Re: Special Reference N0.1 of 2012 v. --

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
27 September 2012
Judge
Justice S.H. Kapadia
Neutral citation
2012 INSC 428
Reported in
[2012] 9 S.C.R. 311
Result
Reference answered
Acts & sections
Article 143 Constitution
Subject
Service

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Full judgment

[2012] 9 S.C.R. 311 RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012 [Under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India]

SEPTEMBER 27, 2012

[S.H. KAPADIA, CJI, D.K. JAIN, JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, DIPAK MISRA AND RANJAN GOGOi, JJ.)

CONSTITUTION OF /NOIA, 1950: Art 143(1) - Power of President to consult Supreme Court - Scope of - It is not necessary that the question on which the c opinion of Supreme Court is sought must have actually arisen - The President can make a reference even at an anterior stage, namely, at the stage when the President is satisfied that the question is likely to arise - The satisfaction whether the question meets pre-requisites of Art. 143(1) is essentially a matter for the President to decide - Upon receipt of a reference under Art. 143(1), the only discretion Supreme Court has is either to answer the reference or respectfully decline to send a report to the President - In the instant Reference, Question no. 1 involves interpretation of a constitutional principle E inherent under Art. 14 of the Constitution and it is of great public importance as it deals with allocation/alienation! disposal! distribution of natural resources. Art. 137 and 143(1) - Review and Reference - Difference between - Explained - Held: Merely because a review of the F judgment of Supreme Court in a case had been filed and withdrawn and in the recital of Reference, the narration pertains to the said case, the same would not be an embargo or impediment for exercise of discretion to answer the Reference. Art. 143 (1) - Presidential Reference - Notice - Practice and procedure. Art. 143(1) - Presidential Reference subsequent to decision of Supreme Court in "2G Case" - Maintainability of L

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[2012] 9 S.C.R.

- Held: The Reference is maintainable, notwithstanding its effect on the ratio of 2G Case, as long as the decision in that case qua tis inter partes is left unaffected - By the Reference, Court's opinion is sought on the limited point of permissibility of methods other than auc.tion for alienation of natural resources, other than spectrum - It has been stated on behalf of Government of India that it is not questioning the correctness of directions in 2G Case, in so far as a/location of spectrum is concerned and, in fact, Government is in the process of implementing the same, in letter and spirit - As long as the decision with respect to allocation of spectrum licenses is untouched, the Court is within its jurisdiction to evaluate and clarify ratio of the judgment in 2G Case.

Art. 141 - Law declared by Supreme Court - Held: The 'law declared' in a judgment, which is binding upon courts, is D the ratio decidendi of the judgment - It is the principle culled out on the reading of a judgment as a whole in the light of the questions raised upon which the case is decided - ln"2G case" the Court was not considering the case of auction in general, but was specifically evaluating the validity of the methods E adopted in the distribution of spectrum during the relevant period - The recommendation of auction for alienation of natural resources was never intended to be taken as an absolute or blanket statement applicable across all natural resources - The choice of the word 'perhaps' suggests that the F Court considered situations requiring a method other than auction as conct;ivable and desirable - Observations in 2G Case could not apply beyond the specific case of spectrum, which according to the law declared in 2G Case, is to be alienated only by auction and no other method - Precedents.

Art. 14 - Disposal of natural resources by State - Auctions - Held: Auctions are not the only permissible method for disposal of all natural resources across all sectors and in qi/ circumstances - Auction, as a method of disposal of natural resources cannot be declared a constitutional mandate under

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012

Art.14 - Auction despite being a more preferable method of A alienation/allotment of natural resources, cannot be held to be a constitutional requirement or limitarion for alienation of all natural resources and, therefore, every method other than auction cannot be struck down as u/tra-vires the Constitution - Market price, in economics, is an index of the value that a B market prescribes to a good - However, this valuation is a function of several dynamic variables; it is a science and not a law - Auction is just one of the several price discovery mechanisms - Since multiple variables are involved in such valuations, auction or any other form of competitive bidding, c cannot constitute even an economic mandate, much Jess a constitutional mandate - Therefore, auction, as an economic choice of disposal of natural resources, is not a constitutional mandate - Alienation of natural resources is a policy decision, and the means adopted for the same are thus, executive prerogatives - However, when such a policy decision is not backed by a social or welfare purpose, and precious and scarce natural resources are alienated to private entrepreneurs for commercial pursuits of profit maximizing, adoption of means other than those that are competitive and E maximize revenue may be arbitrary and face the wrath of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Art. 14 read with Art. 299 - Government contracts - Held: A State action has to be tested on the touchstone of Art.14 The action has to be fair, reasonable, non-discriminatory, F transparent, non-capricious, unbiased, without favouritism or nepotism, in pursuit of promotion of healthy competition and equitable treatment - It should conform to the norms which are rational, informed with reasons and guided by public interest, etc. - All these principles are inherent in the fundamental G conception of Art. 14 - This is the mandate of Art. 14. Arts. 14 and. 39(b) - Equality in allocation of natural resources and "common good" factor - Held: Auctions may be the best way of maximizing revenue but revenue

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[2012) 9 S.C.R.

maximization may not always be the best way to subsetVe public good - "Common good" is the sole guiding factor and a norm under Art. 39(b) for distribution of natural resources Where revenue maximization is the object of a policy, being considered qua that resource at that point of time to be the best way to subsetVe the common good, auction would be· one of.the preferable methods, though not the only method Where revenue maximization is not the object of a policy of distribution, the question of auction would not arise - Revenue considerations may give way to developmental considerations - Public interest litigation - Judicial notice. Arts. 298 and 299 read with Art. 14 - Power of State to trade and execute contracts - Discussed. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:

State Policy - Judicial review of - Held: Court cannot conduct a comparative study of various methods of distribution of natural resources and suggest the most efficacious mode - The methodology pertaining to disposal of natural resources is clearly an economic policy - It cannot, and shall not, be the endeavour of the Court to evaluate the efficacy of auction vis-a-vis other methods of disposal of natural resources - When questioned, courts are entitled to analyse legal validity of different means of distribution and give a constitutional answer as to which methods are ultra vires and intra vires the provisions of the Constitution - If a policy or law is patently unfair to the extent that it falls foul of the fairness requirement of Art. 14, Court would not hesitate in striking it down - Legality and constitutionality of State Policy and implementation thereof - Discussed - Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 14.

After the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Centre for Public Interest Litigation & Ors.1,( 2G Case) the instant Reference was made by the President of India, in exercise of powers under Clause (1) of Art. 143 of the

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012

Constitution of India, for consideration and report of the A Supreme Court on the following questions: Q.1

"Whether the only permissible method for disposal of all natural resources across all sectors and in all circumstances is by the conduct of auctions?

Q.2 Whether a broad proposition of law that only the route of auctions can be resorted to for disposal of natural resources does not run contrary to several judgments of the Supreme C Court including those of Larger Benches?

Q.3 Whether the enunciation of a broad principle, even though expressed as a matter of constitutional law, does not really amount to 0 formulation of a policy and has the effect of unsettling policy decisions formulated and approaches taken by various successive governments over the years for valid considerations, including lack of public E resources and the need to resort to innovative and different approaches for the development of various sectors of the economy?

Q.4 What is the permissible scope for interference by courts with policy making by the Government including methods for disposal of natural resources?

Q.5 Whether, if the court holds, within the permissible scope of judicial review, that a G policy is flawed, is the court not obliged to take into account investments made under the said policy including investments made by foreign investors under multilateral/bilateral agreements?

[2012) 9 S.C.R.

Q.6 If the answers to the aforesaid questions lead to an affirmation of the judgment dated 02.02.2012 then the following questions may arise, viz. (i)

whether the judgment is required to be given retrospective effect so as to unsettle all licences issued and 2G spectrum (800, 900, and 1800 MHz bands) allocated in and after 1994 and prior to 10.01.2008?

(ii)

whether the allocation of 2G spectrum in all circumstances and in all specific cases for different policy considerations would nevertheless have to be undone?

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And specifically (iii)

Whether the telecom licences granted in 1994 would be affected?

(iv)

Whether the Telecom licences granted by way of basic licences in 2001 and licences granted between the period 2003-2007 would be affected?

(v)

Whether it is open to the Government of India to take any action to alter the terms of any licence to ensure a level playing field among all existing licensees?

(vi)

Whether dual technology licences granted in 2007 and 2008 would be affected?

(vii) Whether it is necessary or obligatory for the Government of India to withdraw the

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012

Spectrum allocated to all existing A licensees or to charge for the same with retrospective effect and if so on what basis and from what date? Q.7 Whether, while taking action for conduct of auction in accordance with the orders of the Supreme Court, it would remain permissible for the Government to: (i)

Make provision for allotment of Spectrum from time to time at the auction C discovered price and in accordance with laid down criteria during the period of validity of the auction determined price?

(ii)

Impose a ceiling on the acquisition of 0 Spectrum with the aim of avoiding the emergence of dominance in the market by any licensee/applicant duly taking into consideration TRAI recommendations in this regard? Make provision for allocation of Spectrum at auction related prices in accordance with laid down criteria in bands where there may be inadequate or no competition (for e.g. there is F expected to be a low level of competition for CDMA in 800 MHz band and TRAI has recommended an equivalence ratio of 1.5 or 1.3X1.5 for 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands depending upon the quantum of G spectrum held by the licensee that can be applied to auction price in 1800 MHz band in the absence of a specific price for these bands)?

(iii)

[2012] 9 S.C.R.

Q.8 What is the effect of the judgment on 3G Spectrum acquired by entities by auction whose licences have been quashed b~i the said judgment?"

Notice was issued to the Attorney General for India, and after hearing him, it was directed that notice be issued to all the States through their Standing Counsel, the petitioners in 2G Case, the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and lndt•st!"y, and the Confederation of Indian Industry.

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Answering the reference in part, the Court HELD: Per D.K. Jain, J. (For CJI, himself, Dipak Misra and Ranjan Gogoi, JJ.)

MAINTAINABILITY OF THE REFERENCE:

1.1 Art. 143 of the Constitution of India is couched in broad terms; and from its language, it is plain that it is not necessary that the question on which the opinion of E the Supreme Court is sought must have actually arisen. The President can make a reference under the said Article even at an anterior stage, namely, at the stage when the President is satisfied that the question is likely to arise. The satisfaction whether the question meets the F pre-requisites of Art. 143(1) is essentially a matter for the President to decide. Upon receipt of a reference under Art. 143(1), the function of this Court is to consider the reference, the question(s) on which the President has made the reference, on the facts as stated in the G reference and report to the President its opinion thereon. Nevertheless, the usage of the word "may" in the latter part of Art. 143(1) implies that this Court is not bound to render advisory opinion in every reference and may refuse to express its opinion for strong, compelling and H good reasons. [Para 23-24) (373-E-F, G-H; 374-B-C]

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012

Special Reference No.1 of 1964("Keshav Singh'~ [1965) 1 S.C.R. 413; and Re: The Kera/a Education Bill, 1957 In Reference under Article 143(1) Of the Constitution of India

[1959) S.C.R. 995 - relied on. In re: A/location of Lands and Buildings Situate in a Chief Commissioner's Province and in the matter of Reference by the Governor-General under S. 213; Government of India Act, 1935 A.l.R. (30) 1943 FC 13; and Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. 1994 (5) Suppl. SCR 1 (1994)

6 sec 360 - referred to.

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1.3 As far as the allegation of mala fide is concerned, it is trite that this Court is neither required to go into the truth or otherwise of the facts of the recitals nor can it go into the question of bona tides or otherwise of the authority making a reference. The constitutional power to seek opinion of this Court rests with the President. The only discretion this Court has is either to answer the reference or respectfully decline to send a report to the President. Therefore, the challenge on the ground of mala fide, as raised, is unsustainable. [Para 34] (379-A-C] Re: Presidential Po// 1975 (1) SCR 504

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=(1974) 2 SCC

33 - referred to. 1.4 From the judgment in The Special Courts Bill, 1978, three broad principles emerge: (i) a reference F should not be vague, general and Undefined, (ii) this Court can go through the written briefs and arguments to narrow down the legal controversies, and (iii) when the question becomes unspecific and incomprehensible, the risk of returning the reference unanswered arises. (para G 30) [377 -D-E]

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Re: The Special Courts Bill, 1978 1979 (2) SCR 476 (1979) 1 SCC 380; Special Reference No.1 of 1964 ("Keshav Singh'?,(1965) 1 S.C.R. 413 - referred to

[2012] 9 S.C.R.

1.5 There is no denying the fact that in the entire Reference the word 'doubt' has not been used. Nor does Art. 143(1) use the term 'doubt'. No specific format has been provided in any of the Schedules of the Constitution as to how a reference is to be drawn. The use of the word B 'doubt' in a reference is also not a constitutional command or mandate. Thus, it cannot be said that use of the word 'doubt' is a necessary condition for a reference to be maintainable under Art. 143(1). That apart, Question No.1 of the instant Reference is neither vague c nor general nor unspecific, but is in the realm of comprehension which is relatable to a question of law. It expresses a 'doubt' and seeks the opinion of the Court on that question, besides others. [Para 27 and 32) [374G-H; 375-A; 378-B]

P. Ramanatha Aiyar's, The Major Law Lexicon, 4th Edn.; Concise Oxford Dictionary (Tenth Edn.); and Black's Law

Dictionary-referred to. 1.6 In so far as the impact of filing and withdrawal of E the review application by the Union of India, against the decision in the 2G Case* on the maintainability of the instant Reference is concerned, there is a dff~erence between the jurisdiction exercised by this Court in a review and the discretion exercised in answering a F reference under Art. 143(1) of the Constitution. A review is basically guided by the well-settled principles for review of a judgment and a decree or order passed inter se parties. But, when an opinion of this Court is sought by the Executive taking recourse to a constitutional power, the same stands on a different footing altogether. G A review is lis specific and the rights of the parties to the controversy are dealt with therein; whereas a reference is answered keeping in view the terms of the reference and scrutinising whether the same satisfies the requirements inherent in thetanguage employed under H Art. 143(1) of the Constitution. Therefore, merely because

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012

a review had been filed and withdrawn and in the recital A the narration pertains to the said case, the same would not be an embargo or impediment for exercise of discretion to answer the Reference. [Para 33] [378-C-H] *Centre for Public Interest Litigation & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (2012) 3 SCR 147=(2012) 3 SCC 1 - referred

to. 1. 7 As regards the objection to the maintainability of the Reference that it is an indirect endeavour to unsettle and overturn the verdict in the 2G Case, at the outset it C may be noted that it has been stated on behalf of the Government of India that it is not questioning the correctness of the directions in the 2G Case, in so far as the allocation of spectrum is concerned and, in fact, the Government is in the process of implementing the same, D in letter and spirit. [Para 35- 36] (379-C-D; E-F]

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1.8 As regards reconsideration of a decision, there are two limitations - one jurisdictional and the other selfimposed. The first limitation is that a decision of this Court can be reviewed only under Art. 137 or a Curative Petition E and in no other way. Once a lis between parties is decided, the operative decree can only be opened in review. Overruling the judgment - as a precedent - does not reopen the decree. The second limitation, a selfimposed rule of judicial discipline, was that overruling the F opinion of the Court on a legal issue does not constitute sitting in appeal, but is done only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the earlier decision is per incuriam or is delivered in the absence of relevant or material facts or if it is manifestly wrong and capable of G causing public mischief. In fact, the overruling of a principle of law is not an outcome of appellate jurisdiction but a consequence of its inherent power. This inherent power can be exercised as long as a previous decree visa-vis lis inter partes is not affected. (Para 45-47] (386-D- H

[2012) 9 S.C.R.

H; 387-A-C] Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1955) 2 SCR 603; In the matter of: Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal 1991 (2) Suppl. SCR 497 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96 (II) ("Cauvery-11"); State of Tamil Nadu vs. State of Kamataka & Ors. 1991 (2) SCR 501 = 1991 Suppl (1) SCC 240 ("Cauvery 1'1 & Rupa Ashok Hurra vs. Ashok Hurra & Anr. 2002 (2) SCR 1006 (2002) 4 SCC 388 - referred to

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1.9 From the decisions of this Court, it is C demonstrable that while entertaining the reference under Art. 143(1), this Court can look into an earlier decision. For the purpose of validity of a reference, suffice it to say, dwelling upon an earlier judgment is permissible. That apart, one cannot be oblivious of the fact that the scope o of limited judicial review, in the Second Judges Case, which otherwise is quite restricted, was slightly expanded in the Court's opinion to th_e Presidential reference. [Para 58] [395-D-E] In re: The Special Courts Bill, 1978 1979 (2) SCR 476 (1979) 1 SCC 380, In Re: The Delhi Laws Act, 1912, the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947 And The Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950 [1951] S.C.R. 747, Jatindra Nath Gupta vs. The Province of Bihar & Ors. [1949-50] F.C.R. 595, Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 [1965] 1 S.C.R. F 41 ("Keshav Singh"), Gunupati Keshavram Reddy vs. Nafisul Hasan & the State of U.P. AIR 1954 SC 636, Pandit M. S. M. Sharma vs. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha & Ors. [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 806 ("Sharma"), Supreme Court Advocateson-Record Association and Ors. vs. Union of India (1993) 4 G SCC 441, Special Reference No. 1 of 1998 Re. 1998 (2) Suppl. SCR 400 = (1998) 7 SCC 739 ('Second Judges Case'1, & Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (1994) 6 SCC 360 - referred to.

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1.10 From the analysis of the decisions of this Court,

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012

it is quite vivid that this Court would respectfully decline A to answer a reference if it is improper, inadvisable and undesirable; or the questions formulated have purely socio-economic or political reasons, which have no relation whatsoever with any of the provisions of the Constitution or otherwise are of no constitutional B significance; or are incapable of being answered; or would not subserve any purpose; or there is authoritative pronouncement of this Court which has already decided the question referred. [Para 60] [395-H; 396-A-B] 1.11 In the case at hand, the Reference states that in the current circumstances, certain questions of law with far reaching national and international implications have arisen, including in relation to conduct of the auction and the regulation of the telecommunications industry in accordance with the judgment (2G Case) that may affect the flow of FOi in the telecom industry and otherwise in other sectors into this country. The Reference also states that the questions of law that have arisen are of great public importance and are of far reaching consequences for the development of the country and, therefore, it is thought expedient to obtain the opinion of this Court. Question No. 1 of the Reference involves interpretation of a constitutional principle inherent under Art. 14 of the Constitution and it ls of -great public importance as it deals with allocation/alienation/disposal/ distribution of natural resources. [Para 28 and 61] [375-H; 376-A-C]

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1.12 This Court is, therefore, of the view that as long as the decision with respect to the allocation of spectrum licenses is untouched, this Court is within its jurisdiction to evaluate and clarify the ratio of the judgment in the 2G G Case. Therefore, the fact that the Reference may require the Court to say something different to what has been enunciated in the 2G Case as a proposition of law, cannot strike at the root of the maintainability of the Reference. Consequently, this Court holds that the Reference is H

[2012] 9 S.C.R.

maintainable, notwithstanding its effect on the ratio of the 2G Case, as long as the decision in that case qua lis inter partes is left unaffected. [Para 62] [396-E-G] ON MERITS

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2.1 Art. 141 of the Constitution lays down that the 'law declared' by the Supreme Court is binding upon all the courts within the territory of India. The 'law declared' has to be construed as a principle of law that emanates from a judgment, or an interpretation of a law or judgment by the Supreme Court, upon which, the case is decided. Therefore, the 'law declared' is the principle culled out on the reading of a judgment as a whole in the light of the questions raised upon which the case is decided. Thus, the 'law declared' in a judgment, which is binding upon courts, is the ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the essence of a decision and the principle upon which, the case is decided, which has to be ascertained in relation to the subject-matter of the decision. [Para 66] [397-E-H; 398-A] Fida Hussain & Ors. Vs. Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. 2011 (9) SCR 290 = (2011) 12 SCC 615; Ambica Quarry Works Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. 1987 (1) SCR 562 = (1987) 1 SCC 213 and Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. 1992 (1) Suppl. SCR 732 = 1992 (4) SCC 363; Islamic Academy of Education & Anr. Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 697 - relied on Union of India Vs. Amrit Lal Manchanda & Anr. (2004) 3 SCC 75; State of Orissa & Ors. Vs. Md. /lliyas 2005 (5) Suppl. SCR 395 = 2006 (1) SCC 275 - referred to. ''The Nature of Judicial Process" by Justice Benjamin Cardozo - referred to.

2.2 On a reading paragraphs 85 and 89 of the

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judgment in 2G Case, it can be noticed that while referring to the concept of 'public trust doctrine', emphasis was laid on the doctrine of equality, larger public good, adoption of a transparent and fair method, opportunity of competition; and avoidance of any occasion to scuttle the claim of similarly situated applicants. While dealing with alienation of natural resources like spectrum, it was stated that it is the duty of the State to ensure that a nondiscriminatory method is adopted for distribution and alienation which would necessarily result in the protection of national/public interest. Paragraphs 94 and 95 suggest that the Court was not considering the case of auction in general, but specifically evaluating the validity of those methods adopted in the distribution of spectrum from September 2007 to March 2008. It is also pertinent to note that reference to auction is made in the subsequent paragraph (96) with the rider 'perhaps'. It has been observed that "a duly publicized auction conducted fairly and impartially is perhaps the best method for discharging this burden." It is true that a judgment is not to be read as a statute, but at the same time, when it is argued with vehemence that the judgment lays down auction as a constitutional principle, the word "perhaps" gains significance. This suggests that the recommendation of auction for alienation of natural resources was never intended to be taken as an absolute or blanket statement applicable across all natural resources, but simply a conclusion made at first blush over the attractiveness of a method like auction in disposal of natural resources. The choice of the word 'perhaps' suggests that the Court considered situations requiring a method other than auction as conceivable and desirable. Further, the final conclusions summarized in paragraph 102 of the judgment (SCC) make no mention about auction being the only permissible and intra vires method for disposal of natural resources; the findings are limited to the case of spectrum. In case the Court had

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[2012] 9 S.C.R.

A actually enunciated, as a proposition of law, that auction is the only permissible method or mode for alienation/ allotment of natural resources, the same would have found a mention in the summary at the end of the judgment. [Para 75,76,78 and 79] [402-G; 403-A-B; 404-GB H; 405-A-E] M.C. Mehta Vs. Kamal Nath & Ors. 1996 (10) Suppl. SCR 12 =1997 (1) SCC 388; Jamshed Hormusji Wadia Vs. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai & Anr. 2004 (1) SCR 483 C = 2004 (3) SCC 214; Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi Vs. State of A.P. & Ors. 2006 (2) SCR 419 = 2006 (3) sec 549; Fomento Resorts And Hotels Limited & Anr. Vs. Mingue/ Martins & Ors. 2009 (3) SCR 1 = (2009) 3 SCC 571 and Reliance Natural Resources Limited Vs. Reliance Industries Limited 2010 (5) SCR 704 = 2010 (7) SCC 1; Akhil Bhartiya D Upbhokta Congress vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. 2011 (5) SCR 77 = (2011) 5 SCC 29, Sachidanand Pandey & Anr. vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. 1987 (2) SCR 223 =

(1987) 2 sec 295 - referred to.

The Illinois Central Railroad Co. Vs. The People of the State of Illinois 36 LED 1018: 146 U.S. 387 (1892) - referred

to 2.3 The 2G Case does not even consider other laws and judgments that prescribe methods, other than F auction, for dispensation of natural resources; something that it would have done, in case, it intended to make an assertion as wide as applying auction to all natural resources. Therefore, the observations in Paras 94 to 96 could not apply beyond the specific case of spectrum, G which according to the law declared in the 2G Case, is to be alienated only by auction and no other method. Thus, 2 G case does not deal with modes of allocation for natural resources, other than spectrum. [Para 80-81] [405-H; 406-A-C]

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3.1 By the Reference this Court's opinion is sought A on the limited point of permissibility of methods other than auction for alienation of natural resources, other than spectrum. [Para 82] [406-D-E] 3.2 As regards the objection pertaining to the classification of resources made in the 2G Case, suffice it to say that the judgment itself does not carve out any special case for scarce natural resources only meant for commercial exploitation. However, this Court has the jurisdiction to classify the subject matter of a reference, C if a genuine case for it exists. [Para 83] [406-G-H; 407-AB-D] 3.3 In the 2G Case, two concepts namely, "public trust doctrine" and "trusteeship" have been adverted to. This Court in M.C. Mehta vs Kamal Nath, as explained in D Intellectuals Forum, has held that when the affirmative duties are set out from a nugatory angle, the doctrine does not exactly prohibit the alienation of property held as a public trust, but mandates a high degree of judicial scrutiny. [Para 85 and 87] [407-G-H; 409-E; 410-8] M.C. Mehta vs. Kamal Nath & Ors. 1996 (10) Suppl. SCR 12 = (1997) 1 SCC 388, Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi vs. State of A.P. & Ors. (2006) 3 SCC 549-referred to The Illinois Central Railroad Co. Vs. The People of the State..JJfJJ/inois 36 LED 1018: 146 U.S. 387 (1892) - referred

to 3.4 The public trust doctrine is a specific doctrine with a particular domain and has to be applied carefully. G [Para 90] [411-C] "The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention" by Joseph. L. Sax; and Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the L

[2012] 9 S.C.R.

Public Trust Doctrine" by Richargd J. Lazarus, referred to

3.5 The legislature and the Executive are answerable to the Constitution and it is there where the judiciary, the guardian of the Constitution, must find the contours to the powers of disposal of natural resources, especially Art. 14 and Art. 39(b). [Para 92] (413-A-B] Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Bir/a Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills, Delhi & Anr. [1968] 3 SCR 251 - relied

C on. Raja Ram Pal Vs. Hon'b/e Speaker, Lok Sabha & Ors.

(2007) 3 sec 184- referred to.

·In Re: Delhi Laws Act, 1912- referred to MANDATE OF Art. 14:

4.1 The underlying object of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India is to secure to all persons, citizens or nonE citizens, the equality of status and opportunity referred to in the preamble to Constitution. The right to equality before law is secured from all legislative and executive tyranny by way of discrimination since the language of Art.14 uses the word "State" which as per Art.12, includes F the executive organ. Besides, Art.14 is expressed in absolute terms and its effect is not curtailed by restrictions like those imposed on Art.19(1) by Arts.19(2)(6). However, notwithstanding the absence of such restrictions, certain tests, e.g. classification test, 'arbitrariness' doctrine have been devised through G judicial decisions to test if Art.14 has been violated or not. The expressions 'arbitrariness' and 'unreasonableness' have been used interchangeably and in fact, one has been defined in terms of the other. [Para 94 and 101] [413D-F; 414-A; 418-B-C]

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Basheshar Nath Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, A Delhi & Rajasthan & Anr. 1959 Supp (1) SCR 528; Budhan Chaudhry & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 191; Shri Ram Krishna Dalmiya Vs. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar and Ors. [1959) 1 SCR 279; E.P. Royappa Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. 1974 (2) SCR 348 = (1974) 4 SCC 3; Maneka B Gandhi vs. Union of India & Anr. 1978 (2) SCR 621 = (1978) 1 SCC 248 Sharma Transport Vs. Government of A.P. & Ors. 2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 390 = (2002) 2 SCC 188; Om Kumar & Ors. Vs. Union of India 2000 (4) Suppl. SCR 693 = (2001) 2 SCC 386; Air India Vs. Nergesh Meerza 1982 (1) SCR 438 c = (1981) 4 SCC 335; Ajay Hasia & Ors. Vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors. 1981 (2) SCR 79 (1981) 1 SCC 722; and Ramana Dayaram Sheffy Vs. International Airport Authority of India & Ors. 1979 (3) SCR 1014 (1979) 3 SCC 489: AIR 1979 SC 1628 - referred to. 4.2 From a scrutiny of the trend of decisions it is clearly perceivable that the action of the State, whether it relates to distribution of largesse, grant of contracts or allotment of land, is to be tested on the touchstone of Art.14. A law may not be struck down for being arbitrary E without pointing out a constitutional infirmity. Therefore, a State action has to be tested for constitutional infirmities qua Art.14. The action has to be fair, reasonable, nondiscriminatory, transparent, non-capricious, unbiased, without favouritism or nepotism, in pursuit of promotion F of healthy competition and equitable treatment. It should conform to the norms which are rational, informed with reasons and guided by public interest, etc. All these principles are inherent in the fundamental conception of Art.14. This is the mandate of Art.14. [Para 105) [421-B-E] G

= =

State of A.P. & Ors. vs. McDowell & Co. & Ors. 1996 (3) SCR 721 = (1996) 3 SCC 709 - referred to.

WHETHER 'AUCTION' A CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE: 4.3 Auction as a method of disposal of natural

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A resources cannot be declared a constitutional mandate under Art.14 of the Constitution of India. Firstly, Art.14 may imply positive and negative rights for an individual, but with respect to the State, it is only couched in negative terms; like an admonition against the State which B prohibits the State from taking up actions that may be arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious or discriminatory. Art. 14, therefore, is an injunction to the State against taking certain type of actions rather than commanding it to take particular steps. Reading the mandate of auction into its c scheme would thus, be completely contrary to the intent of the Article apparent from its plain language. Secondly, a constitutional mandate is an absolute principle that has to be applied in all situations; it cannot be applied in some and not tested in others. The absolute principle is then applied on a case by case basis to see which actions fulfill the requirements of the constitutional principle and which do not. [Para 106-107] [421-F-H; 422A-C] "Some Constitutional Problems" by Justice K. Subba E Rao; "Democracy, Equality and Freedom" by Justice K. K. Mathew - referred to

4.4 Equality cannot be limited to mean only auction, without testing it in every scenario. One cannot test the validity of a law with reference to the essential elements of ideal democracy, actually incorporated in the Constitution. [Para 11 O] [423-0-E]

His Holiness Kesavananda Bharti Sripadagalvaru Vs. State of Kera/a & Anr. 1973 Suppl. SCR 1 = (1973) 4 SCC G 225; The State of West Bengal Vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar 1952 SCR 284; Indira Nehru Gandhi Vs. Raj Narain 1976 SCR 347

= 1975 (Supp) SCC 1 - referred to Kotch Vs. Pilot Comm'rs 330 U.S. 552 - referred to.

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4.5 Courts are not at liberty to declare a statute void, because in their opinion it is opposed to the spirit of the Constitution. Courts cannot declare a limitation or constitutional requirement under the notion of having discovered some ideal norm. Further, a constitutional principle must not be limited .to a precise formula but ought to be an abstract principle applied to precise situations. [Para 11 O] [423-F] 4.6 The repercussion of holding auction as a constitutional mandate would be the voiding of every action that deviates from it, including social endeavours, welfare schemes and promotional policies. It would be odd to derive auction as a constitutional principle only for a limited set of situations from the wide and generic declaration of Art.14. The strength of constitutional adjudication lies in case to case adjudication and, therefore, auction cannot be elevated to a constitutional mandate. [Para 110] [423-F-G; 424-A-B]

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4.7 Finally, reading auction as a constitutional mandate would be impermissible because such an E approach may distort another constitutional principle embodied in Art.39(b), which mandates that the ownership and control of natural resources should be so distributed as to best subserve the common good. Art.37 provides that the provisions of Part IV shall not be F enforceable by any court, but the principles laid down therein are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws. "[Para 111] [424-C- ·

G]

4.8 Therefore, Art.39(b) in a sense, is a restriction on 'distribution' built into the Constitution. But the restriction is imposed on the object and not the means. The overarching and underlying principle governing 'distribution' is furtherance of common good. But for the

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A achievement of that objective, the Constitution uses the generic word 'distribution'. Distribution has broad contours and cannot be limited to meaning only one method i.e. auction. It envisages all such methods available for distribution/allocation of natural resources B which ultimately subserve the "common good". [Para 112] [424-H; 425-A-B] 4.9 The term "distribute" undoubtedly, has wide amplitude and encompasses all manners and methods C of distribution, which would include classes, industries, regions, private and public sections, etc. Having regard to the basic nature of Art.39(b), a narrower concept of equality under Art.14 may frustrate the broader concept of distribution, as conceived in Art. 39(b). There cannot, therefore, be a cavil that "common good' and "larger D public interests" have to be regarded as constitutional reality deserving actualization. [Para 115] [425-H; 426-A-

C] State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. Vs. L Abu Kavur Bai & Ors. E 1984 (1) SCR 725 (1984) 1 SCC 515 - referred to

=

4.10 Auctions may be the best way of maximizing revenue but revenue maximization may not always be the best way to subserve public good. "Common good" is the sole guiding factor and a norm under Art. 39(b) for F distribution of natural resources. It is the touchstone of testing whether any policy subserves the "common good" and if it does, irrespective of the means adopted, it is clearly in accordance with the principle enshrined in Art. 39(b). The norm of "common good" has to be G understood and appreciated in a holistic manner. It is obvious that the manner in which the common good is best subserved is not a matter that can be measured by any constitutional yardstick - it would depend on the economic and political philosophy of the government. H Revenue maximization is not the only way in which the

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common good can be subserved. Where revenue A maximization is the object of a policy, being considered qua that resource at that point of time to be the best way to subserve the common good, auction would be one of the preferable methods, though not the only method. Where revenue maximization is not the object of a policy B of distribution, the question of auction would not arise. Revenue considerations may assume secondary position to developmental considerations. [Para 116 and 119] ·[426-D-F; 427-F-H; 428-A] The State of Karnataka and Anr. Vs. Shri Ranganatha C Reddy and Anr. 1978 (1) SCR 641 = (1977) 4 SCC 471; Bennett Coleman & Co. and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. 1973 (2) SCR 757 = (1972) 2 SCC 788 - referred to.

4.11 There is no constitutional imperative in the D matter of economic policies. Art. 14 does not pre-define any economic policy as a constitutional mandate. Even the mandate of 39(b) imposes no restrictions on the means adopted to subserve the public good and uses the broad term 'distribution', suggesting that the E methodology of distribution is not fixed. Economic logic establishes that alienation/allocation of natural resources to the highest bidder may not necessarily be the only way to subserve the common good, and at times, may run counter to public good. Therefore, it needs little emphasis F that disposal of all natural resources through auctions is clearly not a constitutional mandate. [Para 120] [430-8-D] 4.12 Finally, market price, in economics, is an index of the value that a market prescribes to a good. However, this valuation is a function of several dynamic variables; G it is a science and not a law. Auction is just one of the several price discovery mechanisms. Since multiple variables are involved in such valuations, auction or any other form of competitive bidding, cannot constitute even an economic mandate, much less a constitutional H

c

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mandate. [Para 147) [444-G-H] 4.13 Auction despite being a more preferable method of alienation/allotment of natural resources, cannot be held to be a constitutional requirement or limitation for alienation of all natural resources and, therefore, every method other than auction cannot be struck down as ultra-vires the constitutional mandate. [Para 148) [445-AB] LEGITIMATE DEVIATIONS FROM AUCTION: 5.1 The Government has repeatedly deviated from the course of auction and this Court has repeatedly upheld such actions. The judiciary tests such deviations on the limited scope of arbitrariness and fairness under Art.14 and its role is limited to that extent. Essentially whenever the object of policy is anything but revenue maximization, the Executive is seen to adopt methods other than auction. [129) [434-E-F] Sachidanand Pandey & Anr. Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 295; M.P. Oil Extraction and Anr. Vs. State of M.P. & Ors. (1997) 7 SCC 592; Netai Bag & Ors. Vs. State of WB. & Ors. (2000) 8 SCC 262; M & T Consultants, Secunderabad Vs. S. Y. Nawab (2003) 8 SCC 100; Haji T.M. Hassan Rawther Vs. Kera/a Financial Corpn. 1988 (1) SCR 1079 (1988) 1 SCC 166; Vilfianur lyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam Vs. Union of India & Ors. 1997 (1) Suppl. SCR 671 (2009) 7 sec 561 - referred to para 128.

=

=

5.2 A fortiori, besides legal logic, mandatory auction G may be contrary to economic logic as well. Different resources may require different treatment. Very often, exploration and exploitation contracts are bundled together due to the requirement of heavy capital in the discovery of natural resources. A concern would risk H undertaking such exploration and incur heavy costs only

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if it was assured utilization of the resource discovered; A a prudent business venture, would not like to incur the high costs involved in exploration activities and then compete for that resource in an open auction. The logic is similar to that applied in patents. Firms are given incentives to invest in research and development with the B promise of exclusive access to the market for the sale of that invention. Such an approach is economically and legally sound and sometimes necessary to spur research and development. Similarly, bundling exploration and exploitation contracts may be necessary to spur growth c in a specific industry. Similar deviation from auction cannot be ruled out when the object of a State policy is to promote domestic development of an industry. Thus, auction cannot be the sole criteria for alienation of all natural resources. [Para 130-131) [434-G-H; 435-A-D]

Mis Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Anr. 1980 (3) SCR 1338 = (1980) 4 SCC 1 referred to

PLEA OF POTENTIAL ABUSE:

5.3 A potential for abuse cannot be the basis for striking down a method as ultra vires the Constitution. It is the actual abuse itself that must be brought before the Court for being tested on the anvil of constitutional provisions. In fact, it may be said that even auction has a potential of abuse, like any other method of allocation, but that cannot be the basis of declaring it as an unconstitutional methodology either. [Para 135) [437-DE]

R.K. Garg Vs. Union of India & Ors. 1982 (1) SCR 947 = (1981) 4 SCC 675; D. K. Trivedi & Sons & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. 1986 SCR 479 = (1986) Supp SCC 20 referred to.

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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF POLICY DECISIONS: 6.1 The wisdom and advisability of the policies are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review unless the policies are contrary to statutory or constitutional provisions or arbitrary or irrational or an abuse of power. Court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by the Government merely because it feels that another decision would have been fairer, or more scientific or logical, or wiser. Further, it is validity of a law and not its efficacy that can be challenged. In the context of the instant Reference, it needs to be emphasized that this Court cannot conduct a comparative study of the various methods of distribution of natural resources and suggest the most efficacious mode, if there is one universal efficacious method in the first place. It respects the mandate and wisdom of the executive for such matters. The methodology pertaining to disposal of natural resources is clearly an economic policy. It entails intricate economic choices and the court lacks the necessary expertise to make them. As has been repeatedly said, it cannot, and shall not, be the endeavour of this Court to evaluate the efficacy of auction vis-a-vis other methods of disposal of natural resources. Court cannot mandate one method to be followed in all facts and circumstances. Therefore, auction, an economic choice of disposal of natural resources, is not a constitutional mandate. [para 139, 144 and 146] [440-F; 443-D; 444-B-D] Rustom Cavasjee Cooper Vs. Union of India 1970 (3) SCR 530 = (1970) 1 SCC 248; R.K. Garg Vs. Union of India & Ors. 1982 (1) SCR 947 = (1981) 4 SCC 675; Delhi Science Forum & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr. 1996 (2) SCR 767 (1996) 2 SCC 405; Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Reserve Bank of India 1992 (1) SCR 406 = (1992) 2 SCC 343; Premium Granites & Anr. Vs. State of T.N. & Ors. 1994 (1) SCR 579 = (1994) 2 sec 691 Delhi Science Forum & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr. 1996 (2) SCR

=

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767 = (1996) 2 SCC 405; BALCO Employees' Union (Regd.) Vs. Union of India & Ors. 2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 511 = (2002) 2 SCC 333; Mis Prag Ice & Oil Mills & Anr. Vs. Union of India [1978) 3 SCC 459; and State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Narmada Bachao Ando/an & Anr. 2011 (6) SCR 443 = (2011) 7 SCC 639 - referred to

6.2 However, courts can test the legality and constitutionality of these methods. When questioned, courts are entitled to analyse the legal validity of different means of distribution and give a constitutional answer as C to which methods are ultra vires and intra vires the provisions of the Constitution. Nevertheless, it cannot and will not compare which policy is fairer than the other, but, if a policy or law is patently unfair to the extent that it falls foul of the fairness requirement of Art.14 of the Constitution, court would not hesitate in striking it down. D [Para 146) [444-D-F] 6.3 Alienation of natural resources is a policy decision, and the means adopted for the same are thus, executive prerogatives. However, when such a policy E decision is not backed by a social or welfare purpose, and precious and scarce natural resources are alienated for commercial pursuits of profit maximizing private entrepreneurs, adoption of means other than those that are competitive and maximize revenue may be arbitrary F and face the wrath of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Therefore, rather than prescribing or proscribing a method, a judicial scrutiny of methods of disposal of natural resources should depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, in consonance with the G principles culled out in the instant opinion. Failing which, the Court, in exercise of power of judicial review, shall term the executive action as arbitrary, unfair, unreasonable and capricious due to its antimony with Art. 14 of the Constitution. [Para 149) [445-C-E]

[2012] 9 S.C.R.

7.1 In conclusion, answer of this Court to the first set of five questions is that auctions are not the only permissible method for disposal of all natural resources across all sectors and in all circumstances. [Para 150) [445-F]

7.2 As regards the remaining questions, the answer to the same would have a direct bearing on the mode of alienation of Spectrum and, .therefore, in light of the statement made on behalf of the Government that it is not questioning the correctness of judgment in the 2G Case, C this Court respectfully declines to answer the said questions. [Para 151) [445-G-H] PER JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR. J( Concurring): 1.1 It is obvious, that the Government is alive to the fact that disposal of some natural resources have to be made only by auction. Therefore, the first question in the Presidential Reference must be understood to seek this Court's opinion on whether there are circumstances in which natural resources ought to be disposed of only by E auction. [Para 2) [447-C-D]

1.2 The term "auction" expressed in the instant opinion may be read as a means to "maximize revenue returns", irrespective of whether the means adopted should technically and correctly be described as tender, tender-cum-auction, or auction. [Para 3) [448-A-B]

1.3 The concept of equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws, emerges from the fundamental right expressed in Art.14 of the Constitution G of India. The true effect of Art.14 is to provide equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws not only with reference to individual rights, but also by ensuring that its citizens on the other side of the balance are likewise not deprived of their right to the equality H before the law, and their right to equal protection of the

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laws. An individual citizen cannot be a beneficiary, at the cost of the country i.e., the plurality. Enriching one at the cost of all others would amount to deprivation to the plurality i.e., the nation itself. The gist of the first question in the Presidential Reference, raises the issue whether ownership rights over the nation's natural resources, vest in the citizens of the country. [Para 4] [448-B-C-G-H; 449A-B] 1.4 Natural resources are the nation's collective wealth. Public interest litigation as a jurisprudential concept brings into focus the rights of the plurality (as against individual's right) specially when the plurality is, for one or the other reason, not in a position to seek redressal of its grievances. [Para 5] [449-E-F; 449-D]

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2.1 An analysis of the decisions of this Court would lead to the inference that the State has the right to- trade. Government must act as a prudent businessman and the profit earned should be for public benefit and not for private gains. In executing public contracts in its trading activity, State must be guided by relevant principles, and not by extraneous or irrelevant consideration. The same should be based on reasonableness and rationality as well as non-arbitrariness. The State while entering into a contractual relationship is bound to maintain the standard or principle which meets the test of reasonableness and non-discrimination. And any departure from the said standards would be invalid unless the same is supported by good reasons. [Para 6(b) and (c)] [456-E-F; 459-A-C]

Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India & Ors., 1979 (3) SCR 1014 = (1979) 3 SCC 489; Rashbihari Panda etc. Vs. State of Orissa 1969 (3) SCR 374 = (1969) 1 SCC 414; S.G. Jaisinghani Vs. Union of India & Ors., 1967 SCR 703 =AIR 1967 SC 1427; Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Anr. 1980

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A (3) SCR 1338 = (1980) 4 SCC 1; Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons Vs. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, 1989 (2) SCR 751 = (1989) 3 SCC 293; Mahabir Aauto Stores & Ors. vs. Indian Oil Corporation & Ors. (1990) 3 SCC 752; Kuman Shrilekha Vidyarthi & Ors. Vs. State of UP. & Ors. 1990 (1) B Suppl. SCR 625 = (1991) 1 SCC 212; Lucknow Development Authority Vs. MK. Gupta, 1993 (3) Suppl. SCR 615 = (1994) 1 SCC 243; Common Cause, A Registered Society Vs. Union of India & Ors., 1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 719 = (1996) 6 SCC 530; Meerut Development Authority vs. Association of c Management Studies & Anr. etc. 2009 (6) SCR 663 = (2009) 6 SCC 171, Reliance Natural Resources Ltd. Vs. Reliance Industries Ltd. etc. 2010 (5) SCR 704 = (2010) 7 SCC 1; Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., 2011 (5) SCR 77 = (2011) 5 SCC 29- referred to

Council of Civil Service Unions vs. Minister for the Civil Service, (1984) 3 All ER 935, 950 - referred to Wade: Administrative Law (6th edn.) - referred to

2.2 All powers vested in a public office, even in the E field of contract, are meant to be exercised for public good and for promoting public interest; and Art. 14 of the Constitution applies also to matters of governmental policy even in contractual matters, and if the policy or any action of the government fails to satisfy the test of F reasonableness, the same would be unconstitutional. [para S(g)] [476-C-D]

Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarlhi & Ors. Vs. State of UP. & Ors. 1990 (1) Suppl. SCR 625 = (1991) 1 SCC 212 - referred to.

2.3 In Centre for Public Interest Litigation, it was affirmed, that the State was duty bound to adopt the method of auction by giving wide publication while alienating natural resources, so as to ensure that all eligible persons can participate in the process. [para 6] H (501-G]

.,.

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Centre for Public Interest Litigation & Ors. vs. Union of A India & Ors. (2012) 3 SCC 1 - referred to.

2.4 This Court in its judgments has laid down the parameters as regards the scope of applicability of Art.14 of the Constitution, in matters where the State, its instrumentalities, and their functionaries, are engaged in contractual obligations. For an action to be able to withstand the test of Art.14, it has already been expressed in the "main opinion" that it has to be fair, reasonable, non-discriminatory, transparent, non-capricious, unbiased, without favouritism or nepotism, in pursuit of promotion of healthy competition and equitable treatment. The judgments of this Court endorse all those requirements where the State, its instrumentalities, and their functionaries, are engaged in contractual transactions. Therefore, all "governmental policy" drawn with reference to contractual matters, it has been held, must conform to the said parameters. While Art.14 permits a reasonable classification having a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved, it does not permit the power of pick and choose arbitrarily out of several persons falling in the same category. Therefore, a criteria or procedure has to be adopted so that the choice among those falling in the same category is based on reason, fair play and non-arbitrariness. Even if there are only two contenders falling in the zone of consideration, there should be a clear, transparent and objective criteria or procedure to indicate which out of the two is to be preferred. It is this, which would ensure transparency. [Para 7) [501-H; 502-A-E]

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2.5 Another aspect which emerges from the G judgments of this Court is that, the State, its instrumentalities and their functionaries, while exercising their executive power in matters of trade or business etc. including making of contracts, should be mindful of public interest, public purpose and public good. This is H

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so, because every holder of public office by virtue of which he acts on behalf of the State, or its instrumentalities, is ultimately accountable to the people in whom sovereignty vests. As such, all powers vested in the State are meant to be exercised for public good s and in public interest. Therefore, the question of unfettered discretion in an executive authority, just does not arise. The fetters on discretion are - a clear, transparent and objective criteria or procedure which promotes public interest, public purpose and public C good. A public authority is ordained, therefore, to act reasonably and in good faith and upon lawful and relevant grounds of public interest. [Para 8] [502-F-H; 503A-B]

2.6 Observations recorded by this Court on the D subject of revenue returns, during the course of the State's engagements in commercial ventures are being summarized: It has been held, where the State is simply selling a product, there can be no doubt that the State must endeavour to obtain the highest price, subject of E course to any other overriding public consideration. The validity of a trading agreement executed by the Government has to be judged by the test, that the entire benefit arising therefrom enures to the State, and is not used as a cloak for conferring private benefits on a F limited class of persons. In Reliance Natural Resources Ltd.'s case, the Union of India has adopted the position, that natural resources are vested in the State as a matter of trust, for and on behalf of the citizens of the country and is the solemn duty of the State, to protect those G natural resources. More importantly, it was accepted, that natural resources must always be used in the common interest of the citizens of the country, and not for private interest. [Para 9] [503-C-H; 504-A] 3.1 When natural resources are made available by the

H State to private persons for commercial exploitation

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exclusively for their individual gains, the State's A endeavour must be towards maximization of revenue returns. This alone would ensure, that the fundamental right enshrined in Art.14 (assuring equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws), and the directive principle contained in Art.39(b) (that material resources B of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good), have been extended to the citizens of the country. Article 14 does not permit the State to pick and choose arbitrarily out of several persons falling in the same category. A transparent and objective criteria/ c procedure has to be evolved so that the choice amongst those belonging to the same class or category is based on reason, fair play, and non-arbitrariness. If the participation of private persons is for commercial exploitation exclusively for their individual gains, then the 0 State's endeavour to maximize revenue alone, would satisfy the constitutional mandate contained in Arts. 14 and 39(b) of the Constitution. [para 10-12] [504-E-G; 505B-D] Common Cause, A Registered Society Vs. Union of India

& Ors. 1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 719 = (1996) 6 SCC 530 referred to.

3.2 Auction is certainly not a constitutional mandate in the manner expressed, in the "main opinion", but it can F surely be applied in some situations to maximize revenue returns, to satisfy legal and constitutional requirements. It is, therefore, that in the instant opinion it has been chosen to express the manner of disposal of natural resources by using the .words "maximization of revenue" G in place of the term "auction". Further, auction by way of competitive bidding is certainly an indisputable means, by which maximization of revenue returns is assured. It is reiterated that disposal of assets by process of tender, tender-cum-auction and auction could assure maximization of revenue returns. Thus, if the State arrives H

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at the conclusion, in a given situation, that maximum revenue would be earned by auction of the natural resource in question, then that alone would be the process which it would have to adopt. [Para 3 and 12] [447-G-H; 505-F-H; 506-A-B] 3.3 One is compelled to take judicial notice of the fact, that allotment of natural resources is an issue of extensive debate in the country. In Centre for Public Interest Litigation, extensive revenue loss, in the course of allocation of the 2G spectrum was duly noticed. On each occasion when the issue of allocation of natural resources results in an alleged loss of revenue, it is portrayed as a loss to the nation. The Presidential Reference is aimed at invoking this Court's advisory jurisdiction to iron out the creases, so that legal and constitutional parameters are correctly understood. This would avoid such controversies in future. Therefore, an opinion is also being rendered, on the fourth question. The mandate contained in the Art.39(b) envisages that all material resources ought to be distributed in a manner which would "best sub-serve the common good". It is, therefore, apparent that governmental policy for distribution of such resources should be devised by keeping in mind the "common good" of the community i.e., the citizens of this country. It has been expressed in the "main opinion" that matters of policy fall within the realm of the legislature or the executive, and cannot be interfered with, unless the policy is in violation of statutory law, or is ultra vires the provision(s) of the Constitution. It is not within the scope of judicial review for a court to suggest an alternative policy, which in the wisdom of the court could be better suited in the circumstances of a case. Thus far, the position is clearly unambiguous. [Para 13] [506-C-D; 507-A-B-H; 508-A-C]

3.4 The legality and constitutionality of policy is one H matter, and the manner of its implementation quite

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another. Even at the implementation stage a forthright and A legitimate policy, may take the shape of an illegitimate stratagem. The policy of allocation of natural resources for public good can be defined by the legislature. Likewise, policy for allocation of natural resources may also be determined by the executive. The parameters for B determining the legality and constitutionality of the two are exactly the same. Thus, there can be no doubt about the conclusion recorded in the "main opinion" that auction which is just one of the. several price recovery mechanisms, cannot be held to be the only c constitutionally recognized method for alienation of natural resources. That should not be understood to mean, that it can never be a valid method for disposal of natural resources. [para 13) [514-C-E; 508-D] 3.5 Therefore, no part of the natural resource can be D dissipated as a matter of largess, charity, donation or endowment, for private exploitation. Each bit of natural resource expended must bring back a reciprocal consideration. The consideration may be in the nature of earning revenue or may be to "best sub-serve the E common good". It may well be the amalgam of the two. There cannot be a dissipation of material resources free of cost or at a consideration lower than their actual worth. One set of citizens cannot prosper at the cost of another set of citizens, for that would not be fair or reasonable. F [para 13] [514-E-GJ Case Law Reference: As per D.K. Jain, J. c2012) 3 sec 1

referred to

para 2

[1951] S.C.R. 747

referred to

Para 5

[1960] 3 S.C.R. 250

referred to

para 5

[1959] S.C.R. 995

referred to

para 5

c

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[1965] 1 S.C.R. 413

referred to

para 5

1975 (1) SCR 504

referred to

para 5

1979 (2) SCR 476

referred to

para 5

1991 (2) Suppl. SCR 497

referred to

para 5

1998 (2) Suppl. SCR 400

referred to

para 5

1994 (5) Suppl. SCR 1

referred to

Para 9

[1934] A.C. 586

referred to

Para 12

[1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 806 referred to

para 17

A.LR. (30) 1943 FC 13

referred to

Para 25

1991 (2) SCR 501

referred to

Para 37

2002 (2) SCR 1006

referred to

Para 45

(1955) 2 SCR 603

referred to

Para 47

[1949-50] F.C.R. 595

referred to

Para 50

AIR 1954 SC 636

referred to

Para 51

(1993) 4 sec 441

referred to

Para 56

2011 (9) SCR 290

relied on

para 66

1987 (1) SCR 562

relied on

para 66

1992 (1) Suppl. SCR 732

relied on

para 66

2005 (5) Suppl. SCR 395

referred to

para 68

(2004) 3 sec 75

referred to

para 69

(2003) 6 sec 697

relied on

para 70

36 L ED 1018 : 146 U.S. 387 (1892)

referred to

para 74

1996 (10) Suppl. SCR 12

referred to

para 74

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012

2004 (1) SCR 483

referred to

para 74

2006 (2) SCR 419

referred to

para 74

2009 (3) $CR 1

referred to

para 74

2010 (5) SCR 704

referred to

para 74

2011 (5) SCR 77

referred to

para 74

1987 (2) SCR 223

referred to

para 74

(2007) 3 sec 184

referred to

para 91

[1968] 3 SCR 251

relied on

Para 92

1959 Supp (1) SCR 528

referred to

para 94

AIR 1955 SC 191

referred to

para 95

[1959] 1 SCR 279

referred to

para 95

1974 (2) SCR 348

referred to

para 96

1978 (2) SCR 621

referred to

Para 97

1981 (2) SCR 79

referred to

Para 98

1979 (3) SCR 1014

referred to

Para 99

2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 390

referred to

Para101

2000 (4) Suppl. SCR 693

referred to

Para 102

1996 (3) SCR 721

referred to

Para 103

1982 (1) SCR 438

referred to

Para 104

1973 (0) Suppl. SCR 1

referred to

para 109

1952 SCR 284

referred to

para 110

330 U.S. 552

referred to

para 110

1976 SCR 347

referred to

para 11

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1984 (1) SCR 725

referred to

para 113

1978 (1) SCR 641

referred to

para 117

1973 (2) SCR 757

referred to

para 118

1980 (3) SCR 1338

referred to

para 118

1988 (1) SCR 1079

referred to

para 122

1988 (1) SCR 1079

referred to

para 124

1997 (1) Suppl. SCR 671

referred to

para 125

(2000) 8 sec 262

referred to

para 126

(2003) 8 sec 100

referred to

para 127

1997 (1) Suppl. SCR 671

referred to

para 128

1982 (1) SCR 947

referred to

Para 133

1986 SCR 479

referred to

para 134

1970 (3) SCR 530

referred to

para 137

1994 (1) SCR 579

referred to

para 139

1996 (2) SCR 767

referred to

para 140

2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 511

referred to

para 141

1992 (1) SCR 406

referred to

para 142

19781 3 sec 459

referred to

para 143

2011 (6) SCR 443

referred to

para 144

1967 SCR 703

referred to

para 6(a)

1969 (3) SCR 374

referred to

para 6(b)

1979 (3) SCR 1014

referred to

para 6(c)

1980 (3) SCR 1338

referred to

para 6(d)

As Per Khehar, J.

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012

1989 (2) SCR 751

referred to

para 6(e)

(1984) 3 All ER 935, 950

referred to

para 6(e)

(1990) 3 sec 752

referred to

para 6(f)

1990 (1) Suppl. SCR 625

referred to

para 6(g)

1993 (3) Suppl. SCR 615

referred to

para 6(h)

1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 719

referred to

para 6(i)

2009 (6) SCR 663

referred to

para 60)

2010 (5) SCR 704

referred to

para 6(k)

(2012) 3 sec 1

referred to

para 6(1)

(2012) 3 sec 1

referred to

para 13

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ADVISORY JURISDICTION : Special Reference No. 1 of D 2012. [Under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India] [Regarding 2G Spectrum]

Goolam E. Vahanvati, D.J. Khambata, A. Mariarputham, AGs, Indira Jaising, ASG, Shanti Bhushan, Soli J. Sorabjee, Biswajit Deb, Vivek K. Tankha, Ravindra Shrivastava, C.A. Sundaram, Harish N. Salve, T.R. Andhyarujina, Shyam Divan, M.N. Krishnamani, Vikas Singh, Dr. Manish Singhvi, Manjit F Singh, Guru Krishna Kumar, AAGs., Devadatt Kamat, Anoopam N. Prasad, Rohit Sharma, Nishanth Patil, Anandh Kannan, T.A. Khan, D.S. Mahra, Supriya Jain, Sonam Anand, Jhuma Sen, Nizam Pasha, Prashant Bhushan, Pranav Sachdeva, Shakil Ahmed, Gaurav Dhingra, A. Subhashini, G.N. Reddy, M. G Rambabu, S. Nagarajan, Ashoka Thakur, Anil K. Chopra, Khwairakpam Nobin Singh, Sapam Biswajit Meitei, Navnit Kumar, Deepika Ghatowar (For Corporate Law Group), Pragyan Sharma, Rupesh Gupta, Mandakini Sharma, Gautam Dhamija, Heshu Kayina, B.S. Banthia, Vikas Upadhyay, H

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Sameer Sodhi, Avijit Singh, Rachana Srivastava, Utkarsh Sharma, Gopal Singh, Manish Kumar, Chandan Kumar, Radha Shyam Jena, lrshad Ahmad, Milind Kumar, Ramesh Babu M.R., Sushrut Jindal, Madhavi Divan, Sanjay Kharde, Asha G. Nair, Sunil Fernandes, Vernika Tomar, V.N. Raghupathy, P.V. Yogeswaran, C.D. Singh, Dr. Indra Pratap Singh, Sunny Choudhary, Himinder Lal, Anil Shrivastav, Rituraj Biswas, Edward Belho, K. Enatoli Serna, Nimshim Vashum, Jagjit Singh Chhabra, Aruna Mathur, Yusuf Khan, Kamal Mohan Gupta, B. Balaji, A. Prasanna Venkat, Hemantika Wahi, Jayesh Gaurav, S. Chandra Shekhar, Pallavi S. Shroff, Manu Nair, Kirat Singh Nagra, Rohini Musa, Saanjh N. Purohit, Monika Singhal, Mohit Auluck, A.P. Medh (For Suresh A. Shroff & Co.), Rohit Kumar Singh, Anupam Bharti, Ruchi A. Mahajan, Binsy Susan, Anannya Ghosh, Samarika Singh (For Suresh A. Shroff & Co.), Sunil Dogra, Kiran Suri, S.J. Amith, Jayna Kothari, Shruthi Ramakrishna, Vasuman Khandelwal, Mohit Kumar Shah, Dr. Subramanian Swamy (ln-Peson), Dipak Kumar Jena, Minakshi Ghosh Jena, Rajesh Singh, Gautam Narayan, T.G.N. Nair for the Appearing Parties. The opinions of the Court were delivered by D.K. JAIN, J.

[FOR S.H. KAPADIA, CJ, HIMSELF, DIPAK MISRA & RANJAN GOGOi, JJ.]

In exercise of powers conferred under Article 143(1) of the F · Constitution of India, the President of India has on 12th April, 2012, made the present Reference. The full text of the Reference (sans the annexures) is as follows:

"WHEREAS in 1994, the Department of Telecommunication, Government of India ("GOI"), issued 8 Cellular Mobile Telephone Services Licenses ("CMTS Licenses"), 2 in each of the four Metro cities of Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai for a period of 10 years (the "1994 Licenses"). The 1994 licensees were selected based on rankings achieved by them on the technical and

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012 [D.K. JAIN, J.]

financial evaluation based on parameters set out by the Gol in the tender and were required to pay a fixed licence fee for initial three years and subsequently based on number of subscribers subject to minimum commitment mentioned in the tender document and licence agreement. The 1994 Licenses issued by Gol mentioned that a cumulative maximum of upto 4.5 MHz in the 900 MHz bands would be permitted based on appropriate justification. There was no separate upfront charge for the allocation of Spectrum to the licensees, who only paid annual Spectrum usage charges, which will be subject to revision from time to time and which under the terms of the license bore the nomenclature "licence fee and royalty". A copy of the 1994 Licenses, along with a table setting out the pre-determined Licence Fee as prescribed by DoT in the Tender, is annexed hereto as Annexure I (Colly). WHEREAS in December 1995, 34 CMTS ·ucenses were granted based on auction for 18 telecommunication circles for a period of 10 years (the "1995 Licenses"). The 1995 Licenses mentioned that a cumulative maximum of up to 4.4 MHz in the 900 MHz bands shall be permitted to the licensees, based on appropriate justification. There was no separate upfront charge for allocation of spectrum to the licensees who were also required to pay annual spectrum usage charges, which under the terms of the license bore the nomenclature "licence fee and royalty" which will be subject to revision from time to time. A copy of the 1995 Licenses, along with a table setting out the fees payable by the highest bidder, is annexed hereto as Annexure II (Colly). WHEREAS in 1995, bids were also invitet. for basic telephone service licenses ("BTS Licenses") with the license fee payable for a 15 year period. Under the terms of the BTS Licenses, a licensee could provide fixed line basic telephone services as well as wireless basic

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telephone services. Six licenses were granted in the year 1997-98 by way of auction through tender for providing basic telecom services (the "1997 BTS Licenses"). The license terms, inter-alia, provided that based on the availability of the equipment for Wireless in Local Loop (WLL), in the world market, the spectrum in bands specified therein would be considered for allocation subject to the conditions mentioned therein. There was no separate upfront charge for allocation of spectrum and the licensees offering the basic wireless telephone service were required to pay annual Spectrum usage charges, which under the terms of the license bore the nomenclature "licence fee and royalty". A sample copy of the 1997 BTS Licenses containing the table setting out the license fees paid by the highest bidder is annexed hereto as Annexure Ill (Colly). WHEREAS in 1997, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 was enacted and the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (the "TRAI") was established.

WHEREAS on 1st April, 1999, the New Telecom Policy 1999 ("NTP 1999") was brought into effect on the recommendation of a Group on Telecom ("GoT") which had been constituted by Gol. A copy of NTP 1999 is annexed hereto as Annexure IV. NTP 1999 provided that Cellular Mobile Service Providers ("CMSP") would be granted a license for a period of 20 years on the payment of a one-time entry fee and licence fee in the form of revenue share. NTP 1999 also provided that BTS (Fixed Service Provider or FSP) Licenses for providing both fixed and wireless (WLL) services would also be issued for a period of 20 years on payment of a one-time entry fee and licence fee in the form of revenue share and prescribed charges for spectrum usage, appropriate level of which was to be recommended by TRAI. The licensees both cellular and basic were also required to pay annual Spectrum usage charges.

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012 [D.K. JAIN, J.]

WHEREAS based on NTP 1999, a migration package for migration from fixed license fee to one time entry fee and licence fee based on revenue share regime was offered to all the existing licenses on 22nd July, 1999. This came into effect on 1st August 1999. Under the migration package, the licence period for all the CMTS aod FSP licensees was extended to 20 years from the date of issuance of the Licenses. WHEREAS in 1997 and 2000, CMTS Licenses were also granted in 2 and 21 Circles to Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited ("MTNL"} and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited ("BSNL") respectively (the "PSU Licenses"). However, no entry fee was charged for the PSU Licenses. The CMTS Licenses issued to BSNL and MTNL mentioned that they would be granted GSM Spectrum of 4.4 + 4.4 MHz in the 900 MHz band. The PSU Licensees were also required to pay annual spectrum usage charges. A copy of the PSU Licenses is annexed hereto as Annexure V (Colly). WHEREAS in January 2001, based on TRAl's recommendation, DoT issued guidelines for issuing CMTS Licenses for the 4th Cellular Operator based on tendering process structured as "Multistage Informed Ascending Bidding Process". Based on a tender, 17 new CMTS Licenses were issued for a period of 20 years in the 4 Metro cities and 13 Telecom Circles (the "2001 Cellular Licenses"). The 2001 Licenses required that the licensees pay a one-time non refundable entry fee as determined through auction as above and also annual license fee and annual spectrum usage charges and there was no separate upfront charge for allocation of spectrum. In accordance with the terms of tender document, the license terms, inter-alia, provided that a cumulative maximum of upto 4.4 MHz + 4.4 MHz will be permitted and further based on usage, justification and availability, additional

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spectrum upto 1.8 MHz + 1.8 MHz making a total of 6.2 MHz + 6.2 MHz, may be considered for assignment, on case by case basis, on payment of additional Licence fee. The bandwidth upto maximum as indicated i.e. 4.4 MHz & 6.2 MHz as the case may be, will be allocated based on the Technology requirements (e.g. CDMA@ 1.25 MHz, GSM @ 200 KHz etc.). The frequencies assigned may not be contiguous and may not be same in all cases, while efforts would be made to make available larger chunks to the extent feasible. A copy of the 2001 Cellular Licenses, along with a table setting out the fees payable by the highest bidder, is annexed hereto as Annexure VL WHEREAS in 2001, BTS Licenses were also issued for providing both fixed line and wireless basic telephone services on a continual basis (2001 Basic Telephone Licenses). Service area wise one time Entry Fee and annual license fee as a percentage of Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) was prescribed for grant of BTS Licenses. The licence terms, inter-alia, provided that for Wireless Access System in local area, not more than 5 + 5 MHz in 824-844 MHz paired with 869-889 MHz band shall be allocated to any basic service operator including existing ones on FCFS basis. A detailed procedure for allocation of spectrum on FCFS basis was given in Annexure-IX of the 2001 BTS license. There was no separate upfront charge for allocation of spectrum and the Licensees were required to pay revenue share of 2% of the AGR earned from wireless in local loop subss;ribers as spectrum charges in addition to the one time entry fee and annual license fee. A sample copy of the 2001 Basic Telephone License along with a table setting out the entry fees is annexed hereto as Annexure VII. WHEREAS on 27th October, 2003, TRAI recommended a Unified Access Services Licence ("UASL") Regime. A copy of TRAl's recommendation is annexed hereto as Annexure VIII.

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012 [D.K. JAIN, J.]

WHEREAS on 11.11.2003, Guidelines were issued, specifying procedure for migration of existing operators tc the new UASL regime. As per the Guidelines, all applications for new Access Services License shall be in the category of Unified Access Services Licence. Later, based on TRAI clarification dated 14.11.2003, the entry fee for new Unified Licensee was fixed same as the entry fee of the 4th cellular operator. Based on further recommendations of TRAI dated 19.11.2003, spectrum to the new licensees was to be given as per the existing terms and conditions relating to spectrum in the respective license agreements. A copy of the Guidelines dated 11.11.2003 is annexed hereto as Annexure IX. WHEREAS consequent to enhancement of FOi limit in telecom sector from 49% to 74%, revised Guidelines for grant of UAS Licenses were issued on 14.12.2005. These Guidelines, inter-alia stipulate that Licenses shall be issued without any restriction on the number of entrants for pr.ovisior'I of Unified Access Services in a Service Area and the applicant will be required to pay one time nonrefundable Entry, annual License fee as a percentage of Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) and spectrum charges on revenue share basis. No separate upfront charge for allocation of spectrum was prescribed. Initial Spectrum · was allotted as per UAS License conditions to the service providers in different frequency bands, subject to availability. Initially allocation of a cumulative maximum up to 4.4 MHz + 4.4 MHz for TOMA based systems or 2.5 MHz + 2.5 MHz for CDMA based systems subject to availability was to be made. Spectrum not more than 5 MHz + 5 MHz in respect of CDMA system or 6.2 MHz + 6.2 MHz in respect of TOMA based system was to be allocated to any new UAS licensee. A copy of the UASL Guidelines dated 14.12.2005 is annexed hereto as Annexure X.

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WHEREAS after the introduction of the UASL in 2003 and until March 2007, 51 new UASL Licenses were issued based on policy of First Come-First Served, on payment of the same entry fee as was paid for the 2001 Cellular Licenses (the "2003-2007 Licenses") and the spectrum was also allocated based on FCFS under a separate wireless operating license on case by case basis and subject to availability. Licensees had to pay annual spectrum usage charges as a percentage of AGR, there being a no upfront charge for allocation of spectrum. A copy of the 2003-2007 License, along with a table setting out the fees payable, is annexed hereto as Annexure XI (Colly). WHEREAS on 28th August 2007, TRAI revisited the issue of new licenses, allocation of Spectrum, Spectrum charges, entry fees and issued its recommendations, a copy of which is annexed hereto as Annexure XII. TRAI made further recommendations dated 16.07.2008 which is annexed hereto as Annexure XIII. WHEREAS in 2007 and 2008, Gol issued Dual Technology Licences, where under the terms of the existing licenses were amended to allow licensees to hold a license as well as Spectrum for providing services through both GSM and CDMA network. First amendment was issued in December, 2007. All licensees who opted for Dual Technology Licences paid the :>ame entry fee, which was an amount equal to the amount prescribed as entry fee for getting a new UAS licence in the same service area. The amendment to the license inter-alia mentioned that initially a cumulative maximurri of upto 4.4 MHz+ 4.4 MHz was to be allocated in the case of TOMA based systems(@ 200 KHz per carrier or 30 KHz per carrier) and a maximum of 2.5 MHz + 2.5 MHz was to be allocated in the case of CDMA based systems(@ 1.25 MHz per carrier), on case by case basis subject to availability. It was also, inter-alia,

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012 [D.K. JAIN, J.]

mentioned that additional spectrum beyond the above stipulation may also be considered for allocation after ensuring optimal and efficient utilization of the already allocated spectrum taking into account all types of traffic and guidelines/criteria prescribed from time to time. However, spectrum not more than 5 + 5 MHz in respect of CDMS system and 6.2 + 6.2 MHz in respect of TOMA based system was to be allocated to the licensee. There was no separate upfront charge for allocation of Spectrum. However, Dual Technology licensees were required to pay Spectrum usage charges in addition to the license fee on revenue share basis as a percentage of AGR. Spectrum to these licensees was allocated 10.01.2008 onwards. WHEREAS Subscriber based criteria for CMTS was prescribed in the year 2002 for allocation of additional spectrum of 1.8 + 1.8 MHz beyond 6.2 + 6.2 MHz with a levy of additional spectrum usage charge of 1% of AGR. The allocation criteria was revised from time to time. A copy of the Do T letter dated 01.02.2002 in this regard is annexed hereto as Annexure XIV.

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WHEREAS for the spectrum allotted beyond 6.2 MHz, in the frequency allocation letters issued by DoT May 2008 onwards, it was mentioned inter-alia that allotment of spectrum is subject to pricing as determined in future by the Gol for spectrum beyond 6.2 MHz + 6.2 MHz and the outcome of Court orders. However, annual spectrum usage charges were levied on the basis of AGR, as per the quantum of spectrum assigned. A sample copy of the frequency allocation letter is annexed hereto as Annexure

xv. WHEREAS Spectrum for the 3G Band (i.e. 2100 MHz band) was auctioned in 2010. The terms of the auction stipulated that, for successful new entrants, a fresh license agreement would be entered into and for existing licensees who were successful in the auction, the license

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agreement would be amended for use of Spectrum in the 3G band. A copy of the Notice inviting Applications and Clarifications thereto are annexed hereto and marked as Annexure XVI (Colly). The terms of the amendment letter provided, inter alia, that the 3G spectrum would stand withdrawn if the license stood terminated for any reason. A copy of the standard form of the amendment letter is annexed hereto and marked as Annexure XVII. WHEREAS letters of intent were issued for 122 Licenses for providing 2G services on or after 10 January 2008, against which licenses (the "2008 Licenses") were subsequently issued. However, pursuant to the judgment of this Hon'ble Court dated 2nd February, 2012 in Writ Petition (Civil) No.423 of 2010 (the "Judgment"), the 2008 Licenses have been quashed. A copy of the judgment is annexed hereto and marked Annexure XVIII. WHEREAS the Gol has also filed an Interlocutory Application for clarification of the Judgment, wherein the Gol has placed on record the manner in which the auction is proposed to be held pursuant to the Judgment and sought appropriate clarificatory orders/directions from the Hon'ble Court. A copy of the Interlocutory Application is annexed hereto and marked as Annexure XIX. WHEREAS while the Gol is implementing the directions set out in the Judgment at paragraph 81 and proceeding with a fresh grant of licences and allocation of spectrum by auction, the Gol is seeking a limited review of the Judgment to the extent it impacts generally the method for allocation of national resources by the State. A copy of the Review Petition is annexed hereto and marked as Annexure XX. WHEREAS by the Judgment, this Hon'ble Court directed TRAI to make fresh recommendations for grant of licenses and allocation of Spectrum in the 2G band by

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012 [D.K. JAIN, J.]

holding an auction, as was done for the allocation of Spectrum for the 3G licenses. WHEREAS, in terms of the directions of this Hon'ble Court, Gol would now be allocating Spectrum in the relevant 2G bands at prices discovered through auction. WHEREAS based on the recommendations of TRAI dated 11.05.2010 followed by further clarifications and recommendations, the Gol has prescribed in February 2012, the limit for spectrum assignment in the Metro Service Areas as 2x1 OMHz/2x6.25 MHz and in rest of the Service Areas as 2x8MHz/2x5 MHz for GSM (900 MHz, 1800 MHz band)/CDMA(800 MHZ band), respectively subject to the condition that the Licensee can acquire additional spectrum beyond prescribed limit in the open market should there be an auction of spectrum subject to the further condition that total spectrum held by it does not exceed the limits prescribed for merger of licenses i.e. 25% of the total spectrum assigned in that Service Area by way of auction or otherwise. This limit for CDMS spectrum is 10 MHz. WHEREAS, in view of the fact that Spectrum may need to be allocated to individual entities from time to time in accordance with criteria laid down by the Gol, such as subscriber base, availability of Spectrum in a particular circle, inter-se priority depending on whether the Spectrum comprises the initial allocation or additional allocation, etc., it may not always be possible to conduct an auction for the allocation of Spectrum. AND WHEREAS in view of the aforesaid, the auctioning of Spectrum in the 2G bands may result in a situation where none of the Licensees, using the 2G bands of 800 MHz., 900 MHz and 1800 MHz would have paid any separate upfront fee for the allocation of Spectrum.

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AND WHEREAS the Government of India has received various notices from companies based in other countries, invoking bilateral investment agreements and seeking damages against the Union of India by reason of the cancellation/threat of cancellation of the licenses. AND WHEREAS in the circumstance certain questions of law of far reaching national and international implications have arisen, including in relation to the conduct of the auction and the regulation of the telecommunications industry in accordance with the Judgment and FDI into this country in the telecom industry and otherwise in other sectors. Given that the issues which have arisen are of great public importance, and that questions of law have arisen of public importance and with such far reaching consequences for the development of the country that it is expedient to obtain the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India thereon. NOW THEREFORE, in exercise of powers conferred upon me by clause (1) of Article 143 of the Constitution of India, I, Pratibha Devisingh Patil, President of India, hereby refer the following questions to the Supreme Court of India for consideration and report thereon, namely: Q.1

[2012] 9 S.C.R.

Whether the only permissible method for disposal of all natural resources across all sectors and in all circumstances is by the conduct of auctions?

Q.2 Whether a broad proposition of law that only the route of auctions can be resorted to for disposal of natural resources does not run contrary to several judgments of the Supreme Court including those of Larger Benches?

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012 [D.K. JAIN, J.] Q.3

Whether the enunciation of a broad principle, even though expressed as a matter of constitutional law, does not really amount to formulation of a policy and has the effect of unsettling policy decisions formulated and approaches taken by various successive governments over the years for valid considerations, including lack of public resources and the need to resort to innovative and different approaches for the development of various sectors of the economy?

Q.4 What is the permissible scope for interference by courts with policy making by the Government including methods for disposal of natural resources? Q.5

Whether, if the court holds, within the permissible scope of judicial review, that a policy is flawed, is the court not obliged to take into account investments made under the said policy including investments made by foreign investors under multilateral/ bilateral agreements?

Q.6

If the answers to the aforesaid questions lead to an affirmation of the judgment dated 02.02.2012 then the following questions may arise, viz.

(i)

whether the judgment is required to be given retrospective effect so as to unsettle all licences issued and 2G spectrum (800, 900, and 1800 MHz bands) allocated in and after 1994 and prior to 10.01.2008?

(ii)

whether the allocation of 2G spectrum in all

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circumstances and in all specific cases for different policy considerations would nevertheless have to be undone? And specifically

(iii)

Whether the telecom licences granted in 1994 would be affected?

(iv)

Whether the Telecom licences granted by way of basic licences in 2001 and licences granted between the period 2003-2007 would be affected?

(v)

Whether it is open to the Government of India to take any action to alter the terms of any licence to ensure a level playing field among all existing licensees?

(vi)

Whether dual technology licences granted in 2007 and 2008 would be affected?

(vii)

Whether it is necessary or obligatory for the Government of India to withdraw the Spectrum allocated to all existing licensees or to charge for the same with retrospective effect and if so on what basis and from what date?

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Q.7

Whether, while taking action for conduct of auction in accordance with the orders of the Supreme Court, it would remain permissible for the Government to:

(i)

Make provision for allotment of Spectrum from time to time at the auction discovered price and in accordance with laid down criteria during the period of validity of the auction determined price?

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012 [D.K. JAIN, J.]

Q.8

(ii)

Impose a ceiling on the acquisition of A Spectrum with the aim of avoiding the emergence of dominance in the market by any licensee/applicant duly taking into consideration TRAI recommendations in this regard?

(iii)

Make provision for allocation of Spectrum at auction related prices in accordance with laid down criteria in bands where there may be inadequate or no competition (for e.g. C there is expected to be a low level of competition for CDMA in 800 MHz band and TRAI has recommended an equivalence ratio of 1.5 or 1.3X1 .5 for 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands depending upon the quantum of spectrum held by the licensee that can be D applied to auction price in 1800 MHz band in the absence of a specific price for these bands)?

What is the effect of the judgment on 3G Spectrum acquired by entities by auction whose licences have been quashed by the said judgment?

NEW DELHI; DATED: 12 April 2012

PRESIDENT OF INDIA"

2. A bare reading of the Reference shows that it is occasioned by the decision of this Court, rendered by a bench of two learned Judges on 2nd February, 2012 in Centre for Public Interest Litigation & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. 1 (for brevity "2G Case"). 3. On receipt of the Reference, vide order dated 9th May, 2012, notice was issued to the Attorney General for India. Upon hearing the learned Attorney General, it was directed vide order 1.

c2012) 3 sec 1.

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dated 11th May, 2012, that notice of the Reference shall be issued to all the States through their Standing Counsel; on Centre for Public Interest Litigation (CPIL) and Dr. Subramanian Swamy (petitioners in the 2G Case); as also on the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and Confederation of Indian Industry (Cll), as representatives of the Indian industry. On the suggestion of the learned Attorney General, it was also directed (though not recorded in the order), that the reference shall be dealt with in two parts viz. in the first instance, only questions No. 1 to 5 would be taken up for consideration and the remaining questions shall be taken up later in the light of our answers to the first five questions. 4. At the commencement of the hearing of the Reference on 10th July, 2012, a strong objection to the maintainability of the Reference was raised by the writ petitioners in the 2G Case. Accordingly, it was decided to first hear the learned counsel on the question of validity of the Reference. SUBMISSIONS ON MAINTAINABILITY:

5. Mr. Soli Sorabjee, learned senior counsel, appearing for CPIL, strenuously urged that in effect and substance, the Reference seeks to question the correctness of the judgment in the 2G Case, which is not permissible once this Court has pronounced its authoritative opinion on the question of law now sought to be raised. The learned counsel argued that reference under Article 143(1) of the Constitution does not entail appellate or review jurisdiction, especially in respect of a judgment which has attained finality. According to the learned counsel, it is evident from the format of the Reference that it does not express or suggest any 'doubt' as regards the question of fact or law relating to allocation of all natural resources, a sine-quanon for a valid reference. In support of the proposition, learned counsel placed reliance on observations in earlier references - In Re: The Delhi Laws Act, 1912, the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947 And The Part C States (Laws)

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012 [D.K. JAIN, J.]

Act, 1950 2, In Re: The Berubari Union and Exchange of A Enclaves Reference Under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of lndia 3 , In Re: The Kera/a Education Bill, 195, 7 In Reference Under Article 143(1) Of The Constitution of lndia 4, Special Reference No.1 of 19645 (commonly referred to as "Keshav Singh"), In Re: Presidential Po/16 , In Re: The Special B Courts Bill, 19787, In the Matter of: Cauvery Water Disputes Tribuna/8 (hereinafter referred to as "Cauvery-11") and Special Reference No. 1 of 1998 Re. 9 6. Next, it was contended by the learned senior counsel that if for any reason, the Executive feels that the 2G Case does not lay down a correct proposition of law, it is open to it to persuade another bench, before which the said judgment is relied upon, to refer the issue to a larger bench for reconsideration. In short, the submission was that an authoritative pronouncement, like the one in the 2G Case, cannot be short circuited by recourse to Article 143(1 ). 7. Learned counsel also contended that the Reference as framed is of an omnibus nature, seeking answers on hypothetical and vague questions, and therefore, must not be answered. Commending us to In Re: The Special Courts Bill, 1978 (supra) and several other decisions, learned counsel urged that a reference under Article 143(1) of the Constitution for opinion has to be on a specific question or questions. It was asserted that by reason of the construction of the terms of Reference, the manner in which the questions have been 2.

[1951] S.C.R. 747.

3.

(1960) 3 S.C.R. 250.

4.

[1959) S.C.R. 995.

5.

[1965] 1 S.C.R. 413.

6.

(1974) 2 sec 33.

1.

(1979) 1 sec 380.

8.

1993 Supp (1) sec 96 (II).

9.

(1998) 1 sec 739.

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framed and the nature of the answers proposed, this Court would be entitled to return the Reference unanswered by pointing out the aforesaid impediments in answering it. Lastly, it was fervently pleaded that if the present Reference is entertained, it would pave the way for the Executive to circumvent or negate the effect of inconvenient judgments, like the decision in the 2G Case, which would not only set a dangerous and unhealthy precedent, but would also be clearly contrary to the ratio of the decision in Cauvery II.

8. Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned senior counsel, while C adopting the arguments advanced by Mr. Soli Sorabjee, reiterated that from the format of questions No.1 to 5, as well as from the review petition filed by the Government in the 2G Case, it is clear that the present Reference seeks to overrule the decision in the 2G Case by reading down the direction that D allowed only 'auction' as the permissible means for allocation of all natural resource, in paragraphs 94 to 96 of the 2G Case, to the specific case of spectrum. It was argued by the learned counsel that it is apparent from the grounds urged in the review petition filed by the Government that it understood the ratio of E the 2G Case, binding them to the form of procedure to be followed while alienating precious natural resources belonging to the people, and yet it is seeking to use the advisory jurisdiction of this Court as an appeal over its earlier decision. It was contended that even if it be assumed that a doubt relating F to the disposal of all natural resources has arisen on account of conflict of decisions on the point, such a conflict cannot be resolved by way of a Presidential reference; that would amount to holding that one or the other judgments is 1n.correctly decided, which, according to the learned counsel, is beyond G the scope of Article 143(1). Learned counsel alleged that the language in which the Reference is couched, exhibits mala fides on the part of the Executive. He thus, urged that we should refrain from giving an opinion.

9. Dr. Subramanian Swamy, again vehemently objecting

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012 [D.K. JAIN, J.]

to the maintainability of the Reference, on similar grounds, added that the present Reference is against the very spirit of Article 143(1 ), which, according to the constituent assembly debates, was meant to be invoked sparingly, unlike the case here. It was pleaded that the Reference is yet another attempt to delay the implementation of the directions in the 2G Case. Relying on the decision of this Court in Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. 10, Dr. Swamy submitted that we will be well advised to return the Reference unanswered.

10. Mr. G.E. Vahanvati, the learned Attorney General for India, defending the Reference, submitted that the plea regarding non-maintainability of the Reference on the ground that it does not spell out a 'doubt', is fallacious on a plain reading of the questions framed therein. According to him, Article 143(1) uses the word 'question' which arises only when there is a 'doubt' and the very fact that the President has sought the opinion of this Court on the questions posed, shows that there is a doubt in the mind of the Executive on those issues. It was stressed that merely because the Reference does not use the word 'doubt' in the recitals, as in other cited cases, does not imply that in substance no doubt is entertained in relation to the mode of alienation of all natural resources, other than spectrum, more so when the questions posed for opinion have far reaching national and international implications. It was urged that the content of the Reference is to be appreciated in proper perspective, keeping in view the context and not the form.

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11. It was urged that maintainability and the discretion to decline to answer a reference are two entirely different things. The question of maintainability arises when ex-facie, the Presidential reference does not meet the basic requirements of Article 143(1), contrastive to the question of discretion, which is the power of the Court to decline to answer a reference, for good reasons, once the reference is maintainable. In support 10. (1994) 6 sec 360.

[2012] 9 S.C.R

of-the proposition, reliance was placed on In Re: The Kera/a Education Bill, 1957 (supra), Keshav Singh and In Re: The Special Courts Bill, 1978 (supra). According to the learned counsel, the question as to whether the reference is to be answered or not, is not an aspect of maintainability, and is to B be decided only after hearing the reference on merits.

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12. Learned Attorney General, while contesting the plea that in a reference under Article 143(1), correctness or otherwise of earlier decisions can never be gone into, submitted that in a Presidential reference, there is no constitutional embargo against reference to earlier decisions in order to clarify, restate or even to form a fresh opinion on a principle of law, as long as an inter partes decision is left unaffected. In support of the contention that in the past, references have been made on questions in relation to the correctness of judgments, learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions of this Court In Re: The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 (supra), Special Reference No.1 of 1998 (supra), Keshav Singh (supra) and of the Privy Council In re Piracy Jure Gentium 11 • It was asserted that it has been repeatedly clarified on behalf of the Executive that the decision in the 2G Case has been accepted and is not being challenged. The Reference was necessitated by certain observations made as a statement of law in the said judgment which require to be explicated. Referring to certain observations in Re: The Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves (supra), learned counsel submitted that this Court had accepted that a reference could be answered to avoid protracted litigation.

13. Learned Attorney General also contended that withdrawal of the review petition by the Government is of no G consequence ; its withdrawal does not imply that the question about the permissible manner of disposal of other natural resources, and the issues regarding the environment for investment in the country, stood settled. Stoutly refuting the allegation that the reference is mala fide, learned counsel H 11. (1934] A.C. 586.

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submitted that in In Re Presidential Poll (supra), it is clearly laid down that the Court cannot question the bona fides of the President making the reference. 14. Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina, learned senior counsel, voiced concerns arising out of an apparent conflict between provisions of the statutes and the judgment delivered in the 2G Case; specifically with reference to Sections 10 and 11 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (for short, "MMRD Act"}, which prescribe a policy of preferential treatment and first come first served, unlike the 2G Case, which according to the learned counsel only mandates auction for all natural resources. He thus, urged this Court to dispel all uncertainties regarding the true position of law after the judgment in the 2G Case, by holding it as per incuriam in light of the provisions of the MMRD Act and other statutes.

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15. Mr. Harish Salve, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of Cll, while supporting the Reference, fervently urged that the contention that the Reference deserves to be returned unanswered due to the absence of the use of the word 'doubt' in the recitals of the Reference, is untenable. According to the learned counsel, under Article 143(1), the President can seek an opinion on any question of law or fact that has arisen, or is likely to arise, which is of such a nature and such public importance that it is expedient to seek the opinion of this Court. There is no additional condition that there should be any 'doubt' in the mind of the President. It was submitted by the learned counsel that the need for a Presidential reference may also arise to impart certainty to certain questions of law or fact which are of such a nature and of such moment as to warrant seeking opinion of this Court. It was urged that a pedantic interpretation, by which a Presidential reference would be declined on semantic considerations, such as the failure to use the word 'doubt' in the reference, should be eschewed. 16. Learned counsel contended that at the stage of making a reference, it is the satisfaction of the President in relation to

[2012] 9 S.C.R.

the nature of the question and its importance that is relevant. As a matter of comity of institutions, this Court has always declined to go behind the reasons that prevailed upon the President to make a reference and its bona fides. Nevertheless, this Court always has the discretion not to answer B any such reference or the questions raised therein for good reasons. It was stressed that since this Court does not sit in review over the satisfaction of the President, the question of jurisdiction and of maintainability does not arise.

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17. Learned counsel also argued that the premise that earlier judgments of this Court are binding in reference jurisdiction, and thus any reference, which impinges upon an earlier judgment should be returned unanswered, is equally fallacious. It was argued that the principle of stare decisis and the doctrine of precedent are generally accepted and followed as rules of judicial discipline and not jurisdictional fetters and, therefore, this Court is not prevented from re-examining the correctness of an earlier decision. On the contrary, the precedents support the proposition that this Court can, when exercising its jurisdiction under Article 143(1 ), examine the correctness of past precedents. According to the learned counsel, in Keshav Singh, this Court did examine the correctness of the judgment in Pandit M.S.M. Sharma Vs. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha & Ors. 12 (hereinafter referred to as "Sharma"). Explaining the ratio of the decision in Cauvery-11, learned counsel submitted that it is clear beyond any pale of doubt that the said pronouncement does not lay down, as an abstract proposition of law, that under Article 143(1 ), this Court cannot consider the correctness of any precedent. What it lays down is that once a lis between the parties is decided, the operative decree can only be opened by way of a review. According to the learned counsel, overruling a judgment - as a precedent - does not tantamount to reopening the decree. 18. Arguing on similar lines, Mr. C.A. Sundaram, learned

H 12. [1959) Supp. 1 S.C.R. 806.

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senior counsel appearing on behalf of FICCI, contended that if the observations in the 2G Case are read as applying to all natural resources and not limited to spectrum, it woulp tantamount to de facto policy formulation by the Court, which is beyond the scope of judicial review. He also took a nuanced stance on this Court's power of reconsideration over its precedents. It was submitted that a precedent can be sliced into two parts viz. the decision or operative part of an order or decree pertaining to the inter partes dispute and the ratio with respect to the position of law; the former being beyond this Court's powers of review once an earlier bench of this Court has pronounced an authoritative opinion on it, but not the latter. He thus, urged that this Court does have the power to reconsider the principles of law laid down in its previous pronouncements even under Article 141. 19. Mr. Darius Khambata, learned Advocate General of Maharashtra, submitted that observations in the 2G Case were made only with regard to spectrum thus, leaving it open to this Court to examine the issue with regard to alienation of other natural resources. It was urged that even if broader observations were made with respect to all natural resources, it would still be open to this Court under Article 143(1) to say otherwise. He also pointed to certain State legislations that prescribe methods other than auction and thus, urged this Court to answer the first question in the negative lest all those legislations be deemed unconstitutional. 20. Mr. Sunil Gupta, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the State of U.P., added that when Article 143(1) of the Constitution unfolds a high prerogative of a constitutional authority, namely, the President, to consult this Court on question of law or fact, it contains a no less high prerogative of this Court to report to the President its opinion on the question referred, either by making or declining to give an answer to the question. In other words, according to the learned counsel, the issue of a reference being maintainable at the instance of the President is an issue different from the judicial power of this Court to

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answer or not to answer the question posed in the reference.

21. Mr. Ravindra Shrivastava, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Chhattisgarh, contended that neither history supports nor reality warrants auction to be a rule of disposal of all natural resources in all situations. He referred to decisions of this Court that unambiguously strike a just balance between considerations of power of the State and duty towards public good, by leaving the choice of method of allocation of natural resources to the State, as long as it conforms to the requirements of Article 14. It was pleaded that C the State be allowed the choice of methodology of allocation, especially in cases where it intends to incentivize investments and job creation in backward regions that would otherwise have been left untouched by private players if resources were given at market prices. 22. To sum up, the objections relating to the maintainability of the Reference converge mainly on the following points: (i) the foundational requirement for reference under Article 143(1) viz. a genuine 'doubt' about questions of fact or law that the E executive labours under, is absent; (ii) the filing and withdrawal of a review petition whose recitals pertain to the 2G Case would be an impediment in the exercise of discretion under Article 143(1); (iii) the language in which the Reference is couched exhibits mala tides on the part of the Executive; (iv) in light of F enunciation of law on the point in Cauvery II, entertaining a Presidential reference on a subject matter, which has been decided upon directly and with finality, is barred; (v) the present Reference is an attempt to overturn the judgment of this Court in the 2G Case, which is against the spirit of Article 143(1) of the Constitution and (vi) the Executive is adopting the route of G this Reference to wriggle out of the directions in the 2G Case as the same are inconvenient for them to follow.

DISCUSSION:

23. Before we evaluate the rival stands on the

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012 [D.K. JAIN, J.]

maintainability of the Reference, it would be necessary to examine the scope and breadth of Article 143 of the Constitution, which reads thus:

"143. Power of President to consult Supreme Court.(1) If at any time it appears to the President that a question 8 of law or fact has arisen, or is likely to arise, which is of such a nature and of such public importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion of the Supreme Court upon it, he may refer the question to that Court for consideration and the Court may, after such hearing as it thinks fit, report C to the President its opinion thereon.

(2) The President may, notwithstanding anything in the proviso to article 131, refer a dispute of the kind mentioned in the said proviso to the Supr.eme Court for opinion and the Supreme Court shall, after such hearing as it thinks fit, D report to the President its opinion thereon." A bare reading at the Article would show that it is couched in broad terms. It is plain from the language of Article 143(1) that it is not necessary that the question on which the opinion of the Supreme Court is sought must have actually arisen. The President can make a reference under the said Article even at an anterior stage, namely, at the stage when the President is satisfied that the question is likely to arise. The satisfaction whether the question meets the pre-requisites of Article 143(1) is essentially a matter for the President to decide. Upon receipt of a reference under Article 143(1 ), the function of this Court is to consider the reference; the question(s) on which the President has made the reference, on the facts as stated in the reference and report to the President its opinion thereon.

24. Nevertheless, the usage of the word "may" in the latter part of Article 1430) implies that this Court is not bound to render advisory opinion in every reference and may refuse to express its opinion for strong, compelling and good reasons. In Keshav Singh, highlighting the difference in the phraseology H

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used in clauses (1) and (2) of Article 143, P.B. Gajendragadkar, C.J., speaking for the majority, held as follows: " ... whereas in the case of reference made under Article 143 (2) it is the constitutional obligation of this Court to make a report on that reference embodying its advisory opinion, in a reference made under Article 143 (1) there is no such obligation. In dealing with this latter class of reference, it is open to this Court to consider whether it should make a report to the President giving its advisory opinion on the questions under reference."

25. Further, even in an earlier judgment in In re: A/location

of Lands and Buildings Situate in a Chief Commissioner's Province and in the matter of Reference by the Governo:-Genera/ under S. 213, Government of India Act, 1935 13, the Federal Court had said that even though the Court is within its authority to refuse to answer a question on a reference, it must be unwilling to exercise its power of refusal "except for good reasons." A similar phrase was used in In Re: The Kera/a Education Bill, 1957 (supra) when this Court observed that opinion on a reference under Article 143(1 ), may be declined in a "proper case" and "for good reasons". In Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui & Ors. (supra), it was added that a reference may not be answered when the Court is not competent to decide the question which is based on expert evidence or is a political one.

26. Having noted the relevant contours of Article 143(1) of the Constitution, we may now deal with the objections to the maintainability of the Reference. 27. There is no denying the fact that in the entire Reference the word 'doubt' has not been used. It is also true that in all previous references, noted in para 5 (supra), it had been specifically mentioned that doubts had arisen about various issues. Nonetheless, the fact remains that Article 143(1) does 13. A.1.R. (30) 1943 FC 13.

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012 [D.K. JAIN, J.]

not use the term 'doubt'. No specific format has been provided in any of the Schedules of the Constitution as to how a reference is to be drawn. The use of the word 'doubt' in a reference is also not a constitutional command or mandate. Needless to emphasise that the expression, 'doubt', which refers to a state of uncertainty, may be with regard to a fact or a principle. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's, The Major Law Lexicon, 4th Edition, the words 'doubt' and 'question' have been dealt with in the following manner:-

"Doubt, Question. These terms express the act of the mind in staying its decision. Doubt lies altogether in the mind; it is a less active feeling than question; by the former we merely suspend decision; by the latter we actually demand proofs in order to assist us in deciding. We may doubt in silence. We cannot question without expressing it directly or indirectly. He who suggests doubts does it with caution: he who makes a question throws in difficuJties with a degree of confidence. We doubt the truth of a position; we question the veracity of an author. (Crabb.)"

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As per the Concise Oxford Dictionary (Tenth Edition), 'question' means : "a doubt; the raising of a doubt or objection; a problem requiring solution". In Black's Law Dictionary 'doubt', as a verb, has been defined as follows:

"To question or hold questionable." The word 'doubt', as a noun, has been described as under:"Uncertainty of mind; the absence of a settled opinion or conviction; the attitude of mind towards the acceptance of or belief in a proposition, theory, or statement, in which the judgment is not at rest but inclines alternately to either side." 28. The afore-extracted recitals of the instant Reference state that in the current circumstances, certain questions of law

[2012] 9 S.C.R.

A with far reaching national and international implications have arisen, including in relation to conduct of the auction and the regulation of the telecommunications industry in accordance with the judgment (2G Case) that may affect the flow of FOi in the telecom industry and otherwise in other sectors into this B country. Thereafter, it is also stated that questions of law that have arisen are of great public importance and are of far reaching consequences for the development of the country and hence, it is thought expedient to obtain the opinion of this Court. Question No.1 of the reference reads as follows:-

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"Whether the only permissible method for disposal of all natural resources across all sectors and in all circumstances is by the conduct of auctions?" 29. At this juncture, reference may profitably be made to the decision in In Re: The Special Courts Bill, 1978 (supra), an opinion by a Bench of seven learned Judges, wherein it was observed as follows: "27. We were, at one stage of the arguments, so much exercised over the undefined breadth of the reference that we were considering seriously whether in the circumstances it was not advisable to return the reference unanswered. But the written briefs filed by the parties and the oral arguments advanced before us have, by their fullness and ability, helped to narrow down the legal controversies surrounding the Bill and to crystallize the issues which arise for our consideration. We propose to limit our opinion to the points specifically raised before us. It will be convenient to indicate at this stage what those points are."

While expressing the hope that, in future, specific questions would be framed for the opinion of this Court, Y.V. Chandrachud (as his Lordship then was), speaking for the majority, said:

"30. We hope that in future, whenever a reference is made to this Court under Article 143 of the Constitution, care will

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012 [D.K. JAIN, J.]

be taken to frame specific questions for the opinion of the A Court. Fortunately, it has been possible in the instant reference to consider specific questions as being comprehended within the terms of the reference but the risk that a vague and general reference may be returned unanswered is real and ought to engage the attention of B those whose duty it is to frame the reference. Were the Bill not as short as it is, it would have been difficult to infuse into the reference the comprehension of the two points mentioned by us above and which we propose to decide. A long Bill would have presented to us a rambling task in c the absence of reference on specific points, rendering it impossible to formulate succinctly the nature of constitutional challenge to the provisions of the Bill." 30. From the afore-extracted paragraphs, three broad principles emerge: (i) a reference should not be vague, general and undefined, (ii) this Court can go through the written briefs and arguments to narrow down the legal controversies, and (iii) when the question becomes unspecific and incomprehensible, the risk of returning the reference unanswered arises. In Keshav Singh, this Court while dealing with the validity of the reference, -referred to earlier decisions and opined as follows: " ... It would thus be seen that the questions so far referred by the President for the Advisory opinion of this Court under Article 143(1) do not disclose a uniform pattern and that is quite clearly consistent with the broad and wide words used in Article 143(1)."

31. An analysis of the afore-noted cases, indicates that neither has a particular format been prescribed nor any specific pattern been followed in framing references. The first principle G relates to the 'form' and the second pertains to the 'pattern of content'. Holistically understood, on the ground of form or pattern alone, a reference is not to be returned unanswered. It requires appropriate analysis, understanding and appreciation of the content or the issue on which doubt is expressed, H

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keeping in view the concept of constitutional responsibility, juridical propriety and judicial discretion. 32. Thus, we find it· difficult to accept the stand that use of the word 'doubt' is a necessary condition for a reference to be maintainable under Article 143(1 ). That apart, in our view, question No.1, quoted above, is neither vague nor general or unspecific, but is in the realm of comprehension which is relatable to a question of law. It expresses a 'doubt' and seeks the opinion of the Court on that question, besides others.

33. In so far as the impact of filing and withdrawal of the review application by the Union of India, against the decision in the 2G Case on the maintainability of the instant Reference is concerned, it is a matter of record that in the review petition, certain aspects of the grounds for review which have been D stated in the recitals of the Reference as well as in some questions, were highlighted. However, there is a gulf of difference between the jurisdiction exercised by this Court in a review and the discretion exercised in answering a reference under Article 143(1) of the Constitution. A review is basically E guided by the well-settled principles for review of a judgment and a decree or order passed inter se parties. The Court in exercise of power of review may entertain the review under the acceptable and settled parameters. But, when an opinion of this Court is sought by the Executive taking recourse to a F constitutional power, needless to say, the same stands on a different footing altogether. A review is lis specific and the rights of the parties to the controversy are dealt with therein, whereas a reference is answered keeping in view the terms of the reference and scrutinising whether the same satisfies the G requirements inherent in the language employed under Article 143(1) of the Constitution. In our view, therefore, merely because a review had been filed and withdrawn and in the recital the narration pertains to the said case, the same would . not be an embargo or impediment for exercise of discretion to answer the Reference.

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34. As far as the allegation of mala fide is concerned, it is trite that this Court is neither required to go into the truth or otherwise of the facts of the recitals nor can it go into the question of bona tides or otherwise of the authority making a reference. [See: In Re: Presidential Poll (supra)]. To put it differently, the constitutional power to seek opinion of this Court rests with the President. The only discretion this Court has is either to answer the reference or respectfully decline to send a report to the President. Therefore, the challenge on the ground of mala fide, as raised, is unsustainable. 35. The principal objection to the maintainability of the Reference is that it is an indirect endeavour to unsettle and overturn the verdict in the 2G Case, which is absolutely impermissible. The stand of the objectors is that the 2G Case is an authoritative precedent in respect of the principle or proposition of law that all natural resources are to be disposed of by way of public auction and, therefore, the Reference should be held as not maintainable. Emphasis in this behalf was on paragraphs 85 and 94 to 96 of the said judgment. In support of the proposition, heavy reliance was placed on Cauvery II.

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36. At the outset, we may note that the learned Attorney General has more than once stated that the Government of India is not questioning the correctness of the directions in the 2G Case, in so far as the allocation of spectrum is concerned, and in fact the Government is in the process of implementing the same, in letter and spirit. Therefore, in the light of the said statement, we feel that it would be unnecessary to comment on the submission that the Reference is an attempt to get an opinion to unsettle the decision and directions of this Court in the 2G Case. Nevertheless, since in support of the aforesaid submission, the opinion of this Court in Cauvery II has been referred to and relied upon in extenso, it would be appropriate to decipher the true ratio of Cauvery II, the lynchpin of the opposition to maintainability of the present Reference. 37. Cauvery II was preceded by State of Tamil Nadu Vs.

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A State of Karnataka & Ors. 14 (hereinafter referred to as "Cauvery I"), which dwelled on the issue whether the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (for short "the Tribunal") had the power to grant interim relief. In that case, applications filed by the State of Tamil Nadu for urgent interim reliefs were rejected by the B Tribunal on the ground that they were not maintainable. This order was challenged, resulting in the judgment dated 26th April, 1991 by this Court, where it was held as follows:

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"15. Thus, we hold that this Court is the ultimate interpreter of the provisions of the Interstate Water Disputes Act, 1956 and has an authority to decide the limits, powers and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal constituted under the Act. This Court has not only the power but obligation to decide as to whether the Tribunal has any jurisdiction or not under the Act, to entertain any interim application till it finally decides the dispute referred to it. .. "

38. The Tribunal had ruled that since it was not like other courts with inherent powers to grant interim relief, only in case {he Central Government referred a case for interim relief to it, E would it have the jurisdiction to grant the same. lnter-alia, the Court observed that the Tribunal was wrong in holding that the Central Government had not made any reference for granting any interim relief, and concluded that the interim reliefs prayed for clearly fell within the purview of the dispute referred by the F Central Government. Accordingly, the appeals preferred by the State of Tamil Nadu were allowed and the Tribunal was directed to decide the applications for interim relief. However, the Court did not decide the larger question of whether a Tribunal, constituted under the Interstate Water Disputes Act, 1956 had G the power to grant an interim relief, though the answer to the same may be deduced from the final direction. 39. In pursuance of these directions, the Tribunal decided the application and vide its order dated 25th June, 1991,

14. 1991 Supp (1) sec 240.

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proceeded to issue certain directions to the State of Karnataka. Thereafter, on 25th July 1991, the Governor of Karnataka issued an Ordinance named "The Karnataka Cauvery Basin Irrigation Protection Ordinance, 1991 ". Hot on the heels of the Ordinarice, the State of Karnataka also instituted a suit under Article 131 of the Constitution against the State of Tamil Nadu for a declaration that the Tribunal's order granting interim relief was without jurisdiction and, therefore, nuli and void, etc. The Ordinance was replaced by Act 27 of 1991. In the context of these developments, the President made a reference to this Court under Article 143(1) of the Constitution, posing three questions for opinion. The third question of the reference, relevant for the present Reference, was :"3. Whether a Water Disputes Tribunal constituted under the Act is competent to grant any interim relief to the parties to the dispute." However, while dealing with the reference in Cauvery II, the Court split the question, viz., whether a Water Disputes Tribunal constituted under the Act is competent to grant any interim relief into two parts: (i) when a reference for grant of interim relief is made to the Tribunal, and (ii) when no such reference is made to it. It was contended by the States of Karnataka and Kerala that if the Tribunal did not have power to grant interim relief, the Central Government would be incompetent to make a reference for the purpose in the first place and the Tribunal in turn would have no jurisdiction to entertain such reference, if made. Dealing with the said submission, after making a reference to the earlier order, this Court observed that once the Central Government had made a reference to the Tribunal for consideration of the claim for interim relief, prayed for by the State of Tamil Nadu, the Tribunal had jurisdiction to consider the said request being a part of the reference itself. Implicit in the said decision was the finding that the subject of interim relief was a matter connected with or relevant to the water dispute within the meaning of Section 5(1) of the said Act. It was held

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that the Central Government could refer the matter for granting interim relief to the Tribunal for adjudication. 40. The consequence of the Court in coming to the conclusion. while replying to the third question was that the Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to make an interim award or grant interim relief, would have not only resulted in the Court overruling its earlier decision between the two contending parties i.e. the two States, but it would have also then required the Court to declare the order of the Tribunal as being without jurisdiction. The Court therefore, said : "83 ... Although this Court by the said decision has kept open the question, viz., whether the Tribunal has incidental, ancillary, inherent or implied power to grant the interim relief when no reference for granf of such relief is made to it, it has in terms concluded the second part of the question. We cannot, therefore, countenance a situation whereby question 3 and for that matter questions 1 and 2 may be so construed as to invite our opinion on the said decision of this Court. That would obviously be tantamount to our sitting in appeal on the said decision which it is impermissible for us to do even in adjudicatory jurisdiction. Nor is it competent for the President to invest us with an appellate jurisdiction over the said decision through a Reference under Article 143 of the Constitution." These observations would suggest that the Court declined to construe Article 143 as a power any different from its adjudicative powers and for that reason, said that what could not be done in the adjudicatory process would equally not be achieved through the process of a reference.

41. The expression, "sitting in appeal" was accurately used. An appellate court vacates the decree (or writ, order or direction) of the lower court when it allows an appeal - which is what this Court was invited to do in Cauvery I. This Court, in H that appeal decided earlier, held that the Tribunal had the

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jurisdiction to pass the interim order sought by the State of Tamil Nadu. To nullify the interim order passed by the Tribunal, pursuant to a direction of the Supreme Court, on the ground that it was without jurisdiction, would necessarily require vacating the direction of the Supreme Court to the Tribunal to exercise its jurisdiction and decide the interim matter. Para 85 of that decision puts the matter beyond any pale of doubt: "85 ... In the first instance, the language of clause (1) of Article 143 far from supporting Shri Nariman's contention is opposed to it. The said clause empowers the President to refer for this Court's opinion a question of law or fact which has arisen or is likely to arise. When this Court in its adjudicatory jurisdiction pronounces its authoritative opinion on a question of law, it cannot be said that there is any doubt about the question of law or the same is res integra so as to require the President to know what the true position of law on the question is. The decision of this Court on a question of law is binding on all courts and authorities. Hence under the said clause the President can refer a question of law only when this Court has not decided it. Secondly, a decision given by this Court can be reviewed only under Article 137 read with Rule 1 of Order 40 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 and on the conditions mentioned therein. When, further, this Court overrules the view of law expressed by it in an earlier case, it does not do so sitting in appeal and exercising an appellate jurisdiction over the earlier decision. It does so in exercise of its inherent power and only in exceptional circumstances such as when the earlier decision is per incuriam or is delivered in the absence of relevant or material facts or if it is manifestly wrong and productive of public mischief. [See: Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1955) 2 SCR 603). Under the Constitution such appellate jurisdiction does not vest in this Court, nor can it be vested in it by the President under Article 143. To accept Shri

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Nariman's contention would mean that the advisory jurisdiction under Article 143 is also an appellate jurisdiction of this Court over its own decision between the same parties and the executive has a power to ask this Court to revise its decision. If such power is read in Article 143 it would be a serious inroad into the independence of judiciary." 42. Eventually, the reference was answered in respect of question No.3 in the following terms:"Question No.3: (i) A Water Disputes Tribunal constituted under the Act is competent to grant any interim relief to the parties to the dispute when a reference for such relief is made by the Central Government;

(ii) whether the Tribunal has power to grant interim relief when no reference is made by the Central Government for such relief is a question which does not arise in the facts and circumstances under which the Reference is made. Hence we do not deem it necessary to answer the same."

43. The main emphasis of Mr. Soli Sorabjee was on the second part of paragraph 85, which, according to him, prohibits this Court from overruling a view expressed by it previously under Article 143(1). We are not persuaded to agree with the r= learned senior counsel. The paragraph has to be read carefully. Sawant J. first considers the case of a "decision" of this Court whereas in the subsequent sentence he considers a "view of law" expressed by the Court, and attempts to explain the difference between the approaches to these two situations. t3 These words are sometimes used interchangeably but not hereinabove. We believe that Justice Sawant consciously draws a difference between the two by using the words 'When, further, this Court overrules the view of law... " after discussing the case of a "decision".

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44. Black's Law Dictionary defines a "decision" as "a determination arrived at after consideration of facts, and, in legal context, law"; an "opinion" as "the statement by a judge or court of the decision reached in regard to a cause tried or argued before them, expounding the law as applied to the case, and detailing the reasons upon which the judgment is based"; and explains the difference between a "decision" and "opinion" as follows: "Decision is not necessarily synonymous with 'opinion'. A decision of the Court is its judgment; the opinion is the reasons given for that judgment, or the expression of the views of the judge." 45. Therefore, references in Para 85 to "decision" and "view of law" must be severed from each other. The learned Judge observes that in case of a decision, the appellate structure is exhausted after a pronouncement by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the only option left to the parties is of review or curative jurisdiction (a remedy carved out in the judgment in Rupa Ashok Hurra Vs. Ash.Ok Hurra & Anr. 15 ). After the exercise of those limited options, the concerned parties have absolutely no relief with regard to the dispute; it is considered settled for eternity in the eyes of the law. However what is not eternal and still malleable in the eyes of law is the opinion or "view of law'' pronounced in the course of reaching the decision. Justice Sawant clarifies that unlike this Court's appellate power, its power to overrule a previous precedent is an outcon:e of its inherent power when he says, " ... it does not do so sitting in appeal and exercising an appellate jurisdiction over the earlier decision. It does so in exercise of its inherent power and only in exceptional circumstances .... " This Court has pointed out the difference between the two expressions in Rupa Ashok Hurra (supra), in the following words:

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"24. There is no gainsaying that the Supreme Court is the 1s. (2002) 4 sec 388.

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court of last resort - the final court on questions both of fact and of law including constitutional law. The law declared by this Court is the law of the land; it is precedent for itself and for all the courts/tribunals and authorities in India. In a judgment there will be declaration of law and its application to the facts of the case to render a decision on the dispute between the parties to the lis. It is necessary to bear in mind that the principles in regard to the highest court departing from its binding precedent are different from the grounds on which a final judgment between the parties, can be reconsidered. Here, we are mainly concerned with the latter. However, when reconsideration of a judgment of this Court is sought the finality attached both to the law declared as well as to the decision made in. the case, is normally brought under challenge ... "

D Therefore, there are two limitations - one jurisdictional and the other self-imposed. 46. The first limitation is that a decision of this Court can be reviewed only under Article 137 or a Curative Petition and E in no other way. It was in this context that in para 85 of Cauvery II, this Court had stated that the President can refer a question of law when this Court has not decided it. Mr. Harish Salve, learned senior counsel, is right when he argues that once a lis between parties is decided, the operative decree can only be F opened in review. Overruling the judgment - as a precedent does not reopen the decree. 47. The second limitation, a self imposed rule of judicial discipline, was that overruling the opinion of the Court on a legal issue does not constitute sitting in appeal, but is done only in G exceptional circumstances, such as when the earlier decision is per incuriam or is delivered in the absence of relevant or material facts or if it is manifestly wrong and capable of causing public mischief. For this proposition, the Court relied upon the judgment in the Bengal Immunity case (su!')ra) wherein it was H held that when Article 141 lays down that the law declared by

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this Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of A India, it quite obviously refers to courts other than this Court; and t.hat the Court would normally follow past precedents save and except where it was necessary to reconsider the correctness of law laid down in that judgment. In fact, the overruling of a principle of law is not an outcome of appellate B jurisdiction but a consequence of its inherent power. This inherent power can be exercised as long as a previous decree vis-a-vis lis inter partes is not affected. It is the attempt to overturn the decision of a previous case that is problematic which is why the Court observes that "under the Constitution such appellate C jurisdiction does not vest in this Court, nor can it be vested in it by the President under Article 143." 48. Therefore, the controversy in Cauvery II was covered by the decision rendered by this Court in Cauvery I between the parties and the decision operated as res judicata and D hence, it was opined that discretion under Article 143(1) could not be exercised. It has also been observed that this Court had analysed the relevant provisions of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 and thereafter had come to the conclusion that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to grant interim relief if the E question of granting interim relief formed part of the reference. On this bedrock it was held that the decision operated as res judicata. It is, therefore, manifest from Cauvery II that the Court was clearly not opposed to clarifying the ratio of a previous judgment in Cauvery I, in the course of an advisory jurjSdiction. F. Afore-extracted para 85 of Cauvery 11, restricts this Court's advisory jurisdiction on the limited point of overturning a decided issue vis-a-vis a 'dispute' or lis inter partes. 49. Finally a seven Judge Bench of this Court has clearly held that this Court, under Article 143(1), does have the power G to overrule a previous view delivered by it. Justice Chandrachud, C.J. in In re: The Special Courts Bill (supra) held:

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"101 ... We are inclined to the view that though it is always open to this Court to re-examine the question already decided by it and to overrule, if necessary, the view earlier taken by it, insofar as all other courts in the territory of India are concerned they ought to be bound by the view expressed by this Court even in the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction under Article 143(1) of the Constitution."

50. There is a catena of pronouncements in which this Court has either explained, clarified or read down the ratio of C previous judgments. In the very first reference, In Re: Delhi Laws Act, 1912 (supra), the reference was made by reason of a judgment of the Federal Court in Jatindra Nath Gupta Vs. The Province of Bihar & Ors. 16 . The background of that reference was explained by Mukherjea, J. as under:

"The necessity of seeking the advisory opinion of this Court is stated to have arisen from the fact that because of the decision of the Federal Court in Jatindra Nath Gupta v. The Province of Bihar, which held the proviso to subsection (3) of Section 1 of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, ultra vires the Bihar Provincial Legislature, by reason of its amounting to a delegation of its legislative powers to an extraneous authority, doubts have arisen regarding the validity of the three legislative provisions mentioned above, the legality of the first and the second being actually called in question in certain judicial proceedings which are pending before some of the High Courts in India." Justice Das in the same opinion, while noting that reliance was placed by learned counsel for the interveners on the judgment of the Federal Court in Jatindra Nath Gupta (supra), recorded that the learned Attorney General had strenuously challenged the correctness of the decision of the majority of the Federal Court in that case. lnter-alia, observing that the reference was 16. [1949-50] F.C.R. 595.

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in a way occasioned by that decision, the learned Judge held as follows: "I feel bound to say, with the utmost humility and for reasons given already, that the observations of the majority of the Federal Court in that case went too far and, in agreement with the learned Attorney-General, I am unable to accept them as correct exposition of the principles relating to the delegation of legislative power." 51. In this context, it would be beneficial to refer to Keshav Singh's case. In the said case, a reference was made by the President which fundamentally pertained to the privileges of the Legislative Assembly and exercise of jurisdiction by a Bench of the High Court. The High Court entertained a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the decision of the Assembly committing one Keshav Singh, who was not one of its members, to prison for its contempt. The issue was whether by entertaining the writ petition, the Judges of the High Court were in contempt of the Legislature for infringement of its privileges and immunities. For the same, this Court proceeded to construe the relevant provisions contained in Article 194(3) and its harmonization with other Articles of the Constitution, especially Articles 19(1 )(a), 21 & 22. In that context, the decision in "Sharma" (supra) came up for consideration. One of the questions that arose in Sharma's case was the impact of Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 on the provisions contained in the latter part of Article 194(3). The majority view was that the privilege in question was subsisting at the relevant time and must, therefore, deemed to be included under the latter part of Article 194(3). It was held that Article 19(1 )(a) did not apply under the rule of harmonious construction, where Article 19(1 )(a) was in direct conflict with Article 194(3). The particular provision in the latter Article would prevail over the general provision contained in the former. It was further held that though Article 21 applied, it had not been contravened. The minority view, on the other hand, held that the privilege in question had

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not been established; even assuming the same was established and it was to be included in the latter part of Article 194(3), yet it must be controlled by Article 19(1)(a) on the ground that Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Part Ill of the Constitution were of paramount importance and must prevail over a B provision like the one contained in Article 194(3) which may be inconsistent with them. The majority decision also commented on the decision in Gunupati Keshavram Reddy Vs. Nafisul Hasan & the State of UP. 17 and observed that the said decision was based entirely on a concession and could not, therefore, be deemed to be a considered decision of this Court.

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52. The decision in Keshavram Reddy (supra) dealt with the applicability of Article 22(2) to a case falling under the latter part of Article 194(3). It is worth noting that the minority opinion of Sharma treated Keshavram Reddy, as expressing a D considered opinion, which was binding on the Court. In Keshav Singh it was opined that in Sharma's case, the majority decision held in terms that Article 21 was applicable to the contents of Article 194(3), but on merits, it came to the conclusion that the alleged contravention had not been proved. E Commenting on the minority view it was opined that it was unnecessary to consider whether Article 21 as such applied because the said view treated all the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Part Ill as paramount, and therefore, each one of them could control the provisions of Article 194(3).

53. At that juncture, the Bench stated that in the case of Sharma, contentions urged by the petitioner did not raise a general issue as to the relevance and applicabili~ of all the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part Ill at all. The contravention of only two Articles was pleaded and they were G Articles 19(1 )(a) and 21. Strictly speaking, it was, therefore, unnecessary to consider the larger issue as to whether the latter part of Article 194(3) was subject to the fundamental rights in general, and indeed, even on the majority view it could not be H 17. AIR 1954 SC 636.

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said that the said view excluded the application of all fundamental rights, for the obvious and simple reason that Article 21 was held to be applicable and the merits of the petitioner's arguments about its alleged contravention in his case were examined and rejected. Therefore, it was not right to read the majority decision as laying down a general proposition that whenever there is a conflict between the provisions of the latter part of Article 194(3) and any of the provisions of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part 111, the latter must always yield to the former. It was further observed that the majority decision had incidentally commented on the decision in Keshavram Reddy's case (supra). Apart from that there was no controversy about the applicability of Article 22 in that case, and, therefore, the comment made by the majority judgment on the earlier decision was partly not accurate. Their Lordships adverted to the facts in Sharma's case wherein the majority judgment had observed that it "proceeded entirely on a concession of counsel and cannot be regarded as a considered opinion on the subject." After so stating, the Bench opined thus: " ... There is no doubt that the first part of this comment is not accurate. A concession was made by the AttorneyGeneral not on a point of law which was decided by the Court, but on a point of fact; and so, this part of the comment cannot strictly be said to be justified. It is, however, true that there is no discussion about the merits of the contention raised on behalf of Mr. Mistry and to that extent, it may have been permissible to the majority judgment to say that it was not a considered opinion of the Court. But, as we have already pointed out, it was hardly necessary for the majority decision to deal with the point pertaining to the.applicability of Article 22(2), because that point did not arise in the proceedings before the Court in Pandit Sharma's case. That is why we wish to make it clear that the obiter observations made in the majority judgment about the validity or correctness of the earlier decision of

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this Court in Gunupati Keshavram Reddy's case should not be taken as having decided the point in question. In other words, the question as to whether Article 22(2) would apply to such a case may have to be considered by this Court if ar,j when it becomes necessary to do so."

54. From the aforesaid decision it is clear that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 143(1) of the Constitution this Court can look into an earlier decision for the purpose of whether the contentions urged in the previous decision did raise C a general issue or not; whether it was necessary to consider the larger issue that did not arise; and whether a general proposition had been laid down. It has also been stated that where no controversy arose with regard to applicability of a particular facet of constitutional law, the comments made in a decision could be treated as not accurate; and further it could D be opined that in an earlier judgment there are certain obiter observations. 55. Thus, in Keshav Singh, a seven-Judge Bench, while entertaining a reference under Article 143(1), dealt with a E previous decision in respect of its interpretation involving a constitutional principle in respect of certain Articles, and proceeded to opine that the view expressed in Shanna's case, in relation to a proposition laid down in Keshavram Reddy's case, was inaccurate.

56. At this stage, it is worthy to refer to Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association and Ors. Vs. Union of lndia 18• J.S. Verma, J., (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the majority, apart from other conclusions relating to appointment of Judges and the Chief Justices, while dealing G with transfer, expressed thus: "(8) Consent of the transferred Judge/Chief Justice is not required for either the first or any subsequent transfer from one High Court to another. H 1a. (1993) 4 sec 441.

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(9) Any transfer made on the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India is not to be deemed to be punitive, and such transfer is not justiciable on any ground. (10) In making all appointments and transfers, the norms indicated must be followed. However, the same do not confer any justiciable right in anyone. (11) Only limited judicial review on the grounds specified earlier is available in matters of appointments and transfers." As far as the ground of limited judicial review is concerned the majority opined thus: "481. These guidelines in the form of norms are not to be construed as conferring any justiciable right in the transferred Judge. Apart from the constitutional requirement of a transfer being made only on the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India, the issue of transfer is not justiciable on any other ground, including the reasons for the transfer or their sufficiency. The opinion of the Chief Justice of India formed in the manner indicated is sufficient safeguard and protection against any arbitrariness or bias, as well as any erosion of the independence of the judiciary. 482 .... Except on the ground of want of consultation with the named constitutional functionaries or lack of any condition of eligibility in the case of an appointment, or of a transfer being made without the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India, these matters are not justiciable on any other ground, including that of bias, which in any case is excluded by the element of plurality in the process of decision-making." 57. In Special Reference No. 1 of 1998, (commonly referred as the "Second Judges Case"), question No. 2 reads as follows:

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"(2) Whether the transfer of Judges is judicially reviewable in the light of the observation of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment that 'such transfer is not justiciable on any ground' and its further observation that limited judicial review is available in matters of transfer, and the extent and scope of judicial review." While answering the same, the Bench opined thus:

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"37. It is to our mind imperative, given the gravity involved in transferring High Court Judges, that the Chief Justice of India should obtain the views of the Chief Justice of the High Court from which the proposed transfer is to be effected as also the Chief Justice of the High Court to which the transfer is to be effected. This is in accord with the majority judgment in the Second Judges case which postulates consultation with the Chief Justice of another High Court. The Chief Justice of India should also take into account the views of one or more Supreme Court Judges who are in a position to provide material which would assist in the process of deciding whether or not a proposed transfer should take place. These views should be expressed in writing and should be considered by the Chief Justice of India and the four seniormost puisne Judges of the Supreme Court. These views and those of each of the four seniormost puisne Judges should be conveyed to the Government of India along with the proposal of transfer. Unless the decision to transfer has been taken in the manner aforestated, it is not decisive and does not bind the Government of India." In the conclusion their Lordships clearly state as follows:

"1. The expression "consultation with the Chief Justice of India" in Articles 217(1) and 222(1) of the Constitution of India requires consultation with a plurality of Judges in the formation of the opinion of the Chief Justice of India. The sole individual opinion of the Chief Justice of India does

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not constitute "consultation" within the meaning of the said articles.

2. The transfer of puisne Judges is judicially reviewable only to this extent: that the recommendation that has been made by the Chief Justice of India in this behalf has not been made in consultation with the four seniormost puisne Judges of the Supreme Court and/or that the views of the Chief Justice of the High Court from which the transfer is to be effected and of the Chief Justice of the High Court to which the transfer is to be effected have not been obtained." 58. From the aforesaid, it is demonstrable that while entertaining the reference under Article 143(1 ), this Court had analysed the principles enunciated in the earlier judgment and also made certain modifications. The said modifications may be stated as one of the mode or method of inclusion by way of modification without changing the ratio decidendi. For the purpose of validity of a reference, suffice it to say, dwelling upon an earlier judgment is permissible. That apart, one cannot be oblivious of the fact that the scope of limited judicial review, in the Second Judges Case, which otherwise is quite restricted, was slightly expanded in the Court's opinion to the Presidential reference. 59. It is of some interest to note that almost every reference, filed under Article 143(1), has witnessed challenge as to its maintainability on one ground or the other, but all the same, the references have been answered, except in Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui & Ors. (supra), which was returned unanswered, mainly on the ground that the reference did not serve a constitutional purpose. 60. From the aforesaid analysis, it is quite vivid that this Court would respectfully decline to answer a reference if it is improper, inadvisable and undesirable; or the questions formulated have purely socio-economic or political reasons,

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A which have no relation whatsoever with any of the provisions of the Constitution or otherwise are of no constitutional significance; or are incapable of being answered; or would not subserve any purpose; or there is authoritative pronouncement of this Court which has already decided the question referred.

61. In the case at hand, it is to be scrutinized whether the 2G Case is a decision which has dealt with and decided the controversy encapsulated in question No. 1 or meets any of the criteria mentioned above. As we perceive, the question involves C interpretation of a constitutional principle inherent under Article 14 of the Constitution and it is of great public importance as it deals with allocation/alienation/disposal/ distribution of natural resources. Besides, the question whether the 2G Case is on authoritative pronouncement in that regard, has to be looked into and only then an opinion can be expressed. For the said D purpose all other impediments do not remotely come into play in the present Reference. 62. We are, therefore, of the view that as long as the decision with respect to the allocation of spectrum licenses is E untouched, this Court is within its jurisdiction to evaluate and clarify the ratio of the judgment in the 2G Case. For the purpose of this stage of argumentation, it needs little emphasis, that we have the jurisdiction to clarify the ratio of the judgment in 2G Case, irrespective of whether we actually choose to do so or F not. Therefore, the fact that this Reference may require us to say something different to what has been enunciated in the 2G Case as a proposition of law, cannot strike at the root of the maintainability of the Reference. Consequently, we reject the preliminary objection and hold that this Reference is G maintainable, notwithstanding its effect on the ratio of the 2G Case, as long as the decision in that case qua lis inter partes is left unaffected.

ON MERITS:

63. This leads us to the merits of the controversy disclosed

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in the questions framed in the Reference for our advisory opinion. 64. As ;:ilready pointed out, the judgment in the 2G Case triggered doubts about the validity of methods other than 'auction' for disposal of natural resources which, ultimately led to the filing. of the present Reference. Therefore, before we proceed to answer question No.1, it is imperative to understand what has been precisely stated in the 2G Case and decipher the law declared in that case.

65. All the counsel agreed that paragraphs 94 to 96 in the said decision are the repository of the ratio vis-a-vis disposal C of natural resources in the 2G Case. On the one hand it was argued that these paragraphs lay down, as a proposition of law, that all natural resources across all sectors, and in all circumstances are to be disposed of by way of public auction, and on the other, it was urged that the observations therein D were made only qua spectrum. Before examining the strength of the rival stands, we may briefly recapitulate the principles that govern the determination of the 'law declared' by a judgment and its true ratio. 66. Article 141 of the Constitution lays down that the 'law declared' by tie Supreme Court is binding upon all the courts within the territory of India. The 'law declared' has to be construed as a principle of law that emanates from a judgment, or an interpretation of a law or judgment by the Supreme Court, upon which, the case is decided. [See: Fida Hussain & Ors. F Vs. Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. 19]. Hence, it flows from the above that the 'law declared' is the principle culled out on the reading of a judgment as a whole in light of the questions raised, upon which the case is decided. [Also see: Ambica Quarry Works Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. 20 and G Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. 21}. In other words, the 'law declared' in a judgment, which 19. (2011) 12 sec 615. 20. (1987) 1 sec 213. 21. (1992) 4 sec 363.

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is binding upon courts, is the ratio decidendi of the judgment. It is the essence of a decision and the principle upon which, the case is decided, which has to be ascertained in relation to the subject-matter of the decision. 67. Each case entails a different set of facts and a decision is a precedent on its own facts: not everything said by a Jud.ge while giving a jl.idgmer1t can be ascribed precedental value. The essence of a decision that binds the parties to the case is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason, it is important to analyse a decision and cull out from it, the ratio decidendi. In the matter of applying precedents, the erudite Justice Benjamin Cardozo in "The Nature of a Judicial Process", had said that "if the judge is to pronounce it wisely, some principles of selection there must be to guide him along all potential judgments that compete for recognition" and "almost invariably his first step is to examine and compare them;" "it is a process of search, comparison and little more" and ought not to be akin to matching "the colors of the case at hand against the colors of many sample cases" because in that case "the man who had the best card index of the cases would also be the wisest judge". Warning against comparing precedents with matching colours of one case with another, he summarized the process, in case the colours don't match, in the following wise words:"lt is when the colors do not match, when the references in the index fail, when there is no decisive precedent, that the serious business of the judge begins. He must then fashion law for the litigants before him. In fashioning it for them, he will be fashioning it for others. The classic statement is Bacon's: "For many times, the things deduced to judgment may be meum and tuum, when the reason and consequence thereof may trench to point of estate. The sentence of today will make the right and wrong of tomorrow."

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68. With reference to the precedential value of decisions, in State of Orissa & Ors. Vs. Md. llliyas 22 this Court observed:

" ... According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates: (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the B direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio C and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. .. " 69. Recently, in Union of India Vs. Amrit Lal Manchanda

& Anr. 23, this Court has observed as follows: " ... Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes."

70. It is also important to read a judgment as a whole keeping in mind that it is not an abstract academic discourse with universal applicability, but heavily grounded in the facts and G circumstances of the case. Every part of a judgment is intricately linked to others constituting a larger whole and thus, must be read keeping the logical thread intact. In this regard, 22. (2006) 1 sec 275. 23. (2004) 3 sec 75.

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in Islamic Academy of Education & Anr. Vs. State of Kamataka & Ors. 24, the Court made the following observations: "The ratio decidendi of a judgment has to be found out only on reading the entire judgment. In fact, the ratio of the judgment is what is set out. in the judgment itself. The answer to the question would necessarily have to be read in the context of what is set out in the judgment and not in isolation. In case of any doubt as regards any observations, reasons and principles, the other part of the judgment has to be looked into. By reading a line here and there from the judgment, one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment." 71. The ratio of the 2G Case must, therefore, be understood and appreciated in light of the above guiding ·principles. 72. In the 2G Case, the Bench framed five questions. Questions No. (ii) and (v) pertain to the factual matrix and are not relevant for settling the controversy at hand. The remaining three questions are reproduced below:

"(i) Whether the Government has the right to alienate, transfer or distribute natural resources/national assets otherwise than by following a fair and transparent method consistent with the fundamentals of the equality clause enshrined in the Constitution?

(iii) Whether the exercise undertaken by DoT from September 2007 to March 2008 for grant of UAS licences to the private respondents in terms of the recommendations made by TRAI is vitiated due to arbitrariness and mala fides and is contrary to public interest?

(iv) Whether the policy of first-come-first-served followed by DoT for grant of licences is ultra vires the provisions of

24. (2003) 6 sec 697.

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Article 14 of the Constitution and whether the said policy was arbitrarily changed by the Minister of Communications and Information Technology (hereinafter referred to as "the Minister of Communications and Information Technology"), without consulting TRAI, with a view to favour some of the applicants?" 73. While dealing with question No.(i), the Court observed that the State is empowered to distribute natural resources as they constitute public property/national assets. Thereafter, the Bench observed as follows: "75 .... while distributing natural resources the State is bound to act in consonance with the principles of equality and public trust and ensure that no action is taken which may be detrimental to public interest. Like any other State action, constitutionalism must be reflected at every stage of the distribution of natural resources. In Article 39(b) of the Constitution it has been provided that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community should be so distributed so as to best subserve the common good, but no comprehensive legislation has been enacted to generally define natural resources and a framework for their protection ... "

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74. The learned Judges adverted to the 'public trust doctrine'. as enunciated in The Illinois Central Railroad Co. Vs.

The People of the State of lllinois 25 ; M. C. Mehta Vs. Kamal Nath & Ors. 26; Jamshed Hormusji Wadia Vs. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai & Anr. 27; Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi Vs. State of A.P. & Ors. 28; Fomento Resorts And Hotels Limited & Anr. Vs. Minguel Martins & Ors. 29 and

25. 36 LED 1018 : 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 26. (1997) 1 sec 388.

21. (2004) 3 sec 214. 28. (2006) 3 sec 549. 29. (2009) 3 sec 571.

[2012] 9 S.C.R.

A Reliance Natural Resources Limited Vs. Reliance Industries Limited3° and held:

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"85. As natural resources are public goods, the doctrine of equality, which emerges from the concepts of justice and fairness, must guide the State in determining the actual mechanism for distribution of natural resources. In this regard, the doctrine of equality has two aspects: first, it regulates the rights and obligations of the State vis-a-vis its people and demands that the people be granted equitable access to natural resources and/or its products and that they are adequately compensated for the transfer of the resource to the private domain; and second, it regulates the rights and obligations of the State vis-a-vis private parties seeking to acquire/use the resource and demands that the procedure adopted for distribution is just, non-arbitrary and transparent and that it does not discriminate between similarly placed private parties."

Referring to the decisions of this Court in Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. 31 E and Sachidanand Pandey & Anr. Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. 32, the Bench ultimately concluded thus:

"89. In conclusion, we hold that the State is the legal owner of the natural resources as a trustee of the people and although it is empowered to distribute the same, the process of distribution must be g'Jided by the constitutional principles including the doctrine of equality and larger public good."

75. On a reading of the above paragraphs, it can be G noticed that the doctrine of equality; larger public good, adoption of a transparent and fair method, opportunity of competition; and avoidance of any occasion to scuttle the claim 30. (2010) 7 sec 1. 31. (2011) s sec 29.

H 32. (1987) 2 sec 295.

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of similarly situated applicants were emphasised upon. While dealing with alienation of natural resources like spectrum, it was stated that it is the duty of the State to ensure that a no11discriminatory method is adopted for distribution and alienation which would necessarily result in the protection of national/public interest. 76. Paragraphs 85 and 89, while referring to the concept of 'public trust doctrine', lay emphasis on the doctrine of equality, which has been segregated into two parts - one is the substantive part and the other is the regulatory part. In the regulatory facet, paragraph 85 states that the procedure adopted for distribution should be just and non-arbitrary and must be guided by constitutional principles including the doctrine of equality and larger public good. Similcirly, in paragraph 89 stress has been laid on transparency and fair opportunity of competition. It is further reiterated that the burden of the State is to ensure that a non-discriminatory method is adopted for distribution and alienation which would n~cessarily result in the protection of national and public interest. 77. Dealing with Questions No.(iii) and (iv) in paragraphs 94 to 96 of the judgment, the Court opined as follows: "94. There is a fundamental flaw in the first-come-firstserved policy inasmuch as it involves an element of pure chance or accident. In matters involving award of contracts or grant of licence or permission to use public property, the invocation of first-come-first-served policy has inherently dangerous implications. Any person who has access to the power corridor at the highest or the lowest level may be able to obtain information ·from the government files c;ir the files of the agency/instrumentality of the State that a 'particular public property or asset is likely to be disposed of or a contract is likely to be awarded or a licence or permission is likely to be given, he would immediately make an application and would

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become entitled to stand first in the queue at the cost of all others who may have a better claim. 95. This Court has repeatedly held that wherever a contract is to be awarded or a licence is to be given, the public authority must adopt a transparent and fair method for making selections so that all eligible persons get a fair opportunity of competition. To put it differently, the State and its agencies/ instrumentalities must always adopt a rational method for disposal of public property and no attempt should be made to scuttle the claim of worthy applicants. When it comes to alienation of scarce natural resources like spectrum, etc. it is the burden of the State to ensure that a non-discriminatory method is adopted for distribution and alienation, which would necessarily result in protection of national/public interest. 96. In our view, a duly .13ublicised auction conducted fairly and impartially is perh~ps the best method for discharging this burden and the methods like first-come-first-served when used for alienation of natural resources/public property are likely to be misused by unscrupulous people who are only interested in garnering maximum financial benefit and have no respect for the constitutional ethos and values. In other words, while transferring or alienating the natural resources, the State is duty-bound to adopt the method of auction by giving wide publicity so that all eligible persons can participate in the process."

78. Our reading of these paragraphs suggests that the Court was not considering the case of auction in general, but specifically evaluating the validity of those methods adopted in G the distribution of spectrum from September 2007 to March 2008. It is also pertinent to note that reference to auction is made in the subsequent paragraph (96) with the rider 'perhaps'. It has been observed that "a duly publicized auction conducted fairly and impartially is perhaps the best method for H discharging this burden." We ;:ire conscious that a judgment is

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not to be read as a statute. but at the same time, we cannot be oblivious to the fact that when it is argued with vehemence that the judgment lays down auction as a constitutional principle, the word "perhaps" gains significance. This suggests that the recommendation of auction for alienation of natural resources was never intended to be taken as an absolute or blanket statement applicable across all natural resowces, but simply a conclusion made at first blush over the attractiveness of a method like auction in disposal of natural resources. The choice of the word 'perhaps' suggests that the learned Judges considered situations requiring a method other than auction as conceivable and desirable. 79. Further, the final conclusions summarized in paragraph 102 of the judgment (SCC) make no mention about auction being the only permissible and intra vires method for disposal of natural resources; the findings are limited to the case of spectrum. In case the Court had actually enunciated, as a proposition of law, that auction is the only permissible method or mode for alienation/allotment of natural resources, the same would have found a mention in the summary at the end of the judgment. 80. Moreover, if the judgment is to be read as holding auction as the only permissible means of disposal of all natural resources, it would lead to the quashing of a large number of laws that prescribe methods other than auction, e.g., the MMRD Act. While dealing with the merits of the Reference, at a later stage, we will discuss whether or not auction can be a constitutional mandate under Article 14 of the Constitution, but for the present, it would suffice to say that no court would ever implicitly, indirectly, or by inference, hold a range of laws as ultra vires the Constitution, without allowing every law to be tested on its merits. One of the most profound tenets of constitutionalism is the presumption of constitutionality assigned to each legislation enacted. We find that the 2G Case does not even consider a plethora of laws and judgments that

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A prescribe methods, other than auction, for dispensation of natural resources; something that it would have done. in case, it intended to make an assertion as wide as applying auction to all natural resources. Therefore, we are convinced that the observations in Paras 94 to 96 could not apply beyond the '3 specific case of spectrum, which according to the law declared in the 2G Case, is to be alienated only by auction and no other method. 81. Thus, having come to the conclusion that the 2G Case C does not deal with modes of allocation for natural resources, other than spectrum, we shall now proceed to answer the first question of the Reference pertaining to other natural resources, as the question subsumes the essence of the entire reference, particularly the set of first five q1Jestions.

82. The President seeks this Court's opinion on the limited point of permissibility of methods other than auction for alienation of natural resources, other than spectrum. The question also harbours several concepts, which were argued before us through the hearing of the Reference, that require to E be answered in order to derive a comprehensive answer to the parent question. Are some methods ultra vires and others intra vires the Constitution of India, especially Article 14? Can disposal through the method of auction be elevated to a Constitutional principle? Is this Court entitled to direct the F executive to adopt a certain method because it is the 'best' method? If not, to what extent can the executive deviate from such 'best' method? An answer to these issues, in turn, will give an answer to the first question which, as noted above, will answer the Presidential Reference.

83. Before proceeding to answer these questions, we would like to dispose of a couple of minor objections. The first pertained to the classification of resources made in the 2G Case. Learned counsel appearing for CPIL argued that all that the judgment in the 2G Case has done is to carve out a special

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012 [D.K. JAIN, J.]

category of cases where public auction is the only legally sustainable method of alienation viz. natural resources that are scarce, valuable and are allotted to private entities for commercial exploitation. The learned Attorney General, however, contested this claim and argued that no such proposition was laid down in the 2G judgment. He pointed out that the words "commercial exploitation" were not even used anywhere in the judgment except in an extract from anothe~ judgment in a different context. We agree that the judgment itself does not carve out any special case for scarce natural resources only meant for commercial exploitation. However, we feel, despite that, in this Reference, CPIL is not barred from making a submission drawing a distinction between natural resources meant for commercial exploitation and those meant for other purposes. This Court has the jurisdiction to classify the subject matter of a reference, if a genuine case for it exists. 84. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel, in support of his stand that the first question of the Reference must be answered in a way so as to allow auction as the only mode for the disposal of natural resources, submitted that a combined reading of Article 14, which dictates non- arbitrariness in State action and equal opportunity to those similarly placed; Article 39(b) which is a Directive Principle of State Policy dealing with distribution of natural resources for the common good of the people; and the "trusteeship" principle found in the Preamble which mandates that the State holds all natural resources in the capacity of a trustee, on behalf of the people, would make auction a constitutional mandate under Article 14 of the Constitution. It is imperative, therefore, that we evaluate each of these principles before coming to any conclusion on the constitutional verdict on auction. 85. In the 2G Case, two concepts namely, "public trust doctrine" and "trusteeship" have been adverted to, which were also relied upon by learned counsel for CPIL, in defence of the argument that the State holds natural resources in a fiduciary relationship with the people. As far as "trusteeship" is

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concerned, there is no cavil that the State holds all natural resources as a trustee of the public and must deal with them in a manner that is consistent with the nature of such a trust. However, what was asserted on behalf of CPIL was that all natural resources fall within the domain of the "public trust B doctrine", and therefore, there is an obligation on the Government to ensure that their transfer or alienation for commercial exploitation is in a fair and transparent manner and only in pursuit of public good. The learned Attorney General on the other hand, zealously urged that the subject matter of the doctrine and the nature of restrictions, it imposes, are of limited scope; that the applicability of the doctrine is restricted to certain common properties pertaining to the environment, like rivers, seashores, forest and air, meant for free and unimpeded use of the general public and the restrictions it imposes is in D the term of a complete embargo on any alienation of such resources, for private ownership. According to him, the extension of the public trust doctrine to all natural resources has led to a considerable confusion and needs to be clarified.

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86. The doctrine of public trust enunciated more thoroughly by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois (supra) was introduced to Indian environmental jurisprudence by this Court in M. C. Mehta (supra). Speaking for the majority, Kuldip Singh, J. observed as follows : "25. The Public Trust Doctrine primarily rests on the principle that certain resources like air, sea, waters and the forests have such a great importance to the people as a whole that it would be wholly unjustified to make them a subject of private ownership. The said resources being a gift of nature, they should be made freely available to everyone irrespective of the status in life. The doctrine enjoins upon the Government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit their use for private ownership or commercial purposes. According to Professor Sax the Public Trust Doctrine imposes the following restrictions on governmental authority:

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012 [D.K. JAIN, J.]

'Three types of restrictions on governmental authority are often thought to be imposed by the public trust: first, the property subject to the trust must not only be used for a public purpose, but it mu.st be held available for use by the general public; second, the property may not be sold, even for a fair cash equivalent; and third the property must be maintained for particular types of uses'."

The learned Judge further observed:"34. Our legal system - based on English common law includes the public trust doctrine as part of its jurisprudence. The State is the trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment. Public at large is the beneficiary of the seashore, running waters, airs, forests and ecologically fragile lands. The State as a trustee is under a legal duty to protect the natural resources. These resources meant for public use cannot be converted into private ownership." 87. The judgment in Kamal Nath's case (supra) was explained in Intellectuals Forum (supra). Reiterating that the State is the trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment, the Court observed thus: "76. The Supreme Court of California, in National Audubon Society Vs. Superior Court of Alpine Country also known as Mono Lake case summed up the substance of the doctrine. The Court said: "Thus the public trust is more than an affirmation of State power to use public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the State to protect the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering the right only in those rare cases when the abandonment of the right is consistent with the purposes of the trust."

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This is an articulation of the doctrine from the angle of the affirmative duties of the State with regard to public trust. Formulated from a negatory angle, the doctrine does not exactly prohibit the alienation of the property held as a public trust. However, when the State holds a resource that is freely available for the use of the public, it provides for a high degree of judicial scrutiny on any action of the Government, no matter how consistent with the existing legislations, that attempts to restrict such free use. To properly scrutinise such actions of the Government, the courts must make a distinction between the Government's general obligation to act for the public benefit, and the special, more demanding obligation which it may have as a trustee of certain public resources ... "

It was thus, held that when the affirmative duties are set D out from a nugatory angle, the doctrine does not exactly prohibit the alienation of property held as a public trust, but mandates a high degree of judicial scrutiny. 88. In Fomento (supra), the Court was concerned with the E access of the public to a beach in Goa. Holding that it was a public beach which could not be privatized or blocked denying traditional access, this Court reiterated the public trust doctrine as follows:

"52. The matter deserves to be considered from another angle. The public trust doctrine which has been invoked by Ms Indira Jaising in support of her argument that the beach in question is a public beach and the appellants cannot privatise the same by blocking/ obstructing traditional access available through Survey No. 803 (new No. 246/2) is implicitly engrafted by the State Government in Clause 4(ix) of the agreement. That doctrine primarily rests on the principle that certain resources like air, sea, waters and the forests have such a great importance to the people as a whole that it would be wholly unjustified to make them a subject of private ownership. These

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resources are gift of nature, therefore, they should be freely available to everyone irrespective of one's status in life." 89. In Reliance Natural Resources (supra), it has been observed that even though the doctrine of pubic trust has been applied in cases dealing with environmental jurisprudence, "it has broader application". Referring to Kamal Nath (supra), the Court held that it is the duty of the Government to provide complete protection to the natural resources as a trustee of the people at large. 90. The public trust doctrine is a specific doctrine with a particular domain and has to be applied carefully. It has been seriously debated before us as to whether the doctrine can be applied beyond the realm of environmental protection. Richard J. Lazarus in his article, "Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine", while expressing scepticism over the 'liberation' of the doctrine, makes the following observations:"The strength of the public trust doctrine necessarily lies in its origins; navigable waters and submerged lands are the focus of the doctrine, and the basic trust interests in navigation, commerce, and fishing are the object of its guarantee of public access. Commentators and judges alike have made efforts to "liberate", "expand", and "modify" the doctrine's scope yet its basic focus remain~ relatively unchanged. Courts still repeatedly return to the doctrine's historical function to determine its present role. When the doctrine is expanded, more often than not the expansions require tortured constructions of the present rather than repudiations of the doctrine's past." However, we feel that for the purpose of the present opinion, it is not necessary to delve deep into the issue as in Intellectuals Forum (supra), the main departure from the principle explained by Joseph. L. Sax in his Article "The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial

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Intervention" is that public trust mandates a high degree of judicial scrutiny, an issue that we will anyway elaborately discuss while enunciating the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution.

91. We would also like to briskly deal with a similar argument made by Mr. Shanti Bhushan. The learned senior counsel submitted that the repository of sovereignty in our framework is the people of this country since the opening words of the Constitution read "We The People of India ... do hereby C adopt, enact and give to ourselves this Constitution," and therefore the government, as the agent of the Sovereign, the people, while alienating natural resources, must heed to judicial care and due process. Firstly, this Court has held in Raja Ram Pal Vs. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha & Ors 33 • that the "Constitution is the supreme lex in this country" and "all organs D of the State derive their authority, jurisdiction and powers from the Constitution and owe allegiance to it". Further, the notion that the Parliament is an agent of the people was squarely rebutted in In Re: Delhi Laws Act, 1912 (supra), where it was observed that "the legislature as a body cannot be seen to be. E an agency of the electorate as a whole" and "acts on its own authority or power which it derives from the Constitution". .

92. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Bir/a Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills, Delhi & Anr34 • this Court held that "the doctrine that it (the Parliament) is a delegate of the people coloured certain American decision does not arise here" and that in fact the "Parliament which by a concentration of all the powers of legislation derived from all the three Legislative Lists becomes the most competent and potent legislature it is G possible to erect under our Constitution." We however, appreciate the concern of Mr. Shanti Bhushan that the lack of any such power in the hands of the people must not be a sanction for recklessness during disposal of natural resources.

33. (2007) 3 sec 184; Para 21.

34. [1968] 3 SCR 251.

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The legislature and the Executive are answerable to the Constitution and it is there where the judiciary, the guardian of the Constitution, must find the contours to the powers of disposal of natural resources, especially Article 14 and Article 39{b).

MANDATE OF ARTICLE 14:

93. Article 14 runs as follows: "14. Equality before law. - The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India." 94. The underlying object of Article 14 is to secure to all persons, citizens or non-citizens, the equality of status and opportunity referred to in the preamble to our Constitution. The language of Article 14 is couched in negative terms and is in form, an admonition addressed to the State. It does not directly purport to confer any right on any person as some of the other Articles, e.g., Article 19, do. The right to equality before law is secured from all legislative and executive tyranny by way of discrimination since the language of Article 14 uses the word "State" which as per Article 12, includes the executive organ. [See: Basheshar Nath Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi & Rajasthan & Anr. 35 ]. Besides, Article 14 is expressed in absolute terms and its effect is not curtailed by restrictions like those imposed on Article 19(1) by Articles 19(2)-(6). 35. 1959 Supp (1) SCR 528- "Coming then to the language of the Article it must be noted, first and foremost that this Article is, in form, an admonition addressed to the State and does not directly purport to confer any right on any person as some of the other Articles, e.g., Article 19, do. The obligation thus imposed on the State, no doubt, ensures for the benefit of all persons, for, as a necessary result of the operation of this Article, they all enjoy equality before the law. That is, however, the indirect, though necessary and inevitable, result of the mandate. The command of the Article is directed to the State and the reality of the obligation thus imposed on the State is the measure of the fundamental right which every person within the territory of India is to enjoy.".

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However, notwithstanding the absence of such restrictions, certain tests have been devised through judicial decisions to test if Article 14 has been violated or not.

95. For the first couple of decades after the establishment of this Court, the 'classification' test was adopted which allowed for a classification between entities as long as it was based on an intelligible differentia and displayed a rational nexus with the ultimate objective of the policy. Budhan Choudhry & Ors. Vs. State of Bihaf3 6 referred to in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmiya C Vs. Shri Justice S.R. Tendo/kar and Ors. 37 explained it in the following terms:

"It is now well established that while article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and, (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of this Court that article 14 condemns discrimination not only by.a substantive law but also by a law of procedure."

96. However, after the judgment of this Court in E.P. G Royappa Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anf3 8 the 'arbitrariness' doctrine was introduced which dropped a pedantic approach 36. AIR 1955 SC 191. 37. (1959] 1 SCR 279.

H 38. (1974) 4 sec 3.

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towards equality and held the mere existence of arbitrariness as violative of Article 14, however equal in its treatment. Justice Bhagwati (as his Lordship was then) articulated the dynamic nature of equality and borrowing from Shakespeare's Macbeth, said that the concept must not be "cribbed, cabined and confined" within doctrinaire limits: "85 .... Now, what is the content and reach of this great equalising principle? It is a founding faith, to use the words of Bose. J., "a way of life", and it must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic or lexicographic approach. We cannot countenance any attempt to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be "cribbed, cabined and confined" within traditional and doctrinaire limits."

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His Lordship went on to explain the length and breadth of Article 14 in the following lucid words: "85 ... From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14, and if it effects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Article 16. Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that State action must be based on valid relevant.principles applicable alike.to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would be denial of equality. Where the operative reason for State action, as distinguished from motive inducing from the antechamber of the mind, is not legitimate and relevant but is extraneous

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and outside the area of permissible considerations, it would amount to mala fide exercise of power and that is hit by Articles 14 and 16. Mala fide exercise of power and arbitrariness are different lethal radiations emanating from the same vice: in fact the latter comprehends the former. Both are inhibited by Articles 14 and 16."

97. Building upon his opinion delivered in Royappa's case (supra), Bhagwati, J., held in Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India & Anr. 39 : C

"The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or nona rbitra ri ness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be "right and just and fair" and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive."

98. In Ajay Hasia & Ors. Vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi &

Ors. , this Court said that the 'arbitrariness' test was lying E "latent and submerged" in the "simple but pregnant" form of Article 14 and explained the switch from the 'classification' doctrine to the 'arbitrariness' doctrine in the following words:

"16 ... The doctrine of classification which is evolved by the courts is not paraphrase of Article 14 nor is it the objective and end of that article. It is merely a judicial formula for determining whether the legislative or executive action in question is arbitrary and therefore constituting denial of equality. If the classification is not reasonable and does not satisfy the two conditions referred to above, the impugned legislative or executive action would plainly be arbitrary and the guarantee of equality under Article 14 would be breached. Wherever therefore there is arbitrariness in State action whether it be of the legislature 39. (1978) 1 sec 248.

H 40. (1981) 1 sec 722.

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or of the executive or of an 'authority' under Article 12, Article 14 immediately springs into action and strikes down such State action. In fact, the concept of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness pervades the entire constitutional scheme and is a golden thread which runs through the whole of the fabric of the Constitution."

99. Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India & Ors. 41 explained the limitations of Article 14 on the functioning of the Government as follows: "12 ... It must, therefore, be taken to be the law that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other forms of largesse, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or norms which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. The power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of largesse including award of jobs, contracts, quotas, licences, etc. must be confined and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and if the Government departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory." 100. Equality and arbitrariness were thus, declared "sworn enemies" and it was held that an arbitrary act would fall foul of the right to equality. Non-arbitrariness was equated with the rule of law about which Jeffrey Jowell in his seminal article "The

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"Rule of law principle primarily applies to the power of implementation. It mainly represents a state-of procedural fairness. When the rule of law is ignored by an official it may on occasion be enforced by courts." 101. As is evident from the above, the expressions 'arbitrariness' and 'unreasonableness' have been used interchangeably and in fact, one has been defined in terms of the other. More recently, in Sharma Transport Vs. Government of A.P. & Ors. 42, this Court has observed thus: "25 ... ln order to be described as arbitrary, it must be shown that it was not reasonable and manifestly arbitrary. The expression "arbitrarily" means: in an unreasonable manner, as fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure, without adequate determining principle, not founded in the nature of things, non-rational, not done or acting according to reason or judgment, depending on the will alone."

102. Further, even though the 'classification' doctrine was never overruled, it has found less favour with this Court as E compared to the 'arbitrariness' doctrine. In Om Kumar & Ors. Vs. Union of lndia 43, this Court held thus:

"59. But, in E.P. Royappa v. State of T. N. Bhagwati, J laid down another test for purposes of Article 14. It was stated that if the administrative action was "arbitrary", it could be struck down under Article 14. This principle is now uniformly followed in all courts more rigorously than the one based on classification. Arbitrary action by the administrator is described as one that is irrational and not based on sound reason. It is also described as one that is unreasonable." 103. However, this Court has also alerted against the arbitrary use of the 'arbitrariness' doctrine. Typically, laws are 42. c2002) 2 sec 188.

H 43. c2001) 2 sec 386.

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struck down for violating Part Ill of the Constitution of India, legislative incompetence or excessive delegation. However, since Royappa's case (supra), the doctrine has been loosely applied. This Court in State of A.P. & Ors. Vs. McDowell & Co. & Ors. 44 stressed on the need for an objective and scientific analysis of arbitrariness, especially while striking down legislations. Justice Jeevan Reddy observed: "43 ... The power of Parliament or for that matter, the State Legislatures is restricted in two ways. A law made by Parliament or the legislature can be struck down by courts on two grounds and two grounds alone, viz., (1) lack of legislative competence and (2) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part Ill of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision. There is no third ground. We do not wish to enter into a discussion of the concepts of procedural unreasonableness and substantive unreasonableness - concepts inspired by the decisions of United States Supreme Court. Even in U.S.A., these concepts and in particular the concept of substantive due process have proved to be of unending controversy, the latest thinking tending towards a severe curtailment of this ground (substantive due process). The main criticism against the ground of substantive due process being that it seeks to set up the courts as arbiters of the wisdom of the legislature in enacting the particular piece of legislation. It is enough for us to say that by whatever name it is characterised, the ground of invalidation must fall within the four corners of the two grounds mentioned above. In other words, say, if an enactment is challenged as violative of Article 14, it can be struck down only if it is found that it is violative of the equality clause/equal protection clause enshrined therein. Similarly, if an enactment is challenged as violative of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by clauses (a) to (g) of Article 19(1 ), it can be struck down 44. (1996) 3 sec 709.

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only if it is found not saved by any of the clauses (s) to (6) of Article 19 and so on. No enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary** or unreasonable. Some or other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. An enactment cannot be struck down on the ground that court thinks it unjustified. Parliament and the legislatures, composed as they are of the representatives of the people, are supposed to know and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good and bad for them. The court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom. In this connection, it should be remembered that even in the case of administrative action, the scope of judicial review is limited to three grounds, viz., (i) unreasonableness, which can more appropriately be called irrationality, (ii) illegality and (iii) procedural impropriety (see Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service which decision has been accepted by this Court as well). **An expression used widely and rather indiscriminately an expression of inherently imprecise import. The extensive use of this expression in India reminds one of what Frankfurter, J said in Hattie Mae Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 87 L ED 610 : 318 US 54 (1943). "The phrase begins life as a literary expression; its felicity leads to its lazy repetition and repetition soon establishes it as a legal formula, undiscriminatingly used to express different and sometimes contradictory ideas", said the learned Judge."

104. Therefore, ever since the Royappa era, the G conception of 'arbitrariness' has not undergone any significant change. Some decisions have commented on the doctrinal looseness of the arbitrariness test and tried keeping its folds within permissible boundaries. For instance, cases where legislation or rules have been struck down as being arbitrary H in the sense of being unreasonable (See: Air India Vs. Nergesh

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Meerza 45 (SCC at pp. 372-373)] only on the basis of "arbitrariness", as explained above, have been doubted in McDowell's case (supra). But otherwise, the subject matter, content and tests for checking violation of Article 14 have remained, more or less, unaltered. 105. From a scrutiny of the trend of decisions it is clearly perceivable that the action of the State, whether it relates to distribution of largesse, grant of contracts or allotment of land, is to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. A law may not be struck down for being arbitrary without the pointing out of a constitutional infirmity as McDowell's case (supra) has said. Therefore, a State action has to be tested for constitutional infirmities qua Article 14 of the Constitution. The action has to be fair, reasonable, nondiscriminatory, transparent, non-capricious, unbiased, without favouritism or nepotism, in pursuit of promotion of healthy competition and equitable treatment. It s.hould conform to the norms which are rational, informed with reasons and guided by public interest, etc. All these principles are inherent in the fundamental conception of Article 14. This is the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

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WHETHER 'AUCTION' A CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE: 106. Such being the constitutional intent and effect of Article 14, the question arises - can auction as a method of disposal of natural resources be declared a constitutional mandate under Article 14 of the Constitution of India? We would unhesitatingly answer it in the negative since any other answer would be completely contrary to the scheme of Article 14. Firstly, Article 14 may imply positive and negative rights for an individual, but with respect to the State, it is only couched in negative terms; like an admonition against the State which prohibits the State from taking up actions that may be arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious or discriminatory. Article 14, 45. (1981) 4 sec 335.

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A therefore, is an injunction to the State against taking certain type of actions rather than commanding it to take particular steps. Reading the mandate of auction into its scheme would thus, be completely contrary to the intent of the Article apparent from its plain language. 107. Secondly, a constitutional mandate is an absolute principle that has to be applied in all situations; it cannot be applied in some and not tested in others. The absolute principle is then applied on a case by case basis to see which actions fulfill the requirements of the constitutional principle and which C do not.

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108. Justice K. Subba Rao in his lectures compiled in book titled "Some Constitutional Problems''. critically analyzing the trends of Indian constitutional development, stated as follows:

"If the Courts, instead of limiting the scope of the articles by construction, exercise their jurisdiction in appropriate cases, I have no doubt that the arbitrariness of the authorities will be minimised. If these authorities entrusted with the discretionary powers, realize that their illegal orders infringing the rights of the people would be quashed by the appropriate authority, they would rarely pass orders in excess of their powers. If they knew that not only the form but the substance of the orders would be scrutinized in open court, they would try to keep within their bounds. The fear of ventilation of grievance in public has always been an effective deterrent. The apprehension that the High Courts would be swamped with writs has no basis."

109. Similar sentiments were expressed by Justice K. K. G Mathew in series of lectures incorporated in the form of a book titled "Democracy, Equality and Freedom" in which it is stated that "the strength of judicial review lies in case to case adjudication." This is precisely why this Court in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharti Sripadagalvaru Vs. State of Kera/a &

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Anr46 . quoting from an American decision, observed as follows:

"1695 ... The reason why the expression "due process" has never been defined is that it embodies a concept of fairness which has to be decided with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case and also according to the mores for the time being in force in a society to which the concept has to be applied. As Justice Frankfurter said, "due process" is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances [See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath 341 U.S. 123]". 110. Equality, therefore, cannot be limited to mean only auction, without testing it in every scenario. In The State of West Bengal Vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar47 , this Court, quoting from Kotch Vs. Pilot Comm'rs48 , had held that "the constitutional command for a State to afford equal protection of the laws ·sets a goal not attainable by the invention and application of a precise formula. This Court has never attempted that impossible task". One cannot test the validity of a law with reference to the essential elements of ideal democracy, actually incorporated in the Constitution. (See: Indira Nehru Gandhi Vs. Raj Narain4 9 ). The Courts are not at liberty to declare a statute void; because in their opinion it is opposed to the spirit of the Constitution. Courts cannot declare a limitation or constitutional requirement under the notion of having discovered some ideal norm. Further, a constitutional principle must not be limited to a precise formula but ought to be an abstract principle applied to precise situations. The repercussion of holding auction as a constitutional mandate would be the voiding of every action that deviates from it, including social endeavours, welfare schemes

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46. (1973) 4 sec 225. 47. 1952 SCR 284 at pp. 297. 48. 330 U.S. 552. 49. 1975 (Supp) sec 1.

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A and promotional policies, even though CPIL itself has argued against the same, and asked for making auction mandatory only in the alienation of scarce natural resources meant for private and commercial business ventures. It would be odd to derive auction as a constitutional principle only for a limited set B of situations from the wide and generic declaration of Article 14. The strength of constitutional adjudication lies in case to case adjudication and therefore auction cannot be elevated to a constitutional mandate. C

111. Finally, reading auction as a constitutional mandate would be impermissible because such an approach may distort another constitutional principle embodied in Article 39(b). The said article enumerating certain principles of policy, to be followed by the State, reads as follows:

"The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing -

(a)

(b)

that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good;

"

The disposal of natural resources is a facet of the use and distribution of such resources. Article 39(b) mandates that the ownership and control of natural resources should be so distributed so as to best subserve the common good. Article 37 provides that the provisions of Part IV shall not be G enforceable by any Court, but the principles laid down therein are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to cipply these principles in making laws. 112. Therefore, this Article, in a sense, is a restriction on H 'distribution' built into the Constitution. But the restriction is

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imposed on the object and not the means. The overarching and underlying principle governing 'distribution' is furtherance of common good. But for the achievement of that objective, the Constitution uses the generic word 'distribution'. Distribution has broad contours and cannot be limited to meaning only one method i.e. auction. It envisages all such methods available for distribution/allocation of natural resources which ultimately subserve the "common good". 113. In State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. Vs. L. Abu Kavur Bai & Ors. 50, this Court explained the broad-based concept of

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'distribution' as follows: "89 .... The word 'distribution' used in Article 39(b) must be broadly construed so that a court may give full and comprehensive effect to the statutory intent contained in Article 39 (b). A narrow construction of the word 'distribution' might defeat or frustrate the very object which the Article seeks to subserve ... " 114. After noting definitions of 'distribution' from different dictionaries, this Court held: "92. It is obvious, therefore, that in view of the vast range of transactions contemplated by the word 'distribution' as mentioned in the dictionaries referred to above, it will not be correct to construe the word 'distribution' in a purely literal sense so as to mean only division of a particular kind or to particular persons. The words, apportionment, allotment, allocation, classification, clearly fall within the broad sweep of the word 'distribution'. So construed, the word 'distribution' as used in Article 39(b) will include various facets, aspects, methods and terminology of a broad-based concept of distribution ... "

115. It can thus, be seen from the afore-quoted paragraphs that the term "distribute" undoubtedly, has wide 50. (1984) 1 sec 515.

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amplitude and encompasses all manners and methods of distribution, which would include classes, industries, regions, private and public sections, etc. Having regard to the basic nature of Article 39(b}, a narrower concept of equality under Article 14 than that discussed above, may frustrate the broader B concept of distribution, as conceived in Article 39(b). There cannot, therefore, be a cavil that "common good' and "larger public interests" have to be regarded as constitutional reality deserving actualization.

116. Learned counsel for CPIL argued that revenue C maximization during the sale or alienation of a natural resource for commercial exploitation is the only way of achieving public good since the revenue collected can be channelized to welfare policies and controlling the burgeoning deficit. According to the learned counsel, since the best way to maximize revenue is D through the route of auction, it becomes a constitutional principle even under Article 39(b}. However, we are not persuaded to hold so. Auctions may be the best way of maximizing revenue but revenue maximization may not always be the best way to subserve public good. "Common good" is E the sole guiding factor under Article 39(b} for distribution of natural resources. It is the touchstone of testing whether any policy subserves the "common good" and if it does, irrespective of the means adopted, it is clearly in accordance with the principle enshrined in Article 39(b).

117. In The State of Karnataka and Anr. Vs. Shri Ranganatha Reddy and Anr. 51 , Justice Krishna lysr observed that keeping in mind the purpose of an Article like 39(b), a broad rather than a narrow meaning should be given to the G words of that Article. In his inimitable style, his Lordship opined thus: "83. Two conclusions strike us as quintessential. Part IV, especially Article 39(b} and (c), is a futuristic mandate to H 51. (1977) 4 sec 471.

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the state with a message of transformation of the economic and social order. Firstly, such change calls for collaborative effort from all the legal institutions of the system: the legislature, the judiciary and the administrative machinery. Secondly and consequentially, loyalty to the high purpose of the Constitution, viz., social and economic justice in the context of material want and utter inequalities on a massive scale, compels the court to ascribe expansive meaning to the pregnant words used with hopeful foresight, not to circumscribe their connotation into contradiction of the objectives inspiring the provision. To be Pharisaic towards the Constitution through ritualistic construction is to weaken the social-spiritual thrust of the founding fathers' dynamic faith." 118. In the case of Bennett Coleman & Co. and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors52 ., it has been held by this Court that "the only norm which the Constitution furnishes for distribution of material resources of the community is elastic norm of common good." Thus "common good" is a norm in Article 39(b) whose applicability was considered by this Court on the facts of the case. Even in that case, this Court did not evolve economic criteria of its own to achieve the goal of "common good" in Article 39(b), which is part of the Directive Principles. 119. The norm of "common good" has to be understood and appreciated in a holistic manner. It is obvious that the manner in which the common good is best subserved is not a matter that can be measured by any constitutional yardstick it would depend on the economic and political philosophy of the government. Revenue maximization is not the only way in which the common gooq can be subserved. Where revenue maximization is the object of a policy, being considered qua that resource at that point of time to be the best way to subserve the common good, auction would be one of the preferable methods, though not the only method. Where revenue s2. (1972) 2 sec 788.

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maximization is not the object of a policy of distribution, the question of auction would not arise. Revenue considerations may assume secondary consideration to developmental considerations.

120. Therefore, in conclusion, the submission that the mandate of Article 14 is that any disposal of a natural resource

for commercial use must be for r>·venue maximization, and thus by auction, is based neither on law nor on logic. There is no constitutional imperative in ti1e matter of economic policiesArticle 14 does not pre-define any economic policy as a C constitutional mandate. Even the mandate of 39(b) imposes no restrictions on the means adopted to subserve the public good and uses the broad term 'distribution', suggesting that the methodology of distribution is not fixed. Economic logic establishes that alienation/allocation of natural resources to the D highest bidder may not necessarily be the only way to subseNe the common good, and at times, may run counter to public good. Hence, it needs little emphasis that disposal of all natural resources through auctions is clearly not a constitutional mandate. LEGITIMATE DEVIATIONS FROM AUCTION

121. As a result, this Court has, on a number of occasions,

delivered judgments directing means for disposal of natural resources other than auction for different resources in different circumstances. It would be profitable to refer to a few cases and appreciate the reasons this Court has adopted for deviating from the method of auction.

122. In M/s Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy Vs. State of G Jammu & Kashmir & Anr. 53 , while comparing the efficacy of auction in promoting a domestic industry, P.N. Bhagwati, J. observed: "22 .... If the State were giving tapping contract simpliciter

53. (1980) 4 sec 1.

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there can be no doubt that the State would have to auction or invite tenders for securing the highest price, subject, of course, to any other relevant overriding considerations of public weal or interest, but in a case like this where the State is allocating resources such as water, power, raw materials etc. for the purpose of encouraging setting up of industries within the State, we do not think the State is bound to advertise and tell the people that it wants a particular industry to be set up within the State and invite those interested to come up with proposals for the purpose. The State may choose to do so, if it thinks fit and in a given situation, it may even turn out to be advantageous for the State to do so, but if any private party comes before the State and offers to set up an industry, the State would not be committing breach of any constitutional or legal obligation if it negotiates with such party and agrees to provide resources and other facilities for the purpose of setting up the industry. The State is not obliged to tell such party: "Please wait I will first advertise, wee whether any other offers are forthcoming and then after considering all offers, decide whether I should let you set up the industry" ... The State must be free in such a case to negotiate with a private entrepreneur with a view to inducing him to set up an industry within the State and if the State enters into a contract with such entrepreneur for providing resources and other facilities for setting up an industry, the contract cannot be assailed as invalid so long as the State has acted bona fide, reasonably and in public interest. If the terms and conditions of the contract or the surrounding circumstances show that the State has acted mala fide or out of improper or corrupt motive or in order to promote the private interests of someone at the cost of the State, the court will undoubtedly interfere and strike down State action as arbitrary, unreasonable or contrary to public interest. But so long as the State action is bona fide and reasonable, the court will not interfere merely on

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the ground that no advertisement was given or publicity made or tenders invited." 123. In Sachidanand Pandey (supra) after noticing Kasturi Lal's case (supra), it was concluded as under:

"40. On a consideration of the relevant cases cited at the Bar the following propositions may be taken as well established: State-owned or public-owned property is not to be dealt with at the absolute discretion of the executive. Certain precepts and principles have to be observed. Public interest is the paramount consideration. One of the methods of securing the public interest, when it is considered necessary to dispose of a property, is to sell the property by public auction or by inviting tenders. Though that is the ordinary rule, it is not an invariable rule. There may be situations where there are compelling reasons necessitating departure from the rule but then the reasons for the departure must be rational and should not be suggestive of discrimination. Appearance of public justice is as important as doing justice. Nothing should be done which gives an appearance of bias, jobbery or nepotism."

124. In Haji T.M. Hassan Rawther Vs. Kera/a Financial Corpn. 54, after an exhaustive review of the law including the decisions in Kasturi Lal (supra) and Sachidanand Pandey (supra), it was held that public disposal of State owned properties is not the only rule. It was, inter-alia, observed that:

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"14. The public property owned by the State or by any instrumentality of the State should be generally sold by public auction or by inviting tenders. This Court has been insisting upon that rule, not only to get the highest price for the property but also to ensure fairness in the activities of the State and public authorities. They should undoubtedly act fairly. Their actions should be legitimate. Their dealings

H 54. (1988) 1 sec 166.

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should be aboveboard. Their transactions should be without aversion or affection. Nothing should be suggestive of discrimination. Nothing should be done by them which gives an impression of bias, favouritism or nepotism. Ordinarily these factors would be absent if the matter is brought to public auction or sale by tenders. That is why the court repeatedly stated and reiterated that the Stateowned properties are required to be disposed of publicly. But that is not the only rule. As 0. Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed "that though that is the ordinary rule, it is not an invariable rule". There may be situations necessitating departure from the rule, but then such instances must be justified by compulsions and not by compromise. It must be justified by compelling reasons and not by just convenience."

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Here, the Court added to the previous decisions and said that a blithe deviation from public disposal of resources would not be tolerable; such a deviation must be justified by compelling reasons and not by just convenience.

125. In M.P. Oil Extraction and Anr. Vs. State of M.P. & Ors. , this Court held as follows:

"45. Although to ensure fair play and transparency in State action, distribution of largesse by inviting open tenders or by public auction is desirable, it cannot be held that in no case distribution of such largesse by negotiation is permissible. In the instant case, as a policy decision protective measure by entering into agreements with selected industrial units for assured supply of sal seeds at concessional rate has been taken by the Government. The rate of royalty has also been fixed on some accepted principle of pricing formula as will be indicated hereafter. Hence, distribution or allotment of sal seeds at the determined royalty to the respondents and other units 55. (1997) 1 sec 592.

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covered by the agreements cannot be assailed. It is to be appreciated that in this case. distribution by public auction or by open tender may not achieve the purpose of the policy of protective measure by way of supply of sal seeds at concessional rate of royalty to the industrial units covered by the agreements on being selected on valid and objective considerations."

126. In Netai Bag & Ors. Vs. State of WB. & Ors. 56, this Court observed that non- floating of tenders or not holding of public auction would, not in all cases, be deemed to be the C result of the exercise of the executive power in an arbitrary manner. It was stated:

"19 .... There cannot be any dispute with the proposition that generally when any State land is intended to be transferred or the State largesse decided to be conferred, resort should be had to public auction or transfer by way of inviting tenders from the people. That would be a sure method of guaranteeing compliance with the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution. Non-floating of tenders or not holding of public auction would not in all cases be deemed to be the result of the exercise of the executive power in an arbitrary manner. Making an exception to the general rule could be justified by the State executive, if challenged in appropriate proceedings. The constitutional courts cannot be expected to presume the alleged irregularities, illegalities or unconstitutionality nor the courts can substitute their opinion for the bona fide opinion of the State executive. The courts are not concerned with the ultimate decision but only with the fairness of the decisionmaking process. This Court once again pointed out that there can be exceptions from auction; the ultimate test is only that of fairness of the decision making process and compliance with Article 14 of the Constitution.

56. c2000)

a sec 262.

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127. In M & T Consultants, Secunderabad Vs. S. Y. Nawab 57 , this Court again reiterated that non- floating of tenders does not always lead to the conclusion that the exercise of the power is arbitrary:

"17. A careful and dispassionate assessment and consideration of the materials placed on record does not leave any reasonable impression, on the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, that anything obnoxious which requires either public criticism or condemnation by courts of law had taken place. It is by now well settled that nonfloating of tenders or absence of public auction or invitation C alone is no sufficient reason to castigate the move or an action of a public authority as either arbitrary or unreasonable or amounting to mala fide or improper exercise or improper abuse of power by the authority concerned. Courts have always leaned in favour of D sufficient latitude being left with the authorities to adopt their own techniques of management of projects with concomitant economic expediencies depending upon the exigencies of a situation guided by appropriate financial policy in the best interests of the authority motivated by E public interest as well in undertaking such ventures." 128. In Villianur lyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam Vs. Union of India & Ors. 58, a three Judge Bench of this Court was concerned with the development of the Port of Pondicherry where a contractor had been selected without floating a tender or holding public auction. It was held as under:

"164. The plea raised by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Government of Pondicherry was arbitrary and unreasonable in switching the whole public G tender process into a system of personal selection and, therefore, the appeals should be accepted, is devoid of 57. (2003) a sec 100. 58. (2009) 7 sec 561.

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merits. It is well settled that non-floating of tenders or not holding of public auction would not in all cases be deemed to be the result of the exercise of the executive power in an arbitrary manner. 171. In a case like this where the State is allocating resources such as water, power, raw materials, etc. for the purpose of encouraging development of the port, this Court does not think that the State is bound to advertise and tell the people that it wants development of the port in a particular manner and invite those interested to come up with proposals for the purpose. The State may choose to do so if it thinks fit and in a given situation it may turn out to be advantageous for the State to do so, but if any private party comes before the State and offers to develop the port, the State would not be committing breach of any constitutional obligation if it negotiates with such a party and agrees to provide resources and other facilities for the purpose of development of the port." 129. Hence, it is manifest that there is no constitutional mandate in favour of auction under Article 14. The Government has repeatedly deviated from the course of auction and this Court has repeatedly upheld such actions. The judiciary tests such deviations on the limited scope of arbitrariness and fairness under Article 14 and its role is limited to that extent. Essentially whenever the object of policy is anything but revenue maximization, the Executive is seen to adopt methods other than auction. 130. A fortiori, besides legal logic, mandatory auction may be contrary to economic logic as well. Different resources may require different treatment. Very often, exploration and exploitation contracts are bundled together due to the requirement of heavy capital in the discovery of natural resources. A concern would risk undertaking such exploration and incur heavy costs only if it was assured utilization of the resource discovered; a prudent business venture, would not like

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to incur the high costs involved in exploration activities anu then compete for that resource in an open auction. The logic is similar to that applied in patents. Firms are given incentives to invest in research and development with the promise of exclusive access to the market for the sale of that invention. Such an approach is economically and legally sound and sometimes necessary to spur research and development. Similarly, bundling exploration and exploitation contracts may be necessary to spur growth in a specific industry.

131. Similar deviation from auction cannot be ruled out when the object of a State policy is to promote domestic development of an industry, like in Kasturi Lal's case, discussed above. However, these examples are purely illustrative in order to demonstrate that auction cannot be the sole criteria for alienation of all natural resources.

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POTENTIAL OF ABUSE 132. It was also argued that even if the method of auction is not a mandate under Article 14, it must be the only permissible method, due to the susceptibility of other methods to abuse. This argument, in our view, is contrary to an established position of law on the subject cemented through a catena of decisions. 133. In R.K. Garg Vs. Union of India & Ors. 59, Justice P. N. Bhagwati, speaking for a Constitution Bench of five learned Judges, held: "8 .... The Court must always remember that "legislation is directed to practical problems, that the economic mechanism is highly sensitive and complex, that many problems are singular and contingent, that laws are not abstract propositions and do not relate to abstract units and are not to be measured by abstract symmetry"; "that exact wisdom and nice adaption of remedy are not always 59. (1981) 4 sec 675.

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possible" and that "judgment is largely a prophecy based on meager and uninterpreted experience". Every legislation particularly in economic matters is essentially empiric and it is based on experimentation or what one may call trial and error method and therefore it cannot provide for all possible situations or anticipate all possible abuses. There may be crudities and inequities in complicated experimental economic legislation but on that account alone it cannot be struck down as invalid. The courts cannot, as pointed out by the United States Supreme Court in Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Reig Refining Company6° be converted into tribunals for relief from such crudities and inequities. There may even be possibilities of abuse, but that too cannot of itself be a ground for invalidating the legislation, because it is not possible for any legislature to anticipate as if by some divine prescience, distortions and abuses of its legislation which may be made by those subject to its provisions and to provide against such distortions and abuses. Indeed, howsoever great may be the care bestowed on its framing, it is difficult to conceive of a legislation which is not capable of being abused by perverted human ingenuity. The Court must therefore adjudge the constitutionality of such legislation by the generality of its provisions and not by its crudities or inequities or by the possibilities of abuse of any of its provisions. If any crudities, inequities or possibilities of abuse come to light, the legislature Gan always step in and enact suitable amendatory legislation. That is the essence of pragmatic approach which must guide and inspire the legislature in dealing with complex economic issues."

134. Then again, in D. K. Trivedi & Sons & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. 61 , while upholding the constitutional validity 60. 94 L Ed 381 : 338 US 604 (1950).

61. (1986) Supp sec 20.

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of Section 15(1) of the MMRD Act, this Court explained the principle in the following words: "50. Where a statute confers discretionary powers upon the executive or an administrative authority, the validity or constitutionality of such power cannot be judged on the assumption that the executive or such authority will act in an arbitrary manner in the exercise of the discretion conferred upon it. If the executive or the administrative authority acts in an arbitrary manner, its action would be bad in law and liable to be struck down by the courts but the possibility of abuse of power or arbitrary exercise of power cannot invalidate the statute conferring the power or the power which has been conferred by it." 135. Therefore, a potential for abuse cannot be the basis for striking down a method as ultra vires the Constitution. It is the actual abuse itself that must be brought before the Court for being tested on the anvil of constitutional provisions. In fact, it may be said that even auction has a potential of abuse, like any other method of allocation, but that cannot be the basis of declaring it as an unconstitutional methodology either. These drawbacks include cartelization, "winners curse" (the phenomenon by which a bidder bids a higher, unrealistic and unexecutable price just to surpass the competition; or where a bidder, in case of multiple auctions, bids for all the resources and ends up winning licenses for exploitation of more resources than he can pragmatically execute), etc. However, all the same, auction cannot be called ultra vires for the said reasons and continues to be an attractive and preferred means of disposal of natural resources especially when revenue maximization is a priority. Therefore, neither auction, nor any other method of disposal can be held ultra vires the Constitution, merely because of a potential abuse.

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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF POLICY DECISIONS 136. The learned Attorney General also argued that

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dictating a method of distribution for natural resources violates the age old established principle of non-interference by the judiciary in policy matters. Even though the contours of the power of judicial review of policy decisions has become a trite subject, as the Courts have repeatedly delivered opinions on B it, we wish to reiterate some of the principles in brief, especially with regard to economic policy choices and pricing. 137. One of the earliest pronouncements on the subject came from this Court in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper Vs. Union of lndia 62 (commonly known as "Bank Nationalization Case") C wherein this Court held that it is not the forum where conflicting policy claims may be debated; it is only required to adjudicate the legality of a measure which has little to do with relative merits of different political and economic theories. The Court observed: "63. This Court is not the forum in which these conflicting claims may be debated. Whether there is a genuine need for banking facility in the rural sector, whether certain classes of the community are deprived of the benefit of the resources of the banking industry, whether administration by the Government of the commercial banking sector will not prove beneficial to the community and will lead to rigidity in the administration, whether the Government administration will eschew the profit-motive, and even if it be eschewed, there will accrue substantial benefits to the public, whether an undue accent on banking as a means of social regeneration, especially in the backw~rd areas, is a doctrinaire approach to a rational order of priorities for attaining the national objectives enshrined in our Constitution, and whether the policy followed by the Government in office or the policy propounded by its opponents may reasonably attain the national objectives are matters which have little relevance in determining the legality of the measure. It is again not for this Court to

62. (1970) 1 sec 248.

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012 [D.K. JAIN, J.]

consider the relative merits of the different political theories or economic policies. The Parliament has under Entry 45, List I the power to legislate in respect of banking and other commercial activities of the named banks necessarily incidental thereto: it has the power to legislate for acquiring the undertaking of the named banks under Entry 42, List Ill. Whether by the exercise of the power vested in the Reserve Bank under the pre-existing laws, results could be achieved which it is the object of the Act to achieve, is, in our judgment, not relevant in considering whether the Act amounts to abuse of legislative power. This Court has the power to strike down a law on the ground of want of authority, but the Court will not sit in appeal over the policy of the Parliament in enacting a law. The Court cannot find fault with the Act merely on the ground that it is inadvisable to take over the undertaking of banks which, it is said by the petitioner, by thrift and efficient management had set up an impressive and efficient business organization serving large sectors of industry." 138. In R.K. Garg (supra), this Court even observed that greater judicial deference must be shown towards a law relating to economic activities due to the complexity of economic problems and their fulfillment through a methodology of trial and error. As noted above, it was also clarified that the fact that an economic legislation may be troubled by crudities, inequities, uncertainties or the possibility of abuse cannot be the basis for striking it down. The following observations which refer to a couple of American Supreme Court decisions are a limpid enunciation on the subject : "8. Another rule of equal importance is that laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion etc. It has been said by no less a person than Holmes, J., that the legislature should be allowed some play in the joints, because it has to deal with

c

E.

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complex problems which do not admit of solution through any doctrinaire or strait-jacket formula and this is particularly true in case of legislation dealing with economic matters, where, having regard to the nature of the problems required to be dealt with, greater play in the joints has to be allowed to the legislature. The court should feel more inclined to give judicial deference to legislative judgment in the field of economic regulation than in other areas where fundamental human rights are involved. Nowhere has this admonition been more felicitously expressed than in Morey v. Doud63 where Frankfurter, J., said in his inimitable style: 'In the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial self-restraint if not judicial deference to legislative judgment. The legislature after all has the affirmative responsibility. The courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct. When these are added to the complexity of economic regulation, the uncertainty, the liability to error, the bewildering conflict of the experts, and the number of times the judges have been overruled by events - self-limitation can be seen to be the path to judicial wisdom and institutional prestige and stability' ... "

139. In Premium Granites & Anr. Vs. State of TN. & Ors. 64 this Court clarified that it is the validity of a law and not its efficacy that can be challenged: "54. It is not the domain of the court to embark upon unchartered ocean of public policy in an exercise to consider as to whether a particular public policy is wise or a better public policy can be evolved. Such exercise must be left to the discretion of the executive and 63. 354 us 457.

[2012] 9 S.C.R.

64. (1994) 2 sec 691.

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012 [D.K. JAIN, J.]

legislative authorities as the case may be. The court is called upon to consider the validity of a public policy only when a challenge is made that such policy decision infringes fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India or any other statutory right..." 140. In Delhi Science Forum & Ors. Vs. Union oflndia & Anfl . a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court, while rejecting a claim against the opening up of the telecom sector reiterated that the forum for debate and discourse over the merits and demerits of a policy is the Parliament. It restated that the services of this Court are not sought till the legality of the policy is disputed, and further, that no direction can be given or be expected from the courts, unless while implementing such policies, there is violation or infringement of any of the constitutional or statutory provisions. It held thus:

C

"7. What has been said in respect of legislations is applicable even in respect of policies which have been adopted by Parliament. They cannot be tested in Court of Law. The courts cannot express their opinion as to whether at a particular juncture or under a particular situation prevailing in the country any such national policy should have been adopted or not. There may be views and views, opinions and opinions which may be shared and believed by citizens of the country including the representatives of the people in Parliament. But that has to be sorted out in Parliament which has to approve such policies ... "

141. In BALCO Employees' Union (Regd.) Vs. Union of India & Ors. 66 , this Court further pointed out that the Court ought to stay away from judicial review of efficacy of policy matters, not only because the same is beyond its jurisdiction, but also G because it lacks the necessary expertise required for such a task. Affirming the previous views of this Court, the Court 65. (1996) 2 sec 405. 66. (2002) 2 sec 333.

[2012] 9 S.C.R.

A observed that while dealing with economic legislations, the

Courts, while not jettisoning its jurisdiction to curb arbitrary action or unconstitutional legislation, should interfere only in those cases where the view reflected in the legislation is not possible to be taken at all. The Court went on to emphasize that unless the economic decision, based on economic expediencies, is demonstrated to be so violative of constitutional or legal limits on power or so abhorrent to reason, that the courts would decline to interfere.

142. In BALCO (supra), the Court took notice of the C judgment in Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Reserve Bank of lndia 67 and observed that some matters like price fixation are based on such uncertainties and dynamics that even experts face difficulty in making correct projections, making it all the more necessary for this Court to D exercise non- interference:

"31. The function of the Court is to see that lawful authority is not abused but not to appropriate to itself the task entrusted to that authority. It is well settled that a public body invested with statutory powers must take care not to exceed or abuse its power. It must keep within the limits of the authority committed to it. It must act in good faith and it must act reasonably. Courts are not to interfere with economic policy which is the function of experts. It is not the function of the courts to sit in judgment over matters of economic policy and it must necessarily be left to the expert bodies. In such matters even experts can seriously and doubtlessly differ. Courts cannot be expected to decide them without even the aid of experts." 143. In an earlier case in M/s Prag Ice & Oil Mills & Anr. Vs. Union of lndia68 , this Court had observed as under: (SCC p. 478, Para 24) 67. (1992) 2 sec 343.

H 68. [19781 3 sec 459.

RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE. N0.1 OF 2012 [D.K. JAIN, J.]

"We do not think that it is the function of this Court or of any court to sit in judgment over such matters of economic policy as must necessarily be left to the government of the day to decide. Many of them, as a measure of price fixation must necessarily be, are matters of prediction of ultimate results on which even experts can seriously err and doubtlessly by differ. Courts can certainly not be expected to decide them without even the aid of experts." 144. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Narmada Bachao Ando/an & Anr. 69 , this Court said that the judiciary cannot engage in an exercise of comparative analysis over the fairness, logical or scientific basis, or wisdom of a policy. It held that the Court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by the Gov

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