Manish Kumar v. Union of India and Another

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
19 January 2021
Judge
Justice R.F. Nariman
Neutral citation
2021 INSC 28
Reported in
[2021] 14 S.C.R. 895
Result
Dismissed
Acts & sections
Article 32 Constitution, Article 14 Constitution, Section 2 PMLA, Section 12 Consumer Protection Act, Section 5 Limitation Act, Article 19 Constitution, Article 142 Constitution
Subject
Criminal, Consumer

Download the official PDF

Full judgment

[2021] 14 S.C.R. 895

MANISH KUMAR

v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER (Writ Petition (C) No.26 of 2020) JANUARY 19, 2021

[ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN, NAVIN SINHA AND K. M. JOSEPH, JJ.] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020 – s.3 –s.3 of the impugned amendment, amended s.7(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, incorporating three provisos to s.7(1) – Under the second proviso, a new threshold was declared for an allottee to move an application u/s.7 for trigerring the insolvency resolution process under the Code – The second proviso provided that for financial creditors who were allottees under a real estate project, an application for initiating corporate insolvency resolution process against the corporate debtor was to be filed jointly by not less than one hundred of such allottees under the same real estate project or not less than ten per cent of the total number of such allottees under the same real estate project, whichever is less – Challenge to the second proviso to s.7(1) – Held: Not tenable – The object of the Statute, admittedly, is to ensure that there is a critical mass of persons (allottees), who agree that the time is ripe to invoke the Code and to submit to the inexorable processes under the Code, with all its attendant perils – The rationale behind, confining allottees to the same real estate project, is to promote the object of the Code – Once the threshold requirement can pass muster when tested in the anvil of a challenge based on Arts. 14, 19 and 21, then, there is both logic and reason behind the legislative value judgment that the allottees, who must join the application under the impugned provisos, must be related to the same real estate project – Allottees under real estate projects are financial creditors, but they possess certain characteristics, which set them apart from generality of the financial creditors, such as numerosity; heterogeneity; and individuality in decision making – If a single allottee, as a financial creditor, is allowed to move an application u/s.7, the interests of all the other allottees may be put in peril – In the circumstances, if the Legislature, taking into

consideration, the sheer numbers of a group of creditors, viz., the allottees of real estate projects, finds this to be an intelligible differentia, which distinguishes the allottees from the other financial creditors, who are not found to possess the characteristics of numerosity, then, it is not for this Court to sit in judgment over the wisdom of such a measure – The allottee continues to be a financial creditor – All that is envisaged is the legislative value judgment that a critical mass is indispensable for allottees to be present before the Code, can be activised – The purport of the critical mass of applicants would ensure that a reasonable number of persons similarly circumstanced, form the view that despite the remedies available under the RERA or the Consumer Protection Act or a civil suit, the invoking of the Code is the only way out, in a particular case – If the Legislature felt that having regard to the consequences of an application under the Code, when such a large group of persons, pull at each other, an additional threshold be erected for exercising the right u/s.7, certainly, it cannot suffer a constitutional veto at the hands of Court exercising judicial review of legislation – This is not a case where the right of the allottee is completely taken away – All that has happened is a half-way house is built between extreme positions, viz., denying the right altogether to the allottee to move the application u/s.7 of the Code and giving an unbridled license to a single person to hold the real estate project and all the stakeholders thereunder hostage to a proceeding under the Code –Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s.7. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020 – s.3 – s.3 of the impugned amendment, amended s.7(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, incorporating three provisos to s.7(1) – The first proviso provided that for financial creditors, referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (6A) of s.21, an application for initiating corporate insolvency resolution process against the corporate debtor shall be filed jointly by not less than one hundred of such creditors in the same class or not less than ten per cent of the total number of such creditors in the same class, whichever is less – Challenge to – Held: The first proviso is invulnerable – The legislative understanding is clear that in regard to such creditors bearing the hallmark of large numbers they are required to be treated differently – If they are not treated differently it would spell chaos and the objects of the Code would not be fulfilled

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

– It is an extension of this basic principle which has led to the insertion of the impugned proviso – Insisting on a threshold in regard to these categories of creditors would lead to the halt to indiscriminate litigation which would result in an uncontrollable docket explosion as far as the authorities which work the Code are concerned – The debtor who is apparently stressed is relieved of the last straw on the camel’s back, as it were, by halting individual creditors whose views are not shared even by a reasonable number of its peers rushing in with applications – Again, as in the case of the allottees, this is not a situation where while treating them as financial creditors they are totally deprived of the right to apply under s.7 as part of the legislative scheme – The legislative policy reflects an attempt at shielding the corporate debtor from what it considers would be either for frivolous or avoidable applications – All that the amendment is likely to ensure is that the filing of the application is preceded by a consensus at least by a minuscule percentage of similarly placed creditors that the time has come for undertaking a legal odyssey which is beset with perils for the applicants themselves apart from others – As far as the percentage of applicants contemplated under the proviso it is clear that it cannot be dubbed as an arbitrary or capricious figure – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s.7.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020 – s.4 – s.4 of the impugned amendment, incorporated an additional Explanation in s.11 of the Code – While s.11 is about persons not entitled to make application for initiating corporate insolvency resolution process, the additional Explanation provided that nothing in section 11 prevented a corporate debtor from initiating corporate insolvency resolution process against another corporate debtor – Held: The provisions of the impugned Explanation clearly amount to a clarificatory amendment – A clarificatory amendment is retrospective in nature – The Explanation merely makes the intention of the Legislature clear beyond the pale of doubt – The argument of the petitioners that the amendment came into force only on 28.12.2019 and, therefore, in respect to applications filed under ss.7, 9 or 10, it will not have any bearing, cannot be accepted – The Explanation, in the facts of these cases, is clearly clarificatory in nature and it will certainly apply to all pending applications also – The intention of the Legislature was always to target the corporate

debtor only insofar as it purported to prohibit application by the corporate debtor against itself, to prevent abuse of the provisions of the Code – It could never had been the intention of the Legislature to create an obstacle in the path of the corporate debtor, in any of the circumstances contained in s.11, from maximizing its assets by trying to recover the liabilities due to it from others – Not only does it go against the basic commonsense view but it would frustrate the very object of the Code, if a corporate debtor is prevented from invoking the provisions of the Code either by itself or through his resolution professional, who at later stage, may, don the mantle of its liquidator – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s.11, Explanation II. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020 – s.10 – s.10 of the impugned amendment inserts s.32A in the Code – It was contended that but for s.32A, the properties which are acquired could be attached but that is pre-empted by s.32A – The petitioners contend that immunity granted to the corporate debtors and its assets acquired from the proceeds of crimes and any criminal liability arising from the offences of the erstwhile management for the offences committed prior to initiation of CIRP and approval of the resolution plan by the adjudicating authority further jeopardizes the interest of the allottees/creditors – Held: No case whatsoever is made out to seek invalidation of s.32A – The boundaries of this Court’s jurisdiction are clear – The wisdom of the legislation is not open to judicial review – Having regard to the object of the Code, the experience of the working of the code, the interests of all stakeholders including most importantly the imperative need to attract resolution applicants who would not shy away from offering reasonable and fair value as part of the resolution plan if the legislature thought that immunity be granted to the corporate debtor as also its property, it hardly furnishes a ground for this Court to interfere – The provision is carefully thought out – It is not as if the wrongdoers are allowed to get away – They remain liable – The extinguishment of the criminal liability of the corporate debtor is apparently important to the new management to make a clean break with the past and start on a clean slate – The immunity is premised on various conditions being fulfilled – There must be a resolution plan – It must be approved – There must be a change in the control of the corporate debtor – The new management cannot be the

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

disguised avatar of the old management – It cannot even be the related party of the corporate debtor – The new management cannot be the subject matter of an investigation which has resulted in material showing abetment or conspiracy for the commission of the offence and the report or complaint filed thereto – These ingredients are also insisted upon for claiming exemption of the bar from actions against the property – Significantly every person who was associated with the corporate debtor in any manner and who was directly or indirectly involved in the commission of the offence in terms of the report submitted continues to be liable to be prosecuted and punished for the offence committed by the corporate debtor – The corporate debtor and its property in the context of the scheme of the code constitute a distinct subject matter justifying the special treatment accorded to them – Creation of a criminal offence as also abolishing criminal liability must ordinarily be left to the judgement of the legislature – Attaining public welfare very often needs delicate balancing of conflicting interests – As to what priority must be accorded to which interest must remain a legislative value judgement and if seemingly the legislature in its pursuit of the greater good appears to jettison the interests of some it cannot unless it strikingly ill squares with some constitutional mandate suffer invalidation – There is no basis at all to impugn the Section on the ground that it violates Articles 19, 21 or 300A – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s.32A.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020 – s.3 –s.3 of the impugned amendment, amended s.7(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Amendment by s.3 of the impugned amendment incorporated three provisos to s.7(1) – The third proviso provided that where an application for initiating the corporate insolvency resolution process against a corporate debtor has been filed by a financial creditor referred to in the first and second provisos and has not been admitted by the Adjudicating Authority before the commencement of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020, such application shall be modified to comply with the requirements of the first or second proviso within thirty days of the commencement of the said Act, failing which the application shall be deemed to be withdrawn before its admission – Held: The third proviso is a one-time affair – It is intended only to deal with those applications, u/s.7, which were

filed prior to 28.12.2019, when, by way of the impugned Ordinance, initially, the threshold requirements came to be introduced by the first and the second impugned provisos – In other words, the legislative intention was to ensure that no application u/s.7 could be filed after 28.12.2019, except upon complying with the requirements in the first and second provisos – The Legislature did not stop there – It has clearly intended that the threshold requirement it imposed, will apply to all those applications, which were filed, prior to 28.12.2019 as well, subject to the exception that the applications, so filed, had not been admitted, u/s.7(5) – In other words, the Legislature intended that in every application, filed under s.7, by the creditors covered by the first proviso and by the allottees governed by the second proviso, should also be embraced by the newly imposed threshold requirement for which, it was intended, should be complied within 30 days from the date of the Ordinance – However, this restriction was not to apply to those applications which stood admitted as on the date of the Ordinance – It is also clear that the consequence of failure to comply with the threshold requirement, in regard to applications, which have been filed earlier, was that they would stand withdrawn – When applications were filed under the unamended provisions of s.7, at any rate it would transform into a vested right – The vested right is to proceed with the action till its logical and legal conclusion – No doubt, there may not be a vested right as regard mere procedure and while limitation, ordinarily, belongs to the domain of procedure, should new law shorten the existing period of limitation, such a law would not operate in regard to the right of action which is vested – Every sovereign Legislature is clothed with competence to make retrospective laws – It is open to the Legislature, while making retrospective law, to take away vested rights – If a vested right can be taken away by a retrospective law, there can be no reason why the Legislature cannot modify the vested rights – The imposition of a threshold requirement being a mandatory and irreducible minimum even, if it is to be achieved as and after the date of the amendment, constitutes an intrusion into the substantive right of action vested in the individual creditor – The action of the creditor was not a completed transaction – As regards his conduct in the past, viz., moving u/s.7, it is incomplete but the action was commenced – But the law (the 3rd proviso) impairs the past action qua the future –

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

Imposing the threshold requirement under the 3rd proviso, is not a mere matter of procedure – It impairs vested rights – Prescribing a time limit in regard to pending applications, cannot be, per se, described as arbitrary, as otherwise, it would be an endless and uncertain procedure – The applications would remain part of the docket and also become a Damocles Sword overhanging the debtor and the other stakeholders with deleterious consequences also qua the objects of the Code – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s.7.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Need of – Held: The Code was an imperative need for the nation to try and catch up with the rest of the world, be it in the matter of ease of doing business, elevating the rate of recovery of loans, maximization of the assets of ailing concerns and also, the balancing the interests of all stakeholders. Amendment – Clarificatory amendment – Is retrospective in nature.

Legislation – Plenary Legislation – Challenge to – Grounds – Discussed. Legislation – Plenary Legislation – Challenge to – On ground of malice – Held: While malice may furnish a ground in an appropriate case to veto administrative action, malice does not furnish a ground to attack a plenary law.

Dismissing the writ petitions and transferred case, the Court HELD:1.1. The grounds on which plenary law can be challenged are well established. A law can be successfully challenged if contrary to the division of powers, either the Parliament or the State Legislature usurps power that does not fall within its domain thus, rendering it incompetent to make such law. Secondly, a law made contravening Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India would be visited with unconstitutionality and declared void to the extent of its contravention. Needless to say, a law within the meaning of Article 19 of the Constitution would remain valid qua a non-citizen. Thirdly, apart from Fundamental Rights, the supremacy of the

Constitution vis-a-vis the ordinary legislation, even when the law is plenary legislation, is preserved with a view that legislation must be in conformity with the other provisions of the Constitution. [Para 47][955-C-F] 1.2. A plenary law if it is found to be manifestly arbitrary it becomes vulnerable. [Para 50][958-C] 1.3. A law, be it the offspring of a Legislature, it falls foul of Article 14 if it is found to be vague. [Para 51][958-E]

1.4. It has been urged that the law was created by way of pandering to the real estate lobby and succumbing to their pressure or by way of placating their vested interests. Such an argument is nothing but a thinly disguised attempt at questioning the law of the Legislature based on malice. While malice may furnish a ground in an appropriate case to veto administrative action it is trite that malice does not furnish a ground to attack a plenary law. [Para 52][958-G; 959-A, B-C] 1.5. A supreme legislature cannot be cribbed, cabined or confined by the doctrine of promissory estoppel or estoppel. It acts as a sovereign body. The theory of promissory estoppel, on the one hand, has witnessed an incredible trajectory of growth but it is incontestable that it serves as an effective deterrent to prevent injustice from a Government or its agencies which seek to resile from a representation made by them, without just cause. [Para 54][959-E-G]

1.6. A mere charge of either under inclusiveness or over inclusiveness which is not difficult to make hardly suffices to persuade the court to strike down a law. There is a wide latitude allowed in the legislature in these matters. The examination cannot be extended to find out whether there is mathematical precision or wooden equality established. The working of the statute may produce further issues, all of it may not be fully perceived as which may not be wholly foreseen by the law giver. The freedom to experiment must be conceded to the legislature, particularly, in economic laws. If problems emerge in the working

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

of law and which require legislative intervention, the court cannot be oblivious to the power of the legislative to respond by stepping in with necessary amendment. There is nothing like a perfect law and as with all human institutions there are bound to be imperfections. What is significant is however for the court ruling on constitutionality, the law must present a clear departure from constitutional limits. [Para 121][1005-E-H]

1.7. The mere difficulties in given cases, to comply with a law can hardly furnish a ground to strike it down. As to what would constitute the real estate project, it must depend on the terms & conditions and scope of a particular real estate project in which allottees are a part of. These are factual matters to be considered in the facts of each case. [Para 124][1006-G-H] 2. The rationale behind, confining allottees to the same real estate project, is to promote the object of the Code. Once the threshold requirement can pass muster when tested in the anvil of a challenge based on Articles 14, 19 and 21, then, there is both logic and reason behind the legislative value judgment that the allottees, who must join the application under the impugned provisos, must be related to the same real estate project. The connection with the same real estate project is crucial to the determination of the critical mass, which Legislature has in mind, as a part of its scheme, to streamline the working of the Code. If it is to embrace the total number of allottees of all projects, which a Promoter of a real estate project, may be having, in one sense, it will make the task of the applicant himself, more cumbersome. It becomes a sword, which will cut both ways. This is for the reason that the complaints, relating to different projects, may be different. With regard to one project of a Promoter of real estate project, maybe, in the advanced stage, the allottees in a particular project, may not have much of a complaint. The complaint, in relation to yet another project, may be more serious. If the complaint in respect of the latter, attracts the attention of a critical mass of allottees, and the proposed applicant is part of that project in the said project, then, it may be easier for the allottees to fulfil the statutory mantra in the impugned provisos, with the junction of likeminded souls. If, on the other hand, the requirement was

to make a search for allottees of different projects, as would be the case, if the entirety of the allottees, under different projects, were to be reckoned, the task would have been much more cumbersome. The requirement of the allottees, being drawn from the same project, stands to reason and also does not suffer from any constitutional blemish. [Para 140][1013-H; 1014-A-E] 3. There can be no doubt that the requirement of a threshold under the impugned proviso, in Section 7(1), must be fulfilled as on the date of the filing of the application. [Para 141][1014-G-H]

4. In the matter of presentation of an application under Section 7, if the threshold requirement, under the impugned provisos, stands fulfilled, the requirement of the law must be treated as fulfilled. The contention, relating to the ambiguity and consequent unworkability and the resultant arbitrariness, is clearly untenable. If an allottee is able to, in other words, satisfy the requirements, as on the date of the presentation, the requirement of the impugned law is fulfilled. [Para 143][1016-AB] 5. It does not matter whether a person has one or more allotments in his name or in the name of his family members. As long as there are independent allotments made to him or his family members, all of them would qualify as separate allottees and they would count both in the calculation of the total allotments, as also in reckoning the figure of hundred allottees or one-tenth of the allottees, whichever is less. [Para 146][1017-F-G]

6. The object of the Statute, admittedly, is to ensure that there is a critical mass of persons (allottees), who agree that the time is ripe to invoke the Code and to submit to the inexorable processes under the Code, with all its attendant perils. The object of maintaining speed in the CIRP and also the balancing of interest of all the stakeholders, would be promoted by the view that as in the case of the Companies Acts, 1956 and 2013, that for the purpose of complying with the impugned provisos in Section 7(1), while the allottee can be of any of the categories, fulfilling the

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

description of an allottee in Section 2(d) of RERA, joint allottees of a single apartment, will be treated as only one allottee. Any other view can lead to clear abuse and defeating of the object of the Code. If, for instance, a single apartment is taken in the name of hundred persons, a single allottee, who in turn comprise of relatives or family members or friends, can move an application, even though the position ante would be restored, which means that only the allottee qua one apartment, plot or building, is before the Authority and it would not really represent a critical mass of the allottees in the real estate project concerned. [Para 147][1018B-E]

7. The Central Government, having regard to the scheme of Companies Act, is intricately interconnected with the management of the companies. It had powers of investigation into the affairs of the companies under Section 235 and Section 237. The purport of Sections 397 and 398 include the conduct of the affairs of the company in any manner prejudicial to the public interest or also, no doubt, prejudicial to member or members. In such circumstances, clothing the Central Government with the power to waive the requirement and permitting the application to be presented by even a single member, is in sync with the scheme of the Companies Act. The role of the Central Government is different under the Code. In fact, the Central Government does not have any role, as such under the Code. It acts only through the designated Authorities under the Code. The Code is about insolvency resolution and on failure liquidation. The scheme of the Code is unique and its objects are vividly different from that of the Companies Act. Consequently, if the Legislature felt that threshold requirement representing a critical mass of allottees, alone would satisfy the requirement of a valid institution of an application under Section 7, it cannot be dubbed as either discriminatory or arbitrary. [Para 151][1019-D-G] 8. Invalidating a law made by a competent Legislature, on the basis of what the Court may be induced to conclude, as a better arrangement or a morewise and even fairer system, is constitutionally impermissible. If, the impugned provisions are otherwise not infirm, they must pass muster. [Para 157][1023-E]

9. The law giver has created a mechanism, namely, the association of allottees through which the allottees are expected to gather information about the status of the allotments including the names and addresses of the allottees. One cannot proceed on the basis in a case which involves a challenge to a statute that the information to be gathered under the statute will not be available on the basis that the statute will not be worked as contemplated by the law giver. [Para 163][1030-C-D] 10. The law does not interdict the creation of a class within a class absolutely. Should there be a rational basis for creating a sub-class within a class, then, it is not impermissible. A class within a sub-class, is indeed not antithetical to the guarantee of equality under Article 14. [Para 188][1046-G-H; 1047-B] 11. Allottees are, indeed, financial creditors. They do possess certain characteristics, however, which appear to have appealed to the Legislature as setting them apart from the generality of financial creditors. These features, which set them apart, have been clearly indicated in the stand of the Union. They are: (i) Numerosity; (ii) Heterogeneity; and (iii) The individuality in decision making. [Para 189][1047-B-D] 12. In the case of the allottees of a real estate project, it is the approach of the Legislature that in a real estate project there would be large number of allottees. There can be hundreds or even thousands of allottees in a project. If a single allottee, as a financial creditor, is allowed to move an application under Section 7, the interests of all the other allottees may be put in peril. This is for the reason that as stakeholders in the real estate project, having invested money and time and looking forward to obtaining possession of the flat or apartment and faced with the same state of affairs as the allottee, who moves the application under Section 7 of the Code, the other allottees may have a different take of the whole scenario. Some of them may approach the Authority under the RERA. Others may, instead, resort to the For a under the Consumer Protection Act, though, the remedy of a civil suit is, no doubt, not ruled out. Ordinarily, the allottee would have the remedies available under RERA or the Consumer

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

Protection Act, as the more effective option. In such circumstances, if the Legislature, taking into consideration, the sheer numbers of a group of creditors, viz., the allottees of real estate projects, finds this to be an intelligible differentia, which distinguishes the allottees from the other financial creditors, who are not found to possess the characteristics of numerosity, then, it is not for this Court to sit in judgment over the wisdom of such a measure. [Para 192][1049-B-E]

13. The enquiry must not end with finding that there is an intelligible differentia, to be found in the numerosity, heterogeneity and individuality in decision-making of the allottees. The law further requires that the differentia must have bear a rational nexus with the object of the law. [Para 193][1049-F] 14. The object of the law is clear. A radical departure was contemplated from the erstwhile regime, which was essentially contained in The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, and which manifested a deep malaise, which impacted the economy itself. To put it shortly, the procedures involved under the Act, simply meant procrastination in matters, where speed and dynamic decisions were the crying need of the hour. The value of the assets of the Company in distress, was wasted away both by the inexorable and swift passage of time and tardy rate at which the forums responded to the problem of financial distress. The Code was an imperative need for the nation to try and catch up with the rest of the world, be it in the matter of ease of doing business, elevating the rate of recovery of loans, maximization of the assets of ailing concerns and also, the balancing the interests of all stakeholders. The Code purports to achieve the object of maximization of the assets of corporate bodies, inter alia, which have slipped into insolvency. Present a default, which, no doubt, is not barred by time (subject to the power of the Authority under Section 5 of the Limitation Act), the Insolvency Resolution Process can be triggered. [Para 194][1049-G-H; 1050-A-C]

15. A Resolution Plan is intended to resuscitate an ailing corporate debtor and keep it going as a going concern. The

importance of rescuing ailing businesses in the form of infusing new life in such concerns, cannot be understated. Its significance lies in various directions. There would be various categories of creditors, of which, the legislative choice appears to show some degree of preference for the financial creditors, particularly in the form of banks and financial institutions. One of the chief goals of the Code is to prevent the loss of the value of capital. If the recovery of the loan is effected at the earliest, it translates into the availability of the recovered capital for being lent to other entrepreneurs, and this is an aspect, which goes to the root of the matter. With every passing hour, not unnaturally, depreciation will claim its victim in the form of diminution of value of the assets. Should insolvency pass into the stage of liquidation, the loss is not only of the concerned businesses, but it also would represent a loss for the Nation. This is, undoubtedly, apart from the impairment of the interests of all stakeholders. The stakeholders would include the financial creditors and the operational creditors, as well. Employees of the failed business, would take a direct hit. Therefore, the Code accords the highest importance to speed in the matter of undergoing the process of insolvency. [Para 194][1050-F-H; 1051-A-B] 16. The speed, with which the processes can be conducted and completed, is based on the volume of the litigation. The Adjudicating Authorities and the Appellate Bodies, viz., N.C.L.A.T., are authorities under other enactments, as well. They are hard-pressed for time. The matters, which are covered by the Code, may present convoluted facts. The issues may bristle with complications, both in points of law and also facts. If, out of a large body of financial creditors belonging to a sub-group, as for instance allottees of a real estate project, were to be given the freedom to activise the Code, then, the possibility of multiple individual actions, is a spectre, which the Legislature, must be presumed to be aware of. In other words, the Legislature became alive to the peril of entire object of the Code, being derailed by permitting the individual players crowding the docket of the Authorities under the Code, and resultantly, reviving the very state of affairs, which compelled the Legislature to script a new dawn in this area of law. Instead, having regard to the numerosity, the Legislature has thought it fit to adopt a balanced approach by

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

not taking the allottee out of the fold of the financial creditors altogether. The allottee continues to be a financial creditor. All that is envisaged is the legislative value judgment that a critical mass is indispensable for allottees to be present before the Code, can be activised. The purport of the critical mass of applicants would ensure that a reasonable number of persons similarly circumstanced, form the view that despite the remedies available under the RERA or the Consumer Protection Act or a civil suit, the invoking of the Code is the only way out, in a particular case. [Para 196][1051-D-H; 1052-A-B]

17. One of the objects is the balancing of the interests of all stakeholders. By imposing a threshold limit of either hundred allottees or if the number of allottees going by the criteria of one-tenth of the allottees is, even less than hundred, then, the said number of allottees must agree to invoke the Code. This is again, based on the intelligible differentia of heterogeneity. By heterogeneity, is meant, differences between a seemingly homogenous group. All allottees of a real estate project form a class. All of them have stakes in the prompt and effective completion of the real estate project. There is a plurality of remedies, which the law provides. More importantly, the outcome of activising the Code, is almost like an uncertain wager. The outcome of invoking the Code by individual allottees would be apart from clogging the dockets of the Adjudicating Authorities with even more voluminous files leading to greater delay, that at the instance of such individual allottees, what would be perceived as an avoidable calamity, is perpetuated. In other words, while a vast majority of allottees may see reason in either giving time and reposing faith in existing management of real estate project or successfully invoking the other remedies available to them, an individual allottee, out of the heterogenous group, would throw the spanner in the works and bring the entire real estate project itself to a possible doom. [Para 196][1052-D-H; 1053-A-B]

18. The individual allottee, with a high-level of subjectivity in decision-making, may take a plunge at invoking the Code, without having a more global view of the consequences, which will follow. Any such attempt would only be dubbed as frivolous.

This attempt by individual allottees would have the following consequences: i. It would crowd an already heavy docket;

ii. It would consequently slow down the processes under the Code, even with respect to matters, which may be more genuine and require greater and more timely attention; iii. It will defeat the object of the balancing the interests of all stakeholders. [Para 197][1053-E-G]

19. The law under scrutiny is an economic measure. In dealing with the challenge on the anvil of Article 14, the Court will not adopt a doctrinaire approach. A law cannot operate in a vacuum. In the concrete world, when the law is put into motion in practical experiences, bottlenecks that would flow from its application, are best envisaged by the Law Givers. Solutions to vexed problems made manifest through experience, would indeed require a good deal of experimentation, as long as it passes muster in law. It is no part of a court’s function to probe into what it considers to be more wise or a better way to deal with a problem. In economic matters, the wider latitude given to the Law Giver is based on sound principle and tested logic over time. [Para 199][1054-G-H; 1055-A-B] 20. There cannot be any doubt that intrinsically a financial creditor and an operational creditor are distinct. An operational creditor is one to whom money is due on account of goods or services supplied to the debtor. The financial creditor on the other hand, is so described, on account of there being the element of borrowing. This distinction is indisputable. What is unique to the real estate developer vis-a-vis operational debts is that the developer is the debtor as an allottee funds his own apartment by paying amounts in advance. On the other hand, in case of operational debt, the person who has supplied the goods and services, becomes the creditor and the corporate debtor is one who has availed such services. Another distinction is that an operational creditor has no interest or stake in the corporate debtor. The allottee is, on the other hand, vitally concerned with the financial health of the corporate debtor. Should financial ruin occur, the real estate project will come to a nought. Should such

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

an event take place also, the allottee would not be in a position to either claim or get compensation or even refund with interest. Thirdly, there is no consideration for the time value of money in the operational debt. This is not so in the case of an allottee. [Para 212][1065-F-H; 1066-A-C]

21. An action under the Code by way of an application under Section 7 is an action in rem. The recovery of the amounts paid is not what is primarily contemplated under the Code. The vires of the impugned provisions must be judged without turning a blind eye to the distinction between the wisdom and the legislative value judgment behind the Statute being immune from judicial scrutiny on the one hand and a hostile discrimination falling foul of the mandate of equality under Article 14, being fatal to the Statute. In this case, while it may be true that the allottees are unsecured creditors and in that regard, they are similar to the operational creditors and it also may be true that many contracts under real estate projects, may not involve large sums as the subject matter of advances by banks and other financial institutions, the similarity between the two ends there. What is of greater importance is the distinctions and the most vital point which sets them apart, in the matter of pronouncing on the vires of the provisos under Section 7 is the numerosity of the allottees, and what is more not being homogeneous in what they want in a particular situation, since the law has indeed endowed the allottees with different remedies, having different implications, be it under the Consumer Protection Act or under RERA. If the Legislature felt that having regard to the consequences of an application under the Code, when such a large group of persons, pull at each other, an additional threshold be erected for exercising the right under Section 7, certainly, it cannot suffer a constitutional veto at the hands of Court exercising judicial review of legislation. [Para 213][1066-F; 1067-B-F]

22. This is not a case where the right of the allottee is completely taken away. All that has happened is a half-way house is built between extreme positions, viz., denying the right altogether to the allottee to move the application under Section 7 of the Code and giving an unbridled license to a single person to hold the real estate project and all the stakeholders

thereunder hostage to a proceeding under the Code which must certainly pass inexorably within a stipulated period of time should circumstances exists under Section 33 into corporate death with the unavoidable consequence of all allottees and not merely the applicant under Section 7 being visited with payment out of the liquidation value, the amounts which are only due to the unsecured creditor. The point of distinction, between a financial creditor in this case, the allottees of a real estate project and the operational creditors, as contained in Section 7 on the one hand and Sections 8 and 9 are preserved. In other words, the operational creditor still has to cross the threshold of not being shut off from the application not being processed in the teeth of the defense allowed to the corporate debtor in regard to an operational creditor. All that has happened is the Legislature in its wisdom has found that the greater good lies in conditioning an absolute right which existed in favour of an allottee by requirements which would ensure some certain element of consensus among the allottees. The requirement is a mere one-tenth of the allottees. This is a number which goes to policy and lies exclusively within the wisdom of the Legislature. [Para 214][1067-G-H; 1068-A-D] 23. The first proviso is invulnerable. The impact of the insertion of sub-section 3A in Section 25A is to be noticed. Section 25A, inter alia, deals with the exercise of rights and the liabilities of authorised representative of creditors like debenture holders and allottees. After the insertion of sub-section 3A in section 25A, the majority of the creditors of a class is permitted to call the shots. It’s view, in other words, will hold sway. This is subject to the Code otherwise. The legislative understanding is clear that in regard to such creditors bearing the hallmark of large numbers they are required to be treated differently. If they are not treated differently it would spell chaos and the objects of the Code would not be fulfilled. It is an extension of this basic principle which has led to the insertion of the impugned proviso. Insisting on a threshold in regard to these categories of creditors would lead to the halt to indiscriminate litigation which would result in an uncontrollable docket explosion as far as the authorities which work the Code are concerned. The debtor who is apparently stressed is relieved of the last straw on the camel’s

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

back, as it were, by halting individual creditors whose views are not shared even by a reasonable number of its peers rushing in with applications. Again, as in the case of the allottees, this is not a situation where while treating them as financial creditors they are totally deprived of the right to apply under Section 7 as part of the legislative scheme. The legislative policy reflects an attempt at shielding the corporate debtor from what it considers would be either for frivolous or avoidable applications. What we mean by avoidable applications is a decision which would not be taken by similarly placed creditors keeping in mind the consequences that would ensue not only in regard to persons falling in the same category but also the generality of creditors and other stakeholders. All that the amendment is likely to ensure is that the filing of the application is preceded by a consensus at least by a minuscule percentage of similarly placed creditors that the time has come for undertaking a legal odyssey which is beset with perils for the applicants themselves apart from others. As far as the percentage of applicants contemplated under the proviso it is clear that it cannot be dubbed as an arbitrary or capricious figure. The legislature is not wanting in similar requirements under other laws. The provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 and its predecessors contained similar provisions. Allowing what is described as ‘lone Ranger’ applications beset with extremely serious ramifications which are at cross purposes with the objects of the code. This is apart from it in particular spelling avoidable doom for the interest of the creditors falling in the same categories. The object of speed in deciding CIRP proceedings would also be achieved by applying the threshold to debenture holders and security holders. The dividing line between wisdom or policy of the legislature and limitation placed by the Constitution must not be overlooked. [Para 220][1071-D-H; 1072-A-E]

24. The intention of the Legislature was always to target the corporate debtor only insofar as it purported to prohibit application by the corporate debtor against itself, to prevent abuse of the provisions of the Code. It could never had been the intention of the Legislature to create an obstacle in the path of the corporate debtor, in any of the circumstances contained in Section 11, from maximizing its assets by trying to recover the liabilities due to it from others. Not only does it go against the

basic commonsense view but it would frustrate the very object of the Code, if a corporate debtor is prevented from invoking the provisionsof the Code either by itself or through his resolution professional, who at later stage, may, don the mantle of its liquidator. The provisions of the impugned Explanation, thus, clearly amount to a clarificatory amendment. A clarificatory amendment, it is not even in dispute, is retrospective in nature. The Explanation merely makes the intention of the Legislature clear beyond the pale of doubt. The argument of the petitioners that the amendment came into force only on 28.12.2019 and, therefore, in respect to applications filed under Sections 7, 9 or 10, it will not have any bearing, cannot be accepted. The Explanation, in the facts of these cases, is clearly clarificatory in nature and it will certainly apply to all pending applications also. [Para 243][1084-E-H; 1085-A] 25. No case whatsoever is made out to seek invalidation of Section 32A. The boundaries of this Court’s jurisdiction are clear. The wisdom of the legislation is not open to judicial review. Having regard to the object of the Code, the experience of the working of the code, the interests of all stakeholders including most importantly the imperative need to attract resolution applicants who would not shy away from offering reasonable and fair value as part of the resolution plan if the legislature thought that immunity be granted to the corporate debtor as also its property, it hardly furnishes a ground for this this Court to interfere. The provision is carefully thought out. It is not as if the wrongdoers are allowed to get away. They remain liable. The extinguishment of the criminal liability of the corporate debtor is apparently important to the new management to make a clean break with the past and start on a clean slate. One must also not overlook the principle that the impugned provision is part of an economic measure. As far as protection afforded to the property is concerned there is clearly a rationale behind it. Having regard to the object of the statute one hardly sees any manifest arbitrariness in the provision. [Para 257][1098-B-D, F] 27. The immunity is premised on various conditions being fulfilled. There must be a resolution plan. It must be approved. There must be a change in the control of the corporate debtor.

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

The new management cannot be the disguised avatar of the old management. It cannot even be the related party of the corporate debtor. The new management cannot be the subject matter of an investigation which has resulted in material showing abetment or conspiracy for the commission of the offence and the report or complaint filed thereto. These ingredients are also insisted upon for claiming exemption of the bar from actions against the property. Significantly every person who was associated with the corporate debtor in any manner and who was directly or indirectly involved in the commission of the offence in terms of the report submitted continues to be liable to be prosecuted and punished for the offence committed by the corporate debtor. The corporate debtor and its property in the context of the scheme of the code constitute a distinct subject matter justifying the special treatment accorded to them. Creation of a criminal offence as also abolishing criminal liability must ordinarily be left to the judgement of the legislature. Erecting a bar against action against the property of the corporate debtor when viewed in the larger context of the objectives sought to be achieved at the forefront of which is maximisation of the value of the assets which again is to be achieved at the earliest point of time cannot become the subject of judicial veto on the ground of violation of Article 14. Attaining public welfare very often needs delicate balancing of conflicting interests. As to what priority must be accorded to which interest must remain a legislative value judgement and if seemingly the legislature in its pursuit of the greater good appears to jettison the interests of some it cannot unless it strikingly ill squares with some constitutional mandate suffer invalidation. There is no basis at all to impugn the Section on the ground that it violates Articles 19, 21 or 300A. [Paras 258, 259][1098-F-H; 1099-A-E]

28. The third proviso is a one-time affair. It is intended only to deal with those applications, under Section 7, which were filed prior to 28.12.2019, when, by way of the impugned Ordinance, initially, the threshold requirements came to be introduced by the first and the second impugned provisos. In other words, the legislative intention was to ensure that no application under Section 7 could be filed after 28.12.2019, except upon complying with the requirements in the first and second provisos.

The Legislature did not stop there. It has clearly intended that the threshold requirement it imposed, will apply to all those applications, which were filed, prior to 28.12.2019 as well, subject to the exception that the applications, so filed, had not been admitted, under Section 7(5). In other words, the Legislature intended that in every application, filed under Section 7, by the creditors covered by the first proviso and by the allottees governed by the second proviso, should also be embraced by the newly imposed threshold requirement for which, it was intended, should be complied within 30 days from the date of the Ordinance. However, this restriction was not to apply to those applications which stood admitted as on the date of the Ordinance. It is also clear that the consequence of failure to comply with the threshold requirement, in regard to applications, which have been filed earlier, was that they would stand withdrawn.[Para 261][1100-BE] 29. Every sovereign Legislature is clothed with competence to make retrospective laws. It is open to the Legislature, while making retrospective law, to take away vested rights. If a vested right can be taken away by a retrospective law, there can be no reason why the Legislature cannot modify the vested rights. [Para 333][1145-G-H; 1146-A] 30. The financial creditors covered by the 3rd proviso were clothed with a statutory right under Section 7. This right was available to be exercised by an individual creditor, by himself or jointly with others. The imposition of a threshold requirement being a mandatory and irreducible minimum even, if it is to be achieved as and after the date of the amendment, constitutes an intrusion into the substantive right of action vested in the individual creditor. The action of the creditor was not a completed transaction. As regards his conduct in the past, viz., moving under Section 7, it is incomplete but the action was commenced. But the law (the 3rd proviso) impairs the past action qua the future. Imposing the threshold requirement under the 3rd proviso, is not a mere matter of procedure. It impairs vested rights. It has conditioned the right instead, in the manner provided in the first and the second proviso. This Court has already upheld the first and second proviso, which, in fact, operates only in the future. In

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

that sense, the Legislature has purported to equate persons who had not filed applications with persons like the petitioners who had filed the applications under the unamended law. [Para 346][1149-F-H; 1150-A-B]

31. The requirement of compliance with the threshold numerical requirements under the first and second proviso is an integral and inseparable part of the third proviso. [Para 347][Para 348][1150-E] 32. From the standpoint of public interest, every application maintained by a single applicant, is perceived as a veritable threat to the fulfilment of the objectives of the Code. The continuance of the applications could not, therefore, be in public interest. It is, as if, the Legislature intended to apply its brakes in the form of asking the applicants to obtain the consensus of a minimum number of similar stakeholders, before the applications could be further processed. [Para 359][1154-D-E]

33. The law in question is an economic measure. This is a case where the Law Giver has not left anything to speculation or doubt. [Para 360][1155-B] 34. The Legislature has power to impair and take away vested rights. The limitation that flows, however, is from both Article 14 and 19 read with Article 21. It flows from the Doctrine that the action of the State must be fair and reasonable. The question, as to validity of the retrospective law, is a matter to be judged on a consideration of the facts, the period of time, over which the retrospective law operates, the impact of the law on the vested rights, the public interest, the nature of the right, which is the subject matter of the law and the terms of the law. [Para 361][1155-D-F] 35. The nature of the right involved in this case, is the right of the financial creditors to move an application under Section 7. Though, Section 7 confers a right upon the financial creditor to file the application, the proceedings are one in rem. The Legislature was faced with the situation, where it felt that the requirement, as to maintainability of the application under Section 7, must, in regard to pending applications, be modified in the manner done. There is a determining principle, namely, the

perception from experience about how the entire object of the Code would stand jeopardised if applications already filed could go on even when a fair and reasonable number of kindred souls are not available to support it. Once there is a principle, it cannot be capricious, excessive or disproportionate unless the time given under the proviso is manifestly arbitrary. A vested right under a statute can be taken away by a retrospective law. A right given under a statute can be taken away by another statute. There was considerable public interest behind such a law. The sheer numbers, in which applications proliferated, combined with the results it could produce, cannot be brushed aside as an irrational or capricious aspect to have been guided by in making the law. Being an economic measure, the wider latitude available to the Law Giver, cannot be lost sight of. [Para 362][1155-F-H; 1156-AC] 36. As regards the compelled withdrawal under the third proviso of the pending applications is concerned, once the Legislature intended that the pending applications must be made compliant with the threshold requirement, consequences for not doing so had to be provided. Otherwise, it would have created complete uncertainty and the applicant would have been dealt with in a manifestly arbitrary manner. Providing for the consequence of withdrawal before admission does not have the consequence of preventing the fresh filing, even in regard to the same default, after complying, no doubt, with the requirement of the first or the second proviso, cannot be dubbed as arbitrary. No doubt, there is lack of clarity in this regard in the provision but on an understanding of the law, as expounded, the provision was capable of being understood in the manner done. [Para 365][1156G-H; 1157-A-B] 37. In regard to the first and the second provisos, they have only prospective operation. The creditors covered by these provisos, are not subjected to any time limit (except, no doubt, the bar under Article 137 of the Limitation Act), in the matter of garnering the requisite support. However, prescribing a time limit in regard to pending applications, cannot be, per se, described as arbitrary, as otherwise, it would be an endless and uncertain procedure. The applications would remain part of the docket and

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

also become a Damocles Sword overhanging the debtor and the other stakeholders with deleterious consequences also qua the objects of the Code. The period could have been more fair to the petitioners by being longer but that is where one must bear in mind, the limits of jurisdiction. Where would the Court draw the line? It is difficult to hold that within the time limit of 30 days it is impossible to comply with the requirements. [Para 366 and 369][1157-B-D; 1158-C]

38. The impugned amendments are upheld, subject to directions issued under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. [Para 372][1159-D] The State of Gujarat and Others v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad and Others (1974) 4 SCC 656 : [1974] 3 SCR 760; State of West-Bengal v. Anwar Ali AIR 1952 SC 75 : [1952] SCR 284; E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another (1974) 4 SCC 3 : [1974] 2 SCR 348; Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1 : [2017] 9 SCR 797; Navtej Singh Johar and Others v. Union of India and Others (2018) 10 SCC 1 : [2018] 7 SCR 379; Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39 : [2018] 11 SCR 765; Justice K.S. Puttuswamy and Others v. Union of India and Others (2017) 10 SCC 1 : [2017] 10 SCR 569; Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. and Others v. Union of India and Others AIR 2020 SC 122; Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 : [2015] 5 SCR 963; K. Nagaraj and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another (1985) 1 SCC 523 : [1985] 2 SCR 579; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Narain Singh (2009) 13 SCC 165 : [2009] [10] SCR 821 – relied on. Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. and another v. Union of India and Others (2019) 8 SCC 416 : [2019] 10 SCR 381; Chitra Sharma and Others v. Union of India and Others (2018) 18 SCC 575 : [2018] 12 SCR 1044; Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. (1979) 2 SCC 409 : [1979] 2 SCR 641; Nagpur Investment Trust and Others v. Vithal

Rao and Others (1973) 1 SCC 500 : [1973] 3 SCR 39; B.K. Educational Services (P) Ltd. v. Parag Gupta & Associates (2019) 11 SCC 633 : [2018] 12 SCR 794; Swiss Ribbon Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2019) 4 SCC 17 : [2019] 3 SCR 535; Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry AIR 1957 SC 540 : [1957] SCR 488; Thirumalai Chemicals Limited v. Union of India and Others (2011) 6 SCC 739 : [2011] 4 SCR 838; Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Tarun Pal Singh and Others (2018) 14 SCC 161 : [2017] 14 SCR 202; State of Karnataka and Others v. The Karnataka Pawn Brokers Association and Others (2018) 6 SCC 363 : [2018] 10 SCR 409; Vasant Ganpat Padvave (D) by LRs & Ors. v. Anant Mahadev Sawant (D) Through LRs. & Ors. 2019 (12) SCALE 572; Ameerunnissa Begum and Others v. Mahboob Begum and others [1953] SCR 404; State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa and Others (1974) 1 SCC 19 : [1974] 1 SCR 771; Murthy Match Works and others v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Another (1974) 4 SCC 428 : [1974] 3 SCR 121; Ajoy Kumar Banerjee and Others v. Union of India and Others (1984) 3 SCC 127 : [1984] 3 SCR 252; Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan and Others (2002) 4 SCC 34 : [2002] 2 SCR 649; Indra Sawhney and Others v. Union of India and Others (1992) 3 Suppl. SCC 217 : [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454; Lord Krishna Sugar Mills Limited and Another v. Union of India and Another [1960] 1 SCR 39; State of Kerala and Another v. N.M. Thomas and Others (1976) 2 SCC 310 : [1976] 1 SCR 906; State of West Bengal and Another v. Rash Behari Sarkar and Another (1993) 1 SCC 479 : [1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 351; State of Kerala v. Aravind Ramakant Modawdakar and Others (1999) 7 SCC 400; Sansar Chand Atri v. State of Punjab and Another (2002) 4 SCC 154 : [2002] 2 SCR 881; Union of India and others v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. (1985) 4 SCC 369 : [1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 123; K. Nagaraj and Others v. State of A.P. and Another (1985) 1 SCC 523 : [1985]

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

2 SCR 579; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Narain Singh (2009) 13 SCC 165 : [2009] 10 SCR 821; Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Others (1999) 4 SCC 468 : [1999] 2 SCR 895; Howrah Municipal Corporation and Others v. Ganges Rope Co. Ltd. and Others (2004) 1 SCC 663 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1212; Arcelormittal India Private Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Others (2019) 2 SCC 1 : [2018] 12 SCR 362; Swiss Ribbons Private Limited and another v. Union of India and Others (2019) 4 SCC 17 : [2019] 3 SCR 535; Karnail Kaur and Others v. State of Punjab and Others (2015) 3 SCC 206; Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited Through Authorised Signatory v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Others (2019) SCCONLINE SC 1478; M.S. Shivananda v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and Others (1980) 1 SCC 149 : [1980] 1 SCR 684 ; Lalji Raja and Sons v. Hansraj Nathuram (1971) 1 SCC 721 : [1971] 3 SCR 815; Kanaya Ram and Others v. Rajender Kumar and Others (1985) 1 SCC 436 ; J.P. Srivastava & Sons (P) Ltd. and Others v. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. and Others (2005) 1 SCC 172 : [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 648; Anjum Hussain and Others v. Intellicity Business Park Private Limited and Others (2019) 6 SCC 519 : [2019] 7 SCR 1036; Union of India and Others v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. (1985) 4 SCC 369 : [1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 123; B.K. Educational Services Private Limited v. Parag Gupta & Associates (2019) 11 SCC 633 : [2018] 12 SCR 794; Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. A. Nageshwara Rao and Others AIR 1956 SC 213 : [1955] SCR 1066; Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. T. N. Ganapathy (1990) 1 SCC 608 : [1990] 1 SCR 272; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. and Another v. Union of India and Others (2019) 8 SCC 416 : [2019] 10 SCR 381; Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (2019) 9 SCC 304; State of Gujarat and Another v. Shree Ambica Mills Ltd. (1974) 4 SCC 656 : [1974] 3 SCR 760; In Re The Special Courts Bill, 1978 (1979) 1

SCC 380 : [1979] 2 SCR 476; Ajoy Kumar Banerjee and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1984) 3 SCC 127 : [1984] 3 SCR 252; Subramanian Swami v. Director, CBI and Ors. (2014) 8 SCC 682 : [2014] 6 SCR 873; Indira Sawney v. Union of India (1992) 3 Suppl. SCC 217 : [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454; State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Rash Bihari Sarkar and Ors. (1993) 1 SCC 479 : [1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 351; State of Kerala v. Aravind Ramakant Modawdakar and Ors. (1999) 7 SCC 400; Sansar Chand Atri v. State of Punjab and Another (2002) 4 SCC 154 : [2002] 2 SCR 881; His Holiness Kesavananda Bharti Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala and Another (1973) 4 SCC 225 : [1973] 0 Suppl. SCR 1; Innoventive Industries Limited v. ICICI Bank and Another (2018) 1 SCC 407 : [2017] 8 SCR 33; Vasant Ganpat Padave (D) by LRs. and Ors. v. Anant Mahadev Sawant (D) through LRs. and Ors. (2019) 12 SCALE 579; Shayara Bano v. Union of India and Others (2017) 9 SCC 1 : [2017] 9 SCR 797; S. Sundaram Pillai and others v. R. Pattabiraman and Others (1985) 1 SCC 591 : [1985] 2 SCR 643; Sonia Bhatia v. State of U.P. and Others (1981) 2 SCC 585 : [1981] 3 SCR 239; Virtual Soft Systems Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi-I (2007) 9 SCC 665 : [2007] 2 SCR 289; Hiralal Rattanlal and Ors. v. State of U.P. and another (1973) 1 SCC 216 : [1973] 2 SCR 502; Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Others (1994) 4 SCC 602 : [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 360; Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. Amrit Lal & Co. and Another (2001) 8 SCC 397 : [2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 195; B.K. Educational Services Private Ltd. v. Parag Gupta and Associates (2019) 11 SCC 633 : [2018] 12 SCR 794; Lalji Raja and Sons v. Hansraj Nathuram (1971) 1 SCC 721 : [1971] 3 SCR 815; Isha Valimohamed v. Haji Gulam Mohamad & Haji Dada Trust (1974) 2 SCC 484 : [1975] 1 SCR 720; Bombay Stock Exchange v. V.S. Kandalgaonkar (2015) 2 SCC 1 : [2014] 14 SCR 409; New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra (1975) 2 SCC 840 : [1976]

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

2 SCR 266; Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. (1991) 4 SCC 333 : [1991] 3 SCR 912; Union of India v. Harnam Singh (1993) 2 SCC 162 : [1993] 1 SCR 862; V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal (1979) 4 SCC 214 : [1980] 1 SCR 334; D. C. Bhatia v. Union of India (1995) 1 SCC 104 : [1994] 4 Suppl. SCR 539; Mst. Bibi Sayeeda & Ors. v. State of Bihar and Others (1996) 9 SCC 516 : AIR 1996 SC 1936 : [1996] 1 Suppl. SCR 799; M.S. Shivananda v. Karnataka SRTC (1980) 1 SCC 149 : [1980] 1 SCR 684; Rameshwar and Others v. Jot Ram and Another (1976) 1 SCC 194 : [1976] 1 SCR 847; Bansidhar v. State of Rajasthan (1989) 2 SCC 557 : [1989] 2 SCR 152; Mohinder Kumar and Others v. State of Haryana and Another (1985) 4 SCC 221 : [1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 859; D. C. Bhatia and Others v. Union of India and Another (1995) 1 SCC 104 : [1994] 4 Suppl. SCR 539; Howrah Municipal Corporation and Others v. Ganges Rope Co. Ltd. and Others (2004) 1 SCC 663 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1212; Arcelormittal India Private Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta & Others (2019) 2 SCC 1 : [2018] 12 SCR 362; B.K. Educational Services Private Limited v. Parag Gupta and Associates (2019) 11 SCC 633 : [2018] 12 SCR 794; M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise (2015) 7 SCC 58; Mardia Chemicals Ltd. and Others v. Union of India and Others (2004) 4 SCC 311 : [2004] 3 SCR 982; P.D. Aggrawal & Others v. State of U.P and Others (1987) 3 SCC 622 : [1987] 3 SCR 427; Darshan Singh v. Ram Pal Singh and Ors. (1992) 1 Suppl. SCC 191 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 212; K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala (1994) 5 SCC 593 : [1994] 3 Suppl. SCR 405; State Bank’s Staff Union (Madras Circle) v. Union of India and Others AIR 2005 SC 3446 : (2005) 7 SCC 584 : [2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 200; Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress (1991) 1 Suppl. SCC 600 : [1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 142 and Vijay v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 6 SCC 289 : [2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 81 – referred to.

Gopeshur Pal v. Jiban Chandra Chandra and Others AIR 1914 Calcutta 806 – referred to. West v. Gwynne (1910) WLR 976; In Re: Pulborough Parish School Board Election, Bourke v. Nutt (1894) 1 QB 725; Abbott and Minister of Lands (1895) AC 425; Hamilton Gell v. White (1922) 2 K.B. 422; Odgen Industries Pty. Ltd. v. Haider Doreen Lucas 3 WLR 75/ (1969) (1) All England Reports 121; Director of Public Works and Another v. Ho Po Sang and Others [1961] 3 WLR 39 and L’Office Cherifien Des Phosphates and another And Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd. (1994) 1 All ER 20 – referred to. Case Law Reference

[2019] 10 SCR 381

referred to

Para 14

[2018] 12 SCR 1044

referred to

Para 20

[1979] 2 SCR 641

referred to

Para 20

[1973] 3 SCR 39

referred to

Para 20

[2018] 12 SCR 794

referred to

Para 23

[2019] 3 SCR 535

referred to

Para 23

[1957] SCR 488

referred to

Para 25

[2011] 4 SCR 838

referred to

Para 25

[2017] 14 SCR 202

referred to

Para 25

[2018] 10 SCR 409

referred to

Para 26

2019 (12) SCALE 572

referred to

Para 29

[1953] SCR 404

referred to

Para 31

[1974] 1 SCR 771

referred to

Para 31

[1974] 3 SCR 121

referred to

Para 31

[1984] 3 SCR 252

referred to

Para 31

[2002] 2 SCR 649

referred to

Para 31

[1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454

referred to

Para 36

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

[1960] 1 SCR 39

referred to

Para 36

[1976] 1 SCR 906

referred to

Para 36

[1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 351

referred to

Para 36

(1999) 7 SCC 400

referred to

Para 36

[2002] 2 SCR 881

referred to

Para 37

[1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 123

referred to

Para 38

[1985] 2 SCR 579

referred to

Para 38

[2009] 10 SCR 821

referred to

Para 38

[1999] 2 SCR 895

referred to

Para 39

[2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1212

referred to

Para 39

[2018] 12 SCR 362

referred to

Para 39

[2019] 3 SCR 535

referred to

Para 39

(2015) 3 SCC 206

referred to

Para 39

[1980] 1 SCR 684

referred to

Para 40

[1971] 3 SCR 815

referred to

Para 40

(1985) 1 SCC 436

referred to

Para 40

[2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 648

referred to

Para 42

[2019] 7 SCR 1036

referred to

Para 42

[1974] 3 SCR 760

relied on

Para 47

[1952] SCR 284

relied on

Para 48

[1974] 2 SCR 348

relied on

Para 49

[2017] 9 SCR 797

relied on

Para 49

[2018] 7 SCR 379

relied on

Para 50

[2018] 11 SCR 765

relied on

Para 50

[2017] 10 SCR 569

relied on

Para 50

AIR 2020 SC 122

relied on

Para 50

[2015] 5 SCR 963

relied on

Para 51

[1985] 2 SCR 579

relied on

Para 52

[2009] 10 SCR 821

relied on

Para 52

[1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 123

referred to

Para 54

[2018] 12 SCR 794

referred to

Para 134

[1955] SCR 1066

referred to

Para 142

[1990] 1 SCR 272

referred to

Para 155

[2019] 10 SCR 381

referred to

Para 158

(2019) 9 SCC 304

referred to

Para 170

[1974] 3 SCR 760

referred to

Para 175

[1979] 2 SCR 476

referred to

Para 176

[1984] 3 SCR 252

referred to

Para 177

[2014] 6 SCR 873

referred to

Para 178

[1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454

referred to

Para 183

[1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 351

referred to

Para 184

(1999) 7 SCC 400

referred to

Para 185

[2002] 2 SCR 881

referred to

Para 186

[1973] 0 Suppl. SCR 1

referred to

Para 199

[2017] 8 SCR 33

referred to

Para 203

(2019) 12 SCALE 579

referred to

Para 216

[2017] 9 SCR 797

referred to

Para 216

[1985] 2 SCR 643

referred to

Para 227

[1981] 3 SCR 239

referred to

Para 227

[2007] 2 SCR 289

referred to

Para 228

[1973] 2 SCR 502

referred to

Para 233

[1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 360

referred to

Para 262

[2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 195

referred to

Para 262

[2018] 12 SCR 794

referred to

Para 262

[1971] 3 SCR 815

referred to

Para 272

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

[1975] 1 SCR 720

referred to

Para 281

[2014] 14 SCR 409

referred to

Para 287

[1976] 2 SCR 266

referred to

Para 288

[1991] 3 SCR 912

referred to

Para 291

[1993] 1 SCR 862

referred to

Para 291

[1980] 1 SCR 334

referred to

Para 292

[1994] 4 Suppl. SCR 539

referred to

Para 293

[1996] 1 Suppl. SCR 799

referred to

Para 294

[1980] 1 SCR 684

referred to

Para 296

[1976] 1 SCR 847

referred to

Para 297

[1989] 2 SCR 152

referred to

Para 298

[1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 859

referred to

Para 302

[1994] 4 Suppl. SCR 539

referred to

Para 302

[2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1212

referred to

Para 303

[2018] 12 SCR 362

referred to

Para 304

[2018] 12 SCR 794

referred to

Para 308

(2015) 7 SCC 58

referred to

Para 308

[2004] 3 SCR 982

referred to

Para 312

[1987] 3 SCR 427

referred to

Para 317

[1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 212

referred to

Para 319

[1994] 3 Suppl. SCR 405

referred to

Para 322

[2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 200

referred to

Para 323

[1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 142

referred to

Para 326

[2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 81

referred to

Para 328

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 26 of 2020. Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India With

Writ Petition (C) No. 53, 28, 47, 27, 73, 328, 210, 191, 164, 163, 166, 173, 182, 176, 177, 257, 341, 267, 333, 337, 388, 402, 390, 393, 783, 579, 806, 714, 642, 805, 19, 33, 75, 165, 850, 374, 229, 228, 209 Of 2020 And Transferred Case (c) No. 228/2020 Ms. Madhavi Diwan, ASG, Tushar Mehta, SG, Sajan Poovayya, Rana Mukherjee, Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Sr. Advs., Krishnamohan K. Menon, Chaitanyashil Priyadarshi, Ms. Dania Nayyar, Ms. Parul Sachdeva, Akash Vajpayee, Vaibhav Manu Srivastava, Bhanu Pant, Namit Saxena, Piyush Singh, Aditya Parolia, Akshay Srivastava, Nithin Chandran, Rajesh Kumar, Gaurav Goel, Srijan Sinha, Himanshu Chaubey, Ashwarya Sinha, Santosh Kumar, Ayushmaan Vatsyayana, Ms. Hemlata Rawat, Deepak Anand, Mareesh Pravir Sahay, Ms. Tasheem Ahmadi, Sudhir Kumar Gupta, Manish Gupta, Shikhil Suri, Shiv Kumar Suri, Ms. Madhu Suri, Ms. Shilpa Saini, Ms. Nikita Thapar, Ms. Vinishma Kaul, Ms. Priyanjali Singh, Ms. Rashi Bansal, Dinesh Chandra Pandey, Dhruv Gupta, Harshil Gupta, Arjun Singh Bhati, Annam D. N. Rao, Annam Venkatesh, Rahul Mishra, Sidharth Joshi, Gopal Singh Chauhan, Saurabh Trivedi, Mahesh Agarwal, Himanshu Satija, Raheel Patel, Ajitesh Soni, Rohan Talwar, Ramchandra Madan, Akash Lamba, E. C. Agrawala, Ms. Shivali, Nilotpal Shyam, Ms. Bharti Tyagi, Rajesh Goyal, Sumit Gehlawat, Tervender Singh, Abhishek Bharadwaj, Pai Amit, Ms. Pankhuri Bhardwaj, Rakesh Taneja, Parshuram A.L., Kumar Vaibhav, Ankit Agrawal, Rahat Bansal, A.D.N. Rao, Annam Venkatesh, Chandrashekhar A. Chakalabbi, Shivanshu Kumar, Shiv Kumar Pandey, Awanish Kumar, Anshul Rai for M/s Dharmaprabhas Law Associates, Mayank Pandey, Ms. Misha Rohatgi Mohta, Johnson Subba, Ms. Purti Marwaha Gupta, Dr. Anindita Pujari, Arvind Kumar Gupta, Ms. Henna George, Ms. Twisha Issar, Ms. Deval Singh, Om Narayan, Pallav Mongia, Kanu Agarwal, Ms. Sunita Sharma, Rajeev Ranjan, Ms. Sansriti Pathak, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Ms. Charu Ambwani, Hirendranath, Santanam Swaminadhan, Ms. Prakruti Golechha, Ms. Abhilasha Shrawat, Mrs. Aarthi Rajan, Amar Gupta, Divyam Agarwal, Daksh Ahluwalia, Ms. Pallavi Kumar, Adhiraj Gupta, Pratibhanu Singh, Shikhar Maniar, Ms. Raksha Aggarwal, Keshav Mohan, R.K. Awasthi, Prashant Kumar, Piyush Vats, Ms. Ritu Arora, Santosh Kumar - I, Rajesh P., Karan Rajpurohit, Krishna Dev Jagarlamudi, Vikram Hegde, Rahul Kumar, Advs. for the appearing parties. Respondent-in-person

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K. M. JOSEPH, J. 1. The petitioners have approached this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. They call in question Sections 3, 4 and 10 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act 2020 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the impugned amendments’, for short). Section 3 of the impugned amendment, amends Section 7(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’, for short). Section 4 of the impugned amendment, incorporates an additional Explanation in Section 11 of the Code. Section 10 of the impugned amendment inserts Section 32A in the Code.

2. Section 7(1) of the Code before the amendment read as follows: “7. Initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process by financial creditor: (1) A financial creditor either by itself or jointly with other financial creditors, or any other person on behalf of the financial creditor, as may be notified by the Central Government, may file an application for initiating corporate insolvency resolution process against a corporate debtor before the Adjudicating Authority when a default has occurred.” Explanation- For the purposes of this sub section, a default includes a default in respect of a financial debt owed not only to the applicant financial creditor but to any other financial creditor of the corporate debtor. The amendment to the same by Section 3 of the impugned amendment incorporates 3 provisos to Section 7(1), which reads as under: “Provided that for the financial creditors, referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (6A) of section 21, an application for initiating corporate insolvency resolution process against the corporate debtor shall be filed jointly by not less than one hundred of such creditors in the same class or not less than ten per cent. of the total number of such creditors in the same class, whichever is less:

Provided further that for financial creditors who are allottees under a real estate project, an application for initiating corporate

insolvency resolution process against the corporate debtor shall be filed jointly by not less than one hundred of such allottees under the same real estate project or not less than ten per cent. of the total number of such allottees under the same real estate project, whichever is less:

Provided also that where an application for initiating the corporate insolvency resolution process against a corporate debtor has been filed by a financial creditor referred to in the first and second provisos and has not been admitted by the Adjudicating Authority before the commencement of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020, such application shall be modified to comply with the requirements of the first or second proviso within thirty days of the commencement of the said Act, failing which the application shall be deemed to be withdrawn before its admission.”

3. Section 11 before the amendment read as follows: “11. Persons not entitled to make application. - The following persons shall not be entitled to make an application to initiate corporate insolvency resolution process under this Chapter, namely:(a) a corporate debtor undergoing a corporate insolvency resolution process; or (b) a corporate debtor having completed corporate insolvency resolution process twelve months preceding the date of making of the application; or

(c) a corporate debtor or a financial creditor who has violated any of the terms of resolution plan which was approved twelve months before the date of making of an application under this Chapter; or (d) a corporate debtor in respect of whom a liquidation order has been made. Explanation 1 [I]. - For the purposes of this section, a corporate debtor includes a corporate applicant in respect of such corporate debtor.” The explanation which was inserted through the impugned amendment reads as follows:

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] “Explanation II.- For the purposes of this section, it is hereby clarified that nothing in this section shall prevent a corporate debtor referred to in clauses (a) to (d) from initiating corporate insolvency resolution process against another corporate debtor.” 4. Section 32A inserted through the impugned amendment reads as follows:

“32A. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Code or any other law for the time being in force, the liability of a corporate debtor for an offence committed prior to the commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process shall cease, and the corporate debtor shall not be prosecuted for such an offence from the date the resolution plan has been approved by the Adjudicating Authority under section 31, if the resolution plan results in the change in the management or control of the corporate debtor to a person who was not—

(a) a promoter or in the management or control of the corporate debtor or a related party of such a person; or

(b) a person with regard to whom the relevant investigating authority has, on the basis of material in its possession, reason to believe that he had abetted or conspired for the commission of the offence, and has submitted or filed a report or a complaint to the relevant statutory authority or Court: Provided that if a prosecution had been instituted during the corporate insolvency resolution process against such corporate debtor, it shall stand discharged from the date of approval of the resolution plan subject to requirements of this sub-section having been fulfilled: Provided further that every person who was a “designated partner” as defined in clause (j) of section 2 of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008, or an “officer who is in default”, as defined in clause (60) of section 2 of the Companies Act, 2013, or was in any manner incharge of, or responsible to the corporate debtor for the conduct of its business or associated with the corporate debtor in any manner and who was directly or indirectly involved in the commission of such offence as per the report submitted or complaint filed by the investigating authority, shall continue to be liable to be prosecuted and punished for such an offence committed

by the corporate debtor notwithstanding that the corporate debtor’s liability has ceased under this sub-section.

(2) No action shall be taken against the property of the corporate debtor in relation to an offence committed prior to the commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process of the corporate debtor, where such property is covered under a resolution plan approved by the Adjudicating Authority under section 31, which results in the change in control of the corporate debtor to a person, or sale of liquidation assets under the provisions of Chapter III of Part II of this Code to a person, who was not—

(i) a promoter or in the management or control of the corporate debtor or a related party of such a person; or

(ii) a person with regard to whom the relevant investigating authority has, on the basis of material in its possession reason to believe that he had abetted or conspired for the commission of the offence, and has submitted or filed a report or a complaint to the relevant statutory authority or Court. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, it is hereby clarified that,— (i)

an action against the property of the corporate debtor in relation to an offence shall include the attachment, seizure, retention or confiscation of such property under such law as may be applicable to the corporate debtor;

(ii) nothing in this sub-section shall be construed to bar an action against the property of any person, other than the corporate debtor or a person who has acquired such property through corporate insolvency resolution process or liquidation process under this Code and fulfils the requirements specified in this section, against whom such an action may be taken under such law as may be applicable. (3) Subject to the provisions contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), and notwithstanding the immunity given in this section, the corporate debtor and any person who may be required to provide assistance under such law as may be applicable to such corporate debtor or person, shall extend all assistance and co-operation to any authority investigating an offence

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] committed prior to the commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process.”

WHO ARE THE PETITIONERS? 5. More than the lion’s share of the petitioners are allottees under real estate projects and hereinafter referred to as allotees. They have trained the constitutional gun at the impugned provisos. 6. Under the second proviso, a new threshold has been declared for an allottee to move an application under Section 7 for triggering the insolvency resolution process under the Code. The threshold is the requirement that there should be at least 100 allottees to support the application or 10 per cent of the total allottees whichever is less. Moreover, they should belong to the same project. Almost all (except in two petitions), the petitioners also had under the erstwhile regime which permitted even a single allottee to move an application under Section 7 filed petitions singly or with less than the number required under the proviso and they are visited with the provisions of the third proviso as per which such of those applications under section 7 which had not been admitted would stand withdrawn within 30 days, if the newly declared threshold of 100 allottees or 10 per cent of the allottee whichever is lower was not garnered by the applicant/applicants.

7. In some of the petitions, the petitioners are money lenders, that is, they have stepped in to provide finance for the real estate projects. They are also visited with the requirement which is imposed upon them under the first impugned proviso which is on similar lines as those comprised in the second proviso.

8. Then, there is, no doubt, Section 32A, which stands impugned by the creditors and allottees.

THE CODE 9. The Code was enacted in the year 2016. It is one of the most important economic measures contemplated by the State to prevent insolvency, to provide last mile funding to revive ailing businesses, maximise value of assets of the entrepreneurs, balance the interest of all the stakeholders and even to alter the order of priority of payment of Government dues. The Code is divided into five parts. The first part is shortest portion. Part II deals with what we are concerned with in these cases and it purports to deal with insolvency resolution and liquidation

for corporate persons. ‘Corporate person’ has been defined in Section 3(7) as follows: “3(7). “corporate person” means a company as defined in clause (20) of section 2 of the Companies Act, 2013, a limited liability partnership, as defined in clause (n) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008, or any other person incorporated with limited liability under any law for the time being in force but shall not include any financial service provider.” 10. Section 3(8) defines ‘corporate debtor’ which provides that a corporate debtor means a person who owes a debt to any person.

11. We may notice that Chapter II of Part II which consists of Sections 6 to 32 deal with the corporate insolvency resolution process. Chapter III deals with ordinary liquidation process in regard to corporate person. Chapter IV of Part II consisting of four sections deal with fasttrack insolvency resolution process. Chapter V which consists of Section 59 only deals with voluntary liquidation of corporate person. Chapter VI deals with miscellaneous aspects. Chapter VII Part II deals with Penalties. 12. Part III deals with insolvency resolution and bankruptcy code for individuals and partnership firms. It may be noticed at once that partnership firms with limited liability as defined in the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 fall within the definition of the word ‘Corporate person’ and insolvency and liquidation process in regard to the same is found in Part II of the Code. It is in regard to Insolvency resolution and bankruptcy for the other partnership firms which one has to look to the provisions of Part III. Part III begins with Section 78 and ends with Section 187. The further provisions relate to the regulation of insolvency professional agencies and information utilities. They are all key instrumentalities for the effective working of the Code. Equally, it may be apposite to bear in mind Section 238A. It reads as follows: “238A. Limitation - The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) shall, as far as may be, apply to the proceedings or appeals before the Adjudicating Authority, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be.” 13. Shri Krishna Mohan Menon, learned counsel for the petitioners (allottees) in some of the petitions has addressed the following submissions before us:

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] The impugned amendment clearly falls foul of the mandate of Articles 14, 19 (1)(g), 21 and 300A of the Constitution. The amendment by virtue of section 3 of the Amendment Act introducing the second proviso in Section 7(1) of the Code makes a hostile discrimination between financial creditors, the category, to which the petitioners belong and the other financial creditors. Secondly, it is contended that the amendment imposing a threshold restriction is afflicted with the vice of palpable and hostile discrimination qua operational creditors. The purported protection sought to be accorded to the real estate developer, cannot form the premise for inflicting violation of constitutionally protected freedom under Article 19(1)(g) just as much as it also constitutes an insupportable invasion of the grand mandate of equality. Next, he would submit that there are inherent leakages in the impugned provisions which would make it unworkable. Thereafter, learned counsel would submit that the impugned amendment is also bad in law for the reason that it is manifestly arbitrary. Yet another argument addressed by Shri Krishna Mohan Menon, learned counsel is that the amendment has the legally pernicious effect of creating a class within a class, a result, which is frowned upon by the law. 14. Learned counsel would expatiate and submit that under the Code, the law provides for a period of 14 days for the Adjudicating Authority to decide whether an application under Section 7 should be admitted. Section 12 declares an inflexible time limit for the insolvency resolution process to be terminated. The whole purport of the provisions of the Code and the manner in which it is structured is geared to achieve a laudable object. The Code aims at improving the ranking of India in the matter of ease of doing business. It is an economic measure which is intended to transform India into a country which would attract capital and investment. The Code has indeed resulted in a transformation of attitudes of the key players, in that it has come to be perceived as a law not merely on paper but one with teeth to it. He would point out that this Court in its decision in the Pioneer’s Case Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. and another v. Union of India and others1 has elaborately dealt with the apprehension that allowing the home buyers like the petitioners who finance the builder’s activities to invoke the CIRP process will lead to misuse of the provisions and allayed the unfounded

(2019) 8 SCC 416

fears. Yet the legislature has ventured to place unjustifiable clogs on the right of one category of financial creditors alone which is impermissible. The spectre of a speculative investor running riot and playing havoc has been adequately addressed by this Court. There is no worthwhile data of misuse by home buyers. He points out the judgments passed by NCLAT where the financial creditors, who are home buyers, approach the Tribunal and the cases reflect gross and inordinate delay of nearly five years justifying the approach made by the home buyers under the Code. In other words, there were genuine cases where the debtor had become insolvent and hence the home buyer had complete justification in knocking at the doors of the competent Tribunal under the Code. He took us through the reports of the Parliamentary Committee and complained that no reasons are discernible to justify the amendments. Equally, he commended for our acceptance the observations in the dissent notes and contended that they fortify the submissions. 15. In regard to the comparison sought to be made, with similar requirements in Sections 397, 398 read with 399 of the Companies Act, 1956 and Section 241 and 244 of the Companies Act, 2013, he would submit that there are significant distinctions. 16. Firstly, he would submit that in the case of shareholders approaching the Tribunal under the Companies Act, they would be armed with the details regarding shareholding which are always available having regard to the scheme of the Companies Act. On the other hand, he points that in regard to home buyers who have sunk their hard-earned money in real estate projects there is no system under which they could obtain data or information regarding the persons similarly circumstanced and whose co-operation and support is necessary under the impugned amendment to activise the Code. 17. Secondly, he would submit that having regard to the explanation in Section 244 of the companies Act, 2013, it brings about clarity in regard to the situation where there is a joint holding. The absence of any such similar provision in Section 7 of the Code is emphasised in an attempt at persuading the court to overturn the law. He would further point out the practical difficulties in the working of the amended law. He submits that the date of default of various home buyers may be different. Therefore, to forge a common complaint impelling a group of home buyers to come together is impracticable and not workable’. He would submit that legislature cannot be permitted to take away through one hand what it has given by the other.

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

18. Learned Counsel would further contended that as far as the third proviso is concerned while accepting the position that the 14 days period for disposal of the matter under the Code has been understood to be directory and not mandatory, at the same time, it cannot be the law that a case should grace the docket endlessly and never witness an end and the retrospectivity which it reflects clearly renders it arbitrary.

19. Shri Shikhil Suri, learned Counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 191 of 2020 would submit that the impugned amendment is arbitrary being in the teeth of the principles laid down in Pioneer (supra). The object of the law would stand defeated he contends. The Ordinance would not only deprive the petitioner of her right under Section 7 but it also violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The threshold limit is unreasonable and arbitrary. It is excessive and irrational. It is not in public interest. He also points out that there exists adequate shield against a single allottee misusing the Code. The threshold is thrust upon only on the home buyer and is not applicable across the board for other financial creditors. It is discriminatory. There is no rationale. It treats equals unequally and unequals as equals. There is no intelligible differentia. The law does not permit classes among financial creditors. There is breach of the guarantee of equal protection of law. The threshold in Section 4, namely, default of Rupees One crore is the one which applies to all creditors. It is inexplicable as to how only in regard to home buyers, a different threshold should be insisted upon. The remedy of the home buyer is defeated. The Ordinance was brought in haste without proper discussion and debate. The amendment takes away the vested right of the home buyers. There is no intelligible differentia bearing a nexus with the object and purpose of the Act. He also emphasised the practical difficulties involved in arranging the necessary numerical strength under the impugned provision. 20. Shri Piyush Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that once the right is conferred to make an application, then it cannot come conditioned with threshold limit as is provided in the impugned provisos. Secondly, he would point out that there is manifest arbitrariness. That apart, he would also contend that there is hostile discrimination qua other corporate debtor. The builder who is a corporate debtor, in other words, is given a more favourable treatment than other corporate debtors which is afflicted with the vice of hostile discrimination. He also complained of both under and over inclusiveness in the impugned

provisions. Next, learned counsel submits that the very object is discriminatory. Drawing our attention to both Chitra Sharma and others v. Union of India and others2 and Pioneer (supra), he would highlight that having regard to the background in which the rights of the home buyer was recognised as being one of that of a financial creditor, the amendment is clearly impermissible. He would also submit that having regard to the stand taken by the Government in the case before this Court, in particular, Pioneer (supra), the principles of promissory estoppel will apply and prevent enactment of the impugned provisions. He would expatiate and submit that the conditions which have been imposed render the remedy illusory. He drew our attention to Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure and also took us to the explanation therein. He would submit that the proviso is not on similar lines as Order 1 Rule 8. This is for the reason that under the procedure under Order 1 Rule 8, the numerical stipulation in the impugned Provisos is not insisted upon. Once persons having same interest institute a civil suit, after following the procedure all persons having the same interest become involved and what is more would be bound by the decision. Section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act which also captures and embodies the principle of Order 1 Rule 8 ensures the protection of class interest and also protect class interest without putting stiff barriers as threshold limits as done by the impugned amendment. He pointed out that the real estate owners do not take any loan from financial institutions. They raise capital exclusively from the allottees virtually. In such circumstances, to put this threshold limit is clearly impermissible. He drew our attention to the judgment of the Court in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P3., to buttress his submission regarding availability of principles of promissory estoppel. There is manifest arbitrariness in the provisions. He complained that the RERA has not been constituted in all the States. He also made an attempt at pointing out the perception that the amendment is to confer an unmerited advantage on the builder. This he purported to do by drawing our attention to an article in a newspaper. He essentially projected this argument as a thinly disguised argument of malice against the law giver. He also sought to draw support from the judgment of this Court in Nagpur Investment Trust and others v. Vithal Rao and others4. He reiterated the principle of hostile discrimination. He drew our attention

(2018) 18 SCC 575 (1979) 2 SCC 409 (1973) 1 SCC 500

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

to the definition of the word ‘allottee’ in RERA. It is here that he complained of the provision being under inclusive and over inclusive. The legislature, he points out should have waited and at best could have acted if there is impeachable and empirical evidence warranting such a drastic incursion into the vested right of the home buyer. He also highlights that in law there can only be one default. A home buyer who before the amendment could by himself set the law into motion, is now left at the mercy of similarly circumstanced persons which itself is rendered impossible by the absence of an information generating mechanism which is accessible. He would also point out that the dates of the agreements of different home buyers would be different. Depending on the dates of the agreements being different, it is incontrovertible, he points out that the date of default would be different. He would pose the question as to how in such circumstances the law could insist upon a home buyer assembling together other homebuyers and that too one hundred in number or one-tenth of the total number of allottees. Allottees are spread all over the world. It is inconceivable as to how the provision can be worked in a reasonable and fair manner.

21. Shri Rahul Rathore, learned Counsel for the petitioners in some of the writ petition would apart adopting the contentions, contend that insolvency has been predicated project wise. He would submit that under the impugned amendment, the allottees are to be culled out from among a particular project. In other words, the requirement under the provision is that the applicants must be 100 allottees or one-tenth of the allottees of a particular real estate project. He would point out that a corporate body may be having different projects. If that be so, there is no rationale in insisting that the said corporate body has become insolvent, qua the particular project in which the applicants are interested. Insolvency, in other words, would be a financial malaise, which afflicts the corporate body as a whole, qua all its projects. If the allottees can be drawn from other projects undertaken by the company then maybe it may have rendered the provisions more reasonable appears to be the argument of the petitioner. But this is not so. The provisions are irrational. The home buyer is a person who invests his life time savings. He is in a weak position already. Instead of conferring protection on him, the homebuyer is being saddled with more oppressive and burdensome conditions. There is no platform for the exchange and availability of information with details regarding the allottees. The Limitation Act applies as held by this Court. He would also appear to rely on the theory of a single default. The

conditions are impossible to fulfil. The home buyer is being shut out at the very threshold. 22. Shri Dinesh C. Pandey, learned Counsel would also contend that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would protect all the pending applications.

23. Shri Dhruv Gupta, learned Counsel appearing in W.P. (C) No.177 of 2020 complained against retrospectivity spelt out by the impugned provisions. The right which was a vested right was substantive in nature. The law could only be prospective. He draws our attention to the judgment of this Court in B.K. Educational Services (P) Ltd. v. Parag Gupta & Associates5. He also lays store by the principles laid down by this Court in Swiss Ribbon Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.6 and also in The Pioneer (supra). 24. Ms. Purti Marwaha Gupta, learned counsel in W.P.(C) No. 75 of 2020 adopted the contentions of Shri Krishna Mohan Menon. Learned counsel would make submissions qua section 32A which is yet another provision which is challenged. She drew our attention to Section 2(u) and 20 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. She would submit but for Section 32A, the properties which are acquired could be attached but that is pre-empted by Section 32A. The civil remedies open are taken away in regard to acts of crime. Section 14 of the Act which deals with Moratorium is referred to in this regard. 25. Shri A.D.N. Rao, learned Counsel would submit that a substantive right cannot be taken away by a procedural requirement. The home buyers have been conferred the substantive right to invoke the code by moving an application under Section 7. This right cannot be taken away by providing for a procedure and what is more which is impossible to attain. He drew our attention to the decision of this Court in Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry7. He would submit that the law as on the date of initiation should prevail and it cannot be taken away by the amendment which is made subsequently. Apparently, the learned counsel is making his submission qua the 3rd proviso inserted in Section 7(1) of the Code. He seeks to drawn support from judgment of this court in Thirumalai Chemicals Limited v. Union of India and

(2019) 11 SCC 633 (2019) 4 SCC 17 AIR 1957 SC 540 / 1957 SCR 488

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

others8. He also contends that a proviso cannot override the main provision. In this regard, he relied upon the judgment of this court in Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Tarun Pal Singh and others9. He would in fact point out with reference to facts that the orders were reserved in the application under Section 7 in November, 2019. The proviso came to be inserted on 28th December 2019. Resultantly, when the order came to be pronounced regarding admission of the application under Section 7, the authorities stood overtaken by the amendment. All of this is for no fault of the litigant who at the time when the application was moved was governed by a different regime which did not contain the harsh and arbitrary provisions. He would also point out practical difficulty in finding out other allottees.

26. Smt. Tasleem Ahmadi, learned Counsel would submit that an amendment as impugned in this case has the effect of setting at nought the directions and decision of this court. She would complain that an amendment has been engrafted without removing the premise on which Pioneer was decided. She drew our attention to the judgment of this Court in State of Karnataka and others v. The Karnataka Pawn Brokers Association and others10 (paragraphs-16, 20, 23 and 24). 27. Shri Aditya Parolia, learned Counsel would submit that while the legislature has the freedom to experiment the power does not exist beyond certain limits. It cannot create provisions which are arbitrary. Unequals are treated equally. The objections of the home buyers were not discussed. The draft was not discussed. In this regard he points to the dissent of Shri TK Rangarajan. There is no intelligible differentia to distinguish the home buyers from the other creditors. The class action under the Consumer Protection Act is denied under the code. Even a decree holder under the aegis of RERA is denied relief. He also points out the lack of information required to properly work the statute. Allottees are spread across the globe. The real estate investor siphons off major amounts. The default is in rem. 28. Shri Pallav Mongia, learned Counsel would point out that home buyers would continue to be financial creditors. The proviso cannot take away the said right. Unequals are being made equal. Information regarding allottees is not available. He refers to the report of the Parliamentary

(2011) 6 SCC 739 (2018) 14 SCC 161 (2018) 6 SCC 363

Committee. He also complains about the absence of undisputed documents. As regards information relating to allottees he would make the point that the Code itself does not provide for a mechanism for a home buyer to glean information. He is being called upon to collect information with reference to another enactment namely RERA. This should be treated as fatal to the constitutionality of the impugned amendments. He would further submit that the provision is bad for it being vague. The argument of vagueness is addressed with reference to the following: 1. The date of default. 2. The court fee payable when there is more than one applicant.

3. The threshold amount of default stipulated under section 4 namely Rs. One crore at present. 4. He also would complain against the retrospectivity involved.

29. Shri Rana Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel appears in writ petition where first proviso is called in question, he represents the cause of money lenders. He drew our attention to paragraph-43 of the Pioneer (supra). He pointed out that the requirement that the applicants must be of the same class and there must be 100 of them rendered the provisions unachievable. He drew our attention to Sections 244 and 245 of the Companies Act, 2013. He pointed out that the threshold under the said Act could be relaxed whereas under the code the law giver has inflicted the requirement as an inflexible mandate. He also complained of there being no information qua the requirement of 10 percent. He drew our attention to Rule 8A. He would submit that actually Parliament had in mind the home buyer. The insertion of the 1st proviso betrays a mistaken roping in of the category of creditors represented by his clients. He sought to draw considerable support from the judgment of this Court in Vasant Ganpat Padvave (D) by LRs & Ors. v. Anant Mahadev Sawant (D) Through LRs. & Ors.11 of his compilation. He commended for our acceptance the principle that the law must be considered having regard to consequences it produces. He requested that the court may bear in mind the requirement that the law in its application must produce fair results.

2019 (12) SCALE 572

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

30. Per contra, the stand of the Union, as projected through Smt. Madhavi Divan, learned ASG, and through the Written Submissions submitted, can be summed-up as follows:

The impugned amendments are perfectly valid. The amendments are part of an economic measure. There was a Report of an Expert Committee. The Expert Committee recommended imposing a threshold amendment in respect of certain classes of financial creditors. It is modelled on the Companies Act. There are other statutory examples of such threshold requirements. The impugned provisions conform to the principle of reasonable classification. Intelligible differentia distinguishes the allottees and debenture holders and security holders covered by the provisos from the other financial creditors. The amendments were necessitated from experience. There is a rational nexus between the differentia and the objects. The amendment, as far as the impugned provisos are concerned, are essentially an extension of Sections 21(6A) and Section 25A of the Code, under which, the debenture holders and security holders, on the one hand, and allottees, on the other, are treated differently. The provisions are not manifestly arbitrary, they are, indeed, workable. Having regard to the Explanation in Section 7(1), the default qua any financial creditor, even if, he is not an applicant, can be made use of by other allottees or debenture holders and security holders. 31. It is pointed out further that the constitutional validity of Sections 21(6A) and 25A of the Code, was upheld by this Court in Pioneer (supra). In this regard, attention is also drawn to the observations of this Court in paragraph-43 of Pioneer (supra). On the strength of the said observations, it is contended that this court has recognized that allottees/ home buyers are not a homogenous group. This Court also recognized, it is pointed out, that the deposit-holders and security-holders form a subclass/class of financial creditors, who are treated a little differently, on account of the sheer number of such creditors coupled with the heterogeneity within the group that may cause difficulties in the decisionmaking process. The provisions were introduced for ironing out the logistical/procedural complications that may arise on account of the peculiar nature of these groups. The provisions impugned in the present litigation merely supplement Sections 21(6A) and Section 25A of the

Code. The rationale in the said judgment should be applied in this case also. It is further pointed out that the challenge in Pioneer (supra) was mounted by the developers and the home buyers accepted the provisions, as being necessary to iron out the creases. The ASG drew support from judgments of this Court which are as follows:

i.

Ameerunnissa Begum and others v. Mahboob Begum and others 12;

ii.

State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa and others 13;

iii. Murthy Match Works and others v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise and another14;

iv.

Ajoy Kumar Banerjee and others v. Union of India and others 15;

v.

Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan and others16;

32. It is contended that there is a rational nexus with the objects of the Code insofar as the impugned provisos are concerned and the classification is permissible under Article 14 of the Constitution. She drew our attention to the Statements of Objects and Reasons appended to the amendment Bill to the Code, 2019, which introduced sub-Section 3A in Section 25A. It reads as follows: “[…] 2. The Preamble to the Code lays down the objects of the Code to include “the insolvency resolution” in a time bound manner for maximisation of value of assets in order to balance the interests of all the stakeholders. Concerns have been raised that in some cases extensive litigation is causing undue delays, which may hamper the value maximisation. There is a need to ensure that all creditors are treated fairly, without unduly burdening the Adjudicating Authority whose role is to ensure that the resolution plan complies with the provisions of the Code. Various stakeholders have suggested that if the creditors were treated on an equal

(1953) SCR 404 (1974) 1 SCC 19 (1974) 4 SCC 428 (1984) 3 SCC 127 (2002) 4 SCC 34

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

footing, when they have different preinsolvency entitlements, it would adversely impact the cost and availability of credit. Further, views have also been obtained so as to bring clarity on the voting pattern of financial creditors represented by the authorised representative.

[…]

(d) to insert sub-section (3A) in section 25A of the Code to provide that an authorised representative under sub-section (6A) of section 21 will cast the vote for all financial creditors he represents in accordance with the decision taken by a vote of more than fifty per cent. of the voting share of the financial creditors he represents, who have cast their vote, in order to facilitate decision making in the committee of creditors, especially when financial creditors are large and heterogeneous group;” 33. Thus, the Statement of Objects and Reasons recognizes the heterogeneity within the class and the need to streamline, smoothen and facilitate the process so as to avoid unnecessary delay. There is also a concern about extensive litigation causing delays and hampering the maximization of value, it is pointed out. Multiple applications by members of this large class of financial creditors, in such a class, would also add to the burden of the Adjudicating Authority, choke-up its docket and delay the process. This would be counterproductive to the object of the Code which seeks to ensure time-bound Resolution Process for the maximization of total value of assets. Reference is made to the Report of the Insolvency Law Committee, dated February, 2020, which recommended the insertion of a minimum number of financial creditors in a class. It reads as follows: “ii. Application for Initiation of CIRP by Class of Creditors- As CIRP can be initiated by a single financial creditor, such as a homebuyer or a deposit holder, that belongs to a certain class of creditors following a minor dispute, it might exert undue pressure on the corporate debtor and might jeopardize the interests of the other creditors in the class who are not in favor of such initiation. It is being recommended that there should be a requirement for a minimum threshold number of certain financial creditors in a class for initiation of the CIRP. So, an amendment to section 7(1) to provide that for a class of creditors falling within clause (a) or (b)

of Section 21(6A), the CIRP may only be initiated by at least a hundred such creditors or 10 percent of the total number of such creditors in a class. 4. APPLICATION FOR INITIATION OF CIRP BY CLASSES OF CREDITORS

4.1. Section 7 of the Code allows a financial creditor to initiate a CIRP against a corporate debtor upon the occurrence of default, either by itself, or jointly with other financial creditors. 4.2. It was brought to the Committee that for classes of financial creditors referred to in sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21(6A) of the Code - such as deposit holders, bondholders and homebuyers - there was a concern that the CIRP can be initiated by only one or few such financial creditors following minor disputes. This may exert undue pressure on the corporate debtor, and has the potential to jeopardise the interests of the other creditors in the class who are not in favour of the initiation of CIRP. This may also impose additional burden upon the Adjudicating Authority to hear objections to heavily disputed applications. The Committee noted that this may be antithetical to the value of a time-bound resolution process, as the already over-burdened Adjudicating Authorities are unable to list and admit all such cases filed before them. 4.3. The Committee discussed that classes of creditors such as homebuyers and deposit holders have every right as financial creditors to initiate CIRP against a corporate debtor that has defaulted in the repayment of its dues. However, it was acknowledged that initiation of CIRP by classes of similarly situated creditors should be done in a manner that represents their collective interests. It was felt that a CIRP should be initiated only where there is enough number of such creditors in a class forming a critical mass that indicates that there is in fact largescale agreement that the issues against a corporate entity need to be resolved by way of a CIRP under the Code. This may well be a more streamlined way of allowing a well-defined class of creditors to agree upon initiating what is a collective process of resolution under the Code. 4.4. In this regard, and specific to the interests of homebuyers, the Committee also noted that in cases where a homebuyer cannot

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

file an application for initiation of CIRP for having failed to reach the aforesaid critical mass, she would still have access to alternative fora under the RERA and under consumer protection laws. For instance, as recognised by the Supreme Court in the case of Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Limited and Ors. v Union of India, the remedies under the Code and under the RERA operate in completely different spheres. The Code deals with proceedings in rem, under which homebuyers may want the corporate debtor’s management to be removed and replaced so that the corporate debtor can be rehabilitated. On the other hand, the RERA protects the interests of the individual investor in real estate projects by ensuring that homebuyers are not left in the lurch, and get either compensation or delivery of their homes. Thus, if there is a failure to reach a critical mass for initiation of CIRP, it may indicate that in such cases another remedy may be more suitable.

4.5. Accordingly, it was agreed that there should be a requirement to have the support of a threshold number of financial creditors in a class for initiation of CIRP.

4.6. In this regard, the Committee considered if a cue may be taken from the requirements for filing of class actions suits as provided under the Companies Act, 2013. Class action suits may inter alia be filed by a hundred members or depositors or by at least 5 per cent of the total number of members or depositors of the company.14 Similar to this requirement, and keeping with the extant situation of classes of creditors under the Code, it was suggested that Section 7 of the Code could be amended in respect of such classes of creditors to allow initiation by a collective number of at least a hundred such creditors or at least ten percent of the total number of such creditors forming part of the same class. Thus, the Committee agreed that Section 7(1) of the Code may be amended to provide that for classes of creditors falling within clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21(6A), the CIRP may only be initiated by at least a hundred such creditors, or ten percent of the total number of such creditors in a class. 4.7. The Committee also noted that the collective number of homebuyers that form the threshold amount for initiation of a CIRP, should belong to the same real estate project. This would allow

homebuyers that have commonality of interests, i.e. allottees under the same real estate project, to come together to take action for initiating CIRP against a real estate developer. Thus, in such cases, the CIRP may be initiated by at least a hundred such allottees or ten percent of the total number of such allottees belonging to the same real estate project. 4.8. However, to ensure that there is no prejudice to the interests of any such creditor in a class whose application has already been filed but not admitted by the Adjudicating Authority, the Committee agreed that a certain grace period may be provided within which such creditor in a class may modify and file its application in accordance with the above-stated threshold requirements. However, if the creditor is unable to fulfil the threshold requirements to file such modified application within the grace period provided, the application filed by such creditor would be deemed withdrawn.” (Emphasis supplied) 34. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Second Amendment Bill, 2019, promulgated as an Ordinance, and thereafter, as the impugned Act, it was, inter alia, stated that it was necessitated to prevent potential abuse of the Code by certain classes of financial creditors, inter alia. This was necessary to prevent the derailing of the time-bound CIRP, which was designed to secure the maximization of value of the assets. The provision only supplements the protection under Sections 65 and 75 of the Code. The intelligible differentia is projected as follows: i. Numerosity;

ii. Heterogeneity; iii. Lack of special expertise and individuality in decision making. It is sought to be contrasted with institutional decision-making which is associated with banks and financial institutions;

iv. Typicality in determination of default. In other words, in the case of banks and financial institutions, records of public utilities, would show a default. In the case of allottees, records must be accessed through data publicly available under RERA; 35. The object and rationale of the impugned provisions are stated to be as follows:

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] i.

Preventing multiple individual applications, which has the effect of not only crowding the docket of the Adjudicating Authority and further holding up a process in which time is of the essence;

ii. Safeguarding the interest of hundreds or even thousands of allottees who may oppose the application of a single homebuyer; iii. Balancing the interest of members of the same sub-Class as also other financial creditors and other operational creditors. The availability of remedies to the members of the sub-class under RERA, in the case of allottees;

iv. Lastly, the process becomes smoother and cost-effective. Unnecessary financial bleeding of the corporate debtor who is already in difficulty, is avoided. 36. Time is of the essence of the Code. Proceedings are in the nature of proceedings in rem. It impacts the rights of creditors, including similarly placed creditors. It is therefore, reasonable and logical to place the threshold. The minimum threshold is a minimum requirement. The threshold is kept low and reasonable. This Court has upheld subclassification provided there is a rational basis. She drew support from the following decisions; i.

Indra Sawhney and others v. Union of India and others ;

ii. Lord Krishna Sugar Mills Limited and another v. Union of India and another18; iii. State of Kerala and another v. N.M. Thomas and others19;

iv. State of West Bengal and another v. Rash Behari Sarkar and another20; v. State of Kerala v. Aravind Ramakant Modawdakar and others 21.

1992 Supp.(3) SCC 217 (1960) 1 SCR 39 (1976) 2 SCC 310 (1993) 1 SCC 479 (1999) 7 SCC 400

37. She sought to distinguish the judgment of this Court in Sansar Chand Atri v. State of Punjab and another22, which was relied on by the petitioners on the basis that this Court in the said case, only frowned upon creating a class within a class without rational basis. In this case, there was a rational basis for creating a sub-class. Differential treatment is also contemplated under UNCITRAL Legislative Guide and the Guidelines. 38. There is no basis in the contention that the amendments go against the law laid down in Pioneer (supra). The question involved in the said case was not whether there can be a different treatment to the real estate allottees for the purpose of initiating CIRP. Secondly, it is pointed out that the Legislature is free to make laws to deal with problems that manifest with experience. The numerical threshold was felt necessary with experience and recommendations of an Expert Committee. There has been a manifold increase of claim petitions filed by single or handful of allottees resulting in an already overburdened Adjudicating Authorities being flooded with such petitions. The amendment is consistent with the Pioneer (supra) judgment. The uniqueness of the allottees as a class of financial creditors, has been recognized in Pioneer (supra). The fact that they constituted a distinct and separate class of financial creditors meriting distinct treatment, has been approved in Pioneer (supra). The minimum threshold requirement is a procedural requirement. There is no deviation from Pioneer (supra) in a manner which is irreconcilable with it. The legislation, being an economic measure, free play in the joints, must be accorded to the Legislature. The impugned amendment is reasonable, minimal and proportionate. The data gathered by the respondent discloses that between June, 2016 and 5th June, 2018, there were 253 cases filed by allottees in the N.C.L.T.. However, between 6th June, 2018 and 28th December, 2019, as many as 2201 cases were filed by the allottees. Thereafter, pursuant to the Ordinance between December 29th, 2019 and August 26th, 2020, there is a sharp fall, as, nearly in eight months, only 130 cases were filed. It is pointed out that the argument, based on estoppel and malice against the Legislature, is untenable. There can be no estoppel against the Legislature and the decision of this Court in Union of India and others v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd.23, is relied on. The concept of transferred malice is alien in the field of legislation. In this regard, reference is placed on decisions of

(2002) 4 SCC 154 (1985) 4 SCC 369

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

this Court in K. Nagaraj and others v. State of A.P. and another24 and State of Himachal Pradesh v. Narain Singh25.

39. The right to file an application under Section 7 is a statutory right and it can be conditioned. Reliance is placed on judgment of this Court in Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and others26. There is no inherent or absolute right to file an application under Section 7 of the Code. The Legislature is well within its power to impose conditions for the exercise of such statutory rights. It is further contended that the third proviso inserted in Section 7(1) does not affect any vested right of the creditors who have already filed applications for initiating CIRP. A vested right has been the subject matter of several decisions. In this regard reliance is placed on the following judgments: i.

Howrah Municipal Corporation and others v. Ganges Rope Co. Ltd. and others27;

ii.

Arcelormittal India Private Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta and others 28;

iii. Swiss Ribbons Private Limited and another v. Union of India and others29; iv. Karnail Kaur and others v. State of Punjab and others30; v.

Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited Through Authorised Signatory v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Others 31.

40. Mere right to take advantage of a statute is not a vested right. In this regard, the following case law is relied upon: i.

Director of Public Works and another v. Ho Po Sang and Others 32;

(1985) 1 SCC 523 (2009) 13 SCC 165 (1999) 4 SCC 468 (2004) 1 SCC 663 (2019) 2 SCC 1 (2019) 4 SCC 17 (2015) 3 SCC 206 (2019) SCCONLINE SC 1478 [1961]3 WLR 39

ii.

M.S. Shivananda v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and others33;

iii. Lalji Raja and Sons v. Hansraj Nathuram34; iv. Kanaya Ram and others v. Rajender Kumar and others35;

41. The third proviso is enacted to protect the collective interests of others in a class of creditors. Before admission of the application for insolvency, no vested right accrues in favour of the allottee. The amendment, therefore, cannot be said to have retrospective application in a manner that impairs vested rights. Prior to admission, there is no vested right. Insistence on compliance with the new provisos cannot be regarded as having retrospective operation taking away vested rights. It is done to avoid needless multiplicity and to ensure that no single allottee would be able to achieve admission and its consequences, without having a threshold of his compatriots on board. 42. Placing reliance on judgment of this Court, in Garikapati Veeraya(supra), it is contended that even a vested right can be taken away by the Legislature, if a subsequent enactment so expressly provides or if it so by necessary implication. A minimum threshold requirement is a common feature of class action litigation. There are several legislations which provide for a minimum threshold in order to initiate class action. Section 245 of the Companies Act, 2013 and 241 of the said Act are relied upon. Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956, read with Section 399, contemplated a minimum threshold requirement for seeking relief under Sections 397 and 398. Reference is placed on the Bhabha Committee Report (Company Law Committee) in 1952. So also, is support, sought to be drawn from the judgment of this Court in J.P. Srivastava & Sons (P) Ltd. and others v. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. and others36. Under the Consumer Protection Act, this Court, rendered the judgment in Anjum Hussain and others v. Intellicity Business Park Private Limited and others37. A minimum threshold adds, authenticity and weightage to the claim in a class action, proving it to be a common grievance and not a mere obstruction in the work of the opposite party. Reference is made to Rule 23 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the

(1980) 1 SCC 149 (1971) 1 SCC 721 (1985) 1 SCC 436 (2005) 1 SCC 172 (2019) 6 SCC 519

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

United States, which provide for class action suits. The said Rules contemplate numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation. It is pointed out that joint filing was not only not alien to Section 7 but it was interwoven into its very DNA. Even as originally enacted, Section 7 contemplated joint filing by financial creditors. Uniqueness of the Code lies in the fact that the financial creditors may file an application based on a default that occurred in respect of the third-party financial creditor, who may choose not to file an application itself. At the triggering stage, an application under Section 7 partakes the character of an application in rem proceeding rather than in personam one. The impugned amendment merely extends the same rationale.

43. It is further pointed out that Debenture Trustees are defined in Section 2(bb)of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Debenture Trustees Regulations, 1993, as a Trustee of a trust deed for securing any issue of debentures of a body corporate. Debenture is a long-term bond issued by a company or an unsecured loan that a company issues without a pledge of assets, as for example, interest bearing bond. Debenture Trustees are registered under Chapter 2 of the said Regulations. The Regulations provide for responsibilities and duties of Debenture Trustees. In the case of a debenture-holder and other security-holder, there is a Debenture Trustee to protect their interest from the inception under SEBI.

44. As far as absence of information, so far as debenture holders are concerned, necessary information regarding them is available in the public domain, under Section 88(1)(b) and Section 88(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013, which obliges every company to maintain a register of its debenture holders and security holders. A penalty for noncompliance is contemplated under Section 88(5). Section 95 of the Companies Act, 2013 provides that registers, required to be maintained by the Company under Section 88, shall be kept in the registered office. Without payment of fees, the register is open to inspection by any member, debenture holder or other security holder. Extracts and copies of such registered can be obtained. Reference is also made to Rule 4 of the Companies (Management and Administration) Rules, 2014, which contemplates a separate register in Form - FMG-II for debenture holders. It contains all details of the debenture holder, including the e-mail id, address, etc.. Thus, there is a reservoir of information available for complying with the requirement under the first proviso.

45. As regards the allottees are concerned, the submission, is as follows: Reference is made to Section 19 of RERA. Thereunder, Section 19(9) obliges every allottee of a real estate project to participate towards the Association of Allottees. Section 11 (4)(e) of RERA also obliges the Promoter to enable the formation of such an Association. RERA compels the constitution of such an Association, prior to the allotment. This is for the reason that an Association plays an important role during the development of the project. It is pointed out that under Section 8 of RERA, upon lapse of or revocation of the registration, the Authority is obliged to take such action, as it may deem fit, including the carrying out of the remaining development works. The Association of allottees have been given the right of first refusal for carrying out the remaining development works. Section 11(4) contemplates the obligations to be discharged by the Promoter towards the Association. Reference is also made to Section 4(2)(c) of RERA. Under Section 17 of the RERA, the Promoter is to execute a registered conveyance in regard to the undivided proportionate title in the common areas to the Association of the allottees. Physical possession of the common areas is to be handed over to the Association of the Allottees. Under Section 31 of RERA, the Association can file complaint with the Authority. Apart from this, it is also pointed out that under Section 11(1)(b), the Promoter is bound to create a webpage on the website of the RERA Authority and enter thereon the quarterly up-to-date list of the number and the types of the plots/apartments as may be booked. 46. Shri Sajan Poovayya, learned senior Counsel who appears on behalf of respondent no. 4 in Writ Petition No. 191 of 2020, which is a builder, also supported the Union. The second proviso, he contends is a logical and legitimate method to strike a fair balance between all stakeholders. It makes the Code workable. The object of the Amendment Act is to prevent the use of the Code for an extraneous purpose and not to shield and protect an errant real estate developer. He has referred to the facts pertaining to his client by way of an example of the misuse which has happened under the earlier regime. He drew support from paragraph-41 of the judgment in Pioneer (supra). Second proviso is an independent provision to made the Code

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

workable. He drew our attention to paragraph-43 of this court in 1985 1 SCC 591. As regards the information, he also pointed out Section 11 of RERA, pointing to the information which is available in public domain. Illustratively, he drew our attention to the Haryana Real Estate Regulatory Authority, (Gurugram, Quarterly Progress Report Regulations), 2018, under which the format provides various details which include the names of the allottees and the date of booking, inter alia. He also points out that there is no unfair discrimination.

CHALLENGE GROUNDS

TO

PLENARY

LEGISLATION;

47. The grounds on which plenary law can be challenged are well established. In the first two decades decisions of this Court unerringly point to three grounds which render legislation vulnerable. A law can be successfully challenged if contrary to the division of powers, either the Parliament or the State Legislature usurps power that does not fall within its domain thus, rendering it incompetent to make such law. Secondly, a law made contravening Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India would be visited with unconstitutionality and declared void to the extent of its contravention. Needless to say, a law within the meaning of Article 19 of the Constitution would remain valid qua a non-citizen (see in this regard The State of Gujarat and others v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad and Others38). Thirdly, apart from Fundamental Rights, the supremacy of the Constitution vis-a-vis the ordinary legislation, even when the law is plenary legislation, is preserved with a view that legislation must be in conformity with the other provisions of the Constitution. 48. While on breaches of the Fundamental Right, furnishing a plank of attack against plenary law, it is necessary to notice a challenge to law under Article 14, was essentially confined to the law, being class legislation. In other words, a law, if it manifested reasonable classification for treating different persons or things differently, the law would pass muster. Interestingly, even while the theory of reasonable classification had come to be proclaimed in the first year of the Republic, and what is more followed in State of West-Bengal v. Anwar Ali39, the following doubts were expressed by Justice Vivian Bose:

(1974) 4 SCC 656 AIR 1952 SC 75

“82. I can conceive of cases where there is the utmost good faith and where the classification is scientific and rational and yet which would offend this law. Let us take an imaginary cases in which a State legislature considers that all accused persons whose skull measurements are below a certain standard, or who cannot pass a given series of intelligence tests, shall be tried summarily whatever the offence on the ground that the less complicated the trial the fairer it is to their sub-standard of intelligence. Here is classification. It is scientific and systematic. The intention and motive are good. There is no question of favouritism, and yet I can hardly believe that such a law would be allowed to stand. But what would be the true basis of the decision? Surely simply this that the judges would not consider that fair and proper. However much the real ground of decision may be hidden behind a screen of words like ‘reasonable’, ‘substantial’, ‘rational’ and ‘arbitrary’ the fact would remain that judges are substituting their own judgment of what is right and proper and reasonable and just for that of the legislature; and up to a point that, I think, is inevitable when a judge is called upon to crystallise a vague generality like article 14 into a concrete concept. Even in England, where Parliament is supreme, that is inevitable, for, as Dicey tells us in his Law of the Constitution: “Parliament is the supreme legislator, but from, the moment Parliament has uttered its will as law-giver, that will becomes subject to the interpretation put upon it by the judges of the land, and the judges, who are influenced by the feelings of magistrates no less than by the general spirit of the common law, are disposed to construe statutory exceptions to common law principles in a mode which would not commend itself either to a body of officials, or the Houses of Parliament, if the Houses were called upon to interpret their own enactments.” But the following caveat by the learned Judge is worth noticing:

“83. This, however, does not mean that judges are to determine what is for the good of the people and substitute their individual and personal opinions for that of the government of the day, or that they may usurp the functions of the legislature. That is not their province and though there must always be a narrow margin within which judges, who are human, will always be

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] influenced by subjective factors, their training and their tradition makes the main body of their decisions speak with the same voice and reach impersonal results whatever their personal predilections or their individual backgrounds. It is the function of the legislature alone, headed by the government of the day, to determine what is, and what is not, good and proper for the people of the land and they must be given the widest latitude to exercise their functions within the ambit of their powers, else all progress us barred. But, because of the Constitution, there are limits beyond which they cannot go and even though it falls to the lot of judges to determine where those limits, lie, the basis of their decision cannot be whether the Court thinks the law is for the benefit of the people of not. Cases of this type must be decided solely on the basis whether the Constitution forbids it.”

(Emphasis supplied) 49. The seed of this idea had a muted growth. It was in the decision of this Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another40 that this Court laid bare a new dimension in the majestic provisions of Article 14. This Court took the view that arbitrariness and fairness are sworn enemies. The guarantee of Article 14 is not confined in other words to it being a prohibition against equals being discriminated against or unequals being treated alike. State action must be fair and not arbitrary if it is to be pass muster in a court of law. It is essentially following the dicta laid down as aforesaid that this Court in the case of Shayara Bano v. Union of India41, wherein one of us (Justice Rohinton F. Nariman), speaking for the majority, held as follows: “101. It will be noticed that a Constitution Bench of this Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121] stated that it was settled law that subordinate legislation can be challenged on any of the grounds available for challenge against plenary legislation. This being the case, there is no rational distinction between the two types of legislation when it comes to this ground of challenge under Article 14. The test of manifest arbitrariness, therefore, as laid down in the aforesaid judgments would apply to

(1974) 4 SCC 3 (2017) 9 SCC 1

invalidate legislation as well as subordinate legislation under Article 14. Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14.”

(Emphasis supplied)

50. This view, namely, that be it a plenary law if it is found to be manifestly arbitrary it become vulnerable has been followed in the following decisions, among other judgments: (1) Navtej Singh Johar and Others v. Union of India and Others 42; (2) Joseph Shine v. Union of India43;

(3) Justice K.S. Puttuswamy and Others v. Union of India and Others 44. (4) Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. and Others v. Union of India and Others45.

51. Yet another ground recognised by this Court is that a law, be it the offspring of a Legislature, it falls foul of Article 14 if it is found to be vague – (see in this regard Shreya Singhal v. Union of India46). It must be elaborated and we must remember that the case involved overturning Section 66A of the Information Technology Act which purported to create a criminal offence, the ingredients of which were found to be vague. 52. While, on the basis, furnished under law, for impugning the plenary legislation, we may notice two grounds, which have been urged before us by some of the petitioners. It has been urged that the law was created by way of pandering to the real estate lobby and succumbing to their pressure or by way of placating their vested interests. Such an

(2018) 10 SCC 1 (2019) 3 SCC 39 (2017) 10 SCC 1 AIR 2020 SC 122 (2015) 5 SCC 1

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

argument is nothing but a thinly disguised attempt at questioning the law of the Legislature based on malice. A law is made by a body of elected representatives of the people. When they act in their legislative capacity, what is being rolled out is ordinary law. Should the same legislators sit to amend the Constitution, they would be acting as members of the Constituent Assembly. Whether it is ordinary legislation or an amendment to the Constitution, the activity is one of making the law. While malice may furnish a ground in an appropriate case to veto administrative action it is trite that malice does not furnish a ground to attack a plenary law [See in this regard K. Nagaraj and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another47 and State of Himachal Pradesh v. Narain Singh48].

53. Yet another ground which has been urged in these cases is that when this Court decided Pioneer (supra) the Union of India defended the amendment to the Code which included the insertion of the explanation to Section 5(8)(f) of the Code. It was this explanation which made it clear that home buyers would be financial creditors. All grounds urged by the financial creditors were fiercely countered by the very same Union of India by contending that the home buyers are financial creditors and what is more, there existed sufficient safeguards against abuse of power by the individual home buyers. What is contended before us by some of the petitioners is that the supreme legislature is in such circumstances estopped by the principle of promissory estoppel from enacting the impugned enactment. 54. A supreme legislature cannot be cribbed, cabined or confined by the doctrine of promissory estoppel or estoppel. It acts as a sovereign body. The theory of promissory estoppel, on the one hand, has witnessed an incredible trajectory of growth but it is incontestable that it serves as an effective deterrent to prevent injustice from a Government or its agencies which seek to resile from a representation made by them, without just cause [See in this regard Union of India and others v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd.49 – Paragraph-13].

(1985) 1 SCC 523 (2009) 13 SCC 165 (1985) 4 SCC 369

UNRAVELLING THE WORKING OF THE CODE AS REGARDS CORPORATE DEBTOR 55. The Code was passed by Parliament in the year 2016 however, under Section 1(3) provisions were to come into force on such day as the Central Government was to appoint. The provisions of the Code stand enforced from 2017. 56. Part II of the code applies to matters relating to Insolvency and Liquidation of Corporate Debtors where the minimum amount of default is Rupees One crore as it stands [Section 4]. Under Section 6 of the Code when any corporate debtor commits a default, a financial creditor, an operational creditor or the corporate debtor itself is permitted to initiate the corporate insolvency resolution process (hereinafter referred to as CIRP) in respect of the corporate debtor in the manner provided under Chapter II. Chapter II consists of Section 6 to Section 32A. Section 7 (1) provides that a financial creditor by himself or joining with other financial creditors or any other person on behalf of the financial creditor as may be notified by the Central Government may file an application under Section 7 for initiating the CIRP before the adjudicating authority when a default has occurred. The adjudicating authority defined in Section 5(1) of the Code is the NCLT constituted under Section 408 of the Companies Act 2013. The unamended Section 7(1) read as follows: “7. (1) A financial creditor either by itself or jointly with other financial creditors may file an application for initiating corporate insolvency resolution process against a corporate debtor before the Adjudicating Authority when a default has occurred.” Explanation - For the purposes of this sub-section, a default includes a default in respect of a financial debt owed not only to the applicant financial creditor but to any other financial creditor of the corporate debtor.” 57. The three impugned provisos which we have already noted and which have been inserted vide the impugned amendment have been sandwitched in between the provisions of sub-section (1) and the explanation. Sub- section 2 of Section 7 provides that the financial creditor shall make the application which shall be in such manner and form and accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed. 58. Section 3(26) defines the word ‘prescribed’ as meaning prescribed by rules made by the Central Government. Section 239, inter alia, confers power on the Central Government to make rules for carrying out the provisions of the Code. Accordingly, the Insolvency and

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016 came to be made and were enforced from 1.12.2016. Rule 4 reads as under:

“4. Application by financial creditor.—(1) A financial creditor, either by itself or jointly, shall make an application for initiating the corporate insolvency resolution process against a corporate debtor under section 7 of the Code in Form 1, accompanied with documents and records required therein and as specified in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016. (2) Where the applicant under sub-rule (1) is an assignee or transferee of a financial contract, the application shall be accompanied with a copy of the assignment or transfer agreement and other relevant documentation to demonstrate the assignment or transfer. (3) The applicant shall dispatch forthwith, a copy of the application filed with the Adjudicating Authority, by registered post or speed post to the registered office of the corporate debtor.

(4) In case the application is made jointly by financial creditors, they may nominate one amongst them to act on their behalf.” 59. Rule 8 contemplates withdrawal of application. It reads as follows:

“8. Withdrawal of application — The Adjudicating Authority may permit withdrawal of the application made under rules 4, 6 or 7, as the case may be, on a request made by the applicant before its admission.” 60. It must be noticed that Rules 6 and 7 deal with applications by operational creditors and corporate applicants respectively. Rule 10 (1) (2) and (3) read as follows:

“10. Filing of application and application fee — (1) Till such time the rules of procedure for conduct of proceedings under the Code are notified, the application made under sub-section (1) of section 7, sub-section (1) of section 9 or sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Code shall be filed before the Adjudicating Authority in accordance with rules 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 26 of Part III of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016.

(2) An applicant under these rules shall immediately after becoming aware, notify the Adjudicating Authority of any winding-up petition presented against the corporate debtor. (3) The application shall be accompanied by such fee as specified in the Schedule.”

61. Form 1 is the application prescribed in relation to an application to be filed by the financial creditor. It reads as follows: “FORM 1 (See sub-rule (1) of rule 4)

APPLICATION BY FINANCIAL CREDITOR(S) TO INITIATE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION PROCESS UNDER CHAPTER II OF PART II UNDER CHAPTER IV OF PART II OF THE CODE. [*strike out whichever is not applicable]

(Under section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 read with Rule 4 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016) [Date]

To, The National Company Law Tribunal [Address] From,

[Names and addresses of the registered officers of the financial creditors] In the matter of [name of the corporate debtor]

Subject: Application to initiate corporate insolvency resolution process in the matter of [name of the corporate debtor] under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Madam/ Sir, [Names of the financial creditor(s)], hereby submit this application to initiate a corporate insolvency resolution process in

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] the matter of [name of corporate debtor]. The details for the purpose of this application are set out below:

Part-I

PART-II

PARTICULARS OF THE CORPORATE DEBTOR 1.

NAME OF THE CORPORATE DEBTOR

2.

IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF CORPORATE DEBTOR

3.

DATE OF DEBTOR

4.

NOMINAL SHARE CAPITAL AND THE PAID-UP SHARE CAPITAL OF THE CORPORATE DEBTOR AND/OR DETAILS OF GUARANTEE CLAUSE AS PER MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION (AS APPLICABLE)

5.

ADDRESS OF THE REGISTERED OFFICE OF THE CORPORATE DEBTOR

6.

DETAILS OF THE CORPORATE DEBTOR AS PER THE NOTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 55(2) OF THE CODE-

INCORPORATION

OF

CORPORATE

(i) ASSETS AND INCOME (ii) CLASS OF CREDITORS OR AMOUNT OF DEBT (iii) CATEGORY OF CORPORATE PERSON (WHERE APPLICATION IS UNDER CHAPTER IV OF PART II OF THE CODE)

Part-III

Part-IV

Part-V

PARTICULARS OF FINANCIAL DEBT [DOCUMENTS, RECORDS AND EVIDENCE OF DEFAULT] 1.

PARTICULARS OF SECURITY HELD, IF ANY, THE DATE OF ITS CREATION, ITS ESTIMATED VALUE AS PER THE CREDITOR.

ATTACH A COPY OF A CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION OF CHARGE ISSUED BY THE REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES (IF THE CORPORATE DEBTOR IS A COMPANY)

2.

PARTICULARS OF AN ORDER OF A COURT, TRIBUNAL OR ARBITRAL PANEL ADJUDICATING ON THE DEFAULT, IF ANY (ATTACH A COPY OF THE ORDER)

3.

RECORD OF DEFAULT WITH THE INFORMATION UTILITY, IF ANY (ATTACH A COPY OF SUCH RECORD)

4.

DETAILS OF SUCCESSION CERTIFICATE, OR PROBATE OF A WILL, OR LETTER OF ADMINISTRATION, OR COURT DECREE (AS MAY BE APPLICABLE), UNDER THE INDIAN SUCCESSION ACT, 1925 (10 OF 1925) (ATTACH A COPY)

5.

THE LATEST AND COMPLETE COPY OF THE FINANCIAL CONTRACT REFLECTING ALL AMENDMENTS AND WAIVERS TO DATE (ATTACH A COPY)

6.

A RECORD OF DEFAULT AS AVAILABLE WITH ANY CREDIT INFORMATION COMPANY (ATTACH A COPY)

7.

COPIES OF ENTRIES IN A BANKERS BOOK IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BANKERS BOOKS EVIDENCE ACT, 1891 (18 OF 1891) (ATTACH A COPY)

8.

LIST OF OTHER DOCUMENTS ATTACHED TO THIS APPLICATION IN ORDER TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF FINANCIAL DEBT, THE AMOUNT AND DATE OF DEFAULT

I, hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge, [name of proposed insolvency professional], is fully qualified and

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] permitted to act as an insolvency professional in accordance with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and the associated rules and regulations.

[Name of the financial creditor] has paid the requisite fee for this application through [state means of payment] on [date]. Yours sincerely,

Instructions Please attach the following to this application: Annex I Copies of all documents referred to in this application. Annex II Written communication by the proposed interim resolution professional as set out in Form 2.

Annex III Proof that the specified application fee has been paid. Annex IV Where the application is made jointly, the particulars specified in this form shall be furnished in respect of all the joint applicants along with a copy of authorisation to the financial creditor to file and act on this application on behalf of all the applicants.”

62. The schedule prescribes the fees which is contemplated under Rule 10(3). It, inter alia, provides that for an application by a financial creditor (whether solely or jointly a sum of Rupees Twenty-five thousand). Sub-section 3 of Section 7 provides that financial creditor along with the application shall furnish record of the default recorded by the information utility or all such other record or evidence before as may be specified. The word ‘specified’ has been defined in Section 3 (32) as meaning specified by regulations made by the Board and the term ‘specify’ is to be construed accordingly.

63. Section 7(3) (b) requires the financial creditor who makes the application to furnish the name of the Resolution Professional proposed as an Interim Resolution Professional (hereafter referred to as “RP” and “IRP” respectively). Section 5(27) defines the word ‘Resolution Professional’ for the purpose of Part 2 to mean an insolvency professional

appointed to conduct the CIRP and includes an interim resolution professional. In turn Section 3(19) defines ‘insolvency professional’ as the person enrolled under Section 206 with an insolvency professional agency as its member and registered with the Board as an insolvency professional under Section 207. Sub-Section (5) of Section 7 proclaims that when adjudicating authority is satisfied that a default has occurred and the application under sub-section is complete and that there is no disciplinary proceedings pending against the proposed resolution professional, it may by order admit an application. Inter alia on the ground that default has not occurred, it is open to adjudicating authority to reject the application. If rejection is intended, the proviso obliges the adjudicating authority to issue a notice to rectify any defect in the application (this is for the reason that under sub-Section 5 apart from there being no default, if there is any disciplinary action against the proposed resolution professional, the application is liable to be rejected) This is apart from the application being otherwise defective. The application is to contain other information as may be specified under regulations by the Code. The adjudicating authority is required by the letter of the law and indeed we may say so, in accordance with the spirit to ascertain within 14 days of the receipt of the application if there is any default from the records of information utility or on the basis of other evidence made available by the financial creditor under sub-section (3) [In Pioneer (supra), the period has been understood as directory]. ‘Information utility’ has been defined in Section 3(21), as a person who is registered with the Board as information utility under Section 210. The word ‘Board’ has been defined in Section 3(1) to be the ‘Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India’ which is established under sub-Section (1) of Section 188. 64. Section 7(6) declares that the CIRP shall commence from the date of admission of the application under sub-section (5). 65. Section 8 read with Section 9 deal with application for initiation of the CIRP by an operational creditor. Section 10 deals with an application by the corporate applicant. The word Corporate applicant is defined to refer to the corporate debtor and other entities associated with it. More about it at a later stage. It is thereafter that law giver has in Section 11 proscribed applications which should otherwise be maintainable. This is a provision in which we will devote more time later on in this judgement. Section 12 places the time limit. Section 12 has a marginal note which is to the following effect:

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] “12. Time-limit for completion of insolvency resolution process.-

(1) Subject to sub-section (2), the corporate insolvency resolution process shall be completed within a period of one hundred and eighty days from the date of admission of the application to initiate such process. (2) The resolution professional shall file an application to the Adjudicating Authority to extend the period of the corporate insolvency resolution process beyond one hundred and eighty days, if instructed to do so by a resolution passed at a meeting of the committee of creditors by a vote of seventy-five per cent. of the voting shares. (3) On receipt of an application under sub-section (2), if the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that the subject matter of the case is such that corporate insolvency resolution process cannot be completed within one hundred and eighty days, it may by order extend the duration of such process beyond one hundred and eighty days by such further period as it thinks fit, but not exceeding ninety days: Provided that any extension of the period of corporate insolvency resolution process under this section shall not be granted more than once. Provided further that the corporate insolvency resolution process shall mandatorily be completed within a period of three hundred and thirty days from the insolvency commencement date, including any extension of the period of corporate insolvency resolution process granted under this section and the time taken in legal proceedings in relation to such resolution process of the corporate debtor: Provided also that where the insolvency resolution process of a corporate debtor is pending and has not been completed within the period referred to in the second proviso, such resolution process shall be completed within a period of ninety days from the date of commencement of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019.” 66. Coming to sub-Section 2, the CIRP is to be completed within 180 days from the date of admission of the application to initiate the

process. As far as an application by a financial creditor is concerned, the date of admission is the date of the order admitting the application. Under sub-Section (2) however if the Committee of creditors by a vote of 66 per cent of the voting share instructs the RP to extend the period of CIRP beyond 180 days, the RP is bound to file an application. The adjudicating authority on receipt of the application can extend the period of 180 days for a maximum period of 90 days. Such extension can be granted only once. With effect from 16.8.2019, two provisos have been inserted. The provisos were added in fact as noted in paragraph-74 of the Essar Steel (supra) to overcome what was laid down in (2019) 2 SCC 1 decided by this Court 04.10.2018. In the latter decision in Arcellormittal (supra), this Court purported to hold that the time taken in legal proceedings must be excluded. Under the first proviso, the CIRP has to be mandatorily completed within a period of 330 days from the insolvency commencement date. This period of 330 days is to include any extension granted under sub-Section (3) by the Adjudicating Authority and also the time taken in legal proceedings in relation to the resolution process of the corporate debtor. However, in Committee Creditors of Essar Steel (supra), this Court struck down the word ‘mandatorily’ as being manifestly arbitrary and in violation of Article 19 (1)(g) and proceeded to hold as follows: “…The effect of this declaration is that ordinarily the time taken in relation to the corporate resolution process of the corporate debtor must be completed within the outer limit of 330 days from the insolvency commencement date, including extensions and the time taken in legal proceedings. However, on the facts of a given case, if it can be shown to the Adjudicating Authority and/or Appellate Tribunal under the Code that only a short period is left for completion of the insolvency resolution process beyond 330 days, and that it would be in the interest of all stakeholders that the corporate 10-12-2020 (Page 69 of 85) debtor be put back on its feet instead of being sent into liquidation and that the time taken in legal proceedings is largely due to factors owing to which the fault cannot be ascribed to the litigants before the Adjudicating Authority and/or Appellate Tribunal, the delay or a large part thereof being attributable to the tardy process of the Adjudicating Authority and/or the Appellate Tribunal itself, it may be open in such cases for the Adjudicating Authority and/or Appellate Tribunal to extend time beyond 330 days. Likewise, even under the newly

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] added proviso to Section 12, if by reason of all the aforesaid factors the grace period of 90 days from the date of commencement of the Amending Act of 2019 is exceeded, there again a discretion can be exercised by the Adjudicating Authority and/or Appellate Tribunal to further extend time keeping the aforesaid parameters in mind. It is only in such exceptional cases that time can be extended, the general Rule being that 330 days is the outer limit within which resolution of the stressed assets of the corporate debtor must take place beyond which the corporate debtor is to be driven into liquidation.” 67. At this juncture, it must be noted that under the first proviso inserted by the amendment dated 16.08.2019, reference to the period of 330 days is made with regard to the insolvency commencement date. The insolvency commencement date has been defined in Section 5(12). Section 5(12) reads as follows: “5(12) “insolvency commencement date” means the date of admission of an application for initiating corporate insolvency resolution process by the Adjudicating Authority under sections 7, 9 or section 10, as the case may be.” There was a proviso but it stands omitted by Act 1/2020 (with effect from 28/12/2019). 68. In this regard, it is to be noticed that the scheme appears to be that the name of the RP to act as the IRP is to be indicated in the application. While admitting the application under Section 7(5), the adjudicating authority is to appoint the proposed resolution professional. In fact, Section 16(2) of the Code contemplates such appointment. We may refer to Section 12A which was inserted with effect from 6.6.2018. Section 12A reads as follows: “12A. Withdrawal of application admitted under section 7, 9 or 10. – The Adjudicating Authority may allow the withdrawal of application admitted under section 7 or section 9 or section 10, on an application made by the applicant with the approval of ninety per cent voting share of the committee of creditors, in such manner as may be specified.” 69. The above provision dealing with withdrawal of application after admission may be contrasted with Rule (8) which apparently deals with withdrawal before admission.

70. Section 16 of the Code, however, indicates that the adjudicating authority shall appoint an interim resolution professional within 14 days from the insolvency commencement date. We have already noted the definition of the words ‘insolvency commencement date’ as the date of admission. Section 13 contemplates steps to be taken upon admission under Section 7, inter alia. 1. A moratorium contemplated under Section 14 is to be declared. 2. A Public announcement of the initiation of the CIRP and inviting claims against the corporate debtor is to be made.

3. The appointment of the IRP- the appointment is to be done in the manner as provided in Section 16. The announcement is to be made immediately after the appointment of resolution professional. 71. Section 14 deals with moratorium.

“14. Moratorium. - (1) Subject to provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), on the insolvency commencement date, the Adjudicating Authority shall by order declare moratorium for prohibiting all of the following, namely: (a) the institution of suits or continuation of pending suits or proceedings against the corporate debtor including execution of any judgement, decree or order in any court of law, tribunal, arbitration panel or other authority; (b) transferring, encumbering, alienating or disposing off by the corporate debtor 1 Ins. by Act No. 26 of 2019, sec. 4 (w.e.f. 16-8-2019). 2 Ins. by Act No. 26 of 2018, sec. 9 (w.e.f. 6-6-2018). 20 any of its assets or any legal right or beneficial interest therein;

(c) any action to foreclose, recover or enforce any security interest created by the corporate debtor in respect of its property including any action under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002); (d)the recovery of any property by an owner or lessor where such property is occupied by or in the possession of the corporate debtor.

Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, it is hereby clarified that notwithstanding anything contained in any other

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] law for the time being in force, a licence, permit, registration, quota, concession, clearance or a similar grant or right given by the Central Government, State Government, local authority, sectoral regulator or any other authority constituted under any other law for the time being in force, shall not be suspended or terminated on the grounds of insolvency, subject to the condition that there is no default in payment of current dues arising for the use or continuation of the license, permit, registration, quota, concession, clearances or a similar grant or right during the moratorium period. (2) The supply of essential goods or services to the corporate debtor as may be specified shall not be terminated or suspended or interrupted during moratorium period. (2A) Where the interim resolution professional or resolution professional, as the case may be, considers the supply of goods or services critical to protect and preserve the value of the corporate debtor and manage the operations of such corporate debtor as a going concern, then the supply of such goods or services shall not be terminated, suspended or interrupted during the period of moratorium, except where such corporate debtor has not paid dues arising from such supply during the moratorium period or in such circumstances as may be specified.

(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to (a) such transactions, agreements or other arrangement as may be notified by the Central Government in consultation with any financial sector regulator or any other authority;

(b) a surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor. (4) The order of moratorium shall have effect from the date of such order till the completion of the corporate insolvency resolution process: Provided that where at any time during the corporate insolvency resolution process period, if the Adjudicating Authority approves the resolution plan under sub-section (1) of section 31 or passes an order for liquidation of corporate debtor under section 33, the moratorium shall cease to have effect from the date of such approval or liquidation order, as the case may be.”

72. It will be noticed that while Section 6 read with Section 7 contemplates that a financial creditor may move the application individually, he may also move the application jointly with other financial creditors. Even if a single financial creditor was to be the applicant, after the appointment of the interim resolution professional, the applicant ceases to be in seisin of the lis. The provisions of Section 17 is to be noticed. It reads as follows: “17. Management of affairs of corporate debtor by interim resolution professional. - (1) From the date of appointment of the interim resolution professional, -

(a) the management of the affairs of the corporate debtor shall vest in the interim resolution professional; (b) the powers of the board of directors or the partners of the corporate debtor, as the case may be, shall stand suspended and be exercised by the interim resolution professional;

(c) the officers and managers of the corporate debtor shall report to the interim resolution professional and provide access to such documents and records of the corporate debtor as may be required by the interim resolution professional; (d) the financial institutions maintaining accounts of the corporate debtor shall act on the instructions of the interim resolution professional in relation to such accounts and furnish all information relating to the corporate debtor available with them to the interim resolution professional. (2) The interim resolution professional vested with the management of the corporate debtor, shall(a) act and execute in the name and on behalf of the corporate debtor all deeds, receipts, and other documents, if any;

(b) take such actions, in the manner and subject to such restrictions, as may be specified by the Board; (c) have the authority to access the electronic records of corporate debtor from information utility having financial information of the corporate debtor;

(d) have the authority to access the books of accounts, records and other relevant documents of corporate debtor available with

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] government authorities, statutory auditors, accountants and such other persons as may be specified; and

(e) 2 [be responsible for complying with the requirements under any law for the time being in force on behalf of the corporate debtor.” 73. Section 17 contemplates that the management of the affairs of the corporate debtor will vest with the IRP. This takes effect from the date of the appointment of the interim resolution professional. Furthermore, the powers of the Board of Directors who are partners of the corporate debtors shall stand suspended.

74. Virtually, the entire control of the management including all the acts and authority indicated in sub-section 2 is to be carried out by interim resolution professional and authority exercised by him. Section 18 details the duties of the IRP. It reads as follows:

“18. Duties of interim resolution professional. – The interim resolution professional shall perform the following duties, namely: (a) collect all information relating to the assets, finances and operations of the corporate debtor for determining the financial position of the corporate debtor, including information relating to –

(i) business operations for the previous two years; (ii) financial and operational payments for the previous two years; (iii) list of assets and liabilities as on the initiation date; and

(iv) such other matters as may be specified; (b) receive and collate all the claims submitted by creditors to him, pursuant to the public announcement made under sections 13 and 15;

(c) constitute a committee of creditors; (d) monitor the assets of the corporate debtor and manage its operations until a resolution professional is appointed by the committee of creditors;

(e) file information collected with the information utility, if necessary; and (f) take control and custody of any asset over which the corporate debtor has ownership rights as recorded in the balance sheet of the corporate debtor, or with information utility or the depository of securities or any other registry that records the ownership of assets including – (i) assets over which the corporate debtor has ownership rights which may be located in a foreign country;

(ii) assets that may or may not be in possession of the corporate debtor; (iii) tangible assets, whether movable or immovable; (iv) intangible assets including intellectual property;

(v) securities including shares held in any subsidiary of the corporate debtor, financial instruments, insurance policies; (vi) assets subject to the determination of ownership by a court or authority: (g) to perform such other duties as may be specified by the Board.

Explanation. – For the purposes of this 1 section, the term “assets” shall not include the following, namely: (a) assets owned by a third party in possession of the corporate debtor held under trust or under contractual arrangements including bailment;

(b) assets of any Indian or foreign subsidiary of the corporate debtor; and (c) such other assets as may be notified by the Central Government in consultation with any financial sector regulator.”

75. It will be noticed that amongst his duties, is the duty to constitute a Committee of Creditors. The constitution of the committee of creditors and the method of voting and the extent of the same are found detailed inter alia in Section 21. Since much may turn on the said provision we refer to the same: “21. Committee of creditors. –

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] (1) The interim resolution professional shall after collation of all claims received against the corporate debtor and determination of the financial position of the corporate debtor, constitute a committee of creditors.

(2) The committee of creditors shall comprise all financial creditors of the corporate debtor:

Provided that a financial creditor or the authorised representative of the financial creditor referred to in sub-section (6) or sub-section (6A) or sub-section (5) of section 24, if it is a related party of the corporate debtor, shall not have any right of representation, participation or voting in a meeting of the committee of creditors:

Provided further that the first proviso shall not apply to a financial creditor, regulated by a financial sector regulator, if it is a related party of the corporate debtor solely on account of conversion or substitution of debt into equity shares or instruments convertible into equity shares or completion of such transactions as may be prescribed], prior to the insolvency commencement date. (3) Subject to sub-sections (6) and (6A), where the corporate debtor owes financial debts to two or more financial creditors as part of a consortium or agreement, each such financial creditor shall be part of the committee of creditors and their voting share shall be determined on the basis of the financial debts owed to them.

(4) Where any person is a financial creditor as well as an operational creditor – (a) such person shall be a financial creditor to the extent of the financial debt owed by the corporate debtor, and shall be included in the committee of creditors, with voting share proportionate to the extent of financial debts owed to such creditor; (b) such person shall be considered to be an operational creditor to the extent of the operational debt owed by the corporate debtor to such creditor. (5) Where an operational creditor has assigned or legally transferred any operational debt to a financial creditor, the assignee or transferee shall be considered as an operational creditor to the extent of such assignment or legal transfer.

(6) Where the terms of the financial debt extended as part of a consortium arrangement or syndicated facility provide for a single trustee or agent to act for all financial creditors, each financial creditor may(a) authorise the trustee or agent to act on his behalf in the committee of creditors to the extent of his voting share; (b) represent himself in the committee of creditors to the extent of his voting share;

(c) appoint an insolvency professional (other than the resolution professional) at his own cost to represent himself in the committee of creditors to the extent of his voting share; or (d) exercise his right to vote to the extent of his voting share with one or more financial creditors jointly or severally. (6A) Where a financial debt—

(a) is in the form of securities or deposits and the terms of the financial debt provide for appointment of a trustee or agent to act as authorised representative for all the financial creditors, such trustee or agent shall act on behalf of such financial creditors; (b) is owed to a class of creditors exceeding the number as may be specified, other than the creditors covered under clause (a) or sub-section (6), the interim resolution professional shall make an application to the Adjudicating Authority along with the list of all financial creditors, containing the name of an insolvency professional, other than the interim resolution professional, to act as their authorised representative who shall be appointed by the Adjudicating Authority prior to the first meeting of the committee of creditors; (c) is represented by a guardian, executor or administrator, such person shall act as authorised representative on behalf of such financial creditors, and such authorised representative under clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c) shall attend the meetings of the committee of creditors, and vote on behalf of each financial creditor to the extent of his voting share. (6B) The remuneration payable to the authorised representative-

(i) under clauses (a) and (c) of sub-section (6A), if any, shall be as per the terms of the financial debt or the relevant documentation; and

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] (ii) under clause (b) of sub-section (6A) shall be as specified which shall be form part of the insolvency resolution process costs.

(7) The Board may specify the manner of voting and the determining of the voting share in respect of financial debts covered under sub-sections (6) and (6A). (8) Save as otherwise provided in this Code, all decisions of the committee of creditors shall be taken by a vote of not less than fifty-one per cent. of voting share of the financial creditors: Provided that where a corporate debtor does not have any financial creditors, the committee of creditors shall be constituted and shall comprise of such persons to exercise such functions in such manner as may be specified. (9) The committee of creditors shall have the right to require the resolution professional to furnish any financial information in relation to the corporate debtor at any time during the corporate insolvency resolution process.

(10) The resolution professional shall make available any financial information so required by the committee of creditors under subsection (9) within a period of seven days of such requisition.” Section 22 (1) and (2) read as follows: “22. Appointment of resolution professional. –

(1) The first meeting of the committee of creditors shall be held within seven days of the constitution of the committee of creditors. (2) The committee of creditors, may, in the first meeting, by a majority vote of not less than sixty-six per cent of the voting share of the financial creditors, either resolve to appoint the interim resolution professional as a resolution professional or to replace the interim resolution professional by another resolution professional.” Section 23 reads as follows:

“23. Resolution professional to conduct corporate insolvency resolution process.– (1) Subject to section 27, the resolution professional shall conduct the entire corporate insolvency resolution process and manage

the operations of the corporate debtor during the corporate insolvency resolution process period: Provided that the resolution professional shall continue to manage the operations of the corporate debtor after the expiry of the corporate insolvency resolution process period, until an order approving the resolution plan under sub-section (1) of section 31 or appointing a liquidator under section 34 is passed by the Adjudicating Authority.

(2) The resolution professional shall exercise powers and perform duties as are vested or conferred on the interim resolution professional under this Chapter.

(3) In case of any appointment of a resolution professional under sub-sections (4) of section 22, the interim resolution professional shall provide all the information, documents and records pertaining to the corporate debtor in his possession and knowledge to the resolution professional.”

76. Section 24 deals with the meeting of committee of creditors. Now that resolution professional has been appointed, as contemplated under Section 22, Section 24(2) declares that all the meetings of the committee of creditors shall be convened by resolution professional. Section 25 speaks about the duties of the resolution professional. Section 25(2),(h) and (i) read as follows: “25(2) (h) invite prospective resolution applicants, who fulfil such criteria as may be laid down by him with the approval of committee of creditors, having regard to the complexity and scale of operations of the business of the corporate debtor and such other conditions as may be specified by the Board, to submit a resolution plan or plans. (i) present all resolution plans at the meetings of the committee of creditors.”

77. Section 25A, which was inserted with effect from 06.06.2018 will be separately dealt with. No doubt, Section 27 contemplates that a committee of creditors may at any time during the CIRP replace the resolution professional as provided in the section. Section 28, no doubt, constrains the resolution professional in regard to the matters provided therein. The approval of the committee of creditors is required in such

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

matters. It includes making any change in the management of corporate debtor and its subsidiary (Section 28(j)). Section 30 contemplates that resolution applicant may submit a resolution plan. The ‘resolution applicant’ has been defined in sub-section 25 of Section 5 which reads as follows:

“5(25) “resolution applicant” means a person, who individually or jointly with any other person, submits a resolution plan to the resolution professional pursuant to the invitation made under clause (h) of sub-section (2) of section 25.”

The resolution plan has been defined in Section 5 (26). The same reads as under:

“5(26) “resolution plan” means a plan proposed by resolution applicant for insolvency resolution of the corporate debtor as a going concern in accordance with Part II. Explanation.- For removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that a resolution plan may include provisions for the restructuring of the corporate debtor, including by way of merger, amalgamation and demerger.” 78. The resolution professional has to examine each resolution plan received by him on the basis of the invitation made by the resolution professional under Section 25(h) and ascertain whether the plan is in conformity with the various criteria mentioned in Section 30(2) of the Code. The matter is thereafter put up by the resolution professional before the committee of creditors. All resolution plans which conform with the conditions in sub-section (2) of Section 30 are, in fact, to be placed before the committee of creditors. The committee of creditors may approve the resolution plan after considering its feasibility and viability, the manner of distribution proposed, which may take into account the hurdles, priority amongst creditors as laid down in sub-section(1) of Section 53 including the priority and the value of security interest of secured creditors and such other requirements as may be specified by the Board. There are other details with which we are not concerned in Section 30. Section 31 requires approval of the resolution plan by the adjudicating authority. It reads inter-alia as follows:

“31. Approval of resolution plan. –

(1) If the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that the resolution plan as approved by the committee of creditors under sub-section (4) of section 30 meets the requirements as referred to in subsection (2) of section 30, it shall by order approve the resolution plan which shall be binding on the corporate debtor and its employees, members, creditors, including the Central Government, any State Government or any local authority to whom a debt in respect of the payment of dues arising under any law for the time being in force, such as authorities to whom statutory dues are owed, guarantors and other stakeholders involved in the resolution plan: Provided that the Adjudicating Authority shall, before passing an order for approval of resolution plan under this sub-section, satisfy that the resolution plan has provisions for its effective implementation.” The scope of these provisions have been dealt with in the decision of this Court in Essar Steel India Limited vs. Satish Kumar Gupta and Ors. and (2019) 2 SCC 1 among other decisions authored by one of us (Justice R.F. Nariman). 79. Sub-section (2) of Section 31 enables the adjudicating authority to reject the resolution plan. Section 31 (3) contemplates that after the approval of the resolution plan that the moratorium order passed by the adjudicating authority under Section 14 shall cease to have effect. Section 32A will be separately dealt with. 80. Section 33, which is in Chapter III in Part II, compels announcing the death knell of the corporate debtor. That is if, before the expiry of insolvency resolution process period or the maximum period permitted which is CIRP under Section 12, inter alia, a resolution plan is not received or though received is rejected by the adjudicating authority, then under Section 33, order is to be passed. The curtains are wrung down on the insolvency resolution process. The corporate debtor goes into liquidation. The adjudicating authority is bound to pass an order requiring corporate debtor to be liquidated as provided in chapter III Part II. Section 33(2) contemplates that before the confirmation of the resolution plan if the committee of creditors so approved by not less than 66% of the voting decide to liquidate the corporate debtor, the adjudicating authority is to pass the liquidation order. Section 33(5) may be noticed at this stage:

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] “33 (5) Subject to section 52, when a liquidation order has been passed, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted by or against the corporate debtor: Provided that a suit or other legal proceeding may be instituted by the liquidator, on behalf of the corporate debtor, with the prior approval of the Adjudicating Authority.

An explanation has been added to Section 33(2)of the Code. “Explanation - For the purpose of this sub-section, it is hereby declared that the committee of creditors may take the decision to liquidate the corporate debtor, any time after constitution under sub-section (1) of Section 21 and before the confirmation of the resolution plan, including at any time before the preparation of the information memorandum.”

THE REAL ESTATE (REGULATION AND DEVELOPMENT) ACT, 2016 AND ITS SCHEME (HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS ‘RERA’, FOR SHORT).

81. The Real Estate Regulation and Development Bill was introduced in the Rajya Sabha in 2013. Noticing the fact that though the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is available as a Forum in the real estate market for the buyers, the recourse is only curative and is not adequate to address all the concerns of the buyers and promoters in the said sector, it was felt that there should be a central legislation in the interest of effective consumer protection, uniformity and standardization of business practices and transactions in the real estate sector. The Bill was passed by both the Houses of Parliament and received the assent of the President of India on the 25.03.2016. By 01.05.2017, the provisions of the Act came into force, even though, certain Sections have come into force earlier on 01.05.2016. 82. We may advert to the following definition clauses. Section 2(b) defines ‘advertisement’, as follows: “2(b) “advertisement” means any document described or issued as advertisement through any medium and includes any notice, circular or other documents or publicity in any form, informing persons about a real estate project, or offering for sale of a plot, building or apartment or inviting persons to purchase in any manner

such plot, building or apartment or to make advances or deposits for such purposes;” 83. Section 2(c) defines ‘agreement for sale’, as follows:

“2(c) “agreement for sale” means an agreement entered into between the promoter and the allottee;” 84. Section 2(d), which is at the centerstage of the controversy, defines the word ‘allottee’, which reads as follows:

“2(d) “allottee” in relation to a real estate project, means the person to whom a plot, apartment or building, as the case may be, has been allotted, sold (whether as freehold or leasehold) or otherwise transferred by the promoter, and includes the person who subsequently acquires the said allotment through sale, transfer or otherwise but does not include a person to whom such plot, apartment or building, as the case may be, is given on rent;” 85. As can be seen, the word ‘allottee’ includes, plot, apartment or building. The words ‘apartment’ and ‘building’ are defined. Section 2(e) defines the word ‘apartment’ and it reads as follows: “2(e) “apartment” whether called block, chamber, dwelling unit, flat, office, showroom, shop, godown, premises, suit, tenement, unit or by any other name, means a separate and self-contained part of any immovable property, including one or more rooms or enclosed spaces, located on one or more floors or any part thereof, in a building or on a plot of land, used or intended to be used for any residential or commercial use such as residence, office, shop, showroom or godown or for carrying on any business, occupation, profession or trade, or for any other type of use ancillary to the purpose specified;” 86. Section 2(j) defines the word ‘building’ and it reads as follows:

“2(j) “building” includes any structure or erection or part of a structure or erection which is intended to be used for residential, commercial or for the purpose of any business, occupation, profession or trade, or for any other related purposes;” Section 2(s) defines ‘development’ and it reads as follows:

“2(s) “development” with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means carrying out the development of immovable

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] property, engineering or other operations in, on, over or under the land or the making of any material change in any immovable property or land and includes redevelopment;’’

‘Development works’ is defined in Section 2(t) and it reads as follows: “2(t) “development works” means the external development works and internal development works on immovable property;”

The word ‘promoter’ is defined in 2(zk) and it reads as follows: “2(zk) “promoter” means,— (i)

(ii)

(iii)

a person who constructs or causes to be constructed an independent building or a building consisting of apartments, or converts an existing building or a part thereof into apartments, for the purpose of selling all or some of the apartments to other persons and includes his assignees; or a person who develops land into a project, whether or not the person also constructs structures on any of the plots, for the purpose of selling to other persons all or some of the plots in the said project, whether with or without structures thereon; or any development authority or any other public body in respect of allottees of— (a) buildings or apartments, as the case may be, constructed by such authority or body on lands owned by them or placed at their disposal by the Government; or (b) plots owned by such authority or body or placed at their disposal by the Government, for the purpose of selling all or some of the apartments or plots; or

(iv) an apex State level co-operative housing finance society and a primary co-operative housing society which constructs apartments or buildings for its Members or in respect of the allottees of such apartments or buildings; or (v)

any other person who acts himself as a builder, coloniser, contractor, developer, estate developer or by any other

name or claims to be acting as the holder of a power of attorney from the owner of the land on which the building or apartment is constructed or plot is developed for sale; or (vi) such other person who constructs any building or apartment for sale to the general public. Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, where the person who constructs or converts a building into apartments or develops a plot for sale and the person who sells apartments or plots are different person, both of them shall be deemed to be the promoters and shall be jointly liable as such for the functions and responsibilities specified under this Act or the rules and regulations made thereunder;” Section 2(zn) defines ‘real estate project’, it reads as follows:

“2(zn) “real estate project” means the development of a building or a building consisting of apartments, or converting an existing building or a part thereof into apartments, or the development of land into plots or apartments, as the case may be, for the purpose of selling all or some of the said apartments or plots or building, as the case may be, and includes the common areas, the development works, all improvements and structures thereon, and all easement, rights and appurtenances belonging thereto;” 87. Section 3 prohibits any promoter from advertising, marketing, etc. or even inviting persons to purchase any plot, apartment or building in any real estate project or part of it without there being registration. Sub-Section (2), however, exempts certain projects from the requirement of registration and it reads as follows: “3(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), no registration of the real estate project shall be required—

(a) where the area of land proposed to be developed does not exceed five hundred square meters or the number of apartments proposed to be developed does not exceed eight inclusive of all phases: Provided that, if the appropriate Government considers it necessary, it may, reduce the threshold below five hundred

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] square meters or eight apartments, as the case may be, inclusive of all phases, for exemption from registration under this Act;

(b) where the promoter has received completion certificate for a real estate project prior to commencement of this Act; (c) for the purpose of renovation or repair or redevelopment which does not involve marketing, advertising selling or new allotment of any apartment, plot or building, as the case may be, under the real estate project. Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, where the real estate project is to be developed in phases, every such phase shall be considered a stand alone real estate project, and the promoter shall obtain registration under this Act for each phase separately.” Section 7 contemplates revocation of registration. It is relevant to note Section 7(1), which reads as follows:

“7(1) The Authority may, on receipt of a complaint or suomotu in this behalf or on the recommendation of the competent authority, revoke the registration granted under section 5, after being satisfied that— (a) the promoter makes default in doing anything required by or under this Act or the rules or the regulations made thereunder;

(b) the promoter violates any of the terms or conditions of the approval given by the competent authority; (c) the promoter is involved in any kind of unfair practice or irregularities. Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, the term “unfair practice means” a practice which, for the purpose of promoting the sale or development of any real estate project adopts any unfair method or unfair or deceptive practice including any of the following practices, namely:—

(A) The practice of making any statement, whether in writing or by visible representation which,— (i)

falsely represents that the services are of a particular standard or grade;

(ii)

represents that the promoter has approval or affiliation which such promoter does not have;

(iii)

makes a false or misleading representation concerning the services;

(B) the promoter permits the publication of any advertisement or prospectus whether in any newspaper or otherwise of services that are not intended to be offered; (d) the promoter indulges in any fraudulent practices.” We may also further notice Section 7(3). It read as follows:

“7(3) The Authority may, instead of revoking the registration under sub-section (1), permit it to remain in force subject to such further terms and conditions as it thinks fit to impose in the interest of the allottees, and any such terms and conditions so imposed shall be binding upon the promoter.”

We may further bear in mind Section 8 and it reads as follows:

“8. Obligation of Authority consequent upon lapse of or on revocation of registration.—Upon lapse of the registration or on revocation of the registration under this Act, the Authority, may consult the appropriate Government to take such action as it may deem fit including the carrying out of the remaining development works by competent authority or by the association of allottees or in any other manner, as may be determined by the Authority: Provided that no direction, decision or order of the Authority under this section shall take effect until the expiry of the period of appeal provided under the provisions of this Act: Provided further that in case of revocation of registration of a project under this Act, the association of allottees shall have the first right of refusal for carrying out of the remaining development works.”

88. Section 11 deals with the functions and duties of a promoter and is of considerable importance, and it reads as follows: “11. Functions and duties of promoter —(1) The promoter shall, upon receiving his Login Id and password under clause (a) of sub-section (1) or under sub-section (2) of section 5, as the case

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] may be, create his web page on the website of the Authority and enter all details of the proposed project as provided under subsection (2) of section 4, in all the fields as provided, for public viewing, including—

(a)

details of the registration granted by the Authority;

(b)

quarterly up-to-date the list of number and types of apartments or plots, as the case may be, booked;

(c)

quarterly up-to-date the list of number of garages booked;

(d)

quarterly up-to-date the list of approvals taken and the approvals which are pending subsequent to commencement certificate;

(e)

quarterly up-to-date status of the project; and

(f)

such other information and documents as may be specified by the regulations made by the Authority.

(2) The advertisement or prospectus issued or published by the promoter shall mention prominently the website address of the Authority, wherein all details of the registered project have been entered and include the registration number obtained from the Authority and such other matters incidental thereto.

(3) The promoter, at the time of the booking and issue of allotment letter shall be responsible to make available to the allottee, the following information, namely:— (a) sanctioned plans, layout plans, along with specifications, approved by the competent authority, by display at the site or such other place as may be specified by the regulations made by the Authority; (b) the stage wise time schedule of completion of the project, including the provisions for civic infrastructure like water, sanitation and electricity.

(4) The promoter shall— (a) be responsible for all obligations, responsibilities and functions under the provisions of this Act or the rules and regulations made thereunder or to the allottees as per the

agreement for sale, or to the association of allottees, as the case may be, till the conveyance of all the apartments, plots or buildings, as the case may be, to the allottees, or the common areas to the association of allottees or the competent authority, as the case may be: Provided that the responsibility of the promoter, with respect to the structural defect or any other defect for such period as is referred to in sub-section (3) of section 14, shall continue even after the conveyance deed of all the apartments, plots or buildings, as the case may be, to the allottees are executed. (b) be responsible to obtain the completion certificate or the occupancy certificate, or both, as applicable, from the relevant competent authority as per local laws or other laws for the time being in force and to make it available to the allottees individually or to the association of allottees, as the case may be; (c) be responsible to obtain the lease certificate, where the real estate project is developed on a leasehold land, specifying the period of lease, and certifying that all dues and charges in regard to the leasehold land has been paid, and to make the lease certificate available to the association of allottees; (d) be responsible for providing and maintaining the essential services, on reasonable charges, till the taking over of the maintenance of the project by the association of the allottees; (e) enable the formation of an association or society or cooperative society, as the case may be, of the allottees, or a federation of the same, under the laws applicable: Provided that in the absence of local laws, the association of allottees, by whatever name called, shall be formed within a period of three months of the majority of allottees having booked their plot or apartment or building, as the case may be, in the project; (f) execute a registered conveyance deed of the apartment, plot or building, as the case may be, in favour of the allottee

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] along with the undivided proportionate title in the common areas to the association of allottees or competent authority, as the case may be, as provided under section 17 of this Act; (g) pay all outgoings until he transfers the physical possession of the real estate project to the allottee or the associations of allottees, as the case may be, which he has collected from the allottees, for the payment of outgoings (including land cost, ground rent, municipal or other local taxes, charges for water or electricity, maintenance charges, including mortgage loan and interest on mortgages or other encumbrances and such other liabilities payable to competent authorities, banks and financial institutions, which are related to the project): Provided that where any promoter fails to pay all or any of the outgoings collected by him from the allottees or any liability, mortgage loan and interest thereon before transferring the real estate project to such allottees, or the association of the allottees, as the case may be, the promoter shall continue to be liable, even after the transfer of the property, to pay such outgoings and penal charges, if any, to the authority or person to whom they are payable and be liable for the cost of any legal proceedings which may be taken therefor by such authority or person; (h) after he executes an agreement for sale for any apartment, plot or building, as the case may be, not mortgage or create a charge on such apartment, plot or building, as the case may be, and if any such mortgage or charge is made or created then notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, it shall not affect the right and interest of the allottee who has taken or agreed to take such apartment, plot or building, as the case may be; (5) The promoter may cancel the allotment only in terms of the agreement for sale: Provided that the allottee may approach the Authority for relief, if he is aggrieved by such cancellation and such cancellation is not in accordance with the terms of the agreement for sale, unilateral and without any sufficient cause.

(6) The promoter shall prepare and maintain all such other details as may be specified, from time to time, by regulations made by the Authority.” 89. Section 14 declares that the proposed project shall be developed and completed by the promoter in accordance with the sanctioned plans, layout plans and specifications, as approved by the Competent Authorities. 90. Sub-Section (2) of Section 14, reads as follows:

“14. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, contract or agreement, after the sanctioned plans, layout plans and specifications and the nature of the fixtures, fittings, amenities and common areas, of the 16 apartment, plot or building, as the case may be, as approved by the competent authority, are disclosed or furnished to the person who agree to take one or more of the said apartment, plot or building, as the case may be, the promoter shall not make—

(i) any additions and alterations in the sanctioned plans, layout plans and specifications and the nature of fixtures, fittings and amenities described therein in respect of the apartment, plot or building, as the case may be, which are agreed to be taken, without the previous consent of that person:

Provided that the promoter may make such minor additions or alterations as may be required by the allottee, or such minor changes or alterations as may be necessary due to architectural and structural reasons duly recommended and verified by an authorised Architect or Engineer after proper declaration and intimation to the allottee. Explanation.—For the purpose of this clause, “minor additions or alterations” excludes structural change including an addition to the area or change in height, or the removal of part of a building, or any change to the structure, such as the construction or removal or cutting into of any wall or a part of a wall, partition, column, beam, joist, floor including a mezzanine floor or other support, or a change to or closing of any required means of access ingress or egress or a change to the fixtures or equipment, etc.

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

(ii) any other alterations or additions in the sanctioned plans, layout plans and specifications of the buildings or the common areas within the project without the previous written consent of at least two-thirds of the allottees, other than the promoter, who have agreed to take apartments in such building.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this clause, the allottee, irrespective of the number of apartments or plots, as the case may be, booked by him or booked in the name of his family, or in the case of other persons such as companies or firms or any association of individuals, etc., by whatever name called, booked in its name or booked in the name of its associated entities or related enterprises, shall be considered as one allottee only.”

91. A similar Explanation, as found in Section 14, regarding what the word allottee means for the purpose of section 15 is found in Section 15. Section 15 deals with obligations of promoter in the case of transfer of a real estate project to a third party and Section 15(1) reads as follow: “15. Obligations of promoter in case of transfer of a real estate project to a third party.—(1) The promoter shall not transfer or assign his majority rights and liabilities in respect of a real estate project to a third party without obtaining prior written consent from two-third allottees, except the promoter, and without the prior written approval of the Authority: Provided that such transfer or assignment shall not affect the allotment or sale of the apartments, plots or buildings as the case may be, in the real estate project made by the erstwhile promoter. …”

Section 17 (1) of the RERA, reads as follows: “17. Transfer of title.—(1) The promoter shall execute a registered conveyance deed in favour of the allottee along with the undivided proportionate title in the common areas to the association of the allottees or the competent authority, as the case may be, and hand over the physical possession of the plot, apartment of building, as the case may be, to the allottees and the common areas to the association of the allottees or the competent authority, as the case may be, in a real estate project, and the other title documents pertaining thereto within specified period as per sanctioned plans as provided under the local laws:

Provided that, in the absence of any local law, conveyance deed in favour of the allottee or the association of the allottees or the competent authority, as the case may be, under this section shall be carried out by the promoter within three months from date of issue of occupancy certificate”

92. Section 18 deals with the right of the allottee to obtain the amount given by the allottee and even compensation. It reads as follows: “18. Return of amount and compensation.—(1) If the promoter fails to complete or is unable to give possession of an apartment, plot or building,—

(a) in accordance with the terms of the agreement for sale or, as the case may be, duly completed by the date specified therein; or (b) due to discontinuance of his business as a developer on account of suspension or revocation of the registration under this Act or for any other reason, he shall be liable on demand to the allottees, in case the allottee wishes to withdraw from the project, without prejudice to any other remedy available, to return the amount received by him in respect of that apartment, plot, building, as the case may be, with interest at such rate as may be prescribed in this behalf including compensation in the manner as provided under this Act: Provided that where an allottee does not intend to withdraw from the project, he shall be paid, by the promoter, interest for every month of delay, till the handing over of the possession, at such rate as may be prescribed.

(2) The promoter shall compensate the allottees in case of any loss caused to him due to defective title of the land, on which the project is being developed or has been developed, in the manner as provided under this Act, and the claim for compensation under this subsection shall not be barred by limitation provided under any law for the time being in force.

(3) If the promoter fails to discharge any other obligations imposed on him under this Act or the rules or regulations made thereunder or in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement for sale, he shall be liable to pay such compensation to the allottees, in the manner as provided under this Act.”

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

Finally, Section 19 deals with the rights and obligations of an allottee and it reads as follows:

“19. Rights and duties of allottees.—(1) The allottee shall be entitled to obtain the information relating to sanctioned plans, layout plans along with the specifications, approved by the competent authority and such other information as provided in this Act or the rules and regulations made thereunder or the agreement for sale signed with the promoter.

(2) The allottee shall be entitled to know stage-wise time schedule of completion of the project, including the provisions for water, sanitation, electricity and other amenities and services as agreed to between the promoter and the allottee in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement for sale.

(3) The allottee shall be entitled to claim the possession of apartment, plot or building, as the case may be, and the association of allottees shall be entitled to claim the possession of the common areas, as per the declaration given by the promoter under subclause (C) of clause (l) of sub-section (2) of section 4.

(4) The allottee shall be entitled to claim the refund of amount paid along with interest at such rate as may be prescribed and compensation in the manner as provided under this Act, from the promoter, if the promoter fails to comply or is unable to give possession of the apartment, plot or building, as the case may be, in accordance with the terms of agreement for sale or due to discontinuance of his business as a developer on account of suspension or revocation of his registration under the provisions of this Act or the rules or regulations made thereunder.

(5) The allottee shall be entitled to have the necessary documents and plans, including that of common areas, after handing over the physical possession of the apartment or plot or building as the case may be, by the promoter. (6) Every allottee, who has entered into an agreement for sale to take an apartment, plot or building as the case may be, under section 13, shall be responsible to make necessary payments in the manner and within the time as specified in the said agreement for sale and shall pay at the proper time and place, the share of the registration charges, municipal taxes, water and electricity

charges, maintenance charges, ground rent, and other charges, if any. (7) The allottee shall be liable to pay interest, at such rate as may be prescribed, for any delay in payment towards any amount or charges to be paid under sub-section (6).

(8) The obligations of the allottee under sub-section (6) and the liability towards interest under sub-section (7) may be reduced when mutually agreed to between the promoter and such allottee. (9) Every allottee of the apartment, plot or building as the case may be, shall participate towards the formation of an association or society or cooperative society of the allottees, or a federation of the same. (10) Every allottee shall take physical possession of the apartment, plot or building as the case may be, within a period of two months of the occupancy certificate issued for the said apartment, plot or building, as the case may be. (11) Every allottee shall participate towards registration of the conveyance deed of the apartment, plot or building, as the case may be, as provided under sub-section (1) of section 17 of this Act.”

93. The Act contemplates setting-up of a Real Estate Regulatory Authority, a Central Advisory Council and the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal. Offences and penalties are provided for to give teeth to the Act. Section 71 gives the power of adjudication of compensation. Section 72 provides for the factors to be taken into consideration for adjudging the quantum of compensation or interest under Section 71. Section 79 enacts a bar of jurisdiction of the civil court in regard to any matter in which the Authority, the Adjudicating Officer or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by the Act to determine. An injunction cannot be issued by any court or other Authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of the power conferred by or under the Act under the RERA. 94. Section 85 deals with the power to make regulations. Section 85(2) reads as follows inter alia:

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] “85(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such regulations may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely —

xxx xxx

xxx xxx (c) such other information and documents required under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 11; (d) display of sanctioned plans, layout plans along with specifications, approved by the competent authority, for display under clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 11; (e) preparation and maintenance of other details under sub-section (6) of section 11;

Section 88 of RERA, read as follows: “88. Application of other laws not barred.—The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.” It is also important to notice, at once, Section 89 and it reads as follows:

“89. Act to have overriding effect — The provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force.” 95. The only Act, which is repealed is the Maharashtra Housing (Regulation and Development) Act, 2012. 96. A perusal of Section 88 reveals, on the one hand, that the provisions of the RERA, are in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. At the same time, Section 89 provides that the RERA will prevail over any other inconsistent law. The result is that while all cognate laws, which are not inconsistent with RERA will continue to operate within their own sphere, the provisions, which are, however, inconsistent with RERA, will not survive after RERA has come into force.

97. In this regard, we may notice, the Delhi Apartment Ownership Act, 1986. Section 2 deals with the application of the Act and it reads as follows: “2. Application — The provisions of this Act shall apply to every apartment in a multi-storeyed building which was constructed mainly for residential or commercial or such other purposes as may be prescribed, by— (a) any group housing co-operative society; or (b) any other person or authority,

before or after the commencement of this Act and on a free hold land, or a lease hold land, if the lease for such land is for a period of thirty years or more: Provided that, where a building constructed, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, on any land contains only two or three apartments, the owner of such building may, by a declaration duly executed and registered under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), indicate his intention to make the provisions of this Act applicable to such building, and on such declaration being made, such owner shall execute and register a Deed of Apartment in accordance with the provisions of this Act, as if such owner were the promoter in relation to such building.” 98. Section 3(b) defines the word ‘allottee’ as follows:

“3(b) “allottee”, in relation to an apartment, means the person to whom such apartment has been allotted, sold or otherwise transferred by the promoter;” 99. Section 3(c) defines apartment and it reads as follows:

“3(c) “apartment” means a part of any property, intended for any type of independent use, including one or more rooms or enclosed spaces located on one or more floors or any part or parts thereof, in a multi-storeyed building to be used for residence or office or for the practice of any profession, or for the carrying on of any occupation, trade or business or for such other type of independent use as may be prescribed, and with a direct exit to a public street, road or highway, or to a common area leading to such street, road

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

or highway, and includes any garage or room (whether or not adjacent to the multi-storeyed building in which such apartment is located) provided by the promoter for use by the 4 owner of such apartment for parking any vehicle or, as the case may be, for the residence of any domestic aide employed in such apartment;”

100. Section 3(e) defines ‘apartment owner’ and it reads as follows:

“3(d) “apartment number” means the number, letter or combination thereof, designating an apartment; 101. Section 3(f) defines ‘association of apartment owners’ as follows:

“3(e) “apartment owner” means the person or persons owning an apartment and an undivided interest in the common areas and facilities appurtenant to such apartment in the percentage specified in the Deed of Apartment; 102. Section 4, 4(1), (2) and (3), read as follows: “4. Ownership of apartments.—(1) Every person to whom any apartment is allotted, sold or otherwise transferred by the promoter, on or after the commencement of this Act, shall, save as otherwise provided in section 6, and subject to the other provisions of this Act, be entitled to the exclusive ownership and possession of the apartment so allotted, sold or otherwise transferred to him. (2) Every person to whom any apartment was allotted, sold or otherwise transferred by the promoter before the commencement of this Act shall, save as otherwise provided under section 6 and subject to the other provisions of this Act, be entitled, on and from such commencement, to the exclusive ownership and possession of the apartment so allotted, sold or otherwise transferred to him. (3) Every person who becomes entitled to the exclusive ownership and possession of an apartment under sub-section (1) or subsection (2) shall be entitled to such percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities as may be specified in the Deed of Apartment and such percentage shall be computed by taking, as a basis, the value of the apartment in relation to the value of the property. xxx xxx xxx”

103. Section 5 provides that subject to the provisions of Section 6, the apartment owner may transfer his apartment and his right is heritable. 104. Section 14 provides for registration for the deed of apartment, which is to be executed under Section 13.

105. Section 15 declares that there shall be an association of apartment owners in relation to the apartment and property pertaining thereto and for the management of common areas and facilities. Model byelaws are to be framed by the Administrator and the Association of Apartment Owners can make departure from the model byelaws only with the prior approval of the Administrator. 106. There are similar laws made in the States which relate to the right of the apartment owners. We will revert back to the specific questions which have been raised by the petitioners. THE CONTENTIONS

107. The contention which is raised is that under the impugned provisos inserted in Section 7(1) of the Code, an application by an allottee, can be made only if there are hundred allottees or a number representing one-tenth of the total number of allottees, whichever is less, with a further rider that the allottees must be part of the same real estate project. It is contended that the word ‘allottee’ is to be understood in the sense in which the word has been defined in the RERA. If that is so, it is contended that the impugned amendment would be inflicted with the vice of vagueness and it is arbitrary. 108. What is to be meaning of the word ‘allottees’? The following questions are posed:

i. Is the total number of the allottees, to be calculated qua the Units promised? Or

ii. Is it to be based on the number of units constructed or is it to be the number of units allotted or units where the agreement to sell is entered into? 109. There is an information asymmetry. There is no published data available of status of allotted units. No builder shares the information. It is impossible for the buyers to obtain the information. Ten per cent of allotted units, even it is assumed to be qua letter of allotment, is a dynamic

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

figure and keeps changing. A buyer may calculate ten per cent of the hundred units allotted by morning and it may become 110 by night rendering the filing impossible.

110. Further, it is complained that it is not clear as to whether in determining allottees, in a real estate project, whether it is a tower? the entire colonization? Or a SPV? Ten per cent of a real estate allottees could mean ten per cent of the allotted units or ten per cent of the total legal persons, who have bought into the project, particularly, in cases of multiple ownership of the same property. The provision, in fact, renders group members prone to corruption by cash settlement by the builder. The coram will be disrupted, if one or two members are bought of or even legally settled. This will necessitate fresh filing.

FINDINGS 111. We have referred to the definition of the word allottee and real estate project and Section 3 of the Act which requires prior registration. We have also referred to the definition of real estate project. In all these definition clauses, the words ‘as the case may be’ is found after the words plot, apartment or building. Thus, the Act is meant to regulate the dealings in plots, apartments and buildings. A real estate project, in other words, as defined, is the development of a building or apartments or the development of land into plots or apartments. The development is contemplated as being towards selling apartments, plots or buildings. It would also necessarily include common areas. The expression ‘apartment’, as defined in RERA, is a very comprehensive one. It takes in, blocks, chamber, dwelling unit, flat, office, showroom, shop, godown, premises, suite, tenement, unit or by any other name and which is a separate and self-contained part of any immovable property. It includes any one or more rooms or enclosed spaces located on one or more floors or any part thereof, in a building or on a plot of land. It may be used or intended to be used for any residential or commercial use such as residence, office, shop, showroom or godown or for carrying on any business, occupation, profession, trade or any other type of use, which his ancillary.

112. ‘Building’ has been defined as including any structure or erection or part of any structure and intended to be used for residential or commercial purposes, inter alia. Thus, an allotment under RERA can be in relation to a plot, an apartment or a building. In other words, a

1000

project, would be in relation to plots, apartments or buildings. It could also be for a composite one for plots and apartments or for plots and buildings. We have noticed the expansive definition of the word apartment and flats are comprehended within the definition of the word apartment. We have also noticed in this regard, the definition of the word apartment, in the Delhi Apartment Ownership Act, 1986. We have also seen that under the Delhi Apartment Ownership Act, allottee has been defined in relation to an apartment to mean the person to whom such apartment has been allotted, sold or otherwise transferred by the promoter. 113. For appreciating the meaning of the word ‘allottee’, for the purpose of the Code, undoubtedly, it is necessary to travel to Section 2(d) and 2(zn)of RERA for the reason that in Section 5(8)(f) of the Code, the following Explanation was inserted by Act 26 of 2018 w.e.f. 06.06.2018. This provision has been upheld by this Court in Pioneer (supra). “5(8)(f)

xxx

xxx

xxx

Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-clause,— (i) any amount raised from an allottee under a real estate project shall be deemed to be an amount having the commercial effect of a borrowing; and

(ii) the expressions, “allottee” and “real estate project” shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in clauses (d) and (zn) of section 2 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016;” 114. Real estate project may relate to plots, apartments, or buildings or plots/apartments and plots/buildings. As far as the expression ‘allottee’ is concerned, since the Code in the Explanation to Section 5(8)(f), incorporates the definition of the word ‘allottee’ in RERA, for the purpose of the provisos in question, we must necessarily seek light only from the expression ‘allottee’ defined in Section 2(d) of RERA. 115. If we breakdown Section 2(d), it yields the following component parts: i. An allottee may be an allottee of a plot or an apartment or a building. A real estate project may relate to plots or apartments or buildings; or plots/buildings or plots/apartments.

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] ii. An allottee, in the case of an apartment, which expression includes flats, among other structures, would include the following categories of persons. It would include a person to whom the apartment is allotted. It would also include a person to whom the apartment is sold, whether as freehold or leasehold.

1001

iii. Thirdly, it would include a person to whom the promoter has transferred the apartment, otherwise than by way of a sale; iv. Lastly, it would include persons who have acquired the allotment through sale, transfer or otherwise, with the caveat that it will not include a person to whom the apartment is given on rent. Whatever we have mentioned about apartments, is equally true qua allotment of plots or buildings.

A MISCELLANY OF CONTENTIONS REGARDING ALLOTTEES 116. The definition of the word ‘promoter’ in RERA may be noticed in this regard. It includes a person who constructs or causes to be constructed an independent building or apartments or convert an existing building or a part thereof into apartments for the purpose of selling or some of the apartments to other persons. In regard to such a person, it is clear that there is no allotment of any plot as such. It may be another matter that the contract may contemplate the assignment of the undivided interest in the land upon which the construction is made to the allottee but the allottee is the allottee of the building or the apartment as defined in the Act. Coming to clause (ii) of Section 2(zk) defining ‘promoter’, it contemplates a developer who develops land into a project. The promoter in such a case may also put up construction on any of the plots for the purpose of sale either with or without structures thereon. Therefore, this category of promoter and therefore real estate project would be a hybrid project which involves the development of the land into plots sale of plots aloneafter development or sale of the plot with the construction thereon. Coming to clause (iii) of the definition of ‘promoter’ it includes any public body or development authority in respect of allottees of building or apartments constructed by such authority or body on lands owned by them or placed at their disposal by the Government. There may be such promoters who are development authorities or public bodies, if they own plots or have plots at their disposal by the Government which

1002

is then, allotted. The allotment must be for the purpose of selling. The plots and the apartments must be intended for sale. In regard to Apex Level Co-operative Housing Society or Primary Co-operative Housing Society, they are treated as promoters in regard to apartments or buildings for its purpose or in respect of allottees, apartments or buildings. This necessarily mean that in regard to such societies the allottees could be the members or non-members. Clause V also includes person who acts as builder, colonizer, contractor, developer, estate developer or any other name or claiming to be the Power of Attorney of the holder of the land on which the building, apartment constructed or the plot developed for sale. This must be further understood in the light of the definition of the real estate project in Section 2 (zn). It defines as meaning the various activities. It consists of the following: 1. Development of the building 2. A building which consists of apartments

3. Converting an existing building or a part thereof into apartment 4. The development of land into plots or apartments as the case may be.

117. The aforesaid activities must be for the purpose of sale of all or some of the apartments, plot or building along with the common areas and other work and rights. The task of ascertaining who will be an allottee as also the question as to what will be the total number of allottees and therefore what would constitute one-tenth of total number of allottees must depend upon the nature of the real estate project in question. It will depend on what is offered by the promoter under the project. It may be real estate project which seeks to develop a building and sale of the building. It may be a project for the construction of apartments with the agreements to convey the undivided interest of land also. It may be a project which envisages converting an existing building or a part into an apartment. It may be a project for merely development of land into plots and sale of the plotted land as such. It may be also that the same person may also develop either apartments or building to be sold. In this regard we may remember the explanation in Section 2(zk) (vi) defining the word ‘promoter’. The said section reads as under: “(zk) “promoter” means,—

(i) xxx

xxx

xxx

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] (ii) xxx

xxx

xxx

(iii) xxx

xxx

xxx

(iv) xxx

xxx

xxx

(v) xxx

xxx

xxx

(vi) such other person who constructs any building or apartment for sale to the general public. Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, where the person who constructs or converts a building into apartments or develops a plot for sale and the person who sells apartments or plots are different person, both of them shall be deemed to be the promoters and shall be jointly liable as such for the functions and responsibilities specified under this Act or the rules and regulations made thereunder;” 118. Therefore, a conspectus of the provisions would show that having regard to the legislative intention the term ‘allottees’ as defined in Section 2(d) must be understood undoubtedly on its own terms predominantly. But at the same time the other provisions which form part of the Act and therefore the scheme must also be borne in mind. The Argument that the definition of ‘allottee’ suffers from over inclusiveness and under inclusiveness needs to be considered. Under inclusiveness and over inclusiveness are aspects of the guarantee under Article 14. Equals must be treated equally. Unequals must not be treated equally. What constitutes reasonable classification must depend upon the facts of each case, the context provided by the statute, the existence of intelligible differentia which has led to the grouping of the persons or things as a class and the leaving out of those who do not share the intelligible differentia. No doubt it must bear rational nexus to the objects sought to be achieved. 119. Coming to the definition of the word ‘allottee’ it appears to be split up into three categories broadly, they are- plot, apartment and buildings. In the context of the impugned proviso, it must be remembered that if an applicant is able to garner a magical figure of 100 allottees, then he can present the application under Section 7 of the Code. This is for the reason that the further requirement of one-tenth of total number of allottees is meant to apply in a situation only if one-tenth of the total number of allottees is less than 100. This is for the reason that the word

1003

1004

‘whichever‘ has been used. No doubt in the context of one-tenth of the allottees, the greater the number of total number of allottees, the greater will be the number of one-tenth. In other words, if the total number of allottees is less, then, one-tenth of the total number will be less, and if in such circumstances, it is lesser than hundred, such number of allottees can make application under Section 7 under the impugned provisos. Therefore, in calculating the total number of allottees in one sense is a double-edged sword as the more is the numerator, the more will be the resultant figure required under the proviso. 120. Be that as it may, as we have noticed the question must be decided with reference to real nature of the real estate project in which the applicant is an allottee. If it is in the case of an apartment, then necessarily all persons to whom allotment had been made would be treated as allottees for calculating the figure mentioned in the impugned proviso. The word ‘allotment’ does mean allotment in the sense of documented booking as is mentioned in Section 11(1)(b) in regard to apartment or plot with which we are largely concerned. Such detail regarding the quarterly up-to-date list of the number and the types of apartments are to be uploaded as provided in Section 11. It is this information incidentally, which is the reservoir of data which the legislature intends that the allottees can use even though it is not necessarily confined to them. The allottee would also include a person who acquires the allotment either through sale, transfer or otherwise. The transferee of the allotment is contemplated. There can be no difficulty in including such assignee of the allotment as also the allottee for the purpose of complying with the threshold requirement under the impugned proviso. Thus, all allottees and all assignees of allotment would qualify both to be considered for the purpose of calculating the total number of allottees but confined to the particular real estate project and therefore for arriving at the figure of 100 allottees or one-tenth of the allottees as the case may be. Then, there is a third category, which is introduced by the expression ‘sold’ (whether as ‘leasehold’ or ‘freehold’ or otherwise transferred by the Promoter). Here a question may arise, if the word ‘sold’ is applied to the expression ‘plot’, then undoubtedly the transferee would be an allottee. If the sale is to the allottee in a real estate project which is a hybrid project consisting of development of land into plots and also development of buildings as is contemplated under Section 2(zk) then the transferee of the plot undoubtedly would be an allottee. He may have a complaint regarding the default by the promoter in the matter of

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

1005

development of the plot under hybrid project. As far as sale whether ‘freehold’ or ‘leasehold’ of an apartment or a building is concerned, once an apartment or building is sold, it presupposes that the construction of the building or the apartment is complete ordinarily. No doubt, he may also have complaints against the promoter which may be addressed under the RERA. For the purpose of the proviso in question, going by the definition, undoubtedly, such transferee of an apartment or building, is to be treated as an allottee. Let us take an example. A Promoter constructs several apartments. An apartment is defined so as to include ‘flat’. It can be residential or commercial. Assume that the Promoter has constructed and completed construction, five out of the fifteen floors (which constitutes the project), on the basis of the occupation certificate, as different from the completion certificate, as the latter certificate is given only on the completion of the project. He assigns and transfers the apartment to those allottees to whom he allotted the apartment when he has completed the construction. Such transferees would be allottees under the RERA. The question, however, may arise from the point of view of the impugned proviso as to what is the common feature between such an allottee to whom the constructed apartment is already handed over after sale and the allottee of the remaining floors where there is no construction or only construction which is pronouncedly lagging behind the schedule. The question may arise whether banding together such allottees under the definition clause make out the case of over inclusive classification. Are unequals being treated equally?

121. A mere charge of either under inclusiveness or over inclusiveness which is not difficult to make hardly suffices to persuade the court to strike down a law. There is a wide latitude allowed in the legislature in these matters. The examination cannot be extended to find out whether there is mathematical precision or wooden equality established. The working of the statute may produce further issues, all of it may not be fully perceived as which may not be wholly foreseen by the law giver. The freedom to experiment must be conceded to the legislature, particularly, in economic laws. If problems emerge in the working of law and which require legislative intervention, the court cannot be oblivious to the power of the legislative to respond by stepping in with necessary amendment. There is nothing like a perfect law and as with all human institutions there are bound to be imperfections. What is significant is however for the court ruling on constitutionality, the law must present a clear departure from constitutional limits.

1006

122. In the example of an apartment which is sold where the project is not complete, we bear in mind the following features: In such cases if there is insolvency, the project would remain incomplete. Common areas/common facilities would not become available. The feature which attract a buyer is the whole project which is completed. The apartment owner may very well refuse to accept delivery as he may insist upon the completion of the project with all its promised facilities. Section 17 of RERA contemplates the transfer of title to the common areas to the association of allottees. Obviously, such a thing would not be possible ordinarily unless the construction is complete. In other words, unlike an allottee of a different project under the same promoter the different allottees as contained in the definition of the word ‘allottee’ would have room for common complaints. A realistic and pragmatic approach is not to be eschewed or abandoned. Thus, we cannot see merit in the contention. 123. We have noticed Section 11 (1) (b) of RERA. It contemplates details of booking qua apartments and plots. This is sufficient to reject the argument that it could be based on a total number of the units promised. What is required is allotment and not promised flats as per a brochure. It is also not the total constructed units. This is as what is relevant under the impugned provisos read with Section 5(8)(f) explanation and section 2 (d) of RERA read with Section 11(1)(b) and the rules made thereunder is the ‘booking’ of apartments or plots. What is allotted or booked may be more than what is constructed if there is a mismatch at any given point of time. It is the number of units allotted. Now, the allotment and the agreement to sell are not irreconcilable with each other and may signify the same. 124. The further contention that 10 percent is dynamic and what is 1/10 in the morning may fall short by night if more allotment is made, is untenable in law. The provisions of the Companies Act, 1913 (Section 153-C), Section 399 of the Companies Act, 1956 and Section 244 of the Companies Act, 2013 contain similar provisions. The mere difficulties in given cases, to comply with a law can hardly furnish a ground to strike it down. As to what would constitute the real estate project, it must depend on the terms & conditions and scope of a particular real estate project in which allottees are a part of. These are factual matters to be considered in the facts of each case.

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

1007

THE PROBLEM OF DEFAULT AND LIMITATION

125. It is urged on behalf of the petitioners that the provisos requiring support of one hundred persons or one-tenth of the allottees, whichever is lower, is unworkable and arbitrary having regard to the provisions of the Code. There can only be one default in a complaint, it is contended. When the required number of allottees may have to be drawn from allottees who may have entered into agreements with the builder on different dates, the date of default would be different. This would adversely impinge on the absolute right which otherwise exist with an allottee to make an application under Section 7 of the Code.

126. Per contra, the learned Additional Solicitor General would draw attention to Explanation to Section 7(1). She would further contend that as long as there is a default which need not be qua the applicant or applicants, an application would be maintainable and there is no merit in this contention.

127. In this context, it is necessary to recapture Section 4 of the Code. It reads as follows:

“4. (1) This Part shall apply to matters relating to the insolvency and liquidation of corporate debtors where the minimum amount of the default is one lakh rupees: Provided that the Central Government may, by notification, specify the minimum amount of default of higher value which shall not be more than one crore rupees.”

The amount is now fixed at Rs.1 crore. 128. It is thereafter that Section 6 declares that where any corporate debtor commits default, a financial creditor, an operational creditor or a corporate debtor may itself initiate CIRP in the manner provided in Chapter 2. 129. Section 7 continues to declare that a financial creditor either by itself or jointly by other creditors or any other central government notified person, file an application before the Adjudicating Authority, when a default has occurred. It is thereafter that the following Explanation is present, no doubt, after the impugned provisions, after the amendment: “7. (1) xxx

xxx

xxx

1008

Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, a default includes a default in respect of a financial debt owed not only to the applicant financial creditor but to any other financial creditor of the corporate debtor.” 130. The Explanation makes it clear that a financial debt, which is owed to any other financial creditor of the corporate debtor would suffice to make an application on the basis that the default has occurred. Default has been defined in Section 3(12) of the Code as follows: “3(12) “default” means non-payment of debt when whole or any part or instalment of the amount of debt has become due and payable and is not repaid by the debtor or the corporate debtor, as the case may be;” 131. Interpreting these provisions and the Rules as well, this Court in Innoventive (supra), held as follows:

“28. When it comes to a financial creditor triggering the process, Section 7 becomes relevant. Under the Explanation to Section 7(1), a default is in respect of a financial debt owed to any financial creditor of the corporate debtor — it need not be a debt owed to the applicant financial creditor. Under Section 7(2), an application is to be made under sub-section (1) in such form and manner as is prescribed, which takes us to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016. Under Rule 4, the application is made by a financial creditor in Form 1 accompanied by documents and records required therein. Form 1 is a detailed form in 5 parts, which requires particulars of the applicant in Part I, particulars of the corporate debtor in Part II, particulars of the proposed interim resolution professional in Part III, particulars of the financial debt in Part IV and documents, records and evidence of default in Part V. Under Rule 4(3), the applicant is to dispatch a copy of the application filed with the adjudicating authority by registered post or speed post to the registered office of the corporate debtor. The speed, within which the adjudicating authority is to ascertain the existence of a default from the records of the information utility or on the basis of evidence furnished by the financial creditor, is important. This it must do within 14 days of the receipt of the application. It is at the stage of Section 7(5), where the adjudicating authority is to be satisfied

MANISH KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] that a default has occurred, that the corporate debtor is entitled to point out that a default has not occurred in the sense that the “debt”, which may also include a disputed claim, is not due. A debt may not be due if it is not payable in law or in fact. The moment the adjudicating authority is satisfied that a default has occurred, the application must be admitted unless it is incomplete, in which case it may give notice to the applicant to rectify the defect within 7 days of receipt of a notice from the adjudicating authority. Under sub-section (7), the adjudicating authority shall then communicate the order passed to the financial creditor and corporate debtor within 7 days of admission or rejection of such application, as the case may be.”

1009

(Emphasis supplied) 132. It is true that Section 238A (inserted with effect from 06.06.2018) of the Code provides that the provisions of the Limitation Act shall be applicable as far as may be to the proceedings or appeals before the Adjudicating Authority and the NCLAT, as the case may be, inter alia. Interpreting this provision, inter alia, this Court in B.K. Educational Services Private Limited (supra), has held that Article 137 in S

Related judgments

More Supreme Court judgments

Search all Supreme Court and High Court judgments

Reproduced from the official court copy published on eCourts (Indian Court Judgments open dataset, CC-BY-4.0). Not legal advice.