Nadeem Ahmad and Ors v. State Nct Delhi and Anr
- Court
- High Court of Delhi
- Date of judgment
- 27 October 2026
- Judge
- Justice Sachin Datta
- Case number
- CRL.M.C. No. 8003 of 2026
- Acts & sections
- Section 498A IPC, Section 528 BNSS, Section 482 CrPC, Section 406 IPC, Section 506 IPC
- Subject
- Criminal, Family
Full judgment
$~97 *
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Date of Decision : 27.10.2026
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CNR No.DLHC010511892026 CRL.M.C. 8003/2026 & CRL.M.A. 33390/2026 NADEEM AHMAD AND ORS .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Ahmad Waseem, Adv. versus STATE NCT DELHI AND ANR .....Respondent Through: Mr. Utkarsh (APP) for the State. SI Arvind Kumar (P.S. Jafrabad) Mr. Sikander Ali, Mr. Javed Khan, Advs. for R2. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA
SACHIN DATTA, J. (ORAL) 1.
The present petition has been filed by the petitioners under Section
528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”) (corresponding to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”)), seeking quashing of FIR No. 0347/2020 dated 12.08.2020, registered at Police Station Jafrabad, North East District, Delhi, under Sections 498A/406/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) (corresponding to Sections 85, 316(2), 351(2) and (3), and 3(5), respectively, of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (“BNS”)) read with Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (“DP Act”), together with all proceedings emanating therefrom. The respondent no.2 is the complainant and the petitioner no.1 is her husband, whereas petitioner nos.2 to 5 are, respectively, her mother-in-law, sister-in-law, sister-in-law and brother-in-
law. 2.
The petitioner no.1 and the respondent no.2 were married on
26.03.2015 as per Muslim rites and ceremonies at Delhi and one son, namely Master Ibrahim, was born out of the said wedlock. The parties are stated to be living separately since 01.12.2018. The father of the petitioner no.1, namely Sh. Naeem Ahmad (who was also named in the aforesaid FIR), passed away on 27.04.2022, and the proceedings qua him stood dropped. 3.
The respondent no.2 is present in Court and submits that she has
entered into the settlement agreement out of her own free will and without undue influence or coercion. The agreement was entered into under the aegis of the Delhi Mediation Centre, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi, on 12.02.2025. The same reads as under:-
4.
In terms of the said settlement, the petitioner no.1 agreed to pay a sum
of Rs.7,00,000/- to the respondent no.2, comprising Rs.3,50,000/- towards
full and final settlement of her claims on account of maintenance (past, present and future), jewellery, dowry articles, permanent alimony, iddat expenses and mehar, and Rs.3,50,000/- towards the welfare and maintenance of the minor child. It was further agreed that the parties would dissolve their marriage by mutual consent under Muslim Personal Law; that the respondent no.2 would cooperate in the quashing of the FIR qua all the persons named therein, and that the custody of the minor child would remain with the respondent no.2, with visitation rights to the petitioner no.1. 5.
In terms of the settlement, the marriage between petitioner no.1 and
respondent no.2 stands dissolved with effect from 21.04.2025, pursuant to a deed of divorce by mutual consent executed between them in accordance with Muslim Personal Law. 6.
It also transpires that the settlement has been acted upon. Out of the
settlement amount of Rs. 7,00,000/-, a sum of Rs. 4,50,000/- has already been paid to the respondent no.2. A bank draft for the balance sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- has been handed over to her during the course of the hearing today. The respondent no.2 confirms receipt of the said amount. The petitioners and the respondent no.2 have been identified by the concerned I.O. Learned APP for the State has no serious objection to the present petition. 7.
The respondent no.2 has also filed an affidavit dated 01.10.2026,
stating that she has settled all her claims and disputes with the petitioners mutually and amicably, without any force, coercion, pressure or fraud, and that she has no objection to the quashing of the aforesaid FIR. The petitioners and the respondent no.2 undertake to remain bound by the terms of the settlement dated 12.02.2025.
8.
This Court is conscious that the offences under Section 498A of the
IPC and Section 4 of the DP Act are non-compoundable, whereas the offence under Section 406 of the IPC is compoundable by the owner of the property with the permission of the Court, and the offence under Section 506 of the IPC is compoundable by the person intimidated. However, the power of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS (earlier Section 482 of the CrPC) to quash criminal proceedings is distinct from the power of compounding conferred on a criminal court, and is not circumscribed by it. 9.
In this regard, it is apposite to refer to the decision of the Supreme
Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, wherein it has been held that criminal proceedings arising out of matrimony or family disputes, where the wrong is private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute, stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing. The relevant extract reads as under: “58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of
Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.”
10.
The said principles were reiterated by the Supreme Court in Narinder
Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466, wherein it has been held as under: “29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.”
11.
Specifically in the context of matrimonial disputes, the Supreme
Court in Jitendra Raghuvanshi v. Babita Raghuvanshi, (2013) 4 SCC 58, has held as under: “14. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are wide and unfettered. In B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 848], this Court has upheld the powers of the High Court under Section 482 to quash criminal proceedings where dispute is of a private nature and a compromise is entered into between the parties
who are willing to settle their differences amicably. We are satisfied that the said decision is directly applicable to the case on hand and the High Court ought to have quashed the criminal proceedings by accepting the settlement arrived at. 15. In our view, it is the duty of the courts to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes, particularly, when the same are on considerable increase. Even if the offences are non-compoundable, if they relate to matrimonial disputes and the Court is satisfied that the parties have settled the same amicably and without any pressure, we hold that for the purpose of securing ends of justice, Section 320 of the Code would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing of FIR, complaint or the subsequent criminal proceedings.”
12.
Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, the
impugned FIR arises out of a matrimonial relationship and the wrong complained of is essentially private in nature; the offences alleged do not fall within the category of heinous and serious offences of mental depravity, or offences such as murder, rape or dacoity. The parties have amicably resolved all their disputes in terms of the settlement dated 12.02.2025; the marriage between the petitioner no.1 and the respondent no.2 stands dissolved; the entire settlement amount of Rs.7,00,000/- stands paid; the other inter se proceedings between the parties stand withdrawn or disposed of; and the respondent no.2, who is present in Court, has affirmed the settlement, confirmed receipt of the settled amount and filed an affidavit of no objection. The trial has not progressed beyond the stage of framing of charge and no prosecution witness has been examined. In these circumstances, and given that the respondent no.2 is no longer willing to support the prosecution, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak, and the continuation of the proceedings would be an exercise in futility and would serve no useful purpose.
13.
In view of the settlement arrived at between the parties, and
considering the dicta laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, there is no impediment in allowing the present petition. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed and FIR No. 0347/2020 dated 12.08.2020 registered at P.S. Jafrabad, Delhi, under Sections 498A/ 406/ 506/ 34 of the IPC read with Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, along with all proceedings emanating therefrom, qua all the petitioners, stands quashed. 14.
The present petition, along with the pending application, is disposed
of in the above terms.
SACHIN DATTA, J OCTOBER 27, 2026/uk,sd