Mr Shanker Mahadevan Iyer v. Deputy Director

Court
High Court of Karnataka
Date of judgment
28 October 2026
Judge
Justice Suraj Govindaraj
Case number
WP No. 34513 of 2024
Result
DISMISSED
Acts & sections
Section 3 PMLA, Section 5 PMLA, Section 2 PMLA, Section 8 PMLA, Section 173 CrPC, Article 226 Constitution, Section 4 PMLA, Section 43 PMLA
Subject
Criminal

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Full judgment

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® IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 28TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ WRIT PETITION NO. 34513 OF 2024 (GM-RES) BETWEEN MR. SHANKER MAHADEVAN IYER S/O LATE SHANKER IYER AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS R/AT 1/D 15-991/31, LAKSHMI SHANKER GREEN FIELD LAYOUT, CHILLMBI MANGALORE, ASHOK NAGAR (MR), DAKSHINA KANNADA KARNATAKA-575006. ...PETITIONER (BY SRI: D.R. RAVISHANKAR., SR. COUNSEL FOR SRI. ABHISHEK MARLA M J., ADVOCATE) AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT MANGALURU SUBZONAL OFFICE 2ND FLOOR, 4-212/16 “VISTAAR” COMMERCIAL COMPLEX, AIRPORT ROAD YEYYADI, KONCHADY MANGALURU-575008 …RESPONDENT (BY SMT. ANUPARNA BORDOLOI., ADVOCATE) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI OR ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE WRIT, ORDER OR DIRECTION AND QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER PASSED BY 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

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RESPONDENT, DATED 29.10.2024 PASSED IN ECIR/MGSZO/04/2022 (ANNEXURE-A) IN RESPECT OF THE SCHEDULE PROPERTIES AND ETC. THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS AND HAVING BEEN RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 29.07.2026, THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ

CAV ORDER

1.

The Petitioner is before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: i) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction and quash the impugned order passed by Respondent, dated 29.10.2024 passed in ECIR/MGSZO/04/2022 (Annexure-A) in respect of the schedule properties. ii) Grant such other reliefs as this Hon’ble Court deems fit to grant in the interest of justice and equity.

2.

The Petitioner is aggrieved by the show cause notice dated 30.11.2024 issued under Section 8 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (for short, ‘PMLA, 2002’) and in that background the Petitioner has sought for the aforesaid reliefs.

3.

The Petitioner claims that he is a proprietor of M/s. S.S.Maritime

which

was

in

business

of

stevedoring and related activities since the year 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

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1990. The Petitioner had, on 09.02.2011, paid a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- to one M/s. Hanuman Minerals for supply of high-grade iron ore. In the month of January 2012, M/s. Hanuman Minerals had approached the Petitioner with assurance to return the entire sum of Rs.25,00,000/- but had also suggested that M/s.S.S.Maritime take up stevedoring in respect of 40000 metric tons (MT) of iron ore at Alcon and Maina Jetties situated in Goa. M/s.Hanuman Minerals thereafter is alleged to

have

paid

30.01.2012,

a

a

sum

of

Rs.10,00,000/-

on

sum

of

Rs.7,00,000/-

on

02.02.2012 as a partial repayment of a sum of Rs.25,00,000/-. There being certain contractual dispute

between

M/s.Hanuman

Minerals

and

M/s.Manipal Global Services Pvt. Ltd (for short, ‘M/s.Manipal Global’) as regards the agreement dated 18.01.2012, M/s.Manipal Global had filed a private complaint in PCR No.23/2017 before the Additional Civil Judge and ACJM, Udupi, which was referred

to

Manipal

Police

investigation.

In

furtherance

of

Station which,

for

Crime

No.90/2017 was registered on 02.06.2017 against

Petitioner

and

others

for

offences

punishable under Sections 120B, 406, 417, 420, 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

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465, 466, 467, 468, 471, 474 and 34 of the IPC, wherein the Petitioner was arraigned as accused no.11. On completion of investigation, charge sheet has been filed wherein the Petitioner has been arraigned as accused no.3.

4.

The aforesaid offences being scheduled offences under paragraph No.1 of Part-A of the Schedule of the PMLA 2002, the Respondent has recorded an ECIR

bearing

No.ECIR/MGSZO/04/2022

on

28.03.2022. Thereafter, on 29.10.2024 vide Order No. 1/24 the properties belonging to the Petitioner as per the schedule to the petition were attached and, in pursuance thereof, a show cause notice dated 30.11.2024 has been issued, which is under challenge. 5.

Sri.D.R.Ravishankar,

learned

Senior

Counsel

appearing for the Petitioner, submits that:

5.1. The Respondent has mechanically attached the properties of the Petitioner without there being any basis. There are no proceeds of crime which the Petitioner has received in pursuance of Crime No.90/2017 registered 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

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against the Petitioner. There are no amounts which have been received by the Petitioner apart from partial repayment of the monies due to the Petitioner.

Even the full amount

due to the Petitioner has not been paid. It was required for the Respondent to have verified if there were any proceeds of crime, identify the same, and thereafter pass an order of attachment. Not doing so would categorically indicate that there is complete non-application of mind. 5.2. His submission is that there is no crime, much less proceeds of crime. The Petitioner is being falsely harassed by the Respondent. There is no categorical identification as to what is proceeds of crime. Merely because some amount had been paid by M/s.Manipal Global to M/s.Hanuman Minerals, and the Petitioner was part of the transaction as a stevedore, the Petitioner is not responsible for any of the criminal actions, if any, by M/s.Hanuman Minerals and/or M/s.Manipal Global. 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

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5.3. Petitioner is a third party who has nothing to do with the said transaction. The Petitioner only had stevedored the transaction. His submission is that even according to the Respondent,

transaction

M/s.Hanuman

Minerals

and

with

subsequently

with M/s.Manipal Global occurred in the year 2011-12, where the property of the Petitioner which has been attached is one which had been purchased between 2004 to 2008, which was much prior to the predicate offence, let alone the proceedings initiated by the Respondent. 5.4. The predicate offence being subsequent to the purchase of the property, the purchase of the property cannot be said to be from the proceeds of crime, and as such, the said property of the Petitioner would not be amenable to attachment proceedings, is the submission.

This

basic

issue

not

being

considered

by

Respondent,

his

submission is that it would indicate absolute non-application of mind. 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

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5.5. His further submission is that the Respondent has, without any cause, rhyme or reason, exercised powers under the PMLA 2002, where the same would not be applicable to the present transaction. His submission is also that merely because certain of the offences which are scheduled to the PMLA 2002

have

been

invoked

against

Petitioner would not ipso facto entail that the Respondent is exercising powers under the PMLA 2002 to attach the properties of the Petitioner. 5.6. He refers to Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA 2002 which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: (u) “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad; Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that "proceeds of crime" include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence. 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

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5.7. By

referring

to

Section

2(1)(u),

his

submission is that the proceeds of crime would have to be any property derived or obtained directly or indirectly by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property.

He

again

reiterates

that

property which has been attached is not derived or obtained directly or indirectly by the Petitioner as a result of any criminal activity relating to any scheduled offence. The

purchase

occurred

of

between

properties

2004

to

having

2008,

scheduled offence having occurred in the year 2011-12, the proceeds of crime can only be subsequent to the said crime and not prior to. Therefore, he submits that, as Section 2(1)(u) is not applicable, the question of the Respondent exercising any powers to attach the property of the Petitioner would not arise. 5.8. In this regard, he refers to the sale deed under which the property bearing Apartment No.M401 was purchased under a registered sale deed dated 15.12.2004 registered as 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

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document No.MGC-1-04805-2004-05 stored in CD No.MGCD19 on 15.12.2004 in the office of the Sub-Registrar in Mangalore Town. 5.9. He also refers to the sale deed under which

property,

namely

non-agricultural

immovable property held on Warg Right in Survey No.23-1A2 of Derebail Village of Mangalore City within Mangalore City SubRegistrar District of DK District, had been purchased under sale deed dated 28.03.2008 registered as Document No.MGC-1-050282008-09 stored in CD No.MGCD88 dated 19.01.2009 in the office of Sub Registrar, Mangalore City. Thus, he submits that both

transactions

having

occurred

under

registered sale deeds; first the apartment having been purchased under a registered sale deed dated 15.12.2004 and secondly, the non-agricultural property having been purchased under a registered sale deed dated 28.03.2008 were much prior to the predicate offence and were not amenable to the attachment as sought to be contended by the Respondent. 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

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5.10. In this regard, he relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pavana

Dibbur

vs.

Directorate

of

Enforcement [(2023) 15 SCC 91], more particularly paragraphs 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29 and 31 thereof which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 12. On a plain reading of Section 3, unless proceeds of crime exist, there cannot be any money-laundering offence. Clause (u) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 PMLA defines “proceeds of crime”, which reads thus: “2. Definitions.—(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires.— *** (u) “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad; Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that “proceeds of crime” include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence.” 13. Clause (v) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 PMLA defines “property” to mean any property or assets of every description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible. To constitute any property as proceeds of crime, it must be derived or obtained directly or indirectly by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The Explanation clarifies that the proceeds of crime include property, not only derived or obtained 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

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from scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence. Clause (u) also clarifies that even the value of any such property will also be the proceeds of crime. Thus, the existence of “proceeds of crime” is sine qua non for the offence under Section 3 PMLA. 15. The condition precedent for the existence of proceeds of crime is the existence of a scheduled offence. On this aspect, it is necessary to refer to the decision of this Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary [Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1] . In para 109 of the said decision [Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1] , this Court held thus : (SCC p. 166) “109. Tersely put, it is only such property which is derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence that can be regarded as proceeds of crime. The authorities under the 2002 Act cannot resort to action against any person for money laundering on an assumption that the property recovered by them must be proceeds of crime and that a scheduled offence has been committed, unless the same is registered with the jurisdictional police or pending inquiry by way of complaint before the competent forum. For, the expression “derived or obtained” is indicative of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence already accomplished. Similarly, in the event the person named in the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence is finally absolved by a court of competent jurisdiction owing to an order of discharge, acquittal or because of quashing of the criminal case (scheduled offence) against him/her, there can be no action for money laundering against such a person or person claiming through him in relation to the property linked to the stated scheduled offence. This interpretation alone can be countenanced on the basis of the provisions of the 2002 Act, in particular Section 2(1)(u) read with Section 3. Taking any other view would be rewriting of these provisions and disregarding the express language of definition clause “proceeds of crime”, as it obtains as of now.” (emphasis in original and supplied) 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

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17. Coming back to Section 3 PMLA, on its plain reading, an offence under Section 3 can be committed after a scheduled offence is committed. For example, let us take the case of a person who is unconnected with the scheduled offence, knowingly assists the concealment of the proceeds of crime or knowingly assists the use of proceeds of crime. In that case, he can be held guilty of committing an offence under Section 3 PMLA. To give a concrete example, the offences under Sections 384 to 389IPC relating to “extortion” are scheduled offences included in Para 1 of the Schedule to PMLA. An accused may commit a crime of extortion covered by Sections 384 to 389IPC and extort money. Subsequently, a person unconnected with the offence of extortion may assist the said accused in the concealment of the proceeds of extortion. In such a case, the person who assists the accused in the scheduled offence for concealing the proceeds of the crime of extortion can be guilty of the offence of money-laundering. Therefore, it is not necessary that a person against whom the offence under Section 3 PMLA is alleged must have been shown as the accused in the scheduled offence. What is held in para 135 of the decision of this Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary [Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1] supports the above conclusion. The conditions precedent for attracting the offence under Section 3 PMLA are that there must be a scheduled offence and that there must be proceeds of crime in relation to the scheduled offence as defined in clause (u) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 PMLA. 18. In a given case, if the prosecution for the scheduled offence ends in the acquittal of all the accused or discharge of all the accused or the proceedings of the scheduled offence are quashed in its entirety, the scheduled offence will not exist, and therefore, no one can be prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 3 PMLA as there will not be any proceeds of crime. Thus, in such a case, the accused against whom the complaint under Section 3 PMLA is filed will benefit from the scheduled offence ending by acquittal or discharge of all the accused. Similarly, he will get the benefit of quashing the proceedings of the scheduled offence. However, an accused in PMLA case who comes into the picture after the scheduled offence is committed by assisting in the concealment or use of proceeds of crime need not be an accused in the scheduled offence. Such an accused 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

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can still be prosecuted under PMLA so long as the scheduled offence exists. Thus, the second contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant on the ground that the appellant was not shown as an accused in the chargesheets filed in the scheduled offences deserves to be rejected. 19. The allegation against the appellant in the complaint is that she purchased the property worth crores, though she did not have the source of income which would generate enough money to buy the subject properties. The allegation against the appellant is that she allowed and facilitated Accused 1 Madhukar Angur, to conceal the siphoned/misappropriated amounts by using her bank account. Another allegation is that she is shown to have purchased the second property from Accused 1, though she did not have the resources to pay the consideration. The allegation is that she allowed Accused 1 to use her bank accounts to facilitate siphoning the proceeds of the crime. Another allegation is that both the first and second properties have been acquired out of the proceeds of crime. The first property, ex facie, cannot be said to have any connection with the proceeds of crime as the acts constituting the scheduled offence took place after its acquisition. The case of the appellant is that she possessed a substantial amount, as can be seen from the declaration made by her under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 in September 2016 and therefore, at the time of the acquisition of the second property, more than sufficient money was available with her to acquire the second property. The issue of whether the appellant used tainted money to acquire the second property can be decided only after the evidence is adduced. This is not a case where any material is placed on record to show that the sale consideration was paid from a particular bank account of the appellant. Therefore, it is not possible to record a finding at this stage that the second property was not acquired by using the proceeds of crime. We also make it clear that we have considered the issue only in the context of the applicability PMLA. We have not dealt with the issues of valuation and legality of the sale deeds. 27. The penal statutes are required to be strictly construed. It is true that the penal laws must be construed according to the legislative intent as 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

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expressed in the enactment. In Chapter 1 of G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretation (15th Edn.), it is observed that: “The intention of the Legislature, thus, assimilates two aspects : In one aspect it carries the concept of “meaning” i.e. what the words mean and in another aspect, it conveys the concept of “purpose and object” or the “reason and spirit” pervading through the statute. The process of construction, therefore, combines both literal and purposive approaches. In other words the legislative intention i.e. the true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is directed.” In the words of A. Driedger, The Construction of Statutes, 2nd Edn, 1983:“The words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the Scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intent of Parliament. This formulation later received the approval of the Supreme Court and was called the “cardinal principle of construction”.” In both constitutional and statutory interpretation, the court is supposed to exercise discretion in determining the proper relationship between the subjective and objective purposes of the law and help the law achieve its purpose.” (emphasis supplied) 28. While giving effect to the legislature's intention, if two reasonable interpretations can be given to a particular provision of a penal statute, the Court should generally adopt the interpretation that avoids the imposition of penal consequences. In other words, a more lenient interpretation of the two needs to be adopted. 29. The legislative intent which can be gathered from the definition of “scheduled offence” under clause (y) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 PMLA is that every crime which may generate proceeds of crime need not be a scheduled offence. Therefore, only certain specific offences have been included in the Schedule. Thus, if the submissions of the learned Additional Solicitor General are accepted, the Schedule will become meaningless or redundant. The reason is that even if an 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

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offence registered is not a scheduled offence, the provisions of PMLA and, in particular, Section 3 will be invoked by simply applying Section 120-B. If we look at Section 120-B, only because there is a conspiracy to commit an offence, the same does not become an aggravated offence. The object is to punish those involved in conspiracy to commit a crime, though they may not have committed any overt act that constitutes the offence. Conspiracy is an agreement between the accused to commit an offence. If we look at the punishments provided under Section 120-B, it becomes evident that it is not an aggravated offence. It only incorporates the principle of vicarious liability. If no specific punishment is provided in the statute for conspiracy to commit a particular offence, Section 120B treats a conspirator of the main accused as an abettor for the purposes of imposing the punishment. The interpretation suggested by ED will defeat the legislative object of making only a few selected offences as scheduled offences. If we accept such an interpretation, the statute may attract the vice of unconstitutionality for being manifestly arbitrary. It cannot be the legislature's intention to make every offence not included in the Schedule a scheduled offence by applying Section 120-B. Therefore, in our view, the offence under Section 120-BIPC included in Part A of the Schedule will become a scheduled offence only if the criminal conspiracy is to commit any offence already included in Parts A, B or C of the Schedule. In other words, an offence punishable under Section 120-BIPC will become a scheduled offence only if the conspiracy alleged is of committing an offence which is otherwise a scheduled offence. 31. While we reject the first and second submissions canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, the third submission must be upheld. Our conclusions are: 31.1. It is not necessary that a person against whom the offence under Section 3 PMLA is alleged, must have been shown as the accused in the scheduled offence; 31.2. Even if an accused shown in the complaint under PMLA is not an accused in the scheduled offence, he will benefit from the acquittal of all the accused in the scheduled offence or discharge of all the accused in the 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

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scheduled offence. Similarly, he will get the benefit of the order of quashing the proceedings of the scheduled offence; 31.3. The first property cannot be said to have any connection with the proceeds of the crime as the acts constituting scheduled offence were committed after the property was acquired; 31.4. The issue of whether the appellant has used tainted money forming part of the proceeds of crime for acquiring the second property can be decided only at the time of trial; and 31.5. The offence punishable under Section 120-BIPC will become a scheduled offence only if the conspiracy alleged is of committing an offence which is specifically included in the Schedule. … Emphasis supplied by this Court

5.11. By relying on Pavana Dibbur, learned Senior Counsel

submits

that

existence

of

proceeds of crime is an essential condition for attracting Section 3 of the PMLA. Unless

property

in

question

is

derived

or

obtained, directly or indirectly, from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, it cannot be treated as proceeds of crime. Therefore, the existence of a

scheduled

offence and proceeds of crime arising from such offence are necessary to sustain a prosecution under the PMLA. 5.12. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the proceedings under the PMLA cannot be 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

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sustained independently of the scheduled offence. If all the accused in the scheduled offence are acquitted or discharged, or if the proceedings relating to that offence are quashed in their entirety, the scheduled offence ceases to exist in the eye of law. In such

circumstances,

there

can

be

no

prosecution under Section 3 of the PMLA, as the essential basis for alleging the existence of proceeds of crime would no longer remain. 5.13. Learned Senior Counsel also relies upon the finding of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that property acquired before the commission of the acts constituting the scheduled offence cannot be treated as proceeds of crime merely on that account. The prosecution must establish the necessary link between the property and the criminal activity relating to

scheduled

offence.

The

mere

acquisition or possession of property, without such a link, would not by itself be sufficient to bring the property within the definition of proceeds of crime. 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

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5.14. It is further submitted that the provisions of the PMLA, being penal in nature, must be interpreted strictly. Where two reasonable interpretations

of

a

penal

provision

are

possible, the interpretation that avoids the imposition of penal consequences should ordinarily be preferred. The provisions of the Act cannot be extended beyond their plain meaning so as to bring within their scope conduct

which

legislature

has

not

expressly included. 5.15. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that an offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code does not, by itself, become a scheduled offence under the PMLA in every case. Such conspiracy

would

constitute

a

scheduled

offence only where the alleged conspiracy relates to the commission of an offence specifically included in the Schedule to the PMLA. Any wider interpretation would defeat the legislative intention of including only specified offences in the Schedule. 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

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5.16. On the strength of the aforesaid decision, learned Senior Counsel submits that the continuation of proceedings under the PMLA must

be

examined

in

light

of

existence of a scheduled offence, the alleged proceeds

of

crime

and

connection

between such proceeds and the criminal activity in question. Unless these essential requirements are satisfied, the provisions of the PMLA cannot be invoked merely on the basis

of

suspicion

or

existence

of

property whose source is questioned. 5.17. The learned Senior Counsel relies on the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala in the case of Satish Motilal Bidri vs. Union of India [2024 SCC OnLine, Ker 3410], more particularly paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 16, 17

and

thereof,

which

are

reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 13. Section 5 of PMLA authorizes attachment of proceeds of crime. The definition of the term ‘proceeds of crime’ explicitly states that when the proceeds of a crime is a property, such property must have been obtained or derived as a result of any criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. No doubt, even if the property was obtained indirectly, it can still be regarded as proceeds of crime. Assuming that a property derived out of a criminal activity mentioned is not available, still, attachment can be 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

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effected to the extent of the value of such property. The term ‘value’ in section 2(1)(u) can only mean the monetary worth of the property that was derived from the criminal activity. If the attachment is to be effected to the extent of the monetary worth of a property which was not derived out of the criminal activity, then PMLA mandates that the property derived out of such criminal activity be taken out of India or is held outside the country. In other words, the only power to proceed against a property of equivalent value, which has no link with the predicate offence is, when the property was taken out or held out of India. Therefore, except when the property derived out of the criminal activity is not inside the country, can the provisional attachment be effected on a property purchased prior to such criminal activity. 14. In this context, it is appropriate to refer to the decision in Seema Garg v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement (2020 SCC OnLine P&H 738), wherein the High Court of Punjab and Haryana elaborately considered the concept of proceeds of crime and held that property purchased prior to the commission of scheduled offence, does not fall within the ambit of the first limb of the definition of proceeds of crime, though it certainly falls within the purview and ambit of the third limb of the definition. The Andhra Pradesh High Court has also observed along the same lines in Satyam Computer Services Limited v. Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India (2018 SCC OnLine Hyd 787) wherein it was observed that PMLA being a statute which deals with substantive rights, cannot have a retrospective effect. However, the Delhi High Court had taken a differing stance in The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Delhi v. Axis Bank (Crl.A. No. 143/2018), where it was observed that the term value of property must be understood to have been used in the same sense as the third limb. With respects, I am unable to subscribe to the views of the Delhi High Court and on the other hand wholly concur with the views of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and that of Andhra Pradesh. 15. I am further fortified in the above view that I have taken in view of the observations of the Supreme Court as well. In the decision in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India [2022 SCC OnLine SC 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

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929], it has been held in paragraph numbers 295 and 296 that “The precondition for being proceeds of crime is that the property has been derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. ………….Be it noted that the attachment must be only in respect of property which appears to be proceeds of crime and not all the properties belonging to the concerned person who would eventually face the action of confiscation of proceeds of crime, including prosecution for offence of money-laundering. As mentioned earlier, the relevant date for initiating action under the 2022 Act - be it of attachment and confiscation or prosecution, is linked to the inclusion of the offence as scheduled offence and of carrying on the process or activity in connection with the proceeds of crime after such date. The pivot moves around the date of carrying on the process and activity connected with the proceeds of crime; and not the date on which the property has been derived or obtained by the person concerned as a result of any criminal activity relating to or relatable to the scheduled offence.” 16. Apart from the above, in Pavana Dibbur v. Directorate of Enforcement (2023 SCC OnLine SC 1586), it has been observed as follows: “Another allegation is that both the first and second properties have been acquired out of the proceeds of crime. The first property, exfacie cannot be said to have any connection with the proceeds of crime as the acts constituting the scheduled offence took place after its acquisition. …………This is not a case where any material is placed on record to show that the sale consideration was paid from a particular bank account of the appellant. Therefore, it is not possible to record a finding at this stage that the second property was not acquired by using the proceeds of crime.” (emphasis supplied). 17. The aforesaid observations indicate that the properties that can be proceeded against, exercising the powers of attachment must be those that have been acquired utilising the proceeds of crime. The contention of the learned counsel for the Respondents that the term proceeds of crime will also include the value of the property which had been acquired even 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 22 HC-KAR

earlier is, according to me, too far-fetched and will not be justifiable in the light of the constitutional provisions of fairness and reasonableness. It is also necessary to observe at this juncture that the purpose of the PMLA is to remove tainted money and also to initiate proceedings against the proceeds of crime which have been transformed or converted into other property or intermingled with legitimate sources and then the value of the intermingled gain will assume the colour of proceeds of crime. Such a provision cannot be used to enable the authorities to proceed against properties that are unconnected with any of the criminal activity in question. 18. Viewed in the above perspective, as the provisionally attached immovable property was purchased in 2004 - more than a decade and a half before the predicate offence was allegedly committed, the order attaching the immovable property is exfacie, ultra vires the powers of the statute and totally illegal and arbitrary to the extent of the said attachment. Since ex facie illegal acts can be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy, this Court is of the view that the provisional attachment of the immovable property as seen from schedule A to Exhibit P11 order dated 22.05.2024 is liable to be set aside. However, as relating to the provisional attachment mentioned in schedule B to Exhibit P11, i.e. those relating to the amount in the bank accounts - the Petitioner has an effective alternative remedy provided by the statute. … Emphasis supplied by this Court

5.18. By

relying

on

Satish

Motilal

Bidri,

his

submission is that the provisional attachment of the Petitioner’s properties is unsustainable, as both the properties were purchased much before the alleged scheduled offence. The 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 23 HC-KAR

Petitioner purchased Apartment No. M401 under

a

registered

15.12.2004

and

sale

deed

dated

non-agricultural

immovable property situated in Survey No. 23-1A2 of Derebail Village, Mangalore, under a registered sale deed dated 28.03.2008. The alleged transactions involving M/s. Hanuman Minerals and M/s. Manipal Global relate to the period 2011-12. Therefore, according to learned Senior Counsel, the properties in question could not have been acquired from the proceeds of the alleged criminal activity, which allegedly took place several years after their purchase. 5.19. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that

Respondent

has

not

identified

any

proceeds of crime received by the Petitioner or placed any material to establish that the properties in question were acquired, directly or

indirectly,

from

such

proceeds.

The

Petitioner’s case is that the amounts received from M/s. Hanuman Minerals were only part repayments of the sum of Rs. 25,00,000/paid by him on 09.02.2011 towards the supply of high-grade iron ore. It is contended 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 24 HC-KAR

that

Petitioner

was

engaged

in

stevedoring activities and that the mere fact that he was involved in the commercial transactions in question does not establish that the properties acquired by him in 2004 and 2008 constitute proceeds of crime. 5.20. Relying

on

Motilal

Bidri,

observations learned

in

Satish

Senior

Counsel

submits that the expression ‘proceeds of crime’ under Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA cannot be interpreted to permit attachment of any property belonging to the person proceeded

against,

irrespective

of

its

connection with the alleged criminal activity. The power to attach property of equivalent value, which has no connection with the scheduled offence, is also subject to the conditions

specified

in

statutory

definition. In the present case, the properties were

acquired

long

before

alleged

scheduled offence, and the Respondent has not

established

any

link

between

those

properties and the alleged proceeds of crime. 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 25 HC-KAR

5.21. It

is,

therefore,

contended

that

Respondent, merely on the basis of the registration of Crime No. 90/2017 and the subsequent initiation of proceedings under the PMLA, could not have proceeded to attach the Petitioner’s properties without first identifying the alleged proceeds of crime and establishing

necessary

connection

between those proceeds and the properties sought

to

be

attached.

Learned

Senior

Counsel submits that the failure to consider the dates of acquisition of the properties and the absence of material linking them to the alleged criminal activity demonstrate nonapplication of mind. On this basis, he seeks interference with the impugned attachment proceedings

and

consequential

show

cause notice dated 30.11.2024. 5.22. The learned Senior Counsel relies on the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Jayamma vs. The Directorate No.28108/2025

of

Enforcement

[WP

2.6.2026],

more

dtd

particularly paragraphs 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 47, 48, 49 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 26 HC-KAR

and 50 which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 26. Insofar as such contention is concerned, the position of law appears to be well settled and the Apex Court has held that under exceptional circumstances, the available statutory remedies may not be a bar for invocation of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as observed in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others3 (Whirlpool) infra. 27. The Apex Court in Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority and Others4 has observed that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 is plenary in nature and that exercise of power conferred under writ jurisdiction being discretionary and it is for the court to decide as to exercise of such power in appropriate circumstances. The distinction was drawn between the concept of maintainability and entertainability and it was observed that though a writ petition would be maintainable, however, whether the same could be entertained is a matter of judicial discretion and has reiterated the observations in the case of Whirlpool (supra) as well. 29. Hence, it is for the court to decide as to whether it needs to entertain the petition and intervene or allow the proceedings under the statutory scheme to progress to a logical conclusion. 30. The non-following of the procedure prescribed under the Second Proviso to Section 5(1) of PMLA would be a jurisdictional issue that would warrant interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction as being a recognized exemption for waiving of statutory remedy as made out in the case of Whirlpool [(supra) (see exception (iii) at para-6)]. 31. At the outset, it would also be necessary to examine as to whether the statutory scheme does provide for an alternative efficacious remedy of redressal as regards the person aggrieved by not following of the procedure prescribed under second 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 27 HC-KAR

proviso to Section 5 before passing of an order of provisional attachment. 32. The question of relegating an aggrieved person to avail of statutory remedy would be only when the statutory remedy provides for a forum for redressal of grievance. 33. Under the scheme of PMLA, an order of provisional attachment when passed under Section 5 would be followed by forwarding of a copy along with material in possession of the competent Officer to the Adjudicating Authority in terms of Section 5(2). 36. In terms of Section 8 of PMLA, the owner of the property which is subject to an order of provisional attachment is: (i) served with a notice calling upon him to indicate sources of his income, earning or assets, out of which or by means of which he has acquired the property attached; (ii) show-cause why all or any of the properties should not be declared to be properties involved in money laundering and confiscated by the Central Government. 38. However, the procedure contemplated under Section 8 does not provide for testing the validity of the order of provisional attachment for non-following of the procedural requirement under Second Proviso to Section 5 (1). 39. As rightly contended by Sri Jaysham Jayasimha Rao, learned counsel for Petitioner, the procedure prescribed under Section 8 is limited to confirmation of order of attachment, subject to the owner of the property establishing that the acquisition of property which is attached was acquired from sources of his income, earning or assets. 40. The procedural safeguard provided under Second Proviso to Section 5 as in the present case cannot be a matter of enquiry before the Adjudicating Authority. 41. Though Sections 5, 8 and 26 of PMLA do form a self-contained code, however, there are certain procedural aspects leading to exercise of power under Second Proviso of Section 5, the breach of which are not aspects that could be a subject matter of proceedings under Section 8. Accordingly, 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 28 HC-KAR

the power under Section 8 does not permit such enquiry as is raised in the present case. 42. If that were to be so, it cannot be stated that the power conferred under Section 8 could be an efficacious alternative remedy to redress a grievance regarding non-following of restrictions imposed for exercise of power in the context of the Second Proviso to Section 5 of PMLA. Needless to state that, even if it was assumed that there was an alternative remedy in terms of law enunciated in Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. (supra), a writ petition would nevertheless be entertainable though subject to fulfillment of certain criteria. 47. The relevant extract of the statutory provision is as follows:"5. Attachment of property involved in moneylaundering.— [(1)Where the Director or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorised by the Director for the purposes of this section, has reason to believe (the reason for such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession, that— (a) any person is in possession of any proceeds of crime; and (b) such proceeds of crime are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceedings relating to confiscation of such proceeds of crime under this Chapter, he may, by order in writing, provisionally attach such property for a period not exceeding one hundred and eighty days from the date of the order, in such manner as may be prescribed: Provided that no such order of attachment shall be made unless, in relation to the scheduled offence, a report has been forwarded to a Magistrate under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or a complaint has been filed by a person authorised to investigate the offence mentioned in that Schedule, before a Magistrate or court for taking cognizance of the scheduled offence, as the case may be, or a similar report or complaint 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 29 HC-KAR

has been made or filed under the corresponding law of any other country: Provided further that, notwithstanding anything contained in [first proviso], any property of any person may be attached under this section if the Director or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorised by him for the purposes of this section has reason to believe (the reasons for such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession, that if such property involved in money-laundering is not attached immediately under this Chapter, the non-attachment of the property is likely to frustrate any proceeding under this Act.]. (emphasis supplied) 48. Admittedly, in the present case, the requirements of the First Proviso are not met insofar as no Final Report has been forwarded to the Magistrate as regards the predicate offence under Section 173 of Cr.P.C., as on the date of passing of the order of provisional attachment and such aspect is not controverted by the other side. However, the power to pass an order of provisional attachment is conferred upon an Officer of the rank of Director or any other Officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorized by him for the purposes enumerated under Section 5, subject to fulfillment of the following criteria:(i) Has reason to believe which is recorded in writing and on the basis of material in his possession. (ii) That, if such property involved in money laundering is not attached immediately, the non-attachment of property is likely to frustrate any proceedings under the Act. 49. Undoubtedly, in the present case, it is power exercised under the Second Proviso to Section 5 (1) which is called in question. 50. It is necessary to also note that the Respondent has asserted at the time of arguments that Lokayukta Police were still investigating as regards the predicate offences against the other accused as 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 30 HC-KAR

on the date of passing of the provisional order of attachment. It was further submitted by the Respondents that though 'B' Report was filed against some of the accused, i.e. accused Nos.1 to 4, the pending investigation against the other accused as at the relevant point of time has in effect indicated the continuance of investigation and pending such investigation power under the Second Proviso to Section 5 of PMLA was sought to be initiated. … Emphasis supplied by this Court

5.23. By relying on Jayamma, learned Senior Counsel submits that the availability of an alternative statutory remedy does not, by itself, bar the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, particularly where the challenge relates to the failure to comply with the mandatory conditions

prescribed

under

Second

Proviso to Section 5(1) of the PMLA. 5.24. Learned Senior Counsel submits that, in the present case, the Petitioner has challenged the provisional attachment of his properties on the ground that the properties were acquired

in

years

2004

and

2008,

whereas the alleged transactions forming the basis of the scheduled offence relate to the period 2011-12. It is contended that the 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 31 HC-KAR

Respondent invoked the powers under the Second Proviso to Section 5(1) of the PMLA without properly considering the nature of the properties, the dates of their acquisition and the absence of any material establishing their connection with the alleged proceeds of crime. 5.25. Relying

on

Jayamma,

learned

Senior

Counsel further submits that the exercise of power under the Second Proviso to Section 5(1) is subject to specific conditions, namely, that the authorised officer must have reasons to believe, recorded in writing and based on material in his possession, that the property involved in money laundering is required to be attached immediately and that failure to do so is likely to frustrate proceedings under the PMLA. These conditions are not mere formalities but are restrictions governing the exercise

of

power

of

provisional

attachment. 5.26. It is further submitted that the procedure contemplated under Section 8 of the PMLA does not provide an effective remedy for 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 32 HC-KAR

examining

a

grievance

relating

to

non-

compliance with the conditions governing the exercise of power under the Second Proviso to

Section

5(1).

The

proceedings

under

Section 8 are primarily concerned with the confirmation of the provisional attachment and

question

whether

attached

property has been acquired from legitimate sources.

Therefore,

according

to

learned

Senior Counsel, relegating the Petitioner to the proceedings under Section 8 would not adequately address his specific grievance regarding the legality of the exercise of power under the Second Proviso to Section 5(1). 5.27. Applying

aforesaid

principles

to

present case, learned Senior Counsel submits that

Respondent

demonstrate,

on

was

required

basis

of

to

material

available on record, not only the existence of

requisite

grounds

for

provisional

attachment

but

also

necessity

for

immediate

attachment

to

prevent

frustration of proceedings under the PMLA. The mere registration of Crime No. 90/2017, 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 33 HC-KAR

subsequent

initiation

of

proceedings

under the PMLA or the fact that the Petitioner has been arrayed as an accused in the scheduled offence would not, by themselves, dispense with the statutory requirements governing the exercise of such power. 5.28. It is, therefore, contended that, in view of the specific challenge raised to the exercise of jurisdiction under the Second Proviso to Section 5(1) of the PMLA, the Petitioner is entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,

notwithstanding

availability

of

proceedings under Section 8 of the PMLA. Learned Senior Counsel accordingly seeks interference with the impugned provisional attachment

and

consequential

proceedings initiated against the Petitioner. 5.29. The learned Senior Counsel submits on facts that M/s.Hanuman Minerals and M/s.Phoenix International

and

their

facilitator

firm

M/s.Sino Podar Trade Ltd. had entered into an

agreement

with

M/s.Manipal

Global

regarding export of 40,000 metric tons of 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 34 HC-KAR

iron ore to a Hong Kong based firm named M/s.Devi Resources Ltd. from Alcon and Maina Jetty of Goa port. The allegation is that

Petitioner

had

issued

two

stock

certificates to M/s.Manipal Global certifying that

his

proprietary

concern,

M/s.S.S.Maritime was holding 40,000 MT iron ore and it is on that basis that M/s.Manipal Global had entered into a transaction with the aforesaid persons. The allegation made by M/s.Manipal Global in PCR No.23/2017, is that

representative

M/s.Hanuman

Minerals, M/s.Sino Podar Trade Ltd., had on 07.11.2011 visited the office of M/s.Manipal Global and had entered into an agreement on 18.01.2012 as indicated supra. 5.30. Accused no.(2), accused No.(5) and accused No.(7) therein had agreed to supply 40,000 metric tons of iron ore of a Fe quality 50%. Instead of supplying 50% Fe content iron ore, supply was made of 43.9% Fe content iron ore, which according to the complainant resulted in a loss of Rs.9,20,00,000/-. On that basis, alleging the various offences indicated supra, the PCR had been filed. The 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 35 HC-KAR

investigation

was

handed

over

to

CID,

Bangalore, who had filed a charge sheet on 30.12.2021. 5.31. His submission is that merely because there was a charge sheet filed in that matter, the Petitioner could not be roped into the offence requiring invocation of Section 5. He again refers to clause (u) of sub-section of section

of

PMLA

2002,

which

has

been

reproduced hereinabove. His submission is that the proceeds of crime would only apply to property derived or obtained directly or indirectly by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to the scheduled offence. 5.32. As regards the second part of the provision, his submission is that the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad could be said to be proceeds of crime. There is no property held by the Petitioner outside the country or abroad in the second portion of clause (u) of sub-section (1) of 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 36 HC-KAR

section 2, as regard to attachment of value of any property would not be applicable. On the above grounds, he submits that the order of attachment suffers from lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Respondent. When the Respondent has no jurisdiction over the particular property attached on account of it not being proceeds of crime, there is no authority or jurisdiction vested with the Respondent to attach a property which does not come within the definition of proceeds of crime under clause (u) of sub-section (1) of section 2. On that ground, he submits there being a lack of foundational jurisdiction, Respondent could not have attached the property of the Petitioner, purchased much prior to the predicate offence, and on that ground, he submits that the writ petition is required to be allowed. 6.

Ms.Anuparna Bordoloi, learned counsel for the Respondent submits that: 6.1. There being a charge sheet which had been laid upon investigation by the CID, where the Petitioner was arraigned as an accused, the 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 37 HC-KAR

said offences being predicate offences, the Respondent was required to exercise his jurisdiction under Section 5 of the PMLA 2002. 6.2. She relies on Section 5 of the Act which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:5. Attachment of property involved in moneylaundering.—(1)Where the Director or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorised by the Director for the purposes of this section, has reason to believe (the reason for such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession, that— (a) any person is in possession of any proceeds of crime; and (b) such proceeds of crime are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceedings relating to confiscation of such proceeds of crime under this Chapter, he may, by order in writing, provisionally attach such property for a period not exceeding one hundred and eighty days from the date of the order, in such manner as may be prescribed: Provided that no such order of attachment shall be made unless, in relation to the scheduled offence, a report has been forwarded to a Magistrate under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or a complaint has been filed by a person authorised to investigate the offence mentioned in that Schedule, before a Magistrate or court for taking cognizance of the scheduled offence, as the case may be, or a similar report or complaint has been made or filed under the corresponding law of any other country: 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 38 HC-KAR

Provided further that, notwithstanding anything contained in 1[first proviso], any property of any person may be attached under this section if the Director or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorised by him for the purposes of this section has reason to believe (the reasons for such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession, that if such property involved in money-laundering is not attached immediately under this Chapter, the non-attachment of the property is likely to frustrate any proceeding under this Act: Provided also that for the purposes of computing the period of one hundred and eighty days, the period during which the proceedings under this section is stayed by the High Court, shall be excluded and a further period not exceeding thirty days from the date of order of vacation of such stay order shall be counted. (2) The Director, or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director, shall, immediately after attachment under sub-section (1), forward a copy of the order, along with the material in his possession, referred to in that sub-section, to the Adjudicating Authority, in a sealed envelope, in the manner as may be prescribed and such Adjudicating Authority shall keep such order and material for such period as may be prescribed. (3) Every order of attachment made under subsection (1) shall cease to have effect after the expiry of the period specified in that sub-section or on the date of an order made under sub-section (3) of section 8, whichever is earlier. (4) Nothing in this section shall prevent the person interested in the enjoyment of the immovable property attached under sub-section (1) from such enjoyment. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, “person interested”, in relation to any immovable property, includes all persons claiming or entitled to claim any interest in the property. (5) The Director or any other officer who provisionally attaches any property under sub-section (1) shall, 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 39 HC-KAR

within a period of thirty days from such attachment, file a complaint stating the facts of such attachment before the Adjudicating Authority.

6.3. By referring to Section 5 of the PMLA, learned counsel submits that the authorised officer is empowered to provisionally attach a property where he has reason to believe, on the basis of material in his possession and for reasons recorded in writing, that any person is in possession of proceeds of crime and that such proceeds are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in a manner that may frustrate the proceedings relating to their confiscation. 6.4. The

provision

authorised

further

officer,

in

empowers

circumstances

specified under the Second Proviso to Section 5(1), to attach property immediately where non-attachment

is

likely

to

frustrate

proceedings under the Act. 6.5. Learned counsel further submits that the object

of

provisional

attachment

is

to

preserve the property during the pendency of proceedings under the PMLA and to prevent 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 40 HC-KAR

its

disposal,

manner

transfer

or

may

defeat

that

alienation

in

a

eventual

proceedings for confiscation. If the property is permitted to be transferred during the pendency of the proceedings, third parties may acquire an interest in the property and may consequently be drawn into further litigation. 6.6. The power of provisional attachment is, therefore,

intended

to

prevent

such

eventualities and to preserve the property until the proceedings under the Act reach their conclusion. 6.7. It

is

accordingly

contended

Respondent

has

exercised

provisional

attachment

to

that

power

of

safeguard

property and ensure that the proceedings under the PMLA are not rendered ineffective by any subsequent transfer or alienation. Learned counsel submits that the action of the Respondent is intended to preserve the property pending adjudication and to prevent any act that may frustrate the proceedings 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 41 HC-KAR

relating

to

confiscation

of

alleged

proceeds of crime. 6.8. She

submits that the attachment under

Section 5 being provisional in nature, in terms of sub-section (5) of Section 5, the Director

or

provisionally

any

other

attaches

any

officer property

who is

required to, within a period of 30 days from such attachment, file a complaint stating the facts

of

such

attachment

before

Adjudicating Authority, which has been done and therefore, she submits that the Petitioner has an alternate efficacious remedy in terms of adjudication under Section 8 and the present writ petition is not maintainable on account thereof. 6.9. The matter pending before the Adjudicating Authority, the Petitioner has been served in those proceedings. It is for the Petitioner to appear before the authority and place his submission before the Adjudicating Authority to consider the same. 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 42 HC-KAR

6.10. In this regard, she relies on Section 8 of the PMLA 2002 which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 8. Adjudication. (1) On receipt of a complaint under sub-section (5) of section 5, or applications made under sub-section (4) of section 17 or under sub-section (10) of section 18, if the Adjudicating Authority has reason to believe that any person has committed an [offence under section 3 or is in possession of proceeds of crime] [Substituted by Act 21 of 2009, Section 5, for "offence under section 3".], it may serve a notice of not less than thirty days on such person calling upon him to indicate the sources of his income, earning or assets, out of which or by means of which he has acquired the property attached under sub-section (1) of section 5, or, seized [or frozen] [Inserted by Act No. 2 OF 2013] under section 17 or section 18, the evidence on which he relies and other relevant information and particulars, and to show cause why all or any of such properties should not be declared to be the properties involved in money-laundering and confiscated by the Central Government: Provided that where a notice under this sub-section specifies any property as being held by a person on behalf of any other person, a copy of such notice shall also be served upon such other person: Provided further that where such property is held jointly by more than one person, such notice shall be served to all persons holding such property. (2)The Adjudicating Authority shall, after (a)considering the reply, if any, to the notice issued under sub-section (1); 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 43 HC-KAR

(b)hearing the aggrieved person and the Director or any other officer authorised by him in this behalf; and (c)taking into account all relevant materials placed on record before him, by an order, record a finding whether all or any of the properties referred to in the notice issued under sub-section (1) are involved in money-laundering: Provided that if the property is claimed by a person, other than a person to whom the notice had been issued, such person shall also be given an opportunity of being heard to prove that the property is not involved in money-laundering. (3)Where the Adjudicating Authority decides under sub-section (2) that any property is involved in money-laundering, he shall, by an order in writing, confirm the attachment of the property made under sub-section (1) of section 5 or retention of property or [record seized or frozen under section 17 or section 18 and record a finding to that effect, whereupon such attachment or retention or freezing of the seized or frozen property] [Substituted for the words "record seized under section 17 or section 18 and record a finding to that effect, such attachment or retention of the seized property" by Act No. 2 OF 2013] or record shall (a)continue during [investigation for a period not exceeding [three hundred and sixty-five days] [Inserted by Finance Act, 2018 (Act No. 13 of 2018) dated 29.3.2018.] or] the pendency of the proceedings relating to any [offence under this Act before a court or under the corresponding law of any other country, before the competent court of criminal jurisdiction outside India, as the case may be; and] [Substituted for the words "scheduled offence before a court; and" by Act No. 2 OF 2013] (b)[ become final after an order of confiscation is passed under sub-section (5) or sub-section (7) of section 8 or section 5 8 B or sub-section (2A) of 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 44 HC-KAR

section 60 by the Adjudicating Authority] [Substituted by Act No. 2 OF 2013]; [Explanation. - For the purposes of computing the period of three hundred and sixty-five days under clause (a), the period during which the investigation is stayed by any court under any law for the time being in force shall be excluded.] [Inserted by Finance Act, 2019 (Act No. 7 of 2019) dated 21.2.2019.] (4)Where the provisional order of attachment made under sub-section (1) of section 5 has been confirmed under sub-section (3), the Director or any other officer authorised by him in this behalf shall forthwith take the [possession of the property attached under section 5 or frozen under sub-section (1A) of section 17, in such manner as may be prescribed: Provided that if it is not practicable to take possession of a property frozen under sub-section (1A) of section 17, the order of confiscation shall have the same effect as if the property had been taken possession of.] [Substituted by Act No. 2 of 2013.] (5)[ Where on conclusion of a trial of an offence under this Act, the Special Court finds that the offence of money-laundering has been committed, it shall order that such property involved in the money-laundering or which has been used for commission of the offence of money-laundering shall stand confiscated to the Central Government. (6)Where on conclusion of a trial under this Act, the Special Court finds that the offence of moneylaundering has not taken place or the property is not involved in money-laundering, it shall order release of such property to the person entitled to receive it. (7)Where the trial under this Act cannot be conducted by reason of the death of the accused or the accused being declared a proclaimed offender or for any other reason or having commenced but could not be concluded, the Special Court shall, on an application moved by the Director or a person claiming to be 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 45 HC-KAR

entitled to possession of a property in respect of which an order has been passed under sub-section (3) of section 8, pass appropriate orders regarding confiscation or release of the property, as the case may be, involved in the offence of money-laundering after having regard to the material before it.] [Substituted by Act No. 2 OF 2013]

6.11. She relies on Section 8 of the PMLA, which prescribes the procedure for adjudication of properties

attached

under

Act.

She

submits that, upon receipt of a complaint under

Section

5(5),

Adjudicating

Authority is required to consider whether there are grounds to proceed against the property alleged to be involved in money laundering. 6.12. Learned counsel submits that the Petitioner has an effective statutory remedy before the Adjudicating Authority and that the present writ

petition

has

been

filed

without

exhausting that remedy. Under Section 8(2), the Adjudicating Authority is required to consider the Petitioner’s reply, afford an opportunity of hearing to the concerned parties and examine the relevant material on 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 46 HC-KAR

record

before

determining

whether

property specified in the notice is involved in money

laundering.

Authority

may

The

Adjudicating

thereafter

confirm

attachment or decline to do so. On this basis, she

contends

that

writ

petition

is

premature. 6.13. Learned

counsel

further

submits

that

confirmation of provisional attachment is a step in aid of the eventual confiscation of the property and serves to preserve the property during the pendency of the proceedings. The ultimate question of confiscation is to be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Upon conclusion of the trial, if the Special Court finds that the offence of money laundering has not been committed or that

property

is

not

involved

in

money

laundering, the property is liable to be released in accordance with Section 8(6). Confiscation would follow only in accordance with

statutory

provisions

requisite findings are recorded. 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

where

- 47 HC-KAR

6.14. She submits that the PMLA, 2002, provides adequate

procedural

safeguards

at

stages of adjudication and trial, and that this Court ought not to interfere at the present stage. According to her, the Petitioner should raise

his

attachment

objections before

concerning

Adjudicating

Authority, which is empowered to consider the reply and the material placed on record. She further contends that entertaining the writ petition at this stage would obstruct or derail

investigation.

ongoing She

adjudication accordingly

and seeks

dismissal of the petition as premature. 6.15. She submits that proceedings are pending under Section 43 (1) of the PMLA 2002 before

Special

Court

in

Special CC

No.53/2025 for offences of money laundering under Section 3 and Section 4 of the PMLA 2002. The Petitioner could also raise the issues raised in the present writ petition and in the said proceedings. 6.16. She submits that a show cause notice has been issued by the Adjudicating Authority 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 48 HC-KAR

under

Section

wherein

Petitioner

himself had furnished his reply. The said reply

has

been

considered

by

Adjudicating Authority and the Adjudicating Authority has come to a conclusion that the Petitioner has cheated M/s.Manipal Global by issuing

bogus

stock

certificates

to

M/s.Manipal Global, certifying that the jetties pertaining to his concern located in Alcon and Maina were having 40,000 metric tons of iron ore fines. As regards which he has received a consideration

of

Rs.17,00,000/-.

The

Petitioner being arrayed as defendant no.3 in those proceedings. Her submission is that though the property has been purchased in the year 2004 and 2008 not from the proceeds of crime. But it is on account of the proceeds of crime being secreted and not being available, the value equivalent to the same has been attached provisionally under Section 5 and confirmed under Section 8. 6.17. The monies which had been received from M/s.Manipal

Global

are

not

available

inasmuch as a sum of Rs.2,30,00,000/- was received

by

M/s.Hanuman

29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

Minerals

from

- 49 HC-KAR

M/s.Manipal,

out

of

which

a

sum

of

Rs.53,80,000/- was withdrawn in cash. An amount of Rs.96,00,000/- was transferred to Phoenix

International.

Out

of

which

Rs.32,55,000/- has been withdrawn in cash. A

further

sum

of

Rs.17,00,000/-

was

transferred to the Petitioner. M/s.Hanuman Minerals, being a proprietary concern of Girish Sangappa, Jaggal, is defendant no.1 in the said proceedings. There are no amounts which

are

available

defendant no.1.

in

account

of

Sri.Rohan Prakash Lotlikar

is the proprietor of Phoenix International who is defendant no.2 in the said proceedings. 6.18. Her submission is that in one of the accounts belonging to Phoenix, there is an amount of Rs.1,40,773/- and in another account an amount of Rs.5,162/- which are available. In respect of the other defendants therein, there are partial sums which are available in the account. No amount is available from the original account received by M/s.Hanuman Minerals

and

transferred

accounts. 29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

to

other

- 50 HC-KAR

6.19. She relies on the judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Sri.Krishna K.M., and others vs. The Directorate of Enforcement and others [WP No.7155/2026 dated 18.03.2026] more particularly paragraphs 2 (ii) and 4 thereof which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 2(ii) The Petitioners' vendor questioned the correctness of the said notification in W.P.No.7102/2023. The said writ petition was allowed and it was held that the Circular dated 14.03.2023 issued by the State Government cannot bar a compromise in O.S.No.348/2020. Accordingly, the endorsement issued by MUDA was set aside. Out of the sites that were identified by MUDA, the owner conveyed one of the sites to the Petitioners in terms of a sale deed dated 19.07.2023. It is contended that this land was mired in a litigation under the provisions of the PMLA and that several proceedings were pending before several authorities and later, only the site allotted to the predecessor of the Petitioners was provisionally attached under Section 5(1) of the PMLA. 4. A perusal of the proceedings initiated against the Petitioners' property shows that it is under Section 5(1) of the PMLA, which is provisional in nature. The right to challenge the order of attachment would arise only after an order is passed under Section 8 of the PMLA. Therefore, this petition is too premature and this Court cannot exercise jurisdiction to set at nought the proceedings for provisional attachment of the property. … Emphasis supplied by this Court

29/10/2026, 13:40, Bengaluru

- 51 HC-KAR

6.20. By

relying

on

Sri.Krishna

K.M.,

her

submission is that the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has held that a provisional order of attachment under Section 5(1) of the PMLA is provisional in nature and that the right to challenge the attachment would arise only after an order is passed under Section 8 of the Act. 6.21. By placing reliance on the said decision, learned counsel submits that the present writ petition, which challenges the provisional attachment

proceedings

before

Adjudicating Authority has passed an order under Section 8, is premature. She therefore contends

that

this

Court

ought

not

to

exercise its writ jurisdiction to interfere with the provisional attachment at this stage and that the Petitioner must pursue the statutory proceedings

before

Adjudicating

Authority. 6.22. She relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement of Delhi vs. Axis Bank and others 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 52 HC-KAR

[2019:DHC:1887], paragraph

171,

more which

is

particularly reproduced

hereunder for easy reference: 171. It will be advantageous to summarise the conclusions reached by the above discussion, as under : (i) The process of attachment (leading to confiscation) of proceeds of crime under the PMLA is in the nature of civil sanction which runs parallel to investigation and criminal action vis-a-vis the offence of money-laundering. (ii) The empowered enforcement officer is expected to assess, even if tentatively, the value of proceeds of crime so as to ensure such proceeds or other assets of equivalent value of the offender of moneylaundering are subjected to attachment, the evaluation being open to modification in light of evidence gathered during investigation. (iii) The empowered enforcement officer has the authority of law in the PMLA to attach not only a "tainted property"—that is to say a property acquired or obtained, directly or indirectly, from proceeds of criminal activity constituting a scheduled offence—but also any other asset or property of equivalent value of the offender of money-laundering, the latter not bearing any taint but being alternative attachable property (or deemed tainted property) on account of its link or nexus with the offence (or offender) of money-laundering. (iv) If the "tainted property" respecting which there is evidence available to show the same to have been derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence is not traceable, or the same for some reason cannot be reached, or to the extent found is deficient, the empowered enforcement officer may attach any other asset ("the alternative attachable property" or "deemed tainted property") of the person accused of (or charged with) offence of money-laundering provided it is near or equivalent in value to the former, 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 53 HC-KAR

the order of confiscation being restricted to take over by the Government of illicit gains of crime. (v) If the person accused of (or charged with) the offence of money- laundering objects to the attachment, his claim being that the property attached was not acquired or obtained (directly or indirectly) from criminal activity, the burden of proving facts in support of such claim is to be discharged by him. (vi) The objective of the PMLA being distinct from the purpose of the RDBA, SARFAESI Act and Insolvency Code, the latter three legislations do not prevail over the former. (vii) The PMLA, by virtue of section 71, has the overriding effect over other existing laws in the matter of dealing with "money-laundering" and "proceeds of crime" relating thereto. (viii) The PMLA, RDBA, SARFAESI Act and Insolvency Code (or such other laws) must co-exist, each to be construed and enforced in harmony, without one being in derogation of the other with regard to the assets respecting which there is material available to show the same to have been "derived or obtained" as a result of "criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence" and consequently being "proceeds of crime", within the mischief of the PMLA. (ix) If the property of a person other than the one accused of (or charged with) the offence of moneylaundering, i. e., a third party, is sought to be attached and there is evidence available to show that such property before its acquisition was held by the person accused of money- laundering (or his abettor), or it was involved in a transaction which had interconnection with transactions concerning moneylaundering, the burden of proving facts to the contrary so as to seek release of such property from attachment is on the person who so contends. (x) The charge or encumbrance of a third party in a property attached under the PMLA cannot be treated or declared as "void" unless material is available to show that it was created "to defeat" the said law, such declaration rendering such property available for 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 54 HC-KAR

attachment and confiscation under the PMLA, free from such encumbrance. (xi) A party in order to be considered as a "bona fide third party claimant" for its claim in a property being subjected to attachment under the PMLA to be entertained must show, by cogent evidence, that it had acquired interest in such property lawfully and for adequate consideration, the party itself not being privy to, or complicit in, the offence of moneylaundering, and that it has made all compliances with the existing law including, if so required, by having said security interest registered. (xii) An order of attachment under the PMLA is not illegal only because a secured creditor has a prior secured interest (charge) in the property, within the meaning of the expressions used in the RDBA and SARFAESI Act. Similarly, mere issuance of an order of attachment under the PMLA does not ipso facto render illegal a prior charge or encumbrance of a secured creditor, the claim of the latter for release (or restoration) from the PMLA attachment being dependent on its bona fides. (xiii) If it is shown by cogent evidence by the bona fide third party claimant (as aforesaid), staking interest in an alternative attachable property (or deemed tainted property), claiming that it had acquired the same at a time around or after the commission of the proscribed criminal activity, in order to establish a legitimate claim for its release from attachment it must additionally prove that it had taken "due diligence" (e. g., taking reasonable precautions and after due inquiry) to ensure that it was not a tainted asset and the transactions indulged in were legitimate at the time of acquisition of such interest. (xiv) If it is shown by cogent evidence by the bona fide third party claimant (as aforesaid), staking interest in an alternative attachable property (or deemed tainted property) claiming that it had acquired the same at a time anterior to the commission of the proscribed criminal activity, the property to the extent of such interest of the third party will not be subjected to confiscation so long as the charge or encumbrance of such third party subsists, the attachment under the PMLA being valid 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 55 HC-KAR

or operative subject to satisfaction of the charge or encumbrance of such third party and restricted to such part of the value of the property as is in excess of the claim of the said third party. (xv) If the bona fide third party claimant (as aforesaid) is a "secured creditor", pursuing enforcement of "security interest" in the property (secured asset) sought to be attached, it being an alternative attachable property (or deemed tainted property), it having acquired such interest from person(s) accused of (or charged with) the offence of money-laundering (or his abettor), or from any other person through such transaction (or inter-connected transactions) as involve(s) criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, such third party (secured creditor) having initiated action in accordance with law for enforcement of such interest prior to the order of attachment under the PMLA, the directions of such attachment under the PMLA shall be valid and operative subject to satisfaction of the charge or encumbrance of such third party and restricted to such part of the value of the property as is in excess of the claim of the said third party. (xvi) In the situations covered by the preceding two sub-paragraphs, the bona fide third party claimant shall be accountable to the enforcement authorities for the "excess" value of the property subjected to the PMLA attachment. (xvii) If the order confirming the attachment has attained finality, or if the order of confiscation has been passed, or if the trial of a case under section 4 of the PMLA has commenced, the claim of a party asserting to have acted bona fide or having legitimate interest in the nature mentioned above will be inquired into and adjudicated upon only by the special court. Decision on the appeals. … Emphasis supplied by this Court

29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 56 HC-KAR

6.23. By relying on Axis Bank, her submission is that the power of attachment under the PMLA extends not only to property directly or indirectly

derived

from

criminal

activity

relating to a scheduled offence, but also to other assets of equivalent value belonging to the person accused of money laundering, subject to the principles laid down in the said decision. 6.24. She submits that where the proceeds of crime cannot be traced, are unavailable for attachment, or are insufficient in value, the authorised officer may attach other property of equivalent value belonging to the person accused of money laundering. Such property need not itself have been acquired from the proceeds of crime, provided the statutory requirements

governing

attachment

of

equivalent-value property are satisfied. 6.25. Learned counsel further submits that where

person

concerned

disputes

attachment on the ground that the property was not acquired from criminal activity, the claim must be substantiated by evidence. 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 57 HC-KAR

She relies on Axis Bank to contend that the attachment

of

property

is

not

rendered

invalid merely because the property is not itself tainted, and that the nature of the property, its connection with the person accused

of

money

laundering,

and

circumstances in which it was acquired must be considered in determining whether it is amenable to attachment. 6.26. Applying these principles to the present case, learned counsel submits that the mere fact that the Petitioner’s properties were acquired before

alleged

criminal

transactions

would not, by itself, conclude the issue of their attachability. According to her, the Petitioner’s objections regarding the dates of acquisition and the alleged absence of any direct link between the properties and the proceeds

of

considered

in

crime

are

matters

statutory

to

be

adjudication

proceedings, in light of the material on record

and

principles

attachment under the PMLA. 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

governing

- 58 HC-KAR

6.27. On this basis, learned counsel submits that the attachment proceedings are not liable to be interdicted at this stage and that the Petitioner should raise his objections before

Adjudicating

Authority,

which

is

competent to examine the relevant material and determine whether the properties are liable to be proceeded against under the Act. 6.28. She relies on the judgment of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Directorate of Enforcement vs. Prakash Industries Ltd., [2025

SCC

OnLine

Del

8243]

more

particularly paragraphs 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 & 40 which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 34. In view of the aforesaid, it bears importance that this Bench has previously examined similar questions of law in Prakash Industries-I, wherein it was conclusively determined that the allocation of a coal block constitutes “property” within the meaning of Section 2(1)(v) of the PMLA. Further, it was also determined that any undue advantage, benefit, or economic gain derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, through utilisation of such property would constitute “proceeds of crime” as defined under Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA, thereby rendering PIL, prima facie, liable for the offence of money laundering under Section 3 of the PMLA. In order to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the aforestated legal principles adjudicated by this Bench as also applicable to the present controversy, the relevant paragraphs 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 59 HC-KAR

from Prakash hereinbelow:

Industries-I

are

reproduced

“B. SECTION 2(1)(V) OF THE PMLA : WHETHER THE ALLOCATION LETTER CONSTRUES AS ‘PROPERTY’? 31. The word ‘property’ has been defined under Black's Law Dictionary, as, “one which is peculiar or proper to any person; which belongs exclusively to one; in the strict legal sense, an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected by the government.” It also goes on to define it as, “the word commonly used to denote everything which is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal; everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate. It extends to every species of valuable right and interest and includes real and personal property, easements, franchises and incorporeal hereditaments”. 32. The definition of ‘property’ as provided under Section 2(1)(v) of the PMLA, is inclusive and expansive, broadly including every description of asset provided thereunder, in form of a deed or instrument evidencing title or interest in such assets. To put it simply, the definition of ‘property’ as provided under the PMLA is broad and inclusive in its approach towards what constitutes as property within the contours of the Act. This statutory definition is further supported by the constitutional jurisprudence of India, reiterating the understanding of what constitutes as property in India under Article 300A of the COI, which recognizes property as inclusive of intangible interests and rights created through incorporeal assets. 33. Additionally, it is apposite to note that, in the contemporary world, dominated by a commercial landscape where economic transactions are shaped by intangible rights and digital assets, to construe the definition of ‘property’ in a narrow or traditional sense, would not only amount to restricting the approach of the Court to the innovative nuances of the modern commercial world but also create an impediment for the judiciary to keep up its pace with the evolving jurisprudence. Therefore, it becomes 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 60 HC-KAR

essential to embrace a broader and more dynamic understanding of what constitutes ‘property’. 34. In the modern era, as also evidenced by the usage of terms to define property under Section 2(1)(v) of the PMLA, intangible property has assumed immense legal and commercial significance. The evolution of Intellectual Property laws now comprehends rights such as copyrights, trademarks, design rights, patents, licenses, digital assets and contractual entitlements, all of which are firmly recognised as valuable forms of property within the framework of common law. 35. In view of the aforestated, an allocation letter, especially when it confers upon the beneficiary an exclusive right to gain commercial advantage, enabling the beneficiary to derive economic gains, must be examined through this widened legal lens. 39. It is pertinent to note that, the act of allocation, in itself, may not constitute a complete offence; rather, it is the first step in a chain of subsequent events, carrying a cascading effect. These events begin with the procurement of the allocation, which is then followed by the actual extraction of coal, an act, if done on the basis of an unauthorised allocation, constitutes a separate illegal act. The allocation sets in motion the process through which the State Government is expected to act upon recommendation made by the Central Government and facilitate the formalities flowing therefrom. This process leads to an initiation of series of administrative actions, which, if found to be tainted by criminality at the origin, ultimately results in usurpation of a public resource, which otherwise would rightfully vest in the State as a natural resource belonging to the general public at large.” C. SECTION 2(1)(U) AND SECTION 3 OF THE PMLA : WHETHER MISREPRESENTATION IN ALLOCATION OF COAL BLOCK LEADS TO PROCEEDS OF CRIME MAKING IT AN OFFENCE OF MONEY LAUNDERING? 40. Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA covers any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of any criminal activity in relation to a scheduled offence and includes within its 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 61 HC-KAR

meaning, the ‘value of such property’. As explained in the preceding paragraphs under Part B of this judgment, the definition of ‘property’ is broad, which includes the tangible and intangible property and the property used in the commission of a scheduled offence. 41. Section 3 of the PMLA defines the offence of money laundering as an involvement in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime, including concealment, possession, acquisition, use and its projection as untainted or to claim it as untainted. Whereas, explanation (ii) of the said provision highlights that such process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime is a continued activity and continues till such time a person enjoys such proceeds by concealing or being in possession or acquiring or using or projecting or claiming it as an untainted property. 42. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the PMLA also highlights certain important recommendations made by the Financial Task Force held in Paris in 1989, which also forms the foundation of the present-day legislation of PMLA dealing with offence of money laundering in India, which are:” (i) declaration of laundering of monies carried through serious crimes as criminal offence; xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx (iii) confiscation of the proceeds of crime; 43. These two recommendations forming part of the objects of the PMLA when read together, reveal the legislative intent behind the Act. It means that the offence of money laundering as envisaged under Section 3 of the PMLA is a stand-alone offence and not just a byproduct of crimes; rather it is a crime in itself and the illicit financial gains arising from the criminal activities forming a part of money laundering is subject to confiscation. To put it succinctly, the intent of the Act is not only to punish the accused found to be guilty under the offence of money laundering, but also to deprive them of the illegal financial gains. The PMLA not only recognizes the illegal financial gains but also sustainably targets the conduct, in the form of serious economic offences, 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 62 HC-KAR

that results in the generation of such illegal financial gains. 44. The aforestated intent of the PMLA is also corroborated with the preamble of the Act, which defines PMLA as, “an Act to prevent money-laundering and to provide for confiscation of property derived from, or involved in, money-laundering and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto”. 45. Sections 2(1)(u) and 3 of the PMLA, when put together leads us to infer that Section 3 criminalises any process or activity connected with proceeds of crime, which in turn includes property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person, as a result of criminal activity, relating to a scheduled offence and the value of such property. 46. The aforesaid position has also been rendered by the Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary Judgment and the relevant paragraph is reproduced hereunder: 382.8. The offence under Section 3 of the 2002 Act is dependent on illegal gain of property as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. It is concerning the process or activity connected with such property, which constitutes the offence of money-laundering. The Authorities under the 2002 Act cannot prosecute any person on notional basis or on the assumption that a scheduled offence has been committed, unless it is so registered with the jurisdictional police and/or pending enquiry/trial including by way of criminal complaint before the competent forum. If the person is finally discharged/acquitted of the scheduled offence or the criminal case against him is quashed by the Court of competent jurisdiction, there can be no offence of money-laundering against him or anyone claiming such property being the property linked to stated scheduled offence through him.” 47. The view taken by the Supreme Court was further reiterated in a recent judgment passed by the Supreme Court in Union of India through the Assistant Director v. Kanhaiya Prasad, and the relevant paragraph is as follows:” 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 63 HC-KAR

19. We also do not find any substance in the submission made by learned Senior Advocate Ranjit Kumar for the Respondent that the Respondent has not been shown as an accused in the predicate offence. It is no more res integra that the offence of money laundering is an independent offence regarding the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime, which had been derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relating to or in relation to a schedule offence. Hence, involvement in any one of such process or activity connected with the Proceeds of Crime would constitute offence of money laundering. This offence otherwise has nothing to do with the criminal activity relating to a schedule offence, except the Proceeds of Crime derived or obtained as a result of that crime. The precise observations made in Vijay Madanlal (supra) in this regard may be reproduced hereunder:— “270. Needless to mention that such process or activity can be indulged in only after the property is derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity (a scheduled offence). It would be an offence of money laundering to indulge in or to assist or being party to the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime; and such process or activity in a given fact situation may be a continuing offence, irrespective of the date and time of commission of the scheduled offence. In other words, the criminal activity may have been committed before the same had been notified as scheduled offence for the purpose of the 2002 Act, but if a person has indulged in or continues to indulge directly or indirectly in dealing with proceeds of crime, derived or obtained from such criminal activity even after it has been notified as scheduled offence, may be liable to be prosecuted for offence of money laundering under the 2002 Act — for continuing to possess or conceal the proceeds of crime (fully or in part) or retaining possession thereof or uses it in trenches until fully exhausted. The offence of money laundering is not dependent on or linked to the date on which the scheduled offence, or if we may say so, the predicate offence has been committed. The relevant date is the date on which the person indulges in the process or activity connected with such proceeds of crime. These ingredients are intrinsic in the original provision (Section 3, as amended until 2013 and were in force till 31-7-2019); and the same has been merely 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 64 HC-KAR

explained and clarified by way of Explanation vide Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019. Thus understood, inclusion of clause (ii) in the Explanation inserted in 2019 is of no consequence as it does not alter or enlarge the scope of Section 3 at all. 271 to 405…………… 406. It was urged that the scheduled offence in a given case may be a non-cognizable offence and yet rigours of Section 45 of the 2002 Act would result in denial of bail even to such accused. This argument is founded on clear misunderstanding of the scheme of the 2002 Act. As we have repeatedly mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment that the offence of money laundering is one wherein a person, directly or indirectly, attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime. The fact that the proceeds of crime have been generated as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, which incidentally happens to be a non-cognizable offence, would make no difference. The person is not prosecuted for the scheduled offence by invoking provisions of the 2002 Act, but only when he has derived or obtained property as a result of criminal activity relating to or in relation to a scheduled offence and then indulges in process or activity connected with such proceeds of crime. Suffice it to observe that the argument under consideration is completely misplaced and needs to be rejected. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx 49. Subsequently, since any process or activity connected with such proceeds of crime including possession, use, concealment, layering, projection or claim as untainted, constitutes money-laundering, the aforesaid proceeds, having been possessed, used, concealed, projected such as untainted property by PIL, brings the case squarely within the scope of the offence of money laundering as defined under Section 3 of the PMLA. Additionally, it is pertinent to note that explanation (ii) to Section 3 of the PMLA clearly states that the process of money laundering is a continuing offence linked to the existence of proceeds of crime. 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 65 HC-KAR

50. The Supreme Court in Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement, has clarified that the offence of money laundering is not limited to the final act of integration and remains ongoing as long as the proceeds are being dealt with. Accordingly, the continuing nature of money laundering, sustains the liability arising out of the PMLA for post-enactment activities involving such proceeds.” 35. In substance, this Bench in Prakash IndustriesI, upheld the validity of the PAO, with a finding that the definition of property under Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA is deliberately wide to include both tangible and intangible assets, including rights and interests resulting into economic value. Accordingly, an allocation letter leading to an exclusive commercial benefit, falls well within the scope of an intangible property and as such constitutes proceeds of crime. Further, the misrepresentation by PIL in order to obtain such an allocation would be rendered as a criminal activity, resultantly generating proceeds of crime under Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA. Against this backdrop, it was then established that Section 3 of the PMLA criminalises all processes connected with such proceeds, making money laundering a distinct and continuing offence which subsists as long as such illicit gains are possessed or utilized by the accused. 36. Application of the aforesaid principles to the present case becomes relevant to the extent that the definition of proceeds of crime under Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA, not only includes the property derived directly through a criminal activity related to the scheduled offence, rather it also includes any property derived indirectly by such a criminal activity. 37. In light of the aforestated, the LSJ, while making an observation that the investigation and chargesheet are confined merely to aspect of misrepresentation, and therefore, would not extend to the allotment of preferential shares, has based his findings on a fundamental misconception of the nature, scope and legal implications provided within the contours of the offence of money laundering under the PMLA. While it is trite law that the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA is predicated upon the existence of a scheduled offence, it is of equal importance to understand that the offence of money 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 66 HC-KAR

laundering is a distinct and independent offence in itself. 38. Additionally, the essence of money laundering lies in the proceeds of crime as defined under Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA, wherein the usage of words “directly or indirectly” are of crucial importance to demonstrate that the scope of the definition under Section 2(1)(u) extends not only to the immediate consequence of a crime, rather it also includes the subsequent transformation, layers and manifestation of the illicit financial gain. The usage of the word “indirectly” while defining proceeds of crime under PMLA, establishes the intentional expansive definition provided thereunder, which goes on to establish that once the proceeds are generated through any criminal activity, routing it through multiple channels or transactions, thereby creating layers of ostensible legitimacy does not prevent the accused from escaping liability within the rigours of Section 3 of the PMLA. 39. To put it in other words, even if no separate predicate offence is registered in relation to the subsequent act of utilisation of property to acquire funds through a legalised transaction, classification of the illegal gains used by means of a legal transaction emanating from an illegal means adopted for attaining coal block allocation would still be construed as “proceeds of crime”. This is because the proceeds nevertheless are traceable either directly or indirectly, to the original criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. 40. Additionally, the offence of money laundering being continuing in nature is not confined only to the initial act of criminal acquisition but also extends to every process or activity connected with the proceeds including layering through multiple transactions, integration into the legitimate economy and projection of the acquired wealth as lawful. For instance, if a public servant receives a bribe, which constitutes an offence under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and thereafter invests that sum in narcotics trade, real estate, preferential shares or any other avenue, the taint of illegality would still continue and the entire corpus shall be liable to be attached irrespective of the subsequent channels through which 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 67 HC-KAR

it has been routed or the forms it assumes subsequently. Similarly, if the sum received as bribe is invested in share market, which later increases or goes beyond and above the value of actual investment owing to market forces or corporate actions, the entire enhanced amount shall constitute as proceeds of crime. Meaning thereby the appreciation in value does not cleanse or purify the tainted origin, more so since the augmented value is inextricably and indirectly derived from the original illicit source of bribe. … Emphasis supplied by this Court

6.29. By relying on Prakash Industries Ltd, she submits that the expression “proceeds of crime” under Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA has a wide ambit and includes property derived or

obtained,

criminal

directly

activity

or

relating

indirectly, to

a

from

scheduled

offence. Such property may be tangible or intangible and may include economic benefits arising from rights or interests acquired through criminal activity. 6.30. She further submits that the offence of money laundering under Section 3 of the PMLA is distinct from the scheduled offence and

extends

connected

to

with

processes

or

proceeds

activities of

crime,

including their possession, use, concealment, 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 68 HC-KAR

layering,

acquisition

or

untainted

property.

The

projection

as

fact

that

proceeds of crime are subsequently routed through legitimate transactions or converted into another form of asset does not, by itself, extinguish their tainted character. Relying on the observations of the Delhi High Court concerning the continuing nature of money laundering,

she

contends

that

subsequent use, investment or appreciation of proceeds of crime does not sever their link with the original criminal activity. 6.31. On the strength of the said decision, learned counsel

submits

that

Petitioner’s

contention that the attached properties were acquired

before

alleged

scheduled

offence cannot, by itself, determine their non-attachability.

According

to

her,

question must be considered in the light of the statutory definition of proceeds of crime and the material available concerning the alleged criminal activity and any direct or indirect connection between such activity and the properties sought to be attached. 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 69 HC-KAR

6.32. She relies on the judgment of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Gautam Khaitan and anr., vs. Union of India and anr., [2025 SCC OnLine Del 8434] more particularly paragraphs 18, 19 & 22 which are

reproduced

hereunder

for

easy

reference: 18. In this context, this Court also deems it necessary to refer to Paragraph No. 12 of the IJ, wherein the LSJ records that, notwithstanding a suggestion made to the Appellants to seek redressal before the Adjudicating Authority in response to the notice issued, the Appellants pressed the Court to examine the material on record to determine whether the AO possessed sufficient material to form a reason to believe for the issuance of the PAO. Consequently, the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the Appellants, that the LSJ ought not to have addressed the merits of the case while dismissing the writ petition on the ground of alternate remedy, is rendered inconsequential. 19. With respect to the argument raised on behalf of the Appellants that the PAO can only be issued subsequent to the filing of a chargesheet under Section 173 of CrPC, this Bench places reliance on its recent decision in LPA 588 of 2022 titled Directorate of Enforcement v. Hi-tech Merchantile India Pvt. Ltd. dated 17.10.2025. This Bench in the aforesaid judgment comprehensively examined the scope and exercise of powers of attachment conferred under Section 5 of the PMLA. For sake of clarity and to underscore the principles laid down therein, the relevant paragraphs of the judgment are reproduced hereunder: “58. The contention of PIL with respect to the relevance of the date of allocation, i.e. 04.09.2003 and the findings of the LSJ restricting the actions of the Directorate upto the given date falls short of merit. More specifically, when Section 5 of the 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 70 HC-KAR

PMLA enables the Directorate to proceed with an attachment of the properties of similar value, whereas first two provisos out of the three provisos to Section 5(1) of the PMLA, highlights the statutory prerequisite of initiating the attachment. While the first proviso provides for filing of a report under Section 173 of the CrPC or a complaint by an authorised officer for initiation of attachment, the second proviso provides for attachment on account of a “reason to believe” based on the material available. These provisos form a jurisdictional precondition for issuance of the PAO; however, it does not restrict scope of Directorate's attachment to the time period covered in the said report or complaint. 59. To put it succinctly, the report under Section 173 of the CrPC, acts as a gateway triggering the requirement to initiate action under the proviso to Section 5(1) of the PMLA; but does not confine the extent of the inquiry of the Directorate and/or the duration of the proceeds of crime sought to be attached. Having said the aforestated, it is also important to highlight that there are two provisos attached to section 5(1) of the PMLA, each operating within its own independent domain. Therefore, it is important to bear in mind that the filing of a report under Section 173 of the CrPC is one of the triggering conditions for initiating attachment under first proviso to Section 5(1) of the PMLA, but not the only one, as under the statute, other conditions may independently warrant the initiation of attachment proceedings.” In substance, it was observed that while the first proviso to Section 5(1) of the PMLA constitutes a statutory pre-requisite for initiating an attachment, it is not to be construed that the compliance of the said proviso is a sole pre-requisite for issuance of PAO, which if not complied with would render the attachment proceedings invalid or ineffectual. 22. Keeping in view the above position of law, as well as the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court does not deem it appropriate to interfere with the Impugned Judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. … Emphasis supplied by this Court 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 71 HC-KAR

6.33. By relying on Gautam Khaitan, she submits that the existence of an alternative remedy before

Adjudicating

Authority

is

a

relevant consideration while deciding whether this Court should interfere with a provisional attachment order under the PMLA. She points out that, in the said decision, the Delhi High Court declined to interfere with the judgment under

challenge,

challenge

raised

notwithstanding to

provisional

attachment order. 6.34. Learned counsel further submits that, as explained in Gautam Khaitan, while the filing of a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or a complaint, as contemplated under the first proviso to Section 5(1) of the PMLA, constitutes a statutory condition for initiating attachment proceedings under that proviso, it does not restrict the Directorate’s inquiry to the period or transactions referred to in such report or complaint. 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 72 HC-KAR

6.35. She relies on the decision in Directorate of Enforcement v. Hi-Tech Mercantile India Pvt. Ltd., in [LPA 588 of 2022] dated 17.10.2025, referred to therein, to contend that the statutory provisos to Section 5(1) operate within their respective domains and that the filing of such a report or complaint does not, by itself, determine the full scope of the properties that may be considered for attachment. 6.36. Applying these principles to the present case, learned counsel submits that the Petitioner cannot rely solely on the dates on which the properties were acquired or on the period covered

by

predicate-offence

investigation to contend that the provisional attachment is unsustainable. She contends that the validity of the attachment must be examined in the context of the statutory requirements

under

Section

5(1),

material available to the authorised officer and the grounds raised by the Petitioner. Accordingly, she submits that no interference with the provisional attachment is warranted at this stage and that the Petitioner ought to 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 73 HC-KAR

pursue

remedy

available

before

Adjudicating Authority. 6.37. She relies on the judgment of Hon’ble High Court

of

Madras

P.Balamurugan Directorate Chennai [2025

of

Zonal

SCC

in and

case

of

another

vs.

Enforcement,

rep

Office-II

another

OnLine

Mad

and

15158]

by

more

particularly paragraphs 13, 14 & 15 which are

reproduced

hereunder

for

easy

reference: 13. The precondition required to issue the provisional attachment order is the reasonable believe reduced into writing by the competent officer that some person is in possession of the proceeds of crime and the said proceeds of crime are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with any manner which may result in frustrating any proceeds related to confiscation of such proceeds of crime under Chapter III of the PMLA. 14. The yet another condition is that the said property must be in relation to scheduled offence reported and forwarded to the Magistrate or a complaint filed by a person authorised to investigate the offence mentioned in the schedule. The order of provisional attachment issued under Section 5(1) of the PMLA will be inforce 180 days. Once the order of provisional attachment is issued based on the reason believe that the property is a proceeds of crime and likely to be concealed transferred etc., a copy of the order along with material in possession to be sent to the Adjudicating Authority in a sealed envelope (emphasis applied) in the manner prescribed. The provisional attachment does not prevent the person interested from enjoying the property. In this case, 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 74 HC-KAR

the Adjudicating Authority had already informed about the provisional attachment and it is now for the authority to decide whether provisional attachment order to be confirmed or not. The writ Petitioners has to participate in the enquiry once they receive notice and substantiate their plea that the property attached is not a proceeds of crime and they have neither directly nor indirectly aid, assist, use or conceal the said property with knowledge and intention to project it as untainted property. 15. In the light of Section 24 of the Act, which cast the burden of proof on the person accused on money laundering and probability of concealment of the crime proceeds loom large against the Petitioners. The judgment if any which is contrary to the provision of Section 5(1) of the PMLA casting duty on the enforcement authority to issue prior notice before passing provisional order of attachment is to be considered as obitor. Section 8 of PMLA is the answer to the plea of the writ Petitioners regarding opportunity of hearing before the attachment. The Section 5(1) and Section 8(1) and (2) read together clearly show that the provisional attachment is only to prevent the attempt of concealment of the crime proceeds to frustrate confiscation. It is a preventive measure to be done immediately, but at the same time only valid for 180 days. The final order under Section 8 of the PMLA will be passed after affording opportunity to the parties concerned. No where in the statute either in the Act or Rule, notice to parties prior to the provisional attachment is contemplated. While so, there cannot be a interpretation contrary to the law. Hence, the writ petition stands dismissed. There is no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. … Emphasis supplied by this Court

6.38. By

relying

on

P.Balamurugan,

her

submission is that the provisional attachment 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 75 HC-KAR

under

Section

5(1)

of

PMLA

is

a

preventive measure intended to preserve property

and

prevent

its

concealment,

transfer or disposal in a manner that may frustrate eventual confiscation. She submits that,

where

competent

officer

has

recorded the requisite reasons to believe in writing and the statutory conditions are satisfied,

provisional

attachment

may

be

effected without prior notice to the person concerned. 6.39. Applying the said principles to the present case,

learned

Petitioner’s

counsel

properties

submits were

attached

on

29.10.2024

arising

out

of

registered

on

that

provisionally

in

proceedings

ECIR/MGSZO/04/2022,

28.03.2022,

following

registration of Crime No.90/2017 and the filing of the charge sheet in respect of the alleged scheduled offences. She contends that

merely amounts

Petitioner’s

acted

as

received

a

objections

that

he

stevedore,

that

from

M/s

Hanuman

Minerals were partial repayments of the amount advanced by him, and that the 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 76 HC-KAR

properties were acquired in 2004 and 2008, before the alleged transactions of 2011– 2012, are matters that can be raised before the Adjudicating Authority. 6.40. Learned counsel further submits that, as explained in P. Balamurugan, the Petitioner has an opportunity under Section 8 of the PMLA

to

respond

to

notice

dated

30.11.2024, place the relevant sale deeds and other supporting material on record, and establish that the attached properties are not proceeds of crime or otherwise liable to be treated as properties involved in money laundering. She contends that the Petitioner should participate in those proceedings and substantiate

his

objections

Adjudicating

Authority,

rather

before

than

seek

interference by this Court at the provisional stage. On that basis, she submits that the writ petition is premature and is liable to be dismissed. 6.41. She also relies on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court Dibbur

vs.

in

case

Enforcement

29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

of

Pavana

Directorate

- 77 HC-KAR

[(2023)

SCC

91],

more

particularly

paragraph 18 which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 18. In a given case, if the prosecution for the scheduled offence ends in the acquittal of all the accused or discharge of all the accused or the proceedings of the scheduled offence are quashed in its entirety, the scheduled offence will not exist, and therefore, no one can be prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 3 PMLA as there will not be any proceeds of crime. Thus, in such a case, the accused against whom the complaint under Section 3 PMLA is filed will benefit from the scheduled offence ending by acquittal or discharge of all the accused. Similarly, he will get the benefit of quashing the proceedings of the scheduled offence. However, an accused in PMLA case who comes into the picture after the scheduled offence is committed by assisting in the concealment or use of proceeds of crime need not be an accused in the scheduled offence. Such an accused can still be prosecuted under PMLA so long as the scheduled offence exists. Thus, the second contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant on the ground that the appellant was not shown as an accused in the charge-sheets filed in the scheduled offences deserves to be rejected. … Emphasis supplied by this Court

6.42. By relying on Pavana Dibbur, she submits that an accused prosecuted under the PMLA need not necessarily be an accused in the scheduled offence, provided the scheduled offence exists. She submits that a person who becomes involved after the commission 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 78 HC-KAR

of the scheduled offence by assisting in the concealment or use of the proceeds of crime can also be proceeded against under the PMLA. 6.43. Applying the said principle to the present case,

learned

Petitioner’s

counsel

submits

contention

that

that

he

merely

undertook stevedoring activities and was not responsible for the alleged criminal acts of M/s Manipal Global Services Pvt. Ltd. or M/s Hanuman

Minerals

does

not,

by

itself,

exclude the applicability of the PMLA. She points out that the Petitioner was arrayed as accused No.3 in the charge sheet filed in Crime

No.90/2017,

which

concerns

alleged scheduled offences. She contends that, so long as the scheduled offence exists, the Petitioner’s liability under the PMLA must be examined with reference to the alleged proceeds

of

involvement

in

crime

and

his

alleged

any

process

or

activity

connected with them, rather than solely on the basis of whether he committed the scheduled offence himself. 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 79 HC-KAR

6.44. Learned counsel accordingly submits that the Petitioner

cannot

seek

to

invalidate

attachment merely by asserting that he was engaged in commercial transactions or that his role was limited to stevedoring. She contends

that

Petitioner’s

objections

concerning the nature of the transactions, the amounts received from M/s Hanuman Minerals and the absence of a connection between the attached properties and the alleged

proceeds

considered

in

of

crime

statutory

must

be

adjudication

proceedings. 6.45. She also refers to the judgment of the Hon’ble Kerala High Court in Satish Motilal Bidri v Union of India [2024 SCC OnLine Ker 3410] more particularly paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 13. Section 5 of PMLA authorizes attachment of proceeds of crime. The definition of the term ‘proceeds of crime’ explicitly states that when the proceeds of a crime is a property, such property must have been obtained or derived as a result of any criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. No doubt, even if the property was obtained indirectly, it can still be regarded as proceeds of crime. Assuming that a property derived out of a criminal activity mentioned is not available, still, attachment can be 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 80 HC-KAR

effected to the extent of the value of such property. The term ‘value’ in section 2(1)(u) can only mean the monetary worth of the property that was derived from the criminal activity. If the attachment is to be effected to the extent of the monetary worth of a property which was not derived out of the criminal activity, then PMLA mandates that the property derived out of such criminal activity be taken out of India or is held outside the country. In other words, the only power to proceed against a property of equivalent value, which has no link with the predicate offence is, when the property was taken out or held out of India. Therefore, except when the property derived out of the criminal activity is not inside the country, can the provisional attachment be effected on a property purchased prior to such criminal activity. 14. In this context, it is appropriate to refer to the decision in Seema Garg v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement (2020 SCC OnLine P&H 738), wherein the High Court of Punjab and Haryana elaborately considered the concept of proceeds of crime and held that property purchased prior to the commission of scheduled offence, does not fall within the ambit of the first limb of the definition of proceeds of crime, though it certainly falls within the purview and ambit of the third limb of the definition. The Andhra Pradesh High Court has also observed along the same lines in Satyam Computer Services Limited v. Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India (2018 SCC OnLine Hyd 787) wherein it was observed that PMLA being a statute which deals with substantive rights, cannot have a retrospective effect. However, the Delhi High Court had taken a differing stance in The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Delhi v. Axis Bank (Crl.A. No. 143/2018), where it was observed that the term value of property must be understood to have been used in the same sense as the third limb. With respects, I am unable to subscribe to the views of the Delhi High Court and on the other hand wholly concur with the views of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and that of Andhra Pradesh. 15. I am further fortified in the above view that I have taken in view of the observations of the Supreme Court as well. In the decision in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India [2022 SCC 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 81 HC-KAR

OnLine SC 929], it has been held in paragraph numbers 295 and 296 that “The precondition for being proceeds of crime is that the property has been derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. ………….Be it noted that the attachment must be only in respect of property which appears to be proceeds of crime and not all the properties belonging to the concerned person who would eventually face the action of confiscation of proceeds of crime, including prosecution for offence of money-laundering. As mentioned earlier, the relevant date for initiating action under the 2022 Act - be it of attachment and confiscation or prosecution, is linked to the inclusion of the offence as scheduled offence and of carrying on the process or activity in connection with the proceeds of crime after such date. The pivot moves around the date of carrying on the process and activity connected with the proceeds of crime; and not the date on which the property has been derived or obtained by the person concerned as a result of any criminal activity relating to or relatable to the scheduled offence.” 16. Apart from the above, in Pavana Dibbur v. Directorate of Enforcement (2023 SCC OnLine SC 1586), it has been observed as follows:“Another allegation is that both the first and second properties have been acquired out of the proceeds of crime. The first property, exfacie cannot be said to have any connection with the proceeds of crime as the acts constituting the scheduled offence took place after its acquisition. …………This is not a case where any material is placed on record to show that the sale consideration was paid from a particular bank account of the appellant. Therefore, it is not possible to record a finding at this stage that the second property was not acquired by using the proceeds of crime.” (emphasis supplied). 17. The aforesaid observations indicate that the properties that can be proceeded against, exercising the powers of attachment must be those that have been acquired utilising the proceeds of crime. The contention of the learned counsel for the Respondents that the term proceeds of crime will also include the value of the property which had been acquired even 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 82 HC-KAR

earlier is, according to me, too far-fetched and will not be justifiable in the light of the constitutional provisions of fairness and reasonableness. It is also necessary to observe at this juncture that the purpose of the PMLA is to remove tainted money and also to initiate proceedings against the proceeds of crime which have been transformed or converted into other property or intermingled with legitimate sources and then the value of the intermingled gain will assume the colour of proceeds of crime. Such a provision cannot be used to enable the authorities to proceed against properties that are unconnected with any of the criminal activity in question. 18. Viewed in the above perspective, as the provisionally attached immovable property was purchased in 2004 - more than a decade and a half before the predicate offence was allegedly committed, the order attaching the immovable property is exfacie, ultra vires the powers of the statute and totally illegal and arbitrary to the extent of the said attachment. Since ex facie illegal acts can be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy, this Court is of the view that the provisional attachment of the immovable property as seen from schedule A to Exhibit P11 order dated 22.05.2024 is liable to be set aside. However, as relating to the provisional attachment mentioned in schedule B to Exhibit P11, i.e. those relating to the amount in the bank accounts - the Petitioner has an effective alternative remedy provided by the statute. … Emphasis supplied by this Court

6.46. By referring to Satish Motilal Bidri, she submits

that

distinction

between

decision

discusses

property

derived

or

obtained from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence and property of equivalent 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 83 HC-KAR

value, and considers the circumstances in which property acquired before the alleged scheduled offence may be attached. She also refers to the discussion of the decisions in Seema

Garg

v.

Deputy

Director,

Directorate of Enforcement [2020 SCC OnLine

P&H

Services

Satyam

738],

Limited

v.

Computer

Directorate

of

Enforcement [2018 SCC OnLine Hyd 787] and

Deputy

Director,

Directorate

Enforcement

v.

[2019:DHC:1887;

CRL.A.

Crl.M.A.

Axis

2262/2018],

as

of

Bank

143/2018 well

as

&

observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India [(2023) 12 SCC 1] and Pavana Dibbur v. Directorate of Enforcement [(2023) 15 SCC 91]. 6.47. In the context of the present case, learned counsel submits that the Petitioner’s reliance on the dates of acquisition of the attached properties,

Apartment

M401,

under

registered

sale

a

15.12.2004,

and

purchased

deed

dated

non-agricultural

immovable property in Survey No.23-1A2, 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 84 HC-KAR

Derebail

Village,

purchased

under

a

registered sale deed dated 28.03.2008, must be considered in the light of the statutory provisions governing attachment and the material available in the proceedings. She contends that the Petitioner’s assertion that the properties were acquired before the alleged transactions involving M/s Hanuman Minerals and M/s Manipal Global Services Pvt. Ltd. does not, by itself, conclude the question of their attachability, and that the relevant issues should be examined in the statutory adjudication proceedings. 6.48. Learned counsel accordingly submits that the Petitioner should place his objections and supporting

documents

before

Adjudicating Authority under Section 8 of the PMLA, which is empowered to determine whether the properties specified in the notice are

involved

in

money

laundering.

She

therefore contends that the writ petition ought not to be entertained at the present stage. 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 85 HC-KAR

6.49. She refers to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. and another vs. State of Orissa and Others, [(1983) 2 SCC 433], more particularly paragraph 6 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 6. We are constrained to dismiss these petitions on the short ground that the Petitioners have an equally efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the Prescribed Authority under sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act, then a second appeal to the Tribunal under sub-section (3)(a) thereof, and thereafter in the event the Petitioners get no relief, to have the case stated to the High Court under Section 24 of the Act. In Raleigh Investment Company Limited v. Governor-General in Council [AIR 1947 PC 78 : (1947) 74 IA 50 : 231 IC 1] Lord Uthwatt, J. in delivering the judgment of the Board observed that in the provenance of tax where the Act provided for a complete machinery which enabled an assessee to effectively raise in the courts the question of the validity of an assessment denied an alternative jurisdiction to the High Court to interfere. It is true that the decision of the Privy Council in Raleigh Investment Company case [AIR 1947 PC 78 : (1947) 74 IA 50 : 231 IC 1] was in relation to a suit brought for a declaration that an assessment made by the Income Tax Officer was a nullity, and it was held by the Privy Council that an assessment made under the machinery provided by the Act, even if based on a provision subsequently held to be ultra vires, was not a nullity like an order of a court lacking jurisdiction and that Section 67 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 operated as a bar to the maintainability of such a suit. In dealing with the question whether Section 67 operated as a bar to a suit to set aside or modify an assessment made under a provision of the Act which is ultra vires, the Privy Council observed: 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 86 HC-KAR

“In construing the section it is pertinent, in their Lordships' opinion, to ascertain whether the Act contains machinery which enables an assessee effectively to raise in the courts the question whether a particular provision of the Income Tax Act bearing on the assessment made is or is not ultra vires. The presence of such machinery, though by no means conclusive, marches with a construction of the section which denies an alternative jurisdiction to inquire into the same subject-matter.” … Emphasis supplied by this Court

6.50. By relying on Titaghur Paper Mills, she submits that where a statute provides a complete

and

efficacious

mechanism

for

redressal of grievances, the High Court ought not ordinarily to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, thereby bypassing the statutory remedies available

to

aggrieved

party.

She

contends that the Petitioner has an effective alternative remedy under Section 8 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, before the Adjudicating Authority, which is competent

to

consider

Petitioner’s

objections to the provisional attachment and determine whether the properties in question are involved in money laundering. On that basis, she submits that the present writ 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 87 HC-KAR

petition is premature and is liable to be dismissed on the ground of availability of an efficacious alternative remedy. 6.51. She

refers

to

judgment

of

Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Collector

of

Central

Excise,

Chandan

Nagar, West Bengal v Dunlop India Ltd., and others [(1985) 1 SCC 260], more particularly paragraph 3 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 3. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa A.P. Sen, E.S. Venkataramiah and R.B. Misra, JJ. held that where the statute itself provided the Petitioners with an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the Prescribed Authority, a second appeal to the tribunal and thereafter to have the case stated to the High Court, it was not for the High Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution ignoring as it were, the complete statutory machinery. That it has become necessary, even now, for us to repeat this admonition is indeed a matter of tragic concern to us. Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to bypass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 88 HC-KAR

Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged. … Emphasis supplied by this Court

6.52. She refers to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court

in

Bank

of

India

v.

Satyawati Tandon and others, [(2010) 8 SCC 110], paragraphs 43 and 44 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 89 HC-KAR

any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. … Emphasis supplied by this Court

6.53. She refers to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court

in

case

of

Punjab

National

Bank

vs.

OC

Krishnan

and

others

[(2001)

SCC

569],

more

particularly paragraphs 5 and 6 thereof which are

reproduced

hereunder

for

easy

reference: 5. In our opinion, the order which was passed by the Tribunal directing sale of mortgaged property was appealable under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short “the Act”). The High Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 227 in view of the provision for alternative remedy contained in the Act. We do not propose to go into the correctness of the decision of the High Court and whether the order passed by the Tribunal was correct or not has to be decided before an appropriate forum. 6. The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is a hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast-track 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 90 HC-KAR

procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the Respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act. … Emphasis supplied by this Court

6.54. She

relies

on

judgment

of

Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kumar Shivhare

v

Assistant

Director,

Directorate of Enforcement and another [(2010)

SCC

772]

paragraphs

31,

more

and

37,

particularly which

are

reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 31. When a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievance and that too in a fiscal statute, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. In this case the High Court is a statutory forum of appeal on a question of law. That should not be abdicated and given a go-by by a litigant for invoking the forum of judicial review of the High Court under writ jurisdiction. The High Court, with great respect, fell into a manifest error by not appreciating this aspect of the matter. It has however dismissed the writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 91 HC-KAR

32. No reason could be assigned by the appellant's counsel to demonstrate why the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 35 of FEMA does not provide an efficacious remedy. In fact there could hardly be any reason since the High Court itself is the appellate forum. 37. In view of such consistent opinion of this Court over several decades we are constrained to hold that even if the High Court had territorial jurisdiction it should not have entertained a writ petition which impugns an order of the Tribunal when such an order on a question of law, is appealable before the High Court under Section 35 of FEMA. … Emphasis supplied by this Court

6.55. By

placing

reliance

on

aforesaid

judgments in Dunlop India Ltd., Satyawati Tandon,

O.C. Krishnan and Raj Kumar

Shivhare, she submits that, where a statute provides an efficacious alternative remedy and prescribes a comprehensive mechanism for adjudication and appellate redressal, the High

Court

ought

ordinarily

to

exercise

restraint in entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. She contends

that

alternative

remedy

availability does

not

of

an

oust

constitutional jurisdiction of this Court, but ordinarily warrants its exercise only where exceptional circumstances justify bypassing the statutory mechanism. In the present 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 92 HC-KAR

case, the Petitioner can raise his objections to the provisional attachment before the Adjudicating Authority in the proceedings under Section 8 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. If aggrieved by the order passed by the Adjudicating Authority, the Petitioner may prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 26 of the Act and, thereafter, an appeal to the High Court under Section 42 against the order of the Appellate Tribunal. She therefore submits that the Petitioner ought to pursue the remedies available under the Act and that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances warranting

interference, the

present writ

petition ought not to be entertained. 6.56. She

refers

Supreme

to

Court

in

judgment

case

of of

Hon’ble Vijay

Madanlal Choudhary vs. Union of India [(2023) 12 SCC 1] paragraphs 162, 163, 172, 173 and 174, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 162. As a matter of fact, prior to the amendment of 2015, the first proviso acted as an impediment for taking such urgent measure even by the authorised officer, who is no less than the rank of Deputy 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 93 HC-KAR

Director. We must hasten to add that the nuanced distinction must be kept in mind that to initiate “prosecution” for offence under Section 3 PMLA registration of scheduled offence is a prerequisite, but for initiating action of “provisional attachment” under Section 5 there need not be a preregistered criminal case in connection with scheduled offence. This is because the machinery provisions cannot be construed in a manner which would eventually frustrate the proceedings under the 2002 Act. Such dispensation alone can secure the proceeds of crime including to prevent and regulate the commission of offence of money laundering. The authorised officer would, thus, be expected to and, also in a given case, justified in acting with utmost speed to ensure that proceeds of crime/property is available for being proceeded with appropriately under the 2002 Act so as not to frustrate any proceedings envisaged by the 2002 Act. 163. In case the scheduled offence is not already registered by the jurisdictional police or complaint filed before the Magistrate, it is open to the authorised officer to still proceed under Section 5 of the 2002 Act whilst contemporaneously sending information to the jurisdictional police under Section 66(2) of the 2002 Act for registering FIR in respect of cognizable offence or report regarding non-cognizable offence and if the jurisdictional police fails to respond appropriately to such information, the authorised officer under the 2002 Act can take recourse to appropriate remedy, as may be permissible in law to ensure that the culprits do not go unpunished and the proceeds of crime are secured and dealt with as per the dispensation provided for in the 2002 Act. Suffice it to observe that the amendment effected in 2015 in the second proviso has reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the 2002 Act. 172. It was also urged before us that the attachment of property must be equivalent in value of the proceeds of crime only if the proceeds of crime are situated outside India. This argument, in our opinion, is tenuous. For, the definition of “proceeds of crime” is wide enough to not only refer to the property derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, but also of the value of any such property. If the property is taken 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 94 HC-KAR

or held outside the country, even in such a case, the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad can be proceeded with. The definition of “property” as in Section 2(1)(v) is equally wide enough to encompass the value of the property of proceeds of crime. Such interpretation would further the legislative intent in recovery of the proceeds of crime and vesting it in the Central Government for effective prevention of money laundering. 173. We find force in the stand taken by the Union of India that the objectives of enacting the 2002 Act was the attachment and confiscation of proceeds of crime which is the quintessence so as to combat the evil of money laundering. The second proviso, therefore, addresses the broad objectives of the 2002 Act to reach the proceeds of crime in whosoever's name they are kept or by whosoever they are held. To buttress this argument, reliance has been placed on the dictum in Attorney General for India [Attorney General for India v. Amratlal Prajivandas, (1994) 5 SCC 54 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1325] and Raman Tech. & Process Engg. Co. v. Solanki Traders [Raman Tech. & Process Engg. Co. v. Solanki Traders, (2008) 2 SCC 302 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 539] . 174. The procedural safeguards provided in respect of provisional attachment are effective measures to protect the interest of the person concerned who is being proceeded with under the 2002 Act, in the following manner as rightly indicated by the Union of India: 174.1. For invoking the second proviso, the Director or any officer not below the rank of Deputy Director will have to first apply his mind to the materials on record before recording in writing his reasons to believe is certainly a sufficient safeguard to the invocation of the powers under the second proviso to Section 5(1) of the 2002 Act. 174.2. There has to be a satisfaction that if the property involved in money laundering or “proceeds of crime” are not attached “immediately”, such non-attachment might frustrate the confiscation proceedings under the 2002 Act. 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

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174.3. The order passed under Section 5(1) of the 2002 Act is only provisional in nature. The life of this provisional attachment order passed under Section 5(1) of the 2002 Act is only for 180 days, subject to confirmation by an independent Adjudicating Authority. 174.4. Under Section 5(2) officer passing provisional attachment order has to immediately forward a copy of this order to the Adjudicating Authority in a sealed envelope. 174.5. Under Section 5(5) of the 2002 Act, the officer making such order must file a complaint before the Adjudicating Authority within 30 days of the order of provisional attachment being made. 174.6. Section 5(3) of the 2002 Act provides that the provisional attachment order shall cease to have effect on the expiry of the period specified in Section 5(1) i.e. 180 days or on the date when the Adjudicating Authority makes an order under Section 8(2), whichever is earlier. 174.7. Under Section 8(1), once the officer making the provisional attachment order files a complaint and if the Adjudicating Authority “has a reason to believe that any person has committed an offence under Section 3 or is in possession of the proceeds of crime”, the Adjudicating Authority may serve a showcause notice of not less than 30 days on such person calling upon him to indicate the sources of his income, earning or assets or by means of which he has acquired the property attached under Section 5(1) of the 2002 Act. 174.8. The above SCN would require the noticee to produce evidence on which he relies and other relevant information and particulars to show cause why all or any of the property “should not be declared to be the properties involved in money laundering and confiscated by the Central Government”. 174.9. Section 8(2) requires the Adjudicating Authority to consider the reply to the SCN issued under Section 8(1) of the 2002 Act. The section further provides to hear the aggrieved person as well as the officer issuing the order of provisional attachment and also take into account “all relevant 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 96 HC-KAR

materials placed on record before the Adjudicating Authority”. After following the above procedure, the Adjudicating Authority will record its finding whether all the properties referred to in the SCN are involved in money laundering or not. 174.10. While passing order under Section 8(2) read with Section 8(3) there are two possibilities which might happen: 174.10.1. The Adjudicating Authority may confirm the order of provisional attachment, in which case again, the confirmation will continue only up to (i) the period of investigation not exceeding 365 days, or (ii) till the pendency of any proceedings relating to any offence under the 2002 Act or under the corresponding law of any other country before the competent court of criminal jurisdiction outside India. 174.10.2. The Adjudicating Authority may disagree and not confirm the provisional attachment, in which case attachment over the property ceases. 174.11. Under Section 8(4) of the 2002 Act, upon confirmation of the order of provisional attachment, the Director or other officer authorised by him shall take the possession of property attached. 174.12. Under Section 8(5) of the 2002 Act, on the conclusion of a trial for an offence under the 2002 Act if the Special Court finds that the offence of money laundering has been committed it will order that the property involved in money laundering or the property which has been involved in the commission of the offence of money laundering shall stand confiscated to the Central Government. 174.13. However, under Section 8(6) if the Special Court on the conclusion of the trial finds that no offence of money laundering has taken place or the property is not involved in money laundering it will release the property which has been attached to the person entitled to receive it. 174.14. Under Section 8(7), if the trial before the Special Court cannot be conducted because of the 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 97 HC-KAR

death of the accused or because the accused is declared proclaimed offender, then the Special Court on an application of the Director or a person claiming to be entitled to possession of a property in respect of which an order under Section 8(3) is passed either to confiscate the property or release the property to the claimant, after considering the material before it. 174.15. Under Section 8(8), when a property is confiscated, the Special Court may direct the Central Government to restore the property to a person with the legitimate interest in the property, who may have suffered a quantifiable loss as a result of money laundering. Provided that the person must not have been involved in money laundering and must have acted in good faith and has suffered a considerable loss despite taking all reasonable precautions. 174.16. The order passed by the Adjudicating Authority is also subject to appeal before the Appellate Tribunal which is constituted under Section 25 of the 2002 Act. Thus, the Adjudicating Authority is not the final authority under the 2002 Act as far as the attachment of proceeds of crime or property involved in money laundering is concerned. 174.17. Any person aggrieved of an order confirming the provisional attachment order can file an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 26(1) of the 2002 Act. The Appellate Tribunal on receipt of an appeal after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard will pass an order as it thinks fit either confirming or modifying or setting aside the provisional attachment order appealed against. 174.18. Further, the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal is further appealable before the High Court under Section 42 of the 2002 Act on any question of fact or question of law arising out of the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal. … Emphasis supplied by this Court

29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

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6.57. By relying on Vijay Madanlal Choudhary, she submits that the initiation of provisional attachment proceedings under Section 5 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, does not invariably require a criminal case in respect of the scheduled offence to have been registered beforehand, as the authorised officer may act to secure the proceeds

of

proceedings

crime under

and

prevent

from

being

Act

frustrated. She further submits that the expression “proceeds of crime” is sufficiently wide to encompass the value of property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, and that the statutory scheme is intended to reach such proceeds irrespective of the person in whose name they are held. She contends that provisional attachment is preventive in nature and is subject to the safeguards including

prescribed scrutiny

by

under

Act,

Adjudicating

Authority under Section 8, which considers the noticee’s objections and the relevant material to determine whether the properties 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 99 HC-KAR

are

involved

in

money

laundering.

She

further points out that an order confirming

provisional

attachment

is

appealable

before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 26, with a further appeal to the High Court under Section 42. On this basis, she submits that the Petitioner should raise his objections regarding the source and date of acquisition of

attached

Adjudicating

properties

Authority

and

before

pursue

statutory remedies available under the Act, rather

than

seek

premature

interference

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 6.58. She relies on the judgment of Hon’ble High Court of Madras in the case of Vijayraj Surana

vs.

Assistant

Enforcement

Directorate

OnLine

8404]

Mad

more

Director, [2024

SCC

particularly

paragraphs 27, 28, 29, 31, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41 and 44, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 27. ECIR is born from FIR, but once the ECIR is born, the umbilical cord that connects the ECIR with FIR losses its relevance and the ECIR becomes an independent document in itself. Consequently, a new life in the form of ECIR emerges, which can breath on its own without the support of 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 100 HC-KAR

FIR. So, the FIR and ECIR become two different documents and both tend to take shape on its own, independent of each other. 28. “Proceeds of Crime” is the focal point for an ECIR, whereas scheduled offence is dealt with under the FIR. Further reliance is also placed with the aid of judgments delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India cited supra and Rajinder Singh Chada v. Union of India3. Both these judgments have noted the distinction between FIR and ECIR. More so, ECIR is treated as an internal document. 29. In Vijay Madanlal's case (supra), the relevant portion to support this contention is as extracted below; “457. Suffice it to observe that being a special legislation providing for special mechanism regarding inquiry/investigation of offence of moneylaundering, analogy cannot be drawn from the provisions of 1973 Code, in regard to registration of offence of moneylaundering and more so being a complaint procedure prescribed under the 2002 Act. Further, the authorities referred to in Section 48 of the 2002 Act alone are competent to file such complaint. It is a different matter that the materials/evidence collected by the same authorities for the purpose of civil action of attachment of proceeds of crime and confiscation thereof may be used to prosecute the person involved in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime for offence of money-laundering. Considering the mechanism of inquiry/investigation for proceeding against the property (being proceeds of crime) under this Act by way of civil action (attachment and confiscation), there is no need to formally register an ECIR, unlike registration of an FIR by the jurisdictional police in respect of cognizable offence under the ordinary law. There is force in the stand taken by the ED that ECIR is an internal document created by the department before initiating penal action or prosecution against the person involved with process or activity connected with proceeds of crime. Thus, ECIR is not a statutory document, nor there is any provision in 2002 Act requiring Authority referred to in Section 48 to record ECIR or to furnish copy thereof to the Accused unlike Section 154 of the 1973 Code. The fact that such ECIR has not been recorded, does 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

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not come in the way of the authorities referred to in Section 48 of the 2002 Act to commence inquiry/investigation for initiating civil action of attachment of property being proceeds of crime by following prescribed procedure in that regard.” 31. When there are findings arrived at independently in both the FIR and ECIR, can the Court completely disregard those findings and bring the proceedings to an unjustified end just because one of the proceedings was quashed on procedural/technical grounds without due impetus to the substantive grounds? This question requires an in-depth consideration. 36. The Court's observations above hold that where a person is acquitted or absolved of a criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence and on establishing in a Court of law that the crime property is in legitimate ownership, such property cannot be termed as crime property and in consequence the PMLA offences loses its significance. Hence, to warrant a quashing of the ECIR, mere quashing of the FIR on technical grounds by itself does not make the ECIR liable to be quashed. That is not the observations set out in the Vijay Madanlal case. Rather in proceedings pertaining to the quashing of the FIR in a scheduled offence, the Court must have dealt with not mere procedural irregularities, but something more in the nature of substantive grounds. 37. The exact wordings of the Court culls out the object. That the accused person should have been acquitted or absolved from the allegations of criminal activity relating to the scheduled offence and that the crime property should be rightfully owned and possessed by him. So the essence of the observations made herein is that the accused person should be exonerated from the charges levelled against him. 39. Further, when the PMLA proceedings is set in motion and prima facie findings are already made, including completion of filing of chargesheet, then an FIR quashed after this stage cannot be a viable ground to quash the ECIR also. More so, the PMLA requires the presence of a scheduled offence to initiate proceedings under the Act. So it also becomes a mandate that the grounds on which scheduled 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

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offence was quashed is thoroughly examined before rendering the PMLA offence ineffective. 40. This Court is not venturing into the grounds of quashing an FIR as the principles pertaining to the same has already been laid down elaborately by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. But the rationale here is to cull out the level of bearing that a quashed FIR has on an proceedings challenging the ECIR. This Court feels that all cases where FIR is quashed shall not automatically become a ground for quashing an ECIR. Instead a case to case analysis is a pre requisite for deciding on the sustenance of an ECIR. To put it in comprehensive terms, When the Court in an FIR quash proceedings has not delved into the merits of the offence, but rather found technical errors on the face of it, then the Court directs the quashing of the said FIR. The accused then goes on to challenge the ECIR by placing reliance on the said FIR Quash order to quash the ECIR also. But a reading of relevant paragraphs in the Vijay Madanlal's case clearly showcases that this is not the object behind the said judgment. The final summarisation, when read in tandem with the observations set out in paragraphs of the judgment and also keeping in line with the explanation to Section 44 of the PMLA, 2002, this Court comes to the irresistible conclusion that cases where FIR pertaining to the scheduled offence is quashed it does not automate the exoneration of the accused from the predicate offence. Rather FIR quashes on grounds of mere technicalities or procedural irregularities in the FIR, cannot by itself form a basis to grant an automatic quash of ECIR. Also in the aforementioned instance, there needs to be a case to case examination of the offence registered under the PMLA before the offence is rendered ineffectual. 41. Hence, the moot point for consideration whether all cases where FIR has been quashed can pave way for quashing of ECIR? This Court feels that each case must be tested on its own, in consonance with the Vijay madanlal judgment and a blanket application of the principle without due regard to the facts of each and every case shall render both the judgment and the object of the PMLA ineffective. 44. Due to the above development, since the SFIO was already entrusted with the investigation by the 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 103 HC-KAR

Central Government vide order dated 09.04.2019 on the same set of allegations, the present FIR registered by the CBI was quashed by the High Court citing the aforementioned reason. Hence, it is amply clear that the High Court has quashed the FIR only on the ground that another Investigating Agency is seized off the matter. The Court has not dealt with the allegations nor tested the merits of the offences charged in the FIR. The Court restricted itself only to the ground of want of jurisdiction. Hence the FIR was quashed purely on this technical or procedural issue and not on substantive grounds and has not made any findings as to the offences or the prima facie allegations in the FIR. Therefore, the quashing of the FIR shall not warrant an automatic quashing of ECIR. All the more, the predicate offence under Section 447 of the Companies Act, 2013, which is also a scheduled offence under the PMLA still stands good and requires further investigation. Therefore, in view of the above ECIR is not liable to be quashed. … Emphasis supplied by this Court

6.59. By

relying

on

Vijayraj

Surana,

her

submission is that the Hon’ble Madras High Court has held that the quashing of an FIR relating to a scheduled offence does not, by itself, automatically warrant the quashing of the corresponding ECIR or termination of proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. She submits that the effect of quashing the FIR would depend upon the grounds on which it was quashed and

that

a

distinction

must

be

drawn

between quashing on technical or procedural 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 104 HC-KAR

grounds

and

exoneration

grounds

concerning

activity.

She

further

on

substantive

alleged

submits

criminal that

challenge to the said judgment before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Diary No. 43775 of 2024 came to be dismissed as withdrawn on 18.12.2024.

Relying

on

this

development,

she

seeks

to

subsequent support

proposition laid down by the Madras High Court

regarding

independent

consideration of proceedings under the PMLA. 6.60. She relies on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr.Manik Bhattacharya

vs.

Ramesh

Malik

and

others [2022 SCC OnLine SC 1465], more particularly paragraph 7 thereof which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 7. We cannot hold the arrest of the Petitioner by the Enforcement Directorate illegal as the issue of money-laundering or there being proceeds of crime had not surfaced before the Single Judge or the Division Bench of the High Court. Before us, however, it had been brought to our notice by Mr. Rohatgi in course of hearing on the question of interim order passed in the instant special leave petitions, that the Petitioner had been cooperating with investigation by the Enforcement Directorate and the CBI. While testing the legality of an arrest made by an 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 105 HC-KAR

agency otherwise empowered to take into custody a person against whom such agency considers subsistence of prima facie evidence of money-laundering, we do not think a general protective order directed at another investigating agency could have insulated the Petitioner from any coercive action in another proceeding started by a different agency, even if there are factual similarities vis-a-vis the allegations. Under The Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (“2002 Act”), money-laundering is an independent offence and in the event there is any allegation of the Enforcement Directorate having acted beyond jurisdiction or their act of arrest is not authorized by law, the Petitioner would be entitled to apply before the appropriate Court of law independently. But that question could not be examined in a Special Leave Petition arising from the proceedings in which the question of Money Laundering were not involved. … Emphasis supplied by this Court

6.61. By relying on Dr.Manik Bhattacharya, she submits that the offence of money laundering under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, is an independent offence and that proceedings initiated by the Enforcement Directorate are required to be considered independently of proceedings initiated by another investigating agency, even where the allegations in the two proceedings have factual similarities. She further submits that any challenge to the jurisdiction of the 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 106 HC-KAR

Enforcement Directorate or the legality of its action

under

independently

PMLA

examined

must

in

be

appropriate

proceedings and cannot be determined in proceedings

arising

out

of

an

unrelated

matter in which the question of money laundering was not involved. On this basis, she contends that the proceedings initiated by

present

Enforcement case

independently

Directorate

must in

be

accordance

in

considered with

provisions of the PMLA. 6.62. She relies on the judgment of Hon’ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in the case of Surjeet Kumar Bansal vs. Central

Bureau

of

Investigation

another

[2024:PHHC:045226],

04.04.2024,

more

particularly

and dtd

paragraphs

15, 16 and 18 which are reproduced here under for easy reference: 15. Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner has also asserted that since the proceedings in the FIR pertaining to the scheduled offence have been stayed by a Division Bench of this Court, the proceedings under PMLA would also have to be kept in abeyance to await the final outcome of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court. However, this plea is bereft of any merit and deserves to be rejected. While the 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 107 HC-KAR

scheduled offence is pivotal to the accusations of money laundering as has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in 23 of 25 Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:045226 2024:PHHC:045226 CRM-M57266-2023 (O&M) -24- Vijay Madanlal Choudhary's case (supra), the proceedings under PMLA are distinct and independent. Therefore, a stay on criminal proceedings in the FIR initiated by Respondent No.1-CBI would not extend to the proceedings for offences under PMLA, and they would have to await the outcome of the writ petition independently. 16. Furthermore, in the case of Sikandar Singh's case (supra) a Division Bench of this Court while relying upon Dr. Manik Bhattacharya's case (supra) concluded that Enforcement Directorate is not bound by the protective orders passed in FIRs of scheduled offences. Hence, in the light of the ratio of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme the Court and a Division bench of this Court, the case laws relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the Petitioner on this issue would not advance his cause, and this Court respectfully would disagree with those judgments. 18. Before parting, it needs to be emphasized that offences under PMLA constitute a category of their own and must be viewed 24 of 25 Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:045226 2024:PHHC:045226 CRM-M57266-2023 (O&M) -25- with utmost seriousness as such offences not only pose a serious danger to the economic health of the nation but also impede the progress of the country. Such offences are committed with intense planning and calculation, and camouflaged surreptitiously, necessitating investigating agency to go through the material collected with a fine comb so as to uncover the such scams which, if left unaddressed, would without doubt be fatal to economic health of the country. Thus, the rigors of Section 45 of the PMLA which lay down an exceptionally high yardstick for grant of bail under PMLA, must not be given a go-by. … Emphasis supplied by this Court

29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 108 HC-KAR

6.63. By relying on Surjeet Kumar Bansal, she submits

that

proceedings

under

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, are

distinct

proceedings

and

independent

relating

to

of

scheduled

offence. She contends that any stay or protective order operating in the proceedings concerning the scheduled offence does not, by itself, extend to or operate as a bar against

proceedings

initiated

by

Enforcement Directorate under the PMLA. She further submits that the proceedings under

PMLA

must

be

considered

and

that

statutory

independently

mandate of the Act, having regard to the serious economic consequences of money laundering, cannot be circumvented merely because the proceedings relating to the scheduled offence have been stayed or are pending adjudication. On this basis, she contends

that

proceedings

initiated

against the Petitioner under the PMLA are required to be considered independently, in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 109 HC-KAR

6.64. Though there are copies of several other judgments learned

which

counsel

have for

been

produced,

Respondent

is

not

adverted to it. 6.65. She concluded by submitting that the petition is required to be dismissed be relegating the Petitioner

to

statutory

remedies

available. 7.

Heard Sri D. R. Ravishankar, learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner and Ms. Anuparna Bordoloi, learned counsel for the Respondent and perused papers.

8.

The points that would arise for consideration are:

(i)

Whether the present writ petition is maintainable and deserves to be entertained under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India, notwithstanding statutory proceedings under Section 8 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and the availability of alternative remedies, particularly when Petitioner challenges the exercise of power under the Second Proviso to Section 5(1) of the said Act? 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 110 HC-KAR

(ii)

Whether the provisional attachment of the Petitioner’s properties, acquired under registered sale deeds dated 15.12.2004 and 28.03.2008, is sustainable in law when the alleged scheduled offence and the transactions said to have generated the proceeds of crime relate to the period 2011–2012, and whether such properties can be attached as properties of equivalent value under Section 2(1)(u), read with Section 5 of the PMLA, 2002?

(iii) Whether the Respondent has complied with the statutory conditions governing provisional attachment under Section 5(1) of the PMLA, 2002, including the requirement of recording reasons to believe on the basis of material in its possession and, where the Second Proviso is invoked, the requirement that non-attachment of property immediately is likely to frustrate proceedings under the Act? (iv) Whether the impugned attachment is vitiated by non-application of mind or want of a demonstrable nexus between the properties sought to be attached and the alleged proceeds of crime, having regard to the Petitioner’s contention that the amounts received from M/s. Hanuman Minerals represented partial repayment of monies advanced by him and that the properties were acquired before the alleged scheduled offence? 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 111 HC-KAR

(v)

Whether the Petitioner is entitled to the relief sought for quashing the impugned attachment order dated 29.10.2024 and the consequential proceedings initiated under Section 8 of the PMLA, 2002?

(vi) What Order? 9.

This Court answers the above points as follows:

10. Answer to Point No (i): Whether the present writ petition is maintainable and deserves to be entertained under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, notwithstanding the statutory proceedings under Section 8 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and the availability of alternative remedies, particularly when the Petitioner challenges the exercise of power under the Second Proviso to Section 5(1) of the said Act? 10.1. Sri D.R. Ravishankar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, submits that the availability

of

a

remedy

before

Adjudicating Authority does not, by itself, bar this Court from exercising its jurisdiction under

Articles

and

of

Constitution of India. 10.2. He relies on the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Jayamma v. The Directorate

of

Enforcement,

29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

[W.P.

- 112 HC-KAR

No.28108/2025],

decided

on

02.06.2026,

particularly paragraphs 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 38 to 42 and 47 to 50. Relying on Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others [(1998) 8 SCC 1] and Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise

and

Taxation

Officer-cum-

Assessing Authority and Others, [(2023) SCC

OnLine

SC

95],

as

discussed

in

Jayamma, he submits that the existence of an alternative remedy does not oust the constitutional

jurisdiction

of

this

Court.

Whether a writ petition should be entertained is a matter of judicial discretion. 10.3. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that non-compliance with the Second Proviso to Section 5(1) of the “PMLA” is a jurisdictional defect. Relying on paragraphs 30, 36 and 38 to 42 of Jayamma, he contends that the proceedings under Section 8 are directed at determining whether the attached property is involved in money-laundering and whether the attachment should be confirmed. They do not

provide

an

effective

remedy

for

examining whether the statutory conditions 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 113 HC-KAR

for invoking the Second Proviso to Section 5(1) were satisfied. He therefore submits that the Petitioner may invoke Article 226 to challenge the provisional attachment on that ground. 10.4. Applying the principle in Jayamma to the present case, learned Senior Counsel submits that the two properties were purchased in 2004

and

2008,

whereas

alleged

transactions relate to 2011–2012. According to him, the Respondent invoked the Second Proviso to Section 5(1) without adequately considering the dates and nature of the properties or identifying material connecting them with the proceeds of crime. He submits that the authorised officer must have reasons to believe, recorded in writing and based on material in his possession, that immediate attachment

is

necessary

because

non-

attachment is likely to frustrate proceedings under the PMLA. The registration of Crime No.90/2017, the initiation of proceedings under the PMLA or the inclusion of the Petitioner as an accused does not dispense with these statutory requirements. 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 114 HC-KAR

10.5. He also relies on Satish Motilal Bidri v. Union

of

India,[2024

SCC

OnLine

Ker

3410], particularly paragraph 18, in which the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala set aside an attachment of immovable property acquired in 2004, holding that an attachment which is ex facie beyond the authority of the statute may

be

challenged

under

Article

notwithstanding an alternative remedy. 10.6. Finally, learned Senior Counsel submits that the properties were acquired long before the alleged predicate offence and were not held outside India. He contends that they do not fall within the definition of “proceeds of crime” under Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA and that the attachment is therefore without foundational jurisdiction. On these grounds, he seeks interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10.7. Ms.

Anuparna

Bordoloi,

learned

counsel

appearing for the Respondent, submits that provisional attachment under Section 5(1) of the PMLA is an interim measure intended to preserve the property pending adjudication. 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 115 HC-KAR

Under Section 5(5), the authorised officer must file a complaint before the Adjudicating Authority within thirty days of attachment. She submits that the complaint has been filed, notice has been issued to the Petitioner and the Petitioner must pursue his objections before the Adjudicating Authority. 10.8. Learned counsel explains that, under Section 8, the Adjudicating Authority considers the noticee’s

reply,

hears

examines

relevant

parties

material

and

before

deciding whether the property is involved in money-laundering.

It

may

confirm

attachment or decline to do so. She further relies on Section 8(6), under which the property

is

to

be

released

if

establishes

that

no

offence

of

trial

money-

laundering has taken place or that the property is not involved in the offence. She submits

that

these

statutory

safeguards

make the remedy under the PMLA effective and that the Petitioner’s objections should be considered through that process. 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 116 HC-KAR

10.9. Ms. Bordoloi also refers to the pending proceedings before the Hon’ble Special Court in Special C.C. No.53/2025 under Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA. She submits that the Petitioner’s objections concerning the source and acquisition of the properties, and their alleged connection with the proceeds of crime,

should

be

raised

before

appropriate statutory forum. Entertaining the writ petition, she contends, would interrupt the statutory process. 10.10. She relies on Sri Krishna K.M. and Others v. The Directorate of Enforcement and Others, [W.P. No.7155/2026], decided on 18.03.2026,

particularly

paragraph

4,

in

which a Co-ordinate Bench observed that a challenge

to

provisional

attachment

was

premature before an order under Section 8 had been passed. She submits that the Petitioner

should

follow

statutory

procedure prescribed by the PMLA. 10.11. Learned

counsel

further

relies

on

following decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court: 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 117 HC-KAR

10.12. Titaghur

Paper

Mills

Co.

Ltd.

and

Another v. State of Orissa and Others, [(1983) 2 SCC 433], paragraph 6; 10.13. Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal v. Dunlop India Ltd. and Others, [(1985) 1 SCC 260], paragraph 3; 10.14. Bank of India v. Satyawati Tandon and Others, [(2010) 8 SCC 110], paragraphs 43 and 44; 10.15. Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan and

Others,

[(2001)

SCC

569],

paragraphs 5 and 6; and 10.16. Raj

Kumar

Shivhare

v.

Assistant

Director, Directorate of Enforcement and Another, [(2010) 4 SCC 772], paragraphs 31, 32 and 37. 10.17. Relying on these decisions, she submits that where a statute provides an effective remedy through

a

specialised

adjudicatory

and

appellate mechanism, the High Court should ordinarily decline to entertain a writ petition. Although the existence of an alternative 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 118 HC-KAR

remedy does not oust the jurisdiction under Article 226, exceptional circumstances must be shown to justify bypassing the statutory process. In the present case, the Petitioner may

raise

his

Adjudicating

objections

Authority,

before

appeal

to

Appellate Tribunal under Section 26 and, thereafter, invoke Section 42 of the PMLA. 10.18. Ms. Bordoloi also relies on Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, [(2023) 12 SCC

1],

particularly

paragraphs

174.16

onwards, regarding the statutory safeguards and

appellate

provisional

remedies available

attachment.

She

against

refers

to

Gautam Khaitan and Another v. Union of India and Another, [2025 SCC OnLine Del 8434], paragraphs 18, 19 and 22, in support of her submission that the availability of an alternative

remedy

is

consideration

when

deciding

a

relevant

whether

to

entertain a writ petition. She also relies on P. Balamurugan and Another v. Directorate of Enforcement, represented by Chennai Zonal Office-II and Another, [2025 SCC OnLine Mad 15158], paragraphs 13 to 15, to 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 119 HC-KAR

submit that the Petitioner should participate in the Section 8 proceedings and substantiate his contention that the attached properties are not proceeds of crime. 10.19. This Point requires the Court to consider two distinct questions: first, whether the writ petition is maintainable despite the remedies provided

under

PMLA;

and

second,

whether the petition should be entertained at this

stage.

compliance

The with

challenge

Second

concerning Proviso

to

Section 5(1) must be considered against the general

principles

governing

alternative

remedies. 10.20. The relevant facts are that the Respondent passed

Provisional

No.01/2024

dated

Attachment 29.10.2024

Order in

ECIR/MGSZO/04/2022 under Section 5(1) of the PMLA read with Rule 3 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering (Issuance of Provisional Attachment Order) Rules, 2013. The order provisionally attached properties belonging to four persons, including the two properties of the Petitioner, for a period of 180 days. A 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 120 HC-KAR

notice

under

Section

8,

bearing

OC

No.2482/2024 and dated 30.11.2024, was issued by the Registrar of the Adjudicating Authority.

The

Petitioner

is

arrayed

as

defendant No.3 in the notice, which refers to a

complaint

filed

under

Section

5(5).

Proceedings under Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA

are

also

pending

in

Special

C.C.

No.53/2025. The statutory scheme 10.21. Section 5(5) of the PMLA provides: “(5) The Director or any other officer who provisionally attaches any property under subsection (1) shall, within a period of thirty days from such attachment, file a complaint stating the facts of such attachment before the Adjudicating Authority.”

10.22. Section

8(1)

empowers

Adjudicating

Authority, upon receipt of the complaint, to issue

notice

calling

upon

person

concerned to explain the sources of income, earnings or assets from which the property was acquired, produce supporting evidence and show cause why the property should not be declared involved in money-laundering. 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 121 HC-KAR

10.23. Section 8(2) provides that the Adjudicating Authority shall consider the reply, hear the affected person and the authorised officer, and examine the relevant material before recording a finding on whether the property is

involved

in

money-laundering.

If

statutory conditions are satisfied, Section 8(3)

provides

for

confirmation

of

attachment. 10.24. An order of the Adjudicating Authority may be challenged before the Appellate Tribunal under

Section

26(1).

Section

26(3)

prescribes a period of forty-five days from receipt of the order and permits the Tribunal to entertain a delayed appeal where sufficient cause is shown. Section 26(4) empowers the Tribunal to confirm, modify or set aside the order appealed against. Section 42 provides for a further appeal to the High Court within sixty days on a question of law or fact arising from the Tribunal’s decision. 10.25. Section 8(6) also provides for release of the property

in

circumstances

specified

therein if the trial establishes that no offence 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 122 HC-KAR

of money-laundering has taken place or that the property is not involved in the offence. 10.26. The

PMLA

thus

provides

for

provisional

attachment, adjudication by the Adjudicating Authority, an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal and a further appeal to the High Court. The existence of this statutory mechanism is central to

deciding

whether

present

petition should be entertained.

Maintainability and entertainability 10.27. Maintainability

and

entertainability

are

distinct. The availability of an alternative remedy does not, by itself, exclude the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is, however, a relevant consideration when deciding whether that jurisdiction should be exercised. 10.28. In

Jayamma,

(paragraph

27),

Co-

ordinate Bench observed that “though a writ petition would be maintainable, however, whether the same could be entertained is a matter of judicial discretion” paragraph 29 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 123 HC-KAR

further states “it is for the court to decide as to whether it needs to entertain the petition and intervene or allow the proceedings under the statutory scheme to progress to a logical conclusion.” 10.29. The

same

principle

emerges

from

decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court relied upon by the Respondent. In Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan [(2001) 6 SCC

569]

(paragraph

6),

Hon’ble

Supreme Court observed “Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the court under Articles

and

of

Constitution,

nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction

under

said

constitutional

provisions.” 10.30. In Bank of India v. Satyawati Tandon [(2010) 8 SCC 110] (paragraph 44), the Hon’ble Supreme Court recognised the wide scope of the High Court’s jurisdiction while emphasizing “we cannot be oblivious of the 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 124 HC-KAR

rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 10.31. This Court therefore holds that the writ petition is maintainable. The question that remains is whether the circumstances justify entertaining it despite the remedies available under the PMLA. The rule of restraint and the statutory remedy 10.32. In Satyawati Tandon (paragraph 43), the Hon’ble Supreme Court stated that “the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person”. 10.33. In Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd. [(1985) 1 SCC 260] (paragraph 3), the Hon’ble Supreme Court cautioned that “Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit

or

circumvent

procedures.” 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

statutory

- 125 HC-KAR

10.34. The decisions recognise that interference may

nevertheless

be

warranted

in

exceptional circumstances, including where the vires of a statute is challenged or where the circumstances provide sufficient reason to bypass the statutory remedy. 10.35. Similarly, Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. (paragraph 6) emphasises the need to use an equally efficacious alternative remedy where the statute provides a chain of appeals. In Raj Kumar Shivhare (paragraph 31), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed “When a statutory

forum

is

created

by

law

for

redressal of grievance and that too in a fiscal statute,

a

writ

entertained

petition

ignoring

should

not

be

statutory

dispensation.” 10.36. These decisions arose in different statutory contexts, but the general principle applies here: where the legislature has provided an effective

adjudicatory

mechanism,

that

and

appellate

mechanism

should

ordinarily be followed unless the case falls within a recognised exception. 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 126 HC-KAR

10.37. The PMLA itself provides such a mechanism. As

noted

by

Co-ordinate

Bench

in

Jayamma (paragraph 41), Sections 5, 8 and 26 form a self-contained statutory scheme. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary, paragraphs 174.16 to 174.18, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

explained

Authority

is

not

that

final

Adjudicating authority

on

attachment; an order confirming provisional attachment may be appealed against before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 26(1), followed by a further appeal to the High Court under Section 42 on a question of law or fact. The safeguards under Section 8 and the appellate remedies are therefore integral to the statutory scheme.

The exceptions relied upon by the Petitioner 10.38. The Petitioner relies principally on three grounds

to

justify

entertaining

writ

petition despite the alternative remedy: (i) alleged

non-compliance

Proviso

to

Section

with 5(1),

Second

relying

on

Jayamma; (ii) ex facie illegality, relying on Satish Motilal Bidri; and (iii) an alleged 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 127 HC-KAR

absence of foundational jurisdiction because the properties are said not to fall within Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA. The

Second

Proviso

to

Section

5(1)

and

Jayamma

10.39. In Jayamma, the Co-ordinate Bench held that a challenge alleging non-compliance with the Second Proviso to Section 5(1) raises a jurisdictional issue (paragraph 30). It further reasoned that the proceedings under Section 8 do not provide a forum to examine that particular objection (paragraphs 38 to 41).

Accordingly,

alternative

remedy

prevent

writ

a

jurisdictional

existence

would

not,

petition

raising

challenge

from

of

by

an

itself,

such

a

being

entertained, subject to the circumstances of the case (paragraph 42). 10.40. This Court accepts the principle that an alleged

failure

to

satisfy

a

statutory

precondition governing the power to attach property may warrant judicial review, even where an alternative remedy exists. Whether 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 128 HC-KAR

the exception applies, however, depends on

facts

and

applicable

statutory

provisions. 10.41. In the present case, the Court’s conclusion on the applicability of the Second Proviso is based on its consideration of the statutory requirements and the material discussed under

Point

No.

(iii).

For

reasons

recorded there, the Court concludes that the First Proviso to Section 5(1) was satisfied and that invocation of the Second Proviso was not required in the circumstances of this case. The distinction from Jayamma is that, in that case, no final report had been forwarded

to

Magistrate

when

attachment was made, as noted in paragraph 48 of that decision. 10.42. On that basis, the exception founded on the alleged

non-compliance

with

Second

Proviso does not arise for consideration in the manner urged by the Petitioner. The related

submission

Authority

cannot

that

examine

Adjudicating

that

particular

procedural objection does not, by itself, 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 129 HC-KAR

establish

a

ground

for

entertaining

present petition. Ex facie illegality and Satish Motilal Bidri 10.43. In Satish Motilal Bidri (paragraph 18), the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala set aside the attachment

of

immovable

property

after

holding that it was “ex-facie, ultra vires the powers of the statute”. The Court observed that “ex facie illegal acts can be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy”. 10.44. The decision therefore recognises that an alternative

remedy

does

not

prevent

interference where the impugned action is demonstrably beyond the authority conferred by statute. Whether that principle applies here depends on the scope of Section 2(1)(u) and the legal basis on which the Respondent seeks to attach the properties. 10.45. It is not the Respondent’s case that the two properties themselves were directly derived or obtained from the alleged criminal activity. Her case, as presented, rests on the value 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 130 HC-KAR

limb of the definition of “proceeds of crime”. Whether the statutory requirements for such attachment

are

satisfied,

including

availability of the original proceeds and the value that may lawfully be attached, requires consideration of the applicable law and the material relating to the flow of funds. In these circumstances, the attachment cannot, at this stage, be treated as ex facie beyond the statute merely because the properties were acquired before the alleged predicate transactions.

The alleged absence of foundational jurisdiction 10.46. The Petitioner contends that the dates of acquisition Section

place

properties

2(1)(u)

of

outside

PMLA.

The

Respondent, however, relies on the value limb of that provision rather than asserting that the properties were themselves acquired directly from the alleged criminal activity. 10.47. The question is therefore not resolved solely by the dates of purchase. It also requires consideration

of

29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

statutory

basis

for

- 131 HC-KAR

equivalent-value attachment and the material relied upon by the Respondent. For the reasons discussed under Point No. (ii), this Court does not accept that acquisition of the properties offence,

before

alleged

predicate

by

itself,

establishes

that

Respondent

lacked

jurisdiction

to

attach

them. The Petitioner has consequently not demonstrated, on this ground alone, a clear absence

of

jurisdiction

warranting

interference under Article 226 at this stage.

Disputed facts and the appropriate forum 10.48. The Petitioner’s remaining objections concern the nature of the amounts received from M/s. Hanuman Minerals, his role as a stevedore, and whether the original proceeds of crime remain traceable or have been exhausted. The parties advance differing positions on these matters, which require examination of the relevant evidence. 10.49. Section

8(1)

expressly

provides

for

person concerned to explain the sources from which the property was acquired and to 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 132 HC-KAR

produce

supporting

evidence.

The

Adjudicating Authority must consider that material in accordance with Section 8(2). An adverse order may then be challenged before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 26(1), which has the power under Section 26(4) to confirm, modify or set aside the order. 10.50. In these circumstances, the disputed factual questions

are

appropriately

considered

through the statutory process rather than determined in the present writ petition.

The

other

decisions

relied

upon

by

Respondent 10.51. In Sri Krishna K.M. (paragraph 4), the Coordinate

Bench

observed

“The

right

to

challenge the order of attachment would arise only after an order is passed under Section

of

PMLA.

Therefore,

this

petition is too premature”. 10.52. The

decision supports the

principle that

objections to attachment should ordinarily be pursued through the statutory process. The precise stage of the Section 8 proceedings in 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 133 HC-KAR

present

case

must,

however,

be

determined from the relevant record. 10.53. In P. Balamurugan (paragraphs 13 to 15), the Hon’ble High Court of Madras emphasised that the affected person “has to participate in the enquiry once they receive notice and substantiate their plea that the property attached is not a proceeds of crime”. That decision reinforces the importance of placing the relevant evidence before the Adjudicating Authority. 10.54. In Gautam Khaitan (paragraphs 18, 19 and 22),

Hon’ble

High

Court

of

Delhi

considered the material placed before it but declined to interfere in view of the alternative remedy. These decisions support the view that the statutory remedy should ordinarily be pursued where the objections require examination of the evidence.

Proceedings before the Special Court 10.55. Ms. Bordoloi submits that the Petitioner may also raise his objections in Special C.C. No.53/2025.

Section

29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

8(6)

provides

for

- 134 HC-KAR

release of the property in the circumstances specified

therein,

and

Vijay

Madanlal

Choudhary (paragraph 174.13) recognises the role of the Special Court in determining whether the property is involved in moneylaundering. 10.56. It is unnecessary in this Point to determine the precise extent to which the Special Court may

reconsider

an

attachment

already

confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority. The statutory appeal against the Adjudicating Authority’s

order

remains

principal

remedy for challenging the confirmation of attachment.

Limitation and the appropriate appellate forum 10.57. Section 26(3) provides forty-five days from receipt of the Adjudicating Authority’s order for filing an appeal and permits the Appellate Tribunal to condone delay where sufficient cause

is

shown.

The

Petitioner

would,

however, be entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 135 HC-KAR

10.58. The

submission

of

Ms.

Bordoloi

that

entertaining the writ petition would derail the adjudication and investigation is not, by itself,

a

legal

bar

to

exercise

of

jurisdiction under Article 226. It is, however, a relevant consideration in deciding whether the Court should permit the statutory process to proceed. 10.59. For the reasons stated above, this Court answers Point No. (i) by holding that the writ petition is maintainable under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, since the remedies under Sections 8, 26 and 42 of the PMLA do not oust the constitutional jurisdiction

of

this

Court.

However,

Petitioner has not established an exceptional circumstance warranting interference at this stage. The alleged failure to comply with the Second Proviso to Section 5(1) does not, for the reasons recorded under Point No. (iii), warrant intervention in the present case. Nor has the Petitioner established an ex facie want of jurisdiction. The remaining objections substantially concern disputed facts and the application of the PMLA to the properties, 29/10/2026, 13:41, Bengaluru

- 136 HC-KAR

which

should

be

pursued

through

statutory process. 10.60. Accordingly, maintainable

though

it

does

writ

petition

not

is

warrant

entertainment at this stage, subject to the directions in the operative order. 11. Answer to Point No (ii): Whether the provisional attachment of the Petitioner’s properties, acquired under registered sale deeds dated 15.12.2004 and 28.03.2008, is sustainable in law when the alleged scheduled offence and the transactions said to have generated the proceeds of crime relate to the period 2011–2012, and whether such properties can be attached as properties of equivalent value under Section 2(1)(u), read with Section 5 of the PMLA, 2002?

11.1. Sri D.R. Ravishankar, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, submits that Apartment No. M401 was purchased under a registered sale deed dated 15.12.2004 (Document No. MGC-1-04805-2004-05,

CD

No.

MGCD19,

Sub-Registrar, Mangalore Town). The nonagricultural

immovable

property

held

on

Warg Right in Survey No. 23-1A2 of Derebail Village, Mangalore, was purchased under a 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 137 HC-KAR

registered

sale

deed

dated

28.03.2008

(Document No. MGC-1-05028-2008-09, CD No.

MGCD88

dated

19.01.2009,

Sub-

Registrar, Mangalore City). The transactions involving M/s. Hanuman Minerals and M/s. Manipal Global took place in 2011–2012. He contends that property acquired before the alleged criminal activity cannot be treated as proceeds of crime arising from that activity. 11.2. Relying on Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA learned

Senior

Counsel

submits

that

“proceeds of crime” means property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, the value of such property, or, where such property is taken or held outside the country, property of equivalent value held within the country or abroad. According to him,

neither

property

was

derived

or

obtained from criminal activity. He further contends that the value limb cannot be invoked because the Petitioner holds no property outside India. The attachment is therefore

contended

foundational jurisdiction. 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

to

be

without

- 138 HC-KAR

11.3. Learned Senior Counsel also submits that the Petitioner acted only as a stevedore and was a third party to the transactions between M/s. Hanuman Minerals and M/s. Manipal Global. He denies receiving proceeds of crime and maintains that the amounts received from

M/s.

Hanuman

Minerals

were

part

repayments of the sum of Rs.25,00,000 paid by him on 09.02.2011. He contends that the mere

invocation

of

scheduled

offences

against him does not establish that his properties are liable to attachment under the PMLA.

He

further

submits

that

Respondent failed to consider the dates of acquisition and identify material linking the properties to the alleged proceeds of crime. 11.4. He relies on Pavana Dibbur v. Directorate of

Enforcement,

[(2023)

SCC

91],

particularly paragraphs 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29 and 31, and advances the following propositions: 11.4.1.

The existence of proceeds of crime is a necessary condition for an offence 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 139 HC-KAR

under

Section

of

PMLA

(paragraphs 12 and 13). 11.4.2.

If all accused in the scheduled offence are acquitted or discharged, or the proceedings concerning the scheduled offence are quashed in their entirety, the scheduled offence ceases to exist for

purposes

as

explained

in

paragraph 18. The decision also refers to paragraph 109 of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary

v.

Union

of

India

[(2023) 12 SCC 1]. 11.4.3.

Property

acquired

constituting cannot,

merely

before

acts

scheduled

offence

by

of

reason

its

ownership, be treated as proceeds of crime

without

necessary

connection (paragraphs 19 and 31.3). 11.4.4.

Penal

statutes

construed.

must

Where

interpretations

consequences

two

are

interpretation

be

reasonable

available,

avoiding should

strictly

penal

ordinarily

preferred (paragraphs 27 and 28). 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

be

- 140 HC-KAR

11.4.5.

An

offence

of

criminal

conspiracy

under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code is a scheduled offence only where the conspiracy relates to the commission of an offence included in

Schedule

(paragraphs

and

31.5). 11.4.6.

Proceedings under the PMLA must rest on

offence

existence and

of

a

proceeds

scheduled of

crime

connected with it; suspicion alone is insufficient. 11.5. Learned Senior Counsel also relies on Satish Motilal Bidri v. Union of India, [2024 SCC OnLine Ker 3410], paragraphs 13 to 18. He submits that the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala held

that

property

acquired

before

scheduled offence could not be attached as property

of

equivalent

value

where

proceeds of crime had not been taken or held outside India. In paragraph 18, the Hon’ble High

Court

of

Kerala

set

aside

attachment of immovable property purchased 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 141 HC-KAR

in 2004, long before the alleged predicate offence. 11.6. Applying that decision, he contends that the Petitioner’s properties, purchased in 2004 and 2008, are not attachable. He further submits that the Respondent has neither identified proceeds of crime received by the Petitioner nor established a link between the properties and such proceeds. He maintains that the failure to consider these matters shows non-application of mind. 11.7. Ms. Anuparna Bordoloi, learned counsel for the Respondent, states that the Respondent does not allege that the properties purchased in 2004 and 2008 were themselves acquired from proceeds of crime. Her submission is that

original

proceeds

have

been

secreted or are no longer available and that

properties

provisionally equivalent

have

attached value

under

therefore as

been

properties

Section

of and,

according to her, confirmed under Section 8. 11.8. Learned counsel submits that M/s. Hanuman Minerals received Rs.2,30,00,000 from M/s. 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 142 HC-KAR

Manipal Global. Of this amount, Rs.53,80,000 was withdrawn in cash and Rs.96,00,000 was transferred to M/s. Phoenix International, from

whose

withdrawn

accounts

in

Rs.17,00,000

Rs.32,55,000

cash.

A

further

was

transferred

was

sum

of

to

Petitioner. 11.9. M/s.

Hanuman

concern

of

Minerals,

Girish

a

Sangappa

proprietary Jaggal,

is

defendant No.1 in the Section 8 proceedings. Sri Rohan Prakash Lotlikar, proprietor of M/s. Phoenix International, is defendant No.2, and the Petitioner is defendant No.3. Learned counsel submits that no substantial amount remains in the accounts of M/s. Hanuman Minerals or M/s. Phoenix International and that the original funds are no longer available in those accounts. 11.10. Ms. Bordoloi relies on Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Delhi v. Axis Bank

and

Others,[2019:DHC:1887],

paragraph 171. She submits that the PMLA permits attachment not only of property directly or indirectly derived from criminal 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 143 HC-KAR

activity relating to a scheduled offence, but also of other assets of equivalent value where

original

traced,

reached

proceeds

or

are

cannot

deficient.

be

Such

alternative property need not itself have been acquired from proceeds of crime. She further submits that the dates of acquisition do not, by themselves, determine whether property

of

equivalent

attached,

and

objections

should

that

value

be

may

relevant

examined

be

factual by

Directorate

of

Adjudicating Authority. 11.11. She

also

relies

on

Enforcement v. Prakash Industries Ltd., [2025 SCC OnLine Del 8243], paragraphs 34 to 40. She submits that the definition of “proceeds of crime” under Section 2(1)(u) is broad

and

covers

obtained

directly

tangible

or

property or

intangible.

derived

indirectly,

or

whether

Money-laundering

under Section 3 is a distinct and continuing offence

that

extends

to

processes

or

activities connected with the concealment, possession, acquisition or use of proceeds of crime, including their projection as untainted 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 144 HC-KAR

property.

According

to

her,

transformation or routing of tainted funds through

other

transactions

does

not

necessarily remove their tainted character. The date on which the attached property was acquired is therefore not, by itself, decisive. 11.12. Relying on Pavana Dibbur (paragraph 18), learned

counsel

submits

that

a

person

prosecuted under the PMLA need not also be an

accused

in

scheduled

offence,

provided the scheduled offence exists. She further points out that the Petitioner is named as accused No.3 in the charge sheet in Crime No.90/2017. She contends that the Petitioner’s claim that he acted only as a stevedore does not, by itself, exclude the applicability of the PMLA. 11.13. She

also

Choudhary which

refers

to

(paragraphs

recognises

that

Vijay

Madanlal

and

173),

definition

of

“proceeds of crime” includes the value of property derived from a scheduled offence and that the statutory scheme seeks to reach 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 145 HC-KAR

such proceeds irrespective of the person in whose name they are held. 11.14. Ms. Bordoloi refers to Satish Motilal Bidri (paragraphs

to

18),

discussion

of

Computer

Services

Limited

as

well

as

Vijay

Choudhary

and

Pavana

Bank,

Seema

including

Garg,

its

Satyam and

Axis

Madanlal

Dibbur.

She

submits that the question of attachment must be decided in accordance with the statutory

provisions

and

material

available in the proceedings. 11.15. Learned counsel also relies on Vijayraj Surana

v.

Assistant

Enforcement

Directorate,

Director, [2024

SCC

OnLine Mad 8404], paragraphs 27, 28, 29, 31, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41 and 44; Dr. Manik Bhattacharya

v.

Others,

SCC

[2022

Ramesh OnLine

Malik SC

and

1465],

paragraph 7; and Surjeet Kumar Bansal v. Central

Bureau

of

Investigation

and

Another, [2024:PHHC:045226], decided on 04.04.2024, paragraphs 15, 16 and 18. 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 146 HC-KAR

11.16. Relying on these decisions, she submits that proceedings under the PMLA are independent of proceedings relating to the scheduled offence. In particular, Vijayraj Surana holds that quashing an FIR on a technical ground does not automatically result in quashing the ECIR. The challenge to that decision before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was dismissed as withdrawn on 18.12.2024. Learned counsel submits that the PMLA proceedings must therefore be considered independently on their own material. 11.17. The

issue

has

two

aspects:

whether

properties acquired in 2004 and 2008 can be attached when the alleged scheduled offence and the transactions said to have generated the proceeds of crime relate to 2011–2012; and

whether

those

properties

may

be

attached as properties of equivalent value under Section 2(1)(u), read with Section 5 of the PMLA. 11.18. The Court must determine the scope of the statutory power. It is not required in this Point to decide disputed questions of fact 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 147 HC-KAR

that

fall

for

consideration

before

statutory authorities. The

Respondent’s

case

and

statutory

provisions 11.19. The Respondent’s case, as presented by Ms. Bordoloi, is that the properties were not acquired from proceeds of crime but were attached as properties of equivalent value because the original proceeds are no longer available. The dates of purchase support the distinction

between

properties

themselves,

and

alleged

proceeds

generated in 2011–2012. The question is whether the PMLA permits attachment of the properties

on

alternative

basis

as

advanced by the Respondent. 11.20. Section

2(1)(u)

of

PMLA

defines

“proceeds of crime” as follows: “‘proceeds of crime’ means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad;”

11.21. The Explanation to Section 2(1)(u) provides: 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 148 HC-KAR

“For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that ‘proceeds of crime’ include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence;”

11.22. The

definition

thus

addresses

property

derived or obtained from criminal activity, the value of such property, and property of equivalent

value

in

circumstances

specified in the provision. The Explanation clarifies

that

definition

also

covers

property derived or obtained indirectly from criminal

activity

relating

to

a

scheduled

offence. 11.23. Section 2(1)(v) defines “property” broadly as: “any property or assets of every description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible and includes deeds and instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such property or assets, wherever located”.

11.24. The two immovable properties in question fall within the general meaning of “property”. Whether they are attachable depends on the applicable limb of Section 2(1)(u) and the 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 149 HC-KAR

conditions

governing

attachment

under

Section 5. 11.25. Section 3 defines the offence of moneylaundering as follows: “Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of moneylaundering.”

11.26. Explanation (ii) to Section 3 states that: “the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever.”

11.27. These

provisions

distinguish

criminal

activity that generates proceeds of crime from the subsequent processes or activities connected with those proceeds. Existence of a scheduled offence 11.28. The Petitioner submits that there is no basis for invoking the PMLA against him. The 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 150 HC-KAR

record,

however,

shows

that

Crime

No.90/2017 was registered on 02.06.2017 and that a charge sheet was filed in which the Petitioner is arrayed as accused No.3. Paragraph 2.2 of the attachment order refers to

charge

sheet

No.08/2021

30.12.2021,

filed

by

of

Police,

Superintendent

FIU,

dated Deputy CID,

Bengaluru, before the Hon’ble Additional Civil Judge and ACJM Court, Udupi, against Sri Girish Jaggal, Sri Rohan Prakash Lotlikar and Sri S. Mahadevan. The order records that the offences fall within paragraph 1 of Part A of the Schedule. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner also accepts that certain scheduled offences have been invoked. 11.29. In Pavana Dibbur (paragraph 18), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “if the prosecution for the scheduled offence ends in the acquittal of all the accused or discharge of all the accused or the proceedings of the scheduled offence are quashed in its entirety, the scheduled offence will not exist”

11.30. The same paragraph further states: “Such an accused can still be prosecuted under PMLA so long as the scheduled offence exists.” 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 151 HC-KAR

11.31. Paragraph 15 of Pavana Dibbur, referring to paragraph

of

Vijay

Madanlal

Choudhary, also addresses the requirement that the scheduled offence be registered with the jurisdictional police or be pending inquiry by way of a complaint before the competent forum. Paragraph 382.8 of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary, as reproduced in paragraph 34 of Prakash Industries, states that the authorities cannot proceed: “on notional basis or on the assumption that a scheduled offence has been committed, unless it is so registered with the jurisdictional police and/or pending enquiry/trial”.

11.32. In the present case, the registration of the crime and filing of the charge sheet satisfy that threshold. If the scheduled offence later ends in one of the ways described in Pavana Dibbur, the legal consequences identified in that decision will follow. Nothing in this finding prejudges the outcome of the criminal proceedings. Independence of proceedings under the PMLA 11.33. The Respondent relies on Vijayraj Surana, Dr.

Manik

Bhattacharya

29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

and

Surjeet

- 152 HC-KAR

Kumar Bansal to submit that proceedings under the PMLA are distinct from those concerning the scheduled offence. 11.34. In Vijayraj Surana (paragraph 27), the Hon’ble High Court of Madras observed: “ECIR is born from FIR, but once the ECIR is born, the umbilical cord that connects the ECIR with FIR losses its relevance and the ECIR becomes an independent document in itself”

11.35. Paragraph 40 further states: “all cases where FIR is quashed shall not automatically become a ground for quashing an ECIR.”

11.36. Paragraph 29 refers to paragraph 457 of Vijay

Madanlal

Choudhary,

which

describes the ECIR as an internal document of the Enforcement Directorate. Paragraph 28 of Vijayraj Surana also refers to Rajinder Singh Chada v. Union of India [W.P. (CRL) 562/2023 & CRL.M.A. 5126/2023]. 11.37. In Dr. Manik Bhattacharya (paragraph 7), the Hon’ble Supreme Court stated that: “money-laundering is an independent offence”. 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 153 HC-KAR

11.38. In Surjeet Kumar Bansal (paragraphs 15 and 16), the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana held that proceedings under the PMLA are distinct and independent and that the Enforcement Directorate is not bound merely

by

protective

proceedings offence.

orders

concerning

Paragraph

passed

in

scheduled

discusses

seriousness of PMLA offences and Section 45, which is not directly in issue here. 11.39. The

challenge

dismissed

as

to

Vijayraj

withdrawn

by

Surana

was

Hon’ble

Supreme Court. That order does not amount to an affirmation of the reasoning on merits. The

decision

is

considered

here

for

its

persuasive value. 11.40. These authorities support the proposition that proceedings under the PMLA must be examined relevant

independently to

themselves,

that

Act.

establish

on

material

They

do

not,

that

by

Petitioner

committed money-laundering or that the properties are liable to attachment. Those 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 154 HC-KAR

questions must be determined under the PMLA and on the relevant evidence. The Petitioner’s role and the scheduled offence of conspiracy 11.41. In Pavana Dibbur (paragraph 17), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “it is not necessary that a person against whom the offence under Section 3 PMLA is alleged must have been shown as the accused in the scheduled offence”

11.42. Paragraph 18 reiterates the principle that a person need not be an accused in the scheduled offence for proceedings under the PMLA

to

be

maintained,

provided

scheduled offence exists. 11.43. The Petitioner is, in any event, arrayed as accused

No.3

in

charge

sheet.

His

contention that he acted only as a stevedore and

was

a

stranger

to

underlying

transactions involves factual questions that cannot be resolved merely on the competing submissions in this writ petition. Whether the material establishes the requisite connection 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 155 HC-KAR

with

proceeds

of

crime

remains

to

be

considered in the statutory proceedings. 11.44. The Petitioner also relies on Pavana Dibbur (paragraphs 29 and 31.5) concerning Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “the offence under Section 120-B IPC included in Part A of the Schedule will become a scheduled offence only if the criminal conspiracy is to commit any offence already included in Parts A, B or C of the Schedule.”

11.45. This proposition is accepted. Paragraph 2.1 of the attachment order records that Crime No.90/2017 was registered under Sections 120-B, 406, 417, 420, 465, 466, 467, 468, 471, 474 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Paragraph 2.2 records that the charge sheet invokes Sections 406, 417, 420, 465, 468 and 120-B read with Section 37, as stated in the order. The order identifies Sections 417, 420, 467, 471 and 120-B as scheduled offences under paragraph 1 of Part A of the Schedule. 11.46. Sections 417 and 420, relating to cheating, are included in paragraph 1 of Part A of the 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 156 HC-KAR

Schedule. The allegations recorded in the attachment order concern a conspiracy to cheat M/s. Manipal Global. On the face of the order, therefore, the requirement identified in Pavana Dibbur is met. This finding concerns only the existence of the scheduled offence for

present

purpose;

it

does

not

determine whether the charge sheet will succeed. Properties acquired before the alleged criminal activity 11.47. The Petitioner is correct to the extent that property purchased in 2004 or 2008 cannot itself have been derived or obtained from criminal activity alleged to have occurred in 2011–2012. 11.48. In Pavana Dibbur (paragraph 19), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed: “The first property, ex facie, cannot be said to have any connection with the proceeds of crime as the acts constituting the scheduled offence took place after its acquisition.”

11.49. Paragraph 31.3 reiterates that conclusion. This Court accepts that principle in relation to 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 157 HC-KAR

the first limb of Section 2(1)(u). On the Respondent’s own case, the two properties were not acquired from the alleged proceeds generated in 2011–2012. 11.50. That, however, does not conclude the present issue. The Respondent relies on the value limb of the definition and does not claim that the properties themselves were purchased with tainted funds. The question is whether the PMLA permits other property to be attached as property of equivalent value. 11.51. The context of Pavana Dibbur must also be noted.

The

Hon’ble

Supreme

Court

considered whether the properties in that case were proceeds of crime and stated in paragraph 19 that it had considered the issue “only in the context of the applicability PMLA”. It also held, in relation to the second property, that whether tainted money had been

used

could

be

decided

only

after

evidence was adduced (paragraph 19 and paragraph 31.4). Those observations support the distinction between a property’s direct derivation from criminal activity and factual 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 158 HC-KAR

questions requiring evidence. They do not, by themselves, resolve the separate question of equivalent-value attachment addressed in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary. 11.52. The

propositions

in

Pavana

Dibbur

(paragraphs 12 and 13) that proceeds of crime

are

essential to

the operation of

Section 3 are accepted. The existence and amount of the alleged proceeds, and their connection

with

persons

concerned,

remain matters to be established on the evidence. The value limb of Section 2(1)(u) 11.53. Sri

Ravishankar,

learned

Senior

Counsel,

submits that property of equivalent value may be attached only where the proceeds of crime have been taken or held outside India. The Hon’ble Supreme Court considered this argument in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (paragraph 172), observing: “It was also urged before us that the attachment of property must be equivalent in value of the proceeds of crime only if the proceeds of crime are situated outside India” 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 159 HC-KAR

11.54. The Hon’ble Supreme Court rejected that submission, holding: “This argument, in our opinion, is tenuous. For, the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ is wide enough to not only refer to the property derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, but also of the value of any such property.”

11.55. The same paragraph states: “The definition of ‘property’ as in Section 2(1)(v) is equally wide enough to encompass the value of the property of proceeds of crime.”

11.56. Paragraph 173 further explains that the statutory scheme: “addresses the broad objectives of the 2002 Act to reach the proceeds of crime in whosoever's name they are kept or by whosoever they are held.”

11.57. These observations answer the Petitioner’s argument that the value limb can operate only where the original proceeds are held outside India. This Court is bound by the interpretation

adopted

by

Hon’ble

Supreme Court. Accordingly, the absence of property held abroad does not, by itself, exclude attachment of other property of equivalent value under the PMLA. 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 160 HC-KAR

11.58. This conclusion does not mean that any property belonging to an accused may be attached

without

satisfying

statutory

requirements. The legal basis for equivalentvalue

attachment

governing

its

and

exercise

conditions

must

still

be

established.

Satish Motilal Bidri and Axis Bank 11.59. The

Petitioner relies strongly

on Satish

Motilal Bidri (paragraphs 13 to 18). In paragraph 13, the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala held that: “the only power to proceed against a property of equivalent value, which has no link with the predicate offence is, when the property was taken out or held out of India”.

11.60. In paragraph 18, it held that the attachment of immovable property purchased in 2004, long before the alleged predicate offence, was: “ex-facie, ultra vires the powers of the statute”. 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 161 HC-KAR

11.61. The judgment records that the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala was unable to agree with the view taken by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Axis Bank. The two decisions therefore differ on whether property unconnected with the predicate offence may be attached as property

of

equivalent

value

where

proceeds are not held outside India. 11.62. This Court resolves that conflict by applying

interpretation

in

Vijay

Madanlal

Choudhary (paragraph 172). Satish Motilal Bidri and Axis Bank are decisions of Hon’ble High

Courts

and

are

persuasive.

The

interpretation of Section 2(1)(u) in paragraph

of

Vijay

Madanlal

Choudhary,

however, is binding on this Court and directly addresses the argument that equivalentvalue attachment is permissible only when the proceeds are outside India. The Hon’ble Supreme

Court

expressly

rejected

Court

not

that

restriction. 11.63. Accordingly,

this

does

follow

Satish Motilal Bidri to the extent that it restricts

equivalent-value 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

attachment

to

- 162 HC-KAR

cases where the original proceeds are taken or held outside India. The principle in that decision that the PMLA cannot be used to attach properties unconnected with criminal activity

without

requirements

satisfying remains

statutory

relevant.

The

attachment must still have a lawful basis under

Act

indiscriminately

to

and

cannot

extend

all

properties

of

an

accused. 11.64. Paragraphs 295 and 296 of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary, on which Satish Motilal Bidri also relies, emphasise that: “the attachment must be only in respect of property which appears to be proceeds of crime and not all the properties belonging to the concerned person who would eventually face the action of confiscation of proceeds of crime”.

11.65. That

principle

paragraph

is

not

inconsistent

of

Vijay

with

Madanlal

Choudhary. Read together, the provisions do not permit the indiscriminate attachment of all property belonging to an accused. They permit attachment of property falling within the statutory definition, which includes the 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 163 HC-KAR

value of proceeds of crime, subject to the applicable requirements. 11.66. The

extract

from

Vijay

Madanlal

Choudhary also states: “The pivot moves around the date of carrying on the process and activity connected with the proceeds of crime; and not the date on which the property has been derived or obtained by the person concerned”.

11.67. Similarly, Prakash Industries (paragraph 34), reproducing the discussion in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Union of India through

Assistant

Director

v.

Kanhaiya Prasad, refers to the relevant date as: “The relevant date is the date on which the person indulges in the process or activity connected with such proceeds of crime.”

11.68. These observations do not make the date of acquisition irrelevant in every case. They show that the date of purchase alone does not determine whether property may be attached under the value limb of Section 2(1)(u). 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 164 HC-KAR

11.69. The discussion of Seema Garg and Satyam Computer Services Limited in paragraph 14 of Satish Motilal Bidri does not require a different conclusion. As described in Satish Motilal

Bidri,

Seema

property

acquired

Garg

before

held

that

scheduled

offence falls outside the first limb of the definition, while recognising that it may fall within the value limb. That distinction is consistent

with

conclusion

reached

above. 11.70. Satyam Computer Services Limited holds that the PMLA, being a statute dealing with substantive

rights,

has

no

retrospective

effect. Retrospective application has not been advanced as a separate ground of challenge in the present case. The attachment was made in 2024, in proceedings arising from an alleged scheduled offence of 2011–2012 and an ECIR of 2022. The issue before this Court is whether the properties may be attached under the statutory provisions applicable to the attachment, not whether a provision has been retrospectively applied. Paragraph 16 of Satish Motilal Bidri quotes Pavana Dibbur 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 165 HC-KAR

(paragraph 19), which has been considered above. Axis Bank and the limits of equivalent-value attachment 11.71. In Axis Bank (paragraph 171), the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi described attachment under the PMLA as follows: “The process of attachment (leading to confiscation) of proceeds of crime under the PMLA is in the nature of civil sanction which runs parallel to investigation and criminal action vis-avis the offence of money-laundering.”

11.72. Paragraph

171(iii)

states

that

enforcement officer may attach: “any other asset or property of equivalent value of the offender of money-laundering, the latter not bearing any taint but being alternative attachable property (or deemed tainted property) on account of its link or nexus with the offence (or offender) of money-laundering.”

11.73. Paragraph

171(iv)

further

provides

that

where the tainted property: “is not traceable, or the same for some reason cannot be reached, or to the extent found is deficient, the empowered enforcement officer may attach any other asset…of the person accused of offence of money-laundering, provided it is near or equivalent in value to the former”. 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 166 HC-KAR

11.74. Paragraph 171(ii) requires the officer: “to assess, even if tentatively, the value of proceeds of crime”

11.75. Paragraph 171(v) states that: “the burden of proving facts in support of such claim is to be discharged by him.”

11.76. These principles are consistent with the interpretation of Section 2(1)(u) in paragraph

of

Vijay

Madanlal

Choudhary.

Equivalent-value attachment is permissible where the statutory conditions are met, but it is not an unrestricted power to attach any asset belonging to an accused. 11.77. The Petitioner also relies on the principle of strict

construction

of

penal

statutes.

In

Pavana Dibbur (paragraph 28), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed: “if two reasonable interpretations can be given to a particular provision of a penal statute, the Court should generally adopt the interpretation that avoids imposition of penal consequences.”

11.78. The principle of strict construction stated in paragraph 27 of Pavana Dibbur is accepted. However, the interpretation advanced by the 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 167 HC-KAR

Petitioner, that equivalent-value attachment is available only when the original proceeds are held outside India, cannot be accepted in view of paragraph 172 of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary. 11.79. The remaining clauses of paragraph 171 of Axis

Bank,

concerning

RDBA,

SARFAESI Act, the Insolvency Code, secured creditors and bona fide third-party claimants, do not arise for decision here. The Petitioner is not claiming as a creditor or as a bona fide purchaser from the accused. He is arrayed as accused No.3 in the scheduled offence and defendant No.3 in the Section 8 proceedings. In

any

event,

statutory

basis

and

must

be

Respondent;

conditions

for

attachment

established

by

Petitioner’s objections must be assessed in accordance with the applicable provisions and the evidence. Prakash Industries 11.80. The

Respondent

Industries

relies

on

Prakash

(paragraphs

to

40).

Paragraph 38 states that the words “directly 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 168 HC-KAR

or indirectly” are important because the definition

under

Section

2(1)(u)

extends

beyond the immediate consequence of the crime

to

subsequent

transformation,

layering and manifestation of illicit financial gain. Paragraph 40 states that: “the offence of money laundering being continuing in nature is not confined only to the initial act of criminal acquisition but also extends to every process or activity connected with the proceeds”.

11.81. These

observations

support

broad

meaning of property and the continuing nature of processes or activities connected with proceeds of crime. They do not establish that the Petitioner’s properties, acquired in 2004 and 2008,

are

themselves tainted

property. The Respondent does not advance that case. The decision is relevant only to the extent that it explains the breadth of the statutory definition and the continuing nature of the processes connected with proceeds of crime. 11.82. Whether the conditions for equivalent-value attachment are satisfied in the present case depends on the material relating to the 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 169 HC-KAR

alleged flow of funds and the availability of the original proceeds. Under Axis Bank (paragraph 171(ii) to (v)), the authorised officer must have a basis to conclude that the tainted property is untraceable, cannot be reached or is deficient, and must make a tentative assessment of its value. 11.83. The

Respondent

relies

on

alleged

movement of funds from M/s. Manipal Global to M/s. Hanuman Minerals, M/s. Phoenix International

and

Petitioner.

The

Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that

Rs.17,00,000

received

by

him

represented part repayment of his advance. Whether that amount constitutes proceeds of crime, whether the original proceeds are unavailable, and whether the value of the attached properties is within the value of the alleged proceeds are factual matters to be examined by the Adjudicating Authority and, where appropriate, the Appellate Tribunal. 11.84. Paragraph

3.6

of

attachment

order

records the Respondent’s calculation of the alleged proceeds of crime as Rs.2,20,00,000, 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 170 HC-KAR

being an advance of Rs.2,30,00,112 less Rs.10,00,000 repaid. It records that the money was withdrawn in cash or transferred to others and that, as on 28.10.2024, the balances in the accounts of M/s. Hanuman Minerals and M/s. Phoenix International were Rs.70,608.37 and Re.1, respectively. The order

records

that

assets

valued

at

Rs.1,02,02,223 were attached “in lieu of” the alleged proceeds of crime. 11.85. The Petitioner’s two properties are valued in the order, at cost price, at Rs.6,97,000 and Rs.10,00,000,

respectively,

Rs.16,97,000.

The

aggregating

Petitioner

has

not

contended that the value of these properties exceeds the alleged proceeds of crime. The figures recorded in the order show the basis on which the Respondent claims to have invoked the value limb of Section 2(1)(u). 11.86. These

figures

are

recorded

as

Respondent’s case; this Court does not make a final finding that the amounts, account balances or valuations are correct. Their evidentiary basis and the satisfaction of the 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 171 HC-KAR

statutory conditions remain matters for the statutory authorities. The limited conclusion here

is

that

properties’

dates

of

acquisition and the absence of property held abroad do not, by themselves, place the attachment outside the scope of Sections 2(1)(u) and 5 of the PMLA. 11.87. The provisional attachment of the Petitioner’s properties is not unsustainable in law merely because

they

were

purchased

under

registered sale deeds dated 15.12.2004 and 28.03.2008, before the alleged scheduled offence and the transactions of 2011–2012. The properties cannot themselves be treated as having been derived or obtained from criminal activity that occurred later, and the Respondent does not claim that they were directly acquired from the alleged proceeds of crime. 11.88. However, Section 2(1)(u), read with Section

of

property

PMLA, of

permits

equivalent

attachment

value

where

of

statutory requirements are satisfied. That interpretation follows from Vijay Madanlal 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 172 HC-KAR

Choudhary (paragraphs 172 and 173) and Axis Bank (paragraph 171). This Court does not follow Satish Motilal Bidri to the extent that it restricts equivalent-value attachment to cases where the original proceeds of crime are taken or held outside India. 11.89. Whether

original

proceeds

are

unavailable, whether the amounts received by

Petitioner

constitute

proceeds

of

crime, and whether the statutory conditions for attachment are otherwise satisfied must be

determined

on

evidence

by

Adjudicating Authority and, subject to the statutory remedies, the Appellate Tribunal. 11.90. Accordingly, this Court answers Point No. (ii) by holding that the dates of acquisition do not,

by

themselves,

invalidate

attachment as one of equivalent value; the factual and statutory conditions for such attachment remain subject to adjudication under the PMLA. 12. Answer to Point No (iii): Whether the Respondent has complied with the statutory conditions governing provisional attachment under Section 5(1) of the PMLA, 2002, 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 173 HC-KAR

including the requirement of recording reasons to believe on the basis of material in its possession and, where the Second Proviso is invoked, the requirement that nonattachment of the property immediately is likely to frustrate proceedings under the Act?

12.1. Sri D.R. Ravishankar, learned Senior Counsel for

Petitioner,

Respondent

submits

attached

that

properties

mechanically and without sufficient basis. According

to

him,

Respondent

was

required to identify the proceeds of crime before attaching any property. Failure to do so,

he

contends,

demonstrates

non-

application of mind. 12.2. In brief, the learned Senior Counsel submits that the officer must record in writing, on the basis of material in his possession, reasons to believe that failure to attach the property immediately is likely to frustrate proceedings under

Act.

These

are

mandatory

conditions and not mere formalities. The registration

of

Crime

No.90/2017,

commencement of proceedings under the PMLA, or the Petitioner’s inclusion as an 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 174 HC-KAR

accused cannot, by themselves, dispense with these requirements. 12.3. Ms. Anuparna Bordoloi, learned counsel for the Respondent, submits that the CID filed a charge sheet after investigation, arraigning the Petitioner as an accused in respect of scheduled offences. The Respondent was, therefore, entitled to exercise its powers under Section 5 of the PMLA. She relies on Section 5 in support of the attachment. 12.4. Learned counsel submits that an authorised officer

may

provisionally

attach

property

where, on the basis of material in his possession

and

for

reasons

recorded

in

writing, he has reason to believe that a person possesses proceeds of crime and that those proceeds are likely to be concealed, transferred or otherwise dealt with in a manner

that

may

frustrate

confiscation

proceedings. The Second Proviso permits immediate

attachment

where

non-

attachment is likely to frustrate proceedings under the Act. 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 175 HC-KAR

12.5. The purpose of provisional attachment, she submits, is to preserve the property and prevent its transfer or disposal while the proceedings are pending. Otherwise, third parties may acquire interests in the property, complicating

subsequent

recovery.

She

further submits that the complaint was filed before the Adjudicating Authority within the period of 30 days prescribed by Section 5(5). 12.6. Learned counsel relies on Gautam Khaitan and

Another

Another,

v.

[2025

Union

of

India

and

SCC

OnLine

Del

8434]

(paragraphs

18,

and

22),

which

reproduces

paragraphs

and

of

Directorate of Enforcement v. Hi-Tech Mercantile

India

Pvt.

Ltd.,

[LPA

No.588/2022], decided on 17.10.2025. She submits that the First Proviso is a statutory precondition where that proviso applies, but it does not confine the Respondent’s inquiry to the period or transactions covered by the report or complaint. The First and Second Provisos operate independently. Accordingly, the dates on which the Petitioner acquired the properties, or the period covered by the 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 176 HC-KAR

investigation into the scheduled offence, do not by themselves invalidate the attachment. Its legality must be examined with reference to Section 5(1), the material available to the officer

and

grounds

raised

by

counsel

also

relies

on

P.

Petitioner. 12.7. Learned

Balamurugan and Another v. Directorate of Enforcement, represented by Chennai Zonal Office-II and Another, [2025 SCC OnLine Mad 15158] (paragraphs 13 to 15). She submits that provisional attachment is a preventive measure intended to prevent the concealment, transfer or disposal of property. Where the authorised officer has recorded the requisite reasons to believe and the statutory conditions are satisfied, attachment may be ordered without prior notice. The affected person is afforded an opportunity to respond at the stage of proceedings under Section 8. 12.8. Relying on Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union

of

India,

[(2023)

SCC

1]

(paragraphs 162, 163 and 174), learned 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 177 HC-KAR

counsel submits that provisional attachment under Section 5 need not invariably await prior

registration

concerning

of

a

criminal

case

scheduled

offence.

The

authorised officer may act to preserve the proceeds

of

proceedings

crime from

and

being

prevent

frustrated.

The

expression “proceeds of crime” includes the value of property derived from the scheduled offence, and the statutory scheme applies irrespective of the person in whose name such proceeds are held. 12.9. She

further

submits

that

provisional

attachment is subject to the safeguards under the Act. The Adjudicating Authority considers the objections under Section 8, and an order confirming attachment may be challenged

before

Appellate

Tribunal

under Section 26 and thereafter before this Court under Section 42. The Petitioner can raise his objections concerning the source and date of acquisition of the properties before the Adjudicating Authority. Scope of this Point 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 178 HC-KAR

12.10. Point No. (ii) concerns the nature of property that may be attached. The present Point concerns

compliance

with

statutory

requirements governing the exercise of the power

of

provisional

attachment

under

Section 5(1). 12.11. The

provisional

attachment

order

dated

29.10.2024 (Annexure-A) is on record and has been examined. This Point is decided with reference to that order, the statutory provisions and the submissions of learned counsel. Statutory requirements 12.12. Section 5(1) of the PMLA reads: “Where the Director or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorised by the Director for the purposes of this section, has reason to believe (the reason for such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession, that— (a) any person is in possession of any proceeds of crime; and (b) such proceeds of crime are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceedings relating to confiscation of such proceeds of crime under this Chapter, he may, by order in writing, provisionally attach such property for a period not exceeding one hundred and eighty days from the date of the order, in such manner as may be prescribed:” 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 179 HC-KAR

12.13. The First Proviso states: “Provided that no such order of attachment shall be made unless, in relation to the scheduled offence, a report has been forwarded to a Magistrate under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or a complaint has been filed by a person authorised to investigate the offence mentioned in that Schedule, before a Magistrate or court for taking cognizance of the scheduled offence, as the case may be, or a similar report or complaint has been made or filed under the corresponding law of any other country:”

12.14. The Second Proviso states: “Provided further that, notwithstanding anything contained in first proviso, any property of any person may be attached under this section if the Director or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorised by him for the purposes of this section has reason to believe (the reasons for such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession, that if such property involved in money-laundering is not attached immediately under this Chapter, the non-attachment of the property is likely to frustrate any proceeding under this Act.”

12.15. These

provisions

require

authorised

officer to act on material in his possession and record in writing reasons to believe that a person is in possession of proceeds of crime and that the statutory conditions for attachment are satisfied. The First Proviso ordinarily requires a report or complaint 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 180 HC-KAR

concerning the scheduled offence to have been filed before attachment. The Second Proviso permits attachment notwithstanding that requirement, but only where the officer records the prescribed reasons for believing that non-attachment immediately is likely to frustrate proceedings under the Act. 12.16. Section

5(2)

requires

officer,

“immediately after attachment under subsection (1)”, to “forward a copy of the order, along with the material in his possession” to

Adjudicating

envelope.

Authority

Section

5(4)

in

a

sealed

provides

that

“Nothing in this section shall prevent the person interested in the enjoyment of the immovable property attached under subsection (1) from such enjoyment.” Section 5(5), considered under Point No. (i), requires

complaint

to

be

filed

before

Adjudicating Authority within 30 days. 12.17. The

relevant

whether

authorised

questions

are,

order

made

officer;

was

whether

therefore, by

an

reasons

to

believe were recorded in writing on the basis 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 181 HC-KAR

of material in his possession; whether the statutory conditions under the applicable proviso

were

met;

and

whether

procedural requirements were complied with. The

attachment

order

and

material

considered 12.18. The

Provisional

Attachment

Order

No.01/2024 is signed by Sri J. Sarveshwaran, Deputy Director, Mangaluru Sub-Zonal Office. It states that the order was made under Section 5(1), pursuant to Notification No. GSR

441(E)

dated

01.07.2005

and

an

authorisation dated 07.02.2007. On its face, therefore, the order identifies the officer and the authority under which he acted. 12.19. The order refers to the FIR, the charge sheet,

ECIR

recorded

on

28.03.2022,

statements recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA, including the Petitioner’s statement dated

28.03.2024,

relevant

bank

accounts and the movement of funds. 12.20. At paragraph 5.1, the officer records that he considered the facts and material placed 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 182 HC-KAR

before him by the Investigating Officer and identifies 36 documents. These include the FIR, the charge sheet, stock certificates dated

23.01.2012,

under

Section

statements

recorded

50,

bank

statements,

registered

documents

and

encumbrance

certificates

relating

to

Petitioner’s

properties, and a debtor-based search report dated 26.10.2024. 12.21. The officer records his “reasons to believe” that the accused, including the Petitioner, possess the “value of any such property” in lieu of proceeds of crime. He further records that

failure

immediately

to may

attach

frustrate

properties confiscation

proceedings under Chapter III. The reasons given include the possibility of funds in bank accounts being diverted or withdrawn, the likely duration of the trial and the risk that transfers of properties to third parties could make recovery difficult. The order directs attachment for 180 days and states that it may cease to have effect after that period or upon an order under Section 8(3), whichever is earlier. 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 183 HC-KAR

Compliance with the First Proviso 12.22. The

record

establishes

that

Crime

No.90/2017 was registered on 02.06.2017 and that a charge sheet was subsequently filed, naming the Petitioner as accused No.3. 12.23. Paragraph 2.2 of the attachment order, as well

as

document

documents,

No.3

records

Superintendent

in

that

of

Police,

its

list

of

Deputy

FIU,

CID,

Bengaluru, filed charge sheet No.08/2021 dated

30.12.2021

before

Hon’ble

Additional Civil Judge and ACJM Court, Udupi. 12.24. On the material available, the

statutory

precondition under the First Proviso was satisfied before the attachment order was made. Applicability

of

Jayamma

and

Second

Proviso 12.25. In

Jayamma

v.

Directorate

of

Enforcement [W.P. No.28108/2025, decided on

02.06.2026],

Co-ordinate

Bench

considered the requirements of the Second Proviso in circumstances where “no Final 29/10/2026, 13:42, Bengaluru

- 184 HC-KAR

Report has been forwarded to the Magistrate” (paragraph

48).

It

identified

requirements that the officer “Has reason to believe which is recorded in writing and on the basis of material in his possession” and that “if such property

involved

in

attached

immediately,

money

laundering

is

not

non-attachment

of

property is likely to frustrate any proceedings under the Act.”

12.26. Paragraph 49 of Jayamma confirms that the challenge in that case concerned the exercise of power under the Second Proviso. This Court

accepts

stated

requirements.

However, the material circumstance here is different: the charge sheet in the scheduled offence had alre

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