Mukesh & Anr. v. State for Nct of Delhi & Ors.

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
5 May 2017
Judge
Justice Dipak Misra
Neutral citation
2017 INSC 448
Reported in
[2017] 6 S.C.R. 1
Result
Dismissed
Acts & sections
Section 235 CrPC, Section 376 IPC, Section 354 CrPC, Section 27 Evidence Act, Section 313 CrPC, Section 120A IPC, Section 164 CrPC, Section 53A CrPC
Subject
Criminal, Service

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Full judgment

[2017] 6 S.C.R. l

MUKESH & ANR.

v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. (Criminal Appeal Nos. 607-608 of 2017) MAYOS,2017

[DIPAK MISRA, R. BANUMATHI AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860: ss.120B, 365/366, 307, 3 76(2)(g), 3 77, 302/1208, 395 Conviction and death sentence - Nirbhaya case - Forcible sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix, one after the other by six persons and insertion of iron rod in her private parts and thereafter throwing her out of moving bus along with informant - Prosecutrix '.s alimentary canal from the level of duodenum upto 5 cm of anal sphincter was completely damaged - It was beyond repair Septicemia was the direct result of multiple internal injuries - The conduct of the accused in committing such heinous offences with the prosecutrix in concert with each other and thereafter throwing her out of the bus in an unconscious state alongwith PW-I unequivocaly bring home the charge u/s.1208 in case of each of them - The criminal acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy is evident from the acts and also the word.~ uttered during the commission of the offence - Evidence on record lead to a singular conclusion that the accused persons were guilty of criminal conspiracy - RecovelJ' of articles belonging to the informant and prosecutrix from the custody of the accused persons founded on the disclosure statements of accused was relevant circumstance against the appellants - The chain of events described by the prosecutrix in her dying declarations coupled with the testimonies of the other witnesses clearly established that as soon as the informant and the prosecutrix boarded the bus, the accused persons formed an agreement to commit heinous offences against the victim - No inte1j'erence with the concurrent findings of lower courts called for - Evidence Act, 1872 - s.10 - Crime against women. s.1208 - Rationale behind- Held: Conspiracy is a clandestine activity - Persons generally do not form illegal covenants openly -

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In the interest of security, a person may carry out his part of a compiracy without even being informed of the identity of his coconspirators - An agreement of this kind can rarely be shown by direct proof; it must be inferred ji-om the circumstantial evidence of co-operation between the accused - ft becomes clear that the prosecution must adduce evidence to prove that: the accused agreed to do or caused to be done an act; such an act was illegal or was to be done by illegal means within the meaning of !PC: irrespective of whether some overt act was done by one of the accused in pursuance of the agreement.

s.30211208 - Conspiracy - In achieving the goal of the conspiracy, several offences committed by some of the conspirators may not be known to others, still all the accused will be held guilty of the offence of criminal conspiracy - Use of iron rod by one or more of the accused was sufficient to inculpate all the accused for the same - Gang rape and use of iron rod caused grave injuries to D victims vagina and intestines: throwing her out of the bus in that vegetative state in chilled weather led to her death: all this taking place in the course of same transaction and with the active involvement of all the accused was sufficient evidence to find the accused guilty of criminal conspiracy - The findings of the courts below with regard to conviction of all the accused u/s.120-8 and E s.302 rlw s.1208 is affirmed. (R. 8anumathi, J.)

s.376(2)(g), Explanation l - Essential ingredients - Held: In order to establish an offence under s.376(2)(g) rlw Explanation l thereto, the prosecution must adduce evidence to indicate that more than one accused had acted in concert and in such an event, if F rape is committed by even one, all the accused are guilty, irrespective of the fact that only one or more of them had actually committed the act - s.376(2)(g} rlw Explanation l thus embodies a principle of joint liability. (R. 8anumathi, J) Sentence/Sentencing:

Death sentence - Mitigating and aggravating circumstances - Held: In the instant case, the mitigating factors highlighted by the appellants pertain to the strata to which these accused belong, the aged parents, marital status and the young children and the suffering they would go through and the calamities they would face in case

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

of affirmation of sentence, their conduct while they are in custody and the reformative path they have chosen and their transformation and the possibility o.f reformation - The brutal, barbaric and diabolic nature of the crime is evincible fi"om the acts committed by the accused persons, viz., the assault on the informant with iron rod and tearing off his clothes; assaulting the informantand the deceased with hands, kicks and iron rod and robbing them of their personal belongings like debit cards, ring, informant's shoes, etc.; attacking the deceased by forcibly disrobing her and committing violent sexual assault by all the appellants; their brutish behaviour in having anal sex with the deceased and forcing her to pe1jorm oral sex; injuries on the body of the deceased by way of bite marks and insertion of rod in her private parts that, inter alia, caused pe1joration of her intestine which caused sepsis and, ultimately, led to her death - The accused persons had found an object for enjoyment in her and, as is evident, they were obsessed with the singular purpose sans any feeling to ravish her as they liked, treat her as they felt and, the gross sadistic and beastly instinctual pleasures came to the forefi"ont when they, ajler ravishing he1; thought it to be just a matter of routine to throw her alongwith her friend out of the bus and crush them The casual manner with which she was treated and the devilish manner in which they played with her identity and dignity is hwnan(F inconceivable - The appetite for sex, the hunger for violence, the position of the empowered and the attitude of perversity are bound to shock the collective conscience which knows not what to do The aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances brought on record - Therefore, the High Court correctly confirmed the death penalty - No inte1ference called for - Crime against 1vomen.

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Death sentence - Rarest of rare cases - In the instant case, gruesome offences were committed with highest viciousness Human lust was allowed to take such a demonic fonn - The accused may not be hardened criminals; but the cruel manner in which the gang-rape was committed in the moving bus; iron rod~ were inserted G in the private parts of the victim; and the coldness with which both the victims were thrown naked in cold winter night shocks the collective conscience of the society - The instant case clearly comes within the catego1y of 'rarest of rare case' where the question of

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any other punishment is 'unquestionably foreclosed· - If the dreadfulness displayed by the accused in committing the gang-rape, unnatural sex, insertion of iron rod in the private parts of the victim does not fall in the 'rarest of rare categ01:v ', then one may wonder what else would fall in that category - Penal Code, I 860. (R. Banumathi, J.) Mitigating and aggravating circumstances - Question of awarding sentence is a matter of discretion and has to be exercised on consideration of circumstances aggravating or mitigating in the individual cases - Protection of society and deterring the criminal is the avowed object of law - While determining sentence in heinous crimes, courts ought to weigh its impact on the society and impose adequate sentence considering the collective conscience or society:~ c1y for justice - While considering the imposition of appropriate punishment, courts should not only keep in vie1v the rights of the criminal but also the rights of the victim and the society at large. (R. Banumathi, J.) Delay/Laches - Delay in registration of FIR - Effect on prosecution case - Held: Delay in setting the law into motion by lodging of complaint in court or FIR at police station is normally viewed by courts with suspicion because there is possibility of concoction of evidence against an accused - Therefore, it becomes necessary for the prosecution to satisfactorily explain the delay In the instant case, the victim was seriously injured and giving medical treatment to her was of prime importance - PW-1 himself was injured and was admitted to hospital and, therefore, no delay can be said to have been caused in registering the FIR.

FIR - Non-mentioning of assailants in FIR - Effect on prosecution case - Held: It is settled law that FIR is not an encyclopedia of facts and it is not expected ji-om a victim to give details of the incident either in the FIR or in the brief hist01y given to the doctors - It may be suj)lcient if the broad facts of the G prosecution case alone appear - It cannot be said that merely because the names of the accused persons were not mentioned in the FIR, it raises serious doubts about the prosecution case in the light of injuries on PW-I '.I· person and the gruesome acts against the victim must have put him in a traumatic condition and it would H not have been possible for him to recall and narrate the entire

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

incident to the police at one instance.

Evidence: Related witness, testimony of - Evidentiary value - Held: The evidence of a witness is not to be disbelieved simply because he is a partisan witness or related to the prosecution - It is to be weighed whether he was present or not and whether he is telling the truth or not - In the instant case, when informant-PW-I was first examined, his friend (the prosecutrix) was critically injured and he was in a shockea mental condition - PW-1, in his deposition, clearly spoke about the occurrence and also corroborated his complaint - The evidence of PW-1 was unimpeachable in character and the roving cross-examination did not erode his credibility - The injuries found on the person of PW-I lent assurance to his testimony that he was present at the time of the occurrence along with the prosecutrix.

Testimony ofprime witness - Allegation that testimony of PW! was not trustworthy as it was not believable that he did not try to D resist the assailants - Held: The accused persons were in group and were also armed with iron rods - PW-1 was held by them - It would not have been possible for PW-1 to resist the number of' accused persons and save the prosecutrix - The evidence of PW-I cannot he doubted on the ground that he had not inte1fered with the occurrence - The FIR, supplementary statements recorded under E s.164, CrPC and the evidence in court show that there was no justification or warrant to treat the version of the witness as inconsistent - The testimony of PW-I was placed reliance upon by both the courts and there is no reason to differ with the said view. Testimony of injured witness - Evidentimy value of- Held: Evidence of injured witness is entitled to greater weight and the testimony of such a witness is considered to be beyond reproach and reliable. Scientific evidence - DNA - Evidentim:i1 value of- Held: DNA report deserves to be accepted unless it is absolutely dented and for non-acceptance of the same, it is to be established that there had been no quality control or quality assurance - If the sampling is proper and if' there is no evidence as to tampering of samples, the DNA test report is to be accepted - Forensic science.

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Scientific evidence - Odontology - ft is a branch of forensic science in which dental knowledge Is applied to assist the criminal justice delivery system - In the instant case, the prosecution relied upon the odontology report, i.e., bite mark analysis report linking A-1 and A-3 with the crime in question.

Evidence of rape victim - Reliability of - Held: Conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it is implicitly reliable and there is a ring of truth in it - Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of a prosecutrix is not requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances - Courts are expected to act with sensitivity and appreciate the evidence of the prosecutrix in the background of the entire facts of the case and not in isolation - In the facts and circumstances of the instant case as the statements of the prosecutrix in the form of three dying declarations were consistent with each other and there were no material contradiction, they can be completely relied upon without corroboration - The victim also wrote the names of the accused persons in her own hand-writing in the dying declaration recorded by Metropolitan Magistrate - All the three dying declarations were consistent, true and voluntary, satisfying the test of probabilities factor - That apart, the dying declarations were well-corroborated by medical and scientific evidence and by the testimony of eye witness-PW-I. (R. Banumathi, J.)

Dying declaration - Nod~ and gestures - Held: A dying declaration need not necessarily be by words or in writing - It can be by gesture or by nod - Dying declaration made through signs, gesture or by nods is admissible as evidence, ifproper care is taken at the time of recording the statement - The only caution the court ought to take is to ensure that the person recording the dying declaration was able to correctly notice and inte1pret the gestures or nods of the declarant - Evidence Act, 1872 - s.32. Videography of the dying declaration - Held: Videography of the dying declaration is only a measure of caution and in case it is not taken care of; the efject of it would not be fatal for the case and does not, in any circumstance, compel the court to completely discard that particular dying declaration - Therefore, the contention that the third dying declaration made through gestures lacks

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

credibility and that the same ought to have been videographed is totally sans substance - Dying declaration.

Multiple Dying Declarations - In cases where there are more than one dying declarations, the Court should consider whether they are consistent with each other - {f there are inconsistencies, the nature of the inconsistencies must be examined as to whether B they are material or not - In cases where there are more than one dying declaration, it is the duty of the Court to consider each one of them and satisfy itself as to the voluntariness and reliability of the declarations - Mere fact of recording multiple dying declarations does not take away the importance of each individual declaration - Court has to examine the contents of dying declaration in the c light of various surrounding facts and circumstances. (R. Banumathi, J.) Evidence Act, 1872: ss.25, 26, 27 -Admissibility of a confessional statement made D to a police officer - Scope of - Held: ss.25 and 26 of the Evidenc.e Act put a complete bar on the admissibility ofa confessional statement made to a police officer or a confession made in absentia of a Magistrate, while in custody- s.27 of the Evidence Act is by way of a proviso to ss.25 and 26 and a statement even by way of confession made in police custody which distinctly relates to the fact discovered E is admissible in evidence against the accused - s.27 is based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information is true and is a relevant fact and accordingly it can be safely allowed to be given in evidence. (R. Banumathi, J.) s.27 - Essential conditions to be satisfied u/s.27 - Held: s.27 prescribes two limitations for determining how much of the information received from the accused can be proved against him: The information must be such as the accused has caused discovely of the fact, i.e. the fact must be the consequence, and the information G the cause of its discovery; and the information must 'relate distinctly' to the fact discovered - Both the conditions must be satisfied - The recove1y made u/s.27 not only acts as the foundation stone for proceeding with an investigation, but also completes the chain of circumstances - Once the recovery is proved by the prosecution,

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burden of proof on the defence to rebut the same is very strict, which cannot be discharged merely by pointing at procedural irregularities in making the recoveries, especia!!y when the recove1y is corroborated by direct as well as circumstantial evidence, especially when the investigating ojjicer assures that failure in examining independent witness while making the recoveries was not a deliberate or ma/a fide, rather it was on account of exceptional circumstances attending the investigation process. (R. Banumathi, J.)

Examination of independent witnesses, while making recoveries pursuant to the disclosure statement of the accused Held: It is a rule of caution evolved by the Judiciaty, which aims at c protecting the right of the accused by ensuring tramparency and credibility in the investigation of a criminal case - In the instant case, PW-80 SI has deposed in her cross-examination that no independent person had agreed to become a ivitness and i11 the light of such a statement, there ivas no reason for the courts to D doubt the version of the police and the recoveries made - When recovery is made pursuant to the statement of accused, seizure memo prepared by the Investigating Ojjicer need not mandatori!y be attested by independent witnesses - Thus, recoveries made pursuant to disclosure statement of the accused are duly pro Fed by the prosecution and there is no substantial reason to discard the same E - Recovery of articles of PW-I and also that of victim at the instance of the accused is a strong incriminating evide11ce against accused, especially when no plausible explanation is forthcoming fi"om the accused- Further, the scientific examination ofthe articles recovered completely place them in line with the chain of events described by F the prosecution. (R. Banumathi, J.) Criminal Law: Plea of alibi - Burden lies upon the accused persons to establish the plea convincingly by adducing cogent evidence.

Conspiracy - In a criminal conspiracy, meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing an illegal act is the sine qua non but proving this by direct proof is not possible - Hence, conspiracy and its objective can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the accused - Moreove1; conspiracy being d continuing offence continues to subsist till it is executed or rescinded

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

or ji-ustrated by the choice of necessity.

Crime Against Women: Awareness of public on gender justice - Duty of parents, school teachers, government institutions, media and society at large - Suggestions made - Gender equality to be made a part of the school curriculum - A child should be taught to respect women in B the society in the same way as he is taught to respect men - The school teachers and parents should be trained, not only to conduct regular personality building and skill enhancing exercise, but also to keep a watch on the actual behavioural pattern of the children so as to make them gender sensitized - The educational institutions, c Government institutions, the employers and all concerned must take steps to create awareness with regard to gender ·Sensitization and to respect women - Sensitization of the public on gender justice through TV, media and press should be welcomed - Banners and placards in the public transport vehicles like autos, taxis and buses etc. must be ensured - Use of street lights, illuminated bus stops and extra D police patrol during odd hours must be ensured - Police/security guards must be posted at dark and lonely places like parks, streets etc. - Mobile apps for immediate assistance of women should be introduced and effectively maintained - Apart from effective implementation of the various legislation protecting women, change E in the mind set of the society at large and creating awareness in the public on gender justice, would go a long way to combat violence against women. (R. Banumathi, J.) Rape - Duty of court in appreciation of evidence while dealing with cases of rape - While dealing with cases of rape, the Court F must act with utmost sensitivity and appreciate the evidence of prosecutrix, and it should not be swayed by minor contradictions and discrepancies in appreciation of evidence of the witnesses ivhich are not of a substantial character - Courts should not attach undue importance to discrepancies where the contradictions sought to be brought up from the evidence of prosecutrix are immaterial and of G no consequences. (R. Banumathi, J.) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.235(2) - Scope ofHeld: s.235(2) is intended to give an opportunity of hearing to the prosecution as well as the accused on the question of sentence - To

[2017] 6 S.C.R.

afford an effective opportunity to the accused, the Court must hear on the question of sentence to know about age of the accused, background of the accused, prior criminal antecedents, if any, possibility of reformation, if any; and such other relevant factors - • The Court while awarding the sentence has to take into consideration various factors having a bearing on the question of sentence - In case, s.235(2) is not complied with, the appellate Court can either send back the case to the Sessions Court for complying with s.235(2) so as to enable the accused to adduce materials; 01; in order to avoid delay, the appellate Court may by itself give an opportunity to the parties in terms of s.235(2) to produce the materials they wish to adduce instead of sending the matter back to the trial Court for hearing on sentence - In the present case, the latter course is adopted - Sentence/Sentencing. (R. Banumathi, J)

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD: PER DIPAK MISRA, J. (For himself andAshok Bhushan, .J.) I. Delayed registration of FIR:

Delay in setting the law into motion by lodging of complaint in court or FIR at police station is normally viewed by courts E with suspicion because there is possibility of concoction of evidence against an accused. Therefore, it becomes necessary ·for the prosecution to satisfactorily explain the delay. Whether the delay is so long as to throw a cloud of suspicion on the case of the prosecution would depend upon a variety of factors. Even a F long delay can be condoned if the informant has no motive for implicating the accused. Jn the present case, after the occurrence, the prosecutrix and PW-I were admitted to the hospital at 11:05 p.m.; the victiin was admitted in the Gynaecology Ward and PWI, the informant, in the casualty ward. After PW-I and the prosecutrix were taken to the hospital for treatment, the G statement of PW-I was recorded by PW-74, SI at 1:37 a.m. and the same was handed over to PW- 65, Constable to PW-57. Jn the initial stages, the intention of all concerned must have been to save the victim by giving her proper medical treatment. Delay, if any was in consonance with natural human conduct. There was no delay in the registration of FIR. The sequence of events were

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

natural. [Paras 49-511[87-D-H]

Ram Jag and others v. State of U.P (1974) 4 SCC 201 : AIR 1974 SC 606: [1974] 3 SCR 9; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Rakesh Kumar [2009] 8 SCR 264 : (2009) 6 sec 308 - relied on.

2. Non-mentioning of assailants in the FIR: It is settled law that FIR is not an encyclopedia of facts and it is not expected from a victim to give details of the incident either in the FIR or in the brief history given to the doctors. It may be sufficient if the broad facts of the prosecution case alone appear. If any overt act is attributed to a particular accused among the assailants, it must be given greater assurance. Therefore, omission in the first statement of the informant is not fatal to the case. The impact of the omission has to be adjudged in the totality of the circumstances and the veracity of the evidence. The involvement of the accused persons cannot be determined solely on the basis of what has been mentioned in the FIR. In his statement recorded in the early hours of 17.12.2012, PW-1 stated about going to the Select City Walk Mall, Saket alongwith the prosecutrix and boarding the bus. He has also stated about the presence of four persons sitting in the cabin of the bus and two boys sitting behind the cabin and clearly stated about the overt act. He broadly made reference to the accused persons and also to the overt acts. There are no indications of fabrication in his statement. Both the injuries on PW-1 's person and the gruesome acts against the victim must have put him in a traumatic condition and it would not have been possible for him to recall and narrate the entire incident to the police at one instance. It cannot be said that merely because the names of the accused persons were not mentioned in the FIR, it raises serious doubts about the prosecution case. [Paras 55, 60-62][89-C-D; 91-C, D-G]

Rattan Singh v. State of H.P [1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 938 : (1997) 4 sec 161; Pedda Narayana V. State of A.P [1975] Suppl. SCR 84 : (1975) 4 SCC 153; Sane Lal v. State of U.P. (1978) 4 SCC 302; Gurnam Kaur v. Bakshish Singh (1980) Suppl. SCC 567; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Naresh and others [2011] 4 SCR 1176 :

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(2011) 4 sec 324; Rotash V. State of Rajasthan [2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 264 : (2006) 12 SCC 64; Ranjit Singh v. State of MP [2010) 14 SCR 133 : (2011) 4 SCC 336; Animireddy Venkata Ramana v. Public Prosecutor (2008] 3 SCR 1078 : (2008) 5 SCC 368 - relied on.

3. Appreciation of the evidence of PW-1:

3.1 The contentions assailing the evidence of PW-I does not merit acceptance, for at the time when he was first examined his friend (the prosecutrix) was critically injured and he was in a shocked mental condition. The evidence of a witness is not to be disbelieved simply because he is a partisan witness or related to the prosecution. It is to be weighed whether he was present or not and whether he is telling the truth or not. The informant, PW-1, in his deposition, clearly spoke about the occurrence and also corroborated his complaint. The evidence of PW-1 was unimpeachable in character and the roving cross-examination did not erode his credibility. The injuries found on the person of PW-1 lent assurance to his testimony that he was present at the time of the occurrence along with the prosecutrix. The evidence of an injured witness is entitled to a greater weight and the testimony of such a witness is considered to be beyond reproach and reliable. [Paras 77-79)[98-G-H; 99-A-B, DJ Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1953 SC 364 : (1954) SCR 145; State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, Baljit Singh and Karam Singh [1974] 1 SCR 328 : (1974) 3 sec 277; Lehna V. State of Haryana [2002] 1 SCR 377 : (2002) 3 SCC 76; Gangadhar Behera and others v. State of Orissa [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 183 : (2002) 8 SCC 381; State of Rajasthan v. Kalki and another [1981] 3 SCR 504 : (1981) 2 SCC 752; Inder Singh and another v. State (Delhi Administration) [1978] 3 SCR 393 : (1978) 4 SCC 161; Mano Dutt and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2012) 3 SCR 686 : (2012) 4 SCC 79; State Represented by Inspector of Police v. Saravanan & another (2008) 17 SCC 587 : AIR 2009 SC 152 : [2008] 14 SCR 405; Arumugam v. State Represented by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu (2008) 15 sec 590 : AIR 2009 SC 331 : (2008] 14 SCR 309;

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2009) 2 SCR 1033 : (2009) 11 SCC 334; Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) and others v. State of Maharashtra [2010) 15 SCR 452 : (2010) 13 SCC 657 : JT 2010 (12) SC 287 - referred to.

3.2 It is no doubt true that in the earlier statement of PW1, there were certain omissions; but the ml!in thing to be seen is whether the omissions go to the root of the matter or pertain to insignificant aspects. The prosecutrix and PW-1 were surrounded and attacked by at least six accused persons. As narrated by PW1, he was pinned down by two of the assailants while the others committed rape on the prosecutrix on the rear side of the bus. The accused persons were in a group and were also armed with iron rods. PW-1 was held by them. It would not have been possible for PW-1 to resist the number of accused persons and save the prosecutrix. The evidence of PW-1 cannot be doubted on the ground that he had not interfered with the occurrence. The improvements made in the supplementary statement need not necessarily render PW-1 's evidence untrustworthy more so when PW-1 had no reason to falsely implicate the accused. The FIR, supplementary statements recorded under Section 164 CrPC and the evidence in court show that there was no justification or warrant to treat the version of the witness as inconsistent. The testimony of PW-1 was placed reliance upon by both the Courts and there is no reason to differ with the said view. The contradictions in his first statement, were not material enough to destroy the substratum of the prosecution case. [Paras 90, 92, 93, 95 and 96][105-E, G-H; 106-A-B, C-D; 108-A, B-C]

Pudhu Raja and another v. State Represented by Inspector of Police [2012] 8 SCR 740 : (2012) 11 SCC 196; Jaswant Singh v. State of Hmyana [2000] 2 SCR 903 : (2000) 4 SCC 484; Akhtar and others v. State of Uttaranchal [2009] 5 SCR 771 : (2009) 13 SCC 722; State of U.P V. M.K. Anthony (1985) 1 sec 505; Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecut01~ High Court of A.P. [2002] 1 Suppl. SCR 379 : (2002) 6 SCC 470; Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar AIR 1965 SC 277; Krishna Machi v. State of Bihar [2002] 3 SCR 1 : (2002) 6 SCC

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81; State of U.P v. Anil Singh [1988] Suppl. SCR 611: (1988) Supp. sec 686; Mohan Singh and another V. State of MP (1999] 1 SCR 276 : (1999) 2 SCC 428 referred to. 4. Recovery of the bus and the CCTV footage:

The endeavour of the prosecution was to first check the route and get a clue of the bus. Once it is proved before the court through the testimony of the experts that the photographs and the CCTV footage are not tampered with, there is no reason or justification to perceive the same with the lens of doubt. The opinion of the CFSL expert contained in the CFSL report authenticates that there was no tampering or editing in both the exhibits and that a bus having identical patterns as the one parked at Thyagraj Stadium is seen in the CCTV footage, which includes the word "Yadav" written on one side, "back side dent (left)" and absence of wheel cover on the front left side. The contents of the report is also admitted to be true by its author, PW-76. The High Court, in order to satisfy itself, had got the CCTV footage played during the hearing and found the same to be creditworthy and acceptable. A bald allegation was made that the bus, Ex P-1, was falsely implicated and that all the DNA evidence recovered therefrom was actually planted and that the bus, Ex. P-1, was sent to Thyagraj Stadium instead of the concerned Police Station with the deliberate intention of avoiding the media attention so that the evidence could be planted easily. There is dearth of space inside the police stations in Delhi and the use of Thyagraj Stadium as parking lot in the instant case does not necessarily mean that there was any ma/a fide intention on the part of the investigating agency without any specific assertion to advance the said bald allegation. [Paras 97, 100, 103 and 104][108-D; 110-B-D; 111-F; 112-B]

Manjit Singh v. State 214 (2014) DLT 646 - referred to.

5. Reliability of the testimony of PW-81 (the owner of the bus Ex. P-1): PW-81 is a transporter and owns 8 to 10 buses including Ex. P-1. He runs the buses under the name 'Yadav Travels'. He was examined by the prosecution to prove that A-1, A-2 and A-3

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

were connected with the bus, Ex. P-1. The appellant has asserted that PW-81 was kept in judicial custody to obtain a statement favourable to the prosecution in the present case. It is limpid from the deposition of PW-81 that he was in judicial custody for a separate offence and, therefore, the argument that he was under pressure to support the version of the prosecution is not sustainable. There is no trace of doubt that the testimony of the said witness withstands close scrutiny and there is no reason to treat it with any kind of disapproval. [Paras 107, 108 and 111][112G-H; 113-C, P; 114-F-G]

6. Personal search and statements of disclosure leading to recovery:

As the evidence brought on record would show, the accused persons were known to each other. A-2, and deceased A-1 were brothers. According to the testimony of PW-81, A-1 was the driver of the bus and A-3 was working as a helper in the bus. The same is manifest from the Attendance Register. The recoveries made when the accused persons were in custody were established with certainty. The witnesses who deposed with regard to the recoveries remained absolutely unshaken and, in fact, nothing was elicited from them to disprove their creditworthiness. A scrutiny of the arrest memo, statements recorded under Section 27 and the disclosure made in pursuance thereof showed that the recoveries of articles belonging to the informant and the victim from the custody of the accused persons cannot be discarded. The recovery is founded on the statements of disclosure. The items that were seized and the places from where they were seized were within the special knowledge of the accused persons. No explanation came on record from the accused persons as to how they had got into possession of the said articles. [Paras 124, 135 and 136)(118-C-D; 127-A-B, E) Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor AIR 1947 PC 67; Delhi Administration v. Bal Krishan and others (1972) 4 SCC 659; Mohd. lnayatullah v. State of Maharashtra [1976) 1 SCR 715 : (1976) 1 sec 828; Anter Singh V. State of Rajasthan [2004) 2 SCR 123 : (2004) 10 SCC 657; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 79 : (2005) 11 SCC 600; State

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Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil and another [2000) 5 Suppl. SCR 144 : (2001) 1 SCC 652; Sunil Clifford Daniel v. State of Punjab [2012) 7 SCR 1100 : (2012) 11 SCC 205; Ashok Kumar Chaudhary and others v. State of Bihar [20081 7 SCR 714: (2008) 12 SCC 173; Pramod Kumar v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) [2013] 8 SCR 323 : (2013) 6 SCC 588 - referred to.

7. Test Identification Parade and the identification in Court:

In the case at hand, the informant, apart from identifying the accused in the TIP, also identified all of them in Court. A careful scrutiny of the evidence on record showed that it deserved acceptance. Therefore, TIP was not dented. [Para 145)(130-CD] Matru alias Girish Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1971] 3 SCR 914 : (1971) 2 SCC 75; Santokh Singh v. lzhar Hussain and another [1974] I SCR 78 : (1973) 2 SCC 406; Malkhansingh v. State of M.P [2003) 1 Suppl. SCR 443 : (2003) 5 SCC 746; Visveswaran v. State represented by S.D.M [2003] 3 SCR 978 : (2003) 6 sec 73; Sidhartha Vashisht alias Manu Sharma V. State (NCT of Delhi) [2010] 4 SCR 103 : (2010) 6 SCC I; Munshi Singh Gautam v. State of MP. [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 1092 : (2005) 9 SCC 631; Harbhajan Singh v. State of J & K (1975) 4 SC 480 - relied on.

8. Admissibility and acceptability of the dying declaration of the prosecutrix:

8.1 As soon as the prosecutrix was brought to the hospital, she gave a brief description of the incident to PW-49. In the first dying declaration made to the doctor PW-49 recorded and in MLC, due to her medical condition, though the prosecutrix broadly described the incident of gang rape committed on her and injuries caused to her and PW-1, yet she failed to vividly describe the incident of inserting iron rod, etc. As it appears from the record, the prosecutrix had lost sufficient quantity of blood due to which she was drowsy and could only give a brief account of the incident and injuries caused to her and the informant. Even though the prosecutrix has given only a brief

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

account of the occurrence, yet she was responding to verbal command and hence, the same is natural and trustworthy and furthermore, her first statement was also consistent with the other dying declarations. By virtue of the second dying declaration recorded by the SDM, the exact details of the incident and the injuries caused to the prosecutrix were put on record. The SDM satisfied herself that the prosecutrix was fit to make the statement. While recording the dying declaration of the prosecutrix, PW-52, had found her conscious, oriented and meaningfully communicative. It was only thereafter that PW-27, SDM, recorded her statement. The prosecutrix not only signed it but even wrote the date and time in this statement. She narrated the entire incident specifying the role of each accused. [Paras 167, 168)[140-D-G]

8.2 Again on 25.12.2012 on an application though the doctor PW-52, opined that the prosecutrix was unable to speak as she was having endotracheal tube, i.e, in larynx and trachea and was · D on ventilator, yet PW-28, declared her to be conscious, oriented and meaningfully communicative through non-verbal gestures and fit to give statement. PW-30 Metropolitan Magistrate, also satisfied himself qua fitness and ability of the prosecutrix to give rational answers by gestures to his multiple choice questions. The opinion of the doctors obtained prior to recording of the E statements as also the observations made by the SDM and Metropolitan Magistrate qua her fitness cannot be disregarded completely on the basis of surmises of the appellants. [Para 1701[14 t-E-G] 8.3 In the third dying declaration, PW-30, after recording F the statement of the prosecutrix signed the document. The date mentioned therein was overwritten as 25.12.2012. However, in the forwarding note to the investigating officer which was in continuation of the prosecutrix's statement, the signature and date mentioned by PW-30 was very clear and no overwriting was visible. PW-30 was never cross-examined on the aspect of overwriting of the date. The issue was raised for the first time before this court merely to substantiate his suspicion of manipulation on the part of the prosecution. Pointing at insignificant errors is inconsequential so far as cogent evidence

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A produced by the prosecution stand on a terra firma. It is beyond human prudence to discard the detailed and well signed statements of the prosecutrix, in spite of clear date put by herself, merely because PW-30 erred at one point of time in correctly recording the date. Moreover, the testimony of PW-52, the doctor who was incharge of the ICU and in whose supervision the entire treatment and recording of statements by the prosecutrix was done, cannot be discarded on account of meagre technical errors. [Para 171][141-H; 142-A-D] 8.4 A dying declaration is an important piece of evidence which, if found veracious and voluntary by the court, could be the c sole basis for conviction. If a dying declaration is found to be voluntary and made in fit mental condition, it can be relied upon even without any corroboration. However, the court, while admitting a dying declaration, must be vigilant towards the need for 'Compos Mentis Certificate' from a doctor as well as the D absence of any kind of tutoring. In a case where there are more than one dying declaration, if some inconsistencies are noticed between one and the other, the court has to examine the nature of inconsistencies as to whether they arc material or not. The court has to examine the contents of the dying declarations in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances. In E the case at hand, the first statement of the prosecutrix was recorded by PW-49 on the night of 16.12.2012 and the second statement was recorded by the SDM on 21.12.2012 after a delay of five days. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there was no inconsistency in the dying declarations to raise suspicion as F to the genuinity and voluntariness of the subsequent dying declarations. The prosecutrix was under constant medical attention and was reported to be fit for giving a statement on 21.12.2012 only. On the night of the incident itself, she underwent first surgery and was shifted to ICU. The second surgery was performed on her on 19.12.2012. OT notes showed that she was G put on ventilation after the surgery. Therefore, a mere omission on the part of the prosecutrix to state the entire factual details of the incident in her very first statement does not make her subsequent statements unworthy, especially when her statements arc duly corroborated by other prosecution witnesses including

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

the medical evidence. The contention that no dying declaration could have been recorded on 21.12.2012 as the prosecutrix was administered morphine does not hold good as doctor-PW-52 deposed that morphine was injected at 6:00 p.m. on 20.12.2012 and its effect would have lasted for only 3-4 hours. PW-52 denied that the prosecutrix was unconscious and had difficulty in breathing at the time when she made the statement to PW-27, SDM, on 21.12.2012. [Paras 173, 175, 180 and 181)[142-G-H; 143-A; 144G-H; 145-A; 148-B-G]

Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710; Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi [2010] 9 SCR 993 : (2010) 9 SCC 1; Paniben v. State of Gujarat [1992) 2 SCR 197 : (1992) 2 SCC 474; Panneerselvam v. State of Tamil Nadu [2008] 8 SCR 962 : (2008) 17 SCC 190; Shudhakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2012] 7 SCR 128 : (2012) 7 SCC 569; Chirra Shivraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh [2010] 15 SCR 673 : (2010) 14 sec 444; Sandeep and another V. State of Hmyana [2015] 2 SCR 1999 : (2015) 11 SCC 154; Babula/ and others v. State of MP [2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 54 : (2003) 12 SCC 490; Prakash and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1992) 4 sec 225; Vi.Jay Pal V. State (Government of NCT of Delhi [2015] 3 SCR 394 : (2015) 4 SCC 749; Meesa/a Ramakrishan v. State of A.P (1994) 4 SCC 182; B. Shashikala v. State of A.P [2004] 1 SCR 940 : (2004) 13 SCC 249 - relied on

8.5 Yet another objection raised for the appellants concerning the medical fitness of the prosecutrix, while recording the third dying declaration was that when PW-30, Metropolitan Magistrate, recorded the dying declaration of the prosecutrix, she was not in a position to speak as per the endorsement made by PW-52, and, therefore, no weight could be attached to the dying declaration recorded by PW-30. This contention was raised before the High Court as well as the trial court. On 25.12.2012 at 12:35 p.m., PW-52 (doctor) had endorsed on the document that the victim could not speak as she had endotracheal tube in place (that is, in larynx and trachea) and was on ventilator. However, at 12:40 p.m. on the same day, doctor-PW-28, had

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endorsed on the said document to the effect that the victim was conscious, cooperative, meaningfully communicative, oriented, responding through non-verbal gestures and fit to give statement. PW-52 clearly deposed in his cross-examination that he had never endorsed that the victim was unfit to give statement at 12:35 p.m., rather he had said that she was on ventilator and hence, could not speak. The said explanation of PW-52, who was in charge of the ICU in Safdarjung Hospital at the relevant time made it limpid that even though the prosecutrix was not able to speak, yet she was conscious and oriented and was in a position to make the statement by gestures. [Paras 182, 183 and 18411148-G-H; 149-A-B, D-E, G-H; 150-A-B) 8.6 The contention that the third dying declaration made through gestures lacks credibility and that the same ought to have been videographed is totally sans substance. The dying declaration recorded on the basis of nods and gestures is not only admissible but also possesses evidentiary value, the extent of which shall depend upon who recorded the statement. In the instant case, the dying declaration was recorded by PW-30, Metropolitan Magistrate. A perusal of the questions and the simple answers by way of multiple choice put to the prosecutrix is manifest of the fact that those questions and answers were absolutely simple, effective and indispensable. The dying declaration recorded by PW-30 though by nods and gestures and writings, inspires confidence and was rightly relied upon by the trial Court as well as the High Court. Videography of the dying declaration is only a measure of caution and in case it is not taken care of, the effect of it would not be fatal for the case and does not, in any circumstance, compel the court to completely discard that particular dying declaration. [Para 1851[150-B-E]

8.7 The dying declaration made through signs, gestures or by nods are admissible as evidence, if proper care was taken at G the time of recording the statement. The only caution the court ought to take is that the person recording the dying declaration is able to notice correctly as to what the declarant means by answering by gestures or nods. In the present case, this caution was aptly taken, as the person who recorded the prosecutrix's dying declaration was the Metropolitan Magistrate and he was

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

satisfied himself as regards the mental alertness and fitness of A the prosecutrix, and recorded the dying declaration of the prosecutrix by noticing her gestures and by her own writings. In the facts and circumstances of this case and upon appreciation of the evidence and the material on record, all the three dying declarations were consistent with each other and well corroborated with other evidence and the trial court as well as the High Court has correctly placed reliance upon the dying declarations of the prosecutrix to record the conviction. [Paras 188, 189)(151-C-F] 9. Insertion of the iron rod: 9.1 The defence countered the prosecution case on the use of iron rods. It was contended that as recorded by PW-49 in first statement, the prosecutrix was in a fit state of mind for she even gave her residential address after undergoing the traumatic experience, but she failed to mention that the accused persons also used the iron rods on her, a fact that would have had a bearing on her treatment. The said proponement is not sustainable as MLC, Ex.PW 49/ A, of the prosecutrix suggested that she was brought to the hospital in a traumatized state with grievous injuries and she was cold and clammy, i.e., whitish (due to vasoconstriction) and had lost a lot of blood. As per Ex.PW-49/ A, the prosecutrix was sure of intercourse to have been committed twice along with rectal penetration whereafter she did not remember intercourse. She was oscillating between consciousness and unconsciousness at the time of the incident and there was loss of lot of blood by the time she had reached the hospital. The gravity and hideousness of the injuries caused to the prosecutrix, clearly showed the use of iron rods by the accused. The injuries caused to the prosecutrix by incessantly and abominably injuring her private parts using the concerned iron rods were so grave that death was the inevitable consequence. Both the iron rods were recovered at the instance of A-1 from inside the concerned bus. The DNA profile developed from the blood stains obtained from the iron rods was also consistent with the DNA profile of the prosecutrix. In such circumstances, merely because the finger prints of the accused were not obtained from the iron rods, it cannot be concluded that the accused were not linked with the concerned iron rods. A-1

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himself had the iron rods recovered to the lnyestigating Officer. Furthermore, the dying declaration of the prosecutrix, which was highly reliable, clearly established the horrendous \1se of iron rods by the accused persons. [Paras 193-195J[153-C, E-H; 154B-E)

9.2 PW-1, in his chief examination, deposed that he was severely assaulted by the accused with iron rods on his head and the rest of his body. It is submitted that as per MLC of PW-1, the nature of injuries sustained by PW-1 were simple. Of course, as per MLC, PW-1 sustained simple injuries but MLC also mentioned that there was also nasal bleeding from his nose and c PW-1 was also vomiting. Merely because the injuries sustained by PW-1 were opined to be of simple nature, the use of iron rods cannot be doubted. The appellants stressed that PW-I neither in his MLC nor in his complaint mentioned the use of iron rod; the description of bus or the names of the accused. The purpose D of FIR is mainly to set the criminal law in motion and not to lay down every minute detail and the entire gamut of the evidence relating to the case and, therefore, non-mention of use of iron rods in the FIR does not remotely create a dent in the case of the prosecution. PW-1 was being held by the accused towards the front of the bus, while the prosecutrix was being raped at the E rear side of the bus and the lights of the bus also had been turned off. His statement in his complaint that he heard the prosecutrix shouting and crying and that her voice was oscillating, was consistent with the narration of facts as also the medical records. The second statement of the prosecutrix recorded by PW-27 F detailed the account of the entire incident specifying the role of each accused; gang rape/unnatural sex committed upon her; and the injuries caused in her vagina and rectum by use of iron rod and by inserting of hands by the accused are mentioned. This statement, in fact, bears the date and signature of the prosecutrix and records that the accused committed gang rape on her, inserted G iron rod in the vagina and through anal opening causing injuries to the internal organs of the prosecutrix. The subsequent statement of the prosecutrix also affirmed the above facts. That apart, as per the medical opinion given by PW-49, the recto-vaginal injury of the prosecutrix could be caused by the rods recovered

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

from the bus. [Paras 197-200][154-F-G, H; 155-A-B, E-H]

10. Anatomy argument: From the nature of the injuries noted in the OT Notes, the rectum was longitudinally torn and transverse colon was torn. From the Post-Mortem Certificate, the uterus was found in position (no injuries to uterus). If the rod was inserted in the vagina, having regard to the fact that the injury within the vagina was only in the posterior surface, it indicates that the rod was pushed inside with a downward force and not upward (which could have resulted in injury to the uterus) and it perhaps tunnelled its way through the vagina into the rectal cavity and the bowels. Therefore, merely because no injuries to the uterus of the victim were noticed, that does not lead to the conclusion that iron rod was not used. [Para 206][160-F-G] 'Gray's Anatomy: Descriptive and Applied', 34th Edn. [Orient Longman Publication] - referred to.

11. Analysis of evidence pertaining to DNA: 11.1 DNA is the abbreviation of Deoxyribo Nucleic Acid. It is the basic genetic material in all human body cells. It is not contained in red blood corpuscles. It is, however, present in white corpuscles. It carries the genetic code. DNA structure determines

human character, behaviour and body characteristics. DNA profiles are encrypted sets of numbers that reflect a person's DNA makeup which, in forensics, is used to identify human beings. DNA is a complex molecule. It has a double helix structure which can be compared with a twisted rope 'ladder'. DNA technology as a part of Forensic Science and scientific discipline not only provides guidance to investigation but also supplies the Court accrued information about the tending features of identification of criminals. The recent advancement in modern biological research has regularized Forensic Science resulting in radical help in the administration of justice. In our country also like several other developed and developing countries, DNA evidence is being increasingly relied upon by courts. After the amendment in the Criminal Procedure Code by the insertion of Section 53A by Act 25 of 2005, DNA profiling has now become a part of the statutory scheme. Section 53A relates to the examination of .a

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person accused of rape by a medical practitioner. Similarly, under Section 164A inserted by Act 25 of 2005, for medical examination of the victim of rape, the description of material taken from the person of the woman for DNA profiling is must. [Paras 208, 213 and 214][161-C; 164-B-D]

Regina v. Alan James Doheny & Gwy Adams 1997 (1) Criminal Appeal Reports 369; Frye v. United States 54 App. D.C. 46 (1923); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, lnc.113 S.C.T. 2786 (1993); District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District et al. v. William G Osborne 129 Supreme Court Reporter 2308 - referred to.

11.2 DNA report deserves to be accepted unless it is absolutely dented and for non-acceptance of the same, it is to be established that there had been no quality control or quality assurance. In order to establish· a clear link between the accused D persons and the incident at hand, the prosecution also adduced scientific evidence in the form of DNA, fingerprint and bite mark analysis. Various samples, for the purpose of DNA profiling, were lifted from the person of the prosecutrix, the informant, the accused, their clothes/ articles; the dumping spot, the iron rods, the ashes of partly burnt clothes as well as from the offending bus. PW-45 analysed the said DNA profiles and in his report, he concluded that the samples were authentic and capable of establishing the identities of the persons concerned beyond reasonable doubt. After establishing the identities of each of the accused persons, the informant and the prosecutrix through DNA F analysis, the DNA profiles generated from the remaining samples, where the identity of biological material found thereon needed to be ascertained, were matched with the DNA profiles of the prosecutrix, the informant and the accused, generated earlier from known samples. Such an analysis cogently linked each of G the accused with the victims as also with the crime scene. PW45 clearly testified in his cross-examination that all the experiments conducted by him confirmed to the guidelines and methodology documented in the Working Procedure Manuals of the laboratory which have been validated and recommended for use in the laboratory. He further added that once a DNA profile

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

is generated, its accuracy is 100%. The trial court and the High Court consistently noted that the defence did not raise any substantial ground to challenge the DNA report during the crossexamination of PW-45. In such circumstances, there is no reason to declare the DNA report as inaccurate, especially when it clearly linked the accused persons with the incident. (Paras 224-227, 229][170-G-H; 171-A-D; 173-E-G]

Kamti Devi (Smt.) and another v. Poshi Ram [2001] 3 SCR 729 : (2001) 5 SCC 311; Pantangi Ba/arama Venkata Ganesh v. State of Andhra Pradesh [2009] 11 · SCR 636 : (2009) 14 SCC 607; Santosh Kumar Singh v. State Through CBI [2010] 13 SCR 901 : (2010) 9 SCC 747; Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu v. John David [2011] 7 SCR 354: (2011) 5 SCC 509; Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana [2011] 8 SCR 774 : (2011) 7 SCC 130; Surendra Kofi v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2011] 2 SCR 939 : (2011) 4 SCC 80; Mohammed Ajma/ Mohammad Amir Kasab alias Abu. Mujahid v. State of Maharashtra (2012] 8 SCR 295 : (2012) 9 SCC 1; Sandeep v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2012] 5 SCR 952 : (2012) 6 SCC 107; Rajkumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2014] 3 SCR 212 : (2014) 5 SCC 353; Nand/al Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik and another [2014] 1 SCR 120 : (2014) 2 sec 576 - relied on.

12. The evidence relating to finger print analysis: The report of the Finger Print Division of the CFSL, CBI was that the chance prints of A-4 were found on the bus in question. The said report incontrovertibly proved that A-4 was present in the bus at the time of the incident. The other chance prints were found to be unfit for comparison or different from specimen print. [Para 232](174-E-F; 175-B-C) 13. The Odontology report: 13.1 Odontology is a branch of forensic science in which dental knowledge is applied to assist the criminal justice delivery system. In the present case, the photographs of bite marks on different parts of the body of the prosecutrix were examined by

PW-71. The said bite marks found on the body of the victim were compared with the dental models of the suspects. The analysis showed that at least three bite marks were caused by At, whereas one bite mark was identified to have been most likely caused by A-3. Bite mark analysis play an important role in the· criminal justice system. Advanced development of technology such as laser scanning, scanning electron microscopy or cone beam ~omputed tomography in forensic odontology is utilized to identify more details in bite marks and in the individu.al teeth of the bite. Unlike fingerprints and DNA, bite marks lack the specificity and durability as the human teeth may change over time. However, bite mark evidence has other advantages in the criminal justice system that links a specific individual to the crime or victim. For a bite mark analysis, it must contain abundant information and the tooth that made the mark must be quite distinctive. Bite marks in skin are photographed in cases where the suspect is apprehended. A thorough dental combination is administered after dental examination of the suspect. Final comparison of the details of the original mark with the dentation of the suspect is done by experts. [Paras 233, 238-240][175-CD; 177-B; 178-B-D] Dr. K.S. Narayan Reddy, in his book, Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology (law, Practice and Procedure) Third Edition, 2010, Chapter VIII page 268 - referred to.

13.2 The bite marks generally include only a limited number of teeth. Forensic Odontology has established itself as an important and indispensable science in medico-legal matters and expert evidence through various reports which have been utilized by courts in the administration of justice. In the case at hand, the report is wholly credible because of matching of bite marks with the tooth structure of the accused persons and there is no reason to view the same with any suspicion. The evidence brought on record cogently established the injuries sustained by the prosecutrix and there was consistency between the injuries and the report. [Paras 241, 24211178-D-E, F-G] 14. Acceptability of the plea of alibi:

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MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

It is well settled in law that when a plea of alibi is taken by A an accused, the burden is upon him to establish the same by positive evidence after the onus as regards the presence on the spot is established by the prosecution. Considering the inconsistent and contradictory nature of the evidence of 'alibi' led by the accused against the positive evidence of the B prosecution, including the scientific one, the accused miserably failed to discharge their burden of absolute certainty qua their plea of 'alibi'. The plea taken by them was an afterthought and rather may be read as an additional circumstance against them. The plea of 'alibi' that A-4 and A-5 had attended the alleged musical programme in the evening of 16.12.2012 was rightly_ C rejected by the trial court which was given the stamp of approval by the High Court. [Paras 243, 254 and 266][179-A-B; 183-C; 186-E-F)

Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar [1996] 8 Suppl. SCR 225 : (1997) 1 SCC 283; Gwpreet Singh v. State of Haryana [2002) 2 Suppl. SCR 337 : (2002) 8 SCC 18; Shaikh Sattar v. State of Maharashtra [2010] 10 SCR 503 : (2010) 8 sec 430; Jitender Kumar V. State of Haryana (2012) 6 SCC 204; Ram Singh and others v. Col. Ram Singh [1985] Suppl. SCR 399 : (1985) Supp. SCC 611 - relied on.

15. Criminal conspiracy: 15.1 The underlying purpose for the insertion of Sections 120A and 120B IPC was to make a mere agreement to do an illegal act or an act which is not illegal by illegal means punishable under law. The criminal thoughts in the mind when take concrete shape of an agreement to do or cause to be done an illegal act or an act which is not illegal by illegal means then even if nothing further is done an agreement is designated as a criminal conspiracy. The proviso to Section 120A engrafts a limitation that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof. [Para 270)[187-G-H; 188-A)

E.G Barsay v. State of Bombay [1962) SCR 195 : AIR

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1961 SC 1762; Yash Pal Mittal v. State of Punjab [1978) 1 SCR 781 : (1977) 4 SCC 540; Kehm· Singh and Ors. v. State (Delhi Administration) [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 24 : (1988) 3 SCC 609; Saju v. State of Kera/a [2000) 4 Suppl. SCR 621 : (2001) 1 SCC 378; Mir Nagvi Askari v. Central Bureau of Investigation [2009) 13 SCR 124 : (2009) 15 SCC 643; Pratapbhai Hamirbhai Solanki v. State of Gujrat and another (20121 9 SCR 561 : (2013) 1 SCC 613; K. R. Purushothaman v. State of Kera/a [20051 4 Suppl. SCR 498 : (2005) 12 SCC 631; State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v. Na/ini and others [1999] 3 SCR 1 : (1999) 5 SCC 253 - relied on. R. v. Mwphy (1837) 173 ER 502; Quinn v. Leatham (1901) AC 495 - referred to.

Halsbwy's Laws of England (5th Ed. Vol.25, page 73) - referred to.

15.2 The rationale of conspiracy is that the required objective manifestation of disposition of criminality is provided by the act of agreement. Conspiracy is a clandestine activity. Persons generally do not form illegal covenants openly. In the E interest of security, a person may carry out his part of a conspiracy without even being informed of the identity of his co-conspirators. An agreement of this kind can rarely be shown by direct proof; it must be inferred from the circumstantial evidence of co-operation between the accused. It becomes clear that the prosecution must adduce evidence to prove that: the accused agreed to do or caused to be done an act; such an act was illegal or was to be done by illegal means within the meaning of IPC; irrespective of whether some overt act was done by one of the accused in pursuance of the agreement. In order to prove the presence of all the accused in the bus where the entire incident took place, the prosecution G relied upon the testimony of PW-I, PW-82, PW-16 and, most importantly, the dying declarations of the prosecutrix. As per the records, PW-82 has testified to the effect that on the date of the incident, about 8:30 p.m., he had boarded the concerned bus from Munirka Bus Stand, New Delhi, on noticing that the H conductor of the bus sought commuters for Khanpur. However,

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

he was later informed that he would be dropped at Nehru Place instead of Khanpur. When PW-82 tried to get down the bus, he was wrongfully confined, attacked by the persons inside the bus who robbed him of his belongings, viz., Rs.1500/- in cash and a mobile phone, and he was then thrown out of the moving bus. During the trial, PW-82 identified all the four accused persons, viz., A-2 to A-5 present in the concerned bus at the time of the incident. [Paras 285, 287, 290 and 291 )[200-F-G; 202-B, G-H; 203-A-B]

Noor Mohammad Mohd. Yusuf Momin v. State of Maharashtra (1971] 1 SCR 119 : AIR 1971 SC 885; Firozuddin Basheeruddin and others v. State of Kera/a (2001) 7 sec 596; Suresh Chandra Bahri V. State of Bihar [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 483 : (1995) Suppl. I SCC 80 - relied on. V.C. Shukla v. State (Delhi Admn.) [1980] SCR 500 : (I 980) Suppl. SCC 249 - referred to.

15.3 In his statement under Section 313 CrPC, A2 admitted that PW-82 had boarded the offending bus prior to the boarding of the bus by the informant and the victim. The presence of PW82 in Ex.Pl bus prior to the boarding of the bus by the informant, PW-1, and the victim and the presence of all the accused in the bus was, thus, established by the prosecution. The evidence of PW-81, the owner of the offending bus, indicated A-1, (since deceased) as the driver of the bus and A-3 as the cleaner of the bus which was further shown in the attendance register of the bus. The fact that the driver of the bus at the relevant time was A-1 was also proved through the testimony of PW-16, Manager (Administration) of the said school. PW-16 deposed that the bus in question was routinely driven by A-1 (since deceased). The statement of PW-16 was corroborated by the testimony of PW81. [Paras 294, 295)[203-H; 204-A, F-G; 205-A, C-D] 15.4 The testimony of PW-13 who was an auto driver and also resident of jhuggi at Ravi Dass Camp from where the offending bus was seized is also relevant to prove the presence of the accused in the bus. He stated in his evidence that A-1, (since deceased), is the brother of A-2 and that both resided in

[2017] 6 S.C.R.

the jhuggi at Ravi Dass camp and that A-1 (deceased) used to drive the said bus and park it in the night near his jhuggi. PW13, in his evidence, deposed that on the night of 16.12.2012, about 11 :30 p.m., when he returned to his jhuggi after plying his auto, he saw A-2, taking water in some can inside a white colour bus and washing it from inside. He also noticed some clothes and pieces of curtains being burnt in the fire. In his questioning under Section 313 CrPC, A-2, admitted that he and A-1 (since deceased), are brothers. He also admitted that on the night of 16.12.2012, he was driving the bus and that A-4 and A-5 were seated on the backside of the driver's seat, whereas A-1 and A-3 were sitting in the driver's cabin. The prosecution established that the accused were associated with each other. The criminal acts done in furtherance of conspiracy is established by the sequence of events and the conduct of the accused. An important facet of the law of conspiracy is that apart from it being a distinct offence, all conspirators are liable for the acts of each other of the crime or crimes which have been committed as a result of the conspiracy. [Paras 296, 297 and 300][205-E-H; 206-A; 208-

D] 16. Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act begins with the phrase "where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence" which implies that if prima facie evidence of the existence of a conspiracy is given and accepted, the evidence of acts and statements made by any one Qf the conspirators in furtherance of the common intention is admissible against all. In the facts of the F present case, the prima facie evidence of the existence of conspiracy is well established. The chain of events described by the prosecutrix in her dying declarations coupled with the testimonies of the other witnesses clearly establish that as soon as the informant and the prosecutrix boarded the bus, the accused persons formed an agreement to commit heinous offences against G the victim. The conduct of the accused in committing heinous offences with the prosecutrix in concert with each other and thereafter throwing her out of the bus in an unconscious state alongwith PW-I unequivocaly bring home the charge under Section 120B in case of each of them. The criminal acts done in

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

furtherance of the conspiracy is evident from the acts and also the words uttered during the commission of the offence. Therefore, the trial court and the High Court correctly considered the entire case on the touchstone of well-recognised principles for arriving at the conclusion of criminal conspiracy. The prosecution was able to unfurl the case relating to criminal conspiracy by connecting the chain of circumstances. The relevant evidence on record led to a singular conclusion that the accused persons are liable for criminal conspiracy and their confessions to counter the same deserve to be repelled. (Paras 301, 303][208G-H; 209-A; 210-A-B, E-H]

Santa Singh v. State of Punjab [1977] 1 SCR 229 : (1976) 4 SCC 190; Dagdu and others v. State of Maharashtra [1977) 3 SCR 636 : (1977) 3 SCC 68 relied on.

17. The mitigating factors highlighted by the appellants in the instant case pertain to the strata to which these accused D belong, the aged parents, marital status and the young children and the suffering they would go through and the calamities they would face in case of affirmation of sentence, their conduct while they are in custody and the reformative path they have chosen and their transformation and the possibility of reformation. In E the instant case, the brutal, barbaric and diabolic nature of the . crime is evincible from the acts committed by the accused persons, viz., the assault on the informant, PW-1 with iron rod and tearing off his clothes; assaulting the informant and the deceased with hands, kicks and iron rod and robbing them of their personal belongings like debit cards, ring, informant's shoes, F etc.; attacking the deceased by forcibly disrobing her and committing violent sexual assault by all the appellants; their brutish behaviour in having anal sex with the deceased and forcing her to perform oral sex; injuries on the body of the deceased by way of bite marks (10 in number); and insertion of rod in her G private parts that, inter alia, caused perforation of her intestine which caused sepsis and, ultimately, led to her death. The medical history of the prosecutrix demonstrates that the entire intestine of the prosecutrix was perforated and splayed open due to the repeated insertion of the rod and hands; and the appellants had

[2017] 6 S.C.R.

pulled out the internal organs of the prosecutrix in the most savage and inhuman manner that caused grave injuries which ultimately annihilated her life. As has been established, the prosecutrix sustained various bite marks which were observed on her face, lips, jaws, near ear, on the right and left breast, left upper arm, right lower limb, right inner groin, right lower thigh, left thigh lateral, left lower anterior and genitals. These acts itself demonstrate the mental perversion and inconceivable brutality as caused by the appellants. As further proven, they threw the informant and the deceased victim on the road in a cold winter night. After throwing the informant and the deceased victim, they tried to run the bus over them so that there would be no evidence against them. They made all possible efforts in destroying the evidence by, inter alia, washing the bus and burning the clothes of the deceased and after performing the gruesome act, they divided the loot among themselves. The accused persons had found an object for enjoyment in her and, as is evident, they were obsessed with the singular purpose sans any feeling to ravish her as they liked, treat her as they felt and, the gross sadistic and beastly instinctual pleasures came to the forefront when they, after ravishing her, thought it to be just a matter of routine to throw her alongwith her friend out of the bus and crush them. E The casual manner with which she was treated and the devilish manner in which they played with her identity and dignity is humanly inconceivable. It sounds like a story from a different world where huma1iity has been treated with irreverence. The appetite for sex, the hunger for violence, the position of the empowered and the attitude of perversity are bound to shock the collective conscience which knows not what to do. It is manifest that the wanton lust, the servility to absolutely unchained carnal desire and slavery to the loathsome beastility of passion ruled the mindset of the appellants to commit a crime which can summon with immediacy "tsunami" of shock in the mind of the G collective and destroy the civilised marrows of the milieu in entirety. The aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances now brought on record. Therefore, the High Court correctly confirmed the death penalty and there is no reason to differ with the same. [Paras 354, 356 and 357)[246-B, E-H; 247A

A-F, G]

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

Bachan Singh V. State of Punjab (1980) 2 sec 684; Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab [1983] 3 SCR 413 : (1983) 3 SCC 470; Sangeet and another v. State of Haryana (2012] 13 SCR 85 : (2013) 2 SCC 452; Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra [2013] 6 SCR 949 : (2013) 5 sec 546; Shiv v. High Court of Karnataka (2007] 2 SCR 555 : (2007) 4 SCC 713; B.A. Umesh v. Registrar General, High , Court of Karnataka (2011] 2 SCR 367 : (2011) 3 SCC 85; Dhananjoy Chate1jee v. State of West Bengal [1994] 1 SCR 37 : (1994) 2 SCC 220; Triveniben v. State of Gujarat [1989] l SCR 509 : (1989) l SCC 678; Karnesh Singh v. State of UP 1968 AIR 1402 : [1968] SCR 774; Ronny v. State of Maharashtra [1998] 2 SCR 162 : 1998 (3) SCC 625; Nirmal Singh v. State of Haryana (1999] 2 SCR l : (1999) 3 SCC 670; Sahdeo v. State of UP [2004] l Suppl. SCR 918: (2004) 10 sec 682; Raghubir Singh V. State of Haryana [1914] 3 SCR 356: (1975) 3 SCC 37; Harnam Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1976] 2 SCR 274 : (1976) l SCC 163; Amit v. State of Maharashtra [2003) 2 Suppl. SCR 285 : (2003) 8 SCC 93; Rahul v. State of Maharashtra (2005) l 0 SCC 322; Rameshbhai Chandiibhai Rathod v. State of Gujarat [2009) SCR 1055 : (2009) 5 SCC 740; Santosh Kumar Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra [2009) 9 SCR 90 : (2009) 6 SCC 498; Sebastian v. State of Kera/a (2010) l SCC 58; Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod II v. State of Gujarat [2011) l SCR 829: (2011) 2 SCC 764; Amit v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2012] 1 SCR 1009: (2012) 4 SCC 107; La lit Kumar Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2014) 8 SCR 668: (2014) 11 SCC 129; Akhtar v State of Uttar Pradesh (1999) 6 SCC 60; Raju v. State of Ha1yana [2001] 3 SCR 409: (2001) 9 SCC 50; Amrit Singh v. State of Punjab [2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 889 : (2006) 12 S\::C 79; Surender Pal v. State of Gujarat [2004) 4 Suppl. SCR 464 : (2005) 3 SCC 127; Anil v. State of Maharashtra [2014) 3 SCR 34: (2014) 4 SCC 69; La/it Kumar Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh

[2017] 6 S.C.R.

[2014] 8 SCR 668 : (2014) II sec 129; Bantu V. State of Madhya Pradesh (2001] 4 Suppl. SCR 298: (2001) 9 SCC 615; Rajesh Kumar v. State (2011) 13 SCC 706; Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh (2012) 4 SCC 257; Sandesh v. State of Maharashtra (2012] 13 SCR 1049 : (2013) 2 SCC 479; Swamy Shradhananda (2) v. State of Karnataka (2008] 11 SCR 93 : (2008) 13 SCC 767; Union of India v. Sriharan (2016) 7 sec 1; Neel Kumar V. State of Haryana (2012] 5 SCR 696 : (2012) 5 SCC 766; Ram Deo Prasad v. State of Bihar [2013] 6 SCR 108: (2013) 7 SCC 725; Chhote Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2011] 8 SCR 239: (2013) 9 SCC 795; Selvam v. State (2014) 12 SCC 274; Sevaka Perumal v. State of Tamil Nadu [1991] 2 SCR 711 : (1991) 3 SCC 471; Kamta Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 507 : (1996) 6 SCC 250; State of UP. v. Satish [2005] 2 SCR 1132 : (2005) 3 sec 114; Holiram Bordoloi V. State of Assam [2005] 3 SCR 406 : (2005) 3 SCC 793; Ankush Maruti Shinde v. State of Maharashtra [2009] 7 SCR 182 : (2009) 6 SCC 667; Sundar v. State [2013] 4 SCR 25 : (2013) 3 SCC 215; Mohjil Khan v. State of Jharkhand[2014] 10 SCR 812: (2015) 1SCC67; Deepak Rai v. State of Bihar [2013] 14 SCR 297 : (2013) 10 SCC 421; Purshottam Dashrath Borate v. State of Maharashtra [2015( 5 SCR 1112: (2015) 6 sec 652; Haresh Mohandas Rajput V. State of Maharashtra [2011] 14 SCR 921 : (2011) 12 SCC 56; Laxman Naik v. State of Orissa [1994] 2 SCR 94: (1994) 3 SCC 381; Bantu v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2008] 11 SCR 184 : (2008) 11 SCC 113; Devender Pal Singh v. State of A.P. [2002] 2 SCR 767 : (2002) 5 sec 234; Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik V. State of Maharashtra [2012] 2 SCR 225 : (2012) 4 SCC 37; State ofT.N v. Suresh and another [1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 203 : (1998) 2 SCC 372; State of Maharashtra v. Baral Fakira Dhiwar [2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 12: (2002) 1 SCC 622; Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of Maharashtra (2015) 1 sec 253 - referred to.

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

Furman v. Georgia 33 L Ed 2d 346 : 408 US 238 (1972) - referred to.

PER R. BANUMATHI, J. 1. Duty of court in appreciation of evidence while dealing with cases of rape: Crime against women is an unlawful intrusion of her right to privacy, which offends her self-esteem and dignity. B Clause (g) of sub-section (2) of Section 376 IPC (prior to 2013 Amendment Act 13 of 2013) deals with cases of gang rape. In order to establish an offence under Section 376(2)(g) IPC, read with Explanation I thereto, the prosecution must adduce evidence to indicate that more than one accused had acted in concert and c in such an event, if rape is committed by even one, all the accused are guilty, irrespective of the fact that only one or more of them had actually committed the act. Section 376(2)(g) read with Explanation I thus embodies a principle of joint liability. But so far as appreciation of evidence is concerned, the principles concerning the cases falling under sub-section(l) of Section 376 D IPC apply. In a case of rape, like other criminal cases, onus is always on the prosecution to prove affirmatively each ingredients of the offence. The prosecution must discharge this burden of proof to bring home the guilt of the accused and this onus never shifts. [Paras 11, 13 and 14][252-B-C, G-H; 253-A-C] State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh and Others [1996] 1 SCR 532 : (1996) 2 sec 384; State of Rajasthan V. N.K. The Accused [2000] 2 SCR 818 : (2000) 5 SCC 30; State ofH.P. v. lekh Raj and Another [199914 Suppl. SCR 286 : (2000) 1 SCC 247; State of H.P. v. Asha Ram [2005] 5 Suppl. SCR 280 : (2005) 13 SCC 766; Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [20121 6 SCR 148 : (2012) 7 SCC 171 - relied on.

1.2 While dealing with cases of rape, the Court must act with utmost sensitivity, examining the broader probabilities of a case and it should not be swayed by minor contradictions and discrepancies in appreciation of evidence of the witnesses which are not of a substantial character. It is now well-settled that conviction for an offence of rape can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix corroborated by medical evidence and other

.B

C

·E

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circumstantial evidence such as the report of chemical examination, scientific examination etc., if the same is found natural and trustworthy. Persisting notion that the testimony of victim has to be corroborated by other evidence must be removed. To equate a rape victim to an accomplice is to add insult to womanhood. Ordinarily a woman, more so, a young woman will not stake her reputation by levelling a false charge, concerning her chastity. There is no legal compulsion to look for corroboration of the prosecutrix's testimony unless the evidence of the victim suffers from serious infirmities, thereby seeking corroboration. Courts should not attach undue importance to discrepancies, where the contradictions sought to be brought up from the evidence of the prosecutrix are immaterial and of no consequence. Minor variations in the testimony of the witnesses are often the hallmark of truth of the testimony. Trivial discrepancies ought not to obliterate an otherwise acceptable evidence. Due to efflux of time, there are bound to be minor contradictions/discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix but such minor discrepancies/inconsistencies are only natural since when truth is sought to be projected through human, there are bound to be certain inherent contradictions. [Paras 15, 16, 17 and 24][253-F-H; 254-A, D-E; 258-G-H; 259-A-B]

State of Karnataka v. Krishnappa [2000] 2 SCR 761 : (2000) 4 sec 75; Bhanvada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai V. State of Gujarat (1983] 3 SCR 280 : (1983) 3 SCC 217; Krishan Lal v. State of Haryana [1980] 3 SCR 305 : (1980) 3 SCC 159; Rajinder alias Raju v. State of Himachal Pradesh [2009] 10 SCR 248 : (2009) 16 sec 69; Raju and Others V. State of Madhya Pradesh [2008] 16 SCR 1078 : (2008) 15 SCC 133; State of H.P. v. Asha Ram [2005) 5 Suppl. SCR 280 : (2005) 13 SCC 766; State of Punjab v. Ramdev Singh [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 995: (2004) 1 SCC 421; State of U.P. v. Munshi (2008) 12 SCR 897 : (2008) 9 SCC 390; State of H.P. v. Gian Chand (2001) 3 SCR 247 : (2001) 6 SCC 71; State of Rajasthan v. N.K. The Accused [2000] 2 SCR 818 : (2000) 5 SCC 30; State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj and Another [1999) 4 Suppl. SCR 286 : (2000) 1 SCC 247, Wahid Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

(2009] 15 SCR 1207 : (2010) 2 SCC 9; Dinesh Jaiswal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (20101 1 SCR 1063 : (2010) 3 SCC 232; Om Prakash v. State of Hmyana (2011] 7 SCR 1080 : (2011) 14 SCC 309; Om Prakash v. State of U.P. (2006] 2 Suppl. SCR 318 : (2006) 9 SCC 787; Tameezuddin v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2009] 14 SCR 80 : (2009) 15 SCC 566; Suresh N. Bhusare v. State of Maharashtra (1999) 1 SCC 220; Jai Krishna Manda/ v. State of Jharkhand (2010) 14 SCC 534 - relied on.

2. Dying Declaration: 2.1 Rape deeply affects the entire psychology of the woman c arid humiliates her, apart from leaving her in a trauma. The testimony of the rape victim must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trauma which the victim had undergone. As a matter of record, PW-49 at around 11 :15 p.m. on the night of 16.12.2012, had attended to the prosecutrix as soon as she was brought to the hospital and had prepared D casualty/OPD Card of the prosecutrix as well as her MLC. At that time, PW-49 had found her cold and clammy due to vasoconstriction. The prosecutrix was found shivering, for which she was administered JV line and warm saline in order to stabilize her pulse and BP. When the victim was in such a condition, the E' victim cannot be expected to give minute details of the occurrence like overt act played by the accused, insertion of iron rod etc. There is no justification for blowing up such omission out of proportion in the statement recorded by PW-49 and doubt the same. Jn the occurrence, physical and emotional balance of the victim must have been greatly disturbed. Startled by the incident, F whatever the victim was able to momentarily recollect, she narrated to PW-49 and placed in that position non-mention of minute details in OPD Card cannot be termed as a material omission. [Para 2811260-F-H; 261-A-BJ 2.2 The Court must scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis

[2017] 6 S.C.R.

of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. [Para 29)[261-D] K. Ramachandra Reddy and Am: v. Public Prosecutor

[1976] Suppl. SCR 542 : (1976) 3 SCC 618; Paniben v. State of Gujarat [1992) 2 SCR 197: (1992) 2 SCC 474; Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay [1958] SCR 552 : AIR 1958 SC 22; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav [1985] 2 SCR 621 : (1985) 1 SCC 552; State of Orissa v. Bansidhar Singh [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 212 : (1996) 2 sec 194; Panneerselvam V. State of Tamil Nadu [2008) 8 SCR 962 : (2008) 17 SCC 190; Atbir v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi [2010) 9 SCR 993 : (2010) 9 SCC 1; Umakant and Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh [2014] 8 SCR 69 : (2014) 7 sec 405 - relied on. 2.3 Multiple Dying Declarations: In cases where there are more than one dying declarations, the Court should consider whether they are consistent with each other. If there are inconsistencies, the nature of the inconsistencies must be examined as to whether they are material or not. In cases where there are more than one dying declaration, it is the duty of the Court to consider each one of them and satisfy itself as to the voluntariness and reliability of the declarations. Mere fact of recording multiple dying declarations does not take away the importance of each individual declaration. Court has to examine the contents of dying declaration in the light of various surrounding facts and circumstances. The victim made three dying declarations:- (i) statement recorded by PW-49 immediately after the victim was admitted to the hospital; (ii) Dying declaration recorded by PW-27 SDM on 21.12.2012; and (iii) dying declaration recorded by PW-30, Metropolitan Magistrate on 25.12.2012 at I :00 P.M by multiple choice questions and recording answers by gestures and writing. In the first dying declaration, the prosecutrix has stated that more than two men committed rape on her, bit her on lips, cheeks and breast and also subjected her to unnatural sex. In the second dying declaration recorded by PW-27, the victim has narrated the entire incident in great detail, specifying the role of each accused, rape committed by number of persons, insertion of iron rod in her private parts, description of the bus,

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

robbery committed and throwing of both the victims out of the A moving bus in naked condition. In the second dying declaration, she has also stated that the accused were addressing each other with the names like, "Ram Singh, Thakur, Raju, Mukesh, Pawan and Vinay". In the second dying declaration, though there are improvements in giving details of the incident, names of the B accused etc., there are no material contradictions between the first and second dying declaration. On 25.12.2012 at 1:00 P.M, PW-30, Metropolitan Magistrate recorded the statement by putting multiple choice questions to the victim and by getting answers through gestures and writing. The third dying declaration is found consistent with the earlier two declarations. It C conclusively established that the victim was brutally gang-raped, beaten by iron rod, subjected to other harsh atrocities and was finally dumped at an unknown place. While making the third declaration, the victim also tried to reveal the names of the accused by writing in her own handwriting. [Para 31, 35 and D 36)(263-E-G; 264-H; 265-A-F] Vi that v. State of Maharashtra [2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 234 : (2006) 13 SCC 54; Amo/ Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2008] 8 SCR 956 : (2008) 5 SCC 468; Ganpat Mahadeo Mane v. State of Maharashtra (1993) Supp.(2) sec 242; Lakhan V. State of M.P [2010) 9 SCR 705 : (2010) 8 SCC 514 - relied on. 2.4 When a dying declaration is recorded voluntarily, pursuant to a fitness report of a certified doctor, nothing much remains to be questioned unless, it is proved that the dying declaration was tainted with animosity and a result of tutoring. Especially, when there are multiple dying declarations minor variations does not affect the evidentiary value of other dying declarations whether recorded prior or subsequent thereto. Though there was time gap between the declarations, all the three dying declarations were consistent with each other and there were no material contradictions. [Paras 38, 39)(266-D, G-H] Abrar v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2010] 13 SCR 1217 : (2011) 2 SCC 750; Ashabai and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra [2013) 1 SCR 115 : (2013) 2 SCC 224 relied on.

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2.5 Dying Declaration by gestures and nods: As regards the contention that the third dying declaration made through gestures lacks credibility, it is seen that the multiple choice questions put to the prosecutrix by PW-30, MM were simple and easily answerable through nods and gestures. That apart, before recording the dying declaration, PW-30 had satisfied himself about fit mental state of the victim to record dying declaration through nods and gestures. There was nothing on record to show that the mental capacity of the victim was impaired, so as to doubt the third dying declaration. As the victim was conscious, oriented and meaningfully communicative, it is natural c that the victim was in a position to write the names of the accused persons and also about the use of long iron rod. The third dying declaration recorded through nods and gestures and also by the victim's own writing, writing the names of the accused inspires confidence in the Court; the same was rightly relied upon by the D trial Court as well as the High Court. [Para 40)(267-C-D] Meesala Ramakrishan v. State of A.P (1994) 4 SCC 182; B. Shashika/a v. State of A.P. [2004) 1 SCR 940 : (2004) 13 sec 249 - relied on. 2.6 Corroboration of Dying declaration by Medical Evidence:- Injuries to vagina, rectum and recto-vaginal septum as noted by PW-49 and PW-50; and the injuries as depicted in the post-mortem certificate, including the other external injuries which are evidently marks of violence during the incident, exhibit the cruel nature of gang rape committed on the victim. The profused bleeding from vagina and tag of vagina hanging outside; F completely recto-vaginal septum clearly demonstrate the violent act of gang rape committed on the victim. The medical reports including the operation theatre notes and the injuries thereon · indicates the pain and suffering which the victim had undergone due to multiple organ failure and other injuries caused by insertion G of iron rod. If considered on the anvil of settled legal principles, injuries on the person of a rape victim is not even a sine qua non for proving the charge of rape. In the present case, the extensive injuries found on the vagina/private parts of the body of the victim and injuries caused to the internal organs and all over the body, clearly show that the victim was ravished.[Paras 46, 47](269-FH H; 270-A-C]

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

Joseph v. State of Kera/a [2000) 3 SCR 729 : (2000) 5 SCC 197; State ofMaharashtra v. Suresh [1999) 5 Suppl. SCR 215 : (2000) 1 SCC 471; State of Rajas than v. N.K., The Accused [2000) 2 SCR 818 : (2000) 5 SCC

30 - relied on. 2. 7 Corroboration of dying declaration by scientific evidence:- The DNA profiles generated from the clothes of the accused recovered at their behest consistent with that of the victim was an unimpeachable evidence incriminating the accused in the occurrence. There was no plausible explanation from the accused as to the matching of DNA profile of the victim with that of the DNA profile generated from the clothes of the accused. The courts below rightly took note of the DNA analysis report in finding the accused guilty. [Para 48) [270-C-E)

C

3. Bite marks on the chest of the victim and Odontology Report: The photographs of bite marks found on the body of the victim, lifted by PW-66 were examined by PW-71. The analysis D shows that at least three bite marks were caused by A-1 whereas one bite mark was identified to have been most likely caused by A-3. Odontology Report which links A-1 and A-3, with the case, strengthens the prosecution case as to their involvement. The dying declarations well corroborated by medical and scientific E evidence strengthened the case of the prosecution by conclusively connecting accused with the crime. [Paras 49, 50)(270-F-H; 271C-D] 4. Use of Iron Rod and death of the victim: Contention of the appellants is that when the victim had given details of the entire incident to PW-49 in her first statement, if iron rod had been used, she would not have omitted to mention the use of iron rods in the incident. There is no force in such a contention, as ample reliable evidence are proved on record which lead to the irresistible conclusion that iron rod was used and it was not a mere piece of concoction. Insertion of iron rod in the private parts of the prosecutrix is amply established by the nature of multiple injuries caused to jejunum and rectum which was longitudinally torn, tag of vagina hanging out; and completely torn recto-vaginal septum.At the behest of A-1, two iron rods were

(2017] 6 S.C.R.

recovered from the shelf of the driver's cabin vide seizure Memo. The blood-stained rods deposited in the Malkhana were thereafter sent for chemical analysis. The DNA report prepared by PW-45 indicates that the DNA profile developed from the blood-stained iron rods is consistent with the DNA profile of the victim. Presence of blood on the iron rods and the DNA profile of which is consistent with the DNA profile of the victim establishes the prosecution case as to the alleged use of iron rods in the incident. [Paras 51, 52 and 53][271-D, E-F; 272-B-D] 5. Evidence of PW-1:

5.1 The deposition of PW-1 even after lengthy cross examination, remained unshaken. PW-1 clearly explained as to how he happened to be with the victim and considering the cogent evidence adduced by the prosecution, presence of PW-1 cannot be doubted in any manner. PW-1 himself was injured in the incident and he was admitted in the Casualty Ward, where PW-51 examined him. As per Ex.PW-51/A, lacerated wound over the vertex of scalp, lacertated wound over left upper lip and abrasion over right knee were found on the person of PW-1. Testimony of PW-1 being testimony of an injured witness lends credibility to his evidence and prosecution's case. Thus, no convincing grounds existed to discard the evidence of PW-1, an injured witness. [Para 57][273-E-G] Mano Dutt and Am'. v State of Uttar Pradesh [2012] 3 SCR 686 : (2012) 4 SCC 79 - relied on.

5.2 Any minor discrepancies or improvements not touching the core of the prosecution case and not going to the root of the matter, does not affect the trustworthiness of the witness. There are some improvements in version of PW-1 but, the core of his version as to the occurrence remained consistent. More so, when PW-1 and the victim fa,1:cd such a traumatic experience, immediately after the incident, they cannot be expected to give minute details of the incident. It would have taken some time for them to come out of the shock and recollect the incident and give a detailed version of the incident. The statements of PW-1 recorded on various dates are not contradictory to each other.

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

The subsequent statements though are more detailed as A compared to the former ones, in the circumstances of the case, it cannot be said to be unnatural affecting the trustworthiness of PW-l's testimony. There is hardly any justification for doubting the evidence of PW-1, especially when it is corroborated by recovery of PW-l's articles from the accused and scientific B evidence. The trial court as well as the High Court found PW-1 's evidence credible and trustworthy and there is no reason to take a different view. Further, the evidence of PW-1 is amply strengthened by scientific evidence and recovery of the incriminating articles from the accused. The alleged omissions and improvements in the evidence of PW-1 pointed out by the C defence did not materially affect the evidence of PW-1. [Paras 64, 65)[277-E-H; 278-A-B] Kathi Bharat Vajsur And Am'. v. State of Gujarat [2012] 5 SCR 850 : (2012) 5 SCC 724; Pudhu Raja and Am'. v. State Rep. by Inspector of Police [2012] 8 SCR 740 : (2012) 11 SCC 196; Jaswant Singh v. State of Hm:vana [2000] 2 SCR 903 : (2000) 4 SCC 484; Akhtar and Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal [2009] 5 SCR 771 : (2009) 13 sec 722 - relied on.

6. Recovery of the bus and its Involvement in the incident: 6.1 The recovery of the bus (Ex.P-1) and evidence of PW81, owner of the bus led to a breakthrough in the investigation that A-1 was the driver of the bus and A-3 was the cleaner of the bus. By adducing the evidence of PW-81 and PW-16, the prosecution established that the bus in question was routinely driven by A-1 and A-3 was the helper in the bus. The DNA profile of material objects lifted from the bus were found consistent with that of the victim and the complainant. Matching of the DNA profile developed from the articles seized from the bus like hair recovered from the third row of the bus on'the left side with the DNA profile of PW-1, strengthened the prosecution case as to the involvement of the offending bus. DNA profile developed from the blood-stained curtains of the bus and blood-stained seat covers of bus and the bunch of hair recovered from the floor of the bus below sixth row matched with the DNA profile of the

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A victim. The evidence of DNA analysis is an unimpeachable evidence as to the involvement of the offending bus in the commission of offence and also strong unimpeachable evidence connecting the accused with the crime. The accused neither rebutted this evidence nor offered any convincing explanation except making feeble attempt by stating that everything· was concocted. A finger print expert report states that the chance print lifted from the bus being identical with the finger print of A4 established the presence of A-4 in the bus, thereby strengthening prosecution case. [Paras 68, 69 and 70][279-A-B, E-G; 280-A-B]

7. Arrest and Recovery under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act:

7.1 Prosecution very much relied upon disclosure statements of the accused, pursuant to which articles of the victim and also of PW-1 were recovered. Accused being in possession D of the articles of the victim and that of PW-1, is a militating circumstance against the accused and it is for the accused to explain as to how they came in possession of these articles. Recovery of belongings of PW-1 and that of the victim, at the instance of the accused is a relevant fact duly proved by the E prosecution. Notably the articles recovered from the accused thereto have been duly identified by the complainant in test identification proceedings. Recovery of articles of complainant (PW-1) and that of the victim at the behest of accused is a strong incriminating circumstance implicating the accused. As rightly pointed out by the Courts below, the accused did not offer any F cogent or plausible explanation as to how they came in possession of those articles. (Paras 71, 72][280-B-C; 283-B-C] 7.2 Similarly, the Indian bank debit card recovered at the behest of A-1 and Nokia mobile phone recovered at the behest of A-4 were proved to be used by the prosecutrix. PW-75 mother G of the victim in her testimony stated that the Debit card belonged to her and that the same was in the possession of her daughter. Nokia mobile phone is stated to be the mobile used by the victim. The articles of the prosecutrix recovered from the accused were proved by the evidence of PW-75 (mother of the victim) and the H same was not controverted by the defence. Section 25 of the

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

Evidence Act speaks of a confession made to a police officer, A which shall not be proved as against a person accused of an offence. Section 26 of the Evidence Act also speaks that no confession made by the person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person. Sections 25 and 26 of B the Evidence Act put a complete bar on the admissibility of a confessional statement made to a police officer or a confession made in absentia of a Magistrate, while in custody. Section 27 of the Evidence Act is by way of a proviso to Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act and a statement even by way of confession made in police custody which distinctly relates to the fact discovered is c admissible in evidence against the accused. Section 27 is based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information is true and is a relevant fact and accordingly it can be safely allowed to be given in evidence. Section 27 has prescribed two limitations for determining how much of the information received from the accused can be proved against him: (i) The information must be such as the accused has caused discovery of the fact, i.e. the fact must be the consequence, and the information the cause of its discovery; (ii) The information must 'relate distinctly' to the fact discovered. Both the conditions must be E satisfied. [Paras 73, 74, 75][283-D-H; 284-C-D] 7.3 Even though, the arrest and recovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is often sought to be misused, the courts cannot be expected to completely ignore how crucial are the recoveries made under Section 27 in an investigation. The legislature while incorporating Section 27, as an exception to Sections 24, 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, was convinced of the quintessential purpose Section 27 would serve in an investigation process. The recovery made under Section 27 of the Evidence Act not only acts as the foundation stone for proceeding with an investigation, but also completes the chain of circumstances. Once the recovery is proved by the prosecution, burden of proof on the defence to rebut the same is very strict, which cannot be discharged merely by pointing at procedural irregularities in making the recoveries, especially when the recovery is

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corroborated by direct as well as circumstantial evidence, especially when the investigating officer assures that failure in examining independent witness while making the recoveries was not a deliberate or ma/a fide, rather it was on account of exceptional circumstances attending the investigation process. [Paras 77] [285-E-H] 7.4 The need of examining independent witnesses, while making recoveries pursuant to the disclosure statement of the accused is a rule of caution evolved by the Judiciary, which aims at protecting the right of the accused by ensuring transparency and credibility in the investigation of a criminal case. In the present case, PW-80 SI deposed in her cross-examination that no independent person had agreed to become a witness and in the light of such a statement, there is no reason for the courts to doubt the version of the police and the recoveries made. When recovery is made pursuant to the statement of accused, seizure memo prepared by the Investigating Officer need not mandatorily be attested by independent witnesses. Thus, recoveries made pursuant to disclosure statement of the accused are duly proved by the prosecution and there is no substantial reason to discard the same. Recovery of articles of PW-1 and also that of victim at the instance of the accused is a strong incriminating evidence against accused, especially when no plausible explanation is forthcoming from the accused. Further, the scientific examination of the articles recovered completely place them in line with the chain of events described by the prosecution. [Paras 79, 80, 82)[286-C-D; 287-C-D] Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan [2004) 2 SCR 123 : (2004) 10 sec 657; Geejaganda Somaiah V. State of Karnataka [2007) 3 SCR 899: (2007) 9 SCC 315; State Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil and Another [2000) 5 Suppl. SCR 144 : (2001) 1 SCC 652; Pulukuri Kottaya v. King-Emperor AIR 1947 PC 67; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 79 : (2005) 11 sec 600 - relied on.

8. DNA Analysis: 8.1. DNA - De-oxy-ribonucleic acid, which is found in the

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

chromosomes of the cells of living beings, is the blueprint of an A individual. DNA is the genetic blue print for life and is virtually contained in every cell. No two persons, except identical twins have ever had identical DNA. DNA profiling is an extremely accurate way to compare a suspect's DNA with crime scene specimens, victim's DNA on the blood-stained clothes of the accused or other articles recovered, DNA testing can make a virtually positive identification when the two samples match. A DNA finger print is identical for every part of the body, whether it is the blood, saliva, brain, kidney or foot on any part of the body. It cannot be changed; it will be identical no matter what is done to a body. Even relatively minute quantities of blood, saliva c or semen at a crime scene or on clothes can yield sufficient material for analysis. The Experts opine that the identification is almost hundred per cent precise. Using this i.e. chemical structure of genetic information by generating DNA profile of the individual, identification of an individual is done like in the traditional method of identifying finger prints of offenders. Finger prints are only on the fingers and at times may be altered. Burning or cutting a finger can change the make of the finger print. But DNA cannot be changed for an individual no matter whatever happens to a body. [Para 85)(291-B-E] Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edition Reprint 2009 by P. Ramanatha Aiyar - referred to.

8.2 DNA evidence is now a predominant forensic technique for identifying criminals when biological tissues are left at the scene of crime or for identifying the source of blood found on any articles or clothes etc. recovered from the accused or from witnesses. DNA testing on samples such as saliva, skin, blood, hair or semen not only helps to convict the accused but also serves to exonerate. The sophisticated technology of DNA finger printing makes it possible to obtain conclusive results. Section 53A Cr.P.C. is added by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005. It provides for a detailed medical examination of accused for an offence of rape or attempt to commit rape by the registered medical practitioners employed in a hospital run by the Government or by a local authority or in the absence of such a practitioner within the radius of 16 kms. from

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the place where the offence has been committed by any other registered medical practitioner. From the evidence of PW-45 and the details given in the above tabular form, it is seen that the DNA profile generated from blood-stai.ned clothes of A-1; A-2; A-3; A-4; and A-5 were consistent with the DNA profile of the prosecutrix. The result of DNA analysis and that of the DNA profile generated from blood-stained clothes of the accused found consistent with that of the victim is a strong piece of evidence incriminating the accused in the offence. In his evidence, PW45 stated that once DNA profile is generated and found consistent with another DNA profile, the accuracy is hundred per cent and there is no reason to doubt his evidence. The DNA report and the findings thereon, being scientifically accurate clearly establish the link involving the accused persons in the incident. [Paras 87, 89, 91][292-C-D; 294-B, D-E, G-H; 295-A-B) Santosh Kumar Singh v. State through CBI [2010] 13 SCR 901 : (2010) 9 SCC 747 - relied on. Advanced Law Lexicon, 3'd Edition Reprint 2009 by P. Ramanatha Aiyar - referred to.

9. Conspiracy:

9.1 The essentials of the offence of conspiracy and the manner in which it can be proved. Meeting of minds for committing an illegal act is sine qua non of the offence of conspiracy. It is also obvious that meeting of minds, thereby resulting in formation of a consensus between the parties, can be a sudden act, spanning in a fraction of a minute. It is neither necessary that each of the conspirators take active part in the commission of each and every conspiratorial act, nor it is necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every details of the conspiracy. The most important aspect of the offence of conspiracy is that apart from being a distinct statutory offence, all the parties to the conspiracy are liable for the acts of each other and as an exception to the general law in the case of conspiracy intent i.e. mens rea alone constitutes a crime. As per Section 10 of the Evidence Act, once reasonable ground is shown for believing that two or more persons have conspired to commit an offence then, anything done by any one of them in reference to their common intention, is

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

admissible against the others. Another significant aspect of the offence of criminal conspiracy is that it is very rare to find direct proof of it, because of the very fact that it is hatched in secrecy. Unlike other offences, criminal conspiracy in most of the cases is proved by circumstantial evidence only. It is extremely rare that direct evidence in proof of conspiracy can be forthcoming from wholly disinterested, quarters or from utter strangers. Conspiracy is a matter of inference, deduced from words uttered, criminal acts of the accused done in furtherance of conspiracy. [Paras 94, 96, 98)[295-E-F; 296-D-E; 297-B]

Major E.G Barsay v. State of Bombay [1962) 2 SCR 195; State of Maharashtra v. Damu and Others (2000) 6 SCC 269; Shivnarayan Laxminarayan Joshi and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (1980) 2 SCC 465; Mohammad Usman Mohammad Hussain Maniyar and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra [1981] 3 SCR 68: (1981) 2 SCC 443; Kehar Singh and Ors. v. State (Delhi Administration) [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 24 : (1988) 3 SCC 609; State of Maharashtra and Ors. v. Som Nath Thapa and Ors. [1996) 1 Suppl. SCR 189 : (1996) 4 SCC 659; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru (2005) 11 SCC 600; State Through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v. Nalini and Ors. (1999) 5 SCC 253; Yakub Abdul Razak Menon v. The State of Maharashtra, through CBI, Bombay [2013) 15 SCR l : (2013) 13 SCC 1; Noor Mohammad Mohd. Yusuf Momin v. State of Maharashtra [1971) 1 SCR 119 : (1970) 1 SCC 696; Firozuddin Basheeruddin and Ors. v. State of Kera/a (2001) 7 SCC 596; Ram Narain Poply v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Ors. [2003] 1 SCR 119 : (2003) 3 SCC 641; Yogesh@ Sachin Jagdish Joshi v. State of Maharashtra [2008) 6 SCR 1116: (2008) 10 SCC 394; Pratapbhai Hamirbhai Solanki v. State of Gujarat and Am: [2012) 9 SCR 561 : (2013) 1 SCC 613; Chandra Prakash v. State of Rajasthan [2014) 6 SCR 819 : (2014) 8 SCC 340; Yogesh @ Sachin Jagdish Joshi v. State of Maharashtra [2008) 6 SCR 1116 : (2008) 10 sec 394 - relied on.

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KENNY on Outlines of Criminal law, 19th Edn., pp. 426-427 - referred to.

9.2 Jn the present case, there was ample evidence proving the acts, statements and circumstances, establishing firm ground to hold that the accused who were present in the bus were in B prior concert to commit the offence of rape. The prosecution established that the accused were associated with each other. The criminal acts done in furtherance of conspiracy was established by the sequence of events and the conduct of the accused. Existence of conspiracy and its objects could be inferred from the chain of events. In this case, the existence of conspiracy c is sought to be drawn by an inference from the circumstances: (i) the accused did not allow any other passenger to board the bus after PW-1 and the prosecutrix boarded the bus; (ii) switching off the lights; pinning PW-1 down by some while others commit rape/ unnatural sex with the prosecutrix at the rear side of the bus; (iii) exhortation by some of the accused that the victim be not left alive; and (iv) their act of throwing the victim and PW-1 out of the running bus without clothes in the wintery night of December. The courts below rightly drew an inference that there was prior meeting of minds among the accused and they rightly held that the prosecution has proved the existence of conspiracy to commit E gang rape and other offences. [Paras 100, 101]1297-G-H; 298-AB, E-F) Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana (2003) 2 SCC 143 relied on.

9.3 Jn achieving the goal of the conspiracy, several offences committed by some of the conspirators may not be known to others, still all the accused will be held guilty of the offem;e of criminal conspiracy. Use of iron rod by one or more of the accused is sufficient to inculpate all the accused for the same. In the present case, gang rape and use of iron rod caused grave injuries G to victim's vagina and intestines; throwing her out of the bus in that vegetative state in chilled weather led to her death; all this taking place in the course of same transaction and with the active involvement of all the accused is more than sufficient evidence to find the accused guilty of criminal conspiracy. The findings of H the courts below with regard to conviction of all the accused under

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

Section 120-B IPC and Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC is affirmed. [Para 102][298-G-H; 299-A-C]

9.4 Gang rape is dealt with in clause (g) of sub-section (2) of Section 376 IPC read with Explanation 1. As per Explanation I to Section 376 IPC, "where a woman is raped by one or more in a group of persons acting in furtherance of their common intention, B each of the persons shall be deemed to have committed gang rape" and all of them shall be liable to be punished under subsection (2) of Section 376 IPC. As per Explanation I, by operation of deeming provision, a person who has not actually committed rape is deemed to have committed rape even if only one of the groups has committed rape in furtherance of the common intention. So far as the offence under Section 376 (2)(g) IPC, the sharing of common intention and the jointness in commission of rape is concerned, the same is established by the presence of all the accused in the bus; their action in concert as established by the dying declaration of the prosecutrix and the··~vidence of D PW-1, presence of blood in the clothes of all the accused, DNA profile generated thereon being consistent with the DNA profile of the victim. The prosecution established the presence of the accused in the bus and the heinous act of gang rape committed on the prosecutrix by the accused by the ample evidence - by the multiple dying declaration of the victim and also by the E evidence of PW-1 and medical evidence and also by arrest and recovery of incriminating articles of the victim and that of PW-1 complainant. The scientific evidence in particular DNA analysis report clearly brought home the guilt of the accused. [Paras 103, 104, 105][299-E; 300-C-E] 10.

Section 235(2), Criminal Procedure Code:

10.1 Section 235 Cr.P.C. deals with the judgments of acquittal or conviction. Under Section 235(2) Cr.P.C., where the accused is convicted, save in cases of admonition or release on good conduct, the Judge shall hear the accused on the question G of sentence and then pass sentence in accordance with law. Section 235(2) Cr.P.C. imposes duty on the court to hear the accused on the question of sentence and then pass sentence on him in accordance with law. The only exception to the said rule is created in case of applicability of Section 360 Cr.P.C. i.e. when 1-1

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the court finds the accused eligible to be released on probation of good conduct or after admonition. Section 354 Cr.P.C. specifies the language and contents of judgment, while delivering the judgment in a criminal case. Section 354(3) Cr.P.C. deals with judgments where conviction is for an offence punishable with death penalty or in the alternative with imprisonment for life. Section 354(3) Cr.P.C. mandates that when the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative, with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence awarded, and in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons for such sentence. The· c statutory duty to state special reasons under Section 354(3) Cr.P.C. can be meaningfully carried out only if the hearing on sentence under Section 235(2) Cr.P.C. is effective and procedurally fair. To afford an effective opportunity to the accused, the Court must hear on the question of sentence to D know about (i) age of the accused; (ii) background of the accused; (iii) prior criminal antecedents, if any; (iv) possibility of reformation, if any; and (v) such other relevant factors. The major deficiency in the complex criminal justice system is that important factors which have a bearing on sentence are not placed before the Court. Resultantly, the Courts arc constantly faced with the E dilemma to impose an appropriate sentence. In this context, hearing of the accused under Section 235(2) Cr.P.C. on the question of sentencing is a crucial exercise which is intended to enable the accused to place before the Court all the mitigating circumstances in his favour viz. his social and economic backwardness, young age etc. The mandate of Section 235(2) F Cr.P.C. becomes more crucial when the accused is found guilty of an offence punishable with death penalty or with the life imprisonment. [Paras 106, 108, 109, 110)[300-E-F; 301-D-H; 302-A-B]

It is well-settled that Section 235(2) Cr.P.C. is 10.2 intended to give an opportunity of hearing to the prosecution as well as the accused on the question of sentence. The Court while awarding the sentence has to take into consideration various factors having a bearing on the question of sentence. In case, Section 235(2) Cr.P.C. is not complied with, as held in Dagdu's

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

case, the appellate Court can either send back the case to the Sessions Court for complying with Section 235(2) Cr.P.C. so as to enable the accused to adduce materials; or, in order to avoid delay, the appellate Court may by itself give an opportunity to the parties in terms of Section 235(2) Cr.P.C. to produce the materials they wish to adduce instead of sending the matter back to the trial Court for hearing on sentence. In the present case, the latter course is adopted.[Para 111 ][302-C-EJ

10.3 A-2 in his affidavit stated that he was picked up from his house at Karoli, Rajasthan and brought to Delhi and reiterated that he is innocent and he denied his involvement in the occurrence. In their affidavits, A-3, A-4 and A-5 submitted in their c individual affidavits stated that they hail from an ordinary/ poor background and are not much educated. They also stated that they have aged parents and other family members who are dependent on them and they are to be supported by them. Accused also stated that they have no criminal antecedents and D that after their confinement in Tihar Jail they have maintained good behavior. Question of awarding sentence is a matter of discretion and has to be exercised on consideration of circumstances aggravating or mitigating in the individual cases. The courts are consistently faced with the situation where they are required to answer the new challenges and mould the E sentence to meet those challenges. Protection of society and deterring the criminal is the avowed object of law. It is expected of the courts to operate the sentencing system as to impose such sentence which reflects the social conscience of the society. While determining sentence in heinous crimes, Judges ought to weigh F its impact on the society and impose adequate sentence considering the collective conscience or society's cry for justice. While considering the imposition of appropriate punishment, courts should not only keep in view the rights of the criminal but also the rights of the victim and the society at large. [Paras 112, 116][302-G-H; 303-A-B, E-G) 11. Whether the Case falls under rarest of rare cases: 11.1 While closing the shutter of deterrent approach of sentencing in India, the small window of 'award of death sentence' was left open in the category of 'rarest of rare case' in *Bachan H

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A Singh by a Constitution Bench of this Court. The principles laid down in *Bachan Singlt's case is that, normal rule is awarding of 'life sentence', imposition of death sentence being justified, only in rarest of rare case, when the option of awarding sentence of life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed'. By virtue of Bachan Singh, 'life imprisonment' became the rule and 'death sentence' an exception. The focus was shifted from 'crime' to the 'crime and criminal' i.e. now the nature and gravity of the crime needs to be analysed juxtaposed to the peculiar circumstances attending the societal existence of the criminal. [Paras 119, 120][304-E-F, G; 305-B)

State of M.P. v. Munna Choubey and Anr. [2005] 1 SCR 781 : (2005) 2 SCC 710; Jashubha Bharatsinh Gohil and Ors. v. State of Gujarat (1994) 4 SCC 353; Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P. (1973] 2 SCR 541 : (1973) 1 SCC 20; Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P. [1979) 3 SCR 646; *Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 sec 684 - relied on.

11.2 A milestone in the sentencing policy is the concept of 'life imprisonment till the remainder of life' evolved in **Swamy Shradltananda (2). In this case, a man committed murder of his E wife for usurping her property in a cold-blooded, calculated and diabolic manner. The three-Judge Bench, was of the view that even though the murder was diabolic, presence of certain circumstances in favour of the accused, viz. no mental or physical pain being inflicted on the victim, confession of the accused before the High Court etc., made them reluctant to award death sentence. F However, the Court also realised that award of life imprisonment, which euphemistically means imprisonment for a term of 14 years (consequent to exercise of power of commutation by the executive), would be equally disproportionate punishment to the crime committed. Hence, in Swamy Shradhananda (2) the Court ·G directed that the accused sit all not be released from tlte prison till the rest of !tis life. [Para 123) [309-D-G]

**Swamy Shradhananda alias Murali Manohar Mishra (2) v. State of Karnataka [2008) 11 SCR 93 : (2008) 13 SCC 767; Ramnaresh and Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh (2012) 4 SCC 257; Sangeet and Another

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

v. State of Haryana [2012] 13 SCR 85 : (2013) 2 SCC 452; Holiram Bordoloi v. State of Assam (2005] 3 SCR 406 : (2005) 3 SCC 793 ; Ankush Maruti Shinde and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra [2009] 7 SCR 182 : (2009) 6 SCC 667; Kamta Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1996) 5 Suppl. SCR 507 : (1996) 6 SCC 250; State of U.P. v. Satish [2005] 2 SCR 1132 : (2005) 3 SCC 114; Sundar alias Sundarajan v. State by Inspector of Police and Am: (2013) 4 SCR 25 : (2013) 3 sec 215; Sevaka Perumal and Ai11: V. State of Tamil Nadu [1991) 2 SCR 711: (1991) 3 SCC 471; Moh.fit Khan and Am: v. State of Jharkhand (2014) 10 SCR 812 : (2015) l SCC 67 - relied on.

Swamy Shradhananda v. State of Karnataka (2007) 12 sec 282 - referred to.

11.3 As dealing with sentencing, courts have applied the "Crime Test", "Criminal Test" and the "Rarest of the Rare Test", D the tests examine whether the society abhors such crimes and whether such crimes shock the conscience of the society and attract intense and extreme indignation of the community. Courts have further held that where the victims are helpless women, children or old persons and the accused displayed depraved E mentality, committing crime in a diabolic manner, the accused should be shown no remorse and death penalty should be awarded. [Para 126)(312-G-H; 313-A-B) Molai & Anr. v. State of M.P. [1999] 4 Suppl. SCR 104: (1999) 9 SCC 581; Bantu v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 11 SCR 184 : (2008) 11 SCC 113; Ankush Maruti Shinde and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 7 SCR 182 : (2009) 6 SCC 667; Mehboob Batcha and Ors. v. State rep. by Supdt. of Police [2011) 3 SCR 1091 : (2011) 7 SCC 45; Mohd. Mannan @ Abdul Mannan v. State of Bihar [2011) 5 SCR 518 : (2011) 5 SCC 317; Shivaji @ Dadya Shankar A/hat v. State of Maharashtra [2008] 13 SCR 81 : (2008) 15 sec 269; Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik V. The State of Maharashtra [2012) 2 SCR 225 : (2012) 4 SCC 37; Dhananjoy Chatte1jee alias Dhana v. State of WB.

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[19941 1 SCR 37 : (1994) 2 SCC 220; Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra [20131 6 SCR 949 : (2013) 5 SCC 546 - relied on. 11.4 Even the young age of the accused is not a mitigating circumstance for commutation to life. [Para 127)(313-C-D)

Bhagwan Swarup v. State of U.P. [19701 3 SCR 495: (1971) 3 SCC 759; Deepak Rai v. State of Bihar [2013) 14 SCR 297 : (2013) to sec 421; Shabhnam V. State of Uttar Pradesh [20151 9 SCR 943: (2015) 6 SCC 632 - relied on.

11.5 Another significant development in the sentencing policy of India is the 'victim-centric' approach, clearly recognised in ***Mach/ii Singh and re-emphasized in a plethora of cases. It has been consistently held that the courts have a duty towards society and that the punishment should be corresponding to the D crime and should act as a soothing balm to the suffering of the victim and their family. The Courts while considering the issue of sentencing are bound to acknowledge the rights of the victims and their family, apart from the rights of the society and the accused. The agony suffered by the family of the victims cannot be ignored in any case. The nature and the manner of the act E committed by the accused, and the effect it casted on the society and on the victim's family, are to be weighed against the mitigating circumstances stated by the accused and the scope of their reform, so as to reach a definite reasoned conclusion as to what would be appropriate punishment in the present case- 'death sentence', F life sentence commutable to 14 years' or 'life imprisonment for the rest of the life'. [Paras 137, 138)320-A-B, C-D; 320-E-F[

Gurvail Singh@ Gala and A111: v. State of Punjab [2013) I SCR 783 : (2013) 2 SCC 713; Mohfil Khan and A111: v. State of Jharkhand [20141 10 SCR 812 : (2015) 1 SCC 67; ***Machhi Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab [19831 3 SCR 413: (1983) 3 SCC 470 - relied on.

11.6 The question would be whether the present case could be one of the rarest of rare cases warranting death penalty. The court is to draw up a balance-sheet of aggravating and mitigating

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

circumstances attending to the commission of the offence and A then strike a balance between those aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Two questions are to be asked and answered:- (i) Is there something uncommon about the crimes which regard sentence of imprisonment for life inadequate; (ii) Whether there is no alternative punishment suitable except death sentence. Where a crime is committed with extreme brutality and the collective conscience of the society is shocked, courts must award death penalty, irrespective of their personal opinion as regards desirability of death penalty. By not imposing a death sentence in such cases, the courts may do injustice to the society at large. The act was committed in connivance and collusion of six who c were on a notorious spree running a bus, showcasing as a public transport, with the intent of attracting passengers and committing crime with them. The victim and her friend were picked up from the Munirka bus stand with the ma/a fide intent of ravishing and torturing her. The accused not only abducted the victim, but gang0 raped her, committed unnatural offence by compelling her for oral sex, bit her lips, cheeks, breast and caused horrifying injuries to her private parts by inserting iron rod which ruptured the vaginal rectum, jejunum and rectum. The diabolical manner in which crime was committed leaves one startled as to the pervert mental state of the intlictor. On top of it, after having failed to kill E her on the spot, by running the bus over her, the victim was thrown half naked in the wintery night, with grievous injuries. The brazenness and coldness with which the acts were committed reflects the threat to which the society would be posed to, in case the accused are not appropriately punished. More so, it reflects that there is no scope of reform. The horrific acts reflecting the in-human extent to which the accused could go to satisfy their lust, being completely oblivious, not only to the norms of the society, but also to the norms of humanity. The acts committed so shook the conscience of the society. On the aspect of sentencing, seeking reduction of death sentence to life G imprisonment, three of the convicts/appellants namely A-3, A-4 and A-5 placed on record, through their individual affidavits mitigating circumstances such as family circumstances such as poverty and rural background, young age, current family situation including age of parents, ill health of family members and their 1-1

(2017] 6 S.C.R.

responsibilities towards their parents and other family members, absence of criminal antecedents, conduct in jail, and likelihood of reformation. In his affidavit, A-2 reiterated his innocence and only pleaded that he is falsely implicated in the case. [Paras 139142][320-G-H; 321-A-B, C-D, G-H; 322-B-D]

11.7 Society's reasonable expectation is that deterrent punishment commensurate with the gravity of the offence be awarded. When the crime is brutal, shocking the collective conscience of the community, sympathy in any form would be misplaced and it would shake the confidence of public in the administration of criminal justice system. Imposition of appropriate punishment is the manner in which the courts respond to the society's cry for justice against the crime. Justice demands that the courts should impose punishments befitting the crime so that it reflects public abhorrence of the crime. Factors like young age of the accused and poor background cannot be said to be mitigating circumstances. Likewise, post-crime remorse and post-crime good conduct of the accused, the statement of the accused as to their background and family circumstances, age, absence of criminal antecedents and their good conduct in prison cannot be taken as mitigating circumstances to take the case out of the category of "rarest of rare cases". The circumstances stated by the accused are too slender to be treated as mitigating circumstances. [Paras 144, 145][322-G; 323-A-C]

Purushottarn Dashrath Borate and Am: v. Stare of . Maharashtra [20151 5 SCR 1112: (2015) 6 SCC 652; Om Prakash v. State of Haryana 11999) 1 SCR 794 : (1999) 3 sec 19 - relied on.

11.8 In the present case, there is not even a hint of hesitation with respect to the aggravating circumstances outweighing the mitigating circumstances and there is no justification to convert the death sentence imposed by the courts below to 'life G imprisonment for the rest of the life'. The gruesome offences were committed with highest viciousness. Human lust was allowed to take such a demonic form. The accused may not be hardened criminals; but the cruel manner in which the gang-rape was committed in the moving bus; iron rods were inserted in the H private parts of the victim; and the coldness with which both the

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

victims were thrown naked in cold wintery night of December, A shocks the collective conscience of the society. The present case clearly comes within the category of 'rarest of rare case' where the question of any other punishment is 'unquestionably foreclosed'. If at all there is a case warranting award of death sentence, it is the present case. If the dreadfulness displayed by the accused in committing the gang-rape, unnatural sex, insertion of iron rod in the private parts of the victim does not fall in the 'rarest of rare category', then one may wonder what else would fall in that category. The incident of gang-rape on the night of 16.12.2012 in the capital sparked public protest not only in Delhi but nation-wide. We live in a civilized society where law and order c is supreme and the citizens enjoy inviolable fundamental human rights. But when the incident of gang-rape like the present one surfaces, it causes ripples in the conscience of society and serious doubts are raised as to whether we really live in a civilized society and whether both men and women feel the same sense of liberty D and freedom which they should have felt in the ordinary course of a civilized society, driven by rule of law. Certainly, whenever such grave violations of human dignity come to fore, an unknown sense of insecurity and helplessness grabs the entire society, women in particular, and the only succour people look for, is the State to take command of the situation and remedy it effectively. E [Paras 146, 147)(323-D-H; 324-A-B] 12. The statistics of National Crime Records Bureau show that despite the progress made by women in education and in various fields and changes brought in ideas of women's rights, respect for women is on the decline and crimes against women are on the increase. Offences against women are not a women's issue alone but, human rights issue. Increased rate of crime against women is an area of concern for the law-makers and it points out an emergent need to study in depth the root of the problem and remedy the same through a strict law and order regime. There are a number of legislations and numerous penal provisions to punish the offenders of violence against women. However, it becomes important to ensure that gender justice docs not remain only on paper. Its hoped that this gruesome incident in the capital and death of this young woman will be an

[2017] 6 S.C.R.

A eye-opener for a mass movement "to end violence against women" and "respect for women and her dignity" and sensitizing public at large on gender justice. Every individual, irrespective of his/her gender must be willing to assume the responsibility in fight for gender justice and also awaken public opinion on gender B justice. Public at large, in particular men, are to be sensitized on gender justice. The battle for gender justice can be won only with strict implementation of legislative provisions, sensitization of public, taking other pro-active steps at all levels for combating violence against women and ensuring widespread attitudinal changes and comprehensive change in the existing mind set. C [Paras 148, 14911324-C-G]

Dagdu & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra [ 19771 3 SCR 636: (1977) 3 SCC 68; Ma/kiat Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab [1991 J 2 SCR 256 : (1991) 4 SCC 341; Ajay Pandit alias Jagdish Dayabhai Patel and Am: v. State of Maharashtra [2012) 10 SCR 70 : (2012) 8 SCC 43 - relied on.

Case Law Reference In the Judgment of Dil!ak Misra, J. (For himself and Ashok Bhushan, J.}

[1974) 3 SCR 9

relied on

Para 52

[2009) 8 SCR 264

relied on

Para 53

[1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 938

relied on

Para 56

[1975) Suppl. SCR 84

relied on

Para 56

(1978) 4 sec 302

relied on

Para 56

1980 Suppl. sec 567

relied on

Para 56

[2011) 4 SCR 1176

relied on

Para 57

[2006) 10 Suppl. SCR 264

relied on

Para 58

[2010) 14 SCR 133

relied on

Para 58

[2008] 3 SCR 1078

relied on

Para 59

[2008) 14 SCR 405

referred to

Para 70

[2008] 14 SCR 309

referred to

Para 70

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

[2009) 2 SCR 1033

referred to

Para 70

[2010) 15 SCR 452

referred to

Para 70

(1954) SCR 145

referred to

Para 71

[1974) 1 SCR 328

referred to

Para 71

[2002) 1 SCR 377

referred to

Para 71

[2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 183

referred to

Para 71

[1981) 3 SCR 504

referred to

Para 71

[1978) 3 SCR 393

referred to

Para 73

[2012] 3 SCR 686

referred to

Para 79

[2012) 8 SCR 740

referred to

Para 82

[2000] 2 SCR 903

referred to

Para 82

[2009) 5 SCR 771

referred to

Para 82

(1985) 1 sec 505

referred to

Para 83

[2002] 1 Suppl. SCR 379

referred to

Para 84

AIR 1965 SC 277

relied on

Para 85

[2002) 3 SCR 1

referred to

Para 86

(1988) Suppl. SCR 611

referred to

Para 88

(1999] 1 SCR 276

referred to

Para 89

AIR 1947 PC 67

referred to

Para 128

(1972) 4 sec 659

referred to

Para 129

[1976) 1 SCR 715

referred to

Para 130

[2004] 2 SCR 123

referred to

Para 131

[2005) 2 Suppl. SCR 79

referred to

Para 132

[2000) 5 Suppl. SCR 144

referred to

Para 135

[2012] 7 SCR 1100

referred to

Para 135

[2008) 7 SCR 714

referred to

Para 135

[2013] 8 SCR 323

referred to

Para 135

[1971] 3 SCR 914

relied on

Para 140

[1974] 1 SCR 78

relied on

Para 141

(2017] 6 S.C.R.

[2003) 1 Suppl. SCR 44f

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Para 142

[2003] 3 SCR 978

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Para 143

[2010) 4 SCR 103

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Para 144

[2004) 5 Suppl. SCR I092

relied on

Para 144

(1975) 4 sec 480

relied on

Para 144

(2002) 6 sec 110

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Para 173

[2010] 9 SCR 993

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Para 174

[1992] 2 SCR 197

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Para 174

[2008] 8 SCR 962

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Para 174

[2012) 7 SCR 128

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Para 175

[2010) 15 SCR 673

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Para 175

[2015) 2 SCR 1999

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Para 176

[2003) 5 Suppl. SCR 54

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Para 177

(1992) 4 sec 225

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Para 178

[2015) 3 SCR 394

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Para 179

(1994) 4 sec 182

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Para 186

[2004] 1 SCR 940

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129 Supreme Court Reporter 2308 [2001) 3 SCR 729

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Para 187 Para 212

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[2009] 11 SCR 636

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Para 216

[2010) 13 SCR 901

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Para 217

[2011] 7 SCR 354

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Para 218

[2011 I 8 SCR 774

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Para 219

[2011 I 2 SCR 939

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Para 220

[2012] 8 SCR 295

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Para 221

[2012] 5 SCR 952

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Para 222

[2014) 3 SCR 212

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Para 223

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

[2014] 1 SCR 120

relied on

Para 224

[1996] 8 Suppl. SCR 225

relied on

Para 243

[2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 337

relied on

Para 244

[2010) 10 SCR 503

relied on

Para 244

(2012) 6 sec 204

relied on

Para 244

[1985) Suppl. SCR 399

relied on

Para 259

[1971) 1SCR119

relied on

Para 275

[1962] SCR 195

relied on

Para 276

[1978] 1 SCR 781

relied on

Para 277

[1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 24

relied on

Para 278

[2000] 4 Suppl. SCR 621

relied on

Para 280

[2009) 13 SCR 124

relied on

Para 281

[2012) 9 SCR 561

relied on

Para 282

[2005) 4 Suppl. SCR 498

relied on

Para 283

[1999] 3 SCR 1

relied on

Para 284

(2001) 7 sec 596

relied on

Para 285

[1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 483

relied on

Para 286

[1980) SCR 500

referred to

Para 286

[1977) 1 SCR 229

relied on

Para 306

[1977) 3 SCR 636

relied on

Para 307

(1980) 2 sec 684

referred to

Para 318

[1983] 3 SCR 413 .

referred to

Para 318

[2012] 13 SCR 85

referred to

Para 319

[2013) 6 SCR 949

referred to

Para 319

[2007] 2 SCR 555

referred to

Para 319

[2011] 2 SCR 367

referred to

Para 319

[1994) 1 SCR 37

referred to

Para 319

[2017] 6 S.C.R.

[1989] 1 SCR 509

referred to

Para 321

[1968] SCR 774

referred to

Para 322

[1998] 2 SCR 162

referred to

Para 322

[1999] 2 SCR 1

referred to

Para 322

[2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 918

referred to

Para 322

[1974) 3 SCR 356

referred to

Para 323

[1976) 2 SCR 274

referred to

Para 323

[2003) 2 Suppl. SCR 285

referred to

Para 323

(2005) 10 sec 322

referred to

Para 323

[2009) SCR 1055

referred to

Para 323

[2009] 9 SCR 90

referred to

Para 323

(201 O) l sec 58

referred to

Para 323

[2011] l SCR 829

referred to

Para 323

[2012] 1 SCR 1009

referred to

Para 323

[2014) 8 SCR 668

referred to

Para 323

(1999) 6 sec 60

referred to

Para 323

[2001) 3 SCR 409

referred to

Para 323

[2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 889

referred to

Para 323

[2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 464

referred to

Para 324

[2014] 3 SCR 34

referred to

Para 324

[2014] 8 SCR 668

referred to

Para 324

[2001] 4 Suppl. SCR 298

referred to

Para 325

(2011) 13 sec 706

referred to

Para 325

(2012) 4 sec 257

referred to

Para 325

[2013] 4 SCR 25

referred to

Para 325

[2012] 13 SCR 1049

referred to

Para 325

[2008) 11 SCR 93

referred to

Para 326

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

(2016) 7 sec 1

referred to

Para 326

[2012) 5 SCR 696

referred to

Para 326

[2013) 6 SCR 108

referred to

Para 326

[2011) 8 SCR 239

referred to

Para 326

(2014) 12 sec 274

referred to

Para 326

[1991] 2 SCR 711

referred to

Para 328

[1996) 5 Suppl. SCR 507

referred to

Para 328

[2005) 2 SCR 1132

referred to

Para 328

[2005] 3 SCR 406

referred to

Para 328

[2009] 7 SCR 182

referred to

Para 328

[2013) 14 SCR 297

referred to

Para 328

[2014] 10 SCR 812

referred to

Para 329

[2015] 5 SCR 1112

referred to

Para 329

[2011] 14 SCR 921

referred to

Para 340

[1994] 2 SCR 94

referred to

Para 343

[2008) 11 SCR 184

referred to

Para 346

[2002) 2 SCR 767

referred to

Para 346

[2012] 2 SCR 225

referred to

Para 347

[1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 203

referred to

Para 348

[2001) 5 Suppl. SCR 12

referred to

Para 350

(2015) 1 sec 253

referred to

Para 351

In the Judgment of R. Banumathi, J. [1996] 1 SCR 532

relied on

Para 11

[2000] 2 SCR 818

relied on

Para 12

[1999] 4 Suppl. SCR 286

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Para 12

[2005] 5 Suppl. SCR 280

relied on

Para 12

[2012) 6 SCR 148

relied on

Para 14

[2000] 2 SCR 761 [1983] 3 SCR 280 [1980) 3 SCR 305 [2009] 10 SCR 248 [2008) 16 SCR 1078 [2005] 5 Suppl. SCR 280 [2003) 6 Suppl. SCR 995 [2008) 12 SCR 897 [2001 J 3 SCR 247 [2000) 2 SCR 818 [1999) 4 Suppl. SCR 286 [2009] 15 SCR 1207 [2010) 1 SCR 1063 [2011 J 7 SCR 1080 [2006) 2 Suppl. SCR 318 [2009] 14 SCR 80 (1999) 1 sec 220 (2010) 14 sec 534 [1976] Suppl. SCR 542 [1992] 2 SCR 197 [1958) SCR 552 [1985) 2 SCR 621 [1995) 6 Suppl. SCR 212 [2008) 8 SCR 962 [2010) 9 SCR 993 [2014] 8 SCR 69 [2006) 8 Suppl. SCR 234 [2008) 8 SCR 956 (1993) Suppl. 2 sec 242 [2010) 9 SCR 705 [2010) 13 SCR 1217 [2013] 1 SCR 115

relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on

[2017] 6 S.C.R.

Para 16 Para 17 Para 17 Para 18 Para 19 Para 20 Para 21 Para 21 Para 22 Para 22 Para 22 Para 22 Para 22 Para 22 Para 24 Para 25 Para 25 Para 25 Para 29. Para 30 Para 30 Para 30 Para 30 Para 30 Para 30 Para 30 Para 31 Para 32 Para 33 Para 34 Para 37 Para 38

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. (1994) 4 sec 182 [2004] 1 SCR 940 [2000) 3 SCR 729 [1999] 5 Suppl. SCR 215 [2000) 2 SCR 818 (2012) 3 SCR 686 [2012) 5 SCR 850 [2012) 8 SCR 740 [2000) 2 SCR 903 [2009) 5 SCR 771 [2004) 2 SCR 123 [2007] 3 SCR 899 [2000) 5 Suppl. SCR 144 AIR 1947 PC 67 [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 79 [2010] 13 SCR 901 [1962) SCR 195 (2000) 6 sec 269 (1980) 2 sec 465 [1981] 3 SCR 68 [1988) 2 Suppl. SCR 24 [1996] 1 Suppl. SCR 189 (2005) 11 sec 600 (1999) 5 sec 253 [2013) 15 SCR 1 [1971) 1 SCR 119 (2001) 1 sec 596 [2003) 1 SCR 119 [2008) 6 SCR 1116 [2012] 9 SCR 561 [2014) 6 SCR 819

relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on

Para 42 Para 42 Para 47 Para 47 Para 47 Para 58 Para 63 Para 65 Para 65 Para 65 Para 75 · Para 76 Para 80 Para 81 Para 81 Para 88 Para 94 Para 96 Para 97 Para 97 Para 97 Para 97 Para 97 Para 97 Para 97 Para 98 Para 98 Para 98 Para 98 Para 98 Para 98

[2008] 6 SCR 1116

relied on

Para 99

.E

I-I

[2017] 6 S.C.R.

(2003) 2 sec 143

relied on

Para 104

[1977) 3 SCR 636

relied on

Para 107

(1991) 2 SCR 256

relied on

Para 107

(2012) 10 SCR 70

relied Oil

Para 107

[2005) 1 SCR 781

relied on

Para 116

(1994) 4 sec 353

relied on

Para 118

(1980) 2 sec 684

relied oil

Para 119

(1973) 2 SCR 541

relied on

Para 120

[1979) 3 SCR 646

relied on

Para 120

(1983) 3 SCR 413

relied Oil

Para 120

[2008) 11 SCR 93

relied Oil

Para 122

(2001) 12 sec 2s2

referred to

Para 123

(2012) 4 sec 257

relied on

Para 124

[2012) 13 SCR 85

relied on

Para 125

[2005) 3 SCR 406

relied on

Para 126

(2009) 7 SCR 182

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Para 126

[1996) 5 Suppl. SCR 507

relied on

Para 126

[2005) 2 SCR 1132

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Para 126

[2013) 4 SCR 25

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Para 126

(1991) 2 SCR 711

relied on

Para 126

(2014) 10 SCR 812

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Para 126

[1970) 3 SCR 495

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Para 127

(2013] 14 SCR 297

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Para 127

(2015] 9 SCR 943

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Para 127

(1999] 4 Suppl. SCR 104

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Para 128

[2008] 11 SCR 184

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Para 129

[2009) 7 SCR 182

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Para 130

[2011] 3 SCR 1091

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Para 131

[2011] 5 SCR ?18

relied on

Para 132

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

[2008) 13 SCR 81

relied on

Para 132

[2012) 2 SCR 225

relied on

Para 132

[1994) 1 SCR 37

relied on

Para 133

[2013) 6 SCR 949

relied on

Para134,136

[2013] 1 SCR 783

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Para 137

[2014] 10 SCR 812

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Para 137

[2015] 5 SCR 1112

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Para 143

[1999] 1 SCR 794

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Para 144

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos. 607-608 of2017.

From the Judgment and Order dated 13 .03 .20 I 4 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. I 398 and I 399 of20 I 3 & death sentence reference no. 6 of 20 I 3 WITH

Cr!. A. Nos. 609-610 of2017. Raju Ramachandran, (A.C.), Sanjay R. Hegde, (A.C.), Sidharth Luthra, Sr. Advs, K Parameshwar, Ms. Mythini Vjay Kumar Thallam, Vikram Aditya Narayan, Anil Kr. Mishra-I, S. Ni thin, Atul Shankar Vi nod, Pranjal Ki shore, Anas Tanwir, Manohar Lal Sharma, Ms. Suman, Manan Sanghai, Nitin Kumar Thakur, M. M. Kashyap, V. P. Singh, Ms. Geeta Chauhan, Ms. Pratima Rani, Ms. Richa Singh, S. P. Singh, Pawan Trivedi, P. K. Tripathi, C. M. Sharma, C. K. Keshwarwani, Ms. Surekha Srivastava, Supriya Juneja, B. K. Prasad, Sameer Chaudhary, Viraj Gandhi, Ms. Shradha Karol, Ms. Mehaak Jaggi, Ajay Sharma, Ms. Diksha Kukrety, K. L. Janjani, Jaspreet Singh Rai, Rohit Nagpal, Siddhant Sharma, Ishan Rohan, Shyamal Kumar, Arjun Vinod Bobde, Mrs. Praneeta Shanna, Ms. Richa Relhan, Rajat Joseph, Advs. for the appearing parties. The following Judgments of the Court were delivered by

DIPAK MISRA, J. [for himself and Ashok Bhushan, J.) I. The cold evening of Delhi on 161h December, 2012 could not have even remotely planted the feeling in the twenty-three year old lady, a para-medical student, who had gone with her friend to watch a film at

[2017] 6 S.C.R.

PVR Select City Walk Mall, Saket, that in the next few hours, the shattering cold night that was gradually stepping in would bring with it the devastating hour of darkness when she, alongwith her friend, would get into a bus at Munirka bus stand to be dropped at a particular place; and possibly could not have imagined that she would be a prey to the savage lust of a gang of six, face brutal assault and become a playful thing that could be tossed around at their wild whim and her private parts would be ruptured to give vent to their pervert sexual appetite, unthinkable and sadistic pleasure. What the victims had not conceived of, it all happened, as the chronology of events would unroll. The attitude, perception, the beastial proclivity, inconceivable self-obsession and individual centralism of the six made the young lady to suffer immense trauma and, in the ultimate eventuate, the life-spark that moves the bodily frame got extinguished in spite of availing of all the possible treatment that the medical world could provide. The death took place at a hospital in Singapore where she had been taken to with the hope that her life could be saved. 2. The friend of the girl survived in spite of being thrown outside the bus along with the girl and the attempt of the accused-appellants to run over them became futile as they, by their slight movement, could escape from being crushed under the bus, and the appellants left them thinking that they were no more alive. Lying naked, as the clothes were removed from their bodies, they shouted for help and as good fortune would have it, the night patrolling vehicle, a motor cycle, arrived and the said man, Raj Kumar, PW-72, gave the shirt to the boy and contacted the control room from which a Bolero patrol van came and they brought a bed sheet and tore it into two parts and gave a piece to each of the victims so that they could cover themselves and feel civil. The PCR van took the victims to the Safdarjung Hospital where treatment commenced. 3. The present case is one where there can be no denial that the narrative is long, the investigation has been cautious and to bring home the charge, modem and progressive scientific methods have been adopted. Mr. Siddharth Luthra, learned senior counsel for the respondent-State, has made indefatigable endeavour to project that the investigation is flawless and exemplary; and Mr. M.L. Sharma and Mr. A.P. Singh, learned counsel for the appellants, have severely criticized it as faulty on many a score and that it is completely biased; and Mr. Sanjay R. Hegde, learned senior counsel, the friend of the Court, in his own way, has highlighted that the investigation is not only flawed but also unreliable

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

which deserves chastisement and warrants rejection. Many facets of A the investigation that pertain to recording of dying declaration, recording of statements of witnesses under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), the medical examination, holding of the test identification parade, the manner and method of search and seizure and the procedure of arrest have been seriously commented upon. That apart, criticism is advanced from many a spectrum to strengthen the stance that it does not meet the standard and test determined by law. Needless to say, the factual score and the investigation have to withstand the test of reliability and acceptability. The appreciation of evidence brought on record requires to be appositely scrutinized to adjudge the fact whether the appellants are guilty of their culpability or there has been public c pressure, as alleged, to falsely implicate the appellants or to treat them as guinea pigs to save others and accept the hypothesis that the prosecution has booked them at the instance of some political executives or to save a situation which a disturbed society perceives as a collective catastrophe on the paradigm of social stability and to sustain its faith in D the investigation to keep the precept of rule oflaw alive. ln essence, the submission is that the whole exercise, namely, investigation and trial, has been carried out with the sole purpose for the survival of the prosecuting agency. We have stated in the beginning that Mr. Sharma and Mr. Singh appearing for the appellants commenced their submission with all the vehemence and sensitivity at their command to strike at the root of the E prosecution branding it as suspicious, absolutely unreliable, apathetic to the concept ofindividual dignity and engaged in maladroit effort to book the vulnerable and the innocent so as to disguise and cover their inefficiency to catch the real culprits. In the course of our deliberation, we shall dwell upon the same and keenly scrutinize the justifiability of F the aforesaid criticism.

The Prosecution Narrative 4. Presently, we shall advert to the exposition of facts. The prosecution case, as projected, is that on 16.12.2012, the deceased; 'Nirbhaya' (not her real name), had gone with her friend, the informant, PW-1, to the PVR situated in Select City Walk Mall, Saket to watch a movie. After the show was over, about 8:30 p.m., they took an auto and reached Munirka bus stand wherefrom they boarded a white coloured chartered bus [DL-1P-C-0149, Ext.PI] which was bound to Dwarka/Palam Road, as a boy in the bus was calling for commuters for 1.

[2017] 6 S.C.R.

the said destination. As per the version of the informant, PW-I, the friend of the prosecutrix, the bus had yellow and green lines/stripes and the word "Yadav" was written on it. After both of them had entered the bus, they noticed that six persons were already inside the bus, four in the cabin of the driver and two behind the driver's cabin. The deceased and the informant sat on the left side in the row oftwo-seaters and paid the fare of twenty rupees as demanded. Before they could get the feeling of a safe journey (though not a time-consumingjoumey), a feeling oflonely suffocation and a sense of danger barged in, for the accused persons did not allow anyone else to board and the bus moved and the lights inside the bus were put off With the lights being put off, the darkness and the fear of the unexpected darkness ruled. A few minutes later, three persons (who have been identified as accused Ram Singh, Akshay and a young boy, who has been treated as a juvenile in conflict with law) came out of the driver's cabin and started to abuse PW-I. The young companion of the deceased raised opposition to the abuse that led to an altercation which invited the other two who were sitting outside the driver's cabin to join. The spirit to oppose and the duty to save the prosecutrix had to die down and perilously succumb to the assault by the accused persons with the iron rods that caused injuries to his head, both the legs and other parts of the body and the consequence was that he fell on the floor of the bus to hear the painful cries of the lady who, he knew, was being treated as an object, an article for experimentation and prey to the pervert proclivity of the six but could do nothing except to hear unbearable cries made in agony and pain. His spirit was dead, and bound to. 5. As the prosecution story further unfurls, the two accused persons, namely, Pawan and Vinay, pinned the young man down and robbed the victims of their mobiles besides robbing the informant of his purse carrying a Citi Bank credit card, ICICI Bank Debit Card, his identity card issued by his employer-company, metro card, a sum of rupees one thousand, his Titan Watch, a golden ring studded with jewels and a silver ring studded with pearl, black colour Hush Puppies shoes, black colour Numero Uno jeans, a grey colour pullover and a brown colour blazer. As per the version of the prosecution, PW-I was carrying two mobiles and the prosecutrix was carrying only one, and the accused snatched away all the three mobiles. 6. The overpowering was not meant to satisfy the avarice. As the accusations proceed, after the informant was overpowered, as it could

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

only have a singular result, the accused persons, namely, Ram Singh, Akshay and the Juvenile in Conflict with Law (JCL) took the prosecutrix to the rear side of the bus and she was raped by them, one after the other.

7. After committing rape, the accused Ram Singh (since deceased), accused Akshay and the JCL came towards the informant, B PW-1, and nailed him down; then the accused Vi nay and accused Pawan went to the rear side of the bus and committed rape on the prosecutrix, one by one. PW-I noticed that earlier the bus was moving at fast speed but after sometime, he felt that the speed of the bus was reduced and he saw that the accused Mukesh, who was driving the bus, came near him and hit him with the rod and he also went to the rear side of the bus and raped the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix was brntally gang raped by the accused one after the other and she was also subjected to unnatural sex. Her private parts and her internal organs were seriously injured by .inserting iron rod and hand in the rectal and vaginal region. As per PW1, he had heard the cries of the prosecutrix like "chod do, bachao". PW- D 1 could hear the prosecutrix shouting in a loud oscillating voice. The prosecutrix was carrying a grey colour purse having an Axis Bank ATM card and other belongings. The accused persons robbed her of her belongings and stripped her. They also took away the clothes of the informant while beating him with iron rods. The accused were exhorting that both the victims be not left alive. The accused then tried to throw E both the informant and the prosecutrix out of the moving bus from its rear door but could not open it and so, they brought them to the front door and threw them out of the moving bus at National Highway No. 8, Hotel Delhi 37, Mahipalpur flyover by the side of the road. 8. As indicated earlier, the prosecutrix and PW-I were noticed by F PW-72, Raj Kumar, who heard the voice of'bachao, bachao' from the left side of the road near a milestone opposite to Hotel Delhi 37. PW-72 saw PW-I and the prosecutrix sitting naked having blood all around. Immediately thereafter, PW-72, Raj Kumar, informed PW-70, Ram Pal, who was in the Control Room, requesting him to call PCR. PW-70, Ram Pal, ofEGIS Infra Management India (P) Limited, dialed 100 No. and even asked his other patrolling staff to reach the spot. 9. About 10:24 p.m., PW-73, H.C. Ram Chander, who was in charge of PCR van Zebra 54, received information about the incident and the lying of victims in a naked condition near the foot ofMahipalpur

[2017] 6 S.CR.

fly over towards Dhaula Kuan opposite GMR Gate. PW-73 reached the spot and found the victims. He got the crowd dispersed and brought a bottle of water and a bedsheet from the nearby hotel and tore the same into two parts and gave it to both the victims to cover themselves .

.

Travel to the Safdarjung Hospital

I 0. About 11:00 p.m., PW-73 took the victims to Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi. On the way to the hospital, the victims gave their names to him and informed that they had boarded a bus from Munirka and that after some time the occupants had started misbehaving and had beaten the boy and taken the girl (prosecutrix) to the rear side of the bus and committed rape on her. Thereafter, they had taken off the clothes of the victims and thrown them naked on the road. While leaving the informant, PW-1, in the casualty where he was examined by PW-5 l, Dr. Sachin Bajaj, and his MLC, Ext. PW-5 l/ A, was drawn up, PW-73 took the prosecutrix to the Gynae ward and got her admitted there. The MLC of the prosecutrix,PW-49/B, was prepared by PW-49, Dr. Rashmi Ahuja. 11. PW-49, Dr. Rashmi Ahuja, recorded the history of the incident as told to her by the prosecutrix and noted the same in Exhibit PW-49/A. As per the version narrated by the prosecutrix to her, it was a case of gang rape in a moving bus by 4-5 persons when the prosecutrix was returning after watching a movie with the informant. She was slapped on her face, kicked on her abdomen and bitten over lips, cheek, breast and vulva! region.The prosecutrix remembered intercourse two times and rectal penetration also. She was also forced to have m'matural oral sex but she refused. All this continued for half an hour and then she was thrown off from the moving bus along with her friend. 12. The following external injuries were noted by Dr. Rashmi Ahuja in Ex. PW-49/A: a) Bruise over left eye covering whole of the eye ·

b) Injury mark (abrasion) at right angle of eye c) Brnise over left nostril involving upper lip d) Both lips edematous e) Bleeding from upper lip present

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] f) Bite mark over right cheek

g) Left angle of mouth injured (small laceration) h) Bite mark over left cheek i) Right breast bite marks belciv areola present j) Left breast bruise over right lower quadrant, bite mark in inferior left quadrant

Per abdomen: i) Guarding & rigidity present

Local examination:

a) Cut mark (sharp) over right labia present b) A tag of vagina (6 cm in length) hanging outside the introitus c) There was profuse bleeding from vagina

Per vaginal examination:

i) A posterior vaginal wall tear of about 7 to 8 cm

Per rectal examination: i) Rectal tear of about 4 to 5 cm., communicating with the vaginal tear.

13. As the evidence brought on record would show, 20 samples of the prosecutrix were taken and sealed with the seal of the hospital and handed over to PW-59, Inspector Raj Kumari.

Registration of FIR and the progress thereon 14. At this juncture, it is necessary to state that after the victims were rescued, the informant, PW-I, Awninder Pratap, gave his first statement to the police at 3 :45 a.m. on 17.12.2012 which culminated into the recording of the FIR at 5:40 a.m. being FIR No. 413/2012 dated 17.12.2012, PS Vasant Vihar under Section 120B IPC and Sections 365/366/376(2)(g)/377/307/302 IPC and/or Sections 396/395 IPC read with Sections 397/201/412 IPC. It was thereafter handed over to S.I. Pratibha Sharma, PW-80, for investigation.

15. On the same night, i.e., 16/17.12.2012, the prosecutrix underwent first surgery around 4:00 a.m. The prosecutrix was operated

[2017] 6 S.C.R,.

by PW-50, Dr. Raj Kumar Chejara, Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi and his surgery team comprised of Dr. Gaurav and Dr. Piyush. OT notes have been exhibited as Ex.PW-50/A and Ex.PW-50/B. The second and third surgeries were performed on 19.12.2012 and 23.12.2012 respectively.

16. During the period the prosecutrix was undergoing surgeries one after the other, and when all were concerned about her progress of recovery, the prosecution was carrying out its investigation in a manner that it thought systematic. The first and foremost responsibility of the prosecution was to find out, on the basis of the information given, about the accused persons. That is how the prosecution story uncurtains.

17. On 17.12.2012, supplementary statements of PW-I were recorded by PW-80, SI Pratibha Sharma. Based on the description of the bus given .by PW-I, the offending bus bearing No. DL-1 PC-0149 was found parked in Ravi Das Jhuggi Camp, R.K. Puram, New Delhi. PW-80 along with PW-74, SI Subhash Chand, and PW-65, Ct. Kripal Singh, went to the spot and found accused Ram Singh sitting in the bus. On seeing the pol ice, Ram Singh got down from the bus and started running. The police intercepted Ram Singh and he was arrested and interrogated. 18. Personal search was conducted on Ram Singh and his disclosure statement, Ex. P-74/F, was recorded by PW-74 and his team. Based on his disclosure statement, PW-74, Investigating Officer, SI Subhash Chand, seized the bus, Ex. Pl, vide Seizure Memo Ex. PW- 74/ K. PW-74 seized the seat cover of the bus of red colour and its curtains of yellow colour. On the bus, 'Yadav' was found written on its body with green and yellow stripes on it. The Investigating Officer also seized the key of the bus, Ex. P-74/2, vi de Seizure Memo Ex. PW-74/J. The documents of th.e bus were also seized. The disclosure statement of Ram Singh, Ex. PW-74/F, led to the recovery of his bloodstained clothes, iron rods and debit card of Asha Devi, the mother of the prosecutrix. PW-74, Investigating Officer, also recovered ashes and the partly unburnt clothes lying near the bus which was seized vide Memo Exhibit No. PW-74/M and Unix Mobile Phone with MTNL Sim, Ex. P-74/5, vide Memo Ex. P/74E. The Investigating Officer prepared the site plan of the place where the bus was parked and from where the ashes were found.

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

The arrest of the accused persons and seizure of articles

19. The arrest of accused, Ram Singh, also led to the arrest of two other accused persons, namely, accused Vi nay Sharma and accused Pawan@ Kaalu. On 18.12.2012, accused Mukesh was apprehended from village Karoli by PW-58, Sl Arvind Kumar, and was produced before PW-80, SI Pratibha Sharma. At the instance of accused Mukesh Singh, a Samsung Galaxy Trend DUOS Blue Black mobile belonging to the informant was recovered. On 23.12.2012, at his instance, PW-80 prepared the route chart of the route where Mukesh drove the bus at the time of the incident, Ex PW-80/i-i. Besides that, he got recovered his bloodstained clothes from the_garage of his brother at Anupam Apartment, Saidulajab, Saket, New Delhi. He opted to undergo Test Identification Parade. In the Test Identification Parade conducted by PW-17, Sandeep Garg, Metropolitan Magistrate, PW-I, identified accused-Mukesh. 20. Accused Pawan was apprehended and arrested about 1:15 p.m. on 18.12.2012 vide memo Ex.PW-60/A; his disclosure, Ex.PW-60/ G, was recorded and his personal search was conducted vide memo Ex.PW-60/C. In his disclosure statement, Pawan pointed out Munirka bus stand where the prosecutrix and PW-1 boarded the bus and memo Ex.PW-68/I was prepared. He also pointed at the spot where PW-I and the prosecutrix were thrown out of the bus and memo Ex.PW-68/J was prepared in this regard. 21. Accused Vi nay Sharma got recovered his bloodstained clothes, PW-1 's Hush Puppies leather shoes and the prosecutrix 's mobile phone, Nokia Model 3110 of black grey colour. Further recoveries were made pursuant to his supplementary disclosure. Similarly, accused Pawan Kumar got recovered from his jhuggi his bloodstained clothes, shoes and also a wrist watch make Sonata and Rs. 1000/- robbed from PW- I. 22. On 21.12.2012, accused Akshay was also arrested from Village Karmalahang, PS Tandwa, Aurangabad, Bihar. His disclosure statement was recorded. He led to his brother's house in village Naharpur, Gurgaon, Haryana and got recovered his bloodstained clothes. A ring belonging to PW-I, two metro cards and a Nokia phone with SIM of Vodafone Company was also recovered from Akshay. Akshay also opted to undergo TIP and was positively identified by PW-I. The mobile phones of the accused persons were seized and call details records with requisite

.B

.E

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certificates under Section 65-B of Indian Evidence Act were obtained by the police. 23. After getting arrested, all the accused were medically examined. The MLCs of all the accused persons show various injuries on their person; viz., in the MLC, Ex.PW-2/A, of accused Ram Singh, PW-2, Dr. Akhilesh Raj, has opined that the injuries mentioned at point Q to P-1 could possibly be struggle marks. Similar opinions were received in respect of other accused persons. PW-7, Dr. Shashank Pooniya, has opined that the injuries present on the body of accused Akshay were a week old and were suggestive of struggle as per MLC, Ex.PW-7/A. MLC, Ex.PW-7/B, pertaining to accused Pawan shows that he had suffered injuries on his body which were simple in nature. The MLC, Ex. PW-7/C, of accused Vi nay Sharma proved that he too suffered injuries, simple in nature, 2 to 3 days old, though injury No. 8 was claimed to be self inflicted by the accused himself.

Further treatment of the victim and filing of cltargesheet 24. While the arrest took place, as indicated earlier, the victim underwent second and third surgeries on 19.12.2012 and 23.12.2012 respectively. The second surgery was performed on the prosecutrix on 19.12.2012 by PW-50, Dr. Raj Kumar Chejara, along with his operating team consisting of Prof. Sun ii Kumar, Dr. Pintu and Dr. Siddharth. Dr. Aruna Batra and Dr. Rekha Bharti were present along with the anaesthetic team. The clinical notes, Ex.PW-50/C, and notes prepared by the Gynaecology team, Ex.PW-50/D, can be referred to in this regard. The prosecutrix was re-operated on 23.12.2012 for peritoneal lavage and placement of drain under general anaesthesia and the notes are exhibited as Ex.PW-50/E. 25. As the condition of the prosecutrix did not improve much, the prosecution thought it appropriate to record the statements of the prosecutrix. The said statements have been conferred the status of dying declaration. As is noticeable from the evidence, PW-49 also deposed that certain exhibits were collected for examination such as outer clothes, i.e., sweater, sheet covering the patient; inner clothes, i.e., Sameej tomed; dust; grass present in hairs, dust in clothes; debris from in between fingers; debris from nails; nail clippings; nail scrapings; breast swab; body fluid collection (swab from saliva); combing of pubic hair; matted pubic hair, clipping of pubic hair; cervical mucus collection; vaginal secretions; vaginal

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. [DTPAK MISRA, J.]

culture; washing from vaginal; rectal swab; oral swab; urine and oxalate blood vial; blood samples, etc.

26. On 21.12.2012, on being declared fit, the second dying declaration was recorded by PW-27, Smt. Usha Chaturvedi, SubDivisional Magistrate. This dying declaration is an elaborate one where the prosecutrix has described the incident in detail including the insertion of rods in her private parts. She also stated that the accused were addressing each other with names like, "Ram Singh, Thakur, Raju, Mukesh, Pawan and Vinay''.

27. On 25'h December, 2012, at 1:00 p.m., PW-30, Shri Pawan Kumar, Metropolitan Magistrate, went to the hospital to record the dying declaration of the prosecutrix. The attending doctors opined that the prosecutrix was not in a position to speak but she was othe1wise conscious and responded byway of gestures. Accordingly, PW-30 put questions in such a manner as to enable her to narrate the incident by way of gestures or writing. Her statement, Ex.PW-30/D, was recorded by PW-30 in the form of dying declaration by putting her questions in the nature of D multiple choice questions. The prosecutrix gave her statement/dying declaration through gestures and writings, Exhibit PW-30/D, the contents of which will be discussed later.

28. At this juncture, the cure looked quite distant. The health condition was examined on 26'h December 2012 by a team of doctors comprising ofDr. Sandeep Bansal, Cardiologist, Dr. Raj Kumar Chejara, Dr. Sunil Kumar, Dr. Arun Batra and Dr. P.K. Verma and since the condition of the prosecutrix was critical, it was decided that she be shifted abroad for further treatment and fostering oasis of hope on 27'h December, 2012, she was shifted to Mt. Elizabeth Hospital, Singapore, for her further treatment. The hope and expiration became a visible mirage as the prosecutrix died on 29'" December, 2012 at Mt. Elizabeth Hospital, Singapore. Dr. Paul Chui, PW-34, Forensic Pathologist, Health Sciences Authority, Singapore, deposed that her exact time of death was 4:45 a.m. on 29'h December, 2012. The death occurred at Mt. Elizabeth Hospital and the cause of her death was sepsis with multiple organ failure following multiple injuries. The original post mortem report is Ex. PW34/A and its scanned copy is Ex.PW-34/B; the Toxicology Report dated 4lh January, 2013 is Exhibit PW-34/C. In the post-mortem report, Ex.PW34/ A, besides other serious injuries, various bite marks have been observed on her face, lips, jaw, rear ear, on the right and left breasts, left

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upper arm, right lower limb, right upper inner thigh (groin), right lower thigh, left thigh lateral and left leg lower anterior. 29. It is apt to note here that during the course of investigation (keeping in mind that the vehicle was identified), the investigating agency went around to collect the electronic evidence. A CCTV footage produced by PW-25, Rajender Singh Bisht, in a CD, Ex.PW-25/C-l and PW-25/C-2, and the photographs, Ex.PW-25/B-l to Ex.PW-25/B-7, were collected from the Mall, Select City Walk, Sake! to ascertain the presence of PW-I and the prosecutrix at the Mall. The certificate under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, "Evidence Act") with respect to the said footage is proved by PW-26, Shri Sandeep Singh, vi de Ex.PW-26/A. Another important evidence is the CCTV footage of Hotel Delhi 37 situated near the dumping spot. The said footage showed a bus matching the description given by the informant at 9:34 p.m. and again at 9:53 p.m. The said bus had the word "Yadav" written on one side. Its exterior was of white colour having yellow and green stripes and its front tyre on the left side did not have a wheel cap. The description of the bus was affirmed by PW-1 's statement. The CCTV footage stored in the pen drive, Ex.P-67/1, and the CD, Ex.P-67/2, were seized by the T.O. vide seizure memo Ex.PW-67/A from PW-67, Pramod Kumar Jha, the owner of Hotel Delhi 37. The same were id,11tified by PW-67, Pramod Jha, PW-74, ST Subhash, and PW-76, Gautam Roy, from CFSL during their examination in Court. PW-78, SHO, fnspector Anil Sharma, had testified that the said CCTV footage seized vide seizure memo Ex.PW-67/A was sent to the CFSL through S.T. Sushi! Sawaria and PW-77, the MHC(M). Thereafter, on 01.01.2013, the report of the CFSL was received. 30. As the prosecution story would furtherundrape, in the course of investigation, the test identification parade was carried out. We shall advert to the same at a later stage. 31. We had indicated in the beginning that the investigating team had taken aid of modem methods to strengthen its case. The process undertaken, the method adopted and the results are severely criticized by the learned counsel for the appellants to which we shall later on revert to but presently to the steps taken by the investigating agency during investigation. With the intention to cover the case from all possible spheres and to establish the allegations with the proof of conclusivity and not to give any chance of doubt, the prosecution thought that it was

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

its primary duty to ascertain the identity of the accused persons; and for the said purpose, it carried out DNA analysis and fingerprint and bite mark analysis.

Collection of samples and identity of accused persons 32. The blood sample of the informant was collected by Dr. Kamran Faisal, PW-15, Safdarjung Hospital, on 25.12.2012 and was handed over to SI Pratibha Sharma, PW-80, vide seizure memo Ex.PW15/A by Constable Suresh Kumar, PW-42. Similarly, as mentioned earlier, PW-49, Dr. Rashmi Ahuja, had collected certain samples from the person of the prosecutrix which are reflected in Ex.PW-49/A from point B to B. All the samples were collected by Inspector Raj Kumari, PW-59, vide seizure memo Ex.PW-59/ A and were handed over to PW-80, SI Pratibha Sharma, at Safdarjung Hospital in the morning of 17.12.2012. Also the samples of gangrenous bowels of the prosecutrix were taken on 24.12.2012 and were handed over to ST Gajender Singh, PW-55, who seized the same vide seizure memo Ex.PW-I I/A. All the samples were deposited with the MHC(M) and were not tampered with in any manner. A specimen of scalp hair of the prosecutrix was also taken on 24.12.2012 by Dr. Ranju Gandhi, PW-29, and was handed over to PW- 80, SI Pratibha Sharma, vide seizure memo Ex.PW-29/A. 33. The accused were also subjected to medical examination and samples were taken from their person which were sent for ON A analysis. 34. DNA analysis was done at the behest of PW-45, Dr. B.K. Mohapatra, Sr. Scientific Officer, Biology, CFSL, CBI, and Biological Examination and DNA profiling reports were prepared which are exhibited as Ex. PW-45/A-C. The report, after analysing the DNA profiles generated from the known samples of the prosecutrix, the informant, and each of the accused, concluded that:

"An analysis of the above shows that the samples were authentic and established the identities of the persons mentioned above beyond reasonable doubt." 35. On 17.12.2012 and 18.12.2012, a team of experts from the CFSL went to Thyagraj Stadium and lifted chance prints from the bus in question, Ex.P-1. On 28.12.2012, PW-78, Inspector Anil Sharma ofP.S. Vasant Vihar, the then S.H.O. of Police Station Vasant Vihar, requested the Director, CFSL, for taking digital palm prints and foot prints of all the

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accused persons vide his letter Ex.PW-46/C. Pursuant to the said request made by PW-78, Inspector Anil Sharma, the CFSL, on 31.12.2012, took the finger/palm prints and foot prints of the accused persons at Tihar Jail. After comparing the chance prints lifted from the bus with the finger prints/palm prints and foot prints of all the accused persons, PW-46, Shri A.D. Shah, Senior Scientific Officer (Finger Prints), CFSL, CBI submitted his report Ex.PW-46/D. In the report, the chance prints of accused Vinay Sharma were found to have matched with those on the bus in question. 36. Bite mark analysis was also undertaken by the investigative team to establish the identity and involvement of the accused persons. PW-66, Asghar Hussain, on the instrnctions of the 1.0., S.I. Pratibha Sharma, had taken 10 photographs of different parts of the body of the prosecutrix at SJ Hospital on 20.12.2012 between 4:30 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. which were marked as Ex.PW-66/B (Colly.) [I 0 photographs of 5" x 7" each] and Ex.PW-66/C (Colly.) [10 photographs of 8" x 12" each]. PW-66 also proved in Court the certificate provided by him in terms of Section 65-B of the Evidence Act in respect of the photographs; Ex. PW-66/A. Thereafter, PW-18, SI Vishal Choudhary, collected the photographs and the dental models from Safdarjung Hospital on 01.01.2013 and duly deposited the same in the malkhana after he, PW18, had handed them over to the S.H.O. Anil Sharma, PW-78. The same were later entrnsted to S.I. Vishal Choudhary, PW-18 on 02.01.2013, which is proved vide RC No.183/21/12 and exhibited as Ex.PW-77/V. PW-71, Dr. Ashith B. Acharya, submitted the final report in this regard which is exhibited as Ex. PW-71/C. In the said report, he has concluded that at least three bite marks were caused by accused Ram Singh whereas one bite mark has been identified to have been most likely caused by accused Akshay. 37. It is seemly to note here that on completion of the investigation, the chargesheet came to be filed on 03.01.2013 under Section 365/ 376(2)(g)/377/307/395/ 397/302/396/412/201/120/34 IPC and supplementary chargesheet was filed on 04.02.2013.

Charge and examination of witnesses, conviction and awarding of sentence by the trial court 38. After the case was committed to the Court of Session, all the accused were charged for the following offences:

I. u/s 120-B IPC;

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] 2. u/s. 365 I 366 I 307 I 376 (2)(g) !PC I 377 IPC read with Section 120-B IPC;

3. u/s. 396 IPC read with Section 120-B IPC and /or; 4. u/s. 302 IPC read with Section 120-B !PC; 5. u/s. 395 IPC read with Section 397 IPC read with 120-B TPC;

6. u/s. 201 TPC read with Section 120-B IPC and; 7. u/s. 412 TPC. During the course of trial, accused Ram Singh committed suicide and the proceedings qua him stood abated vide order dated 12.10.2013. 39. It is worthy to mention here that in order to bring home the charge, the prosecution initially examined 82 witnesses and thereafter, the statements of the accused persons were recorded and they abjured their guilt. Accused Pawan Gupta @ Kaalu examined Lal Chand, DW-1, Heera Lal, DW-2, Ram Charan, DW-3, Gyan Chand, DW-4, and Hari Kishan Sharma, DW-16, in support of his plea. Accused Vinay Sharma examined Smt. Champa Devi, DW-5, Hari Ram Sharma, DW6, Kishore Kumar Bhat, DW-7, Sti Kant, DW-8, Manu Sharma, DW-9, Ram Babu, DW-10, and Dinesh, DW-17, to establish his stand. Accused Akshay Kumar Singh @ Thakur examined Chavinder, DW-11, Sa1ju Singh, DW-12, Raj Mohan Singh, DW-13, Punita Devi, DW-14, and Sarita Devi, DW-15. As the factual matrix would reveal, subsequently three more prosecution witnesses were examined and on behalf of the defence, two witnesses were examined. 40. Learned Sessions Judge, vide judgment dated 10.09.2013, convicted all the accused persons, namely, Akshay Kumar Singh @ Thakur, Vi nay Sharma, Mukesh and Pawan Gupta@ Kaalu under Section l 20B TPC for the offence of criminal conspiracy; under Section 365/366 !PC read with Section 120B !PC for abducting the victims with an intention to force the prosecutrix to illicit intercourse; under Section 307 TPC read with Section l 20B TPC for attempting to kill PW-I, the informant; under Section 376(2)(g) !PC for committing gang rape with the prosecutrix in pursuance of their conspiracy; under Section 377 !PC read with Section I 20B !PC for committing unnatural offence with the prosecutrix; under Section 302 TPC read with Section 120B !PC for committing murder of the helpless prosecutrix; under Section 395 !PC

[2017] 6 S.C.R.

for conj"ointly committing dacoity in pursuance of the aforesaid conspiracy; under Section 397 IPC read with Section 120B TPC for the use of iron rods and for attemptiqg to kill PW-I at the time of committing robbery; under Section 201 IPC read with Section 120B IPC for destroying of evidence and under Section 412 IPC for the offence of being individually found in possession of the stolen property which they all knew was a stolen booty of dacoity committed by them. 41. After recording the conviction, as aforesaid, the learned trial Judge imposed the sentence, which we reproduce:

"(a) The convicts, namely, convict Akshay Kumar Singh @Thakur, convict Mukesh, convict Vinay Sharma and convict Pawan Gupta @ Kaalu are sentenced to death for offence punishable under Section 302 Indian Penal Code. Accordingly, the convicts to be hanged by neck till they are dead. Fine ofRs. l 0,000/- to each of the convict is also imposed and in default of payment of fine such convict shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month. (b) for the offence under Section 120-B IPC I award the punishment of life imprisonment to each of the convict and fine of Rs.5000/- to each of them. In default of payment of fine simple imprisonment for one month to such convict;

l-1

(c) for the offence under Section 365 IPC I award the punishment of seven years to each of the convict and fine of Rs.5000/- to each of them. In default of payment of fine simple imprisonment for one month to such convict; (d) for the offence under Section 366 IPC I award the punishment of seven years to each of the convict person and fine ofRs.5000/ - to each of them. In default of payment of fine simple imprisonment for one month to such convict; (e) for the offence under Section 376(2)(g) TPC I award the punishment of life imprisonment to each of the convict person with fine ofRs.5000/- to each of them. In default of payment of fine simple imprisonment for one month to such convict;

(t) for the offence under Section 377 IPC I award the punishment often years to each of the convict person and fine ofRs.5000/- to each of them. In default of payment of fine simple imprisonment for one month to such convict;

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] (g) for the offence under Section 307 IPC I award the punishment of seven years to each of the convict person and fine ofRs.5000/ - to each of them. In default of payment of fine simple imprisonment for one month to such convict; (h) for the offence under Section 201 IPC I award the punishment of seven years to each of the convict person and fine ofRs.5000/ - to each of them. In default of payment of fine simple imprisonment for one month to such convict;

( i) for the offence under Section 395 read with Section 397 IPC I

award the punishment often years to each of the convict person and fine ofRs.5000/- to each of them. In default of payment of fine simple imprisonment for one month to such convict;

U) for the offence under Section 412 IPC I award the punishment often years to each of the convict person and fine ofRs.5000/- to each of them. In default of payment of fine simple imprisonment for one month to such convict;" 42. Be it noted, the learned trial Judge directed the sentences under Sections 120B/365/366/376(2)(g)/ 377/201/395/397/412 IPC to run concurrently and that the benefit under Section 428 CrPC would be given wherever applicable. He further recommended that appropriate compensation under Section 357 A CrPC be awarded to the legal heirs of the prosecutrix and, accordingly, sent a copy of the order to the Secretary, Delhi Legal Services Authority, New Delhi, for deciding the quantum of compensation to be awarded under the scheme referred to in sub-section ( 1) of Section 357 A CrPC. That apart, as death penalty was imposed, he referred the matter to the High Court for confirmation under Section 366 CrPC.

The vieiv of the High court 43. The High Court, vide judgment dated 13.03.2014, affirmed the conviction and confirmed the death penalty imposed upon the accused by expressing the opinion that under the facts and circumstances of the case, imposition of death penalty awarded by the trial court deserved to be confirmed in respect of all the four convicts. As the death penalty was confirmed, the appeals prefe1Ted by the accused faced the inevitable result, that is, dismissal.

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Commencement of hearing and delineation of contentions 44. As we had stated earlier, the grievance relating to the lodging of FIR and the manner in which it has been registered has been seriously commented upon and criticized by the learned counsel for the appellants. Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants - Mukesh and Pawan Kumar Gupta, and Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the appellants - Vi nay Sharma andAkshay Kumar Singh, have stressed with all the conviction at their command that when a matter of confirmation of death penalty is assailed before this Court, it is the duty of this Court to see every aspect in detail and not to treat it as an ordinary appeal. 45. As the argument commenced with the said note, we thought it appropriate to grant liberty to the learn.:d counsel for the appellants to challenge the conviction and the imposition of death sentence from all aspects and counts and to dissect the evidence and project the irregularities in arrest and investigation. Learned counsel for the parties argued the matter for considerable length of time and hence, we shall deal with every aspect in detai I.

Delayed registration of FIR

46. The attack commences with the registration of FIR and, therefore, we shall delve into the same in detail. PW-57, AS! Kapil Singh, the Duty Officer at P.S. Vasant Vihar, New Delhi, on the intervening night of J 6/17.12.2012, received information about the incident. He lodged DD No.6-A, Ex.PW-57/A, and passed on the said DD to PW-74, SI Subhash Chand, who was on emergency duty that night at P.S. Vasant Vihar. Immediately thereafter, PW-57, AST Kapil Singh, received yet another infonnation qua admission of the prosecutrix and of the informant in Safdarjung Hospital and he lodged DD No.7-A, Ex.PW-57/B, and also passed on the said DD to SI Subhash Chand. 47. PW-74, SI Subhash Chand, then left for Safda1jung Hospital where he met PW-59, Inspector Raj Kumari, and PW-62, SI Mahesh Bhargava. PW-59, Inspector Raj Kumari, handed over to him the MLC and the exhibits concerning the prosecutrix as given to her by the treating doctor and PW-62, SI Mahesh Bhargava, handed over to him the MLC of the informant. PW-74, SI Subhash Chand, then recorded the statement, Ex.PW-I/A, of the informant at I :30 a.m. on 17.12.2012 and made his endorsement, Ex.PW-74/A, on it and he gave the rukka to PW-65, Ct. Kripal Singh, for being taken to P.S. Vasant Vihar, New

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

Delhi and to get the FIR registered. PW-65, Ct. Kripal Singh, then went to P.S. Vasant Vihar, New Delhi and at 5:40 a.m. and gave the rukka to PW-57, AST Kapil Singh, the Duty Officer, who, in tum, recorded the FIR, Ex.PW-57/D, made endorsement, Ex.PW-57/E, on the rukka and returned it to PW-65, Ct. Kripal Singh, who then handed it to PW-80, SI Pratibha Sharma, at P.S. Vasant Vihar to whom the investigation was entrusted.

48. SI Subhash Chand, PW-74, deposed that the statement of the informant might have been recorded around 3:45 a.m. although PW-I deposed that his statement was recorded at 5:30 a.m. It was submitted that the original statement was recorded by HC Ram Chander, PW-73, and the investigation process had already begun around I: 15 a.m. and the subsequent information from the informant which is stated to be the first information was, in fact, crafted after the investigating agency decided on a course of action. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that the delay in the FIR raises serious doubts.

49. Delay in setting the law into motion by lodging of complaint in D court or FIR at police station is normally viewed by courts with suspicion because there is possibility of concoction of evidence against an accused. Therefore, it becomes necessary for the prosecution to satisfactorily explain the delay. Whether the delay is so long as to throw a cloud of suspicion on the case of the prosecution would depend upon a variety of E factors. Even a long delay can be condoned if the informant has no motive for implicating the accused. 50. In the present case, after the occurrence, the prosecutrix and PW-I were admitted to the hospital at 11 :05 p.m.; the victim was admitted in the Gynaecology Ward and PW-I, the informant, in the casualty ward. PW-74, SI Subhash Chand, recorded the statement of PW-I at 3:45 a.m. After PW-1 and the prosecutrix were taken to the hospital for treatment, the statement of PW-I was recorded by PW-74, SI Subhash Chand, at 1:37 a.m. and the same was handed over to PW- 65, Constable Kripal Singh, to PW-57, Kapil Singh. In the initial stages, the intention of all concerned must have been to save the victim by giving her proper medical treatment. Even assuming for the sake of argument that there is delay, the same is in consonance with natural human conduct.

51. In this case, there is no delay in the registration of FIR. The sequence of events are natural and in the present case, after the

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occurrence, the victim and PW-I were thrown out of the bus at Mahipalpur in semi-naked condition and were rescued by PW-72; Raj Kumar, and PW-70, Ram Pal, both EGIS Tnfra Management Tndia (P) Limited employees. The victim was seriously injured and was in a critical condition and it has to be treated as a natural conduct that giving medical treatment to her was of prime importance. The admission of PW-I and the victim in the hospital and the completion of procedure must have taken some time. PW-I himself was injured and was admitted to the hospital at 11:05 p.m. No delay can be said to have been caused in examining PW- I, the informant. 52. Tn the context of belated FTR, we may usefully refer to certain authorities in the field. Tn Ram Jag and others v. State of U.P/, it was held as that witnesses cannot be called upon to explain every hour's delay and a commonsense view has to be taken in ascertaining whether the first information report was lodged after an undue delay so as to afford enough scope for manipulating evidence. Whether the delay is so long as to throw a cloud of suspicion on the seeds of the prosecution case must depend upon a variety of factors which would va1y from case to case. Even a long delay in filing report of an occurrence can be condoned if the witnesses on whose evidence the prosecution relies have no motive for implicating the accused. On the other hand, prompt filing of the report is not an unmistakable guarantee of the truthfulness of the version of the prosecution." 53. Tn State of Himachal Pradesh v. Rakesh Kumar, the Court repelled the submission pertaining to delay in lodging of the FTR on the ground that the first endeavour is always to take the person to the hospital immediately so as to provide him medical treatment and only thereafter report the incident to the police. The Court in the said case further held that every minute was precious and, therefore, it is natural that the witnesses accompanying the deceased first tried to take him to the hospital so as to enable him to get immediate medical treatment. Such action was definitely in accordance with normal human conduct and psychology. When their efforts failed and the deceased died they immediately reported the incident to the police. The Court, under the said circumstances ruled that in fact, it was a case of quick reporting to the police. (1974)4 sec 201=AIR1974 sc 606 ' (2009) 6 sec 30s

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

Judged on the anvil of the aforesaid decisions, we have no hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that there was no delay in lodging of the FIR.

Non-mentioning of assailants in the FIR 54. An argument was advanced assailing the FIR to the effect that the FIR does not contain: (i) the names of the assailants either in the MLC, Ex.PW-51/A, or in the complaint, Ex.PW-I/A, (ii) the description of the bus and (iii) the use of iron rods. 55. As far as the argument that the FIR does not contain the names of all the accused persons is concerned, it has to be kept in mind that it is settled law that FIR is not an encyclopedia of facts and it is not expected from a victim to give details of the incident either in the FIR or in the brief history given to the doctors. FIR is not an encyclopedia which is expected to contain all the details of the prosecution case; it may be sufficient ifthe broad facts of the prosecution case alone appear. lfany overt act is attributed to a particular accused among the assailants, it must be given greater assurance. In this context, reference to certain authorities would be fruitful. 56. In Rattan Singh v. State of H.P. 3 , the Court, while repelling the submission for accepting the view of the trial court took note of the fact that there had been omission of the details and observed that the criminal courts should not be fastidious with mere omissions in the first information statement since such statements can neither be expected to be a chronicle of every detail of what happened nor expected to contain an exhaustive catalogue of the events which took place. The person who furnishes the first information to the authorities might be fresh with the facts but he need not necessarily have the skill or ability to reproduce details of the entire story without anything missing therefrom. Some may miss even important details in a narration. Quite often, the police officer, who takes down the first information, would record what the informant conveys to him without resorting to any elicitatory exercise. It is voluntary narrative of the informant without inte1rngation which usually goes into such statement and hence, any omission therein has to be considered along with the other evidence to determine whether the fact so omitted never happened at all. The Court also referred to the principles stated in Pedda Narayana v. State ofA.P. 4 ; Sone Lal v. State of U.P.5; '(1997) 4 sec 161 • (1975) 4 sec 153 ' (1978) 4 sec 302

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Gurnam Kaur v. Bakshish Singh 6 • 57. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Naresh and others 7 , reiterating the principle, the Court opined that it is settled legal proposition that FIR is not an encyclopedia of the entire case. It may not and need not contain all the details. Naming of the accused therein may be important but not naming of the accused in FIR may not be a ground to doubt the contents thereof in case the statement of the witness is found to be tmstworthy. The court has to determine after examining the entire factual scenario whether a person has participated in the crime or has been falsely implicated. The informant fully acquainted with the facts may lack necessary skill or abi Iity to reproduce detai Is of the entire incident with out anything missing from the same. Some people may miss even the most important details in narration. Therefore, in case the informant fails to name a particular accused in the FIR, this ground alone cannot tilt the balance of the case in favour of the accused. For the aforesaid purpose reliance was placed upon Rotash v. State of RaJastha11 8 and RanJit Singh v. State of M.P.9 58. In Rotash (supra) this Court while dealing with the omission of naming an accused in the FIR opined that: "14 ..... We, however, although did not intend to ignore the importance of naming of an accused in the first information report, but herein we have seen that he had been named in the eadiest possible opportunity. Even assuming that PW l did not name him in the first information report, we do not find any reason to disbelieve the statement ofMooli Devi, PW 6. The question is as ·to whether a person was implicated by way of an afterthought or not must be judged having regard to the entire factual scenario obtaining in the case. PW 6 received as many as four injuries."

59. While dealing with a similar issue in Animireddy Venkata Ramana v. Public Prosecutor'", the Court held as under: "13 .... While considering the effect of some omissions in the first information report on the part of the informant, a court cannot fail to take into consideration the probable physical and ment.al

' 1980 supp sec 567 c2011) 4 sec 324 ' c2006) 12 sec 64 ' c2011) 4 sec 336 " c2008) s sec 368

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

condition of the first informant. One of the important factors which may weigh with the court is as to whether there was a possibility of false implication of the appellants. Only with a view to test the veracity of the correctness of the contents of the report, the cou11 applies certain well-known principles of caution."

Thus, apart from other aspects what is required to be scrutinized is that there is no attempt for false implication, application of principle of caution and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses as regards their trnstworthiness.

60. In view of the aforesaid settled position of law, we are not disposed to accept the contention that omission in the first statement of the informant is fatal to the case. We are disposed to think so, for the omission has to be considered in the backdrop of the entire factual scenario, the materials brought on record and objective weighing of the circumstances. The impact of the omission, as is discernible from the authorities, has to be adjudged in the totality of the circumstances and the veracity of the evidence. The involvement of the accused persons cannot be determined solely on the basis of what has been mentioned in the FIR. 61. In his statement recorded in the early hours of 17.12.2012, PW- I stated about going to the Select City Walk Mall, Saket alongwith the prosecutrix and boarding the bus. He has also stated about the presence of four persons sitting in the cabin of the bus and two boys sitting behind the cabin and clearly stated about the overt act. He has broadly made reference to the accused persons and also to the overt acts. There are no indications of fabrication in Ex.PW-I/ A. 62. The victim and PW-I were thrown out of the bus and after some time they were admitted to the hospital. Both the injuries on PW1's person and the gruesome acts against the victim must have put him in a traumatic condition and it would not have been possible for him to recall and narrate the entire incident to the police at one instance. It cannot be said that merely because the names of the accused persons are not mentioned in the FIR, it raises serious doubts about the prosecution case.

Appreciation of the evidence of PW-1 63. Having dealt with the contention of delay in lodging of the FIR

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and omission of names in the FTR on the basis of the first statement of PW-I, we may now proceed to appreciate the evidentiary value to be attached to the testimony of PW-I and the contentions advanced in this regard. 64. As per the evidence of PW-I, he alongwith the prosecutrix, on the fateful day about 3:30 p.m., took an auto from Dwarka, New Delhi to Select City Walk Mall, Saket, New Delhi, where they watched a movie till about 8:30 p.m. and, thereafter, left the Mall. As they could not get an auto for Dwarka, they hired an auto for Munirka intending to take a bus (route No. 764) thereon. About 9:00 p.m. when they reached Munirka bus stand they boarded a white colour chartered bus and JCL was calling for commuters to Dwarka/Palam Mod. While boarding the bus, PW-I noted that the bus had "Yadav" written on its side; had yellow and green lines/stripes; the entry gate was ahead of its front left tyre; and its front tyre was without a wheel cover. After boarding, he saw that besides the boy (JCL) who was calling for passengers and the driver, ~wo other persons were sitting in the driver's cabin and two persons were seated inside the bus on either side of the aisle. After the bus left the Munirka bus stand, the lights inside the bus were turned off. Then accused Ram Singh, accused Akshay Thakur and the JCL (all three identified later) came towards PW-I and verbally and physically assaulted him. When PW-1 resisted them, accused Vinay and accused Pawan were called along with iron rods and all the accused persons started hitting PW-I with the iron rods. When the prosecutrix attempted to call for help, PW-I and the prosecutrix were robbed of their possessions. 65. PW-I was immobilized by accused Vi nay and accused Pawan Kumar; while others, viz., accused Ram Singh, Akshay and the.JCL took the prosecutrix to the rear side of the bus whereafter PW-I heard the prosecutrix shout out "chod do, bachao" and her cry. After the above, three accused committed the heinous act of raping the prosecutrix, accused Vi nay and Pawan then went to the rear side of the bus while the other three pinned down PW-I. Thereafter, accused Mukesh (originally driving the bus) hit PW-I with the rod and went to the rear side of the bus. PW-I also heard one of the accused saying "mar gayee, mar gayee''. After the incident, PW- I and the prosecutrix were dragged to the front door (because the rear door was jammed) and were pushed out of the moving bus opposite Hotel Delhi 37. After being thrown outside, the bus was turned in such a manner as to crnsh both of them but PW-I

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

pulled the prosecutrix and himself out of the reach of the wheels of the bus and saved their lives.

66. The statement of the informant, PW-1, was recorded by PW74 in the early hours of 17.12.12 and Ex.PW-1/A is the complaint. In his chief examination, PW-74 deposes that he had given the complaint (rukka) to Ct. Kripal Singh and sent him to the pvlice station at 5: 10 B a.m. which thereby leaves the time of recording the infom1ant's statement inconclusive. Even ifthe version of PW-74 was to be relied upon and the informant's statement had been recorded by 5: I 0 a.m., DD entry which forms Ex.PW-57IC records that till 5:30 a.m., no punishable offence has been reported to have occurred and infonnation of well-being had been recorded despite the fact that previous DD entries had been c recorded on the basis of telephonic conversations between police officers at the hospital, the scene of crime and the control room (both DD entries 6A and 7A had been recorded on the basis of phone conversations). The first supplementary statement was recorded around 7:30 a.m., on 17.12.2012 specifically with respect to the bus in question. In this D statement, Ex. PW-80/D I, PW-1 merely gives a generic description of the bus. However, unlike in Ex. PW-I/A, in his supplementary statement, the informant states that the bus was white in colour with stripes of yellow and green, that there were 3 x 2 seats and that if he remembered anything else, he would reveal the same. At this time, the investigating agency had neither seized the bus nor arrested the accused; the statement E of the informant is, therefore, silent on specific details about the same. PW's second supplementary statement, Ex.PW-80/D3, was recorded around noon on 17.12.2012 in which the informant, for the first time since the time of the incident, revealed details about the bus in which the crime allegedly occurred (that there was the word "Yadav" written on F the side, that the front wheel cover was missing), and also revealed the names of the accused (Ram Singh, one Thakur, one Mukesh/Ramesh, Vinay and Pawan). 67. The learn~d amicus curiae, Mr. Hegde, submitted that at every stage, PW-1 made improvement in his statements. It was submitted that when PW-I was confronted with the omissions Ex.PW1/A, Ex.PW-8/D I and Ex. PW-80/D3, he stated that he was unable to talk at the time ofrecording of his statement due to injury to the tongue. It was submitted that as per Ex.PW-51/A, he sustained only simple injury and it does not state that PW-I suffered injury to his tongue. It was

further contended that the process of improving and embellishing the informant's statement did not end with recording his statement under Section 161 CrPC. On 19.12.2012, the infonnantmade a statement und~r Section 164 CrPC before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Saket Courts. This statement is the most comprehensive and contains details which had been discovered by the prosecution by then such as the names of all the accused (including the name of the JCL for.the first time) and details from inside the bus (colour of the seats and curtains). It was contended that the improved version of PW-I renders his evidence unreliable and merely because he is an injured witness, his evidence carlnot be accepted. 68. It is urged by Mr. Hegde, learned amicus curiae, that inconsistencies and omissions amounting to contradiction in the testimony of PW-I make him an untrustworthy and unreliable witness. The inconsistencies pointed out by the learned amicus curiae pertain to the number of assailants, the description of the bus and the identity of the accused. As regards the omission, it is contended by him that the said witness had not mentioned about the alleged use of rod in the FIR. He has further submitted that though he has stated that he had been assaulted by the iron rods as per his subsequent statement, yet the said statement is wholly unacceptable since he had sustained only simple injuries. 69. Mr. Hegde, in his further criticism of the evidence of PW-!, has put f01th that the effo1t of the prosecution had been to highlight the consistencies instead of explaining the inconsistencies. That apart, submits Mr. Hegde, that the witness has revealed the story step by step including the gradual recognition of the identity of the accused in tandem with the process of investigation and in such a situation, his testimony has to be looked with suspicion. 70. Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants - Mukesh and Pawan Kumar Gupta, and Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the appellants - Vi nay Sharma and Akshay Kumar Singh, submit that the omissions in the statement of PW-I amount to contradictions in material particulars and such contradictions go to the root of the case and, in fact, materially affect the trial or the very case of the prosecution. Therefore, they submit that the testimony of PW-!, who is treated as a star witness, is liable to be discredited. Reliance has been placed on the authorities in State Represented by Inspector of Police v. Sarava11a11 & anot/zer 11 ,

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c2008) 17 sec 587 : AIR 2009 sc 1s2

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

Arumugam v. State Represented by Inspector of Police, A Tamil Nadu 11 , Malzendra Pratap Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh' 3 and Sunil Kumar Samb/111dayal Gupta (Dr.) and others v. State of Malzaraslttra 14 • • 71. The authorities that have been commended by Mr. Sharma need to be appositely understood. In Arumugam (supra), the Court B was dealing with the issue of acceptance of the version of interested witnesses. It has referred to Da/ip Singh v. State of Punjab 15 , State of

Punjab v. Jagir Singh, Baljit Singh and Karam Si11gh' 6 , Le/ma v. State of Haryana 17, Gangadltar Behera and others v. State of Orissa 18 and State of Rajastlian v. Kalki and another 19 and opined that while normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party's case, material -discrepancies do so.

72. In Saravanan (supra), reiterating the principle, the Com1 held:

"18 ..... it has been said time and again by this Court that while appreciating the evidence of a witness, minor discrepancies on trivial matters without affecting the core of the prosecution case, ought not to prompt the court to reject evidence in its entirety. Further, on the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness, the trial court upon appreciation of evidence forms an opinion about the credibility thereof, in the normal circumstances the appellate court would not be justified to review it once again without justifiable reasons. It is the totality of the situation, which has to be taken note of. Difference in some minor detail, which does not otherwise affect the core of the prosecution case, even if present, that itself would not prompt the comi to reject the evidence on minor variations and discrepancies."

73. In Mahendra Pratap Singh (supra), the Court referred to the authority in lnder Singh and another v. State (Delhi Administration} 20 wherein it has been held thus: (2008) 15 sec 590 :AIR 2009 SC 331 " (2009J 11 sec 334 " (2010) 13 sec 657: JT 2010 (12) sc 287 AIR 1953 SC 364 ' <1974) 3 sec 2n (2002) 3 sec 76 ' (2002) 8 sec 381 ' <1981 l 2 sec 752 '° (1978) 4 sec 161

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"2. Credibility of testimony, oral and circumstantial, depends considerably on a judicial evaluation of the totality, not isolated scrutiny. While it is necessary that proof beyond reasonable doubt should be adduced in all criminal cases, it is not necessary that it should be perfect."

In the circumstance of the case, the Court, analyzing the evidence, opined:

"62. From the above discussion of the evidence of the eyewitnesses including injured witnesses, their evidence does not at all inspire confidence and their evidence is running in conflict and contradiction with the medical evidence and ballistic expert's report in regard to the weapon of offence, which was different from the one sealed in the police station. The High Court has, in our opinion, disregarded the rule of judicial prudence in converting the order of acquittal to conviction." 74. In Sunil KumarSambhudayal Gupta (supra), while dealing with the issue of material contradictions, the Court held: "30. While appreciating the evidence, the court has to take into consideration whether the contradictions/ omissions had been of such magnitude that they may materially affer the trial. Minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters without effecting the core of the prosecution case should not be made a ground to reject the evidence in its entirety. The trial court, after going through the entire evidence, must form an opinion about the credibility of the witnesses and the appellate court in normal course would not be justified in reviewing the same again without justifiable reasons. (Vide State v. Saravanan) 31. Where the omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt about the truthfulness of a witness and the other witness also makes material improvements before the court in order to make the evidence acceptable, it cannot be safe to rely upon such evidence. (Vide State of Raja,sthan v. Rajendra Singh 11 .) 32. The discrepancies in the evidence of eyewitnesses, if found

" (2009J 11 sec 106

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] to be not minor in nature, may be a ground for disbelieving and discrediting their evidence. In such circumstances, witnesses may not inspire confidence and iftheir evidence is found to be in conflict and contradiction with other evidence or with the statement already recorded, in such a case it cannot be held that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt." (Vide Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P )"

And again: "35. The courts have to label the category to which a discrepancy belongs. While normal discrepancies do not coJTode the credibility of a party's case, material discrepancies do so." (See Syed Ibrahim v. State of A.Pn and Arumugam v. State) 75. Mr. Luthra, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-State, on the other hand, has disputed the stand of the appellants as regards the discrepancies in the statement of PW-I. According to him, the evidence of PW- I cannot be discarded on grounds which are quite specious. The circumstances in entirety are to be appreciated. He has placed reliance on the appreciation of the trial court and contended that the appreciation and analysis are absolutely impeccable. The relied upon paragraph is as follows: "The complainant PW! in his deposition had coJToborated his complaint Ex.PW I/A; his statement Ex.PW80/D- l recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C; his supplementary statement Ex.PW80/D-3 and his statement Ex.PWl/B recorded under section 164 CrPC; qua his visit to Select City Mall, Saket; then moving to Munirka in an auto; boarding the bus Ex. P 1; the incident; throwing them out of the moving bus and attempt of accused to ovemm the victims by their bus. It was argued by the Ld. Defence counsel that during his cross examination PW I was confronted with his statement Ex. PW 1I A qua the factum of not disclosing in it the user of iron rods; the description of bus, the name of the assailants either in MLC Ex. PW51/A or in his complaint Ex.PWl/A. However, I do not consider such omissions as fatal as it is a settled law that FIR is not an encyclopedia of facts. The victim is not precluded from ·explaining the facts in his subsequent statements. It is not expected " c2006) 10 sec 601

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of a victim to disclose all the finer aspects of the incident in the FIR or in the brief history given to the doctor; as doctor(s) are more concerned with treatment of the victims. More so the victim who suffers from an incident, obviously, is in a state of shock and it is only when we moves in his comfort zone, he starts recollecting the events one by one and thus to stop the victim from elaborating the facts to describe the finer details, if left out earlier, would be too much. Thus if PWl had failed to give the description of the bus or of iron rods to the doctor in his MLC Ex. PWS I! A or in his complaint Ex. PW I/A it shall not have any fatal effect on the prosecution case. What is fatal is the material omissions, if any." 76. The evidence of PW-1 is assailed contending that he is not a reliable witness. During the cross-examination, his evidence was assailed contending that Ex.PW-I/A is replete with contradictions and inconsistencies. Taking us through the evidence, Mr. Singh has submitted that in his first statement, Ex.PW-I/A, there were lot of omissions and contradictions and the improvements in his subsequent statements render the evidence wholly untrnstworthy. The appellants, in an attempt to assail the credibility of the testimony of PW-I, inter alia, raised the contentions: (i) Non-disclosure of the use of iron rod and (ii) the names of the assailants in the MLC in Ex. PW-51/A or in Ex.PW-I/ A. However, the trial court held these assertions as non-fatal to PW-1 's testimony: " ... It is not expected of a victim to disclose all the finer aspects of the incident in the FIR or in the brief history given to the doctor; as doctor(s) are more concerned with treatment of the victims. More so the victim who suffers from an incident, obviously, is in a state of shock and it is only when we move in his comfort zone, he starts recollecting the events one by one and thus to stop the victim from elaborating the facts to describe the finer details, if left out earlier, would be too much."

77. The contentions assailing the evidence of PW- I does not merit acceptance, for at the time when he was first examined his friend (the prosecutrix) was critically injured and he was in a shocked mental condition. The evidence of a witness is not to be disbelieved simply because he is a partisan witness or related to the prosecution. It is to be weighed whether he was present or not and whether he is telling the trnth or not.

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

78. The informant, PW-1, in his deposition,. has clearly spoken about the occurrence and also corroborated his complaint, Ex.PW-I/ A. The evidence of PW-I is unimpeachable in character and the roving cross-examination has not eroded his credibility. It is necessary to mention here that PW- I was admitted in the casualty ward of Safda1jung Hospital. As he was injured, he was medically examined by Dr. Sachin Bajaj, PW-51, and as per the evidence, Ext.PW-SI/A, the following injuries were found on his body:

(a) lcm XI cm size clean lacertated wound over the vertex of scalp (head injury);

(b) 0.5 X I cm size clean lacerated wound over left upper leg; (c) IX 0.2 cm size abrasion over right knee. 79. The injuries found on the person of PW-I and the fact that PW-I was injured in the same occurrence lends assurance to his testimony that he was present at the time of the occurrence along with the prosecutrix. The evidence of an injured witness is entitled to a greater weight and the testimony of such a witness is considered to be beyond reproach and reliable. Fim1, cogent and convincing ground is required to discard the evidence of an injured witness. It is to be kept in mind that the evidentiary value of an injured witness carries great weight. In Mano Dutt and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh 23 , it was held as under: "31. We may merely refer to Abdul Sayeed v. State of MP. where this Court held as under:

"28. The question of the weight to be attached to the evidence of a witness that was himself injured in the course of the occurrence has been extensively discussed by this Court. Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. 'Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness.' [Vide Ramlagan Singh v. State

" (2012) 4 sec 79 " (201 o) 1o sec 259

of Bihar25 , Ma/khan Singh v. State of U.P. 26 , Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab27, Appabhai v. State of Gujarat 2", Bonkya v. State of Maharashtra 29 , Bhag Singh v. State of Punjab·"', Mohar v. State of U.P. 31 , Dinesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan 32 , Vishnu v. State of Rajasthan 33 , Annareddy Sambasiva Reddy v. State of A.P. 34 and Balraje v. State of Maharashtra 35 .]

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29. While deciding this issue, a similar view was taken in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab36 where this Court reiterated the special evidentiary status accorded to the testimony of an injured accused and relying on its earlier judgments held as under: '28. Darshan Singh (PW 4) was an injured witness. He had been examined by the doctor. His testimony could not be brushed aside lightly. He had given full details of the incident as he was present at the time when the assailants reached the tubewell. In Shivalingappa Kallayanappa v. State of Karnataka 37 this Court has held that the deposition of the. injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies, for the reason that his presence on the scene stands established in case it is proved that he suffered the injury during the said incident. 29. In State of U.P. v. Kishan Chand"' a similar view has been reiterated observing that the testimony of a stamped witness has its own relevance and efficacy. The fact that

"(1973) 3 sec 881 "(1975) 3 sec 311 "(1983) 3 sec 470 " 1988 Supp sec 241 "(1995) 6 sec 447 "(1997) 1sec112 " c2002) 1 sec 606 " c2008) 8 sec 210 ii c2009) 10 sec 477 "c2009) 12 sec 546 " c201 OJ 6 sec 673 ' c2009) 9 sec 119 1994 Supp (3) sec 235 • c2004) 1 sec 629

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.] the witness sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence, lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. In case the injured witness is subjected to lengthy cross-examination and nothing can be elicited to discard his testimony, it should be relied upon (vide Krishan v. State of Haryana 39 • Thus, we are of the considered opinion that evidence ofDarshan Singh (PW 4) has rightly been relied upon by the courts below.' 30. The law on the point can be summarised to the effect that the testimony of the injured witness is accorded a special status in law. This is as a consequence of the fact that the injury to the witness is an inbuilt guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and because the witness will not want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to falsely implicate a third party for the commission of the offence. Thus, the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein."

To the similar effect is the judgment of this Court in Balraje (supra)." 80. As is manifest from the evidence, S.I. Pratibha Sharma, PW80, recorded the First Supplementary Statement under Section 16 l CrPC of the infonnant, PW-I, Awninder Pratap Singh about 7:30 a.m. on 17.12.2012. Thereafter, PW- I, the informant, took PW-80, S. T. Pratibha Sharma, to the spot from where he and the prosecutrix had boarded the

~.

81. Apart from the injuries sustained, the presence of PW-I is further confirmed by the DNA analysis of: 1. the bloodstained mulberry leaves and grass that were collected from the spot in Mahipalpur where they were thrown off the bus; (Ex.74/C)

2. the blood stains on Vinay's jacket (Ex.68/2) (as per Seizure Memo Ex. 68/3), Pawan's sweater (Ex. P.68/6) (as per Ex. PW68/ F) and Akshay's jeans (Ex P.68/6) tying them to the incident; " (2006) 12 sec 459

(from the trial court judgment); and

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3. the unburnt cloth pieces belonging to PW-I that were recovered alongwith the ashes of the prosecutrix's clothing (Ex. PW74/M).

82. The trial court judgment was fortified by the decisions of this Court in Pudhu Raja and another v. State Represented by Inspector of Police40, Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana 41 and Akhtar and others v. State of Uttarancha/41 on the law of material omissions and contradictions. Concurringly, the High Court too observed that the defence had failed to demonstrate from the informant's testimony such discrepancies, omissions and improvements that would have caused the High Court to reject such testimony after testing it on the anvil of the law laid down by this Court: "325 .... Their throbbing injuries and the rigors of the weather coupled with the state of their minds must have at that point of time brought forth their instinct of survival and self preservation. The desire to have apprehended their assailants and to mete out just desserts to them could not have been their priority.... " 83. In this context, we may frnitfully reproduce a passage from

State of U.P. v. M.K. Antlwny43 :

"I 0. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring oftrnth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touchii1g the core of the case, hyper-technical approach by taking sentences tom out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily pennit rejection of the evidence as a whole .... " • c2012)-11 sec 196 " c2000) 4 sec 484 " c2009) n sec 122 " cI 985) 1 sec 505

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

84. In Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court ofA.P. 44 , it has been ruled that:

"11. .... In appreciating the evidence the approach of the comi must be integrated not tnmcated or isolated. In other words, the impact of the evidence in totality on the prosecution case or innocence of the accused has to be kept in mind in coming to the conclusion as to the guilt or otherwise of the accused. In reaching a conclusion about the guilt of the accused, the court has to appreciate, analyse and assess the evidence placed before it by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic value and the animus of witnesses." 85. In Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar5 , a three-Judge Bench held: "7. The maxim falsus in uno, falsu in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) is neither a sound rule oflaw nor a rule of practice. Hardly one comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggerations, embroideries or embellishments. It is, therefore, the duty of the court to scrutinise the evidence carefully and, in terms of the felicitous metaphor, separate the grain from the chaff. But, it cannot obviously disbelieve the substratum of the prosecution case or the material parts of the evidence and reconstruct a story of its own out of the rest."

86. In Krishna Mochi v. State of Bi/lar6, the Court ruled that: "32 ..... The court while appreciating the evidence should not lose sight of these realities of life and cannot afford to take an unrealistic approach by sitting in an ivory tower. I find that in recent times the tendency to acquit an accused easily is galloping fast. It is very easy to pass an order of acquittal on the basis of minor points raised in the case by a short judgment so as to achieve the yardstick of disposal. Some discrepancy is bound to be there in each and every case which should not weigh with the court so long it does not materially affect the prosecution case. In case discrepancies pointed out are in the realm of pebbles, the court

" (2002) 6 sec 410 " AIR 1965 SC 277 " (2002) 6 sec s 1

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should tread upon it, but if the same are boulders, the court should not make an attempt to jump over the same. These days when crime is looming large and humanity is suffering and the society is so much affected thereby, duties and responsibilities of the courts have become much more. Now the maxim "let hundred guilty persons be acquitted, but not a single innocent be convicted" is, in practice, changing the world over and courts have been compelled to accept that "society suffers by wrong convictions and it equally suffers by wrong acquittals". I find that this Court in recent times has conscientiously taken notice of these facts from time to time". 87. In Inder Singh (supra), Krishna Iyer, J. laid down that: "Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish and guilty man cannot get away with it because trnth suffers some infirmity when projected through human processes."

.F

88. In the case of State of U.P. v. A nil Singh 47 , it was held that a Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. One is as important as the other. Both are public duties which the Judge has to perform. 89. In Mohan Singh and another v. State of M.P. 48 , this Court has held: "11. The question is how to test the veracity of the prosecution story especially when it is with some variance with the medical evidence. Mere variance of the prosecution story with the medical · evidence, in all cases, should not lead to the conclusion, inevitably to reject the prosecution story. Efforts should be made to find the truth, this is the very object for which courts are created. To search it out, the courts have been removing the chaff from the grain. It has to disperse the suspicious cloud and dust out the smear of dust as all these things clog the very truth. So long as chaff, cloud and dust remain, the criminals are clothed with this protective layer to receive the benefit of doubt. So it is a solemn duty of the courts, not to merely conclude and leave the case the moment suspicions are created. It is the onerous duty of the court, within permissible limit, to find out the truth. It means on one hand, no " 1988 (Supp.) sec 686 " <I 999) 2 sec 428

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. [DWAK MISRA, J.]

innocent man should be punished but on the other hand, to see no A person committing an offence should get scot-free. Ifin spite of such effort, suspicion is not dissolved, it remains writ at large, benefit of doubt has to be credited to the accused. For this, one has to comprehend the totality of the facts and the circumstances as spelled out through the evidence, depending on the facts of B each case by testing the credibility of eyewitnesses including the medical evidence, of course, after excluding those parts of the evidence which are vague and uncertain. There is no mathematical formula through which the truthfulness of a prosecution or a defence case could be concretised. It would depend on the evidence of each case including the manner of deposition and his c demeans (sic), clarity, corroboration of witnesses and overall, the conscience of a judge evoked by the evidence on record. So courts have to proceed further and make genuine efforts within the judicial sphere to search out the truth and not stop at the threshold of creation of doubt to confer benefit of doubt." 90. Keeping the aforesaid aspects in view, we shall now proceed to test the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned amicus curiae on the issue whether the testimony of PW-I deserves acceptance being reliable or not. It is no doubt true that in the earlier statement of PW-I, that is, Ex.PW-I/A, there are certain omissions; but the main thing to be seen is whether the omissions go to E the root of the matter or pertain to insignificant aspects. The evidence of PW-1 is not to be disbelieved simply because there were certain omissions. The trial Court as well as the High Court found his evidence credible and trustworthy and we find no reason to take a different view.

91. The case of the prosecution is attacked contending that PW! is a planted witness and that he keeps on improving his version. It is submitted that PW-I is not reliable as had he been present at the time of occurrence, he would have endeavoured to save the victim and the nature of injuries as mentioned in Ex. PW-51/ A on the person of PW-I raises serious doubt about his presence at the time of occurrence.

92. The prosecutrix and PW-I were surrounded and attacked by at least six accused persons. As narrated by PW- I, he was pinned down by two of the assailants while the others committed rape on the prosecutrix on the rear side of the bus. The accused persons were in a group and were also armed with iron rods. PW- I was held by them. It would not

[2017] 6 S.C.R.

have been possible for PW- I to resist the number of accused persons and save the prosecutrix. The evidence of PW-I cannot be doubted on the ground that he had not interfered with the occurrence. The improvements made in the supplementary statement need not necessarily render PW-1 's evidence untrustworthy more so when PW-I has no reason to falsely implicate the accused. 93. Learned counsel for the State has highlighted that the version of PW-I is absolutely consistent and the trial co1111 as well as the High Court has correctly relied upon his testimony. He has drawn our attention to the version of PW-I in the FIR, the statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC and his testimony before the trial court. We have given anxious consideration and perused the FIR, supplementary statements recorded under Section 164 CrPC and appreciated the evidence in court and we find that there is no justification or warrant to treat the version of the witness as inconsistent. The consistency is writ large and the witness, as we perceive, is credible. 94. Mr. Luthra, learned senior counsel, further contested the argument advanced on behalf of the appellants as regards the discrepancies so far as PW-I is concerned. As regards the items stolen, it is recorded in the FIR that the accused persons stole the informant's Samsung Galaxy Mobile phone bearing 7827917720 and 9540034561 and his wallet containing Rs. I 000, TCTCT debit card, Ci ti Bank Credit Card, ID Card, one silver ring, one gold ring and took off all his clothes, i.e., khakhi coloured blazer, grey sweater, black jeans, black Hush Puppies shoes and they also stole the prosecutrix's mobile phone with number 9818358144. His statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC states that the accused snatched the Samsung Galaxy S-Duos Mobile, one more mobile phone of Samsung, one purse with Rs. l 000, one Citibank credit card, ICTCT Debit Card, Company I-Card, Delhi Metro Card and also snatched black jeans, one silver ring, one gold ring, Hush Puppies shoes. They also snatched the prosecutrix's Nokia mobile phone and grey colour purse and both the wrist watches. Before the trial com1, he deposed that they snatched both the rings, shoes, purse containing cards and cash, socks and belt; they took off all his clothes and left him in an underwear; the accused had also taken off all the prosecutrix's clothes and snatched all her belongings including grey purse containing Axis bank card. PW-I also identified Hush Puppies shoes, Ex. P-2, Sonata watch, Ex. P-3, metro card, Ex. P-5, Samsung Galaxy Duos, Ex. P-6,

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

and currency notes, Ex. P-7. As regards the weapon of assault, in the FIR and in the Section 164 statement, "rod" was recorded as weapon of assault and in his testimony before the trial court, PW- I deposed that the weapon of assault was "iron rods". So far as throwing from the bus is concerned, it is recorded in the FIR that the other accused persons told the driver to drive the bus at a fast speed and then tried to throw the informant from the back door of the bus, however, the back door of the bus did not open. Then they threw both the info1mant and the prosecutrix from the moving bus near NH 8 Mahipalpur on the side of the road. His statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC states that the bus driver was driving the bus at a fast speed on being told by the other accused and he heard them saying that the girl had died and to throw her off the bus. They then took the informant and the prosecutrix to the rear door of the bus but could not open the door and, therefore, dragged them to the front door of the bus and threw them out. The bus driver turned the bus in such a manner after throwing them, that if the infonnant had not pulled the prosecutrix, then the bus would have nm over her. PW- I has deposed before the trial court that he heard one of the accused saying "mar gayee, margayee"; the accused were exhorting that the informant and the prosecutrix should not be left alive; the accused persons pulled the informant near the rear door and put the prosecutrix on him. The rear door was closed, so they dragged both the informant and the prosecutrix to the front door; they were thrown off opposite Hotel Delhi 37; after they were thrown, the accused persons turned the bus and tried to crush them under the wheels. As regards the naming/description of the accused, the FIR recorded that the accused were aged between 25-30 years; one of them had a flat nose and was the youngest; one of them wore a red banian and they were wearing pant and shirt; and the accused were named as Ram Singh, Thakur, Mukesh, Vinay and Pawan. In the statement, it was recorded that he saw a dark coloured man who was being called "Mukesh, Mukesh"; he over-heard them calling each other as Ram Singh, Thakur; and the other three were addressing each other Pawan and Vinay and taking the name of JCL. In his testimony, it is recorded that he identified A-2, Mukesh, as Driver, A-1. Ram Singh, and A-3, Akshay, as persons sitting in the driver's cabin and identified A-4, Vi nay, and A-5, Pawan, as persons sitting in the bus.

95. As regards the minor contradictions/omissions, the trial court has placed reliance upon Pudlm Raja (supra) and Ja:jwant Singh

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(supra) and treated the version of PW-I as reliable. The testimony of PW-I has been placed reliance upon by both the Courts and on an anxious and careful scrutiny of the same, we do not perceive any reason to differ with the said view. 96. As we find, the trial court has come to the conclusion that the incident has been aptly described by PW-I, the injured, The injuries on his person do show that he was present in the bus at the time of the incident. His presence is further confirmed by the DNA analysis. Suffice it to say for the present, the contradictions in the statement, Ex.PW-I/A, are not material enough to destroy the substratum of the prosecution case. From the studied analysis of the evidence of PW- I, it is the only inevitable conclusion because the appreciation is founded on yardstick of consideration of totality of evidence and its intrinsic value on proper assessment.

Recovery oftlte bus and tlte CCTV footage

97. The endeavour of the prosecution was to first check the route and get a clue of the bus. For the aforesaid purpose, the CCTV footage becomes quite relevant. The story starts from the Select City Walk Mall, Saket and hence, we have to start from there. As per the case of the prosecution, the informant and the prosecutrix had gone to Select City Walk Mall, Sake! to see a film. The CCTV footage produced by PW25, Rajender Singh Bisht, in a CD, Ex.PW-25/C-l and PW-25/C-2, and the photographs, Ex.PW-25/B-l to Ex.PW- 25/B-7, are evident of the fact that the infonnant and the prosecutrix were present at Saket till 8:57 p.m. The certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act with respect to the said footage is proved by PW-26, Shri Sandeep Singh, vide Ex.PW-26/A. The infonnant as well as the prosecutrix gave brief description of the entire incident in their MLCs which led the investigating team to the Hotel near Delhi Airport where the prosecutrix and the informant were dumped after the incident. PW-67, Pramod Kumar Jha, the owner of the Hotel at Delhi Airport, was examined by the investigating officers regarding the present incident. He handed over the pen drive containing the CCTV footage, Ex.P-67/1, and the CD, Ex.P-67/2 to the I.O. which were seized vide seizure memo Ex.PW-67/A. The CCTV footage and the photographs were identified by PW-67, Pramod Jha, PW-74. SI Subhash Chand, and Gautam Roy, PW-76, from CFSL during their examination in Court. The CCTV footage twice showed a white coloured bus having yellow and green stripes at 9:34 p.m. and again at

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

9:53 p.m. The bus exactly matched the description of the offending bus given by the informant. lt had the word "Yadav" written on one of its sides and its front tyre on the left side did not have a wheel cap. PW-78, the S.H.O., Inspector Anil Sharma, has further deposed that the said CCTV footage seized vi de seizure memo Ex. PW-67 /A was sent to the CFSL through SI Sushil Sawariya, PW-54, on 02.01.2013, and this part of the testimony of PW-78 is corroborated by the testimony of PW-54, SI Sushil Sawaria, and PW-77, the MHC(M). Thereafter, on 03.01.2013, the report of the CFSL was received. In fact, the trial court had assured itself of the correct identification of the bus by playing the said CCTV footage shown in the pen drive, Ex.PW-6711, and the CD, Ex.PW-67 /2, during the cross-examination of PW-67, Pramod Jha.

C

98. Learned counsel Mr. Singh has asserted that bus, Ex. P-1, has been falsely implicated in the present case as is evidenced from the recovery of the CCTV footage. In an attempt to discredit the CCTV footage, he pointed out that only the CCTV recording alleged to be of this bus was recorded and not of all other white buses that had 'Yadav' D written on them. The learned counsel for the defence subsequently maintained that the CCTV footage cannot be relied upon as the same has been tampered with by the investigating officers. 99. PW-76, Gautam Roy, HOD, Computer Cell, Forensic Division, has testified that on 02.01.2013, he had received two sealed parcels sealed with the seal of PS and the seals tallied with the specimen seals provided. He marked the blue coloured pen drive found in parcel No. I as Ex. I and the Moser Baer CD found in the second parcel as Ex.2. He further testified that both the exhibits were played by him in the computer and the bus was seen twice, at 9:34 p.m. and 9:54 p.m. He had photographed all these three by freezing the pen drive and the CD and these photographs were compared by him with the photographs taken by the photographer, PW-79, P.K. Gottam, which he had summoned. The witness testified that he had prepared the three comparison charts in this regard as Ex.PW-76/B, PW-76/C and PW-76/D, and his detailed report as Ex.PW-76/E. The footage taken in a CD and pen drive was sealed in PW-67's presence and as the recording was automatic data being fed on regular basis into the hard disk, the question of tampering with the same could not arise. PW-79, P.K. Gottam, from CFSL, CBI, has stated in his examination that he took photographs of the bus bearing No.DL-1 P-C-0149 parked at Thyagraj Stadium, INA, New Delhi from

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different angles on 17.12.2012 and 18.12.2012 and handed over the same to PW-76. The said photographs were marked as BI in Ex.PW-76/B; as Cl and C2 in Ex.PW-76/C; and as DI in Ex.PW-76/D. He has deposed as to the genuineness of the photographs by deposing that the software used for developing the photographs was tamper proof.

100. Once it is proved before the court through the testimony of the experts that the photographs and the CCTV footage are not tampered with, there is no reason or justification to perceive the same with the lens of doubt. The opinion of the CFSL expert contained in the CFSL report marked as Ex.PW-76/E authenticates that there was no tampering or editing in both the exhibits, Ex.P-67/1 and Ex.P- 6712, and that a bus having identical patterns as the one parked at Thyagraj Stadium is seen in the CCTV footage, which includes the word "Yadav" written on one side, "back side dent (left)" and absence of wheel cover on the front left side. The contents of the report is also admitted to be tme by its author, PW-76, Gautam Roy. Quite apart from that, it is perceptible that the High Court, in order to satisfy itself, had got the CCTV footage played during the hearing and found the same to be creditworthy and acceptable.

101. As the narrative proceeds, the next step was to find out the bus. The identity of the bus in the CCTV footage was known and the said knowledge could propel the prosecution to move for recovery. We E may start from the beginning. The bus, Ex. P-1, bearing registration No. DL-1 P-C-0149, is the vehicle alleged to have been involved in the incident. PW-74, SI Subhash Chand, on 17.12.2012, along with PW-I, the informant,.and PW-80, WSI Pratibha Singh, went to Munirka bus stand from where the victims had boarded the alleged bus, Ex. P-1, and. then to Mahipalpur to the spot where both the victims were thrown off the F bus on 16.12.2012. Afterthe collection of exhibits from the spot, PW-74 and PW-80 went to the hotels opposite the spot having CCTV cameras installed and amongst those was Hotel Delhi 37. At the said hotel, the informant/PW-! identified the bus they had boarded in the CCTV footage of the road and the relevant footage of the recording was taken in a pen G drive and CD and was handed over to the Investigating Officer as Ex. PW-67/A. Later in the day, secret information was received by PW-80 that the alleged bus was parked at Sector 3, R.K. Puram. PW-74 accompanied PW-80 and PW-65, Ct Kripal Singh, to Ravidass Camp where a bus matching the description given by PW-1 was parked near the Gurudwara. It was white in colour with 'Yadav' written on the side.

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS. [DTPAK MISRA, J.]

When the police approached the bus, A-1, Ram Singh, got down from it and started to run; he was later apprehended in a chase by PW-74 and PW-65. From A-1, the fitness certificate, PUC ahd other documents regarding the registration of the vehicle DL-1PC-0149 were seized as Ex. PW-74/I, PW-74/J and PW-74/K. The entry door of the bus was ahead of the front wheel and the wheel cap was missing from the front tyre. After recovery of the burnt clothes at the behest of A I, he was sent to the police station with PW-65. PW-42, Ct. Suresh Kumar, was called to the spot and he drove the bus to Thyagraj Stadium around 5 :45 p.m. on the same day. An inspection of the bus was conducted inside the stadium and the CFSL team lifted Ex. PW-74/P. Thereafter, PW-32, SI Vishal Chaudhary, and PW-33, ST Vikas Rana, were called from police station Kotla Mubarakpur to guard the bus.

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I 02. Mr. Singh has raised the following issues with respect to the identification and recovery of the alleged bus: 1. CCTV footage was not properly examined to check all possible buses plying on the said route;

2. The bus was taken to Thyagraj Stadium instead of the Police Station to avoid the media and to better facilitate the planting of evidence; and 3. PW-81, Dinesh Yadav, owner of the Bus was in judicial custody for 6 months before his examination in the Court and he was so detained in custody to bring pressure upon him. I 03. Mr. Singh has made bald allegation that the bus, Ex P-1, was falsely implicated and that all the DNA evidence recovered therefrom was actually planted. He contends that the bus, Ex. P-1, was sent to Thyagraj Stadium instead of the concerned Police Station, PS Vasant Vihar, with the deliberate intention of avoiding the media attention so that the evidence could be planted easily. This argument is in furtherance of his false implication theory. He has, however, provided no further specific assertions to cast a doubt in our mind that the police has planted the evidence in the bus.

104. Mr. Luthra, in his tum, relying on the decision of the Delhi High Court in Manjit Singh v. State4 9, has placed statistics before us pointing to the paucity of physical space in police stations across the city. In Manjit Singh (supra), the High Court had ordered the Delhi

214 (2014) DLT 646

.C

[2017) 6 S.C.R.

Police to furnish data regarding case properties with the Police. The High Court noted that there was an accumulation of "2,86,741 case properties including 25,547 vehicles, out of which as many as 2,479 properties are lying in public places outside the police stations". Given the state of affairs, the submission put forth by Mr. Luthra is acceptable. There is dearth of space inside the police stations in Delhi and the use of Thyagraj Stadium as parking lot in the present case does not necessarily mean that there was any ma/a fide intention on the part of the investigating agency without any specific assertion to advance the said bald allegation. 105. It may also be noted that on 17.12.2012, PW-42, Ct. Suresh Kumar, drove the bus from Ravidass Camp to Thyagraj Stadium around 5:45 p.m. along with PW-74 and PW-80. About 6: 15 p.m., PW-32, SI Vishal Chaudhary, along with Ct. Amit, both of PS Kotla Mubarakpur, PW-80, were sent to Thyagraj Stadium where on the instructions of SI Pratibha, PW-32, guarded the bus till 8:00 a.m. the next day. On 18.12.2012, he handed over the charge of guarding the bus to PW-33, SI Vikas Rana, PS Kotla Mubarakpur, and he guarded the bus till 8:30 p.m., until after the CFSL team left. Thus, the criticism as regards the parking of the bus at Thyagraj Stadium and not at the Police Station pales into insignificance.

Reliability of the testimony of PW-81 (the owner of the bu~)

. F

106. Having dealt with the recovery of the bus, it is necessary to dwell upon the contention put forth by the learned counsel for the appellants which pertains to the acceptability and reliability of the testimony of PW-81, Dinesh Yadav. The principal contention in this regard is that PW-81, Dinesh Yadav, the owner of the bus, was in judicial custody and, therefore, his version in the court is under tremendous pressure as he was desirous of getting a bail order to enjoy his liberty. Highlighting this aspect, it is urged by Mr. Sharma and Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the appellants, that the testimony of the said witness deserves to be totally discarded. 107. PW-81, Dinesh Yadav, is a transporter and owns 8 to JO buses including Ex. P-1. He runs the buses under the name 'Yadav Travels'. He was examined by the prosecution to prove that A-1, A-2 andA-3 are connected with the bus, Ex. P-1. In his examination, PW-81 admitted that the word 'Yadav' is written across Ex. P-1 and that it is white in colour with yellow stripes. PW-81 stated that A-1, Ram Singh

MUKESH & ANR. v. STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS.

[DIPAK MISRA, J.] (since deceased), was the driver of the said bus.in December 2012, A3, Akshay Kumar Singh, was his helper and the bus was usually parked by A-1, Ram Singh, in R.K. Puram, near his residence. The bus was attached to Birla Vidya Niketan School, Pushp Vihar, New Delhi to ferry students in the morning and also to a Company, M/s Net Ambit, Sector 132, Noida, to take its employees from Delhi to Noida. On 17.12.2012, the bus went from Delhi to Sector 132, Noida to take the staff of M/s Net Ambit to their office and PW-81 was informed by A-1, Ram Singh, or A-2, Mukesh, that the bus was checked at the DND toll plaza on their route to Noida.

108. Learned counsel Mr. Singh has asserted that PW-81 was kept in judicial custody to obtain a statement favourable to the prosecution in the present case. In this aspect, it is noted that PW-81 also stated that he was kept in judicial custody. The arrest was, however, not made in the present case; it was in connection with another case in relation to providing incorrect address to the Transport Authority. He was lodged in jail in case FIR No. 02/2013 of PS Civil Lines under Sections 420, 468, 471 WC. PW-81 had provided his friend's address as his own at the time of registration and was arrested on a complaint made by the Transport Authority. He was named in the

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