Nabam Rebia, and Bamang Felix v. Deputy Speaker and Others

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
13 July 2016
Judge
Justice J.S. Khehar
Neutral citation
2016 INSC 526
Reported in
[2016] 6 S.C.R. 1
Result
Appeal(s) allowed
Acts & sections
Article 163 Constitution, Article 174 Constitution, Article 208 Constitution, Article 175 Constitution, Article 166 Constitution, Article 190 Constitution, Article 191 Constitution, Article 179 Constitution
Advocates
Civil Appeal Nos, Kapil Sibal, Vivek Tankha, Ashok Desai, Subramonium Prasad, T. R. Andhyarujina, Satya Pal Jain, Ram Jethmalani, Arunabh Chaudhary, Heena Khan, Subhash Sharma, Vaibhav Tomar, G. Panmei, Ankur Chawla, Nizam Pasha

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Full judgment

f2016] 6 S.C.R. 1

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX

v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS (Civil Appeal Nos. 6203-6204of2016) JULY 13,2016

[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, DIPAK MISRA, MADAN B. LOKUR, PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE AND N. V. RAMANA, JJ.]

CONSTITUTION OF IND/A: Art.155 - Appointment and status of Governor - Held: A Governor is appointed by a warrant issued under the hand and seal of the President under Art.155, and his term of office enures under Art.156, during the pleasure of the President - A Governor is an executive nominee, and his appointment flows from the aid and advice tendered by the Council ·of Ministers with the Prime Minister as the head, to the President. Art. 163 - Power of Governor to exercise his discretion Scope of - Held: Art.163 does not give the Governor a general discretionary power to act against or without the advice of his Council of Ministers - The area for the exercise of his discretion is limited - Even in this limited area, his choice of action should not be arbitrary or fanciful - It must be a choice dictated by reascm, actuated by good faith and tempered by caution - Under Art.163(1) the discretionary power of the Governor extends to situations, wherein a constitutional pr.ovision expressly·requires the Governor to act in his own discretion - Any discretion exercised beyond the Governor '.s jurisdictional authority, would certainly be subject to iudicial review - The judgment rend_ered in the Mahabir Prasad Sharma by the High Court of Calcutta does not lay down the correct legal position as it confers excessive powers on the Governor, well beyond his status as a formal or constitutional head of the Executive - The' constitutional position declared therein, With reference to Af't.163(2), is accordingly set aside.

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Arts.163, 174, 179 - Removal of the Speaker (or the Deputy Speaker) under Art.179 - Role of Governor:._ Held: Governor has

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no role whatsoever, in the removal of the Speaker (or the Deputy Speaker) under Art.179 - The question of adoption or rejection of a notice of resolution, for the removal of the Speake1~ is to be determined by the legislators - If the resolution for the Speakers removal is supported by a simple majority of the members of the House, the motion has lo be adopted, and the Speaker has to be removed - Failing ll'hich, the motion has to be rejected -Any action taken by the Governor, based on disputations, with reference to activities in ll'hich he has no role to play, is liable to be considered as extraneous. Arts. 163, 166, 168 - Powers of Governor to exercise executive and legislation function - Held: Governor has a limited scope of authority, relating to the exercise of executive functions, in his own discretion, i.e., without any aid and advice - The said limited power of the Governor is exercisable in situations, expressly provided for "by or under" the provisions of the Constitution - Likewise, even though Art.168 includes the Govern01; and pronounces him to be a part of the State Legislature, the provisions of the Constitution extend no legislative responsibility to him, within the precincts of the House or Houses of the State Legislature - Governor does not participate in debates within the Legislature, nor does he have any role in any activity which would result in the passing of a Bill, on the floor of the House - All in all, the legislative jimctionality constitutionally extended to the Governor, is extremely limited. Arts.163, 174, 179 - Role of Governor in scheduling the functioning of the Assembly - Held: It is not for the Governor to schedule the functioning of the Assembly - It is also not in the Governor~· domain, to schedule the agenda of the House - The Governor has no role ll'ith reference to the ongoings in the Assembly - The Governor must keep away. ji·om all that goes on, within the House - The order of the Governor dated 9.12.2015 preponing the 6th session of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, from 14.1.2016, to 16.12.2015 is violative of Art.163 r.w. Art.174 and as such, is quashed- The message of the Governor dated 9.12.2015, directing the manner of conducting proceedings during the 6 h session of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, from 16.12.2015 to 18.12.2015, is violative of Art.163 1:w. Art.175 and as such, is quashed - All steps and decisions taken by the Arunachal Pradesh

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS

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Legislative Assembly. pursuant to the Governors order and message dated 9.12. 2015, are unsustainable - The same are accordingly set aside.

Art.163(1) - Expression 'required' - Held: The expression 'required' signifies that the Governor can exercise his discretionary powers only if there is a compelling necessity to do so.

Art.163 - Historical background behind its enactment Discussed - Government of India Act, 1935 - s.50 - Indi.a (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947 - Paragraph 3(2). (per Madan B. Lokur, J.) Arts.163, 174 - Relationship of the Governor vis-a-vis the Executive and the relationship of the Governor vis-a-vis Legislature - Distinction between - Art.163 deals with the relationship of first category and Art.17 4 deals with the relationship of second category. (per Madan B. Lokur, J.) Art.163(1) - Governor bound by the advice of his Councilof Ministers - Exceptions - Held: There are only three exceptions Governor may in exercise of his functions act in his discretion as conferred by the Constitution; the Governor may in exercise of his functions, act in his discretion as conferred under the Constitution; and the Governor may in exercise of his functions act in his individual judgment in instances specified by the Constitution. (per Madan B. Lokur, J.) Art.163 - Interpretation of - Reference made to reports of Justice Sarkaria Commission and Justice Punchhi Commission on Union-State Relations to define the role of Governor - Justice Sarkaria Commission looked at Art.163(1) in two parts namely, the Governor exercising his discretion when required by the Constitution and when required under the Constitution - Functions of Governor placed in four categories i.e. Governor acting in his discretion; in his individual judgment; in his discretion independently of the Council of Ministers and in in his discretion under the Constitution - Justice Punchhi Commission did not disagree with the Justice ·Sarkaria Commission on any issue relating to the functions and duties of the Governor - No reason to take view different from that expressed by these reports. (per Madan B. Lokw; J.) Art.163, 174 - Duty of Governor when advice of Council of

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J\,{inisters not available - Options available to the Governor - In dealing with the situation in Arunachal Pradesh, the Governor was obliged to adhere to and follow the constitutional principle, that is to be bound by the advice of Council of Ministers - In the event that advice was not available and re!>ponsible government was not possible, the Governor could have resorted to the .. breakdown provisions" and left it to the President to break the impa,_sse Governor had another option - If Governor had any doubt about the continuance of a responsible government as a result of the shenanigans that were going on in Arunachal Pradesh , he could very well have required the Chief Minister to prove that he had the confidence of the Assembly - Therefore, the unilateral act of summoning the Assembly by the Governor was certainly not in the language of the law or the spirit of parliamentary democracy and responsible government and is declared unconstitutional. (per Madan B. Lokur, J.) Art.174 - Power of Governor vested under Art.174 - Exercise of, without any aid and advice - Scope of - Held: In ordinary circumstances during the period when the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers enjoy the confidence of the majority of the House, the power vested with the Governor under Art.174, to summon, prorogue and dissolve the House(!>) must be exercised in consonance with the aid and advice of the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers - In the above situation, he is precluded to take an individual call on the issue at his own will, or in his own discretion - In a situation where the Governor has reasons to believe, that the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers have lost the confidence of the House, it is open to the Governor, to require the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers to prove their majority in the House, by a floor test - Only in a situation, where the Government in power on the holding of such floor test is seen to have lost the confidence of the majority, it would be open to the Governor to exercise the powers vested with him under Art.174 at his own, and without any aid and advice - Since it is not a matter of dispute, that the Governor never called for a floor test, it is reasonable to infer, that the Governor did not ever entertain any doubt, that the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers were still enjoying the confidence of the majority, in the House - Nor was a motion of no confidence moved against the Government - In

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS

the above situation, the Governor just could not have summoned the House, by his order dated 9.12.20 I 5, in his own discretion, by preponing the 61" session of the Legislative Assembly ji·om 14.I.20I6 to I6.I2.20I5.

Art. I 74 - Historical background behind its enactn~ent Discussed - Government of India Act, I935 - s.62. (per Madan B. Lokw; J.) Art. I 79 - Power of Governor to remove Speaker/Deputy Speaker - Held: Issue of removal of the Speaker (or Deputy Speaker), squarely rests under the jurisdictional authority of the Members of the Legislative Assembly, who must determine at their own, whether the notice of resolution for the removal of the Speaker (or the Deputy Speaker) should be adopted or rejected - Neither the Chief Minister nor the Council of Ministers has any determinative role on the subject of removal of the Speaker/Deputy Speaker Their individual participation is limited to their individual vote either in favour or against the motion for the removal of the Speaker/ Deputy Speaker - Even that bit is not available to the Governor Therefore no direct or indirect role can be assumed by Governor under Art. I 79(c). Art. I 79(c) - Interpretation of expression "all the then members" - Held: Art. I 79(c) provides, that a Speaker (or Deputy Speaker), "may be removed ji·om his office by a resolution of the Assembly passed by a .majority of all the then members of the Assembly" - The words "passed by a majority of all the then members", would prohibit the Speaker from going ahead with the disqualification proceedings under the Tenth Schedule, as the same would negate the effect of the words "all the then members", after the disqualification of one or more MLAs from the House - Any change in the strength and composition of the Assembly, by disqualifying sitting MLAs, for the period during which the notice of resolution for the removal of the Speaker (or the Deputy Speaker) is pending, would conflict with the express mandate of Art. I 79(c), requiring all "the then members" to determine the right of the Speaker to continue. (per Dipak Misra, J.) Art. I 79(c), first proviso - Interpretation of- Held: When there is an expression of intention to move the resolution to remove Speake1; it is requisite that he should stand the test and then proceed

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- That is the intendment of Art.179(c) and the said interpretation serves the litmus test of sustained democracy founded on rule of law - It would be anathema to the concept of constitutional adjudication, if the Speaker is allowed to initiate proceedings under Tenth Schedule after intention to remove him from his office is moved - The fourteen days period being mandatory, the words "all the then members" gain importance. (per Dipak Misra, J.) Art.181 - Nature ofparticipation of Speaker when the question of his removal arises - Discussed. (per Dipak Misra, J.)

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Office of Speaker - Held: Speaker has duty to see that business of the House is carried out in a decorous and disciplined manner - Importance of office of Speaker, discussed. (per Dipak Misra, J.J Art.356 - Scope of - Held: This Article provides an escape route to the Governor - Governor can make a report to the President in the event there is a failure of constitutional machinery in the State - This escape route is available in case where the Governor dismisses a Government but the Government refuses to recognize the dismissal order.(per Madan B. Lokur, J.) Art.371-H - Scope of- Held: Art.371-H provides for the Governor exercising his "individual judgment" in discharge of his functions relating to law and order in Arunachal Pradesh - Therefore, the exercise of individual judgment by the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh is permitted by the Constitution, but is limited to issues of law and order only. (per Madan B. Lokur, J.)

Tenth Schedule, Paragraph 6 - Role of Governor in disqualification of members of the Assembly - Held: Governor has no role, in the disqualification of members of the Assembly - The ·exclusive jurisdiction in this issue, rests with Speaker ofthe Assembly,· under Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule - Whether Speakers actions fall within the framework of the Constitution, or otherwise, G does not fall within the realm of consideration of the Governor The remedy for any wrong doing under the Tenth Schedule, lies by way ofjudicial review - Neither the provisions of the Constitution nor the 'Conduct of Business Rules' assign any such role to the Governor - Judicial review.

Tenth Schedule - Power of Governor to interfere with the

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS

functions of the Speaker - Held: It does not lie ·within the domain of the Governor, to interfere with the functions of the Speaker Governor is not a guide or mentor to _the Speaker - Governor cannot require the Speaker to discharge his functions in the manner he considers const~tutionally appropriate - Both the Governor and the Speaker have independent constitutional responsibilities.

Tenth Schedule - Propriety of Speaker in conducting proceedings under the Tenth Schedule when his own position as the Speaker of Legislative Assembly is under challenge - Held: The constitutional purpose and constitutional har111ony would be maintained and preserved, if a Speaker refrains from adjudication of a petition for disqualification under the Tenth Schedule, whilst his own position, as Speaker. is under challenge - This would also, allow the two provisions (Art.179(c), and the Tenth Schedule) to operate in their individual constitutional space, without encroaching on the other - Therefore, it would be constitutionally i111permissible for a Speaker to adjudicate upon disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule, while a notice of resolution for his own removal from the office of Speaker, is pending. Tenth Schedule - Power, position and the status of office of Speaker - Held: Speaker enjoys the power of constitutional adjudication - He is expected to 111aintain propriety as an adjudicator - Speaker when functions as a tribunal has the jurisdiction/authority to pass adverse orders - Power which flows from the introduction of Tenth Schedule by constitutional amendment is required to be harmoniously construed with Art. J79(c) - Both the provisions of the Constitution are meant to sub-serve the purpose of sustenance of democracy which is basic feature of the Constitution. (per Dipak Misra, J.) Tenth Schedule - Power of Deputy Speaker of Legislative Assembly of Arunachal Pradesh to set aside the order of the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of Arunachal Pradesh by which the Speaker had disqualified fourteen 111e111bers of the Legislative Assembly of Arunachal Pradesh (including Deputy Speaker) under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution - Held: Deputy Speaker had no authority to set aside the decision of the Speaker passed under the Tenth Schedule - Moreover, Deputy Speaker was himself disqualified from the membership of the Legislative Asse111bly by the

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Speaker and he could certainly not set aside the order passed against him and in respect of which he would be beneficiary. INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES: Constitution of India Guidelines for understanding the text, context, the words and the purpose of a constitutional provision - Discussed.

RULES OF PROCEDURE AND CONDUCT OF BUSINESS IN ARUNACHAL PRADESH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY: Role of Governor in terms of the Rules - Held: These Rules are ji-amed by Legislative Assembly in exercise of powers conferr:!d under Art.208 - Even these Rules give the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh limited discretionary powers but more particularly so in the matter of summoning the Legislative Assembly - Constitution of India Art.208.(per Madan B. Lokur, J.)

ARUNACHAL PRADESH RULES OF EXECUTIVE BUSINESS, 1987: n:8, 14, 33 - Held: The Governor has no independent o · discretion or authority to summon the Legislative Assembly Constitution of India - Art.166. (per Madan B. Lokur, J.)

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: PER .JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, .J.: 1.1. Undoubtedly, all executive actions of the Government of a State are expressed in the name of the Governor, under Article 166. That, however, does not per se add to the functions and powers of the Governor. In the discharge of executive functions, the Governor of a State has the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishments or to suspend, remit or commute sentences (under Article 161). The Governor's power under Article 161, is undisputedly exercised on the aid and advice of the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers. The Governor has power to frame rules for the convenient transaction of executive business of the Government, under Article 166. The instant responsibility is also discharged, on aid and advice. All in all, it is apparent, that the Governor is not assigned any significant role in the executive functioning of the State. [Para 137] [172-CE]

1.2. The duties and responsibilities of the Governor in the legislative functioning of a State are incorporated in Part VI Chapter Ill of the Constitution, which includes Articles 168 to

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS

212. Even though Article Hi8 postulates, that the legislature of A a State would comprise of the Governor, yet the Governor is not assigned any legislative responsibility in any House(s) of the State Legislature, irrespective of whether it is the legislative process relating to Ordinary Bills or Money Bills. Insofar as the legislative process is concerned, the only function vested with the Governor · is expressed through Article 200 which inter a/ia provides, that a Bill passed by the State Legislature, is to be presented to the Governor for his assent. And its ancillary provision, namely, Article 201 wherein a Bill passed by the State Legislature and presented to the Governor, may be reserved by the Governor for consideration by the President. The only exception to the c non-participation of the Governor in legislative functions, is postulated under Article 213 which apparently vests with the Governor, some legislative power. The Governor under Article 213 can promulgate Ordinances, during the period when the House(s) of the State Legislature, is/are not in session. This function is exercised by the Governor, undisputedly, on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as the head. The Governor is also required to summon the House or Houses of State Legislature, or to prorogue or dissolve them under Article 17 4. Articles 178 to 187 deal with the officers of the State Legislature, including the Speaker and the Deputy E Speaker, as well as, the secretariat of the State Legislature. These Articles are on the subject of appointment and removal of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, as also, the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Legislative Council, as well as, other ancillary matters. In neither of these Articles, the Governor has any assigned role. The only responsibility allocated to the Governor under Article 208, is of making rules as to the procedure with respect to communications between the two Houses of State Legislature. All in all, it is apparent, that the Governor is not assigned any significant role even in the legislative functioning of the State. [Para 137] [172- G E-H; 173-A-E) 2. The scope and extent of the discretionary power of the Governor, is provided for through Article 163(1). Article 163(1) provides for the principle of ministerial responsibility. The Constituent Assembly debates, leave no room for any doubt, that

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the framers of the Constitution desi.red to embody the general and basic principle, describing the extent and scope of the discretionary power of the Governor, in sub-article (1) of Article 163, and not in sub-article (2) thereof. As regard the constitutional role of the Governor, in paragraph 4.2.14 of the Justice M.M. Punchhi Commission report, it was observed that in a very limited field, the Governor may exercise certain functions in his discretion, as provided in Article 163(1). The first part of Article 163(1) requires the Governor to act on the advice of his Council of Ministers. There is, however, an exception in the latter part of the clause in regard to matters where he is by or under the Constitution required to function in his discretion. The expression "required" signifies that the Governor can exercise his discretionary powers only if there is a compelling necessity to do so. The inferences drawn in the Justice M.M. Punchhi Commission report are in consonance with the scheme of the functions and powers assigned to the Governor, with reference to the executive and legislative functioning of the State, and more particularly with reference to the interpretation of Article 163. Insofar as the exercise of discretionary powers vested with the Governor is concerned, the same is limited to situations, wherein a constitutional provision expressly so provides, that the Governor should act in his own discretion. Additionally, a Governor can exercise his functions in his own discretion, in situations where an interpretation of the concerned constitutional provision, could not be construed otherwise. The finality expressed in Article 163(2) would apply to functions exercised by the Governor in his own discretion, as are permissible within the framework of Article 163(1), and additionally, in situations where the clear intent underlying a constitutional provision, so requires i.e., where the exercise of such power on the aid and advice, would run contrary to the constitutional scheme, or would be contradictorr in terms. [Paras 139, 140, 142) (174-E; 175-AB, E-G; 177-B-C; 178-A-B, DJ

Mahabir Prasad Sharma v. Prafulla Chandra Ghose (1968) 72 C.W.N. 328; Pratapsinf( Raojirao Rane v. Governor of Goa AIR 1999 (Born.) 53 - Not correct law.

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II

3.1. Interpretation of Section 174 - Power of summoning Assembly.

The draft Article 153 was renumbered as Article 174 of the Constitution. The most significant feature of draft Article 153 was expressed in sub-article (3) thereof, wherein it was provided, that the functions of the Governor with reference to sub-clauses (a) and (c), namely, the power to summon and dissolve the House or Houses of the State Legislature " ... shall be exercised by him in his discretion." The words used in sub-article (3) of draft Article 153, were in consonance with the requirements postulated under Article 163(1). Under Article 163(1), the Governor can exercise only such functions in his own discretion which he is expressly required, by or under the Constitution, to exercise in his discretion. The manner in which draft Article 153(3) was originally drawn, leave no room for any doubt, that the Governor would definitely have had the discretion to summon or dissolve the House or Houses of the State Legislature, without any aid or advice. After the debate, draft Article 153 came to be renumbered as Article 174. Article 174 reveals, that sub-article (3) contained in draft Article 153 was omitted. The omission of sub-article (3) of draft Article 153, is a matter of extreme significance, for a purposeful confirmation of the correct intent underlying the drafting of Article 174. The only legitimate and rightful inference, that can be drawn in the final analysis is, that the framers of the Constitution altered their original contemplation, and consciously decided not to vest discretion with the Governor, in the matter of summoning and dissolving the House, or Houses of the State Legislature, by omitting sub-article(3), which authorized the Governor to summon or dissolve, the House or Houses of Legislature at his own, by engaging the words " ..shall be exercised by him in his discretion ... ". [Para 149) [180-H; 181-C-G] 3.2. A Governor under the Constitution, is not an elected representative. A Governor is appointed by a warrant issued under the hand and seal of the President under Article 155, and his term of office enures under Article 156, during the pleasure of the President. A Governor is an executive nominee, and his appointment flows from the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister as the head, to the

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President. The President, on receipt of the above advice, appoints the Governor. Likewise, the tenure of the Governor rightfully subsists, till it is acceptable to the Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister as its head, as the Governor under Article 156 holds office, during the pleasure of the President. Such a nominee, cannot have an overriding authority, over the representatives of the people, who constitute the House or Houses of the State Legislature (on being duly elected from their respective constituencies) and/or even the executive Government functioning under the Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as the head. [Para 150) [181-H; 182-B-C) 3.3. In a situation where the Governor has reasons to believe, that the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers have lost the confidence of the House, it is open to the Governor, to require the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers to prove their majority in the House, by a floor test. Only in a situation, where the Government in power on the holding of such floor test is seen to have lost the confidence of the majority, it would be open to the Governor to exercise the powers vested with him under Article 17 4 at his own, and without any aid and advice. Since in the instant case, the Governor never called for a floor test, it is reasonable to infer, that the Governor did not ever entertain any doubt, that the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers were still enjoying the confidence of the majority, in the House. Nor was a motion of no confidence moved against the Government. In the above situation, the Governor jnst could not have summoned the House, by his order dated 9.12.2015, in his own discretion, by preponing the 6th session of the Legislative Assembly from 14.1.2016 to 16.12.2015. This, for the simple reason, that the Governor neither had the jurisdiction nor the power to do so, without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as the head. [Paras 153, 154) [185-F-H; 186-A-BJ 4.1. Article 175 of the Constitution: Section 63 of the Government of India Act, 1935 was a precursor to Article 175. A perusal of Section 63 of the Act of 1935, reveals that sub-section (2) thereof had the words "in his discretion", incorporated therein, with reference to the scope and am bit of the Governor's

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS

messages, to the Legislature. It is therefore apparent, that under the Act of 1935, the discretion to send messages to the Legislature, was clearly bestowed on the Governor, as he may consider appropriate, in his own wisdom. Article 175 has no such or similar expression. It is apparent, therefore, that the framers of the Constitution did not intend to follow the regimen, which was prevalent under Section 63 of the Act of 1935. It must have been for the above reason, that the Constituent Assembly framed Article 175, by excluding and omitting the discretion which was vested with the Governor, in the matter of sending messages, under the Government of India Act, 1935. [Para 159) [189-A-D]

4.2. The Governor's messages with reference to matters (as were expressed in the message dated 9.12.2015), do not flow from the functions assigned to him. The Governor cannot likewise interfere in the activities of the Assembly, for the reason that the Chief Minister, or the entire Council of Ministers, or an individual Minister in the Cabinet, or for that matter even an individual MLA, are not functioning in consonance with the provisions of the Constitution, or in the best interest of the State. The State Legislature, does not function under the Governor. In sum and substance, the Governor just cannot act as the Ombudsman of the State Legislature. The messages addressed by the Governor to the Assembly, must abide by the mandate contained in Article 163(1), namely, that the same can only be addressed to the State Legislature, on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as the head. The message of the Governor dated 9.12.2015, was therefore beyond the constitutional authority vested with the Governor. (Paras 161, 162) (190-G-H; 191-A-CJ 5. The appointment of the Governor is made under Article 155, not by way of an electoral process, but by a warrant issued under the hand and seal of the President. The constitutional Governor, is to- hold his office under Article 156, during the pleasure of the President. Since the President exercises his functions on the aid and advice of the Prime Minister and his Council of Ministers, the tenure of the office of the Governor has also to coincide with the aid and advice of the Prime Minister and his Council of Ministers. Insofar as the issue of the removal of the Speaker is concerned, the same would depend on the result

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of the vote, on the notice of resolution for his removal. If the majority votes in favour of the motion, the resolution is liable to be adopted. Failing which, it is liable to be rejected. In the above situation, it is apparent, that neither the Chief Minister, nor the Council of Ministers, has any determinative role on the subject of removal of the Speaker (or the Deputy Speaker). Their individual participation is limited to their individual vote, either in favour or against the motion for the removal of the Speaker (or the Deputy Speaker). Even the above bit, is not available to the Governor. The Governor has no role whatsoever in the removal of the Speaker (or the Deputy Speaker). Therefore, no role direct or indirect can be assumed by the Governor, under Article 179(c). The assumption of such a role, and the fulfillment thereof by addressing a message to the Assembly under Article 175, can only be ascribed as an ingenuity, without any constitutional sanction. In the above view of the matter, the impugned message of the Governor dated 9.12.2015, cannot be endorsed as constitutionally acceptable. [Paras 166, 167) (193-A-B, C-F] 6.1. Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule inter alia postulates, that if a question arises, whether a member of the Legislative Assembly has become subject to disqualification, the adjudicatory role for determining the above question, will fall within the exclusive authority of the Speaker; and in case of a member of the Legislative Council, solely on the shoulders of the Chairman. Sub-paragraph (2) of Paragraph 6, by a constitutional fiction, adopts all proceedings carried out by the Speaker or the Chairman under the Tenth Schedule, as proceedings of the State Legislature. It is apparent from the provisions of the Tenth Schedule, that no role whatsoever has been assigned to the Governor, in the matter of removal of a member of the Assembly/Council. In the above view of the matter, even where a petition is filed for disqualification of one or more MLAs under the Tenth Schedule, the Governor's direct or indirect participation in the same, is impermissible. Besides the fact that the Governor has no role whatsoever in the proceedings carried out under the Tenth Schedule, he cannot have any interest in the outcome of the disqualification proceedings under the Tenth Schedule. The Governor can, therefore, never be concerned with the proceedings under the Tenth Schedule, one way or the other. Accordingly,

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS

any exercise of authority by the Governor based on pending proceedings against members of the Legislative Assembly, under the Tenth Schedule, are clearly beyond his constitutional authority. [Paras 170, 171] [195-B-F.]

6.2. When the position of a Speaker is under challenge, through a notice of resolution for his removal, it would "seem" just and appropriate, that the Speaker first demonstrates his right to continue as such, by winning support of the majority in the State Legislature. The action of the Speaker in continuing, with one or more disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule, whilst a notice of resolution for his own removal, from the office of Speaker is pending, would "appear" to be unfair. If a Speaker truly and rightfully enjoys support of the majority of the MLAs, there would be no difficulty whatsoever, to demonstrate the confidence which the members of the State Legislature, repose in him. The office of Speaker, with which the Constitution vests the authority to deal with disqualification petitions against MLAs, must surely be a Speaker who enjoys confidence of the Assembly. Article 179(c) provides, that a Speaker (or Deputy Speaker), "may be removed from his office by a resolution of the Assembly passed by a majority of all the then members of the Assembly". A notice of resolution for the removal of the Speaker (or the Deputy Speaker) of the Assembly, would therefore, have to be passed by a majority "of all the then members of the Assembly". The words "all the then members" were consciously added to Article 179(c), and their substitution was not accepted by the Constituent Assembly. The words "passed by a majority of all the then members of the Assembly", would prohibit the Speaker from going ahead with the disqualification proceedings under the Tenth Schedule, as the same would negate the effect of the words "all the then members", after the disqualification of one or more MLAs from the House. The words "all the then members", demonstrate an expression of definiteness. Any change in the strength and composition of the Assembly, by disqualifying sitting MLAs, for the period during which the notice of resolution for the removal of the Speaker (or the Deputy Speaker) is pending, would conflict with the express mandate of Article 179(c), requiring all "the then members" to determine the right of the Speaker to continue. [Para 173, 175] (196-F-H; 198-F-G; 199-A-C]

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6.3. The Tenth Schedule was inserted in the Constitution, by the Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992, with effect from 24.4.1993. The purpose sought to be achieved through the Tenth Schedule, is clear and unambiguous. The same is unrelated to, and dist!nct from, the purpose sought to be achieved through Article 179(c). Neither of the above provisions, can be seen as conflicting with the other. Both, must therefore freely operate, within their individual constitutional space. Each of them will have to be interpreted, in a manner as would serve the object sought to be achieved, without treading into the constitutional expanse of the other. The interpretation would have to be such, as would maintain constitutional purpose and harmony. [Para 176) [199-D-E)

6.4. If a Speaker survives the vote, on a motion for his removal from the office of Speaker, he would still be able to adjudicate upon the disqualification petitions filed under the Tenth Schedule. The process of judicial review, cannot alter the above position. But, if a disqualification petition is accepted by the Speaker, the disqualified MLAs will have no right to participate in the motion moved against the Speaker under Article 179(c). A disqualified MLA, can assail the order of his disqualification, by way of judicial review. If he succeeds, and his disqualification from the House is set aside, such a disqualified MLA, would be deprived of the opportunity to participate in the motion against the Speaker, under Article 179(c). In this situation, the process of judicial review, can also alter the position, if a disqualification order passed by the Speaker, is set aside by a Court of competent jurisdiction. In the event of an MLA having been disqualified by the Speaker, the notice of resolution for the removal of the Speake1; would surely be dealt with, and will be disposed of, during the period when the concerned MLA stood disqualified. Alternatively, if an MLA has not been disqualified when the motion for the removal of the Speaker is taken up, he would have the right to vote on the motion pertaining to the removal of the Speaker, whereafter, the petition for his own disqualification would certainly be considered and decided, by the Speaker. It is apparent, that the difficulty arises only, if the disqualification petition is taken up first, and the motion for the removal of the Speaker is taken up thereafter. The possibility ofa disqualification

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petition being decided on political considerations, rather than on merits, cannot be ignored. In fact, that is a real possibility. The constitutional purpose and constitutional harmony would be ·maintained and preserved, if a Speaker refrains from adjudication of a petition for disqualification under the Tenth Schedule, whilst his own position, as Speaker, is under challenge. This would also, allow the two provisions (Article 179(c), and the Tenth Schedule) to operate in their individual constitutional space, without encroaching on the other. For the reasons recorded, it would be constitutionally impermissible for a Speaker to adjudicate upon disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule, while a notice of resolution for his own removal from the office of Speaker, is pending. [Para 177, 178] [199-F-H; 200-A-D, G-H; 201-A)

7.1. It is not within the realm of the Governor to embroil himself in any political thicket. The Governor must remain aloof from any disagreement, discord, disharmony, discontent or dissension, within individual political parties. The activities within a political party, confirming turbulence, or unrest within its ranks, are beyond the concern of the Governor. The action of the Governor, in bringing these factual position to the notice of the President, in his monthly communications, may well have been justified for drawing the President's attention to the political scenario of the State. But, it is clearly beyond the scope of the Governor's authority, to engage through his constitutional position, and exercise his constitutional authority, to resolve the same. It is open to the Governor to take into consideration, views of a breakaway group. Under Paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule, legitimacy is bestowed on a breakaway group which comprises of not less than two thirds of the members of the concerned legislature party. In the present case, the breakaway group belonging to the ruling INC comprised of 21 members, whereas the INC had 47 MLAs in the prevailing 60-member Legislative Assembly. 21 MLAs belonging to the INC did not constitute a legitimate and recognizable breakaway group. The Governor could not in support of the protests and assertions of an invalid breakaway group, adopt a constitutional course, recourse whereof could be taken only in case of a constitutional crisis. As for instance, when the Government is seen to have lost the confidence of the House. It has never been the position

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of the Governor, that the Chief Minister had lost the confidence of the House. Nor, that the INC could not sustain its majority in the Assembly. Had that been the position, the Governor would have called for a floor test. Admittedly, the Governor never called for a floor test, nor did he ever require the Chief Minister to establish his majority in the House. The Governor's actions, based on feuds and wrangles of a breakaway group, which is not recognized under the Tenth Schedule, cannot be constitutionally condescended. [Paras 191 and 192] [211-A-B, D, E-H; 212-A] 7.2. There is no justification for a Governor to be disturbed about proceedings in connection with the disqualification ofMLAs under the Tenth Schedule. Because, the Governor has no role therein. Even the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers, have no concern with the disqualifkation proceedings contemplated under the Tenth Schedule. Therefore, the legitimacy or illegitimacy thereof, is beyond consideration of the Governor. That being the constitutional position, there can be no justification in the Governor initiating action, based on proceedings commenced against MLAs, under the Tenth Schedule. Any action taken by the Governor, based on the proceedings being carried on under the Tenth Schedule, would be a constitutional impropriety. It is open to individual MLAs, against whom disqualification proceedings are taken (or who have been disqualified, and consequently have lost their membership of the House), to seek judicial review thereof. [Para 195] [212-E-H] Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) 2 SCC 831: 1975 (1) SCR 814; Sardari Lal v. Union of India (1971) 1 SCC 411; PU Myllai Hlychho v. State of Mizoram (2005) 2 sec 92: 2005 (1) SCR 279; State of Meghalaya v. KA Brhyien Kurkalang (1972) 1 SCC 148; Bhuri Nath v. State of Jammu & Kashmir (1997) 2 SCC 745: 1997 (1) SCR 138; Samatha v. State of A.P. (1997) 8 sec 191: 1997 (2) Suppl. SCR 305; Dr. Kashinath G Jalmi v. The Speaker (1993) 2 SCC 703:. 1993 (2) SCR 820; B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010) 6 SCC 331; S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1; Union of India v. Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (1979) 3 SCC 324: 1979 (3) SCR 802; K.A. Mathialagan v. P. Srinivasan AIR 1973 (Madras)

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371; State of Punjab v. Satya Pal Dang AIR 1969 SC 903: 1969 SCR 478; Nipamacha Singh v. Secretary, Manipur Legislative Assembly AIR 2002 (Gauhati) 7; Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2004) 8 SCC 788: 2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 1020; State of Gujarat v. Justice R.A. Mehta (2013) 3 SCC 1: 2013 (1) SCR 1; Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kera/a (1973) 4 SCC 25; State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak (1982) 2 SCC 463; Rajendra Singh Verma v. Lt. Governor (NCT of Delhi) (2011) 10 sec 1 - referred to.

M.N Kaul and S.L. Shakdher - "Practice and Procedure of Parliament", (5th Edition), published by the Lok Sabha Secretariat - referred, to.

PER DIPAK MISRA, J.: (SUPPLEMENTING) HELD: 1. Office of the Speaker in our history had its origin in 1921 when the Central Legislative Assembly was constituted under the Montague-Chelmsford reforms. At that time, office of the Speaker did not enjoy much importance. But, a significant one, after the Constitution came into force, as is evident from the constitutional scheme, the Speaker enjoys high constitutional status and the Constitution reposes immense faith in him. For this reason alone, the Speaker is expected to have a sense of elevated independence, impeccable objectivity and irreproachable fairness, and above all absolute impartiality. This expectation is the constitutional warrant; not a fond hope and expectation of any individual or group. The Speaker has the duty to see that business of the House is carried out in a decorous and disciplined manner. This functioning requires him to have unimpeachable faith in the intrinsic marrows of the Constitution, constitutionalism and, "Rule of Law". The faith, should be a visible and apparent one. (Paras 9, 10] [218-B-E] 2. Article 179(a) postulates that a Speaker or a Deputy Speaker of the Assembly shall vacate his office if he ceases to be a member of the Assembly. Article 179(b) deals with resignation from the office. In the case at hand, neither clause (a) nor clause (b) of Article 179 is attracted. In the obtaining fact situation,.the controversy pertains singularly to the understanding of clause (c).

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Article 179(c) lays focus on two aspects, namely, (i) resolution of the Assembly, and (ii) the resolution to be passed by a majority of all the then members of the Assembly. The first proviso commands that no resolution for the purpose of clause (c) shall be moved unless fourteen days; notice has been given of the intention to move the resolution. The fourteen days' time as mandated by the constitutional provision gives protection to the Speaker. It has a salutary purpose. The Founding Fathers of the Constitution had thought it appropriate that a resolution to be moved for removal of the Speaker is a matter of grave constitutional consequence and, therefore, the "intention to move the resolution", has to precede the act of moving of the resolution. The Rules are framed under Article 208 of the Constitution for regulating the procedure of a House of the Legislature of a State and the conduct of its business and said procedures prescribe the manner of expressing the intention to move the resolution. While prescribing a resolution to be passed by the majority, the framers of the Constitution have also provided for "all the then members of the Assembly". It indicates the intention of the Founding Fathers that "all the then members of the Assembly" have to be regarded as to be the actual or real figure. [Paras 2, 13, 14) [213-H; 214-A; 220-A-E) 3.1. The fulcrum of the controversy is "disqualification". Different disqualifications find mention under Article 191(1) of the Constitution. These contingencies are quite different than the situation enshrined under Article 191(2) which has been inserted by the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985. The said sub-Article specifically refers to disqualification under the Tenth Schedule. Article 189 provides for voting in Houses, power of Houses to act notwithstanding vacancies and corum. Sub-Article (1) of Article 189 stipulates that save as otherwise provided in the Constitution, all questions at any sitting ofa House of the legislature of a State shall be determined by a majority of votes of the members present and voting, other than the Speaker or Chairman, or person acting as such. The said sub-Article also provides that Speaker or Chairman or person acting as such shall not vote in the first instance, but shall have and exercise a casting vote in the case of an equality of votes. The said sub-Article, thus, clearly states about the majority of votes of the members

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present and voting and secondly, it empowers the Speaker to exercise his power of voting in case of equality of votes. In contradistinction to the same, Article 181 provides that Speaker or the Deputy Speaker not to preside while resolution for his 1·emoval from office is under consideration and he is entitled to vote in the first instance on such resolution but not in the case of an equality of votes. Under the Constitution, the Speaker is entitled to take part in the proceedings and speak. Therefore, he is in a position to contest. Appreciating the scheme of the Constitution and especially keeping in view the language employed in the first proviso to Article 179(c) it is quite clear that it is the constitutional design that the Speaker should not do any act in furtherance of his interest till the resolution is moved. [Paras 15, 17, 18] [220-F-G; 223-A-G]

3.2. Regard being had to the language employed in the Article 179 (c) of the Constitution and the role ascribed to the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule, it is necessary that the Speaker as a tribunal has to have complete detachment and perceivable impartiality. When there is an expression of intention to move the resolution to remove him, it is requisite that he should stand the test and then proceed. That is the intendment of Article 179(c) and the said interpretation serves the litmus test of sustained democracy founded on Rule of Law; and the founding fathers had so intended and the constitutional value, trust and morality unequivocally so suggest. It would be an anathema to the concept of constitutional adjudication, if the Speaker is allowed to initiate proceeding under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution after intention to remove him from his office is moved. The fourteen days period being mandatory, the words "all the then members" gain more significance. The Constitution has confidence in the Speaker. Simultaneously, the command is to have the confidence of the majority of the "actual or real figure". This understanding is gatherable from the express provisions of the Constitution and it clearly brings in harmony between "constitutional confidence" or trust and the "constitutional control". [Para 21] [225-E-H; 226-A] State of Karnataka v. Union of India and another (1977) 4 SCC 608: 1978 (2) SCR 1; S.R Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab and others (2001) 7 SCC 126: 2001 (1)

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Suppl. SCR 621; M Nagaraj and others l~ Union of India and others (2006) 8 SCC 212: 2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 336; Kihota Hollohon v. Zachilhu and others (1992) 1 SCC 309; Manoj Narztla v. Union of India (2014) 9 SCC 1: 2014 (9) SCR 965 - relied on.

PER MADAN B. LOKUR, J.: (SUPPLEMENTING)

HELD: 1.1. Article 163 of the Constitutiou traces its origins first to Section 50 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and then to Article 143 in the draft Constitution. Two important expressions find mention in Section 50 of the Government of India Act, 1935 namely, "in his discretion" and "his individual judgment". These expressions are noticed in several Sections of the Government of India Act, 1935 and came up for discussion when Section 9 of the Government of India Act, 1935 (relating to the Council of Ministers) was discussed in the House of Commons on 281h February, 1935. In the debate, the view expressed by one of the Members of Parliament was that the Governor-General acts "in his discretion" when he is not obliged to consult the Council of Ministers. On the other hand, he acts in "his individual judgment" when he consults the Council of Ministers but does not necessarily accept its advice. Thus it is clear that the expression "his individual judgment" obliges the Governor to take the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers but he is not bound by that advice and may act in his judgment. After Independence, there was no intention to permit the Governor to exercise any discretion or to take any decision in his individual judgment. This is clear from the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947 issued in exercise of powers conferred by Section 9(1)(c) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947. Paragraph 3(2) of the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947 explicitly deletes the expressions "in his discretion", "acting in his discretion" and "exercising his individual judgment" wherever they occur in the Government of India Act, 1935. The expression "his individual judgment" did not find mention in Article 143 in the draft Constitution. This is as clear an indication that the framers of our Constitution did not intend that the Governor could disregard the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. [Paras 7, 8, 12, 13, 16] [227-H; 228-A, E-F; 229-A; 232-C-D, E-F; 234-D-E]

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS

1.2. The sum and substance of the historical background leading to Article 163 of the Constitution, as enacted, is this: (i) The Council of Ministers will aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions. This is the first part of Article 163 (1) of the Constitution. The Governor then has two options - (a) To reject the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and act in "his individual judgment". This. is an illusory and non-existent option since the Constitution does not permit it. (b) To act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. By default this is the only reai option available to him. (ii) If the exercise of function is beyond the purview of the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers but is by or under the Constitution, the Governor can act "in his discretion". Article 163(2) of the Constitution will have reference only to the last part of Article 163(1) of the Constitution and is not all-pervasive. If there is a break-down in communications between the Council of Ministers and the Governor (as imagined by Mr. Churchill), then the Governor will not have the benefit of the aid and advice of the Council of · Ministers. In that event, the Governor may "take the matter into his own hands and act freely." The break-down of communications was a possibility under the Government of India Act, 1935 since it was "in the main undemocratic" and there could be a break-down of communications between the representative of His Majesty and the Council of Ministers. However, if such a situation were to arise today in independent India, namely, a break-down of communications between the Governor of a State and the Council of Ministers, it would be most unfortunate and detrimental to our democracy. In the unlikely event of a complete break-down of communications, the Preside~t can and must intervene to bring in constitutional order. [Paras 20, 21] [238-FG; 239-A-C]

2. The historical background and the debates pertaining to Article 174 (and Article 85) of the Constitution lead to the conclusion that it is only the Governor who may summon the Legislative Assembly, but only on the advice of the Council of Ministers and not suo moto. In other words, the G~>Vernor cannot summon the Legislative Assembly "in his discretion". If the Governor disregards the advice of the Council of Ministers the pleasure of the President can be withdrawn since the Governor

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holds office during his pleasure. [Para 39] [247-F-G; 248-A-B] 3.1. The Justice Sarkaria Commission looked at Article 163(1) of the Constitution in two parts, namely, the Governor exercising his discretion when required by the Constitution and when required under the Constitution. The exercise of discretion conferred by the Constitution would relate to an express provision of the Constitution (such as those relating to the Tribal Areas of Assam) or by necessary implication; while the latter expression would include the exercise of discretion from n11Ps and orders made under the Constitution. Given this interpretation, according to the Justice Sarkaria Commission, "The scope of discretionary powers has to be strictly construed, effectively dispelling the apprehension, if any, that the area for the exercise of discretion covers all or any of the functions to be exercised by the Governor under the Constitution. In other words, Article 163 does not give the Governor a general discretionary power to act against or without the advice of his Council of Ministers." The Justice Sarkaria Commission studied the Constitution and placed the functions of the Governor in four categories: i) The Governor acting in his discretion; (ii) The Governor acting in his individual judgment; (iii) The Governor acting in his discretion independently of the Council of Ministers. (iv) The Governor acting in his discretion under the Constitution. (Paras 86, 87] [265-C-G] 3.2. In March 2000, Justice Punchhi submitted a Report on Centre-State Relations. The broad mandate of the Commission was "to review the existing arrangements between the Union and States as per the Constitution of India in regard to powers, functions and responsibilities in all spheres. The Justice Punchhi Commission did not disagree with the Justice Sarkaria Commission on any issue relating to the functions and duties of the Governor. It must therefore be taken that the functions, duties and powers of the Governor by or under the Constitution are "cabined, cribbed, confined". However, if"discretion" is given a broad meaning as desired by the respondents and is given greater weightage than "his individual judgment" then there would be "saucy doubts and fears" of the arbitrary exercise of discretion by the Governor as has happened in the present case,

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and other cases. First and foremost, it is important to note that A the rules of procedure framed by the Legislative Assembly for regulating its procedure and the conduct of its business under Article 208 of the Constitution do not need anybody's approval, including that of the Governor of the State. The Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly ("the Rules") framed by the Legislative Assembly of Arunachal Pradesh in exercise of powers conferred by Article 208 of the Constitution carry forward the intention of the Constituent Assembly as well as the decisions of this Court to the effect that the Governot: is a constitutional or formal head not only of the Executive but, in some respects, also of the c Legislature. The Rules give the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh limited discretionary powers, but more particularly so in the matter of summoning the Legislative Assembly. Rule 3 and 3A provides that the Governor can summon the Assembly only if the Chief Minister (in consultation with the Speaker) so advises him. There is no exception to this. However, Article 174 of the Constitution would be violated if the Chief Minister does not so advise the Governor to summon the Assembly for a period of six months, or if the Governor does not summon the Assembly despite the advice of the Chief Minister. As mentioned by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru when the First Amendment to the Constitution E was discussed in Parliament, either the Chief Minister or the Governor (as the case may be) would have to bear the consequences of violating the Constitution. In matters pertaining to the Assembly, the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh has been given an additional 'discretionary power'. This is with regard to the election of the Speaker of the Assembly. Rule 7(1) of the Rules provides that when a new Assembly is constituted or there is a vacancy in the office of the Speaker and the election of the Speaker is necessary, the Governor shall fix a date for holding the election. To this extent the Governor has a role to play in the Assembly in his capacity as a constituent of the Legislature, as G postulated by Article 168 of the Constitution. [Paras 100, 102, 106, 107, 109, 110) [269-E-F; 270-D-E; 271-C-F; 272-E-H; 273-

AJ 3.3. The Governor has yet another discretionary duty to perform which is when the office of the Speaker as well as the

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Deputy Speaker is vacant, even when the Assembly is not a new Assembly. In that event the Governor has the discretionary duty to appoint a member of the Assembly as a Speaker. This is provided for in Article 180(1) of the Constitution as well as Rule 8B of the Rules. Though summoning the Legislative Assembly might be an executive function of the Governor, that function can be exercised by him only after such a proposal is seen by the Chief Minister and sent to him. Reading this with the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, the Chief Ministt-r can make a proposal to the Governor for summoning the Legislative Assembly only c in consultation with the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly who is, in a sense, the Master of the House. In other words, the Governor has no independent discretion or authority to summon the Legislative Assembly, in terms of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly framed under Article 208 of the Constitution or the Arunachal Pradesh Rules of Executive Business, 1987 framed under Article 166 of the Constitution to summon the Legislative Assembly in his discretion. In case the Chief Minister fails in hfs -duty to put forward a proposal before the Governor for summoning the Legislative Assembly or if the Governor does not accept the E proposal of the Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh for summoning the Legislative Assembly, necessary consequences will follow as mentioned in the debates in Parliament when the first amendment to the Constitution was considered. [Paras 111, 121, 122) [273-C; 276-B-E]

4. Article 371-H of the Constitution provides for the Governor exercising "his individual judgment" in the discharge of his functions relating to law and order in Arunachal Pradesh. Specifically, therefore, the exercise of individual judgment by the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh is permitted by the Constitution, but is limited to issues of law and order only. Under Arti~le 163(1) of the Constitution, the Governor is bound by the advice of his Council of Ministers. There are only three exceptions ["except in so far as"] to this: (i) The Governor may, in the exercise of his functions, act in his discretion as conferred by the Constitution; (ii) The Governor may, in the exercise of his functions, act in his

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discretion as conferred under the Constitution; and (iii) The Governor may, in the exercise of his functions, act in his individual judgment in instances specified by the Constitution. [Paras 123, 124, 125] [276-G; 277-G]

5. Our Constitution expects all constitutional authorities to act in harmony and there must be comity between them to further the constitutional vision of democracy in the larger interests of the nation. It must be appreciated that no one is above the law and equally, no one is not answerable to the law and the debate on the First Amendment to the Constitution clearly indicates so. As is evident from our constitutional history, there are three areas in which a Governor might function: Areas in which he can act only on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. This is in all areas of the executive functions of the State Government [Article 166). Areas in which he can act in his discretion by or under the Constitution and in which he does not need to take the advice of the Council of Ministers [Article 163 - "except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion."] or, areas in which he might take the advice of the Council of Ministers but is not bound by it enabling him to act in his individual judgment by or under the Constitution. Areas that have no concern with the Constitution. For example, where he is acting eo nomine. A distinction needs to be drawn between the relationship of the Governor vis-fl-vis the Executive and the relationship of the Governor vis-fl-vis the Legislature. Article 163 deals with the relationship of the first category and Article 174 (among others) deals with the relationship of the second category. [Paras 136, 137] [282-D-H; 283-A-C] 6. If the functions of the Governor were to be read as his power, and an untrammeled one at that (in view of Article 163 of the Constitution, as contended), then the Governor has the power to literally summon the Assembly to meet "at such time and place as he thinks fit" that is in any city and at any place other than the Legislative Assembly building and at any odd time. This is nothing but arbitrary and surely, an arbitrary exercise of power is not what our Constitution makers either contemplated in the hands of the Governor or imagined its wielding by any constitutional

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authority. In dealing with the situation in Arunachal Pradesh, the Governor was obliged to adhere to and follow the constitutional principle, that is, to be bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers. In the event that advice was not available and responsible government was not possible, the Governor could have resorted to the "breakdown provisions" and left it to the President to break the impasse. The Governor had the advice of the Council of Ministers but chose to ignore it; he assumed (well before the advice was tendered) that the advice would be such that he might not be bound by it; the Governor, despite being the 'first citizen' of the State, chose to take no steps to break the impasse caused by a collapse of communications between him and the Chief Minister; finally, the Governor took no steps to resort to the breakdown provisions and obtain impartial advice from the President. Instead, the Governor acted in a manner opposed to the rule of law and, therefore, arbitrarily and in a manner that certainly surprises "a sense of juridical propriety". [Para 139, 146] [284-B-C; 287-E-H] 7. The Governor had yet another option available to him to invoke what is referred in Canada as the "confidence convention" in which "the Prime Minister and the Cabinet are responsible to, or must answer to, the House of Commons for their actions and must enjoy the support and the confidence of a majority of the Members of that Chamber to remain in office." If the Governor had any doubt about the continuance of a responsible government as a result of the shenanigans that were going on in Arunachal Pradesh at the relevant time, he could very well have required the Chief Minister to prove that he had the confidence of the Assembly, but he chose not to exercise this option also. In other words, all possible constitutional options were unilaterally discarded and disregarded by the Governor in summoning the Assembly to meet on l6 1h December, 2015 and cancelling the session fixed for 141h January, 2016. The actions of the Governor were certainly not in the language of the law or the spirit of parliamentary democracy and responsible government. In these circumstances, it must be held that the Governor's unilateral act of summoning the Assembly is unconstitutional. [Para 147] [288A-D]

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8. Relations between the Governor, the Executive and the Legislature

8.1. The issue may also be looked at from an entirely different perspective based on the provisions of the Constitution. Article 158 of the Constitution provides that the Governor shall not be a Member of Parliament or of a State Legislature and if such a Member is appointed as a Governor, he shall be deemed to have vacated his seat in the House when he enters upon his office as Governor. This is significant since it insulates the Legislature from the Governor. Article 164 of the Constitution provides for the appointment of the Chief Minister of the State by the Governor and the appointment of other Ministers on the advice of the Chief Minister. The appointment of the Chief Minister is based on the postulate that he commands or is expected to command the support of a majority of Members of the Legislative Assembly. Therefore, it is not as ifthe Governor has untrammeled discretion to nominate anyone to be the Chief Minister of a State. Similarly, if the Governor chooses to 'withdraw his pleasure' in respect of a Minister he must exercise his discretion with the knowledge of the Chief Minister and not by keeping him in the dark or unilaterally. Article 165 of the Constitution deals with the appointment of the Advocate General for the State. He is appointed by the Governor and holds office during the pleasure of the Governor and receives such remuneration as the Governor may determine. The purpose of all these provisions is to indicate that the discretion given to the Governor is not all-pervasive or allencom passing. Article 166 of the Constitution provides that all executive action of the Government shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor, orders and instruments shall be executed in the name of the Governor and the Governor shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of business of the Government and allocation of business among the Ministers "in so far as it is not business with respect to which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion." This clearly has reference to Article 163 of the Constitution and must be understood as meaning that framing the rules under Article 166(3) of the Constitution is not the discretion of the Governor but an executive exercise undertaken by the Council of Ministers. Article 167 of the Constitution relates to the duty

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of the Chief Minister of a State to communicate the decisions of the Council of Ministers to the Governor and furnish information to the Governor. Chapter II of Part VI of the Constitution is, therefore, quite compact and delineates the relations between the Executive and governance of the State. [Paras 148, 149, 150] [288-D-E, F-G; 289-B-D, E-H; 290-A-BJ 8.2. Amongst others, Article 174 of the Constitution provides that the Governor shall summon the Legislative Assembly from time to time and may prorogue and dissolve the Legislative Assembly. Summoning the House was described by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in the debate on 16'h May, 1951 on the First Amendment to the Constitution as "an indirect duty" of the President. He went on to say that by the President, he meant the government of the day. Applying this to Article 174 of the Constitution, the Governor is obliged to perform this indirect duty. Since this indirect duty is executive in character, it cannot be performed except on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers so as to avoid a "futile operation" and subject to the procedure mentioned in the Rules referred to above. Addressing the House under Article 175(1) of the Constitution or making a special address under Article 176 of the Constitution would also be executive functions performed by the Governor on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Sending a message to the House under Article 175(2) of the Constitution might not strictly be an executive function but would fall in a separate category altogether which might be described as having a quasi-executive or quasi-legislative flavour. This entitlement specifically provided for in the Constitution is exercised by the Governor as a constituent of the Legislature and therefore not traceable to the aid and advise of the Council of Ministers. [Paras 152, 153] [290E-G; 291-A-C]

Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. The State of Punjab 1955 2 SCR 225 - relied on.

9. There are other executive functions that a Governor is required to perform with respect to the Legislature. If the provisions of Article 163 of the Constitution are read into all other executive functions relatable to the Legislature and the exercise of discretion of the Governor cannot be questioned then the

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS

Legislature could and would be dominated by the Governor - A something completely unthinkable in a parliamentary democracy, where the Governor cannot dominate the Executive but could dominate the Legislature. Except in specified matters, executive functions of the Governor whether relating to governance issues or issues pertaining to the Legislature are required to be performed by him on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and the Rules framed by the House. The only discretion available to the Governor under Article 163 of the Constitution is in respect of matters provided for by or under the Constitution not relatable to the Council of Ministers and the Judiciary. The Speaker gave a notice to fourteen members of the Legislative Assembly on 71h c December, 2015 requiring them to show cause why they should not be disqualified under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. Thereafter, by an order dated 15'h December, 2015 the Speaker disqualified them from their membership in the Legislative Assembly. The correctness of this order and the procedure followed has now been decided by the Gauhati High Court and the correctness of that decision is not before this Court. The Deputy Speaker passed an order on 151h December, 2015 inter alia, on the ground that the Speaker lacked the competence to pass the disqualification order and that he had nqt followed the constitutional and legal procedures. He had had lost his E .competence to pass the disqualification order since a notice of his removal dated 19'h November, 2015 was pending and was to come up before the Legislative Assembly on 16'h December, 2015. In passing his order of 15'h December, 2015 the Deputy Speaker purported to derive his power from the message given by the Governor to the Legislative Assembly on 9th December, 2015 requiring the Deputy Speaker to conduct the proceedings of the House on the resolution for removal of the Speaker. The Deputy Speaker was to preside over the House on 16'h December, 2015. He certainly had no derivative power from the message of the Governor dated 9'h December, 2015 to take over the functions G of the Speaker or to sit in judgment over the decision of the Speaker of 15'h December, 2015. Even the Speaker does not have the power to review the decision taken by him under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. Under these circumstances, there is absolutely no question of the Deputy Speaker setting aside

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[2016] 6 S.C.R.

the order of the Speaker passed under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. The Deputy Speaker was himself disqualified from the membership of the Legislative Assembly by the Speaker and he could certainly not have set aside the order passed against him and in respect of which he would be the beneficiary. [Paras 154, 155, 160, 161, 162, 163) [291-C, D-E, G-H; 292-A, G-H; 293-A-D, E-G] MP. Special Police Establishment v. State of MP. (2004) 8 sec 788: 2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 1020; Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu 1992 Supp.(2) SCC 651: 1992 (1) SCR 686; Kashinath Jalmi v. Speaker (1993) 2 SCC 703: 1993 ( 2) SCR 820 - relied on. Mahabir Prasad Sharma v. Prafulla Chandra Ghose (1968) 72 CWN 328; Pratapsingh Raojirao Rane v. Governor of Goa AIR 1999 Bombay 53 - Not correct law. State of Punjab v. Satya Pal Dang 1969 1 SCR 478; Pema Khandu v. The Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly MANU/GH/0118/2016 [decided on 30th March, 2016; Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) 2 SCC 831: 1975 (1) SCR 814; Sardari Lal v. Union of India (1971) 1 SCC 411 ; Sardari Lal and Jayantilal Amritlal Shodhan v. F.N. Rana (1964) 5 SCR 29; Pu Myllai Hlychho v. State of Mizoram (2005) 2 SCC 92: 2005 (1) SCR 279; State of Gujarat v. R.A. Mehta (2013) 3 SCC 1: 2013 (1) SCR 1; UN.R. Rao v. Indira Gandhi (1971) 2 SCC 63: 1971 (0) Suppl. SCR 46; S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab (2001) 7 SCC 126: 2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 621- referred to. Case Law Reference Per Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.: 1975 (1) SCR 814 referred to Para 43 (1971) 1 sec 411 referred to Para 43 2005 (1) SCR 279 referred to Para 46 2905 (1) SCR 279 referred to Para 46 1997 (1) SCR 138 referred to Para 46 1997 (2) Suppl. SCR 305 referred to Para 46 1993 (2) SCR 820 referred to Para 53 (201Q) 6 sec 331 referred to Para 95

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS

(1994) 3 sec 1 1979 (3) SCR 802 AIR 1973 (Madras) 371 AIR 1999 (Born.) 53 1969 SCR 478 AIR 2002 (Gauhati) 7 2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 1020 2013 (1) SCR 1 (1968) 72 C.W.N. 328 AIR 1999 (Born.) 53 (1973) 4 sec 2s (2011) 10 sec 1 (1982) 2 sec 463

referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to Not correct law Not correct law referred to referred to referred to

Para 96 Para 98 Para 99 Para 99 Para 101 Para 101 Para 114 Para 114 Para 144 Para 144 Para 118 Para 124 Para 124

Per Dinak Misrai J.: 1978 (2) SCR 1 2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 621 2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 336 (1992) 1 sec 309 2014 (9) SCR 965

relied on relied on relied on relied on relied on

Paras Para6 Para 7 Para 19 Para 20

-~

Per Madan B. Lokuri J.: 1955 2 SCR 225 (1968) 72 CWN 328 1969 1 SCR 478 1975 (1) SCR 814 (1971) 1 sec 411 (1964) 5 SCR 29 AIR 1999 Bombay 53 2004 (5) Suppl. SCR1020 2005 (1) SCR 279 2013 (1) SCR 1 1971 ( 0) Suppl. SCR 46 2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 621 1992 (1) SCR 686 1993 ( 2) SCR 820

relied on Para 41 Not correct law Para 45 referred to Para 51 referred to Para 62 referred to Para 62 referred to Para 70 Not correct law Para 72 relied on Para 78 referred to Para 81 referred to Para 82 referred to Para 144 referred to Para 145 relied on Para 145 relied on Para 162 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 62036204of2016. From the Judgment and Order dated 13.01.2016 of the High Court

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[2016] 6 S.C.R.

of Gauhati in W. P. (C) No. 7745 of 2015 and W. P. (C) No. 7998 of 2015. Fali S. Nariman, Kapil Sibal, Vivek Tankha, Ashok Desai, Subramonium Prasad, T. R. Andhyarujina, Satya Pal Jain, Ram Jethmalani, Sr. Advs., Arunabh Chaudhary, Ms. Heena Khan, Subhash Sharma, Vaibhav Tomar, G. Panmei, Ankur Chawla, Nizam Pasha, Ms. Kanika Singh, Ms. Megha Gupta, Ashish Jha, Samir Malik, D. Kumanan, Varun K. Chopra, Sachin Pujari, Parth T. (for Sarvesh Singh Baghel), Raj iv Dalal, Ashmeet Singh, Anmol Chandan, Mrs. Deepika Kalia, Abhay Kumar, Tenzing Tsering, Ms. Meha Aggarwal, Aditya Singh Bhakti, Vardhan Singh, Vikas Singh Ja11gra, Vikramjit Banerjee, Amit Kumar Pathak, Siddharth Sijoria, Soumik Ghosal, Ms. Madhavi Divan, Ms. Nidhi Khanna, Jayant Mohan, Advs. for the appearing parties. The Judgments of the Court were delivered by

JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J. I. Leave granted.

2. The 5th session of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly (hereinafter referred to as, the Assembly/House) was concluded on 2 I .10.2015. On 3.11.2015, the Governor issued an order summoning the 6th session of the Assembly, to meet on 14.1.20 I 6 in the Legislative Assembly Chamber at Naharlagun. The instant order was passed by the Governor, on the aid and advice of the Chief Minister, and in consultation with the Speaker of the House. The 6th session of the House was preponed by the Governor from 14.1.2016 to 16.12.2015, by an order dated 9.12.2015 indicating imer alia the manner in which the proceedings of the House should be conducted. In its support, the Governor issued a message on 9.12.2015. These actions of the Governor, \ according to learned senior counsel for the appellants, demonstrate an extraneous and inappropriate exercise of constitutional authority. The above order and message of the Governor, without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and the Chief Minister, constitute the foundation of the challenge raised by the appellants. 3. When hearing in these appeals commenced, the impression given out was, that the sequence of facts relating to the affairs of the House and the MLAs, by itself wquld be sufficient to establish, that constitutional responsibilities were exercised in such manner, as would be sufficient for this Court to strike down the same. The same position was espoused on behalf of the respondents, who also advocated that the factual back~round, would establish the legal and constitutional validity

NABAM REBIA, AND BA.MANG fELJI){ v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS t1AGDISH SffiGH KHEHAR, J.]

of the Governor's actions. And also, that the Governor had passed the impugned order, and issued the impugned message, bona fide. The narration of facts, therefore assumes significance.

The foundation of the appellants case: The first sequence of facts: 4. In order to project the correct narrative (as per the understanding, of learned counsel, representing the appellants), towards highlighting the factual position, it was urged, that the political posturing in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, commenced after the Governor Jyoti Prasad Rajkhowa assumed charge on 1.6.2015.

5. It was suggested, that when the Governor assumed office, there was a brewing discord amongst members of the ruling Indian National Congress (hereinafter referred to as the INC). Only a few days after the Governor took over charge, the President of the Arunachal Pradesh Congress Committee - Padi Richo addressed his first communication to theChiefMinister-Nabam Tuki (on 18.6.2015), inviting his attention to reports received from party workers, regarding breach of party discipline. On the same lines, another letter was addressed by the party President, to the Chief Minister on 1.9.2015. The text of the same is extracted hereunder:

"In reference to my earlier letter no.nil dated 18/6/2015 in connection with repo11s received from party workers regarding breach of discipline by some of the Congress legislators by their active involvement in anti-party activities, which has been seriously viewed by the AICC and APCC. But despite of that, it has been reported by party functionaries and workers that some of the congress legislators are still actively indulging in indiscipline and various anti-party activities.

Therefore, all the Congress legislators are requested to refrain themselves from indulging in such anti-party activities and maintain paify discipline." 6. It was submitted, that strenuous efforts were ongoing, to quell the intra-party dissidence. It was asserted, that resignation letters of two MLAs belonging to the INC - Wanglam Sawin and Gabriel D. Wangsu were accepted on 6.10.2015, whereupon, they stood removed from the House. The details of the ongoing disruptive activities within the Congress Legislature Party, as also, the involvement of the Governor, was sought to be demonstrated, by placing reliance on two further

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[2016] 6 S.C.R.

communications, the first of which (dated 11.10.2015), was addressed by the removed MLAs, to the Governor. A relevant part of the same, is reproduced hereunder: "Sub: Commission of an enquiry into the forceful resignation. Your Ex_cellency, With great pain and indignation, we the undersigned Members of Legislative Assembly of the Sixth Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly would like to apprise your benign authority about some disturbing, degraded and inglorious conduct of the leader of the Congress Legislative Party-cum-incumbent Chief Minister and his supporters for favour of your kind information and necessary action please; Your Excellency, on 14111 Sept 2015 at around 5 pm, we were repeatedly informed through phone calls requesting us to join "a get-together dinner party", purportedly on the invitation of Mr. Mama Natung, HMLA, at his residence at Senki View area, Itanagar. Some 18 MLA colleagues from the Congress Party visited his residence for the dinner but were instead asked to join an informal discussion on the prevailing political crisis faced by the Congress led State Government under the ChiefMinistership of Mr. Nabam Tuki. All members participated in the discussion which revolved around support for Mr. Tuki and further the issue of initiating actions against any member not adhering to the decision to be loyal to Tuki was discussed. Also it was decided to form a group of 'like-minded' legislators and accordingly formed S-18 or Super-18, besides forming one Action Committee tasked to take necessary actions against those MLAs who do not abide by the decisions takenjointly by the group. Thereafter, we had our dinner and left. Your Excellency, on l 61h September' 2015, we were informed by Mr. Nyamar Karbak, MLA who was the coordinator of S-18 to join a dinner party at the official residence of Hon'ble Chief Minister Mr. Nabam Tuki. Like the other day, this time also 17 of us went together to attend the dinner hosted by the Chief Minister which amongst other included, i) Gabriel D.Wangsu, ii) Mr. Wanglarri Sawin, iii) Phurpa Tsering, iv) Mr. Jam bey Tashi, v) Mr. TirongAboh, vi) Mr. Dikto Yikar, vii) Mr. Mama Natung, viii) Mr. Pani Taram, ix) Mr. Nikh Kamin, x)-Mr. Nyamar Karbak, xi) Mr.

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

Bamang Felix, xii) Mr. Techi Kaso, xiii) Mr. Tatung Jamoh, xiv) Mr.Alo Libang, xv) Mr. Tapuk Taku, xvi) Kumsi Sidisow, xvii) Mrs. Karya Bagang.

Like the preceding night, some of the MLAs like Mr. Nyamar Karbak, Mr. Bamang Felix, Mr. Mama Natung and Mr. Nikh Kamen suddenly started discussion on the political matter and requested 17 of us to support Tuki and to protect his leadership from being ousted by the dissident group of the party. Most of us participated in the said discussion though reluctantly with certain reservations in our mind and heart. The gathering instead of being a dinner party was turning more into a political meeting and some MLAs, to our anxiety and panic, aggressively tried to persuade and prevail upon us thereby, putting all of us in a very stressful and awkward situation. There was little room left for further discussion or dissent. Thereafter. some of our MLA colleagues came up with a strange proposal to sign and submit irrevocable resignation letter in the hand of HCM to show our loyalty to his leadership. We were baffled and dumbstruck by hearing the undemocratic. dangerous and inappropriate proposition placed before us by him. All of us were confused and couldn't gather the courage to protest against the said proposal in the presence of the CM, Speaker of the Assembly and PCC president. Then some of the loyalists of Mr. Tuki namely Nyamar Karbak and Bamang Felix holding ready and prepared stereotype resignation letters in their hands came to us and handed over to each of us and asked us to put our signatures. The whole drama took place in presence of Mr. Nabam Tuki, CM and Mr. Padi Richo, President, Pradesh Congress Committee and putting us in strained mental torment and duress compelled us to hurriedly sign the resignation letter without even reading the content thereon, against our will and against the spirit of democracy. After getting us to sign the papers they collected the same and handed over to the Chief Minister Mr. Nabam Tuki. Furthermore, we were given strict instruction and direction not to mention the date in our signatures. And just before the dinner, after concluding the meeting and signing of the resignation letters, surprisingly Speaker Nabam Rebia to arrived and joined in the dinner party at the CM's official residence. Soon thereafter a group namely 'S-1 S'was formed in the Whatsapp. However, both

C

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[2016) 6 S.C.R.

of us were removed from the group on 6 h October 2015. Now under the above circumstances, we would like to inform you that those resignation letters were signed by all 17 of us under complete duress having obtained illegally and wrongfully. In this regard, the following arguments may be taken into considerations; i) That we were invited to attend an informal dinner party hosted by the HCM for 17 of us. It was neither a CLP meeting nor a party meeting to discuss politics as only 17 ofus were invited for the dinner at the official bungalow of the HCM. It is equally true that we were invited for a dinner and not for signing our own resignation letters. ii) That none of us could muster the courage and spirit to protest the unholy and vicious agenda of the HCM that too in his presence and that of the Speaker, both holding high constitutional posts, and President, PCC. iii) That all the resignation letters signed by us were stereotype or identical copies of one single letter which speaks volume about the dishonest intention of the HCM, Speaker and his supporters as he was ready with the resignation letters which again established that everything was planned before hand with the help and support of the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly to obtain our signatures in the resignation letters by hook or crook and insti II fear in our mind. Invitation to the dinner party was only a ploy to trap us in the larger game plan to secure the Chief Ministerial Chair. iv) These disgracing, undemocratic and unethical action has brought disgrace to the benign office of the Chief Minister and the Speaker as their conduct are completely unbecoming of a Chief Minister as well as for holding the prestigious and dignified chair of the Speaker. Their illegal and wrongful act of obtaining our signatures by putting us in duress is nothing but criminalization of politics and brute murder of democracy and its values and principles for their vested personal interest which is punishable under relevant law of the land. v) !fan elected representative is not allowed to take any decision out of his conscience and free will it tantamounts to murder of the very basic fabric of democracy which will bear negative impact in overall contribution to the state's governance, and above all that would be murder of democracy.

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

vi) The reason quoted in the resignation letter is also highly inconceivable and ludicrous. How could any elected representative including us after being elected by the people would tender the resignation on such irrational, unjust and unfounded ground.

Your Excellency, vide our letter dated 01-10-2015 addressed to the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly which we had submitted to the office of the Speaker on 05-10-2015 before noon. we have elucidated the facts and circumstances under which our signatures in the resignation letters were obtained on 16-09-2015 at the official bungalow of CM and that the same was obtained under duress against our consent and free will, therefore requested the Speaker not to accept the resignation letter and to treat the same as invalid, null and void until and unless we come in person to submit the resignation letters. However, ironically, after submission of our letter, it came to our knowledge that the Speaker had without following the provisions as enshrined in Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution and Rule 200(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly had purp01iedly issued a notification dated 01-10-2015 accepting our resignation and declaring our respective seats to have fallen vacant. The said notification was published in the evening of 05-10-2015 only immediately after submission of our withdrawal letters to the Speaker.

Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution reads as follows; xxx

xxx

xxx

Rule 200(3) of the Business Rules reads as follows;

xxx

xxx

xxx

Thus, the abovementioned provisions casts an obligation on the Speaker to make inquiry regarding the voluntariness and genuineness of the resignation letters when the resignation letters are not submitted in person but since the Speaker himself is a party to the whole episode playing hand in glove with the CM, therefore, he choose to do away with the laid provisions of the law.

xxx

xxx xxx Your Excellency, since the notification dated 01-10-2015 was

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issued by the Speaker without following the established principles, therefore we had approached the Hon'ble Gauhati High Cout1 challenging the said notification vi de WP (C) No.6193/2015. The Hon 'ble Gauhati High Court after considering the whole facts and circumstances of the case was inter-al ia pleased to stay the operation of the impugned notification dated 01-10-2015 vide order dated 07-10-2015. The Hon'ble Court further observed that primafacie the requirement of Rule 200(3) of the Procedure and Conduct of Business and the incorporated proviso to A11icle 190(3 )(b) of the Constitution do not seem to have been complied and directed the Election Commission not to take any action on the basis of the said notification. xxx

[2016] 6 S.C.R.

xxx

xxx

Your Excellency, along with us, 15 other MLAs had also signed the resignation letters and handed over the same to the CM in the presence of the PCC Chief, but why only our resignation letters were entertained and accepted by the Speaker. What happened to the other resignation letters signed by 15 other MLAs? Why no action has been taken till date on the resignation letters of other 15 MLAs who till date has not withdrawn their resignation letters? xxx

xxx

xxx

We, therefore, request your Excellency to look into the issue seriously to uneatth the unholy nexus between the Chief Minister, the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly and PCC, President. And why the Chief Minister has adopted such wrongfol and illegal means to obtain the resignation letters from us, and what compelled him for such a criminal act is the million dollar question. In view of the above facts and circumstances, it is our humble requestto your august office to immediately enquire into the whole resignation incident through independent investigating agency like CBI because both the culprits are holding high constitutional posts, i.e. Chief Minister and Speaker and there cannot be free: and fair investigation, iif conducted by the State Investigation agency and take stringent wction against all the persons involved in the whole crime by booki1ng each and everyone under appropriate provision of law."

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

According to learned counsel, it is shocking and distressing, that the above letter should have been addressed to the Governor, who has no role in intra-party affairs. The above letter and inferences, according to learned counsel, were suggestive of political motivation. The second communication dated I I.I 0.2015 was addressed (to the Governor) by 20 MLAs of the INC, jointly with two Independent MLAs. A relevant extract of the instant communication is reproduced below:

"Sub: Complaint against the policy of absolutism of the Chief Minister. Your_ Excellency, We the incumbent MLAs of INC party amongst them some are sitting Ministers in the present ruling dispensation of the State being perturbed and disillusioned with the current dismal and grim state of affairs of the State Government and the tyrannical style of incumbent Chief Minister Shri Nabam Tuki in running the government would with profound veneration most humbly like to state the following few lines for favour of your perusal and necessary appropriate action; His Excellency, it has been learnt through the print media that the Chief Minister _is contemplating to literally drop four veteran, experienced and highly regarded leaders like i) Mr. Chowna Mein, Agriculture Minister, ii) Mr. Kamlung Mossang, Food & Civil Supply Minister, iii) Mr. Kumar Wai, Cooperation Minister and Mr. Wanglin Lowangdong. Social Welfare Minister from the council of Minister without articulating any cogent reasons either implicit or explicit for taking such a drastic and unpleasant measure at this particular junction when the State is experiencing acute financial crisis having occasioned due to the misrule, shortsightedness, autocratic policies and wrong decisions of the incumbent Chief Minister coupled with excessive unplanned, wasteful expenditures and financial mismanagement leading the state to a complete stalemate with development activities in the State in a complete standstill and clouding the State with complete darkness of financial depression. His Excellency, your benign authority may be well aware of the fact that the State under the leadership of Mr. Nabam Tuki, CM has been reeling under the burden of humongous financial liabilities, insurmountable debts and burden of overdrafts for last 3 years

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[2016] 6 S.C.R.

due to gross and unprecedented level of corruption, fraudulent misappropriation and embezzlement of the project specific funds and revenues of the government. His Excellency, it is ve1y unfortunate that there are serious charges of criminal misconduct, nepotism and corruption against Shri Nabam Tuki on numerous counts which are as follows; I) Awarding contract to his family and relatives by abusing his 12ower and position without floating tenders and secured pecuniary gain by illegal and dishonest means in clear v~()lation of coda! formalities. The Hon'ble Gauhati High Court tal-;ing cognizance of the allegations against Nabam Tuki, CM vide Judgement and Order dated 21-08-2015 in WP (C) No. 1267/20 I 0 has directed the CBI to register a case and conduct investigation against the alleged misconduct ofShri Nabam Tuki in awarding contracts to his wife, sister-in-law, brother and other near relatives without calling tenders by abusing his official position as a Minister. The Hon 'ble Court also directed the CBI to probe and investigate the alleged UCO bank transaction of Rs.30,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty Lacs) only allegedly deposited in the account number of Mr. Nabam Tuki by Mr. N .N. Osik, the then Director of Food & Civil Supplies. 2) Serious allegation against the incumbent CM who also holds the charges of Finance, Planning and Disaster & ReliefMinistries for gross misuse and embezzlement ofrelieffunds under NDRF & SDRF. In this connection also two PILs are pending in the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court being numbered as PIL No. 62/201 S & 65/20 l Sand vidc order dated 06/08/20 l S the Hon' blc Gauhati High Court was pleased to admit both the PILs by rejecting the preliminary objection of the State Government on the issue of maintainability of the cases and made an observation that "there appears to be some prima facic case to be enquired into the justification of the State in making assessments regarding natural disaster". In this connection the Controller and Auditor General oflndia is also conducting an enquiry into the allegation. 3) Gross misuse and siphoning of Rroiect specific funds under Centrally Sr.onsored Scheme (CSS) as a result of which majority of the projects or works under abovementioned schemes has not been completed and/or are under progress. Worst some have even

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

not been commenced and will never see the light of the day because all the grant and assistance provided by the GO! has been whimsically and capriciously diverted and misused under NonPlan head and PDS. Though majority of the works and projects has not been completed but the funds have been completely exhausted creating colossal financial liabilities to the tune of Rs.6911.55 Crores. That is the sole reason, why the state government is unable to furnish the UC as demanded by the GOL The Ministry of DONER has instituted an enquiry to unearth the degree of corruption. 4) The State Government is reeling under the burden ofoverdraft for consecutively two years. The Government committed an overdraft of Rs.(-) 449.76 Crores during 2013-14 and Rs.(-) 581.38 Crores during last financial year 2014-15. The current overdraft till May' 2015 is Rs.(-) 222 Crores bringing the total overdraft to the tune of Rs. (-) 1,253 .14 Crores. The amount of overdraft are to be repaid by the State government to the RBI with 13% interest rate which in turn will affect the development of the State, as the Government will be forced to utilize the plan money for the repayment of the overdraft. Your Excellency, overdraft, suspension of government bank transactions, inordinate delay in disbursement of pension, GPF, TA/DA and other benefits to the government employees, transfer of funds in the civil deposits of the government, non-payment of bil Is to the contractors and suP12liers against the completed works and non-payment of stipend to the students has become an order of the day.

Your Excellency. Shri Nabam Tuki. CM is adopting all sorts of illegal and unlawful means in order to quell and crush the voices of dissent who having been disillusioned and disenchanted with his misdeed and style ofrunnlng the State Government in a despotic and autocratic manner has intensified their demand in recent days for a change in the leadership. He is even indulging in criminal and immoral activities to secure his Chief Ministerial post. It is very disheartening that Shri Nabam Tuki. CM with the suppo11 of handful of his protagonist invited 17 MLA's for a dinner pmty at his official bungalow and has forcefully obtained signatures of the 17 MLA's in a resignation letters authored and produced at his

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residence by putting them under intense duress and pressure with the objective to use the same as a tool to blackmail them not to shift their loyalty or allegiance.

xxx

xxx

xxx

7. Your Excellency, in a democratic and parliamentary form of government, the legislators of the single largest pa1ty in the legislative assembly select a leader amongst themselves to lead them who is called as a leader of the legislative party and the selected leader accordingly becomes the Chief Minister and forms a government. If the leader upon being selected loses the goodwill, trust and confidence of the legislators who have selected him, the legislators can change or replace the said leader with more efficient, capable and competent leader to run the government. In context to the present prevailing political scenario of the State the CM has lost the goodwill, trust and confidence of majority of the legislators which can gauged from the CLP meeting which was held on 29-09-2015 where only 22 party legislators attended the meeting. Immediately thereafter a Cabinet was also summoned by the CM and similarly the meeting not attended by majority of the Cabinet Ministers and was less than the necessary quorum for taking any major decisions, therefore, it is the CM who should be tendering his resignation papers rather than dropping highly respected and decorated sitting Ministers who have serving the State to the best of their caRability and capacity without any complaint or blemish on their integrity.

xxx

[2016] 6 S.C.R.

xxx

xxx

Therefore, in view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, it is our collective earnest request and appeal to your esteemed office not to ente1tain the decision of the incumbent CM as he is running a minority government and enjoys the support of only handful of legislators as he has lost the confidence and goodwill of the majority of the legislators. If the CM is allowed to prevail then it will tantamount to murder of democracy and parliamentary form of government. With regards,

signed by 20 INC MLAs and 2 Independent MLAs. Yours faithfully,"

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDJSH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

It was submitted, that despite the position being clear, that a Governor has no role in internal party feuds, details as noticed in the letter extracted above, were being provided to the Governor. Illustratively it was submitted, that the manner of functioning of the Chief Minister, or the likely change in the composition of the Cabinet, or the manner in which financial affairs of the State were being handled, or the prevailing allegations of corruption against the Government, and such Iike matters, are beyond the realm of cognition and responsibility of the Governor. And yet, were being brought to the notice of the Governor. It was urged, that all this was being done, because of the belief of the dissident faction, that the Governor would act thereon. This, because of the tacit support, by MLAs belonging to the Bharatiya Janata Party (hereinafter referred to as, 'the BJP'). It was highlighted, that the involvement of two Independent MLAs along with 20 MLAs of the INC, in the letter dated 11.10.2015, needed to be pointedly noticed. Because it demonstrates, not only dissension within the party, but also the involvement of support from outsiders. The connotations of the above second letter, according to learned counsel, were also suggestive of political motivation.

7. Having highlighted the alleged divisive activities of the breakaway group ofMLAs within the INC, itz was submitted, that the party President - Padi Richo, was right in perceiving, that the above actions amounted to breach of party discipline. The party President accordingly, addressed individual communications dated 12.10.2015, to the defaulting MLAs, wherein he brought to their attention, the party's impressions. A relevant extract of one of the said communications is ~eing reproduced hereunder:

"It has been reported by pmiy functionaries and workers of your constituency and the Block/District Congress Committee that you are indulging in various activities which amounts to breach of discipline of the Party under Claus 4(a), (b) and (c) of the Constitution of Indian National Congress. In this connection I have also issued a Circular to all Party MLAs and Leaders on 1" September 2015 making it clear that action will be taken against any such leader indulging in indiscipline and anti-party activities. The matter was placed before the Executive Committee of the PCC on 6!h October 2015 and the Committee is of the view that there is a prima facie breach of discipline from your side. You are hereby called upon to explain the charges made against you within

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15 days time as to why disciplinary action as it may deem fit is not taken against you."

Your failure to reply within the above stated time will be considered as that you have no explanation or reply to be given, and appropriate action as deemed fit, will be taken against you without any further notice."

g, At the instant juncture, a meeting inviting all members of the Congress Legislature Party was convened for g.11.2015, which was to be attended by representatives of the central leadership. An extract of the communication dated 5.11.2015, calling the above meeting, is reproduced below:

"No.CM(AP - 11/2015 dtd 05 1" Nov, 2015[:] Please convey the following message by quickest means as under[.] quote[.] From Shri Nabam Tuki, Chief Minister to all Congress MLAS/ Parliamentary Secretaries/Ministers[.] As directed by Shri V. Narayanasami, General Secretary, AICC, In-Charge, Arunachal Pradesh a meeting of all members of Congress Legislature Party (CLP) convened on gm_J.J_o_y~mber, 20 l 5(Sunday) at 4.30 PM repeat gm November,2015 at 4.30 PM at Raj iv Gandhi Bhawan, Itanagar[.] Meeting will be attended by [.] One[.] Shri V Narayanasami, General Secretary, AICC, In Charge[.] Two[.] Dr. Jayakumar, AICC Secretary,[.] Three[.] Shri Padi Richo, President PCC among others[.] Request to attend the meeting as directed by Shri V Narayanasami, GS, AICC positively[.] unquote[.] Plse confirm N.T.T." Immediately on receipt of the aforesaid invitation, the same 21 dissident MLAs, addressed a joint statement to the party leadership, that they would not be attending the meeting (scheduled for g. f 1.2015), as the Chief Minister - Nabam Tuki had lost all moral credibility to lead the House. An extract of the contents of above joint assertion is reproduced below: " ... It has come to our notice that a CLP meeting has been convened on g'" November 2015. There are already differences of opinion with regards to autocratic way of functioning and disrespect for inner democracy of the party with the present CLP leader Mr. Nabam Tuki. Were clearly denounce his legitimacy as the leader of Congress Legislature Party of Arunachal Pradesh.

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

Under this circumstances any meeting called under his leadership do not carry any substance and holds no water. He has lost all the moral credibility to lead the party in the house.

Therefore, we the undersigned Congress legislature party members have unanimously decided not to attend the CLP meeting called under the leadership of Mr. Nabum Tuki."

signed by 21 MLAs of the INC.

9. On 12. I 0.2015, the President of the Congress Legislature Party issued a show cause notice to 19 MLAs belonging to the INC, for indulging in activities, indicative of breach of sincerity and commitment towards the INC. Another communication was also issued to all MLAs belonging to the INC, to attend a party meeting, at the residence of the leader of Congress Legislature Party. It was submitted, that the same 21 legislators belonging to the INC again addressed a joint statement to the Chief Minister, wherein they contested his legitimacy, as leader of the INC. The said legislators, again refused to attend the meeting. They also issued a press note, to openly announce their aforesaid stance. In a meeting held on 8.11.2015, the central leadership of the Congress Party affirmed, its support to the Chief Minister- Nabam Tuki. It was pointed out, that thereafter, another notice was issued for holding a meeting of the legislators, belonging to the INC, on 18. I I .2015. Yet again, the same 21 MLAs did not attend the meeting, and reiterated their point of view, with reference to the leadership of the Chief Minister. It was asse11ed on behalf of the appellants, that this was a revolt of sorts, within the INC. 10. In their narration, learned cotinsel also pointed out, that on 16.11.2015, a notice ofresolution for the removal of the Deputy Speaker

D •

- Tenzing Norbu Thongdok, was moved. The same was allegedly moved by 16 MLAs, belonging to the INC. As a matter of clarification, it would be pertinent to mention, that the Deputy Speaker had been elected as an MLA, on the nomination of the INC.

11. On 19.11.2015, a notice of resolution for the removal of the Speaker of the Assembly- Nabam Rebia, was moved by the 13 MLAs - 11 belonging to the BJP, and 2 Independent MLAs. It was submitted, that the aforesaid notice was issued under Article 179( c) read with A11icle 181, and Rules 151 and 154 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, framed under

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Article 208 (hereinafter referred to as, the 'Conduct of Business Rules'). The notice depicted the following grounds for the removal of the Speaker: "(i) The Constitution and democracy are not safe in the hands of

the Speaker, as he has unseated two members of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly;

(ii) That he has flagrantly violated the Constitution; (iii) That Speaker has not been functioning as a neutral person; (iv) That the Speaker has been appointing secretarial staff/persons without following administrative procedure."

12. Yet another meeting ofMLAs belonging to the INC, was held on 18.11.2015. The allegedly errant 21 MLAs belonging to the INC, did not again attend the meeting. It was asserted, that in order to take stock of the ongoing activities of the 21 dissident MLAs, another meeting of the Congress Legislature Party was held on 3.12.2015, wherein the participants took note of the prevailing situation, by recording the following proceedings:

"This meeting of the Congress Legislature Party, Arunachal Pradesh, held on today, the 3™ December at 4.00 P.M. at Itanagar unanimously resolves to request the Party Leadership and the Congress High Command at Delhi, bringing to your kind attention ;i letter dated 2llil November 2015 signed by 21 elected members of the Congress Legislature Paity Arunachal Pradesh, in clear undemocratic, indis..£!.Rline and unheard manner dictating terms and excuses for absenting and voluntarily distancing from the Congress Legislature Patty, Arunachal Pradesh against procedure established by the rules and regulations of the pa1ty, challenging the democratically elected Congress Legislature Party leaders authority, instead of participating in the meeting as members of the Congress Legislature Party and express whatever opinion, suggestion or grievances which can be resolved or decided by the Congress Legislature Party in its meeting. It is also requested that the Congress High Command may make it clear that whether the signatories of the letter are staying back in Delhi as per the advice of the AI CC in spite of the fact that, the above group of Legislatures voluntarily abstained from the earlier CLP meeting held on l 61h November, 2015, which was attended

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

by the General Secretary, AICC in charge of Arunachal Pradesh Shri V. Narayanaswamy, Dr. Jayakumar, Secretary AICC and Shri Padi Richo President APCC on the same grounds.

The meeting of the Congress Legislature Party also bring to the notice of the Party Leadership that the activities of the above 21 MLAs who have formed a separate group distancing themselves from the Congress Party, is working against the interests of the Party and the democratically elected Government of the Party, which is taking all-round efforts to develop the State and working untiringly to improve and help the people of Arunachal Pradesh, which got elected with an unprecedented mandate in the Assembly election held on 2014." 13. It was submitted, that the said 21 dissident MLAs, were publicly proclaiming, that V. Narayanasamy, a former Union Minister, and the All India Congress Committee in-charge for North Eastern States, was supporting them in their cause. V. Narayanasamy had to address identical letters to all the 21 dissident MLAs, on 6.12.2015, to repudiate their assertion of his support. The text of the aforesaid communications is reproduced below: "AICC has received copies of letters dat(;':d I 5. 11.2015 and 02.12.2015 addressed to the Chief Minister written by you and 20 other MLAs of the Congress Legislative Pai1v, Arunachal Pradesh in which you have claimed and alleged that I have advised you to stay back in Delhi to bring a solution to the present stalemate in the Party. 2. The above statements are false and against the directions given by me and the Party Leadership at Delhi and Itanagar. In the CLP meeting held on 16.11.2015 at Itanagar, I categorically made a statement that the Party Leadership is wholly supporting the present Chief Minister, Shri Nabam Tuki who is CLP leader having majority and if any grievance, any of the CLP member is having can be sorted out in the Pai1y forum instead of giving public statements and working against the Chief Minister or the Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh. 3. You have also willfully did not attend three consecutive CLP meetings and boycotted the same. 4. Instead of listening to my statement and direction, you have

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made contrary statements and false allegations against me and the Party Leadership which is not acceptable." The President of the Arunachal Pradesh Congress Committee - Padi Richo was required to deliver the said letters to the 21 dissident MLAs, and also, to obtain their acknowledgement. Which he did.

14. It was highlighted, that the aforesaid activities of the dissident members of the INC, compelled the President - Padi Richo, to again issue identical letters to the concerned MLAs on 7.12.2015, with a copy to the Chief Whip of the Congress Legislature Party - Rajesh Tacho. The text of the above letter is reproduced below:

"AICC has taken serious note of your activities against the party, continuous attacks, defamatory and unfounded allegations and propaganda against the Chief Minister and the Council of Ministers of Arunachal Pradesh and the Congress Party calculated to lower the prestige of the party, inspite ofour repeated directions not to indulge in any such activities which amounts to breach of discipline of the party.

By such continuous actions and activities you have distanced Y-9Jl\]elf and ft:g_!}lyour conduct we have come to the conclusion that you have voluntarily given up your membership of Indian National Cong[ess and the Congress Legislature Party. I am enclosing herewith he letter received from the General Secretary, AICC vi de dated 06/ 12/20 I 5, addressed to you in this regard."

I 5. It was also pointed out, that a very important event, sponsored by the respondents, took shape on 19.11.2015. The 13 MLAs who had issued the notice of resolution for the removal of the Speaker- Nabam Rebia, forwarded its copy to the Governor, with a covering letter dated 19.11.2015, wherein, they requested the Governor, to prepone the 6th session of the Assembly. Their prayer was aimed at expediting the removal of the Speaker- Nabam Rebia. This, according to the appellants, is apparent from the fact, that the request for preponement was sought on the ground, that the issue ofremoval should be taken up immediately after completion of the 14 days notice, mandated under Article l 79(c). The 13 MLAs also pressed, through their above letter, that the party composition in the House, be not altered, till the resolution for removal of the Speaker, was finally disposed of.

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

5I

16. In narrating the facts, it was pointed out, that in the meeting of the members of the Congress Legislature Party held on 3.12.2015, the activities of the dissident members of the party were highlighted, indicating their rebellious postuting. The central leadership of the INC, at this juncture, again supported the leadership of Chief Minister- Nabam Tuki. The central leadership further took note of the fact, that 21 members of the Congress Legislature Party, had distanced themselves from the party. It was therefore, that the Chief Whip of the Congress Legislature Party - Rajesh Tacho, filed a petition under Paragraph 2( 1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule on 7.12.2015, seeking disqualification of 14 MLAs of the INC. The disqualification of the 14 MLAs had been sought on the ground, that they had snapped their ties with the INC, by their refusal to respond to, or associate with the political leadership in the State, and fortheir having expressly refused to attend the meetings of the party held on 29.9.2015, 8.11.2015, 18.11.2015 and 3.12.2015. And also, for having issued a press note, to publicly air their views. The above disqualification petition, was presented to the Speaker. It would be relevant to mention, that the name of the Deputy Speaker - Tenzing Norbu Thongdok, figured at serial no.14, in the disqualification petition. On receipt of the aforesaid petition, the Speaker issued notices to the concerned 14 MLAs, on 7.12.2015 itself. The 14 MLAs belonging to the INC, were required to submit their response(s), and thereupon to appear before the Speaker, on 14.12.2015.

17. It was contended on behalfofthe appellants, that the factual position noticed above, triggered the stage for a political upmanship. Not between the legislators of the INC and the BJP, but between two factions of the INC. With one faction of the INC legislators, garnering support from BJP legislators. It was alleged, that the BJP legislators, in order to topple the Government in p_pwer, were extending support to the faction opposing the continuation of the Chief Minister- Nabam Tuki.

The impugned orders: I 8. The Governor of the State of Arunachal Pradesh, according to learned counsel, without consulting the Chief Minister- Nabam Tuki, and his Council of Ministers, or even the Speaker-Nabam Rebia, issued an order dated 9. 12.2015, whereby, he preponed the 6th session of the Assembly scheduled to be held on 14.1.2016, to 16.12.2015. The instant order passed by the Governor, has been assailed by the appellants. A relevant extract of the order, is reproduced below:

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"WHEREAS I, Jyoti Prasad Rajkhowa, the Governor ofArunachal Pradesh. had issued an Order on 3 November, 2015 under clause (I) of article 17-4 oftne Constitution oflndia summoning the Sixth Legislative Assembly of Arunachal Pradesh to meet for its sixth session at 10.00 AM on 14 January, 2016 in the Legislative Assembly Chamber at Naharlagun: WHEREAS subsequent to the issue of the aforesaid order by me. a notice ofresolution for removal ofShri Nabam Rebia. from the office of the Speaker of. the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly has been received on 19 November, 2015 with a copy endorsed to me by the notice givers namely Shri Tamiyo Taga. the Leader of Opposition in the said Assembly along with 12 other Members of the Legislative Assembly: WHEREAS the notice ofresolution for removal of the Speaker as aforesaid has complied with the notice period of 14 days on the 4 December, 2015 (excluding the day of notice and 4 December, 2015 - 14 days clear notice) as required under the first proviso to article l 79(c) of the Constitution oflndia: WHEREAS it has been judicially held in Nipamacha Singh and Others Vs. Secretary, Manipur Legislative Assembly and Others [AIR 2002 Gauhati 7] as under:

'"' 13 ... the powers to consider or to reject a motion for.removal of the Speaker from his office did not vest in the Speaker but in the Legislative Assembly under article 179 and 181 of the Constitution ... " WHEREAS in view of the above judicial order. it is a Constitutional obligation on my part to ensure that the resolution for removal of Speaker is expeditiouslv placed before the Legislative Assembly: WHEREAS I have also received a request from the notice givers of the resolution for removal of the Speaker that the sitting of the sixth session of the SixthArunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly originally slated for 14 January, 2016 may be advanced so as to enable the House to urgently consider the resolution for removal of the Speaker: WHEREAS, the time gap between the 4 December, 2015 and the intended date of first sitting of the sixth session i.e. l 4 January, 20 l 6 i.e. the earliest date on which the resolutions for removal of Speaker can be taken up for consideration by the House, is 42

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDLSH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

days (including 4 December, 2015 and 14 January, 2016):

WHEREAS any such notice ofresolution in relation to an Officer of the Legislative Assembly (Speaker or Deputy Speaker) needs to be expeditiously considered by the Legislative Assembly in view of (i) past precedents in the Lok Sabha and (ii) the seriousness and urgency accorded to such resolutions in paragraph 2 of Rule 151 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly and (iii) the utmost immediacy with which the cloud cast by the notice ofresolutiun over the continuance of the incumbent in the office of the Speaker has to be cleared: WHEREAS I am personally satisfied that the time gap between the date of compliance of the notice with the notice period prescribed in the first proviso to article 179(c) of the Constitution of India and the date of the intended first sitting of the ensuing session. as computed in the aforesaid manner, is long and unreasonable and may cause damage to the goals and ideals of provisions in the Constitution oflndia and the Rules of Procedure of the House concerning speedy disposal of such resolutions: WHEREAS I am further satisfied that, for any exercise of advancing, the date of the sixth session under clause (I) of article 174 of the Constitution of India to a date earlier than the date mentioned in the Summons dated 3'd November, 2015 for facilitating the House to expeditiously consider resolutions for removal of Speaker, I may not be bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers, since the subject matter of the notice for removal of the Speaker is not a matter, falling under the executive jurisdiction of the Chief Minister, Arunachal Pradesh not such a subject matter finds a mention in the Rules of Executive Business of the Government of Arunachal Pradesh framed under article 166 of the Constitution oflndia thereby restricting the role of the Chief Minister in advising me in exercise of my powers under article 174(1) of the Constitution oflndia only to the matters for which the Chief Minister, under the Constitution of India, is responsible".

AND NOW THEREFORE In exercise of powers conferred upon me by clause (1) of article 174 of the Constitution oflndia, I, Jyoti Prasad Rajkhowa, Governor

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of Arunachal Pradesh do herby modify the order issued by me under the said provision of the Constitution of India on 3rd November, 2015 summoning the Sixth Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly to meet for its sixth-session on l 4'h January, 2016 to the following extent: . (i) For '14th January, 2016' read '16th December, 2015' (ii) For ' 18th January, 2016' read '18th December, 2015'

2. Accordingly, in pursuance of the order issued by me under clause (I) of article 174 of the Constitution of India on 3rd November, 2015 as modified herein, the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly shall now meet at 10.00 AM on 16th December, 2015 at the Legislative Assembly Chamber at Naharlagun. JYOTI PRASAD RAJKHOWA Governor"

19. It was pointed out, that the order extracted above reveals, that it was prompted by a notice of resolution for the removal of the - Speaker, coupled with the assumption, that a constitutional obligation was cast on the Governor, to ensure that the above resolution was expeditiously taken up for consideration. Because, any delay in taking up the same, on the scheduled date of summoning of the 6th session of E the House (- 14.1.2016), would" ... cause damage to the goals and ideals of the provisions of the Constitution, besides the Conduct of Business Rules ... ".And that, the Governor was not obliged, in the peculiar background referred to above, to seek the advice of the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers. Admittedly, the Governor had issued the above order at his own, without any aid and advice.

20. On the same day-9.12.2015, the Governor issued a message under Article 175(2) inter alia fixing the resolution for the removal of the Speaker, as the first item of the House agenda, at the first sitting of its 6th session. A relevant extract of the same is reproduced hereunder:

"I. The1·esolution for removal of Speaker shall be the first item on the agenda of the House at the first sitting of the Sixth Session of the Sixth Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly; 2. As the resolution for removal of the Speaker shall be the first item of business, at the first sitting of the Sixth Sess_ion of the Sixth Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, the Deputy Speaker

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

shall preside over the House from the first moment of the first sitting of the House in accordance with provisions in article 181 ( 1) of the Constitution oflndia;

3. The proceedings of the House on the leave, discussion and voting on the resolution for removal of the Speaker shall be completed at the first sitting of the session itself; 4. The Deputy Speaker shall conduct the proceedings peacefully and truthfully and shall communicate the results of the voting on the resolution on the same day. The proceedings of the House on the resolution shall be video graphed and an authenticated copy of the video record shall also be sent to me on the same day; and 5. Until the session is prorogued, no Presiding Officer shall alter the party composition in the House." The above message of the Governor, has also been assailed by the appellants. The message predetermined the procedure which the Assembly was mandated to follow, particularly with reference to the notice of resolution for the removal of the Speaker. The message also e1itailed, that the " ... party composition in the House ... " would not be altered until the 6th session of the House was prorogued. It was pointed out, that by the above edict, the proceedings initiated by the Chief Whip of the Congress Legislature Party under the Tenth Schedule, against 14 MLAs of the INC, would automatically be put on hold, till the 6th session of the House was prorogued.

Resumption of, the first sequence of facts: 21. It was pointed out, that consequent upon the above development, a meeting of the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers was convened on 14.12.2015. Based on the opinion tendered by the Advocate General of the State of Arunachal Pradesh dated 12.12.2015, the State Cabinet resolved, that the order of the Governor dated 9.12.2015, was violative of Article 174 read with Article 163 of the Constitution, and Rule 3 of the 'Conduct of Business Rules'. It was resolved, that the message of the Governor dated 9.12.2015, infringed Article 175 of the Constitution, read with Rule 245 of the 'Conduct of Business Rules'. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the Speaker Nabam Rebia issued a letter dated 14.12.2015, bringing the aforesaid legal position to the notice of the Governor, and requested the Governor, to allow the House to function, in consonance with the provisions of the

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Constitution. The Governor was accordingly urged, to convene the 6th ·session of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, as was originally scheduled (-for 14.1.2016). It was submitted, that the aforesaid communication addressed by the Speaker to the Governor, was neither responded to nor acknowledged.

22. It was also the case of the appellants, that the disqualification proceedings against the 14 legislators of the JNC (initiated through the notice dated 7.12.2015), were taken up for consideration by the Speaker - Nabam Rebia on 14.12.2015. None of the 14 ML'..s sought to be disqualified, responded to the notice issued to them. They did not even enter appearance before the Speaker on thereturnable date- 14.12.2015. Accordingly, the Speaker deferred the disqualification proceedings, to the following day- 15.12.2015. On 15.12.2015, a disqualification order was passed against all the 14 MLAs of the INC, ex parte. As a natural corollary, the constituencies from which the 14 disqualified MLAs were elected, were declared vacant (through a notification published in the Arunachal Pradesh Gazette dated 15.12.2015).

23. Jt was the pointed contention of the appellants, that on the same day, - 15. 12.2015, when the aforesaid 14 MLAs belonging to the INC, were declared disqualified, in a purely unprecedented and unconstitutional manner, the Deputy Speaker-Tenzing Norbu Tongdok quashed the order of disqualification, even though he himself had been unseated through the disqualification order. Relevant extract of the above order dated 15.12.2015, is reproduced hereunder: "ARUNACHAL PRADESH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF DEPUTY SPEAKER

No.APLA/D8/68/MEM/2015

15 DECEMBER, 2015

ORDER UNDER TENTH SCHEDULE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF JNDIA AND RULE MADE THEREUNDER

WHEREAS the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh had issued an order dated 9 1h December, 2015 under article 174( I) of the Constitution of India preponing the Sixth Session of the Sixth Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly to l 6'h December, 2015 from J 41h January, 2016; WHEREAS the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh preponed the Sixth Session as aforesaid in order to enable the House to

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDJSH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

expeditiously consider and dispose of a notice of Resolution for removal of Shri Nabam Rebia from the Office of the Speaker.

WHEREAS the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh had further issued a message to the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly under article 175(2) of the Constitution pflndia, of which, the following part has significance of clipping the abuse of power of the incumbent Speaker. "Until the session is prorogued the Presiding Officer shall not alter the party composition in the House."

WHEREAS the resolution for removal of Speaker Sh Nabam Rebia is listed as the first item of business at the first sitting of Sixth Session of the Legislative Assembly on the\ 6th December,

2015; ' WHEREAS the Speaker who is facing the resolution for removal has deliberately refrained from issuing the necessary Bulletin part II notifying the resolution and also the list of business for the 16.12.2015 including the resolution for transaction by the. House, despite the message of the Governor and in total defiance of the Constitution, rules, norms and ideals thereby subverting the vary Constitution oflndia; WHEREAS the Deputy Speaker who was tasked by the Governor to conduct the proceedings of the House on the resolution for removal of the Speaker in accordance with article 181 of the Constitution oflndia read with relevant rules of procedure of the House, prepared the Bulletin Part II and list of business for \6th December, 2015 thereby conforming to the Constitution and the mandate issued by the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh: WHEREAS the Speaker, in order to escape the consequence of the resolution of his removal slated for transaction on the 16th December, 2015, suddenly a day before the first sitting of the Sixth Session i.e. on the 15'h December, 20 IS disqualified following 14 MLAs by 2 Notification of even number with No.LA/LEG37/2015 dated the 15th December, 2015 under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution oflndia: (I) Shri Perna Khandu (2) Shri Kumar Waii (3) Srhi Kameng Do lo

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(4) Shri Markio Tado (5) Shri JarkarGamlin Shri P.D. Sona (6) (7) Shri Mutchu Mithi Shri Kamlung Mossang (8) Shri Phosum Khimhun (9) (10) Shri Wanglin Lowangdong (11) Shri T. Wangham (12) Shri Lombo Tayeng (13) Shri Kalikho Pu! (14) Shri T.N. Thongdok WHEREAS THE Speaker has disqualified the above 14 MLAs without following basic procedure oflaw and justice in regard to:

(i) Receipt of petition for Disqualification. (ii) Forwarding the petition for comments of the respondents. (iii) Hearing the respondents.

WHEREAS Rule 7(7) of the Members of Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) provides as under, according to which, no MLAcan be disqualified under the Tenth Schedule without affording an opportunity of personally being heard: " ..... neither the Speaker nor the committee shall come to any finding that a member has become subject to disqualification under the Tenth Schedule without affording a reasonable opportunity to such members to represent his case and to be heard in person." WHEREAS, when a notice ofresolution is staring at the face of Speaker, he is completely incapacitated from making any order on the membership of other MLAs when his own fate is hanging in balance: WHEREAS the Speaker, as Constitutional functionary, is not vested with omnipotent powers to cause injury to the powers of Honourable Governor who had already issued a message as aforesaid to maintain the integrity of party-wise composition of the House:

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

WHEREAS the Speaker, in committing this ma la fide and perverse action, has not even spared the Deputy Speaker whom the Governor had appointed to preside over the proceedings of the House when it takes up consideration of the resolution for removal of the Speaker:

WHEREAS a Speaker who is facing a removal resolution before the House has no competence whatsoever to pass instantaneous orders under the Tenth Schedule to manipulate a majority in favour of him and also Speaker who has been directed to face the House over the resolution for his own removal11as no power whatsoever to escape his defeat by throwing out chunks of MLAs abusing his powers.under the Tenth Schedule:

WHEREAS the orders of the Speaker disqualifying 14 MLAs as aforesaid squarely challenges the position of the Governor which the Constitutio'i\ oflndia had designed him to occupy in the scheme of Constitution: NOW THEREFORE, I, Shri T.N. Thongdok, Deputy Speaker appointed by the Governor to preside over the first sitting of the sixth session of the sixth Arunachal Legislative Assembly, hereby quash the orders of the Speaker and notification issued by the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly as aforesaid disqualifying above named named fourteen members of the Legislative Assembly and such orders and notifications may be deemed as non est for want of competence on the part of the Speaker who passed the order not only for not following constitutional and legal procedures but also for having lost his competence to do so since a notice of resolution dated 19.11.2015 for his removal is pending against him and which is to come before the house on 16.12.2015. 2. The effect of this order is that all the above named 14 MLAs continue to be members of the sixth Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly as though the order of the delinquent Speaker is ab initio void.

3. All the aforesaid 14 MLAs shall attend all the sessions of the sixth Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly without let or hindrance. 4. Any authority, civil or police, obstructing their attendance of the ensuing session shall be committing grave breach of privilege of·

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the legislative assembly as also shall come directly under the disciplinary jurisdiction of all law enforcing authorities including the Governor. Naharlagun T.N. Thongdok 15th December 2015 Deputy Speaker" 24. It was also the case of the appel !ants, that on 16.12.2015, the Deputy Speaker conducted the proceedings of the 6th session of the Assembly, outside the official premises of the State Assembly. lt was submitted, that the House assembled at Techi Takar Community Hall, G Sector, Naharlagun. It was contended, that at the aforesaid unconstitutional session of the Assembly (presided over by the Deputy Speaker), the Deputy Speaker - Tenzing Norbu Thongdok, passed an order declaring, that the erstwhile Speaker - Nabam Rebia's announcement that the 6th session of the Assembly would not commence on 16.12.2015, was illegal. Having so declared, the Deputy Speaker further ordered, that the 6th session of the Assembly would be convened as rescheduled by the Governor, with effect from 16.12.2015. It was also ordered, that the 6th session of the Assembly would continue upto 18.12.2015. The order passed by the Governor on 9.12.2015 was thus reiterated, and also given effect to. When the House assembled for the preponed 6th session on 16.12.2015, the notice for a vote of confidence against the Speaker was taken up for consideration. The resolution for removal of the Speaker- Nabam Rebia, was adopted.by the Assembly on 16.12.2015 itself. The list of business issued by the Deputy Speaker - Tenzing Norbu Thongdok provided, that the following motions would betaken upon 17.12.2015: (i)

vote of confidence of the Council of Ministers headed by Shri Nabam Tuki -the then Chief Minister, and

(ii)

expression of confidence in Kalikho Pu!, to head the new Council of Ministers.

The second sequence of facts:

25. It is also relevantto mention, that the Speaker- Nabam Rebia, filed Writ Petition (C) No.7745of2015 before the Gauhati High Court, challenging inter a/ia the Governor's order dated 9.12.2015, the Governor's message dated 9.12.2015, the alleged holding of the preponed 6th session of the Assembly, outside the House on 16.12.2015, the Deputy

NABAM REBJA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

Speaker- Tenzing Norbu Thongdok'rnrder dated 15.12.2015, quashing the disqualification order of the 14 MLAs, belonging to the INC, and the resolution dated 16.12.2015 adopting the resolution for removal of the Speaker- Nabam Rebia, and its consequential notification.

26. A Single Bench of the Gauhati High Court, by an interim order dated 17.12.2015 stayed all the aforementioned impugned decisions, till the n-ext date of hearing - 1.2.2016. A relevant extract of the interim order passed by the High Court is reproduced below: "23. The disturbing developments in the State ofArunachal Pradesh noticed from the various steps taken since November 2015 indicates the tussle for power by opposing group and it is clear that the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the Assembly are heading the opposite camps. Understandably the action of the MLAs are motivated by political exigencies and a manifestation of this can be seen from the FIR dated 20.12.2015. In such situation, the Governor as the constitutional head. is expected to discharge his role with dispassion and within the constitutional framework. But the impugned steps taken by the State's Governor which facilitated the political battle to move in certain direction in the tussle for power, reflects the non neutral role of the constitutional head and this is undermining the democratic process. xxx

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25. Taking all the above factors into account meanwhile, the impugned decision(s) are ordered to be kept in abeyance until the case is considered next. List on 1.2.2016." A perusal of the interim order passed by the High Court, it was contended, reveals that the High Court had entertained a primafacie view, that the Governor, was facilitating the political conflict between the parties towards a definite direction, in a prejudicial manner. And also, that the Governor had not acted in a dispassionate manner. The appellants, during the course of hearing, left no stone unturned, to endorse the above noted impression of the Single Bench. The decisions kept in abeyance;· by the interim order extracted above, were:

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(i) the order passed by the Governor dated 9.12.2015

(ii) the message of the Governor dated 9.12.2015 (iii) the order passed by the Deputy Speaker dated 15.12.2015 setting aside the disqualification of the 14 MLAs; and

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(iv) the resolution dated 16.12.2015, removing the Speaker. Thereafter, based on an order obtained by the Joint Registrar (Judicial) of the Gauhati High Court from the acting Chief Justice of the High Court, on the administrative side, the above Writ Petition (C) No. 7745 of 2015, was placed before a different Single Bench of the High Court. During the course of hearing of the above writ petition on 19.12.2015, the Governor-Jyoti Prasad Rajkhowa, and the State Government, were impleaded as parties. Two further interlocutory applications bearing nos. 2822 and 2823 of2015, were filed by 13 and 7 applicants respectively, seeking impleadment in Writ Petition (C) No.7745 of2015, and were allowed. Through the above applications, the applicants besides seeking impleadment, assailed the maintainability of Writ Petition (C) No.7745 of 2015. They also sought modification/vacation of the interim order (staying the impugned decisions), dated 17.12.2015. 27. It was submitted, that when the Assembly met on 17.12.2015, and the Government headed by the Chief Minister - Nabam Tuki was declared to have lost confidence of the House, Kalikho Pul, another JNC MLA, was chosen as the new leader of the House. 28. The learned Single Bench, before whom the matter came to be posted by the acting Chief Justice of the High Court (after the interim order extracted above, had been passed), issued notice for modification/ vacation of the interim order (passed by the previous Single Bench) dated 17.12.2015. It was submitted, that without any notice to the appellant, and without affording an opportunity of hearing to the counsel representing the appellant, the successor Single Bench restrained reconvening of the House till 4. l .2016. 29. The two MLAs belonging to the INC (- Bamang Felix and Nyamar Karbak) also approached the High Court by filing Writ Petition (C) No. 7998of2015. The petitioners in the aforesaid writ petition, inter alia assailed the same decisions, as were impugned by Nabam Rebia in Writ Petition (C) No.7745 of2015 (more or less, on the same grounds). The instant matter came up for hearing, before yet another Single Bench · of the High Co-urt. On its first date of hearing, Writ Petition (C) No. 7998 of2015 was directed to be posted for hearing on 4.1.2016, along with the first writ petition - Writ Petition (C) No.7745of2015. Resultantly, both the writ petitions came to be posted before the same Single Bench (nominated by the acting Chief Justice, on 18.12.2015).

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

30. Dissatisfied with the listing of the matters, the appellant herein - Nabam Rebia, filed an Interlocutory Application in Writ Petition (C) No.7745of2015, on the judicial side on 23.12.2015, seeking the recusal of the Single Bench, nominated to hear the case by the acting Chief Justice. Writ Petition (C) No. I 0of2016, was independently filed in the High Court, impugning the order of the acting Chief Justice dated 18.12.2015 (communicated by the Joint Registrar (Judicial), after obtaining instructions from the acting Chief JusticeJ, directing the posting of Writ Petition (C) No.7745of2015, before a different Single Bench of the High Cour1.

31. As already noticed above, a prayer for recusal was also made to the learned Single Bench, before which the matter had been posted, by the acting Chief Justice. The learned Single Bench, was asked to recuse from the proceedings in Writ Petition (C) No.7745 of2015. The acting Chief Justice of the High Court, entertained an Interlocutory Application with a similar prayer, in his chambers on the administrative side, and rejected the same on 4.1.2016. Writ Petition (C) No. I 0 of2016 was dismissed on 7.1.2016 by a Single Bench (other than the OI1e, which had passed the interim order dated 17.12.2016, as also, other than the one to which the acting Chief Justice had assigned Writ Petition (C) No. 7745 of 2015 for hearing - after the passing of the interim order dated 17.12.2016). Dissatisfied with the above determination, the appellant filed Special Leave Petition (C) No.189 of 2016, before this Court. It would be pertinent to mention, that the above special leave petition was withdrawn by the petitioner on 13.1.2016.

The legal challenge, on behalf of the appellants: 32. The High Court disposed of Writ Petition (C) Nos.7745 and 7998of2015 by a common order dated 13.1.2016. The instant order is subject matter of challenge~ through Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.12591260of2016. 33. Despite the challenges to the various orders passed by the High Court through different petitions, it was contended on behalf of the appellants, that the determination of Special Leave Petitions (C) Nos.1259-1260 of 2016 would completely and effectively, result in the adjudication of all the issues canvassed at the hands of the appellants, in the connected matters. 34. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants, that for an

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effective adjudication of the present controversy, it is necessary to understand the duties and responsibilities of the Governor, as envisaged in the scheme of the ConstitLition. It was highlighted, that the position of the Governor, should not be confused with the impression created by Article 168 - that the State Legislature includes the Governor. It was submitted, that the Governor cannot be considered even as an officer of the House. Despite the above two express assertions, it was submitted, that it cannot be disputed that the Governor _of a State is a part of the State Legislature- just like the President, is a part of the Parliament. It was asserted, that the Governor functions and operates as a bridge between the executive and the legislature. Through an address by the Governor under Article 175, the executive informs the Assembly, about the policies of the Government. The power vested with the'Governor, to give his assent to a Bill passed by the Assembly, or to require the matter to be retonsidered by returning the Bill to the legislature, it was pointed out, w'ere powers which a Governor exercised beyond the precincts of the Assembly. This function/power resting with the Governor, according to learned counsel, was clearly beyond the scope oflegislative business, conducted within the Assembly. lt was pointed out, 'that when a Governor summons the House, he does not do so at his own will. He summons the House, on the aid and advice of the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers, after due consultation with the Speaker. The only responsibility entrusted to the Governor, according to learned counsel, is provided for in Article 174, inasmuch as, it is the obligation of the Governor to ensure, that the interval between the last sitting of the previous session, and the first sitting of the succeeding session, is not more than six months . .35. For substantiating the propositions canvassed in the foregoing paragraph, reliance was first placed on Article 158, which expressly provides, that the" ... Governor shall not be a member of either House of Parliament or of a House of the Legislature of any State specified in the First Schedule ... ". It was pointed out, that as a matter of abundant caution, Article 158 also provides, that in case an incumbent member of the Assembly (or that of the Parliament) is appointed as Governor of a State " ... he shall be deemed to have vacated his seat in that House on the date on which he enters his office as Governor". Additionally, reliance was placed on Article 163 to demonstrate, that the Governor is bound by the aid and advice of the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers. It was acknowledged, that the Governor is also authorized tp act independently,- on his own, but only in respect of such functions, wherein

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

he is expressly authorized to do so, by or under the Constitution. It was acknowledged, that in such matters which the Governor considers as ·falling within his independent judgment," ... the decision of the Governor in his discretion shall be final. .. ". And that, the exercise of such discretion, cannot be called in question. It was however pointed out, that such exercise ofindependentjudgment, can only be questioned by way . ofjudicial review.

36. In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Governor as a bridge between the executive and the legislature, reliance was placed by learned counsel on Article 167, which provides that it would be the duty of the Chief Minister, to communicate all decisions cifthe Council of Ministers relating to administration of affairs of the State to the Governor, as well as, proposals with reference to matters on which legislation is contemplated. It was therefore submitted, that the intent expressed in Article 168 should not be determined from a peripheral reading thereof, but from the scheme envisioned by the surrounding provisions. It was urged, that even though Article 168 provides, that every State Legislature "shall" consist of the Governor, the fact of the matter is, that the Governor has no role in any legislative activity of the House. 3 7. It was acknowledged, that the Governor was obliged to address the Assembly, in consonance with Article 175( 1). It was however urged, that the Governor's address to the House, was obligated to be in consonance with, the aid and advice of the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers. It was pointed out, that the same position prevailed, in the matter of sending messages to the House under Article 175(2), which according to learned counsel, was subject to similar aid and advice. 38. Inviting the Court's attention to Article 178 it was submitted, that the instant Article is a part of Chapter III - under Part VI (which includes Articles 178 to 189), of the Constitution. It was pointed out, that Chapter III bears the heading - "Officers of the State Legislature". It was pointed out, that the Speaker and the DeP.uty Speaker are the only two officers of the State Legislative Assembly. And likewise, the Chairman and the Deputy Chainnan, are the only officers of the State Legislative Council. Besides the above officers, the staff of a State Legislative Assembly, comprises of the personnel appointed, for carrying on ministerial responsibilities of the secretariat of the Leg-islature. It was submitted, that no other functionary could be considered as an officer

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of the State Legislature. The pointed contention oflearned counsel was, that the Governor could not be considered, as an officer of a State Legislative Assembly. 39. In the present sequence of submissions, learned counsel, last of all, referred to Article 208, and urged, that the same allows every State Legislative Assembly to frame rules for regulating the procedure for conducting business of the House. Having drawn the Court's attention to sub-article (3) of Article 208, it was submitted, that the power vested with the Governor· to make rules thereunder, was limited to communications between the two Houses (the State Legislative Assembly and the State Legislative Council). It was accordingly contended, that the framing of the above rules of procedure, should not be confused with, the rules for carrying on the business of the House itself. Having invited our attention to Article 163, it was asserted, that the power vested with the Governor under Article 208 by necessary implication, had to be exercised on the aid and advice of the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers. 40. Having premised his submissions on the aforementioned provisions, reference was made by learned counsel to Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule. Paragraph 6( I), according to learned counsel, leaves no room for any doubt, that on the subject of disqualification of an MLA, the functional authority is vested only with the Speaker. It was further submitted, that reference to Article 212 (cited in Paragraph 6(2), of the Tenth Schedule), was for the sole purpose of grantingjudicial immunity, to the actions taken on a disqualification motion under Paragraph 6. Most importantly, it was pointed out, that the Governor has no role whatsoever, on the question ofremoval ofMLAs. And as such, according to learned counsel, it was not open to the Governor to be concerned with, what might or might not emerge, from proceedings conducted by the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule. 41. It is relevant to mention, that learned counsel representing the appellants, also made a reference to Article 361, which postulates inter alia, that the Governor of a State is not" ... answerable to any court for the exercise and performance of powers and duties of his office or for any act done or purporting to be done by him in the exercise and performance of those powers and duties ... ". Despite the aforesaid protection afforded to the Governor, it was submitted, that in the present controversy, the Governor - Jyoti Prasad Rajkhowa had moved an

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. I)EPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

application for being permitted to be arrayed as a party respondent. This action of the Governor, according to learned counsel, was sufficient to infer, that the actions of the Governor were partisan. It was submitted, that the facts of the case reveal, that the actions of the Governor, were supportive of the BJP for purely political considerations, and that, they were pointedly prejudicial to the interest of the INC. It was asserted, that an analysis of actions of the Governor would reveal, that the Governor was making concerted efforts towards dislodging the INC Government, and/or weakening it by extending support to the faction of the INC MLAs seeking the removal of the Chief Minister - Nabam Tuki.

42. In order to support his contentions, learned counsel placed reliance on debates of the Constituent Assembly. With reference to Article 163, it was submitted, that the Governor was mandated to discharge his functions in consonance with the aid and advice of the "Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head". The only exception to the above position was in situations, where an express provision of the Constitution, required the Governor to exercise his functions in his own discretion/judgment. It would be relevant to mention, that draft Article 143 eventually came to be renumbered as Article 163 in the Constitution. The debate highlighted, with reference to. the concerned provision, is extracted hereunder:

"Shri H.V. Karnath: (C.P. & Berar: General): Mr. President, Sir, I move: "That in clause(]) of article 143, the words 'except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion' be deleted." If this amendment were accepted .by the House, this clause of, article 143 would read thus:."There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions." Sir, it appears from a reading of this ·clause that the Government oflndiaAct of 1935 has been copied more or less blindly without mature consideration. There is no strong or valid reason for giving the Governor more authority either in his discretion or otherwise vis-a-vis his ministers, th'an has been given to the President in relation to his ministers. If we turn to article 61(1), H

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we find it reads as follows:"There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions."

When you, Sir, raised a very important issue, the other day, Dr. Ambedkar clarified this clause by saying that the President is bound to accept the advice of his ministers in the exercise ofall of his functions. But here article 143 vests certain discretionary powers in the Governor, and to me it seems that even as it was, it was bad enough, but now after having amended a1ticle 131 regarding election of the Governor and accepted nominated Governors, it would be wrong in principle and contrary to the tenets and principles of constitutional Government, which you are going to build up in this country. It would be wrong I say, to invest a Governor with these additional powers, namely, discretionary powers. I feel that no departure from the principles of constitutional Government should be favoured .except for reasons of emergency and these discretionary powers must be done away with. I hope this amendment of mine will commend itself to the House. I move, Sir.

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Shri T.T. Krishnamachari: Mr. President, I am afraid I will have to oppose the amendment moved by my honourable Fri.end Mr. Karnath, only for the reason that he has not understood the scope of the article clearly and his amendment arises out of a misapprehension. Sir, it is no doubt true, that certain words from this article may be removed, namely, those which refer to the exercise by the Governor of his functions where he has to use his discretion irrespective of the advice tendered by his Ministers. Actually, I think this is more by way of a safeguard, because there are specific provisions in this Draft Constitution which occur subsequently where the Governor is empowered to act in his discretion irrespective of the advice tendered by his Council of Ministers. There are two ways of formulating the idea underlying it. One is to make a mention of this exception in this article 143 and enumerating the specific power of the Governor where he can exercise his discretion in the articles that occur subsequently, or

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

to leave out any mention of this power here and only state it in the appropriate article. The former method has been followed. Here the general proposition is stated that the Governor has normally to act on the advice of his Ministers except in so far as the exercise of his discretions covered by those articles in the Constitution in which he is specifically empowered to act in his discretion. So long as there are articles occurring subsequently in the Constitution where he is asked to act in his discretion, which completely cover all cases of depa11ure from the normal practice to which I see my honourable Friend Mr. Karnath has no objection, I may refer to article 188, 1see no harm in the provision in this article being as it is. If it happens that this House decides that in all the subsequent articles, the discretionary power should not be there, as it may conceivably do, this pa11icular provision will be ofno use and will fall into desuetude. The point that my honourable Friend is trying to make, while he concedes that the discretionary power of the Governor can be given under article 188, seems to be pointless. If it is to be given in article 188, there is no harm in the mention of it remaining here. No harm can arise by specific mention of this exception of article 143. Therefore, the serious objection that Mr. Karnath finds for mention of this exception is pointless. I therefore think that the article had better be passed without any amendment. If it is necessary for the House either to limit the discretionary power of the Governor or completely do away with it, it could be done in the articles that occur subsequently where specific mention is made without which this power that is mentioned here cannot at all be exercised. That is the point that I would like to draw the attention of the House to and I think the article had better be passed as it is. Dr. P.S. Deshmukh: (C.P. & Berar: General): Mr. President, Mr. T. T. Krishnamachari has clarified the position with regard to this exception which has been added to clause (1) of article 143. lf the Governor is, in fact, going to have a discretionary power, then it is necessary that this clause which Mr. Karnath seeks to omit must remain.

Sir, Besides this, 1 do not know if the Drafting Committee has deliberately omitted or they are going to provide it at a later stage, and I would like to ask Dr. Ambedkar whether it is not necessary to provide for the Governor to preside at the meetings of the

Council ofMinisters. I do not find any provision here to this effect. Since this article 143 is a mere reproduction of section 50 of the Government of India Act, 1935, where this provision does exist that the Governor in his discretion may preside at the meetings of the Council of Ministers, I think this power is very necessary. Otherwise, the Ministers may exclude the Governor from any meetings whatever and this power unless specifically provided for, would not be available to the Governor. l would like to draw the attention of the members of the Drafting Committee to this and to see if it is possible either to accept an amendment to article 143 by leaving it over or by making this provision in some other part. I think this power of the Governor to preside over the meetings of the Cabinet is an essential one and ought to be provided for. xxx

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Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru: (United Provinces: General): Mr. President I should like to ask Dr. Ambedkar whether it is necessary to retain after the words "that the Governor will be aided and advised by his Ministers". the words "except in regard to certain matters in respect of which he is to exercise his discretion". Supposing these words, which are reminiscent of the old Government oflndiaAct and the old order, are omitted, what harm will be done? The functions of the Ministers legally will be only to aid and advice the Governor. The article in which these words occur does not lay down that the Governor shall be guided by the advice of his Ministers but it is expected that in accordance with the Constitutional practice prevailing in all countries where responsible Government exists the Governor will in all matters accept the advice of his Ministers. This does not however mean that where the Statute clearly lays down that action in .regard to specified matters may be taken by him on his own authority this article 143 will stand in his way: xxx

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I should like to say one word more before I close. If article 143 is passed in its present form, it may give rise to misapprehensions of the kind that my honourable Friend Dr. Deshmukh seemed to be labouring under when he asked that a provision should be inserted entitling the Governor to preside over the meetings of the Council of Ministers. The Draft Constitution does not provide for

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

this and I think wisely does not provide forth is. It would be contrary to the traditions of responsible government as they have been established in Great Britain and the British Dominions, that the Governor or the Governor-General should, as a matter of right, preside over the meetings of his cabinet. All that the Draft Constitution does is tcr lay on the Chief Minister the duty of informing the Governqr of the decisions come to by the Council of Ministers in regard to administrative matters and the legislative programme of the government. In spite of this, we see . thatthe article 143, as it is worded, has created a misunderstanding in the mind of a member like Dr. Deshmukh who takes pains to follow every article of the Constitution with care. This is an additional reason why the discretionary power of the Governor should not be referred to in article 143. The speech of my Friend Mr. Krishnamachari does not hold out the hope that the suggestion that I have made has any chance ofbe.ing accepted. Nevertheless, I feel it my duty to say that the course proposed by Mr. Karnath is better than what the Drafting'. Sub-Committee seem to approve.

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Shri Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar: (Madras: General): Sir, there is really no difference between those who oppose and those who approve the amendment. In the first place, the general principle is laid down in article 143 namely, the principle of ministerial responsibility, that the Governor in the various spheres of executive activity should act on the advice of his ministers. Then the article goes on to provide "except in so far as he is by or under this - Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion. So long as there are article in the Constitution which enable the Governor to act in his discretion and in certain circumstances, it may be, to over-ride the cabinet ·or to refer to the President, this article as it is framed is perfectly in order. If · 1ater on the House comes to the <:onclusion that those articles which enable the Governor to act in his discretion in specific cases should be deleted, it will be open to revise this artic;le. But so long as there are later articles which pennit the Governor to act in his discretion and not on ministerial responsibility, the article as drafted is perfectly in order.

Shri H.V. Pataskar: (Bombay: General): Sir, article 143 is perfectly

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clear. With regard to the amendment of my honourable Friend Mr. Karnath various points were raised, whether the Governor is to be merely a figure-head, whether he is to be a constitutional head only or whether he is to have discretionary powers. To my mind the question should be looked at from and entirely different point of view. Article 143 merely relates to the functions of the ministers. It does not primarily relate to the powers and functions of a Governor. It only says: "There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions." Granting that we stop there, is it likely that any complications will arise or that it will interfere with the discretionary powers which are proposed to be given to the Governor? In my view article 188 is probably necessa1y and I do not mean to suggest for a moment that the Governo(s powers to act in an emergency which powers are given under article 188, should not be there. My point is this, whether if this Provision, viz., "except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion", is not there, is it going to affect the powers that are going to be given to him to act in his discretion under article 188? I have carefully listened to my honourable Friend and respected constitutional lawyer. Mr. Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyer, but I was not able to follow why a provision like this is necessary. He said that instead later on, while considering article 188, we might have to say "Notwithstanding anything contained in article 143." In the first place to my mind it is not necessary. In the next place, even granting that it becomes necessary at a later stage to make provision in mticle 188 by saying "notwithstanding anything contained in article 143", it looks so obnoxious to keep these words here and they are likely to enable certain people to create a sort ofunnecessa1y and unwarranted prejudice against ce1tain people. Article 143 primarily relates to the functions of the ministers. Why is it necessary at this stage to remind the ministers of the powers of the Governor and his functions, by tel Iing them that they shall not give any aid or advice in so far as he, the Governor is required to act in his discretion? This is an article which is intended to , define the powers and functions of the Chief Minister. At that point to suggest this, looks like lacking in courtesy and politeness.

NABAM REBIA, AND 13AMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH· SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

Therefore I think the question should be considered in that way. A The question is not whether we are going to give discretionary powers to the Governors or not. The question is not whether he is to be merely a figure-head or otherwise. These are questions to be debated at their proper time and place. When we are considering article 143 which defines the functions of the Chief Minister it looks so awkward and unnecessary to say in the same article "except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion." Though I entirely agree that article 188 is absolutely necessary 1 suggest that in this article 143 these words are entirely.unnecessary and should not be there. Looked at from a practical point of view c this provision is misplaced and it is not courteous, nor polite, nor justified nor relevant. I therefore suggest that nothing would be lost by deleting these words. I do not know whether my suggestion would be acceptable but I think it is worth being considered from a higher point of view.

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The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: Mr. President, Sir, I did not think that it would have been necessary for me to speak and take part in this debate after what my Friend, Mr. T. T. Krishnamachari, had said on this amendment of Mr. Karnath, but as my Friend, Pandit Kunzru, pointedly asked me the question and demanded a reply, I thought that out of cou11esy I should say a few words. Sir, the main and the crucial question is, should the Governor have discretionary powers? It is that question which is the main and the principal question. After we come to some decision on this question, the other question whether the words used in the last part of clause (I) of article 143 should be retained in that article or should be transferred somewhere else could be usefully considered. The first thing, therefore, that I propose to do so is to devote myself of this question which, as I said, is. the crucial question. It has been said in the course of the debate that the retention of discretionary power in the Governor is contrary to responsible government in the provinces. It has also been said that the retention of discretionary power in the Governor smells of the Government of India Act, 1935, which in the main was undemocratic. Now, speaking for myself, I have no doubt in my mind that the retention in or the vesting the Governor with certain

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discretionary powers is in no sense contrary to or in no sense a negation ofresponsible government. I do not wish to rake up the point because on this point I can very well satisfy the House by reference to the provisions in the Constitution of Canada and the Constitution of Australia. I do not think anybody in this House would dispute that the Canadian system of government is not a fully responsible system of government, nor will anybody in this House cha Ilenge that the Australian Government is not a responsible form of government. Having said that, I would like to read section 55 of the Canadian Constitution. "Section 55.-Where a Bill passed by the Houses of Parliament is presented to the Governor-General for the Queen's assent, he shall, according to his discretion, and subject to provisions of this Act, either assent thereto in the Queen's name, or withhold the Queen's assent or reserve the Bill for the signification of the Queen's pleasure."

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The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: I think he has misread the article. I am sorry I do not have the Draft Gonstitution with me. "Except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution," those are the words. If the words were "except whenever he thinks that he should exercise this power of discretion against the wishes or against the advice of the ministers", then I think the criticism made by my honourable Friend Pandit Kunzru would have been valid. The clause is a very limited clause; it says: "except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution". Therefore, article 143 will have · to be read in conjunction with such other articles which specifically reserve the power to the Governor. It is not a general clause giving the Governor power to disregard the advice of his ministers in any matter in which he finds he ought to disregard. There, I think, lies the fallacy of the argument of my honourable Friend, Pandit Kunzru. Therefore, as I said, having stated that there is nothing incompatible with the retention of the discretionary power in the Governor in specified cases with the system of responsible Government, the only question that arises is, how should we provide for the mention of this discretionary power? It seems to me that there are three ways by which this could be done. One way is to omit the words

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SlNGH KHEHAR, J.)

from article 143 as my honourable Friend, Pandit Kunzru, and others desire and to add to such articles as 175, or 188 or such other provisions which the House may hereafter introduce, vesting the Governor with the discretionary power, saying notwithstanding article 143, the Governor shall have this or that power. The other way would be to say in article 143, ''that except as provided in articles so and so specifically mentioned-articles 175, 188, 200 or whatever they are". But the point I am t1ying to submit to the House is that the House cannot escape from mentioning in some manner that the Governor shall have discretion. Now the matter which seems to find some kind of favour with my honourable Friend, Pandit Kunzru and those who have spoken in the same way is that the words should be omitted from here and should be tra1isferred somewhere else or that the specific articles should be mentioned in article 143. It seems to me that this is a mere method of drafting. There is no question of substance and no question of principle. I personally myself would be quite willing to amend the last portion of clause (I) of ai1icle 143 if I knew at this stage what are the provisions that this Constituent Assembly proposes to make with regard to the vesting of the Governor with discretionary power. My difficulty is that we have not as yet come either to article 175 or 188 nor have we exhausted all the possibilities of other provisions being made, vesting the Governor with discretionary power. If I knew that, I would very readily agree to amend article 143 and to mention the specific article, but that cannot be done now. Therefore, my submission is that no wrong could be done ifthe words as they stand in article 143 remain as they are. They are ce11ainly not inconsistent.

Shri H. V. Karnath: Is there no material difference between article 61(1) relating to the President vis-a-vis his ministers and this

article? The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: Of course there is because we do not want to vest the President with any discretionary power. Because the provincial Governments are required to work in subordination to the Central Government, and therefore, in order to see that they do act in subordination to the Central Government the Governor will reserve certain things in order to give the President the opprn1unity to see that the rules under which the provincial Governments are supposed to act according to the

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Constitution or in subordination to the Central Government are observed. Shri H.V. Karnath: Will it not be better to specify certain articles in the Constitution with regard to discretionary powers, instead of conferring general discretionary powers like this?

The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: I said so, that I would very readily do it. I am prepared to introduce specific articles, if I knew what are the articles which the House is going to incorporate in the Constitution regarding vesting of the discretionary powers in the Governor.

Shri H.V. Karnath: Why not hold it over?

The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: We can revise. This House is perfectly competent to revise article 143. If after going through the whole of it, the House feels that the better way would be to mention the articles specifically, it can do so. It is purely a logomachy." It is not necessary for us to summarise any inferences or conclusions, from the above debate, as the same are apparent from the suggestions and responses, highlighted above. 43. Reliance was then placed on the decision rendered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Sam sher Singh v. State of Punjab 1 • The question that arose for consideration in the above case was; whether the Governor as a constitutional head of the State, could exercise powers or functions ofappointment and removal of members of the subordinate judicial service, personally? The contention of the State Government was, that the Governor was obliged to exercise powers of appointment and removal, conferred on him by or under the Constitution, like the other executive power of the State Government, only on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, and not personally. As against the above stance, the appellants before this Court placed reliance on the decision in Sardari Lal v. Union of India', wherein this Court had held, that the President or the Governor, as the case may be, on being satisfied would make an order under Article 311 (2), and more particularly, under proviso (c) thereof. It was further held, that the satisfaction of the President or the Governor, in the above matter, was his "personal satisfaction". It was therefore, the contention of the appellants before (1974)2SCC831 ' (1971) l sec 411

I

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

this Court, in the above case, that in exercise of powers vested with the Governor under Article 234, the appointment/termination of subordinate judges was to be made by the Governor in exercise of his "personal discretion". It would also be relevant to mention, that the Samsher Singh case' was decided by a seven-Judge Bench, which examined the correctness of the decision rendered in the Sardari Lal case~. While debating the issue, this Cou1t in the Sam sher Singh case', examined the distinction between Articles 74 and 163, and held as under:

"16. It is noticeable that though in Article 74 it is stated that there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions, there is no provision in Article 74 comparable to Article 163 that the aid and advice is except in so far as he is required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion. 17. It is necessary to find out as to why the words 'in his discretion' are used in relation to some powers of the Governor and not in the case of the President. 18. Article 143 in the Draft Constitution became Article 163 in the Constitution. The Draft Constitution in Article 144(6) said that the functions of the Governor under that article with respect to the appointment and dismissal of Ministers shall be exercised by him in his discretion. Draft Article 144(6) was totally omitted when Article 144 became Article 164 in the Constitution, Again Draft Article 153(3) said that the functions of the Governor under clauses (a) and (c) of clause (2) ofthe article shall be exercised by him in his discretion. Draft Article 153(3) was totally omitted when it became Article 174 ofour Constitution. Draft A1ticle 175 (proviso) said that the Governor "may in his discretion return the Bill together with a message requesting that the House will reconsider the Bill". Those words that "the Governor may in his discretion" were omitted when it became Article 200. The Governor under Article 200 may return the B ii I together with a message requesting that the House will reconsider the Bill. Draft Article 188 dealt with provisions in case of grave emergencies. Clauses (1) and (4) in Draft Article 188 used the words "in his discretion" in relation to exercise of power by the Governor. Draft Article 188 was totally omitted. Draft Article 285(1) and (2) dealing with composition and staff of Public Service Commission used the expression "in

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his discretion" in relation to exercise of power by the Governor in regard to appointment of the Chairman and Members and making of regulation. The words "in his discretion" in relation to exercise of power by the Governor were omitted when it became Article 316. In Paragraph 15(3) of the Sixth Schedule dealing with annulment or suspension of Acts or suspension of Acts and resolutions of District and Regional Councils it was said that the functions of the Governor under the Paragraph shall be exercised by him in his discretion. Sub-paragraph 3 of Paragraph 15 of the Sixth Schedule was omitted at the time of enactment of the Constitution. 19. It is, therefore, understood in the background of these illustrative draft articles as to why Article 143 in the Draft Constitution which became Article 163 in our Constitution used the expression "in his discretion" in regard to some powers of the Governor. 20. Articles where the expression "acts in his discretion" is used in relation to the powers and functions of the Governor are those which speak of special responsibilities of the Governor. These articles are 371A(l)(b), 371A(l)(d), 371A(2)(b) and 371A(2)(f). There are two paragraphs in the Sixth Schedule, namely, 9(2) and 18(3) where the words "in his discretion" are used in relation to certain powers of the Governor. Paragraph 9(2) is in relation to determination ofamount ofroyalties payable by licensees or lessees prospecting for, or extracting minerals to the District Council. Paragraph 18(3) has been omitted with effect from January 21, 1972. .

xxx

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xxx

xxx

30. In all cases in which the President or the Governor exercises his functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers he does so by making rules for convenient transaction of the business of the Government oflndia or the Government of the State respectively or by allocation among his Ministers of the said business, in accordance with A11icles 77(3) and 166(3) respectively. Wherever the Constitution requires the satisfaction of the President or the Governor for the exercise of any power or function by the President or the Governor, . as the case may be, as for example in Articles 123, 213, 311 (2) proviso(c), 317, 352(1), 356 and 360 the satisfaction required

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY: SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

by the Constitution is not the personal satisfaction of the President or of the Governor but is the satisfaction of the President or of the Governor in the constitutional sense under the Cabinet system of Government. The reasons are these. It is the satisfaction of the Council of Ministers on whose aid and advice the President or the Governor generally exercises all his powers and functions. Neither Article 77(3) nor Article 166(3) provides for any delegation of power. Both Articles 77(3) and 166(3) provide that the President under Article 77(3) and the Governor under Article 166(3) shall make rules forthe more convenient transaction of the business of the Government and the allocation of business among the Ministers of the said business. The Rules of Business and the allocation among the Ministers of the said business all indicate that the decision of any Minister or officer under the Rules of Business made under these two articles viz., Article 77(3) in the case of the President and Article 166(3) in the case of the Governor of the State is the decision of the President or the Governor respectively."

44. Based on the determination rendered by this Court in the Samsher Singh case 1, it was submitted, that all functions discharged by the Governor, Jou Id have to be based on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers (with the Chief Minister as the head), and in the instant case, it is apparent, that the Governor had acted on his own, while issuing the order dated 9.12.2015, for summoning the House for 16.12.2015, under Article 174. It was pointed out, that the Governor in the above order had himself recorded, that " ... I may not be bound by the advice of the Council of.Ministers ... "and had also expressed therein, " ... it is a constitutional obligation on my part to ensure that the resolution for removal of the Speaker is expeditiously placed before the Legislative Assembly ... ". And likewise, the message of the Governor dated 9.12.2015, directing that the composition of the House should not be changed, and the manner in which the business of the House was to be conducted when it assembled on 16.12.2015, was issued without any aid and advice.

45. Based on the conclusions recorded in the Samsher Singh case 1, it was contended, that the disqualification process contemplated under the Tenth Schedule, is of no concern, of the Governor. While, it was acknowledged, that the Tenth Schedule was introduced into the

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Constitution, to maintain and sustain the process of democratic governance, and therefore, the same could not be put on a backburner or suspended. Learned counsel was emphatic in his submission, that the Governor has no role in the disqualification process contemplated under the Tenth Schedule. And the Speaker alone, has the authority to effectuate in his exclusive discretion, the schedule which needed to be adopted, in the process of disqualification ofMLAs. As such, it was asserted, that the fluidity of the democratic process, could not be treated as some kind of justification, for the Governor's order and message dated 9.12.2015. 46. Learned senior counsel also contended, that all actions of the Governor, ought to be in conformity with the aid and advice tendered to him by the Council of Ministers and the Chief Minister, except when mandated otherwise. It was submitted, that where such an express discretion is not provided for, by or under a constitutional provision, the Governor is precluded from exercising his own discretion. Illustratively, he invited our attention to Articles 371-A(1 )(b ), 371-A( I)( d), 37 l-A(2)(b) and 371-A(2)(t), wherein the Articles themselves postulate that the Governor would discharge his functions in his individual discretion/ judgment. Reliance in this behalf, was placed on PU Myllai Hlychho v. State of Mizoram'. It was submitted, that similar dis9retion has also been vested with the Governor under the provisions of the Fifth and the Sixth Schedules to the Constitution. In this behalf, reference was made to State ofMeghalaya v. KA Brhyien Kurkalang", Bhuri Nath v. Sate of Jammu & Kashmir', and Samatha v. State of A.P. 6 • Illustratively, reference was also made to Articles 167, 200 and 356 wherein the Governor is presumed to exercise his powers at his own discretion, because the above provisions cannot be construed otherwise. It was accordingly asserted, that individual discretion could be exercised by the Governor, only when the Governor was so expressly authorized by a constitutional provision, to exercise his discretion at his own. And not otherwise. 47. It was pointed out, that the functions of the office of the Governor vis-a-vis the State Legislature, are coruparable to those of the President with reference to the Parliament and the Central Government. In order to highlight the contours of the duties and responsibilities of the ' (2005J 2 sec n

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• (1972) 1 sec 148 ' (1997) 2 sec 745 '(1997)8SCCl91

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

Governor, and the extent to which he can participate in the legislative process, reliance was placed on a treatise by M.N Kaul and S.L. Shakdher - "Practice and Procedure of Parliament", (5th Edition), published by the Lok Sabha Secretariat. In order to highlight the extent of the Governor's power and authority, on the subject of summoning the Assembly, reference was made to the following position narrated in Chapter IX, which bears the heading-._"Summoning, Prorogation of the Houses of Parliament and the Dissolution of the Lok Sabha":

"Summoning of Lok SabhaThe power to summon Lok Sabha is vested in the President. He exercises this power on the recommendation of the Prime Minister or the Cabinet. He may make informal suggestions to the Prime Minister as to the more convenient date and time of summoning the House, but the ultimate advice in this matter rests with the Prime Minister. In West Bengal consequent on the resignation of eighteen members, inctuding one Minister, from the ruling United Front on 6 November, 1967, prima facie doubts arose about majority support to the Government in the Legislative Assembly. The Governor desired that the Assembly be summoned on 23 November, so that a confidence vote might be taken, but the Chief Minister said that he would call the Assembly into session on 18 December, as scheduled. Thereupon, the Governor dismissed the Ministry on 21 November.

The crisis in West Bengal, as observed by Speaker Reddy, was not unavoidable, for the Governor need not have precipitated matters by insisting on the Chief Minister to convene the Assembly earlier than scheduled, when the interval between the two dates was only of a few days.

In a Resolution adopted at the Conference of Presiding Officers, it was recommended that the Government of India should, in the light of the following observations, take urgent and suitable steps in regard to the powers of Governors to summon or prorogue the Legislatures and to dismiss Ministries:

That a Governor shall summon or prorogue the Legislature on the advice of the ChiefMinister. A convention shall be developed that the Chief Minister may fix the dates of summoning or prorogation

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after consulting the Presiding Officer concerned. The Governor may suggest an alternative date but it shall be left to the Chief Minister or the Cabinet to revise their decision or not. Where, however, there is undue delay in summoning a Legislative Assembly and the majority of members of the Legislative Assembly desire to discuss a Motion of No-confidence in a Ministry and make a request to that effect in writing to the Chief Minister, the ChiefM inister shal I advise the Governor to summon the Assembly within a week of such request. The proposal to summon Lok Sabha is initiated by the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs (and by the Leader of the House in case _the Prime Minister is not the Leader of the House) and submitted to the Prime Minister, after an informal consultation with the Speaker in regard to the date of commencement and the duration of the session. The Prime Minister may agree with the suggestion or refer it to the Cabinet. The proposal as finally agreed to by the Prime Minister or the Cabinet is formally submitted to the Speaker. If the Speaker also agrees (in the case of a rare disagreement, he may refer the matter back to the Prime Minister for reconsideration), he directs the Secretary-General to obtain the order of the President to summon Lok Sabha on the date and time specified. After the President has signed the order, the Secretariat notifies it in the Gazette Extraordinary and issues a press communique for wider publicity in the Press as well as over the All India Radio and Doordarshan." And from ChapLer XLI under the title - "Parliament and the States", our attention was invited to the following narration: "Prorogation of the Assembly

As regards prorogation, the Governor should normally act on the advice of his Council of Ministers. Where a notice ofno-confidence against his Ministry is pending in the Assembly, the Governor should first satisfy himself that the notice is not frivolous and is a genuine exercise of the parliamentary right of the Opposition to challenge the Government's majority. If so satisfied, the Governor should ask the Chief Minister to face the Assembly and allow the motion to be debated and voted upon. To prorogue the Assembly otherwise would amount to avoidance of responsibility of the Council of Ministers to the Assembly.

NABAM REBJA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

If an Assembly or Legislature has been prorogued in a State, the matter may be raised in the Lok Sabha and the Speaker may, in certain circumstances, allow a discussion thereon.

Dissolution of the Assembly Normally a Governor should exercise the power of dissolution on the advice of the Council of Ministers. If a Chief Minister who enjoys majority support advises dissolution, the Governor must accept the advice, but if he advises dissolution after losing his majority, the Governor need accept his advice only ifthe Ministry suffers a defeat on a question of major policy and the ChiefMinister wishes to appeal to the electorate fora mandate on that policy. In the case of a Chief Minister heading a single party Government which has been returned by the electorate in absolute majority, if the ruling party loses its majority because of defection by at least one-third of its members and the Chief Minister recommends dissolution so as to enable him to make a fresh appeal to the electorate, the Governor may grant a dissolution. The mere fact that some members of the pmty·have defected does not necessarily prove that the pa1ty has lost the confidence of the electorate. lf there is a no-confidence motion against a Ministry and the chief Minister, instead of facing the Assembly, advises the Governor to dissolve the Assembly, the Governor need not accept such advice, but should ask the ChiefMinisterto get the verdict of the Assembly on the no-confidence motion. In a case where the Chief Minister recommends dissolution of the Assembly when the Budget has not been voted and the Ministry claims majority support, the Ministry in such a situation should face the Assembly and get the Budget passed before seeking dissolution for whatever reason. If, on the other hand, there is· reason to believe that the Chief Minister no longer commands majority support, it is clearly open to the Governor to take steps to ascertain if it is possible to install another Minist1y which is able to command majority support and get the Budget passed. Failing both, the Governor has no alternative except to make a report to the President under article 356 because Parliament alone could then sanction appropriation for canying on the administration of the State.

A Governor is not bound to accept the advice ofa Chief Minister

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to dissolve the Assembly ifthe Chief Minister has lost the majority support." 48. In order to appreciate and effectively interpret Article 174, it was submitted, that it is necessary to examine draft Article 153 drawn by the Drafting Committee. The same is reproduced below:

"153. Sessions of the State Legislature, propagation and dissolution.-(!) The House or Houses of the Legislature of the State shall be summoned to meet twice at least in every year, and six months shall not intervene between their last sitting in one session and the date appointed for their first sitting in the next session. (2) Subject to the provisions of this article, the Governor may, from time to time (a) summon the Houses or either House to meet at such time and place as he thinks fit;

(b) prorogue the House or Houses; (c) dissolve the Legislative Assembly.

(3) The functions of the Governor under sub-clauses (a) and (c) of clause (2) of this article shall be exercised by him in his discretion." In the written comments submitted to draft Article 153, Jayaprakash Narayan suggested, that clause (3) of Article 153 should be deleted. It was his submission, that there was no reason why the Governor in his discretion, should be permitted to summon or dissolve the House, when no such discretionary power was being extended to the President (-with regard to summoning and dissolution, of the Parliament). Another reason expressed by him for deleting the aforesaid clause (3) was, the changed position of selection of Governors, whereby Governors are to be nominated by the President, instead of being elected, as hitherto before. When draft Article 153 came up for debate, Mohd. Tahir suggested, addition of the following words at the end of sub-clause (c) of clause (2) - "If the Governor is satisfied that the administration is failing and the Ministry has become unstable". It was canvassed, that merely because a Governor did not subscribe to the views of the majority party, he should not have the discretion to dissolve the House. It was asserted, that there could be no other reason forthe dissolution of a House, except mal-administration

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

and instability of the Government. It was therefore, that Dr. B.R. Ambedkar moved, that clause (3) of draft Article 153 be omitted, as the same was inconsistent with the scheme of a "constitutional" Governor. When put to vote, the amendment suggested by Mohd. Tahir was rejected, and the one suggested by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar was adopted. The above draft Article was renumbered as Article 174 of the Constitution.

49. Based on a collective reading of draft Article 153, and Article 174 of the Constitution, according to learned counsel, it was apparent that the original intention of the Constituent Assembly, to vest personal discretion with the Governor, for summoning, proroguing and dissolving . the House, was overruled. The above historical background, it was urged, should not be overlooked, and that, Article 174 should be interpreted in a manner as would exclude the personal discretion of the Governor, in the matter of summoning, proroguing or dissolving the House(s) of the State Legislature, in consonance with the obvious intention of the framers of the Constitution. Learned counsel for the appellants, suggested while concluding, that the Governor in the present case, having no discretion to unilaterally sµmmon the Assembly, having done so, while passing the order dated 9.12.2015, had acted unconstitutionaJly. Consequently, according to learned counsel, all steps taken by the Assembly, pursuant to the order dated 9.12.2015 were liable to be set aside, as unconstitutional and void. 50. The appellants also assailed the validity of the message of the Governor, dated 9.12.2015. In order to demonstrate the contours of the authority of the Governor under Article 175, it was pointed out, that the precursor to Article 175, was Section 63 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which is extracted below: "63. Right of Governor to address, and send messages to, Chambers.-(!) The Governor may in his discretion address the Legislative Assembly or, in the case of a Province having a Legislative Council, either Chamber of the Provincial Legislature or both Chambers assembled together, and may for that purpose require the attendance of members.

(2) The Governor may in his discretion send messages to the Chamber or Chambers of the Provincial Legislature, whether with respect to a Bill then pending in the Legislature or otherwise, and a Chamber to whom. any message is so sent shaJI with aJI

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convenient dispatch consider any matter which they are required by the message to take into consideration."

Referring to the words "in his discretion" used in sub-section (2) of Section 63, it was submitted, that Article 175 vests no such discretion, with the Governor. It was therefore contended, that the framers of the B Constitution, did not intend to confer any discretion with the Governor, in the matter of sending messages (envisaged under Article 175). Accordingly, it was submitted, that no authority is vested with the Governor under Article 175(2), to send messages in respect of the functioning of the House, at his own. It was pointed out, that there was no question of .. any right being vested with the Governor, to interfere with the legislative C · autonomy of the House, by addressing a message to the House under Article 175. It was submitted, that the message of the Governor dated 9.12.2015, was beyond the purview of Article 175(2), and therefore, was liable to be declared unconstitutional.

51. It was also asserted, that the message of the Governor dated 9.12.2015, contained directions to the House. The aforesaid directions, according to learned counsel, would not fall .within the purview of messages contemplated under Article 175(2). It was pointed out, that the 'Conduct of Business Rules' framed under Article 208, assigned no such role to the Governor. A Governor, according to learned counsel, cannot determine or interfere with, any issue with reference to the conduct of business, within the Legislative Assembly. In support of the above proposition, reliance was placed on Rule 21, of the 'Conduct of Business Rules', which is extracted below: "Arrangement of Business, Provisional Programme and List of Business. (a) Arrangement of Business:

21. Arrangement of Govt. business. On days allotted for the transaction of Government business, such business shall have precedence and the Secretary shall arrange that business In such order as the Speaker may, after consultation with the Leader of the House, determine: Provided that such order of business shall not be varied on the day that business is set down for disposal unless the Speaker is satisfied that there is sufficient ground for such variation."

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

Based on Rule 21, it was submitted, that a Governor has no right to determine the agenda of the business of the House. Or even, the sequence in which the business of the House, was to be conducted. To the above extent, it was submitted, that the message of the Governor dated 9.12.2015, was not only unconstitutional, but also violative of Rule 21. It was therefore submitted, that it was not open to the Governor, to have directed the House, through his message dated 9.12.2015, to take up the resolution for removal of the Speaker, as the first item on the agenda, on 16.12.2015. A reference was also made to Rules 152 to 154 of the 'Conduct of Business Rules', which are extracted below:

"152. Leave of House to take up resolution.- (I) Subject to the provisions of Article 181 of the Constitution, the Speaker or the Q'W.!J.!J'_fuleaker or such oth~r person as is referred to in clause (2) ofArticle 180 of the Constitution shall preside when a motion under rule 151 is taken up for consideration.

(2) The member in whose name the motion stands on the list of business shall, except when he wishes to withdraw it, move the motion when called upon to do so, but no speech shall be pem1itted at th is stage. 153. Inclusion of Resolution in the list of.- On the appointed day the Resolution shall be included in the list of business to be taken up after the questions and before any other business for the day is entered upon.

154. Time limit for speeches. - Except with the permission of the Speaker or the 11erson presiding, a speech on the Resolution shall not exceed fifteen minutes in duration: Provided that the mover of the Resolution when moving the same may speak for such longer time as the Speaker or the person presiding may permit." Based on the above Rules, it was urged, that the entire proceedings in the Assembly, are to be regulated by the Speaker (or the Deputy Speaker), and that, the Governor has no role in the proceedings of the House. 52. It was also co1ttended, that the Governor is neither a member of the State Legislative Assembly, nor an officer of the State Legislature, and therefore, a Governor can have no jurisdiction in the functioning, and affairs of the House. It was accordingly asserted, that the intent

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expressed in Article 168, should not be determined from a cursory reading thereof, but should be visualised from the scheme of the surrounding provisions. The Governor's connectivity and relationship with the House, according to learned counsel, was based on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister.

53. It was submitted, that the Governor has no authority whatsoever, to get embroiled with matters falling under the Tenth Schedule. It was urged, that the Speaker, was the sole adjudicatory authority, under the Tenth Schedule, and his actions ~h·reunder cannot be interfered with, by or at the behest of the Governor. !twas submitted, that even the Legislative Assembly itself, could not interfere with the Speaker's determination, under the Tenth Schedule. It was urged, that on the same analogy, even the Deputy Speaker of the House, had no authority whatsoever, to set aside an order passed by the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule. It was pointed out, that even the Speaker himself had no power or discretion to review the order of disqualification dated 15.12.2015 (as in the present case). In this behalf, reliance was placed on the following observations recorded in Dr. Kashinath G. Jalmi v. The Speaker7 :

"49. The power of review which, it is suggested by counsel for the respondents, inheres in the Speaker by necessary implication has to be found in the provisions made in the Tenth Schedule alone, and not elsewhere. Para 7 has to be treated as non-existent in the Tenth Schedule from the very inception, as earlier indicated. As held by the majority in Kihoto Hollohan 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651,judicial review is available against an order of disqualification made by the Speaker under para 6 of the Tenth Schedule, notwithstanding the finality mentioned therein. It is on account of the nature of finality attaching by virtue of para 6, that the judicial review available against the Speaker's order has been labelled as limited in para 110 (at page 711 ofSCC) of the decision in Kihoto Hollohan and the expression has to be understood in that sense distinguished from the wide power in an appeal, and no more. As held in Kihoto Hollohan, the Speaker's order is final being subject only to judicial review, according to the settled parameters of the exercise of power of judicial review in such cases, which it is not necessary to elaborate in the present context. The existence of

(1993)2sec103

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGD!SH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

judicial review against the Speaker's order of disqualification made under para 6 is itself a strong indication to the contrary that there can be no inherent power of review in the Speaker. read in the Tenth Schedule by necessary implication. The need for correction of errors in the Speaker's order.made under the Terith Schedule is met by the availabilitv of judicial review against the same. as held in Kihoto Hollohan. ·

50. In our opinion there is no merit in the submission that the power of review inheres in the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule as a necessary incident of his jurisdiction to decide the question of disqualification; or that such a power existed till November 12, 1991 when the decision in Kihota Hollohan (1992) I SCC 309 was rendered: or at least a limited power of review inheres in the Speaker to correct any palpable error outside the scope of judicial review." 54. It was the pointed assertion of learned senior counsel, that the order of the Deputy Speaker dated 16.12.2015, quashing the Speaker's order dated 15.12.2015 (disqualifying 14 members of the House, belonging to the INC}, was totally without jurisdiction. It was also urged, that if any individual including the Deputy Speaker of the Assembly and/ or the other 13 disqualified members of the House were aggrieved, they could have legitimately taken recourse to judicial review, either before the jurisdictional High Court under Article 226, or before this Court under Article 32. It was pointed out, that the disqualified MLAs had actually assailed their disqualification orders before the High Court. It was accordingly submitted, that the decision of the Deputy Speaker, quashing the order of the Speaker dated 15.12.2015 (disqualifying 14 MLAs of the INC), was per se unconstitutional, it lacked jurisdictional authority, and as such, was unacceptable in law. 55. In addition to the above, it was submitted, that the Deputy Speaker of the Assembly - Tenzing Norbu Thongdok was one of the 14 INC MLAs of the Assembly disqualified by the Speaker vide his order dated 15.12.2015. As such, it was urged, that it was not open to the Deputy Speaker, to set aside the order of his own disqualification. It was submitted, that the aforesaid determination at the hands of the Deputy Speaker, amounted to the Deputy Speaker acting as a judge in his own cause. It was pointed out, that not only his action was illegal, but the same was also violative of the rules of natural justice. With reference to

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the importance of the validity (or invalidity) of the order of the Deputy Speaker dated 16.12.2015, it was pointed out, that in case the above order was found by this Cou1t to be unacceptable in law, the paiticipation of the 14 disqualified MLAs belonging to the INC, in the proceedings of the House on 16.12.2016 - and thereafter, was liable to be considered as non est in the eyes of law. It is important for us to record, that the validity of above order of the Deputy Speaker, is sub-judice before the jurisdictional High Cou1t at Guwahati. 56. It was submitted, that the proceedings of the Assembly held with effect from 16.12.2015, till the House was prorogued on 18.12.2015 with the participation of the 14 disqualified MLAs belonging to the INC, was nothing but an ove1t political act of the BJP MLAs, supported by the Governor, to undermine the democratic process in the State. It was submitted, that once the Governor had summoned the leader of the political pa1iy, having the largest strength amongst the different political parties, to form Government, without any suppo1t from any other political party, the action of the Governor expressed through the order and message dated 9.12.2015 was absolutely undemocratic, and unconstitutional. 57. Mr. F.S. Nariman, learned Senior Advocate entered appearance, in support of the claim raised by the appellants. He represented Bamang Felix - Deputy Chief Whip of the INC. In his opening statement, Mr. Nariman adopted the factual and the legal submissions advanced on behalf ofNabam Rebia. He pointed out, that he affirmed the submissions advanced by Mr. Kapil Sibal, but would assist the Court, by projecting some further constitutional aspects. 58. In the first instance, learned senior counsel placed reliance on two repo1ts. The first - the Justice Sarkaria Commission report, on "Centre-State Relations", and the second - the Justice M.M. Punchh! Commission report, on "Constitutional Governance and Management of Centre-State Relations". It was pointed out, that in the Justice Sarkaria Commission report, Chapter 5 was attributed to the role of the Governor. And in the Justice M.M. Punchhi Commission report, Chapter 4 was ascribed to the role .of the Governor. It was asse1ted, that reference to both the reports would be repetitive, inasmuch as, the conclusions drawn in the Justice Sarkaria Commission repo1t, had been substantially affirmed and reiterated in the Justice M.M. Punchhi Commission report. It was therefore, that learned counsel placed reliance only on the Justice M.M. Punchhi Commission report. He invited our attention to paragraph 4.1.03,

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

of the report, wherein the Commission adopted the reasoning expressed during the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly for arriving at its conclusions. Reference was also made to paragraphs 4.2.09 to 4.2.15 high!ightingthe fact, thatthe Governor in exercise of his fi.111ctions, cannot act in his individual capacity, especially when the function sought to be discharged (by the Governor), is in the realm of executive dispensation. Reliance was also placed on paragraph 4.3 of the report (in its entirety), which expounds the proposition, that it is not expected of the Governor to embroil himself in day-to-day activities ofrival political parties, and that, Governors are expected to be independent, and to act in a manner devoid of any political consideration. It was pointed out, that independence of such actions would include, keeping the State Legislature and the political executive, shielded from the political will of the Union Government. Especially when the concerned State and the Union were not being governed by the same political party/conglomerate. Last of all, reliance was placed on paragraph 4.5, and more particularly, on sub-paragraph 4.5.03, to demonstrate, that a reading of the constitutional provisions had resulted in the two Commissions very clearly expounding, that the Governor was bound to act in consonance with the aid and advice tendered to him, by the Council ofMinistersand the Chief Minister. It was pointed out, that the aforesaid mandate was also applicable to situations, where provisions of the Constitution had used expressions Iike "he thinks fit". It was pointed out, that only in situations, where a constitutional provision expressly requires the Governor to exercise his fui1ctions in his own discretion, it is open to the Governor to do so. Only then, the exercise of such discretion, will be deemed to have been constitutionally exercised. Paragraphs of the Justice M.M. Punchhi Commission report, relied upon by learned senior counsel, are extracted hereunder:

"4.1.03 Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, highlighted the Constitutional role of the Governor in following terms: "The Governor un.QerJh~S::Qrn;tltution has no functions which he can discharge fil' himself: no functions at all. While he has no functions, he has certain duties to perform, and I think the House will do well to bear in mind this distinction. This Article (Article 167) certainly, it should be borne in mind, does not confer upon the Governor the power to overrule the Ministry on any particular matter. Even under this Article, the Governor is bound to accept the advice of the Ministry ... This Article, nowhere, either in clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c1 savs that the Governor in any

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particular circumstances may overrule the Ministry. Therefore. the criticism that has been made that this Article somehow enables the Governor to interfere or to upset the decision of the Cabinet is entirely beside the point, and completely mistaken. A distinction has been made between the functions of the Governor and the duties which the Governor has to perform. My submission is that although the Governor has no functions still, even the Constitutional Governor, that he is, has certain duties to perform. His duties according to me, may be classified in two parts. One is, that he has to retain the Ministry in office. Because, the Ministry is to hold office during his pleasure, he has to see whether and when he should exercise his pleasure against the Ministry. The second duty which the Governor has, and must have, is to advice the Ministry, to warn the Ministry, to suggest to the Ministry an alternative and to ask for a reconsideration. I do not think that anybody in this House will question the fact that the Governor should have this duty cast upon him; otherwise, he would be an absolutely unnecessary functionary: l}O good at all. He is the representative not of a party; he is the representative of the people as a whole of the State. It is in the name of the people that he carries on the administration. He must see thatthe administration is carried on at a level which may be regarded as good, efficient. honest administration. I submit that he cannot discharge the constitutional functions of a Governor which I have just referred to unless he is in a position to obtain the information ... It is to enable the Governor to discharge his functions in respect of a good and pure administration that we propose to give the Governor the power to call for any information ... 4.2.09 The Governor does not exercise the executive functions individually or personally. The State Government at various levels takes executive action in the name of the Governor in accordance with the rules of business framed under Article 166(3). Hence, it is the State Government and not the Governor who may sue or be sued in respect of any action taken in the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of his office [Articles 361. 299(2) and 300]. 4.2.10 The Governor enjoys the same privileges as the President does under Article 361 and he stands, in this respect, on the same footing. Article 361 states that neither the President nor the

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

Governor can be sued for executive actions of the Government. The reason is that neither the President nor the Governor exercises the executive functions individually or personally.

4.2.11 The Governor is not answerable to any court for the exercise and the performance of the powers and duties of his office, or for 'any act done or purporting to be done by him' in the exercise and performance of those duties. The words 'purporting to be done by him' are of very wide import, and even though, the act is outside the scope of his powers, so long it is professed to be done in pursuance of the Constitution, the Governor will be protected. 4.2.12 Lack of bona-fide vitiates executive action, but due to the operation ofArticle 361 the Governor is not personally responsible. Even where the Governor's bonafide is in question while exercising his discretionary powers, such as appointment and dismissal of Chief Minister, he cannot be called to enter upon defense. The Madras High Court had held that a combined reading of Articles 154, 163 and 361 would show that the immunity against answerability to any Court is regarding functions exercised by the Governor qua Governor and those functions in respect of which he acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers or in his discretion. 4.2.13 In the recent case of Rameshwar Prasad, Chief Justice Sabharwal, while stating the majority opinion held: The immunity granted to the Governor under Article 361 ( 1) does not affect the power of the Court to judicially scrutinize the attack made to the proclamation issued under Article 361 (1) of the Constitution of India on the ground of mala fides or it being ultra vi res. It would be for the Government to satisfy the court and adequately meet such ground of challenge. A mala fide act is wholly outside the scope of the power and has no existence in the eyes of law. Even, the expression "purporting to be done" in Article 361 (I) does not cover acts which are mala fide or ultra vires and, thus, the Government supporting the proclamation under Article 361 ( 1) shall have to meet the challenge.

The personal immunity from answerability provided in Article 36](1) does not barthe challenge that may be made to their actions. Under law, such actions including those actions where the challenge may be based on the allegations ofmala fides are required to be defended by Union of India or the State, as the case may be.

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Even in cases where the personal mala fides are alleged and established; it would not be open to the Governments to urge that the same cannot be satisfactorily answered because of the immunity granted. In such an eventuality, it is for the respondent defending the action to satisfy the Court either on the basis of the material on record or even filing the affidavit of the person against whom such allegation of personal mala fides are made. Article 361(1) does not bar filing ofan affidavit ifone wants to file on his own. The bar is only against the power of the Court to issue notice or making the President or the Governor answerable. In view of the bar, the Court cannot issue direction to President or Governor for even filing of affidavit to assist the Court. 4.2.14 In a ve1y limited field. howe\~JJb.eS!.\wernoi:..ill!!Y exercise certain functio_ns in his dis~n~tion~_provided ii] Article 163( I). The first part of Article 163( 1) requires the Governor to act on the advice of his Council of Ministers. There is. however. an exce12tion in the latter part of the clause in regard to matters where he is by or under the Constitution required to function in his discretion. The exP.ression "required" signifies that the Governor can exercise his discretionary powers only if there is a compelling necessity to do so. It has been held that the expression "by or under the Constitution" means that the necessity to exercise such powers may arise from any express provision of the Constitution or by necessary implication. We would like to add that such necessity may also arise from rules and orders made "under" the Constitution." 4.2.15 Thus, the scope of discretiona1y powers as provided in the exception in clause ( 1) and in clause (2) of Article 163 has been limited by the clear language of the two clauses. It is an accepted principle that in a parliamentary democracy with a responsible form of government, the powers of the Governor as Constitutional or formal head of the State should not be enlarged at the cost of the real executive, viz. the Council of Ministers. The scope of discretionary powers has to be strictly construed, effectively dispelling the apprehension, if any, that the area for the exercise of discretion covers all or any of the functions to be exercised by the Governor under the Constitution. In other words, Article 163 does not give the Governor a general discretionary power to act against or without the advice of his Council of Ministers. The

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

area for the exercise of his discretion is limited. Even this limited area. his choice of action should not be arbitrary or fanciful. It must be a choice dictated by reason, actuated by good faith and tempered by caution. 4.3 Role of Governor in Management of Centre-State Relations

4.3.0 I The role of the Governor has been a key issue in the matters of Central State relations. The Constitution of India envisages three tiers of Government - the Union, State and the Local SelfGovernment. In the light ofa volatile Political system prevailing today, it is pertinent to recognize the crucial role played by the Governors in the working of the democratic framework. Addressing the Conference of Governors in June 2005, the President of India, Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam stressed the relevance of recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission and observed that "While there are many checks and balances provided by the Constitution, the office of the Governor has been bestowed with the independence to rise above the day-to-day politics and override compulsions either emanating from the central system or the state system. "The Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh on the same occasion noted that "you are the representatives of the centre in states and hence, you bring a national perspective to state level actions and activities". The then Vice-President oflndia, Shri G.S. Pathak, had remarked in 1970 that "in the sphere which is bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers, for obvious reasons, the Governor must be independent of the center" as there may be cases "where the advice of the Center may clash with advice of the State Council of Ministers" and that "in such cases the Governor must ignore the Centre's "advice" and act on the advice of his Council ofMinisters.".

4.3.02 One highly significant role which he (Governor) has to play under the Constitution is of making a report where he finds that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. The Governor is not amenable to the directions of the Government of India, nor is he accountable to them forJhe manner in which he carries out his functions and duties. He is an independent constitutional office which is not subject to the control of the Government of India.

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4.3.03 The Court in Rameshwar Prasad case affirmed the following views of the Sarkaria Commission that the Governor needs to discharge "dual responsibility" to the Union and the State. Further, most of the safeguards as regards the working of the Governor will be such as cannot be reduced to a set of precise rules of procedure or practice. This is so because of the very nature of the office and the role of the Governor. The safeguards have mostly to be in the nature of conventions and practices, to be understood in their proper perspective and faithfully adhered to, not only by the Union and the State Governments but also by the political parties. 4.5 Powers of the Governor in the Context of Harmonious CentreState Relations Article 163 of the Constitution, unlike Article 74. carves out two ways in which the power of the Governor must be exercised. One, in which the Governor has to act in accordance with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and two. where he exercises his personal discretion. The concept of the Governor acting in his discretion or exercising independent judgment is not alien to the Constitution. The normal rule is that the Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, but there are exceptions under which the Governor can act in his own discretion. The powers in exercise of which the Governor has to use his personal discretion have now been settled through judicial pronouncements. In relation to other powers, even though the Constitution uses phrases like "he thinks fit" and "in exercise of his discretion", the Governor must act on the aid and advise of the Council of Ministers. Article 163(2) gives an impression that the Governor has a wide, undefined area of discretionary powers even outside situations where the Constitution has expressly provided for it. Such an impression needs to be dispelled. The Commission is of the view that the scope of discretionary powers under Article 163(2) has to be narrowly construed, effectively dispelling the apprehension, if any. that the so-called discretionary powers extends to all the functions that the Governor is empowered under the Constitution. Article 163 does not give the Governor a general discretionary power to act against or without the advice of his Council of· Ministers. In fact. the area for the exercise of discretion is limited

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

and even in this limited area. his choice of action should not be nor appear to be arbitrary or fanciful. It must be a choice dictated by reason. activated by good faith and tempered by caution. The Governor's discretionary powers are the following: to give assent or withhold or refer a Bill for Presidential assent under Article 200; the appointment of the Chief Minister under Article 164; dismissal of a Government which has lost confidence but refuses to quit. since the Chief Minister holds office during the pleasure of the Governor; dissolution of the House under Article 174; Governor;s report under Article 356; Governor's responsibilitv for certain regions under Article 371-A, 371-C. 371-E, 371-H etc. These aspects are now considered below:

4.5.03 Dismissal of the Chief Minister It has already been stated that the Council of Ministers occupy office upon the pleasure of the Governor. Further. Article 164 states that Council ofMinisters shall be collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly of the State. So the question arose as to whether the discretion of the Governor or his pleasure is curtailed by the fact that the Ministers no longer enjoy the confidence of the House. Courts have time and again clarified that the discretion of the Governor is not fettered by any condition or restriction. It was held thatthe Assembly could only express want ofconfidence in the Ministry; it can go no further. The power to dismiss solely and entirely rests with the Governor. However, the fact that the Ministry has lost confidence is a major consideration for its dismissal. The Sarkaria Commission recommended that if a Government loses its majority, it should be given a chance to prove whether it has a majority or not on the floor of the House. The Governor should not dismiss a Council of Ministers, unless the Legislative Assembly has expressed on the floor of the House its want of confidence in it. He should advise the ChiefMinisterto summon the Assembly as early as possible. If the Chief Minister does not accept the Governor's advice, the Governor may, summon the Assembly for the specific purpose of testing the majority of the Ministry. The Assembly should be summoned to meet early within a reasonable time. What is "reasonable" will depend on the circumstances of each case. Generally, a period of 30 days will

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be reasonable, unless there is very ur.gent business to be transacted, such as passing the Budget, in which case, a shorter period may be indicated. On the question of dismissal of a Chief Minister, the Governor should invariably insist on the Chief Minister proving his majority on the floor of the House for which he should prescribe a time limit. This view of the Sarkaria Commission ought to be considered in the form ofa Constitutional Amendment. 4.5.04 Summoning, proroguing and dissolution of the legislative assembly Article 174 of the Constitution empowers the Governor to summon, prorogue or dissolve the House. It is a well-recognised principle that, so long as the Council of Ministers enjoys the confidence of the Assembly, its advice in these matters, unless patently unconstitutional must be deemed as binding on the Governor. It is only where such advice, if acted upon, would lead to an infringement of a constitutional provision, or where the Council of Ministers has ceased to enjoy the confidence of the Assembly, that the question arises whether the Governor may act in the exercise of his discretion. The Sarkaria Commission recommended that, if the Chief Minister neglects or refuses to summon the Assembly for holding a "Floor Test", the Governor should summon the Assembly for the purpose. As regar~roroguing a House of Legislature, the Governor should normally act on the advice of the ChiefMinister. But where the latter advises prorogation when a notice of no-confidence motion against the Ministry is pending, the Governor should not straightaway accept the advice. If he finds that the no-confidence motion represents a legitimate challenge from the Opposition, he should advice the Chief Minister to postpone prorogation and face the motion. As far as dissolution of the House is concerned, the Governor is bound by the decision taken by the Chief Minister who has majority. However, if the advice is rendered by a Chief Minister who doesn't have majority, then the Governor can try to see if an alternate government can be formed and only if that isn't possible, should the house be dissolved. This Commission reiterates the recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission in this regard.,. 59. Learned senior counsel then placed reliance on Article 166, which postulates the manner of conducting the executive business of

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

the State Government. It was pointed out, that the Governor, has been A assigned the responsibility of framing rules under Article 166. For the State of Arunachal Pradesh, these rules were notified on 9 .4.1987::.. the Arunachal Pradesh Rules of Executive Business, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as, the Rules of Executive Business). It was submitted, that Part-I of the Rules of Executive Business containing Rules 4 to 12 are clustered under the heading - "Allocation and Disposal of Business". Whereas Part-II containing Rules 13 to 21, are grouped under the ·. heading- "Procedure of the Cabinet". Learned counsel thereupon, invited our attention to Rule 4 from Part-I and Rules 13 and ·14 from Part-II, which are being extracted hereunder:

Part I xxx

xxx

xxx

Rule4 "4. The business of the Government shall be transacted in -its different departments. Allocation of subjects among the· departments shall continue to be as set out in the Government of D .· Arunachal Pradesh (Allocation) Rules, 1975 (as notified from time . to time) until new Rules are prescribed." Part II xxx

xxx

Rules 13 and 14 "13. The Chief Secretary shall be the Secretary to the Cabinet· and another officer shall be designated to ee the Joint Secretary to the Cabinet. In the· absence of both the Chief Secretary and the Joint Secretary to the Cabinet the Chief Minister may appoint for this purpose any other Secretary to f.unction as the Secretary to the Cabinet.

· 14. All cases referred to as in the schedule shall, after consideration by the Minister be sent to the §ecretary with a view to obtaining orders of the Chief Minister for circulation of the-case.under Rule 16 or for bringing it for consideration at a meeting of the Cabinet." 60. Learned counsel then drew our attention to the Schedule referred to in Rules 8 and 14, and further invited our attention, to item no.4 in the said Schedule which is extracted below:

"Proposals to summon, prorogue or dissolve the legislature of the . · · State".

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It was urged on behalf of the appellants, that in the matter of summoning

the House for 16.12.2015, the procedure contemplated under Rules 8, 13 and 14 ought to have been adopted. But the same was breached. Learned senior counsel further pointed out, that while passing the order dated 3.11.2015 (when the same Governor had summoned the 6th session of the House to meet at 10 a.m. on 14.1.2016), the procedure contemplated under Rules 8 and 14 was duly followed. Learned counsel then referred to the summoning particulars to demonstrate, that the proposal to summon the 6th.s~ssion of the House, had emanated from the Chief Minister. The Court's attention was also invited to the fact, that the Speaker of the Assembly had also been consulted, on the matter, as also the duration of the 6th session, whereupon, the Chief Minister submitted the outcome on the matter to the Governor. It was pointed out, that the Governor had duly accepted the proposal, and had scheduled the 6th session of the Assembly, to meet at I 0 a.m. on 14.1.2016. It was asserted, that the above rules framed under Article 166 were binding and every constitutional authority, including the Governor of the State, who js bound to carry out his functions/duties in compliance therewith. 61. In addition to the above, our attention was invited to the 'Conduct of Business Rules', framed under Article 208. Learned senior counsel pointedly drew our attention to Rule 3, which is extracted hereunder: "3. The Chief Minister shall, in consultation with the Speaker, fix the date of commencement and the duration of the session, advise the Governor for summoning the Assembly under Article 174 of the Constitution." A perusal of the above rule, according to learned senior counsel, postulates a procedure, similar to the one-contemplated under the Rules of Executive Business, framed under Article 166. It was submitted, that in view of the clear mandate of Rule 3 extracted above, not only the Rules of Executive Business, framed under Article 166 must be deemed to have been breached by the Governor(through his order dated 9.12.2015), the Governor must also be deemed to-have breached Rule 3 of the Conduct of Business Rules, framed under Article 208. It was therefore the contention of learned counsel for the appellants, that the order of the Governor dated 9.12.2015, preponing the 6th session of the Assembly from the earlier determined date - 14.01.2016, by summoning it for 16.12.2015, was in breach of the rules framed under the Constitution, and was liable to be set aside.

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER 101 AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

The foundation of the respondents' case: The third sequence of facts: 62. A notice of resolution for the removal of the Speaker - Nabam Rebia, was moved on 19.11.2015. This factual position is not in dispute. The authors of this notice were 13 MLAs- 11 belonging to the BJP and 2 Independent MLAs. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants, that a notice of resolution dated 16.11.2015 was moved by 16 MLAs, all belonging to the INC, for the removal of the Deputy Speaker - Tenzing Norbu Thongdok. This factual position is disputed at the hands of the respondents. The claim of the respondents before this Court was, that no such resolution had been moved under Article 179, forthe removal of the Dep~ty Speaker. During the course of hearing, we ventured to determine the factual position. In support Qf their assertion, learned counsel for the appellants invited our attention to a xerox copy of the notice dated 16.11.2015, which is reproduced below:

''To, The Secretary' Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly Naharlagun. Sub: Resolution for Removal of Deputv Speaker, under Article 179(c) of Constitution of India and Rule 151 (Chapter XX) of Rules of procedure and conduct of Business AP Legislative Assembly.

Sir, We the Members of the 61h Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly do here by move this resolution as per the Articles and Rules quoted in the subject cited above. The specific Charges against the incumbent Deputy Speaker warranting his removal F . from the post are as below: · . 1. The Deputy Speaker is absent from attending his office continuously for a period three months which shows disability to " hold the post of Deputy Speaker 2. The Deputy Speaker is involved in active political dissidence G activity and thereby demeaning the office of the Deputy Speaker and also there by the neutrality and sanctity of the Legislative Assembly is at stake. Therefore, we request you to kindly accept this resolution and initiate necessary action immediately. Yours Sincerely" · H

'

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All 16 MLAs had affixed their signatures, below theabove notice. Having perused the aforesaid document, and having found no clear endorsements thereon (depicting the receipt thereof, in the office of the Secretary, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly), we called.for the original. During the hearing, learned counsel representing the appellants adopted the stance, that the original resolution was in the custody of the respondents, whereas, learned counsel for the respondents pleaded to the contrary, namely, that the same was in the custody of the appellants. It is therefore apparent, that even though the Court desired to peruse the original resolution mpved by 16 MLAs for the removal of the Deputy Speaker, the same was never produced for consideration. For sure the appellants, ifnothing else, could have filed an affidavit of the concerned 16 MLAs, along with a copy of the resolution. But they did nothing of the sort. 63. Despite the above, it was asserted on behalf of the respondents, that there was substantial material on the record of the case, to demonstrate that such a resolution had never been moved. In order to establish that the notice dated 16.11.2015 was actually submitted, learned counsel for the appellants referred to a letter dated· 7.12.2015 addressed by the.Deputy Secretary - Minik Damin (attached to the Governor), to the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly. The above communication which bore reference number GS/I-115/00 (Vol.II)/6742, is being extracted hereunder: "To The Secretary,, ·Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, Arunachal Pradesh, Naharlagun. Sub: Notice of Resolution for removal of Deputy Speaker. Sir, I am directed to inform you that there is a Notice of Resolution for removal of Deputv Speaker. A copy of the resolution may kindly be forwarded to this Office for information and perusal of His Excellency the Governor. The Hon'ble Governor would also like to have the following information on the above stated resolution at the earliest. I. Date ofreceipt of the notice of the resolution in the Legislative Assembly.

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER I 03 ·AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] 2. Action taken by the Legislative Assembly on the notice: 3. Highlight of the precedents, if any. . Kindly ensure that replies of above points are sent latest by 8'• December, 2015. Yours faithfully, signed(illegible) 07.12.2015 (MinikDamin) Deputy Secretary to Governor" The aforesaid communication, according to learned counsel for the appellants, was responded to by the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly on the following day, i.e., 8.12.2015. The response is extracted below: "To, The Secretary to Governor, .Governor's Secretariat, RajBhawan, Itanagar. Sub: Notice of Resolution of Removal ofHon'ble Deputy Speaker. Sir, . With reference to your letter No. GS/1-115/00 (Vol-II) 6742 dated 7"' December, 2015 on the above mentioned subject, I am to furnish the following information required by you for kind peruSal of His Excellency, the Governor. . '

'.

I.

2. ··

3.

'

. !I'•

o.t~ of Receipt of Notice of the Resofu11on of the Legislative

Assembly. Action Taken by !he Legislative Assembly on Notice Highlightoflhe precedent

!6th November. 2015.

Fl le

processed

consideration Speaker.

and of

\!!!der

F.

Hon'ble

Nill Yours faithfully,

signed 8/XII/15 (M.LASA)

Secretary,

Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, Naharlag\!!!. Signed (illegible) 8/12115'

'

t

)

104 .

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•

Further it is learned that Hon'ble speaker is en tour in his home con-sti1uency. He is: likely to return late night today. For information please. signed (illegible) (Tage Ha bung) SP A DC to G ovcrnor Di. Secretary to Governor _,

H.E.

maY like to Peruse Please. Signed 8.12.1 s D.S.

Illegjble signed 08.12.IS"

NABAM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

Based on the note/endorsement extracted above, it was submitted, that even though the Deputy Secretary to the Governor, through his communication dated 7.12.2015, had sought "A copy of ... " the notice of resolution for the removal of the Deputy Speaker - Tenzing Norbu Thongdok, the same was not furnished to the Governor. Further more, it was pointed out from the note/endorsement dated 8.12.2015 (of the Superintendent of Police-cum-ADC to the Governor), that even on his visit to the office of the Speaker, when he had met the Secretary, the_ Additional Secretary and the Officer-on-Special Duty to the Speaker, he was not furnished with a copy of the notice of resolution for the removal of the Deputy Speaker. Rather he was informed, that the same was in the personal custody of the Speaker, who was on tour in his home constituency. Learned counsel for the respondents wishes us to draw a very important inference, from their instant assertion. That, the factum of the custody of the notice of resolution for the removal of the Deputy -;· Speaker, was allegedly in the custody of the Speaker of the House, and that, the Speaker never ever produced the original t-hereof. And the Speaker, who is one of the appellants before this Court, did not produce _the same, even when it was called for by the Court. And secondly, despite repeated efforts made by the Governor, to obtain a copy of the notice of .resolution for the removal of the Deputy Speaker - Tenzing Norbu Thongdok, no such copy was ever furnished to him, by the office of the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly. 66. More important than the factual inferences drawn in the foregoing paragraph, was the assertion at the hands of the respondents, that the letter addressed by the Secretary of Legislative Assembly dated 8.12.2015, to the Secretary to the Governor extracted hereinabove, was a forged and fabricated document. The accusation was aimed at the appellants, who alone could be beneficiaries of the above resolution. To demonstrate, that the communication dated 8.12.2015 was a forged and fabricated document, the Court's attention was drawn towards a similar intimation, about the notice ofresolution for the removal of the Speaker, on the very same day- 8.12.2015. The above communication, bearing endorsement number LA/Leg.26/2015, is extracted hereunder:"Dated Naharlagun, the 8th Dec, 2015. To, The Secretary to Governor, Governor Secretariat,

" , SUPREME COURT REPORTS

A-

Raj Bhawan Itanagar, Arunachal Pradi;sh. Sub:- Notice of Resolution for Removal ofHon'ble Speaker• . Sir,

With reference to your Letter No.GS/1-115/00 (Vol.II) 6743, Dated 07112/2015, on the above mentioned subject, I am to furnish the following information required by you for kind perusal of His Excellency the Governor. I.

2. 3.

·. [2016) 6 S.C.R; ': ·

Date ofrecejpt of the notice of the resolution of the Legislative Assembly. . Action taken by the Legislative Assembly on the notice Highlight of the precedents, if any.

19/1 l/2(JJ5

File processed and · under consideration ofHon'ble Speaker Nil.

Yours faithfully, signed (M. Lasa) Secretary, Arunachal Pradesh, Legislative Assembly Naharlagun."

It was the submission oflearned senior counsel forthe respondents, that · the letter-head on which the two communications were add~essed by c the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly on 8.12.2015, depicting details F of the resolutions for the removal of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker, even though addressed on the same day, were different. Having perused · the same, we hereby affirm the assertion. It was also pointed out, that· the seal of the receipt affixed by the Governor's Secretariat, on the two ~-- 1., t. . • letters were markedly different, inasmuch as, the seal of the Governor's Secretariat on the letter bearing no.LA/LEG-24/2015 (pertaining to the notice ofresolutionJor the removal of the Deputy Speaker) was oflong and almost twice the size of the seal on .the letter bearing no. LA/LEG26/2015 (pertaining to the notice of resolution for the removal of the Speaker), ·which was circular. The former letter merely recorded in writing the date 8.12.20 IS on the receipt, whereas the latter bears a H printed receipt number, as also, a printed date of receipt, which we were

NAB AM REBIA, AND BAMANG FELIX v. DEPUTY SPEAKER AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

I 07

informed, is the usual practice adopted in the Secretariat of the Governor.

67. To contest the above accusation, it was submitted on behalf of the appellants, that no receipt number was depicted even in the former letter bearing no. LA/LEG-24/2015, dated 8.12.2015, which the respondents acknowledge as genuine. The respondents therefore placed reliance on a third communication, which was also addressed by the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly, to the Commissioner to the Governor, on the subject of preponement of the 6th Legislative Assembly. The instant communication, bearing endorsement number LA/LEG-23/ 2015, is extracted below:

~ The Commissioner, to the Governor, Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar. Sub.: Preponing of Sixth Legislative Assembly. Sir., Please refer Deputy Secretary's letter NO.GS/1-11/00 (Vol. - Il/6778 dated 10.12.2015 forwarding (i) Order modifying summons dated 3'd November, 2015 under 174( 1) of the Constitution oflndia; and (ii) Message under article 175 (2) of the Constitution oflndia. This office had issued summons for the Sixth Session of Sixth Legislative Assembly conveying the order dated 03.11.2015 of His Excellency. Accordingly, this office has swung in to action and initiated all necessary steps for conducting the Session with effect from I 41h January, 2015. In the meantime we have received a communication referred above from the Deputy Secretary, Governor's Secretariat preponing the assembly session and fixing the agenda for the Session. I am to state that as per normal practice and procedure the notice for summoning of the Assembly Session should reach the Legislative Assembly Secretariat through the Department of Parliamentary

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