Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India THR. Secretary Ministry of Law and Justice
Landmark judgment · Constitution & fundamental rights — Consensual same-sex relations between adults decriminalised; Section 377 IPC read down.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 6 September 2018
- Judge
- Justice Dipak Misra
- Neutral citation
- 2018 INSC 790
- Reported in
- [2018] 7 S.C.R. 379
- Result
- Disposed off
- Acts & sections
- Section 377 IPC, Section 375 IPC, Article 21 Constitution, Article 14 Constitution, Article 372 Constitution
- Subject
- Criminal
Full judgment
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [2018] 7 S.C.R. [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR & ORS.
v. UNION OF INDIA THR. SECRETARY MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE (Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 76 of 2016)
SEPTEMBER 06, 2018 [DIPAK MISRA, CJI, R. F. NARIMAN, A. M. KHANWILKAR, DR. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD AND INDU MALHOTRA, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860 – s.377 – Constitutionality of – Held: s.377, so far as it criminalises even consensual sexual acts between competent adults, fails to make a distinction between non-consensual and consensual sexual acts of competent adults in private space which are neither harmful nor contagious to the society – s.377 subjects the LGBT community to societal pariah and dereliction and is, therefore, manifestly arbitrary, for it has become an odious weapon for the harassment of the LGBT community by subjecting them to discrimination and unequal treatment – Therefore, s.377 is liable to be partially struck down for being violative of Art.14 of the Constitution – In other words, s.377, so far as it penalizes any consensual sexual activity between two adults, be it homosexuals (man and a man), heterosexuals (man and a woman) and lesbians (woman and a woman), cannot be regarded as constitutional – However, if anyone, both a man and a woman, engages in any kind of sexual activity with an animal, the said aspect of s.377 is constitutional and it shall remain a penal offence under s.377 – Any act of the description covered under s.377 done between the individuals without the consent of any one of them would invite penal liability under s.377 – Constitution of India – Art.14 – Homosexual – LGBT. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.])
Penal Code, 1860 – s.377 – Expression ‘against the order of nature’ – The expression ‘against the order of nature’ has neither been defined in s.377 nor in any other provision of the IPC – The connotation given to the expression by various judicial
pronouncements includes all sexual acts which are not intended for the purpose of procreation – Therefore, if coitus is not performed for procreation only, it does not per se make it ‘against the order of nature’. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]) Penal Code, 1860 – s.377 – Examination of s.377 on the anvil of Art.14 of the Constitution – Held: The classification adopted under s.377 has no reasonable nexus with its object as other penal provisions such as s.375 and the POCSO Act already penalize nonconsensual carnal intercourse – s.377, insofar as it applies to samesex consenting adults, demeans them by having them prosecuted instead of understanding their sexual orientation and attempting to correct centuries of the stigma associated with such persons – s.377 offends Art.14 as it discriminates between heterosexual and homosexual adults which is a distinction which has no rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Section - namely, the criminalization of all carnal sex between homosexual and/or heterosexual adults as being against the order of nature – Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity give further content to the fundamental rights contained in Arts 14, 15, 19 and 21, and in the light of these principles also, s.377 is unconstitutional. (Per R.F. Nariman, J.)
Penal Code, 1860 – s.377 – Examination of s.377 on the anvil of Art.19(1)(a) of the Constitution – Held: s.377 amounts to an unreasonable restriction, for public decency and morality cannot be amplified beyond a rational or logical limit and cannot be accepted as reasonable grounds for curbing the fundamental rights of freedom of expression and choice of the LGBT community – Consensual carnal intercourse among adults, be it homosexual or heterosexual, in private space, does not in any way harm the public decency or morality – Therefore, s.377 in its present form violates Art.19(1)(a) of the Constitution. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.])
Penal Code, 1860 – s.377 – Miniscule population of LGBT – The mere fact that the percentage of population whose fundamental right to privacy is being abridged by the existence of s.377 in its present form is low does not impose a limitation upon the Constitutional court from protecting the fundamental rights of those
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
who are so affected by s.377. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.])
Penal Code, 1860 – s.375 and s.377 – Distinction between – The major difference between the language of s.377 and s.375 is that of the element of absence consent which has been elaborately incorporated in the seven descriptions contained in the latter part of s.375 – It is the absence of willful and informed consent embodied in the seven descriptions to s.375 which makes the offence of rape criminal – On the other hand, s.377 contains no such descriptions/ exceptions embodying the absence of willful and informed consent and criminalises even voluntary carnal intercourse both between homosexuals as well as between heterosexuals. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.])
Penal Code, 1860 – s.377 – Expression ‘against the order of nature’ – Held: Sex, if performed differently, as per the choice of the consenting adults, does not per se make it against the order of nature – It is the freedom of choice of two consenting adults to perform sex for procreation or otherwise and if their choice is that of the latter, it cannot be said to be against the order of nature. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.])
Penal Code, 1860 – s.377 – History of s.377 – Laws in United Kingdom and in United States, Discussed. (Per R.F. Nariman, J.)
Penal Code, 1860 – s.377 – Constitutionality of – Held: s.377 was the product of the Victorian era, with its attendant puritanical moral values – Victorian morality must give way to constitutional morality – Constitutional morality is the soul of the Constitution, which is to be found in the Preamble of the Constitution, which declares its ideals and aspirations, and is also to be found in Part III of the Constitution, particularly with respect to those provisions which assure the dignity of the individual – The rationale for s.377, namely Victorian morality, has long gone and there is no reason to continue with - as Justice Holmes said - a law merely for the sake of continuing with the law when the rationale of such law has long since disappeared – s.377, insofar as it applies to same-sex consenting adults, demeans them by having them prosecuted instead of understanding their sexual orientation and attempting to correct centuries of the stigma associated with such persons. (Per R.F. Nariman, J.)
Penal Code, 1860 – s.377 – Discrimination grounded on stereotypes – Held: s.377 is the basis of persecution of members of the LGBT community – The section rests on deep rooted gender stereotypes – It perpetuates notions of morality which prohibit certain relationships as being against the ‘order of nature’ – A criminal provision has sanctioned discrimination grounded on stereotypes imposed on an entire class of persons on grounds prohibited by Art.15(1) – This constitutes discrimination on the grounds only of sex and violates the guarantee of non-discrimination in Art.15(1) – Constitution of India – Art.15(1). (Per Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.) Penal Code, 1860 – s.377 – Denial of sexual orientation is also a denial of the right to privacy – To deny the members of the LGBT community the full expression of right to sexual orientation is to deprive them of their entitlement to full citizenship under the Constitution – By penalising sexual conduct between consenting adults, s.377 imposes moral notions which are anachronistic to a constitutional order – While ostensibly penalising ‘acts’, it impacts upon the identity of the LGBT community and denies them the benefits of equal citizenship – s.377 is based on a stereotype about sex – Our Constitution which protects sexual orientation must outlaw any law which lends the authority of the state to obstructing its fulfilment– Constitution of India – Art.21. (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Penal Code, 1860 – s.377 – Creation of a class of criminals – Held: Although s.377 prima facie appears to criminalise certain acts or conduct, it creates a class of criminals, consisting of individuals who engage in consensual sexual activity – It typecasts LGBTQ individuals as sex-offenders, categorising their consensual conduct on par with sexual offences like rape and child molestation – s.377 not only criminalises acts (consensual sexual conduct between adults) which should not constitute crime, but also stigmatises and condemns LGBTQ individuals in society. (Per Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Penal Code, 1860 – s.377 – Import and effect – Held: While a consensual heterosexual relationship is permissible, a consensual relationship between LGBT persons is considered to be ‘carnal’, and against the order of nature – s.377 creates an artificial dichotomy – The natural or innate sexual orientation of a person
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
cannot be a ground for discrimination – Where a legislation discriminates on the basis of an intrinsic and core trait of an individual, it cannot form a reasonable classification based on an intelligible differentia – Constitution of India – Reasonable classification. (Per Indu Malhotra, J.)
Penal Code, 1860 – s.377 – In contemporary civilised jurisprudence, with States increasingly recognising the status of same-sex relationships, it would be retrograde to describe such relationships as being ‘perverse’, ‘deviant’, or ‘unnatural’. (Per Indu Malhotra, J.)
Penal Code, 1860 – s.375 and 377 – While s.375 permits consensual penetrative acts (the definition of ‘penetration’ includes oral and anal sex), s.377 makes the same acts of penetration punishable irrespective of consent – This creates a dichotomy in the law – Constitution of India – Art.14. (Per Indu Malhotra, J.)
Penal Code, 1860 – s.377 – History owes an apology to the members of LGBT community and their families, for the delay in providing redressal for the ignominy and ostracism that they have suffered through the centuries – The members of this community were compelled to live a life full of fear of reprisal and persecution – This was on account of the ignorance of the majority to recognise that homosexuality is a completely natural condition, part of a range of human sexuality. (Per Indu Malhotra, J.)
Penal Code, 1860 – s.377 – s.377, insofar criminalising the consensual sexual acts of adults in private, is violative of Arts.14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution – Such consent must be free consent, which is completely voluntary in nature, and devoid of any duress or coercion – The declaration of the said reading down of s.377 shall not, however, lead to the re-opening of any concluded prosecutions, but can certainly be relied upon in all pending matters whether they are at the trial, appellate, or revisional stages – The provisions of s.377 will continue to govern non-consensual sexual acts against adults, all acts of carnal intercouse against minors, and acts of beastiality. (Per Indu Malhotra, J.) Constitution of India – Interpretation of Constitution – Concept of transformative Constitutionalism – Held: The Constitution would become a stale and dead testament without
dynamic, vibrant and pragmatic interpretation – Constitutional provisions have to be construed and developed in such a manner that their real intent and existence percolates to all segments of the society – Our Constitution has been perceived to be transformative in the sense that the interpretation of its provisions should not be limited to the mere literal meaning of its words; instead they ought to be given a meaningful construction which is reflective of their intent and purpose in consonance with the changing times – Transformative constitutionalism not only includes within its wide periphery the recognition of the rights and dignity of individuals but also propagates the fostering and development of an atmosphere wherein every individual is bestowed with adequate opportunities to develop socially, economically and politically – Discrimination of any kind strikes at the very core of any democratic society – When guided by transformative constitutionalism, the society is dissuaded from indulging in any form of discrimination so that the nation is guided towards a resplendent future – Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT). (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]) Constitution of India – Constitutional morality – It is only constitutional morality that can be allowed to permeate into the Rule of Law – Constitutional morality embraces within its sphere several virtues, foremost of them being the espousal of a pluralistic and inclusive society – The concept of constitutional morality urges the organs of the State, including the Judiciary, to preserve the heterogeneous nature of the society and to curb any attempt by the majority to usurp the rights and freedoms of a smaller or minuscule section of the populace – Constitutional morality cannot be martyred at the altar of social morality – The veil of social morality cannot be used to violate fundamental rights of even a single individual, for the foundation of constitutional morality rests upon the recognition of diversity that pervades the society. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]) Constitution of India – Right to live with dignity – The Constitution has ladened the judiciary with the very important duty to protect and ensure the right of every individual including the right to express and choose without any impediments so as to enable an individual to fully realize his/her fundamental right to live with
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
dignity – Sexual orientation is one of the many biological phenomena which is natural and inherent in an individual and is controlled by neurological and biological factors – The science of sexuality has theorized that an individual exerts little or no control over who he/ she gets attracted to – Any discrimination on the basis of one’s sexual orientation would entail a violation of the fundamental right of freedom of expression. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.])
Constitution of India – Intention of constitutional framers was never to grant protection of fundamental rights only to the majority population – If such had been the intention, then all provisions in Part III of the Constitution would have contained qualifying words such as ‘majority persons’ or ‘majority citizens’ – Instead, the provisions have employed the words ‘any person’ and ‘any citizen’ making it manifest that the constitutional courts are under an obligation to protect the fundamental rights of every single citizen without waiting for the catastrophic situation when the fundamental rights of the majority of citizens get violated. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]) Constitution of India – Sexual privacy and autonomy – Right to privacy enables an individual to exercise his or her autonomy away from the glare of societal expectations – In a liberal democracy, recognition of the individual as an autonomous person is an acknowledgement of the State’s respect for the capacity of the individual to make independent choices – Autonomy and privacy are inextricably linked – Each requires the other for its full realization – Sexual choices are an essential attribute of autonomy. (Per Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Constitution of India – Choice of partner – The choice of whom to partner, the ability to find fulfilment in sexual intimacies and the right not to be subjected to discriminatory behaviour are intrinsic to the constitutional protection of sexual orientation. (Per Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Constitution of India – Right to health – Impact of s.377 on right to health – The operation of s.377 denies consenting adults the full realization of their right to health, as well as their sexual rights – It forces consensual sex between adults into a realm of fear and shame, as persons who engage in anal and oral intercourse
risk criminal sanctions if they seek health advice – This lowers the standard of health enjoyed by them and particularly by members of sexual and gender minorities, in relation to the rest of society – s.377 has had far-reaching consequences for this “key population”, pushing them out of the public health system – Laws that criminalize same-sex intercourse create social barriers to accessing healthcare, and curb the effective prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS – Criminal laws are the strongest expression of the State’s power to punish certain acts and behaviour, and it is, therefore, incumbent upon the State to ensure full protection for all persons, including the specific needs of sexual minorities – Penal Code, 1860 – s.377. (Per Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.) Constitution of India – Constitutional morality – The very purpose of fundamental rights chapter in the Constitution of India is to withdraw the subject of liberty and dignity of the individual and place such subject beyond the reach of majoritarian governments so that constitutional morality can be applied by the Supreme Court to give effect to the rights among others of discrete and insular minorities. (Per R.F. Nariman, J.) Constitution of India – Constitution morality – Held: The Constitution assures to every individual the right to lead a dignified life – It prohibits discrimination within society – LGBT individuals are equal citizens of India, that they cannot be discriminated against and that they have a right to express themselves through their intimate choices. (Per Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.) Constitution of India – Constitution morality and public morality – Difference between – Held: Under a regime of public morality, the conduct of society is determined by popular perceptions existent in society – The continuance of certain symbols, labels, names or body shapes determine the notions, sentiments and mental attitudes of the people towards individuals and things – Constitutional morality, on the other hand, determines the mental attitude towards individuals and issues by the text and spirit of the Constitution – It requires that the rights of an individual ought not to be prejudiced by popular notions of society – It assumes that citizens would respect the vision of the framers of the Constitution and would conduct themselves in a way which furthers that vision – Constitutional morality reflects that the ideal of justice is an
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
overriding factor in the struggle for existence over any other notion of social acceptance. (Per Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Constitution of India – Arts.14, 21 – Persons who are homosexual have a fundamental right to live with dignity, which, in the larger framework of the Preamble of India, will assure the cardinal constitutional value of fraternity – Such groups are entitled to the protection of equal laws, and are entitled to be treated in society as human beings without any stigma being attached to any of them – All government officials, including and in particular police officials, and other officers of the Union of India and the States, be given periodic sensitization and awareness training of the plight of such persons – LGBT – Homosexual. (Per R.F. Nariman, J.) Constitution of India – Art.14 – A classification which discriminates between persons based on their innate nature, would be violative of their fundamental rights, and cannot withstand the test of constitutional morality – s.377 insofar as it criminalises consensual sexual acts between adults in private, is not based on any sound or rational principle, since the basis of criminalisation is the “sexual orientation” of a person, over which one has “little or no choice” – Further, the phrase “carnal intercourse against the order of nature” in s.377 as a determining principle in a penal provision, is too open-ended, giving way to the scope for misuse against members of the LGBT community – Thus, apart from not satisfying the twin-test under Art.14, s.377 is also manifestly arbitrary, and hence violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. (Per Indu Malhotra, J.) Constitution of India – Art.15 – Term ‘sex’ as it occurs in Art.15, is not merely restricted to the biological attributes of an individual, but also includes their “sexual identity and character” – The prohibition against discrimination under Art.15 on the ground of ‘sex’ should, therefore, encompass instances where such discrimination takes place on the basis of one’s sexual orientation – The LGBT community is a sexual minority which has suffered from unjustified and unwarranted hostile discrimination, and is equally entitled to the protection afforded by Art.15. (Per Indu Malhotra, J.)
Constitution of India – Art.21 – LGBT, sexual orientation of – Impediment of s.377 IPC – When biological expression, be it an
orientation or optional expression of choice, is faced with impediment, albeit through any imposition of law, the individual’s natural and constitutional right is dented – Such a situation urges the conscience of the final constitutional arbiter to demolish the obstruction and remove the impediment so as to allow the full blossoming of the natural and constitutional rights of individuals – Yogyakarta Principle. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]) Constitution of India – Art.21 – Right to choose partner on the basis of sexual orientation – Held: Sexual orientation is innate to a human being – It is an important attribute of one’s personality and identity – Homosexuality and bisexuality are natural variants of human sexuality – LGBT persons have little or no choice over their sexual orientation – LGBT persons, like other heterosexual persons, are entitled to their privacy, and the right to lead a dignified existence, without fear of persecution – They are entitled to complete autonomy over the most intimate decisions relating to their personal life, including the choice of their partners – Such choices must be protected under Art.21 – The right to life and liberty would encompass the right to sexual autonomy, and freedom of expression – s.377 insofar as it curtails the personal liberty of LGBT persons to engage in voluntary consensual sexual relationships with a partner of their choice, in a safe and dignified environment, is violative of Art.21. (Per Indu Malhotra, J.) Constitution of India – Art.21 – Right to privacy – s.377 affects the private sphere of the lives of LGBT persons – It takes away the decisional autonomy of LGBT persons to make choices consistent with their sexual orientation, which would further a dignified existence and a meaningful life as a full person – s.377 prohibits LGBT persons from expressing their sexual orientation and engaging in sexual conduct in private, a decision which inheres in the most intimate spaces of one’s existence. (Per Indu Malhotra, J.) Constitution of India – Art.21 – Right to health – LGBT persons being a sexual minority have been subjected to societal prejudice, discrimination and violence on account of their sexual orientation – Since s.377 criminalises “carnal intercourse against the order of nature” it compels LGBT persons to lead closeted lives – As a consequence, LGBT persons are seriously disadvantaged and
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prejudiced when it comes to access to health-care facilities – This results in serious health issues, including depression and suicidal tendencies amongst members of this community. (Per Indu Malhotra, J.)
Constitution of India – Art.32 – Duty of constitutional Courts – Held: It is expected from the courts as the final arbiter of the Constitution to uphold the cherished principles of the Constitution and not to be remotely guided by majoritarian view or popular perception – The Court has to be guided by the conception of constitutional morality and not by the societal morality – Whenever the constitutional Courts come across a situation of transgression or dereliction in the sphere of fundamental rights, which are also the basic human rights of a section, howsoever small part of the society, then it is for the constitutional Courts to ensure, with the aid of judicial engagement and creativity, that constitutional morality prevails over social morality. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]) Doctrines/Principles – Doctrine of progressive realization and non-retrogression – The rationale behind the doctrine of progressive realization of rights is the dynamic and ever growing nature of the Constitution under which the rights have been conferred to the citizenry – The State has an obligation to take appropriate measures for the progressive realization of economic, social and cultural rights – The doctrine of progressive realization of rights, as a natural corollary, gives birth to the doctrine of non-retrogression – As per this doctrine, there must not be any regression of rights – The doctrine of non-retrogression sets forth that the State should not take measures or steps that deliberately lead to retrogression on the enjoyment of rights either under the Constitution or otherwise – The two doctrines lead to the irresistible conclusion that if the law enunciated in Suresh Koushal’s case is accepted, it would definitely tantamount to a retrograde step in the direction of the progressive interpretation of the Constitution and denial of progressive realization of rights – The observation was made in Suresh Koushal that gays, lesbians, bisexuals and transgenders constitute a very minuscule part of the population – Suresh Koushal’s view gets wrongly embedded with the minuscule facet and assumes criminality on the bedrock being guided by a sense of social morality – It discusses about health which is no more a phobia and is further
moved by the popular morality while totally ignoring the concepts of privacy, individual choice and the orientation – Orientation, in certain senses, does get the neuro-impulse to express while seeing the other gender – That apart, swayed by data, Suresh Koushal fails to appreciate that the sustenance of fundamental rights does not require majoritarian sanction – Thus, the ruling becomes sensitively susceptible – LGBT – Penal Code, 1860 – s.377. (Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]) Judicial review – Scope of – Where the validity of the law is called into question, judicial review will extend to scrutinizing whether the law is manifestly arbitrary in its encroachment on fundamental liberties – If a law discriminates against a group or a community of citizens by denying them full and equal participation as citizens, in the rights and liberties granted by the Constitution, it would be for the Court to adjudicate upon validity of such a law. (Per Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.) Jurisprudence – Criminal Law Theories – ‘Bentham’s Utilitarian Theory’ and ‘The Harm Principle’ – Discussed. (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) Maxim – The latin maxim ‘cessant ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex’, meaning when the reason for a law ceases, the law itself ceases is a rule of law – Parliament has unequivocally declared that the earlier stigma attached to same-sex couples, as persons who are regarded as mentally ill, has gone for good – Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 – Penal Code, 1860 – s.377. (Per R.F. Nariman, J.) Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 – s.3 – Homosexuality, whether a mental disorder – Medical and scientific authority has now established that consensual same sex conduct is not against the order of nature and that homosexuality is natural and a normal variant of sexuality – Parliament has provided legislative acknowledgment of this global consensus through this enactment – s.3 of the Act mandates that mental illness is to be determined in accordance with ‘nationally’ or ‘internationally’ accepted medical standards – The International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) by the World Health Organization is listed as an internationally accepted medical standard and does not consider non-peno-vaginal sex between consenting adults either a mental disorder or an illness – Penal Code, 1860 – s.377. (Per Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.)
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LGBT – Members of the LGBT community are entitled, as all other citizens, to the full range of constitutional rights including the liberties protected by the Constitution – Constitution of India. (Per Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Legislation – Constitutional validity of a legislation – While assessing whether a law infringes a fundamental right, it is not the intention of the lawmaker that is determinative, but whether the effect or operation of the law infringes fundamental rights. (Per Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Disposing of the writ petitions, the Court HELD: Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.] – 1. The Constitution has been conceived of and designed in a manner which acknowledges the fact that ‘change is inevitable’. It is the duty of the courts to realize the constitutional vision of equal rights in consonance with the current demands and situations and not to read and interpret the same as per the standards of equality that existed decades ago. The judiciary cannot remain oblivious to the fact that the society is constantly evolving and many a variation may emerge with the changing times. There is a constant need to transform the constitutional idealism into reality by fostering respect for human rights, promoting inclusion of pluralism, bringing harmony, that is, unity amongst diversity, abandoning the idea of alienation or some unacceptable social notions built on medieval egos and establishing the cult of egalitarian liberalism founded on reasonable principles that can withstand scrutiny. [Para 86] [475-F-H; 476-A] National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and others (2014) 5 SCC 269; Ashok Kumar Gupta and another v. State of U.P. and others (1997) 5 SCC 201: [1997] 3 SCR 269; Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd. and another v. State of Punjab and another (1990) 3 SCC 87: [1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 731; Saurabh Chaudri and others v. Union of India and others (2003) 11 SCC 146: [2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 152 – relied on Childline India Foundation and another v. Allan John Waters and others (2011) 6 SCC 261; Khanu v. Emperor
AIR 1925 Sind 286; Lohana Vasantlal Devchand v. State AIR 1968 Guj 252; State of Kerala v. Kundumkara Govindan and another [1969] Cri LJ 818 (Ker); Calvin Francis v. State of Orissa 1992 (1) OLR 316; Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and others v. L.V.A. Dixitulu and Others (1979) 2 SCC 34 : [1979] 1 SCR 26 – referred to Re: Same Sex Marriage [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698; State of Missouri v. Holland 252 U.S. 416 (1920) – referred to
2.1 The concept of transformative constitutionalism has at its kernel a pledge to transform the Indian society so as to embrace therein, in letter and spirit, the ideals of justice, liberty, equality and fraternity as set out in the Preamble to our Constitution. Transformation as a singular term is diametrically opposed to something which is static and stagnant, rather it signifies change, alteration and the ability to metamorphose. Thus, the concept of transformative constitutionalism, which is an actuality with regard to all Constitutions and particularly so with regard to the Indian Constitution, is, as a matter of fact, the ability of the Constitution to adapt and transform with the changing needs of the times. It is this ability of a Constitution to transform which gives it the character of a living and organic document. A Constitution continuously shapes the lives of citizens in particular and societies in general. Its exposition and energetic appreciation by constitutional courts constitute the lifeblood of progressive societies. The Constitution would become a stale and dead testament without dynamic, vibrant and pragmatic interpretation. [Paras 96, 97] [479-C-G] State of Kerala and another v. N.M. Thomas and others AIR 1976 SC 490 : [1976] 1 SCR 906 – relied on Road Accident Fund and another v. Mdeyide 2008 (1) SA 535 (CC); Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v. Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and others [2004] ZACC 15; President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo (1997) 6 B.C.L.R. 708 (CC) – referred to 2.2 Equality does not only imply recognition of individual dignity but also includes within its sphere ensuring of equal opportunity to advance and develop their human potential and
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social, economic and legal interests of every individual and the process of transformative constitutionalism is dedicated to this purpose. [Para 104] [482-A-B]
Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. 2018 (5) SCALE 422 – relied on Albertyn & Goldblatt (1997) 6 B.C.L.R. 708 (CC); Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and others v. Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and others: In Re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and others v. Smit NO and others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) – referred to
3. Constitutional morality and Section 377 IPC Whenever the constitutional courts come across a situation of transgression or dereliction in the sphere of fundamental rights, which are also the basic human rights of a section, howsoever small part of the society, then it is for the constitutional courts to ensure, with the aid of judicial engagement and creativity, that constitutional morality prevails over social morality. In the garb of social morality, the members of the LGBT community must not be outlawed or given a step-motherly treatment of malefactor by the society. If this happens or if such a treatment to the LGBT community is allowed to persist, then the constitutional courts, which are under the obligation to protect the fundamental rights, would be failing in the discharge of their duty. A failure to do so would reduce the citizenry rights to a cipher. [Paras 121, 122] [487-F-H] Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India and Others 2018 (8) SCALE 72 – relied on
4. Perspective of human dignity 4.1 The fundamental idea of dignity is regarded as an inseparable facet of human personality. Dignity has been duly recognized as an important aspect of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. In the international sphere, the right to live with dignity had been identified as a human right way back in 1948 with the introduction of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Dignity is that component of one’s being without which
sustenance of his/her being to the fullest or completest is inconceivable. Dignity while expressive of choice is averse to creation of any dent. When biological expression, be it an orientation or optional expression of choice, is faced with impediment, albeit through any imposition of law, the individual’s natural and constitutional right is dented. Such a situation urges the conscience of the final constitutional arbiter to demolish the obstruction and remove the impediment so as to allow the full blossoming of the natural and constitutional rights of individuals. This is the essence of dignity. [Paras 127, 132] [489-C-D; 490-F, G-H; 491-A] Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and another (1978) 1 SCC 248: [1978] 2 SCR 621 – relied on Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 – referred to 4.2 It is not only the duty of the State and the Judiciary to protect basic right to dignity, but the collective at large also owes a responsibility to respect one another’s dignity, for showing respect for the dignity of another is a constitutional duty. It is an expression of the component of constitutional fraternity. The concept of dignity gains importance in the present scenario, for a challenge has been raised to a provision of law which encroaches upon this essential right of a severely deprived section of our society. An individual’s choice to engage in certain acts within their private sphere has been restricted by criminalising the same on account of the age old social perception. To harness such an essential decision, which defines the individualism of a person, by tainting it with criminality would violate the individual’s right to dignity by reducing it to mere letters without any spirit. [Paras 134, 135] [491-F-H; 492-A] P v. S Judgment of 30 April 1996; P v S and Cornwall County Council Case C-13/94; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992) – referred to 5. Homosexuality is something that is based on sense of identity. It is the reflection of a sense of emotion and expression of eagerness to establish intimacy. It is just as much ingrained, inherent and innate as heterosexuality. Sexual orientation, as a
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
concept, fundamentally implies a pattern of sexual attraction. It is as natural a phenomenon as other natural biological phenomena. What the science of sexuality has led to is that an individual has the tendency to feel sexually attracted towards the same sex, for the decision is one that is controlled by neurological and biological factors. That is why it is his/her natural orientation which is innate and constitutes the core of his/her being and identity. That apart, on occasions, due to a sense of mutuality of release of passion, two adults may agree to express themselves in a different sexual behaviour which may include both the genders. To this, one can attribute a bisexual orientation which does not follow the rigidity but allows room for flexibility. To compel a person having a certain sexual orientation to proselytize to another is like asking a body part to perform a function it was never designed to perform in the first place. It is pure science, a certain manner in which the brain and genitals of an individual function and react. Whether one’s sexual orientation is determined by genetic, hormonal, developmental, social and/or cultural influences (or a combination thereof), most people experience little or no sense of choice about their sexual orientation. [Paras 143, 144] [494-G; 495-A-B, C-D]
K.S. Puttaswamy and another v. Union of India and others (2017) 10 SCC 1 – followed
James Egan and John Norris Nesbit v. Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Canada and another [1995] 2 SCR 513 – referred to 6. Privacy and its concomitant aspects 6.1 Within the compartment of privacy, individual autonomy has a significant space. Autonomy is individualistic. It is expressive of self-determination and such self-determination includes sexual orientation and declaration of sexual identity. Such an orientation or choice that reflects an individual’s autonomy is innate to him/ her. It is an inalienable part of his/her identity. The said identity under the constitutional scheme does not accept any interference as long as its expression is not against decency or morality. And the morality that is conceived of under the Constitution is constitutional morality. Under the autonomy principle, the individual has sovereignty over his/her body. He/she can
surrender his/her autonomy wilfully to another individual and their intimacy in privacy is a matter of their choice. Such concept of identity is not only sacred but is also in recognition of the quintessential facet of humanity in a person’s nature. The autonomy establishes identity and the said identity, in the ultimate eventuate, becomes a part of dignity in an individual. [Para 149] [497-C-E] R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu and others (1994) 6 SCC 632 : [1994] 4 Suppl. SCR 353 – relied on
6.2 There can be no doubt that an individual also has a right to a union under Article 21 of the Constitution. As a concept, union also means companionship in every sense of the word, be it physical, mental, sexual or emotional. The LGBT community is seeking realisation of its basic right to companionship, so long as such a companionship is consensual, free from the vice of deceit, force, coercion and does not result in violation of the fundamental rights of others. [Para 155] [498-G; 499-A] Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia v. Hardwick et al. 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton 413 U.S. 49 (1973); A.R. Coeriel and M.A.R. Aurik v. The Netherlands Communication No. 453/1991; Toonen v. Australia Communication No. 488/1992, U.C. Doc CCPR/C/50/D 488/ 1992, March 31, 1994; Dudgeon v. United Kingdom [1981] 4 EHRR 149 – referred to 6.3 The observation made in Suresh Koushal that gays, lesbians, bisexuals and transgenders constitute a very minuscule part of the population is perverse due to the very reason that such an approach would be violative of the equality principle enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution. The mere fact that the percentage of population whose fundamental right to privacy is being abridged by the existence of Section 377 in its present form is low does not impose a limitation upon this Court from protecting the fundamental rights of those who are so affected by Section 377 IPC. The constitutional framers could have never intended that the protection of fundamental rights was only for the majority population. If such had been the intention, then all provisions in Part III of the Constitution would have contained
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qualifying words such as ‘majority persons’ or ‘majority citizens’. Instead, the provisions have employed the words ‘any person’ and ‘any citizen’ making it manifest that the constitutional courts are under an obligation to protect the fundamental rights of every single citizen without waiting for the catastrophic situation when the fundamental rights of the majority of citizens get violated. A second count on which the view in Suresh Koushal becomes highly unsustainable is that the language of both Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution is not reflective of such an intention. A cursory reading of both the Articles divulges that the right to move the Supreme Court and the High Courts under Articles 32 and 226 respectively is not limited to a situation when there is violation of the fundamental rights of a large chunk of populace. [Paras 169, 170, 172] [503-D-F; 504-C-D]
D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. (1997) 1 SCC 416 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 284; Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India [1950] 1 SCR 869 – relied on 7.1 The Doctrine of progressive realization of rights invariably reminds about the living and dynamic nature of a Constitution. The rationale behind the doctrine of progressive realization of rights is the dynamic and ever growing nature of the Constitution under which the rights have been conferred to the citizenry. The constitutional courts have to recognize that the constitutional rights would become a dead letter without their dynamic, vibrant and pragmatic interpretation. Therefore, it is necessary for the constitutional courts to inculcate in their judicial interpretation and decision making a sense of engagement and a sense of constitutional morality so that they, with the aid of judicial creativity, are able to fulfill their foremost constitutional obligation, that is, to protect the rights bestowed upon the citizens of our country by the Constitution. The doctrine of progressive realization of rights, as a natural corollary, gives birth to the doctrine of non-retrogression. As per this doctrine, there must not be any regression of rights. In a progressive and an everimproving society, there is no place for retreat. The society has to march ahead. The doctrine of non-retrogression sets forth that the State should not take measures or steps that deliberately lead to retrogression on the enjoyment of rights either under the
Constitution or otherwise. [Paras 178, 183, 184, 188, 189] [505D-E; 507-G-H; 508-A-B; 509-C] McCulloch v. Maryland (1816) 17 US 316; Kazenbach v. Morgan (1966) 384 US 641 – referred to
7.2 The two doctrines lead to the irresistible conclusion that if the law enunciated in Suresh Koushal’s case is accepted, it would definitely tantamount to a retrograde step in the direction of the progressive interpretation of the Constitution and denial of progressive realization of rights. It is because Suresh Koushal’s view gets wrongly embedded with the minuscule facet and assumes criminality on the bedrock being guided by a sense of social morality. It discusses about health which is no more a phobia and is further moved by the popular morality while totally ignoring the concepts of privacy, individual choice and the orientation. Orientation, in certain senses, does get the neuro-impulse to express while seeing the other gender. That apart, swayed by data, Suresh Koushal fails to appreciate that the sustenance of fundamental rights does not require majoritarian sanction. [Para 190] [509-D-F] Obergefell, et al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, et al. 576 US (2015), Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Kimberly Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana 830 F.3d 698; Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roberts v. United States Jaycees 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Delwin Vriend and others v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Alberta and others [1998] 1 SCR 493; Euan Sutherland v. United Kingdom 2001 ECHR 234; Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission of Elections G. R. No.190582, Supreme Court of Philippines (2010) – referred to Black’s Law Dictionary, 2nd edn. – referred to
8. Comparative analysis of Section 375 and Section 377 IPC
8.1 A cursory reading of Section 375 IPC divulges that it is a gender specific provision for the protection of women as only a man can commit the offence of rape. The Section has been divided into two parts. The former part, comprising of Clauses (a) to (d), simply describes what acts committed by a man with a woman
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
would amount to rape provided that the said acts are committed in the circumstances falling under any of the seven descriptions as stipulated by the latter part of the Section. It is in this way that the latter part of Section 375 IPC becomes important as it lays down the circumstances, either of which must be present, for an act committed by a man with a woman to come within the sweep of the offence of rape. [Paras 206, 207] [517-B; 518-F-H]
8.2 Explanation 2 to Section 375 IPC gives the definition of consent for the purpose of Section 375 to the effect that consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement by the woman through words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication whereby she communicates her willingness to participate in any of the sexual acts described in the former part of Section 375 IPC. The element of absence of consent is firmly ingrained in all the descriptions contained in the latter part of Section 375 IPC and the absence of a willful and informed consent is sine qua non to designate the acts contained in the former part of Section 375 IPC as rape. [Paras 209, 210] [519-F-G, H; 520A] 8.3 Section 377 IPC, unlike Section 375, is a gender-neutral provision as it uses the word ‘whoever’. Another expression which has been employed in Section 377 is ‘against the order of nature’. The phrase ‘against the order of nature’ has neither been defined in Section 377 IPC nor in any other provision of the IPC. The foundation on which Section 377 IPC makes carnal intercourse an offence is the precept that such carnal intercourse is against the order of nature. [Paras 212, 213] [520-D, E-F] 8.4. With the passage of time and evolution of the society, procreation is not the only reason for which people choose to come together, have live-in relationships, perform coitus or even marry. They do so for a whole lot of reasons including emotional companionship. It is the freedom of choice of two consenting adults to perform sex for procreation or otherwise and if their choice is that of the latter, it cannot be said to be against the order of nature. Therefore, sex, if performed differently, as per the choice of the consenting adults, does not per se make it against the order of nature. Section 377 criminalises even voluntary carnal intercourse not only between homosexuals but also between
heterosexuals. The major difference between the language of Section 377 and Section 375 is that of the element of absence consent which has been elaborately incorporated in the seven descriptions contained in the latter part of Section 375 IPC. It is the absence of willful and informed consent embodied in the seven descriptions to Section 375 which makes the offence of rape criminal. On the other hand, Section 377 IPC contains no such descriptions/exceptions embodying the absence of willful and informed consent and criminalises even voluntary carnal intercourse both between homosexuals as well as between heterosexuals. The legislature, in its wisdom, while enacting Section 375 IPC in its amended form after the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, has not employed the words “subject to any other provision of the IPC”. The implication of the absence of these words simply indicates that Section 375 IPC which does not criminalize consensual carnal intercourse between heterosexuals is not subject to Section 377 IPC. [Paras 215, 216, 217, 218] [521-A, C-H] 9. Despite the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 coming into force, by virtue of which Section 375 was amended, whereby the words ‘sexual intercourse’ in Section 375 were replaced by four elaborate clauses from (a) to (d) giving a wide definition to the offence of rape, Section 377 IPC still remains in the statute book in the same form. Such an anomaly, if allowed to persist, may result in a situation wherein a heterosexual couple who indulges in carnal intercourse with the willful and informed consent of each other may be held liable for the offence of unnatural sex under Section 377 IPC, despite the fact that such an act would not be rape within the definition as provided under Section 375 IPC. Drawing an analogy, if consensual carnal intercourse between a heterosexual couple does not amount to rape, it definitely should not be labelled and designated as unnatural offence under Section 377 IPC. If any proclivity amongst the heterosexual population towards consensual carnal intercourse has been allowed due to the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, such kind of proclivity amongst any two persons including LGBT community cannot be treated as untenable so long as it is consensual and it is confined within their most private and intimate spaces. [Paras 220, 221] [522-B-E]
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10. The litmus test for survival of Section 377 IPC
10.1 When the liberty of even a single person of the society is smothered under some vague and archival stipulation that it is against the order of nature or under the perception that the majority population is peeved when such an individual exercises his/her liberty despite the fact that the exercise of such liberty is within the confines of his/her private space, then the signature of life melts and living becomes a bare subsistence and resultantly, the fundamental right of liberty of such an individual is abridged. [Para 230] [525-A-B]
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration and others [1979] 1 SCR 392 – relied on
10.2 What Article 14 propounds is that ‘all like should be treated alike’. In other words, it implies equal treatment for all equals. Though the legislature is fully empowered to enact laws applicable to a particular class, as in the case at hand in which Section 377 applies to citizens who indulge in carnal intercourse, yet the classification, including the one made under Section 377 IPC, has to satisfy the twin conditions to the effect that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia and the said differentia must have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the provision, that is, Section 377 IPC. A perusal of Section 377 IPC reveals that it classifies and penalizes persons who indulge in carnal intercourse, with the object to protect women and children from being subjected to carnal intercourse. This classification does not have a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved as the non-consensual acts which have been criminalized by virtue of Section 377 IPC have already been designated as penal offences under Section 375 IPC and under the POCSO Act. Per contra, the presence of this Section in its present form has resulted in a distasteful and objectionable collateral effect whereby even ‘consensual acts’, which are neither harmful to children nor women and are performed by a certain class of people (LGBTs) owning to some inherent characteristics defined by their identity and individuality, have been woefully targeted. This discrimination and unequal treatment meted out to the LGBT community as a separate class of citizens
is unconstitutional for being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. [Para 233, 237] [525-G; 526-A-B; 527-B-D] M. Nagaraj and others v. Union of India and Others AIR 2007 SC 71 : (2006) 8 SCC 212: [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336; E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and another (1974) 4 SCC 3: [1974] 2 SCR 348; Budhan Choudhry v. The State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 191 : [1955] SCR 1045 – relied on 10.3 Section 377 fails to make a distinction between consensual and non-consensual sexual acts between competent adults. Further, Section 377 IPC fails to take into account that consensual sexual acts between adults in private space are neither harmful nor contagious to the society. On the contrary, Section 377 trenches a discordant note in respect of the liberty of persons belonging to the LGBT community by subjecting them to societal pariah and dereliction. The Section also interferes with consensual acts of competent adults in private space. Sexual acts cannot be viewed from the lens of social morality or that of traditional precepts wherein sexual acts were considered only for the purpose of procreation. This being the case, Section 377 IPC, so long as it criminalises consensual sexual acts of whatever nature between competent adults, is manifestly arbitrary. The LGBT community possess the same human, fundamental and constitutional rights as other citizens do since these rights inhere in individuals as natural and human rights. The organisation of intimate relations is a matter of complete personal choice especially between consenting adults. It is a vital personal right falling within the private protective sphere and realm of individual choice and autonomy. Such progressive proclivity is rooted in the constitutional structure and is an inextricable part of human nature. [Paras 238, 239, 240] [527-H; 528-A-D, E-H] Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1951 SC 118 : [1950] SCR 759; S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram and Others (1989) 2 SCC 574 : [1989] 2 SCR 204; Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 : [2015] 5 SCR 963 – relied on
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
11.1 Section 377 IPC takes within its fold private acts of adults including the LGBT community which are not only consensual but are also innocent, as such acts neither cause disturbance to the public order nor are they injurious to public decency or morality. The law is et domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium – A man’s house is his castle. That apart, any display of affection amongst the members of the LGBT community towards their partners in the public so long as it does not amount to indecency or has the potentiality to disturb public order cannot be bogged down by majority perception. Section 377 IPC amounts to unreasonable restriction as it makes carnal intercourse between consenting adults within their castle a criminal offence which is manifestly not only overboard and vague but also has a chilling effect on an individual’s freedom of choice. [Paras 245, 246] [530-B, D]
11.2 Section 377 IPC does not meet the criteria of proportionality and is violative of the fundamental right of freedom of expression including the right to choose a sexual partner. Section 377 IPC also assumes the characteristic of unreasonableness, for it becomes a weapon in the hands of the majority to seclude, exploit and harass the LGBT community. It shrouds the lives of the LGBT community in criminality and constant fear mars their joy of life. They constantly face social prejudice, disdain and are subjected to the shame of being their very natural selves. Thus, an archaic law which is incompatible with constitutional values cannot be allowed to be preserved. The very existence of Section 377 IPC criminalising transgenders casts a great stigma on an already oppressed and discriminated class of people. This stigma, oppression and prejudice has to be eradicated and the transgenders have to progress from their narrow claustrophobic spaces of mere survival in hiding with their isolation and fears to enjoying the richness of living out of the shadows with full realization of their potential and equal opportunities in all walks of life. [Paras 247, 249] [530-E-G; 531A-B]
Shayara Bano v. Union of India and Others (2017) 9 SCC 1: [2017] 3 SCR 630 – relied on
Suresh Kumar Koushal and another v. Naz Foundation and others (2014) 1 SCC 1 : [2013] 17 SCR 1019 – overruled Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi and others (2009) 111 DRJ 1; Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013) 15 SCC 755 : [2013] 14 SCR 1019; Shakti Vahini v. Union of India and others (2018) 7 SCC 192; Manoj Narula v. Union of India (2014) 9 SCC 1 : [2014] 9 SCR 965; Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi and others (1981) 1 SCC 608 : [1981] 2 SCR 516; Common Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India and another (2018) 5 SCC 1; Anuj Garg and others v. Hotel Association of India and others (2008) 3 SCC 1 : [2007] 12 SCR 991; S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal and another (2010) 5 SCC 600 : [2010] 5 SCR 322; Kishore Samrite v. State of U.P. and others (2013) 2 SCC 398 : [2012] 9 SCR 733; Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another (2013) 10 SCC 591 : [2013] 14 SCR 213; Iqbal Singh Marwah and another v. Meenakshi Marwah and another (2005) 4 SCC 370 : [2005] 2 SCR 708; K.A. Abbas v. Union of India and another (1970) 2 SCC 780 : [1971] 2 SCR 446; Rt. Rev. Msgr. Mark Netto v. State of Kerala and others (1979) 1 SCC 23 : [1979] 1 SCR 609; Fazal Rab Choudhary v. State of Bihar (1982) 3 SCC 9; Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P. (1973) 1 SCC 20 : [1973] 2 SCR 541; State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat and others (2005) 8 SCC 534 : [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 582; Kesavananda Bharati v. Union of India (1973) 4 SCC 225 : [1973] Suppl. SCR1; Sakshi v. Union of India and others (2004) 5 SCC 518 : [2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 723; Union of India and another v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 323 : [1991] 3 SCR 873 – referred to Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) – referred to
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
Per R. F. Nariman, J. 1.1 At one point of time, the thinking in Victorian England and in America was that homosexuality was a mental disorder. The definition of ‘mental illness’ in the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 throw s to the winds all earlier misconceptions of mental illness including the fact that samesex couples who indulge in anal sex are persons with mental illness. [Para 68] [577-E-F]
Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Obergefell etal v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, et al., 576 US (2015) – referred to 1.2 Mental illness in our statute has to keep pace with international notions and accepted medical standards including the latest edition of the International Classification of Diseases of the World Health Organization under Section 3(1) of the Act. Under Section 3(3), mental illness shall not be determined on the basis of social status or membership of a cultural group or for any other reason not directly relevant to the mental health of the person. More importantly, mental illness shall not be determined on the basis of non-conformity with moral, social, cultural, work or political values or religious beliefs prevailing in a person’s community. It is thus clear that Parliament has unequivocally declared that the earlier stigma attached to same-sex couples, as persons who are regarded as mentally ill, has gone for good. The latin maxim cessant ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex, meaning when the reason for a law ceases, the law itself ceases is a rule of law. [Paras 73, 78] [583-C-D; 585-C-D]
H.H. Shri Swamiji of Shri Amar Mutt v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Dept (1979) 4 SCC 642 : [1980] 1 SCR 368; State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd. (2004) 11 SCC 26 : [2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 930 – relied on
Suresh Kumar Koushal and Anr. v. Naz Foundation and Ors. (2014) 1 SCC 1 : [2013] 17 SCR 116 – overruled
1.3 Section 377 was the product of the Victorian era, with its attendant puritanical moral values. Victorian morality must give way to constitutional morality. Constitutional morality is the soul of the Constitution, which is to be found in the Preamble of
the Constitution, which declares its ideals and aspirations, and is also to be found in Part III of the Constitution, particularly with respect to those provisions which assure the dignity of the individual. The rationale for Section 377, namely Victorian morality, has long gone and there is no reason to continue with as Justice Holmes said - a law merely for the sake of continuing with the law when the rationale of such law has long since disappeared. Section 377, insofar as it applies to same-sex consenting adults, demeans them by having them prosecuted instead of understanding their sexual orientation and attempting to correct centuries of the stigma associated with such persons. [Paras 78, 79] [585-D-F, G-H] K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. (2017) 10 SCC 1 – followed.
S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal and Anr. (2010) 5 SCC 600 : [2010] 5 SCR 322 – relied on 2. Section 377, in penalizing consensual gay sex, is manifestly arbitrary. Given modern psychiatric studies and legislation which recognizes that gay persons and transgenders are not persons suffering from mental disorder and cannot therefore be penalized, the Section must be held to be a provision which is capricious and irrational. Also, roping in such persons with sentences going upto life imprisonment is clearly excessive and disproportionate, as a result of which, when applied to such persons, Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution would clearly be violated. The object sought to be achieved by the provision, namely to enforce Victorian mores upon the citizenry of India, would be out of tune with the march of constitutional events that has since taken place, rendering the said object itself discriminatory when it seeks to single out same-sex couples and transgenders for punishment. [Para 82] [587-C-E] Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1; Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 : [2015] 5 SCR 963 – relied on 3. The International Commission of Jurists and the International Service for Human Rights on behalf of a coalition of human rights organizations had undertaken a project to develop
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
a set of international legal principles on the application of international law to human rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity to bring greater clarity and coherence to States’ human rights obligations. A distinguished group of human rights experts drafted, developed, discussed and refined these Principles. Following an experts’ meeting held at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, Indonesia from 6th to 9th November, 2006, 29 distinguished experts from 25 countries with diverse backgrounds and expertise relevant to issues of human rights law unanimously adopted the Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. These principles give further content to the fundamental rights contained in Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21, and viewed in the light of these principles also, Section 377 will have to be declared to be unconstitutional. [Paras 85, 86, 88] [588-B-E; 598-F-F-G]
4.1 The view of Suresh Kumar Koushal is not correct. Suresh Kumar Koushal’s judgment first begins with the presumption of constitutionality attaching to pre-constitutional laws, such as the Indian Penal Code. The judgment goes on to state that pre-constitutional laws, which have been adopted by Parliament and used with or without amendment, being manifestations of the will of the people of India through Parliament, are presumed to be constitutional. [Para 89] [595-G-H; 596-A]
4.2 Article 372 of the Constitution of India continues laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. The Indian Penal Code is a law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution. Under Article 372(2), the President may, by order, make such adaptations and modifications of an existing law as may be necessary or expedient to bring such law in accord with the provisions of the Constitution. The fact that the President has not made any adaptation or modification as mentioned in Article 372(2) does not take the matter very much further. The presumption of constitutionality of a statute is premised on the fact that Parliament understands the needs of the people, and that, as per the separation of powers doctrine, Parliament is aware of its limitations in enacting laws – it can only
enact laws which do not fall within List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution of India, and cannot transgress the fundamental rights of the citizens and other constitutional provisions in doing so. Parliament is, therefore, deemed to be aware of the aforesaid constitutional limitations. Where, however, a pre-constitution law is made by either a foreign legislature or body, none of these parameters obtain. It is, therefore, clear that no such presumption attaches to a pre-constitutional statute like the Indian Penal Code. [Para 90] [596-B-E] New Delhi Municipal Council v. State of Punjab and Ors. (1997) 7 SCC 339 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 472 – disapproved 4.3 In Suresh Kumar Koushal, the Court held that the fact that the legislature has chosen not to amend the law, despite the 172 nd Law Commission Report specifically recommending deletion of Section 377, may indicate that Parliament has not thought it proper to delete the said provision, is another reason for not invalidating Section 377. This view is not accepted when the Union of India admittedly did not challenge the Delhi High Court judgment striking down the provision in part. Secondly, the fact that Parliament may or may not have chosen to follow a Law Commission Report does not guide the Court’s understanding of its character, scope, ambit and import as was stated in Suresh Kumar Koushal. It is a neutral fact which need not be taken into account at all. All that the Court has to see is whether constitutional provisions have been transgressed and if so, as a natural corollary, the death knell of the challenged provision must follow. [Para 92] [597-D-F] 5.1 After 2013, when Section 375 was amended so as to include anal and certain other kinds of sexual intercourse between a man and a woman, which would not be criminalized as rape if it was between consenting adults, it is clear that if Section 377 continues to penalize such sexual intercourse, an anomalous position would result. A man indulging in such sexual intercourse would not be liable to be prosecuted for rape but would be liable to be prosecuted under Section 377. Further, a woman who could, at no point of time, have been prosecuted for rape would, despite her consent, be prosecuted for indulging in anal or such other
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sexual intercourse with a man in private under Section 377. This would render Section 377, as applied to such consenting adults, as manifestly arbitrary as it would be wholly excessive and disproportionate to prosecute such persons under Section 377 when the legislature has amended one portion of the law in 2013, making it clear that consensual sex, as described in the amended provision, between two consenting adults, one a man and one a woman, would not be liable for prosecution. If, by having regard to what has been said above, Section 377 has to be read down as not applying to anal and such other sex by a male-female couple, then the Section will continue to apply only to homosexual sex. If this be the case, the Section will offend Article 14 as it will discriminate between heterosexual and homosexual adults which is a distinction which has no rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Section - namely, the criminalization of all carnal sex between homosexual and/or heterosexual adults as being against the order of nature. Viewed either way, the Section falls foul of Article 14. [Para 94] [597-G-H; 598-A-D]
5.2 The fact that only a minuscule fraction of the country’s population constitutes lesbians and gays or transgenders, and that in the last 150 years less than 200 persons have been prosecuted for committing the offence under Section 377, is neither here nor there. When it is found that privacy interests come in and the State has no compelling reason to continue an existing law which penalizes same-sex couples who cause no harm to others, on an application of the recent judgments delivered by this Court after Suresh Kumar Koushal, it is clear that Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 have all been transgressed without any legitimate state rationale to uphold such provision. [Para 95] [598E-F] 6. Persons who are homosexual have a fundamental right to live with dignity, which, in the larger framework of the Preamble of India, will assure the cardinal constitutional value of fraternity. Such groups are entitled to the protection of equal laws, and are entitled to be treated in society as human beings without any stigma being attached to any of them. Section 377 insofar as it criminalises homosexual sex and transgender sex between consenting adults is unconstitutional. The Union of India shall
take all measures to ensure that this judgment is given wide publicity through the public media, which includes television, radio, print and online media at regular intervals, and initiate programs to reduce and finally eliminate the stigma associated with such persons. Above all, all government officials, including and in particular police officials, and other officers of the Union of India and the States, be given periodic sensitization and awareness training of the plight of such persons. [Paras 97, 98] [599-A-D] Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 7 SCC 547 : [2011] 8 SCR 1028; Subramaniam Swamy v. Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 221 : [2016] 3 SCR 865; National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014) 5 SCC 438; Anuj Garg and Ors. v. Hotel Association of India and Ors. (2008) 3 SCC 1 : [2007] 12 SCR 991; Common Cause v. Union of India (2018) 5 SCC 1; Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. 2018 SCC Online 343; Shakti Vahini v. Union of India 2018 SCC Online SC 275 – relied on. Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi 111 DRJ 1 (2009) – referred to
Bowers v. Hardwick 92 L. Ed. 2D 140 (1986); Stanley v. Georgia, 22 L. Ed. 2D 542 (1969); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 32 L. Ed. 2D 15 (1972); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Southeaster Pa. v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1981); Romer v. Evans 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Modinos v. Cyprus 16 EHRR 485 (1993); El-Al Israel Airlines Ltd. v. Jonathan Danielwitz H.C.J. 721/94; Jason Jones v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago Claim No. CV 201700720; Dhirendra Nadan v. State Case No. HAA0085 of 2005; The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. The Minister of Home Affairs Case CCT 10/99; Toonen v. Australia Communication No. 488/ 1992, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994); Obergefell et al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, et al., 576 US (2015) – referred to
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. 1. When the constitutionality of a law is challenged on the ground that it violates the guarantees in Part III of the Constitution, what is determinative is its effect on the infringement of fundamental rights. This affords the guaranteed freedoms their true potential against a claim by the state that the infringement of the right was not the object of the provision. It is not the object of the law which impairs the rights of the citizens. Nor is the form of the action taken determinative of the protection that can be claimed. It is the effect of the law upon the fundamental right which calls the courts to step in and remedy the violation. The individual is aggrieved because the law hurts. The hurt to the individual is measured by the violation of a protected right. [Para 34] [625-F-G; 626-A-B]
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014) 5 SCC 438 – relied on Air India v. Nergesh Meerza (1981) 4 SCC 335 : [1982] 1 SCR 438 – disapproved Sri Sri Mahadev Jiew v. Dr. B. B. Sen AIR (1951) Cal. 563; Air India v. Nergesh Meerza (1981) 4 SCC 335 : [1982] 1 SCR 438; Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India (2008) 3 SCC 1 : [2007] 12 SCR 991; The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. The Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC); Re. the Kerala Education Bill AIR 1958 SC 956 : [1959] SCR 995; Sakal Papers v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 305 : [1962] SCR 842; R.C. Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248 : [1970] 3 SCR 530; Bennett Coleman v. Union of India AIR (1972) 2 SCC 788 : [1973] 2 SCR 757; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 : [1978] 2 SCR 621; (Meharban) Nowshirwan Irani v. Emperor AIR 1934 Sind. 206; D P Minwalla v. Emperor AIR 1935 Sind. 78; Ratan Mia v. State of Assam (1988) Cr.L.J. 980; E P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3 : [1974] 2 SCR 348; Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1; Khanu v. Emperor AIR (1925) Sind. 286 – referred to
Griggs v Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424 (1971); The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. The Minister of Justice, 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC), Sachs J., concurring – referred to Lyrics from Leonard Cohen’s song “Democract” (1992); Same-Sex Love in India : A Literary Hisotyr (Ruth Vanita and Saleem Kidwai, eds.) Penguin India (2008) for writings spanning over more than 2,000 years of Indian literature which emonstrate that same-sex love has flourised, evolved and been embraced in various forms since ancient times; Law like Love : Queer Perspectives on Law (Arvind Narrain and Alok Gupta, eds.), Yoda Press (2011); K. N. Chandrasekharan Pillai and Shabistan Aquil, “Historical Introduction to the Indian Penal Code”, in Essays on the Indian Penal Code, New Delhi, Indian Law Institute (2005); Siyuan Chen, “Codification, Macaulay and the Indian Penal Code [Book Review], Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, National University of Singapore, Faculty of Law (2011), at pages 581-584; Douglas E. Sanders, “377 and the Unnatural Afterlife of British Colonialism in Asia”, Asian Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 4 (2009), at page 11 (“Douglas”); David Skuy, “Macaulay and the Indian Penal Code of 1862 : The Myth of the Inherent Superiority and Modernity of the English Legal System Compared to India’s Legal System in the Nineteenth Century”, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 32 (1998), at pages 513-557; Barry Wright, “Macaulay’s Indian Penal Code: Historical Context and Originating Principles”, Carleton University (2011); Michael Kirby, “The Sodomy Offence: England’s Least Lovely Law Export?” Journal of Commonwealth Criminal Law, Inaugural Issue (2011); Jessica Cecil, “The Destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah”, British Broadcasting Company, 11 February 2017; KSN Murthy’s Criminal Law: Indian Penal Code (KVS Sarma ed), Lexis Nexis (2016) England; Philo, translated by F.H. Colson and G.H. Whitaker, 10 Volumes, (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1929-1962); David F.
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
Greenberg and Marcia H. Bystryn, “Christian Intolerance of Homosexuality”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 88 (1982), at pages 515-548; Human Rights Watch. This Alien Legacy : The Origins of “Sodomy” Laws in British Colonialism (2008); H. Montgomery Hyde, John O’Connor, and Merlin Holland, The Trials of Oscar Wilde (2014), at page 201; Report of the Departmental Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (1957) (“Wolfenden Report”); Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000, Parliament of the United Kingdom; Enze Han, Joseph O’Mahoney, “British Colonialism and the Criminalization of Homosexuality: Queens, Crime and Empire”, Routledge (2018); Nang Yin Kham, “An Introduction to the Law and Judicial System of Myanmar”, Centre for Asia Legal Studies Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore, Working Paper 14/02, (2014); Arvind Narrain, “‘That Despicable Specimen of Humanity’: Policing of Homosexuality in India”, in Challenging the Rule(s) of Law: Colonialism, Criminology and Human Rights in India (Kalpana Kannabiran and Ranbir Singh eds.), Sage (2008); Arvind Narrain, “A New Language of Morality: From the Trial of Nowshirwan to the Judgement in Naz Foundation”; The Indian Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 4 (2010); Sex, Morality and the Law, (Lori Gruen and George Paichas eds.) Routledge (1996); Andrew Davis, “The Framing of Sex : Evaluating Judicial Discourse on the ‘Unnatural Offences’”, Alternative Law Journal, Vol. 5 (2006); Alok Gupta, “Section 377 and the Dignity of Indian Homosexuals” The Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 41 (2006); John Sebastian, “The opposite of unnatural intercourse : understanding Section 377 through Section 375; Indian Law Review, Vol. 1 (2018); Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society, Macmillan (1984); Nivedita Menon, “How Natural is Normal? Feminism and Compulsory Heterosexuality”, In Because I have a Voice, Queer Politics in India, (Narrain and Bhan eds.) Yoda Press (2005) – referred to
2. A discrimination will not survive constitutional scrutiny when it is grounded in and perpetuates stereotypes about a class constituted by the grounds prohibited in Article 15(1). If any ground of discrimination, whether direct or indirect is founded on a stereotypical understanding of the role of the sex, it would not be distinguishable from the discrimination which is prohibited by Article 15 on the grounds only of sex. A provision challenged as being ultra vires the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds only of sex under Article 15(1) is to be assessed not by the objects of the state in enacting it, but by the effect that the provision has on affected individuals and on their fundamental rights. [Para 41] [631-B, E] K S Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 – followed.
Sanwesh Pokkuluri v. UOI Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 121 of 2018; Navtej Johar v. Union of India Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 76 of 2016 – referred to Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Karin Weber von Hartz (1986) ECR 1607; Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia (1989) 1 SCR 143; City Council of Pretoria v. Walker (1998) 3 BCLR – referred to Elvia R. Arriola, “Gendered Inequality : Lesbians, Gays, and Feminist Legal Theory”, Berkeley Women’s Law Journal, Vol. 9 (1994), at pages 103-143; Zachary A. Kramer, “The Ultimate Gender Stereotype : Equalizing Gender-Conforming and Gender-Nonconforming Homosexuals under Title VII”, University of Illinois Law Review (2004), at page 490; Bennett Capers, “Note, Sexual Orientation and Title VII”, Columbia Law Review (1991), at pages 1159, 1160, 1163; Andrew Koppelman, “The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 98 (1988), at page 147; Andrew Koppelman, “Why Discrimination against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination”, New York University Law Review, Vol. 69 (1994); Suzanne Pharr, Homophobia: A weapon of Sexism, Chardon Press (1988), at page 18; Tarunabh
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Khaitan, “Inclusive Pluralism or Majoritarian Nationalism: Article 15, Section 377 and Who We Really Are”, Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy (2018); International Commission of Jurists, “Unnatural Offences” Obstacles to Justice in India Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (2017) – referred to
3. By criminalizing consensual sexual conduct between two homosexual adults, Section 377 has become the basis not just of prosecutions but of the persecution of members of the affected community. Section 377 perpetuates notions of morality which prohibit certain relationships as being against the ‘order of nature.’ A criminal provision has sanctioned discrimination grounded on stereotypes imposed on an entire class of persons on grounds prohibited by Article 15(1). This constitutes discrimination on the grounds only of sex and violates the guarantee of nondiscrimination in Article 15(1). [Para 52] [642-A-B] 4.1 The application of Section 377 causes a deprivation of the fundamental right to privacy which inheres in every citizen. The exercise of the natural and inalienable right to privacy entails allowing an individual the right to a self-determined sexual orientation. Thus, it is imperative to widen the scope of the right to privacy to incorporate a right to ‘sexual privacy’ to protect the rights of sexual minorities. Emanating from the inalienable right to privacy, the right to sexual privacy must be granted the sanctity of a natural right, and be protected under the Constitution as fundamental to liberty and as a soulmate of dignity. In order to ensure to sexual and gender minorities the fulfilment of their fundamental rights, it is imperative to ‘confront the closet’ and, as a necessary consequence, confront ‘compulsory heterosexuality.’ [Paras 58, 59, 60] [647-A, D, E-F] Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, University of California Press (1990); David A.J. Richards, “Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution:, Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 30, at page 786 – referred to
4.2 Privacy creates “tiers of ‘reputable’ and ‘disreputable’ sex”, only granting protection to acts behind closed doors. Thus, it is imperative that the protection granted for consensual acts in private must also be available in situations where sexual minorities are vulnerable in public spaces on account of their sexuality and appearance. If one accepts the proposition that public places are heteronormative, and same-sex sexual acts partially closeted, relegating ‘homosexual‘ acts into the private sphere, would in effect reiterate the “ambient heterosexism of the public space.” It must be acknowledged that members belonging to sexual minorities are often subjected to harassment in public spaces. The right to sexual privacy, founded on the right to autonomy of a free individual, must capture the right of persons of the community to navigate public places on their own terms, free from state interference. [Para 62] [648-C-E] 5. Sexual privacy and autonomy- deconstructing the heteronormative framework An individual’s sexuality cannot be put into boxes or compartmentalized; it should rather be viewed as fluid, granting the individual the freedom to ascertain her own desires and proclivities. The self-determination of sexual orientation is an exercise of autonomy. Human sexuality cannot be reduced to a binary formulation. Nor can it be defined narrowly in terms of its function as a means to procreation. To confine it to closed categories would result in denuding human liberty of its full content as a constitutional right. The Constitution protects the fluidities of sexual experience. It leaves it to consenting adults to find fulfilment in their relationships, in a diversity of cultures, among plural ways of life and in infinite shades of love and longing. [Para 66] [648-E-F; 652-C, E-F] Common Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India (2018) 5 SCC 1 – followed.
Santosh Singh v Union of India (2016) 8 SCC 253 : [2016] 5 SCR 761 – relied on. M. Mahler, “The Psychological Birth of the Human infant. Symbiosis And Individuation” (1975); L. Kaplan, Oneness and Separateness: From infant to
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Individual (1978); Thomas M. Jr. Scanlon, Rawls’ Theory of Justice, University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1973) at 1022; David A. J. Richards, “Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right to Privacy : A Moral Theory”, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 45 (1977), at pages 1130-1311 – referred to
6. A right to intimacy- celebration of sexual agency 6.1 By criminalising consensual acts between individuals who wish to exercise their constitutionally-protected right to sexual orientation, the State is denying its citizens the right to intimacy. The right to intimacy emanates from an individual’s prerogative to engage in sexual relations on their own terms. It is an exercise of the individual’s sexual agency, and includes the individual’s right to the choice of partner as well as the freedom to decide on the nature of the relationship that the individual wishes to pursue. [Para 67] [653-A-B] Shakti Vahini v. Union of India (2018) SCC OnLine SC 275; Shafin Jahan v. Asokan (2018) SCC OnLine SC 343 – referred to. Dipika Jain and Kimberly Rhoten, “The Heteronormative State and the Right to Health in India”, NUJS Law Review, Vol. 6 (2013) – referred to 6.2 Consensual sexual relationships between adults, based on the human propensity to experience desire must be treated with respect. In addition to respect for relationships based on consent, it is important to foster a society where individuals find the ability for unhindered expression of love that they experience towards their partner. Social institutions must be arranged in such a manner that individuals have the freedom to enter into relationships untrammelled by binary of sex and gender and receive the requisite institutional recognition to perfect their relationships. While ostensibly penalising ‘acts’, it impacts upon the identity of the LGBT community and denies them the benefits of a full and equal citizenship. Section 377 is based on a stereotype about sex. Our Constitution which protects sexual orientation must outlaw any law which lends the authority of the state to obstructing its fulfilment. [Para 67] [654-D-F; 655-A-B]
7. Section 377 and the right to health
7.1 The right to health is understood to be indispensable to a life of dignity and well-being, and includes, for instance, the right to emergency medical care and the right to the maintenance and improvement of public health. In addition to the constitutional recognition granted to the right to health, the right to health is also recognised in international treaties, covenants, and agreements which India has ratified, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (“ICESCR”) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (“UDHR”). Article 12 of the ICESCR recognizes the right of all persons to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. Article 12.2 requires States Parties to take specific steps to improve the health of their citizens, including creating conditions to ensure equal and timely access to medical services. In its General Comment No. 14, the UN Economic and Social Council stated that States must take measures to respect, protect and fulfil the health of all persons. States are obliged to ensure the availability and accessibility of health-related information, education, facilities, goods and services, without discrimination, especially for vulnerable and marginalized populations. Pursuant to General Comment No. 14, India is required to provide marginalized populations, including members of the LGBTIQ community, goods and services that are available (in sufficient quantity), accessible (physically, geographically, economically and in a non-discriminatory manner), acceptable (respectful of culture and medical ethics) and of quality (scientifically and medically appropriate and of good quality). [Paras 68, 69] [655-D-F; 658-F-G; 659-A-E] C.E.S.C. Limited v. Subhash Chandra Bose, (1992) 1 SCC 441; Consumer Education and Research Centre v. UOI, (1995) 3 SCC 42; Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal, (1996) 4 SCC 37; Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1; Devika Biswas v. Union of India & Ors., (2016) 10 SCC 726; Common Cause v. Union of India & Ors., (2018) 5 SCC 1 – relied on.
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Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 161 : [1984] 2 SCR 67; Consumer Education & Research Centre v. Union of India (1995) 3 SCC 42 : [1995] 1 SCR 626; C.E.S.C. Limited v. Subhash Chandra Bose (1992) 1 SCC 441 : [1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 267 ; Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. v. Employees’ State Insurance Corporation (1996) 2 SCC 682 : [1996] 1 SCR 884; State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga (1998) 4 SCC 117 : [1998] 1 SCR 1120; Smt M Vijaya v. The Chairman and Managing Director Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd., (2001) 5 ALD 522; Devika Biswas v. Union of India (2016) 10 SCC 726 – referred to.
7.2 Sexuality is a natural and precious aspect of life, an essential and fundamental part of our humanity. Sexual rights are entitlements related to sexuality and emanate from the rights to freedom, equality, privacy, autonomy, and dignity of all people. For people to attain the highest standard of health, they must also have the right to exercise choice in their sexual lives and feel safe in expressing their sexual identity. [Para 71] [659-F-G; 660-A] 7.3 The term ‘sexual health’ was first defined in a 1975 WHO Technical Report series as “the integration of the somatic, emotional, intellectual and social aspects of sexual being, in ways that are positively enriching and that enhance personality, communication and love. The operation of Section 377 denies consenting adults the full realization of their right to health, as well as their sexual rights. It forces consensual sex between adults into a realm of fear and shame, as persons who engage in anal and oral intercourse risk criminal sanctions if they seek health advice. This lowers the standard of health enjoyed by them and particularly by members of sexual and gender minorities, in relation to the rest of society. [Paras 73, 76] [660-E; 662-E-F] UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, UN Doc. E/C.12/2004 (2000); Definition contained in the Preamble to the WHO Constitution (1948); Sexual Rights, International
Planned Parenthood Federation (2008); Alexandra Muller, “Health for All? Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, and the Implementation of the Right to Access to Health Care in South Africa”, Health and Human Rights (2016) at pages 195–208; Institute of Medicine, “The Health of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender People : Building a Foundation for Better Understanding”, National Academies Press (2011); World Health Organization, “Gender and human rights : Defining sexual health”, (2002); World Health Organisation, “Sexual Health, Human Rights and the Law” (2015); International Women’s Health Coalition, “Sexual Rights are Human Rights” (2014) – referred to 7.4 The right to health is not simply the right not to be unwell, but rather the right to be well. It encompasses not just the absence of disease or infirmity, but “complete physical, mental and social well being”, and includes both freedoms such as the right to control one’s health and body and to be free from interference (for instance, from non-consensual medical treatment and experimentation), and entitlements such as the right to a system of healthcare that gives everyone an equal opportunity to enjoy the highest attainable level of health. The jurisprudence of this Court, in recognizing the right to health and access to medical care, demonstrates the crucial distinction between negative and positive obligations. Article 21 does not impose upon the State only negative obligations not to act in such a way as to interfere with the right to health. This Court also has the power to impose positive obligations upon the State to take measures to provide adequate resources or access to treatment facilities to secure effective enjoyment of the right to health. While the enumeration of the right to equal healthcare is crucial, an individual’s sexual health is also equally significant to holistic well-being. A healthy sex life is integral to an individual’s physical and mental health, regardless of whom an individual is attracted to. Criminalising certain sexual acts, thereby shunning them from the mainstream discourse, would invariably lead to situations of unsafe sex, coercion, and a lack of sound medical advice and sexual education, if any at all. [Paras 77, 78, 81] [662-G; 663-AB; 664-F-G]
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7.5 Laws that criminalize same-sex intercourse create social barriers to accessing healthcare, and curb the effective prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS. Criminal laws are the strongest expression of the State’s power to punish certain acts and behaviour, and it is therefore incumbent upon the State to ensure full protection for all persons, including the specific needs of sexual minorities. The equal protection of law mandates the state to fulfill this constitutional obligation. Indeed, the state is duty bound to revisit its laws and executive decisions to ensure that they do not deny equality before the law and the equal protection of laws. That the law must not discriminate is one aspect of equality. But there is more. The law must take affirmative steps to achieve equal protection of law to all its citizens, irrespective of sexual orientation. [Para 83] [665-C-E]
Study Guide: Sexual Orientation and Human Rights, University of Minnesota Human RIghts Library (2003); Center for Health and Human Rights and Open Society Foundations. “Health and Human Rights Resource Guide(2013)”. UNAIDS, “UNAIDS Calls on India and All Countries to Repeal Laws That Criminalize Adult Consensual Same Sex Sexual Conduct”(2013) – referred to
8. Section 377 and HIV prevention efforts Section 377 has a significant detrimental impact on the right to health of those persons who are susceptible to contracting HIV – men who have sex with men (“MSM”) and transgender persons. MSM and transgender persons may not approach State health care providers for fear of being prosecuted for engaging in criminalized intercourse. Studies show that it is the stigma attached to these individuals that contributes to increased sexual risk behaviour and/or decreased use of HIV prevention services. To safeguard the health of persons who are at the greatest risk of HIV infection, it is imperative that access is granted to effective HIV prevention and treatment services and commodities such as clean needles, syringes, condoms and lubricants. A needle or a condom can only be considered a concrete representation of the entitlements of vulnerable groups: the fundamental human rights of dignity, autonomy and freedom from ill-treatment, along
with the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, without regard to sexuality or legal status. This is the mandate of the Directive Principles contained in Part IV of the Constitution. In 2017, Parliament enacted the HIV (Prevention and Control) Act, to provide for the prevention and control of the spread of HIV/AIDS and for the protection of the human rights of persons affected. Parliament recognized the importance of prevention interventions for vulnerable groups including MSMs. In order to promote sexual health and reduce HIV transmission among LGBT individuals, it is imperative that the availability, effectiveness, and quality of health services to the LGBT community be significantly improved. [Paras 84, 87, 91, 92] [666-A-B; 667-E-F; 668-E-F; 669-A-B, F-G] Eszter Kismodi, Jane Cottingham, Sofia Gruskin & Alice M. Miller, “Advancing sexual health through human rights : The role of the law”, Taylor and Francis, (2015), at pages 252-267; Regional Office for SouthEast Asia, World Health Organization, “HIV/AIDS among men who have sex with men and transgender populations in South-East Asia : the current situation and national responses” (2010); United Nations Development Programme, “Global Commission on HIV and the Law : Risks, Rights and Health” (2012), at pages 11-12; Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994), decision dated 31/03/ 1994; Beena Thomas, Matthew J. Mimiaga, Senthil Kumar, Soumya Swaminathan, Steven A. Safren, and Kenneth H. Mayer, “HIV in Indian MSM : Reasons for a concentrated epidemic & strategies for prevention”, Indian Journal Medical Research (2011), at pages 920–929; UNAIDS, “Judging the Epidemic : A Judicial Handbook on HIV, Human Rights and the Law” (2013) at page 165 – referred to 9. Mental health
9.1 The treatment of homosexuality as a disorder has serious consequences on the mental health and well-being of LGBT persons. The mental health of citizens “growing up in a culture that devalues and silences same-sex desire” is severely
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impacted. Medical and scientific authority has now established that consensual same sex conduct is not against the order of nature and that homosexuality is natural and a normal variant of sexuality. Parliament has provided legislative acknowledgment of this global consensus through the enactment of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017. Section 3 of the Act mandates that mental illness is to be determined in accordance with ‘nationally’ or ‘internationally’ accepted medical standards. The International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) by the World Health Organisation is listed as an internationally accepted medical standard and does not consider non-peno-vaginal sex between consenting adults either a mental disorder or an illness. The Act through Section 18(2) and Section 21 provides for protection against discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. The repercussions of prejudice, stigma and discrimination continue to impact the psychological well-being of individuals impacted by Section 377. [Paras 93, 95] [670-C; 671-C-D, E]
9.2 Counselling practices will have to focus on providing support to homosexual clients to become comfortable with who they are and get on with their lives, rather than motivating them for change. Instead of trying to cure something that isn’t even a disease or illness, the counsellors have to adopt a more progressive view that reflects the changed medical position and changing societal values. There is not only a need for special skills of counsellors but also heightened sensitivity and understanding of LGBT lives. The medical practice must share the responsibility to help individuals, families, workplaces and educational and other institutions to understand sexuality completely in order to facilitate the creation of a society free from discrimination where LGBT individuals like all other citizens are treated with equal standards of respect and value for human rights. [Para 96] [671-F; 672-A-C] 10. Judicial review Both Parliament and the State Legislatures can enact laws providing for offences arising out of legislation falling within their legislative domains. The authority to enact law, however, is subject to the validity of the law being scrutinised on the touchstone of constitutional safeguards. Where the validity of the law is called
into question, judicial review will extend to scrutinising whether the law is manifestly arbitrary in its encroachment on fundamental liberties. If a law discriminates against a group or a community of citizens by denying them full and equal participation as citizens, in the rights and liberties granted by the Constitution, it would be for the Court to adjudicate upon validity of such a law. [Para 97] [672-G; 673-B-C] Ketki Ranade, “Process of Sexual Identity Development for Young People with Same Sex Desires: Experiences of Exclusion”, Psychological Foundations - The Journal (2008); Vinay Chandran, “From judgment to practice: Section 377 and the medical sector”, Indian Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol. 4 (2009) – referred to 11. India’s commitments at International Law
11.1 International human rights treaties and jurisprudence impose obligations upon States to protect all individuals from violations of their human rights, including on the basis of their sexual orientation. International law today has evolved towards establishing that the criminalization of consensual sexual acts between same-sex adults in private contravenes the rights to equality, privacy, and freedom from discrimination. These rights are recognised in international treaties, covenants, and agreements which India has ratified, including the UDHR, ICCPR, and the ICESCR. India has a constitutional duty to honour these internationally recognized rules and principles. [Paras 98, 99] [673-C-D; F-G] Vishaka v State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241 – relied on
Dominic McGoldrick, “The Development and Status of Sexual Orientation Discrimination under International Human Rights Law”, Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 16 (2016); UN Human Rights Council, “Discriminatory laws and practices and acts of violence against individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity” (2011); UN Human Rights Council, “Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil,
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development” (2008) – referred to
11.2 There is a contradiction between India’s international obligations and Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, insofar as it criminalizes consensual sexual acts between same-sex adults in private. In adjudicating the validity of this provision, the Indian Penal Code must be brought into conformity with both the Indian Constitution and the rules and principles of international law that India has recognized. Both make a crucial contribution towards recognizing the human rights of sexual and gender minorities. [Para 104] [676-A-B] 12. The past two decades have witnessed several decisions by constitutional and international courts, recognizing both the decriminalization of same-sex intercourse in private, as well as broader rights recognizing sexual orientation equality. In 1996, South Africa became the first country in the world to constitutionally prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. The United Kingdom, Bolivia, Ecuador, Fiji, and Malta specifically prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity, either constitutionally or through enacted laws. According the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association, 74 countries (including India) criminalize same-sex sexual conduct, as of 2017. Most of these countries lie in the Sub-Saharan and Middle East region. Some of them prescribe death penalty for homosexuality [Para 125] [693-F; 694-A-B] Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India 2018 (8) SCALE 72 – referred to. Dudgeon v The United Kingdom App No 7525/76, (1981) ECHR 5; Norris v Ireland Application No. 10581/83, (1988) ECHR 22; Modinos v Cyprus Application No. 15070/89,16 EHRR 485; Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Lawrence v Texas 539 U.S. 558 (2003); X v. Colombia Communication No. 1361/2005; National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC); Dhirendra Nadan Thomas McCoskar v. State [2005] FJHC 500; Caleb Orozco v. The Attorney General of
Belize Claim No. 668 of 2010; Jason Jones v. The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago Claim no. CV2017-00720; Leung TC William Roy v. Secretary for Justice Civil Appeal No. 317 of 2005 El-Al Israel Airlines Ltd v. Jonathan Danielwitz HCJ 721/94; Vriend v Alberta (1998) 1 S.C.R. 493; Sunil Babu Pant v. Nepal Government Writ Petition No. 917 of 2007; Oliari v Italy [2015] ECHR 716; United States v. Windsor 570 U.S. 44 (2013); Obergefell v. Hodges 576 U.S.(2015); Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission 584 U.S. (2018) Lee v. Ashers Bakery Co. Ltd. [2015] NICty 2 – referred to. Robert Wintemute, “Same-Sex Love and Indian Penal Code §377: An Important Human Rights Issue for India” National University of Juridical Sciences Law Review (2011); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, “General Comment 20 : Nondiscrimination in economic, social and cultural rights” (2009), at para 32; Amy Raub, “Protections Of Equal Rights Across Sexual Orientation And Gender Identity: An Analysis Of 193 National Constitutions”, Yale Journal of Law and Feminism, Vol. 28 (2017); The International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans And Intersex Association, “Sexual Orientation Laws of the World”, (2017); Halsbury’s Laws of England. 3rd edition, Vol. 3, Butterworths (1953) at page. 271; Glanville Williams, ‘The Definition of Crime’, Current Legal Problems, Vol. 8 (1955) – referred to 13. Crime, morality and the Constitution: Criminal Law Theories
13.1 Bentham’s Utilitarian Theory – Utilitarianism has provided some of the most powerful critiques of existing laws. Bentham was one of the earliest supporters for reform in sodomy laws. In his essay, “Offences Against One’s Self”, Bentham rebutted all the justifications given by the state for enacting laws on sodomy. According to Bentham, homosexuality, if viewed outside the realms of morality and religion, is neutral behaviour which gives the participants pleasure and does not cause pain to
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
anyone else. Therefore, he concluded that such an act cannot constitute an offence, and there is “no reason for punishing it at all. According to Bentham, sodomy neither cause primary mischief, nor secondary mischief, nor any danger to society. Bentham also critiqued criminal laws by analysing the utility of the punishment prescribed by them. He succinctly described the objective of law through the principles of utility - “The general object which all laws have, or ought to have…is to augment the total happiness of the community; [and] to exclude…everything that tends to subtract from that happiness.” According to Bentham, “all punishment in itself is evil because it reduces the level of happiness in society, and should be prescribed only if it “excludes some greater evil”. [Paras 129, 130] [694-F; 698-B; 699-G; 700-A-B]
Henry M. Hart, “The Aims of the Criminal Law”, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 23 (1958), at pages 401–441; Roscoe Pound, Interpretation of Legal History, Harvard University Press (1946); H.C. Lawson-Tancred, The Art of Rhetoric/Aristotle, Penguin (2004); Immanuel Kant: The Metaphysics of Morals (Mary Gregor ed.), Cambridge University Press (1996); Grant Lamond, “What is a Crime?”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol.27 (2007); Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book IV, Ch. 1 & 2; Antony Duff and Sandra Marshall, “Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs”, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, Vol. 11, (1998) at pages 7-22; Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Basic Books (1974),at page 65; Lawrence C. Becker, “Criminal Attempts and the Theory of the Law of Crimes”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol 3 (1974), at page 273; Jeremy Bentham, “Offences Against One’s Self” (Louis Crompton Ed.), Columbia University – referred to 13.2 The Harm Principle – John Stuart Mill, in his treatise “On Liberty,” makes a powerful case to preclude governments from interfering in those areas of an individual’s life which are private. Mill’s theory, called the “harm principle”, suggests that the state can intrude into private life by way of sanction only if
harm is caused to others or if the conduct is “other-affecting. Mill proposed that “all that portion of a person’s life and conduct which affects only himself, or, if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation” should be free from state interference. He further added that the state and society are not justified in interfering in the selfregarding sphere, merely because they believe certain conduct to be “foolish, perverse, or wrong. While Mill’s theory was not propounded in relation to LGBTQ rights, his understanding of criminal law is well-suited to argue that sodomy laws criminalise ‘self-regarding’ actions which fall under the first category of conduct, and should England not be subjected to sanctions either by the state or the society. [Para 131] [700-C, E; 701-F] Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, The Library of Economics and Liberty (1823); John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, (Elizabeth Rapaport ed), Hackett Publishing Co, Inc (1978); Mark Strasser, “Lawrence, Mill, and Same Sex Relationships : On Values, Valuing and the Constitution”, Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal, Vol. 15 (2006); Joseph Raz, ‘Autonomy, Toleration and the Harm Principle’, in Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The Influence of HLA Hart (R. Gavison ed.), Oxford University Press (1987); Graham Hughes, “Morals and the Criminal Law”, The Yale Law Journal, Vol.71 (1962); Sir Patrick Arthur Devlin, “The Enforcement Of Morals” Oxford University Press (1959) at page 9; Animesh Sharma, “Section 377 : No Jurisprudential Basis.” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43 (2008) at pages 12-14; Hart, H. L. A, “The Changing Sense of Morality” In Political Thought (Michael Rosen and Jonathan Wolff eds.), Oxford University Press (1999) at pages 140-141; H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty And Morality (1979); William Starr, “Law and Morality in H.L.A. Hart’s Legal Philosophy”, Marquette Law Review, Vol. 67 (1984); Peter August Bittlinger, “Government enforcement of morality : a critical analysis of the Devlin-Hart controversy”, Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 (1975) at pages 69-70 – referred to
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13.3 A broad analysis of criminal theory points to the general conclusion that criminologists and legal philosophers have long been in agreement about one basic characteristic of crime: that it should injure a third person or the society. An element of larger public interest emerges as the crux of crime. The conduct which Section 377 criminalises voluntary ‘carnal intercourse against the order of nature’ with a man or woman, inter alia – pertains solely to acts between consenting adults. Such conduct is purely private, or as Mill would call it, “self-regarding,” and is neither capable of causing injury to someone else nor does it pose a threat to the stability and security of society. Once the factor of consent is established, the question of such conduct causing any injury, does not arise. Although Section 377 prima facie appears to criminalise certain acts or conduct, it creates a class of criminals, consisting of individuals who engage in consensual sexual activity. Section 377 not only criminalises acts (consensual sexual conduct between adults) which should not constitute crime, but also stigmatises and condemns LGBTQ individuals in society. [Para 136] [707-B-F]
14.1 The conception of constitutional morality is different from that of public or societal morality. Under a regime of public morality, the conduct of society is determined by popular perceptions existent in society. Constitutional morality determines the mental attitude towards individuals and issues by the text and spirit of the Constitution. It builds and protects the foundations of a democracy, without which any nation will crack under its fissures. For this reason, constitutional morality has to be imbibed by the citizens consistently and continuously. Constitutional morality leans towards making Indian democracy vibrant by infusing a spirit of brotherhood amongst a heterogeneous population, belonging to different classes, races, religions, cultures, castes and sections. Constitutional morality cannot, however, be nurtured unless, as recognised by the Preamble, there exists fraternity, which assures and maintains the dignity of each individual. [Paras 141, 143] [709-E-F, G; 710-A, F-G]
Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi (2010) Cri LJ 94 – referred to.
14.2 Constitutional morality will impact upon any law which deprives the LGBT individuals of their entitlement to a full and equal citizenship. After the Constitution came into force, no law can be divorced from constitutional morality. Society cannot dictate the expression of sexuality between consenting adults. That is a private affair. Constitutional morality will supersede any culture or tradition. The interpretation of a right in a matter of decriminalisation and beyond must be determined by the norms of the Constitution. LGBT individuals living under the threats of conformity grounded in cultural morality have been denied a basic human existence. They have been stereotyped and prejudiced. Constitutional morality requires this Court not to turn a blind eye to their right to an equal participation of citizenship and an equal enjoyment of living. Constitutional morality requires that this Court must act as a counter majoritarian institution which discharges the responsibility of protecting constitutionally entrenched rights, regardless of what the majority may believe. [Paras 145, 146] [713-F-H; 714-A-B] 15. Transformative constitutionalism
15.1 In penalising consensual sexual conduct between adults of the same sex, Section 377 violates the constitutional guarantees of liberty and equality. It denudes members of the LGBT communities of their constitutional right to lead fulfilling lives. Sexual and gender based minorities cannot live in fear, if the Constitution has to have meaning for them on even terms. In its quest for equality and the equal protection of the law, the Constitution guarantees to them an equal citizenship. In decriminalising such conduct, the values of the Constitution assure to the LGBT community the ability to lead a life of freedom from fear and to find fulfilment in intimate choices. The choice of a partner, the desire for personal intimacy and the yearning to find love and fulfilment in human relationships have a universal appeal, straddling age and time. In protecting consensual intimacies, the Constitution adopts a simple principle: the state has no business to intrude into these personal matters. Nor can societal notions of heteronormativity regulate constitutional liberties based on sexual orientation. [Paras 147, 150 and 151] [714-C-D, G-H; 715-A-B]
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2014) 1 SCC 1 : [2013] 17 SCR 116 – overruled
Christopher. R. Leslie, “Creating criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by “Unenforced” Sodomy Laws”, Harvard Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law Review, Vol. 35 (2000); Jawaharlal Nehru, “Tryst with Destiny”, address to the Constituent Assembly of India, delivered on 14-15 August 1947; Uday S. Mehta, “Constitutionalism”, In The Oxford Companion to Politics in India (Niraja Gopal Jayal and Pratap Bhanu Mehta eds.), Oxford University Press (2010), at page 15; Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, Oxford University Press (1966), at page 65; Constituent Assembly Debates (25 November 1949); Lord Neuberger, “UK Supreme Court decisions on private and commercial law: The role of public policy and public interest”, Centre for Commercial Law Studies Conference (2015); Marc Galanter, “Fifty Years on”, in BN Kirpal et al, Supreme but Not Infallible: Essays in Honour of the Supreme Court of India, Oxford University Press (2000), at page 57 – referred to Per Indu Malhotra, J. 1. The essential ingredient required to constitute an offence under Section 377 is “carnal intercourse against the order of nature”, which is punishable with life imprisonment, or imprisonment of either description up to ten years. Section 377 applies irrespective of gender, age, or consent. The expression ‘carnal intercourse’ used in Section 377 is distinct from ‘sexual intercourse’ which appears in Sections 375 and 497 of the IPC. The phrase “carnal intercourse against the order of nature” is not defined by Section 377, or in the Code. [Paras 12.1, 12.2] [721-F-G] Khanu v. Emperor AIR 1925 Sind 286; Khandu v. Emperor AIR 1934 Lah 261 : 1934 Cri LJ 1096; Lohana Vasantlal Devchand & Ors v. State AIR 1968 Guj 252; Fazal Rab Choudhary v. State of Bihar (1982) 3 SCC 9 – referred to
The New International Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition, 1996) – referred to 2. Whilst a great deal of scientific research has examined possible genetic, hormonal, developmental, psychological, social and cultural influences on sexual orientation, no findings have conclusively linked sexual orientation to any one particular factor or factors. It is believed that one’s sexuality is the result of a complex interplay between nature and nurture. Sexual orientation is an innate attribute of one’s identity, and cannot be altered. Sexual orientation is not a matter of choice. It manifests in early adolescence. Homosexuality is a natural variant of human sexuality. [Para 13.1] [723-D-F] Lawrence et al. v. Texas 539 U.S. 558 (2003) – referred to
Brief for the Amici Curiae American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, National Association of Social Workers, and Texas Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers in Lawrence et al. v. Texas 539 U.S. 558(2003); KK Gulia and HN Mallick, Homosexuality: a dilemma in discourse, 54 Indian Journal of Physiology and Pharmacology (2010), at pp. 5, 6 and 8; Jack Drescher, Out of DSM: Depathologizing Homosexuality, 5(4) Behavioral Sciences (2015), at p. 565; The ICD-10 classification of mental and behavioural disorders: clinical descriptions and diagnostic guidelines, World Health Organization, Geneva (1992); Indian Psychiatry Society: “Position statement on Homosexuality” IPS / Statement / 02/07/2018 – referred to 3. SECTION 377 IF APPLIED TO CONSENTING ADULTS IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 3.1 The twin-test of classification under Article 14 provides that: (i) there should be a reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia; and, (ii) this classification should have a rational nexus with the objective sought to be achieved. Section
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
377 operates in a vastly different manner for two classes of persons based on their “sexual orientation” i.e. the LGBT persons and heterosexual persons. Section 377 penalises all forms of non penile-vaginal intercourse. In effect, voluntary consensual relationships between LGBT persons are criminalised in totality. The import and effect of Section 377 is that while a consensual heterosexual relationship is permissible, a consensual relationship between LGBT persons is considered to be ‘carnal’, and against the order of nature. Section 377 creates an artificial dichotomy. The natural or innate sexual orientation of a person cannot be a ground for discrimination. Where a legislation discriminates on the basis of an intrinsic and core trait of an individual, it cannot form a reasonable classification based on an intelligible differentia. [Paras 14.2, 14.3] [726-D-G]
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India & Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 438 – relied on 3.2 A person’s sexual orientation is intrinsic to their being. It is connected with their individuality, and identity. A classification which discriminates between persons based on their innate nature, would be violative of their fundamental rights, and cannot withstand the test of constitutional morality. [Para 14.5] [727-B]
3.3 In contemporary civilised jurisprudence, with States increasingly recognising the status of same-sex relationships, it would be retrograde to describe such relationships as being ‘perverse’, ‘deviant’, or ‘unnatural’. [Para 14.6] [727-B-C]
3.4 While Section 375 permits consensual penetrative acts (the definition of ‘penetration’ includes oral and anal sex), Section 377 makes the same acts of penetration punishable irrespective of consent. This creates a dichotomy in the law. The proscription of a consensual sexual relationship under Section 377 is not founded on any known or rational criteria. Sexual expression and intimacy of a consensual nature, between adults in private, cannot be treated as “carnal intercourse against the order of nature”. [Paras 14.7, 14.8] [727-E-F]
Shayara Bano v. Union of India & Ors. (2017) 9 SCC 1 – relied on
4. SECTION 377 IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 15 Sex as it occurs in Article 15, is not merely restricted to the biological attributes of an individual, but also includes their “sexual identity and character”. The prohibition against discrimination under Article 15 on the ground of ‘sex’ should, therefore, encompass instances where such discrimination takes place on the basis of one’s sexual orientation. Race, caste, sex, and place of birth are aspects over which a person has no control, ergo they are immutable. On the other hand, religion is a fundamental choice of a person. Discrimination based on any of these grounds would undermine an individual’s personal autonomy. [Paras 15.1, 15.2] [729-C; 730-F-G] Egan v. Canada [1995] SCC 98; Vriend v. Alberta [1998] SCC 816 – referred to Nicholas Toonen v. Australia Communication No. 488/ 1992, U.N. Doc.CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994); Reading Swaraj into Article 15: A New Deal For All Minorities by Tarunabh Khaitan, 2 NUJS Law Review (2009), at p. 419; John Gardner, On the Ground of Her Sex (uality), 18(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1998), at p. 167 – referred to 4.2 Section 15(1), of the Canadian Charter like Article 15 of our Constitution, does not include “sexual orientation” as a prohibited ground of discrimination. Notwithstanding that, the Canadian Supreme Court in a decision has held that sexual orientation is a “ground analogous” to the other grounds specified under Section 15(1). Discrimination based on any of these grounds has adverse impact on an individual’s personal autonomy, and is undermining of his personality. A similar conclusion would be in the Indian context as well in light of the underlying aspects of immutability and fundamental choice. The LGBT community is a sexual minority which has suffered from unjustified and unwarranted hostile discrimination, and is equally entitled to the protection afforded by Article 15. [Para 15.2] [731-B-D] 5. SECTION 377 VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND LIBERTY GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE 21 5.1 Sexual orientation is innate to a human being. It is an
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
important attribute of one’s personality and identity. Homosexuality and bisexuality are natural variants of human sexuality. LGBT persons have little or no choice over their sexual orientation. LGBT persons, like other heterosexual persons, are entitled to their privacy, and the right to lead a dignified existence, without fear of persecution. They are entitled to complete autonomy over the most intimate decisions relating to their personal life, including the choice of their partners. Such choices must be protected under Article 21. [Para 16.1] [733-D-E]
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Anr. (1978) 1 SCC 248 : [1978] 2 SCR 621; Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi & Ors. (1981) 1 SCC 608 : [1981] 2 SCR 516; K.S. Puttaswamy & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2017) 10 SCC 1; Common Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India & Anr. (2018) 5 SCC 1 – relied on National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Anr. v. Minister of Justice and Ors. [1998] ZACC 15 – referred to 5.2 Section 377 insofar as it curtails the personal liberty of LGBT persons to engage in voluntary consensual sexual relationships with a partner of their choice, in a safe and dignified environment, is violative of Article 21. It inhibits them from entering and nurturing enduring relationships. As a result, LGBT individuals are forced to either lead a life of solitary existence without a companion, or lead a closeted life as “unapprehended felons”. Thus, Section 377 prevents LGBT persons from leading a dignified life as guaranteed by Article 21. [Para 16.1] [734-B-C] “unapprehended felons” - according to Professor Edwin Cameron, LGBT persons are reduced to the status of “unapprehended felons” owing to the ever-sopresent threat of prosecution; Edwin Cameron, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Test Case for Human Rights, 110 South African Law Journal (1993), at p. 450; Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton 413 U.S. 49 (1973) – referred to.
6. RIGHT TO PRIVACY 6.1 The right to privacy has now been recognised to be an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. Sexual orientation of a person is an essential attribute of privacy. Its protection lies at the core of Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 15, and 21. The right to privacy is broad-based and pervasive under our Constitutional scheme, and encompasses decisional autonomy, to cover intimate/personal decisions and preserves the sanctity of the private sphere of an individual. [Para 16.2] [736-C-E] 6.2 The right to privacy is not simply the “right to be let alone”, and has travelled far beyond that initial concept. It now incorporates the ideas of spatial privacy, and decisional privacy or privacy of choice. It extends to the right to make fundamental personal choices, including those relating to intimate sexual conduct, without unwarranted State interference. Section 377 affects the private sphere of the lives of LGBT persons. It takes away the decisional autonomy of LGBT persons to make choices consistent with their sexual orientation, which would further a dignified existence and a meaningful life as a full person. Section 377 prohibits LGBT persons from expressing their sexual orientation and engaging in sexual conduct in private, a decision which inheres in the most intimate spaces of one’s existence. [Para 16.2] [736-E-G; 737-A] 6.3 A subjective notion of public or societal morality which discriminates against LGBT persons, and subjects them to criminal sanction, simply on the basis of an innate characteristic runs counter to the concept of Constitutional morality, and cannot form the basis of a legitimate State interest. [Para 16.2] [737-E] 7. RIGHT TO HEALTH
The right to health, and access to healthcare are also crucial facets of the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. LGBT persons being a sexual minority have been subjected to societal prejudice, discrimination and violence on account of their sexual orientation. Since Section 377 criminalises “carnal intercourse against the order of nature” it compels LGBT persons to lead closeted lives. As a consequence, LGBT persons
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
are seriously disadvantaged and prejudiced when it comes to access to health-care facilities. This results in serious health issues, including depression and suicidal tendencies amongst members of this community. [Para 16.3] [738-A-C]
Common Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India & Anr. (2018) 5 SCC 1; C.E.S.C. Limited & Ors. v. Subhash Chandra Bose & Ors. (1992) 1 SCC 441 : [1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 267; Union of India v. Mool Chand Khairati Ram Trust, (2018) SCC OnLine SC 675; Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India & Ors. (2013) 16 SCC 279 : [2013] 9 SCR 1103 – relied on The Economic Cost of Stigma and the Exclusion of LGBT People: A Case Study of India, by M.V. Lee Badgett, World Bank Group (2014); India’s homosexual discrimination and health consequences by Govindasamy Agoramoorthy and Minna J Hsu, 41(4) Rev Saude Publica (2007), at pp. 567-660 – referred to
8. SECTION 377 VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION OF LGBT PERSONS LGBT persons express their sexual orientation in myriad ways. One such way is engagement in intimate sexual acts like those proscribed under Section 377. Owing to the fear of harassment from law enforcement agencies and prosecution, LGBT persons tend to stay ‘in the closet’. They are forced not to disclose a central aspect of their personal identity i.e. their sexual orientation, both in their personal and professional spheres to avoid persecution in society and the opprobrium attached to homosexuality. Unlike heterosexual persons, they are inhibited from openly forming and nurturing fulfilling relationships, thereby restricting rights of full personhood and a dignified existence. It also has an impact on their mental well-being. Section 377 cannot be justified as a reasonable restriction under Article 19(2) on the basis of public or societal morality, since it is inherently subjective. [Paras 17.1, 17.2] [740-B, C-E; 741-E-F] National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India & Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 438; S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal &
Anr. (2010) 5 SCC 600 : [2010] 5 SCR 322 – relied on Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors. (2009) 111 DRJ 1 (DB); A.K. Roy v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 271 : [1982] 2 SCR 272– referred to Suresh Kumar Koushal & Anr. v. Naz Foundation & Ors. (2014) 1 SCC 1 : [2013] 17 SCR116 – overruled Lawrence et al. v. Texas 539 U.S. 558 (2003); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Anr. v. Minister of Justice and Ors. [1998] ZACC 15 – referred to
9. History owes an apology to the members of this community and their families, for the delay in providing redressal for the ignominy and ostracism that they have suffered through the centuries. The members of this community were compelled to live a life full of fear of reprisal and persecution. This was on account of the ignorance of the majority to recognise that homosexuality is a completely natural condition, part of a range of human sexuality. The mis-application of this provision denied them the Fundamental Right to equality guaranteed by Article 14. It infringed the Fundamental Right to non-discrimination under Article 15, and the Fundamental Right to live a life of dignity and privacy guaranteed by Article 21. [Para 20] [745-E-F] Case Law Reference Per Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and Khanwilkar, J.]
(2014) 5 SCC 438
relied on
Para 5
(2017) 10 SCC 1
followed
Para 10
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referred to
Para 22
2018 (5) SCALE 422
relied on
Para 22
[2014] 9 SCR 965
referred to
Para 23
[1981] 2 SCR 516
referred to
Para 24
(2018) 5 SCC 1
referred to
Para 24
[2007] 12 SCR 991
referred to
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relied on
Para 27
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[2010] 5 SCR 322
referred to
Para 29
[2012] 9 SCR 733
referred to
Para 31
[2013] 14 SCR 213
referred to
Para 31
[2005] 2 SCR 708
referred to
Para 47
[1971] 2 SCR 446
referred to
Para 50
[1979] 1 SCR 609
referred to
Para 50
(1982) 3 SCC 9
referred to
Para 55
[1973] 2 SCR 541
referred to
Para 55
[2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 582
referred to
Para 56
[1973] Suppl. SCR 1
referred to
Para 56
[2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 723
referred to
Para 62
[1991] 3 SCR 873
referred to
Para 63
(2011) 6 SCC 261
referred to
Para 74
AIR 1925 Sind 286
referred to
Para 75
AIR 1968 Guj 252
referred to
Para 76
[1969] Cri LJ 818 (Ker)
referred to
Para 78
1992 (1) OLR 316
referred to
Para 79
[1979] 1 SCR 26
referred to
Para 82
[2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 152
referred to
Para 83
[1997] 3 SCR 269
relied on
Para 84
[1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 731
relied on
Para 85
[2004] 3 SCR 698
referred to
Para 91
[1976] 1 SCR 906
relied on
Para 95
2018 (8) SCALE 72
relied on
Para 118
[1978] 2 SCR 621
relied on
Para 131
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 497
referred to
Para 133
[1995] 2 SCR 513
referred to
Para 147
[1994] 4 Suppl. SCR 353
relied on
Para 154
[1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 284
relied on
Para 173
[1950] 1 SCR 869
referred to
Para 174
[1998] 1 SCR 493
referred to
Para 198
[1979] 1 SCR 392
referred to
Para 232
[2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336
relied on
Para 234
[1974] 2 SCR 348
relied on
Para 235
[1955] SCR 1045
relied on
Para 236
[1950] SCR 759
relied on
Para 241
[1989] 2 SCR 204
relied on
Para 242
[2015] 5 SCR 963
relied on
Para 244
[2013] 17 SCR 1019
overruled
Para 253
(2014) 5 SCC 438
relied on
Para 5
[2007] 12 SCR 991
relied on
Para 44
(2018) 5 SCC 1
relied on
Para 62
2018 SCC Online 343
relied on
Para 64
2018 SCC Online SC 275
relied on
Para 64
[2013] 17 SCR 116
overruled
Para 73
[1980] 1 SCR 368
relied on
Para 78
[2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 930
relied on
Para 78
[2015] 5 SCR 963
relied on
Para 83
[1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 472
disapproved
Para 90
[2011] 8 SCR 1028
relied on
Para 97
[2016] 3 SCR 865
relied on
Para 97
[2013] 17 SCR 116
overruled
Para 3
(2010) Cri LJ 94
referred to
Para 12
AIR 1934 Sind. 206
referred to
Para 23
Per R.F. Nariman, J.
Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
AIR 1935 Sind. 78;
referred to
Para 23
(1988) Cr.L.J. 980.
referred to
Para 23
(1952) SCR 284
referred to
Para 26
[1989] 1 SCR 689
referred to
Para 26
[1974] 2 SCR 348
referred to
Para 27
(2017) 9 SCC 1
referred to
Para 27
AIR (1925) Sind. 286
referred to
Para 30
[1959] SCR 995
referred to
Para 34
[1962] SCR 842
referred to
Para 34
[1970] 3 SCR 530
referred to
Para 34
[1973] 2 SCR 757
referred to
Para 34
[1978] 2 SCR 621
referred to
Para 34
AIR (1951) Cal. 563
referred to
Para 35
[1982] 1 SCR 438
referred to
Para 35
[2007] 12 SCR 991
referred to
Para 37
[1989] 1 SCR 143
referred to
Para 43
(2017) 10 SCC 1
followed
Para 52
[2016] 5 SCR 761
relied on
Para 64
(2018) 5 SCC 1
followed
Para 65
(2018) SCC OnLine SC 275
referred to
Para 67
(2018) SCC OnLine SC 343
referred to
Para 67
[1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 267
referred to
Para 68
[1995] 1 SCR 626
referred to
Para 68
[1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 331
referred to
Para 68
[2012] 2 SCR 715
referred to
Para 68
(2016) 10 SCC 726
referred to
Para 68
(2018) 5 SCC 1
referred to
Para 68
[1984] 2 SCR 67
referred to
Para 68
[1995] 1 SCR 626
referred to
Para 68
[1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 267
referred to
Para 68
[1996] 1 SCR 884
referred to
Para 68
[1998] 1 SCR 1120
referred to
Para 68
(2001) 5 ALD 522
referred to
Para 68
(2016) 10 SCC 726
referred to
Para 68
2018 (8) SCALE 72
followed
Para 142
[2013] 17 SCR 116
overruled
Para 3
(1982) 3 SCC 9
referred to
Para 12.4
(2014) 5 SCC 438
relied on
Para 14.4
(2017) 9 SCC 1
relied on
Para 14.9
[1978] 2 SCR 621
relied on
Para 16
[1981] 2 SCR 516
relied on
Para 16.1
(2017) 10 SCC 1
followed
Para 16.1
(2018) 5 SCC 1
relied on
Para 16.1
[1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 267
relied on
Para 16.3
[2013] 9 SCR 1103
relied on
Para 16.3
[2010] 5 SCR 322
relied on
Para 17.2
[1982] 2 SCR 272
referred to
Para 19
Per Indu Malhotra, J.
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 76 of 2016 Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. WITH W.P. (C) No. 572/2016 and W.P. (Crl.) Nos. 88, 100, 101 and 121 of 2018. Tushar Mehta, ASG, Anand Grover, K. Radhakrishnan, Mahesh Jethmalani, Soumya Chakraborty, Chander Uday Singh, Ashok Desai, Shyam Divan, Sr. Advs., Saurabh Kirpal, Mahesh Agarwal, Nikhil Rohatgi, Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Ms. Arundhati Katju, Ms. Neeha
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
Nagpal, Sagar Gupta, Ms. Devanshi Singh, Ms. Pritha Srikumar Iyer, Shashank Khurana, E.C. Agrawala, Mrs. Shally Bhasin, Sunil Fernandes, Ms. Astha Sharma, Ms. Nupur Kumar, Ms. Tripti Tandon, Suraj Sanap, Ms. Priyanshia Sharma, Samyak Gangwal, Ms. Aarushi Mahajan, Ms. Priyam Cherian, Ms. Anju Thomas, Arun Srikumar, Ms. Vasudha Sharma, Kaustav Saha, Ms. Neha Methen, O. P. Bhadani, S. S. Shamshery, Rajat Nair, R. Balasubramanium, Kanu Agarwal, Ms. Swati Ghildiyal, Ms. Ranjana Narayan, K. L. Janjani, T. A. Khan, Ms. Anil Katiyar, Arvind Kumar Sharma, B. V. Balram Das, K. V. Jagdishvaran, Mrs. G. Indira, Ms. Mugdha Pande, Ravi Sharma, Pallav Mongia, Praveen Agarwal, Pankaj Sharma, Dr. Harshvir Pratap Shrama, A. K. Srivastava, Paras Joshi, Pankaj Kumar, Manoj V. George, Ms. Shilpa Liza George, Aakarsh Kamra, B. D. Das, Nilkant Nayak, Towseef Ahmad Dar, Ms. Munmun, Subart, Zulfiker Ali P. S., Dhiraj Abraham Philip, Febin Mathew Varghese, Ms. Palak Misra, Ms. Amritananda Chakravarty, Mihir Samson, Ms. Shreya Munoth, Ms. Deepanshi Ishar, Ms. Liz Mathew, Gautam Narayan, Jawahar Raja, Chinmay Kanojia, Amjid Maqbool, Ms. Ila Sheel, Ms. Anu Bindra, Siddharth Narain, Gowthaman Rangarajan, Sai Vinod, Nikhil Nayyar, Vasuman Khandelwal, Govind Manoharan, Pukhrambam Ramesh Kumar, Jawahar Raja, Gautam Bhatia, Arvind Narain, Chinmay Kanojia, Ajay Bansal, Gaurav Yadava, Mrs.Veena Bansal, Vijay Pratap Yadav, Ms. Harvinder Chawdhury, Dr. Nisheh Sharma, Anil Kumar Singh, Ms. Meera Patel, Tejas Patel, Mughees Ahmed Khan, Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DIPAK MISRA, CJI (for himself and A.M. Khanwilkar, J.) C O N T E N T S* S. No(s).
Heading
Page No(s)
A. Introduction…………………………
3-11
B. The Reference………………………
11-15
C. Submissions on behalf of the petitioners…
15-30
D. Submissions on behalf of the respondents and other intervenors.……………………
31-44
* Ed. note: The pages mentioned in the index above giving the scheme of the judgment denotes the page number of the original judgment.
E. Decisions in Naz Foundation and SureshKoushal ………………..……..
45-48
F. Other judicial pronouncements on Section 377 IPC …………….........
48-57
G. The Constitution – an organic charter of progressive rights ……………
57-64
H. Transformative constitutionalism and the rights of LGBT community………
65-74
I. Constitutional morality and Section 377 IPC..74-81
J. Perspective of human dignity…………
81-89
K. Sexual orientation ………………………
89-96
L. Privacy and its concomitant aspects………
96-111
M . Doctrine of progressive realization of rights...111-118
N. International perspective……………......
(i)
United States………………………...
118-122
(ii)
Canada………………………………
123-125
(iii)
South Africa…………………………
(iv)
United Kingdom…………………….
126-127
(v)
Other Courts/Jurisdictions…………
127-129
O. Comparative analysis of Section 375 and Section 377 IPC……………………………
129-140
P. The litmus test for survival of Section 377 IPC ...................................................
140-156
Q. Conclusions ..............................................
156-166
A.
Not for nothing, the great German thinker, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, had said, “I am what I am, so take me as I am” and similarly, Arthur Schopenhauer had pronounced, “No one can escape from their individuality”. In this regard, it is profitable to quote a few lines from John Stuart Mill:-
Introduction
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
“But society has now fairly got the better of individuality; and the danger which threatens human nature is not the excess, but the deficiency of personal impulses and preferences.” The emphasis on the unique being of an individual is the salt of his/ her life. Denial of self-expression is inviting death. Irreplaceability of individuality and identity is grant of respect to self. This realization is one’s signature and self-determined design. One defines oneself. That is the glorious form of individuality. In the present case, our deliberation and focus on the said concept shall be from various spectrums. 2. Shakespeare through one of his characters in a play says “What’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet”. The said phrase, in its basic sense, conveys that what really matters is the essential qualities of the substance and the fundamental characteristics of an entity but not the name by which it or a person is called. Getting further deeper into the meaning, it is understood that the name may be a convenient concept for identification but the essence behind the same is the core of identity. Sans identity, the name only remains a denotative term. Therefore, the identity is pivotal to one’s being. Life bestows honour on it and freedom of living, as a facet of life, expresses genuine desire to have it. The said desire, one is inclined to think, is satisfied by the conception of constitutional recognition, and hence, emphasis is laid on the identity of an individual which is conceived under the Constitution. And the sustenance of identity is the filament of life. It is equivalent to authoring one’s own life script where freedom broadens everyday. Identity is equivalent to divinity. 3. The overarching ideals of individual autonomy and liberty, equality for all sans discrimination of any kind, recognition of identity with dignity and privacy of human beings constitute the cardinal four corners of our monumental Constitution forming the concrete substratum of our fundamental rights that has eluded certain sections of our society who are still living in the bondage of dogmatic social norms, prejudiced notions, rigid stereotypes, parochial mindset and bigoted perceptions. Social exclusion, identity seclusion and isolation from the social mainstream are still the stark realities faced by individuals today and it is only when each and every individual is liberated from the shackles of such bondage and is able to work towards full development of his/her personality that we can call ourselves a truly free society. The first step on the long path to acceptance of the diversity and variegated hues that
nature has created has to be taken now by vanquishing the enemies of prejudice and injustice and undoing the wrongs done so as to make way for a progressive and inclusive realisation of social and economic rights embracing all and to begin a dialogue for ensuring equal rights and opportunities for the “less than equal” sections of the society. We have to bid adieu to the perceptions, stereotypes and prejudices deeply ingrained in the societal mindset so as to usher in inclusivity in all spheres and empower all citizens alike without any kind of alienation and discrimination. 4. The natural identity of an individual should be treated to be absolutely essential to his being. What nature gives is natural. That is called nature within. Thus, that part of the personality of a person has to be respected and not despised or looked down upon. The said inherent nature and the associated natural impulses in that regard are to be accepted. Non-acceptance of it by any societal norm or notion and punishment by law on some obsolete idea and idealism affects the kernel of the identity of an individual. Destruction of individual identity would tantamount to crushing of intrinsic dignity that cumulatively encapsulates the values of privacy, choice, freedom of speech and other expressions. It can be viewed from another angle. An individual in exercise of his choice may feel that he/she should be left alone but no one, and we mean, no one, should impose solitude on him/her. 5. The eminence of identity has been luculently stated in National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and others 1, popularly known as NALSA case, wherein the Court was dwelling upon the status of identity of the transgenders. Radhakrishnan, J., after referring to catena of judgments and certain International Covenants, opined that gender identity is one of the most fundamental aspects of life which refers to a person’s intrinsic sense of being male, female or transgender or transsexual person. A person’s sex is usually assigned at birth, but a relatively small group of persons may be born with bodies which incorporate both or certain aspects of both male and female physiology. The learned Judge further observed that at times, genital anatomy problems may arise in certain persons in the sense that their innate perception of themselves is not in conformity with the sex assigned to them at birth and may include pre-and post-operative transsexual persons and also persons who do not choose to undergo or do not have access to
(2014) 5 SCC 438
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
operation and also include persons who cannot undergo successful operation. Elaborating further, he said:-
“Gender identity refers to each person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth, including the personal sense of the body which may involve a freely chosen, modification of bodily appearance or functions by medical, surgical or other means and other expressions of gender, including dress, speech and mannerisms. Gender identity, therefore, refers to an individual’s self-identification as a man, woman, transgender or other identified category.”
6. Adverting to the concept of discrimination, he stated:“The discrimination on the ground of “sex” under Articles 15 and 16, therefore, includes discrimination on the ground of gender identity. The expression “sex” used in Articles 15 and 16 is not just limited to biological sex of male or female, but intended to include people who consider themselves to be neither male nor female.”
7. Dealing with the legality of transgender identity, Radhakrishnan, J. ruled:“The self-identified gender can be either male or female or a third gender. Hijras are identified as persons of third gender and are not identified either as male or female. Gender identity, as already indicated, refers to a person’s internal sense of being male, female or a transgender, for example hijras do not identify as female because of their lack of female genitalia or lack of reproductive capability. This distinction makes them separate from both male and female genders and they consider themselves neither man nor woman, but a “third gender”.” 8. Sikri, J., in his concurring opinion, dwelling upon the rights of transgenders, laid down that gender identification is an essential component which is required for enjoying civil rights by the community. It is only with this recognition that many rights attached to the sexual recognition as “third gender” would be available to the said community more meaningfully viz. the right to vote, the right to own property, the right to marry, the right to claim a formal identity through a passport and a ration
card, a driver’s licence, the right to education, employment, health and so on. Emphasising on the aspect of human rights, he observed:“…there seems to be no reason why a transgender must be denied of basic human rights which includes right to life and liberty with dignity, right to privacy and freedom of expression, right to education and empowerment, right against violence, right against exploitation and right against discrimination. The Constitution has fulfilled its duty of providing rights to transgenders. Now it is time for us to recognise this and to extend and interpret the Constitution in such a manner to ensure a dignified life for transgender people. All this can be achieved if the beginning is made with the recognition of TG as third gender.” The aforesaid judgment, as is manifest, lays focus on inalienable “gender identity” and correctly connects with human rights and the constitutionally guaranteed right to life and liberty with dignity. It lays stress on the judicial recognition of such rights as an inextricable component of Article 21 of the Constitution and decries any discrimination as that would offend Article 14, the “fon juris” of our Constitution. 9. It has to be borne in mind that search for identity as a basic human ideal has reigned the mind of every individual in many a sphere like success, fame, economic prowess, political assertion, celebrity status and social superiority, etc. But search for identity, in order to have apposite space in law, sans stigmas and sans fear has to have the freedom of expression about his/her being which is keenly associated with the constitutional concept of “identity with dignity”. When we talk about identity from the constitutional spectrum, it cannot be pigeon-holed singularly to one’s orientation that may be associated with his/her birth and the feelings he/she develops when he/she grows up. Such a narrow perception may initially sound to subserve the purpose of justice but on a studied scrutiny, it is soon realized that the limited recognition keeps the individual choice at bay. The question that is required to be posed here is whether sexual orientation alone is to be protected or both orientation and choice are to be accepted as long as the exercise of these rights by an individual do not affect another’s choice or, to put it succinctly, has the consent of the other where dignity of both is maintained and privacy, as a seminal facet of Article 21, is not dented. At the core of the concept of identity lies self-determination, realization of one’s own abilities visualizing the opportunities and rejection of external views with a clear
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
conscience that is in accord with constitutional norms and values or principles that are, to put in a capsule, “constitutionally permissible”. As long as it is lawful, one is entitled to determine and follow his/her pattern of life. And that is where the distinction between constitutional morality and social morality or ethicality assumes a distinguished podium, a different objective. Non-recognition in the fullest sense and denial of expression of choice by a statutory penal provision and giving of stamp of approval by a two-Judge Bench of this Court to the said penal provision, that is, Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, in Suresh Kumar Koushal and another v. Naz Foundation and others2 overturning the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi and others 3, is the central issue involved in the present controversy.
B. The Reference 10. Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 76 of 2016 was filed for declaring “right to sexuality”, “right to sexual autonomy” and “right to choice of a sexual partner” to be part of the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and further to declare Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, “IPC”) to be unconstitutional. When the said Writ Petition was listed before a three-Judge Bench on 08.01.2018, the Court referred to a two-Judge Bench decision rendered in Suresh Koushal (supra) wherein this Court had overturned the decision rendered by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Naz Foundation (supra). It was submitted by Mr. Arvind Datar, learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioners, on the said occasion that the two-Judge Bench in Suresh Koushal (supra) had been guided by social morality leaning on majoritarian perception whereas the issue, in actuality, needed to be debated upon in the backdrop of constitutional morality. A contention was also advanced that the interpretation placed in Suresh Kumar (supra) upon Article 21 of the Constitution is extremely narrow and, in fact, the Court has been basically guided by Article 14 of the Constitution. Reliance was placed on the pronouncement in NALSA case wherein this Court had emphasized on “gender identity and sexual orientation”. Attention of this Court was also invited to a nine-Judge Bench decision in K.S. Puttaswamy and another v. Union of India and others 4
(2014) 1 SCC 1 (2009) 111 DRJ 1 (2017) 10 SCC 1
wherein the majority, speaking through Chandrachud, J., has opined that sexual orientation is an essential component of rights guaranteed under the Constitution which are not formulated on majoritarian favour or acceptance. Kaul, J, in his concurring opinion, referred to the decision in Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd.5 to highlight that the emphasis for individual’s freedom to conduct his sex life and personal relationships as he wishes, subject to the permitted exceptions, countervails public interest. 11. The further submission that was advanced by Mr. Datar was that privacy of the individual having been put on such a high pedestal and sexual orientation having been emphasized in the NALSA case, Section 377 IPC cannot be construed as a reasonable restriction as that would have the potentiality to destroy the individual autonomy and sexual orientation. It is an accepted principle of interpretation of statutes that a provision does not become unconstitutional merely because there can be abuse of the same. Similarly, though a provision on the statute book is not invoked on many occasions, yet it does not fall into the sphere of the doctrine of desuetude. However, Suresh Koushal’s case has been guided by the aforesaid doctrine of desuetude. 12. Appreciating the said submissions, the three-Judge Bench stated that:-
“Certain other aspects need to be noted. Section 377 IPC uses the phraseology “carnal intercourse against the order of nature”. The determination of order of nature is not a constant phenomenon. Social morality also changes from age to age. The law copes with life and accordingly change takes place. The morality that public perceives, the Constitution may not conceive of. The individual autonomy and also individual orientation cannot be atrophied unless the restriction is regarded as reasonable to yield to the morality of the Constitution. What is natural to one may not be natural to the other but the said natural orientation and choice cannot be allowed to cross the boundaries of law and as the confines of law cannot tamper or curtail the inherent right embedded in an individual under Article 21 of the Constitution. A section of people or individuals who exercise their choice should never remain in a state of fear. When we say so, we may not be
[2008] EWHC 1777 (QB)
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
understood to have stated that there should not be fear of law because fear of law builds civilised society. But that law must have the acceptability of the Constitutional parameters. That is the litmus test. It is necessary to note, in the course of hearing on a query being made and Mr. Datar very fairly stated that he does not intend to challenge that part of Section 377 which relates to carnal intercourse with animals and that apart, he confines to consenting acts between two adults. As far as the first aspect is concerned, that is absolutely beyond debate. As far as the second aspect is concerned, that needs to be debated. The consent between two adults has to be the primary pre-condition. Otherwise the children would become prey, and protection of the children in all spheres has to be guarded and protected. Taking all the apsects in a cumulative manner, we are of the view, the decision in Suresh Kumar Koushal’s case (supra) requires re-consideration.” The three-Judge Bench expressed the opinion that the issues raised should be answered by a larger Bench and, accordingly, referred the matter to the larger Bench. That is how the matter has been placed before us. C. Submissions on behalf of the petitioners 13. We have heard Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Saurabh Kirpal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 76 of 2016, Ms. Jayna Kothari, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 572 of 2016, Mr. Arvind P. Datar, learned senior counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 88 of 2018, Mr. Anand Grover, learned senior counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition (Criminal) Nos. 100 of 2018 and 101 of 2018 and Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 121 of 2018. We have also heard Mr. Ashok Desai, Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Mr. Shyam Divan and Mr. Krishnan Venugopal, learned senior counsel appearing for various intervenors in the matter. A compilation of written submissions has been filed by the petitioners as well as the intervenors. 14. We have heard Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor General for the Union of India, Mr. K. Radhakrishnan, learned senior counsel appearing in Interlocutory Application No. 94284 of 2018 in Writ
Petition (Criminal) No. 76 of 2016, Mr. Mahesh Jethmalani, learned senior counsel appearing in Interlocutory Application No. 91147 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 76 of 2016, Mr. Soumya Chakraborty, learned senior counsel appearing in Interlocutory Application No. 94348 of 2018 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 76 of 2016, Mr. Manoj V. George, learned counsel appearing for Apostolic Alliance of Churches & Utkal Christian Council and Dr. Harshvir Pratap Sharma, learned counsel appearing in Interlocutory Application No. 93411 of 2018 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 76 of 2016. 15. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioners and the intervenors that homosexuality, bisexuality and other sexual orientations are equally natural and reflective of expression of choice and inclination founded on consent of two persons who are eligible in law to express such consent and it is neither a physical nor a mental illness, rather they are natural variations of expression and free thinking process and to make it a criminal offence is offensive of the well established principles pertaining to individual dignity and decisional autonomy inherent in the personality of a person, a great discomfort to gender identity, destruction of the right to privacy which is a pivotal facet of Article 21 of the Constitution, unpalatable to the highly cherished idea of freedom and a trauma to the conception of expression of biological desire which revolves around the pattern of mosaic of true manifestation of identity. That apart, the phrase “order of nature” is limited to the procreative concept that may have been conceived as natural by a systemic conservative approach and such limitations do not really take note of inborn traits or developed orientations or, for that matter, consensual acts which relate to responses to series of free exercise of assertions of one’s bodily autonomy. It is further argued that their growth of personality, relation building endeavour to enter into a live-in relationship or to form an association with a sense of commonality have become a mirage and the essential desires are crippled which violates Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. It is urged that the American Psychological Association has opined that sexual orientation is a natural condition and attraction towards the same sex or opposite sex are both naturally equal, the only difference being that the same sex attraction arises in far lesser numbers. 16. The petitioners have highlighted that the rights of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community, who comprise 7-8% of the total Indian population, need to be recognized and protected, for
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
sexual orientation is an integral and innate facet of every individual’s identity. A person belonging to the said community does not become an alien to the concept of individual and his individualism cannot be viewed with a stigma. The impact of sexual orientation on an individual’s life is not limited to their intimate lives but also impacts their family, professional, social and educational life. As per the petitioners, such individuals (sexual minorities in societies) need protection more than the heterosexuals so as to enable them to achieve their full potential and to live freely without fear, apprehension or trepidation in such a manner that they are not discriminated against by the society openly or insidiously or by the State in multifarious ways in matters such as employment, choice of partner, testamentary rights, insurability, medical treatment in hospitals and other similar rights arising from live-in relationships which, after the decision in Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma6, is recognized even by the “Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005” for various kinds of livein relationships. The same protection, as per the petitioners, must be accorded to same sex relationships.
17. It is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that individuals belonging to the LGBT group suffer discrimination and abuse throughout their lives due to the existence of Section 377 IPC which is nothing but a manifestation of a mindset of societal values prevalent during the Victorian era where sexual activities were considered mainly for procreation. The said community remains in a constant state of fear which is not conducive for their growth. It is contended that they suffer at the hands of law and are also deprived of the citizenry rights which are protected under the Constitution. The law should have treated them as natural victims and sensitized the society towards their plight and laid stress on such victimisation, however, the reverse is being done due to which a sense of estrangement and alienation has developed and continues to prevail amongst the members belonging to the LGBT group. Compulsory alienation due to stigma and threat is contrary to the fundamental principle of liberty. 18. The petitioners have referred to the decision of this Court in NALSA case wherein transgenders have been recognized as a third gender apart from male and female and have been given certain rights. Yet, in view of the existence of Section 377 in the IPC, consensual activities amongst transgenders would continue to constitute an offence.
(2013) 15 SCC 755
Drawing inspiration from the NALSA case, the petitioners submit that the rights of the LGBT group are not fully realized and they remain incomplete citizens because their expression as regards sexuality is not allowed to be pronounced owing to the criminality attached to the sexual acts between these persons which deserves to be given a burial and, therefore, the rights of the LGBT community also need equal, if not more, constitutional protection. Accordingly, the petitioners are of the view that Section 377 of the IPC be read down qua the LGBT community so as to confine it only to the offence of bestiality and non-consensual acts in view of the fact that with the coming into force of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), the scope of sexual assault has been widened to include non peno-vaginal sexual assault and also criminalize non-consensual sexual acts between children thereby plugging important gaps in the law governing sexual violence in India. 19. The petitioners have also submitted that Section 377, despite being a pre-constitutional law, was retained post the Constitution coming into effect by virtue of Article 372 of the Constitution, but it must be noted that the presumption of constitutionality is merely an evidentiary burden initially on the person seeking to challenge the vires of a statute and once any violation of fundamental rights or suspect classification is prima facie shown, then such presumption has no role. In the case at hand, the petitioners face a violation of their fundamental rights to an extent which is manifestly clear and it is a violation which strikes at the very root or substratum of their existence. The discrimination suffered at the hands of the majority, the onslaught to their dignity and invasion on the right to privacy is demonstrably visible and permeates every nook and corner of the society. 20. It is the argument of the petitioners that Section 377, if retained in its present form, would involve the violation of, not one but, several fundamental rights of the LGBTs, namely, right to privacy, right to dignity, equality, liberty and right to freedom of expression. The petitioners contend that sexual orientation which is a natural corollary of gender identity is protected under Article 21 of the Constitution and any discrimination meted out to the LGBT community on the basis of sexual orientation would run counter to the mandate provided under the Constitution and the said view has also gained approval of this Court in the NALSA case.
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
21. The petitioners have also relied upon the view in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra) to advance their argument that sexual orientation is also an essential attribute of privacy. Therefore, protection of both sexual orientation and right to privacy of an individual is extremely important, for without the enjoyment of these basic and fundamental rights, individual identity may lose significance, a sense of trepidation may take over and their existence would be reduced to mere survival. It is further urged that sexual orientation and privacy lie at the core of the fundamental rights which are guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution and in the light of the decision in Puttaswamy (supra), it has become imperative that Section 377 be struck down. It is contended that the right to privacy has to take within its ambit and sweep the right of every individual, including LGBTs, to make decisions as per their choice without the fear that they may be subjected to humiliation or shunned by the society merely because of a certain choice or manner of living.
22. Having canvassed with vehemence that sexual orientation is an important facet of the right to privacy which has been raised to the pedestal of a cherished right, the learned counsel for the petitioners have vigorously propounded that sexual autonomy and the right to choose a partner of one’s choice is an inherent aspect of the right to life and right to autonomy. In furtherance of the said view, they have relied upon the authorities in Shakti Vahini v. Union of India and others7 and Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M.8 wherein it has been clearly recognized that an individual’s exercise of choice in choosing a partner is a feature of dignity and, therefore, it is protected under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution.
23. According to the petitioners, there is no difference between persons who defy social conventions to enter into inter-religious and inter-caste marriages and those who choose a same sex partner in the sense that the society may disapprove of inter-caste or inter-religious marriages but this Court is for enforcing constitutional rights. Similarly, as per the petitioners, even if there is disapproval by the majority of the sexual orientation or exercise of choice by the LGBT persons, the Court as the final arbiter of the constitutional rights, should disregard social morality and uphold and protect constitutional morality which has been adverted to by this Court in several cases, including Manoj Narula v.
(2018) 7 SCC 192 AIR 2018 SC 1933 : 2018 (5) SCALE 422
Union of India9, for that is the governing rule. It is argued that the Delhi High Court in Naz Foundation (supra) has referred to and analysed the concept of constitutional morality and ultimately struck down Section 377 IPC clearly stating that carnal intercourse between homosexuals and heterosexuals with consent cannot be an offence.
24. The LGBT persons cannot, according to the petitioners, be penalized simply for choosing a same sex partner, for the constitutional guarantee of choice of partner extends to the LGBT persons as well. Learned counsel for the petitioners and the supporting intervenors have submitted that sexual orientation, being an innate facet of individual identity, is protected under the right to dignity. To bolster the said argument, reliance has been placed upon Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi and others10 and Common Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India and another11 wherein it was held that the right to life and liberty, as envisaged under Article 21, is meaningless unless it encompasses within its sphere individual dignity and right to dignity includes the right to carry such functions and activities as would constitute the meaningful expression of the human self.
25. It is submitted that Section 377 is an anathema to the concept of fraternity as enshrined in the Preamble to our Constitution and the Indian Constitution mandates that we must promote fraternity amongst the citizens sans which unity shall remain a distant dream. 26. The petitioners have further contended that Section 377 is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as the said Section is vague in the sense that carnal intercourse against the order of nature is neither defined in the Section nor in the IPC or, for that matter, any other law. There is, as per the petitioners, no intelligible differentia or reasonable classification between natural and unnatural sex as long as it is consensual in view of the decision of this Court in Anuj Garg and others v. Hotel Association of India and others12 which lays down the principle that classification which may have been treated as valid at the time of its adoption may cease to be so on account of changing social norms. 27. Section 377, as argued by the petitioners, is manifestly arbitrary and over-broad and for the said purpose, immense inspiration has been
(2014) 9 SCC 1 (1981) 1 SCC 608 (2018) 5 SCC 1 (2008) 3 SCC 1
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drawn from the principles stated in Shayara Bano v. Union of India and others13 , for making consensual relationship a crime on the ground that it is against the order of nature suffers from manifest arbitrariness at the fulcrum.
28. It is the case of the petitioners that Section 377 violates Article 15 of the Constitution since there is discrimination inherent in it based on the sex of a person’s sexual partner as under Section 376(c) to (e), a person can be prosecuted for acts done with an opposite sex partner without her consent, whereas the same acts if done with a same-sex partner are criminalized even if the partner consents. The petitioners have drawn the attention of this Court to the Justice J.S Verma Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law which had observed that ‘sex’ occurring in Article 15 includes sexual orientation and, thus, as per the petitioners, Section 377 is also violative of Article 15 of the Constitution on this count. 29. It is argued with astuteness that Section 377 has a chilling effect on Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution which protects the fundamental right of freedom of expression including that of LGBT persons to express their sexual identity and orientation, through speech, choice of romantic/sexual partner, expression of romantic/sexual desire, acknowledgment of relationships or any other means and that Section 377 constitutes an unreasonable exception and is thereby not covered under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. To buttress the said stance, reliance is placed upon the decision in S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal and another14 wherein it has been held that law should not be used in such a manner that it has a chilling effect on the freedom of speech and expression. Additionally, the view in NALSA case has also been strongly pressed into service to emphasize that the said decision clearly spells out that the right under Article 19(1)(a) includes one’s right to expression of his/her self-identified gender which can be expressed through words, action, behaviour or any other form. 30. The petitioners have also contended that Section 377 violates the rights of LGBT persons under Article 19(1)(c) and denies them the right to form associations. Similarly, such persons are hesitant to register companies to provide benefits to sexual minorities due to the fear of state action and social stigma. Further, a conviction under Section 377
(2017) 9 SCC 1 (2010) 5 SCC 600
IPC renders such persons ineligible for appointment as a director of a company. 31. It is averred that Section 377 IPC, by creating a taint of criminality, deprives the LGBT persons of their right to reputation which is a facet of the right to life and liberty of a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution as observed by this Court in Kishore Samrite v. State of U.P. and others15 and Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another16 to the effect that reputation is an element of personal security and protected by the Constitution with the right to enjoyment of life and liberty. This right, as per the petitioners, is being denied to the LGBT persons because of Section 377 IPC as it makes them apprehensive to speak openly about their sexual orientation and makes them vulnerable to extortion, blackmail and denial of State machinery for either protection or for enjoyment of other rights and amenities and on certain occasions, the other concomitant rights are affected. 32. The petitioners have advanced their argument that Section 377 IPC impedes the ability of the LGBTs to realize the constitutionally guaranteed right to shelter. To illustrate the same, the petitioners have drawn the attention of the Court to the fact that LGBTs seek assistance of private resources such as Gay Housing Assistance Resources (GHAR) in order to access safe and suitable shelter and this is an indication that the members of this community are in need of immediate care and protection of the State. 33. The decision in Suresh Koushal (supra), as per the petitioners, is per incuriam as the view observed therein has failed to take into account the amendment to Section 375 IPC which has rendered sexual ‘carnal intercourse against the order of nature’ between man and woman as permissible. Section 377, on the other hand, has continued to render same sex carnal intercourse as an offence, even if it is consensual. Further, the petitioners have assailed the decision of this Court in Suresh Koushal’s case on the ground that the view in the said decision on classification is contrary to the ‘impact or effect test’, for the result, in ultimate eventuality, leads to discrimination. Thus, the petitioners have contended that after Puttaswamy (supra), the view in Suresh Koushal (supra) needs to be overruled and the proper test would be whether Section 377 IPC can be enacted by the Parliament today after the
(2013) 2 SCC 398 (2013) 10 SCC 591
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decisions of this Court in NALSA (supra) and Puttaswamy (supra) and other authorities laying immense emphasis on individual choice.
34. It is further contended that LGBT persons are deprived of their rights due to the presence of Section 377 as they fear prosecution and persecution upon revealing their sexual identities and, therefore, this class of persons never approached this Court as petitioners, rather they have always relied upon their teachers, parents, mental health professionals and other organizations such as NGOs to speak on their behalf. It is urged that the appellants in Suresh Koushal (supra) led this Court to assume that LGBT persons constitute only a minuscule fraction whereas most of the studies indicate that they constitute at least 7-8% of the population and that apart, rights are not determined on the basis of percentage of populace but on a real scrutiny of the existence of right and denial of the same. It is the stand of the petitioners that majority perception or view cannot be the guiding factor for sustaining the constitutionality of a provision or to declare a provision as unconstitutional. D. Submissions on behalf of the respondents and other intervenors
35. The respondent, Union of India, has, vide affidavit dated 11th July, 2018, submitted that the matter at hand was referred to a Constitution Bench to decide as to whether the law laid down in Suresh Koushal (supra) is correct or not and the only question referred to this Bench is the question of the constitutional validity of criminalizing ‘consensual acts of adults in private’ falling under Section 377 IPC.
36. Further, the Union has submitted that so far as the constitutional validity of Section 377 IPC, to the extent it applies to ‘consensual acts of adults in private’, is concerned, the respondent leaves the same to the wisdom of this Court.
37. The respondent has also contended that in the event Section 377 IPC so far as ‘consensual acts of adults in private’ is declared unconstitutional, other ancillary issues or rights which have not been referred to this Bench for adjudication may not be dealt with by this Bench as in that case, the Union of India expresses the wish to file detailed affidavit in reply, for consideration of other issues and rights would have far reaching and wide ramifications under various other laws and will also have consequences which are neither contemplated in the reference nor required to be answered by this Hon’ble Bench.
38. The respondent has submitted that allowing any other issue (other than the constitutional validity of Section 377 IPC) to be argued and adjudicating the same without giving an opportunity to the Union of India to file a counter affidavit may not be in the interest of justice and would be violative of the principles of natural justice.
39. Another set of written submissions has been filed by Shri K. Radhakrishnan, senior counsel, on behalf of intervenor-NGO, Trust God Ministries. The said intervenor has submitted that the observations of this Court in Puttaswamy (supra), particularly in Para 146, virtually preempt and forestall the aforesaid NGO from raising substantial contentions to the effect that there is no uncanalised and unbridled right to privacy and the said right cannot be abused. Further, the intervenor has contended that there is no personal liberty to abuse one’s organs and that the offensive acts proscribed by Section 377 IPC are committed by abusing the organs. Such acts, as per the intervenor, are undignified and derogatory to the constitutional concept of dignity and if any infraction is caused to the concept of dignity, then it would amount to constitutional wrong and constitutional immorality.
40. It is also the case of the intervenor that issues pertaining to the constitutional and other legal rights of the transgender community, their gender identity and sexual orientation have been exhaustively considered in the light of the various provisions of the Constitution and, accordingly, reliefs have been granted by this Court in NALSA (supra). It is contended by the intervenor that no further reliefs can be granted to them and the prayers made by them is only to abuse privacy and personal liberty by transgressing the concepts of dignity and public morality.
41. As per the intervenor, Section 377 rightly makes the acts stated therein punishable as Section 377 has been incorporated after taking note of the legal systems and principles which prevailed in ancient India and now in 2018, the said Section is more relevant legally, medically, morally and constitutionally.
42. To illustrate this, the intervenor has drawn the attention of this Court to W. Friedmann from ‘Law in a Changing Society’ wherein he has observed that to prohibit a type of conduct which a particular society considers worthy of condemnation by criminal sanctions is deeply influenced by the values governing that society and it, therefore, varies from one country to another and one period of history to another.
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
43. Further, it has been contended by the intervenor that persons indulging in unnatural sexual acts which have been made punishable under Section 377 IPC are more susceptible and vulnerable to contracting HIV/AIDS and the percentage of prevalence of AIDS in homosexuals is much greater than heterosexuals and that the right to privacy may not be extended in order to enable people to indulge in unnatural offences and thereby contact AIDS.
44. It is also the case of the intervenor that if Section 377 is declared unconstitutional, then the family system which is the bulwark of social culture will be in shambles, the institution of marriage will be detrimentally affected and rampant homosexual activities for money would tempt and corrupt young Indians into this trade. 45. Written submissions have also been filed on behalf of Mr. Suresh Kumar Koushal, intervenor, submitting therein that the argument of the petitioners that consensual acts of adults in private have been decriminalized in many parts of the world and, therefore, it deserves to be decriminalized in India as well does not hold good for several reasons inasmuch as the political, economic and cultural heritage of those countries are very different from India which is a multi-cultural and multi-linguistic country. 46. The intervenor has contended that since fundamental rights are not absolute, there is no unreasonableness in Section 377 IPC and decriminalizing the same would run foul to all religions practised in the country, and, while deciding the ambit and scope of constitutional morality, Article 25 also deserves to be given due consideration. 47. Another application for intervention, being I.A No. 91250 of 2018, was filed and the same was allowed. It has been contended by the said intervenor that in the attempt that Section 377 is struck down, it would render the victims complaining of forced acts covered under the existing Section 377 IPC remediless as the said Section not only impinges on carnal intercourse against the order of nature between two consenting adults but also applies to forced penile non- vaginal sexual intercourse between adults. This, as per the intervenor, would be contrary to the decision of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah and another v. Meenakshi Marwah and another17.
(2005) 4 SCC 370
48. The applicant has also submitted that in the event consenting acts between two same sex adults are excluded from the ambit of Section 377 IPC, then a married woman would be rendered remediless under the IPC against her bi-sexual husband and his consenting male partner indulging in any sexual acts.
49. The intervenor has suggested that the alleged misuse of Section 377 IPC as highlighted by the petitioners can be curbed by adding an explanation to Section 377 IPC defining ‘aggrieved person’ which shall include only non-consenting partner or aggrieved person or wife or husband or any person on their behalf on the lines of Section 198(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. This, as per the applicant, would curb any mala fide complaint lodged by authorities and vindictive or mischievous persons when the act complained of is ‘consenting act’ between two persons. Further, the applicant has submitted that this Court may be pleased to identify that the courts shall take cognizance of an offence under Section 377 IPC only on a complaint made by an aggrieved person. Such an approach, as per the applicant, inherently respects consent and also protects from interference and safeguards the privacy and dignity of an individual under Article 21 of the Constitution.
50. The applicant has also contended that the constitutionality of any legislation is always to be presumed and if there is any vagueness in the definition of any section, the courts have to give such a definition which advances the purpose of the legislation and that the courts must make every effort to uphold the constitutional validity of a statute if that requires giving a stretched construction in view of the decisions of this Court in K.A. Abbas v. Union of India and another18 and Rt. Rev. Msgr. Mark Netto v. State of Kerala and others19. 51. The applicant, through his learned counsel Mr. Harvinder Chowdhury, submits that if the right to privacy as recognized in Puttaswamy (supra) is allowed its full scope and swing, then that itself would rule out prosecution in all cases of consensual unnatural sex between all couples, whether heterosexual or homosexual, and without having to engage in reading down, much less striking down of, the provisions of Section 377 IPC in its present form. This is so because the State cannot compel individuals engaging in consensual sexual acts from testifying against one another as it involves a breach of privacy unless
(1970) 2 SCC 780 (1979) 1 SCC 23
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the consent itself is under challenge and one cannot be a consenting victim of a crime so long as the consent is legally valid.
52. Submissions have also been advanced on behalf of Raza Academy, intervenor, through its learned counsel Mr. R.R Kishore, who has contended that homosexuality is against the order of nature and Section 377 rightly forbids it. Prohibition against carnal intercourse involving penetration into non-sexual parts of the body does not constitute discrimination as laws based on biological reality can never be unconstitutional, for if a male is treated as a male, a female as a female and a transgender as a transgender, it does not amount to discrimination. 53. The applicant has submitted that the purpose of criminal law is to protect the citizens from something that is injurious and since carnal intercourse between two persons is offensive and injurious, it is well within the State’s jurisdiction to put reasonable restrictions to forbid such aberrant human behaviour by means of legislation, for it is the duty of the State that people with abnormal conduct are prohibited from imperiling the life, health and security of the community. Unrestrained pleasure, and that too of a lascivious nature, is not conducive for the growth of a civilized society, such inordinate gratification needs to be curbed and, thus, prohibition against carnal intercourse as defined in Section 377 IPC does not violate the constitutional rights of a person. 54. Another application for intervention, being I.A No. 9341 of 2011, was filed and allowed. The applicant, in his written submissions, after delineating the concept of immorality, has submitted that the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness is of no application to the present case as the law is not manifestly or otherwise arbitrary, for Section 377 criminalizes an act irrespective of gender or sexual orientation of the persons involved. The universal application of the said provision without any gender bias is the touchstone of Part III of the Constitution and is not arbitrary as there is no intentional or unreasonable discrimination in the provision. 55. The applicant has drawn the attention of this Court to the case of Fazal Rab Choudhary v. State of Bihar20 wherein this Court held that the offence under Section 377 IPC implies sexual perversity. Further, it is the case of the applicant that there should not be identical transplantation of Western ideology in our country which has also been a matter of concern for this Court in Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P.21
(1982) 3 SCC 9 (1973) 1 SCC 20
56. The applicant, after citing the case of State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat and others22, has stressed upon the fact that the interest of a citizen or a section of the society, howsoever important, is secondary to the interest of the country or community as a whole and while judging the reasonability of restrictions imposed on fundamental rights, due consideration must also be given to the Directive Principles stated in Part IV. In view of these aforesaid submissions, the applicant has submitted that fundamental rights may not be overstretched and the Directive Principles of State Policy which are fundamental in the governance of the country cannot be neglected, for they are not less significant than what is fundamental in the life of an individual as held in Kesavananda Bharati v. Union of India23. 57. Another application for intervention, being I.A. No. 76790 of 2018, has been filed by Apostolic Alliance of Churches and the Utkal Christian Council. The applicants have submitted that the Court, while interpreting Section 377 IPC, has to keep in mind that there can be situations where consent is obtained by putting a person in fear of death or hurt or consent can also be obtained under some misconception or due to unsoundness of mind, intoxication or inability to understand the nature and the consequences of the acts prohibited by Section 377 IPC. 58. The applicant has also advanced the argument that Section 377 IPC in its present form does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution as it merely defines a particular offence and its punishment and it is well within the power of the State to determine who should be regarded as a class for the purpose of a legislation and this, as per the applicant, is reasonable classification in the context of Section 377 IPC. 59. Further, the applicant has contended that Section 377 IPC is not violative of Article 15 of the Constitution as the said Article prohibits discrimination on the grounds of only religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them but not sexual orientation. The word ‘sexual orientation’, as per the applicant, is alien to our Constitution and the same cannot be imported within it for testing the constitutional validity of a provision or legislation. As per the applicant, if the word ‘sex’ has to be replaced by ‘sexual orientation’, it would require a constitutional amendment.
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60. It is also the case of the applicant that the Yogyakarta principles which have been heavily relied upon by the petitioners to bolster their stand have limited sanctity inasmuch as they do not amount to an international treaty binding on the State parties and there are no intergovernmentally negotiated international instruments or agreed human rights treaties on the issue of LGBTs.
61. Further, the applicant has submitted that there is no requirement to reconsider the decision of this Court in Suresh Koushal (supra) wherein it was held that there is a presumption of constitutionality of a legislation and the Court must adopt self-restraint and thereby refrain from giving birth to judicial legislation. In the applicant’s view, the legislative wisdom of the Parliament must be respected and it must be left to the Parliament to amend Section 377 IPC, if so desired. 62. The applicant has contended that if the prayers of the petitioners herein are allowed, it would amount to judicial legislation, for the Courts cannot add or delete words into a statute. It is stated that the words ‘consent’ and/or ‘without consent’ are not mentioned in Section 377 IPC and, therefore, the Courts cannot make such an artificial distinction. To buttress this stand, the applicant has relied upon the decision of this Court in Sakshi v. Union of India and others24 wherein it was observed that the attention of the Court should be on what has been said and also on what has not been said while interpreting the statute and that it would be wrong and dangerous for the Court to proceed by substituting some other words in a statute since it is well settled that a statute enacting an offence or imposing a penalty has to be strictly construed. 63. The applicant has also drawn the attention of this Court to the decision in Union of India and another v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal 25 wherein it was observed that the Court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation for the good reason that it has no power to legislate since the power to legislate has not been conferred upon the Court and, therefore, the Courts cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there. The Courts are to decide what the law is and not what it should be.
64. It is also the case of the applicant that the decriminalization of Section 377 IPC will open a floodgate of social issues which the legislative
(2004) 5 SCC 518 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 323
domain is not capable of accommodating as same sex marriages would become social experiments with unpredictable outcome. 65. Further, it is the contention of the applicant that decriminalization of Section 377 IPC will have cascading effect on existing laws such as Section 32(d) of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936; Section 27(7)(1A) A of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 which permits a wife to present a petition for divorce to the district court on the ground,—(i) that her husband has, since the solemnization of the marriage, been guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality; Section 10(2) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 and Section 13(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. E. Decisions in Naz Foundation and Suresh Koushal 66. We shall now advert to what had been stated by the Delhi High Court in Naz Foundation and thereafter advert to the legal base of the decision in Suresh Koushal’s case. The Delhi High Court had taken the view that Article 15 of the Constitution prohibits discrimination on several enumerated grounds including sex. The High Court preferred an expansive interpretation of ‘sex’ so as to include prohibition of discrimination on the ground of ‘sexual orientation’ and that sexdiscrimination cannot be read as applying to gender simpliciter. Discrimination, as per the High Court’s view, on the basis of sexual orientation is grounded in stereotypical judgments and generalization about the conduct of either sex. 67. Another facet of the Indian Constitution that the High Court delineated was that of inclusiveness as the Indian Constitution reflects this value of inclusiveness deeply ingrained in the Indian society and nurtured over several generations. The High Court categorically said that those who are perceived by the majority as deviants or different are not to be, on that score, excluded or ostracised. In the High Court’s view, where a society displays inclusiveness and understanding, the LGBT persons can be assured of a life of dignity and non-discrimination. 68. It has been further opined by the High Court that the Constitution does not permit any statutory criminal law to be held captive of the popular misconceptions of who the LGBTs are, as it cannot be forgotten that discrimination is the antithesis of equality and recognition of equality in its truest sense will foster the dignity of every individual. That apart, the High Court had taken the view that social morality has to succumb to the concept of constitutional morality.
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
69. On the basis of the aforesaid reasons, the High Court declared Section 377 IPC violative of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution in so far as it criminalises consensual sexual acts of adults in private, whereas for non-consensual penile non-vaginal sex and penile non-vaginal sex involving minors, the High Court ruled that Section 377 IPC was valid.
70. The Delhi High Court judgment was challenged in Suresh Koushal (supra) wherein this Court opined that acts which fall within the ambit of Section 377 IPC can only be determined with reference to the act itself and to the circumstances in which it is executed. While so opining, the Court held that Section 377 IPC would apply irrespective of age and consent, for Section 377 IPC does not criminalize a particular people or identity or orientation and only identifies certain acts which, when committed, would constitute an offence. Such a prohibition, in the Court’s view in Suresh Koushal (supra), regulates sexual conduct regardless of gender identity and orientation.
71. The Court further observed that those who indulge in carnal intercourse in the ordinary course and those who indulge in carnal intercourse against the order of nature constitute different classes and the people falling in the latter category cannot claim that Section 377 IPC suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and irrational classification. The Court further observed that while reading down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, it cannot be overlooked that only a minuscule fraction of the country’s population constitutes lesbians, gays, bisexuals or transgenders and in last more than 150 years, less than 200 persons have been prosecuted under Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code which cannot, therefore, be made a sound basis for declaring Section 377 IPC ultra vires the provisions of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. 72. The submission advanced by the respondents therein to the effect that the provision had become a pernicious tool for perpetrating harassment, blackmail and torture on those belonging to the LGBT community was repelled by stating that such treatment is neither mandated by the Section nor condoned by it and the mere fact that the Section is misused by police authorities and others is not a reflection of the vires of the Section, though it might be a relevant factor for the Legislature to consider while judging the desirability of amending Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code.
F. Other judicial pronouncements on Section 377 IPC 73. Presently, we may refer to some of the judgments and the views taken therein by this Court as well as by the High Courts on Section 377 IPC so as to have a holistic perspective.
74. While interpreting the said provision, the Courts have held that the provision stipulates certain acts, which when committed, would constitute a criminal offence. In Childline India Foundation and another v. Allan John Waters and others26, the Court was dealing with carnal intercourse against the order of nature when the material on record showed that the accused Nos. 2 and 3 used to have sex and fellatio with PWs 1 and 4. The Court opined that the ingredients of Section 377 IPC were proved and, accordingly, restored the conviction and sentence of 6 years’ rigorous imprisonment and confirmed the imposition of fine. In Fazal Rab Choudhary (supra), although the Court convicted the accused under Section 377 IPC, yet it took note of the absence of any force in the commission of the act. The Court also took into account the prevalent notions of permissive society and the fact that homosexuality has been legalized in some countries. In view of the same, the Court reduced the sentence of 3 years imposed on the accused to 6 months opining that the aforesaid aspects must also be kept in view as they have a bearing on the question of offence and quantum of sentence.
75. A reference may be made to Khanu v. Emperor27 which was also alluded to in Suresh Koushal’s case. We deem it appropriate to reproduce a part of Khanu’s decision to understand how the courts in India had understood the word “carnal intercourse against the order of nature”. The said passage reads thus:-
“The principal point in this case is: whether the accused (who is clearly guilty of having committed the sin of Gomorrah coitus per os) with a certain little child, the innocent accomplice of his abomination, has thereby committed an offence under Section 377 of the Penal Code.
Section 377 punishes certain persons who have carnal intercourse against the order of nature with inter alia human beings. Is the act here committed one of carnal intercourse? If so, it is clearly against the order of nature, because the natural object of carnal
(2011) 6 SCC 261 AIR 1925 Sind 286
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intercourse is that there should be the possibility of conception of human beings which in the case of coitus per os is impossible. Intercourse may be defined as mutual frequent action by members of independent organisation. Commercial intercourse [is thereafter referred to; emphasis is made on the reciprocity].
By a metaphor the word intercourse like the word commerce is applied to the relations of the sexes. Here also there is the temporary visitation of one organism by a member of other organisation, for certain clearly defined and limited objects. The primary object of the visiting organisation is to obtain euphoria by means of a detent of the nerves consequent on the sexual crisis. But there is no intercourse unless the visiting member is enveloped at least partially by the visited organism, for intercourse connotes reciprocity. Looking at the question in this way it would seem that sin of Gomorrah is no less carnal intercourse than the sin of sodomy. …
It is to be remembered that the Penal Code does not, except in Section 377, render abnormal sexual vice punishable at all. In England indecent assaults are punishable very severely. It is possible that under the Penal Code, some cases might be met by prosecuting the offender for simple assault, but that is a compoundable offence and in any case the patient could in no way be punished. It is to be supposed that the legislature intended that a Tigellinus should carry on his nefarious profession perhaps vitiating and depraving hundreds of children with perfect immunity?
I doubt not, therefore, that coitus per os is punishable under Section 377 of the Penal Code.”
76. In Suresh Koushal’s case, there has also been a reference to the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Lohana Vasantlal Devchand v. State28 wherein the issue presented before the High Court was whether an offence under Section 377 read with Section 511 IPC had been committed on account of the convict putting his male organ in the mouth of the victim, if the act was done voluntarily by him. A contention was raised that there was no penetration and, therefore, there could not have been any carnal intercourse. The High Court referred to a passage
AIR 1968 Guj 252
from the book ‘Pyschology of Sex’ 29 authored by Mr. Havelock Ellis which reads thus:“While the kiss may be regarded as the typical and normal erogenic method of contrectation for the end of attaining tumescene, there are others only less important. Any orifical contact ‘between persons of opposite sex’ is sometimes almost equally as effective as the kiss in stimulating tumescene; all such contacts, indeed, belong to the group of which the kiss is the type, Cunnilinctus (often incorrectly termed cunnilingus) and fellatio cannot be regarded as unnatural for they have their prototypic forms among animals, and they are found among various savage races. As forms of contrecttion and aides to tumescene they are thus natural and are sometimes regarded by both sexes as quintessential forms of sexual pleasure, though they may not be considered aesthetic. They become deviations, however, and this liable to be termed “perversions”, when they replace the desire of coitus”
77. After referring to the definition of sodomy, the pronouncement in Khanu (supra), Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edition and Webster’s New 20th Century Dictionary, unabridged, 2nd Edition, the Gujarat High Court opined thus:E
“In the instant case, there was an entry of a male penis in the orifice of the mouth of the victim. There was the enveloping of a visiting member by the visited organism. There was thus reciprocity; intercourse connotes reciprocity. It could, therefore, be said without any doubt in my mind that the act in question will amount to an offence, punishable under Section 337 of the Indian Penal Code.”
78. The decision in State of Kerala v. Kundumkara Govindan and another30 has also been reproduced in Suresh Koushal’s case. The High Court of Kerala held thus:G
“18. Even if I am to hold that there was no penetration into the vagina and the sexual acts were committed only between the thighs, I do not think that the respondents can escape conviction under Section 377 of the Penal Code. The counsel of the
‘Psychology of Sex’ Twelfth Impression, 1948, London 1969 Cri LJ 818 (Ker)
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respondents contends (in this argument the Public Prosecutor also supports him) that sexual act between the thighs is not intercourse. The argument is that for intercourse there must be encirclement of the male organ by the organ visited; and that in the case of sexual act between the thighs, there is no possibility of penetration.
19. The word ‘intercourse’ means ‘sexual connection’ (Concise Oxford Dictionary). In Khanu v. Emperor the meaning of the word ‘intercourse’ has been considered: (AIR p. 286) ‘Intercourse may be defined as mutual frequent action by members of independent organisation.’
Then commercial intercourse, social intercourse, etc. have been considered; and then appears: ‘By a metaphor the word intercourse, like the word commerce, is applied to the relations of the sexes. Here also there is the temporary visitation of one organism by a member of the other organisation, for certain clearly defined and limited objects. The primary object of the visiting organisation is to obtain euphoria by means of a detent of the nerves consequent on the sexual crisis. But there is no intercourse unless the visiting member is enveloped at least partially by the visited organism, for intercourse connotes reciprocity.’ Therefore, to decide whether there is intercourse or not, what is to be considered is whether the visiting organ is enveloped at least partially by the visited organism. In intercourse between the thighs, the visiting male organ is enveloped at least partially by the organism visited, the thighs: the thighs are kept together and tight. 20. Then about penetration. The word ‘penetrate’ means in the Concise Oxford Dictionary ‘find access into or through, pass through.’ When the male organ is inserted between the thighs kept together and tight, is there no penetration? The word ‘insert’ means place, fit, thrust.’ Therefore, if the male organ is ‘inserted’ or ‘thrust’ between the thighs, there is ‘penetration’ to constitute unnatural offence.
21. Unnatural offence is defined in Section 377 of the Penal Code; whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal commits unnatural offence. The act of committing intercourse between the thighs is carnal intercourse against the order of nature. Therefore committing intercourse by inserting the male organ between the thighs of another is an unnatural offence. In this connection, it may be noted that the act in Section 376 is ‘sexual intercourse’ and the act in Section 377 is ‘carnal intercourse against the order of nature’.
22. The position in English law on this question has been brought to my notice. The old decision of R. v. Samuel Jacobs31 lays down that penetration through the mouth does not amount to the offence of sodomy under English law. The counsel therefore argues that sexual intercourse between the thighs cannot also be an offence under Section 377 of the Penal Code. In Sirkar v. Gula Mythien Pillai Chaithu Maho Mathu32 a Full Bench of the Travancore High Court held that having connection with a person in the mouth was an offence under Section 377 of the Penal Code. In a short judgment, the learned Judges held that it was unnecessary to refer to English Statute Law and English text books which proceeded upon an interpretation of the words sodomy, buggery and bestiality; and that the words used in the Penal Code were very simple and wide enough to include all acts against the order of nature. My view on the question is also that the words of Section 377 are simple and wide enough to include any carnal intercourse against the order of nature within its ambit. Committing intercourse between the thighs of another is carnal intercourse against the order of nature.”
79. In Calvin Francis v. State of Orissa33, the Orissa High Court had reproduced certain passages from Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 81, pp. 368-70. We may reproduce the same:G
“A statute providing that any person who shall commit any act or practice of sexual perversity, either with mankind or beast, on conviction shall be punished, is not limited to instances involving
1817 Russ & Ry 331 : 168 ER 830 (CCR) (1908) 14 TLR Appendix 43 (Ker) 1992 (1) OLR 316
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carnal copulation, but is restricted to cases involving the sex organ of at least one of the parties. The term ‘sexual perversity’ does not refer to every physical contact by a male with the body of the female with intent to cause sexual satisfaction to the actor, but the condemnation of the statute is limited to unnatural conduct performed for the purpose of accomplishing abnormal sexual satisfaction for the actor. Under a statute providing that any person participating in the act or copulating the mouth of one person with the sexual organ of another is guilty of the offence a person is guilty of violating the statute when he has placed his mouth on the genital organ of another, and the offence may be committed by two persons of opposite sex.”
80. Referring to the said decision, the two-Judge Bench in Suresh Koushal’s case has opined:“60. However, from these cases no uniform test can be culled out to classify acts as “carnal intercourse against the order of nature”. In our opinion the acts which fall within the ambit of Section 377 IPC can only be determined with reference to the act itself and the circumstances in which it is executed. All the aforementioned cases refer to non-consensual and markedly coercive situations and the keenness of the Court in bringing justice to the victims who were either women or children cannot be discounted while analysing the manner in which the section has been interpreted. We are apprehensive of whether the court would rule similarly in a case of proved consensual intercourse between adults. …” 81. From the aforesaid analysis, it is perceptible that the twoJudge Bench has drawn a distinction between the “class” and the “act” that has been treated as an offence. On a plain reading of the provision, it is noticeable that the “act” covers all categories of persons if the offence is committed. Thus, the seminal issue that emerges for consideration, as has been understood by various High Courts and this Court, is whether the act can be treated as a criminal offence if it violates Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, the provision has to be tested on the anvil of the said constitutional provisions. Additionally, it is also to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 especially under the scanner of its second limb, that is, manifest arbitrariness. For
adjudging the aforesaid facets, certain fundamental concepts which are intrinsically and integrally associated with the expression of a person who enjoys certain inalienable natural rights which also have been recognized under the Constitution are required to be addressed. In this context, the individuality of a person and the acceptance of identity invite advertence to some necessary concepts which eventually recognize the constitutional status of an individual that resultantly brushes aside the “act” and respects the dignity and choice of the individual.
G. The Constitution – an organic charter of progressive rights
82. A democratic Constitution like ours is an organic and breathing document with senses which are very much alive to its surroundings, for it has been created in such a manner that it can adapt to the needs and developments taking place in the society. It was highlighted by this Court in the case of Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and others v. L.V.A. Dixitulu and others34 that the Constitution is a living, integrated organism having a soul and consciousness of its own and its pulse beats, emanating from the spinal cord of its basic framework, can be felt all over its body, even in the extremities of its limbs. 83. In the case of Saurabh Chaudri and others v. Union of India and others35, it was observed:“Our Constitution is organic in nature, being a living organ, it is ongoing and with the passage of time, law must change. Horizons of constitutional law are expanding.” 84. Thus, we are required to keep in view the dynamic concepts inherent in the Constitution that have the potential to enable and urge the constitutional courts to beam with expansionism that really grows to adapt to the ever-changing circumstances without losing the identity of the Constitution. The idea of identity of the individual and the constitutional legitimacy behind the same is of immense significance. Therefore, in this context, the duty of the constitutional courts gets accentuated. We emphasize on the role of the constitutional courts in realizing the evolving nature of this living instrument. Through its dynamic and purposive interpretative approach, the judiciary must strive to breathe life into the Constitution and not render the document a collection of mere dead
(1979) 2 SCC 34 (2003) 11 SCC 146
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letters. The following observations made in the case of Ashok Kumar Gupta and another v. State of U.P. and others36 further throws light on this role of the courts:-
“Therefore, it is but the duty of the Court to supply vitality, blood and flesh, to balance the competing rights by interpreting the principles, to the language or the words contained in the living and organic Constitution, broadly and liberally.” 85. The rights that are guaranteed as Fundamental Rights under our Constitution are the dynamic and timeless rights of ‘liberty’ and ‘equality’ and it would be against the principles of our Constitution to give them a static interpretation without recognizing their transformative and evolving nature. The argument does not lie in the fact that the concepts underlying these rights change with the changing times but the changing times illustrate and illuminate the concepts underlying the said rights. In this regard, the observations in Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd. and another v. State of Punjab and another37 are quite instructive:“Constitution is a living organism and the latent meaning of the expressions used can be given effect to only if a particular situation arises. It is not that with changing times the meaning changes but changing times illustrate and illuminate the meaning of the expressions used. The connotation of the expressions used takes its shape and colour in evolving dynamic situations.” 86. Our Constitution fosters and strengthens the spirit of equality and envisions a society where every person enjoys equal rights which enable him/her to grow and realize his/her potential as an individual. This guarantee of recognition of individuality runs through the entire length and breadth of this dynamic instrument. The Constitution has been conceived of and designed in a manner which acknowledges the fact that ‘change is inevitable’. It is the duty of the courts to realize the constitutional vision of equal rights in consonance with the current demands and situations and not to read and interpret the same as per the standards of equality that existed decades ago. The judiciary cannot remain oblivious to the fact that the society is constantly evolving and many a variation may emerge with the changing times. There is a constant need to transform the constitutional idealism into reality by fostering respect for human rights, promoting inclusion of pluralism,
(1997) 5 SCC 201 (1990) 3 SCC 87
bringing harmony, that is, unity amongst diversity, abandoning the idea of alienation or some unacceptable social notions built on medieval egos and establishing the cult of egalitarian liberalism founded on reasonable principles that can withstand scrutiny. 87. In Ashok Kumar Gupta (supra), the Court had observed that common sense has always served in the court’s ceaseless striving as a voice of reason to maintain the blend of change and continuity of order which are sine qua non for stability in the process of change in a parliamentary democracy. The Court ruled that it is not bound to accept an interpretation which retards the progress or impedes social integration. The Court further observed that it is required to adopt such interpretation which would give the ideals set out in the Preamble to the Constitution aided by Part III and Part IV a meaningful and living reality for all sections of the society. 88. It is through this armoury of expansive dynamism that the courts have been able to give an all-inclusive interpretation to the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of our Constitution. This is borne testimony by the decisions of the constitutional courts which have evolved views for extending the protection of fundamental rights to those who have been deprived of the enjoyment of the same. If not for such an approach adopted by the courts, our Constitution and its progressive principles would have been rendered ineffective and the dynamic charter would be reduced to a mere ornate document without any purpose or object. 89. The Court, as the final arbiter of the Constitution, has to keep in view the necessities of the needy and the weaker sections. The role of the Court assumes further importance when the class or community whose rights are in question are those who have been the object of humiliation, discrimination, separation and violence by not only the State and the society at large but also at the hands of their very own family members. The development of law cannot be a mute spectator to the struggle for the realisation and attainment of the rights of such members of the society. 90. The authority in NALSA is one such recent illustration where the rights of transgenders as a third sex was recognized which had been long due in a democracy like ours. This Court ruled: -
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“It is now very well recognized that the Constitution is a living character; its interpretation must be dynamic. It must be understood in a way that intricate and advances modern realty. The judiciary is the guardian of the Constitution and by ensuring to grant legitimate right that is due to TGs, we are simply protecting the Constitution and the democracy inasmuch as judicial protection and democracy in general and of human rights in particular is a characteristic of our vibrant democracy. As we have pointed out above, our Constitution inheres liberal and substantive democracy with rule of law as an important and fundamental pillar. It has its own internal morality based on dignity and equality of all human beings. Rule of law demands protection of individual human rights. Such rights are to be guaranteed to each and every human being. These TGs, even though insignificant in numbers, are still human beings and therefore they have every right to enjoy their human rights.”
The ‘living document’ concept finds place in several international authorities as well. The courts in other jurisdictions have endorsed the view that the Constitution is forever evolving in nature and that a progressive approach is mandated by the principles inherent in the Constitution itself.
91. The Supreme Court of Canada, while giving an expansive interpretation to marriage by including same-sex unions within its encompass, in Re: Same Sex Marriage38, has observed:-
“The “frozen concepts” reasoning runs contrary to one of the most fundamental principles of Canadian constitutional interpretation: that our Constitution is a living tree which, by way of progressive interpretation, accommodates and addresses the realities of modern life.”
92. As early as the 1920s, the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of State of Missouri v. Holland39, while making a comparison between the ‘instrument in dispute’ and the ‘Constitution’, had made the following observations with regard to the nature of the Constitution:-
“When we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 252 U.S. 416 (1920)
that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation.”
93. In one of his celebrated works, Judge Richard Posner made certain observations which would be relevant to be reproduced here:“A constitution that did not invalidate so offensive, oppressive, probably undemocratic, and sectarian law [as the Connecticut law banning contraceptives] would stand revealed as containing major gaps. Maybe that is the nature of our, or perhaps any, written Constitution; but yet, perhaps the courts are authorized to plug at least the most glaring gaps. Does anyone really believe, in his heart of hearts, that the Constitution should be interpreted so literally as to authorize every conceivable law that would not violate a specific constitutional clause? This would mean that a state could require everyone to marry, or to have intercourse at least once a month, or it could take away every couple’s second child and place it in a foster home.... We find it reassuring to think that the courts stand between us and legislative tyranny even if a particular form of tyranny was not foreseen and expressly forbidden by framers of the Constitution.”40
94. Thus, it is demonstrable that expansive growth of constitutional idealism is embedded in the theory of progress, abandonment of status quoist attitude, expansion of the concept of inclusiveness and constant remembrance of the principle of fitting into the norm of change with a constitutional philosophy. H. Transformative constitutionalism and the rights of LGBT community
95. For understanding the need of having a constitutional democracy and for solving the million dollar question as to why we adopted the Constitution, we perhaps need to understand the concept of transformative constitutionalism with some degree of definiteness. In this quest of ours, the ideals enshrined in the Preamble to our Constitution
Posner, Richard: (1992) Sex and Reason, Harvard University Press, pg. 328. ISBN 0-674- 80280-2
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would be a guiding laser beam. The ultimate goal of our magnificent Constitution is to make right the upheaval which existed in the Indian society before the adopting of the Constitution. The Court in State of Kerala and another v. N.M. Thomas and others41 observed that the Indian Constitution is a great social document, almost revolutionary in its aim of transforming a medieval, hierarchical society into a modern, egalitarian democracy and its provisions can be comprehended only by a spacious, social-science approach, not by pedantic, traditional legalism. The whole idea of having a Constitution is to guide the nation towards a resplendent future. Therefore, the purpose of having a Constitution is to transform the society for the better and this objective is the fundamental pillar of transformative constitutionalism.
96. The concept of transformative constitutionalism has at its kernel a pledge, promise and thirst to transform the Indian society so as to embrace therein, in letter and spirit, the ideals of justice, liberty, equality and fraternity as set out in the Preamble to our Constitution. The expression ‘transformative constitutionalism’ can be best understood by embracing a pragmatic lens which will help in recognizing the realities of the current day. Transformation as a singular term is diametrically opposed to something which is static and stagnant, rather it signifies change, alteration and the ability to metamorphose. Thus, the concept of transformative constitutionalism, which is an actuality with regard to all Constitutions and particularly so with regard to the Indian Constitution, is, as a matter of fact, the ability of the Constitution to adapt and transform with the changing needs of the times. 97. It is this ability of a Constitution to transform which gives it the character of a living and organic document. A Constitution continuously shapes the lives of citizens in particular and societies in general. Its exposition and energetic appreciation by constitutional courts constitute the lifeblood of progressive societies. The Constitution would become a stale and dead testament without dynamic, vibrant and pragmatic interpretation. Constitutional provisions have to be construed and developed in such a manner that their real intent and existence percolates to all segments of the society. That is the raison d’etre for the Constitution.
98. The Supreme Court as well as other constitutional courts have time and again realized that in a society undergoing fast social and economic change, static judicial interpretation of the Constitution would
AIR 1976 SC 490
stultify the spirit of the Constitution. Accordingly, the constitutional courts, while viewing the Constitution as a transformative document, have ardently fulfilled their obligation to act as the sentinel on qui vive for guarding the rights of all individuals irrespective of their sex, choice and sexual orientation.
99. The purpose of transformative constitutionalism has been aptly described in the case of Road Accident Fund and another v. Mdeyide42 wherein the Constitutional Court of South Africa, speaking in the context of the transformative role of the Constitution of South Africa, had observed:-
“Our Constitution has often been described as “transformative”. One of the most important purposes of this transformation is to ensure that, by the realisation of fundamental socio-economic rights, people disadvantaged by their deprived social and economic circumstances become more capable of enjoying a life of dignity, freedom and equality that lies at the heart of our constitutional democracy.”
100. In Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v. Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and others43, the Constitutional Court of South Africa opined:“The achievement of equality is one of the fundamental goals that we have fashioned for ourselves in the Constitution. Our constitutional order is committed to the transformation of our society from a grossly unequal society to one “in which there is equality between men and women and people of all races”. In this fundamental way, our Constitution differs from other constitutions which assume that all are equal and in so doing simply entrench existing inequalities. Our Constitution recognises that decades of systematic racial discrimination entrenched by the apartheid legal order cannot be eliminated without positive action being taken to achieve that result. We are required to do more than that. The effects of discrimination may continue indefinitely unless there is a commitment to end it.”
101. Davies44 understands transformation as follows:42
2008 (1) SA 535 (CC) [2004] ZACC 15 Asking the Law Question: The Dissolution of Legal Theory 205 (2002), Margaret Davies.
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“Transformation which is based on the continuing evaluation and modification of a complex material and ideological environment cannot be reduced to a scientific theory of change, like those of evolution or the halflife of radioactive substances ... practical change occurs within a climate of serious reflection, and diversity of opinion is in my view absolutely essential as a stimulus to theory.” 102. A J Van der Walt45 has metaphorically, by comparing ‘constitutional transformation’ to ‘dancing’, described the art of constitutional transformation to be continually progressive where one does not stop from daring to imagine alternatives and that the society could be different and a better place where the rights of every individual are given due recognition:“However, even when we trade the static imagery of position, standing, for the more complex imagery of dancing, we still have to resist the temptation to see transformation as linear movement or progress - from authoritarianism to justification, from one dancing code to another, or from volkspele jurisprudence to toyitoyi jurisprudence... I suggest that we should not only switch to a more complex metaphorical code such as dancing when discussing transformation, but that we should also deconstruct the codes we dance to; pause to reflect upon the language in terms of which we think and talk and reason about constitutionalism, about rights, and about transformation, and recognize the liberating and the captivating potential of the codes shaping and shaped by that language. 103. Again, the Supreme Court of South Africa in President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo46 observed that the prohibition on unfair discrimination in the interim Constitution seeks not only to avoid discrimination against people who are members of disadvantaged groups but also that at the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a recognition that the purpose of our new constitutional and democratic order is the establishment of a society in which all human beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect, regardless of their membership of particular groups.
Van der Walt, Dancing with codes - Protecting, developing and deconstructing property rights in a constitutional state, 118 (2) J. S. APR. L. 258 (2001) (1997) 6 B.C.L.R. 708 (CC)
104. Equality does not only imply recognition of individual dignity but also includes within its sphere ensuring of equal opportunity to advance and develop their human potential and social, economic and legal interests of every individual and the process of transformative constitutionalism is dedicated to this purpose. It has been observed by Albertyn & Goldblatt47:“The challenge of achieving equality within this transformation project involves the eradication of systemic forms of discrimination and material disadvantage based on race, gender, class and other forms of inequality. It also entails the development of opportunities which allow people to realise their full human potential within positive social relationships.”
105. In Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and others v. Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and others: In Re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and others v. Smit NO and others48, the Constitutional Court of South Africa observed:“The Constitution is located in a history which involves a transition from a society based on division, injustice and exclusion from the democratic process to one which respects the dignity of all citizens and includes all in the process of governance. As such, the process of interpreting the Constitution must recognise the context in which we find ourselves and the Constitution’s goal of a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights. This spirit of transition and transformation characterises the constitutional enterprise as a whole.
... The Constitution requires that judicial officers read legislation, where possible, in ways which give effect to its fundamental values. Consistently with this, when the constitutionality of legislation is in issue, they are under a duty to examine the objects and purport of an Act and to read the provisions of the legislation, so far as is possible, in conformity with the Constitution.”
Albertyn & Goldblatt, Facing the challenge of transformation: Difficulties in the development of an indigenous jurisprudence of equality, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 248 (1998) 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC)
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106. The society has changed much now, not just from the year 1860 when the Indian Penal Code was brought into force but there has also been continuous progressive change. In many spheres, the sexual minorities have been accepted. They have been given space after the NALSA judgment but the offence punishable under Section 377 IPC, as submitted, creates a chilling effect. The freedom that is required to be attached to sexuality still remains in the pavilion with no nerves to move. The immobility due to fear corrodes the desire to express one’s own sexual orientation as a consequence of which the body with flesh and bones feels itself caged and a sense of fear gradually converts itself into a skeleton sans spirit.
107. The question of freedom of choosing a partner is reflective from a catena of recent judgments of this Court such as Shafin Jahan (supra) wherein the Court held that a person who has come of age and has the capability to think on his/her own has a right to choose his/her life partner. It is apposite to reproduce some of the observations made by the Court which are to the following effect:-
“It is obligatory to state here that expression of choice in accord with law is acceptance of individual identity. Curtailment of that expression and the ultimate action emanating therefrom on the conceptual structuralism of obeisance to the societal will destroy the individualistic entity of a person. The social values and morals have their space but they are not above the constitutionally guaranteed freedom. The said freedom is both a constitutional and a human right. Deprivation of that freedom which is ingrained in choice on the plea of faith is impermissible.”
108. Recently, in Shakti Vahini (supra), the Court has ruled that the right to choose a life partner is a facet of individual liberty and the Court, for the protection of this right, issued preventive, remedial and punitive measures to curb the menace of honour killings. The Court observed:-
“When the ability to choose is crushed in the name of class honour and the person’s physical frame is treated with absolute indignity, a chilling effect dominates over the brains and bones of the society at large.”
109. An argument is sometimes advanced that what is permissible between two adults engaged in acceptable sexual activity is different in
the case of two individuals of the same sex, be it homosexuals or lesbians, and the ground of difference is supported by social standardization. Such an argument ignores the individual orientation, which is naturally natural, and disrobes the individual of his/her identity and the inherent dignity and choice attached to his/her being.
110. The principle of transformative constitutionalism also places upon the judicial arm of the State a duty to ensure and uphold the supremacy of the Constitution, while at the same time ensuring that a sense of transformation is ushered constantly and endlessly in the society by interpreting and enforcing the Constitution as well as other provisions of law in consonance with the avowed object. The idea is to steer the country and its institutions in a democratic egalitarian direction where there is increased protection of fundamental rights and other freedoms. It is in this way that transformative constitutionalism attains the status of an ideal model imbibing the philosophy and morals of constitutionalism and fostering greater respect for human rights. It ought to be remembered that the Constitution is not a mere parchment; it derives its strength from the ideals and values enshrined in it. However, it is only when we adhere to constitutionalism as the supreme creed and faith and develop a constitutional culture to protect the fundamental rights of an individual that we can preserve and strengthen the values of our compassionate Constitution.
I. Constitutional morality and Section 377 IPC
111. The concept of constitutional morality is not limited to the mere observance of the core principles of constitutionalism as the magnitude and sweep of constitutional morality is not confined to the provisions and literal text which a Constitution contains, rather it embraces within itself virtues of a wide magnitude such as that of ushering a pluralistic and inclusive society, while at the same time adhering to the other principles of constitutionalism. It is further the result of embodying constitutional morality that the values of constitutionalism trickle down and percolate through the apparatus of the State for the betterment of each and every individual citizen of the State. 112. In one of the Constituent Assembly Debates, Dr. Ambedkar, explaining the concept of constitutional morality by quoting the Greek historian, George Grote, said:-
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
“By constitutional morality, Grote meant... a paramount reverence for the forms of the constitution, enforcing obedience to authority and acting under and within these forms, yet combined with the habit of open speech, of action subject only to definite legal control, and unrestrained censure of those very authorities as to all their public acts combined, too with a perfect confidence in the bosom of every citizen amidst the bitterness of party contest that the forms of constitution wall not be less sacred in the eyes of his opponents than his own.”49 113. Our Constitution was visualized with the aim of securing to the citizens of our country inalienable rights which were essential for fostering a spirit of growth and development and at the same time ensuring that the three organs of the State working under the aegis of the Constitution and deriving their authority from the supreme document, that is, the Constitution, practise constitutional morality. The Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary all have to stay alive to the concept of constitutional morality.
114. In the same speech50, Dr. Ambedkar had quoted George Grote who had observed:“The diffusion of ‘constitutional morality’, not merely among the majority of any community, but throughout the whole is the indispensable condition of a government at once free and peaceable; since even any powerful and obstinate minority may render the working of a free institution impracticable, without being strong enough to conquer ascendance for themselves.” 51 This statement of Dr. Ambedkar underscores that constitutional morality is not a natural forte for our country for the simple reason that our country had attained freedom after a long period of colonial rule and, therefore, constitutional morality at the time when the Constituent Assembly was set up was an alien notion. However, the strengthening of constitutional morality in contemporary India remains a duty of the organs of the State including the Judiciary.
115. The society as a whole or even a minuscule part of the society may aspire and prefer different things for themselves. They are
Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 7 (4th November 1948) Ibid Grote, A History of Greece. Routledge, London, 2000, p. 93.
perfectly competent to have such a freedom to be different, like different things, so on and so forth, provided that their different tastes and liking remain within their legal framework and neither violates any statute nor results in the abridgement of fundamental rights of any other citizen. The Preambular goals of our Constitution which contain the noble objectives of Justice, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity can only be achieved through the commitment and loyalty of the organs of the State to the principle of constitutional morality. 116. It is the concept of constitutional morality which strives and urges the organs of the State to maintain such a heterogeneous fibre in the society, not just in the limited sense, but also in multifarious ways. It is the responsibility of all the three organs of the State to curb any propensity or proclivity of popular sentiment or majoritarianism. Any attempt to push and shove a homogeneous, uniform, consistent and a standardised philosophy throughout the society would violate the principle of constitutional morality. Devotion and fidelity to constitutional morality must not be equated with the popular sentiment prevalent at a particular point of time. 117. Any asymmetrical attitude in the society, so long as it is within the legal and constitutional framework, must at least be provided an environment in which it could be sustained, if not fostered. It is only when such an approach is adopted that the freedom of expression including that of choice would be allowed to prosper and flourish and if that is achieved, freedom and liberty, which is the quintessence of constitutional morality, will be allowed to survive. 118. In Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India and others52, one of us (Dipak Misra, CJI) observed:“Constitutional morality, appositely understood, means the morality that has inherent elements in the constitutional norms and the conscience of the Constitution. Any act to garner justification must possess the potentiality to be in harmony with the constitutional impulse. We may give an example. When one is expressing an idea of generosity, he may not be meeting the standard of justness. There may be an element of condescension. But when one shows justness in action, there is no feeling of any grant or generosity. That will come within the normative value.
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NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
That is the test of constitutional justness which falls within the sweep of constitutional morality. It advocates the principle of constitutional justness without subjective exposition of generosity.” 119. The duty of the constitutional courts is to adjudge the validity of law on well-established principles, namely, legislative competence or violations of fundamental rights or of any other constitutional provisions. At the same time, it is expected from the courts as the final arbiter of the Constitution to uphold the cherished principles of the Constitution and not to be remotely guided by majoritarian view or popular perception. The Court has to be guided by the conception of constitutional morality and not by the societal morality. 120. We may hasten to add here that in the context of the issue at hand, when a penal provision is challenged as being violative of the fundamental rights of a section of the society, notwithstanding the fact whether the said section of the society is a minority or a majority, the magna cum laude and creditable principle of constitutional morality, in a constitutional democracy like ours where the rule of law prevails, must not be allowed to be trampled by obscure notions of social morality which have no legal tenability. The concept of constitutional morality would serve as an aid for the Court to arrive at a just decision which would be in consonance with the constitutional rights of the citizens, howsoever small that fragment of the populace may be. The idea of number, in this context, is meaningless; like zero on the left side of any number. 121. In this regard, we have to telescopically analyse social morality vis-à-vis constitutional morality. It needs no special emphasis to state that whenever the constitutional courts come across a situation of transgression or dereliction in the sphere of fundamental rights, which are also the basic human rights of a section, howsoever small part of the society, then it is for the constitutional courts to ensure, with the aid of judicial engagement and creativity, that constitutional morality prevails over social morality. 122. In the garb of social morality, the members of the LGBT community must not be outlawed or given a step-motherly treatment of malefactor by the society. If this happens or if such a treatment to the LGBT community is allowed to persist, then the constitutional courts, which are under the obligation to protect the fundamental rights, would be failing in the discharge of their duty. A failure to do so would reduce the citizenry rights to a cipher.
123. We must not forget that the founding fathers adopted an inclusive Constitution with provisions that not only allowed the State, but also, at times, directed the State, to undertake affirmative action to eradicate the systematic discrimination against the backward sections of the society and the expulsion and censure of the vulnerable communities by the so-called upper caste/sections of the society that existed on a massive scale prior to coming into existence of the Constituent Assembly. These were nothing but facets of the majoritarian social morality which were sought to be rectified by bringing into force the Constitution of India. Thus, the adoption of the Constitution, was, in a way, an instrument or agency for achieving constitutional morality and means to discourage the prevalent social morality at that time. A country or a society which embraces constitutional morality has at its core the well-founded idea of inclusiveness. 124. While testing the constitutional validity of impugned provision of law, if a constitutional court is of the view that the impugned provision falls foul to the precept of constitutional morality, then the said provision has to be declared as unconstitutional for the pure and simple reason that the constitutional courts exist to uphold the Constitution. J. Perspective of human dignity
125. While discussing about the role of human dignity in gay rights adjudication and legislation, Michele Finck53 observes:“As a concept devoid of a precise legal meaning, yet widely appealing at an intuitive level, dignity- can be easily manipulated and transposed into a number of legal contexts. With regard to the rights of lesbian and gay individuals, dignity captures what Nussbaum described as the transition from “disgust” to “humanity.” Once looked at with disgust and considered unworthy of some rights, there is increasing consensus that homosexuals should no longer be deprived of the benefits of citizenship that are available to heterosexuals, such as the ability to contract marriage, on the sole ground of their sexual orientation. Homosexuals are increasingly considered as “full humans” disposing of equal rights, and dignity functions as the vocabulary that translates such socio-cultural change into legal change”
The role of human dignity in gay rights adjudication and legislation: A comparative perspective, Michele Finck, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 14, Jan 2016, page no.26 to 53
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR v. UOI THR. SECY. MINISTRY OF LAW & JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI ]
126. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 became the Magna Carta of people all over the world. The first Article of the UDHR was uncompromising in its generality of application: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. Justice Kirby succinctly observed:-
“This language embraced every individual in our world. It did not apply only to citizens. It did not apply only to ‘white’ people. It did not apply only to good people. Prisoners, murderers and even traitors were to be entitled to the freedoms that were declared. There were no exceptions to the principles of equality.”54
127. The fundamental idea of dignity is regarded as an inseparable facet of human personality. Dignity has been duly recognized as an important aspect of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. In the international sphere, the right to live with dignity had been identified as a human right way back in 1948 with the introduction of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The constitutional courts of our country have solemnly dealt with the task of assuring and preserving the right to dignity of each and every individual whenever the occasion arises, for without the right to live with dignity, all other fundamental rights may not realise their complete meaning. 128. To understand a person’s dignity, one has to appreciate how the dignity of another is to be perceived. Alexis de Tocqueville tells us55:-
“Whenever I find myself in the presence of another human being, of whatever station, my dominant feeling is not so much to serve him or please him as not to offend his dignity.” 129. Every individual has many possessions which assume the position of his/her definitive characteristics. There may not be any obsession with them but he/she may abhor to be denuded of them, for they are sacred to him/her and so inseparably associated that he/she may not conceive of any dissolution. He/she would lik