SMT. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain

Landmark judgment · Constitution & fundamental rights — Free and fair elections are part of the basic structure; part of the 39th Amendment struck down.

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
7 November 1975
Judge
Justice A.N. Ray
Neutral citation
1975 INSC 272
Reported in
[1976] 2 S.C.R. 347
Result
Dismissed
Subject
Service

Download the official PDF

Full judgment

SMT. INDIRA NEHRU GANDHI

v. SHRI RAJ NARAIN (and Vice Versa)

November 7, 1975 (With Review Application dated December 19, 1975)

[A. N. RAY, C.J., H. R. l<HtANNA, K. K. MATHEW, M. H. BEG AND

Y. v. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.] Constitutiou of India-Art. 329,A ( 4) and (5) as inserted by the Constitution (Thirty Ninth Amendment) Act, 1975-Validity of.

C

Election Laws (Amendment) Act, (Act 40) 1975 and the Constitution of lndia (Thirty Ninth Amendment) Act, 1975-Validity of-Not open to challenge on the score theot some members of Parliament were in preventive detelltio'nScope of Articles 79, 81, 85, 105(3) and 122 of the Constitution of lndia. Preventive detention of the Members of Parliament-Challenge to-Not· permissible collaterally while challenging the validity of the Statute. (

Represemation of the People (Amendment Act 58) of 1974-Validity of.

Election Laws (Amendment Act 40) of 1'975-Ss. 7, 8 and 10. Validity ofConstittttion of India Art. 31-B, 245 and 246 intent. Election £c,ws (Amendment Act 40) of 1975-S. 7 is only clarificatory of the State of Law and not changing the ,law-Validity of the amendment is not open ta cha/lenge wizen unamended S. 123(7) df the Representation of the People A ct (Act 43) of 1951 was not assailed-Amendment is intra vi res, t/1e powers of the Parliamellt to legislate-Constitution of lndiQ Art. 327. Constitution of lndia-Art. 368-Constituent powers S11premacy of.

of

Parliame11t-

Basic structure, theo1)' of-Applicability to "o,rdinary legislation" 1111der Arts. 245, 246 of the Constitution of India. Representatio!l of the People Act (Act 43) of 1'951-S. 123(3) as amended by Election Law Amendment Act 40 of 1975-Use of "Cow and Calf symbol" -Neither a religious nor a national symbol.

,.

Eiection expenses-Expenditure "incurred" or "authorised"-Mea11illg and tcsi of autlwrisation-S. 77, 83(1)(b) and 123(6) of the Representation of the Prople Act 1951-Evidence and proof of allegations of exceeding the limit of authorised expenditure-Candidate not required to disavow or denounce expcndi-

1life

Cor1·upt Practice-Proof of "Mens Rea" and "Actus Reus" is necessary u/s 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act. Constitutidn of India An. 14-Amendment to Election Laws by Act 40 of 1975. special treatment to the Prime Minister and Speaker on account of unique oflice-Placin~ the statutes in the protected Schedule under A rt. 31-11 dues not offend A rt: 14.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1976] 2 S.C.R.

Pl<'adi11g alld Eridc11ce in Election petitions-A//egatio11 of corrupt practice-

s. 8.3( I) (b) and 123 of the Representatio11 of the People Act-lllsufficie11t pa111culars of corrupt practice-No amount of 1·ridencc b.e iooked into a case 11ot really set up.

Adverse inference, presumptio11 Of S. 114 illustration (g) of the Evidence Act (Act !), 1872-Presumptio11 is always optional and one of fact and 1101 obliga• tory.

Conclusive Proof-Gazette notificatio11 of appointment suspensio'n, retirement or resignatio11 of Government employees-Cl. 8 of the Election Laws Amendmott Act 40 of 1975. Interpretation df Statutes-Rule of construction of provisio11 widely worded.

Review Appl/cation--Order XXXVlll Supreme Court Rules 1966 read with order XLV!l Rule 1 C.P.C.-Fai/ure to make a submission is not a ground 101·

~

reopening or review of a case.

D111y-Cou11se/'s duty while arguing a case, one of law and facts-What is.

Pursuant to the Notification dated January 27, 1971 u/s 14(2) of the Representation of the People Act. 1951, Smt. Indira :Nehru Gandhi, the appellant filed her nomination papers on February 1. 1971 before February 3, 1971, the last date therefor fixed by the Election Commission for Rae Barely constituency. The appellant was for a number of years before the election, Prime Minister of Tndia and is since then continuing to hold that office. On his resignation w.e.f. 14-1-1971 the notification of which was gazetted on 25-1-1971 from the post of officer on special duty in the . Prime Minister's Secretariat Yashpal Kapur was appointed the election agent of the appellant. The signed form about the appointment of Yashpal Kapur as an election agent was submitted to the Returning Officer on February 4, 1971 the date of scrutiny. The r,ppellant, who was a candidate of the Indian National Congress (R) ""' allotted the party symbol of "Cow and Calf".

As per the poll results declared on March 10, 1971, the appellant was elected to the House of the People by an overwhelming majority of 1,11,810 votes over her close rival, Shri Raj Narain, a Samyukta Socialist Party Leader. Shri Raj Narain filed an election petition on 24-4-1971 under s. 80 read with s. 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 to challenge the election of the successful returned candidate before the High Court of Allahabad. At the trial of the petition, the petitioner limited. the challenge only to the following grounds viz., (i) The successful candidate procured the assistance of' the Armed Forces for ar.tanging her flights by Air Force aeroplanes and helicopters. (ii) Her election agent Shri Yashpal Kapoqr and others distributed clothes and liquor to induce the voters to vote for her. (iii) She and her election, agent made appeals to the religious symbol of "cow and calf". (iv) Her election agent and others proenred vehicles for the free . conveyance of voters to the polling station. (v) She and her election agent incurred or authorised expenditure in violation of s. 77(3) of the Rewesentation of the People Act read with Rule 90 of the Conduct of Election Laws, 1961. (vi) She obtained assistance of the Gazetted Officers of the ·Government of Uttar Pradesh for fnrlhering her election prospects by rostrums and providing loudspeakers etc. and (vii) She held herself out as a prospective candidate £rom the Rae Barely Constituency immediately after the dit!solution of the

\

f

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

Lok Sabha on 27-12-1970 and for furtherance of her election rrospects, she obtained the assistance of Shri Yashpal Kapoor a Gazetted Officer in the Government of India holding the post of' officer on special duty in the Prime Minister's Secretariat for furthering the same purpose. The learned single Judge of the High Court found the appellant guilty of having committed corrupt practices within the meaning of s. 123 (7) of the Representation of the Peopl·e Act and held ( l) The appellant held herself out as a candidate from the Rae Bareily Parliamentary Constituency on December 29, 1970.

~··

( 2) The appellant obtained the assistance of the officers of the Government of U.P., particularly the Dist. Magistrate, superintendent of Police, the Executive Engineer (PWD) and the Engineer Hyde! Dept. for construction of rostrums and arrangement of <;\Jpplv of power to loudspeakers in the meetings held on l-2-197 l ,- and 25-2-1971 in f[irtherance of her election prospects and

(3) The status of YashpaJ Kapur continued to be that of a gazetted officer despite retrospective acceptance of the resignation and hence she obtained his services in furtherance oi' her election prospect. Acting under s. SA of the Act, the learned Judge also declared that the successful candidate would stand disqualified for a. period of six years from June 12, 1975 being the date of the judgment. Aggrieved by this part of the Judgment, Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi filed an appeal No. 887 of 1975 and the defeated candidate filed cross-appeal No. 909 of 1975.

f

During the pendency of the election petition in the: High Court, the President of India on October 19, 1974 promulgated "The Representation oi' the People !Amendment) Ordinance, 1974" which was replaced by Act 58 of 1974. The Representation of the People (Amendment Act 58) of 1974 by way of an explanation to s. 77 of the Act laid down that expenses incurred by a political party or supporte'rs would not be deemed to be election expenditure of a candidate belonging to that party. lt expressly excepted from its operation decision of the Supreme Court voiding an election before the commencement of the Ordinance. Jt also excepted similar decisions of High Court provided they had become final or unappealable.

The defeated candidate filed a Writ Petition No. 3761 of 1975 in the High Court to challenge the constitutional validity of the Ordinance of 1974. ln view of the finding in the election petition that the total amount of expendiure incurred or authorised by the successful candidate Qr her election agent together with the amount proved to have been incurred by the political party or the State Government in connection with the election did not exceed the prescribed limit, the learned judge though it unnecessary to inquire into the constitutionality of the Ordinance and the Act of 1.974 and thus, dismissed the Writ Petition. An appeal was filed to a Division Bench of the High Court from the aforesaid order but by the consent of parties. the points _involved in the Writ Petition and in the appeal before the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court were permitted to be argued in this Court, in the appeal and cross-appeal. During 1he pendency of these appeals the Parliament passed the Election Laws (Amendment) Act 40 of 1975 which came into force on August 6, 1975. It substitutes a new S. 8A in the Representation of the People Act, 1951 em· powering the President to decide where a person found guilty of corrupt practice shall be disqualified and if so, for what pelriod. By s. 6 it amends s. 77 of the Act of 1951 making pre-nomination expenses, a matter of irrelevant consideration. It declares that the expenditure incurred by a Government ser· vant in the discharge of his official duty in connection with any arrangement or I

II

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1976] 2 S.C.R.

facilities and such arrangements or facilities shall not be deemed to be expenditum or assistance incurred or rendered for tbe furtherance of the election prospects of the candidate concerned. By s. 7 it redefines a candidate to mean a person who has been or claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate in any election. lly s. 8 it provides that no 9ymbol allotted to a candidate shall be deemed to be a religious or national symbol and it says to extent relevant that the publication in the official gazette of the resignation of the government servant shall be conclusive proof of the fact of resignation. lf the effective date, of resignation is stated in the publication, it shall also be a conclus·ive proof of- the fact that the Government servant ceases to be in service with effect from the particular date. The amendments made by ss. 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Amending Act have retrospective effect and expressly govern election . appeals pending in this Court among other proceedings.

l

·~

By the Constitution ( 39lh Amendment) which came into force on August 10, 1975 two new Articles in the Constitution, namely, Art. 71 and 329A were introduced. This Act puts in the 9lh Schedule three Acts, namely, (1) The Representation of the People Act (Act 43) of 195l.; (2) The Representation of the People (Amending Act 58) of 1974 and (3) The Election Laws (Amendment Act) 4() of 1975. Article 71 which replaces its precursor empowers the Parliament to pass law9 regulating the election of the President and the Vice President including the making of a provision for the decision of disputes relating to these elections. Art. 329A has six clauses out of which the first three d~al with the future election to the Parliament of persons holding the office of Prime Minister or Speaker at the time of election or who are appointed to these offices after the election to the Parliament.· These clauses aim at depriving the courts of their jmisdiction to try election petitions in which the election of the Prime Minister or tbe SP.eaker to the Parliament is challenged. Clause 4 frees the disputed election of the Prime Minister and the Speaker to the Parliament from the resu·aints of all election laws. It declares snch election ag valid notwithstanding any judgment and clause 5 ordains that any appeal dr cross-appeal pending before the Supreme Court shall be disposed of on the assumption that judgment under appeal is void, that the findings contained in the jud,gment never had· any existence in the eye of law and tbe election declared void by judgment shall continue to be valid in all respects. Clause 6 provides that Art. 329A shall have precedence over the rest of the Constitution. This Court held by a majority of 7 to 6 in the case of His Holiness Kcsavmvmda Bharati v. State of Kera/a, that the power of amendment under Art. 368 does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or framework of th·e Constitution. As to what are the basic structLrres of the Constitution, illustrations have been given by each of these. Judges. They include democratic republican form of the Government, Secular character of the Constitution, separation of powers among the legislature. executive and judiciary, the federal character of the O:mstitution; Rule of Law, Equality of status and of opportunity; Justice, Soda!, Economic and political; Unity and integrity of the nation aud the dignity of the individual secured by the various provisions of the Constitution. There was consensus among these judges that democracy is a basic structure of the Constitution. This Court further was of the unanimous view in Bharati's case that Art. 31-B is not open lo challenge. The view of the seven judge< in Bharati's case is that Art. 31-B is a constitutional device to place the specified statutes in ihe Schedule beyond any attack that these infringe Part HI of the Constitution. Placiug reliance on the majority view in Bharati'9 case and on the ground that some of the basic stmctures of the Constitutio1\ have been damaged by the enactment and that they were beyond the amending power under Art. 368 the respondent challenged the constitutional validity of the Constitution (39th Amendment) Act, 1975 and tbe Election Laws (Amendment) Act 40 of 1975.

Accepting the appeal and dismissing the cross-appeal· the Court. HELD : (By Court) Constitutional validity of the Acts cannot be challenged on the score that a number of members of Parliament were in detention under the Preventive detention laws. The legality of the detention orders c:timot be canvassed collaterally. [355F, 461F, 5340-E; 587A-G, 670H, 671A]

i-

>

I SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

May's Parliamentary Practice 18th Edn.; Bradlaugh v. Gosett 12 9.B.D. 27 285-86; K. Ana11da11 Na.inbiar v. The Chief Secretary to Gdvt. of Madras [1966} 2 S.C.R. 406. Per Majority (Khanna, Mathew and Chandrachud. JJ.) Cl. 4 of Art. 329A as introduced by the Constitution (Thirty Ninth Amendment) Act, 1975 is unconstitution. [474D, 525E, 665B-E]

·@

Per C.J. Clause 4 of Art. 329A in the present case inv3:lida!ing the electi<?n has passed a declaratory Judgment and not a law. The legislative Judgment .m Cl. 4 is an exercise of judicial power. The conslituent power can exercise judicial power, but it has to apply law. [418F]

f

Per Beg J. Undoubtedly Cl. (4) of Art. 329A could be said to have a political objective in the context in which it was introduced and the comt CQltld perhaps take judicial notice of this context. If the purpose of Clause 4 of Art. 329A was purely to meet the political needs of the country and was only partly revealed by the policy underlying the Statement of object and reasons, it seems possible to contend that it was not intended at all to oust the jurisdiction · of the court. Hence, Art. 329A Cl. 5 will not so understood, bar the j llrisd iction of the Court to hear and decide the appeals. when it says that t'he appeal shall be disposed of in conformity with the provisons of Cl. ( 4) [644H, 645A-B] (Per C.J., Khanna a11d Beg, JJ.) (iii) The "Cow and Calf" symbol is not a religious symbol. [443G-H, 480H, 578F-Gl By Court (Unanimous) The Election Laws (Amendment Act 40) 1975 is valid. [437E-G, 488E, 536C, 587A-G, 669GJ (Per Khanna, Mathew &. Beg JJ.) The corrupt practice defined in S. 123(7) could not be committed by any person before there was a "candidate" for an election. [476F, 535E-F, 547E] ·Per C.J. Candidate is not required to disavow or denounce expenditure, incurred by a political party. [433-A] Per C.J. & Khanna J. Official duty will be a duty in law. [44IEF, 480ABJ By Court : Retrospective legislation of election law is valid. [418E, 481CD, 482 A-B, 530 D-G] Per C. J. There is no vice of delegation in the Statutes. [442AJ Mathew J. (Contra) Cl. 8(b) of the Election Laws Amendment Act does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation and is not arbitrary. [536C] Per Ray C.J.

Judicial Review in an electio'n petition is not a conipu/sion.

..

(i) Judicial Review in many mattern under statute may be excluded. In many cases special jurisdiction is created to deal with matters assigned to such authorities. A Special forum is even created to have election disputes. A right of appeal may be conferred against such decision. If Parliament acts as •the forn111 for determination of election disputes, it may be a question of Parliamentary privilege and the courts may not entertain any review from suchJ decisions.. That is because the exercise of power by the Legislature in determining disputed elections may be called legislative power. A distinction arises between what can be called the traditional judicial determination by courts and tribunals on the one hand and the peculiar jurisdiction by the legislature in determining .controverted election on the other. [410D-F] American Constitution Art.1 Sec. 5(2); German Federal· Republic C6nstitu. lion; Australian Constitution; Grenvile Act 1868; English Representation of People Act. 1949; Story on American Constitution: Corpus Juris Vo]. 16(1956) & Vol 29(1965); Taylor v. Beckham'44 L, Ed. 547 p.585; Truman H. Newbery v. U$.A. 65 L. Ed. 913; David S. Barry v. The U.S.A. Ex Rel Thomas W. Cunningham 73 L. Ed. 867 Charles W. Baker v. Joe C. Carr 7 L.Ed. 663. Julian Bond v. James Slopper Floyd 17 L. Ed. 2nd 235 Adam Clayton Powell v. John W. McCormack 23 L. Ed. 491. (Considered)

B.

C

C.

U

.A

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1976) 2 S.C.R.

. (ii) The legal order is a sysrem of genera\ and individual norms connected with each other according to the principle that Jaw regulates its own creation. Creatio1_1 of_ law is an application of law. The creation of a legal norm is normaJly an apphcat101! of the h\gher norm, regulating its creation. The application of ~1g~~r norn~ .1s t~e creation of a'. !ower norm determined by the higher norm. A JUd1crnl dec1s1on is an. act by which a general. norm, a statute, is applied but at the same time an individual norm is created binding one or both parties to the Taking it into a court is application conflict. Legislation is creation of law. of Jaw. The higher norm may determine the organ and the Procedure by which a lower norrm and the contents of the lower norm are created. The judicial function is like legislation both creation and application of law and is ordinarily determined by the general norms both as to procedure and as to the contents of the norm to be created. whereas Jegislation is usually determined by the constitution only in the former aspect. [4 IOF-H, 411-Cl Judicial Review is not to be fotmded on any Article in our Constitution unlike the American or the Australian Constitutions. [414F]

·C

Judicial review in the election disputes is not a compulsion. Judicial Review of decisions in election disputes may be enlrusted by Jaw to a judicial tribunal. If it. is to a Tribunal or to the High Court. the Judicial Review will be attracted either under the relevant law providing for appeal to this court or Art. 136 of the Constitution may be attracted. Under Art. 329(b) the contemplated Jaw may vest thei, power to entertain election petitions in the House itself which may determine the dispute by a resolution after receiving a report from a special committee. Jn such cases Judicial review may be eliminated without involving amendment of the Constitution. The Constitution permits by amendment exc.Jusion of judicial review of a matter if it is necessary to give effect to the Directive Priniciples of Slate Policy. A similar power may be available in the larger interest of the security of the State. In either case. the exc]usian of judicial review does not mean that pi:incinles of equality are violated. It only means that the appropriate body making the law satisfied itself and determines conclusivelv that principles of equality have not been violated. Tf judicial review is excluded the court is not in a position to conclude that the principles of equality has heen violated. Art. 33 excludes judicial review in matter> relating to the Armed Fo,rces. Art. 262(2) excludes. jurisdiction of court> in water disputes. The Amending body has similarly excluded judicial review in Articles 31A. 31B and 31C. [416BE. G] "Audi A/teram Partem-Rule of-App/icabilit)' to le!?islative processes.

The The legislature is entitled to obtain information from any source. kgislature may can witnesses. The rule of Audi Alteram Partem is not applicable to a legislative process. [415H, 416A]

Exclusio11 of the operation of the equalitv principle from some fields is

co11.1tit11tio11ally possible.

Equality of status as well as equality of opportunity is a fundamental right in Art. 14 and 16 of the Constitution, which means equality before law and equal protection of the laws. Equality is spoken in the Preamble. There is liberty to legislature to classify to establish equality. When Art. 3 IA and 31B eliminated judicial review the meaning was not that the legislature would go on discriminating. The task of classification can be left to the legislature. It is the· very nature of legislation that cfassification must be in public interest. Exclusion of the operation of the equality principle from some fields is constitutionally possible. [416E-G] There is 110 q11estio11 of c.ny separation of powers beillf? invo/l"ed i11 clcctio11 nu:.ilters.

In our constitution there is separatfon of powers in a broad sense.. The doctrine of separation' of powers as recognised in America. is not app\icable to our country. Hence, the larger question wh~ther there !S any doctrine of separation of p0wers, when it comes to exercise of constituent power does not arir1e. [414G-HI

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

I In re. Del/ii Laws Act [1951] SCR 747 @ 965-66; Jayantilal Sodhan V, R. N. Raina [1964} 5 SCR 294; Chatldra Mohan v. State of U.P. & Ors.. [1967] I SCR 77 @ 87 and Udai Ram Sharma and Ors. etc. v. U11io11 of J11di1J and Ors. (1968J 3 SCR 41 & 67 (referred to).

Many powers which are strictly judicial have been excluded from the Purview of the courts. Under our constitution. Parliament has inherited all the privileges, powers and immunities of the British HouSe of Comm0ns. In the case of election disputes Parliament has defined the procedure by Jaw. It can at any time change that procedure and take over itself the whole question. There is, therefore, no question of_ any separation of powers being involved in matters concerning elections and election petitions. [415B-C] J11lia11 Bond v. John S/opper Floyd 17 L. Edn. Adam Clayton Powell v. Jolin W. McCormack 23 L. Eda. 491 (referred to). "Legislature is cvmpcle111 to validate matters. fo1111d to he i11w1Ud by cour/J by c!1a11ging the law'' The power of the legislature to validate mailers which have been found by judgment or orders of competent courts and Tribunals to be invalid or illegal is a well known pattern. The legislature validates acts and things by which the basis of judgments or order of competent courts and tribunals is changed and the judgments and orders are made ineffective. The effect of validation is to chan~ the law so as to alter the basis of any judgment which might have been given on the basis of old law. The rendering of the judgment ineffective by changing its basis by legislative enactment is not an encroachment on judicial power, but a legislation within the competence of the Legislature rendering the basis of the judgment non-est. Where invalid elections declared by reason of corrupt practice have been validated by changing the definition Qf corrupt practices in the Representation of the People Act. 1951. retrospectively, the original judgment is rendered ineffective. [412D, E-F, 4 I 3A-B]

S

Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand Surmw, (1970] 2 S.C.R. 830 (relied on). Abe)·a Sekma v. .layahilake [1932] A.C. 260, Basa11thc• Chandra Chose v. The King Emperor [1944] F.C.R. 225, Piare D11sad/1 & Ors. v. King Emperor [f944J F.C.R. 81, referred to.

Constit11e111 Power is "sui generis". It can exercise judicial power but it has to apply law. ·

The constituent powers is "sui generis". It is different from legislative power The position of unlimited Jaw making power is the criterion of legal sovereignty. The .:onstituent power is sovereign because the Constitution flows from the Constituent power. When the constituent nower exercises powers, the constituent power comprises legislative, executive and ludicial powers. All powers flow from the constituent power through the constitution, to the various departments or heads. Jn the hands of the constituent authority there is no demarcation of powers. The Constituent power is independent of the doctrine of separation of powers and sovereign. Jt is the power which creates the organs and distributes the powers. There is no doubt, that the constituent power i9 not the same as le-gislative. power and legislative power is always to be borne in mind because !he constituent power is higher in norm. The constituent power is not the same as ordinary law making power. The constituent power is sovereign. The constituent power can exercise judicial power. but it has to apply law. [410E, C-D. 416A, 4180, Fl

The concept of free and fair election is 1101 a basic structure.

The concep~ of free and fair election is worked out by the Representation of the People Act. The Act provides a definition of "corrupt practice" for the guidance of the court. In making !he law the legislature acts on the concept of free and fair election. In any legislation relating to the validity of election. the \;"Oncept of free and fair elections is an important consideration. In the process of election the concept of free and fair election is worked out by formulatinit the principles of franchise. and the free exercise of franchise. In cases of disputes as to election the concept of free and fair elections means

1-1

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1976] 2 'S.C.R. \

that dispt~tes are fa!rlY and justly decided. Electoral offences are statutory ones. . It 1s not possible to hold that the concept of free and fair election is a basic structure. Some people may advocate universal franchise. Some people. may adv.ocate proportional representation. Some people may advocate edue.al!onal qua!Jficat10ns for voters. Some P.eople may advocate property qualifications for voters. Instances can be mult1phed on divergence of views in regard to qualifications for voters, qualifications of members, forms of corrupt practices. Th:lt is why there is law relating to and regulating elections. [416H, 417A-C] Infirmities in Cl. (4) of Art. 329A-Rule of law is of]ended.

Cbuse 4 in Art. 329A has done four things, first it has wipe<.! out not merely the judgment but also the election petition and the law relating ~hereto. Secondly, it has deprived the right to raise a dispute about the validity of the election by not having provided another forum. Third, there is no judgment to deal with and no right or dispute to adjudicate upon. Fourth, the constituent power of its own legislative judgment has validated the el~ction. [417C-D] · Clause ( 4) suffers from these infirmities. First, the forum might be chaaged but another forum has to be creared. If the constituent power became itself the forum to decide the disputes the constituent power by repealing the law in relation to election petitions and matters connected therewith did not have any petition to seize upon to deal with- the same. Secondly, any decision is to be made in accordance with law. Parliament has power to create law and apply the same. In the present case, the constituent power did not have any law to apply to the case, because the previous law did not apply and no other law was applied to clause (4). , The validation of the election in the pre5'ent case is, therefore, not by applying any law and it, therefore offends Rule of .Jaw. [417H, 418A-B] It is true that no express mention is made in our constitution of vesting the judiciary the judicial power as is to be found in the American constitution. But a division of the three main functions of Government is recogni§cd in our constitution; judicial power in the sense of the judicial power of the state i9 vested in the judiciary. Similarly, the Executive and the Legislature are vested with powers in thei.r spheres. Judicial power bas lain in the hands of the judiciary prior to the constitution and .. aJso since the constitution. It is not the intention that the powers of the Judiciary should be passed to or be shared by the Executive or the legislature or that the powers of the Legislature or the Executive should pass to or be shared by the Judiciary. [418B-D]

Ref1·ospective Legislation not by itself discrimination

The constituent power is 90verei'gn. Law-making power is subject to the constitution. Parliament mav create a forum to· bear or itself hear the election disputes. Whichever body Will hear election disputes will have to apply norms. Norms are legal standards. There is no discrimination, if classification on rational basis is made for determination of disputes relating to persons hold~g the office of the Prime Minister or the Speaker. The changes effected by the Amendment Acts 1974 and 1975 apply to all an<l there is no discrimination. Retrospective legislation is not by itself discrimination. [4180-E] Clause (4) of Art. 329A in the present case invalidating the election has passed a declarat01y judgment and not a law. The legislative judgment in clause 4 is an exercise of judicial power. The constituent power can exercise judicial power but it has to apply law. r418F]

'"

The validation of the election is not by applying legal norms. Nor can it be said !'hat the validation of election in clause 4 is by norms set up by the Constituent power. [418G] Clause 5 in Art. 329A shows that an appeal against any order of any court referred to in clause 4 pending, before the commencement of the Constitution (Thirty.ninth Amendment) Act, 1975, before the Supreme Court, shall

)

"

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

be disposed of in conformity with the provisions of clause 4. The appeal cannot be disposed of in conformity with the provisions of clause 4 inasmuch at !he validation of lhe election cannot rest on clause 4. [4l8HJ

"The Election Lall"s (Amendment) Act 40, 1975 and Constillltion (Thirty11i11th Amendment) Act, 1975 cannot be challenged on the ground that there was no valid session of 1/te House as a number of members of Parliament were in detention and were prevenled from taking deliberations in tile Pai"liament." · (1) When a member is excluded from participation in the proceedings of

the House, that is a nrntter concerning the Parliament and the grievances of exclusion is in regarJ to proceedings within ~he walls of Parliament. In regard to rights to be exercised within the walls of the House, the House itself is the judge. (420 A-BJ . May's Parliamentary Practice 18th Edn. pp. s2:s3 Draudlaugh v. Gossett 12 Q.B.D. 271 & 285-286. In re. Farrers (1543). In re. Shirley I Jiatsell 157, English Act J: James I C 13' (Considered). The composition of Pmliament is not dependent on inability of a member to attend for whatsoever reason. The purpose of Art. 85. is to give effect to the collective right of ~he House which represents the nation to be called as often as the situation demands, and in any case the interval between two sessions must not exceed six months. Assuming a conftic! were to arise between the privileges of a member under Art. 105(3) and the functions of the House to assemble under Art. 85 the privilege .of the member .wi!J not prevail. The Constitution provides for proclamation of emergen~y. the suspension of the remedy under Art. 359 for enforcement of fundamental rights enabling even . detention of members of Parliament, when necessary. Art. 85 is not suspended. The six months rule is obligatory. It follows that the members' right under Art. 105 (3) and the functions of the House to assemble under Art. 85 the privilege Of the a member will not prevail. The det>ention of members of Parliament is by statutory authority in the exercise of his statutory powers. It follows that member~· right under Art. 105 are not availablelunder a detention in these circumstances. For the purposes of Art. 105(3) a conviction under Penal laws or detention under Emergency laws must be deemed to be valid till it is set aside. (421 B-C, E] When under Art. 359, the Presiden' during the operation of a Proclamation of Emergency by order declares that the right to move any court for the enforcement of rights conferred by Part III shall remain suspended and persons who · are members of House of Parliament are in detention under orders made under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, the detention cannot be challenged by collateral attack on the ground of deprivation of their participation in the Parliamentary proceedings. The challenge will be questioning the detention on the ground that the detention is in violation of Artid~s 19, 21 and 22. · [421F-Gl Art. 85 is not a prov1Sion regarding the Constitution of Parliament, but of holding session. The scope of Parliamentary privilege of freedom· from arrest has been defined positively and negatively. The positive aspect of the privile11e is expressed in the claim of the Commons to freedom from arrest in all civil actions or suits during Parliament. and during tbe period when a member was journeying or returning from Parliament. The privilege has been deprived negatively in the claim of the Commons which specifically excepted treason, fulony and breach or surety or the peace. The House will not allow even the sanctuary of its walls to protect a member from the process of criminal Jaw aHhough a service of a criminal process on a Member within the precincts of Parliament, whilst the House is sitting without obtaining the leave of the Home, would be a breach of privilege. [421H, 422B-C, F-GJ Mays' Parliamentary Practice 18th E<ln. pp. 82-83 Braudlaugh v. Gosset 12 Q.B.D. 271 @ 285-86. In re. Shirley's Halsell 157; English Act I James I C 13; Constitntion of India A1is. 18. 21, 22. 79, 81, 85, 105(3) 122(1) and 359; Special Reference No. 1 of 1964, [1965] 1

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1976) 2 S.C.R.

\

S.C.R. 413: In rP. Wilke., 19 State Tr. 981; Defence General Regulation 1939. Emergency (Defence) Act 1939 English; Defence of India Rules 1962 Rule 30(1)(2) (referred to). Arl>. 79, 81, 85, 86, I 00 cannot be construed to confer any right as such on individual Members or impose any· obligation on them. It is not as if a Member of Parliament is bound to attend the session or is under an obligatio11 to be present in the House, when the President addresses it. The context in which these Articles appear shows that the subject matter of these Articles is not the individual righls of the Members of Parliament, but they refer to the right of the President to· issue a summon' for the ensuring session of Parliament or to address the House or Houses. The freedom of speech to which Article t05 refers would be available to a Member of Parliament, when he attends the Session of Parliament. If the order of detention validly prevents him from attending a session of Parliament no occasion arises for the exercise of the right of freedom of speech and no complaint can b~ made that the said right has invalidly invaded. [424B-D] -

'~

1\. A11a11dan Nambiar & Anr. v. The Chief Secretarv, r.01•er11111e11t of Madras and Ors., rJ966l 2 S.C.R. 406 (relied on). The challenge that there was no \'alid session of the House. cannot be accepted. It is not open to the respondents to challenge the orde1:s of detention collaterally. The principle is that what is direclly forbidden cannot be indireC'ly achieved. [424Dl

A cc.ndidate is 1101 required to diSa\'011' or denounce expenditure incurred or authorised hy a po/it/m/ part:·. Election expenses incurred by a political party in connection with the election of the candidate of the party is not a part of the election expenses of the candidates. Similarly. participation in the programme of activity organised by a political party will nol fall within the expenses of candidate of the party. A candidate is not required to disavow or. denounce the expenditure incurred or authorised by the political party because the expenditure is neither incurred nor authorise by the candidate. One can disavow what would be a'cribcd to be incurred or authorised by one. In the case of expenses of a political party, there is no quo,.lion of disavowing expenditure incurred or authorised by the political party. As per the changes in law affected by the Amendment Acts. 1974, 1975 to Section 77 of the t 961 Act the exnenditure incurred or authorised in connection with the election of a candidate by the political party shall not be deemed to be &nd shall not ever be deemed to have been expenditure incurred O" authorised by the candidate or his election agent. The ruling in Kanwar Lal Gupta's case is no longer good law because of the legislative changes. [432H, 433A-B. 430H,. 431AB1

\,

Ka111rar Lal G11,.ta v. Amamath Chawla. A.LR. 1975 S.C. 308 (no longer good law); flam Raj v. Pt., Tlari Ram and Ors. 40 ELR 1125; S/w/1 Ja.rnntilal Ambalal \'. Kast11rilal Nagindas Doshi and Ors. 42. ELR 307; Rwrania)'a Singh v. Baijnath Singh J: Ors. [19551 1 SCR, 671; Ram Dayal v. Briirai Singh and Ors. [1970] 1 S.C.R. 530; Mag Raj Patadia v. R. K. Bir/a and On. f 19711 (2) S.C.R. 118. (discussed).

"Authorisation in S.

of the Represe11rario11 of the l'cor>le Act

1951

r<:q11ires proof".

1\llegations that election expenses arc incurred or auihoriscd by a candidate or bis agent will have to be proved. Authorisation means acceptance of the responsibility. Authorisation must precede the expenditure. Authorisation means reimbursement by the candidate or election agent of the person who has been authorised by the candidate or by the elec!ion agent to spend m !ncur. In onkr to constitute authorisation the effect must be that the authonty must cany with it the right of reimbursement. [433F-G] "Rosie Structure Theory" The contentions that ordinary legislative measl!res are suhie.:;t like ~onstitu­ tion mncnuments ta the restrictions of not damaging or t.lestroy111g ba"c struc-

'f

I

SMT. INDIRA GANDI-ll V. RAJ NARAIN

ture or basic features are utterly unsound. The contention that legislative measures are subject to restrictions of Nie ilieory of basic structures or basic features is to equate legislative measures with constitution amendment. [436A,B] Art. 245 and 246 give plenary powers to legislature to legislate. The power of plenary body is not to be construed like the power to delegate. The only prohibition is with reference to the provisions of the constituiion. The Constitution is the conclusive instrument by which powers are affirmatively created or negatively restricted. The only relevant test for the validity of a statute made under Art. 245 is whether the legislation is within the scope of the affirmative grant of power or is forbidden by some provisions of the constitution. [436F-G]

· To accept the basic features or basic structures· theory with re~ard to ordinary legislation would mean that there WOJJld. be two kinds of !imitations for legislative measures. One will pertain to legislative power under Art. 245 and 246 and the legislative en;ries and the provision in Art. 13. The other would be that no legislation can be made as to damage or destroy basic features or basic structures. ·This will mean rewriting the constitution and robbing the legislature of acting wiihin the framework of the Constitution. No legislation can be free from challenge on this ground even though the legislative measure is within the plenary. powers of the legislative. [436G-H, 437AJ

C

There is no implied limitations on the power of amendment of the constitution. Our constitution has not adopted the due process clause of the American Constitution. Reasonableness of legislative measures is unknown to our constitution. The crucial point is that unlike the American consiitqtion where rights are couched in wide ~neral terms leaving it to the course to evolve necessary I imitations our constitutioJl has denied due process as a test of invalidity of law, Our constitution contemplates that consideration of jusiice or general welfare might require restriction on enjoyment of fundamental rights. (437 A-CJ

.,

Kesavananda Bliarati's case [1973] Suppl. S.C.R. State of Madras [1950] S.C.R. 88 (followed).

1;

A. K. Copa/an

v.

The theory of basic structures or basic features is an exercise in imponderables. Bade structures or basic features are indefinable. The legislative entries are the fields of legislation. The pith and sub>tance doctrine has been applied ou in order to find ou• legislative competency, and eliminate encroachment legislative entries. Jf the theory of basic structures or basic features will be applied to legislative measures it will denude Parliament and State Legislatures of tire power of legislation and deprive them of laying down legislative policies. This will be encroachment on the separation of powers. [437C-DJ

"Electo1d Legislation and amendments thereto are intra vires the powers of Parliament to legislate.

..• 'l

The Constitutional validity of a •latutc depends entirely on the exisl'ence of the legislative power and the express provision ii1 Art. 13. Apart from the limitation the legislature is not subject to any other prohibition. The amendments made to the 1951 Act by the Amendment Acts 1974 and 1975 are to give elfect to ce1tain 'iews expressed by this Court in preference to certain views dcparl!ed from or otherwise to clarify the original intention. It is within the powers of Parliament to frame laws with regard to elections. Parliament has power to enumerate and define election expenses. Parliament has power to state whether certain expenses can be included or may be excluded from election expenses. Parliament has power to adopt conclusive proof with regard to · matters of appointment, resignation or termination of service. Parliament has power to state what can be considered to be office of profit. Parliament has power to state as to what will and wh'.lt will not constitute co~rupt prac~ice. Parliament has power to enact what will be the ground for d1squal1ficatlon. Parliament has power to define "candidate". Parliament has power to state what symbols will be allotted to candidates for election. These are all legislative policies. [437E-GJ • , .•.•.. '"'~· . 2-t~SCI/76

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[ 197 6] 2 s.c.rc

\

The conclusive evidence or conclusive proof clause is an accepted legislative measure. Similarly giving retrospective effect to legislative amendment is accepted to be valid exercise of legislative power. [437H]

Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand ~urana, (1970] 2 S.C.R. 830 (affirmed). The rendering of a judgment ineffective by changing the basis by legislative enactment is not encroachment on judicial power because the legislation is within the competence of the legislature. [438Cl

M. P. V. Sundararamier & Co. v. The State of A. P. & Ors. [19581 S.C.R. 14'22 (relied on) · "Retro~pective

legis/aJion of election laws is valid".

It is well recognised that Parliament and State Legislature can make their law5 operate retrospectively. Any law that can be made prospectiwly can be made with retrospective operation (Vide Kanta Kathuria's case). Certain kinds of laws cannot operate retrospectively and that i9 "expost facto" legislation. The present case docs not fall within the category. [438E-F]

May's Parliamentary Practice 17th Edn. p. 546 and English (referred to).

ca~cs

therein

Tl1e Fundamental Right< Chapter has no bearing on Election rights.

The Fundamental Rights chapter has no bearing on a right created by a Statute relating to Election. The Right to stand as candidate and to contest an election is not a common law right. It is a special right created by a statute which can only be exercised on the conditions laid down by a statute. £438HJ

Jamna Prasad Mukhariya and Ors., v. Lachhi Ram and Ors., (1955] 1 S.C.R. 608 (applied).

There is no basic structure or basic feature or basic framework with regard to the time when under the Election Laws a person is a candidate at the election. The contention that the amendment of the definition of "candidate" has damaged or destroyed basic structure is untenable. [439Al

Camlid<Me meaning of-It does not include "retumed candidate" within tlie meanillR of Section !OO(l)(b)

The contention that the expression "returned . candidate" is descriptive of the expression "candidate" will rob section 100 of its content. The word "candidate" in relation to various electoral offences shows that he must be a candidate: at the time of the offence. [439A-B]

Electoral Offences under the Representation of the and the Indian Panel Code Ss. 171-A No. l Distinctfon.

Peqple

Act,

1951

A significant distinction arises between the electoral offences under the 1951 Act and the offences under sections 171-A to 171-I of the Indian Penal Code. namely, that the 1951 Act uses the word "cimdidate' or his election agent with reference to various offences, whereas the Indian Penal Code does not use the word "candidate" in relation to commission of any offence. Any person may fall within the offences of bribery, undue influence, personation at elections within the provisions of the Indian Penal Code or for false statement or illegal payments in connection with any election or failure to keep election accounts. Sections 171-A to 171-I of the Indian Penal Code and the provisions contained in sections 125 to 136 of the Representation of the People Act 1951 follow the pattern of English Acts namely, Statutes 17 and 18 Victoria, Chap. r.n (1853-54). Statutes 21 and 22 Victoria Chapter I (1882). In these sectiol!s dealing with the acts of persons other than candidates and votees no time JS mentioned, while the English Act does mention. [439B-C, 4400-EJ Parker's conduct of Parliamentary Elections' 19'70 Edn. p. 52-53; In· re. Youthal I O'M & H 295; In re. Bodin 50'M N 280; In re. Norwic/1 54 L T

1. I •

/

r

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

'627; Siatute 17 and 18 Victoria, Ch. CII (1853-54); Statute 21 and 22 Viet. Ch. LXXXVU (1858 l Statute 46 and 47 Viet. LI !882.

Holding out as a candidate~Meaning of. \

The 1951 Act uses the expression "candidate" in relation to several offence for the purpose of fixing liability with reference to a person being a candidate, if no time be fixed with regard to a person being a candidate it can be said that from the moment a person is elected he can be said to hold himself out as a candidate for the next election. The definition of the English Act cannot be of any aid to the construction of the 1951 Act. [441A-BJ

"Official dutv" will he duty in law. Official duty will be a duty in law. Official duty will be duty under administrative directions of the Executive. Official duty will be for security law and order and matters in aid of public purpase. These dnties will be in connection with election. Official. duties must have reasonable connection between the Act and the discharge of duty. [441E-F]

MataioR Dob~y v. fl. C. Bhari, [19551 2 S.C.R. 925 (applied). "There is no vice of delegation in the statutes." There is no vice of delegation in the statutes. "Delegation" is not the complete handing over or transference of a power from one person or body of persons to another. Delegation may be defined as the entrusting by a person or body of persons of the exercise of power residing in that person or body of persons to another person or body of persons with complete power of revocation or' amendment remaining in the grantor or dele,sator. Delegation often involves the granting of discretionary authority to another, but such authority is purely derivative. The< ultimate power always remains in the delegator and is never renounced. [442A-C]

Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturin.fi' (Weaving) Co. Ltd. v. The Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax and Ors. [19741 4 S.C.R. 98 & 116. (followed). The contentions that the Amendment Acts of 1974 and 1975 are subject to basic features or basic structures or basic frame work fails on two grounds. First, legislative measures are not subject to the theory of basic features or basic structure or basic frame work. Secondly the majority view in Kesavananda Blzarati's case is that the 39th Amendment which put the two statutes in the Ninth Schedule and Art. 31-B is not open to challenge on the ground of either damage to destruction of basic features., basic structures or basic framework or on the ground of violation of fundamental rights. [442H, 443A]

Kesavananda Bliarati's case, [1973] Supp. S.C.R. 1 (applied).

...- '"'\

:...

·~

••

Cow and Calf symbol validity allotted by the Election Commissioner under the Election Rule is not a religious symbol within the mealling of s.123(3) and the usage of the symbol will not co1Zslitute also a corrupt practice." It is impossible to hold that because one party ha9 not been given the symbol of "cow, calf and milk maid", therefore, the symbol of "cow, calf and milk maid" becomes a religious symbol. No evidence was let to prove that "cow and calf" is a religious symbol. [443G-HJ

Per Khanna,. l.

"Propriety of the impugned constitutional amendment is not_ the concern of the Court. This Court is n9t ~oncerned _with the wisdom behind or the propriety of the impugned constitutional amendment. These are matters essentially for those who are vested with the authority to make the constitutional amendments All that this Court is concerned with is the constitutional validity of the impugn: ed amendment. [457A-B]

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[l976j 2 S.C.R.

\

"Co11stit11tional validity of tlze Acts cannot be assailed on the ground tlzat some of the members of Parliament where prevented because al tlzeir detention from attending and participating in the prodecdings of tlze House of Parlia-

mem.

The contention that the sitttings of the two Houses of Parliament in which, the impugned Acts were passed essentially relates to the validity of the proceedings of the two Houses, are matters which are not justiciable and pertain to the internal domain of the two Houses. Of course, the courts can go into the question as to whether the measures passed by Parliament are constitutionally valid. The court cannot, however, go into the question as to whether the sittings of the Houses of Parliament were not constitutionally valid because some members of those Houses were prevented, from attending and participating in the discussion9 in these Houses. Art. 122(1) and Art. 100 would show that the framers of the Constitution were anxious to ensure that the procedural urcgularities and other grounds like those mentioned in clause (2) of Art. 100 should not vitiate the validity of proceedings of Parliament and that it would not be permissible' to call in question those proceedings on such grounds. [458DE, 459B-C]

I

I

~

May's "Parliamentary Practice" 18th Edn. 100; K. Anc•ulan Nambiar &

A11r. v.' The Chief Secreta1'v Govemment of Madras and Ors. [1966] 2 S.C.R.

406 {relied on). Speo.tal Refel"ence No. 1 of 1964, [1965] 1 S.C.R. p. 413; (Obiter) not applicable.

It is a right of each House of Parliament to be the sole judge of the lawfulness of its own proceedings. It would, therefore. follow that the courts cannot go into the lawfulness of the proceedings of the House of Parliament. [460F·Gl Bradla11gh v. Gossett 12 Q.B.D. 271 (1883-84) (quoted with approval).

The act of detaining a person is normally that of an outside agency and not that of the House of\ Parliament. It would certainly look anomalous, if the act of an outside agency which might ultimately turn out to be not leMl could affect the validity of the proceedings of the House of Parliament or could prevent that House from assembling and fnnctioning. [460Gl "Gazette notification raises an assumptio'n tlzat tlze Acts were duly passed".

Jn the face of the pt1blication in the gazette of the Election Laws (Amendment Act 40) 1975 and the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment Act) 1975 this court must assume that those two Acts were duly passed. [461Al

Marshall Field & Co. v. Jdh11 M. Clark 14 U.S. 649: Oscar Leser v. Merder Garnett 66 L. Ed. 505 (di~cussed).

The constitutional validity of the Constitution Amendment Act and the 1975 Act amendini: the Representation or the People Act cannot be assailed on the ground that some of the members of Parliament were prevented because of their detention from attending and participating in the proceedings of the House of Parliament. [461Fl ·

"Validity of preventive detention of Members of Par/icvnent cannot be do/laterally raised in proceedings wherein the court is concemed with t/ie l'afidity of constitution a11u!nd111ent.1'

Question as: to whether a member of Parliament has been validly detained under a law relating to p~·evention detention can be !lppropriately gone into in proceedings for a y;nt o~ habeas corpus. Suc1!- question can!lot be collaterally raised in procee<lmgs ltke the present wherem the court 1s concerned with the validity of a Constitution Amendment Aot and an Act to amend the Representation of the People Act. [458B·Cl

It is plain that it would not be poosible. ~or the court in. such co!lateraT proceedings to record a findinu about the. valld1ty of the. d;tent10n of mem~rs because the full material having a beanng on the val1d1ty of the detention

J •

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

\

would normally be, apart from the authority passing the order for detention, ·Only with the person ordered to be detained or his friends and relatives. It would plainly be hazardous to record a finding without such material and a .court of law, should decline to record such a finding in collateral proceedings. Till such time as a finding is recorded in appropriate proceedings, about the validity of the detention pf the members of Parliament the court would have to proceed upon the assumption that the detention has not been shown to be invalid. [459E-G]

[Obiter : Jn deciding a case .before it. the co_urt should resist the atte~pt <if a party to induce it to decide a matl'Cr which though canvassed durmg arguments is only incide.ntal and collateral and can appropriately be dealt with in separate proceedings.] [458C-Dl

"Clause 4 of Art. 329A is unconstitutional as it violates the principle of free tN1d fair elections an essential postulate o'j democracy, which in its tum is a part of the !Jc.<Sic structure of the Constitution." Clause ( 4) of Art. 329A consists of four parts, viz; (i) No law made by Parliament before the commencement of the Con~titution (Thirty-ninth Amend· men!) Act, 1975 insofar as it relates to the election petitions and matters connected therewith shall apply or shall be deemed ever to have applied to or in relation to the election of any such person as is referred to in Cl. ( 1) to either House of Parliament. (ii) and such election could be declared to be void or has, before such commencement, been declared to be void under any such law. (iii) and notwithstanding an qrder made by any court before such commencement declaring such election to be void, such election shall continue to be valid in all respects; and (iv) any such order and any finding on whicbi such order is based shall be and shall he deemed always to have been void and of no effect. [461G-H, 462A-CJ

As far as part (i), it relates to a matter which can be the subject of an ordinary legislation or a constitutional amendment. A Jaw in the above terms can validly be made by a legislature as well as by constituent authority. The fact that the above Jaw would have retrospective effect would not detract tfrom the competence of legislature of competent authority to make such a law. It is well-settled that it is permissible for a legislature to make a law with retrospective effect. The power of a legislature to make a law with retrospective effect is not curtailed or circumscribed by the fact that the subject matter of such retrospective law is a matter relating to an election dispute. If a legislature can pass legislation in respect of matters relating to an election dispute with retrospective effect, the constituent autoority. which is a kind of super Jegisla· ture would a fortiori be entitled to do so. (4620-G] State of Orissm v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose, [1962] Supp. 2 SCR 38Q; Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand Surana, (1970](2) SCR 835, applied. Part (ii) of cl. ( 4) spells out the consequence which flows from part ( i) or the clause. If the previous law insofar as it relates to the election petitions and matters connected therewith was not to apply to the election of the Prime Minister and Speaker, it wonld necessarily follow that election of the appellant who was the P.rime Minister would not be deemed to be void or ever to have become void on the ground on which such election could be declared to be void or has before such commencement been declared to be void under any such law. [462G-H] If. The same, to some extent, appears to be true of part (iv) of Cl.(4). the previous law insofar as it relates to the election petitions and matters connected therewith was not to apply to the election of the appellant, the High Court shall be deemed to have had no jurisdiction to decide the election peti~ ti<:>n challenging the election of the appellant. The resultant effect of the amendment thus was that the order by which the election of the appellant was declared to be void and the finding on which such order was based were rnndered to be void and of no effect.· [463A-C] A declaration that an order made by a court of Jaw is void is normally part of the judicial function and is not a legislative function. AlthOugh there

"' '

E-

l A'

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1976] 2 s.c.R.

J

is, in the Constitution of India, na rigid separation af powers, by and large, the spheres of judicial functian and legislative functions have been demarcated and it is not permissible for the legislature to encroach upon the judicial sphere. A legislature while it is entitled to change with retrospective effect the law which formed the basis of judicial decision, it is not permissible to the legislature to declare the judgment of the court to be void or not binding. [463D-E] Shri Prithvi Cotto11 Mills Ltd. & A11r. v. Broach Borough Municipality & Ors., [1970](1) SCR 388 @ 392, Janpada Sc.b/ia, Ch/1indwara etc. v. The Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd. & Anr. etc. [1970] (3) SCR 745 @751; Municipal Cdrporat1'011 of the City of Alunedabtul etc. v. New Shorrock Spg. & Wvg. Co. Ltd. etc. [1971] (1) SCR 287; State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. v. M. Rayappa Gounder, AIR 1971 SC 231, (followed).

American Jurisprudence 2nd Edn. Vol. 46 p. 318-319 and Douglas Liyange v. The Quee11, [1967] AC 259 (discussed).

By Part (iii) of Cl.(4), it is declared that the election of the appellant shall continue to be valid in all respects. Such a declaration would not follow from part (i) or part (ii) or part (iv) of the clause. The result is that so far as the dispute relating to the election of the appellant is concerned, a legal vacuum came into existence. It was open to the Constituent Authority to fill that vacuum by prescribing a law which was to govern the dispute arising out of the petition filed by the respondent to challe_nge the election of the appellant. The constituent authority, however, did not do so and straightaway proceededi to declare the election of the appellant to be valid. There is nothing ip clause ( 4) to indicate that the constituent authority applied any law in declaring the election of the appellant to be valid and if so what wn.s that Jaw. [465H, 466F-Gl "Democracy, which is a basic stmcture of t/1e Constitution and its postulates." The power of amendment of the Constitution in A.rt. 368 does not Permit altering the basic structnre of the Constitution. Democratic set up is part of the .basic structure of the Constitution. Democracy i:ostulates that there should be pJ:riodic elections so that people may be in a position to select the old re• presentatives or if they so choose, to change the representatives and elect in their place other representative. Democracy fnrther contemplates that the elections should be free and fair, so that the voters may be in a position to vote for candidates of their choice. Democracy can indeed function only upon the faith that elections are free and fair and not rigged and manipulated, that they are effective instruments of ascertaining popular will both in reality and form and are not mere rituals calculated to generate illusion of deference to mass opinion. Free and fair elections require that the candidates and their agents should not resort to unfair means or malpractices as may impinge upon the process of free and fair elections. Disputes do arise and to resolve the disputes, the different democratic countries of the world have made provisions prescribing the law and the forum for resolving of those disputes. [4670-H] Kesavananda Bliarati's case [1973] Supp. SCR 1, (applied). U. K. Representation of the People Act, 1949: U.S. Constit111ion, Art. Section 5: Au.<tralian Constitution, s. 47; Japanese Constitution, Art. 55; Iceland Constitution, Art. 46; Norwaigia11 Constitution Art. 64; French Constitution, Art. 59; German Federal Republic Co11stitutio11 Art. 41; Italian Cdnstiflltion Art. 66; Tur/dsh Constitution Art. .75 and Malaysian Constitution, Art. 53, referred to. "Rules ofi Electoral Morality affected' by cl. (4) of Art. 329A." Election laws lay down a code of conduct in election matters and prescribe what may be called. rules of electoral morality. The object of a provision for resolving election disputes in the Election Laws i~ to enforce rules of eJectoral morality and to punish deviance fr?i;n the prescribed code of con9uct Ill election matters. But for such prov1S1on, there would be no sanct10n fo,r the above code of conduct and rules of electoral morality. Nothing would bring the code of conduct into greater contempt and make a greater mockery of it than the absence of a provision to punish its vioiati<?~· 'f!le position would become all the more glaring that even though a prov1s1on exists on the statut.e book for punishing violation of the code of conduct in election matters a parti-

I "

>

' ..

I

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

cu!ar election is made immune and granted exemption from the operation such a provision. [469A-C]

of

The vice of clause (4) of Art. 329A is not merely that it makes the previous law contained in the R.P. Act as amended by Acts 58 of 1974 and 40 of 19·75 inapplicable to the challenge to the election of the appellant, it also makes n() other election Jaw applicable for resolving that dispute. The further vice from wl,.ich the said clause suffers is that it not merely divests !]le previous authority. namely the High Court of its jurisdiction to decide the dispute relating to the election of the appellant, it confers no jurisdiction on some other authority to decide that dispute. Without even prescribing a law and providing a forum for adjudicating upon the grounds advanced to challenge the election of the appellant, the constituent authority has declared the election of the appellant to be valid. (4690-B] · .._.;

To confer an absolute validity upon the election ot one particular candidate and to prescribe that· the validity of that election shalJ not be questioned before any forum or under any law would necessarily have the effect cA sayin11. that howsoever gross may be the improprieties which might have vitiated that election: howsoever flagrant may be the malpractices which might have been committed on behalf of the returned candidate during the course of election and howsoever foul and violative of the principles of free and fair elections may be the means which might haw been employed fm securing success in that election, the said election would be none-the-Jess valid and it would not be permissible to complain of these impropdeties, malpractices and unfair means before any forum or under any Jaw with a view to assail the validity of that election. Not much argument is needed to show that any provision which brings about that result is subv~ive of the principle of free and fair election in a democracy. The fact that the candidate concerned is the Prime Minister of the country or the Speaker of the Lower House of Parliament would, if anything, add force to the above conclusion because both these offices re_Present the acme of the democratic process in a country. That ill fact the elections of the incumbents of the two offices were not vitiated by any impropriety, malpractice or unfair means is not relevant or germane to the question with which the Court is concerned, namely, as to what is the effect of clause (4) of article 329A. [469F-H, 470AJ The vice of declaration contained in part (iii) of clanse (4) regarding the validity of the election of the appellant is aggravated by the fact that such a declaration is made after the High Court which was then seized of juriSdiction had found substance in some of the grounds advanced by the respondent and had consequently declared the election of the appellant to be void. To put a stamp of validity on the election of a candidate by saying that the chalJenge to such an election would not be governed by any election law and that the said election in any case would be valid and immune from any challenge runs counter to accepted nonm of free and fair elections in all democratic countries. [470B-CJ

C

Marabary v. Madison 1 Cr. 137, 163 (1803) United States v. Lee 106 U.S. l96, 220 (quoted with approval). ' Rule of Construction o1 widely worded provisions in the Statute." If a clause of a Constitution or statutory provision is widely worded the width of its ambit cannot be circumscribed by taking into account the facts of an individual case to which it applies. [470F]

Although the provisions of constitutional amendment should be construed in a fair and liberal spirit, such liberal spirit should not be carried by the court to the extent of discovering the application of dormant and latent law in the declarati'on of the validity of an election even though there is not even a remote indication of such law in the impugned provi~ion. (471 BJ

"Rule of law, requirements of"

R.ule of Jaw postulates that the decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and in general such decisions should be predictable

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

fl 97 6) 2 S.C.R.

\

and the ctt1zen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or any rule, it is not predictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. [471il-C]

Clause (4) of Art. 319A strikes at the basis of free and fair Eleclions.

The effect of impugned clause ( 4) is to take away both the right and the remedy to challenge the election of the appellant. Such extinguishment of the right and remedy to challenite the validity of the election, is incompatible with the process of free and fair elections. Free and fair elections necessarily postulate that if the, Sl!CCCSS of a candidate is secured in elections by means which violate the principle of free and fair elections, the election should on that account be liable to be set aside and be declared to be void. To extinguish the right and the remedy to challenge the validity of an election would' necessarily be tantamount to laying down that even if the election of a candidate is vitiated by the fact that it was secured by flagrant violation of the principle of free and fafr election, the same would still enjoy immunity from Cl:iallenge and would be none-the-less valid. Claiise ( 4) of Art. 32<}A can, therefOre, be held to strike at the basis of free and fair elections. [417C-E]

Bryce : American Commonwealth 912 Edn. 47-50; United States Code 1970 Ed. Sections 5, 6, 15 and Roscse Pound, Jurisprudence Vol. III 106.

Clause (4) of Art. 329A of the Constitution is to be struck down on the ground that it violates the principle of free and fair elections, which is an essential postulate of democracy and which in its turn is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, inasmuch as it abolishes the forum without providing for another forum for going into the dispute relating to the validity of the election of the appellant and further prescribes that the said dispute relating to the validity of the election of the appellant shall not be governed by any ele9(ion Jaw and that the validity of the said election shall be absolute and not consequently he liable to be assailed and (2) it extinguishes both the rigl:!t and the remedy 'to challenge the validity of the aforesaid election. [4740-E] [His Lordship did not express any opinion about the validity of the other cal uses of Art. 329A, since Cl. ( 4) alone was relevantl [461G]

"From when held out as change in law.

candidate" has becdme academic in view of the

The question as to when the appellant held herself out as a candidate from the Rae Bareli Constituency has become purely academic in view of he change of the definition of the word "candidate" as given in clause (b) of s.79 of the Representation of the People Act 40 of 1975. [475C-D]

"Candidate ddes not include "returned candidate" ins. lOO(l){b)."

Candidate in Clause (7) of Sec. 123 of the Representation of the People Act would mean a person who has or who claims to have been duly nominated au a candidate at the election. The word "candidate" has not been used merely to identify the person who is duly nominated as a candidate at an election. The word "candidate" would not include also a person who, after the commission of corrupt practice specified in cl.(7) is subse14uent!y nominated as a candidate. The amended definition shows that unless context otherwise requires candidate means a person who has been or dailllll to have been duly nominated as a candidate at an election. There is nothing to indicate that the word candidate in cl.(7) of s.123 has been used merely tn identify the person who has been or would be subsequently nominated as a candidate. A definition clause in a statute is a legislative device with a view to avoid making different provisiom of the statutes to be cumbersome. When a word is defined in the statute and that word is used in a provision to which that definition is applicable the effect is that wherever the word defined is used in that provision, the definition of the Reading the word "candidate" i'n s.123(7) of the word get~ substituted. Representation of the People Act in the sense in which it has been defined as

...

SMT. INDIRA GANDIII V. :RAJ NARAIN

••

a r~sult of. the amendment made by Act 40 of 1975, tl?.e only reasonable inference is that the person referred to as a ca:i.diJate in that clause should be a person who bas been or claims tQ have been duly nominated as a candidate at 1n1 election and not one \vho is yet to be nominated. [476F-ll, 477A-B] · · The contention that, if while dealing: with corrupt practice committed by a .candidate before he became a returned candidate in the ccintext of s-.100\ 1) (b) it is permissible to hold the \\'ords ureturned candidate'' are intended to identify the person who subsequently becomes a returned candidate, the !ame criterion should apply when construing the \\'Ord ..candidate'' in s. 123 of the Repr~entation of the People Act. is devoid of force. The definition of the words returned candidate and candidate given in s. 79 of the Representation of the People Act are preceded by the words unless the context otherwise requires.'' . The connotation of the above words is that normally it is the definition given in the section w,hich should be applied and given effect to. This normal rule may h0\1.'ever be departed from if there be· something in the context to show that the definition should not be applied. So far .as clause (b) of s. 100 (1) is conce;:,.ed, the context plainly requires that the corrupt practice referred to in· that cl<u.1se should have been committed by the candidate before 00 became a returned candidate, or by his agent or by any other person with his consent ~r that of his election agent. The compulsion arising from the context which is there in ct. (b) of s. 100(1) of the Representation of the People Act is singularly absent 'in s. 123(7} of the Representation of the People Act. There is nothing in the context of the later provision which requires that the full effect to the new <lefinition of the word ''candidate" should not be given effect to. [474E·Hl llahhury's Laws of England 3rd Edn. Vol. 14, 222-223 (not applicable).

ll

Official duty includes statutory and all those to be carried out as per o.dministratl'i·e instructions. There is_ nothing in the proviSo to s.123(7) as inserted by the Election Law Amendment (Act 40) of 1975 to confine the words "official duty" to duty imposed by the statute. Official duty would include not merely duties imposed by statutes but also those /\\·hich have to be carried out in pursuance of administrative in<;tructions. [480A-Bl

"Co1v and. Calf is not a religious or a national synibor·. .,

In view of the proviso to Cl. 3 of s. 123 inserted by Act 40 of 1975, the symbol of cow and calf shall not be deemed to be a religious symbol or. a natio:1al symbol for the purposes of s. 123(3) of the R"Cpresentation of the People Act. [480H, 481Al _ .

"Retorspective -legfs{atioli. is· intra vires the [)OY.'ers of the legislature".

,•

A legislature has, except in a matter for ,,.,hich there is prohibition tile one contained in Art. 20(1) of the constitution, the power to make laws which are prospective in operation as well as laws which have retrospective operation. There is no limitation on the power of the legislature in this respect. Apart f!om the field in which there is a constitutional prohibition fer giving retro~c­ uve effect has now become a part of norm.al legislative process. Election laws are a part of the normal legislative process and what is permitted in the matter or .ordinary le&islation would also be permissible in the matter of. legblation relahn~ to elections unless there be rome provision in the constitution which forbids such a course. 'The matter is no tonger "res jntegra". [481C-D G 482A-B] . . ' ' Statt of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kunwr Bose [1962) Supp. (2) SCR 380; "Kanta Kathurl, v. Manak Chand Surana [1970] (2) SCR 835 (affirmed). ;lbeyusekera v. Jaya~Uake [1932) AC 26Q (discussed).

-J

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1976) 2 S.C,R.

The provisions of Act 40 of 1975 are general in terms and would apply to all election disputes which may be, pending either in the High Court or in appeal before the Supreme Court or which may arise in future. It is no doubt true that the retrospective operation of amending Act has tlie effect of placing one of the parties to the dispute in a more advantageous position compared to others; but tliat is inevitable in most of the amendments with retrospective operation. The contention that the amendment in laws was void because it gave advantage to a party is to be rejected. [486C-DJ

Harbhajan Singh v. Mohan Singh and Ors. [1974] 2 SCC 364 (discussed and applied). Kanta Kathurio v. Manak Chand Surana [1970] (2) SCR 835 (affirmed).

Whenever a legislature makes a law or amends a law it has to inoicatc the time from which it would come into effect. This is essentially a matter for the legislature and the court cannot substitute its own opinion, for that of the legislature. The fact that the change in law is made applicable to pending cases and the classification treats the decided cases as belonging to one category and pending cases as belonging to another category is not offensive to Art. 14. Indeed the question of propriety is a matter which is entirely for the legislature to think of and decide. It cannot aJfect the validity of Jaw. [486F-H] Anam Mills v. State of Gujarat [1975] 2 SCC 175 (followed).

In case the provisions of the amended law are abused, this court would not be helple~s in the matter. The proper course in such an event would be to strike down the action taken under the amended law and not the law itself. [4870] Change in tlze definition of tlze word does not impinge upon the process of "free and fair elections".

As a result of the change in the definition of candidate, the legislature has fixed a definite date viz. that of nomination instead of the earlier time which had an element of indefiniteness and uncertainty about it for finding as to..mhcn a person became a candidate. Certainty is an essential desideratum in law and any amendment of law to achieve that object is manifestly a permissible piece of legislation. The choice of date was a matter for the legislature to decide and the court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the legislature. In this respect. more so when whatever be the choice of date, has aspects of both pros and cons. [4888-C] Union of India v. M/s. Parmaswaran Match Works AIR · followed.

1974 SC 2349,

Laying down rule of conclusive proof is not assumption of judicial power by Le1dslaturr..

Laying down a rule of conclusive presumption in a statute with a view to remove uncertainty with regard to the date of taking effect of appointment or resignation of a Government employee cannot be characterised as an assump·· tion of judicial power by the legislature. [488G] Nolle of the three objects o~ the change effected by Act 40 of 1975 has any taint of 1111constitutionality.

One of the objects of the changes effected by Act 40 of 1975 is to remove the uncertainty and set at rest the controversy as to what would be the precise date of a person in the service of the Central Government ceasing to be in such service in case he tenders his resigqation. Another object of the change effected by the Act of 1975 is that a candidate who is bound in view of para 8 of the Elections Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 to use the party symbol allotted by the Election Commission and who cannot use any other symbol shall not suffer and be guilty of corrupt practice under s. 123 (3) of the Representation of the People Act because of the use of that symbol. The third

t

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

\ l

object of the change effected by the Act 40 of 1976 is that a candidate should not suffer or be held guilty of corrupt practice because of any act done by any person in the service of the Government and belonging to any of the classes mentioned in s. 123(7) of the Representa.tion of the People Act ii~ the discharge of his official duty. Non~ of the three objects has any tamt of unconstitutionality and that the impugned provisions do not infringe upon the principle of free and fair election. [488E, H, 489C-01 The act in the discharge or purported disch11rge of official duty of the Government employees referred to in the newly added proviso to section 123(7) of RP Act would have to be of a kind which is germane to their official duties. Wha.t would be permissible under the above provision would be that which is conceived to be done in public interest and not something conceived to be done in the personal interest of a candidate. In spite of some difficulty which may arise in borderline cases, this distinction must be borne in mind. If, however, because of doing something conceived in public interest, e.g., as in the present case the security arrangement for the person holding the office of the Prime Minister, some advantage may also possibly accrue to a candidate, it will have to be regarded as incidental and would not detract from action taken under lhe above provision being in publ,ic interest. As against that, any action taken with a view to further the personal interest of a candidate should not be allowed to be camouflaged as an action taken in public interest. Care must be taken to ensure that public interest is not allowed to degenerate into a cloak for furtheranc" of the personal interests of a candidate in an election. The disch11rge or purported discharge of official duty must necessarily have public interest and not the personal interest of a candidate as its basis. The courts while dealinl? with the newly a.dded proviso to section 123(7) should construe it, if reasonably possible, in such a manner as would sustain the validity of that proviso. In case there is abuse of the above provision, the proper course, would be to strike down the action taken under the proviso and not the proviso itself. [4890-H, 490A-Bl [His Lordship felt not necessary to deal with the argument that the theory of basic structure of the Constitution operates upon an amendment or the Constitution under Art. 368 only, but it does not hold good when Parliament enacts a statute in exercise of powers under Art. 245 of the Constitution in view of his findings that the provisions of Act 40 of 1975 have not been shown to infringe upon the process of free. and fair election]. [490E-G]

·

"Lexa! evidence is necessary to show the extent of user of each vehicle in the elections'.

It is n.o doubt true that by using a vehicle for the furtherance of the prospects of candidates in more tb~n one constitnency one should not be allowed !O ci~cumvent the salutary provisions of the Representation of the People Act tn this respect. To prevent such circumvention it is essential that evidence should be led to show as to what was the extent of the mer of the vehicle in the constituency. [4940-E]

v

"

Hans Raj v. Pt. Hari Ram and Ors., 40 E.L.R. 125 (applied).

As the election expenses of the· appellant have not been shown to exceed the prescribed limit of Rs. 35,000/- the question of invoking a.nd going into the validity of Act 58 of 1974 doe~ not arise. [497 A-BJ [His Lordship thought it unnecessary to express an opinion abou.t the view of Ka11wc•r Lal v. Amar Nath Chawla, AIR 1975 SC 308]. [497B] "Whether Fundamental Rights are not a part of the basic structure of the Constitution-O;bservations of Justice Khanna in Bharati's case clarified." (1) What has been laid down by His Lordships in Bharati's case [1973] Supp. SCR 1 is (i) that no article of the Constitution is immune from the amendatory process because of the fact that it relates to a fundamental right and is contafoed in Part Ill of the Constitution. The constitutional amendment under Art. 368 does not constitute "law" as mentioned in Art. 13. There

SUPRE,\fE COURT REPORTS

[1976] 2 5.C,R.

was no Iimita.tion on the power o~ Parliament to amend the provisions of Part III of the ConstltutIO'! so a~ to. abndge or take away the fundamental rights. As r~gards the SCOPe. of the power of amendment under Art. 368, and the connotati_on _of th<:: word "amendment" it is clear from the Bharati's case that no dist!nct1on was ma_de between a provision relating to fundamental rights and provis10ns _dealmg with matters other than funda:mental rights. The limitation inhen~nt m the word "amendment" according to which it is not permissible by ~niendment of the Constitution to change the basic structure of the Constitut10n was. to operate equally on articles pertaining to fundamental rights as on o_the! articles not pertaining to these rights. The secular cha-meter of the Constltut10n and .the rights guaranteed by Art. 15 pertain to the basic structure. Right to property 1s not a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. To contend that according to. Khanna J ., in Bharati's case that fundamental rights are not a part of the basic structure of the Constitution is not correct. [4970-E, 4980-H, 499A, E-F) Go/aknath'.s case [1967] 2 SCR 762, referred to; Bharati's case [1973] Supp. S.C.R. 1, clanfied.

I

It hag been said that great cases like hard cases make bad Jaw. For great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming i~terest, which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate . interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure. It, therefore, became essential to rid the case of all the embellishments resultiing from the political overt?ne~ and to bring it to a level which is strictly judicial, so that the various constlturnonal and legal aspects of the matter may be examined in a dispassionate atmosphere. [499G-H, 500AJ ,

·E

1I

National Securities Co. v. U.S .. 193 US 197 referred to. Per Mathew I. "Concept of democracy and its requisite" The concept of democracy as visualised by the Constitution presupposes the representation of the people in Parliament and State Legislatures by tbe method of election. And before an election machinery can be brought into operation, there are three requisites which require to be attended to namely (1) there s!iould be a set of laws and rules making provisions with respect to all matters relatin,g to, or in connection, elections and it should be decided as to how these laws and rules are to be made (2) there should be an execut<ive charged with the duty of securing the due conduct of elections; and (3) there should be a judicial tribunal to deal with disputes arising out of or in connection with elections. Articles 327 and 328 deal with the first of these requisites Art. 324 with second and Art. 329 with the third requisite. [5040-F] N. P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer Namnakal Constituency & Ors. [1952] SCR 218 @ 219 (referred to). As per Art. 329(b), a power must be lodged somewher~ to judge the validity of the election, for otherwise there would be no certamiy as to who were legitimately chosen as members, and any intruder or usurper might cl~m a seat and thus trample upon the privileges and liberties of the people. In whichever au1'hority the power is lodged, the nature of the func!ion i~ such that. !t requires a judicial apprc:ach. It cannot be resc:lve<l on. cc;ms.1d~rah~ms of polill-· cal expediency. In whichever body or authority the 1unsd1ction JS rested, the exercise of the jurisdiction must be judicial in cliaracter. [505C-D, 506B] Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Ors. [1965] (I) SCR 267 (relied on). Erskine May's Parliamentary Practice ]8th Edn. (19•71) 29 @ 31 and Bcwry v. U.S. Ex. Rel. Cu1aningham 73 L. ed. 367 (referred to). Vesting power~ to ad]'udicate election disputes in each ?f the Ho'!se of Parliament by the Constitution would have bee!! on the basis ?f do_ctrme of political question and this doctrine has no hosp1ta~le quarte.r .m this Court. Judicial power is the exercise of a power on the basis of pre-existing Jaw. [506C-D, 507-Bl

j

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

Madliav Rao Sci11dia v. Union AIR 1'971 SC 530 Wechsler : Tdward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law 73 Harv. Law Rev. 1 @ 1-9; United E11gi11eeri11g Workers' Union v. Devanayagam (1968} A.C. 365; Justice Holmes in "Prentis v. At/antic Coast Line Co. 211 @ 216 (J;eferred to).

Constituem power is the vower to frame Constitution a11d make laws by way of amending.

\

The Constituent power is the power to frame a Constitution. The people of India in the exercise of that power framed the Constitution and ia enac.ts basic norms. By that instrument, the people conferred on the amending body the power to amend by way of addition, varia~ion or repeal any of its provisions. "Legal sovereignty" is a capacity "to determine the actions of persons in certain intended ways by means of law. The amending body which exercises the constituent power of the legal sovereign, though limited by virtue of the decision in Bharati's case can express itself only by making Jaws. [507H, 508-E] Kcsavananda Bharati's case [1973] Supp. SCR 1 (applied).

W. J. Rees: The theory of sovereignty Restored in "Mind". Vol. LIX 1950, quoted at p. 68 of In defence of Sovereignly, ed. W. J. Stankiewicz (referred to).

Distinction between constitutional law a11d ordinary law.

The distinction between constitutional law and ordinary law in a rigid constitution like ours is that the validity of the Constitutional Law cannot be challenged whereas that of ordinary law can be challenged on the touchstone of Constitution. A constitution cannot consist of a string of isolated dooms. A judgment or sentence which is the result of the exercise of judicial power or of despotic discretion is not a law as it has not got the generality which is an essential characberistic of law. A despotic decision without ascertaining the facts of a case and applying the law to them though dressed in the garb of law is like a bill of attainder. It is a legislative judgment. The end-product of· the exercise of judicial power. is a judgment or sentence and nob law. Since the enJ of law is common good. the law should be framed not for private benefit but for the common good of all citizens. A statute is a general law. [508E-G, 509C-D, 510B]

The resolution of an election dispute by the amending body is not law. It is either judicial sentence or a legislative judgment like a Bill of Attainder. The pith and substance of the law enactments was a legislative plan ex-post facto to secure the conviction, although legislation ad lwminem which is directed to the course of particular proceedings may not always amount to an inter. ferene<i with the functions of the judiciary. [51 lF-G, 513C-D] Li)'anage v. The Queen [1971] 1 A.C. 259 @ 291 a11d Blackstone : Commentad,s Vol. I, 44; Ro1~<sea11 C<intract Social Bk. fl Ch. VI, S. V. Tlwma.1• At1uinas Treatise on Law Gateway Edn. (1970) 87 (referred to).

Austill: Jurisprudence 2nd Ed. Vol. I. p. 18; Kelsen : General Theorv of Law and Statute (1961) p. 38 John Chipman Grcry : Nature and Source of LGw p. 161 : Courtney Jlbert: Legislative Methods & Forms (Oxford) 1901 p. 208, J.C. Carter: Laiv Its original, growth and fu11ctlo11 (New York cmd Londdn) 1907 fl· 116 : Walter Bar,elu;t; The English Cmrntilution (1967) World's Classics Edn. (Oxford 1928) P. 119; Hayek : Law, Legislation a11d Liberty : Friedman "Legal TTreory" 5th Edn. p. 1010; Len L, Fuller : "The Morality of Law" p. 49; J. ~tory: Commentaries 0'11 the Constitution of the United States (Bostan 1833). (discussed) J

~

U.S. v. Brown 381 U.S. 437 : Cooley Co11stitwional Limitations pp. 536-537 Sth Ed. 1927 : M'Caulay; History of Eng/and p. 207 (1900) Cfause 4 of Art. 329A is a legislation ad /1omi11em

' '

Clause 4 was legisl.ation ad hominem directed against the course of hearing of f:be appeals on 11'.ents as the appeals and cross-appeah were to be disposed of m accordance with that clause and not applying the law to the facts as

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1976] 2 S.C,R.

ascertained by the court. This was a direct interference with the decision of these appeals by the Supreme Court -on their merits by a h;gislative judgment. [513F-GJ Principles of Audi Alteram Partem violated.

If the amending body really exercised judicial power that power was exercised in violation of the principles of natural justice of "audi alteram partem". Even if a power is given to a body without s111;cifying that the rules of natural justice should be observed in exercising it, the nature of the power would caJl for its observance. There is nothing on the face of the amendment to show that the amending body ascertained the facts of the case or applied any norms for determining the validity of the election. Under Art. 368, the amending body cannot pass an ordinary law with retrospective effect to validate the election. It can only amend the Constitution by passing a Jaw of the rank of which the Constitution is made of. Adjudication facts of an election dispute cannot be gathered by legislative process behind the back of the parties; they can be gathered only by judicial process. The amending body in the instant case did . not ascertain the facts by resorting to the judicial process. [513G, 514E-F, 515A-B)

:H

Clause 4 of Art. 329A, damages the democratic structure of the Cdnstit11tio11, ff clause ( 4) was an exercise in legislative validation without changing the Jaw which made the election invalid, when there ought to have been an exercise of judicial power of ascertaining the adjudicative facts and applying the Jaw, the clause would damage the democratic structure of the Constitution, as the Constitution visualizes the resolution of an election dispute by a petition presented to an authority exercising judicial power. The contention that there was no election dispute as clause (4) by repealing the law relating to election petition had rendered the petition filed by the respondent non-est, if allowed, will toll the death knell of the democratic structure of the Constitution. If Art. 329(b) envisages the resolution of an election dispute by judicial process by a petitiqn presented to an authority as the appropriate legislature may by Jaw provide, a constitutional amendmen.t cannot dispense with that requirement without damaging an·essential feature of democracy, viz.; the rnech~J.ism for determining the real representative of the people in an election as contemplated by the Constitution. [515B-D] Our Constitution visuahzes the resolution of an election dispute on the basis of a petition presented to such authority and in such manner as the appropriate legislature may, by Jaw, provide. The nature of the dispute raised in an eleC"' tion dispute is such that it cannot be resolved except by judicial process, namely by ascertaining the facts relating to the election and When the amending body held that applying the pre-existing- Jaw. the election of the appellant was valid, it could not have done to except by ascertaining the facts by judicial process and by applying the law. The result of this process would not be the enactment of constitutional Jaw but the passing of a judgment or sentence. The amending body, though possessed of judicial power had no competence to exercise unless it passed a constitutional law enab1ing it to! do so. If, however, the decision of the amending body to hold the election of the appellant val~ was the result of the exercise of an "irresponsible despotic discretion" governed solely by what it deemed political neces·sity or expediency, then like a bill of attainqer, it was a legislative amendment disposing or a particular election dispute and not the enactment of a law resulting in an amendment of the Constitution. And, even if the latter process (the exercise of, despotic discretion) could be regarded as an amendment of the Constitution, the amendment would destroy an essential feature or democracy as established by the Constitution, namely, the resolution of election dispute by an authority by the exercise of judicial power by ascertaining the adjudicative facts and applying the relevant Jaw for determining the real representative of the people. The decision of amending body cannot be regarded as an exercise in al•nstituent legislative validation of an election for these reasons. Firstly there can be no legislative validation of an election when there is dispute between the parties -as regards the adjudicativ~ facts; the amending body cannot gather these facts by employing legislative process; they can be gathered only

I

I

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NA~AIN

__.., by judicial process. Secondly, !he amending body must change the law retrospectively so as to make the election valid, if the election was rendered invalid by virtue of any provision of the law actually exi!'lting at the time of election. Art. 368 does not confer on the amending body the competence to pass any ordinary law whether with or without restrosP'ective effect. Clause ( 4) expressly excluded the operation of all Jaws relating to election petition. to the election in questi'on. Therefore, the election was held to be valid not by changing the law which rendered it invalid. Thirdly, the cases cited for the appellant are cases relating to legislative validation of invalid election~ or removal of disqualification with retrospective effect. Being cases of legislative validation or re~ moval of disqualifications by legislature, they are not liable to be tested on the basis of the theory of basic structure, which is applicable only to constitution amendment~. Fourthly there was no controversy in those cases with·regard to adjudicative facts; if there was controversy with regard to these facts, ft is verY doubtful whether there could be legislative validation of an election by a changing the law alone without ascertaining the adjudicative facts by judicial process. [52lA-H]

I

\

Abcyasekhara v. Jayatilake [1932] A.C. 260; Piare Dusadh & Ors. v. King Emperor [1944] F.C.R. 61, Kanta Kathuria v. Ma11ak Chand Surana [19701 2 SCR 835 and State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose (1962) Supp. 2 SCR 380. (Considered).

"Art. 14 is not a basic structure of the Constitution.'' The majority in Bharati's case did not hold that Art. 14 pertains to the basic structure of the Constitution. The majority upheld the validity of the first pal"t of Art. 31C. This would show that a constitutional amendment which takes away or abridges the right to challenge the validity of an ordinary law for violating the fundamental right under that Article would not destroy or damage the basic structure. The only logical basis for supporting the validity of Art. 31A-31B and the first part of 31C is that Art. 14 is not a basis structure. [522B-Cl Democracy proceeds on two basic assumptions (1) popular sovereignty in the sense that the coontry should be governed by the representatives of the people; that all power came from them; at their pleasure and under their watchful supervision it must be held and (2) that there should be equality among the citiz.ens in arriving at the decisions affecting them. Today it is impossible to conceive of a democratic republican form of government without equality of ditizeDSI Our Constit:ution envisage~ the establishment of a democrat'ic republican form of government based on adult suffrage. [5220-H, 523Al Equality fs a multi-coloured concept incapable of division. It is a notion of many shades and connotations. The Preamble of the Constitution guarantees equality of status and of opportunity. They are nebulous concepts. It i9 not sure whether they can provide a solid foundation to rear i basic structure. The types of equality which democracy guarant'ees are all subsumed under specific articles of the Constitution like articles 14, 15, 16, 17 etc. and there are no other principles of equality which is an essential feature of democratic polity. [523B-CJ

-

..

"Art. 329A of/ends Rule of Law which is a basic structure of the Co11slitution" t

<

>

I

In the opini'on of some of the judges constituting the majority in Bharati's case, rule of law is a basic structure of the Omstitution apart from democracy. The rule of law postulates the pervasiveness of the spirit of law throughout the whole range of government in the sense of excluding arbitrary official action in any sphere. "Rule of law" is an expression to, give reality to something which is not readily expressible. Rule of law is based upon the liberty of the indivi-, dual and bar. as its object the harmonizing of the opposing notions of i'ndivi-< dual liberty and public order. The notion of justice maintains the balance between the two, and justice has a variable content. [523C-D]

Dicey "Constitlllions''; Jermome Frank "If men were Angels" p. 203 (1942), Friederich Hayek; "Road to Serfdom" "Constitution' of Liberty" Frank's Committee (1957) Report p, 6 (discussed).

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1976] 2 S.C.R.

The rule of law from one point of view means ti1at decisions; should be made by the application of known principles and rules, and in general, such, decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. [524·C! Jafainghani v. Union of India [1967] 2 S.C.R. p. 703 @ 718 (applied)

This exposition of the rule of law is only the aspiration for an ideal and it is not based on any down-to-earth analysis of practical problems with which a modem government is confronted. ' In the world of action, this ideal cannot be worked ou< and that is the reason why this exposition has been rejected b)' all .practical men. [524-C-D]

There is a genuine concept of rule of' law and that concept implies equalitr before the law or equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law. But if rule of law i9 to be a basic structure of the Constitution, Ol1'e must find specific provisions in the Constitution embodying the constituent elements of the concept. It cannot be conceived of rule of law as a twinklin~ star up above the constitu" tion. To be a basic structure, it must 1Je a terrestnal concept having its habitat within the four-corners of the Constitution. The provisions of the Constitution wero enacted with a view to ensure the rnle of law. The equality aspect of the rule of law and of democratic republicanism is provided in Article 14. May be, the other a1ticles referred to do the same duty. The concept of equality which is basic to rule of law and that which is regarded as the most fundamental postubte of republicanism are both embodied in Ati. 14. [524G-H, 525-CJ

Basheswar Nath v. The Commission,er of Income Tax [1959] (!) SCR 528: State of West Bengal v. Anwar A Ii Sarkar [1952] SCR 284, Ward v. Flood 17 Am. Rep. 405 (disi:ussed).

Qu(J.('re : If, according to the majority in Bharati's case Article 14 .toes not pertain to basic structure of the Constitution, which is the other principle of equality incorporated in the Constitution which can be a basic structure of the Constitution or an. essential feature of democracy or rule of law ? [525-DT "Cl. 4 of Art. 329A is bed and 1mco11stitwidi1al"

. {

I

Clause ( 4) is bad and has to be struck. down, as unconstitutional, Clauses l to 3 of Art. 329A are severable. [525-E] (His Lordship did not express any opinion on validity of claru;es 1 to 3 Art. J29A as it was not necessary for deciding tbe case]. [525-E]

.

or

"T/1ere is 110 inldbition as suc/1 in Art. 368 to destroy or damage the basic stmcture by an amendment so far as the powers of Parliamellt to pass laws are cancerned."

T™' inhibition to destroy or damage the basic structure by an amendment of the Constitution flows from the limitatic>n on the power of amendment unde1· Art, 368 read into it by the majority in Bharati's case because of their assnmPtion that there are certain fundamental features in the constitution which i'ts makers intended to remain there in perpetuity. There is no such inhibitiort so far as the power of Parliament or State legisla.tures to pass laws is concerned. Articles 245 and 246 give the power and also provide the limitation upon the· power of Parliament and legislature to pass laws. It is only the specific p1<0visions enacted in the Constitution which could operate as limitation upon that power. [525 G-H, 526-A] "Preamble is 11eit/1er a source nor a limitation 11po11 tile power of lei:isfafio11.

l

It is. impossible to spin out any concrete concept of basic sfmctw·e out of tf1e fiOSSlTlner conL'epts set out in the Prean1ble.'' /

;).

The Preamble, though a part of tbe Consti'tutioDJ is neither a source of power nor a limitation upon that power. Tiie Preamble sets out the ideological aspiratiaos of the people. The essential features of the great roncepts set out in t11e preamble are delineated in the various provisions of the Constitution. It is these specific provisions in the body of the Constitution which determine the type of

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

..

democracy which the founders of that instrument established; the quality and nature of justice political, social and economic which was their desideratum, the content of liberty of thought and expression which they entrenched in that document, the scope of equality of status and of opportunity which they enshrined in it. These specific provisions enacted in the Constitution alone can determine the basic structure of the Constitution as established. These specific provisions either separately or in combination determine the content of the great concepts set out in the preamble. It is impossible to spin out any concrete concept of basic structure out of the gossamer concepts set out in the preamble. The specific provisions of the ConstitutiO!li are the stuff from which the basic struc· ture has to be, woven. [526A-D] "Free and fair election in an ideal democracy is not a test to which law can be subjected to" ..

\

The norms of election set out by parliament or state legislatures tested in the light of the provisions of the Constitution or necessary implications therefrom constitute the law of the land. That law cannot be subject to any other test, like the test of free and fair election in an ideal democracy. An ordinary law cannot be declared invalid for the reason that it goes against the vague concept of democracy; justice, political, economic· and social; liberty of thought belief and expression; or equality of status and opportunity or some invisible radiation from them. [526D-F] (Finer : Comparative Government (1970) pp. 62-63 Giovanni Sartori : Democratic Tlzeor)' Ch. I;) "Law can be tested dnly on the principles of Democracy actually incorporated in the Constitution."

..

The term democracy has not only a descriptive or denotative function, but also a normative and persuasive function. A firm distinction should be made between t!J.e is and the ought of democracy. The prescriptive and the descriptive definition of democracy must not be confused because the democraiic ideal does not define the democratic reality and vice versa; the real democracy is not and cannot be the same as the ideal one. One cannot test the validity of an ordinary law with reference to the esSential elements of an ideal democracy. It can be tested only with reference to the principles of democracy actually incor~ porated in the Constitution. Nor can democracy be tested on the touchstone of justice. The concept of social justice is vague · and indefinite. Liberty of thought, expression belief, faith and worship are not absolute concepts. They are emotive words. They mean different things to different people. Equality of status and of opportunity are concepts laden with emotional overtones. In their absoluteness they are in~apable of actual realisation. The enacting provisions in the body of the Constitution alone give concrete shape to these ideas and it is on the basis of these provisions that the validity of ordinary law should be tested. [527A-El

Giovanni Sartori; "Democratic Theory Ch. l, Hanskelsen; General Theory of Law and State" (1946) p. 13 and G. K. Al/en "Aspects of Justice" p. 31 (referred to).

,.

I

""

.

\

"The doctrine of the spirit of the Constirutidn is a slipper slope". ;representation of the people in the law-making organs. The method by which this representation has to be effectuated has been provided in part XV of the Constitution. Under Article 329(a) the Constitution has entrusted the task: of framing the law relating to election parliament, and subject to the Jaw made by Parliament, to the State legislature. An important branch of the law which sounds in the area of free and fair election, namely, delimitation of constituencies and allotment of seats to such constituencies is put by Art. 327 and 328 beyond the cognizance of court. When it is found that the task of writing the legislation on the subject has been committed to Parliament ang State legi 0fatures by the Constitution, it is incompetent for a court to test its validity on the basis of some vague norms of free, and fair election. Like other Jaws made by par!ia-· m'ent or state legislatures, the Jaws made under Articles 327 and 328 are liable to be· tested by Part Ill of the Constituti'on or any other provision of the Constitution, but it is difficult to see how these Jaws could be challenged on the 3-126 Sup. Cf/76

.H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1976] 2 ·s.c.R.

ground that they do not conform to some ideal notions of free and fair election to be evolved by the court from out of airy nothing. [527F-G. 528A-C] "The doctrine of the spirits of the Constitution is a slippery slope". The doctrine of the 'spirit' of the Constitution is a slippery slope. T!Je courts are not at liberty ta declare an act void, because, in their opinion, It rs opposed to the spirit of democracy or repu.blicanism supposed to pervade the Constitution but not expressed in words. When the fundametttal law has not ~limited, either in terms or by necessary implication, the general powers conferred upon the legislature, the Court cannot declare a limitation under the notion of having discovered some ideal norm : of free and fair election. [528-D] The principles of democratic republfcan government are not a set of inflexible rules; and unless they are specifically incorporated in the Constitution, no law can be· declared bad merely because the court thinks that it is opposed to some implication drawn from the concept. [528-F] Cooley: Constitutional /imitations, Stlz Ed. Vol. I (referred to). "Bharati's case does not support either of the propositiom viz. (i) an ordi· nm·y law, if it damages the basic structune should be held bad (ii) that a co11stit111ional omendme/lf putting an Act in the Ninth Schedule would make the pro1·isio11s of the Act \'11/nerable for the reasons that tiiey damage or destroy tlie ha.1ic structure constituted not by the fundamellfal rights, bllf by some .other basic structure".

.

Even though an Act is put in the Nin th Schedule by a constitution amendment, its provisions would. be open to attack on the ground that they destrey or damage the basic structure if the fundamental right or rights tak~n away or abrogated pertains or periain to: basic structure. But the Act cannot be attack-· ed, for a collateral reason, namely, that the provisions of the Act have destroyed or damaged some other basic structure, say for instance, democracy o ~ separation of powers. There is no support from the majority in Bbarati's case for the proposition that an ordinary law, if it damages or destroys basic, structure should be held bad or for the proposition that a constitutional amendment putting an Act in the Ninth Schedule would make the provisions of the Act vulnerable for the reasons that they damage or ilestroy the basic structure constituted not by the fundamental rights taken. away or abridged but some other basic htructure. And, in principle, .there is no reason for accepting the correctness of the proposition. The Constitution makers eschewed to incorporate the "due process" clause in that instrument apprehending that the vague contours of that concept will make the court a third chamber. The concept of basic structure as brooding omnipresence in the sky apart from the specific provisions of the Constitution constituting it is too vague and indefinite tu provide a yardstick. to determine the validity o~ an ordinary law. [529B-C, F-H] "Election /c.ll's do not attain the stntus of constituliona/ law by virtue of heing put in the Ninth Schedule".

It may be assumed that these election laws amendment Acts, even after th"y were put in the Ninth Schedule by Constitutional amendmer.t remained open to attack for contravent_ion, if any, of the fundamental rights, these Acts would not be open to attack on the ground that their provisions destroyed or damaged an essential feature of democracy, namely, free and fair election. The Acts remain part of the ordinary Jaw of the land. They did not attain the, status of constitutional Jaw merely because they were put in the Ninth Schedule. The utmost that can be said is that even after putting them in the Ninth Schedule, their provisions would be open to chalienge on the ground that they fook away or abrogated all or any of the fundamental rights, and therefore damaged or destroyed a basic structure if the fundamental rights or right taken away er abrogated constitute or constitutes a basic structure. [530A-C] "Retro.1pectil'e legislation is intra rires the powers of Par/irlmF!nt to legislate." Retrospective operation of law in the field of election bas been upheld by this Court in Kanta Katlwria v. Manak Chand Surana. Retrospective• operation

I

>

I

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

of any Jaw would cause hardship to some person or other. This is inevitable; but that is no reason to deny to the legislature the power to enact retrospective iaw. In the case of a Jaw which has retrospective effect, the theory is (l:lat the Jaw was actually in operation in the past and if the provisions of the Acts are general in their operation, there can be no challenge on the ground of discrimination or unfairness merely because of their retrospective effect. If an Act cannot be challenged on the ground that its provisions are discriminatory or unreasonable if it is prospective in operation, those provisions cannot be attacked on these grounds merely because the provisions were given retrospective effect unless there are special circumstances and in the instant ca~e there are no such special circumstances. These Acts are not liable to be challenged on any of the grounds. [5300-G]

Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand SurallC' [1970] 2 SCR 835 (affirmed). "The Election Law (Amendment) Act 40, 1975--mid the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendmellf) Act 1975 canndt be challenged on the score. that ll 1111111ber of 1r1c111bcrs of Parlia111ent were in detention and prevented froni taking deliberations in the Parliameni"

Jn Ananda Nambiar v. Chief Secretary Govt. of Madras [1966] 2 SCR p. 406 this Court held that the member of Parliament had no privilege which obliged the court to release him from custody in order to enable him to attend the sessions of the Parliament. Jn England a member of Parliament who is convicted of a criminal offence. and is undergoing sentence in pursuance to his. conviction has no right or privilege to be released from custody for attending Parliament. The very same principle will apply in the case of detention under an emergency regulation. [531C-D]

A. Nambiar v. Chief Secretary [1966] 2 SCR 406 (noti applicable). May's Parliamentary Practice 18th Ed. p. 103, 372 (referred to).

Ever since the decision of Holt C.J. in Ashby v. White 'it has been settled that privilege is part of the common law and cannot affect rights to be exercised outside or independently of the House. Regularity of internal proceedings is one rhing; the constitutional rights of the subject are another; and it is the latter which are in issue in a case where the question is whether t4e document is a statute. [533E-FJ

Bmdlaugh v. Gossett, 12 Q.B.D. 271, 285-286 and Ashby v. White, 1703 Heksten: Essays in Con'stitutionnl Law ended, p. 22 (applied). (14 ), St. Tr. 695 and May's Parliamentary Practice.

>

Art. 85 (I) provides that the President shall from time to time summon each House of Parliament to meet at such time and place as he thinks fit, but six months shall not in'tervene between the last. sitting in one session alild 'he date appointed for its first sitting in the next session. Art. 122 (1) provides that the validity of any proceedings in Parliament shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure, so even if there is any

irregularitiy in the procedure in the passing of the statute, it is not open to a

court to question its validity.

[533G, BJ

The detention of the members of Parliament was by statutory authorities in the purported exercise of rheir statutory power. It would be strange if a statutory authority, by an order which turns out to be illegal, could prevent the Houses of Parliament from meeting as enjoined by Art. 85. If a statutory authority passes an illegal order of detention and thus prevents a member of Parliament from attending the House the proceedings of Parliament cannot become illegal for that reason. It is the privilege of Parliament to secure the attendance of persons illegally detained. But if the privilege is not exercised by Parliament. the proceedings of Parliament would not become illegal for that reason. [533H, •534A-B1 ~

The President in performing his constitutional functions under Articles 352, and 359 has not authorised the illegal detention of any person let alone any members of Parliament or unconstitutionally prevented the release from custody

C

n

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1976] 2 S.C.R.

of any member. He has only discharged his constitntional fnnctions. If this be s~, it is difficnlt to hold that the Session in which the amendments were passed was illegally convened. The challenge to the validity of the amendments on this score mnst be over-ruled. [534D-EJ ·"Ca11didate, mea11i11g of-for purposes of corrupt practice." There can be no doubt that s. 100(1) (b) when it speaks of commission of corrupt practice by a returned candidate, it can only mean commission of corrupt practice by a candidate before he became a returned candidate. Any other reading of the sub section would be absurd. But there is no such compulsion to read the words "candidate" in s.123(7) in the same manner. It is the content that gives colour to a word. A word is not crystal clear S. 79 of the Act indicate3 that the definitions therein have to be read snbject to the context. The Legislature must fix some point of time before which a person cannot be a "candidate" in an election and, a wide latitude must be given to the legislature in fixing that point. [53 5E-FJ Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd Edn, Vol. IV p. 332 218 (referred to) : U11io11 of I11dia and Anr. etc. v. M /s Parameswaran Match Works etc. [1975] 2 SCR 573'@ 579•; Louisville Gas Co. v. Alabama Power Co. 240 US 30 @ 32 (relied dn). There is no excessive delegatio11 i11, cl. 8(b) of EL Act 40 of 1975.

Clause 8 (b) of the Election Laws Amendment Act, 40 of 197 5 does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation and is not arbitrary. [536C] Per Beg, J. The meaning of the Principle of the Supremacy of the Co11stitutio11 is tlzat neither of the three constitutionally separate organs of State, can leap 01uside the boundaries of its own constitutionally assig11ed :

The assumption ·underlying the theory of Judicial review of all law making, including fundamental law making is that courts, acting as interpreters of the "Real Will" of the people embodied in their constitution and assumed to be more lasting and just and rational and less liable to .err than their "General Will', represented by the opinions of the majorities in Parliament and the State Legislatures for the time being can discover the not always easily perceived purposes of their constitution for the people. The courts thus act as agents and mouthpieces of the "Real Will" of the people themselves. Just as courts are not constitutionally competent to Legislate under the guise of interpretation so also neither our Parliament, nor any State Legislature, in the purported exercise of any kind of law making power, perform an essentially judicial function by virtually withdrawing a particular case, pending in any court, and taking upon itself the duty to decide it by an application of law or its own standards to the facts of that case. This power must a~ least be first constitutionally taken awav from the court concerned and vested in another authority before it can be lawfully exercised by that authority. lb is not a necessary or even a natural incident of a "Constituent power". The logical and natural meaning of the princ'iple of supremacy of the Constitution is that neither of the three constitutionally separate organs of State can, according to the basic scheme of our Constitution to-day, leap outiside the boundaries of its own constitutionally assigned sphere or orbit of authority into that of the other. [538G-H, 539A-EJ Bosanquet "Philosophical theory of the State etc. Ch. V. 96-115 Hanskelsen" "General Theory of Law and the State" p. 143, referred to. Legal effect and nature of the stay order. It was not a "co11ditio11al stay", but a "co11ditio11ed stay order." The legal effect of the stay order was that the trial Court's order, to use the language of s.116(B)(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, "shall be deemed never to have taken effect". It did not matter if the stay order, out of deference for existing precedents had been framed in the form of a "conditioned" stay, that is to say, a stay in law and effect 'with certain conditions annexed. It was no- a conditional stay. Indeed, having regard to the nature! of the order, the operation of which was to be stayed, there could be no

l

>

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. )1AJ NARAIN

·'conditional" stay in this case. As to the legal effect of such a stay order, there is no doubt, that, considering the clear words of section 116(B)(3) of the 4ct, it deprived the order of the High Court of any operative force whatsoever durmg the pendency of these appeals. There could be really no binding precedent in discretionary matters depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. The operation of the judgment of the trial court and the consequential orders are stayed only on "sufficient cause" shown on the facts of that case. [540E·G]

,.,/'

Under section 123 (7) of the Repre~entation of the People Act the obtaining or procuring or abetting or attempting to obtain or procure had to take place either by a candidate or by his agent or by somebody with the consent of the candidate or his election agent. The question of vicarious liability will a!ise only from the date of appointment as such agent and only when a case of obtaining indirect assistance is set up.

\

Un~il the candidate had appointed an election agent, the action of any other parson could not constitute him automatically an agent so that he may, by doing something voluntarily, succeed in making the candidate vicariously liable for his own actions whether he was or was not a gazetted officer at the time when he committed the act complained of. The question of obtaining assistance through an agent or other person could only arise where such a case of obtaining assistance indirectly through others is set up but not otherwise. [545A-B]

"Liability by implication, Nature of the Principle" Whenever a case of a liability by implication, where there is such a species of liability in law, comparable to a criminal Jia:bility, is to be fastened upon an individual, the prosecutor is to be expected, as part of an elementary duty to give fair notice and a fair opportunity to meet what the individual has rea-lly to be made liable for, either because of some act or omission of the individual concerned, or, even more so, for that of an agent, or another person fo1' which there may be some sort of' vicarious liability from facts showing consent or agency, to give full particulars of circumstances from which such implications or vicarious liabilities may arise. [545G·H, 5461\]

"I

On the language of section 123(7) a liability in not created by merely not rejecting voluntarily given aid. The candidate may not often be aware ·of the voluntarily given assistance so as to be able to reject it. A case of consent which can be legally set up is only one of consenting to active obtaining o~ procurement by an agent or by some other person who becomes, fo.r the purposes of the specific aid given and consented to, ordinarily prior to obtaining it, as good as an agent employed by the candidate. [546C·Dl

"Types .of cases of actual obtaining of assistance u/s. 123(7) On the terms of Section 123(7) the following three types of cases of actual obtaining of assistance, as distinguished from abetment or attempting to obtain it can be legally set up either exclusively or alternatively against a candidate: (il a direct obtaining of it by the act of th" candidate himself; (ii) an indirect or vicarious procurement of it by the acts of a duly constituted agent, and (iii) an indirect or vicarious procurement of it by the acts of a person who, though not a duty constituted agent becomes constructively an agent for the purpose of some particular aid obtained, because it was assented to by the candidate at a time which, must, ordinarily, be before the aid is given, so that the person through whom assistance is obtained is a constructive agent for this particular aid at the time when it is given. The term procurement should, strictly speaking, apply only in the last two types of cases. A reference to s. 100( 1) (b) furtheir emphasises the position that a corrupt practice for which the High Court fa to declare an election void must have been committed either by a returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of the returned candidate or his election agent". A case falling u/s. 100(1) (d) (ii) of a "Corrupt practice committed in the interest of a candidate by an agent other than his election agent is very different and postulates ( 1) a, corrupt practice which is committed only by an agent, and,; (ii) the existence of such

,

>

'

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1976) 2 S.C.R.

'·

an agent, and then requires proof of the further fact that the result of the election was materially affected by the corrupt practice. [5460-G]

Jt is the act of solicitation for the aid of the officials mentioned in S. 123(7), wh.ether successful or not, and not the mere fact that certain advantage flow qmte naturally and conventionally from the occupation of an office without any solicitation, or the mere fact that some assistance is voluntarily given by some one to an election campaign which is penalised by the provision. [547-D]

Voluntary rendering of help by a Government ser.vant without any attempt by the candidate concerned to "obtain" or "procure" it does not constitute a "Corrupt practice" of the candidate, whatever be the impropriety of it for the Government servant himself._ [563E-F] Hafiz Mohd. Ibrahim v. Elcctioll Tribullal 13 E.L.R. P. 262 and Rcmphal v. Brahm Prakash 23 E.L.R. (Punjab) p. 92, (1968), applied.

Corrupt practice could not be committed by any person before there was . .a ''candidate"

The definition in section 123(7) meant, on a ordinary and natural interpretaticm of words used, that the corrupt practice defined there could not be committed by any pElrson before he was a "candidate" for an election. [547-E]

In any case, if there was any uncertainty at all, in the law, it has been removed by amendment of section 7 of the Act. 40 of 1975, so that Section 79(b) reads as follows : "Candidate means a person who has been on claims to have been duly nomi· nated as a candidate at any election." [569C-D] I

Prooj of "mens rea" fdr the act of actus reus is necessary to allegations of corrupt prac.tice

substantiate

It is a . well settled rule that allegations of corrupt practice in the course of an election must be judged by the same standards as a criminial charge. And, no rule of evidence, in judging guilt on a criminal charge, is more firmly rooted than that no charge, resting on circumstantial evidence, could be held to be proved beyond reasonable doubt unless the chain of circumstances is so complete and so connected with the charge that it leaves no other reasonable hypothesis open for the court to adopt except that the offender had committed the offence alleged. [550C-E]

Smt. Om Prab/w Jain v. Charan Das & Anr. relied. on.

.

AIR 1975 S.C. 1417 @ 1426,

The logical conseCJ,uence of placing a charge of . corrupt practice on !he same footing as a crimlflal charge is the obligation to mterpr~t the .words wh~ch define it strictly and narrowly. Indeed, any natural and ord10.ary interpretation on the words "obtaining or procuring or abettin& or attemptmg" mu~t carry with it the imperative requirement that the candidate concerned or ht• ag~nt must have intentionally done an act which has the effect contemplated by Section 123(7). In other words, a "mens rea" or a guilty mind as well as an "actus reus" or a wrongful act must concur to pro~uc~ the r~sult contemp.lated by Jaw. So far as election expenses are concerned, It ts possib!e to conceive. that .ev.en an unintentional result (i.e. expenses "incurred" exceedmg the p1escnbed hmit) may be enough: so that a duty to' prevent this result may be there in law. But, S. 123(7) requires actual intended acts of "obtaining" or "procuring" or attempt. ing or abetti.ng. For s. 123(7·) results are immaterial. S.123(7) does not create an "absolute -statuto!'y liability". [548A-C] Dr. Y. S. Parmar v. Hira Singh, AIR 1959 S.C. p. 244, dissented from. Satyadel' Bushahiri v. Padam Dev and ors. 10 E.L.R. 103 (S.C.) 1954, 103 (SC) (1954); McJ1e11dra Kumar v. Vidyavati & Ors. 10 E.L.R. 214 (SC) 1954;

!

t

"'

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

Babubhai Va./lab!z Das Gandhi v. Pil/ao Homi Mody 36 E.LR. 108 @ 123-124; Haji Abdul Wahid v. B. V. Keskar 21 ELR 409' @ 432, discussed.

Before a candidate can be held guilty of a corrupt practice a mens rea as well as an actus reus must be shown on the. part of either the candidate herself or her election agent; and, on the evidence on record mens rea was a necessary ingredient of the corrupt practice and the doctrine of constructive knowledge is not applicable. [573F-G] v.

in the instant case, the election petition alleged a wrongfully obtained and procured assistance due to acts of the respondent as well as her election agent Shri Yashpal Kapoor. Proof of actual mens rea as well as actus reus was not given. The allegation of "corrupt practice" was, therefore, liable to be rejected on thi's ground alone since there could not possibly, on the facts of the case, be any mens rea on the part of appellant. [573H-574A]

C

Moti/al v. Manglaprasad AIR 1958 794 @ 797 and Ram Nath Sharma & Ors. 17 ELR 243 @ 253, referred to.

Biresh Mishra

Sheopath Singh v. Ram Pratap [1965] 1 SCR 1975, relied on.

Contractual iwtice on termination of Government serrice Oil either side is not cdmpulso1y. It is abundantly clear from Rule 5(b) of the. Central Civil Services (Tempo.rary Service) Rules, 1949, that the Government and the Government servant could dispense with the period of notice if it was mutually agreed upon to do that. [558-F]

Neither the Government nor the Government servant is in a worse position than the ordinary master and servant governed by contract. In fact, Art. 310 makes it clear that in such. a case. the tenure of office of a Central Government is "during the pleasure of the President" It is inconcievable that the law shonld thrust the status of a Government servant upon one who does not want it, jparticularly when the Government also does not in public interest, refuse to relieve him, by making him stick to any terms to the contrary in his contract. Our law on this point is not so monstrous as to foist the "statm" of a Government servant on anyone in such, circumstances. However, there was an amendment also in the law by s. 1 of Act 40/1975, which was made retrospective by Sec. 10 of Act 40/1975, and that makes the legal position still clearer. [558G-H, 559B,F]

Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. V (Simond's Edn.) p. 61 Edwards M. Edwards v. United States ( 1800) 26 Lawyers Edn. p. 31. Raj Kumar v. Union of India [1968] (3) SCR 857; Raj Narain v. Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi, (1972], (3) SCR 841 (referred to).

Mere possibility of abuse of power does not invalidate the provisions of all Act; right to complain begins after t.he event.

There is no foree in the contention that the power conferred by Election Law Amendment Act upon the Government is bound to be abused by those who hold the reins of Government. The presumption is that a bona fide use will be made of this power lodged in such responsible hands. If such powers are ever exercised in a mala fide manner, it is the particular exercise of the power that can be questioned and struck down. The provisions do not become invalid merely because it could be abused as practically any provision of law can be by those who may want to do so. [559G-H] Chailenge· on the ground that it conld be misused or likelihood of misuse, in future, cannot possibly succeed. The possibility of misuse of power given by a statute cannot invalidate the provision conferring the power. The occasion to complain can only arise where there is such alleged misuse. Even the possibility of such misuse of the power by so responsible an official as the Election Commissioner cannot be easily conceived of. [578C-D]

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1976] 2 S.C.R.

\

Df. B. N. Khare v. State of Delhi [1952] SCR 519 @ p. 562, State of Wesz Bengal v. A. A. Sarkar [1952] SCR 284 @ p. 301; R. K. Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar [1959] SCR 279 @ p. 306; T. K. Mudaliar v. Venkatachafam [1955] (2) SCR 11% @ 1239; Chitralekha v. State of Mysore [1964] (6) SCR 368 @ p. 382-383; M. R. Dcka v. N. E. F. Rly. [1964] (5) SCR p. 683 (referred to.) Act 58/1974 could be justified as merely an attempt to restore the law as understood prior to Amarnath Chawlds case. ·

·'

The amendment made by Act 58 of 1974, by adding the explanation (1) to Sec. 77 ( 1) of the Act, could be justified as merely an attempt to restore the law as it has been understood to be previous to decisions of this Court in Kanwar/al Gupta's case. [582 D]

!

)

Kanwar/al Gupta v. Amarnath Chawla AIR 1975 SC p. 308 @ 315-316 (no longer good law).

"Allegations of corrupt practice u/s 123 in an election petition uls 83 ( l)(b) require pleading with sufficient particulars of legal evidence and no amount of evidence· can be looked into> onl a case not really setup".

The principle that no amount of evidence could be Jocked into on a case not really set up was applicable in the instant case. It was quite unfair to expect the original respondent to meet ~ case of a de facto agency which was not set np at all. Furthermore, the case of de facto agency was, in the circumstances of the particular case, only pos'3ible to set up if the respondent had made some request to an alleged agent to go and conduct the election campaign even before he was appointed her election agent on 1-2-1971. The Court cannot, without proof of any specific request or solicitation or even knowledge of or consent to the doing of any particular acts which the alleged agent may have done, make the candidate vicariously liable for them. Of this, there was not only no evidence whatsoever on record, but the evidence is to the contrary. If this was not established by evidence on record, it could be said that the bottom was knocked out of even such. a hypothetical case. Had a case of de facto agency been argued, it is not conceivable that certain cases of Division Benches of th~ Allahabad High Court would not have been cited to show on what kind of evidence it could succeed. [562 E-F, A-Bl Rustom 5atin v. Dr. Sampurnanand and Ors. XX ELR 221 @ J. P. Rc•wat v. K. D. Paliwal XX ELR (All) 443, 456, referred to.

243;

The principle that no amount of evidence can be looked into on a case not set up i's sufficient to dispose of the evidence songht to be adduced a bout a cheque of Rs. 70,000/_-· received by Shri D. B. Singh, who was not summoned by either party to prove what it was spent upon if it was spent at all. Section 83 (1) (b) of the Act contains the mandatory provision that the petition 'shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice." [581 G-H, 582 A] · Absence of proof of a desire to change the constituency is not proof of a a. positive holding out as a candidate under the unamended s. 79(h) of rite Representation of the People Act. Absence of proof of a desire to change the constituency is not proof of a positive "holding out". What is relevant is not what other people think or say about what a possible candidate would do, but what the candidate cgncerned himself' has said or done, so as to amount to a "holding out" as a candidate by the candidate from a particular cons!lituency. Mere speculation of rumour circulated by other persons interested in finding out the the Prime Minister's constituency could only prove what their own expectations or beliefs were. This type of evidence, strictly speaking, could not even be admissible unless ' it could be related to s-Omething actually said or done by the candidate. All that such "evidence", consisting of speculation and rumours, could prove was that people interested were speculating or indulging in guess work. [565 E-F]

r

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

38 I

In the instant case, the answer of the Prime Minister at tm:, Press conference 29-12-1970 or the contents of her speech in Coimbatore, in early January 1971, or even a declaration or announcement of the All India Congress Com~ mittee on 29-1-1971, assuming that there was such an announcement, could not mean that the Prime Minister had held herself out as a .candidate for the constituency. \fhis "holding out has to take place by the Prime Minister heFself and not by the Congress Committee." [567 A-B] In any case, if there was any uncertainty at all, in the Jaw, it has been removed by an amendment by section 7 of Act No. 40/19,75, changing the definition of "candidate" in S. 79'(b) of the Representation of the People Act. [569-C] Mwudswami Gounder v. S. Khader Sharif] 4 E.L.R. 283 @ 292; S. Khader Sharif] v. Munniswami Gounder and Ors. [1955] (2) SCR 469 @ 473 lrelied on). J. P. Rawat v. Krishna Dutt Paliwal 20 ELR (Act) p. 443 @ 463; Haji Abdul Wahid v. B. V. Keskar and Anr. 21 ELR (Act) 409. K. K. Mishra V. Baramali Babu 38 ELR (Orissa) p. 451 453. (referred to). "Punitive character df corrupt practice under the Indian Penal Code and under the Peoples Representatidn Act, 1951.

'Oil

Corrupt practices of a candidate cannot go unpunished, whether they are committed before or after he becomes a candidate, when they amount to acts which come within the purvi~w of electoral offences dealt with by chapter 3, Sections 125, 126, 127, 127(A) or chapter 9A of the Indian Penal Code. Offences such as bribery, for purposes of either ind11cing persons to vote or not to vote or to stand or not to stand as candidates, undue infiuence and persona~ tion etc. should be sufficient deterrents against perver~ion of the electoral process by those prospective candidates, who want to adopt corrupt and objectionable means for gaining success at the polls. [569 GH, 570 Al The Amendment of the definition "ccmdidate" in s. 79(b) with retrospective .effect, is i11t1:a vires of the powers of the Parliament to legislate under Art. 327 of the Constitution of India. Duty of the Court to interfere with and when to interfere. The amendment of Section 79(b) by section 7 r /w section 10 of the Election Laws (Amendment) Act 40 of 1975 is within the unquestionable powers of Parliament to legislate, either prospectively or retrospectively, with regard to election matters. It is incapable of being interpreted as an attack on free and fair elections. Court cannot take upon themselves the task of laying down what electoral laws should be. The law~makers, assembled in Parliament, are presumed to know and understand their business of making laws for the welfare and well being of the mass of people of this country, for the protection of democrncy, and of free and fair elections, in accordance with the needs of the democratic process better than courts, know and understand these. It is only where a piece of legislation clearly infringes a constitutional provision or indubitably overrides a constitutional purpose or mandate or prohibition that courts can interfere. There is no invalidity in this provision. Even if the present definition of candidate is a new one, it cannot be said to be arbitrary. The concept contained in it is found in the English defintion. [569 FJ

C

Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd Edn. Vol. 14 p. 162 (referred to). "Faci/.ities to the Prime Minister in compliance with the official rules and Instructions do not fall under corrupt practice within the meaning of s. 123(7) of the Represellfation of the People Act."

The State Government had acted in compliance with the instructions issued by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India in 1958 read with Rule 71 (6) of what is known as the Blue Book. The provisions of Section 123 (7) were intended to prevent solicitation for aid and not sending of information to the State Government in the course of ordinary official business even if the candi· date concerned knows that the State Government is bound, under the rules,

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1976] 2 'S.C.R.

'

to make the necessary arrangements dictated by the needs of the security of the Prime Minister and convenience of the public. [570 G-H, 571 G] The case, that by instructing the State Government, knowing that it will make the necessary arrangements through its servants, the returned candidate was employing the State Govt. as her agency in prbcurising the aid of' the Officers concerned, was neither set up nor put in issue. [571 F]

The view taken by the High Court that the "persona" of a candidate during the election must not only be different from that of the Prime Minister, but also that when the two capacities are held by the same person, the secuoify arrangements are made to protect an artificial legal "Persona" and not the persona of the Prime ~,Iinister is manifestly erroneous. The security <rrrangements are not to be withdrnwn merely because the Prime Minister at some particular moment of time, acts in another capacity. Even if the court were to recognise this distinction between the "Persona" of the Prime Minister and that of a candidate, it is impossible to separate the special iurangements made for the security of the person of the Prime Minister from these to which she may be entitled as a candidate only. It is impossible to deny at any time the facilities and precautions meant for the person who holds the office of the Prime Minister to the person just because she also figures as a candidate at an election. So Jong as the person is the same, what is meant for the person must be attributed to> the persona or capacity of the Prime Minister and not to that of a candidate only. So long as the person was the same the distinction between the two capacities or personae for the purposes for which facilities were given and the proteclion provided, was both factually &S well as legaily impossible and quite immaterial. Such a case could not be 'one of solicitation of official aid and assistance. It is a case in which certain precautions are taken <rnd arrangements made almost "automatically" by officers of the State, as a m<rtter of duty towards the office held by a candidate who undoubtedly enjoys certain advantages, which an ordinary candidate cannot have. The appurtenances of office or distinctions achieved are comparable to those personal advantages which are not enjoyed because they are "obtained" or "proce,red" by a candidate <rs any official favour shewn, but as a matter of right under the rules. The officials concerned only perform their duties under the law and are not giving aid "procured" or "obtained". If such a result in law is unfair, it is not for courts to find a remedy by accepting the argument that those who enjoy the benefits of office must be made to realise and suffer some of its handicaps. Thi~ clearly means that the benefit which law gives, without solicitation by the candidate, must be converted, by a jedicia,l fiat, into a disadvantage and a Jiandicap. It is for Parliament to step in and change the Jaw if an alteration of it is considered necessary by it The only change that need be made in the law, if that could be the legislative intent, is to provide that the holder of any office for the time being would not be qmdified to stand at an election, .In that event, holders of' all ministerial offices will have to resign before they offelf th.emselves as candidates. But. such is not our law found in the 1951 Act or anywhere else. rt would be extending the scope of section 123 (7) too wide to hold that the facilities automatically provided by the State to the Prime Minister, by virtue of his ·or her office. are also struck by a provision directed against solicit<rtion of official aid and assistance by candidates, (571 H, 572 A-H, 573 A-Bl Motilal v. Mang/a Prasad AJ.R, 19•58 Alt 794 & 797; Biresh Mishra v. Ram Nath Sharma and ors, 17 ELR All 243 @ 253, referred to. Amendment· with retrospective effect of the definition of the candidate in s. 79(b) is only clari/icatory by the law and cannot be characterised as altering the "rules of the 1::ame",

Parliament could certainly set right a defect in law which may have come to its notice <rs a result of the interpretation of s, 123 (7). It is not, possible to question the motives behind the legislation. when the defect due to a possible ambiguity is removed, because a judicial interpretation focusses the attentio1t of Parliament on the need for a clarification of the law which becomes evident. This amendment with retrospective effect is merely a clarification of the state of Ja,w as it really was even before the amendment, but was misunderstood.

I

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

There is no question here of altering the "rules of th_e gam~". to th~ disadvautage of the petitioner. The disadvantage for the elect10n petitioner, if any, was there already, because of the consequences which legally and_ natura.lly flow frOJ!I the occupation by the appelhmt of the high office of the Pnme Mm1ster of this country. [574 A-B, G-H]

There is no attack on the validity of section 123(7) of the Act as it existed before the amendment. Hence, there could be no challenge to the validity of the amendment if it does not change the law but merely clarifies it. [574 H, 575 Al

Amendment by i11serti11g a provisio11 at the end of s. 123(7) of the Represe11tatio11 of the People Act by Act 40/1975 relating to certai11 facilities to the Ptime Mi11ister by virtue of h,er .office by Government official-and placing the Act 40 of 1975 under the protected Ninth S,chedule of the Constitutio11 read with Art. 31B cannot be challenged on the grmtnd of validation of Art. 14 and JIB of the Constitution of lndia.

Such an attack upon the validity of this amendment viz., that, as a candidate at an election, the Prime Minister a:nd an ordinary candidate should enjoy equal protection of Jaws, is possible only under the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution. But, as Act 40 of 1975, has been placed, by section 5 of the Thirty Ninth Amendment, in the protected Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, it becomes immune from such an attack. A similar attack through the back door . of a "basic structure" of the Constitution, cannot be made. This particular amendment has nothing to do with damage to any part of the "basic sbructure" of the Constitution. Even if an attack on the ground of violation of Art. 14 were open today, the occupation of such a high and important office as that of the Prime Minister of this country, with all its great hazards and trials, would provide a rationa:l basis for reasonable classification in respect of advantages possessed by a Prime Minister as a candidate at an election due to arrangements made necessary by considerations of safety and protection of the life and person of· the Prime Minister. There is no sustainable ground of a,ttack at all on the validity of this provision. [57 5 B-E] Kesavanada Bharati's case [1973] [Suppl.] SCR p. I, affirmed.

To treat unequally situated and circumstanced persons as though they 'were equals in the eyes of law for all purposes is not really to satisfy the requirements of the equality contemplated by the Constitution. The court cannot attempt to achieve, by means of judicial interpretation, an equalisation of conditic-ns under which, in its opinion, candidates should contest elections. It is not the function of courts to embark on attempts to achieve what is only in the power of Parlia:ment to accomplish, that is to say, to bring about equality of conditions where the law permits j'ustifiable discrimination. [576 D-C]

.,.

Burden of Proof :

The burden of proof is heavy on one who assails the result of an .election. [576 G] Rahimkhan v. K/1urs/iid Ahmed 1974 (2) SCC 6601 666, 672, followed. "Cow and Calf symbol, validity allotted by the Election Commissioner under' the Rules, is not a religious symbol withi11 the meaning of the rules-the svmbol will not constitute corrupt practice u/s 123(7) of the Represel!fation of the People A ct. The amendment inserted by Act 40 of 1975 is valid.

· Quoting passa:ges from ancient text about the sacredness of the cow in The use of pictures of this excellent and useful ammal 1s so frequently made today for commercial purposes or purposes other than religious that a picture of the cow and calf cannot,_ excel?t ~n so~e special and purely religious contexts, be held to have a rehg1~us s1gmfic~nce. The cow and calf symbol is not in itself a religious symbol_ m an elecl!on so as to convert its. use into a: corrupt practice unqer secllon 123(3) of the Act. [578 F-G]

supp~rt of the use of cow as a relig_ious symbol is useless.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1976] 2 ·s.c.R.

Blzar~tandro Singh v. Ram Salzava Pandey & Ors. AIR 1972 M.P. 176 @ 179; Sl11tal Prasad Misra v. Nitiraj Singh Chaudhary M.P. Gazette, 23-6-1971, Pt. I P; 807 Paras 18 to 23. Sri Prasanna Das Damodar Das Pa/war v. /ndu Lal Kanlzaiya 1;-al Yajnik, .Gujarat Gazette dt. 20-7-1972 Pt. 4 C p. 1042 & pp, 1355 to .~362: Sh~h Jaya_ntdal Ambalal v. Kasturilal Nagin Das Doshi 36 ELR 189; Bai1anath Smgh Vzdya v. R. P. Singh 36 ELR 327; Bishambar Dayal v. Raj Ra1esh.war and Ors. 39 ELR 363 & p. 376; Dinesh Dang v. Dau/at Ram 465 & 4?6; M1ym:nta/ v. Mansa Din & Ors. 37 ELR 67 & 89; B. P. Maurya v. Prakashv1r Shastri 37 ELR 137 & p, 147; Bahadar Rai v. Ram Singh Dlzanvar and Ors. 37 ELR 176 & 188, Vishw@iath Prasad v. Salamatullah and Ors. 27 ELR 145 & f.;/86, Lachchi Ram v. J.P. Mukhalva and Ors., 9 ELR 149 & p. 157. (Referred

The test of authorisation u!s 77 of the Representation of the People Act 1vou/d be creation of a liability and the case of authorisation has lo be set up and proved.

t

'

The test of authorisation wou.ld naturally be the creation of a liability to reimburse whoever spends the money and not necessarily the provision of money before hand by the candidate on whose behalf it is spent. Nevertheless, the authorisation has to be set up and proved. [583 BJ Kanwar/al Gupta v. Amamath Chawla, AIR 1975 S.C. P.308 @ 315-316 (no longer good Jaw) Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh [1955] (1) SCR 671 Ramdayal v. Brijraj Singh [1970] (1) SCR 530, Magrai Patadia v. R. K. Bir/a [1971] (1) SCR 118; B. Rajagopala Rao v. N. C. Ranga AIR 1971 SC 367. "Election laws in our country require proof of circumstances from which implied authorisation can be intended."

\

If some expenses are shown or admitted to have been incurred by the candidate's party or third persons over the election of the successful candidate, and are part of total expenditure on more than one constituency the question of separation of such expenses by such process of estimation and /apportionment can only arise if it is first proved that whatever expenditure was incurred by candidate's party or by any other person, who may be a friend, a relation, or a sympathiser, was incurred in circumstances from which it can be inferred that the successful candidate would reimburse the party or person who incurred it. It is only then that expenditure could be held to be authorised by the candidate. Voluntary expenditure by friends, r~li;tions or sympathisers and expenditure incurred by a candidate's, party, without any request or authorisation by the candidate has never been deemed to be expenditure1 by the candidate himself. (583 D-G]

Rananjaya Singh v. Biaj11ath Singh and Ors. [1955] ( 1) SCR 671, Ram Dayal v. Brijrai Singh [1970] (1) SCR 530; Magraj Patadia v. R. K. Bir/a [1971] (2) SCR 118. Hans Raj v. Pt. Hari Ram and Ors., 40 ELR SC 125 @ 128-129; Shah Jayantilal Ambalal v. Kasfllri Lal Nagindas & Ors. etc. 42 ELR SC 307 @ 311, Samant N. Balakrishna etc. v. George Fernandez & Ors. etc. [1969] (3) SCR 603 @ 607 (relied on). It is true that, when election~ of persons in the position of a Prime Minister of even a minister, whether in the Central Government or a State Government, takes place a number of people, come forward eit~er to give or th!Ust their It may be impossible for the candidate to supposed aid in the election. ;refuse it without offending them. But, i~ is also impossible for the courts to make the candidate himself or herself responsible so as to impose an obligation upon the candidate not only to find out and pay them the expenses incurred by them but to add them to1 his own expenses. That would. obviously be a most unfair result. And, this is not what the Jaw requires in this country. The law requires proof of circumstances from which at least implied authorisation can be properly inferred. [585 H, 586 A-Bl

'

.

i

/

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

Presumption as to adverse inference under section 114, Evidence . Act, is always optional and one of fact depending upon th;e whole set of facts and1 it is not obligatdry. A presumption u/s 114, Evidence Act (Act I) 1872 is always ()ptional and It is not obligatory. A' one of fact depending upon the whole set of facts. presumption could not arise from non-production of alleged evidence to m:et a case not even set up and when the Court was not even requested to exercise its discretionary powers under Order XVI Rule 14, C.P .C. [586 D·Fl M. C/zenna Reddy v. Ramachandra Rao 40 ELR p. 390 @ 415. (distinguished) Vdidity of the Election Law (Amendment) Act 40 of 1975-And the Constitution (39th Amendment) Act 1975 cannot be challenged on the ground that a number of Members of Parliament were in detention and prevented from taking deliberations in the Parliament. Article 122 of the Constitution prevents this t;.ourt from going into any question relating to irregularity of Qroceedings "in Parliament." An objection that, as a number of membe,-s of Parliament belonging to the opposition parties in detention were kept .away due to orders under the Preventive Detention laws, which could not even be questioned before courts of law, because of ~he declaration of the emergency by the President, so that some procedural defect, in making the amendments of the Act of 1951 and the 39th Constitutional amendment, arose is directly covered by the terms of Art, 122 ·of the Constitution which debars every court from examining the propriety of' Pro, ceedings "in Parliament." H any privileges of Members of Parliament were involved, it was open to them to have the question raised in Parliament. There is no provision of the Constitution providing lfor any notice to each Member of Parliament. That is also a matter completely covered by Art. 122 of the Constitution,. Issuance of notice.s are internal matters of procedure· which the ;Houses of Parliament themselves regulate. Objections on such grounds cannot be. taken to the legislative procedure. [587 A-G] Sharma v. Srikrishna AIR 1960 SC 1186 @ 1189 (followed). Col/c.teral challenge to preventive detention by way of obiections td the. validity of the Thirty Ninth Amendment and the Election Laws Amendment cannot even be entertained. As regards the validity of detentions of Members of Parliament, that cannot be questioned automatically or on the bare statement by counsel that certain Members of Parliament are illegally detained with some ulterior object. The enforcement of fundamental rights is regulaied by Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution and the suspension of remedies under these Articles is also governed by appropriate constitutional provisio9s. Their legality and regularity cannot be collaterally assailed by mere assertions made by counsel. These' objections to the validity of the amendments and the 39th Amendments cannot even be entertained in this manner in these election proceedings. [387 H, 388 A-BJ . "A certificate by the Speaker that a bill has been duly passed is a conclusive evidence df the [egislt>tion." All that this court can look into, in appropriate cases is whether the proCe· dure which amounts to "legislation" or, in the case of a constitutional amendment, which is prescribed by Art. 368 of the Constitution, was gone through at all. As a proof of that, however, it will accept, as conclusive evidence, a certificate of the Speaker, that a bill has been duly passed. [587 Fl State of Bihar v. Kameshwar AIR 1952 SC 252 @ 266 (applied). "Precise meaning of the term "constituent powers" under Art. 368 of the Constitution;" The theory that the constituent power is above the Constitution or lies "outside" the Constitution is quite novel. It postulates an undifferentiated or amorphous amalgam of bare power constituting the "constituent poWer" which is independent and above the Constitution Itself because it operates on

B·

F·

3:l 6

SllPREJV!E COURT REPORTS

[ 197 6] 2 ·s.C.R.

the Constitution and can displace it with, so to say, one stroke of its exercise. Such an extreme theory could not be supported by any of the earlier cases. The majority view in Bharati's case seemed to be that both the supremacy of the Constitution and separation of powers are parts of the ba5ic structure of the Constitution. To accept a theory that the constituent power Is outside th'<! Constitution and operates independently and above the Constitution itself, would make it unnecessary to have a Constitut1on beyond one consisting of a single sentence laying down that every kind. of power is vested in the consti-· tuent bodies, which may, by means of a single consolidated order or declaration of law exercise any or all of them themselves whenever they pleased to do so whether such powers be executive, legislative or judicial. • This cannot be the Such a ·view will defeat ambit of "constituent power" in our constitution. the whole purpose of a cOn'.titution. [594 G-H, 59.S A-DJ

T. C. Golaknatlz v. State of Punjab [1967] (2) SCR 672 Kesm·ananda Bharti's case [1973] Supp SCR p. 1 referred to.

If constituent power ·by itself is so transcendental and excepti.onal as to be above· the provisions of the Constitution itself, it should not, logically speaking, be- bound even by the procedure of amendment in Art. 386(2). [595 Fl The words "sovereignty" and "sovereign power" to describe the constituent power should for several good reasons be avoided, so far as possible by lawyers ~ho seek that clarity of thought for which precision in language is the first requircmeni as these terms are "emotive" and vague in character. [596 D-EJ

Lord Bryce: Studies in History & Jurisprudence (1901) (503-504); Leonard ;Sclwrpio; Key concepts in Political Science Series @ p. 7; Drcd Scott v. Sandford (1856) 19 How; 393 referred to. The j'udicial and law-making func~ions, however broadly conceiv~d, could not possibly have b~en m~an_t to. be mterchm;ga\Jle. They are not moopable of distinction and d1fferentiahon 1n any constJtutionally prescnbed sphere of operation of power including that of constituent power. [603 F J Ju.dicial Review of all law-making, whether it appertains to the sphere of fundamental law or of ordinary law, is tracable to the doctrine of judicial control by reference to certain basic principles contained in our constituliqn and considered too inviolable .to be easily alterable. One cannot refu&c to recoonise it so long as the doctrine is found embodied in our constitution (606 H. 607 Al

There is no Article in the American Constitution like Art.l 3 of our constitution, which declared any kind of legislation abridging or taking_ myay fundamental rights to be "void". Nevertheless, even there, .the Con>tttut1on, as the ba•sic or fundamental law of the land, was to operate as the touch-stone of the validity of ordinary laws. [607 El

Marbury v. Madison 1803, Cranc/1 137 referred to.

Under our Constitution, by Article 141 of the Comtitution. power is vested only in the Supreme Court and no other organ or authority of the Republic to declare the law "which shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India." Articles 32, 136 and 143 of the Constitution of India do vest c·~rtain powers on the Supreme Court of Jndia and Articles 226 and 227, similarly, vest certain powers on the High Courts, including superintendenc-e of the functioning of all courts and Tribunals. It is true that there is no mention or vesting of judicial power, as such, in the Supreme Court by any Article of our Constitution, but, it c_annot be denied that what wsts in the Supreme Court and High Courts is really judicial power. The Constitution undcuhtcdly sPecifically vests such power, that is to say, power which can properly he described as ''.judicial power", only in the Supreme Court and in the High Court9 and not in other bodies or authorities, whether executive or legislati,·e, functionit;o under the Constitution. Such a vesting of power in Parliament could not hav~

\

'

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

38 7

been omitted if it was the intention of Constitution makers to clothe it also with any similar ju(iicial authority or functions in any capacity whatsoever, [607 E-H, 608 A-BJ The claim therefore that an amalgam or some undifferentiated residue of inherent pow~r, incapable of precise definition ~md including jt?dicial power, vests in Parliament in its role as a constituent authority, cannot be substantiated by a reference to any Article of the Constitution whatsoever, whether substantive or procedurai. Attempts are made to infer such a power from mere theory· and speculation as to the nature of the Constituent power" itself. It does not follow that because the constituent power necessarily carries with it the power to constitute judicial authorities, it must also by implication. mean that the Parliament, acting in its constituent capacity, can exercise the judicial power itself directly without vesting it in itself first by an amendment of the Constitution. As a matter of correct interpretation of the Constitution, and, even more so, from the point of view of correct theory and principle, from which no practice should depart without good reason, it is highly important. [608 C-E] The term "so\'~reign" is only used in till! preamble of our Constitution".

The CoJllltitution was actually made by the people of India by virtue of their political sovereignty which enabled them to create a legally sovereign Democratic Republic Jo which they consigned or entrusted, through the Constitution, the use of sovereign power to be exercised, in its different forms, by the three 0rgans of Government, each acting on behalf of the whole people so as to serve the object stated in the Preambk. This reference to the "people of Tndia" is much more than a legal fiction. It is an asse,11ion, in the basic legal in~trument for the governance of this country of the f'act of. a new political power. [609 A-BJ It has been pointed out, in the Kesavananda Bharati's case that the preamble of our Constitution did not, like that of the American Constitution, "Walk before the Constitution", but was adopted after the rest of the Constitution was passed so that it is really a part of the Constitution itself. Tt means that the Constitution is a document recording an act of entrustment and conveyance by the people of India:, the political sovereign, of legal authority to act on its "This Constitution'' has a behalf to a "Sovereign Democratic Republic". basic structure comprising the three organs of the Republic : the Executive. the Legislature, and the Judiciary. It is through each of these organs that the Sovereign will of the People has to operare and manifest itself and not through only one of them. Neither of these three separate organs of the Republic can take owr the function assigned to the other. This is the1 basic structure or scheme of the system of Government of the Republic laid down in this Constitution whose identiy cannot, according to the majority view in Kesavananda's case be changed even by resorting to Article 368. The Republic is controlled and directed by the Constitution to proceed towards certain destinations and for certa.in purposes only. The power to change even llhe direction and purposes is itself divided in the sense that a proposed change, if challenged must be shown to have the sanction of all the three organs of the Republic each applying its own methods and principles and procedure for resting the correctness or v_alidity of the' measure. This result necessarily follows from our pre>ent Constitutional structure and scheme. If the judicial power operates here like a brake, or a veto, it is not one which can be controlled by any advice or direction to the judiciary as is the case in totalitarian regimes. In our system. which is democratic its exercise is left to the judicial conscience of each individual judge. This is also a basic and distinguishing feati1re of Democracy. [(\09 C-HJ Pro~.

Friedman: Law in a changing Society p. 61 (referred to).

Inasmuch as the Constitution is the imtrument which regulates the distribution between and the exercise of sovereign power by the three organs of the State, and it is there constantly to govern and to be referred to and to be appealed to in any and every case of doubt and difficulty, it could itself, con:eptua:lly, be regarded as the true· or "ultimate" sovereign, that is to say, Sovereign as

3BS

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1976] 2 ·s.C.R.

compared with "immediate" sovereignty of an organ of the Republic acting with· in its own sphere and at its own level. [610 A-C] . . Ernest Barker : Social & Political Theory. (referred to) · "Sovereignty is. limited bdth by its own nature as well as its mode of action"

A theory of a legal sovereignty must necessarily demarcate the sphere of its "legal" or proper operation as opposed to mere use of power either capriciously or divorced from human reason and natural justice. Sovereignty, as recognised by law, is limited both by its own "nature" as well as its "mode of action". There should be no difficulty in accepting such a theory if one can conceive of an ordered system or "Government of laws" as opposed to "Government of men" placed beyond limitations of this kind, which is implicit in the very idea of a Constitution. Our constitution not only regulates the. operations of the organs of State, but symbolises the unity of the Republic and contains the inspiring hopes and aspirations and cherished goals of all the efforts of the nation. It operntes not merely through law but also on the minds and feelings of the people. [612 C-GJ

, ,~

! "' r

Bharati's case Supp, [1973] 1 SCR [applied]

Any satisfactory theory of sovereignty must account for the power of the people to act in certain ways or to move in certain directions. The will of the people is thus inseparable, from a constitution which enables it- to be expressed and then to govern. The Constitution neither is nor can be sovereign in the sense that ihe people whd made it cannot unmake it or change to. It only prescribes the correct mode of doing everything, including that of changing the very system of Government. It is only in this sense that it ca~ be sovereign or supreme and rule the life of a nation. [613 D-FJ Willis; Constitution Law of the United States; Willioughby; Fundamental concepts of Public Law (Tago~e Law Lectures) 1924 p. 77; Cooper v. Wendsworth Board of Works 1863 14CB (NS) 180.

"Placing some limitations on exercise of sovereign power is the esssence of a constitution and the rationale of its existence." No simple theory of sovereignty fits the complex facts of modern life. E·very theory of today, ultimately, rests on concepts more refined than the physical or spiritual might of some ruler, in whom executive, legislative and judicial powers coalesce to take away all legal distinctions between them. Even if that was over the concept of sovereignty anywhere, it was certainly not that of our .constitution makers and it is not ours today. The value of constitutional government is that it prescribes definite ways in which this sovereign power shall be exercised by the State. The Constitution does place some limitations on exercise of sovereign power. That is the essence of a constitution and the rationable of its existence. [614 C-F] Willoughby : Nature of the State (1928) p. 302, Lester B. Orfield: The Amending of the F!ederal Constitution p. 166.

As between the sovereignty of the amending Article and the sovereignty of the Constitution there could be little doubt that lawyers should and would prefer the sovereignty or supremacy of the whole constitution rather than of any part of it. On the face of it, it appears more reasonable and respectable to swear allegiance to the whole Constitut10n, rather to Art. 368 or to the amending power contained in it. If there is a part of our constitution which deserves greater devotion than any other part of it is certainly the preamble of our Cons, titution. [615 C-D] Our Constitution, which has been described as the "Cornerstone of the Nation", was devised as a means to serve needs of the people of the country. It has not only the elevating preamble, deserving the allegiance of every rational

'

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

I

) "\

\.

~·

38 9

human being, but Part IV of our Constitution, which contains Directive.Principles of State Policy'' to guide the future course of state action, Parlicularly in the Jegil;lative field. It is true. that provisions· of Part IV are not enforceable thr9ugh the Courts against the State, but they are declared to be fund~mental in the governance of the country and are used to mterpret the Constttuuon and to fix the meanings of its provisions. From this point of viey; also, the co~· cept of supremacy of the Constitution is, undoubtedly, more sUited to the neeos of <;>ur country. It not only places the goals towards which nations must march, but it is meant to compel our Sovereign Republic, with its three organs of Government, to proceed in certain directions. It assumes that each o~gan of State will discharge' its tmst faithfully. We cannot deny to the Constttnuon that supremacy which is the symbol and proof of the level of our civilisation. [617 A-CJ

Ware v. Hylton (1876)3 Dall 199, Dred Scott v. Sandfo,rd (1856) 19 How 393; Gibbus v. Ogden (1824) (9 Wheat p. 1); White v. Heart (1871) 13 Wall 646; Keit/1 v. Clark (1878) 97 U.S. 454; National Prohibition cases (1920) 253 U.S. p. 350; American Constitution (Compared and discussed) "Supremacy of the Constitution is part of the basic structure". The doctrine of supremacy or sovereignty of the Constitution, adopted by this Court in Special Reference No. l of 1964, was declared to be a. part of the basic structure of the Constitution in Bharati's case. The minority, while not specifically dissenting from this view, held that, even what was considered by the majority to be a part of the basic structure, was alterable under Art. 368. But, no judge of this Court has so far held that, without even attempting to change what may be basic structure of the Constitution itself, by appropriate amendments, judicial power could be exercised by Parliament under Art. 368 on the assumption that it was already there. [617 D, G-HJ The theory of the supremacy of the Constitution is inherent in the very concept of the "auguster thing" which lies behind "Parliament or King" and is sought to be embodied in the Constitution of a country. The most proper and appropriate functions· of the amending power in a Constitution, which is also a part 6f the Constitution, and, indeed, its most potent part, is that of making basic changes so as to avert constitutional breakdowns and revolutions, if possible. The implied limitations of a "basic structure'', operating from even outside the language of Art. 368, as it stood before the 24th amendment restrict its scope. These limitation~ must, however, be related to and found in the provisions of the cC!nstitution and not outside. [619 D-G]

The words "Constituent power" ~re advisedly used in the 24th amendment so as to clarify the position and not to put jn or to include anything beyond constitution making power in Art. 368. (620 Cl ' The constituent power is still bound by the exclusively prescribed procedure to "amend by way of addition, variation or repeal" any provision of' the Constitu,tion. It is entirely a law making procedure elaborately set out in clause (2) of Art. 368. Jn fact, Art. 368 contains so much of the fundamental law making or legislative procedure that, in Golaknath's case, fiV"e learned Judges' held that it was confined to procedure and did not contain at all the substantive power to amend. Clause (1) of Art. 368 introduced by the 24th amendment. was, meant to remove this objection among others, and to do no more. It could not be intended to put some new amalgam of executive and judicial or quasijudicial substantive powers into it also by some implication so as to do away with the very need for such an elaborate and carefully drawn up constitution such as. ours. The absence of any quasi-judicial procedure, .from the comprehensively fram~d procedural provisions. of Art. 368, seems extremely significant. It indicates that it was the clear intention of constitution makers that no judicial or quasi-judicial function could be performed by Parliament whilst operating in the special constituent field of Constitutional law making. An omission to provide any quasi-judicial procedure in Art. 368. which. apparently furnishes a self-contained code, means that no 5ruch power wa~ meant to be included here _at all. Prqper exercise of judicial power is inseparable from hppropriate procedure. [620 C-F] 4-126 S.C.T./76

.•

.H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[ 197 6] 2 s.c.it.

The political sovereignty of the people, recognised by the preamble of our constitution, where the people are described as the constitution makers who gave the constitution unto themselves, does not mean that the people retained unto themselves any residue of legal sovereignty. They did not p~escribe, apart from dividing the exercise of sovereign power roughly between the three organs of the Republic, each with its own modus operandi any othe,r or direct method, such as Initiative or Referendum, for exercising their politically sovereign power. The people entrusted to the three. organs of the sovereign Democratic Republic. They constituted the exericse of the three aspects of sovereign power on behalf of the people. This is the only way of reconciling the idea of a sovereign people in the political sense, and the sovereignty of the Republic represented by a legally supreme constitntion, so that the sovereign powers of each of the' three organs of the Republic had to be exercised in conformity with the mandates, both positive and negative, express and implied of the constitution. It would be preferable to describe this concept as one of the "Supremacy of the Constitution" instead of "Sovereignty" of the Constitution, because of the theoretical, speculative, and emotive clouds which have gathered arou11d the term sovereignty. [621 A-DJ Tijkayat Sri Govinc:ic.lji Maharaj v. The State of Rajasthan [1964] (1) .SCR p. 561 @ 591, Queen v. Burah 5 I.A. 178; (referred to).

' ,. (

I

'•

"Clause 4 of Art. 329A could not be said to be a valid piece; or Jaw making. ·

It is true that, in the exercise of the law making constituent power, brought in by s. 8 of the Indian Independenee Act, the legislatures could be armed ·with judicial powers if appropriate Jaws w'ere made to that effect. But, as no law either constitutional or ordinary, was passed, preceding the 39th Amendment, to repeal the Act of 1951 and then to vest a judicial powzr in Parlh\ment, so as to enable it to take over and decide election disputes itself directly Cl.. (4) of Art. 329A by virtue of containing certain provisions or the assumptio'Ql that s_uch a judicial power was already there in Parliament, could not be said to be valid as a piece of law making. [623 E-GJ

Art. 105 (3) of the Constitution does presumed exercise of judicial power.

not

confer

on

Parliame•it

any

What was not conferred upon Parliament itself, in its constituent capacity, could not be impliedly assumed to be there by virtue of certain "powers, ,privileges and immunities which belong separately to each House of Parliament. Such a claim cannot be based upon what is to be derived from Art. 105. This reasoning would, obviously, conflict with the provisions, of Art. 329(b) of the Constitution which indicates that an election dispute can only be resolved by an election petition before a forum provided by an ordinary enactment. [624 C-DJ In exercise of its powers under Art. 329(b), our Parliament had enacted the Act of 19,51. The procedure prescribed by the Act had the binding force of a constitutionally. prescribed procedure. It could not be circumvented un1ess, with reference to cases covered by Art. 329'A(4), it had been first repealed. Only after such! a -repeal could any other forum or procedure be legally adopted. It could not be assumed, by reason of Art. 105(3), that the prescribed forum shifted to Parliament itself, and that Parliament. in exercise of its constituent function, had both legislated and adjudicated. [624 E-F] Australian Constitution Art. 47 (referred to) Rule of Construction applies to interpretation of the Constitution G1! well.

The well recognised rule of construction of statutes, which must apply t~ .the interpretation of the Constitution as well is "Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius". From this is derived the subsidiary rule that an expressly laid .down mode of doing something necessarily prohibits the doing of that thing in .any other manner. [624 G-H]

-

/

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

Crawford's "Statutory Constructions ( 1940) p. 334 (referred to).

Art. 329(b) excludes the provisions of Art. 105(3).

\

\

What is separately expressly, and especially provided for by Art. 329(b) must necessarily fall outside the purview of Art. 105(3). Moreover Art. 105(3) contained a temporary provision until o~her provision was made by Parliament in that behalf. Appropriate provisions were enacted by the Act of 1951, in compliance with Art. 329(b), the proper Article for it. It would be idle to contend that these provisions suddenly lapsed or ceased to exist as soon as Parliament took up consideration of the issues and the grounds of the decision on them by the High Court to which reference is made in Art. 329(A)(4). Again, a purported exercise of power, in enacting Art. 329(A)(4), cou_ld only be a law making power and not any other power which could conceivably fall under Art. 105(3). The required law making power is found in article 368. [625 D-E] Erskine May: Parliamentary Procedure (18th Edn.) 153-155; Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 [1965] 1 SCR 175; Kielly v. Cc;-son 4 Moore PC 63;

The exercise of the jurisdiction to determine an election dispute, vested in the High Court by the Act of 1951, for al! elections to the House of the Peop]e, in accordance with Art. 329(b), cannot be taken away by a constitutional amendment, purporting to repeal retrospectively the provisions of the Act of 19'51, a piece of ordinary legislation, in their application to a particular class of cases, and making a. simultaneous declaration of the rights of the parties to a judgment, without first performing a judicial function also, which was not included in the constituent or any other law making power. [629 D-E] ~

C

[His Lordship thought it nQ.t necessary to pursue the question whether there are any legal !imitations upon the subject matter which may be considered fit for inclusion or incorporation in a constitution, as it was left to the good sense , of. the Constitution makers]. [631 DJ

'

Parliament could not be deemed to have withdrawn the c.ase and decided if. ~gislative action can sometimes be made to serve as an unobjectionable substitute for what could and should strictly and properly be done judicially. The A~t of 1951, enacted under the provisions of article 329(b) of the Constitution, provided a procedure which could not be circumvented. Despite the impression created by the terms of the declaration at the end or Cl, ( 4) of Art. 329A, it cannot be assumed that Parliament took over a case intn its own hands to decide it and to incorporate the result in the form of Art. 329(A)(4). Parliament could not be deemed to be unaware of the bar created by Art. 329 (b) and the 1951 Act. [631 D-GJ

t

East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council [1952] A.C. 109 (referred to.). Art. 329(A) 4 is only a piece of purported /aw-making.

Art: 329 (A) (4) is part of. an amendment of the Constitution for _the purposes found m the statement of ob1ects and Reasons. Only the declarat10n given at the end of it suggests that, in the course of it, the effect upon the case before this, court was considered and dealt .with. [633 F-GJ }·

Retrospectivity of Art. 329(A) 4 is valid.

Retrospective legislation which does not impair vested or substantial rights or const,itutional prohibitions is permissible. [636 Al Willoughby : Constitution of the United States 2nd Edn. V.ol. 3: Cooley : Constitutional Limitation; MPV. Sundaramier & Co. v. The State of A.P. & Anr. [1958] SCR 1422; Sri Vinod Kumar and Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh [,!259] Supp. (1) SCR 160; Jadah' Singh v. The State of Himachal Pradesh and

1l

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1976] 2 S.C.R.

'

Ors. [1960] (3) SCR 755; Udai Ram Sharma and Ors. v. Union of India anti Ors. [1968] 3 SCR 41; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of. jndia and Ors. [1970] (3) SCR 530; Jagannat/z etc. v. Authorised Officer L<tnd Reforms and Ors. etc. [1972] (1) SCR 1055; Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. & Anr. v. T/1e State of Assam, [1964] (5) SCR 975; Mis. Tirat'iz Ram Rajindranath Lucknow v. State of U.P. & Anr. AIR 1973 SC 405; Krishna Chandra Gangopadhaya etc. v. Tile Union of India and Ors. AIR 1975 SC 1389; Pandia Nad~w mu/ Ors. v. The State of Tamil Nadu (1974] (2) SCC 539; State of Orissa v. B. K. Bose [1962] (Supp.) 2 SCR 380; State of U.P. v. Roja Anand Brahma Shah [1967] (!) SCR 362; Shri Pritlzvi Cotton Mills Ltd. & A nr. v. Broach Borough Municipality & Ors. [1970] (1) SCR 382 @ 392; Jana.pada Sabha, Chindwara etc. v. The Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd & A11r. etc. [1970] 3 SCR 745; Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. New Shorock Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd. etc. [1971] (1) SCR 288; State of Tami/ Nadu & Anr. v. M. R. Gounder Am".,. AIR 1971 SC 231; A marjit Kaur and Ors. v. Pritam Singh and Ors. AIR 1974 SC 2068; Qudrat Ullah v. Municipal Board Bareill)'1 AIR 1974 SC 396; A. K. Copa/an v. State .of Ta111il Nadtt [1950] SCR 88 @ 198; S. C. Chose v. King Emperor [1944) FCR 295; John Clm'ke Geot'ge Esquil'e and Sir, Roll:111d Jennings, Knight 1955 Law Rep. States 4 Eliz~ 2 America~' Jurisprudence; 2nd· Edn. Vol. 46@ 318; Kanta Katlzurla v. Ma11ak Chand Surano [1970] (2) SCR 835. Constitutional validity of amendments in general and 39th Amendment in particular.

If the constituent bodies taken separately or together, could be legally sovereign, the constitutional validity of no amendment could be called in question before the Court. It is well established that it is the Constitution and not theconstituent power which is supreme here, in the sense that the constitutionalitY of the Constitution cannot be c.alled in question but the exercise of the constituent power can be. The validity of exercise of constituent powers have to be judged by testing it on anvil of Constitutional provisions. Courts have to test the legality of Jaws, whether purporting to be ordinary or Constitutional, by the no1'ms laid down in the Constitution. This follows from the supremacy of theConstitution. [640 D-E, GJ

, \

J. C. Gray : Nature & Source of Law p. 96 Ke/sen "General Theory of law and State" p. 150 (referred to).

"The basic structure of the Constitution tests validity of a constitutional law· an1e11(/Jnent and c•!so ordinary laws :

The basic structure of the Con>titution tests both, viz. the validity of a. constitutional amendment and ordinary laws, because ordinary law making itself cannot go beyond the range of constituent power. [640 GJ The issues whether a majority patty can virtually act as the judge, in an election dispute between itself and the minority parties and whether this amounts to a denial of political justice can only be decided in accordance with the objects of the Preamble, by the judiciary. It would be a dangerous precedent to Jay down that they can be. and need be determined n9where at all. That is ·what acceptance of total validity of Art. 329A(4) may mean if it bars this court's jurisdiction to hear and decide such a case on merits. There is no reason why the issue should be termed as· one of "political justice" instead of one olain and simple or elementary justice. [641 A, B, Fl ".l11risdz'ction cannot be barred by A rt. 329A" Tt is true that the right in an ele,ction petition is a statutory right, created' by the statute u/s 116A· .of the Act of 1951 and it can be taken away retrospectively. But, where this taking away also involves the taking away of the ~ight to be heard by this Court on a grievance, whether justifiable or not that a minority is party is being oppressed by the majority. this court cannot' deny the spokesman of the minority a right to lie heard on merits. Such an issue is ,:onsti*1.1tional and legal and not political. [642 C-D]

I

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN

The jurisdiction of this court to consider the different grounds of complaint does not ordinarily arise at all under Section 1l6A of th~ A_ct of _1951. ~ut, in view of the decision to hear the arguments on the constttut10nal issues raised fo the writ petition in the High Court, the causes of action arising out of the amenqments have become attached to the appeals u/s 116 A of the Act. [643 B-D] T]le effect of clauses (4) and (5) & (6) of Art. 329A would be,_ if ~his <:ourt were to hold that its jurisdiction is barred preventing it from gmng int~ the merits of the appeals under section l 16A of the Act, the appeal also could not be gone into, and, this; would mean denying an -opportunity also• to the ajlPe1lant Prime Minister of asserting her rights, under the 1951 Act and of vind1catfog her stand in the case bv showing that there was really no sustainable :ground what·soever for the findings of the High Court against her. This court would, therefore, be prevented from doing justice to. her case as well a9 if the court were to accept the contention that the Thirty-ninth Amendment bars the Court's jurisdiction to hear the appeals under S<:ction 116A of the Act on merits. The total effect would be that justice would appear to be defeated even if in fact, it is not so as a result of the a.lleged bar to this Court's jurisdiction if such a Bar be held to b<: there. It could not be the intention of Parliament that justice should appear to be defeated. [643 D-F] "The doctrii1e of political q11csthm" of Art. 329A. Undoubtedly, clause ( 4) of the Art. 329A, could be said to have a political objective, in the context in which it was introduced and this court could perhaps take judicial notice of this context. Even if it was possible to go beyond the ~tatement of objects and reasons and to hold that clause (4) of Art. 329A is there essentially for demonstrating the strong position of the Government and of the Prime Minister of this country so as to inspire the necessary confidence in and give the necessary political a.nd legal strength to the Government to enable it to go forward boldly to deal with internal economic and Jaw and order problems and international question there is no reason why this -could make it necessary to exclude the jurisdiction of this court so as to prevent it from consi• dering a case which would have been over much sooner if the court bad not been confronted with these difficulties. [644 H, 645 A-Bl [His Lordship observed that he failed to see what danger to the countrY could arise or how national interests could be jeopardised by a consideration and a decision by this court of such a good case as the Prime Minister of this country had on facts and law.] [645 CJ There may be and was som1:. useful political objective. to be served by demonstrating the strength and ability of the Government to face the difficulties with which it had been conf'ronted. lf that be so, clause ( 4) of Art. 329A bad a political objective and its purpose has been served. If that was the real object behind its enactment, it could not be really to injure the interests of political parties or groups. The context and the political consideratiOns placed before the court could be relevant in understanding the real meaning of clause ( 4) of Article 329A of the Constitution. [645 C-Dl Mai:bury v. Madison (1803) 1 Cr. 137, 163 (referred to). kesavana11da Bharati's case [1973] Supp. SCR 1 (relied on). Baker v. Carr 369 U.S. 186, H. H. Malwrajadhiraja Madhay Rao Jiwaji Rao Scindia Bahadur & Ors. v. Union of India [1971] 3 SCR 9; Raisahib Ram Jawa!'a Kap.ur and Ors. v. State df Punjab. [1955] (2) SCR 225; Jayantilal Anmtlal Smdhan v. N. Rana [1965] 3 SCR 201; Halsbury's Laws English 3rd Edn. Vol. 7 Art. 409 p. 192 (discussed). , "Maxim" ut res magis valeat quam pereat-lts applicability. It is. well-establishe~ _canon of in~erpretation that, out of two possible interpreta!Ions of a provisIOn. one which prevents it from becoming unconstitutional should be preferred if this is possible-Vt res magis valeat quam pereat. [645 El Jt. f~ t_rue that the de~ming provision seems to stand in the way of the court's exam111at10n of the ments of the case even though there is no dire.ct provision takin~ away !h:e co_urt's ju~isdiction to coi:sicler the merits of the appeals. A deeming provision mtroduc111g a legal action must be confined to the context

C

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1976] 2 'S.C.R.

of it and cannot be given a larger effect. A legal fiction is created for some definite purposes and should not be extended beyond its legitimate field determined by its coil.text. [645 F-G] Radha Kishan v. Durga Prasad AIR 1940 PC 167; Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and Anr. [1955] (2) SCR 603; C.I.T. Bombay v. James Anderson [1964] (5) SCR 590; C.I.T. Madras v. Express Newspapers Ltd. Madras, [1964] (8) SCR 189; Sri Jagadguru Kavi Basara Rajendraswami of Gavimutt v. Commissio11er of Hindu Religious Charitable Endowments Hyderabad [1964] (8) SCR 252, Ex part Walto11 in Re. Levy (1881) 17 Ch. D. 746 (referred to). \

"Clause (5) of Art. 329A does 11ot bar this Court's Jurisdiction"

If the purpose of clause ( 4) of Art. 329A was purely to meet the political needs of the country and was only partly revealed by the policy underlying the Statement of reasons and objects it seems possible to contend that it was not intended at all to oust the jurisdiction o·f the Court. Hence Art, 329A; clause (5) will not, so understood, bar the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide the appeals when it says that the appeal shall be disposed of in conformity with the provisions of clause ( 4). [646 B-C]

In the circumstances of this case, it would seem that conformity with the declaration embodied in Article 329A clause (4) is possible if it i~ confined to the meaning and effect of the deeming provision to what was needed only for the declaration to be given at the end of clause ( 4) by the constituent bodies, with a political object, and not for the purposes of affecting this Court's jurisdiction which was meant to determine the legal effects of what was decided in the Allahabad High Court. The more natural interpretation would appear to be that the deeming provision should apply for "all purposes" including those for consideration of the appeals before this Court. But, if it is not possible to decide those appeals without giving a different meaning to the deeming provision, on which the final declaration in claU9e (4) rests and clause (5) leaves this court free to decide bow this court could conform with clause ( 4), this court's jurisdiction ro decide factual and legal issues judicially cannot be said to be taken away absolutely. If the fiction was only a logical step in the proces~ of the declaration to be made by constituent auJhorities for. political purpo~s. but not of this court for legal purposes. The fiction will only attach to the declaration contained at the end of clause ( 4) for political purposes only. f646 C-EJ "Doctrine of Readifzg down not applied"

Perhaps it could be argued, by applying the doctrine of reading down, that clause (4) was 11ot intended to oust the jurisdiction of this court altogether to try the case. No such attempts at reading it down have, however, been made in support of the validity of Art. 329A (4). Clause (4) _of Article 329A(4) does not so operate as to bar the jurisdiction of this court to go into and determine the merits of the appeals before this Court by applying the Act of 1951. Even if this Court were to consider matters of expediency and national interest, as it 9hould in appropriate· cases, it does not appear to be either eX" pedient or in conformity with national interests to leave the question in doubt whether the judgment under appeal before this Court could or could not legally stand on its own legs under the unamended law. [646 E-Hl Art. 329A(4) does not stand in the way of the consideration of the appeals before this court on merits under the Act of 1951 or the validity of the amendments of the Act. [647 A] On Review Application : "Cou11sel's duty while arguing a case"

A court is not required, by any rule of natural justice, to intimate to learned counsel what particular route or reasoning will finally appeal to a judge or be· adopted by him in reaching a particular cGnclusion in his judgment. If a counsel raises an issue which, in the opinion of a Judge, can only be answered

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

by 'going into findings of fact, he should anticipate the possibility of such a view. [673 C-D] It may be difficult for learned counsel sometimes to anticipate and meet the requirements of every learned judge of this court when there are live of them hearing a cas~. It is, however, the duty of counsel, who raise issues which. may necessitate consideration of questions of fact and law, to satisfy the require. ments of any one of the judges, who may be of opinion that these issues could not possibly by decided properly without considering findings of fact and the applications of law to them. · [673 F-G]

After· holding that the Representation of People Act 1951 was not materially altered, but only explained by most amendments of 1975, consideratidn of merits wu:.voidable : Learned counsel for the election petitioner having stated that he had no further atgument to advance if his submissions on the validity and interpretation of amendments of Representation of the People Act, 1951, were not accept· able to the Court, could not urge, on an application for review, that he did not deal with merits because he did not anticipate the view of a learned Judge that the law, as contained in the Representation of People Act, 1951, had not been altered except on one matter. On such· a view, the appeal of the successful candidate coi.ild not be either fairly or legally disiposed of or allowed without any consideration of the merits of the case simply because of the election petitioner's counsel's statement presumably in the interests of his client. A consideration of and decision on merits of the case became imperative in such a situation. [674 E-Hl "Failure to make a particular submis~~on is 1101 a ground for redpening or review of a case." When counsel had ample opportunity to make all his submissions and yet, either due to some D)isapprehension or for some other reason he fails to make any particular sybmission, the case cannot be reopened, particularly when nothing which could possibly affect the result is indicated even in the review application. ·It is high time that it was realized by everyone that courts are not meant for political tactics or propaganda. [67 4 B, C-D] Per. Chandrachud, J. It is beyond Court's jurisdiction to consider whether, the election of a private individual and the disvute concerning it cannot be a matter of constitutional amendment under Art. 368. The alleged objection to the 39th Amendment is that the election of a private individual and the dispute concerning it cannot ever be a matter of Constitutional amendment. Under Article 368 the question touches a totally new dimension of the amending power : Can the Constituent Assembly, while amending the Cone•itution, prpnounce upon private disputes or must it only concern itself with what may be termed orgap.isational matters concerning the country's governance ? The question has the mefi.t of' novelty, but there is no substance in it. It requires to be examined in isolation. that is, divorced from considerations arising from the theory of separation of powers and the aspect whether the amendment constitutes an encroachment on judicial functions and thereby damages one of the basic structures of the Constitution. The reason why there is no wbstance in the contention is that what the Constitution ought to contain is not for the Courts to decide. The touchstone of the validity of a Constitutional amendment is firstly whether the procedure prescribed by Articlei 368 is strictly complied with and secondly whether the amendment destroys or damages the basic structure of the Constitution. The subject-matter of constitutio.nal amendments is a question ,of high policy and Courts are concerned with the interpretation of laws, no~ with the wisdom of the policy underlying them. The Constitution can be amended so as to provide that wagering contracts shall be void or that bigamous marriages shall be unlawful or that economic offenders shall be visited with a higher penalty. The Indian Constitution is not like the American Constitution an instrument of few words. The range of topics it covers would bemuse anY student of foreign Constitutions which do not even skirt the problems with which our Constitution deals in copious details. In fact, there is hardly any important

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1976] 2 ·s.c.R.

facet of national life which our Constitution does not touch. Along with matters of high priority like citizenship, Fundamental Rights, Directive Principles of State Policy and the relation between the Union and ~he States, it deals with matters not normally considered constitutionally important like the salaries of high dignitaries, the power of the Supreme Court to frame rules for regulating its practice and procedure, official language for communication between one State and another and last but not the least, elections to the Parliament and lhe S>tate Legislatures. Those to whose wisdom and judgment the constituent power is confided, will evoke scorn and derision if that power is used for granting~ er withdrawing building contracts, passing or failing students or granting and denying divorces. But the electorate lives in the hope that a sacred power will not so flagrantly be abused and the moving finger of history warns of the consequenceS: that inevitably flow when absolute power bas corrupted absolutely. The fear of perversion is no test of power. [656 G-H, 657 A-Fl Elections to legislatures were considered by Constitution makers to be a matter of constitutonal importance. Though the powers of the Prime Minister in a cabinet form of democracy are not as unrivalled as those of the President in the American system it i~ undeniable that the Prime Minister occupies a unique position. The choice of the subject for constitutional amendment cannot, therefore, be characterized as trifling, frivolous or outside the framework of a copious Constitution. It is wrong to think that elections to the country's legislatures are a private affair of the contestants. They are matters of public interest and of national importance. Every citizen has a stake in legislative elections for, his social and economic well-being depends upon the promises and performance of the legislature. Such elections, and more so the election. of the Prime Minis~er who is at least primqs inter pares, can legitimately form the subject-matter of a constitutional provision. The validity of what is brought into the Constitution has to be judged by different standards. [657 G-H, 658 A-CJ Rottscliaefcr on Constitutional Law (Ed. 1939) page 397 (referred to). "Ratio of the. majority decision in Bharati's case and the 1111amendc:•bl~ features."

The ratio of the majority decision in Bharati's case is not that ,some named features of the constitution are a part of its basic structure but that the power of amendment cannot be exercised so as to damage or destroy the essential elements or the basic structure of the Constitution. Supremacy of the constitution, Republican Democratic form of the Government, Secular character of the Cons!itution, Separation of powers, federalism and dignity and freedom of the individual, the mandate to build a welfare state, unity and integrity of the Nation, sovereignty of India. Sovereign Democratic Republic, Parliamentary Democracy. the three organs of the· State and judicial Review are mere illustrations of what constitutes the basic structure according to Bharati's case. [658 C-E] If there be beyond the pale of reasonable controversy any unamendable features of the constituti'on on the score that they form a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, they are that (i) India is a sovereign Democratic Republic (ii) Equality of Status and opportunity shall be secured to all its citizens; (iii) The state shall have no religion of its own and all persons sha!l be equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion and that (iv) The nation ~hall be governed by a Government of Laws, not of men. These are the pillars of our const!tutional philosophy, the pillars therefore of the basic structure of the Constitution. "Basic Struc!ure" by the majority judgment, is not a part of the funda-· mental rights nor indeed a provision of the constituti.on.. The theory of ha.sic structure is woven out of the conspectus of the constitution and the amendmg power is subjected to it because it is a constituent power. "The power to amend the fnndamental instrument cannot carry with it the power to destroy its essen. tial features". This brief is the arch of the theory of basic structure. [659 B-C, 670 B-CJ Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kera/a, [1973] Supp. S.C.R. 1 (explained). The Preamble of the co11stit11tion does not hold the key to its be.sic structure and is neithe.r a source nor a /imitation df Power". The view that the preamble of the Constitution holds the t.ey to its basic structure or that the preamble is too holy to suffer a human touch is not correct

, I

'

'

-

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

Preambles of the Constitution9 are metaphysical like slogans and are intended . primarily to reflect the hopes and aspirations of !•he people; they resonate the ideal which the' Nation seeks to achieve, the target and not the achievement. Though our preamble was voted upon and is a part of the Constitution it is really "a preliminary statement of the reasons" which made the )Jass.tog of the Constitution neceS>Sary and desirable. The preamble of our conslltution cannot therefore be regarded as a source of any prohibitions or inhibitions. [659 D·G}

H. M. Seervai Constitutional Law o'f India 2nd Edn. 19,75 p. 76:; Halsbury's Laws of En!iland 3rd Edn., p. 370; Willoughby : Constitutional La>v; Attorney GeneraA v. Prince Emest Augustus of Ilanorer [1957] A.C. 436, 463; Jn re: Bembari Union & Exqhange of Enclaves (Referred to).

"Judicial Review cannot be considered ti} be a part of the basic structure so .tar as le11islative elections are concerned".

The fundamental premise of the argument that judicial power is a part of the basic structure and since the 39th Amendment by Arts. 329A(4) and (5) deprives the courts including the Supreme Court of their power to adjudicate upon the disputed election the amendment is unconstitutional, is too broadly stated because the Constitution, as originally enacted, expressly <;xcluded Judi· cial Review i'n a large variety of important matters. Each of the provisions of Art. 31(4), 31(6), 136(2), 227(4), 262(2) and 329(a), shows that the Constitutio_n· did not regarg judicial review as an indispensable measure of. t~e legality or propriety of every determination. Even in a vital matter perta1mng to the election for membership of the Parliament the framers of the Constitution had left .the decision to the judgment of the Executive through Art. 103 (I) and 103(2) and 329(b). Under Art. 329(b). it was open to the legislature to ·]eave. the adjudication of election disputes to authorities other than thes·2 in the hierachy of our judicial system. The decisions of these tribunals could eventually be brought before the Supreme Court under Art. 136( 1) of the constitutidn, but it is at least, plausible that were. the legislatures to pass laws leaving the decisions of election disputes to themselves, judicial review might have stood excluded~ Since the Constitution, as originally enacted did not consider that judicial power must intervene in the interest of purity of elections, judicial review cannot be considered to be a part of the basic structure in so far as Jegis· lative elections are coricemed. The theory of Basic Structure has to be considered in each individual case, not in the abstract, but in the context of the concrete problem. The problem here is whether under our constitution, judicial review was considered as an indispensable concomitant of elections to country's legislatures. The answer,plainly is "no". [660 A-H, 661 A]

"I

-

The contention that Arts. 329(A)(4) and (5) are unconstitutional on the ground that by these provisions the election of the Prime Minister is placed beyond the purview of courts cannot be accepted. [661 Fl

Erskine May: Parliamentary Practice 18th Edn. p. 29,; Halsbury'> Laws of England 3rd Edn. Vol. 14 p. 250, 324; American Cons~itution Art. 1 sec. V. Clause ( !.) Leste~ Jayson "The Constitution of tl1e U.S.A." (referred to).

-· ,

-

\

. I

I i

'

Constitution of India Art. 31(4), 31(6). 103(1), 103(2), 136(2), 227(4), 262(2), 327, 328, 329(a), (b). (considered).

"Clauses (4) mid (5) o1 Art. 329(A) i11trnd11ced by 39th Amendment are not in total derogatio'n of Po/iticifll Justice ond hence Constitutional". \

The concept of "Political Justice" of which the Preamble to the Constitution of India speaks is too vague and nebulous to permit by its yardstick, the invali' dati.on of a constitutional amendment. There is no substance in the contention 1ba·: the relevant clauses of the 39th Amendment are in total derogation of "polL tiC>tl justice" and are accordingly unconstitutional. [661 G.l Clauses (4) and (5) of Art. 329(A) inserted hv the 39th Amendment do not damage or destroy democratic structure of the Constitution.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1976] 2 ·s.c.R.

The contention that "Democracy" is an essential feature of the Constitution is unassailable. If the democratic form of government is the corner-stone of our constitution, the basic feature is the broad form of democracy that was known to our Nation, when the constitution was enacted, with such adjustments and modifications as exigencie~ ·may demand, but not so as to leave the mere husk of a popular rule. Democracy is not a dogmatic: doctrine and no one can suggest that a rule is authoritarian because some rights and safeguards. avail· able to the people at the inception of its constitution have been abridged or ab· rogated or because, as the result of a constitutional amendment, the form of Government does not strictly comport with some classical defrnition of the concept. The needs of the Nati on may call for severe abne&ation, though never the needs of the Rulers and evolutionary changes in the fundamental law do not necessarily destroy the basic structure of its Government. What does the law live for, if it is dead to living needs ? [661 H,. 662 A-DJ An answer to the question whether the provisions contained in Articles 329A ( 4) and (5) are destructive of' the democratic form of government lies in the comparison between the pre 39th Amendment period and the post 39th Amend~ ment period in the context of our constituti'on. The substance of the matter is the rule of the majority and the manner of ascertaining the will of the majority is through the process of elections. The rule is still the rule of the majority despite the 39th Amendment and no law or amendment of the fundamental instrument has provided for the abrogation of the electoral process. In fact it is through that process t.hat the electorate expressed its preference for the appellant over the respondent. Articles 79, 80, 81, 100(1), 105 and 326 unimpaired as they remain even after the 39th amendment are enough assurance that the Parliament is not leading the country to a totalitarian path. The impugned provisions do not destroy the democratic structure of our government. [662 E, 663-B-C, D-El Max Radin: "A restatement of Honfold" Harvard Law Review (1938) Vol. 51, P. 1141, 1145; C.F. Storng; "Political Constitutions" E.L, B.S. (Ed. 2 Impression 1970) p. 172; Tennyson "Poems"; Sir Frederick Pollock "Essays in Jurisprudence 'Essays & Morals' 303; Constitution of India Art. 79, 80, 81 100(1), 105 & 326 (considered).

"Provisidns of Art. 329(4) are outright negation of the right of equality conferred by Article 14".

The 39th Amendment is, however, open to grave objection on other grounds, insofar as clause (4) and (5) of Article 329A are concerned. Generality and equality are two indelible characteristics of justice administered according India to law. The preamble to our constitution by .which the people of resolved solemnly to secure to all its citizens equality of status and opportunity finds its realization in an ampler· measure in Article 14 which guarantees equality before the law and the equal protection Of laws to all persons, citizens and non. citizens alike. Equality is the faith and creed of our Democratic Republic and without it, neither the constitution nor the laws made under it could reflect the common conscience of those who owe allegiance to them. And if they did not, they would fail to commandi. respect and obedience without which any constitution would be doomed to founder on the rocks of revolution. A constitution which, without a true nexus, denies equality b.efore the law to its citizen may in a form thinly disguised contain reprisals directed against private individuals in matters of private rights and wrongs. [663 H, 664 A-Cl Sir Frederick Pollock "Ethics and Morals (Essays in Jurisprudence) p. 303 Sir Frederick Pollock "Jurisprudence & Legal Essays" (1960) p. 195.

Article 329(a) (4) which makes the existing election laws retrospectively inapplicable in a wry substantial measure, to the Parliamentary elections of the Prime Minister and the Speaker, creates a legal vacuum. The plaiD intendment and meaning of Clause ( 4) is that the election of the tw~ .personages will be beyond the reach of any Jaw, past or present. These prov!Sl:ins are .an outright negation of the right of equality conferred by Art. 14, a nght which

'

.

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

me re than any other is a basic postulate of our constitution. It is true that the right, though expressed in an absolute form, is hedged in by a judge .made restriction that it is open to the Legi~lature to make a reasonable classification so that the same law will not apply to all persons alike or different laws may govern the rights and obligations of different persons falling within distinct cla:ises. [664 D-E, G]

·,Plato's "Politicus" p. 294 quoted in Edmond Cahn "The sense of justice"

(19~) p. 161 (referr~d to).

"Clauses ( 4) & ( 5) of Art. 329A are arbitrary and are calculated to damage or destroy the Rule of Law."

..

That the classification must be fo-unded on an intelligible differenth which distinguishes those who are grouped together from those who are left c ~ot and th<.t the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the particular law flows from the principle of equality. The first test may be assumed to be satisfied, since there i> no gainsaying that in our system of Government, the Prime Minister occupies a unique position as a "Primus inter pares." But what is the nexus of the uniqueness with law which provides that the election of the Prime Minister and the Speaker to the Parliament will be above all laws, that the election will be governed by no norms or standards applicable to all others who contest the efection and that an election declared to be void by a High Court judgment shall be deemed to h0 valid, the judgment and its finding;; being themselves required to be deemed to be void ? Such is not the doctrine of classification and no facet of that doctrine can support the favoured treatment accorded by the 39th Ame;idment to the high personages. It is the common man's sense of justice which sustains democracies and there is a fear that the 39th Ari1endment, by its impugned. part, may outrage that sense of justice. Different rules may apply to different conditions and classes of men and even a single individual may, by his uniqueness, form a class by himself. But in the absence of differentia reasonably related to the object of the law, justice must be administered with an even hand to an. [665 B-E]

State of Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952] S.C.R. 284, (applied). "The "Rule of law" means that the exercise of powers of government >hall be conditioned by law and that suoject to the exceptions to the doctrine of equality, no one shall be exposed to the arbitrary will of the Government. It has been said in lighter vein, to show the supremacy of the Parliament, that the charm of the English constitution is that"'it does not exist". But our constitution exists and must con!inue to exist. It guarantees equality before Jaw and the equal protection of laws to everyone. The denial of such equality as modified by the judicially evolwd theory of classification is the very negation of rule of lii.w. It follows that clauses ( 4) and (5) of Article 329(A) are arbitrary and are calculated to damage or destroy the Rule of Law. [665 G, 666 D-El A. V. Dicey "Constitutional Law"; S. A. de Smith "Judicial of Administmtlve Action (1968) p. 5; Wade & Phillips; Constitutional Law (6th Edn.) p. 70-73; (reforred to)

·C

Separation of Powers, principle of-Whether the 39th Amendment is invalid on the ground that it abrogates the principle of "Separation of Powers". The argument directed at showing the invalidation of the 39th Amendment on the ground that it abrogates the principle of "separation of powers" is replete with many possibilities since it has several side lights. Unlike the American and Australian Constitutions which are rigid, ail Indian constitution does not expressly vest the three kinds of power in three ditrerent organs of the State. But the principle of "separation of powers" is not a magic· formula for keeping the three organs of the State within the strict" confines of their functions. [666 E, 667 C-Dl

Hi

SUPREME COURT REPORTS.

(1Q76) 2 S.C.R.

Granville Austin : The Indian Constitution : Corner-stones of

p. 186.

a

Nal.ion

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 293 U.S. 388 @ 410; In re : Delhi La11•s Act [1951] S.C.R. 747, 964. (Considered).

The existence and the limitations on the powers of three departments ot governm~nt are due to the normal proces~ of specialisation in governmental busi-

:C

ness, which becomes more and more complex as civilisation advances. The legislature must make Jaws, the executive enforce them and tlie· judiciary interpret them because they have in their respective field, acquired an expertise which makes them competent to discharge their duly appointed J'unctions. The political usefulness of the doctrine of separation of powers is now widely recognised though a satisfactory definition of the three functions is difficult to evolve. But the function of the Parliament is to make laws, not to decide cases. The reason for this restraint is not that the Indian Constitution recognises any dgid separation of powers. Plainly it does not. The reason is that the concentration of powers in any one organ may, by upsetting that fine balance between th,e th~ee organs destroy the fundamental premises of a democratic government to which we are pledged. [667 E-F, 668 A-CJ Sir Carleton K. Allen "Law and Orders" 1965 Edn. p. 8 ·Madison: "The Federalist"; Paton: Text Book of Jurisprudence (1964) p. 296. (referred to). No constitution can survive without a conscious adherence to its fine check' and balances. Just as courts ought not to enter into the problems entwined in the "Political thicket", Parliament must also respect the preserve of the .courts. Courts have, by and large, come to check their valourous propensities. Jn the name of the constitution, the Parliament may not also turn· its attention from: th•e important task of legislation to deciding court cases for which it lacks the expertise and the apparatus. If it gathers facts, it gathers tacts of policy. If it records findings, it does so without a pleading and without framing any issues. And worst of all if it decides a court case, it decides without hearing the parties- and in defiance of the fundamental principles of natural justice. [668 G-H, 669 A-Bl Julius Stone: '"Social Dimensions of Law & Justice (1966) P. 668. (referred to)

In the instant case, the Parliament by clause ( 4) of Art. 319A. has, decided a matter of which the country's courts were lawfully seized. . Neither more nor less. It is true, that retrospective validation is a well known legislative process which has received the recognition of this Court in tax cases·, pre-emption cases. tenancy cases and a variety of otlier matters including four election cases. But in all these cases, what the legislature did was to change the Jaw retrospectively so as to remove the reason of disqualification, leaving it to the couris to apply the amended Jaw to the decision of the particular case. The exercise by the legislature of what is purely and indubitably a judicial function is impossible to sustain frt the context of our cooperafive federalism w.hich contains no rigid distribution of powers but which provides a system of salutary checks and balances. (669 B-El

•G

Harold Laski : "Grammar of Politics"; Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Surc•na [1970] 2 SCR 835 (referred to).

Chand

It is contrary to the basic tenets of our constitution to hold that the Amending body is an amalgam of all powerS-legislative, executive and judicial. "Whatsoever pleases the emperor has the force of law" is not an article of democratic fai"th. The basis of our constitution is a well planned legal order, the presuppositions Qf which are accepted by the people as determining the methods; bv which the'.functions of the Government will be discharged and the power of the State shall be used. [669 F-G]

.H

''Elertion Laws (Amendment Acts) are valid", Bharati's case is not an authority that ordinary legislation must also answer to the same test as a constitutidnal cJ1swer. The tlzeorv of basic structure is wlwilv nut of place in matre1'.~ relating 101 validities oi 01·dinary laws made under the constltutidn!'

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

I

40 1

( i) The argument regarding the invalidity of the Representation of the People (Amendment) Act 58 of 1974 and of the Election Laws (Amendment Act, 1.97 5) has, however no substance. [669 G]

\

)

(ii) The Constitutional Amendments may, on the ratio of the Fundamental Rights case, be tested on the anvil of basic structure. But apart from !he pnncipl'e that a case is only an authority for what it decides it does not logically follow from the majority judgment in Bharati's case, that ordinary legislation must aho answer the same test as a constitutional amendment. Ordinary Jaws have to answer two tests for their validity; ( 1) The law must be within the legislative competence of' the legislatlire as defiRed in Chapter I Part XI of the Constitution and ( 2) it must not offend against the provisions of Articles 13 ( 1l and (2) of the Constitution. "Basic structure'', QY the majority Judgment is not a part of the fundamental rights nor indeed a provision of the Cons!itution. The theory of basic structure is wholly out of place iu matters relating to the validity cf ordinary Jaws made under the Constitution. (669 G-H, 670 A-CJ There is no paradox that the higher power should be subject to a limitation, which will not operate upon a lower power. A constitutional amendment has to be passed by a special majority and certain such amendments have to be ratified by the legiSlature of not Jess than one, half of the States as provided bv Art. 368(2). An ordinary legislation can be passed by a simple majority. The two powers, though species of the same genus, operate in different fields and are therefore subject to different limitations. [670 C-Dl No objection can accordingly be taken to the constitutional validity of the two imrugned Acts on the ground that they damage or destroy the basic structure. The power to pass these Acts could be exercised retrospectively ~ . as n!uch as prospectively. [670 E]

"R(presentation of the People Amendment Act 58 of 1974, makes the issue of expu:sl!s incurre(l by the political party ccaden1ic.'' The expenses incurred by the political party together with the expenses incurred by the appellant are not shown to exceed the prescribed ceiling. Apart from that, Act 58 of 1974, makes that issue academic. (670 G]

"Vaiidity of Co11stit111io'11 (Thil'fyni/l/h Amendment) cannot be challenged nn the ground that a number of members of Parliamelit were in detention and were prcrented fron1 taking de/iQercl/ions in tile Parlia1nent."

Tk ·e is no' merit in the contention that the Constitutional amendment is bad because it was passed when some members of the Parliament were in deten-· tion. The legality of the detention orders cannot be canvassed in these appeals collater21ll'. And from a practical point of view, the presence of 21 members of the Lok Sabha and 10 members of the Rajya Sabha, who were in detention could net have made a difference to the passing of the Amendment. (670 H, 671 Al

Argumems of Respondem No. 1 (Defeated Candidate) (1) Th·~ :l9ih Amendment affects the basic structure or the framework of the Con-titution adopted by the constitution and i9, therefore, beyond the amend'nQ power conferred by Art. :168. It destroys the identity of the Constitutian.

(2) Separation of powers is a basic feature of the Constitution and, therefore, c,ery dispute involving the adjudication of legal rights must be left to the decision of the judiciary. Clause four of Art. 329A iniroduced by the 39th Amendr;-:ent takes away that .iurisdiction and is, therefore, void. (3) The function of the legislature is to legislate and not decide private dispute,. In the instant case the constituent assembly has transmitted its constitutional functions by adjudicating upon a private dispute.

( 4) Democracy is an essential feature of the Constitution. Free and fair election' are indispen5able for the successful workin!I of any democratic Government by providi,ng that the election of the Prime Minister shall not be open to

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1976) 2 S.C.R.

challenge and shall continue to be val.id despite the judgment of the Allahabad High Court; holding that the election is vitiated by corrupt practices, the constituent assembly has destroyed the very core of democracy. (5) Equality is an essential feature of a republican Constitution. The 39th Amendment .puts the Prime Minister and the Speaker above the law and beyond . the reach of the equality principle. The classification made by the· 39'i'h Amend. ment bears no nexus with the sort of the immunity grahted to too high personages from the operation of election laws.

,

(6) The rule of law and judicial review are also basic features of the Constitution. To freeze certain persons from the constraints of law and to place their conduct beyond the judicial review is to destroy the identity of the Constitution. No freedom is secured without the court to protect it. The organic balance between the three branches, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary is upset by eroding the authority of the Supreme Court in the vital matteVi like el('.9tions and the rule or law is abrogated by providing that the election of the Prime Minister shall continue to be valid and will be open to no challenge before any other authority whatsoever. (7) The concept of political justice recognised by the preamble is Yiolated by the 39th Amendment. The Constitution can always be subverted by revolutionary methods. The question is whether it is permissible to the Parliament to use the legitimacy of the constitutional provisions for effecting revoluticnary changes.

E'

(8) The .constituent power partakes of legislative power and can only be exerciS't)d within the highest ambit of the latter power. Therefore, even With a 2/3rd majority of the constituent body cannot exercise executive or judicial power for example, the power to appoint or dismiss a Government servant or the power to declare war which are executive powers cannot be exercised by the constituent assembly. Similarly, it cannot be in the guise of amending the Constitution provided that an accused arraigned before the criminal court shall be acquittl;)d and shall be deemed to be innocent. The Constitution body can make changes in the conditions of the exercise of judicial power but it cannot usurp that power and lastly (9) The question in Fundamental Rights case was whether Parliament can in the exercise of its powers of amendment abridge or take away Fundamental Rights and whether there are any foherent or implied limitations on the Parliament powers of amendment. Jn other words, the · question was whether the power of amendment can be exercised so as to destroy or mutilate the basic structure of the Constitution. The Fundamental Rights case did not involve the consideration of the question as to what the power of amendment comprehends. Promoting and demoting Gov~rnment servants passing and failing students who have appeared in an examination granting or withdrawing building contracts but not the least declaring whc ha~ won and who has Jost an election are matters clearly outside the scope of the• amendi.,g power under Article 368 which means and implies the power to alter the Fundamental instrument of country's governance. Arguments for the constitutional validity of the 39th Amendmelll : For the Appellants by A. K. Sen :

(1) The amendment follows well-known pattern of all validation Act3 bY which the basi9 or judgments or orders of competent courts and tribunals is changed and the judgments arid orders are made ineffective.

(2) The effect of validation i's to change the law so as to alter the basis of any judgment. wbich might have been given on the basis of old law and, thus,

to make the judgment ineffective. (3) A forn1al declaration that the judgment rendered under the old Act is void is not necessary. If the matter is pending in appeal, the Appellate court has to give effect to the altered law and reverse the judgment. If the matter is not pending in appeal then the judgment ceases to be operative and binding L 1 as res judicata.

~

I

SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN

(4) The rendering of a judgment ineffective by changing its basis b):' legis· lative enactment is not an em;roachriient on judicial power but a legtsJation within the competence of the Legislature rendering the basis of the judgment non· est. (5) The constituent power has retrospectively changed the law in so far as it relates to election. The constituent authority could have left the applica~ tion of the changed law either to Parliament or to any other body. But, it has chosen fr,, assume the duty of determination in thi~ particular case for itself.

r

(6) The determination of election disputes and the validity of elections is not an exercise of judicial power. This function may be left either to courts properly so called or to tribunals or to other bodies including the Legislature itself. (7) The rigid separa.ion of powers as it obtain in the United States of America and in the lesser degree under the Australian, Constitution does not apply to India. Many powers which are strictly judicial have been excluded from the purview of the courts. Therefore, no question of any separation of powers being involveJ in matters concerning elections and election petitions. (8) There is no question of separatiOn of powers when the constituent authority exercises either a power which is allocated to the legislature or to the Executive or to the judiciary under the Constitntioh. In the hands of the constituent authority there is no demarcation of powers. But, the demarcation emerges only when it leaves the hands of the constituent authority through well. defined channels into demarcated pools. The constituent power is independent of the fetters or limitations imposed by separation of powers in the hands of the organ~ of the Government amongst whom the supreme authority or the State is allocated.

(9) The constituent power springs as the fountain head and partakes of sovereignty and is the power which creates organs and distributes the power. Therefore, in a sense, the, constituent power is all embracing and is at once judicial, executive and legislative. It is in a sense a supreme power. (I 0) Even if' the preamble Jays down as its objective, the 39th Constitution amendment do~s not violate the said concept. of equality as the same is based on a rational classification and has a reasonable nexus with the object of the amendment.

(11 ). The preamble to the Constitution only refers to securing "equality of status nnd opportunity". Equality of status and opportunity has· got manY facets. Some of these facets are guaranteed as Fundamental Rights under Article 14 to l 8 of the Constitution. These facets alone can be considered to be basic features of the Constitution assuming that equa!itv was a basic feature of the Constitution. · (12) "Free and fair election" does not postulate that there must be a constitutional provision for determining election disputes by a separate tribunal or court. (13) The 39th Amendment does not affect the structure of a republic demo· cracy assuming that the sam~ is a basic feature of the Constitution. The validation of one election does not alter the character of the democrncy. (14) A constitutional amendment need not necessarily be the structural erganisation of the .State. Shri Jaganath Kaushal supported the argument of Shri Sen by citing pragmatic· Hlustrations. He gave interesting statistics showing that from very smaJl percentage of election petitions succeed eventually which is evidenced with such petitions are used by defeated candidates as an instrument against a successful candidate. Parliament, therefore, wanted to save high personages from such harass·mertt. A law may benefit a single individual and may still be valid. The judgment of the A11ahabad High Court became a nullity by reason of that Court ceasin!( retrospectively to have jurisdiction over the dispute and a judg· men! which is a nullity need not be set aside. It can even challenged in a collateral JJroceedings.

4 0-1

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1976] 2 ·s.C.R.

(I) The majority decision in the fundamental Rights case is not an authority for the proposition ·that there could be no free or f'air elections without judicial review. The Constitutions and laws of several countries leave the decision of election disputes to the judgment of the legislatures themselves. The history of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 as also various articles in our Constitution show that judicial review can be excluded in appropriate cases as a matter of policy. (2) ·That validation of elections is a process wellknown to democratic forms of Government. ( 3) That a law may be constitutional even if it relates to a single individual if on account of special reasons, the sirrgle individual could be treated as a class by himseli'. (4) That it is clear from rn·ticles 326 and 327 of the Constitution that the Constitution-makers thought that as a matter of high policy elections ought to be dealt with by the Constitution itself and not by ordinary legislation passed within the framework of the Constitution. How much of elections should be dealt with by the Constitution and how much should be relegated to ordinary legislation is not a matter for the courts to decide. Jf the constituent body thought that the offices of the Prime Minister and the Speaker are important eno\!.iUi to be dealt with by the Constitution itself' in the matter of their elections to the Parliament, it cannot be said that the dech;ion is frivolous or without jurisdiction; and that (5) The contention tbat the 39th Amendment is not an exercise of cdnstituent power should not be allowed to be taken up· because every possible aspect of the matter was argued in Sankari Prasad's case, Sajjan Singh's case and the Fundamental Rights case. The basic question involved in these cases was as to what is the meaning of the word 'amendment'. The argument now is that there is a further limitation on the amendin_g power. If it is .the same question and. has been de>ided, it cannot be reopened by saying that the question has a, new aspect which was not considered then. Ti' the question is new, the principle of Fundamental Rights case cannot be extended any further. Therefore, the constituent power must be held to be a plenary power on which the only limitation is as regards the inviolability of the basi·c .structure.

.

f

Arguments of the Solicitor General: ( 1) Article 14 is founded on a sound public policy recognised and followed in all civilised States. The exclusion of judici'al review does not by itself' mean !he negation of equality. Article 3 lB which on the face of it denied equality to different sections of the community attained the ideal of economic justice by bringing about economic ~quality. ~rticle 33 aJs.o shows that the demands of public problems mav reqmre the ad1ustment of Fundamental Rights for ensuring greater equality. (2) What a Constitution should contain depends on what permanencv is intended to be accorded to a particular provision included in the Constitution (3) Exclusion of Judicial Review is at least permissible in those fields where originally the Con.stitution did not provide for or contemplate judicial revfow. (4) Tf the election law does not apply. as it ceases to applv ·by virtue of arti~le 329A(4l. it.is the £'unction of the legislature to declare whether or not a narhcular elect19n 1s good or bad: and that the Rule of Law is not " part of the basic structure of the Constitution and apart from article J 4. our Constitution recognises neither the doctrine of equality nor the Rule of Law.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 887 and 909 of 1975. Appeals from the judgment a'.id order dated the 12th June, 1975 of the Allahabad High Court in Election Petition No. 5 of 1971.

'

Arguments of the Allomey General:

A.' K. Sen, .T. N. Kaushal. D. P. Singh, .T. B. Dadachanii. R. H. Dhebar, Madun Gujadlwr, S.C. Agarwal, Yogeshwar Prasad, H.K. L. Blwgat, Sudhir Bera, K. P. Bhandari and Mrs. Anjali K. Verma for the Appellant (In C.A. No. 887175) and for Respondent No. 1 (In CA No. 909 /75) .

,

.

I

I.

-

-

.I

....

.,.

r

.

. SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v~ RAJ NARAlN '(Ray,

C.J.)

Shanti Bhushan J. P. Goyal, R. C. Divivedi, R. C. Srivastava Pranab Chatterji; s.'s. Khanduja, E. C. Agarwala, C. K. Ratnaparkhi, M. C. Gupta, T. N. Parwal, U. N, R. Rao, C. K. Garg, B. Soloman, K. C. Dua, Raghunath Singh and Sripal Singh for the Appelfant (In CA No. 909175) ·and for Respondent N~. 1 (In C.A. No. 887175). Niren De, Attorney General of India, Lal Narain Sinha, Solicitor General for India and Dr. V. A. Said Mohammad, R. N. Sachthey, P. P. Rao, Miss Sumitra Chakravarty and S. P. Nayar for the Attorney General of India. · , The following Judgments were delivered RAY, C.J.-In Civil ·App~al No. 887 of 1975 the appellant is Indira Nehru Gandhi and the respondent is Raj Narain. Civil Appeal No. 909 of 1975 is the cross objection of the respondent . 0,1 14 Jnly, 1975 it was directed that both the appeals would be heard together. The appeals arise out of the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad dated 12 June, 1975. The High Court held that the appellant held herself out as a candidate from 29 December, 1970 and was guilty of having committed corrupt practice by having obtained the assistance of Gazetted Officers in furtherance of her election prospects. The High Court further found the appellant guilty of corrupt practice committed under section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 hereinafter referred to as the· 1951 Act by havmg obtained the assistance of Yashpal Kapur a Gazetted . Officer for the furtherance of her election prospects. T.he High Court held the appellant to be disqualified for a period of six years from the date of the order as provided in section 8(a) of the 1951 Act. The High Court awarded costs of the election petition to the respondent. · It should be stated here that this ju_dgment disposes of both the appeals. Under directions of this Court the original record of the High Court was called for. The appeal filed by the respondent with regard to Issues Nos. 2, 4, 6, 7 •and 9 formed the subject matter of cross objections in Civil Appeal No. 909 of 1975. The cross objections are t® same which form grounds of appeal filed by the respondent in the High Court at Allahabad, against an order of dismissal of Civil Misc. Writ No. 3761 of 1975 filed in the High Court at Allahabad. The Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975 conl"ains three principal features. First, Article 71 has been substituted by a new Article 7L The new Article 71 states that subject to the provisioas of the Constitution, Parliament may by law regulate any matter relating to or connected with the election of a President or Vice-President including the grounds on which such election may be · questioned. The second feature is insertion of Article 329A in the Constitution. Clause 4 of Article 329A is challenged in the present appeals. There are six clauses in Article 329 A. The first clause states that subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Part V [except sub-clause (e) of clause (1) of Article 102] no election to either House of Parliament of a person who holds the office S-L126 SCI/76 '

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

{1976] 2 s.c.R.

of Prime Minister at the time of such election or is appointed as Prime Minister after such election; and to the House of the People of a person who holds the office of Speaker of that House at the time of such election or who is chosen as the Speaker for that House after such election, shall be called in question, except before such authority (not being any such authority as is referred to in clause (b) of Article 329) or body and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by Parliament and any such law may provide for all other matters relating to doubts and disputes in relation to such election including the grounds on which such election may be questioned. Under the second clause the validity of any such law as is referred to in clause ( 1) and the decision of any authority or body under such law shall not be called in question in any court. The third clause states that where any person is appointed as Prime Minister or, as the case may be, chosen to the office of the Speaker of the House of the People, while an election petition referred to in Article 329 (b) in respect of his election to either House of Parliament or, as the case may be, to the House of the People is pending, such election petition shall abate upon such person being appointed as Prime Minister or, as the case may be, being chosen to the office of the Speaker of the House of the People, but such election may be called in question under any such law as is referred to in dause ( 1). The fourth clause which directly concerns the present appeals states that no law made by Parliament before the commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975, in so far as it relates to election petitions and matters connected therewill1, shall apply or shall be deemed ever to have applied to or in relation to the ekction of any such person as is referred to in clause ( 1) to either House of Parliament and such election shall not be deemed to be void or ever to have become void on any ground on which such election could be declared to be void under any such law and notwithstanding any order made by any court, before such commencement, declaring such election to be void, such election shall continue to be valid in all respects and any such order and any finding on which such order is based shall be and shall be deemed always to have been void and of no effect. The fifth clause states that any appeal or cross appeal against any such order of any court as is referred to in clause ( 4) pending immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975, before the Supreme Court shall be disposed of in conformity with the provisions of clause ( 4).

'

'

f

The sixth clause states that the provisions of this Article shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution.

The third feature in the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act is that in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution after Entry 86 and before the Explanation several Entries No. 87 to 124 inclusive are inserted. The Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 1974 and the Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 are mentioned in Entry 87.

...

SMT. lll!DIRA GANDHI

t

v. RAJ NARAIN (Ray, C.J.)

The respondent contends that the Representation of the People A (Aniendment) Act., 1974 and the Election Laws (Amendment) ~ct, 1975 referred to as the Amendment Acts, 1974 and 1975 do not enJ~Y constitutional immunity because these Acts destroy or damage basic .structure or basic features. In view of the challenge by the respondent to the constitutional validity of the Amendment Acts, 1974 and 1975 notice was given to B the Attorney General. The appeals were to be heard on 11 August, 1975. In view of the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975 which came into existence on 10 August, 1975 the hearing was adjourned till 25 August, 1975. The constitutional validity of clause ( 4) of Article 329A falls for .consideration. Clause ( 4) of Article 329A is challenged on two grounds. First, it destroys or damages the basic features or basic structure of the Constitution. Reliance is placed in support of the contention on the majority view of 7 learned Judges in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadanagalavaru v. State of Kera/a and Another( 1 ). It should be stated here that the hearing has proceeded on the assumption that it is not necessary to challenge the majority view in D Kesavananda Bharati's(<1) case. The contentions of the respondent .are these : First, under Article 368 only general principles governing the organs of the State and the basic principles can be laid down. An .amendment of the Constitution does not contemplate any decision in ce&pect of individual cases. Clause ( 4) of Article 329A is said to be exercise of a purely judicial power which is not included in the constiE ·tuent power conferred by Article 368. . Second, the control over the result of the elections and on the question whether the election of any person is valid or invalid is vested in the judiciary under the provisions of Article 329 and Article 136. The jurisdiction of judicial determination is taken away, and, therefore, the democratic character of the Constitution is destroyed. T~ird, th~ A~endment destroys and abrogates the principle of equahty. It 1s said that there is no rational basis for differentiation between persons holding high offices and other persons elected to Parliament. Fourth, the rule of law i& the basis for democracy and judicial review. The fourth clause mak~s the provisions of Part VI of the Representation of the People Act inapplicable to the election of the Prime Minister and the Speaker. Fifth, clause ( 4) destroys not only judicial review but also separation of power. The order of the High Court declaring the election to be void is declared valid. The cancellation of the judgment is denial of political justice which is the basic structure of the Constitution. The second ground is that the constitution of the House which passed the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act is illegal. It is said that a number of members of Parliament of the two Houses ---(1) [1973] Supp. S.C.R.1.

.

408.

.

;

SUPREME COURT REPORTS J .

- [19761 2 s.c.R.

were detained by executive order after 26 June, .1975.. These persons were not supplied any grounds of detention or given any opportunity of making a representation against their detention. Uniess the President convenes a session of the full Parliament by giving to all members thereof an opportunity to attend the session and exercise their right of speech and vote, the convening of the session will suffer from illegality and unconstitutionality and cannot be regarded as a session of the two Houses of Parliament. The mere fact that a person may be deprived of his dght to move any court to secure his release from such illegal detention by means of a presidential order under Article 359 does not render the detention itself either legal or constitutional. The important leaders of the House have been prevented from participation. Holding of the session and transacting business are unconstitu· tional. Under the first ground these are the contentions. The Constitution Amendment affects the basic structure of institutional pattern adopted by the Constitution. The basic feature of separation of powers with the role of independence of judiciary is changed by denying jurisdiction of this Court to test the validity of the election. The essential feature of democracy will be destroyed if power is conceded to Parliament to declare the elections void according to law under which it has been held to valid. This is illustrated by saying that Parliament can· by law declare the election of persons against predominant ruling party to be void. If the majority party controls the legislature and the executive, the legislature could not have any say as to whether t.he executive was properly elected. Free and fair elections are part of democratic structure and an election which has been held to be invalid for violation of the principles of free and fair elections and by commfasion of corrupt practices is validated. The basic structure of equality is violated by providing that those who hold office of Prime Minister and Speaker are above law although election laws were there. The persons who will hold the office of Prime Minister and Speaker have been free from those laws and they are not under rule of law and there is no judicial review with regard to their elections. The nature of the constituent power is legislative. The constituent power cannot exercise judicial power. Exercise of judicial power or of a purely executive power is n9t power of amendment of the Constitution. The Constitution may be amended to change constitutional provisions but the constituent power cannot enact that a person is declared to be elected. The consequence of change of law may be that the decision given by a co_urt under the law as it stood will not stan<l. The respondent contends that judicial review is an essential feature of basic structure because of the doctrine of separation of powers for these reasons : Judicial review is basic structure in the matter of election to ensure free, fair and pure election. In the American and the Australian Constitutions the judicial power of the State is located in the judiciary. There is no such provision in our Constitution. The Executive, tbe Legislature and the Judiciary are all treated under our Constitution with respective spheres. The jurisdiction of this Court and of High Courts under our Constitution .is dealt with by Articles under

Related judgments

More Supreme Court judgments

Search all Supreme Court and High Court judgments

Reproduced from the official court copy published on eCourts (Indian Court Judgments open dataset, CC-BY-4.0). Not legal advice.