Krishan Pratap v. The State Nct of Delhi and Ors

Court
High Court of Delhi
Date of judgment
28 October 2026
Judge
Justice Sachin Datta
Case number
CRL.M.C. No. 4478 of 2026
Acts & sections
Section 363 IPC, Section 307 IPC, Section 528 BNSS, Section 482 CrPC
Subject
Criminal, Family

Download the official PDF

Full judgment

$~97 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % # +

Date of Decision: 28.10.2026 CNR No.DLHC010268352026 KRISHAN PRATAP .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Pankaj Kumar, Adv. versus THE STATE NCT OF DELHI AND ORS .....Respondents Through: Mr. Hemant Mehla, APP for the State along with Mr. Mohd. Naved and Mr. Mayank Chaudhary, Advs. for State. Mr. V. P. Singh, Adv. for R-2. SI Shivam Bisht, PS Khajuri Khas. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA

SACHIN DATTA, J. (ORAL) 1.

The present petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik

Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) seeks quashing of FIR No.69/2019 dated 01.02.2019 registered under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) at PS Khajuri Khas, North-East, Delhi and all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom. 2.

The present petition has been filed on the basis of a settlement arrived

at with the respondent nos.2 and 3. 3.

The petitioner and the respondent no.2 are now married. The

respondent no.3 (complainant) is the maternal uncle of the respondent no.2. 4.

The factual conspectus is that on 31.01.2019, the respondent no.3

reported to the police that his niece (the respondent no.2) had left his house at 03:30 AM and that he suspected that the petitioner had lured her away. On the basis of the said written complaint, the subject FIR came to be registered

on 01.02.2019. 5.

As noticed, the petitioner and the respondent no.2 got married on

10.04.2019, i.e., a little over two months after the registration of the subject FIR, as per Hindu rites and ceremonies. Two children were born of the said wedlock. 6.

By the settlement deed dated 28.02.2026, the respondent nos.2 and 3

have agreed that the present FIR be quashed. The said settlement deed reads as follows:-

7.

In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is noticed that

the FIR invokes Section 363 of the IPC alone, and that no other offence has been alleged. Further, the respondent no.2 married the petitioner within a short period after the registration of the said FIR and they have lived together ever since. As noticed, they now have two children and more than seven years have elapsed since the registration of the FIR. The possibility of conviction is remote and bleak. The dispute essentially falls within the private/family domain. 8.

The power of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS

(corresponding to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) to quash proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences on the basis of

a settlement between the parties is distinct from the power of compounding conferred on a court, and is not limited by it. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court observed as under:“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. … However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. … In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

9.

The principles were thereafter crystallized in Narinder Singh v. State

of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466. In paragraph 29, the Supreme Court observed as under: “29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept

the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete

settlement between the parties. …”

10.

A Coordinate Bench of this Court has, in a fact-situation closely

comparable to the present one, quashed an FIR registered under Section 363 of the IPC. In Pawan Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors., CRL.M.C. 4716/2026, decided on 10.07.2026, it was observed as under:“10. In Narinder Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Anr.: (2014) 6 SCC 466, the Apex Court observed that proceedings, even in noncompoundable cases, can be quashed on the basis of settlement provided that the Court is satisfied that there was no meaningful purpose in continuing with the proceedings, and that the scope of conviction was remote and bleak. Reference be made to Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr.: (2012) 10 SCC 303. 11. Since respondent No.3 and petitioner are living a blissful matrimonial life, continuing with further proceedings would serve no real or meaningful purpose and would disrupt their stable family-life. Reference be made to Mohd. Parwej v. State: 2026 SCC OnLine Del 1030 and Harmeet Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi): 2026 SCC OnLine Del 1707, wherein also in such fact-situation, the proceedings were quashed.”

11.

Considering the circumstances of the present case, and the dicta laid

down in the aforesaid judgements, there is no impediment to quashing the subject FIR on the basis of the aforesaid settlement arrived at between the parties. 12.

During the course of hearing, the petitioner as also the respondent

no.2 and the respondent no.3 have submitted that the settlement has been arrived at of their own free will and volition. 13.

The petitioner and the respondents have been duly identified by the

concerned Investigating Officer, who is present in Court. 14.

Accordingly, the present petition is allowed; FIR No.69/2019 dated

01.02.2019 registered under Section 363 of the IPC at PS Khajuri Khas,

North-East, Delhi, and all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom, are hereby quashed. 15.

The petition is disposed of in the above terms.

16.

Let a copy of this order be sent to the trial Court. SACHIN DATTA, J

OCTOBER 28, 2026/r,sd

Related judgments

More Delhi High Court judgments

Search all Supreme Court and High Court judgments

Reproduced from the official court copy published on eCourts (Indian Court Judgments open dataset, CC-BY-4.0). Not legal advice.