Raja Ram Pal v. The Honble Speaker, Lok Sabha & Ors.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 10 January 2007
- Judge
- Justice Y.K. Sabharwal
- Neutral citation
- 2007 INSC 22
- Reported in
- [2007] 1 S.C.R. 317
- Result
- Dismissed
- Acts & sections
- Article 143 Constitution, Article 105 Constitution, Article 32 Constitution, Article 194 Constitution
Full judgment
RAJA RAM PAL
v.
THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA & ORS. JANUARY 10, 2007 [Y.K. SABHARWAL, CJI, K.G. BALAKRlSHNAN, C.K. THAKKER, R.V. RAVEENDRAN AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950: Articles JOI, 102, 105 and 122/Representation of the People Act, 1951-Sections 7 and JOA: Cash for query-Monetary consideration for raising questions in Parliament-MP Local Area Development Scheme-Improper conduct in relation to implementation thereof-Espoused by T V. channels-Inquiry by Committee of MPs-Report tabled in House and the MPs concerned expelled from the House-Constitutional validity of-Powers, privileges and immunities-Competence of the Houses of Parliament to expel the Members from the membership of the House-Whether such power subject to judicial review-Held: The Houses of Parliament are competent to expel the Members-Such power subject to judicial review-Scope thereofExplained. Procedure adopted by the two Houses of Parliament-Does not suffer from any illegality, irrationality, unconstitutionality, violation ofprinciples of natural justice or perversity-Hence not violative of Articles 14, 20 or 21. Lok Sabha Speaker's announcement that the guilty will not be spared-Whether mala fide and motivated-Held, no, since the Speaker was only giving vent to his feeling on the subject-The fact that the Speaker had thereafter constituted an Inquiry Committee with Members also from the opposition would go to show that the resolve at that stage was to find the truth.
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Articles 19(J)(g) and 21-Vis-a-vis-Article 105(3)-Discussed
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Powers, privileges and immunities ofMembers ofParliament-Position in countries like USA, UK., Canada, Australia-Discussed. Words & Phrases:
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'Vacw1cy', 'disqualification', 'expulsion', 'power', 'privilege', 'immunity'-Meaning of The interpretation of Article 105 of Constitution of India is in issue in these matters. The question is whether in exercise of the powers, privileges and immunities as contained in Article 105, are the Houses of Parliament competent to expel their respective Members from membership of the House. If such a power exists, is it subject to judicial review and if so, the sco'pe of such judicial review. The aforesaid questions have arisen in the background of the allegation that the Members of Parliament (MPs) indulged in unethical and corrupt practices of taking monetary consideration in relation to their functions as MPs. The Presiding officers of each House of Parliament instituted inquiries through separate Committees.
On the Report of.the Inquiry Committee being laid on the table of the House, a Motion was adopted by Lok Sabha resolving to expel the 10 members from the membership of Lok Sabha, accepting the finding as contained in the Report of the Committ~e that the conduct of the members was unethical and unbecoming of the Members of Parliament and their continuance as MPs is untenable. On the same day i.e. 23rd December, 2005, the Lok Sabha Secretariat issued the impugned notification notifying the expulsion of those MPs with effect from same date. Similarly the Report of the Ethics Committee was adopted by Rajya Sabha concurring with the recommendation of expulsion and on the same date i.e. 23rd December, 2005, a notification notifying expulsion of the Member from membership of Rajya Sabha with immediate effect was issued. In the Writ Petitionsffransfer Cases, the expelled MPs have challenged
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.. RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA
the constitutional validity of their respective expulsions.
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On behalf of the petitioners, it was inter alia contended that the power of judicial review is an incident of and flows from the concept that the fundamental and higher laws are the touchstone of the limits of the powers of the various organs of State which derive power and authority under the Constitution of which the judicial wing is the interpreter; unlike in England where Parliament is sovereign, in a federal State with a written Constitution like India is, the supremacy of the Constitution is fundamental to its existence, which supremacy is protected by the authority of the independent judicial body that acts as the interpreter thereof through the power of judicial review to which even the Legislature is amenable and cannot claim immunity wherefrom; the legislative supremacy being subject to the Constitution, Parliament cannot determine for itself the nature, scope and effect of its powers which are, consequently, subject to the supervision and control of judicial organ; that unlike the Parliament of England, the status of Legislature in India has never been that of a superior court of record and that even privileges of Parliament are subject to limits which must necessarily ~e ascertainable and, therefore, subject to scrutiny by the Court, like any other right; the validity of any proceedings even inside a legislative chamber can be called in question before the Court when it suffers from illegality and unconstitutionality and there is no immunity available to Parliament from judicial review; the Legislature has no power to expel its member since the Parliament has not enacted any law which provides for expulsion of a member in a specified circumstance, in terms of enabling power to legislate on ~he subject as available in Article 105(3) of the Constitution; the expulsions are illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional, being violative of the provisions of Articles 83, 84 and 101 to 103, 105 and 190 to 193 of the Constitution; there is no provision either in the Constitution of India or in the Ru!es of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the Houses of Parliament for expulsion of a member by adoption of a motion and thus the impugned acts were beyond the jurisdiction of Parliament; the expulsion of the petitioners from the Legislature through a motion adopted by simple majority was a dangerous precedent which would give dictatorial powers to the ruling IDajority in the Legislatures in future and thus be prone to further abuse; the Constitutional law governing the democracies the world over, even in other jurisdictions governed by written Constitutions, would not allow the power of exclusion of the elected members unto the legislative chamber.
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The following questions were formulated by the Court:
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1. Does this Court, within the constitutional scheme, have the jurisdiction to decide the content and scope of powers, privileges and immunities of the Legislatures and its members?
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2. If the first question is answered in the affirmative, can it be found that the powers and privileges of the Legislatures in India, in particular with reference to Article 105, include the power of expulsion of their members? 3. In the event of such power of expulsion being found, does this Court have the jurisdiction to interfere in the exercise of the said power or privilege conferred on the Parliament and its members or Committees and, if so, is this jurisdiction circumscribed by certain limits? Dismissing the Writ Petitions and the Transferred Cases, the Court HELD: Per Majority (Sabharwal, CJ!, for himself and K.G. Balakrishnan and D.K. Jain, JJ.)
1. In view of the clear enunciation of law by Constitutional Benches of this court in case after case, there ought not be any doubt left that whenever Parliament, or for that matter any State legislature, claims any power or privilege in terms of the provisions contained in Article 105(3), or Article 194(3) as the case may be, it is the court which has the authority and the jurisdiction to examine, on grievance being brought before it, to find out if the particular power or privilege that has been claimed or asserted by the legislature is one that was contemplated by the said constitutional provisions or, to put it simply, if it was such a power or privilege as can be said to have been vested in the House of Commons of the Parliament of United Kingdom as on the date of commencement of the Constitution of India so as to become available to the Indian legislatures. [Para 62) [386-G-H, 387-A-B]
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kera/a, [1973) 4 SCC 225; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, [1975) (Suppl) SCC 1; Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, [1980] 3 SCC 625; Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India, [1991] 4 SCC 699; I. Manila! Singh v.
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RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA
H. Borobabu Singh (Dr), (1994] Supp (1) SCC 718; Union of India v. Assn. for Democratic Reforms, [2002] 5 SCC 294; Special Reference No. I of 2002, In re (Gujarat Assembly Election matter), (2002] 8 SCC 237; People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399; Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, [2005) 3 SCC 551; Rameshwar Prasad (VI) v. Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC 1; Ku/dip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006] 7 SCC 1; Special Reference No. I of 1964, (1965] 1 SCR 413 (UP Assembly case); MS.M Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, [1959] Supp (1) SCR 806; MS.M Sharma v. Shree Krishna Sinha, [1961] 1 SCR 96 and State of Karnataka v. Union of India, [1977] 4 SCC 608, relied on.
Bradlaugh v. Gosset, [1884] 12 QBD 271 and Richard William Prebble v. Television New Zealand Ltd, (1994) (S) WLR 970, referred to.
"Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha"; "Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in ·the Council of States" and "May's Parliamentary Practice" by Sir Thomas Erskine May, referred to.
2. The historic origin of the doctrine of privileges of the legislature in England is founded on its judicial functions. The House of Lords has always claimed itself to be a Court of Record and as such having the inherent authority and power not only to imprison but also to impose fines in matters of contempt. But then, its position as a Court of Record does not inure, according to Lord Kenyon, "when exercising a legislative capacity". According to May's Parliamentary practice, the House of Commons at one point of time in the history had also claimed to be a Court of Record, but this position has never been finally determined. [Para 82] [393-H, G 394-A-B] ,
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Sir Thomas Erskine May: "May's Parliamentary Practice" and Rutledge: "Procedure of the House of Commons" [Volume I, page 46], referred to. 3.1. The medieval concept of Parliament in England primarily as a court of justice, the 'High Court of Parliament' gave rise to the firm belief that in order to defend the dignity of Parliament against disrespect and affronts, there must vest in it a power to commit, without which the privileges of Parliament would not exist. (Para 83] {394-Dl
3.2. In matters concerning import of powers and privileges of the
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House of Commons unto the legislature in India, while examining the issue, albeit from the limited concern of the availability to State legislature under Article 194(3) of the power of commitment for contempt, this court in the UP Assembly Case had administered a note of caution that must hold good even for purposes at hand. [Para 861 [395-D-E] 3.3= In the UP Assembly Case, it was settled by this court that a broad claim that all the powers enjoyed by the House of Commons at the commencement of the Constitution of India vest in an Indian legislature cannot be accepted in its entirety because there are some powers which cannot obviously be so claimed. (Para 87] (396-B] Special Reference No. 1 of 1964, (1965) 1 SCR 413 (UP Assembly case), relied on. Ashby v. White L.J. (1701-05), 714, referred to.
4. The Constitution thus adopted through Articles 105 and 194, for the Parliament and the State Legislatures respectively, the same powers, privileges and immunities as vested at the commencement of the Constitution in the House of Commons of the Parliament of United Kingdom, until they were "defined by law". (Para 122] [413-D-E]
Prititosh Roy: "Parliamentary Privilege in India" (1991), Chapter-4, titled 'Historical Background of Parliamentary Privilege in India (19151950)' p. 53 and Constituent Assembly Debates Volume 8 of 19.5.1949, page 143-149, 578-584, referred to.
5. Reference to the privileges of the House of Commons was justified on grounds of self-assertion that free India and its Parliament are as great as the Parliament of Great Britain. The drafting committee was more concerned about giving to the Parliament the widest privileges as exercised by members of Parliament in England, including the power to punish for contempt of the House. Full fledged provisions listing out the powers and privileges was not possible as there was not sufficient time or the leisure to formulate all of them in a compendious form, as had been found by a Committee constituted by the Speaker on the legislative side. That is why a wide scope and unfettered discretion was being left for the future Parliament of India to set up the proper machinery for formulating
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RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAK ER, LOK SABHA
privileges, which could be enlarged or curtailed. The adoption of the powers and privileges of the House of Commons was only as a temporary measure, following the practice that had been followed in Australia, Canada and in other Dominions with advantage to secure complete freedom of speech and also the omnipotence of the legislature in every respect. !Para 123) 1413-F-H, 414-A-Bl 6. The amendment brought into force in 1979 does not turn the clock ahead. The powers and privileges of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom as on the date of commencement of the Constitution of India were the powers and privileges available to the Parliament before the amendment and that is the package which continues .to be available postamendment. Use of a particular power in 1947 would rather make it closer in terms of time to the crucial date of commencement oflndian Constitution. Its disuse in later period is of no consequence. !Para 125) (414-F-G) 7. It is incumbent in view of Article 105 (3) to trace the power of expulsion with reference to the powers, privileges and immunities recognized as vesting in the House of Commons of Parliament of United Kingdom as on the date of commencement of the Constitution of India, that is 26th January 1950. If such a power or privilege vested in the said legislature, the question would arise as to whether it could be part of the inheritance for Indian legislatures in the face of the provisions of its written Constitution. [Para 135] (417-G-H)
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8. It is settled that out of entire bouquet of privileges and powers which the House of Commons claimed at the time of its bitter struggle for recognition during the 17th through 19th centuries, all have not survived the test of time. Some were given up. Some others faded out by desuetude. [Para 136) [418-A) 9. The argument of availability of all the powers and privileges has been rejected in UP Assembly Case with reference to illustrations of some powers claimed by the House of Commons as mentioned in May's Parliamentary Practice, but which cannot be claimed by the Indian legislatures, including the privilege of freedom of access which is exercised by the House of Commons as a body and through its Speaker "to have at all times the right to petition, counsel, or remonstrate with their Sovereign through their chosen representative imd have a favourable construction
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placed on his words was justly regarded by the Coinmons as fundamental privilege"; the privilege to pass acts of attainder and impeachments; and the privilege in regard to its own Constitution which is expressed in three ways, first by the order of new writs to fill vacancies that arise in the Commons in the course of a parliamenl; secondly, by the trial of controverted elections; and thirdly, by determining the qualifications of its members in cases of doubt. [Para 137) [418-E-G] Special Reference No. I of 1964, (1965) 1 SCR 413 (UP Assembly
case), relied on.
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Sir Thomas Erskine May : "May's Parliamentary Practice" 16th Edn. pp. 86, 175, referred to. 10.1. It is necessary to understand the exact import of the terms 'vacancy', 'disqualification' and 'expulsion'. These terms have different meanings and they do not overlap. Disqualification strikes at the very root of the candidate's qualification and renders him or her unable to occupy a member's seat. Expulsion, on the other hand, deals with a person who is otherwise qualified, but in the opinion of the House of the legislature, unworthy of membership. While disqualification operates to prevent a candidate from re-election, expulsion occurs after the election of the member and there is no bar on re-election. As far as the term 'vacancy' is concerned, it is a consequence of the fact that a member cannot continue to hold membership. The reason may be any one of the several possible reasons which prevent the member from continuing membership, for example disqualification, death or expulsion. [Paras 142 & 143] (420-B-D] 10.2. In view of above, it is not possible to accept the submission that the termination of membership can be effected only in the manner laid down in Articles 101 and 102. While these articles do speak of qualifications for and continuation of membership, they operate independently of Article 105(3). Article 105(3) is also a constitutional provision and it demands equal weight as any other provision, and neither being 'subject to the provisions of the constitution', it is impossible to accord to one superiority over the other. It cannot be said the submission that the provisions in Articles 101 or 102 restrict in any way the scope of Article 194(3). There is no reason for them to do so. Though disqualification and expulsion both result in the vacancy of a seat, there is no necessity to read one in a way
RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA
that restricts the scope of the other. The expulsion on being found unfit for functioning within the House in no way affects the qualifications that a member must fulfill, and there is no reason for the latter to affect expulsion. Both of the provisions can operate quite harmoniously. There is no inconsistency between the two. Nor is there any reason to support the claim that provisions under Articles 101 and 102 are exh.austive and for that reason, Article 105(3) be read as not to include the power of expulsion. Further, death as a cause for vacancy of a seat is also not mentioned in the relevant provisions. Similarly, it is not necessary for expulsion to be mentioned, ifthere exists another constitutional provision that provides for such a power. It is obvious that upon expulsion, the seat of the member is rendered vacant and so no specific recognition of this provision is necessary within the provision relating to vacancy. Thus, the power of expulsion cannot be held to be inconsistent with these provisions. [Para 144] [420-E-H, 421-A]
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10.3. It is not possible to accept the Petitioners' contention that Articles 101 and 102 are exhaustive with respect to termination of membership. Therefore, power of expulsion cannot be said to be inconsistent with these provisions. [Para 146) [421-E] 10.4. Disqualification and expulsion are two different concepts altogether, and recognizing the Parliament's power to expel under Article 105(3) does by no means amount to adding a new ground for disqualification. [Para 147) [421-GJ 10.5. Article 105(3) itself provides the power to make a law defining powers and privileges and further the position that all the privileges of the House of Commons vest in the Parliament until such a law is passed. Article 327 pertains to the constitution of the House insofar as election matters, etc. are concerned. It does not refer to privileges that the Parliament enjoys. Thus, the power of expulsion is not negated by any of the above constitutional or statutory provisions. [Para 148 & 149] [422-B-C] Yashwant Rao Meghawale v. Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly, AIR (1967) MP 95; Hardwari Lal ILR (1977) 2 P&H 269 (FB); K. Anbazhagan v. TN Legislative Assembly, AIR (1988) Mad. 275 and Shrikant v. Vasantrao, [2006] 2 SCC 682, referred to. Armstrong v. Budd, (1969) 71 SR 386 (NSW), referred to.
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11.1. In the present case, where there is a lawful expulsion, the members cannot claim that the provisions relating to salaries and duration of the House create such rights for the members that would have supremacy over the power of expulsion of the House. I Para 15411423-Fl 11.2. As ~ar as the provision for the duration of the House is concerned, the normal duration of a House is to be five years. It cannot be interpreted to mean that it guarantees to the members a term of five years. The Respondents have correctly pointed out that a member does not enjoy the full five-year term under various circumstances; for example-when he or she is elected mid-term, when the term of the House is cut short by dissolution, when the member stands disqualified or the seat is rendered vacant. A correct view in this regard has been taken in K. Anbazhagan, in line with the view expressed by this Court in K. Anandan Nambiar. If the provisions mentioned by the petitioners were actually to create rights in respect of members, then each of the above situations would be liable to be challenged for their violation. This quite obviously is not what is intended by the Constitution. Expulsion is onl)'. an additional cause for the shortening of a term of a member. [Para 156] [424-A-C] 11.3. Further, as far as the provision relating to the salary of the member is concerned, it is quite absurd to claim that because the Constitution makes a provision for salaries, the power of the House to expel is negated since the result would be that the member would no longer be paid. Salades are obviously dependent upon membership, and the continuation of membership is an independent matter altogether. The termination of membership can occur for a variety of reasons and this is at no point controlled by the fact that salaries are required to be paid to a member. (Para 157] [424-D-E)
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11.4. Thus, the provisions do not negate the power of expulsion of the House, and there is no inconsistency between the House's power of expulsion and the said provisions. iPara 158) (424-F) 11.5. While it is true that the right to vote and be represented is integral to our democratic process, it must be remembered that it is not an absolute right. There are certain limitations to the right to vote and be represented. For example, a citizen cannot claim the right to vote and be represented by a person who is disqualified by law or the right to be
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represented by a candidate he votes for, even if he fails to win the election. Similarly, expulsion is another such provision. Expulsion is related to the conduct of the member that lowers the dignity of the House, which may not have been necessarily known at the time of election. It is not a capricious exercise of the House, but an action to protect its dignity before the people of the country. This is also an integral aspect of our democratic set-up. The power of expulsion is not contrary to a democratic process. It is rather part of the guarantee ofa democratic process. Further, expulsion is not a decision by a single person. It is a decision taken by the representatives of the rest of the country. Finally, the power of expulsion does not bar a member from standing for re-election or the constituency from electing that member once again. Thus, the power of expulsion does not violate the right of the constituency or any other democratic principles. [Paras 161 and 162} [425-B-FJ
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11.6. Article 105(3) is itself a constitutional provision and it is necessary to construe the provisions in such a way that a conflict with other provisions is avoided. Where there is a specific constitutional provision as may have the effect of curtailing these fandamenta/ rights if found applicable, there is no need for a law to be passed in terms of Article 19(6). For example, Article 102 relating to disqualifications provides that members who are of unsound mind or who are undischarged insolvents as declared by competent courts are disqualified. These grounds are not mentioned in the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951. Though this provision would have the effect of curtailing the rights under Article 19(1 )(g), there is doubt that it can ever be contended that a specific law made in public interest is required. Similarly, if Article 105(3) provides for the power of expulsion (though not so expressly mentioned), it cannot be said that a specific law in public interest is required. Simply because the Parliament is given the power to make law on this subject is no reason to say that a law has to be mandatorily passed, when the Constitution itself provides that all the powers of the House of Commons vest until such a law is made. Thus, Article 19(1)(g) cannot prevent the reading of power of expulsion under Article 105(3). [Para 165) [426-B-E) 11.7. As far as Article 21 is concerned, it was submitted that the 'procedure established by law' includes the rules relating to the Privileges Committee, etc., which were not followed and thus the right was violated. · This does not prevent the reading of the power to expel in Article 105(3).
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It is not possible to say that because a 'procedure established by law' is required, it will prevent the power of expulsion altogether and that every act of expulsion will be contrary to the procedure established by law. Whether such a claim is maintainable upon specific facts of each case is something that will have to be considered when the question of judicial review is taken up. At this stage, however, a blanket ban on the power of expulsion based on Article 21 cannot be read in the Constitutional provisions. This is an issue that may have a bearing on the legality of the order. But, it cannot negate the power of expulsion. (Para 166] (426-F-H]
11.8. The power of expulsion does not come into conflict with any of the constitutional provisions and thus cannot be negated on this basis. (Para 167) (427-A] Shrikant v. Vasantrao, 12006] 2 SCC 682 and Ku/dip Nayar v. Union of India, [2006] 7 SCC 1, relied on.
K. Anbazhagan v. TN Legislative Assembly, AIR (1988) Mad. 275 and K. Anandan Nambiar v. Chief Secretary, State of Madras, AIR (1966) SC 657, referred to. 12.1. Neither Parliament nor State Legislatures in India can assert power to provide for or regulate their own constitution in the manner claimed by the House of Commons in United Kingdom. Having regard to the elaborate provision made elsewhere in the Constitution, this power cannot be claimed even, or least of all, through the channel of Articles 105 (3) or 294 (3). Wara 188] (431-G-H]
12.2. Though Maitland also discusses expulsion along with the other constituent elements of the House's Privilege of determining its own composition, it is difficult to accept the argument of the Petitioners that this exposition by Professor Maitland shows that the power of expulsion was claimed by the House of Commons it being only a part and parcel of its basic privilege to control its own composition. [Para 217] (441-B-C]
12.3. Wade & Phillips have treated the subject of expulsion from different angles, not necessarily leading to the conclusion that this power would always be traceable to the power of self composition alone. Expulsion on account of conviction for misdeamonour refers to disciplinary control
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and therefore part of penal jurisdiction which undoubtedly is distinct from the power of the House to provide for its own constitution. [Para 220) (442-C] 12.4. The petitioners seek to point out that expulsion ofa member is not included in the penal powers of the House of Commons. Default in this regard by the author does not lead to the conclusion that expulsion was not one of the sanctions available against a member to the House as part of its disciplinary control in as much as other authorities on the subject demonstrate it to be so. [Para 222) [442-F-G) 12.5. It is clear that E.W. Ridges, though referring to the power of expulsion under the heading "The Right to Provide for its Due Composition", does not restrict it as a power sourced from the right to provide for its own composition but refers at length to cases where the power of expulsion was used by the House of Commons in cases of criminal conduct, gross misdemeanour and even in matters of contempt. It is difficult to subscribe to the inference that the power of expulsion according to Ridges is traceable only to the privilege of self composition. [Para 224) [442-D-E]
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12.6. It cannot be said that the source of Power of Expulsion in England was the privilege of the House of Commons to regulate its own constitution or that the source of the power is single and indivisible and cannot be traced to some other source like independent or inherent penal power. The right to enforce its privileges either by imposition of fine or by commitment to prison (both of which punishments can be awarded against the members of the House as well as outsiders) or by expulsion (possible in case of members only) is not a part of any other privilege but is by itself a separate and independent power or privilege. To enforce a privilege against a member by expelling him for breach of such privilege is not a way of expressing the power of the House of Commons to constitute itself. Though expulsion can be, and may have been, resorted to by the House of Commons with a view to preserve or change its constitution, it would not exclude or impinge upon its independent privilege to punish a member for breach of privilege or for contempt by expelling him from the House. Expulsion concerns the House itself as the punishment of expulsion cannot be inflicted on a person who is not a member of the House. As a necessary and direct consequence, the composition of the House may be affected by the expulsion of a member. That would not, however, necessarily mean that the power of expulsion is exercised only with a view, or for the
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purpose of regulating the composition of the House. One of the three ways of exercising the privilege of the Commons to constitute itself as mentioned by May (in 20th Editbn) can undoubtedly, in certain circumstances, be expressed by expelling a member of the House. But this does not mean that the existence and exercise of the privilege of expelling a member by way of punishment for misconduct or contempt of the House stands ruled out. The power of self composition of the House of Commons is materially distinct and meant for purposes other than those for which the House has the competence to resort to expulsion of its members for acts of high misdemeanour. The existence of the former power on which expulsion can be ordered by the House of Commons cannot by itself exclude or abrogate the independent power of the House to punish a member by expelling him, a punishment which cannot be inflicte~ on a non-member. [Paras 233, 234 & 235] [447-C-H, 448-A-B] 12. 7. Expulsion being regarded as "justly as an example of the privilege of the House of Commons to regulate its own Constitution" by May does not mean tilat the power to expel is sclely derived from the privilege to regulate its own Constitution or that without the privilege of providing for its own Constitution, the House could not expel a member. The latter view would be contrary to the established position that the Ho!lse has a right as part of its privilege to have complete control over its proceedings including the right to punish a member by expulsion who by his conduct interferes with the proper conduct of Parliament business. [Para 236] [447-C-DJ Anson: 'The Law and Custom of the Constitution' [Fifth edition (1922), Volume I, Chapter IV); Para 1019 ofHalsbury's Law of England; Professor F.W. Maitland: The "Constitutional History of England" (first edition 1908, reprinted 1941); Profess0t:s Wade and Phillips: "Constitutional Law" (Seventh edition); Professors .Keir and Lawson: "Cases in Constitutional Law" (fifth edition) and E.W. Ridges: "Constitutional Law" (Eighth edition, p; 65), referred to. 13.1. In the opinion of the Court in case of UP Assembly, legislatures in India do enjoy the power to punish for contempt. It is equally clear that while the fact that the House of Commons enjoyed the power to issue unspeaking warrants in its capacity of a Court of Record was one concern, what actually worried the Court was not the source of the power per se, but
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the 'judicial' nature of power to issue unspeaking warrant insofar as it was directly in conflict with the scheme of the Constitution whereby citizens were guaranteed fandamental rights and the power to enforce the fundamental right is vested in the Courts. It was not the power to punish for contempt about which the Court had reservations. Rather, the above-quoted passage shows that such power had been accepted by the Court. The issue decided concerned the non-reviewability of the warrant issued by the legislature, in the light of various constitutional provisions. There are many differences between the case of UP Assembly and the one at hand. The entire controversy in the former case revolved around the privileges of the House in relation to the fundamental rights of a citizen, an outsider to the House. The decision expressly states that the Court was not dealing with internal proceedings, nor laying down law in relation to members of the House. [Paras 266 & 267) [459-H 460-A-D)
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13.2. The ratio of case of UP Assembly, which was decided under significantly different circumstances, cannot be interpreted to have held that all the powers of the House of Commons enjoyed in its capacity as a Court of Record are unavailable to the Indian parliament, including the power to punish for contempt. [Para 268) (461-A-B) 13.3. This Court is unable to accept the contention that the power to punish for contempt is denied to the Indian legislatures as they are not Courts of Record. However, it is emphasized that the power to punish for contempt of the House of Commons is a very broad power, encompassing a variety of other powers. The case of UP Assembly examined only one aspect of that power - to issue unspeaking warrants - and held that such a power is unavailable under our constitution. What this Court presently examining in the cases at hand is another aspect of this broad contempt power - the power to expel a sitting member. While the power to punish for contempt in its totality has not been struck down by decision in UP Assembly, this Court does not intend to rule on the validity of the broad power to punish for contempt as a whole. The different elements of this broad contempt power will have to be decided on an independent scrutiny of validity in appropriate case. This Court would restrict to the power to expel a member for contempt committed by him. Having found, however, that there is no bar on reading the power to punish for contempt in Article 105(3), it is possible to source the power of expulsion through the same provision. [Para 272) [463-B-E)
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13.4. There is no contest whatsoever to the plea that the House of Commons did in fact enjoy the power of expulsion at the commencement of the Constitution. A number of instances have been quoted even by the petitioners, including those occurring around the time of the commencement of the Constitution. To mention some of them, notice may be taken of case of member named Horatio Bottomley, expelled in 1922 after he was convicted for fraudulent conversion of property; case of Gary Allighan, expelled in 1947, for gross contempt of House after publication of an article accusing members of the House of insobriety and taking fees or bribe for information; and, the case of Peter Baker, expelled in 1954 from the House after being convicted and sentenced for forgery. Although the examples of expulsion in this century by the House of Commons are few, the relevant time for our purposes is the date of the commencement of the Constitution. The last two cases occurring in 1947 and 1954 clearly establish that the power to expel was in fact a privilege of the House of Commons at the commencement of our Constitution. Thus, from this perspective, the power of expulsion can be read within Article 105(3). As already held this power is not inconsistent with other provisions of the Constitution. [Paras 273 & 274) [463-F-H, 464-A-B] Special Reference No. 1 of 1964, [1965) 1 SCR 413 (UP Assembly case; MS.M Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, [1959] Supp 1 SCR 806; MS.M Sharma v. Shree Krishna Sinha, [1961) 1 SCR 96; Yeshwant Rao v. MP Legislative Assembly AIR (1967) MP 95; Hardwari Lal v. Election Commission of India Etc. ILR (1977) P&H 269; K. Anbazhagan v. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, AIR (1988) Mad 275 and State of Karnataka v. Union of India, [1977) 4 SCC 608, referred to. Dill v. Murphy, 1864 (15) ER 784; Fielding v. Thomas, [1896) AC 600; Kei/ley v. Carson, [1842) 4 Moo. PC 63; Fenton v. Hampton (1858) 11 MOO PCC 347; Doyle v. Falconer, [1865-67) LR 1 PC 328; Barton v. Taylor, {1886) 11 App Cases 197 and Marshallv. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 541 [1917), referred to.
14. It is axiomatic to state that expulsion is always in respect of a member. At the same time, it needs to be borne in mind that a member is part of the House due to which his or her conduct always has a direct bearing upon the perception of the House. Any legislative body must act through its members and the connection between the conduct of the members and the
RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA
perception of the House is strong. It is, therefore, concluded that even if the Parliament had only the limited remedial power to punish for contempt, the power to expel would be well within the limits of such remedial contempt power. There is no reason as to why legislatures established in India by the Constitution, including the Parliament under Article 105 (3), should be denied the claim to the power of expulsion arising out of remedial power of contempt. [Paras 290 and 291] [469-H, 470-A-B]
,.
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Hartnett v. Crick, [1908] AC 470, referred to. 15. In view of the interpretation of Article 105(3) of the Constitution, it is not essential to determine the question whether 'necessity' as an independent source of power, apart from the power of the House to punish for contempt, by expulsion of a member, is available or not. [Para 293] [470-E]
r
16. The approach adopted in Australia is entirely for the Parliament to consider and examine, if so advised. In so far as this Court is concerned, since India does not have a law that codifies the privileges of the Parliament, nothing turns on the basis of the Australian legislation. [Para 297) [472-A] Odger's "Australian Senate Practice", referred to. 17. The opinion expressed by the Members of Parliament in May 1981, or for that matter in December 1978, as indeed in June 1951 merely represent their respective understanding of the law of privileges. These views are not law on the subject by the Parliament in exercise of its enabling power under the second part of Article 105(3). It cannot be said, given the case of expulsion of Mudgal in 1951 that the parliamentary practice in India is wholly against resort to the sanction of expulsion for breach of privileges under Article 105. On the question whether power of expulsion exists or not, divergent views have been expressed by members in the Parliament. These views deserve to be respected but on the question whether there exists power of expulsion is a matter of interpretation of the constitutional provisions, in particular Article 105(3) and Article 194(3) on which the final arbiter is this Court
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and not the Parliament. [Paras 313 & 314) (481-C-E] Hardwari Lal, ILR (1977) 2 P&H 269, referred to.
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Subhash C. Kashyap: 'Parliamentary Procedure' (Vol. 2, p.1657) and 'Practice and Procedure of Parliament' by Kaul and Shakder (5th Edn.) page 262, referred to. 18. The observation of this court in the case of UP Assembly, paraphrasing the position of law and practice in England on the authority of May's Parliamentary Practice, refers to enforcement by the legislature of privileges which had been recognized by the courts. The observation has no relevance on the question under consideration in these matters since the law in England of exclusive cognizance has no applicability in India which is governed and bound by the Constitution oflndia. (Para 330) [486-E-F)
MS.M Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, (1959) Supp (1) SCR 806; Indira Nehru Gandhiv. Raj Narain, [1975) Supp SCC 1 and P. V. Narasimha Rao v. State, (CBl/SPE) [1998) 4 SCC 626, referred to.
Earl of Shaftesbury (86 E.R. 792); Ashby v. White, [1703-04] 92 E.R. 129; R. v. Paty, (1704) 92 E.R. 232; Case of Murray (95 E.R. 629); Case of Brass Crosby (95 E.R. 1005); Case of Sir Francis Burdett (104 E.R. 501); Cases of Stockdale (1836-37), Howard v. Sir William Gosset (116 E.R. 139) and Bradlaugh v. Gossett, (1884) L.R. 12 Q.B.D. 271, referred
to.
19. What this Court_ "deliberately omitted" to do in the case of UP Assembly was consideration of the powers, privileges and immunities other ·..,than the contempt jurisdiction of the Legislature. The views expressed as to the applicability of Article 20 and Article 21 in the context of manner of exercise of the powers and privileges of the Legislative Assembly are of general import and cannot be wished away. They would hold good not merely against a non-member as was the case in that Reference but even against a member of the Legislature who also is a citizen of this country and entitled to the protection of the same fundamental rights, especially when the impugned action entails civil consequences. [Para 349] [495-C-F]
Special Reference No. I of 1964, [1965] 1 SCR 413 (UP Assembly case) and MS.M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, (1959) Supp 1 SCR 806, referred to.
New Brunswick Broadcasting Corporation v. Nova Scotia Speaker,
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RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON~BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA
[1993) 1 SCR 391; Harvey v. New Brunswick, [1996) 2 SCR 876 and House of Commons v. Vaid, (2005) 1 SCR 667, referred to. 20. In the light of law laid down in the two cases of Pandit Sharma and in the case of UP Assembly, it is held that the broad contention on behalf of the Union oflndia that the exercise of Parliamentary privileges cannot be decided against the touchstone offundamental rights or the constitutional provisions is not correct. In the case of Pandit Sharma the manner of exercise of the privilege claimed by the Bihar Legislative Assembly was tested against the "procedure established by law" and thus on the touchstone of Article 21. It is a different matter that the requirements of Article 21, as at the time understood in its restrictive meaning, were found satisfied. The point to be noted here is that Article 21 was found applicable and the procedure of the legislature was tested on its anvil. This view was followed in the case of UP Assembly which added the enforceability of Article 20 to the fray. [Para 350) (495-F-H]
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Special Reference No. I of 1964, )1965) 1 SCR 413 (UP Assembly case); MS.M Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, [1959) Supp 1 SCR 806 and MS.M Sharma v. Shree Krishna Sinha, (1961) 1 SCR 96, referred to. 21.1. The enforceability of Article 21 in relation to the manner of exercise of Parliamentary privilege, as affirmed in the cases of Pandit Sharma and UP Assembly has to be understood ~n light of the expanded scope of the said fundamental right. [Para 352] [4 97-H, 498-A]
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21.2. It is to be remembered that the plenitude of powers possessed by the Parliament under the written Constitution is subject to legislative competence and restrictions of fundamental rights and that iri case a member's personal liberty was threatened by imprisonment of committal in execution of Parliamentary privilege, Article 21 would be attracted. [Para 353) [498-B] 21.3. Ifit were so, it is difficult to fathom any reason why the general proposition that fundamental rights cannot be invoked in matters concerning Parliamentary privileges should be accepted. Further, there is no reason why the member, or indeed a non-member, should not be entitled to the protection of Article 21, or for that matter Article 20, in case the exercise of Parliamentary privilege contemplates a sanction other than that of
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committal. [Para 354] [498-C] Special Reference No. I of 1964, [1965] 1 SCR 413 (UP Assembly case); MS.M Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, [1959] Supp 1 SCR 806; MS.M Sharma v. Shree Krishna Sinha, [1961] 1 SCR 96; A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, [19501 SCR 88; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 1 SCC 248 and Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P., {1997) 5 sec 201, referred to. 22. Notwithstanding the existence of finality clauses, this court exercised its jurisdiction of judicial review whenever and wherever breach offundamental rights was alleged. President oflndia while determining the question of age of a Judge of a High Court under Article 217 (3), or the President oflndia (or the Governor, as the case may be) while taking a decision under Article 311 (3) to dispense with the ordinarily mandatory inquiry before dismissal or removal of a civil servant, or for that matter the Speaker (or the Chairman, as the case may be) deciding the question of disqualification under Para 6 of the Tenth Schedule may be acting as authorities entrusted with such jurisdiction under the constitutional provisions. Yet, the manner in which they exercised the said jurisdiction is not wholly beyond the judicial scrutiny. In the case of Speaker exercising jurisdiction under the Tenth Schedule, the proceedings before him are declared by Para 6 (2) of the Tenth Schedule to be proceedings in Parliament within the meaning of Article 122. Yet, the said jurisdiction was not accepted as non-justiciable. In this view, it is not possible to subscribe to the proposition that there is absolute immunity available to the Parliamentary proceedings relating to Article 105(3). It is a different matter as to what parameters, if any, should regulate or control the judicial scrutiny of such proceedings. [Para 374) [510-B-D)
Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India, [1991] 4 SCC 699; Union of India v. Jyoti Prakash Mitter, [1971) 1 SCC 396; Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, [1985] 3 SCC 398; Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, [1992] Supp 2 SCC 651 and Express Newspaper (P) Ltd v. Union of India, AIR (1958) SC 578, referred to. Australian Boot Trade Employees Federation v. Whybrow & Co., (1910) 10 CLR 266, referred to.
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RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA
23. The question before the court in the case of Indira Nehru Gandhi essentially pertained to the lawfulness of the session of Parliament that had passed the constitutional amendment measure. The concern of the court did not involve the legality of the act of the legislative body. As regards the views based on the holding in the case of Pandit Sharma, it has already been observed that it was rather premature for the court to consider as to whether any illegality vitiated the process of the legislative assembly. [Para 381) [513-C] Tej Kiran Jain v. N. Sanjiva Reddy, (1970) 2 SCC 272 and Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, [1975] Suppl. SCC 1, referred to.
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24. Article 122(1) must be found to contemplate the twin test oflegality and constitutionality for any proceedings within the four walls of Parliament The fact that the case of UP Assembly dealt with the exercise of the power of the House beyond its four-walls does not affect this view which explicitly interpreted a constitutional provision dealing specifically with the extent of judicial review of the internal proceedings of the legislative body. In this view, Article 122(1) displaces the English doctrine of exclusive cognizance of internal proceedings of the House rendering irrelevant the case law that emanated from courts in that jurisdiction. Any attempt to read a limitation into Article 122 so as to restrict the court's jurisdiction to examination of the Parliament's procedure in case of unconstitutionality, as opposed to illegality would amount to doing violence to the constitutional text. Applying the principle of" expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (whatever has not been included has by implication been excluded), it is plain and clear that prohibition against examination on the touchstone of "irregularity of procedure" does not make taboo judicial review on findings of illegality or unconstitutionality. (Para 384) [514-C-F)
Smt. S. Ramaswami v. Union of India, (1992) Suppl. 1 SCR 108, referred to.
25. It is always expected, rather it should be a matter of presumption, that Parliament would always perform its functions and exercise its powers in a reasonable manner. But, at the same time there is no scope for a general rule that the exercise of powers by the legislature is not amenable to judicial review. This is neither the letter nor the spirit of our Constitution. This Court finds no reason not to accept that the scope
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for judicial review in matters concerning Parliamentary proceedings is limited and restricted. In fact this has been done by express prescription in the constitutional provisions, including the one contained in Article 122(1). But the scrutiny cannot stop, merely on the privilege being found, especially when breach of other constitutional provisions has been alleged. [Para 387) [515-F-H] 26. Non-existence of standards of judicial review is no reason to conclude that judicial scrutiny is ousted. If standards for judicial review of such matters as at hand are not yet determined, it is time to do so now. Parliament indeed is a coordinate organ and its views do deserve deference even while its acts are amenable to judicial scrutiny. While its acts, particularly of the nature involved here ought not to be tested in the same manner as an ordinary administrative action would be tested, there is no foundation to the plea that a Legislative body cannot be attributed jurisdictional error. [Para 389) [516-C-D] 27. While it is agreed that contempt of authority of Parliament can be tried and punished nowhere except before it, the judicial review of the manner of exercise of power of contempt or privilege does not mean the said jurisdiction is being usurped by the judicature. As has been noticed, in the context of Article 122(1), mere irregularity of the procedure cannot be a ground of challenge to the proceedings in Parliament or effect thereof, and while same view can be adopted as to the element of "irrationality", but in our constitutional scheme, illegality or unconstitutionality will not sa':e the Parliamentary proceedings. [Para 391) (516-G-H, 517-A] 28. It is the submission on behalf of the Union of India that the proceedings in question were proceedings which were entitled to protection under Article 105(2). In other words, in respect of proceedings, if a member is offered immunity, Parliament too is offered immunity. The actions of Parliament, except when they are translated into law, cannot be questioned in court. It is found the argument to be founded on reading of Article 105(2) beyond its context. What is declared by the said clause as immune from liability "to any proceedings in any court" is not any or every act of the Legislative body or members thereof, but only matters "in respect of anything said or any vote given" by the members "in Parliament or any Committee thereof'. If Article 105(2) were to be construed so broadly, it would tend to save even the legislative Acts from judicial gaze, which would militate against
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the constitutional provisions. (Paras 392 and 393) (517-B-D]
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29. The manner of exercise of the power or privilege by Parliament is immune from judicial scrutiny only to the extent indicated in Article 122(1), that is to say the Court will decline to interfere if the grievance brought before it is restricted to allegations of "irregularity of procedure". But in case gross illegality or violation of constitutional provisions is shown, the judicial review will not be inhibited in any manner by Article 122, or for that matter by Article 105. If one was to accept what was alleged while rescinding the resolution of expulsion by the 7th Lok Sabha with conclusion that it was "inconsistent with and violative of the well-accepted principles of the law of Parliamentary privilege and the basic safeguards assured to all enshrined in the Constitution", it would be partisan action in the name of exercise of privilege. This issue is not gone into but incident is cited as an illustration. (Para 396] (518-A-C) 30. While rejecting the reliance on certain cases cited in support of the plea of exclusive cognizance vesting in the Legislature, and restriction of judicial review to the extent offinding the privilege, support is found to the case set up by the petilioners from constitutional provisions and debates thereupon which show that it is the duty of the Court to inquire into the legitimacy of the exercise of the power. [Para 410] (523-A-B)
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Special Reference No. I of 1964, [1965] l SCR 413 (UP Assembly case) MS.M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, (1959] Supp l SCR 806; M.S.M. Sharma v. Shree Krishna Sinha, (1961] l SCR 96 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1982) 3 SCC 24; Jatish Chandra Ghosh v. Hari Sadhan Mukherjee, [1961] 3 SCR 486; K. Nagaraj v. State ofA.P., (1985] l SCC 523 and T. Ven/r.ata Reddy v. State of A.P., (19851 3 SCC 198, referred to.
Harvey v. New Brunswick, [1996) 2 SCR 876, referred to.
31. In tlt'e Rajasthan case while dealing with the issues arising out of communication by the then Union Home Minister to the nine States asking them to advise their respective Governors to observe the legislative assemblies and seek fresh mandate from the people, this court observed that:
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"This Court has never abandoned its constitutional function as the final Judge of constitutionality of all acts purported to be done under the authority of the Constitution. ... "
The said resolve is reaffirmed and there is no reason why in the facts and circumstances at hand this court should take a different view so as to abandon its constitutional functions as the final judge of constitutionality of all acts purported to be done under the authority of the Constitution, though at the same time refraining from transgressing into the sphere that is properly the domain of the Parliament. (Paras 412 & 413] (523-D-E, 524-C] State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (1977] 3 SCC 592, referred to.
32. While it is true that there is no challenge to the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha and Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Council of States, as made by the two Houses of Parliament in exercise of enabling powers under Article 118 (1), that mere availability of Rules is never a guarantee that they have been duly followed. [Para 415] (524-F] 33. A controversy similar to the one in the case of S.R Bommai arose before this Court in Rameshwar Prasad. The questions raised once again concerned the validity of the subjective satisfaction of the President under Article 356 for issue of proclamation. Following the spirit of the judgment of S.R. Bommai, with due deference to the exceptional character of the power exercised by the President under Article 356 which cannot be treated on a par with an administrative action and so the validity whereof cannot be examined by applying the grounds available for challenge of an administrative action, this Court held that the power is not absolute but subject to checks & balances and judicial review. (Para 429] (530-C-D] Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, AIR (1967) SC 295; Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S.D. Agarwal, (1969] l SCC 325; S.R Bommai v. Union ofIndia, (1994] 3SCC1 and Rameshwar Prasadv. Union ofIndia, [2006] 2 sec 1, referred to.
34. The Legislature cannot ordinarily be accused of having acted for an extraneous purpose or being actuated by caprice or malafide intention. The Court would not lightly presume abuse or misuse of authority by such
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august bodies also because allowance is always to be given to the fact that the legislature is the best Judge in such matters. [Para 4341 [534-B-C)
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35.1. Conclusions cannot be drawn so as to attribute motive to the Houses of Parliament by reading statements out of the context. The relevant part of the speech of the Hon 'ble Speaker made on the floor of the House on 12th December 2005 has been extracted in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India. It is pertinent to note that before stating that nobody would be spared, the Speaker had exhorted the members of the House to rise to the occasion and to see to it that such an event does not occur ever in future and commended that "if anybody is guilty, he should be punished". It is clear that when he stated that nobody would be spared he was not immediately passing a judgment that the petitioners were guilty. He was only giving vent to his feeling on the subject of the proper course of action in the event of inquiry confirming the facts that had been projected in the telecast. The finding of guilt would come later. The fact that he had constituted an Inquiry Committee with members drawn also from parties in opposition rather goes to show that the resolve at that stage was to find the truth. (Para 435) (534-D-F]
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35.2. In these circumstances, one is unable to accept the allegation of malafide on the ground that decision had already been taken to expel them. Even otherwise, it cannot be ignored that the dissent within the respective Committees of the two Houses ~ssentially pertained to the procedure adopted. Nothing less and nothing more. Further, the reports of the Committees having been adopted by the respective chambers of Parliament, the decision of the Committee got merged into that of the Legislative chamber which being collective body, it is difficult to attribute motive thereto, in particular, in the face of the fact that the resolutions in question were virtually unanimous as there was no demand at any stage from any quarter for division of votes. [Para 436] [534-G-H, 535-A] 36. This Court is not concerned here with what kind of gains, financial or otherwise, those persons made as had conceived or engineered the sting operations leading to the material being brought into public domain through electronic media. This was not an area of anxiety even for the Houses of Parliament when they set about probing the matter resulting
ultimately in expulsions. The sole question that was required to be addressed by the Inquiry Committees and the Legislative chambers revolved
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around the issue of misconduct attributed to the individual members bringing the House in disrepute. (Para 438] [535-C-E]
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37. This Court already found that the purposes of the procedure prescribed in both the said provisions of the Constitution are entirely different. While Article 103 relates to disqualifications prescribed in Article 102, the tenth schedule pertains to the disqualification on account of defection. These provisions have no nexus whatsoever with the exercise of power of expulsion claimed as a privilege available to the Houses of Parliament under Article 105(3). [Para 4401 [535-G-H) 38. The matters pertaining to the two Members ofRajya Sabha were referred to the Committee on Ethics which is also a mechanism provided by the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the said House. While it is correct that the matters pertaining to the Members of Lok Sabha were referred to a Committee specially constituted for the purpose but nothing turns on that fact. It may be observed that under circumstances in question the composition of the Committee itself is sufficient to show that it was not a partisan Committee. The terms ofreference for the Committee required it to make investigation into the allegations. The conclusions reached by the Inquiry Committee and recommendations made have been accepted by passing of resolutions by the two Houses that have adopted the reports of the respective Committees. [Paras 442 & 443] [536-D-F] 39. Article 118 empowers each House of Parliament to make rules for regulating its procedure. The rules of the procedure of both Houses permit constitution of Committees. There is no illegality attached to constitution of a Special Committee by the Speaker, Lok Sabha for purposes of investigation into the allegations against members of the said House. [Para 444] [536-F-G] 40. One cannot draw inferences from the amount of time taken by the Committees that inquired the matters as no specific time is or can be prescribed. Further such matters are required to be dealt with utmost expedition subject to grant of reasonable opportunity, which was granted to the petitioners. The request for supply offull-footage of video recordings and audio tapes or extension of time or representation through counsel for such purposes did not find favour with the Inquiry Committee mainly because the Committee had offered to the concerned Members of Lok Sabha an opportunity
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RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA
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to view the relevant video-footage that was available with the Committee and point out the discrepancies therein. But the petitioners themselves chose to turn down the said offer. [Para 446 & 447) [537-E-G] Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors., [WP (C) No. 287 of 2004 decided by S.C. on 11.12.2006), referred to.
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41.1. The Inquiry Committee in the face of the refusal on the part of the concerned members was fully justified in not giving any credence to the objections that the video-clippings were doctored or morphed. The Committee in these circumstances could not be expected but to proceed to draw conclusions on the basis of the available material. [Para 448] [538-A) 41.2. The reports of the Inquiry Committee of Lok Sabha and the Committee on Ethics of Rajya Sabha indicate that both of the said Committees had called for explanations from each of the Members in question and had given due consideration to the same. The submissions of the counsel for Union of India that the proceedings of the respective Committees were open to one and all, including these petitioners who· actually participated in the proceedings could not be refuted. Therefore, it is not permissible to the petitioners to contend that evidence had been taken behind their back. The reports further show that the Committees had taken care not to proceed on the edited versions of the video recordings. Each of them insisted and procured the raw video-footage of the different sting operations and drew conclusions after viewing the same. The evidence contained in the video recordings indicating demand or acceptance of money was further corroborated in two cases by the admissions made by the two Members ofRajya Sabha. Dr. Chhattrapal Singh Lodha had sought to attribute the receipt of money to a different transaction connected with some organization he was heading. But this explanation was not believed by the Committee on Ethics that unanimously found his complicity in unethical behavior on account of acceptance of money for tabling questions in Rajya Sabha. Dr. Swami Sakshiji Maharaj, on the other hand, went to the extent of expressing his regrets and displaying a feeling of shame for his conduct even before the Committee on Ethics. [Para 449) [538-B-F] 42. The impugned resolutions of Lok Sabha and Raj ya Sabha cannot be questioned before this Court on the plea of proportionality. This Court is not sitting in appeal over the decision of the Legislative chambers with
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regard to the extent of punishment that deserved to be meted out in cases of this nature. That is a matter which must be left to the prerogative and sole discretion of the legislative body. All the more so because it is the latter which is the best Judge in exercise of its jurisdiction the object of which is self-protection. So long as the orders of expulsion are not illegal or unconstitutional, this Court not concerned with the consequences for the petitioners on account of these expulsions. [Para 451] [538-H, 539-A-B] 43. In these proceedings, this Court cannot allow the truthfulness or correctness of the material to be questioned or permit the petitioners to go into the adequacy of the material or substitute its own opinion for that of the Legislature. Assuming some material on which the action is taken is found to be irrelevant, this Court shall not interfere so long as there is some relevant material sustaining the action. It is found this material was available in the form of raw footage of video recordings, the nature of contents whereof are reflected in the Inquiry reports and on which subject the petitioners have not raised any issue of fact. [Para 452] [539-C-D] 44. On perusal of the Inquiry reports, it is found that there is no violation of any of the fundamental rights in general and Articles 14, 20 or 21 in particular. Proper opportunity to explain and defend having been given to each of the petitioners, the procedure adopted by the two Houses of Parliament cannot be held to be suffering from any illegality, irrationality, unconstitutionality, violation of rules of natural justice or perversity. It cannot be held that the petitioners were not given a fair deal. [Para 453] [539-E] C.K. THAKKER, J: (Supplementing) : 1.1. Though all the three expressions, viz. powers, privileges and immunities are invariably used in almost all Constitutions of the world, they are different in their meanings and also in contents. [Para 8] [541-B]
1.2. 'Power' means 'the ability to do something or to act in a particular way'. It is a right conferred upon a person by the law to alter, by his own will directed to that end; the rights, duties, liabilities or other legal relations either of himself or of other persons. It is a comprehensive word which includes procedural and substantive rights which can be exercised by a person or an authority. [Para 9) [541-B-C]
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RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABR \ ~~
1.3. 'Privilege' is a special right, advantage or benefit conferred on A a particular person. It is a peculiar advantage or favour granted to one person as against another to do certain acts. Inherent in the term is the ,. · idea of something, apart and distinct from a common right which is enjoyed by all persons and connotes some sort of special grant by the sovereign. (Para 10) (541-D] 1.4. 'Immunity' is an exemption or freedom from general obligation, duty, burden or penalty. Exemption from appearance before a court oflaw or other authority, freedom from prosecution, protection from punishment, etc. are immunities granted to certain persons or office bearers. [Para 11) [541-E]
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1.5. Elected representatives, however, are not placed above the law by way of parliamentary privileges; they are simply granted certain advantages and basic exemptions from legal process in order that the House may function independently, efficiently and fearlessly. This is in the interest of the nation as a whole. (Para 17) [543-E)
Powers, Privileges and Immunities of State Legislatures, Article 143, Constitution ofIndia, Re, (1965) 1SCR413: AIR (1965) SC 745, referred to.
Sir Erskin May: Treatise on The Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament (23rd Edn.) p. 75; Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th Edn.; Reissue, Vol. 34; p. 553; para 1002) and Parliamentary Privilege, First Report (Lord Nicholas Report), referred to.
2. In the United States, the House possesses the power of observance of discipline by its members and in appropriate cases, such power extends to expulsion. It is also clear that such power has been actually exercised for disorderly behavior in the House as also outside the House, where the House was satisfied that the member was 'unfit' physically, mentally or morally even if such conduct could not be a 'statutable offence' or was not committed by him in his official capacity or during House in Session or at the seat of Government. [Para 32) [548-B-C)
Chapman, Re, 166 US 661 (1891) : 41 L Ed 2nd 1154; Julian Bond v. James Sloppy Floyd, 385 US 116 (1966): 17 L Ed 2nd 235; Powell v.. McCormack, 395 US 486 (1969): 23 L Ed 2nd 491; H Snowden Marshall
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v. Robert B. Gordon, 243 US 521 (1917); Kie/ley v. Carson, (1842) 4 MOO PC 63 : 13 ER 225 and United States v. Daniel Brewster, 408 US 501 : (1972) 33 L Ed 2nd 507, referred to. Cooley: Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations', (1972 Edn., p. 133); Willoughby: Constitutional Law of the United States (Second Edn.; p. 256); Pritchett: American Constitution (Third Edn., p. 146); American Jurisprudence (Second Edn., Vol. 77, p. 21) and Enid Campbell: Parliamentary Privilege in Australia dealing with 'Expulsion', referred to.
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3. In Australia, only recently, the power to expel a member from the House has been taken away by a specific statute. (Para 40] (550-C) Enid Campbell: Parliamentary Privilege in Australia dealing with 'Expulsion'; Odger: Australian Senate Practice, (11th Edn.; p. 57) and Lumb and Ryan: The Constitution ofthe Commonwealth ofAustralia, 1974 Edn., referred to. 4. Unlike India, in Canada, the Legislature could not enlarge its privileges by enacting a law investing in it the privileges enjoyed by British Parliament. There is no such limitation under Section 49 of the Australian Constitution nor under Article 105(3) or Article 194(3) of the Indian Constitution. Inspite of the above provision in the Constitution, the right of the House to expel a member has never been challenged. [Paras 42 & 43] (550-G-H, 551-A] Speaker of the House of-Jissembly v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, (1993] 1 SCR 319;:~$tockdale v. Hansard, [1839] 9 Ad & E 1 : 112 ER 1112 (QB); Kie/fey'~': c;~son, (1842], 4 MOO PC 63 : 13 ER 225; Fred Harvey v. Attorney General for New Brunswick, [1996] 2 SCR 876 and House of Commons v. Satnam Vaid, (2005) 1 SCR 667, referred
to.
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Sir John George Bourinot: Parliamentary Procedure and Practice in the Dominion of Canada, (4th Edn., p. 64), referred to.
5.1. In its creative sense; in England the House did not sit down to build its edifice of the powers, privileges and immunities of Parliament The evolution of English Parliamentary institution has thus historical
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development. It is the story of conflict between Crown's absolute prerogatives and Commons' insistence for powers, privileges and immunities; struggle between high handed actions of Monarchs and People's claim of democratic means and methods. Parliamentary privileges are the rights which Houses of Parliament and members possess so as to enable them to carry out their functions effectively and efficiently. Some of the parliamentary privileges thus preceded Parliament itself. They are, therefore, rightly described by Sir Erskine May as Jundamental rights' of the House as against the prerogatives of the Crown, the authority of ordinary Courts of Law and the special rights of the House of Lords. [Para 62] [557-C-E] 5.2. Initially, the House simply claimed privilege. They neither made request to the Crown for their recognition nor to Courts for their enforcement. Parliamentary privileges in that sense are outside the law, or a law unto themselves. For instance, the House would not go to Crown or to Court for release of its member illegally detained. It would also not pray for a writ of habeas corpus. It would simply command the Sergeant-atArms with the ceremonial mace to the prison and get the Member release~ on its own authority. [Para 63) [557-E-F] Ann Lyon : 'Constitutional history of the United Kingdom, [2003) p. 39; Holdsworth: A History ofEnglis_l;z Law, Second Edition, pp. 92-93 and Halsbury's Laws ofEngland, (Fourth Edn.; Reissue: Vol. 34; p. 569; para 1026, referred to. 6. The two things, namely, (i) expulsion; and (ii) disqualification are different and distinct. A member can be expelled by the Legislature if his conduct renders him 'unfit' to continue as such. It, however, does not ipso facto disqualify him for re-election. An expelled member may be re-elected and no objection can be raised against his re-election, as was the case of John Wilkes in 1769. [Para 68) [558-H, 559-A]
0. Hood Phillips: 'Constitutional and Administrative Law', 4th Edition; p. 180; Wade and Phillips: 'Constitutional Law', 7th Edition; p.793; Sir William Anson: "The Law and Custom ofthe Constitution", Fifth Edn; Vol. I; pp. 187-88; Griffith and Ryle: "Parliament, functions, practice and procedures", (1989), at p. 85 and Sir Erskine May: 'Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament', referred to.
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7. Keilley has no application inasmuch as it was decided in the light of factual, political and legal background which was totally different. For more than one reason, the ratio in Keilley cannot be pressed in service in the case on hand. Firstly, India, after 1950, cannot be termed as a 'colonial country' nor its Legislature Colonial or subordinate. Secondly, it was not to derive powers, privileges or prerogatives from the Crown either expressly or impliedly. Thirdly, after January 26, 1950, it is the written Constitution which has conferred powers, privileges and immunities on Parliament/ Legislatures and on their members. Fourthly, provisions of the Constitution themselves expressly conferred certain powers, privileges and immunities [Arts.105(1), (2); 194 (1), (2)]. It also allowed Parliament to define them by making an appropriate law and declared that until such law is enacted, they would be such as exercised by British Parliament on January 26, 1950 [Arts. 105(3), 194(3)]. Fifthly, the crucial question is not the fact that the Assembly of Newsouthland had no right to commit a person for contempt but whether or not the British Parliament possessed such power on January 26, 1950. Sixthly, Keilley was not a member of Assembly and as such the ruling in that case has no direct bearing on the issue raised before this Court. Finally, Keilley was a case of committal of a person to jail and keeping in view the fact situation, the Privy Council decided the matter which is absent here. For all these reasons, reliance on Keilley is of no assistance to the petitioners. [Para 109] [569-H, 570-A-D]
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Bradlough v. Gossett, [1884] 12 QBD 275; Stockdale v. Hansard, (1839) 9 Ad & E 1 : 112 ER 1112 (QB); Edward Keilley v. William Carson, (1842) : 4 MOO PC 63 : 13 ER 225 and Beaumont v. Barrett, (1836) 1 MOO PC 80, referred to.
8. An interesting point of law, which has been raised before this Court was also raised before the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Armstrong v. Budd, [1969] 71SR386 (NSW). Section 19 of the Constitution Act, 1902 laid down that in certain circumstances, a seat in the Legislative Council would automatically fall vacant. A was a member of Legislative Council against whom a suit was filed. During the course of litigation, he gave evidence. The evidence was disbelieved by the Court and in the judgment, certain strictures were passed by the trial Judge. The Legislative Council, on the basis of comments and adverse observations, passed a resolution and expelled A from the Council and declared his seat vacant. A sought a declaration that the resolution was ultra vires. It was contended by A that
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since his case was not covered by any of the eventualities enumerated in Section 19, he could not be disqualified. The Court, however, negatived the contention. [Paras 114 & 115) [571-H, 572-A-C) Thomas William Doyle v. George Charles Falconer, [1866) LR 1 PC 328; Barton v. Taylor, (1886] ll AC 197 and Armstrong v. Budd, [1969) 71 SR 386 (NSW), referred to.
Broom's Legal Maxims, 10th Edn; p. 314, referred to.
9.1. It is no doubt true that the existing law relating to parliamentary privileges iP India is essentially of English origin. But the concept of parliamentary privileges was not unknown to ancient India. Prititosh Roy in his work 'Parliamentary Privilege in India' (1991) states that even during Vedic times, there were two assemblies; Sabha and Samiti which were keeping check on all actions of the King. Reference of Sabha and Samiti is found in all Vedas. In Buddhist India, there was a developed parliamentary system. Members were not allowed to disobey directions of Assemblies. Offenders were answerable to Assemblies and after affording an opportunity to them, appropriate actions used to be taken against erring officers. It has thus 'rudimentary features' of parliamentary privilege of today. [Para 119) (583-C-E) 9.2. During 1915-50, there was remarkable growth and development of Parliamentary privileges in India. For the first time, a limited right of freedom of speech was conferred on the Members of Legislature by the Government oflndia Act, 1919 (Section 67). By the Legislative Members Exemption Act, 1925, two parliamentary privileges were allowed to Members; (i) exemption from jury service; and (ii) freedom from arrest. The Government of India Act, 1935 extended the privileges conferred and immunities granted. The Indian Independence Act, 1947 accorded sovereign legislative power on the Indian Dominion. [Paras 121 and 122) l583-G-H, 584-A]
10. There are certain instances wherein Indian Parliament has exercised the power of expulsion of its members. (Para 126) [587-G] Kaul and Shakhder: 'Practice and Procedure of Parliament', (5th Edn., p. 262), rl!ferred to.
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11. The right to expel a member is distinct, separate and independent of right to provide for the due constitution or composition of the House and even in absence of such power or prerogative., right of expulsion is possessed by a Legislature (even a Colonial Legislature), which in appropriate cases can be exercised. [Para 165) [602-F-G) MS.M Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha & Ors., [1959) Supp 1 SCR 806 : AIR (1959) SC 395; Re: Powers, Privileges and Immunities of State Legislatures, Article 143 of the Constitution, (1965] 1 SCR 413 : AIR (1965) SC 745; Raj Narain v. Atmaram Govind & Anr., AIR (1954) All 319; Yeshwant Rao Meghawale v. Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly & Ors., AIR (1967) MP 95; Hardwari Lal v. Election Commission ofIndia, ILR (1977) 2 P & H 269 (FB) and K. Anbazhagan & Ors. v. Secretary, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, Madras & Ors., AIR (1988) Mad 275, referred to.
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12. When draft Article 85 (Present Article 105) was considered, different view-points were before the House. It was also aware of various Constitutions, particularly, Constitutions of Canada and Australia. The Members expressed their views, made suggestions and sought amendments and finally, the draft Article 85 was approved as amended. [Para 169) [605-C-D] 13.1. Likewise, when draft Article 169 (Present Article 194) came up before the House on June 3, 1949, again, the matter was discussed at length. [Para 170) [605-E]
13.2. The Constitution Assembly debates clearly and unequivocally indicates that the Members of the Constitution wanted Parliament (and State Legislatures) to retain power and privileges to take appropriate action against any individual member for 'anything that has been done by him' which may bring Parliament or Legislative Assembly into 'disgrace'. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Founding Fathers of the Constitution were not aware or never intended to deal with individual misdeeds of members and no action can be taken by the Legislature under Article 105 or 194 of the Constitution. [Para 173) 607-H, 608-A) 14. We have a written Constitution which confers power of judicial review on this Court and on all High Courts. In exercising power and
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discharging duty assigned by the Constitution, this Court has to play the role of a 'sentinel on the qui vive' and it is the solemn duty of this Court to protect the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution zealously and vigilantly. [Para 182] [611-E-F] Ashby v. White, (1704) 14 St Tr 695; Stockdale v. Hansard, [1839] 9 Ad & E 1 : 112 ER 1112 and Bradlaugh v. Gossett, [1884] 12 QBD 271: 53 LJQB 200, referred to. Anson: 'The Law and Custom ofthe Constitution', 5th Edn.; Vol. I; pp. 190-99; Halsbury's Laws ofEngland, (4th Edn., Reissue, Vol. 34; pp. 55354; paras 1004-05 and Holdsworth: 'A History ofEnglish Law' (Vol. I; pp. 393-94), referred to. 15. This Court cannot be oblivious or unmindful of the fact that the Legislature is one of three organs of the State and is exercising powers under the same Constitution under which this Court is exercising the power of judicial review. It is, therefore, the duty of this Court to ensure that there is no abuse or misuse of power by the Legislature without overlooking another equally important consideration that the Court is not a superior organ or an appellate forum over the other constitutional functionary. This Court, therefore, should exercise its power of judicial review with utmost care, caution and circumspection. [Para 184] (612-B-C]
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16. In Searchlight as well as in Keshav Singh, it has been observed that there is no doubt that Parliament/State Legislature has power to punish for contempt, which has been reiterated in other cases also. But what has been held is that such decision of Parliament/State Legislature is not 'final and conclusive'. This Court in all earlier cases held that in view of power of judicial review under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court and High Courts have jurisdiction to decide legality or otherwise of the action taken by State-authorities and that power cannot be taken away from judiciary. There lies the distinction between British Parliament and Indian Parliament. Since British Parliament is also 'the High Court of Parliament', the action taken or decision rendered by it is
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not open to challenge in any court of law. This is based on the doctrine that there cannot be two parallel courts, i.e. Crown's Court and also a Court of Parliament ('the High Court of Parliament') exercising judicial power in respect of one and the same jurisdiction. India is a democratic and republican State having a written Constitution which is supreme and no organ of the State (Legislature, Executive or Judiciary) can claim sovereignty or supremacy over the other. Under the said Constitution, power of judicial review has been conferred on higher judiciary (Supreme Court and High Courts). The said power is held to be one of the 'basic features' of the Constitution and, as such, it cannot be taken away by Parliament, even by an amendment in the Constitution. [Para 187] [612-G-H, 613-A-D]
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MS.M Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha & Ors., [1959) Supp 1 SCR 806 : AIR (1959) SC 395; Re: Powers, Privileges and Immunities of State Legislatures, Article 143 of the Constitution, (1965) 1 SCR 413 : AIR (1965) SC 745; State of Karnataka v. Union of India, [1977] 4 SCC 608; P. V. Narasimha Rao v. State, [1998) 4 SCC 626; Sambamurthy v. State of A.P., [1987] 1 SCC 362 : AIR (1987) SC 663; Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kera/a, (1973] 4 SCC 225 : AIR (1973) SC 1461; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1975) Supp SCC 1 : AIR (1975) SC 2299; Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, [1980) 3 SCC 625 : AIR (1980) SC 1789; L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, [1987) 1 SCC 124 : (1987) 1 SCC 124 : [1987) 1 SCR 435 and Kihoto Hollohon v. Zachilhu, [1992) Supp 2 SCC 651 : AIR (1993) SC 412, referred to.
17. It has been held in several cases that an action of Parliament/State Legislature cannot claim 'total immunity' from judicial review. In fact, this argument had been put forward in Keshav Singh which was negatived by this Court. It was opined that an aggrieved party may invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 or of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. That, however, does not mean that while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under the Constitution, the powers of the courts are absolute, unlimited or unfettered. The Constitution which conferred power of judicial review on the Supreme Court and High Courts, with the same pen and ink provided that the validity of proceedings in Parliament cannot be called in question on the ground of 'irregularity in procedure'. It is, therefore, the duty of this Court to give effect to the said provision and keeping in view the limitation, exercise the power of judicial review. [Para 188) [613-F-H, 614-A)
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Re: Powers, Privileges and Immunities of State Legislatures, Article 143 of the Constitution, (1965] 1 SCR 413 : AIR (1965) SC 745, referred to.
...
18. In the instant cases, the Court is called upon to answer a limited question whether Parliament can expel a member. Even a Colonial Legislature having limited privileges possesses the power to expel a member if his conduct is found to be not befitting a member of Legislature. If it is so, it goes without saying that Indian Parliament, which has undoubtedly much more powers than a Colonial Legislature, can take such action and it cannot be successfully contended that Parliament does not possess the power to expel a member. (Para 189] (614-B-C] 19. Every legislative body-Colonial or Supreme--possesses power to regulate its proceedings, power of self-protection, self-preservation and maintenance of discipline. It is totally different and distinct from the power to provide the constitution or composition which undoubtedly not possessed by Indian Parliament But every legislative body has power to regulate its proceedings and observance of discipline by its members. In exercise of that power, it can suspend a member as also expel him, if the circumstances warrant or call for such action. It has nothing to do with disqualification and/or vacation of seat. In fact, a question of expulsion arises when a member is not disqualified, his seat has not become vacant and but for such expulsion, he is entitled to act as a member of Parliament. [Para 191] (614-F-H] 20. Parliament, like the other organs of the State, is subject to the provisions of the Constitution and is expected, nay, bound to exercise its powers in consonance with the provisions of the Constitution. But it cannot be held that the power to expel a member is a carte blanche in nature and Parliament has no authority to expel any member. Parliament can take appropriate action against erring members by imposing appropriate punishments or penalties and expulsion is one of them. Under our Constitution, every action of every authority is subject to law as nobody is above law. Parliament is not an exception to this 'universal' rule. It is, therefore, open to an aggrieved party to approach this Court raising grievance against the action of Parliament and if the Court is satisfied within the limited parameters of judicial review that the action is unwarranted, unlawful or unconstitutional, it can set aside the action. But
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it is not because Parliament has no power to expel a member but the action was not found to be in consonance with law. [Para 192) [615-C-E] Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., [1975) 1 SCR 173 : [1974) 1 sec 717 : AIR (1974) SC 1389, referred to.
21.1. Taking into account serious allegations against some of the members of the House, Parliament decided to inquire into correctness or otherwise of the charges by constituting an 'Inquiry Committee'. The members were asked to offer their explanation and considering the evidence and material on record, the Committee appointed by Parliament decided the matter. It, therefore, cannot be said that the case is covered by exceptional part of clause (1) of Article 122. It cannot be overlooked that this Court is exercising power of 'judicial review', which by its nature limited to serious infirmities of law or patent illegalities. It cannot, therefore, enter into sufficiency of material before the authority nor can substitute its own opinion/finding/ decision for the opinion/finding/decision arrived at by such authority. Hence, even ifthere is any irregularity in adopting the procedure or in appreciating evidence by the Committee or in approving the decision by Parliament, it squarely falls under the 'protective umbrella' of Artide 122(1) of the Constitution and this Court cannot interfere with the decision in view of the constitutional protection granted by the said provision. [Para 199) [617-E-H] 21.2. Neither the Committee appointed by Parliament can be said to be a 'Court' stricto sensu, nor it is bound by technical rules of evidence or . procedure. It is more in the nature of 'fact-finding' inquiry. Since the dignity, decorum and credibility of Parliament was at stake, the Committee was appointed which was required to act with a view to restore public faith, confidence and honour in this august body without being inhibited by procedural im'pediments. [Para 200) [618-A-B] Pandit MS.M Sharma v. Shree Krishna Sinha & Ors. (Pandit Sharma II); [1961) 1 SCR 96 : AIR (1960) SC 1186 and Kihoto Hallahan v. Zachil!hu & Ors., [1992) Supp 2 SCC 651, 711, referred to. Constituent Assembly Debates : Vol.VIII; pp. 199-201), referred to.
22. So far as principle of law is concerned, it is well-settled and cannot
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be disputed and is not challenged. However, in the facts of the case, it cannot successfully be contended that there is breach or non-observance of natural justice by the Committee. Reading of the Reports makes it clear that adequate opportunity had been afforded to the petitioners and thereafter the action was taken. Notices were issued to the members, CDs were supplied to them, evidence of witnesses was recorded, defence version was considered and 'findings and conclusions' were reached. (Para 203] (619-B-C]
Kihoto Hollohon v. Zachilhu, [1992) Supp 2 SCC 651 : AIR (1993) SC 412 and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 1 SCC 248 : AIR (1978) SC 597, referred to.
23. What was stated by the Hon'ble Speaker was that "if anybody is guilty, he would be punished. Nobody would be spared". In other words, an assurance was given by the Hon'ble Speaker to the members of august body that an appropriate action will be taken without considering the position or status of an individual member and if he is found guilty, he will not be spared. The statement is a responsible one, expected of the Hon'ble Speaker of an august body of the largest democracy. There is nothing in the above statement from which it can be concluded that the issue had already been decided even before the Committee was constituted and principles of natural justice were violated. [Para 213) [625-H, 626-A-B] 24. It is well settled that Parliament has power to take up the matter so far as privileges are concerned and it can take an appropriate action in accordance with law. If it feels that the case of 'Cash for query' was made out and it adversely affected honesty, integrity and dignity of the House, it is open to the House to attempt to ensure restoration of faith in one of the pillars of democratic polity. [Para 222] [627-E-FJ
Sir Erskine May: 'Corruption or impropriety' and Hilaire Burnett: 'Constitutional and Administrative Law', Fourth Edn.; pp. 571-72, referred to. 25. It cannot be gainsaid that expulsion of a member is a grave measure and normally, it should not be taken. Parliament could have taken a lenient view as suggested on behalf of the petitioners. But it cannot be accepted as a proposition of law that since such action results in deprivation of constituency having its representation in the House, a member can never be expelled. If representation of the constituency is taken to be the sole
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consideration, no action can be taken which would result in absence of representation of such constituency in the House. Such interpretation would make statutory provisions (the Representation of the People Act, 1951) as also constitutional scheme (Articles 84, 102, 190, 191, 192, Tenth Schedule, etc.) non-workable, nugatory and otiose. If a member is disqualified or has been convicted by a competent court, he has to go and at least for the time being, till new member is elected, there is no representation of the constituency in the House but it is inevitable and cannot be helped. There is one more aspect also. Once it is conceded that an action of suspension of a member can be taken (and it was expressly conceded), there is no reason why in principle, an action of expulsion is impossible or illegal. In a given case, such action may or may not be lawful or called for, but in theory, it is not possible to hold that while the former is permissible, the latter is not. If it is made referable to representation of the constituency, then as observed in Raj Narain, withdrawal of a member from the House even for a brief period is a serious matter both for the member and his constituency. Important debates and votes may take J.?lace during his absence even if the period be brief and he may not be able to present his view-point or that of the group or that of the constitudhcy he represented. It is, however, in the nature of disciplinary or punitive action for a specific parliamentary offence, namely, disorderly behaviour. Moreover, if the House has a right to expel .a member, non-representation of the constituency is merely a consequence, nothing more. [Paras 225 & 226] (628-E-H, 629-A-C] 26.1. Even in England, where Parliament is sovereign and supreme and can do everything but 'make woman a man and a man a woman', no member of Parliament has ever been expelled on the ground of 'ugly face'. And not even a single incident has been placed before this Court to substanti:::te the extreme argument. Even Maitla~d himself has not noted any such instance. On the contrary, he had admitted that normally, the power of expulsion can be exercised for iffegalities or misconduct of a serious nature. (Para 228] [629-F-G) 26.2. It is well-established principle of law that the mere possibility or likelihood of abuse of power does not make the provision ultra vires or bad in law. There is distinction between existence (or availability) of power and exercise thereof. Legality or otherwise of the power must be decided by considering the nature of power, the extent thereof, the body or authority
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on whom it has been conferred, the circumstances under which it can be exercised and all other considerations which are relevant and germane to the exercise of such power. A provision of law cannot be objeded only on the ground that it is likely to be misused. [Para 229) [629-H, 630-A-B]
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State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, [1977) 3 SCC 592, 658 : AIR (1977) SC 1361 and Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corporation, [2005) 7 sec 764, referred to. Providence Bank v. A/phens Billings, 29 US 504 (1830) : 7 Law Ed 939, referred to.
27. By and large, constitutional functionaries in this country have admirably performed their functions, exercised their powers and discharged their duties effectively, efficiently and sincerely and there is no reason to doubt that in coming years also they would continue to act in a responsible manner expected of them. Not only all the constituents of the State will keep themselves within the domain of their authority and will not encroach, trespass or overstep the province of other organs but will also act in preserving, protecting and upholding the faith, confidence and trust reposed in them by the Founding Fathers of the Constitution and by the people of this great country by mutual regard, respect and dignity for each other. On the whole, the situation is satisfactory and there is no reason to be disappointed for future. [Para 234] [631-G-H, 632-A-B]
RA VEENDRAN J. (Dissenting) : 1.1. There is no power of expulsion in the Parliament, either inherent or traceable to Article 105(3). Expulsion by the House will be possible only if Article 102 or Article 101 is suitably amended or if a law is made under Article 102(1)(e) enabling the House to expel a member found unworthy or unfit of continuing as a member. [Para 36) [659-H, 660-A] 1.2. The action of the two Houses of Parliament, expelling the petitioners is violative of Articles 101 to 103 of the Constitution and therefore invalid. Petitioners, therefore, continue to be Members of Parliament (subject to any action for cessation of their membership).
[Para 37} [660-B-C]
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State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, AIR (1977) SC 1361; Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kera/a, [1973] 4 SCC 225; SubCommittee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India, .[1991) 4 SCC 699; Re. the C.P and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit & Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938 -- the Central Provinces case, AIR (1939) FC 1; Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State ofAssam, AIR (1961) SC 232; M.P V. Sundaramier & Co. v. State ofAndhra Pradesh AIR (1958) SC 468 and Automobile Transport Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR (1962) SC 1406, relied on. Re: Art. 143, Constitution of India and Delhi Laws Act, AIR (1951) SC 332; Special Reference No. I of 1964, UP Assembly Case, [1965) 1 SCR 413; Mary Roy v. State of Kera/a, (1986] 2 SCC 209; Chhabildas Mehta v. The Legislative Assembly, Gujarat State, (1970 Guj.LR 729] and Hardwari Lal v. The Election Commission of India, (1977 (2) Punj. & Har. 269], referred to. Clarke v. Bradlaugh, (1881] 8 QBD 63, referred to.
2. The Constitution-makers have made detailed and specific -provisions regarding the manner in which a person becomes a Member of Parliament (elected/nominated), the duration for which he continues as a member and the manner in which he ceases to be a member and his seat becomes vacant. Therefore neither the question of election or nomination, nor tenure, nor cessation/termination of membership of the House covered by the express provisions in the Constitution, can fall under 'other powers, privileges and immunities' of the House mentioned in Article 105(3). [Para 31] [658-C-D] 3. The Constitution makes express provisions for election/appointment and removal/cessation of service of the Executive (President and Vice-Pre:>ident), Judiciary (Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court) and all other constitutional functionaries (Attorney General, Auditor and Comptroller General, Chief Election Commissioner etc.). It is therefore inconceivable that the Constitution-makers would have omitted to provide for 'expulsion' as one of the methods of cessation of membership or consequential vacancy, if it intended to entrust such power to the Parliament (Para 32] (658-E-F] 4. In view of the express provisions in the Constitution, as to when a person gets disqualified to be a member of either House of Parliament (and
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thereby ceases to be a member) and when a consequential vacancy arises, it is impermissible to read a new category of cessation of membership by way of expulsion and consequential vacancy, by resorting to the incidental powers, privileges and immunities referred to in Article 105. (Para 33) (658-G)
5. Clause (3) of Article 105 opens with the words 'in other respects'. The provision for 'powers, privileges and immunities' in clause (3) occurs after referring to the main privilege of freedom of speech in Parliament, in clause (1) of Article 105, and the main immunity against court proceedings in clause (2) of Article 105. Therefore, clause (3) is intended to provide for 'non-main' or 'incidental' or miscellaneous powers, privileges and immunities which are numerous to mention. Two things arc clear from clause (3). It is not intended to provide for the matters relating to nomination/ election, term of office, qualifications, disqualification/cessation, for which express provisions are already made in Articles 80, 81, 83, 84, 101 and 102. Nor is it intended to provide for important privilege of freedom of speech or important immunity from court proceedings referred to in Clause (1) and (2) of Article 105. By no stretch of imagination, the power to expel a member can be considered as an 'incidental' matter. If such a power was to be given, it would have been specifically mentioned. [Para 34J [658-H, 659-A-C, E]
Special Reference No.I of 1964, UP Assembly Case, (1965) 1 SCR 413, relied on.
6. The appropriate course in case of allegation of corruption against a Member of Parliament, is to prosecute the member in accordance with law. The immunity under Article 105(2) may not be available, as the decision in P. V.Narasimha Rao v. State recognizes immunity to a member who is a bribe taker only where the 'bribe' is taken in respect of a 'vote' given by him in Parliament and not otherwise. Such cases can be fast tracked. Pending such criminal proceedings, the member can be suspended temporarily, if necessary, so as to prevent him from participating in the deliberations of the Houses. On being tried, if the member is convicted, he becomes disqualified for being or continuing as a Member under Article 102(1)(e). If he is acquitted, he is entitled to continue as a member. Though it may sound cumbersome, that apparently is what the
Constitution intends. [Para 35) [659-F-GJ P. V. Narasimha Rao v. State, [1998) 4 SCC 626, relied on.
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CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1 of2006.
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(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) WITH
TC (C) Nos. 82/2006, 83/2006, 84/2006, 85/2006, 86/2006, 87/2006, 88/ 2006, 89/2006, 90/2006 and WP(C) No. 129/2006. Gopal Subramanian, ASG, Dayan Krishan, Gautam Narayan, Satyakam, T. S. Murthy, Raghenth Basant, Aman Ahluwalia, Arunav Patnaik, Abhishek Tiwati and D.S. Mahra for Attorney General for India.
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Ram Jethmalani, P.N. Lekhi, T.R. Andhyarujina, Sr. Advs. Dr. Krishan Singh Chauhan, Dr. Indra Pratap Singh, Gyan Mitra, Chand Kiran, P.K. Jayakrishnan, K.C. Lamba, Sudha Pal, V.K. Shukla, Nischal Kumar Neeraj, Ashish Tripathi, K.K. Mohan, Nawal Kishore Jha, M.P. Jha, Harshvardhan Jha, Ram Ekbal Roy, Rani Jetmalani, Harish Pandey, Samar Bansal, Abhik Kumar, P.R. Mala, Raj iv Kumar Ti~ari, Rajesh Kumar, Sanjai Kumar Pathak, Devvrat, Harish Pandey, Rajeev Kumar Tiwari, Lata Krishnamurti, Sachin Jain, Mukesh Kumar Tripathi, Lokesh Kumar, Sanjay Kumar Pathak, Jaspreet S. Rai, Rakesh Kumar, M.K. Garg, Meenakshi Arora, S.K. Mehndiratta, Pranav Sen, S.W.A. Qadri, Ashis Chugh, Gaurav Agarwal, Satyakam, D.S. Mahra, R.M. Sharma and Sushma Suri for the appearing parties.
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The Judgments of the Court were delivered by Majority Judgment by Hon'ble the Chief Justice alungwith Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.G. Balakrishnan, Hon'ble Mr. Justice C.K. Thakker and Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.K. Jain.
Dissenting Judgment by Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.V. Raveendran. Order of the Hon'ble Court.
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Y.K SABHARWAL, CJI.: Factual Backgrounds :
1. The interpretation of Article 105 of Constitution of India is in issue in these matters. The question is whether in exercise of the powers, privileges and immunities as contained in Article 105, are the Houses of Parliament competent to expel their respective Members from membership of the House. If such a power exist~, is it subject to judicial review and if so, the scope of such judicial review.
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2. The unfortunate background in which the aforesaid questions have arisen is the allegation that the Members of Parliament (MPs) indulged in unethical and corrupt practices of taking monetary consideration in relation to their functions as MPs.
3. A private channel had teleeast:a programme on 12th December, 2005 depicting 10 MPs of House of People (Lok Sabha) and one of Council of States (Rajya Sabha) accepting money, directly or through middleman, as consideration for raising certain questions in the House or for otherwise espousing certain causes for those offering the lucre. This led to extensive publicity in media. The Presiding Officers of each Houses of Parliament instituted inquiries through separate Committees. Another private channel telecast a programme on 19th December, 2005 alleging improper conduct of another MP of Raj ya Sabha in relation to the implementation of Member of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme ('MPLAD' Scheme for short). This incident was also referred to a Committee. 4. The Report of the inquiry concluded, inter alia, that the evidence against the 10 members of Lok Sabha was incriminate; the plea that the video footages were doctored/morphed/edited had no merit; there was no valid reason for the Committee to doubt the authenticity of the video footage; the allegations of acceptance of money by the said 10 members had been established which acts of acceptance of money had a direct connection with the work of Parliament and constituted such conduct on their part as was unbecoming of Members of Parliament and also unethical and calling for strict action. The majority report also recorded the view that in case of misconduct, or contempt, committed by its members, the House can impose punishment in the nature of admonition, reprimand, withdrawal from the House, suspension from service of House, imprisonment, and expulsion from the House. The majority report recorded its deep distress over acceptance of money by MPs for raising questions in the House and found that it had eroded the credibility of Parliament as an institution and a pillar of democracy in this country and recommended expulsion of the 10 members from the membership of Lok Sabha finding that their continuance as Members of the House would be untenable. One member, however, recorded a note of dissent for the reasons that in his understanding of the procedure as established by Jaw, no member could be expelled except for breach of
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privileges of the House and that the matter must, therefore, be dealt with according to the rules of the Privileges Committee.
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5. On the Report of the Inquiry Committee being laid on the table of the House, a Motion was adopted by Lok Sabha resolving to expel the 1O members from the membership of Lok Sabha, accepting the finding as contained in the Report of the Committee that the conduct of the members was unethical and unbecoming of the Members of Parliament and their continuance as MPs is untenable. On the same day i.e. 23rd December, 2005, the Lok Sabha Secretariat issued the impugned notification notifying the expulsion of those MPs with effect from same date. In the Writ Petitions/Transfer Cases, the expelled MPs have challenged the constitutional validity of their respective expulsions.
a similar process was undertaken by the Rajya Sabha in c respect6. ofAlmost its Member. The matter was referred to the Ethics Committee of
the Rajya Sabha. As per the majority report, the Committee found that the Member had accepted money for tabling question in Rajya Sabha and the plea taken by him in defence was untenable in the light of evidence before it. However, one Member while agreeing with other Members of the Committee as to the factual finding expressed opinion that in view, amongst others, of the divergent opinion regarding the law on the subject in judgments of different High Courts, to which confusion was added by the rules of procedure inasmuch as Rule 297(d) would not provide for expulsion as one of the punishments, there was a need for clarity to rule out any margin of error and thus there was a necessity to seek opinion of this Court under Article 143(1) of the Constitution. 7. The Report of the Ethics Committee was adopted by Rajya Sabha concurring with the recommendation of expulsion and on the same date i.e. 23rd December, 2005, a notification notifying expulsion of the Member from membership of Rajya Sabha with immediate effect was issued. 8. The case of petitioner in Writ Petition (C) No.129/2006 arises out of different, though similar set of circumstances. In this case, the telecast of the programme alleged improper conduct in implementation of MPLAD Scheme. The programme was telecast on 19th December, 2005. The Report of the Ethics Committee found that after viewing the unedited footage, the Committee was of the view that it was an open and shut case as the Member had unabashedly and in a professional manner demanded commission for helping the so-called NGO to set up projects in his home state/district and to recommend works under MPLAD Scheme. The Committee came to the conclusion that the conduct of the Member amounts to violations of Code
RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 363
of Conduct for Members of Rajya Sabha and it is immaterial whether any money changed hands or not or whether any commission was actually paid or not. It found that the Member has not only committed gross misdemeanor but by his conduct he also impaired the dignity of the House and its Member and acted in a manner which is inconsistent with the standards that the House is entitled to expect of its Members. Since the conduct of the Member has brought the House and its Members into disrepute, the Committee expressed the view that the Member has forfeited his right to continue as Member and, therefore, recommended his expulsion from the membership of the House. The Raj ya Sabha accepted the recommendations of the Ethics Committee and Motion agreeing with the recommendation was adopted on 21st March, 2006 thereby expelling the Member from the membership bringing to an end his membership. On the same date notification was issued by Rajya Sabha Secretariat.
9. The two Members of Rajya Sabha have also challenged the constitutional validity of their expulsions. Article 105 reads as under :
"105. Powers, privileges, etc. of the Houses of Parliament and of the members and committees thereof.- (I) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and the rules and standing orders regulating the procedure of Parliament, there shall be freedom of speech in Parliament.
(2) No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the authority of either House of Parliament of any report, paper, votes or proceedings.
(3) In other respects, the powers, privileges and immunities of each House of Parliament, and of the members and the committees of each House, shall be such as may from time to time be defined by Parliament by law, and, until so defined, shall be those of that House and of its members and committees immediately before the coming into force of section 15 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act 1978.
{4) The provisions of clauses {I), (2) and (3) shall apply in relation
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to persons who by virtue of this Constitution have the right to speak in, and otherwise to take part in the proceedings of, a House of Parliament or any committee thereof as they apply in relation to members of Parliament."
I 0. There is identical provision as contained in Article 194 relating to
B . powers, privileges and immunities of State legislature. Article 194 reads as under :-
( "194. Powers, privileges, etc., of the House of Legislatures and of the members and committees thereof.- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the rules and standing orders regulating the procedure of the Legislature, there shall be freedom of speech in the Legislature of every State. (2) No member of the Legislature of a State shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in the Legislature or any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the authority of a House of such a Legislature of any report, paper, votes or proceedings. (3) In other respects, the powers, privileges and immunities of a House of the Legislature of a State, and of the members and the committees of a House of such Legislature, shall be such as may from time to time be defined by the Legislature by law, and, until so defined, shall be those of that House and of its members and committees immediately before the coming into force of section 26 of the Constitution (forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. (4) The provisions of clauses (1), (2) and (3) shall apply in relation to persons who by virtue of this Constitution have the right to speak in, and otherwise to take part in the proceedings of a House of the Legislature of a State or any committee thereof as they apply in relation to members of that Legislature."
11. Article 105(3) underwent a change in terms of Section 15 of the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978. In Article 105(3), the words "shall be those of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United
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RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 365
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Kingdom, and of its members and committees at the commencement of this Constitution" were ·substituted by the words "shall be those of that House and of its members and committees immediately before the coming into force of Section 15 of the Constitution (forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978". The similar changes were also effected in Article 194(3) of the Constitution. These amendments have no relevance for determining the interpretation of Article 105(3) since the amendments clearly seem to be only cosmetic for the purpose of omitting the reference of the House of Commons in these articles .
12. Before the amendment in 1978, clause (3) of Article I 05 read as under :"(3). In other respects, the powers, privileges and immunities of each Hot:se of Parliament, and of the members and the committees of each House, shall be such as may from time to time be defined by I?arliament by law, and, until so defined, shall be those of the Ho~se of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and of its members and committees, at the commencement of this Constitution."
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Contentions 13. The petitioners submit that all the powers, privileges or immunities, as vested on the date of commencement of the Constitution of India, in the House of Commons of the Parliament of United Kingdom had not been inherited by the legislatures in India under Article 105(3) of the Constitution. 14. The main contention urged is that power and privilege of expulsion was exercised by the House of Commons as a facet of its power of selfcomposition and since such power of such self-composition has not been given by the Constitution to Indian Legislature, it did not inherit the power to expel its members. The contention is that expulsion is necessarily punitive in nature rather than remedial and such power vested in House of Commons as a result of its power to punish for contempt in its capacity as a High Court of Parliam~nt and since this Status was not accorded to Indian Legislature, the power to expel could not be claimed by the Houses of Parliament under Article 105(3). It is also their contention that power to expel cannot be asserted through Article 105(3) also for the reason that such an interpretation would come in conflict with other constitutional provisions. A grievance has also been made about denial of principles of natural justice in the inquiry proceedings and it is contended that there are gross and
3(,6
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patent illegalities which are not protected from judicial review by Article 122 on plea of procedural irregularities. The contention of the petitioners further is that even the plenary powers of the legislature are controlled by the basic concepts of the Constitution and, therefore, it has to function within the circumscribed limits. The submission is that this Court is the final arbiter on the constitutional issues and the existence of judicial power in such behalf must necessarily and inevitably postulate the existence of a right in the citizen to move the Court for protection of fundamental rights and for due adherence to the constitutional provisions and scheme in absence of which the power conferred on the judicial organ would be rendered meaningl~s. The contention also is that the extent and scope of power conferred on each branch of the State, limits on the exercise of such power under Constitution and any action of any branch that transgresses such limit is for the judiciary to determine as the final interpreter of the Constitution. Petitioners submit that the constitutional and legal protection accorded to the citizens would become illusory if it were left to the organ in question to determine the legality of its own action. They further submit that it is also a basic principle of rule of law permeating every provision of the Constitution, rather forming its very core and essence, that the exercise of power by the Executive or any other authority must not only be conditioned by the Constitution but also be in accordance with law in which context it is primarily the function of the jµdiciary alone to ensure that the law is observed and there is compliance with the requirement of the constitutional provisions which is performed through patent weapon used as power of judicial review. 15. On the plea that this Court has the jurisdiction to exercise the power of judicial review in a case of this nature where another coordinate organ of the State has asserted and claimed a power and privilege on the strength of a Constitutional provision seemingly also claiming "exclusive cognizance", meaning immunity from judicial interference, the contentions ofthe petitioners can be summarized thus:-
"(i)
The power of judicial review is an incident of and flows from the concept that the fundamental and higher laws are the touchstone of the limits of the powers of the various organs of State which derive power and authority under the Constitution of which the judicial wing is the interpreter;
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RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 367
(ii)
(iii)
Unlike in England where Parliament is sovereign, in a federal State with a written Constitution like India is, the supremacy of the Constitution is fundamental to its existence, which supremacy is protected by the authority of the independent judicial body that acts as the interpreter thereof through the power of judicial review to which even the Legislature is amenable and cannot claim immunity wherefrom; The legislative supremacy being subject to the Constitution, Parliament cannot determine for itself the nature, scope and effect of its powers which are, consequently, subject to the supervision and control of judicial organ;
(iv) The petitioners would also point out that unlike the Parliament of England, the status of Legislature in India has never been that of a superior court of record and that even privileges of Parliament are subject to limits which must necessarily be ascertainable and, therefore, subject to scrutiny by the Court, like any other right; (v)
The validity of any proceedings even inside a legislative chamber can be called in question before the Court when it suffers from illegality and unconstitutionality and there is no immunity available to Parliament from judicial review. "
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16. It is the petitioners' contention that the Houses of Parliament had no power of expulsion of a sitting member. They plead that the petitioners could not be debarred from membership of the House by or under the impugned notifications pursuant to proceedings consequent upon the media reports inasmuch as substantive and adjectival law had been disregarded and the Constitutional inhibition placed on the exercise of power ofdebarment had been defeated. On the case that the Indian Legislatures cannot claim the power of expulsion of their members, the contentions are stated thus:"(i)
The Legislature has no power to expel its member since the Parliament has not enacted any law which provides for expulsion of a member in a specified circumstance, in terms of enabling power to legislate on the subject as available in Article 105(3) of the Constitution;
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(ii)
(
The expulsions are illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional, being violative of the provisions of Articles 83, 84 and IOI to 103, 105 and 190 to 193
(iii)
There is no provision either in the Constitution of India or in the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the Houses of Parliament for expulsion of a member by adoption of a motion and thus the impugned acts were beyond the jurisdiction of Parliament;
(iv) The expulsion of the petitioners from the Legislature through a motion adopted by simple majority was a dangerous precedent which would give dictatorial powers to the ruling majority in the Legislatures in future and thus be prone to further abuse; (v)
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of th~ Constitution;
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The Constitutional law governing the democracies the world over, even in other jurisdictions governed by written Constitutions, would not allow the power of exclusion of the elected members unto the legislative chamber. "
17. Claiming that they were innocent and had been falsely trapped, by the persons behind the so-called sting operation who had acted in a manner actuated by ma/a jides and greedy intent for cheap publicity and wrongful gains bringing the petitioners into disrepute, the Petitioners question the procedure adopted by the two Houses of Parliament alleging that it suffered E from gross illegality (as against procedural irregularity) calling for judicial interference. In this respect, the petitioners submit that the enquiries conducted by the two Houses were unduly hurried; were neither fair nor impartial and have resulted in gross violation of rules of natural justice which were required to be followed inasmuch as the action that was F contemplated would entail civil consequences; the Petitioners had not even been treated as ordinary offenders of law and deprived of basic opportunity of defending themselves through legal counsel and opportunity to explain; the evidence in the form of videography etc. had been relied upon without opportunity being given to them to test the veracity of such evidence, specially in the face of their defence that the video clippings had been G doctored or morphed which plea had not been properly examined or enquired into and the evidence of such nature had been relied upon in violation of the settled law; the expulsions are illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional, being violative of the provisions of Articles 14 & 21 of the Constitution; the petitioners claim that as a consequence of the impugned H· decisions they had suffered irreparable loss and their ijnage and prestige had
RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 369
been lowered in the eyes of the electorate. 18. The two Houses of Parliament, through their respective secretariats, have chosen not to appear in the matter. The impugned decisions are, however, sought to be defended by the Union of India. The contention urged on behalf of Union of India is that the conduct of accepting money for tabling questions and raising matters in the House was considered by the respective Houses of Parliament as unbecoming of members of the House rendering them unfit for being members of the respective Houses. The actions of expulsions are matters within the inherent power and privileges of the Houses of Parliament. It is a privilege of each House to conduct its internal proceedings within the walls of the House free from interference including its right to impose disciplinary measures upon its members. The power of the Court to examine the action of a House over outsider in a matter of privilege and contempt does not extend to matters within the walls of the House over its own members. When a member is excluded from participating in the proceedings of the House, it is a matter concerning the House and the grievance of expulsion is in regard to proceedings within the walls of Parliament and in regard to rights to be exercised within the walls of the· House, the House itself is the final judge. The expulsion of these members has been rightly carried out by respective Houses in exercise of their powers and privileges under Article 105(3) of the Constitution which power and privilege of expulsion has been exercised by the Houses of Parliament in the past as well. The expulsion does not create any disability to be re-elected again as a member of the House. 19. We have heard learned Senior Advocates Mr. Ram Jethmalani, Mr. P.N. Lekhi for the petitioners as also Dr. K.S. Chauhan, Advocate and other learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. For the respondents, we have heard Mr. Gopal Subramanian, learned additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of Attorney General for India and Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina, learned Senior Advocate on behalf of Union of India.
Constitutional Scheme
20. To appreciate the contentions, it is necessary to first examine the constitutional scheme. 21. That the Constitution is the Supreme lex in this Country is beyond
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the pale of any controversy. All organs of the State derive their authority, jurisdiction and powers from the Constitution and owe allegiance to it. This includes this Court also which represents the judicial organ. In the celebrated case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kera/a, [1973) 4 SCC 225, this Court found certain basic features of the Constitution that include, besides supremacy of the Constitution, the republican and democratic form of Government, and the separation of powers between the Legislature, the -- Executive and the Judiciary. The principle of supremacy of the Constitution has been reiterated by this Court post Kesavananda Bharati in case after case including, to name just some of them, Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, [1975] Suppl SCC l; Minerva Mills Ltd. v:Union of India, [1980] 3 SCC 625, Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India, [1991] 4 SCC 699, I. Manila! Singh v. H. Borobabu Singh (Dr), [1994] Supp 1SCC718, Union of India v. Assn.for Democratic Reforms, [2002] 5 SCC 294, Special Reference No. 1 of 2002, In re (Gujarat Assembly Election matter) [2002] 8 SCC 237, People's Unionfor Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India, [2003] 4 SCC 399, Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, [2005] 3 SCC 551, Rameshwar Prasad (VI) v. Union ofIndia, [2006] 2 SCC I, Ku/dip Nayar v. Union of India, [2006] 7 SCC I.
22. That the parliamentary democracy in India is qualitatively distinct from the one in England from where we have borrowed the Westminister model of Government, is also well settled. In this context, before proceeding further on this premise, we may quote the following observations of the Constitution Bench (7 Judges) appearing at page 444 in Special Reference No. I of 1964, [1965] I SCR 413 (UP Assembly case) :"In dealing with this question, it is necessary to bear in mind one fundamental feature of a Federal Constitution. In England, Parliament is sovereign; and in the words of Dicey, the three distinguishing features of the principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty are that Parliament has the right to make or unmake any law whatever; that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament, and that the right or power of Parliament extends to every part of the Queen's dominions [Dicey, The Law of the Constitution 10th ed. Pp.xxxiv, xxxv]. On the other hand, the essential characteristic of federalism is "the distribution of limited executive, legislative and judicial authority among bodies which are coordinate with and
RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 371
independent of each other". The supremacy of the constitution is fundamental to the existence of a federal State in order to prevent either the legislature of the federal unit or those of the member States from destroying or impairing that delicate balance of power which satisfies the particular requirements of States which are desirous of union, but not prepared to merge their individuality in a unity. This supremacy of the constitution is protected by the authority of an independent judicial body to act as the interpreter of a scheme of distribution of powers. Nor is any change possible in the constitution by the ordinary process of federal or State legislation [Ibid p.lxxvii]. Thus the dominant characteristic of the British Constitution cannot be claimed by a Federal Constitution like ours."
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23. In the constitutional scheme that has been adopted in India, the Legislatures play a significant role in pursuit of the goals set before the nation and command the position of grandeur and majesty. The Legislatures undoubtedly have plenary powers but such powers are controlled by the basic concepts of the written constitution and can be exercised within the legislative fields allotted to their respective jurisdiction under the Seventh Schedule. They have the plenary legislative authority and discharge their legislative functions by virtue of the powers conferred on them by the relevant provisions of the Constitution. But, the basis of that power is the Constitution itself. In this context, it would be fruitful to also take note of the following observations appearing at page 445 of the afore-mentioned judgment in UP Assembly case :" ... Besides, the legislative supremacy of our legislatures including the Parliament is normally controlled by the provisions contained in Part III of the Constitution. If the legislatures step beyond the legislative fields assigned to them, or acting within their respective fields, they trespass on the fundamental rights of the citizens in a manner not justified by the relevant articles dealing with the said fundamental rights, their legislative actions are liable to be struck down by courts in India. Therefore, it is necessary to remember that though our legislatures have plenary powers, they function within
the limits prescribed by the material and rele~ant provisions of the Constitution."
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24. The judicial organ of the State has been made the final arbiter of Constitutional issues and its authority and jurisdiction in this respect is an important and integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India. Before coming in grips with the complex Constitutional questions that have been raised, we would well remind ourselves, more than we do everyone else, of the following further observations made at page 447 :" .. .In this connection it is nece:;sary to remember that the status, dignity and importance of these two respective institutions, the legislatures and the Judicature, are derived primarily from the status, dignity and importance of the respective causes that are assigned to their charge by the Constitution. These two august bodies as well as the Executive which is another important constituent of a democratic State, must function not in antimony nor in a spirit of hostility, but rationally, harmoniously and in a spirit of understanding within their respective spheres, for such harmonious working of the three constituents of the democratic State alone will help the peaceful development, growth and stabilisation of the democratic way of life in this country.'; 25. The issues involved are required to be examined bearing in mind the basic ethos of our Constitutional scheme in the above light.
26. The Constitution of India provides through Chapter II of Part V for Union Legislature, called the "Parliament". Parliament consists of, besides the President, two Houses known respectively as the Council of States (Rajya Sabha) and the House of the People (Lok Sabha). Article 80 deals with the matter of composition ofRajya Sabha. Article 81, on the other hand, provides for composition of Lok Sabha. In terms of Article 83, Rajya Sabha is a permanent body, not subject to dissolution, its continuance being ensured by replacements of one third of the members who retire on the expiration of every second year. Lok Sabha, on the other hand, is given a fixed term of five years, unless sooner dissolved or unless its term is extended in situation of emergency as provided in the proviso to sub-rule (2) of Article 83. 27. In the loose federal structure that India has adopted for itself, wherein India is an indestructible Union of destructible units, there is a provision for State Legislature in Chapter III of Part VI governing the States,
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almost similar to the set up at the Centre.
28. The relations between the Union and the States are controlled by the provisions contained in Part XI of the Constitution.
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29 The Constitution permits, through Article 118 and Article 208, the Legislature at the Centre and in the States respectively, the authority to make rules for regulating their respective procedure and conduct of business "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" . 30. Since we are concerned mainly with the Houses of Parliament in these proceedings, it may be mentioned that each House in exercise of its powers under Article 118 has framed detailed rules of procedure which are called "Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha" and Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Council of States". 31. Conscious of the high status of these bodies, the Constitution accorded certain powers, privileges and immunities to the Parliament and State Legislatures and their respective members. For this purpose, specific provisions were included in the Constitution in Articles 105. 32. For the present, it may only be noticed that sub-Article (I) of Article l 05 and Article 194 respectively confers on the Members of Parliament and the State Legislatures respectively "freedom of speech" in the Legislature, though "subject to the provisions" of the Constitution and "subject to the rules and orders regulating the procedure" of Parliament or of the Legislatures, as the case may be.
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33. Sub-Article (2) of both the said Articles grants, inter a/ia, absolute immunity to members of the Legislatures from "any proceedings in any Court in respect of anything said or any vote given" by them in the Legislatures or any Committee thereof. Sub-Article (3) of Artide 105 and Article 194 declares that "the powers, privileges and immunities" of each House of the Legislatures and the members and Committees thereof, "in other respects" shall be "such as may from time to time be defined" by the Parliament or the State Legislature, as the case may be, "by law" and, "until so defined", to be those as were enjoyed by the said Houses or members of the Committees thereof immediately before coming into force of the amendment in 1978.
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34. Article 122 is of great import in the context of, amongst others, Article l 05, since it seems to restrict the jurisdiction of the Courts in relation to "proceedings of Parliament". It reads as under:-
"122. Courts not to inquire into proceedings of Parliament.-{!) The validity of any proce\!dings in Parliament shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure.
(2) No officer or member of Parliament in whom powers are vested by or under this Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business, or for maintaining order, in Parliament shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers."
35. There is a similar provision in relation to State Legislature.
36. Having given our anxious considerations to the myriad issues that have been raised on both sides of the divide, we have found that the primordial questions that need to be addressed by the Court can be formulated as under :1.
Does this Court, within the constitutional scheme, have the jurisdiction to decide the content and scope of powers, privileges and immunities of the Legislatures and its members?
2.
If the first question is answered in the affirmative, can it be found that the powers and privileges of the Legislatures in India, in particular with reference to Article 105, include the power of expulsion of their members?
3.
In the event of such power of expulsion being found, does this Court have the jurisdiction to interfere in the exercise of the said power or privilege conferred on the Parliament and its members or Committees and; if so, is this jurisdiction circumscribed by certain limits?
3 7. In our approach to these issues of great importance, we have followed the advice of Thomas Huxley in the following words :-
"It is not who is right, but what is right, that is of importance"
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RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 375
38. In our quest, again borrowing the words of Thomas Huxley, we must:
"learn what is true in order to do what is right". 39. The need, if any, to take up for consideration, the grievances expressed by the petitioners in relation to the manner of exercise of the power and privilege asserted by both Houses of Parliament to expel their respective members would arise in light of decision on the two firstmentioned cardinal questions.
Court's Jurisdiction to decide on the scope of Article 105(3) 40. There was virtually a consensus amongst the learned counsel that it lies within the powers and jurisdiction of this Court to examine and determine the extent of power and privileges to find out whether actually power of expulsion is available under Article 105(3) or not. 41. Having regard to the delicate balance of power distributed amongst the three chief organs of the State by the Constitution of India and the forceful assertions made particularly with regard to the limitation on court's jurisdiction, we decided not to depend upon mere concession of the learned counsel as to our jurisdiction. We thought it prudent to examine it fully even in the context of primary question about the judicial authority to go into the question of existence of a particular power or privilege asserted and claimed under Article 105, so as to reassure ourselves that we were not in any manner intruding into a zone which is out-of-bounds for us. 42. Fortunately, the subject at hand is not a virgin territory. There have been occasions in the past for this court to go into these issues, though in somewhat different fact situations. Similarly, we have the benefit of opinion on these questions, expressed by at least three High Courts, though that happens to be a divided opinion. 43. As can be seen from the language employed in Article 105, the Parliament is empowered to define, by law, the powers, privileges and immunities of each House and of their Members and Committees in respects other than those specified in the Constitutional provisions. Though some
part of the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners did try to refer to certain statutory provisions, for example, provisions contained in Sections
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8 to 11 of the Representation of People Act 1951, as referable to the enabling power given to the Parliament in the first part of Article 105(3) but for present purposes, we would assume that Parliament has not yet exercised the said enabling power in as-much-as there is no law enacted till date that can be referred as cataloging the powers, privileges and immunities of each House of Parliament and of their members and committees. This consequence leads to continuity of the life of the second part of Article 105(3) in as-muchas that part of the provision was designed to come to an end as soon as the Parliament defined by law its powers, privileges and immunities. Therefore, powers, privileges and immunities not having been defined, the question is what are those powers which were enjoyed by House of Commons at the commencement of our Constitution as that will determine the powers, privileges and immunities of both Houses of Indian Parliament. 44. The history of the subject of Parliamentary privileges indicates numerous instances where the effort at tracing the dividing line between the competence of courts and the exclusive jurisdiction of the legislature threw up complex Constitutional questions giving rise to divergent opinions and decisions even in England, more importantly, in connection with the House of Commons. These questions included the abstract question whether the law of Parliament in such regard was a "particular law" or "part of the common law" in its wide and extended sense and the practical question whether the House of Commons was to be the sole judge of a matter of privilege claimed by it even when the rights of third parties were involved or whether in such cases the issues could be decided in the courts. The next question arising from the last mentioned issue naturally concerned the extent of the power of the judges, that is to say, if they were bound to accept and apply the parliamentary interpretation of the law or were free to form their own view in such regard. 45. The dust has since settled even in England which jurisdiction since concedes the jurisdiction of the court to decide all questions of privilege, except those concerning exclusive jurisdiction of the legislative chamber over its own internal proceedings. 46. The works of English and Commonwealth authors have always been treated as the most authoritative references for determining the source of a privilege or power exercised by the House of Commons. They include Halsbury's Laws of England, Maitland, Wade and Phillips, Keir & Lawson, Sir Barnett Cocks, Ridges on Constitutional Law, and Sir William Anson's
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RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 377
"The Law and Custom of the Constitution". Sir Thomas Erskine May was a clerk of the House of Commons (1871-1886). His work "Parliamentary Practice'', hereinafter referred to as "May's Parliamentary Practice'', is universally regarded as an authoritative exposition of this branch of law.
:
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47. The following extract from page 183 in chapter 11 "Jurisdiction of Courts of Law in Matters of Privilege" as appearing in Erskine May's Parliamentary Practice, 20th Edition reflects the prevalent law in United Kingdom:"The problem thus became one of reconciling the law of privilege with the general law. The solution gradually marked out by the courts is to insist on their right in principle to decide all questions of privilege arising in litigation before them, with certain large exceptions in favour of parliamentary jurisdiction. Two of these, which are supported by a great weight of authority, are the exclusive jurisdiction of each House over its own internal proceedings, and the right of either House to commit and punish for contempt. While it cannot be claimed that either· House to commit or formally acquiesced in this assumption of jurisdiction by the courts, the absence of any conflict for over a century may indicate a certain measure of tacit acceptance."
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48. The learned counsel for all sides have referred to Bradlaugh v. Gosset, [1884] 12 QBD 271. Charles Bradlaugh, the plaintiff in that case before Queen's Bench Division had been elected a Burgess to serve in the House of Commons and was entitled to take oath by law prescribed to be taken by the members of the said chamber of legislature and to sit and vote in the House as an elected representative. This resolution was explained in due course by Speaker to mean that the exclusion of Bradlaugh from the House would continue "until he should engage not to attempt to take the oath in disregard of the resolution of the House now in force". The issues that were raised before the court included the question whether the House of Commons had a right to pass such a resolution forbidding the member of the House within the walls of the House itself from doing something which by the law of the land he had a right to do so and whether the court could inquire into the said right and allow an action to be maintained by a member of the House. Reliance has been placed on certain observations made in the judgment that was rendered in the said fact situation. At page
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275, Lord Coleridge, CJ. observed as under:"Alongside, however, of these propositions, for the soundness of which I should be prepared most earnestly to contend, there is another proposition equally true, equally well established, which seems to me decisive of the case before us. What is said or done within the walls of Parliament cannot be inquired into in a court of law. On this point all the judges in the two great cases which exhaust the learning on the subject - Burdett v. Abbott [14 East, 1, 148] and Stockdale v. Hansard [9 Ad. & E. l.]; - are agreed, and are emphatic. The jurisdiction of the House over their own members, their right to impose discipline within their walls, is absolute and exclusive. To use the words of Lord Ellenborough, "They would sink into utter contempt and inefficiency without it. " [14 East, at p. 152]" 49. The learned counsel then referred to the Privy Council decision in Richard William Prebble v. Television New Zealand Ltd., [1994] (S) WLR 970. It arose out of a defamation action by a former Minister of the Government ofNew Zealand where proceedings in Parliament were questioned. The issue of infringement of parliamentary privilege was raised in the context of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, 1689 which declared that the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament "ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament". The Privy Council observed as under at page 976:"In addition to article 9 itself, there is a long line of authority which supports a wider principle, of which article 9 is merely one manifestation, viz. that the courts and Parliament are both astute to recognize their respective constitutional roles. So far as the courts are concerned they will not allow any challenge to be made to what is said or done within the walls of Parliament in performance of its legislative functions and protect one of its established privileges. Burdett v. Abbot, (1811) 14 East l; Stockdale v. Hansard, (1839) 9 Ad. & EI. l; Bradlaugh v. Gossett, [1884] 12 QBD 271; Pickin v. BritishRailwaysBoard, [1974] AC765;Pepperv.Hart, [1993]AC 593. As Blackstone said in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, 17th ed. (1830), vol.I, p. 163:
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"the whole of the law and custom of Parliament has its original from this one maxim, 'that whatever matter arises concerning either House of Parliament, ought to be examined, discussed, and adjudged in that House to which it relates, and not elsewhere." 50. Further, the views formulated in Prebble v. Television New Zealand Ltd. were expressed at page 980 thus: "Parties to litigation, by whomsoever commenced, cannot bring into question anything said or done in the House by suggesting (whether by direct evidence, cross-examination, inference or submission) that the actions or words were inspired by in proper motives or were untrue or misleading. Such matters lie entirely within the jurisdiction of the House, subject to any statutory exception such as exists in New Zealand in relation to perjury under Section 108 of the Crimes Act 1961."
51. The learned counsel would then refer to the law that has been evolved in India, the case of MS.M Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, [1959] Supp l SCR 806, hereinafter referred to as case of Pandit Sharma(!), being perhaps the first in a series of such cases on the subject.
52. Pandit Sharma, the petitioner in that case was editor of an English Daily Newspaper "Searchlight" of Patna. He invited the wrath of the legislative assembly ofBihar by publishing extracts from proceedings of the legislative assembly including certain parts which had been ordered to be expunged by the Speaker. this context, the Speaker had referred the matter to the Privileges Committee of the assembly which in tum issued a show cause notice to him. Pandit Sharma brought writ petition in this court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India alleging that the proceedings initiated by the legislative assembly had violated his fundamental right of speech and expression under Article 19 (1) (a) as also the fundamental right of protection of his personal liberty under Article 21. The case was decided by a Constitution Bench (five Judges), with main focus on two principal points; namely, the availability of a privilege under Article 194(3) of the Constitution to the House of a legislature in India to prohibit entirely the publication of the publicly seen and heard proceedings that took place in the House or even to prohibit the publication of such part of the proceedings
In
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as had been directed to be expunged and as to whether the privilege of the legislative chamber under Article 194(3) prevailed over the fundamental right of a citizen under Article I 9 (I) (a). Noticeably, no specific objection as to the jurisdiction of the court in examining the issue of existence and availability of the particular privilege was raised at any stage. 53. It may be mentioned here that the writ petition of Pandit Shanna was dismissed on the basis of majority view, inter alia, holding that the legislatures in India were vested with the power or privilege of prohibiting the publication of debates or proceedings that took place in the House, of even a true and faithful report, as indeed of an inaccurate or garbled version thereof. It was further held that the powers, privileges and immunities available in tenns of Articles 105(3) and 194(3) stood in the same supreme position as the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and could not be affected by Article 13 and, therefore, the principle ofhannonious construction required to be adopted. The court concluded that the fundamental right of free speech and expression under Article 19 (l)(a) being general in nature must yield to Article 194(1) and the latter part of Article 194(3) which are special provisions. The challenge to the proceedings under Article 194(3) on the basis of Article 21 was also repelled on the ground of it being "in accordance with the procedure established by law" in as-much-as the rules framed by the legislative assembly under Article 208 laid down the procedure.
54. The case of Pandit Sharma (supra) did not end there. Subsequently, the legislative assembly of Bihar came to be prorogued several times and the committee of privileges was also reconstituted. This led to a fresh notice being issued to Pandit Shanna in the wake of which he brought another writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, substantially raising the same questions and contentions as had been agitated in the earlier proceedings by him before this court. This writ petition was dismissed by the Constitution Bench (eight Judges). The judgment is reported as MS.M Sharma v. Shree Krishna Sinha, [1961] l SCR 96, hereinafter referred to as case of Pandit Shc..rma (II) (supra). 55. In Para 10 of the Judgment, this Court observed thus:-
"10 .. .It was contended that the procedure adopted inside the House of the Legislature was not regular and not strictly in accordance with law. There are two answers to this contention, firstly, that
RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 381
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according to the previous decision of this Court, the petitioner has not the fundamental right claimed by him. He is, therefore, out of Court. Secondly, the validity of the proceedings inside the Legislature of a State cannot be called in question on the allegation that the procedure laid down by the law had not been strictly followed. Article 212 of the Constitution is a complete answer to this part of the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. No Court can go into those questions which are within the special jurisdiction of the Legislature itself, which has the power to conduct its own business. Possibly, a third answer to this part of the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that it is yet premature to consider the question of procedure as the Committee is yet tc conclude its proceedings. It must also be observed that once it has been held that the Legislature has the jurisdiction to control the publication of its proceedings and to go into the question whether there has been any breach of its privileges, the Legislature is vested with complete jurisdiction to carry on its proceedings in accordance with its rules of business. Even though it may not have strictly complied with the requirements of the procedural law laid down for conducting its business, that cannot be a ground for interference by this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. Courts have always recognised the basic difference between complete want of jurisdiction and improper or irregular exercise ofjurisdiction. Mere non- compliance with rules of procedure cannot be a ground for issuing a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution vide Janardan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad, [1951] SCR344."
·~ 56. By far, the advisory opm1on given by a Constitution Bench comprising of seven Judges of this court in UP Assembly (Supra) case is the most elaborate discourse on the subject of powers, privileges and immunities of the legislatures under the Constitution of India. The matter had arisen out of a Reference by the President of India under Article 143(1) of the Constitution seeking opinfon of this court on certain issues, the genesis of which was traceable to certain unfortunate developments concerning the legislative assembly of the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Lucknow Bench
of the High Court at Allahabad. The legislative assembly of Uttar Pradesh had committed one Keshav Singh, who was not one of its members, to prison for its contempt. The warrant of committal did not contain the facts
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constituting the alleged contempt. Keshav Singh moved a petition, inter alia, under Article 226 of the Constitution through his advocate challenging his committal as being in breach of his fundamental right. A division bench of the High Court sitting at Lucknow gave notice to the Government counsel and on the appointed day proceeded to hear the application for bail. At that stage, the Government Counsel did not appear. The division bench heard the application and ordered release of Keshav Singh on interim bail pending decision on his writ petition. The legislative assembly found that Keshav Singh and his advocate in moving the High court and the two Judges of the High Court in entertaining the petition and granting bail had committed contempt of the legislative assembly. The assembly passed a resolution that all of them, including the two High Court Judges, be produced before it in custody. The High Court Judges and the advocate in question thereupon filed writ petitions before the High Court at Allahabad. A full bench of the High Court admitted the writ petitions and ordered the stay of execution of the assembly's resolution against them. Subsequently, the legislative assembly passed a clarificatory resolution modifying its earlier stand and asking the Judges and the advocate to appear before the House and offer I their explanation. It was against this backdrop that the President made a Reference under Article I 43( 1) of the Constitution seeking opinion mainly as to the Constitutional relationship between the High Court and the State Legislature in matters of the powers and privileges of the latter. The contours of the main controversy were siµnmarized by this court at page 439 in the report in the following words:-
"27 ... Is the House the sole and exclusive judge of the issue as to whether its contempt has been committed where the alleged contempt has taken place outside the four walls of the House? Is the House the sole and exclusive judge of the punishment which should be imposed on the party whom it has found to be guilty of its contempt? And, if in enforcement of its decision the House issues a general or unspeaking warrant, is the High Court entitled to entertain a habeas corpus petition challenging the validity of the detention of the person sentenced by the House? ........... "
57. It is clear from the opinion rendered in UP Assembly (Supra) case that the State legislature, though participating in the hearing, expressed reservations as to the jurisdiction of this court in any manner in respect of the area of controversy covered by the questions, insisting that "the
,.
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RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.) 383
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question about the existence and extent of the powers, privileges and immunities of the House, as well as the question about the exercise of the powers and privileges were entirely and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the House; and whatever this Court may say will not preclude the House from deciding for itself the points referred to us under this Reference", referring in this context, inter alia to the fact that there was no /is before the court which was therefore not exercising "its judicial function" while dealing with a Reference under Article 143 (l). 58. After examining the issue of absolute immunity of the proceedings of the House in such matters from challenge in the court, in the light of various Constitutional provisions and tracing the development of the law on the subject in England with the help, amongst others, of May's Parliamentary Practice, this Court summarized the legal position as obtaining in United Kingdom, at page 467, as under:-
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"83. In regard to punishment for contempt, a similar process of give and take by convention has been in operation and gradually a large area of agreement has, in practice, been evolved. Theoretically, the House of Commons claims that its admitted right to adjudicate on breaches of privilege implies in theory the right to determine the existence and extent of the privileges themselves. It has never expressly abandoned this claim. On the other hand, the courts regard the privileges of Parliament as part of the law of the land, of which they are bound to take judicial notice. They consider it their duty to decide any question of privilege arising directly or indirectly in a case which falls within their jurisdiction, and to decide it according to their own interpretation of the law [May's Parliamentary Practice, p. 172]. Naturally, as a result of this dualism the decisions of the courts are not accepted as binding by the House in matters of privilege, nor the decisions of the House by the courts; and as May points out, on the theoretical plane, the old dualism remains unresolved. In practice, however, "there is much more agreement on the nature and principles of privilege than the deadlock on the question of jurisdiction would lead one to expect" and May describes these general conclusio:is in the
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following words: (1)
It seems to be recognized that, for the purpose of
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adjudicating on questions of privilege, neither House is by itself entitled to claim the supennacy over the ordinary courts of justice which was enjoyed by the undivided High Court of Parliament. The supremacy of Parliament, consisting of the King and the two Houses, is a legislative supremacy which has nothing to do with the privilege jurisdiction of either House acting singly.
(2)
It is admitted by both Houses that, since either House can by itself add to the law, neither House can by its own declaration create a new privilege. This implies that privilege is objective and its extent ascertainable, and reinforces the doctrine that it is known by the courts.
On the other hand, the courts admit:
(3)
That the control of each House over its internal proceedings is absolute and cannot be interfered with by the courts.
(4)
That a committal for contempt by either House is in practice within its exclusive jurisdiction, since the facts constituting the alleged contempt need not be stated on the warrant of committal [May's Parliamentary Practice: p. 173]."
84. It is a tribute to the remarkable English genius for finding pragmatic ad hoc solutions to problems which appear to be irreconcilable by adopting the conventional method of give and take. The result of this process has been, in the words of May, that the House of Commons has not for a hundred years refused to submit its privileges to the decision of the courts, and so, it may be said to have given practical recognition to the jurisdiction of the courts over the existence and extent of its privileges. On the other hand, the courts have always, at any rate in the last resort, refused to interfere in the application by the House of any of its recognized privileges [May's Parliamentary Practice, pp. 173-74]. That broadly stated, is the position of powers and privileges claimed by the House of Commons."
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RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 385
59. Sarkar J. in his separate judgment in the same case was ad idem with the majority opinion in this context. Rejecting the contentions based on the observations in Bradlaugh, he observed at page 508 as under:"This passage should suffice to illustrate the nature of the dispute. It will not be profitable at all, and indeed I think it will be 'mischievous', to enter upon a discussion of that dispute for it will only serve to make it turbid, by raking up impurities which have settled down, a stream which has run clear now for years. Furthermore that dispute can never arise in this country for here it is undoubtedly for the courts to interpret the Constitution and, therefore, Article 194(3). It follows that when a question arises in this country under that article as to whether the House ofCommons possessed a particular privilege at the commencement of the Constitution, that question must be settled, and settled only, by the Courts of law. There is no scope of the dreaded "dualism" appearing here, that is, courts entering into a controversy with a House of a legislature as to what its privileges are. I think what I have said should suffice to explain the nature of the privileges for the purposes of the present reference and I will now proceed to discuss the privileges of the Assembly that are in question in this case, using that word in the sense of rights ancillary to the main function of the legislature."
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60. His conclusions to above effect were settled in view of the legal position in England, as is clear from the observations at page 522 of his Judgment, which read as under:-" "All privileges of the House of Commons are based on law. That law is known as Lex Parliamenti. Hence privileges are matters which the House of Commons possesses as of right. In Stockdale v. Hansard, [112 E. R. 1112] all the Judges held that the rights of the House of Commons are based on Lex Parliamenti and that law like any other law, is a law of the land which the courts are entitled
to administer." 61. The case State of Karnataka v. Union of India, [ 1977] 4 SCC 608
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decided by a Constitution Bench (seven Judges) of this Court finally clinched the issue beyond the pale of any doubts. The case had arisen against the backdrop of appointment by the Central Government of a Comn1ission of Inquiry against the then Chief Minister of Karnataka. The State of Karnataka filed a suit in this court, inter alia, for a declaration that the appointment of the Commission was illegal, in as much as the terms of reference of the Inquiry Commission covered matters falling exclusively within the sphere of the State's legislative and executive power on which basis, amongst others, it was contended that the federal structure implicit and accepted as an inviolable basic feature of the Constitution was being abridged. Some arguments in the context of this controversy were founded on the powers and privileges of the legislature of the State under Article 194 of the Constitution. Examining these arguments, Beg CJ.· in his judgment observed as under:"63. Now, what learned Counsel for the plaintiff seemed to suggest was that Ministers, answerable to a Legislature were governed by a separate law which exempted them from liabilities under the ordinary law. This was never the Law in England. And, it is not so here. Our Constitution leaves no scope for such arguments, based on a confusion concerning the "powers" and "privileges" of the House of Commons mentioned in Articles 105(3) and 194(3). Our Constitution vests only legislative power in Parliament as well as in the State Legislatures. A House of Parliament or State Legislature cannot try anyone or any case directly, as a Court of Justice can, but it can proceed quasi-judicially in cases of contempts of its authority and take up motions concerning its "privileges" and "immunities" because, in doing so, it only seeks removal of obstructions to the due performance of its legislative functions. But, if any question ofjurisdiction arises as to whether a matter falls here or not, it has to be decided by the ordinary courts in appropriate proceedings. " (Emphasis supplied) 62. In view of the above clear enunciation of law by Constitutional Benches of this court in case after case, there ought not be any doubt left that whenever Parliament, or for that matter any State legislature, claims any power or privilege in terms of the provisions contained in Article 105(3), or
RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 387
Article 194(3) as the case may be, it is the court which has the authority and the jurisdiction to examine, on grievance being brought before it, to find out if the particular power or privilege that has been claimed or asserted by the legislature is one that was contemplated by the said constitutional provisions or, to put it simply, if it was such a power or privilege as can be said to have been vested in the House of Commons of the Parliament of United Kingdom as on the date of commencement of the Constitution of India so as to become available to the Indian legislatures.
Historical perspective from England 63. To find out the basis of House of Commons possessing the right of expulsion of its members, it is necessary to examine the historical perspective of preliminary powers and privileges and immunities. For finding out the roots of powers, privileges and immunities of House of Commons, it is necessary to refer to the views of constitutional authors mentioned hereinbefore. 64. The term 'privilege in law' is defined as immunity or an exemption from some duty, burden, attendance or liability conferred by special grant in derogation of common right. The term is derived from an expression 'privilegium' which means a law specially passed in favour of or against a particular person.
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65. May, in his "Parliamentary Practice", has defined parliamentary privilege as "the sum of the peculiar rights enjoyed by each House collectively as a constituent part of the High Court of Parliament, and by members of each House individually, without which they could not discharge . their functions, and which exceed those possessed by other bodies of individuals''. Thus, privilege, though not part of the law of the land, is to a certain extent an exemption from the ordinary law. 66. Rutledge, in his "Procedure of the House of Commons" [Volume I, page 46), defined privileges as "the sum of the fundamental rights of the House and of its individual members as against the prerogatives of the Crown, the authority of the courts oflaw, and the special rights of the House of Lords". 67. The origin of parliamentary privileges is inextricably intertwined
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with the specific history of the institution of Parliament in England, and more specifically with the battle between Parliament and the English Monarch for political control in the 17th century. An understanding of the manner in which the concept of parliamentary privilege developed, therefore, requires a sound understanding of the institutional history of Parliament in the United Kingdom. 68. Parliament in the United Kingdom emerged in the Thirteenth Century. By 14th century, Parliament had begun to exercise a small measure of judicial power. It took on the role of a court in relation to treason and related matters. In 1376, Parliament, specifically the Commons, had taken upon itself the power of impeachment of the King's servants. Thus, the Lords could hear appeals of treason and Bills of Attainder where the accuser was the King. The long struggle of the British subjects to bring about a parliamentary democracy involved royal concessions, people's resistance, claims against Crown prerogatives, execution of Monarchs and restoration of Parliament, struggles, advances and retreats, and it is through these turbulent times that the House of Commons emerged as a representative form of government. 69. The origin of some of the Parliamentary privileges preceded Parliament itself and was part of the King's peace, common to all his subjects, but in special measure shared by his servants. The privilege of freedom of speech eventually came to be statutorily recognized by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights Act, 1688. 70. May (23rd :edn., pp.78, 79, 83, 89, 90) describes the historical development of privileges as follows:""At the commencement of every Parliament it has been the custom for the Speaker, in the name, and on the behalf of the Commons, to lay claim by humble petition to their ancient and undoubted rights and privileges; particularly to freedom of speech in debate, freedom from arrest, freedom of access to Her Majesty whenever occasion shall require; and that the most favourable construction should be placed upon all their proceedings .... Freedom of Speech - The first claim in the Speaker's petition is for freedom of speech in debate. By the latter part of the fifteenth
RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 389
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century, the Commons of England seems to have enjoyed an undefined right to freedom of speech, as a matter or tradition rather than by virtue of a privilege sought and obtained ... FREEDOM FROM ARREST - The second of the Speaker's customary petitions on behalf of the Commons at the beginning of a Parliament is for freedom from arrest. The development of this privilege is in some ways linked to that of other privileges. Arrest was frequently the consequence of the unsuccessful assertion of freedom of speech, for example .... FREEDOM OF ACCESS -The third of the Speaker's petitions is for freedom of access to Her Majesty whenever occasion shall require. This claim is medieval (probably fourteenth century) in origin, and in an earlier form seems to have been sought in respect of the Speaker himself and to have encompassed also access to the Upper House....
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FAVOURABLE CONSTRUCTION - The final petition which the speaker makes is that the most favourable construction should be placed upon all the House's proceedings ... PRIVILEGE WITH RESPECT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE HOUSE - It is a privilege of the House of Commons to provide for its own proper constitution as established by law. The origins of this privilege are to be found in the sixteenth century."
71. In the UP Assembly (supra) Case, while dealing with questions relating to Powers, Privileges and Immunities of State Legislatures, it was observed as under:-
"69 .... Parliamentary privilege, according to May, is the sum of the peculiar rights enjoyed by each House collectively as a constituent part of the High Court of Parliament, and by members of each House individually, without which they could not discharge their functions, and which exceed those possessed by other bodies or individuals. Thus privilege, though part of the law of the land, is to a certain extent an exemption from the ordinary law. The particular privileges of the House of Commons have been defined as "the
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sum of the fundamental rights of the House and of its individual Members as against the prerogatives of the Crown, the authority of the ordinary courts of law and the special rights of the House of Lords". There is a distinction between privilege and function, though it is not always apparent. On the whole, however, it is more convenient to reserve the tenn "privilege" to certain fundamental rights of each House which are generally accepted as necessary for the exercise of its constitutional functions. The distinctive mark of a privilege is its ancillary character. The privileges of Parliament are rights which are "absolutely necessity for the due execution of its powers". They are enjoyed by individual Members, because the House cannot perfonn its functions without unimpeded use of the services of its Members; and by each House for the protection of its Members and the vindication of its own authority and dignity [May's Parliamentary Practice, pp. ·42-43]." 72. According to May, origin of the modem Parliament in England consisted in its judicial functions. It was Maitland who was the first to point out in his introduction to the Parliament Roll of 1305 that Parliament at that time was the King's "Great Court" and thus, inter alia, the highest Court of royal justice. It is now generally accepted that a strong judicial streak in the character of the earliest Parliament was noticeable throughout the earlier period of English history, reflected by the fact that dispensation of justice was one of its chief functions in the eyes of the subjects of the realm, aside from the political and economic business. 73. Out of the two chambers of Parliament of United Kingdom, the House of Lords has continued till the present times as the Court of Judicature, as part of which function it has the power to sit as a Court during prorogation and dissolution. The final appellate jurisdiction vests in the Lords and, in matters of impeachment, the Lords are the sole judges of the crime in proceedings that involve the other chamber, the House of Commons, as the accusers or advocates. 74. While the House of Lords would claim its powers and privileges on the basis of theory of inheritance and Divine Right of Kings, the House of Commons was constrained to wage a fierce struggle against the prerogatives of the Crown and of the House of Lords to assert and claim its rightful place. It was almost a fight for its existence in which the House
RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 391 ~'t
of Commons was pitted against not only the Crown and the House of Lords, but also the judicature which was regarded as a creature of the King and which wing was subordinate to the House of Lords that happened to be the main opponent of the House of Commons. 75. The dust raised by the bitter struggle waged by the House of Commons to assert its privileges finally settled when equilibrium was reached in the 19th century with limits of privileges being prescribed and accepted by Parliament, the Crown and the courts in England. The position that emerged against this backdrop has been noticed by this court in the following words in the UP Assembly (supra) Case:"The two Houses are thus of equal authority in the administration of a common body of privileges. Each House, as a constituent part of Parliament, exercised its own privileges independently of the other. They are enjoyed, however, not by any separate right peculiar to each, but solely by virtue of the law and custom of Parliament. Generally speaking, all privileges properly so called, appertain equally to both Houses. They are declared and expounded by each House; and breaches of privilege are adjudged and censured by each; but essentially, it is still the law of Parliament that is thus administered. It is significant that although either House may expound the law of Parliament, and vindicate its own privileges, it is agreed that no new privilege can be created. This position emerged as a result of the historic resolution passed by the House of Lords in 1704. This resolution declared "that neither House of Parliament have power, by any vote or declaration, to create to themselves new pri~ileges, not warranted by the known laws and customs of Parliament". This resolution was communicated by the House of Lords to Commons and assented to by them [May's Parliamentary Practice, p.47]. Thus, there can be no doubt that by its resolutions, the House of Commons cannot add to the list of its priviieges and ~owers." 76. The Resolution of 1704, mentioned in the passage extracted above, had been adopted by the House of Lords in answer to an earlier resolution passed by the House of Commons declaring its intent to treat the conduct of any person in moving the court for relief in matters mentioned by the resolution of the House of Commons as amounting to its contempt.
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77. The main privileg(!s which are claimed by the House of Commons were noticed at length at page 462 of the judgment in the UP Assembly (supra) Case, as under:-
"72 ...Freedom of speech is a privilege essential to every free council or legislature, and that is claimed by both the Houses as a basic privilege. This privilege was from 1541 included by established practice in the petition of the Commons to the King at the commencement of the Parliament. It is remarkable that notwithstanding the repeated recognition of this privilege, the Crown and the Commons were not always agreed upon its limits. This privilege received final statutory recognition after the Revolution of 1688. By the 9th Article of the Bill of Rights, it was declared "that the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament [May's Parliamentary Practice, p. 52]". 73. Amongst the other privileges are: the right to exclude strangers, the right to control publication of debates and proceedings, the right to exclusive cognizance of proceedings in Parliament, the right of each House to be the sole judge of the lawfulness of its own proceedings, and the right implied to punish its own Members for their conduct in Parliament [ibid, p. 52-53). 74. Besides these privileges, both Houses of Parliament were possessed of the privilege of freedom from :irrest or molestation, and from being impleaded, which was claimed by the Commons on ground of prescription ... " 78. The privilege of freedom of speech under Article 9 of the Bill of Rights includes the freedom of the member· to state whatever he thinks fit in debate, howsoever offensive it may be to the feelings, or injurious to the character, of individuals. He is protected by his privilege from any action for libel, as well as from any question or molestation [May's Parliamentary Practice, 23rd edn., pp. 96-97). The privilege of freedom from arrest has never been allowed to interfere with the administration of criminal justice or emergency legislation.
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RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 393
79. In early days of its struggle the House of Commons would assert a claim to all kinds of privileges for itself and its members but in the course of time many of such privileges either fell into disuse or faded out of existence or came to be controlled by legislation. Examples in this context can be given of the privilege of freedom from being impleaded, limitation put by the Parliamentary Privilege Act, 1770 on the freedom from arrest and the privilege of exemption from jury service. What is important for purposes at hand is that the major privileges properly described as privileges essential for the efficient functioning of the House still continue in force. 80. As per May's Parliamentary Practice [23rd edn., pp. 128] contempt came to be defined as "any act or omission which obstructs or impedes either House of Parliament in the performance of its functions or which obstructs or impedes any member or officer of such House in the discharge of his duty, or which has a tendency, directly or indirectly, to produce such results even though there is no precedent of the offence".
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81. Power to punish and commit for contempt is one of the privileges asserted by both Houses of Parliament in United Kingdom. In the context of power to punish for contempt, this Court found in the UP Assembly (supra) Case (at page 461) as under:-
" .... Since the decision of the Privy Council in Kielley v. Carson,
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[4 Moore P.C. 63] it has been held that this power is inherent in the House of Lords and the House of Commons, not as a body with legislative functions, but as a descendant of the High Court of Parliament and by virtue of the lex et consuetudo parliamenti [May's Parliamentary Practice, p. 44]. Historically, as originally the weaker body, the Commons had a fiercer and more prolonged struggle for the assertion of their own privileges, not only against the Crown and the courts, but also against the Lords. Thus the concept of privilege which originated in the special protection against the King began to be claimed by the Commons as customary rights, and some of these claims in the course of repeated efforts to assert them hardened into legally recognised "privileges". 82. As has been noticed earlier, the historic origin of the doctrine of privileges of the legislature in England is founded on its judicial functions. The House of Lords has always claimed itself to be a Court of Record and
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as such having the inherent authority and power not only to imprison but also to impose fines in matters of contempt. But then, its position as a Court of Record does not inure, according to Lord Kenyon, "when exercising a legislative capacity". According to May's Parliamenta1y Practice, the House of Commons at one point of time in the history had also claimed to be a Court of Record, but this position has never been finally determined. Be that as it may, as observed in the UP Assembly (supra) Case (at pp. 465466), on the authority of May's Parliamentary Practice, the genesis of the power of commitment, "the key stone of Parliamentary privileges", as possessed by the House of Commons, arises out of "the medieval inability to conceive of a constitutional authority otherwise than as in some sense a court of justice". 83. The medieval concept of Parliament in England primarily as a court of justice, the 'High Court of Parliament' gave rise to the firm belief that in order to defend the dignity of Parliament against disrespect and affronts, there must vest in it a power to commit, without which the privileges of Parliament would not exist. On the penal jurisdiction of the House arising from this, May in his "Parliamentary Practice" [23rd edn. pp. 91-92] would observe as follows:"The Lords derived an independent power to punish from their original membership of the Curia Regis. Immemorial constitutional antiquity was not similarly available to the Commons, and indeed its possession of penal jurisdiction was challenged on this ground as late as the nineteenth century, and has been defended by arguments which confused legislative with judicial jurisdiction. The difficulties the Commons experienced in proving its case to be a Court of Record (see p. 161 }-an issue never determined at law were connected with these problems. Yet whatever the legal or constitutional niceties, in practice the House on many occasions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries exercised its power to impose fines (seep. 161) and imprison offenders. These offenders might include Members of the House itself or non-members, the latter comprising sheriffs, magistrates and even judges of the superior courts." 84. Almost to ensure that there be not any doubts entertained in this behalf in any quarter, while asserting its right to commit offenders on the
RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 395 . ...,
same terms as the House of Lords, it was said in the House of Commons in 1593 as under:-
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"This court for its dignity and highness hath privilege, as all other courts have. And, as it is above all other courts, so it hath privilege above all other courts; and as it hath privilege and jurisdiction too, so hath it also Coercion and Compulsion; otherwise the jurisdiction is nothing in a court, if it hath no Coercion." 85. The House of I .ords would eventually concede this power in favour of House of Commons at the conference between the two Houses as noticed in the case of Ashby v. White, [L.J. (1701-05), 714]. This has ever since been consistently recognized even by the courts of law in England. The origin of this power of commitment for contempt, judicial in its nature, is thus traceable to the conception of Parliament as primarily a court of justice - the "High Court of Parliament". 86. In matters concerning import of powers and privileges of the House of Commons unto the legislature in India, while examining the issue, albeit from the limited concern of the availability to State legislature under Article 194(3) of the power of commitment for contempt, this court in the UP Assembly Case (supra) had administered a note of caution that must hold good even for purposes at hand. At page 591 of the judgment, it was observed thus:-
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"I 2 I. In this connection, it is essential to bear in mind the fact that the status, of a superior Court of Record which was accorded to the House of Commons, is based on historical facts to which we have already referred. It is a fact of English history that the Parliament was discharging judicial functions in its early career. It is a fact of both historical and constitutional history in England that the House of Lords still continues to be the highest Court of· law in the country. It is a fact of constitutional history even today that both the Houses possess powers of impeachment and attainder. It is obvious, we think, that these historical facts cannot be introduced in India by any legal fiction. Appropriate legislative provisions do occasionally introduce legal fictions, but there is a limit to the power of law to introduce such fictions. Law can introduce fictions as to legal rights and obligations and as to the retrospective operation of provisions made in that behalf, but legal
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fiction can hardly introduce historical facts from one country to another." (Emphasis supplied) 87. In the UP Assembly (supra) Case, it was settled by this court that a broad claim that all the powers enjoyed by the House of Commons at the commencement of the Constitution of India vest in an Indian legislature cannot be accepted in its entirety because there are some powers which cannot obviously be so claimed. In this context, the following observations appearing at page 448 of the judgment should suffice:" .... Take the privilege of freedom of access which is exercised by the House of Commons as a body and through its Speaker "to have at all times the right to petition, counsel, or remonstrate with their Sovereign through their chosen representative and have a favourable construction placed on his words was justly regarded by the Commons as fundamental privilege" [Sir Erskine May's Parliamentary Practice (16th ed.) p.86]. It is hardly necessary to point out that the House cannot claim this privilege. Similarly, the privilege to pass acts of attainder and impeachments cannot be claimed by the House. The House of Commons also claims the privilege in regard to its own Constitution. This privilege is expressed in three ways, first by tke order of new writs to fill vacancies that arise in the Commons in the course of a parliament; secondly, by the trial of controverted elections; and thirdly, by determining the qualifications of its members in cases of doubt [ibid, p. 175]. This privilege again, admittedly, cannot be claimed by the House. Therefore, it would not be correct to say that all powers and privileges which were possessed by the House of Commons at the relevant time can be claimed by the House." 88. The historical background of parliamentary privileges in India is to be understood with reference to history of England and the Constitutional history of the Constitution of India. Indian Constitutional History
The East India Company Act, 1784 formed the basis of the Indian Constitution till 1858. It created Commissioners for the affairs of India to
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be appointed at home by the King. This was followed by the Charter Act, 1833 that provided for a legisfative authority. In this dispensation, the meetings of the Governor-General's Council for law-making were distinguished from the meetings of the Council for discharging other, i.e., executive functions. Macaulay, as Law Member of the Governor General Council, against the backdrop of the insistence by the Executive Councilor of the Governor General's Council that all the drafts of laws should be fully considered by the Executive Council before they were laid before the Legislative Council for final passage, in his speech of 13th June, 1835, described the deliberztive chamber as the "supreme Legislative Council", and said "when the Parliament gave us the power of legislating it gave us also, by necessary implication, all the powers without which it is impossible to legislate well", referring in this context particularly to power "to correspond directly with the subordinate Governments"; "directly call for information from any public functionary"; and "require the attendance of the military or financial secretary". An expansion of the Legislative Council of India was provided by the Charter Act of 1853, followed by certain further additions by the Acts of 1854 and 1861. 90. The period 1915-1950 indeed marks a definite advance in the history of the development of parliamentary privilege in India. By the Government of India Act, 1915, the entire position of Parliamentary privilege that obtained before that time was consolidated. The Government of India Act, 1915, provided in Section 63 that the Indian Legislature shall consist of the Governor-General and "two chambers, namely, the Council of State and the Legislative Assembly". 91. Section 67 of the Act related to the business and proceedings of the Indian Legislature. Sub-Section (1) enabled provision to be made by rules, inter alia, "for regulating the course of business and the preservation of order in the chambers of the Indian legislature"; "as to the persons to preside at the meetings of the Legislative Assembly in the absence of the president and the deputy president"; for "quorum"; and "for prohibiting or regulating the asking of questions on, and the discussion of any subject specified in the rules". SubSection (6) allowed "Standing orders" to be made providing for the conduct of business and the procedure, to be followed in either chamber of the Indian Legislature in so-far-as these matters are not provided for by rules made under this Act. Sub-Section (7) declared "Subject to the rules and standing orders affecting the chamber" that there shall be "freedom of speech in both
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chambers of the Indian legislature"; and that no person shall "be liable to any proceedings in any court by reason of his speech or vote in either chamber, or by reason of anything contained in any official report of the proceedings of either chamber". 92. The Government of India Act, 1919 brought about material changes in the Government of India Act, 1915. The legislature now ceased to be part of the Executive and stood on its own. It was no longer an expanded Governor-General's Council with additional members. The Governor General and the Executive Councilor ceased to be ex-officio members of the Legislative Council. The bicameral Indian Legislature would consist of both nominated and elected members. 93. Section 65 of the Government oflndia Act, 1915, as amended in 1919, provided for the powers of the Indian Legislature, subject to the specific prohibition that it shall not have the powers, inter alia, to make laws "unless expressly so authorized by Act of Parliament (of United Kingdom)", amongst others, "affecting the authority of Parliament, or any part of the unwritten laws or constitution of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland whereon may depend in any degree the allegiance of any persons to the Crown of the United Kingdom, or affecting the sovereignty or domination of the Crown over any part of British India". The powers of legislation of the local legislatures were defined more or less similarly in Section 80 A. 94. 'Parliamentary Privilege in India' by Prititosh Roy (1991 ), in Chapter4, titled 'Historical Background of Parliamentary Privilege in India (19151950)' mentions, at page 53, about the Report dated 3rd December, 1924 of the Reforms Inquiry Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Alexander Muddiman (the Home Member), which included as members Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. Jinnah, which had examined the issue of powers of the Indian Legislature and gave vent to the hope and aspiration of bringing legislatures in India "at par with the House of Commons" and that "eventually no doubt similar provision will be made in the Constitution of British India". On the basis of the Report, the Indian Legislature passed the Legislative Members Exemption Act, 1925 (Act XXIII of 1925) which granted two new parliamentary privileges; viz. the privilege of exemption of the legislator from jury service and the privilege of freedom from arrest. These new privileges would be reflected in the Code of Criminal procedure 1898 by incorporation in Section
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323 and insertion of Section 135A respectively. 95. Prititosh Roy mentions in "Parliamentary Privilege in India" [p-55), the Legislative Assembly created under the Government of India Act, l 919 witnessed a number of instances wherein the privileges of a legislative body were asserted. These include the adjournment motion moved on 21st January, l 927 by Pt. Motilal Nehru to discuss the conduct of the Government in detaining Shri Satyendra Chandra Mitra, an elected member of the House, on the ground it tantamounts to a breach of the Privileges of the House and the adjournment motion in the Legislative Assembly moved by Shri Gaya Prasad Singh on 4th September, 1928 agaim,t the Editor of the Times oflndia having made an attack on the President. of the House, though disallowed but with the President having held that it is the inherent right of any assembly to defend itself against outside attacks and it is perfectly open in a proper cause for the House to table a substantive motion and pass a vote of censure or condemnation on the attacker. 96. Prititosh Roy also mentions at Page 56 an interesting episode involving the Indian Press Act, 1931 that was enacted on 13th February, 1932. In its context, a question arose before the Legislative Assembly under the Government of India Act, 1919 regarding breach of the privileges upon a notice of motion having appeared in the Press given by a member. Acknowledging that there was a convention in the House of Commons against release by a member to the Press for publication questions for resolutions before they are admitted by the chair and that breach thereof was treated as a serious breach of the privilege of the House of Commons which had ample powers to deal with the member in question, the President of Indian Legislative Assembly noted that "unfortunately neither this House nor the Spokesmen have such powers" and commended that "this well established convention, which is observed in the House of Commons should also be observed as one of the conventions of this House". 97. Prititosh Roy refers at Pages 58-59 to Debates oflndian Legislative Assembly [22nd January, 1935, p. 81 ff], which quote yet another incident that needs to be taken note of. Shri N.C. Bardaloi had raised an issue about the conduct of the Government in preventing Mr. Sarat Chandra Bose, an elected Member of the House, from attending to his duties as Member and thereby seriously infringing the privileges of the House. Sir N.N. Sircar, the then Law Member of the Government of India replied stating that the House
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had no power to punish for its breach of privilege. 98. The Government of India Act, 1935 came into force on 1st April, 1937 and was operative till 14th August, 1947. Sections 28 and 71 of the Government of India Act, 1935 dealt with the subject of Privileges etc. of members of Federal Legislature and Provincial Legislatures respectively.
99. The provision in Sub-Section (1) of Section 71 extended the freedom of speech and immunity to speech or vote even in the Committees of the Legislature and also covering publication under the authority of a Chamber of the Legislature of the House. Sub-Section (I) of Section 71, inter a/ia, declared that "Subject to the provisions of this Act and to rules and standing orders regulating the procedure of the Legislature there shall be freedom of speech in every Provincial Legislature" and that every member shall be entitled to immunity from "any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote gi'ven by him in the Legislature or any committee thereof'. 100. Sub-Section (2) of Section 71 of the Government of India Act, 1935, for the first time, empowered the Provincial Legislature to pass an Act to define the other privileges of the members and, pending such legislation, the pre-existing privileges were confirmed. Some of the Provincial Legislatures did legislate or attempt to legislate on this subject. Sub-Section (2) of Section 71 was on lines similar to present Article 194 (3). It read as follows:"71.(2) In other respects the privileges of members ofa Chamber of a Provincial Legislature shall be such as may from time to time be defined by Act of the Provincial Legislature, and, until so defined, shall be such as were immediately before the commencement of this Part of this ,A_ct enjoyed by members of the Legislative Council of the Province." IOI. Sub-Section (3) of Section 71 watered down the powers and privileges of Indian Legislatures under the Government of India Act, 1935. It ran as follows:"71.(3) Nothing in any existing Indian Law, and, notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Section, nothing in this Act, shall be construed as conferring, or empowering any Legislature to confer, on a chamber thereof or on both Chambers
RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 401
sitting together or any Committee or officer of the Legislature, the status of a court, or any punitive or disciplinary powers other than the power to remove or exclude persons infringing the rules or standing orders, or otherwise behaving in a disorderly manner." 102. Clearly, the intendment was to restrict the powers and privileges of Indian Legislatures to remedial action for unobstructed functioning, severely restricting, or rather forbidding, the exercise of punitive powers by a House of Legislature. 103. Similar provisions, mutatis mutandis, were made for the Central Legislature, called the Federal Legislature, under Section 28 which, however, never came into force since Part II of the Act of 1935 concerning the Federation of India never became operative. Sub-Section (1) of Section 28 of the Government of India Act, 1935, inter alia, declared that there shall be "freedom of speech" in the Federal Legislature "Subject to the provisions of this Act and to the rules and standing orders regulating the procedure", and that "no member of the legislature shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in the Legislature or any Committee thereof'. 104. Sub-Section (2) of Section 28 of the Government of India Act, 1935, for the first time, empowered the Federal Legislature to pass an Act to define the other privileges of the members and again, pending such legislation, the pre-existing privileges were confirmed. Its language has a resonance of what is employed in present Article 105 (3). It stated as follows:-
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"28. (2). In other respects, the privileges of members of the Chambers shall be such as may from time to time be defined by the Act of the Federal Legislature, and, until so defined, shall be such as were immediately before the establishment of the Federation enjoyed by members of the Indian legislature."
10. Sub-Section (3) of Section 28 was designed to restrict the powers and privileges of Indian Federal Legislature to remedial action for unobstructed functioning. While preventing the legislature from exercising the powers of the Court for any punitive or disciplinary powers, it allowed the limited jurisdiction to remove or exclude the person infringing the rules or standing
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orders or otherwise behaving in a disorderly manner. It read thus:"28. (3). Nothing in any existing Indian Act, and, notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this section, nothing in this act, shall be construed as conferring, or empowering the Federal legislature to confer, on either Chamber or on both Chambers sitting together, or on any committee or officer of the Legislature, the status of the Court, or any punitive or disciplinary powers other than a power to remove or exclude persons infringing the rules or standing orders, or otherwise behaving in a disorderly manner."
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106. It is also necessary to take note of sub-Section (4) of section 28 of Government of India Act, 1935 since it made the intention clear that for punitive action in certain matters the Legislature would have to go before a court. It provided as follows:"28. (4). Provision may be made by an Act of the Federal Legislature for the punishment, on conviction before a court, of persons who refuse to give evidence or produce documents before a committee of a Chamber when duly required by the Chairman of the Committee to do so.
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Provided that any such Act shall have effect subject to such rules for regulating the attendance before such committees of persons who are, or have been, in the service of the Crown in India, and safeguarding confidential matter from disclosure as may be made by the Governor General exercising his individual judgment." 107. Prititosh Roy at Page 71 mentions that the above mentioned provisions were found by the Legislatures to be ineffective and inadequate for upholding the dignity and prestige of the legislature in India and for safeguarding the fight and privileges of Members and officers thereof. This became subject matter of grievance conveyed in a Memorandum by the President of the Indian Legislative Assembly to the Reforms Commissioner of the Government oflndia on 29th January, 1938, raising a demand that the Central as well as Provincial Legislature in India should have among other privileges also "the power to proceed in·contempt like the High Court and inflict punishment on any pe~son who violates the privileges of the House and of the members thereof, or tries to bring the House or the President or
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the Speaker into contempt" and for a request to be made to the Government oflndia to take immediate steps to get Sections 28 and 71 of the Government of India Act, 1935 amended so as to secure for the Central and Provincial Legislatures and the officers and members thereof "all the powers and privileges which are held and enjoyed by the Speaker and members of the British House of Commons". 108. The Indian Independence Act, 1947, which brought freedom from alien rule, made India a full fledged Dominion of the Commonwealth of Nations. The Act conferred, through Section 6(2), sovereign legislative power on the Indian dominion abrogating the Imperial Doctrine of Repugnancy in the following terms:"No law and no provision of any law made by the Legislature of either of the new Dominions (India and Pakistan) shall be void or inoperative on the ground that it is repugnant to the law of England, or to the provisions of this or any existing or future Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom, or to any order, rule or regulation made under any such Act." 109. The Governor General of India issued an Adaptation Order by which, amongst others, the provisions of Section 28 of the Government of India Act, 1935, excepting the sub-Sections (3) and (4), were brought into force for the first time for purposes of dominion legislature,. As a result, aside from the "freedom of speech in the legislature", the law provided that "in other respects the privileges of the members of the domain legislature" shall be such as may from time to time bt: defined by dominion legislature and, until so defined, should be such as were immediately before the establishment of the dominion enjoyed by the members of the Indian legislature. The omission of sub-Section (3) and sub-Section (4) of Section 28 indicated that the restrictions on the exercise of punitive and disciplinary powers by the legislature were being removed.
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110. As a result of the omission of sub-Sections (3) & (4) of Section 28 by the Order, the Central Legislature became entitled to pass any Act on the subject of privileges under sub-Section (2) without any restriction and assume punitive and disciplinary powers similar to those invested in the House of Commons in England. But then, the Central Legislature did not pass any law on privileges in exercise of the enabling powers under Section
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28 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, as adapted after Independence. 111. Dr. Ambedker, the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Constitution, while mooting for the Parliamentary System similar to the one obtaining in England noted, in the course of debates in the Constituent Assembly, that in the latter jurisdiction, the Parliamentary System relies on the daily assessment of responsibility of the executive by Members of Parliament, through questions, resolutions, no-confidence motions and debates and periodic assessment done by the electorate at the time of election; unlike the one in the United States of America a system far more effective than the periodic assessment and far more necessary in a country like India. India thus adopted parliamentary Constitutional traditions. 112. The concept of parliamentary privileges in India in its modem form is indeed one of graft, imported from England. The House of Commons having been accepted by the Constituent Assembly as the model of the legislature, the privileges of that House were transplanted into the Draft Constitution through Articles 105 and 194. 113. Article 85 of the Draft Constitution, which corresponds to present Article 105, contained the following provision with respect to parliamentary privileges:"85. (I) Subject to the .rules and standing orders regulating the procedure of Parliament, there shall be freedom of speech in Parliament
(2) No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the authority of either House of Parliament of any report, paper, votes or proceedings. (3) In other respect, the privileges and immunities of member of the Houses shall be such as may from time to time be defined by Parliament by law, and until so defined, of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom at the commencement of this Constitution.
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(4) The provisions of clauses (1), (2), and (3) shall apply in relation to persons who by virtue of this Constitution have the right to speak in, and otherwise take part in the proceedings of, a House of Parliament as they apply in relation to Members of Parliament."
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114. The reference to the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom provoked comment and intense debate. As is seen from the Constituent Assembly Debates (Volume 8of19.5.1949 page 143-149), Shri H.V. Karnath suggested that draft Article 85 should truly rely upon our own precedents, our own traditions and no importation must be attempted. While commending reference to be made instead to privileges "as were enjoyed by the members of the Dominion Legislature of India immediately before commencement" of the Constitution, he spoke thus:"Sir, my knowledge of the various Constitutions is not as vast or as profound as that of Dr. Ambedkar, but relying on my meagre knowledge of these constitutions, I venture to state that this is the first instance of its kind where reference is made in the Constitution of a free country to certain provisions obtaining in the constitution of another State. I see no valid reason why this should be done. It may be that the rights and privileges which we are going to confer upon the Members of Parliament of free India will be identical with, or more or less similar to, those enjoyed by the Members of the House of Commons in the United Kingdom. But may I ask, Sir, in all humility "ls it necessary or is it desirable, when we are drafting our own Constitution that we should lay down explicitly in an Article that the provisions as regards this matter will be like those of the House of Commons in England?"
It may be argued in support of this proposition that there is !lothing derogatory to the dignity of our Constitution or of our State in making reference to the United Kingdom. It may be further reinforced by the argument that now we have declared India as a full member of the Commonwealth, certainly there should be no objection, or any sort of compunction in referring to the House of Commons in England. But may I suggest for the serious consideration of the House as to whether it adds - it may not be derogatory, or detract from the dignity of the Constitution - but does it add to the dignity of the Constitution? We say that such and such thing should be what it is in the United Kingdom or in
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America. Will it not be far better, far happier for us to rely upon our own precedents, or our own traditions here in India than to import something from elsewhere and incorporate it by reference in the Constitution? Is it not sufficient to say that the rights and privileges and immunities of Members shall be such as have been enjoyed by the Members of the Constituent Assembly or Dominion Legislature just before the commencement of this Constitution? Personally, I think, Sir, this would be far better. I venture to hope that my honourable friends in this House will be inclined to the same view that instead of quoting or citing the example of the United Kingdom it would be far better for us to rely upon the tradition we have built up here. Surely, nobody will dispute the fact that the privileges and immunities enjoyed by us here today are in no way inferior to, or worse than, those enjoyed by Members of the House of Commons in the United Kingdom. As a matter of fact, I think most of us do not know what are the privileges of the Members of the House of Commons. We know very well what our privileges at present are. Therefore, Sir, it is far better to build on our own solid ground, rather than rely on the practices obtaining in other countries ...... "
115. Similar views were expressed in the course of the debate, amongst others, by Shri Jaspat Roy Kapoor, Prof. K.T. Shah, Prof. Shibban Lal Saxena, Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad, Dr. P.S. Deshmukh. Prof. K. T. Shah had also proposed insertion of clause (5) in draft Article 85 in the following form:-
"In all matters of the privileges of the House of Parliament or of .members thereof the House concerned shall be the sole Judge and any order, decree or sentence duly passed by that House shall be enforced by the officers or under the authority thereof'.
116. Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Iyer, while replying to the criticism, stated thus:-
"Sir, in regard to the Article as it stands, two objections have been raised, one based upon sentiment and the other upon the advisability of making a reference to the privileges of a House in another State with which the average citizen or the Members of Parliament here
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RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 407
may not be acquainted with. In the first place, so far as the question of sentiment is concerned, I might share it to some extent, but it is also necessary to appreciate it from the practical point of view. It is common knowledge that the widest privileges are exercised by Members of Parliament in England. If the privileges are confined to the existing privileges of legislatures in India as at present constituted, the result will be that a person cannot be punished for contempt of the House. The actual question arose in Calcutta as to whether a person can be punished for contempt of the Provincial Legislature or other legislatures in this country. It has been held that there is no power to punish for contempt any person who is guilty of contempt of the provincial or even the Central Legislature, whereas the Parliament in England has the inherent right to punish for contempt. The question arose in the Dominions and in the Colonies and it has been held that by reason of the wide wording in the Australia Commonwealth Act as well as in the Canadian Act, the Parliament in both places have powers similar to the powers possessed by the Parliament in England and therefore have the right to punish for contempt. Are you going to deny to yourself that power? That is the question. I will deal with the second objection. If you have the time and if you have the leisure . to formulate all the privileges in a compendious form, it will be well and good. I believe a Committee constituted by the Speaker on the legislative side found it very difficult to formulate all the privileges, unless they went in detail into the whole working of parliamentary institutions in England and the time was not sufficient before the legislature for that purpose and accordingly the Committee was not able to give any effective advice to the Speaker in regard to this matter. I speak, subject to correction, because I was present at one stage and was not present at a later stage. Under these circumstances I submit there is absolutely no question of infra dig. We are having the English language. We are having our Constitution in the English language side by side with Hindi for the time being. Why object only to reference to the privileges in England? The other point is that there is nothing to prevent the Parliament from setting up the proper machinery for formulating
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privileges. The article leaves wide scope for it. "In other respects, the privileges and immunities of members of the Houses shall be such as may from time to time be defined by Parliament by law and, until so defined, shall be such as are enjoyed by the members of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom at the commencement of this Constitution." That is all what the article says. It does not in any way fetter your discretion. You may enlarge the privileges, you may curtail the privileges, you may have a different kind of privileges. You may start on your own journey without reference to the Parliament of Great Britain. There is nothing to fetter the discretion of the future Parliament of India. Only as a temporary measure, the privileges of the House of Commons are made applicable to this House. Far from it being infra dig, it subordinates the reference to privileges obtained by the Members of Parliament in England to the privileges which may be confe1Ted by this Parliament by its own enactments. Therefore, there is no infra dig in the wording of clause (3). This practice has been followed in Australia, in Canada and in other Dominions with advantage and it has secured complete freedom of speech and also the omnipotence of the House in every respect. Therefore, we need not fight shy of borrowing to this extent, when we are ~orrowing the English language and when we are using constitutional expressions which are common to England. You are saying that it will be a badge of slavery, a badge of serfdom, if we say that the privileges shall be the same as those enjoyed by the members of the House of Commons. It is far from that. Today the Parliament of the United Kingdom is exercising sway over Great Britain, over the Dominions and others. To say that you are as good as Great Britain is not a badge of inferiority but an assertion of your own self-respect and also of the omnipotence of your Parliament. Therefore, I submit, Sir, there is absolutely no force in the objection made as to the reference to the British Parliament. Under these circumstances, far from this article being framed in a spirit of servility or slavery or subjection to Britain, it is framed in a spirit of self-assertion and an assertion that our country and our Parliament are as great as the Parliament of Great Britain. " (Emphasis supplied)
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RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 409
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117. Dr. Ambedkar when invited by the President to speak, expressed satisfaction with the reply already given by Mr. Alladi by saying "Mr. Alladi and others have already given the reply, and I will be saying mostly the same thing, probably in a different way".
i
118. The amendment moved by Prof. Shah was negatived by the Constituent Assembly on 19th May, 1948. After adoption of a minor amendment, for including the Committees of the Houses of Parliament, Draft Article 85 (present Article 105) was adopted and added to the Constitution. 119. Article 169 of the Draft Constitution, which corresponds to present Article 194, contained similar provision with respect to privileges of the State Legislatures and came up for discussion before the Constituent Assembly on 3rd June, 1949. The speeches made on the occasion are available at pages 578-584 of the Constituent Assembly Debates (Volume 8). Shri H.V. Karnath took exception in the following words:-
....,
..,
"Mr. President, I shall, by your leave, say a few words with respect to clause (3) of this Article. I do not propose to repeat what I said on an earlier occasion when we were discussing the corresponding clause relating to the privileges of members of the Central Parliament. But I should like to invite the attention of Dr. Ambedkar and also of the H_ouse to the reaction among the people as well as in the Press to the clause that we adopted on that occasion. I have no doubt in my own mind that Dr. Ambedkar keeps his eyes and ears open, and cares to read some of the important papers daily or at least has them read to him daily. Soon after this clause relating to the privileges of Members of Parliament was adopted in this House, most of the Press was critical of the way in which we had dealt with the matter ............................. Britain, as the House is aware, has an unwritten Constitution though this particular measure may be written down in some document. .............. Many of the Members here who spoke on that occasion remarked that they did not know what the privileges of the Members of the House of Commons were, ...... .... They could have at least drafted a schedule and incorporated it at the end of the Constitution to show what the privileges of the members of the House of Commons were. That was not done, and simply a clause was inserted that the privileges
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obtaining there will obtain here as well. Nobody knows what those are, and a fortiori nobody knows what privileges we will have. Our Parliament presided over by Mr. Mavalankar has adopted certain rules of business and procedure tentatively, and has also appointed or is shortly going to appoint a Committee of Privileges. I wonder why we could not have very usefully and wisely adopted in our Constitution something to this effect, that whatever privileges we enjoy as Members of the Central Parliament will be enjoyed by Members of the Legislature in the States. If at all there was a need for reference to any other Constitution. I think it was very unwise on the part of the Drafting Committee to refer to an unwritten Constitution, viz., the Constitution of Great Britain. There is the written Constitution of the U.S.A., and some of us are proud of the fact that we have borrowed very much from the American Constitution. May I ask Dr. Ambedkar whether the privileges of the Members of the House of Commons in the United Kingdom are in any way superior to or better than the privileges of the Members of the House of Representatives of the United States? If they are, I should like to have enlightenment on that point. If they are not, I think the reference to an unwritten Constitution is not at all desirable. .......... .If necessary let us put in a schedule to our Constitution, and say here in this Article that the privileges and rights are as specified in the Schedule at the end.... I would any day prefer a definite schedule in the Constitution showing what privileges shall be enjoyed by Members of the Legislatures and of Parliament. This particular clause, to my mind, should be recast. We have passed one clause on an earlier occasicn, but that is no reason why we should perpetrate the same mistake over and over again. I would, therefore, beg of Dr. Ambedkar and his wise team of the Drafting Committee and the House to revise this clause, and if necessary, to go back to the other clause, if they are convinced of the wisdom of this course, and: revise that also ~ccordingly, and proceed in a saner and a wiser manner." 120. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Chairman of the Drafting Committee, trying to allay doubts, answered the criticism in the following manner:;-.
"Sir, not very long ago this very matter was debated in this House, when we were discussing the privileges of Parliament and I thought
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RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 411
!hat as the House had accepted the Article dealing with the privileges and immunities of Parliament no further debate would follow when we were really reproducing the very same provision with regard to the State Legislature. But as the debate has been raised and as my friend Mr. Karnath said that even the press is agitated, I think it is desirable that I should state what exactly is the reason for the course adopted by the Drafting Committee, especially as when the debate took place last time I did not intervene in order to make the position clear. I do not know how many Members really have a conception of what is meant by privilege. Now the privilege which we think of fall into two different classes. There are first of all, the privileges belonging to individual members, such as for instance freedom of speech, immunity from arrest while discharging their duty. But that is not the whole thing covered by privilege.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx .......... It is not easy, as I said, to define what are the acts and deeds which may be deemed to bring Parliament into disgrace. That would require a considerable amount of discussion and examination. That is one reason why we did not think of enumerating these privileges and immunities.
But there is not the slightest doubt in my mind and I am sure also in the mind of the Drafting Committee that Parliament must have certain privileges, when that Parliament would be so much exposed to calumny, to unjustified criticism that the Parliamentary institution in this country might be brought down to utter contempt and may lose all the respect which parliamentary institutions should have from the citizens for whose benefit they operate. I have referred to one difficulty why it has not been possible to categorise. Now I should mention some other difficulties which we have felt.
It seems to me, if the proposition was accepted that the Act itself should enumerate the privileges of Parliament, we would have
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to follow three courses. One is to adopt them in the Constitution, namely to set out in detail the privileges and immunities of Parliament and its m~mbers. I have very carefully gone over May's Parliamentary Practice which is the source book of knowledge with regard to the immunities and p~ivileges of Parliament. I have gone over the index to May's Parliamentary Practice and I have noticed that practically 8 or 9 columns of the index are devoted to the privileges and the immunities of Parliament. So that if you were to enact a complete code of the privilege and immunities of Parliament based upon what May has to say on this subject, I have not the least doubt in my mind that we will have to add not less than twenty or twenty five pages relating to immunities and privileges of Parliament. I do not know whether the Members of this House would like to have such a large categorical statement of privileges and immunities of Parliament extending over twenty or twenty five pages. That I think is one reason why we did not adopt that course.
The other course is to say, as has been said in many places in the Constitution, that Parliament may make provision with regard to a particular matter and until Parliall).ent makes that provision the existing position would' stand. That is the second course which we could have adopted. We would have said that Parliament may define the privileges and immunities of the members and of the body itself, and until that happens the privileges existing on the date on which the Constitution comes into existence shall continue to operate. But unfortunately for us, as honourable Members will know, the 1935 Act conferred no privileges and no immunities on Parliament and its members. All that it provided for was a single provision that there shall be freedom of speech and no member shall be prosecuted for anything said in the debate inside Parliament. Consequently that course was not open, because the existing Parliament or Legislative Assembly possesses no privilege and n~ immunity. Therefore we could not resort to that course.
The third course open to us was the one which we have followed, namely, that the privileges of Parliament shall be the privileges of the House of Commons. It seems to me that except for the sentimental objection to the reference to the House of Commons
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RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 413
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I cannot see that there is any substance in the argument that has been advanced against the course adopted by the Drafting Committee. I therefore suggest that the article has adopted the only possible way of doing it and there is no other alternative way open to us. That being so, I suggest that this article be adopted in the way in which we have drafted it."
(Emphasis supplied) 121. Dr. Ambedkar thus reiterated the justification given by Mr. Alladi earlier, adding that the cataloguing of all powers and privileges would have added to the volume of the Constitution and that the course of adopting the powers and privileges of the existing legislature under Government of India Act, 1935 was inadvisable as that body had hardly any rights available. The draft Article 169 (corresponding to present Article 194) was adopted after the above mentioned explanation and made part of the Constitution. . 122. The Constitution thus adopted through Articles 105 and 194, for the Parliament and the State Legislatures respectively, the same powers, privileges and immunities as vested at the commencement of the Constitution in the House of Commons of the Parliament of United Kingdom, until they were "defined by law". From this perspective, the learned Additional Solicitor General is not wrong when he says that the establishment of privileges in India at par with those existing in the House of Commons was not reflective of a colonial legacy but, it was an assertion of the truly sovereign nature of the Indian Parliament. 123. The above discussion shows that the reference to the privileges of the House of Commons was justified on grounds of self-assertion that free India and its Parliament are as great as the Parliament of Great Britain. The replies above quoted also show that the drafting committee was more concerned about giving to the Parliament the widest privileges as exercised by members of Parliament in England, including the power to punish for contempt of the House. Full fledged provisions listing out the powers and privileges was not possible as there was not sufficient time or the leisure to formulate all of them in a compendious form, as had been found by a Committee constituted by the Speaker on the legislative side. That is why a wide scope and unfettered discretion was being left for the future
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Parliament oflndia to set up the proper machinery for formulating privileges, which could be enlarged or curtailed. The adoption of the powers and privileges of the House of Commons was only as a temporary measure, following the practice that had been followed in Australia, in Canada and in other Dominions with advantage to secure complete freedom of speech and also the omnipotence of the legislature in every respect. 124. We would like to dispose of here itself a small argument put across by learned Counsel for the Petitioners. The argument is that the fact that the provisions of Article I 05 were amended by the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978, thereby deleting the reference to the House of Commons with effect from 20th June, 1979, the subject of powers and privileges are to be construed and pegged to that date and further that since the House of Commons had not exercised the power of expulsion after 1947, such power, even ifit existed in the House of Commons in 1947 has become obsolete and non-existing. While arguing that such power has not been inherited by the Indian Parliament, counsel would also refer to certain recent developments in United Kingdom, in particular Parliamentary Privilege-First Report, published on 30.03.1999, in the wake of which a recommendation has been made that "the Parliament's power to imprison person whether member or not, who are in contempt of Parliament should be abolished" and further that, "the power of the House of Lords to suspend its members should be clarified and confirmed". 125. We are not impressed with any of these arguments. The amendment brought into force in 1979 does not tum the clock ahead. The powers and privileges of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom as on the date of commencement ofthe Constitution of India were the p0wers and privileges available to the Parliament before the amendment and that is the package which continues to be available post-amendment. Use of a particular power in 1947 would rather make it closer in terms of time to the crucial date of commencement of Indian Constitution. Its disuse in later period is of no consequence. In this view, we are also not concerned with subsequent developments.
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126. We are, thus, back at the issue of powers and privileges of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom as on the date of commencement of the Constitution of India.
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RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 415
Powers, Privileges and Immunities - generally
127. As already noticed, Articles 105 and 194 employ almost identical language. Article 194 was at the core of the controversy in the UP Assembly (supra) Case. 128. Dealing with the provisions contained in Clause (1) of Article 194, this Court observed thus:-
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" ...... Clause (I) makes it clear that the freedom of speech in the legislature of every State which it prescribes, is subject to the provisions of the Constitution, and to the rules and standing orders, regul~t~ng the procedure of the legislature. While interpreting this clause, it is necessary to emphasise that the provisions of the :•'""'"' Constitution to which freedom of speech has been conferred on the legislators, are not the general provisions of the Constitution but only such of them as relate to the regulation of the procedure of the legislature. The rules and standing orders may regulate the procedure of the legislature and some of the provisions of the Constitution may also purport to regulate it; these are, for instance, Articles 208 and 211. The adjectival clause "regulating the procedure . of the legislature" governs both the preceding clauses relating to "the proviSions of the Constitution" and "the rules and standing orders". Therefore, clause (I) confers on the legislators specifically the right offreedom of speech subject to the limitation prescribed by its first part. It would thus appear that by making this clause subject only to the specified provisions of the Constitution, the Constitution-makers wanted to make it clear that they thought it necessary to confer on the legislators freedom of speech separately and, in a sense, independently of Article 19(1 )(a). If all that the legislators were entitled to claim was the freedom of speech and expression enshrined in Article 19(l)(a), it would have been unnecessary to confer the same right specifically in the manner adopted by Article 194(1); and so, it would be legitimate to conclude that Article 19(/)(a) is not one of the provisions of the Constitution which controls the first part of clause (1) of Article 194."
(Emphasis supplied) 129. Taking note of Pandit Sharma (!), it was reiterated in the UP
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Assembly (supra) Case that clause (1) of Article 194 no doubt makes a substantive provision of the said clause subject to the provisions of the Constitution; but in the context, those provisions cannot take in Article 19(l)(a), because latter article does not purport to regulate the procedure of the legislature and it is only such provisions of the Constitution which regulate the procedure of the legislature which are included in the first part of Article 194(1) 130. On the provisions of clause (2) of Article 194, this is what the Court found:-
"It is plain that the Constitt1_tion-makers attached so much importance to the necessity of absolute freedom in debates within the legislative chambers that they thought it necessary to confer complete immunity on the legislators from any action in any court in respect of their speeches in the legislative chambers in the wide terms prescribed by clause (2). Thus, clause (1) confers freedom of speech on the legislators within the legislative chamber and clause (2) makes it plain that the freedom is literally absolute and unfettered " (Emphasis supplied) 131. In the context of the all important clause (3) of Article 194, the Court observed thus:" ........ The Constitution-makers must have thought that the legislatures will take some time to make laws in respect of their powers, privileges and immunities. During the interval, it was clearly necessary to confer on them the necessary powers, privileges and immunities. There can be little doubt that the powers, privileges and immunities which are contemplated by clause (3), are incidental powers, privileges and immunities which every legislature must possess in order that it may be able to function effectively, and that explains the purpose of the latter part of clause (3)." (Emphasis supplied) 132. The above quoted observations squarely apply to the corresponding clauses of Article 105 of the Constitution.
133. In the context of the noticeable omission in other clauses,
RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 417
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including clause (3), of the expression "Subject to the provisions of this Constitution" as used in clause ( 1) of Article 194, this Court felt: " ........ all the four clauses of Article 194 are not in terms made subject to the provisions contained in Part III. In fact, clause (2) is couched in such wide terms that in exercising the rights conferred on them by clause (I), ifthe legislators by their speeches contravene any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III, they would not be liable for any action in any court. Nevertheless, iffor other valid considerations, it appears that the contents of clause (3) may not exclude the applicability of certain relevant provisions of the Constitution, it would not be reasonable to suggest that those provisions must be ignored just because the said clause does not open with the words "subject to the other provisions of the Constitution". In dealing with the effect of the provisions contained in clause (3) of Article 194, wherever it appears that there is a conflict between the said provisions and the provisions pertaining to fundamental rights, an attempt will have to be made to resolve the said conflict by the adoption of the rule of harmonious construction" (Emphasis supplied)
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134. The argument that though Article 194(3) had not been made subject to the provisions of the Constitution, it does not necessarily mean that it is not so subject, and that the several clauses of Article 194 should not be treated as distinct and separate provisions but should be read as a whole and that, so read, all the clauses should be taken as subject to the provisions of the Constitution which, of course, would include part III of the Constitution had been earlier rejected by tl;iis Court through unanimous view on the subject in Pandit Sharma (!). 135. It is incumbent in view of Article 105 (3) to trace the power of expulsion with reference to the powers, privileges and immunities recognized as vesting in the House of Commons of Parliament of United Kingdom as on the date of commencement of the Constitution of India, that is 26th January 1950. If such a power or privilege vested in the said legislature, the question would arise as to whether it could be part of the inheritance for Indian legislatures in the face of the provisions of its written Constitution.
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136. It is settled that out of entire bouquet of privileges and powers which the House of Commons claimed at the time of its bitter struggle for recognition during the 17th through 19th centuries, all have not survived the test of time. Some were given up. Some others faded out by desuetude. In this context, this Court in UP Assembly Case opined thus:" ....... .in every case where. a power is claimed, it is necessary to enquire whether it was an existing power at the relevant time. It must also appear that the said power was not only claimed by the House of Commons, but was recognised by the English Courts. It would obviously be idle to contend that if a particular power which is claimed by the House was claimed by the House of Commons but was not recognised by the English courts, it would still be upheld under the latter part of clause (3) only on the ground that it was in fact claimed by the House of Commons. In other words, the inquiry which is prescribed by this clause is: is the power in question shown or proved to have subsisted in the House of Commons at the relevant time?" (Emphasis supplied) 13 7. The argument of availability of all the powers and privileges has been rejected in UP Assembly Case with reference to illustrations of some powers claimed by the House of Commons as mentioned in May's Parliamentary Practice (pages 86 & 175 in 16th Ed.), but which cannot be claimed by the Indian legislatures, including the privilege of freedom of access which is exercised by the House of Commons as a body and through its Speaker "to have at all times the right to petition, counsel, or remonstrate with their Sovereign through their chosen representative and have a favourable construction placed on his words was justly regarded by the Commons as fundamental privilege"; the privilege to pass acts of attainder and impeachments; and the privilege in regard to its own Constitution which is expressed in three ways, first by the order of new writs to fill vacancies that arise in the Commons in the course of a parliament; secondly, by the trial of controverted elections; and thirdly, by determining the qualifications of its members in cases of doubt.
Plea of negation by other Constitutional provisions
138. Before we consider the question whether the power of expulsion
RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 419
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can be read within Article 105(3) or not, it is necessary first to decide the question: will reading such a power under Article 105(3) violate any other provisions of the constitution. In other words, whether power of expulsion would be inconsistent with other provisions of the Constitution of India.
139. According to the Petitioners the power of expulsion is inconsistent with the following provisions of the Constitution:-
(i)
The provisions relating to vacancy and disqualifications [Articles 101-103];
(ii)
The provisions relating to salaries and allowances of members and their right to hold office till the end of the term [Article I 06 and Article 82(3)];
(iii)
Citizen's right to vote and right of representation of their constituency in Parliament ; and
(iv) The fundamental rights of the MPs.
(i}
Provisions relating to vacancy and disqualification:
140. The Petitioners have relied on Articles 10 I, I 02 and I 03 of the Constitution in support of their contention. The submission is that these Articles (relating to vacancy and disqualification) are exhaustive regarding the termination of membership of the ParliaGJ.ent and that no additional ground can exist based on which the membership of a sitting Member of Parliament can be terminated. Articles l 0 I, I 02 and I 03 appear under the sub-heading "Disqualifications of Members" in Chapter II of Part V of the Constitution.
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141. Learned counsel for the Petitioners submit that since the Parliament can create an additional disqualification by law, it was open to it to pass a law seeking to disqualify from continuing the membership of such members as are guilty of conduct unworthy of a member. Such a law not having been passed, the petitioners submit, the termination of membership cannot take place through a resolution of the House purporting to act under Article 105(3). Articles 190 and 191 which pertain to the vacation of seats and
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disqualifications for membership of State legislatures, correspond to, and are on identical terms as, Articles 101 and 102. 142. It is necessary to understand the exact import of the terms 'vacancy', 'disqualification' and 'expulsion'.
143. These terms have different meanings and they do not overlap. Disqualification strikes at the very root of the candidate's qualification and renders him or her unable to occupy a member's seat. Expulsion, on the other hand, deals with a person who is otherwise qualified, but in the opinion of the House of the legislature, unworthy of membership. While disqualification operates to prevent a candidate from re-election, expulsion occurs after the election of the member and there is no bar on re-election. As far as the term 'vacancy' is concerned, it is a consequence of the fact that a member cannot continue to hold membership. The reason may be any one of the several possible reasons which prevent the member from continuing membership, for example disqualification, death or expulsion. 144. In view of above, it is not possible to accept the submission that the termination of membership can be effected only in the manner laid down in Articles 101 and 102. While these articles do speak of qualifications for and continuation of membership, in our view they operate independently of Article 105(3 ). Article 105(3) is also a constitutional provision and it demands equal weight as any other provisfon, and neither being 'subject to the provisions of the constitution', it is impossible to accord to one superiority over the other. We cannot accept the submission that the provisions in Articles 101 or 102 restrict in any way the scope of 194(3). There is no reason for them to do so. Though disqualification and expulsion both result in the vacancy of a seat, there is no necessity to read one in a way that restricts the scope of the other. The expulsion on being found unfit for functioning within the House in no way affects the qualifications that a member must fulfill, and there is no reason for the latter to affect expulsion. Both of the provisions can operate quite harmoniously. We fail to see any inconsistency between the two. Nor do we find any reason to support the claim that provisions under Articles 101 and 102 are exhaustive and for that reason, Article 105(3) be read as not to include the power of expulsion. Further, death as a cause for vacancy of a seat is also not mentioned in the relevant provisions. Similarly, it is not necessary for expulsion to be mention,~d, if there exists another constitutional provision that provides for such a power.
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RAJA RAM PAL v. THE HON'BLE SPEAKER, LOK SABHA [SABHARWAL, CJ.] 421
It is obvious that upon expulsion, the seat of the member is rendered vacant and so no specific recognition of this provision is necessary within the provision relating to vacancy. Thus, the power of expulsion cannot be held to be inconsistent with these provisions.
145. While interpreting Article 194, three High Courts have rightly rejected similar contentions {Yashwant Rao Meghawale v. Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly, AIR ( 1967) MP 95, Hardwari Lal, ILR ( 1977) 2 P&H 269 (FB)], K. Anbazhagan v. TN Legislative Assembly, AIR (1988) Mad. 275. An almost identical question was raised in an Australian case of Armstrong v. Budd, [1969] 71 SR 386 (NSW). The question in that case was whether Section 19 of the Constitution Act which provided for circumstances of vacation of seats of Legislative Councillors was exhaustive so as to prevent the power of expulsion. The Court rejecting the argument that section 19 was exhaustive stated:" ......... but cannot be argued thats. 19 constitutes a complete code for the vacation of a seat or contains the only criteria upon which a vacancy can occur .... " 146. Thus, we are unable to accept the Petitioners' contention that Articles 101 and 102 are exhaustive with respect to termination of membership. Therefore, power of expulsion cannot be said to be inconsistent with these provisions. 147. In connection with this issue, the Petitioners have also relied on two other provisions. First, they would submit that sections 7-lOA of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 lay down exhaustive provisions on disqualification, implying that all disqualifications must be made by law. Indeed, there is no quarrel with this position. In fact, it has been held by this Court in Shrikant v. Vasantrao, [2006] 2 SCC 682 that "it is not possible to add to or subtract from the disqualifications, either on the ground of convenience, or on the grounds of equity or logic or perceived legislative intention". However, as discussed earlier, disqualification and expulsion are two different concepts altogether, and recognizing the Parliament's power to expel under Article 105(3) does by no means amount to adding a new ground for disqualification. 148. The other provision that the Petitioners have reiied upon is Article
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2007] I S.C.R.
327 of the Constitution. This article enables the Parliament, subje