S.P. Gupta & Ors. ETC. ETC. v. Union of India & Ors. ETC. ETC.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 28 December 1981
- Judge
- Justice P.N. Bhagwati
- Neutral citation
- 1981 INSC 209
- Reported in
- [1982] 2 S.C.R. 365
- Result
- Dismissed
- Acts & sections
- Article 222 Constitution, Article 224 Constitution, Section 123 Evidence Act, Article 32 Constitution, Article 14 Constitution, Article 217 Constitution, Article 216 Constitution
Full judgment
SP. GUPTA & ORS. ETC. ETC.
v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC. ETC.
December 28, 1981 [ P.N. BHAGWATI, A.C. GUPTA, S. MURTAZA FAZAL Au V.D. TULZAPURKAR, D.A. DESAI,
R.S. PATHAK AND E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ. ]
1, Independence of Judiciary, scope and limitations of the concept-Basic. structure of the Constitution-Constitution of India, 1950, Preamble, Articles 124, 216, 217 222 and 224.
A.
2. Public interest litigation-Right to challenge executive order/action os affecting the independence of judiciary by persons other than the aggrieved partyLocus standi of lawyers to raise issues like fixation of strength of Judges in each High Court, appointment and re-appointments, of addtiona/ Judges, short term appointments, transfer, etc. by means of petitions either under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution of India, explained. 3. Public law-Protection against disclosure of documents claiming privilege-Evidence Act, sections 123 and 162, difference in-Whether the Union of India could claim privilege in respect of the correspondence between the high dignitaries which formed the opinion regarding transfer of Judges/gram of extension to the additional Judges-Constitution of India, Articles 19(1) (a), 14, 217 and 224.
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4. Freedom of the press-Disc11ssions based on the disclosed materials on the grounds on which recommendations were made to the President for not granting extension to the additional Judges, when the matter is sub-judice tan/amounts to trial by press, not authorised by law-Constitution of India, Articles 19( /)(a) and 32. 5. Consent to be appointed to any of the three preferred High Courts, as a J11dge, by the proposed appointee and the sitting additional Judges-Validity of such a circular letter requiring consent, dated March 18, 1981, of the Law Minister-Constitution of India, 1950, Articles 217 and 222. 6. Constitution of India, Articles 216, 224, and 226-Appointm~nt of High Court Ju1ge<-Difference between sitti~.~ flcdifi!ional Jl!d!{e·I q~rf proposed appointee for initial recruitment. explained.
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7. Transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another-Constitution of India, 1950, Articles 222-Notification dated January 19, 1981 issued by the President of India transferring Mr. K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna to Madras, validity of. 8. Constilution of India, Article 222(1)-Legal effect of an order of transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another. 9. High Courts-Inter se-status-All High Courts have same statusConstitution of India, Articles 224 ( 4), 139A (2), 214 (2) & ( 3) before deletion in 1956, 222, 366(14) 376, Schedule VII List I Entry 78, discussed.
10. Constitution of India, Article 222 (])-Power to transfer a Judge, nature and extent of use, explained. 11. Constitution of India, Article 222, power to formulate general po/icy of transfers of Judges or Chief Justices from one High Court to another-Article 222 vests such power.
12. Constitution of India, Article 222 (/)-The word "Chief Justice" is included in the expression "a Judge of the High Court"-Transfer of Chief Justice of High Court from one State to another, therefore, falls within the purview or Article 222(1) of the Constitution. 13. Constitution of India, Articles 215, 216 and Proviso (c) to Arlicle 217 (1)-Whether Judges of lhe High Court constitute a single All India cadre for purpose of appointment and transfer.
14. Constitution of India, Article 222-Proposal for transfer of a Judge or Chief Justice of a High Court-The provisions of Article 222 must necessarily be complied wir!z irrespective of the fact which authority initiates the proposal. 15. Constitution of India, Article 222 (2)-Transfer of a High Court Judge/ Chief Justice-Simultaneous fixation of compensatory allowance-Transfer order and an order fixing compensatory allowance need not be simultaneous.
16. Constitution of India, Article 217 (/} proviso (e) and Article 222Distinction between "transfer" and "appointment"-Taking afresh oath by a trans· feree Judge does not make a transfer a fresh appoil1tment.
· 17. Onus probandi-Constitution of India, Article 222 (1) read with Evi· dence Act, sections JOI to 104-0nus of justifying transfer of a Judge is upon the State. 18. Constitution of India, Article 222 (1)-Transfer of a Judge-Advice tendered by the Chief Justice of India must, ordinarily, be accepted by the President of India.
19. Transfer af a Judge, on 'mere allegations of misbehaviour or incapacity of gq(i<m under Article 218 read with Article 224-
whic~ fqrm, subject-matter •1
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S.P. GUPTA v. UNION
Transfer of a Judge under the guise of Article 222 is impermissible and liable to be quashed. 20. Transfer of a Judge, exercise of power under Article 222 of the Constitution, should be in public interest and not by way of punishment-The word "consent" in Article 222 is a case of deliberate omission and not casus omissus.
21. Interpretation of statutes and/or constitutional provi.lions-Duty of the Supreme Court-Constitution of India, Article 141 and Preamble. 22. Interpretation of Constitution-Preamble to the Constitution-Court must not bend language of Constitution according to its will. 23. Interpretation of statutes, when language is clear doctrine of casus omissus will cease to be applicable.
24. Interpretation of statutes-External aid, marginal note, reference to legislative debate, etc. as aid to interpretation of uctions, admissibility of. 25. Interpretation of Constitution, rules regarding-Power conferred by Constitution upon authority cannot be denied on grounds of its misuse-Constitution of India, 1950. ~
26. Interpretation of Constitution-Constitutional conventions scope and its use as an aid to interpretation-Constitution of India. 27. Precedence-Judicial precedence-Value of-Ratio and not the conclusion which binds-Constitution of India, Article 141. 28. Constitution of High Courts-Strength of Judges-Whether a writ af mandamus can be issued against Union of India for fixing the strength of Judges in each High Court-Constitution of India, Articles 216, 32, 74 and 226, scope a/Advice under Article 74 in the matter of appointment of Judges is binding.
29. Constitution of India, Articles 224 (2), 227 (2) and 274 (2)-Additional Judges, their status and functions, explained. \
30. Appointment of Additional Judges-Conditions precedent-Power of President when can be exercised-Constitution of India, Articles 217 and 224. 31. Appointment of Judges-Appointment must be made by the Central Government only after effective consultation as required by Articles 124 and 227 read with 74-Whether the opinion of the Chief Justice of India has a primacy. 32. Appointment of additional Judges-Procedure regarding extension of tenure-Initiation well in time and in advance of proposals of recommendations or otherwise is a must-Constitution of India, Article 217 and 224.
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33. Words and phrases-"Consultation" -·Meaning of-Consultation should be meaningful, purposeful and result-oriented-Constitution, Articles, 217, 222 and 224. 34. Additional Judges-Extension of term-Matters to be consideredAppointment of Judges to High Court being purely an executive function of President, Court cannot declare a sitting additional Judge to be deemed to have become permanent or direct the President to make him permanent. 35. Non-extension of the term of office of Mr. S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge of the Delhi High Court, validity of
36. Constitution of India, Articles 217 and 224-Additional Judges, a right to be considered for fresh appointment-Short term extensions, propriety of justiciability of denial to grant extension. 37. Additional Judge-Non-extension of his term-Principle of natural justice-There is no necessity to give him opportunity of hearing.
38. Additional JudJ;e of a High Court-Non-extension of the term of the Judge as additional Judge of the High Court-Integrity of the Judge doubted by the Chief Justice of High Court as disclosed before the Court--Judge ready to establish his innocence :and seeking opportunity from Supreme Court to do so-Supreme Court cannot grant such opportunity in view of its restricted jurisdiction in such cases-Constitution of India, Articles 32, 226 and I 39A jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, explained. 39. Appointment of High Court Judges-Initial recruitment-Non-appointment of a person-Non-appointee aggrieved person has no standing and no writ of mandamus will issue at his instance. 40. CollStitution of India, Articles 226 and 32-Courts have no powers to decide questions of pure academic interest.
41. Constitution of India, Article 136-Powers of the Supreme Court to grant Special Leave Petition-High Court rejecring petition under Article 226 in limine on the ground that the petitioner was unable to produce documents beyond his reach on which he wanted 10 place reliance-Rejection of the petition if invalid S.L.P. could be granted. 42. Constitution o( India, Article 226-Writ proceedings-Pleadings in the form of affidavits, counter-affidavits, rejoinder-affidavits, etc. filed by the parties to a writ petition also partakes of the character oi the evidence in the case.
On March 18, 1981, Honourable Sri P. Shivshankar, Minister for Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India addressed a circular letter to the Governor of Punjab and the Chief Ministers of all the States, except the
S.P. GuPl·A v. UNioN
North-Eastern States, requesting them to obtain the consent of additional Judges serving in the High Courts to their appointment as permanent Judges of other High Courts. Such consent was also required from persons who had already been proposed or may in the future to be proposed for initial appointment. The additional Judges, the proposed and the would-be-proposed for initial appointment were requested to indicate three High Courts, in order of preference, to which they would prefer to be appointed. It was made clear by the said circular letter that the furnishing of the consent or the indication of a prefereJilce would not imply any commitment on the part of Government either in regard to their appointment or in regard to accommodation in accordance witll the preferences given. Prior to, as well as after the issuance of the aforesaid circular letter by the Union Law Minister on March 18, 1981, in several High Courts, including High Courts of Allahabad, Bombay and Delhi, the President of India acting under Article 224 granted short-term extensions for three months, six months or a year to sitting additional Judges whose initial terms were about to expire. Relying on the letter dated May 7, 1981 of the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court, Mr. Justice S.N. Kumar, Additional Judge of the Delhi High Court was finally not given further appointment. Similarly, Mr. Justice O.N. Vohra. Additional Judge of the same High Court was also not re-appointed after the expiry of his tenure of appointment.
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Earlier, in exercise of the power conferred by Ar tide 222 (!)of the Constitution the President of India by his order dated January 19, 1981 transferred Mr. Justice M.M. Ismail, the then Chief Justice of the Madras High Court as · Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and also Mr. Justice K.B.N. Singh, Chief fostice of Patna High Court as Chief Justice of the Madras High Court with effect from the date they assumed charges of their respective offices. Since such short-term ext~nsions became a frequent phenomenon, particularly after the issuance of the circular letter dated March 18, 1981, it created great consternation in the legal and judicial circles in the country. These two actions of the Union Government, namely, the issuance of the circular letter dated March 18, 1981 and the grant of short-term extensions led to legal action being taken challenging their constitutional validity by individual lawyers, by Bar Associations in a representative capacity. Having regard to their high positions as a constitutional functionary all the sitting Additional Judges in various High Courts, though agitated by these two actions of the Union Government understandably felt reluctant to adopt legal steps against said circular letter as well as the short-term extensions. Mr. Justice O.N. Vohra, Additional Judge of the Delhi High Court, did not join issue when he was dropped outright, while Mr. Justice S.N. Kumar as a party-respondent to the Writ Petition filed in Delhi High Court actively supported the challenge to these actions and also the further action of dropping him outright during the pendency of the petition.
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Though the transfer order dated January 19, 1981 in respect of the two Chief Justices was also challenged, Mr. Justice M.M. Ismail refused to take part
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as a party-respondent and chose to resign his high office, while Mr. Justice K.B.N. Singh actively opposed the orders of transfer by transposing himself as petitioner No. 3 to the petition. Details of the several cases filed were :
(i) Transferred case No. 19 of 1981 was filed by Sri S.P. Gupta, an Advocate of the High Court at Allahabad. While challenging the validity of the circular letter of March 18, 1981 it was contended (a) that the President has failed to appoint the necessary number of permanent and additional Judges of the High Court of Allahabad in accordance with Article 216 and clause (1) of Article 224 of the Constitution; (b) the appointments of some of the additional Judges of the High Court for short-terms of six months only was bad and they shouid have been appointed as permanent Judges, and (c) a declaration should be issued to the effect that three Additional Judges, Mr. Justice Murali Dhar, Mr. Justice A.N. Verma, Mr. Justice N. N. Mittal be deemed to have been appointed as permanent Judges.
(ii) Transferred case No. 20 of 1981 was filed by Sri V.M. Tarkunde, a senior Advocate of the Supreme Court, as a Writ Petition in the High Court of Delhi assailing the circular and the appointments of three Additional Judges, Sri O.N. Vohra, Sri S.N. Kumar and Sri S.B. Wad for a further period of three months only, It was prayed that the posts of additional Judges in the several High Courts be converted into permanent posts.
(iii) In Transfer Case No. 21 of 1981, Shri J. L. Kalra and a few other advocates filed as a Writ Petition in the High Court of Delhi, it was prayed that a mandamus be issued to the Union Government to create an adequate number of posts of permanent and additional Judges and to make appointments to those posts.
(iv) Transferred Case No. 22 of 1981, was filed as a Writ Petition in the High Court of Bombay by four advocates, Sri Iqbal M. Chagla, Sri C.R. Dalvi, Sri M.A. Rana and Sri Sarab K.G. Modi questioning the validity of the circular dated March 18, 1981 and have prayed inter alia for a declaration that the circular letter is ultra vires and void and that the Union Government should be directed not to act on the consent conveyed by the additional Judges. These four cases constitute a group raising substantially common points of consideration arising out of interpretation of Articles 124, 216, 217 and 224 of the Constitution.
(v) The Second group also constituted of four cases led by Writ Petition No. 274 of 1981 filed by Miss Lily Thomas an Advocate practising in the Supreme Court of India, under Article 32 of the Constitution. She challenged the transfer of Sri M.M. Ismail, Chief Justice of the Madras High Court, to Kerala High Court as Chief Justice, Sri M.M. Ismail filed an affidavit stating that he has decided not to proceed to Kerala, nor to challenge the validity of the order of the President transferring him but to proceed on leave preparatory to retirement. Shri M.M. Ismail has resigned since.
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(vi) Transfer Case No. 2 of 1981 was filed as a Writ Petition in the High Court of Madras by one Mr. A Rajappa, an Advocate, praying for a declaration that the order of the President transferring Sri M.M. Ismail from the High Court of Madras and Sri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of the Patna High Court to Madras High Court was void. (vii) Transferred Case No. 6 of 1981 was another Writ Petition filed by Sri P. Subramaniam praying for similar reliefs as Sri Rajappa in Transfer Case No. 2 of 1981. (viii) Two Advocates Sri D.N. Pandey and Sri Thakur Ramapathi Sinha, filed Transferred Case No. 24 of 1981 in the High Court at Patna challeging the order of transfer of Sri M.M. Ismail from the High Court of Madras to the High Court of Kerala and of Sri K.B.N. Singh from the High Court at Patna to the High Court of Madras. During the pendency of this Writ Petition, Sri K.B.N. Singh, who has been impleaded as a respondent was transposed as a petitioner; and (ix) Special Leave Petition No. 1509 of 1981 filed by Ripudaman Prasad Sinha is directed against an order passed by the . High Court at Patna rejecting in limine the Writ Petition of the petitioner challenging the constitutional validity of the order of transfer of Chief Jusctice K.B.N. Singh, on the ground that he had not been able to produce the documents on which he wanted to place reliance.
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Several contentions raised in these Writ Petitions are : (i) The actions of the Union Government forming part of a scheme constitute a direct attack on the independence of judiciary, which is a basic feature of a constitution. (ii) The circular dated March 18, 1981, seeks to effect, in substance and reality, a mass transfer of sitting ·Additional Judges as also the proposed appointees based on a policy decision unilaterally taken by the Law Minister/ Union Government and as such violates the requirements of Article 222(1) of the Constitution as laid down by the Supreme Court in Sankal Chand's case [1978] 1 S.C.R. 423 in as much as such mass transfers on alleged grounds of policy are outside its scope and further it reduces the efficacy of the consultation with the Chief Justice of India contemplated therein to a meaningless formality by presenting a transfer proposal to him as a fait accompli, the same being backed by the consent of the concerned judge or the proposed appointee to his transfer.
(iii) The circular letter was without the authority of law.
(iv) The circular letter, as far as the sitting of Additional Judges are concerned, contains by implication a threat to them (a) that if they do not give their consent they will not be either continued as Additional Judges or confirmed as Permanent Judgos: (b) that the Government would watch their performance in matters to which the Government, Government bodies and Corporations are
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parties before them and would appoint them as Permanent Judges only if they were found to toe the Government line and as such it constitutes gross interference with administration of justice and is subversive of judicial independence. (v) The circular letter seeks to obtain consent under threat, coercion and duress and also in advance and in abstract and the same would be no consent in law •.
(vi) As regards the proposed appointees it introduces an additional qualification for being appointed as Additional or Permanent Judge not warranted by the Constitution. (vii) The circular letter was written ma/a fide for a collateral purpose to by pass Article 222 and further to exercise the power of appointing additional judges not for the purpose for which that power has been confirmed but for the purpose of carrying out the so-called "policy" of the Government and is therefore malafide in the sense that the power [is being exercised for a collateral purpose foreign to the purpose indicated in Article 224. (viia) The circular letter under which absolute power and discretion is claimed to the effect that there is no obligation on the part of the Union Government to continue the sitting additional Judges after th€ expiry of their initial term notwithstanding pendency of arrears of work or to make them permanent as and when permanent vacancies become available and to appoint different persons for different periods of additional Judges in the vacancies of sitting additional Judges after their initial terms have expired, is a clear abuse of the power conferred by Article 224 (I) of the Constitution, because the power, being purposive is coupled with a duty to exercise the same when the conditions precedent mentioned in provision exist and the circular letter which claims such absolute power is violative of the provisions of Article 224, in any case the course of action proposed in the said circular letter in exercise of such absolute power claimed thereunder is contrary to the established constitutional convention and practice that has grown over the years in the matter of appointment of Additional Judges and, therefore, bad in law inasmuch as Article 224 (1) has been interpreted and workea having regard to the said convention and practice.
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(viii) The circular letter is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it makes invidious discrimination against those who would be refusing to furnish their consent as they will suffer a disadvantage, while those who would be furnishing their consent would stand to gain, it gives to the Government unfettered and unguided power or discretion to pick and choose i.e. select some for being shifted to High Courts other than their home-State High Courts and to retain and appoint other in their home.-State High Courts-which power can be exercised either by way of punishment or by way of favouritism. (ix) In the appointment of Additional Judges of one High Court as Permanent Judges of another High Court or in the appointments of the members of the Bar practising in one High Court as Additional or Permanent Judges of another High Court pursuant to the consent obtained under the said circular letter, the consultation with the Governor of that other State and particularly with the Chief Justice of that other High Court would be illusory and an empty
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formality and as such circular letter is violative of Article 217 of the Constitution.
(x) The short-term extensions are directly subversive of the independence of Judiciary and not contemplated by the Constitution. (xi) A member of th~ Bar who accepts the appointment of an Additional Judge has legitimate expectation that he will be confirmed as Permanent Judge of that High Court when a vacancy occurs and in the past he has been confirmed except in the rarest of cases. The power claimed under Article 224 (I) not to continue the Additional Judges, even if temporary increase in the Court's business persists or pendency of arrears justifies such continuance after the expiry of the initial term and not to make him permanent even if a vacancy of permanent post occurs and to appoint another person as Additional Judge by ignoring the legitimate expectancy of the sitting incumbent whose initial term has expired, apart from involving an unjustified departure from the well recognised and established practice, amounts to breach of faith with the concerned Judge and further to ask such Additional Judge who has given such undertaking to agree in advance to a transfer (or even to accept . fresh appointment) to other High Courts as a Permanent Judge also involves similar breach of faith amounts to a clear abuse of power and the purported exercise of the power in that manner would be illegal and void. (xii) The claim made by the Government that Article 224 (1) only fixes the maximum period of two years at a time, that the Article does not limit the discretion of the Government in the matter of the period for which an Additional Judge can be appointed except in regard to the ceiling of two years and that the appointment can be for a shorter period and that 'period is not justiciable is untenable in law and clearly wrong because, apart from involving an unjustified departure from the well recognised and established practice, it introduces an element of insecurity of tenure having serious repercussions on the independence of Judiciary and also undermines people's confidence and faith in it. (xiii) Article 216 of the Constitution casts a primary obligation upon the President mandatorily to provide adequate strength of Permanent Judges to cope with the normal busines in every High Court so as to ensure its disposal within reasonable time and to review such strength from time to time so that arrears do not acoumulate and justice to litigants is not unduly delayed. When the objective facts unmistakably demonstrate that the increase of business every year or that the arrears have increased and accumulated to an appreciably disturbing level with no reasonable prospects of substantialy reducing the same over a period of years, the President cannot resort to Article 224 (I) but has to increase the permanent strength by making permanent appointments under Article 217. In any case Additional Judges cannot be appointed while keeping permanent posts vacant. (xiv) To keep a large number of sitting Judges as Additional Judges would be arbitrary and unconstitutional and a clear case exists for declaring them to be deemed to have become permanent.
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(xv) Article 222 (I) does not refer to a Chief Justice hence the order dated 19-l-198Jis outside its purview. (xvi) Since Article 222 (1) properly construed, covers only consensual trans· fers, the transfer order dated 19-1-1981 which is admittedly non-consensual, is bad in law.
(xvii) The transfer dated 19-1-1981 was not effected in public interest.
(xviii) The transfer has been effected without full and effective consulta· tion contemplated by Article 222 (1) and therefore the procedure followed in effecting the same did not ensure fairplay in relation to K.B.N. Singh and the transfer is punitive in character. The contesting respondents raised a preliminary objection as to maintainability of the petitions inasmuch as the advocates had no locus standi and as to the request for disclosing certain correspondence in the case of S.N. Kumar, Additional Judge, of the Delhi High Court, the respondents claimed privilege under sections 123 and 162 of the Evidence Act.
Dismissing the petitions, the Court, while agreeing that (a) the petitioners being advocates had a 'standing' to challenge the va!idity of circulars; (b) independence of Judiciary is the founding faith of the Constitution and the power to appoint Judges is executive in the nature and the President is bound by the advice of the Cabinet by virtue of Article 74; (c) As to appointment and extension of Additional Judges, consultation with constitutional functionaries must be meaningful and result-oriented, none of them can exercise veto in the matter and the proposal can emanate from any of them and (d) transfer must be in public interest, not by way of punishment and personeal inconvenience, language problem and other factors should be taken into consideration, HELD : (Per majority).
(i) The circular letter of the Law Minister dated 18.3.81 is not invalid because it is a document without any legal force and does not by itself of its own force, produce any legal consequence or effect but if any adverse action is taken against an additional judge because he has not given his consent for being appointed a permanent judge in another High Court, such adverse action would be invalid. Since an additional Judge has a right to be considered for appointment as an additiona 1 Judge for a further term on the expiration of his original term, and in case of a vacancy in a permanent post, for appointment as a permanent Judge in his own High Court, he cannot be discontinued as an additional Judge on the ground that be has not given hi; consent for being appointed as a permanent Judge in any other High Court. Such a ground for discontinuing as an additional Judge would be a wholly irrelev2nt ground and if an additional Judge is discontinued on any such ground, the decision of the President discontinuing him would be unconstitutional and void. [Vide opinions of P.N. Bhagwati, S.M. Fazal Ali, D.A. Desai and E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ.]
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(ii) Among the opinions of the three constitutional consultancies, the opinion of the Chief Justice of India does not enjoy primacy over the other two opinions in the matter of appointment of Judges. (Vide P.N. Bhagwati, S.M. Fazal Ali, D.A. Desai and E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ.)
(iii) Non-extension of Mr. Justice S.N. Kumar after the expiry of his term was not invalid. (Vide P.N. Bhagwati, S.M. Fazal Ali, D.A. Desai and E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ.)
(iv) "Consent" is not necessary for the transfer of a Judge under Article 222, (Vide A.C. Gupta, Fazal Ali, V.D. Tulzapurkar, D.A. Desai, R.S. Pathak and E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ.) (v) The transfer of Sri K.B.N. Singh, the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court is in public interest and not vitiated by malafides. (Vide /,,C. Gupta, V.D. Tulzapurkar, R.S. Pathak and E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ.)
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(vi) No privilege could be claimed in respect of documents which constituted material for forming the opinions in the matter of either appointment or transfer of the Judges. (Vide P.N. Bhagwati, A.C. Gupta, V.D. Tulzapurkar, D.A. Desai, R.S. Pathak and E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ.) Per Bhagwati, J.
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I : I. The principle of independence of the judiciary is not an abstract con· ception but it is a living faith which must derive its inspiration from the constitutional character and in nourishment and sustenance from the constitutional values. Indian Constitution is a document of social revolution which casts an obligation on every instrumentality including the judiciary, which is a separate but equal branch of the State to transform the status quo ante into a new human order in which justice, social, economic and political will inform all institutions of national life and there will be equality of status and opportunity for all. The judiciary has therefore a socio-economic d~stinat ion and a creative function. It cannot remain content to act merely as an umpire but it must be functionally involved in the goal of socio-economic justice. Therefore, what is necessary is to have Judges who are prepared to fashion new tools, forge new methods, innovate new strategies and evolve a new jurisprudence, who are judicial statesmen with a social vision and a creative faculty and who have, above all, a deep sense of commitment to the Constitution with an activist approach and obligation for accountability, not to any party in power nor to the opposition nor to the classes which are vociferous but to the half hungry millions of India who are continulaly denied their basic human rights. Only Judges who are alive to the soc10-economic realities of Indian life, who are anxious to wipe every tear from every eye, who have faith in the constitutional values and who are ready to use law as an instrument for achieving the constitutional objectives are needed. And this has to be the broad blue-print of the appointment project for the higher echelons of judicial service. It is only if appointments of Judges are made with these considerations weighing predominently with the appointing authority that we can have a truly independent judiciary commit\~d only to the <;:onsti!\lti<;m an\! to the people of India. , ~534' J:I 1 5.35~A-!3 1 536 f-H 1 537 AJ
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1 : 2. The concept of the independence of the judiciary is a noble concept which inspires the constitutional scheme and constitutes the foundation on which rests the edifice of our democratic polity. If there is one principle which runs through the entire fabric of the Constitution, it is the judiciary which is entrusted with the-task of keeping every organ of the State within the limits of the law and thereby making the rule of law meaningful and effective. It is to aid the judiciary in this task that the power of judicial review has been conferred upon the judiciary & it is by exercising this power which constitutes one of the most potent weapons in armoury of the law, that the judiciary seeks to protect the citizen against violation of his constitutional or legal rights or misuse or abuse of power by the State or its officers. The judiciary stands between the citizen and the State as a bulwark against executive excesses and misuse or abuse of power by the executive and therefore it ls absolutely essential that the judiciary must be free from executive pressure or influence and this has been secured by the Constitution makers by making elaborate provisions in the Constitution. The concept of independence of the judiciary is not limited only to independence from executive pr~ssure or influence but it is much wider concept which takes within its sweep independence from many other pressures and prejudices. It has many dimensions, namely, fearlessness of other power centres economic or p()litical, and freedom from prejudices acquired and nourished by the class to which the Judges belong. [537 A-El
1 : 3. Judges should be of stern stuff and tough fibre, unbending before power, economic or political, and they must uphold the core principle of the rule of law which says "Be you ever so high, the law is above you." This is the principle of independence of the judiciary which is vital for the establishment of real participatory democracy, maintenance of the rule of law as a dynamic concept and delivery of social justice to the vulnerable sections of the community, It is this principle of independence of the judiciary which must be kept in mind while interpreting the relevant provisions of the Constitution. [537H, 538A-B]
2 : J. The traditional rule in regard to locus standi is that judicial redress is available only to a person who has suffered a legal injury by reason of violation of his legal right or legally protected interest by the impugned action of the State or a public authority or any other person or who is likely to suffer a legal injury by reason of threatened violation of his legal right or legally protected interest by any such action. The basis of entitlement to judicial redress is personal injury to property, body, mind or reputation arising from violation, actual or threatened, of the legal right or legally protected interest of the person seeking such redress. This is a rule of vintage and it arose during an era when private law dominated the legal scene and the public law had not been born. Under this rule, the court concerned only with the question whether the applicant was an aggrieved person. According to this rule, it is only a person who has suffered a specific legal injury by reason of actual or threatened violation of his legal right or legally protected interest who can bring an action for judicial redress. This rule in regard to lo~us standi postulates a right-duty pat!ern. J513A, Sl4A-C,'S15A-BJ
S.P. GUPTA v. UNION
y
2 : 2. But, narrow and rigid though this rule may be, there are a few exceptions to it which have been evolved by the Courts over the [years. They are: (a) A rate payer of a local authority is accorded standing to challenge an illegal action of the local authority; (b) if a person is entitled to participate in the proceedings relating to ·the decision making process culminating in the impugned decision, he would have locus stiindi to maintain an action challenging the impugned decision; (c) the !tatute itself may expressly recognise the locus standi of an applicant, even though no legal right protected interest of the applicant has been violated resulting in legal injury to him; and (d) the applicant for judicial redress must have suffered a legal wrong or injury in order to entitle him to maintain an action for such redress. [515B,C,D,F, 516A] 2 : 3. Where a person who ha• suffered a legal wrong or a legal injury or whose legal right or legally protected interest is violated, is unable to apporach the court on account of some disability or it is not practicable for him to move the court for some other sufficient reasons, such as his socially or economically disadvantanged position, some other person can invoke assistance of the court for the pupose of providing judicial redress to the person wronged or injured, so that the legal wrong or injury caused to such person does not go unredressed and justice is done to him.[517 A·B]
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Ex-parte Sidebotham, 14 Chancery Division 458; Reed Baveri & Comp'lny, 19 Q.B. Division 174, K.R. Shenoy v. Udipi Municipality, A.I.R. 1974 SC 2177; Vaidarajan v. Salem Municipality; A.LR. 1973 Mad. 55; Queen v. Bowman (1898) Q.B. 633; J.M. Desai v. Roshan Kumar, 1976 3 SCR 58; Rat/am Municipality v. Vardhi Chand, A.I.R. 1980 SC 1622; United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17; 4 L. Ed. 2 d 524; Atwood v. Merry Wether, (1867) 5 Equity 464; Duryappah v. Fernando, (1967) 2 Appeal Cases 337; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249; Law Ed. 1586; Suni/ Batra v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1980 SC 1579; Dr. Upendra Baxi v. State of U.P., (1981) 3 Scale 1137, discussed and referred to.
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2 : 4. Where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person or to a determinate class of persons by reason of violation of any constitutional or legal right or any burden is· 'imposed in contravention of any constitutional or legal provision or without authority of law or any such legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is threatened and such person or determinate class of persons i~ by reason of poverty helplessness or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position, unable to approach the court for relief any member of the public can maintain rn application lor an appropriate direction, order or writ in the High Court under Article 226 and in case of breach of any fundamental right of such person or determinate class of persons, in this Court under Article 32 seeking judicial redress for the legal wrong or injury caused to such person or determinate class of persons. Where the weaker sections of the community are concerned, who are helpless victims of an exploitative society and who do not have easy access to justice, Supreme Court will not insist on a regular writ petition to be filed by the public spirited individual espousing their cause and seeking relief for them. Supreme Court will readily respond even to a letter addressed by such individual acting pro bono publico. It is true that there are rµles made by Supreme c:;ourt prescri\Jin(l the pr<;>C\l\11,lre for movin!I
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Supreme Court for relief under Article 32 and they require various formalities to be gone through by a person seeking to approach Supreme Court. But, procedure is but a handmaiden of justice and the cause of justice can never be allowed to be thwarted by any procedural technicalities. The Court would therefore unhesitatingly and without the slightest qualms of conscience cast aside the technical rules of procedure in the exercise of its dispensing power and treat the letter of the public minded individual as a writ petition ~nd act upon it. But the individual who moves the court for judicial redress in cases of this kind must be acting bona fide with a view to vindicating the cause of justice and if he is acting for personal gain or private profit or out of political motivation or other oblique consideration, the court should not allow itself to be activised at the instance of such person and must reject his application at the threshhold whether it be in the form of a letter addressed to the court or even in the form of a regular writ petition filed in court. As a matter of prudence and not as a rule of law, the court may confine this strategic exercise of jurisdiction to cases where legal wrong or legal injury is caused to a determinate class O" group of persons or legal right of such determinate class or group of persons is violated and as far as possible, not en.tertain cases of individual wrong or injury at the instance of a third party, where ·there is an effective legal aid organisation which can take careof such cases. [520 B-H, 521 ~-Fl
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2:5. Cases, where the State or a public authority may act in violation of a constitutional or statutory obligation or fail to carry out such obligation, resulting in injury to public interest may conveniently be termed as public injury as distinguished from private injury. (521 H, 522 A]
If the State or any public authority acts beyond the scope of its power and thereby causes a specific legal injury to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons, it would be a case of actionable private injury. If the duty is owed by the State or any public authority to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons, it would give rise to a corresponding right in such person or determinate class or group of persons and they would be entitled to maintain an action for judicial redress. But if no specific legal injury is caused to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons by the act or omission of the State or any public authority and the injury is caused only to public interest, and if no one can maintain an action for redress of such public wrong or public injury, it would be disasterous for the rule of Jaw, for it would be open to the State or a public authority to act with impunity beyond the scope of its power or in breach of a public duty owed by it. The courts cannot countenance <uch a situation where the observance of the law is left to the sweet will of the authority bound by it, without any redress if the law is contravened. Therefore, whenever there is a public wrong or public injury caused by an act or omission of the State or a public authority which is contrary to the Constitution or the law, any member of the public acting bona fide and having sufficient interest can maintain an action for redressal of such public wrong or public injury. The strict rule of stancting which insists that only a person who has suffered a specific legal injury can maintain an action for judicial redress is relaxed and a broad rule is evolved which gives standing to any member of the public, who is not a mere busy-body or a meddlesome interloper, but who has sufficient interest in the proceedini:. There c1111 be n<;> c;!o\lbt that the ris!< of Iei:al action ai:ainst the State
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S,P, GUPTA V, UNION
or a public authority by any citizen will induce the State or such public authority to act with greater responsibility and care thereby improving the administration of justice. [522 F-H, 523 A-El
Rex v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, (1981) 2 W.L.R. 722 al 740, quoted with approval.
2:6. If public duties are to be enforced and social collective 'diffused' rights and interests are to be protected, the initiative and zeal of public-minded persons and organisations must be utilised by allowing them to move the court and act for a general or group interest, even though, they may not be directly injured in their own rights. It is for this reason that in public interest litigationlitigation undertaken for the purpose of redressing public injury, enforcing public duty, protecting social, collective, 'diffused rights and interests or vindicating public interest, any citizen who is acting bona fide and who has sufficient interest has to be accorded standing. What is sufficient interest to give standing to a member of the public would have to be determined by the Court in each individual case. [526 H. 527 A-Bl 2:7. It is not possible for the Court to lay down any hard and fast rule or any straight jacket formula for the purpose of defining or delimiting 'sufficient interest'. The Judge who has the correct social perspective and who is on the same wave-length as the Constitution will be able to decide, without any difficulty and in consonance with constitutional objectives, whether a member of the public moving the court in a particular case has sufficient interest to initiate the action. [527 B, D-El Any member of the public having sufficient interest can maintain an action for judicial redress for public injury arising from breach of public duty or from violation of some provision of the Constitution or the law and seek enforcement of such public duty and observance of such constitutional or legal provision. This is absolutely essential for maintaining the rule of law, furthering, the cause of justice and accelerating the pace of realisation of the constitutional objective. But care should be taken to see that the member of the public, who approaches the court in cases of this kind, is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private profit or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The Court must not allow its process to be abused by politicians and others to delay legitimate administrative action or to gain a political objective. [530 D-E, 532 B-C] Data Processing Service v. Camp; 397 U.S. 150: 2d 25 Law Ed. 184; Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, U.S. App. DC. 328; United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166; Warth v. Seldin. 422 U.S. 490; Attorney General v. Independent Broadcasting, Authority, 1973 1 All England Reports 689; Rex v. Greater London Council; Gouriet v. U.P. W., 1978 Appeal Cases 482, quoted with approval.
2:8. There is a vital distinction between "locus standi and "justiciability" and it is not every default on the p&rt <?f the ~late or a public authoritr that is
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justiciable. The Court must take care to see that it does not over-step the limits of its judicial function and trespass into areas which are reserved to the Executive and the Legislature by the Constitution. It is a fascinating exercise for the Court to deal with public interest litigation because it is a new jurisprudence which the court is evolving, a jurisprudence whkh demands judicial statesmanship and high creative ability. [532 D-E]
2:9" There can be no doubt that the practising lawyers have a vital interest in the independence of the judiciary and if any unconstitutional or illegal action is taken by the State or any public authority which has the effect of impairing the independence of the judiciary, they would certainly be interested in challenging the constitutionality or legality of such a.:tion The rrofession of lawyers is an essential and integral part of the judicial system and lawyers may figuratively be described as priests in the temple of justice. They assist the court in dispensing jusitice and it can hardly be disputed that without their help, it would be well nigh impossible for the Court to administer justice. They are really and truly officers of the Court in which they daily sit and practise. They have, therefore, a special interest in preserving the integrity and independence of the judicial s)stem and if the integrity or independence of the judiciary is threatened by any act of the State or any public authority they would naturally be concerned about it, because they are rqual partners with the Judges in the administration of justice. [533 C-F] The circular letter, on the averments ruade in the writ petition, did not cause any specific legal injury to an individual, but it caused public injury by prejudicially affecting the independence of the judiciary. The petitioners being lawyers h d sufficient interest to challenge the cons1itutionality of the circular leUer and they were, therefore, entitled to file the writ petition as a public interest litigation. They had clearly a concern deeper than that of a busy body and they cannot be told off at the gates. [533 H, 534 A]
Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344, applied.
3:1. The Court does not decide issues in the abstract. It undertakes determination of a controversy provided it is necessary in order to give relief to a party and if no relief can be given because none is sought. The Court cannot take upon itself a theoretical exercise merely for the purpose of deciding academic issues, howscevcr important they may be. The Court cannot, embark upon an inquiry whether there was any misuse or abuse of power in a particular case, unless relief is sought by the person who is said to have been wronged by such n.isuse or abuse of power. For this reason, the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India in regard to non-appointment of O.N. Vohra was not relevant to the issues arising for determim1tion in the writ petition and the Union of India could not be required to disclose it. [588 H, 589 A] 3:2. But, since the decision of the Central Government not to appoint S.N. Kumar as an additional Judge for a further term was assailed, firstly, that there has been no full and effective consultation bet ween the Central Government and the constitutional authorities required to be consulted under that Article
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s.P. GUPTA v. UNloN
and, secondly, that the decision of the Central Government is based on irrelevant grounds, the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India would be relevant qua both these grounds. [589 E-F] 3:3. Under our Constitution the President is a constitutional Head and is bound to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The decision of the President under Article 224 read with Article 217 not to appoint an additional Judge for a further term is really a decision of the Council of Ministers and the reasons which nave weighed with the Council of Ministers in taking such decision would necessarily be part of the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President. The Court cannot, having regard to clause (2) of Article 72, embark upon an inquiry as to whether any and if so what advice was tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President and since the reasons which have prevailed with the Council of Ministers in taking a particular decision not to continue an additional Judge for a further term would form part of the advice tendered to the President, they would be beyond the ken of judicial inquiry. [590 B, E-F, G-H, 591 A] 3:4. There can be no doubt that the advice tendered by Council of Ministers to the President is protected against judicial scrutiny by reason of clause (2) of Article 74. But it cannot be said that the views expressed by the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India on consultation form part of the advice. The advice is given by the Council of Ministers after consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India. The two Chief Justices are consulted on "full and identical facts" and their views are obtained and it is after considering ihose views that the Council of Ministers arrives at its decision and tenders its advice to the President. The views expressed by the two Chief Justices precede the formation of the advice and merely because they are referred to in the advice which is ultimately tendered by the Council of Ministers, th~y do not necessarily become part of the advice. What is protected against disclosure under clause (2) of Article 74 is only the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers. The reasons which have weighed with the council of Ministers in giving the advice would certainly form part of the advice. The material on which the ad,·ice tendered by the Council of Ministers is based cannot be said to be part of the advice and the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India which constituted th~ material forming the basis of the decision of the Central Government must accordingly be held to be outside the exclusionary rule enacted in clause (1) of Article 74. [594 E-H. 595 A-Fl
State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, [1961] 2 SCR 371, overruled. State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, [1978] 1SCR1, referred to.
3:5. Where a society has chosen to accept democracy as its credal faith, it is elementary that the citizons ought to know what their government is doing. The citizens have a right to decide by whom and by what rules they shall be governed and they are entitled to call on those who govern on their behalf to account for their conduct. No democratic government can survive without accountability and the basic postulate of ac"ountability is that the people should have information about the functioning of the government. [598 D-F]
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3:6. The demand for openness in the government is based principally on two reasons. It is now widely accepted that democracy does not consist merely in people exercising their franchise once in five years to choose their rulers and, once the vole is cast, th:n retiring in p1ssivity and not taking any interest in the government. Today it is common ground that democracy has a more positive content and its orchestration has to be continuous and pervasive. This means inter alia that people should not only cast intelligent and rational votes but should also exercise sound judgment on the conduct of the government and the merits of public policies, so that democracy does not remain merely a sporadic exercise in voting but becomes a continuous process of government-an attitude and habit of mind. But this important role people can fulfil in a democracy only if it is an open government where there is full access to information in regard to the functioning of the government. Now, if secrecy were to be observed in the functioning of government and the processes of government were to be kept hidden from public scrutiny, it would tend to promote and encourage oppression, corruption and misuse or abuse of authority, for it would all be shrouded in the veil of secrecy without any public accountability. But i( there is an open government with means of information available to the public, there would be greater exposure of the functioning of government and it would help to assure the people a better and more efficient administration. There can be little doubt that exposure to public gaze and scrutiny is one of the surest mean nf achieving a clean and healthy administration. [599 A-C, E-G]
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, [1975] 3 SCR 333 at page 360, referred to.
3:7. The concept of an open government is the direct emanation from the right to know which se.ems to be implicit in the right of free speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a). Therefore, disclosure of information in regard to the functioning of Government must be the rule and secrecy an exception justified only where the strictest requirement of public interest so demands. The approach of the court must be to attenuate the area of secrecy as much as possible consistently with 1he requirement of public interest, bearing in mind all. the time that disclosure also serves an important aspect of public interest. [602 B-D] .
3:8. The court would allow the objection to disclosure if it finds that the document relates to affairs of State and its disclosure would be injurious to public interest, but on the other hand, if it reaches the conclusion that the document does not relate to affairs of State or that the public interest does not compel its non-disclosure or that the public interest in the administration of justice in the particular case before it overrides all other aspects of public interest, it will overrule the objection and order disclosure of the document. The basic question to which the court would therefore have to address itself for the purpose of deciding the validity of the objection would be whether the document relates to affairs of State or in other words, it is of such a character that its disclosure would be agains 1 the interest of the State or the public service and if so, whether the public interest in it• non-disclosure is so strong that it must prevail over the public interest in the administration of justice and un that account, it should not be allowed to be disclosed. The final decision in regard to the validity of an objection against disclosure raised under section 123 would always be with the court by reason o{ section 162. [607 A-DJ
$.1>. GUt>t A v. UNION
3:9. Now an objection against the disclosure of a document on the ground that it relates to affairs of State may be made before the court either because it would be against the interest of the State or the public service to disclose its contents or because it belongs to a class of document which in the public interest ought not to be disclosed, whether or not it would be harmful to disclose the contents of the particular document. Where immunity from disclosure is claimed on the ground that disclosure of the contents of the document would be injurious to the interest of the State or the public service it would not be difficult to decide the claim because it would almost invariably be supported by an affidavit made either by the Minister or by the head of the department and if the Minister or the head of the department asserts that to disclose the contents of the document "would or might do to the nation or the public service a grave injury, the court will be slow to question his opinion or to allow any interest, even that of justice to prevail over it" unless there can be shown to exist some factor suggesting either lack of good faith or an error of judgment or an error of law on· the part of the minister or the head· of the department. But, even in such cases, it is now well-settled that that the court is not bound by the statement made by the minister or the bead of the department in the affidavit and it retains the power to balance the injury to the State or the public service against the risk of injustice, before reaching its decision. But the claim in the present case to withhold disclosure of the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and the Chief Justice of India in regard to continuance of S.N. Kumar is not based on the ground that the contents of these particular documents are such that their disclosure would harm the national interest or the interest of public service. [607 E-H, 609 A-BJ 3 : 10. The court has to balance the detriment to the pubiic interest on the administrative or executive side which would result from the disclosure of the document against the detriment to the public interest on the judicial side which would result from non-disclosure of the document though relevant to the proceeding. The court has to decide which aspect of the public interest predominates or in other words, whether the public interest which requires that the document should not be produced, outweighs the public interest that a court of justice in performing its function should not be denied access to relevant evidence. The court has thus to perform a balancing e•ercise and after weighing the one competing aspect of public interest against the other, decide where the balance lies. If the court comes to the conclusion that, on the balance, the disclosure of the document would cause greater injury to public interest than its non-disclosure the court would uphold the objec1ion and not allow the document to be disclosed but if, on the 01her hand, the court finds that the balance between competing public interest lies the other way, the court would order the disclosure of the document. This balancing between two competing aspects of public interesi has to be performed by the court even where an objection to the disclosure of the document is taken on the ground that it belongs to a class of documents which are protected irrespective of their contents, because there is no absolute immunity for documents belonging to such class. [612 G-H: 613 A-CJ 3 : 11. There is a heavy burden of proof on any authority which makes the. claim for cla~s immunity. The claim for class immunity is an extraordinary claim because 1t is based not upon the contents of the document in question but
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upon its membership of a class whatever be its contents and therefore the court should be very slow in upholding such a broad claim which is contradictory, if not destructive, of the concept of open government. Secondly, classes of documents which the immunity may be accorded are not closed and in the life of a fast changing society rapidly growing and developing under the impact of vast scientific and technological advances new class or classes of documents may come into existence to which the immunity may have to b~ granted in public interest, but that should only be as a highly exceptional measure. It is only under the severest compulsion of the requirement of public interest that the court may extend the immunity to any other class or classes of document and in the context of our commitment to an open government with the concommitment right of the citizen to know what is happening in the government, the court should be reluctant to expand the classes of documents to which immunity may be granted. The court must on the contrary move in the direction of attenuating the protected class or classes of documents, because by and large secrecy is the badge of an authoritarian government. (625 C-G]
3 : 12. In cases of this kind where non-appoinment of a additional Judge for a further term or transfer of a High Court Judge is challenged, the disclosure of the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of the High Court, the State Government and the Chief Justice of India and the relevant notings made by them, could not at all be said to be injurious to public interest. (628 A-BJ
Science Research Council v. Nasse, 1979 All England Reports p. 673, quoted with approval.
3 : 13. In a proceeding where the transfer of a High Court Judge or Chief Justice of a High Court is challenged, no immunity can be claimed in respect of the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister and the Chief Justice of India and the notings made by them,. since, on the balance, the non-disclosure of these documents would cause greater injury to public interest than what may be caused by their disclosure. Further the disclosure of the correspondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of the High Court, the State Government and the Chief Justice of India and the relevant notes made by them in regard to non-appointment of an additional Judge for a further term or transfer of a High Court Judge cannot be considered to be detrimental to public interest. (631 C-E]
3.14. In these circumstances, the injury which would be caused to the public interest in administration of justice by non-disclosure of the correspondence between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India and the relevant notings made by them in regard to non-appointment of S. N. Kumar and the correspondence between the Law Minister and the Government of India and the relevant notings made by them in regard to transfer of the Chief Justice of Patna, far outweighs the injury which may, if at all, be caused to the public interest by their disclo· sure and hence these documents were liable to be disclosed. (635 G-H; 636 A]
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S.P. GUPTA V. UNION
4: l. There is no constitutional orlegal infirmity or any abuse or misuse of authority on the part of the Law Minister in issuing the circular letter. The circular letter dated March 18, 1981 does not violate the provisions of clause (I} of Article 217 or clause (I) Article 222 nor does it offend against any other constitu· tional or legal provision and the challenge against the validity of the circular letter must, therefore, fail. However, since an additional Judge has a right to be consi· dered for appointment as an additional Judge for a further term on the expiration of his original term, and in case of a vacancy in a permanent post, for appointment as a permanent Judge in his own High Court, he cannot be discontinued as an additional Judge on the ground that he has not given his consent for being appointed as a permanent Judge in any other High Court. Such a ground for discontinuing an additional Judge would be wholly irrelevant ground and if on the expiration of his original term, an additional Judge is discountinued on any such gi'ound, the decision of the President discontinuing him would be unconstitut i6nal and void and the Union of India would be liable to be directed to reconsider his case on the basis of relevant considerations after excluding the irrelevant ground. [685 H; 686 A-D] 4:2. The circular letter addressed by the Law Minister is not in the nature of a public order made by a public authority. The Law Minister is undoubtedly a member of the Cabinet and in issuing the circu Jar letter he was acting on behalf of the Central Government but the circular letter does not appear to have been issued by the Law Minister in the exercise of any constitutional or legal power. The circular letter has no constitutional or legal sa11ction behind it and non compliance with the request contained in it would not proprio vigore entail any adverse consequence to the additional Judge or to the person recommended for initial appointment, for not complying with such request. It may be that because an additional Judge does not give his consent to be appointed as a permanent Judge in another High Court, he may not be appointed as a permanent Judge in his own High Court and may be discontinued as an additional Judge on the expiration of his term, though this is not within the intendment of the circular letter and is clearly impermissible, but in that event it would be his non-appointment as a permanent Judge or discontinuance as an additional Judge which would, if at all, given him a cause of action and not the circular letter asking for such consent. The circular letter is a document without any legal force and does not by itself of its own force, create or alter any legal relationship or arrangement or produce any legal consequence or effect. It is no more than a letter addressed to the Chief Minister of each State asking him to obtain the consent of the additional Judges as also of those recommended or to be recommended for inititial appointment for being appointed as Judges in a High Court outside the State The circular letter must be construed from a commonsense point of view having regard to the clarification, if any given by the author of circular letter, namely, the Law Minister. [568 G-H; 569 A-D]
Commississioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanfi, [1952] SCR 135, held inapplicable.
4 : 3. The policy of having one third of the Judges in every High Court from outside the State, which the Law Minister is trying to implement by)ssuiog
f
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the circular letter, is n~ither ill-conceived nor mo/a fide nor subversive of the independence of rhe judiciary. So long as the policy is evolved by the Government after consultation with the Chief Justice of India and it is not otherwise unconstitutional, the Court cannot pronounce upon the wisdom of the policy or strike it down because it does not appeal to the court. Here the policy of having one third of the number of Judges in each High Court from outside the State has been adopted after consultation with the Chief Justice of India and, in fact, it has his complete approval and the Law Minister did not therefore act unconstitutionally or illegally in relying upon the policy in the first paragraph of the circular letter. Further this is supported by the unanimity of view of all high powered bodies and Law Associations over several years. [573 B-E]
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4 : 4. It is clear from the langu~ge of clause (1) of Article 217 that the appointment of a Judge of a High Court can be made by the President c•nly after consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of India and consultation within the meaning of this Article means full and effective consultations with each of the three constitutional functionaries after placing all relevant material before them. Now, if a person who is an additional kdge in the High Court in one State or who is practising as a lawyer in that State is to be appointed as a Judge in another State, then obviously his willingness to be so appointed would be a highly relevant factor and that would have to be ascertained and placed before the three constitutional functionaries who are required to be consulted before an appointment can be made. It is obvious that the President cannot appoint JI person to be a Judge of a High Court without first ascertaining his willingness to be appointed as a Judge in that High Court and someone has to make an inquiry in that behalf in order to ascertain his willingness. It is only if the person concerned is willing to be appointed as a Judge in that High Court that the question would arise of processing his name and consulting the three constimtional functionaries in regard to the appointment of such person This inquiry has to be made before the process of consultation can start and the Law Minister therefore by addressing the circular letter requested the Chief Minister of each State to make this inquiry. It is true that the Law Minister did not state in so many terms in the circular letter that the Chief Minister may make this inquiry through the Chief Justice of the High Court but that was clearly implicit in the circular letter, because a copy of the circular Jetter was also sent to the Chief Justice of each High Court with the endorsement "for necessary action" and moreover it must he presumed that the necessary inquiry would be made by the Chief Minister only through the Chief Justice of the High Court. Therefore, the obtaining of the consent of the person proposed for appointment in advance for being appointed as a Judge in another High Court can never have the effect of reducing consultation with the Chief Justice of India to a mockery or making it ineffective so as to be violative of clause (I) of Article 217. [575 A-E; 578 G-H] 4: 5. Further, from the mere use of the word 'obtain' in the circular letter, it cannot be inferred that there was an implied threat tot he additional Judges that if they do not give their consent for being appo;nted as Judges in another High Court, ..\. they would be visited with adverse consequences. The word 'obtain' is a transitive verb and it is obvious that when the Chief Minister of each State \\as asked by the Law Minister by issuing the circular letter to o\Jtain tlw c;opsent of ttw
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additional Judges for being appointed as permanent Judges in another High Court what was meant was that the Chief Minister should obtain the consent of each additional Judge if be was willing to give such consent. The use of the wold 'obtain' ca11not possibly be construed to mean that the person from whom the consent is to be obtained must be coerced into giving it. To read the word 'obtain' in the circular letter as meaning that the Chief Minister was expected to coerce the additional Judges into giving their consent or as conveying an implied threat to the additional Judges that if they do not give their consent they might be dropped as additional Judges on the expiration of their term, would, therefore, be nothing short of torturing out of the language used in the circular letter, a meaning which the language does not bear and which could not possibly have been intended by the Law Minister. [579 D-H]
4 : 6. The circular letter deals with two categories of persons; one is the category of persons who are recommended may in future be recommended for initial appointment as Judges and the other is the category of additional Judges who are appointed for a period of two years or less. So far as the first category of persons is concerned, when a person who is recommended or proposed to be recommended for initial appointment as a Judge is a;ked whether he is willing to be appointed as a Judge in another High Court, no transfer is involved in such process, as such person is not a sitting Judge in any High Court and is appointed for the first time in another High Court. The transfer contemplated in Article 222 clause (1) is not a mere act of physical locomotion or transfer of residence from one place to another, but it is an act by which a Judge in one High Court is transferred as a Judge of another High Court. Equally there is no transfer involved where an additional Judge is, on the expiration of his term, appointed as a permanent Judge in any other High Court. It is no doubt true that by reason of his appointment as an additional Judge or permanent Judge in another High Court, he has physically to go to that High Court, but it is not while being a Judge of one High Court that he goes over as a Judge of the other High Court. His appointment as an additional Judge of one High Court comes to an ·end and be is appointed afresh as an additional or permanent Judge in another High Court. It is by virtue of a fresh appointment that he becomes a Judge, whether additional or permanent, of another High Court and he is not transferred from one High Court to another within the meaning of clause (I) of Article 222. [582 G-H; 583 A-DJ 4 : 7. Further, the circular did not seek to transfer Judges from one High Court to another. The expression "transfer" /"transferred" happened to be used by the Law Minister in an ex-tempore speech made on the floor of the House and not in a document or letter prepared after much care and dellberation. No undue reliance can therefore be placed on the use of the expression 'transfer' or 'transferred' in the speech of the Law Minister. What was contemplated by the circular letter was not transfer of additional Judge from one High Court to another and it did not therefore, have to satisfy the requirements of clause (l) of Article 222. [584 B, F-G, H; 585 A] . 4 : 8. But quite apart from this consideration, even if the view be taken that what the circular Jetter sought to achieve was transfer of additional Judge from one High Court to another by obtaining consent of the additional Judges in •
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advance, the Law Minister would not be circumventing the majority decision in
Sankalchand Sheth's case. [585A-B, G-H]
4 : 9. Even where the consent of the additional Judge has been obtained in advance, the Chief of India would have to consider whether it is in public interest to appoint the additional Judge as a permanent Judge in another High Court and the consent obtained in advance would not pre-empt the consultative exercise with the Chief Justice of India. The advance consent obtained from the additional Judge would have no meaning so far as the Chief Justice of India is concerned, because irrespective whether the additional Judge has given his consent or not, the Chief Justice of India would have to consider whether it would be in public interest to allow the additional Judge to be appointed as a permanent Judge in the other High Court. [585 E-G]
'D
5. On a plain reading of Articles 217 (1) and 124 it is clear that the Chief Justice of India, the Chief Justice of the High Court and such other Judges of the High Courts and of the Supreme Court as the Central Government may deem it necessary to consult, are merely constitutional functionaries having a consultative role and the power of appointment reside solely and exclusively in the Central Government. It is not an unfettered power in the sense that the Central Government cannot act arbitrarily without ~onsulting the constitutional functionaries specified in the two Articles but it can act only after consulting them and the consultation must be full and effective consultation. [541 B-D]
6: I. Each of the constitutional functionaries required to be consulted under Articles 124 (2) and 217 (1) must ha•e for his consideration full and identical facts bearing upon appointment or non-appointment of the person concerned as a Judge and the opinion of each of them taken on identical material must be considered by the Cenetral Government before it takes a decision whether or not to appoint the person concerned as a Judge. It is only "consultation" which is provided by way of fetter upon the power of appointment vested in the Central Government and "consultation" cannot be equated with "concurrence" [542 D-E]
6: 2. On a proper interpretation of clause (2) of Article 124 and clause (I) of Article 217, it is open to the Central Government to take its own decision in regard to appointment or non-appointment of a Judge in a High Court or the Supreme Court after taking into account and giving due weight to the opinions expressed by the constitutional functionaries required to be consulted under these two Articles. Even if the opinion given by all the constitutional functionaries consulted by it is identical, the Central Government is not bound to act in accordance with stich opinion though being a unanimous opinion of all the three constitution functionaries, it would have great weight and if an appointment is made by the Central Government in defiance of such unanimous opinion, it may become vulnerable to attack on ground that it is mala fide or based on irrelevant. grounds. But, ordinarily the Central Government would not make an appointment of a Judge in a High Court, if all the three conslitutional functionaries have expressed an opinion aiiainst it. [543 A-Cl
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s.1>. GUPtA v. IJNtON
6 : 3. The contention that where there is difference of opinion amongst the constitutional funtionaries required to be consulted, the opinion of the Chief Justice of India should have primacy, since he is the head of the Indian Judiciary any paterfamilias of the judicial fraternity, is not sound. On no principle primacy can be given to the opinion of one constitutional functionary, when clause (I) of Article 217 places all the three constitutional functionaries on the same pedestal so far as the process of consultation is concerned and does not make any distinction between one constitutional functionary and another. Each of the three constitutional functionaries occupies a high constitutional office and clause (I) of Article 217 provides that the appointment of a High Court Judge shall be made after consultation with all the three constitutional functionaries without assigning superiority to the opinion of one over that of another. (543 D-F]
It is true that the Chief Justice of India is the head of the Indian Judiciary and may be figuratively described as paterfamilias of the brotherhood of Judges but the Chief Justice of a High Court is also an equally important constitutional functionary and it is not possible to say that so far as the consultative process is concerned, be is in any way less importal'lt than the Chief Justice of India. In fact under the constitutional scheme, the Chief Justice of a High Court is not subject to the administrative superintendence of the Chief Justice of India nor is he under the control of supervision of the Chief Justice of India. It is only the power of bearing appeals against the decision of the Chief Justice of a High Court that is possessed by the Chief Justice of India and there his superiority over the Chief Justice of the High Court ends. (543 F-H; 544 E]
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Looking at the raison d'etre of the provision for consultation enacted in clause (I) of Article 217, it will be obvious that the opinion given by the Chief Justice of the High Court must have at least equal weight as the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, because ordinarily the Chief Justice of the High Court would be better in a position to know about the competence, character and integrity of the person recommended for appointment as a Judge in the High Court. The opinion of the Governor of the State, which means the State Government would also be entitled to equal weight, not in regard to the technical competence of the person recommended and his knowledge and perception of law on which the Chief Justice of the High Court would be the proper person to express an opinion, but in regard to the character and integrity of such person, his antecedents and his social philosophy and value-system, the opinion of the Chief Justice of India would be valuable because he would not be affected by caste, communal or other parochial considerations and standing outside the turmoil of local passions and prejudices. he would be able to look objectively at the problem of appointment. There is therefore, a valid and intelligible purpose for which the. opinion of each of the three constitutional functionaries is invited before the Central Government can take a decision whether or not to appoint a particular person as a Judge in a High Court. (544A-E] The opinion of each of the three constitutional functionariei; is entitled to equal weight and it cannot be said that the opinion of the Chief Justice of India must have primacy over the opinions of the other two constitutional functionaries. If pritnacy were to be given to the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, it would,
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(19B2i 2 s.c.il.
in effect and substance amount to "concurrence", because giving primacy would mean that his opinion must prevail over that of the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Governor of the State, which means that the Central Government must accept his opinion. But it is only "consultation" and not "concurrellee" of the Chief Justice of India that is provided in clause (1) of Article 217. [544 E-G]
Where there is a difference of opinion amongst the constitutional functionaries in regard to appointment of a Judge in a High Court, the opinion of none of the constitutional functionaries is cmtitled to primacy but after considering the opinion of each of the constitutional functionaries and giving it due weight, the Contra] Government is entitled to come to its own decision as to which opinion it should accept in deciding whether or not to appoint the particular person as a Judge. So also where a Judge of the Supreme Court is to be appointed, the Chief Justice of India is required to be consulted, but again it is not 'concurrence" but only "consultation" and the Central Government is not bound to act in accordance with the opinion of the Chief Justice of India. The ultimate power of appointment rests with the Central Government and that is in accord with the constitutional practice prctvailing in all democratic countries. [545 C-E]
6 : 4. Thus the appointment of a Judge belonging to the higher echelons of Judicial service is wholly in the hands of the Executive. This is, of course, not an ideal system of appoi11tment of Judges, but the reason why the power of appointment of Judges is left to the Executive is that the Executive is responsible to the Legislature and through the Legislature, it is accountable to the people who are consumers of justice. The power of appointment of Judges is not entrusted to the Chief Justice of India or to the Chief Justice of a High Court because they do not have any accountability to the people and even if any wrong or improper appointment is made, they are not liable to account t<' anyone for such appointment. [545 G-H; 546 A-BJ
6 : 5. The appointment of a Judgo of a High Court or the Supreme Court does not depend merely upon the professional or functional suitability of the person concerned in terms of experience or knowledge of Jaw. Though this requirement is certainly important and vital and ignoring it might result in impairment of the efficiency of administration of justice, but also on several other considerations such as honesty, integrity and general pattern of behaviour which would ensure dispassionate and objective adjudication with an open mind, free and ·fearless approach to matters in issue, social acceptability of the person concerned to the high judicial office in terms of current norms and ethos of the society, commitment to democracy and th• rule of law, faith in the constitutional objectives indicating his approach towards the Preamble and the Directive Principles of State Policy, sympathy or absence thereof with the constitutional goals and the needs of an activist judicial system. These various considerations, apart from professional and functional suitability, have to be taken Judge of a High Court or the into account while appointing a Supreme Conrt and it is on this accotnt that the power of appointment is entrusted to the Executive, subject to the fetter placed upon the power
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of appointment by the requirement of consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of India in case of appointment of a High Court Judge and with the Chief Justice of India in case of appointment of a Supreme Court Judge. However, so far as appointment of Supreme Court Judge is concerned, it is not consultation with the Chief Justice of India alone that is provided in clause (2) of Article 124, but in addition "such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts" as the Central Government deem necessary are also required to be consulted. l546 A·H]
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6:6. Clause (2) of Article 124, clearly provides for consultation as a mandatory exercise and the only m~tter which is left to the discretion of the Central Government is the choice of the Judge of the Supreme Court and the High Courts who may be consulted. The words "as the President may deem necessary" qualify only the preceding words "such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States." Which of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts should be consulted is left to the tliscretion of the Central Government but consultation there must be with one or more of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts. The Central Government must consult at least one Judge out of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts before exercising the power of appoint· ment conferred by clau~e (2) of Article 124. This requirement is prescribed obviously because the Constitution makers did not think it desirable that one person alone, howsoever high and eminent he may be, should have a predominent voice in the appointment of a Judge of the Supreme Court. But this requirement is not complied with in making appointments on the Supreme Court Bench presumably under a misconception that it is not a mandatory but only an optional provision. The result is that the Chief Justice of India alone is consulted in the matter of appointment of a Supreme Court Judge and largely as a result a healthy practice followed through the years, the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India is ordinarily accepted by the Central Government, the consequence being that in a highly important matter like the appointment of a Supreme Court Judge, it is the decision of the Chief Justice of India which is ordinarily, for all practical purposes final. [547 C-H; 548 A]
But, there are no criteria laid down or evolved to guide the Chief Justice! in this respect nor is there any consultation with wider interests. This is, no a very satisfactory mode of appointment, because wisdom and experience demand that no power should be vested in a single individual, howsoever high and great he may be, and howsoever honest and well meaning. We are all human beings with our own likes and dislikes, our own predilictions and prejudices and our mind is not so comprehensive as to be able to take in all aspects of a question at one time and more over sometimes, the information on which we base our judgments may be incorrect or inadequate and our judgment may also sometimes be imperceptibly influenced by extraneous or irrelevant considerations. Therefore, it is unwise to entrust power in any significant or sensitive area to a singal individual howsoever high or important may be the office which he is occupying. There must be checks and controls in the exercise of every power, particularly when it is a power to make important
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1982] 2 s.c.a
and crucial appointments and it must be exercisable by plurality of hands rather than be vested in a single individual. Hence, the Constitution Makers introduced the requirement in clause (2) of Article 124 that one niore Judge out of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts should be consulted in making appointment of a Supreme Court Judge. But even with this provision the safeguard is not adequate because it is left to the Central Government to select any one or more of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts for the purpose of consultation. [548 A-F] It is, therefore, suggested that there must be a collegium to make recommendation to the President in regard to appointment of a Supreme Court or High Court Judge. The recommending authority should be more broad based and there should be consultation with wider interests. If the collegium is composed of persons who are expected to have knowledge of the persons who may be fit for appointment on the Bench and of qualities required for appointment and this last requirement is absolutely essential-it would go a long way towards securing the right kind of Judges, who would be truly independent in the sense and who would invest the judicial process with significance and meaning for the deprived and exploited sections of humanity. [548 F-H] 7;1. Article 224 confers power on the President to appoint an additional Judge, if by reason of any temporary increase in the business of a High Coutt or by reason of arrears of work therein, it appears to the President that the number of the judges of that court should be for the time being increased and in that event he can appoint an additional Judge for such period not exceeding two years as he may specify. The words "for the time being" clearly indicate that the increase in the number of judges which the President may make by appointing additional Judges would be temporary with a view to dealing with the temporary increase in the business of the High Court or the arrears of work in the High Court. Article 224 clause (!) did not contemplate that the increase in the number of Judges should be for an indefinite duration, the object being that additional Judge should be appointed for a short period in order to dispose of the temporary increase of pending cases. The underlying idea was that there should be an adequate strength of permanent Judges in each High Court to deal with its normal institutions and so far as the te·mporary increa~e.in the work or the arrears of pending cases were concerned, additional Judges appointed for a period not exceeding two years should assist in disposing of such work. On ·a true interpretation of clause (l) of Article 224 it was never intended ihat additional Judges should go on being appointed and reappointed term after term." [554 G-11, 555 B-E, 557 D-E] 7:2: It is obvious that ·if additional Judges were appointed according to the true intendment of clause (I) of Article 224, they would be temporary Judges appointed for a short duration to dear off the arrears and once the arrears are cleared off, which was expected by Parliament to be achieved within not more than ·two years they would, on the expiration their term, go back to the Bar or to the District Judicial service. Their tenure being for a short period limited by the ii'me expeeted to be taken in clearing off the arrears-such time, in any event, being hopefully not more than two years they would know that, on the expiration
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of their term, they Would have to go back. They would have no right to be appointed or even to be c1.msidered for appointment as permanent Judges, because when they accepted appomtment as additional Judges under clause (1) of Article 224, they would have known that they were appointed only as temporary Judges for a short period in order to clear off the arrears. [557 E-H]
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7;3. But in practice the true intendment and' purpose of clause (I) of Article 224 was never carried into effect. The strength of additional Judges was not fixed realistically and a much lesser number of additional .Tudges than required for the purpose of clearing off the arrears within a period of about two years were appointed in the different High Courts from time to time with the . result that the arrears continued to ·increase and the need for additional Judges continued to subsist. The entire object and purpose of the introduction of clause (!) of Article 224 was perverted and additional Judges were appointed under this Article not as temporary Judges for a short period who would go·back on the expiration of their term as soon as the arrears are cleared off, but as Judges whose tenure, though limited to a period not exceeding two years at the time of each appointment as an addi1ional Judge, would be renewed from time to time until a berth was found for them in tl1e cadre of permanent Judges. (557 H, 558 A, E-F, 559 A-CJ
7:4. Therefore, far from being aware that on the expiration of their term, they would have to go back because they were appointed only as temporary Judges for a short period in order to clear off the arrears-which would have been the position if clause (1) of Article 224 had been implemented according to its true intendment and purpose-the additional Judges entered. the High Court judiciary with a legitimate expectation that they would not have to go back on the expiration of their term but they would be either reappointed as additional Judges for a further term or if in the meanwhile, a vacancy in the post of a permanent Judge became available, they would be confirmed as permanent Judges. This expectation which was generated in the minds of additional Judges by reason of the peculiar manner in which clause (1) of Article 224 was operated, cannot now be ignored by the Government and the Government cannot be permitted to say that when the term of an additi.onal Judge expires, the Govern!I)ent can drop him at its sweet will. By reason of the expectation raised in his mind through a practice followed for almost over a quarter of a century, an additional Judge is entitled to be considered for appointment as an additional Judge for a further term on the expiration of his original term and if in the meanwhile, a vacancy in the post of a permanent Judge becomes available to him on the basis of seniority amongst additional Judges, he has a right to be considered for appointment as a permanent Judge in his high Court. [559 D-H]
7:5. On a plain reading of Article 217 clause (1) it is clear that when an additional Judge is to be appointed, the procedure set out in that Article is to be followed. Clause (1) of Article 217 provides that "Every Judge" of a High Court shall be appointed after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of the High Court. The expression "Every Judge' mun on a plain natural COl1$tructi<;>Q jQcluqe J:lOt o!llr a !'ermanen\
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[i982] 2 s.c.tt.
Judge but also an additional Judge. Therefore, no additional Judge can be appointed without complying with the requirement of clause (1) of Article 217. (560 A-B, F] I
When the term of an additional Judge expires he ceases to be a Judge and therefore, if he is to continue as Judge, he must be either reappointed as an additional Judge or appointed as a permanent Judge. In either case, clause (I) of Article 217 would operate and no reappointment as an additional Judge or appointment as a permanent Judge can be made without going through the procedure set out in Article 21 clause (I). [560 F-G] 7:6.
7.7. An additional Judge has a right to be considered for such reappointment or appointment as the case may be, and the Central Government cannot be heard to say that the additional Judge need not be considered. The additional Judge cannot just be dropped without consideration. The name of the additional Judge would have o go through the procedure clause (I) of Article 217 and after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Central Government would have to decide whether or not reappoint him as an additional Judge or to appoint him as permanent Judge. But this is the only right possessed by the additipnal Judge. The additional Judge is not entitled to contend that he must automatically and without any further consideration be appointed as an additional Judge for a further term or as a permanent Judge. He has to go through the process of clause (1) of Article 217 and to concede to him the right to be appointed either as an additional Judge for a further term or as a permanent Judge would be to fly in the face of Article 217 clause (1 ). The only right he has is to be considered for such appointment and this right also belongs to him not because clause (1) of Article 224 confers such right upon him, but because of the peculiar manner in which clause (1) of Article 224 has been operated aII these years. [560 G-H, 561 A, D-H]
7:8. There are no limitations in the language of clause (I) of Article 217 as to what factors shall be considered and what factors shaII not be, but having regard to the object and purpose of that provision, namely, appointment of a High Court Judge, it is obvious that fitness and suitability, physical, inteilectual and moral, would be the governing considerations to be taken into account in deciding the question of appointment. Public interest requires that only such person should be appointed as a Judge who is physically, inteIIectually and morally fit and suitable to be appointed as a Judge and it would be contrary to public weal to appoint a person, who does not possess the requisite fitneios and suitability. The Central Government would, therefore, be under a constitutional obligation to consider whether the additional Judge, whose term has expired, is fit and suitable to be reappointed as an additional Judge or appointed as a permanent Judge. Of course, at the time when the question of reappointment of an additional Judge for a further term or his appointment as a permanent Judge comes-up before the Central Government for consideration, the additional Judge would have two weighty circumstances in his favour: one, that he has experience ;is a Judge f9r one term and the other, that it would not be desirable to send an
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S. P. GUPTA v. UNION
additional Judge back to the Bar. But even with these weighty circumstances in his favour, he would have to satisfy the test ·of fitness and suitability, physical, intellectual and moral, before the Central Government can, consistently with its constitutional obligation and in public interest, decide to reappoint him as an [562 C-H, 563 A-Bl additional Judge or appoint him as a permanent Judge.
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7:9. It is true that the fitness and suitability of the additional Judge must have been considered by the Central Government at the- time of his original appointment, hut when the question again comes-up for consideration on the expiration of his term, the Central Government has. to consider afresh, in the light of the mate1ial then available save and except material which was already with the Central Government at the time of original appointment, as to whether he possesses the requisite fitness and suitability being appointed as a Judge. This would not amount to treating his as if he were on probation. An additional Judge is certainly not on probation in the sense that his services cannot be terminated before the expiration of his term, unlike a probationer who can be sent out at any time during the period of probation. It would also not be open to the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Governor of !he State or the Chief Justice of india to sit in judgment over the quality of the work turned out by the additional Judge during his term, because that would be essentially an appellate function which can be discharged only by court entitled to hear appeals from the decisions of the additional Judge. But every other consideration which .bears on the physical, .intellectual and moral fitness and suitability of the additional Judge based on material other than that which was with the Central Government at the time of original appointment can and must be considered and if the Central Government finds, after consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of India that the additional Judge is not fit and suitable for being appointed as a Judge the Central Government may decide not to appoint him an additional Judge for a further .term or as a permanent Judge. [563 B-H]
7: IO. So Iong as tl1e case of the . additional Judge is considered by the Central Government for reappointment or appointment as the case may be, the decision of the Central Government cannot be questioned except on the ground · that it was reached without full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Governor of the State and the Chief Ju~tice of India or that ' it was based on irrelevant considerations: Where such a challenge is made, the burden is on Central Government to show that there was full and effective consultation and the decision was based on relevant considerations. In fact where an additional Judge is not appointed as an additional Judge for a further term or as a permanent judge despite the unanimous opinion of the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India, the decision of the Central Government would prima facie be liable to attack and the burden would lie heavily on the Central G wernment to show that it had cogent reasons to disagree with the Chief Justice of the Hil!'1 <;:ourt and the Chi~f J11stice of India. [563H, 564 A-C]
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7:1 I. An additional Judge has a right to be considered for appointment as an additional Judge for a further term or in case there is a vacancy in a permanent post, then for appointment as a permanent Judge, and he must therefore, be considered by the Government for s·uch reappointment or appointment ·as the case may be, and a decision must be taken in regard to him after consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of India and if it is found that there was no consultation with any of these three constitutional functionaries before the decision was taken by the Central Government not to appoint him or the decision of the Central Government is based on irrelevant grounds, it would not be consideration by the Central Government as required by clause {I) of Article 217 and he would, therefore, be entitled to challenge the decision ·of the Central Government which · is based on what may be called 'non-consideration in law' and to require the Central Government to reqonsider his case in accordance with clause (l) of Article.217. [564 E-H] 7:12. Clause (1) of Article 224 contemplates appointment of additional Judges to augment the strength of existing Judges before additional Judges can be appointed and so long as any post of existing Judges is not filled-up; there can be no question of appointing additional Judges to augment· their strength. When there is a-vacancy in the post of a permanent Judge, it must first be filled up before any additional Judge can be appointed under clause (!) of Article 224. It is, therefore, necessary that the Central Government must periodically review the strength of permanent Judges in each High Court so that there is a proper and adequate strength for the purpose of dealing' with the normal institutions. Since there are large arrears pending almost in every High Court and it is not humanly possible to dispose of these arrears within a measurable distance of time even by appointment of additional Judges, it is necessary that instead of appointing additional Judges for the purpose of disposing of the arrears, it would be desfrable to increase the strength of permanent Judges because the arrears have come to stay and it is not possible to wipe them out for a long period of time. [565 C-G] 7:13. It is no doubt true that clause (I) of Article 224 fixes the outer limit for the term for which an additional Judge may be appointed, but that has been done because there may be cases where the temporary increase in the business or the arrears of pending cases are so small that it may be possible to dispose them of by appointing additional Judges for. term less then two years. That is why Parliament provided that an additional Judge may be appointed for a term not exceeding two years. But, when arre~rs of pending cases are so large that it would. not be possible to dispose them of even within a period of ten years, there can be no justification for appointing additional Judges for a period of less than two years and that would be plainly outside the scope of the power conferred under clause (I) of Article 224. When the arrears of pending cases are such that they cannot possibly be disposed of within a period ·of Jess than two years, additional Judges must be appointed for a tarm of two years and no less. [566 G-H, 567 A-CJ
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7:14. The term for which an additional Judge is appointed must not be Jess than two years~ u~les~ the temporary in~re11~c in busipe~s 9r the arrears of
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pending cases are so small that they can reasonably be disposed of within a shorter period. [567 C-D]
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7:15.. An additional Judge cannot be appointed for a perio~ of three months or six months in order to rnable the Chief Justice of India or tbt;. Central Government to consider whether the additional Judge should be appointed for a further term or as a . permanent Judge. That is a matter on which the Chief Justice of India must come to his opinion well in time and the Government of India llilUSt also reach its decision sufficiently in advance so that the additional Judge would know quite sometime before his term is due to expire whether he is going to be appointed for a further term or is going to be discontinued. There is no power in the Central Government to appoint an additional Judge for a short term in order to enable the Chief Justice of India or the Central Government to make enquiries with a view to satisfying itself whether the additional Judge is fit and suitable for being appointed as an additional Judge or as a permanent Judge. In the instant case, the Chief Justice of India act~d under a misconceptim:l of the true constitutional position when he recommended the appointment of 0. N. Vohra, S. N. Kumar and S. B. Wad for a period of six months and the Central Government was also in error in appointing them only for a period of three months. [567 D-H] 8:1. A writ of mandamus cannot be issued against the Union of India for fixing a particular strength of judges in each High Court. The fixation of the strength of judges in each High Court is a purely executive function which is entrusted by Article 216 to the President, that is, the Government oflndia and it is entirely for the Government of India to decide in the exercise of its judgment as to what shall be the strength of judges in each High Court. There are no judicially manageable standards for the purpose~ of controlling or guiding the discretion of· the Union of India in that respect nor is it possible for the Supreme Court to lay down any standards or norms on the basis of which it can require the Union of India to appoint a certain number of Judges in a particular High Court. [539 D-E, 540 DJ
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8:2. The fixatian of the number of Judges necessary to be appointed in a particular High Court does not depend upon the.· application of a mathematical formula dividing the number of pending cases by the average rate of disposal per Judge per year. It is singularly complex . problem and merely increasing the number of Judges in a High' Court would not necessarily solve the problem of disposal of pending cases. There would be many policy considerations which would influence the Government of Indi;i in taking a decision as to what number of judges are necessary to be appointed in a particular High Court, like difficulty in getting competent judges, finding court rooms. availability of other strategies to clear the arrears,' etc. ·It would not be po~sible to lay down any judicially mangeable standards with reference to which the Government of India could be directed to appoint a particular number . of judges in a High Court. What should be the number of Judges necessary to be appointed in a particular High Court must essentially remain a matter within the discretion of the Government of India and if the Government of India does not appoint sufficient number uf judges, the appeal !DUS! be to the legislature and not t<;> thQ Court. [539 E-Hi 540 A-DJ
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1982] 2 s.c.R.
9:1. The decision not to continue S.N. Kumar as an Additional Judge was taken by the Central Government "after full and effective consultation" within the meaning of Article 217, with the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chjef Justice oflndia and it was not based on any irrelevant consideration. As between two conflicting but perfectly bonafide opinions of the two constitutional authoritles, the Central Government had to choose between them and come to its own decision. Here it chose that of Chief Justice of Delhi High Court. As such the decision does not suffer from constitutional infirmity. [668G·669 B-C] 9:2. It is not open to the court to hold an inquiry and determine for itself the correctnes.s of the opinion of any of the constitutional authorities required to be consulted by the President. The opinion given by any such constitutional . authority may be mis taken or erroneous but the corrective for such mistake or error is to be found in the constitutional provision itself and it cannot be provided by judicial intervention. The Court cannot take evidence for the purpose of determining whether the facts on which the opinion of a constitutional authority required to be consulted is based are true or not or whether the opinion expressed by such constitutional authority is well-founded or not. That is a function entrusted by the Constitution to the President, that is, the Central Government and it is for the Central Government to judge whether the opinion expressed by the constitutional authority such as the Chief ~Justice of the High Court is well-founded or not and whether it should be accepted or rejected. The court cannot be invited to go into the question whether the facts on which th~ opinion of the Chief Justice of Delhi was based were correct or not and whether the op inio~ expressed by him was or was not justified. The court 1s concerned merely to enquire whether there was in fact full and effective consultation. [656C-F, 657 DJ
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9:3. Where the name of a person is proposed for appointment as a Judge of the High Court for the first time, he having no right to be considered for such appointment, is not entitled to insist that the proposal for his appointment, whether initiated by the Chief Justice of the High Court or the State Government or the Chief Justice of India, should be subjected to the process of consultation set out in Article 217 and his name can be dropped without any such consultation. But the position is different in c.asc of an additional Judge, for though an additional Judge has no right, on the expiration of his term, to be appointed an additional Judge for a further term or to be appointed a permanent Judge, be has still a right to be considered for such appointment and the Central Government has to decide whether or not to appoint him after consultation with the [636 D-G] three constitutional functionaries mentioned in Article 217.. 9:4. Article 217 does not require that any particular procedure should be followed for full and effective consultation nor does it insist that the relevant facts on which the final decision of the Central Government is based should be conveyed to the other three constitutional functionaries in any particular manner or by the Central Government itself. What is necessary to ensure full and effective consultati~n within the meaning of Article 217 is that the Central Qovern!llc;ont as well as eitc~ of the three copstitµtional functiooarie~ require<,\
-
s.P. GUPTA 11. bNioN
to.be consulted "must have for its consideration full and identical facts which can at once constitute both the source and foundation of the final decision" and it is immaterial as to how such "full and identical facts" are conveyed by one authority to the oth;r. It is sufficient compliance . with the constit~~ion~l requirement of Article 217 if the self-same facts on which the final dec1s10~ JS taken by the Central Government are placed before each of the three constlt~ tional functionaries required to be consulted and their opinion is taken on the basis of such facts whatever be the manner in which those facts are brought to their notice. ' [637 C-F]
-
9:5. It is undoubtedly true that it was constitutionally impossible for the Central Government to arrive at the decision not to continue S.N. Kumar as an Additional Judge without consultation with the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and the Chief Justice of India as mandatorily required by Article 217~ It was notnecessary that 1he full and identical facts which at once constituted .'both the source and foundation of the final decision" of the Central Government should be placed before the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India by the Central Government itself or that they should be brought to their notices in any particular order or by following any particular procedure. What was necessary to constitute full and effective consultation within the meaning of Article 217 was that the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India should have for their consideration "full and identical facts" which ultimately, [662 G-H, 663 A] formed the basis of the decision of the Central Government.
....
;.·
9:6. The charge of conspiracy is at all times a very serious charge and it must not be lightly made more particularly when it is· directed against persons holding high offices. Here it is difficult to see any justification at all for levelling a charge of conspiracy against the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Law Minister. It may be that on full and detailed investigation through an independent and efficient investigative machinery, the complaints and doubts against S.N. Kumar might have been found to be unjustified but such a course would have been neither practicable nor desirable. In the first place, as pointed by the Chief Justice of Delhi himself, he had no investigative ~achinery at his disposal and if be wanted the complaints and doubts against· S.N. Kumar to be investigated, be would have bad to ask the Central Government to carry out such investigation through the .Central Bureau of Investigation or the Intelligence Bureau or some such investigating agency and that . would have been clearly subversive of the independence of the judiciary. It would have been most improper for the Chief Justice of Delhi to ask the Central Government to investigate into complaints or doubts against a sitting Judge of his Court. Moreover, leaving the investigation of complaints and doubts against a sitting Judge in the hands of an investigative agency under the Control of a political Government would not be desirable because, apart from exposing the sitting Judge to unhealthy political pressures, it may not yield satisfactory result in all cases because such an investigation would not have the benefit of the guidance of a mature and experienced person like the Chief Justice who has lived a whole lifetime. in the courts and who is closely and intimately connected with lawyers and Judges in the Court over which he presides. It would indeed be impossible for any one unfamiliar with the legal profession and the functioning of the courts·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1982] 2 s.c.a:
to judge the genuineness or veracity of the sources from which information might be obtained in regard to a sitting Judge. It must, therefore, necessarily be left to the Chief Justice of the High Court to give his opinion in regard to the suitability of an additional Judge for further appointment on the basis of such information as he may gather by making his own inquiries. The Chief Justice of the High Court would have sufficient opportunities for judging the suitability of an additional Judge for further appointment, because the additional Judge would be· in close contact with the members of the Bar and his own colleagues and if there is anything wrong with the functioning of the Court or the Judges, he would be best in a position to know about it, [638 F ,640 C-H, 641 A-B] 9:7. Where the complaint against an additional Judge is in regard to his integrity, the Chief Justice of the High Court is not expected to hold a judicial or quasi-judicial inquiry for the purpose of adjudicating whether the additional Judge is, in fact, lacking in honesty and integrity. Such an inquiry against a Judge whether additional or permanent would not be permissible except in a proceeding for his removal. What the Chief Justice of the High Court has to do is merely to assess the suitability of the additional Judge for farther appointment and where Jack of integrity is alleged against him, the assessment can only by ·on the basis of his reputation for integrity, The integrity of the person under consideration would undoubtedly be a relevant factor to be taken into account, but in assessing such factor the Chief Justice of the High Court would not be expected to hold a judicial or.quasi-judicial inquiry for the purpose of determining whether the person concerned does, in fact, possess honesty and integrity or is Jacking in these qualities. The Chief Justice of the High Court would have to proceed on the basis of the reputation for honesty and integrity enjoyed by the person under consideration and if, on the basis of the information gathered by him, the Chief Justice of the High Court comes to the view that such person does not enjoy good reputation for integrity, the Chief Justice of the High Court would be justified in not recommending such person for appointment. Where a question of honesty and integrity of a Judge is concerned, it is almost impossible to come to a conclusive determination wheiher he is lacking in integrity or not, because experience shows that most persons are not willing to speak if they knew that they may he quoted and that in any event they are not prepared to testify in any judicial or quasi-judicial inquiry. It is therefore not enough in order to be able to recommend a person for appointment as a Judge to say that there is no proof of lack of integrity against him, because, if such were the test to be applied, there would be grave danger of persons lacking in integrity being appointed as Judges. The test which must be applied for the purpose of assessing the suitability of a person for appointment as a Judge must be whether the Chief Justice of ths High Court or for the matter of that, any other constitutional authority concerned in the appointment, is satisfied about the integrity of the person under consideration. If the person under consideration does not enjoy reputation for honesty and integrity, it would not be possible for the Chief Justice of the High court to say that he is satisfied about the integrity of such person and in such an event, the Chief iustice of the High Court would be justified is not recommending such person for appointment : in fact, it would be his duty not to recommend 911ch person. The public injury Mlich may be caused by appointment of a Judge Jacking in i11.tegrity would be infinitely more than th~ public injury which may
.....
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•
S.P. GUPtA v. uNlON
resuit from non-appointment of a competent Judge possessing integrity. On the bona fide view taken by him, the Chief Justice of Delhi did what it was his plainest duty in the circumstances to do. When an additional Judge, whose term has expired. and who would, therefore, have to return to the Bar or the subordinate judicial service, is not appointed a permanent Judge or an z.dditional Judge for afurther term, he he · Is· not removed by the Central Government. If he is not appointed a permanent Judge or an additional Judge for a further term, he goes out, but that happens because the term for which he was originally appointed has come to an end and not because he is renioved. There, is, therefore, no question of giving him an opportunity .o be beard before the decision is taken.not to appoint him as a permanent Judge or an additional Judge. [643 H, 644 A-H, 645 A-D, 669 F-H, 670 A]
-
9:8. What the Chief Justice of the High Court is required to c!o is to give his opinion in regard to the suitability of the additional Judge for further appointment and he has therefore Lo consider various matters relevant to the question of appointment and give his opinion to the Presi<!ent. He does not hold a judicial or quasi-judicial inquiry into the honour and integrity of the additional Judge nor does he arrive at any conclusive finding or determination. l:ll: merely gives his personal opinion in regard to the suitability of the additional Judge in discharge of the constitutional duty laid upon him and there is therefore no question of any opportunity being afforded to the additiOnal Judge before the Chief Justice of the High Court arrives at his opinion. When the Chief Justice of the High Court gives his opinion, it is a confidential communication which would not ordinarily be known to the public and in the case of S. N. Kumar too, but for the disclosure of documents vehemently pressed and passionately sought not only by the counsel for the petitioners but also by the counsel for s. N. Kumar, the world would never have known that the Chief Justice of Delhi has given an adverse opinion against the continuance of S. N. Kumar on the ground that his integrity was doubtful. It is obvious that in cases of this kind where the Chief Justice of the High Court gives his personal opinion or assessment on consultation by the President there is neither adjudication nor condemnation and hence there is no basis or justification for imporcing the requirement of fair play or natural justice. [645 F-H, 646 A-Bl
(Agreeing with D.A. Desai, J.) 10;!. The transfer of Mr. K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Court to the Madras High Court as Chief Justice was made by way of punishment an<! not in public interest and hence it is unconstitutional and void. (685 G-H]
10:2. The power of transfer under Article 222 clause (I) cannot be exercised against a Judge without his consent. It is a highly dangerous power involving great hardship and injury to the Judge transferred including a stigma on his reputation in cases where the transfer is not effected pursuant to any policy but the Judge is packed out for transfer on a selective basis and it makes no difference whether the transfer is made by the Government on its own initiative or it is made
4()2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS .;
.
[19s2j 2 s.c.a.
at the instance of the Chief Justice of India as in the case of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh. The power to transfer a Judge from one High Court to another can be exercised only in public interest and there must be full and effective consultation between the President, that is, the Central Government and the Chief Jilstice of India before the decision to transfer a Judge is taken. [673 B-D, E]
Union of India v. Sankalchand Seth, [1978] 1 SCR 423 followed.
10:3. When a Judge is transferred from one High Court to another by way of punishment, it can never be in public interest for no public interest would counte· nance punishment of a Judge except by way of impeachment under proviso (b) to clause (1) of Article 217 read with clause (4) of Article 124. There is a clear antithesis between· a transfer by way of punishment and a transfer in public interest and therefore, a transfer by way of punishment must be held to be outside the scope and ambit of Article 222 clause (!). Undoubtedly, when a Judge is transferred by the Government because he does not toe, the line of the Executive or gives decisions against the Executive or has for some reason. or the other fallen from its grace, it would be a transfer by way of punishment. That would be the pli!lnest case of penal transfer. But these are not the only circumstance in which a Judge may be transferred from one High Court to another by way of punishment. The element of punishment is not confined merely to the wrath of the Government on account of a Judge being inconveniently independent. There may be cases where a Judge may be transferred because he is not behaving properly or is conducting himself in a manner not befitting the position of a High Court Judge and such a transfer grounded on the conduct or behaviour of the Judge would clearly be punishment, even· if it be on the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India. It is also possible that the Chief Justice of India may find in a given case that a' Judge of a High Court is promoting the interest of his son or brother in practice or by passive inaction allowing his son or broth1r to exploit his relationship with the Judge for the purpose of advancing his pro· fessional interest and in such a case, the Chief Justice of India niay recommend that the Judge should be transferred to another High Court and the Government may accept such recommendation. The transfer in such a case would be clearly by way of punishment. There may also be cases where the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India for transfer of a Judge may proceed from his disagreement with the social philosophy of the Judge or his unhappiness with the manner in which he is deciding cases and the Government may unquestioningly accept such recommendation. This would also he nothing shori of punishment. Whenever transfer of a Judge is effected for a reason bearing upon the conduct or behaviour of the Judge, it would be by way of punishment and therefore, not permissible under clause (I) of Article 222. Transfer per se is not a punish- ment .. It is the reason for which the transfer is made, which makes it penal and if that reason is related to the cond11ct of behaviour of the Judge, the transfer would clearly'be a penal transfer not in public interest and hence outside the scope and ambit of Article 222 clause(!). (67JF-H, 674 A-H]
10;4. When a transfer of a Judge of a High Court is challenged in a court of Law, the burden must lie upon the Government to sustain the validity of the
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S.I'. OUl'TA V, UNION
transfer. The power of transfer is a drastic power to be exercised only in rare
.r
case• as it has the effect of destroying the right of the Judge who is transferred,. to continue as a Judge in the High Court to which be-was ·appointed until be reaches the age of 62 years and removiO.g him to another High Court where Possibly lie would not have agreed to go- if be· had been asked at the time of his original appointment. When an order of transfer· is made, the Judge ha~ a diffi· cult choice, either to go to the High Court where· he is transferred or to resign and having burrit his boats and given up his proression Jong back, he would be in great difficulty if he chose to resign and therefore, from a practical point of view, he would have no option but to go to thC -other High Court, bo"'·ever inconvenient it may be to him. Moreover, it would be almost impossible' for the Judge to successfully chaUenge the order of transfer if the burden of sbowi1:J.g its invalidity were cast upon him. Even as it is, the Judge would have to wage a tone ,. and unequal battle against the Government when he chatlenges ·the order of transfer and if the onus of establishing _facts invalidating the order of transfer were thrown-upon him. the battle wouJd be rendered still more· ullequal and- the scales would be weighed heavily against him. TbC result . would be that even an invalid order of transfer would pass 'muster on account of the inability of the · Judge to discharge the burden of showing the invalidity of the ordef of transfeiand the virtual immunity thUs granted to the order· of transfer would seriously impair the independence of the judiciary. (675 B-G]
- I' Furthermore, having regard to the high st:itus·and dignity Of 3. Judge of a · ·High Court, it is but fair that when the Governinent is displacing the right of the Judge to continue in his High Court uptO the age . of 62 years, be should be tOtd what are the reasons which have weighed with the Government in transferring him. He must be assured that atl the cOnstitutional requirements have been com-· plied with. Besides, the facts showing that there was fuII and effective consultation between the Governcllent and the Chief Justice of India and the reasons for making thC transfer would be within the special knowledge of the Government and the onus must therefore be upon the Government to prove them•. Thus the burden of sustainin_g the val_idity of the order of transfer must rest on the Government . and this burden is a heavy burden, which must be satisfactorily discharged by the Government. [675 G-H, 676 A-BJ
.10:5. There was no full ·-and effective consultatioO bet~een the Ceniral Government and the Chief Justice of India. The burden of showing that there was full and effective consultation rests heavil,r on the Government and it is not possible to say ·that this burden has been discharged by the Government. There is nothing in the correspondence exch.anged· between the Chief Justice of India and the Law Minister which shows that any facts bearing up on the transfer of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh were_communicated by tbC Chief Justice of India, who initiated the transfer, to the Lilw Minister.. The counter-affidavits and the. affidavit do not indicate the constitutional functionary on behalf of the PtesiJent, with whom every relevant aspect of the question was discussed. ·unleSs the name of the person i:J mentioned, the correctness of the statement cannot be verified or challenged by the other side. It is not enough merely to repeat the constitutional formula_ that every aspect of the quest~on was discussed w~~h the
..
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A.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19821 2 s.c.tt.
President. It is an affidavit which is made by the Chief Justice itnd the affidavit must contain not mereJy the constitutional incantation but facts giving particulars stating with whom the Chief Justice of India bad discussion. The affidavit a1so does not give the date or dates whe~ the discussion took place between the Chier , Justice of India and the President. The statement made in the affidavit is delight.. fulty vague. Without_furnishing the dates of discussion by. the Chief Justice of India with the Prime Minister and indicate the nature of the aspects discussed etc. · in the affidavit of Shri K.B.N. Singh cannot meet vague allegations. [677 E, 681 B-H, 682 A-C] It is for the Court to decide whether all relevant facts were diiicussed between the Chief Justice of India and the Central Government so as to constitute full and effective consultation and this enquiry cannot be pre-empted by the Chief Justice of India by asserting in his affidavit that every relevant aspect of the question was discussed by him with the· Centr"a.J Government. It is not for the Chief Justice - of India to decide, but it is for the Court to be satisfied, that all relevant aspects of the question were discussed by him with the Central Government. It is possible that the Ghief Justice of India might have considered some facts as irrelevant and not discussed thCm '.with the Central Government,' but the C~urt may find that such facts were relevant ·and should have fo'rmed the subject matter of discussion and it is equally possible that some facts might have been discUssCd which the Chief Justice of India considered relevant but the Court ~ might find them to be irrelevant. Absence of these info1mation will lead to the conclusion that thCre was no fuU and effective consultation betWeen the Chief Justice of India and the cCntral Government: Further the omission. to com- · municatc the difficulty which would be experienced by the Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh as a result of transfer. is .sufficient to vitiate the process of consultation. . [682 D-G, 683 D-E] \
10:6. To avCr that the transfer Was in pursuance of a "Government Policy,. is it.correct as it is not borne out by correspondence. Equally the ground of transferi namely, a necessity ofa senior and experienced Chief Justice is disproved in the case of the proposed tr"ansfer to._· Rajasthan. These grounds were not ·, corr..municate.d to the Law Minister and even assuming that they_were commu~i . CatCd and it weighed with the Central Government, in making the order of transfer1 it would have the effect of converting the transfer into a peilal transfer. • . . [683;684 C-D, G-H, 685 A]
/
Apart from tha·t, this is not the reason_ which weighied with' the Central' Government in making thC order of transfer against Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh. The Central GovernmeD.t stated in_ a note banded over to ~be Court that the reason .... ___ why the Central Goverriment made- the o~der of trao!)fer was "(1). it was felt th~t - Ilot agreeing to these transfers may be const~ued as though _the Government 1s ·departing from ttie view of having Chief Justices fro_m _outside; (2) the· policy aspect could still be pressed into se'rvice later.0 This ~eason which. prevailed. with the Central Government was totally different from the reason which induced the Chief JusticC of India to makC his proposal for transfer and there is nothing to show tha( this reaso~ which weighed with the Government of India was com· ,
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S.i>. Glii>TA v. UNION
·,_,.<.
-
40S
municated to the Chief Justice of India for his opinion, There was therefore clearly no full and effective consultation even in regard to this aspect. Moreover this reason given by the Central Government for making the order of transfer clearly shows that the Central Government did not apply its wind to the question ' whether on the facts, it was necessary or expedient to transfer Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh, but accepted the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India, because it thought that if the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India was accepted and the transfers of Chief Justice M.M. Ismail and Chfef Justice K.B.N. Singh were made, it would be easier for the .Central Government thereafter to · press for acceptance of the government policy by the Chief Justice of India. There was clearly abdication of its constitutiona I function by the Central Government. . [685 B-G]
10:7. The process of consultation whether under Article 217 or under Article 222, must be evidenced in writing so that if at any point of time a disput arises as to whether consultation had in fact taken place or what was the nature and content of such consultation, there must be documentary evidence to resolve such dispute and an ugly situation should not arise where the world of one constitutional authority should be pitted against the word of another and the Court should be called upon to decide which of Kthem is telling the truth. Oral talk or discussion may certainly take place between the Central Government and any other constitutional authority required to be consulted but it roust be record ed immediately either in a note or in correspondence. Besides eliminating future dispute or controversy, the practice of having written communication or record of oral discussion ensures greater care and deliberation in ei.press1on of views and considerably reduces the possibility of improper or unjustified recommendations or unholy confabulations or conspiracies which might be hidden under the veil of secrecy if there were no written record. Moreover, such a practice would tend to promote evenness in society which is the hall-mark of a democratic polity, It would indeed be highly regrettable if, instead of following· this healthy practice of having a written record of consultation, the Central Government or the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice 0f India were to carry on the consultation process either on the telephone or by personal discussion without recording it. [592 C-H, 593 A-C]
11 :I. The interpretation of every statutory prov1s1on must keep pace with changing concepts and values and it must, to the extent to which its language permits or rather does not prohibit, suffer adjulltments through judicial interpretation so as to accord with' the requirements of the fast changing society which is undergoing rapid social and economic transformation. The language of a statutory provision is not a static vehicle of ideas and concepts and as ideas and concepts change, as they are bound to do in a country like ours with the establishment of a democratic structure based on egalitarian ·values and aggressive developmental strategies, so must the meaning and content of the statutory provision undergo a change. It is elementary that law does not operate in a vacuum. It is ilot an antique to be taken down, dusted, admired and put ba~k on the shelf, but rather it is a powerful instrument fashioned by society for the purpose of adjusting conflicts and tensions which arise by reasons of clash
SUPRSMI! COURT IU31'01tt$
(19Q2] 2 s.c.R..
between conflicting interests. It is therefore intended to serve a social purpose and it cannot be interpreted without taking in!o account the social economic and political setting in which it is intended to operate. It is here that the Judge is called upon to perform a creative function. He has to inject flesh and blood in the dry skeleton provided by the legislature· and by a process of dynamic interpretation, invest it with a meaning which will harmonise the law with the prevailing concepts and values and make it an effective instrument for delivery of justice. [697 E-H, 698 A-CJ 11:2. The Constitution is an organic instrument intended to endure and its provision must be interpreted having regard to the constitutional objectives and goals and not in the light of how a particular Government may be acting at a given point of time. Judicial response to the pro b!em of constitutional interpretation must not suffer from the fault of emotionalism or sentimentalism which is likely to cloud the vision when Judges are confronted with issues of momentous importance. [500 B-C]
...
Northem Security Co, v. United States, (1903] 193 U.S. 197, quoted with approval.
PER GUPTA, J.
1:1. Independence of the judiciary is a cardinal principle ofladiaa Constitution. Independence of the judiciary does not mean freedom of the judges to act arbitrarily; it means that the judges must have freedom in discharging their judicial functions. la order to maintain the independence of the judiciary it has to be protected against interference direct or indirect; it also follows that the coastitutio.aal provisions should not be construed in a manner that would tend to undermine this independence. (686 D-F] 1:2. The independence of the judiciary depends to a great extent on the security of term or tenure of the judges. If the judge's tenure is uncertain or precarious, it will be difficult for him to perform the duties of his office without fear or favour. The tenure of an Additional Judge is not uncertain or precarious but it is a conditional on the existence of arrears in. the High Court which is an objective condition. [689 F-G] 2:1. The decision not to extend Shri Kumar's term of office as an Additional Judge of the Delhi High Court was invalid and unconstitutional in as much as it was not based on a full and effective consultation, as contemplated in Article 217(1) of the Constitution. [687; 702F] 2:2. When the question before the concerned authorities was whether the term of an Additional Judge should be extended and the volume of work pending in the High Court admittedly require the services of another judge, it was not permissible to refuse extension on the basis of unconfirmed reports. The scheme of the constitutional provisions does not warrant such course of action. [687 F-G]
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S.P. GUPTA V, UNION
3. It is true that on the expiry of the initial term of an Additional Judge, Article 217(1) is attracted for further appointment. The fitness of the judge having already been considered at the time of bis initial appointment the scope of consultation with the appointment of an Additional Judge for another tenr1 is contemplated is limited to an inquiry as to the volume of work pending in the High Court and the time likely to be required to dispose of the .arrears. If his initial appointment was not made on probation, the judge's capacity and integrity cannot come within the scope of the consultation necessary under Article 217(1) for giving him another term on the expiry of his previous term of office. [690A-C] 4. A proper reading of Article 224(1) makes it clear· that the tenure of an Additional Judge is not uncertain or precarious but is conditional on the existence · of arrears in the High Court which is an objective condition of fact. The claim of absolute power for the Government cannot be accepted on the ground that Article 224 only fixes an outer limit of time and the President is, therefore free to appoint additional judges for varying periods of time not exceeding two years without reference to the volume of work pending in the High Court. Such a claim is untenable on the language of Articie 224 and militates against the conception of independence of judiciary. [688 B, 689 D-F]
5:1. If complaints against the judge -are serious and are from a responsible
source, they cannot certainly be ignored. But, the allegations cannot be presu!ned or assumed to be true and have to be proved. [690 C-D)
Since the language of Article 224(1) does not permit shqrt term extensions of the tenure of an Additional Judge to enable the authorities to complete investigation into the allegatio,ns against him the only reasonable course open which does not undermine the independence of judiciary is to appoint the judge for another term having a rational nexus with the volume of arrears in the High Court and then proceed with the inquiry into allegations and remove the judge if the allegations were found true, in accordance with the procedure laid down in claµses (4) and (5) of Article 124 read with Article 218. In the case of Shri Kumar admittedly there has been no real inves ligation in relation to the complaints against him. [690 F-HJ
5:2. From long practice, an Additional Judge has a legitimate expectancy, if not a right to be appointed for another term if the pending business in the
High Court require the services of an Additional Judge, or as a permanent Judge when a vacancy is available, if he is the senior most of the Additional Judges. Refusing to appoint him again when the conditions require an appointment to be made means in substance bis removal. To remove a permanent judge, the prescribed procedure must be followed and the allegations against him proved: dropping an Additional Judge at the end of his initial term of office on the ground that there are allegations against him without properly ascertaining the truth of the allegations may be expedient but it is destruotive of the independence of the judiciary. This would be an easy way for tl)e e)(ecutive to get rid of an incony~nient judge. [ 691 B-D J · ·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1982] 2 s.c.R.
5:3. Even assnming that the scope of consultation under Article 211(1) is the same for the initial appointment of an Additional Judge and also for his appointment for another term, there has been not only no proper consultation in the case of Shri Kumar but also no full and effective consultation as contemplated by Article 217(1) of the Constituiion, inasmuch as the relevant material was withheld from the Chief Justice of India and •his vitiates the decision not to extend his term of office. [691 F, 692 D-F]
5:4. Even assuming that the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court had informed the Chief Justice of India of the allegation of corruption against Shri Kumar, it is clear that it was not disclosed to Shd Kumar and he was not given an opportunity to explain the charge against him. Consistent with the principles of natural justice Shri Kumar who had undoubtedly suffered an injury by his term of office not being extended should have been given an opportunity to explain the charge of corruption against him. The principles of natural justice apply even to a person who has no legal right. [702 G-H, 703 A-Bl
...
In re H.~ (An Infant); [1967] 2 Queens Bench 617, quoted with approval.
6. It is true that under Article 217(1) the President, before appointing a person as a Judge of a High Court has to consult three functionaries, the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of the High Court; for the appointment of the Chief Justice of the High Court, the President bas to consult the Chief Justice of India and the Governor of the State. Assuming however they are coordinate authorities in the sense that each of them must be consulted, the scope of consultation is not the same so far as the Governor is concerned. He is certainly not in a position to give any opinion on the legal acumen of the perso~s proposed to be appointed. His opinion k relevant on matters on which the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice of India are not expected to have any information. (703 D-E, G] Normally, the Chief Justice of the High Court is likely to know more about a lawyer practising in that court whose name is proposed for appointment but where the question is whether or not the tenure of an Additional Judge should be extended, if all the relevant materials are before both, the Chief Justice of India, the Chief Justice of the High Court cannot be said to be in a better position than the Chief Justice of India to give a correct opinion. The Chief Justice of India being the pater fami/ias of the Indian judiciary, the President should accept the opinion given by the Chief Justice of India in such a case unless the opinion suffers from any obvious infirmity, _he cannot act as an umpire and choose between the two opinions. (703 H, 704 A-C] Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, [1975] 1 SCR 814, followed.
7. The letter dated March 18, 1981 of the Law Minister is of no consequence legally and ·can~ot bind or affect anr of those for whom it was intended.
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S.P. GUPTA V. UNION
The President may transfer a judge from one High Court to another only after consultation with the Chief Justice of India. The policy '"may provide the President with a ground to suggest the transfer of a Judge, but the Chief Justice of India must consider in each case whether the proposed transfer in public ·interest because, even granting the validity of the policy, the question would remain who among the Judges should be transferred and to which High Courts. (706 C-D]
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Union of India v. Sankal Chand Himatlal Sheth & Anr., (1978) 1 SCR 423, referred to.
8. The impugned order of transfer of Shri K.B.N. Singh, Chief Justice of the Patna High Court as Chief Justice of Madras High Court is valid under Article 222(1) of the Constitution. [706 G]·
OBSERVATION: An order of transfer even if made for administrative reasons and in public interest is likely to cause some injury to the Judge transferred, though that could not be valid ground for holding that the transfer is by way of punishment; it is the reason behind the order of transfer that should_ determine its nature. It would be only fair not to let the Judge who is being transferred face more difficulties than are absolutely necessary. If the Judge is wholly unfamiliar with the language of the State to which he is transferred, it is possible in some cases that it will affect his efficiency. It is desirable, therefote, to transfer Shri K.B.N. Singh to some High Court, consistent with his position as a Senior Chief Justice where the language difficulty will not be so acute. [706 H, 707 A-C]
C
9. As to foe us standi the petitioners who are practising advocates of different High Courts are competent to maintain the petitions. (707 E]
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PER FAZAL ALI, J. 1:1. Independence of judiciary is doubtless a bassic structure of the Constitution but the said concept of independence has to be confined within the four corners of the Constitution and.cannot go beyond the Constitution. While this absolute judicial power has been conceded by the Constitution to the judiciary, a certain amount of executive control has already been vested in the hlgher judiciary .in respect of the subordinate judiciary. At the same time, the power of appointment of High Court Judges including the Chief Justice or Supreme Court .Tudges, as also the Chief Justice of India, vests entirely in the executive, namely, the President of India, who acts on the advice of Council of Ministers. Here again, this executive power is not absolute and has to be exercised in consultation with the CJI in the case of appointment of Supreme Court Judges, as also in consultation with the CJI and the Governor of the States concerned in case of the appointment of Chief Justice of the High Courts and in the case .of appointment of High <:;oµrt Jud~es, the Chief Jt1stic;e qf the concerned Hi!1b
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1982} 2 s.c.R.
Court is also to be consulted. The consultation contemplated by the Constitution must be full and effective and by co~vention the view of the concerned CJ a.ad CJI should always prevail unless there are exceptional circumstances which may impel the President to disagree with the advice given by these constitutional authorities. Thus, in fine, the doctrine of separation of powers so far as our Constitution is concerned, reveals an artistic blending and an adroit admixture of judicial and executive functions. [776 C-H, 777 A]
1:2. In the American Conslltution by virtue of the fact that the entire judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court or other courts, unlike the provisions of our Constitution where appointments are to be made by the Appointments have to be made by the Supreme Court, the President in consultation both with judicial and ex~cutive authorities as indicated above. Therefore, in expounding the concept of separation, the essential distinctive features which differentiate our Constitution from the American Constitution must be kept in mind. [778 H, 779 A-BJ 1:3. So far as framers of our Constitution are concerned they had deliberately rejected the theory of complete insulation of the judicial system from the ·executive control. During the formative process of our Constitution though jurists like Shri B. N. Rau and Dr. Ambedkar wanted to give la1ger powers to the CJI or to a Council of State which may be appointed so as to be a judicial Body but these ideas were not accepted and ultimately the Constitution emerged as a valuable document which vests complete power in the President. The Indian Constitution has devised a wholesome and effective mechanism for the appointment of judges which strikes a just balance between the judicial and executive powers so that while the final appointment vests in the highest authority of the executive, the power is subjecMo a mandatory consultative process which by convention is entitled to great weight by the President. Anart from these safety valves, checks and balances at every stage, where the power of the President is abused or misused or violates any uf the constitutional safeguards, it is always subject to judicial review. The power of judicial review, which has been conceded by the Constitution to the judiciary is the safest possible safeguard not only to ensure independence of judiciary but also to prevent it from the vagaries of the executive, Another advantage of the method adopted by our Constitution that by vesting the entire power in the President, the following important elements are introduced : (i) a popular element in the matter of administration of justice: (ii) linking with judicial system the dynamic goals of a progressive society by subjecting the principles of governance to be guided by the Directive Principles of State policy: (iii) in order to make the judiciary an effective and powerful machinery, the Constitution contains a most onerous and complicated system by which judges can be removed under Article 124(4), which in practice is almost an impossibility; (iv) in order to create and subserve democratic processes the power of appointment of the judiciary in the eKecutive has been vested so that the bead of the executive which functions through the Council of Ministers, which is a purely elected body, is made ,,ccountable to the people. If absolute powers were to be vested in the judiciary alone for all its spheres of activities (appointments may have crept in, resulting in irreparable harm to the great judicial institution. Another reason why the power of appointment in the judiciary Wa$
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S.P. GUPTA v. UNION
4ii
not vested absolutely was to avoid judicial interference in the day-to-day working of the legislative or parliamentary institutions. [779D-F, 780B-H, 781A-B]
....
i
1.:4. The Indian Constitution fully safeguards the independence of Judges as also of the judiciary by a three-fold method : (i) by guaranteeing complete safety of tenure to judge except removal in cases of incapacity or misbehaviour which is not only a very complex and complicated procedure but a difficult and onerous one; (ii) by giving absolute independence to the Judges to decide the cases according to their judicial conscience without being influenced by any extraneous considerati'on ·and without any interference from the executive. Article 50 clearly provides that the State shall1 take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public service of the State. This important Directive Principle enshrined in Article 50 has been carried out by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which seeks to achieve complete separation of judiciary from the executive; (iii) so far as the subordinate judiciary is concerned the provisions of Articles 233-236 vest full and complete control over them in the High Court. Only at the initial stage of the appointment of munsiffs or the District Judges, the Governor 1s the appointing authority and he is to act in consultation with the High Court but in all other matters like posting, promotion, etc., as interpreted by this Court in· Shamsher Singh's case [1975) 1 SCR 814, the High Court exercises absolute and unstinted control over. the subordinate judiciary. Promotion, holding of disciplinary inquiry, demotion, suspension of Sub-Judges lie with the High Court .and the Governor has nothing to do with the same. The condition of consultation which the Governor has to exercise implies that he would have to respect the recommendations of the High Court and cannot turn it down without cogent reasons and even if be does so,' it is manifest that his order is always subject to judicial review on the ground of ma la fide or exceeding his jurisdiction. [781 C-H, 782A-E]
Chandra Mohan v. State of UP & Ors., [1967] 1 SCR 77, referred to.
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~:l : Re : Disclo1ure of Document and plea of Privilege claimed by the Government-
If the documents are not disclosed, the petition would not suffer serious prejudice because the undisputed facts show that the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court had fot reasons given by him opined that the term of Justice Kumar ought not be extended. The CJI, however, expressed a contrary view; It was, therefore, for the President to choose any of the two views. Thus, disclosure of details would have undoubtedly caused serious damage to public interest by exposing not only the petitioner Kumar but also the CJ, Delhi High Court and the CJI to public gaze and criticism which would be highly derogatory to the high position that these high constitutional functionaries hold and would in future deter them from expressing any opinion on the merit of future appointments which might . result in an insoluble stalemate. Thus, balancing the two factors, there can be no doubt that the weight is on the side of the Union of India. Article 74(2) of the Constitution and sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act are expressed in a negative form which is the clearest
SUPJl.EMB COURt REPORTS
(1982] 2 S.C.I!.
possible proof of the fact that the legislature has incorporated a direct prohibition against the use of documents mentioned in these provisions. Thus, a disclosure can be allowed only in exceptional circumstances where there is no injury to public interest because public interest is always paramount to private interest. In fact, these provisions clearly contain four important attributes of the doctrine of disclosure, viz., (i) public interest; (ii) confidentiality; (ii) candour; and (iv) expediency [831F-H, 832A]
State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, [1961] 2 SCR 371; Amar Chand Butail v.Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 1658; State of U.P. v, Raj Narain & Ors., [1975) sec 428,followed.
Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co., [1942) A.C. 624; Henry Greer Robinson v. Stale of South Australia. [1931] A.C, 704; Conway v. Rimmer & Anr., [1968] AC 9l0; Rogers v. Home Secretary, [1973] A.C. 388; Sankey v. Whit/am & Ors., 21 Australian L.R. 505; Marconi's Wireless Telegraph Co. Ltd. v. The Commonwealth, 16 Commonwealth L. R. 178; Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd. v. Customs and Excise Co111missioners, [1974] A.C. 405; United States v. Richard M. Nixon, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1309; United States of America v. Partida J. Rayno/des, 345 US I; Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-persian Oil Co. Ltd., [1916) 1 KB 822/829; Hennessy v. Wright, 21 Q.B.D. 509; The Corporation of the City of Glasgow v. The Central Land Board, 1956 Sessions Cases 1/18, D. v. National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, [1977] 1 A.E.R. 589; Sci911ce Research Cowtcil v. Nasse, [1980] A.C. 1028; Burmah Oil Co.· Ltd. v. Bank of England, [1980] A.C. 1090; Neilson v. Laugharne, [1981] 1 All E.R. 829, referred to.
J!l,
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2:2. The doctrine of "candour" or "confidentiality" propounded by the American Supreme Court cannot be blindly applied to the provisions of the Indian Constitution which has features of its own and substal)tially differel1t from that of the American Constitution. The doctrine of "confidentiality" as applied by the American Court is directly opposed to the scope of sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act. [835F-G]
2:3. On a parity of reasoning, the statutory provisions of sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act as also those of Article 74(2) of the Constitution have fully safeguarded high Government and official secrets and disclosure is prohibited in public interest unless the court is fully satisfied that disclosure will not harm the public interest. Thus the rule or protection against self discrimination as prevalent in the United Kingdom or U.S.A. has never been accepted in India~ [836H, 837A]
Before importing the doctrines or the liberal trend of modern cases acro's the seven seas, the Court cannot overlook the mandatory provisions of the Evidence Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, while in England and A.merica the democratic system of Government had been existing for m.ore than
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S.P. GUPTA V. UNION
two or three centuries, Indian democracy is only three decades old, which is very small period in the life of a nation and India had yet to develop its law by a process of adaptation and accommodation, rejection or modification or by a trialand error method. The Supreme Court while construing sections 123 & 124 of the Evidence Act was fully alive to the conditions prevailing in the country and the manner in which the public services were run and the Central Government or the State Governments took important decisions. Any revolutionary decisions so as to expose high confidential matters tc) public gaze by following a policy of liberal disclosure of documents ignoring the provisions of sections 123 & 124 of the Act would not only be detrimental to our progress but may cause serious obstruction In the practical running of day to day affairs of the Government or for that matter the Government of the country itself. [g49F·H, 850A-B]
2:4. The cor,ect legal position is tbat whereas mere expediency may not be a ground to claim privilege so as to avoid production of a document which is produced, may defeat the defence where the documents consist of highly confidential matters in respect of constitutional functionaries like Chief Justices or High Court Judges, the Law Minister, the President of India, C.B.I., l,B. and such other Departments the question of public injury, which may be caused, becomes a decisive factor in upholding the plea of privilege. The Court is, however, not powerless to hold its ·own enquiry in order to test the bona fide of the plea of privilege. One form of such an enquiry may be the inspection-of the documents themselves by the court before disclosure. If after inspe9tion the court finds that the plea of privilege is well grounded and _its disclosure will lead to great public injury, it wiH be justified in upholding the plea of privilege. [839C-E]
2:5. Thui, so far as the Supreme Court is concerned it has chosen to follow the principle of English Law with suitable adjustments and modifications in determining the plea of privilege under ss. 123 & 124 of the Act. This is, as it should be, because that since the Evidence Act was enacted during the British rule and we have generally adopted the English system in procedural matters, we should not depart from the basic and essential principles of interpretation as laid down by the English law. While construing ss. 123 & 12~ and applying the principles of English law, we must do so against the background of the socialist State and the egalitarian society which is the goal of our constitution instead of confining the contours of privilege in a strait-jacket; in suitable cases a liberal ·view can be taken by this Court without violating the express language or the general spirit of the statutory provisions of Evidence Act. So far no case has. ever held that ss. 123 & 124 are unconstituticmal an<I this could not be so because these provi,ions deal with matters relating to great public interest. [8500-G]
2:6; Another important circumstance that has to be taken into consideration is that even after more than three decades of our independence, the P~rliament .despite so many socio-economic chan$e~ a,p 9v~r tile; world has not thought it
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1982) 2 s.c.R.
advisable or necessary to amend the provisions of the Evidrnce Act so as to liberalise or widen the scope or the policy of p1ivilege contained in ss. 123 & 124 of the Act by incorporating the principles laid down in the recent English or American cases. This intrinsic circumst anee demonstiably proves that the view taken by the Supreme Court over the years is correct and does not call for any a'nendment of the Evidence Act by the Parliament. On a parity of reasoninj!, the irresistibl~ conclusion that follows and the natural presumption that arises is that our Jegisfature did not intend to make a departure from the earlier English decisions either by incorporating or adapting tbe principles of American law on the subject. It will not be unreasonable to presume that the ft;>unding fathers of the Constitution and the Parliament thr.reafter having been fully aware of the view taken by the American courts in recent decisions has affirmatively chosep to reject the liberal and somewhat dangerous doctrine of candour. [85JB-D l
2:7. Coming to the practical side of the dangerous consequences of the disclosure, and in support of the view that afler inspecting the documents, it was not in public interest to order disclosure of the contents of the documents, the following considerations must be kept in mind : (a) appointment of High Courts Judges are highly confidential matters containing frank and free legal views expressed by the CJ of the High Court, CJI and the Central Government repre· sented by the Law Minister and Council of Ministers. These authorities have expressed their views in the secret correspondence on the distinct assurance and belief that for the last two centuries such docu meats have always been treated as secret, confidential and privileged and uni ii today no disclosure of such documents has ever been allowed by any court. Thus, any disclosure of the contents of the documents would be extremely derogatory to the High constitutional position that these Constitutional functionaries enjoy and would in the Jong run prove counter-productive and destroy the sacrosanct consultative process as envisaged by the Constitution. (b) If disclosure is allowed, it will bring into disrepute the judicial institution itself and lead to a continual process of washing of dirty linen and perpetual mudslinging by allowing the so called wronged persons to make allegations and counter-allegations against the Government and CJ concerned as was sought to be done in this very case. It is true that even after the conteilts of the documents are' disclosed, the petitioners cannot be allowed to travel beyond the material disclosed by the documents but even the material could be exploited and affect the secrecy of such high constitutional officers and raise a controversy which will ultimalely lead to opening a pandora's box which is neither in the interest of the judiciary nor even of the lawyers, [825F-H, 853A-F]
3.1.
Re. Circular letter of the law Minister-
The circular of Union Law Minister dated March 18, 1981 does not endanger and erode the independence of the judiciary or intend to do any such thing. The circular merely seeks to provide an easy and practical, a rough and ready and an ingenious and scientific mechanism to achieve the policy of taking i:me·third of the Jud~es in a Hi~h <;our! from outside the State. (8J3F-H, 814A-Bl
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. S. P. GUPTA v. UNION
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3:2. The circular d_oes not cover Permanent Judges the High Court at all but it applies Only to two.kinds. or JudgCs;· '(i) ·persons w!lO are .abOtit tC) be aPPoinied as Additional Judges and (ii) who are working -A-ddltional Jµ'dges and whose term is Jikely to expire. 'The.re is no compulsion On theril to give their conSeD.t. On. the other· hand, the circular pfovides ·an addi~ tional facility t'o the Ji.idges Who may iike to go out ·or the State !n acCordai:Jc'o with the policy. (814 G-H, SIS FJ . . .. .
persons
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3:3. The tone and the tenor of the circular docs not amount to pressurising the Judges and putting them under coercion to give their consent at the peril of their l?eing droPp(d at' the initial sta'ge.· The ple_a of coercion or undue itiftuence i~ to be pleaded by persons on wboli undlle influenCe "r _Coercic;in is. practised. N~ne Of ·thC Judgis-b.iVe· either bY any- staterDent affidavit- comPlaine'd · thiit the1 h,ld ~ive'! t~eir co~sent under duress. [81~ F-H] ·- ·
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. 3:4.. The circular does not in any way interfere with the supreme authority of the Chief Justice of India in thC mitter of consultation under Article 222. There is no question of presenting a fail accompli to the Chief Justice of Icdia, because he has to consider all the shades~ aspects and problems of the matt.er in its entirety clD.d would also have to consult the Judge concerned and if he feels t~at ~·proper case for transfering the. Additional Judge to other High Court bas not be-~n made out, he can refuse to give his consent in which case in all pr<>"' bability the proposal would die a natural death. [816 F-HJ
J:5. No ques,ion of transfer is invoi~ed in the mechanism sought to be devised by ~h·C circular as the Addi tionaf Judges have only to be appointed for the firSt timC in.other High.CoUrts and are not to be transferred. They wOUtd not be transferee J~dges and thCrefore~ not entitled to.the . facilities which are aVailabtC io trans_feree. Judgc:s compens~tory allowance. visiting bis home State e•ery.year.· · · ·· [817 B-CJ.
3:6. The circular letter issued by the· Law Mi~~ter is not maridatory but purely directory..' It is open to the Judges to refuse to answer the queries made from them by the C~l in pursu3.nce of the Circular and no adverse inference . ca~ blf agai~st them, though the law Will take its..own- course. [817 C-D] ·- taken .- . . . - . . . . . . '' . .
. 4:1. At;t
• or the various optntons expressed by the legal
~Aamination
lumin3'.r_iCs, StateSffieo, politicians aiid jurists from' 1958 to 1981 makes it clear · thai the.idea ·or the Cetitral Govi:mnient of a uniform Policy of tCanSrCr of .·CJs~ . sc;i'that.c'ach Sta~ei bits~ ·CJ fr~rll olltside, is a· ~.ery essential, u~~ful, seti.sible 'arid a· wise· ·o~e \vpich CutS at' .the rOots 'Or sO . inaDY Cvils With_ which·· nOi O?tY"o~.r CNJniry but~ e~ei;i fhe higher j1:1dicfary is faced. Se~ndly,"' sue_~ uniform policy will be in the betier interest 9f the concerned Judge himself ~Ca~se however disi~terested or ·independ~rlt ~e may be, p.C is ·bo'und t6 'be ~~c~-~ Cith~r f9RS'£!?~~11~r-~p~~~c~~~~Ir1?~ ~qt~~-~~i~4 ~~~o~ whQ. ~~O?~~
a
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS '
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[19821 2 s.c.R.
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to exp1oit him even ·without his .knOwtedge. Such a policy wou!d enhance the prestige the judiciary, ensure its independence and make the. working of _the head of the judiciary in the State more efficient and generate a greater confidence in the people of the new State where he is transferred .. The language problem also does' not 3ppear to be an insurmountable obstacle because while laying down the polic}r the Government can start with tran5fers of CJs ·within the Zones as recoinmended by the Law Commission which will minimise the language difficully. (800 D·H, 801 A]
or
4:2. In making the tranr;.fers,_ there wOuld · be ·no senous objection if the CJ is allowed to indicate his choice regaring the State where be.- would be· prepared to be transferi'Cd and the same niay be accepted as far as ,practicable. So far as recruitment of One.-third jlldges at the initial st3gC is coricemed, ·this will ·c~· no doubt. present some difficulties in the beginOirig because~ several Constitutional authorities would have to be consulted but this difficulty can be overcome either . by the appropriate method adopted by the Circular or any mechanism similar to the same. (801 A-CJ ·
The Chief Justice of each High Court should be asked· to Prepare a panel of suitable persons who are considered· for· appointment as High Court Judges both from the Bar and from the subordinate judiciary. ·Before including the narm: Of the persons concerned their previous consent for being .appointed outside the State may be ·obtained by the CJ. This can be done by determining: the strength of the panel so that it may form one-third of the total strength of permanent judges already fixed by the Presi4ent or as may be fixed from time to time.. The Civil.List of Jndges oftbe Supreme Court and High Courts gives the ·sa.nctioned· strength of permaiient and· Additional Judges. One-third of the strength of the permanent judges according to the vacancies that fa11 should be reserved for the persons found suitable and who are. willing to serve outside the State;- It would be better if the t>ersons whose ·names are included in the Panel .. are appointed outside the State as permanent judges which would Provide an ·attractive offer and give a better impetus. to the persons aspiring for judgeship and would tempt theni to serve outside the State. [801 CF]
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ID.. fact;iawyers,.Judges pol;ticians;jurists, nlembers of the ~Bai and other statesmen h3ye aJ)plied ~heir minds and expressed .themselves strongly in favour or thepolicysoughttobeevolved_by the Government. In_view, however, of the ~banged circumstances, such a Policy is not oiity proper but essential as being theprime need of the hour. One should nof be blind to the. fissiparous and parochial tendencies that have sta.fted raisillg their heads threatening disintegration of the . country. The dark clouds - of. s1tparatism, · conservatism and paroChialisni' haYe-started ·casting their shadows- on the entire" Country and it is high time that SuCh a sacred and sacrosanct institution like the High Courts should be protected and kept aloof from such evil forces~ It is manifest that a CJ from outside will apply an jndepei:ident approach both in discharging his judicial dUties as a Judge and in recommending appoiiltment of members of the Bar .:or service io the High Court and his selection will not be inspired or tainted by any local
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s. 1>, GUPTA v, tJ~iON
or personal consideration because he would be an outsider in the High Court of a State where he presides. Further, even the litigant would have much greater confidence in such a ci than in a local person. [805 B-E]
4:3. Indeed, if we are really concerned that we should build up an independent judiciary then it is absolutely essential that new talents from outside should be imported in every High Court either to man it or to head it so that they may generate much greater confidence in the people than the local Judges. The position of a CJ is indeed a very high constitutional position and our Con. stitution contains sufficient safeguards to protect both his decision making ,process and his tenure. It is a well-known saying that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. As man is not infallible, so is a Chief Justice, though a person holding a high judicial post is likely to be incorruptible because of the quality of sobriety and restraint that the judicial method contains, even so, if a CJ is from outside the State, the chances of misusing his powers are reduood to the absolute minimum. The power to formulate or evolve this. policy clearly lies within the four comers of Article 222 itself which contains a very wide power conditioned only by consultation with CJI who is the highest judicial authority in the country. It is always open to the President, which in practice means the Central Government. to lay down a policy, norms and guidelines according to which the presidential powers are to be exercised and once these norms _are followed, the powe~s of the PresiGent would be beyond judicial review. [ 805 H, 806 A-DJ
As against policy transfer selective transfers of CJs to High Courts other •han the one where they are working or may be appointed, contains· the colour of discrimination and arbitrariness because however careful the CJI may be if he starts picking and choosing CJs from outside the High Courts the element of discrimination or arbifrariness cannot be reasonably excluded. On the other band, if a general policy applying to all and sundry (CJs) is evolved by which every state would have a CJ from outside no complaint of discrimination can ever be made. In fact, the very foundation of discrimination would disappear. The view taken by the CJI, does not appear to be correct or acceptable and perhaps in his o'wn interest selective transfers should not be made because even if in one or two cases discrimination is made due to oversight or bona fide lapse, it will amount to a great slur on such a high position as the CJI bolds. On the other hand, if a uniform policy of appointing or promoting CJs to High Courts outside the State is followed it will promote national integration. and curb the fissiparoas and parochial tendencies and preserve and protect the purity of judicial administration. [806 E-H]
5:1. Re: Policy of transfer of Judges and Chief Justices: Article 222 confers an express power on the· President to transfer a judge (which includes the CJ) fro"m one State to another. This power is not circumscribed or he<lged by any conditions or stipulations excepting that the CJI has
ff
stJPRllMl:l coiJRt RllPOkTS
(t 982) 2 S.C.R.
to be consulted. Jn determining as to how this power can be exercised, the President undoubtedly possesses an implied power to lay down the norms •. the principles, the conditions and· the circumsiances under which the said power is to be exercised so long as ! he does not overstep the limits or confines of the power enshrined under Article 222. Since the implied power lies •with the President it is not at all necessary that this power should be regulated by a legislation or an Act or a Rule or a bye-law or any other instruction. A declaration by the President regarding the nature and terms of the policy which virtually means declaration by the Council of Ministers is quite sufficient and absolutely Jegijl and constitutional to effectuate the policy decided upon. t809C-FJ
Secondly, as the policy is a general one which applies to all and sundry wiihout any discrimination or selection, it cannot be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution because the policy will operaie equally on all the Judges or the CJs without any difference or distinction. [809F-G)
Thirdly, it is necessary to put the policy beyond the :barge of unreasonableness or arbitrariness that the State policy must be subject to just exceptions which may be very few, so that the exceptions do not become a rule or a ruse to destroy the effect of the main policy itself. For instance, while evolvilig or formulating a general policy the. following exceptions can be made by the President-(i) that where the personal circumstances of a judge, purely on humanitarian grounds, are such as may endanger his life, e.g,, he may be a heart patient and so he may 'not be transferred to a High Court which is situated in a hill station or at a particular height or he may be suffering from such disease which may imperil him there or such other circumstances of a very compelling or pressing nature·; (ii) where the judge or the CJ concerned is about to retire and is to serve only for a very short term before retirement, his transfer to some other court would not serve any useful purpose and would be very inconvenient to him-such a period may vary from one day to six months but not more; (iii) where due to some physical infirmity the CJ concerned has become immobile and cannot be moved beyond his home State, this may be a just and humanitarian ground for bringing him under the exceptions to 'the policy; and (iv) such other circumstances, either siinilat to or idehtical with the circumsiances mentioned above, which in the opinion of the CJI or the President requires due consideration on humanitarian grounds. [8090-H, '8JOA-E]
It Is manifest that even if a Policy has been finally evolved and formulated and transfers are sought to be made in pursuance of the policy, the President has to consult the CJI or where the CJJ initiates the proposal he is to consult the Judge concerned as also the President but the process of consultation would have to 1'c confined to the four cornets of the ju st exceptions and not beyond the same which form part of the Policy laid down by the President. At the same time, . the exceptions should not be so broadly construed as .to destroy the effect and fruitfulness of the Policy. [8 IOF-G]
....
S. P. GUPTA v. UNION
5:2. The President before formulating the Policy should consult the·CJI and have his views because the laying down of the Policy would be under Article 222 and consultation with the CH being a necessary concomitant of the said power, even while laying down the Policy, the consultative process is essential. [819 C-D]
6:1. Although it is true that by fixing the strength of permanent and Additional Judges of each High Court, the Central Government appears to have created two parallel lines of recruitment so that the appointment of an Additional Judge was a sort of training ground for being appointed as a Permanent Judge whenever a permanent vacancy arose. [858 D-F]
6:2. If properly read, Article 224 envisages certain conditions precedent before an appointment under Article 224 can be made and also prescribed the nature and the term of the judge appointed. In the first rlace, it requires that an Additional Judge can be appointed only if-(i) there is any temporary increase in the business of a High Court, for instance where by virtue of some new temporary law passed, a spate of litigation crops up but that ends with the duration of the Act or with the completion of the temporary reforms, -etc., contemplated by the statute. Such an appointment is a kind of an emergency appointment which is to last until the temporary increase or arrears are disposed of; (ii) where by reasons of heavy arrears of work it becomes necessary to appoint an Additional Judges, the appointment is made under Article 224. The Article, therefore, contemplates only a tenure appointment to meet a particular contingency and is not meant to be a permanent feature so as to form a training base for recruiting judges from the training base to the permanent cadre. [859 C-F]
'
.
6:3. The nature of the appointment under Article'224 is a pure tenure appointment for a fixed period and once the period expires, there is no question of extension of that period or reappointment. In other words, once the time for which a Judge has been appointed expires, the appointment of the Judges ceases to exist. That being so, whenever a judges is sought to be appointed afresh, the constitutional functionary will have to go back to Article 217 even if a judge is to be appointed under Article 224 and the question ol> suitability would be the first criterion. As in the case of initial appointment under Article-217, so in the case of a fresh appointment after the period mentioned in Article 224 expires, there is no leg~! right to be appointed nor does non-appointment give rise to any legal or constitutional infirmity so as to be the subject of a judicial review. It is a different.matter that if an additional judge is consici'ered for a permanent appointment afresh, the fact that he has acquired some experience would u·ndoub1edly be an important factor to be taken into consideration while judging the suitability of the candidate concerned. At the same time, the constitutional functionaries cannot shut their eyes to the facts which may have come to their knowledge either against the Additional Judge or in his favour. [859 H; 860 A-DJ Thus, thc·position is that even if an Add;tional Judge is not appointed afresh and somebody else is appointed, \lwre~isj no q_uestion of ju<;\;ciat: review
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1982] 2 s.c.~.
nor is there any question of the non-appointment of an Additional Judge a fresh casting any reflection or aspersion on the reputation or character of an Additional Judge because he was appointed only for a particular period and for a particular purpose and is not on probation. [860 D-EJ 7. Re: Case of Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh-
Where two high constitutional functionaries are involved and have given affidavits and counter-affidavits it is obviously a most difficult and delicate situation. Jn a matter of such a serious magnitude, the Court has to make a very careful and cautious approach having regard to ihe respectability of the persons who have sworn the affidavits. [869 BJ
8. Analysing the ratio of the decisions in Seth's case and Chandran.(JU/eshwar Prasad's case the following necessary concomitants of an effective consultation may be stated : (i) that the consultation contemplated by Article 222 must be full and effective and is an essential ingredient of the exercise of power under Article 222; (ii) that once when the President decides to transfer a judge, he must consult the CJI before transfer, the consultation before transferring a judge is, as it were; a condition precedent to the actual transfer of the judge; (iii) if the consultation with the CJI has not been dcine before trans• ferring a judge, the transfer becomes unconstitutional; (iv) the President must make the relevant data and the necessary facts available to the CJI ~o that he (CJI) may arrive at a proper conclusion. In case any facts are wanting the same should be supplied to the CJI and this is an imperative duty or obligation cast on the President who initiates the proposal; (v) the fulfilment by the President of his constitutional obligation and performance of his duty by the CJI are parts of the same process and after this process is fully complied with, the consultation becomes full and effective and not formal or unproductive, (vi) that sufficient opportunity should be given to the authorities concerned to express their views so as to tender advice as deliberation is the quintessence of consultation; (vii) afte; the date, facts or materials are placed before the consultee and the consultant, there should be a full and complete application of minds in respect of the subject to enable them to reach a satisfactory conclusion. In other words, the two minds must be able to confer and produce a mutual impact on the identical facts which would §Onstitute both the source and the foundation· of the final decision; (viii) the CJI owes a corresponding duty both to the President and to the Judge who is proposed to be transferred to consider every relevant fact before tendering his opinion to the President; (ix) before giving his opinion the CJI must take into consideration all relevant facts and should i;;formally ascertain from the Judge if he bas any personal difficulty or any humanitarian ground on which his transfer is proposed to be made and having done so, must forward the same to the President; (x) consultation or deliberation is not complete until the parties make their points of view known to the other or others and discuss and examine the relative merit of their views. If one party makes a proposal to the other who has a counter proposal which is not communicated to the proposer, the direction to give effect to the counter-proposal without anythin!J more wilt ~ot alIJount to consultation. ~873 D-ll, 874 A-HJ
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S.P. GtJl>TA v. ONION
9. The .constitutional requirements of an effective consultation have not been proved beyond reasona_ble doubt inasmuch as-(i) t.he petitioner was not consulted before the formal proposal recommending him for transfer to Rajasthan and then to Madras, was sent to the Government; (ii) that there is no mention .al all in any of the proposals dated 7-12-80 or 20-12-80 regarding any discussion having been held with the petitioner; (iii) that there is noth'.ng to sbow that the President or the concerned Constitutional authority had sufficient time to deliberate over tbe pros and cons of the transfer particularly in view of the difficulties placed by the petitioner; factually, as held by the CJI himself, in Sheth'1 case that deliberation is the very quintessence of consultation; (iv) the case . squarely falls within the.ratio laid down in Chandramouleshwar' s case. [881 C, 882!0-G] In view of the circumstances discussed above the consultative process as contemplated by Article 222 is clearly vitiated which renders the order impugned passed by the Presid_ent constitutionally invalid. [882 H] 10. While Article 222(2) does require that on transfer from one High Court to another, compensatory allowance may be paid, it does not state .that the Pre•idential Order should issue pari passu the order of transfer. Such an Order could follow the transfer. Moreover, as the petitioner never cared to join his new assignment and before· he could do so the wr_it petitions were filed and proceedings were stayed, there was no occasion for the President to pass the order directing compensatory allowance to be paid to him until the validity of the transrer;of the petitioner was finally a.diudged by Supreme Court. This is not a case whereJajudge or a~CJ having been transferred had joined his new assignment and started w<;>rking and still no order of compensatory allowance was made by the President. [883 F- H]
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11_. The .presumption un,der section 114 (e) of the Evidence Act, that official Acts must .deemed to have been actually done applies only where there is no challenge to the constitutional validity of .an official act. Where an act is found to be per se unconstltutional, the question of raising a .presumption does not arise because once it :is '.held, that the consultation did not fulfil the constitutional requirements, the order impugned would become void ab initio and non-est. The order transferring Mr. K.B.N. Singh to Madras to constitutionaily invalid. [883 B-C, G]
C
Collector of Customs, Barod~ v. Digvijayasinhji Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd., (1962] 1 SCR 896 followed.
12:1. A general and unanimous policy of transfer of Judges and Chief Justices of High Courts to promote national integration and suppress fissiparous tendencies, would doubtless be in public interests. Although Art. 222 does not contain the words 'Public interest' in so many words but tbe very exercise of the power, which is not a normal power but an exceptional one, it follows as a logical consequence that public interest is a necessary concomitant of the exercise of this power. It.cannot be said that on a parity of reasoning that 'consent' also should be read as a part and parcel of the exercise of the power under Article 222,
/
SUPRBME COURT REPORTS
[I 982] 2 s.c.R.
because if a Judge cannot be transferred without his consent then the power loses its signiikan~e and becomes an immunity to a judge from transfer by withholding his consent. Thus, a power which is to be exercised by the President can be defeated or stalled by a simple act of the Judge in refusing to give bis consent to the 1ransfer. This could never have been the intention of the founding fathers of the Constitution. [722 H, 723 A-D]
12:2. A perusal of Article 222 unmistakably shows that it is expressed in absolutely clear, Iexplicit, intelligible, plain and unambiguous language which admits of no vagueness or ambiguity. It is not the function of the court to supply words to suit a particular course of action so as to be acceptable to a particular set of persons as a doctrine of implied consent. The word 'consent' h·as been dropped by the legislature deliberately or it is a case of deliberate omission rather than casus omissus. Whenever the Founding Fathers intended that a particular expression should be used in an ArtiCle as a condition precedent to the exercise of a particular power, the same has been mentioned and where no such intention was there the expressions have not been used. [723 H, 724 A-C, 729 CJ Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1967] I S.C.R. 77, followed.
12:3. The word 'consent' was never intended to be included ia the powers to be exercised under Article 222. There is no provision in the Constitution, empowering the President to appoint for the first time a person as a Judge of a High Court against his consent and even if he is appointed, th~ person so appointed, can refuse to act as a Judge and if he does so the matter ends there and he cannot be compelled to act as a Judge. Once however, the person decides to accept the appointment of a Judge of a High Court he becomes a constitutional functionary and therefore would be subject to the provisions of the Constitution because before deciding to accept the appointment he must be presull).ed to be aware of the constitutional provision contained in the ·various Articles regarding High Court Judges, viz., the conditions of of service, the salary and other allowances; the date of retirement and also the provision .regarding transfer as provided for in Article 222 which does not contain the word 'consent'. Therefore no Judge can complain that be bad been transferred against bis consent or plead that had he known this he may not have accepted the office of a High Court Judge. As the word 'consent' is conspicuously absent from Article 222, such a plea cannot in th'e very nature of things be permitted to be taken by the concerned Judge. If he does not want to be transferred, it is always open to him to resign for which also there is a clear provision under Proviso (a) to clause (!)·of Article 217. [727 G, 729 G-H, 730 A-DJ
Even at the time when Article 222 was taking its birth there was some talk of making the transfer with the consent of 1be Judge concerned but this was given up when it was pointed out that in the national interest it may be necessary to send a compeient Judge to another High Court and this policy may be stalled by the judge by withholding this consent. In other words, the idea of consent having been conceived, discussed and rejected clearly shows that the Founding Fathers deliberately omitted the word consent from Article 222. . . · . [766 C-EJ
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,
S.P. ouPtA v. UNtON 12:4. The plain and unambiguous language of Article 217(c) and Article 222 cannot be stretched to indicate that 'appointment' and 'transfer' are synony· mous terms when the constitutional provisions make it very clear that the power of transfer and the ·power of appointment are two different kinds of powers to be exercised in different ways. [763 A-CJ
Kesavananda Bharati Sripadag'alavaru v. State of Kera/a [1973J Supp. S.C.R. 1 explained.
12:5 The coastitution has used the word "appointed' in the case of a Judge ·of the Supreme Court and 'transfer' in the case of Jiidge of a High Court. A perusal of the language of Article 217 (c) leads to the irresistible conclusion and logical inference that the Founding Fathers have made a clear distinction between transfer and appointment. It is true that in both cases the office held by a Judge is vacated in a fictional sense because there is a complete change in the life of the Judge but that does mean. that the incidental of both these appointments are the same. A Judge of the High Court when appointed as a Judge of the Supreme Court cannot be equated .in any respect' with a Judge of the High Court who is transferred to another High Court and continues to poss~ss the same status, position . and emoluments which is essentially different from a Judge of the Supreme Court. It is true that on being transferred to another High Court a Judge ceases to be a Judge but then he ceases to be Judge of the transferor court only and does not cease to be a Judge for all times to come so ·as to make his transfer in the transferee court a fresh appointment. This is clear from paragraph 11 (iii) to the Second Schedule to the Constitution. It is true that i.n this schedule joining time is mentioned on transfer from a High Court to Supreme Court or from one High Court to another and the word 'appointment' has not been used as such. That however makes no difference because this schedule only refers to a small matter of joining time which both the judges. viz., a judge appointed to the Supreme Court and the Judge transferred are entitled to avail. (761 A-HJ
a
12:6. When a judge was appointed in the original High Court he had taken the oath of his office which bound him to act as Judge of that. particular High Court. Since by virtue of the transfer, the court is chang~d. a fresh oath becomes necessary as a clerical formality to indicate that although his appointment as a Judge of a High Court does not cease to exist he discharges his duties as a judge in another court in respect of which be had not taken the oath of office. Io these circumstances, it cannot be said that merely because a transferee Judge has to take a fresh oath the transfer becomes a new or a fresh appointment. Moreover it is doubtful if the taking of a fresh oath is necessary at all because the warrant signed by the President appointing a person as a Judge of a High Court bolds good in the transferee court and the place is indicated by the notification issued under the authority of the President which really means that after the notification the warrant would have to be read to indicate that the judge was transferred to the transferee court where he is to act as a Judge. (762 A-DJ
a
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1982] 2 s.c.R.
12:7. T ere is no reason to presume that any order Which is passed by .the President under Article 222 hence forward is bound to be mala fide or colourable and even if it is in a particular case or cases, it is doubtless subject to judicial review. Therefore in all cases, constitutional transfers could not amount to a punishment so as to arm the Government with a weapon to punish a Judge for not toeing the line of Government. [770 C-E]
12:8. Once it is conceded that the power of transfer under Article 222 is to be exercised in public interest then any inconvenience that is felt by the judge would have to yield to the larger interest of the community so as to· make the said article workable. Alth_ough Article 222 is an extraordinary power, whenever a person accepts judgeship of a High Court he is fully aware that during his career as a judge the power under Article 222 could be exercised by the President without his consent and if knowing this he accepts the position of High Court Judge, he cannot be heard to say that he ought not to be transferred because be would suffer lot of inconvenience. [770 P-H]
12:9. The very concept of transfer under Article 222 being a punishment is highly derogatory to the high constitutional posit.ion that a High Court judge holds. Such a constitutional appointment, )'llhich makes a judge a constitutional · functionary and not a government servant, more·so when he obtains certain special privileges having regard to the high position he holds, is against .the very concept of penalty or punishment. It is manifest that when a person is punished .for an offence or a mistake or an error, then be is to undergo some penal process. In the case of a Judge who is transferred, no such pei;u,d consequence~ are at all visited because on the plain term of Article 222 the Judge _has to get special facilities before being transferred to the transferee High Court. .clause (2) of Art. :222 clearly provides that a tra~sferred judge is only to receive in .addition to bis salary such compensatory allowance as may be determined by Parliament by law and until so determined such compensatory allowance as the President may fix. Thus, the granting of compensatory allowance to a judge in lieu of transfer completely destroys the concept that the transfer involves a stigma or a punishment. Apart from the allowances, the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act and the Rules m~de therein clearly provide that a judge who is transferre.d from one High Court to l!nother can always avail· of the specia.1 _Ieave concession rules by visiting his home State, along with his family, at Governinen.t .cost once a year. The Judges Rules, as amended, further enjoin that the Judge must be supplied with a free furnished house. which under the Amendment Act of 1981 is not even to be treated as a perquisite under the Income Tax Act. .It .is true that some of these facilities are available to a Judge in his original High Court also but the totality of the facilities taken into consideration undoubted.ly seek to make him as comfortable as possible in the transferee court also. [771 B-l;I]
12:10. Far from being a punishment the transfer of a judge does not involve any strain or stigma nor even the slightest reflection on his legal functioning or his judicial character or integrity. The transfer of a judge contemplated by Article 222 is in the nature of a response to a call of duty in the larger
j
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batioiial ifiterest ot ihe country in order to fnaihlai~ ahd ensute absoiute purity oftudieial adm iti istratiob. bn beibg transferred the Judge would find himself free to .\Vbrk in at'I ihdependeht ntmosphere untramelled by any provindal or parochial eonsideta:tion, undaunted by any external or internal influences or local pulls or pressures and uninfluenced by the considerati!ins of class, caste or creed. He would also generate much gfea:ter confidence in the people to whom he imparts justice which is bound to enhance his judicial prestige and as a logical result would subserve the concept of independence of judieiary. For a true and conscientious judge there can be no higher honour than to create a feeling that justice is not actually done but also appears to have been done, the latter being more important and fundamental quality of judicial approach. The apprehension that a judge on being transferred to another State is likely to face a hostile bar is merely an anathema and an illusion which has either a factual normal legal existence. If the judge's behaviour towards · the Bar is polite and courteous and he gives a little accommodation to the Bar he is bound to win laurels of the Bar. In fact, the Bar always welcomes an outside judge who is likely to build uo a new judicial structure and establish a a flawless and unblemished reputation This is not merely a pious wish or an ideal dream out a stark and speaking reality which is evident from the perfor-· mance and reputation of judges who had been transferred outside their States and had proved to be not only successful but memorable judges. [772 B-G]
12:11. Where a judge is transferred because the envirnoment or the atmosphere is not congenial or conducive to administration of impartial justice, he does so as a conscientious judge responding to a call of duty but where his sons or relations follow him in the transferee court then it becomes the most cogent and reliable evidence to show that the judge openly allows himself to be exploited by his sons or relations and this p~r se would be conclusive proof of misbehaviour for which, he can be impeached under Article 124(4) read with Article 218. If these facts are proved, then he will have to be removed for no court can ever accept a plea of the judge that even after he was transferred to some other court his close relations followed him there without his knowledge. [774 <?-H,775 A-BJ
13. I. The Supreme Court which lays down the law of the land under Art. 141 must be extremely careful and circumspect in interpreting statutes, more so constitutional provisions, so as to obviate the necessity of constitutional amendment every time. which, is extremely onerous task. Having carefully interpreted a particular provision of the Constitution, the Court should as far as possible stick to the doctrine of stare decisis. The function of a- Judge is jus decere and not jus dart- [731 B-D, E, 737 BJ ·
The Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and Ors. [1955)2 S.C.R. 603: James v. Commenwea/th, 1936 A.C. 578 referred to.
·ff 13:2. Where the Words ot the language used in a statute ~re clear and ~.loµdless, plai.n !iimple and explicit . uncloude~ !ll!cl 1,1n<;>l;>sc:ured! intelli~ible and'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1982) 2 S.C.R.
pointed so as to admit of no ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty or equivocation there is absolutely no room for deriving support from external aids. In such cases, the statute should be interpreted on the face of the language itself without adding, substracting or omitting words therefrom. It is equally well settled that it is not the duty of the court to import words which have been omitted deliberately or intentionally in order to fill up a gap or supply omissions to fit in with the ideology or concept of the Judge concerned. The words and the' language used must be given their natural meaning and interpreted in their ordinary and popular sense. [ 7 43 C-F]
There may be a third type of cases which may be on the border line-where the language may admit of two interpretations in which case the court may consider the desirability of resorting to external aids in order to catch ond delve into the spirit and object of the statute. In construing a statutory or a constitutional provision, the Court should not presume that the legislature has either committed a mistake or has omitted something which was very necessary. It was not for the Court but for others to remedy the defect, if any, found in a statutory provision. To read the word "consent" in Art. 222 by supplying the omission, would be violating the cardinal principle of interpretation. (749 G-H, 750 A)
13:3. On a full and complete consideration of the decisions classified under the various categories,· the propositions that emerge from the decided cases of this Court and other foreign courts are as follows:- [754 G-H)
(1) Where the language of a statute is clear and unambigous, there is no room for the application of the doctrine of casus omissus or of pressing into service external aids or in such a case the words used by the constitution or the statute speak for themselves and it is not the intention of the court to and words or expressions merely to suit what the courts think is the supposed intention of legislature. [755 A-BJ
(2) · Where, however, the words or expression used in the constitutional or or statutory provisions are shrouded in· mystery, clouded with ~mbiguity and are unclear and unintelligible so that the dominant object and spirit of the legislature cannot be spelt out from the language, external aids in the nature of parliamentary debates, immediately proceeding the passing of the statute, the report of the select committees or its Chairmar,, the s1atement of objects and reasons of the statute, if any, or any statement made by the sponsor of the statute which is in close proximity to the actual introduction or insertion of the statutory provision so as to become, as it were, a result of the statement made, can be pressed into service in order to ascertain the real purport, intent and will of the legislature to make the constitutional provision workable. Such aids may neither be decisive nor conclusive but they would certainly assist the courts in interpreting the statute in order to determine the a.vow~d object of t.he Act or the (:onstitution as the case may be. (755 B-EJ ·
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s.i>. oui>h v. UNION
427.
(3) Except in the aforesaid cases, a mere speech of any Member made on the floor of the House during the course of a parliamentary or legislative debate would not be admissible at all because the views expressed by the speaker may be his individual views which may or may not be accepted by the majority of the Members present in. the House. [755 F-G]
(
'
(4) Legislative history of a constitutional provision though not directly germane for the purpose of consutring a statute may, however, be used in exceptional cases to denote the beginning of the legislative process which;results in the logical end and the finale of the statutory provision but in no case can the legislative history take the place of or be a substitute for an interpretation which is in direct contravention of the statutory provision concerned. [755 G-H, 756 A-B]
(5) Where the scheme of a statute clearly shows that certain words or phrases were deliberately omitted by the legislature for a particular purpose or motive it is not open to the court' to add those words either by confirming to the supposed intention of the legislature or because the insertion or the omission suits the ideology of the Judges deciding the case. Such a course of action would amount not to interpretation but to interpolation of the statutory or constitutional provisions, as the case may be, and is against all the well established canons of interpretation of statutes. The main reason behind the principles enunciated above is that the legislature must be presumed to be aware of the expanding needs of the nation, the requirements of the people and above all, the dominant object which the legislation seeks to subserve. Thus where the language is plain and unambiguous the court is not entitled to go behind the language so as to add or supply omissions and thus play the role of a political [reformer or of a wise counsel to the legislature. [756 B-E]
r ~-
Heydo11's case 76 English Reports 637; A. K. Gopala11 v. The State of Madras [1950] SCR 88; Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukan [1958] SCR 360; M. Pentiah & Ors. v. Muddala Veeramal/appa & Ors. [1961]2 SCR 294; N. V. Joshi v. M. U, Shimpi & Anr. [1961] 3 SCR 986; Hansraj Gordhandasv. N. H. Da~e, Asstt. Collector of Central Excise & Customs, Surat & Two Ors. [1969] 2 SCR 253; Commissioner of Income-Tax, Assam & Nagaland, etc. v. Shri G. Hyatt [1971] 1 sec 466; Senior Superintendent, R. M. S. Cochin & Anr. v. K. V. Gopinath, Sorter [1972] 3 SCR 530; Shri Umed v. Raj Singh & Ors. [1975] 1 sec 76; Anandji Haridas & Co. P. Ltd. v. Engineering Mazdoor Sangh & Anr, [1975] 3 seR 542; Mangalore Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v·. The Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal [1978) 3 sec 248; Powell v. The Kempton Park Racecourse Co. Ltd. [1899] A.C. 143; Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat v. Vadilal Lallubhai etc. [1973] 1 SCR 1058; State of Mysore v. R. V. Bidap [1974) 3 sec· 337; Fagu Shaw & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal [1974] 4 SCC 152; Anandji Haridas & Co. v. Engineering Mazdoor Sangh & Anr. [1975] 3 sec 862; · The Sole Trustee, Lok Shikshana Trust v. Commissioner of Income· Tax, My1~re [1976) 1 SCC 254; State o/Tamil Nadu v. Pyare Lal Malthotra & Ors; [)97o] 1 SCC 834; Jaisingh Jairam Tyagi & Ors. v. Mamachand Ratilal Agarwal & Ors.'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1982) 2 S.C.R.
[1980] 3 SCC 162; M/s. Polestar Electronic (Pvt) Ltd. etc. v. Additional Commis· sioner, Sales Tax Anr. etc. [197811 SCC 638; Dadafi Alias Dina v. Sukhdeobabu & Ors. [1980] I SCC 621; Malinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar & Ors. [1953] SCR 533; Sri Ram Ram Narain M edhi v. State of Bombay [ 1959] Supp. I SCR 489; Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Calcutta v National Taj Traders (1980] I SCC 370; Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia & Ors. v. State of Punjab [1980] 2 SCC,565; United States v. Trans Missouri Freight Association; Aswini Kumar Ghosh & Anr. v. Arabinda Bose & Anr. (1953] SCR I; State of West Bengal v. Union of India [ 1964] I SCR 371; Shyamlal Mohanlal v. State of Gujarat (1965] 2 SCR 457 referred to.
Per Tulzapurkar J
1. In the task of administration of justice, the role of judges and the role of lawyers are complementary to each other and the practising lawyers as ciass are an integral part of justicing 'machinery rendering assistance to the judges in the discharge of their functicin of reaching justice to the litigants appearing before the court; in other words the practising lawyers who are nothing short of partners in the task of administration of justice undertaken by the judges are vitally interested in the maintenance of a fearless and an independent judiciary to ensure fair and fearless justice to the litigants. That being the positio~ it can not be said that, in the instant case, the petitioners are either in their individual capacity or as representing some of the Lawyers' Association are wayfarers, interlopers, officious ioterveners or busy bodies without any interest or concern of their own in the subject matter. They have not merely sufficient interest but special interest of their own in the transfer and appointment of judges and, therefore, they cannot be told off at the gates. The petitions at their instance are clearly maintainable. (904 F-H, 905 A-CJ
Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Shri Vardhichand and Ors; [I981] I SCR 97, and Fertilizer Corpn, Kamgar Union v. Union of India [1982] 2 SCR 52 followed.
Dw<frkaoas Srl11ivas v. The Sholapur Spg, & Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. [1954) SCR 674; Adi P. Gandhi's Case [1971] 1 SCR 863; Dabholkar's Case [1976] SCR 306; Attorney-General of the Gambia v. Pierra Sarr N:Jie [1961 AC 617], referred to.
H ''
2. At the stage of initial recruitment under Art 217(1) no one bas a right to be appointed a Judge of the High Court nor the right to be!' considered for such appointment, and therefore, a writ of Mandamus at the instance of a~ aggrieved persons would not lie, for the. reasons that Judges of the High Court occupy a high constitutional position and a special machinery is provided for their app9intment. (i) for obvious reasons, the post of a High Court Judge is not .piled in liy. inviting applications through advertisements nor by holding test mtervfows: (ii) .further, the minimum qualifications for appointment as a Judge (Piescribed in sub-Art. (2) of Art. 217) would be possessed by numerious advoeates and by a (air number of service Judges but even so, the special machiriecy
S.P. GUPTA v. UNION
for making appointments is indicated in Art. 217 (1), obviously designed to recruit . persons of great ability, high character and unquestioned integrity to the Bench. [906 H, 907 A-C]
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3:1. The sitting Additional Judges have an enforceable right not to be dropped illegally or at the whim or caprice of the appointing authority but to be considered for their continuance either by extending term or making them permanent until the practice that has grown over years is changed and a proper, practice .is introduced which can be done only after having made a complete and correct assessment about the requisite strengths of permanent as well as Additional Judges for every High Court, depending upon statistical data to be collected throwing tight on 'normal business a 'temporary increase' and 'arrears of work' after fixing 1'ate of disposal per Judge per year and defining what should be termed as main cases, miscellaneous cases or interlocutory cases etc.
3:2. Unlike a Permanent Judge whose tenure is fixed by reference to his age the tenure of an Additional Judge when appointed under Art. 224 (I) is fixed by the warrant of his appointment and on the expiry of the period mentioned in the warrant he ceases to be a Judge of the High Court. The continuance as an Additional Judge for any further term or as a Permanent Judge in the vacancy of a permanent post cannot be thought of unless for continuance as Additional Judge either one or the other or both the preconditions mentioned in Art. 224 (1) . obtain in that High Court, and for continuance as a Permanent Judge the normal business of the High Court justifies the filling up of the vacancy in the permanent post. In other words 'pendency of work must justify such continuance-te~porary· increase in the business of the High Court or arrears of work therein both for extension of his term and normal business (current institutions) for making him permanent. [907 F-H, 908 A] ·
Kandaswami Pillai v. Mathvenkatacha/a, [1917] 33 Mad. L. J. 787 approved.
3:3. The very purpose and raison d' etre of Art. 224(1) being the existence of arrears of work and clearance thereof sitting Additional Judges who have already been selecied and appointed for the very purpose must be considered for continued appointments if the arrears obtain and go on mounting in their High Court. Secondly, a comparison of Arts. 216 and 224(1) clearly shows that the former deals with the appointment of·permanent Judges to dispose· of tbe normal business and the latter deals· with appointment Additional Judges, whenever tl:rere is either a temporary increase in the normal business of a High Court or arrears of work therein. The work in a High Court has been classified into three categories, namely, (a) normal business indicated by the current annual institu.tions (suits, writs and other proceedings), (b) sudden temporary increase in business over and above the normal institutions such as filing of hundreds of petitions challenging an enactment, like for instance Money Lenders Act, which will disappear when the validity or otherwise of the enactment is pronounced upon and (c) arrears of work meaning the normal or ordinary work which the permanent strength has not been able to cope with and dispose of within a llll!.soi:iablc or stated period, say one or two ye.w.s and has accumulated; Art. 216 ........... '
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1982] 2 S.C.R.
has to be resorted to for the first category of work and Art. 224(1) for the other two categories. But having construed Article 224(1) and worked by all concerned and resorted to even in situation where Article 216 ought to have been resorted, and in fact after following such practice over the years and thus putting all the Additional Judges into the belief that they will be confirmed in normal course it doas not behove the appointing authority to say that the sitting Additional Judges have no right to be considered for their continuance either for an extended term or for making them permanent. Clearly by reason of the said practice though followed under some misapprehension, they have such a right. In the case of the members of the Bar, if the genesis of the convention· or practice as well as the undertaking is nothing but pub lie interest in the sense that public interest is served (a) by not permitting them to revert to the Bar on the expiry or their term, and (b) by not losing or frittering away the experience or expertise gained by them in administering justice during their initial terms, then it is these very aspects of public interest which form the compelling reasons to consider their cases for their continuance either by extending their term or making them permanent in preference to outside or freshers. It is not as if that these two aspects of 'public interest' giving rise to the convention or practice and the undertaking are merely factors to be taken into account while deciding upon their, continuance but along with the disability emanating from the undertaking these aspects confer upon them a legitimate expectancy and the enforceable right not to be dropped illegally or at the whim or caprice of the appointing authority but to be considered for such continuance in the High Court. [9090-H; 910A-D, E, 911 E-H, 912C-E]
4:1. There is a valid classfication between proposed appointees for· initial recruitment and the sitting Additional Judges whose cases for their continuance after the expiry of their initial term are to be decided and the two are not in th~ same position. [915 F-G]
4:2. Constitutional conventions and practices have importance under· unwritten as well as written Constitutions and the position that conventions have a role to play in interpreting Articles of a Constitution is clear. It is true, that no constitutional convention or pra~tice can affect, alter or control the operation of any Article if its meaning is quite plain and clear, but here, Art. 224(1) merely provides for situations when Additional Judges from duly qualified persons could be appointed to a High Court, and at the highest reading of the Article with s. 14 of the General Clauses Act, it can be said that the power conferred by that Al'licle may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires but on the question as to whether when the occasion arises to make appointment on expiry of the term of a sitting Adgitional Judge whether he should be continued or a fresher or outsider could be appointed by ignoring the erstwhile incumbent even when arrears continue to obtain in that High Court, the Article is silent and not at all clear. On the other liand, it will be proper to invoke in such a situ~tion the other well settled principle that in construing a constitutional provision the implications which arise from the structure of the Constitution itself or from its scheme may legitimately be ll)ade aQd looking at· Art. 224(1) from this angle a
S.P. GUPTA v. UNlON
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wholesome constitutional convention or practice that has grown because of such implications will have to be borne in mind especially when it serves to safeguard one of the basic features which is the cardinal faith underlying our constitution, namely, independence of the judiciary. In other words, limitatio11 on the otherwise absolute power and discretion contained in Art. 224cl) is required to be read into it because of the clear implication arising from the said cardinal faith which forms a fundamental pillar supporting the basic structure of the . Constitution, as otherwise the exercise of the power in the aboslute manner as suggested will be destructive of the same. [913 E-F, 914 B-GJ
4:3. The aforesaid convention or practice and the undertaking serve the cause of public interest in two respects and those two aspects of public interest confer upon these sitting Additional Judges recruited from the Bar a legitmate expectancy and the enforceable right not to be dropped illegally or at the whim or caprice or tho appointing authority but to be considered for continuance in that High Court either by way of extending their t1:rm ()r making them permanent in preference to freshers or outsiders. Therefore, it is impossible to construe Art. 224(1) as conferring upon the appointing authority absolute power and complete discretion in the matter of appointment of Additional Judges to a High Court. [915 C-G)
KeJhavananda Bhartl's CaJe [1973] [Suppl] SCR; The Lord Mayor Councilors and Citizens of the City of Melbourne v. The Common Wealth & Anr. (74 C. L. Reports P. 31;]; State of Victoria v. The Common Wealth of Australia [122 C. L . Reports 353J referred to.
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4:4. If the sitting Additional Judges have this enforceable right to be considered for their continuance, then the eventual non-continuance, if any, can become a justiciable issue open to judicial review, if such non-continuance is based on extraneous or non-germane consideration or is malaficle in law or in fact, and in that sense it will not be a (case of non-appointment as is the case qua the proposed appointees at the stage of their inital recruitment. [918 F-G] 4:5. Io substance and reality in extending their term or making them permanent in their High Court no 'fresh appointment' in the sense of initial or fresh recruitment is involved, except for the formality of issuing a fresh warrant of appointment ·and taking a fresh oath. Therefore, logically speaking the consultative process in so far as suitability under Art. 217(1) is concerned is not attracted at all. [918 G-H, 919 A-BJ
Krishna Gopa/ v. P. C. Sethi [1974] 2_S~R 206; The Sp/. Courts Bill 1978 [1979) 2 SCR 476 held in applicable.
4:6. Sitting Additional Judges ar(not on probation and cannot be regarded pr dealtl,with as probationer$, Jtl_i~ !rµe tha(they are not probationer~ iq thcr scrn~9
SUPREME COURT REPOllTS
[1982] 2 S.C.R.
that they have an indefeasible tenure though for the periods fixed in their warrants of appointment and that during-such fixed tenure, like the Permanent Judges, they can be removed only by following the regular process for it, as -indicated in the Consthution and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, but in the context of their having an enforceable right not to be dropped illegally and to be considered for their continuance, it will not be possible to confine the concept of .probation to these two aspects only. Nor does it. mean that for deciding upon their cont!· nuance they should be treated as on probation. If the Additional Judges are not on probation in any sense of the term their continuance either as additional or Permanent Judges cannot be made to depend upon the evaluation or assessmect of their suitability as emerging from their work, performance and behaviour during their initial term. If the misbehaviour or lack of integrity is glaringly self-evident the question of his continuance obviously cannot arise and in all probabilities will not engage the attention of the appointing authority, for, the concerned Judge in such a situatiori would himself resign. But since the question relates to the continuance of a high constitutional functionary like the Additional Judge of High Court it would be jeopardising his security and judicial independence if action is taken on the basis.of merely opinion material. Moreover, no. machinery having legal sanction -behind it for holding an inquiry disciplinary or otherwise against the concerned Judge on allegations of misbehaviour and/or lack of integrity obtains in the constitution or any law made by the Parliament, save and except the regular process of removal indicated in Art 124(4) and (5) read with Art. 218 and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. [919C-H, 920A-H;921A·B)
4:7. Io the absence ofutisfactory machinery possessing legal sanction to reach a positive conclusion on the alleged misbehaviour or an act of corruption the decision to drop him shall have been arrived at merely on the basis of • opinions, reports, rumours or gossip and apart from being unfair and unjust to him such a course will amount to striking at the root of judicial independence. The other alternative, namely, to make him permanent if a vacancy is available and then take action for his removal under regular process indicated in Art. 124(4) and (5) read with Art. 218 and Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 may sound absurd but is inevitable if judicial independence, a cardinal faith of Constitution, is to be preserved and safeguarded. Not to have a corrupt· Judge or a Judge wh_o has misbehaved is unquestionably in public interest but at. the same time preserving judicial independence is of the high~st public interest. lt is a question of choosing lesser evil and the inevitable course has to be adopted not for the protection of the corrupt or dishonest judge but for protecting several other honest, conscientious and hardwor.Jcing Judges by preserving their independence; it is a price which the Society has to pay to avoid the greater evil that will ensure if judicial iode~ pendence is sacrificed. Therefore,' while considering the question of continuance of the sitting additional Judges on the expiry of their initial term either as Additional Judge or as Permanent Judge the test of suitability contemplated within the consultative process under Art. 217(1) should not be invoked-at least until such time as proper machinery possessing legal sanction is provided for enabling a proper inquiry against an alleged errant Judge less cumbersome than the near impeachment process contemplated by Art. 124(4) and (5) of the ~onstitution. ~921 C·tt; 922 ..\·HJ
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S;P. GUPTA v. UNION
4:8. Bringing in the suitability test under Art. 217(1) at the state of 'continuance of the Additional Judge will not affect the quality or character of justice administered by the sitting Additional Judges during their initial term or towards the end of their term. In fact, so far on every occasion the consultative ·process inclusive of the suitabiiity test under Art. 217(1) has been resorted to while considering the question of granting extension to the Additional Judges or making them permanent on the expiry of their initial term, it has not been suggested that because of this their work, performance or behaviour was or has been guided by the anxiety to keep themselves on the right side of the Chief Justice of the High Court. the Chief Justice of India or the Appointing, Authority. Only when the basic assumption made while putting forward .t he argument is well founded, there will be any question of any violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. [922 B-E]
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4:9. At the time of deciding upon the continuance of the sitting Additional Judges on the expiry of their initial term the consultative ~process should be confined only to see whether the preconditions mentioned in Art. 224(1) exist 'o r ·nO-t or whether pendency of work justifies their confirmation or not and the test of suitability contemplated within the consultative process under Article 217(1) cannot and should not be resorted to at all. [924 A-B]
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4:10. The consultative process even of Additional Judges at the time of deciding upon continuance of Judges either as Additional Judges or as Permanent Judges must be full complete and effective as is the case with the consultative prQCess that is required to be gone through under Ai't. 222(1), when the question of transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another High Court is considered. Further the procedure to be followed at the time 1>f undertaking such co11sultative process must also ensure fair play qua the concerned sitting Additional_ Judge. Io other words, though the principle of natural justice in. its full vigour is not contemplated, the sitting Additional )udge should not receive a raw deal at the hands of the consulting functionaries and either one or the other or if necessary both should hear him, especially if any adverse material is weighing in their "minds against him, just as in the case under Art. 222(1) the personal difficulties and other grounds of objections of the proposed .transferee are considered by the consulting functionary. In other words, the scope and ambit of the consultative process under Art. 217(1) are and must be the same. The question whether, in the consultative process contemplated by Article 217(1) if any primacy is· intended to be given to the views or advice to be handed by the Chief Justice of India in the matter of a High Court Judge or whether from amongst these consulting functionaries the President (Appointing Authority) is entitled to choose or prefer the views or advice of any ·one to the view of the other, really arises only° in regard to the ·views or advice tendered on the suitability aspect and ·not on the aspeet touching the existence of the pre-conditions of Art. 224(1) or pendency of work justifying confirmation, because the former aspect is a matter of subjective assessment, while th~ latter depends on objective facts over which no difference is likely to arise. The said question cannot at all arise in view of the conclusion that the test of suitability falling within the consultative process under Art. 217\:t) cannot and
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(1~82) 2 S.C.R.
should not be resorted to while deciding upon ·the continuance of sitting Additional Judges Obviously the question cannot arise in cases of non-appointments qua proposed appointees at the time of initial recruitment, for such non-appointments are cases of nan-sequitur. [919 G-H; 930 A-CJ
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5.2. l'\ssuming it arises the question of primacy has to be considered not only in the light of what this Court has said about the almost binding character of the resultant advice flowing from the consultative process but also by keeping in mind the object or purpose of providing for such consultation. The object of providing for such consultation clearly is that the same should act as a controlling or limiting factor on the discretion vested in the President while performing his executive function of making appointment of High Court Judges and neither the President nor the Chief Justice should have power to veco a proposal. [925 F-H; 926 D} Sankalchand v. Union af India [1970) 1 SCR. 423;' Sham Sher Singh v. State of Punjab [1975) 1 SCR 714 referred to.
5.3. On the question as to whether any primacy is intended to be accorded to the views or advice that would be tendered by the Chief Justice of India during the consultative process over the views or advice of the other two consulting functionaries (Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of the High Court) or whether all the three consulting functionaries are of co-ordinate authority so as to accord equal efficacy to each one's views or advice, article 217 is clearly s.ilent. Mere use of the expression 'Consultation' does not mean that the President has absolute authority or discretion in the matter because 'Consultation• has been provided with the object of limiting the authority 9r discretion of the President. [926 F-H; 927 A] 5.4. In the very nature of things all the three consulting functionaries under Art. 217(1) cannot be rega~ded as of co-ordinate authority Jor the simple reason that on aspects like capacity, character, merit, efficiency and fitness whieh converge on the suitability of the person proposed for appointment the Governor of the _State will be least informed and will have nothing to say whereas the Chief Justice of the High Court and Chief Justice of India, being, best informed, are well equipped to express their views and tender advice; further it is an accepted position that ii is because of the financial aspect (Salary and emoluments of a High Court Judge being charged on the Consolidated Fund of the State) and information about the antecedent, local affiliations and like other matters, capable of objective proof, roncemiog the proposed appointee which the State Executive would be possessing, that consultation with the Governor has been provided for. It is, therefore, difficult to regard the Governor of the State as being of Co-ordinate authority with the other two consulting functionaries especially on the aspect of suitability which is the primary thing in the matter of making appointment of High Court Judges. Conferring a power of veto on the Chief Justice of India is entirely different · from the primacy being given "to his views or advice over and above the views or advice of the other coniulting functionaries, as a limiting factor on the Presider;its'. discretion. [927 F-H; 928 A. C-D~
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S.P. GUPTA V. UNION
5.5. Once it is realised that the scope and ambit of full and effective consultation requires that all the material facts and records concerning the proposed candidate must be made available to both these consulting functionaries by placing the same before each during the consultative process and that each consulting functionary must consider the same or identical material and exchange each one's views thereon with the other, it will be clear that the Chief Justice of the High Court does not have a closer opportunity to assess the suitability of the proposed appe>intee; surely it is not a case of watching the demeanour of the witness so as,. to put the assessment of the Chief Justice of the High Court on any higher footing. [928 E-G)
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5.6. Article 217 does not expressly suggest that any primacy is to be accor. ded to his advice during the con,ultative process undertaken in Art.217(1) but, the scheme of consultative process co·ntemplated by that Article envisages consideration of identical facts and materials bearing on the suitability of the candidate by both the consulting functionaries namely, the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India, as also an exchange of their views on such material and thereafter placing of the entire material together with each one's views thereon and the tendering of the advice or final recommendation by the Chief Justice of India to the President whose decision should be guided by such advice or final recommendation so tendered. Such being the scheme envisaged by Art. 217(1) clearly by implication primacy is intended to he given to the advice that would be tendered by the Chief Justice of India to. the President. In any event, evolving such a scheme regarding the consultative process under Article 217(1) would be in fitness of things as primacy shall have been given to the advice or final recommendation to be tendered by the Chief Justice of India who happens to occupy the highest constitutional position as the head of the Indian Judiciary. Howevec, giving primacy to the advice of the Chief Justice of India in the matter of appointment of High Court Judge is not to give power to veto any proposal nor would giving such primacy to his advice mean that the Chief Justice would be enjoying unfettered arbitrary powers, for, if his advice has proceeded on extraneous or non-germane considerations, the same shall be subject to the judicial review just as the President's final decision is so subject if he were to disregard the advice of the Chief Justice of India unless the same is justified for cogent and convincing reasons and construing Art. 217(1) as envisaging such a scheme would go a Jong way in preserving judicial independence rather than not according primacy to Chief Justice of India's advice and permitting the President to act as an arbiter between the divergent views of the two high constitutional functionaries and leaving him to prefer the views of one to the other. [928 H, 929 A-HJ
6:1. It is true that Art. 224(1) confers power on the President to appoint duly qualified persons to be additional judge of a High Court, if the pre-conditions mentioned therein exist "for such period not exceeding two years as he may specify". The phrase cannot be construed literally to mean that the term can be for any short period or that the period is not justiciable or that the period must of pee\)ssity get corelated to the contiP.\l\:<l c;l\isteµce of the pre·con<Jitions relating. to .
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SUPREME COURT REPO'Q.TS
[19S2J 2 S.C.R.
·t~e. volume of wor~ f~r which the appointments are to be made, because no prov1s10n of the constitution can be interpreted in a manner which will be in conflict with any of the basic features of the constitution and the cardinal principle of independence of Judiciary is one such basic feature; therefore, the construction to be .put on the phrase in the Article must be consistent with the said principle. Admittedly security of tenure .ensures judicial independence and tenures for shortterms like three months, six months or nine months hring insecurity directly impinging on judicial independence and also tend to shake the faith of the community in the administration of justice and, therefore, would be unconstitutional. [930 E-H; 931 A-BJ
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'~1 · , 6:2. Granting short-term extensions for periods like three months, six months, or nine months' pending inquiry into the complaints said to have been received against some of the sitting Additional Judges, would be clearly outside the contemplation of the Constitution for no machinery having legal sanction behind it has been provided for either in the Constitution or any other law authorising such inquiry or invest iga lion into the complaints against sitting Additional Judges and must be voided as unconstitutional. [931 B-C]
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"6:3 Assuming that suitability test while deciding upon the continuance of the sitting Additional Judges, is required to be gone through, the process must be completed well in advance of the date of expiry of their initial term or if for any reason it cannot be so completed the concerned Additional Judge must be given extension for at least one year, as evidenced by constitutional convention or practice that has grown over the years notwith-standing that phrase in Article 224(1). Jn any case no extension for less than a year should ever be granted irrespective of whether volume of work justifies it or not simply with a view to give the Judge concerned fixity of tenure for that period. Further, it is extremely desirable and necessary that order granting extensions to sitting Additiona I Judges or making them permanent are issued and intimated to the concerned Judges and not merely to the Constitutional authorities well in advance of the date of expiry of their term and not at the eleventh hour keeping them on tender-hooks till the last moment. After all the sitting Additional Judges are high Constitutional functionaries possessing the same position, powers and privileges as the permanent Judges, and deserve due consideration and respectful treatment at the bands of thQ appointing authority. [931 D-H; 932 A-BJ
7:1. On a consideration of the two Articles, namely 216 and 224(1), it is clear, that Art. 216 unquestionably casts a mandatory obligation on the President (appointing authority) to provide adequate strength of permanent Judges in every High Court to cope with and dispose of its normal business and further to review periodically such permanent strength. The word 'shall' and the further words "such other Judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint" occurring in the Article are a clear pointer in that direction. Art. 224(1) confers power on the President to ap~oint additional Judges only to meet the situation arising f;om (a) temporary increase in the business of the High Court, or (b) a,rrears of work tl\erein. In otber words, if the increase in the work of business of
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the High Court is not of a temporary character but a permanent increase every year resort will have to be made to Art. 216 and not to Art. 224(1). Further, ordinarily, it will not be proper to appoint an Additional Judge in a High Court while keeping a permanent post vacant or unfilled. [933 F-H, 934 A-Bl
7:2. But, it will not be proper for the Supreme Court to give the directions or reliefs by way of declaring the sitting Additional Judges to be deemed to have become permanent nr by way issuing a mandamus to the President to make them permanent by arpropriately increasing the permanent strength in the concerned High Courts. It cannot be disputed that appointing Judges to a High Court either as permanent Judges or Additional Judges is purely an executive function entrusted by the constitution to the appointing authority and it will not be proper for the Supreme Court to usurp that function to itself or issue any directions in that behalf unless forced by glaringly compelling circumstances, (ii) no directions or relief as sought is possible unless a full, complete and correct assessment about the requisite strengths for every High Court as on a particular date is made available to the court ; (iii) such assessment about the requisite strengths for every High Court must depend on statistical data to be collected throwing light on 'normal business', 'temporary increase' and 'arrears of work' in each High Court after fixing the rate of disposal per judge per year and defining what should be regarded as 'main cases, miscellaneous cases' or 'interlocutory cases' etc. the norm in regard to such matters being a variable criterion requiring refixation depending on facts, circumstances and situation as and when they develop. [934 B-F] Whell the President lias appointed· a duly qualified person as an Additional Judge fonwo years the President cannot be deemed to have appointed him as the permanent Judge under Art. 216. Though no particular Article is referred to in the warrant of appointment, reference in the warrant to the fact that the person has been appointed "an Additional Judge" and the mentioning of the short-periods therein will clearly negative any intention on 'the part of the President to appoint him a permanent Judge, notwithstanding the duty having arisen in the circum· stance of the cases to make a permanent appointment. [934 F-H; 935 Al
Shewpujanrai lndrasen Rai Ltd. v. The Collector of Customs & Ors. [1959] SCR 821 at 840 and 841 ; Y. Mahaboob Sheriff and Ors. v. Mysore State Trpt. Authority & Ors. [1960) 2 SCR !46 referred to.
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8:1. The safeguard of public interest read into Art. 222( l) is not intended for protecting any black-sheep in the judiciary but for protecting the numerous honest, conscientious hard-working Judges and niether corrupt or dishonest Judge, nor a Judge, who contrary to his oath of office indulges in any kind or favouritism while discharging his duties-who could be likened to a rotten egg, should be tolerated in the Judicial basket and he deserves to be dealt with under Art. 218 read with Art. 124(4) and (5) but not by transferring him to another High Court, fof such a transfer would be contrary to public interest. Therefore, a transfer by way of punishment for misbehaviour is clearly outside the purview of Art. 222(1) and
SUPRflME COURT REPORTS
[1982] 2 s.c.lt
similarly, any transfer with an oblique motive or for an oblique purpose, such as for not toeing the line of the Executive or for rendering decision unpalatable to the Executive or for having for some reason or the other fallen from the grace of the Executive, would also be outside its purview and liable to be struck down, if oblique motive or purpose is established. [942 D-GJ
8:2. Transfers under Art. 222(1) have to be made only in public interest, the ground being convenience of the general administration like a transfer from one High Court to another in order to strengthen the High Court elsewhere by importing better talent which may not be locally available (b) transfer to import a new Chief Justice to a High Court with a view to have a man unaffected by local politics or local jealousies and (c) transfer effected for remedying unsatisfactory working conditions obtaining in a High Court for reasons beyond the control <'f the Judge concerned and for which he is not responsible in any manner and (d) Transfer resorted, if a particular Judge by reason of his nature and temperament is unable to get along with the Chief Justice or any of colleagues in a High Court. In the context of tile power to transfer under Article 222, in such cases the power to transfer a Judge from one High Court to another without his consent would be appropriate and justified and will not be by way of punishment. [9430-E; 944B-E)
8:3. When it is said that the power to transfer under Art. 222(1) cannot be and should not be exercised by way of punishment, what is intended to be conveyed is that Judge concerned should not be transferred for misbehaviour falling under Art. 124(4) or with oblique motive or for oblique purpose, which alone would be by way of punishment in the correct sense of that expression in the Article and not that be should not be subjected to the kind of punishment which is inherent in the transfer. There is a clear distinction between the punishment involved in making the transfer for misbehaviour or out of oblique motive and the punishment which is inherent in the order of transfer in the sense of infliction of personal injury, loss or damage arising out of his moorings being severed, he being required to have two establishments or his suffering a dislocation in his family affairs, etc. Further it is not as if this latter aspect of punishment which is inherent in an order of transfer is being totally ignored before passing the order of transfer, for precisely these very aspects concerning the Judge proposed to be transferred are required to be taken into consideration and given due weight by the Chief Justice of India during the consultative process which he is required to undertake for observing the second safeguard of full and effective consultation. Therefore, the two safeguards of public interest and effective consultation subject to which the power of transfer is to be exercised are neither illusory nor unreal and if they afford real protection to the Judge concerned against the abuse of power, there would be no need to read consent into Art. 222( 1). Non-consensual transfers are within the purview of Art. 222(1). [944 F-H; 945 A-C & 947 E]
Sankalchand Sheth v. Union of India [1978) l SCR 423 explained and followed.
8:4. Even if a transfer is effected pursuant to a general policy adopted by that is to sa)'.,
t~e Government, the same must satisfy requirements of Art. 222(1)
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S.t>. OuPTA v. ONION
it must be in public interest and made after full and effective consultation. Ordinarily, no general policy will be adopted unless it clearly serves some public interest and hence when a transfer is stated to be pursuant to such general policy, it will be a difficult task for the Judge concerned to establish that it has been made for extraneous considerations but all the same a transfer based on a general policy will have to satisfy the requirement of Art.222(1) and if extraneous considerations are established the same will have to be struck down.
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[948 D·E]
8:5. It is true that Art. 222(1) merely refers to consultation of the Chief Justice of India o,; specific individual proposals for transfer as and when these are made and nothing is mentioned therein as regards consultation with him on points such as whether, and if so what policy or policies should be adopted for effecting transfer of Judge from one High Court to another. It is also true that ordinarily policy matters would be decided upon by the Government. But, propriety requires and perhaps smooth working thereof may necessitate consultation with the Chiei Justice who is the highest administrative head of the country's Judiciary especially as the policy or policies to be adopted are in relation to transfor of High Court Judges. But, even after a general policy in the matter of transfers of High Court Judges is framed and adopted whenever a transfer is to be made in pursu· ance of such policy the proposal, before it culminates into an order, will have to satisfy the requirements of Art. 222(1). (948 F-H; 949 A-CJ
8:6. A policy transfer, that is to say, a transfer based on or made in pursuance of a general policy would not necessarily be non-punitive in character nor would every selective transfer be necessarely punitive. A policy transfer with· out fixing the requisite mechanism or modality or procedure ensuring complete insulation against the Executive interference could be a punitive transfer in the sense of having been effected with some oblique motive. Even with proper mechanism or modality of procedure a transfer can be made for extraneous considerations, and will be liable to be struck down if it so established. But admittedly no mechanism or modality of procedure of any kind has been fixed or decided upon so far and, therefore, it cannot be asserted that every policy transfer made in pursuance of either of these two policies would necessarily be above board. In other words, merely adopting a general policy, which is or may be broadly supportable for reasons of public interest would not be sufficient to insulate transfers of High Court Judges against