Ravi Kumar P H v. Krishna Kumar M
- Court
- High Court of Karnataka
- Date of judgment
- 5 November 2026
- Judge
- Justice Geetha K.B
- Case number
- CRL.RP No. 796 of 2024
- Result
- Partly Allowed
- Acts & sections
- Section 138 NI Act, Section 118 NI Act, Section 139 NI Act, Section 200 CrPC, Section 313 CrPC
- Subject
- Criminal, Cheque bounce
Full judgment
-1HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 5TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE GEETHA K.B.
CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO.796 OF 2024 BETWEEN: RAVI KUMAR P.H., S/O HULISIDDE GOWDA, AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS, R/AT NO.546, 4TH CROSS, LIG 707, YELAHANKA NEW TOWN, BENGALURU - 560 064. …PETITIONER (BY SRI SHARAN B.T., ADVOCATE) AND: KRISHNA KUMAR M., S/O G.H. HUCHAIAH, AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS, RA/T NO.103/C, TYPE 1, RWF WEST COLONY, YELAHANKA TOWN, BENGALURU - 560 064. …RESPONDENT (BY SRI SHRINIWAS M. KULKARNI, ADVOCATE) THIS CRL.RP IS FILED U/S.397 R/W 401 OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO SET ASIDE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED 29.09.2020 IN C.C.NO.1480 OF 2019 PASSED BY THE HONBLE XVIII ADDL. CHIEF MM AT BENGALURU AND TO SET
-2HC-KAR
ASIDE THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED 24.04.2024 IN CRL.A.NO.186/2021 PASSED BY THE LXII ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE (CCH-63) AT BENGALURU BY ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER (ANNEXURE-B AND ANNEXURE-A) RESPECTIVELY. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE GEETHA K.B. ORAL ORDER
1.
This is the revision petition filed under Section
397 read with 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, 'Cr.P.C') by the revision petitioner/accused challenging the Judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29.09.2020 passed in CC No.1480/2019 on the file of XVIII Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru (in short, 'the trial Court') and confirmed the same in Judgment of criminal appeal dated 24.04.2024 passed in criminal appeal No.186/2021 on the file of LXII Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge (CCH - 63), Bengaluru and to acquit the revision petitioner.
-3HC-KAR
2.
The parties would be referred with their ranks,
as they were before the trial Court for the sake of convenience and clarity. 3.
The complainant has filed the private complaint
under Section 200 Cr.P.C., before the trial Court praying for taking the cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short, 'NI Act') against the accused. 4.
It
is
stated
in
the
complaint
that
the
complainant and the accused are known to each other. The
accused
during
April-2018
approached
the
complainant for financial assistance of `6,74,000/- to perform the marriage of his younger sister and to install the water refilled tank. Accordingly, the complainant lent the aforesaid amount during May-2018; out of which he has
paid
`2,00,000/-
through
cheque
drawn
on
Corporation Bank, Yelahanka, New town, Bengaluru and the balance amount was paid by pledging the gold ornaments of his wife to perform the marriage of sister of
-4HC-KAR
the accused. The accused has agreed to repay the amount on 31.10.2018.
In this connection, he has issued the
subject cheque bearing No.313257 drawn on State Bank of India, Yelahanka, New town, Bengaluru for the sum of `6,74,000/-. The complainant presented the same for encashment on the same day. However, the said cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement 'Funds insufficient' and that the complainant received the said endorsement on 09.11.2018. He has issued the legal notice dated 14.11.2018
to
the
accused,
which
is
served
on
15.11.2018; he has given an untenable reply dated 07.12.2018 and then the complaint is filed on 15.12.2018. 5.
After recording the sworn statement of the
complainant, the trial Court has taken cognizance of the offence and issued summons to the accused. 6.
After his appearance, the accused pleaded not
guilty of the offence, when the accusation leveled against him were read over and explained to him.
-5HC-KAR
7.
Afterwards the statement of the accused under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C., was recorded, wherein he denied the case of the complainant in toto. The complainant was cross-examined by the learned counsel for the accused and the accused also led his defence evidence. 8.
After recording the evidence of both sides,
hearing the arguments, the trial Court concluded that the accused has committed the offence and convicted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of NI Act, sentenced him to pay a fine of
`10,20,000/-; out of which
`10,00,000/- shall be payable to the complainant as compensation. 9.
Aggrieved by the said Judgment of conviction
and order of sentence, the revision petitioner approached the
appellate
Court.
After
hearing
arguments,
the
appellate Court dismissed the appeal by confirming the Judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 10.
Aggrieved by the same, the revision petitioner
is before this Court.
-6HC-KAR
11.
Heard arguments of both sides.
12.
The learned counsel for the revision petitioner
Sri Sharan B.T. for Sri Pruthvi M. would submit that the accused has received only `2,00,000/- through cheque from the complainant to perform the marriage of his sister and he has to repay only the said amount and not the cheque amount of `6,74,000/-. The complainant being a central government employee has not obtained permission of his employer to lend the amount mentioned in the cheque and has not shown the amount due to him from the accused in his income tax returns. Furthermore, the complainant has not produced any evidence to show that the he has pledged the gold ornaments of his wife to lend amount to the accused. The Xerox documents produced by him were relied by the trial Court. In this regard, he places reliance of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan1. Hence, prays for allowing the revision petition.
(2010) 11 SCC 441
-7HC-KAR
13.
The
learned
counsel
for
the
respondent
Sri Shriniwas M. Kulkarni for Sri Manish S would submit that
the
trial
Court
and
the
appellate
Court
have
considered the available evidence and have applied the presumptions available under Section 118 and 139 of NI Act, which were not at all rebutted by the accused. Hence, the Judgment of conviction passed by the trial Court and confirmed by the appellate Court is just and proper and requires no interference. 14.
As far as sentencing is concerned, the learned
counsel for the revision petitioner would submit that admittedly the transaction between the complainant and the accused is not commercial transaction; but it is for the performance of the marriage of younger sister of the accused. Furthermore, the accused is in acute financial crisis and could not pay the amount stated in the sentence.
No
appropriate
reason
is
given
for
such
enhancement of the sentence. Hence prayed for reduction of the sentence.
-8HC-KAR
15. submit
The learned counsel for the respondent would that
the
conduct
of
the
revision
petitioner
establishes that he is not entitled for any relaxation as prayed by him. Even though the sentence was suspended by imposing some conditions; they were not fulfilled by the revision petitioner; he approached the Hon'ble Apex Court. The revision petition was dismissed for nonprosecution. But as per the direction of the Hon'ble Apex Court, it was restored because he deposited the amount mentioned in the condition for suspension of sentence. Hence, he is not entitled for any relaxation. 16.
Having heard arguments of both sides, verifying
the revision petition papers, trial Court records and the appellate
Court
records,
the
points
that
arise
consideration is:
i.
Whether
the
revision
petitioner
establish
perversity or grossly erroneousness in the judgment of the trial Court and appellate Court or the judgment of the trial Court and appellate Court is glaringly unreasonable or
for
-9HC-KAR
wholly
unreliable
or
untenable
and
the
judgment of the trial Court and appellate Court
considered
immaterial
or
irrelevant
material or no material or non-consideration of any relevant material or judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously ? ii.
Whether imposing sentence by the trial court is exorbitant compared to the gravity of the offence committed and proved against the accused.
17.
The finding of this Court on point No.1 is in
‘Negative’ and point No.2 is in 'Affirmative' for the following: REASONS 18.
The revisional jurisdiction of this Court is very
limited. In this regard, this Court places reliance on the Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kuntegowda
v/s
Thurubaiah
in
Criminal
Appeal
No.3654/2026, (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal)
No.2247
of
2024
dated
04.08.2026
reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485. In the aforesaid
- 10 HC-KAR
judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph Nos.7.1. to 7.3 has discussed the revisional jurisdiction of this Court, which reads as follows: "7.1 This Court, in the State of Maharashtra vs. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659 observed that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-depth roving re-examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent one reached by two courts below. In the facts of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the High
Court
gravely
erred
in
upsetting
the
concurrent findings of conviction of the trial Court and the Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the merits of the case and thereby erred in setting aside the well-reasoned and correct judgement and orders of the trial and appellate Courts.
- 11 HC-KAR
7.2 Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents and merits of the case which could have been avoided especially when the subject matter had come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of the case, something which is generally impermissible unless a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of record. In State of Kerala vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court this Court has laid down the following: "5.... In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But
- 12 HC-KAR
the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate Court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court
which
would
otherwise
tantamount
to
gross
miscarriage of justice. On scrutinizing the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence...."
7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction has been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court wherein time and again it has been observed that the High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the lower Court unless: i. The order or finding of the lower Court is perverse,
grossly
erroneous,
glaringly
- 13 HC-KAR
unreasonable or wholly
unreliable
or
untenable in law. ii. The lower Court has passed the impugned order after
considering an immaterial or
irrelevant material or no material at all iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant material or the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously."
19.
Thus, only if the judgment of the trial Court
confirmed by appellate Court is perverse or grossly erroneous, or grossly unreasonable, or wholly unreliable, or wholly untenable, or the trial Court considered an immaterial or irrelevant, material or no material or not at all
relevant
material
or judicial
discretion has
been
exercised arbitrarily and capriciously, the revisional Court can interfere with such judgment. 20.
The alleged offence in this case is the offence
under Section 138 of NI Act; to attract the offence under Section 138 of NI Act, the complainant has to satisfy the following ingredients:
- 14 HC-KAR
(i)
that there exists legally enforceable debt;
(ii) that the cheque was drawn from the account of bank of the accused for the discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability; (iii) that the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (iv) that cheque so issued has been returned due to insufficiency of funds; (v) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque, within 30 days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; (vi) the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice; (vii) Filing of the complaint within a month from the date of expiry of the grace period of fifteen days
- 15 HC-KAR
before a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate not below first class.
21.
If the aforementioned ingredients are satisfied,
then there shall be a presumption under section 139 of the N.I. Act. Always, the cheque is a bill of exchange and thus there shall be a presumption under Section 118 of the NI Act. There is also statutory presumption under Section 139 of NI Act that there exists legally recoverable debt and the cheque is issued for recovery of legally recoverable debt either wholly or in part.
But the presumptions available
under Section 118 and 139 of the NI Act are rebuttable presumptions. 22.
With this background, the facts of the present
case are to be analysed and to verify whether the trial Court and the appellate Court have not examined the records
produced
by
either
appreciated the evidence.
party
or
erroneously
- 16 HC-KAR
23.
The Case of complainant is that as per the
request of the accused he lent totally `6,74,000/- to the accused in the month of May-2018; out of which he lent only
`2,00,000/-
through
bank
transaction
and
the
remaining amount is by way of cash. 24.
The defence of the accused is that he has taken
loan only of `2,00,000/- mentioned in the bank transaction and he denied the receipt of balance amount which was paid by way of cash. 25.
The accused has not disputed the signature on
the cheque and it belongs to his bank account. The cheque is dated 31.10.2018; it was presented for encashment on the same day; the complainant received the endorsement - 'Funds insufficient' on 09.11.2018; he issued legal notice dated 14.11.2018 as per Ex.P.3 which was served upon the accused on 15.11.2018 as per Ex.P.5 and the accused has given reply dated 07.12.2018; the complaint is filed on 15.12.2018.
- 17 HC-KAR
26.
The above facts establish that the complainant
able to establish clauses No.(iii) to (vii) of the ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 138 of NI Act, as stated above; when the complainant establishes these facts, the initial presumptions in favour of the complainant is that the subject cheque was issued for consideration; it was issued on the date mentioned in it; there exists legally enforceable debt and to discharge the whole or in part of said debt, the accused has issued the subject cheque. The above presumptions are rebuttable in nature. The accused can rebut these presumptions by giving reply, by crossexamining the complainant or by leading defence evidence or by all the above three modes. 27.
In this case, the accused did all the above
three. His defence since from beginning is that he received only `2,00,000/- from the complainant which was paid to him by way of bank transaction. However, he has not made any efforts to repay the said amount before institution of the case before the trial Court. Only as per
- 18 HC-KAR
the direction of the appellate Court, he has deposited 20% of the fine amount and then as per the direction of the Hon'ble Apex Court, he deposited totally 50% of the fine amount. 28.
The cross-examination of accused reveals that
he has not taken any legal steps for misusing his cheques. In the legal notice he has only stated that he has given 5 blank signed cheques to the complainant; out of them the subject cheque is one and it was misused by the complainant. But, in the evidence he has deposed that he has issued those 5 cheques to one Jagdish who stood as surety for his loan transaction. Thus, he has taken two different stands in reply to legal notice and also in his evidence. 29.
In the cross-examination of the complainant,
the accused able to elicit that the complainant is central government employee and to lend the amount and also not showed the amount of lending in his income tax returns. Except the above evidence, there is no evidence
- 19 HC-KAR
on record to rebut the presumptions available in favour of the complainant. 30.
In Rangappa's case cited above, the Hon'ble
Apex Court at para No. 19 and 27 held as follows: 19. It has been contended on behalf of the appellantaccused that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does not extend to the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability and that the same stood rebutted in this case, keeping in mind the discrepancies in the complainant's version. It was reasoned that it is open to the accused to rely on the materials produced by the complainant for disproving the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. It has been contended that since the complainant did not conclusively show whether a debt was owed to him in respect of a hand loan or in relation to expenditure incurred during the construction of the
accused's
house,
the
existence
of
a
legally
enforceable debt or liability had not been shown, thereby creating a probable defence for the accused.
27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative
objective
of
improving
the
credibility
of
negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the
- 20 HC-KAR
course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality
should
guide
the
construction
and
interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendataccused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof.
31.
The standard of proof required to rebut the
presumptions in favour of the complainant by the accused is only preponderance of probability and not beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case as discussed above nothing was produced by the accused to rebut the presumptions in favour of the complainant. Under these circumstances, convicting the accused by the trial Court is appropriate and it requires no interference. 32.
As far as imposing sentence is concerned, the
trial Court has not assigned any reason to impose the sentence of `10,20,000/- when the cheque amount is `6,74,000/-. The transaction is of the year 2018 and the
- 21 HC-KAR
criminal case is filed in the year 2019 and the judgment was pronounced in the year 2020 itself. Admittedly, the transaction between the complainant and the accused is for the performance of the marriage of younger sister of the accused. Even though it is stated that for installation of water refilling tank, the accused has taken the loan, the said fact is not emphasized in the evidence but the fact emphasized is that accused has taken the loan for performing the marriage of his younger sister. Thus, the transaction between parties is not commercial transaction but it is for the domestic needs of the accused.However as on today, the transaction has taken place about 8 years back. 33.
Considering all these aspects, this Court opines
that the imposition of fine of `10,20,000/- by the trial Court is exorbitant and it shall be reduced to `8,00,000/-. Further, the trial court imposes the default sentence of two years, which is defiantly not in accordance with the norms prescribed under law.
- 22 HC-KAR
34.
The maximum sentence of imprisonment for
this offence is two years; which cannot be imposed as default sentence.
Hence, the default sentence is to be
reduced to six months. 35.
Hence, this Court passes the following: ORDER
I. The Criminal revision petition is allowed in part. II. The imposition of fine amount of `10,20,000/- by the trial Court is reduced to `8,00,000/-; in default of payment of fine, the accused shall undergo simple imprisonment of six months. III. Except this modification, the remaining part of the judgment of the trial Court is unaltered. IV. The
respondent/complainant
is
permitted
to
withdraw the amount already deposited before the trial Court on proper identification by allowing IA No.5/2026.
- 23 HC-KAR
V. In view of disposal of the main petition and IA No.5/2026, if any other pending IAs, they shall stand disposed of.
(GEETHA K.B.) JUDGE LL List No.: 1 Sl No.: 9