Rajeev Suri v. Delhi Development Authority & Ors.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 5 January 2021
- Judge
- Justice A.M. Khanwilkar
- Neutral citation
- 2021 INSC 4
- Reported in
- [2021] 15 S.C.R. 283
- Result
- Disposed off
- Acts & sections
- Article 13 Constitution, Article 32 Constitution, Article 226 Constitution
Full judgment
[2021] 15 S.C.R. 283
RAJEEV SURI
V. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS (Transferred Case (Civil) No. 229 of 2020) JANUARY 05, 2021
[A.M. KHANWILKAR, DINESH MAHESHWARI AND SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.] Judicial Review – Scope and amplitude of – Central Vista Project of the Government of India – Judicial scrutiny regarding its’ permissibility – Government’s duty to consult – Scope and ambit of the citizen’s right to participate in quasi legislative exercise – Issues concerning decisions taken by the statutory Authorities including regarding the change in land use, grant of statutory and other permissions, environmental as well as heritage clearances etc. – Challenge to change in land use of six plots in the Central Vista under the Delhi Development Act, 1957, and the permissions /approvals granted by the Central Vista Committee, the Delhi Urban Arts Commission under the Delhi Urban Arts Commission Act, 1973 and clearance/no-objection for construction of a new Parliament House under the Environment Protection Act, 1986 – Failure to take prior permission/approval of the Heritage Conservation Committee as per Annexure II of the Unified Building Bye-Laws, alleged – Plea of absence of sufficient public participation in the entire process – Held (per majority) (per A.M. Khanwilkar, J. [for himself and Dinesh Maheshwari, J.]): There is no infirmity in the grant of “No Objection” by the Central Vista Committee (CVC); “Approval” by the Delhi Urban Art Commission (DUAC) as per the DUAC Act, 1973; and “Prior approval” by the Heritage Conservation Committee (HCC) under clause 1.12 of the Building Byelaws for Delhi, 2016 – Further, exercise of power by the Central Government u/s.11A(2) of the DDA Act, 1957 is just and proper and thus modifications regarding change in land use of plot Nos. 2 to 8 in the Master Plan of Delhi, 2021/Zonal Development Plan for Zone-D and Zone-C vide impugned notification dated 20.3.2020, confirmed – Recommendation of Environmental Clearance (EC) by Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) and grant thereof by Ministry
of Environment and Forest (MoEF) is just, proper and in accordance with law including the 2006 Notification – Project proponent may set up smog tower(s) of adequate capacity, as being integral part of the new Parliament building project; and additionally, use smog guns at the construction site throughout the construction phase is in progress on the site – The stage of prior permission under clause 1.3 of the Building Bye Laws of the Heritage Conservation Committee (HCC), is the stage of actual development/ redevelopment etc. work is to commence and not the incipient stage of planning and formalisation of the Project – Accordingly, respondents to obtain prior permission of the designated Authority before actually starting any development /redevelopment work on the stated plots/structures/ precincts governed by the heritage laws including on plot No. 118, if already not obtained – Held (per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) (partly dissenting) (Minority judgment): The dissent is only on aspects of public participation on interpretation of the statutory provisions, failure to take prior approval of the Heritage Conservation Committee (HCC) and order passed by the Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) – However on aspects of Notice inviting Bid, award of consultancy and the order of the Urban Arts Commission, as a standalone and independent order, there is no disagreement – Final notification of modification /change of the land use dated 28th March 2020 in respect of the 6 plots in the Central Vista quashed and set aside, with directions – Order of EAC dated 22nd April, 2020 and environment clearance by Ministry of Environment and Forest dated 17th June, 2020 set aside, and an order of remit to the EAC passed with a request that they may decide the question on environment clearance, without awaiting the decision on the question of change/ modification of land use – Delhi Development Act, 1957 – s.11A(2) – Delhi Urban Arts Commission Act, 1973 – Environment Protection Act, 1986 – Building Byelaws for Delhi, 2016 – Master Plan of Delhi, 2021. Doctrines / Principles – Principle of Rule of Law – Held: The principle of Rule of Law runs as a common thread through the substantive as well as procedural laws – A democratic polity requires all organs of the state to attach equal importance to substance of law as well as to the procedure delineated to perform such substantive functions – That must be the constant endeavour to touch both ends as well as means.
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.
Judiciary and Rule of Law – The duty enjoined upon the judiciary is to ensure checks and balances; and to place itself between the Government and citizens when they come face to face in a Court of law – The judicial organ is not meant to impose the citizens’ or even its own version of good governance upon the Government in the name of Rule of Law in exercise of its power of judicial review.
Government Policy – Interference with – Judicial Review – Scope – Held: The Courts do not sit in appeal over the decisions of the Government to do merit review of the subjective decision as such – The Government may examine advantages or disadvantages of a policy at its own end, it may or may not achieve the desired objective – The Government is entitled to commit errors or achieve successes in policy matters as long as constitutional principles are not violated in the process – It is not the Court’s concern to enquire into the priorities of an elected Government – Judicial review is never meant to venture into the mind of the Government and thereby examine validity of a decision. Judicial Review – Principled judicial review – “Constitutional due process” – Held: In a principled judicial review a “check” is maintainable without tilting the “balance” – An elected Government is the repository of public faith in matters of development – Dispensation of judicial review cannot be resorted to by the aggrieved /dissenting section for vindication of their point of view until and unless it is demonstrated that the proposed action is in breach of procedure established by law or in a given case, colourable exercise of powers of the Government – Therefore, it is important for the Courts to remain alive to all the attending circumstances and not interfere merely because another option as in the perception of the aggrieved/dissenting section of public would have been a better option. Doctrines / Principles – Constitutionalism – Held: Constitutionalism is a relative concept which envisages a constitutional order wherein powers and limits on the exercise of those powers are duly acknowledged – It is a tool which is used to reach upto the ultimate goal of constitutionalization of governance but it cannot be deployed to present an alternative model of governance – Principle of constitutionalism is a work in progress
which is meant to infuse life and blood into an existing scheme which has stood the test of constitutional validity and not to nudge with the scheme itself – It may only be deployed to evolve minimum standards of procedures prescribed by law – It is not to undermine or supplant the elaborate statutory regulatory schemes.
Constitution of India – Role of – Held: Constitution in our system plays twin role – First, Constitution as the guardian of fundamental rights and second, Constitution as the structure of governance.
Democracy – Principle of participatory democracy – Elements – Scope of public involvement in Government processes – Held: The principle of participatory democracy has two integral elements – first, public participation in decision making and second, placing information regarding Government actions in public domain – The scope of public involvement in Government processes is however a matter dependent on legal framework of a country and the Court should be loath to venture into that area in the guise of eminence of the project under consideration – In a democratic setup where the citizen has entrusted abundant governance to the Government, it is bounden obligation of the Government to keep the citizens well informed about its actions, as a prudent trustee would. Policy and Development – Role of the Courts – Held: Courts operate within the boundaries defined by the Constitution, and cannot be called upon to govern, for, they have no wherewithal or prowess and expertise in that regard – The political issues including regarding development policies of the Government of the day must be debated in the Parliament, to which it is accountable – The role of Court is limited to examining the constitutionality including legality of the policy and Government actions – The right to development is a basic human right and no organ of the State is expected to become an impediment in the process of development as long as the government proceeds in accordance with law – Judiciary. In the instant matters, this Court was called upon by the petitioners to undertake a comprehensive and heightened judicial scrutiny regarding the permissibility of the Central Vista Project of the Government of India. As per the policy documents, the
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.
need for the development of the Central Vista Project is rooted in the creation of a larger working space for efficient functioning of the highest legislative wing of the country and for integrated administrative block for Ministries/ Departments presently spread out at different locations including on rental basis. The Central Vista lies in the heart of the national capital, and within the “Lutyens’ Bungalow Zone” (LBZ), and is described by the Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage (INTACH) as the “ensemble with main axis Rajpath...the Rashtrapati Bhawan at Raisina Hills, flanked by the Secretariat (North and South Blocks)...the Parliament House...the hexagonal round-about that has the India Gate and the Canopy...”
Diverse issues concerning the decisions taken by the statutory Authorities including regarding the change in land use, grant of statutory and other permissions, environmental as well as heritage clearances etc., were raised in the proceedings. The challenge was premised on high principles of democratic values as applicable in India and not limited to mere infringement of statutory provisions of the governing enactments. That is on account of the nature of project – being of high political significance and eminence for our democratic republic; and for upholding the “Rule of Law”, which is on a higher pedestal than the governance by “Rule by Law”. An argument was also advanced as regards the absence of sufficient public participation in the entire process. Advancing the argument regarding direct public consultation, the petitioners stated that the concept of participatory democracy demands that a project of this nature must involve the common public as they are the real stakeholders of national heritage and must be consulted at every stage of the project including prior to drawing outline of the project, releasing consultancy tender, modifying the Master Plan and finalisation of the design and making changes therein. The dispute relating to the modification and redevelopment of the Central Vista has different facets. First, is the legal challenge to change in the land use of six plots in the Central Vista under the Delhi Development Act, 1957, and the permissions/approvals granted by the Central Vista Committee, the Delhi Urban Arts Commission under the Delhi Urban Arts
Commission Act, 1973 and the clearance/no-objection for construction of a new Parliament House under the Environment Protection Act, 1986. Failure to take prior permission/approval of the Heritage Conservation Committee as per Annexure II of the Unified Building Bye-Laws is alleged. In Writ Petition (Civil) No. 853/2020, the Notice inviting Bid and award of consultancy to the ninth respondent therein has been challenged. At a deeper and conceptual level the question relates to the government’s duty to consult and the scope and ambit of the citizen’s right to participate in the quasi legislative exercise. Connected with the two issues is the third question of scope and amplitude of the power of judicial review. Disposing of the matters, the Court Per A.M. Khanwilkar, J. [for himself and for Dinesh Maheshwari, J.] (Majority judgment)
HELD:1.1. The Rule of Law requires law in existence; such law must qualify as law within the meaning of the Constitution and must satisfy the standards laid therein and legally applicable meaning of Rule of Law in India can be best understood as a democratic rule within the four corners of the Constitution, as originally envisaged and as is interpreted from time to time. The existence of democracy per se does not guarantee adherence to Rule of Law, but abidance of Rule of Law by one and all is the hallmark of a real thriving democracy. [Para 133][386-B-D] 1.2. The fact that all power flows from law and must be exercised in accordance with such law is easy to be theorized in a constitutional discourse, but difficult to be sustained in the aftermath of ever-expanding potpourri of the law itself. It is for this very reason the statement – ‘Rule of Law’ must encompass a dynamic concept albeit rooted in four corners of the Constitution. It provides a constant trigger to any state-citizen intercourse and calls upon this Court to strike a just balance between two entities, both equally bound by the same principle of superiority of law. A just and time-tested methodology to strike this balance lies in the end product of furthering the avowed goal of a democracy premised upon Rule of Law and not dragging it backwards. [Para 134][386-D-F]
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.
1.3. The principle of Rule of Law runs as a common thread through the substantive as well as procedural laws. A democratic polity requires all organs of the state to attach equal importance to substance of law as well as to the procedure delineated to perform such substantive functions. That must be the constant endeavour to touch both ends as well as means. [Para 135][386F-G]
2.1. The trajectory of our jurisprudence in review of matters involving personal liberties has been one of strict approaches. It is, however, a misnomer to propagate that we have gradually transformed from chosen “procedure established by law” into once consciously rejected “due process of law”. The petitioners, despite their best of efforts, have not been able to demonstrate a case of deprivation of life or personal liberty of any individual on account of any of the impugned executive action. Whereas, it is essential for the petitioners to demonstrate a real and direct impact or restriction on their core fundamental rights due to the impugned executive action to invoke the due process argument. A cause-effect relationship is essential. Only then the burden would shift on the State to either show the absence of restrictions or justification of restrictions within the permissible exceptions of Part-III. [Para 144][394-E-G] 2.2. A judicial review is an exercise in reference to some existing rights and the reliefs and remedies prayed for. The Rule of Law, as accepted and settled in India, with regard to judicial interference in administrative and executive or policy matters is no more res integra. The duty enjoined upon the judiciary is to ensure checks and balances; and to place itself between the Government and citizens when they come face to face in a Court of law. It is meant to act as an equaliser and ensure that the flow of decisions from executive to citizens is overseen through the prism of well-established principles, as and when called upon to do so. The judicial organ is not meant to impose the citizens’ or even its own version of good governance upon the Government in the name of Rule of Law in exercise of its power of judicial review. [Para 145][394-H; 395-A-C] 2.3. In India, what prevails is the “constitutional due process” i.e., the process which is due under the constitutional scheme. And what is due, is a principled judicial review wherein
a “check” is maintainable without tilting the “balance”. For, all organs of the state are constitutionally committed to and beholden by the common goal of giving effect to processes and procedure established by law, ideals, expectations, rights and duties due under the Constitution and no deviation can be permitted therefrom. [Para 158][405-A-C] 3. In a democracy, the electors repose their faith in the elected Government which is accountable to the legislature and expect it to adopt the best possible course of action in public interest. Thus, an elected Government is the repository of public faith in matters of development. Some section of the public/ citizens may have another view point if not complete disagreement with the course of action perceived by the elected Government, but then, the dispensation of judicial review cannot be resorted to by the aggrieved/dissenting section for vindication of their point of view until and unless it is demonstrated that the proposed action is in breach of procedure established by law or in a given case, colourable exercise of powers of the Government. Therefore, it is important for the Courts to remain alive to all the attending circumstances and not interfere merely because another option as in the perception of the aggrieved/dissenting section of public would have been a better option. [Para 163][406-H; 407A-C] 4.1. The Courts do not sit in appeal over the decisions of the Government to do merit review of the subjective decision as such. The Government may examine advantages or disadvantages of a policy at its own end, it may or may not achieve the desired objective. The Government is entitled to commit errors or achieve successes in policy matters as long as constitutional principles are not violated in the process. It is not the Court’s concern to enquire into the priorities of an elected Government. Judicial review is never meant to venture into the mind of the Government and thereby examine validity of a decision. [Paras 164 and 165][407-C; 408-B-C] 4.2. Judicial review primarily involves a review of State action – legislative, executive, administrative and policy. The primary examination in a review of a legislative action is the existence of power with the legislature to legislate on a particular
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.
subject matter. For this purpose, doctrines of pith and substance, harmonious construction, territorial nexus etc. are often resorted to. Once the existence of power is not in dispute, it is essentially an enquiry under Article 13 of the Constitution which enjoins the State to not violate any of the provisions of Part-III in a lawmaking function. The review of executive action would depend upon the precise nature of the action. For, the domain of executive is wide and is generally understood to take within its sweep all residuary functions of the State. Thus, the precise scope of review would depend on the decision and the subject matter. For instance, an action taken under a statute must be in accordance with the statute and would be checked on the anvil of ultra vires the statutory or constitutional parameters. The enquiry must also ensure that the executive action is within the scope of executive powers earmarked for State Governments and Union Government respectively in the constitutional scheme. The scope of review of a pure administrative action is well settled. Since generally individuals are directly involved in such action, the Court concerns itself with the sacred principles of natural justice – audi altrem partem, speaking orders, absence of bias etc. The enquiry is also informed by the Wednesbury principles of unreasonableness. The review of a policy decision entails a limited enquiry. Second guessing by the Court or substitution of judicial opinion on what would constitute a better policy is strictly excluded from the purview of this enquiry. Under the constitutional scheme, the government/executive is vested with the resources to undertake necessary research, studies, dialogue and expert consultation and accordingly, a pure policy decision is not interfered with in an ordinary manner. The burden is heavy to demonstrate a manifest illegality or arbitrariness or procedural lapses in the culmination of the policy decision. However, the underlying feature of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution must inform all enquiries of State action by the constitutional Court. [Para 167][410-D-H; 411-A-B]
5.1. Constitutionalism is a relative concept which envisages a constitutional order wherein powers and limits on the exercise of those powers are duly acknowledged. It is a tool which is used to reach upto the ultimate goal of constitutionalization of
governance and it cannot be deployed to present an alternative model of governance. It would not only be absurd but also fraught with dangers of overreach and ambiguity if subjective principles of interpretation are applied by detaching them from the textual scheme of the Constitution, particularly when the textual scheme lays down an elaborate structure of administration. For, to do so would be to drag a duly elected Government on the edges as it would be under a constant fear of being adjudged wrong on the basis of undefined principles which appeal to “three gentlemen or five gentlemen sitting as a Court”. And what will suffer is public interest in the form of public exchequer including sovereignty of the nation. [Para 170][412-C-F] 5.2. The principle of constitutionalism is a work in progress which is meant to infuse life and blood into an existing scheme which has stood the test of constitutional validity and not to nudge with the scheme itself. It may only be deployed to evolve minimum standards of procedures prescribed by law. It is not to undermine or supplant the elaborate statutory regulatory schemes. [Para 172][413-A-B] 6.1. A holistic understanding of the dispensation envisaged under our Constitution would reveal that we are a representative democracy with strong elements of participatory democracy embedded in it. The element of participation, however, is regulated not only by statutes but also by the Constitution. The Constitution, if it would have envisaged every important decision to be flowing from the public in the manner proposed by the petitioners, would have clearly provided for that dispensation. It has not. Understood thus, the Constitution in our system plays twin role – first, Constitution as the guardian of fundamental rights and second, Constitution as the structure of governance. [Para 183][421-C-D] 6.2. The principle of participatory democracy has two integral elements – first, public participation in decision making and second, placing information regarding Government actions in public domain. The first element, no matter how desirable, is carefully circumscribed by the state of Rule of Law or procedure established by law, as present, and a fine balance has been struck between need for public participation and effective functioning of
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.
administration. The legislature has expressly provided for such public participation and the extent thereof in the governing enactments.[Para 184][421-E-F]
6.3. The participation itself involves three features – the stage, the extent and the nature of participation. The extent and quality of permissible participation is dependent upon a multitude of factors including, but not limited to, the stage of procedure, nature of subject matter, number of affected persons, local conditions, geography, strategic importance of project, budgetary allocations for the project etc. The subject matter of a development project having no direct bearing on lives and livelihoods cannot be equated with a project which has a direct impact upon their lives and livelihoods. [Para 185][421-F-G] 6.4. Pertinently, this exercise cannot be undertaken in abstractness merely because participation is one of the facets of a democratic structure. Rather, it involves delicate analysis of a complex web of factors. Whether in a given case personal oral hearing is to be provisioned for or mere representations be invited or public discussion is called for, is a matter for the legislature to make a law in that regard. [Para 186][422-B] 6.5. One may very well have our own notion of participation and it could be radically different from the prescribed one. It may be possible that some people feel unheard in a direct manner, however, a democracy, in an ultimate analysis, is about prevalence of collective wisdom of citizens, which may or may not commend to individual wisdom of few. The citizens are completely free to advocate any notion along the Government policy or the manner of making it in their free exercise of right to speech and expression, but enforcement of such notion cannot be fructified by resorting to judicial review. The idea of public involvement in administrative matters is based upon the stage and extent of representation prescribed by the legislature. No country with a sizeable population like ours can give a promise of direct participation to every individual in the decision-making process (of the Government) in administrative matters unless the law so prescribes. [Paras 187 and 188][422-C-F]
6.6. However, it must be borne in mind that such public participation is not to supplant the discretion of the Government or to retard the development work. It is only for inviting constructive suggestions/objections from all stakeholders for effective implementation of the policy of the Government, to subserve public interest. [Para 189][422-F-G] 6.7. The prosaic, bland, inapplicable metaphysical principles of constitutional theory, imported from foreign jurisdictions, cannot create an extra-constitutional standard of judicial review or to extend involvement of public at every level of governance absent any statutory regime in that regard. Thus, the scope of public involvement in Government processes is a matter dependent on legal framework of a country and the Court should be loath to venture into that area in the guise of eminence of the project under consideration. [Para 191][426-A-B] 6.8. The other facet of participatory democracy is disclosure of information in public domain about the actions of Government. The petitioners’ argument is that for effective participation, the citizens must know what they are participating in and why. This merits consideration. For, unless complete and relevant information about Government decision is placed in public domain, the public would be ill-equipped to engage with the Government in a meaningful manner. In a democracy, disclosure of full information is empowerment and acts as an enabler for meaningful participation. Granting open access to information also secures the goal of transparency to which all public institutions are wedded. It is right to say that the Right to Information Act, 2005 has empowered the citizen to obtain information from the Government but it would be absolutely untenable to say that there is no duty on the Government to be open. In a democratic setup where the citizen has entrusted abundant governance to the Government, it is bounden obligation of the Government to keep the citizens well informed about its actions, as a prudent trustee would. [Paras 193 and 194][428-C-D; 431-C] 6.9. The idea of political justice is not constrained to an orthodox understanding of a democratic form of Government. We are in an information age and political justice would be
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.
incomplete without informational justice which essentially requires the decision makers to consider the subjects of their decisions as rightful recipients of all information that may have an impact on their lives. Furthermore, open availability of information would also advance the objective of education and empowerment. Article 51(h) provides for the fundamental duty “to develop the scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of inquiry and reform”. The furtherance of spirit of inquiry and reform is largely dependent on the availability of information. It is nothing but a duty which enjoins the citizens to participate in good governance. Notably, the respondents in the present case have recognised the importance of openness and have placed elaborate data to demonstrate how all steps of the project including all permissions, orders, invitations, approvals etc. were made available for direct public access online from time to time at the earliest available opportunity. [Paras 196 and 197][431-H; 432A-D]
7. In the present case, the petitioners enthusiastically called upon this Court to venture into territories that are way beyond the contemplated powers of a constitutional court. No doubt, the Courts are repositories of immense public trust and the fact that some public interest actions have generated commendable results is noteworthy, but it is equally important to realise that Courts operate within the boundaries defined by the Constitution. The Court cannot be called upon to govern. For, the court has no wherewithal or prowess and expertise in that regard. [Para 420][595-E; 595-G-H; 596-A] 8. The constitutionally envisaged system of “checks and balances” has been completely misconstrued and misapplied in this case. The principle of “checks and balances” posits two concepts - “check” and “balance”. Whereas the former finds a manifestation in the concept of judicial review, the latter is derived from the well enshrined principle of separation of powers. The political issues including regarding development policies of the Government of the day must be debated in the Parliament, to which it is accountable. The role of Court is limited to examining the constitutionality including legality of the policy and Government actions. The right to development is a basic human right and no organ of the State is expected to become an
impediment in the process of development as long as the government proceeds in accordance with law. [Para 421][596-BD] 9. In conclusion, it is declared and directed as follows:
(i) There is no infirmity in the grant of: (a) “No Objection” by the Central Vista Committee (CVC); (b) “Approval” by the Delhi Urban Art Commission (DUAC) as per the DUAC Act, 1973; and (c) “Prior approval” by the Heritage Conservation Committee (HCC) under clause 1.12 of the Building Byelaws for Delhi, 2016. (ii) Further, the exercise of power by the Central Government under Section 11A(2) of the DDA Act, 1957 is just and proper and thus the modifications regarding change in land use of plot Nos. 2 to 8 in the Master Plan of Delhi, 2021/Zonal Development Plan for Zone-D and Zone-C vide impugned notification dated 20.3.2020 stands confirmed. (iii) The recommendation of Environmental Clearance (EC) by Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) and grant thereof by MoEF is just, proper and in accordance with law including the 2006 Notification. The same along with appropriate directions therein are upheld to ensure that the highlighted mitigating measures are followed by the project proponent in their letter and spirit. (iv) The project proponent may set up smog tower(s) of adequate capacity, as being integral part of the new Parliament building project; and additionally, use smog guns at the construction site throughout the construction phase is in progress on the site.
(v) The respondent MoEF to consider issuing similar general directions regarding installation of adequate capacity of smog tower(s) as integral part in all future major development projects whilst granting development permissions, particularly in cities with bad track record of air quality - be it relating to Government buildings, townships or other private projects of similar scale and magnitude, including to use smog guns during the construction activity of the Project is in progress. (vi) The stage of prior permission under clause 1.3 of the Building Bye Laws of the Heritage Conservation Committee (HCC), is the stage of actual development/redevelopment etc.
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.
work is to commence and not the incipient stage of planning and formalisation of the Project.
Accordingly, the respondents shall obtain aforementioned prior permission of the designated Authority before actually starting any development/redevelopment work on the stated plots/structures/precincts governed by the heritage laws including on plot No. 118, if already not obtained.
(vii) The selection/appointment of Consultant, in light of the limited examination warranted in this case, is held to be just and proper. [Para 423][596-F-H; 597-A-H; 598-A] Lal Bahadur v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2018) 15 SCC 407; Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa & Ors. (1991) 4 SCC 54 : [1991] 3 SCR 102 ; R.K. Mittal & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2012) 2 SCC 232 : [2011] 15 SCR 877; Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v. Hiraman Sitaram Deorukhar & Ors. (2019) 14 SCC 411; Goel Ganga Developers India Private Limited v. Union of India Through Secretary, Ministry of Environment and Forests & Ors. (2018) 18 SCC 257; Union of India & Anr. v. Cynamide India Ltd. & Anr. (1987) 2 SCC 720; Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (1990) 3 SCC 223 : [1990] 1 SCR 909; State of Punjab v. Tehal Singh & Ors. (2002) 2 SCC 7: [2002] 1 SCR 27; Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Promoters and Builders Association & Anr. (2004) 10 SCC 796 : [2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 207; Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Limited & Anr. v. Sai Renewable Power Private Limited & Ors. (2011) 11 SCC 34 : [2010] 8 SCR 636; Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. v. the Notified Area Committee, Tulsipur (1980) 2 SCC 295 : [1980] 2 SCR 1111; Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija & Ors. v. Collector, Thane, Maharahstra & Ors. (1989) 3 SCC 396 : [1989] 3 SCR 405 ; Bangalore Development Authority v. Aircraft Employees’ Cooperative Society Limited & Ors. (2012) 3 SCC 442 : [2012] 4 SCR 881; Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. (2007) 8 SCC 705 :
[2007] 6 SCR 799; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Ors. (2019) 12 SCC 720; Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association v. Designated Authority & Ors. (2011) 2 SCC 258 : [2011] 1 SCR 198; State of U.P. & Ors. v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh & Ors. (1989) 2 SCC 505 : [1989] 1 SCR 176; Aruna Roy & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2002) 7 SCC 368: [2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 266; Travancore Rayon Ltd. v. Union of India (1969) 3 SCC 868 : [1970] 3 SCR 40; Hanuman Laxman Aroskar v. Union of India (2019) 15 SCC 401 : [2019] 5 SCR 916; Rajendra Shankar Shukla & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. (2015) 10 SCC 400 : [2015] 11 SCR 723; S.N. Chandrashekar & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2006) 3 SCC 208 : [2006] 1 SCR 1039; Virender Gaur & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 577 : [1994] 6 Suppl. SCR 78; Inderpreet Singh Kahlon & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. (2006) 11 SCC 356: [2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 772; Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia & Ors. (2004) 2 SCC 65 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1023; National Buildings Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan & Ors. (1998) 7 SCC 66: [1998] 1 Suppl. SCR 156; R.S. Garg v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2006) 6 SCC 430 : [2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 120; Council of Architecture v. Mukesh Goyal & Ors. 2020 SCC Online SC 329; Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi & Ors. (1991) 2 SCC 716 : [1991] 1 SCR 772 ; Alaknanda Hydropower Company Limited v. Anuj Joshi & Ors. (2014) 1 SCC 769 : [2013] 11 SCR 784; Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India & Ors. (1996) 5 SCC 647: [1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 241; A.P. Pollution Control Board II v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu (Retd.) & Ors. (2001) 2 SCC 62 : [2000] 5 Suppl. SCR 249 ; Lafarge Umiam Mining Private Limited v. Union of India (UOI) & Ors. (2011) 7 SCC 338: [2011] 7 SCR 954; Keystone Realtors Private Limited v. Anil V. Tharthare & Ors. (2020) 2 SCC 66 : [2019] 17 SCR 539; Bengaluru Development Authority
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.
v. Sudhakar Hegde & Ors. 2020 SCC Online SC 328; Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi v. State of A.P. & Ors. (2006) 3 SCC 549 : [2006] 2 SCR 419; Common Cause v. Union of India & Ors. (2017) 9 SCC 499 : [2017] 13 SCR 361; State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Thakur Bharat Singh AIR 1967 SC 1170 : [1967] 2 SCR 454; K.S. Puttaswamy (Retired) & Anr. (II) v. Union of India & Anr. (2019) 1 SCC 1 : [2018] 8 SCR 1; Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve Bank of India (2020) 10 SCC 274 : [2020] 2 SCR 297; Cellular Operators Association of India & Ors. v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India & Ors. (2016) 7 SCC 703 : [2016] 9 SCR 1; K.S. Puttaswamy & Anr. (I) v. Union of India & Ors. (2017) 10 SCC 1 : [2017] 10 SCR 569; State of U.P. v. Raj Narain & Ors. (1975) 4 SCC 428: [1975] 3 SCR 333; Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Proprietors of Indian Express Newspapers, Bombay Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. (1988) 4 SCC 592 : [1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 212; M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath & Ors. (1997) 1 SCC 388 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 12; I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs v. State of T.N. (2007) 2 SCC 1 : [2007] 1 SCR 706 ; Government (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India & Anr. (2018) 8 SCC 501 : [2018] 7 SCR 1; Lok Prahari Through its General Secretary v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2018) 6 SCC 1 : [2018] 6 SCR 1076 ; Rajeev Mankotia v. Secretary to the President of India & Ors. (1997) 10 SCC 441 : [1997] 3 SCR 421; Sushanta Tagore & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2005) 3 SCC 16 : [2005] 2 SCR 502; K. Guruprasad Rao v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2013) 8 SCC 418 : [2013] 11 SCR 581; Manohar Joshi v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2012) 3 SCC 619; Public Interest Foundation & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr. (2019) 3 SCC 224; Brajendra Singh Yambem v. Union of India & Anr. (2016) 9 SCC 20 : [2016] 6 SCR 333; Hindustan Construction Company Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 2019 SCC Online SC 1520; State of Punjab & Anr. v. Khan Chand (1974) 1 SCC 549 : [1974] 2 SCR 768; Shayara Bano v. Union of
India & Ors. (2017) 9 SCC 1: [2017] 9 SCR 797; Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012 (2012) 10 SCC 1 : [2012] 9 SCR 311; Manoj Narula v. Union of India (2014) 9 SCC 1 : [2014] 9 SCR 965; Global Energy Limited & Anr. v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (2009) 15 SCC 570: [2009] 9 SCR 22; Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India AIR 1962 SC 305 : [1962] 3 SCR 842; Bennett Coleman & Co. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1972) 2 SCC 788 : [1973] 2 SCR 757; Union of India & Ors. v. Motion Picture Association & Ors. (1999) 6 SCC 150: [1999] 3 SCR 875; Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Prof. Manubhai D. Shah (1992) 3 SCC 637 : [1992] 3 SCR 595; Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Govt. of India & Ors. v. Cricket Association of Bengal & Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 161: [1995] 1 SCR 1036 ; Chandramouleshwar Prasad v. Patna High Court & Ors. (1969) 3 SCC 56 : [1970] 2 SCR 666; Orissa Mining Corporation Limited v. Ministry of Environment & Forests & Ors. (2013) 6 SCC 476 : [2013] 6 SCR 881; Archaeological Survey of India v. Narender Anand & Ors. (2012) 2 SCC 562 : [2012] 1 SCR 260; Nagar Nigam, Meerut v. Al Faheem Meat Exports Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (2006) 13 SCC 382 : [2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 354; Dutta Associates Pvt. Ltd. v. Indo Merchantiles Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (1997) 1 SCC 53 : [1996] 8 Suppl. SCR 710; Meerut Development Authority v. Association of Management Studies & Anr. (2009) 6 SCC 171 : [2009] 6 SCR 663; Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary & Ors. (2014) 9 SCC 516 : [2014] 8 SCR 446; Radha Krishna Agarwal & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. (1977) 3 SCC 457 : [1977] 3 SCR 249 ; Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad & Ors. v. Om Prakash Sharma (2013) 5 SCC 182: [2013] 6 SCR 199; Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (2011) 5 SCC 29 : [2011] 5 SCR 77; Harminder Singh Arora v. Union of India & Ors. (1986) 3 SCC 247 : [1986] 3 SCR 63; Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa & Ors. (2007) 14
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.
SCC 517 : [2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 606; Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India & Ors. (1979) 3 SCC 489 : [1979] 3 SCR 1014; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1978) 4 SCC 494 : [1979] 1 SCR 392; Rajbala & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.(2016) 1 SCC 463 : [2015] 9 SCR 113; Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay AIR 1951 SC 128 : [1951] 0 SCR 228; Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India & Ors. (2000) 10 SCC 664 : [2000] 4 Suppl. SCR 94; Shimnit Utsch India Private Limited & Anr. v. West Bengal Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited & Ors. (2010) 6 SCC 303 : [2010] 6 SCR 1110; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan & Anr. (2011) 7 SCC 639 : [2011] 6 SCR 443; Directorate of Film Festivals & Ors. v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain & Ors. (2007) 4 SCC 737 : [2007] 5 SCR 7; State of Kerala v. Joseph Antony (1994) 1 SCC 301 : [1993] 3 Suppl. SCR 531; G. Sundarrajan v. Union of India & Ors. (2013) 6 SCC 620 : [2013] 8 SCR 631; University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao & Anr. [1964] 4 SCR 575; Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr. (1996) 9 SCC 709 : [1996] 3 Suppl. SCR 808; Federation of Railway Officers Association & Ors. v. Union of India (2003) 4 SCC 289 : [2003] 2 SCR 1085; Avishek Goenka v. Union of India & Anr. (2012) 5 SCC 275 : [2012] 5 SCR 547; Dental Council of India v. Subharti K.K.B. Charitable Trust & Anr. (2001) 5 SCC 486 : [2001] 3 SCR 149; Basavaiah (Dr.) v. Dr. H.L. Ramesh & Ors. (2010) 8 SCC 372 : [2010] 9 SCR 227; K.T. Plantation Private Limited & Anr. v. State of Karntaka (2011) 9 SCC 1 : [2011]13 SCR 636; Rohit Dhupar & Ors. v. Lt. Governor & Ors. (2009) SCC Online Del 487; Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy (2005) 6 SCC 321 : [2005] 3 SCR 81; Haryana Financial Corporation & Anr. v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja (2008) 9 SCC 31 : [2008] 10 SCR 222; Punjab National Bank & Ors. v. Manjeet Singh & Anr. (2006) 8 SCC 647 : [2006] 6 Suppl. SCR 825; Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation
& Anr. v. S.G. Kotturappa & Anr. (2005) 3 SCC 409 : [2005] 2 SCR 520; Viveka Nand Sethi v. Chairman, J&K Bank Ltd. & Ors. (2005) 5 SCC 337 : [2005] 3 SCR 1095; Ranjan Kumar Mitra v. Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. & Ors. (1997) 10 SCC 386; Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors. (2006) 11 SCC 1 : [2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 521; Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines v. Ramjee (1977) 2 SCC 256 : [1977] 2 SCR 904; Sohan Lal Gupta (Dead) through LRs. & Ors. v. Asha Devi Gupta & Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 492 : [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 249; Major G.S. Sodhi v. Union of India (1991) 2 SCC 382; Bhim Sen & Ors. v. State of Punjab AIR 1951 SC 481: [1952] SCR 18; Barium Chemicals Ltd. & Anr. v. Company Law Board & Ors. AIR 1967 SC 295: [1966] Suppl. SCR 311; Rohtas Industries v. S.D. Agarwal & Ors. (1969) 1 SCC 325 : [1969] 3 SCR 108; M. Jhangir Bhatusha & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1989) 2 Suppl. SCC 201 : [1989] 3 SCR 356; Haryana Financial Corporation & Anr. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills & Anr. (2002) 3 SCC 496 : [2002] 1 SCR 621; Puranlal Lakhanpal v. President of India & Ors. AIR 1961 SC 1519 : [1962] 1 SCR 688; Union of India & Ors. v. E.G. Nambudiri AIR 1991 SC 1216 : [1991] 2 SCR 451; Mahabir Jute Mills Ltd., Gorakhpore v. Shibban Lal Saxena & Ors. (1975) 2 SCC 818 : [1976] 1 SCR 168; Sarat Kumar Dash and Ors. v. Biswajit Patnaik and Ors. (1995) 1 Suppl. SCC 434 : [1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 223; Dr. Ashwani Kumar v. Union of India & Anr. 2019 SCC Online SC 1144; R.K. Garg v. Union of India & Ors. (1981) 4 SCC 675 : [1982] 1 SCR 947; Premium Granites & Anr. v. State of T.N. & Ors. (1994) 2 SCC 691 : [1994] 1 SCR 579; Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India (1996) 2 SC 405 : [1996] 2 SCR 767 ; BALCO Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India & Ors. (2002) 2 SCC 333 : [2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 511; G.B. Mahajan & Ors. v. Jalgaon Municipal Council & Ors. (1991) 3 SCC 91 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 20; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) 1 Suppl. SCC : [1975] Suppl. SCC 1;
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.
State of Karnataka v. Union of India & Anr. (1977) 4 SCC 608 : [1978] 2 SCR 1; Kuldip Nayar & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2006) 7 SCC 1 : [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 1; Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India & Ors. (2008) 6 SCC 1 : [2008] 4 SCR 1; Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association & Anr. v. Union of India (2016) 5 SCC 1 : [2015] 13 SCR 1; Indian Railway Construction Company Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar (2003) 4 SCC 579 : [2003] 2 SCR 387; Asia Foundation & Construction Ltd. v. Trafalgar House Construction (I) Ltd. and Others (1997) 1 SCC 738 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 209; Reliance Airport Developers (P) Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India & Ors. (2006) 10 SCC 1: [2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 398; Himachal Pradesh Housing and Urban Development Authority v. Universal Estate & Anr. (2010) 14 SCC 253; Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India & Ors. (2009) 7 SCC 561: [2009] 9 SCR 225; Centre for Public Interest Litigation & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2000) 8 SCC 606; Sterlite Industries (India) Limited & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2013) 4 SCC 575 : [2013] 6 SCR 573; Municipal Corporation, Ujjain & Anr. v. BVG India Limited & Ors. (2018) 5 SCC 462 : [2018] 6 SCR 861; N.D. Jayal & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2004) 9 SCC 362 : [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 152; Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors. AIR 1963 SC 1295 : [1964] 1 SCR 332; Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer, New Delhi & Ors. AIR 1967 SC 1836: [1967] 2 SCR 525; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248 : [1970] 3 SCR 530; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Anr. AIR 1978 SC 597 : [1978] 2 SCR 621; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 : [1996] 3 SCR 721; State of A.P. & Ors. v. McDowell & Company & Ors. (1996) 3 SCC 709; Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India & Ors. (2014) 9 SCC 737: [2014] 11 SCR 1009; Swiss Ribbons Private Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2019) 4 SCC 17 : [2019] 3
SCR 535; Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala & Anr. (1973) 4 SCC 225 : [1973] Suppl. SCR 1; Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Limited & Anr. v. Reserve Bank of India (1992) 2 SCC 343 : [1992] 1 SCR 406; Daroga Singh & Ors. v. B.K. Pandey (2004) 5 SCC 26 : [2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 113; Syed Hasan Rasul Numa & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1991) 1 SCC 401 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 165; Mackinonn Mackenzie & Company Limited v. Mackinnon Mackenzie Employees Union (2015) 4 SCC 544 : [2015] 4 SCR 45; Babu Verghese & Ors. v. Bar Council of Kerala & Ors. (1999) 3 SCC 422 : [1999] 1 SCR 1121; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh & Ors. AIR 1964 SC 358; Kedar Nath Yadav v. State of West Bengal & Ors. (2017) 11 SCC 601 : [2016] 11 SCR 263; Khub Chand & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. AIR 1967 SC 1074 : [1967] 1 SCR 120; Mithu v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 277 : [1983] 2 SCR 690; Rajbala and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors. (2016) 2 SCC 445 : [2015] 12 SCR 1106; Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651: [1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 122; Bhanumati and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2010) 12 SCC 1 : [2010] 7 SCR 585; K. Krishna Murthy and Ors. v. Union of India (UOI) and Anr. (2010) 7 SCC 202 : [2010] 6 SCR 972; Mohinder Singh Gill and Anr. v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Ors. (1978) 1 SCC 405 : [1978] 2 SCR 272; Janhit Manch and Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. (2019) 2 SCC 505 : [2018] 14 SCR 860; S.P. Gupta & Ors. v. President of India & Ors. AIR 1982 SC 149 : [1982] 2 SCR 365; R.K. Jain v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 119 : [1993] 3 SCR 802; Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2020) 5 SCC 481 : [2019] 16 SCR 424; T.S.R. Subramanian and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2013) 15 SCC 732 : [2013] 11 SCR 991; Anjali Bhardwaj and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. 2019 (3) SCALE 447; Raghunathrao Ganpatrao v. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 1267: [1993]
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.
1 SCR 480; Machavarapu Srinivasa Rao & Anr. v. Vijayawada, Guntur, Tenali, Mangalagiri Urban Development Authority & Ors. (2011) 12 SCC 154 : [2011] 12 SCR 639; Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and Anr. (2015) 15 SCC 1 : [2015] 9 SCR 890; Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta AIR 1967 SC 997 : [1967] 2 SCR 170; State Bank of Patiala & Ors. v. S.K. Sharma (1996) 3 SCC 364 : [1996] 3 SCR 972; Secretary, Andhra Pradesh Social Welfare Residential Educational Institutions v. Pindiga Sridhar & Ors. (2007) 13 SCC 352 : [2007] 4 SCR 145; Lachmi Narain and Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1976) 2 SCC 953: [1976] 2 SCR785; Ganesh Bank of Kurundwad Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2006) 10 SCC 645 : [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 437; Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. (1999) 4 SCC 727 : [1999] 2 SCR 1033; Union of India & Ors. v. Hindustan Development Corporation & Ors. (1993) 3 SCC 499 : [1993] 3 SCR 128; Ram Pravesh Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 381 : [2006] 6 Suppl. SCR 512; Col. A.S. Sangwan v. Union of India & Ors. 1980 Supp. SCC 559; Secretary, Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers, Government of India v. Cipla Ltd. & Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 1 : [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 177; Sooraram Pratap Reddy & Ors. v. District Collector, Ranga Reddy Distt. & Ors. (2008) 9 SCC 552 : [2008] 13 SCR 126; Michigan Rubber (India) Limited v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (2012) 8 SCC 216 : [2012] 8 SCR 128 and Kalpana Mehta & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors (2018) 7 SCC 1 : [2018] 4 SCR 1 – referred to.
Utkarsh Mandal v. Union of India 2009 SCC Online Del 3836; T. Muruganandam v. Ministry of Environment & Forests Manu/GT/0135/2014 (NGT decision dated 10.11.2014 in Appeal No. 50/2012); Sunil Kumar Chugh & Ors. v. Secretary, Environment Department, Government of Maharashtra & Ors. MANU/GT/0153/
2015 [Appeal No. 66 of 2014 decided on 3.9.2015; Samata & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 2013 SCC Online NGT 101; Sarpanch, Grampanchayat, Tiroda, Tal. Sawantwadi, District Sindhudurg, Maharashtra & Ors. v. Ministry of Environment & Forests & Ors. 2011 SCC Online NGT 10; M/s. Lithoferro & Ors. v. Ministry of Environment and Forests (2013) SCC Online NGT 40; S. Rama Rao & Ors. v. Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, Hyderabad & Anr. 1977 SCC Online AP 27; Aircel Cellular Ltd. v. Union of India 2016 SCC Online Mad 8463; Friends of Rajouri Garden Environment & Anr. v. South Delhi Municipal Corporation 2020 SCC Online Del 458 – referred to. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. People of the State of Illinois [146 US 387 : 36 L Ed 1018 (1892)] Democratic Alliance & Anr. v. Masondo NO & Anr. 2003 (2) BCLR 128 (CC); Matatiele Municipality & Ors. v. President of the Republic of South Africa & Ors. 2007 (1) BCLR 47 (CC); South African Veterinary Association v. Speaker of the National Assembly & Ors. 2019 (2) BCLR 273 (CC); Law Society Case of Kenya v. Attorney General & Ors. [Decision of Court of Appeal, Kenya in Civil Appeal No. 96 of 2014 decided on 27.9.2019]; Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service 1984 (3) All ER 935; Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation (1947) 2 All ER 680; R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte Daly [2001] 3 All ER 433; Regina (Mahmood) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 WLR 840; Huang & Ors. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 3 All ER 435; Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann 285 U.S. 262; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish 300 U.S. 379 (1937); United States v. Carolene Products Co. 304 U.S. 144 (1938); American Federation of Labor Et. Al. v. American Sash & Door Co. 335 U.S. 538 (1949); Ferguson, Attorney General
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.
of Kansas, Et. Al. v. Skrupa 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Wolf v. Colorado 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Legg & Ors. v. Inner London Education Authority [1972] 1 WLR 1245; Bishop v. Wood 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Arnett, Director, Office of Economic Opportunity, Et. Al. v. Kennedy Et. Al. 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Board of Regents of State Colleges Et. Al. v. Roth 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155; Morey, Auditor of Public Accounts of Illinois Et. Al. v. Doud Et. Al. 354 US 457 (1957); King & Ors. v. Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of Control & Anr. 2006 (4) BCLR 462; Ethyl Corporation v. EPA 426 U.S. 941 (1977) : 541 F.2d 1 (1977); Doctors for Life International v. Speaker of the National Assembly & Ors. 2006 (12) BCLR 1399; Kiambu County Government & Ors. v. Robert N. Gakuru & Ors [Decision of Court of Appeal, Kenya in Civil Appeal No. 200 of 2014 decided on 30.6.2017]; Lonrho Plc v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry & Anr. [1989] 2 All ER 609 and R. v. Ministry of Defence, Ex p. Murray [1998] COD 134 (QBD) – referred to.
Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. I, VIII, IX and XI; T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional Justice, Oxford University Press (Edn. 2001) pg. 1; Duke Law Journal, Vol. 1977, No. 2, Eighth Annual Administrative Law Issue (May, 1977), pp. 453-488; The Nature of the Judicial Process, Benjamin Cardozo, New Haven: Yale University Press, 13th Edn. 1946 pg. 141; Administrative Law, 5th Edn., Thomson Sweet and Maxwell, pg. 440; Dictionary of Environment & Ecology Dictionary of Environment & Ecology, Bloomsbury, P.H. Collin, 5th Edn., page 116; “Implementing the Right to Development International Law and Sustainable Development – Principles and Practice, Edn. 2004, pg. 354; Professor Schotland D.C. Circuit Judicial Conference, Environmental Protection: Law and Policy, 2nd Edn., pg. 122; Landscape Architecture Magazine, Frederick SteinerandJohn Roberts Prospect: Public Trust Doctrine, Landscape Architecture Magazine, May/June, 1986, Vol. 76, pg.
132 and “Charting the Boundaries of Hawaii’s Extensive Public Trust Doctrine Post Waiâhole Ditch Charting the Boundaries of Hawaii’s Extensive Public Trust Doctrine Post-Waiâhole Ditch, Ana Ching, Page 2 – referred to.
Per Sanjiv Khanna, J. (partly dissenting) (Minority judgment)
HELD:1. This separate dissenting judgment is on account of difference with the opinion expressed by A.M. Khanwilkar, J. on the aspects of public participation on interpretation of the statutory provisions, failure to take prior approval of the Heritage Conservation Committee and the order passed by the Expert Appraisal Committee. However on the aspects of Notice inviting Bid, award of consultancy and the order of the Urban Arts Commission, as a standalone and independent order, there is no disagreement with the final conclusions in the judgment authored by A.M. Khanwilkar, J. [Para 3][599-D-E] 2.1. Gunning principles, first established in 1985, can be crystallised as under: (a) consultation must occur when the proposals are still at a formative stage; (b) the proponent must give sufficient reasons for the proposal that permit intelligent consideration and response; (c) adequate time must be given for consideration and response; and (d) the product of consultation must be conscientiously taken into account in finalising any statutory proposals. These principles ref lect the basic requirements essential if the public consultation process is to be sensible and meaningful. They would normally form the basis and foundation for proper application of the duty to consult and right to be consulted. Nevertheless, these principles should not be put in a strait-jacket and the degree of application would depend upon the factual matrix and is situation specific. [Para 25][639-DG] 2.2. Sections 7 to 11-A of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 decree detailed procedure for preparation of a Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plan(s) including direction that the Authority shall prepare a draft and make a copy available for inspection to general public and invite objections and suggestions
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.
from any person. Gunning principles can be substantially read as resonating in Sections 10, 11 and 11-A of the Development Act and Rules 4, 8, 9 and 10 of the Delhi Development (Master Plan and Zonal Development Plan) Rules, 1959. To ignore their salutary mandate as to the manner and nature of consultation in the participatory exercise, would be defeat the benefic objective of exercise of deliberation. Public participation to be fruitful and constructive is not to be a mechanical exercise or formality, it must comply with the least and basic requirements. Thus, mere uploading of the gazette notification giving the present and the proposed land use with plot numbers was not sufficient compliance, but rather an exercise violating the express as well as implied stipulations, that is, necessity and requirement to make adequate and intelligible disclosure. This condition also flows from the common law general duty of procedural fairness. Doctrine of procedural legitimate expectation as explained below would be attracted. Intelligible and adequate disclosure of information in the context of the Development Act and the Development Rules means and refers to the degree to which information should be available to public to enable them to have an informed voice in the deliberative decision making legislative exercise before a final decision is taken on the proposals. In the present matter this lapse and failure was acknowledged and accepted by the Board of Enquiry and Hearing (BoEH), which had recommended disclosure and furnishing of details. Intelligible and adequate disclosure was critical given the nature of the proposals which would affect the iconic and historical Central Vista. The citizenry clearly had the right to know intelligible details explaining the proposal to participate and express themselves, give suggestions and submit objections. The proposed changes, unlike policy decisions, would be largely irreversible. Physical construction or demolition once done, cannot be undone or corrected for future by repeal, amendment or modification as in case of most policies or even enactments. They have far more permanent consequences. It was therefore necessary for the respondents to inform and put in public domain the redevelopment plan, layouts, etc. with justification and explanatory memorandum relating to the need and necessity, with studies and reports. Of particular importance is whether by the changes,
the access of the common people to the green and other areas in the Central Vista would be curtailed/restricted and the visual and integrity impact, and proposed change in use of the iconic and heritage buildings. [Paras 27, 28][641-A-B; 642-A-H] 3. In the context of the present case, given the nature and importance the statutory provisions which emphasise on fair participation of the public in the deliberations, and the importance and significance of Central Vista, it would not be appropriate and correct to ignore failure on the part of the respondents to ascribe to the principle of intelligible and adequate disclosure to fulfil the requirement of public participation. Right to make objections and suggestions in the true sense, would include right to intelligible and adequate information regarding the proposal. Formative and constructive participation forms the very fulcrum of the legislative scheme prescribed by the Development Act and the Development Rules. Every effort must be made to effectuate and actualise the participatory rights to the maximum extent, rather than read them down as mere irregularity or dilute them as unnecessary or not mandated. [Para 37][649-F-H; 650A-B] 4. The Central Government has not placed on record even a single document or minutes to show that the objections and suggestions were considered by the Central Government. [Para 51][662-D-E] 5. The core issue in the present case is whether or not the respondents have performed their duty to consult the public, followed the prescribed procedure and the authority competent had acted to modify/amend, in terms of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 and the Delhi Development (Master Plan and Zonal Development Plan) Rules, 1959. Merits of the public policy is not per se a dispute being decided by the Court. [Para 55][671E; 672-C] 6. It is a well-settled proposition that where power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, then the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. When the statute prescribes a particular act must be done by following a particular procedure, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The Technical Committee of
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.
the Authority in its meeting held on 5th December, 2019 while examining the proposal had, inter alia, stated that steps would be taken to seek approval of the Heritage Conservation Committee. However Heritage Conservation Committee was never moved to secure approval/permission. No approval/permission has been taken. [Paras 71, 72][688-F; 689-A-B]
7. Respondents raised two other defences. First, the construction of the new Parliament being on a vacant plot adjacent to the existing Parliament building does not require approval/no objection from the Heritage Conservation Committee. This contention according to the petitioners is fallacious as it is contrary to the statutory Master Plan of Delhi and the Unified Building Bye-Laws. They rely on the definition assigned to the term ‘heritage building’, which ‘includes such portion of land adjoining such building and part thereof as may be required for fencing or covering or in any manner preserving the historical and/or architectural and/or aesthetic and/or cultural value of such building’. However, the respondents should have moved and asked for clarification from the Heritage Conservation Committee. Further, if the interpretation as put forward by the respondents, including the NDMC, is to be accepted, then as a sequitur it follows that construction or development can take place in a vacant plot adjacent to or adjoining the Grade-I building. This interpretation appears unacceptable as it is contrary to the express stipulations in the Master Plan and the Unified Building Bye-Laws. It would also lead to unintended consequences and would be incompatible with the purpose and objective of these two legislations, a relevant principle when one interprets provisions in case of doubt or ambiguity. This is a tentative view, as it is for the Heritage Conservation Committee to opine on ‘includes such portion of land adjoining such building and part thereof as may be required for fencing or covering or in any manner preserving the historical and/or architectural and/or aesthetic and/or cultural value of such building’. [Para 74][689H; 690-A-E]
8. Central Government could not have notified the modified the land use changes, without following the procedure and without prior approval/permission from the Heritage Conservation
Committee. Further, the local body is expressly interdicted from issuing building permits in respect of the listed heritage buildings/ precincts. The local body i.e. NDMC should have approached the Heritage Conservation Committee for clarification/ confirmation and proceed on their advice. [Para 75][690-G-H; 691-A] 9. The Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) [which carried out the entire decision making process in the build-up to the issuance of the Environmental Clearance] proceeded to impose as many as fifteen conditions including those relating to other clearances which would be required, like clearance from Delhi Pollution Control Committee under the Air and Water Pollution Act, provision for adequate fire safety measures, etc. What is of concern is lack of discussion, reasons or even the conclusion or finding on the aspect of slicing or inclusion. Proceedings before the EAC are not adversarial in nature. EAC acts both as a fair investigator and an independent objective adjudicator when deciding whether or not to grant environmental clearance. There must be application of mind which is reflected when reasons justifying the conclusion are recorded. Mere reproduction of the contesting stands is not sufficient. On the contrary it would reflect mechanical grant without application of mind. Further, it is not for the court/appellate forum to assume what weighed, whether the conclusion relies on material which is relevant, irrelevant or partly relevant, or whether the decision is partly based on surmises and conjectures and partly on evidence. [Paras 89, 90][703-F-G; 704-C-E] 10. It was argued that the relevant clause of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification of 2006 does not require giving of reasons when environment clearance is granted. However, the apprising body, which includes EAC as well as the Ministry, has to make categorical recommendations to the regulatory authority either for grant of clearance or rejection, together with reasons for the same. Further, the orders passed by the EAC are appealable before the National Green Tribunal. Appellate forum would not be able to decipher and adjudicate unless reasons are set out and stated in the order under challenge. The whole purpose of outsourcing the task to EAC, comprised of experts and specialists, is to have a proper
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.
evaluation on the basis of some objective criteria. EAC is a body that has to apply its collective mind and not to record conclusions. It must justify and give basis for its conclusions. [Para 92][706D-E; 707-C-D]
11. There are complex and esoteric issues which have to be at first stage considered and decided by the specialised authorities like the Heritage Conservation Committee. If the merits of the pleas is considered and examined, it would be a direct encroachment on their jurisdiction and exceeding the power of judicial review. It is the reasoning and discussion in the orders by the statutory /quasi-judicial that are subjected to judicial scrutiny and review. Further, matters pertaining to heritage, architectural, functionality etc are for the experts and specialists in the field like Architects, town planers, historians, urbanists, engineers etc. to examine and guide. The respondents without doubt do verily believe that redevelopment of Central Vista and new Parliament building is an imperative necessity. Central Vista requires a makeover. The hutments and some of the non-heritage buildings like Shashtri Bhawan, Nirman Bhawan, Udyog Bhawan etc. which it is stated occupy more than 90 acres of land require re-development. Similarly, if new parliament building is required and being a must, it should be constructed. Several former and the present Speaker have expressed the need for construction of a new Parliament. Some of the petitioners do not oppose partial and regulated redevelopment for functionality, while maintaining and preserving the heritage, ethos and visual look. Central Vista and Parliament House is an heritage and belongs to the Nation and the people. Their primary grievance is lack of information and details. They submit that experts and specialists can provide acceptable solutions to conserve and make historical buildings functional, as it has happened elsewhere. The issues raised by the petitioners along with the stand of the respondents have to be taken into consideration by the statutory authorities in terms of and as per the statutory mandate. Ultimately, the issue has to be decided as per law after ascertain details by professional experts. [Para 96][711-D-H; 712-A-C] 12. While setting aside and quashing the final notification of modification/change of the land use dated 28th March 2020 in respect of the 6 plots in the Central Vista, it is directed as under:
A) The Central Government/Authority would put on public domain on the web, intelligible and adequate information along with drawings, layout plans, with explanatory memorandum etc. within a period of 7 days. B) Public Advertisement on the website of the Authority and the Central Government along with appropriate publication in the print media would be made within 7 days. C) Anyone desirous of filing suggestions/objections may do so within 4 weeks from the date of publication. Objections/ suggestions can be sent by email or to the postal address which would be indicated/mentioned in the public notice. D) The public notice would also notify the date, time and place when public hearing, which would be given by the Heritage Conservation Committee to the persons desirous of appearing before the said Committee. No adjournment or request for postponement would be entertained. However, the Heritage Conservation Committee may if required fix additional date for hearing. E) Objections/suggestions received by the Authority along with the records of BoEH and other records would be sent to the Heritage Conservation Committee. These objections etc. would also be taken into consideration while deciding the question of approval/permission. F) Heritage Conservation Committee would decide all contentions in accordance with the Unified Building Bye Laws and the Master Plan of Delhi. G) Heritage Conservation Committee would be at liberty to also undertake the public participation exercise if it feels appropriate and necessary in terms of paragraph 1.3 or other paragraphs of the Unified Building Bye Laws for consultation, hearing etc. It would also examine the dispute regarding the boundaries of the Central Vista Precincts at Rajpath. H) The report of the Heritage Conservation Committee would be then along with the records sent to the Central
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. Government, which would then pass an order in accordance with law and in terms of Section 11A of the Development Act and applicable Development Rules, read with the Unified Building Bye-laws. I) Heritage Conservation Committee would also simultaneously examine the issue of grant of prior permission/approval in respect of building/permit of new parliament on Plot No. 118. However, its final decision or outcome will be communicated to the local body viz., NDMC, after and only if, the modifications in the master plan were notified.
J) Heritage Conservation Committee would pass a speaking order setting out reasons for the conclusions. [Para 97][712-C-H; 713-A-G] 13. The order of the EAC dated 22nd April, 2020 and the environment clearance by the Ministry of Environment and Forest dated 17th June, 2020 are set aside, and an order of remit to the EAC passed with a request that they may decide the question on environment clearance within a period of 30 days from the date copy of this order received, without awaiting the decision on the question of change/modification of land use. [Para 98][713-G-H; 714-A] All India Recruitment Board and Another v. K. Shyam Kumar and Others (2010) 6 SCC 614 : [2010] 6 SCR 291; Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) 3 SCC 637; Modern Dental College and Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others (2016) 7 SCC 353 : [2016] 3 SCR 579; K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar5J) (2019) 1 SCC 1 : [2018] 8 SCR 1; Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Sale Tax (1974) 4 SCC 98 : [1974] 2 SCR 879; In Re.: The Delhi Laws Act. AIR 1951 SC 332: [1951] SCR 747; Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641 : [1985] 2 SCR 287; Kerala Samsthana Chetu Thozhilali Union v. State of Kerala & Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 327 : [2006] 3 SCR 420; Ispat Industries Limited v. Commissioner of Customs (2006) 12 SCC 583 : [2006] 6 Suppl. SCR 733; Union of India
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RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.
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referred to
Para 8
[2018] 8 SCR 1
referred to
Para 8
[1974] 2 SCR 879
referred to
Para 10
[1951] SCR 747
referred to
Para 10
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [1985] 2 SCR 287
referred to
Para 11
[2006] 3 SCR 420
referred to
Para 11
[2006] 6 Suppl. SCR 733
referred to
Para 13
[1987] 2 SCR 841
referred to
Para 14
[2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 207
referred to
Para 14
[1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 627
referred to
Para 15
[2016] 9 SCR 1
referred to
Para 17
[1975] 3 SCR 333
referred to
Para 18
[1995] 1 SCR 1036
referred to
Para 18
(1988) 4 SCC 592
referred to
Para 18
[2004] 1 SCR 232
referred to
Para 18
[2011] 11 SCR 1028
referred to
Para 19
[1965] SCR 970
referred to
Para 20
[1979] 1 SCR 845
referred to
Para 21
[1979] 1 SCR 845
referred to
Para 23
[2009] 2 SCR 161
referred to
Para 27
[2009] 3 SCR 355
referred to
Para 27
(2019) 12 SCC 720
referred to
Para 30
[2011] 15 SCR 877
referred to
Para 31
[2015] 11 SCR 723
referred to
Para 32
(1990) 2 SCC 334
referred to
Para 33
[1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 165
referred to
Para 34
[1958] SCR 533
referred to
Para 35
[1961] SCR 679
referred to
Para 35
[1967] SCR 170
referred to
Para 53(b)
[1957] SCR 1052
referred to
Para 53(c)
[1991] 1 SCR 974
referred to
Para 53(c)
2020 (12) JT 78
referred to
Para 53(e)
[2016] 6 SCR 333
referred to
Para 71
(2019) 3 SCC 224
referred to
Para 71
[2019] 6 SCR 307
referred to
Para 71
[2019] 5 SCR 916
referred to
Para 90
AIR 1955 SC 271
referred to
Para 90
[1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 44
referred to
Para 91
[1976] Suppl. SCR 489
referred to
Para 91
[2009] 5 SCR 326
referred to
Para 91
[1967] 3 SCR 214
referred to
Para 91
[2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 904
referred to
Para 91
[2019] 5 SCR 916
referred to
Para 92
[2018] 6 SCR 1076
referred to
Para 95(b)
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Transferred Case (Civil) No. 229 of 2020. From the Judgment and Order dated 28.02.2020 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in LPA No. 119 of 2020.
With Transferred Case (Civil) No. 230 Of 2020, Civil Appeal No. 12 Of 2021, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 510, 638, 681, 845, 853, 922 And 1041 of 2020. Mr. Tushar Mehta, SG , Sanjay R. Hegde, Shyam Divan, Rajiv Bansal, Harish N. Salve, Sr. Advs., Shikhil Suri, Shiv Kumar Suri, Ms. Madhu Suri, Ms. Shilpa Saini, Ms. Shweta Saini, Ms. Nikita Thapar, Ms. Vinishma Kaul, Ankit Yadav, Anshuman Srivastava, Rohan Pratap Talwar, Ms. Sugandha Yadav, Ms. Ria Singh Sawhney, Ms. Sanam Tripathi, Bhav Ratan, Ms. Vrinda Bhandari, Gautam Bhatia, Ms. Sanam Tripathi, Shadan Farasat, Bharat Gupta, Gurmeet Singh Makker, Kanu Agarwal, Ashok Panigrahi, Ms. Garima Prasad, G.S. Oberoi, Rajat Nair, Kanu Agarwal, Raj Bahadur Yadav, Yoginder Handoo, Ms. Ruby Singh Ahuja, Ms. Deepti Sarin, Ms. Tahira Karanjawala, Anupm Prakash, M/s. Karanjawala & Co., Saurabh Mishra, Onkar Singh, Arun Verma, Ms. Neha Tripathi, Chirag M. Shroff, Ms. Sanjana Nangia, Ms. Abhilasha Bharti, Anshuman Srivastava, Advs. for the appearing parties.
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. The Judgments of the Court were delivered by A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.
*Ed. Note: Pagination is as per the original judgment.
INTRODUCTION 1. By these petition(s)/appeal(s)/case(s), we are called upon by the petitioners to undertake a comprehensive and heightened judicial scrutiny regarding the permissibility of the Central Vista Project1 of the Government of India. Diverse issues concerning the decisions taken by the statutory Authorities including regarding the change in land use, grant of statutory and other permissions, environmental as well as heritage clearances etc., have been raised in these proceedings. The challenge is premised on high principles of democratic values as applicable in India and not limited to mere infringement of statutory provisions of the governing enactments. That is on account of the nature of project – being of high political significance and eminence for our democratic republic; and for upholding the “Rule of Law”, which is on a higher pedestal than the governance by “Rule by Law”. OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT
2. As per the policy documents, the need for the development of the Project is rooted in the creation of a larger working space for efficient functioning of the highest legislative wing of the country and for integrated administrative block for Ministries/Departments presently spread out at different locations including on rental basis.
3. The Parliament House building, a Grade-I heritage structure, was commissioned in 1927 and stands as a 93 years old structure today. The structure has been subjected to various modifications in the postindependence period so as to maintain its functionality as per changing requirements. Post 1971 census wherein the total population of India was recorded as 548,159,6521, the number of seats for the House of People was fixed at 545. Today, the population has spiralled exponentially and is stated to have crossed the 130-crore mark. The next delimitation exercise, proposed to take place in 2026, is bound to result in a substantial increase in the total number of seats in both the Houses. Accordingly, enhanced and commensurate spatial requirements ought to be in place.
4. The present Central Hall has a seating capacity of only 440 persons. That already falls short of the present need to accommodate members of both Houses together during a joint session. Presently, there is no scope to expand the existing Central Hall. Resultantly, the Joint Sessions of both the Houses of Parliament are conducted by way of a
For short, “the Project”
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
makeshift arrangement in the Central Hall causing inconvenience to the members attending official functions thereat, apart from undermining their dignity. Furthermore, the structure falls short of fire, water and electrical safety norms and poses a grave security risk for the legislators and secretariat staff.
5. In order to address the concerns stated above, the Central Government decided to construct a new Parliament building with a futuristic approach and the House of People being 3 times the size of the present chamber. That along with the present Parliament building and Annexe attached therewith, would be referred to as the Parliament Complex. It is further proposed that all the 51 Ministries of the Central Government be housed in 10 buildings within an integrated complex marked with underground transit connectivity and structural identity. Expressing the need for urgent completion of the project, it has been stated that the new Parliament shall symbolize the 75th Independence Day of the country in 2022 as well as the Global G-20 Summit to be hosted by India in the same year. The objectives, as stated in the written submissions of the respondents, succinctly read thus:
“(i)
A new Parliament Building with space and technology to meet the present and emerging needs of vibrant Indian democracy.
(ii)
Common Central Secretariat with all Ministries in a single location for efficiency and synergy in functioning.
(iii)
Central Vista to be redeveloped as a world class public space and venue for national and international events.”
6. Similar structural defects, along with acute shortage of office spaces, have been pointed out in the offices of various Ministries presently spread across 47 buildings in the Central Vista region and in particular, Central Secretariat block. It is stated that various buildings housing the Ministries, including North Block and South Block, are illequipped to meet even the basic fire and earthquake safety norms and require regular upgradations involving recurring expenses to the tune of Rs.50 crores annually. As per Non-Availability Certificates (NACs) issued by Directorate of Estate, a shortage of 3.8 lakh sq.m. of office space has been flagged. To add to this state of affairs, the Central Government is spending an amount equivalent to about Rs.1,000 crores on rental spaces to accommodate the offices of various Ministries annually. The proposal states thus:
“Most of the buildings in the Central Vista area are more than 4050 years old and have either outlived or approaching their structural lives. Further buildings constructed over 100 years ago such as North and South Block are not earthquake safe. There is shortage of working spaces, parking amenities and services. The spread of Central Government Ministries and Departments in different locations leads to inefficiencies and difficulty in coordination.” 7. Upon examination of other documents associated with the Project, the objectives for redeveloping/constructing the existing Central Secretariat have been broadly summed up thus:
(i)
Even after 73 years of independence, the nation does not have a common secretariat building. Some Ministries are housed in Central Vista complex while some Ministries are housed in other parts of Delhi;
(ii)
Various Ministries, due to lack of available space, have hired premises on rent and till date most of the rent paid for and on behalf of the Central Government for using its Ministries in Delhi runs into thousands of crores;
(iii)
Except North Block and South Block and one or two other buildings, rest of the buildings are not heritage buildings and are constructed in the near vicinity based upon the need;
(iv)
Most of the existing buildings have outlived its structural life and are not earthquake resistant;
(v)
As there is no common Central Secretariat and Ministries are spread over different locations, the resultant effect is administrative inefficiency and difficulty in interdepartmental coordination;
(vi)
This also leads to travelling, resulting into traffic congestion and pollution;
(vii)
Existing secretariat buildings spread all over haphazardly, suffering from poor servicing, inefficient use of land, inadequate facilities and outdated infrastructure;
(viii) There are six plots on Central Vista, which houses temporary barracks or stable building during 2nd World War occupying 90 acres of land, which has remained underutilised;
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.] (ix)
To utilise the underutilised spaces in the Central Vista region;
(x)
Integrated functioning of all offices of the Central Government;
(xi)
Modernisation of Government work spaces for enhanced productivity and efficient management of human resources;
(xi)
To promote the concept of green buildings commensurate with scientific standards and sustainable with the needs of future generations; and
(xiii) To connect all the ministerial offices through an underground shuttle transportation system for smooth performance of routine administrative functions. 8. As regards the decision to supplement the existing Parliament building (on plot No. 116 admeasuring 10.75 acres having built-up area 44940 sq. mts.) with utilities constructed on plot No. 118 admeasuring 10.5 acres having built-up area of 5200 sq. mts. which is not a heritage building/site; has been felt necessary because: (i)
The existing Parliament House was constructed during 19211927;
(ii)
The building was constructed prior to independence to house the Imperial Legislative Council and was never intended to house a bicameral national legislature;
(iii)
2 floors were added to this structure in 1956 as per the demand for more space;
(iv)
Periodically ad-hoc additions have taken place in this building as per the requirement of the day, which has added to an additional stress on the heritage structure;
(v)
The building is not designed as per the fire norms;
(vi)
Water supply lines and sewer lines are installed in a haphazard manner, leading to seepage and destroying the heritage nature of the building;
(vii) These systems like audio-video system, A/c system etc. are later additions and were installed in various stages on an ad-hoc basis;
(viii) By 2026, the number of seats in Lok Sabha would increase from 545. Both Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha are packed and would have no capacity for addition of seats when the number of seats would increase;
(ix)
To prepare the Houses of Parliament for emerging spatial requirements in light of the impending delimitation exercise.
(x)
In the Central Hall of the Parliament, the seating capacity is only for 440 persons. Whenever constitutional joint sessions are held, large number of temporary seats are placed in the aisles, undermining the dignity of this great democratic institutions;
(xi)
The cramped seating arrangement both for members of the House and the staff posed a serious security risk in case of either any fire hazard or any external attack requiring quick evacuation. The existing Parliament is not built from the earthquake resistant point of view;
(xii) Concerns about these factors have been raised periodically by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and Chairman of the Rajya Sabha in past. (xiii) To ensure a modern and technologically advanced space for single and joint sittings of the Houses of Parliament commensurate with modern safety norms; and
(xiv) To preserve the built heritage by not undertaking aggressive reconstruction activity on graded heritage structures on which only minimum renovation measures are permissible in law. 9. Before we begin the discussion, we deem it fit to observe that the proposal, as far as change in land use is concerned, comprises of seven plots falling in the central vista region – Plots no. 22 (or Plot No. 118 – New Parliament Building), 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. The terms “central vista region or area” and “central vista precincts”, as used at various places in the judgment, are not interchangeable. Whereas the central vista region broadly refers to the entire region as per the master plan, central vista precincts refers to the “Central Vista Precincts at Rajpath” as per the list of 141 heritage buildings/precincts. The subject plots, except
For short, “plot no. 2" or “plot no. 118"
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
plot no. 3, fall in the central vista region and not in the central vista precincts.
10. In a constitutional democracy governed by Rule of Law where diversity of views is both heard and respected; and the principle of constitutionalism touches both ends as well as means of accomplishing the wisest of intentions, every action of the Government, howsoever laudable, need not have a free flow in its implementation and unless it stands the test of constitutional parameters. In the same vein, the petitioners herein (claiming to be public spirited persons) have approached this Court taking exception to various aspects of the project, including but not limited to the manner and procedure adopted for effecting the proposed changes in the central vista precincts. Our examination flows from such objections which have been presented to us in this set of cases. PROCEEDINGS AND CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 11. After objections to the proposed change in land use were received by the Delhi Development Authority3 and public hearings were conducted thereagainst, the petitioners approached the High Court of Delhi4 for challenging the Public Notice dated 21.12.2019 in W.P. (C) No. 1568 of 2020. The learned single Judge of High Court, vide order dated 11.2.2020, directed the respondents to inform the Court before taking any step in furtherance of the impugned public notice. The relevant extract of the order reads thus: “20. In case, a decision is taken to notify the proposed changes in MPD 2020-21, the DDA will approach the court before notifying such decision.” 12. The respondent Union of India took exception to the aforesaid order by filing L.P.A. No. 119 of 2020 before the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench ordered an ex-parte stay on the above direction of learned single Judge vide order dated 28.2.2020. Another writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 1575 of 2020 was also pending before the High Court.
13. Aggrieved by the order of the Division Bench, the petitioners approached this Court vide S.L.P. (Civil) Diary No. 8430 of 2020 which
For short, “DDA” or “the Authority”, as the case may be For short, “the High Court”
resulted in the withdrawal of the entire subject matter before this Court in terms of order dated 6.3.2020, which reads thus: “………
In our opinion, it is just and proper that writ petition itself is heard by this Court instead of examining the grievance about the manner in which the interim directions have been passed and then vacated by the High Court. Indeed, this order is not a reflection on the proceedings before the High Court, in any manner, but in larger public interest, we deem it appropriate that the entire matter pertaining to challenge pending before the High Court is heard and decided by this court expeditiously. We are given to understand that there is one more writ petition pending before the High Court involving the same issue. Accordingly, Writ Petition Nos. 1568 and 1575 of 2020 pending before the High Court of Delhi shall stand withdrawn to this Court and be registered as Transferred Cases, to be heard along with the present Special Leave Petition on 18.03.2020. Letters Patent Appeal No. 119 of 2020 before the High Court stands disposed of in terms of this order.
Any steps taken by the authorities, in the meantime, will be subject to the outcome of the proceedings. Liberty is granted to both sides to file additional documents. The Registry shall forthwith call for the case records of Writ Petition Nos. 1568 and 1575 of 2020 from the High Court.”
Thereafter, more petitions were filed and we agreed to hear all petitions analogously. We deem it apposite to reproduce two other orders passed in the leading case dated 19.6.2020 and 29.7.2020 respectively. The same read thus: 19.6.2020
“O R D E R We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
Application(s) for amendment of petition(s) are allowed subject to just exceptions and without prejudice to the contentions available to the respondent(s).
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.] The petitioner(s) in the respective case(s) to file separate compilation with index consisting of writ petition memo, as amended, along with annexure(s) thereto, followed by the affidavits filed before the Delhi High Court in seriatum. The said compilation will be used at the time of hearing of the concerned cases. The compilation in the respective transferred cases be filed by 23rd June, 2020 through e-mail/on-line. Mr. Shikhil Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner(s), has informed us that one more petition has been filed in this Court being Writ Petition (C) No.510 of 2020. The said petition shall be heard along with these petitions (transferred cases).
We make it clear that any other petition/proceedings instituted or to be filed hereafter by any party concerning the subject Project, be heard and proceeded along with the present cases. The respondent(s) may file consolidated reply on or before 3rd July, 2020, which can be placed on record in the respective transferred cases/proceedings.
List these matter(s) along with all connected cases on 7th July, 2020.” 29.7.2020
“O R D E R Heard learned counsel for the parties on the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant(s)-intervenor(s). In deference to the observations made by the Court, Mr. Shyam Divan submits that he would commend to the applicant(s) in application I.A. No.59230/2020 to file substantive writ petition challenging the environmental clearance dated 17.06.2020 by way of writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution while maintaining the preliminary objection already raised so that all aspects can be considered by the Court at appropriate stage.
Counsel for the respondent(s) and the petitioner(s) have no objection to take recourse to this option while permitting each of them to file response to the proposed writ petition, to be filed by
the applicant(s) in I.A. No.59230/2020. As assured by Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel, the substantive writ petition will be filed within one week from today. The respondents in the said writ petition to file a comprehensive reply within one week from service of memo of writ petition. Advance copy of the proposed writ petition be served by the applicant(s) in the office of the Solicitor General through e-mail/on-line, at the time of filing the same in the Registry. List the matters at the end of Board in the week commencing 17th August, 2020.”
Being mindful of the prevailing state of affairs amidst the pandemic, we refrained from insisting upon technicalities during the course of hearing and granted complete freedom to the parties, both in terms of timelines and volume of submissions, to file pleadings, written statements and documents. We may now advert to the challenge raised by the petitioners in the subject petitions. Civil Appeal No. …......./2021 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.……….2021 @ Diary No. 8430/ 2020)
14. The appellant (writ petitioners) has challenged the order of Division Bench on the ground that well-considered order of learned single Judge came to be vacated by the Division Bench without hearing the appellant. This amounted to violation of the basic principles of natural justice which required the appellant to be heard before passing an adverse order. It is further stated that the learned single Judge had asked the respondents to file a reply to the original writ petition, however, no reply was filed and the Division Bench failed to consider this aspect while vacating the stay granted by the learned single Judge. 15. In this appeal arising out of special leave petition, the applicants (third parties) filed I.A. No. 59796/2020 praying for recall/modification of the order of this Court dated 6.3.2020 whereby the following direction was issued: “We make it clear that any other petition/proceedings instituted or to be filed hereafter by any party concerning the subject Project, be heard and proceeded along with the present cases.”
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
The applicants have contended that the aforesaid direction debarred the applicants from approaching the National Green Tribunal 5for the invocation of their statutory remedy of challenging the grant of environmental clearance6. It is submitted that NGT, being an expert body equipped with technical members, ought to exercise jurisdiction concerning environmental issues in the first place. Hence, the order of this Court could not have curtailed the statutory remedies otherwise available to the applicants. At the conclusion of the hearing of these cases, however, the learned counsel for the applicants had prayed that this application be disposed of as infructuous.
T.C. (C) NO. 229/2020
(formerly W.P. (C) No. 1568 of 2020 before the High Court of Delhi) 16. In this petition, originally filed in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioners therein have assailed the public notice dated 21.12.2019 and final notification for change in land use dated 20.3.2020. The relevant prayers read thus: “I. Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction calling for records and quashing Public Notice S.O. 4587 E dated 21.12.2019, issued by Respondent No. 1 Delhi Development Authority (DDA); and/ or xxx
xxx
xxx
IV. Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction calling for records and quashing Notification S.O. 1192 (E) dated 20.03.2020 issued by Union of India Represented Through Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs.” 17. The Land & Development Officer7, Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs8, Government of India, being the land-owning agency of the plots, initiated the process of change in land use vide letter no. L&DO/ L-IIA/11(1158)/545 dated 4.12.2019 for 8 plots. Plots No. 1 to 7 and 8 are in Planning Zone-D and C respectively of the central vista area. The said proposal was considered in the Technical Committee Meeting of
For short “NGT”. For short, “EC” For short, “the L&DO” For short, “MoHUA”
the DDA on 5.12.2019 wherein the proposal was recommended for further processing by the Authority. The recommendation reads thus: “After detailed deliberation, the proposal as contained in Para 4.0 of the agenda with the above modification in landuse for Plot No. 1 was recommended by the Technical Committee for further processing under Section-11A of DD Act, 1957. With the following conditions:
(i) The clearances from the PMO, Heritage Conservation Committee and Central Vista Committee shall be taken by L&DO.
(ii) The heritage buildings shall be dealt as per the relevant heritage provisions.” (emphasis supplied)
18. Thereafter, on 11.12.2019, in the meeting of the Authority at Raj Niwas, Delhi (Lieutenant Governor’s Residence), the recommendations of the Technical Committee were placed for consideration. The Authority approved the recommendations with a direction for issuing public notice inviting objections/suggestions from the public qua the proposed modifications in accordance with Section11A of the Delhi Development Act, 19579. The decision taken on 11.12.2019 reads thus: “The proposal contained in the agenda item was approved. Public notice inviting objections/suggestions under Section-11A of DD Act, 1957 be issued.”
19. Thereafter, on 21.12.2019, the Authority issued Public Notice S.O. 4587 E with a proposal for the change in land use of Plots No. 1 to 8 situated at different direction/location in Zones C and D and inviting suggestions/objections from the citizens of the country qua the said proposal. After a public hearing on objections, the matter was considered by the Authority in its following meeting chaired by Lt. Governor, Delhi on 10.2.2020. The Board recommended that a fresh proposal be initiated as regards plot no. 1. This recommendation was accepted by the Authority in the meeting. Thus, plot no. 1 stood excluded from the original proposal and is not the subject matter of these petitions. As regards plots no. 2 to 8, the Authority approved the proposal after public consultation
For short, “the 1957 Act”
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
and the same was finally submitted to the Central Government for issuing the final notification. On 20.3.2020, the final notification (impugned) was issued by the Central Government notifying the change in land use of plots nos. 2 to 8.
20. To buttress the challenge, the petitioner would assert that the changes in land use had been proposed without framing an updated Zonal Development Plan10 for Zone D, as mandated in the Master Plan Delhi, 202111, and therefore, the changes are not backed by updated information and empirical data. It is submitted that the respondents relied upon an old ZDP of 2001 for carrying on the changes. Further, in the absence of an updated plan, an informed decision could not have been taken by the respondents with regard to the proposed changes, more particularly relating to standards of population density. It is supplemented by referring to Chapter-16 of the Master Plan which requires a comprehensive land use plan based on current data for undertaking different urban activities, social and physical infrastructure. 21. It is submitted that the proposal issued is ultra vires Section 11A of 1957 Act as the Authority had no power to modify the land use of subject plots. The argument stems from the understanding that the proposed modifications substantially alter the Master Plan and Section 11A(1) prohibits the Authority from undertaking modifications of a nature that effect important alterations in the character of the plan. It is submitted that the nature of changes proposed could not have been carried forth in the name of modifications as they were of a substantial nature and thus, required a fresh Master Plan or amendment to the extant Master Plan. 22. Mr. Shikhil Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that since the notice dated 21.12.2019 stood vitiated in terms of the abovementioned submissions, the final notification dated 20.3.2020 is bad and illegal as such notification ought to have preceded by a valid public notice. The petitioner submits that the proposed changes contradict the Master Plan. An attempt has been made to demonstrate contradictions within various chapters of the plan. It is stated that the public notice does not advert to Chapter-17 of the Master Plan which provides for a “Development Code” and lays emphasis on the quality of built
For short, “ZDP” or “zonal plan” For short, “Master Plan” (Prepared by Delhi Development Authority and approved by the Central Government under Section 11A(2) of Delhi Development Act 1957 and notified on 7th February 2007 (The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II–Section 3 Subsection (ii) No. 125 (Magha 18, 1928) vide S.O. 141- (E)).
environment while considering any land use proposals and development policies. It is stated that Chapter-8 of the plan requires decentralization of Government offices in the NCR region which is contrary to the proposal of creating an integrated vista of Government offices. It is further stated that proposal to alter central vista precincts does not reckon the mandate of Chapter-10 for conservation of built heritage. 23. It is urged that the respondents have acted in an arbitrary manner and have violated Article 21 as well as the Doctrine of Public Trust by denying basic access to public/recreational spaces which are essential to life and liberty.
24. To buttress their submissions, the petitioners have placed reliance upon Lal Bahadur v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 12, Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa & Ors.13, R.K. Mittal & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.14, Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v. Hiraman Sitaram Deorukhar & Ors. 15 and Goel Ganga Developers India Private Limited v. Union of India Through Secretary, Ministry of Environment and Forests & Ors. 16. 25. In the counter affidavit filed by DDA, it is submitted that the proposal is merely meant to align the existing land use with the proposed plan for optimum utilisation whilst preserving and conserving environment and built heritage of the central vista precincts as a whole. As regards the contention of population density, it is submitted that the project is not going to result in any enhancement in population density as the area attracts floating population which brings in a temporary footprint during official working hours only. 26. As regards the absence of an updated ZDP, the respondent DDA, in its counter affidavit, placed reliance upon Chapter-16 of the Master Plan to urge that such plan was not required at all as Chapter-16 expressly permits the usage of the previous plan. It is submitted that in the absence of an updated plan, the ZDP formulated under the previous Master Plan continues to be operative. 27. In the consolidated counter affidavit, the respondents (Union of India) have urged that the changes indicated in the proposal regarding
(2018) 15 SCC 407 (paras 12, 13 and 15) (1991) 4 SCC 54 (paras 23 and 24) (2012) 2 SCC 232 (para 47) (2019) 14 SCC 411 (para 6) (2018) 18 SCC 257
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
land use are in the nature of minor modifications and not substantial alterations of the Master Plan, as suggested. Responding to the argument of lack of authority, the respondents have urged that the power of Central Government to propose modifications falling under Section 11A(2) is not restricted as the limitations of sub-Section (1) are strictly meant for the Authority and do not apply to the Central Government as such. To buttress the submission, it is urged that the powers of Central Government under sub-Section (2) are untrammelled and uninhibited by restrictions which apply to the Authority. 28. Countering the argument that DDA possessed no power to issue public notice, it is submitted in the written submissions that procedure prescribed under the Act requires DDA to publish notice inviting objections, be it for modification of the existing plan or for preparation of new Master Plan. Reference has been made to S.O. 141 dated 7.2.2007 to support this view. 29. It is further urged in the written submissions that procedure prescribed by law has been strictly followed by the Authority. In that, the proposal was initiated by Land & Development Office – land owning agency – and was placed for due consideration of Technical Committee on 5.12.2019 before being finally placed before the Authority on 11.12.2019 wherein all recommendations of the Technical Committee were considered before approving the release of public notice. Appearing for the respondents, learned Solicitor General has submitted that the above sequence of events reveals due application of mind and no ground for arbitrariness has been made out. 30. The respondents, in addition to the arguments, have placed reliance upon Union of India & Anr. v. Cynamide India Ltd. & Anr.17, Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.18, State of Punjab v. Tehal Singh & Ors.19, Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Promoters and Builders Association & Anr. 20, Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Limited & Anr. v. Sai Renewable Power Private Limited & Ors.21, Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. v. the Notified Area Committee, Tulsipur 22, Sundarjas Kanyalal
(1987) 2 SCC 720 (paras 4, 6, 7 and 14) (1990) 3 SCC 223 (paras 36 to 47) (2002) 2 SCC 7 (paras 36 to 44) (2004) 10 SCC 796 (paras 2 to 5) (2011) 11 SCC 34 (para 39) (1980) 2 SCC 295 (para 3, 5, 7 and 8)
Bhatija & Ors. v. Collector, Thane, Maharahstra & Ors. 23 , Bangalore Development Authority v. Aircraft Employees’ Cooperative Society Limited & Ors.24 and Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. 25. T.C. (C) No. 230/2020 [formerly W.P. (C) No. 1575 of 2020 before the High Court of Delhi]
31. The challenge in this petition is to the public notice dated 5.2.2020 and also the final notification dated 20.3.2020. The relevant extract of prayers read thus: “a) Issue a Writ in the nature of mandamus or any other Writ/ Order/Direction thereby quashing the impugned public notice dated 05.02.2020 issued by the Respondent No. 1 herein and all consequential actions taken thereto;
b) Issue a Writ in the nature of mandamus or any other Writ/ Order/Direction thereby quashing the impugned notification for change in land use dated 20.03.2020 issued by the Respondent No. 2 herein and all actions taken in furtherance thereof.”
32. In response to the notice inviting objections/suggestions regarding the change in land use, a total of 1292 responses were received by the Authority. Thereafter, on 3.2.2020, the Authority sent emails and SMS to the objectors conveying about personal/public hearing on the said responses before the Board of Enquiry and Hearing26 scheduled for 6.2.2020 and 7.2.2020. Additionally, on 5.2.2020, the Authority also published a notice (impugned notice) in six leading newspapers having wide circulation informing about the said hearing. The objectors were asked to remain present for personal/public hearing as per the slot (time) allotted to objections clubbed on the basis of commonality of the issue(s) raised by them so as to hear them together. In response, only 42 persons appeared for the oral hearing. The hearings were concluded as per the schedule published for that purpose. 33. Assailing the said notice, the petitioners submit that the respondents called the objectors for public hearing at short notice of only one day which effectively disabled most of the objectors from
(1989) 3 SCC 396 (para 2, 3, 5, 7, 15, 27 and 28) (2012) 3 SCC 442 (paras 2, 8, 9, 66, 67, 76 and 77) (2007) 8 SCC 705 (paras 20, 42 and 87 to 90) For short, “BoEH”
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
appearing as travel arrangements could not be made within such short period. It is submitted that short notice resulted in the denial of natural justice to the objectors and negated the very essence of the requirement of public consultation as envisaged in Section-11A of 1957 Act. To buttress this submission, it is urged that the impugned notice had the effect of reducing the hearing into a mere formality and violated the requirements of fair opportunity which is an essential facet of democratic decision making. It is further submitted that as many as 200 persons were called for oral submissions within a time slot of one hour, thereby rendering the hearing itself as meaningless and ineffective. 34. Mr. Sanjay Hegde, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners further submitted that the respondents did not place complete information regarding the proposed changes in public domain and without adequate information, it entailed in denial of opportunity of raising effective objections. Reliance has been placed upon a series of judgments to support the view that a Master Plan ought to be preceded by a comprehensive consultative exercise based on multiple parameters including population density, availability of open spaces etc. 35. To support their case, the petitioners have made reference to M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Ors. 27 , Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association v. Designated Authority & Ors. 28, State of U.P. & Ors. v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh & Ors.29, Aruna Roy & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.30, Travancore Rayon Ltd. v. Union of India31, Hanuman Laxman Aroskar v. Union of India32, Utkarsh Mandal v. Union of India33, R.K. Mittal34, Rajendra Shankar Shukla & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. 35, S.N. Chandrashekar & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. 36 , Lal Bahadur37, Bangalore Medical Trust38 and Virender Gaur & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.39.
(2019) 12 SCC 720 (para 13 and 15 to 18) (2011) 2 SCC 258 (paras 16, 63, 77-80 and 83) (1989) 2 SCC 505 (para 64) (2002) 7 SCC 368 (paras 7 and 8) (1969) 3 SCC 868 (paras 7 and 12) (2019) 15 SCC 401 (para 112.8) 2009 SCCOnline Del 3836 (paras 31 and 32) (supra at 14, paras 48 and 49) (2015) 10 SCC 400 (paras 7, 38, 39, 103, 108 and 109) (2006) 3 SCC 208 (paras 31, 33 and 34) (supra at 12, paras 12, 14 to 16, 24 and 26) (supra at 13, paras 13 and 23 to 29) (1995) 2 SCC 577 (paras 7, 8 and 10)
36. To counter the aforesaid submissions, respondent DDA, in its consolidated reply, has submitted that out of 1292 objections, 1156 were identical and even remaining objections raised similar issues. It is urged that personal communication in the form of emails and SMS was sent to the objectors at least 3 days before the date of hearing which constitutes reasonable time in the facts and circumstances of the case and thus, denial of principles of natural justice cannot be alleged. To buttress this submission, it is further submitted that apart from aforesaid communication, the notice of public hearing was also published in six leading newspapers to encourage participation. 37. Responding to the argument of lack of information in public domain before calling for objections, the consolidated reply states that each and every detail relating to the project was published on the official website of Authority (www.dda.org.in) and it was open to common public to access it at any point of time. 38. Learned Solicitor General, appearing for the respondents, contended that there is no requirement of oral hearing in the 1957 Act or in the 1959 Rules and despite that the hearing was provided by the Authority as a measure of fairness and transparency. He further submitted that none of the heritage buildings is being adversely affected in the process. 39. In the written submissions filed by the respondents, it is submitted that the argument of denial of natural justice cannot be sustained as modification of Master Plan and town planning are activities of a legislative character and in legislative functions, public hearing can be allowed only to the extent provided in the law unlike other administrative processes. W.P. (C) No. 510/2020 40. Post the final notification of change in land use, the Special Advisory Group of Central Vista assembled at its 50th meeting to consider the agenda item – Proposed New Parliament Building at Plot No. 118 on 23.4.2020. The minutes of the said meeting were released on 30.4.2020 wherein “No Objection” was granted to the said proposal. The petitioner herein seeks to challenge the said grant of “No Objection”. Another challenge to the Office Memorandum dated 14.10.2019 issued by Works Division, MoHUA whereby the Central Vista Committee40 was reconstituted. The relevant prayers read thus:
For short, “CVC”
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.] “I. Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to Respondent No. 2 Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MoHUA), calling for records and quashing the Minutes of Meeting of Central Vista Committee dated 30.04.2020 at the 5th Meeting of Special Advisory Group of Central Vista and Central Secretariat Central Vista Committee with Agenda Item – Proposed New Parliament Building at Plot No. 118 New Delhi which was held on 23rd April 2020; and/or II. Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to Respondent No. 2 Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MoHUA), quashing Office Memorandum F.No.6/21/2018/ADG (Works)/338-W-1 dated 14th October, 2019 which was reconstituted as a patently biased Central Vista Committee with obvious conflict of interest in the Central Vista Project.” 41. In the additional written note submitted by the petitioner, it is urged that the reconstitution of the CVC was done to rush through the proposals regarding the subject project without any impartial and objective scrutiny. It is submitted that the project proponent herein was Chief Architect (CPWD) and after reconstitution, the chairmanship of the Committee was entrusted to ADG (Works), CPWD, another officer of the project proponent, indicative of the fact that there was an apparent conflict of interest in the CVC. It is further urged that similar identity of the Project Proponent and Chairman subjugated the principle of Nemo Judex In Causa Sua. Referring to the minutes of the meeting, the petitioner argues that the minutes reveal a clear non-application of mind on the part of this Committee as no reasons are supplied for the alleged “No Objection”. To buttress this submission, it is urged that the Committee was originally envisaged to be a study group which was meant to advise the Government and contrary to this purpose, the Committee paid a mere lip service to their duty and failed to act as a study group. 42. It is further submitted that the said meeting was not convened in a proper manner as it was not attended by designated officers and various junior officers were present on their behalf to consider the proposal. It is further submitted that the prescribed quorum of the meeting was not complete as only 7 out of 12 members of the study group were present in the meeting, thereby leaving out 5 members belonging to independent non-Governmental organisations. As per the petitioner’s case, the absence of representation from non-Government organisations and
presence of junior officers of the Government goes to show that there was no effective deliberation and application of mind. 43. The petitioner further submits that detailed maps, drawings, scheme, layouts and other relevant documents of the subject project were not placed before the Committee and these documents were sine qua non for taking an informed decision regarding the proposal. The absence of consideration of the relevant material, argues the petitioner, had vitiated the outcome of the meeting. 44. In the counter affidavit filed by respondents, it is submitted that the CVC serves a limited purpose and is meant to study the development proposals submitted for its consideration and examine whether the proposal is in sync with the overall character of the region. It is submitted that the Committee has been reconstituted at various points of time in the past as per emerging needs and nomination to chairmanship is made on the basis of designation (ex-officio) irrespective of individual holder of office. As regards the absence of designated members, it is submitted that as a general practice, when some members are preoccupied with other engagements, their representatives from the same department/office are nominated and authorised to act on their behalf. As regards quorum, it is stated that no quorum is prescribed for the meetings of the Committee and in absence thereof, the standard quorum of 25% would suffice the requirement. 45. Regarding the conduct of meeting, the counter affidavit states that the online meeting was in tune with the standard Government protocol amidst the pandemic and it was aimed towards facilitation of participation without requiring the members to step out of their homes for the purpose of meeting. It is submitted that the grant of no objection by CVC was a pre-requisite to further processing of the proposal and the entire project could not have been kept in abeyance by delaying the CVC meeting indefinitely amidst the uncertainties of the pandemic. The respondents have also highlighted that the minutes of the meeting were sent to all the members (including the non-attendees) and no objections were raised by them nor received from any member concerning the propriety of the grant of no objection. W.P.(C) No. 638/2020
46. The thrust of this petition is also on the “No Objection” dated 23.4.2020 granted by the CVC. The relevant prayer reads thus:
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.] “A. Issue a Writ in the nature of mandamus or any other Writ/ Order/Direction thereby quashing “No-objection” granted by the Respondent No. 2 herein, being the Central Vista Committee, to the proposed New Parliament Building in its meeting dated 23.04.2020, which is reflected in the minutes of that meeting circulated on 30.04.2020 and all consequential actions taken thereto;” 47. In addition to the grounds urged in W.P. (C) 510/2020, the petitioners herein submit that the CVC was functioning under the chairmanship of ADG (Works) who is not an architect or town planner and thereby lacks the requisite skills/knowledge required for considering the said proposal. The argument is supplemented in the written submissions where it is stated that the nature of duties entrusted to CVC requires the head of the Committee to be a professional architect or town planner so as to consider the proposal in a nuanced manner. To buttress this submission, the petitioners contend that the meeting was called despite absence of external experts and it was a deliberate step to avoid professional scrutiny of the professional, thereby rendering the said no objection as arbitrary and illegal. 48. The petitioners have also pressed the argument of nonapplication of mind, akin to that taken in W.P. (C) 510/2020, on the ground that no assessment was made by the respondents to consider the viability and need of a new Parliament building and the entire process was carried in undue haste. To buttress this argument, reliance has been placed upon Inderpreet Singh Kahlon & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.41 and Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia & Ors.42 to urge that an action taken in undue haste could be declared as bad in law. 49. It is further submitted that CVC disregarded the legal framework for dealing with heritage structures. The petitioners seek support from clause 7.26 read with Annexure-II of Building Byelaws to contend that minimum changes are permissible on Grade-I heritage buildings/precincts and the Committee failed to take that into consideration. The said no objection is also assailed on the alleged failure of the Committee to take into consideration various factors concerning environmental impacts, traffic assessment etc.
(2006) 11 SCC 356 (paras 72 and 73) (2004) 2 SCC 65 (paras 24 and 25)
50. During the hearing, Mr. Hegde, appearing for the petitioners, submitted that CVC, though originally conceived as an advisory body, has assumed a statutory character owing to its long functioning and is expected to discharge pivotal role in development of such projects. In “Supplementary Note on the Role of Central Vista Committee” submitted by the petitioners, reference is made to the notice inviting bids and clause 6.4.3 of ZDP for Zone-D to support the view that CVC was envisaged as a statutory committee. 51. Alternatively, it is urged that the statutory mandate of CVC is in line with the doctrine of legitimate expectations in administrative matters. The petitioners have relied upon National Buildings Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan & Ors.43 to contend that this doctrine is premised on the ground of reasonableness and natural justice, and has now become a source of substantive as well as procedural rights. 52. In addition to cases noted above, the petitioners have placed reliance upon R.S. Garg v. State of U.P. & Ors. 44, Council of Architecture v. Mukesh Goyal & Ors.45and Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi & Ors. 46 53. The argument regarding the statutory character of CVC has been countered by learned Solicitor General. He would urge that it is merely an advisory body with a limited mandate to advise the Government on a proposal submitted for its consideration. It has no authority to grant approvals or take decisions. Further, merely because a body has been referred to in the ZDP (Zone-D) or has been working for a prolonged period, it will not assume a statutory character on its own until it is so provided by a statute. 54. As regards the argument of non-application of mind, it is submitted that CVC is not supposed to supply reasons for its approval in a manner akin to judicial/quasi-judicial bodies and the fact that CVC, in its decision, had asked the project proponent/CPWD to ensure that the project is in sync with the character of Central Vista reveals due application of mind. It is urged that application of mind must be revealed
(1998) 7 SCC 66 (2006) 6 SCC 430 (para 28) 2020 SCCOnline SC 329 (para 58) (1991) 2 SCC 716 (paras 20 and 21)
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
from a substantial compliance perspective. The respondents have urged that the present case is a sui generis one and must be treated accordingly keeping in mind larger national interest. For brevity, other submissions of the respondents to this prayer are not being repeated here.
W.P.(C) No. 681/2020 AND W.P. (C) No. 845/2020 55. On 12.2.2020, the project proponent (CPWD) filed application for EC for “Expansion and Renovation of Existing Parliament Buildings, New Delhi”. The Expert Appraisal Committee47 considered the said application in its 49th meeting dated 25-26.2.2020. After examining details of the project, EAC noted that several objections have been received by the Committee as well as by the Ministry of Environment, Forests & Climate Change48 wherein various concerns have been expressed regarding the project. After underlining this information, the Committee deemed it appropriate to record the said objections and ask the project proponent to submit additional information for further deliberation. Thus, the proposal stood deferred. On 11.3.2020, CPWD responded to the Committee’s observation for supplying additional material and submitted the relevant documents for consideration of the proposal. Form-I and Form-IA were also revised in light of the additional information sought by the Committee. In the revised form, details touching upon cost of project, total built-up area and number of trees were modified. The total cost of the Project was enhanced from Rs. 776 crores to Rs.922 crores, total built-up area of the proposed Parliament was enhanced from 59,800 sq.m. to 65,000 sq.m., number of trees on plot no. 118 was enhanced from 326 to 333. In its 50th meeting on 22.4.2020, EAC considered the revised proposal and approved the same for grant of EC subject to certain specific conditions commensurate with the nature of subject project along with standard conditions of EC. Thereafter on 17.6.2020, the MoEF accepted the recommendations of EAC and granted EC to the proposal on Expansion and Renovation of Parliament building. This grant of EC stands impugned in these two petitions. The relevant extract of prayers read thus: “a.
Pass an order in the nature of a Writ/Order quashing and setting aside the impugned Environmental Clearance dated 17.06.2020 issued by the Respondent No. 1 in respect to the project titled as “Expansion and Renovation of
For short, “EAC” For short, “the MoEF”
Existing Parliament Building at Parliament Street, New Delhi”;
b.
Pass an order in the nature of a Writ/Order calling for the records of the Environmental Clearance dated 17.06.2020 issued by the Respondent No. 1 and thereafter hold that the entire decision making process as carried out by the Expert Appraisal Committee in the build-up to the issuance of the Environmental Clearance dated 17.06.2020 is vitiated and accordingly set aside the same;
c.
Pass an Order in the nature of a Writ/Order declaring that the subject project being Development /Redevelopment of Parliament Building, Common Central Secretariat and Central Vista at New Delhi is a composite project for the purposes of seeking Environmental Clearance;”
In addition to the aforesaid prayer for quashing the Clearance, the petitioners in W.P. (C) 681/2020 have alleged a case of deliberate concealment of information and supply of misleading information in the proposals submitted for EC and prayed thus: “2. Direct action against Respondent No. 3 as Project Proponent for concealment of information and submission of false and misleading information; classifying the project as a Category B2 instead of Category B1; and a Schedule 8(a) project instead of 8(b); and obtaining Environment Clearance; which attracts conditions stipulated in Clause 8 of the EIA Notification of 2006, ‘Grant of Rejection of Prior Environmental Clearance’, and the penal conditions of sub clause (vi); leading to cancellation of Environment Clearance.”
56. The petitioners in W.P. (C) 845/2020 have submitted that the EAC failed to apply its mind while considering the proposal and both the proposal and objections by various persons were treated in a mechanical manner. The submission is buttressed by placing reliance upon Hanuman Laxman Aroskar49, wherein this Court observed that EAC being an expert body must apply itself to every relevant aspect of the project and its bearing upon environment. 57. The petitioners, in common rejoinder, have furthered the argument by contending that merely seeking certain clarifications from
(supra at 32)
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
the project proponent is not sufficient compliance and it would only be upon a detailed scrutiny of the response/data/statements that the requirement of application of mind could be satisfied. It is added that the absence of a reasoned order by EAC advances the case of the petitioners as administrative/quasi-judicial authorities cannot grant approvals without recording reasons.
58. To support this argument, it is submitted that EAC failed to note that the project proponent deliberately separated the Parliament project out of the larger Central Vista Project with an objective to lower the scrutiny level by considering it on a standalone basis. Due to this segregation, the project was categorised as B2 project (Building and Construction) in item 8(a); whereas a collective assessment of the project would make it fall in item 8(b) i.e., Township and Area Development, falling under category B1 in terms of the 2006 Environmental Impact Assessment 50 Notification 51. As a result of this categorisation, as contended, the respondents unscrupulously did away with the requirements of preparing a comprehensive Terms of Reference (TOR), Scoping and EIA Report as these requirements do not apply to B2 category projects. To buttress this submission, it is added that it was only to bypass the comprehensive scrutiny that the respondents characterised the proposal as a “renovation” and “expansion” project, instead of specifying that a whole new building with a built-up area measuring 65,000 sq.m. is being proposed alongwith the development of Central Vista precincts as a whole. 59. According to the petitioners, the proposed Project is a single project with three components – Development /Redevelopment of Parliament Building, Common Central Secretariat and Central Vista. The argument of deliberate disintegration and slicing of the project is further supported by referring to various documents of the Government wherein a single vision was projected by the Government viz: (i)
CPWD notice inviting bids which referred to the project as “Development/Redevelopment of Parliament Building,
For short, “EIA” For short, “2006 notification” or “EIA Notification”, as the case may be. [Although this notification has been described as “ 2006 notification” it has been reprinted in August, 2015 (pages 3-55 in Compilation of Documents filed by respondents), incorporating all the amendments thereto until 6.7.2015, and the extracted portions of the notification in this judgment are from the reprinted version].
Common Central Secretariat and Central Vista at New Delhi.”
Public notice of DDA dated 21.12.2019 inviting objections and suggestions proposed change in land use of 8 plots collectively.
(iii)
MoHUA Press Release dated 25.10.2019 treats it as an integrated project as it reads:
60. The petitioners have relied upon OM dated 24.12.2010 issued by MoEF which refers to “Consideration of Integrated and Inter-linked projects” to urge that legal mandate requires collective appraisal of interlinked and integrated projects for the purpose of EC so that their cumulative impact can be assessed. To buttress the submission, it is urged that the said O.M. ought to be given a purposive meaning so as to procure comprehensive information on such projects in line with the objective of environmental protection. Reliance has been placed upon Alaknanda Hydropower Company Limited v. Anuj Joshi & Ors. 52 to supplement the view that combined impact of a project must be considered to arrive at a true assessment of environmental impact. Emphasizing on the meaning of the phrase “cumulative impact”, the petitioners have relied upon the decision of NGT in T. Muruganandam v. Ministry of Environment & Forests53 to contend that cumulative assessment involves a holistic approach towards all present and reasonably foreseeable future activities so that actual impact on ecology can be determined. 61. It is further submitted that the respondents wilfully concealed relevant information from the Expert Committee regarding cumulative effects, proximity to other existing or planned projects, etc. which would attract clause 8(vi) of 2006 Notification pertaining to concealment of information and submission of false information. Reliance has again been
(ii)
“With an aim of improving the old buildings on Raisina Hills, make improved Common Secretariat Buildings, refurbish old Parliament building, make new space for new requirement of MPs and upgrade the entire Central Vista area by revisiting entire Master Plan, a world class Consultant was required. ….”
(2014) 1 SCC 769 Manu/GT/0135/2014 (NGT decision dated 10.11.2014 in Appeal No. 50/2012)
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
placed upon Hanuman Laxman Aroskar54 to contend that submission of authentic information without any concealment is a basic expectation under the 2006 Notification and any clearance granted on the basis of a defective Form-I is liable to be rejected. 62. The petitioners submit that the project proponent failed to conduct any assessment studies for examining the real impact of the project on environment. The respondents’ statement that the new Parliament building shall have minor and incremental impacts on the environment is alleged to be baseless and unfounded. It is urged that absent any scientific assessment to back its claim, the project proponent misinformed the expert committee and gave false assurances regarding impact on air pollution, noise pollution, geology, ecology and biodiversity. The respondents’ assurance on transplantation of trees is also assailed as baseless and lacking in substance as no study was conducted to determine the age, girth and species of the trees which are essential elements for examining the potential of survival of a transplanted tree. 63. The petitioners further submit that the project proponent misinformed and misled the expert committee as regards the requirement of parking space and acted in violation of Master Plan which mandates a parking requirement of 1.8 ECS (Equivalent Car Space) per 100 sq.m. of built-up area. Contrary to this specification, parking space of 100 ECS was stated in the requirements for the proposed built-up area of 65,000 sq.m. which is grossly low. 64. Relying upon Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India & Ors.55 and A.P. Pollution Control Board II v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu (Retd.) & Ors.56, the petitioners have contended that EAC ought to have given regard to the precautionary principle during appraisal as it is attracted in all those cases where an identifiable risk of environmental degradation is present and thus, there was heavy burden on the project proponent to demonstrate the absence of environmental harm. In this case, the EAC could not have relied upon blanket assurances without undertaking any analysis as it would otherwise be a case of nonapplication of mind. The threshold submission is that the role of EAC under 2006 Notification is well carved out and in Hanuman Laxman Aroskar57, this Court had highlighted the importance of reasons and undertaking a detailed analysis of all environmental factors.
(supra at 32) (1996) 5 SCC 647 (2001) 2 SCC 62 (supra at 32)
65. Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, further submitted that as per Lafarge Umiam Mining Private Limited v. Union of India (UOI) & Ors. 58, doctrine of proportionality and non-application of mind standards can be invoked in environmental review cases and as per Hanuman Laxman Aroskar59, an in-depth merits review is mandated by the 2006 Notification and EAC failed to undertake the same. Thus, the respondents are bound by these high standards and the entire matter needs to be examined on that basis by this Court. 66. The petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 681/2020 has adopted similar submissions to assail the EC and they are not being repeated. Referring to Clause 7 of 2006 Notification, the petitioner submitted that the notification contemplates four stages of EC for new projects and by showcasing this project as an “expansion” instead of new construction, the respondents have evaded the crucial stages. It is further submitted that EAC ought to have considered the proposal in the light of principles of sustainable development, public trust and inter-generational equity. 67. To support their submissions, petitioners have relied upon Keystone Realtors Private Limited v. Anil V. Tharthare & Ors.60, Bengaluru Development Authority v. Sudhakar Hegde & Ors. 61, Sunil Kumar Chugh & Ors. v. Secretary, Environment Department, Government of Maharashtra & Ors.62, Samata & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.63, Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi v. State of A.P. & Ors. 64, Common Cause v. Union of India & Ors.65, Sarpanch, Grampanchayat, Tiroda, Tal. Sawantwadi, District Sindhudurg, Maharashtra & Ors. v. Ministry of Environment & Forests & Ors.66and Goel Ganga Developers India Private Limited67. 68. In counter affidavit filed by CPWD, it is submitted that the new Parliament building is being constructed adjacent to the existing
(2011) 7 SCC 338 (supra at 32) (2020) 2 SCC 66 (para 19) 2020 SCCOnline SC 328 (paras 99 and 100) MANU/GT/0153/2015 [Appeal No. 66 of 2014 decided on 3.9.2015 (paras 24 to 26)] 2013 SCCOnline NGT 101 (para 38) (2006) 3 SCC 549 (paras 66 to 69, 72 to 76, 78 and 82) (2017) 9 SCC 499 (paras 208, 209 and 210) 2011 SCCOnline NGT 10 (para 19) (supra at 16, para 17)
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
building and both buildings will supplement each other in terms of functionality. Simultaneously, the existing building shall be retrofitted and renovated in accordance with the limitations prescribed for Grade-I structures and thus, the project was rightly named as an expansion and renovation project.
69. It is submitted that in terms of 2006 Notification, no detailed EIA is required for building projects with built-up area of less than 1,50,000 sq.m. as they fall under category 8(a), and since the built-up area of subject project is less than 1,50,000 sq.m., no such assessment is required as per the notification and thus, EAC was right in not insisting for any such impact assessment. Learned Solicitor General, would further submit that categorisation as 8(a) or 8(b) would not be of much consequence as the nature of categorisation causes no prejudice in considering the cumulative impact of the project on environment, if any. To buttress this submission, it is urged that as per the mandate of law, a detailed EIA would be carried out for the Central Secretariat project as it falls under category 8(b) i.e., Township and Area Development. Such assessment, as per law, would examine land use within the radius of 10km and since Parliament falls within these dimensions, environmental concerns (if any) associated with it may also be addressed in the same assessment and additional mitigating measures could be imposed.
70. To the argument that both these projects are integrated projects calling for a collective appraisal, the counter affidavit states that the expression “Integrated Projects” refers to those projects that cannot exist without each other to the extent that their existence as well as functionality is inevitably dependent upon each other. In present case, submitted the respondents, both these projects are marked by different timelines, different budgetary allocations, different wings of the Union of India (Parliament and Executive) and also for different utilities. In that, Parliament project is supposed to culminate in 2022, the other project may go on till 2026. It is further urged that budgetary allocation for Parliament project is made by Lok Sabha Secretariat and that for North/ South Block project is made by Ministry of Culture. To further justify separate EC application for Parliament project, the consolidated reply states that as a matter of practice, EC is not given merely on the basis of preliminary vision/Master Plan and such application ought to be made for those projects only for which detailed drawings, planning layouts etc. are available so that an informed impact assessment (site specific) can
be made. The central secretariat project has not reached that stage yet. The submission reads thus: “8. ...Therefore, an application for Environment Clearance can be made effectively and accurately only in the final stages of the planning and execution of a project and not at a broad macro level without mentioning the minute details of the project.” 71. Learned Solicitor General urged that merely because the project was mentioned in the comprehensive project and in the bid document for engagement of the Consultant, it does not mean that the project proponent is obliged to treat it as a whole for all future purposes. Whereas, the Government is well within its rights to even drop the plan of Central Secretariat project without impacting the Parliament project. It is urged that expansion/renovation of Parliament and development of new Central Secretariat in that sense are two distinct projects and attract different procedural compliances under law before the construction thereof commences, as stated in the written submissions thus: “20. It is submitted that carrying out architectural and engineering planning of all the components through a single consultant with a view to benefit from cost and planning efficiencies does not automatically mean that the Parliament project and the remaining Central Vista redevelopment projects are, for the purposes of an environment clearance, is a single project. It is submitted that Parliament Project and the remaining Central Vista redevelopment are different projects and the planning in respect of such projects is carried out in different stages. It is submitted that execution of the different projects shall be taken up in phases ...” 72. It is submitted that the total built-up area of the proposed Parliament building is 65,000 sq.m. whereas that of proposed Central Secretariat is approximately 17 lakh sq.m. and it was a conscious policy decision of the competent authority to treat the Parliament project as an independent one being most urgent and to prevent it from falling prey to delays owing to the vast territorial expanse of the comprehensive plan. Thus, the conscious decision of the Government is to ensure completion of building project in a smooth manner and not to link it up with the town development project. 73. The contention regarding non application of mind by EAC has been countered by respondent MoHUA in its reply affidavit wherein it is
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
submitted that EAC comprises of scientific experts who have been considering proposals for EC for past 1.5 years. It is submitted that detailed deliberation took place in the 49th EAC meeting after which supplementary information was sought in a revised Form-1/1A regarding scope of renovation of existing building, status of pending cases, traffic management plan, response to objections received from public, updated Master Plan showing land use of plot no. 118 and accordingly, entire information was placed before the Committee and the same was duly considered in the next meeting before formulating its recommendation. Thus, application of mind is writ large in the entire process. As regards the allegation of fraud and misrepresentation while providing information regarding connected projects in Form-I, the written submissions state that O.M. dated 24.12.2010, relied upon by the petitioners to extend this argument, was misconceived as the concept of inter-linked projects is used in reference to multi-sectoral projects and the subject project does not involve a multi-sectoral component and is a standalone building construction project.
74. In written submissions filed by the respondents, it is further submitted that a detailed study was conducted to identify the possible impacts of the proposed project and concerns relating to air emissions, water, soil etc. were duly addressed by EAC by prescribing an Environment Management Plan (EMP) and operational measures. It is informed that measures including setting up of sewage treatment plant at the site, usage of recycled water, rain water storage tanks, usage of recycled material, solid waste management etc. shall be followed. 75. Learned Solicitor General has sought to distinguish the judgment of this Court in Hanuman Laxman Aroskar68 by contending that in the said case, the analysis was done in context of a Category-A project and moreover, the view of the Court as regards the requirement of reasons was in the context of the facts of that case. It is submitted that as per the 2006 Notification, reasons are required only in cases of rejection of objections and not in all cases. To buttress this submission, the argument advanced in W.P. (C) 638/2020 that decisions taken by experts are not akin to those taken by judicial/quasi-judicial bodies has been reiterated.
W.P. (C) No. 853/2020 76. On 2.9.2019, the respondent CPWD invited bids vide NIT No. 04/CPM/RPZ/NIT/2019-20 from national/international design and
(supra at 32)
planning firms for appointment of Consultant (Consultancy Services) for a comprehensive architectural and engineering planning for development/redevelopment of Parliament Building, Common Central Secretariat and Central Vista. The minimum eligibility criteria required the bidders to have an average annual turnover of Rs. 20 crores from consultancy services in India. On 4.9.2019, the Indian Institute of Architects69 gave a representation to the respondent raising certain objections to the eligibility conditions in the tender document. The Council of Architecture, on 9.9.2019, also raised similar objections and called for an Open Design Competition. On 12.9.2019, a pre-bid meeting was held for the interested parties for clarifications regarding the NIT. After the pre-bid meeting discussion, CPWD released a corrigendum and addendum to Consultation Services NIT whereby, the date of online submission was extended from 23.9.2019 to 30.9.2019 and sum of earnest money was reduced to Rs.25 lakhs. After this process, five firms qualified for technical bids and four firms qualified for financial bids. On 25.10.2019, MoHUA announced that M/s. HCP Designs has been awarded the Consultation Services NIT for the development of entire Central Vista region. This was followed by DDA’s public notice for change in land use, public hearing on objections, final notification of change in land use and grant of no objection by CVC at relevant points of time as already discussed above. 77. On 5.6.2020, Delhi Urban Art Commission70, in its 1542nd meeting considered the proposal for Parliament project and recorded various observations regarding urban form, aesthetics, integration of old building with proposed old building, incorporation of green building features etc. Thereafter, on 1.7.2020 (1544th meeting), DUAC considered a revised building plan proposal submitted by the project proponent and granted its approval along with some observations regarding parking requirements, public art, skylights and height of the building. 78. The petitioners herein seek to raise a comprehensive challenge to the project by assailing various stages of the project elaborated above. The relevant extract of the prayers read thus: “a. A declaration that the Central Vista Project including but not limited to the Parliament building is ultra vires the Constitution of India and is illegal, null and void;
For short, “IIA” For short, “DUAC”
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.] b. A declaration that a project for redesigning the Central Vista including Parliament building may be carried out (i) only pursuant to an objective and independent assessment made after stakeholder consultation which confirms the necessity for such a project; (ii) through a widely publicized Open Design Competition; (iii) by adopting a transparent process with adequate timelines that enable wide participation in the consultancy, design and execution phases; and (iv) through the selection of the design by a representative and independent jury; c. A declaration that Parliament building is a part of India’s national political heritage; that it is a living symbol of Indian democracy; and that it can only be supplanted by following a transparent process involving the widest stakeholder consultation and global best practices for selecting excellence in design; d. A writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction ordering and directing Respondent No. 1 and No. 2 to disclose and furnish copies to the Petitioners of each and every document, correspondence and any other communication (including electronic records) relating to the conception of the impugned Project and up to the date of the issuance of the impugned Notice inviting Bid NIT No. 04/CPM/ RPZ/NIT/2019-20 dated 02.09.2019 issued by Respondent No. 1, CPWD (the Consultation Services NIT), including all documents relating to the preparation of the Consultation Services NIT, which are in the possession and control of Respondent No. 1 and No. 2 or their officers, including any document, correspondence or any other communication exchanged inter se with the other Respondents or any of their officers;”
Apart from the above prayers, further prayers to quash and set aside the following are made: “(i) Notice inviting Bid NIT No. 04/CPM/RPZ/NIT/2019-20 dated 02.09.2019, issued by Respondent No. 1, the Central Public Works Department;
(ii) The award of the consultancy bid to Respondent No. 9, HCP Design, Planning and Management Pvt. Ltd., dated 18.10.2019; (iii) The Notice inviting pre-qualification bids, NIT No. 01/CE/ PCWZ/CPWD/2020-21, dated July 2020, for the Construction of
New Parliament Building at Plot No. 118 Parliament House Estate, New Delhi, released by Respondent No. 1 in July 2020.
(iv) The approval granted by Respondent No. 3, the Delhi Urban Art Commission in its 1545th meeting dated 01.07.2020 to the “proposal for New Parliament Building, Plot No. 118, N.A., New Raisina Road, New Delhi”;
(v) The notice inviting objections from the public against the changes proposed to be made to the Master Plan for Delhi 2021/ Zonal Development Plan for Zone-D under Section 11-A of the DDA Act, 1957 dated 21.12.2019, issued by Respondent No. 7, Delhi Development Authority; (vi) The consequent decision dated 10.02.2020 made by DDA approving the change in land use for the aforementioned plot including Plot No. 118 wherein the new Parliament House is proposed to be made;
(vii) Notification dated 20.03.2020 under Section 11-A of the DDA Act, 1957, allowing the change in land use in Central Vista, including the change in land use for the proposed new Parliament building; (viii) Decision taken by Respondent No. 8, the Central Vista Committee dated 23.04.2020, as reflected in minutes published on 30.04.2020.” 79. Appearing for the petitioners, Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel supported by Ms. Vrinda Bhandari and Mr. Gautam Bhatia, learned counsel, submits that this petition seeks to interrogate the State at a very fundamental level so as to enforce the principle of “Rule of Law” as distinguished from “Rule by Law”. Broadly, it is the petitioners’ case that the respondents have followed the principle of “Rule by Law” right from the stage of conception of the subject project and have failed to comply with the idea of substantive due process including in obtaining various approvals and clearances for the same. As is manifest from the aforesaid prayer, the petitioners have called upon this Court to issue suitable declarations relating to democratic due process, standards of transparency, public consultation and procedural fairness in a project of this nature and importance. 80. In addition to grounds already urged with respect to common prayers in previous petitions, the primary submission of the petitioners
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
herein is that any decision to change or renovate the Parliament building ought to be preceded by widest public consultation as it is an essential feature of democratic due process. The petitioners contend that a project of this nature should be backed by a legislation and even if the same is not made, the executive Government is bound to work under the contours of a limited Government ensuring minimum standards of stakeholder consultation, transparency, fair competition, adequate participation time and excellence in design. Reliance has been placed upon State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Thakur Bharat Singh71 to contend that there are well recognised constitutional limitations on the Government of the day. The manner of consultation, as envisaged by the petitioners in writ petition and rejoinder to consolidated reply, involves two elements- consultation with expert agencies and consultation with common public.
81. The argument regarding lack of expert consultation states that the respondents failed to consult Heritage Conservation Committee72 which is an expert body in matters involving heritage structures and ought to have been consulted right from the stage of conception of the project. It is contended that even before the design is freezed, the project proponent was obliged to consult HCC. For, as it would be of no use to consult it after the procedure is complete and development work is about to commence. It is submitted that the respondents have violated their obligation to protect and conserve the heritage as per globally accepted international principles. It is submitted that principles of adaptive re-use and minimal impact must be adhered to and any operation of restoration or modification ought to be considered as a special operation to be compulsorily preceded by a detailed archaeological and historical study. It is added that non-adherence to due procedure in the present case is also violative of Article 49 which, being a Directive Principle, is meant to be fundamental in the governance of the country. Similarly, consultation with other bodies such as DUAC and CVC was not only inadequate and arbitrary but also delayed as it ought to have been done at the plan conception stage itself. It is urged that the tender document called upon the consultant to make a new Master Plan for Central Vista without undertaking any assessment by expert bodies such as HCC or CVC. It is further contended that CPWD ought to have conducted a physical audit of heritage structures and called for views of special committee of Parliament. To buttress this submission, it is further submitted in written
AIR 1967 SC 1170 for short, “HCC”
submissions that post 2015, no Parliamentary Committee has had examined the prospects of repairing the existing structure or the need for transformation of the entire Central Vista. 82. The petitioners invited our attention to the Parliament Buildings (Restoration and Renewal) Act, 2019 passed by UK Parliament to contend that this comprehensive legislation reflects the best practices adopted by other democracies while undertaking projects of this nature. 83. Assailing the decision of DUAC, the petitioners have argued that the Commission acted in a manner contrary to its statutory scheme as per Memorandum No. 1(2)/82-DUAC dated 7.7.2005 which enjoins it with the duty of preservation. As a statutory body, the petitioners submit, the Commission ought to have considered the impact of this project on heritage by conducting a thorough study and it failed to fulfil its mandate by not doing so. This mandate is borne from Section 11 of the Delhi Urban Art Commission Act, 197373 which enjoins the Commission with a duty to advise the Government and lay down guidelines for the local bodies. The petitioners submit that this duty to advise must continue at all stages of the process including the pre-tender stage. 84. While taking exception to the No Objection granted by CVC, the petitioners’ stand is similar to that taken in W.P. (C) 638/2020 as has been set out hitherto. Hence, the same is not reiterated for brevity. The primary submission pertains to non-application of mind, absence of reasons, mechanical approval and abdication of real duty envisaged for CVC. 85. In addition to arguments set forth in previous petitions regarding need for empirical data, the petitioners herein have placed reliance upon K.S. Puttaswamy (Retired) & Anr. (II) v. Union of India & Anr.74 and Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve Bank of India75 in the written submissions to reiterate the need for proper/ empirical independent studies before taking actions in larger public interest. Reference has been made to Internet and Mobile Association76 to support the view that empirical data is essential to understand the degree of harm and a decision based on lack of proper studies must fail the test of proportionality. The requirement of conducting proper scientific studies
For short, “the DUAC Act” (2019) 1 SCC 1 (2020) 10 SCC 274 (supra at 75)
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
is also borne from Article 9 and 10 of Venice Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites, 1964.
86. Advancing the argument regarding direct public consultation, the petitioners have stated that the concept of participatory democracy demands that a project of this nature must involve the common public as they are the real stakeholders of national heritage and must be consulted at every stage of the project including prior to drawing outline of the project, releasing consultancy tender, modifying the Master Plan and finalisation of the design and making changes therein. Reliance has been placed upon Hanuman Laxman Aroskar77 and clause 1.3 of AnnexureII of UBBL to contend that the mandate of law requires inviting suggestions from public and consideration thereof by the expert bodies before granting any permission. To buttress this submission, Mr. Divan has contended that the nature of Indian democracy envisages public participation at the most fundamental level of decision making. Placing reliance upon Cellular Operators Association of India & Ors. v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India & Ors.78, it is submitted that CPWD ought to have followed a three-step process including – stakeholder consultation, inviting submissions from stakeholders, full documentation of all decisions supported with reasons. Further reliance has been placed upon K.S. Puttaswamy & Anr. (I) v. Union of India & Ors.79 to contend that akin to privacy, democracy is also a travelling right which travels across all tenets and all stages of the project. 87. The written submissions of petitioners state that right to public participation and consultation is a pre-requisite for consequential state action and it flows from 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. It is submitted that this requirement is born out of reasonableness and State is under a constitutional duty to take affirmative measures to ensure maximum participation. It is urged that what extent of participation may be reasonable in a given case may be determined on a case-to-case basis keeping in mind certain parameters including – scope and public importance of State action, urgency involved, availability of forums to engage with public, efficacy of public participation etc.
88. The petitioners, in written submissions, have supported the idea of wide public participation by drawing strength from comparative
(supra at 32) (2016) 7 SCC 703 (2017) 10 SCC 1
constitutional position on the subject-matter in other jurisdictions. Reliance has been placed upon Doctors for Life International v. Speaker of the National Assembly & Ors.80, delivered by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, wherein an express provision providing for public consultation was considered to be a practical and symbolic part of the democratic process. While describing the nature and scope of such right, the petitioners adopt observations from para 98 of the judgment wherein indirect participation through elected representatives and direct participation by public are both recognized as essential tenets of democracy. Additionally, the petitioners also submit that in Doctors for Life International81, the right to political participation is recognized even beyond the express provision by referring to various international and regional human rights instruments.
89. Mr. Divan, in order to advance the submission on public participation, placed further reliance upon the decision of Court of Appeal, Kenya in Kiambu County Government & Ors. v. Robert N. Gakuru & Ors.82 wherein public participation was envisaged both quantitatively and qualitatively. While enunciating the concept of participatory democracy, the Court in Kiambu County83 further observed that armslength democracy is not participatory democracy.
90. The petitioners, in Rejoinder to Third Consolidated Reply filed by the respondents, submit that public participation is premised on the principle of democratic due process which requires the fulfilment of at least six basic parameters: (i)
decision based upon extensive debate and discussion;
(ii)
Robust statutory framework laying out specific obligations of different bodies involved in the process;
(iii)
Budgetary control through Parliament;
(iv)
Public portal for continuous exchange with public and stakeholders;
(v)
No substantial alteration of heritage;
(vi)
Disclosure and transparency.
2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (supra at 80) Civil Appeal No. 200 of 2014 decided on 30.6.2017 (Court of Appeal, Kenya) (supra at 82)
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
91. To conclude, the petitioners have submitted a set of principles which can be termed as essential features of “consultation” in any such process and we reproduce the same for clarity of thought and better consideration of the case thus:
“(a) There are two sets of parties involved – (1)
the proposer, upon whom a duty to consult has been cast – in this case, the State, acting through the Respondents; and
(2)
the stakeholder, who has a claim to be consulted and whose input is sought – in this case, the entire citizenry of India, represented non-exclusively through the Writ Petitioners.
(b) There must be a ‘meeting of minds’ between the proposer and the stakeholder; (c) The precursors for an effective ‘meeting of minds’ are that the stakeholder must be: (1) provided all relevant materials available to the proposer, and (2) given sufficient time to prepare its response; (d) The parties must ‘deliberate’ upon the subject matter, such that there is full and meaningful communication of each party’s proposals and counter-proposals, and the parties ‘make their respective points of view known to the others’ and ‘discuss and examine the relative merits of their views’; and
(e) While a consensus is not necessary, the minimum preference is for there to be a ‘satisfactory solution’ for all concerned. It is submitted that the Central Vista Project has failed to meet these requirements.”
92. The petitioners, in written submissions, have adopted a ground similar to that taken in T.C. (C) 230/2020 to contend that availability of information is essential for public consultation. Mr. Divan has submitted that the opaque manner in which various steps of this project have proceeded has jeopardized the citizens’ right to know, which is considered to be fundamental under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution as per Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (I)84and State of U.P. v. Raj Narain & Ors.85as
(supra at 79) (1975) 4 SCC 428
well as under the broad spirit of the Constitution. Further reliance has been placed upon Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Proprietors of Indian Express Newspapers, Bombay Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.86 to contend that right to know is also traceable from Article 21. It is urged that any modification/alteration/renovation with respect to structures like Parliament that reflect living heritage of the country must be undertaken in a manner wherein the voice of common public is recognised. To buttress this submission, it is argued that unless public is made aware of Government actions, it would not be in a position to question such actions and democratically participate in the decision-making process. 93. Regarding Respondent No. 9 (Consultant) as well, the petitioners submit that it is an agent of the State and is duty bound to adopt practices and procedures akin to the State including public consultation with respect to design, architecture, heritage impact etc. 94. In order to assail Consultation Services NIT, the petitioners contend that it undermined the principles of fair competition and prevented international firms from applying. The fact that six bidders applied for the tender demonstrates unfairness of the process. It is urged that an Open Design Competition ought to have been organized by the project proponent as it is a standard practice across the world. As per global standards, the petitioners have submitted, such competitions entail three basic norms – a two-part open competition, competition to be judged by jury (with citizen participation), encouragement of widest participation. Various domestic examples were also cited – including of National War Memorial and Indira Gandhi National Center for Arts - to demonstrate how an open design competition is the standard norm. 95. The petitioners contend that Consultation Services NIT was issued in violation of existing heritage conservation regulations as it called for redevelopment of entire area including demolition and construction of buildings which is violative of clause 7.26, UBBL 2016 which specifies that no changes other than prolonging the life of the heritage structures are permissible. The argument is on similar lines with those taken already in W.P. (C) Nos. 638/2020 and 845/2020 and is not being elaborated. 96. The petitioners have further submitted that no estimated cost of project was provided in the tender document which is not only arbitrary but also violative of Rule 182 of General Finance Rules, 2017 which
(1988) 4 SCC 592
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
envisages for an estimation of reasonable expenditure. It is submitted that consultation NIT sought to employ a Quality and Cost Based Selection (QCBS) system while at the same time, inviting bids on a cost percentage basis which effectively made it impossible to rank different bids in a fair and non-discriminatory manner. The provision regarding percentagebased fee has also been alleged to be contrary to clause 3.4.2 of Manual of Procurement of Consultancy & Services (Ministry of Finance) which discourages percentage-based fee as it lacks incentive for economic design. 97. Advancing the ground of public trust adopted in previous petitions, in this petition as well, Mr. Divan has stoutly contended that the respondents have compromised with the doctrine of public trust while proceeding with this project. Placing reliance upon M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath & Ors.87, it is submitted that a transient Government holds the resources in trust for the public and they can only be utilised for the benefit of public. It is further submitted that under American law (Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. People of the State of Illinois88) as well, the public trust doctrine extends to properties which are of “special consequence” and extending the same logic, it is urged that Central Vista is of special consequence for the nation, thereby calling for a high threshold of due process. To further the argument of suppression of public trust, it is urged that the bid document reveals that the decision of constructing a new Parliament building or to renovate the existing building was left to be decided by the private consultant and entrusting a private consultant with a fundamental decision of this nature does not fall in sync with the principles of public trust. 98. In addition to cases noted above, the petitioners have placed reliance upon I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs v. State of T.N.89, Government (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India & Anr.90, Lok Prahari Through its General Secretary v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 91, Rajeev Mankotia v. Secretary to the President of India & Ors.92, Sushanta Tagore & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.93, K. Guruprasad Rao v. State of Karnataka & Ors.94, Manohar Joshi v. State of Maharashtra
(1997) 1 SCC 388 [146 US 387 : 36 L Ed 1018 (1892)] (2007) 2 SCC 1 (paras 48, 109, 139-141 and 151) (2018) 8 SCC 501 (paras 53 to 57) (2018) 6 SCC 1 (paras 2, 26, 27 and 38) (1997) 10 SCC 441 (paras 4, 6, 13, 18 and 19) (2005) 3 SCC 16 (paras 21 and 32) (2013) 8 SCC 418 (paras 15, 71, 94, 95 and 102)
& Ors.95,Public Interest Foundation & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr. 96, Brajendra Singh Yambem v. Union of India & Anr. 97, Hindustan Construction Company Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.98, State of Punjab & Anr. v. Khan Chand99, Shayara Bano v. Union of India & Ors.100, Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012 101, Manoj Narula v. Union of India 102, Global Energy Limited & Anr. v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission103, Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India104, Bennett Coleman & Co. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.105, Union of India & Ors. v. Motion Picture Association & Ors. 106, Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Prof. Manubhai D. Shah 107, Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Govt. of India & Ors. v. Cricket Association of Bengal & Ors. 108 , Chandramouleshwar Prasad v. Patna High Court & Ors.109, Orissa Mining Corporation Limited v. Ministry of Environment & Forests & Ors.110, Democratic Alliance & Anr. v. Masondo NO & Anr.111, Matatiele Municipality & Ors. v. President of the Republic of South Africa & Ors.112, South African Veterinary Association v. Speaker of the National Assembly & Ors.113, Law Society Case of Kenya v. Attorney General & Ors. 114 , Archaeological Survey of India v. Narender Anand & Ors.115, Nagar Nigam, Meerut v. Al Faheem
(2012) 3 SCC 619 (2019) 3 SCC 224 (para 99) (2016) 9 SCC 20 (para 38) 2019 SCCOnline SC 1520 (para 17) (1974) 1 SCC 549 (para 12) (2017) 9 SCC 1 (para 85) (2012) 10 SCC 1 (paras 149 and 184) (2014) 9 SCC 1 (para 82) (2009) 15 SCC 570 AIR 1962 SC 305 (1972) 2 SCC 788 (1999) 6 SCC 150 (1992) 3 SCC 637 (1995) 2 SCC 161 (1969) 3 SCC 56 (para 7) (2013) 6 SCC 476 (paras 50, 51, 66 and 70) 2003 (2) BCLR 128 (CC) (South African Constitutional Court) 2007 (1) BCLR 47 (CC) (South African Constitutional Court) 2019 (2) BCLR 273 (CC) (South African Constitutional Court) Civil Appeal No. 96 of 2014 decided on 27.9.2019 (Court of Appeal, Kenya) (2012) 2 SCC 562 (para 7)
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
Meat Exports Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.116, Dutta Associates Pvt. Ltd. v. Indo Merchantiles Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.117, Meerut Development Authority v. Association of Management Studies & Anr.118, Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary & Ors.119, Radha Krishna Agarwal & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.120, Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad & Ors. v. Om Prakash Sharma 121, Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.122, Harminder Singh Arora v. Union of India & Ors.123, Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa & Ors. 124and Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India & Ors.125. 99. The respondents have filed elaborate written submissions to respond to petitioners’ arguments on the concept of democracy, as it exists in India and democratic due process as envisaged under the Constitution. It is contended that the manner of public participation in India is through the representative mode, as we have adopted the representative model of governance. It is submitted that the public elects its representatives and the Council of Ministers are collectively responsible to the Parliament. To buttress this argument, the written submissions state that a necessary element of democratic process is that directly elected persons represent true will of the people and they must take decisions that affect the people. 100. The respondents have contended that the principle of Rule of Law, as envisaged in India, requires due adherence to existing statutory and constitutional principles. To include imaginary steps in the process of decision making by democratically elected representatives would be antithetical to the Rule of Law. It is urged in written submissions that the nature of participatory process proposed by the petitioners is akin to a referendum. Such process is not envisaged under our Constitution.
101. To demonstrate ample consultation within Lok Sabha Secretariat, the respondents have placed a short affidavit on General
(2006) 13 SCC 382 (para 16) (1997) 1 SCC 53 (paras 3 and 4) (2009) 6 SCC 171 (paras 28 and 37 to 39) (2014) 9 SCC 516 (1977) 3 SCC 457 (paras 9 and 10) (2013) 5 SCC 182 (para 29) (2011) 5 SCC 29 (paras 62 to 66) (1986) 3 SCC 247 (para 19) (2007) 14 SCC 517 (1979) 3 SCC 489
Purpose Committee126 which states that the idea of GPC, originally constituted for the first time on 26.11.1954, was to enable the Presiding Officer/Speaker to take into confidence all members of the House irrespective of party lines while considering matters relating to the affairs of the House. Learned Solicitor general has further submitted that the need for this project was expressed by the then Speaker of Lok Sabha in writing vide letter dated 9.12.2015. In 2019, another letter was addressed by the present Speaker to the Prime Minister. Furthermore, separate presentations were conducted by the officials of the concerned departments before Speaker of Lok Sabha and Chairman of Rajya Sabha i.e., Vice-President of India in order to apprise them about the project. It is submitted in the affidavit that GPC for 17th Lok Sabha was constituted on 21.11.2019 and present composition of the said Committee has representation from the following national political parties; whose members were elected representatives in the Parliament: • Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP)
• Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) • All India Trinamool Congress (AITC) • Indian National Congress (INC) • Shiv Sena (SS)
• Biju Janata Dal (BJD) • Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) • Lok Jan Shakti Party (LJSP) • Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP)
• Telangana Rashtra Samiti (TRS) • Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Congress Party (YSR Congress Party) • Janata Dal (United) (JDU) • Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)
• Samajwadi Party (SP) 102. It is submitted that a detailed presentation was made before GPC on 19.3.2020. The meeting was attended by Members of Parliament
For short, “GPC”
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
being representatives of prominent national political parties having presence in the Lok Sabha, one Special Invitee, six Secretariat members, Secretary and Joint Secretary of MoHUA, Dr. Bimal Patel, Director, HCP Designs, and was chaired by the Speaker of Lok Sabha (Chairperson of GPC). The aforesaid persons were present during the presentation regarding the new Parliament Building project. Furthermore, the budgetary considerations were placed before the relevant committee comprising of members across party lines and no objections is placed on record. Therefore, it would be wrong to allege that Parliament was kept in the dark regarding the project.
103. Responding to the contention that a legislation ought to have been passed for this purpose, the respondents have submitted that there was no constitutional requirement to adopt the legislative route as construction projects can be carried out in discharge of executive functions. 104. The respondents have specifically addressed in the written submissions that extensive reliance on foreign decisions may not be useful in the Indian context. In any case, that cannot be made the basis to answer the matters in issue. It is urged that the precedents relied upon by the petitioners had dealt with express statutory provisions for public participation, as applicable in the concerned country, and judicial opinion was rendered in that specific context. Besides, these precedents deal with prior public participation in legislative action. That is entirely different than extending similar public participation in the matter of executive and administrative functions such as planning and development of a national project, in absence of any statutory requirement in that regard. 105. As regards approval by DUAC, the respondents, in consolidated reply, have submitted that every local body in Delhi is required to procure approval by DUAC, which is a statutory body meant to advise and guide the Government on matters submitted to it. It is submitted that as per Section 11 of the DUAC Act, the proposal must be submitted for scrutiny by DUAC in respect of any project of building operations or engineering operations or any development proposal. It is stated that considering different stages for different components of the project, DUAC approval as regards the Parliament project has been obtained whereas the approval for rest of central vista precincts shall be taken as and when the development activity thereat is proposed in future. As regards application of mind, it is stated that the proposal was first
considered by the committee in its 1542nd meeting dated 5.6.2020 wherein it was deferred due to insufficient information as regards vehicular parking plan and landscape plan. Thereafter, a revised proposal was placed before the committee in its 1545th meeting dated 1.7.2020 wherein it had been approved. It is further submitted that the minutes of the committee reveal that all representations concerning heritage, parking, landscape etc. were placed before the committee and duly considered by it while granting approval. To buttress this submission, it is urged that the minutes were ratified by the committee in its 1547th meeting on 10.7.2020 and no amendments were suggested by any member at the time of such ratification. 106. As regards the preservation of heritage structures and permission of HCC, in addition to grounds already urged above, the respondents submit that no heritage structure is being affected in the entire project. In the written submissions, it is stated that heritage conservation does not prohibit improving the heritage structures by taking necessary action for increasing their life. The genesis of this argument could be understood by reproducing the following extract form para 150 of the written submissions: “150. ...The present project represents not a radical break from the past so as to lean on the future, rather entails a judicious policy attempt to conserve the delicate heritage and historical value of the area whilst allowing room for growth and development for future generations. ….” 107. It is further submitted that as per relevant laws, permission would be required only for retrofitting of existing Parliament building and no such prior permission is needed for the construction of new building in the neighbouring independent plot, without affecting the existing heritage Parliament building. Reliance has been placed upon AnnexureII of UBBL to show that regulations on development/redevelopment are only for listed buildings and even for such buildings, no such approval from HCC is needed at the planning stage. All such approvals are required at the development stage only. To buttress this submission, it is urged that the mandate of HCC is limited to buildings only and it does not concern the areas adjacent to such buildings. As far as area is concerned, DUAC is empowered to consider such changes and grant approval and accordingly, it has already granted its approval, as aforesaid.
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
108. Repelling the challenge to Consultation Services NIT on the ground of limited competition, it is submitted that both national and international design firms were invited to participate in the process and widest choice was given to applicants to encourage participation. It is urged that the requirement of prior experience of Government work was consciously provided for to ensure that the firm is capable of working in the administrative framework of Government. The respondents have also contended that even if any irregularity could be pointed out in the tender process, none of the participants raised any grievance as regards the same and the petitioners have no locus to escalate it at this stage by way of a public interest litigation.
109. On the alleged irregularities in percentage-based fee mechanism, it is submitted that the apprehension regarding percentagebased fee for consultancy services is not sustainable as the consultancy fee was consciously pegged by the Government vide corrigendum dated 23.9.2019 and thus, there was no incentive left for the consultant to escalate the cost of the project.
110. Addressing the contention of heightened judicial review in this case, the respondents, in addition to grounds already urged in T.C. (C) 229/2020, have submitted that the subject project involves a set of policy decisions, namely – construction of new Parliament, location of proposed structure, common Central Secretariat, treating them as mutually independent projects and to achieve these objectives without impinging upon heritage. It is urged that the scope of judicial review must be limited to the examination of violation of statutory and constitutional principles and theoretical and academic questions need not be entertained or invoked for striking down policy decisions otherwise in compliance with the statutory provisions and mandate of the Constitution. The respondents, in their written submissions, have placed reliance upon Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (II) 127 to contend that the expression “procedure established by law” connotes a fair and reasonable procedure and it cannot be equated with the due process clause, as understood and applied in the American constitutional scheme. Reliance has been placed upon Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration128and Rajbala & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.129 to contend that this Court has expressly rejected the existence of substantive due process under the Constitution. To
(supra at 74) (1978) 4 SCC 494 (2016) 1 SCC 463
buttress this submission, it is submitted that judicial review in India, in context of Article 13, is to be understood in reference to actual violation of any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. 111. Learned Solicitor General has submitted that the entire case of the petitioners merely presents an alternative and to choose between available alternatives is not within the domain of judicial review. It is urged that when appeal is made to the Court on flimsy and abstract grounds which are incapable of any precise definition, the Court must be cautious and must interpret in line with the language of the Constitution. Reliance has been placed upon Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay130 to advance this proposition. It is also submitted that if procedure has been complied with substantially and in a broad sense and application of mind is duly revealed, then no minute enquiry is called for on the basis of exposition in Lafarge Umiam Mining131. 112. Addressing the contention regarding public trust, the respondents categorically submit that they are principally in agreement with the notion that a Government ought to act in accordance with public trust. However, this doctrine does not prohibit the Government from utilising the resources held in public trust for the advancement of public interest itself. 113. Responding to the contention that respondents compromised with public trust by entrusting the decision of new construction/renovation to the consultant, it is submitted that the task of making a Master Plan or of deciding whether or not a new building is required was never entrusted to the consultant and it was a conscious decision taken by the Government after consultation with all relevant entities. The Consultation NIT merely called upon the prospective bidders to prepare a vision document which could be used to understand the vision of the bidders regarding the project and scrutinize their applications on that basis and therefore, it cannot be said that Government abdicated its duty. The consultant was merely to advise whether renovation would suffice or a new structure would be imminent and final decision regarding all aspects of the project rested with the Government. 114. To support their position, the respondents have placed reliance upon Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India & Ors.132, Shimnit
AIR 1951 SC 128 (supra at 58) (2000) 10 SCC 664 (paras 226 to 235)
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
Utsch India Private Limited & Anr. v. West Bengal Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited & Ors.133, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan & Anr.134,Directorate of Film Festivals & Ors. v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain & Ors.135, State of Kerala v. Joseph Antony136, G. Sundarrajan v. Union of India & Ors.137, University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao & Anr.138, Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr.139, Federation of Railway Officers Association & Ors. v. Union of India140, Avishek Goenka v. Union of India & Anr.141, Dental Council of India v. Subharti K.K.B. Charitable Trust & Anr.142, Basavaiah (Dr.) v. Dr. H.L. Ramesh & Ors.143, K.T. Plantation Private Limited & Anr. v. State of Karntaka144, Rohit Dhupar & Ors. v. Lt. Governor & Ors. 145, Cynamide India 146, Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy 147, Haryana Financial Corporation & Anr. v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja148, Punjab National Bank & Ors. v. Manjeet Singh & Anr.149, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. v. S.G. Kotturappa & Anr.150,Viveka Nand Sethi v. Chairman, J&K Bank Ltd. & Ors.151, Ranjan Kumar Mitra v. Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. & Ors.152, Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.153, Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines v. Ramjee154, Sohan Lal Gupta (Dead) through LRs. & Ors. v. Asha Devi Gupta
(2010) 6 SCC 303 (para 34, 42 to 48 and 52) (2011) 7 SCC 639 (paras 36 and 37) (2007) 4 SCC 737 (para 16) (1994) 1 SCC 301 (para 14) (2013) 6 SCC 620 (paras 200, 201, 207 to 212) (1964) 4 SCR 575 (para 12) (1996) 9 SCC 709 (para 68) (2003) 4 SCC 289 (para 12) (2012) 5 SCC 275 (paras 20 to 22 and 25) (2001) 5 SCC 486 (paras 11 and 16) (2010) 8 SCC 372 (paras 13, 20 to 22 and 38) (2011) 9 SCC 1 (para 59) (2009) SCCOnline Del 487 (paras 7 to 9) (supra at 17, paras 27, 31 and 35) (2005) 6 SCC 321 (paras 6 to 9 and 18) (2008) 9 SCC 31 (paras 22 to 24, 35, 36, 40, 42, 44 and 45) (2006) 8 SCC 647 (paras 17, 19 and 22) (2005) 3 SCC 409 (para 24) (2005) 5 SCC 337 (paras 19, 20 and 22) (1997) 10 SCC 386 (para 1) (2006) 11 SCC 1 (paras 14, 20, 24 to 27, 44, 46, 47 and 49) (1977) 2 SCC 256 (para 13)
& Ors.155, Major G.S. Sodhi v. Union of India156, Bhim Sen & Ors. v. State of Punjab157, Barium Chemicals Ltd. & Anr. v. Company Law Board & Ors.158, Rohtas Industries v. S.D. Agarwal & Ors.159, M. Jhangir Bhatusha & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. 160, Haryana Financial Corporation & Anr. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills & Anr.161, Puranlal Lakhanpal v. President of India & Ors.162,Union of India & Ors. v. E.G. Nambudiri163, Maharashtra State Board164, Mahabir Jute Mills Ltd., Gorakhpore v. Shibban Lal Saxena & Ors.165, Sarat Kumar Dash and Ors. v. Biswajit Patnaik and Ors.166,Dr. Ashwani Kumar v. Union of India & Anr.167,R.K. Garg v. Union of India & Ors.168, Premium Granites & Anr. v. State of T.N. & Ors.169, Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India 170, BALCO Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India & Ors.171, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan172, Natural Resources Allocation173, G.B. Mahajan & Ors. v. Jalgaon Municipal Council & Ors.174, Meerut Development Authority175, Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain176, State of Karnataka v. Union of India & Anr.177, Kuldip Nayar & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.178, Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India & Ors.179, Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association
(2003) 7 SCC 492 (paras 29, 43 and 44) (1991) 2 SCC 382 (paras 35 to 37) AIR 1951 SC 481 AIR 1967 SC 295 (para 10, 27, 60 and 64) (1969) 1 SCC 325 (paras 7 to 9, 11 and 13) 1989 (2) Supp. SCC 201 (paras 8, 9 and 13) (2002) 3 SCC 496 (para 10) AIR 1961 SC 1519 AIR 1991 SC 1216 (paras 6 to 10) (supra at 46, paras 22 and 23) (1975) 2 SCC 818 (para 3) 1995 Supp (1) SCC 434 (para 11) 2019 SCCOnline SC 1144 (paras 8 to 16, 19, 22 to 37, 43 and 44) (1981) 4 SCC 675 (para 8) (1994) 2 SCC 691 (para 54) (1996) 2 SC 405 (para 7) (2002) 2 SCC 333 (paras 77 to 88) (supra at 134, para 36) (supra at 101, paras 146 to 150) (1991) 3 SCC 91 (paras 22 to 26) (supra at 118, paras 40 to 46, 61, 62, 67 and 68) 1975 Supp. SCC 1 (paras 176 and 661) (1977) 4 SCC 608 (para 238) (2006) 7 SCC 1 (para 107) (2008) 6 SCC 1 (para 116)
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
& Anr. v. Union of India180, Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service 181,Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation 182 , Indian Railway Construction Company Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar183, R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte Daly184, Regina (Mahmood) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 185, Huang & Ors. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department186, Asia Foundation & Construction Ltd. v. Trafalgar House Construction (I) Ltd. and Others187, Reliance Airport Developers (P) Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India & Ors. 188 , Himachal Pradesh Housing and Urban Development Authority v. Universal Estate & Anr. 189, Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India & Ors.190, Centre for Public Interest Litigation & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 191, Jagdish Mandal 192, Sterlite Industries (India) Limited & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.193, Municipal Corporation, Ujjain & Anr. v. BVG India Limited & Ors.194, Lafarge Umiam Mining195, N.D. Jayal & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 196 ,Alaknanda Hydropower Company197,M/s. Lithoferro & Ors. v. Ministry of Environment and Forests198, Lochner v. New York199, New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann200, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish201, United States v.Carolene Products
(2016) 5 SCC 1 (para 381) 1984 (3) All ER 935 (1947) 2 All ER 680 (2003) 4 SCC 579 [2001] 3 All ER 433 [2001] 1 WLR 840 [2005] 3 All ER 435 (1997) 1 SCC 738 (paras 9, 10 and 11) (2006) 10 SCC 1 (paras 56, 77 and 89 to 92) (2010) 14 SCC 253 (paras 22, 23 and 26) (2009) 7 SCC 561 (paras 113 to 115 and 165 to 170) (2000) 8 SCC 606 (para 19 to 22) (supra at 124, paras 21, 21.1., 21.6 and 22) (2013) 4 SCC 575 (paras 31 and 32) (2018) 5 SCC 462 (paras 14, 15 and 27) (supra at 58, paras 105 to 111) (2004) 9 SCC 362 (paras 19 and 20) (supra at 52, paras 13 to 16) (2013) SCC Online NGT 40 (paras 17 to 21 and 39) 198 U.S. 45 (1905) 285 U.S. 262 (1932) 300 U.S. 379 (1937)
Co.202, American Federation of Labor Et. Al. v. American Sash & Door Co. 203, Ferguson, Attorney General of Kansas, Et. Al. v. Skrupa204, Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors.205, Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer, New Delhi & Ors.206, Wolf v. Colorado207,Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India208,Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Anr.209, Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab210, State of A.P. & Ors. v. McDowell & Company & Ors.211, Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India & Ors. 212 , Shayara Bano 213 ,K.S. Puttaswamy & Anr. (I)214,Swiss Ribbons Private Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.215, Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala & Anr.216, Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Limited & Anr. v. Reserve Bank of India217 and Daroga Singh & Ors. v. B.K. Pandey 218. 115. Appearing for Respondent No. 9 (Consultant), Mr. Harish Salve, learned senior counsel stoutly contends that allegations of bias and favouritism have been made by the petitioners which colourises this challenge as one based on malice in fact. That allegation cannot proceed further in absence of the person against whom such case of bias is pleaded, by name. It is submitted that the virtue of participatory democracy is laudable but the extent and nature of participation cannot be enforced through the medium of judicial review. Mr. Salve argues that participatory democracy is a two-tier process of which a major element is Parliamentary law making which is done through the representative mode
304 U.S. 144 (1938) 335 U.S. 538 (1949) 372 U.S. 726 (1963) AIR 1963 SC 1295 AIR 1967 SC 1836 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (1970) 1 SCC 248 AIR 1978 SC 597 (1980) 2 SCC 684 (1996) 3 SCC 709 (2014) 9 SCC 737 (supra at 100) (supra at 79) (2019) 4 SCC 17 (1973) 4 SCC 225 (paras 634, 1436, 1437 and 1442) (1992) 2 SCC 343 (2004) 5 SCC 26 (para 30)
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
in India and not by a referendum. It is submitted that the nature of participation envisaged in India requires participation without causing hindrance in the system. It is for the Government to decide who is to be heard, for instance, in EC issues, only local affected people are meant to be heard.
116. It is further urged that even arguably, mere absence of sufficient participation would not be capable of being termed as Wednesbury unreasonableness so as to quash the whole process. Further, the argument of participatory democracy in respect of important decisions to be taken by the Government such as in respect of construction of a new Parliament building, if accepted, would be forcing the judiciary to define the type of Government decisions where such procedure need to be followed by applying the same logic. That will be groping in the dark and by no standards a judicial function. In that, same logic may then be invoked to compel the Government of the day to undertake public participation before going for a war on the fronts due to aggression by the neighbouring country, which is more important than a decision to construct a new Parliament building.
117. Mr. Salve submits that the scope of judicial review should be focussed on two enquiries only – first, whether there is any illegality or infraction of any statutory mandate and second, whether there is any procedural unfairness which can be checked by judicially manageable standards. As regards the lack of information in public domain, it is submitted that it is one thing to place information in public domain, but it does not mean that mere absence of information would render the decision as vitiated.
118. To buttress his submissions, Mr. Salve placed reliance upon Aruna Roy219.
W.P.(C) No. 922/2020 119. On 17.10.2017, the MoHUA, while acting under Section11A of 1957 Act, had issued notification S.O. 3348 (E) whereby Chapter17 (clause 8(2)) of Master Plan “Permission of Use Premises in Use Zones” was modified to permit the usage of land allocated for Public/ Semi Public (PSP) usage for the purpose of Government offices. The said notification is assailed by the petitioners herein with the following prayer:
(supra at 30)
“i. Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction calling for records and for quashing the Notification S.O. 3348 (E) dated 17.10.2017, promulgated by Respondent No. 1 being ultra vires the power under the Delhi Development Authority Act of 1957, and in violation of Article 14 and 21 of Constitution of India;”
120. In addition to grounds urged in T.C. (C) 229/2020, it is submitted that the said notification violates the tenets of Wednesbury Principle of Reasonableness and can be assailed on the three grounds of – illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. The petitioners submit that the notification was the result of a colourable exercise of power and no such power vested with the respondents so as to permit the usage of land for uncontemplated purposes.
121. To support their case, the petitioners have relied upon Syed Hasan Rasul Numa & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.220, Mackinonn Mackenzie & Company Limited v. Mackinnon Mackenzie Employees Union221, Babu Verghese & Ors. v. Bar Council of Kerala & Ors.222, State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh & Ors.223, Kedar Nath Yadav v. State of West Bengal & Ors.224, Khub Chand & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.225, S. Rama Rao & Ors. v. Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, Hyderabad & Anr. 226, Aircel Cellular Ltd. v. Union of India227 and Legg & Ors. v. Inner London Education Authority228. W.P. (C) No. 1041/2020 122. This petition seeks to challenge various approvals including award of tender dated 2.9.2019, EC dated 17.6.2020 and No Objection by CVC dated 30.4.2020. The prayer reads thus:
“i. Issue a writ in the nature of order and/or direction(s) calling for the records of the various approvals/decisions granted/taken to redevelop Central Vista including the Parliament such as the
(1991) 1 SCC 401 (paras 11 to 14) (2015) 4 SCC 544 (paras 42 and 44) (1999) 3 SCC 422 (paras 31 and 32) AIR 1964 SC 358 (paras 7 and 8) (2017) 11 SCC 601 (paras 85, 88 and 89) AIR 1967 SC 1074 (para 7) 1977 SCC Online AP 271 (paras 23, 24, 28 and 31) 2016 SCC Online Mad 8463 (paras 141, 142, 144 and 152) [1972] 1 WLR 1245 (Chancery Division)
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
tender awarded pursuant to the Notice dated 02.09.2019 NIT No. 04/CPM/RPZ/NIT/2019-20, Environmental Clearance dated 17.06.2020 in relation to the Parliament, the Central Vista Committee “No objection” dated 30.04.2020, and after reviewing the same to quash and set aside the said approvals/decisions.”
123. The grounds adopted by the petitioner herein are similar to those adopted by the petitioners in W.P. (C) No. 853/2020 and W.P. (C) No. 638/2020 and we do not intend to dilate on the same for brevity.
CONSIDERATION RULE OF LAW
124. After ruminating on the blistering and exquisite arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, we find that the same are proffered on the hypothesis of governance by Rule of Law with specific emphasis on the high constitutional tenets and values of democratic polity, as adopted in India, and the principle of constitutionalism. All other grounds, relating to alleged violations of statutory and municipal laws, flow from the petitioners’ understanding of the aforesaid fundamental principles and thus, we begin our discussion by examining this fundamental premise so as to understand to what extent, if at all, and in what manner policy/ administrative decision-making can be overseen in judicially manageable standards in the light of such principles.
125. To consider the matters in issue, we deem it apposite to traverse through some illuminating discourse of founding fathers of our country. On 9.12.1946, when the Constituent Assembly embarked upon the journey to create the most fundamental instrument of future governance of the country, it had two concepts in mind – democracy and Rule of Law. The reason for this pin-pointed emphasis reflects aptly from the words of Sir S. Radhakrishnan, who rose to speak up as the first speaker after election of Permanent Chairman on 11.12.1946. He said:
“...We have to remember with gratitude all those great souls who worked and suffered for the freedom of this country, for the dawn of this day. Thousands died, more thousands suffered privation, imprisonment, and exile, and it is their suffering that has cemented and built up this great edifice ...229”
Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. I (9.12.1946 – 23.12.1946)
126. The fact that millions of Indians had struggled incessantly to breathe in a democratic polity which treated them not as mere subjects but as cardinal constituents on which the whole edifice of the nation stands, was the primary reason that our Constitution makers wanted an environment where law operates equally upon one and all, where Rule of Law trumps over even the slightest notion of rule by whims, where the equation between state and citizens is not marked by imbalance and where law, as it exists, governs all legal relationships. 127. When an effort is made to decipher the understanding of members as regards the concept of governance by Rule of Law during the Constituent Assembly Debates, an interesting pattern emerges and we must delineate it henceforth. During the discussion on Part-III, Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad emphatically stated that democracy means rule of law. He elaborated his viewpoint by stating thus: “We are erecting one of the finest democracies in the world. But the implication of democracy must be squarely faced. Democracy means a rule of law as opposed to a rule of force. In autocracies and in Totalitarian States the law is not supreme. But democracy means supremacy of the law where no one, be he the highest individual, is above the law. We should therefore all respect law and should be law-abiding citizens in order to inculcate that sense of law-abidingness wherein lies the safety of democracy. We should ourselves follow democratic principles, democratic methods and respect the law. 230” (emphasis supplied) On another occasion, Dr. P.K. Sen exposited that Rule of Law is meant to save the Government from disruptive tendencies. He said: “…The rule of law is, in my humble judgment, the rule that should save the Government from all manner of disruptive tendencies…231” While speaking on the administrative setup that the British left for us, Dr. P. Subbarayan observed Rule of Law to be a concept on which future of the country depends. He said: “The second point I wish to touch upon is the rule of law which I think is a peculiar part of the English legal system. If there is
Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. VIII (16.5.1949 – 16.6.1949) Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. VIII (16.5.1949 – 16.6.1949)
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.] anything which I would like to cling to in the future of this country, it is this rule of law…232”
On 17.9.1949, Mr. K.M. Munshi rose to speak on the evolution of Supreme Court of India for the independent India and expressed an earnest hope premised on nothing but the ideal of Rule of Law. He said: “Sir, the British Parliament and the Privy, Council are the two great institutions which the Anglo-Saxon race has given to mankind. The Privy Council during the last few centuries has not only laid down law, but coordinated the concept of rights and obligations throughout all the Dominions and Colonies in the British Commonwealth. So far as India is concerned, the role of the Privy Council has been one of the most important. It has been a very great unifying force and for us Indians it became the instrument and embodiment of the rule of law, a concept on which alone we have based the democratic institutions which we have set up in our Constitution.233” (emphasis supplied)
He added: “Sir, on the 26th of January our Supreme Court will come into existence and it will join the family of Supreme Courts of the democratic world of which the Privy Council is the oldest and perhaps the greatest. I can only hope and trust that though we part with the Privy Council our Supreme Court will carry forward the traditions of the Privy Council, traditions which involve that judicial detachment, that unflinching integrity, that subordination of everything to the rule of lawand that conscientious regard for the rights and for justice not only between subjects and subjects but also between the State and the subjects.”
(emphasis supplied) What emerges from this discourse is that the makers of the Constitution envisaged a legal and political system which would be subservient to Rule of Law.
128. Rule of Law inter alia posits four universal tenets. It is a system of laws, institutions, norms and community commitment that
Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. XI (14.11.1949 – 26.11.1949) Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. IX (30.7.1949 – 18.9.1949)
envisages – Accountability of Government and private actors alike under the law; The laws must be just, clear, publicized and stable and applied evenly, protect fundamental rights and human rights; Open Government – meaning thereby the processes by which the laws are enacted, administered and enforced are accessible, fair and efficient; and Accessible justice – to include timely delivery of justice by competent, ethical, and independent representations and neutrals who are accessible, have adequate resources and mirror the traits of the communities they serve 234. 129. Theoretically, the concept of Rule of Law was understood and applied to advance even autocratic regime. Louis XIV, Napolean and Hitler had Governments based on nothing but Rule of Law. But with the evolution of political discourse, the expanse of Rule of Law traversed from an autocratic to a democratic one. It underwent a transformation from being a concept used by autocrats to control their subjects to a living idea of governance wherein citizens and state interact with each other on a level playing field. 130. For the purposes of present examination, we need to provide life and meaning to this idea as a concept capable of judicial application with manageable standards and not just as an idea of political rhetoric. The difference between these two approaches is real and reflects in the introductory words of T.R.S. Allan in “Constitutional Justice” where he notes thus: “Its rhetorical power in aid of an argument about governmental authority, individual liberty, or constitutional legitimacy, makes the rule of law an object of understandable suspicion as much as one of reverence: its uncertain and contested content allows it to be too readily invoked in support of opinions whose cogency might not withstand careful scrutiny…235”
(emphasis supplied)
131. The principle of Rule of Law coalesces two words – rule and law. The two words are not only connected with each other but also control the meanings attributable to each other. “Rule” refers to the idea of governing the state and depending on the nature of model adopted in a country, such rule can be effected in multiple ways. When we gave to
worldjusticeproject.org T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional Justice, Oxford University Press (Edn. 2001) pg. 1
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
ourselves the Constitution, we categorically envisioned such rule to be “DEMOCRATIC” i.e., Government of the people, by the people and for the people. The word “law”, now, lays down the precise contours of mode of ruling in India. Article 13 provides an inclusive definition of “law” as understood in India and reads thus:
“13. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights.—
(1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.
(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. (3) In this article, unless the context otherwise requires,— (a) “law” includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law; (b) “laws in force” includes laws passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that any such law or any part thereof may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas. (4) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution made under article 368.” The first written safeguard, mentioned in Article 13, categorically prohibits the making of any law which contravenes the fundamental rights. The legislation passed in Parliament is not included in this definition but is covered separately in Articles 245 and 246. What is clear is that the structure of rule in India is duly codified by the makers. It primarily means a democratic rule based upon law as envisaged in the Constitution.
132. With passage of time, the word “law” has also been circumscribed by a plethora of safeguards, written and unwritten, thereby widening the array of rights which were not articulated by the founding
fathers. For, the most remarkable features of a living and dynamic Constitution are its ability to grow and stay effective with the growth of socio-economic structures and vicissitudes. To elaborate further, the characteristics of reasonableness, non-arbitrariness and fairness have time and again shown direction to law and thus, to rule by such law.
133. The above discussion is instructive on at least three countsfirst, Rule of Law requires law in existence; second, such law must qualify as law within the meaning of the Constitution and must satisfy the standards laid therein and third, legally applicable meaning of Rule of Law in India can be best understood as a democratic rule within the four corners of the Constitution, as originally envisaged and as is interpreted from time to time. The existence of democracy per se does not guarantee adherence to Rule of Law, but abidance of Rule of Law by one and all is the hallmark of a real thriving democracy.
134. The fact that all power flows from law and must be exercised in accordance with such law is easy to be theorized in a constitutional discourse, but difficult to be sustained in the aftermath of ever-expanding potpourri of the law itself. It is for this very reason the statement – ‘Rule of Law’ must encompass a dynamic concept albeit rooted in four corners of the Constitution. It provides a constant trigger to any state-citizen intercourse and calls upon this Court to strike a just balance between two entities, both equally bound by the same principle of superiority of law. A just and time-tested methodology to strike this balance lies in the end product of furthering the avowed goal of a democracy premised upon Rule of Law and not dragging it backwards. 135. The principle of Rule of Law runs as a common thread through the substantive as well as procedural laws. A democratic polity requires all organs of the state to attach equal importance to substance of law as well as to the procedure delineated to perform such substantive functions. That must be the constant endeavour to touch both ends as well as means. DEMOCRATIC DUE PROCESS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 136. The petitioners have called upon this Court to apply the scale of “democratic due process” for examining the validity of procedures adopted by the respondents at various stages. Before expressing our opinion on whether the concept of Rule of Law in India envisions
RAJEEV SURI v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
something akin to a democratic due process or not, we must make an endeavour to understand the meaning of this phrase.
137. The phrase “democratic due process” is not privy to any reasonably acceptable definition and thus, it is relevant to understand it in substance. Rodney A. Smolla, in his seminal work “Democratic Due Process: Administrative Procedure after Bishop v. Wood” 236 explained this phrase in the form of a negative concept i.e., one that diminishes constitutional protections rather than enhancing them, as opposed to the petitioners’ understanding. He couched it as a phenomenon wherein: “... the responsibility for defining, shaping and limiting administrative due process has been taken from the courts and given to the legislatures. By placing this responsibility in the hands of elected representatives, the Supreme Court has in effect created a “democratic due process clause…..” 138. The background story leading upto the enunciation of this phrase can be understood by making a reference to Bishop v. Wood237 wherein the US Supreme Court upheld the termination of Carl Bishop, a policeman in North Carolina, who was terminated without a prior hearing. The Court affirmed the decision on the ground that the applicable statutory employment laws did not mandate any prior hearing and the same could not be compelled by the invocation of the due process clause. Upon further examination, one would note that this decision was not an isolated one, rather, it was a culmination of prior decisions on terminations from public employment, as noted by Smolla in his work. Beginning from Arnett, Director, Office of Economic Opportunity, Et. Al. v. Kennedy Et. Al. 238 and Board of Regents of State Colleges Et. Al. v. Roth239, the US Supreme Court made a conscious departure from the due process clause, as enshrined in 14th amendment of the US Constitution. The basis of this departure is reflected in the opinion of Justice Stewart, writing for the Court in Roth240 wherein he observed that there are some processes in the Government wherein due process clause may not be imported. He relied upon the language of fourteenth amendment which lays down that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 1977, No. 2, Eighth Annual Administrative Law Issue (May, 1977), pp. 453-488 426 U.S. 341 (1976) 416 U.S. 134 (1974) 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (supra at 239)
without due process of law” to hold that due process clause would become operative only when a person’s life, liberty or property is at stake. The underlying idea behind shifting the judicial eye from blanket application of due process to enforcement of specific processes under statutes is that, due process must be restricted to matters involving actual deprivation of life, liberty or property. Smolla, in the aforesaid work, notes that all administrative due process decisions were primarily marked by two characteristics: “….. first, a property interest is not an abstract expectation of a benefit, but a legitimately claimed entitlement; and second, in determining whether an asserted interest is a mere expectation or a matured entitlement, the Court will look not to the Constitution, but to an independent source of law, such as a state statute 241.” This conscious judicial departure from blanket application of due process clause is understood in the American constitutional discourse as evolution of due process into democratic due process - as it restates giving effect to the mandate of statutes duly enacted by elected representatives. 139. Though the petitioners have used this phrase in a manner which is purportedly opposite to the way democratic due process is perceived in U.S., the above discussion is relevant to understand the thrust of the petitioners on acceptance of a procedural standard akin to “due process” in administrative matters. The above discussion irresistibly offers the following takeaways – first, the requirement of due process is envisaged in matters involving deprivation of individual rights; second, before asserting deprivation of a right, the claimant has to discharge the onus of proving the entitlement to such right; third, such deprivation needs to be demonstrably proved in order to remedy it; fourth, even in U.S., there is judicial acceptance of the tenet that the requirement of due process cannot be enforced in all Government processes; fifth, there can be situations when existence of duly enacted and valid statutes may preclude the application of the principle of due process in adjudication.
Duke Law Journal, Vol. 1977, No. 2, Eighth Annual Administrative Law Issue (May, 1977), pg. 454
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140. Reverting to the Indian context, the inroad of due process clause in the Indian Constitution has a unique history of its own. When Pandit Shri Thakur Das Bhargava, in the Constituent Assembly, proposed an amendment to Article 15 (now Article 21) to substitute the words “procedure established by law” with “due process of law242”, he was supported by many other stalwarts of the Assembly who, in one voice, considered that inclusion of thelater expression would be much more effective in safeguarding personal liberty of persons. The proposed change, however, did not appeal to others including Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Mr. Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar. Drawing upon the origin and dubious acceptability of the doctrine in U.S., Ayyar said: “… Today, according to Professor Willis, the expression means, what the Supreme Court says what it means in any particular case. It is just possible, some ardent democrats may have a greater faith in the judiciary than in the conscious will expressed through the enactment of a popular legislature. Three gentlemen or five gentlemen, sitting as a court of law, and stating what exactly is due process according to them in any particular case, after listening to long discourses and arguments of briefed counsel on either side, may appeal to certain democrats more than the expressed wishes of the legislature or the action of an executive responsible to the legislature. In the development of the doctrine of `due process’, the United States Supreme Court has not adopted a consistent view at all and the decisions are conflicting. One decision very often reversed another decision. I would challenge any member of the Bar with a deep knowledge of the cases in the United States Supreme Court to say that there is anything like uniformity in regard to the interpretation of `due process’. One has only to take the index in the Law Reports Annotated Edition for fifteen years and compare the decisions of one year with the decisions of another year and he will come to the conclusion that it has no definite import. It all depended upon the particular Judges that presided on the occasion. Justice Holmes took a view favourable to social control. There were other Judges of a Tory complexion who took a strong view in favour of individual liberty and private property…243" (emphasis supplied)
Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. IX (30.7.1949 – 18.9.1949) Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. VII (4.11.1948 – 8.1.1949)
Before the amendment was negatived by voting, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar rose to sum up the controversy in the Assembly and noted as to how the distinction between “due process” and “procedure established by law” is essentially one of the extents and scope of judicial review that the Courts must be empowered to exercise in independent India. He said: “… The question now raised by the introduction of the phrase ‘due process’ is whether the judiciary should be given the additional power to question the laws made by the State on the ground that they violate certain fundamental principles.244"
He went on to elaborate and, in a way, to reinforce the express negation of due process clause which was to follow his speech and said: “The question of “due process” raises, in my judgment, the question of the relationship between the legislature and the judiciary. In a federal constitution, it is always open to the judiciary to decide whether any particular law passed by the legislature is ultra vires or intra vires in reference to the powers of legislation which are granted by the Constitution to the particular legislature. If the law made by a particular legislature exceeds the authority of the power given to it by the Constitution, such law would be ultra vires and invalid. That is the normal thing that happens in all federal constitutions. Every law in a federal constitution, whether made by the Parliament at the Centre or made by the legislature of a State, is always subject to examination by the judiciary from the point of view of the authority of the legislature making the law. The ‘due process’ clause, in my judgment, would give the judiciary the power to question the law made by the legislature on another ground. That ground would be whether that law is in keeping with certain fundamental principles relating to the rights of the individual…”
(emphasis supplied)
The above discussion vividly expounds that the makers of the Constitution expressly rejected the incorporation of a due process clause. 141. The express deletion of “due process” from the draft Constitution and replacement thereof by “procedure established by law”
Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. VII (4.11.1948 – 8.1.1949)
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as noted by Jurist Granville Austin, is adverted to by this Court in K.S. Puttaswamy(I)245 thus:
“276. The third major change which the Constituent Assembly made was that the phrase “due process of law” was deleted from the text of the draft Constitution. Following B.N. Rau’s meeting with Justice Frankfurter, the Drafting Committee deleted the phrase “due process of law” and replaced it with “procedure established by law”. Granville Austin refers to the interaction between Frankfurter and B.N. Rau and the reason for the deletion [Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution : Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford University Press, 1966) at p. 103.] : “Soon after, Rau began his trip to the United States, Canada, Eire, and England to talk with justices, constitutionalists, and statesmen about the framing of the Constitution. In the United States he met Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, who told him that he considered the power of judicial review implied in the due process clause both undemocratic—because a few Judges could veto legislation enacted by the representatives of a nation—and burdensome to the Judiciary. Frankfurter had been strongly influenced by the Harvard Law School’s great constitutional lawyer, James Bradley Thayer, who also feared that too great a reliance on due process as a protection against legislative oversight or misbehaviour might weaken the democratic process. Thayer’s views had impressed Rau even before he met Frankfurter. In his Constitutional Precedents, Rau had pointed out that Thayer and others had ‘drawn attention to the dangers of attempting to find in the Supreme Court— instead of in the lessons of experience—a safeguard against the mistakes of the representatives of people’.” 142. Further, the whole idea of due process was meant to safeguard personal liberties of individuals by ensuring that the process to be used for taking away such liberty complies with certain standards. It was never meant to be used to circumscribe or to questionthe administrative decisions by applying higher bench mark than the statutory defined/ articulated obligations. This is not to say that administrative action was left unchecked by the Constitution. The Constitution provides for a scheme wherein “law” is made subject to all the provisions of Part-III
(supra at 79)
depending on the nature of action and nature of consequence on the rights. The test of nature of action and nature of consequence is essential to determine the nature of remedy that the Constitution can offer. For this purpose, a line must be drawn between executive action which has a direct bearing on personal liberty of individual; and executive action which comprises of ministerial/administrative functions with no direct impact on individual liberties. 143. The distinction is relevant to highlight a crucial aspect of the growth of constitutional law in India. As regards individual liberties, we have witnessed a wholehearted and rather expansive approach by the Court. One would note that it was during the review of an administrative action with bearing on personal liberty that this Court mandated the procedure in “procedure established by law” to be just, fair and nonarbitrary, as distinguished from fanciful, arbitrary and oppressive in Maneka Gandhi246. With unwinding of time, dimensions came to be added to increase the fairness of procedure so as to make it more exacting for the executive to put curbs on personal liberty of an individual. In Mithu v. State of Punjab247and Sunil Batra248, standards of fairness and non-arbitrariness were held to inform the word “law” as well in the phrase “procedure established by law” because individual liberties were at stake. In Sunil Batra249, Desai J. noted in para 228 thus: “228. ... The word “Law” in the expression “procedure established by law” in Article 21 has been interpreted to mean in Maneka Gandhi case that the law must be right, just and fair, and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. Otherwise it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would no be satisfied. If it is arbitrary it would be violative of Article 14...”
However, in Rajbala and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors.250,this Court succinctly observed about the non-existence of the doctrine of substantive due process in the Indian Constitution thus: “64. From the above extract from McDowell & Co. case [State of A.P. v. McDowell & Co., (1996) 3 SCC 709, para 43] it is clear that courts in this country do not undertake the task of
(supra at 209) (1983) 2 SCC 277 (supra at 128) (supra at 128) (2016) 2 SCC 445
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declaring a piece of legislation unconstitutional on the ground that the legislation is “arbitrary” since such an exercise implies a value judgment and courts do not examine the wisdom of legislative choices unless the legislation is otherwise violative of some specific provision of the Constitution. To undertake such an examination would amount to virtually importing the doctrine of “substantive due process” employed by the American Supreme Court at an earlier point of time while examining the constitutionality of Indian legislation. As pointed out in the above extract, even in United States the doctrine is currently of doubtful legitimacy. This Court long back in A.S. Krishna v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 297 declared that the doctrine of due process has no application under the Indian Constitution [Municipal Committee, Amritsar v. State of Punjab, (1969) 1 SCC 475]. As pointed out by Frankfurter, J., arbitrariness became a mantra.
(emphasis supplied)
In K.S. Puttaswamy (I)251, the Court was more categorical in noting the dichotomy between these two expressions and observed thus: “290. The constitutional history surrounding the drafting of Article 21 contains an abundant reflection of a deliberate and studied decision of the Constituent Assembly to delete the expression “due process of law” from the draft Constitution when the Constitution was adopted. In the Constituent Assembly, the Drafting Committee chaired by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar had included the phrase but it came to be deleted after a careful evaluation of the vagaries of the decision-making process in the US involving interpretation of the due process clause. Significantly, present to the mind of the Framers of our Constitution was the invalidation of social welfare legislation in the US on the anvil of the due process Clause on the ground that it violated the liberty of contract of men, women and children to offer themselves for work in a free market for labour. This model evidently did not appeal to those who opposed the incorporation of a similar phrase into the Indian Constitution ....”
(emphasis supplied)
(supra at 79)
It further noted the dangers of construing substantive due process as a rigid principle of constitutional interpretation in India and vagaries associated with it thus: “296. The danger of construing this as an exercise of “substantive due process” is that it results in the incorporation of a concept from the American Constitution which was consciously not accepted when the Constitution was framed. Moreover, even in the country of its origin, substantive due process has led to vagaries of judicial interpretation. Particularly having regard to the constitutional history surrounding the deletion of that phrase in our Constitution, it would be inappropriate to equate the jurisdiction of a constitutional court in India to entertain a substantive challenge to the validity of a law with the exercise of substantive due process under the US Constitution. Reference to substantive due process in some of the judgments is essentially a reference to a substantive challenge to the validity of a law on the ground that its substantive (as distinct from procedural) provisions violate the Constitution.” (emphasis supplied)
144. Therefore, the trajectory of our jurisprudence in review of matters involving personal liberties has been one of strict approaches. It is, however, a misnomer to propagate that we have gradually transformed from chosen “procedure established by law” into once consciously rejected “due process of law”. Indisputably, we are not dealing with a matter of personal liberty per se. The petitioners, despite their best of efforts, have not been able to demonstrate a case of deprivation of life or personal liberty of any individual on account of any of the impugned executive action. Whereas, it is essential for the petitioners to demonstrate a real and direct impact or restriction on their core fundamental rights due to the impugned executive action to invoke the due process argument. A cause-effect relationship is essential. Only then the burden would shift on the State to either show the absence of restrictions or justification of restrictions within the permissible exceptions of Part-III. 145. Concededly, we are sitting in review of the process of an administrative or so to say quasi legislative action which falls in the latter category, namely, with no direct impact on personal liberties as such. A judicial review is an exercise in reference to some existing rights and the
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reliefs and remedies prayed for. The Rule of Law, as accepted and settled in India, with regard to judicial interference in administrative and executive or policy matters is no more res integra. The duty enjoined upon the judiciary is to ensure checks and balances; and to place itself between the Government and citizens when they come face to face in a Court of law. It is meant to act as an equaliser and ensure that the flow of decisions from executive to citizens is overseen through the prism of well-established principles, as and when called upon to do so. The judicial organ is not meant to impose the citizens’ or even its own version of good governance upon the Government in the name of Rule of Law in exercise of its power of judicial review. 146. In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans252, Lord Brightman very succinctly observed thus: “Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision-making process. Unless that restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court will in my view, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power.” Benjamin Cardozo, in his seminal work “TheNature of the Judicial Process” elaborated as to how a Judge derives his strength from hallowed principles thus: “… The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to “the primordial necessity of order in the social life.” Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that remains…253.” In Reliance Airport Developers254, this Court discussed the scope of judicial review in administrative action and noted thus: “56. One of the points that falls for determination is the scope for judicial interference in matters of administrative decisions. Administrative action is stated to be referable to broad area of
[1982] 1 WLR 1155 The Nature of the Judicial Process, Benjamin Cardozo, New Haven: Yale University Press, 13 th Edn. 1946 pg. 141 (supra at 188)
governmental activities in which the repositories of power may exercise every class of statutory function of executive, quasilegislative and quasi-judicial nature. It is trite law that exercise of power, whether legislative or administrative, will be set aside if there is manifest error in the exercise of such power or the exercise of the power is manifestly arbitrary (see State of U.P. v. Renusagar Power Co. [(1988) 4 SCC 59 : AIR 1988 SC 1737] ). At one time, the traditional view in England was that the executive was not answerable where its action was attributable to the exercise of prerogative power. Professor de Smith in his classic work Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th Edn. at pp. 285-87 states the legal position in his own terse language that the relevant principles formulated by the courts may be broadly summarised as follows. The authority in which a discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, a discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it; it must not act under the dictates of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion, it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorised to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be influenced by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. …”
(emphasis supplied)
The Court then summed up the principles into two broad categories thus:
“56. …These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories: (i) failure to exercise a discretion, and (ii) excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account, and where an authority hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires.”
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The Court further added the grounds of non-application of mind to relevant factors and non-existence of facts and noted thus:
“57. ...If the power has been exercised on a non-consideration or non-application of mind to relevant factors, the exercise of power will be regarded as manifestly erroneous. If a power (whether legislative or administrative) is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently erroneous, such exercise of power will stand vitiated ...” In Council of Civil Service Unions255, Lord Diplock attempted to sum up the grounds of judicial review of administrative action under three broad heads and noted thus: “… Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call ‘illegality’, the second ‘irrationality’ and the third ‘procedural impropriety’. That is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of ‘proportionality’ which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community; but to dispose of the instant case the three already well-established heads that I have mentioned will suffice.”
(emphasis supplied) Apart from noting that judicial review is warranted only in cases of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety, Lord Diplock prophetically noted that the categories of review could not be exhaustive in a society where administrative action is making inroads in all spheres of human activity and that “proportionality” could emerge as yet another ground of review in future.
147. This Court succinctly summed up the position in Tata Cellular v. Union of India256 and observed thus:
(supra at 181) (1994) 6 SCC 651
“94. The principles deducible from the above are:
(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made.
(3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. …”
(emphasis supplied)
148. We must note that the scope, operation and extent of judicial review is dependent upon the nature of subject matter that a Court is dealing with. A constitutional Court cannot devise a uniform standard of interference particularly when nature of administrative action may involve expediency (in relative terms) in execution depending on the subject matter. In Council of Civil Service Unions257, Lord Scarman observed thus: “… Just as ancient restrictions in the law relating to the prerogative writs and orders have not prevented the courts from extending the requirement of natural justice, namely the duty to act fairly, so that it is required of a purely administrative act, so also has the modern law, a vivid sketch of which my noble and learned friend Lord Diplock has included in his speech, extended the range of judicial review in respect of the exercise of prerogative power. Today, therefore, the controlling factor in determining whether the exercise of prerogative power is subject to judicial review is not its source but its subject matter.”
(emphasis supplied)
149. Graham Aldus and John Alder in their book “Applications for Judicial Review, Law and Practice”, as relied upon by the Court in Reliance Airport Developers258, have identified two categories of national security and foreign affairs to demonstrate how judicial review
(supra