Shayara Bano v. Union of India and Others

Landmark judgment · Constitution & fundamental rights — Instant triple talaq (talaq-e-biddat) declared unconstitutional.

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
22 August 2017
Judge
Justice J.S. Khehar
Neutral citation
2017 INSC 785
Reported in
[2017] 9 S.C.R. 797
Acts & sections
Article 25 Constitution, Article 14 Constitution, Article 32 Constitution, Article 142 Constitution, Section 25 CPC
Subject
Family, Service

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Full judgment

(2017] 9 S.C.R. 797

SHAYARA BANO

v.

UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS (Writ Petition (C) No. 118 of2016)

With

Suo Motu Writ (C) No. 2 of2015 AUGUST 22, 2017 [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI, KURIAN JOSEPH, R. F. NARIMAN, UDAY .UMESH LALIT AND S. ABDUL NAZEER, JJ,j

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MAJORITY OPINION Muslim Law: Talaq-e-biddat - The practice of Talaq-e-biddat is set aside. (Per Court) ·Muslim Law: Talaq-e-biddat - Triple Tcllaq by a Muslim husband which severs the marital bond - Constitutionali~)I of- Held: In "Shamim Ara case, it was held that the correct law of Tc1laq as ordained by the Holy Qurnn is that, the Talaq must be for a reasonable cause and be preceded by attempts at reconciliation· between the husband and the wife by two arbiters - one .fi·om the wife's fC1mily and the other from the husband's; if the attempts fail, Talaq may be effected" - Given the fact that Triple Talaq is instantaneous and irrevocable, it is obvious !hut any at/empt al reconciliation between the husband and wife by two arbiters from their fc1milies, which is essential to save the maritC1! lie, cannot ever take place - This form of Talaq is. manifestly arbitrary in the sense that the marital tie can be broken capriciously and whimsically by a Muslim man without any attempt at reconciliation so as to save if - This form of Talaq must, there.fore, be held to be violative of the fundamental right contained under Art.14 of the Constitution of India - Therefore, the 193 7 Act, insofar c1s it seeks to recognize and en.force Triple Tafaq, is within the meaning of the expression "laws in.force" in Art.13(1) and must be struck down as being void to the extent that it recogriizes and enf.orces Triple Ta/aq - Muslim Personal Laws (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 - s.2 - Constitution of India - Art.13(1). (Per Nariman, J.) '

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Muslim Law: Sunnis Discussed. (Per Nariman, J,)

[2017] 9 S.C.R.

Various sub-sects of Sunnis -

Muslim Law: Various forms of divorce recognised in Islamic law - Discussed. (Per Nariman, J,)

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Muslim Law: Triple Talaq - Legal sanctity and constitutional protection - Triple Talaq is n,ot an integral part of the religious practice - Merely because a practice has continued far long, that by itself cannot make it valid if it has been expressly declared to be impermissible - The whole purpose of the 1937 Act was to declare Shariat as the rule of decision and to discontinue anti-Shariat practices with respect to subjects enumerated in s.2 which include talaq - Therefore, in any case, after the introduction of the 1937 Act, no practice against the tenets of Quran is permissible ., Therefore, there cannot be any Constitutional protection to such a practice - Constitution of India - Art.25 - Muslim Personal Laws (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 - s.2. (Per Kurian, J,) Muslim Law: Whether what is wrong in Quran can be legally right - Held: What is held to be bad in the Holy Quran cannot be good in Shariat and, in that sense, what is bad in theology is bad in law as well. (Per Kurian, J,) Constitution of India: Art.14 - When something is done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle or which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary - Therefore, arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness would apply to negate legislation as well under Art.14 -Applying the test of manifest arbitrariness, it is clear that Triple Talaq is a form ofTalaq which is itself considered to be something innovative, namely, that it is not in the Sunna, being an irregular or heretical form of Talaq - Muslim law. (Per Nariman, J.)

Muslim Personal Laws (Shariat) Application Act, 1937: s.2 Whether the 1937 Act can be said to recognise and enforce Triple Talaq as a rule of law to be followed by the courts in India - Held: The 1937 Act is a pre-constitutional legislative measure which would fall directly within Art.13(1) of the Constitution of India - True, the Objects and Reasons of a statute throw light on the background H in which the statute was enacted, but it is difficult to read the nonG

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obstante clause of s.2 as governing the enacting part of the A section - It is, therefore, clear that all forms of Talaq recognized and e11forced by Muslim personal law are recognized and enforced by the 1937 Act - This would necessarily include Triple Talaq when .. it comes to the Mus/impersonal law applicable to Sunnis in India s.2 recognizes or enforces Triple Talaq because the Section makes B Triple Talaq "the rule of decision in cases where the parties are Muslims"-. Thus, the 1937 Act is a law made by the legislature before the Constitution came into force, it would fall squarely within the expression "laws in force" in Art.13(3)(b) and would be hit by Art.13(1) if found to be inconsistent with the provisions of Part Ill of the Constitution, to the extent of such inconsistency - Constitution C of India -Arts.13(1), 13(3)(b). (Per Nariman, J.) Muslim Personal Laws (Shariat) Application Act, 1937: s.2 Law applicable to Muslim shall be only their personal law namely Shariat~ It is not a legislation regulating Talaq - The 1937 Act simply makes Shariat applicable as the rule of decision in the matters D enumerated in s.2 - Therefore, while Talaq is governed by Shariat, the specific grounds and procedure for Talaq have not been codified in the 1937 Act. (Per Kurian, J.) ~

Words and Phrases: Expression 'Shariat' - Meaning of (Per Nariman, J.)

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Words and Phrases: Shariat - Meaning of (Per Kurian, J,)

MINORITY OPINION Muslim Law: Talaq-e-biddat - Does the judgment of the Privy Council in the Rashid Ahmad case, upholding Ta/aq-e-biddat, require a relook - It was submitted, that after having acquired statuto1y status, the questions and subjects (including 'talaq-e-biddat'), would have to be in conformity (-and not in conflict), with the provisions of Part Ill - Fundamental Rights, of the Constitution - All these are important legal questions, requiring examination - The matter would certainly require a fresh look, because various High Courts, having G examined the practice of divorce amongst Muslims, by way of' 'talaqe-biddat', have arrived at the conclusion, that the judgment in the Rashid Ahmad case was rendered on an incorrect understanding, of the Mu.i:Jim 'personal law' - 'Shariat'. (Per Khehar, CJ/)

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Muslim law: Talaq-e-biddat - All the parties were unanimous, that despite the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat' being considered sinful, it was accepted amongst Sunni Muslims belonging to the Hana.fl school, as V(l/id in law, and has been in practice t1mongst them Talaq-e-biddat' is integral to the religious denomination of Sunnis B belonging to the Hanafi school - The same is a part of their faith. having been followed for more than 1400 years, and as such, has to be accepted as being constituent of their 'personal law'. (Per Klrehar, CJ/) Muslim law: Talaq-e-biddat - Constitutionality under the C Muslim 'personal law' • Shariat - T11e practice of 'talaq-e-biddat' being a constituent of 'personal law' has a stature equal to other fundamental rights, conferred in Part 111 of the Constitution - The practice cannot, therefore, be set aside, on the ground of being violative of the concept of the constitutional morality, through judicial intervention. (Per Khelrar, CJI)

Muslim law: Talaq-e-biddat - Need for legislation - It is not within the realm ofjudicial discretion, to set aside a ma/fer of.fi1ith and religion - The position can only be salvaged b)' way of legislation - This is a case which presents a situation where the Court should exercise its discretion to issue appropriate directions E under Article 142 of the Constitution - The U11ion of India is directed to consider appropriate legislation, particularly with reference to 'talaq-e-biddat' - Till such time as legislation in the matter is considered, Muslim husbands, are injuncted fi·om pronouncing 'talaq-e-biddat' as a means for severing their matrimonial relationship. (Per Khehar, CJJ) Muslim Personal Law (.%ariat) Application Act, 1937: it is incorrect statement that the questions/subjects covered by the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, ceased to be /Jersonal law', and got transformed into 'statutory law'. (Per Khe/lar, CJI)

Constitution of India: Art.25 and Arts. 14, 15 and 21 - 'Talaqe-biddat ', does not violate the parameters expressed in Art.25 The practice is not contrary to public order, morality and health The practice also does not violate Arts.14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution, which are limited to State actions alone - Muslim law. (Per H Khehar, CJ/)

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

Constitution of India: Arts.25 and 44 riw Seventh Schedule, A List III, Entry 5 - Reforms to 'personal law' in India, with reference to sociatly unacceptablepractices in different religions, have come about only by way of legislative intervention - Such legislative intervention is permissible under Arts25(2) and 44, read with Entry 5 of the Concurrent List, contained in the Seventh Schedule of the B Constitution - The said procedure alone need to be followed with reference to the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat ', if the same is to be set . I aside. (Per Khehar, C.11) · International Conventions and Declarations: Binding effect for deciding validity of talaq-e-biddat - Held: Not binding since the practice of 'ta/aq-e-biddat ', is a component of 'personal law', and has the protection of Art.25 of the Constitution. (Per Khehar, C.Tl)

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Disposing of the matters, Held:· PER COURT: By a majority of 3 : 2, the practice of 'talaq-e- D biddat' - triple talaq is set aside. [Para 1) [i158-B] PER NARIMAN, J. (FOR HIMSELF AND FOR LALIT, J.): 1.1 The Muslims in India are divided into two main sects, namely Sunnis .and Shias, and this case pertains only to Sunnis as E Shias do not recognise Triple Talaq. Fourt major sub-sects are broadly recognised schools of Sunni law. They are the Hanafi school, Maliki school, Shafi' i school and Hanbali school. The overwhelming majority of Sunnis in India follow the Hanafi school of law. The Hanafi school has supported the practice of Triple Talaq amongst the Sunni Muslims in India for many centuries. F [Paras 4, 6, 7) [1084-B-C; 1085-F-G; 1086-D-E] *Shamim Ara v. State of U.P. [20021 3 Suppl. SCR 19 : (2002) 7 SCC 518; Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagdishwarananda Avadhuta [2004] 2 SCR 1019 : (2004) 12 sec 770 - relied on.

Prakash v. Phu!avati (2016) 2 SCC 36; State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 Born 84 referred to

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Principles of Mahomedan Law (16th Ed.) and (20th Ed.) by Mulla; "Outlines of Muhammadan Law" (5th Ed.) by A.A.A. Fyzee - referred to.

1.2 It can be seen that the 1937 Act is a pre-constitutional legislative measure which would fall directly within Article 13(1) B of the Constitution of India. True, the Objects and Reasons of a statute throw light on the background in which the statute was enacted, but it is difficult to read the non-obstante clause of Section 2 as governing the enacting part of the Section. It is, therefore, clear that all forms of Talaq recognized and enforced by Muslim C personal law are recognized and enforced by the 1937 Act. This would necessarily include Triple Talaq when it comes to the Muslim personal law applicable to Sunnis in India. Therefore, it is very difficult to accept the argument that Section 2 does not recognize or enforce Triple Talaq. It clearly and obviously does both, because the Section makes Triple Talaq "the rule of decision D in cases where the parties are Muslims". Thus, the 1937 Act is a law made by the legislature before the Constitution came into force, it would fall squarely withi"n the expression "laws in force" in Article 13(3)(b) and would be hit by Article 13(1) if found to be inconsistent with the provisions of Part Ill of the Constitution, to the extent of such inconsistency. [Paras 14, 16, 18, 19) (1095E B, G-H; 1097-C-EJ

Sarabai v. Rabiabai (1906) ILR 30; Commissione1; Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt [1954) SCR 1005; Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, U.P. [1963) Supp. 1 SCR 885; Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 at 2605, decided on June 26, 2015 by U.S. Supreme Court - referred to

2.1 In **Commissioner of Police~v. Acharya, it was held "Test to determine whether a part of practice is essential to a G religion is to find out whether the nature of the religion will be changed without that part or practice. If the taking away of that part or practice could result in a fundamental change in the character of that religion or in its belief, then such part could be treated as an essential or integral part." Applying this test, it is H clear that Triple Talaq is only a form ofTalaq which is permissible

. (· I

SHAYARA -BANO v. UNION-OF INDIA AND OTHERS

in law, but at the same time, stated to be sinful by the very Hanafi A school which tolerates it and that the fundamental nature of the Islamic religion, as seen through an Indian Sunni Muslim's eyes, will not change without this practice. As stated by Hidayatullah, J. in his introduction to Mulla, Islam divides all actions into five kinds which figure differently in the sight of God and in respect B of whiclt His Commands are different. This plays an important part in the lives of Muslims. (i) First degree: Fard. Whatever is commanded in the Koran, Hadis or ijmaa must be obeyed. Waiib. Perhaps a little less compulsory than Fard but only slightly less so. (ii) Second degree: Masnun, Mandub and Mustahab: These are recommended actions. (iii) Third degree: Jaiz or Mubah: C These are permissible actions as to which religion is indifferent. (iv) Fourth degree: Makruh: That which is reprobated asunworthy. (v) Fifth degree: Haram: That which is forbidden." [Paras 24, 25] [1100-E, 1101-B~C, E~H; 1002-A-C] *Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagdishwarananda Avadhuta (2004] 2 SCR 1019 : (2004) 12 SCC 770 -

relied on. Sant Ram & Ors. v. Labh Singh & Ors., [1964] 7 SCR

756 - referred to -- · 2.2 Obviously, Triple Talaq does not fall within the first E degree, since even assuming that it forms part of the Koran, Hadis or Ijmaa, it is not something "commanded". Equally Talaq itself is not a recommended action and, therefore, Triple Talaq will not fall within the second degree. Triple Talaq at best falls within the third degree, but probably falls more squarely within the fourth degree. It will be remembered that under the third degree, Triple F Talaq is a permissible. action as to which religion -is indifferent. Within the fourth degree, it is reprobated as unworthy. It is seen that though permissible in Hanafi jurisprudence, yet, that very jurisprudence castigates Triple Talaq as being sinful. It is, therefore, clear that Triple Talaq forms no part of Article 25(1). G This being the case, the submission on behalf of the Muslim Personal Board that the ball must be bounced back to the legislature does not at all arise in that Article 25(2)(b) would only apply if a particular religious practice is first covered under Article 25(1) of the Constitution, [Para 25] [1102-D-F]

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Javed v. State of Haryana [20031 1 Suppl. SCR 947 : (2003) 8 sec 369 - relied on Ahmedabad Women Action Group v. Union of India · [19971 2 SCR 389 : (1997) 3 SCC 573 - Not good law

3.1 It is at this point that it is necessary to sec whether a B fundamental right has been violated by the 1937 Act insofar as it seeks to enforce Triple Talaq as a rule of hiw in the Courts in India. Article 14 of the Constitution of India is a facet of equality of status and opportunity spoken of in the Preamble to the Constitution. The Article naturally divides itself into two partsC (1) equality before the law, and (2) the equal protection of the law. [Para 31, 32) (1105-A-BJ

Mithu v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 277; Mohd. Arif v. Supreme Court of India [20141 11 SCR 1009 : (2014) 9 SCC 737; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration & Ors. (1978) 4 SCC 494; A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950) SCR 88; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India [1970] 3 SCR 530 : (1970) 1 SCC 248; State of Punjab v. Khan Chand [19741 2 SCR 768 : (1974) 1 SCC 549; Om Kumar v. Union of India [20001 4 Suppl. SCR 693 : (2001) 2 SCC 386 - referred to.

Tej Bahadur Sapru Memorial Lecture entitled "Democracy and Judicial Review" - referred to.

3.2. The arbitrariness doctrine contained in Article 14 would apply to negate legislation, subordinate legislation and executive F action. Arbitrariness in legislation is very much a facet of unreasonableness in Article 19(2) to (6). There is no reason why arbitrariness cannot. be used in the said sense to strike down legislation under Article 14 as well. The thread of reasonableness runs through the entire fundamental rights Chapter. What is manifestly arbitrary is obviously unreasonable and being contrary G to the rule of law, would violate Article 14. Further, there is an apparent contradiction in the three Judges' Bench decision in **McDowell when it is said that a constitutional challenge can succeed on the ground that a law is "disproportionate, excessive or unreasonable", yet such challenge would fail on the very H ground of the law being "unreasonable, unnecessary or

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

unwarranted". The arbitrariness doctrine when applied to A legislation obviously would not involve the latter challenge but would only involve a law being disproportionate, ex~essive or otherwise being manifestly unreasonable. All these grounds, therefore, do not seek to differentiate between State action in its various forms, all of which are inter(jicted if they fall foul of the B fundamental rights guaranteed to persons and citizens in Part III of the Constitution. Subordinate legislation can be struck down on the ground that it is arbitrary and, therefore, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. [Para 41, 44, 45, 54] [1112-E, 1126-C-D; 1129-C-E, 1136-B-C] **State of A.P. v. McDowell & Co. [1996) 3 SCR 721:

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(1996) 3 sec 709 - per incuriam. State of UP. v. Deoman Upadhyaya [1961] 1 SCR 14; Lachhman Das v. State of Punjab [1963) 2 SCR 353; S.G Jaisinghani v. Union of India [1967) 2 SCR 703; State of Mysore v. S.R. Jayaram [1968) 1 SCR 349; Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain judgment [1976] SCR 347 : 1975 Supp SCC 1; Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kera/a (1973) Suppl. SCR l : (1973) 4 SCC 225; E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. [1974] 2 SCR 348 : (1974) 4 SCC 3; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [1978] 2 SCR 621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248; A.L. Katra v. Project and Equipment Corpn. [1984] 3 SCR 646 : (1984) 3 SCC 316; Babita Prasad v. State of Bihar [1992) 3 Suppl. SCR 438 : (1993) Suppl. 3 SCC 268; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid M11jib Sehravardi (1981) 1 SCC 722; K.R. Lak5hmanan (Dr.) v. State of T.N. [1996) .1 SCR 395 :

(1996) 2 SCC 226 - relied OD; Malpe Vishwanath Achmya v. State of Maharashtra·. [1997) 6 Suppl. SCR 717 : (1998) 2 SCC 1; Mardia Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. etc. etc. [2004] 3 SCR 982 : (2004) 4 SCC 311; State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Shyam Sunder [2011) 11 SCR 1094 : (2011) 8 SCC 737; A.P. Dairy Development Co1pn. Federation v. B. Narasimha Reddy [2011) 14 SCR 1 : (2011) 9 SCC 286; Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India [2008) 4 SCR 1 i (2008) 6 SCC 1; K.T. Plantation (P) ·

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Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2011( 13 SCR 636 : (2011) 9 SCC 1; Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No.I of 2012, (2012( 9 SCR 311 : (2012) 10 SCC 1; Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Direct01; Central Bureau of investigation J2014J 6 SCR 873 : (2014) 8 SCC 682; D1: Subramanian Swamy v. Direct01; Central Bureau of Investigation (2005) 2 SCC 317 - referred

to.

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3.3 Manifest arbitrariness, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. Therefore, arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness would apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14. Appl)•ing the test of manifest arbitrariness to the case at hand, it is clear that Triple Talaq is a form of Talaq which is itself considered to be something innovative, namely, that it is not in the Sunna, being an irregular or heretical form of Talaq. [Para 55-561 f1138-B-DI · Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India f1985( 2 SCR 287 : (1985) 1 SCC 641 - relied on.

Cellular Operators Association of India v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India f2016] 9 SCR 1 : (2016) 7 SCC 703; State ofBihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd. (1996( 9 Suppl. SCR 479 : (1997) 2 SCC 453; State of M.P. v. Rakesh Kohli (2012] 6 SCR 661 : (2012) 6 SCC 312; Rajbala v. State of Haryana & Ors., (2015] 12 SCR 1106 : (2016) 2 SCC 445; Binoy Viswam v. Union of India, (2017) 7 SCC 59 - referred to.

3 .4 Indeed, in Sltamim Ara case, this Court after referring to a number of authorities including certain recent High Court G judgments held "The correct law of talaq as ordained by the Holy Quran is that talaq must be for a reasonable cause and be preceded by attempts at reconciliation between the husband and the wife by two arbiters - one from the wife's family and the other from the husband's; if the attempts fail, talaq may be effected". Given the fact that Triple Talaq is instant and irrevocable, it is obvious

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

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that any attempt at reconciliation between the husband and wife A by two arbiters from their families, which is essential to save the marital tie; cannot e~er take place. Also, as. understood· by the Privy Council in Rashid Ahmad, such Triple Talliq is valid even if • it is not for any reasonable cause, which view of the law rio longer ho~ds good after Shamim Ara. This being the case, it is clear th.at B this form of Talaq is manifestly arbitrary in the serise that the marital tie can be broken capriciously and whimsically by a: Muslim man without any attempt at reconciliation so as to save it. This form of Talaq must, therefore, be held to be .violative of .the . fundamental right contained under Article. 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the 1937. Act, insofar as it s·eeks:to recognize C · and enforce Triple Talaq, is within the meaning of the expression , · "laws in force" in Article 13(1) :ind must be struck down as being. ... void to the extent that it recognizes and enforces Triple :Talaq. [Paras 56, 57) (1138-D-E; 1139-B-D) '.

Rashid Ahmad v. Anisa Khatun (1931~ 32) S9 IA 21: · · AIR 1932 PC 25 - Not good law. . .

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PER KURIAN, J.: I. After the 1937 Act, in respect of the enumerated subjects under Section 2 regarding "marriage, dissolution of marriage, including talaq", the law that is applicable to Muslims shall be only their personal law namely Shariat. Nothing more, nothing less. It is not a legislation regulating talaq. In contradistinction, The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 provides for the grounds for dissolution of marriage. So is the case with the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The 1937 Act simply makes Shariat applicable as the rule of decision in the matters enumerated in section 2, Therefore, while talaq is governed by Shariat, the specific grounds and procedure for talaq have not been codified in the 1937 Act. [Paras 4) (1140-D-E; 1141-A-B)

2.1 There are four sources for Islamic law- (i) Quran (ii) G Hadith (iii) Ijma (iv) Qiyas. The #author in his book Outlines of· Muhammadan Law has rightly said that the Holy Quran is the "first source of law". According to the author, pre-eminence is to be given to the Quran. That means, sources other than the Holy • Quran are only to supplement what is given .in it and to supply

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what is not provided for. In other words, there cannot be any Hadith, Ijma or Qiyas against what is expressly stated in the Quran. Islam cannot be anti-Quran. [Para 71 [1142-B-CI

Asaf A.A. Fyzee in his book Outlines of Muhammadan Law, 5th Edition, 2008 - referred to

2.2 There is reference to talaq in three Suras - in Sura II while dealing with social life of the community, in Sura IV while dealing with decencies of family life and in Sura LXV while dealing explicitly with talaq. The instructive verses in Sura LXV of the Quran, dealing with talaq are clear and unambiguous as far as c talaq is concerned. The Holy Quran has attributed sanctity and permanence to matrimony. However, in extremely unavoidable situations, talaq is permissible. But an attempt for reconciliation and if it succeeds, then revocation are the Quranic essential steps before talaq attains finality. In triple talaq, this door is closed, hence triple talaq is against the basic tenets of the Holy Quran D and consequently, it violates Shariat. (Paras 8, 10111142-F-; 1150A-B] Fuzlunbi v. K Khader Vali and Another (19801 3 SCR

1127 : (1980) 4 sec 125 - approved

Masroor Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Another ILR (2007) II Delhi 1329; Sarabai v. Rabiabai lLR 30 Born 537; Furzund Hossein v. Janu Bibee ILR (1878) 4 Cal 588; Jiauddin Ahmed v. Anwara Begum (1981) 1 Gau LR 358; Rukia Khatun v. Abdul Khalique Laskar (1981) 1 Gau LR 375; A. Yousuf Rawther v. Sowramma AIR 1971 Ker 261; Mohd Haneefa 1~ Pathummal Beevi 1972 KLT 512; Andhra Pradesh, in Zamntd Begum v. K. Md. Haneef and another (2003) 3 ALU 220; A. S. Parveen Akthar v. The Union of India 2003-1-L.W. 370

- referred to

3. The view of the Chief Justice that the practice of triple talaq has to be considered integral to the religious denomination in question and that the same is part of their personal law is not endorsed. [Para 23) (1156-G-HJ 4. To freely profess, practice and propagate religion of one's

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

choice is a Fundamental Right guaranteed under the Indian A Constitution. That is subject only to the following-(1) public order, (2) health, (3) morality and (4) other provisions of Part III dealing with Fundamental Rights. Under Article 25(2) of the Constitution of India, the State is also granted power to make law in two contingencies notwithstanding the freedom granted under Article B 25(1). Article 25 (2) states that "nothing in this Article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law- (a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice; (b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public C character to all .classes and sections of Hindus." Except to the above extent, the freedom of religion under the Constitution of India is absolute. However, triple talaq is not an integral part of the religious practice. Merely because a practice has continued for long, that by itself cannot make it valid if it has been expressly D declared to be impermissible. The whole purpose of the 1937 Act was to declare Shariat as the rule of decision and to discontinue anti-Shariat practices with respect to subjects enumerated in Section 2 which include talaq. Therefore, in any case, after the introduction of the 1937 Act, no practice against the tenets of Quran is permissible. Hence, there cannot be any Constitutional E protection to such a practice.[Para 24] [1157-A-C, D-E] 5. When issues of such nature come to the forefront, the discourse often takes the form of pitting religion against other constitutional rights. A reconciliation between the same is possible, but the process of harmonizing different interests is within the powers of the legislature. Of course, this power has to be exercised within the constitutional parameters without curbing the religious freedom guaranteed under the Constitution of India. However, it is not for the Courts to direct for any legislation. What is held to be bad in the Holy Quran cannot be good in Shariat and, in that sense, what is bad in theology is bad in law as well. [Paras 25, 26] [1157-F-G; 1158-A] , Shamim Ara v. State of UP and Another [2002) 3 Suppl. SCR19 : (2002) 7 SCC 518 - affirmed. Shri Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir and Others [1980]

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2 SCR 660 = (1981) 3 SCC 689; Ahmedabad Women Action Group (AWAG) and Ors. v. Union of India [19971 2 SCR 389 = (1997) 3 SCC 573; Manzoor Ahmad Khan v. Saja & Ors. 2010 (4) JKJ 380; Ummer Farooque v. Naseema 2005 (4) KLT 565; Nazeer @ Oyoor Nazeer v. Shemeema 2017 (1) KLT 300 - referred to . PER KHEHAR, CJI (FOR HIMSELF AND FOR NAZEER, J.): 1. Does the judgment of the Privy Council in the **Rashid Ahmad case, upholding 'talag-e-biddat', require a relook'!

The **Rashid Ahmad case was rendered by applying the Muslim 'personal law'. In the said judgment, 'talaq-e-biddat' was held as valid and binding. This judgment was rendered in 1932. The opinion expressed by the Privy Council with reference to 'talaq-e-biddat', in the Rashid Ahmad case, holding that 'talaq-e-biddat' results in finally and irrevocably severing the matD rimonial tie between spouses, the very moment it is pronounced, needs to be examined afresh. More particularly, because the validity of the same as an approved concept, of Muslim 'personal law' - 'Shariat', was not evaluated at that juncture (-as it indeed could not have been, as the legislation was not available, when the Privy Council had rendered its judgment), in the backdrop of E the Shariat Act, and also, the provisions of the Constitution of India. [Paras 115, 120) (999-G-H; 1000-C-D; 1103-G-H; 1104-AI C

**Rashid Ahmad v. Anisa Khatun AIR 1932 PC 25 -

needs fresh examination.

..G

Jiauddin Ahmed v. Anwara Begum (1981) 1 Gau.L.R. 358; Must. Rukia Khatun v. Abdul Khalique Laskar (1981) 1 Gau. L.R. 375; Masroor Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2008 (103) DRJ 137; Nazeer v. Shemeemu 2017 (1) KLT 300; Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala [1973) Suppl. SCR 1 : (1973) 4 SCC 225; Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (198111SCR206: (1980) 3 SCC 625; Manoj Narula v. Union o.f' lndia (20141 9 SCR 965 : (2014) 9 SCC 1; Javed State of Haryana [20031 1 Suppl. SCR 947 : (2003) 8 SCC 369; Khursheed Ahmad Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2015) 1 SCR 1032 : (2015) 8 SCC 439; State of Bihar

i'

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

v. Rai Bahadur Jjurdut Roy Moti Lal .Jute Mills 1?60 • AIR 378 : [1960] SCR 331; A. YusufRa~ 1 ther v. Sowramma AIR 1971 Ker 261; Fuzlunbi v. K. Khader . Vali (1980) 3 SCR 1127 : (1980) 4 SCC 125 - referred ·

to. Principles ofIVlohomedan Law by Sir Dinshaw .Fardlinji MuHa, Lexis Nexis, Butterworths Wadhwa, Nagpur, 20th edition) - referred to.

Has 'talaq-e-biddat', which is concededly sinful, sanction of law'! 2.1 The submission that 'talaq-e-biddat', does. not have its source o'f origin from the Quran does not need a serious c examination, because even 'talaq-e-ahsan' and 'talaq-e-hasan' which the petitioners acknowledge as - 'the most proper', and - . 'the proper' forms of divorce respectively; also do not find mention in the Quran. Despite the absence of any reference to 'talaq-e. ahsan' and 'talaq-e-hasan' in the Quran, none of the petitioners D has raised any challenge thereto, on this score. A challenge. t.o 'talaq-e-biddat' obviously cannot be raised on this ground. Tlie different approved practices of talaq among Muslims, have their origin in 'hadiths' and other sources of Muslim. jurisprudence and therefore, merely because it is not expressly provided for or approved by the Quran, cannot be a valid j ustitication for. setting E aside the practice.[Para 1211 [1004-B-DJ 2.2 The prayer of petitioners was that whatever is irregular and sinful, cannot have the sanction of law on the ground that 'talaq-e-biddat' is proclaimed as bad in theology. The petitioners prayed that the present controversy needed· a similar F intervention, as had ·been adopted for doirig away with similar · patriarchal, irregular and sinful practices amongst Hindus. The submission was, that just as 'Sati' · Devadasi and Polygamy had been dedared as unacceptable, the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat' should likewise be declared as unacceptable in taw. Insofar as G the practice of 'Sati' is concerned, its practice n·ached alarming ~ . proportion between 1815-1818, it is estimated that the incidence ·of 'Sati' doubled during this period. The provincial Government of Bengal banned 'Sati' in 1829, by way of legislation. This.was then followed by similar laws by princely States in India. After

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A the practice was barred by law, the Indian Sati Prevention Act, '1988 was enacted, which criminalised any type of aiding, abetting 'or glorifying the practice of 'Sa ti'. Insofar as the practice of '•Devadasi' is concerned, soon after the end of British rule, 'independent India passed the Madras Devadasi's (Prevention of B Dedication) Act (-also called the Tamil N ad u Devadasis (Prevention of Dedication Act) on 09.10.1947. The enactment made prostitution illegal. The other legislations enacted on the same issue, included the 1934 Bombay Devadasi Protection Act, the 1957 Bombay Protection (Extension) Act, and the Andhra Pradesh Devadasi (Prohibition of Dedication) Act of 1988. It is C therefore apparent, that the instant practice was done away with, through legislation. Polygamy was permitted amongst Hindus. In 1860, the Indian Penal Code made 'polygamy' a criminal offem;e. The Hindu Mariage Act was passed in 1955. Section 5 thereof provides, the conditions for a valid Hindu marriage. One of the conditions postulated therein was, that neither of the parties to the matrimonial alliance should have a living spouse, at the time of the marriage. The practices of 'Sati', 'Devadasi' and 'polygamy' were abhorrent, and could well be described as sinful. They were clearly undesirable and surely bad in theology. However neither of those practices came to be challenged before E any court of law. Each of t~e practices were discontinued and invalidated by way of legislative enactments. The instances cited on beJtalf of the petitioners cannot therefore be of much avail, wit.h reference to the matter in hand, wherein, the prayer is for judicial intervention. [Para 122-1251 [1004-E-F; 1005-E-H; 1006F A, B-EJ 2.3 There is no dispute on two issues. Firstly, that the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat' has been in vogue since the period of Umar, which is roughly more than 1400 years ago. Secondly, the counsels, irrespective of who they represented, (-the petitioners or the respondents), acknowledged in one voice, that 'talaq-eG 'biddat' though bad in theology, was considered as "good" in law. All counsel representing the petitioners were also unequivocal, that 'talaq-e-biddat' was accepted as a "valid" practice in law. That being so, it is not possible to hold, the practice to be invalid in law, merely at the asking of the petitioners, just because it is

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

considered bad in theology. !Para 1271 [1007-F-H]

3. ls the practice of 'talag-e-biddat', approved?disapproved by "hadiths"? This Court in the ***Shamim Ara case did not debate the issue of validity of 'talaq-e-biddat'. Observations recorded on the subject cannot, therefore, be treated as ratio decidendi in the B matter. In fact, the question of validity of 'talaq-e-biddat' has never been debated before this Court. This is the first occasion that the matter is being considered after rival submissions have been advanced. l\foreover, in the said judgment the Court was adjudicating a dispute regarding maintenance under Section 125 C of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The husband, .in order to avoid the liability of maintenance pleaded that he had divorced his wife. the liability to pay maintenance was accepted, not because 'talaq-e-biddat' - triple talaq was not valid in Inv, but because the husband had not been able to establish the factum of divorce. It is therefore not possible to accept the submission on D the strength of the Shamim Ara case. [Para 138] (1016-D-E; 1018-.

Bl ***Shamim Ara v. State of U.P. [20021 3 Suppl. SCR 19 : (2002) 7 sec 518 - distinguished

4. Is the practice of 'talag-e-biddat', a matter of faith for Muslims? If yes, whether it is a constituent of their 'personal law'?

The practice of 'talaq-e-biddat' was widespread. About 90% of the Sunnis in India, belong to the Hanafi school, and they have been adopting 'talaq-e-biddat' as a valid form of divorce. An F overwhelming majority of Muslims in India, have had recourse to the severance of their matrimonial ties, by way of 'talaq-ebiddat' - as a matter of their religious belief - as a matter of their faith. The practice of 'talaq-e-biddat' has to be considered integral to the religious denomination in question - Sunnis belonging to the Hanafi school. The practice of 'talaq-e-biddat', has had the G sanction and approval of the religious denomination which practiced it, and as such, there can be no doubt that the practice, is a part of their 'personal law'. [Para 142, 144, 1451 11019-C-D, G; 1020-B-D, E-F] ~

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A 5. Did the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 confer statutory status to the subjeds regulated by the said le2islation'! 5.1 'Personal law' has a constitutional protection through Ai:ticle 25 of the Constitution. The stature of 'personal law' is B that of a fundamental right. The elevation of 'personal law' to this stature came about when the Constitution came into force. This was because Article 25 was included in Part III of the Constitution. Stated differently, 'personal law' of every religious denomination, is protected from invasion and breach, except as provided by and under Article 25. (Para 1461 (1020-Gf

c

· 5.2 A perusal of Section 2 of 1937 Act thereof reveals, that on the questions/subjects of intestate succession, special property of females, including personal property inherited or obtained under contract or gift or any other provision of 'personal law', marriage, dissolution of marriage, including talaq, ila, zihar, lian, D khula and mubaraat, maintenance, dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts and trust properties, and wakfs, " ... the rule of decision ... ",where the parties are Muslims, shall be" ... the Muslim Personal Law - Shariat. [Para 1491 11021-F-GI 5.3 The limited purpose of Section 2 was to negate the overriding effect of usages and customs over the Muslim 'personal law' - 'Shariat'. This determination clearly emerges even from the debates in the Legislative Assembly before the enactment of Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937. The debates reveal that customs and usages by tribals were being given overriding effect by courts while determining issues between Muslims. Even usages and customs of particular villages were given overriding effect over Muslim 'personal law' - 'Shariat'. A perusal of Section 2 and the non obstante clause used therein, has that effect. The Shariat Act neither lays down nor declares the Muslim 'personal law' - 'Shariat'. Not even, on G the questions/subjects covered by the legislation. There is substantial divergence of norms regulating Shias and Sunnis. There was further divergence of norms, in their respective schools. The Shariat Act did not crystalise the norms as were to be applicable to Shias and Sunnis, or their respective schools. H What was sought to be done through the Shariat Act was to

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

preserve Muslim 'personal law' -' 'Shariat', as it existed from ·A time immemorial. The Shariat Act recognizes the Muslim 'personal law' as the 'rule of decision' in the same manneras Article 25 recognises the supremacy and enforceability of 'personal law' of all religions. Muslim 'personal law' - 'Shariat' as body of law, was perpetuated by the Shariat Act, and what had B become ambiguous (due to inundations through customs and usages), was clarified and crystalised. In contrast, if such a plea had been raised with reference to the Diss9lution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, which legislati_vely postulated the grounds of divorce for Muslim women, the submission would have been acceptable. The 1939 Act would form a part of 'statutory. law', C and not 'personallaw'. Therefore, the proposition canvassed on behalf of the petitioners, na~ely, that the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 conferred statutory status, on the questions/subjects governed by the Shariat Act, cannot be accepted; That being the position, Muslim 'personal law' ~ 'D 'Shariat' cannot be considered as a State enactment. The practices . of Muslim 'personal law' - 'Sh~riat' c.annot be required .to satisfy the provisions contained in Part Ill '- Fundamental Rights, of the Con·stitution, applicable to State actio1is, in terms of Ar~icle 13 of the Constitution. (Paras 156, 157] [1024-E-H; 1025-A-E) '

'

' '

i

'

6. Does 'talaq-e-biddat', violate the parameters expressed in Article 25 of the Constitution? .

'

6.1 The constitutional protecti~n to tenets of 'personal · law' cannot be interfered with, as long as the same do not infringe "public order, morality and health'', and/or "the provisions of Part . Ill of the Constitution". This is the clear position expressed in · F Article 25(1). It is not possible to accept, that the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat' can be set aside and held as unsustainablein law for the three defined purposes expressed in Article 25(1), namely, for reasons of it being contrary to public order, morality and health. Viewed from any angle, it is impossible to conclude, that the G practice impinges on 'public order'; or for that matter on 'health'. Also it has no nexus to 'morality', as well. Therefore, the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat' cannot be struck. down on the three nonpermissible/prohibited areas which Article 25 forbids even .in· respect of 'personal law'. [Paras 163, 164] [1025-G-H; 1037~D-

G]

C

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N. Adithyan v. Travancore Devasom Board (2002) 8

SCC 106;. Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi v. State of U.P. [1997] 2 SCR 1086 : (1997) 4 SCC 606; Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar [19961 1 Suppl. SCR 442 : (1996) 5 SCC 125 - relied on State of Bombay v. Nara.1·u Appa Mali AIR 1952 Born 84 - referred to 6.2 The only remaining ground on which the challenge to 'talaq-e-biddat' under Article 25 could be sustainable is, if 'talaqe-biddat' can be seen as violative of the provisions of Part Ill of the Constitution. The fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 14; 15 and 21 are as against State actions. A challenge under these provisions (Articles 14, 15 and 21) can be invoked only against the State. Ar_ticle 14 forbids the State from acting arbitrarily. Article 14 requires the State to ensure equality before the law and equal protection of the laws, within the territory of India. Likewise, Article 15 prohibits the State from taking discriminatory action on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth, or any of them. The mandate of Article 15 requires, the State to treat everyone equally. Even Article 21 is a protection from State action, inasmuch as, it prohibits the State from depriving anyone of the rights enuring to them, as a matter of life and liberty (-except, by procedure established by law). Since Muslim 'personal law' - 'Shariat' is not based on any State Legislative action, therefore Muslim 'personal law' - 'Shariat', cannot be tested on the touchstone of being a State action. Muslim 'personal law' - 'Shariat', is a matter of 'personal law' of Muslims, to be traced from four sources, namely, the Quran, the 'hadith', the 'ijma' and the 'qiyas'. None of these can be attributed to any State action. Talaq-e-biddat' is a practice amongst Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school. A practice which is a component of the 'faith' of those belonging to that school. 'Personal law', being a matter of religious faith, and not being State action, there is no question of its being violative of the provisions of the Constitution of India, more particularly, the provisions relied upon by the petitioners, to assail the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat', namely, Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. [Para 165] [1037-GH; 1038-A-GJ

• SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India 11995) 1 Suppl. SCR 250 : (1995) 3 sec 635 - referred to

7. Constitutional morality and 'talag-e-biddat': 7.1 The debates in the Constituent Assembly with reference to Article 25, leave no room for any doubt, that the framers of the Constitution· were firm in making 'personal law' a part of the B fondamental rights with the liberty to the State to provide for · social reform. The debates of the Constituent Assembly with reference to Article 44, are also relevant. Article 25 requires the State to endeavour to secure a uniform 'civil code'. A member who debated the provision during the deliberations of the c Constituent Assembly, canvassed that groups and sections of religious denominations be given the right to adhere to their own personal law (-Mohamed Ismail Sahib), as it was felt, that interference in 'personal law' would amount to interfering with " ... the way of life and religion of the people ... ". (Paras 170, 171) (1038-G-H; 1048-C-D, F-G] Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University [19961 1 SCR 128 : (1996) 3 sec 545 ...: distinguished. John Vallamattom v. Union of India [20031 1 Suppl. SCR 638 : (2003) 6 SCC 611 - held inapplicable.

7.2 There cari be no doubt, that the 'personal law' has been elevated to the;stature of a fundamental right in the Constitution. And as such, 'personal law' is enforceable as it -is. All constitutional Courts, are the constitutionai guardians of all the Fundamental Rights (..., included in Part III of the Constitution). It is, therefore; the constitutional duty of all Courts to protect, preserve and enforce, all fundamental rights, and not the other way around. It is judicially unthinkable.for a Court, to accept any pra·yer to declare as unconstitutional (-or unacceptable in law), for any reason or logic, what the Constitution declares as a fundamental right Because, in accepting the prayer(s), this Court would be denying the rights expressly protected under Article 25. (Para 1721 [1049-D-EJ

8. Reforms to 'personal law' in India: Reference was made to the Legislation in India with regard to matters strictly pertainH

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A ing to 'personal law', and particularly to the issues of marriage and divorce, i.e., matters strictly within the confines of 'personal law'. [Para 1751 [1050-Bf 8.1. The Divorce Act, 1869 provided for the grounds for dissolution of marriage in Section 10 thereof. Consequent upon B a further amendment, Section lOA was added thereto, to provide for dissolution of marriage by consent. What is sought to be highlighted is, that it required legislation to provide for divorce amongst the followers of the Christian faith in India. The instant legislation provided for grounds on which Christian husbands and wives could obtain divorce. {Para 1761 [1052-C; 1053-Df

c

.8.2 Parsis in India, are the followers. of the Iranian prophet Zoroaster. The Parsis, are stated to have migrated from Iran to India, to avoid religious persecution by the Muslims. Parsis in India were governed in the matter of marriage and divorce by their 'personal law'. For the first time in 1865, the Parsi Marriage D and Divorce Act was passed. The same was substituted by the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936 after substantial amendments to the original enactment. [Para 1771 (1053-E-Fl 8.3 The Special Marriage Act, 1872 provided for inter-faith marriages. The same came to be replaced by the Special Marriage E Act, 1954. [Para 178( [1053-G)

8.4 The Foreign Marriage Act,_ 1969 followed the Special Marriage Act, 1954. It was enacted on account of uncertainty of law related to foreign marriages. The statement of objects and reasons of the Foreign Marriage Act, 1969 expresses the holistic view, which led to the passing of the legislation. [Para 179,1 (1060B-CJ ·

8.5 Muslims are followers of Islam. Muslims consider the Quran their holy book. For their personal relations, they follow the Muslim 'personal law' - 'Shariat'. The Muslim Personal Law . G (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 provided, "the rule of decision" in matters pertaining, inter alia, to marriage, dissolution of marriage including talaq, ila, zihar, lian, khula and mubaraat would be the Muslim 'personal law' - 'Shariat', and not, any custom or usage to the contrary. It is therefore, that by a statutory intervention, customs and usages in conflict with Muslim

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

.819

'personal law', were done away with, in connection with 'personal law' matters, in relation to Muslims. The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 provided, grounds for dissolution of marriage to Muslim women, under Section 2 of the above enactinent. [Para 1801 [i06l-H; 1062-A-CI

8.6 The law of marriage and divorce amongst Hindus,. has B . had a chequered history. A marriage, according to Hindu law, is . · a holy .sacrament, and not a contract (as is the case of Muslims); Originally fhere were eight forms of Hindu marriages, four of which were considered regular - and the rest irregular. The . choice of marriage, was limited only to one's own religion and c - • caste. Polygamy was permitted amongst Hindus, but not "'pU!~'llD~ry. Widow marriage was also not permitted. Legislation in respect of Hindu marriages commenced in 1829 when S:iti was • \ abolished by law. In 1856, Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act, fi~ · ''legalized the marriage of Hindu widows. In 1860, the India ii Penal J Code made polygamy a criminal offence. In 1866, Native Converts·. , D · · Marriage Dissolution Act facilitated divorce for Hindus, who ha(f adopted the Christian faith. In 1872, Special Marriage Act was enacted, but it excluded Hindus. In 1869, the Indian Divorce Act was passed, but this too remained inapplicable to Hindus. In 1909, the Anand Marriage Act legalized marriages amongst Sikhs (called - Anand). In 1923, by an amendment to the Special E Marriage Act, inter-religious civil marriages between Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains were legalized. In 1937, the Arya Marriage Validation Act legalized the inter-caste marriages, and marriages with converts to Hinduism, among the followers of Arya · Samaj. Jn 1949, Hindu Marriages Validity Act legalized inter- f r.eligious marriages. The Hindu Marriage Act, was passed in 1955. Section 5 o_f the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, provides for the conditions of a valid Hindu marriage. A perusal of the details pertaining to legislation in India with regard to matters pertaining to 'personal law', and particularly to issues of marriage and divorce for different religious communities reveals, that all issues G governed by 'personal law', were only altered by way of' legislation. There is not a singular instance of judicial intervention. The unbroken practice during the pre-independence period, and the post independence period - under the Constitution, demonstrates a clear and unambiguous course, H

r.

. ·, , .

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namely, reform in the matter of marriage and divorce (which are integral components of 'personal law') was only introduced through legislation. Therefore any change thereof, has to be only by legislation under Articles ,2~(2) and 44, r/w entry 5 of the Concurrent List contained in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. [Paras 181, 182) [1062-D-H; 1065-E-HJ 9. Impact of international conventions and declarations on 'talaqe-biddat':

9.1 The Indian State is committed to gender equality. This is the clear mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution. India is c also committed to eradicate discrimination on the ground of sex. Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution, prohibit any kind of discrimination on the basis of sex. There is, therefore, no reason or necessity while examining the issue of 'talaq-e-biddat', to fall back upon international conventions and declarations. The Indian Constitution itself provides for the same. The protection of 'perD son al laws• of religious sections, is elevated to the stature of a fundamental right, inasmuch as Article 25 of the Constitution, which affords such protection to 'personal law' is a part of Part III (- Fundamental Rights), of the Constitution. It is therefore apparent, that whilst the Constitution of India supports all conE ventions and declarations which c~h for gender equality, the Con' stitution preserves 'personal law' through which religious communities and denominations have governed themselves, as an exception.(Paras 186, 187( (1067-D-E, F-HI

9.2 International conventions and declarations arc of utmost importance, and have to be taken into consideration while interpreting domestic laws. But, one important exception to the above rule is, that international conventions as are not in conflict with domestic law, alone can he relied upon. The dispute in hand falls in the above exception. Insofar as 'personal law' is concerned, the same has constitutional protection. Therefore if 'personal G law' is in conflict with international conventions and declarations, 'personal law' will prevail. The contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners to hold the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat', on account it being in conflict with conventions and declarations to which India is a signatory can, therefore, not be acceded to.(Para 189) H (1075-A-C(

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

,•••.••• 't

...

' .

'

Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.& Chopra . [1999) 1 SCR 117 : (1999) 1 SCC 759; Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattaraya G Hegde [20081 1 SCR 605 : (2008) 4 SCC 54; State ofKerala v. Peoples Union.for Civil Liberties [2009[ 11 SCR142 : (2009) 8 sec 46; Safai Karamchari Ando/an v. Union df1ndia [2014) 4 SCR 197 : (2014) 11 SCC 224 - relied on .

, 10.1 There is seemingly an overwhelming maJority of Muslim-women; demanding that the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat' which is sinful in theology, be declared as impermissible in law. During the course of hearing, the issue was hotly canvassed in the media. Most of the views expressed in erudite articles on c the subject, hugely affirmed that the practice was demeaning. · Some even described it as being debased, abhorrent and wretched. "Talaq-e-biddat is a matter of personal law of Sunni Muslims b~longing to Hanafi school. It constitutes a matter of their faith. Religion is a matter of faith, and not oflogic. It is not D open to a court to accept an egalitarian approach, over a practice which constitutes ait integral part of religion. The Constitution allows the followers of every religion, to follow their beliefs and religious traditions. The Constitution assures believers of all faiths, that their way of life, is guaranteed, and would not be subjected to any challenge, even though they may seem to others E (-and even rationalists, practicing the same faith) un·acceptable, in today's world and age. The Constitution extends this guarantee, b·ecause faith constitutes the religious consciousness, of the followers. It is this religious consciousness, which binds believers into separate entities.· The Constitution endevours to F protect and preserve, the, beliefs of each of the separate_ entities; under Article 25. Despite the views expressed by those who challenged the prlc}i:tice of 'talaq-e-biddat', being able to demonstrate that the practice transcends the barriers of constitutional morality (emerging from different provisions of the Constitution), the petitioners' claim cannot be accepted because G the challenge raised is in respect of an issue of 'personal law' . which has constitutional protection. The authority to safeguard and compel compliance, is vested under a special jurisdiction in constitutional Courts (-underArticle 32, with the Supreme Court;

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and under Article 226, with the High Courts). Accepting the petitioners prayers, would be in clear transgression of the constitutional mandate contained in Article 25. [Paras 191, 192, 193, 194, 195) [1076-E-G; 1077-A-B, C-D; 1078-A-B)

10.2 lt is not difficult to comprehend, what kind of challenges would be raised by rationalists, assailing practices of different faiths on diverse grounds, based on all kinds of enlightened sensibilities. It is not for a court to determine whether religious practices were prudent or progressive or regressive. Religion and 'personal law', must be perceived, as it is accepted, by the followers of the faith. And not, how another would like it to be (c including self-proclaimed rationalists, of the same faith). Article 25 obliges all Constitutional Courts to protect 'personal laws' and not to find fault therewith. Interference in matters of 'personal law' is clearly beyond judicial examination. The judiciary must, therefore, always exercise absolute restraint, no matter how D compelling and attractive the opportunity to do societal good may seem. [Para 1961 [1078-D-E, F-H; 1079-A-B] Whether this is a tit case to exercise jurisdiction under Article 142, " ... for doing complete justice ... "? 10.3 A perusal of the consideration recorded reveals, that the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat' has been done away with, by way of legislation in a large number of egalitarian States, with sizeable Muslim population and even by theocratic Islamic States. It is not within the realm of judicial discretion, to set aside a matter of faith and religion. There can be no doubt, that the position can F only be salvaged by way of legislation. This is a case which presents a situation where this Court should exercise its discretion to issue appropriate directions under Article 142 of the Constitution. The Union of India is directed to consider appropriate legislation, particularly with reference to 'talaq-ebiddat '. The contemplated legislation will also take into G consideration advances in Muslim 'personal law' - 'Shariat', as have been corrected by legislation the world over, even by theocratic Islamic States. Measures have been adopted for other religious denominations (see at IX - Reforms to 'personal law' in India), even in India, but not for the Muslims. Till such time H as legislation in the matter is considered, Muslim husbands, are

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

injuncted ·from pronouncing 'talaq-e-biddat' as a means for A severing their matrimonial relationship. The instant injunction, shall in the first instance, be operative for a period of six months. If the legislative process commences before the expiry of the period of six months, and a positive decision emerges towards redefining 'talaq-e-biddat' (three pronouncements of 'talaq', at . one and the same time) - as one, or alternatively, if it is decided that the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat' be done away with altogether, the· injunction would continue, till legislation is finally enacted. Failing which, the in,iunction shall cease to operate. [Paras 198, 199, 200] 11079-E; 181-A-FI ' c Shabnam Hashmi v. Union ofIndia 12014] 2 SCR 1101 : (2014) 4 SCC 1; Charu Khurana v. Union of India (2014] 12 SCR 259 : (2015) 1 SCC 192; C. Masilamani Mudafiar v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Thirukoii [1996] 1 SCR 1068 : (1996) 8 SCC 525; S.R. Bommai v. Union of India [1994] 2) SCR 644 : (1994) 3 SCC 1; Anuj Gmg v. Hotel Association ollndia (2007) 12 SCR 99f : (2008) 3 SCC 1; Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan [1997) 3 Suppl. SCR 404 : (1997) 6 SCC 241; Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank ol India 119991 1 SCR 669 : (1999) 2 SCC 228; Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore 1958 SCR 895; A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of A.P. 119961 3 SCR 543 : (1996) 9 SCC 548; Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, [1980) 2 SCR 660 : (1981) 3 SCC 689; Maharshi Avdhesh v. Union of India, (1994) Supp (l) SCC 713, · Masilamani Mudaliar v. Idol of Sri Swaminatlwswami Thirukoif [1996] 1 SCR1068 : (1996) 8 SCC 525; Daniel Latifi v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740; Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, [19851 3 SCR 844 : (1985) 2 SCC 556; Co111missione1; Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt [1954) SCR 1005 : AIR 1954 SC 282; Ratilal v. State ol Bombay [19541 SCR 1035 : AIR 1954 SC 388; Qureshi v. Stale ofBihar 1958 AIR 731 : [19591 SCR 629; State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamal 12005] 4 Suppl. SCR 582 : (2005) 8 SC::C 534; Sardar Syedna Taher Saiji1ddin

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[2017] 9 S.C.R.

. Saheb v. State of Bombay 1962 AIR 853 : [19621 Suppl. SCR 496; Shri Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir [19801 2 SCR 660 : (1981) 3 SCC 689; Ahmedabad Women · Action Group v. Union of India [1997) 2 SCR 389 : (1997) 3 SCC 573; Maharshi Avadhesh v. Union of India 1994 (1) Suppl. SCC 713; Andhra Pradesh High Court in the Youth Welfare Federation case. v. Union of India (1996) ALT 1138 - referred to.

'The lawful and the prohibited in Islam" by Al-Halal Wal Haram Fil Islam (edition -August 2009); "Woman in Islamic Shariah" by Maulana Wahiduddin Khan (published by Goodword Books, reprinted in 2014); "Marriage and family life in Islam" by Prof. (Dr.)A. Rahman (Adam Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi, 2013 edition); Imam Abu Hanifa - Life and Work" by Allamah Shiblinu 'mani's of Azamgarhj Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, lntema!ional Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966; International Covenant of Social and Political Rights, 1966; Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1952), Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict (1974), Inter-American Convention for the ·Prevention, Pl.mishment and Elimination of Violence against Women ( 195 5), Universal Declaration on Democracy ( 1997), and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination against Women (1999); 'Conflict of Laws 188' (7th edition, 1974) by R.H. Graveson; Imam Abu Yusuf in his book "Ikhtilaaf Abi Hanifah wabni Abi Laila" (first edition, 1357); Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application, 1937; "Marriage and family life in Islam" by Prof. (Dr.) A. Rahman (Adam Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi 2013 Edition; "lmamAbu Hanifa- Life and Work" by Allamah Shiblinu' mani's of Azamgarh; Blacks Law Dictionary (10th edition, 2014) - referred to. Case Law Reference

Per Nariman, J. (2016) 2 sec 36

referred to

Para 1

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

AIR 1952 Born 84

referred to

Para2

[19531 SCR 1

relied on

Para 16

(1957( SCR 837

relied on

Para 17

(1906) ILR 30

referred to

Para 20

AIR 1932 PC 25

not good law

Para 57

[1964) 7 SCR 756

referred to

Para 21.

[1954) SCR 1005

referred to

Para 24

[2003( 1 Suppl. SCR 947

relied on

Para 24

[2004) 2 SCR 1019

relied on

Para 24 ·

[1963] Supp. l SCR 885

referred to

Para 27.

[19971 2 SCR 389

not good law

Para 29

(19611 1 SCR 14

relied on

Para 32

[1963) 2 SCR 353

relied on

Para 32

[1967) 2 SCR 703

referred to

Para 33

(1968) 1 SCR .349

relied on

Para 34

[1976) SCR 347

relied on

Para 35

[19731 Suppl. SCR 1

referred to

Para 35

119741 2 SCR 348

relied on

·Para 38

(19781 2 SCR 621

relied on

Para 39

[19841 3 SCR 646

relied on

Para 40

[19921 3 Suppl. SCR 438

relied on

Par;i40·

(1981) 1 sec 122

relied on

Para 41

[1996] 1 SCR 395

relied on

Para 42

[1996) 3 SCR 721

per hicuriam

Para43

[2014( 11 SCR 1009

referred to .

Para 44

(1983) 2 sec 211

referred to

Para 44

(1978) 4 sec 494

referred to

Para.44

(1950) SCR 88

referred to

Para 44

[19701 3 SCR 530

referred to

-Para 44

c

c

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119741 2 SCR 768

referred to

Para 44

120001 4 Suppl. SCR 693

referred to

Para 44

[19971 6 Suppl. SCR 717

referred to

Para 46

120041 3 SCR 982

referred to

Para 47

(2011] 11 SCR 1094

referred to

Para 48

[2011] 14 SCR 1

referred to

Para 48

(20081 4 SCR 1

referred to

Para 49

120111 13 SCR 636

referred to

Para 50

120121 9 SCR 311

referred to

Para 51

[20141 6 SCR 873

referred to

Para 52

c2005) 2 sec 317

referred to

Para 52

[1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 479

referred to

Para 53

[2012] 6 SCR 661

referred to

Para 53

[20151 12 SCR1106

referred to

Para 53

c2011) 1 sec 59

referred to

Para 53

[2016] 9 SCR l

referred to

Para 54

119851 2 SCR 287

relied on

Para 55

120021 3 Suppl. SCR 19

relied on

Para 56

120021 3 Suppl. SCR 19

affirmed

Paras 1, 26

ILR (2007) 11 Delhi 1329

referred to

Para 7

[19801 3 SCR 1127

approved

Para 11

lLR 30 Bom 537

referred to

Para U

ILR (1878) 4 Cal 588

referred to

Para 12

(1981) 1 Gau LR 358

referred to

Para 10, 12

(1981) 1 Gau LR 375

referred to

Para 12

AIR 1971 Ker 261

referred to

Para 13

1972 KLT 512

referred to

Para 13

Per Kurian, J.

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

(2003) 3 ALD 220

referred to

Para 17

2003-1-L.W. 370

referred to

Para 18

[1980] 2 SCR 660

referred to

Para 18

[1997] 2 SCR 389

referred to

Para 18

2010 (4) JKJ 380

referred to

Para 18

2005 (4) KLT 565

referred to

Para 20

2017 (1) KLT 300

referred to

Para 22

Per Khchar2 CJI

c

AIR 1932 PC 25

needs fresh examination

Para 30

(1981) 1 Gau ..L.R. 358

referred to

Para 31

(1981) 1 Gau. L.R. 375

referred to

Para 32

2008 (103) DRJ 137

referred to

Para 33

2017 (1) KLT 300

referred to

Para 34

[1973) Suppl. SCR 1

referred to

Para 35

[1981) 1 SCR 206

referred to

Para 35

[2014] 9 SCR 965

referred to

Para 36

[2003) 1 Suppl. SCR 638

held inapplicable

Para 36

[2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 947

referred to

Para 36

[2015) 1 SCR 1032

referred to

Para 36

[2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 19

distinguished

Para 40

[1960) SCR 331

referred to

Para 41

[2014) 2 SCR 1101

referred to

Para 41

[2014) 12 SCR 259

referred to

Para 45

[1996] 1SCR1068

referred to

Para 64

[1994] 2 SCR 644

referred to

Para 64

[2007] 12 SCR 991

referred to

Para 64

[1997) 3 Suppl. SCR 404

referred to

Para 64

[1999) 1 SCR 669

referred to

Para 64

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[19961 1 SCR 128

distinguished

Para 65

[19581 SCR 895

referred to

Para 67

[1996] 3 SCR 543

referred to

Para 69

AIR 1952 Born 84

referred to

Para 70

[1980] 2 SCR 660

referred to

Para 71

(1994) Supp (1) sec 713

referred to

Para 71

[2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 638

referred to

Para 71

[19961 1 SCR 1068

referred to

Para 71

c2001) 1 sec 140

referred to

Para 71

[1985) 3 SCR 844

referred to

Para 71, 160

[19541 SCR 1005

referred to

Para 72

[19541 SCR1035

referred to

Para 72

[1959) SCR 629

referred to

Para 72

[2005) 4 Suppl. SCR 582

referred to

Para 72

[1962) Suppl. SCR 496

referred to

Para 72

[1980] 2 SCR 660

referred to

Para 81

[1997) 2 SCR 389

referred to

Para 81

(1996) ALT 1138

referred to

Para 82

(1994) 1 Suppl. sec 713

referred to

Para 101

c2002) 8 sec 106

relied on

Para 105

[1997)' 2 SCR1086

relied on

Para 105, 161

AIR 1971 Ker 261

referred to

Para 117

(1980] 3 SCR 1127

referred to

Para 118

[1996] 1 Suppl. SCR 442

relied on

Para 161

[1995] 1 Suppl. SCR 250

referred to

Para 167

(1999( 1 SCR 117

relied on

Para 188

[2008( 1 SCR 605

relied on

Para 188

[2009) l1 SCR142

relied on

Para 188

[2014) 4 SCR 197

relied on

Para 188

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No. 118 of2016.

Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. WITH Suo Motu Writ (C) No. 2 of2015

W. P. (C) Nos. 288, 327, 665 of2016 W. P (C) No: 43 of2017. . Prashanth Murthy SG, Mukul Rohatgi, AG, Tushar Mehta, Ms. Pinky Anand, ASGs.,Amit Singh Chadda, Salman Khurshid, Anand Grover, V. C Giri, Kapil Sibal, YusufHatim Muchhala; Raju Ramachandran, Ms. Indira Jaising, B. H. Marlapalle, RamJethmalani, Sr. Advs., Balaji Srinivasan, Arunava Mukherjee, Dilpreet Singh, Abhishek Bharti, Ms. Vaishnavi Subrahmanium, Ms. Pratiksha Mishra, Ms. Srishti Govil, Mayank Krinsagar, Sahil Mongia, Divyesh Pratap Singh, Kunwar Aditya Singh, Ms~ Shivangi Singh, Suraj Prakash Singh, Jailandra Kumar Rai, Ms. D Priya Hingorani, Ashwani Upadhyay, Ranbir Yadav, Balaji Srinivasan, V. K. Biju, Abbay Pratap Singh, Ms. Hema Sahu, Ms. Gagan Deep Kaur, Rajesh Pathak, Harish Pandey, Abhishek Chakraborty, Amit Sharma, Mukesh Jain, Dwarka Sawale, Ms. Madhvi Diwan, Ms. Diksha Rai, Ms. Ranjita Rohatgi, Abhinav Mukherjee, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, E Rajat Nair, Devashish Bharuka, Rajesh Ranjan, Raj Bahadur, M. K. Maroria, Ms. Kanika Saran, Ms. Nidhi Khanna, G. S. Makker, .. Zafar Khurshid, Ms.SanchitaAin, Antony R. Julian, Ms. Azra Rehman, · (For Mis Equity Lex Associates), Arif Mohd. Khan; Dr. Chandra Rajan, .Ms. Reshma Arif, Aftab Ali Khan, Mustaffa Arif, Sandeep Garausa, Ms. Afshan Pracha, Rahul Sharma, Ms. Tripati Tondon, Ms. Lorraine F Misquith, Ms. Shrinidhi Rao, Shadan Farasat, Ms. Rudrakshi Deo, Uzmi Jameel Hussain, Mohd. Parvez Dabas, Shakil Ahmad Syed, Mohammed Sadique T.A, Ms. Svadha Shankar, Keerthivas G., Amit Krishnan, Krishna Dev J., Manav Vohra, Taiyab Khan, Mujeeb Uddin Khan, Niaz Ahmed Farooqui, Syed Shahid Husain Rizvi, S. Mansoor, N. Aziz, Ejaz G . Maqbool, Tahir M. Hakim, M. R. Shamshad, C. George Thomas, Ms. Akriti Chaubey, Ms. Qurratulain, Ms. Tanya Shree, Vikram Aditya Narayan, Ms. Mythili Vijay Kumar Thallam, Zain Maqbool, Tahir M. .. Hakim, SaquibAnsari~ SharifShaikh,AnsarTamboli, Shahid Nadeem. Ishwar Mohanty, Ms. Hamsini Shankar, Ms. Meher Dev, Purushottam . Sharma Tripathi, Mukesh ~umar Singh, Ravi Chandra Prakash, H

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Amritnanda C., Sanjeeb Panigrahi, Ms. GarimaBajaj,Ajit Wagh, Aditya Gaggar, Aproov Shukla, 0. P. Gaggar, Manoj Goel. Wajeem Shafiq, Naman Kamb<'i, DhairyaKapoor, Ms. Nitya Ramakrishnan, Ms. Warisha Farasat, Ms. J{cudrakshi Deo, Ahmed Said, Shadan farasat, lmtiaz Ahmed, Ms. Naghma lmtiaz,Ahmed Zargham, Dr. Harsh Pathak, Mohd. Ibrahim, (for Mis Equity Lex Associates), Ms. Aparna Bhat, Ms. Joshita Pai, Azmal Khan, Dr. Sumant Bharadwaj, Prem Prakash Singh, Aviral Saxena, Rakesh Kailash Shanna, Ms. Mridula Ray Bharadwaj, Manoj Kumar, A.P. Singh, V.P. Singh, Ms. Geeta Chauhan, Ms. Pratima Rani, Ms. Richa Singh, Pawan Trivedi, C. M. Sharma, C. K. Kcsharwani, S.P.Singh, Ms. Surekha Srivastava, M. M. Kashyap, Ms. Rukhsana Choudhary, Anis Ahmed Khan, Shoaib Ahmad Khan, Sandeep Garausa, Mohd. Naved Mian, Md. Irshad Hanit~ Sahid Nadeem Ansari, Mateen Shaikh, WasifRehman, Arshad Shaikh, Md. Razik Shaikh,AarifAli Khan, Muzahid Ahmad, Mohd.Izhar Alam, Mata Prasad Singh, Ms. Ranjana Rastogi Singh, Md. lrshad Hanif, Sarwar Raza, Mohd.WaseemAkram, Takrim Ahsan Khan, Mohd. Ateek, Ansar Tamboli, Afroz Siddiqui, M.R. Shamshad, Zaki Ahmad Khan, Aditya Samadd~r, Mushtaq Ahmad, Subrata Das, Reegan S. Bel, Jogy Scaria, V.K. Shukla, Mohd. Nizam Pasha, Gautam Talukdar, Ms. Abha R.Shanna, D.S.Parmar, Sushee! Tomar, Ms. Sujeeta Srivastava, Ms. Kavitta Sharma, Ms. AlkaAgrawal, Ms. Shobha, P.V. Singh, Ms. Srimato Ray, Debasis Misra, Ms. Farha Faiz, Vivek C. Solshe, C. G. Solshe, Mohd.Amanullah, Ms. Shabeena J\njum, Misbah Bin Tariq, Neeraj Jha, Nikhlesh Ramachandran, Jabar Singh, Pramod Kumar, Vishwa Pal Singh, C. M. Angadi, R. P. Goyal, Arnn Kumar, Birendra Kumar Chowdhary, Ajay Awasthi, Raj Singh Rana, Nitin Kumar Thakur, E.C.Agrawala, Abhi,nav Agrawal, Baldev Ateraya, Sunil Murarka, J. S. Suhag, Jagjit Singh Suhag, Dr. Kai!ash Chand, Rishad Ahmed Chowdhury, Advs., for the appear,ing parties. The Judgments and Order of the Court were delivered by JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI

SL No Divisions

Cmtents

Paragrnphs

Part-I

The 1x1itirner's nnrital discon~ and the i;ctitirner's prayers

1-10

1.

.

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS "[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI]

2.

Parl-2

The prncticed modes of 'talaq' amongst Muslims .

11-16

3.

Part-3

The Holy Quran -with reference to 'talaq'

17-21

4.

Pmt4

Legislation in India, in the field of Muslim 'personal law'

22-27

5.

Patt-5

Abrogation of the practice of 'talaq-ebiddat' by legislation, the world over, in Islamic, as well as, non-Islamic States

28-29

Laws of Arab States

(i)-(xiii)

:

.

A.

c

.

B.

Laws ofSmrtheast Asian States .

(i) -(iii)

c.

Laws of Sub-continental States

(i) '-(ii)

Part-6

Judicial pronouncements, on the subject of 'talaq-e-biddat' .

30- 34

7.

Part-7

The petitioner's and the intervencrs · contentions:

35- 78 .

8.

Part-S

The rebuttal ofthe_petitieners' contentions ·

79-"lll

.. 9.

Part-9 ·

Consideration of the rival contentions, · and our conclusions

112--114

L

Does the judgment of the Privy Council in the Rashid Ahmad case, upholding 'talaq-e-biddat', require a relooh.1

115-120

II.

Has 'talaq-e-biddat', which is concededly sinful, sanction of Jaw?

121-12( '

III.

Ts the p·rnctice of 'talaq-e-biddat', · approved/disapproved by,. "ha.di ths"?'"

128-139

IV.

ls the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat', a matter of faith for Muslims? If yes, whether it isa constituent of their 'personal law'?

6: .

.

v.

.

.

.D

'

.

-

1'40-145

Did tl)e Muslim Personal Law<(Shaiiat) . 146-157 Application Act, 1937 confer statu.t01y · status to tlic subjects regulated by the. said Jegislatio11? .

I-1 '

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

c

10.

[2017] 9 S.C.R.

VI.

Does 'talaq-e-biddat', violate the parameters expressed in Article 25 of the Constitution?

158-165

VII.

Constitutional morality and 'talaq-ebiddat'.

166-174

VITI.

Reforms to 'personal law' in India.

175-182

IX.

Impact of international conventions and declarations on 'talaq-c-biddar.

183-189

X.

Conclusions emerging out of the above consideration

190-190

Part-I 0

The declaration

191-201

Part-1. The petitioner's marital discord, and the petitioner's prayers: 1. The petitioner-Shayara Bano, has approached this Court, for D assailing the divorce pronounced by her husband - Rizwan Ahmad on 10.10.2015, wherein he affirmed" .. .in the presence of witnesses saying that I gave 'talak, talak, talak', hence like this I divorce from you from my wife. From this date there is no relation of husband and wife. From today I am 'haraam', and I have become 'naamharram'. In future you E are free for using your life ... ". The aforesaid divorce was pronounced before Mohammed Yaseen (son of Abdul Majeed) and Ayaaz Ahmad (son of Jtyaz Hussain)- the two witnesses. The petitioner has sought a declaration, that the 'talaq-e-biddat' pronounced by her husband on 10.10.2015 be declared as void ab initio. 1t is also her contention, that such a divorce which abruptly, unilaterally and ilTevocably tenninates F the ties of matrimony, purportedly under Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Appl icationAct, 1937 (hereinafter referred to as, the Shariat Act), be declared unconstitutional. During the course of hearing, it was submitted, that the 'talaq-e-biddat' (-triple talaq), pronounced by her husband is not valid, as it is not a part of 'Shariat' (Muslim 'personal G law'). It is also the petitioner's case, that divorce of the instant nature, cannot be treated as "rnle of decision" under the Shariat Act. It was also submitted, that the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat' is violative of the fundamental rights guan.. ;kt:d to citizens in India, under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitut; . ,, also the petitioner's case, that the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat' canP , ·.~pr 'tected under the rights granted to religious

SHAYARA BANO . v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

[JAGDISH SJNGH KHEHAR, CJ!] denominations (-or any sections thereof) under Articles 25(1),26(b) and A 29 of the Constitution. It was submitted, that the practice of 'talaq-ebiddat' is denounced internationally, and further, a large number of Muslim theocratic countries, have forbidden the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat', and as such, the same cannot be considered sacrosanctal to .the tenets of the Muslim religion. 2. The counter affidavit filed by respondent no.5 - the petitioner's husband - Rizwan Ahmad, discloses, that the 'nikah' (marriage) between the petitioner and the respondent was solemnized on 11,04.2001, as per 'Shariat', at Allahabad. Jt was submitted, that the petitioner - Shayara Bano, performed her matrimonial duties intermittently, coming and leaving the matrimonial home from time to time. The matrimonial relationship C between the .parties resulted in the births. of two children, a son Mohammed Irfan (presently about 13 years old) studying in the 7'h standard, and a daughter - Umaira Naaz (presently abollt 11 years old) studying in the 4'h standard, both at Allahabad. 3. It is the case of the respondent-husband, that the petitioner- .D wife, left her matrimonial home on 9.4.2015 in the company of her father - Iqbal Ahmad and maternal uncle--:- Raees Ahmed, as well as children - Mohammed Irfan and Umaira Naaz, to live in her pilrerital home. The respondent clainis, that he continued to visit the petitioner, for giving her maintenance, and for enquiring about her well being. When E the husband met the wife at her parental home in May and June 201 S, she refused to accompany him, and therefore, refused to .return to the matrimonial home. On 03.07.2015, RizwanAhmad, asked thefather of . Shayara Bano to send her back to her matrimonial home. He was informed by her father, after a few days, that the petitioner was not inclined to live with the respondent. · 4. On 07.07.2015 the father of the petifiener, brought the two children - Mohammed Irfan and Umaira Naaz to Allahabad. The husband submits, that both the children have thereafter been in his care.and custody, at Allahabad. It is the assertion of the husband, that the petitioner's • father had given him the impression, t11at the petitioner would be inclined 0. to return to Allahabad; consequent upon the husband's care and custody of both children, at the matrimonial home. 5. It is claimed by the respondent-husband, that he made another attempt to bring back' the petitioner-wife from her parental home on . 09.08.20 IS, but Shayara Barto refused to accompany him. It is submitted, H

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

that Rizwan Ahmad was opposed in the above endeavour, both by the petitioner's father and her maternal tmcle. 6. Finding himself in the above predicament, Rizwan Ahmad approached the Court of the Principal Judge, Family Court at Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh, by preferring Matrimonial Case No.1144 o"f 2015 with a prayer for restitution of conjugal rights. The petitioner-Shayara Bano, preferred Transfer Petition (C) No. 1796 of 2015, under Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, read with Order XXXVI-8 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, for the transfer of Matrimonial Case No. 1144 of2015, filed by the respondent-husband (seeking restitution ofconjugal rights) pending at Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh, to the P1incipal Judge, Family Court, Kashipur, Uttarakhand. In the above transfer petition, the wife inter afia asserted as under: "2.3 The Petitioner who hails from Kashipur, Uttarakhand is unemployed and her father is a government employee. The only somce of income is the Petitioner's father who has a low income and despite this the Petitioner during the time of marriage had made arrangements beyond their capacity. But soon after the marriage the Respondent husband started demanding for additional dowry and made unreasonable demands for a car and cash. 2.4 The Petitioner who rightfully denied the demands of the Respondent was tortured and physically abused by the Respondent and his family. She was often beaten and kept hungry in a close,d room for days. The family of the Respondent administered her with medicines that caused her memory to fade. Duet? the medicines she remained unconscious for long hours.

xxx

[20 I7] 9 S.C.R.

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2.6 On 09.04.2015, the Respondent attempted to kill the Petitioner by administering medicines. These medicines on inspection by a doctor on a later date were revealed to came loss of mental balance after regular consumption. The Respondent brought the Petitioner to Moradabad in a critical near-death condition with the intention of abandoning her if his dowry demands were not fulfilled. 2.7. Thereafter on 10.04.2015 the Respondent called the parents of the Petitioner to Moradabad to take their daughter. The parents

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] of the Petitioner requested him to come to Kashipur to meet and settle the issue. He refused to go to Kashipur and said that they should come and take their daughter or fulfil his demands for more dowry. He demanded Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakh Only).

2.8. Due to the unreasonable demands and the torturous behaviour of the Respondent husband, the Petitioner's parents ·came to Moradabad to take her and she was forced to stay with her parents after 10.04.2015.

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2.13 The Respondent has filed for restitution despite the fact C that he himself had asked the Petitioner wife's father to either fulfil his dowry demands or to take the Petitioner back to her . maternal home and in pursuance of the same had drugged the Petitioner and had left her in Moradabad." 7. It is the case of the respondent-RizwanAhmad, that in view of. D the above averments of the petitioner-Shayara Bano, he felt that his wife was not ready for reconciliation, and therefore, he withdrew the suit (-for restitutiQn of conjugal rights), preferred by him at Allahabad, and divorced the petitioner-Shayara Bano, by serving upon her a 'talaqnama' (deed of divorce) dated 10.10.2015. The text of the 'talak~nama', E is reproduced below: "Deed of Divorce Dated 10.10.2015 Madam,

Shayra Bano D/o Iqbal Ahmad. RL· it clear that I RizwanAhmed married with you without any dowry to spend a peaceful and happy ma1ital life. After maJTiage you came in my marital tie. From the relation between you and me two issues namely Irfan Ahmad aged about 13 years and Kumari Htimaira Naz (ii} Muskan aged about 11 years were born who are receiving education living under my guardianship. With a great sorrow it is being written that you, just after. 6 months of marriage, with your unreasonable and against Sharia acts started to pressurize me to live separately from my parents. I, in order to keep you happy and as per your wish started to live at rented

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A house at Mahalia Ghausnagar and while working as a clerk under a builder tried my level best to spend peaceful marital life with you and children. However, you, in an unreasonable manner and against Shriah continued to create problem and quarrel in house on regular basis. When you were asked the reason in a very affectionate manner about two years ago, you had put a condition that now when your other relatives are not with you in such situation come with me to my parents' house and live further life there. I being a person from a self-respecting family refused to live as 'son in law living at in-laws house'. Then you, under the influence ofyour parents, continued to fake various mental and physical pains and continued to behave life a mental patient. When tried to know C the reason then you after much difficulty told that you had med with a seriqus accident before marriage. I for the sake of my children and you tolerated that. I became despondent from your persistent demand of living at your parental house and your being of stubborn nature, your giving threarof implicating in false case and threat of inflicting injury to yourself and of consuming poison and implicating me in false case on that count given on daily 6asis and complained about the same to your paternal uncle but your father replied that whenever you do such acts sleeping pills be given to you. I found this very baftling, upon asking your father told that since the time before your marriage you had been under treatment for mental ailment. I ignored such a big incident and the E information received about you. Resultantly you became audacious in your behavior. When reported all these things to your father, your father told me that this is the time of children's holidays you be sent to your parents' house with children. You take them back after the atmosphere is changed and summer vacations are over. Acting on the words of your father I left you at your parents~ place along with children and while going, you took away gold jewelry given by me including a gold neck set of two Tolas, gold bangles of one and a half Tola, two gold rings of half Tola and cash Rs.15,000/-. I continued to visit you· enquiring your wellbeing and giving you expenses from time to time. That in the month of May and June when I tried to bring you then you gave excuses and · G pleas. I continued to make.'repeated attempts between May to July to bring you back but ultimately on 03.07.2015 you clearly refused to return and on 07.07.2015 you father brought both the children at Allahabad Railway Station and left them there informing me and gave threat on phone that either you will come here and live or shall perform the role of ·father and mother of both the children. In this regard when I enquired

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

[J_AGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] from you then you also refused to return in clear wo·rds and said to the A extent that you raise the children and forget me or separate from me to bring another mother for the children. On this also I could not satisfy myself; whereupon I filed a suit for bringing you back. After receiving notice, out of the blues you threatened me on phone that I will soon file a case and will tell you how a son in law is kept at the in-laws _house. B Being fed up with your unreasonable conduct and against Sharaih acts I found it better to separate from you, therefore, I on 8.10.2015 applied for dismissal of the suit for bringing you back and now I, in my full senses and in the presence of marginal witnesses, release you from my marriage in the light ofShariah through tripe! talaq by uttering 'I give talaq', 'I give talaq', 'I give talaq'. Froin today the relation of husband C and wife forever ends between you and me. After today you are unlawful for me and I have become unlawful for you. You are free to spend your life the way you want. Note: So far is the question of your dower (Mehr) and expenses of · waiting period (iddat) that I am paying through demand draft no.096976 D dated 06.10.2015 drawn at Allahabad Bank, Karaili, Allahabad Branch, which comprises a sum of Rs. l 0, 151 towards payment of dower and Rs.5;5001- towards the expenses of waiting period which I am sending along with this written deed of divorce, you kindly take paid to accept the same.

Dated 10.102015 Witnesses:-

1. Mohd. Yaseen, s/oAbdul Majid, Rio J.K. Colony, Ghaus Nagar, Kara.iii,

Allahabad;

2. AyazAlimed S/o Imtiyaz Hussain Rio G.T.B. Nagar, Karaili Scheme, Allahabad Sd/ Hindi Ri~an Ahmed (Rizwan Ahmed) G S/o Iqbal Ahmed Ghaus Nagar, Karaili, Allahabad," 8. Based on the above, the case of the respondent-husband is, that he had pronounced 'talaq' in-consonan_ce with the prevalent and H

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A valid mode of dissolution of Muslim marriages. It was submitted, that the pronouncement of divorce by him, fulfils all the requirements of a valid divorce, under the Hanafi sect of Sunni Muslims, and is in consonance with 'Shariat' (Muslim 'personal law'). 9. It is also the submission of the respondent-husband, that the B present writ petition filed by the petitioner-wife under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, is not maintainable, as the questions raised in the petition are not justiciable under Article 32 of the Constitution.

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10. Keeping in view the factual aspect in the present case, as also, the complicated questions that arise for consideration in this case (and, in the other connected cases), at the very outset, it was decided to limit the instant consideration, to 'talaq-e-biddat' - triple talaq. Other questions raised in the connected writ petitions, spch as, polygamy and 'halala' (-and other allied matters), would be dealt with separately. The determination of the present controversy, may however, coincidentally render an answer even to the connected issues.

Part-2. The nracticed modes of'talag' amongst Muslims:

11. Since the issue under consideration is the dissolution ofmarriage by 'talaq', under the Islamic law of divorce, it is imperative, to understand E the concept of'talaq'. In this behalf, it is relevant to mention, that under the Islamic law, divorce is classified into three categories. Talaq understood simply, is a means of divorce, at the instance of the husband. 'Khula', is another mode of divorce, this divorce.is at the instance of the wife. The third category of divorce is 'mubaraat' - divorce by mutual consent.

12. 'Talaq', namely, divorce at the instance of the husband, is also of three kinds - 'talaq-e-ahsan', 'talaq-e-hasan' and 'talaq-e-biddat'. The petitioner's contention before this Court is, that 'talaq-e-ahsan', and 'talaq-e-hasan' are both approved by the 'Quran' and' hadith'. 'Talaqe-ahsan', is considered as the 'most reasonable' form of divorce, whereas, 'talaq-e-hasan' is also considered as 'reasonable'. It was submitted, that 'talaq-e-biddat' is neither recognized by the 'Quran' nor by 'hadith', and as such, is to be considered as sacrosanctal to Muslim religion. The controversy which has arisen for consideration before this Court., is with referenc to 'talaq-e-biddat'.

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... SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI]

13. It is necessary for the determination·ofthe present controversy, to understand the parameters, and the nature of the different kinds of 'tafaq'. 'Talaq-e-ahsan' is a single pronouncement of 'talaq' by the husband, followed by a period of abstinence. The period of abstinence is described as 'iddat'. The duration of the 'iddat' is ninety days or three menstrual cycles (in case, where the wife is menstruating). Alternatively, the period of 'iddat' is of three lunar months (in case, the wife is not menstruating). If the couple resumes cohabitation or intimacy, within the period of 'iddat', the pronouncement of divorce is treated as having been revoked. Therefore, 'talaq-e-ahsan' is revocable. Conversely, if there is no resumption of cohabitation or intimacy, during the period of 'iddat', then the divorce becomes final and irrevocable, after the expiry of the 'iddat' period. It is considered irrevocable because, the couple is . forbidden to resume marital relationship thereafter, unless they contract a fresh 'nikah' (-marriage), with a fresh 'mahr'. 'Mahr' is a mandatory payment, in the form of money or possessions, paid or promised to be paid,.by the groom or by the groom's father, to the bride, at the time of marriage, which legally becomes her property. However, on the third pronouncement of such a 'talaq', the couple cannot remarry, unless the wife first marries someone else, and only after her marriage with other person has been dissolved (either through 'talaq' - divorce, or death), can the couple remarry. Amongst Muslims, 'talaq-e-ahsan' is regarded as - 'the most proper' form of divorce.

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14. 'Talaq-e-hasan' is pronounced in the same manner, as 'talaqe-ahsan'. Herein, in place of a single pronouncement, there are three successive pronouncements. After the first pronouncement of divorce, if there is resumption ofcohabitation within a period of one month, the ·pronouncement of divorce is treated as having been revoked. The same F procedure is mandated to be followed, after the expiry of the first month (during which marital ties have not been resumed). 'Talaq' is pronounced again. After the second pronouncement of'talaq', ifthere is resumption of cohabitation within a period of one month, the pronouncement of divorce is treated as having been revoked. It is significant to note, that the first and the second pronouncements may be revoked by the husband. G If he does so, either expressly or by resuming conjugal relations, 'talaq' pronounced by the husband becomes ineffective, as if no 'talaq' had ever been expressed. If the third 'talaq' is pronounced, it becomes irrevocable. Therefore, if no revocation is made after the first and the second declaration, and the husband makes 'the third pronouncement, in H

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the third 'tuhr' (period of purity), as soon as the third declaration is made, the 'talaq' becomes irrevocable, and the marriage stands dissolved, whereafter, the wife has to observe the required 'iddat' (the period after divorce, during which a woman cannot remarry. Its purpose is to ensure, that the male parent of any offspring is clearly identified). And after the third 'iddat', the husband and wife cannot remarry, unless the wife first marries someone else, and only after her marriage with another person has been dissolved (either through divorce or death), can the couple remarry. The distinction between 'talaq-e-ashan' and 'talaq-e-hasan' is, that in the former there is a single pronouncement of 'talaq' followed by abstinence during the period of 'iddat', whereas, in the latter there are c three pronouncements of 'talaq', interspersed with abstinence. As against 'talaq-e-ahsan', which is regarded as 'the most proper' form of divorce, Muslims regard 'talaq-e-hasan' only as 'the proper form of divorce'.

15. The third kind of 'talaq' is- 'talaq-e-biddat'. This is effected by one definitive pronouncement of 'talaq' such as, "I talaq you D irrevocably" or three simultaneous pronouncements, like "talaq, talaq, talaq'', uttered at the same time, simultaneously. In 'talaq-e-biddat', divorce is effective forthwith. The instant talaq, unlike the other two categories of 'talaq' is irrevocable at the ve1y moment it is pronounced. Even amongst Muslims 'talaq-e-biddat', is considered irregular.

16.According to the petitioner, there is no mention of 'talaq-ebiddat' in the Quran. It was however acknowledged, that the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat' can be traced to the second centmy, after the advent of Islam. It was submitted, that 'talaq-e-biddat' is recognized only by a few Sunni schools. Most prominently, by the Hanafi sect of Sunni Muslims. It was however emphasized, that even those schools that recognized 'talaq-e-biddat' described it, "as a sinful form of divorce". It is acknowledged, that this form of divorce, has been described as "bad in theology, but good in Jaw". We have recorded the instant position at this juncture, because learned counsel for the rival parties, uniformly acknowledge. the same. Part-3.

The Holy Ouran - with reference to 'talaq': 17. Muslims believe that the Quran was revealed by God to the Prophet Muhammad over a period of about 23 years, beginning from H 22 .12 .609, when Muhammad was 40 years old. The revelation continued

SHAYARA BANO v.· UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]

upto the year 632 - the year of his death. Shortly after Muhammad's A death, the Quran was completed by his companions, who had either .written it down, or had memorized parts of it. These compilations had differences of perception. Therefore, Caliph Usman - the third, in the line of caliphs recorded a standard version of the Quran, now known as Usman 's codex. This codex is generally treated, as the original rende1ing B of the Quran. 18. During the course of hearing, references to the Quran were made from 'The Holy Quran: Text Translation and Commentary' by Abdullah YusufAli, (published by Kitab Bhawan, New Delhi, l 4'h edition, 2016). Learned counsel representing the rival parties commended, that C the text and translation in this book, being the most reliable, could safely be relied upon. The text and the inferences are therefore drawn from the above publication. (i) The Quran is divided into 'suras' (chapters). Each 'sura' contains 'verses', which are arranged in sections. Since our determination is limited to the validity of 'talaq-e-biddat', within the framework of the D Muslim 'personal law' - 'Shariat', we shall only make a reference to such 'verses' from the Quran, as would be relevant for our above determination. In this behalf, reference may first be made to 'verses' 222 and 223 contained in 'section' 28 of 'sura' II. The same are reproduced below: "222. They ask thee

Concerning women's courses. Say : They are A hurt and a pollution : So keep away from women In their courses, and do not · Approach them until They are clean. But when they have Purified themselves, Ye may approach them In any manner, time, or place Ordained for you by God.

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For God loves those Who turn to Him constantly And he loves those Who keep themselves pure and clean.

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223.Your wives are As a tilth unto you ; So approach yollr tilth When or how ye will ; But do some good act For your souls beforehand; And fear God, And know that ye are To meet Him (in the Hereafter), And give (these) good tidlings To those who believe." The above 'verses' have been extracted by us for the reason, that the Quran mandates respectability at the hands of men - towards women. 'Verse' 222 has been interpreted to mean, that matters of physical cleanliness and purity should be looked at, not only from a man's point of view, but also from the woman's point of view. The 'verse' mandates, that if there is danger of hurt to the woman, she should have every consideration. The Quran records, that the action, of men towards women are often worse. lt mandates, that the same should be better with reference to the woman's health, both mental and spiritual. 'Verse' 223 postulates, that sex is as solemn, as any other aspect of life. lt is compared to a husband-man's tilth, to illustratively depict, that in the same manner as a husband-man sows his fields, in order to reap a harvest, by choosing his own time and mode of cultivation, by ensuring that he does not sow out of season, or cultivate in a manner which will injure or exhaust the soil. So also, in the relationship towards a wife, 'verse' 223 exalts the husband, to be wise and considerate towards her, and treat her in such manner as will neither injure nor exhaust her. 'Verses' 222 and 223 exhort the husband, to extend every kind of mutual consideration, as is required towards a wife.

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SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ' ' [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] .

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(ii) Reference is also necessary to 'verses' 224 to 228 contained in section A

28 of 'sura' II of the Quran. The same are extracted below: "224. And make not God's (name) an excuse In your oaths against Doing good, or acting rightly, Or making peace .... . Between persons; For God is one Who heareth and knoweth All things. ·~ 225. God will not Call you to account For thougbtlessness ' In your oaths, But for the intention In your hearts; And He is Oft-forgiving Most Forbearing. 226 ..For those who take An oath for abstention From thejr wives, A waiting for four months Is ordained; If then they return, God is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful. 227. But if their intention ls firm for divorce, Godheareth · And knoweth all things. ..1,

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228. Divorced women Shall wait concerning themselves For three monthly periods. "Noris it lawful for them To hide what God Hath created in their wombs, If they have faith In God and the Last Day. And their husbands Have the better right To take them back In that period, if They wish for reconciliation. And women shall have rights Similar to the rights Against them, according To what is equitable; But men have a degree (Of advantage) over them And God is Exalted in Power Wise."

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'Verse' 224, has a reference to many special kinds of oaths practised amongst Arabs. Some of the oaths even related to matters concerning F sex. These oaths caused misunderstanding, alienation, division or separation between husbands and wives. 'Verses' 224 to 227 are pointed references to such oaths. Through 'verse' 224, the Quran ordains in general terms, that no one should make an oath-in the name of God, as an excuse for not doing the right thing, or for refraining from doing G something which will bring people together. The text relied upon suggests, that 'verses' 225 to 227 should be read together with 'verse' 224. 'Verse' 224 is general and leads up to the next three 'verses'. These 'verses' are in the context of existing customs, which were very unfair to married women. Illustratively, it was sought to be explained, that in a fit of anger or caprice, sometimes a husband would take an oath - in the name of H God, not to approach his wife. This act of the husband, it was' sought to

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SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] "

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be explained, deprives the wife of her conjugal rights, and yet, keeps her A tied to the husand indefinitely, inasmuch as, she has no right to remarry. Even if this act of the husband, was protested by the wife, the explanation provided is, that the husband was bound - by the oath in the name of God. Through the above verses, the Quran disapproves thoughtless . oaths, and at the same time, insists on a proper solemn and conscious/ purposeful oath, being scrupulously observed. The above 'verses' caution husbands to understand, that an oath in the name of God was not a valid excuse.- since God looks at intention, and not mere thoughtless words. It is in these circumstances, that 'verses' 226 and227 postulate, that the h'usband and wife in a difficult relationship, are allowed a period of four months, to determine whether an adjustment is possible. Even though c reconciliation is recommended, but ifthe couple is against reconciliation, the Quran ordains, that it is unfair to keep the wife tied to her husband indefinitely. The Quran accordingly suggests, that in such a situati9n, divorce is the only fair and equitable course. All the same it is recognized, that divorce is the most hateful action, in the sight of the God.

(iii) 'Verses' 229 to 231 contained in 'section' 29 of'sura' II, (lnd 'verses' 232 and 233 included in 'section' 30 of 'sura' U, as· also 'verse' 237 contained in 'section' 31 in 'sura' II, are relevant on the issue of divorce. The same are extracted below: .I

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"229. A divorce is only Permissible twice: after that, The parties should either.hold Together on equitable terms, Or separate with kindness. It is not lawful for you, (Men), to take back Any of your gifts (from yol.lr wives), . Except when both parties . Fear that ~hey would be Unable to keep the limits Ordained by God. Ifye (judges) do indeed .Fear that they would be Unable to keep the limits

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Ordained by God, There is no blame on either Of them if she give Something for her freedom. These are the limits Ordained by God; So do not transgress them If any do transgress The limits ordained by God, Such persons wrong (Themselves as well as others) 230.So if a husband Divorces his wife (irrevocably), He cannot, after that, Re-marry her until After she has married Another husband and He has divorced her. In that case there is No blame on either of them If they re-unite, provided They feel that they Can keep the '1imits Ordained by God. Such are the limits Ordained by God, Which He makes plain To those who understand. 231.When ye divorce Women, and they fulfil The term ofthei~ ('Jddat') Either taken them back On equitabl!'l terms

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SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA ANP OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] ;

Or set them free On equitable terms; . But do not take them back To injure them, (or) to take Undue advantage; If ~Y one does that, He wrongs his own soul. Do not treat God's Signs As a jest, But solemnly rehearse God's favours on you, And the fact that He Send down to you The Book And Wisdom, For your instruction. And tear God, And know that God ls well acquainted ·with all things."

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A perusal of the aforesaid 'verses' reveals, that divorce for tbe reason of mutual incompatibility is allowed. There is however a recorded word of caution - that the parties could act in haste .and then repent; and thereafter again reunite, and yet again, separate. To prevent erratic and F fitful repeated separations and reunions, a limit of two divorces is prescribed. In other words, reconciliation after two divorces is allowed. After the second divorce, the parties must definitely make up their mind, either to dissolve their ties permanently, or to live together honourably, in mutual love and forbearance - to hold together on equitable terms. However, if separation is inevitable even on reunion after the second· G divorce, easy reunion is not permitted. The husband and wife are forbidden from casting aspersions on one another. They are mandated to recognize, what is right and honourable, on a collective consideration· of all circumstances. After the divorce, a husband cannot seek the return of gifts or properties, he may have given to his wife. Such retention by the·. H

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A wife is permitted, only in recognition that the wife is economically weaker. An exception has been carved out in the second part of 'verse' 229, that in situations where the freedom of the wife could suffer on account of the husband refusing to dissolve the marriage, and perhaps, also treat her with cruelty. It is permissible for the wife, in such a situation, to B extend some material consideration to the husband. Separation of this kind, at the instance of the wife, is called 'khula'. 'Verse' 230 is in continuation of the first part of'verse' 229. The instant 'verse' recognizes the permissibility of reunion after two divorces. When divorce is pronounced for the third time, between the same parties, it becomes irreversible, until the woman marries some other man and he divorces C her (or is otherwise released from the matrimonial tie, on account of his death). The Quranic expectation in 'verse' 230, requires the husband to, restrain himself, from dissolving the matrimonial tie, on a sudden gust of temper or anger. 'Verse' 231 provides, that a man who takes back his wife after two divorces, must not put pressure on her, to prejudice her rights in any way. Remarriage must only be on equitable terms, D whereupon, the husband and wife are expected to lead a clean· and honourable life, respecting each other's personalities. The Quranic message is, that the husband should either take back the wife on equitable terms, or should set her free with kindness. (iv) The 'verses' referred to above need to be understood along with E 'verses' 232 and233, contained in 'section' 20 of'sura' 11, of the Quran. The above two 'verses' are extracted below:

"232. When ye divorce Women, and they fulfil The terin of their ('Iddat'), Do not prevent them From marrying Their (former) husbands, If they mutually agree On equitable terms. This instruction Is for all amongst you, Who believe in God And the Last Day.

•

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] That is (the course Making for) more virtue And purity amongst you, And God knows, And ye know not. 233. The mothers shall give suck To their offspring For two whole years, If the father desires To complete the term. But he shall bear the cost Of their food and clothing On equitable terms. No soul shall have A burden laid on it Greater than it can bear. No mother shall be Treated unfairly On account of his child, An heir shall be chargeable In the same way. If they both decide On weaning, By mutual consent, And after due consultation, There is no blame on them. lfye decide On a foster-mother For your offspring,·· There is no blame on you, Provided ye pay (the mother) What ye offered, . On equitable terms. But fear God and know

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That God sees well What ye do."

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A perusal of the above 'verses' reveals, that the termination of the contract of marriage, is treated as a serious matter for family and social life. And as such, every lawful advice, which can bring back those who .B had lived together earlier, provided there is mutual love and they can live with each other on honourable terms, is commended. After following the above parameters, the Quran ordains, that it is not right for outsiders to prevent the reunion of the husband and wife. 'Verse' 233 is in the midst of the regulations on divorce. It applies primarily to cases of divorce, C where some definite rule is necessary, as the father and mother would not, on account of divorce, probably be on good terms, and the interest of children must be safeguarded. Since the language of 'verse' 233 is general, the edict contained therein is interpreted, as applying equally to · the father and mother, inasmuch as, each must fulfil his or her part, in the fostering of children. D (v) The last relevant 'verse' in 'sura' II of the Quran, is contained in 'section' 31, namely, 'verse' 237. The same is reproduced below:

"237. And if ye divorce them

Before consummation, But after the fixation Of a dower for them, Then the half of the dower (Is due to them), unless .They remit it Or (the man's halt) is remitted By him in whose hands Ils the marriage tie; And the remission (Of the, man's half) Is the nearest to righteousness. And do not forget Liberality between yourselves. For God sees well All that ye do."

· SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI]

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In case of divorce before consummation of marriage, it is recognized, A that only half the dower fixed needed to be refunded to the wife. It is however open to the wife, to remit the half due to her. And likewise, it is. .open to the husband to remit the half which he is entitled to deduct (and thus pay the whole dower amq_4nt). 19. Reference is also necessary to 'verses' 34 and 35, contained B in 'section'6,aswellas, 'verse' 128containedin 'section' 19,of'sura'. IV. Allthe above verses are extracted below: ·

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"34. Men are the protectors And maintainers of women, Because God has given The one more (strength) Than the other, and because They support them From their means. Therefore the righteous women Are devoutiy obedient, and guard In (the husband's) absence What God would have them guard. As to those women -On whose part ye fear Disloyalty and ill-conduct, Admonish them (first), (Next), refuse to share their beds, (And last) beat them (lightly); But if they return to obedience, Seek not against them Means (of annoyance): For God is Most High, Great (above you all). 35. lfye fear a breach Between them twain,

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Appoint (two) arbiters, One from his family, And the other from hers; If they wish for peace, God will cause Their reconciliation: For God hath full knowledge, And is acquainted With all things." Section 19, Sura IV "128.If a wife fears Cruelty or desertion On her husband's part, There is no blame on them, If they arrange An amicable settlement Between themselves; And such settlement is best; Even though men's souls Are swayed by greed. But if ye do good And practice self-restraint God is well-acquainted With all that ye do."

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The Quran declares· men as protectors, and casts a duty on them to maintain their women. In order to be entitled to the husband's support, the Qw-an ordains the women to be righteous, .and to be devoutly obedient to the husband, even in his absence. 'Verse' 34, extends to the husband G the right to admonish his wife who is either disloyal, or ill-conducts herself. Such admonition can be by refusing to share her bed, and as a last resort, even to beat her lightly. Thereafter, if the woman does not return to obedience, the husband is advised not to use means of annoyance against her.. 'Verse' 35, sets out the course of settlement of family H disputes. It postulates the appointment of two arbitrators - one

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SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]

representing the family of the husband, and the other the family of the A wife. The arbitrators are mandated to explore the possibility of reconciliation. In case reconciliation is not possible, dissolution is advised, without publicity or mud-throwing or by resorting to trickery or deception. 'Verse' 128 provides for divorce at the instance of the wife- 'khula'. It provides for a situation where, the wife fears cruelty or desertion on her B husband's part. Jn such a situation, her desire to seek an amicable settlement, cannot be treated as an aspersion on her. The couple must then settle to separate, on most amicable terms. The husband is cautioned not to be greedy. He is required to protect the wife's economic interest. In case of disputation between the couple, for economic reasons, the Quran ordains, that sanctity of the marriage itself, is far greater than any C economic interest, and accordingly suggests, that if separation can be prevented by providing some economic consideration to the wife, it is better for the husband to make such a concession, than to endanger the future of the wife and children. 20. The last relevant 'verses' -1 and2, are contained in 'section' 1 of 'sura' - LXV. The same are reproduced below:

"l. Prophet! When ye

Do divorce women, Divorce them at their Prescribed periods, And count (accurately) Their prescribed periods: And fear God your Lord: And turn them not out Of their houses, nor shall They (themselves) leave, Except in case they are Guilty of SOl}le open lewdness, Those are limits Set by God: and.any Who transgresses the limits Of God, does verily Wrong his (own) soul:

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Thou knowest not if Perchance God will Bring about thereafter Some new situation. 2. Thus when they fulfil Their term appointed, Either take them back On equitable terms Or part with them On equitable terms; And take for witness Two persons from among you, Endued with justice, And establish the evidence (As) before God. Such Is the admonition given To him who believes In God and the Last Day. And for those who fear God, He (ever) prepares A way out,"

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"Verse' l above, it may be noticed, has reference to the Prophet Muhammad himself. lt is addressed in his capacity as teacher and F representative of the community. It endorses the view, that of all things permitted, divorce is the most hateful in the sight of the God. Even though, the 'verse' provides for divorce, it proscribes the husband from turning out his wife/wives from his house. It also forbids the wife/wives, to leave the house of their husband, except when they are guilty. Those G who transgress the above limitation, are cautioned, that they are committing wrong to their own souls. Reconciliation is suggested, whenever it is possible. It is recommended at every stage: The first serious difference between the spouses is first to be submitted to a family counsel, on which both sides are to be represented. The 'verse' requires the divorce to be pronounced, only after the period of prohibit01y waiting. H 'Dower' has to be paid, and due provisions have to be made, by the

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI]

husband, for many things on equitable terms. On each aspect, there is to be consideration. Reconciliation is recommended till the last moment. The message contained in 'verse' 2 is, that everything should be done fairly, and all interests should be safeguarded. It is ordained, that the parties should remember, that such matters affect the most intimate aspect of their lives, and therefore, have a bearing even in the spiritual kingdom. It is therefore, that the 'verses' extract~d above, impress on the parlies, to fear God, and ensure that their determination.is just and true.

21. The understanding of the 'verses' of the Quran, is imperative in this case, because the' petitioner and those supporting the petitoner's case contend inter alia, that 'talaq-e-biddat', is not in conformity with the unambiguous edicts of the Quran, and therefore; cannot be considered as valid constituents of Muslim 'personal law'.

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Part-4. Legislation in India, in thdield of Muslim 'personal law':

-22. It would be relevant to record, that 'personal law' dealing D with the affairs of those professing the Muslim religion, was also regulated by custom or u,~~_ge. It was also regulated by 'Shariat' - the Muslim 'personal law'. The status of Muslim women under customs and usages adopted by Muslims, were considered to be oppressive towards women. Prior, to the independence of India, Muslim women organisations _ E condemned customary law, as it adversely affected their rights, under the 'Shariat'. Muslim women claimed, that the Muslim '_personal law' be made applicable to them: It is therefore, tha_t the Muslim Personal Law (Sharait) Application Act,, 1937 {hereinafter referred to, as the Shariat Act), was passed. It is essential to understand, the background which resulted in the enactment of the Shariat Act. The same is recorded in F the statement of objects and reasons,_ which is reproduced below: "For several years past it has been the cherished desire of the Muslims of British India that Customary Law should in no case take the place of Muslim Personal Law. The matter has been repeatedly agitated in the press as well as on the platform. The . G Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind. the greatest Moslem religious body has supported the demand and invited the attention of all concerned to the urgent necessitv of introducing a measure to this effect. Customary Law is a misnomer inasmuch as it has ncit any sound basis to stand upon and is very much liable to frequent changes H

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and cannot be expected to attain at any time in the futLITe that certainty and definiteness which must be the characteristic of all laws. The status of Muslim women under the so-called Customary Law is simuly disgraceful. All the Muslim Women Organisations have therefore condemned the Customan:: Law as it adversely affects their rights. They demand that the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) should be made am;1licable to them. The introduction of Muslim Personal Law will automatically raise them to the 12osition to which they are naturally entitled. In addition to this present measure, if enacted, would have very salutary effect on society because it would ensure certainty and definiteness in the mutual rights and obligations of the public. Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) exists in the form of a veritable code and is too well known to admit of any doubt or to entail any great labour in the shape ofresearch, which is the chief feature of Customary Law." 23. Sections 2, 3 and 5 of the Shariat Act are relevant and are extracted hereunder: "2 Application of personal law to Muslims.- Notwithstanding any customs or usage to the contrary, in all guestions (save questions relating to agricultural land) regarding intestate succession, special property of females, including personal property inherited or obtained under contract or gift or any other provision of Personal .Law, marriage, dissolution·ofmarriage, inch\ding talag, ila, zihar, , lian, khula and mubaraat, maintenance, dower, guardianship; gifts, trusts and 'trust properties, and wakfs (other than charities and charitable institutions and charitable and religious endowments) the rule of deCision in cases where the 12arties are Muslims shall be the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)." 3. Power to make a declaration.- (1) Any person who satisfies the prescribed authority-

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(a) that he is a Muslim, and

(b) that he is competent to contract within the meaning of section 11 of the Contract Act, 1872 (9of1872), and (c) that he is a resident of the teITitories to which this Act extends, may by declaration in the prescribed form and filed before the prescribed authority declare that he desires to obtaih the benefit

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SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]

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of the provisions of this section, and thereafter the provisions of A section 2 shall apply to the declarant and all his minor children and their descendants as if in addition to the matters enumerated therein adoption, wills and legacies were also specified. (2) Where the prescribed authority refuses to accept a declaration under sub-section (1 ), the person desiring to make the same may B appeal to such officer as the Government may, by general or special order, appoint in this behalf, and such officer may, ifhe is satisfied that the appellant is entitled to make the declaration, order the prescribed authority to accept the same. xxx

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5. Dissolution of marriage by Court in certain circumstances.The District Judge may, on petition made by a Muslim married woman, dissolve a marriage on any ground recognized by Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)." A close examination of Section 2, extracted above, leaves no room for D any doubt, that custom and usage, as it existed amongst Muslims, were sought to be expressly done away with, to the extent the same were contrary to Muslim 'personal law'. Section 2 also mandated, that Muslim 'personal law' (Shariat) would be exclusively adopted as" ... the rule of decision ... " in matters of intestate succession, special property of E females, including all questions pertaining to " ... personal property inherited or obtained under contract or gift or any other provision of .- 'personal law', man'iage, dissolution of man-iage, including talaq, ila, zihar, lian, khula and mubaraat, maintenance, dower, gifts, trusts and trust properties, and wakfs ... ". Section 3 added to the above list," ... adoption, wills and legacies ... ", subject to the declaration expressed in Section 3. F 24. lt is relevant to highlight herein,. that under Section 5 9f the Shariat Act provided, that a Muslim woman could seek dissolution of her marriage, on the grounds recognized under the Muslim 'personal law'. It would also be relevant to highlight, that Section 5 of the Shariat Act was deleted, and replaced by the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.

25. In the above context, it would be relevant to mention, that there was no provision in the Hanafi Code, of Muslim law for a man-ied Muslim woman, to seek dissolution of marriage, as of right. Accordingly, Hanafi jurists had laid down, that in cases in which the application ofHanafi law H

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caused hardship, it was permissible to apply the principles of the Maliki, Shafii or Hanbali law. This position was duly noticed in the introduction to the 1939 A.ct, as well as, in the statement of its objects and reasons. Be that as it may, the alternatives suggested by the Hanafi jurists were not being applied by courts. Accordingly, in order to crystalise the grounds of dissolution of marriage, by a Muslim woman, the 1939 Act, was enacted. The statement of objects and reasons of the above enactment is relevant, and is accordingly extracted hereunder:

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'"'There is no proviso in the Hanafi Code of Muslim Law enabling a married Muslim woman to obtain a decree from the Court dissolving her marriage in case the husband neglects to maintain her, makes her life miserable by deserting or persistently maltreating her or absconds leaving her unprovided for and under certain other circumstances.

The absence of such a provision has entailed unspeakable misery to innumerable Muslim women in British India. The Hanafi Jurists however, have clearly laid down that in cases in which the application ofHanafi Law causes hardship, it is permissible to apply the provisions of the "Maliki, Shafii or Hambali Law".

Acting on this principle the Ulemas have issued fatwas to the effect that in cases enumerated in clause 3, Part A of this Bill (now see section 2 of the Act}, a married Muslim woman may obtain a decree dissolving her marriage. A lucid exposition of this principle can be found in the book called "Heelatun Najeza" published by Maulana Ashraf Ali Sahib who has made an exhaustive study of the provisions of Maliki Law which wider the circumstances prevailing in India may be applied to such cases. This has been approved by a large number of Ulemas who have put their seals of approval on the book. As the Courts are sure to hesitate to apply the Maliki Law to the case of a Muslim woman, legislation recognizing and enforcing the above mentioned principle is called for in order to relieve the sufferings of countless Muslim women. One more point remains in connection with the dissolution of marriages. It is this. The Courts in British India have held in a number of cases that the apostasy of a married Muslim woman ipso facto dissolves her marriage. This view has been repeatedly

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ' [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI]

challenged at the bar, but the Courts continue to stick to A precedents created by rulings based on an erroneous view of the Muslim Law. The Ulemas have issued Fatwas supporting non-dissolution of marriage by reason of wife's apostasy, The Musliin community has, again and again, given expression to its supreme dissatisfaction with the view held by the Courts. Any B , number of articles have been appearing in the press demanding legislation to rectify the mistake committed by the Courts; henci: clause 5 (now see section 4) is proposed to be incorporated in this Bill. . Thus, by this Bill the whole Law relating to dissolution ofmarriages is brought at one place and consolidated in the hope that it would supply a very long felt want of the Muslim Community in India". 26. The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 provided, the grounds on which a Muslim woman, could seek dissolution of marriage. Section 2 of the enactment is reproduced below: .'

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"2. Grounds for decree for dissolution of marriage.-A woman married under Muslim law shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on any one or more of the following grounds, namely:(i) that the where~bouts of the husband have not been known for a period of four years;

(ii) that the husband has neglected or has failed to provide for her maintenance for a period of two years; (iii) that the husband has been sentenced to imprisonment for a period of seven years or upwards; (iv) that the husband has failed to perform, without reasonable cause, his marital obligations for a period of three years; (v) that the husband was impotent at the time of the marriage and continues to be so; (vi) that the husband has been insane for a period of two years or is suffering from leprosy or virulent venereal disease;

(vii) that she, having been given in marriage b/her father or other guardian before she attained the age of fifteen years, repudiated the marriage before attaining the age of eighteen years: H

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Provided that the marriage has not been consummated;

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(viii) that the husband treats her with crnelty, that is to say,-

(a) habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable by cruelty of conduct even if such conduct Cloes not amount to physical illtreatrnent, or (b) associates with women of evil repute or leads an infamous life, or

(c) attempts to force her to lead an immoral life, or

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(d) disposes of her property or prevents. her exercising her legal rights over it, or (e) obstrncts her in the observance of her religious profession or practice, or

(t) ifhe has more wives than one, does not treat her equitably in accordance with the injunctions of the Quran;

(ix) on any other ground which is recognised as valid for the dissolution of marriages under Muslim law: Provided thatE

(a) no decree shall be passed on ground (iii) until the sentence has become final; (b) a decree passed on ground (i) shall not take effect for a period of six months from the date of such decree, and if the husband appears either in person or through an authorised agent within that period and satisfies the Court that he is prepared to ' perform his conjugal duties, the Court shall set aside the said decree; and (c) before passing a decree on ground (v) the Court shall, on application by the husband, make an order requiring the husband to satisfy the Court within a period of one year from the date of such order that he has ceased to be impotent, and if the husband so satisfies the Court within such period, no decree shall be passed on the said ground."

27. We may record here, that the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, is irrelevant for the present controversy on account of the H fact, that the issue in hand does not pertain to the dissolution of marriage

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] at the behest of a Muslim wife (but pertains to the dissolution of marriage, at the behest of a Muslim husband). The provisions of the instant enactment are relevant, to understand the submissions advanced by learned counsel, representing the petitioners, as also the respondents, based on their individual perspectives,

Part-5.

Abrogation of the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat' by legislation, the world over, ill Islamic, as well as. non-Islamic States: 28. 'Muslim Law in India and Abroad', by Tahir Mahmood and Saif Mahmood (Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 2012 edition), records the following position about the abrogation of the c practice of 'talaq-e-biddat' as a means of divorce, through statutory enactments, the world over. The cmmtries which have abolished 'talaqe-biddat' have been divided into Arab States, Southeast Asian States, and Subcontinental States. We have maintained the above classifications, in order to establish their factual positions. Firstly, to demonsfrate.that D the practice was prevalent across the globe in States having sizeable Muslim populations. And secondly, that the practice has been done away with, by way of legislation, in the countries referred to below. A. Laws of Arab States

(i) Algeria: Is a theocratic State, which declares Islam to be its official religion. Muslims of the Sunni sect constitute its majority. On the issue in hand, it has enacted the following legislation:

Code ofFamily Law 1984 Law No.84-11 of 1984 as amended in 2005

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"Article 49. Divorce cannot be established except by a judgment of the court, preceded by an attempt at reconciliation for a period not exceeding three months. '·' (ii) Egypt: Is a secular State. Muslims of the Sunni sect constitute its majority. On the issue in hand, it has enacted the following legislation:

Law of Personal Status 1929 Law 25 of 1929 as amended by Law 100 of 1985 "Article 1. A Talaq pronounced under the effect of intoxication or compulsion shall not be effective;

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Article 2. A conditional Talaq which is not meant to take effect immediately shall have no effect if it is used as an inducement to do some act or to abstain from it.

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Article 3. A Talaq accompanied by a number, expressly or impliedly, shall not be effective except as a single revocable divorce. Article 4. Symbolic expressions oftalaq, i.e., words which may or may not bear the implication of a divorce, shall not effect a divorce unless the husband actually intended it."

(iii) Iraq: Is a theocratic State, which declares Islam to be its official C religion. The majority oflraq's Muslims is Shias. On the issue in hand, it has enacted the following legislation: Code of Personal Status 1959 Law 188 of 1959 as amended by Law 90 of 1987

"Article 35. No divorce shall be effective when pronounced by the persons mentioned below: (a) one who is intoxicated, insane or imbecile, tmder duress, or not in his senses due to anger, sudden calamity, old age or sickness;

(b) a person in death-sickness or in a condition which in all probabilities is fatal and of which he actually dies, survived by his wife."

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Article 37. (1) Where a Talaq is coupled with a number, express or implied, not more than one divorce shall take place. (2) If a woman is divorced thrice on three separate occasions by her husband, no revocation or remarriage would be permissible afterthat. xxx

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·Article 39. (1) When a person intends to divorce his wife. he shall institute a suit in the Court of Personal Status requesting that it be effected and that an order be issued therefor. If a person cannot so approach the court, registration of the divorce in the court during the period oflddat shall be binding on him.

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SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] (2) The certificate of marriage shall remain valid till it is cancelled . by the court."

(iv) Jordan: Is a secular State. Muslims of the Sunni sect constitute its majority. On the issue in hand, it has enacted the following legislation: Code of Personal Statusl976

Law 61of1976 "Article 88. (1) Talaq shall not be effective if pronounced under intoxication, bewilderment, compulsion, mental disoroer, depression or effect of sleep. (2) 'Bewildered' is one who has lost senses due to' anger or provocation, etc., and cannot understand what he is saying!

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Article 90. A divorce coupled with a number. expressly or impliedly, as also a divorce repeated in the same sitting, will not take effect except as a single divorce.

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Article 94. Every divorce shall be revocable except the final third, one before consummation and one with consideration.

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Article 98. Where an irrevocable Talaq was pronounced once or twice, renewal of marriage with the consent of parties is not prohibited." ' · (v) Kuwait: Is a theocratic State, which declares Islam to be the official religion. Muslims of the Sunni sect constitute its majority. On the issue in hand, it has following legislation in place:

the

Code of Personal Status 1984 Law 51of1984 "Article 102. Talaq may be effected by major and sane men G acting by their free will and understanding the implications of their action. Therefore Talaq shall not take effect if the husband is mentally handicapped, imbecile, under coercion, mistake, intoxication, fear or high anger affecting his speech and action.

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A1ticle 109. If a Talag is pronounced with a number (two, three) by words, signs or writing, only one Talaq shall take effect."

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(vi) Lebanon: ls a secular State. Muslims constitute its majority, which is estimated to be 54%. (27% Shia, and 27% Sunni). On the issue in hand, it has enacted the following legislation:

Family Rights Law 1962 Law of 16 July 1962 "Article 104. A divorce by a drunk person shall.have no effect.

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Article 105. A divorce pronounced under coercion shall have no effect." (vii) Libya: Is a theocratic State, which declares Islam to be its official religion. Muslims of the Sunni sect constitute its majority. On the issue in hand, it has ~nacted the following legislation:

Family Law 1984 Law 10of1984 as amended by Law 15of1984 "Article 28. Divorce is termination of the marriage bond. No divorce will become effective in any case except by a decree of a competent court and subject to the provision of Article 30.

Article 29. Divorce is of two kinds - revocable and irrevocable. Revocable divorce does not terminate the marriage till the expiry oflddat. Irrevocable divorce terminates the marriage forthwith. Article 30. All divorces shall be revocable except a third-time divorce, one before consummation of marriage, one for a consideration, and those specified in this law to be irrevocable. Article 31. A divorce shall be effective only if pronounced in clear words showing intention to dissolve the marriage. Symbolic or metaphorical expression will not dissolve the marriage.

Article 32. A divorce pronounced by a minor or insane person, or if pronounced under coercion, or with no clear intention to dissolve the marriage, shall have no legal effect. Article 33. (1) A divorce meant to be effect on some action or omission of the wife shall have no legal effect.

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] (2) A divorce given with a view to binding the wife to an oath or A restrain her from doing something shall have no legal effect. (3) A divorce to which a nlimber is attached, by express words or a gesture, shall effect only a single revocable divorce, except when it is pronounced for the third time.

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Article 35. The marriage may be dissolved by mutual consent of the parties. Such a divorce must be registered with the court. If the parties cannot agree on the terms of such a divorce, they shall approach the court and it will .appoint arbitrators to settle the matter or reconcile them. ·C

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Article 47. A divorce must be pronounced in a court and in the presence of the other party or his or her representative. The court shall before giving effect to a divorce exhaust all possibilities of reconciliation."

(viii) Morocco: ls a theocratic State, which declares Islam to be its official religion. Muslims of the Sunni sect constituteits majority. On the issue in hand, it has enacted the following legislation: . . Code of Personal Status 2004

Law70.03 of2004 Article 79. Whoever divorces his wife by Talaq must petition the court for permission to register it with the Public Notaries of the area where the matrimonial home is situate, or where the wife resides, or where the marriage took place.

Article 80. The petition wiJI mention the identity of spouses, their professions, addresses, number of children, if any, with their age, · health condition and educational status .. It must be supported by a copy of the marriage. agreement and a document stating the liusband's social status and financial obl!gations.

Article 81. The court shall summon the spouses and attempt reconciliation. If the husband deliberately abstains. this will be deemed to be \Vithdrawal of the petition. If the wife abstains, the court will notify her that if she does not present herself the

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petition may be decided in her absence. If the husband has fraudulently given a wrong address for the wife, he may be prosecuted at her instance.

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Article 82. The court will hear the parties and their witnesses in camera and take all possible steps to reconcile them. including appointment of arbitrators or a family reconciliation council, and if there are children such efforts shall be exhausted within thirty days. If reconciliation takes place, a report will be filed with the court. Article 83. If reconciliation attempts fail, the court shall fix an amount to be deposited by the husband in the court within thirty days towards payment of the wife's post-divorce dues and maintena1ice of children. xxx

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Article 90. No divorce is permissible for a person who is not in his senses or is under coercion or provocation. xxx

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Article 92. Multiple expressions of divorce, oral or written, shall have the effect of a single divorce only.

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Article 123. Every divorce pronounced by the husband shall be revocable, except a third-time divorce, divorce before consummation of marriage, divorce by mutual consent, and divorce by Khula or Talaq-e-Tafweez.

(ix) Sudan: Is a theocratic State, which declares Islam to be its official religion. Muslims of the Sunni sect constitute its majority. On the issue in hand, it has the following legislation in place: Law on Talaq 1935

Judicial Proclamation No.4of1935 "Article 1. A divorce uttered in a state of intoxication or under duress shall be invalid and ineffective. Article 2. A contingent divorce which is not meant to be effective

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SHAYARA BANO v. · Ul'-llON OF INDIA AND OTHERS

[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] immediately and is used as an inducement or threat shall have not effect.

Article 3. A formula of divorce coupled with a number. expressly or impliedly. shall effect only one divorce. Article 4. Metaphorical expressions used for a divorce shall have B the effect of dissolving the marriage only if the husband actually meant a divorce." (x) Syria: Is a secular State. Muslims of the Swmi sect constitute its majority. On the issue in hand~ it has enacted the following legislation: Code of Personal Status '1953

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Law 59of1953 as amended by Law 34of1975 "Article 89. No divorce shall take place when the man is drunk, out of his senses, or under duress. A person is out of his senses when due to anger, etc. he does not appreciate what he says. Article 90. A conditional divorce shall have no effect ifnot actually intended and used only as an inducement to do or abstain from doing something or as an oatli or persuasion. If

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Article 92. If a divorce is coupled with a number. expressly or · impliedly, not more than one divorce shall take place.

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Article 94. Every divorce shall be revocable except a third-time divorce, one before consummation, a divorce with a consideration, and a divorce stated in this Code to be irrevocable.

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Article 111. Where a person divorces his wife the court may, if satisfied that he has arbitrarily done so without any reasonable cause and that as a result of the divorce the wife shall suffer G damage and become destitute, give a decision, with due regard to the husband's financial condition and the amount of wife's suffering, that he should pay her compensation not exceeding three years' maintenance, in addition to maintenance payable during the period oflddat. It may be directed to be paid either in

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a lump sum or in instalments as the circumstances of a case may · reqmre. (xi) Tunisia: ls a theocratic State, which declares Islam to be its official religion. Muslims of the Sunni sect constitute its majority. On the issue in hand, it has enacted the following legislation:

Code of Personal Status 1956 ·Law 13~8of1956 as amended by Law 7of1981

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"Article 31.( 1) A decree of divorce shall be given: (i) with the mutual consent of the parties; or (ii) at the instance of either party on the ground of injury; or (iii) if the husband insists on divorce or the wife demands it. The party causing material or mental injury by the fact of divorce under clauses {ii) and (iii) shall be directed to indemnify the aggrieved spouse. (2) As regards the woman to be indemnified for material injury in terms of money, the same shall be paid to her after the expiry oflddat and may be in the fonn ofretention of the matrimonial home. This indemnity will be subject to revision, increase or decrease in accordance with the changes in the circumstances of the divorced wife until she is alive or until she changes her marital status by marrying again. If the fonner husband dies, this indemnity will be a charge on his estate and will have to be met by his heirs if they consent to it and will be decided by the court if they· disagree. They may pay her in a lump sum within one year from the fonner husband's death the indemnity claimable by her. Article 32 (I) No divorce shall be decreed except after the court has made an overall inquiry into the causes of rift and failed to effect reconciliation.

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(2) Where no reconciliation is possible the court shall provide, even if not asked to, for all important matters relating to the residence of the spouses, maintenance and custody of children and meeting the children, except when the parties specifically agree to forgo all or any of these rights. The court shall fix the maintenance on the basis of all those facts which it comes to know while attempting reconciliation. All important matters shall

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS .

[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJi] be provided for in the decree, which shall be non-appeal able but · A can be reviewed for making additional provisions. (3) The court of first instance shall pass orders in the matters of . divorce and all concerning matters including the compensation . money to which the divorced wife may be entitled after the expiry of Iddat. The portions of the decree relating to custody, B maintenance, compensation, residence and right to visit children shall be executed immediately." . (xii) United Arab Emirates: ls a theocratic State, as the Federal Constitution declares Islam to be the official religion. The Constitution also provides for freedom of religion, in accordance with established customs. Muslims of the Shia sect constitute its majority. On the issue in hand, it has the following legislation in place:

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Law of Personal Status 2005 Federal LawNo.28 of2005 "Article 140(1). If a husband divorces his wife after. consummation of a valid marriage by .his unilateral action andwithout any move for divorce from her side, she will be entitled to compensation besides maintenance for Iddat. The amount of compensation will be decided with due regard to the means of · the husband and the hardship suffered _by the wife, but it shall E not exceed the amount of one year's maintenance payable in law to a woman of her status. .c

(2) The Kazi may decree the compensation, io be paid·as a lump sum or in instalments, according to the husband's ability to pay." (xiii) Yemen: ls a theocratic State, which declares Islam to be the official ·. religion. Muslims of the Sunni sect constitute its majority. On the issue in hand, it has the following legislation in place:

Decree on Personal Status 1992 'l

Decree 20 of 1992

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"Article 6 LA divorce shall not be effective if pronounced by a man who is drunk, or has lost his senses, or has n~ power of discernment, if this is shown by his condition and action. xxx

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Article 64. A divorce to which a number is attached, whatever be the number, will effect only a single revocable divorce.

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Article 65. The words saying that ifthe wife did or failed to do something she will stand divorced will not effect a divorce.

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Article 66. The words that if an oath or vow is broken it will effect a divorce will not dissolve the marriage even if the said oath or vow is broken. Article 67. A divorce can be revoked by the husband during the Iddat period. After the expiry of Iddat, a direct remarriage between them will be lawful. xxx

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Article 71. If a man arbitrarily divorces his wife without any reasonable ground and it causes· hardship to her, the court may grant her compensation payable by the husband not exceeding maintenance for one year in accordance with her status. The court may decide if the compensation will be paid as a lump sum or in instalments." B. Laws of Southeast Asian States

(i) Indonesia: The Constitution oflndonesia guarantees freedom of religion E among Indonesians. However, the Government recognizes only six official religions - Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Muslims of the Sunni sect constitute its majority. On the issue in hand, it has the following legislation in place:

(a) Law of Marriage 1974

Law 1 ofl974 "Article 38. A divorce shall be effected only in the court and the court shall not permit a divorce before attempting reconciliation betweenthe parties. Divorce shall be permissible only for sufficient reasons indicating breakdovm of marriage.

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Article 41. In the event of a divorce both the parents shall continue to be responsible for the maintenance of their children. As regards custody of children, in case of a dispute between

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ1] . .

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themthe court shall take a decision. Expenses of maintenance A ·and education shall be primarily the father's liability, but ifhe is unable to discharge this liability the court may transfer it to the mother. The court may also direct the former husband to pay alimony to the divorced wife." (b)MarriageRegulations 1975

Regul;ition 9of1975 "Article 14. A man married under Islamic law wanting to divorce his wife shall by a letter notify his intention to the District Court seeking proceedings for that purpose. Article 15: On receiving a letter the court shall, within thirty . days, summon the parties and gather from them all relevant facts.

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Article 16. If the court is satisfied of the existence of any of the grounds mentioned in Article 19 below and is convinced that no reconciliation between the parties is possible it will allow a D divorce. Article 17. Immediately after allowing a divorce as laid down in . Article 16 above the court shall issue a certificate of divorce and send it to the Registrar for registration of the divorce.

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"'Article 19. A divorce ri-tay be allo;wed on the petition of either . party if the other party: (a) has committed adultery or become addict to alcohol, drugs, gambling or another serious vice; · (b) has deserted the aggrieved party for two years or more without

any legal ground and against the said party's will;.·. (c) has been imprisoned for at least five years; (d) has tre~ted the ag~rieved party with cmelty of an injurious nature; ·G

(e) has been suffering from a physical deformity affecting conjugal duties, or whete relations between the spouses have become too much strai~~d making r~conciliation impossible.'.' .

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(ii) Malaysia: Under the Constitution of Malaysia, Islam is the official religion of the country, but other religions are permitted to be practiced in peace and harmony. Muslims of the Sunni sect constitute its majority. On the issue in hand, it has the following legislation in place: Islamic Family Law Act 1984

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Act 304of1984 "Article 47. (1) A husband or a wife who desires a divorce shall present an application for divorce to the court in the prescribed form accompanied by a statutory declaration containing (a) particulars of the marriage and the name, ages and sex of the children, if any, of the marriage; (b) particulars of the facts giving the court jurisdiction under Section 45; (c) particulars of any previous matrimonial proceedings between the parties, including the place of the proceedings; (d) a statement as to the reasons for desiring divorce; (e) a statement as to whether any, and if so, what steps have been taken to effect reconciliation; (t) the terms of any agreement regarding maintenance and habitation of the wife and the children of the marriage, if any, and the division of any assets acquired through the joint effort of the parties, if any, or where no such agreement has been reached, the applicant's proposals regarding those matters; and (g) particulars of the order sought. (2) Upon receiving an application for divorce, the court shall cause summons to be served on the other party together with a copy of the application and the statutory decla'.raiion made by the applicant, and the summons shall direct the other party to appear before the court so as to enable it to inguire whether or not the other party consents to the divorce. (3) If the other party consents to the divorce and the com1 is satisfied after due inquiry and investigation that the marriage has irretrievably broken down, the court shall advise the husband to pronounce one Talaq before the court. (4) The com1 shall record the fact of the pronouncement of one Talag and shall send a certified copy of the record to the appropriate Registrar and to the Chief Registrar for registration.

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(5) Where the other party does not consent to the divorce or it

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] appears to the court that there is reasonable possibility of a A reconciliation between the parties, the court shall as soon as possible appoint a Conciliatory Committee consisting of a religious officer as Chairman and two other persons, one to act for the husband and the other for the wife, and refer the case to the Committee.

(6) In appointing the two persons under sub-section (5) the court shall, where possible, give preference to close relatives of the parties having knowledge of the circumstances of the case. (7) The court may give directions to the Conciliat01y Committee . as to the conduct of the conciliation and it shall conduct it in accordance with such directions.

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(8) If the Committee is unable to agree or if the court is not satisfied with its conduct of the conciliation, the cotut may remove the Committee and appoint another Committee in its place. (9) The Committee shall endeavour to effect reconciliation within D a period of six .months from the date of its being constituted or such further period as may be allowed by the court. (10) The Committee shall require the attendance of the parties and shall give each of them an opportunity of being heard and may hear such other persons and make such inquiries as it thinks fit and may, ifit considers it necessary, adjourn its proceedings from time to time. ( 11) If the Conciliatory Committee is unable to effect reconciliation and is unable to persuade the parties to resume · their conjugal relationship, it shall issue a certificate to that effect and may append to the certificate such recommendations as it thinks fit regarding maintenance and custody of the minor children of the marriage, if any, regarding division of pro perry and other matters related to the marriage. (12) No advocate and solicitor shall appear or act for any party in any proceeding before a Conciliatory Committee and no party shall be represented by any person other than a member of his or her family without the leave of the Conciliatory Committee.

(13) Where the Committee reports to the court that reconciliation has been effected and the parties have resumed their conjugal H

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relationship, the court shall dismiss the application for divorce. (14) Where the Committee submits to the-court a certificate that

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it is unable to effect reconciliation and to persuade the parties to resume the conjugal relationship, the court shall advise the husband to pronounce one Talaq before the court, and where the court is, unable to procure the presence of the husband before the court to pronounce one Talaq, or where the husband refuses to pronounce one Talaq, the court shall refer the case to the Hakams [arbitrators] for action according to section48. (15) The requirement of sub-section (5) as to reference to a Conciliatory Committee shall not apply in any case (a) where the applicant alleges that he or she has been deserted by an does not know the whereabouts of the other party; (b) where the other party is residing outside West Malaysia and it is unlikely that he or she will be within the jurisdiction of the court within six months after the date of the application; (c) where the other party is imprisoned for a term of three years or more; (d) where the applicant alleges that the other party is suffering from incurable mental illness; or (e) where the cowi is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances which make reference to a Conciliatory Committee impracticable.

(16) Save as provided in sub-section(! 7), a Ialaq pronounced by the husband or an order made by the court shall not be effective until the expiry of the Iddat. (17) If the wife is pregnant at the time the Talaq is pronounced · or the order is made, the Ta lag or the order shall not be effective yntil the pregnancy ends." (iii) Philippines: ls a secular State. Christians constitute its majority. On

the issue in hand, it has the following legislation in place: Code of Muslim Personal Law 1977

Decree No. I 083 of 1977 "Article 46. (1) A divorce by Talaq may be effected by the husband in a single repudiation of his wife during her Tuhr [nonmenstrual period] within which he has totally abstained from carnal relations with her.

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] (2) Any number of repudiations made during one Tuhr [nonmenstrual period] shall constitute only one repudiation and shall become irrevocable after the expiration of the prescribed Iddat. (3) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or second time, shall have the right to take her back within the Iddat period by resumption of cohabitation without need of a new contract of marriage. Should he fail to do so, the repudiation shall become irrevocable. xxx

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Article 85. Within seven days after the revocation of a divorce the husband shall, with the wife's consent, send a statement thereof to the Circuit Registrar in whose records the divorce was previously entered. '

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Article 161. (1) A Muslim male who has pronounced a Talaq shall, without delay, file with the Clerk of the Sharia Circuit Court of the place where his family resides a written notice of such fact and the circumstances attending thereto, after having served a copy to the wife concerned. The Talaq pronounced shall not become irrevocable until after the expiration of the prescribed Iddat. (2) Within seven days from receipt of notice the Clerk of the Court shall require each of the parties to nominate a representative. The representatives. shall be appointed by the court to constitute, with the Clerk of the Court as Chairman, an Agama [religious scholars] Arbitration Council which shall try and submit to the court a report on the result of arbitration on the basis of which. and such other evidence as may be allowed, the court will pass an order. (3) The provisions of this Article will be observed if the wife exercises right to Talaqce-Tafweez. xxx

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Article 183; A person who fails to comply with the requirements of Article 85, 161and162 of this Code shall be penalized by

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imprisonment or a fine of two hundred to two thousand Pesos, or both."

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C. Laws of Sub-continental States (i) Pakistan & Bangladesh: Are both theocratic States, wherein Islam is the official religion. In both countries Muslims of the Sunni sect constitute B the majority. On the issue in hand, it has the following legislation in place: Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961

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Ordinance VIII of 1961 amended in Bangladesh by Ordinance (Bangladesh changes noted below relevant provisions)

"Section 7. (1) Any man who wishes to divorce his wife shall, as soon as may be after the pronouncement ofTalag in any form whatsoever, give the Chairman a notice in writing of his having done so, and shall supply a copy thereof to the wife. (2) Whoever contravenes the provision of sub-section (1) shall be punishable with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.

[Bangladesh: ten thousand taka] (3) Save as provided in sub-section (5), a Talaq unless revoked· earlier, expressly or otherwise, shall not be effective until the expiration of ninety days from the day on which notice under subsection ( l) is delivered to the Chairman. (4) Within thirty days of the receipt of notice under sub-section (1) the Chairman shall constitute an Arbitration Council for the pur:pose of bringing about reconciliation between the parties, and the Arbitration council shall take all steps necessary to bring about such reconciliation.

(5) If the wife be pregnant at the time Talag is pronounced, Talaq shall not be effective until the period mentioned in subsection (3) or of pregnancy, whichever is later, ends. (6) Nothing shall debar a wife whose marriage has been terminated byTalaq effective under this section from re-marrying

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] ,

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the same husband without any intervening marriage with a third A . person, unless such termination is for the third time so effective." (ii) Sri Lanka: Is a secular State. Buddhists constitute its majority. On the issue in hand,. it has the following legislation in place: Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act 1951

Act 6 of 1951 as amended by Act 40 of 2006 "Section 17 (4) Save as otherwise hereinafter expressly provided, every marriage contracted between Muslims after the commencement of this Act shall be registered, as hereinafter provided, immediately upon the conclusion of the Nikah ceremony connected therewith.

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(5) In the case of each such marriage, the duty of causing it to be registered is hereby imposed upon the following persons concerned in the marriage; (a) the bridegroom, (b) the guardian of the bride, and (c) the person who conducted the Nikah D . ceremony connected with the marriage. Section 27. Where a husband desires to divorce his wife the procedure laid down in Schedule II shall be followed." (2) Where a wife desires to effect a divorce from her husband on any ground not referred to in sub-section (1), being a divorce of any description permitted to a wife by the Muslim law governing the sect to which the parties belong, the procedure laid down in the Schedule Ill shall be followed so far as the nature of the divorce claimed in each case renders it possible or necessary to follow that procedure.

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29. 'Talaq-e-biddat' is effective, the very moment it is pronounced. It is irrevocable when it is pronounced. Part-6;

Judicial pronouncements, on the subject of 'talag-e-biddat': 30. Rashid Ahmad v. Anisa Khatun 1•

(i) The facts: The primary issue that came to be adjudicated in the above case, pertained to the validity of 'talaq-e-biddat' pronounced by Ghiyasud-din, a Sunni Mohomedan of the Hanafi school, to his wife Anisa I

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A Khatun -respondent no. I. The marriage of the respondent with Ghiyasud-din had taken place on 28.08.1905. Ghiyas-ud-din divorced her on or abqut 13. 09 .1905. Ghiyas-ud-din pronounced triple talaq, in the presence of witnesses, though in the absence of his wife - Anisa Khatun. Respondent no. I - Anisa Khatun received Rs. I ,000 in payment of 'dower' on the same day, which was confirmed by a registered receipt. Thereafter, Ghiyas-ud-din executed a 'talaqnama' (decree of divorce) dated l 7 .09.1905, which narrates the divorce. The 'talaqnama' is alleged to have been given to Anisa Khatun - respondent no. I. (ii) The challenge: Anisa Khatun - respondent no.I, challenged the validity of the divorce, firstly, for the reason, that she was not present at C the time of pronouncement of divorce. And secondly, that even after the aforestated pronouncement, cohabitation had continued and subsisted for a further period of fifteen years, i.e., till the death of Ghiyas-ud-din. In the interregnun1, five children were born to Ghiyas-ud-din and Anisa Khatun. According to Anisa Khatun, Ghiyas-ud-din continued to treat D Anisa Khatun - respondent no.I, as his wife, and the children born to her, as his legitimate children. It was also the case of respondent no. I, thil;t the payment of Rs.1,000, was a payment of prompt dower, and as such, not payment in continuation of the 'talaq-e-biddat', pronounced by Ghiyas-ud-din.

(iii) The consideration: While considering the validity of the 'talaq-ebiddat' pronounced on 13.09.1905, and the legitimacy of the children born to Anisa Khatun, the Privy Council held as under: "I5. Their Lordships·are of opinion that the pronouncement of the triple talak by Ghiyas-ud-din constituted an immediately effective divorce, and, while they are satisfied that the High Court were not justified in such a conclusion on the evidence in the present case, they are of opinion that the validity and effectiveness of the divorce would not be affected by Ghiyas-ud-din's mental intention that it should not be a genuine divorce, as such a view is contrary to all authority. A talak actually pronounced under compulsion or in jest is valid and effective: Baillie's Digest, 2nd edn., p. 208;Ameer Ali'sMohammedan Law, 3rdedn., vol. ii, p. 518; Hamilton's Hedaya, vol. i, p. 2 I I. I 6. The respondents sought to found on the admitted fact that for about fifteen years after the divorce Ghiyas-ud-din treated

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

' [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] Anisa Fatima as his wife and his children as legitimate. and on certain admissions of their status said to have been made by appellant No. 1 and respondent pro forma No. 10, who are brothers of Ghiyas-ud-din. but once the divorce is held proved such facts could not undo its effect or confer such a status on .the respondents.

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17. While admitting that, upon divorce by the triple talak, Ghiyas~ ud-din could not lawfully remarry Anisa Fatima until she had married another and the latter had divorced her or died, the respondents maintained that the acknowledgment of their legitimacy by Ghiyas-ud-din, subsequent to the divorce, raised C the presumption that Anisa Fatima had in the interval married another, who had died or divorced her, and that Ghiyas-ud-din had married her again, and that it was for the appellants to displace that presumption. In support of this contention, they founded on · certain dicta in the judgment of this Board in Habibur Rahman Chowdhury v. Altaf Ali Chowdhury L.R.48 I.A: 114. Their D Lordships find it difficult to regard this contention as a serious . one, for these dicta directly negative it. The passage relied on, which related to indirect proof of Mahomedan marriage by . acknowledgment of a son as a legitimate son is as follows: "It must not be impossible upon the face of it, i.e., it must not be made when the ages are such that if'is impossible in nature for E the acknowledgor to be the father of the ac~owledgee, or when the mother spoken to in an acknowledgment, being the wife of another, or within prohibited degrees ofthe acknowledgor, it would be apparent that the issue would be the issue of adultery or incest. The acknowledgment may be repudiated by the acknowledgee. f But if none of these objections occur, then the acknowledgment has more than evidential value. It raises _a prestlmption of · marriage - a presumption which may be taken advantage of either by a wife-claimant or a son-claimant. Bei~g, however, a presumption of fact, and not juris et de jure, it is, like every other presumption of fact capable of being set aside by contrary proof. G

18. The legal bar to re-marriage created by the divorce in the present case would equally prevent the raising of the presumption. If the respondents had proved the removal of that bar by proving . · the marriage of Anisa Fatima to another after the divorce and

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the death of the latter or his divorce of her prior to the birth of the children and their acknowledgment as legitimate, the respondents might then have had the benefit of the presumption, but not otherwise.

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19. Their Lordships are, therefore, of opinion that the appeal should be allowed, that the decree of the High Court should be reversed, and that the decree of the Subordinate Judge should be restored, the appellants to have the costs of his,appeal and their costs in the High Court. Their Lordships \Viii humbly advise His Majesty accordingly." (iv) The conclusion: The Privy Council, upheld as valid, 'talaq-e-biddat' triple talaq, pronounced by the husband, in the absence and without the knowledge of the wife, even though the husband and wife continued to cohabit for 15 long years thereafter, wherefrom 5 offsprings were born ~fu~ . 31. Jiauddin Ahmed v. Anwara Begµm 2• (Single Judge judgment, authored by Baharul Islam, J., as he then was). (i) The facts: The respondent - Anwara Begum had petitioned for maintenance, under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Her contention was; that she had lived with her husband for about 9 months, after her marriage. During that 'p1;riod, her marriage \Vas consummated~ Anwara Begum alleged, that after the above 'period, her husband began to torture her, and :even ·ustid t'o heather: It ~as therefore, that she was ~ompelled ib 'leave liis ~.ompany, an" start living with her father, who was a <la/labourer. Maintenance was duly granted, by the First Class Magistrate, Tinsukia. Her husband, the petitioner - Jiauddin Ahmed, contested the respondent's claim for maintenance, before the Gauhati High Court, on the ground that he had divorced her, by pronouncing divorce by adopting the procedure of 'talaq~e-biddat'. (iii) The challenge: It is in the above circumstances, that the validity of 'talaq-e-biddat'., and the wife'.s entitlement to U}aintenaqce came to be considered by the •Guahati ·High Gourt,;which e;xamjned the . I ' validity of the ccmcept of 'tiµaq-e-b,iddat'. ,· '. ~· . . .._ ~

(iv) The consideration; 'c~) The High c6urt placed reliance ori 'verses' 128 to 130, contained in 'section' 19, of 'sura' lV, and 'verses' 229 to

'(1981) 1 Gau.LR. 358

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

(JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] 232, contained in 'sections' 29 and 30 of 'sura' II, and thereupon, A referred to the commentary on the above verses by scholars (Abdullah Yusuf Ali and Maulana Mohammad Ali) and the views of jurists (Ameer Ali and Fyzee), with pointed reference to 'talaq', which was narrated as under: "Islam tried to maintain the married state as far as possible, B especially where children are concerned, but it is against the restriction of the liberty of men and women in such vitally important matters as love and family life. It will check hasty action as far as possible and leave the door to reconciliation open at many stages. Even after divorce a suggestion of reconciliation is made, subject to certain precautions against thoughtless action. C A period of waiting (Iddat) for three monthly courses is prescribed, in order to see ifthe marriage conditionally dissolved is likely to · result in issue. But this is not necessary where the divorced woman is a virgin. It is definitely declared that women and men shall have similar 1ights against each other.· Yusuf Ali has further observed: "Where divorce for mutual incompatibility is allowed, there is danger that the parties might act hastily, then repent, and again wish to separate. To prevent such capricious action repeatedly, a limitis prescribed. Two divorces (with a reconciliation between) E are allowed. After that the parties must unitedly make up their minds, either to dissolve their union permanently, or to live honourable lives together in mutual love and for-bearance to 'hold together on equitable terms, 'neither party worrying the other nor grumbling nor evading the duties and responsibilities 9f F marriage". · YusufAli proceeds: "All the prohibitions and limits prescribed here are in the intere~ts of good and honourable lives for both sides, and in the interests of a clean and honourable social life, without public or private scandals ... "

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"Two divorces followed by re-union are permissible; the third time the divorce becomes irrevocable, until the woman marries

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some other man and he divorces her. This is to set an almost impossible condition. The lesson is: if a man loves a woman he should not allow a sudden gust of temper or anger to induce him to take hasty action ...

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If the man takes back his wife after two divorces, he must do so only on equitable terms, i.e. he must not put pressure on the woman to prejudice her rights in any way, and they must live clean and honourable lives, respecting each other's personalities ... "

The learned Commentator further observes :

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"The termination of a marriage bond is a most serious matter for family and social life. An every lawful device is approved which can equitably bring back those who have lived together, provided only there is mutual love and they can live on honourable terms with each other. If these conditions are fulfilled, it is no right for out-siders to prevent or hinder re-union. They may be swayed byproperty or other considerations." (b) The High Court also placed reliance on 'verse' 35 contained in 'section' 6, of 'sura' IV, and again referred to the commentary on the above 'verse' (by Abdullah YusufAli), who had interpreted the same as under: "An excellent plan for settling family disputes, without too much publicity or mud-throwing, or resort to the chicaneries of the law. The Latin countries recognise this plan in their legal system. It is a pity that Muslims do not resort to it universally, as they should. The arbiters from each family would know the idiosyncrasies of both pai1ies, and would be able, with God's help, effect areal reconciliation." Maulana Mohammad Ali has commented on the above verse thus:

"This verse lays down the procedure to be adopted when a case for divorce arises. It is not for the husband to put away his wife; it is the business of the judge to decide the case. Nor should the divorce case be made too public. The Judge is required to appoint two arbi-trators, one belonging to the wife's family and the other to the husband's. These two arbitrafors will find out the facts but

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CH] their objective must be to effect a recOJ)Ci-liation between the A parties. If all hopes ofreconciliation fail, a divorce is allowed. ·But the final decision rests with the judge who is legally entitled · . to pronounce a divorce. Cases.were decided in accordance with . the direc-tions contained in this verse in the early days of Islam." . The same learned author commenting on the above verse (IV: 35) in his the Religion oflslam has observed: ,. "From what has been said above, it is clear that not only must there be a good cause for divorce, but that all means to effect . reconciliation must have been exhaus-ted before resort is had to this extreme measure. The impression that a Muslim husband may put away his wife at his mere caprice, is a grave distortion of the Islamic institution of divorce."

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Fyzee denounces talaq as "absurd and unjust". Abdur Rahim says: "I may remark that the interpretation of the. law of divorce by D the jurists, specially of the Hanafi School, is one flagrant instance where because of literal adherence to mere words and a certain tendency towards subtleties they have reached a result in direct antagonism to the admitted policy of the law on the subject." 12. Mohammad Ali has observed:-

"Divorce is thus discouraged: 'If you hate' them (i.e. your wives). it may be that you dislike a thing while Allah has plac,ed abundant good in it." Remedies are also suggested to avoid divorce so long as possible:

"And if you fear a breach between the two (i.e. the husband arid the wife), then appoint a judge from his people and a judge from her people; if they both desire agreement, Allah will effect harmony between them.

It was due to such teachings of the Holy Quran that the Holy

Prophet declared divorce to be the most hateful of all things G permitted.... The mentality of the Muslim is to face the difficulties of the married life along with its comforts and to avoid disturbing the disruption of the family relations as long as possible, turning to divorce only as a last resort." The learned author has further . observed:

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"The principle of divorce spoken of in the Holy Quran and which in fact includes to a greater or less extent all causes, is the decision no longer to live together as husband and wife. In fact, marriage itself is nothing but an agreement to live together as husband and wife and when either of the parties finds him or herselfunable to agree to such a life, divorce must follow. It is not, of course, meant that every disagreement between them would lead to divorce; it is only the disagreement to live any more as husband and wife ..!' He then refers to the condition laid down in Sura IV verse 35.

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The learned author proceeds: "The 'shiqaq' or breach of the marriage agreement may also arise from the conduct of either party; for in-stance, if either of. them misconducts himself or herself~ or either of them is consistently cruel to the other, or, as may sometimes happen there is incompatibility of temperament to such an extent that they cannot live together in marital agreement. The 'shiqaq' in these cases is more express, but still it will depend upon the parties whether they can pull on or not. Divorce must always follow when one of the parties finds it impossible to continue the marriage agreement and is compelled to break it off.At first sight it may look like giving too much latitude to the parties to allow them to end the marriage contract thus, eyen if there is no reason except incompatibility of temperament, but this much is certain that if there is such disagreement that the husband and the wife cannot pull together, it is better for themselves, for their offspr-ing and for society in general that they should be sepa-rated than that they should be compelled to live toge-ther. No home is worth the name wherein instead of peace there is wrangling; and marriage is meaningless if there is no spark of love left between the hus~and and the wife. It is an error to suppose that such lati-tude tends to destroy the stability of marriage, because marriage is entered into as a permanent and sacred relation based on love between a man and a woman, and divorce is only a remedy when marriage fails to fulfill its object." With regard to the husband's right of pronouncing divorce the learned author has found;

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI]

"Though the Holy Quran speaks of the divorce being pronounced A by the husband, yet a limitation is placed upon the exercise of .. · this right." He then refers to the procedure laid down in Sura IV Verse 35 quoted above, and says : "It will be seen that in all disputes between the hus-band and the wife, which it is feared will lead to a breach, two judges are to be appointed from the· respec-tive people of the two parties~

These judges are required first to try to reconcile the parties to each other, failing which divorce is to be effected .. Therefore, though it is the husband who pronounces the divor\:e, he is as c much bound by the decision of the judges, as is the wife. This shows that the husband cannot repudiate the marriage at will. The case must first be referred tO two judges and their decision is binding.; ....The Holy Prophet is reported to have interfered and disallowed a divorce pronounced by a husband, restoring ·the marital relations (Bu. 68: 2). It was no doubt matter of D procedure, but it shows that the authority constituted by law has the right to interfere in matters of divorce." The learned author has further observed:

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"Divorce may be given oraUy, or in writing, but it must take place in the presence ofwitnesses."

(iv) The conclusion: Based on the Quranic verses referred to above, the High Court concluded as under: "13. A perusal of the Quranic verses quoted above and the commentaries thereon· by· well-recognized Scholars of great · F · · · . eminence like Mahammad Ali and Yusuf Ali an:d .the pronounce-ments of great jurists like AmeerAJi and Fyzee . completely rule out the observation ofMacnaghten that "there is . no occasion for any particular cause for divorce, and mere whim· is sufficient", and the observation ofBatchelor, J. (ILR 30 Born. G 537) that "the whimsical and capricious divorce by the husband is good in law, though bad in theology". These observations have been based on the concept that women were chattal belonging to men, which the Holy Quran does not brook. Costello, J. In .59 Calcutta 833 has not, with respect, laid down the correct Jaw of · talaq. In my view the correct law of talaq as ordained by the H

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Holy Quran is that talaq must be for a reasonable cause and be preceded by attempts at reconciliation between the husband and the wife by two arbiters-one from the wife's family the other from the husband's. If the attempts fail, talaq may be effected.

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16. In the instant case the petitioner merely alleged in his written statement before the Magistrate that he had pronounced talaq to the opposite party; but he did not examine himself, nor has he adduced any evidence worth the nan1e to prove 'talaq'. There is no proof of talaq, or its registration. Regis-tration of marriage and divorce under the Assam Muslim Marriages and Divorces Registration Act, 1935 is voluntary, and unilateral. Mere registration of divorce (or marriage) even ifproved, will not render valid divorce which is otherwise invalid under Muslim Law."

A perusal of the conclusion recorded by the High Court, through the D above observations, leaves no room for any doubt, that the 'talaq-ebiddat' pronounced by the husband without reasonable cause, and without being preceded by attempts of reconciliation, and without the involvement of arbitrators with due representation on behalf of the husband and wife, would not lead to a valid divorce. The High Court also concluded, that the petitioner- Jiauddin Ahmed, had mainly E alleged that he had pronounced talaq, but had not established the factum of divorce by adducing any cogent evidence. Having concluded, that the marriage between the parties was subsisting, the High Court upheld the order awarding maintenance to the wife Anwara Begum.

32. Must. Rukia Khatun v. Abdul Khaligue Laskar3, (Division Bench judgment, authored by Baham! Islam. CJ., as he then was).

(i) The facts: Rukia Khatun was married to Abdul Khalique Laskar. The couple lived together for about 3 months, after their marriage. During that period, the marriage was consummated. Rukia Khatun G alleged, that after the above period, her husband abandoned and neglected her. She was allegedly not provided with any maintenance, and as such, had been living in penury, for a period of about 3 months, before she moved an application for grant of maintenance. The petitioner's application for maintenance filed under Section 125 of

'(1981) I Gau. L.R. 375

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SHA.YARA BANO v. tJNIQN. OF INDIA AND OTHERS

[JAGDISH SINGHKI-iEHAR, CJI] .

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. the Code of Criminal Procedure, was rejected by the Sub-Divisional A Judicial Magistrate, Hailakandi. She challenged the order rejecting her claim of maintenance, before the Gauhati High Court. The respondent-husband -Abdul Khalique Laskar, contested the claim for maintenance by asserting, that even though he had married the petitioner, but he had divorced her on 12.4. i 972 by way of 'talaq-eB biddat', and had thereafter even executed a tal.aknama. The,,husband also asserted, that he had paid dower to the petitioner. The claim of the petitioner-wife for maintenance was declined on the ground, that she had been divorced by the respondent-husband. {ii) The challenge: It is in the above circumstances, that the validity C of the divorce pronounced by the responderit-husband, by way of 'talaq-e-biddat', and the wife's entitlement to maintenance, came up for consideration. · · {iii) The consideration: The Gauhati High Court recorded the following observations in respect of the validity of 'talaq' pronounced by the respondent~husband, on 12.4.1972. ·D

ii

"7. The first point to be decided, therefore, is whether the opposite party divorced the Petitioner. The equivalent of the word 'divorce' is 'talaq' in Muslim Law. What is valid 'talaq' in Muslim law was considered by one of us (Baharul Islam, J. as he then was) sitting singly in Criminal Revision No. 199/77 (supra). The word E 'talaq' carri.es the literal significance of'freeing' or 'the undoing of knot'. 'Talaq' means divorce of a woman by her husband. Under the Muslim law marriage is a Civil contract. Yet the rights and responsibilities consequent upon itare of such importance to the welfare of the society that a high degree of sanctity is attached F .. to it. But in spite of the sacredness ofthe character of the : marriagetic, Islam recognizes the necessity in exceptional · circumstances of keeping the way open for its dissolution. There has been a goo'd deal of misconception of the institution of 'talaq' under the Muslim law. From the Holy Qiiran and: the ... G ... · · Hadis, it appears that though divorce was permitted, yet theright could be exercised only under exceptional circumstances: The Holy Prophet is reported to have said: "Never did Allah allow anything more hateful to Him than "divorce." According fo a . report of Ibn Umilr, the Prophet said: "With Allah the most.·

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detestable of all things permitted is divorce". (See the Religion . of Islam by Maulana Muhammed Ali at page 671 ). In the cafe of Ahmed Kasim Molla v. Khatun Bibi reported in ILR Cal 833, which has so long been regarded as a leading case 011 the law of divorce, Justice Costello held:

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"Upon that point (divorce), there are a number of authorities and I have carefully considered this point as dealt with in the very early authorities to see whether I am in agreement with the mere recent decisions of the Courts. I regret that I have to come to the conclusion that at the law stands at present, any Mohamedan may divorce his wife at his mere whim and caprice." Following Macnaghten, J. who held: "there is no occasion for any particular cause for divorce, and mere whim is sufficient," and Batchelor, J, in case ofSarabai v. Babiabai (ILR 30 Bombay 537) Costello, J. held:-

"It is good in law, though bad in theology." Ameer Ali, in his Treatise on Mahomedan Law has observed: "The Prophet pronounced talaq to be a most destable thing before the Almighty God of all permitted things.

lf'talaq' is given without any reason it is stupidity and ingratitude to God." The learned Author in the same book has also observed

"The author of the Multeka (Ibrohim Halebi) is more concise. He says-'The law gives to the man primarily the power of dissolving the marriage, ifthe wife, by her indocility or her bad character, renders the married life unhappy; but in the absence · of serious reasons, no Musalrnan can justify a divorce either in the eyes of the religion or the law. Ifhe abandons his wife or put her away from simpfe caprice, he draws, upon himself the divine anger, for 'the curse of God', said the Prophet, 'rests on him who repudiates his wife capriciously." In ILR Madras 22, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, consisting of Munro and Abdur Rahim, JJ ., held:

"No doubt an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the right to

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SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

'

[JAGDISH'SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] . dissolve the marriage is strongly condemned in the Quran and in A the reported S!!ying of the Prophet (Hadith) and is treated as a spiritual offence. But the impropriety of the husband's conduct would in rio way affect the legal validity of a divorce duly effected by the husband." What Munro and Abdur Rahmim, JJ. in ILR 30 Madras B 22 precisely held was that impropriety of the husband's conduct would in no way affect the legal validity ofa divorce duly effected by the husband. The emphasis was that a talaq would be valid only if it is effected in accordance with the Muslim Law. In ILR 5, Rangoon 18, their Lordships of the Privy Council observed:

c ·

"According to that law (the Muslim Law), a husband can effect a divorce whenever he desires." But the Privy Council has not said that the divorce need not be duly effected or that procedure enjoined by the Quran need not D be followed. 8. It is needless to say that Holy Quran is the ·primary source · and is the weightiest authority on any subject under the Muslim Law. The Single Judge in Criminal Revision No. 199/77 in his judgment quoted the relevant verses of the Quran, to deal with divorce. We need not refer to all the Verses. It will be sufficient . if we· refer to only one of them, whi,ch is Sura IV verse 35. It reads: "Ifye fear a breach Between them twain, Appoint two·arbiters One from his family, · And the other from hers; If they wish for peace, God will cause Their reco~ciliation: For God hath full knowledge, And is acquainted With all things."

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Fromthe verse quoted above, it appears that there is a condition precedent which must be complied with before the talaq is effected. The condition precedent ifwhen the relationship between the husband and the wife is strained and the husband intends to give 'talaq' to his wife he must chose an arbiter from his side and the wife an arbiter from her side, and the arbiters must attempt · at reconciliation, with a time gap so that the passions of the parties may call down and reconciliation may be possible. If ultimately conciliation is not possible, the husband will be entitled to give 'talaq' .. The 'talaq' mdst be for good cause and must not be at the mere desire, sweet will, whim and caprice of the husband. It must not be secret. Maulana Mohammad Ali, an eminent Muslim jurist, in his Religion of Islam, after referring to, and considering, the relevant verses on the subject has observed:

From what has been said above, it is clear that not only mus~ there be a good cause for divorce, but that all means to effect re<:onciliation must have been exhausted before resort is had to · this extreme measure. The impression that a Muslim husband may put away his wife at his mere caprice, is a grave distortion of the Islamic institution of divorce." The learned Jurist also has observed: "Divorce must always follow when one of the parties finds it . impossible to continue the marriage agreement and is compelled to break it off."

9. Costello, J. in ILR 59 Calcutta 833 (supra) considered the judgments of Munro and Abdur Rahim, JJ. in ILR 33 Mad. 22 (supra) and of the Privy Council in JLRS, Rangoon 18, (supra) but he preferred the opinions ofMachaghten and Batchalor, JJ. in ILR 30 Bombay 537 (supra). The reason perhaps is, as observed by Krishna Ayer, J. (now of the Supreme Court) in the case of A. Yusuf Rowther v. Sowramma, reported in AIR 1971 Kerala261: · "Marginal distortions are inevitable when the Judicial Committee in Downing Street has to interpret Manu and Muhammad of India and Arabia. The soul of a Culture law is largely the ·formalised and enforceable expression of a community's culture

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SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] norms-cannot be fully understood by alien minds."

10. Krishna Ayer, J., in AIR 1971Kerala261 (supra) has further observed: "The view that the Muslim husband enjoys an arbitrary, unilateral power to inflict instant divorce does not accord with Islamic injunctions ... Indeed, a deeper study of the subject disclosed a · surprisingly rational, realistic and modem law of divorce......... "

The learned Judge has further observed: "It is a popular fallacy that a Muslim male enjoys; under the Quranic law, Unbridled Authority to liquidate the marriage. The whole Quran expressly forbids a man to seek pretexts for divorcing his wife, so long as she remains faithful and obedient to him, 'if they (namely, women) obey you, then do·not seek a way against them' (Quran IV: 34)" . ·

(iv) The conclusion: Based on the above consideration above, the High Court recorded the following conclusion:

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"-11. Inouropinion the correct law of'talaq' as ordained by Holy Ouran is: (i) that 'talaq' must be for a reasonable cause; and (ii) that it must be preceded by an attempt at reconciliationbetween the husband and wife by two arbiters, one chosen by the wife E · from her family and the other by the husband from his. If their · attempts fail. 'talaq' may be effected. In our opinion the Single Judge has correctly laid down the law in Criminal Revision No. 199/77 (supra), and, with respect the Calcutta High Court in ILR 59 Calcutta 833 and the Bombay High Court in ILR 30 Bombay 537 have not laid down the correct law." A perusal of the consideration extracted above, when. examined closely, reveals that the High Court listed the following essential ingredients of a valid 'talaq' under Muslim law. Firstly, 'talaq' has to be based on good cause, and must not be at the mere desire, sweet will, whim and caprice of the husband. Secondly, it must not be secn~t. G Thirdly; between the pronouncement and finality, there must be a time gap, so that the passions of the parties may calm down, and reconciliation may be possible. Fourthly, there has to be a process of arbitration (as a means·ofreconciliation), wherein the arbitrators are representatives of both the husband and the wife. If the above ingredients

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A do not exist, 'talaq' -divorce would be invalid. For the reason, that the 'talaq-e-biddat' - triple talaq pronounced by the respondent-husband Abdul Khalique Laskar, did not satisfy all the ingredients for a valid divorce, the High Court concluded that the marriage was subsisting, and accordingly held the wife to be entitled to maintenance ..

33. Masroor Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhil4, (Single Bench judgment. authored by Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.. as he then was). (i) The facts: Aisha Anjum was married to the petitioner - Masroor ·

Ahmed, on 02.04.2004. The marriage was duly consummated and a daughterwas born to the couple (-on 22.10.2005). It was alleged by the c wife -Aisha Anjum, that the husband's family threw her out of her matrimonial home (-on 08.04.2005), on account ofnon-fulfjlment of dowry demands. While the wife - Aisha Anjum was at her maternal home, the husband - Masroor Ahmed filed a case for restitution of conjugal rights (-on 23.03.2006), before the Senior Civil Judge, Delhi, During the course of the above proceedings, the wife returned to the D matrimonial home; to the company of her husband (-on 13.04.2006), whereupon, marital cohabitation wasTestored. Once again there was discord between the couple, and Masroor Ahmed pronolinced 'talaq-ebiddat', on 28.08.2006. The wife -Aisha Anjum alleged, that she later . came to know that her husband - Masroor Ahmed, had divorced her by. E exercising his right of 'talaq-e-biddat', in the presence of the brothers. ofAishaAnjum, in October 2006. And that, the husband had lied to the Court, (and to her, as well) when he had sought her restitution, from the· Court, bymaking out as ifthe marriage was still subsisting. It was her claim, thatshe would not have agreed to conjugal relations with him, had· she known ofthe divorce. And therefore, her consent to have conjugal F relations with Masroor Ahmed, was based· on fraud committed by him, on her -Aisha Anjum. She therefore accused Masroor Ahmed, for having · committed the offence under Section 376.ofthe Indian Penal Code, i.e., the offence of rape. She also claimed maintenance from her husband, under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code. During the pendency, 0 of the above proceedings, the parties arrived at an amicable settlement on 1.9.2007. (ii) The challenge: The position expressed by the High Court in paragraph

12 ofthejudgment, crystalises the challenge. Paragraph 12, is reproduced below: H • 2008 (103) DRJ 137

SHAYARA _BA;NO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] "12. Several questions impinging upon muslim law concepts arise for consideration. They are:- .

(1) What is the legality and effect ofa triple talaq? (2) Does a talaq given in anger result in dissolution of marriage? .

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(3) What is the effect of non-communication of the talaq to the wife?

(4) Was the purported talaq of October 2005 valid? (5) What is the effect of the second nikah of 19.4.2006?". (iii) The consideration: While considering the legality and effect of'talaqe~biddat'; the High Court recorded ihe following consideration:

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"Sanctity and effect ofTalaq-e-bidaat or triple talaq. 24. There is no difficulty with ahsan talaq or hasan talaq. Both have legal recognition under all fiqh schools, sunni or shia. The difficulty lies with triple talaq which is classed as bidaat (an D innovation). Generally speaking, the shia schools do not · recognise triple talaq as bringing about a valid divorce'. There is. however. difference of opinion even within the Sunni schools as to whether the triple talag should be treated as three talags. irrevocably bringing to an end the marital relationship or as one rajai (revocable) talag 2• operating in much the same way as an ·E ahsan ta lag."

a

I With regard to triple talaq. Fyzee comments: Such ialaq is lawful, although sinful, in Hanafi law; but in Ithna 'A•hari .and the Fatintid laws it is not perntissible. p. 154 .. Ameer Ali notes: The Shiahs and the Malikis do not recognise the .validity of the talak-ul-bid'at. whilst the Hanafi and the Shaf'eis agree.in holding that a dhwce is effective, if pronounced F in the bid' at form, though in its commission the Dian .incurs a sin. p. 435. These. statements may not be accurate as to the views of Malikis and Bhaf'eis. but ii is universally recognized that the above-mentioned Shi'a·scbools do not find triple talaq to be a valid form of · divorce. · , . . ., .

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' Classical Hamifi · esp"6ially as it is in India ·seems to take the triple talaq js sinful yet effectiw as an irrevocable diyorce. See, e.g. Mulla p. 261 -62; the Hedaya. p. 72-73, ·83. On the other band, Ameer Ali suggests that a triple talaq can be revoked within the iddat period, p; 436. Maulana 'Umar Ahmad· 'Usman!. in the Qiiran;' Women and. Modem Society, by Asghar Ali Engineer, N,ew Daw!l: Ne.w De.lhi (i005);states that Muhammad ibn Mugatil a Hanafi jurist gave evidence indicating that -Imam Abu Hanjfa developed a second opinion that a triple talaq constitutes one talag and that it can therefore be revoked within. the iddat period. Maulana .otJmarA!unad 'Usmani qtiotesfrom' Fath al-Bari by Hafiz lbn Jahar a!-Asgalani who states that many e1ninent jurists have held the opjnion that three talaqs pronounced in one sittj!lj! constitutes only one talaq. Maulana

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A (iv) The conclusion: Based on the consideration recorded above, the High Court arrived at the following conclusions:

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Wahiduddin Khan. in Concerning Divorce, Goodword Books: New Delhi (2003). p. 29, says that in the case of a man who was 'emotionally overwrought' when pronouncing talaq three times. "His three utterances of the word talaq may be taken as an expression of the intensity of his emotions and thus the equivalent of only one such utterance". He further gives the example of a Hadith recorded by Imam Abu Dawud in which Rukana ibn Abu Yazid said talag to his wife three times in one sitting and then regretted his action. When he told the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him! how he had divorced his wife. the Prophet (pbuh) observed "All three count as only one. If you want. you may revoke it." P. 28-29 (original Hadith found in Musnad Ahmad ibn Hanbal). There is also a Hadith reported by Abdullah ibn Abbas that in the Prophet (pbuhl lifetime. during the caliphate of Abu Bakr. · and during the first two years of Umar ibn al-Khattab's caliphate. triple 'talaq was counted as one talag only. but that Umar then made triple talag. binding upon his people so that they learned the consequences of their hasty action. Sahib Muslim 3491. Maulana Wabiduddin Khan observes this rule was of a "temporary nature" and was specific to the people of the time, and that the 'ijma of the Companions on Umar's decision was also temporary, as 'ijma cannot override the system of divorce prescribed in the Quran. P. 30, 32. He notes that the Shariah is eternal. but that a Muslim ruler can make exceptions in special circumstances and can ensure that women affected by such a ruling are fulh compensated. P. 30-31. He concludes that scholars today cannot justify enforcing triple talaq by citing Umar's rnling because they do not have the powers of a Caliph as Umar had. P. 32. It seems that modern Indian Hanafi scholars havae taken this opinion as well: the Cohlpendium of Islamic Laws. 2001. Part II Section 24. states the following: "lf a perso11 pronouncing talaq says that he intended only a single talaq and repeated the words of talaq only to put emphasis and these words were not meant to pronounce more than one talaq. his statement on oath will be accepted" Translated by Mahmood. (Also sec: The Muslim Law of India, 3"' ed., Tahir Mahmood Lexis Nexis Butterworths: New Delhi (2002), p. l 07. where the learned author noted: "In India there bas been no legislation in this regard, but the muftis of the time now agree that if a man pronounces the so-called 'triple talaq' but later swears that he did not mean it. his declaration may be given the effect of a single talaq revoqable during iddat and. if not so revoked, leaving room for a fresh nikah thereafter with the wife's consent"). Such a view is, perhaps. based upon an application of the following legal maxim of Islamic law - Al-umuru bi-maqasidiha : Acts are judged by the intention behind them.

Sheikh Sayyed Sabiq in Fiqh As-Sullllah states on the subject of triple talaq that although the majority opinion is that triple talak will count as three divorces, other scholars such as Ibo Taymiyyah and Ibo al-Qayyim, as well as Companions like 'Ata". Tawuus. lbn Dinar. 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, lbn Mas'ud, 'Abdur-Rahman ibn 'Awf, Az-Zubayr, were of the opinion that it counts as only one pronouncement of divorce. He then says. "This latter view is believed to be the inost correct." Some go as far as to argue that there is ijma 'that triple talak counts as three talaks. However, according to the requirements for ijma '(in the Hanafi madhab ), 'no opinion to the contrary should have been expressed on the question by any of the Companions, or by other Mujtahids before the formation of the ljma' ." and "none of the Mujtahids taking part in the decision should have atlerwards changed his opinion." Abdur Rahim, p. 145. Here, the first condition is certainly not met, and the second is arguably not met. Finally, many Musjim countries, including Algeria. Egypt. Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, Syria and Yemen, have implemented laws that uphold the notion that a triple talak counts as only one talak. Personal Law in Islamic Countries, Tahir Mahmood. Academy of Law and Religion: New Delhi (1987).

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SHAYARA _BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] "26. It is accepted by all schools of law that talag-e-bidaat is sinful6• Yet .some schools regard it as valid. Courts in India have also held itto be valid. The expression - bad in theology but valid in law - is often used in this context. The fact remains that it is. considered to be sinful. It was. deprecated by prophet Muhammad7• It is definitely not recommended or even approved _by any school. It is not even considered to be a valid divorce by _shia schools. There are views even amongst the sunni schools that the trible talag pronounced in one go would not be regarded · as three talags but only as one. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the harsh abruptness of triple talag has brought _about· extreme misery to the divorced women and even to the ; men who are left with no chance to undo the wrong or any scope to bring about a reconciliation. It is an innovation which may have served a purpose at a particular point of time in history8 but, if it is rooted out such a move would not be contrary to any basic tenet ofislam or the Ouran or any ruling of the Prophet Muhammad.· 27. In this background, I would hold that a triple talaq (talag-e- bidaat), even for sunni muslims-be regarded as one revocable · talag. This would enable the husband to have time to think and to have ample opportunity to revoke the same during the iddat period. All this while. family members of the spouses could make sincereefforts·at bringing about a reconciliation. Moreover. even if the iddat period expires and the talag can no longer be revoked as a consequence of it, the estranged couple still has an opportunity to re-enter matrimony by contracting a fresh nikah on fresh terms ofmahr etc."

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See supra, fn 25 & 26, for the opinion of the Hanafi madhab that triple talaq is sinful. ' Once the Prophet (pb_uh) was informed about a man who had pronounced three divorces at one time. He got up in anger, saying, "ls sport being made of the Book of Allah while 1 am (yet) among you?" Reported by an-Nasai'i.

'The exact Hadith is as follows: "Abudllah ibnAbbas reported that the pronouncemeni of three ~ivorces during the lifetime ofAllah's Messenger (pbuh) and that ofAbu Bakr and.two years of the caliphate ofUmarwas treated as one. But Umar ibn al-Khattab said, "Verily the people have begun to hasten in the matter in which they are required to observe respite. So if we had imposed this upon them, [it w6uld have deterred them from doing so!] and he imposed it upon them." Sahib Muslim 3491.

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A A pemsal of the conclusions recorded by the High Court would reveal, that triple talaq pronounced at the same time, is to be treated as a single pronouncement of divorce. And therefore, for severing matrimonial ties finally, the husband would have to complete the prescribed procedure, and thereafter, the parties would be treated as divorced.

. 34. Nazeer v. Shemeema5. (Single Bench judgment. authored by A. Muhamed Mustague. J.).

(i) The facts: Through the above judgment, the High Court disposed of a number of writ petitions, including three writ petitions, wherein husbands had terminated their matrimonial alliance with their spouses, by c pronouncing 'talaq-e-biddat' - triple talaq. Their matrimonial relationship having come to an end, one or the other or both (-this position is unclear, from the judgment) spouses approached the passport authorities, to delete the name of their former spouse, from their respective passports. The passport authorities declined to accept their request, as the same was based on private actions of the parties, which were only supported by D unauthenticated 'talaq-namas' (deeds of divorce). The stance adopted by the passport authorities was, that in the absence of a formal decree of divorce, the name of the spouse could not be deleted. By passing interim directions, the High Court ordered the passport authorities, to correct the spouse details (as were sought), based on the admission of E the corresponding spouse, that their matrimonial alliance had been dissolved. (ii) The challenge: Even though the authenticity and/or the legality of 'talaq-e-biddat', did not arise for consideration before the High Court, it noticed " ....Though the issue related to triple talaq does not directly F crop up in these writ petitions calling upon this Court to decide the validity of triple talaq, this Court cannot ignore while granting a relief based on acb;nission, the fact that direction of this Court would result in greater or lesser extent of injustice if it remains oblivious to the repercussions of the repudiation of marriage by volition ofindividual. .... ". The High Court therefore, embarked on the exercise of examining the validity of 'talaqG e-biddat'. (iii) The consideration: The High Court took imo consideration texts by renowned scholars, as for instance, from "Shari!l" by Wael B. Hallaq, "Sharia Law, An Introduction" by Mohammad Hashim Kamali, "Qur 'an:

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SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] The Living Truth" by Basheer Ahmad Mohyidin, "Muslim Law in India A And Abroad" by Dr. Tahir Mahmood, "The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam" by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, from the Urdu book "Hikmatul Islam" by Moulana Wahidul Khan. The High Court also took into consideration Quranic verses (all of which have been, extracted above). The High Court even took note of the two judgments of the Gauhati B High Court (referred to above), besides other High Court judgments, and thereupon, observed as under: "12. This case only symptomize the harsh realities encountered by women belonging to Muslim community, especially ofthe lower strata. It is a reminder to the court unless the plight of sufferers is alleviated in a larger scheme through legislation by the.State, C justice will be a distant dream deflecting the promise of justice by the State "equality before the law". The State is constitutionally bound and committed to respect the promise of dignity and · equality before law and it cannot shirk its responsibility by remaining mute spectator of the malady suffered by Muslim D women in the name of religion and their inexorable quest for justice broke all the covenants of the divine law they professed to denigrate the believer and faithful. Therefore, the remainder of the judgment is a posit to the State and contribution for settlement of the 'legal vex'. which remains unconcluded more than four decades after this court's reminder in Mohamed E Haneefas' case (supra). 13. The State is constitutionally obliged to maintain coherent order in the society, foundation of which is laid by the family. Thus sustenance or purity of the marriage will lay a strong foundation for the society, without which there would be neither civilisation F nor progress. My endeavour in this judgment would have been over with the laying of correct principles related to triple talag in Our' anic perspective to declare the law and to decide the matter. However. I find the dilemma in this context is not a singular problem arisen demanding a resolution of the dispute between G the litigants by way of adjudication. But rather it require a State intervention by way of legislation to regulate triple talag in India. · Therefore. settlement of law relating to talag is necessary and further discussion is to be treated as an allude for the State to consider for possible reforms of divorce Law of Muslim in this

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Countrv. The empirical research placed herein justifies such course of action to r:emind the State for action. It is to be noted, had the Muslim in India been governed by the true Islamic law, Penal law would have acted as deliverance to sufferings of Muslim women in India to deter arbitrary talaq in violation of Qur'anic injunction. xxx

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15. This takes me to the question why the State is so hesitant to reforms. 1t appears from public debate that resistance is from a small section ofUlemas (scholars within the society) on the ground that Sharia is immutable and any interference would amount to negation of freedom of religion guaranteed under the Constitution. I find this dilemma ofUlema is on a conjecture of repugnancy of divine law and secular law. The State also appears as reluctant on an assumption that reforms of religious practice would offend religious freedom guaranteed under the Constitution of India. This leads me to discuss on facets of Islamic law. I also find it equally important to discuss about the reforms of personal law · relating to triple talaq within the constitutional potity, as the ultimately value of its legality has to be tested under the freedom ofreligious practices." (iv) .The conclusion: In the background oflhe above consideration, the High Court held as under: · . "The W.P.(C) 37436 of2003 is filed by the husband alleging that the triple talaq pronounced by him is not valid in accordance with Islamic law. Therefore, proceedings initiated before the Magistrate under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, l 986 and consequent order will have to be set aside. This case depicts the misuse of triple talaq. wife appears to have accepted the talaq and moved the Magistrate court on a folly created by husband. There are innumerable cases as revealed from the empirical data referred in the research in which neither party are aware of the procedure of talaq according to the personal law. This Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not expected to go into the disputed questions of fact. The entire exercise in this judgment is to alert the State that justice has become elusive to the Muslim woman

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI]

and the remedy thereof lies in codification of law of divorce. A This court cannot grant any relief to the writ petitioner as the trne application of the law to be considered in a given facts is upon the Court trying the matter. It is for the subordinate court to decide whether there was application of Islamic law in effecting divorce by triple talaq. Therefore, declining jurisdiction, this writ petition is dismissed.

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W.P.(C) Nos. 25318 & 26373 of2015 and 11438 of2016

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In these Writ Petitions guestion of validity oftri12le talag does not arise. However this guest.ion was considered in larger nersnective for the reason that if court grant any relief based on admission c of the Qarties as to the renudiation of marriage by tri12le talaag, that would amount to recognition of a tri12le talag effected not in accordance with law, as this court has no mechanism to find out the manner in which talag is effected. The Court cannot become a party to a proceedings to recognise an ineffective divorce in the guise of directions being given to passport authorities to accept D. · . the divorce. The legal effect of such divorce has to be 12robed by a fact finding authori!Y in accordance with the true Islamic law. Stamn of a1212roval being given by the court by ordering gass12ort authori!Y to acce12t divorce effected not in accordance with the law, will create an im12ression that court transgressed its limits E while directing a 12ublic authority to honour an act which was done not in accordance with law. Though in these Writ Petitions, · considering the urgency of the matters, this court granted interim order directing the passport authorities to act upon the request ofthe petitioners. Considering the large number of similar reliefs sought before this court in various Writ Petitions, this court is of F the view that the issue can be resolved only through a larger remedy of codification of law in the light of the discussion as above. In the light of interim order, these Writ Petitions are dis12osedof Conclusion:

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· Courts interpret law and evolve justice on such interpretation of law. It is in the domain of the legislature to make law. Justice has become elusive for Muslim women in India not because of the religion they 12rofess, but on account of lack of legal formalism

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resulting in immunity from law. Law required to be aligned with justice. The search for solution to this predicament lies in the hands of the law makers. It is for the law makers to correlate law and social phenomena relating to divorce through the process of legislation to advance justice in institutionalized form. It is imperative that to advance justice, law must be formulated without any repugnance to the religious freedom guaranteed under the Constitution of India. It is for the State to consider the formulation of codified law to govern the matter. Therefore. J conclude by drawing attention of those who resist any form of reform of the divorce law of Muslim community in India to the following verses of Holy Quran. (Chapter 47:2) "And those who believe and do good works and believe in that which is revealed unto Muhammad - and it is the truth from their Lord-He riddeth them of their ill deeds and improveth their state."

"Thus we display the revelations for people who have sense" (Chapter 30:28) The Registry shall forward the copy of this judgment to Union Law Ministry and Law Commission oflndia."

A perusal of the conclusions drawn by the High Court reveals, that the E practice of 'talaq-e-biddat', was deprecated by the Court. The Court however called upon the legislature, to codify the law on the issue, as would result in the advancement of justice, as a matter of institutional fonn.

Part-7.

The petitioner's and the interveners' contentions:

35. On behalf of the petitioner, besides the petitioner herself, submissions were initiated by Mr. Amit Singh Chadha, Senior Advocate. He invited this Court's attention to the legislative history in the field of Muslim 'personal law' (-for details, refer to Part-4- Legislation in India, G in the field of Muslim 'personal law'). It was submitted, that all fundamental rights contained in Part III of the Constitution were justiciable. It was therefore pointed out, that the petitioner's cause before this Court, was akin to such rights as were considered justiciable. The practice of 'talaq-e-biddat', according to learned counsel, permitted a male spouse H - an unqualified right, to severe the matrimonial tie. It was pointed out,

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SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

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[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, "CJI] that the right to divorce a wife, by way of triple talaq, could be exercised A without the disclosure of any reason, and in fact, even in the absence of reasons. It was submitted, that a female spouse had no say in the matter, inasmuch as, 'talaq-e-biddat' could be pronounced in the absence of the wife, and even without her knowledge. It was submitted, that divorce pronounced by way of triple talaq was final ahd binding, between the B parties. These actions, according to learned counsel, vested an aroitrary right in the husband, and as such, violated the equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. It was submitted, that the Constitution postulates through the above article, equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. This right, according to learned counsel, was clearly denied to the female spouse)n the matter of pronouncement of C divorce by the husband by adopting the procedure of 'talaq-e-biddat' .. Further more, it was submitted, the Constitution postulates through Article . 15, a clear restraillt on discrimination, on the ground of sex. It was subm1tted, that 'talaq-e-biddat' violated the aforesaid fundamental right, which postulates equality between men and women. Learned counsel D relied on the decisions ofthis Court in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala6 , and Minerva Mills.Ltd. v. Union oflndia7 to contend, that it was the duty of courts to intervene in case of violation ofany individual's fundamental right, and to render justice. It was also submitted, that the. rights of the female partner in a matrimonial alliance amongst Muslims,· had resulted in severe gender discrimination, which amounted to violating E their human rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. Learned counsel accordingly sought intervention, for grave injustice practiced against . Muslim wives. 36. Mr. Amit Singh Chadha, learned senior counsel, then placed reliance on the Jiauddin Ahmed2 , and the Rukia Khatun3 cases (-for F details, refer to Part-6 - Judicial prnnouncements, on (he subject of 'talaq-e-biddat'). Based on the above judgments, .it was submitted, that courts of this country had not found favour with the practice of triple talaq, inthe manner.prevalent in India.1t was cbntended, that 'talaq-e-biddat' should not be confused with the profession, practice and propagation of Islam. It was ·pointed out, that 'talaq-e-biddat' G was not sacrosanctal to the profession of the Muslim religion. It was accordingly submitted, that this Court had an indefeasible right, to to press his claim based on intervene and render justice. In order . ' . .

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A constitutional morality, wherein the petitioners were claiming not only gender equality, but also the progression of their matrimonial life with dignity, learned senior counsel placed reliance on Manoj Narula v. Union oflndia8, wherein this Court observed as under:

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"The Constitution of India is a living instrument with capabilities of enormous dynamism. It is a Constitution made for a progressive society. Working of such a Constitution depends upon the prevalent atmosphere and conditions. Dr Ambedkar had, throughout the debate, felt that the Constitution can live and grow on the bedrock of constitutional morality. Speaking on the same, · he said: "Constitutional morality is not a natural sentiment. It has to be cultivated. We must realise that our people have yet to learn it. Democracy in India is only a top-dressing on an Indian soil, which is essentially undemocratic." [Constituent Assembly Debates, 1948, Vol. VII, 38.]

The principle of constitutional morality basically means to bow down to the norms of the Constitution and not to act in a manner which would become violative of the rule oflaw or reflectible of action in an arbitrary manner. It actually works at the fulcrum and guides as a laser beam in institution building. The traditions and conventions have to grow to sustain the value of such a morality. The democratic values survive and become successful where the people at large and the persons in charge of the institution are strictly guided by the constitutional parameters without paving the path of deviancy and reflecting in action the primary concern to maintain institUtional integrity and the requisite constitutional restraints. Commitment to the Constitution is a facet of constitutional morality ... " ' \

In continuatfun with the instant submission, it was also the contention of learned senior counsel, that Articles 25, 26 and 29 of the Constitution, G did not in any manner, impair the jurisdiction of this Court, to set right the apparent breach of constitutional morality. In this behalf, the Court's attention was invited to the fact, that Article 25 itself postulates, that the freedoms contemplated thereunder, were subject to the overriding principles enshrined in Part Ill - Fundamental Rights, of the Constitution.

• (2014) 9 sec 1

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SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI]

This position, it was submitted, was affirmed through judgments rendered A by this Court in John_ Vallamattom v. Union oflndia9, Javed v. State of Haryana 10, and Khursheed Ahmad Khan v. State ofUttar Pradesh 11 • 37. Learned senior counsel also drew our attention to the fact, that a number of countri'es had, by way of express legislations, done away with the practice of'talaq-e-biddat'. It was submitted, that even B when talaq was pronounced thrice simultaneously, the same has, by legislation, beeff treated as a single pronouncement,. in a number of countries, including countries which have declared Islam as their official State religion. It was accordingly contended, that had 'talaq-e-biddat' been an essential part ofreligion, i.e., if it constituted a core belief, on whieh Muslim religion~was founded, it could not have been interfered · C with, by such legislative intervention. It was accordingly suggested, that this Court should have no difficulty whatsoever in remedying the cause with which the petitioners had approached this Court, as the same was not only violative of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution, but was also in contravention of the principle of constitutional morality D emerging therefrom. . 38. Last of all, it was contended, that it is nobody's"case before this Court, that 'talaq-e-biddat' is a pa.t1 of an edict flowing out of the Quran. It was submitted, that triple talaq is not recognized by many schools of Islam. According to learned counsel, all concerned E acknowledge, that 'talaq-e-biddat' has all along been treated irregular, patriarchal and even sinful. It was pointed out, that it is accepted by all . schools -even of Sunni Muslims, that' talaq-e-biddat' is "bad in theology but good in law". In addition, it was pointed out, that even the Union of India had affirmed before this Court, t_he position expressed above. In such situation, it was prayed; that this Court being .a constitutional court, F was obliged to perform its constitutional responsibility under Article 32 of the Constitution, as a protector, enforcer, and guardian of citizens' rights under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. It was submitted, that in discharge of the above constitutional obligation, this Court ought to strike down, the practice of 'talaq-e•biddat', as violative of the G fundamental rights and constitutional morality contemplated by the provisions of the Constitution. It was commended, that the instant practice of 'talaq-e-biddat' should be done away with, in the same ma_nner as the • c2003) 6 sec 611 ,, c2003) s sec 369 11 c201 s) s sec 439

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A practice of'Sati', 'Devadasi' and 'Polygamy', which were components of Hindu religion, and faith. Learned counsel concluded his submissions by quoting from the Constitutional Law of India, by H.M. Seervai (fourth edition, Volume 2, published by N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd., Bombay), wherein in clause 12.60, at page 1281, the author has expressed the B followingview:

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"12.60 I am aware that the enforcement of laws which are violated is the duty of Govt., and in a number of recent cases that duty has not been discharged. Again, in the last instance, blatant violation of religious freedom by the arbitrary action of religious heads has to be dealt with firmly by our highest Court. This duty has resolutely discharged by our High Courts and the Priyy Council before our Constitution. No greater service can be done to our country than by the Sup. Ct. and the High Courts discharging that duty resolutely, disregarding popular clamour and disregarding personal predilections. I am not unaware of the present political and judicial climate. But I would like to conclude with the words of very great man "never despair", for when evil reaches a particular point, the antidote of that evil is near at hand."

39. Mr. Anand Grover, Senior Advocate, represented Zakia E Soman - respondent no.10. Respondent no.10 was added as a party respondent on 29.6.2016, on the strength of an interlocutory application filed by her. Learned senior advocate, in the first instance, invited our attention to the various kinds of 'talaq' practiced amongst Muslims (-for details, refer to Part-2 - The practiced modes of 'talaq' amongst Muslims). It was submitted, that 'talaq-e-ahsan' and 'talaq-e-hasan' F were approved by the Quran and the 'hadith'. It was submitted, that 'talaq-e-biddat' is neither recognized by the Quran, nor approved by the 'hadith'. With reference to 'talaq-e-biddat', it was asserted, that the same was contrary to Quranic prescriptions .. It was submitted, that the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat' was traceable to the second century, after G the advent oflslam. It was asserted, that 'talaq-e-biddat' is recognized only by a few Sunni schools, including the Hanafi school. In this behalf, it was also brought to our notice, that most of the Muslims in India belonged to the Hanafi school of Sunni Muslims. lt was submitted, that even the Hanafi school acknowledges, that 'talaq-e-biddat' is a sinful . form of divorce, but seeks to justify it on the ground that though bad In

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SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] theology, it is good in law. In India 'talaq-e-biddat', according to learned A counsel, gained validity based on the acceptance of the same by the British courts, prior to independence. It was submitted, that the judgments rendered by the British courts were finally crystallized, in the authoritative pronouncement by the Privy Council in the Rashid Ahmad case 1• It was pointed out, that thereafter, 'talaq-e-biddat' has been consistently B · · practised in India. 40. The first contention advanced at the hands of learned senior counsel was, that after the adoption of the Constitution, various High Courts in India had the occasion to consider the validity of ·'talaq-ebiddat', exercised by Muslim men to divorce their wives. And all the High Courts (which had the occasion to deal with the issue) tinanimously C arrived at the conclusion, that the same could not muster support either from the Quran or the 'hadith'. In this behalf, the Court's attention was drawn to the various judgments of High Courts including the High Court of Gauhati in the J iauddin Ahmed case 2 - by a Single Bench, and by the same High Court in the Rukia Khatun case 3 - by a Division Bench. D By the Delhi High Court in the Masroor Ahmed case 4 - by a Single Bench, and finally by the Kerala High Court in the Nazeer case 5 by a Single Bench (-for details, refer to Part-6 - Judicial pronouncements, on the subject of'talaq-e-biddat'). It was submitted, that the High Courts were fully justified in their opinions and their conclusions. It was pointed out, that despite the aforesaid judgments, E Muslim husbands continued to divorce their wives by 'talaq-e-biddat', and therefore, an authoritative ·pronouncement on the matter was required to be delivered, by this Court. Based on the decisions-relied upon, it was submitted, that a Muslim husband, could not enjoy arbitrary or unilateral power to proclaim a divorce, as the same does F not accord with Islamic traditi~ns. It was also contended, that the proclamation oftalaq must be for a demonstrated reasonable cause, and must proceed by an attempt at reconciliation by two arbiters (one each, from the side of the rival parties). In order to affirm the aforesaid position; learned counsel placed reliance on Shamim Ara v. State of U.P. 12 , to assert, that this Court approved the judgments G referred to above. It was accordingly asserted, that ,this Court has already recognized, the Quranic position as recorded in verses 128 to 130 of 'sura' IV and verses 229-232 of 'sura' II, and also, 'verse'

(2002) 1 sec s1s

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A 35 of 'sura' IV. These verses, according to learned senior counsel, declare the true Quranic position on the subject of divorce (-for details, refer to Part-3 - The Holy Quran - with reference to 'talaq'). Learned counsel heavily relied on the decision rendered by the Delhi High Court in the Masroor Ahmed case4, and by the Kerala High B Court in the Nazeer case' to bring home his contention, that 'talaq-ebiddat' was wholly unjustified and could not be recognized as a valid means of divorce in the Muslim community. It was the vehement submission ofleamed counsel, that the legal position being canvassed on behalf of the petitioners, clearly emerged from the judgments referred to above, anl:i should be treated as the foundation, for adoption C and declaration by this Court. It was therefore prayed, that triple talaq as was being practiced in India, be declared unsustainable in Jaw. 41. It was also contended by learned senior counsel, that the settled principles applicable in all co~on law jurisdictions including India was D that courts do not test the constitutionality oflaws and procedures, ifthe issue arising between the parties can be decided on other grounds. It was submitted, that only when the relief being sought, cannot be granted without going into the constitutionality of the law, only then courts need to enter the thicket of its constitutional validity. Learned counsel invited the Court's attention, to the judgment of this Court in State of Bihar v. E Rai Bahadur Hurdut Roy Moti Lal Jute Mills 13 , wherein this Court refused to test the constitutional validity ofcertain provisions, by holding as under: "7. On behalf of the appellant Mr Lal Narain Sinha has contended that the High Court was in error in holding that the proviso to Section 14A violates either Article 20(1) or Article 31 (2) of the Constitution. He has addressed us at length in supp01t of his case that neither of the two articles is violated by the impuged proviso. On the other hand, the learned Solicitor-General has sought to support the findings of the High Court on the said two constitutional points; and he has pressed before us as a preliminary point his argument that on a fair and reasonable constrnction, the proviso cannot be applied to the case of the first respondent. We would. therefore. first deal with this preliminarv point. In cases where the vire"s of statutory provisions are challenged on constitutional grounds. it is essential that the material facts should

AIR 1960 SC 378

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS·

· 907

[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] first be clarified and ascertained with a view to determine whether A the impugned statiitozy provisions are attracted: if they are. the constjtutional challenge to their validity must be examined and decided. If. however. the facts admitted or proved do not attract the impugned provisions there is no occasion to decide the issue about the vires of the said provisions. Any decision on the said B question would in such a case be purely academic. Courts are and should be reluctant to decide constitutional points merely as matters of academic importance. ·

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19. In view of this conclusion it is unnecessary to consider the C objections raised by the first respondent against the validity of the proviso on the ground that it contravenes Articles 20(1) and 31 (2) of the Constitution ..... " In the· context of 'personal law', it was submitted, that in Shabnam '• Hashmi v. Union of India 14, the Court had recently refused to examine the constitutional validity of 'personal laws', when the issue could be D plainly decided on the interpretation of the concemed statute. It was therefore contended, that through a purely interpretative exercise, this Court should declare 'talaq-e-biddat' as illegal, ineffective and having no force in law, in the same manner as the Gauhati High Court and the Delhi High Court, have previously so held. It was submitted, that the E same declaration be given by this Court, by an interpretation of 'personal law', as would incorporate the ingredients of the permissible and acceptable modes oftalaq into 'talaq-e-biddat'.

42. In the present determination, learned senior counsel submitted, that it would be essential to recognize the existence of distortions in the p 'hadiths'. It was pointed out, that it was by now well settled, that there were various degrees ofreliability and/or authenticity of different 'hadiths' (reference in this behalf was made to - Principles of Mohomedan Law by Sii Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla, LexisNexis, Butterworths Wadhwa, Nagpur, 2Q1h edition). It was the contention of learned senior counsel, that the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (hereinafter referred to G as, the AIMPLB), had relied on 'hadiths', that were far removed from the time of the 'Prophet. It was submitted, that they were therefore far · less crectible and authentic, and also distorted and unreliable, as against the 'hadiths' taken into consideration in the judgments rendered by the "(2014) 4 sec 1

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A High Courts (-for details, refer to Part-6- Ju.dicial pronouncements, on the subject of 'talaq-e-biddat'). It was pointed out, that the AIMPLB had relied upon a later 'hadith' (that is, Sunan Bayhaqi 7/547). It was pointed out, that when compared to the 'ha di th' ofBhukahri (published by Darussalam, Saudi Arabia), the 'hadith' relied upon by the AIMP LB B appeared to be a clear distortion. It.was also submitted, that the 'hadith' relied upon by the AIMPLB, was not found in the Al Bukhari Hadiths, and as such, it would be inappropriate to place reliance on the same. As against the submissions advanced on behalf of AIMP LB, it was pointed out (in rejoinder), that Sahih Muslims believe, that during the Prophet's time, and that of the First Caliph Abu Baqhr and the Second Caliph C Umar, pronouncements of 'talaq' by three consecutive utterances were ' treated as one. Reference in this behalf was made to "Sahih Muslim" compiled by Al-Hafiz ZakiuddinAbdul-AzimAl-Mundhiri, and published by Darussalam. Learned senior counsel also invited this Court's attention to "The lawful and the prohibited in Islam" by Al-Halal Wal Haram Fil D Islam (edition -Augtist 2009), which was of Egyptian origin. It was pointed out, that Egypt was primarily a Sunni Hanafi nation. It was submitted, that the text of the above publication, clearly showed, that the practice of instant talaq was described sinful, and was to be abhorred. Reference was also made to "Woman in Islamic Shariah" by Maulana Wahiduddin Khan (published by Goodword Books, reprinted in 2014), E wherein it is opined, that triple talaq pronounced on a singular occasion, would be treated as a single pronouncement of talaq, in terms of the 'hadith' oflmam Abu Dawud in Fath al-bari 9/27. It was submitted, that the views of the above author, were also relied upon by the Delhi High Court in the Masroor Ahmed case4 • Reference was also made to "Marriage and family life in Islam" by Prof. (Dr.) A. Rahman (Adam F Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi, 2013 edition), wherein by placing reliance on a Hanafi Muslim scholar, it was expressed that triple talaq was not in consonance with Quranic verses. Reliance was also placed on "Imam Abu Hanifa- Life and Work" by Allamah Shiblinu'mani's of Az!lillgarh, who founded the Shibli College in the I 9'h century. It was G submitted, that Abu Hanifa himself ruled, that it was forbidden to give three divorces at the same time, and whoever did so was a sinner. Based on the aforestated submissions, it was the pointed contention of learned senior counsel, that there was no credibility in the position adopted by theAIMPLB, in its pleadings to demonstrate the validity of the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat'.

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI] J'

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43. Based on the above submissions, ii was contended, that the A judgment rendered by the Privy Council in the Rashid Ahmad case l with reference to the validity of 'talaq-e-biddat' needed to be overruled. Since 'talaq-e-biddat' cannot be traced to the Quran, and since the Prophet himself deprecated it, and since 'talaq-e-biddat' was considered sinful by all schools of Sunni Muslims, and as invalid by all the Shia Muslim B schools, it could not be treated to be a part of Muslim 'personal law'. It was asserted, that triple talaq was not in tune with the prevailing social conditions, as Muslim women were vociferously protesting against the practice. Learned senior counsel solicited, that this Court in order to resolve the present dispute, declare that the pronouncetnent of triple tal_aq by a Muslim husband, in order to divorce his wife, would be treated C as a single pronouncement of talaq, and would have to follow the procedure of '.talaq-e-ahsan' (or, 'talaq-e-hasan') in accordance with the Quran, so as to conclude a binding dissolution of marriage byway of 'talaq', in terms of Muslim 'personal law'. 44. Ms. Indira Jaising, Senior Advocate, was the third counsel to D represent the cause of the petitioners. She entered appearance on behalf · ofrespondent no.7 -Centre for Study of Society and Secularism, which came to be added as a party respondent vide an order dated 29.6.2016 .. It was the contention oflearned senior counsel, that the term 'personal laws' had not been defined in the Constitution, although there was reference to the same in entry 5 of the Concurrent List of the Seventh E Schedule. Learned counsel referred to Article 372 of the Constitution which mandates, that all laws in force, in the territory of India immedia~ely before the commencement of the Constitution, "shall" continue in force until altered or repealed or amended by a competent legislature (or other competent authority). It was submitted, that on personal issues, Muslims F were governed by the Muslim 'personal law' - Shariat. It was contended, that even before, the commencement of the Constitution, the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 193 7 enforced Muslim 'personal . law', and as such, the Muslim 'personal law' should be considered as a ~'law in force", within the meaning of Article 13(3)(b). It was pointed out, that the instant position made the legal position separate and distinct G from what ordinarily falls in the realm of 'personal law'. It was also highlighted, that a reading of entry 5 in the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule, leaves no room for any doubt, that 'personal law' necessarily has to have nexus, to issues such as marriage and divorce, infants and . minors, adoptions, wills, intestacy and succession, joint family property H

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A and partition, etc. It was contented, that 'personal law' could therefore conveniently be described as family law, namely, disputes relating to issues concerning the family. It was pointed out, that such family law disputes, were ordinarily adjudicated upon by the Family Courts, set up under the Family Courts Act, 1984. The matters which arise for B consideration before the Family Courts are disputes of marriage (namely, restitution of conjugal rights, or judicial separation, or dissolution of marriage), and the like. Based on the above backdrop, it was submitted, that it could be safely accepted that 'personal Jaw' deals with family Jaws and law of succession such as marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance, etc.

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45. Based on the foundation recorded in the preceding paragraph, it was submitted, that the question in the present controversy was, whether "rule of decision" (the term used in Section 2, of the Shariat Act) could be challenged, on the ground that the same was violative of the fundamental rights postulated in Part lil of the Constitution? It was the pointed contention of!earned counsel, that no "rule of decision" can be violative of Part III of the Constitution. It was acknowledged (we would say - fairly), that 'personal law' which pertained to disputes between the family and private individuals (wherein the State has no role), cannot be subject to a challenge, on the ground of being violative of the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. It was submitted, that insofar as Muslim 'personal law' is concerned, it could no longer be treated as 'personal law', because it had been statutorily declared as "rule of decision" by Section 2 of the Shariat Act. It was therefore asserted, that all questions pertaining to Muslims, 'personal law' having been described as "rule of decision" could no longer be treated as private matters between parties, nor can they be treated as matters of mere 'personal law'. It was therefore contended, that consequent upon the inclusion/subject of the question of" ... dissolution of marriage, including talaq, ila, zihar, lian, khula and mubaraat, ... ", amongst Muslims in the statute book, the same did not remain a private matter between the parties. And as such, all questions/matters, falling within the scope of Section 2 aforementioned, were liable to be considered as matters of 'public law'. Learned senior counsel therefore asserted, that no one could contest the legitimacy of a challenge to 'public law' on the ground of being violative of the provisions of the Consti tu ti on. In support of the aforesaid foundational premise, learned senior counsel

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS .[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI]

placed reliance on Charu Khurana v. Union of India 1s, to contend that A 'talaq-e-biddat' should be considered as arbitrary and discriminatory, under Articles 14 and 15, in the same manner as the rule prohibiting women make-up artists ·and hair dressers from becoming members of registered make-up artists and hair dressers association, was so declared .. It was also pointed out, that discrimination based on sex was opposed to B gender justice, which position was clearly applicable to the controversy in hand. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, leame.d counsel placed reliance on the following observations recorded in the above judgnient: "46. These bye-laws have been certified by .the Registrar of C Trade Unions in exercise of the statutory power. Clause 4, as is demonstrable, violates Section 21 of the Act, for the Act has not made any distinction between men and women. Had it made a bald distinction it would have been indubitably unconstitutional. The legislature, by way of amendment in Section 21-A, has only fixed the age. It is clear to us that the clause. apart from violating D the statutory command. also vfolates the constitutional mandate which postulates that there cannot be any discrimination on the ground of sex. Such discrimination in the access of employment and to be considered for the employment unless some justifiable · riders are attached to it. cannot withstand scrutiny. When the access or entry is denied. Article 21 which deals with livelihood E is offended. It also works against the fundamental human rights. Such kind of debarment creates a concavity in her capacity to earn her livelihood.

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50. From the aforesaid enunciation of law, the signification of right to livelihood gets clearly spelt out. A clause in the bye-laws of a trade union. which calls itself an Association. which is accepted by the statutory authority. cannot play foul of Article

21."

46. Learned senior counsel, thereupon attempted to express the same position, through a different reasoning. It is necessary to recall, that the question posed for c_onsideration is, whether this Court should accept "rule of decision" under Section 2 of the Shariat Act - as "laws ·" {2015) 1 sec in

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2017] 9 S.C.R.

in force" within the meaning ofArticle 13 of the Constitution, and thereby, test the validity thereof, on the touchstone of the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution? It was the fervent contention oflearned senior counsel, that all questions falling for consideration within the meaning of the term "rule of decision" had necessarily to be treated as "laws in force". Thus, it was submitted, that such laws were to be in consonance with the provisions of Part III - Fundamental Rights, of the Constitution. Insofar as the challenge to the constitutional validity of 'talaq-e-biddat' is concerned, learned senior counsel, adopted the submissions advanced by other learned counsel. 47. Learned senior counsel, then placed reliance on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10.12.1948, to contend that the preamble thereof recognised the inherent dignity of the entire human family, as equal and inalienable. It was submitted, that the charter provides for equal rights to men and women. It was submitted, that Article 1 thereof provides, that all human beings were born free and equal, in dignity and rights. Referring to Article 2, it was submitted, that there could be no distinction/discrimination on the basis inter alia of sex and/or religion. It was submitted, that it was this Court's responsibility to widen, and not to narrow, the right of equality contained in the aforestated Declaration. The Court's attention was also drawn to the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which provided for elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. The instant convention was adopted· by the United Nations General Assembly on I0.04.1979. It was submitted, that the International Convention bill of rights for women, was instituted on 3.9.1981, and had been ratified by 189 States. It was pointed out, that India had also endorsed the same. It was submitted, that Article I thereof defines "discrimination", as discrimination against women on the basis of sex. Referring to Article 2, it was submitted, that all State parties who ratified the above convention, condemned discrimination against women in all its forms, and agreed to eliminate discrimination against women by following the principle of equality amongst men and women, in their national Constitutions, as well as, other legislations. Tt was submitted, that Article 2 of the convention mandates, that all States would take all steps to eliminate discrimination against women - by any person, organisation or enterprise. It was submitted, that insofar as the present controversy is concerned, the provisions of the above declaratfons and conventions can be relied upon, to test the validity of'talaq-e-biddat',

SHAYARA BANO v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS '

[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI]

by treating it as "rule of decision" and for that matter, as law in force (on A the touchstone of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution). It was further submitted, that in any case, the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat', clearly violated the norms adopted by the declaration, and conventions. 48. It was acknowledged, by learned senior counsel, that India recognises a plural legal system, wherein different religious communities B are permitted to be governed by different 'personal laws', applicable to them. .It was submitted, that there could be no dispute, that different religious communities can have different laws, but the laws of each religious community must meetthe test of constitutional validity and/or -constitutional morality, inasmuch as, they cannot be violative of Articles C 14 and 15 of the Constitution. Viewed in the above context, it was submitted, that even though matters of faith and belief are protected by Article 25 of the Constitution, yet law relating to marriage and divorce were matters of faith and belief, were also liable to be tested on grounds of P!.!blic order, morality and health, as well as, on the touchstone of the other provisions of Part Ill of the Constitution. Therefore, on a plain D reading of Article 25, according to learned senior counsel, the right to freedom of conscience was subject to public order, morality, health, and the other provisions contained in Part III of the Constitution. And as such, according to learned counsel, the said rights must be so interpreted, that no 'personal law' negates any of the postulated conditions containe

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