Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India

Landmark judgment · Constitution & fundamental rights — Any law taking away liberty must be fair, just and reasonable; Articles 14, 19 and 21 read together.

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
25 January 1978
Judge
Justice M. Hameedullah Beg
Neutral citation
1978 INSC 16
Reported in
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 621
Result
Disposed off
Acts & sections
Article 22 Constitution, Article 19 Constitution, Article 21 Constitution, Article 32 Constitution
Subject
Family, Service

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Full judgment

MANEKA GANDHI

v. UNION OF INDIA January 25, 1978

[M. H. BEG, c. J., Y. v. CHANDRACHUD, P. N. BHAGWATI, V. R. KRISHNA IYER, N. L. UNTWALIA, S. MuRTAZA FAZAL Au, AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.] Constitution of India Articles 14, 19 (1) (a) and 21-Personal libertyWhether right to go abroad is part of personal liberty-Whether a law which tomplies with Article 21 has still to meet the challenge of Article 19.-Nature and ambit of Article 14-ludging validity with reference to direct and inevitable cOect-Whether the right under Article 19(1) (a) has any geographical limitation.

Pnssports Act, 1967-Ss. 3,5,6,10(3) (c), 10(5)-Whether s,lO (3 )(c)___ is violative of Articles 14, 19(1) (a) (b) & 21-Grounds for refusing to gram passport-Whether the power to impound passport arbitrary-"in general public interest" if vague. Principles of Natural Justice-Whether applies only to quasi judicial orders or applies TO administrative orders affecting rights of citizens-When statute silent whether can be implied-Duty to act judicially whether can be spell ou~ In urgtnt cases whether principles of natural justice can apply.

·~

The petitioner was issued a passport on Juqe 1, 1976 under the Passport Act, 1967. On the 4th of July 1977, the petitioner received a letter dated 2nd July, 1977, from the Regional Passport Officer Delhi intimating to her that it was decided by the Government of India to impound her passport under s. 10(3)(c) of the Act "in public interest". The petitioner was required to sum:nd.:r her passport within 7 days from the receipt of that letter. The petitioner immediately addressed a letter to the Regional Pass port Officer requesting him to furnish a copy of the statement of reasons for making the order as provided in s.10(5). A reply was sent by the Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs on 6th July 1977 stating i1t1er alia that the Government decided "in the interest of the general public" not to furnish her copy of the statement of reasons for the making of the order. The petitioner thereupon filed the present Writ Petition chullenging action of the Government in impounding her passport and declining to give reasons for doing so. The Act was enacted on 24-4-67 in view of the decision of this Cour t in Satwant Sint<h Sawflllcy's case. The position which obtained prior to the coming into force of the Act was that there was no law regulating the issue of passports for leaving th<.: shores of India and going abroad. The issue of passrorl was entirely within the unguided and unchannelled discretion of the Executive. In Sat want Singh's case, this Court hdd bv a majority that the expression 'personal liberty' in Article 21 takes in, the right of locomotion and travel abroad and under Art. 21 no nerson can be deprived of his right to go abroad except according to the procedure established by law. This decision was acceoted by the llarliament and the infirmity pointed out by it was set right by the enactment of the Passports Act, 1967. The preamble of the Act shows that it was enacted to provide for the issue of passport and travel documents to regulate the departure from India of citizens of India and other persons and fo r incidental and ancillary matters. Section 3 provides that no person shall deJ"Iart from or attempt to depart from Tndia unless he holds in this behalf a valid passport or travel document. Section 5(1) provides for making of an aoplicati?n for issue of ~ passport or travel document for visiting foreign country. Suh-sectron ( 2) of sectton 5 says that on receipt of such application the Passport Authority. after making such enquiry, if any, as it may consider necessary, shall , by order in writing, issue or refme to issue the passport or travel document or m ake or refuse to make that passport or travel document endorsement in

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[1978) 2 S.C.R.

respect of one or more of the foreign countries specified in the application. Sub-section (3) requires the Passport Authority where it refuses to issue the passport or travel document or to make any endorsement to record in writing a brief statement of its reasons for making such order. Section 6(1) lays down the grounds on which the Passport Authority shall refuse to make an endorsement for visiting any foreign country and provides that on no other ground the endorsement shall be refused. Section 6 (2) specifies the grounds on which alone and on no other grounds the Passport Authority shall refuse to issue the Passport ot travel document for visiting any foreign country and amongst various ground! set out there the last is that in the opinion of the Central Government the issm of passport or travel document to the applicant will not be in the public inter_est Sub-section (1) of sectio"' 10 empowers the Passport Authority to vary or cancel the endorsement on a passport or travel document or to vary or cancel it or the conditions subject to which a passport or travel document has been issuec having regard to, inter ali'a,. the provisions of s. 6 ( 1) or any notification unde · s. 19. Sub-section (2) confers powers on the Passport Authority to vary o: cancel the conditions of the passport or travel document on the application o: the holder of the passport or travel document and with the previous approval of the Central Government. Sub-section (3) provides that the Passport Authority may impound or cause to be impounded or revoke a passport or travel de· cument on the grounds set out in cl. (a) to (h). The order impounding th! passport in the present. case, was made by the Central Governm~nt under cl. (c) which reads as follows : " (c) 1f the passport authority deems it necessary so to do in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of India, friendly relations of India with the foreign country, or in the interests of the general public." Sub-~;ection ( 5) requires the Passport Authority impounding or revoking a pas;port or travel document or varying or cancelling an endorsement made upon it to record in writing a brief statement of the reasons for making such order :u d furnish to the holder of the passJ'ort or travel document on demand a copy 1 )f the same. unless, in any case, the Passport Authority is of the opinion that it wilT not be in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the securi:y of India, friendly relations of India with any foreign countrv, or in the intenst of the general public to furnish such a copy. The Central Government declin :d to furnish a copy of this statement of reasons for impounding the passport of t 1e petitioner on the ground that it was not in the interest of the general public to furnish such copy to the petitioner.

The petitioner contended.

1. The right to go abroad is part of "personal liberty" within the meaning of that expression as used in Art. 21 and no one can be deprived of this ri1 :ht except according to the procedure prescribed by law. There is no proced_ure prelicribed by the Passport Act, for impounding or revoking a Passport. E~ en if some procedure can be traced in the said Act it is unreasonable and arbitr;try in as much as it does not provide for giving an opportunity to the holder of he Passport to be heard against the making of the order. 2. Section 10(3)(c) is violative of fundamental rights guaranteed under Artic1es 14, 19(1) (a) and (g) and 21. 3. The impugned order is made in contravention of the rules of natural j.1s:ice and is, therefore, null and void. The impugned order has effect of placing an unreasonable restriction on the right of free speech and expression guaranteed to the petitioner under Article 19(1 )(a) as also on the right to carry on the profession of a journalist conferred under Art. 19(1 )(g). 4. The impugned order could not consistently with Articles 19(1 ){a.) and (g) be passed on a mere information of the Central Government that th<! ?te· sence of the· petitioner is likely to be required in connection with the proce:dmgs before the Commission of Inquiry.

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MANEKA GANDHI V. UNION

Jill"

5. In order that a passport may be impounded under s. 10(3)(c), public intere11t mmt actually exist in present an~ mere _likelihood of public interest .arising in future would be no ground for 1mpoundmg the passport.

6. It was not correct to say that the petitioner was likely to be required for giving evidence before the Shah Commission. The respondents denied the contentions raised by the petitioner.

BEG, C. J., (Concurring with Bhagwati, J.)

1. The right of travel and to go outside the country is included in the right 10 personal liberty. [643 G]

Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam Assistant

Passport

Officer,

<Jovernmelll of India, New Delhi & Ors. [19671 3 SCR .525 and Kharak SinRh

v. State of U.P. & Ors. [1964] 1 SCR 332 relied on.

2. Artic1e 21 though framed as to appear as a shield operating negatively against executive encroachment over something covered by that shield, is the legal recognition of both the protection or the shield as well as of what it protects which lies beneath that shield. [644 B}

A .. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, [1950] SCR 88 and Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. S. S. Shukla [1976] Suppl. SCR 172 @ 327 referred to.

Haradhan Saha v. The State of West Bengal & Ors. [1975] 1 SCR 778, Shambhu Nath Sarkar v. State of West Bengal [1973} 1 S.C.R. 856 and R. C. -Cooptr v. Union of India [1973] 3 SCR 530 referred to.

, I

3. The view that Articles 19 and 21 constitute watertight compartments has been rightly over-ruled. The doctrine that Articles 19 and 21 protect or regulate flows in different channels, was laid down in A. K . Gopalan's case in a context which was very different from that in which that approach was displaced by the counter view that the constitution mu~t be read as an intearal whole, with possible overlappings of the subject matter of what is sought to be protected by its various provisions, particularly by articles relating to fundamental rights. The observations in A. K. Gopalan's case that due process with regard to law relating to preventive detention are to be found in Art. 22 of the Constitution because it is a self-contained code for laws. That observation was the real ratio decidendi of tGopalan's case. Other observations relating to the separability of the subject matters of Art. 21 and 19 were mere obiter dicta. This Court has already heid' in A. D. M. Jabalpur's case by reference to the decision from Gopalan's case that the ambit of personal liberty protected by Art. 21 is wide and comprehensive. The <Juestions relating to either deprivation or restrictions of per· sonal liberty, concerning laws falling outside Art. 22 remain really unanswered by the Gopalan's case. The field of 'due process' for cases of preventive deten· tion is fully covered by Art. 22 but other parts of that fidd not covered by Art. 22 are 'Unoccupied' by its specific provisions. In what may be called unoccu· 1)ied portions of the vast sphere of personal liberty, the substantive as well as procedural laws made to cover them must satisfy the requirements of both Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution. [646 E·H, 647 B·D, 648 A-Bl Article8 dealing with different fundamental rights contained in Part III of the ·Constitution do not represent entirely separate streams of rights which do not mingle at many points. They are all parts of an integrated scheme in the Constitution. Their waters must mix to constitute that giand flow unimpeded and impartial justice (social, economic and political-), freedom (not only .of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship, but also of associa.tion, movement, vocation or occupation as well as of acquisition and pos~ession of reasonable property), or equality (of status and of opportunity, which imply absence of ·,u nreasonable or unfair discrimination between individuals, groups and classes), .and of fraternity (assuring dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation)

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[1978] 2 S.C.R~

which our Constitution visualises. Isolation of various aspects of human freedom, for purposes of their protection, is neither realistic nor beneficial but would defeat very objects of such protection. [648 B-D]

Blackstone's theory of natural rights cannot be rejected as totally irrelevant. If we have advanced today towards higher civilization and in a more enlighkned era we cannot lag behind what, at any rate, was the meaning given to 'personal liberty' long ago by Blackstone. Both the rights of personal security and perso8 . nal liberty recognised by what Blackstone termed 'natural law' are embodied in. Art. 21 of th.e Ccmtitution. [649 A-C, 650> H, 651 :\-B]

A. D. M. Jabalpur vs. S. S. Shukla [1976] Supp. S.C.R. 172 relied on. The natural law rights were m~ant to be converted into our constitutionally rights so that they are to be found within it and not outside it. To take a contrary view would involve a conflict between natural Jaw and our constitutional law. A divorce between natural law and our constitutional law would be disastrous. It would defeat one of the basic purposes of our Constitution. [652 B-CJ rec~gnised fundamental

The total effect and not the mere form of a restriction would determine which, fundamental right is really involved in a particular case and whether a restriction: upon its exercise is reasonably permissible on the facts and circumstances of that case. [652 H, 653A]

ll

If rights under Art. 19 are rights which inhere in Indian citizens, individuals carry these inherent fundamental constitutional rights with them wherever they go, in so far as our Ia w applies to them, because they are part of the Indian National just as Indian ships, flying the Indian flag are deemed in international law to be floating parts of Indian territory. This analogy, however, could not be pushed too far because Indian citizens, on foreign territory, are only entitled by virtue of their Indian Nationality and Passports to the protection of the Indian Republic and the assistance of its Diplomatic Missions abroad. They cannot claim to be governed abroad by their own constitutional or personal laws which do not operate outside India. [653 A-Cl In order to apply the test contained in Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution we have to consider the objects for which the exercise of inherent rights recognised by Art. 21 of the Constitution are restricted as wel1 as the procedure by which these restrictions are sought to be imposed, both substantive and procedural laws and actions taken under them will have to pass the test imposed by Arts. 14 and 19, whenever facts justifying the invocation of either of these Articles may be disclosed, for example, an international singer or dancer may well be able to complain of an unjustifiable restriction on orofessional activity by denial of a passport. In such a case. violation of both Arts. 21 and J9(1)(g) may be put forward making it necessary for the authorities concerned to justify the restriction imposed ·by showing satisfaction of tests of validity contemrlated by each of these two Articles. [653 F-H] The tests of reason and justice cannot be abstract. They cannot be divorced from the needs of the nation. The tests have to be pragmatic otherwise they would cease to be reasonable. The discretion left to the authority to impound a passport in oublic interest cannot invalidate the law itself. We cannot, out of fear, that such power will be misused, refuse to permit Parliament to entrust even such power to executive authorities as may be absolutely necessary to carry out the purposes of a validly exercisable power. Jn matter'\ such as, grant, sus,'pension, impounding or cancellation of passports. the possible dealing of an individual with national~ and authorities of other States h:we to be considered. The contem!llated or po~sible activities abroad of the individual may have to be taken into account. There may be quesions of national safety and welfare which tr~t",cend the imrortance of the individual's inherent right ro go where ne or she pleases to go. Therefore, the grant of wide disC"retionary power to the executive authorities cannot be considered as unreasonab1e yet there must be procedural safeguards to ensure that the power wi11 not be used for purJ')oses extraneous to the grant of the power. The procedural proprieties must be insisted' upon. [654 A-EJ

I

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MANEKA GANDHI-v. UNION

I

).

A bare look at the provisions of s. 10(3) shows that each of the orders which could be passed under s. 10(3)(a) and (b) requires a satisfaction of the Passport Authority on certain objective conditions which must exist in a case before it passes an order to impound a passport or a travel document. Impounding or revocation are placed side by side on the same footing in the provisions. [654 G-H] It is clear from the provisions of the Act that there is a statutory right also acquired, on fulfilment of the prescribed conditions by the holder of a passport, that it should continue to be effective for the specified period so long as no ground has come into existence for either its revocation or for impounding it which amounts to a suspension of it for the time being. It is true that in a proceeding under Art. 32, the Court is concerned only with the enforcement of fundamental constitutional rights and not with any statutory rights apart from fundamental rights. Article 21, however, makes it clear that violation of all law whether statutory or of any other kind is itself an infringement of the guaranteed fundamental right. [655 B-D] The orders under s. 10(3) must be based upon some material even if tha material concerns in some cases of reasonable suspicion arising from certair. credible assertions made by reliable individuals. In an emergent situation, the impounding of a passport may become necessary without even giving an opportunity to be heard against s11ch a step which could be reversed after an opportunity is given to the holder of the passport to show why the step was unnecessary. However. ordinarily no passport could be reasona.bly either irnpoundect or revoked· without giving a prior opportunity to its holder to show cause against the pro· posed action. [655 D·E]

It is well-settled that even when there is no specific provision in a statute or rules made thereunder for showing cau«e against action nronosed to be taken against an individual. which affects the right of that individual the dutv to ~ive reasonable opportunity to be beard will be implied from the nature of the function to be perfor!N'rl hy the authority which ha-. the power to take punitive or d:~maging action. [655 G]

State nf Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors. AIR [1967] SC 1269 @ 1271 relied on. Cooper v. Wand.~worth Board of quoted with approval.

Works,

[1863] 14 C.B. (N. S.) 180

An order impounding a passport must be made quasi-judicially. This was not done in the present case. It cannot be said that a good enough reason has been shown tQI exist for impo1Jnding the passport of the petitioner. The petitioner had no opportunity of showing that the ground for impounding it given in this Court either does not exist or has no bearing on public interest or that the public interest can be better served in some other manner. The order should be quashed • and the respondent should be directed to give an opportunity to the petitioner to show cause against any proposed action on such grounds as may be available.

f

[656 E-Gl There were no pressing grounds with regard to the petitioner that the imme· diate action of impounding her passport was called for. The rather cavalier fashion in which the disclosure of any reason for impounding of her passport was denied to the petitioner despite the fact that the only reason said to exist is the possiblity of her being called to give evidence before a Commission of Inquiry. Such a ground is not such as to be reasonably deemed to necessitate its concealment in public interest. [656 G-H] Even executive authorities when taking administrative action which involves anv deprivation of or restriction on inherent fundamental rights of citizens must take care to see that justice is not only done but manifestly appears to be done. They have a duty to proceed in a way which is free from even the appearance of arbitrariness, unreasonableness or unfairness. They have to act in a m anner which is patently impartial and meets the requirements of natural justice.

[657 A-B1

(1978] 2 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

I

As the undertaking given by the Attorney General amounts to an offer to deal with the petitioner justly and fairly after informing her of any grouRd that may exist for impounding her passport, no further acLion by this Court isnecessary. [657 C-D] The impugned order must be quashed and Passport Authorities be directed to return the passport to the petitioner. Petition allowed with costs. [657 D]

Clumdrachud, l. (concurring with Bhagwati, J.)

The power to refuse to disclose the 'reasons for impounding a passport is of an exceptional nature and it ought to be exercised fairly, sparingly and only when fully justified by the exigencies of an uncommon situation. The reasons if disclosed, being open to judicial scrutiny for ascertaining their nexus with the order impounding the passport, the refusal to disclose the reasons would also be open to the scrutiny of the court; or else the wholesome power of a dispassionate judicial examination of executive orders could with impunity be set at nought by an obdurate determination to suppr:ess the reasons. The disclosure made under the stress of the Writ Petition that the petiioner's passport was impounded because, -her presence was likely to be required in connction with the proceedings before a Commission of Inquiry, could easily have been made when the petitioner called upon the Government to let her know the reasons why her passport was impounded. [658 A·D]

'

In Satwant Singh Saw/zney's case this Court ruled, by majority, that the expression personal liberty which occurs in Art. 21 of the Constitution includes the right to travel abroad and that no person can be deprived of that right except according to procedure established by law. The mere prescription of some kind of procedure cannot even meet the mandate of Article 2 t. The procedure prescribed by law has to be fair, just and reasonable, not fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary. The question whether the procedure prescribed by law which curtails or takes away the personal liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 is reasonable or not bas to be considered not in the abstract or on hypothetical considerations like the E provision for a full-dressed hearing as in a court room trial but in the contest, primarily, of the purpose which the Act is intended to achieve and of urgent situations which those who are charged with the duty of administering the Act may be called upon to deal with. Secondly, even the fullest compliance with the requirements of Art. 21 is not the journey's end because a bw which prescribes fair and reasonable procedure for curtailing or taking away the personal liberty granted by Art. 21 has still to meet a possible cha11enge under the other provi· sions of the Constitution. In the Bank Natio1111lisation case the majority held that the assumption in A. K. Gopalan's case that certain Articles of the ConstiF tution exclusively deal with specific matters cannot be accepted as correct. Though • the Bank Nationalisation case was concerned with the inter-relationship of Art~ . 31 and 19 and not of Arts. 21 and 19, the basic approach adopted therein as regards the construction of fundamental rights guaranteed in the different provisions of the Constitution categorically discarded the major premise of the majority judgment in Gopalan's case. [658 D-G, 659 A-BJ

~

The test of directness of the impugned law as contrasted with its consequence was thought in A . K. Gopalan and &m Singh's case to be the true approach for determining whether a fundamental right was infringed. A significant application of that test may be perceived in Naresh S. Mirajkar's case where an order passed by the Bombay High Court prohibiting the publication of a witness's evidence in a defamation case was upheld by this Court on the ground that it was passed with the object of affording protection to the witness in order to obtain true evidence and its impact on the right of free speech and expression guaranteed by Art. 19(1) (a) was incidentaL N. H. Bhagwati J. in Express Newspapers Case struck a modified note by evolving the test of proximate effect and operation of the Statute. That test saw its fruition in Sakal Paper's case where the Court giving precedence to the direct and immediate effect of the order over the form and object, struck down the Daily Newspapers (Price and Page) Order, 1960, on the ground that it violated Artic1e 19(1 )(a) of the Constitution. The culmi-

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MANEKA GANDHI V. UNION

nation of this thought process was reached in the Bank Nationalisation case wbere it was held by the majority, speaking through Shall J, that the extent of protection against the impairment of a fundamental right is determined by the direct operation of an action upon the individual's rights and not by the object of the Legislature or by the form of the action. In Bennett Coleman's case It struck down the newsprint policy the Court reiterated the same position. re~tricting the number of pages of newspapers without the option to reduce the circulation as offending against the provisions of Art. 19(1) (a). [659 F-H, 660 A-C]

Article 19{ 1) (a) guarantees to Indian Citizens the right to freedom of speech and expression. It does not delimit the grant of that right m any manner and there is no reason arising either out of interpretational dogmas or pragmatic considerations why courts should strain the language of the Article to cut down amplitude of that right. The plain meaning of the clause guaranteeing free speech and expression is that Indian citizens are entitled to exercise that right wherever they choose regardless of geographical considerations. [661 A-D] The Comtitution does not confer any power on the executive to prevent the exercise by an Indian citizen of the right of free speech and expression on foreign soil. The Constitution guarantees certain fundamental freedoms except where their exercise is limited by territorial considerations. Those freedoms may be exercised wheresoever one chooses subject to the exceptions or qualifications mentioned in Art. 19 itself. The right to go out of India is not an integral part of the right of free speech and expression. The analogy of the freedom of press being included in the right of free speech and expression is wholly mig.. placed bt><'ause the right of free expression incontrovertibly includes the right of freedom of press. The right to go abroad on one hand and the right of free speech and expression on the other are made up basically of constituents so different that one cannot be comprehended in the other. The presence of the due process clause in the 5th and 14th amendments of the American Constitution makes significant difference to the approach of American Judges to the definition and evaluation of constitutional guarantees. This Court rejected the contention that the freedom.Jo form associations or unions contained in Article 19(1) (c) carried with it the right that a workers' union could do all that was necessary to make that right effective in order to achieve the purpose for which the union was formed. [See the decision in All India Bank Employees Associ~tion]. [661 F, H, 662 A-B, E]

/

"'..

Bhagwati, J. (for himself Untwalia and Murtaza Fazal Ali, JJ) The fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution represent the basic values cherished by the people of this country since the Vedic time~ and they are calculated to protect the dignity of the individual and create conditions in which every human being can develop his personality to the fullest extent. But these freedom~ are not and cannot be absolute, for absolute and unrestrict~d freedom of one may be destructive of the freedom of another In a well ordered civilised society, freedom can only be regulated freedom. · It is obvious that Article 21 though couched in negative language confers fundamental right to life and personal liberty. The question that arises for consideration on the language of Art. 21 is as to what is the meaning and content of the words 'personal liberty' as used in this Article. In A. K. Gopalan's case a narrow interpretation was placed on the words 'personal liberty.' But there was no definite pronouncement made on this point since the question before the court was not so much the internrctation of the words 'personal liberty' as the interrelation between Arts. 19 and 21. [667 G-H. 668 D-E, G, H, 669 A]

·

A. K. Copalan v. State of Madras [1950] SCR 88 and Kharak Singh v. State

of U. P. & Ors. {1964] 1 SCR 332 refen:ed to. \

)

In I<. harak Singh's case the majority of this Court held that 'personal liberty'

is used in the Article as a compendious term to include within itself all varieties of rights v:hich go to make up the personal liberties of man other than those dealt with in several clauses of Article 19(1). The minority however took the view that the expression personal liberty is a comprehensive one arid the right to mow freely is an attribute of personal liberty. The minority observed that it was not right to exclude any attribute of personal liberty from the scope

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[1978] 2 S.C.R.

and ambit of Art. 21 on the ground that it was covered by Art. 19(1 ). It was pointed out by the minority that both Articles 19 ( 1) and 21 are indepen· dent fandamental rights though there is a certain amount of overlapping and there is no question of one being carved out of another. The minority view wa" upheld as correct and it was pointed out that it would not be light to read ti-.e expression 'personal liberty' in Art. 21 in a narrow and restricted sense so as to exclude those attributes of personal liberty which are specillc:.tlly dealt with in Art. 19 (1). The attempt of the Court should be to expand the reach and ambit of the fundamental rights rather than attenuate their meaning and content by a process of judicial construction. The wavelength for comprehending the scope and ambit -of the fundamental rights has been ~et by the Court in R. C. Cooper's case and the approach of the Court in the interpretation of the fundamental rights must now be in tune with this wave length. The expression 'personal liberty' in Art. 21 is of the widest amplitude and covers a variety of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man and some of them have been raised to the status of distinct fundamental rights and given additional protection under Art. 19(1). Thus Articles 19(1) and 21 are not mutually exclusive. [669 B-670 A-H]

R. C. Cooper v. Union of India L1973] 3 SCR 530 relied on. Shambhu Nath Sarkar v. The Srate of West Bengal & Ors. applied.

Haradhan Saha v. The State of West Be~gal & Ors. followed.

This Court held in case of Satwant Singh that personal liberty within the meaning of Art. 21 includes with its ambit the right to go abroad and consequently no person can be deprived of this right except according to procedure Obviously, the procedure cannot be arbitary, unfair or prescribed by law. unreasonable. The observations in A. K. Gopalan's case support this view and apart from these observations, even on principle, the concept of reasonableness must be projected in the procedure contemplated by Art. 21, having regard to the impact of Art. 14 on Art. 21. [671 A, D, G-Hl

/

The decision of the majority in A. K. Gopalan's case proceeded on the assumption that certain Articles . in the Constitution exclusively deal with Fpedfic matters and where the requirements of an article dealing with the particular matter in question are satisfied and there is no infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed by that Article, no recourse can be had to a fundamental right conferred by another article. This doctrine of t:xclusivity was overruled by a majority of the Court in R. C. Cooper's case. The ratio of the majority judgment in R. C. Cooper's case was explained in clear and cate.gorical terms in Shambhu Nath Sarkar's case and followed in Hartldlwrr Salta's case and Klwdi Ram Das's case. [672 B-C, G, 673 A] Shambhu Nath Sarkar v. State of West Bengal [1 973] 1 SCR 856 referred to. Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal & Ors. [1975} 1 SCR 778 and J(hudiram Das v. The State of We.rt Bengal & Ors. [19751 2 SCR 832 relied on.

t

The Jaw must therefore be now taken to be well-settled that AI ttcle 2 1 does not exclude Article 19 and that even if there is a law prescribing procedure for depriving a person of personal liberty and the(e is consequently no infringement of the fundamental right conferred by Art. 21, such law in so far as it abridges or takes away any fundamental right under Article 19 would have • 1o meet the chal_knge of that Article. Equally such law would be liable to be tested with reference to Art. 14 and the procedure prescribed by it would have to answer the requirement of that Article. [673 A-G ]

The State of We.st Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar [1952] SCR 284 and Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra [1952] SCR 435 referred to.

Article 14 is a founding faith of the Constitution. It is indeed the pillar on which rests securely the foundation of our democratic republic and, therefore, it

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MANEKA GANDHI v. UNION

must not be subjected to a narrow, pedantic or lexicographic approach. No .attempt should be made to truncate its all embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned within traditional nnd doctrinaire limits .. [673 H, 674 A]

E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu & Another [19741 2 SCR 348 applied.

Equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law

in a republic while the other to the whim and caprice of an absolute mo~arcb.

..J

Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a broQding omni-presence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be right and just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. [674 B-CJ It is true that the Passports Act does not provide for giving reasonable opportunity to the holder of the passport to be heard in advance before impounding a passport. But that is not conclusive of the question. If the statute make itselt clew on this point, then no more questioo arises but even when statute is silent the law may in a given case make an implication and apply the principle. Natural justice is a great humanising principle intended to invest law with ta1rness and to secure justice and over the years it has grown into a widely perva·sive rule affecting large areas of administrative action. [674 F-G, 675 A-B]

Wiseman v. Borneman [1971] A.C. 297 approved. Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1968] 112 Solicitor General 690 approved.

There can be no distinction between a quasi-judicial function and an administrative function for the purpose of principles of natural justice. The aim ot both administrative inquiry as well as the quasi-judicial enquiry is to arrive at a just decision and if a rule of natural justice is calculated to secure justice or to put it 'negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is difficult to see why it should be applicable to quasi-judicial enquiry and not to administrative enquiry. It must logically gpply to both. It cannot be said that the requirements of fairplay in action is any the less in an administrative enquiry than in a quasi-judicial one. Sometimes an unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have far more serious consequences than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry and hence rules of natural justice must apply, equally in an administrative enquiry which entails civil consequences. [676 0-H, 677 A)

Re.x v. Electricity Commissioners [1924] 1 K.B. 171 referred to. Re.x v. LeRislative Commiuee of the Church Assembly [1928] 1 K. B. 411 -and Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] A. C. .40 referre<t to. Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P. N. Sharma & Anr. [1965) 2 SCR 366, State of Orissa v. Dr. Binapani [1967) 2 SCR 625 and A. K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. rt9701 1 SCR 457 relied.

The duty to act judicially need not be superadded but it may be spelt out from the nature of the power conferred, the manner of exercising it and its impact on the rights of the person affected and where it is found to exist the rules of natural justice would be attracted. Fairplay in action requires that in administrative proceedings also the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable. [678 B-C] In re : H. K. (An Tnfa.nt) [1967] 2 Q.B. 617 and Schmidt v. S ecretary of

State for Home A (fairs referred to.

D F. 0 . South Kheri v. Ram Sanehi Sin~h r1973] 3 S.C.C. 864 relied on 2-119 SCI/78

n

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1978] 2 S.C.R.

The Jaw is not well settled that even in an administrative proceeding which involves civil consequences the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable. [680 Aj The power conferred on the Passport Authority is to impound a passport and the consequence of impounding a passport would be to impair the con5titutional right .of. the holder of the passport to go a~road during the time that the passpott IS Impounded. The passport cart be Impounded· only on certain specified $rou~ds set out in section 1~(3) and the PasspC?rt Authority would have to apply 1ts mmd to the facts and Circumstances of a gtven case and decide whether any of the spec!fir~ grounds e?Cbts which would justify i~pou~d_ing of the passport. The authonty ts also requtred by s. 10(5) to record tn wntmg a brief statement of the reasons for making the order impounding a passport and save in certain exceptional situations, the authority is obhged to furnish a copy of the statement of reasons to the holder of the passpor:t. Where the Passport Authoritv which bas impounded a passport is other than the Central Government a right of appeal ag:tillst the order impounding the passport is given by section 11. Thus, the pow~r conferred

on the Passport Authority to impound a pa~sport is ~:· quasi-

judicial power. The rules of natural justice would in the circumstances be applicable in the exercise of the power of impounding a passport even on the orthodox view which prevailed prior to A. K. Kmipa/, 's case. The same result mu~t totTow in view of the decision in A. K. Kraipak's case, even if the power to impound a passport were regarded as administrative in cha·racter, bccnuse it seriously ionterfercs with the constitutional right o1f the holder of the passport to go abroad and entails adverse civil consequences. The argument of the :\Horney General however was that having regard to the nature of the action involved in the impounding of a passport, the audi {1/teram partem rule mn't b~ hdd to be excluded because if notice were to be ~iven to the holder of the passport and reasonable opportunity afforded to him to show cause why his passport sh0uld not be impounded he might immediately on the strength of the pas3port mnke good his exit from the country and the object of impoundinoetc., woLIH be frustrated. Now it is true that there may be cases where. ha.::ing regard to the nature of the action to be taken, its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant statutory provlsionl, fairness in action may warrant exclusion of the tmdi alteram partem mle. Indeed, there are certain wellrecognised exceptions. to the audi alteran1 pariem rule established by judicial decisions. These exceptions, do not in any way militate against the principle which requires fair play in administrative action. The word exception is really a misnomer because in. these exceptional cases the audi olteram parlem rule is he1d inauplicable not by way of an exception to fRirplay in action but because nothing unfair can be inferred by not conferring an opportunity to present or meet a case. The life Of the law is not logic but experience. Therefore. every legal proposition must in the ultimate analysis be t~sted on fnc touch-stone of pragmatic realism. [680 B-F, H, 681 C-F] The audi alteram partem rule may, therefore, by the experiential test, be excluded, if importing the right to be h1!ard has the effect of paralysing the administrative process or the need for promptitude or the ur_gencv of the situation so demands. But. at the same time, it must be remembered that this is a rule of vital importance in the field of administrative law and it must not be jettisoned save in very exceptinnal circums~ances where compulsive necessity so demands. Tt is a wholesome rule destgned to secure the rule of law and the Court should not be too ready to eschew it in its application to a given case. The Court must make everY effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent pe!missible in a .giv~~ case. __ The audi .afteram partem rule is not cast in n rigtd mould and }tKhcml declstons establish t~at it may snffer situutional modifications. The core of it must, bowe_ver, rem~m, namely, that the person affected must .h<IVe re~sonable opportumty of bet~g he.a rd and the hearing must be a genutne heanng and not an empty publtc relations exercise. lt would, not therefore. be right to conclude t~at !he oudi aftcrani Fartem rule is excluded merel_y because the power to tmp~und a passport might be frustrnted, . if prior. noti~c and hearing were to _b e gwen to the person concerned before tmpoundmg hts pass~~rt. The ~assp01 t Aut~o­ ritv may proceed to impound the pass\'lort without gtvlng any -~nor ~pportu':ttv to · the person concerned to be heard, but as soon as the order tmpoundm.~

J

MANEKA GANDHI V. UNION

the passport is made, an opportunity of hearing, remedial in aim, should be ~iven to him so that he may present his case and controvert that of the Passport Authority and point out why his passport should not be im~ pounded and the order impounding it recalled. This should not only be possible but also quite appropriate, because the reasons for impounding the passport are required to be supplied by the Passport Authority after the making of the order and the person affected would, therefore, be in a position to make a repre~ sentation setting forth his case and plead for setting aside the action impounding his passport. A fair opportunity of being heard following immediately upon the order impounding the Passport would satisfy the mandate of natural justice nnd a prov-ision requiring giving of such opportunity to the person concerned can and should be read by implication in the Passports Act. If such a provision were held to be incorporated in the Passport's Act by necessary imp1ication the procedure prescribed by the Act for impounding a passport would be right, fair and just and would not suffer from arbitrariness or unreasonableness. Therefore, the procedure established by the Passport Act for impounding a passport must be held to be in conformity with the requirement of Art. 21 and does not fall foul of that Article. [681 G-H, 682 A-C, E-H, 683 A-B]

,

In the present case, however. the Central Government not only did not give

an opportunity of hearing of the petitioner after making the impugned order impounding her passport but even declined to furnish to the petitioner the reasons for impounding her passport despite requests made by her. The Central Government was wholly unjustified in withholding the reasons for impounding the passport and this was not only in breach of the statutory provisions but it also amounted to denial of opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The order impounding the passport of the petitioner was, therefore, clearly in violation of the rule of natural justice embodied in the maxim audi alteram partem and was not in conformity with the procedure prescribed by the Act. The learned Attorney General, however, made a statement on behalf of the Government of India that the Government was agreeable to considering any representation that may be made hy the petitioner in respect of the impoundin~ of her pa£sporl and giving her an opportunity in the matter, and that the representation would be dealt with expeditiously in accordance with Jaw. This statement removes the vice from the order impounding the passport and it can no longer be assailed on the ground that it does not comr>lY with the audi alteram partem rule or is not in accord with the procedure prescribed by the Act. [683 C-G} The law is well settled that when a statute vests unguided and' unrestricted power in an authority to affect the rights of a person/ without layin~ down any policy or principle which is to guide the authority in exercise of the power, it would be affected by the vice of discrimination since it would leave ·it open to the authority to discriminate between persons and things similarly situated. However, it is difficult to say that the discretion conferred ori the passport authority is arbitrary or unfettered. There are four grounds set out in section 10(3 )(c) which would justify the making of an order impounding a passport. [684 C-DJ

J

The words "in the interest of the general public" cannot be characterised as vague or undefined. The expression "in the interest of the general public" ha~ clearly a well defined meal\ing and the Courts have often been called upon to decide whether a particular action is in the intefe~t of general public or in public interest and no difficulty has been experienced by the Courts in carrying out this exercise. These words are in fact borrowed ipsissima wrba from Art 19(5) and it would be nothing short of heresay to accnse the constitution makers of vague and loose thinking. Sufficient ,guidelines are provided by the Act it~elf and the power conferred on the Passport AuthoritY to impound n passport cannot be said to be unguided or unfettered. More· over the exercise of this power is not made dependent on the subjective opinion of the Passport Authority as regards the necessity of exercisin~ it on one or more grounds stated: in S.10(3)(c), but the Passport Authority is required to record in writing a brief statement of reasons for impounding the passport and save in certain exceptional circumstances, supply a copy of such statement of reasons to the person affected so that the nerson concerned can challenge the decision of the Passport Authori!Y in appeal and the Appellate Authority can examine whether the reasons gtven: by the Passport Autho·

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1978] 2 S.C.R.

riiy are correct and if so whether they justify the making of the order impounding the passport. It is true that when the order impounding the passport is made by the Central Government there is no appeal against it. But it must be remembered that in such a case the power is exercised by the Central Government itself and it can safely be assumed that the Central Govt. will exercise the power in a reasonable and responsible manner. When power is vested in a high authority like the Central Government abuse of power cannot be lightly assumed and in any event, if there is abuse vf the power the arms of the Co\]rt are long enough to reach it and to' strike it down. The power conferred on the PasspOrt Authority to impound a passport under section 10(3) (c) cannot be regarded as discriminatory. [684-D-H, 685 A-C]

)<

The law on the point viz. the proper test or yard-stick to be applied for determining whether a statute infringes a particular fundamental right, wnile adjudging the constitutionality o( a statute on the touchstone of fundamental rights has undergone radical changes since the days of A.K. Gopalan's case [l950] SCR 88, which was followed in Ram Singh and Ors. v. Sture of Delhi [1951] SCR 451 and applied in Naresh Shridhar Mirajikar & Ors. v. State of Maltarashtra & Anr. [1966] 3 SCR 744. [685 D-G, 686-B] According to these decisions, the theory was that the object and form of state action determine the extent of protection which may be claimed by an individual and the validity of such action has to be judged by considering whether it is "directly in respect of the subject covered by any particular article of the Constitution or touches the said article only incidentally or indirectly". The test to be applied for determining the· co•.ls!itlltional validity of state a-ction with fundamental right therefore was : what is the object of • the authority in taking the action : What is the subject matter of the action and to which fundamental right does it relate? This the()ry that "the extent of protection of important guarantees, such as the liberty of persons and right to property, depend upon the form and object of the state action not upon its direct operation upon the individual's freedom" held sway, in spite of three decisions of the Supreme Court in Dwarkadass Srinivas v. The Sho!apur Weaving Co. Ltd. [1954] SCR 674; Express Newspaper (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India [1959] SCR 12; and Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India [1962] 3 SCR 842 formulating the test of direct and inevitable effect or the doctrine of intended and real effect for the purpose of ad~ judging whether a statute offends a particular fundamental right. However, it was only iri R.C. Cooper v. Union of India [1973] 3 SCR 530 that the doctrine that the object and form of the State action alone determine the extent of protection that may be claimed by an individual and that the effect of the State action on the fundamental right of the individual is irrelevant as Jaid down in Gopalan's case was finally rejected. This doctrine is in substance and reality nothing else than the test of pith and substance which is applied for determin~ng the constitutionality of legislation where there is conflict of l<'gisbtive powers conferred on Federal and State legislatures with reference to legislative lists. [685 H, 686 A-B, D-H, 687 A-E, F-G] The test applied since R.C. Cooper's case was as to what is the direct and inevitable consequence or effect of the impugned state action on the fundamental right of the petitioner. It is possible that in a given case the pith and substance of the State action may deal with a particular iundame!_!!al_ ri11:ht but its direct and inevitable effect may be on another fundnmental right and in that case, the state action would hav-e to meet the challenge of the latter fundamental right. The pith and substance doctrine looks only at the obJect and subject matter of the state action, but in testing the validitY of the state action with reference to fundamenat rights, what the Courts must consider is the direct a® inevitable consequence of the State action. Otherwise the protection of the fundamental rights would subtly but surely eroded. [690 B-D]

A. K. Gopafan v. State of Madras [1950] 2 SCR 88; Ram SinRh & Ors. Stnte of Delhi [19511 SCR 451; Naresh Sridhar Marajkar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. fl966] 3 SCR 744 referred to. R. C. Cooper v. Union of 1ndia T19731 3 SCR 530: Dwarakadass Srinivas v. the Sholapur and Wef!Vinrr Co. Ltd. 09541 SCR 674; Express Newspaper (P) Ltd. & Anr. v: Umon o/ lndia, [1959] S.C.R. 12 and Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Umon of V.

I >,

MANEKA GANDHI V. UNION

India [19621 3 SCR 842; quoted with approval, Bennet Coleman & Co. v. Union of India [1973] 2 SCR 757 applied. The test formulated in R. C. Cooper's case merely refers to "direct operation" or "direct consequence and effect" of the State action on the funclamental right of the petitioner and does not use the word "inevitable" in this connection. If the test were merely of direct or indirect effect, it would be an open-~·nded concept and in the absence of operational criteria for ju<fgmg "directness" it would give the Court an unquestionable discretion to decide whether in a given case a consequence or effect is direct or not. Some other concept-vehicle would be ~1eeded to quantify the extent of directnes" or indirectness in order to apply the test. And that is supplied by the .criterion of "inevitable" consequence or effect adumbrated in the Express Newspaper case [1959] SCR 12. This criterion helpg to quantify the extent of directness necessary to constitute infringement of a fundamental right. Now, if the effect of State action on a fundamental right is direct and inevitable, then a fortiorari it must be presumed to have been intended by the authority taking the action and hence this doctrine of direct and inevitable< effect is deBcribed aptly as the doctrine of intended and real effect. This is the test which must be applied for the purpose of determining whether section 10(3)(c), or the impugned order made under it is violated of Art. 19( 0 (a) or (g). [698 C-fl Prima facie, the right which is sought to be restricted by s~ 10(3){c) and the impugned order is the right to go abroad and that is not named as a fundamental right or included in so many words in Art. 19 (1 )(a) of the Constitution. The right to go abroad, as held in Satwant Singh Sawhney's case [1967] 3 SCR 525, is included in "personal liberty" within the meaning of Art. 21 and is thus a fundamental right protected by that Article. This dearly shows that there is no underlying principle in the Constitution which limits the fundamental right in their operation to the territory of India. If a fundamental right under Art. 21 can be exercisable outside India, there is no reason why freedom of speech and expression conferred under 19(1)(a) cannot be so exercisable. [690 H, 694 C-D] Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramaratlmam, Asstt. Pos.sport Officer, Govt. of India, New Delhi & Ors., [1967] 3 SCR 525; Best v. United States; 184 Federal Reporter (ed) p 131, referred to. Dr. S. S. Sadashiva Rao v. Union of India [1965] Mysore Law Journal p. 605 approved. There are no geographical limitatioM to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Art. 19(1) (a) and this freedom is exercisable not only in India but also outside and if State action sets up barriers to its_ citi· zens' freedoru of expression in any country in the world, it would v1olate Art. 19(1) (a) as much .as if it inhibited such expression within the country. This conclusion would on a parity of reasoning apply ~qually in relation to fundamental right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation. trade or business, guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(g). [694 G-H, 695 A) Freedom to go . abroad incorporates the important function of an ultiFreedom to go abroad has much social n.lue and represents a basic human right of great significance. It is in fact incorporated as in alienable human right in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But it is not specifically named as a fundamental right in Art. 19(1) of the Constitution. [696 C-D]

C

mum refunium liberatis when other basic freedoms are refused.

l

'

Kent v. Dulles, 351 US 116 : 2 L.ed 2d, 1204 referred to.

Even if a right is not specifically named in Art. 19(1) it may still be a fundamental right covered by some clause of that Article, if it: is an integral part of a named fundamental right or partakes of the same basic nature and character as that fundamental right. It is not enough that a right claimed by the petitioner flows or emanates from a named fundamental right or that its existence, is necessary in order to make the exercise of the nameo f1.mdamental right meaningful a<nd effective. Every activity which fac!11ta~es the exercise of a named fundamental right is not necessarily comprehended in that fundamental right, nor can it be regarded as such merely because it may not be possible otherwise to effectively exercise that fundamental right.

II

SUPREME

COURT

REPORTS

[1978] 2 s.c.R.

What is necessary to be seem is and that is the test which must be applied, whether the right claimed by the petitioner is ~ n integral part of a named fundamental right or partakes of the same basic nature and character as the named fundamental right is in reality and substance nothing but an instance of the exercise of the named fundamental right. If this be the correct test, the right to go abroad cannot in all circumstances be regarded as included in freedom of speech and expression. [697 D-G]

Kent v. Dulles, 357 US. 116. 2 L.ed 2d. 1204 : Expres.\' Newspapers (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. [1959] SCR 12; Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India [1962} 3 SCR 842; Bennet Cohman & Co. & Ors. v. Union of India' [1973] 2 SCR 757; Ramesh Thappar v. State of Madra3 [1950] SCR 594 referred to. Apthekar v. Secretary of Swte 378 US 500: 12 Led 2d 992; Zamei v. Rusk 381 US 1 : 14 Led 2d 179 expiained.

C

The theory that a peripheral or concomitant right which facilitates the exercise of a named fundamental right or gives its meaning and substance or makes its exercise effective, is itself a guaranteed right included within the named fundamental right cannot be accepted. [701 B-C] All India Bank Employees' Association v. National Industrial Tribunal {l962] 3 SCR 269 applied.

The right to go· abroad cannot therefore be regarded as included in free-

D dom of speech and expression guaranteed under Art. 19 ( 1 ) (a) on the theorv

of peripheral or concomitant right. The right to go abroad cannot be treated as part of the right to carry on trade, business or profession or calling guaranteed under Art. 19 (1 )(g). The right to go abroad is clearly not a ~uarante­ ed right under any clause of Article 19(1) and Section 10(3)(c) which authorises imposition of restrictions on the right to go abroad by impounding of passport cannot be held as void as offending Article 191 1 ) (a) or (g), as its direct and inevitable impact is on the right to go abroad and nor on the right of free speech and expression or the right to carry on trade, business, profession or calling. [702 C-E] But that does not mean that an order made under s. 10 (3) ( c} may not violate Article 19 (1 )(a) or (g). Where a statutory provision empowerin!! an authority to take action is constitutionally valid, action taken under' it may offend a fundamental right and in that event, though the statutory provision is valid, the action may be void. Therefore, even though section 10( 3) (c) is valid, the question would always remain whether a•n order made under it is inva1id as contravening a fundamental right. The direct and inevitable effect of an order impounding a passport may, in a given case, be to abridge or take away freedom of speech and expression or tile right to carry on a profession and where such is the case, the order would be invalid, unless saved by Article 19(2) or Article 19(6). [702 F-H] Narendra Kumar & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1960] 2 SCR 375 referred to.

Though the impugned order may be within the terms of s. 10 (3) (c), lt must nevertheless not contravene any fundamental ri,ght and if it does, it would be void. Now, even if an order imp~unding a pa~SP?rt i~ made in th~ interests of public order decency or mor~·hty, the restnctJon Imposed by 1t may be so wide, excessive disproportionate to the mischief or evil sought to be averted that it may be considered unreasonable and in that event, if the direct and inevitable consequence of the order is to abridge or take awav freedom of speech and expression, it would be violative of Article 19(1 )(a) and would not be protected by Article 19 (2) and the same would be. the position where the order is in the interests of the genera! public but. it if.lfringes directly and inevitably on the freedom to carry on a professton tn which case it would contravene Article 19(1) (g) without being saved bv the provision enacted in Article 19(6). [705 D-E]

MANEKA GANDHI V. UNION

The impugned order, in the present case does not violate either Art. 19 (1 }(a) or Art. 19 (1 )(g). What the impugned order does is to impound the passport of the petitioner and thereby prevent her from going abroad and at th-e date, when impugned order was made, there is nothing to show' that the petitioner was intending to go abroad for the purpose· of exercising her freedom or speech and expression or her right to carry on her profession as a jon~·nalist. The direct and inevitable consequence of the impugned order was to impede the exercise of her ri_ght to go abroad and not to interfere with her freedom of speech and expression or her right to carry on her profession. [7D6 F-G] The petitioner is not justified in seeking to limit the expression "interests of the general public" to matters relating to foreign affairs. The argument that the said expression could not cover a situation where the presence of a person i!'. requirep to give evidence before a commission of Jnquir.y_ is plainlv erroneous as it seeks to cut down the width and amplitude of the expression "interests of the general public," an expression which has a well recognised legal connotation and which is found in Article 19(5) as well as Article 19 ( 6). It is true that that there is always a perspective within which a statute is intended to operate, but that does not justify reading of a statutory provision in a manner not warranted by the langua,ge or narrowing down its scope and meaning by introducing a limitation which has no basis either in the language or in the context of a statutory provision. Clauses (d), (e) and (h) of S. 10(3) make it clear that there are several ,grounds in this section which do not relate to foreign affairs. [709 B-F] Moreover the present case is not one where the maxim "expressio exclusio uTterius has any application at all. [710-B-C] Rohta.~

Industries Ltd. v. S. 0.

AJ?arwal & Anr., [1969] 3

rmius

SCR 108

@ 128 referred to.

OBSERVA TlON

Tt is true that. the power under s. 10(3) (c) is rather a drastic power to interfere with a basic human right, but this: power has been conferred by the legislature in public interest and there is no doubt that it will be sparingly used and that too, with great care and circumspection and as far as possible. the passport of a person will not be impounded merely on the ground of his being required in connection with a proceeding, unless the case is brough.t within s. 10(3)(e) or sec. 10(3)(h). [7JOG-H).

Ghalli v. Jones [1970] 1 Q. B 693 quoted with approval.

A': <?rd_er impoun~ing a passport can be made by the Passport Authority only 1f 1t IS actually m the mterests of the general public to do so and it is !lot enough that the int~rests of the general public may be likely to be served m future by the makmg of the order. Tn the present case it was not merely on the futur7 likelihood of the interests of the general public being adva~ced that the tmpugned order was made by the Central Govri1ment. The 1mpugned order wa~ made because, in the opinion of the Central Govt. the pr~s~nce· of the . petitioner was necessary for giving evidence before the ~omnnss10n of Inqmry. and according to the report received by the Central Government she \vas ltkelv to leave India and that might frustrate ·or imp~d~ to some e~tent the inQuiries which were being conducted by the CommiSSIOns of Inqmry. [711-C-D]

Krishna lyer, J. (concurring with Bhagwati, J.)

• British Raj has fr<:~ned on foreign travels by Indian patriotic suspects and mstances from the Bnt1sh Indian Chapter may abound. ln many countries the

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1978) 3 S.C.R-

p~ssport ~nd visa system has been used as potent paper curtain to inhibit illustnous wnters, outstanding statesmen, humanist churchmen and renowned scientists, if they are dissenters, from leaving their national frontiers. Things have changed, global awareness has dawned. The European Convention on Human Rights and bilateral understandings have· made head\vay to widen freedom of travel abroad as integral to liberty of the person. And the universal Declaration of Human Rights has proclaimed in Article 13, that every one has the nght to leave any country including his own, and to return to his country. Thls human planet is our single home, though geographically variegated. culturally diverse, politically pluralist, in science and technology competitive and cooperative, in arts and life-styles a lovely mosaic and, above all, suffused with a cosmic consciousness of unity and inter-dependence. [717 B, C, D, E-F]

Viewed from another angle, travel abroad is a cultural enrichment which enables one's' understanding of one's own country in better light. Thus it serves national interest to have its citizenry see other countries and judge one's country on a comparative scale. [718 B] The right of free movement is a vital element of personal liberty. The right of free movement includes right to travel abroad. Among the great guaranteed rights life and liberty are the first among equals, carrying a universal connotation cardinal to a decent human order and protected by constitutional armour. Truncate liberty in Art. 21 traumatically and the several other freedoms fade out automatically. [720 A-B] Personal liberty makes for the worth of the human person. Travel makes liberty worthwhile. life is a terrestrial op):Ortunity for unfolding personality rising to a higher scale moving to fresh woods 2.nd reaching out to reality which makes our earthly journey a true fulfilment not a tale told by an idiot full of sound and fury signifying nothing, but a fine frenzy rolling between heaven and earth. The spirit of Man is at the root of Art. 21 Absent liberty, other freedoms are frozen. [721 C-F] Proceuure which deals with the modalities of regulating, restrictin~ or even rejecting a fundamental right falling within Article 21 has to be fair, not foolish, carefully designed to effectuate, not to subvert, the substantive right itse1i. Thus, understood, 'procedure' must rule out anything arbitrary, freakish or bizarre. What is fundamental is life and liberty. What is procedural is the manner 6f its exercise. This quality of fairness in the process is emphasised by the strong word "establish'' which means 'setlled firmly', not wantonly or whimsically. [722 H, 723 A-B]

Procedure in Article 21 means fair, not formal procedure. Law is reasonable law, not any enacted piece. As Art. 22 specifically spells out the procedural safeguards for pre,·entive and punitive detention. a law providing for such detention should conform to Art. 22. It has been rightly pointed out that for other rights forming part of personal liberty, the procedural safeguards enshrined in Art. 21 are available. Otherwise, as the procedural safeguards contained in Art. 22 wiii be available only in cases of preventive and punitive detention the right to ·Jife, more fundamental than any other forming part of personal liberty and paramount to the happiness, dignity and worth of the individual, will not be entitled to any procedur;-•.1 safeguard, save such as a legislatur~·~ mood chooses. [723 F-H]

Kochunmi's case (AIR 1960 SC 1080, 1093) referred.

Liberty of locomotion into alien territory cannot be unjustly forbidden by the Establishment and passport legislation must take processual provisions which accord with fair norms, free from extraneous pressure and, by and large, complying with natural justice. Unilateral arbitrariness, police dossiers, faceless alliants, behind-the-back. materials oblique motives and the inscrutable face of an official sphinx do not fill the 'fairness,' bill. [726 D-E] Artic1e 21 clubs life with liberty and when we interpret the colour and content of 'procedure established by law', we must be alive to the deadly periL of

MANEKA GANDHI V. UNION

--~

life being deprived without minimal processual justice, legislative callousness despising hearing and fair opportunities of defence. [726 F] Sections 5, 6 and 10 of the impugned legislation must be tested even under Art. 21 on canons of processual justice to the people outlined above. Hearing is obligatory-meaningful hearing, flexible and realistic, according to circumstances, but not ritualistic and wooden. In exceptional cases and emergency situations, interim measures may be taken, to avoid the mischief of the passportee becoming a11 escapee before the hearing begins. "Bolt the stables after the horse has been stolen·• is wt a command of natural justice. But soon after the . provisional seizure, a reasonable hearing must follow, to minimise procedural prejudice. And when a prompt final order is made against the applicant or passport holder the reasons must be disclos~d to him almost invariably save in those d"ngerous cases, where irreparable mjury Will ensue to the State. A government which revels in secrecy in the field of people"s llberty not only acts against democratic decency but busies itself with its own burial. That is the writing on the wall if history were teacher, memory our mentor and decline of liberty not our unwitting endeavour. Public power must rarely hide its heart in an open society and system. [727 F-H] Article 14 has a pervasive processu~.t potency and ver~::ltile quality, equalitarian i:n its soul and allergic to discriminatory diktats. EQuality is the antithesis of arbitrariness. [728 A] As far as question of extra-territorial jurisdiction in foreign lands is concerned, it is a misconception. Nobody contends that India should interfere with other countries and ·their sovereignty to ensure free movement of Indians in those ~Quntries. What is meant is that the Government of India should not prevent by any sanctions it has over its citizens from moving within in any other country if that other country has no objection to their travelling within it~ territory. [728 C]

C

In Gopalan'3 case it was held that Art. 22 is a self-contained Code, however, this has suffered supersession at the hands of R. C. Cooper_

__ ..._I

')

f

[728 D]

Sakal Newspapers [1962] 3 SCR 842, Cooper [1973] 3 SCR 530. Bennet Coleman [1973] 2 SCR 759 and Slwmbu Nath Sarkar [1973] 1 SCR 856 referred to. The law is now settled that no article in Part III is an island but part of a continent, and the conspectus of the whole part gives the direction and correction needed for interpretation of these basic provisions. Man is not dissectible into separate limbs and, likewise, cardinal rights in an organic constitution, which make man human have a synthesis. The proposition is indubitable that Art. 21 does not, in a given situation exclude Art. 19 if both rights are breached. It is a salutary thought that the summit court should not interpret constitutional rights enshrined in Part III to choke its life-breath or chill its elan vital by processes of legalism, overruling the enduring values burning in the bosom'l of those who · won our independence and dre• up our found.ing document. [728 F-G. 729 A-B] High constitutional policy has harmonised individual freedoms with holistic community good by inscribing exceptions to Art. 19(l) in Art 19(2) to (6). Even so, what is fundamental is the freedom, not the exception. More importantly, restraints are permissible only to the extent they have nexus with the approved object. No verbal labels but real values are the governing consid!!ra· tions i.n .the exploration and adjudication of constitutional prescriptions and proscnptlons. Governments come and go, but the fundamental rights of the people cannot be subject to the wishful value·sets of political regimes of the passing day. [729 C-D, 730 FJ ·

P

~ocomotion in some situation is necessarily involved in the exercise of the

s~enfif;d fun~amental rights as an associated or integrated right.

Travel, simpli-

~lfer, ~s penpheral to and not necessarily fundnmental in Art. 19 Free soeech

JS feastble w1thout movement beyond country.

[731 B]

The delicat~, yet difficult, phase of the controversy arrives where free speech and free practice of profession are inextricably interwoven with travel abroad.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1978] 2 S.C.R.

One. bas to view the proximate and real consequence of thwarting trans~ national travel through the power of the State exercised under s. J of t.he Passport Act read with ss. 5 and 6. Associated rights totally integrated with fundamental rights must enjoy the same immunity. Three sets of cases might arise. First, where the legislative provision or executive order expressly forbids exercise in foreign lands of the fundamental ri~ht while ~rant­ ing passport. Secondly, there may be cases where even if thei order is inno<:ent on its face, the refusal of permission to go to· a foreign countrY mav, with certainty and immediacy, spell denial of free speech and professional practice or business. Thirdly, the fundamental right may itself enwomb locomotion regardless of national frontiers. The second and third often are blurred in their edges and may overlap. [732 H, 733 A-C] Spies, traitors, smugglers, saboteurs of the health, wealth and survival or sovereignty of the nation shall not be passported into hostile soil to work their vicious plan fruitfully. But when applying the Passports Act, Over-breadth, hyper-anxiety, regimentation complex, and political mistrust shall not sub-consciously exaggerate, into morbid or •.1eurotic refusal or unlimited impo:1ding or ;final revocation of passport, facts which, objectively assessed, may prove tremendous trifles. That is why the pro'-;isions have to be read down into constitutionality, tailored to fit the reasonableness test and humanised by natural justice. The Act will survive but the order shall perish for reasons so fully set out by Shri Justice Bhagwati. And on this construction, the conscience of the Constitution triumphs over vagarious governmental orders. [734 E-G-H]

Kailasam, J. (Dissenting)

The preamble to the Constitution provides that the people of India have solemnly resolved to constitute India into a sovereign, socialist, secular and democratic republic and to secure to all its citizens, justice, social, economic and political, liberty of thought, expression, belief. faith and worship, equality of status and of opportunity. Article 12 defines. the State as including the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and of local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.· Article 13 provides that laws that are inconsistent with or in derogation of fundamental ri_ghts are to that ex· tent void. Article 245 (2) provides that no law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground that it would have extra territorial operation. Tn England section 3 of the Statute of Westminster declares that Parliament has full power to make laws having extra territorial operation. The following arc the principles to determine whether the provisions of a Constitution or a Statute have extra territorial application. (a) An Act unless it provides otherwise applies only to the country concerned. (b) An Act of a Legislature wilt bind the subjects of the realm both within and without if that is the intention of the Legislature, which must be gathered from. the language of the Act in question.

(c) Legislature normally restricts operation of legislation to its own territories. However. on occasions legislation controJiing the acti~ vitics of its own citizens when they are abroad may be passed.

ll

!

Niboyet v. Nihoyet 48 L.J.P.I. at p. 10 and Quew v. Jameson Others [1896] 2 Q.B. Division 425 at 430 referred to. (d) In the absence of an intention clearly expressed or to be inferred from its language, or from the object or subject matter or history of the enactment, the presumption is that Parliament does not design its statute to operate beyond the territorial limit of the country. [738-E-F-H. 739 A, B. E, G-1-T. 740 !\, B, G-H.J

and

Go1•erno.r-General in Council v. Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. A.I.R. (31) [1944] Federal Court 51, referred to. Wallace Brothers & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of lncome-Tax, Bombay, Sind and Baluchistan [19451 F. C. R. 65 and Molzammad Mohy-ud-din v. The King Emperor [1946] F. C. R. 94 referred to.

_....-::

MANEKA GANDHI V. UNION

The application of Article 14 is expressly limited to the territory of India. Articles 15, 16, 17, 18, 20 and 22 by the:r very •nature are conlined to the territory of India. Articles 23 to 28 are applicable only to the territory of India. At any rate, there is no intention in these Articles indicating extra-territorial application. So also Articles 29 and 30 which deal with cultural and educational rights are applicable only within the territory of India. Article 31 does not expressly or impliedly have any extra-territorial application. It is poosible that the right conferred by Article 19(1) (a) may have extra-territorial application. It is not likely, however, that the framers of the Constitution intended the right to assemble peaceably and without arms or to form associations or unions or to a~quire, hold and dispose of property, or to ~ractise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business, to have .:~ny extra-territorial applic:;.. tion for such rights would not be enforced by the State oubide the l•,1dian terri- . tory. The r:ghts conferred under Article 19 are fundameutal rights and Arts. 32 & 226 provide that those rights are guaranteed 2.nd can be e'Jlforced by the aggrieved person by approaching this Court or the High Courts. These rights cannot be protected by the State outside its territory and, therefore, there is a presumption that the constitution makers would not have intended to guarantee any rights which the State cannot enforce. [742 H, 743 A-D-E-F]

Virendra v. The State of Punjab and Anolher, [1958] SCR 308 referred to.

-~

It is most unlikely that before the declaration of human ri_ghts was promulgated the framers of the Constitution decided to declare that the funda~ mental rights conferred on the citizens would, be available even outside fndia: Even in the American Constitution there is no mention of right to freedom of speech or expression1 as being available outside America. The law made under Article 19(2) to 19(6) imposes restrictions on the exercise of right of freedom of speech and expression etc: The restrictions thus imposed normally would apply· only within the territory of India unless the legisla~ tion expressly or by necessary implication provides for extra-territorial operation. (n the penal code, section ~ aru:t 4 specifically provides that crimes com- · mitted by citizens of India outside India are punishable. In Article 19, however, there is no such provision expressly or by nec·ess~ry implication. Secondly, a citizen cannot enforce his fundamental rij!;hts outside the territorv of India even if it is taken that such rights are available outside the country. Therefore, the contention of the petitioners that by denying the passt~ort the petitioner's fundamen~al rights guaranteed by Article 19 are infrin,ged cannot be accepted. [744 H, 745 A-D, 746 F-G, H. 747 A] The important question which arises, is whether an Act passed under Article 21 should also satisfy requirements of Article 19. It has been decided by this Court in Gopalan's case that the punitive detention for offences under the Penal Code cannot be challenged on the ground that it infringes fundamental rights under Article 19. [747 E-F1

)

!

The rights guaranteed under Article 19 ( 1) are subject to restrictions that may be placed by Articles 19(2) to 19{6). The right not to be deprived of Jife and pet'sonal .liberty is subject to its deprivation by procedure established by law. In Gopalan's case it was held that Article 19 dealt with the rights of the citizens when he was free and would not apply to person who had ceased to be free and has been either under punitive or preventive detention. It was further held th21t Article1 19 only applied where a legislation directly hit the rights enumerated in the Article and not where the loss of ri~hts mentioned in the Article was a result of the operation of legislation relating to punitive or preventive detention. The aforesaid ratio of Gopalan's case has been confirmed by this· Court in Ram Sinfdl v. Srate of Delhi. The view was again confirmed in the State of Bilzar v. Kameshwar Singh. [749 C,750 B-G]

Ram Singh v. State of Delhi [1951] SCR 451 and State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh [1952] SCR 889 relied on. In Express Newspapers, the test laid down was that there must be a direct or inevitable consequences of the measure enacted in the impugned Act and that

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1978] 2 S.C.lt.

A it would not be possible to strike down the legislation as having that effect and operation. [7 51 B-C]

J Exvress Newspavers (P) Ltd. and another v. The Union of India & Ors. f1959] 1 SCR 135 referred to.

\

In Hamdard Dawakhana's case it was held that it is not the form or inci~ dental infringement that determines the constitutionality of a statute but thereality or the substance. [751 D}

Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan v. Union of India [1960J 2 SCR 671 at page 691 and Koclwnni v. Tf1e State of Madras [1960] 3 SCR 887 referred to. Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. and Ors. v. The Union of India [1962] 3 SCR 842. distinguished.

In Sakal Paper's Case the Court held that the order was void as it viol<l•ted In that case the impact of Jeg1s1atton under Article 21 on the nghts guaranteed under Article 19(1) was not in issue. [752 C-D] Artic1~ 19_(1)(a) and ~as not saved b~ Article 19(2).

Kharak Singh [1964] 1 SCR 332 relied on; Bank Nationalisation [19.70] 3 SCR 530 and Bennet Coleman [1973] 2 SCR 757 distinguished.

In Bank Natio!Ullisation case the Court was only considering the decisions that took the view that Articles 19(1 )(f) and 31(2) were mutually exclusive. The basis for the conclusion in Bank Nationalisation case is that Arucks 19 and 31 are parts of a single pattern and while Article 19(l)(f) enjoins the right to :1 acquire, hold and dispose of property, clause 5 of Article 19 authorises imposition of restrictions upon the right. There must be a reasonable restriction and Article 31 assures the right to property and grants protection against the exercise of the authority of the State and clause 5 of Article 19 and clauses 1 and 2 of Article 31 _prescribe restrictions upon the said action, subject to which the right to property may· be exercised. The case specifically over-ruled the view taken in Govalan's case that the approach and form of the State action alone need to be considered and the fact of loss of fundamental rights of the individual in general w11 be ignored. The entire discussion ioa Bank f\/ation.nli5aF tion case related to the inter-relation between Article 31(2) and Article l9(1)(f). Certain passing observations have been made about the liberty of persons. However. there is no justification for holding that the c2.se is an authority for the proposition that the legislation under Article 21 should also satisfy all the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1). Article 21 is relafed to deprivation of life and personal liberty and it has been held that it is not one of the rights enumerated in Article 19(1). That the decision in Bank Nationalisation: case so far as it relates to Articles 19(1) and 21 is in the G nature of obiter dicta. The Court had not applied its mind and decided the specific question. The observations were general and casual observations on a point not calling for decision and not obviously argued before it cannot be taken as an authority on the proposition im question. The Court cannot be said to have declared the law on the subject when no occasion arose for it to' consider and decide the question. The judgment proceeded on some erroneous assumptions. It was assumed by the judgment that the majority of the Court in Gopalan's case held that Article 22 being a compl~te code relatin~ to l?re~ ventive detention the validity or an order of detention mu"t be t!etermmed H directly according to the terms within the four corners o~ that ~rttc!e· Th~ said statement is 't1ot borne out from the record of th~ ~udgt;nent m (rapalan s Cl.'Re. Tf the· obiter dicta based on the wrong assumptiOn 1s to be takery as the correct position in law it would lead to strange results. If Articles·

/

, J

\

/

MANEKA GANDHI V. UNION

1_9(1)(a) to (e) _and (g) arc ~t~acted in the case of de11rivation of personal liberty under Arhcle 21, a pumt1ve detention for an offence committed under I.P.C., such as theft, cheating or assault would be illegal. for the reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order would not cover the said offences. There can be no distinction between the punitive detention and preventive detention. Observation in Bank Nationalisation case that a legislation under Article 21 should also satisfy the requirements of Article 19 cannot be taken as correct law. [754 G-H, 756 D-E, 757 C-E, G-H, 758 A-B, C, 759 A, E-P]

Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri [1950] SCR 869, The State of West BenRal v. Subodh Gopal [19541 SCR 587, State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji [19531 1 SCR 777, Dabu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay, (1961} 1 SCR 128, Smt. Sitabari Debi & Anr. v. State of Wesr Bengal [1967] 2 SCR 940 and K. K. Kochunni [1968] 3 SCR 887 referred to.

In S. N. Sarkar's case also, the majority held that Article 22 was a selfcontained Code. The view taken in this case also suffers from the same infirmities referred to in the Bank Nationalisation case. In Khudi Ram's case also this Court erroneousiy stated that Gopalan's case ha.s tak.!n the view that Article 22 was a complete code. [759 F-H, 760 A-Bl

..'"

C

In Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur, Chief Justice Ray held that Article 21 is the rule of law regarding life and liberty and no other rule of Jaw can have separate existence as a distinct right. Justice Beg observed that D Gopalan's case was merely cited in Cooper's case for illustrating a. line of reasoning which was held to be incorrect in determining validity of law. The question under consideration was whether Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(2) were mutually exclusive. The learned Judge did not understand the Cooper's case as holding that effect of deprivation of rights outside Artide 21 will also have to be considered. [760 D-F-HJ

In Bennet Coleman's case, the Court held thal though Article 19(1) does not mention the freedom of press it is settled view of the court that freedom ot speech and expression includes freedom of Press and circulation. In that case also the question whether Articles 21 and 19 are mutually exclusive did not arise for consideration. Be1t11et Coleman's case. Express Newspapers Case, and Sakal Newspapers case were all concerned with the right to freedom of the press which is held to form part of the freedom of speech and expression. [761 G-HJ Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales [1950] A.C. 235 referred to.

The Passport Act provides for issue of passports and travel documents for

reg1.1lating the departure from India of citizens of India and other nerson. Since the said Act complies with the requirements of Article 21 i.e. compliance

)

chaUenJ,Zed. If with procedure established by 1aw, its validity cannot be Hlcidentally the Act infringes on the rights of a citizen under Article 19 ( 1) of the Act, it cannot be found to be invalid. The pith and substance rule will have to be anplied and unless the rights are directly 3ffected, the challenge will fail. [763 A-B)

The procedure established by law does not mean procedure, however, fantastic and oppressive or arbitrary which in truth and reality is no procedure at all. Section 5 of the Act provides for applying for passports or travel documents etc. and the procedure for passing orders thereon. The authority can either grant passport or can refuse it. In case the authority refuses to H grant it; it is required to record in writing a brief statement of his reasons which are to be furnished to the nerson concerned unless the authority for reasons specified in sub-section (3) refuses to furnish a copy. Section 6 provides that the refusal to give an endorsement shall be on one or other grounds mentioned in sub-sections (2) to (6}. Section 10 enables the Passport authority to Tary or cancel the endorsement on a passport. Section 10(3)

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1978] 2 s.c.R.

provides the reasons for which a passport may be impounded. Again reasons are required to be furnished to the person concerned on demand, except if the Passport Authority is of the opinion that it will not be in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of India, friendly relations of India with any foreign country or in the interest of the general public to furnish such a copy. Section 11 provides for an appeal except when the order is passed by the Central Government. [764 C-E. 765 A-G]

The Legislature by making an express provision may deny a person the right to be heard. Rules of natural justice cannot be equated with the fundamental rights. Their aim is to secure justice and to prevent miscarriage of justice. They do not supplant the law but supplement it. If a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice the court C should do so but if a statutory provision that specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any mles of natural justice this Court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the co~cerned provision the principles of natural justice. To a limited extent it may be necessary to revoke or to impound a passport without notice )f there is real Apprehension that the holder of the passport may leave the country if he becomes aware of any intention on the part of the Passport D Authority or the Government to revoke or impound the passport but that itself would not justify denial of an -opportunity to the holder of the passport to state his case before the final order is passed. The legislature has not by express provision excluded the right to be heard. [768 F-H, 769 A-B]

Purtabpur v. Cane Commissioner, Bihar (1969] 2 SCR 807 and Schmidt v. Secretary of State, Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch. 149 referred to.

A passport may be impounded without notice but before any final order is passed. the rule of audi alteram partem, would apply and the holder of the passport will have to be heard. The petitioner has a right to be heard before a final order under section 10 ( 3 )(e) is passed. Earlier, the courts had taken a view that the principle of natural justice is inapplicable to administrative orders. However, subsequently, there is a change in the judicial opinion. The frontier between judicial and quasi-judicial determination on the one hand and an executive or administrative determination on the other has become blurred. The rizid view that principles of natural justice apply only to judicial and quasi-judicial acts and not to administrative acts no longer holds the field. The court is not intended to sit in appeal over the decision of the Government. The decision of the Government under section 10(3) (c) is subject to a limited judicial ~crutiny. [770 A-F, H, 771 A, 772 R-D] H. K. (A 11 infant) [1967] 2 Q,B. 617 at p. 630 Barium Chemicals Ltd. Company Law Board [1966] Supp. SCR 311, Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S. D. Agarwal, [1969] 3 SCR 103 and U.P. Electric Co. v. State of U.P. [1969) 3 SCR 865 fol1owed. v

The provision empowering the Government not to disclose the reasons for impounding etc. is valid. The Government is bound to give opportunity to the holder of the passport before finally revoking it. or impounding it. The

MANEKA GANDHI V. UNION (Beg, C.J.)

~

cases in which the authority declines to furnish reasons for making an order would be extremely rare. In case where the Government itself passes an order it should be presumed that it would have made the order after careful scrutiny. Jf an order is passed by the Passport Authority an appeal is provided. In the present case, there is no reason in declining to furnish to the petitioner :statement of reasons for impounding the passport. [772 H, 773 A-D, H, 774 A] In view of the statement of the Attorney General that the petitioner might make a representation in respect of the impounding of passport and that the representations would be dealt with expeditiously and that even if the imound~ ing of the passport is confirmed it will not exceed a period of 6 months, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the case any further. [776 B-C] ORIGINAL JuRISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 231 of 1977.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India). Madan Bhatia and D. Goburdhan for the Petitioner. S. V. G'upte, Attorney General, Soli J. Sorabjee, Additional Sol. Genl. of India, R. N. Sachthey and K. N. Bhatt for the Respondents. Ram Panjwani, Vijay Panjwani,

Raj Panjwani, S. K. Bagga

&

Mrs. S. Bagga for the Intervener. The folio wing Judgments were delivered : BEG, C.J. The case before us involves questions relating to baste human rights. On such questions I believe that multiplicity of views giving the approach of each member of this Court is not a disadvant~ age if i( clarifies our not infrequently differing approaches. It should enable all interested to appreciate better the significance of our Constitution.

J

As I am in general agreement with my learned brethren Bhagwati and Krishna Iyer. I wi11 endeavour to confine my observations to an indication of my own approach on some matters for consideration now before us. This seems to me to be particularly necessary as my learned brother Kailasam, who has also given l,JS the benefit of his separate opinion) has a somewhat different approach. I have had the advantage of going through the opinions of each of my three learned brethren. Jt seems to me that there can be little doubt that the right to travel and to go outside the country, which orders regulating issue, suspension or impounding, and cancellation of passports directly affect, must be included in rights to "personal liberty" on the strength of decisions of this Court giving a very wide ambit to the right to personal liberty (see: Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer} Government of India, New Delhi & Ors.,C) Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors.(2 ). [1967] 3 S.C.R. 525. (2) [1964] l·S.CR. 332.

(1)

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1978) 2 S.C.R.

Arttcle 21 of the Constitution reads as follows : "Protection of life and personal liberty. No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law".

I'

It is evident that Article 21, though so framed as to appear as a shield operating negatively against executive encroachment over something covered by that shield. is the legal recognition of both the pro~ection or the shield as well as of what it protects which lies beneath that shield. It has been so interpreted as long ago as in A. K. Gopalan v. State of lvfadras,C) where, as pointed out by me in Addi~ tional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. S. S. Shukla and othersC) with the help of quotations from judgments of Patanjli Sastri, J. (from p. 195 to 196), Mahajan J. (p. 229~230), Das J. (295 and 306-307). I may add to the passages I cited there some from the judgment of Kania Chief Justice who also, while distinguishing the objects and natures of articles 21 and 19, gave a wide enough scope to Art. 21. Kania CJ said (at p. 106-107) : "Deprivation (total loss) of personal liberty, which inter alia includes the right to eat or sleep when one likes or to work or not to work as and when one pleases and several such rights sought to be protected by the expression 'per~ sonalliberty' in article 21, is quite different from restriction (which is only a partial control) of the right to move freely (which is relatively a minor right of a citizen) as safeguarded by article 19 ( 1) (d) . Deprivation of personal liberty has not the same meaning as restriction of free. movement in the territory of India. This is made clear when the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code in Chapter VIII relating to security of peace or maintenance of public order are read. Therefore article 19(5) cannot apply to a substantive law depriving a citizen of personal liberty. I am unable to accept the contention that the word 'deprivation' includes within its scope 'restriction' when interpreting article 21. Article 22 envisages the law of preventive detention. So does artic1c 246 read with Schedule Seven, List I, Entry 9, and List III, Entry 3. Therefore, when the subject of preventive deten~ tion is specifically dealt with in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights I do not think it is proper to consider a legislation permitting preventive detention as in conflict with the rights mentioned in article 19 ( 1) . Article 19 ( 1) does not purport to cover all aspects of liberty or of personal liberty. In

(l) [1950] SCR 88.

(2) {1976] Suppl. SCR 172 at 327.

.. ''~

~_..,

c-.

•

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MANEKA GANDHI v. UNION (Beg, C. ], )

that article only certain phases of liberty are dealt wit~. 'Personal liberty' would primarily mean liberty of the physical body. The rights given _u~der article 19~1) do ~ot directly come under that descnptlon. They are nghts whtch accompany the freedom or liberty of the person. By their very nature they are freedoms of a person assumed to be in full possession of his personal liberty. If article 19 is considered to be the only article safeguarding personal liberty several well-recognised rights, as for instance, the right to eat or drink, the right to work, play, swim and numerous other rights and activities and even the right to life will not be deemed protected under the Constitution. I do not think that is the intention. It seems to me improper to read article 19 as dealing with the same subject as article 21: Article 19 gives the rights specified therein only to the citizens of India while article 21 is applicable to all persons. The word citizen js expressly defined in the Constitution to indicate only a certain section of the inhabitants of India. Moreover, the protection given, by article 21 is very general. It is of 'law'whatever that expression is interpreted to mean. The legislative restrictions on the law-making powers of the legislature are not here prescribed in detail as in the case of the rights specified in article 19. In my opinion therefore article 19 should be read as a separate complete article". In that case, Mukherjea J., after conceding that the rights given by article 19 (1 ) ( u) would be incidentally contravened by an order of preventive detention (see p. 261) and expressing the opinion that a wider significance was given by Blackstone to the term "personal liberty", which may include the right to locomotion, as Mr. Nambiar, learned Counsel for A. K. Gopalan, wanted the Court to infer, gave a narrower connotation to ''personal liberty", as "freedom from physical constraint or coercion" only. Mukherjea, J., cited Dicey for his more restrictive view that "personal Iil~erty" would mean : "a personal right .not to be . subjected to imprisonment, arrest or other physical coerciOn in any manner that does not admit of legal justification". He then said : "It is, in my opinion, this negative right of not being subjected to any form of physical restraint or coercion that constitutes the essence of personal liberty and not mere freedom to move to any part of the Indian territory".

.A.

l<

After referring to the views of the Drafting Cpmmittee of our Constitution Mukherjea, J., said : (p. 263) : "It is enough to say at this stage that if the report of the Dra~ting Com~ittee is an appropriate material upon which the mterpretat1on of the words of the Constitution could be based, it certainly goes against the contention of the applicant and it shows that the words used in article 19 (I ) (d) of the · Constitution do not mean the same thing as the expression

3--119SCI/78

.

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personal liberty' in article 21 does. It is well known that the word 'liberty' standing by itself has been given a very wide meaning by the Supreme Court of the United States of America; It ~ncludes not only personal freedom from physical restraint but the right to the free use of one's own property and to enter into free contractual relations. In the Indian Constitution, on the other hand, the expression 'personal liberty' has been deliberately used to restrict it to freedom from physical restraint of person by incarceration or otherwise". Fazal Ali, J., however, said (at p. 148) :

"To my mind, the scheme of the Chapter dealing with the fundamental rights does not contemplate what is attributed to it, namely, that each article is a code by itself and is independent of the others. In my opinion, it cannot be said that articles 19, 20, 21 and 22 do not to some extent overlap each other. The case of a person who is convicted of an offence will come under article 20 and 21 and also under article 22 so far as his arrest and detention in custody before trial are concerned. Preventive detention, which is dealt with in article 22, also amounts to deprivation of personal liberty which is referred to in article 21, and is1 a violation of the right of freedom of movement dealt with in article 19 ( 1) (d). That there are other instances of overlapping of articles in the Constitution may be illustrated by reference to article 19 ( 1) {f) and article 31 both of which deal with the right to property and to some extent overlap each otherH. As has been pointed out by my learp.ed brother Bhagwati, by de· tailed references to cases, such as Haradhan Saha v. The State of West Bengal & Ors(l) and Shambhu Nath Sarkar v. State of West Bengal (2), the view that Articles 19 and 21 constitute water tight compartments, so that' all aspects of personal liberty could be excluded from Article 19 of the Constitution, had to be abandoned as a result of what was held, by a larger bench of this Court in R. C. Cooper v. Union of lndia( 3 ), to be the sounder view. Therefore, we could neither revive that overruled doctrine nor could we now hold that impounding or cance11ation of a passport does not impinge upon and affect fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. I may point out that the doctrine that Articles 19 and 21 protect or regulate flows in different channels, whicJi certainly appears to have found favour in this Court in A. K. Gopalan's case (supra), was laid down in a context which was very different from that in which that ap· proach was displaced by the sounder view that the Constitution must be read as an integral whole, with possible over-lappings of the subject matter of what is sought to be protected by its various provisions particularly by articles relating to fundamental rights. (1) [1975J 1 SCR 778. (2) [1973] 1 SCR 856. (3) [ 1973] 3 SCR 530.

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MANEKA GANDHI V. UNION ( ChanJrachud, ]. )

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In A. K. Gopalan's case (supra), what was at issue was whether ihe tests of valid procedure for deprivation of personal liberty by pre-vcnth e detention must be found exclusively in Article 22 of the Constitution or could we gather from outside it also dements of any "due process of law" and use them to test the validity of a law dealing with ~preventive detention. Our Constitution~makers, while accepting a departure from ordinary norms, by permitting making of laws for preventive detention without trial for special reasons in exceptional situa·tions also provided quite elaborately, in Article 22 of the Constitutio~ itselfJ what requirements such Jaw, relating to preventive detention, mulit sati!ify. The procedural requirements of such laws separately fonned parts of the guaranteed fundamental rights. Therefore, when .this Court was called upon to judge the validity of provisions relating to preventive detention it laid down, in Gopalan's case (supra), that tlle tests of "due process", with regard to such laws, are to be found in Article 22 of the Constitution exclusively because this article con.stitutes a self~contained code for laws of this description. That was, in my view, the real ratio decidendi of Gopalan's case (supra). It appears to me, with great respect, that other observJ.tions relating to the separability of the subject matters of Articles 21 and 19 were mere obiter dicta. They may have appeared to the majority of learned Judges in Gopalan's case to be extensions of the logic they adopted with regard to the relationship between Article 21 and 22 of the Con~ stitution. But, the real issue there was whether, in the face of Article 22 of the Constitution, which provides all the tests of procedural validity of a law regulating preventive detention, other tests could be imported from Article 19 of the Constitution or elsewhere into ''proce~ dure established by law". The majority view was that this could not be done. I think, if I may venture to conjecture what opinions lear~ ned Judges of this Court would have expressed on that occasion had other t}pes of law or other aspects of personal liberty, such as those which confronted this Court in either Satwant Singh's case (supra) .or Kharak Singh's case (supra) were before them, the same approach or the same language would not have been adopted by them. It seems to me that this aspect of Gopalan's case (supra) is important to remember if we are to correctly understand what was laid down in that case.

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I have already referred to the passagel) I cited in A. D. M. hbaipur:s ~ase (~upra) to s~ow that, even in ~opalan's case (supra), the maJOnty of JUdges of th1s Court took the vtew that (the( ambit of per· sonal liberty protected by Article 21 is wide and comprehensive. It G ~mbraces both substantive rights to personal Jiberty and the procedure provided for their deprivation. One can, however, say that no question .of ''due process of .law" can. really. arise, apart from procedural reqmrements of preventive detentiOn latd down by Article 22 in a: case such as th~ one this ~ourt c?nsidered in G~palan's case (s~pra). The dear meanmg of Arttcle 22 Is that the reqUirements of "due pro~ess of. law", in cases of preventive detention, are satisfied by what H t-l provtded ·by Article 22 of the Constitution itself. This article indkates the pattern of "the procedure established by Jaw" for cases of preventive detention.

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[1978] 2 S.C.R.

Questions, however, relating to either deprivation or restrictions of personal liberty, concerning laws falling outside Article 22 remain\!d really unanswered, strictly speaking, by Gopalan's case. If one may so put it, the field of. ''due process" for cases of preventive detention is fully covered by Article 22, but other parts of that field, not covered by Article 22, are "unoccupied" by its specific provisions. I have no doubt that, in what may be called "unoccupied" portions of the vast sphere of personal liberty, the substantive as well as procedural laws made to cover them must satisfy the requirements of both Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution.

Articles dealing with different fundamental rights contained in Part Ill of the Constitution do not represent entirely separate streams of rights which do not mingle at many points. Th!;\y are all parts of an integrated scheme in the Constitution. Their waters must mix to constitute that· grand flow of unimpeded and impartial Justice (social, economic and political), Freedom (not only of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship, but also of association, movement, vocation or occupation as well as of acquisition and possession of reasonable property), of Equality (of status and of opportunity, which imply absence qf unreasonable or unfair discrimination betD ween individuals, groups and classes), and of Fraternity (assuring dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation), which our Constitution visualises .. Isolation o.f various aspects of human freedom, for purposes of their protection, is neither realistic nor beneficial but would defeat the very objects of such protection.

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We have to remember that the fundamental rights protected by Part III of the Constitution, out. of which Articles 14, 19 and 21 are the most frequently invoked, form tests of the validity of executive as well as legislative actions when these actions are subjected to· judicial scrutiny. We cannot disable Article 14 or 19 from so functioning and hold those executive and legislative actions to which they could apply as unquestionable even when there is no emergency to shield actions of doubtful legality. These tests are, in my opinion, available to us now to determine the constitutional validitv of Section 10(3) (c) of the Act as well as of the impugned order of 7th July, 1977, passed against the petitioner impounding her passport "in the interest of general public" and stating that the Government had decided not to furnish her with a copy of reasons and claiming immunity from such disclosure under section 10(5) of the Act.

I have already mentioned some of the authorities relied upon by me in A. D. M. Jabalpur v. S. Shukla (Supra), while discussing the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution, to hold that its ambit is very wide. I will now indicate why, in my view, the particular rights claimed by the petitioner could fan within Articles 19 and 21 and the nature and origin of such rights.

Mukerji J., in Gopalan's case (supra) referred to the celebrated commentaries of Blackstone on the Laws of England. It is instructive to reproduce passages from there even though juristic reasoning may have travelled today beyond the stage reached by it when Blackstone

MANEKA GANDHI v. UNION (Beg, C. J.)

wrote. Our basic concepts on such matters, stated there, have provided the foundajons on which subsequent superstructures were raised. Some of these foundat:ons, fortunately, remain intact. Blackstone said : "This law of nature, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe in all coun-· tr!es, and at all times : no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force and alJ their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original."

The identification of natural law with Divine will or dictates of God may have, qui·,e understandably, vanished at a time when men see God, if they see one anywhere at all, in the highest qualities inherent in the nature of Man himself. But the idea of a natural law as a morally inescapable postulate of a just order, recognizing the inalienable and inherent rights of all men (which term includes women) as equals before the law persists. It is, I think, embedded in our own Constitution. I do not think that we can reject Blackstone's theory of natural rights as totally irrelevant for us today. Blackstone propounded his philosophy of natural or fights in the following terms :

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absolute

''The absJlute rights of man, considered as .1 free agent, endowed with discernment to know good from evil, and with power of choosing those measures which appear to him to be most desirable, are usually summed up in one general appellation, and denom:nated the natural liberty of mankind. This natural liberty consists properly in a power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the law of nature; being a right inherent in us by birth, and one of the gifts o£ God to man at his creation, when he endued him with the faculty of free will.· But every man, when he enters into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so valuable a purchase; and, in consideration of receiv_ing. the advantages of mutual commerce, obliges himself to conform to those laws, which the community has thought proper to establish. And this species of legal obedience and conformity is infinitely more desirable than that will and savage liberty which is sacrificed to obtain it. - For no man that considers a moment would wish to retain the absolute and uncontro11ed power of doing whatever he pleases; the consequence of which is, that every other man would also have the same power, and then there would be no security to individuals in any of the enjoyments of life. Political, therefore, or civil liberty, which is that of a member of society, is no other than natura~ liberty so far restrained by human laws (and no farther) as is necessary and exped!ent for the general advantage of the public.

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[1978] 2 S.C.R.

The absolute rights of every Englishman, (which, taken in a political and extensive sense, are usually called their liberties), as they are founded on nature and reason, so they are coeval with our form of Government; though subject at times to fluctuate and change; their establishment (excellent as it is) being still human.

* * * And these may be reduced to three principal or primary articles; the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private property, because, a3 there is no other known method of compulsion, or abridging man's natural free will, but by an infringement or diminution of one or other of these important rights, the preservation of these, involate, may justly be said to include the preservation of our civil immunities in their largest and most extensive sense. I. The right of personal security consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health and his reputation.

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II. Next to personal security, the law of England regards, asserts, and preserves the personal liberty of indivi~ duals. This personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one's person to whatsoever place qne's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or r~straint, unless by due course of law. Concerning which we .may make the same observations as upon the preceding article, that it is a right strictly natural; that the laws of England have never abridged it without sufficient cause; and that, in Jhis kingdom, it cannot ever be abridged at the mere discretion of the magistrate, without the explicit permission of the laws. III. The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property; which cons:sts in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land, The original of private property is probably founded in nature, as will be more fully explained in the second book of tbe ensuing commentaries; but certainly the modifications under which we at present find it, the method of conserving it in the present owner, and of translating it from man to man, are entirely derived from society; and are some of those civil advantages, in exchange for which every indi. vidual has resigned a part of his natural liberty." I have reproduced from Blackstone whose ideas may appear somewhat quaint in an age of irreverence because, although1 I know that modern jurisprudence conceives ·of all rights as relative or as products of particular socio-economic orders, yet, the idea that man, as man, morally has certain inherent natural primordial inalienable human rights goes back to the very origins of human jurisprudence.

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MANEKA GANDHI v. 1JNION (Beg, C. /.)

It is found in Greek philosophy. If we have advanced today to· wards what we believe to ·be a higher civilisation and a more enligh·

tened era, we cannot fall behind what,-at any rate, was the meaning given to "personal fberty" long ago by Blackstone. "As indicated above, it included "the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may dlrect, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law". I think that both the rights of "personal security" and of "personal liberty", recognised by what Blackstone termed ''natural law", are embodied in Article 21 of the Constitution. For this proposition, I relied, in A. D. M. Jabalpur v. S. S. Shukla (supra), and I do so again here, on a passage from Subba Rao C.J., speaking for five Judges of this Court in /. C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (I) when he said (at p. 789) : "Now, what are the fundamental rights? They are ern":' bodied in Part III of the Constitution and they may be classified thus: (i) right to equality, (ii) right to freedom, (iii) right against exploitation, (iy) right to freedom of religion, (v) cultural and educational rights, (vi) right to property, and (vii) right to constitutional remedies. They are the rights of the people preserved by our Constitution, 'Fundamental rightst are the modern name for what have been traditionally known as 'natural rights'. As one author puts it : 'they are moral rights which every human being everywhere at all times ought to have simply because of the fact that in contradistinction with other beings, he is rational and moral'. They are the primordial rights necessary for the development of human personality. They are the rights which enable a man to chalk out his own life in the manner he likes best. Our Constitution, in addition to +he well-known fundamental rights, also inaluded the rights of the minorities, tintouchables and other backward communities, in such right". Hidayatullah, J., in the same case said (at p. 877) : "What I have said does not mean that Fundamental Rights are not subject to change or modification. In the most inalienable of such rights a distinction must be made between possession of a right and its exercise. The first is fixed and the latter controlled by justice and necessity. Take for example Article 21 : 'No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedur~ established by law". Of all the rights, the right to one's life is the most valuable. This article of the Constitution, therefore, makes the right fundamental. But the inalienable right is curtailed by a murderer's conduct as viewed under Iaw. The depriva· tion, when it takes place, is not of the right which was immutable but of the continued exercised of the right." . . .<

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(1) [1967] 2 SCR 762.

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[1978] 2 s.c.R.

It is, therefore, clear that six out of eleven Judges in Golak Nath's case declared that fundamental rights are natural rights embodied in the Constitution itself. This view was affirmed by the majority Judges of this Court in Shukla's case. It was explained by me there at some length. Khanna, J ., took a somewhat different view. Detailed reasons were given by me in Shukla's case (supra) for taking what I found to be and still find as the only view I could possibly take if I were not to disregard~ as I could not properly do, what had been held by larger benches and what I myself consider to be the correct view : that natural law rights were meant to be converted into our Constitutionally recognised fundamental rights, at~ least so far as they are expressly mentioned, so that they arc to be found within it and not outside it. To take a contrary vlew would involve a conflict between natural law and our Constitutional law. I am emphatically of opinion that a divorce between natural law and our Constitutional law will be disastrous. It will defeat one of the basic purposes of our Constitution. The implication of what I have indicated above is that Article 21 is also a recognition and declaration of rights which inhere in every individual. Their existence does not depend on the location of the individual. Indeed, it could be argued that what so inheres is ina~ lienable and cannot be taken away at all. This mav seem theoretically correct and logical. But, in fact, we are ofte~ met with de~ nials of what is, in theory, inalienable or "irrefragible". Hence, we speak of "deprivations" or "restrictions" which are really impediments to the exercise of the "inalienable" rights. Such deprivations or restrictions or regulations of rights may take place, within prescribed limits, by means of either statutory Jaw or purported actions under that law. The degree to whkh the theoretically recognised or abstract right is concretised is thus determined by the balancing of principles on which an inherent right is based against those on which a restrictive law or orders under it could be imposed upon its exercise. We have to decide in each specific case, as it arises before us, what the result of such a balancing is. In judging the validity of either legislative or executive state action for conflict with any of the fundamental rights of individuals, whether they be of citizens or non-citizens, the question as to where the rights are to be exercised is not always material or even relevant. If the persons concerned, on whom the law or purported action under it is to operate, are outside the territorial jurisdiction of our ~ountry, the action taken may be ineffective. But, the validity of the law must be determined on considerations other than this. The tests of validity of restrictions imposed upon the rights covered by article 19 (1) will be found in clauses (2) to ( 6) of Article 19. There is nothing there to suggest that r estrictions on rights the exercise of which may involve going out of the country or some activities abroad are excluded from the purview of tests contemplated by articles 19(2) to (6). I agree with my learned brother Bhagwati, for reasons detailed by him, that the total effect and not the mere form of a restric~ tion will determine which fundamental right is really involved in a

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MANEKA GANDHI V. UNION (Beg, C. ].)

particular case and whether a restric_tion upon its exercise is reasonbly permissible on the facts and circumstances of that case.

If rights under article 19 are rights which inhere in Indian cit~­

zcns, individuals concerned carry these inherent fundamental consti-

tutional rights with them wherever they go, in s~ far a.s o'!r law applies to them, because they arc parts of the Indmn nation JUSt as Indian ships, flying the Indian flag, are deemed, in International law, to be floating parts of Indian territory. This analogy, however, ~ould not be pushed too far because Indian citizens on foreign terntory, are only entitled, by virtue of their Indian nationality and passports, to the protection of the Indian Republic and the assistance of its diplomatic missions abroad. They cannot claim to be governed abroad by their own ConstiTutional or personal laws which do not operate outside India. But, that is not the position in the case before us. So far as the impugned action in the case before us is concerned, it took place in India and against an ln{.lian citizen residing in India.

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In India, at any rate, we are all certainly governed by our Constitution. The fact that the affected petitioner may not, as a result of a particular order, be able t9 do something intended to be done by her abroad cannot possibly make the Governmental action in lndja either ineffective or immune from judicial scrutiny or from an attack made on, the ground of a violation of a fundamental right which inhere.,s in an Indian citizen. The consequences or effects upon the petitioner's possible actions or future activities in other countries may be a factor which may be weighed, where relevant, with other relevant facts in a particular case in judging the merits of the restriction imposed. It will be relevant in so far as it can be shown to have some connection with public or national interests when determining the ffi(,rits of an order passed. It may show how she has bl!come a "person aggrieved" with a cause of action, by a particular order involving her personal freedom. But, such considerations cannot curtail or impair the scope or operation of fundamental rights of citizens as protections against unjustifia:ble action.s of their own Government. Nor can they, by their own force, protect legally unjustifiable actions of the Government of our country against attacks in our own Courts. In order to apply the tests contained in Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution, we have to consider the objects for which the exercise of iil.lterent rights recognised by Article 21 of the Constitution are restricted as well as the procedure by which these restrictions are sought to be imposed. Both substantive and procedural laws and actions taken under them will have to pass tests imposed by articles 14 and 19 whenever facts justifying the invocation of either of these articles may be disclosed. For example, an international 'iinger or dancer. may well be able to complain of an unjustifiable restriction on professional activity by a denial of a passport. In such a case viol~tions of both articles 21 and 19 ( 1) (g) may both be put forward makmg it necessary for the authorities concerned to justify the restriction imposed, by showing satisfaction of tests of validity contemplated by each of these two articles.

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·.'.<The tests - of reason . and -justice.,cannot ' - be abstract. . . They cannot

-be divorced from the needs of the nation. The tests have to be pragmat£. , Otherwise, th~y would ce-ase to be reasonable. Thus, I think that a discretion left to· the authority to impound a passport in public interest cannot invalidate the law itself. We cannot, out of fear that such power will be misused, refuse to permit Parliament !o entrust --even such power to executive authorities as may be absolutely neccs· B. sary to carry out the purposes of a validly exercisable power. I think it has to be necessarily left to executive discretion to decid~ whc· · ther, on the facts and circumstances of a particular case, public inte-rest will or will _not be served by a particular order to be passed under a valid law subject, as it always is, ..to judicial supervision. In matters such as grant; suspension, impounding or cancellation of pJ.ss... ports, the possible dealings of an individual with nationals and authoC lities of other .States have to be considered.. · The contemplated or - . possible activities abroad of the individual may have to be taken into account. '-_There may be questions of national safety and welfare which transcend ·. the importance of the individual's inherent right to go where he or she pleases to go. Therefore, although we may not deny the grant of wide_ discretionary power _to the executive authorities as unreasonable. in such cases, yet, I think we must look for and find pro.. D cedural safeguards to ensure that the power will not be used for purposes extraneous to the grant cf the power· before we uphold the validity of the power conferred. \Ve have to insist on procedural proprieties the observance _of which could show that such_ a power is being used only to serve what can reasonably· and justly be regarded as a public or national interest capable of overriding the individual's inherent right of movement or travel to wherever he or she pleases in the modern world E of closer integration in every sphere between the peoples of the world and the sh~nk time-space relationship~. ..:: -· The view I have taken above proceeds on the assumption that there · are inherent or natural human rights of the individual recognised by and embodied in our Constitution. Their actual exercise, however, is regulated and conditioned largely by statutory law. Persons upon whom _F these basic rights are cvnferred can exercise them so long as there is . no justifiable reason under the law enabling deprivations or !estrictions of such rights._, But. once the valid reason is found to be there and the ··deprivation or restriction takes place for that valid reason in a procedurally Vfllid manner, the action which results in a deprivation or restrictilm becomes unassailable. If either the reason sanctioned by the law . i~ absent, or the procedure followed in arriving at the conclusion· that --- :_- · G such a reason exists is unreasonable, the order having the effect of de- · privation or restriction must. be quashed.

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·A bare look at the provisions of S. 10, sub.s.(3) of the Act will s})ow that each of the orders which could be passed under section 10, sub.s. (3)(a) to (h) requires a usatisfactiod" by the Passport Authority on certain objective conditions which must exist in a case !Jefore it p~sses an order to impound a passport or a travel document. Impoun.dmg or revocation are placed side by side on the same footing in the provision. Section 11 of the Act provides an appeal to· the Central· Governt?ent ;~=~.-

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MANEKA GANDHI v. UNION (Beg, C. ]. )

from every order passed under section 10, sub.s. (3) of the Act. Rene~, section 10, subs. s. (5) makes it obligatory upon the Passport Authority to "record in writing a brief statement of the reasons for making such order and furnish to the holder of the passport or travel document on demand a copy of the same unless in any case, the passport aut]¥:lrity is of the opinion that ·it will not be in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of India, friendly relations of India with any foreign country or in the interests of the general public to fur~ ni~h such a copy".

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It seems to me, from the prpvisions of section 5, 7 and 8 of the: Act, read with other provisions, that there is a statutory right also acquired, on fulfilment of prescribed conditions by the holder of a passport, that it should continue to be effective for the specified period so· long as no ground has come into existence for either its revbcation or for impounding it which amounts to a suspension of it for the time being. It is true that in a proceeding t!nder article 32 of the Constitution, we are only concerned with the enforcement of fundamental Constitutional rights and not with any statutory rights apart from fundamental rights. Article 21, however, makes it clear that violaTion of a law, whether statutory or if any other kind, is itself an infringement of the guaranteed fundamental right. The basic right is not to be denied the protection of "law" irrespective of variety of that law. It need only be a right "established by law". There can be no doubt what~ver that the orders under section 10(3) must be based upon some material even if that material consists, in some cases, of reasonable suspicion arising from certain credible assertions made by reliable individuals. It may be that, in an emergent situation, the impounding of a passport may become necessary without even giving an opportunity to be heard. against such a step, which could be reversed after an opportunity given to the holder of the passport to show why the step was unnecessary, but, ordinarily, no passport could be reasonably either impounded or revoked without giving a prior op~ portunity to its holder to show cause against the proposed action. The impounding as well revocation of a passport, seem to constitute action in the nature of a punishm~p.t necessitated on one of tht:J grounds specified in the Act. . Hence, ordinaJily, an opportunity to be heard in defen::e after a show cause notice should be given to the holder of a passport even before impounding it.

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It is well established that even where there is no specific provision in a statute or rules made thereunder for showing cause against action proposed to be taken against an individual, which affects the rights o~ that individual, the duty to give reasonable opportunity to be heard will be implied from the nature of the function to be performed by the authority which has the power to take punitive or damaging action. This principle was laid down by this Court in the· State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Or~. C) in the following words : "The rule that a party to whose prejudice an order is intended to be passed is entitled to a hearing applies alike to (l) AlR 1967 S.C. 1269 at 1271.

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In England, the rule \Vas thus expressed by Byles J. in Cooper v. Wandru·orth Board of Works(!) : "The laws of God and man both give the party an opportunity to make his defence, if he has any. I remember to have heard it observed by a very learned man, upon such an occasion, that even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence. "Adam (say~ God), "where art thou? Hast thpu not eaten of the treewhereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat ?" And the same question was put to Eve also."

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[1978] 2 S.C.lt.

judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences. It is one of the fundamental rules of .our constitutional set-up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers. Duty to act judicially would, therefore arise from tb~ very nature of the function intended to be performed, it need not be shown to be super1added. If there is ppwer to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. If the essentials of justice be ignored and an order to the prejudice of a Person is made, the order is a nullity. That is a basic concept of the rule of law and importance thereof transcends the significance of a decision in any particular case.''

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

I find no difficulty whatsoever in holding, on the strength of these weU recognised principles, that an order impounding a passport must be made quasi-judicially. This was not done in the case before us. In my estimation, the findings arrived at by my learned brethren after an examination of the facts of the case before us, with which I concur, indicate that it cannot be said that a good enough reason has been shown to exist for impounding the passport of the petitioner by the order dated 7th July, 1977. Furthermore, the petitioner has had no opportunity of showing that the ground for impounding it finaJly given in this Court either does not exist or has no bearing on public mterest or that public interest cannot be better served in some other manner. Therefore, speaking ~r myself, I would quash the order' and direct the opposite parties to give an opportunity to the petitioner to show cause against any proposed action on such grounds as may be avai1ab1e.

I am not satisfied that there were present any such pressing grounds with regard to the petitioner be(o're us that the immediate action of impounding her passport 'vas called for. Furthermore, the rather cavalier fashion in which disclosure of any reason for impounding her passport was denied to her, despite the fact that the only reason said to exist the possibility of hef being called to give evidence before a commission {)t inquiry and stated in the counter-affidavit filed in this Court, is not such as to be reasonably deemed to necessitate its concealment in (1)

1863 (14) C.B. (N.S.) 180.

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MANEKA GANDHI V. UNION (Chandrachud, J.)

public interest, may indicate the existence of some undue prejudice against the petitioner. She has to be protected against even the appearance of such prejudice or bias.

It appears to me that even executive authorities when taking administrative action which involves any deprivations of or restrictions on inherent fundamental rights of citizens must take care to see that justice is not only done but manifestly appears to be done. They have a duty to proceed in a way which is free from even the appearance of arbitrariness or unreasonableness or unfairness. They have to act in a manner which is patently impartial and meets the requirements of natural justice. The attitude adopted by the Attorney General however, shows that Passport authorities realize fully that the petitioner's case has not been justly or reasonably dealt with. As the· undertaking given by the Attorney General amounts to an offer to deal with it justly and fairly after informing the petitioner of any ground that may exist for impounding her pa·ssport, it seems that no further action by this Court may be necessary. In view, however, of what is practically an admission that the order actually passed on 7th Jply, 1977, is neither fair nor procedurally proper, I would, speaking for myself, quash this order and direct the return of the impounded passport to the petitioner~ I also think that the petitioner is entitled to her costs.

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CHANDRACHUD, J.-The petitioner's passport dated June 1, 1976 having been impoundr~d "in public interest" by an order dated July 2, 1977 and the Government of India having declined "in the interest of general public" to furnish to her the reasorus for its decision, she has filed this writ p=tition under article 32 of the Constitution to challenge that order. The challenge is founded on the following grounds :

(1) To the extent to which section 10(3) (c) of the Passport Act, 1967 authorises the passport authority to impound a passport "in the interests of the general public", it is violative of article 14 of the Constitution since it confers vague and undefined power on the passport authority;

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{2) Section 10(3)(c) is void as conferring an arbitrary power since it does not provide for a hearip.g to the holder of the passport before the passport is impounded; (3) Section 10 ( 3) (c) is violative of article 21 of the Constitution since it does not prescribe 'procedure' within the meaning of that article and since the procedure which it prescribes is arbitrary and unreasonable; and

(4) Section 10(3) {c) offends against articles 19(1 ){a) and

19 ( 1) (g) since it permits restrictions to be imposed on the rights guaranteed by these articles eve·n though such restrictions cannot be imposed under articles 19(2) and 19(6).

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At first, the passport authority exercising its power under section 10 ( 5) of the Act refus·~d to furnish to the petitioner the reason for which it was considered necessary in the interests of general public to impou'nd her passport. But those reasons were disclosed later in the counteraffidavit filed on behalf of the Government of India in answer to the writ petition. The disclosure made under the stress of the writ petition that the petitio'ner's passport was impounded because, her presence .8 was likely to be required in connectiop. with the proceedings before a Commission of Inquiry, could easily have been made when the pe.titioner called upon the Government to let her know the reasons why her passport was impounded. The power to refuse to disclose the reasons for impou'nding a passport is of an exceptional nature and it ought to be ~~xercised fairly, sparingly and only when fully justified by the exigencies of an uncommon situation. The reasons, if disclosed being open to judicial scrutiny for ascertaining their nexus with the order impou'nding the passport, the refusal to disclose the reasons would equally be open to the scrutiny of the court; or else, the wholesome power of a dispassionate judicial examination of executive orders could with impunity be set at naught by an obdurate determination to suppress the rea-sons. Law cannot permit the exercise of a power to keep the reasons undisclosed if the sole reason for doing so is to D keep tb~ reasons away from judicial scrutiny.

In Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer, Government of India, New Delhi & Ors.C) this Court ruled by majority that the expression "personal liberty" which occurs in article 21 of the Constitution includes the right to travel abroad and that no perso'n can be deprived of that right except according to proceE dure established by law. The Passport Act which was enacted by Parliament in 1967 in order to comp1y with that decision prescribes the procedure whereby an application for a passport may be granted fully or partially, with or witj10ut any endorsement, and a passport once granted may later be revoked or impounded. But th~ mere prescription of some ki'nd of procedure cannot ever meet the mandate of article 21. The procedure prescribed by law has to be fair, just f and reasonable, not fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary. The question whether the .procedure prescribed by a law which curtails or takes away the personal liberty guaranb:!ed by article 21 is reasonable or not has to be considered not in the abstract or on hypothetical considerations like the provision for a full-dressed hearing as in a Courtroom trial, but in the context, primarily, of the purpose which the Act is intended to achieve and of urgent situationiS which those who are G charged with the duty of administering the Act may be called upon to deal with. Sr~condly, even the fullest compliance with the requirements of aritcle 21 is not the journey's end because, a law which prescribes fair and reasonable procedure for curtailing or taking away the personal liberty guarante-~d by article 21 has still to meet a possible challenge under other provisions of the Constitution like, for example, articles 14 and 19. If the holding in A. K. Gopalan v. State of H Madras(2) that the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitutldn are ( 1) [1967] 3 SCR 525 (2) [1950} SCR 88.

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mutually exclusive were still good law, the right to travel abroad A which is part of the right of personal liberty under artic:e 21 could only be found and located in that article and in no other. But in the Bank Nationalisation Case (7t C. Cooper v. Union of India) C) the majority held that the assumption in A. K- Gopalan(2) that certain articles of the Constitution exclusively deal with specific mattens cannot be accepted as correct. Though the Bank Nationalisation casc(l) was concerned with the inter-relationship of article 31 and 19 and not B of articles 21 and 19, the basic approach adopted therein as regards 'the construction of fundamental rights guaranteed in th,~ different provisions of the Constitution categorically discarded the major premise of the majority judgment in A. K. Gopalan (supra) as incorrect. That is how a seven-Judge Bench in Shambhu Nath Sarkar v. State of West Bengal & Ors. (8) assessed the true impact of the ratio of the Ba1lk Nationalisation Case (supra) on the dec;ision in A. K. Gopalan (supra) c in Shambhu Nath Sarkar(3) it was accordingly held that a law of preventive detent~on has to meet the challenge not only of articles 21 and 22 but also of article 19(1)(d). Later, a five-Judge Bench in Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal & Ors.( 4 ) adopted the same approach and considered the question whether the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 violated the right guaranteed by article 19 ( 1) (d). Thus, the inquiry whether the right to travel abroad D forms a part of any of the freedoms mentioned in article 19 ( 1) is not to be shut out at the threshold merely because that right i! a part of the guarantee of personal liberty under article 21 . I am in entire agreement with Brother Bhagwati when he says : "The law must, therefore, now be taken to be well settled that article 21 does not exclude article 19 and that even if there is a law prescribing a procedure for depriving a person of 'personal liberty' and there is consequently no infring~ment of the fundamental right conferred by article 21, such law, in so far as it abridges or takes away any fundamental right under article 19 would have to meet the challenge of that article." The interplay of diverse articles of the Constitution guaranteeing varioU8 freedoms has gone through vicissitudes which have been elaborately traced by Brother Bhagwati. The test of directness of the impugned law as contrasted with its cons·~quences was thought in A. K. Gopalan (supra) and Ram Singh( 5 ) to be the true approach for determining whether a fundamental right was infringed. A significant application of that test may be perceived in Naresh S. Mirajkar(6) where an order passed by the Bombay High Court prohibiting the publication of a witness's evidence in a defamation case was upheld by this Court on the ground that it was passed with the object of affording protection to the witness in order to obtain true evidence (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

[1973) 3 SCR 530. [1950) SCR 88 [1973) l SCR 856. [1975) 1 SCR 778. P951J SCR 451. [1966J 3 SCR 744.

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and its impact on the right of free speech and expression guaranteed by article 19(1) (a) was incidental. N. H. Bhagwati J. in Express NewspapersC) struck a modified note by evolving the test of proxi~ mate effect and operation of the statute. That test saw its fruition in Sakal PapersC) where the Court, giving precedence to the direct and imm~diate effect of the order over its form and object, struck down the Daily Newspapers (Price and Page) Order. 1960 on the ground that it violated article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The culmination of this thought process came in the Bank Natianalisation Case (supra) where it was held by the majority, speaking through Shah J., that the extent of protection against impairment of a fundamental right is determined by the direct operation of an action upon the individual's rights and not by the object of the l•=gislature or by the form of the action. In Bennett Coleman( 3 ) the Court, by a majority, reiterated the same position by saying that the direct operation of the Act upo'n the rights forms the real test. It struck down the newsprint policy, restricting the number of pages of newspapers without the option to reduce the circulation, as offending against the provisions of article 19 (1 )(a). "The action may have a direct effect on a fuhdamental right although i!s direct subject matter may be different" observed the Court, citing an effective instance of a law dealing with the D~fence of India or with defamation and yet having a direct effect on the freedom of speech and expression. The measure of directness, as held by Brother Bhagwati, is the 'inevitable' consequence of the impugned stature. These then are the guidelines with the help of which one has to ascertain whether section 10(3) (c) of the Passport Act which authorizes the passport authority to impound a passport or the impugned order passed thereunder violates the guarantee of free speech and expression conferred by article 19 ( 1 ) (a) . The learned Attorney General answered the petitioner's contention in this behalf by saying firstly, that the right to go abroad cannot be comprehended within the right of free speech and expression since the latter right is exercisable by the Indian citizens within the geographical limits of India only. Secondly, he contends, the right to go abroad is altogether of a different genre from the right of free speech and expression and is therefore not a part of it.

The first of these contentions raises a question of great importance but the form in which the contention i;S couched is, in my opinion, apt to befog the true issue. Article 19 confers certain freedoms on Indian citizens, some of which by their very language and nature are limited G in their exercise by geographical considerations. The right to move freely throughout the 'territory of India' and the right to resid~ and settle in any part of the 'territory of India' which are contained in clauses (d) and (c) of article 19(1) are of this nature. The two clauses expressly restrict the operation of the rights mentioned therein to the territorial limits of India. Besides, by the very object and nature of those rights, their exercise is limited to Indian territory.

(1) (1959]SCR12.

(2) [ 1962] 3 SCR 842. (3) [1973] 2 SCR 757.

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Those rights are int,;!nded to bring in sharp focus the unity and integrity of the country and its quasi-federal structure. Their drive is directed against the fissiparous theory that 'sons of the soil' alone shall thrive, the 'soil' being conditioned by regional and sub-regional coruaderations. The other freedoms which article 19 ( 1) confers are not so restricted by their terms but that again is not conclusive of the question under consideration. Nor indeed does the fact that restraints on the freedoms guaranteed by Article 19(1) can be imposed under Article\S 19(2) to 19 (6) by the State furnish any clue to that question. The State can undoubtedly impose reasonable restrictions on fundamental freedoms under clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 and those restrictions. generally, have a territorial operation. But th'~ ambit of a freedom cannot be measured by the right of a State to pass laws imposing restrictions on that freedom which, in the ~nerality of cases, have a geographical limitation.

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Article 19 (1) (a) guarantees to Indian citizens the right to free.dom of speech and expression. It does not delimit that right in any manner ::md there is no remson, arising either out of interpP:!tational dogmas or pragmatic considerations, why the courts should str1fln the language of the Article to cut down the amplitude of that right. The plain meaning of the clause guaranteeing free speech and expression is D that Indian citizens are entitled to exercise that right wherever they choose, regardles-s of geographical considerations, sub}~ct of course to the operation of any existing law or the power of the State to make a law imposing reaso'nable restrictions in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation t.a contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence, as provided E in article 19(2). The exercise of the right of free speech ai1d expression beyond the limits of Indian territory will, of course, also be subject to the laws of the country in which the freedom is ot is intended to be exercised. I am quite clear that the Constitution does not confer any power on the executive to prevent the exercise by <ili Indian citizen of the right of free speech and expression on foreign soil, subject to what I have just state~. In fact, that seems to me to F be the crux of ~he m~tter, for w~ich reason I said, though with respect. tha~ _the form. m which the learned Attorney General stated his proposition v:as likely !O cloud the true issue. The Constitution guar:.ititees certam fundamental freedoms and except where their exerci~e is 1i.mited by territorial considerations, those freedoms may be exer-. c.1sed wher~socver one chooses, subject to the exceptions or qualifica· t1ons mentwncd above. . The next questio~ is whether the right to go out of India is an mtegral part . o~ th_e nght of free speech and expression and is com~reh~nded Wlthm 1~. Tt ~ecms to me impossible to answer this question m the a~rmatn.:e as IS. contended by the petitioner's counsel, Shrl Mad~n Bhatia. It JS possible . to predicate- or many a rigbt that its e~erc1se would be more me~~mgfu1 if the right is extended to comp1ehend~d an extraneous facility. But such extensions do not form part of the nght con~err?d by the. Constitution. The analogy of the freedom of press bcmg mc1uded m the right of free speech and expres~ion

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is wholly misplaced because the right of free expression incontrovertibly includes the right of freedom of the press. The right to go abroad on one hand and the right of free speech and expression on the other are made up of basically different constituents, so dlfterent indeed that one cannot be comprehended in the other. Brother Bhagwati has, on this aspect considered at length certain American decisions like Kent(') ,;Apthekar(2 ) and Zemel( 3 ) and illuminating though his analysis. is, I am inclined to think that the presence of the due process clause in tlie 5th and 14th Amendments of the American Constitution makes significant difference to the approach of American Judges to the definition and evaluation of constitutional guarantees. The content which has been meaningfully and imaginatively poured into "due process of law" may, in my view, constitute an important point of distinction between the American Constitution and ours which studiously avoided the use of that expression. In the Centennial Volume. "The Fourteenth Amendment" edited by Bernard Schwartz, is contained in an article on 'Landmarks of Legal Liberty' by Justice William J. Brennan in which the learned Judge quoting from Yeat's play has this to say : In the service of the ageold dream for recognition of the equal and inalienable rights of man, the 14th Amendment though 100 years old, can never be old.

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"Like the poor old women in Yeat's play,

"Did you see an old woman going down the path ?" asked Bridget. "I did not," replied Patrick, who had come into the house after the old woman left it, "But I saw a young girl and she had the walk of a queen." Our Constitution too strides in its majesty but, may it be remembered, without the due process clause, I prefer to be content with a decision directly in point, All India Bank Employees' Association( 4 ) tn which this Court rejected the contention that the freedom to form associations or unions contained in article 19 ( 1 ) (c) carried with it the right that a workers' union could do all that was necessary to make that right effp,ctive, in order to achieve the purpose for which the union was formed. One right leading to another and that another to still other. and so on, was described in the abovementioned decision as productive of a "grotesque result". I have nothing more to add to what Brother Bhagwati has said en the other points in the case. I share his opinion that though the right to go abroad is not included in the right contained in article 1Y( 1 ) (a), if an order made under section 10 ( 3) (c) of the Act -does in fact violate the right of free speech and expression, such an order could be struck down as unconstitutional. It is well-settled that a statute may pass the test of constitutionality and yet an order passed under it may be unconstitutional. But of that I will say no. .more . (1) 2 L. eel. 2d 1204. (2) 12 L. ed. 2d 992. (3) 14 L. ed. 2d 179. (4) [1962} 3 SCR 269.

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MANEKA GANDHI V. UNION (Bhagwari, /.)

because in this branch, one says no more than the facts warrant and decides nothing that does not call for a decision. The -fact that the petitioner was not heard before or soon after the impounding of her passport would have introduced a serious infirmity in the order but for the statement of the Attorney General that the Government was. willing to hear the petitioner find further to limit the operation ~f. the order to a· period of six months from the date of the fresh dects1on, if the decision was adverse to the petitioner. The order, I agree, does not in fact offend against article 19(1) (a) or 19(1 )(g).

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I, therefore., agree with the order proposed by Brother Bhagwati.

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BHAGWATI, J.-The Petitioner is the holder of the passport issued to her on 1st June, 1976 under the Passport Act, 1967. On 4th July, 1977 the Petitioner received a letter dated 2nd July, 1977 from the Regional Passport Officer, Delhi intimating to her that it has ~een dr.dded by the Government of India to impq_und her passport under se.ction 10 ( 3) (c) of the Act in public interest and requiring her t() surrender the passport within seven days from the date of receipt of the letter. The petitioner immediately addressed a letter to the Regional Passport Officer requesting him to furnish a copy of the statement of reasons for making the order as provided in section 10(5) to which a reply was sent by the Government of India, Minis1ry of External Affairs on 6th July, 1977 stating inter alia that the Government has decided "in the interest of the general public" not to furnish her a copy of the statement of reasons, for making of the order. The Petitioner thereupon filed the present petition challenging the action of the Government in impounding her passport and d~clining to give reasons for doing so. The action of the Government was impugned inter alia on the ground that it was mala (ide, but this challe§S_e was not pressed before us at the time of the hearing of the arguments and hence it is not necessary to state any facts bearing <m that question. The principal challenge set out in the petition against the legality of the action of the Government was based mainly on the ground that section 10( 3) (c)~ in so far as it empowers the Passport Authority to· impound a passport "in the interests of the general public" is violative of the equality clause contained in Art. 14 of the Constitution, since the condition denoted by the words "in the interests of the general public" limiting the exercise of the power is vague and undefined and the power conferred by this provision is, tberefore, excessive and suffers from the vice of "over-breath." The petition also contamed a challenge that an order under section 10(3) (c) impounding a passport couJd not be made by the Passport Authority without giving an opportumty to the holder of the passport to be heard in defence and since in. the present. case, the pass~rt was impounded by the Government Without a.ffordmg an opporturuty of hearing to the petitioner, the order was ~ull and void, and, in the alternatjve, if section 10(3 )(c) were read m s~ch a ma~er as t<? exclude. the .right of hearing, section would be mfccted w1th the vtce of arbttranness and it would be void as ~trending .~cle 14. These were the only grounds taken in llie Peti· tion as ongmally filed and on 20th July, 1977 the petition was admitted and rule issued by this Court and an interim order was made directing

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that the passport of the petitioner should continue to remain deposited with the Registrar of this Court pending the hearing and final disposal of the Pe<tition. The hearing of the petition was fixed on 30th August 1977, but before that, tl1e petitioner filed an application for urging additional ground~ and by this application, two furth!!r grounds were sought to be urged by her. One ground was that· section 10 ( 3) (c) is ultra vires Article 21 since it provides for impounding of passport without any procedure as required by that Article, or, in any event, even if it could be said that there is some procedure prescribed under the passport Act, 1967, it is wholly arbitrary and unreasonable and, therefore, not in compliance with the requirement of that article. The other ground urged on behalf of the petitioner was that section 10(3 )(c) is violative of Articles 19 (1 )(a) and 19 (1 )(g) inasmuch as it autliorises imposition of restrictions on freedom of Speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) and freedom to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, or business guaranteed under Article 1Y(1 )(g) and these restrictions arc impermissible under ArtiCle 19 (2) and Article 19 ( 6) respectively. The application for urging these two additional grounds was granted by this Court and ultimately at the hearing of the petition these were the two principal grounds which were pressed on behalf of the petitioner.

Before we examine the rival arguments urged on behalf of the parties in regard to the various questions arising in this petition, it would be convenient to set out the relevant provisions of the Passport Act, 1967. This Act was enacted on 24th June, 1967 in view of the E decision of this Court in SMwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport O.fficer. Government of l1tdia, New Delhi & Ors.C) The position which obtained prior to the coming into force of this Act was that there was no law regulating the issue of passports for leaving the shores of India and going abroad. The issue of passports was entirely within the discretion of the_ executive and this discretion was unguided and unchanneUed. This Court. by a majority,-he1a that F the expression "personal liberty" in Article 21 takes in the right ot locomotion and travel abroad and under Article 21 no person can be deprived of his right to go abroad except according to the procedure established by law and since no law had been made by the State regulating or prohibiting the exercise of such right, the refusal of pass~ port was in violation of Article 21 and moreover the discretion with the executive in the matter of issuing or refusing passport being unG channclled and arbitrary, it was plainly violative of Article 14 and hence the order refusing passport to the petitioner was also inva1id under that Article. This decision was accepted by Parliament and the infirmity pointed out by it was set right by the enactment of the Passports Act, 1967. This Act, as its preamble shows, was en_acted to provide for the issue of passports and travel documents to reg_t!late the departure from India of citizens of India and other l'Crsons a1_1d for H incidental and ancillary matters. Section 3 provides that rio pers0'" shall depart from or attempt to depart from India unless he balds in (1) [1967] 3 SCR 52.5.

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this behalf a valid passport or travel document. What are the different c1asses of passports and travel documents which can be issued under the Act is. laid down in section 4. Section 5, sub-section (1) provides for making of an application for issue of a passport or travel document or for endorsement on such passport or travel document for ·visitmg fllreign country or countries and sub-section (2) says that on receip! Df such application, the passport authority, after making such inquiry, if any, as it may consider neces~ry, shall, by order in writing, issue or rciuse to issue the passport or travel document or make _or refuse to make on the passpo-rt or travel document endorsement in respect of one or more of the foreign countries specified in the application. Sub-section ( 3) requires the passport authority, where it refuses to issue the passport or travel document or to make any endorsement on the passport or travel document, to record in writing a brief statement of its reasons for making such order. Section 6, sub-section ( 1) lays down the grounds on which the passport authority shall refuse to make ari endorsement for visiting any foreign coun!ry and provides that on no other ground the endorsement shall be refused. There are fout grounds set out in· this sub-section ~nd of them, the last is that, in the opinion of the Central Government, the presence of the applicant in such foreign country is not in the public interest. Similarly sub-sec· tion (2) of section 6 specifies the grounds on which alone and on no other grounds the passport authority shall refuse to issue pa~sport or travel document for visiting any foreign country and amongst various wounds set out there, the last is that, in the opinion of the Central Government the issue of passport or travel docul!lent to the applicant will not be in the public interest. Then we come to section 10 which is the material section which falls for consideration. Sub-section ( 1 ) of that section empowers the passport authority to vary or cancel the endorsement of a passport or travel document or to vary or cancel the conditions subject to which a passport or travel document has been issued, having regard, inter alia, to the provisions of sub-section ( 1) ot section 6 or any notification under section 19, Sub-section (2) confer~ powers on the passport authDrity to vary or cancel the conditions cf thr passport or travel document on application of the holder of the passport or travel document and with the previous approval of the Central Gd,vemment. Sub-section ( 3) provides that the passpott authority may impound or cause to he impounded or revoke a pass· port or travel document on the grounds set out in clauses (a) to (h), .The order impounding the passport in the present case was made by the Central Government under clause (c) which reads as follows : -

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:'(c) if. the passport authority deems it necessary so to do In the mterest of the Sovereignty and Integrity of Indra, the security of India, friendly relations of India with any foreign country, or in the interests of the general public;n

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The .partiqilar ground relied upon for making the order was that sef out II~ the last part of clause (c), namely, that the Central Govern~· ment' ~eem.s · it ~ec,~ssary to impou~d th~_ passport "in. the interests of the general pubhc. Then folfows sub-section (5) which requires the

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passport authority impounding or revoking a passport or travel document or varying or cancelling an endorsement made upon it to "record in writing a brief statement of the reasons for making such order and furnish to the holder of the p(!ssport or travel document on demand a copy of the same unless, in any case, the passport authority is of the opinion that it will not be in the interests of the soveriegnty and integrity of India, the security of India, friendly relations of India with IWY forei~ country or in the interests. of the general public to furnish such a copy." It was in virtue of the provision contained in the latter part of this sub-section that the Central Government declined to furnish a copy of the statement of reasorn; for impounding the passport of the petitioner on the ground that it was not in the interests of the general public to furnish such copy to the petitioner. It is indeed a mattez of regret that the Central Government should have taken up this attitude m reply to the request of the petitioner to be supplied a copy of the statement of reasons, because ultimately, when the petition came to be filed, the Central Government did disclose the reasons in the affidavit in reply to the petition which shows that it was not really contrary to public interest and if we look at the reasons given in. the affidavit in reply, it will be clear that :QO reasonable person oould possibly have taken the view that the interests of the general public would be prejudiced by the disclosure of the reasons. This iS an instance sho,win~: how power conferred on a statutory authority to act in the in:....Tests of toe general public can sometimes be improperly exercised. If the petitioner had not filed the petition, she would perhaps 11ever have been able to find out what were the reasons for which her passport was impounded and she was deprived of her right to go abroad. The necessity of giving reasons has obviously been introduced in sub-section (5) so that it ntay act as a healthy check against abuse orr misuse of power. If the reasons given are not relevant and there is no nexus between the 1easons and the grqund on which the passport has bten impounded, it would b~ open to the holder of the passport to challenge the order impounding it in a court of law and if the court is satisfied that the reasons are extraneous. or irrelvant, the court would strike down the order. This liability to be exposed tO judicial scrutiny would by itself act as a safeguard against improper or mala (ide exercise of power. The court would, therefore, be very slow to accept, without close scrutiny, the claim of the passport authority that it would not be in the jnterests. O(f the general public to disclose the reasons. The passport authority would have to satisfy the court by placing proper material that the giving of reasons would be clearly and indubitably against the interests of the general public and if the Court is. not sd satisfied, the Court may require the passport authority to disclose the reasons, subject to any valid and lawful claim for privilege which may be set up on behalf of the Government. Here in the present case, as we have already pointed out, the Central Government did init!_ally claim that it would b~ against the interests of the general public to disclose the reasons for impounding the passport, but when it came to filing the affidavit in reply, the 'Central Government very properly abandoned this unsustainable claim and disclosed the· reasons. The question whether these reasons have any nexus with the interests, of the general public or they are extraneous and irrelevant is a matter

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which \Ve shall examine when we deal with the arguments of the parties. Meanwhile, proceeding further with the resume of the relevant provi~ sions, reference may be made to sectio~ U which provides for _ an 'tppeal inter alia against the order impounding or revoking a passport or travel document under sub-sedion (3) of section 10. But there is a proviso to this section which says that if the order impounding or 1evoking a passport or travel document is passed by the Central Gov· ernment, there shall be no right to appeal. These are the !e~vant provisions. of the Act in the light of which we have to consider the constitutionality of sub~section (3 )(c) of section 10 and the validity of the order impounding the passport of the petitioner.

Mea11ing and content of personat liberty in article 21 The first contention urged on behalf of the petitioner in support ot the petition was that the right to go abroad is part of 'personal ~~-~erty' within the meaning of that expression as used in Article 21 and no one ·can be deprived of this right except according to the procedure prescribed by law. There is no procedure prescribed by the Passport Act, 1967 for impounding or revoking a passport and thereby preyent· ing the holder of the passport from going abroad and in any event, even if some procedure can be traced in the relevant provisions-of the: Act, it is unreasonable and arbitrary, inasmuch as it does not provide [or giving an opportunity to the holder "of the passport to be_heard against the making of the order and hence the action of the Central Government in impounding the passport of the petitioner is in violation of Article 21. This contention of the petitioner raises a question as to the true interpretation of Article 21, what is the nature and ex· tent of the protection afforded by this article ? What is the meaning of 'personal liberty' : does it include the right to go abroad so that this right cannot be abridged or taken away except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law ? What is the inter-relation between Art. 14 and Article 21 ? Does Article 21 merely require that there must be some semblance of procedure, howsoever arbitrary or fanciful, prescribed by law before a person can be deprived of his personal liberty or that the procedure must satisfy certain requisites in the sense that it must be fair and reasonable ? Article 21 occurs. in Part Ill of the ConsHtution which confers certain fundamental rights. These fundamental rights had their roots deep ~n the struggle for independence and, as pointed out by Granville Austin in 'The Indian Constitution-Cornerstone of a Nation', "they were included in the· Constitution in the hope and expectation that one day the tree of true lib-erty would bloom in India". They were indelibly written in the sub-conscious memory of the race which fought for well~nigh thirty years for securing freedom from British rule and they found expression in the form of fundamental rights when the Constitution was enacted. These fund~mer1 tal rig~ts represent. th~ .basic values cherished by the people of tlus country smce the V edzc times and they are calculated to protect the dignily of the. individual and create conditions in which every human being can develop his personality to the fullest extent. They wea':e a 'ilpattem _of gua~ant~s on the basic-structure of human if~f' ~nd 1mpoie negative obligations on the State not to encroach on mdi~

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vidual liberty in its various dimensions. It is apparent from the enunciation of these rights that the respect for the individual and his capacity for individual volition which finds expression there is not a self fulfilling prophecy. Its purpose is to help the individual to find his own liability, to give expression to his creativity and to prevent governmental and other forces from 'alienating' the individual from his creative impulses. These rights are wide ran_ging and comprehensive and they fall under seven heads, namely, right to equality, right to freedom, right against exploitation, right to freedom of religion, cultural and educational rights, right to property and right to constitutional rer.:.ledies. Articles 14 to 18 occur under the heading 'Right to Equality', and of them, by far the most important is Article 14 wnich confers a fundamental right by injuncting the State not to "deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India". Articles 19 to 22, which find place under the heading "Right to freedom" provide for different aspects of freedom. Clause ( 1) of Article 19 enshrines what may be described as the seven lamps of freedom. It provides that all citizens shall have the right-( a) to freedom of speech and expression; (b) to assemble peaceably and without arms; (c) to form associations or unions;-(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India; (e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; {f) to -acquire, hold and dispose of property and (g) to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business·. But these freedoms arc not and cannot be absolute, for absolute and unrestricted freedom of one may be destructive of the freedom of another and in a well·ordered, civilised society, freedom can only be regulated freedom. Therefore, clauses ( 2) to ( 6) of Art. 19 permit reasonable restrictions to be imP.OSOO on the exercise of the fundamental rights guaranteed under clause-{ 1) of that article. Article 20 need not detain us as. that is not material for the determination of the controversy between the parties. Then comes Article 21 which provides : "21. No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."

Article 22 confers protection against arrest and detention in certain cases and provides inter alia safeguards in case of preventive detentien. The other fundamental rights are not relevant to the present discussion and we need not refer to them. It is obvious that Article 21, though couched in negative language, confers the fundamental right to life and personal liberty. So far as the right to personal liberty is concerned~ it is ensured by providing that no one shall be deprived of personal liberty except according to procedure prescribed by law. The first question that arises for consideration on the language of Article 21 is : what is the meaning and content of the words 'personal liberty' as ~sed in this article ? This qu~stion incidently came up for discussion in some of the jud~eJ!lS in A. K. Gopalan v. State of MadrasC) and the observations madeoy Patanjali Sastri, J., Mukherjee, J., and S. R. Das, J., seemed to place a narrow interpretation on the words 'personal liberty' so as to confine (1) {t950J s.c.R.. ss ..

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the protection of Article 21 to freedom of the person against unlawful detention. But there was no definite pronouncement made on this point since· the question before the Cour! was not so much the interpretation of the words 'personal liberty' as the inter-relation between Article 19 and 21. It was in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors.C) that the question as to the proper scope and meaning of the exp~ession 'personal liberty' came up pointedly for consideration for the first time before this Court. The majority of the Judges took the view "that 'personal liberty' is used in the article as a compendious term, to include within itself all the varieties of rights which go to make ~ the 'personal liberties' of man other than those dealt with in tl!e several cJauses of Article 19 ( 1). In other words, while Article 19 (1) deals with particular species or attributes of that freedom, 'personal_ liberty' in Article 21 takes in and comprises the residue". The minority judges, however, disagreed with this view taken by the majority and explained their position in the following words : "No doubt the expr~ssion 'personal liberty' is a comprehensive one and the right to move freely is an attribute of personal liberty. It is said that the Jreedom to move freely is carved out of personal liberty and, therefore, the expression 'personal liberty' in Article 21 excludes that attribute. In our view, this is not a correct approach. Both are independent fundamental rights, though there is overlapping. There is no question of one being carved out of another. The fundamental right of life and personal liberty bas many attributes and some of them are found in Article 19. If a person's fundamental right under Article 21 is infringed, the State can rely upon a law to sustain the action~ but that cannot be a complete answer unless the said law satisfies the test laid down in Article 19 (2) so far as the attributes covered by Article 19 (1) are concerned". There can be no doubt that in view of the decision of this Court in R. C. Cooper v. Union of India(2) the minOrity view must-be regarded as correct and the majority view must be held to have been overruled. We shalt have occasion to analyse agd djscuss the decision in R. C. Cooper's case a little later when we deal with the arguments base.d on infraction of Articles 19(1) (a) and 19 ( 1 )(g), but it is sufficient to state for the present that according to this decision, which was a decision given by the full Court, the fundamental rights conferred by Part III are not distipct arid mutually exdusive rights. Each freedom has different dimensions and merely because the' limits of interference with one freedom are satis.fied, the law is not freed from the necessity to meet the challenge of another guaranteed freedom. The decision in A. K. Gopalan's (supra) .case gave rise to the theory that the freedoms under Articles 19, 21 , 22 and 31 are exclusive-each article enacting a code relating to the pmtcction of distinct rights, but this theory was over-turned in R. C. Cocper's case (supra) where Shah, J., speaking on behalf of the majority pointed out that "Part III of the Constitution weaves a l)attern of guarantees on the texture of basic human rights. The guarantees delimit the protection of those rights in their allotted fields : they do not attempt to enunciate distinct rights.H The conclusion was summari&ed in these terms : "In our judgment, the assumption in A. K. (1) [1964J 1 S.C.R. 332. (2) [1973} 3 S.C.R. 530.

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Gopakm's case that certain articles in the Constitution exclusively deal with specific matters cannot be accepted as correct". It was held in R. C. Cooper's case and that is clear from the judgment of Shah, J., because Shah, J., in so many terms disapproved of the contrary statement of law contained in the opinions of Kania, c. J., Pa4tnjali Sastri, J., Mahajan, J., Mukherjee, J., and S. R. Das, J., in A. K. Gopalan's case that even where a person is detained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, as mandated by Article 21, the protection conferred by. the various clauses of Article 19 (1) does not cease to be available to him and the law authorising such detention lias. to satisfy the test of the applicable freedom under Article 19, clause ( 1). This would clearly show that Articles 19(1) and 21 are not muntally exclusive, for, if they were, there would be no question of a law depriving a person of personal liberty within the meaning of Article 21 having to meet the challenge· of a fundamental right under Article 19 ( 1). Indeed, in that event, a law of preventive detention which deprives a person of 'personal liberty' in the narrowest sense, namely, freedom from detention and thus falls indisputably withif! Art. 21 would not require to be tested on the touchstone of clause (d) of Article 19 ( 1) and yet it was held by a Bench of seven Judges of this Court in Shambhu Nath Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.(1 ) that such a law would have to satisfy the requirement inter alia of Article 19(1), clause (d) and in flaradhan Saha v. The State of WestBengal & Ors., (2) which was a decision given by a Bench of five judges, this Court considered the challenge of clause (d) of Article 19(1) to the constitutional validity of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 and held that that Act did not violate the constitutional guarantee embodied in that article. It is indeed difficult to see on what prin-· cipk we can refuse to give its plain natural meaning to the expression 'personal liberty' as used in Article 21 and read it in a narrow and restricted sense so as to exclude those attributes of personal liberty which are spacifically dealt with in Article 19. We do not think that this would be a correct way of interpreting the provisions of the Constitution conferring fundamental rights. The atlempt of the court should be to expand the reach and ambi' of the fundamental rights rather than attenuate their meaning arid content by a process of judicial construction. The wave length for comprehending the scope and ambit of the fundamental rights· has been set by this Court in R. C. Cooper's case and our approach in the interpretation o.f the fundamental rights must now be in tune with this wave length. We may point out even at the cost of repetition that this Court has said in so many terms in R. C. Cooper's case that each freedom has different dimensions and there may be overlapping between different fundamental rights and therefore it is not a valid argument to say that the expression 'personal liberty' in Article 21 must be so interpreted as to avoid overlapping bdween that article and Article 19 ( 1). The expression 'personal iibertyt in Article 21 is of the widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man and some of them have· been raised to the status of distinct fundamental rights nnd given additional protection under Article 19. Now, it has b_een (1) [1973]1 SCR 856. (2) [1975] 1 S.C.R. 718.

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hdd by this Court in Satwant Singh's case that 'personal liberty' within the meaning of Article 21 includes within its ambit the right to go abroad and consequently no person can be deprived of this right ex.cept according to procedure prescribed by law. Prior to the enactment of the Passports Act, 1967, there was no law regulating d1e right of a person to go abroad and that was the reason why the order of the Passport Officer refusing to issue passport to the petitioner in Satwant Singh's case was struck down as. invalid. It will be seen at once from the language of Article 21 that the protection it secures is a limited one. · It safeguards the right to go abroad against executive interference which is not supported by law; and law here means 'enacted Jaw' or 'State Law'. Vide A. K. Gopakm's case. Thus, no person can be deprived of his right to· go abroad unless there is a law made by the State prescribing the procedure for so depriving him and the deprivation is effected strictly in accordance with such procedure. It was for this reason, in order to comply with the requirement of Article 21, that Parliament enacted the Passports Act, 1967 for regu.. lating the right to go abroad. It is clear from the provisions of the Passports Act, 1967 that is lays down the circumstances under which a passport may be issued or refused or cancelled or impounded and also prescribes a procedure for doing so, but the que-stion is whether that is sufficient compliance with Article 21. Is the. prescription of some sort of procedure enough or must the procedure comply with any partir.uJar requirements'! Obviously, procedure cannot be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable. This indeed was conceded by the learned Attorney General who with his usual candour frankly stated that it _was not possible for him to contend that any procedure howsoever arbitrary, oppressive or unjust may be prescribed by the law. There was some discussion in A. K. Gopalan's case in regard to the nature! of the procedure required to be prescribed under Article 21 and at least three of the learned Judges out of five 'expressed themselves strongly in favour of the view that the procedure cannot be any arbitrary, fantastic or oppressive procedure. Fazal Ali, J., who was in a minority, went to the farthest limit in saying that the procedure must include the fcmr essentials. set out in Prof. Willi's book on Constitutional Law, namely, notice, opportunity to be heard, impartial tribunal and ordinary course of procedure. Patanjali Sastri, J. did not go as far as that but he did say that "certain basic principle's emerged as the constant factors known to all those procedures and they formed the core of the procedure established by law." Mahajan, J., also observed that Article 21 requires that "there should be some form of proceeding before a person can be condemned either in respect of his life or his liberty" and "it negatives the idea of fantastic, arbitrary and oppressive forms of proceedings". But apart altogether from these observations in A. K. Gopalants case, which have great weight, we find that even oil principle the concept of reasonab1tmess must be projected in the procedure contemplated by Article 21 ,, having regard to the impact of Article 14 on Article 21.

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A The inter-relationship between articles 14, 19 and 21 We may at this stage consider the inter-relation between Article 21 on the one hand and Articles 14 and 19 on the other. We have already pointed out that the view taken by the majority in A. K. Gopalan's case wa' that so long as a law of preventive detention satisfies the requirements of Article 22, it would be within the terms of Article 21 and it would not be required to meet the challenge of Article B 19. This view proceeded on the assumption that "certain articles in the constitution exclusively deal with specific matters" and where the requirements of an article dealing with the particular matter in question are satisfied and there is no infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed by that article, no recourse· can be had to a fundamental right conferred by another article. This doctrine of exclusivity was seriously questioned in R. C. Cooper's case and it was over-ruled by C a majority of the Full Court, only Ray, J., as he then was, dissenting. The majority judges held that though a law of preventive detention may pass the test of Article 22, it has yet to satisfy the requirements of other fundamental rights such as Article 19. The ratio of the majo:-ity judgment in R. C. Cooper's case was explained in clear and cate~orical term·s by Shelat, J., speaking on behalf of seven judges of this D Court in Shambhu Nath Sarkar v. State of West Bengal('). The learned Judge there said : "In Gopa/an's case (supra) the majority court had held that Article 22 was a self-contained Code and therefore a law of preventive detention did not have to satisfy the requirement of Articles 19, 14 and 21. The view of Fazal Ali, J., on · the other hand, was that preventive detention was a direct breach of the right under Article 19 (1) (d) and that a law providing for preventive detention had to be subject to such judicial review as is obtained under clause (5) of that Article. In R. C. Cooper v. Union of lndkl, (supra) the aforesaid premise of the m_ajority in Gopalwls case (supra) was disapproved and therefore it no longer holds the field. Though Cooper's case (supra) dealt with the inter-relationship of Article 19 and Article 31, the basic approach to construing the fundamental rights guaranteed in the different provisions of the Constitution adopted in this case held the major premise of' the majority in Gopalan's case (supra) to be incorrect." Subsequently, in Haradhan Saha v. State of Wes: Bengal & Ors.(2) also, a Bench of five Judges of this Court, after referring to the deciG sions in A. K. Gopalan's case and R. C. Cooper's case, agreed that the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, which is a law of preventive detention, has to be tested in regard to its reasonableness with reference to Article 19. That decision accepted and applied the ratio ' in R. C. Cooper's case and Shambhu Nath Sarkar's case and proceeded to consider the challenge of Article 19 to the constitutional validity of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 and held that the H Act did not violate any of the constitutional guarantees enshrined in Art. 19. The same view was affirmed once again by a Bench of four (1) [1973] t S.C.R. 856. (1) [1975] 1 S.C.R. 778.

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judges of this Court in Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bengal A & Ors. (1). Interestingly, even prior to these decisions~ as pointe~ out by Dr. Rajive Dhawan, in his book: "The Supreme Court of Indta :" at page 235, reference was made by this court in Mohd. Sabir v. State of Jammu and Kashmir('2) to article 19(2) to justify preventive. detention. The law, must, therefore, now be taken to be well settled that Artic1e 2J docs not exclude Article 19 and tktt even if there· is a law prescribing a procedure for depriving a person of 'personal liberty' and B there is consequently no infringement of the fundamental right con· ferred by Article 21, such law, in so far as it abridges or takes away any fundamental right under Article 19 would have to meet the challenge of that article. This proposition can no longer be disputed after the decisions in R. C. Cooper's case, Shambhu Nath Sarkar's case and Haradhan Saha's case. Now, if a law depriving a person of •personal liberty' and prescribing a procedure for that purpose within . C the meaning of Article 21 has to stand the test of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred under Article 19 which may be applicable in a given situation, ex hypothesi it must also be liable to bt) tested with reference to Article 14. · This was in fact not disputed by the learned Attorney General and indeed he could not do so in view of the clear and categorical statement made by Mukharjea, J., in A. K. Gopalan's case that Article 21 "presupposes that the law is a valid and binding D Jaw under the provisions of the Constitution having regard to the competence of the legislature and the subject it relates to and does not infringe any of the fundamental rights which the Constitution provides for", including Article 14. This Court also applied Article 14 in two of its earlier decisions, namely, The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar(3) and Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra( 4 ) where there was a special law providing for trial of certain offences by E a speedier process which took away some of the safeguards available to an accused under the ordinary procedure in the Criminal Procedure Code. The special law in each of these two cases undoubtedly prescribed a procedure for trial of the specified offences and this procedure could not be condemned as inherently unfair or unjust and there was thus compliance with the requirement of Article 21, but even so the validity of the special law was tested before the Supreme Court o~ the F touchstone of Article 14 and in one case, namely, Kathi Raning Ra!""at's c~se, the yalidity was upheld and in the other, namely, Anwar All Sarkar s case, 1t was struck down. It was held in both these cases that the procedure estabHshed by the special law must not be violative of the equality clause. That procedure must artswer the requirement of Artic1e 14. The nature and requirement of th~ procedure under article 21. No~, the question_ immediately !rises as to what is the requirement of. A~ttclc 14 : .what .Is th~ con.tent and reach of the great equalising prmc1ple enuncmted m this article ? There can be no doubt that it is a fouudin~f~_it~ of the Constitution. It is indeed the pil1ar oii which

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rests securely the foundation of our democratic republic. And, therefore, it must not be subjected to a narrow, pedantic or lexicographic approach. No attempt should be made to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning for, to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimen~ sions and it cannot be imprisoned within traditional and doctrinaire limits. We must reiterate here what was pointed out by the majority B in E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu & Another ( t) namely, that "from a positivistic point of view, equality isr antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic, while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is abritrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14". Articie 14 strikes at arbiC trariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophi~ cally, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contem· plated by Article 21 must answer the best of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be ·"right and just and fair'' and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no D procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied.

How far natural justice is an essential element of procedure established by law. The question immediately arises : does the procedure prescribed by the Passports Act, 1967 for impounding a passport meet the Lest of E this requirement ? Is it 'right or fair or just' ? The argument of the petitioner was that it is not, because it provides for impounding of a passport without affording reasonable opportunity to the holder of the passport to be heard in defence. To impound the passport of a person, said the petitioner, is a serious matter, since it prevents him from exercising his constitutional right to go abroad and such a drastic consequence cannot in fairness be visited without observing the princiF pie of audi alteram partem. Any procedure which permits impairment of the constitutional right to go abroad without giving reasonable opportunity to show cause cannot but be condemned as unfair and unjust and hence, there is in the present case clear infringement of the require~ ment of Article 21. Now, it is true that there is no express provision in the Passports Act, 1967 which requires that the audi alteram partem rule should be followed before impounding a passport, but that is not G conclusive of the question. If the statute makes itself clear on this point, then no more question arises. But e~en ':Vhe~ the statute is silent, the law may in a given case make an Imphcatton and apply the principle stated by Byles, J., in O?o_per v. JVa.ndswC?rth Board ~~ Works(2). "A long course of decisiOns, begmmng ~tth Dr. Bentley s case and ending with some very recent cases,. ~stabhsh that, although ther~ are no positive words in the statute req~mng that the pa.rt~ shall H be heard, yet the justice of the common law wJll supply the omiSSion of (1) {1974] 2 S.C.R. 348. (2) [1863] 14 C.B.N.S. 180.

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the legislature". The principle of audi alteram partem, whlch mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard, iS part of the rules of natural justice. In fact, there are two main principles in which the rules of natural justice are manifested, namely, Nemo Judex in Sua Causa and audi alteram partem. We are not concerned here with the former, since there is no case of bias urged here. The question is only in regard to the right of hearing which involves the audi alteram partem rule. Can it be imported in ihe procedure for impounding a passport?

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We may commence the discussion of this question with a few general observations to emphasise the increasing importance of natural justice in the field of administrative law. Natural justice is a great humanising principle intended to invest law with fairness and to secure justice and over the years it has grown into a widely pervasive rule affecting large areas of administrative action. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest spoke of this rule in eloquent terms in his address before tl:tc Bentham Club : "We can, I think, take pride in what has been done in recent periods and particularly in the field of administrative law by invoking and by applying these principles which we broadly classify under the designation of natural justice. Many testing problems as to their application yet remain to be solved. But I affirm that the area of administrative action is but one area in which the principles are to be deployed. Nor are tl1ey to be invoked only when procedural failures are shown. Does natural justice qualify to be described as a "majestic" conception ? I believe it does. Is it just a rhetorical but vague phrase which can be employed, when needed, to give a gloss of assurance ? I believe that it is very much more. If it can be summarised as being fair play in action-who could wish that it would ever be out of action ? It denotes that the law is not only to be guided by reason and by logic but that its purpose \"ill not be fulfilled; it lacks more exalted inspiration." (Current Legal Problems, 1973, Vol. 26, p. 16)

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And then again, in his speech in the House of Lords in Wiseman v. Borneman (1), the learned Law Lord said in words of inspired felicity : "that the conception of natural justice should at all stages guide those who discharge judicial functions is not merely an acceptable but is an essential part of the philosophy of the law. We often speak of the rules of natural justice. But there is nothing rigid or mechanical about them. What they comprehend has been analysed and described in many authorities. But any analysis must bring into relief rather their spirit and their inspiration than any precision of definition or l?recisior: as t? application. We do not sear.ch for prescriptions whtch will lay down exactly what must, m various divergent situations, be done. The principles and procedures are

--(1) [1971) A.C. 297.

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to be applied which, in any particular sitdation or set of circumstances, are right and just and fair. Natural justice, it has been said, is only "fair play in action." Nor do we wait for directions from Parliament. The common law has abundant riches : there we may find what Byles, J., ca11ed "the justice of the common law".

Thus, the soul of natural justice is ' fair play in aCtion' and that is why it has received the widest recognition throughout the democratic world. In the United States, the right to an administrative hearing is regarded as essential requirement of fundamental fairness. And in England too it has been held that 'fair play in action' demands that before any prejudicial or adverse action is taken against a person, he must be given an opportunity to be heard. The rule was stated by Lord Denning, M.R. in these terms in Sdunidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs(l) :-where a public officer has power to deprive a person of his liberty or his property, the general principle is that it has not to be done without his being given an opportunity of being heard and of making representations on his own behalf". The same rule also prevails in other Commonwealth countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It has even gained access to the United Nations. Vide American Journal of lnterlUltional Law, Vol. 67, page 479. Magarry, J., describes natural justice "as a distillate of dbe process of law''. Vide Fontaine v. Chesterton(2). It is the quintessence of the process of justice inspired and guided by fair play in action'. If we look at the speeches of the various law Lords in Wise1n11n's case, it will be seen that each one of them asked the question "whether in the particular circumstances of the case, the Tribunal acted unfairly so that it could be said that their procedure did not match with what justice demanded", or, was 1he procedure adopted by the Tribunal 'in all the circumstances unfair' ? The test adopted by every Jaw Lord was whether the procedure followed was "fair in all the circumstances" and 'fair play in action' required that an opportunity should be given to the tax payer "to see and reply to the counter-statement of the Commissioners" F before reaching the conclusion that "there is a prima facie case against him." The inquiry must, therefore, always be : does fairness in action demand that an opportunity to be heard should be given to the person affected?

Now, if this be the test of applicability of the doctrine of natural justice, there can be no distinction between a quasi-judicial function and an administrative function for this purpose. The aim of both administrative inquiry as well as quasi-judicial inquiry is to arrive at a .iust decision and if a rule of natural justice is calculated to secure justice, or to put it negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is difficult to see why it should be applicable to quasi-judicial inquiry and not to administrative inquiry. It must logically apply to both. On what principle can distinction be made between one and the other ? Can it be said that the requirement of 'fair play in action' is any thB -------- ·-- -(1) [1969] 2 Chancery Division 149. (2) (1968) t 12 Solicitor General 690.

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less in an adminjstrative inquiry than in :1 quasi-.iudicia! one '? Some- A times an unjust decision in an administrative inquiry may have far more serious consequences than a decision in a quasi-judicial inquiry and hence the rules of natural justice must apply equally in an administrative inquiry which entails civil consequences. There was, however, a time in the early stages of the development of the doctrine of natural justice when the view prevailed that the rules of natural justice have application only to a quasHudicial proceeding as distinguished from an B administrative proceeding and the distinguishing featur~ of a quasijudicial proceeding is that the authority concerned is required by the law under which it is functioning to act judicially. This requirement of a duty to act judicially in order to invest the fw1ction with a quasijudicial character was spelt out from the following observation of Atkin, L.J. in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners(!), "wherever any body of persons havin·g legal authority to determine questions affect- c ing the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority, they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King Bench Division .... ". Lord Hewart, C .J., in Rex v. Legislative Committee of the Church Asscmblye) read this objservation to mean that the duty to act judicially should be an additional requirement existing independently of the "authority to deterD mine quesions affecting the rights of subjec.ts"-something super added to it. This gloss placed by Lord Hewart, C.J., on the dictum of Lord Atkin, L.J., bedevilled the law for a considerable time and stultified the growth of the doctrine of natural justice. The Court was constrained in every case that came before it, to make a search for the. duty to .act judicially sometimes from tenuous material and sometimes in the servic~s of the statute and this led to oversubtlety and over-refinement resulting in confusion and uncertainty in the Jaw. Bu.t this was plainly con- E trary to the earlier authorities and in the epoch-making decision of the House of Lords in Ridge v. Baldwin( 3 ), which m:lrks a turning point in the history of the development of the doctrine of natural justice,. Lord Reid pointed out how the gloss of Lord Hewart, C.J., was based on a misunderstanding of the observations of Atkin, L.J., and it went counter to the law laid down in the earlier decisions of the Court. Lord Reid observed : "If Lord Hewart meant that it is neve.r enough that a body has a duty to determine what the rights of an individual should be, but that there must always be something more to impose on it a duty to act judicially, then that appears to me impossible to reconci]e with the earlie.r authorities". The learned law Lord held that the duty to act jadicially may arise from the very nature of the function intended to be performed and it need not be shown to be superadded. This decision broadened the area of application of the rules of natural justice and to borrow the words of Prof. Clar in his article on <Natural Justice, Substance and Shadow' in Public Law Journal, 1975, restored light to an area "heniphted by the narrow conceptualism of the previous decade". This development in the law had its parallel 'in India in the Associated Cement Compcii1ies Ltd. v. P. N. Shanna & Anr( 4 ) where (1) (1924) 1 K.B. 171. (2) [1928] 1 K.B. 41 t. (3) [1964) A. C. 40. (4) [1965] 2 S.C.R. 366. 5-119 SCI/78

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this Court approvingly referred to the decision in Ridge v. Baldwin (supra) and, later in State of Orissa v. Dr. BinapaniC) observed that : "If th~re is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power''. This Court also pointed out in A.K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2) another historic decision in this branch of the law, that in recent years the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing radic·al change and said: "The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated, for detem1ining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature. of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the framework of the law conferring that power, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised". The net effect of these and other decisions was that the duty to act judicially need not be super-added, but it may be spelt out from the nature of the power conferred, the manner of exercising it and its impact on the rights of the person effected and where it is found to exist, the rules of natural justice would be attracted. This was the advance made by the law as. a result of the decision in Ridge v. Baldwin (supra) in England and t~ decision in Associated Cement Companies's case (supra) and other cases- following upon it, in India. But that was not to be the end of the development of the law on this subject. The proliferation of administrativeJ law provoked considerable fresh thinking on the subject and soon it came to be recognised that 'fair play .in action' required that in administrative proceeding also, the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable. We have already discussed this aspect of the question on principal and shown why no distinction can be made between an administrative and a quasi-judicial proceeding for the• purpose of applicability of the doctrine of natural justic~. This position was judicially recognised and accepted and the dichotomy between administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings vis-a,..vis doctrine of natural justice was finally discarded as unsound by the decisions in ln re :1-I.K. (An Infant) ( 3 ) and Schrnidt v. Secretary of StQte for flgme A[ftlirs (supra) in England and, so far as India is concerned, by the memorable decision rendered by this ·Court in A.K. Kratpak's case Ompra). Lord Parker, C.J. pointed out in the course of his judgment in ln Re : H.K.. (An Infant) (supra) : "But at the same time,. I myself think that even if an quasi-judicial capacity, he must at any rate give the i:nmigra:nt an opportunity of &atisfying him of the matters in the sub·section, and for that purpose let the immigrant know what his immediate impression is so that the immigrant can disabuse him. That

Immigration officer is not in a judicial or

(1) [1967]2 S C.R. 625.

(2) [l970] 1 S.C.R. 457. (3) [1967] 2 Q. B. 617.

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is not, as I see it, a question of acting or being~ required to act judicially, but of being required to act fall:l~. Good administration and an honest or boiUlr-{ide decision must, as it seems to me, required not merely impartiality, nor rner~ly bringing one's mind to bear on the problem, but actmg fairly; and to the limited extent that the circumstances of any partic11!ar case allow, and within the legislative framc\~or~ under which the administrator is working, only to that hmlted extent do the so-called rules of natural justice apply, wl1ich in a case· such as this is merely a duty to act fairly. I appreciate that in saying that it may be said that one is going fnrther than is permitted on the decided cases because heretofDre at any ·rate the decisions of the co-urts do seen"! to have drawn a strict line in these matters according to whether there is or is not a duty to act judicially or quasi--judicially."

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This Court, speaking through Hegde, J., in A. K. Krcdpak's case quoted with approval the above passage from the judg·nent of Lord Parker, C.J., and proceeded to add :

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"The aim of the rules· of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice.. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made-. In other words they do not suppbnt the law of the land but supplement it--Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that tmless the authority con-cerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the, application .of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questiq_ned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage oJl justice one fails to ~ee wh.y those rules should oo made inapplicable tQ adminishative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi..judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-jt:dicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative eriquiry may lmYe more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. The University of Kerala and Ors. (1969)1 S.C.R. 317 the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent Ofll the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principles of natural justice had been contravened the court has to •.lecide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of the case."

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~is view .was reiterated and re-affirmed in a subsequent decision of th1s Court m D.F.O. South Khari v. Ram Sanefd Singh( 1 ) . The la\v must. therefore. now be taken tn be well settled that even in an administrative proceeding, which involves civil ·consequences, the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable.

Now, here, the power conferred on the Passport Authority is to impound a passport and the consequence of impounding a passport would · be to impair the constitutional right of the holder of the passport to go abroad during the time that the passport is impounded. Moreover, a passport can be impounded by the Passport Authority only on certain specified grounds set out in sub-section ( 3) of section 10 ~rtd the Passport Authority would have to apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of a given case and decide whether any of the specified grounds exists which would justify impounding of the passport The Passport Authority is also required by sub-section (5) of section 10 to record in wding a brief statement of the reasons for making an order impounding a passport and, save in c~rtain exceptional situations, the Passport Authority is obliged to furnish a copy of the statement of reasons to the holder of the passport. Where the Passport Authority which has Impounded a passport is other than the Central Government, a right of appeal against the order impounding the passport is given by section 11, and in the appeal, the validity of the reasons given by the Passport Authority for impounding the passport can be canvassed before the Appellate Authority. It is clear on a consideration of these circumstances that the test laid down in the decisions of this Court for distinguishing between a quasi-judicial power and an administrative power is satisfied and the power conferred on the Passport Authority tt;> impound a passE port ·is quasi-judicial power. The rules of natural justice would, in the circumstances, be applicable in the exercise of the power of impounding a passport even on the orthodox view which prevailed prior to A. K. Kraipak's case. The same result must follow in view of the decision in A. K. Kraipak's case, even if the power to impound a passport were regarded as administrative in character, because it seriously interferes with the constitutional right of the holder of the passport to go abroad and entails adverse civil consequences. ·

Now, as al(eady pointed out, the doctrine of natural justice consists principally of two rules, namely, nemo debt esse judex propria cause : no one shall be a judge in his own cause, and audi alteram partem : no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing. We are concerned here with the second rule and hence we shall confine ourselves only to a discussion of that rule. The learned Attorney General, appearing on behalf of the Union of India, fairly conceded that the audi alteram partem rule is a highly effective tool devised by the courts to enable a statutory authority to arrive at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on abuse or misuse of power and hence its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed. He rightly did not plead for reconsideration of the historic advances made in the law as a result of the decisions of this Court and did (1) [l973J 3 g.c.c. ~64.

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not suggest that the Court should re-trace its steps. That would indeed have been a most startling argument coming from the Governmeni. of India and for the Court to accede to such an argument would have been so act of utter retrogression. But fortunately no such argument was advanced by the learned Attorney General. What he urged was a very limited contention, namely that having regard to the nature of the action involved in the impounding of a passport, the audi alteram partem ru~e must be held to' be excluded, because if notice were to be given to the hol- B der of the passport and reasonable opportunity afforded to him to show cause why his passport should not be impounded, he migh't immediately, on the strength of the passport, make good his exit from the country and the object of impounding the passport would be frustrated. The argument was that if the audi alteram pattern rule were applied, its effect would be to stultify the power of impounding the· passport and it would defeat and paralyse the administration of the law and hence the audi c alteram partem rule cannot in fairness be applied while exercising the power to impound a passport. This argument was sought lo be sunported by reference to the statement of the law in A.S. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 2nd ed., where the learned authcr says at page 174 that "in administrative law a: prima facie right to prior notice and opportunity to be heard may be held to be excluded by implication-where an obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard D would obstruct the taking of prompt action, especially actio.n of a preventive or remedial nature". Now, it is true that since the right to prior notice and opportunity of hearing arises only by implication from the duty to act fairly, or to use the words of Lord Morris of Borth-yGest, from 'fair play in action', it may equally be excluded where, having regard to the nature of the action to be taken, its cb ject and pur- E pose and the scheme of the relevant statutory provision, fairness in action does not demand its implication and even warrants its exclusion. There are certain well recognised exceptions to the audi alteram partem rule established by judicial decisions and they are summarised by S.A. de Smith in Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 2nd ed., at page 168 to 179. If we analyse these exceptions a little closely, it will be apparent that they do not in any way militate against the principle which requires fair play in administrative action. The worrl 'excr·oticn' is F really a misnomer because in these exclusionary cases, the audi alteram partem rule is held inapplicable not by way of an exception to "fair play in ~ction", but because nothing unfair can be inferred by not affording an opportunity to present or meet a case. The audi alteram partem rule is intended to inject justice into the law and ~t cannot be applied to defeat the ends of justice, or to make the law 'lifeless, absurd, stultifying, self-defeating or plainly contrary to the common sense of G the situation'. Since the >life of the law is not logic but experience and every legal proposition must, in the ultimate analysis, be tested on the touchstone of pragmatic realism, the audi alteram vartem ru1e would, by the experiential test, be excluded, if importing the right to be heard has the effect of paralysing the administrative process or the need for promptitude or the urgency of the situation so demands. But at the same time it must be remembered that this ·is a rule of vital importance H in the field of administrative law and it must not b~ jettisoned save 1n very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. '

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It is a wholesome rule designed to secure the rule of law and the court should not be too ready to eschew it in its application to a given case. True it is that in questions of this kind a fanatical or doctrinaire approach should be avoided, but that dpes not mean that merely because the traditional methodology of a formalised hearing may have the effect of stultifying the exercise of the statutory power, the audi alteram partern should be wholly excluded. The court must make every effort to B· salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent permiss~ble in a given case. It must not be forgotten that "natural justice is pragrnat:cally flexible and is. amenable to capsulation under the compulsive pressure of circumstances". The audi alteram partem rule is not cast in a rigid mould and judicial decisions establish that it may suffer situational modifications. The core of it must, however, remain, namely, that the person affected must have a reasonable opportunity of being heard and c the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise. That is why .Tucker, L.J., emphasised in Russel v. Duke of Norfolk( 1 ) that "whatever standard Qf natural justice is adopted, one essential is that the person concerned should have a reasonable oppor- , tunity of presenting his case". What opportunity may be regarded as reasonable· would necessarily depend on the practical necessities of the situation. It may be a sophisticated fullfledged hearing or it may be D a hearing which is very brief and minimal : it may be a hearing prior to the decision or it may even be a post-decisiona1 remedial hearing. The audi alteram partem rule is sufficiently flexible to pennit modifications and variations to suit the exigencies of myriad kinds of. situations which may arise. This circumstantial flexibility of the audi alteram pm·tem rule was emphasised by Lord Reid i1t Wiseman v. Sorneman (supra) when he said that be would be ..sorry to see this fundamental E general principle degenerate into a series of hard and fast rules~' and Lord Hailsl~am, L.C., also observed in Pearl-Berg v. Party(2) that the courts "have taken in increasingly sophisticated view of what is required in individual cases". It would not, therefore, be right to conclude that the audi alteram partem rule is excluded mereJy because the power to impound a passport might be frustrated, if prior notice and hearing were to be given to the person concerned before impounding his F passport. The Passport Authority may proceed to impound the passport without giving any prior opportunity to the person concerned to be heard, but as soon as the order impounding the passport is made, and opportunity of bearing, remedial in aim, should be given to him so that he may present his case and controvert that of the Passport Authority and point out why his passport ~hould not be impounded and the order impounding it recalled. This should not only be possible but also quite G appropriate, because the reasons for impounding the passport· are required to be supplied by the Passport Authority after the making of the order and the person affected would, therefore, be in a position to make a representation s.etting forth his case and plead for setting aside the action impounding his passport. A fair opportunity of being heard following immediately upon the order impounding the passport would satisfy the mandate of natural justice and a provision requiring giving H of such opportunity to the person concerned can and should be read by (1) {1949] 1 All Eng. Reports 109. (2) [1971] 1 We~kly Law Reports, 728.

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v. (Bhagwati, J.)

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implication in the Passports Act, 1967. If such a provision were held A to be incorporated in the Passports. Act, 1967 by necessary implication, as we hold it must be, the procedure prescribed by the Act for impound- ing a passport would be right, fair and just and it would not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or unreasonableness. We must, therefore, hold that the procedure 'established' by the Passports Act, 1967 for impounding a passport is in conformity with the requirement of Article 21 and does not falffoul of that article. But the question then immediately arises whether the Central Government has complied with this procedure in impounding the passport of the Petitioner. Now, it is obvious and indeed this could not be controverted, that the Central Government not only did not give an opportunity of hearing tt;> the petitioner after making the impugned order impounding her passport but even declined to furnish to the petitioner the reasons for impounding her passport despite request made by her. We have already pointed out that the Central Government was wholly unjustified in withholding the reasons for impounding the passport from the petitioner and this was not only in breach of the statutory provision, but it also amounted to 4enial of opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The order impounding the passport of the• petitioner was, therefore, clearly in violation of the rule of nat1,1ral justice embodied in the maxim audi alteram partem and jt was not in conformity with the procedure prescribed by the Passports Act, 1967. Rea·lising that this was a fatal defect which would void the order impounding the passport, the learned Attorney-General made a statement on behalf of the Government of India to the following effect : "1. The Government is agreeable to considering any representation that may be made by the petitioner in respeCt of the impounding of her passport and giving her an opportunity in the matter. The opportunity will be given within two weeks of the receipt of the representation. It i,s clarified that in the present case the grounds for impounding the passport are those mentioned in the affidavit in reply dated 18th August, 1977 of Shri Ghosh except those mentioned in para 2(xi).

2. The representation of the petitioner will be dealt with expeditiously in accordance with law. This statement removes the voice from the order impounding the passport and it can no longer be assailed on the ground that it does not comply with the audi alteram partem rule or is. not in accord with the procedure prescribed by the Passports Act, 1967.

ls Section 10(3) (c) violative of Article 14 1 . T~a t takes us to the next question whether section 10 ( 3) (c) is viOlative <?f a_ny of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the C?nst1tut10n. Only two articl~s of the Constitution are relied upon fo! th1s p~rpose and they are Articles 14 and 19(1)(a) and (g). We wdl first dtspose of the challenge based on Article 14 as it lies in a very narrow compass. The argument under this head of challenge was that

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section 10(~) (c) ~onfers unguided and unfettered power on the Passport ~uthonty to Impound a p~ssport and hence it is violative of the equ~uty clause contained in Article 14. It was conceded that under section 10( 3) (c) the power to impound a passport can be exercised only upon one or more of the stated grounds, but the complaint was ~hat th~ ground of "interests of the general public" was too vague and 1ndefirnte to afford any real guidance to the Passport Authority and the 8 Passpor~ A~thority could, without in any way violating the terms of the .section, Impound the passport of one and not of another, at its discretiOn. Moreover, it was sa·id that when the order impounding a passport is made by the Central Government, there is no appeal or revision provided by the Statute and the decision of the Central Government that it is in public interest to impound a passport is final and conclusive. The discretion vested in the Passport Authority, and particularly in the C Central Government, is tlius. unfettered and unrestricted ~nd this is plainly in violation of Artide 14. Now, the law is well settled that when a statute vests unguided and unrestricted power in an authority to affect the rights of a person without laying down any policy or principle which is to guide the authority in exercise of this power, it would be affected by the vice of discrimination since it would leave it open to · the Authority to discriminate between persons and things similarly D situated. But here it is difficult to say that the discretion conferred on the Passport Authority is arbitrary or unfettered. There are four grounds set out in section 10 ( 3) (c) which would justify the making of an order impounding a passport. We are concerned only with the last ground denoted by the words ''in the interests of the general public", for that i~ the ground which is attacked as vague and indefinite. We fail to see how this ground can, by any stretch of argument, be characE terised as vague or undefined. The words "in the interests of the general public" have a clearly well defined meaning and the courts have often been called upon to· decide whether a particular action is "in the interests of the general public~' or in "public interest" and no difficulty has been experienced by the Courts in carrying out this exercise. These words are in fact borrowed ipsissima verba from Article 19 (5) and we think it would be nothing short of heresy to accuse the constitutionF makers of vague and loose thinking. The legislature performed a sci.ssor and paste operation in lifting these words out of Article 19(5) and introducing them in section 10 ( 3) (c) and if these words are not vague and indefinite in Article 19 ( 5) , it is difficult to see how they can be condemned to be such when they occur in section 10( 3) (c). How can section 10(3) (c) be said to incur any constitutional infirmity on account of these words when they are no wider than the constitutional G provision in Artiole 19(5) and adhere loyally to the verbal fo~ula adopted ·in the Constitution ? We are clearly of the view that suffictent guidelines are provided by the words "in the interests .of th~ general public" and the power conferred on the Passport Authonty to 1mpound a passport cannot be said to be unguided or unfettered. Moreover, it must be remembered that the exercise of this power is not made dependent on .the subjective opinion of the Passport Authority as re.gards H the necessity of exercising it on one or more of the grounds stated m the section, but the Passport Authority is· required to record in writing a brief statement of reasons for impounding the passport and, save in cerA

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tain exceptional circumstances, to supply a copy of such statement to A the person affected, so that the person concerned can challenge the ~e­ cision of the Passport Authority in appeal and the appellate authonty can examine whether the reasons given by the Passport Authority are correct, and if so, whether they justify the making of the order impound~ ing the passport. It is true that when the order impounding a passport is made by the Central Government, there is no appea1l aganst it, but it must be remembered that in such a case the power is exercised by the B Central Government itself and it can safely be assumed that the Central Government will exercise the power in a reasonable and responsible manner. When power is vested in a high authority like the Central • Government, abuse of power calUlot be lightly assumed. And in any event, if there is abuse of power, the arms of the court are long enough to reach it and to strike it down. The power conferred on the Passport Authority to impound a passport under section 10(3) (c) cannot, there~ c fore, be regarded as discriminatory and it does not fall foul of Article 14. Buf every exercise of such power has to be tested in order to de~ termine whether it ·is arbitrary or within the guid~lines provided in Sec~ tion 10(3) (c). Conflicting approaches for locating the fundamental right violated : Direct and inevitable effect test. We think it would be proper at this stage to consider the approach to be adopted by the Court in adjudging the constitutionality of a statute on the touchstone of fundamental rights. What is the test or yardstick to be applied for determining whether a statute infringes a particu~ lar fundamental right ? The law on this point has undergone radical change since the days of A. K. Gopalan's case. That was the earlies~ decision of this Court on the subject, following almost immediately E. upon the commencement of the Constitution. The argument which arose for consideration in this case ·was that the preventive detc:ntion order results in the detention of the applicant in a cell and hence it contravenes the fundamental rights guaranteed under clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (g) of Art!cle 19 (1) . This argument was negatived by Kania, C. J., who pointed out that: "The true approach is only to con~ sider the directness of the legiS>lation and not what will be the result of F the detention, otherwise valid, on the mode of the detenu's life-Any · other construction put on the article-will be unreasonable". These observations were quoted with approval by Patanjali Sastri, J; speaking on behalf of the majority in Ram Singh and Ors. v. State of Delhi(l). There, the detention of the petitioner was ordered with a view, to preventing him from maki~g any speecbes prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and the argument was that the order of G detention was invalid as it infringed the right of free speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a). The Court took the view that the direct object of the order was preventive detention and not the in~ fringement of the right of freedom of speech and expression, which was merely consequential upon the detention of the detenu and uphPld the validity of the order. The decision in A. K. Gopalan's case, followed by Ram Singh's case, gave rise to the theory that the object and form H of State action determine the extent of protection which may be claimed ·----- .... (1) rf951] S.C.R. 451.

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by ~n i~dividual an~ t~e, v~dity of such action has to be judged by cons1dex:ng whether It IS 'drrectly in respect of the subject cov~red by any particular article of the Constitution or touches the said article only incidentially or indirectly". The test to be applied for determining the constitutional validity of State action with reference to fundamental rights is : what is the object of the authority in taking the action : what is the subject-matter of the action and to which fundamental right does it relate ? This theory that "the extent of protection of important guarantees, such as the liberty of person and right to property, depend upon the form and object of the State action and not upon its direct operation upon the individual's freedom" held away for a considerable time and was applied in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.( 1) to sustain an order made by the High Court in a suit for defamation prohibiting the publication of the evidence of a witness. This Court, after referring to the observation of Kania, C.J ., in A. K. Gopalan's case and noting that they were approved by the Full Court in Ram Singh's case, pointed out that the object of the impugned order was to give protection to the witness in order to obtain true evidence in the case with a view to do justice between the parties and if incidentally it operated to prevent the petitioner from reporting the proceedings of the court in the press, it could not be said to contravene Article 19( 1) (a). But it is interesting to note that despite the observations of Kania, C.J., in A. K. Gopalan's case and the approval of these observations in Ram Singh's case, there were two decisions given by this Court prior to Mirajkar's case, which seemed to deviate and strike a diiTerent note. The first was the decision in Express News Papers (P) Ltd. & Anr. v.. The Union of India & Ors.(2) where N. H. Bf:tagwati, J., speaking on behalf of the Court, referred to the observations of Kania, C.J., in A. K. Gopalan's case and the decision in Ram Singh's case, but ultimately formulated the test of direct and inevitable effect for the purpose of adjudging whether a statute offends a particular fundamental right. The learned Judge pointed out that all the consequences suggested on behalf of the petitioner's as flowing out of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Act, 1955, namely, "the tendency to curtail circulation and thereby narrow the scope of dissemination of information, fetters on the petitioners' freedom to choose the means of exercising the right, likelihood of the independence of the press being undermined by having to seek government aid, the imposition of penalty on the petitioners' right to choose the instruments for exercising the freedom or compelling them to seek alternative media etc::, would be remote and depend upon various factors which may or may not come into play. "Unless these were the direct or inevitable consequences of the measures enacted in the impugned Act", said the learned Judge, "it would not be possible to strike down the legislation as having that effect and operation. A possible eventuality of this type would 'not necessarily be the consequence which could be in the contemplation of thet Legislature while enafting a measure of this type for the benefit of the (1) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 744. (2) [1959) S.C.R. 12.

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workmen concerned." Then again, the learned Judge observed: "-if A . the intention or the pro~mate effect and operation of the Act was such as to bring it within the mischief of Article 19(1) (a), it would cer~ tainly be liable to be struck down. The real difficulty, however, in the way of the petitioners is that neither the intention nor the effect and operation of the impugned Act is to take away or abridge the right of freedom of speech and expression enjoyed by the petitioners". Here we find the gern of the doctrine of direct and inevitable effect, which · B necessarily must be effect intended by the legislature, or in other words, what may conveniently and appropriately be described as the doctrine of intended and real effect. So also in Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. The Union of India( 1 ) while considering the constitutional validity ·Of the Newspaper (Price and Page) Act, 1956 and Daily Newspaper (Price and Page) Order, 1960, this Court applied the test of direct and immediate effect. This Court, relying upon the decision in Dwarkadas c Shrinivas v. The Sholapur & Weaving Co. Ltd.(2) pointed out that "it is the substance and the practical result of the act of the State that should be considered rather than its purely legal aspect" and "the correct approach in such cases should be to enquire as to what in substance is the loss or injury caused to the citizen and not merely what manner and method has been adopted by the State in placing the restriction." Since "the direct and immediate effect of the order" would be to restrain a newspaper from publishing any number of pages for carrying its news and views, which it has a fundamental right under Article 19 ( 1) (a) to do, unless it raises the seNin.g price as provided in the Schedule to the Order, it was held by this Court that the order was violative of the right of the newspapers guaranteed by Article 19 ( 1) {a). Here again, the emphasis was on the direct and inevitable effecr E of the impugned action of the State· rather than on its object and form or subject-matter. However, it was only R. C. Cooper's case that the doctrine that the <>bject and form of the State action alone determine the extent of protection that may be claimed by an individual and that the effect of the State action on the fundamental right of the individual is irrelevant, was finally rejected. It may be pointed out that this doctrine is in substance and reality nothing else than the test of pith and substance which is applied for determining the constitutionality of legislat-ion where there is conflict of legislative powers conferred on Fede!al and State Legis~ latures with reference to legislative Lists. The question which is asked in such cases is : what is the pith and substance of the le-gislations; if it "is within the express po\Yers, the-n it is not invalidated if incidentally it effects matters which are outside the authorised field". Here also, <>n the application of this doctrine, the question that is required to be ~onsidered is : what is the pith and substance of the action of the State, or in other words, what is its true nature and character; if it is in res~ pect of the subject covered by any particular fundamental right, its vali-dity must be judged only by reference to that fundamenta·l right and it is immaterial that it incidentally affects another fundamental right. (1) [1962] 3 S.C.R. 842. {2) fl954] S.C.R. 674.

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[1978} 2 S·C·R·

Mathew, J., in his dissenting jl]dgment in Bennett Coleman & Co. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.(l) recognised the likeness of this doc· trine to the pith and substance test and pointed out that "the pith and substance test, although not strictly appropriate, might serve a useful purpose" in determining whether the State action infringes a particular fundamental right. But in R. C. Cooper's case, which ·was a decision given by the Full Court consisting of eleven judges, this doctrine was thrown everboard and it was pointed out by Shah, J., speaking on behalf of the majority :

"--it is not the obJect of the authority making the law impairing the right of a citizen, nor the form· of action that determines the protection he can claim; it is the effect of the law and of the action upon the right which attract the jurisdiction of the Court te~ grant relief. If this be the true view, and we think it is, in determining the impact of State action upon constitutional guarantees which are fundamental, it follows that the extent of protection against impairment of a fundamental right is detenn.ined not by the object of the Legislature nor by the form of the action, but by its direct operation upon the individual's rights."

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"we are of the view that the theory that the object and form of the State action determine the extent of protection which the aggrieved party may claim is not consistent with the ..:onstitutional scheme----" "In our judgment, the assumption in A. K. Gopalan's case that certain articles in the Constitution exclusively deal with specific matters and in determining whether there is infringement of the individual's guaranteed rights, the object and the form of the State action alone need be considered, and effect of the laws on fundamental rights of the individuals in general will -be ignored cannot be accepted as · correct."

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The decision in R. C. Cooper's case thus overturned the view taken in A. K. Gopalan's case and, as pointed out by Ray, J., speaking on behalf of the majority in1 Bennett Coleman's case, it laid down two interrelated propositions, namely, "'First, it is not the object of the authority making the law impairing the right of the citizen nor the· form of action that determines the invasion of the right. Secondly, it is the effect of the law and the action upon the right which attracts the jurisdiction of the Court to grant reJief. The direct operation of the Act upon the rights fom1s the re:1l test." The decision in Bennett Coleman's case, followed upon R. C. Cooper's case and it is an important and significant decision, since it elaborated and applied the thesis laid down in R. C. Cooper's case. The St~te action which was impugned in Bennett Coleman's case was newsprmt (1) [1973] 2 S.C.R. 757.

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• MANEKA GANDHI v. UNION (Bhagwat,i, /.)

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policy which inter alia imposed a maximum limit of ten pages for every newspaper. but without permitting the newspaper to increase the number of pages by reducing circulation to meet its requirement even within the admissible quota. These restrictions were said to be violative of the rjgbt of free speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19{1) (a) since their direct and inevitable consequence was to limit the number of pages which could be published by a newspaper to ten. The argument of the Government was that the· object of the newsprint policy__was rationing and equitable distribution of imported newsprint '''hiclr~s scarce commodity and nol abridgement of freedom of speech and expression. The subject-matter of the import policy was "rationing of imported co~odity and equitable distribution of newsprint" and the neWSJ]dnt·t)olicy did not directly and immediately deal with the right-mentioned in Article 19( 1) (a) and hence there was no violation-of that Article. This argument of the Government was negatived by the majority in the following words :

"Mr. Palkhivala said ~hat the tests of pith and substance of the subject matter and of direct and of incidental effect of the legjsJation are relevant to questions of legislative comp~ tence but they are i~relevant to the question of infringement of fundamental rights. In our view this is a sound and correct approach to interpretation of legislative measure~ and State action in !elation to fundamental rights. The true test is whether the effect of the impugned action is to take away or abridge fundamenal rights. If it be assumed that the direct object of the law or action has to be direct abridgement· of the right of free speech by the impugned law or action it is to be related to the directness of effect and not to the directness of the subiect matter of the impeached Jaw or action. The action may have a direct effect on a funda:mental right although its direct subject matter may be different. A law dealing directly with the Defence of India or defamation may yet have a direct effect on the freedom of speech. Article 19 (2) could not have such law if the restriction is unreasonable even if it is related to matters mentioned therei.p.. Therefore, the word "direct" would go to the quality or character of the effect and not to the subject matter. The object of the law or executive action is irrelevant when it establishes the petitioner's contention about fundamental right. In the present case, the object of the newspaper restrictions has nothing to do with the avilability of newsprint or foreign exchange because these restrictions come into operation after the grant of quota. Therefore the restrictions are to control the numoer of pages or circulation of dailies or newspapers. These restrictions are clearly outsrde the ambit of Article 19 (2) of the Constitution. It, therefore, copfirms that the right of freedom of speech and expression is abridged by these restrictions". The majority took the view that it was not the object of the newsprint policy or its subject matter which was determinative but its direct consequence or effe<..t upon the rights of the newspapers and since "the effect

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[1978] 2 S·C·R·

and consequence of the impugned policy upon the newspapers" was direct control and restriction of growth and circulation of newspaper3, the newsprint policy infringed freedom of speech and expression and was hence violative of Article 19(1) (a). The pith and substance theory was thus negatived in the clearest terms and the test applied was as to what is the direct and inevitable consequence or effect of the impugned State action on the fundamental right of the petitioner. It is possible that in a given case the pith and substance of the State action may deal with a particular fundamental right but its direct and inevitable effect may be on another fundamental right and in that case, the State action woulc have to meet the challenge of the latter fundamental right. The pith and substance doctrine looks only at the object and subject-matter of the State action, but in testing the validity of the State action with reference to fundamental rights, what the Court must considor is the direct and inevitable consequence of the State action. Otherwise, the protection of the fundamental rights would be subtly but surely eroded.

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It may be recalled that the test formulated in R. C. Cooper's case merely refers to 'direct operation' or 'direct consequence and effect' of the State action on the fundamental right of the petitioner and does not use the word 'inevitable' in this connection. But there can be no D doubt, on a reading of the relevant observations of Shah, J ., that such was the test really intended to be laid down by the Court in that case. If the test were merely of direct or indirect effect, it would be a openended concept and in the absence of operational 'criteria for judging 'directness', it would give the Court an unquantifiable discretion to decide whether in a given case a consequence or effect is direct or not. Some other concept-vehicle would be needed to quantify the extent of E directness or indirectness in order to apply the test. And that is supplied by the criterion of 'inevitable' consequence or effect adumbrated in the Express Newspaper's case. This criterion helps to quantify the extent of 'directness n~cessary to constitute infringement of a fundamental right is direct and inevitable, then a fortiori it must be presumed to have been intended by the authority taking the action and hence this doctrine of direct and inevitable effect has been described by some F jurists as the doctrine of intended and real effect. This is the test which must be applied for the purpose of determining whether section 10(3) (c) or the impugned order made under it is violative of Art. 19(1) (a) or (g). Is Section 10(3) (c) violative of Article 19(1) (a) or (g)?

We may now examine the challenge based on Article 19(1) (a) in the light o.f this background. Article 19 ( 1) (a) enshrines one of the most cherished freedoms in a .democracy, namely, freedom of speech and expression. The petitioner~· being a citizen, has undoubtedly this freedom guaranteed to her, but the question is whether section 10(3) (c) or the Impugned Order unconstitutionally takes away or abr.idges this freedom. Now, prima facie, the right, which is sought to be rcstricted by section 10(3) (c) and the impugned Order, is the right to go abroad and that is not named as' a fundamental right or included in so many words in Article 19 (1) (a) , but the argument of the petitioner was that the right to go abroad is an integral part of the freedom of

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MANEKA GANDHI v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.)

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