M/S. Gujarat Machinery Manufacturers LTD. v. Collector, Central Excise, Baroda.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 11 September 1996
- Bench
- Justice S.P. Bharucha, Justice K. Venkataswami
- Neutral citation
- 1996 INSC 1039
- Reported in
- [1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. 106
- Result
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Advocates
- Shanti Bhusan, Miheer Thakur, Darshan Parekh, Jay Salve, J.K. Das, Soli J. Sorabjee, S.B. Vakil, S. Ganesh, P.N. Kapadia, U.A. Rana
- Subject
- Service
Full judgment
MJHEER H. MAFATLAL
v.
MAFATLAL INDUSTRIES LTD., SEPTEMBER 11, 1996 [N.P. SINGH AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.]
Company Law : Companies Act, 1956: Sections 391 to 393. Amalgamation-Scheme of-Sanction-Granting of-Factors to be considered-By Company Court-Jurisdiction of-Broad contours laid down--Creditors or. members must anive at infonned decision based on relevant material for approving schemc:-Scheme as a whole was to be just, fair and reasonable to creditors or members without coercing mi1101ity. Amalgamation-Scheme of-Approved by majority shareholde1"j~ Sanction of-By Company Cowt-Alleged bona fide action of maj01ity shareholders or supression by the minority shareholders-Consideration for-Held : Bona fides of majolity shareholde1"j' acting as group to be examined-Not bona fides of pe1w11 whose personal interest might be different from that of voters as a class-Fwthe1; glievance of bona fides of maj01ity voiced before General Body meeting itself-In the circumstances of the case, Scheme of Amalgamation could not be said to be unfair to min01ity shareholders. Amalgamation-Scheme of-Mi1101ity equity shareholders-Convening of separate meeting of-Held : No separate meeting of the sub-class of min01ity shareholders to be convened unless different type of scheme of compromise offered to them-If same scheme offered to entire class of equity shareholders no separate meeting of 111in01ity shareholders required to be convened.
The respondent transferee-company was a large multi- Division, multi-locational company carrying on diversified activities including manufacturing and sale of textiles. The appellant was a director in the transferor-company which had been carrying on the business of manufacture and sale of textile piece goods and chemicals.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
The transferee-company moved an application before the High Court for sanctioning lofa scheme of Amalgamation of the transferor-company with the transferee-company. H was at this sfage that ~he appellant who · was one of the shareholders of the transferee-company filed his objections under Section 391 of the Companies Act, Earlier the High Court directed convening of a meeting of equity shareholders of the respondent transferee-company. In the meeting an overwhelming majority of equity shareholders approved the scheme of Amalgamation. Thereafter the respondent transferee-company filed Company Petition before the High Court under Section 391(2) of the Act. The Single Judge sanctioned the said scheme of Amalgamation which was confirmed in appeal by the Division Bench of the High Court. Being aggrieved the appellant preferred the present appeal. On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the respondent transferee-company was guilty of hiding the special interest of its director from the shareholders thereby the voting by the equity shareholders got vitiated; that the scheme of Amalgamation was unfair, unreasonable and amounted to supression of minority shareholders represented by the ap· pellant and hence liable to be rejected; that a separate meeting of minority shareholders represented by the appellant was required to be convened on the basis that the appeJiant's group represented a special class of equity shareholders; and that the exchange ratio of equity shares of the transferor and transferee companies was ex f acie unfair and unreasonable to the shareholders of the transferee-company. On behalf of the respondent transferee-company it was contended that the personal disputes between the directors of the transferee and transferor. eompanies were out of con·sideration of the equity shareholders and in any case non~disclosure of such disputes had no adverse effect on the decision ofthe majority shareholders who had approvedthe Scheme with a thumping majqrity of a about 95% and the appellant who was objecting to the Scheme was in microscopic minority of 5% of the total voting strength; that the appellant never cared even fo be present at the meeting of the equity shareholders to put forward his objection and he only sent proxies who had no right to speak at the meeting; that the exchange ratio was suggested by experts and approved by an overwhelming majority of the equity shareholders; and that the appellant himself who was the director of the transferor-company had approved the scheme of Amalgamation.
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MIHEERH.MAFATIAL v. MAFATLALINDS.LTD.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court
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HELD: 1.1. The provisions of Sections 391and393 of the Companies Act, 1956 show that compromise Qr arrangement can be proposed between a company and its creditors or any class of them or between a company and its members or any class of them. Such a compromise would also take in its sweep any scheme of amalgamation/merger of one company with B another. When such a scheme is put fonvard by a company for the sanction of the Court in the first instance the Court has to direct holding of meeting of creditors of class of creditors or members or class of members who are concerned with such a scheme to accord their approval. The Company Court which is called upon to sanction such a scheme has not merely to go by the ipse dixit of the majority of the shareholders or creditors or their respective classes who might have voted in favour of the scheme by requisite majority but the Court has to consider the pros and cons of the scheme. A Company Court before whom an application is moved for sanctioning such a scheme which might have got the requisite majority support of the creditors or members or any class of them for whom the scheme is mooted D by the concerned company, cannot act merely as a rubber stamp and automatically put its seal of approval on such a scheme. [24-A-G; 25-B]
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1.2. The following broad contours of the jurisdiction of the Company Court in granting sanction to the scheme have emerged :
1. The sanctioning court has to see to it that all the requisite
statutory procedure for supporting such a scheme has been complied with and that the requisite meetings as contemplated by Section 391(1)(a) have been held. [31-H; 32-A] 2. That the scheme put up for sanction of .the Court is backed up by the requisite majority vote as required by Section 391 (2). [32-B]
3. That the concerned meetings of the creditors or members or any class of them had the relevant material to enable the voters to arrive at an informed decision for approving the scheme in question. That the majority G decision of the concerned class of voters is just and fair to the class as a whole so as to legitimately bind even the dissenting members of that class. [32-C] 4. That all necessary material indicated by Section 393(l)(a) is placed before the voters at the concerned meetings as contemplates by
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
Section 391(1). [32-C-D] 5. That all the requisite material contemplated by the proviso to Section 391(2) of the Act is placed before the Court by the concerned applicant seeking sanction•for such a scheme and the Court gets satisfied about the same. [32-D] 6. That the proposed Scheme of compromise and arrangement is not found to be violative of any provision of law and is not contrary to public policy. For ascertaining the real purpose underlying the Scheme with a view to be satisfied on this aspect, the Court, if necessary, can pierce the veil of apparent corporate purpose underlying the scheme and can judiciously X-ray the same. [32-E]
7. That the Company Court has also to satisfy itself that members or class of members or creditors or class of creditors, as the case may be, were acting bona fide and in good faith and were not coercing the minority in order to promote any interest adverse to that of the latter comprising of the same class whom they purported to represent. [32-F] 8. That the scheme as a whole is also found to be just, fair and reasonable from the point of vies of prudent men of business taking a commercial decision beneficial to the class represented by them for whom the scheme is meant. [32-G] 9. Once the aforesaid board parameters about. the requirements of the scheme for getting sanction of the Court are found to have been met, the Court will ha•e no further jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the commercial wisdom of the majority of the class of persons who with their open eyes have given their approval to the scheme even if in the view of the Court there would be a better scheme for the company and its members or creditors for whom the scheme is framed. The Court cannot refuse to sanction such a scheme on that ground as it would otherwise amount to the Court exercising appellant jurisdiction over the scheme rather than its supervisory jurisdiction. [32-H; 33-A-B] 1.3. It is the commercial wisdom of the parties to the scheme who have taken an informed decision about the usefulness and propriety of the scheme by supporting it by the requisite majority vote that has to be kept in view by the Court. The Court certainly would not act as a court of appeal
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MIHEER H. MAFATIAL v. MAFATLAL INDS. LID.
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and sit in judgment over the informed view of the concerned parties to the compromise as the same would be in the realm of corporate and commercial wisdom of the con~erned parties. The Court has neither the expertise nor the jurisdiction to delve deep into the commercial wisdom exercised by the creditors and members of the company who have ratified the Scheme by the requisite majority. Consequently the Company Court's jurisdiction to that extent is peripheral and supervisory and not appellate. The Court acts like an umpire in a game of cricket who has to see that both the teams play their game according to the rules and do not overstep the limits. But subject to that how best the game is to be played is left to the players and not to the umprie. The supervisory jurisdiction of the Company Court can also be culled out from the provisions, of Section 392 of the Act. Of course this Section deals with post- sanction supervision. But the said provisions itself clearly earmarks the field in which the sanction of the Court operates. The supervisor cannot ever treated as the author or a policy maker. Consequently the propriety and the merits of the Compromise or arrangement have to be judged by the parties who as sui juris their open eyes and fully informed about the pros and cons of the Scheme arrive at their own reasoned judgment and agree to be bound by such compromise or arrangement. The aforesaid parameters of the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the Company Court which is called upon to sanction a Scheme of Compromise and Arrangement are not exhaustive but only broadly illustrative of the contours of the Court's jurisdiction. [25-H; 26-A·C; 27-A-B]
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Alabama New Orleans Texas and Pacific Junction Railway Company, Re, (1891) 1 Chancery Division 213 andAnglo- Continental Supply Co. Ltd., Re, (1992) 2 Ch. 723, referred to. Mankam Investments Ltd. and Others, Re., (1995) 4 Comp. W 330 (cal.), approved.
Hindustan Lever Employees' Union v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. and Other, [1995] Supp. 1 SCC 499, relied on. _..
Hoare & Co. Ltd., Re, (1933) All ER Rep. 105, Ch. D and Bugle Press Ltd., Re, (1961) Ch. 270, cited.
Bucklay on the Companies Act, 14th Edition, referred to. 2.1. Section 393(1)(a) of the Act shows that the special interest of
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
director which is required -to be brought home to the voters m~st satisfy the following requirements of the Section before it can be treated to be a relevant special interest of the director which.is required to be.communicated to the voters : [34-E-F] · 1. The director's interest 1_!1.Ustbe a special interest different frQm the
B interest of other members who are the voters at the meeting. [34-E-F-GJ
2. The compromise or arrangement which is put to vote must have an effect on such special interest of the director. [34-G]
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3. Such effect must be different from the effect of compromise and arrangement on similar interest of other persons who are called upon to vote at the meeting. [~4-F-H]
2.2. When a scheme of Compromise and Arrangement which involves two companies, namely, the transferor-company and the transferee-comD pany and their shareholders and creditors is on the anvil of scrutiny before the sanctioning Court, the Court has to see that the interest of the class of creditors or shareholders to whom the Scheme is offe17ed for approval is any way likely to be affected by the suppression of special interest of t6'~ director in connection with such a scheme which is on the anvil. Two independent bodies which are represented by their shareholders or E creditors as a class, as the case may be, have to take commercial decisions strictly with a view to seeing that the concerned Scheme of Compromise or Arrangement is beneficial to the shareholders or creditors as a class vis-a-vis the company which is a corporate entity in so far as company's relations with these class of creditors and shareholders are concerned. If F the special interest which the director has is in any way likely to be affected by the Scheme and if non-disclosure of such an interest is likely to affect the voting pattern of the class of creditors or shareholders who are. called upon to vote on the scheme, then only such special interest of the director is required to be communicated to the voters as per Section 393(1)(a) of G the Act. [36-E-GJ
2.3. The personal family dispute between the appellant on the one hand and his uncle, director or the transferee-company on the other regarding the right to hold shares in the company cannot have any linkage or nexus with the Scheme of Amalgamation of these two companies which was put to vote before the equity shareholders. The equity shareholders of
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MIHEER H. MAFATLAL v. MAFA'ILALINDS. LTD.
the transferee-company had to decide in their commercial wisdom whether A it is worthwhile to have a larger body of shareholders on account of the merger so that apart from the share-holding of the transferee-company its objects would also get diversified and its field of operation would be enlarged with the prospect of hike in the dividend available to these shareholders after the economic and Industrial activities of both the companies so amalgamated would get elongated and whether the value of their shares in such consolidated companies were likely to get a boost in the stock market. While deciding whether transferor-company should be merged with the transferee-company and the transferee company's economic and industrial activity should be permitted to be enlarged as.a result of such merger the equity shareholders least concerned whether the C appellant would purchase in future the share of his uncle, t!le present director or vice versa. That was entirely their personal dispute which was still not adjudicated upon and its decision one way or the other had no impact on the pattern of voting of the equity shareholders of the respondent- company as a class of prudent businessmen and investors so far as D the Scheme was concerned. Consequently, it must be held that mention about the personal interest was outside the statutory requirements of Section 393(1)(a) of the Act. [36-H; 37-A; C; H; 38-A-B; CJ
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3.1. While considering the question of bona fides of the majority voters and whether they were unfair to the appellant it has to be kept in view that bona fides of the majority acting as a group has 'to be examined vis-a-vis the Scheme in question and not the bona fides of the person whose personal interest might be different from the interests of the voters as a class. Bona fide of person can only be relevant if it can be established with reasonable certainty that he represents majority or is controller of majority. The director of the transferee-company cannot be visited with such a charge. The question of bona fide of the majority shareholders or .the alleged suppression by them of the minority shareholders or their attempt to suffocate their interest has to be judged from the pc,int of view of the class as a whole. Question is whether the majority equity shareholders while acting on behalf of the class as a whole had exhibited any adverse interest against the appellant's minority shareholders also having similar interest as members of the same clas's, while approving the Scheme or had acted with any oblique motive to whittle down such a class interest of the minority. [41-E-F]
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
Hellenic and General Tmst Limited, Re, (1976) 1 WLR 123, referred
to. 3.2. In the instant case it cannot be said that the voting pattern was dominated by the share-holding of the director of the transferee-company and his group. Nor could it be said that the Scheme as put to vote was in B any way unfair to appellant or that the majority shareholders acting as a class had not behaved in a bona fide manner for protecting the interest of the class as a whole and were in any way inimical to the appellant. It was not the contention of the appellant that while voting by majority in favour of the Scheme the majority had acted with any oblique motive to fructify any adverse commercial interest qua him and his group when it consisted of outsiders like financial institutions or that there was any possibility of their surrendering their economic interest in the scheme at the dictates of shareholder-director of the transferee-company and his group. The Board of DirectfJrs of the respective companies, namely, the transferor-company as well as the transferee-company had approved that Scheme of AmalD gamation before it was imt to vote. The appellant was himself one of the directors of the transferee-company who had no objection to the Scheme of Amalgamation from the point of view of the transferor-company. So far as the transferee-company is concerned though appellant was not a director he was 5% shareholder who did not think it fit to personally remain present at the time of voting and simply relied upon proxy~ If the appellant was feeling that the Scheme was unfair ~o him or was not going to protect his interest as shareholder in the respondent-company nothing prevented him from remaining present and voicing his grievance before the General Body of the equity shareholders and to apprise them of the alleged pernicious effect of the Scheme. It is, therefore, too late in the day for him to contend F that the Scheme was unfair to him and that the family of the director of transferee-company had tried to dominate and engineer any adverse pat· tern of voting at the meeting of the equity shareholders. Apart from the · pattern of voting at the meeting of the equity shareholders, even the shareholding pattern of the respondent-company belies the submission put for· G ward on behalf of the appellant that the group of the transferee-company's director dominated the constitution of the company and could control the decisions of the shareholders. The scheme of the Amalgamation cannot be said to be unfair and, amounting to suppression of minority shareholders represented by the appellant. [41-D; 42-C-F; 43-G]
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4. Even though the Companies Act or the Article of Association do
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MIHEER H. MAFATLAL v. MAFATLAL INDS. LTD.
not provided for such a class within the class of equity shareholders, in a A given contingency it may be contended by a group of shareholders that because of their separate and conflicting interests vis-a-vis other equity shareholders with whom they formed a wider class, a separate meeting of such separately interested shareholders should have been convened. On the express language of Section 391(1) it becomes clear that where a B compromise or arrangement -is proposed between a company and its members or any class of them a meeting of such members or class of them has to be convened. This clearly presupposes that if the Scheme of Arrangement or Compromise is offered to the members as a class and no separate Scheme is offered to any sub- clause of members which lms a separate Scheme to consider, no question of holding a separate meeting of such a sub-class would at all survive. In the instant case when one the same Scheme is offered to the entire class of e(1uity shareholders for their consideration :md when commercial interest of the appellant so far as the Scheme is concerned is common with other equity shareholders he would have a common cause \\1th them either to accept or to reject the Scheme D from c;Jmmercial point of view. Consequently there was no occasion for convening a separate class meeting of the minority equity shareholders represented by the appellant and his group. [46-G-H; 47-E; G-H]
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Palmer 011 Company Law 24th Edition, referred to.
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S. Valuation of shares is a technical and. complex problem which can be appropriately left to the consideration of experts in the filed of accountancy. Many imponderables enter the exercise of valuation of shares. Which exchange ratio is better is in the realm of commercial decision of well informed equity shareholders. It is not for the Court to sit in appeal over this value judgment of equity shareholders who are supposed to be men of the world and reasonable persons who know their own benefit and interest underlying any proposed scheme and who with open eyes have okayed this ratio and the entire Scheme. [49-D; SO-A; 51-B]
Kamala Sugar Mills Ltd. 55 Company Cases, 308 (Guj), approved. CWT. v. Mahadeo Jalan, [1973] 3 SCC 157, relied on. Penington : Plinciples of Company Law, referred to.
SUPREMECqURTREPORTS [1996) SUPP. 6S.C.R.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 11879 of 1996. . From the Judgment and Order dated 12.7.96 of the Gujarat High Court in O.J.A. No. 16 of 1994.
Shanti Bhusan, Miheer Thakur, Darshan Parekh, Jay Salve, and J.K. Das for the Appellant. Soli J. Sorabjee, S.B. Vakil, S. Ganesh, P.N. Kapadia, U.A. Rana and Rajiv Tyagi for Gagrat & Co. for the Respondent.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.B. MAJMUDAR, J. Leave granted.
By consent of learned advocate of parties this appeal was taken up for final hearing. We have heard the learned advocates of parties. The appeal is being disposed of by this judgment. This appeal by special leave arises out of the judgment and order of a Division Bench of High Court of Gujarat in Original Jurisdiction Appeal No. 16 of 1994 decided on 12 July 1996. The Division Bench by the said impugned judgment dismissed the appeal of the appellant and confirmed the order of the learned Single Judge in Company Petition No. 22 of 1994 and s_anctioned a Scheme of Amalgamation of two Public Limited _com- . panies, namely Mafatlal Industries Limited ('MIL' for short) being the transferee-company with which Mafatlal Fine Spinning and Manufacturing Company Limited ('MFL' for short) being the transferor-company was to be amalgamated. The iearned Single Judge granted requisite sanction to the applicant transferee-company MIL to amalgamate in it the transferorcompan y MFL under Section: 391(2) of the Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). In order to appreciate the grievance of the appellant who objected to the Scheme moved by the respondentcompany MIL, as ventilated before us by its learned senior counsel Shri Shanti Bhusan, assisted by learned counsel Shri M.J. Thakore, it will be necessary to glance through a few relevant background facts.
Background Facts
The respondent-company MIL which was the petitioner before the
MIHEER H. M.Af<ATLAL v. MAI'A11.AL INDS. LTD. [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 11
learned Single Judge has its registered office at Ahmedabad in Gujarat A State. It was incorporated on 20th January 1913 under the name 'The New Shorrock Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Limited' and its name was subsequently changed to 'Mafatlal Industries Limited' as per the fresh Certificate of Incorporation dated 24 January 1974 consequent upon change of name, as sanctioned by the Registrar of Companies, Gujarat, Ahmedabad. The objects of the transferee-company MIL as per its Memorandum of Association, inter a/ia, included activity of carrying on all or any of the businesses such as cotton spinners and doublers, wool, silk, flax, jute and hemp spinners and doublers, linen manufactures, to work spinning and weaving mills, cotton mills, jute mills and mills of any other description. The Authorised Share Capital of the respondent-company was Rs. 100,00,00,000 (Rupees one hundred crores only) divided into 30,05,500 equity shares of Rs. 100 each and 69,94,500 unclassified shares of Rs. 100 each. The subscribed Share Capital of the respondent-company as on 31st March 1993 was Rs. 26.30 crores (Rupees twenty six crores thirty lacs only) divided into 26,90,000 equity shares of Rs. 100 each.
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The respondent-company commenced the business of textiles and had been carrying on the same since incorporation. The respondent-company is a large multi-Division, Multi-locational company carryiny on diversified activities including manufacturing and sale textiles, dyes intermediates and chemicals, professional grade connectors, plastic processing machineries and promoting various companies through Project Promotion Division. The MFL being transferor-company was incorporated on 20th April 1931 under the Baroda State Companies Act and had been carrying on the busines.s of manufacture and sale of textile piece goods and chemicals. Its registered office was situated at Mafatlal Centre, Nariman Point, Bombay. It was engaged in the manufacture and sale of textiles and fluorines based chemicals. There were three units of the Textiles Division situated at (1) Vejalpur Road, Navsari, (2) Mazagon, Bombay and (3) Lower Parel, Bombay and the unit of the Chemicals Division was situated at Bhestan, District Surat.
The Authorised Share Capital of the transferor-company as on 31st March 1993 was Rs. 30 crores (Rupees thirty crores only) divided into 30,00,000 ordinary shares of Rs. 100 each. The Subscribed Share Capital H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996} SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
of the transferor-company as on 31st March 1993 was Rs. 26,25,77,100 (Rupees twenty six crores twenty five lacs seventy seven thousand and one hundred only) divided into 26,25,771 ordinary shares of Rs. 100 each. Subsequent to 31st March 1993 the the transferor-company had allotted 382 ordinary sh:ires of Rs. 100 each. The transferor-company had also issued and allotted further 1,00,000 ordinary shares of Rs. 100 each at a premium of Rs. 200 per share on conversion of 1,00,000 Partly Convertible Debentures of the face value of Rs. 2,000 each issued to Financial Institutions with effect from 1st February 1994 by the transferor-company. The transferor-company MFL is proposed to be amalgamated with
C the respondent-company MIL under the following circumstances and for the following reasons : (1)
The proposed amalgamation will pave the way for batter, more efficient and economical control in the running of operation.
(2) Economies in administrative and management costs will improve in combined profitability.
(3) The amalgamated company will have the benefit of the combined reserves, manufacturing assets, manpower and cashflows of the two companies. The combined technological, managerial and financial resources are expected to enhance the capability of the amalgamated company-to invest in larger and sophisticated projects to ensure rapid growth.
(4) The amalgamated company will have a strong and large re source base. With a strong resource base, the risk bearing capacity of the amalgamated Company will be substantial. Hitherto, with limited resources and capacity, either company had to forego business opportunities which would otherwise have been profitable to the group. (5) "Exports" have been identified a 'thrust' area for both the companies and response in time to customers needs is considered to be critical in this area of 'operations. An amalgamated company will be strategically better placed to reduce the response time. Customers' confidence in dealing with such
MIHEERH.MAfi\TLAL v. MAf"ATLALINDS. LID. [S.B.MAfMUDAR,J.j 13
a mega company ensures timely delivery of large orders.
(6) The amalgamated company will be able to source and absorb new technology and spend on Research and Development, Market Surveys etc. More comprehensively. (7)
More particularly in the Textiles Division, with .5 operating units at the company's disposal, the flexibility in operations will be very much pronounced. The Managers will not be inhibited by capacity constraints and will have the freedom of choosing from various options.
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(8) Both the companies have been subject to the pressures of raw material price fluctuations and of adverse market conditions in their respective product mix. Hence, the amalgamation will neutralise the adverse effects of contrary business cycles. The operations of one unit will be complementary to the other and a stable profitability will be achieved. The director of the respondent-company MIL and transferor- company MFL approved the proposal for amalgamation of the MFL with MIL and pursuant to the respective Resolutions passed by them the detailed Scheme of Amalgamation was finalised. The directors of both the companies of the opinion that such amalgamation was in the interest do both the companies. 1~-
It is pertinent to note at this stage that the appellant who has objected to the amalgamation before the High Court in the present proceedings so far as the amalgamation of the transferee-company is F concerned, is himself one of the directors of the transferor- company being MFL. So far as the transferor-company MFL is concerned as its registered office is located at Bombay the corresponding application on behalf of the transferor-company for sanctioning this very Scheme of Amalgamation was. moved in the Bombay High Court. The appellant at this stage did not object to this very Scheme for amalgamation on behalf of the transferor- G company of which he was one of the directors and party to the Resolution approving the said am;:tlgamation. Learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court sanctioned the said Scheme on behalf of transferor-company. , It is not in dispute between the parties that Bombay High Court had already sanctioned this very Scheme on behalf of the transferor-company. H
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As the registered office of the transferee-company is located at Ahmedabad the respondent transferee-company had approached the High Court of Gujarat for sanctioning this very Scheme of Amalgamation on behalf of the transferee-company and that application was moved on 8th February 1994. It is at this stage that the appellant who was one of the shareholders. of the transferee-company filed his objection to the Scheme of Amalgamation moved under Section 391 of the Act. Earlier the learned Single Judge directed convening of meeting of equity shareholders of the respondent-company. In the meeting of equity shareholders convened pursuant to the order of the High Court, overwhelming majority of the equity shareholders approved the Scheme in the meeting of 22nd January 1994 convened at Premabhai Hall, Bhadra, Ahmedabad. The said meeting was attended by 5522 members present in person or by proxy, holding 20, 48, 513 fully paid equity shares of Rs. 100 each aggregating to Rs. 20,48,51,300. At the said meeting, resolution was passed without modification by the requisite majority as 5298 members holding 19, 36, 964 fully paid equity shares vokd in favour of the Scheme and 143 members holding 86, 061 fully paid equity shares voted against the Scheme. In short, the said meeting by requisite majority approved the proposed Scheme of Amalgamation and report of the Chairman was submitted to the High Court. Thereafter the respondent-company MIL filed Company Petition No. 22 of 1994 under Section 391(2) of the Act. That application was ordered to be published in local newspapers as well as in the Bombay edition ofthe said newspaper. Notice was also issued to Regional Director, Company Law Board, Western Region, Bombay. In response to the notice issued to the Central Government under Section 394A of the Act the learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel appeared before the High Court and submitted to the orders of the Court making it clear that the Central Government is not to make any representation in favour or against the proposed Scheme.
Pursuant to the public advertisement only the present appellant, the
G shareholder of transferee-company holding 40, 567 share in MIL filed affidavit opposing the Scheme of Amalgamation and Arrangement between the respondent transferee-company MIL and transferor-company MFL of which, as noted earlier, he himself was one of the directors and the High Court of Bombay which sanctioned this very Scheme on behalf of the transferor-company had sanctioned· the Scheme without any objection H being taken by the appellant at that stage.
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MlHEERH.MAFATLAL v. MAFATLALINDS.LTD.(S.B.MAJMUDAR,J.] 15 Nine objections were raised by the appellant against the proposed A Scheme of Amalgamation as shareholder of the transferee-company. At this stage we may not mention all these nine objections as ultimately only four objections have survived for our consideration in the present proceedings and to which we will make a detailed reference hereinafter. Suffice it to state at this stage that after a prolonged hearing the learned Single Judge B S.D. Shah, J., over-ruled these objections and by a detailed as exhaustive judgment running over 254 pages covering various aspects of the matters canvassed before him sanctioned the said Scheme moved on behalf of the respondent transferee-company.
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The Division Bench of the High Court to which the appellant carried the matter in appeal confirmed the aforesaid decision of the learned Single Judge by well considered Judgment which also ran into 136 pages and that is how the appellant, original objector, is before us in this appeal.
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Family Hist01y
In order to properly appreciate the grievance of the appellant against the proposed Scheme and his roie as an objector it will be necessary to note the family history of the appellant and two of the directors of the respondent transferee-company who have a comm~n ancestor Mafatlal Gagalbhai. The Family Tree of Mafatlal Gagalbhai projects the following picture:
Family Tree of Mafat/al Gagalblzai
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<~
Seth Mafatlal Gagalbhai (Died on 19.07.1944) Bhagubhai (Died 30.09.1944)
Navinchandra (Died 31.08.1955) Arvind Padmanabh (Died on Hrishikesh 29.07.1990)
Pransukhlal (Deceased) (No issues)
Yogindra Rasesh Atulya
Pradeep
Hemant (Died on 16.08.1971) Miheer (Born on 27.05.1958)
·~
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As the aforesaid Family Tree shows, the appellant Miheer is the son of cousin brother of Arvind Navinchandra who is said to be at the helm of affairs of the transferee-company along with his son Hrishikesh. As seen from the Family Tree the common ancestor Mafatlal Gagalbhai who was himself a very astute businessman and entrepreneur had three sons Pransukhlal. Navinchandra and Bhagubhai. The eldest son Pransukhlal got out of the family prior to the death of Mafatlal Gagalbhai and he died without leaving any issue. Mafatlal Gagalbhai expired on 19th July 1944 and was survived by his two sons Navinchandra and Bhagubhai. On 30th September 1944, the said Bhagubhai died leaving him surviving Hemant, then aged 9 as his only male issue. On 31st August 1955, Navinchandra Mafatlal died leaving him surviving the three sons. Arvind Mafatlal. Yogindra Mafatlal and Rasesh mafatlal as his male issues. On 16th August 1971, said Hemant expired leaving behind him only male issue, present objector Miheer, them aged 13. The said Mafatlal Gagalbhai started different business undertakings and with passage of time, the family of said Mafatlal consisting to Navinchandra and Bhagubhai expanded their business undertakings. The said family held controlli!lg interest in 'different business concerns run throug~ public limited_ or private limited companies and the members of the family were also partners in partnership firms. The pattern which was maintained throughout was thatthe two sons Navinchandra and Bhagubhai and their families would respectively have an equal interest in companies or in partnership firms. At the time of the death of the said Bhagubhai the said Hemant was just 9 years of age. The business of Mafatlal Group was therefore for all practical purposes managed by the said Navinchandra. At the time to the death of _Navinchandra the shareholding of.the branch of Hemant Mafatlal in Mafatlal Group of Industries was equal to aggregate shareholding of Arvind Mafatlal, Yogindra Mafatlal and Rasesh Mafatlal. On the death of Navinchandra, the Mafatlal Group was managed by Arvind Mafatlal, Yogindra Mafatlal, Rasesh Mafatlal and late Hemant Mafatlal. Arvind Mafatlal was, however the eldest male member in the family who was always looked upon by Yogindra, Rasesh and late Hemant as an elder in the family and respected. On 16th August 1971, Hemant Mafatlal died at the young age of 36 years leaving behind him his widowed mother, his wife, his son Miheer (then aged 13) and his two daughters (then aged 11 and 6). At that time,
MIHEERH.MAFATLAL v. MAFATLALINDS.LTD.[S.B.MAIMUDAR,J.] 17
the Mafatlal family, i.e., the families of Navinchandra and Bhagubhai were running 3 apex companies (1) Mafatlal Gagalbhai & Company Private Limited, (2) Surat Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Private Limited and (3) Pransukhlal & Company Private Limited. It is the case of Miheer that when his father expired, the New Shorrock Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Limited was being controlled and managed by Mafatlal Gagalbhai & Co. Limited in which his father and his family had 46.47% shares vis-a-vis 43.66% shares held by the family of Navinchandra Mafatlal. After the death of his father, when Miheer was minor, it was decided to amalgamate Mafatlal Gagalbhai & Co. Pvt. Limited with the New Shorrock Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Limited on 24th January 1974 January 1974 :.i.nd the name of the company was changed to present name i.e. MIL.
A·
C
According to the appellant Miheer in or around 1979, there were certain disputes and difference amongst Arvind Mafatlal, Yogindra Mafat- D Ial and Rasesh Mafatlal and it was felt that some arrangement should be worked put, whereby there would be a separation and division of the family business concerns amongst the four branches viz. Miheer Branch known as MHM Group, family of Arvind Mafatlal known as ANM Group, family of Yogindra Mafatlal known as YNM Group and family of Rasesh Mafatlal known as RNM Group. It is his further case that Shri C.C. Chokshi, a E reputed chartered accountant was requested to prepare a Scheme for division of family business concerns. According to the appellant. Shri C.C. Chokshi prepared Note dated 23rd February 1979 making six suggestions for the division of Mafatlal Group of Industries into four groups as there were four family groups. The appellant contends that as per the aforesaid F family arrangement the transferee-company, i.e., MIL was agreed to be put to his share and the other groups which were holding shares in the said transferee-company were to transfer their share-holdings in favour of the appellant. The appellant contends that however because of some family disputes the appellant fell from the grace of Shri Arvind Mafatlal who was the eldest male member monitoring all these industries belonging to all the G groups of the same family, and consequently the family arrangement was not give effect to and that the transferee-company was not handed over in management to the appellant. On the other hand the case of the other group headed by Shri Arvind
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Mafatlal was to the effect that the said family arrangement of 1979 was given a go-by and the appellant himself agreed to sell his share-holding in the transferee-company MIL in favour of Arvind Mafatlal''.: Group. Number of litigations took place between the parties in the second half of 1980s. That on 6th April 1987 Arvind Mafatlal filed Suit No. 10 of 1987 in the High Court of .Judicature at Bombay for a declaration that there was a valid, subsisting and binding contract to sell shares held by Rasesh Mafatlal, Yogindra Mafatlal and Miheer Mafatlal, the appellant herein, groups to Shri Arvind Mafatlal's group and for a direction that they should sell that shares at a price to be determined by the arbitrator. In the said suit the appellant Miheer filed a counter-claim praying that the family arrangement of 1979 should should be enforced and the share-holding of Shri Arvind Mafatlal's group and other groups in the transferee- company MIL should be sold by way of specific performance to the appellant. The aforesaid suit by Arvind Mafatlal and the counter- claim by the appellant are pending for adjudication in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. It is in the background of the aforesaid history of family feud between these warring groups descended from the common ancestor Shri Mafatlal Gagalbhai that the grievance voiced by the appellant in these proceedings has to be appreciated. Rival Contentions
As noted earlier though a battle royal was fought between the contesting parties before the learned Single Judge wherein nine objections were raised for adjudication by the appellant, at this stage, the dispute centered round a limited number of contentions which were canvassed for our consideration by learned senior counsel for the appellant. Four-fold. submissions for opposing the Scheme were canvassed on behalf of the appellant before us by Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel. In the first place he contended that the respondent-company while putting the Scheme for approval of the equity shareholders in their meeting did not disclose the interest of the directors, namely, Shri Arvind Mafatlal and Shri Hrishikesh Mafatlal belonging to the camp of Arvind Mafatlal in the explanatory statement supporting the Scheme and consequently the +.' shareholders were misled and could not come to an informed decision regarding the approval of the said Scheme with the result that the approval by the majority of equity shareholders to the said Scheme has got vitiated; (2) The Scheme as proposed was unfair to the minority shareholders
MIHEERH.MAFATLAL v. MAFATLALINDS.LID.[S.B.MATMUDAR,J.) 19
represented by the appellant and consequently it ought not to have been A sanctioned by the Court; (3) The Scheme was otherwise unfair to ·the equity shareholders as the exchange ratio of equity shares of the transferor and transferee companies was ex facie unreasonable and unfair to the shareholders of the transferee-company MIL in so far as it provides under the Scheme that two equity shares of the transferee company will be • B allotted against five equity shares of the transferor-company at their respective face value of Rs. 100 per share; and (4) That the appellant represented a distinct class of equity shareholders so far as the respondent transferee-company is concerned and consequently separate meeting_ so far as his group is concerned should have been convened by the Company Court and as that has not been done the Scheme is liable to be rejected. C As a corollary to the aforesaid contention Shri M.J. Thakore, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in addition submitted that the voting pattern as adopted in the meeting of equity shareholders which had approved the Scheme by majority, resulted in coercing the minority repre- D sented by the appellant and that has rendered the Scheme unfair and unreasonable and consequently it is required to be rejected. On the other hand learned senior counsel Shri Sorabjee appearing for th respondent transferee-company contended that there was to illegality either procedural or substantive vitiating the Scheme and that there was E no suppression of relevant material from the shareholders when the Scheme was put to vote. That the personal disputes between the worring groups of the family, namely, Arvind Mafatlal on the one hand and the appellant on the other and which were subject-matter of the pending litigation in Bombay High Court had nothing to do with the question of F sanctioning the Scheme for its better economic viability with which the shareholders were concerned and that as the transferor-company and the transferee-company were juristic persons and corporate bodies, while considering the question of approving the said Scheme such personal disputes between the directors of the transferee-company and the director of trans- G feror-company were completely irrelevant and were out of consideration of the equity shareholders who were not at all c9ncerned with this type of internal feuds and in any case non-disclosure of such disputes had no adverse effect on the decision of the majority share_holders who had approved the Scheme with a thumping majority of about 95% and the appellant who was objecting to the Scheme was in microscopic minority of H
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5% of the total voting strength. It was also contended by learned senior counsel for the respondent that it is wrong to assume that the transfereecompany was family concerned and was managed by families. That Shri Arvind Mafatlal and Hrishikesh Mafatlal were only two direcfors out of thirteen directors of respondent-company. These eleven directors did not belong to his family. That even shareholding of Arvind Mafatlal's group in the respondent-company was not substantial and on the contrary about 40% shares were held by outside financial institutions. Even otherwise there was no question of any unfairness underlying the proposed Scheme or that in any way it was unfair to the appellant who never cared even to remain present personally at time of the meeting of the equity shareholders to put forward his objections and he only sent proxies who had no right to speak at the meeting. That therefore all these objections which he ultimately raised before the High Court were an afterthought. It was also contended that there was nothing wrong with the exchange ration as C.C. Chokshi & Co., a firm of reputed chartered accountants, had considered all the pros and cons underlying the Scheme and had suggested the exchange ratio and such an expert opinion was endorsed by another financial institution ICICI. That the appellant had not chosen to controvert this expert opinion by leading any evidence in rebuttal by any other expert in the field who could have suggested the exchange ratio differently. That the appellant's contention that the exchange ratio should have been one share of transferee company against six shares of the transferor company was in the realm of mere conjecture and ipse di.xit. It was not supported by any expert opinion. Consequently the High Court was justified in taking the view both at the stage of learned Single Judge as well as in appeal by the Division Bench that the exchange ratio could not be said to be unfair or unreasonable especially when by as overwhelming majority the equity shareholders approved the said Scheme along with said exchange ratio and had no objection to the allotment of two equity shares of the transferee-company in exchange for five equity shares of transferor-company. It was also contended that the appellant himself who was the director of the transferorcompany had approved the same exchange ratio while he acted on behalf of the transferor-company. He was, therefore, playing hide and seek when it came to the enforcement of the very same exchange ratio at the end of the transferee-company wherein he was not a director but only shareholder of merely 5% shares. It was next contended that the appellant was also an equity
MIHEERH.MAFA1LAL v. MAFA1LALINDS.LTD.(S.B.MAJMUDAR,J.] 21
. ._
shareholder and so far as the other equity shareholders were concerned A they constituted the same class as the appellant. That there was no inter se conflict between the rest of the equity shareholders representing 95% of the voting strength which approved the Scheme and the appellant who represented dissenting 5% votes and consequently there was no question of holding as separate meeting so far as the appellant was concerned. Even · B otherwise such a separate meeting would not have made any impact on the voting pattern projected by the equity shareholders approving the said Scheme by overwhelming majority. Repelling the additional contention canvassed by learned counsel for the appellant it was submitted by Shri Sorabjee learned senior counsel for the respondent that there was no question of coercing any minority by the majority as in the meeting of the C equity shareholders the appellant had not thought fit even to remain present personally and had only got represented through proxy for submitting his objection by voting against the Scheme without having any right to address the meeting. Thus the contention regarding alleged suppression by the majority was purely an afterthought especially when in the meeting the D group of Arvind Mafatlal had not represented an absolute majority and 40% of the voting was by financial institutions who had no axe to grind against the appellant and who had voted by keeping in view purely commercial and economic interests of equity shareholders and had approved the Scheme in that light. It was, therefore, submitted that the contention raised on behalf of the appellant deserve to be rejected and the appeal E consequently also deserve to be dismissed. In view of the aforesaid rival contentions the following points arise for our determination : 1. Whether the respondent-company was guilty of hiding the special interest of its director Shri Arvind Mafatlal from the shareholders while circulating the explanatory statement supporting the Scheme and whether thereby the voting by the equity shareholders got vitiated.
2. Whether the Scheme is unfair and unreasonable to the minority shareholders represented by the appellant.
3. Whether the proposed Scheme of Amalgamation was unfair and amounted to suppression of minority shareholders represented by the appelJant and hence liable to be rejected.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
4. Whether separate meeting of minority shareholders represented by the appellant was required to be convened on the basis that the appellant's group represented a special class of equity shareholders.
5. Whether the exchange ratio of two equity shares of MIL for five equity shares of MFL was ex f acie unfair and unreasonable to the equity shareholders of MIL and consequently the Scheme of Amalgamation on that account was liable to be rejected.
C
However before we deal with the aforesaid. points for determination seriatim, it will be necessary to keep in view the limited scope of the jurisdiction of the Company Court which is called upon to sanction the Scheme of Amalgamation as per the provisions of Section 391 read with Section ~93 of the Act. Scope of inte1ference by the Company Cowt in sanction proceedings
The relevant proyisions of the Companies Act, 1956 are found in Chapter V of Part VI dealing with 'Arbitration, Compromises, Arrangements and Reconstructions'. In the present proceedings we will be concerned with Sections 391 and 393 of the Act. The relevant provisions thereof read as under : "391. (1) Where a compromise or arrangement is proposed (a) between a company and its creditors or any class of them; or
(b) between a company and its members or any class of them; the Court may, on the application of the company, or, ·of any. creditor or member of the company, or, in the case of a company which is being wound up, of the liquidator, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, or of the members or class of members, as the case may be, to be called, held and conducted in such manner as the Court directs. (2) If a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of . the creditors, or class of creditors, or members, or class of members, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or, . where proxies are allowed under the rules made u.nder section 643,
MIHEER H. MAFATLAL v. MAFATLALINDS. LID. [S.B. MNMUDAR, J.] 23
by proxy, at the meeting, agree to any compromise or arrangement, A the compromise or arrangement shall, if sanctioned by the Court, be binding on all the creditors, all the creditors of the class, all the members, or all the members of the class, as the case may be, and also on the company, or, in the case of a company which is being wound up, on the liquidator and contributories of the company :
Provided that no order sanctioning any compromise or arrangement shall be made by the Court unless the Court is satisfied that the company or any other person by whom an application has been made under sub-section (1) has disclosed to the Court, by affidavit or otherwise, all material facts relating to the company, such as the latest financial position of the company, the latest auditor's report on the accounts of the company, the pendency of any investigation proceedings in relation to the company under sections 235 to 251, and the like.
C
393. (1) Where a meeting of creditors or any class of creditors, or D of members or any class of members, is called under section 391,-
(a) with every notice calling the meeting which is sent to a creditor or member, there shall be sent also a statement setting forth the terms of the compromise or arrangement and explaining its effect : and in particular, stating any material interests of the directors, managing director, managing agent, secretaries and treasurers or manager of the company, whether in their capacity as such or as members or creditors of the company or otherwise, and the effect on those interests, of the compromise or arrangement, if, and in so far as, it is different from the effect on the like interests of other persons; and
(b) in every notice calling the meeting which is given by advertisement, there shall be included either such a statement as aforesaid on a notification of the place at which and the manner in which creditors or members entitled to attend the meeting may obtain copies of such a statement as aforesaid."
The aforesaid provisions of the Act show that compromise or arrangement
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SUPREME C,OURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
can be proposed between a company and its creditors or any class of them or between a company and its members or any class of them. Such a compromise would also take in its sweep any scheme of amalgamation/merger of one company with another. When such a scheme is put forward by a company for the sanction of the Court in the first instance B the Court has to direct holding of meetings of creditors or class of creditors or members or class of members who are concerned with such a scheme and once the majority in number representing three-fourths in value of creditors or class of creditors or members or class of members, as the case may be, present or voting either in person or by proxy at such a meeting accord their approval to any compromise or arrangement thus put to vote, c. and once such compromise is sanctioned by the Court, it would be binding to all creditors. or class of creditors or members or class of membc:rs, as the case may be, which would also necessarily mean that even to dissenting creditors or class of creditors or dissenting members or class of members D such sanctioned scheme would remain binding. Before sanctioning such a scheme even though approved by a majority of the concerned creditors or members the Court has· to be satisfied that the company or any other person moving such an application for sanction under sub-section (2) of Section 391 has disclosed all the relevant matters mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (2) of that Section. So far as the meetings of the creditors E or members, or their respective classes for whom the Scheme is proposed are concerned, it is enjoined by Section 391(1)(a) that the requisite information. as contemplated by the said provision is also required to be placed for consideration of the concerned voters so that the parties concerned before \Vhom the scheme is placed for voting can take an informed and F objective decision whether to vote for the scheme or against it. On a conjoint reading of the relevant provisions of Sections 391 and 393 it becomes at once clear that the Company Court which is called upon to sanction such a scheme has not merely to by go by the ipse di.xit of the majority of the shareholders or creditors or their respective classes who G might have voted in favour of the scheme by requisite majority but the Court has to consider the pros and cons of the scheme with a view to finding out whether the scheme is fair, just and reasonable and is not contrary to any provisions of law and it does not violate any public policy. This is implicit in the very concept of compromise or arrangement which H is required to receive the imprimature of a court of law. No court of law
MIHEER H. MAFATLAL v. MAFATLAL INDS. LTD. (S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 25
would ever countenance any scheme of compromise or arrangement ar- A rived at between the parties and which might be supported by the requisite majority if the Court finds that it is an unconscionable or an illegal scheme or is otherwise unfair or unjust to the class of shareholder or creditors for whom it is meant. Consequently it cannot be said that a Company Court before whom an application is moved for sanctioning such a scheme which B might have got the requisite majority support of the creditors or members or any class of them for whom the scheme is mooted by the concerned company has to act merely as a rubber stamp and must almost automatically put its seal of approval on such a scheme. It is trite to say that once the scheme gets sanctioned by the Court it would bind even the dissenting c minority shareholders or creditors. Therefore, the fairness of the scheme qua them also has to be kept in view by the Company Court while putting its seal of approval on the concerned scheme placed for its sanction. It is, of course, true that so far as the Company Court is concerned as per the statutory provisions of Sections 391 and 393 of the Act the question of voidability of the scheme will have to be judged subject to the rider that a D scheme sanctioned by majority will remain binding to a dissenting minority of creditors or members, as the case may be, even though they have not consented to such a scheme and to that eXtent absence of their consent will have no effect on the scheme. It can be postulated that even in case of such a Scheme of Compromise and Arrangement put up for sanction of a E Company Court it will have to be seen whether the proposed scheme is lawful and just and fair to the whole class of creditors or members including the dissenting minority to whom it is offered for approval and which has been approved by such class of persons with required majority vote. However further question remains whether the Court has jurisdiction like an appellate authority to minutely scrutinies the scheme and to arrive at an independent conclusion whether the scheme should be permitted to go through or not when the majority of the creditors or members or their as required by Section 391 respective classes have approved the scheme . , I sub-Section (2). On this aspect. the nature of"compromise or arrangement between the company and the ~creditors and members has to be kept in . view. It is the commercial wisdom of the parties to the scheme who have taken and informed decision about the usefulness and propriety of the scheme by supporting it by the requisite majority vote that has to be kept
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in view by the Court. The Court certainly would not act as a court of appeal nd sit in judgment over the informed view of the concerned parties to the compromise as the same would be in the realm of corporate and commercial wisdom of the concerned parties. The Court has neithe~ the expertise nor the jurisdiction to delve deep into the commercial wisdom exercised by the creditors and members of the company .who have ratified the Scheme by the requisite majority. Consequently the Company Court's jurisdiction to that extent is peripheral and supervisory and not appellate. The Court acts like an umprie in a game of cricket who has to see that both the teams play their game according to the rules and do not overstep the limits. But subject to that how best the game is to be played is left to the players and not to the umpire. The supervis~ry jurisdiction of the Company Court can also be culled out from the provisions of Section 392 of the Act which reads as under : "392. (1) Where a High Court makes an order under Section 391 sanctioning a compromise or an arrangement in respect of a company, it (a) shall have power to supervise the carrying out of the compromise or arrangement; and
(b) may, at the time of making such order or at any time thereafter, give such directions in regard to any matter or make such modifications in the compromise or arrangement as it may consider necessary for the proper working of the compromise or arrangement.
(2) If the Court aforesaid is satisfied that a compromise or arrangement sanctioned under section 391 cannot be worked satisfactorily with or without modifications, it may, either on its own motion or on the application of any person interested in the affairs of the company, make an order winding up the company, and such an order shall be deemed to be an order made under section 433 of this Act.
(3) The provisions of this section shall, so far as may be, also apply to a company in respect of which an order has been made before the commencement of this Act under section 153 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 (7 of 1913), sanctioning a compromise or an
MIHEERH.MAFATLAL v._MAFATLALINDS.LID.[S.B.MAJMUDAR,J.]27 I
arrangement."
..
Of course this Section deals with post-sanction supervision. But the said provision itself clearly earmarks the filed in which the sanction of the Court operates. It is obvious that the supervisor cannot ever be treated as the author or a policy maker. Consequently the propriety and the merits of the compromise or arrangement have to be judged by the parties who as sui juris with their open eye and fully informed about the pros and cons of the Scheme arrive at their own reasoned judgment and agree to be bound by such compromise or arrangement. The Court cannot, therefore, undertake the exercise of scrutinising the scheme place for its sanction which a view to finding out whether a better scheme could have been adopted by the parties. This exercise remains only for the parties and is in the realm of commercial democracy permeating the activities of the concerned creditors and members of the company who in the their best commercial and economic interest by majority agree to give green single to such a compromise or arrangement. The aforesaid statutory scheme which is clearly D discernible from the relevant provisions of the Act, as seen above, has been subjected to a series of decisions of different High Courts and this Court as well as by the courts in England which had also occasion to consider schemes under pari materia English Company Law. We will briefly refer to the relevant decisions on the point. But before we do so we may also usefully refer to the observations found in the oft-quoted passage in Bucklay E on the Companies Act, 14th Edition. They are as under:
c
"In exercising its power of sanction the Court will see, first that the provisions of the statute have been complied with, second, that the class was fairly represented by those who attended the meeting F and that statutory majority are acting bona fide and are not coercing the minority in order to promote interest adverse to those of the class whom they purport to represent, and thirdly, that the arrangement is such as an intelligent and honest man, a member of the ciass concerned and acting in respect of his interest, might reasonably approve.
The court does not sit merely to see that the majority are acting bona fide and thereupon to register the decision of the meeting, but at the same time, the court Will be slow to differ from the meeting, unless either the class has not been properly consulted, H
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or the meeting has not considered the matter with a view to the interest of the class which it is empowered to bind, or some blot is found in the Scheme." In the case of Re. Alabama, New Orleans Texas and Pacific junction Railway Company reported in 1891 (1) Chancery Division 213 the relevant observations regarding the power and jurisdiction of the Company Court which is called upon to sanction a scheme of arrangement or compromise between the company and its creditor or shareholders were made by Lindley, L.J. as under : "What the court has to do is to see, first of all, that the provisions of that statute have been complied with; and, secondly, that the minority has been-acting bonafide. The court also has to see that the minority is not being overriden by a majority having interests of its own clashing with those of the minority whom they seek to coerce. Further than that, the court has to look at the scheme and see whether it is one as to which persons acting honestly, and viewing the scheme laid before them in the interests of those whom they represent, take a view which can reasonable be taken by businessmen. The court must look at the scheme, and see whether the Act has been complied with, whether the majority are acting bonafide, and whether they are coercing the minority in order to promote interests adverse to those of the class whom they purport to represent; and then see whether the scheme is a reasonable one or whether there is any reasonable objection to it, or such an objection to it as that any reasonable man might say that he could not approve it." To the similar ef\¢ct were the observations of Fry, L.J., which read as under: "The next enquiry is-Under what circumstances is the court to sanction a resolution which has been passed approving of a compromise or arrangement? I shall not attempt to define what elements may enter into the consideration of the court beyond this, that I do not doubt for a moment that the Court is bound to ascertain that all the conditions required by the statute l~ve been complied with; it is bound to be satisfied that the proposition was made in good faith; and, further, it must be satisfied that the proposal was at least so far fair and reasonable, as that an intel-
\
MIHEER H. MAFATLAL v. MAFATLALINDS. LID. [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 29
ligent and honest man, who is a member of that class, and acting A alone in respect of his interest as such a member, might approve of it. What other circumstances the court may take into consideration I will not attempt to forecast." In Anglo-Continental Supply Co. Ltd., Re. (1992) 2 Ch. 723 Ashtury, J., a century later reiterated the very same propositions as under :
"Before giving its sanction to a scheme of arrangement the court will see firstly that the provisions of the statute have been complied with; secondly that the· class was fairly represented by those who attended tile meeting and that the statutory majority are acting bona fide and are not coercing the minority in order to promote interests adverse to those of the class whom they purport to represent; and, thirdly, that the arrangement is such as a man of business would reasonably approve."
c
Learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Re. Mankam Investments Ltd. and Others (1995) 4 Comp U 330 (Cal.) relying on a catena of decisions of the English Courts and Indian High Courts observed as under on the power and jurisdiction of the Company Court which is called upon to sanction a scheme of merger and amalgamation of companies:
"It is a matter for the shareholders to consider commercially whether amalgamation or merger is beneficial or not. The court is really not concerned with the commercial decision of the shareholders until and unless the court feels that the proposed merger is manifestly unfair or is being proposed unfairly and/or to F defraud the other shareholders. Whethe.r the merged companies will be ultimately benefited or will be able to economise in the matter of expenses is a matter for the shareholders to consider. If three companies are amalgamated, certainly, there will be some economies in the matter of maintaining accounts, filing of returns G and various other matters. However, the court is really not concerned with the exact details of the matter and if the shareholders approved the scheme by the requisite majority, then the court only looks into the scheme as to find out that it is not manifestly unfair
and/or is not intended to defraud or do injustice to the other shareholders."
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We may also in this connection profitably refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of Hindustan Lever Employee's Union v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. and Others, [1995) Supp. 1 SCC 499 wherein a Bench of three learned judges speaking through Sen, J. on behalf of himself and Venkatachaliah, CJ., and with which decision Sahai, J., concurred. Sahai, J., in his concurring judgment in the aforesaid case has made the folloWing pertinent observations in this connection in paras 3. and 6 of the Report : "But what was lost sight of was that the jurisdiction of the Court in sanctioning a claim of merger is not to ascertain with mathematical accuracy if the determination satisfied the arithmetical test. A company court does not exercise an appellate jurisdiction.
Section 394 casts an obligation on the court to be satisfied that the scheme for amalgamation or merger was not contrary to public interest. The basic principle of such satisfaction is none other than the broad and general principles inherent in any compromise or settlement entered between parties that it should not be unfair or contrary to public policy or unconscionable. In amalgamation of companies, the courts have evolved, the principle. "prudent business management test" or that the scheme should not be a device to evade law. But when the court is concerned with a scheme of merger with a subsidiary of a foreign company then test is not only whether the scheme shall result in maximizing profits of the shareholders or whether the interest of employees was protected but it has to ensure that merger shall not ·result in impeding promotion of industry or shall obstruct growth of national economy. Liberalised economic policy is to achieve this goal. The merger, therefore, should not be contrary to this objective. Reliance on English decisions Hoare & Co. Ltd., Re 1933 All ER Rep 105, Ch ·D and Bugle Press Ltd.. Re. 1961 Ch 270 that the power of the court is to be satisfied only whether the provisions .P( .tl!t?. .~f::tJg1xe J?eeru:oi;nplied with· or, that therdassyor classes 1?bfrirl:WI~r.e MIY.:rf!pr.esent1,:;p a1'-P!the .wrangemeqbwas;suthras,a man of 1r, nu l;>µsjQ.~SliJW.OHl.dirJ(~l>OJ:!(/:b]y ~pprove bt;tween.two1private1e~_mpanies nu ; tµ~YHQ~nCPfi.fieft !ian,4 Jn;J;ay normally; be1:a4her¢d (to ibJ.lt 11when the , > :.Al.:le!;ge!. 1~~~~th :<!-'.:Sl\bsiflU.ry :.Pf <i 1fo.reign;90mpany th¢P, 1ei:;onomic interest of the country may have to be giYeniiJ)rete<;fence. The
MIHEER H. MAFATLAL v. MAFATLALINDS. LTD. [S.B. MAIMUDAR, J.) 31
jurisdiction of the court in this regard is comprehensive." Sen, J ., speaking for himself and Venkatachaliah, CJ., also towed the line indicated by Sahai, J ., about the jurisdiction of the Company Court while sanctioning the scheme and made the following pertinent observations in paragraph 84 at page 528 of the Report :
"An argument was also made that as a result of the amalgamation, a large share of the market will be captured by HLL. But there is nothing unlawful or illegal about this. The Court will decline to sanction a scheme of merger, if any tax fraud or any other illegality is involved. But that is not the case here. A company may, on its own, grow up to capture a large share of the market. But unless it is shown that there is some illegality or fraud involved in the scheme, the Court cannot decline to sanction a scheme of amalgamation. It has to be borne in mind that this proposal of amalgamation arose out of a sharp decline in the business of TOMCO. Dr. Dhavan has argued that TOMCO is not yet a sick D Company. That may be right, but TOMCO at this rate will become a sick Company, unless something can be done to improve its performance. In the last two years, it has sold its investments and other properties. If this proposal of amalgamation is not sanctioned, the consequence for TOMCO may be very serious. The E shareholders, the employees, the creditors will all suffer. The argument that the Company has large assets is really meaningless. Very many cotton mills and jute mills in India have become sick and are on· the verge of liquidation, even though they have large assets. The Scheme has been sanctioned almost unanimously by the shareholders, debenture-holders, secured creditors, unsecured F creditors and preference shareholders of both the Companies. There must exist very strong reasons for withholding sanction to such a scheme. Withholding of sanction may turn out to be disastrous for 60,000 shareholders of TOMCO and also a large number of its employees."
c
In view of the aforesaid settled legal position, therefore, the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the Company Court has clearly got earmarked. The following broad contours of such jurisdiction have emerged : 1. The sanctioning court has to see to it that all the requisite statutory
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
procedure for supporting such a scheme has been complied with and that the requisite meetings as contemplated by Section ·39l(l)(a) have been held. 2. That the scheme put up for sanction of the Court is backed up by the requisite majority vote as required by Section 391 sub- Section (2).
c
3. That the concerned meetings of the creditors or members or any class of them had the relevant material to enable the voters to arrive at an informed decision for approving the scheme in question. That the majority decision of the concerned class of voters is just and fair to the class as a whole so as to leg,itimately bind even the dissenting members of that class. 4. That all necessary material indicated by Section 393(1)(a) is placed before the voters at the concerned meetings as contemplated by Section 391 sub-Section (1).
5. That all the requisite material contemplated by the proviso of sub-Section (2) of Section 391 of the Act is placed before the Court by the concerned appllicant seeking sanction for such a scheme and the Court gets satisfied about the same.
6. That the proposed scheme of compromise and arrangement is not E found to be violative of any provision of law and is not contrary to public policy. For ascertaining the real purpose underlying the Scheme with a view to be satisfied on this aspect, the Court, if necessary, can pierce the veil of apparent corporate purpose underlying th~ scheme and can judiciously · X-ray the same.
7. That the Company Court has also to satisfy itself that members or class of members or creditors or class of creditors, as the case may be, were acting bona fide and in good faith and were .not coercing the minority in order to promote any interest adverse to that of the latter comprising of the same class whom they purported to represent. 8. That the scheme as a whole is also found to be just, fair and reasonable from the point of view of prudent men of business taking a commercial decision beneficial to the class represented by them for whom· the scheme is meant. 9. Once the aforesaid broad parameters about the requirements of a
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
better, more efficient and economic control in the running operations and would lead to economy in the administrative and management cost, resulting in improving profitability. The amalgamated company will have a strong and large resource funds. The combined Technological Managerial and financial resources would enhance the capability of the amalgamated company to invest in larger and sophisticated projects to ensure rapid growth. The amalgamated company's Textiles Division with five operative units at its disposal will have· flexibility in its operation."
)
•
I '
l.
...._
So far as the aforesaid explanatory statement is concerned it gives sufficient indication regardingJhe pliability and usefulness of the proposed Scheme of Amalgamation of transferor-company MFL with the transferee-company MIL. However the special grievance of the appellant voiced by his learned counsel is to the effect that the real interest underlying the scheme of merger was that of the director Shri Arvind Mafatlal and his group who were at the helm of affairs of the transferee,company. Learned senior counsel Shri Shanti Bhushan in this connection submitted that under Section 393(1)(a) of the Act the company is enjoined to mention in the statement material interest of the director Shri Arvind Mafatlal in the Scheme which is of a special nature as compared to the interest of other shareholders and it was also necessary to mention the effect of the compromise and arrangement on such special interest of Shri Arvind Mafatlal and ~s that was not mentioned in the explanatory statement along with which the copy of the Scheme was circulat.ed to the members the majority vote became vitiated. Now a mere look at Section 393(1)(a) shows that the special interest of the director which is required to be brought home to the voters must satisfy the following requirements of the Section before it can be treated to be a relevant special interest of the director which is required to be communicated to the voters :
.~
1. The director's interest must be a special interest different from the interest of other members who are the voters at the meeting. .)
2. The compromise or arrangement which is put to vote must have an effect on such special interest of the director.
t
3. Such effect must be different from the effect of compromise and arrangement on similar interest of other persons who are called upon to vote at the meeting. ~
MIHEERH.MAFA11..AL v. MAFA11..ALINDS.LTD. [S.B.MAJMUDAR,J.] 35
When we enquired of Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the A appellant as to which special interest, according to him, of director Arvind Mafatlal was required to be communicated to the voters as per Section 393(1)(a), he stated that there was a pending litigation between the appellant on the one hand Shri Arvind Mafatlal on the other in Bombay High Court. That Shri Arvind Mafatlal had sought a declaration in a pending suit against the appellant that the latter was required to sell off his share-holding in the transferee-company MIL to the plaintiff Arvind Mafatlal who was director of MIL. In this very suit the appellant had filed a counter-claim to the effect that· Shri Arvind Mafatlal and his group was required to transfer their share-holding in the transferee-company in favour of the appellant as per the Family Arrangement of 1979. Shri Shanti C Bhushan in this connection submitted that though the learned Single Judge had taken the view that this type of special interest of director Arvind mafatlal was not relevant and germane to the requirement of Section 393(1)(a), the Division Bench in appeal had taken a contrary view and held that such a special interest was required to be communicated to the equity D shareholders in their meeting as per the said provision. In this connection our attention was invited by Shri Shanti Bhushan to the observation of the Division Bench of the High Court at page 325 of the paper book wherein the Division Bench observed as under :
,
"Mihir H. Mafatlal was to get exclusive control to MIL to t~e exclusion of Arvind N. Mafatlal and his two brothers. Under the proposed family arrangement M. Fine was to be hived off from MIL and the control and management of the M. Fine was to be held by Arvind N. Mafatlal and that of MIL was tc:i be handed over to objector Mihir H. Mafatlal. This family arrangement has suffered rough weather. Suit No. 1010of1987 was filed by Arvind N. Mafatlal against Mihir H. Mafatlal and others before the Bombay High Court alleging that another agreement subsequent to the said family arrangement has come into existence under which Mihir H. Mafatlal and other brothers of Arvind had agreed to transfer all their holdings in MIL to A.N. Mafatlal, drawing a curtain on the family arrangement of 1979. Mihir H. Mafatlal has filed counter claim in that suit claiming enforcement of family arrangement of 1979. The said dispute and the outcome thereof will have direct effect on the respective interest of the shares held by AN. Mafatlal, Mihir H. Mafatlal and other members of the Mafatlal family, and
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
trusts. under them." He also invited our attention to the observations of the Division Bench at page 328 of the paper book to the effect that having cons;dered the rival co.ntentions and closely examined the scheme of Section 393, they were unable to sustain the conclusion that the facts about the interests under the alleged family arrangements and the effect of proposed arrangement for amalgamation on such interests were not required to be disclosed under section 393(1)(a). In our view the aforesaid observations of the Division Bench are not
C quite apposite in the light of the proposed Scheme of Compromise and
arrangement which was sought to be got sanctioned by the Court. On the other hand the learned Single Judge was quite justified in taking the View that this type of interest which was of personal nature so far as director Arvind Mafatlal on the one hand and appellant on the other hand were concerned was not at all germane to the question relating to sanctioning of the Scheme of Compromise and Arrangement with which the Court was concerned. It is obvious that when a. Scheme of Compromise and Arrangement which involves two companies, namely the transferor- company and the transferee-company and their shareholders and creditors is on the anvil of scrutiny before the sanctioning Court, the court has to see that the interest of the class of creditors or shareholders to whom the Scheme is offered for approval is any way likely to be affected by the suppression of special interest of the director in connection with such a scheme which is on the anvil. Two independent bodies which are represented by their shareholders or creditors as a class, as the case may be, have to take commercial decisions strictly with a view to seeing that the concerned ' Scheme of Compromise or Arrangement is beneficial to the shareholders or creditors as a class vis-a-vis the company which is a corporate entity in so far as company's relations with these class of creditors and shareholders are concerned. If the special interest which the director has is in any way likely to be affected by the Scheme and if non-disclosure of such an interest is likely to affect the voting pattern of the class of creditors or shareholders who are called upon to vote on the scheme, then only such special interest of the .director is required to be communicated to the voters as per Section 393(1)(a). We fail to appreciate how the personal family dispute between the appellant on the one hand and Arvind Mafatlal, director of the transferee-company MIL on the other regarding the right to hold shares in the
.....
MIHEER H.MAFAlLAL v. MAFKILALINDS. LID. [S.B. MATMUDAR, J.) 37
company can have any linkage or nexus with the Scheme of Amalgamation A of these two companies which was put to vote before the equity shareholders. It is easy to visualize that if the suit filed by Arvind Mafatlal against the appellant succeeds and the appellant's counter-claim fails then all that would happen is that the appellant will have to sell his share-holding which is only 5% in the transferee-company to the plaintiff Arvind Mafatlal. That. has nothing to do with the equity shareholders as a class which was called upon to decide whether the scheme of merging the transferor-company MFL with the transferee-company was for the benefit of the shareholders as a class. The equity shareholders of the transfereecom pany had to ,decide in their commercial wisdom whether it is worthwhile to have a larger body of shareholders on account of the merger so that apart from the shareholding of the transferee-company its objects would also get diversified and its filed of operation would be enlarged with the prospect of hike in the dividend available to these shareholders after the economic and industrial activities of both the companies so amalgamated would get elongated and whether the value of their shares in such D consolidated companies were likely to get a boost in the stock market. This was the commercial decision which the equity shareholders of the transferee-company .had to take. For taking this informed decision they were least concern~d whether 5% share-holding of appellant in the company remained or did not remain with him in future. Consequently if Arvind Mafatlal's suit ultimately succeeded before the Bombay High Court and E the appellant lbst in his counter-claim that would have no effect whatsoever on the informed decision which the equity shareholders were called upon to take while approving the scheme in question.
c
Conversely if the appellant succeeded in his counter-claim and direc- F tor Arvind Mafatlal lost in his suit then all that would happen is that Arvind Mafatlal will have to transfer his share- holding and share-holding of his group in favour of appellant so far as the transferee-company is concerned. That future possibility would have no impact on the decision making process which the equity shareholders of transferee-company had to un- G dertake at this stage while approving the Scheme. Consequently such an eventuality was totally irrelevant for being brought to the notice of the equity shareholders before whom the scheme was put to vote. While deciding whether transferor-company should be merged with the transferee-company and the transferee-company's economic and industrial activity should be permitted to be enlarged as a result of such merger the H
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
equity shareholders were least concerned whether the appellant would purchase in future the share of the present director Arvind Mafatlal or vice versa. That was entirely their personal dispute which was still not adjudicated upon and its decision one way qr the other had no impact on the pattern of voting of the equity shareholders of the respondent-company as a class of prudent businessmen and investors so far as the Scheme was concerned. The Scheme of Compromise and Arrangement which was put to vote was of such a nature that it had no impact or effect on the personal interest of the director Arvind Mafatlal in connection with his present share-holding in the transferee-c()mpany. Consequently it must be held that mention about such an interest was outside the statutory requirements of Section 393(1)(a) as rightly held by the learned Single Judge whose view was erroneously upset by the Division Bench. However in any case we are in entire agreement with the subsequent reasoning of the Division Bench for approving the decision of the learned Single Judge on this aspect, namely, that such non-disclosure of interest had no impact on the voting pattern adopted at the meeting by the equity shareholders who are called upon to approve the scheme. It may also be noted in this connection that the resolution of the equity shareholders approving the Scheme of Amalgamation was passed with overwhelming majority by members including through proxies, present and voting. It projected the following picture :
In favour
Against
Total
(i)
No. of Members
5,298
5,441
(ii)
No. of valid votes
19,36,964
86,061
20,23,025
F From the pattern ofvoting it became apparent that out of 100% of the share capital 75.75 per cent in value participated of which 95.75 per cent voted in favour of the proposed Scheme. Out of 95.75 per cent of the votes in value, a paltry 8.43 per cent votes had been attributed to Arvind Mafatlal group consisting of individuals and trust. 39.45 per cent were the votes attributable to financial institutions which can be said to have no interest G other than their own interests as men of business' in considering the proposed Scheme. Over 23 per cent votes have been attributed to public limited companies or private limited companies which held the shares of MIL and in which Arvind Mafatlal was also alleged to have interests. Thus non-mentioning of the private dispute between Arvind Mafatlal and objecH tor in connection with the holding of shares in the transferee-company had
·MIHEER H. MAFA'ILAL v. MAFATIAL INDS. LID. (S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.) 39
,_...,..._
in fact no impact on the voting pattern of equity shareholders including the A financial institutions which had nothing to do with this personal feud between the warring groups. Consequently the non-mentioning of the pending dispute between the appellant on the one and Arvind Mafatlal on the other which was pending adjudication in the Bombay High Court had in fact no impact whatsoever on the result of the voting undertaken by the B equity shareholders in their class meeting. Thus the requisite statutory majority of votes approving the scheme could not have been adversely affected by the non-mentioning of this pending litigation in the explanatory note even assuming that the Division Bench was right in holding that it was required to ·be informed to the voters as per the requirements of Section 393(1)(a). In either view of the matter, therefore, the non-mentioning of C the pending litigation between. the director of the transferee-company Arvind Mafatlal on the the one hand and the appellant on the other, had no vitiating effect on the majority decision of the equity shareholders who approved the Scheme with overwhelming majority of 95.75 per cent of votes and when the dissenting vote on behalf of the appellant's group was in D microscopic minority of less than 5%. It is also pertinent to note in this connection that appellant who being a party to the civil litigation before the Bombay High Court and who was very much keep to get more shareholding in transferee-company and who had already filed his counter-claim for enforcing the family arrangement of 1979, had not thought it- fit to remain present in the meeting of equity shareholders and on the contrary E . he got himself represented through proxy who had no night to speak. Thus in substance the appellant himself never though that information about the pendency of the litigation between Arvind Mafatlal, director or the respondent-company and himself was so important that it was required to be brought to the voters' notice even though he had opportunity to do so by F remaining personally present in the meeting for that purpose. It, therefore, clearly appears to be an afterthought when he put forward such an objection for the sake of it at the time of opposing the Scheme which was put for sanction of the Court.
It may also be kept in view that the explanatory statement no way G emphasised that it is the management of the transferee-company by Shri Arvind Mafatlal which is going to be better monitored and managed by him after the merger in question. In other words management of the company is not at all a germane consideration for the Scheme. Consequently whether the management remains with Arvind Mafatlal or in future may H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
.A met get changed and go in the hands of the appellant is not a consideration
which has any linkage or nexus with the Scheme. Consequently the interest of Arvind Mafatlal in the share-holding or likely future impact thereon by the litigation was de hors the Scheme in question and was not required to be placed before the voters. The first point for determination is, therefore, answered in the negative. Point No. 2
..,. So far as this point is concerned Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the appellant, submitted that in modern days corporate bodies even.though public limited companies are mostly controlled by big, influential and economically powerful families, which have inherited entrepreneurial skill and expertise from earlier generations which had controlled such enterprises in past. That in the present case also the director of the respondent-company Shri Arvirid Mafatlal, the eldest male D member of the family, had descended from the common ancestor Mafatlal Gagalbhai who had established this empire and which has further grown with passage of years. That when such a powerful director who is the eldest male member of the family of the family is at the helm of affairs the minority interest of the appellant who, according to him, was entitled to 50% share in the family concerns as per the 1979 family settlement was E likely to be voted out and cornered by the influence of such a towering personality as Arvind Mafatlal in the meeting of equity shareholders. Therefore, unfairness of the Scheme has to be judged also from the point of view of its impact on the minority shareholder who has a common ancestor Mafatlal Gagalbhai and who is sought to be cornered and F deprived of his just share in the family concerns. by the machinations of Shri Arvind Mafatlal. The Court has, therefore, to see whether the Scheme of Amalgamation which is sought to be put through at the behest of the director of the respondent-company is fair to the minority group of the appellant who claims 50% share in the family concerns against the director of the respondent-company Shri Arvind Mafatlal and his group. So far as G this submission is concerned Shri Sorabjee, learned senior counsel for the respondent joined issues and submitted that factually there is no basis for such a contention as respondent-company is not controlled by Shri Arvind Mafatlal who is one of the direct.ors along with his son Hrishikesh but there are eleven outside directors and the share-holding of Arvind Mafatlal and H his group is not even 50% even including the share-holding of other
c
...
- _,
MJHEERH.MAFATLALv.MAFATLALINDS.LTD.[S.B.MAfMUDAR,J.]41 subsidiary companies in which also Arvind Mafatlal and his group may be shareholders. We find considerable force in the aforesaid contention of learned senior counsel for the respondent. The evidence produced in the case shows that out of total majority vote of95.75 per cent which supported the Scheme at the meeting of equity shareholders even according to the pattern disclosed by the appellant himself individual trust controlled by Arvind Mafatlal and private companies accounted to only 16% of the shares voted in the meeting, about 44% of the share were represented by financial institutions, employees and public taken together and two companies stated to be from Mafatlal group had only 15% share. Consequently it is too much to contend that the voting pattern was dominated by the share-holding of Arvind of Mafatlal and his group when about 40% of the shares are held by financial institutions which had nothing to do with the internal feuds of director Arvind Mafatlal on the one hand had the appellant-objector on the other. It could not be said that the Scheme as put to vote was in any way unfair to appellant or that the majority shareholders acting as a class had not behave.cl in a bona fide manner for protecting the interest of the class as a while and were in any way inimical to the appellant. While considering the question of bona fides of the majority voters and whether they were unfair to the appellant it has to be kept in view that bona fides. of the majority acting as a group has to be examined vis-a-vis the Scheme in question and. not the bona fides of the person whose persona!. interest might be different from the interest of the voters as a class. Bona fide of person can only be relevant if it can be established with reasonable certainty that he represents majority or is controller of majority. Arvind Mafatlal cannot be visited with such a charge. In this connection we may usefully refer to a decision of English Court in the case of Hellenic and General Trust Limited reported in (1976) 1 WLR 123. In that case the Court was concerned with a Scheme of Arrangement whereunder all the ordinary shares of the company were to be cancelled and new shares were to be issued to Hambros which would make the company as wholly owned subsidiary of Hambros. Holders of such cancelled shares were to be paid by Hambros at 48 pennies. In short it was an arrangement for taking over of the company by Hambros. 53% shares of the Hellenic Company were held by another company MIT. MIT itself was a wholly owned subsidiary company of Hambros. This situation led the Court to conclude that the subsidiary company of Hambros which was holding such large number of shares placed itself vis-a-vis Hambros in the position of vendor and the
A ·
C
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
lifted veil of transaction showed it to be one of acquisition than of amalgamation. The aforesaid decision is a pointer to the fact that what was required to be considered while sanctioning the scheme was bona fides of the majority acting as a class and not of single person. It is, therefore, not possible to agree with the coatention of learned senior counsel for the appellant that the majority had acted unfairly to the appellant and had not B protected his interest when what was to be protected was the class interest of minority shareholders falling in the same class along with the majority. It is not the contention of the appellant that while voting by majority in favour of the Scheme the majority had acted with any oblique motive to fructify any adverse commercial interest qua him and his group when it c consisted of outsiders like financial institutions or that there was any possibility of their surrendering their economic interest in the Scheme at the dictates of shareholder-director Arvind Mafatlal and his group. It is also to be kept in view that the Board of Directors of the respective companies, namely, the transferor-company as well as the transferee-comD pany had approved the Scheme of Amalgamation before it was put to vote . . The appellant was himself one of the directors of the transferor- company who had no objection to the Scheme of Amalgamation from the point of view of the transferor-company. So far as the transferee-company is concerned though appellant was not a director he was 5% shareholder who did not think it fit to personally remain present at the time of voting and E simply relied upon proxy. If he was feeling that the Scheme was unfair to him or was not going to protect his interest as shareholder in the respondent-company nothing prevented· him from remaining present and voicing his grievance before the General Body of the equity shareholders and to apprise them of the alleged pernicious effect of the Scheme. It is, therefore, F too late in the day for him to contend that the Scheme was unfair to him and that the family of Arvind Mafatlal had tried to dominate and engineer any adverse pattern of voting at the meeting of the equity shareholders.
In 'this connection we tried to know from Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the appellant as to how the appellant felt that the Scheme was unfair to him. He submitted that under the Scheme the transferor-company was losing its identity and was getting merged in the transferee-company. That in the pending litigation between the parties in the Bombay High Court if the appellant succeeded in his counter-claim he was likely to get larger share-holding in the transferee- company and if that was not possible he could have got the complete control of the transferor-
MIHEER H. MAFA1LAL v. MAFA1LALINDS. LID. [S.B. MATMUDAR, J.] 43
r
company as per the family arrangement. Now once the transferor-company loses its identity then his counter-claim was likely to be infructuous as the subject-matter of the counter-claim will stand withdrawn from the possible operation of the decree if at all granted in his favour in the counter-claim. This submission was countered by learned senior counsel for the respondent by pointing out that it had no factual basis. That as earlier noted in the suit pending in Bombay High Court if Arvind Mafatlal succeeded then appellant will have to transfer his even remaining 5% share-holding in transferee-company in favour of Arvind Mafatlal. If on the other hand the appellant succeeded in his counter-claim and Arvind Mafatlal's suit was dismissed then the appellant may get the shares which are at present held by Arvind Mafatlal and his group in the transferee-company. But there is no question of appellant getting any exclusive control of the transferorcompany. Therefore, impact of that litigation one way or the other is going to be totally negative so far as the existence of the transferor-company or otherwise is concerned. We find considerable force in the contention of iearned counsel for the respondent. It is also pertinent to note that if the appellant felt that the Scheme was unfair inasmuch as he was likely to lose his future interest, if any, and control, if any, in the transferor-company by its merger and loss of identity on account of the Scheme it passes one's comprehension how he as sitting director of the transferor-company approved of the Scheme, did not object to the Scheme and on the contrary was a party to the resolution of the Board of Directors of transferor-company to propose the Scheme of its amalgamation with the transferee company. Not only that but even when that Scheme was put for sanction before the Bombay High Court on behalf of the transferor-company the appellant did not object meaning thereby appellant had no objection to the transferor-company losing its identity and getting merged in the transfereecompany pursuant to the proposed Scheme. The appellant's own conduct, therefore, belies his apprehension that the Scheme as proposed was in any was unfair to him or that there were any ma/a fides behind the Scheme attributable to Shri Arvind Mafatlal who is the director of the transfereecompany. The second point for determination, therefore, also is found to be factually not sustainable. It is, therefore, held that the Scheme of Compromise and Arrangement is neither unfair nor unreasonable to the minority shareholders represented by the appellant.
c
Before parting with the discussion on this point it is also worthwhile to note that apart from the pattern of voting at the meeting of the equity H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
shareholders, even the share-holding of the respondent-company belies the submission put forward on behalf of the appellant that Arvind Mafatlal's group dominated the constitution of the company and could control the decisions of the shareholders. The evidence on record shows that the share- holding of ANM Group can be worked out to 30.42% approximately. As against aforesaid share-holding the share-holding of financial institutions and MHM group in MIL would work out to 39.03% and that of appellant's group works out at 29.05% while that of other shareholders would work out to 34.34%. Hence it cannot be said that Arvind Mafatlal is at the helm of affairs of the respondent- company or is in the driver's seat or that his family is the virtual master of respondent-company. This is not a case where it can be urged with any emphasis that the respondentcompany is an alter ego of Arvind Mafatlal who is one of the directors of the company and that he could create a show of the Scheme being apparently beneficial to the shareholders but was in fact concealing any covert and hidden device of augmenting his personal interest and interest of his family which was adverse to the interest of innocent investors and other equity shareholders including the appellant. It is also pertinent to note that fina~cial institutions and statutory corporations held substantive percentage of shares in respondent-company. This class of shareholders who are naturally well informed about the business requirements and economic meeds and the requirements of corporate finance in the light of their personal interest would not have wholly approved the Scheme if it was contrary to the interest of shareholders as a class. Individual personal interest of a minority shareholder like the appellant is absolutely out of consideration when such class meeting acting for the benefit to the whole class of equity shareholders take up the consideration of the Scheme for its approval. Consequently it could not be said that the majority shareholders had sacrificed the class interest of appellant minority shareholders when they voted with overwhelming majority in favour of the Scheme. Point No. 2 is accordingly answered in the negative. That takes us to the consideration of Point No 3 for determination.
G Point No. 3
In a way the answer to point No. 2 necessarily results in negativing this point also. Even that apart we fail to appreciate how the Scheme of Amalgamation can be said to be unfair and amounting to suppression of minority shareholders represented by the appellant. It has to be kept in
MIHEERH.MAFAlLAL v. MAFAlLALINDS.LTD.[S.B.MAJMUDAR,J.] 45
view that by this proposed Scheme of Amalgamation the transferor-com- A pany was getting merged in the transferee-company. Now even if it is held that the appellant succeeds in his counter-claim in the suit pending in Bombay High Court and if he is to get the share-holding of Arvind Mafatlal and his group transferred to him so far as transferee- company is concerned, the transferee-company because of the amalgamation will then be B having more diversified activities and if at all according to the appellant because of this future success, if any, in the counter-claim he is going to replace A'l:vind Mafatlal and his group in the management of the respondent-company he would have larger field to operate and larger company to manage. We fair to appreciate as to how such a scheme from any point of view can amount to suppression of appellant's minority interest in the share-holding of the company. This interest is not going to be in any way adversely affected. If at all, his share-holding is going to increase in the respondent-company if his counter-claim succeeds. If his counter-claim fails he will have to get out lock, stock and barrel from the respondentcompany and he will have to wash his hands off the same. In either case D the Scheme of Amalgamation will have no adverse impact on the appellant's interest in the respondent-company. On the other hand the Scheme of Amalgamation is likely to have a move beneficial effect on the appellant's share-holding in the respondent-company if he succeeds in his counter-claim in Bombay High Court. It has to be kept in view that the E question of bona fide of the majority shareholders or the alleged suppression by them of the minority shareholders or their attempt to suffocate their interest has to be judged from the point of view of the class as a whole. Question is whether the majority equity shareholders while acting on behalf of the class as a whole had eXhibited any adverse interest against the appellant's minority shareholders also having similar interest as members of the same class, while approving the Scheme or had acted with any oblique motive to whittle down such a class interest of the minority. As we have seen earlier no such situation ever existed both at the time when the Scheme of Compromise and arrangement was cleared and proposed by the Board of Directors of both the transferor and transferee companies and G also at the stage when the Scheme was put to vote before the meeting of equity shareholders forming a common class of which the app~llant was also a member though a minority member. Consequently point No. 3 will also have to be answered in the negative on the same lines and for the same reasons on the basis of which point No. 2 is answered.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
Point No. 4
So far as this point is concerned the relevant provis10ns of the · Companies Act to which we have made a reference earlier indicate that the Court has to order under Section 391(1) a meeting of creditors or class of creditors or members or class of members to whom the Scheme of B Compromise or Arrangement is offered by the company. The present controversy centers round a meeting of members. Members of the company are shareholders. Part IV of the Companies Act deals with 'Share Capital and Debentures'. Section 82 provides that 'the shares or other interest of any member in a company shall be movable property, transferable in the manner provided by the articles of the company'. As per Section 86 the share cap.ital of a company limited by shares formed after the commencements of this Act, or issued after such commencement, shall be of two kiQds only, namely, equity share capital and preference share capital. So far as the Articles of Association of respondent-company are concerned D they also contemplate two classes of shareholders, namely, equity and preference shareholders. No separate class of equity shareholders is contemplated either by the Act or by the Articles of Association of respondent-company. Appellant is admittedly an equity sharehoWer. Therefore, he would fall within the same class of equity shareholders whose meeting was convened by the orders of the Company Court. However it ·is veheE mently contended by learned counsel for the appellant that because of the family arrangement of 1979 on which he relies he was a special class of ·minority equity shareholder who had separate rights against the director of the company and whose special interest because of the pending litigation between him and the director Shri Arvind Mafatlal was likely to be adverF sely affected by the Scheme, therefore, a separate meeting had to be convened as he represented a class within the class of equity shareholders. It is difficult to agree with this contention. Even though the Companies Act or the Articles of Association do not provide for such a class within the class of equity shareholders, in a given contingency it may be contended G by a group of shareholders that because of their separate and conflicting interest. vis-a-vis other equity shareholders with whom they formed a wider class, a separate meeting of such separately interested shareholders should have been con~ened. But such is not the case of the appellant. It is not his case that his interest as an equity shareholder in respondent-company is in any way conflicting with the general interest of the equity shareholders as
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MIHEERH.MAFATLALv.MAFATLALINDS.LTD.[S.B.MATMUDAR,J.]47
a class. Consequently it could no be urged by him with any emphasis that A the General Body of equity shareholders acting as a class while considering the question of approval of the Scheme was likely to take a decision which could adversely affect the commercial interest of the appellant as an equity shareholder. His personal conflict of interests with the director was totally foreign to the scope of class meeting which was convened to consider the B Scheme in question as we have seen earlier while considering earlier points for determination. It is also to be ~ept in view that the appellant would have urged with some justification his contention for convening a separate meeting representing for him and his group of dissenting equity shareholders if it was his case that the Scheme of Compromise and Arrangement as offered to him and his group was in any way different from the Scheme of Compromise and Arrangement offered to other equity shareholders who also belonged to the same class in the wider sense of the term. On the express language of Section 391(1) it becomes clear that where a compromise or arrangement is proposed between a company and its members or any class of them a meeting of such members or class of D them has to be convened. This clearly presupposes that if the Scheme of Arrangement or Compromise is offered to the members as a class and no separate Scheme is offered to any sub- class of members which has a separate interest and a separate Scheme to consider, no question of holding a separate meeting of such a sub-class would at all survive. Even E otherwise it becomes obvious that as minority shareholder if the appellant had to dissent from the Scheme his dissent representing 5% equity shareholding would have been visible both in a separate meeting if any, of his sub-class or in the composite meeting where also his 5% dissent would get registered by appellant either remaining present in person or through proxy. Consequently when one and the same Scheme is offered to the entire class of equity shareholders for their consideration and when commercial interest of the appellant so far as the Scheme is concerned is in common with other equity shareholders he would have a common cause with them either to accept or to reject the Scheme for commercial point of view. Consequently there was no occasion for convening a separate class G meeting of the minority equity shareholders represented by the appellant and his group as tried to be suggested. It is also to be kept in view that it is not the case of the appellant that any different terms of compromise were offered to persons holding equity shares who were covering by the family arrangement of 1979 or otherwise. In fact the entire proposal of the H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
Scheme of Arrangement was one affecting equally and in the like manner all the existing equity shareholders of the respondent-company. In this connection it is profitable to refer to what the learned author Palmer in his Treatise Company Law 24th Edition, has to say : "What constitutes a class : The Court does not itself consider at this point what classes of creditors or members should be made parties to the scheme. This is for the Company to decide, in accordance with what the scheme purports to achieve. The application for an order for meetings is a preliminary step, the applicant taking the risk that the classes which are fixed by the judge, unusually on the applicant's request, are sufficient for the ultimate purpose of the section, the risk being that if in the result, and we emphasis the words 'in the result' they reveal inadequacies, the scheme will not be approved. If e.q. rights of ordinary shareholders are to be altered, but those of preference shares are not touched, a meeting of ordinary shareholders will be necessary but not of preference shareholders. If there are different groups within a class the interests of which are different from the rest of the class, or which are to be treated differently under the Scheme, such groups must be treated as separate class for the purpose of the scheme. Moreover, when the Company has decided what classes are necessary parties to the scheme, it may happen that one class will consist of a small number of persons who will all be willing to be bound by the scheme. In that case it is not the practice to hold a meeting of that class, but to make the class a party to the scheme and to obtain the consent of all its members to be bound. It is however, necessary for at least one class meeting to be held in order to give the Court jurisdiction under the Section." It is, therefore, obvious that unless a separate and different type of Scheme of Compromise is offered to a sub-class of a class of creditors or shareholders otherwise equally circumscribed by the class no separate meeting of such sub-class of the main class of members or creditors is required to be convened. On the facts of the present case the appellant has not been able to make out a case for holding a separate meeting of dissenting minority equity shareholders represented by his. The fourth point for determination, therefore, is answered in the negative. That takes
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MIHEER H. MAFATLAL v. MAFATLAL INDS. LTD. [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 49
us to the consideration of the last point for determination placed for our consideration by the learned senior counsel for appellant.
Point No. 5
....
It was submitted that the exchange ratio of equity shareholders so far as the transferee-company is concerned works very unfairly and un- B reasonably to them. As per the proposed Scheme 5 equity shares of transferor-company are to be exchanged for 2 equity shares of transfereecompany. So far as this contention is concerned it has to be kept in view. that before formulating the proposed Scheme of Compromise and Amalgamation an expert opinion was obtained by the respondent-company as well as the transferor- company, namely, MFL on whose Board of Director~ appellant himself was a members. M/S. C.C. Chokshi & Co., a reputed firm of Chartered Accountants, having considered all the relevant aspects suggested the aforesaid exchange ratio keeping in view the valuation of shares of respective companies. It must at once be stated that valuation of shares is a technical and complex problem which can he appropriately left D to the consideration of experts in the filed of accountancy. Pennington in his 'Principles for Company Law' mentions four factors which had to be kept in mind in the valuation on shares :
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"(1) Capital Cover,
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(2) Yield, (3) Earning Capacity, and (4) Marketability
For arriving at the fair value of share, three well known methods are applied : (1) The manageable profit basis method (the Earning Per Share Method)
(2) The networth method or the break value method, anti (3) The market value method." So many imponderables enter the exercise of valuation of shares. M/s. C.C. Chokshi & Co. considering all the relevant aspects and obviously keeping
SUPREME COURT REP.ORTS (1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A in view the accounting principles underlying the valuation of shares sug"" gested the said ratio which was found acceptable both by the Board ot Directors of the respondent-company as well as th.e Board of Directors of the transferor-company. That the appellant himself as a director of that transferor-company gave green single to the Scheme and to this very ratio B of exchange of shares. But Shri M.J. Thakore, appearing for the appellant submitted that form the point of view of the transferor-company it was very profitable to have two shares of transferee-company against five shares of transferor- company. But the difficulty arises only from the point of view of transferee-company shareholders. According to Shri Thakore the proper c exchange ratio would be one share of transferee-company to six shares of transferor-company. It is difficult to appreciate this contention of the appellant. It has to be kept in view that appellant never bothered to personally remain present in the meeting of equity shareholders for pointing out the unfairness of this exchange ratio to his brother equity D shareholders who were likely to be affected by the very same ratio as the appellant. His interest at least to that extent was entirely common and parallel to that of other equity shareholders. But he had no time to remain personally present. He sent his proxy only to record his dissent vote which was in microscopic minority of 5% as compared to 95% majority vote. Not only that even before the Court he did not submitted and contrary expert E opinion regarding the valuation of shares of transferor and transferee companies for supporting his ipse dixit that the correct ratio would be 6 : 1 so far as transferor .and transferee. companies were concerned. Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for. the appellant having realised this difficulty submitted that at last these proceedings are continuation of F proceedings before the High Court, therefore, this Court may now in order to satisfy itself send for the opinion of an expert. It is difficult to agree. The appellant who was propounding this theory of correct exchange ratio had nothing to offer in support of his contention both b~fore the learned Single Judge as well as before the High Court. It has to be kept in view G that the matter was fiercely contested on all permissible points before learned Single Judge. 1:he proceedings were pending before the High Court for more than two years from 8th February 1994 till lZth July 1996 when the Division Bench disposed of the appeal. For all these years neither before the learned Single Judge nor before the High Court in appeal the H appellant thought it fit to request the Court to either call for the report of
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MIHEERH.MAFA1LAL v. MAFA1LALINDS.LID. [S.B.MATMUDAR,J.) 51
any other expert on valuation of shares not did he himself get such report A for placing for consideration of the Court in support of his supposed better ratio. It has also to be kept in view that which exchange ratio is better is in the realm of coinmercial decision of well informed equity shareholders. It is not for the Court to sit in appeal over this value judgment of equity shareholders who are supposed to be men of the world and reasonable B persons who know their own benefit and interest underlying any proposed scheme. With open eyes they have okayed this ratio and the entire Scheme. 40% of the majority shareholders were financial institutions who were supposed to be well versed on the aspect of valuation of shares. They had no objection to the exchange of 2 shares of transferee-company for 5 shares C of transferor company. As stated earlier it was a sort of a package duly · cdnsidering all imponderables and implicit factors which the shareholders had to keep in view for deciding whether to approve the Scheme of Amalgamation or not. The exchange ratio was only one of the itt!ms. They though if fit in their commercial wisdom to ac;cept the Scheme as a whole D along with the exchange ration presumaply in expectation of better profits in years to come when the amalgamated companies would operate and when there would be, according to the shareholders, better. prospects of earning greater dividends. They willingly agreed to give in exchange two shares of transferee-company for five share of transferor-company and made them available to the shareholders of the transferor- company. The E appellant was representing only 5% dissenting shareholders and his object was almost a voice in the wilderness, which did not appeal to the majority of his brother shareholders. Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the appellant in this connection invited our attention to the observation of the Division Bench in its judgment at page 375 wherein it has F been observed that "if one were to examine the exactitude of exchange ratio that may be offf'.red fairly on the arithmetic scale by taking into consideration various details, there is some force in what were suggested . by Mr. B.R. Shah on behalf of~e appellant. However, keeping in view the scope of enquiry which the court is required to undertake and with whose G findings we are concerned, it will not be ~ermissible for us in law to undertake this exercise in the facts and circumstances of present case in absence of bona fides". We fail to appreciate how this observation can be of any avail to learned senior conceal for the appellant as all that the Court wanted to suggest was that even assuming that some another exchange ratio H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
can be suggested to be better one, it was for the equity shareholders who acted bona fide in the interest of their class as a whole to accept even a less favourable ratio considering other benefits, that may offset such less favourable ratio once an amalgamation goes through. We wholly concur with this view. In this connection we may also refer to a decision of Maughm, J., in Re Hoare & Co. (No. 2) case (1933) All ER 105 wherein it was laid down that where statutory majority had accepted the offer the onus must rest on the applicants to satisfy the court that the price offered is unfair. In this connection following pertinent observations were made by the learned Judge :
"The other conclusion I draw is this X X X X X X the court ought to regard the scheme as a fair one inasmuch as it seems me impossible to suppose that the court, in the absence of any strong grounds, is to be entitled to set up its own view of fairness of the scheme in opposition to so very large a majority of shareholders who are concerned. Accordingly, without expressing a final opinion on the matter because there may be special circumstances in special cases, I am unable to see that 11 have any, right to order otherwise in such a case as I have before me, unless it is affirmatively established that notwithstanding the views of a very large majority of shareholder, the scheme is unfair."
We may also refer to a decision of the Gujarat High Court in Kamala Sugar Mills Limited 55 Company Cases p. 308 dealing with an identical objection about the exchange ratio adopted in the Scheme of Compromise and Arrangement. The Court observed as under :
"Once the exchange ratio of the shares of the transferee-company to be allotted to the shareholders of the transferor-company has been worked out by a recognised firm of chartered accountants who are experts in the field of valuation and if no mistake can be pointed out in the said valuation, it is not for the court to substitute its exchange ratio, especially when the same has been accepted without demur by the overwhelming majority of the shareholders of the two companies or to say that the shareholders in their collective wisdom should not have accepted the said exchange ratio on the ground that it will be detrimental to their interest."
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MIHEERH. MAFATIAL v. MAFATIALINDS. LID. [S.B.MATMUDAR,J.] 53
"'
These observations in our view represent the correct legal position on this A aspect. We may also keep in view that in the present case not only expert like M/s. C.C. Chokshi & Co. had suggested the ratio but another independent body ICICI Security & Finance Company Limited reached the same conclusion which was conveyed by its letter dated 10th November 1993 to the company approving of the entire Scheme along with suggested B ratio. A mere look at the report of the Chartered Accountants M/s. C.C. Chokshi & Co. shows that various factors underlying the Scheme of Compromise and Arrangement were taken into consideration while suggesting the exchange ratio by the said reputed firm of chartered accountants. The said opinion had taken into account the fact that on amalgamation shares C have to be cancelled. Increase in share premium account in equity capital of the MIL will also have to be taken into account as a result of final call made in respect of Bond 1992 issue. It has also taken into account significant increase in the paid-up equity of MIL as a result of issue of its Bond in the international market. It has undertaken exercise in calculating D net-worth of two companies. It has also referred to the method of valuation of exchange ratio on the basis of earning per share of the two companies by taking into account five years' working results of the two companies making certain adjustments. Apart from taking into consideration the past results of the two companies, the chartered accountants have taken into account the potentiality of the two companies to earn profit in future, E considering existing expansion and modernisation of projected and planned expenditure by the MIL as well as subsidiary and sister concern in hard. It has also taken into account the market price of equity shares of past 24 months, declared dividend by the two companies the overall effect of security scam in the market price, realisable investment and their F market value. Taking into consideration multifarious considerations detailed in the report, note was also taken of the fact that MIL held substantial shares of MFL, which shall have to be cancelled on merger of MFL with MIL. :rwo fully paid up equity shares of MIL of Rs. 100 each for every five equity share of Rs. 100 each of MFL, was considered to he G a fair exchange ratio to be offered as term of amalgamation. It was clarified that, 'in absolute terms it would mean that the MIL is keeping consideration of equity capital of par value of Rs. 7.77 crores which at the last issue price of share amounts about to Rs. 38.84 crores and which at the correct market price amounts to Rs. 57.4 crores. At the stage of dividend declared H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A . for 1992-93, it will result in a cost in terms of distributable profits of Rs. 2.72 crores. For an undertaking in a diversified business activity of textile and chemicals with the tota_l infrastructure, knowhow, technology tie up and range of established products and capacities and potential the aforesaid cost to MIL can be regarded as fair and reasonable'.
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The aforesaid report of the chartered accountants heavily w~ighed with the transferor-company's Board of Directors which comprised, amongst others, the appellant himself but also the Board of Directors of transferee-company and also weighed with tCe General Body of equity shareholders who approved the Scheme and the ratio with overwhelming majority. No grievance, therefore, can be make by the appellant at the stage of Company Petition proceedings.for demonstrating the ratio to be exfacie unfair and unacceptable .as the appellant would like to have it. Undeterred by this position Shri Thakore, learned counsel for the
D appellant in support of his contention that the exchange ratio was ex f acie unfair to the shareholders. ·of the transferee- company, invited our attention • to the statement showing the working results of both the transferor and transferee companies as found at Annexures M and N of Vol. II of the Paper Book at page 534 and 535. He submitted that these statements showing the working results of the company for the last five years ended 31st March 1993 showed that the earning per equity share after depreciation and tax so far as the respondent-company was concerned was Rs. 30 while earning of transferor-company Mafatlal Fine Spg. & Mfg. Company Limited was only Rs. 7 for the relevant five years. He also invited our attention to the break-up value of the shares of company on the basis of F the Balance Sheet as on 31st March 1993 so far as respondent-company was concerned. Annexure 'Q' at page 538 showed value per equity share of Rs. 100 each at Rs. 1,515 while so far as the transferor-company was concerned the break-up value per equity share was Rs.259. That may be so. But as a package deal when the Scheme as a whole is examined and G found to be advantageous to the economic and commercial interest of shareholders as a class only one or two item simplicitor for deciding the exchange ratio cannot tilt the balance as so 'may factors and aspect would enter that exercise. It was undertaken by expert body of chartered accountants like M/s. C.C. Chokshi & Co. Before parting with the discussion on H this point it would be apposite to refer to the decision of this Court in
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MIHEER H. MAFATLAL v. MAFATLALINDS. LTD. [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.) 55
Hindustan Lever Employees' Union (supra). In paragraph 41 of the Report A Justice Sen speaking for himself and Venkatachaliah, CJ, and to which Sahai, J concurred has observed that the problem of valuation in the case of amalgamation of two companies has been dealt with by Weinberg and Blank in the book 'Take-overs and Mergers' in which it is stated that some or all of the 8 listed factors will have to be taken into account in determin- B ing the final share exchange ratio. The Court has also approved the fixation of exchange ratio of the shares of the companies on the basis of adoption of combination of two or more well-known methods of valuation of shares out of many such methods. In para 37 of the Report it has been observed that the question is what method should be adopted for arriving at a proper exchange ratio. The usual rule is that shares of the going concern must be taken at quoted market value. This principle was also recognised by this Court in the case of CWT v. Mahadeo lalan, (1973) 3 SCC 157. It is not .the case of the appellant that M/s. C.C. Chokshi & Co. had not taken into consideration the quoted market value of shares of both the companies which were going concerns and which were subjected to the Scheme of D Amalgamation in question. For all these reasons, therefore, there is no substance in this contention canvassed on behalf of the appellant that the exchange ratio was ex f acie unfair to the equity shareholders of the transferee- company. The fifth point for determination is also, therefore, answered in the negative.
c
Before parting with this appeal we may mention that written submissions comprising of 69 pages have beeµ. submitted by learned counsel for the appellant. We have gone through the written submissions. We may mention that learned counsel for the appellant was permitted to file written submissions spread over 4 to 5 pages while his written submission have gone upto 69 pages. It may also be mentioned that there was an order passed by us 21st August 1996 permitting filing of written statements within two days but the learned counsel for the Appellant has filed written submissions only on 27th August 1996. Therefore, ex f acie his written submissions are not required to be considered. However in order to see that the appellant may not suffer on account of non-consideration of these written submission we have gone through them and have considered them in the interest of justice. But having gone through the same we find that they involve repetition of the main contentions canvassed before us during oral arguments by their learned senior counsel Shri Shanti Bhushan and by
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A their counsel Shri M.J. Thakore. Some additional points also appear to
have been raised in the written submissions pertaining to additional objections which were not pressed before us at the time of oral hearing and, therefore, they obviously cannot be considered in support of the contentions on which the appeal was pressed before us. The written submissions in connection with the points which were already pressed before us are already dealt with by us while considering the main points for determination in the earlier part of this judgment and, therefore, it is not necessary to deal with the same once again. These were the only contentions canvassed in support of the points
C for determination which have all been answered in the negative. The inevitable result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed. Jn the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs.
v.s.s.
Appeal dismissed.
COOCH BEHAR CONTRACTORS' ASSOCIATION AND ORS. ETC.
v.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS. SEPTEMBER 11, 1996
[S.P. BHARUCHA AND K. VENKATASWAMI, JJ.] Sales Tax Law: Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941: Sections 2(c) and 6-D.
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Sales TOJ..~Declaration forms-Denial of-To dealers under S.6D-While advantage of using such forms was available to other dealers-Held: not violative of A1ticle 14 of Constitution-Constitution of India, 1950, A1ticles 14 and 366(29- A).
Section 6-D-Scope of-Held : was a complete code so far as dealers in works contract were concemed--Hence, such dealers were not entitled to any concession other than those enumerated in S.6-D. "Contractual transfer p1ice''-Goods supplied to contractor by contractee and p1ice recovered from colllractor by way of adjustment-Held : value of such goods covered under "contractual transfer p1ice". "Contractual transfer p1ice''-Royalty-Paid by contractor in the execution of w01*s contract while procuring boulders, e01th etc.-Includibility of-Held : royalty amounted to payment of p1ice for goods obtained from the Govemment Depaltments and used in the works contract-Hence, includible in "contractual tramfer price".
"Contractual transfer price''-Cost of'freight and delive1y for canying goods to work site-Includibility of-Question left open. Words and Phrases : "Contractual tram.fer price''-!vleaning of-In the context of Section 6-D of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941.
The appellants were contractors who executed civil construction , works under different departments of the Central and State Governments as well as Corporations. The Revenue sought to assess the appellants
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A under Section 6-D of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941. The appellants filed a petition before the Taxation Tribunal challenging such assessment. The Tribunal dismissed the petition. Being aggrieved the appellants preferred the present appeal. On behalf of the appellants it was contended that denial to dealers
B under Section 6-D c)f the Act the use of declaration forms which had been
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made available to other dealers was violative of the Constitution; that the value of the stores.and materials supplied by the contractee to the contractor should not be included in the "contractual transfer price" under Section 6-D of the act; that the royalty paid by the contractor in the execution of works contract while procuring boulders, earth etc. should not be included in the 'contractual transfer price'; and that cost of freight and delivery for carrying goods to the work site should not be included in the 'contractual transfer price'. Dismissing the appeal, this Court HELD : 1.1. Section 6-D of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 is a self-contained code so far as dealers in works contract are concerned. Whatever concessions the Legislature wanted to extend to such dealers were enumerated in clauses (a) to (e) of Section 6-D(2) of the Act. Moreover, having regard to the non-obstante clause used in Section 6-D, it is clear that no further concession was intended to be extended to the dealers in works contract. As t~ey form a class by themselves, they cannot compare themselves with other dealers coming under sections 4 or 5 and allege discrimination to invoke Article 14 of the Constitution of India. [63-H; 64-A-B] Gannon Dunkerley and Co. v. State of Rajasthan, [1993) 1 SCC 364, relied on. Builders Association of India and Others v. Union of India and Others, [1989) 2 sec 645, referred to. .
1.2. The Tribunal bas found the contractor has to pay the price of the goods supplied by the contractee by way of adjustment. It is, therefore, clear that goods used in the execution of the works contract stand transferred from the contractor to the contractee at the time the goods are incorporated in the construction and the value of such goods is covered, under the 'contractual transfer price'. [65-E; H]
COOCHBEH.ARCONTRACTORS'.ASSN. v.ST.ATE[VENKATASWAMI,J.}59 N.M. Goel & Co. v ..Sales Tax Officer & Anr., 72 STC 375, relied on. 2.1. The payment of royalty in the execution of works contract while procuring boulders, earth etc. amounts to payment of price for the goods obtained from the Government Departments and used in the works contract, and covered under 'contractual transfer price'. [66-D]
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Orient Paper Mills Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 77, relied on.
2.2. The Tribunal has not finally disposed of the issue of inclusion of cost of freight and delivery for carrying goods to the work site under 'contractual transfer price' and hence this question if left open. [67-B]
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5577-79 (NT) of 1990 Etc. From the Judgment and Order dated 26.4.90 of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal, in R.N. 103 (T), 367 (T) and 34(T) of 1989.
B. Sen and T. Ramachandran, Dilip Sinha, D. Krishan and J. R. Das for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATASWAMI, J. Common questions of law arise out of a common judgment of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal dated 26.4.1990 rendered in RN-30(T), RN-31(T) RN-34(T), RN-103(T), RN-367(T), RN138(T), RN-338, RN-339 of 1989. The appellants are contractors and they execute civil construction works including construction of roads and bridges under different departments of the Central and State Governments as well as respective corporations. Such works include excavation of earth, drilling, construction of water channel and river bank protection. Sue~ works of contract were not brought under the net of sales tax till the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") was amended by the West Bengal Act 4 of 1984 inserting section 60 and amending section 2(c) of the Act. These amendments were pursuant to the 46th Amendment of the
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Constitution of India in the year 1982 inserting clause 29A in Article 366. The constitutional validity of the 46th Amendment inserting clause 29A in Article 366 was challenged and this Court in Builders Association of India and Others v. Union of India and Others, [1989] 2 SCC 645 upheld the constitutionality of the said amendment.
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As a result of the insertion of section 6D to the Act, all transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract was deemed to be a sale of those goods by the }Jerson making the transfer and the purchase of those goods by the person to whom such transfer was made. The revenue sought to assess the appellants under section 6D of the Act and the appellants aggrieved by such assessm~nts moved the High Court challenging initially the · constitutionality of section 6D and finally confining their challenge to certain limited aspects which we shall refer to hereinafter. The cases were originally filed in the High Court and subsequently were transferred to West Bengal Taxation Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal") and the Ttibunal in its detailed judgment repelled every one of the arguments raised on behalf of the. appellants and consequently dismissed the cases. Before us Mr. Jayant Das, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants broadly raised three poi11ts while attacking the assessments under section 6D of the Act. The first contention raised by the learned counsel was that section 6D unjustly discriminates in the matter of grant of declaration forms to the dealers under section 6D and thereby denies the advantage gained by other dealers by using declaration forms and thus it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
The second contention put forward by the learned counsel was that the value of the stores and materials supplied by the contractee to the contractor for the specific purpose of use in the execution of works contract should not be included in the 'contractual transfer price' under section 6D as according to the learned counsel in such supplies there is no transfer of property and the property always remains with the contractee. The third submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants was that the royalty paid by the contractors in the execution of works contract while procuring boulders, earth etc. should not be included in the 'contractual transfer price'. Another minor point raised by the learned counsel was that the cost of freight and delivery for carrying goods to the
COOCH BEHAR CONTRACTORS'ASSN. v. STATE [VENKATASWAMI, J.] 61
works site should not also be included in the 'contractual transfer price'. Mr. B. Sen, learned Senior Counsel in reply submitted that none of the questions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants remain res integra as they are totally covered either by the decision of this Court in Builders' Association case (supra) or the recent decision of this Court in M/s. Gannon Dunkerley and Co. and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others, [1993] 1 SCC 364. In addition to that he also invited our attention to a decision of this Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Orient Paper Mills Ltd., (1977] 2 SCC 77 wherein this Court has held that 'royalty' is a feudalistic euphemism for price. So far as the cost of freight and delivery for carrying the goods to the works site is concerned, the learned counsel invited our attention to the judgment of the Tribunal wherein the Tribunal has not finally decided the issue, but has left open the same for decision with reference to the facts of each case. In view of this overall submission with which we agree we do not feel it necessary to deal elaborately the contentions raised before us.
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For appreciation of the rival contentions, it is necessary to set out sections 2(c) and 60 of the Act as amended in the year 1984. They read as follows: "2(c) 'dealer' means any person who carries on the business of selling goods in West Bengal or of purchasing goods in West Bengal in specified circumstances or any person making a sale under section 60 ......" "60. - Liability to payment of tax on the transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of works contract and rate thereof. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act. (a) any transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract (hereinafter referred to as contractual transfer) shall be deemed to be a sale of these goods by the person making the transfer and the purchase of those goods by the person to whom such transfer is made; (b) (i) every dealer whose contractual transfer price during. the last year ending on or before the 31st day of March, 1984 exceeds
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
rupees two lakhs shall, in addition to the tax payable by him under section 5 and section 6B, if any, be liable to pay from the 1st day of April, 1984 a tax at the rate specified in sub-section (3) of such part of his contractual ·transfer price. as specified in sub-section (2);
(ii) every dealer, other than a dealer referred to in sub-clause (i), whose contractual transfer price during any year ending on or after the 1st day of April, 1984 exceed& rupees two lakhs shall, in addition to the tax payable by him under section 5 and section 6B, if any, be liable to pay from the first day of the year immediately following such year a tax at the rate specified in sub-section (3) of such part of his contractual transfer price as specified in sub-section (2);
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(iii) every dealer who has become liable to pay tax under sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) shall continue to be so liable until the expiry of three consecutive. years during each ·of which the contractual transfer price does not exceed rupees two lakhs and on the expiry of such three years his liability to pay such tax shall cease. (iv) every dealer, whose liability to pay tax has ceased under the provisions of sub-clause (iii), shall, if the contractual transfer price during any year again exceeds rupees two lakhs, be liable to pay from the first day of the year immediately following such year the tax at the rate specified in sub~section (3) of such par~ of this contractual transfer price as specified in sub-section (2);
(2) The tax payable under sub-section (1) shall be levied on that part of contractual transfer price of a dealer during any period which remains after deducting therefrom his contractual transfer price during the period on -
(a) contractual ti'.iansfer of goods referred to iii. section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (74 ·of 1956), on a prior sale whereof in West Bengal due tax under this Act or under the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954 (West. Bengal Act IV of 1954), if such . goods are notified for taxation under that Act, is shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioner to have been paid;
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COOCHBEHAR CONTRACTORS'ASSN. v. STATE [VENKATASWAMI, J.] 63
(b) contractual transfer of goods, sales of which are declared A tax-free under section 6; (c) contractual transfer of goods, sales of which are generally · exempt from tax under sub-clause (vi) of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 5;
(d) contractual transfer of .goods, on the purchase of which tax is payable by him under section 6C; (e) such other contractual transfers, as may be prescribed. (3) The tax under this section shall be levied at the rate of four per centum of such part of the contractual transfer price as specified in sub-section (2).
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Explanation 1. - In this section, the expression "contractual transfer price", used in relation to any period, shall mean the aggregate of the amounts received or receivable by a dealer during D such period as valuable consideration for the transfer of property in goods used in execution of a works contract, whether or not the amount receivable as valuable consideration for such transfer is separately shown in the works contract, and shall include the value of such goods purchased, manufactured, processed or E procured otherwise by the dealer and the cost of freight or delivery as may be incurred by such dealer for carrying such gooc_ls to the place where these are used in execution of such ·works contact, but shall not include such portion of the aforesaid amounts as may be prescribed.
· Explanation 2. - For the purpose. of this section, the expression "goods" include commodities specified for taxation under section 25 of the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954 (West Bengal Act IV of 1954) and, notwithstanding any contained in this Act or in the west Bengal Act IV of 1954), tax shall be levied on such commodities under this section." A perusal of section 60 clearly indicates that it is· a self-contained code so far as dealers in works contract are concerned. Whatever concessions the Legislature wanted to extend to such dealers were enumerated in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (2) of section 60. Apart from that and
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
having regard to the non obstante clause used in section 6D, it is made clear no further concession was intended to be extended to the dealers in works contract. As they form a class by themselves, they cannot compare themselves with other dealers coming under sections 4 or 5 and allege discrimination to invoke Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Tribunal has rightly taken a view by holding 'we are satisfied that the B contractors, being dealers under section 6D read with section 2(c), have _he<:n appropriately grouped together in one class, distinct and separate from the other classes of dealers. The charge of arbitrariness and unreasonableness must fail. The classification cannot be faulted on account of denial of the facility of use of declaration forms, because this class of c dealers has been treated and dealt with on a different footing altogether and they are governed by almost a self-contained code envisaged in section 6D.' As rightly pointed out by learned senior counsel for the respondent
D Mr. B. Sen, the recent decision of this Court in Gannon Dunkerley and Co. v. State of Rajastlzan, [1993] 1 SCC 364 also supports the view taken by the Tribunal. This Court has observed as follows :
"A question has been raised whether it is permissible for the State Legislature to levy tax on deerried sales falling within the ambit of Article 366 (29-A)(b) by prescribing a uniform rate of tax for all goods involved in the execution of a works contract even though different rates of tax are prescribed for sale of such goods. The learned counsel for the contractors have urged that it would not be permissible to impose two different rates of tax in respect of sale of the same article, one rate when the article is sold separately and a different rate when there is deemed sale in connection with the execution of works contract. On behalf of the States it has been submitted that it is permissible for the State to impose a particular rate of tax on all goods involved in the execution of a works contract which may be different from the rates of tax applicable to those goods when sold separately. In the field of taxation the decisions of this Court have permitted the legislature to exercise an extremely wide discretion in classifying items for tax purposes, so long as it refrains from clear and hostile discrimination against particular persons or classes. (See : East India Tobacco
COOCH BEHAR CONTRACTORS'ASSN. v. STATE [VENKATASWAMI, J.] 65
Co. v. State of A.P., P.M. Ashwathanarayana Shetty v. State of Karnataka, Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India v. Union of India and Kera/a Hotel and Restaurant Association v. State of Kera/a. Imposition of sales tax at different rates depending on the value of the annual turnover was upheld in S. Kodar v. State of Kera/a. Similarly, imposition of purchase tax at different rates for sugar mills and Khandsari units was upheld in Ganga Sugar Co. v. State of U.P. In our opinion, therefore, it would be permissible for the State Legislature to tax all the goods involved in t~e execution of a works contract at a uniform rate which may be different from the rates applicable to individual goods because the goods which are involved in the execution of the works contract when incorporated in the works can be classified into a separate category for the purpose of imposing the tax and a uniform rate may be prescribed for sale of such goods."
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In view of the above we hold that there is no discrimination violating D Article 14 of the Constitution as alleged by the learned counsel for the appellants. So far as the second contention urged on behalf of ·the learned counsel for the appellant is concerned, the Tribunal on facts has found the contractor has to pay the price of the goods supplied by the contractee by way of adjustment. This Court in 1989 (2) SCC 645 (supra) has observed as follows:
"Ordinarily unless there is a contract to the contrary, in the case. of a works contract the property in the goods used in the p construction of a building passes to the owner. of the land on which the building is constructed, when the goods or materials used are incorporated in the building. The contractor becomes liable to pay the sales tax ordinarily when the goods or materials are so used in the construction of the building and it is not necessary to· wait till G the final bill is prepared.for the entire work."
It is, therefore, clear that goods used in the execution of. the works contract stand transferred from the contractor to the contractee at the time the goods are incorporated in the construction. It is also brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the respondents that the principle laid H
"'
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down by this Court in N.M. Goel & Co. v. Sales Tax Officer & Anr., 72 STC 375 squarely applies to the second point raised herein. While considering a similar issue, namely, whether there was sale of goods in view of the contract between the parties whereunder the custody and control of the goods remained with the P.W.D. and goods were only used in the construction under the contract, this Court held that 'in the instant case, by use or consumption of materials in the work of construction, there was passing of the property in the goods to the assessee from the P.W.D. By appropriation and by the agreement, there was a sale as envisaged in terms of clause {10) set out hereinbefore. Therefore, in our opinion, there was a sale which was liable to tax'. Though this case was sought to be distinguished before the Tribunal by contending that that ratio must be treated as one given per incuriam it was rightly rejected by the Tribunal. We are, therefore, in agreement with the conclusion reached by the Tribunal that 'having considered all aspects of the matter, we hold that a sale within the meaning of section 2{g) of the 1941 Act, namely, a transfer of property in goods supplied by the owner/contractee to the contractor for use in the execution of a works contract takes place in the cases under our consideration, when such goods are actually used in the construction work, provided prices of such goods are deducted from or adjusted against bills or dues of the contractor'. So far as the third question of payment of royalty is concerned, we do not think there is any substance in that argument. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that in view of the decision of this Court in Orient Paper Mills (supra) the payment of royalty amounts to payment of price for the goods obtained from the Government departments and used in the works contract.
•.
Regarding the additional minor point, the Tribunal has not finally disposed of the issue and it has left open the issue by observing as follows:
"Learned counsel for the applicants did not submit that such inclusion is in anyway bad or unconstitutional. Expenses incurred on account of labour simpliciter surely cannot form a part of the contractual transfer price simply because it is not a value of or valuable consideration for any 'goods' unless such expense amounts to cost of freight or delivery for carrying the goods to the worksite. It will depend on the circumstances in which or the purpose for ,,
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COOCH BEHAR CONIRACTORS'ASSN. v. STATE [VENKATASWAMI, J.] 67
which labour was employed. On this question we hold accordingly. Each case shall have to be judged on its own merits and on its peculiar facts. ...... We, therefore, do not at this stage express any opinion one way or the other on those charges and expenses as to whether or not they will form part of the contractual transfer price." ~
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In view of the above it is not necessary to go into this issue further.
For the foregoing reasons, we do not think there is any case for interference under Article ·136 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed. No costs.
v.s.s.
Appeals dism1.ssed.
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SHRI CHANDER CHINAR BADA AKHARA UDASIN SOCIETY AND ORS. v. STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND JRS.
SEPTEMBER 11, 1996 [A.M. AHMADI CJ., N.P. SINGH AND B.N. KIRPAL, JJ.] Education-Higher education-Admission to professional colleges:
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Medical Colleg~Admission-Selection procedure-P1ivate recognised medical college run by society-No rules/guidelines framed by State Govemment for admission-Students seeking admission filed w1it petition before High Court-Complaining that failure on pmt of State Govemment to frame rules/guidelines deprived them of opp01tunity of seeking admission-Society D impleaded as respondent to the said wlit petition-Single Judge of High Cowt constituted Committee for selecting candidates on basis of oral interviews and fixed time schedule for admission-Pursuant to which advertisement issued on 4-10-1995 inviting applications and last date for receipt of applications was 11-12-1995-/nterviews held between 15 and 17-12-1995-Classes commenced from 26-12-1975-But Division Bench in L.PA. stayed operation of E order of Single Judge and directed selection be made on basis of common viva voce examination and that 75% marks for academic qualification and 25% marks for viva voce be allotted-Advertisement in'Jiting applications stipulated that candidate must be pennanent resident of State-Held: orders and directions of Single Judge as well as J?ivision Bench of High Court not F consistent with orders and directions issued by Supreme Court-Time Schedule fLXed by Single Judge was perse arbitrary-Percentage of marks secured at stage of higher secondmy examination conducted by different Boards vary and should not f01m basis of selection-Allotment of 25% marks for viva voce examination was unjustified-Condition of eligibility that cmididate must be a pennanent resident of State also unreasonable:-Common G entrance examination must be held and admission made in accordance with Supreme Court's directions in-Vnnikrishnan and subsequent cases.
Medical Co/leg~Admission-Plivate recognised medical college-No ntles/guidelines framed by State Govemment-Admission made in accbrdance with High Cowt's directions-Though such directions not consistent with
C.C. BADA v. STATE
orders and directions issued by Supreme Court-Held : due to indifferent A attitude of State Government and haste shown by college, the so-called candidates, who were said to have been admitted, were viltually on the roads-But only on equitable grounds, a procedure which was not sanctioned by law would not be approved only to mitigate hardship of such candidates who had sought admissions in the said medical college.
The Appellant-Society had the object of promoting medical education by establishing medical colleges, hospitals and child welfare· centres. A proposal was submitted to the State Government for setting up a medical college and a private hospital in the State. The State Government allotted land for the proposed medical college and charitable hospital. In due course temporary recognition to the said medical college was granted by the Medical Council of India. However, no rules/guidelines were framed by the State Government for admissions to the said medical College.
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Some students seeking admission to the said medical college filed a D writ petition before the High Court complaining that failure on the part of the State Government to frame rules/guidelines to regulate admission to the medical college of the Society had deprived them of the opportunity of seeking admission. The Single Judge of the Big~ Court constituted a Committee for selecting candidates on the basis of oral interviews and fixed a time schedule for admission, pursuant to which an advertisement E was issued on 4-12-1995 inviting applications. The last date for receipt of applications was 11- 12-1995 and interviews were held between 15-12-1995 and 17-12· 1995 and classes commenced from 26-12-1995. The respondents filed a Letters Patent Appeal against the aforesaid order before the Division Bench which stayed the operation of the order of the Single Judge. The Division Bench directed that selection be made on basis of common viva voce entrance examination and no common entrance written examination be held. A direction was also given that out of 100 marks awarded for selection of the candidates, 75% shall be for academic qualification and 25% shall be for common entrance viva voce examination. Pursuant to the direction given by the Division Bench an advertisement was issued by the State Government notifying conditions of eligibility for admission to the said medical college. One of the conditions was the candidate must be a permanent resident of the State. There was no such condition laid down by the Division Bench. Being aggrieved the
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
appellant-Society preferred the present appeal. Dismissing the appeal, this Court
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HELD : 1.1. Orders and directions of the Single Judge as well as Division Bench of the High Court are not consistent with the orders and directions issued by this Court indicating the procedure for admission in private medical colleges. The time schedule fixed by the Single Judge was perse arbitrary. The percentage of marks secured by different applicants at different types of examinations at the higher secondary stage cannot be treated as uniform. Some of such examinations are conducted at the state level, others at the national level including (he Indian School Certificate examination. The percentage secured at different examinations are bound to vary according to the standard applied by such examining bodies, which is well known. As such a common entrance examination has to be held. The allotment of 25% marks for viva voce examination is unjustified. A fresh advertisement shall be issued inviting applications and admission must be made in accordance with this Court's orders/directions issued in Unnikrishnan and subsequent cases. [77-D] J.P. Unnilaishnan v. State of A.P. & Ors., [1993] 1 SCC 645, followed.
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravadi & Ors., AIR (1981) SC 487; T.MA. Pai Foundation & Ors. v. State of Kamataka, [1993] 4 SCC 276; Manipal Academy of Higher Education v. State of Kamataka & Ors., [1994) 2 SCC 201 and T.MA. Pai Foundation and Ors. v. State of Kamataka and Ors., [1995) 5 SCC 220, referred to.
1.2. Due to the indifferent attitude of the State Government and haste shown by the appellant-Society, the so-called selected candidates, who are said to have been admitted, are virtually on the roads. But only on equitable grounds, a procedure which is. not sanctioned by law cannot be approved only to mitigate the hardship of such candidates who have sought admissions in the medical college aforesaid. [77-B-C]°
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 11915-17 of 1996 Etc.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.3.96 of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in L.P.A. (W) Nos. 307, 312/95 and 8of1996.
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C.C.BADA v. STAIB[N.P.SINGH,J.]
Dhruv Mehta and S.K. Mehta for the Appellants.
H.N. Salve, E.M.S. Anam and Subhash Sharma and Rajeev Sharma for the Respondents. The following Judgment/Order of the Court was delivered :
N.P. SINGH, J. Leave granted. Appellant No. 1 Shri Chander Chinar Bada Akhara Udasin Society (hereinafter referred to as the Society) is a society registered under the J & K Society Registration Act, the primary object being to promote medical education by establishing medical colleges, hospitals and child welfare centres. A proposal was submitted to the State Government for setting up a medical college and a private hospital in Jammu, in the year 1988. The State Government allotted 356 kanals of land for the proposed medical college and charitable hospital. A further allotment of 250 kanals of land is said to have been made by the State Government. The State Government D recommended to the Jammu University for grant of affiliation to the proposed medical college to be set up by the society. The State Government also requested the Medical Council of India to grant approval/recognition to the said medical college. Inspection was made by the representatives of the Medical Council of India in respect of infrastructure including the teaching facilities. In due course temporary recognition of the institution was granted. It is said that the Society approached the State Government to issue necessary guidelines and to frame· rules to regulate the admissions to the medical college established by the Society. The Society in its communication undertook to make admissions in accordance with the directions of the Supreme Court of India in the case of J.P. F Un11ik1islman v. State of A.P. & Ors., (1993] 1 SCC 645 and other directions issued by this Court. The last such communication was addressed by the Society to the State Government on 17.10.1995 saying that although it had got recognition from the Government of India, but no rules/regulations were being framed by the State Government for admissions to the said G medical college.
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The State Government had issued an advertisement on 6.7.1995 inviting applications from eligible candidates for appearing at the entrance test for admission to the two government medical colleges. But while iSsuing such advertisement the State Government did not invite applica-
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tions for the admission into the medical college of the Society. In the brochure published by the State Government for information to the candidates, who may be willing to seek admission, nothing was said about the medical college in question, which was necessary in view of the judgments and orders of this Court for filling up the 'merit seats' and the 'payment seats'. It is further the case· of the Society that when people of the State of J & K learnt about the medical college of the Society, they approached the management for seeking admission and some applications were also submitted to the management. However, no action was taken on such applications, as no instructions had been received from the State Government.
Some students seeking admission in the medical college in question, filed a writ petition before the High Court of J ammu & Kashmir making a grievance in respect of failure on the part of the State Government to frame necessary rules/guidelines to regulate admission to the medical D college of the society which had deprived them -of the opportunity of seeking admission against the 'merit seats' or the 'payment seats'. The appellant-society was impleaded as a respondent to the said writ petition. Counte~ affidavit was filed on their behalf. All necessary records and information were placed before ~he High Court. Inspite of the several E opportunities being given to the State Government, no affidavit on their . behalf was filed. By an order dated 27.11.1995, the learned single Judge constituted a Cqmmittee consisting of : "(a) Mr. Justice J.N. Bhat, (Rtd.) Judge of J & K High Court: Chairman.
(b) Mr. A.M. Watali, former member J & K Public Service Commission : Member.
(c) Dr. Krishan Lal Gupta, Former Director, Health Services, J & K State: Member. (d) Prof. Vidya Nath Gupta, formerly Prof. and Head, Department of Hindi, University of Jammu: Member."
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C.C.BADA v. STATE[N.P.SINGH,J.)
A direction was giveµ to the said committee to immediately proceed with the selection process for admission of students in the 1st year MBBS course of the said medical college. An option was given to invite or call for applications by publication through recognised modes including issuance of an advertisement in at least one leading newspaper having wide circulation. In the order, the learned Judge observed that the selection Committee may conduct oral interviews of the candidates for short-listing the applicants on basis of their inter se merit. The first meeting of the aforesaid Committee is said to have been held on.29.11.1995. An advertisement was issued on 4.12.1995 inviting applications from eligible candidates in respect of the following four catregories :-
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"(a) 50% merit seats from permanent resident of the State of J&K; (b) 20% payment seats from permanent resident of the State of J&K;
(c) 15% payment seats from candidates outside the State of J&K; and ( d) 15% from NRl's and foreigners." The advertisement was published in the Indian Express in its issue dated 4.12.1995. In the said advertisement, 11.12.1995 was fixed as the last date for receipt of the applications saying "that the interviews of the candidates shall be held between 15.12.1995 and 17.12.1995. It is the case of the Society that after the interviews were so held, a merit list was prepared on basis of the percentage of marks secured by the applicants at the Higher Secondary School Examination or equivalent examinations and the marks secured at the interview. The report of the Selection Committee was forwarded on 19.12.1995, which was placed on the notice board on 20.12.1995. Candidates so selected were admitted between 20.12.1995 to 26.12.1995. The teaching commenced from 26.12.1995.
A Letters Patent Appeal against the order dated 27.11.1995, aforesaid of the learned single Judge, had been filed on behalf of the State Government, which was listed before the Division Bench on 27.12.1995. On the basis of the caveat filed on behalf of the Society, the parties were heard on the aforesaid date. After hearing the parties, the appeal filed on behalf
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
of the State Government, was admitted and the operation of the order of the learned single Judge was stayed. Ultimately, the Appeal filed on behalf of the State and the appeals filed on behalf of others were allowed on 22.3.1996. The order of the learned single Judge was set aside. The pre~ent, appeals have been filed against the said judgment of the Division Bench.
From the judgment of the Division Bench, it shall appear that after taking into consideration the different aspects of the controversy as well as the predicament of the students who claimed to have been admitted in the medical college aforesaid, the following directions were given :
"
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"To conclude, considering these several aspects, we make the following orders : (1) These appeals are allowed. The order of the learned Single Judge passed on OWP No. 379/1995 dated November 27, 1995 is set aside.
(2) We issue a writ of Mandamus to the State Govt. to issue a Notification calling for application from the eligible candidates in the prescribed form for appearing in the common viva voce entrance examination. There shall be no common entrance written examination. Notification calling for applications shall be published in one local Daily Vernacular language and in one daily widely circulated English newspaper providing enough time. The Writ petitioners, the contesting respondents, the appellants of the LPAs who have already applied need not apply once again except those who have not applied. (3) The last date for receiving the applications in the prescribed form shall be 5th April, 1996. Applications received after the date fixed above either by post or by hand would not be entertained. (4) The Roll Nos. to the eligible candidates shall be supplied by the 8th April, 1996. The date for holding the common entrance viva voce examination is fixed as 10th April, 1996. (5) The competent Authority shall make selection and announce the results on or before 17th April, 1996. The selection list . so prepared shall be got published in atleast two leading local dailies of .Srinagar and Jammu and it shall also be displayed at the
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C.C.BADA v.STATE[N.P.SINGH,J.]
office of Competent Authority, Entrance Examination in J ammu and Srinagar.
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(6) Out of 100 marks awarded for selection of the candidates, 75% shall be for academic qualification and 25% shall be for common Entrance viva voce Examination.
(7) The number of 100 seats shall be filled up by selecting candidates from the order of merit. (8) At least 50% of the seats out of the 100 seats shall be filled up by the nominet!s of the Govt. or University as the case may be, C hereinafter referred to as "free seats". These students shall be selected on the basis of merit determined on the basis of merit list by such criteria as may be determined by the Competent Authority or appropriate Authority as the case may be. The remaining 50% of the seats (payment seats) shall be filled up by those candidates who are prepared to pay the fee prescribed therefor and who have D complied with the instructions regarding deposit and furnishing of cash security/Bank guarantee for the balance of the amount. The allotment of students against payment seats shall also be done on the basis of inter se merit determined on the same basis as in the case of free seats. (9) In so far as the reservation of the seats. for persons claiming constitutionally permissible reserved, the SRO issued by the State of J&K in relation to the reservation of seats shall be followed.
(10) In so far as the fixation of the scale of fee payable by these students, the State Govt. shall constitute a committee within a period of ten days and that committee shall fix the scale of fee payable by the students in accordance with the guidelines contained in the scheme of Unnikrislman J.P. AIR (1993) SC 2173."
It is apparent from the order aforesaid that a writ of mandamus was issued G to the state Government to inyite applications from eligible candidates in prescribed form for app~aring in the common viva voce entrance examination. However, there is a specific direction that no common entrance written examination shall be held. 5th April, 1996 was as the last date for receiving the applications in the prescribed form. Thereafter a time · H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
schedule was prescribed in respect of common viva voce entrance examination, selection and announcement of the result. A direction was also given that out of 100 marks awarded for selection of the candidates, 75% shall be for academic qualification and 25% shall be for common entrance viva voce examination. According to the appellant-society, there was no justification on the part of the Division Bench to interfere with the directions given by the learned single Judge, which were just and proper. It was pointed out that under the predicament under which the appellant-society and the applicants had been placed because of the inaction on the part of the State Government, the learned single Judge had no option but to constitute a Committee of persons mentioned above for selecting the applicants for admission in order to save them from losing an academic session, for no fault of theirs. It is true ·that when the Society requested the State Government to
frame necessary rules/guidelines to regulate the admissions in the medical college of the society, the State Government should have taken appropriate and immediate steps and there was no sense in shelving the said issue by ignoring it outright. The learned counsel, who appeared on behalf of the State, could not give any explanation as to why the necessary guidelines were not issued to the society in respect of the admissions in the medical college aforesaid. But the fact remains that the learned Single Judge on the writ petition filed on behalf of the students adopted a procedure and fixed a time schedule in respect of admission of the applicants, which are not consistent with the orders and directions issued by this Court in different cases, indicating the procedure for admission in private medical colleges. There is no dispute that the advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates was issued on 4.12.1995 and 11.12.1995 was fixed as the last date for receipt of the such applications i.e. within a week, which according to us, was perse an arbitrary time limit fixed for receipt of the applications. It is said that the interviews were held between 15.12.1995 and 17.12.1995 and the selection list was forwarded on 19.12.1995. The selected candidates are said to have been admitted between 20.12.1995 and 26.12.1995 and classes are said to have commenced since 26.12.1995 itself. Admittedly, the Division Bench passed an interim order staying the operation of the judgment of the single Judge only the next day i.e. 27.12.1995. In this background, it is difficult to accept the claim made on behalf of the
C.C.BADA v. STATE(N.P.SINGH,J.]
Society as well as applicants who are said to have been admitted in the said A medical college, that their studies coinmenced since 26.12.1995 and as such on equitable grounds they should be allowed to pursue their studies. It is unfortunate that due to the indifferent attitude of the State Government and haste shown by the appellant-society, the so-called selected candidates, who are said to have been admitted, are virtually on the roads. But only on equitable grounds, a procedure which is not sanctioned by law cannot be approved only to mitigate the hardship of .such candidates who have sought admissions in the .medical college aforesaid. But at the same time many of the directions given by the Division Bench also cannot be approved. It has directed that selection be made on basis of common viva voce entrance examination and no common entrance written examination be held. According to the direction of the Division Bench, 75% marks have been allotted for academic qualification and 25% marks for the viva voce examination. It need not be pointed out that the percentage of marks secured by different applicants at different types of D examinations at the higher secondary stage cannot be treated as uniform. Some of such examinations are conducted at the state level, others at the national level including the Indian School Certificate examination. The percentage secured at different examinations are bound to vary according to the standard applied by such examining bodies, which is well known. As such a common entrance examination has to be held. The counsel appear- E ing for the parties could not justify the awarding of 25% marks for viva voce examination in view of the several judgments of this Court in connection with admission in educational institutions; one such judgment being from the State of J&K itself in the case of Ajay Hasia Etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravadi and Others Etc.; AIR (1981) SC 487 = (1981) 1 SCC 722.
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The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State informed the Court that pursuant to the direction given by the Division Bench, an advertisement was issued on 27.3.1996 by the State Government, notifying the conditions of eligibility for admission in the said medical college. From the said advertisement it appears that one of the conditions is that the candidate must be permanent resident of J & K. There was no such direction given by the Division Bench. Apart from that any such condition is not consistent with the different judgments and orders of this Court. Mr. Verma, learned senior counsel, immediately offered to rectify the same and to abide by any direction given by this Court.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
Taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration, we are of the view that for one reason or the other, now it is not possible to complete the admission in the said medical college for the session which has already commenced. As such the only reasonable course shall be that a (resh advertisement be issued for the next academic session in accordance with law in the light of directions given by this· Court in the cases of J.P. B Unnik1ishnan v. State of AP & Ors. (supra), T.MA. Pai Foundantion & Ors. v. State of Kamataka, [1993] 4 SCC 276; Manipal Academy of Higher Education v. State ofKamataka & Ors.; [1994] 2 SCC 201 and in the case of T.MA. Pai Foundation and Ors. v. State of Kamataka and Ors., [1995] 5 SCC 220. The advertisement inviting applications should be given proper publicity and thereafter the seats should be ear-marked and allotted in terms of the judgments aforesaid which prescribe the procedure for admission by the private medical colleges. Seats shall also be reserved for NRI within the percentage fixed in those judgments. The State Government shall extend all cooperation and help so that proper selections are made D as per directions of this Court and the appellant-society which was established the medical college is able to pursue its goal by making the medical college functional, which shall be in the interest of the State of J & K itself. The learned counsel appearing for the State of J & K assured this Court that all necessary steps shall be taken promptly.
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In the result, the appeals are dismissed but at the same time in view of the directions given above, it has to be held that we are not approving the directions given by the Division Bench. Now, the steps have to be taken by the appellant-society and the State Government in accordance with the different directions given by this Court for admission in the private medical colleges. There shall be no orders as to cost.
v.s.s.
Appeals dismissed. N.P. SINGH, J. Leave granted.
Civil Appeals are disposed of in terms of the judgment of this Court in the case of Shri Chander Chinar Bada Akhara Udasin Society and Ors. v. The_ State of J & Kand Ors., (Civil Appeal Nos. 11915-17of1996@ SLP (C) Nos. 7924-7926 of 1996) delivered today.
v.s.s.
Appeals disposed of.
,,,.
AHMEDABAD URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
v.
MANILAL GORDHANDAS AND ORS.
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SEPTEMBER 11, 1996 [AM. AHMADI, CJ. N.P. SINGH AND SUJATA V. MANOHAR, JJ.] Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 : Sections 17(1)(c), 9 to 17, 20 and 124. Town Pla1111i11g-Development Plan-Sanction of-State Govemment accorded sa11ction to Draft Development Plan submitted by Mu11icipal Corporation under Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954-Subsequently 1976 Act came into force and repealed earlier Bombay A ct-{]rban Development Authority submitted Development Plan to State Govemment for sanction which covered area included in Draft Development Plan submitted by Municipal C01poratio11-Held : sanction of Plan submitted by Municipal Corporation without co11sideli11g Pla11 submitted by Urban Development Authority was without application of mind-Provisions of Bombay Act inconsistent with provisions of Gujarat Act-Therefore, deeming fiction in S.124(2) would not apply and Plan submitted under repealed Act not deemed to be submitted u11der Gujarat Act-Final development pla11 i11 respect of area withi11 C01poration came into force on date of sam;tio11 of draft developme11t plan submitted under Gujarat Act-Hence, pe1iod of 10 years mentioned liz S.20(2) must be computed from that date-Bombay Town Pla11ning Act, 1954.
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Administrative Law : Judicial review-Mala fide excercise of power--Held: It must be shown that power was excercised with ulte1ior motive only to defeat statutory rights of perso11s biterested.
The Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 regulated the town planning activity within the area falling within the jurisdiction of the local authority in the State including the Municipal Corporation. On 15.1.1976 the Corporation submitted a revised development plan for tbe area falling within the limits of the Corporation to the State Government for its sanction. On H
SUPREME COURTREPORTS (1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A 19.6.1976 the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act was enacted which came into force on 30.1.1978. On that very date Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority (AUDA) was constituted under Section 22 of the said Act. Section 124(1) of the said Act repealed the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954.
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By a notification dated 12.8.1983 the State Government sanctioned the revised development plan submitted on 15.1.1976 by the Corporation under the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954. AUDA prepared a draft development plan in accordance with the provisions of the Gujarat Town Planning Act and submitted to the State Government for sanction on 23-7-1981. It also included the area covered by the Corporation. The State Government sanctioned the draft development plan submitted on 23.7.1981 by the appellant AUDA on 2.11.1987 including for the areas within the Corporation in respect of which the draft development had been sanctioned by the State Government by aforesaid notification dated 12.8.1983. According to the writ petitioners respondents, as the draft development plan which had been submitted. on 15.1.1976 and sanctioned on 12.8.1983 by a notification saying that the sanction plan would come into force with effect from 16.9.1983, the period of 10 years as specified in Section 20(2) of the Gujarat Town Planning Act would have to be counted with effect from 16.9.1983 so far as the area covered by notification dated 12.8.1983 was concerned. They claimed that within the aforesaid period of 10 years from coming into force of the final development plan neither t~e lands in question covered by that notification were acquired by agreement nor any proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were commenced. Thereafter, they issued notices and on expiry of the period of six months from the date of service of such notices it was claimed on their behalf that the designation of the land had lapsed. This found favour with the High Court. Being aggrieved the appellant-ADDA preferred the present appeal. Allowing the appeal, this Court HELD : 1.1. The State Government could not have sanctioned the draft development plan submitted by the Municipal Corporation on 12.8.1983 because the Gujarat Town Planning Urban Development Act, . 1976 had come into force on 30.1.1978, and Section 124(2) of the Gujarat Town Planning Act shall not save the plan submitted by the Corporation,
AHMEDABAD URBAN DEV. AlJTHORITY v. MANUAL GORDHANDAS
provisions of Sections 9 to 17 of Gujarat Town Planning Act being inconsistent with Sections 7 to 10 of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954. The · State Government after coming int(, force of the Gujarat Town Planning Act should have ignored the draft development plan submitted by the Corporation on 15.1.1976. This was also necessary because a special Act, Gujarat Town Planning Act had been enacted on 19.6.1976 with the sole object to develop the urban area of the State in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. [98-G-H; 99-A-B]
1.2. From a mere comparison of the relevant Sections under the Bombay To"11 Planning Act, 1954 with the provisions of the Gujarat Town Planning Act it shall appear that the relevant provisions of the Gujarat C Town Planning Act are inconsistent with the provisions of Bombay Town Planning Act. Provisions of Sections 7 to 10 of Bombay Town Planning Act are inconsistent with Sections 9 to 17 of the Gujarat Town Planning Act. As such after coming into force of Gujarat Town Planning Act on 30.1.1978 State Government was required to follow provisions of Sections 9 to 17 of D the Gujarat Town Planning Act. Section 124(2) of Gujarat Town Planning Act was of no help when the plan submitted by Corporation was sanctioned on 12.8.1983. That could have been done if the provisions of the Gujarat Town Planning Act had been consistent with the provisions of Bombay Town Planning Act. [94-G; 95-E]
1.3. There was a complete lack of application of ~ind on the part of the State Government when the draft development plan submitted on 15.1.1976 by the Corporation was sanctioned under the provisions of the Gujarat Town Planning Act on 12.8.1983, overlooking the fact that in the meantime a comprehensive draft development plan had been prepared by F the appellant and had been submitted on 23.7.1981 for sanction of the State Government. When Section 17(1) vests power in the State Government to sanction the draft development plan, the said statutory power should not be exercised in a casual manner without proper application of mind. The facts of the present case clearly depict how the State Government has exercised the power under Section 17(l)(c) of the Gujarat Town planning G Act without proper application of mind. It appears the notification dated 12.8.1983 has· been issued being completely oblivious and ignorant of the submission of a draft development plan by the appellant in the meantime on 23.7.1981 covering those areas also. If the State Government was conscious of the fact that later a more comprehensive draft development . H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
plan had been submitted by the appellant, there was no reason to sanction the draft development plan submitted by the Corporation which had lost . jurisdiction over ·the area for which the draft development plan had been prepared. (93-G-H; 94-A~E) 2.l. The State Government. should not have Qiken note of the plan submitted on 15.1.1976 by the Corporation after the repeal of the Bombay Town Planning Act on 30.1.1978 and coming into .force of the new Gujarat Town Planning Act. There was no occasion to ignore the comprehensive plan submitted by AUDA vested With the power to submit such plan and to sanction the draft plan submitted by the Corporation. After coming into force of the Gujarat Town, Planning Act on 30.1.1978 the State Government could not have sanctioned a plan submitted by the Corporation when the AUDA had already submitted a draft development plan even <:overing those areas under the Gujarat Town Planning Act. (96-B-D] 2.2. When power has been vested in the appellant to prepare a draft developnient plan and there being no bar to include in the said draft development plan even area for which an earlier draft development plan had already been sanctioned, then the draft development plan which was sanctioned and notified on 2.11.1987 shall be deemed to be the final development plan within the meaning of Section 20 of the Gujarat Town Planning Act. As such the period of 10 years has to be calculated and counted With reference to 3.12.1987 the date when such final development plan was to come into force. (97-D-E)
3. The possibility of misuse of such power does not arise because if such power is exercised With ulter~or motive and With an object to defeat the statutory right of persons interested, courts Will be perfectly justified in nullifying such actions of area development authorities. But in the present case the draft development plan had been submitted by the appellant as early as on 23.7.1981 much before the draft development plan submitted by the Corporation was sanctioned on 12.8.1983. There is no G scope for attributing any bad faith or malice on the part of the appellant or the State Government in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The writ petitioners - respondents did not take such a stand that the State Government approved the draft development plan submitted by the appellant ·on 2.11.1987 only to defeat the right which was to accrue to the H · land owners or persons interested in the next few years. (98-A-C]
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AHMEDABAD URBAN DEV. AUlHORITY v. MANILALGORDHANDAS (N.P. SINGH, J.)
'83
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 1193511943 of 1996.
From the Judgment and Order dated 1.8.95 of the Gujarat High Court in L.P.A. No. ~96, 300, 301-02, 299, 294"95, 297 and 298 of 1995. S.N. Shelat, Additipnal Advocate General, Gujarat, S.K. Dholakia, Soli J. Sorabjee, Anil B. Divan, Ashok H. Desai, S.H. Sanjanwala, Harish N. Salve, P.S. Poti and R.P. Bhatt, Sr. Advs., V.K. Bhatt, D.S. Nanavati, A.K. Agarwal, A. Chinnasamy, Y. Adhyaru, Ms. Alka Agarwal, V.D. Khanna, Mrs. Nirmala Gupta, H.S. parihar, Kuldeep S. Parihar, P.H. Parekh, E.R. Kumar, G.E. Desai, C.G. Sharma, Sandeep Parekh, A.J. Patel, C. Patel, S. Parekh, H. D. Raval, Anip Sachthey, C.D. Singh, N.N. Munshi, A.P. Medh, A. Mehrotra, A. K. Pandey, C.C. Bhalja, A.K. Pandey, A. Mehrotra, C.C. Bhalja, Ms. Tanuja Sheel and Ms .. Reema Bhandari for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
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N.P. SINGH, J. Leave granted. These appeals have been filed on behalf of the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority for setting aside the order passed by the High Court of Gujarat dismissing the Letters Patent Appeals filed on behalf of the appellants, against the judgment of the single Judge of the said High Court in different writ petitions. The writ petitions had been allowed saying that the sanction accorded by the Notification dated 12.8.1983, by the State of Gujarat in exercise of powers conferred 011 it by clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 had lapsed after the expiry of period of 10 years and because of service of notice by the concerned land owners in accordance with sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the said Act, as during this period neither the lands in question were acquired by agreement nor proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were cbmmenced.
The Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 regulated the town planning activity within the area falling within the jurisdiction of the local authorities in the State of Gujarat including the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the "Corporation"). On 15.1.1976 the Corporation submitted a revised development plan to the State Government for the H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
area falling within the limits of the Corporation for sanction of the State Government. Section 7 of the Bombay Town Planning Act provides that the details of the proposals for designating the use of the land for the purposes such as (1) residential (2) industrial (3) commercial and (4) agricultural as well as proposals regarding designation of and for public purposes such as parks, play-grounds, recreation grounds, open spaces, schools, markets and for institutions should be indicated in the development plan. Section 8 prescribes, the particulars which have to be submitted to the State Government along with the development plan. In view of Section 9 within 2 months from the date of publication of the aforesaid · development plan any member of the public has a right to communicate in writing to the local authority any suggestion relating to such plan which has to be considered at any time before submitting the development plan to the State Government. On receipt of the development plan under Section 8, the State Government under Section 10 can sanction such development plan including with modifications if any. Such sanction shall be notified in official gazette and thereafter the development plan so sanctioned shall be called "the final development plan" which shall come into force on such date as the State Government may specify in the notification issued. The Corporation submitted the development plan to the State Government for sanction on 15.1.1976. On 19.6.1976 the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Gujarat Town Planning Act) was enacted, which came in force on 30.1.1978 and the Bombay Town Planning Act was repealed since that date. On 30.1.1978 itself in exercise of the power under Section 22, the Ahmedabad Urban development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the AUDA) was constituted and the power to prepare development plan in respect of even the areas which were the part and parcel of the Corporation vested in AUDA since that date. The preamble of the Gujarat Town Planning Act says "an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the making and execution of development plans and town planning schemes in the State of Gujarat". Section 7 specifies the functions of the development authority which includes to undertake the preparation of development plans under the provisions of the. said Act for the development area and to undertake the preparation of town planning schemes under the provisions of the said Act; to control the development activities. Section 9 provides that as soon as may be after the constitution of an area development authority as in the
AHMEDABADURBANDEV.AUIBORITY v.MANILALGORDHANDAS(N.P.SINGH,J.)
present case AUDA, for any development area such authority shall not later than three years after the declaration of such area as a development area or within such time as the State Government may, from time to time extend "prepare and submit to the State Government a draft development plan for the whole or any part of the development area" in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. In view of Section 10 of that Act a copy of the draft development plan as prepared under Section 9 in respect of any area has to be kept open for inspection by the public. Section 12 requires such draft development plan to indicate the manner in which the use of the lands in the area covered by it shall be regulated and shall also indicate the manner in which the development therein shall be carried out. The relevant portion of sub-section (2) of Section 12 is as follows :
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"12(2) In particular, it shall provide, so far as may be necessary, for all or any of the following matters, namely : (a) proposals for designating the use of the land for residential, industrial, co~mercial, agricultural and recreational purpose; (b) proposals for the reservation of land for public purposes, such as schools, colleges and other educational institutions, medical and public health institutions, markets, social welfare and cultural institutions, theatres and places for public entertainment, public assembly, museums, art galleries, religious buildings, playgrounds, stadia, open spaces, dairies and for such _other purposes as may, from time to time, be specified by the State Government;
(c) ............................................................... ..
( d) transport and communications, such as roads, highways, parkways, railways, waterways, canals and airport, including their extension and development;
(e) ............................................................... ..
(t) ································································· (g) ................................................................ .
(h) .................................................................
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996]SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
(i) .......................................... ,..................... .
G) ·································································
(k) proposals for the reservation of land for the purpose of Union, any State, local authority or any other authority or body established by or under· any law for the time being in force;
(1) ................................................................ . (m) ................................................................. .
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(n) provision for preventing or removing pollution of water or air caused by the discharge of waste or other means as a result of the use of land; (o) ................................................................. "
Because of Section 13 such authority after "the draft development plan is prepared and submitted to the State Government under Section 9", shall publish it in the official gazette and in such other manner as may be prescribed along with a notice in a prescribed manner inviting suggestions or objections from any person with respect to the development plan within a period of two months from the date of its publication. Sub-section (2) of Section 13 prescribes the particulars which have to be published alongwith the draft development plan. Objections or suggestions communicated in writing within the period specified has to be considered and· if necessary the draft development plan may be modified. If the modifications made by the authority in the draft development ptan are of extensive or substantial nature the said authority has to publish the said modifications in the official gazette along with the notice in prescribed manner inviting suggestions or objections from any person with respect to the proposed modifications within a period of two months from the date of publication of the said notice, which is required by Section 15. Section 16 provides that after the development plan is published as aforesaid and the objections or suggestions thereto, if any, are received, the authority shall within a period of six months from the date of the publication of the draft development plan under Section 13 "submit to the State Government for its sanction the draft development plan and the regulations with the modifications, if any, made thereof under Sections 14 or 15". The particulars published under sub-section (2) of Section 13 and the suggestions or objections received under
.,
AHMEDABAD URBAN DEV. AUIBORITY v. MANIJ.ALGORDHANDAS [N.P.SINGii,J:)
Sections 14 or 15 have also to be submitted to the State Government along A with the draft development plan because of sub- section (2) of Section 16. Section 17(1) which is relevant for the pr.esent case is as follows : "17.(l)(a) On receipt of the draft development plan under section 16, the State Government may, by notification, (i) sanction the draft development plan and the regulations so received, within the prescribed period, for the whole of the area covered by the plan or separately for any part thereof, either without modifications, or subject to such modifications, as it may consider proper; or
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(ii) return the draft development plan and the regulations to the area development authority or, as the .case may be, to the authorised officer, for modifying the plan and the regulations in s~ch manner as it may direct.
· Provided that, where the State Government is of opinion that substantial modifications in the draft development plan and regulations are necesary, the State Government may, instead of returning them to the area development authority or, as the case may be, the authorised officer under this sub-clause, publish the modifications so considered necesary in the Official Gazette alongwith a notice in the prescribed manner inviting suggestions or objections from any person with respect to' the proposed modifications within a period of two months from the date of publication of such notice; or
(iii) refuse to accord sanction to the draft development plan· and the regulations and direct the area development authority or the authorised Officer to prepare a fresh development plan under the provisions of this Act. (b) Where a development plan and regulations are returned to G an area development authority, or, as the· case may be, the authorised. officer under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a), the .area development authority, or, as the case may be, the authorised· officer, shall carry out the modifications therein as directed by the State 'Government and then submit them as so modified to the · H ·
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS l 1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
State Government for sanction; and the State Government shall thereupon sanction them after satisfying itself that the modifications suggested have been duly carried out therein. (c) Where the State Government has published the modifications considered necessary in a draft development plan as required under the proviso to sub-clause (ii) of clause (a), the State Government shall, before according sanction to the draft development plan and the regulations, take into consideration the suggestions or objections that may have been recieved thereto, and thereafter accord sanction to the draft development plan and the regulations in such modified form as it may consider fit. (d) The sanction accorded under clause (b) or clause (c) shall be notified by the State Government in the Official Gazette and the draft development plan together with the regulations so sanctioned shall be called the final development plan.
(e) The final development plan shall come into force on such date as the State Government may specify in the notification issued under clause ( d) : Provided that the date so specified shall not be earlier than one month from the date of publication of such notification . .The State Government under the aforesaid sub-section (1) of .section 17, may sanction the draft development plan forwarded by development authority either without modifications or subject to such modifications. Section 20 provides : "20.(1) The area development authority or any other authority for whose purpose land is designated in the final development plan for any purpose specified in clause (b ), clause (d), clause (k) or clause (n) of sub-section (2) of section 12, may acquire the land either by agreement or under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. (2) If the land referred to in sub-section (1) is not acquired by agreement within a period of ten years from the date of the corning into force of the final development plan or if proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are not commenced within such
AHMEDABAD URBAN DEV. AUIBORITY v. MANilALGORDHANDAS [N.P. SINGH, J.)
period, the owner or any person interested in the land may serve a notice on the authority concerned requiring it to acquire the land and if within six months from the date of service of such notice the land is not acquired or no steps are commenced for its acquisition, the designation of the land as aforesaid shall be deemed to have lapsed. On a plain reading, sub-section (1) of Section 20 requires the area development authority for whose purpose land is designated in the final development plan for any purpose specified in clauses (b), (d), (k) or clause (n) of sub-section (2) of Section 12 to acquire the land either by agreement or under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. If such land is not acquired by agreement within the period of 10 years from the date of the "coming into force of the final development plan" or if the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act are not commenced within such period, the owner or any person interested in the land may serve a notice on the authority concerned requiring it to acquire the land. If within period of six months from the date of the service of the notice the land is not acquired or no steps are taken for its acquisition, the designation of the land as aforesaid shall be deemed to have lapsed. Sub-section (1) of Section 124 repeals the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 but because of sub-section (2) of the said Section 124 notwithstanding such repeal anything done or any action taken, including any declaration of intent.ion to make a development plan or town planning scheme, any draft development plan or draft town planning scheme published by a local authority, any application made to the State Government for the sanction of any draft development plan or draft town planning scheme, any, sanction given by the State Government to the draft development plan or draft town planning scheme shall in so far as it is not
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inconsistent with the provisions of the Gujarat Town Planning Act shall have effect in relation thereto. (emphasis supplied)
As already mentioned above on 15.1.1976 the Corporation under the provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 had submitted a revised development plan to the State Government for the area falling within the limits of the Corporation for sanction of the State Government. But on 19.6.1976, the Gujarat Town planning Act was enacted which came into
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
force with effect from 30.1.1978. On that very date AUDA was constituted under Section 22 of the said Act. Because of sub-section (1) of SectiOn 124 it shall be deemed that the Bombay Town Planning Act was repealed with effect from 30.1.1978, when the Gujarat Town Planning Act came into force. Section 9 required AUDA to prepare and submit to the State Government a draft development plan within three years from the declaration of the areas as development areas. A draft development plan was prepared by AUDA for the entire area under its jurisdiction which included the area covered by the Corporation and was submitted to the State Government for its sanction on 23.7.1981.
c saying:On 12.8.1983 a notificatio~ ,.was issued by the State Government
"WHEREAS the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "the said Municipal Corporation) has prepared a "Draft Revised Development Plan (hereinafter referred to as the said" Draft Revised Development Plan") in respect of the lands within the jurisdiction of the said Municipal Corporation under the provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 and advertisement regarding publication of the said draft revised Development Plan and calling; objections and suggestions in the said draft revised development plan was published in the Part II of the Gujarat Government Gazette dated 15th January, 1976; I
AND WHEREAS the government of Gujarat had considered it necessary to make modifications (hereinafter referred to as "the said modifications") in the said draft revised Development Plan which was submitted by the said Municipal Corporation to the State Government for sanction under the provisions of the Gujarat Town Planing and Urban Development Act, 1976;
NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 17 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development· Act, 1976, the Government of Gujarat hereby; (a) finalises the said modifications;
(b) sanctions the said draft revised development plan and the
AHMEDABAD URBAN DEV. AUTHORITY v. MANll.ALGORDHANDAS [N.P. SINGH,J.j
regulations thereto subject to the modifications so finalised and as A set out in the schedule appended hereto; and (c) specifies the 16th September, 1983 as the date on which the final development plan shall come into force." From the aforesaid notification itself it is apparent that the State Govern. ment purported to sanction the draft revised development plan submitted on 15.1.1976 by the Corporation under the provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Act and State Government specified 16.9.1983 as the date on which the said final development plan shall come into force. There is no dispute that when AUDA prepared a draft development plan in accordance with the provisions of the Gujarat Town Planning Act and submitted to the State Government for sanction on 23.7.1981 it also included the area and the draft plan with modifications already submitted by the Corporation on 15.1.1976. It is the case of the AUDA that it was considered necessary to include even that area in the draft development plan prepared by the appellant, because by that time the draft development plan which had been submitted by the Corporation had not been sanctioned by the State Government. The State Government sanctioned the draft development plan submitted on 23.7.1981 by the appellant AUDA on 2.11.1987 including for the areas within the Corporation in respect of which the draft development had been sanctioned by the State Government by aforesaid notification dated 12.8.1983.
c
According to the writ petitioners-respondents, as the draft development plan which had been submitted on 15.1.1976 and sanctioned on 12.8.1983 by a notification saying that the sanction plan shall come into F force with effect from 16.9.1983, the period of 10 years as specified in sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Gujarat Town Planning Act shall have to be counted with effect from 16.9.1983 so far the area covered by notification dated 12.8.1983 is concerned. They claimed that within the aforesaid period ,of 10 years from coming into force of the final develop- G ment plan neither the lands in question covered by that notification were acquired by agreement nor any proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act were commenced. Thereafter, they issued notices and on expiry of the period of six months from the date of seryice of such notices it was claimed on their behalf that the designation of the land had lapsed. This has found favour with the High Court which has been questioned before this Court. H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
It may be pointed out that although the aforesaid notification dated 12.8.1983 was issued under the provisions of Clause (c) sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Gujarat Town Planning Act, admittedly the said draft plan had neither been prepared in accordance with the provi;ions of Gujarat Town Planning Act nor submitted by AUDA the appellant. In the B notification itself it has been specifically mentioned that the Corporation had prepared the said draft revised development plan under the provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Act and submitted the same to the State Government on 15.1.1976. It has been further said that the State Government had considered it necessary to make modifications in the said draft revised development plan which was submitted by the Corporation to the c State Government and thereafter sanction was being accorded. We are not able to appreciate as to why and how the draft revised development plan which had been submitted by the Corporation on 15.1.1976 was sanctioned and notified on 12.8.1983, when in the meantime the Gujarat Town Planning Act had come into force with effect from 30.1.1978 which had jurisD diction even over the area in respect of which the Corporation had submitted the draft development plan on 15.1.1976. Apart from that before the aforesaid notification dated 12.8.1983 was issued, the appellant had submitted its draft development plan prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Gujarat Town Planning Act to the State Government for E sanction, covering even the area which had been included in the draft development plan submitted by the Corporation on 15.1.1976 along with the much larger area for which th~ draft development plan was prepared by the appellant. In normal course, the State Government should not have taken note of the draft development plan submitted by the Corporation on 15.1.1976 which remained pending before the State Government and in the F meantime the Gujarat Town Planning Act came into force and a more comprehensive draft development plan prepared by the appellant had been submitted to the State Government covering even the· area for which the Corporation had submitted a draft developmenf plan. On behalf of the respondents it was pointed out that when the appellant had submitted the G draft development plan on 23.7.1981 including the area for which the draft development plan had been submitted by the Corporation, it was open to the State Government to sanction the draft development plan only in part, covering the area for which the draft development plan had been submitted earlier, while exercising power under Section 17(1)(a)(i) which says that H the State Government may by notification sanction the draft development
AHMEDABAD URBAN DFV. AUlHORITY v. MANII.ALGORDHANDAS [N.P. SINGH, J.)
...~
plan for the "whole area covered by the plan or separately for any part thereof'. This argument could have been accepted if in the notification dated 12.8.1983 the State Government had referred to the draft development plan submitted by the appellant on 23.7.1981 and had specifically said that it was sanctioning only part of the said plan by that notification. In the notification dated 12.8.1983, no notice has been taken of the draft development plan submitted by the appellant on 23.7.1981, covering even the areas in respect whereof the draft development plan had been prepared by the Corporation. As such it is a futile contention that by notification dated 12.8.1983 part of the draft development plan submitted by the appellant on 23.7.1981 had been sanctioned by the State Government in exercise of the powers under Section 17(1)(a)(i).
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_,(
I
,,
It was then submitted that as the draft development plan had been submitted by the Corporation to the State Government before the Bombay Town Planning Act stood repealed on coming into force of the Gujarat Town Planning Act on 30.1.1978, because of sub- section (2) of Section 124 D aforesaid it was open to the State Government to sanction that plan. On proper reading of sub- section (2) it appears, that it shall be deemed that the said draft ·development plan was pending before the State Government because of sub~section (2) of Section 124. There is a deeming fiction in sub-section (2) of Section 124 saying that any application made to the State E Government for sanction of any draft development plan shall "be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act". It shall only keep the draft development plan submitted by the Corporation pending for consideration by the State Government because it shall be deemed that it has been submitted to the State Government under the provisions of the Gujarat Town Planning Act. But before sanctioning the said plan the State Government was required to examine the said draft development plan along with the draft development plan prepared and submitted by the appellant AUDA in the meantime. It can be said that there was complete lack of application of mind on the part of the State Government when the draft development plan submitted on G 15.1.1976 by the Corporation was sanctioned under the provisions of the Gujarat Town Planning Act on 12.8.1983, overlooking the fact that in the meantime a comprehensive draft development plan had been prepared by the appellant and had been submitted on 23.7.1981 for sanction of the State Government. When Secrion 17(1) vests power in the State Government to H
C
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
sanction the draft development Plan, the said statutory Power should not be exercised in a casual manner without proper application of mind. The fac~s of the present case clearly depict how the State Government has exercised the power under Section 17(1)(c) of the Gujarat Town planning Act without proper application of mind. It appears the notification dated 12.8.1983 has been issued being completely oblivi.:ius and ignorant of the submission of a draft development plan. by the appellant in the meantime on 23.7.1981 covering those areas also. lnspite of repeated queries from the counsel who appeared for the writ petitioner-responc!ents, they could not explain as to how while sanctioning the draft development plan submitted on 15.1.76 by the Corporation, there is no mention in the notification in question about the submission of a draft development plan by the appellant covering those very areas. Why the State Government was sanctioning the plan submitted on 15.1.1976 ignoring the more comprehensive and detailed draft developmeat plan for a· much larger area including the area for which the draft development plan had been submitted on 15.1.1976 by the Corporation? If the State Government was conscious of the fact that later a more comprehensive draft development plan had been submitted by the appellant, there was no reason to sanction the · draft development plan submitted by the Corporation which had lost jurisdiction over the area for which the draft development plan had been prepared. The draft development plan submitted by the Corporation had been sanctioned on 12.8.1983 without proper application of mind is obvious from the fact that admittedly later the State Government on 2.11.1987 sanctioned by notification issued under Section 17(1)(i)(c) of the Gujarat Town planning Act,. the draft development plan submitted by the appellant on 23.7.1981 including the area for which the draft development plan had been submitted by the Corporation on 15.1.1976.
Apart from that from a mere compadson of the relevant Sections under the Bombay Town Planning Act with the provisions of the Gujarat G Town Planning Act it shall appear that the relevant provisions of the Gujarat Town Planning Act are inconsistent with the provisions of Bombay Town Planning Act. Section 12 of the Gujarat Town Planning Act covers a much wider field of the development and the object for development is not as limited as Section 7 of the Bombay Town Planning Act. H Section 12 takes note of the factors and objects for which provisions have t0 be made in the draft development plan. Keeping in view the modern
>-
·•
AHMEDABADURBANDEV.AUTIIORITY v.MANII.ALGORDHANDAS(N.P.SINGH,J.)
requirements for an urban development provisions have been made for A zoological gardens, green belts, natural reserves sanctuaries, railways, waterways canals, airport, water supply, drainage, sewage disposal, public utility amenities including supply of electricity and gas. It also contemplates preservation, conservation and development of natural scenery and landscape, places of historical, architectural interest. It provides for con- B trolling and regulating the use and development of land within the developed area including imposition conditions and restrictions in regard to the open space to be maintained for buildings, the percentage of building area for a plot, the location, number, size, height, number of storeys, parking spaces etc. It conceives provision for preventing or removing pollution of water or air caused by discharge of waste or other means as a result of the use of land. All this was not in Section 7 of the Bombay Town Planning Act prescribing the contents of the development plan. Similarly, the procedure prescribed for sanction of a draft development plan under Sections 13 to 17 of the Gujarat Town Planning Act are not consistent with Sections 8 to 10 of Bombay Town Planning Act. It has to be held that provisions of Sections 7 to 10 of Bombay Town Planning Act are inconsistent with Sections 9 to 17 of .the Gujarat Town Planning Act. As such after coming into force of Gujarat Town Planning Act on 30.1.1978 State Government was required .to follow provisions of Sections 9 to 17 of E the Gujarat Town Planning Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 124 of Gujarat Town Planning Act was of no help when the plan submitted by Corporation was sanctioned on 12.8.1983. That could have been done if the provisions of the Gujarat Town Planning Act had been consistent with the provisions of Bombay Town Planning Act. Sub- section (2) of Section 124 says :
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It
"Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken (including any declaration of intention to make a development plan or town planning scheme, any draft development plan or draft town planning scheme published by a local authority, any application made to the State Government for the Sanction of any draft development plan or draft town planning scheme, any, sanction given by the State Government to the draft development plan...... .
shall, in so far as it is not in consistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions, of this Act, and the provisions of this Act shall have
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
effect in relation thereto." (emphasis supplied)
C
Provisions and procedures under Sections 7 to 10 of the Bombay Town Planning Act are different from the provisions and procedures in respect of preparation of a development plan under the Gujarat Town Planning Act. In this background the State Government should not have taken note of the Plan submitted on 15.1.1976 by the Corporation after the repeal of the Bombay Town Planning Act on 30.1.1978 and coming in force of the new Gujarat Town Planning Act. There was no occasion to ignore the comprehensive plan submitted by AUDA vested with the power to submit such plan and to sanction the draft plan submitted by the Corporation. According to us, after coming into force of the Gujarat Town Planning Act on 31.1.1978 State Government could not have sanctioned a plan submitted by the Corporation when the AUDA had already submitted a draft development plan even covering those areas under the Gujarat Town Planning Act.
To prepare a scheme for the development of an urban agglomeration in the present days is a very complex issue and any development authority E as well as the State Go\-ernment which is· the sanctioning authority has to apply its mind on the details of such development plans. During the last few decades an urban development has assumed unprecedented importance because of the population migration from rural areas to urban areas and cry for a roof and fresh air. In such urban areas the orderly growth of the cities has to be enforced through proper development plans. For every F city as was done in Ahmedabad in the present case, development authorities have been constituted who can prepare comprehensive development plans keeping not only the present requirement but even the requirements for the 21st century in view. If the development in such areas are not carried on the well known principle, most of.the cities will be converted G into slums sooner or later. There was a time when a ci~y meant only residential area and commercial complex including industrial centres. But the whole concept has changed. While planning an urban area not only the residential, institutional, industrial and commercial, aspects have to be seen but also provisions have to be made in respect of zoological gardens, green H belts, natural reserves, sanctuaries, highways, parkways, Waterways, airport,
AHMEDABAD URBAN DEV. AUTIIORITY v. MANII.ALGORDfL\NDAS [N.P. SINGH,J.)
.. ·
···drainage, sewage disposal. The development authority has also to reserve · A land for community facilities and services and for prevention of pollution of water or air caused by the discharge of waste or other means as a result of the use of land. From a bare reference to sub-section (2) of Section 12 it shall appear that framers of the Gujarat Town Planning Act have conceived the new requirements for a proper development of an urban B area. As in the present case the only question which is to be answered is as to with effect from which date 10 years period shall be counted, it has to be decided as to which date shall be deemed to be the date of coming into force of the final development plan, so far the area within the Cor- C poration is concerned. The notification dated 2.11.1987 had been issued by the State Government covering the area notified on 12.8.1983 several years before the issuance of notices by the writ petitioners. The notification dated 2.11.1987 was neither questioned by the writ petitioners-respondents nor could have been questioned, according to us. When p9wer has been vested D in the appellant to prepare a draft development plan and there being no bar to include in the said draft development plan even area for which an earlier draft development plan had already been sanctioned, then the draft development plan which was sanctioned and notified on 2.11.1987 shall be deemed to be the final development plan within the meaning of Section 20 E of the Gujarat Town Planning Act. As such the period of 10 years has to be calcu.lated and counted with reference to 3.12.1987 the date when su.ch final development plan was to come into force.
On behalf of the writ petitioners it was pointed out that if it is held that period of 10 years is to be counted with reference to 3.12.1987 then the right which has been provided to the land owners or the persons interested by sub-section (2) of Section 20 to give notice after the expiry of the period of 10 years from coming into force of the final development plan, can be defeated by any area development authority by notifying a fresh draft development plan just on expiry of the final plan including fresh areas. In other words any area development authority on verge of the eXpiry of the period of 10 years of a final development plan, may include that area into another draft development plan along with other area to defeat the right which had accrued or was likely to accrue to the land owners or the persons interested under sub-section (2) of Section 20. If such power is
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
exercised with ulterior mo~ive and with an object to defeat the statutory right of persons interested, courts will be perfectly justified in nullifying such actions of area development authorities. But in the present case as has been pointed out above the draft development plan had been submitted by the appellant as early as on 23.7.1981 much before the draft development plan submitted by the Corporation was sanctioned on 12.8.1983. There is no scope for attributing any bad faith or malice on the part of the appellant or the State Government in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In all fairness none of the counsel appearing for the writ-petitioners-respondents took such a stand that the State Government approved the draft development plan submitted by the appellant on 2.11.1987 only to defeat the right which was to accrue to the land owners or persons interested in the next few years. We are not inclined to accept the submission made on behalf of the respondents that the effect of the sanctions given on 12.8.1983 and 2.11.1987 shall be that two final development plans had come into force. The effect of sanction given on 2.11.1987 shall be that the State Government had sanctioned the comprehensive draft plan prepared by the appellant with the area in respect of which State Government had purported to accord sanction on 12.8.1983. The respondents could not point ou~ as to how this sanction of the State Government given by notification dated 2.11.1987 shall be illegal, invalid and not sanctioned by law. In the present case the draft development plai:i was submitted on 23.7.1981 by the appellant which was sanctioned on 2.11.1987. Then it shall be deemed that the area in respect of which separate draft development plan had been sanctioned on 12.8.1983 merged and became part and parcel of the scheme and plan which had been submitted by the appellant AUDA on 23.7.1981 and which was sanctioned on 2.11.1987. It will be deemed that the final plan came in force with effect from 3.12.1987, even in respect of area which was covered by the notification dated 12.8.1983. We have already held that the State Government could not have sanctioned the draft development plan submitted by Corporation on 12.8.1983 because the Gujarat Town Planning Act had come in force on 30.1.1978 and sub-section (2) of Section 124 of the Gujarat Town Planning Act shall not save the plan submitted by the Corporation, provisions of Sections 9 to 17 of Gujarat Town Planning Act being inconsistent with
AHMEDABAD URBAN DEV. AUTIIORITY v. MANIIALGORDHANDAS [N.P. SINGH, J.]
Section 7 to 10 of the Bombay Town Planning Act. The State Government after coming into force of •the Gujarat Town Planning Act should have ignored the draft development plan submitted by the Corporation on 15.1.1976. This was also necessary because a special Act, Gujarat Town Planning Act had been enacted on 19.6.1976 with the sole object to develop the urban areas of the State in accQrdance with the provisions of the .said Act.
Accordingly, the appeals are allowed. The Judgments of the High Court are set aside and the writ petitions are dismissed. There shall be no orders for costs.
v.s.s.
Appeals allowed.
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DEPUTY COLLECTOR, MINICOY AND ORS. v.
NAVADIGOTHI MOHAMMED AND ORS. SEPTEMBER 11, 1996
[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.] Tenancy and Land Laws : Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Revenue and Tenancy
C Regulation, 1965: Section 121.
South Pandaram Land-Allotment of-To inhabitants-Such inhabitants had only collective right of collection of coconuts and enjoyment thereof through their Mooppans as Trustees-Neither the Mooppans nor the inhabitants had right over the land or coconut trees-Mooppans as trustees exercised this collective right arbitrarily-Hence notices issued for allotment of separate plots of land to inhabitants-Mooppans challenged these notices claiming 1ight of occupancy on ground of they being in occupation of said land on behalf of inhabitants prior to commencement of Reguiation-High Court allowed the claim-Held : High Court e"ed in granting right of occupancy to Mooppans-ln the circumstances of the case, Regulations, Rules and notices were valid-Lakshadweep Land Revenue and Tenancy (Allotment of Pandaram Land) Rules, 1979-Constitution of India, 1950, Article 240.
The inhabitants of the South Pandaram Land collected coconuts from the trees for which purpose they were getting some remuneration in kind but at no point of time they had any vested right to the trees or the land on which the trees stood. After sometime this right was conferred as a collective right in favour of the inhabitants for enjoyment thereof through the respondents- Mooppans as trustees. When the Moppans as trustees arbitrarily exercised this collective right, the appellants G promuglated Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindive Islands Revenue and Tenancy Regulation, 1965 under Article 240 of the Constitution of India. The appellants issued notices for allotting separate plots of land to the inhabitants in accordance with Lakshadweep Land Revenue and Tenancy (Allotment of Pandaram Land) Rules, 1979 framed under Section 121 of H the Regulations.
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DY. COLLECTOR MINICOY v. NAVADIGOTIII MOHAMMED
The respondents-Mooppans filed writ applications before the High Court challenging the aforesaid notices for allotment of plots which were dismissed by the Single Judge. On appeal the Division Bench held that the respondents-Mooppans were in occupation of the Pandaram Lands at the commencement of the Regulation on behalf of the inhabitants and, therefore, they were entitled to their claim of right of occupancy over the land in question. The Division Bench also held that the notices issued under the Rules were only applicable in respect of fresh lands and would not divest the persons who had already acquired right of occupancy. Accordingly, the Division Bench allowed the writ appeals. Being aggrieved the appellants preferred the present appeal.
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Allowing the appeal, this Court HELD : 1. There is no infirmity with the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Revenue and Tenancy Regulations, 1965 as well as the Lakshadweep Land Revenue and Tenancy (Allotment of Pandaram Land) Rules, 1979 framed thereunder and it has been so framed in exercise of D power conferred under Article 240 of the Constitution for the peace, progress and good government of the Lakshadweep group of Islands. The Regulations and the Rules sub-serve the purpose for which power has been conferred on the President under Article 240 of the Constitution and the Regulation and the Rules would achieve the object of allotting specific part E of the land in favour of each individual, so that, the Mooppans will not be able to exploit the individuals. The Division Bench of the High Court was wholly in error in granting right of occupancy in favour of the respondents and in quashing the impugned notices issued by the Administrator in exercise of his power under the Regulation and the Rules framed thereF under. [105-A-C; DJ CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1190711910 of 1996. From the Judgment and Order dated 8.2.84 of the Kerala High Court G in W.A. Nos. 525~26, 547 and 550 of 1981.
P.A. Chowdhary, S.P. Singh and B. Krishna Prasad for the Appellants. A.S. Nambiar, Ms. Shanta Vasudevan and P.K. Manohar for the
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATTANAIK, J~ Leave granted.
c
These appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court dated 8th February, 1984 in Writ Appeal No.525/81 and batch. Notices were issued under the Lakshadweep Land Revenue and Tenancy (Allotment of Pandaram Land) Rules, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as 'Rules') and challenging those notices the respondents herem filed writ applications. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ applications. In appeal the Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned judgment quashed notices issued and allowed the writ appeals filed and thus these appeals by special leave. The case of the appellants is that South Pandaram Lands are the Government lands. Before the Minicoy Island came under the British Rule the Raja of Cannanore was enjoying the usufruct of the coconut trees standing on the South Pandaram Lands. The inh~bitants of the Islands were getting some mamul for collecting and stacking the coconuts. After the British Rule the inhabitants of the Islands continued to collect the coconuts from the trees and for that purpose they are getting some remuneration in kind but at no point of time they had any right to the trees or the land on which the trees stood. Sometimes prior to 1942 the Government evolved a scheme conferring rights to the inhabitants of the Island to collect and enjoy the fruits from the coconut trees. After India became independent when Five Year Plan was implemented, on the representation of the people of Minicoy a new ·scheme was proposed and under that scheme the inhabitants were permitted not only to collect the coconuts falling from the trees but also to pluck the nuts from the trees itself. And after this right was conferred as a collective right in favour of inhabitants through their Moopppans, the Mooppan thus as a trustee for all the villagers had the right to enjoy usufruct of the coconut trees for himself as well as for all the villagers together and the Mooppan was distributing the coconuts amongst the villagers. While the Mooppans continued to enjoy usufruct of the coconut trees for themselves as well as for the villager!', gradually a demand for abolition of Mooppans system began. The administration considering the grievances of the villagers finally thought of granting separate plots and land individually to the inhabitants and ul-
DY. COLLECTORMINICOY v. NAVADIGOTIIIMOHAMMED (PATIANAIK, J.)
timately Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Revenue and Tenancy Regulation, ·1965 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Regulation') was promulgated under Article 240 of the Constitution of India. The Administrator thereafter framed Rules in exercise of power conferred under Section 121 of the Regulation. It is the further case of the appellants that the people of Minicoy Island never had any vested right on the land on which the coconut trees stood though they were enjoying the right of collection of yield of the coconut trees standing on the South Pandaram Land and there fore they cannot be held to have acquired right of occupancy. In accordance with the Rules framed under the Regulation notices having been issued by the appropriate authority for allotting different parts of South Pandaram Land to different persons, writ applications came to be filed by the respondents herein contending inter alia that they have acquired right of occupancy being in occupation of South Pandaram Lands prior to the Regulation coming into force and therefore the notices issued under the Rules would deprive them of their right of occupancy. The learned Single Judge on consideration of the relevant provisions of the Regulation and the rights enjoyed by the Mooppans in respect of the usufruct of the coconut trees came to hold that no right of occupancy accrued in favour of the Mooppans under Sections 83 and 84 of the Regulation. It was also further found that the Mooppans as well as the inhabitants of the Island merely enjoyed a right of plucking coconuts from the trees without having any right over the land or the trees itself and therefore they cannot be held to be in occupation of the land in question and their claim of right of occupancy is unsustainable. With these findings the writ applications having been dismissed, the respondents preferred appeals to the Division Bench. The Division Bench by the impugned judgment came to hold that the Mooppans were in occupation of the Pandaram Lands at the commencement of the Regulation on behalf of the inhabitants of the village and therefore they are entitled to their claim of right of occupancy over the land in question. The notices issued by the appropriate authority under the 1979 Rules can only be applicable in respect of fresh lands and will not divest the persons who have already acquired right of occupancy. Accordingly, the Division Bench allowed the writ appeals and hence these appeals by special leave. Mr. Chowdhary, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants contended that in view of the limited right of collection of coconuts from the trees conferred upon the Mooppans and the inhabitants of the
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
village without any right over the Land on which the trees stood, the Division Bench of the High Court was wholly in error to hold that they were in occupation of the land prior to Regulation coming into force. He further contended that the Mooppan of the village had been conferred certain privileges as he was representing the interest of village community at large. The Mooppans were acting as trustees but as complaints received from several villagers the Government decided to confer individual rights on the inhabitants under the Regulation and therefore there is no infirmity with the notices issued. Mr. Nambiar, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents on the other hand contended that the Lakshadweep group of Islands have its own peculiar concept of rights and the Mooppans were merely representing the entire village community. There was total unity of enjoyment and the Moopans and the villagers had absolute right over the coconut trees and therefore the Division Bench rightly held that they held the right of occupancy which right can't be taken away by the Regulation or the Rules framed thereunder. In view of the rival submissions at the Bar the question that arises for consideration is whether the Division Bench of the High Court was right in its conclusion that the Mooppans and the villagers can be said to have acquired the right of occupancy over the land on which the coconut trees stood prior to Regulation coming into force? If it is held that right of occupancy had accrued in their favour then that right cannot be taken away by the administration in exercise of its power under the Regulation and Rules framed thereunder. But on examination of the materials on record and the history of the bundle of rights which the inhabitants of these Islands were enjoying, it is crystal clear that there was no demarcation of any individual property. The villagers through their Mooppans were initially getting some remuneration for collecting and stacking coconuts. In course of time. they got the right to pluck coconuts from the trees but no specific individual had any specific right over any specific tree and it was a case of collective right of collection and enjoyment of the fruits through their Mooppans. Mooppan was acting as the trustee and was equality distributing the usufruct of the coconut trees. At no point of time either the Moopans or any individual villager had an iota of right over the land or the coconut trees standing thereon. This being the position, it is difficult to accept the conclusion of the Division Bench of the High Court that the respondents had acquired a right of occupancy prior to the Regulation coming into force. Further the so-calle9 collective rights which were being exercised by the Mooppans on behalf of the villagers as trustees were
DY. COLLECTOR MINICOY v. NA VADIGOIBI MOHAMMED (PATIANAIK,J.j
complained of when the Mooppans started arbitrarily exercising their A power. After due enquiry the government decided to confer right of occupancy over specific parts of land in favour of each individual in accordance with the Regulation and the Rules framed thereunder. We see no infirmity with the Regulation as well as the Rules framed thereunder and it has been of framed in exercise of power conferred under Article 240 of the Constitution for the peace, progress and good government of the Lakshadweep group of Islands. The Regulation and the Rules sub-serve the purpose for which power has been conferred on the President under Article 240 of the Constitution and the Regulation and the Rules would achieve the object of allotting specific parts of the land in favour of each individual, so that, the Mooppans will not be able to exploit the individuals.
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In view of our aforesaid conclusion we have no hesitation to hold that the Division Bench of the High Court was wholly in error in granting right of occupancy in favour of the respondents and in quashing the impugned notices issued by the Administrator in exercise of his power under the Regulation and the Rules framed thereunder. Appeals are accordingly D allowed. The judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Writ Appeal No. 525/81 and batch is set aside. Writ applications filed by the respondents stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
v.s.s.
Appeal allowed.
M/S. GUJARAT MACHINERY MANUFACTURERS LTD. v. COLLECTOR, CENTRAL EXCISE, BARODA. SEPTEMBER 11, 1996
(S.P. BHARUCHA AND K. VENKATASWAMI, JJ.] Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944: •,
C
First Schedule-Tariff Item 23A(4), general item 68-Frit-Assistant Collector accepting the claim of assessee and classifying it under general item 68-Collector setting aside the order and classifying flit as other glass failing under Item 23-A(4) and demanding difference in duty-Tribunal upholding the reclassification but limited levy of duty for six months prior to the notice by Tribwia1-0n appeal held, since no notice was issued to the assessee by the Collector before the reclassification, the orders of the Collector and the Tribunal directing the assessees to pay the short-levied duty bad in law--Hence set aside.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : CiVil Appeal No. 117 of 1984.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.6.83 of the Customs Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal in A. No. E.D. (SB) (T) A. No. 139 of 1982-D. D.A. Dave, Sunil Dogra, A. Roy, S. Shroff for S.A. Shroff & Co. for the Appellants. Joseph Vellappally and V.K. Verma for the Respondent. The following Order of the Court was delivered :
We are concerned in this appeal against an order of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (the "Tribunal") with a commodity called frit, which is manufactured by the appellants. With the introduction into Tariff Item 23-A(4) of the words "glass and", it read "other glass and glassware including tableware". The Collector of Central Excise issued to the appellants a notice under Section 45-A of
GUJ. MACHINERY MANUFACTURERS LID. v. COLLECTOR, CENTRAL EXCISE
the Central Excise and Salt Act on 4th November, J..981, asking them to A show cause why frit should not be classified under sub-item (4) of Item 23-A with effect from 1st March, 1979, and the order of the Assistant Collector accepting that classification under the general Item 68 be revised accordingly. The appellants showed cause. The collector by his order dated 3.12.1981 made the notice absolute. He set aside the Assistant Collector's order. He ordered that frit 'is hereby classified as other glass falling within the purview of Item 23-A(4) of the First Schedule'. He further ordered that the appellants 'shall pay the duty of excise at the appropriate leviable rate on frit glass manufactured and cleared by them as applicable to Item 23-A(4) of the said First Schedule or the difference in duty, as the case may be'.
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The appellants preferred a revlSlon appl:cation to the Central Government which came to be transferred to the Tribunal when it was .. onstituted. The Tribunal considered the evidence that had been placed on record by the appella