis of which his conviction could be justified. He is. therefore, entitled to be acquitted. [JOSH] 33. The material evidence against accused Kehar Singh is the evidence of PW 65, Bimla Khalsa wife of Beant Singh. Although she has been declared hostile, but her statement could not be discarded in toto merely because on certain questions 1 she has chosen not to support prosecution. It is trne that her statement for the first time during investigation was recorded on January 16, 1985. She lost her husband Beant Singh on October 31, !9S5. She was placed in a situation where it would have been very difficult for her to compose herself in a manner in which she could give her statement immediately. It is nobody's case that she has any grudge against anybody. Bimla Khalsa in clear terms stated that Kehar Singh and Bean! Singh had secret talks on October 17, !9S4. She wanted to know it, but she was not given to understand. This kind of secret talk with Beant Singh which Kehar Singh bad, is a very significant circumstance. Apparently Kehar Singh being an elderly person
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
did not indicate her about their plan. If the at~empt of Kehar Singh was to dissuade Beant Singh then there was no occasion for him to keep the matter secret from his wife. On the contrary he should have indicated to his wife also what Beant Singh was planning. These talks, therefore, as rfl>ved by Bimla Khalsa go a long way in establishing Kehar Singh being a party to the conspiracy. [IO~B-C, 111G-112AJ ·
·' 34. - Her evidence also indicates that Beant Singh took Amrit on 14th and Beant Singh kept his gold-en 'kara' and 'ring' in the house of Kehar Singh which have been recovered from th"e latter. It clearly goes to show that Kehar Singh knew why Beant Singh took Amrit and why he handed over the golden 'kara' and 'ring' to him. It is also clear from the evidence of Bimla Khalsa that what transpired between Beant Singh and Kehar Singh on 14th was not conveyed to her and she was kept in dark. [112B] JS. In this background the trip to Amritsar of Beant Singh,
Kehar Singh and their families is of some significance. The attempt of D these tw~ persons to keep themselves away from the company of their wives and children speaks volume about their sinister designs. The way in which these two avoided the company of the members of the family and PW 53 at whose residence they were staying and the manner in which they remairted mysterious if looked at with the secret talks which, they had in the house of Bimla' Khalsa earlier goes to establish that E the two were doing something or discussing something _or planning something which they wanted to keep it as a secret even from Bimla Khalsa. [112C-G] 36. The manner in which Amrit has been taken by Beant Singh and even Satwant Singh and Bimla Khalsa have been made to take it F · makes it significant that in all these three of Amrit taking Kehar Singh was always with them or at least it could be said, was inspiring them to have it. It also indicates that there was something in the mind of Bean! Singh which was known to Kehar Singh and which he even tried to keep a secret from his wife Bimla Khalsa amYwanted Beant Singh to have a full religious purification and confidence. [llJA-B] 37. The post-crime conduct of Kehar Singh immediately after the · -- news of assassination spread when he mentioned to his office colleague that "whosoever would take confrontation with the Panth, he would meet the same fate" shows his guilty mind with that of Beant Singh. These circumstances by themselves indicate that Kehar Singh was a H ~o-conspirator to assassinate Mrs. Gandhi. [llJC-E]
KEHAR SINGH v. STA TE
38. The main evidence against accused Satwant Singh is evidence of eye witnesses. The testimony of Narain Singh PW 9-an eye witness, is corroborated by the first information report and also by the two other eye witnesses Rameshwar Dayal PW 10 and Natho Ram PW 64, whose presence on the spot could not he doubted. Natho Ram was in the personal staff of the Prime Minister and Rameshwar Dayal himself had received injuries. Apart from it,_ this evidence of tlirect witnesses also finds corroboration from the post-mortem report, recovery of cartridges and arms on the spot and the evidence of the Doctor and the expert who tallied the bullets. Under these circumstances, even if the confession of this appellant Satwant Singh is not taken into consideration, still there is enough evidence which conclusively establish his part in the offence and in this view of the matter there appears to be no reason to interfere with the conclusions arrivtd at by the f\\-'O Courts below. Therefore, the appeal of Satwant Singh deserves to be di1smissed. [114D, I ISC-D)
(Per Ray. J.). I. The concurrent findings of the Trial Court as well as of the High Court that offences under s. 302 I.P.C. read withs. 120-B, l.P.C.
and s. 34 I.P.C. were proved aginst Satwant Singh, must be upheld. It is a gruesome murder committed by the accused who was tmployed as a security guard to protect the Prime Minister Indira Gundhi. It is one of the rarest of rare cases in which extreme penalty of death is called for. [136C]
2. The charge of· conspiracy against Kehar Singh with the accused Satwant Singh and Beant Singh since deceased has been proved without any reasonable doubt. [136D)
-;/
3. The fixing of the place of sitting of Court of Sessions was made prior to the enforcement of the Code of Criminal procedure Amendment 1973 by the Executive. Under the amended Criminal Procedure Code, 197.3, s. 9(6) has conferred power on the High Court to notify the place where the Court of Sessions will ordinarily hold its sittings within the Sessions Division in conformity wiih the policy of separation of Judiciary from the executive. The High Court may notify the place or places for the sitting of the Court of Sessions. Thus, the High Court can fix a place other than the Court where the sittings are ordinarily held if the High Court so notifies under s. 9(6) Cr.P.C. for the ends of justice. The use of the word "ordinarily" ins. 9(6) Cr.P.C. by itself signifies that the High Court in exercise of its powers under s. 9(6) of the Code
(
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
A may order the holding of Court in a place other than the Court where sittings are ordinarily held if the High Court thinks it expedient to do so and for other valid reasons such as security of the accused as well as of the witnesses and also of the Court. [117C-F] 4. The Order of the High Court notifying the trial of a particular B case in a place other than the Court is not a prejudicial order but an administrative Order. In this case because of the surcharged atmosphere and for reasons of security. the High Court ordered that the trial be held in Tihar Jail. Therefore. it cannot be said that the trial is not an open trial because of its having been held in Tihar Jail as there is noting to show that the public or the friends and relations of the accused were C prevented from having access to the place of trial provided the space of the Court could accommodate them. Various representatives of the press including representatives of international news agency like BBC, etc. were allowed to attend the proceedings in Court subject to the usual regulations of the jail. [117F-G]
S. Section 327 of the Code of Criminal Procednre provides that any place in which any criminal Court is held for the purpose of inquiring into or trying any offence shall be deemed to be an open Court, to which the public generally may have access, so far as the same can conveniently contain them. The place of trial in Tihar Jail according to this provision is to be deemed to be an open Court as the access of the E public to it was not prohibited. [117H-118A]
6. In some cases, trial of a criminal case is held in Court and some restrictions are imposed for security reason regarding entry into the Court. Such restrictions do not detract from trial in open Court. Section 327 proviso empowers the Presiding Judge or Magistrate to make order denying entry of public in Court. No such order had been made in this case denying access of members of public to Court. [118D-E] 7. Trial in jail does not by itself create any prejudice to the accused and it will not be illegal. [118F]
8. In the instant case, though the trial was held In Tihar Jail for reasons of security of the accused as well as of the witnesses and of the Court and also because of the surcharged atmosphere, there was no restriction on the public to attend the Court, If they so minded. Therefore, the trlal, in the instant case, in Tihar Jail is an open trial and It does not prejudice In any manner whatsoever the accused. [I20H-121A]
KEHAR SINGH v. STATE
9. Though public trial or trial in open Court is the rule yet in cases where the ends of justice would be defeated if the trial is held in public, it is in that case the Court has got inherent jurisdiction to hold trial in camera. Therefore, the holding of trial in jail cannot be said to be illegal and bad and entire trial cannot be questioned as vitiated if the High Court thinks it expedient to hold the trial in jail. [122F]
Re: T.R. Ganeshan, AIR 1950 Madras 696; Shashi Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1917 Lahore 311; Prasanta Kumar Mukherjee v. The State, AIR 1952 Cal. 9; Kai/ash Nath Agarwal & Anr. v. Emperor, AIR 1947 Allahabad 436 and Narwarsingh v. State, AIR 1952 MB 193, approved.
·r
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, United States, Supreme Court Reports 65 L. Ed. 2d 973; Scott & Anr. v. Scott, [1913] AC 417; Core Lillian MC Pherson v. Oran Leo MC Pherson, AIR 1936 PC 246 and A.K. Roy, etc. v. Union of India & Anr., [1982] 2.SCR 272 at 356, referred to.
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkat v. State of Maharashtra, [1966] 3 SC.R 744, relied upon.
.ij
10. Section 164(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the Magistrate before recording confession shall explain to the person making confession that he is not bound to make a confession and if does so it may be used as evidence against him and upon questioning the person if the Magistrate has reasons to believe that it is being made voluntarily, then the confession will be recorded by the Magistrate. The compliance of suh-s. (2) of s. 164 is therefore, mandatory and impera· live and non-compliance of it renders the confession inadmissible in evidence. Section 463 (old s. 533) of the Code provides that where the questions and answers regarding the confession have not been recorded evidence can be adduced to prove that in fact the requirements of sub· s. (2) of s. 164 read withs. 281 have, in fact, been complied with. If the Court comes to a finding that such a compliance had, In fact, been made the mere omission to record the same in the proper form will not.render It inadmissible in evidence and the defect is cured under s. 46J.(s, 533 of the old Code) but when there is non-compliance of the mandatory requirement of s. 164(2) of the Code and it comes out in evidence that no such explanation as ·envisaged in the aforesaid sub-section has been given to the accused by the Magistrate, this substantial defect cannot be cured under s. 463 of the Code. [126E·127A)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
11. In the instant case, accused Satwant Singh who was in police custody was produced before the Magistrate on 29.11.1984. On that day the accused made an application stating that be wanted to make a statement about the facts concerning assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Magistrate directed the remand of the accused in judicial custody till l.12.1984 giving the accused time to reconsider and reOect. B The Magistrate also told him that he was not bound to make any statement and if any statement is made the-same might be used against him. The Magistrate also directed the sending of a letter to the Secretary, Legal Aid Committee to provide legal assistance to the accused at the expenses of the State. On 1.12.1984, the Magistrate enquired of the accused whether he wanted to make a statement whereon the accused stated that he wanted to make a statement. He was allowed to consnlt his counsel who conferred with him for about 15 minutes privately. As the accused insisted that his statement be recorded, the application was sent by the magistrate to the Link Magistrate for recording his statement. Before recording his statement a doctor was called to examine the accused, who in his report (Ext. PW 11/B) stated that in his opinion the D accused is fit to make his statement. It appears from Ext. PW 11/B-2 as well as from the questions and answeres which were put to the accused (Ext. PW 11/B-3) that the Link Magistrate warned the accused that he was not bound to make any confessional statement and in case he does so it may be used against him during trial. The accused in spite of this warning wanted to make a statement and thereafter the confessional statement Ext. PW 11/C was recorded by the Link Magistrate. In the certificate appended to the said confessional statement it has been stated that there was no pressure upon the accused and there was neither any police officer nor anybody else within the hearing or sight when the statement was recorded. Therefore, it appears that the accused was put the necessary questions and was given the warning that he was not F bound to make any statement and in case any statement is made, the same might be used against him by the prosecution for his conviction. Of conrse, no question was put by the Magistrate to the accused as to why he wanted to make a confessional statement. It also appears from the evidence of the Magistrate that the confessional statement was made voluntarily by the accused. So the defect in recording the statement in G the form prescribed is cured by s. 463 of the Code. The defect in recording the statement in appropriate form prescribed can be cured under section 463 of the Code provided the mandatory provisions of s. 164(2) namely explaining to the accused that he was not bound to make a statement and if a statement is made the same might be used against him, have been complied with and the same is established on an H examination of the Magistrate that the mandatory provisions have been complied with. [128D-129D]
••
,
.
KEHAR SINGH v. STATE
•
Hem Raj Devi Lal v. State of Ajmer, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 462, followed.
Ram Chandra & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 381; Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor, A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 253 (2); Taylor v. Taylor, [1876] 1 Chancery Division 426; State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 358; RanbirSingh v. Emperor, [19321 Cr. L.J. 242; Partap Singh v. The Crown, I.L.R. (1925) 6 Lah. 415; Prag v. Emperor, [1931] Cr. L.J. 97; Ambai Majhi v. State, [1966) Cr. L.J. 851; Abdul Rajak Murtaja v. State of Maharashtra, [1970) 1 S.C.R . 551; Dagdu & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, A.LR. 1977 S.C. 1579 and Ram Parkash v. State of Punjab, [1959) S.C.R. 1219, considered.
On a consideration and appraisement of the evidence of the eyewitnesses, it is clear and apparent that the accused Satwant Singh and Bean! Singh fired at Smt. Indira Gandhi while she was approaching the TMC gate accompanied by her Private Secretary Shri R.K. Dhawan, Narain Singh, H.C., PW-9 holding an umbrella on her head to protect her from sun accompanying her on the right side and Natho Ram following behind Shri R.K. Dhawan. It also appears that Beaut Singh first started firing from his service revolver and simultaneously the accused Satwant Singh also cocked his SAF Carbine towards the Prime Minister whereon the Prime Minister fell on the ground on her right side. The eye-witnesses have specifically stated that the accused Satwant Singh and Beaut Singh shot on the Prime Minister while she was approaching the TMC gate and she was about 8-10 steps away from the TMC gate. The eye-witnesses have denied that there was any firing from all the sides and it has been specifically stated in cross: examination that the firing was caused by Beaut Singh and Satwant Singh from their respective service revolver and SAF carbine. It also appears that Beant Singh and accused Satwant Singh were apprehended by PW-9 Narain Singh, HC and by the ITBP people. PW-9 in his cross-examination specifically stated that Satwant Singh did not sustain bullet injuries before Smt. Indira Gandhi had been fired at. The suggestion on behalf of the defence that there was firing from all the sides and accused Satwant Singh was injured seriously and Beaut Singh died by this firing has got no basis and it is unsustainable. It is obvious from the deposition of PW-49 that when he and other ITBP took Bean! Singh and Satwant Singh to the guard room they were not at all in injured condition. [132F-133C] 13. The evidence clearly show that Satwant Singh accused No. 1 manipulated his duty from beat No. 4 to TMC gate in P .M. House and so there is no doubt about his presence at the TMC gate on 31.10.1984 from 7.30A.M. [135C)
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[1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
14. A confession made by an accused cannot be used to convict his co-accused unless there is corroborative evidence against the co-accused but a person can be convicted solely upon his own confession even if retracted if the Court believed it to be true. The deposition of the independent witnesses is corroborated by the confessional statement PW 11 /C made by the accused Satwant Singh. Though the said confesB sion was retracted subsequently by the accused, the same can be used by the Court against the accused in convicting him. In the instant case the confessional statements were corroborated by independent evidences which clearly prove the guilt of the accused. [13SC-E]
•
Per Shetty, J.
I. Section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 marks a significant shift in the legislative policy of awarding death sentence. Now the normal sentence for murder is imprisonment for life and not sentence of death. The Court is required to give special reasons for awarding death sentence. Special reasons mean specific facts and circumstances obtained in the case justifying the extreme penalty. [202D]
'
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, [1980] 2 S.C.C. 684 and Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, [1983] 3 S.C.R. 413, referred to.
2. In the instant case, the crime charged was not simply the murdering of the human being, but it was the crime of assassination of tne duly elected Prime Minister of the country. The motive for the crime was not personal, but the consequences of the action taken by the Government in the exercise of constitutional powers and duties. In our democratic republic, no person who is duly constituted shall be eliminated by privy conspiracies. The 'Operation Blue Star' was not directed to cause damage to Akal Takht. Nor it was intended to hurt the religious feelings of Sikhs. The decision was taken by the responsible and responsive Government in the national interest. The late Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi was, however, made the target for the consequences of the decision. The security guards who were duty-bound to protect the Prime Minister at the cost of their lives, themselves became the assassins. All values and all ideals in life; all norms and obligations were thrown to the winds. It was a betrayal of the worst order. It was the most foul and senseless assassination. The preparations for and the execution of this egregious crime do deserve the dread sentence of the law.
!
"
KEHAR SINGH v. STATE
3. Sub-s. (6) of s. 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be divided into two parts. The first part provides power to the High Court to notify the place or places for the Court of Session to hold its sittings for disposal of cases. The second part deals_with the power of the Court of Sessions in any particular case to hold its sittings at a place not notified by the High Court. (142D-EJ
4. The words "place or places" used in S. 9(6) indicate that there could be more than one place for the sitting of the Court of Session. The different places may be notified by different notificatio•»· There may be a general notification as well as a special notification. The general notification may specify the place for the class of cases where Court of Session shall sit for disposal. The special notification may specify the same place or a different place in respect of a particular case. (143C] S. The words and sections like men do not have their full significance when standing alone. Like man, they are better understood by the company they keep. (143D] 6. Section 9(4) and s. 194 of the Code are the closely related sections and they may also be examined to understand the true meaning of the words "place or places"· in the first part of s. 9( 4). Section 9( 4) empowers the High Court to appoint a Sessions Judge of one division to sit at such place or places in another division for disposal of cases. The High Court while so appointing need not direct him to sit only at the ordinary place of sittings of the Court of Sessions. There is no such constraint ins. 9(4). The High Court may also issue a separate notification under s. 9(6) specifying the place or places where that Sessions Judge should sit for disposal of cases. Section 194 provides power to the High Court to make a special order directing an Additional or Assistant Session Judge of the same division to try certain specified cases or a particular case. If the High Court thinks that the Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge should hold the Court at a specified place, a separate notification could be issued under s. 9(6). (143E-144C] 7. The power provided by the first part of the High Court is an administrative power, intended to further the administration of justice. The power provided by the second part is a judicial power of the Court of Session intended to avoid hardship to the parties and witnesses in a particular case. One is independent of and unconnected with the other. So, the first part of s. 9(6) cannot be read with second part thereof. The judicial power of the Court of Session is of limited operation, the exer-
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cise of which is conditioned by mutual consent of the parties in the first place. Secondly, the exercise of that power has to be narrowly tailored to the convenience of all concerned. It cannot be made use of for any other purpose. This limited judicial power of the Court of Session cannot be put across to curtial the vast administrative power of the High Court. (1440-E]
8. Section 9(6) is similar to s. 9(2) of the Old Code (Act 5 of 1898). The only difference being that s. 9(2) conferred power on the State Government to specify the "place or places" where the Court of SessiOu should sit for the purpose of disposal of cases. That power is now vested in the High Court. The change of authorities was made to keep in tune with the separation of judiciary from the executive. The scope of the sections, however, remains the same. [I44G]
9. It is unnecessary for the High Court to hear the accused or anybody else before exercising the power under s. 9(6). Such a hearing, however, is required to be given by the Court of Session, if ii wants to D change the normal place of sitting, in any particular case, for the general convenience of parties and witnesses. Therefore, the impugned notification of the High Court, in the instant case, directing that the trial of the case shall be held at Tihar Jail is not ultra vires of s. 9(6) of the Code. [I46G-H]
Lakshman v. Emperor, A.LR. 1931 Born. 313 and Ranjit Singh v. Chief Justice & Ors., 11985] Vol. 28 DLT 153, affirmed.
IO. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides "In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury ..... ". No such right has been guaranteed to the accused under the Indian Constitution. The right of an accused to have a public trial in India has been expressly provided in the Code. [147F]
11. The jail trial is not an innovation. It has been there since long back. The practice of having trials inside jails, seems to have persisted G even after the coming into force of the Indian Constitution. [I47G] 12. Jail is not a prohibited place for trial of criminal cases. Nor the jail trial can be regarded as an illegitimate trial. There can be trial in jail premises for reasons of security to the parties, witnesses and for other valid reasons. The enquiry or trial, however, must be conducted H in open Court. There should not be any veil of secrecy in the proceed-
KEHAR SINGH v. STATE
ings. There should not even be an impression that it is a secret trial. The dynamics of judicial process should be thrown open to the public at every stage. The public must have reasonable access to the place of trial. The Presiding Judge must have full control of the Court house. The accused must have all facilities to have a fair trial and all safeguards to avoid prejudice. [149F]
13. In the instant case, there is no reason to find fault with the decision of the High Court to have the trial in Tihar Jail. The records show that the situation then was imperative. It is said that the assessination of Smt. Indira Gandhi had provoked widespread violence threatening the security of the State and the maintenance of law and order. The remand and the committal proceedings had to be taken in Tihar Jail since the Magistrate and Prosecutor were threatend with dire consequence. Such circumstances continued to exist when the case came up for trial. The Government requested the High Court to have the trial of the case in Tihar Jail for the security of the Judge, witnesses, Police Officers and also for the safety of the accused themselves. The High Court also had taken note of the events that immediately followed the assassination of Smt. Indira Gandhi. Beaut Singh one of the assassins was shot dead and Satwant Singh accused received near fatal gun shot injury. There was unprecedented violence aftermath in the national capital and other places. Frenzied mobs armed with whatever they could lay their
hands \.Vere seen besieging passing Sikhs and burning their vehicles, as
doctors in the hospital fought their vain battle to save the life of Smt. Indira Gandhi. Even President Zail Singh's cavalcade, making its way from the Airport to·the hospital was not spared. The reaction of outrage went on unabated followed by reprisal killings and destruction of properties. The local police force was badly shaken. They could do little .even to contain the violence. The Army had to be deployed to stem the tide of deluge. The new Prime Minister, made an unscheduled broadcast to the Nation pleading for sanity and protection to the Sikhs.
Nevertheless three days passed on with murder and loot leaving behind
a horrendous toll of more than two thousand dead and countless property destroyed. It is a tragedy frightening even to think of. These unprecedented events and circumstances would amply justify the decision of the High Court to direct that the trial of the case should take place in Tihar Jail. [149G-ISIC] Sahai Singh v. Emperor, A.LR. 1917 Lahore 311; Kai/ash Nath v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1947 All. 436; Re: M.R. Venkataraman, A.LR. 1950 . (J" . Madras 441; Re: T.R. Ganeshan, A.I.R. 1950 Madras 696; Prasanta Kumar v. The State, A.LR. 1952 Calcutta 91 and Narwar Singh & Ors.
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[1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
v. State, (1952] MP 193 at 195, referred to. 14. The main part of sub-s. (I) of s. 327 embodies the principle of public trial. It declares that the place Of enquiry and trial of any offence shall be deemed to be an open Court. It significantly use the words •·open Court". It means that all justice shall be done openly and the Courts shall be open to public. It means that the accused is entitled to a public trial and the public may claim access to the trial. The sub· section, however, goes on to state that "the public generally may have access so far as the place can conveniently contain them". It is implicit in the concept of a public trial. The public trial does not mean that every person shall be allowed to attend the Court. Nor the Court room shall be large enough to accommodate all persons. The Court may restrict the public access for valid reasons depending upon the particu· Jar case and situation. [151G-152B] 15. The proviso to sub-s. (I) of s. 327 specifically provides power to the Presiding Judge to impose necessary constraint on the public access depending upon the nature of the case. It also confers power on the Presiding Judge to remove any person from the Court house. The public trial is not a disorderly trial. It is an orderly trial. The presiding Officer may, therefore, remove any person from the Court premises if his conduct is undesirable. If exigencies of a situation require. the person desiring to attend the trial may be asked to obtain a pass from the authorised person. Such visitors may be even asked to disclose their names and sign registers. There may be also security checks. These and other like restrictions will not impair the right of the accused or that of the public. They are essential to ensure fairness of the proceedings and safety to all concerned. [152F-153A] 16. There are yet other fundamental principles justifying the public access to criminal trials. The crime is a wrong done more to the society than to the individual. It involves a serious invasion of rights and liberties of some other person or persons. The people are. therefore.
entitled to know whether the justice delivery system is adequate or inadequate. Whether it responds appropriately to the situation or it presents a pathetic picture. This is one aspect. The other aspect is still more fundamental. When the State representing the society seeks to prosecute a person, the State must do it openly. [153B]
Cooley's Constitutional Law, Vol. 1. 8th Ed. at 647 and Scott v. Scott, 1913, A.C. 417 at477, referred to.
(
KEHAR SINGH v. STA TE
17. In open dispensation of justice, the people may see that the A State is not misusing the State machinery like the Police, the Prosecutors and other public servants. The people may see that the accused is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned. There is yet another aspect. The Courts like other institutions also belong to people. They are as much human institutions as any other. The other instruments and institutions of the State may survive by the power of the purse or B might of the sword. But not the Courts. The Courts have no such means or power. The Courts could survive only by the strength of public confidence. The public confidence can be fostered by exposing Courts more and more to public gaze. [l53H-l54B)
"First Amendment Right of Access to Pretrial Proceedings in Criminal Cases" By Beth Hornbuckle Fleming (Emory Law Journal, V. C 32 (1983) p. 618 to 688, referred to. 18. In the instant case, the Office Block of the Jail Staff was used as the Court House. It is an independent building located at some distance from the main jail complex. In between there is a court-yard. This D court-yard has direct access from outside. A visitor after entering the court-yard can straight go to the Court House. He need not get into the Jail Complex. This is evident from the sketch of the premises produced before this Court. It appears the person who visits the Court House does not get any idea of the Jail Complex in which there are Jail Wards and Cells. From the sketch, it will be also seen that the building corn- E prises of a Court-hall, Bar room and Chamber for the Judge. The Court hall can he said to he of ordinary size. It has seating capacity for about fifty with some space for those who could afford to stand. The accused as undertrial prisoners were lodged at Jail No. I inside the Jail complex. It was at a distance of about l Km. from the Court House. For trial purposes, the accused were transported by van. In the Court hall, F they were provided with bullet proofenclosure. [ ISSD-G I
(,
19. For security reasons, the public access to trial was regulated. Those who desired to witness the trial were required to intimate the Court in advance. The trial Judge used to accord permission to such persons subject to usual security checks. Before commencement of the trial of the case, the representatives of the Press and News Agencies, national or international, approached the trial Judge for permission to cover the Court proceedings. The trial Judge allowed their request. The trial Judge did permit access to the members of the public also. He permitted even the Law Students in batches to witness the trial, There is_ hardly any instance brought to the attention of this Court where a
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[1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
A person who sought permissions was denied access to the Court. The observations of the High Court that the "trial Judge has giveu access to the place of trial for all members of the public who may he minded to attend the same save for certain reasonable restriction imposed in public interest" have not been shown to be incorrect. The accused were represented by leading members of the Bar. Some of the close relatives B of the accused were allowed to be present at the trial. All press representatives and news agencies whoever sought permission have been allowed to cover the day to day Court proceedings. There can, therefore, be no doubt or dispute as to the adequacy of safeguards povided to constitute an open trial. Indeed, the steps taken by learned trial Judge were more than adequate to ensure fair trial as well as public There is no member of the public or press before this Court c trial. making grievance that his constitutional right of access to the trial has been denied in this case. [!SSH, IS8C-F, HJ 20. What the Judicial decision purports to do is to decide the controversy between the parties brought the Court and nothing more. D The Judicial verdict pronounced by Court in or in relation to a matter brought before it for its decision cannot be said to affect the fundamental rights of citizens under Art. 19(1) of the Constitution of India. [1S9E-F] Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, [1966] 3 E S.C.R. 744, referred to.
21. Under the American Constitution the mandatory exclusion of the press and public to criminal trials in all cases violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. But if such exclusion is made by the trial Judge in the best interest of fairness to make that F exclusion, it would not violate that constitutional right. I 161C-D] Gannet Co. v. De Pasquale, 433 U.S. 368 (1979); Richmond Newspaper Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. SSS (1980) and Globe Newspapers v. Superior Court, 4S7 U.S. S96 (1982), referred to.
22. Soon after the assassination of Smt. Indira Gandhi the Government of India by notification dated November 20, 1984, constituted a Commission under the Commission of Inquiry Act, 19S2 presided over by Mr. Justice M.P. Thakkar the sitting Judge of the Supreme Court. The Commission inter-alia was asked to make recommendations as to the corrective remedies and measures that need to be H taken for the future with respect to the matters specified in clause (d) of
1·
KEHAR SINGH v. STATE
the terms of reference. The Commission framed regulations under s. 8 of the Act in regard to the procedure for enquiry. Regulation 8 framed thereon provided that "in view of the sensitive nature of the enquiry, the proceedings will be in camera unless the Commission directs otherwise". Accordingly, the Commission had its sittings in camera, and the Commission submitted an interim report, followed by the final report. [l61G, 162E-F] '
23. The Government of India did not lay the said repotts before the House of People on the ground of expediency in the interest of the security of the State and in the public interest and for that purpose amended the Commissions of Inquiry Act. [162G, 163G] 24. The trial Court while rejecting ihe application of the accused held that the statements recorded by the Commission are inadmissible in evidence in any subsequent proceedings and cannot, therefore, be used for the purpose of contradicting the same witnesses under s. 145 of the Evidence Act. The High Court also rejected such applications and held that it was not proper to compel production of the proceeding;';;"r
the report of the Commission in view of the privilege of nonMdisclosure
provided by the Act of Parliament and that the evidence before the Commission is wholly inadmissible in any other Civil or Criminal proceedings except for prosecuting the person for prejury. [164B-G]
Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Justice Tandolkar, [1959] S.C.R. 279, followed. J 25. The accused in criminal trials should be given equal opportunity to lay evidence fully, freely and fairly before the Court. The Government which prosecutes an accused will lay bare the evidence in its possession. If the accused asks for summoning any specific document or thing for preparing his case, it should normally be allowed by the Court if there is no legal bar. Bnt "the demand ·must be for production of ..... specific documents and should not propose any broad or blind fishing expedition." These principles are broadly incorporated for the guidance of Courts under s. 91 and s. 233 of the Code of Criminal procedure. [165G-166C]
.
(9
Clinton E. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657-1L.Ed.1103 at llll and Nizam of Hyderabad v. A.M. Jacob, ILR XIX Cal. 52 at 64, referred to. 26. Dissecting s. 6 of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 it will
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[ 1988) Supp. 2 S.C.R.
be clear that the statement made by a person before the Commission, in the first place shall not be the basis to proceed against him. Secondly, it shall not be 'used against him' in any subsequent civil or crim'-,·,.·, proceedings except for the purpose set out in the section itself. The single exception provided thereunder is a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement: [166F)
C
27. ·From the provisions of ss. 3, 4, 5, S(a), 6 and 8 of the Commission of the Inquiry Act, it will be clear that the Act was intended to cover matters of public important. In matters of public imp'ortance it may be necessary for the Government to fix the responsi· bility on individuals or to kill harmful rumours. The ordinary law of the land may not fit in such cases apart from it is time consuming. The Commission under the Act is given the power to regulate its own proce· dure and also to decide whether to sit in camera or in public. A Commission appointed under the Act does not decide any dispute. There are no parties before the Commission. There is no lis. The Commission is not a Court except for a limited purpose. The procedure
of the Commission is inquisitorial rather than accusatorial. The·
Commission more often may have to give assurance to persons giving evidence before it that their statements will not be used in any subse· quent proceedings except for perjury. Without such an assurance, the persons may not come forward to give statements. If persons have got lurking fear that their· statements given before the Commission are E likely to be used against them or utilised for productive use on them in any other proceeding, they may be relu~tant to expose themselves before the Commission. Then the Commission would not be able to perform its task. The Commission would not be able to reach the nuggets of truth from the obscure horizon. The purpose for which the Commission is constituted may be defeated. [169F-170B) 28. The Court should avoid such construction to s. 6 of the said . Act which may stultify the purpose of the Act. Section 6 must receive liberal construction so that the person deposing before the Commission may get complete immunity except in :{case of prosecution for perjury. That is posssible if the word "against" used in s. 6 is properly G understood. [l70C)
29. Section 6 contains only one exception. That is a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement. When the Legislature has expressly provided a singular exception to the provisions, it has to be normally understood that other exceptions are ruled out. Therefore, the statement given before a Commission shall not be admissible against
)
KEHAR SINGH v. STATE
the person in any subsequent civil or criminal proceedings save for perjury. l170E)
Sohan Lal v. State, A.1.R. 1965 Born. 1; State of Maharashtra v. Ibrahim Mohd., [1978) Crl. L.J. 1157 and State of Assam v. Suparbhat Bhadra, [1982] Crl. L.J. 1672, overruled. .
Puhupram & Ors., v. State of M.P., [1968) M.P. L.J. 629, affirmed. Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry, ( 1966); The Special Commission Act, 1888 and The Tribunal of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, I921, referred to.
Ramakrishna Dalmia v. Justice Tandolkar, [1959) S.C.R. 279, upheld.
· '7
30. There is vital difference between the two crimes; (i) abetment in any conspiracy, and (ii) criminal conspiracy. The former is defined under the second clause of s. 107 and the latter is under s. 120·A of the Indian Penal Code. The gist of the offence of criminal conspiracy created under s. 120-A is a bare agreement to commit an offence. It has been made punishable under s. 120-B. The offence of abetment created under the second clause of s. 107 requires that there must be something more than a mere conspiracy. There must be some act or illegal omission in pursuance of that conspiracy. That would be evident by the wordings of s. 107 (Secondly): "engages in any conspiracy •.... for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy ...•. " The punishments for these two categories of crimes are also quite different. Section 109 IPC is concerned only with the punishment of abetments for which no express provision is made under the Indian Penal Code: A charge under s. 109 should, therefore, be along with some other substantive offence committed In consequence of abetment. The offence of criminal conspiracy Is, on the other hand, an lndepe)\dent offence. It is made punishable under s. 120-B for which a charge under s. 109 IPC Is unnecessary and Indeed Inappropriate. [175G:.J.77C)
31. The genuineness of the document Ex. PW 26/B is inextricably connected with the arrest and search of the accused Balbir Singh at Najafgarh Bus Stand. The document was recovered from the accused upon arrest and search made under s. 51 of the Code. If the arrest cannot carry conviction then the recovery automatically falls to · the
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[1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
ground. Not merely that, even the allegation that the accused had absconded vanishes to thin air. The case of the prosecution is that Balbir Singh was released from his 'de facto custody' at Yamuna Velodrome in the evening of November 1, 1984 and thereafter he was absconding till he was arrested on December 3, 1984 at Najafgarh Bus Station. The accused has challenged this version. [177H-178C]
32. The Courts do not interfere in the discretion of the police in •natters of arrest, search and release of persons suspected in criminal
cases. But the Courts do insist that it should be done according to law. If the prosecution say that the accused was released from custody and ·the accused denies it, it will be for the prosecution to place material on C record in support of the version. In the instant case, there is no record indicating the release of Balbir Singh from Yamuna Velodrome. The explanation given is that Yamuna Velodrome being not a Police Station, registers were not maintained to account for the incoming and outgoing suspects. It is hardly an explanation where life and death questions are
involved. [1780-E]
33. The question of absconding by the accused Balbir Singh remains unanswered. First, there is no material to lend credence to this
serious allegation. Nobody has been asked to search him. No police party has been sent to track him. No procedure contemplated under law has been taken. Second, there is no evidence from which place the accused came and landed at Najafgarh Bus stand. There is no independent witness for the seizure memo (PW. 35/A) vide which the police is said to have recovered certain articles including Ex. PW. 26/B described as "memorandum of events." Third, no question as to absconding was put to the accused in the examination under s. 313 of !he Code. So far as the reliance placed by the prosecution upon the averments in the remand application is concerned, the averments in the
remand application are only self-serving. The silence of the accused cannot be construed as his admission of those allegations. Further, the reliance placed by the prosecution on the Malkana Register is of little assistance to the prosecution as there is an endorsement in the Malkana
Register stating that the D. T.C. ticket which the accused carried and the paper containing the dates in English (Ex. PW. 26/B) were not deposited. In view of these infirmities, the arrest of the accused at Najafgarh Bus Stand does not inspire confidence. This by itself is sufficient to discard the document Ex. PW. 26/B. [178F-180A]
34. The document Ex. PW. 26/B is a sheet of paper which contains H certain entries. If this document is an incriminating piece of evidence, it
KEHAR SINGH v. STATE
is rather baffiing why the accused, who was suspected to be a cons- A pirator to murder the Prime Minister of the country, should carry the document wherever he goes that too at a place where there were reprisal killings. The accused is not a rustic person. He is a Sub-Inspector of Police with several years of service to his credit. He must have investigated so many crimes. He must have anticipated the danger of carrying incriminating document when he was already suspected to be a B party to the deadly conspiracy. Indeed, nobody could offer even a plausible explanation for this unusual conduct attributed to the accused. To say that the absconding accused-Sub-Inspector was found at a public place in the national capital with an incriminating document which may take him to gallows is to insult the understanding, if not the intelligence of police force of this country. [180B-18JG] . I
35. A bare reading of the document Ex. PW. 26/B shows that this is a document composed at one time with the same ink and same writing instrument. The corrections, the fixing of months and dates with the nature of entries therein apparently indicate that the document was not kept as a contemporaneous record of events relating to Balbir Singh. The fact that it was not in the possession of the accused when his house was searched in the early hours of November I, 1984 also confirms this conclusion. [18JH-182A] 36. In the document, there is no reference to killing of the Prime Minister. In fact, except for a "felt like killing" in early June as an immediate reaction the "Operation Blue Star" even the manifestation of this feeling does not exist anywhere in subsequent part of the document. The document refers to bare meetings, visits of persons, or visiting somebody's house. It is, however, not possible to find out to whom the document was intended to be used. There is no reference to a joint 'Ardas' or a message for revenge associated with the appearance of the eagle. The entry does not suggest that the author had anything to do with the eagle. It is something between Beant Singh alone and the eagle. It is significant that there is no reference to Beant Singh and his plans to murder the Prime Minister. There is no reference to bombs or grenades associated with the plans to eliminate the Prime Minister before the 15th August, 1984. There is no reference to any commission of any offence. There is no reference about Bean! Singh conspiring with Balbir Singh. There is no reference to Kehar Singh at all. IfBalbir Singh was a party to the conspiracy with Bean! Singh, the date on which Beant Singh had planned the murder of Smt. Indira Gandhi, that is, October 25, 1984 as written in Ex. P. 39 ought to have been noted in Ex. PW. 26/B, but there is.no reference to that. There is a cryptic reference to
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[1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
~
Satwant Singh against 30th October. The only one entry which makes a reference to killing is the second entry. It refers to "felt like killing". But one does not know who "felt like killing" and killing whom? It may be somebody's reaction to the "Operation Blue Star". If the document is read as a whole, it does not reveal anything incriminating against Balbir Singh. [I82B-183A]
C
37. Entering into an agreement by two or more persons to do an illegal act or legal act by illegal means is the very quintessence of the offence of conspiracy. The illegal act may or may not be done in pursuance of agreement, but the very agreement is an offence and is punishable. Reference to ss. 120A and 120B I.P.C. would make these aspects clear beyond doubt. These provisions have brought the law of conspiracy in India in line with the English Law by making the overtact unessential when the conspiracy is to commit any punishable offence. [184C]
38. Generally, a conspiracy is hatched in secrecy and it may be D difficnlt to adduce direct evidence of the same. The prosecution will often rely on evidence of acts of various parties to infer that they were done in referene to their common intention. The prosecution will also more often rely upon circumstantial evidence. The conspiracy can be undoubtedly proved by such evidence direct or circumstantial. But the Court must enquire whether the two persons are independently pursuE ing the same end or they have come together to the pursuit of the unlawful object. The former does not render them conspirators, but the latter does. It is, however, essential that the offence of conspiracy requires some kind of physical manifestation of agreement. The express agreement, however,, need not be proved. Nor actual meeting of two persons is necessary. Not it is necessary to prove the actual words of F communication. The evidence as to transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful design may be sufficient. [184D-EJ
39. The relative acts or conduct of the parties must be conscientious and clear to mark their concurrence as to what should be done. The concurrence cannot be inferred by a group of irrelevant facts artfully arranged so as to give an appearance of coherence. The innocuous, innocent or inadvertent events and incidents should not enter the judicial verdict. 40. Section IO of the Evidence Act introduced the doctrine of agency and if the conditions laid down therein are satisfied, the acts "' done by one are admissible against the co-conspirators. [ISSD]
.
KEHAR SINGH '· STATE
41. Section IO will come into play only when the Court is satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence. There should be a prima facie that the person was a party to the conspiracy before his acts can be used against his co-conspirator. ·Once such prime facie evidence exists, anything said, done or written by one of the conspirators in reference to the common intention, after the said intention was first entertained is relevant against the others. It is relevant not only for the purpose of proving the existence of conspiracy, but also for proving that the other person was a party to it. [l85G-H] Russell on Crime, 12 Ed. Vol. I, 202; Glanville Williams in the "Criminal Law" (Second Ed. 382); Regina v. Murphy, 173 England Reports 508; Gerald Orchard. University of Canterbury, New Zealand, (Criminal Law Review 1974, 297 at 299 and Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. State of Maharashtra, [1964] 2 SCR 378.
Mirza Akbar v. King Emperor, AIR 1940 P.C. 176 at 180.
Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. State of Maharashtra, [1958] SCR 161 at 1.93.
I'
42. The High Court was unjustified in attaching importance to any one of the aforesaid circumstances in proof of the conspiracy. Like Balbir Singh there were several Sikh officers on security duty at the PM's house. There is no evidence to show intimacy between Balbir Singh and Bean! Singh or between Balbir Singh and Satwant Singh. There is no acceptable evidence that Balbir Singh shared the indigna-
tion of Beant Singh against Smt. Gandhi and was in a mood to avenge
for the "Operation Blue ·star". From the evidence of P. W. 13 all that could be gathered is that after the "Operation Blue Star", Balbir Singh was in agitated mood and he used to say that the responsibility of damaging 'Akal Takhat' lies with Smt. Gandhi and it would be avenged by them. This is not to say that Balbir Singh wanted to take revenge against the Prime Minister along with Beant Singh. It would not be proper to take notice of such general dissatisfaction. It is not an offence to form one's own opinion on governmental action. It is on record that some members of the Sikh community felt agitated over the "Operation Blue Star". The resentment was also expressed by some of the sikh employees of the Delhi Police posted for PM's security. In fact, ihe chargesheet against all the accused is founded on those averments. Resentment of the accused on "Operation Blue Star" should, therefore, be excluded from consideration. There is no material that Balbir
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
A Singh took earned leave for any sinister purpose or design. There is uo evidence that during the said period, he met Beant Singh or anybody else connected with the conspiracy. It is, therefore, totally an innocuous circumstance. Assuming that falcon did appear and sat on a tree in the PM's house and that Beaut Singh and Balbir Singh did offer 'Ardas' on the occasion, there is "nothing unusual or abnormal about the incident." B The sanctity of the falcon as associated with the Tenth Guru is not denied. The evidence of Satish Chander Singh (PW 52) about the meeting of Balbir Singh with Satwant Singh on October 30, 1984 has got only to be referred to be rejected. To place reliance on the testimony of Amarjit Singh (PW 44) would be to put a premium on bis irresponsibility. The discrepancies between the first version and bis evidence in the C Court are not immaterial. They are substantial and on material points. The witness is putting the words of Bean! Singh into the mouth of Balbir Singh and thereby creating circumstances against the latter. All the facts and circumstances above recited are either irrelevant or explainable. No guilty knowledge of the contemplated assassination of the Prime Minister could be attributed to Balbir Singh on those facts and D circumstances. [187E-188F] 41. The confession of a co-accused could be used only to lend assurance to the conclusion on the acceptable evidence against the accused. When by all the testimony in the case, Balbir Singh's involvement in the conspiracy is not established, the confession of Satwant E Singh cannot advance the prosecution case. Even otherwise, the reference in the confession as to the conspiracy between Balbir Singh and Beant Singh was not within the personal knowledge of Satwant Singh. He refers to Beaut Singh consulting Balbir Singh and "advising" to kill P.M. It is not clear who told him and when? Such a vague statement is of little use even to lend assurance to any acceptable F case against Balbir Singh. [19IB] 42. The evidence produced by the prosecution against Balbir Singh is defective as well as deficient. It is safer, therefore, to err in acq1;1itting than in convicting him. ll91C] 43. The evidence of Bimla Khalsa wife of Beaut Singh indicates that on October 17, 1984 Beaut Singh and Kehar Singh were combined and conspiring together. Kehar Singh was closeted with Beaut Singh on the roof of her house for about 15/18 minutes. There was hush hush talk between them which could not be over-heard by her as she was in the kitchen. That evoked suspicion in her mind. She did consider "their H talk as something secret". She enquired from Kehar Singh "as to what
j
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KEHAR SINGH v. STATE
they were talking thereupon?" Kehar Singh replied that the talks were "with regard to making somebody to take Amrit". Bimla Khalsa re· marked: "that taking Amrit was not such a thing as to talk secretly". She was perfectly right in her remark. There cannot be a secret talk about Amrit taking ceremony.His a religious function. Kehar Singh might have realised that it would be difficult to explain his conduct without exposing himself. He came with cryptic reply: "There was nothing particular". The said conversation, as the High Court has observed, could be only to further the prosecution of the conspiracy. Satwant Singh later joining them for meals lends credence to this conclusion. [193H-194C, Fl
44. Merely because Bimla Khalsa turned hostile, her evidence cannot be discarded. That is a well accepted proposition. She had no axe to gririd against any person. She gains nothing by telling .falsehood or incorrect things against Kehar Singh. She has revealed what she was told and what she had witnessed on October l 7, 1984 in her own house. There is, therefore, no reason to discard that part of her testimony. It is true that the police did not record .her statement after the incident. That is understandable. she had lost her husband. She was in immeasurable grief. She ought to be allowed time to compose herself. Both the ob,jections raised against her testimony are, therefore, not sound. [194G-195A]
45. The visit of Kehar Singh and Beant Singh along wiih their family members to Amritsar on October 20, 1984 assumes importance and it is significant to note about the relative character of Kehar Singh and Bean! Singh. Even at the most sacred place they remained isolated from their·wives and children. [l95E-196A]
46. Kehar Singh had the opportunity to bring Beant Singh back to the royal path, by dissuading him from taking any drastic action against Smt Gandhi, but unfortunately, he did nothing of that kind. If he had not approved the assassination of the Prime Minister; Beant Singh would not have grafted Satwant Singh to the conspiracy. Secondly, if Kehar Singh was really interested in redeemin~ Beant Singh, he would have taken the assistance of Bimla Khalsa. He did not do that even. She was deliberately not taken into confidence. She was in fact kept in darkness even though she was inquisitive to know their s«¥;ret talk. [196B·CJ
47. It is true that there is no substantive evidence from the testimony of Bimla Kha.Isa that Beant Singh took Amrit on October 14,- H
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A 1984 at the instance of Kehar Singh. Undisputedly he was present at the ceremony in which Bimla Khalsa took Amrit. It may not be, therefore, unreasonable to state that he must have been present when Bean! Singh also took Amrit. The recovery made from his house supports this inference. It is said that while taking Amrit or thereafter, the person is not expected to wear gold ornaments. Bean! Singh had gold 'kara' B (Ex. p. 27) and ring (Ex. p. 28) ..These two articles were recovered by the investigatiug agency from the house of Kehar Singh. That is not disputed before this Court. Bean! Sigh must have entrusted the articles I to Kehar Singh at the time of his taking Amrit. It also shows the significant part played by Kehar Singh in taking Amrit by Beaut Singh. [196D-F]
48. It is true that taking Amrit by itself may not have any sinister significance. It is a religious ceremony and 'Amrit' is taken only to 'lead a life of spartan purity giving up all worldly pleasures and evil habits'. But, unfortunately, the assassins have misused that sacred religious ceremony for ulterior purpose. [196G]
49. The post crime conduct of Kehar Singh is conclusive of his guilt. He was cognizant of all the details of the coming tragedy and waiting to receive the news on that fateful day. That would be clear from the testimony of Nand Lal Mehta (PW 59) who was an office colleague of Kehar Singh. He has deposed that Kehar Singh had met him in the third floor corridor of the office at about 10-45 A.M. on October 31, 1984. By that time the news of the murderous attack on the Nation's Prime Minister came like a thunder-blot from a clear sky. The messenger had told that 'some-body' had shot at Smt. Gandhi. PW 59 then enquired from Kehar Singh as to what had happened. Kehar Singh replied that "whosoever would take confrontation with the Panth, he would meet the same fate." So stating, he went away. It may be noted· that at that time, there was no specific information to the outside world
whether any Sikh had shot the Prime Minister or anybody else. Unless Kehar Singh had prior knowledge, he could not have reacted with those words. [196H-197CJ
50. To sum up: Kehar Singh's close and continued association with Beaut Singh; his deliberate attempt to exclude Mrs. Bimla Khalsa from their company and conversation; his secret talk with Beaut Singh followed by taking meals together with Satwant Singh; his keeping the gold 'kara' and 'ring' of Bean! Singh; and his post crime conduct taken together along with other material on record are stronger as evidence of H . guilt than even direct testimony. Kehar Singh was one of the
i
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KEHAR SINGH v. STATE
conspirators to murder Smt. Gandhi, though not for all the reasons stated. [197D] 51. Satwant Singh, a constable in the Delhi Police was on security i;Iuty at the Prime Minister's house since July 2, 1983. On October 31, 1984, in the usual course, he was put on security at Beat No. 4 in the Akbar Road House (not at the TMC Gate). This has been confirmed by the daily diary maintained at Teen Murti (Ex. PW 14/C)-Entry No. 85). He was issued SAF Carbine (Sten-gun) having Butt No. 80 along with 5 magazines and 100 live rounds of 9 mm ammunition. In acknowledgement thereof, he had signed the register (Ex. PW 3/A). He got exchanged his place of duty to carry out the conspiracy he had with Beant Singh to murder Smt. Gandhi oit the pretext that he was suffering from loose motions and got himself posted as TMC Gate being nearer to a latrine. [197F-198E] 52. Three eye witnesses to the occurrence, namely, Narain Singh, Rameshwar Dayal and Nethu Ram corroborate with each other on all material particulars. They had accompanied the Prime Minister on the fateful day. They were able to see vividly, describe correctly and indentify properly the persons who gunned down Smt. Gandhi. Both the Courts below have accepted them as natural and trustworthy witnesses. Such a conclusion based on appreciation of evidence is binding on this Court in the appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. [198F-Gl
Pritam Singh v. The State, A.I.R. 1950 SC 169; Hem Ra1 v. State of Aimer, [1954] S.C.R. 1133 and Bhoqinbhai Hirjibhai v. St<!le of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1983 SC 753; relied upon.
T
53. There.can be little doubt as to the presence of Narain Singh at the spot. His evidence receives fUll corroboration from the other two eye witnesses. The umbrella (Ex. p. 19) which he was holding has been recovered from the place nnder the seizure memo (Ex. PW 5/H). Rameshwar Dayal (PW 10) is au A.S.I. of Police. He was on security duty at the PM's residence. He was also the water attendant in the pilot car of the Prime Minister. On material particulars his evidence ls identical in terms with that of Narain Singh (f'W 9). ·undisputedly, he had suffered bullet injuries. He was admitted to the AIIMS for treatment. The Medico-legal Certificate issued by the AIIMS (Ex. 10/DA) supports his version. No further corroboration is necessary to accept his evidence. [199E-200A]
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[1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
54. Nathu Ram (PW 64) is also an eye witness. He was a dedicated servant of Smt. Gandhi. His evidence as to the relative acts of the two assassins is consistent with the version of PW 9 of PW 10. His presence at the spot was most natu:al. His evidence is simple and straight-forward. l200B-D]
El
SS. The presence of Satwant Singh at TMC Gate is also not in dispute and indeed it was admitted by his while answering question No. Sl(A) in the examination under s. 313 of the Code. What is important to notice from the testimony of Ganga Singh (PW 49) is that Satwant Singh when apprehended by him was not injured. He was taken safely to the guard room. He did not receive any bullet injury in the incident with which this Court is concerned. He must have been shot evidently inside the guard room where he was taken for safe custody by the ITBP personnel. The defence put forward by Satwant Singh that he was decoyed to the TMC gate where he received bullet injury is, therefore, patently false. 200G-H]
C
56. The eye witnesses are not strangers to the assassins. They were familiar faces in the security ring of the Prime Minister. Their
Ii'
presence with Smt. Gandhi at the spot was not accidental, but consistent with their duties. There was no scope for mistaken identity since everything happened in the broad day light. Therefore, the evidence thus far discussed itself is sufficient to bring home the guilt to Satwant Singh on all the charges levelled against him. [201A-B] The records contain evidence as to the identification of arms and ammunition entrusted to the assassins. The stengun issued to Satwant Singh along with 25 empties of the sten-gun were recovered from the place of incident under the seizure memo (Ex. PW 5/H). The revolver (Ex. P.l) delivered to Beant Singh and 5 empties of the revolver were also collected at the spot. Dr. T .D. Dogra (PW 5) while conducting limited post-mortem examination had taken two bullets from the bod)'. of Smt. Gandhi; one from injury No. I and the other from injury No. 2. These bullets along with the arms recovered from the spot were sent for the opinion ofthe Principle Scientific Officer, Ballistic Division, GFSL, New Delhi. P. W. 12 has testified that the bullets recovered from the body ·or Smt. Gandhi are traceable to the sten-gun and the revolver. Similar is the evidence with regard to the other bullets recovered from the place of incident. The record also contains evidence about the total tally of the bullets fired and empties collected. It is not necessary to confirm the finger prints on the sten-gun, as that of the accused when it is proved that sten-gun was delivered to him. The examination of the
:><
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KEHAR SINGH v. STATE
bullets recovered from the body of Smt. Gandhi for the traces of blood or tissues is also unnecessary, since one of the bullets taken by the Doctor tallied with the sten-gun (Ex. P. 4). Equally, limited post-mortem examination would not affect the merits of the case. It is not always necessary to have a complete post-mortem in every case. Section 174 of the Code confers discretion to the Police Officer not to send the body for post-mortem examination if there is no doubt as to the cause of death. If the cause of death is absolntely certain and beyond the pale of donbt or controversy, it is unnecessary to have the post-mortem done by Medic!'! Officer. In the instant case, there was no controversy abont the cause of death of Smt. Gandhi. A complete post-mortem of _the body was ·therefore uncalled for. [201F-202A] 57. From the aforesaid direct testimony coupled with the other clinching circumstances available on record, there is not even an iota of doubt about the crime committed by Satwant Singh. He is guilty of all the charges. [202B]
58. In the past, the Judges and lawyers spoke of a 'golden rule' D by which statutes were to be interpreted according to grammatical and ordinary sense of the word. During the last several years, the 'golden rule' has been given a go bye. [1678] 59. The Courts now look for the 'intention' of the legislature or the 'purpose' of the statute. First, it examines the words of the statute. E If the words are precise and cover the situation in hand it does not go further. It expounds those words in the natural and ordinary sense of the words. But if the words are ambiguous, uncertain or any doubt arises at to the terms employed, the Court deems it as its paramount duty to put upon the language of the legislature rational meaning. It then examines every word, every section and every provi.sion. It examines the Act as a F_
whole. It examines the necessity which gave rise to the Act. It looks at the mischiefs which the legislature intended to redress. It looks at the whole situation and not just one to .one relation. It will not consider any provisions out of the frame work of the statute. It will not view the provisions as abstract principles separated from the motive force behind. It will consider the provisions in the circumstances to which G they owe their origin. It will consider the provisions to ensure coherence and consistency within the law as a whole and to avoid undesirable consequences. [168B-Dl
-r
Colin Cherry, (On human Communication at 10) and Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless G. F. & 1. Co., A.LR. 1987 S.C. 1023 at 1042; H referred to.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos. 180 to 182 of 1987. From the Judgment and Order dated 3.12.1986 of the Delhi High Court in Murder Reference No. 2 of W86 and Criminal Appeal Nos. 28 and 29of1986. Ram Jethmalani, R.S. Sodhi, Ms. Rani Jethmalani, R.M. Tewari, Ashok Sharma and Sanjeev Kumar for the Appellants.
G. rlamaswamy, Additional Solicitor General, S. Madhusudhan Rao, P. Parmeshwaran, Ms. A. Subhashini, M.V. Chelapathi Rao, S.P. Manocha and A.P. Ahluwalia for the Respondent. The following judgments of the Court were delivered:
OZA, J. These appeals by leave are directed against the conviction of the three appellants Kehar Singh, Balbir Singh and Satwant D Singh under Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC and the appellant Satwant Singh under Section 302 read with Sec. 120-B, Sec. 34 & Sec. 307 IPC and also under Sec. 27 of the Arms Act. All the three were sentenced to death under Section 302 read with Sec. 120-B. The conviction and sentence of these appellants were confirmed by the High Court of Delhi by its judgment in Criminal Appeal Nos. 28-29/ E 1986 and Confirmation Case No. 2/86. The case relates to a very unfortunate incident where the Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi was assassinated by persons posted for her security at her residence. The facts brought out during investigation are that Smt. Indira Gandhi had her residence in New Delhi at No. 1, Safdarjung Road. F Her office was at No. 1, Akbar Road which was a bungalow adjoining her residence. In fact the two bungalows had been rolled into one by a campus with a cemented pathway about 8 ft. wide leading from the residence to the Office and separated by a Sentry gate which has been referred to as ihe TMC Gate and a sentry booth nearby. Smt: Indira Gandhi had gone on a tour to Orissa and returned to New Delhi on the G night of 30th October, 1984. At about 9 A.M. on the fateful day i.e. 31st October, 1984 Smt. Gandhi left her residence and proceeded towards the office along the cemented path. When she approached the TMC Gate and was about 10 or 11 ft. away therefrom she was riddled with a spray of bullets and she fell immediately. She was removed to All India Institute of Medical Sciences ('AIIMS' for short) but to no H avail. A wireless message about the occurrence was received at 9.23
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KjjHAR SINGH v. STATE [OZA, J.I
A.M. by the Wireless Operator Head Constable Ram Kumar PW 38 at Togiak Road Police Station having jurisdiction over the place of occurrence. The Duty Officer PW 1 deputed Sub Inspector Vir Singh PW 20 and Constable Mulak Raj to visit the spot at once. They were soon joined by the Station House Officer Inspector Baldev Singh Gill PW 21. These persons roped off the' area of occurrence to isolate it, placed it in charge of Constable and then proceeded to AIIMS. In the meanwhile it was decided to entrust this investigation to Ra jendra Prasad Kochhar PW 73 then Inspector in the Homicide squad of the Crime Branch of Delhi Police. However, as is only to be expected having regard to the circumstances, the Government soon decided to constitute a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to pursue the investigation. On 9.11.84 the Delhi Administration issued two notifications. By one of these in exercise of powers under Section 7(1) of Delhi Police Act, S. Anandram, JPS was appointed as· an Additional Commissioner of Police and was declared for the purpose of Section 36 Cr. P.C. to be a Police Officer superior in rank to an Officer-in-charge of a Police Station. By the other notification issued in exercise of the powers conferred under Sec. 7(2)(b) of the Police Act, Anandram was authorised to exercise all the powers and perform all the duties of Commissioner of Police in relation to this case and any other offences connected the(eto. The notification shows that copy of each of them is forwarded for publication to the Delhi Gazette. Sometime later on 22nd December, 1984 the Administration in exercise of powers under Section 8(1) of the Police Act appointed Des Raj Kakkar and M.S. Sharma as Deputy Commissioner of Police and· Assistant Commissioner of Police respectively designating them as Officers superior to an Officer-in-charge of a Police Station and place.d their services at the disposal of Shri Anandram. We understand that Shri R.P. Kapoor was named as the Chief Investigative Officer but it was Mr. Kochhar who was closely associated with the investigation throughout except for a short period between 15.11.84 when the'SIT assumed charge and 27 .11.84 when his services were lent to SIT am! he is an important witness of the prosecution so far as investigation is concerned.
~-
Shri Kochhar reached AIIMS at about 10 A.M. and at 11.25 A.M. on 31. i0.84 he sent at the Tuglak Road Police Station through Shri Vir Singh, PW 20 a report on the basis of which First Information Report (FIR) for a cognizable offence punishable under Sections 307, 120-B !PC and Sections 25, 27, 54 & 59 of the Arms Act was registered at the Police Station. The report was based on the statement of Narain Singh, PW 9, a Head Constable deputed on duty at Smt. Indira
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
<
A Gandhi's residence, recorded by Shri Kochhar at AIIMS. Narain
J1
(}
Singh who was accompanying Smt. Gandhi at the time of shooting and claimed to be a witness of occurrence had stated as follows: This statement made by Narain Singh in the First Information Report brings out the important facts leading to the offence and this part of the Statement as quoted by the High Courrreads: "When we were about 10-11 ft. away from the gate of 1, Safdarjung Road and 1, Akbar Road, I noticed Bean! Singh SI on duty at TMC Gate and in the adjoining Sentry booth Constable Satwant Singh, 2nd Bn. in uniform armed with a Stengun was on duty. When Smt. Indira Gandhi reached near the Sentry booth, Beaut Singh, SI took out his service revolver from his right du6 and immediately started firing bullets at Smt. Indira Gandhi. At the same time Constable Satwant Singh also fired shots at Smt. Indira Gandhi with his Stengun. As a result of firing of bullets at the hands of the aforesaid two persons Smt. Indira Gandhi sustained injuries on her front and fell down on the ground. Sh. Rameshwar Dayal AS! has also received bullet injuries due to the firing made by the aforesaid two persons. I threw the umbrella. Shri Beant Singh SI and Constable Satwant Singh were secured with the assistance of Shri B.K. Bhatt AGP PSO in ITBP personnel. The arms of these two persons fell down on the spot itself. Thereafter I went to call Dr. R. Obey. In the meantime the car, doctor and the other officials reached the place of occurrence and Smt. Indira Gandhi was removed to AIIMS and was got admitted there. Shri B.K. Bhatt, Shri R.K. Dhawan, Shri Nathu Ram, Sh. Lavang Sherpa and Shri Rameshwar Dayal ASI had witnessed the occurrence. Bean! Singh SI and Constable Satwant Singh in furtherance of their common objects have fired shots at Smt. Indira Gandhi and have caused injuries on her person with an intention to kill her. It is learnt that Bean! Singh SI and Constable Satwant Singh had also sustained bullet injuries at the hands of ITBP personnel. Legal action may please be taken against them." Upon receiving the news about the death of Smt. Indira Gandhi, the offence in the FIR was converted from Section 307 to Section 302 and investigation proceeded ahead.
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-=KEHAR SINGH v. STATE [OZA, J.l
I I
I
~~
According to the prosecution Satwant Singh was arrested on 15.11.84 at Red Fort where he had been taken after his discharge from the Hospital in early hours of the same day. The Chief Justice and the Judges of the Delhi High Court on a request made by Delhi Administration decided to depute and designate Shri S.L. Khanna, Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Tis Haz3ri to deal with the remand matter of Satwant Singh in Red Fort, Delhi. Satwant Singh was produced before Shri S.L. Khanna, PW 67 on the same day and remanded to the police custody till 29.11.84. On 29.11.84 it was said that Satwant Singh wanted to make a confession and he was produced before Shri Khanna. Shri Khanna, however, gave him time to think over till 1.12.84 and remanded him to judicial custody in Tihar Jail. It appears that thereafter the Delhi Administration again made a request to the Delhi High Court and the Delhi High Court authorised Sh. S.L. Khanna by Order dated 1.12.84 to hold remand proceedings in Tihar Jail on 1.12.84 and on subsequent dates. It also appears that Shri G.P. Tareja who was the link Magistrate of Shri S.L. Khanna had gone on long leave and by an order dated 1.12.84, Shri Bharat Bhushan Gupta, PW 1 was appointed as a link Magistrate in this case. In the .light of these orders Satwant Singh was produced before Shri Khanna on 1.12.84 in the Jail. He passed on the papers to Shri Bharat Bhushan Gupta and later recorded a confession from Satwant Singh on the same day which is Ex. 11-G.
One Kehar Singh said to be an Uncle (Phoopha) of Beant Singh working as an Assistant in the Office of the Director General of Supplies & Disposals was claimed to have been arrested on 30.11.84. He was produced before Shri Khanna on 1.12.84 who remanded him to police custody till 5.12.84. He is said to have made a statement on 3.12.84 in pursuance of which some incriminating articles were seized at his house and from a place pointed out by him. He was again produced on 5.12.84 before Shri S.L. Khanna who remanded him to judicial custody till 15.12.84 pending further investigation.
Balbir Singh, a Sub-Inspector posted for security duty at Smt. Gandhi's office is said to have been arrested on 3.12.84. It is said that certain incriminating material was found on his person when searched at the time_ of his arrest. On 4.12.84 at the request of Delhi Adminis!ration the High Court empowered Shri S.L. Khanna to deal with the remand matter of these persons accused in the assassination case of Prime Minister. Balbir Singh was therefore produced before Shri S.L. Khanna on. 4.12.84 and was remanded to the police custody till 6.12.84. On 6.12.84 an application was filed before Shri S.L. Khanna
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1988) Supp. 2 S.C.R.
which stated that Balbir Singh wanted to make a confession. The matter was sent by Sh. S.L. Khanna to Sh. Bharat Bhushan Gupta. After two appearances before Shri Bharat Bhushan, Balbir Singh finally refused to make statement confessional or otherwise. In the meantime the Police had recorded certain statements one of Amarjit Singh PW 44 who was also a Police Officer AS! on duty at the PM's residence. These statements have been recorded on 24.11.84 and 19.12.84i The Police requested the Magistrate Shri Bharat Bhushan to record a statement of Amarjit under Section 164 Cr. P.C. That was accordingly recorded as PW 44-A. Bean! Singh had died as a result of injuries sustained by him and referred to by Narain Singh in his statement in the FIR itself. A report under Section 173 Cr. P .C. hereto referred to as the charge-sheet was filed on 11.12.1985 in the Court of Shri S.L. Khanna against Satwant Singh who had survived after a period of critical illness from his injuries and the two other persons referred to above namely Balbir Singh and Kehar Singh. These three persons were accused of an offence under Sections 120-B, 109 and 34 read with 302 !PC and also of substantive offences under Sections 302, 307 IPC and Sections 27, 54 & 59 of the Arms Act. This report also mentions Beant Singh as one of the accused persons but since he had died the charges against him were said to have abetted.
The prosecution case at the trial was that in June 1984 the armed forces of the Indian Union took action which is described generally as 'Operation Bluestar' under which armed forces personnel entered the Golden Temple complex at Amritsar and cleared it off the terrorists. In this operation it is alleged that there was loss of life and properties as F well as damage amongst other things to the Akal Takht in the Golden Temple complex. As a result of this Operation the religious feelings of the members of the Sikh community were greatly offended. According to the prosecution, all the four accused persons mentioned in the charge-sheet who were sikhs by faith have been expressing their resentment openly and holding Smt. Indira Gandhi responsible for the G action taken at Amritsar. They had met at various places and at various times to discuss and to listen inflammatory speeches and recording calculated to excite listeners and provoke them to retaliatory action against the decision of the Government to take army action in Golden Temple complex. The resentment led them ultimately to the incident of 31.10.84 and to become parties to a criminal conspiracy to commit H an illegal act namely to commit the murder of Smt. Indira Gandhi. In
· 'o,
KEHAR SINGH '· STATE [OZA, J.l
pursuance of the above conspiracy accused has committed the following acts. This report (charge-sheet) stated facts against each of the accused persons which have been quoted by the High Court in its judgment:
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"(i) Accused Kehar Singh, a religious fanatic, after the 'Bluestar Operation' converted Beant Singh and through him Satwant Singh to religious bigotry and made them undergo 'Amrit Chhakna ceremony' on 14.10.1984 and 24.10. 1984 respectively at Gurudwara Sector VI, R.K. Puram, New Delhi. He also took Bean! Singh to Golden Temple on 29.10.1984 where Satwant Singh was to join them as part of the mission. (ii) Since the 'Bluestar Operation' Balbir Singh was planning to commit the murder of Smt. Indira Gandhi and discussed his plans with Beaht Singh, who had similar plans to commit the offence. Balbir Singh also shared his intention and prompted Satwant Singh to commit the murder of Smt. Indira Gandhi and finally discussed this matter with him on 30th October, 1984. (iii) In the first week of September, 1984, when a falcon (qaaz) happened to sit on a tree near the main reception of PM's house, at about 1.30 P.M. Balbir Singh spotted the falcon, called Beant Singh there and pointed out the falcon. Both of them agreed that it had brought the message of the Tenth Guru of the Sikhs and that they should do something by way of revenge of the 'Bluestar Operation'. Both of ihe above accused performed ardas then and there.
(iv) In pursuance of the aforesaid conspiracy, Bean! Singh and Satwant Singh, who ilad prior knowledge that Smt. Indira Gandhi was scheduled to pass through the T.M.C. Gate on 31.10.1984 at about 9 A.Mi for an interview with an Irish television team, manipulated their duties in such a manner that Beant Singh would he present at the T.M.C. Gate and Satwant Singh at the T.M.C. Sentry booth on 31.10.1984 between 7 .00 and 10.00 A.M. Bean! Singh managed to exchange his duty with SI Jai Narain (PW 7) and Satwant Singh arranged to get his duty changed from Beat No. 4 at PM's house to T.M.C. Sentry Booth situated near the latrine by misrepresenting that he was suffering
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from dysentery. Beant Singh was ar_med with a revolver (No. J-296754, Butt No. 140) which had 18 cartridges of .38 bore and Satwant Singh was armed with a SAF Carbine (No. WW-13980 with Butt No. 80) and 100 cartridges of 9 mm. Both having managed to station themselves together near the T.M.C. Gate on 31.10.1984, at about 9.10 A.M., Beant Singh opened fire from his revolver and Satwant Singh from his carbine at Smt. Indira Gandhi as she was approaching the T.M.C. Gate. Beant Singh fired five rounds and Satwant Singh 25 shots at her from their respective weapons. Smt. Indira Gandhi sustained injuries and fell down. She was immediately taken to the AIIMS where she succumbed to her injuries the same day. The cause of death was certified upon a post-mortem which took place on 31.10.1984, as haemorrhage and shock due to multiple fire arm bullet in juries which were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The post-mortem report No. 1340/84 of the AIIMS also opined that injuries Nos. 1 and 2, specified in the report, were sufficient to cause-death in the ordinary course of nature, as well." In this report (charge-sheet) it was also mentioned that Bean! Singh and Satwant Singh laid down their weapons on the spot which had been recovered. About five empties of Bean! Singh 's revolver were recovered and 13 live cartridges .38 bore from his person, 25 empties of SAF carbine .and 6 led pieces were recovered from the spot. About 75 live· cartridges of .99 SAF carbine were recovered from the person of Satwant Singh. That too led pieces were recovered from the body of Smt. Indira Gandhi during the postmortem and two from .her clothes and that the experts have opined that the bullets recovered from the body and found from the spot were fired through the weapons possessed by these two accused persons. The report also mentioned that Rameshwar Dayal AS! who was following Smt. Indira Gandhi, PW 10 also received grievous and dangerous injuries on his left thigh as a result of shots fired by the accused which according to the medical opinion were grievous and dangerous to life.
It is significant tha·t in this case the Additional Sessions Judge who tried the case was nominated by the High Court for trial of this case and on this count some arguments were advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants. I will examine the contentions a little later. Learned counsel appearing for appellants Kehar Singh and Balbir Singh first raised some preliminary objections about the procedure at
KEHAR SINGH v. STATE [OZA, J.]
the trial. First contention raised by him was about the venue of the trial and the manner in which this venue was fixed by the Delhi High Court by a notification under Section 9(6) Cr. P.C. The second objection was about the trial held in jail and it was contended that under Article 21 of the Constitution of lridia, open and public trial is one of the constitutional guarantees of a fair and just trial and by holding the trial in the Tihar Jail this guarantee has been affected and accused have been deprived of a fair and open trial as contemplated under Section 327 Cr.P.C. The other objection raised was that under Sec. 327 Cr.P.C. it is only the trial Judge, the Sessions Judge who could for any special reasons hold the trial in camera or a part of the trial in camera but there is no authority conferred under that Section on the High Court to shift the trial in a place where it ultimately ceases to be an open trial. Learned counsel on this ground referred to series of decisions from United States, England and also from our own courts and contended that the open trial is a part of the fair trial which an accused is always entitled to.
The other question raised by the learned counsel for the appellants was that by preventing the accused from getting the papers of the Thakkar Commission, its report and statements of persons recorded; who are prosecution witnesses at the trial the accused have been deprived of substantial material· which could be used for their defence.
These main questions were raised by the counsel appearing for Kehar Singh and Balbir Singh and counsel for Satwant Singh adopted these arguments and in addition raised certain preliminary objections pertaining to the evidence of post-mortem, ballastic expert and similar matters. Learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the respondent replied to some of the legal arguments and also the other arguments on facts. ·One of the preliminary objections sought to be raised by the learned Additional Solicitor General was that this Court in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is not expected to interfere with the findings of facts arrived by the two courts below. He also relied on some decisions of this Court to support his contention. On the preliminary objection raised by the Additional Solicitor General that in this appeal under Article 136, we are not expected to go into the facts of the case, we. will like to observe that we are dealing with a case where the elected leader of our people, the Prime Minister
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of India was assassinated and who was not only an elected leader of the majority but was very popular with the people, as obser.ved also by the High Court in its judgment but still we have all through maintained the cardinal principle of our Constitution-Equality before law and the concept of rule of law in the system of administration of justice. Although these accused persons indicated at some stage that they are not able to engage counsel but still they could get the services of counsel of their choice at the State expense, it must be said to the credit of the learned counsel Shri Ram Jethmalani and Shri R.S. Sodhi that they have done an excellent job for the appellants and therefore we will like to thank these counsel and also the Additional Solicitor General, who all have rendered valuable assistance to this Court. In view of the importance of the case, we have heard the matter at some length both on questions of law and also on facts. The first objection raised by the learned counsel is on the basis of Sec. 194 that it was not necessary for the High Court to have allotted the case to a particular Judge. The learned Judges of the High Court in their judgment have come to the conclusion that the last part of the Section refers to "The High Court may by special order direct him to try" and on the basis of this phrase the High Court in the impugned judgment, has observed that it was even open to the accused to make an application and to get the case transferred or allotted to a Judge. Sec. 194 Cr.P.C. reads: "Additional and Assistant Sessions Judge to try cases made over to them-An Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge shall try such cases as the Sessions Judge of the division may, by general or special order, make over to him for trial or as the High Court may, by special order, direct him to try." The first part of the Section clearly provides that the Sessions Judge of the Division by general or special order is supposed to allot cases arising in a particular area or jurisdiction to be tried by Additional or Assistant Sess_ions Judges appointed in the division but the last part of this Section also authorises the High Court to allot the case to a particular Judge keeping in view the fact that in certain cases the Sessions Judge may not like to allot and may report to the High Court or either of the parties may move an application for transfer and under these circumstances it may become necessary for the High Court to allot a particular case to a particular Judge. Thus, this objection is of no
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KEHAR SINGH v. STATE [OZA, J.]
consequence. The other objection which has been raised by the learned counsel is about the issuance of a notification by the High Court under Sec. 9(6) Cr.P.C. and by this notification the High Court purported to direct that the trial in this case shall be held in Tihar JaiL Learned counsel appearing for the Delhi Administration on the other hand attempted to justify such an order passed by the High Court by contending that if the High Court had the authority to issue notification fixing the place of sitting it was open to the High Court :&o to fix the place of sitting for a particular case whereas emphasis by learned counsel for the appellants was that Sec. 9(6) only authorises the High Court to fix the place of sitting generally. So far as in any particular case is concerned, the second part of sub-clause 6 permits the trial court with the consent the parties to sit at any other place than the ordinary place of sitting. The High Court in the impugned judgment have attempted to draw from proviso which has been a local amendment of Uttar Pradesh. Unfortunately nothing could be drawn from that proviso as admittedly that is not a State amendment applicabie to Delhi. Section 9(6) Cr.P.C. nowhere permits the High Court to fix the venue of a trial of a particular case at any place other than the place which is notified as the ordinary place of sitting. It reads thus: · "Sec. 9( 6): The Court of Session shall ordinarily hold its sitting at such place or places, as the High Court may, by notification, specify but if, in any particular case, Court of Session is of opinion that it will tend to the general convenience of the parties and witnesses to hold its sittings at any other place in the sessions division, it may, with the consent of the prosecution and the accused, sit at that place for the disposal of the case or the examination of any witness or
witnesses therein."
On the basis of this language one thing is clear that so far as the High Court is concerned it has the jurisdiction to specify the place or places where ordinarily a Court of Sessions may sit within the division. So far as any particular case is to be taken at a place other than the normal
place of sitting it is only permissible under the second part of subclause with the consent of parties and that decision has to be taken by the trial court itself. It appears that seeing the difficulty the Uttar Pradesh amended the provision further by adding a proviso Which reads:
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"Provided that the court of Sessions may hold, or the High Court may direct the Court of Session to hold, its sitting in any particular case at any place in the sessions division, where it appears expedient to do so for considerations of internal security or public order, and in such cases, the consent of the prosecution and accused shall not be necessary.''
I
But it is certain that if this proviso is not on the statute book applicable to Delhi, it can not be used as the High Court has used to interpret it. That apart, if we look at the notification from a different angle the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants ceases to have any force. Whatever be the terms of the notificac tion, it is not disputed that it is a notification issued by the Delhi High Court under Sec. 9 sub-clause (6) Cr. P.C. and thereunder the High Court could do nothing more or less than what it has the authority to do. Therefore, the said notification of the High Court could be taken to have notified that Tihar Jail is also one of the places of sitting of the D Sessions Court in the Sessions division ordinarily. That means apart from the two places Tis Hazari and the New Delhi, the High Court by notification also notified Tihar Jail as one of the places where ordinarily a' Sessions Court could hold its sittings. In this view of the , matter, there is no error if the Sessions trial is held in Tihar Jail after such a notification has been issued by the High Court. The next main contention advanced by the counsel for the appellants is about the nature of the trial. It was contended that under Article 21 of the Constitution a citizen has a right to an open public , trial and as by changing the venue the trial was shifted to Tihar Jail, it could not be said to be an open public trial. Learned counsel also F referred to certain orders passed by the trial court wherein it has been provided that representatives of the Press may be permitted to attend and while passing those orders the learned trial Judge had indicated that for security and other regulations it will be open to Jail authorities to regulate the entry or issue passes necessary for coming to the Court and on !he basis of these circumstances and the situation as it (J was in Tihar Jail it was contended that the trial was not public and open and therefore on this ground the trial vitiates. It was also contended that provisions contained in Sec. 327 Cr. P. C. clearly provides that a trial in a criminal case has to be public and open except if any part of the proceedings for some special reasons to be recorded by the trial court, could be in camera.,lt was contended that the High Court H while" exercising jurisdiction under Sec. 9( 6) notified the place of trial
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KEHAR SINGH v. STATE [OZA, J.]
as Tihar Jail, it indirectly did what the trial court could have done in respect of particular part of the proceedings and the High Court has no jurisdiction under Section 327 to order trial to be held in camera or private and in fact as the trial was shifted to Tihar Jail it ceased to be open and public trial. Learned counsel on this part of the contention referred to decisions from American Supreme Court and also from House of Lords. In fact, the argument advanced has been on the basis of the American decisions where the concept of open trial has developed in due course of time wh.ereas so far as India is concerned here even before the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure and even before the Constitution our criminal practice always contemplated a trial which is open to public.
In fact, the High Court in the impugned judgment was right when it referred to the concept.of administration of justice under the old Hindu Law. But apart from it even the Criminal Procedure Code as it stood before the ~mendment had a provision similar to Sec. 327 which was Sec. 352 of the Old Code and in fact it is because of this that the criminal trial is expected to be open and public that in our Constitution phraseology difference from the United States has been there. Article 21 provides:
"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."
It is not disputed that so far as this aspect of open trial is concerned the procedure established by law even before our Constitution was enacted was as is provided in Sec. 327 Cr. P.C. (Sec. 352 of the old Code): "Court to be open (1) The place in which any Criminal Court is held for the purpose of inquiring into or trying any offence shall be deemed to be an open Court, to which the public generally may have access, so far as the same can conveniently contain them:
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Provided that the Presiding Judge or Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, order at any stage of any inquiry into, or trial of, any particular case, that the public generally, or any particular person, shall noi have access to, or be or remain in, the room or building used by the Court. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the inquiry into and trial of rape or an offence under sec-
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tion 376, section 376A, Section 376B, section 376C or section 376D of the Indian Penal Code shall be conducted in camera;
Provided that the presiding judge may, if he thinks fit, or on an application made by either of the parties, allow any particular person to have access to, or be or remains in, the room or building used by the Court. {3) Where any proceedings are held under sub-section (2) it shall not be lawful for any person to print or pubhsh any matter in relation to any such proceedings, except with the · previous permission of the court." This was Section 352 in the Code of Criminal Procedure which was Act of 1898. It will be interesting to notice the language of Sec. 327. It speaks that any place where a criminal court holds its sitting for enquiry or trial shall be deemed to be an open court to which the public generally may have access. So far as the same can conveniently contain them. The language itself indicates that even if a trial is held in a private house or is held inside Jail or anywhere no sooner it becomes a venue of trial of a criminal case it is deemed to be in law an open place and everyone who wants to go and attend the trial has a right to go and attend the trial except the only restriction contemplated is number of persons which could be contained in the premises where the Court sits. It appears that the whole argument advanced on behalf of the appellants is on the basis of an assumption in spite of the provisions of Sec. 327 that as the trial was shifted from the ordmary place where the Sessions Court are sitting to Tihar Jail it automatically became a trial which was not open to public but in our opinion in view of Section 327 this assumption, the basis of the argument itself is without any foundation and can not be accepted and argument on the basis of the foreign decisions loses all its significance. So far as this country is concerned the law is very clear that as soon as a trial of a criminal case is held .. whatever may be the place it will be an open trial. The only thing that it is necessary for the appellant is to point out that in fact that it was not an open trial. It is not disputed that there is no material at all to suggest that any one who wanted to attend the trial was prevented from so doing or one who wanted to go into the Court room was not allowed to do so and in absence of any such material on actual facts all these legal arguments foses its significance. The authorities on which reliance were placed are being dealt with elsewhere in the judgment.
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KEHAR SINGH v. STATE !OZA, J.l
•.
Learned Additional Solicitor General attempted to contend that this is not a question of any constitutional right under Article.21 and the basis of his argument was that Article 21 only talks of procedure established by law and if today on the statute book there. is Section 327, tomorrow Section 327 may be so amended that it may not be necessary for a criminal trial to be open and on this basis, learned Additional Solicitor General attempted to contend that it does not become a constitutional right at all. It is very clear that Article 21 contemplates procedure established by law and in my opinion the procedure established by law was as on the day on which the Constitution was adopted and therefore it is not so easy to contend that by amending the Criminal Procedure Code the effect of the procedure established by law indicated in Article 21 could be taken away. The trend of decisions of this Court has clearly indicated that the procedure must be fair and just. Even expeditious trial has been considered to be a part of guarantee under Art1c1e 21 but in my opinion so far as the present case is concerned it is not necessary togo so far. At present no one could dispute that the procedure established by law as indicated in Article 21 is as provided in Section 327 and unless on facts it is established that what is provided in Sec. 327 was prevented or was not permitted, it could not be said that merely because trial was held at a particular place it could be said to be a trial which was not open to public. As indicated earlier on facts there is nothing to indicate although learned counsel also attempted to some extent to suggest that there were restrictions. A person has to pass through two gates, a person has to sign on the gate and had to have a pass or a clearance but in the modern times especially in the context of the circumstances as they exist. On this basis it could not be said that it ceased to be a public trial. It could not be doubted that at one time in this Court the highest Court of the land, any one could freely walk in and sit and attend the Court but today even in this Court there are restrictions and one has to pass through those restrictions but still it could not be said that any one is prevented from attencjing the Court and therefore merely suggesting the difficulties in reaching the Jail will not be enough. On the other hand, learned Additional Solicitor General drew our attention to the plan of the Jail and the situation of the premises ,where the trial was held and it is not disputed that it was not that part of the Jail where the prisoners are kept but was the . Office block where· there was an approach, people were permitted to reach and the trial was held as if it was held in an ordinary place· and it is in this view that as I observed earlier that in fact what the High Court did by issuing a notification under Sec. 9( 6) was not to fix place of trial of this particular case in Tihar Jail. But what could be understood is that High Court by notifi-
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cation made Tihar Jail also as one of the places where a Sessions Court could ordinarily sit and in this case therefore the trial was held at this place. As soon as a trial is held whatever the place may be the provisions of Sec. 327 are attracted and it will be an open Court and every citizen has a right to go and unless there is evidence or material on record to suggest that on the facts in this particular case public at large was not permitted to go or some one was prevented from attending the trial or that the trial was in camera. In fact without an appropriate order it could not be said that what is contemplated under Section 327 or under Article 21 was not made available tp the accused in this case and therefore it could not be contended that there is any pre ju dice at the trial. There remains however one more question which was raised by the counsel for the appellants that in spite of the prayer made by the accused person during the trial and also in the High Court about the copies of the statement of witnesses who have been examined by the prosecution and were also examined before the Commission (Thakkar Commission) to be provided to the accused so that they may be in a position to use these statements for purposes of contradiction or for other purposes. They had also prayed for the copy of the Thakkar Commission report as the Thakkar Commission was inquiring into the events which led to the assassination of the Prime Minister. In fact, it was contended that the terms of reference which were notified for the enquiry of the Thakkar Commission were more or less the same questions which fell for determination in this case and thus the appellants have been prejudiced and they could not avail of the material which they could use to build up their defence. According to learned counsel not only the accused are entitled to previous statements of witnesses who are examined by the prosecution but they are also entitled to any material on the basis of which they could build up their defence and raise appropriate issues a1 the trial. Learned counsel relied on number of decisions and also said that the decision of .the Supreme Court in Dalmia's case is not binding as in that case the scope of Sec. 6 of the Commission of Enquiry Act was not in question.
Whereas learned counsel for the respondent, the Additional Solicitor General vehemently contended that the language of Sec. 6 is clear that a witness who is examined before a Commission, is protected and that protection is such which clearly indicates that this statement made before the Commission could not be used against him for any other purpose in any other proceeding either civil or criminal. The H only exception carved out in Sec. 6 pertains to his prosecution for
KEHAR SINGH v. STATE [OZA, J.]
perjury and therefore when the language is clear and the exception carved out is clear enough. no other exception could he carved out nor the Section could be interpreted in any manner. According to the Additional Solicitor General the Commission by its regulation and notification clearly made the enquiry a confidential affair and in addition to that there was an amendment of the Act by Ordinance which even provided that if Government by notification decided not to place the Report of the Commission before the House of Parliament or Legislature then it was not necessary that it should be so placed before the House and thus the report not only was confidential but even the Parliament had no right to see the report and therefore neither the report nor the statements made before the Commission could be asked for by the accused for the purposes of trial. Soon after the assassination of Smt. Indira Gandhi, the Government of India by notificatiol} dated 20.11.84 constituted a Commission under the Commission of Enquiry Act, 1952 (the Act). The Commissioner was presided over by Mr. Justice M.P. Thakkar, a sitting Judge of this Court. The terms of enquiry notified for the Committee reads:
"(a) the sequence of events leading and all the facts relating to, the assassination of late Prime Minister; (b) Whether the crime could have been averted and whether there were any lefts or dereliction of duty in this regard on the part of any one of the commission of the crime and other individuals responsible for the security of the late Prime Minister; (c) the deficiencies, if any, in the security system and arrangements as prescribed or as operated to impractice which might have facilitated the commission of the crime; (d) the deficiencies, if any, in the procedure and measures as prescribed, or as operated in practice in attending to any providing medical attention to the late Prime Minister after the commission of the crime; and whether was any lapse or dereliction of duty in this regard on the part of the individuals responsible for providing such medical attention; (e) whether any person or persons or agencies were_responsible for conniving, preparing and planning the assassination or whether there was any conspiracy in this behalf,
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and if so, all its ramifications". The Commission was also asked to make recommendations as 'to corrective remedies and measures that need to be taken for future.
It is therefore clear that out of these terms of reference the first term (a) and the last one (e) are such that the evidence collected by the Commission could be said to be relevant for the purposes of this trial. It is significant that the Commission framed regulations under Section 8 of the Act in regard to the procedure for enquiry and regulation 8 framed therein reads:
"In view of the sensitive nature of enquiry the proceedings will be in camera unless the Commission directs otherwise." The Regulation made it clear that the proceedings of the Commission will be ordinarily in camera. It would only be in public if the Commission so directs and it is not disputed that so far as recording of evidence is concerned and the proceedings of the Commission it has gone on in camera throughout and even the report, interim and the final report. And then also it was stated by the Commission itself to be confidential. In this perspective the prayer of the appellants has to be considered. Under the Act as it stood before the amendment which was done by Ordinance No. 6 of 1986 normally the Government was supposed to place the report of the Commission under Section 3 sub-clause 4 of the Act before the House of the People within six months of the submission of the report by the Commission but the Government did not do that. The steps were taken to amend the Commission of Enquiry Act and on May 14, 1986 the President of India promulgated an Ordinance No. 6 of 1986 namely Commission of Enquiry (Amendment) Ordinance, 1986 by which sub-sections 5 arid 6 were introduced to section 3 as follows: "Sub-clause 5: The provisions of sub-section 4 shall not apply if the appropriate Govt. is satisfied then in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states or in public interest, it is not expedient to lay before the House of People, .or as the case may be, the Legislative Assembly of the State, the report, or any part thereof, of the
KEHAR SINGH v. STATE [OZA, J.]
.Commission. On the enquiry made by the Commission under sub-sec.° (1) and iss~e a notification to that effect in the official gazette.
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(6) 'Every notification issued under sub-section (5) shall be laid before the House of the People, as the case may be, the Legislative Assembly of the State, if it is sitting as soon as may be after the issue of the notification, and if it is not sitting, within seven days of its resuming and the appropriate Govt. shall seek the approval of the House of People, or as the case may be, the Legislative Assembly of the State to the notification by a resolution moved within a period of 15 days beginning with the day on which the notification is so laid before the House of People or as the case may be the Legislative Assembly of the State makes any modification in the notification or directs that the notification should cease to have effect. The notification shall thereafter have effect as the case may be."
.V
In pursuance of this amendment on May 15, 1986 the Central Government issued a notification under sub-section (5) of Section 3 stating "The Central Government, being satisfied that it is not expedient in the interest of the security of the State and in public interest to lay before the House of People, the report submitted to the Government on 19.11.85, and 27.2.86, by Justice M.P. Thakkar, a sitting Judge of E the Supreme Court of India appointed under the notification of the Government of India, in the Ministry of Home Affairs No. So. 867(B), dated the 20th November, 1984 thereby notifies that the said report shall not be laid before the House of People." It is interesting that on 20.8.86, Ordinance No. 6 was replaced by Commission of Enquiry (Amendment) Act, 1986 (Act No. 36 of 1986) with retrospective F effect. The said notification dated May 15, 1986 was also got approved by the Ho.use of People is .required under sub-section 6 of Section 3 and therefore after the apptoval of the notification by the House of the People there remains no question of placing the report of the Commission before the House. So far as the steps taken by the appellants are concerned, it is no doubt true that an appropriate application in the manner in which it was moved in the High Court was not moved in the trial court but it could not be doubted that one of the accused persons had even sought these copies in the trial court and the same prayer has been appropriately made during the hearing in the High Court. The proper time H
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A for awarding the prayer was in the trial court during the pendency of the trial as the accused wanted the copies of the previous statements of some of the prosecution witnesses which were recorded during the enquiry before the Thakkar Commission but such a prayer was made and rejected.
The High Court rejected this prayer by the impugned judgment against which the present appeal is before us. The High Court relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Ram Krishan Dalmia v. Justice Tendulkar, (1959] SCR 279 which is referred to henceforth as Dalmia's case. It was contended by learned counsel for the appellants that this case could not be accepted as an authority on interpretation of Sec. 6 as in that case the scope of Sec. 6 was not before the Court but it C was the validity of the provisions which were challenged. Das, C.J. in Dalmia's case while examining the challenge to the validity of the Act and the notification issued thereunder made the following observations:
"The whole purpose -0f setting up of a Commission of Enquiry consisting of experts will be frustrated and the elaborate process of enquiry will be deprived of its utility if the opinion and the advice of the expert body as to the measures and situation disclosed calls for can not be placed before the Government for consideration notwithstanding that doing so can not be to the prejudice of anybody because it has no force of its own. In our view, the recommenda\ions of a Commission of Enquiry are of great importance to the Government in order to enable it to make up its mind as to what legislative or administrative measures should be adopted to eradicate the evil found or to imple.ment the beneficial objects it has in view. From this point of view, there can be no objection even .to. the Commission of Enquiry recommending the imposition of some form of punishment which will, in its opinion, be sufficiently deterrent to deliquent in future. But seeing that the Commission of Enquiry has no judicial powers and its report will purely be recommendatory and not effective pro pro vigro." The statement made by any person before the Commission of Enquiry under Sec. 6 of the Act is wholly inadmissible in evidence in any future · proceedings civil or criminal.
KEHAR SINGH v. STATE [OZA, J.)
According to learned counsel, in that case it was not the scope of Section 6 but the validity of the provisions were in question and the observations were only incidental and it can not be regarded as a binding precedent. The High Court.has accepted these observations of this Court in the judgment quoted above and in our opinion rightly. But apart from it, we shall try to examine Sec. 6 itself and other provisions relevant for the purpose as to whether the appellants i.e. the accused before the trial court were entitled to use the copies of the statements of those prosecution witnesses who were examined before the Thakkar Commission for purposes of cross examination or to use the report of the Commission or whether it could be handed over or given over to the accused for whatever purpose they intended to use. The learned counsel for the parties on this aspect of the matter have referred to number of decisions of various High Courts and also some of the decisions of the English Courts. They are being dealt with in the judgment elsewhere as in my opinion it is not necessary to go into au of them except examining the provisions of the Act itself. Sec. 6 of the Commission of Enquiries Act reads:
"No statement made by any person in the course of giving
evidence before the Commission shall subject him to, or be used against him in any civil or criminal proceedings except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement."
On analysis of the provision, it will be found that there are restrictions on the use ·of a statement made by a witness before the Commission. First is "shall subject him to, . , .............. any civil or criminal proceedings except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement." This, in my opinion, is the first restriction. The second restriction, according to me_, is spelt out from the wprds "or be
used against him in any civil or criminal proceedings." Thus if we examine the two restrictions stated above it appears that a.statement given in a Commiss.ion can not used to subject the witness to any civil or criminal proceedings nor it can be used against him in any civil. or criminal proceedings and in my opinion it is in the context of these· restrictions that we will have to examine the provisions of the Evidence Act which permit the use of a previous statement.of a witness and for what purpose'. Sec. 145 read with Sec. 155(3) and Sec. 157 are the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act. Sec. 145 reads:
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''Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing. A witness may be cross examined as to previous statements
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made by him in writing or reduced into writing and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to these parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him."
This provision permits that a witness may be cross-examined as to the previous statement made by him in writing or reduced to writing relevant to the matters in question without such writing being shown to him or being proved. But if it is intended to contradict him by the writing his attention must be drawn to these parts of the writing; and it can be proved. A witness could be cross examined on his previous statement but if a contradiction is sought to be proved then that portion of the previous statement must be shown to him and proved in due course. Sec. 155 of the Evidence Act provides for the use of a previous statement to impeach the credit of a witness. Sec. 155 reads: "155. Impeaching credit of witness-The credit of a witness may be impeached in the following ways by the adverse party or, with the consent of the Court, by the party who calls him-
f
( 1) by the evidence of persons who testify that they, from their knowledge of the witness, believe to be unworthy of credit; (2) by proof that the witness has been bribed, or has (accepted) the offer of a bribe, or has received any other corrupt inducement to give his evidence; (3) by proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of this evidence which is liable to be contradicted;
(4) When a man is prosecuted for rape or an attempt to ravish, it may be shown that the prosecutrix was of generally immoral character." This section provides that the credit of a witness may be impeached in the following ways by an adverse party with the consent of the Court by the party who calls him and the third sub-clause refers
KEHAR SINGH v. STATE !OZA, J.J
to a former statement which is inconsistent with the statement made by the witness in evidence in the case and it is permissible that the witness be contradicted about that statement. The third provision is Sec. 157 which provides for the use of a previous statement for cortobbration. It reads: "157. Former statements of witness may be proved to corroborate later testimony as to same fact. In order to corroborate the testimony of a witness, any former statement made by such witness relating to the same fact, at or about the time when the fact took place, or ·before any authority legally competent to investigate the fact, may be proved.'' · A perusal of these three Sections clearly indicate that there are two purposes for which a previous statement can be used. One is for cross examination and contradiction and the other is for corroboration. The first purpose is to discredit the witness by putting to him the earlier statement and contradicting him on that basis. So far as corroboration is concerned it could not be disputed that it is none of the purposes of the defence to corroborate the evidence on the basis of the previous statement. Sec. 145 therefore is the main section under which relief was sought by the accused. The use for which the previous statement was asked for was to contradict him if necessary and if it was a contradiction then the earlier statement was necessary so that that contradiction be put to the witness and that part of the statement can be proved. To my mind, there could. bi: no other purpose for which the appellants could use the previous statements of those witnesses. Contradiction could be used either to impeach his credit or discredit him or to pull down or bring down the reliability of the witness. These purposes for which the previous statements are required could not be said to be purposes which were not against the witness. The two aspects of the restrictions which Sec. 6 contemplates and have been discussed earlier are the only two aspects which could be the result of the use of these statements. I cannot find any other use of such previous statements in criminal proceedings. It is therefore clear that without going into the wider questions even a plain reading of Sec. 6 as discussed above will prohibit the use of the previous statements at the trial either for the purposes of cross examination to contradict the witness or to impeach his credit. The only permissible use which has· been provided under Sec. 6 is which has been discussed earlier and
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therefore the Courts below were right in not granting the relief to the . accused.
The report of the Commission was also prayed for although learned counsel could not clearly suggest as to what use report of the Thakkar Commission could be to the accused in his defence. The B report is a recommendation of the Commission for consideration of the Government. It is the opinion of .the Commission based on the previous statements of witnesses and other material. It has no evidentiary value in the trial of the criminal case. The courts below were also justified in not summoning the reports. C
Learned counsel for parties referred to number of decisions, Indian and foreign and are being dealt with by my learned colleague in this judgment. But in view of the discussions above I do not find it necessary to go further into the matter.
Learned counsel for Appellant No. 1 Satwant Singh also made a D reference to some of the question which were raised before the High Court in respect of the post-mortem, although learned counsel appearing for the other two appellants did not seriously raise those questions. It is apparent that in the facts of the case as the evidence stands the question of post-mortem or a fuller post-mortem was necessary or not loses all its significance. There is no dispute that she died as a result of E the gun shot injuries which was inflicted by Beant Singh and Satwant Singh, one who shot from his service revolver and other from the carbine. In view of such clear evidence about the cause of the death, the post-mortem exaniination loses all its significance. It becomes important only in cases where the cause of death is to be established and is a ·matter of controversy. · Before I go to the merits and deal with the evidence in the case, I will dispose of the preliminary objection raised by the learned Additional Solicitor General as to the scope of the appeals before us. He urged that under Article 136 of the Constitution this Court is not expected to go into the questions of fact when there are concurrent G findings of fact recorded by the courts below. The learned counsel apart from Art. 136 relied upon a decision reported in the case of Pritam Singh v. The State, [1950) AIR SC 169 where Fazal Ali, J. said:
"It would be opposed to all principles and precedents if we were to constitute ourselves irito a third court of fact and after re-weighing the evidence come to the conclusion
"'
KEHAR SINGH v. STATE [OZA, J.l
different from that arrived at by the trial Judge and the High Court."
Similarly in Ram Raj v. State of Ajmer, [1954] SCR p. 1133. Justice Mahajan, Chief Justice observed at page 1134: "Unless it is shown that exceptional and special circum- B stances exist"that substantial and grave injustice have been done and the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of decision appealed against this Court does not exercise its overriding powers under Art. 136(1) of the Constitution and the circumstances that because the appeal have been admitted by special leave c does not entitle the appellant to open out the whole case · and contest all the findings of fact and raise every point which should have been raised in the High Court. Even in the final hearing only those points can be urged which are fit to be urged stage and preliminary stage at the preliD minary when the leave to appeal is asked for." Even in a recent decision AIR 1983 SC 753. Justice Thakkar stated: "A concurrent finding of fact can not be reopened in an appeal unless it is established; (i) that the finding is based on no evidence or record, that the finding is perverse, it being such as no reasonable person would have arrived at even if the evidence was taken at its face value or thirdly, the finding is based and built on inadmissible evidence which evidence if excluded from the vision would negate the prosecution case or substantially discredit or impair it or; fourthly some vital piece of evidence which would tilt the balance in favour of the convict has been overlooked, disregarded or wrongly discarded." These are the principles laid down by this court and keeping these in view I will attempt to examine the High Court judgment. I may however, mention that where the High Court has reached conclusions based on partly inadmissible evidence and partly on circumstances which are not justified on the basis of evidence, or partly on facts which are not borne out from the evidence on record it can not be contended that in an appeal under Art. 136 this Court will not go into the facts of the case and come to its own conclusions. The case on hand
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is one of such cases and some of the findings of fact reached by the High Court could not be said to be such which are concurrent or conclusive. We were therefore put to the necessity of examining the evidence wherever it was necessary. The other ground urged on behalf of the appellants relates to the
B relevancy of evidence on conspiracy in view of Section 10 of the Evidence Act. It will be worth-while to deal with this question of law at this stage. Sec. 12-A and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code which deal with the question of conspiracy. Sec. 120-A reads:
"When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done,(1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy:
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof." E Sec. 120,A provides for the definition of criminal conspiracy and it speaks of that when two or more persons agree to do or cause to be done an act which is an illegal act and Sec. 120-B provides for the punishment for a criminal conspiracy and it is interesting to note that in order to prove a conspiracy it has always been felt that it was not easy to get direct evidence. It appears that considering this experience F about the proof of conspiracy that Sec. 10 of the Indian Evidence Act was enacted. Sec. 10 reads:
"Things said or done by conspirator in reference to common design-Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them, i~ a relevant fact as against each of the person believed to be so conspiring, as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it." r
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KEHAR SINGH v. STATE (OZA, J.)
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This Section mainly could be divided into two: the first part talks of where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons ha\" ccnspired to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, and it is only when. this condition precedent is satisfied that the subsequent part of the Section comes into operation and it is material to note that this part of the Section talks of reasonable grounds to believe that two or more persons have conspired together and this evidently has reference to Sec. 120-A where it is provided "When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done." This further has been safeguarded by · providing a proviso that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to criminal conspiracy. It will be therefore necessary that a prima facie case of conspiracy has to be established for application of Sec. 10. The second part of Section talks of anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to the common intention after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them is relevant fact against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring as well for the purpose for proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it. It is clear that this second part permits the use of evidence which otherwise could not be used against the accused person. It is_ well settled that act or action of one of the accused could not be used as eviaence against the other. But an exception has been carved out in Sec. 10 in cases of conspiracy. The second part operates only when the first part of the Section is clearly established i.e. there must be reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have "conspired together in the light of the language of Sec. 120-A. It is only then the evidence of action or statements made by one of the accused could be used as evidence against the other. In Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. State of Maharashtra, [1964] 2 SCR 378 Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) analysed the-provision of Sec. 10 and made the following observations: "This section, as the opening words indicate will come into play only when the Court is satisfied_ that there is reasonable ground to believe that two .or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, that is to say, there should be a prima facie evidence that a person was a partyto the conspiracy before his acts can be used against his ·co-conspirators. Once such a reasonable ground exists, anything said, done or written by one of the conspirators in reference to the common intention,- after the said in-tention was entertained, is relevant against the others, not only for the purpose of proving !he
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existence of the conspiracy but also for pro,ing that the other person was a party to it. The cvidentiary vah;e of the said acts is limited by two circumstances, namely, that the acts shall be reference to their common intention and in respect of a period after such intention was entertained by any one of them. The expression 'in reference to their common intention' is very comprehensive and it appears to have been designedly used to give it a wider scope than the words 'in furtherance of in the English law; with the result, anything said, done or written by a co-conspirator, after the conspiracy was formed, will be evidence against the other before he entered the field of conspiracy or after he left it. Another important limitation implicit in the language is indicated by the expressed scope of its relevancy. Anything so said, done. or written is a relevant fact only 'as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it.' It can be used only for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy or that the other person was a party to it. It cannot be used in favour of the other party or for the purpose of showing that such a person was not a party to the conspiracy. In short, the Section can be analysed as follows: ( !) There shall be a prima facie evidence affording a reasonable ground for a Court to believe that two or more persons are members of a conspiracy; (2) if the said condition is fulfilled, anything said, done or written by any one of them in reference to their common intention will be evidence against the other; · (3) anything said, done or written by him should have been said, done or written by him after the int.ention was formed
by any one of them; (4) it would also be r10levant for the said purpose against, another who entered the conspiracy whether it was said, done or written before he entered the conspiracy or after he leftrit; (5) it can only be used against a conspirator and not in his favour." G · In the light of these observations and the analysis of Sec. 10 we will have to examine the evide_nce led by prosecution in respect of conspiracy. We first take the case of Balbir Singh. Balbir Singh was an Officer_ of the Delhi Police in the cadre of Sub Inspector. He was H posted on duty at the PM's residence on·security. On 31.10.84 in the
KEHAR SINGH '· STATE [OZA, J.]
morning he was not on duty but his duty was to commence in the evening and on that day at Akbar Road gate it appears that when he reported for duty in the normal course he was asked to go to the Security Police Lines and at about 3 A.M. on November l, 1984 he was. awakened from his sleep and his house was searched by SJ Mahipal Singh, PW 50, Constable Jiari Chand, PW 17 and Inspector Shamsheer Singh. Nothing except a printed book on Sant Bhindra'ivaie Ex. PW 17A was recovered. It is alleged that about 4 A.M. he was taken to Yamuna Velodrome. He was kept there till late in the evening when he is reported to have been released. This custody in Yamuna Velodrome is described by Sh. Kochhar, PW 75 as 'de facto custody.' But there is no eyidence or no police officer examined to say that he allowed this accused to go in the evening on November I, 1984. Thereafter he is alleged to have been arrested on December 3, 1984 at Nagafgarh Bus-stand. When his personal search was taken and certain articles were recovered from his possession including a piece of paper which is Ex. PW 26B. On December 4, 1984 he was produced before the Magistrate who remanded him to police custody. Thereafter it is alleged that he expressed his desire to make a confession but when produced before the Magistrate he refused to make any statement.
.. . ,,
The allegations in the charge-sheet against this accused if summarised are: that Balbir Singh like the other accused persons has expressed his resentment openly holding Smt. Indira Gandhi responsible for the 'Bluestar Operation'. He was planning to commit the murder of Smt. Gandhi and he discussed these matters with Bean! Singh deceased who had similar plan to commit the murder. He also shared his intention and prompted accused Satwant Singh to commit the murder of Smt. Gandhi and finally discussed the matter with him on Oct. 30, 1984. In the first week of September, 1984 a falcon (baaz) happened to sit on the tree near the Reception gate of the Prime Minister's house in the afternoon at about 1.30 P.M. Balbir Singh spotted the falcon and called Beant Singh there. Both of them agreed that it has brought a message of the Tenth Guru of Sikhs that they should do something by way of revenge of the 'Bluestar Operation'. Thereafter they offered 'Ardas'.
These allegations, the prosecution has attempted to prove by the evidence of the following witnesses: (i) SI Madan Lal Sharma, PW 13 . ' -..-.
(ii) Constable Satish Cha!J.dra Singh, PW 52
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(iii) Sub Inspector Amarjit Singh, PW 44 and (iv) Confession of Satwant Singh, PW llC. The prosecution also strongly relied upon the document Ex. PW 26B which was recovered from the possession of the accused when he was arrested at Najafgarh Bus-stand. His leave applications which are Ex. PW 26 El to ES along with his post crime conduct of absconding are also relied u pan. According to the accused. the document Ex. PW 26B was not recovered from his possession as alleged by the prosecution. He also contests his arrest at Najafgarh Bus-stand and says that it is just a make-believe arrangement. According to him, he was all along under police custody right from the day when he was taken to Yamuna Velodrome on November 1, 1984. In fact he was not allowed to go out and the question of his abscondence does not arise. He was also not put any question on abscondence under Sec. 313 examination. Now, we will take first, the arrest of this accused on Ist November. It is not disputed that on !st November late at night his house was searched and a printed book-Sant Bhindrawale was seized
from his house and he was brought to Yamuna Velodrome. It is also not in dispute that the prosecution evidence itself indicates that upto the evening the next day he was seen in the Yamuna Velodrome.
c;
It will be better here to describe what this Yamuna Velodrome is? From the prosecution evidence what has emerged is that this is a place where there are number of offices but Police has reserved a portion of this building to be used for interrogation and investigation. Normally when a person or a witness is brought for interrogation or investigation at a Police Station, some record has to be made as there is a general diary although diaries may or may not be filled in but a duty is cast on the Station House Officer of a Police Station to maintain the move-· ments of the Police Officers and also to note down the activities especially when it is connected with the investigation of an important case. But it appears that all about the preliminary investigation of this case was going on at Yamuna Velodrome, witnesses and persons were brought here, detained or kept, and interrogated. We do not have any further evidence in regard to this place. According to the prosecution, this accused was at Yamuna Velodrome upto the evening of that day and thereafter he was allowed to go and then he absconded. As a matter of fact this part of the story
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KEHAR SINGH v. STATE [OZA, J.]
becomes very important in· view of the further facts alleged by the prosecution that the investigating officer got some information through some one that this accused who was wanted would appear at the time and place indicated. But there is no evidence as to who asked this accused to go. He was a suspect in the criminal conspiracy. He could not have gone away of his own accord. Some responsible officer must have taken the decision but it is unfortunate that no officer has been examined to state that "I thought that his presence was not necessary and therefore I allowed him to go." Learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the State before us also was asked if he could lay his hands 'at any part of the evidence of any one of the witnesses who could say that before him this person was allowed to go from the Yamuna Velodrome. There is no evidence on this aspect of the matter at all and therefore we are left with the only evidence that this person was arrested at midnight \n the late hours on Ist November and was carried to Yamuna Velodrome and was seen there by some prosecution witness till the evening of the next day. Then the other aspect of the matter which is of some importance is about the prosecution allegation that he was absconding from Ist or 2nd November till 3rd Dec. 1984. It is significant that no witness has been examined to indicate that he went to find him out either at his residence or at any other place in search of him and that he was not available. There is also no evidence produced to indicate that in spite of the fact that during investigation police wanted to arrest him again but he was not available at his known address. It is perhaps of absence of evidence as to absconding the trial court when examined this accused under Sec. 313 did not put him any question about his abscondence. It is therefore clear thafthe abscondence as a circumstance could not be used against him.
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Let us now examine the story of the prosecution that this accused was arrested at Najafgarh Bus-stand. It is alleged that Sh. Kochhar, the Investigating Officer got some information that this accused was expected to appear at that place on 3rd December, 1984. It was not immediately after the assassination. It was after a month. The people could come forward to become witness. But no independent witness has been examined in support of the arrest or seizure from the accused. It may be as technically argued by the learned Additional Solicitor General that the presence of public witnesses under the scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure is required when there is search and seizure from the house or property of the accused but not when a person is arrested and something is recovered from the personal
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A search. But it is well-known that in all matters where the police wants that the story should be believed they always get an independent witrness of the locality so that that evidence may lend support to what is <illeged by the police officers. Admittedly for this arrest at Najafgarh and for the seizure of the articles from the person of this accused there is no other evidence except the evidence of police officers. IndepenB dent witness in this case would be all the more necessary especially in view of what has been found above as his release after the earlier arrest is not established, and his abscondence is not proved. In such a controversial situation the presence of an independent witness from the public, if not of the locality, would have lent some support to the case of the prosecution. It may also be noted that according to Mr. that the accused appeared at the Bus-stand but they have not c Kochhar, been able to disclose from where he appeared. Whether he got down from a bus, ff so from which bus/city or outstation bus? How he appeared there is all mystery. Nodoby bothered to notice of his coming. It is said that he had a DTC bus ticket. Nobody examined it. Perhaps there was nothing to examine. If the Police Officers haagone D with prior information to arrest the absconding accused Who 'was involved in .such an important crime, they could have taken an independent witness with them. It is again interesting to note that instead of searching him and performing the formalities of arrest at the place where the accused appeared, he was taken to a place said to be the office of the Electricity Board. The search and seizure took place E there. Some articles were recovered from his possession. Most of the articles recovered are mere personal belongings. There was also a piece of paper since marked as Ex. PW 26/B. The Police did not think it necessary to have an independent witness even for the seizure memo,. when particularly some important piece of evidence was recovered from his possession. -The reply of the learned Additional F Solicitor .General was that in law it was not necessary. The Investigating Officer when questioned in cross-examination answered that nobody was available or none was prepared to be a witness in this mattet<. It is unthinkable at a public place and that too at the Busstand. Learned Additional Solicitor General also attempted to contend that the circumstances in Delhi after the assassination of the G Prime Minister were such. that no witness was prepared to come forward. It appears that for every problem this situation is brought as a defence but in our opinion, this would not help them so far as this matter is concerned. We are talking of 3rd December which was more than a month after the. unrest in Delhi. It is very difficult to believe that a citizen in this capital did not come forward to be a witness for H seizure memo. The arrest of the accused in the circumstances appears
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KEHAR SINGH v. STATE (OZA, J.]
to be only a show and not an arrest in actuality. Learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the State frankly conceded that if the release of this accused after his arrest on Ist November is not established and his abscondence is not proved, then the story of his arrest on 3rd December with the recovery of the articles loses all its significance. It is indeed so.
In the context of what has been discussed above it is apparent that the arrest of the accused on 3rd December and the recovery of these articles from his person have not been proved satisfactorily and therefore could not be of any consequence against this accused.
··
The prosecution attempted to prove the recovery of Ex. PW C 26/B on the basis of an entry in the Malkhana Register of Tuglak Road Police Station. Entry 986 in the Malkhana Register which is made on December 3, 1984 according to the learned Additional Solicitor General, contains a verbatim copy of the seizure memo Ex. PW 35A and it indicates the fact of recovery of PW-26/B and therefore proves D that it was recovered from the appellant upon his arrest and search qn that day. Here again there is an interesting situation. There is an endorsement in the Malkhana Register stating that the DTC ticket which the accused carried and the paper containing .the dates in English Ex. PW 26/B were not deposited. The Malkhana Register therefore is of no help to the prosecution. If they were taken back for E any further investigation they could have made an entry to that effect in the general diary. The nature of entry in the Malkhana Register only shows the recovery of certain articles and a note that the two documents although are said to be recovered but they were not brought and deposited at the Tuglak Road Police Station. It is therefore clear that although in the seizure memo the mention of the two documents ·F including Ex. PW 26/B is there, they in fact did not reach the Police Station or see the light of the day. In view of these infirmities we can not accept that the accused was arrested on 3rd December as alleged by the prosecution. So the recovery of Ex. PW 26/B is doubtful. However, we may refer to the said documents as it has been said to be one of the most important pieces of evidence as the High Court has described it. The document can be taken to have been written i.n the handwriting of Balbir Singh as that is not seriously contested before us. The document is a sheet of paper in which we find certain entries. The
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document is reproduced at Pages Nos 57-58 of the judgment prepared by my learned brother Shetty, J.
If this document is considered to be a memorandum of events prepared by this accused relating to his conspiracy, why should he carry it in an atmosphere surcharged with emotion against the Sikhs. B Not only that, this person knew that he was an accused in such an important case where whole public opinion is against him. He also knew that he was absconding and he also knew that he was carrying in his pocket such an important piece of evidence. Was it his intention that he should keep it readily available so that he could oblige the prosecution whenever they needed? There is no other possible reason C why this person should keep this document with him all the time. On our questioning the learned Additional Solicitor General about this strange behaviour of the accused, he also could not explain a' to why the accused could have thought of carrying such a piece of paper in his pocket.
Apart from it, if the document is looked at as it is we see nothing in it except a mention of few dates and few events. It even does not indicate that with those events whether this accused was connected in any manner. It is also significant that this document was not with this accused when his house was searched and he was arrested on the night of Ist November, 1984. If the accused after that arrest was not released E at all and there was no occasion for him to go away then, one fails to understand as to how this document came in his possession? The explanation suggested by the learned counsel for the accused appears to be the most probable. As indicated from other evidence, the accused was preparing to give a statement or a confession and therefore he was given the notes and he must have recorded those dates to F facilitate the statement that he was planning or he was made to give which ultimately he chose not to give at all.
Looking to this document the only material which could be said to be of some significance is the words 'felt like killing'. But there is no reference after those words as to who was intended to be killed. There G is also no indication as to whose feelings are noted in this piece of paper. There are entries in this document which refer to meetings, visits, persons, visiting somebody's house but it is not clear as to whom they refer and what is intended when this reference is made. Bean! Singh has been referred to in this document more than in one place. At one place, there is a reference to Bean! Singh with eagle. But there H i& no reference to a joint Ardas or this accused or Beant Singh telling I
KEHAR SINGH v. STATE [OZA, J.]
that it had brought a message or they should take revenge. The entry does not suggest that the accused has anything to do with the eagle. If there is anything, it is against Bean! Singh. A perusal of this whole document also shows that there is ilo reference at all to Bean! Singh and his plan to kill the Prime Minister. Nowhere it is mentioned about the bomb or grenade with which the accused was planning to eliminate the Prime Minister before 15th August, 1984. There is also no reference about Bean! Singh conspiring with this accused or vice-versa. Kehar Singh is not at all in the document. Satwant Singh, however, is mentioned against 30th October. But it does not give an indication where? The prosecution has connected it with the evidence of PW 52 who was the Sentry in the Prime Minister's security. We will consider the evidence of this witness a little later. Under these circumstanceS it is very clear that except the mention of 'Bluestar Operation' and 'felt like killing' there is nothing in this document which is of any significance. If the document is read as it
is, we see nothing incriminating against this accused. Unfortunately it
appears that the High Court read in this document what was suggested by the prosecution without considering whether it could be accepted or not in the absence of evidence on record. Admittedly, there is no such evidence at all in this case. Salish Chandra Singh, PW 52, who has been produced to prove the meeting of Balbir Singh with Satwant Singh was for the first time examined during the investigation on 7.2.85 that is after the trial had commenced. He has stated that when he was on duty on October 30, 1984 Satwant Singh came and talked to Balbir Singh. But he frankly admitted that he could not follow what they talked as he did not know Punjabi. What value we could attach to the testimony of this witness. It is impossible to believe him. In view of what we have noticed, even if the document is accepted to have been written by the accused, still there is nothing in it on the basis of which an inference of conspiracy could be drawn. There must be evidence to indicate that the accused was in agreement with the other accused persons to do the act which was the ultimate object which was achieved on 31.10.1984. This document therefore although described by the learned Judges of the High Court as very important piece of evidence is nothing but a scrap of paper.
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Excluding from consideration this recovery of a piece of paper Ex. PW 26/B, what remains has been analysed by the High Court in the judgment in the following words: "Summing up then the evidence against Balbir Singh leaving out of account for the time being the confession of Satwant Singh and the evidence of Amarjit Singh the position is as follows: He was an Officer on security duty at the PM's ho\lse. He knew Bean! Singh and Satwant Singh as well. He shared the indignation of Bean! Singh against Smt. Gandhi for 'Operation Bluestar', and was in a mood to avenge the same. He went on leave on· 25.6.84 to 26.7.84. On his return he met Bean! Singh and Amarjit ·Singh. He was present on the occasion of the appearance of eagle and their association on that date is borne out by Ex. PW 26/B. He is known to have talkecl to Satwant Singh on 30th October, 1984." Unfortunately, the learned Judges of the High Court when they came to the conclusion that Balbir Singh knew Beant Singh and Satwant Singh well, have not referred to any piece of evidence in this case which establishes that they knew each other well. The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the State also has not been able to point out any piece of evidence on the basis of which this could be inferred. This accused being a Sikh also is referred to but there were number of Sikh officers posted at the house of the Prime Minister and merely because he was a Sikh it could not be said that he became a party to the conspiracy or he was in conspiracy or he knew Bean! Singh and Satwant Singh well. Similarly as regards the observations made by the High Court that Balbir Singh shared }ndignation of Bean! Singh against Smt. Gandhi and was in .a. mood to avenge for the 'Bluestar Operation', there is no evidence to support it. From the testimony of SI Madan Lal Sharma, PW 30 all that we could gather is that after the 'Bluestar Operation' Balbir Singh was in an agitated mood and he used to say that the responsibility of damaging the Akal Takht lies with Smt. Gandhi and it would be avenged by them. From this it cannot be inferred that Balbir Singh wanted to take revenge against the Prime Minister alongwith Beaut Singh. This is not what is said by the witness. If expression of anger or protest on the 'Blues'tar Operation' could be used as a piece of evidence or a circumstance against accused then all that members of the Sikh community who felt .agitated over the
KEHAR SINGH v. STATE fOZA, J.]
'Bluestar Operation' must be held as members of.the conspiracy. So far as taking leave is concerned·there is nothing on the basis of which any significance could be attached to it. There is no material to indicate that during the leave Balbir Singh met Beant Singh or anyone else or was in any manner connected with the conspiracy or was doing something in pursuance of the agreement of conspiracy between them. Merely because on certain dates he was on leave no inference could be drawn. The High Court relied on the fact that after returning from leav~ this accused met Beant Singh and Amarjit Singh but on this . meeting also there is no other evidence except the evidence of Amarjit Singh PW 44 which we will deal with a little later. So far as appearance of falcon and offering of ardas is concerned it is admitted that appearance of falcon is considered, by the Sikh community, as a sacred thing as falcon is supposed to be a representative of the Guru and if therefore this accused and Bean! Singh offered ardas noihing could be inferred from this alone. As even the High Court observed that:
"Nothing unusual or abnormal about the incident as any religious Sikh seeing the appearance of a falcon could offer the Ardas." So far as meeting with Satwant Singh is concerned on October 30, 1984 the only evidence of that fact is the evidence of Satish Chandra Singh PW 52 about. whom I have discussed little earlier and nothing more need be stated here. With this we are now left with the evidence of Amarjit Singh who is an important witness as per the prosecution. It has come on record that his statement during investigation was recorded thrice; twice by Police under Section 161 and cnen under Sec. 164 Cr. P.C. The first statement is Ex. PW 44 which was recorded 011 November 24, 1984, after 25 days of the incident and the second statement PW 44 DB was recorded on December 19, 1984. On December 21, 1984 the third statement PW 44A under Sec. 164 of the Code came to be recorded. In the first statement there is no involvement of Balbir Singh. The second statement according to the witness was recorded at his own instance: He states that it did not occur to him that assassination was the handwork of Balbir Singh and Kehar Singh. After he ·had learnt about the firing and death of Smt. Indira Gandhi be recalled certain things and went to Shri R.P. Sharma who recorded his statement on 24.11.84.
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According to him, he recalled bit by bit and that was the reason, he gave the subsequent two statements. If we carefully peruse these statements it is clear that the entire approach of the High Court appears to be erroneous. Amarjit Singh PW 44 states before the Court as follows: "In the first week of August 1984 I had a talk with Beant Singh. Then he told me that he would not let Mrs. Indira Gandhi unfurled the flag on 15th August. Shri Balbir Singh also used to tell me that if he could get a remote control bomb and his children are sent outside India then he also could finish Mrs. Indira Gandhi. I used to think that he was angry and I used to tell him that he should not think in these terms. In the third Week of October, 1984, Balbir Singh told me that Beant Singh and his family have been to the Golden Temple alongwith Kehar Singh his Phoopha. He further told that Bean! Singh and Constable Satwant Singh had taken Amrit in Sector 6, R.K. Puram, New Delhi at the instance of Kehar Singh."
In his first statement PW 44 DA which has been exhibited during his cross examination admittedly there is no reference to Balbir Singh at all. No reference to Balbir Singh telling the witness that if he could get a remote control bomb and his children are sent outside India, he could also finish Mrs. Indira Gandhi there he has stated:
"In the end of September, 1984 SI Balbir Singh met me once in the Prime Minister's house and told me that Bean! Singh wanted to kill the Prime Minister before 15th August, he (Bean! Singh) agreed to kill her with a grenade and remote control but this task was to be put off because the same could not be arranged. Actual words being 'In do cheeson ka intezam nahim ho saka isliye baat ta! gayi.' Similarly in his earlier statement Ex. PW 44DA what this witness said was:
"In the third week of October, 1984 Beant Singh SI met me and told me that he had procured one Constable. Actual words being 'October 1984 ke tisare hafte main Beant Singh mu jhe mi la usne bataya ki usne ek sipahi pataya hai' and that now both of them would put an end to Smt. Indira Gandhi's life very soon."
'\
........ KEHAR SINGH v. STATE [OZA, J.]
These portions of the statement which were put and proved from Amarjit Singh as his first statement recorded by the police clearly go to show that he had only alleged these things against Bean! Singh. What he did later was to improve upon his statement and introduce Balbir Singh also or substitute Balbir Singh in place of Beant Singh. The only other inference is that he was himself a party to that conspiracy. Otherwise there is no explanation why he should keep on giving statement after statement, that too after 25 days of the incident. The second statement was recorded on December 19 and a third statement on December 21, 1984. It clearly shows that he was a convenient witness available to State whatever was desired from him. He appears to have become wiser day by day and remembered bit by bit, is certainly interesting to remember.
It could not be doubted that the two versions given out by this witness are not such which could easily be reconciled. In fact in his first version there is nothing against Balbir Singh. In his second statement he has tried to introduce things against him. This apparently is a clear improvement. It is well-settled tliat even delay is said to be dangerous D and if a person who is an important witness does not open his mouth for a long time his evidence is always looked with suspicion but here we have a witness who even after 25 days gave his first statement and said nothing against the present accused and then even waited for one more month and then he suddenly chose to come out with the allegations against this accused. In our opinion, therefore, such a witness E could not be relied upon and even the High Court felt that it would not be safe to rely on the testimony of such a witness alone. Apart from it, the evidence which he has given is rather interestiilg. According to him Bean! Singh and Balbir Singh were so close to him that they used to keep him informed about their plans to assassinate the Prime Minister of India. But relation with Balbir was such F that he was not even invited when Balbir Siqghwas married and therefore it was nothing but casual but still he claims that he had so much of close association that he used to be taken in confidence by these two persons. That means that he is one of the conspirators or otherwise he would not have kept quiet without informing his superiors as it was his duty to do when the Prime Minister was in danger.
In view of this, it is clear that there is no evidence at all to establish prima facie participation of this accused in conspiracy or any evidence to indicate that he had entered into any agreement to do an unlawful l!CI or to commit an offence alongwith the other accused persons. Therefore, in absence of any evidence in respect of the first
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part of Sec. 10 which is necessary it could not be contended lhat the confession of Satwant Singh could be of any avail or could be used against this appellant.
Before parting with this witness, one more thing may be noted. The High Court, in order to explain that this witness Amarjit Singh did B not refer to Balbir Singh in his first statement on 24.11.84 stated something out of imagination. The High Court has quoted his statement on 24.11.84 in these words:
"He is also reported to have said that Bean! Singh had wanted to kill Smt. Gandhi before 15th of August and that he had agreed to do so if grenade and remote control were available."
In this context, the use of the word 'agreed' and word 'he' the High Court felt that they refer to Balbir Singh and none else. This appears to be an explanation given by Amarjit Singh in his statement in Court D and the High Court felt that it could accept it. It is clear that where he says 'agreed' and 'he' in his statement on November 24, 1984 he had not named Balbir at all. It is only now in his statement at trial that he grew wiser and made an attempt by way of this explanation. It is rather unfortunate that the High Court felt that this explanation should be accepted. The statement against Balbir coming for the first time on E 21st December, 1984 itself in the light of the settled criminal jurisprudence of this country ought to have been rejected outright. Secondly, the High Court found corroboration from the confession of Satwant Singh. So far as the statement of the confession of Satwant Singh is concerned, it could not be used against this accused as we have earlier indicated. Thirdly so far as falcon incident is concerned, we do not know how the High Court felt that that incident corroborates the evidence of Amarjit Singh when Amarjit Singh alone talks of the falcon incident. There is no basis for this conclusion of the High Court.
Lastly, it may be noted that so far ~s this accused is concerned, even Bimla Khalsa, the wife of Bean! Singh does not mention anything.
, In the light of the discussion above, in our opinion, so far as this accused is concerned there is no evidence at all on the basis of which H his conviction could be justified. He is therefore entitled to be acquitted.
KEHAR SINGH v. STATE [OZA, J.]
KeharSingh
The finding of guilt recorded by the High Court against Kehar Singh is a miXture of both relevant and irrelevant evidence adduced by the prosecution. We will consider only those that are most important and relevant. Material evidence against Kehar Singh is the evidence of PW 65, Bimla Khalsa wife of Beant Singh. She was examined by the B Police ~n 16th January, -1985 and 19th January, 1985. This witness although has been declared hostile, but her statement could not be discarded in toto merely because on certain que~tions she has.chosen not to support prosecution. It is true that her statement for the first time during in~estigation was recorded on 16th January, J985 but it could not be disputed that after all she is the wife of the main accused in this case. She has lost her husband on 31st October. She was placed c in a situation where. it would have been very difficult for her to compose herself in a manner in which she could give her statement immediately. It is nobody's case that she has any grudge against· anybody. Important circumstances which emerge from the testimony of
this witness are: (i) She was married to Beant Singh in 1976 through the good offices of her maternal uncle Gurdeep Singh.
(ii) Kehar Singh's wife Jagir Kaur hailed from Matloya and she (Birnla) used to call Kehar Singh and Jagir Kaur Phoophi and Phoopha and there was close friendship between the two families. Rajendra Singh son of Kehar Singh who was a friend of Beaut Singh and often used to have drinks with him. In her statement in Co11rt later she also stated that the wives of Rajendra Singh and Shamsher Singh, brother of Bean! Singh belonged to the same 'biradari'.
(iii) Kehar Singh started visiting their house more often after the 'Operation Bluestar'. Bean! Singh and Kehar Singh had talked about the destruction of the Akal T'akht in the Golden Temple complex on two or three occasions but became silent when she·came.
(iv) In the last week of July, Bean! Singh told her that he had gone to the Gurudwara at Moti Bagh at the instance of Kehar Singh and that they heard highly provocative and inciting speeches there. Bean! Singh had told her that he would become a "Shaheed" and that s'he should loo_k after the children or God will look after them but he
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A never told her that he wanted to kill Smt. Indira Gandhi. {v) In the middle of September, 1984 the birthday of the grandson of U jagar Singh Sandhu was celebrated at his residence at Mo ti Bagh. Though they had not received any invitation, at Kehar Singh's instance they attended the party where many inciting speeches were delivered. (vi) On 13.10.84 her husband told her that he would be taking Ami-it on 14.10. 84 and when she asked for the reason, he told her that it was in order go give up drinking.
C
(vii) On 17.10.84 she was sent to Gurudwara Sis Ganj alongwith Kehar Singh and Jagir Kaur to take Amrit there which she did.
(viii) On the evening of 17.10.84 Kehar Singh came and was closetted together with Beant Singh on the roof of the house for 15 to 18 minutes. Satwant Singh who had come to their house on the two earlier occasions in the first week of October, also came. First two D talked in low tone and later all the three had meals together. She asked Kehar Singh what they were talking about on the roof. He said it was about asking somebody to take Amrit. When she said why it needed. to be kept secret from her, he became silent but he complained to her husband later about her having questioned him.
(ix) On 20th October, 1984 Beant Singh's family went to Amritsar with Kehar Singh and his wife. Originally Beant Singh and Kehar Singh had intended to go alone. She has said that she would algo like to go there and that all of them could go in March, 1985. Then he insisted that she should also go with him, it was decided that Jagir Kaur should also go. At Amritsar they stayed with one M.R. Singh F that evening whiie Bimla Khalsa and children and J agir Kaur were listening to the Kirtan, Beant Singh and Kehar Singh went to see the Akal Takht. She also wanted to go but she was told she could see it next morning. Next morning also, Beant Singh and Kehar Si.ngh left for Akal· Takht early in the morning leaving them to follow later. When they were all there again Beant Singh and Kehar Singh went G away somewhere and returned 3 to 4 hours later. On their way back again the two went away alone to some place for a few minutes. ThH purchased acassette and a photo of Bhindrawale. Beant Singh stayed behind saying that to meet some one and join them at the railway station. They returned to Delhi on 21st October, 1984.
(x) On 24.10.84 Beant Singh insisted on her taking Amrit ag11in
....,,.., KEHAR SINGH v. STATE [OZA, J.]
at R.K. Puram Gurudwara but she refused. After he returned from the night duty he went alongwith Satwant Singh on a Scooter. There is only one variation between the previous statement and evidence in Court. That relates to identification .of Satwant Singh. In the Court she attempted to say that he was a boy and later explained that at that time he had no beard but the manner in which the boy has been described and the occasions when the boy had come to their house, there is hardly any doubt left. Apart from it, so far as Satwant Singh is concerned even if we omit the evidence of Bimla Khalsa, it . is not material. But it could not be doubted that from her evidence that the above circumstances have been established. Next important circumstance is the 'Yak'. It is alleged that when early morning the worship starts in a Gurudwara, the Granth Sahib is opened at random and some message from a page which is so opened is written on the blackboard as a 'Yak' for the day. It is proved by Bimla Khalsa that Ex. P SSA was writter. in the handwriting of Beant Singh. It was a 'Yak' of a particular day which was in the following terms:
"One gets eomfort on serving the Guru. Then miseries do not come near. Birth and death come to an end and the black (wicked) do not have effect." About this 'Yak' having been taken out in the Gurudwara, there is some controversy as the witness produced for that purpose Surendra Singh, PW SS was not in a position to produce the diary but so far as Bean! Singh is concerned, the 'Yak' written by him on a piece of paper in Yellow ink in Gurumukhi with date 13.10.84 was put on it has been proved by the evidence of Bimla Khalsa. This was admittedly found from the quarters of Beant Singh on 31.10.84 and it was lying inside the book 'Sant Bhindrawale'.
~
As far as the incident on 17th October is concerned, Bimla Khalsa in clear terms stated that Kehar Singh and Beaut Singh had secret talks. She wanted to know it, but she was not given to understand. This kind of secret talk with Bean! Singh which Kehar Singh had, is a very significant circumstance. Apparently Kehar Singh being an elderly person did not indicate to her about their plan. If the attempt of Kehar Singh was to dissuade Beaut Singh then there was no occasion for him to keep the matter secret from his wife. On the contrary he should have indicated to his wife also what Bean! Singh was planning. These talks therefore as proved by Bimla Khalsa go a
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A long way in establishing Kehar Singh being a party to the conspiracy. Her evidence also indicates that Beant Singh took Amrit on 14th and Bean! Singh kept his golden 'kara' and ring in the house of Kehar Singh which has been recovered from the latter. It clearly goes to show that Kehar Singh knew why Beant Singh took Amrit and why he B handed over the golden 'kara' and ring to him. It is also clear frbm the evidence of Bimla Khalsa that what transpired between Bean! Singh and Kehar Singh on 14th was not conveyed.to her and she was kept in dark.
In this background, the trip to Amritsar of Bean! Singh, Kehar Singh and their families is of some significance. On October 20, 1984 Bean! Singh and Kehar Singh alongwith their family members went to Amritsar. There is evidence indicated by Bimla Khalsa that originally Kehar Singh and Bean! Singh wanted to go alone but ultimately they agreed that the families also could accompany. According to the evidence of Bimla Khalsa they reached at Amritsar at about 2 to 3 P.M. D and went to Darbar Sahib Gurudwara in the evening of 20th October. While ladies and children were listening to kirtan, Beant Singh and Kehar Singh went to see the Akal Takht. Bimla Khalsa wanted to accompany them to see the Akal Takht but she was told to see the same on the next morning. On the next morning i.e. on 21st October, PW 53 was woken up by Kehar Singh and told that he would attend E 'Asaki War Kirtan' in Darbar Sahib. He went alongwith Beant Singh. The ladies and children went to Darbar Sahib at 8 A.M. alongwitli PW 53. They returned home·at 11 A.M. Bean! Singh and Kehar Singh did not return alongwith them. After lunch, PW 53 took the ladies and children to the railway station. Beant Singh and Kehar Singh directly came to the railway station from where they caught the train to New F Delhi. The attempt of these two persons to keep themselves away from the company of their wives and children speaks volume about their sinister designs. The way in which these two avoided the company of the members of the family and PW 53 at whose residence they were staying and the manner in which they remained mysterious if looked at with the secret talks which ·they had in the house of Bimla Khalsa G earlier goes to establish that the two were doing something or discussing something or planning something which they wanted to keep it as a secret even from Bimla Khalsa. C
So far as 'Amrit Chhakna' ceremony is concerned or taking Amrit is concerned, ordinarily it may not be significant. It is only a ceremony wherein a Sikh takes a vow to lead the life of purity and
1.,
KEHAR SINGH v. STATE (OZA, J.]
giving up all wordly pleasures and evil !iabits but this unfortunately is a situation which could be understood in different.ways. The manner in which Amrit has been taken by Bean! Singh and even Satwant Singh has been made to take it and even Bimla Khalsa made "to take it makes it significant that in all these three of Amrit taking Kehar Singh was always with them or atleast it could be said, was inspiring them to have it. It also indicates that there was something in the mind of Bean! Singh which was known to Kehar Sjngh and which he even tried to keep a secret from Bimla Khalsa, wife of Bean! Singh and wanted Bean! Singh to have a full religious purification and confidence.
There is yet another circumstance. Post-crime conduct of Kehar Singh. It is in the evidence that on the day i.e. 31st October, 1984 C although Kehar Singh claims to be on leave, he goes to the office at 10.45 A.M. and at thattime when the news reached in the Office about the assassination PW 59 inquired from Kehar Singh as to what had happened? Kehar Singh replied in these words: "Whosoever would take confrontation with the Panth, he would meet the same fate."
This remark shows his guilty mind with that of Bean! Singh. We have discussed some of the main features of the case and it is not necessary for us to go into other details which the High Court has discussed. These circumstances by themselves indicate that Kehar Singh was a co-conspirator to assassinate Mrs. Gandhi.
Satwant Singh
He was a Constable on security duty at the residence of the Prime Minister.
He was charged under Sec. 302 read with Sec. 120-Band Sec. 34 for murdering the Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi, secondly under Sec. 307 for attempting to murder one Rameshwar.Dayal, PW 10 and under Sec. 27 of the Arms Act. To prove these charges, prosecution G has examined Narain Singh, PW 9, Rameshwar Dayal PW 10 and Nathu Ram PW 64 besides Sukhvir Singh PW 3 and Raj Singh PW 15. PW 27 has deposed about the history as to how this person was recruited in the Police in 1982 and how he happened to come to be posted at Teen Murti Lines and thereafter in the security duty with the Prime Minister. PW 14 Duty Officer at the Teen Murti Lines has H
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deposed that DAP personnel was placed on duty at various duty points at the PM's house on weekly basis from Friday to Friday by Head Constable Dayal Singh the Company Havaldar. The daily duty maintained at Teen Murti Ex. PW 4-C shows that Entry No. 85 that on the morning of 31.10.84 Satwant Singh was put on duty at Gate No. 4 in the Akbar Road House and not the TMC Gate and this entry is confirmed by Ex. PW 15 Daily Diary Clerk at that time. The arms and ammunition register Ex. PW 3A at Teen Murti Lines also shows that Satwant Singh was issued an SAF Carbine having Butt No. 80 alongwith five magazines and hundred live rounds of .99 of ammunition. He signed the register in token of the receipt. PW 3, the Armoury Incharge confirms this. There is also evidence to indicate that this person manipulated his duty and was put on the TMC gate where ultimately the incident took place on the morning of 31.10.84.
The main evidence against him is evidence of eye witnesses. The first eye witness which I would like to refer is Narain Singh PW 9. This witness stated that he was on duty at about 7.30 A.M. in the porch of D the Prime Minister's house. According to him at 8.45 A.M. he with an umbrella took up his position near the entry gate as he came to know that Smt. Gandhi had to go to No. 1, Akbar Road to meet certain foreign TV representatives and he was to go alongwith her holding an umbrella to protect her from the sun. At 9.10 A.M. Smt. Gandhi came out of the house followed by Nathu Ram PW 6 and her Private SecreE tary Shri R.K. Dhawan. Then he moved over to the right side and held the umbrella Ex. P 19. They approached the TMC Gate and when they were about 10 ft. therefrom he saw that the gate was open and he also saw Bean! Singh on the left side and Satwant Singh on the right side, the former in a Safari Suit and the later in the uniform and with a Carbine stengun in his hands. At that time Beant Singh took out his F revolver from the right dub and fired at Smt . Gandhi and immediately thereafter Satwant Singh also started firing at her. Smt. Gandhi was hit by these bullets and injured. She fell down on the right side. Seeing this he threw the umbrella on the left side, took out his revolver and jumped on Beant Singh. Asa result of which revolver fell from the hands. He saw Satwant Singh throwing his Carbine to the ground on G his right side. At that time Shri Bhatt, the personal guard of Smt. Gandhi and ITBP personnel arrived there and secured Satwant Singh. Some other persons also came and secured Bean! Singh. He then ran to summon the doctor and while going, he noticed that Rameshwar Dayal PW 10 had also sustained bullet injuries. The doctor himself came running by then. He, Bhatt, the doctor and Nathu Ram took her H to the escort car whici\ had arrived near and placed her in the rear seat.
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KEHAR SINGH v. STATE [OZA, J.]
By this time, Smt. Sonia Gandhi had also arrived and Smt. Gandhi was taken to AIIMS accompanied by Bhatt, Dhawan. and Fotedar on the front seat and the doctor and Sonia Gandhi on the back seat. He went to the Hospital in a staff car and PW 10 was taken to AIIMS in another tar. There she was taken to the eighth floor and he was given the duty of controlling the crowd. At about 10 or 10.15 A.M. R.P. Kochhar, PW 73 arrived and this witness gave a statement to Kochhar in the doctors' room which was recorded by him and sent to Tuglak Road Police Station which is the FIR in this case.
His testimony is corroborated. by the First Information Report and also py the two other eye witnesses Rameshwar Dayal and Nathu Ram whose presence on the spot could not be doubted. Nathu was in the personal staff of the Prime Minister and Rameshwar Dayal himself- C .had received injuries. Apart from it, this evidence of direct witnesses also finds corroboration from the post-mortem report, recovery of cartridges and arms on the spot and the evidence of the Doctor and the expert who ·tallied the bullets. Under these circumstances everi if the confession of this appelant Satwant Singh is not taken into considera- D tion, still there is enough evidence which conclusively establish his part in the offence and in this view of the matter there appears to be no reason to interfere with the conclusions arrived at by the two courts below. In our opinion, therefore, the appeal of Satwant Singh deserves to be dismissed.
.•
Then is the question of sentence which was argued to some extent. But it must be clearly understood that it is not a case where Xis killed by Yon some personal ground or personal vendatta. The person killed is a lady and no less than the Prime Minister of this Country who was the elected leader of the people. In our country we have adopted and accepted a system wherein change of the leader is permissible by ballet and not by bullet. The act of the accused not only takes away the life of popular leader but also undermines our system which has been working so well for the last forty years, There is yet another serious consideration. Beant Singh and Satwant Singh are persons who were posted on the security duty of the Prime Minister. They are posted there to protect her from any intruder or from any attack from outside and therefore if they themselves resort to this kind of offence, there appears to be no reason or no mitigating circumstance for consideration on the question of sentence. Additionally,, an unarmed lady was attacked by these two persons with a series of bullets and it has been found that a number of bullets entered her body. The manner in which mercilessly she was attacked by these two persons on whom the confi-
.H
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dence was reposed to give her protection repels any consideration of reduction of sentence. In this view of the matter, even the conspirator who inspired the persons who actually acted does not deserves any leniency in the matter of sentence. In our opinion, the sentence awarded by the trial court and maintained by the High C.6urt appears to be just and proper.
In the light of the discussions above Criminal Appeal No. 180/87 filed by accused Kehar Singh and Criminal Appeal No. 182/87 filed by accused Satwant Singh are dismissed. Conviction and sentence passed against them are maintained whereas Criminal Appeal No. 181/87 filed by Balbir Singh is allowed. Conviction and sentence passed against him are set aside. He is in custody. He be set at liberty forthwith, if not wanted in connection with any other case. RAY, J. I have perused the judgments prepared by my learned brothers Hon'ble Oza, J and Hon 'ble She tty, J. I fully concur with the views expressed in these judgments. However since the matter is important I like to deal with two aspects of the case i.e. whether trial in Tihar Jail is vitiated as it infringes the right of the accused to have open public trial and secondly, whether the confession of accused Satwant Singh being not made in the manner prescribed under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is admissible in evidence and whether the same can be relied upon.
A Gazette Notification dated 10.5.1985 was issued under section 9(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure mentioning that the High Court of Delhi have directed that the trial of this assassination case shall be held in the Central Jail Tihar. Another Notification of the same date was issued whereby the High Court was pleased to order F that this case will be tried by Shri Mahesh Chandra, Addi. Sessions .Judge, New Delhi. This order was made under Section 194 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that Section 9(6) empowers the High Court to specify the place where the Sessions Court shall hold its sittings ordinarily. It does not empower the High Court to direct the holding of a court in a place G other than the usual place of sitting in court for trial of a particular case. It is only in a particular case if the Court of Sessions is of opinion that it will be for the general convenience of the parties and witnesses to hold its sittings at any other place in the Sessions Division, it may, with th.e consent of the prosecution and the accused, sit at that place for the disposal of the case. The High Court has not been giyen any H such power to order holding of court at a.n}! other place than the court
KEHAR SINGH v. STATE [RAY, J.)
,;
where generally the sittings of the Court of Sessions are held or where usually the Court of Sessions sit. It was therefore, urged that the impugned order is wholly bad and arbitrary. It has also been urged in this connection that speedy trial and trial in an open ·court is .fundamental right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The holding of trial in Tihar Jail as directed by the High Court is a clear breach of this fundamental right and as such the entire trial is vitiated. B It has also been urged in this connection that an application was filed on behalf of the accused, Kehar Singh before the Court on 17.5.1985 objecting to the holding of trial in jail. This application, of course, was rejected by order dated 5.6.1985 by the Magistrate by holding that the trial in Tihar Jail was an open trial and there wa• no restriction for the public so minded to go to the place of trial to witness'the same. As regards the first objection the fixing of the place of sitting of Court ·of Sessions was Iljade prior to the enforcement of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code Amendment, 1973 by the executives. Under the Code, 1973, Section 9(6) has conferred amended Criminal Procedure . power on the High Court to notify the place where the Court of Sessions will ordinarily hold its sittings within the Sessions Division in D conformity with the policy of separation of judiciary from the executive. It is also to be noticed that the High Court may notify the place or places for the sitting of the Court of Sessions. Thus, the High Court can fix a place other than the Court where the sittings are ordinarily held if the High Court so notifies for the ends of justice. Moreover, the use of the words "ordinarily" by itself signifies that the High Court in E exercise of its powers under Section 9(6) of the said Act may order the holding of .court in a place other than the court where sittings are ordinarily held if the High Court thinks it expedient to do so and for other valid reasons such as security of the .accused as well as of the witnesses and also of the Court. The order of High Court notifying the trial of a particular case in a place other than the Court is not a F judicial order but an administrative order. In this case because of the surdfarged atmosphere and for reasons of security, the High Court -0rdered that the trial be held in Tihar Jail. Therefore, it cannot be said that the trial is not an open trial because of its having been held in Tihar Jail as there is nothiD.g to show that the public or the friemls and relations of"the accused were prevented from having .access ·10 ·the G place of trial provided the space of the ·court could accommodate them. It is also to be noted in this connection that various representatives of the press including representatives of international news agency like BBC etc. were allowed to attend the proceedings in court subject to the usual regulations of the jail. It is ;pettinent to :mention that Section 327 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ;provides ;that any
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[1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
place in which any criminal court is held for the purpose,of enquiring into or trying any offence shall be deemed to be an open court, to which the public generally may have access, so far as the same can conveniently contain them. The place of trial in Tihar Jail according to this 'provision is to be deemed to be an open court as the access of the public to it was not prohil/ited. However, it has been submitted on B behalf of the prosecution that there is nothing to show that the friends and relations of the accused or any other member of the public was prevented from having access to the place where trial was held. On the other hand, it has been stated that permission was granted to the friends and relations of the accused as well as to outsiders who wanted to have access to the court to see the proceedings subject, of course, to jail regulations. Section 2(p) Criminal Procedure Code defines place as including a house, building, tent, vehicle and vessel. So court can be held in a tent, vehicle, a vessel other than in court. Furthermore, the proviso to Section 327 Criminal Procedure Code provides that the Presiding Judge or Magistrate may also at any stage of trial by order restrict access of the public in general, or any particular person in D particular in the room or building where the trial is held. In some cases trial of criminal case is held in court and some restrictions are imposed for security reason regarding entry into the court. Such restrictions do not detract from trial in open court. Section 327 proviso empowers the Presiding Judge or Magistrate to make order denying entry of public in court. No such order had been made in this case denying access of E members of public to court.
Trial in jail does not by itself create any prejudice to the accused and it will not be illegal. In re T.R. Ganeshan, AIR 1950 (Madras) 696 at 699 it has been held that:F
"Section 352 empowers the Magistrate to hold his court ·in any place, provided it is done publicly and the Court premises is made accessible to the public, there can be no objection to the holding of the trial within the jail com-. pound in the recreation room which is strictly outside the jail premises proper.
Where the public have access to the court-room and the trial is conducted in open view, the holding of the trial within the jail compound will not cause prejudice to the accussed and will not be illegal, merely because it relates to an offence committed within the jail premises, where the trying Magistrate is in no way connected with the jail department."
KEHAR SINGH v. STATE [RAY, J.]
In the case of Sahai Singh and Others v. Emperor, AIR 1917 (Lahore) 311 the trial of the criminal case was held in jail. It was contended that the whole trial was vitiated. It has been held that.:-"'
"There is nothing to show that admittance was refused to any one who desired it, o.r that the prisoners were unable to communicate with their friends Counsel. No doubt, it is B difficult to get Counsel to appear in jail and for that reason, if for no other, such trials are undesirable, but in this case the Executive Authorities were of the opinion that it would be unsafe to hold the trial elsewhere." The trial was therefore, held to be not vitiated.
In Prasanta Kumar Mukherjee v. The State, AIR 1952 (Calcutta) 91 at 92 the petitioner was tried along with several others on a charge under section 147 LP .C. and the trial took place inside the Hooghly Jail. In accordance with the order made by the Magistrate who was posted at Serampore. It was contended by the learned Counsel on D behalf of the accused that the trial inside the Hooghly Jail was improper and prejudiced the accused in his defence. It was observed that:
"The ordinary rule is that the trials are to be held in open Court. While there is nothing in law to prevent a Magistrate by S. 352, Criminal P.C., the very nature of a jail E building and the restrictions which are necessarily imposed on any one visiting jail, would make it ordinarily impossible for a Magistrate to hold open Court in Jail. There may . be circumstances in which for reasons of security for the accused or for the witnesses or for the Magistrate himself or for other valid reason the Magistrate may think it proper F to hold Court inside Jail building or some other building and restrict the free access of the public. There is, however hothing in the record of lhis cast: tu show that there was any
such reason which made the Magistrate decide in favour of holding the trial in a jail."
Similar observation has been made in the_ case. of Kai/ash Nath Agarwal and another v. Emperor., AIR 1947 (Allahabad) 436.
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This decision has been relied upon in the case of Narwar singh and Ors. v. State, AJRI952 (Madhya Bharat) 1932.
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In the case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Common Wealth of Virginia, United States Supreme Court Reports 65 L.Ed. 2nd 973 before the commencement of fourth trial on murder charges, counsel for the defendant moved that the trial be closed to the public: The prosecutor stated that he had no objection, and the trial courtapparently relying on a Virginia statute providing that in the trial of all criminal cases, "the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the trial any persons whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of the accused to a public trial shall not be violated"-ordered that the courtroom be kept