M Siddiq (d) Thr Lrs v. V. Mahant Suresh Das & Ors.
Landmark judgment · Property & civil — Ayodhya title dispute decided.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 9 November 2019
- Bench
- Justice Ranjan Gogoi, Justice S.A. Bobde, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Justice Ashok Bhushan, Justice S. Abdul Nazeer
- Neutral citation
- 2019 INSC 1231
- Reported in
- [2019] 18 S.C.R. 1
- Result
- Disposed off
- Acts & sections
- Section 145 CrPC, Article 142 Constitution
- Subject
- Criminal
Full judgment
[2019] 18 S.C.R. 1
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS V. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS (Civil Appeal Nos. 10866-10867 of 2010) NOVEMBER 09, 2019 [RANJAN GOGOI, CJI, S. A. BOBDE, DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, ASHOK BHUSHAN AND S. ABDUL NAZEER, JJ.] Religion / Religious Structure – Ayodhya Matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – Five suits instituted between 1950 and 1989, centering around dispute of ownership between Hindu community and Muslim community over piece of land admeasuring 1500 square yards in the town of Ayodhya – Hindu community claimed the disputed site to be the birth-place of Lord Ram, referring it as Ram Janmabhumi or Ram Janmasthan and asserting that there existed at the disputed site an ancient temple dedicated to Lord Ram, which was demolished by Mughal Emperor Babur – Muslim community however claimed it as the site of the Babri Masjid (mosque) built by or at the behest of Babur on vacant land – Suit 1 was filed by a worshipper for enforcement of his right to worship Lord Ram at the Janmabhumi – Suit 2 seeking reliefs similar to those in Suit 1 was however subsequently withdrawn – Suit 3 filed by Nirmohi Akhara (representing a religious sect amongst Hindus) was for handing over the management and charge of the Janmabhumi temple to it – Suit 4 filed by Sunni Central Waqf Board was for a declaration that the entirety of the disputed site, including Babri Masjid and the surrounding graveyard, is a public mosque and for a decree for possession – Suit 5 was filed by the deity of Lord Ram and the Janmasthan (both of whom were asserted to be juridical persons) through a next friend impleaded as a third plaintiff for a declaration that the entire premises constitute Ram Janmabhumi and for an injunction against interference in construction of new temple after demolition of the existing building – All the suits were transferred by the High Court to itself – In a split 2:1 verdict, the High Court held that the Hindu and Muslim parties were joint holders of the disputed premises – Each of them was held entitled to one third of the disputed property – Nirmohi Akhara was granted the remaining one third – A preliminary decree to that effect was passed
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in the suit brought by the idol and the birth-place of Lord Ram through the next friend – On appeal, held: Disputed site was one composite whole – On balance of probabilities, clear evidence to indicate that worship by Hindus in the outer courtyard of the premises continued unimpeded in spite of the setting up of a grill-brick wall in 1857 by British colonial administration – Hindus established a clear case of a possessory title to the outside courtyard by virtue of long, continued and unimpeded worship at the Ramchabutra and other objects of religious significance – As regards the inner courtyard, evidence on preponderance of probabilities to establish worship by the Hindus prior to annexation of Oudh by the British in 1857 – Muslims offered no evidence to indicate that they were in exclusive possession of the inner structure prior to 1857 – Sunni Central Waqf Board did not establish its case of dedication by user or alternate plea of adverse possession – Existence of the structure of a mosque until 6 December 1992 however does not admit any contestation – Submission that the mosque did not accord with Islamic tenets, also not tenable – Muslims have been wrongly deprived of a mosque which had been constructed well over 450 years ago – While a decree must ensue in Suit 5, Suit 4 (instituted by Sunni Central Waqf Board) must also be partly decreed by allotment of alternate land to the Muslims for construction of a mosque and associated activities – Allotment of land to the Muslims is necessary because though on a balance of probabilities, evidence in respect of possessory claim of the Hindus to the composite whole of the disputed property stands on a better footing than the evidence adduced by the Muslims, the Muslims were dispossessed upon the desecration of the mosque in December 1949 which was ultimately destroyed on 6 December 1992 – Justice would not prevail if the Court were to overlook the entitlement of the Muslims – Direction issued that land admeasuring 5 acres be allotted to Sunni Central Waqf Board either by the Central Government out of the acquired land or by Government of Uttar Pradesh within the city of Ayodhya – This exercise, and the consequent handing over of the land to the Sunni Central Waqf Board, to be conducted simultaneously with the handing over of the disputed site comprising of the inner and outer courtyards as a consequence of the decree in Suit 5 – Suit 4 shall stand decreed in the above terms – Central Government to frame scheme in exercise of powers conferred upon it by ss.6 and 7
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
(of the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act 1993) to set up a trust or any other appropriate mechanism to whom the land would be handed over in terms of the decree in Suit 5 – Suit 3 filed by Nirmohi Akhara barred by limitation and Nirmohi Akhara’s claim to be a shebait stands rejected – However, having regard to the historical presence of Nirmohi Akhara at the disputed site and their role, direction issued that in framing the scheme, an appropriate role in the management would be assigned to the Nirmohi Akhara – Right of the plaintiff in Suit 1 to worship at the disputed property affirmed subject to restrictions by relevant authorities with respect to maintenance of peace and order and performance of orderly worship – Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act 1993 – ss.6 and 7 – Constitution of India, 1950 – Art. 142.
Partition – Ayodhya Matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – High Court held that the Hindu and Muslim parties were joint holders of the disputed premises – Each of them was held entitled to one third of the disputed property – Nirmohi Akhara was granted the remaining one third – A preliminary decree to that effect was passed in the suit brought by the idol and the birth-place of Lord Ram through the next friend – Decree for partition by High Court – Legality – Held: Three-way bifurcation by the High Court was legally unsustainable – High Court was not seized of a suit for partition – High Court adopted a path which was not open to it and granted reliefs which were not the subject matter of the prayers in the suits – In the process of doing so, it proceeded to assume the jurisdiction of a civil court in a suit for partition, which the suits before it were not – Order VII Rule 7 of CPC does not entitle the court in a civil trial to embark upon the exercise of recasting virtually the frame of a suit, which was undertaken by the High Court – There was no basis in the pleadings before the High Court and certainly no warrant in the reliefs which were claimed to direct a division of the land in the manner that a court would do in a suit for partition – High Court completely erred in granting relief which lay outside the ambit of the pleadings and the cases set up by the plaintiffs in Suit 3 (filed by Nirmohi Akhara), Suit 4 (filed by Sunni Central Waqf Board) and Suit 5 (brought by the idol and the birthplace of Lord Ram through the next friend) – Further, having come to the conclusion that Suit 3 and Suit 4 were barred by limitation, the High Court proceeded to grant relief in Suit 5 to the plaintiffs in
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Suits 3 and 4 – This defies logic and is contrary to settled principles of law – Moreover, the claim by Nirmohi Akhara was as a shebait who claimed a decree for management and charge – On its own case, Nirmohi Akhara could not have been granted an independent share of the land – Even as a matter of maintaining public peace and tranquillity, the solution which commended itself to the High Court is not feasible – The disputed site admeasures all of 1500 square yards – Dividing the land will not subserve the interest of either of the parties or secure a lasting sense of peace and tranquillity – CPC – Or.VII, r.7. Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act 1991 – Object and Purpose – Held: The Act prohibits the conversion of place of worship and imposes a positive obligation to maintain the religious character of every place of worship as it existed on 15 August 1947 – The Places of Worship Act was enacted to secure the fundamental values of the Constitution – Tolerance, respect and acceptance of the equality of all religious faiths is a precept of fraternity – Parliament determined that independence from colonial rule furnishes a constitutional basis for healing the injustices of the past. Limitation – Ayodhya Matter – Ram Janmabhumi - Babri Masjid dispute – Suit filed by Nirmohi Akhara (representing a religious sect amongst Hindus) for handing over the management and charge of the Janmabhumi temple to it – Maintainability of the suit – Held: The City Magistrate had attached the disputed property by order dated 29th December, 1949 u/s.145 CrPC, 1898 – The suit was filed for restoration of management and charge so as to enable the Nirmohi Akhara to have the benefit of the usufruct in discharge of its obligations towards the deity – It was not a suit for possession – Hence, neither Art.142 nor Art.144 of Limitation Act, 1908 has any application – The suit was governed by provisions of the residuary article, Art.120 – Period of limitation u/Art.120 is six years – Nirmohi Akhara claimed that the cause of action arose on 5 th January, 1950 when the receiver appointed by the Magistrate took charge of the property and they were denied charge and management of the temple – Since the suit was instituted on 17th December, 1959 (i.e. after more than nine years) it was outside the prescribed period of limitation and was thus barred – Alternate submission on behalf
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
of Nirmohi Akhara by virtue of s.23 of the Limitation Act, 1908 that denial or obstruction of its’ shebait rights of management and charge was a continuing wrong, also not tenable – Limitation Act, 1908 – Art. 120 – CrPC,1898 – s.145.
Limitation – Ayodhya Matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – Maintainability of suit – Suit filed by Sunni Central Waqf Board for declaration that entirety of the disputed site, including Babri Masjid and the surrounding graveyard, is a public mosque and for a decree for possession – Whether suit barred by limitation – Held: The grievance of the plaintiffs was that they were in possession and had offered prayers till 23rd December, 1949 on which date it was alleged that the mosque was desecrated – By pleading specifically that the plaintiffs were in possession and had offered prayers until a particular date, the sequitur is that after that date, the plaintiffs ceased to be in possession – The suit in the circumstances was a suit for possession of immoveable property falling in the description provided by the first column of Art.142 of the Limitation Act, 1908; and having been instituted on 18 th December, 1949, i.e. within a period of twelve years of the date of alleged dispossession on 23 rd December, 1949, it was within limitation – Even if the plaintiffs were not in exclusive or settled possession of the inner courtyard of the disputed site, the suit would fall within the residuary Art. 144 in which event also, the suit would be within limitation – Limitation Act, 1908 – Arts. 142 and 144. Limitation – Ayodhya Matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – Maintainability of the suit – Suit filed by deity of Lord Ram and Janmasthan (both of whom were asserted to be juridical persons) through a next friend impleaded as a third plaintiff for declaration that the entire premises constitute Ram Janmabhumi and for injunction against interference in construction of new temple after demolition of the existing building – Whether suit barred by limitation – Held: In three earlier suits centering around the dispute, neither of the plaintiffs in the instant suit were impleaded – Case of plaintiffs that institution of the instant suit was necessitated as a result of the deity not being a party to the earlier suits, and on the apprehension that in those suits, personal interests of the leading parties were being pursued without protecting the independent needs and concerns of the deity of Lord Ram, is well and truly borne out
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by the proceedings – Cause of action in the instant suit cannot be considered to be barred by limitation on proper construction of the basis of cause of action for institution of the suit – Suit at the behest of the first plaintiff (deity of Lord Ram) who is a juristic person, is within limitation and maintainable – The third plaintiff (next friend) is entitled to represent the first plaintiff. Limitation Act, 1908 – Art. 142 – Requirements to bring a suit within purview of Art.142 – The suit must be for possession of immoveable property; the plaintiff must establish having been in possession of the property; and the plaintiff should have been dispossessed or must have discontinued possession while in possession of the property – For Art.142 to apply, these requirements must cumulatively be established. Ayodhya Matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – Suit filed by a worshipper for enforcement of his right to worship Lord Ram at the Janmabhumi – Maintainability of the suit, on death of the original plaintiff – Held: The pleadings indicate that the right asserted was not a private right, but a right in common with and for the benefit of other Hindu devotees to pray at the disputed property – The right claimed was that of the “Hindu public” to worship at the disputed property without undue interference – The right asserted on behalf of the larger “Hindu public” does not stand extinguished upon the death of the original plaintiff and can be pursued by his son who is also a worshipper. Doctrines / Principles – Doctrine of res judicata – Estoppel – Ayodhya Matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – An earlier suit filed in 1885 by one Mahant Raghubhar Das for permission to construct a temple on the Chabutra, had been dismissed – Whether the decision operated as res judicata and brought about a bar on filing of subsequent suits centering on the dispute, which gave rise to the appeals in question – Held: No merit in the contention – The parties were distinct – Claim in the earlier suit was distinct – Basis of the claim was not which formed the subject matter of subsequent suits – Similarly, no merit in submission based on doctrine of issue estoppel or estoppel by record. Religion / Religious structure – Ayodhya Matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – Idol of Lord Ram – Deity – Shebaitship – Claim of Nirmohi Akhara as shebaits – Tenability –
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
Held: A claim of rights as a de facto shebait must be substantiated with proof that person is in exclusive possession of the trust property and exercises complete control over the right of management of the properties without any let or hindrance from any quarters whatsoever – Though it cannot and has not been denied in the present proceedings that Nirmohi Akhara existed at the disputed site, the claim of Nirmohi Akhara, taken at the highest is that of an intermittent exercise of certain management rights – Their rights were peripheral, usually involving the assistance of pilgrims, and were constantly contested – A stray or intermittent exercise of management rights does not confer upon a claimant the position in law of a de facto shebait – It cannot be said that the acts of Nirmohi Akhara satisfy the legal standard of management and charge that is exclusive, uninterrupted and continuous over a sufficient period of time – Despite their undisputed presence at the disputed site, Nirmohi Akhara is not a shebait for the idols of Lord Ram at the disputed site.
Religion / Religious structure – Ayodhya Matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – Idol of Lord Ram – Deity – Shebait – Absence of lawfully recognised shebait – Effect – Held: In such a case, it is open for an interested worshipper to sue on behalf of the deity. Religion / Religious structure – Hindu temple – Idol – Deity – Shebait – Distinction between shebait and pujari – Held: A shebait is vested with the authority to manage the properties of the deity and ensure the fulfilment of the purpose for which the property was dedicated – As a necessary adjunct of this managerial role, a shebait may hire pujaris for the performance of worship – This does not confer upon the appointed pujaris the status of a shebait – As appointees of the shebait, they are liable to be removed from office and cannot claim a right to continue in office. Religion / Religious structure – Hindu temple – Debutter property – Shebait – de facto shebait and de jure shebait – Held: Where a person claims to be a shebait despite lack of a legal title, relevant enquiry before the Court is whether the person was in actual possession of the debutter property and was exercising all rights of a shebait – Paramount interest in protection of the debutter property underlines the recognition of a de facto shebait.
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Religion / Religious structure – Hindu temple – Debutter property to Idol – Title – Independent claim of shebait – If tenable – Held: Though the shebait may have an interest in the usufruct of the debutter property, the de facto shebait is not vested with an independent right of title over the debutter property – Where a de facto shebait raises an independent claim to the debutter property to the idol, it assumes the position of a trespasser and no action at its behest is maintainable. Religion / Religious structure – Hindu temple – Idol – Deity – Shebait acting adverse to interests of the deity – Suit by worshipper – Held: Where a shebait acts adverse to the interests of the deity, a worshipper can, as next friend of the deity, sue on behalf of the deity itself, provided that if the next friend’s bona fides are contested, the court must scrutinise the intentions and capabilities of the next friend to adequately represent the deity – The court may do so of its own accord, ex debito justitae. Religion / Religious structure – Deity – Juristic personality – Ayodhya matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – Hindu idol – Juristic personality of the deity of Lord Ram (“Bhagwan Shri Ram Virajman”) – Held: For devotees of Lord Ram, the deity is embodiment of Lord Ram and constitutes the resident deity of Ram Janmabhumi – Oral and documentary evidence shows that Hindu devotees of Lord Ram hold a genuine, long standing and profound belief in the religious merit attained by offering prayer to Lord Ram at the site they believe to be his birth-place – Travel logs in the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century record prevalence of Hindu worship at the disputed site – Factum of Hindu belief in the sanctity of the disputed site established by evidence – The deity has been the object of worship for several hundred years and the underlying purpose of continued worship is apparent even absent any express dedication or trust – Existence of the idol is merely a question of form, or corpus, and legal personality of the deity “Bhagwan Sri Ram Virajman” is not dependent on the continued existence of the idol – Jurisprudence – Juristic Personality. Religion / Religious structure – Birth-place of deity – Juristic personality – Ayodhya matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – Birth-place of Lord Ram ‘Asthan Sri Ram Janam Bhumi’ – Juristic personality – Held: Recognition of ‘Asthan Sri Ram Janam
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
Bhumi’ as a juristic person would result in the extinguishment of all competing proprietary claims to the land in question – This conferral of ‘absolute title’ (resulting from the conferral of legal personality on land) would in truth render the very concept of title meaningless – Moreover, the extinguishing of competing claims would arise not by virtue of settled legal principles, but purely on the basis of the faith and belief of the devotees – This cannot be countenanced in law – Jurisprudence – Juristic Personality.
Evidence – Title to land – Ayodhya matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – Report of Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) – Evidentiary value – Held: Title to the land must be decided on settled legal principles and applying evidentiary standards which govern a civil trial – A finding of title cannot be based in law on the archaeological findings arrived at by ASI – On facts, conclusion in the ASI report about remains of an underlying structure of Hindu religious origin, symbolic of temple architecture of the twelfth century A.D., must be read contextually with caveats. Evidence – Historical records – Travelogues – Gazetteers – Ayodhya matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – Rival claims to possessory title – Historical records of travellers – Relevance of – Held: Accounts of the travellers must be read with circumspection – Their personal observations must carefully be sifted from hearsay – matters of legend and lore – Consulting their accounts on matters of public history is distinct from evidence on a matter of title – Contents of gazetteers can at best provide corroborative material to evidence which emerges from the record – The court must be circumspect in drawing negative inferences from what a traveller may not have seen or observed – Title cannot be established on the basis of faith and belief. Religion / Religious structure – Ayodhya Matter – Ram Janmabhumi - Babri Masjid dispute – Birth-place of Lord Ram – Faith and belief of Hindu devotees – Whether the disputed structure is birth-place of Lord Ram according to the faith and belief of the Hindu devotees – Held (per addenda): Faith and belief of Hindus since prior to construction of Mosque and subsequent thereto has always been that Janmasthan of Lord Ram is the place where Babri Mosque has been constructed which faith and belief is proved by documentary and oral evidence.
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Acts of State – Change in sovereignty – Effect – Held: Municipal courts of the new sovereign will not enforce the legal rights of parties existing under the former sovereign absent an express or implied recognition by the new sovereign of such legal rights – Municipal courts of the new sovereign can embark upon an inquiry as to whether the new sovereign has expressly or impliedly recognised the rights and liabilities existing under a former regime – However, burden to establish the existence and recognition of such rights and liabilities remains on the party claiming them. Law and Justice – Historical rights and wrongs – Role of Court – Held: Courts of today cannot take cognisance of historical rights and wrongs unless it is shown that their legal consequences are enforceable in the present – The law cannot be used as a device to reach back in time and provide a legal remedy to every person who disagrees with the course which history has taken. Evidence – Civil Trial – Proof – Preponderance of probabilities – Held: Court in civil trials apply standard of proof governed by preponderance of probabilities – Proof of a fact depends upon probability of its existence – Findings of the court must be based on: (i) test of a prudent person, who acts under the supposition that a fact exists; and (ii) in the context and circumstances of a particular case. Religion / Religious structure – Place of worship – Title or ownership of composite place of worship – Held: In absence of historical records with respect to ownership or title, the court has to determine the nature and use of the disputed premises as a whole by either of the parties – In determining the nature of use, the court has to factor in the length and extent of use. Religion / Religious structure – Mosque – Characteristics of mosque in Islamic law – Judicial review – Held: It would be inappropriate for Supreme Court to enter upon an area of theology and to assume the role of an interpreter of the “Hadees” – True test is whether those who believe and worship have faith in religious efficacy of the place where they pray – Courts must steer clear from choosing one among the possible interpretations of theological doctrine and must accept the faith and belief of the worshipper – Any attempt to lead the court to interpret religious doctrine in an
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absolute and extreme form and question the faith of worshippers must be firmly rejected – Nothing would be as destructive of the values underlying Art.25 of the Constitution – Constitution of India, 1950 – Art.25.
Jurisprudence – Juristic personality – Conferral of – Effect – Held: It does not automatically grant an ensemble of legal rights – The contours of juristic personality i.e. the rights and liabilities that attach upon the object conferred with juristic personality, must be determined keeping in mind the specific reasons for which such legal personality was conferred. Jurisprudence – Juristic Personality – Idols – Hindu idol and divinity – Contours of legal personality ascribed to a Hindu idol – Held: Conferral of legal personality on a Hindu idol is not conferral of legal personality on divinity itself, which in Hinduism is often understood as the ‘Supreme Being’ – The Supreme Being has no physical presence for it is understood to be omnipresent – the very ground of being itself. Jurisprudence – Juristic Personality – Idols – Legal characteristics of Hindu idols and the properties associated with them – Held: To provide courts with a conceptual framework within which they could analyse and practically adjudicate upon disputes involving competing claims over endowed properties, courts recognised the legal personality of the Hindu idol – It was a legal innovation necessitated by historical circumstances, the gap in the existing law and by considerations of convenience – It had the added advantage of conferring legal personality on an object that within Hinduism had long been subject to personification – Legal personality of the idol, and the rights of the idol over the property endowed and the offerings of devotees, are guarded by the law to protect the endowment against maladministration by the human agencies entrusted with the day to day management of the idol. Constitution of India, 1950 – Art. 142 – Scope under – Held: Supreme Court in exercise of its powers u/Art.142 must ensure that a wrong committed must be remedied – This power is not limitless – Power u/Art.142 authorises the court to pass orders to secure complete justice in the case before it – Art.142 embodies both the notion of justice, equity and good conscience as well as a supplementary power to the court to effect complete justice.
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Constitution of India, 1950 – Art. 372 – Change of legal regime between British sovereign and the Republic of India – Line of continuity – Art. 372 embodies the legal continuity between the British sovereign and independent India. Constitution of India, 1950 – Equality – Rule of law – Held: Under the Constitution, citizens of all faiths, beliefs and creeds seeking divine provenance are both subject to the law and equal before the law – The Constitution does not make a distinction between the faith and belief of one religion and another – All forms of belief, worship and prayer are equal. Constitution of India, 1950 – Equality and Secularism – Held: The Constitution postulates the equality of all faiths – Tolerance and mutual co-existence nourish the secular commitment of our nation and its people. CrPC, 1898 – s.145 – Nature and scope of proceedings u/s.145 – Held: s.145 proceedings do not purport to decide a party’s title or right to possession of the land – Property held in attachment in proceedings u/s.145 is ‘custodia legis’ – Provisions of s.145 can be invoked only when there is danger of breach of peace – Jurisdiction of Magistrate does not extend to adjudicate into disputed questions of title – Determination of the Magistrate is confined to which party was in actual possession on the date of the order – The real purpose is to decide who has actual physical possession and not legal possession supported by title over the land – To initiate proceedings u/s.145, the Magistrate has to be satisfied of the existence of a dispute which is likely to cause a breach of peace – Enquiry by the Magistrate is of a summary nature, the object being to ensure tranquillity in the locality when the dispute is likely to result in a breach of peace. Property Law – Immovable property – Dispute – Title – Held: Court does not decide title on basis of faith or belief but on basis of evidence of ownership and possession. Doctrines / Principles – Doctrine of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience – Applicability – Held: With the development of statutory law and judicial precedent, including progressive codification of customs, the need to place reliance on justice, equity and good conscience gradually reduced – However, where the existing
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statutory framework is inadequate for courts to adjudicate upon the dispute before them, or no settled judicial doctrine or custom can be availed of, or when parties are not governed by a particular personal law, or when the source of law requires to be supplemented, courts may legitimately take recourse to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience to effectively and fairly dispose of the case.
Doctrines / Principles – Doctrine of lost grant – Applicability – Held: The doctrine supplies a rule of evidence and is applicable in the absence of evidence, due to lapse of time, to prove the existence of a valid grant issued in antiquity – However, the court is not bound to raise the presumption where there is sufficient and convincing evidence to prove possession or when there are no defined grantees – There must be long, uninterrupted and peaceful enjoyment of an incorporeal right – The doctrine of lost grant is different from assertion of rights due to a prolonged custom – Alternate plea of adverse possession is destructive of a valid legal basis to apply the doctrine of lost grant as a rule of evidence – Evidence. Doctrines / Principles – Doctrine of lost grant – Effect of alternate plea of adverse possession – Held: Adverse possession postulates the vesting of title in one person and the existence of a long continued and uninterrupted possession of another, to the knowledge of and in a manner hostile to, the true title holder – Plea of adverse possession would lead to an inference against the application of the doctrine of lost grant as a plea of adverse possession is premised in title vesting in someone other than the alleged grantee – A person who sets up a plea of adverse possession must establish both possession which is peaceful, open and continuous – possession which meets the requirement of being ‘nec vi nec claim and nec precario’ – To substantiate a plea of adverse possession, the character of the possession must be adequate in continuity and in the public because the possession has to be to the knowledge of the true owner in order for it to be adverse – These requirements have to be duly established first by adequate pleadings and second by leading sufficient evidence – Possession – Adverse Possession – Evidence.
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Evidence Act, 1872 – s.110 – Applicability – Held: s.110 is based on the principle that possession in itself may raise a presumption of title – But this applies when the facts disclose no title in either of the disputants, in which case, possession alone decides – Presumption cannot arise when the facts are known – Possession. Waqf – Waqf by user – Principles – Express declaration of Waqf, if necessary – Held: Muslim law does not require an express declaration of a Waqf in every case – Dedication resulting in a waqf may also be reasonably inferred from the facts and circumstances of a case or from conduct of the wakif – Doctrine of waqf by user is a doctrine of necessity – The law recognises that where, since time immemorial, worship has been offered at a land with a mosque, the land is presumed to have been dedicated for a religious purpose and even absent a dedication, is waqf by user – However, this may not be extended to the extinguishment of competing and established religious rights of another community in the same property particular in the face of the evidence – Waqf Act, 1995 – s.3(r) – Doctrines / Principles – Doctrine of “waqf by user” – Muslim Law.
Evidence – Pleadings – Effect of inadequate pleadings – Held: Evidence can only be adduced with reference to matters which are pleaded in a civil suit and in the absence of an adequate pleadings, evidence by itself cannot supply the deficiency of a pleaded case.
Words and Phrases – “legal person” – Meaning – Held: To be a legal person is to possess certain rights and duties under the law and to be capable of engaging in legally enforceable relationships with other legal persons – Who or what is a legal person is a function of the legal system – Jurisprudence.
The instant appeals arose out of five regular suits instituted between 1950 and 1989, centering around a dispute of ownership over a piece of land admeasuring 1500 square yards in the town of Ayodhya. The Hindu community claims it as the birth-place of Lord Ram, an incarnation of Lord Vishnu. The Hindus refer to the disputed site as Ram Janmabhumi or Ram Janmasthan (i.e. birth-place of Lord Ram) and assert that there existed at the disputed site an ancient temple dedicated to Lord Ram, which was demolished upon the conquest of the Indian sub-continent
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
by Mughal Emperor Babur. The Muslim community claims it as the site of the historic Babri Masjid built by the Mughal Emperor, Babur. The Muslims contended that the mosque was built by or at the behest of Babur on vacant land. In 1856-57, riots had broken out between Hindus and Muslims in the vicinity of the structure. The British colonial government attempted to raise a buffer between the two communities to maintain law and order by setting up a grill-brick wall which would divide the premises into two parts: the inner portion to be used by the Muslim community and the outer portion or courtyard, to be used by the Hindu community. In January 1885, a person claiming to be the Mahant of Ram Janmasthan instituted a suit seeking the relief of permission to build a temple on the Ramchabutra situated in the outer courtyard. The trial judge dismissed the suit noting that there was a possibility of riots breaking out between the two communities due to proposed construction of a temple. The controversy entered a new phase on the night intervening 22 and 23 December 1949, when the mosque was desecrated by a group of about fifty or sixty people who broke open its locks and placed idols of Lord Ram under the central dome. On 29 December 1949, the City Magistrate issued a preliminary order in respect of the property under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. On 16th January, 1950, a suit (Suit 1) was filed before the civil Judge by one Gopal Singh Visharad which was essentially a suit by a worshipper for enforcement of his right to worship Lord Ram at the Janmabhumi. On 5th December, 1950, another suit (Suit 2) was instituted by one Paramhans Ramchandra Das seeking reliefs similar to those in Suit 1; however it was subsequently withdrawn. Nirmohi Akhara (which represents a religious sect amongst the Hindus, known as the Ramanandi Bairagis) filed a suit (Suit 3) before the civil Judge on 17th December, 1959 for handing over the management and charge of the Janmabhumi temple to it. On 18th December 1961, the Sunni Central Waqf Board filed a suit (Suit 4) before the civil Judge for declaration that the entirety of the disputed site, including Babri Masjid and the surrounding graveyard, is a public mosque and for a decree for possession. The plaint in Suit 4 contained a recital of a Suit of 1885 and it was contended that the plaintiff therein (Mahant) sued on behalf of himself, the Janmasthan and all persons interested in it, and the decision operates as res judicata as the matter
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directly and substantially in issue was the existence of the Babri Masjid, and the rights of the Hindus to construct a temple on the land adjoining the mosque. On 1 July 1989, a suit (Suit 5) was brought before the civil Judge by the deity of Lord Ram (“Bhagwan Shri Ram Virajman”) and the Janmasthan (“Asthan Shri Ram Janam Bhumi, Ayodhya”), both of whom were asserted to be juridical persons) through a next friend impleaded as a third plaintiff for a declaration that the entire premises constitute Ram Janmabhumi and for an injunction against interference in the construction of a new temple after the demolition of the existing building. On 10th July, 1989, all the said suits were transferred by the Allahabad High Court to itself for trial from the civil court. Meanwhile, on 6th December 1992, the structure of the mosque was brought down and the mosque was destroyed. In 2010, the High Court held that the suits filed by the Sunni Central Waqf Board and by Nirmohi Akhara were barred by limitation. Thereafter, in a split 2:1 verdict, the High Court held that the Hindu and Muslim parties were joint holders of the disputed premises. Each of them was held entitled to one third of the disputed property. The Nirmohi Akhara was granted the remaining one third. A preliminary decree to that effect was passed in the suit brought by the idol and the birth-place of Lord Ram through the next friend. The judgment of the High Court was challenged in the present appeals where the following points arose for determination: (i) Whether Suits 3, 4 and 5 or any of them are barred by limitation; (ii) Whether the decision in Suit of 1885 will operate as res judicata in Suits 1, 3 and 5; (iii) (a) Whether a Hindu temple existed at the disputed site; (b) Whether the temple was demolished by Babur or at his behest by his commander Mir Baqi in 1528 for the construction of the Babri Masjid; (c) Whether the mosque was constructed on the remains of and by using the materials of the temple; and (d) What, if any are the legal consequences arising out of the determination on (a) (b) and (c) above; (iv) Whether the suit property is according to the faith and belief of the Hindus since time immemorial the birth-place of Lord Ram;
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(v) (a) Whether the first and the second plaintiffs in Suit 5 are juristic persons; and (b) Whether the third plaintiff was entitled to represent the first and second plaintiffs as next friend; (vi) (a) Whether Nirmohi Akhara has established its claim of being a shebait of the deity of Lord Ram in the disputed premises; (b) If (a) is in the affirmative, whether the objection of Nirmohi Akhara to the maintainability of Suit 5 is valid; (vii) Whether during the intervening night of 22/23 December 1949, Hindu idols were installed under the Central dome of Babri Masjid as pleaded in the plaint in Suit 4; (viii) (a) Whether it is open to the Court to determine if the three domed structure which existed at the disputed site prior to 6 December 1992 was a mosque in accordance with Islamic tenets; (b) If the answer to (a) is in the affirmative, whether the three domed structure at the disputed site was constructed in accordance with Islamic tenets; (ix) (a) Whether there was a dedication of the three domed structure as a waqf at the time of its construction; (b) I n the alternative to (a) above, whether there is a waqf by public user as claimed by the plaintiffs in Suit 4; (x) Whether the plaintiffs in Suit 4 have established in the alternative their case of adverse possession; (xi) Whether the Muslims and or the Hindus have established the claim of worship and a possessory title over the disputed property; (xii) Whether the plaintiffs in Suit 4 have established their title to the disputed property; (xiii) Whether the plaintiff in Suit 5 have established their title to the disputed property; (xiv) Whether the High Court was justified in passing a preliminary decree for a three way division of the disputed property in equal shares between the Nirmohi Akhara, the plaintiffs of Suit 4 and the plaintiffs of Suit 5; (xv) Whether the plaintiff in Suit 1 is entitled to the reliefs as claimed in the suit; and (xvi) What, if any, relief ought to be granted in Suits 1, 3, 4 and 5
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Disposing of the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. Evidence on claim of title in Suit 4 and Suit 5. 1.1. The report of the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) indicates the following position: (i) Archaeological finds in the area of excavation reveal significant traces of successive civilisations, commencing with the age of the North Black Polished Ware traceable to the second century B.C.; (ii) The excavation by the ASI has revealed the existence of a pre-existing underlying structure dating back to the twelfth century. The structure has large dimensions, evident from the fact that there were 85 pillar bases comprised in 17 rows each of five pillar bases; (iii) On a preponderance of probabilities, the archaeological findings on the nature of the underlying structure indicate it to be of Hindu religious origin, dating to twelfth century A.D.; (iv) The mosque in dispute was constructed upon the foundation of the pre-existing structure. The construction of the mosque has taken place in such a manner as to obviate an independent foundation by utilising the walls of the pre-existing structure; and (v) The layered excavation at the site of excavation has also revealed the existence of a circular shrine together with a makara pranala indicative of Hindu worship dating back to the eighth to tenth century. A reasonable inference can be drawn on the basis of the standard of proof which governs civil trials that: (i) The foundation of the mosque is based on the walls of a large pre-existing structure; (ii) The pre-existing structure dates back to the twelfth century; and (iii) The underlying structure which provided the foundations of the mosque together with its architectural features and recoveries are suggestive
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of a Hindu religious origin comparable to temple excavations in the region and pertaining to the era. [Para 788 (I)][786-E-H; 787-A-E] 1.2. The conclusion in the ASI report about the remains of an underlying structure of a Hindu religious origin symbolic of temple architecture of the twelfth century A.D. must however be read contextually with the following caveats: (i) While the ASI report has found the existence of ruins of a pre-existing structure, the report does not provide: (a) The reason for the destruction of the preexisting structure; and (b) Whether the earlier structure was demolished for the purpose of the construction of the mosque. (ii) Since the ASI report dates the underlying structure to the twelfth century, there is a time gap of about four centuries between the date of the underlying structure and the construction of the mosque. No evidence is available to explain what transpired in the course of the intervening period of nearly four centuries; (iii) The ASI report does not conclude that the remnants of the pre- existing structure were used for the purpose of constructing the mosque (apart, that is, from the construction of the mosque on the foundation of the erstwhile structure); and (iv) The pillars that were used in the construction of the mosque were black Kasauti stone pillars. ASI has found no evidence to show that these Kasauti pillars are relatable to the underlying pillar bases found during the course of excavation in the structure below the mosque. [Para 788 (II)][787-F-H; 788-A-C] 1.3. A finding of title cannot be based in law on the archaeological findings which have been arrived at by ASI. Between the twelfth century to which the underlying structure is dated and the construction of the mosque in the sixteenth century, there is an intervening period of four centuries. No evidence has been placed on the record in relation to the course of human history between the twelfth and sixteen centuries. No evidence
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is available in a case of this antiquity on (i) the cause of destruction of the underlying structure; and (ii) whether the pre-existing structure was demolished for the construction of the mosque. Title to the land must be decided on settled legal principles and applying evidentiary standards which govern a civil trial. [Para 788 (III)][788-D-E] 1.4. Historical records of travellers (chiefly Tieffenthaler and the account of Montgomery Martin in the eighteenth century) indicate: (i)
The existence of the faith and belief of the Hindus that the disputed site was the birth-place of Lord Ram;
(ii)
Identifiable places of offering worship by the Hindus including Sita Rasoi, Swargdwar and the Bedi (cradle) symbolising the birth of Lord Ram in and around the disputed site;
(iii)
Prevalence of the practice of worship by pilgrims at the disputed site including by parikrama (circumambulation) and the presence of large congregations of devotees on the occasion of religious festivals; and
(iv)
The historical presence of worshippers and the existence of worship at the disputed site even prior to the annexation of Oudh by the British and the construction of a brick-grill wall in 1857.
Beyond the above observations, the accounts of the travellers must be read with circumspection. Their personal observations must carefully be sifted from hearsay – matters of legend and lore. Consulting their accounts on matters of public history is distinct from evidence on a matter of title. An adjudication of title has to be deduced on the basis of evidence sustainable in a court of law, which has withstood the searching scrutiny of cross-examination. Similarly, the contents of gazetteers can at best provide corroborative material to evidence which emerges from the record. The court must be circumspect in drawing negative inferences from what a traveller may not have seen or observed. Title cannot be established on the basis of faith and belief above. Faith and belief are indicators towards
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patterns of worship at the site on the basis of which claims of possession are asserted. The court has evaluated the rival claims to possessory title in a situation in which the state has expressly stated in its written statement that it claims no interest in the land. [Para 788 (IV)][788-F-H; 789-A-D]
1.5. The evidence indicates that despite the existence of a mosque at the site, Hindu worship at the place believed to be the birth-place of Lord Ram was not restricted. The existence of an Islamic structure at a place considered sacrosanct by the Hindus did not stop them from continuing their worship at the disputed site and within the precincts of the structure prior to the incidents of 1856-7. The physical structure of an Islamic mosque did not shake the faith and belief of Hindus that Lord Ram was born at the disputed site. On the other hand, the evidence relied on by the Sunni Central Waqf Board to establish the offering of namaz by the Muslim residents commences from around 1856-7. [Para 788 (V)][789-E-F]
1.6. The setting up of a railing in 1857 by the British around the disputed structure of the mosque took place in the backdrop of a contestation and disputes over the claim of the Hindus to worship inside the precincts of the mosque. This furnished the context for the riots which took place between Hindus and Muslims in 1856-7. The construction of a grick-brick wall by the colonial administration was intended to ensure peace between the two communities with respect to a contested place of worship. The grill-brick wall did not constitute either a sub-division of the disputed site which was one composite property, nor did it amount to a determination of title by the colonial administration. [Para 788 (VI)][789-G-H; 790-A] 1.7. Proximate in time after the setting up of the railing, the Ramchabutra was set up in or about 1857. Ramchabutra was set up in close physical proximity to the railing. Essentially, the setting up of Ramchabutra within a hundred feet or thereabouts of the inner dome must be seen in the historical context as an expression or assertion of the Hindu right to worship at the birthplace of Lord Ram. Even after the construction of the dividing wall by the British, the Hindus continued to assert their right to
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pray below the central dome. This emerges from the evidentiary record indicating acts of individuals in trying to set up idols and perform puja both within and outside the precincts of the inner courtyard. Even after the setting up of the Ramchabutra, pilgrims used to pay obeisance and make offerings to what they believed to be the ‘GarbhGrih’ located inside the three domed structure while standing at the iron railing which divided the inner and outer courtyards. There is no evidence to the contrary by the Muslims to indicate that their possession of the disputed structure of the mosque was exclusive and that the offering of namaz was exclusionary of the Hindus. [Para 788 (VII)][790-B-D] 1.8. Hindu worship at Ramchabutra, Sita Rasoi and at other religious places including the setting up of a Bhandar clearly indicated their open, exclusive and unimpeded possession of the outer courtyard. The Muslims have not been in possession of the outer courtyard. Despite the construction of the wall in 1858 by the British and the setting up of the Ramchabutra in closeproximity of the inner dome, Hindus continued to assert their right to pray inside the three-domed structure. [Para 788 (VIII)][790-E-F] 1.9. In or about 1877, at the behest of the Hindus, another door to the outer courtyard was allowed to be opened by the administration on the northern side (Sing Dwar), in addition to the existing door on the east (HanumatDwar). The Deputy Commissioner declined to entertain a complaint against the opening made in the wall. The Commissioner while dismissing the appeal held that the opening up of the door was in public interest. The opening of an additional door with the permission of the British administration indicates recognition of the presence of a large congregation of Hindu devotees necessitating additional access to the site in the interest of public peace and safety. [Para 788 (IX)][790-F-H] 1.10. Testimonies of both Hindu and Muslim witnesses indicate that on religious occasions and festivals such as Ram Navami, Sawan Jhoola, Kartik Poornima, Parikrama Mela and Ram Vivah, large congregations of Hindu devotees visited the disputed premises for darshan. The oral testimony of the Hindu devotees establishes the pattern of worship and prayer at Sita
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Rasoi, Ramchabutra and towards the ‘Garb Grih’, while standing at the railing of the structure of the brick wall. [Para 788 (X)][791A-B]
1.11. Hindu witnesses have indicated that Hindus used to offer prayer to the Kasauti stone pillars placed inside the mosque. Muslim witnesses have acknowledged the presence of symbols of Hindu religious significance both inside and outside the mosque. Among them, is the depiction of Varah, Jai-Vijay and Garud outside the three domed structure. They are suggestive not merely of the existence of the faith and belief but of actual worship down the centuries. [Para 788 (XI)][791-C] 1.12. There can no denying the existence of the structure of the mosque since its construction in the sixteenth century with the inscription of ‘Allah’ on the structure. The genesis of the communal incident of 1856-7 lies in the contestation between the two communities over worship. The setting up of the railing in 1856-7 was an attempt by the administration to provide a measure of bifurcation to observe religious worship – namaz by the Muslims inside the railing within the domed structure of the mosque and worship by the Hindus outside the railing. Attempts by the Sikhs or faqirs to enter into the mosque and set up religious symbols for puja were resisted by the Muslims, resulting in the administration evicting the occupier. [Para 788 (XII)][791-D-E] 1.13. After the construction of the grill-brick wall in 1857, there is evidence on record to show the exclusive and unimpeded possession of the Hindus and the offering of worship in the outer courtyard. Entry into the three domed structure was possible only by seeking access through either of the two doors on the eastern and northern sides of the outer courtyard which were under the control of the Hindu devotees. [Para 788 (XIII)][791F-G]
1.14. On a preponderance of probabilities, there is no evidence to establish that the Muslims abandoned the mosque or ceased to perform namaz in spite of the contestation over their
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possession of the inner courtyard after 1858. Oral evidence indicates the continuation of namaz. [Para 788 (XIV)][791-G-H] 1.15. The contestation over the possession of the inner courtyard became the centre of the communal conflict of 1934 during the course of which the domes of the mosque sustained damage as did the structure. The repair and renovation of the mosque following the riots of 1934 at the expense of the British administration through the agency of a Muslim contractor is indicative of the fact the despite the disputes between the two communities, the structure of the mosque continued to exist as did the assertion of the Muslims of their right to pray. Namaz appears to have been offered within the mosque after 1934 though, by the time of incident of 22/23 December 1949, only Friday namaz was being offered. The reports of the Waqf Inspector of December 1949 indicate that the Sadhus and Bairagis who worshipped and resided in the outer courtyard obstructed Muslims from passing through the courtyard, which was under their control, for namaz within the mosque. Hence the Waqf Inspector noted that worship within the mosque was possible on Fridays with the assistance of the police. [Para 788 (XV)][792-AD] 1.16. The events preceding 22/23 December 1949 indicate the build-up of a large presence of Bairagis in the outer courtyard and the expression of his apprehension by the Superintendent of Police that the Hindus would seek forcible entry into the precincts of the mosque to install idols. In spite of written intimations to him, the Deputy Commissioner and District Magistrate (K K Nayyar) paid no heed and rejected the apprehension of the Superintendent of Police to the safety of the mosque as baseless. The apprehension was borne out by the incident which took place on the night between 22/23 December 1949, when a group of fifty to sixty persons installed idols on the pulpit of the mosque below the central dome. This led to the desecration of the mosque and the ouster of the Muslims otherwise than by the due process of law. The inner courtyard was thereafter attached in proceedings under Section 145 CrPC 1898 on 29 December 1949 and the receiver took possession. [Para 788 (XVI)][792-D-F]
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1.17. On 6 December 1992, the structure of the mosque was brought down and the mosque was destroyed. The destruction of the mosque took place in breach of the order of status quo and an assurance given to this Court. The destruction of the mosque and the obliteration of the Islamic structure was an egregious violation of the rule of law. [Para 788 (XVII)][792-G-H]
1.18. The net result, as it emerges from the evidentiary record is thus: (i)
The disputed site is one composite whole. The railing set up in 1856-7 did not either bring about a subdivision of the land or any determination of title;
(ii)
The Sunni Central Waqf Board has not established its case of a dedication by user;
(iii)
The alternate plea of adverse possession has not been established by the Sunni Central Waqf Board as it failed to meet the requirements of adverse possession;
(iv)
The Hindus have been in exclusive and unimpeded possession of the outer courtyard where they have continued worship;
(v)
The inner courtyard has been a contested site with conflicting claims of the Hindus and Muslims;
(vi)
The existence of the structure of the mosque until 6 December 1992 does not admit any contestation. The submission that the mosque did not accord with Islamic tenets stands rejected. The evidence indicates that there was no abandonment of the mosque by Muslims. Namaz was observed on Fridays towards December 1949, the last namaz being on 16 December 1949;
(vii) The damage to the mosque in 1934, its desecration in 1949 leading to the ouster of the Muslims and the eventual destruction on 6 December 1992 constituted a serious violation of the rule of law; and
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(viii) Consistent with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, both Suits 4 and 5 will have to be decreed and the relief moulded in a manner which preserves the constitutional values of justice, fraternity, human dignity and the equality of religious belief. [Para 788 (XVII)][792-H; 793-A-F] 1.19. The Hindus have established a clear case of a possessory title to the outside courtyard by virtue of long, continued and unimpeded worship at the Ramchabutra and other objects of religious signficance. The Hindus and the Muslims have contested claims to the offering worship within the three domed structure in the inner courtyard. The assertion by the Hindus of their entitlement to offer worship inside has been contested by the Muslims. [Para 788 (XVIII)][793-G-H] 2. Legality of the decree for partition by the High Court
2.1. The High Court on a finding that Hindus and Muslims were in joint possession directed a three-way bifurcation of the disputed site, one third each being assigned to the Muslims, Hindus and Nirmohi Akhara. [Para 789][794-A-B] 2.2. In assessing the correctness of the decree of the High Court, it must be noted at the outset that the High Court was not seized of a suit for partition. In a suit for partition, it is trite law that every party is both a plaintiff and defendant. The High Court was hearing: (i) a suit by a worshipper seeking the enforcement of the right to pray (Suit 1); (ii) a suit by Nirmohi Akhara asserting shebaiti rights to the management and charge of the temple (Suit 3); (iii) a declaratory suit on title by the Sunni Central Waqf Board and Muslims (Suit 4); and (iv) a suit for a declaration on behalf of the Hindu deities in which an injunction has also been sought restraining any obstruction with the construction of a temple (Suit 5). The High Court was called upon to decide the question of title particularly in the declaratory suits, Suits 4 and 5. [Para 791][794-F-H; 795-A] 2.3. The High Court has adopted a path which was not open to it. It granted reliefs which were not the subject matter of the prayers in the suits. In the process of doing so, it proceeded to
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assume the jurisdiction of a civil court in a suit for partition, which the suits before it were not. Order VII Rule 7 of the CPC requires a plaintiff to specifically claim either simply or in the alternative the relief, which is sought. However, it clarifies that it is not necessary to ask for general and other reliefs which may always be given in the discretion of the court. This provision does not entitle the court in a civil trial to embark upon the exercise of recasting virtually the frame of a suit, which was undertaken by the High Court. There was no basis in the pleadings before the High Court and certainly no warrant in the reliefs which were claimed to direct a division of the land in the manner that a court would do in a suit for partition. [Para 792][795-E-F; 796-A-B]
2.4. The High Court has completely erred in granting relief which lay outside the ambit of the pleadings and the cases set up by the plaintiffs in Suits 3, 4 and 5. [Para 793][796-E-F] 2.5. There is another serious flaw in the entire approach of the High Court in granting relief of a three-way bifurcation of the disputed site. Having come to the conclusion that Suit 3 (filed by Nirmohi Akhara) and Suit 4 (filed by Sunni Central Waqf Board) were barred by limitation, the High Court proceeded to grant relief in Suit 5 to the plaintiffs in Suits 3 and 4. This defies logic and is contrary to settled principles of law. Moreover, the claim by the Nirmohi Akhara was as a shebait who claimed a decree for management and charge. On its own case, Nirmohi Akhara could not have been granted an independent share of the land. [Para 794][796-F-G; 797-A] 3. Conclusion on title 3.1. The facts, evidence and oral arguments of the present case have traversed the realms of history, archaeology, religion and the law. The law must stand apart from political contestations over history, ideology and religion. For a case replete with references to archaeological foundations, it must be remembered that it is the law which provides the edifice upon which our multicultural society rests. The law forms the ground upon which, multiple strands of history, ideology and religion can compete. By determining their limits, this Court as the final arbiter must
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preserve the sense of balance that the beliefs of one citizen do not interfere with or dominate the freedoms and beliefs of another. On 15 August 1947, India as a nation realised the vision of selfdetermination. On 26 January 1950 we gave ourselves the Constitution of India, as an unwavering commitment to the values which define our society. At the heart of the Constitution is a commitment to equality upheld and enforced by the rule of law. Under our Constitution, citizens of all faiths, beliefs and creeds seeking divine provenance are both subject to the law and equal before the law. Every judge of this Court is not merely tasked with but sworn to uphold the Constitution and its values. The Constitution does not make a distinction between the faith and belief of one religion and another. All forms of belief, worship and prayer are equal. Those whose duty it is to interpret the Constitution, enforce it and engage with it can ignore this only to the peril of our society and nation. The Constitution speaks to the judges who interpret it, to those who govern who must enforce it, but above all, to the citizens who engage with it as an inseparable feature of their lives. [Para 795][797-B-F] 3.2. In the present case, this Court is tasked with an adjudicatory task of unique dimension. The dispute is over immovable property. The court does not decide title on the basis of faith or belief but on the basis of evidence. The law provides parameters as clear but as profound as ownership and possession. In deciding title to the disputed property, the court applies settled principles of evidence to adjudicate upon which party has established a claim to the immovable property. [Para 796] [797-G-H] 3.3. On the balance of probabilities, there is clear evidence to indicate that the worship by the Hindus in the outer courtyard continued unimpeded in spite of the setting up of a grill-brick wall in 1857. Their possession of the outer courtyard stands established together with the incidents attaching to their control over it. [Para 797][798-A-B] 3.4. As regards the inner courtyard, there is evidence on a preponderance of probabilities to establish worship by the Hindus prior to the annexation of Oudh by the British in 1857. The Muslims have offered no evidence to indicate that they were in
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exclusive possession of the inner structure prior to 1857 since the date of the construction in the sixteenth century. After the setting up of the grill-brick wall, the structure of the mosque continued to exist and there is evidence to indicate that namaz was offered within its precincts. The report of the Waqf Inspector of December 1949 indicates that Muslims were being obstructed in free and unimpeded access to mosque for the purposes of offering namaz. However, there is evidence to show that namaz was offered in the structure of the mosque and the last Friday namaz was on 16 December 1949. The exclusion of the Muslims from worship and possession took place on the intervening night between 22/23 December 1949 when the mosque was desecrated by the installation of Hindu idols. The ouster of the Muslims on that occasion was not through any lawful authority but through an act which was calculated to deprive them of their place of worship. After the proceedings under Section 145 of CrPC 1898 were initiated and a receiver was appointed following the attachment of the inner courtyard, worship of the Hindu idols was permitted. During the pendency of the suits, the entire structure of the mosque was brought down in a calculated act of destroying a place of public worship. The Muslims have been wrongly deprived of a mosque which had been constructed well over 450 years ago. [Para 798][798-B-F]
3.5. The three-way bifurcation by the High Court was legally unsustainable. Even as a matter of maintaining public peace and tranquillity, the solution which commended itself to the High Court is not feasible. The disputed site admeasures all of 1500 square yards. Dividing the land will not subserve the interest of either of the parties or secure a lasting sense of peace and tranquillity. [Para 799][798-G] 3.6. Suit 5 has been held to be maintainable at the behest of the first plaintiff (the deity of Lord Ram) who is a juristic person. The third plaintiff (next friend) has been held to be entitled to represent the the first plaintiff. On the one hand a decree must ensue in Suit 5, Suit 4 must also be partly decreed by directing the allotment of alternate land to the Muslims for the construction of a mosque and associated activities. The allotment of land to the Muslims is necessary because though on a balance of
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probabilities, the evidence in respect of the possessory claim of the Hindus to the composite whole of the disputed property stands on a better footing than the evidence adduced by the Muslims, the Muslims were dispossessed upon the desecration of the mosque on 22/23 December 1949 which was ultimately destroyed on 6 December 1992. There was no abandonment of the mosque by the Muslims. This Court in the exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution must ensure that a wrong committed must be remedied. Justice would not prevail if the Court were to overlook the entitlement of the Muslims who have been deprived of the structure of the mosque through means which should not have been employed in a secular nation committed to the rule of law. The Constitution postulates the equality of all faiths. Tolerance and mutual co-existnce nourish the secular commitment of our nation and its people. [Para 800][798-G; 799-A-D] 3.7. The area of the composite site admeasures about 1500 square yards. While determining the area of land to be allotted, it is necessary to provide restitution to the Muslim community for the unlawful destruction of their place of worship. Having weighed the nature of the relief which should be granted to the Muslims, it is directed that land admeasuring 5 acres be allotted to the Sunni Central Waqf Board either by the Central Government out of the acquired land or by the Government of Uttar Pradesh within the city of Ayodhya. This exercise, and the consequent handing over of the land to the Sunni Central Waqf Board, shall be conducted simultaneously with the handing over of the disputed site comprising of the inner and outer courtyards as a consequence of the decree in Suit 5. Suit 4 shall stand decreed in the above terms. [Para 801][799-E-G] 3.8. Section 6 of the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act 1993 empowers the Central Government to direct that the right, title and interest in relation to the area or any part thereof, instead of continuing to vest in the Central Government shall vest in the authority or body or trustees of any trust which is willing to comply with the terms and conditions as government may impose. Section 7(1) provides that the property vested in the Central Government under Section 3, shall be maintained by
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
the government or by any person or trustees of any trust, authorities in this behalf. It would be necessary to direct the Central Government to frame a scheme in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by Sections 6 and 7 to set up a trust or any other appropriate mechanism to whom the land would be handed over in terms of the decree in Suit 5. The scheme shall incorporate all provisions necessary to vest power and authority in relation to the management of the trust or the body chosen for the vesting of the land. [Paras 802 and 803][799-G-H; 800-A-C]
3.9. Suit 3 filed by Nirmohi Akhara has been held to be barred by limitation. This Court has also rejected the objection of Nirmohi Akhara and of the Sunni Central Waqf Board to the maintainability of Suit 5 which was based on their plea that Nirmohi Akhara is a shebait. Nirmohi Akhara’s claim to be a shebait stands rejected. However, having regard to the historical presence of Nirmohi Akhara at the disputed site and their role, it is necessary for this Court to take recourse to its powers under Article 142 to do complete justice. Hence, it is directed that in framing the scheme, an appropriate role in the management would be assigned to the Nirmohi Akhara. [Para 804][800-C-D; 801-A-B]
4. Reliefs and directions 4.1. It is accordingly ordered and directed as follows:
(i) Suit 3 instituted by Nirmohi Akhara is held to be barred by limitation and shall accordingly stand dismissed; (ii) Suit 4 instituted by the Sunni Central Waqf Board and other plaintiffs is held to be within limitation. The judgment of the High Court holding Suit 4 to be barred by limitation is reversed; and
(iii) Suit 5 is held to be within limitation. [Para 805 (1)][801-B-D] 4.2. Suit 5 is held to be maintainable at the behest of the first plaintiff who is represented by the third plaintiff. There shall be a decree in terms of prayer clauses (A) and (B) of the suit, subject to the following directions:
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(i) The Central Government shall, within a period of three months from the date of this judgment, formulate a scheme pursuant to the powers vested in it under Sections 6 and 7 of the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act 1993. The scheme shall envisage the setting up of a trust with a Board of Trustees or any other appropriate body under Section 6. The scheme to be framed by the Central Government shall make necessary provisions in regard to the functioning of the trust or body including on matters relating to the management of the trust, the powers of the trustees including the construction of a temple and all necessary, incidental and supplemental matters; (ii) Possession of the inner and outer courtyards shall be handed over to the Board of Trustees of the Trust or to the body so constituted. The Central Government will be at liberty to make suitable provisions in respect of the rest of the acquired land by handing it over to the Trust or body for management and development in terms of the scheme framed in accordance with the above directions; and (iii) Possession of the disputed property shall continue to vest in the statutory receiver under the Central Government, untill in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 6 of the Ayodhya Act of 1993, a notification is issued vesting the property in the trust or other body. [Para 805 (2)][801-D-G; 802-A-C]
4.3 (i) Simultaneously, with the handing over of the disputed property to the Trust or body, a suitable plot of land admeasuring 5 acres shall be handed over to the Sunni Central Waqf Board, the plaintiff in Suit 4. (ii) The land shall be allotted either by:
(a) The Central Government out of the land acquired under the Ayodhya Act 1993; or (b) The State Government at a suitable prominent place in Ayodhya;
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
The Central Government and the State Government shall act in consultation with each other to effectuate the above allotment in the period stipulated.
(iii) The Sunni Central Waqf Board would be at liberty, on the allotment of the land to take all necessary steps for the construction of a mosque on the land so allotted together with other associated facilities;
(iv) Suit 4 shall stand decreed to this extent in terms of the above directions; and (v) The directions for the allotment of land to the Sunni Central Waqf Board in Suit 4 are issued in pursuance of the powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution.
[Para 805 (3)][802-D-H] 4.4. In exercise of the powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, it is directed that in the scheme to be framed by the Central Government, appropriate representation may be given in the Trust or body, to the Nirmohi Akhara in such manner as the Central Government deems fit. [Para 805 (4)][803-A] 4.5. The right of the plaintiff in Suit 1 to worship at the disputed property is affirmed subject to any restrictions imposed by the relevant authorities with respect to the maintenance of peace and order and the performance of orderly worship. [Para 805 (5)][803-B] Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584 : [1991] 1 Suppl. SCR 251; Supdt and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja (1979) 4 SCC 274 : [1980] 1 SCR 323; Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar v. Som Nath Dass (2000) 4 SCC 146 : [2000] 2 SCR 705; P Lakshmi Reddy v. L Lakshmi Reddy [1957] SCR 195; Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India (2004) 10 SCC 779 : [2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 255; Annakili v. A Vedanayagam (2007) 14 SCC 308 : [2007] 11 SCR 517; Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur (2019) 8 SCC 729; Raja Braja Sundar Deb v. Moni
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Behara AIR 1951 SC 247 : [1951] SCR 431; Buddu Satyanarayana v. Konduru Venkatapayya AIR 1953 SC 195; C. Periaswami Goundar v. Sundaraesa Ayyar AIR 1965 SC 516 : [1964] 8 SCR 347; Monohar Das Mohanta v. Charu Chandra Pal AIR 1955 SC 228 : [1955] 1 SCR 1168; Konda Lakshmana Bapuji v. Government of A P (2002) 3 SCC 258 : [2002] 1 SCR 651; Braja Kishore Jagdev v. Lingraj Samantaray (2000) 6 SCC 540 : [2000] 2 Suppl. SCR 5; Jattu Ram v. Hakam Singh, (1993) 4 SCC 403, Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner (2007) 6 SCC 186 : [2007] 5 SCR 155; Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K C Alexander AIR 1968 SC 1165 : [1968] 3 SCR 163; M.S. Jagadambal v. Southern Indian Education Trust (1988) (Supp) SCC 144 : [1988]1 SCR 722; Chief Conservator of Forests, Govt of A P v. Collector (2003) 3 SCC 472; State of A.P. v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Company (2013) 9 SCC 319 : [2013] 4 SCR 394; Srinivas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad [1951] SCR 277; Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore [1958] SCR 895; Shiv Kumar Sharma v. Santosh Kumari (2007) 8 SCC 600 : [2007] 10 SCR 17; Shamsu Suhara Beevi v. G Alex (2004) 8 SCC 569 : [2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 653; Om Prakash v. Ram Kumar (1991) 1 SCC 441; Promod Chandra Deb v. State of Orissa [1962] 1 Suppl. SCR 405; State of Gujarat v Vora Fiddali Badruddin Mithibarwala [1964] 6 SCR 461; Pema Chibar v. Union of India [1966] 1 SCR 357; Union of India v. Sudhansu Mazumdar (1971) 3 SCC 265 : [1971] Suppl. SCR 244; Dr N G Dastane v. S Dastane (1975) 2 SCC 326 : [1975] 3 SCR 967; State of U P v. Krishna Gopal (1988) 4 SCC 302 : [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 391; Sukhdev Singh v. Maharaja Bahadur of Gidhaur [1951] SCR 534; Mahant Shri Srinivasa Ramanuj Das v. Surajnarayan Dass [1966] Supp. SCR 436; Vimla Bai v. Hiralal Gupta (1990) 2 SCC 22 : [1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 759; Bala Shankar Maha Shanker Bhattjee v. Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State (1995) 1 Suppl. SCC 485 : [1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 687;
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Aliyathammuda Beethathebiyyappura Pookoya v. Pattakal Cheriyakoya (2019) SCC OnLine 953; Prem Sagar Manocha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2016) 4 SCC 571 : [2016] 1 SCR 34; Sri Kishore Chandra Singh Deo v. Babu Ganesh Prasad Bhagat AIR 1954 SC 316 : [1954] SCR 919; Smt. Bhagwan Kaur v. Shri Maharaj Krishan Sharma (1973) 4 SCC 46 : [1973] 2 SCR 702; Murari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1980) 1 SCC 704 : [1980] 2 SCR 249; State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, (1992) 3 SCC 700; Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee AIR 1964 SC 529; SPS Rathore v. CBI (2017) 5 SCC 817 : [2016] 5 SCR 335; Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy v. Baddam Pratapa Reddy (2019) SCC Online SC 1098; M V Elisabeth v Harwan Investment and Trading Pvt Ltd. (1993) 2 Suppl. SCC 433 : [1992] 1 SCR 1003; Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar [1956] SCR 756; Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt [1954] SCR 1005; Sree Sree Kalimata Thakurani of Kalighat v. Jibandhan Mukherjee AIR 1962 SC 1329; Vemareddi Ramaraghava Reddy v. Konduru Seshu Reddy [1966] Suppl. SCR 270; Bishwanath v. Sri Thakur Radha Ballabhji [1967] 2 SCR 618; Vikrama Das Mahant v. Daulat Ram Asthana AIR 1956 SC 382; Bhinka v. Charan Singh, [1959] 2 Suppl. SCR 798; R H Bhutani v. Miss Mani J Desai [1969] 1 SCR 80; Shanti Kumar Panda v. Shakuntala Devi, (2004) 1 SCC 438 : [2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 98; Surinder Pal Kaur v. Satpal (2015) 13 SCC 25 : [2015] 1 SCR 430; Deokuer v. Sheoprasad Singh, [1965] 3 SCR 655; Jhummamal alias Devandas v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1988) 4 SCC 452 : [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 584; Amresh Tiwari v. Lalta Prasad Dubey (2000) 4 SCC 440; Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of UP (1985) 1 SCC 427; Shyam Sunder Prasad v. Raj Pal Singh (1995) 1 SCC 311 : [1994] 6 Suppl. SCR 193; Ramiah v. N Narayana Reddy (2004) 7 SCC 541 : [2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 425; State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi, (1972) 2 SCC 890 : [1973] 3 SCR 1004; Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Amritsar v. Suresh Seth
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(1981) 2 SCC 790 : [1981] 3 SCR 419; Narayana Prabhu Venketeswara Prabhu v. Narayana Prabhu Krishna Prabhu (1977) 2 SCC 181 : [1977] 2 SCR 636; V Rajeshwari (Smt) v. T C Saravanabava (2004) 1 SCC 551 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 927; Maya Rani Punj v. CIT (1986) 1 SCC 445 : [1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 827; Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (2008) 8 SCC 648 : [2008] 12 SCR 104; Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgoan Medium Project (2008) 17 SCC 448 : [2008] 15 SCR 135; Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mahomed Jaffar Mohamed Hussein AIR 1954 SC 5; Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan, [1959] 2 Suppl. SCR 476; Faqir Mohamad Shah v. Qazi Fasihuddin Ansari AIR 1956 SC 713; Namdeo Lokman Lodhi v. Narmadabai [1953] SCR 1009 – relied on. Dr M Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 360 : [1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 1; S R Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1 : [1994] 2 SCR 644; Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998) 4 SCC 409; Sastri Yagnapurushad Ji v. Muldas Bhudardas Vaishya [1966] 3 SCR 242; Kamaraju Venkata Krishna Rao v. Sub Collector, Ongole [1969] 1 SCR 624; Thayarammal v. Kanakammal (2005) 1 SCC 457 : [2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 734; Idol of Thakurji Shri Govind Deoji Maharaj, Jaipur v. Board of Revenue, Rajasthan [1965] 1 SCR 96; Profulla Chorone Requitte v. Satya Chorone Requitte (1979) 3 SCC 409 : [1979] 3 SCR 431; Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji v. SP Sahi, Special Officer-in-Charge of the Hindu Religious Trusts [1959] Supp 2 SCR 583; Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati (2004) 10 SCC 65 : [ 2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 42; Rajasthan Housing Board v. New Pink City Nirman Sahkari Samiti Limited (2015) 7 SCC 601 : [2015] 5 SCR 365; Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee v. C K Rajan (2003) 7 SCC 546 : [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 619; Saraswathi Ammal v. Rajagopal Ammal [1954] SCR 277; Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi
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Vishwanath Temple v. State of UP (1997) 4 SCC 606 : [1997] 2 SCR 1086; Nar Hari Shastri v. Shri Badrinath Temple Committee [1952] SCR 849; Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullick [1951] SCR 1125; Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad (2004) 8 SCC 724 : [2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 942; S S Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1989) 4 SCC 582 : [1989] 1 Suppl. SCR 43; Deshmukh v. Walchand Ramchand Kothari [1950] SCR 852; Late Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Hyderabad [1986] Suppl. SCC 700 : [1986] 3 SCR 1072; Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur AIR 1965 SC 1923; Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd., (2004) 2 SCC 747 : [2004] 2 SCR 145; Shanti v. T D Vishwanathan, (2018) SCC OnLine SC 2196; Badri Nath v. Punna, AIR 1979 SC 1314 : [1979] 3 SCR 209; Rai Sahib Dr Gurdittamal Kapur v. Mahant Amar Das Chela Mahant Ram Saran, AIR 1965 SC 1966 : [1965] 3 SCR 433; Sarangadeva Periya Matam v. Ramaswami Goundar (Dead) by Legal Representatives AIR 1966 SC 1603 : [1966] 1 SCR 908; K Ethirajan v Lakshmi (2003) 10 SCC 578 : [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 33; Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi [1960] 1 SCR 773; Durgesh Sharma v. Jayshree (2008) 9 SCC 648 : [2008] 13 SCR 1056; Garikapati Veeraya v. N Subbiah Choudhry [1957] SCR 488; Ghulam Rasul Khan v. Secretary of State for India in Council (1925) SCC OnLine PC 12; C Natrajan v. Ashim Bai (2007) 14 SCC 183 : [2007] 11 SCR 33; Murarilal v. Dev Karan (1964) 8 SCR 239; Mohd Afzal Ali and Mohd Asghar v. Government AIR 1965 SC 516 : [1964] 8 SCR 347; Ram Jankijee Deities v. State of Bihar (1999) 5 SCC 50 : [1999] 3 SCR 442 and Yogendra Nath Naskar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta (1969) 1 SCC 555 : [1969] 3 SCR 742 and The Poohari Fakhir Sadavarthy of Bondipiputram v. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments [1962] 2 Suppl. SCR 276 – referred to.
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Gauri Shankar v. Ambika Dutt AIR 1954 Pat 196; Ganesh Chunder Dhur v. Lal Behary Dhur (1935-36) 63 IA 448; Bhabatarini Debi v. Ashalata Debi (194243) 70 IA 57; Maharaja Jagadindra Nath Roy Bahadur v. Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi (1903-04) 31 IA 203; Tarit Bhushan Rai v. Sri SriIswar Sridhar Salagram Shila Thakur AIR 1942 Cal 99; Rajah Kishendatt Ram v. Rajah Mumtaz Ali Khan (1878-79) 6 IA 145; Mahant Ram Charan Das v. Naurangi Lal AIR 1933 PC 75; Mahadeo Prasad Singh v. Karia Bharti AIR 1935 PC 44; Panchkari Roy v. Amode Lal Burman (1937) 41 CWN 1349; Subramania Gurukkal v. Abhinava Poornapriya A Srinivasa Rao Sahib AIR 1940 Mad 617; SankarnarayananIyer v. Sri Poovananathaswami Temple AIR 1948 PC 25; Sapna Koteshwar Godat Goa Endowment (Trust) v. Ramchandra Vasudeo Kittur AIR 1956 Bom 615; Palaniappa Goundan v. Nallappa Goundan AIR 1951 Mad 817; Mohideen Khan v. Ganikhan AIR 1956 AP 19; Vankamamidi Balakrishnamurthi v. Gogineni Sambayya AIR 1959 AP 186; The Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Madras v. PR Jagnnatha Rao (1974) 87 LW 675; D Ganesamuthuriar v. The Idol Of Sri Sappanikaruppuswami AIR 1975 Mad 23; Lalji Dharamsey v. Bhagwandas Ranchghoddas 1981 Mah LJ 573; Shri Parshvanath Jain Temple v. L.R.s of Prem Dass (2009) 1 RLW (Rev) 523; Palaniandi Gramani Manickammal v. V Murugappa Gramani AIR 1935 Mad 483; Ashim Kumar v. Narendra Nath 76 CWN 1016; Mahant Damodar Das v. Adhikari Lakhan Das (190910) 37 IA 147; Chttar Mal v. Panchu Lal AIR 1926 All 392; Rama Reddy v. Rangadasan AIR 1926 Mad 769; Surendrakrishna Roy v. Shree Shree Ishwar Bhubaneshwari Thakurani AIR 1933 Cal 295; Sri Sri Iswari Bhubaneshwari Thakurani v. Brojonath Dey (1936-37) 64 IA 203; In The Mosque, Masjid Shahid Ganj v. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar AIR 1940 PC 116; Radhakrishna Das v. Radharamana Swami AIR 1949 Orissa 1; Kumaravelu
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
Chettiar v. T P Ramaswami Ayyar, AIR 1933 PC 183; Maharaja Jagatjit Singh v. Raja Partab Bahadur Singh (1942) 2 Mad LJ 384; Posunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo (1875) 14 L Beng LR 450; Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami Ayyar AIR 1922 PC 123; Manohar Mukherji v. Bhupendranath Mukherji ILR (1933) 60 Cal 452; Maharani Rajroop Koer v. Syed Abul Hossein (1879-80) 7 IA 240; Ellappa Naicken v. K Lakshmana Naicken AIR 1949 Madras 71; Sir Seth Hukum Chand v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh (1933) 38 LW 306 (PC); Sri Sabhanayagar Temple, Chidambaram v. State of Tamil Nadu (2009) 4 CTC 801; Pichal alias Chockalingam Pillai v. The Commissioner for Hindu Religions and Charitable Endowments (Administrations Department) Madras AIR 1971 Mad 405; Sapneswar Pujapanda v. Ratkanar Mahapatra AIR 1916 Pat 146; Manohar Ganesh Tambekar v. Lakhmiram Govindram ILR (1888) 12 Bom 247; Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami v. Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami ILR (1904) 27 Mad 435; Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v. Ram Lal Maitra ILR (19091910) 37 Cal 128; Mohatap Bahadur v. Kali Pada Chatterjee AIR 1914 Cal 200; Rampat v. Durga Bharthi AIR 1920 Oudh 258; Ram Brahma v. Kedar Nath (1922) 36 CLJ 478; Madura, Tirupparankundram v. Alikhan Sahib (1931) 61 Mad. LJ 285; The Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Pidugu Narasimhan 1939 1 MLJ 134; TRK Ramaswami Servai v. The Board of Commissioners for the Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras ILR 1950 Mad 799; Venkataramana Murthi v. Sri Rama Mandhiram (1964) 2 ANWR 457; Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick (1924-25) 52 IA 245; Rambrahma Chatterjee v. Kedar Nath Banerjee (1922) 36 CLJ 478; TRK Ramaswami Servai v. The Board of Commissioners for the Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras ILR 1950 Mad 799; Venkataramana Murthi v. Sri Rama Mandhiram (1964) 2 ANWR 457; Gurushiddappa Gurubasappa Bhusanur v. Gurushiddappa Chenavirappa Chetni AIR 1937
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Bombay 238; Chandan Mull Indra Kumar v. Chiman Lal Girdhar Das Parekh AIR 1940 PC 3; New Multan Timber Store v. Rattan Chand Sood (1997) 43 DRJ 270; Farzand Ali v. Zafar Ali (1918) 46 IC 119; Rajah Muttu Ramalinga Setupati v. Perianayagum Pillai (1873-74) 1 IA 209; Sir Seth Hukum Chand v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh (1933) 38 LW 306 (PC); Raja Rajgan Maharaja Jagatjit Singh v. Raja Partab Bahadur Singh AIR 1942 PC 47; Secretary of State Council in India v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba (1857-60) 7 Moo IA (476); Secretary of State of India in Council v. Bai Rajbai ILR (1915) 39 Bom 625; Degunbaree Dabee v. Eshan Chunder Sein (1868) 9 W.R. 230, 232; Gatha Ram Mistree v. Moohita Kochin Atteah Domoonee (1875) 23 W.R. 179; Radha Kishen v. Raj Kaur (1891) 13 All 573; The Court of Wards for the property of Makhdum Hassan Bakhsh v. Ilahi Bakhsh ILR (1913) 40 Cal 297; Abdul Ghafoor v. Rahmat Ali AIR 1930 Oudh 245; Miru v. Ram Gopal AIR 1935 All 891; Chockalingam Pillai v. Mayandi Chettiar ILR 19 Madras 485; Asrabulla v. Kiamatulla Haji Chaudhury AIR 1937 Cal 245; N Sankaranarayana Pillayan v. Board Of Commissioners For The Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras AIR 1948 PC 25 and Lakshmidhar Misra v. Rangalal AIR 1950 PC 56 – referred to. The City of Mecca (1881) 5 P.D. 106; Bumper Development Corporation Ltd v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1991] 1 WLR 1362 (2); Thomas and James Cook v Sir James Sprigg (1899) AC 572; and Miller v. Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 ALL ER 372; Harris and Earl of Chesterfield [1911] A.C. 623 – referred to. Führer, Alois Anton, Edmund W. Smith, and James Burgess, The Sharqi architecture of Jaunpur: with notes on Zafarabad, Sahet-Mahet and other places in the North-Western provinces and Oudh (1994); William Erskine, John Leyden, and Annette Susannah Beveridge, the Babur-nama in English (Memoirs of
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Babur), London: Luzac & Co. (Reprint in 2006 by Low Price Publications, Delhi); Epigraphia Indica, Arabic and Persian Supplement (in continuation of Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica) (Z A Desai Eds), Archaeology Survey of India (1987); Rashid Akhtar Nadvi, Tuzk e Babri, Lahore: Sang e Mil (1995); Manucci, NiccoloÌ, and William Irvine, Storia do Mogor; or, Mogul India, 1653-1708, J. Murray: London (1907); Abual-Faz$l ibn Mubarak and H. Blochmann; The Ain i Akbari, 1873, Calcutta: Rouse (Reprint of 1989 published by Low Price Publications, Delhi); Lok Sabha Debates, Volume V, nos 41-49, page 443-444, 448; Rajya Sabha Debates, Volume CLX, nos 13-18, pages 519-520 and 522; Roscoe Pound, Jurisprudence, Part IV, 1959 Edition; J W Salmond, Jurisprudence, Steven and Haynes (1913); Phillip Blumberg, The Multinational Challenge to Corporation Law : The Search for New Corporate Personality, Oxford University Press (1993), at pages 3, 22 and 207; D R Thomas, Maritime Liens in British Shipping Laws: Volume 14 (Steven & Sons London 1980); Douglas Lind, Pragmatism and Anthropomorphism: Reconceiving the Doctrine of the Personality of the Ship, 22 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 39 (2009) at page 91; Bryant Smith, Legal Personality, 37 Yale L.J. (1928) at pages 287, 295 and 296; B.K. Mukherjea, The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust, 5th Edition, Eastern Law House, (1983) at pages 9, 28 and 36; Gautam Patel, Idols in Law, Vol. 45, No.50, Economic and Political Weekly (11-17 December 2010); Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Code by Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, 20th edition (2016) at pp. 427 and 451; Black’s Law Dictionary Tenth Edition at p. 572; P Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon Fifth Edition at pgs. 1537 and 1563; Mortimer Wheeler, Archaeology from the earth, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1954); Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson & Co (1959); Adam Hardy, Indian temple architecture: form and transformation: the Karnòatòa Dravidòa tradition, 7th
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to 13th centuries: Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts (1995); Jose K. John, The Mapping of Hindustan: A Forgotten Geographer of India, Joseph Tieffenthaler (1710-1785); Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Vol. 58 (1997) at pages 400-410; Edward Thornton, 1799-1875: A Gazetteer of the Territories Under the Government of the East-India Company, and of the Native States on the Continent of India, London: W. H. Allen (1854); Alexander Cunningham, Four Reports Made During the Years 1862-63-64-65, Archaeological Survey of India, Volume 1, Simla: Government Central Press, 1871; U.P. District Gazetteer Faizabad by Smt. Isha Basant Joshi (1960 Edition); Introduction by Richard J Evans in E.H. Carr, What is History?, Penguin (2018 reprint) at page 12; and Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, Penguin (2019 reprint), at page 4; Sastri’s “Hindu Law, Chapter XIV, 5th edition at page 726; Phipson on Evidence, 16 th Edn. at pgs 154-155; Robert Montgomery Martin (Biographical details) – British Museum; F. H. H. King, Survey our empire! Robert Montgomery Martin (1801–1868), a bio-bibliography (1979); William Foster, “Early Travels in India (15831619)”, London (1921) at pg 176 – referred to. HELD (per addenda):
1. The oral evidence of the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs of Suit No.5, plaintiffs of Suit No. 3 and even witness examined on behalf of plaintiffs of Suit No.4 clearly proves faith and belief of Hindus that Janmasthan of Lord Ram is the place where Babri Mosque has been constructed. Three-dome structure was treated as Birthplace of Lord Ram. People worship of the three-dome structure, parikrama of the entire premises by the devotees have been amply proved by oral evidences led in the Suit. [Para 166][866-D] 2. The statements noted in all Gazetteers published under authority of government categorically and unanimously state that at Janmasthan of Lord Ram, Babri Mosque was constructed in
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
1528 by Babar. It is true that statements recorded in Gazette is not conclusive evidence but presumption of correctness of statements recorded have to be raised subject to being disproved by leading appropriate evidences. All Gazettes published by the Government authority repeat the same statement that Babri Mosque was constructed at the Janmasthan of Lord Ram. There is no evidence worth name led of the plaintiffs of Suit No.4 to disprove the above statement and further, oral evidence clearly supports the faith and belief of Hindus that Lord Ram was born at the place where Babri Mosque has been constructed. The conclusion that place of birth of Lord Ram is the three-dome structure can, therefore, be reached. [Para 167][866-E-G]
3. The sequence of the events clearly indicate that faith and belief of Hindus was that birth place of Lord Ram was in the three-dome structure Mosque which was constructed at the janamasthan. It was only during the British period that grilled wall was constructed dividing the walled premises of the Mosque into inner courtyard and outer courtyard. Grilled iron wall was constructed to keep Hindus outside the grilled iron wall in the outer courtyard. In view of the construction of the iron wall, the worship and puja started in Ram Chabutra in the outer courtyard. Suit of 1885 was filed seeking permission to construct temple on the said Chabutra where worship was permitted by the British Authority. Faith and belief of the Hindus as depicted by the evidence on record clearly establish the Hindus belief that at the birth place of Lord Ram, the Mosque was constructed and threedome structure is the birth place of Lord Ram. The fact that Hindus were by constructing iron wall, dividing Mosque premises, kept outside the three-dome structure cannot be said to alter their faith and belief regarding the birthplace of Lord Ram. The worship on the Ram Chabutra in the outer courtyard was symbolic worship of Lord Ram who was believed to be born in the premises. [Para 169][867-B-E]
4. It is thus concluded that faith and belief of Hindus since prior to construction of Mosque and subsequent thereto has always been that Janmaasthan of Lord Ram is the place where
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Babri Mosque has been constructed which faith and belief is proved by documentary and oral evidence. [Para 170][867-F] Sukhdev Singh v. Maharaja Bahadur of Gidhaur, AIR 1951 SC 288 : [1951] SCR 534; Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mahomed Jaffar Mahomed Hussein, AIR 1954 SC 5; Mahant Shri Srinivas Ramanuj Das v. Surjanarayan Das and Another, AIR 1967 SC 256: [1966] SCR 436; and Bala Shankar Maha Shanker Bhattjee and Others v. Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State, (1995) 1 Suppl. SCC 485 : [1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 687 – relied on. Shastri Yagnapurushadji and others v. Muldas Sbhudardas Vaishya and another AIR 1966 SC 1119 : [1966] 3 SCR 242; The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282:[1954] SCR 1005 – referred to. Case Law Reference In the judgment per curiam
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referred to
Para 25
[1994] 2 SCR 644
referred to
Para 83
[2000] 2 SCR 705
relied on
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[1992] 1 SCR 1003
relied on
Para 96
[1999] 3 SCR 442
referred to
Para 102
[1969] 3 SCR 742
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Para 104
[1956] SCR 756
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Para 117
[1962] Supp 2 SCR 276
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Para 130
[1966] 3 SCR 242
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Para 130
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Para 149
[2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 734
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Para 132
[1965] 1 SCR 96
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Para 131
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
[1979] 3 SCR 431
referred to
Para 131
[1959] Supp 2 SCR 583
referred to
Para 132
[2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 42
referred to
Para 132
[2015] 5 SCR 365
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Para 132
[2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 619
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Para 176
[1954] SCR 277
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Para 176
[1997] 2 SCR 1086
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Para 176
[1952] SCR 849
referred to
Para 212
[1966] 3 SCR 242
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Para 212
[1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 687
relied on
Para 212
[1951] SCR 1125
referred to
Para 228
[1954] SCR 1005
relied on
Para 228
[2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 942
referred to
Para 228
[1989] 1 Suppl. SCR 43
referred to
Para 228
[1959] 2 Suppl. SCR 798
relied on
Para 229
[1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 584
relied on
Para 235
[1965] 3 SCR 655
relied on
Para 229
[1950] SCR 852
referred to
Para 229
[1986] SCR 1072
referred to
Para 230
[1969] 1 SCR 80
relied on
Para 234
[2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 98
relied on
Para 234
[2015] 1 SCR 430
relied on
Para 234
(2000) 4 SCC 440
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Para 236
(1985) 1 SCC 427
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Para 236
[1980] 1 SCR 323
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Para 243
[1994] 6 Suppl. SCR 193
relied on
Para 244
AIR 1965 SC 1923
referred to
Para 249
[2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 425
relied on
Para 254
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[1973] 3 SCR 1004
relied on
Para 264
[1981] 3 SCR 419
relied on
Para 261
[1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 827
relied on
Para 263
[2008] 12 SCR 104
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Para 263
[1959] 2 Suppl. SCR 476
relied on
Para 264
[2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 942
referred to
Para 269
[2004] 2 SCR 145
referred to
Para 269
[1979] 3 SCR 209
referred to
Para 332
AIR 1962 SC 1329
relied on
Para 333
[1966] Suppl. SCR 270
relied on
Para 340
[1967] 2 SCR 618
relied on
Para 343
AIR 1956 SC 382
relied on
Para 374
AIR 1954 SC 5
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Para 379
[2008] 15 SCR 135
relied on
Para 410
[1965] 3 SCR 433
referred to
Para 422
[1966] 1 SCR 908
referred to
Para 423
[2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 33
referred to
Para 437
[1960] 1 SCR 773
referred to
Para 438
[2008] 13 SCR 1056
referred to
Para 441
[1957] SCR 488
referred to
Para 441
[1977] 2 SCR 636
relied on
Para 442
[2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 927
relied on
Para 444
[2016] 1 SCR 34
referred to
Para 488
[1973] 2 SCR 702
relied on
Para 493
[1980] 2 SCR 249
relied on
Para 493
(1992) 3 SCC 700
relied on
Para 493
AIR 1964 SC 529
referred to
Para 493
[2016] 5 SCR 335
relied on
Para 493
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
[1954] SCR 919
relied on
Para 493
[1975] 3 SCR 967
relied on
Para 506
[1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 391
relied on
Para 506
(2004) 1 Suppl. SCC 255
relied on
Para 585
[1951] SCR 534
relied on
Para 589
[1966] Supp. SCR 436
relied on
Para 591
[1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 759
relied on
Para 591
[1965] 3 SCR 655
referred to
Para 616
[2007] 11 SCR 33
referred to
Para 627
[1962] 1 Suppl. SCR 405
relied on
Para 643
[1964] 6 SCR 461
relied on
Para 645
[1966] 1 SCR 357
relied on
Para 645
[1971] Suppl. SCR 244
relied on
Para 645
[1953] SCR 1009
referred to
Para 671
[1964] 8 SCR 239
referred to
Para 671
[1991] 1 Suppl. SCR 251
relied on
Para 675
(1998) 4 SCC 409
relied on
Para 675
[1964] 8 SCR 347
relied on
Para 681
AIR 1956 SC 713
relied on
Para 738
[1980] 1 SCR 323
referred to
Para 752
[1957] SCR 195
relied on
Para 752
[2007] 11 SCR 517
relied on
Para 752
AIR 1940 PC 116
referred to
Para 753
(2019) 8 SCC 729
relied on
Para 754
[1951] SCR 431
relied on
Para 762
AIR 1953 SC 195
relied on
Para 763
[1955] 1 SCR 1168
relied on
Para 764
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[2002] 1 SCR 651
relied on
Para 765
[2000] 2 Suppl. SCR 5
relied on
Para 766
(1993) 4 SCC 403
relied on
Para 774
[2007] 5 SCR 155
relied on
Para 774
[1968] 3 SCR 163
relied on
Para 785
[1988] 1 SCR 722
relied on
Para 785
(2003) 3 SCC 472
relied on
Para 785
[2013] 4 SCR 394
relied on
Para 785
[1951] SCR 277
relied on
Para 792
[1958] SCR 895
relied on
Para 792
[2007] 10 SCR 17
relied on
Para 793
[2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 653
relied on
Para 793
(1991) 1 SCC 441
relied on
Para 793
In the addenda
[1966] SCR 242
referred to
Para 29
[1954] SCR 1005
referred to
Para 38
[1951] SCR 534
relied on
Para 77
AIR 1954 SC 5
relied on
Para 78
[1966] SCR 436
relied on
Para 79
[1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 687
relied on
Para 80
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 1086610867 of 2010.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.09.2010 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow in O.O.S. No. 4/1989 (Regular Suit No. 12 of 1961) and O.O.S. No. 5/1989 (Regular Suit No. 236 of 1989) With
C.A Nos. 4768-4771/2011, 2636/2011, 821/2011, 4739/2011, 49054908/2011, 2215/2011, 4740/2011, 2894/2011, 6965/2011, 4192/2011, 5498/2011, 7226/2011, 8096/2011
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
Tushar Mehta, SG, Raghvendra Singh, Sr. Adv./Adv. Gen., Vinod Diwakar, Madan Mohan Pandey, Ajay Kumar Mishra, AAGs, Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Zafaryab Jilani, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, K. Parasaran, C.S. Vaidyanathan, Sushil Kumar Jain, Ranjit Kumar, Shekhar Naphade, Vikas Singh, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, P.S. Narasimha, V. Shekhar, R.N. Venjrani, S.P. Singh, Aman Sinha, Jaideep Gupta, Dr. P.N. Mishra, Sr. Advs., Ejaz Maqbool, Shahid Nadeem, Ms. Akriti Chaubey, Ms. Qurratulain, Gautam Prabhakar, Wasif Rahman Khan, Kunwar Aditya Singh, Ms. Siddhi Padia, Shakil Ahmed Syed, Mohd. Parvez Dabas, Uzmi Jameel Husain, Daanish Ahmad Syed, Mohammad Sulaiman Khan, Zia Ul Qayuim, Mushtaq Ahmad Siddique, Shail Kumar Dwivedi, Mohd. Nizamuddin Pasha, M.R. Shamshad, Nizampasha, Zaki Ahmad Khan, Aditya Samaddar, Ms. Sarah Haque, Ms. Bhabna Das, Ms. Rashmi Singh, Ms. Chitra Vats, Bhupender Yadav, P.V. Yogeswaran, Gobind Kumar, P.K. Singh, Ms. Aditi, Anirudh Sharma, Amit Sharma, Sandeep Singh, Pranav Kumar, Ashish Kumar Upadhyay, Babul Kumar, Y. Lokesh, Akshay Nagarajan, P. Abinesh Karthik, Priya Ranjan Roi, Anil Hooda, Ajay Sharma, Puneet Jain, R.L. Verma, Arun Sharma, Ms. Christi Jain, Tarunjeet Verma, Varun Sharma, Harshit Khanduja, Harsh Jain, Abhinav Deshwal, Abhinav Gupta, Shailendra Sharma, Ms. Pratibha Jain, M.K. Tiwari, D. Bharat Kumar, Yash Mishra, Ankit Raj, Indira Bhakar, Rajesh Singh, Vineet Pandey, Ms. Nidhi Jaiswal, Santosh Kumar, T. Bhaskar Gowtham, Ashwin Kumar, Kumar Mihir, Ms. Shristi Mishra, Dwijendra Prasad Gupta, Deepak Kumar, Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Irshad Ahmad, Abhikalp Pratap Singh, Ms. Lakshmi S. Iyer, Ms. Aishwarya Dash, M. Taiyyab Khan, Mujibuddin, Tasbrik Ahmad, Ravi Shankar Kumar, Vivek Sharma, Pallav Mongia, Rajesh Raina, Abhinav Goyal, Dawneesh Shaktivats, Narendra Kumar, Utkarsh Kashyap, Saayan Kunal, Jamshed Bey, Ms. Priyambica M. Jha, Ms. Deepika Kaliya, Mritunjaya Singh, Sanjay Kumar Mishra, Satwik Misra, Smarhar Singh, Dr. Prabhat Kumar, Dr. S.K. Verma, Ms. Aakancha Verma Chandhiok, Janmay Verma, Binay Kumar Das, Ms. Priyanka Das, Ms. Joyoti Kundu Goyal, Ms. Vimla Sinha, Baldev Atreya, Dr. Alok Kumar Sharma, Ms. Dhriti Singh, M.C. Dhingra, Piyush Kant Roy, Gaurav Dhingra, Mrs. Abha Roy, Vikrant Yadav, Ms. Indira Kandra, Ms. Arna Das, Ms. Kamakshi S. Mehlwal, Mohit Yadav, Ms. Deepti J. Raj, Ms. Rubina Jawed, Md. Izhar Alam, Ramjee Pandey, Anoop Bose, Girjesh Pandey, Antariksh Singh, Rakesh Kumar, Sanjeev Kumar, Rajesh Kumar, Akash Kumar Singh, Ms. Divyani Singh,
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Ms. Vrinda Jhingan, Uday Prakash Yadav, Ms. Nabhanya Sharma, Hement Sharma, Aushothosh Sharma, Niraj Srivastava, Sujit Jha, Alok Singh, Narayan R. Panicker, Abhishek Singh, K.K. Khurana, M.K. Pandey, Amit Kumar Singh, Shiv Nand Mishra, Rajkumar Parashar, Hari Shankar Jain, Ms. Yashmi Sehgal, Ms. Kanika Rai, Ms. Pooja Rai, Ms. Bandana Mishra, Vishnu Shankar Jain, Ms. Vaishnavi Ranjana, Pankaj Kumar Verma, Bhavanishankar V. Gadnis, Vishwanath B. Gadnis, Radni V. Gadnis, Varinder Kumar Sharma, Manoj K. Mishra, Umesh Dubey, Jyoti Mishra, Mahendra Singh, D.K. Mishra, Vijay Pal, Shyamal Kumar, Sunil Kumar Tomar, Sujeet Kumar, Bitu Kumar Singh, Balraj Singh Malik, Shyam Sunder Gupta, R.S. Rond, R.P. Singh, Ashutosh Sharma, Shantanu Sharma, Ms. Ranjana Agnihotri, Ms. Sangeeta Mandal, Ms. Swati Singh, Ms. Taruna A. Prasad, Ms. Sukanya Basu, Ms. Shimantika Mandal, Rajeshwar Nath Mishra, Ms. Swati Singh for M/s. Fox Mandal & Co., Syed Shahid Hussain Rizvi, Zeeshan Rizvi, Anas Zaidi, Imtiaz Ahmad, S. Mansoor Ali, Rashid Saeed, Aftab Ali Khan, M. Tayyab Khan, Mujeebuddin Khan, Ali Safeer Farooqi, Syed Imtiyaz Ali, Mumtaz Alam Siddiqui, Sheik Maulali Basha, Piyush Beriwal, Ms. Swati Ghildiyal, Surender Kumar Gupta, B.V. Balram Das, B. Krishna Prasad, Ravindra Raizada, Sanjay Kumar Tyagi, S.K. Dwivedi, Rajeev Kumar Dubey, D.N. Dubey, Shashank Shekhar Singh, Pankaj Sharma, Sudhakar Kulwant, Ajay Jain, Ashutosh Kumar Sharma, Saurav Singh Chauhan, Ashish Tiwari, Siddharth Krishan Dwivedi, Ms. Nidhi Dwivedi, B.N. Dubey, Aviral Saxena, Ashiwan Mishra, Ms. Manvi Dixit Sharma, B.P. Singh Dhakray, Shakit Singh Dhakray, Kamlendra Mishra, Manish Shukla, sAmit Kumar, Pankaj Pandey, Bhakti Vardhan Singh, Vikas Singh Jangra, Sarthak Nayak, Shridhar Pottaraju, Ms. Ankita Sharma, Prakash Gautam, Amit Kumar Pathak, V.C. Shukla, Rahul G. Tanwani, Rishi Raj Sharma, Tushar Thareja, Sayooj Mohandas, Praneet Pranav, Ms. Shivani Tushir, Sindoora VNL, Ms. Aditi Tripathi, Ms. Kanti, Prashant Singh, Rajesh Kumar, Gaichangpou Gangmei, Arjun D. Singh, Abhishek R. Shukla, Mukunda Rao Angara, Siddhartha Talukdar, Ms. Shiwani Tushir, Ms. Shweta Parihar, Ms. Gavarraju Ushasri, Yashvir Kumar, Vishnu Thulasi Menon, D. Bharat Kumar, Mrs. Swarupama Chaturvedi, Rishi Raj Sharma, Anish Kumar Gupta, B.N. Dubey, Ms. Devika Gulati, Kumar Gaurav, Robin Khokhar, Ms. Aparna Trivedi, Amit Kumar, Ms. Babita Yadav, Mukesh Kumar, Ashutosh Mohan, Niaz Ahmad Farooqui, Tanveer Ahmad Khan, Milan Laskar, Zaki Ullah Khan, Mohd. Shakim,
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
Mohammad Noorullah, Mohd. Umar Iqbal Khan, Vaibhav Tandon, Pulkit Chandna, Mohd. Shahib, Mohd. Aamir Dabas, Fuzail Ahmad Ayyubi, Abdul Qadir, Ibad Mushtaq, Ms. Aditi Gupta, Lakshmi Raman Singh, Chandra Prakash, Vivek Singh, Ms. Udita Singh, C.P. Rajwar, Srikaanth S., Abhishek Sharma, Shashank Shekhar, Rituraj, Ms. Sheetal Rajput, Satwik Misra, Ms. Ritika Rani, Ravishankar Kumar, Anupam Mishra, V. Harikumar, Pankaj Sharma, Hitesh Kumar Sharma, S.K. Rajora, Ms. Anika Nissar Syyed, Prerit Shukla, Sudhakar Dwivedi, A. Deb Kumar, Ms. A. Deepa, Shashank Singh, Ambuj Ojha, Abhishek Atrey, Dr. Ashwini Bhardwaj, Neeraj Sharma, Umesh Babu Chaurasia, Ms. Vidyottama, Ajay Kumar Pandey, Sai Deepak, Ravindra Lokhande, Mukul Singh, Satya Ranjan Swain, Deepak Goel, Rajesh Kumar Singh, Ms. Kavitha K.T., Dr. Ashwani Bhardwaj, Neeraj Sharma, Umesh Babu Chaurasia, Ms. Priyanka Swami, Navneet Kumar, Vaibhav Chadha, Siddhartha Sinha, Samar Vijay Singh, Govind Kumar, Harshit Kaushik, Manoj Kumar, Ms. Shweta Bharti, Shantanu Malik, Anil Tiwari, Ms. Ananya Baweja, Vishal Srivastava, Virendra Chaubey, Awadhesh Chaubey, Karunesh Kumar Shukla, Anil Kumar, Amit Pawan, R.S. Mishra, Ms. Ayuseya, Dr. P.N. Mishra, Ms. Ranjana Agnihotri, Ms. Sangeeta Mandal, Barun Kumar Sinha, Mrs. Pratibha Sinha, Ms. Baby Devi Bonia, Birendra Kumar Choudhary, Arun Kumar, Abhishek, Anil Kumar, Jitendra Kumar Tripathi, Mrs. Anubha Bhardwaj, Dinesh Bhati, Yadvendra Dutt Dwivedi, B.K. Satija, Aditya Sharma, Mrs. Minakshi Vij, C.R. Jaya Sukin, Ms. Abhilasha Tungathurthy, Ajay Bansal, Mrs. Veena Bansal, Gaurav Yadava, B.K. Satija, Mohd. Ainul Ansari, Ms. Garima Shukla, Sujeet Kumar, Pardeep Jatav, Sunil Khatwani, Abdul Karim Ansari, Mukesh Verma, Vivek Vishnoi, R.S. Tripathi, Raj Singh Rana, Pawan Kumar Shukla, Kamal Kumar Pandey, Pankaj Kumar Singh, Dr. Gunratan Sadavarte, Dr. Jayshri Laxmanrao Patil, Vipin Kumar Saxena, T.N. Saxena, G.P. Mahto, Sanjeet Paliwal, Vishal Tewari, Yash Pal Dhingra, Nachiketa Joshi, Ms. Sucheta Joshi, Bharat Sood, Ayush Anand, V.V.V.M.B.N. Pattaviram, Shubhendu Anand, Neeraj, Ankit Raj, R.K. Rajvanshi, Harshvardhan Singh Rathore, Baij Nath Patel, Ms. Baby Devi Bonia, Sunil Kumar Tomar, Gopal Jha, Yasharth Kant, Udayaditya Banerjee, Sudipto Sircar, Bhav Ratan, Ms. Ankita Chaudhary, Aditya Singh, Mukul Singh, Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, Md. Irshad Hanif, Rizwan Ahmad, Aarif Ali Khan, Mujahid Ahmad, Manoj V. George, Syed Faizan, Sheik Moulali Basha, Towseef Ahmad Dar, Syed Mehdi Imam, Ms. Shamama Anis, Atif Suhrawardy,
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Tabrez Ahmad, Omar Siddiqui, Nauras Suhrawardy, Md. Noorullah, Javaid Muzaffar, Tashriq Ahmed, Ghufran Imtiaz, Mohd. Parvez Dabas, Sharad Chauhan, Arup Banerjee, Prakash Sharma, Pankaj Sharma, Prashant Sharma, Anuj Saxena, Ms. Prakrati Raj, Achyut Saxena, Mohd. Naved, Md. Shahid Anwar, Advs. for the appearing parties. The following Judgment of the Court was delivered: INDEX
A.
Introduction
B.
An overview of the suits
C.
Evidence: a bird’s eye view
D.
The aftermath of 1856-7 D.1 Response to the wall D.2 Period between 1934-1949
E.
Proceedings under Section 145
F.
Points for determination
G.
The three inscriptions
H.
Judicial review and characteristics of a mosque in Islamic law
I.
Places of Worship Act
J.
Juristic personality
J.1 Development of the law
J.2 Idols and juristic personality J.3 Juristic personality of the first plaintiff J.4 Juristic personality of the second plaintiff
K.
Analysis of the suits
L.
Suit 1: Gopal Singh Visharad L.1 Pleadings L.2 Issues and findings of the High Court
L.3 Analysis
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
M.
Suit 3: Nirmohi Akhara
M.1 Pleadings M.2 Conflict between Suit 3 and Suit 5 M.3 Issues and findings of the High Court M.4 Limitation in Suit 3
M.5 Oral testimony of the Nirmohi witnesses M.6 Nirmohi Akhara’s claim to possession of the inner courtyard Documentary evidence in regard to the mosque (1934-1949) N.
Suit 5: The deities N.1 Array of parties N.2 No contest by the State of Uttar Pradesh N.3 Pleadings
N.4 Written statements N.5 Issues and findings of the High Court N.6 Shebaits: an exclusive right to sue? A suit by a worshipper or a person interested Nirmohi Akhara and shebaiti rights N.7
Limitation in Suit 5 The argument of perpetual minority
N.8
The Suit of 1885 and Res Judicata
N.9
Archaeological report
N.10
Nature and use of the disputed structure: oral evidence
N.11
Photographs of the disputed structure
N.12
Vishnu Hari inscriptions
N.13
The polestar of faith and belief
Travelogues, gazetteers and books Evidentiary value of travelogues, gazetteers and books N.14
Historian’s report
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O.
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Suit 4: Sunni Central Waqf Board O.1 Analysis of the plaint O.2 Written statements O.3 Issues and findings of the High Court
O.4 Limitation in Suit 4 O.5 Applicable legal regime and Justice, Equity and Good Conscience O.6 Grants and recognition
O.7 Disputes and cases affirming possession Impact of Suit of 1885 Incidents between 1934 and 1950 O.8 Proof of namaz
O.9 Placing of idols in 1949 O.10 Nazul land O.11 Waqf by user O.12 Possession and adverse possession
O.13 Doctrine of the lost grant O.14 The smokescreen of the disputed premises – the wall of 1858 O.15 Analysis of evidence in Suit 4
O.16 The Muslim claim to possessory title P.
Analysis on title P.1 Marshalling the evidence in Suit 4 and Suit 5 P.2 Conclusion on title
Q.
Reliefs and directions
A. Introduction
1. These first appeals centre around a dispute between two religious communities both of whom claim ownership over a piece of land admeasuring 1500 square yards in the town of Ayodhya. The
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
disputed property is of immense significance to Hindus and Muslims. The Hindu community claims it as the birth-place of Lord Ram, an incarnation of Lord Vishnu. The Muslim community claims it as the site of the historic Babri Masjid built by the first Mughal Emperor, Babur. The lands of our country have witnessed invasions and dissensions. Yet they have assimilated into the idea of India everyone who sought their providence, whether they came as merchants, travellers or as conquerors. The history and culture of this country have been home to quests for truth, through the material, the political, and the spiritual. This Court is called upon to fulfil its adjudicatory function where it is claimed that two quests for the truth impinge on the freedoms of the other or violate the rule of law.
2. This Court is tasked with the resolution of a dispute whose origins are as old as the idea of India itself. The events associated with the dispute have spanned the Mughal empire, colonial rule and the present constitutional regime. Constitutional values form the cornerstone of this nation and have facilitated the lawful resolution of the present title dispute through forty-one days of hearings before this Court. The dispute in these appeals arises out of four regular suits which were instituted between 1950 and 1989. Before the Allahabad High Court, voluminous evidence, both oral and documentary was led, resulting in three judgements running the course of 4304 pages. This judgement is placed in challenge in the appeals. 3. The disputed land forms part of the village of Kot Rama Chandra or, as it is otherwise called, Ramkot at Ayodhya, in Pargana Haveli Avadh, of Tehsil Sadar in the District of Faizabad. An old structure of a mosque existed at the site until 6 December 1992. The site has religious significance for the devotees of Lord Ram, who believe that Lord Ram was born at the disputed site. For this reason, the Hindus refer to the disputed site as Ram Janmabhumi or Ram Janmasthan (i.e. birth-place of Lord Ram). The Hindus assert that there existed at the disputed site an ancient temple dedicated to Lord Ram, which was demolished upon the conquest of the Indian sub-continent by Mughal Emperor Babur. On the other hand, the Muslims contended that the mosque was built by or at the behest of Babur on vacant land. Though the significance of the site for the Hindus is not denied, it is the case of the Muslims that there exists no proprietary claim of the Hindus over the disputed property.
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4. A suit was instituted in 1950 before the Civil Judge at Faizabad by a Hindu worshipper, Gopal Singh Visharad seeking a declaration that according to his religion and custom, he is entitled to offer prayers at the main Janmabhumi temple near the idols. 5. The Nirmohi Akhara represents a religious sect amongst the Hindus, known as the Ramanandi Bairagis. The Nirmohis claim that they were, at all material times, in charge and management of the structure at the disputed site which according to them was a ‘temple’ until 29 December 1949, on which date an attachment was ordered under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. In effect, they claim as shebaits in service of the deity, managing its affairs and receiving offerings from devotees. Theirs is a Suit of 1959 for the management and charge of ‘the temple’. 6. The Uttar Pradesh Sunni Central Board of Waqf (“Sunni Central Waqf Board”) and other Muslim residents of Ayodhya instituted a suit in 1961 for a declaration of their title to the disputed site. According to them, the old structure was a mosque which was built on the instructions of Emperor Babur by Mir Baqi who was the Commander of his forces, following the conquest of the sub-continent by the Mughal Emperor in the third decade of the sixteenth century. The Muslims deny that the mosque was constructed on the site of a destroyed temple. According to them, prayers were uninterruptedly offered in the mosque until 23 December 1949 when a group of Hindus desecrated it by placing idols within the precincts of its three-domed structure with the intent to destroy, damage and defile the Islamic religious structure. The Sunni Central Waqf Board claims a declaration of title and, if found necessary, a decree for possession. 7. A suit was instituted in 1989 by a next friend on behalf of the deity (“Bhagwan Shri Ram Virajman”) and the birth-place of Lord Ram (“Asthan Shri Ram Janmabhumi”). The suit is founded on the claim that the law recognises both the idol and the birth-place as juridical entities. The claim is that the place of birth is sanctified as an object of worship, personifying the divine spirit of Lord Ram. Hence, like the idol (which the law recognises as a juridical entity), the place of birth of the deity is claimed to be a legal person, or as it is described in legal parlance, to possess a juridical status. A declaration of title to the disputed site coupled with injunctive relief has been sought.
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
8. These suits, together with a separate suit by Hindu worshippers were transferred by the Allahabad High Court to itself for trial from the civil court at Faizabad. The High Court rendered a judgment in original proceedings arising out of the four suits and these appeals arise out of the decision of a Full Bench dated 30 September 2010. The High Court held that the suits filed by the Sunni Central Waqf Board and by Nirmohi Akhara were barred by limitation. Despite having held that those two suits were barred by time, the High Court held in a split 2:1 verdict that the Hindu and Muslim parties were joint holders of the disputed premises. Each of them was held entitled to one third of the disputed property. The Nirmohi Akhara was granted the remaining one third. A preliminary decree to that effect was passed in the suit brought by the idol and the birth-place of Lord Ram through the next friend.
9. Before deciding the appeals, it is necessary to set out the significant events which have taken place in the chequered history of this litigation, which spans nearly seven decades. 10. The disputed site has been a flash point of continued conflagration over decades. In 1856-57, riots broke out between Hindus and Muslims in the vicinity of the structure. The colonial government attempted to raise a buffer between the two communities to maintain law and order by set ting up a grill-brick wall having a height of six or seven feet. This would divide the premises into two parts: the inner portion which would be used by the Muslim community and the outer portion or courtyard, which would be used by the Hindu community. The outer courtyard has several structures of religious significance for the Hindus, such as the Sita Rasoi and a platform called the Ramchabutra. In 1877, another door was opened on the northern side of the outer courtyard by the colonial government, which was given to the Hindus to control and manage. The bifurcation, as the record shows, did not resolve the conflict and there were numerous attempts by one or other of the parties to exclude the other. 11. In January 1885, Mahant Raghubar Das, claiming to be the Mahant of Ram Janmasthan instituted a suit1 (“Suit of 1885”) before the Sub-Judge, Faizabad. The relief which he sought was permission to build a temple on the Ramchabutra situated in the outer courtyard, measuring seventeen feet by twenty-one feet. A sketch map was filed with the plaint. On 24 December 1885, the trial judge dismissed the suit, `noting that there was a possibility of riots breaking out between the two communities due to the proposed construction of a temple. The
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trial judge, however, observed that there could be no question or doubt regarding the possession and ownership of the Hindus over the Chabutra. On 18 March 1886, the District Judge dismissed the appeal against the judgment of the Trial Court2 but struck off the observations relating to the ownership of Hindus of the Chabutra contained in the judgment of the Trial Court. On 1 November 1886, the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh dismissed the second appeal3, noting that the Mahant had failed to present evidence of title to establish ownership of the Chabutra. In 1934, there was yet another conflagration between the two communities. The domed structure of the mosque was damaged during the incident and was subsequently repaired at the cost of the colonial government. 12. The controversy entered a new phase on the night intervening 22 and 23 December 1949, when the mosque was desecrated by a group of about fifty or sixty people who broke open its locks and placed idols of Lord Ram under the central dome. A First Information Report (“FIR”) was registered in relation to the incident. On 29 December 1949, the Additional City Magistrate, Faizabad-cum-Ayodhya issued a preliminary order under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 18984 (“CrPC 1898”), treating the situation to be of an emergent nature. Simultaneously, an attachment order was issued and Priya Datt Ram, the Chairman of the Municipal Board of Faizabad was appointed as the receiver of the inner courtyard. On 5 January 1950, the receiver took charge of the inner courtyard and prepared an inventory of the attached properties. The Magistrate passed a preliminary order upon recording a satisfaction that the dispute between the two communities over their claims to worship and proprietorship over the structure would likely lead to a breach of peace. The stakeholders were allowed to file their written statements. Under the Magistrate’s order, only two or three pujaris were permitted to go inside the place where the idols were kept, to perform religious ceremonies like bhog and puja. Members of the
(OS No. 61/280 of 1885) Civil Appeal No. 27/1885 No 27 of 1886 "Section 145. Procedure where dispute concerning land, etc, is likely to cause breach of peace (1) Whenever a District Magistrate, or an Executive Magistrate specially empowered by the Government in this behalf is satisfied from a police-report or other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or
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general public were restricted from entering and were only allowed darshan from beyond the grill-brick wall.
The institution of the suits 13. On 16 January 1950, a suit was instituted by a Hindu devotee, Gopal Singh Visharad5, (“Suit 1”) before the Civil Judge at Faizabad, alleging that he was being prevented by officials of the government from entering the inner courtyard of the disputed site to offer worship. A declaration was sought to allow the plaintiff to offer prayers in accordance with the rites and tenets of his religion (“Sanatan Dharm”) at the “main Janmabhumi”, near the idols, within the inner courtyard, without hindrance. On the same date, an ad-interim injunction was issued in the suit. On 19 January 1950, the injunction was modified to prevent the idols from being removed from the disputed site and from causing interference in the performance of puja. On 3 March 1951, the Trial Court confirmed the ad-interim order, as modified. On 26 May 1955, the appeal6 against the interim order was dismissed by the High Court of Allahabad.
14. On 5 December 1950, another suit was instituted by Paramhans Ramchandra Das7 (“Suit 2”) before the Civil Judge, Faizabad seeking reliefs similar to those in Suit 1. Suit 2 was subsequently withdrawn on 18 September 1990. 15. On 1 April 1950, a Court Commissioner was appointed in Suit 1 to prepare a map of the disputed premises. On 25 June 1950, the Commissioner submitted a report, together with two site plans of the disputed premises which were numbered as Plan nos 1 and 2 to the Trial Court. Both the report and maps indicate the position at the site and are reproduced below:
water of the boundaries thereof, within the local limits of his jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, within a time to be fixed by such Magistrate, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute…” Regular Suit No 2 of 1950. Subsequently renumbered as Other Original Suit (OOS) No 1 of 1989. FAFO No 154 of 1951 Regular Suit no 25 of 1950 (subsequently renumbered as Other Original Suit (OOS) No 2 of 1989)
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Report of the Commissioner “REPORT Sir,
I was appointed a commissioner in the above case to prepare a site plan of the locality and building in suit on scale. Accordingly, in compliance with the order of the court, I visited the locality on 16.4.50 and again on 30.4.50 after giving due notice to the counsel of the parties, and made necessary measurements on the spot. On the first day of my visit none of the parties were present, but on the second day defendant no. 1 was present with Shri Azimullah Khan and Shri Habib Ahmad Khan counsel. At about noon defendant no. 1 presented an application, attached herewith, when the measurement work had already finished. Plan No. I represents the building in suit shown by the figure ABCDEF on a larger scale than Plan no.II, which represents the building with its locality. A perusal of Plan No.I would show that the building has got two gates, one on the east and the other on the north, known as “Hanumatdwar” and “Singhdwar” respectively. The “Hanumatdwar” is the main entrance gate to the building. At this gate there is a stone slab fixed to the ground containing the inscription “1-Shri Janma Bhumi nitya yatra,” and a big coloured picture of Shri Hanumanji is placed at the top of the gate. The arch of this entrance gate, 10’ in height, rests on two black kasauti stone pillars, each 4’ high, marked a and b, containing images of “Jai and Vijai” respectively engraved thereon. To the south of this gate on the outer wall there is engraved a stone image, 5’ long, known as “Varah Bhagwan.” The northern gate, known as “Singhdwar,” 19’6" in height, has got at its top images of Garura in the middle and two lions one on each side. On entering the main gate there is pucca floor on the eastern and northern side of the inner building, marked by letters GHJKL DGB on the north of the eastern floor there is a neem tree, and to the south of it there is the bhandara (kitchen). Further south there is a raised pucca platform, 17’ x 21’ and 4’ high, known as “Ram Chabutra,” on which stands a small temple having idols
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
of Ram and Janki installed therein. At the south-eastern corner E there is a joint neem-pipal tree, surrounded by a semi-circular pucca platform, on which are installed marble idols of Panchmukhi Mahadev, Parbati, Ganesh and Nandi. On the northern floor there is a pucca platform, 8’ x 9’, called “Sita Rasoi.” On this platform there is a pucca chulha with chauka and belna, made of marble, affixed by its side. To the east of the chulha there are four pairs of marble foot prints of Ram, Lakshman, Bharat & Shatrunghna. The pucca courtyard in front of the inner (main) building is enclosed by walls NHJK intercepted by iron bars with two iron bar gates at O and P as shown in the Plan no.I. At the southern end of this Courtyard there are 14 stairs leading to the roof of the building, and to the south of the stairs there is a raised pucca platform 2’ high, having a urinal marked U at its south-west corner. There are three arched gates, X,Y and Z leading to the main building, which is divided into three portions, having arches at Q and R. There is a chhajja (projected roof) above the arch Y. 31. The three arches, Y, Q and R are supported on 12 black kasauti stone pillars, each 6’ high, marked with letters c to n in Plan no. I. The pillars e to m have carvings of kamal flowers thereon. The pillar contains the image of Shankar Bhagwan in Tandava nritya form and another disfigured image engraved thereon. The pillar J contained the carved image of Hanumanji. The pillar N has got the image of Lord Krishna engraved thereon other pillars have also got carvings of images which are effaced. In the central portion of the building at the north-western corner, there is a pucca platform with two stairs, on which is installed the idol of Bal Ram (infant Ram). At the top of the three portions of the building there are three round domes, as shown separately in Plan no.I, each on an octagonal base. There are no towers, nor is there any ghusalkhana or well in the building. Around the building there is a pucca path known as parikrama, as shown in yellow in Plan Nos.I & II. On the west of the parikrama, the land is about 20’ low, while the pucca road on the northern side is about 18’ low.
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Other structures found on the locality have been shown in Plan no.II at their proper places. The land shown by letters S and T is covered by huts and dhunis of sadhus. Adjacent to and south of the land shown by letter T, there is a raised platform, bounded by walls, 4’ 6" high, with a passage towards west, known as “shankar chabutra.” The pucca well, known as “Sita koop” has got a tin shed over it, and a stone slab is fixed close to it with the inscription “3-Sita koop”. To the south - west of this well there is another stone slab fixed into the ground with the inscription “4-Sumitra Bhawan”. On the raised platform of Sumitra Bhawan there is a stone slab fixed to the ground, marked, carved with the image of Shesh nag. The names of the various samadhis and other structures as noted in Plan No. II were given by sadhus and others present on the spot. Plans nos.I and II, which form part of this report, two notices given to parties counsel and the application presented by defendant no.1 are attached herewith. I have the honour to be, Sir, Your most obedient servant, Shiva Shankar Lal, Faizabad. Pleader 25.5.50 Commissioner.”
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
Site map (Plan I)
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Site map (Plan II)
16. On 17 December 1959, Nirmohi Akhara instituted a suit8 through its Mahant (“Suit 3”) before the Civil Judge at Faizabad claiming that its “absolute right” of managing the affairs of the Janmasthan and the temple had been impacted by the Magistrate’s order of attachment and by the appointment of a receiver under Section 145.
Regular Suit No 26 of 1959 (subsequently renumbered as OOS No. 3 of 1989)
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A decree was sought to hand over the management and charge of the temple to the plaintiff in Suit 3.
17. On 18 December 1961, the Sunni Central Waqf Board and nine Muslim residents of Ayodhya filed a suit9 (“Suit 4”) before the Civil Judge at Faizabad seeking a declaration that the entire disputed site of the Babri Masjid was a public mosque and for the delivery of possession upon removal of the idols.
18. On 6 January 1964, the trial of Suits 1, 3 and 4 was consolidated and Suit 4 was made the leading case. 19. On 25 January 1986, an application was filed by one Umesh Chandra before the Trial Court for breaking open the locks placed on the grill-brick wall and for allowing the public to perform darshan within the inner courtyard. On 1 February 1986, the District Judge issued directions to open the locks and to provide access to devotees for darshan inside the structure. In a Writ Petition10 filed before the High Court challenging the above order, an interim order was passed on 3 February 1986 directing that until further orders, the nature of the property as it existed shall not be altered. 20. On 1 July 1989, a Suit11 (“Suit 5”) was brought before the Civil Judge, Faizabad by the deity (“Bhagwan Shri Ram Virajman”) and the birth-place (“Asthan Shri Ram Janam Bhumi, Ayodhya”), through a next friend for a declaration of title to the disputed premises and to restrain the defendants from interfering with or raising any objection to the construction of a temple. Suit 5 was tried with the other suits. 21. On 10 July 1989, all suits were transferred to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. On 21 July 1989, a three judge Bench was constituted by the Chief Justice of the High Court for the trial of the suits. On an application by the State of Uttar Pradesh, the High Court passed an interim order on 14 August 1989, directing the parties to maintain status quo with respect to the property in dispute. 22. During the pendency of the proceedings, the State of Uttar Pradesh acquired an area of 2.77 acres comprising of the disputed premises and certain adjoining areas. This was effected by notifications
Regular Suit No. 12 of 1961 (subsequently renumbered as OOS No. 4 of 1989) Civil Misc. Writ No. 746 of 1986 Regular Suit No. 236 of 1989 (subsequently renumbered as OOS No. 5 of 1989)
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dated 7 October 1991 and 10 October 1991 under Sections 4(1), 6 and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (“Land Acquisition Act”). The acquisition was for ‘development and providing amenities to pilgrims in Ayodhya’. A Writ Petition was filed before the High Court challenging the acquisition. By a judgment and order dated 11 December 1992, the acquisition was set aside. 23. A substantial change took place in the position at the site on 6 December 1992. A large crowd destroyed the mosque, boundary wall, and Ramchabutra. A makeshift structure of a temple was constructed at the place under the erstwhile central dome. The idols were placed there.
Acquisition by the Central Government and Ismail Faruqui’s case
24. The Central Government acquired an area of about 68 acres, including the premises in dispute, by a legislation called the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act 1993 (“Ayodhya Acquisition Act 1993”). Sections 3 and 4 envisaged the abatement of all suits which were pending before the High Court. Simultaneously, the President of India made a reference to this Court under Article 143 of the Constitution. The reference was on “(w)hether a Hindu temple or any Hindu religious structure existed prior to the construction of the Ram Janam Bhoomi and Babari Masjid (including the premises of the inner and outer courtyards on such structure) in the area on which the structure stands…”. 25. Writ petitions were filed before the High Court of Allahabad and this Court challenging the validity of the Act of 1993. All the petitions and the reference by the President were heard together and decided by a judgment dated 24 October 1994. The decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court, titled Dr M Ismail Faruqui v Union of India12 held Section 4(3), which provided for the abatement of all pending suits as unconstitutional. The rest of the Act of 1993 was held to be valid. The Constitution Bench declined to answer the Presidential reference and, as a result, all pending suits and proceedings in relation to the disputed premises stood revived. The Central Government was appointed as a statutory receiver for the maintenance of status quo and to hand over the disputed area in terms of the adjudication to be made in the suits. The conclusions arrived at by the Constitution Bench are extracted below:
(1994) 6 SCC 360
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“96. ... (1)(a) Sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Act abates all pending suits and legal proceedings without providing for an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for resolution of the disputes between the parties thereto. This is an extinction of the judicial remedy for resolution of the dispute amounting to negation of rule of law. Sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Act is, therefore, unconstitutional and invalid. (1)(b) The remaining provisions of the Act do not suffer from any invalidity on the construction made thereof by us. Sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Act is severable from the remaining Act. Accordingly, the challenge to the constitutional validity of the remaining Act, except for sub-section (3) of Sec. 4, is rejected. (2) Irrespective of the status of a mosque under the Muslim law applicable in the Islamic countries, the status of a mosque under the Mahomedan Law applicable in secular India is the same and equal to that of any other place of worship of any religion; and it does not enjoy any greater immunity from acquisition in exercise of the sovereign or prerogative power of the State, than that of the places of worship of the other religions. (3) The pending suits and other proceedings relating to the disputed area within which the structure (including the premises of the inner and outer courtyards of such structure), commonly known as the Ram Janma Bhumi - Babri Masjid, stood, stand revived for adjudication of the dispute therein, together with the interim orders made, except to the extent the interim orders stand modified by the provisions of Section 7 of the Act. (4) The vesting of the said disputed area in the Central Government by virtue of Section 3 of the Act is limited, as a statutory receiver with the duty for its management and administration according to Section 7 requiring maintenance of status quo therein under sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act. The duty of the Central Government as the statutory receiver is to handover the disputed area in accordance with Section 6 of the Act, in terms of the adjudication made in the suits for implementation of the final decision therein. This is the purpose for which the disputed area has been so acquired. (5) The power of the courts in making further interim orders in the suits is limited to, and circumscribed by, the area outside the ambit of Section 7 of the Act.
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(6) The vesting of the adjacent area, other than the disputed area, acquired by the Act in the Central Government by virtue of Section 3 of the Act is absolute with the power of management and administration thereof in accordance with sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act, till its further vesting in any authority or other body or trustees of any trust in accordance with Section 6 of the Act. The further vesting of the adjacent area, other than the disputed area, in accordance with Sec. 6 of the Act has to be made at the time and in the manner indicated, in view of the purpose of its acquisition.
(7) The meaning of the word “vest” in Section 3 and Section 6 of the Act has to be so understood in the different contexts.
(8) Section 8 of the Act is meant for payment of compensation to owners of the property vesting absolutely in the Central Government, the title to which is not in dispute being in excess of the disputed area which alone is the subject matter of the revived suits. It does not apply to the disputed area, title to which has to be adjudicated in the suits and in respect of which the Central Government is merely the statutory receiver as indicated, with the duty to restore it to the owner in terms of the adjudication made in the suits.
(9) The challenge to acquisition of any part of the adjacent area on the ground that it is unnecessary for achieving the professed objective of settling the long standing dispute cannot be examined at this stage. However, the area found to be superfluous on the exact area needed for the purpose being determined on adjudication of the dispute, must be restored to the undisputed owners. (10) Rejection of the challenge by the undisputed owners to acquisition of some religious properties in the vicinity of the disputed area, at this stage is with the liberty granted to them to renew their challenge, if necessary at a later appropriate stage, in cases of continued retention by Central Government of their property in excess of the exact area determined to be needed on adjudication of the dispute. (11) Consequently, the Special Reference No. 1 of 1993 made by the President of India under Art. 143(1) of the Constitution
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
of India is superfluous and unnecessary and does not require to be answered. For this reason, we very respectfully decline to answer it and return the same. (12) The questions relating to the constitutional validity of the said Act and maintainability of the Special Reference are decided in these terms.”
The proceedings before the High Court 26. The recording of oral evidence before the High Court commenced on 24 July 1996. During the course of the hearings, the High Court issued directions on 23 October 2002 to the Archaeological Survey of India (“ASI”) to carry out a scientific investigation and have the disputed site surveyed by Ground Penetrating Technology or GeoRadiology (“GPR”). The GPR report dated 17 February 2003 indicated a variety of “anomalies” which could be associated with “ancient and contemporaneous structures” such as pillars, foundations, wall slabs and flooring extending over a large portion of the disputed site. In order to facilitate a further analysis, the High Court directed the ASI on 5 March 2003 to undertake the excavation of the disputed site. A fourteenmember team was constituted, and a site plan was prepared indicating the number of trenches to be laid out and excavated. On 22 August 2003, the ASI submitted its final report. The High Court heard objections to the report. 27. Evidence, both oral and documentary, was recorded before the High Court. As one of the judges, Justice Sudhir Agarwal noted, the High Court had before it 533 exhibits and depositions of 87 witnesses traversing 13,990 pages. Besides this, counsel relied on over a thousand reference books in Sanskrit, Hindi, Urdu, Persian, Turkish, French and English, ranging from subjects as diverse as history, culture, archaeology and religion. The High Court ensured that the innumerable archaeological artefacts were kept in the record room. It received dozens of CDs and other records which the three judges of the High Court have marshalled.
The decision of the High Court 28. On 30 September 2010, the Full Bench of the High Court comprising of Justice S U Khan, Justice Sudhir Agarwal and Justice D V Sharma delivered the judgment, which is in appeal. Justice S U Khan and Justice Sudhir Agarwal held “all the three sets of parties” – Muslims,
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Hindus and Nirmohi Akhara - as joint holders of the disputed premises and allotted a one third share to each of them in a preliminary decree. Justice S U Khan held thus: “Accordingly, all the three sets of parties, i.e. Muslims, Hindus and Nirmohi Akhara are declared joint title holders of the property/ premises in dispute as described by letters A B C D E F in the map Plan-I prepared by Sri Shiv Shanker Lal, Pleader/ Commissioner appointed by Court in Suit No.1 to the extent of one third share each for using and managing the same for worshipping. A preliminary decree to this effect is passed. However, it is further declared that the portion below the central dome where at present the idol is kept in makeshift temple will be allotted to Hindus in final decree. It is further directed that Nirmohi Akhara will be allotted share including that part which is shown by the words Ram Chabutra and Sita Rasoi in the said map. It is further clarified that even though all the three parties are declared to have one third share each, however if while allotting exact portions some minor adjustment in the share is to be made then the same will be made and the adversely affected party may be compensated by allotting some portion of the adjoining land which has been acquired by the Central Government. The parties are at liberty to file their suggestions for actual partition by metes and bounds within three months. List immediately after filing of any suggestion/ application for preparation of final decree after obtaining necessary instructions from Hon’ble the Chief Justice. Status quo as prevailing till date pursuant to Supreme Court judgment of Ismail Farooqui (1994(6) Sec 360) in all its minutest details shall be maintained for a period of three months unless this order is modified or vacated earlier.” Justice Sudhir Agarwal partly decreed Suits 1 and 5. Suits 3 and 4 were dismissed as being barred by limitation. The learned judge concluded with the following directions: “4566… (i) It is declared that the area covered by the central dome of the three domed structure, i.e., the disputed structure being the
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deity of Bhagwan Ram Janamsthan and place of birth of Lord Rama as per faith and belief of the Hindus, belong to plaintiffs (Suit-5) and shall not be obstructed or interfered in any manner by the defendants. This area is shown by letters AA BB CC DD in Appendix 7 to this judgment.
(ii) The area within the inner courtyard denoted by letters B C D L K J H G in Appendix 7 (excluding (i) above) belong to members of both the communities, i.e., Hindus (here plaintiffs, Suit-5) and Muslims since it was being used by both since decades and centuries. It is, however, made clear that for the purpose of share of plaintiffs, Suit-5 under this direction the area which is covered by (i) above shall also be included.
(iii) The area covered by the structures, namely, Ram Chabutra, (EE FF GG HH in Appendix 7) Sita Rasoi (MM NN OO PP in Appendix 7) and Bhandar (II JJ KK LL in Appendix 7) in the outer courtyard is declared in the share of Nirmohi Akhara (defendant no. 3) and they shall be entitled to possession thereof in the absence of any person with better title. (iv) The open area within the outer courtyard (A G H J K L E F in Appendix 7) (except that covered by (iii) above) shall be shared by Nirmohi Akhara (defendant no. 3) and plaintiffs (Suit5) since it has been generally used by the Hindu people for worship at both places. (iv-a) It is however made clear that the share of muslim parties shall not be less than one third (1/3) of the total area of the premises and if necessary it may be given some area of outer courtyard. It is also made clear that while making partition by metes and bounds, if some minor adjustments are to be made with respect to the share of different parties, the affected party may be compensated by allotting the requisite land from the area which is under acquisition of the Government of India. (v) The land which is available with the Government of India acquired under Ayodhya Act 1993 for providing it to the parties who are successful in the suit for better enjoyment of the property shall be made available to the above concerned parties in such manner so that all the three parties may utilise the area to which they are entitled to, by having separate entry for egress and
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ingress of the people without disturbing each others rights. For this purpose the concerned parties may approach the Government of India who shall act in accordance with the above directions and also as contained in the judgement of Apex Court in Dr. Ismail Farooqi (Supra).
(vi) A decree, partly preliminary and partly final, to the effect as said above (i to v) is passed. Suit-5 is decreed in part to the above extent. The parties are at liberty to file their suggestions for actual partition of the property in dispute in the manner as directed above by metes and bounds by submitting an application to this effect to the Officer on Special Duty, Ayodhya Bench at Lucknow or the Registrar, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow, as the case may be.
(vii) For a period of three months or unless directed otherwise, whichever is earlier, the parties shall maintain status quo as on today in respect of property in dispute.”
Justice D V Sharma decreed Suit 5 in its entirety. Suits 3 and 4 were dismissed as being barred by limitation. Justice D V Sharma concluded: “Plaintiff’s suit is decreed but with easy costs. It is hereby declared that the entire premises of Sri Ram Janm Bhumi at Ayodhya as described and delineated in annexure Nos. 1 and 2 of the plaint belong to the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2, the deities. The defendants are permanently restrained from interfering with, or raising any objection to, or placing any obstruction in the construction of the temple at Ram Janm Bhumi Ayodhya at the site, referred to in the plaint.” The parties preferred multiple Civil Appeals and Special Leave Petitions before this Court against the judgment of the High Court. Proceedings before this Court
29. On 9 May 2011, a two judge Bench of this Court admitted several appeals and stayed the operation of the judgment and decree of the Allahabad High Court. During the pendency of the appeals, parties were directed to maintain status quo with respect to the disputed premises in accordance with the directions issued in Ismail Faruqui. The Registry of this Court was directed to provide parties electronic copies of the digitised records.
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
30. On 10 September 2013, 24 February 2014, 31 October 2015 and 11 August 2017, this Court issued directions for summoning the digital record of the evidence and pleadings from the Allahabad High Court and for furnishing translated copies to the parties. On 10 August 2015, a three judge Bench of this Court allowed the Commissioner, Faizabad Division to replace the old and worn out tarpaulin sheets over the makeshift structure under which the idols were placed with new sheets of the same size and quality.
31. On 5 December 2017, a three judge Bench of this Court rejected the plea that the appeals against the impugned judgement be referred to a larger Bench in view of certain observations of the Constitution Bench in Ismail Faruqui. On 14 March 2018, a three judge Bench heard arguments on whether the judgment in Ismail Faruqui required reconsideration. On 27 September 2018, the three judge Bench of this Court by a majority of 2:1 declined to refer the judgment in Ismail Faruqui for reconsideration and listed the appeals against the impugned judgement for hearing. 32. By an administrative order dated 8 January 2019 made pursuant to the provisions of Order VI Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, the Chief Justice of India constituted a five judge Bench to hear the appeals. On 10 January 2019, the Registry was directed to inspect the records and if required, engage official translators. On 26 February 2019, this Court referred the parties to a Court appointed and monitored mediation to explore the possibility of bringing about a permanent solution to the issues raised in the appeals. On 8 March 2019, a panel of mediators comprising of (i) Justice Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, a former Judge of this Court; (ii) Sri Sri Ravi Shankar; and (iii) Mr Sriram Panchu, Senior Advocate was constituted. Time granted to the mediators to complete the mediation proceedings was extended on 10 May 2019. Since no settlement had been reached, on 2 August 2019, the hearing of the appeals was directed to commence from 6 August 2019. During the course of hearing, a report was submitted by the panel of mediators that some of the parties desired to settle the dispute. This Court by its order dated 18 September 2019 observed that while the hearings will proceed, if any parties desired to settle the dispute, it was open for them to move the mediators and place a settlement, if it was arrived at, before this Court. Final arguments were concluded in the batch of appeals on 16 October 2019. On the same
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day, the mediation panel submitted a report titled “Final Report of the Committee” stating that a settlement had been arrived at by some of the parties to the present dispute. The settlement wassigned by Mr Zufar Ahmad Faruqi, Chairman of the Sunni Central Waqf Board. Though under the settlement, the Sunni Central Waqf Board agreed to relinquish all its rights, interests and claims over the disputed land, this was subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions stipulated. The settlement agreement received by this Court from the mediation panel has not been agreed to or signed by all the parties to the present dispute. Moreover, it is only conditional on certain stipulations being fulfilled. Hence, the settlement cannot be treated to be a binding or concluded agreement between the parties to the dispute. We, however, record our appreciation of the earnest efforts made by the members of the mediation panel in embarking on the task entrusted by this Court. In bringing together the disputants on a common platform for a free and frank dialogue, the mediators have performed a function which needs to be commended. We also express our appreciation of the parties who earnestly made an effort to pursue the mediation proceedings. B. An overview of the suits 33. Before examining the various contentions of the parties before this Court, we first record the procedural history, substantive claims and reliefs prayed for in the pleadings of the three Suits before this Court. Suit 1 - OOS No 1 of 1989 (Regular Suit 2 of 1950) 34. The suit was instituted on 13 January 1950 by Gopal Singh Visharad, a resident of Ayodhya in his capacity as a “follower of Sanatan Dharm” seeking: (i) A declaration of his entitlement to worship and seek the darshan of Lord Ram, “according to religion and custom” at the Janmabhumi temple without hindrance; and (ii) A permanent and perpetual injunction restraining defendant nos 1 to 10 from removing the idols of the deity and other idols from the place where they were installed; from closing the way leading to the idols; or interfering in worship and darshan. Defendant nos 1 to 5 are Muslim residents of Ayodhya; defendant no 6 is the State of Uttar Pradesh; defendant no 7 is the Deputy Commissioner of Faizabad; defendant no 8 is the Additional City
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
Magistrate, Faizabad; defendant no 9 is the Superintendent of Police, Faizabad; defendant no 10 is the Sunni Central Waqf Board and defendant no 11 is the Nirmohi Akhara. The case of the plaintiff in Suit 1 is that, as a resident of Ayodhya, he was worshipping the idol of Lord Ram and Charan Paduka (foot impressions) “in that place of Janambhumi”. The boundaries of the ‘disputed place’ as described in the plaint are as follows: “Disputed place: East: Store and Chabutra of Ram Janam Bhumi West: Parti North: Sita Rasoi South: Parti.” The cause of action for Suit 1 is stated to have arisen on 14 January 1950, when the employees of the government are alleged to have unlawfully prevented the plaintiff “from going inside the place” and exercising his right of worship. It was alleged that the “State” adopted this action at the behest of the Muslim residents represented by defendant nos 1 to 5, as a result of which the Hindus were stated to been deprived of their “legitimate right of worship”. The plaintiff apprehended that the idols, including the idol of Lord Ram, would be removed. These actions were alleged to constitute a “direct attack on the right and title of the plaintiff” and were stated to be an “oppressive act”, contrary to law. 35. Denying the allegations contained in the plaint, defendant nos 1 to 5 stated in their written statements that: (i) The property in respect of which the case has been instituted is not Janmabhumi but a mosque constructed by Emperor Babur. The mosque was built in 1528 on the instructions of Emperor Babur by Mir Baqi, who was the Commander of Babur’s forces, following the conquest of the sub-continent by the Mughal emperor; (ii) The mosque was dedicated as a waqf for Muslims, who have a right to worship there. Emperor Babur laid out annual grants for the maintenance and expenditure of the mosque, which were continued and enhanced by the Nawab of Awadh and the British Government;
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(iii)
The Suit of 1885 was a suit for declaration of ownership by Mahant Raghubar Das only in respect of the Ramchabutra and hence the claim that the entire building represented the Janmasthan was baseless. As a consequence of the dismissal of the Suit on 24 December 1885, “the case respecting the Chabutra was not entertained”;
(iv)
The Chief Commissioner Waqf appointed under the U.P. Muslim Waqf Act 1936 had held the mosque to be a Sunni Waqf;
(v)
Muslims have always been in possession of the mosque. This position began in 1528 and continued thereafter, and consequently, “Muslims are in possession of that property … by way of an adverse possession”;
(vi)
Namaz had been offered at Babri Masjid until 16 December 1949 at which point there were no idols under the central dome. If any person had placed any idol inside the mosque with a mala fide intent, “the degradation of the mosque is evident and the accused persons are liable to be prosecuted”;
(vii)
Any attempt of the plaintiff or any other person to enter the mosque to offer worship or for darshan would violate the law. Proceedings under Section 145 of the CrPC 1898 had been initiated; and
(viii) The present suit claiming Babri Masjid as the place of the Janmasthan is without basis as there exists, for quite long, another temple with idols of Lord Ram and others, which is the actual place of the Janmasthan of Lord Ram.
A written statement was filed by the defendant no 6, the State, submitting that:
(i)
The property in suit known as Babri Masjid has been used as a mosque for the purpose of worship by Muslims for a long period and has not been used as a temple of Lord Ram;
(ii)
On the night of 22 December 1949, the idols of Lord Ram were surreptitiously placed inside the mosque imperilling
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
public peace and tranquillity. On 23 December 1949, the City Magistrate passed an order under Section 144 of CrPC 1898 which was followed by an order of the same date passed by the Additional City Magistrate under Section 145 attaching the disputed property. These orders were passed to maintain public peace; and (iii)
The City Magistrate appointed Shri Priya Datt Ram, Chairman, Municipal Board, Faizabad-cum-Ayodhya as a receiver of the property.
Similar written statements were filed by defendant no 8, the Additional City Magistrate and defendant no 9, the Superintendent of Police.
Defendant no 10, the Sunni Central Waqf Board filed its written statement stating: (i) (ii)
The building in dispute is not the Janmasthan of Lord Ram and no idols were ever installed in it;
The property in the suit was a mosque known as the Babri mosque constructed during the regime of Emperor Babur who had laid out annual grants for its maintenance and expenditure and they were continued and enhanced by the Nawab of Awadh and the British Government;
(iii)
On the night of 22-23 December 1949, the idols were surreptitiously brought into the mosque;
(iv)
The Muslims alone had remained in possession of the mosque from 1528 up to the date of the attachment of the mosque under Section 145 on 29 December 1949. They had regularly offered prayers up to 21 December 1949 and Friday prayers up to 16 December 1949;
(v)
The mosque had the character of a waqf and its ownership vested in God;
(vi)
The plaintiff was estopped from claiming the mosque as the Janmabhumi of Lord Ram as the claim in the Suit of 1885 instituted by Mahant Raghubar Das (described to be the plaintiff’s predecessor) had been confined only to the Ramchabutra measuring seventeen by twenty-one feet outside the mosque; and
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(vii)
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There already existed a Ram Janmasthan Mandir, a short distance away from Babri Masjid.
In the plaintiff’s replication to the written statement of defendant nos 1 to 5, it was averred that the disputed site has never been used as a mosque since 1934. It was further stated that it was “common knowledge” that Hindus have been in continuous possession by virtue of which the claim of the defendants has ceased. Suit 3 - OOS no 3 of 1989 (Regular Suit no 26 of 1959)
36. The suit was instituted on 17 December 1959 by Nirmohi Akhara through Mahant Jagat Das seeking a decree for the removal of the receiver from the management and charge of the Janmabhumi temple and for delivering it to the plaintiff. Defendant no 1 in Suit 3 is the receiver; defendant no 2 is the State of Uttar Pradesh; defendant no 3 is the Deputy Commissioner, Faizabad; defendant no 4 is the City Magistrate, Faizabad; defendant no 5 is the Superintendent of Police, Faizabad; defendant nos 6 to 8 are Muslim residents of Ayodhya; defendant no 9 is the Sunni Central Waqf Board and defendant no 10 is Umesh Chandra Pandey. The cause of action is stated to have arisen on 5 January 1950 when the management and charge of the Janmabhumi temple was taken away by the City Magistrate and entrusted to the receiver. Nirmohi Akhara pleaded that: (i)
There exists in Ayodhya “since the days of yore” an ancient Math or Akhara of Ramanandi Bairagis called the Nirmohis. This is a religious establishment of a public character;
(ii)
The Janmasthan, commonly known as Janmabhumi, is the birth-place of Lord Ram and belongs to and has always been managed by Nirmohi Akhara;
(iii)
The Janmasthan is of ancient antiquity lying within the boundaries shown by the letters A B C D in the sketch map appended to the plaint within which stands the “temple building” marked by the letters E F G K P N M L E. The building denoted by the letters E F G H I J K L E is the main Janmabhumi temple, where the idols of Lord Ram with Lakshman, Hanuman and Saligram have been installed. The temple building has been in the possession
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
of Nirmohi Akhara and only Hindus have been allowed to enter the temple and make offerings such as money, sweets, flowers and fruits. Nirmohi Akhara has been receiving these offerings through its pujaris; (iv)
Nirmohi Akhara is a Panchayati Math of the Ramanandi sect of Bairagis which is a religious denomination. The customs of Nirmohi Akhara have been reduced to writing by a registered deed dated 19 March 1949;
(v)
Nirmohi Akhara owns and manages several temples;
(vi)
No Mohammedan has been allowed to enter the temple building since 1934; and
(vii)
Acting under the provisions of Section 145 of the CrPC 1898, the City Magistrate placed the main temple and all the articles in it under the charge of the first defendant as receiver on 5 January 1950. As a consequence, the plaintiffs have been wrongfully deprived of the management and charge of the temple.
37. In the written statement filed on behalf of defendant nos 6 to 8, Muslim residents of Ayodhya, it was stated that Babri Masjid was constructed by Emperor Babur in 1528 and has been constituted as a waqf, entitling Muslims to offer prayers. Moreover, it was submitted that: (i)
The Suit of 1885 by Raghubar Mahant Das was confined to Ramchabutra and has been dismissed by the Sub-Judge, Faizabad;
(ii)
The property of the mosque was constituted as a waqf under the U.P. Muslim Waqf Act 1936;
(iii)
Muslims have been in continuous possession of the mosque since 1528 as a consequence of which all the rights of the plaintiffs have been extinguished;
(iv)
On the eastern and northern sides of the mosque, there are Muslim graves;
(v)
Namaz was continuously offered in the property until 16 December 1949 and the character of the mosque will not stand altered if an idol has been installed surreptitiously; and
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There is another temple at Ayodhya which is known as the Janmasthan temple of Lord Ram which has been in existence for a long time.
The plaint was amended to incorporate the averment that on 6 December 1992 “the main temple was demolished by some miscreants who had no religion, caste or creed”. In the replication filed by Nirmohi Akhara to the joint written statement of defendant nos 6 to 8, the existence of a separate Janmasthan temple was denied. It was stated that the Janmasthan temple is situated to the North of the Janmabhumi temple.
A written statement was filed in the suit by Defendant no 9, the Sunni Central Waqf Board denying the allegations. In the written statement filed by defendant no 10, Umesh Chandra Pandey, it was submitted:
(i)
The Janmasthan is a “holy place of worship” and belongs to the deity of Shri Ram Lalla Virajman for a long period of time. The temple is possessed and owned by the deity. Lord Ram is the principal deity of Ram Janmabhumi;
(ii)
Nirmohi Akhara has never managed the Janmasthan;
(iii)
In 1857, the British Government attempted to divide the building by creating an inner enclosure and describing the boundary within it as a mosque but no “true Muslim” could have offered prayers there;
(iv)
The presence of Kasauti pillars and the carvings of Gods and Goddess on the pillars indicated that the place could not be used by a “true Muslim” for offering prayers;
(v)
The place was virtually landlocked by a Hindu temple in which worship of the deity took place;
(vi)
The Suit of the Nirmohi Akhara was barred by limitation having been instituted in 1959, though the cause of action arose on 5 January 1950; and
.(vii) Nirmohi Akhara did not join the proceedings under Section 145 nor did they file a revision against the order passed by the Additional City Magistrate.
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
In the replication filed by Nirmohi Akhara to the written statement of defendant no 10, there was a detailed account of the founding of the denomination. Following the tradition of Shankaracharya since the seventh century CE, the practice of setting up Maths was followed by Ramanujacharya and later, by Ramanand. Ramanand founded a sect of Vaishnavs known as ‘Ramats’, who worship Lord Ram. The spiritual preceptors of the Ramanandi sect of Bairagis established three ‘annis’ namely, the (i) Nirmohi; (ii) Digamber; and (iii) Nirwani Akharas. These Akharas are Panchayati Maths. Nirmohi Akhara owns the Ram Janmasthan temple which is associated with the birth-place of Lord Ram. The outer enclosure was owned and managed by Nirmohi Akhara until the proceedings under Section 145 were instituted.
Suit 4 - OOS 4 of 1989 (Regular Suit no 12 of 1961) 38. Suit 4 was instituted on 18 December 1961 by the Sunni Central Waqf Board and nine Muslim residents of Ayodhya. It has been averred that the suit has been instituted on behalf of the entire Muslim community together with an application under Order I Rule 8 of the CPC. As amended, the following reliefs have been sought in the plaint: “(a) A declaration to the effect that the property indicated by letters A B C D in the sketch map attached to the plaint is public mosque commonly known as ‘Babari Masjid’ and that the land adjoining the mosque shown in the sketch map by letters E F G H is a public Muslim graveyard as specified in para 2 of the plaint may be decreed. (b) That in case in the opinion of the Court delivery of possession is deemed to be the proper remedy, a decree for delivery of possession of the mosque and graveyard in suit by removal of the idols and other articles which the Hindus may have placed in the mosque as objects of their worship be passed in plaintiff’s favour, against the defendants. (bb) That the statutory Receiver be commanded to hand over the property in dispute described in Schedule ‘A’ of the Plaint by removing the unauthorized structures erected thereon.”
[Note : Prayer (bb) was inserted by an amendment to the plaint pursuant to the order of the High Court dated 25 May 1995].
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Defendant no 1 in Suit 4 is Gopal Singh Visharad; defendant no 2 is Ram Chander Dass Param Hans; defendant no 3 is Nirmohi Akhara; defendant no 4 is Mahant Raghunath Das; defendant no 5 is the State of U.P.; defendant no 6 is the Collector, Faizabad; defendant no 7 is the City Magistrate, Faizabad; defendant no 8 is the Superintendent of Police of Faizabad; defendant no 9 is Priyadutt Ram; defendant no 10 is the President, Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha; defendant no 13 is Dharam Das; defendant no 17 is Ramesh Chandra Tripathi; and defendant no 20 is Madan Mohan Gupta. The suit is based on the averment that in Ayodhya, there is an ancient historic mosque known commonly as Babri Masjid which was constructed by Babur more than 433 years ago following his conquest of India and the occupation of its territories. It has been averred that the mosque was built for the use of the Muslims in general as a place of worship and for the performance of religious ceremonies. The main construction of the mosque is depicted by the letters A B C D on the plan annexed to the plaint. Adjoining the land is a graveyard. According to the plaintiffs, both the mosque and the graveyard vest in the Almighty and since the construction of the mosque, it has been used by the Muslims for offering prayers while the graveyard has been used for burial. The plaint alleged that outside the main building of the mosque, Hindu worship was being conducted at a Chabutra admeasuring 17x21 feet on which there was a small wooden structure in the form of a tent. The plaint contains a recital of the Suit of 1885 by Mahant Raghubhar Das for permission to construct a temple on the Chabutra which was dismissed. The plaintiffs in Suit 4 contend that the Mahant sued on behalf of himself, the Janmasthan and all persons interested in it, and the decision operates as res judicata as the matter directly and substantially in issue was the existence of the Babri Masjid, and the rights of the Hindus to construct a temple on the land adjoining the mosque. According to the plaintiffs, assuming without admitting that there existed a Hindu temple as alleged by the defendants on the site of which the mosque was built 433 years ago by Emperor Babur, the Muslims by virtue of their long exclusive and continuous possession commencing from the construction of the mosque and ensuing until its desecration perfected their title by adverse possession. The plaint then proceeds to make a reference to the proceedings under Section 145 of CrPC 1898.
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
As a result of the order of injunction in Suit 2 of 1950, Hindus have been permitted to perform puja of the idols placed within the mosque but Muslims have been prevented from entering.
According to the plaintiffs, the cause of action for the suit arose on 23 December 1949 when the Hindus are alleged to have wrongfully entered the mosque and desecrated it by placing idols inside the mosque. The injuries are claimed to be continuing in nature. As against the state, the cause of action is alleged to have arisen on 29 December 1949 when the property was attached by the City Magistrate who handed over possession to the receiver. The receiver assumed charge on 5 January 1950.
The reliefs which have been claimed in the suit are based on the above averments. Essentially, the case of the plaintiffs proceeds on the plea that (i)
(ii)
The mosque was constructed by Babur 433 years prior to the suit as a place of public worship and has been continuously used by Muslims for offering prayers; and Even assuming that there was an underlying temple which was demolished to give way for the construction of the mosque, the Muslims have perfected their title by adverse possession. On this foundation, the plaintiffs claim a declaration of title and, in the event that such a prayer is required, a decree for possession.
39. In the written statement filed by Gopal Singh Visharad, the first defendant (who is also the plaintiff in Suit 1), it has been stated that if the Muslims were in possession of the mosque, it ceased in 1934. The Hindus claim to be in possession after 1934 and their possession is stated to have ripened into adverse possession. According to the written statement, no prayers were offered in the mosque since 1934. Moreover, no individual Hindu or Mahant can be said to represent the entire Hindu community. Hindu puja is stated to be continuing inside the structure, which is described as a temple since 1934 and admittedly since January 1950, following the order of the City Magistrate. In an additional written statement, a plea has been taken that the UP Muslim Waqf Act 1936 is ultra vires. It has been averred that any determination under the Act cannot operate to decide a question of title against nonMuslims. In a subsequent written statement, it has been stated that
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Hindus have worshipped the site of the Janmabhumi since time immemorial; the Muslims were never in possession of the Janmabhumi temple and, if they were in possession, it ceased in 1934. The suit is alleged to be barred by limitation. As regards the Suit of 1885, it has been submitted that the plaintiff was not suing in a representative capacity and was only pursuing his personal interest. The written statement of Nirmohi Akhara denies the existence of a mosque. Nirmohi Akhara states that it was unaware of any suit filed by Mahant Raghubar Das. According to it, a mosque never existed at the site and hence there was no occasion for the Muslim community to offer prayers till 23 December 1949. It is urged that what the property described as Babri mosque is and has always been a temple of Janmabhumi with idols of Hindu Gods installed within. According to the written statement, the temple on Ramchabutra had been judicially recognised in the Suit of 1885. It was urged that the Janmabhumi temple was always in the possession of Nirmohi Akhara and none else but the Hindus were allowed to enter and offer worship. The offerings are stated to have been received by the representative of Nirmohi Akhara. After the attachment, only the pujaris of Nirmohi Akhara are claimed to have been offering puja to the idols in the temple. The written statement contains a denial of Muslim worship in the structure at least since 1934 and it is urged that Suit 4 is barred by limitation. In the additional written statement, Nirmohi Akhara has denied that the findings in the Suit of 1885 operate as res judicata. There is a denial of the allegation that the Muslims have perfected their title by adverse possession. The State of Uttar Pradesh filed its written statement to the effect that the government is not interested in the property in dispute and does not propose to contest the suit. In the written statement filed on behalf of the tenth defendant, Akhil Bhartiya Hindu Mahasabha, it has been averred that upon India regaining independence, there is a revival of the original Hindu law as a result of which the plaintiffs cannot claim any legal or constitutional right. In an additional written statement, the tenth defendant denies the incident of 22 December 1949 and claims that the idols were in existence at the place in question from time immemorial. According to the written statement, the site is the birth-place of Lord Ram and no mosque could have been constructed at the birth-place.
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
The written statement by Abhiram Das and by Dharam Das, who claims to be his chela, questions the validity of the construction of a mosque at the site of Ram Janmabhumi. According to the written statement, the site is landlocked and surrounded by places of Hindu worship and hence such a building cannot be a valid mosque in Muslim law. The written statement contains a denial of a valid waqf on the ground that a waqf cannot be based on adverse possession. According to the written statement, at Ram Janmabhumi there was an ancient temple tracing back to the rule of Vikramaditya which was demolished by Mir Baqi. It has been averred that Ram Janmabhumi is indestructible as the deity is divine and immortal. In spite of the construction of the mosque, it has been submitted, the area has continued to be in the possession of the deities and no one could enter the three domed structure except after passing through Hindu places of worship. The written statements filed by the other Hindu defendants broadly follow similar lines. Replications were filed to the written statements of the Hindu parties.
Suit 5 – OOS no 5 of 1989 (Regular Suit no 236 of 1989) 40. The suit was instituted on 1 July 1989 claiming the following reliefs: “(A) A declaration that the entire premises of Sri Rama Janma Bhumi at Ayodhya, as described and delineated in Annexure I, II and III belongs to the plaintiff Deities.
(B) A perpetual injunction against the Defendants prohibiting them from interfering with, or raising any objection to, or placing any obstruction in the construction of the new Temple building at Sri Rama Janma Bhumi, Ayodhya, after demolishing and removing the existing buildings and structures etc., situate thereat, in so far as it may be necessary or expedient to do so for the said purpose.”
This suit has been instituted in the name of “Bhagwan Sri Ram Virajman at Sri Ram Janmabhumi, Ayodhya also called Bhagwan Sri Ram Lalla Virajman”. The deity so described is the first plaintiff. The second plaintiff is described as “Asthan Sri Rama Janambhumi, Ayodhya”. Both the plaintiffs were represented by Sri Deoki Nandan Agrawala, a former judge of the Allahabad High Court as next friend. The next friend of the first and second plaintiffs is impleaded as the third plaintiff.
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The defendants to the suit include: (i)
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Nirmohi Akhara which is the Plaintiff in Suit 3;
(ii) Sunni Central Waqf Board, the Plaintiff in Suit 4; (iii) Hindu and Muslim residents of Ayodhya; and
(iv) The State of Uttar Pradesh, the Collector and Senior Superintendent of Police. Several other Hindu entities including the All India Hindu Mahasabha and a Trust described as the Sri Ram Janmabhumi Trust, are parties to the Suit as is the Shia Central Board of Waqfs.
The principal averments in Suit 5 are that: (i) The first and second plaintiffs are juridical persons: Lord Ram is the presiding deity of the place and the place is itself a symbol of worship;
(ii) The identification of Ram Janmabhumi, for the purpose of the plaint is based on the site plans of the building, premises and adjacent area prepared by Sri Shiv Shankar Lal, who was appointed as Commissioner by the Civil Judge at Faizabad in Suit 1 of 1950;
(iii) The plaint contains a reference to the earlier suits instituted before the Civil Court and that the religious ceremonies for attending to the deities have been looked after by the receiver appointed in the proceedings under Section 145. Although seva and puja of the deity have been conducted, darshan for the devotees is allowed only from behind a barrier;
(iv) Alleging that offerings to the deity have been misappropriated, it has been stated that the devotees desired to have a new temple constructed “after removing the old structure at Sri Ram Janmabhumi at Ayodhya”. A Deed of Trust was constituted on 18 December 1985 for the purpose of managing the estate and affairs of the Janmabhumi; (v) Though both the presiding deity of Lord Ram and Ram Janmabhumi are claimed to be juridical persons with a distinct personality, neither of them was impleaded as a
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party to the earlier suits. As a consequence, the decrees passed in those suits will not bind the deities;
(vi) Public records establish that Lord Ram was born and manifested himself in human form as an incarnation of Vishnu at the premises in dispute; (vii) The place itself – Ram Janmasthan - is an object of worship since it personifies the divine spirit worshipped in the form of Lord Ram. Both the deity and the place of birth thus possess a juridical character. Hindus worship the spirit of the divine and not its material form in the shape of an idol. This spirit which is worshipped is indestructible. Representing this spirit, Ram Janmabhumi as a place is worshipped as a deity and is hence a juridical person; (viii) The actual and continuous performance of puja of “an immovable deity” by its devotees is not essential for its existence since the deity represented by the land is indestructible; (ix) There was an ancient temple during the reign of Vikramaditya at Ram Janmabhumi. The temple was partly destroyed and an attempt was made to raise a mosque by Mir Baqi, a Commander of Emperor Babur. Most of the material utilised to construct the mosque was obtained from the temple including its Kasauti pillars with Hindu Gods and Goddesses carved on them; (x) The 1928 edition of the Faizabad Gazetteer records that during the course of his conquest in 1528, Babur destroyed the ancient temple and on its site a mosque was built. In 1855, there was a dispute between Hindus and Muslims. The gazetteer records that after the dispute, an outer enclosure was placed in front of the mosque as a consequence of which access to the inner courtyard was prohibited to the Hindus. As a result, they made their offerings on a platform in the outer courtyard; (xi) The place belongs to the deities and no valid waqf was ever created or could have been created;
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(xii) The structure which was raised upon the destruction of the ancient temple, utilising the material of the temple does not constitute a mosque. Despite the construction of the mosque, Ram Janmabhumi did not cease to be in possession of the deity which has continued to be worshipped by devotees through various symbols;
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(xiii) The building of the mosque could be accessed only by passing through the adjoining places of Hindu worship. Hence, at Ram Janmabhumi, the worship of the deities has continued through the ages;
(xiv) No prayers have been offered in the mosque after 1934. During the night intervening 22-23 December 1949, idols of Lord Ram were installed with due ceremony under the central dome. At that stage, acting on an FIR, proceedings were initiated by the Additional City Magistrate under Section 145 of the CrPC and a preliminary order was passed on 29 December 1949. A receiver was appointed, in spite of which the possession of the plaintiff deities was not disturbed; (xv) The plaintiffs, were not a party to any prior litigation and are hence not bound by the outcome of the previous proceedings; and (xvi) The Ram Janmabhumi at Ayodhya which contains, besides the presiding deity, other idols and deities along with its appertaining properties constitutes one integral complex with a single identity. The claim of the Muslims is confined to the area enclosed within the inner boundary wall, erected after the annexation of Oudh by the British. The plaint contains a description of the demolition of the structure of the mosque on 6 December 1992 and the developments which have taken place thereafter including the promulgation of an Ordinance and subsequently, a law enacted by the Parliament for acquisition of the land. 41. In the written statement filed by Nirmohi Akhara, it has been stated that:
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
(i) The idol of Lord Ram has been installed not at Ram Janmabhumi but in the Ram Janmabhumi temple. Nirmohi Akhara has instituted a suit seeking charge and management of Ram Janmabhumi temple; (ii) While the birth-place of Lord Ram is not in dispute, it is the Ram Janmabhumi temple which is in dispute. The Muslims claim it to be a mosque while Nirmohi Akhara claims it to be a temple under its charge and management. Ram Janmabhumi temple is situated at “Asthan Ram Janmabhumi” (the birth-place of Lord Ram), Mohalla Ram Kot at Ayodhya;
(iii) Nirmohi Akhara is the Shebait of the idol of Lord Ram installed in the temple in dispute and has the exclusive right to repair and reconstruct the temple, if necessary; and (iv) “Ram Janmabhumi Asthan” is not a juridical person. The plaintiffs of suit 5 have no real title to sue. The entire premises belong to Nirmohi Akhara, the answering defendant. Hence, according to the written statement the plaintiffs have no right to seek a declaration.
According to the written statement of the Sunni Central Waqf Board:
(i) Neither the first nor the second plaintiffs are juridical persons; (ii) There is no presiding deity of Lord Ram at the place in dispute;
(iii) The idols were surreptitiously placed inside the mosque on the night of 22-23 December 1949. There is neither any presiding deity nor a Janmasthan; (iv) The Suit of 1885 was instituted by Mahant Raghubar Das in his capacity as Mahant of the Janmasthan of Ayodhya seeking permission to establish a temple over a platform or Chabutra. The mosque was depicted in the site plan on the western side of the Chabutra. The suit was instituted on behalf of other Mahants and Hindus of Ayodhya and Faizabad. The suit was
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dismissed. The first and second appeals were also rejected. Since the claim in the earlier suit was confined only to the Chabutra admeasuring seventeen by twentyone feet outside the mosque, the claim in the present suit is barred;
(v) There exists another temple known as the Janmasthan temple situated at a distance of less than one hundred yards from Babri Masjid; (vi) The mosque was not constructed on the site of an existing temple or upon its destruction;
(vii) During the regime of Emperor Babur the land belonged to the State and the mosque was constructed on vacant land which did not belong to any person;
(viii) The structure has always been used as a mosque ever since its construction during the regime of Emperor Babur, who was a Sunni Muslim;
(ix) The possession of Muslims was uninterrupted and continuous since the construction of the mosque, until 22 December 1949. Therefore, any alleged right to the contrary is deemed to have been extinguished by adverse possession; (x) Prayers were offered in the mosque five times every day, regularly until 22 December 1949 and Friday prayers were offered until 16 December 1949;
(xi) On 22-23 December 1949, some Bairagis forcibly entered into the mosque and placed an idol below the central dome. This came to the knowledge of Muslims who attended the mosque for prayers on 23 December 1949 after which proceedings were initiated under Section 145 of the CrPC 1898. The possession of the building has remained with the receiver from 5 January 1950; (xii) The third plaintiff in Suit 5 could have got himself impleaded as a party to the suit instituted by the Sunni Central Waqf Board. Having failed to do so the third
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
plaintiff cannot maintain Suit 5 as the next friend of the deities;
(xiii) The third plaintiff has never been associated with the management and puja of the idols and cannot claim himself to be the next friend of Lord Ram; (xiv) There is no presiding deity as represented by the first plaintiff and it is incorrect to say that the footsteps (“charan”) and other structures constitute one integral complex with a single identity; (xv) The concept of a mosque envisages that the entire area below as well as above the land remains dedicated to God. Hence, it is not merely the structure of the mosque alone but also the land on which it stands which is dedicated to the Almighty, Allah; (xvi) The site in question has no connection with the place of birth of Lord Ram and has no significance to the alleged “Asthan” of Ram Janmabhumi; (xvii) The cause of action for the suit is deemed to have accrued in December 1949 when the property was attached and when the Muslims categorically denied the claim of the Hindus to perform puja in the mosque. Hence, the suit is barred by limitation; (xviii) The subject matter of the suit is property registered as a waqf which is maintained by the Sunni Central Waqf Board under Section 30 of the U P Muslim Waqf Act 1960, shown as such in the revenue records; and
(xix) Archaeological experts seem to indicate that there appears to be no sign of human habitation predating to 700 B.C. nor is there any evidence that a fort, palace or old temple existed at the site of Babri Masjid. In the written statement filed on behalf of defendant no 5 who is a Muslim resident of Ayodhya, it has been submitted that:
(i) The premises have always been a mosque since the construction in the sixteenth century and have been used only for the purposes of offering namaz;
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(ii) The existence of Kasauti pillars is denied. No one else except the Muslims worshipped in Babri Masjid. Namaz was offered in the mosque since its construction until 22 December 1949; (iii) Babri Masjid was not constructed on the site of a temple which was demolished at the behest of Emperor Babur; (iii) The Ram Janmasthan Mandir which exists in Ayodhya is distinct and separate from the premises in question; and
(iv) The findings in the Suit of 1885 operate as res judicata. An additional written statement was filed on behalf of defendant nos 4 and 5 in order to deal with the amendments to the plaint consequent upon the demolition of the Babri Masjid on 6 December 1992. The written statement of defendant no 6, a Muslim resident of Ayodhya, adopts the written statement of defendant no 5. The written statement of defendant no 11, the President of the All India Hindu Mahasabha, has submitted to a decree in terms as sought in the plaint. The written statements filed by the Hindu and Muslim defendants follow broadly the same respective lines. 42. A written statement has been filed by defendant no 24, Prince Anjum Qader stating thus: “(a) The spot being presently claimed by the plaintiff is being made known as Ram Janam Bhoomi only since 22.12.1949.
(b) The Ram Chabutra, in the court-yard outside the Babri Masjid structure, is being known as Ram Janam Bhoomi only since 1885. (c) The Janamsthan site Rasoi Mandir, facing the Babri Masjid across the street, is traditionally known as Ramjanambhumi since time immemorial.” According to defendant no 24:
(i) In 1855, a spot outside the structure of Babri Masjid in a corner of the courtyard was claimed as the Janmasthan. At that stage, an area admeasuring seventeen by twenty-one feet was partitioned by naming it as Ramchabutra;
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
(ii) On 22 December 1949, the Janmasthan claim was shifted from Ramchabutra to a place inside the mosque beneath the main dome of the Babri Masjid; (iii) Prior to 1855, “the undisputed Ram Janmasthan was the old Janmasthan Sita Rasoi Mandir across the street on a mound facing the Babri Masjid”;
(iv) According to defendant no 24, the following three sites are now believed to be probable places of the birth of Lord Ram, namely: (a) Inside the Babri Masjid beneath the main dome since 1949;
(b) At Ramchabutra in the courtyard of the Babri Masjid since 1855; and (c) At the old Ram Janmasthan Mandir where Sita Rasoi is also situated. (v) While the 1928 edition of the Faizabad Gazetteer published by the British Government contains a narration of Emperor Babur halting at Ayodhya for a week, destroying the ancient temple and building the Babri Masjid with the materials of the destroyed temple, it is a fact of history that Babur never came to Ayodhya. The Babur-Nama, a memoir of Emperor Babur has made no mention of visiting Ayodhya, destroying the temple or of building a mosque. Defendant no 24 states that: “However, after all said and done, it is most respectfully submitted that if only this claim is proved that a Mandir was demolished and Babri Masjid was built on the Mandir land, this defendant and all other Muslims will gladly demolish and shift the mosque, and return the land for building of the Mandir thereon.”
(vi) Babri Masjid was built by Mir Baqi on vacant land and not on the ruins of a pre-existing temple. Since Mir Baqi was a Shia Muslim, the ‘mutawalliship’ devolved upon his descendants since inception in 1528 without a break.
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However, both Shias and Sunnis offered namaz in Babri Masjid. The Sunni Muslims were permitted by the Shia mutawalli to perform their own daily Jamaat in the Masjid since 1925, when the Shia population in Ayodhya dwindled. The Sunni Imam of Babri Masjid led the last namaz on 22 December 1949. The written statement of defendant no 25 states that: (i) Babri Masjid has always been in use as a mosque in which the namaz was offered since its construction, until 22 December 1949; and
(ii) On the night between 22-23 December 1949, some persons illegally trespassed into the mosque as a result of which an FIR was lodged and proceedings under Section 145 were initiated. A receiver was appointed and the status quo was directed to be continued during the pendency of the civil suits before the Civil Court. Heads of issues in the Suits 43. Justice Sudhir Agarwal observed that the issues in the four suits can be broadly classified under the following heads : “(A) Notice under Section 80 C.P.C.
(B) Religious denomination (C) Res judicata, waiver and estoppel (D) Waqf Act 13 of 1936 etc.
(E) Miscellaneous issues like representative nature of suit, Trust, Section 91 C.P.C., non joinder of parties, valuation/ insufficient Court fee/under valuation and special costs. (F) Person and period- who and when constructed the disputed building
(G) Deities, their status, rights etc. (H) Limitation (I) Possession/adverse possession
(J) Site as birthplace, existence of temple and demolition if any.
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
(K) Character of Mosque
(L) Identity of the property (M) Bar of Specific Relief Act (N) Others, if any.” C. Evidence: a bird’s eye view 44. A wealth of material emerged before the court during the course of the trial. The judgment of Justice Sudhir Agarwal in the High Court copiously tabulates the documentary evidence 13 . The documentary exhibits of the parties during the course of trial comprised of 533 exhibits of which a brief categorisation is: 1. Plaintiffs (Suit-1)
– Exhibits No. 1 to 34
(Total 34)
2. Plaintiffs (Suit-3)
– Exhibits No. 1 to 21
(Total 21)
3. Plaintiffs (Suit-4)
– Exhibits No. 1 to 128
(Total 128)
4. Plaintiffs (Suit-5)
– Exhibits No. 1 to 132
(Total 132)
5. Defendants (Suit-1) – Exhibits No. A1 to A72
(Total 73)
6. Defendants (Suit-4) – (i) Exhibits No. A1 to A16
(Total 16)
(ii) Exhibits No. M1 to M7
(Total 7)
(iii) Exhibits No. B1 to B16
(Total 16)
(iv) Exhibits No. J1 to J31
(Total 32)
(v) Exhibits No. T1-T6
(Total 6)
(vi) Exhibit No. V1
(Total 1)
(vii) Exhibits No. Q1 to Q6
(Total 6)
7. Defendants (Suit-5) – (i) Exhibits No. C1 to C11
(Total 11)
(ii) Exhibits No. D1 to D38
(Total 38)
(iii) Exhibits No. E1 to E8
(Total 12)
Grand Total - 533
These exhibits broadly comprise of : (i) Religious texts;
2010 (ADJ), Vol. I, pages 624-662
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(ii) Travelogues; (iii) Gazetteers; (iv) Translations of inscriptions on pillars; (v) Reports of Archaeological excavation;
(vi) Photographs prior to demolition; and (vii) Details of artefacts found at the disputed site. The judgment of Justice Sudhir Agarwal in the High Court tabulates the oral evidence in the four suits under the following heads:
“274. (1) Oral Depositions : Parties to these suits produced 88 witnesses, who deposed on one or the other subject. Broadly, these witnesses are categorized as under: 275. (a) Witnesses produced in Suit-4 by Plaintiff : (I) Witness of facts :
1. P.W 1 Sri Mohd. Hashim 2. PW 2 Hazi Mahboob Ahmed 3. PW 3 Farooq Ahmad 4. PW 4 Mohd. Yasin
5. PW 5 Sri Abdul Rehman 6. PW 6 Mohd. Yunus Siddiqui 7. PW 7 Sri Hashmat Ullah Ansari 8. PW 8 Sri Abdul Aziz
9. PW 9 Syeed Akhlak Ahmad 10. PW 10 Mohd. Idris 11. PW11 Mohd. Burhanuddin 12. PW 12 Ram Shanker Upadhyay
13. PW 13 Suresh Chandra Mishra 14. PW 14 Jalil Ahmad 15. PW 21 Dr. M. Hashim Qidwai 16. PW 23 Mohd Qasim Ansari 17. PW 25 Mohd. Sibte Naqvi
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
(II) Expert Witnesses (Historians)
18. PW 15 Sushil Srivastava 19. PW 18 Prof. Suvira Jaiswal 20. PW 20 Prof. Shirin Musavi (III) Expert Witnesses (Archaeologists)
21. PW 16 Prof. Suraj Bhan 22. PW 24 Prof. D. Mandal 23. PW 27 Dr. Shereen F. Ratnagar 24. PW 28 Dr. Sita Ram Roy
25. PW 29 Dr. Jaya Menon 26. PW 30 Dr. R. C. Thakran 27. PW 31 Dr. Ashok Datta 28. PW 32 Dr. Supriya Verma
(IV) Private Commissioner 29. PW 17 Zafar Ali Siddiqui (V) Expert Witnesses (Religious matters) 30. PW 19 Maulana Atiq Ahmad
31. PW 22 Mohd. Khalid Naqui 32. PW 26 Kalbe Jawed 276. (b) Witnesses produced in Suit-5 by Plaintiff : (I) Witness of facts :
1. OPW 1 Mahant Paramhans Ram Chandra Das 2. OPW 2 Sri D.N. Agarwal 3. OPW 4 Harihar Prasad Tewari 4. OPW 5 Ram Nath Mishra alias Banarsi Panda
5. OPW 6 Hausila Prasad Tripathit 6. OPW 7 Sri Ram Surat Tewari 7. OPW 8 Ashok Chandra Chatterjee
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8. OPW 12 Kaushal Kishor Misra 9. OPW 13 Narad Saran (II) Expert Witnesses (Archaeologists) 10. OPW 3 Dr. S.P. Gupta
11. OPW 14 Dr. Rakesh Tewari 12. OPW 17 Dr. R. Nagaswami 13. OPW 18 Sri Arun Kumar Sharma 14. OPW 19 Sri Rakesh Dutta Trivedi
(III) Expert Witness (Epigraphist and Historian) 15. OPW 9 Dr. T.P. Verma (IV) Expert Witnesses (Epigraphist) 16. OPW 10 Dr. Voluvyl Vyasarayasastri Ramesh
17. OPW 15 Dr. M.N. Katti (V) Expert Witnesses (Historians) 18. OPW 11 Dr. Satish Chandra Mittal
(VI) Expert Witnesses (Religious matters) 19. OPW 16 Jagadguru Ramanandacharya Swami Ram Bhadracharya 277. (c) Witnesses produced in Suit-1 by Plaintiff : (I) Witness of facts :
1. DW 1/1 Sri Rajendra Singh 2. DW 1/2 Sri Krishna Chandra Singh 3. DW 1/3 Sri Sahdeo Prasad Dubey
278. (d) Witnesses produced in Suit-3 of 1989 by Plaintiff: (I) Witness of facts : 1. DW 3/1 Mahant Bhaskar Das 2. DW 3/2 Sri Raja Ram Pandey
3. DW 3/3 Sri Satya Narain Tripathi
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
4. DW 3/4 Mahant Shiv Saran Das
5. DW 3/5 Sri Raghunath Prasad Pandey 6. DW 3/6 Sri Sita Ram Yadav 7. DW 3/7 Mahant Ramji Das 8. DW 3/8 Pt. Shyam Sundar Mishra @ Barkau Mahraj
9. DW 3/9 Sri Ram Ashrey Yadav 10. DW 3/11 Sri Bhanu Pratap Singh 11. DW 3/12 Sri Ram Akshaibar Pandey 12. DW 3/13 Mahant Ram Subhag Shashtri
13. DW 3/15 Narendra Bahadur Singh 14. DW 3/16 Sri Shiv Bhikh Singh 15. DW 3/17 Sri Mata Badal Tewari 16. DW 3/18 Sri Acharya Mahant Bansidhar Das @ Uriya Baba
17. DW 3/19 Sri Ram Milan Singh 18. DW 3/20 Mahant Raja Ramchandr-acharya (II) Others :
19. DW 3/10 Sri Pateshwari Dutt Pandey 20. DW 3/14 Jagad Guru Ramanandacharya Swami Haryacharya 279. (e) Witnesses produced by Defendant 2/1 in Suit-4 :
(I) Witness of facts : 1. DW 2/1-3 Mahant Ram Vilas Das Vedanti (II) Others : 2. DW 2/1-1 Sri Rajendra.
3. DW 2/1-2 Sri Ram Saran Srivastava 280. (f) Witnesses produced by Defendant 13/1 in Suit-4 : (I) Expert Witness (Historians) : 1. DW 13/1-3 Dr. Bishan Bahadur
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(II) Others : 2. DW 13/1-1 Mahant Dharam Das 3. DW 13/1-2 Mahant Awadh Bihari Das Pathak 281. (g) Witnesses produced by Defendant 17 in Suit-4 :
(I) Witness of facts : 1. DW 17/1 Sri Ramesh Chandra Tripathi 282. (h) Witnesses produced by Defendant 20 in Suit-4 : (I) Witness of facts :
1. DW 20/1 Sri Shashi Kant Rungta 2. DW 20/4 Sri M.M. Gupta (II) Expert Witnesses (Religious matters) 3. DW 20/2 Swami Avimukteshwaran and Saraswati
4. DW 20/3 Bramchari Ram Rakshanand (III) Expert Witness (Archaeologist) 5. DW 20/5 Sri Jayanti Prasad Srivastava 283. (i) Witnesses produced by Defendant 6/1 in Suit-3 :
(I) Expert Witness (Archaeologist) : 1. DW 6/1-2 Sri Mohd. Abid (II) Others : 2. DW 6/1-1 Sri Haji Mahboob Ahmad.”
Statements under Order X Rule 2 CPC 45. During the course of the hearing of the suit, the Trial Court recorded the statements of parties and their pleaders under the provisions of Order X Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 190814 (“CPC”).
On 8 August 1962, it was stated on behalf of the Sunni Central Waqf Board that:
2. Oral examination of party, or companion of party- (1) At the first hearing of the suit, the Court(a) shall, with a view to elucidating matters in controversy in the suit, examine, orally such of the parties to the suit appearing in person or present in Court, as it deems fit; and
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
“the property in suit is the property dedicated to Almighty God and is a mosque for the use of the entire Muslim community at large…” On 28 August 1963, it was stated by the Sunni Central Waqf Board that in the alternative even if the defendants had any right in the property, it stood extinguished by a lapse of time and the plaintiff (Sunni Central Waqf Board) had acquired title by adverse possession.
On 11 January 1996, the statement of Mr Zafaryab Jilani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Sunni Central Waqf Board was recorded to the effect that: “That the mosque was situate on a Nazul Plot No. 583 of the Khasra of 1931 of Mohalla Kot Ramchandra known as Ramkot at Ayodhya.” On 22 April 2009, the following statement of Mr Zafaryab Jilani, learned Senior Counsel was recorded under Order X Rule 2 of the CPC: “For the purpose of this case there is no dispute about the faith of Hindu devotees of Lord Rama regarding the birth of Lord Rama at Ayodhya as described in Balmiki Ramayana or as existing today. It is, however, disputed and denied that the site of Babri Masjid was the place of birth of Lord Rama. It is also denied that there was any Ram Janam Bhoomi Temple at the site of Babri Masjid at any time whatsoever. The existence of Nirmohi Akhara from the second half of Nineteenth Century onwards is also not disputed. It is however, denied and disputed that Nirmohi Akhara was inexistence and specially in Ayodhya in 16th Century A.D. or in 1528 A.D. and it is also denied that any idols were there in the building of the Babri Masjid up to 22nd December, 1949.” (b) may orally examine any person, able to answer any material question relating to the suit, by whom any party appearing in person or present in Court or his pleader is accompanied. (2) At any subsequent hearing, the Court may orally examine any party appearing in person or present in Court, or any person, able to answer any material question relating to the suit, by whom such party or his pleader is accompanied. (3) The Court may, if it thinks fit, put in the course of an examination under this rule questions suggested by either party.
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Similar statements were made on behalf of other counsel representing the Muslim parties. There is, in other words, no dispute before this Court in regard to the faith and belief of the Hindus that the birth of Lord Ram is ascribed to have taken place at Ayodhya, as described in Valmiki’s Ramayan. What is being disputed is whether the disputed site below the central dome of the Babri Masjid is the place of birth of Lord Ram. The Muslim parties have expressly denied the existence of a Ram Janmabhumi temple at the site of Babri Masjid. With this background, it becomes necessary to advert to the salient aspects of the documentary evidence which has emerged on the record. D. The aftermath of 1856-7
D.1 Response to the wall
46. In 1856-7, a communal riot took place. Historical accounts indicate that the conflagration had its focus at Hanumangarhi and the Babri mosque. Some of those accounts indicate that prior to the incident, Muslims and Hindus alike had access to the area of the mosque for the purpose of worship. The incident was proximate in time with the transfer of power to the colonial government. The incident led to the setting up of a railing made of a grill-brick wall outside the mosque. The object of this would have been to maintain peace and due order at the site. The railing provided the genesis of the bifurcation of the inner courtyard (in which the structure of the mosque was situated) and the outer courtyard comprising the remaining area. The setting up of the railing was not a determination of proprietary rights over the inner and outer courtyards, the measure having been adopted to maintain peace between the two communities. This section of the judgment traces the documentary evidence on the aftermath of 1856-7 at the disputed site, the continuing skirmishes in the inner and outer courtyards, the proceedings between various disputants and the claim to worship by the Hindus in the inner courtyard. The evidence is as follows: (i) On 28 November 1858 a report was submitted by Sheetal Dubey who was the Thanedar, Oudh 15. The report spoke of an incident during which Hawan and Puja was organised inside the mosque by a Nihang Sikh who had erected a religious symbol. The report states:
Exhibit 19
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
“Today Mr. Nihang Singh Faqir Khalsa resident of Punjab, organized Hawan and Puja of Guru Gobind Singh and erected a symbol of Sri Bhagwan, within the premises of the Masjid. At the time of pitching the symbol, 25 sikhs were posted there for security. Deemed necessary so requested. May your regime progress. Pleasure.” (ii) An application was submitted by Syed Mohammad Khateeb, Muazzim of the Masjid16. The subject of the application was the report of the Thanedar Oudh. The application stated that ‘Mahant Nihang Singh Faqir’ was creating a riot on “Janam Sthan Masjid situated in Oudh”. The application stated: “Near Mehrab and Mimber, he has constructed, inside the case, an earth Chabutra measuring about four fingers by filling it with Kankars (concrete). Lighting arrangement has been made…and after raising the height of Chabutra about 11/4 yards a picture of idol has been placed and after digging a pit near it, the Munder wall has been made Pucca. Fire has been lit there for light and Puja and Hom is continuing there. In whole of this Masjid ‘Ram Ram’ has been written with coal. Kindly, do justice. It is an open tyranny and high handedness of the Hindus on Muslims and not that of Hindus. Previously the symbol of Janamsthan had been there for hundreds of years and Hindus did Puja. Because of conspiracy of Shiv Ghulam Thandedar Oudh Government, the Bairagis constructed overnight a Chabutra up to height of one ‘Balisht’ until the orders of injunction were issued. At that time the Deputy Commissioner suspended the Thanedar and fine was imposed on Bairagis. Now the Chabootra has been raised to about 11/4 yards. Thus sheer highhandedness has been proved. Therefore, it is requested that Murtaza Khan Kotwal City may be ordered that he himself visit the spot and inspect the
Exhibit 20
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new constructions and get them demolished (sic) and oust the Hindus from there; the symbol and the idol may be removed from there and writing on the walls be washed.” The contents of the application indicate that by this time a platform had been constructed inside the mosque in which an idol had been placed. A fire had been lit and arrangements were made for puja. Evidently, the railing did not prevent access to the inner courtyard or to the precincts of the mosque. (iii) A report was submitted by the Thanedar on 1 December 1858 “for summoning Nihang Singh Faqir who is residing within the Masjid Janam Sthan17. The report stated that he had taken a summons “to the said Faqir” and he was admonished, in spite of which he continued to insist that “every place belonged to Nirankar”;
(iv) A report was submitted by the Thanedar on 6 December 1858 indicating service of the summons18;
(v) There was an application dated 9 April 1860 of Mohammadi Shah, resident of Mohalla Ramkot seeking a postponement of the grant of a lease in respect of village Ramkot until a decision was taken on whether the land is Nazul land19;
(vi) On 5 November 1860, an application was made to the Deputy Commissioner for the removal of the Chabutra which had been constructed “within Babri Masjid Oudh”20. The grievance in the application and the relief sought is indicated in this extract:
“Besides, when the Moazzin recites Azaan, the opposite party begins to blow conch (Shankh/ Naqoos). This has never happened before. I would pray that your honour is the Judge for both the parties. The opposite party should be restrained from
Exhibit 21 Exhibit 22 Exhibit 23 Exhibit 31
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M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
his unlawful act and after proper inquiry the newly constructed Chabootra which had never existed, may kindly be demolished and a bond be got executed from the opposite party to the effect that he will not unlawfully and illegally interfere in the Masjid property and will not blow conch (Shankh/ Naqoos) at the time of Azaan.” (vii) The application would indicate that the namaz was at the stage being performed in the mosque. The Azaan of the Moazzin was met with the blowing of conch shells by the Hindus. A contentious situation was arising. Eventually, the Nihang Sikh was evicted from the site and a record was maintained; (viii) In or about 1877, another door to the outer courtyard was allowed to be opened by the administration on the northern site, in addition to the existing door on the east. The Deputy Commissioner declined to entertain a complaint against the opening made in the wall of the Janmasthan21. The order of the Deputy Commissioner records: “A doorway has recently been opened in the wall of the Janum-Asthan not at all in Baber’s mosque, but in the wall which in front is divided from the mosque by a railing. This opening was necessary to give a separate route on fair days to visitors to the Janum-Asthan. There was one opening only, so the crush (sic rush) was very great and life was endangered. I marked out the spot for the opening myself so there is no need to depute any Europe officer. This petition is merely an attempt to annoy the Hindu by making it dependent on the pleasure of the mosque people to open or close the 2nd door in which the Mohammedans can have no interest.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Exhibit 15
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This was accepted by the Commissioner while dismissing an appeal on 13 December 1877 holding: “As the door in question has opened by the Deputy Commissioner in the interests of the public safety, I decline to interfere. Appeal dismissed.”
(ix) Justice Agarwal has alluded to the above documentary evidence including in particular, the application of the Moazzin dated 30 November 1858.22 The application complained of the construction of a Chabutra near the mihrab and mimbar on which a picture of an idol had been placed. The complaint refers to the worship which was being conducted by lighting a fire and conducting a puja. The letter notes that previously the symbol of the Janmasthan was in existence for hundreds of years and Hindus had performed puja. Justice Agarwal has noted that the genuineness of this document has not been disputed by the plaintiff in the suit or of it having been written by a person whose identity was not disputed. The learned Judge held that the document contains admissions which prove that Hindus had continuously offered prayers inside the disputed building including the inner courtyard and at Ramchabutra and Sita Rasoi in the outer courtyard. However, during the course of the proceedings Mr Mohd. Nizamuddin Pasha, learned counsel for the plaintiffs in Suit 4 has challenged the translation of the exhibit;
(x) Mohd Asghar instituted Suit 374/943 of 188223 against Raghubar Das, Mahant, Nirmohi Akhara claiming rent for use of the Chabutra and Takht near the door of Babri Masjid and for organizing the Kartik Mela on the occasion of Ram Navami in 1288 Fasli. The Sub-Judge, Faizabad dismissed the suit on 18 June 1883;
(xi) The construction of a railing in 1856-7 to provide a measure of separation between the inner and outer courtyards led to the construction of a platform by the
Exhibit 20 Exhibit 24
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Hindus in close proximity to the railing, in the outer courtyard. The platform, called Ramchabutra, became a place of worship for the Hindus; (xii) On 29 January 1885, a suit was instituted in the court of the Munsif, Faizabad by Mahant Raghubar Das, describing himself as “Mahant Janmasthan at Ayodhya”. The sole defendant was the Secretary of State for India in Council24. The relief which was sought in the suit was an injunction restraining the defendant from obstructing the construction of a temple over the Chabutra admeasuring 17x21 feet. The plaint stated that the Janmasthan at Ayodhya is a place of religious importance and the plaintiff is a Mahant of the place. Charan Paduka was affixed on the Chabutra and a small temple built next to it was worshipped. The plaintiff stated that in April 1883, the Deputy Commissioner, Faizabad acting on the objection of the Muslims, obstructed the construction of a temple. A map was appended with the plaint showing the three domed structure described as “Masjid” within a boundary railing. The map appended to the plaint indicated two entrances to the outer courtyard on the Northern and Eastern sides. Mohd Asghar as Mutawalli of the mosque was impleaded as second defendant to the suit. He filed a written statement on 22 December 1885 stating that Babur had created a waqf by constructing a Masjid and above the door, the word ‘Allah’ was inscribed. Babur was also stated to have declared a grant for its maintenance. Mohd Asghar pleaded that no permission had been granted for the use of the land in the compound of the mosque. It was averred that there was no Chabutra from the date of the construction of the mosque until 1856 and it was only constructed in 1857. The prayer for the construction of a temple was opposed; and
The above suit was dismissed by the Sub-Judge on 24 December 1885. The Trial Court held that:
The certified copy of the plaint is Exhibit A-22 in Suit 1
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(a) The Chabutra was in possession of the plaintiff, which had not been disputed by the second defendant; (b) The area was divided by a railing wall separating the domed structure from the outer courtyard where the Chabutra existed to prevent any dispute between Hindus and Muslims; (c) The erection of a railing was necessitated due to the riot in 1885 between Hindus and Muslims;
(d) The divide was made to so that Muslims could offer prayers inside and the Hindus outside; (e) Since the area to visit the mosque and the temple was the same but the place where the Hindus offered worship was in their possession, there could be no dispute about their ownership; and
(f) Though the person who was the owner and in possession is entitled to make construction, grant of permission to construct a temple in such close proximity to a mosque may lead to a serious dispute between Hindus and Muslims and create a law and order problem. The suit was dismissed on this ground. Against the decree of the Trial Court, an appeal was filed by Mahant Raghubar Das while cross-objections were filed by Mohd Asghar. The District Judge by a judgment dated 18/26 March 1886 dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff. The District Judge held that it was “most unfortunate” that the Masjid should have been built on the land especially held sacred by the Hindus but since the construction had been made 358 years earlier, it was too late in the day to reverse the process. The suit was dismissed on the ground that there was no injury which could give a right of action to the plaintiff. On the cross-objections of Mohd Asghar, the District Judge held that the finding of the Trial Court that the plaintiff was the owner of the land in dispute was redundant and should be expunged. The second appeal was dismissed by the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh on 1 November 1886 on the ground that (i) there was nothing on record to show that the plaintiff was the proprietor of the land in
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question; and (ii) it was inappropriate to allow the parties to disturb the status quo especially when a mosque had been in existence for nearly 350 years. The Judicial Commissioner held:
“The matter is simply that the Hindus of Ajodhya want to create a new temple or marble baldacchino over the supposed holy spot in Ajodhya said to be the birthplace of Shri Ram Chandar. Now this spot is situated within the precinct of the grounds surrounding a mosque erected some 350 years ago owing to the bigotry and tyranny of the Emperor Babur, who purposely chose this holy spot according to Hindu legend as the site of his mosque. The Hindus seem to have got very limited rights of access to certain spots within the precincts adjoining the mosque and they have for a series of years been persistently trying to increase those rights and to erect buildings on two spots in the enclosure:
(a) Sita ki Rasoi (b) Ram Chandar ki Janam Bhumi.
The Executive authorities have persistently refused these encroachments and absolutely forbid any alteration of the ‘status quo’. I think this is a very wise and proper procedure on their part and I am further of opinion that the Civil Courts have properly dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim.”
The issue as to whether the findings in the suit will operate as res judicata will be dealt with in a subsequent segment of the judgment. The conflagration which took place in 1855-56 resulted in a brick wall and railing being put up outside the mosque. This divided the courtyard into an inner portion which lay within the railing and the outer portion beyond it. Situated in the outer portion were places worshipped by the Hindus, among them being Ramchabutra and Sita Rasoi. Two entrance gates (on the north and east) provided access to the outer courtyard. Entry to the mosque was through the access points to the outer courtyard.
D.2 Period between 1934-1949 47. In 1934, there was another communal incident in the course of which damage was sustained to the mosque which was subsequently
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restored. The documentary evidence which has been brought on record shows that : (i) The colonial administration sanctioned the work of repair and renovation of the damaged structure of the mosque;
(ii) A fine was imposed on the Hindus for the damage which was caused to the mosque; (iii) The work of restoration was entrusted to a Muslim contractor with whom there was an exchange of correspondence over the payment of unpaid bills and for verification of work done;
(iv) This was a claim by the Pesh Imam of the mosque over the payment of the arrears of salary with the Mutawalli; and (v) Upon the work of repair, the administration permitted arrangements to be made for commencement of namaz.
(In Suit 4, Dr Rajeev Dhavan and Mr Zafaryab Jilani have relied upon this documentary evidence as indicative of the status of the mosque and of the performance of namaz).
48. A series of incidents took place between March and December 1949. On 19 March 1949, a deed was executed by the Panches of Nirmohi Akhara purportedly to reduce into writing the customs of the Akhara. This document25 included the following provision in regard to “the temple of Janmabhoomi” of which the management was claimed to vest in the Akhara: “Temple of Janam Bhoomi is situate in Mohalla Ram Ghat of City, Ayodhya which is under the Baithak of this Akhara and its whole management is trust upon to this Akhara. It stands in name of Mahant of Akhara as Mahant and Manager. This is the best well reputed, moorty of worship temple of Ayodhya. Being the birthplace of Lord Rama, it is the main temple of Ayodhya. The deity of Shri Ram Lalaji is installed there and there are other deities also.”
Exhibit 1 in Suit 3
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49. During the course of his arguments, Dr Rajeev Dhavan, learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs in Suit 4 urged that the communications exchanged between the officials of the State of Uttar Pradesh demonstrate that they had prior information about a carefully planned course of action of placing idols inside the mosque which led to the desecration of the mosque. Despite this, it has been submitted, the administration took no steps to prevent such an incident from taking place. Hence, in this backdrop, it is necessary to set out the events that led to the incident which took place on 22-23 December 1949:
(i) On 12 November 1949, a police picket was posted in the area;
(ii) On 29 November 1949, Kripal Singh who was the Superintendent of Police at Faizabad addressed a letter to K K Nayar, the Deputy Commissioner and District Magistrate, Faizabad stating: “I visited the premises of Babri mosque and the Janm Asthan in Ajodhya this evening. I noticed that several “Hawan Kunds” have been constructed all around the mosque. Some of them have been built on old constructions already existing there.” … I found bricks and lime also lying near the Janm Asthan. They have a proposal to construct a very big Havan Kund where Kirtan and Yagna on Puranmashi will be performed on a very large scale. Several thousand Hindus, Bairagis and Sadhus from outside will also participate. They also intend to continue the present Kirtan till Puranmashi. The plan appears to be to surround the mosque in such a way that entry for the Muslims will be very difficult and ultimately they might be forced to abandon the mosque. There is a strong rumour, that on puranmashi the Hindus will try to force entry into the mosque with the object of installing a deity.” (Emphasis supplied)
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(iii) On 10 December 1949, Mohd Ibrahim who was the Waqf Inspector submitted a report to the secretary of the Masjid stating that Muslims were being prevented from offering namaz Isha (the namaz at night) at the mosque, due to the fear of Hindus and Sikhs and there was an apprehension of danger to the mosque:
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“On investigation in Faizabad city it was revealed that because of the fear of Hindus and Sikhs no one goes into the Masjid to pray Namaz Isha. If by chance any passenger stays in the Masjid he is being threatened and teased by the Hindus ... (sic)..... There are number of Numberdars ... (sic)..... if any Muslim into the Masjid, he is harassed and abused. I made on the spot enquires which reveal that the said allegations are correct. Local people stated that the Masjid is in great danger because of Hindus ... (sic)..... Before they try to damage the wall of the Masjid, it seems proper the Deputy Commissioner Faizabad may be accordingly informed , so that no Muslim, going into the Masjid may be teased. The Masjid is a Shahi monument and it should be preserved.” (Emphasis supplied)
(iv) On 16 December 1949, K K Nayyar addressed a communication to Govind Narayan who was Home Secretary to the Government of Uttar Pradesh, stating that there was a “magnificent temple” at the site which had been constructed by Vikramaditya, which was demolished by Babur for the construction of a mosque, known as Babri Masjid. The letter stated that building material of the temple was used in the construction of the mosque and that a long time had elapsed before Hindus were again restored to the possession of a site therein, at the corner of two walls. The letter recorded a reference to recent happenings and stated: “Some time this year probably in October or November some grave-mounds were partially
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destroyed apparently by Bairagis who very keenly resent Muslim associations with this shrine. On 12.11.49 a police picket was posted at this place. The picket still continues in augmented strength. There were since other attempts to destroy gravemounds. Four persons were caught and cases are proceeding against them but for quite some time now there have been no attempts. Muslims, mostly of Faizabad have been exaggerating these happenings and giving currency to the report that graves are being demolished systematically on a large scale. This is an entirely false canard inspired apparently by a desire to prevent Hindus from securing in this area possession or rights of a larger character than have so far been enjoyed. Muslim anxiety on this score was heightened by the recent Navami Ramayan Path, a devotional reading of Ramayan by thousands of Hindus for nine days at a stretch. This period covered a Friday on which Muslims who went to say their prayers at the mosque were escorted to and from safely by the Police. As far as I have been able to understand the situation the Muslims of Ayodhya proper are far from agitated over this issue with the exception of one Anisur Rahman who frequently sends frantic messages giving the impression that the Babri Masjid and graves are in imminent danger of demolition.”
Nayyar saw no apprehension of danger to the mosque in spite of the letter of the Superintendent of Police which contained specific reference to the plans which were afoot to enter the mosque and install idols within its precincts;
(v) On the night between 22-23 December 1949, Hindu idols were surreptitiously placed inside Babri Masjid by a group of 50-60 persons. An FIR was lodged, complaining of the installation of idols inside the inner courtyard of the disputed site. The FIR, complaining of
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offences under Sections 147, 295, 448 of the Indian Penal Code was lodged at 7:00 pm on 23 December 1949 by Ram Deo Dubey, Sub-Inspector in charge. The FIR recorded that on information received from Mata Prasad, Constable No. 7, the complainant had arrived at the disputed site at 7:00 am and learned that a crowd of 50 or 60 persons had broken the locks placed on the compound of the mosque and had placed the idols inside, besides inscribing the names of Hindu deities on the walls. Thereafter, 5000 people had gathered to perform Kirtan. It was alleged that Abhay Ram Das, Ram Shukul Das, Sheo Darshan Dass and about 50 or 60 persons had committed an act of trespass by entering the mosque and installing idols, thereby desecrating the mosque. The judgment of Justice S U Khan contains a reference to the report/diary of the District Magistrate stating that on 23 December 1949, the crowd was controlled by allowing two or three persons to offer bhog; (vi) K K Nayyar opposed the direction of the state government to remove the idols, fearing a loss of life. On 25 December 1949, K K Nayar recorded that puja and bhog was offered as usual. In spite of the directions to remove the idols, K K Nayar declined to do so stating that “if Government still insisted that removal should be carried out in the face of these facts, I would request to replace me by another officer”; (vii) K K Nayar addressed two letters on 26 and 27 December 1949 to Bhagwan Sahai, Chief Secretary, Government of U.P. stating that the incident that took place on 23 December 1949 was “unpredictable and irreversible” on the basis of the above narration of incidents. On the basis of the above documentary material, Dr Dhavan, learned Senior Counsel submitted that: (a) There was a mosque at the disputed site; (b) The state authorities acknowledged the structure as a mosque and consistently referred to it as a mosque in their internal communications;
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(c) From the report of the Waqf commissioner dated 10 December 1949, the following points emerge: “(a) The temple of the Hindus was outside the courtyard Namaz was being read in the Babri Mosque as it refers to the Muslim worshippers being harassed by the members of the Hindu Community;” (d) The state authorities acknowledged the threat posed by the members of the Hindu Community to the mosque and to the people going to pray; (e) The state authorities could foresee the potential desecration / attack to the mosque and the worshippers, but took no steps to avert such an incident; (f) From the internal communication of the officials of the state, it is clear that the desecration of the mosque was planned as the Superintendent of Police had informed the Deputy Commissioner of (g) the plan of the Hindus to force entry into the mosque with the intention of installing an idol; (h) The desecration of December 22-23, 1949 was a planned attack, the seeds for which were sown with the ‘customs deed’ dated March 19, 1949 when the temple of Ram Janmabhumi was for the first time mentioned; and (i) Officials of the state refused to thereafter remove the surreptitiously installed idols despite orders from the State Government, further confirming their alliance with the miscreants who desecrated the mosque. E. Proceedings under Section 145 50. On 29 December 1949, a preliminary order was issued under Section 145 of the CrPC 1898 by the Additional City Magistrate, Faizabad cum Ayodhya. Simultaneously, treating the situation as involving an emergency, an order of attachment was issued and the disputed site was directed to be entrusted to Sri Priya Datt Ram who was the
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Chairman of the Municipal Board. The order dated 29 December 1949 is extracted below: “Whereas I, Markendeya Singh, Magistrate First Class and Additional City Magistrate, Faizabad-cum-Ayodhya, am fully satisfied from information received from Police sources and from other credible sources that a dispute between Hindus and Muslims in Ayodhya over the question of rights of proprietorship and worship in the building claimed variously as Babari Masjid and Janam Bhoomi Mandir, situate at Mohalla Ram Kot within the local limits of my jurisdiction, is likely to lead to a breach of the peace. I hereby direct the parties described below namely: (1) Muslims who are bona fide residents of Ayodhya or who claim rights of proprietorship or worship in the property in dispute; (2) Hindus who are bona fide residents of Ahodhya or who claim rights of proprietorship or worship in the property in dispute; to appear before me on 17th day of January at 11 A.M. at Ayodhya Police Station in person or by pleader and put in written statements of their respective claims with regard to the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. And the case being one of the emergency I hereby attach the said buildings pending decision. The attachment shall be carried out immediately by Station Officer, Ayodhya Police Station, who shall then put the attached properties in the charge of Sri Priya Datt Ram, Chairman Municipal Board, Faizabad-cum-Ayodhya who shall thereafter be the receiver thereof and shall arrange for the care of the property in dispute. The receiver shall submit for approval a scheme for management of the property in dispute during attachment, and the cost of management shall be defrayed by the parties to this dispute in such proportions as may be fixed from time to time. This order shall, in the absence of information regarding the actual names and addresses of the parties to dispute to be served by publication in:
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
1. The English Daily, “The Leader” Allahabad,
2. The Urdu Weekly “Akhtar” Faizabad 3. The Hindi Weekly “Virakta” Ayodhya. Copies of this order shall also be affixed to the walls of the buildings in dispute and to the notice board at Ayodhya Police Station.
Given under my hand and the seal of the court on this the twenty ninth day of December, 1949 at Ayodhya.” 51. The receiver took charge on 5 January 1950 and made an inventory of the properties which had been attached. The last namaz which was offered in the mosque was on 16 December 1949. The receiver made an inventory of the following articles:
“1. Idols of Thakur Ji 1- (a) Two idols of Sri Ram Lala Ji, one big and another small.
(b) Six idols of Sri Shaligram Ji. 2. A two feet high silver throne. 3. One idol of Hanuman Ji. 4. (a) One glass of German Silver.
(b) One small glass of silver. (c) One big glass of silver 5. One Garun bell. 6. One incensory.
7. One Arti vessel. 8. One lamp stand 9. “Husra” and one sandal. 10. Two big photographs of Ram Janki.
11. Four flower pots. 12. One (small) photograph of Badrinath Ji. 13. One small photograph of Ramchandra Ji. 14. Ornaments of Deity
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Two caps of Ramlala and one cap of Hanuman Ji. And eight robes of Deity. 15. Building- Three domed building with Courtyard and boundary wall, which is bounded as under. North-Premises comprising Chhathi Courtyard and Nirmohi Akhara. South-Vacant land and “Parikrama” (circumambulation path) East-‘Chabutara’ (platform) of Ram temple under possession of Nirmohi Akhara, and Courtyard of temple premises. West-Parikrama’ (circumambulation path) 16. Small brass glass 17. One bowl of “Phool” (an alloy) for sandal. 18. “Panch Pas” and one brass plate. 19. One small brass plate. 20. One small wooden board.” In the course of the proceedings of the civil suit before the Trial Court at Faizabad, the pleader, Shiv Shankar Lal, was appointed as a Commissioner to prepare a site plan of the locality and building. The Commissioner submitted a report on 25 May 1950, annexing two site plans which were numbered as Plan nos 1 and 2 which have been referred above in the earlier part of the judgment. 52. The salient features noticed in the Commissioner’s report are: (i) The existence of two entry gates to the disputed site, described as Hanumat Dwar and Singh Dwar; (ii) The presence of two black Kasauti stone pillars at the entry point of Hanumat Dwar containing engraved images of ‘Jai’ and ‘Vijai’; (iii) The images of a ‘Garud’ flanked by lions on either side above Singh Dwar; (iv) An engraved stone image of a boar (‘varah’) on the outer wall, to the south of Hanumat Dwar; (v) Ramchabutra admeasuring 17 X 21 feet containing a small temple with idols of Lord Ram and Janki;
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
(vi) On the south-eastern corner, a semi-circular platform attached to the neem-pipal tree containing idols of Panchmukhi Mahadev, Parvati, Ganesh and Nandi; (vii) The platform called Sita Rasoi containing the foot prints of Lord Ram, Lakshman, Bharat and Shatrughan; (viii) The railing separating the inner and outer courtyards; (ix) The presence of twelve black Kasauti stone pillars supporting the three arches of the mosque which contained carvings of: (a) Lotus flowers; (b) Tandava nritya; (c) Lord Hanuman; and (d) Lord Krishna. (Carvings on the other pillars had been obliterated); (x) The idol of infant Lord Ram placed on a platform with two steps in the central portion of the domed structure; (xi) A parikrama around the disputed structure; and (xii) The existence of structures surrounding the disputed site including huts of sadhus/bairagis and the wall called ‘sita-koop’. F. Points for determination The following points for determination arise in these appeals: (i) Whether Suits 3, 4 and 5 or any of them are barred by limitation (ii) Whether the decision in Suit 81/280 of 1885 will operate as res judicata in Suits 1, 3 and 5; (iii) (a) Whether a Hindu temple existed at the disputed site; (b) Whether the temple was demolished by Babur or at his behest by his commander Mir Baqi in 1528 for the construction of the Babri Masjid;
(c) Whether the mosque was constructed on the remains of and by using the materials of the temple; and (d) What, if any are the legal consequences arising out
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of the determination on (a)(b) and (c) above; (iv) Whether the suit property is according to the faith and belief of the Hindus since time immemorial the birthplace of Lord Ram; (v) (a) Whether the first and the second plaintiffs in Suit 5 are juristic persons; (b) Whether the third plaintiff was entitled to represent the first and second plaintiffs as next friend; (vi) (a) Whether Nirmohi Akhara has established its claim of being a shebait of the deity of Lord Ram in the disputed premises; (b) If (a) is in the affirmative, whether the objection of Nirmohi Akhara to the maintainability of Suit 5 is valid; (vii) Whether during the intervening night of 22/23 December 1949, Hindu idols were installed under the Central dome of Babri Masjid as pleaded in the plaint in Suit 4; (viii) (a) Whether it is open to the Court to determine if the three domed structure which existed at the disputed site prior to 6 December 1992 was a mosque in accordance with Islamic tenets; (b) If the answer to (a) is in the affirmative, whether the three domed structure at the disputed site was constructed in accordance with Islamic tenets; (ix) (a) Whether there was a dedication of the three domed structure as a waqf at the time of its construction; (b) In the alternative to (a) above, whether there is a waqf by public user as claimed by the plaintiffs in Suit 4; (x) Whether the plaintiffs in Suit 4 have established in the alternative their case of adverse possession; (xi) Whether the Muslims and or the Hindus have established the claim of worship and a possessory title over the disputed property; (xii) Whether the plaintiffs in Suit 4 have established their title to the disputed property;
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(xiii) Whether the plaintiff in Suit 5 have established their title to the disputed property; (xiv) Whether the High Court was justified in passing a preliminary decree for a three way division of the disputed property in equal shares between the Nirmohi Akhara, the plaintiffs of Suit 4 and the plaintiffs of Suit 5; (xv) Whether the plaintiff in Suit 1 is entitled to the reliefs as claimed in the suit; and (xvi) What, if any, relief ought to be granted in Suits 1, 3, 4 and 5 These points will be analysed and dealt with in the course of this judgment. Before analysing the issues in the individual suits, it would be appropriate to discuss certain matters in dispute at the forefront, since they traverse the gamutof the entire case. G. The three inscriptions 53. The case of the Sunni Central Waqf Board and other plaintiffs in Suit 4 is that in the town of Ayodhya “there exists an ancient historic mosque commonly known as Babri Masjid built by Emperor Babur more than 433 years ago, after his conquest of India and his occupation of the territories including the town of Ayodhya”. The mosque, it has been pleaded, was for the use of Muslims in general as a place of worship and for the performance of religious ceremonies. The mosque and the adjoining graveyard are stated to vest “in the Almighty” and the mosque since the time of its inscription is stated to have been used by Muslims for offering prayers. Thus, the plaintiffs have come forth with a positive case in regard to the: (i) Existence of a mosque; (ii) Construction of the mosque by Babur 433 years prior to the institution of the Suit in 1961; (iii) Construction of the mosque as a place of worship and for religious ceremonies; and
(iv) Use of the mosque since its construction for the purpose of offering prayers. 54. Justice Sudhir Agarwal recorded in his judgment that it is accepted by the counsel appearing on behalf of the Sunni Central Waqf
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Board that the sole basis for determining the date of the construction of the mosque and correlating it to Babur consists of the inscriptions stated to have been installed on the mosque as referred to in the gazetteers and other documents. In paragraph 1435, the learned Judge observed:
“Broadly, we find and in fact it is even admitted by Sri Jilani that the sole basis for determining the period of construction of the disputed building and to co-relate it with Emperor Babar is/are the inscription(s) said to be installed in the disputed building referred to in certain Gazetteers etc.”
Now both before the High Court and during the course of the present proceedings, there has been a debate on whether the texts of the alleged inscriptions on the mosque have been proved. Mr P N Mishra, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Akhil Bharatiya Shri Ram Janmabhumi Punrudhar Samiti has questioned the authenticity of the inscriptions. He sought to cast doubt on whether the mosque was constructed in 1528 A.D. by or at the behest of Babur.
55. The first document relied on is the text by Fuhrer titled “The Sharqi Architecture of Jaunpur with notes on Zafarabad, SahetMahet and other places in the Northern-Western Provinces and Oudh26. The original edition of the book was printed in 1889 and there is a reprint in 1994 by the ASI. In Chapter X, there is a reference to three inscriptions bearing nos XL, XLI, and XLII. It is from these three inscriptions that Fuhrer formed an opinion that the Babri mosque was constructed at Ayodhya in 1523 A.D or A.H. 930. Inscription XL in Arabic is over the central mihrab and furnishes the Kalimah twice in the following words: “There is no god but Allah, Muhammad is His Prophet.” Inscription XLI was found on the mimbar and was written in Persian. The inscription as translated in English reads thus:
“1. By order of Babar, the king of the world, 2. This firmament-like, lofty, 3. Strong building was erected.
Führer, Alois Anton, Edmund W. Smith, and James Burgess, The Sharqi architecture of Jaunpur: with notes on Zafarabad, Sahet-Mahet and other places in the NorthWestern provinces and Oudh (1994)
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4. By the auspicious noble Mir Khan.
5. May ever remain such a foundation, 6. And such a king of the world.” Inscription XLII was found above the entrance door. Also, in Persian, the inscription has been translated thus:
“1. In the name of God, the merciful, the element. 2. In the name of him who …...; may God perpetually keep him in the world. 3. …........
4. Such a sovereign who is famous in the world, and in person of delight for the world. 5. In his presence one of the grandees who is another king of Turkey and China. 6. Laid this religious foundation in the auspicious Hijra 930.
7. O God ! May always remain the crown, throne and life with the king. 8. May Babar always pour the flowers of happiness; may remain successful.
9. His counsellor and minister who is the founder of this fort masjid. 10. This poetry, giving the date and eulogy, was written by the lazy writer and poor servant Fath-allah-Ghorl, composer.” After adverting to the inscriptions, Fuhrer notes: “The old temple of Ramachandra at Janamasthanam must have been a very fine one, for many of its columns have been used by the Musalmans in the construction of Babar’s masjid. These are of strong, close-grained, dark-coloured or black stone, called by the natives kasauti, “touch-stone slate,” and carved with different devices. They are from seven to eight feet long, square at the base, centre and capital, and round or octagonal intermediately.” 56. The second piece of documentary evidence in which these inscriptions are purportedly translated the “Babur-Nama”. The
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translation by A S Beveridge was first published in 192127. Apart from the book, extracts of some of its pages were exhibited by the parties to the proceedings.
Appendix (U) refers to two inscriptions; one inside and another outside the mosque. Photocopies of the pages of appendix (U) were marked as appendix T3 in Suit 4.
57. Beveridge obtained the text of the inscription through the Deputy Commissioner of Faizabad on a request made by her spouse. Beveridge notes that while reproducing the text she had made a few changes. The text of the inscription inside the mosque, as quoted by Beveridge is as follows: “(1) By the command of the Emperor Babur whose justice is an edifice reaching up to the very height of the heavens. (2) The good-hearted Mir Baqi built this alighting place of angels.
(3) It will remain an everlasting bounty, and (hence) the date of its erection became manifest from my words: It will remain an everlasting bounty.” The text of the inscription outside the mosque is thus: “1. In the name of One who is Great (and) Wise (and) who is Creator of the whole world and is free from the bondage of space.
2. After His praise, peace and blessings be on Prophet Muhammad, who is the head of all the Prophets in both the worlds.
3. In the world, it is widely talked about Qalandar Babur that he is a successful emperor.” Beveridge stated that the second inscription outside the mosque was incomplete.
58. The third set of texts in support of the inscriptions is published in “Epigraphia Indica-Arabic-Persian Supplement (In continuation
William Erskine, John Leyden, and Annette Susannah Beveridge, the B bur-nama in English (Memoirs of B bur), London: Luzac & Co. (Reprint in 2006 by Low Price Publications, Delhi)
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
of Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica) 1964 and 1965”28 (reprinted in 1987). This has been published by the Director General, ASI and contains a reference to the inscriptions of Babur. The text is attributed to Maulvi M Ashraf Husain and is edited by Z A Desai. The introductory note to the edition states:
“A rough draft of this article by the author, who was my predecessor, was found among sundry papers in my office. At the time of his retirement in 1953, he had left a note saying that it might be published after revision by his successor. Consequently, the same is published here after incorporation of fresh material and references and also, extensive revision and editing. The readings have been also checked, corrected and supplemented with the help of my colleague, Mr. S.A.Rahim, Epigraphical Assistant,-Editor.”
The text contains the following description in regard to the construction of Babri Masjid: “The Baburi-Masjid, which commands a picturesque view from the riverside, was constructed according to A. Fuhrer in A.H. 930 (1523-24 A.D.) but his chronology, based upon incorrect readings of inscriptions supplied to him, is erroneous. Babur defeated Ibrahim Lodi only in A.H. 933 (1526 A.D.), and moreover, the year of construction, recorded in two of the three inscriptions studied below, is clearly A.H. 935 (1528-29 A.D.). Again, it was not built by Mir Khan as stated by him. The order for building the mosque seems to have been issued during Babur’s stay at Ajodhya in A.H. 934 (1527-28 A.D.), but no mention of its completion is made in the Babur Nama. However, it may be remembered that his diary for the year A.H. 934 (152728 A.D.) breaks off abruptly, and throws the reader into the dark in regard to the account of Oudh.” The text also provides an account of the manner in which the author obtained an inked rubbing of one of the inscriptions from Sayyid Badru’l Hasan of Faizabad:
“The mosque contains a number of inscriptions. On the eastern facade is a chhajja, below which appears a Quranic text and
Epigraphia Indica, Arabic and Persian Supplement (in continuation of Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica) (Z A Desai Eds), Archaeology Survey of India (1987)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 18 S.C.R.
above, an inscription in Persian verse. On the central mihrab are carved religious texts such as the Kalima (First Creed), etc. On the southern face of the pulpit was previously fixed a stone slab bearing a Persian inscription in verse. There was also another inscription in Persian verse built up into the right hand side wall of the pulpit. Of these, the last-mentioned two epigraphs have disappeared. They were reportedly destroyed in the communal vandalism in 1934 A.D., but luckily, I managed to secure an inked rubbing of one of them from Sayyid Badru’l Hasan of Fyzabad. The present inscription, restored by the Muslim community, is not only in inlaid Nasta’liq characters, but is also slightly different from the original, owing perhaps to the incompetence of the restorers in deciphering it properly. The readings and translations of the historical epigraphs mentioned above, except in the case of one, were published by Fuhrer and Mrs. Beveridge, but their readings are so incomplete, inaccurate and different from the text that their inclusion in this article is not only desirable but also imperative. The epigraph studied below was inscribed on a slab of stone measuring about 68 by 48 cm., which was built up into the southern side of the pulpit of the mosque, but is now lost, as stated above. It is edited here from the estampage obtained from Sayyid Badru’l Hasan of Fyzabad. Its three-line text consists of six verses in Persian, inscribed in ordinary Naskh characters within floral borders. It records the construction of the mosque by Mir Baqi under orders from emperor Babur and gives the year A.H. 935 (1528-29 A.D.) in a chronogram.” The author states that on the southern side of the pulpit of the mosque was an inscription fixed on a slab of stone measuring 68 X 48 cm but the original was lost. What is quoted is the version obtained from the inked rubbing noted above. The text of the first inscription was thus: “(1) By the order of king Babur whose justice is an edifice, meeting the palace of the sky (i.e. as high as the sky). (2) This descending place of the angels was built by the fortunate noble Mir Baqi.
M SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS v. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS
(3) It will remain an everlasting bounty, and (hence) the date of its erection became manifest from my words: It will remain an everlasting bounty.”
As regards the second inscription, the judgment of Justice Sudhir Agarwal notes: “1449. Fuhrer’s inscription no. XLI which he mentions that the same was found inside the mosque on the mimbar (right hand side of the disputed building) has been termed as second inscription by Maulvi F. Ashraf Hussain. It consists of three couplets arranged in six lines. He (Hussain) clearly admits non existence of the said inscription by observing “the epigraphical Tablet” which was built up into right hand side wall of the pulpit, does not exist now, and, therefore, the text of the inscription is quoted here from Furher’s work, for the same reason, its illustration could not be given.” Husain/Desai however, did not agree to the reading of the inscription by Fuhrer and observed that Furher’s reading does not appear free from mistakes.”
The text of the third inscription is as follows: “(1) In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. And in Him is my trust. (2) In the name of One who is Wise, Great (and) Creator of all the universe (and) is spaceless. After His praise, blessings be upon the Chosen one (i.e. the Prophet), who is the