SMT. Selvi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 5 May 2007
- Bench
- Justice K.G. Balakrishnan, Justice Altamas Kabir, Justice R.V. Raveendran
- Neutral citation
- 2007 INSC 520
- Reported in
- [2010] 5 S.C.R. 381
- Result
- Disposed off
- Acts & sections
- Article 20 Constitution, Article 21 Constitution, Section 27 Evidence Act, Section 161 CrPC, Section 315 CrPC, Section 313 CrPC, Section 132 Evidence Act, Section 24 Evidence Act
- Subject
- Criminal
Full judgment
[2010] 5 S.C.R. 381 SMT. SELVI & ORS.
v. STATE OF KARNATAKA (Criminal Appeal No. 1267 of 2004) MAY 5, 200.7
[K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI., R.V. RAVEENDRAN AND J.M. PANCHAL, JJ.] CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973: Section 161 (2), Explanation to Sections 53, 53-A and 54 - Investigation - Examination of accused persons, suspects and witnesses - Use of certain scientific techniques viz. narcoanalysis, polygraph examination and Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) test - Involuntary administration of - Held: Violative of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India However, any information or material that is subsequently discovered with the help of voluntary administered test results can be admitted in accordance with Section 27 of Evidence Act - Guidelines formulated by National Human Rights Commission to be strictly adhered to - Similar safeguards should be adopted for conducting such tests - Constitution of India, 1950, Article 20(3)- Evidence Act, 1872, Section 27, Criminal Investigation - Video recordings of narcoadalysis interviews - Leakage to media by the investigation agency - A worrisome practice since public distribution of these recordings can expose the subject to undue social stigma and specific risks - May even encourage vigilantism in addition to media trial. .CONSTITUTION OF IND/A, 1950:
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Article 20(3) - Right against self-incrimination Polygraph examination and Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) test - Results obtained from these tests should be
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A treated as 'personal testimony' since they are a means for 'imparting personal knowledge about relevant facts' - Herice, the results obtained through involuntary administration of either of the impugned tests viz. narcoanalysis technique, polygraph examination and BEAP test comes within the B scope of testimonial compulsion thereby attracting the protective shield of Article 20(3). Article 21 - Personal liberty - Involuntary administration of narcoanalysis technique, polygraph examination and BEAP Test - Whether a reasonable restriction or personal C liberty - Held: No person should be forcibly subjected to any of the abovesaid techniques whether in the conte.xt of investigation in criminal cases or otherwise - Doing so would amount to unwarranted intrusion into personal liberty.
The legal questions in the batch of criminal appeals relate to the involuntary administration of certain scientific techniques, namely narcoanalysis, polygraph examination and the Brain Electrical Activation Profile . (BEAP) test for the purpose of improving investigation E efforts in criminal cases. The involuntary administration of the impugned techniques evoked questions about the protective scope of the 'right against self-incrimination' which finds place in Article 20(3) of the Constitution.
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Arguments were advanced invoking the guarantee of F 'substantive due process' which is part and parcel of the idea of 'personal liberty' protected by Article 21 of the Constitution. The main question raised in this regard was whether the provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 that provide for 'medical examination' G during the course of investigation can be read expansively to include the impugned techniques, even though the latter are not explicitly enumerated. Questions have also been raised with respect to the professional. ethics of medical personnel involved in the administration H . of these techniques .. Furthermore, Article 21 has been
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
judicially expanded to include a 'right against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment', requiring this Court to determine whether the involuntary administration of the impugned techniques violates this right whose scope corresponds with evolving international human rights norms.
Contentions were raised invoking the test subject's 'right to privacy', both in a physical and mental sense. On the basis of the issues involved and contentions raised, the Court framed the following questions:
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I. Whether the involuntary administration of the impugned techniques violates the 'right against selfincriminatiofl' enumerated in Article 20(3) of the Constitution?
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· 1-A. Whether the investigative use of the impugned techniques creates a likelihood of incrimination for the subject? 1-B. Whether the results derived from the impugned tech_niques amount to 'testimonial compulsion' thereby attracting the bar of Article 20(3)? II, Whether the involuntary administration of the impugned techniques is a reasonable restriction on 'personal liberty' as understood in the context of Article 21 of the Constitution?
Disposing of the appeals, the Court HELD~ 1.1. Compulsory administration of the impugned ·techniques violates the 'right against selfincrimination'. This is because the underlying rationale of the said right is to ensure the reliability as well as voluntariness of statements that are admitted as tN\dt!nCt!. This Court has recognised that the protect\'le
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scope of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of lnd.ia extends to the investigative stage in criminal cases and when read with Section 161(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,· 1973 it protects accused persons, suspects as well as witnesses who are examined during an investigation. The test results cannot be admitted· in evidence if they have been obtained through the use of compulsion. Article 20(3) protects an individual's choice between speaking and remaining silent, irrespective of whether the subsequent testimony proves to be inculpatory or exculpatory. Article 20(3) aims to prevent the forcible 'conveyance of personal knowledge that is relevant to the facts in issue'. The results obtained from e~ch of the impugned tests bear a 'testimonial' character and they cannot be categorised as material evidence. [Para 221) [591-C-G]
1.2. Forcing an individual to undergo any of the impugned techniques violates the standard of 'substantive due process' which is required for restraining personal liberty. Such a violation will occur E irrespective of whether these techniques are forcibly administered during the course of an investigation or for any other purpose since the test results could also expose a person to adverse consequences of a nonpenal nature. The impugned techniques cannot be read F into the statutory provisions which enable medical examination during investigation in crimioal cases, i.e. the Explanation to Sections 53, 53-A and -S4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Such an expansive interpretation is not feasible in light of the rule of 'ejusdem G generis' and the considerations which govern the interpretation of statutes in relation to scientific advancements. Compulsory administration· of any of these techniques is an unjustified intrusion into the mental privacy of an individual. It would also .amount to H 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment' with regard to the
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
language of evolving international human rights norms. A Furthermore, placing reliance on the results gathered from these techniques comes into conflict with the 'right to fair trial'. Invocations of a compelling public interest cannot justify the dilution of constitutional rights such as the 'right against self-incrimination'. [Para 222) [591-G-H; · B 592-A-D] 1.3. No individual should be forcibly subjected to any of the techniques in question, whether in the context of investigation in criminal cases or otherwise. Doing so would amount to an unwarranted intrusion into personal liberty. However, there could be voluntary administration of the impugned techniques in the context of criminal justice, provided that certain safeguards are in place. Even when the subject has given consent to undergo any of these tests, the test results by themselves cannot be admitted as evidence because the subject does not exercise conscious control over the responses during the administration of the test. However, any fuformation or material that is subsequently discovered with the help of voluntary administered test results can be admitted, in accordance with Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872. [Para 223) [592-E-G] 1.4. The National Human Rights Commission, India has formulated guidelines which should be strictly adhered to and similar safeguards should be adopted for ·conducting the 'Narcoanalysis technique' and the 'Brain Electrical Activation Profile' test. The text of these guidelines has been reproduced below:
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(i)
No Lie Detector Tests should be administered except on the basis of consent of the accused. An option should be given to the accused whether he wishes to avail such test.
(ii)
If the accused volunteers for a Lie Detector
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Test, he should be given access to a lawyer and the physical, emotional and legal implication of such a test should be explained to him by the police and his lawyer. (iii)
The consent should be recorded before a Judicial Magistrate.
(iv)
During the hearing before the Magistrate, the person alleged to have agreed should be duly represented by a lawyer.
(v)
At the hearing, the person in question should also be told in clear terms that the sta~e.ment that is made shall not be a 'confessional' statement to the Magistrate but wil! have the status of a statement made to the police.
(vi)
The Magistrate shall consider all factors relating to the detention including the··length of detention and the nature of the interrogation.
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(vii) The actual recording of the Lie Detector Test shall be done by an independent agency (such as a hospital) and conducted in the presence of a lawyer.
(viii) A full medical and factual narration of the manner of the information received must be taken on record. [Para 223] [592-G-H; 593-A-H; 594-A] National Human Rights Commission, India: Guidelines for administration of Polygraph Test (Lie Detector Test) on Accused, published in 2000, referred to.
Polygraph Examination:
2.1. Polygraph tests have several limitations and
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
therefore a margin for errors. The premise behind these tests is questionable b9icause the measured changes in physiological responses are not necessarily triggered by lying or deception. Instead, they could be triggered by nervousness, anxiety, fear, confusion or other emotions. Furthermore, the physical conditions in the polygraph examination room can also create distortions In the· recorded responses. The test is best administered in comfortable surroundings where there are no potential distractions for the subject and complete privacy is maintained. The mental state of the subject is also vital since a person in a state of depression or hyperactivity is likely to offer highly desparate physiological responses which could mislead the examiner. In some cases the subject may have suffered from loss of memory in the intervening time-period between the relevant act and the conduct of the test. When the subject does not remember the facts in question, there will be no self-awareness of truth or deception and hence the recording of the physiological responses will not be helpful. Errors may also result from 'memory-hardening', i.e. a process by which the subject has created and consolidated false memories about a particular incident. This commonly occurs in respect of recollections of traumatic events and the subject may not be aware of the fact that he/she is lying. [Para 16] [442-C-H]
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2.2. The errors associated with polygraph tests are broadly grouped into two categories, i.e., 'false positives' and _'false negatives'. A 'false positive' occurs when the results iffaicate that a person has been deceitful even though he/she answered truthfully. Conversely a 'false negative' occurs when a set of deceptive responses is reported as truthful. On account of such inherent complexities, the qu~ifications and competence of the polygraph examiner are of the utmost importance. The
examiner needs to be thorough in preparing the
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A questionnaire and must also have the expertise to account for extraneous conditions that could lead to erroneous inferences. However, the biggest concern about polygraph tests is that an examiner may not be able to recognise deliberate attempts on part of the s subject to manipulate the test results. Such 'countermeasures' are techniques which are deliberately used by the subject to create certain physiological responses in order to deceive the examiner. The intention is that by deliberately enhancing one's reaction to the c control questions, the examiner will incorrectly score the test in favour of truthfulness rather than deception. The most commonly used 'countermeasures' are those of creating a false sense of mental anxiety and stress at the time of the interview, so that the responses triggered by . lying cannot be readily distinguished. [Paras 17, 18] [4430 A-E] Frye v. United States, (1923) 54 App DC 46; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 US 579 (1993); United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529 (11th Circ.1989); E United States v. Posada, 57 F.3d 428 (5th Circ. 1995); United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp 877 (D.N.M. 1995); United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225 (9th. Circ. 1997); United States v. Scheffer, 523 US 303 (1998) and R v Beland, [1987] 36 C.C.C. (3d) 481, referred to. Laboratory Procedure Manual - Polygraph Examination (Directorate of Forensic Science, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, 2005), referred to. David Galfai: 'Polygraph evidence in federal courts:
'3 Should it be admissible?' 36 American Criminal Law Review 87-116 (Winter 1999) p. 91; Henry T. Greely and Judy /lies: 'Neuroscience based lie-detection: The urgent need for regulation', 33 American Journal of Law and Medicine, 377-421 (2007); 'The Polygraph and Lie-Detection: 1-1 Committee to Review the scientific evidence on the Polygraph
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
(Washington D. C.: National Academies Press, 2003); A Review of the cu"ent scientific status and fields of application of polygraph deception detection - Final Report (6 October, 2004) from The British Psychological Society (BPS) Working Party, referred to.
Narcoanalysis technique: 3.1. This test involves the intravenous administration of a drug that causes the subject to enter into a hypnotic trance and become less inhibited. The drug-induced hypnotic stage is useful for investigators since it makes the subject more likely to divulge information. The drug used for this test is sodium pentothal, higher quantities of which are routinely used for inducing general anaesthesia in surgical procedures. This drug is also used in the field of psychiatry since the revelations can enable the diagnosis of mental disorders. However, one has to decide on the permissibility of resorting to this technique during a criminal investigation, despite its' established uses in the medical field. The use of 'truthserums' and hypnosis is not a recent development. Earlier versions of the narcoanalysis technique utilised substances such as scopolamine and sodium amytal. [Para 41] [459-G-H; 460-A-B] 3.2. The use of the 'Scopolamine' technique led to the coining of the expression 'truth serum'. With the passage of time, injections of sodium amytal came to be used for inducing subjects to talk freely, primarily in the field of psychiatry. [Para 42] [461-G-H]
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3.3. In India, this technique has been administered G either inside forensic science laboratories or in the operation theatres of recognised hospitals. While a psychiatrist and general physician perform the preliminary function of gauging whether the subject is· mentally and physically fit to undergo the test, the H
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A anaesthesiologist sup~vises the intravenous administration of the drug. It is the forensic psychologist who actually conducts the questioning. Since the tests are meant to aid investigation efforts, the forensic psychologist needs to closely co-operate with the B investigators in order to frame appropriate questions. [Para 45] [464-B-D] 3.4. Narcoanalysis tests could be requested by defendants who want to prove their innocence. Demands for this test could also be made for purposes such as C gauging the credibility of testimony, to refresh the memory of witnesses or to ascertain the mental capacity of persons to stand trial. Such uses can have a direct impact on the efficiency of investigations as well as the fairness of criminal trials. [Para 46] [464-H; 465·A-B]
3.5. It takes great skill on part of the interrogators to extract and identify information which could eventually prove to be useful. While some persons are able to retain their ability to deceive even in the hypnotic state, others E can become extremely suggestible to questioning. This is especially worrying, since investigators who are under pressure to deliver results could frame questions in a manner that prompts incriminatory responses. Subjects could also concoct fanciful stories in the course of the F 'hypnotic stage'. Since the responses of different individuals are bound to vary, there is no uniform criteria for evaluating the efficacy of the 'narcoanalysis' technique. [Para 47] [465-D-F] State v. Hudson, 314 Mo. S99 (1926); State v. Lindemuth, G 56 N.M. 237 (1952); People v. Jones, 42 Cal. 2d 219 (1954); Lindsey v. United States, 237 F. 2d 893 (9th Circ. 1956); Lawrence M. Dugan v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 333 S.W~2d. 755 (1960); Townsend•· Sain, 372 US 293 (1963); United States v. Swanson, 572 F.2d 523 (5th Circ. 1978); H United States v. Solomon, 753 F. 2d 1522 (9th Circ. 1985);
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
State of New Jersey v. Daryl/ Pitts, 56 A.2d 1320 (N.J. 1989); Horvath v. R, [1979] 44 C.C.C. (2d) 385; Ibrahim v. ~, [1914] A.C. 599 (P.C.) 609; Rock v. Arkansas, 483 US 44 (1987) and United States v. Solomon, 753 F. 2d 1522 (9th Circ. 1985), referred to.
Laboratory Procedure Manual - Forensic Narco-Analysis (Directorate of Forensic Science, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi - 2005), referred to .
. C. W Muehlberger: 'Interrogation under Drug-influence: C The so-called Truth serum technique', 42(4) The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 513-528 (NovDec. 1951); John M. Macdonald: 'Truth Serum', 46(2) The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 259-263 (Jul.-Aug. 1955); George H. Dession, Lawrence Z. Freedman, Richard C. Donnelly and Frederick G. Redlich, D 'Drug-Induced revelation and criminal investigation', 62 Yale Law Journal 315-347 (February 1953); J.P. Gagnieur: 'The Judicial use of Psychonarcosis in France', 40(3) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 370-380 (Sept.-Oct. 1949); Andre A. Moenssens: 'Narcoanalysis in Law Enforcement', E 52(4) The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 453-458 (Nov.-Dec. 1961) and Charles E. Sheedy: 'Narcointerrogation of a Criminal Suspect', 50(2) The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 118-123 (July-Aug 1959) pp. 118-119, referred to. Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAPl Test: 4.1. 'Brain Electrical Activation Profile test', also known as the 'P300 Waves test' is a process of detecting whether an individual is familiar with certain information by way of measuring activity in the brain that is triggered by exposure to selected stimuli. This test consists of examining and measuring 'event-related potentials' (ERP) i.e. electrical wave forms emitted by the brain after it has absorbed an external event. An ERP measurement is the
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recognition of specific patterns of electrical brain activity in a subject that are indicative of certain cognitive mental activitie~ that occur when a person is exposed to a stimulus in the form of an image or a concept expressed in words. The measurement of the cognitive brain activity B allows the examiner to ascertain whether the subject recognised stimuli to which he/she was exposed. [Para 67) [478-G-H; 479•A-C]
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4.2. The P300 waves test is conducted by attaching electrodes to the scalp of the subject, which measure the emission of the said wave components. The test needs to be conducted in an insulated and air-conditioned room in order to prevent distortions arising out of weather conditions. Much like the narcoanalysis technique and polygraph examination, this test also requires effective collaboration between the investigators and the examiner,· most importantly for designing the stimuli which are called 'probes'. Ascertaining the subject's familiarity with. the 'probes' can help in detecting deception or to gather useful information. The test subject is exposed to auditory or visual stimuli (words, sounds, pictures, videos) that are relevant to the facts being investigated alongside other irrelevant words and pictures. Such stimuli can be broadly classified as material 'probes' and neutral 'probes'. The underlying theory is that in the case of guilty suspects, the exposure to the material probes will lead to the emission of P300 wave components which will be duly recorded by the instruments. By examining the records of these wave components the examiner can. make inferences about the individual's familiarity with the information related to the crime. [Para 69) [479-F-H; 480A-C]
4.3. The P300 wave test was the precursor to other neuroscientific techniques such as 'Brain Fingerprinting' developed by Dr. Lawrence Farwell. The latter technique H has been promoted in the context of criminal justice and
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
has already been the subject of litigation. There is an A important difference between the 'P300 waves test' that has been used by Forensic Science Laboratories in India and the 'Brain Fingerprinting' technique. [Para 70] (480D-E] 4.4. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (FMRI) is another neuroscientific technique whose application in the forensic setting has been contentious. It involves the use of MRI scans for measuring blood flow between different parts of the brain which bears a correlation to the subject's truthfulness or deception. FMRl-based lie- C detection has also been advocated as an aid to interrogations in the context of counter-terrorism and intelligence operations, but it prompts the same legal questions that can be raised with respect to all of the techniques mentioned above. Even though these are D non-invasive techniques the concern is not so much with the manner in which they are conducted but the consequences for the individuals who undergo the same. The use of techniques such as 'Brain Fingerprinting' and 'FMRl-based Lie-Detection' raise numerous concerns E such as those of protecting mental privacy and the harms that may arise from inferences made about the subject's truthfulness or familiarity with the facts of a crime. [Para 71] (481-A-D] 4.5. Even though the P300 Wave component has been the subject of considerable research, its uses in the criminal justice system have not received much scholarly attention. Dr. Lawrence Farwell's 'Brain Fingerprinting' technique has attracted considerable publicity but has G ' not been the subject of any. rigorous independent study. Besides this preliminary doubt, an important objection is centred on the inherent difficulty of designing the appropriate 'probes' for the test. Even if the 'probes' are prepared by an examiner who is thoroughly familiar with H
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all aspects of the facts being investigated, there is always a chance that a subject may have had prior exposure to the material probes. In case of such prior exposure, even if the subject is found to be familiar with the probes, the same will be. meaningless in the overall context of the investigation. In the aftermath of crimes th~t receive considerable 'rnedia-attention the subject cari be exposed to the test stimuli in many ways. Such exposure could occur by way of reading about the crime in newspapers or magazines, watching television, listening to the radio or by word of mouth. A possibility of prior exposure to the stimuli may also arise if the investigators unintentionally reveal crucial facts about the crime to the subject before conducting the test. The subject could also be familiar with the content of the material probes for several other reasons. [Para 73] [482-C-G] 4.6. Another significant limitation is that even if the tests demonstrate familiarity with the material probes, there is no conclusive guidance about the actual nature of the subject's involvement in the crime being · investigated. For instance a by-stander who witnessed a murder or robbery could potentially be implicated as an accused if the test reveals that the said person was familiar with the information related to the same. Furthermore, in cases of amnesia or 'memory-hardening' on part of the subject, the te.sts could be blatantly misleading. Even if the inferences drawn from the 'P300 wave test' are used for corroborating other evidence, they could have a material bearing on a finding of guilt or innocence despite being based on an uncertain premise. [Para 74] [482-H; 483-A-C] Harrington v./9wa, 659 N.W2d 509 (2003) and Slaughter v. Oklahoma, 105 P. 3d. 832 (2005), referred to. Laboratory Procedure Manual - Brain Electrical Activation Profile (Directorate of Forensic Science, Ministry
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of Home Affairs, GovernJTlent of India, .fJew Delhi, 2005), referred to. Andre A Moenssens: 'Brain Fingerprinting - Can it be used to detect the innocence of persons charged with a crime?' 70 University of Missouri at Kansas City Law Review 891-920 (Summer 2002) p. 893; Lawrence A. Farwell: 'Brain Fingerprinting: A new paradigm in criminal investigations and counter-terrorism', (2001); Michael S. Pardo: 'Neuroscience evidence, legal culture and criminal procedure', 33 American Journal of Criminal Law 301-337 (Summer 2006); Sarah E. Stoller and Paul Root Wolpe: 'Emerging neurotechnologies for lie detection and the fifth amendment', 33 American Journal of Law and Medicine 359-375 (2007); Henry T. Greely: 'Chapter 17: The social effects ofadv~nces in neuroscience: Legal problems, legal perspectives', m Juay flies (ed.}, Neuroethics - Defining the issues in tneory, practice and policy (Oxford University Press, 2005) pp. 245263 and John G. New: 'If you could read my mind -Implications of neurological evidence for twenty-first century criminal jurisprudence', 29 Journal of Legal Medicine' 179-197 (April-June 2008) - referred to.
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Whether the involuntary administration of the impugned techniques violates the 'right against self-incrimination' enumerated in Article 20(3) of the Constitution?
5.1. The interrelationship between the 'right against self-incrimination' and the 'right to fair trial' has been recognised in most jurisdictions as well as international human rights instruments. For example, the U.S. Constitution incorporates the 'privilege against selfincrimination' in the text of its Fifth Amendment. The meaning and scope of this privilege has been judicially moulded by recognising it's interrelationship with other constitutional rights such as the protection against 'unreasonable search and 'seizure' (Fourth amendment) and -the guarantee of 'due process of law' (Fourteenth
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A amendment). In the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 14(3)(g) enumerates the minimum guarantees that are· to be accorded during a trial and states that everyone has a right not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. B In the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental. Freedoms, Article 6(1) states that every person charged with an offence has a right to a fair trial and Article 6(2) provides that 'Everybody charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed c innocent until proved guilty according to law'. The guarantee of 'presumption of innocence' bears a direct link to the 'right against self-incrimination' since compelling the accused person to testify would place the burden of proving innocence on the accused instead of requiring the prosecution to prove guilt. [Para 81] [4870 F-H; 488-A-C] 5.2. In the Indian context, Article 20(3) should be construed with due regard for the inter-relationship between rights, since this approach was recognised in E Maneka Gandhi's. Hence, one must examine the 'right against self-incrimination' in respect of its relationship with the multiple dimensions of 'personal liberty' under Article 21, which include guarantees such as the 'right to fair trial' and 'substantive due process'. It must also be F emphasized that Articles 20 and 21 have a non-derogable status within Part Ill of our Constitution because the Constitution (Fourty-Fourth amendment) Act, 1978 mandated that the right to move any court for the enforcement of these rights cannot be suspended even G during the operation of a proclamation of emergency. [Para 82] [488-D-F]
5.3. Not only does an accused person have the right to refuse to answer any question that may lead to incrimination, there is also a rule against adverse
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
inferences being drawn from the fact of his/her silence. At the trial stage, Section 313(3) of the CrPC places a crucial limitation on the power of the court to put questions to the accused so that the latter may explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. It lays down that the accused shall not render himself/herself liable to punishment by refusing to answer such questions, or by giving false answers to them. Further, Proviso (b) to Section 315(1) of CrPC mandates that even though an accused person can be a competent witness for the defence, his/her failure to give evidence shall not be made the subject of any comment by any of the parties or the court or give rise to any presumption against himself or any l?erson charged together with him at the trial. It is evident that Section 161(2), CrPC enables a person to choose silence in response to questioning by a police officer during the stage of investigation, and as per the scheme of Section 313(3) and Proviso (b) to Section 315(1) of the same code, adverse inferences cannot be drawn on account of the accused person's silence during the trial stage. [Para 84] [489-G-H; 490-A-D]
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Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248, relied on. Historical origins of the 'right against self-incrimination': 6.1. The right of refusal to answer questions that may incriminate a person is a procedural safeguard which has gradually evolved in common law and bears a close relation to the 'right to fair trial'. There are competing versions about the historical origins of this concept. Some scholars have identified the origins of this right in the medieval period. In that account, it was a response to the procedure followed by English judicial bodies such as the Star Chamber and High Commissions which required defendants and suspects to take ex officio oaths.
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A These bodies mainly decided cases involving religious non-conformism in a Protestant dominated society, as well as offences like treason and sedition. Under an ex officio oath the defendant was required to answer all questions posed by the judges and prosecutors during B the trial and the failure to do so would attract punishments that often involved physical torture. It was the resistance to this practice of compelling the accused to speak which led to demands for a 'right to silence'. [Para 85] [490-D-H]
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6.2. The practice of requiring the accused persons to narrate or contest the facts on their own corresponds to a prominent feature of an inquisitorial system, i.e. the testimony of the accused is viewed as the 'best evidence' that can be gathered. The premise behind this is that D innocent persons should not be reluctant to testify on their own behalf. This approach was followed in the inquisitional procedure of the ecclesiastical courts and had thus been followed in other courts as well. The obvious problem with compelling the accused to testify E on his own behalf is that an ordinary person lacks the legal training to effectively respond to suggestive and misleading questioning, which could come from the prosecutor or the judge. Furthermore, even an innocent person is at an inherent disadvantage in an environment F where there may be unintentional irregularities in the testimony. Most importantly the burden of proving ·innocence by refuting the charges was placed on the defendant himself. In the present day, the inquisitorial conception of the defendant being the best source of G evidence has long been displaced with the evolution of adversarial procedure in the common law tradition. Criminal defendants have been given protections such as the presumption of innocence, right to counsel, the right to be informed of charges, the right of compulsory H process and the standard of proving guilt beyond
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
reasonable doubt among others. It can hence be stated that it was only with the subsequent emergence of ttie 'right to counsel' that the accused's 'right to silence' became meaningful. With the consolidation of the role of defence lawyers in criminal trials, a clear segregation emerged between the testimonial function performed by the accused and the defensive function performed by the lawyer. This segregation between the testimonial and defensive functions is now accepted as an essential feature of a fair trial so as to ensure a level-playing field between the prosecution and the defence. In addition to a defendant's 'right to silence' during the trial stage, the protections were extended to the stage of pre-trial inquiry as well. With the enactment of the Sir John Jervis Act of 1848, provisions were made to advise the accused that he might decline to answer questions put to him in the pre-trial inquiry and to caution him that his answers to pre-trial interrogation might be used as evidence against him during the trial stage. [Para 89] [493-A-H; 494-A] Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, (1978) 2 SCC 424, referred to.
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Brown v. Walker, 161 US 591 (1896) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966), referred to. Leonard Levy: 'The right against self-incrimination: history and judicial histOry', 84(1) Political Science Quarterly 1-29 (March 1969) and John H. Langbein: 'The historical origins of the privilege against self-incrimination at common law', 92(5) Michigan Law Review 1047-1085 (March 1994) referred to.
Underlying rationale of the right against selfincrimination: 7.1. The right against self-incrimination is now viewed as an essential safeguard in criminal procedure. Its
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A underlying rationale broadly corresponds with two objectives - firstly, that of ensuring reliability of the statements made by an accused, and secondly, ensuring that such statements are made voluntarily. It is quite possible that a person suspected or accused of a crime 8 may have been compelled to testify through methods involving coercion, threats or inducements during the investigative stage. When a person is compelled to testify on his/her own behalf, there is a higher likelihood of such testimony being false. False testimony is undesirable C since it impedes i:he integrity of the trial and the subsequent verdict. Therefore, the purpose of the 'rule against involuntary confessions' is to ensure that the testimony considered during trial is reliable. The premise is that involuntary statements are more likely to mislead the judge and the prosecutor, thereby resulting in a D miscarriage of justice. Even during the investigative stage, false statements are likely to cause delays and obstructions in the investigation efforts. [Para 91] [4958-F]
7.2. The concerns about the 'voluntariness' of statements allow a more comprehensive account of this right. If involuntary statements were readily given weightage during trial, the investigators would have a strong incentive to compel such statements - often F through methods involving coercion, threats, inducement or deception. Even if such involuntary statements are proved to be true, the law should not incentivise the use of interrogation" tactics that violate the dignity and bodily integrity of the person being examined. In this sense, 'the G right against self-incrimination' is a vital safeguard against torture and other 'third-degree methods' that could be used to elicit information. It serves as a check on police behaviour during the course of investigation. The exclusion of compelled testimony is important, otherWise H the investigators will be more incline_d t-0 extract
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
information through such compulsion as a matter of course. The frequent reliance on such 'short-cuts' will compromise the diligence required for conducting meaningful investigations. During the trial stage, the onus is on the prosecution to prove the charges levelled a.gainst the defendant and the 'right against self·"fhcrimination' is a vital protection to ensure that the p'rosecUtion discharges the said onus. [Para 92] [495-FH; 496-A-C]
7.3. One must recognise the infusion of constitutional values into all branches of law, including procedural areas such as the law of evidence. While certain criticisms have been made in academic commentaries, one must turn to the judicial precedents that control the scope of Article 20(3). [Para 98] [500-D]
C
State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, [1962] 3 SCR 10, relied on. Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, (1978) 2 SCC 424, referred to.
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 US 52 (1964); Wong Kam-ming v. R, [1979] 1 All ER 939 and Rochin v. California, 342 US 166 (1951 ), referred to. John Wigmore: 'The privilege against self-incrimination, its constitutional affectation, raison d'etre and miscellaneous implications', 51 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 138 (1960); David Dolinko: 'Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?', 33 University of California Los Angeles Law Review 1063 (1986); Akhil Reed Amar: The Constitution and Criminal Procedure: . First Principles (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997) pp. 65-70; Mike Redmayne: 'Re-thinking the Privilege against Self-incrimination', 27 Oxford Journal of Legal-studies 209232 (Summer 2007), referred to.
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1-A. Whether the investigative use of the impugned techniques creates a likelihood of incrimination for the subject? Applicability of Article 20(3) to the stage of investigation:
C
8. The majority decision in Miranda was not a sudden development in U.S. constitutional law. The scope of the privilege against self-incrimination had been progressively expanded in several prior decisions. The notable feature was the recognition of the interrelationship between the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that the government must observe the 'due process of law' as well as the Fourth Amendment's protection against 'unreasonable search and seizure'. After Miranda, administering a warning about a persol)•$ right to silence during custodial interrogations as well as obtaining a voluntary waiver of the prescribed rights has become a ubiquitous feature in the U.S. criminal justice system. In the absence of such a warning and voluntary waiver, there is a presumptjon of compulsion with regard to the custodial statements, thereby rendering them inadmissible as evidence. The position in India is different since there is no automatic presumption of compulsion in ·respect of custodial statements. However; if the fact of compulsion is proved then the resulting statements are rendered inadmissible as evidence. [Para 106) [507-C-H]
M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, [1954) SCR 1077; State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad & Others, [1962) 3 SCR 10 and Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, (1978) 2 SCC 424, G referred to. Ernesto Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966), referred
to.
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Who can invoke the protection of Article 20(3)?:
9.1. While there is a requirement of formal accusation for a person to invoke Article 20(3) it must be noted that the protection contemplated by Section 161(2), CrPC is wider. Section 161 (2) read with 161 (1) protects 'any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case' in the course of examination by the police. [Para 108] [508-C-D]
9.2. The 'right against self-incrimination' protects persons who have been formally accused as well as C those who.are examined·as suspects in criminal cases. It also extends to cover witnesses who apprehend that their answers could expose them to criminal charges in the ongoing investigation or even in cases other than the one being investigated. [Para 109] [509-A-B] 9.3. Even though Section 161 (2) of the CrPC casts a wide protective net to protect the formally accused persons as well as suspects and witnesses during the investigative stage, Section 132 of the Evidence Act limits E the applicability of this protection to witnesses during the trial stage. The latter provision provides that witnesses cannot refuse to answer questions during a trial on the ground that the answers could incriminate them. However, the proviso to this section stipulates that the F content of such answers cannot expos~the witness to arrest or prosecution, except for a prosecution for giving false evidence. Therefore, the protection accorded to witnesses at the stage of trial is not as wide as the one accorded to the accused, suspects and witnesses during investigation [under Section 161(2), CrPC]. Furthermore, G it is narrower than the protection given to the accused during the trial stage [under Section 313(3) and Proviso (b) to Section 315(1 ), CrPC]. The legislative intent is to preserve the fact-finding function of a criminal trial. [Para 11 O] [509-H; 510-A-D]
A·
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9.4. Since the extension of the 'right against self· incrimination' to suspects and witnesses has its basis in Section 161(2), CrPC it is not readily available to persons who are examined during proceedings that are not governed by the code. There is a distinction between proceedings of ~a purely criminal nature and those proceedings which can culminate in punitive remedies and yet cannot be characterised as criminal proceedings. The consistent position has been that ordinarily Article 20(3) cannot be invoked by witnesses during proceedings that cannot be characterised as criminal proceedings. In administrCitive and quasi-criminal proceedings, the protection of Article 20(3) becomes available only after aperson has been formeilly accused of committing an offence. [Para 111] [510-G-H; 511-A-B] Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, (1978) 2 SCC 424; State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, [1962] 3 SCR 10; M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, (1954] SCR 1077; Raja Narayan/al Bansilal v. Maneck Phiroz Mistry, (1961] 1 SCR 417; Romesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal, (1969] 2 SCR 461 and Balkishan A. Devidayal v. State of Maharashtra, (1980) 4 SCC 600, referred to. What constitutes 'incrimination' for the purpose of Article 20(3)?
F·
10.1. It is a settled principle that statements made in custody are considered to be unreliable unless they have been subjected to cross-examination or judicial scrutiny. The scheme created by the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act also mandates that confessions made before police officers are ordinarily not admissible as evidence and it is only the statemen~s made in the presence of a judicial magistrate which can be given weightage. The doctrine of excluding the 'fruits of a poisonous tree' has been incorporated in -Sections
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
24, 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. [Para 118] [516-D-F]
10.2. Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 permits the derivative use of custodial statements in the ordinary course of events. In Indian law, there is no automatic 8 presumption that the custodial statements have been extracted through compulsion. In short, there is no requirement of additional diligence akin to the administration of Miranda warnings. However, in circumstances where it is shown that a person was · C indeed compelled to make statements while in custody, relying on such testimony as well as its derivative use will offend Article 20(3). The relationship between Section 27 ·pf the Evidence Act and Article 20(3) of the Constitution was clarified in Kathi Kalu Oghad. [Para 120] [518-A-C] 10.3. The distinction between inculpatory and exculpatory evidence gathered during investigation is relevant for deciding what will be admissible as evidence during the trial stage. The exclusionary rule in evidence law mandates that if inculpatory evidence has been E gathered through improper methods (involving coercion, threat or inducement among others) then the same should be excluded from the trial, while there is no such prohibition on the consideration of exculpatory evidence. However, this distinction between the treatment of F inculpatory and exculpatory evidence is made retrospectively at the trial stage and it cannot be extended back to the stage of investigation. If the admission of involuntary statement is permitted on the ground that at the time of asking a question it is not known whether the G answer will be inculpatory or exculpatory, the 'right against self-incrimination' will be rendered meaningless. The law confers on 'any person' who is examined during an in...,estigation, an effective choice between speaking and remaining silent. This implies that it is for the person H
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being examined to decide whether the answer to a particular question will eventually prove to be inculpatory or exculpatory. Furthermore, it is also likely that ttie information or materials collected at an earlier stage of investigation can prove to be inculpatory in due course. [Para 123) [520-B-G] .
10.4. However, it is conceivable that in some circumstances the testimony extracted throug.ti compulsion may not actually lead to ~posure to criminal charges or penalties. This is a possibility when the C investigators make ·an offer of immunity against the di~ect use, derivative use,;or transactional use of the testimony. Immunity against direct use entails that a witness will not be prosecuted on the basis of the statements made to the. investigators. A protection against derivative use implies D that a person will not be prosecuted on the basis of the ,fruits of such testimony. Immunity against transactional use will shield a witness from criininal cf)arges in cases other than the one being investigated .. It is of course entirely up to the investigating agencies to decide E . whether to offer immunity and in what form. Even though this is distinctly possible, it is difficult to conceive of such a situation. in .the context of the present case. A person who is given an offer of immunity againsf prosecution is far more" likely to voluntarily cooperate with the. F investigation efforts. This could be ih the form of giving testimony or helping in the discovery of mat~.rial evidence. If a person· is freely willing to cooperate with the investigation efforts, it would be redundant to com'pel such a person to undergo the impugned tests. If reliance G on such tests is sought for refreshing a cooperating witness' memory, the person will in all probability give his/her consent to undergo these tests. [Para 124] [520G-H; 521-A-D]
10.5. It could be argued· that the compulsory
SELVI & ORS. it. STATE OF KARNATAKA
administration of the impugned tests can prove to be useful in instances where the cooperating witness has difficulty in remembering the relevant facts or is wilfully concealing crucial details. Such situations could very well arise when a person who is a co-accused is offered immunity from prosecution in return for cooperating with the investigators. Even though the right against selfi_ncrimination is not directly applicable in such situations, the relevant legal inquiry is whether the compulsory administration of the impugned tests meets the requisite standard of 'substantive due process' for placing restraints on personal lib.arty. [Para 125) [521-E-G] 10.6. Indian law incorporates the 'rule against adverse inferences from silence' which is operative at the trial stage. This position is embodied in a conjunctive reading of Article 20(3) of the Constitution and Sections 161 (2), 313(3) and Proviso (b) of Section 315(1) of the CrPC. The gist of this position is that even though an accused is a competent witness in his/her own trial, he/ she cannot be compelled to answer questions that could expose him/her to incrimination and the trial judge cannot draw adverse inferences from the refusal to do so. This position is cemented by prohibiting any Qf the .parties from commenting on the failure of the accused to give evidence. [Para 126) [521-H; 522-A-B] 10.7. A person who refuses to undergo the impugned tests during the investigative stage could face non-penal consequences which lie outside the protective scope of Article 20(3). For example, a person who refuses to undergo these tests could face the risk of. custodial violence, increased police surveillance or harassment thereafter. Even a person who is compelled to undergo these tests could face such adverse consequences on account of the contents of the. test results if they heighten the investigators' suspicions. Each of these
c
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A consequences, though condemnable; tall short of the requisite standard of 'exposure to criminal charges and penalties' that has been enumerated in Section_ 161(2) of the CrPC. Even though Article 20(3) will not be applicable in such circumstances, reliance can be placed on Article B 21 if such non-penal consequences amount to a violation of 'personal liberty' as contemplated under the Constitution. [Para 128] [521-G-H; 522-A-B] State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, [1962] 3 SCR 10 C and Suni/ Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1978) 4 SCC 494, relied on.
' Samuel Hoffman v. United States, 341 US 479 (1951) and Woolmington v. OPP, (1935) AC 462, referred to.
"180th Report of the Law Commission of India" (May 2002), referred to. 1-B. Whether the results derived from the impugned techniques amount to 'testimonial compulsion' thereby attracting the bar of Article 20(3)?
11.1. It is quite evident that the narcoanalysis technique .involves a testimonial act. A subject is &ncouraged to speak in a drug-induced state, and there is no reason why such an act should be treated any F differently from verbal answers during an ordinary interrogation. The compulsory administration of the narcoanalysis technique was defended on the ground that at the time of conducting the test, it is not known whether the results will eventually prove to be G inculpatory or exculpatory. This reasoning has already been rejected. There is no other obstruction to the proposition that the compulsory administration of the narcoanalysis technique amounts to 'testimonial compulsion' and thereby triggers the protection of Article 20(3). [Para 130] [524-G-H; 525-A-B]
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
11.2. Since the majority decision in Kathi Kalu Oghad is the controlling precedent, it will be useful to re-state the two main premises for understanding the scope of 'testimonial compulsion'. The first is that ordinarily it is the oral or written statements which convey the personal knowledge of a person in respect of relevant facts that amount to 'personal testimony' thereby coming within the prohibition contemplated by Article 20(3). In most cases, such 'personal testimony' can be readily distinguished from material evidence such as ,bodily substances and other physical objects. The second premise is that in some cases, oral or written statements can be relied upon but only for the purpose of identification or comparison with facts and materials that are already in the possession of the investigators. The bar of Article 20(3) can be invoked when the statements are likely to lead to incrimination by themselves or 'furnish a link in the chain of evidence' needed to do so. It is emphasized that a situation where a testimonial response is used for comparison with facts already known to investigators is inherently different from a situation where a testimonial response helps the investigators to subsequently discover fresh facts or materials that could be relevant to the ongoing investigation. [Para 136] [532-G-H; 533-A-
c
C] 11.3. The recognition of the distinction between testimonial acts and physical evidence for the purpose of invoking Article 20(3) of the Constitution finds a close parallel in some foreign decisions. [Para 137] [533-D-E] State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, [1962] 3 SCR 10, relied on.
M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, [1954] SCR 1077, referred to. Armando Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 (1966);
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United States v. Hott, 218 US 245 .(1910) and Saunders v. United Kingdom, (1997) 23 EHRR 313, referred to.
Michael S. Pardo: 'Self-Incrimination end the Epistemology of Testimony', 30 Cardozo Law Review 1023B 1046 (December 2008) pp. 1027-1028, referred to. Evolution of the law on 'medical examination': 12.1. With respect to the testimonial-physical distinction, an important statutory development in our legal system was the introduction of provisions for C medical examination with the overhauling of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1973. Sections 53 and 54 of the . CrPC contemplate the medical examination of a person who has been arrested, either at the instance of the investig~ting officer or even the arrested person himself. D The same can also be done at the direction of the jurisdictional court. However, there were no provisions for authorising such a medical examination in the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The absence of a statutory basis for the same had led courts to hold E that a medical examination could not be conducted without the prior consent of the person who was to be subjected to the same. [Paras 140, 141] [536-C-F] '
12.2. The Law Commission recommended the F insertion of a provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure to enable medical examination without the consent of an accused. These reco·mmendations proved to be the precursor for the inclusion of Sections 53 and 54 in the. Code. of Criminal Procedure, 1973. [Para 142] [537-F-G] ·
12.3. The results of the impugned tests should be treated as testimonial acts for the purpose of invoking the right against self-incrimination. Therefore, it would be prudent to state that the phrase 'and such other tests' [which appears in the Explanation to Sections 53, 53-A H and 54 of the CrPC] should be read so as to confine its
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
meaning to include only those tests ,which involve the examination of physical evidence. It should also be noted that the Explanation to Sections 53, 53-A and 54 of the CrPC does not enumerate certain other forms of medical examination that involve testimonial acts, such as psychiatric examination among others. This demonstrates that the amendment to this provision was informed by a rational distinction between the examination of physical substances and testimonial acts. [Para 149] [543-D-H]
12.4. While it is most likely that the Parliament was well aware of the impugned techniques at the time of the 2005 amendment to the CrPC and delib~rately chose not to enumerate them, one cannot arrive at a conclusive finding on this issue. While it is open to courts to examine the legislative history of a statutory provision, it is not proper to try an~ conclusively ascertain the legislative intent. Such an inquiry is impractical since this Court does not have access to all the materials which would have been considered by the Parliament. In such a scenario, this Court must address the respondent's arguments about the interpretation of statutes with regard to scientific advancements. [Para 150] [544-A-C]
C
12.5. There are some clear obstructions to the dynamic interpretation of the amended Explanation to Sections 53, 53-A and 54 of the CrPC. Firstly, the general words in question, i.e. 'and such other tests' should ordinarily be read to include tests which are in the same genus as the other forms of medical examination that have been specified. Since all the explicit references are to the examination of bodily substances, one cannot readily construe the said phrase to include the impugned tests because the latter seem to involve testimonial responses. Secondly, the compulsory administration of the impugned techniques is not the only means for ensuring an expeditious investigation. Furthermore, there
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A is also a safe presumption that Parliament was well aware of the existence of the impugned techniques but deliberately chose not to enumerate them. Hence, on an aggregate understanding of the materials produced before this Court leans towards the view that the B impugned tests, i.e. the narcoanalysis technique., polygraph examination and the BEAP test should not be read into the provisions for 'medical examination' under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. However, it must be borne in mind that even though the impugned c techniques have not been expressly enumerated in the CrPC, there is no statutory prohibition against them either. It is a clear case of silence in the law. Furthermore, in circumstances where an individual consents to undergo these tests, there is no dilution of Article 20(3). D [Paras 152, 153] [546-G-H; 547-A-E] 12.6. Being a court of law, courts do not have the expertise to mould the specifics of professional ethics for the medical profession. Furthermore, the involvement of doctors in the course of investigation in criminal cases E has long been recognised as an exception to the physician-patient privilege. In the Indian context, the statutory provisions for directing a medical examination are an example of the same. Fields such as forensic toxicology have become important in criminaHustic.g F systems all over the world and doctors are frequently called on to examine bodily substances such as samples of blood, hair, semen, saliva, sweat, sputum and fingernail clippings as well as marks, wounds and other physical characteristics. A reasonable limitation on the G forensic uses of medical expertise is the fact that testimonial acts such as the results of a psychiatric examination cannot be used as evidence without the subject's informed consent. [Para 156] [549-C-F]
Bhondar v. Emperor, AIR 1931 Cal 601; Deomam H Shamji Patel v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1959 Born 284;
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, [1962] 3 SCR 10; Sharda v. Dharampal, (2003) 4 SCC 493; Thogorani v. State of Orissa, 2004 Cri L J 4003 (Ori); Senior Electric Inspector v. Laxminarayan Chopra, AIR 1962 SC 159; Mahipal Maderna v. State of Maharashtra, 1971 Cri L J 1405 (Born) and Jamshed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1976 Cri L J 1680 (All), referred to. 37th and 41st Reports of the Law Commission of India; Justice G.P. Singh: Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 10th edn. (New Delhi: Wadhwa & Co. Nagpur, 2006) pp. 239-247; Amar Jesani: 'Willing participants and tolerant profession: Medical ethics and human rights in narco-analysis', Indian Journal of Medical Ethics, \lo/. 16(3), July-Sept. 2008 and 'Principles of Medical Ethics' adopted by the United Nations General Assembly [GA Res. 371194, 111th Plenary Meeting) on December 18, 1982, referred to.
-
C
Results of impugned tests should be treated as 'personal testimony' 13.1. Ordinarily evidence is classified into three broad categories, namely oral testimony, documents and material evidence. The protective scope of Article 20(3) read with Section 161 (2), CrPC guards against the compulsory extraction of oral testimony, even at the stage of investigation. With respect to the production of documents, the. applicability of Article 20(3) is decided by the trial judge but parties are obliged to produce documents in the first place. However, the compulsory extraction of material (or physical) evidence lies outside the protective scope of Article 20(3). Furthermore, even testimony in oral or written form can be required under compulsion if it is to be used for the purpose of identification or comparison with materials and information that is already in the possession of investigators. [Para 157] [549-G-H; 550-A-B] 13.2. Even though the actual process of undergoing
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A a polygraph examination or a BEAP test is not the same as that of making an oral or written statement,' the consequences are similar. By making inferences from the results of these tests, the examiner is able to derive . knowledge from the subject's mind which otherwise B would not have become available to the investigators. These two tests are different from medical examination and the analysis of bodily substances such as blood, semen and hair sa_mples, since the test subject's physiological responses are directly correlated to mental c faculties. Through lie-detection or gauging a subject's familiarity with the stimuli, personal knowledge is conveyed in respect of a relevant fact. It is also significant that unlike the case of documents, the investigators cannot possibly have any prior knowledge of the test subject's thoughts and memories, either in the actual or constructive sense. Therefore, even if a highly-strained analogy were to be made between the results obtained fron:i the impugned tests and the production .of documents, the weight of precedents leans towards E restrictions on the extraction of 'personal knowledge' through such means. [Para 160] [551-G-H; 552-A-D] 13.3. During the administration of a polygraph test or a BEAP test, the subject makes a mental effort which is accompanied by certain physiological responses. The F measurement of these responses then becomes the basis of the transmission of knowledge to the investigators. This knowledge may aid an ongoing investigation or lead to the discovery of fresh evidence which could then be used to prosecute the test subject. G In any case, the compulsory administration of the impugned tests impedes the subject's right to choose between remaining silent and offering substantive information. The requirement of a 'positive volitional act' becomes irrelevant since the subject is compelled to
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
convey personal knowledge irrespective of his/her own volition. [Para 161] [552-D-G] 13.4. The results obtained from tests such as polygraph examination and the BEAP test should also be treated as 'personal testimony', since they are a means for 'imparting personal knowledge about relevant facts'. Hence, the results obtained through the involuntary administration of either of the impugned tests (i.e. the narcoanalysis technique, polygraph examination and the BEAP test) come within the scope of 'testimonial compulsion', thereby attracting the protective shield of Article 20(3). [Para 165] [554-E-G]
C
_ State of Bombay v. Kathi Ka/u Oghad, [1962] 3 SCR 1O and M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, [1954] SCR 1077, referred to. Human Rights Commission, India: Guidelines Relating to Administration of Polygraph Test [Lie Detector Test] on an Accused (2000), referred to. Michael S. Pardo: 'Self-Incrimination and the Epistemology of Testimony', 30 Cardozo Law Review 10231046 (December 2008) p. 1046 and Ronald J. Allen and M. Kristin Mace: 'The Self-Incrimination Clause explained and its future predicted', 94 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 243-293 (2004), Fn. 16 p. 247, referred to.
II. Whether the involuntary administration of the impugned techniques is a reasonable restriction on 'personal liberty' as understood in the context of Article 21 of the Constitution? 14.1. There are several ways in which the involuntary administration of either of the impugned tests could be viewed as a restraint on 'personal liberty'. The most obvious indicator of restraint is the use of physical force to ensure that an unwiiling person is confined to the
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A premises where the tests are to be conducted. Furthermore, the drug-induced revelations or the substantive inferences drawn from the measurement of the subject's physiological responses can be described as an intrusion into the subject's mental privacy. It is also B quite conceivable that a person could make an incriminating statement on being threatened with the prospective administration of any of these techniques. Conversely, a person who has been forcibly subjected to these techniques could be confronted with the results c in a subsequent interrogation, thereby eliciting incriminating statements. The circumstances where a person who undergoes the said tests is subsequently exposed to harmful consequences, though not of a penal nature must also be accounted for. This Court has already expressed its concern with situations where the contents of the test results could prompt investigators to engage in custodial abuse, surveillance or undue harassment. This Court has also been apprised of some in~tances where the investigation agencies have leaked the video-recordings of narcoanalysis interviews to media E organisations. This is an especially worrisome practice since the public distribution of .these recordings can expose the subject to undue social stigma and specific risks. It may even encourage acts of vigilantism in addition to a 'trial ·-0y media'. [Paras 169, 170] [556-C-H; 557-A-B]
14.2. One must remember that the law does provide for some restrictions on 'personal liberty' in the routine exercise of police powers. For instance; the CrPC incorporates an elaborate scheme prescribing the G powers of arrest, detention, interrogation, search and seizure. A fundamental prem.ise of the criminal justice system is that the police and the judiciary are empowered to exercise a reasonable degree of coercive powers. Hence, the provision that enables Courts to order a H person who is under arrest to undergo a medlcal
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
examination also provides for the use of 'force as is reasonably necessary' for this purpose. It is evident that the notion of 'personal liberty' does not grant rights in the absolute sense and the validity of restrictions placed on the same needs to be evaluated on the basis of criterion such as 'fairness, non-arbitrariness, and reasonableness'. [Para 171] [557-B-E]
14.3. The line of precedents shows that the compelled extraction of blood samples in the course of a medical examination does not amount to 'conduct that shocks the conscience'. There is also an endorsement C of the view that the use of 'force as may be reasonably necessary' is mandated by law and hence it meets the threshold of 'procedure established by law'. In this light, this Court must restate two crucial considerations that are relevant for the instant case. Firstly, the restrictions D placed on 'personal liberty' in the course of administering the impugned techniques are not limited to physical confinement and the extraction of bodily s.ubstances. All the three techniques in question also involve testimonial responses. Secondly, most of the cases cited before this E Court were decided in accordance with the threshold of 'procedure established by law' for restraining 'personal liberty'.· However, in this case one must use a broader standard of reasonableness to evaluate the validity of the techniques in question. This wider inquiry calls for F deciding whether they are compatible with the various judicially-recognised dimensions of 'personal liberty' such as the right to privacy, the right against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and the right to fair trial. (Para 176) [561-D-H; 562-A] State of Maharashtra v. Sheshappa Dudhappa Tambade, AIR 1964 Born 253; Jamshed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1976 Cri L J 1680 (All); Ananth Kumar. Naik v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1977 Cri L J 1797 (A.P.) and Anil Anantrao Lokhande v. State of Maharashtra, 1981 Cri L J 125 (Born),
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A referred to. Rochin v. California, 342 US 165 (1952) and Paul H. Breithaupt v. Morris Abram, 352 US 432 (1957), referred to. Applicability of the 'right to privacy':
15.1. A distinction must be made between the character of restraints plac~d on the right to privacy. While the ordinary exercise of police powers contemplates restraints of a physical nature such as the extraction of bodily substances and the use of C reasonab~ force for subjecting a person to a medical examination, it is not viable to extend these police powers to the forcible extraction of testimonial responses. In conceptualising the 'right to privacy' the distinction between privacy in a physical sense and the privacy of D one's mental processes, has to be highlighted. [Para 191) [571-8-D] 15.2. So far~ the judicial understanding of privacy in our country has mostly stressed on the protection of the · E body and physical spaces from intrusive actions by the State. While the scheme of criminal procedure as well as evidence I.aw mandates interference with physical privacy through statutory provisions that enable arrest, detention, search and seizure among others, the same cannot be F the basis for compelling a person 'to impart personal knowledge about· a relevant fact'. The theory of interrelationship of rights mandates that the right against self"incrimination should also be read as a component of 'personal IT6erty' .under Article 21. Hence, our understanding of the 'right to privacy' should account for G its interse-ctio.n with Article 20(3). Furthermore, the 'rule against.Jrut.oluntary confessions' as embodied in Sections 24, 25, 26 and 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 seeks to serve· both the objectives of reliability as well as voluntariness of testimony given in a custodial setting.
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
A conjunctive reading of Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution along with the principles of evidence law leads to a clear answer .. One must recognise the importance of personal autonomy in aspects such as the choice between remaining silent and speaking. An individual's decision to make a statement is the product of a private choice and. there should be no scope for any other individual to interfere with such autonomy, especially in circumstances where the person faces exposure to criminal charges or penalties. [Para 192) [571D-H; 572-A] 15.3. Subjecting a person to the impugned techniques in an involuntary manner violates the prescribed boundaries of privacy. Forcible interferel'!ce with a person's mental processes is not provided for under any statute and it most certainly comes into conflict with the 'right against self-incrimination'. However, this determination does not account for circumstances where a person could be subjected to any of the impugned tests but not exposed to criminal charges and the possibility of conviction. In such cases, he/she could still face adverse consequences such as custodial abuse,· surveillance, undue harassment and social stigma among others. [Para 193) [572-8-D] Sharda v. Dharampal, (2003) 4 SCC 493, distinguished. M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra,. [1954) SCR 1077; Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 1295; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597; Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1975) 2 SCC 148; R. Raj Gopa/ v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 6 SCC 632; People's Union for Civil Liberties v: Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 568; X v. Hospital Z, (1998) 8 SCC 296; Xv. Hospital Z, (2003) 1 SCC 500 and M. Vijaya v. Chairman and Managing Director, Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd., AIR 2001 AP 502, referred to.
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R (on the application of S) v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, (2003) 1 All ER 148 (CA) and Attorney General's Reference (No. 3 of 1999), (2001) 1 All ER 577, referred to.
Safeguarding the 'right against cruel. inhuman or B degrading treatment'
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16.1. It is quite conceivable that the administration of any of these techniques could involve the infliction of 'mental pain or suffering' and the contents of their results could expose the subject to physical -abuse. When a person undergoes a narcoanalysis test, he/she is in a halfconscious state. and subsequently does not remember the revelations made in a drug-induced state. In the case of polygraph examination and the BEAP test, the test subject remains fully conscious during the tests but does not immediately know the nature and implications of the results derived from the same. However, when he/she later learns about the contents of the revelations, they may prove to be incriminatory or be in the nature of testimony that can be ~sed to prosecute other individuals. This Court has also highlighted the likelihood of a person making incriminatory statements when he/ she is subsequently confronted with the test results. The realisation of such consequences can indeed cause 'mental pain or suffering' for the person who was subjected to these tests. The test results could also support the theories or suspicions of the investigators in a particular case. These results could very well confirm suspicions about a person's involvement in a criminal act. For a person in custody, such confirmations could lead to specifically targeted behaviour such as physical abuse. [Para 201] [578-G-H; 579-A-D]
16.2. One must also contemplate situations where a threat given by the investigators to conduct any of the impugned tests could prompt a person to make H incriminatory statements or to undergo some mental
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
trauma. Especially in cases of individual~ from weaker sections of society who are unaware of their fundamental rights and unable to afford legal advice, the mere apprehension of undergoing scientific tests that supposedly reveal the truth could push them to make confessional statements. Hence, the act of threatening to administer the impugned tests could also elicit testimony. It is also quite conceivable that an individual may give his/ her consent to undergo the said tests on account of threats, false promises or deception by the investigators. For example, a person may be convinced to give his/her consent after being promised that this would lead to an early release from custody or dropping of charges. However, after the administration of the tests the investigators may renege on such promises. In such a case the relevant inquiry is not confined to the apparent voluntariness of the act of undergoing the tests, but also includes an examination of the totality of circumstances. [Para 202] [579-E-H; 580-A-B] 16.3. This Court can also contemplate a possibility .that even when an individual freely consents to undergo the tests in question, the resulting testimony cannot be readily characterised as voluntary in nature. This is attributable to the differences between the manner in which the impugned tests are conducted and an ordinary interrogation. In an ordinary interrogation, the investigator asks questions one by one and the subject has the choice of remaining silent or answering each of these questions. This choice is repeatedly exercised after each question is asked and the subject decides the nature and content of each testimonial response. On account of the continuous exercise of such a choice, the subject's verbal responses can be described as voluntary in nature. However, in the context of the impugned techniques the test subject does not exercise such a choice in a continuous manner. After the initial consent
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A is given, the subject has no conscious control over the subsequent responses given during the test. In case of the narcoanalysis technique, th.e subject speaks in a drug-induced state and is clearly not aware of his/her own responses at the time. In the context of polygraph B examination and the BEAP tests, the subject cannot anticipate the contents of the 'relevant questions' that will be asked or the 'probes' that will be shown. Furthermore, the results are derived from the measurement of physiological responses and hence the subject cannot c exercise an effective choice between remaining silent and imparting personal knowledge. [Para 204] [581-8-G]
16.4. It is undeniable that during a narcoanalysis interview, the test subject does lose 'awareness of place and passing of time'. It is also quite evident that all the three impugned techniques ca.n be described as methods of interrogation which impair the test subject's 'capacity of decision or judgment'. Going by the language of these principles, it is held that the compulsory administration of the impugned techniques constitutes 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment' in the context of Article 21. It must be remembered that the law disapproves of involuntary testimony, irrespective of the nature and degree of coercion, threats, fraud or inducement used to elicit the same. The popular perceptions of terms such as 'torture' and 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment' are associated with gory images of blood-letting and broken bones. However, one must recognise that a forcible intrusion into a person's mental processes is also an affront to human dignity and liberty, often with grave and long-lasting consequences. [Para 205] [582-D-G] 16.5. It would also be wrong to sustain a comparison between the forensic uses of these techniques and the practice of medicine. It has been suggested that patients
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
undergo a certain degree of 'physical or mental pain and suffering' on account of medical interventions such as surgeries and drug-treatments. However, such interventions are acceptable since the objective is to ultimately cure or prevent a disease or disorder. So it is argued that if the infliction of some 'pain and suffering' is permitted in the medical field, it should also be tolerated for the purpose of expediting investigations in criminal cases. This is the point where our constitutional values step in. A society governed by rules and liberal values makes a rational distinction between the various circumstances where individuals face pain and suffering. While the infliction of a certain degree of pain and suffering is mandated by law in the form of punishments for various offences, the same cannot be extended to all those who are questioned during the course of an investigation. Allowing the same would vest unlimited discretion and lead to the disproportionate exercise of police powers. [Para 206] [583-A-D] Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1978) 4 SCC 494 and D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1997 SC 610, referred to. National Human Rights Commission, India: 'Guidelines relating to administration of Polygraph test (Lie Detector test) on an accused (2000), referred to. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (GA Res. 217 A (Ill) of December 10 1948], Article 5; Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) [GA Res. 2200A (XXI), entered into force March 23, 1976; Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984; Body of Principles for the Protection of all persons under any form of Detention or Imprisonment [GA Res. 43/173, 76th plenary meeting, 9 December 1988] adopted by the United Nations
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A General Assembly; Linda M. Keller: 'Is Truth Serum Torture?' 20 American University International Law Review 521-612 (2005) and Marcy Strauss: 'Criminal Defence in the Age of Terrorism - Torture', 48 New York Law School Law Review 201-274 (200312004), referred to. Incompatibility with the 'Right to fair trial': 17.1. The respondents' position is that the compulsory administration of the impugned techniques should be permitted at least for investigative purposes, C and if the test resul'ts lead to the discovery of fresh evidence, then these fruits should be admissible. In light of the conjunctive reading of Article 20(3) of the Constitution and Section 27 of the Evidence Act, if the fact of compulsion is proved, the test results will not be o admissible as evidence. [Para 207] [583-E-F] 17.2. Access to legal advice is an essential safeguard so that an individual <;an be adequately apprised of his constitutional and statutory rights. This is also a measure which checks custodial abuses. However, the E involuntary administration of any of the impugned tests can lead to a situation where such legal advice becomes ineffective. For instance even if a person receives the best of legal advice before undergoing any.of these tests, it cannot prevent the extraction of information which may F prove to be inculpatory by itself or lead to the subs~uent discovery of incriminating materials. Since the subject has no conscious control over the drug-induced revelations or substantive inferences, the objective of providing access to legal advice are frustrated. [Para 208] G [584-A-C] 17.3. Since the subject is not immediately aware of the contents of the drug-induced revelations or substantive inferences, it is also conceivable that the H investigators may chose not to communicate them to the
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
subject even after completing the tests. In fact statements may be recorded or charges framed without the knowledge of the test subject. At the stage of trial, the prosecution is obliged to supply copies of all incriminating materials to the defendant but reliance on the impugned tests could curtail the opportunity of presenting a meaningful and wholesome defence. If the contents of the revelations or inferences ·are communicated much later to the defendant, there may not be sufficient time to prepare an adequate defence. [Para 209] [584-D-F]
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17.4. In respect of the narcoanalysis technique, it was observed that there is no guarantee that the drug-induced revelations will be truthful. Furthermore, empirical studies have shown that during the hypnotic stage, individuals are prone to suggestibility and there is a good chance D that false results could lead to a finding of guilt or innocence. As far as polygraph examination is concerned, though there are some studies showing improvements in the accuracy of results with advancement in technology, there is always scope for E · error on account of several factors. Obje.ctions can be raised about the qualifications of the examiner, the physical conditions under which the test was conducted, the manner in which questions were framed and the possible use of 'countermeasures' by the test subject. A F significant criticism of polygraphy is that sometimes the physiological responses triggered by feelings such as anxiety and fear could be misread as those triggered by deception. Similarly, with the P300 Waves test there are inherent limitations such as the subject having had 'prior : G exposure' to the· 'probes' which are used as stimuli. F.urthermore, this technique has not been the focus of · rigorous independent st.udies. The questionable scientific reliability of these techniques comes into conflict with the · standard of proof 'beyond reasonable doubt' which is an H
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A essential feature of criminal trials. [Para 210] [584-G-H; 585-A-D] 17.5. While the consideration of expert opinion testimony has become a mainstay in our criminal justice system with the advancement of fields such as forensic toxicology, questions have been raised about the credibility of experts who are involved in administering the impugned techniques. It is a widely accepted principle for evaluating the validity of any scientific technique that it should have been subjected to rigorous C independent studies and peer review. This is so because the persons who are involved in the invention and development of certain techniques are perceived to have an interest in their promotion. Hence, it is quite likely that such persons may give unduly favourable responses D about the reliability of the techniques in question. [Para 211] [585~E-G] 17.6. Even though India does not have a jury system, the use of the impugned techniques could impede the E fact-finding role of a trial judge. This is a special concern in our legal system, since the same judge presides over the evidentiary phase of the trial as well as the guilt phase. The consideration of the test results or their fruits for the purpose of deciding on their admissibility could F have a prejudicial effect on the judge's mind even if the same are not eventually admitted as evidence. Furthermore, reliance on scientific techniques could cloud human judgment on account of an 'aura of infallibility'. While judges are expected to be impartial and objective in their evaluation of evidence, one can never G discount the possibility of undue public pressure in some cases, especially when the test results appear to be inculpatory. [Para 212] [586-A-D] 17.7. If compulsory administration of any of the H impugned techniques are permitted at the behest of
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
investigators, there would be no principled basis to deny the same opportunity to defendants as well as witnesses. If the investigators could justify reliance on these tecnniques, there would be an equally compelling reason to allow the indiscrete administration of these tests at the. request of convicts who want re-opening of their cases or even for the purpose of attacking and re,habilitating the credibility of witnesses during a trial. An untrammelled right of resorting to the techniques in question will lead to an unnecessary rise in the volume of frivolous litigation before our Courts. [Para 213) [586-E-H; 587-A] 17.8. In light of the preceding discussion, this Court is of the view that irrespective of the need to expedite investigations in such cases, no person who is a victim of an offence can be compelled to undergo any of the tests in question. Such a forcible administration would be an unjustified intrusion into mental privacy and could lead to further stigma for the victim. [Para 214) [587-B-C] D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1997 SC 610, relied on.
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Armando Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 (1966); R v. Beland, [1987) 36 C.C.C. (3d) 481 and United States v. Scheffer, 523 US 303 (1998), referred to.
Examining the 'compelling public interest': 18.1. Ordinarily it is the task of the legislature to arrive at a pragmatic baldnce between the often competing interests of 'personal liberty' and public safety. As a constitutional court, this Court can only seek to preserve the balance between these competing interests as reflected in the text of the Constitution and its subsequent interpretation. There is absolutely no ambiguity on the status of principles such as the 'right against self-incrimination' and the various dimensions of 'personal liberty'. It has already been pointed out that the
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A rights guaranteed in Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India have been given a non-derogable status and they are available to citizens as well as foreigners. It is not within the competence of the judiciary to create exceptions and limitations on the availability of s these rights. [Para 216] [588-C-F]
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18.2. Even though the main task of constitutional adjudication is to safeguard the core organising principles of our polity, this Court must also highlight some practical concerns that strengthen the case against the involuntary administration of the tests in question. Firstly, the claim that the results obtained from these techniques will help in extraordinary situations is questionable. All of the tests in question are those which need to be patiently administered and the forensic psychologist or the examiner has to be very skilful and thorough while interpreting the results. In a narcoanalysis test the subject is likely to divulge a lot of irrelevant and incoherent information. The subject is.as likely to divulge false information as he/she is likely to reveal useful facts. Sometimes the revelations may begin to make sense only when 1compared with the testimony of several other individuals or through the discovery of fresh materials .. In a polygraph test, interpreting the results is a complex process that involves accounting for distortions such as 'countermeasures;, used by the subject and weather condition.s among others. In a BEAP test, there is always the possibility of the subject having had prior exposure to the 'probes' that are used as stimuli. All of this is a gradually unfolding process and it is not appropriate to argue that the test results will always prove to be crucial in times of exigency. It is evident that both the tasks of preparing for these tests a"nd interpreting their results need considerable time and expertise. [Para 217] [588-F'H; 589-A-D] , . 18.3. If forc:ible administration of these techniques
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
are permitted, it could be the first step on a very slipperyslope as far as the standatds of police behaviour are concerned. It has been sug~ested that the promotion of these techniques could reduce the regrettably high incidence of 'third degree methods' that are being used by policemen all over the country. This is a circular line of reasoning since one form of improper behaviour is sought to be- replaced by ancther. What this will result in is that investigators will increasingly seek reliance on the impugned techniques rather than engaging in a thorough investigation. The widespread use of 'third-degree' interrogation methods so as to speak is a separate problem and needs to be tackled through long~term solutions such as more emphasis on the protection of human rights during police training, providing adequate res"ources for investigators and stronger accountability measures when such abuses do take place. [Para 218) [589-D-G]
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18.4. The claim that the use of these techniques will only be sought in cases involving heinous offences rings hollow since there will no principled basis for restricting E their use once the investigators are given. the discretion to do so. From the statistics presented before this Court as well as the chargE'.s filed against the parties in the impugned judgments, it is obvious that investigators have sought reliance on the impugned tests to expedite F investigations,· unmindful of the nature of offences involved. In this regard, this Court does not have the authority to permit the qualified use of these techniques by way of enumerating the offences which warrant their use. By itself, permitting such qualified use would G amount to a law-making function which is clearly outside ttie judicial domain. [Para 219) [589-G-H; 590-A-C] 18.5. One of the main functions of constitutionally prescribed rights is to safeguard the interests of citizens in their interactions with the Government. As the
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guarpians of these rights, this Court will be failing in its duty if this Court permits any citizen to be forcibly_ subjected to the tests in question. One could argue that some of the parties who will benefit from·this decision are hardened criminals who have no regard for societal B value$. However, it must be borne in mind that in constitutional adjudication this Court's concerns are not confined to th~ facts at hand but extend to the implications of the decision for the whole population as well as the future generations. Sometimes there are c · apprehensions about judges imposing their personar sensibilities through broadly worded terms such as 'substantive due process', but in this case the inquiry has been based on a faithful understanding of principles entrenched in our Constitution. (Para 220) [590-C-F]
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel, H.C. 5100 I 94 (1999), referred to.
Jason R. Odeshoo: 'Truth or Dare?: Terrorism and Truth Serum in the Post- 9111 World, 57 Stanford Law Review E 209-255 (October 2004) and Kenneth Lasson: 'Torture, Truth Serum, and Ticking Bombs: Toward a pragmatic perspective on coercive interrogation', 39 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 329-360 (Winter 2008), referred to. Case Law Reference:
(1923) 54 App DC 46
referred to
Para 21
509 us 579 (1993)
- referred to
Para 22
885 F.2d 1529 (11th Circ. 1989) referred to
Para 26
57 F.3d 428 (5th Circ. 1995)
referred to
Para 27
908 F. Supp 877 (O.N.M. 1995) referred to
Para 28
104 F.3d 225 (9th. Circ. 1997)
referred to
Para 29
523 US 303 (1998)
referred to
Para 30
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA ,
[1987] 36 c.c.c. (3d) 481
referred to
Para 37
314 Mo. 599 (1926)
referred to
Para 49
56 N.M. 237 (1952)
referred to
Para 50
42 Cal. 2d 219 (1954)
referred to
Para 51
237 F. 2d 893 (9th Circ. 1956)
referred to
Para 52
333 S.W.2d. 755 (1960)
referred to
Para 53
372 us 293 (1963)
referred to
Para 54
572 F.2d 523 (5th Circ. 1978)
referred to
Para 56
753 F. 2d 1522 (9th Circ. 1985) referred to
Para 57
56 A.2d 1320 (N.J. 1989)
referred to
Para 60
[1979] 44 c.c.c. (2d) 385
referred to
Para 61
[1914] A.C. 599 (P.C.) 609
referred to
Para 62
. 483 us 44 (1987)
referred to
Para 66
753 F. 2d 1522 (9th Circ. 1985) referred to
Para 66
659 N.W.2d 509 (2003)
referred to
Para 75
105 P. 3d 832 (2005)
referred to
Para 77
(1978) 1 sec 248
relied on
Para 82
(1978) 2 sec 424
. 161 us 591 (1896)
referred to
Para 90
referred to
Para 90
384 us 436 (1966)
referred to
Para 90
[1962] 3 SCR 10
relied on
Para 93
378 us 52 (1964)
referred to
Para 94
[1979] 1 All ER 939
referred to
Para 94
342 us 166 (1951)
referred to
Para 98
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[1954] SCR 1077
referred to
Para 100
384 us 436 (1966)
referred to
Para 103
[1961] 1 SCR 417
referred to
Para 111
[1969] 2 SCR 461
referred to
Para 112
(1980) 4 sec 600
referred to
Para 113
341 us 479 (1951)
referred to
Para 116
(1935) AC 462
referred to
Para 126
(1978) 4 sec 494
relied on
Para 128 ·
384 us 757 (1966)
referred to
Para 137
218 us 245 (1910)
referred to
Para 137
(1997) 23 EHRR 313
referred to
Para 139
AIR 1931 Cal 601
referred to
Para 141
AIR 1959 Born 284
referred to
Para 141 ·
(2003) 4 sec 493
referred to
Para 143
2004 Cri L J 4003 (Ori)
referred to
Para 144
AIR 1962 SC 159
referred to
Para 151
1971 Cri L J 1405 (Born)
referred tO
Para 153
1976 Cri L J 1680 (All)
referred to
Para 153
342 us 165 (1952)
referred to
Para 173
AIR 1964 Born 253
referred to
Para 174
352 us 432 (1957)
referred to
Para 174
1977 Cri L J 1797 (A.P.)
referred to
Para 175
1981 Cri L J 125 (Born)
referred to
Para 175
AIR 1963 SC 1295
referred to
Para 178
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
AIR 1978 SC 597
referred to
Para 179
(1975) 2 sec 148
referred to
Para 180
(1994) 6 sec 632
referred to
Para 181
AIR 1997 SC 568
referred to
Para 182
(1998) 8 sec 296
referred to
Para 183
(2003) 1 sec 500
referred to
Para 184
AIR 2001 AP 502
referred to
Para 184
(2003) 1 All ER 148 (CA)
referred to
Para 185
(2001) 1 All ER 577
referred to
Para 187
AIR 1997 SC 610
relied on
Para 195
[1987) 36 c.c.c. (3d) 481
referred to
Para 212
523 us 303 (1998)
referred to
Para 213
H.C. 5100 I 94 (1999)
referred to
Para 220
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1267 of 2004. From the Judgment & Order dated 10.9.2004 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Petition No. 1964 of 2004.
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WITH Crl. A.No. 987 of 2010 & 54, 55, 56-57, 58-59 of 2005 & 1199 of 2006, 1471 of 2007 & 990 of 2010. Goolam E. Vahanvati, SG, Dushyant Dave (A.C.), Anoop G. Chaudhari, June Chaudhari, T.R. Andhyarujina, Harish N. Salve, Rajesh Mahale, A.S. Bhasme, Santosh Paul, Aanchal Jain, M.J. Paul, Priyank Adhyaru, Manoj Goel, Shuvodeep Roy, v'Vajeesh Shafiq, Gopal Verma (for Shivaji M: Jadhav), S.S.
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Shinde, Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, Bina Madhavan, S.U.K. Sagar, Minakshi Grover (for Lawyer's Knit & Co.), A. Sumathi, Sanjay R. Hegde, Amit Kr. Chawla, S. J. Aristotle, Devvrat (for P. Parmeswaran), A. Subba Rao, T. Srinivasa Murthy, Devdatt Kamat, Sushma Suri, Manjula Gupta, D.M. Nargolkar, Saurav B Kirpal, Hemantika Wahi, Jesal, Pinky, Devendra Kr. Singh, D. Bharathi Reddy, Ajit S. Bhasme, Hage Lampu, Raghavendra Srivastava, Mukta Gupta, Vibhor Garg, Mukul Gupta, Sangeeta Singh, Tushar Mehta, Venayagam (for Lawyers' Knit & Co.), Altaf Fathima for the appearing parties.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI. Leave granted in SLP (Crl.) Nos. 10 of 2006 and 6711 of 2007. 1. The legal questions in this batch of criminal appeals D relate to the involuntary administration of certain scientific techniques, namely narcoanalysis, polygraph examination and the Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) test for the purpose of improving investigation efforts in criminal cases. This issue has received considerable attention since it involves E tensions between the desirability of efficient investigation and the preservation of individual liberties. Ordinarily the judicial task is that of evaluating the rival contentions in order to .arrive at a sound conclusion. However, the present case is not an ordinary dispute between private parties. It raises pertinent questions F about the meaning and scope of fundamental rights which are available to all citizens. Therefore, we must examine the implications of permitting the use of the impugned techniques in a variety of settings. 2 .. Objections have been raised in respect of instances where individuals who are the accused, suspects or witnesses in an investigation have been subjected to these tests without their consent. Such measures have been defended by citing· the importance of extracting information which could help the H investigating agencies to prevent criminal activities in the future
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
as well as in circumstances where it is difficult to gather evidence through ordinary means. In some of the impugned judgments, reliance has been placed on certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to refer back to the responsibilities placed on citizens to fully co-operate with investigation agencies. It has also been urged that administering these techniques does not cause any bodily harm and that the extracted information will be used only for strengthening investigation efforts and will not be admitted as evidence during the trial stage. The assertion is that improvements in fact-finding during the investigation stage will consequently help to increase the rate of prosecution as well as the rate of acquittal. Yet another line of reasoning is that these scientific techniques are a softer alternative to the regrettable and allegedly widespread use of 'third degree rpethods' by investigators. . 3. The involuntary administration of the impugned techniques prompts questions about the protective scope of the 'right against self-incrimination' which finds place in Article 20(3) of our Constitution. In one of the impugned judgments, it has been held that the information extracted through methods such as 'polygraph examination' and the 'Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) test' cannot be equated with 'testimonial compulsion' because the test subject is not required to give verbal answers, thereby falling outside the protective scope of Article 20(3). It was further ruled that the verbal revelations made during a narcoanalysis test do not attract the bar of Article 20(3) since the inculpatory or exculpatory nature of these revelations is not known at the time of conducting the test. To address these questions among others, it is necessary to inquire into the historical origins and rationale behind the 'right against self-incrimination'. The principal questions are whether this right extends to the investigation stage and whether the test results are of a 'testimonial' character, thereby attracting the protection of ~rticle 20(3). Furthermore, we must examine whether relying
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on the test results or materials discovered with the help of the same creates a reasonable likelihood of incrimination for the test subject. 4. We must also deal with arguments invoking the guarantee of 'substantive due process' which is part and parcel of the idea of 'personal liberty' protected by Article 21 of the Constitution. The first question in this regard is whether the provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 that provide for 'medical examination' during the course of investigation can be read expansively to include the impugned techniques, even though the latter are not explicitly enumerated. To answer this question, it will be ;necessary to discuss the principles governing the interpretation of statutes in light of scientific advancements. Questions have also been raised with respect to the professional ethics of medical personnel involved in the administration of these techniques. Furthermbre, Article 21 has been judicially expanded to include ..a 'right against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment', which requires us to determine whether the involuntary adminis.tration of the impugned techniques violates this right whose scope corresponds with evolving international human rights norms. \ii/a' must also consider contentions that have invoked the test subject's 'right to privacy', both in a physical and mental sense.
5. The scientific validity of the impugned techniques has been questioned and it is argued that their results are not entirely reliable. For instance, the narcoanalysis technique involves the intravenou~ administration of sodium pentothal, a drug which lowers inhibitions on part of the subject and induces the person to talk freely. However, empirical studies suggest G that the drug"induced revelations need not necessarily be true. Polygraph examination and the BEAP test are methods which serve the respective purposes of lie-detection and gauging the subject's familiarity with information related to the crime. These techniques are essentially confirmatory in nature, wherein inferences are drawn from the physiological responses of the
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
subject. However, the reliability of these methods has been repeatedly questioned in empirical studies. In the context of criminal cases, the reliability of scientific evidence bears a causal link with several dimensions of the right to a fair trial such as the requisite standard of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the right of the accused to present a defence. We must be mindful of the fact that these requirements have long been recognised as components of 'personal liberty' under Article 21 of the Constitution. Hence it will be instructive to gather some insights about the admissibility of scientific evidence. 6. In the course of the proceedings before this Court, oral submissions were made by Mr. Rajesh Mahale, Adv. (Crl. App. No. 1267 of 2004), Mr. Manoj Goel, Adv. (Crl. App. Nos. 5657 of 2005), Mr. Santosh Paul, Adv. (Crl. App. No. 54 of 2005) and Mr. Harish Salve, Sr. Adv. (Crl. App. Nos. 1199 of 2006 and No. 1471 of 2007) - all of whom argued against the involuntary administration of the impugned techniques. Arguments defending the compulsory administration of these techniques were presented by Mr. Goolam E. Vahanvati, Solicitor General of India [now Attorney General for India] and Mr. Anoop G. Choudhari, Sr. Adv. who appeared on behalf of the Union of India. These were further supported by Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina, Sr. Adv. who appeared on behalf of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and Mr. Sanjay Hegde, Adv. who represented the State of Karnataka. Mr. Dushyant Dave, Sr. Adv., rendered assistance as amicus curiae in this matter. 7. At this stage, it will be useful to frame the questions of law and outline the relevant sub-questions in the following manner:
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I. Whether the involuntary administration of the impugned techniques violates the 'right against self-incrimination' enumerated in Article 20(3) of the Constitution?
1-A. Whether the investigative use of the impugned
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techniques creates a likelihood of incrimination for the subject? 1-B. Whether the results derived from the impugned techniques amount to 'testimonial compulsion' thereby attracting the bar of Article 20(3)? IL Whether the involuntary administration of the impugned techniques is a reasonable restriction on 'personal liberty' as understood in the context of Article 21 of the Constitution?
8. Before answering these questions, it is necessary to examine the evolution and specific uses of the impugned techniques. Hence, a description of each of the test procedures is followed by an overview of their possible uses, both within D and outside the criminal justice system. It is also necessary to gauge the limitations of these.techniques. Owing to the dearth of Indian decisions on this subject, we must look to precedents from foreign jurisdictions which deal with the application of these techniques in the area of criminal justice. E DESCRIPTIONS OF TESTS - USES, LIMITATIONS AND PRECEDENTS Polygraph Examination
9. The origins of polygraph examination have been traced back to the efforts of Lombroso, a criminologist who experimented with a machine that measured blood pressure and pulse to assess the honesty of persons suspected of criminal conduct. His device was called a hydrosphygmograph. A similar device was used by psychologist William Marston G during World War I in espionage cases, which proved to be a precursor to its use in the criminal justice system. In 1921, John Larson incorporated the measurement of respiration rate and by 1939 Leonard Keeler added skin conductance and an amplifier to the parameters examined by a polygraph machine.
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10. The theory behind polygraph tests is that when a A subject is lying in response to a question, he/she will produce physiological responses that are different from those that arise in the normal course. During the polygraph examination, several instruments are attached to the subject for measuring and recording the physiological responses. The examiner then B reads these results, analyzes them and proceeds to gauge the credibility of the subject's answers. Instruments such as cardiographs, pneumographs, cardio-cuffs and sensitive electrodes are used in the course of polygraph examinations. They measure changes in aspects such as respiration, blood pressure, blood flow, pulse and galvanic skin resistance. The truthfulness or falsity on part of the subject is assessed by relying on the records of the physiological responses. [See: Laboratory Procedure Manual - Polygraph Examination (Directorate of Forensic Science, Ministry of Home Affairs, D Government of India, New Delhi - 2005)]
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11. There are three prominent polygraph examination techniques: i.
The relevant-irrelevant (R-1) technique
ii.
The control question (CQ) technique
iii.
Directed Lie-Control (DLC) technique
Each of these techniques includes a pre-test interview during F which the subject is acquainted with the test procedure and the examiner gathers the information which is needed to finalize the questions that are to be asked. An important objective of this exercise is to mitigate the possibility of a feeling of surprise on part of the subject which could be triggered by unexpected G questions. This is significant because an expression of surprise could be mistaken for physiological responses that are similar to those associated with deception. [Refer: David Gallai, 'Polygraph evidence in federal courts: Should it be admissible?' 36 American Criminal Law Review 87-116 (Winter 1999) at p. H
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91]. Needless to say, the polygraph examiner should be familiar with the details of the ongoing investigation. To meet this end the investigators are required to ~hare copies of documents such as the First Information Report (FIR), Medico-Legal Reports (MLR) and Post-Mortem Reports (PMR) depending on the nature of the facts being investigated.
12. The control-question (CQ) technique is the most commonly used one and its procedure as well as scoring system has been described in the materials submitted on C behalf of CBI. The test consist$. of control questions and relev~nt questions. The control questions are irrelevant to the facts being investigated but they are intended to provoke distinct physiological responses, as well as false denials. These responses are compared with the responses triggered by the relevant questions. Theoretically, a truthful subject will show D greater physiological responses to the control questions which he/she has reluctantly answered falsely, than to the relevant questions, which the subject can easily answer truthfully. Conversely, a deceptive subject will show greater physiological responses while giving false answers to relevant questions in E comparison to the responses triggered by false answers to control questions. In other words, a guilty subject is more likely to be concerned with lying about the relevant facts as opposed to lying about other facts in general. An innocent subject will have no trouble in truthfully answering the relevant questions but will F have trouble in giving false answers to control questions. The scoring of the tests is done by assigning a numerical value, positive or negative, to each response given by the subject. After accounting for all the numbers, the result is compared to a standard numerical value to indicate the overall level of G deception. The net conclusion may indicate truth, deception or uncertainty.
13. The use of polygraph examinations in the criminal justice system has been contentiou~. In this case, we are mainly considered with situations when investigators seek reliance on
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
these tests to detect deception or to verify the truth of previous testimonies. Furthermore, litigation related to polygraph tests has also involved situations where suspects and defendants in criminal cases have sought reliance on them to demonstrate their innocence. It is also conceivable that witnesses can be compelled to undergo polygraph tests in order to test the credibility of their testimonies or to question their mental capacity or to even attack their character. 14. Another controversial use of polygraph tests has been on victims of sexual offences for testing the veracity of their allegations. While several states in the U.S.A. have enacted provisions to prohibit such use, the text of the Laboratory Procedure Manual for Polygraph Examination [supra.] indicates that this is an acceptable use. In this regard, Para 3.4 (v) of the said Manual reads as follows: "(v) In cases of alleged sex offences such as intercourse with a female child, forcible rape, indecent liberties or perversion, it is important that the victim, as well as the accused, be made available for interview and polygraph examination. It is essential that the polygraph examiner get a first hand detailed statement from the victim, and the interview of the victim precede that of the suspect or witnesses .... " [The following article includes a table which lists out the statutorily permissible uses of polygraph examination in the different state jurisdictions of the United States of America: Henry T. Greely and Judy Illes, 'Neuroscience based liedetection: The urgent need for regulation', 33 American Journal of Law and Medicine, 377-421 (2007)]
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15. The propriety of compelling the victims of sexual offences to undergo a polygraph examination certainly merits consideration in the present case. It must also be noted that in some jurisdictions polygraph tests have been permitted for the
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A purpose of screening public employees, both at the stage of recruitment and at regular intervals during the service-period. In the U.S.A., the widespread acceptance of polygraph tests for checking the antecedents and monitoring the conduct of public employees has encouraged private employers to resort B to the same. In fact the Employee Polygraph Protection Act, 1998 was designed to restrict their USE) for employee screening. This development must be noted because the unqualified acceptance of 'Lie-detector tests' in India's criminal justice system could have the unintended consequence of c encouraging their use by private parties.
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16. Polygraph tests have several limitations and therefore a margin for errors. The premise behind these tests is questionable because the measured changes in physiological responses are not necessarily triggered by lying or deception. Instead, they could be triggered by nervousness, anxiety, fear, confusion or other emotions. Furthermore, the physical conditions in the polygraph examination room can also create distortions in the recorded responses. The test is best administered in comfortable surroundings where there are no potential distractions for the subject and complete privacy is maintained. The mental state of the subject is also vital since a person in a state of depression or hyperactivity is likely to offer highly disparate physiological responses which could mislead the examiner. In some cases the subject may have suffered from loss of memory in the intervening time-period between the relevant act and the conduct of the test. When the subject does not remember the facts in question, there will be no self-awareness of truth or deception and hence the recording of the physiological responses will not be helpful. Errors may also result from 'memory-hardening', i.e. a process by which the subject has created and consolidated false memories about a particular incident. This commonly occurs in respect of recollections of traumatic events ~nd the subject may not be aware of the fact that he/she is lying.
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17. The errors associated with polygraph tests are broadly grouped into two categories, i.e., 'false positives' and 'false negatives'. A 'false positive' occurs when the results indicate that a person has been deceitful even though he/she answered ·truthfully. Conversely a 'false negative' occurs when a set of deceptive responses is reported as truthful. On account of such inherent complexities, the qualifications· and competence of the polygraph examiner are of the utmost importance. The examiner needs to be thorough in preparing the questionnaire and must also have the expertise to account for extraneous conditions that could lead to erroneous inferences. 18. However, the biggest concern about polygraph tests is that an examiner may not be able to recognise deliberate attempts on part of the subject to manipulate the test results. Such 'countermeasures' are techniques which are deliberately used by the subject to create certain physiological responses in order to deceive the examiner. The intention is that by deliberately enhancing one's reaction to the control questions, the examiner will incorrectly score the test in favour of truthfulness rather than deception. The most commonly used 'countermeasures' are those of creating a false sense of mental anxiety and stress at the time of the interview, so that the responses triggered by lying cannot be readily distinguished. 19. Since polygraph tests have come to be widely relied upon for employee screening in the U.S.A., the U.S. Department of Energy had requested the National Research Council of the National Academies (NRC) to review their use for different purposes. The following conclusion was stated in its report. i.e. The Polygraph and Lie-Detection: Committee ro Review the scientific evidence on the Polygraph (Washington D.C,: National Academies Press, 2003) at pp.
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212~213:
"Polygraph Accuracy: Almost a century of research in scientific-psychology and physiology provides little basis
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for the expectation that a polygraph test could have extremely high accuracy. The physiological responses measured by the polygraph are not uniquely related to deception. That is, the responses measured by the polygraph do not all reflect a single underlying process: a variety of psychological and physiological processes, including some that can be consciously controlled, can affect polygraph measures and test results. Moreover, most polygraph testing procedures allow for uncontrolled variation in test administration {e.g., creation of the emotional climate, selecting questions) that can be expected to result in variations in accuracy and that limit the level of accuracy that can be consistently achieved. Theoretical Basis: The theoretical rationale for the. polygraph is quite weak, especially in terms of differe9tial fear, arousal, or other emotional states that are triggered in response to relevant or comparison questions. We have not found any serious effort at construct validation of polygraph testing. Research Progress: Research on the polygraph has not progressed over time in the manner of a typical scientific field. It has not accumulated knowledge or strengthened its scientific underpinnings in any significant manner. Polygraph research has proceeded in relative isolation from rel~ted fields of basic science and has benefited little from conceptual, theoretical, and technological advances in those fields that are relevant to the psychophysiological detection of deception. Future Potential: The inherent ambiguity of the physiological measures used in the polygraph suggests that further investments in improving polygraph technique and interpretation will bring only modest improvements in . I accuracy." / 20. A Working Party of the British Psychological Society
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
(BPS) also came to a similar conclusion in a study published in 2004. The key finding is reproduced below, [Cited from: A Review of the current scientific status and fields of application of polygraph deception detection - Final Report (6 October, 2004) from The British Psychological Society (BPS) Working Party at p. 1O]: "A polygraph is sometimes called a lie detector, but this term is misleading. A polygraph does not detect lies, but only arousal which is assumed to accompany telling a lie. Polygraph examiners have no other option than to measure deception in such an indirect way, as a pattern of physiological activ1ty directly related to lying does not exist (Saxe, 1991 ). Three of the four most popular lie detection procedures using the polygraph (Relevant/Irrelevant Test, Control Question Test and Directed Lie Test, ... ) are built upon the premise that, while answering so-called 'relevant' questions, liars will be more aroused than while answering so-called 'control' questions, due to a fear of detection (fear of getting caught lying). This premise is somewhat naive as truth tellers may also be more aroused when answering the relevant questions, particularly: (i) when these relevant questions are emotion evoking questions (e.g. when an innocent man, suspected of murdering his beloved wife, is asked questions about his wife in a polygraph test, the memory of his late wife might re-awaken his strong feelings about her); and (ii) when the innocent examinee experiences fear, which may occur, for example, when the person is afraid that his or her honest answers will not be believed by the polygraph examiner. The other popular test (Guilty Knowledge Test, ... ) is built upon the premise that guilty examinees will be more aroused concerning certain information due to different orienting reactions, that is, they will show enhanced orienting responses when recognising crucial details of a crime. This premise has strong support in psychophysiological research (Fiedler, Schmidt & Stahl, 2002)."
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21. Coming to judicial precedents, a decision reported as Frye v. United States, (1923) 54 App DC 46, dealt with a precursor to the polygraph which detected deception by measuring changes in systolic blood pressure. In that case the defendant was subjected to this test before the trial and his B counsel had requested the court that the scientist who had conducted the same should be allowed to give expert testimony about the results. Both the trial court and the appellate court rejected the request for admitting such testimony. The appellate court identified the considerations that would govern the c adrriissibility of expert testimony based on scientific insights. It was-held, Id. at p. 47:
·~· Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stag_es is difficult to define. Som~_here in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made."
22. The standard of 'general acceptance in the particular G field' governed the admissibility of scientific evidence for several decades. It was changed much later by the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 US 579 (1993). In that case the petitioners had instituted proceedings against a pharmaceutical company H .which had marketed 'Bendectin', a prescription drug. They had
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
alleged that the ingestion of this drug by expecting mothers had caused birth defects in the children born to them. To contesl these allegations, the pharmaceutical company had submitted an affidavit authored by an epidemiologist. The petitioners had also submitted expert opinion testimony in support of their contentions. The District Court had ruled in favour of the company by ruling))lat their scientific evidence met the standard of 'general i~ptance in the particular field' whereas· the expert opinion testimony produced on behalf of the petitioners did not meet the said standard. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the judgment and the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court which vacated the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court. It was unanimously held that the 'general acceptance' standard articulated in Frye (supra.) had since been displaced by the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, wherein Rule 702 governed the admissibility of expert opinion testimony that was based on scientific findings. This rule provided that: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 23. It was held that the trial court should have evaluated the scientific evidence as per Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence which mandates an inquiry into the relevance as well as the reliability of the scientific technique in question. The majority opinion (Blackmun, J.) noted that the trial judge's first step should be a preliminary assessment of whether the testimony's underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid and whether it can be properly applied to the facts in issue. Several other considerations will be applicable, such as:
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whether the theory or technique in question can be and has been tested
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whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication
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its known or potential error rate
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the existence and maintenance of ·standards controlling its operation
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whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within the scientific community
24. It was further observed that such an inquiry should be C a flexible one, and its focus must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate. It was reasoned that instead of the wholesale exclusion of sci~_11tific evidence on account of the high threshold of proving 'general acceptance in the particular field', the same could be admitted D and then challenged through conventional methods such as cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence and careful instructions to juries about the burden of proof. In this regard, the trial judge is expected to perform a 'gate-keeping' role to decide on the admission of expert testimony based on E scientific techniques. It should also be kept in mind that Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 1975 empowers a trial. judge to exclude any form of evidence if it is found that its probative value will be outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 25. Prior to the Daubert decision (supra.), most jurisdictions in the U.S.A. had disapproved of the use of polygraph tests in criminal cases. Some State jurisdictions had absolutely prohibited the admission of polygraph test results, while a few had allowed consideration of the same if certain conditions were met. These conditions included a prior G stipulation between the parties to undergo these tests with procedural safeguards such as the involvement of experienced examiners, presence of counsel and proper recording to enable subsequent scrutiny. A dissonance had also emerged in the treatment of polygraph test results in the different Circuit
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jurisdictions, with some jurisdictions giving trial judges the discretion to enquire into the reliability of polygraph test results on a case-by-case basis. 26. For example, in United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529 (11th Circ. 1989), it was noted that in some instances polygraphy satisfied the standard of 'general acceptance in the particular field' as required by Frye (supra.). It was held that polygraph testimony could be admissible under two situations, namely when the parties themselves agree on a stipulation to this effect or for the purpose of impeaching and corroborating the testimony of witnesses. It was clarified that polygraph examination results could not be directly used to bolster the testimony of a witness. However, they could be used to attack the credibility of a witness or even to rehabilitate one after his/ her credibility has been attacked by the other side. Despite these observations, the trial court did not admit the polygraph results on remand in this particular case. 27. However, after Daubert (supra.) prescribed a more liberal criterion for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence, some Courts ruled that weightage could be given to polygraph results. For instance in United States v. Posido, 57 F.3d 428 (5th Gire. 1995),. the facts related to a pre-trial evidentiary hearing where the defendants had asked for the exclusion of forty-four kilograms of cocaine that had been recovered from their luggage at an airport. The District Court had refused to consider polygraph evidence given by the defendants in support of their version of events leading up to the seizure of the drugs and their arrest. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court held that the rationale for disregarding polygraph evidence did not survive the Daubert decision. The Court proceeded to remand the case to the trial court and directed that the admissibility of the polygraph results should be assessed as per the factors enumerated in Daubert (supra.). It was held, Id. at p. 4_34: "There can be no doubt that tremendous advances have
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been made in polygraph instrumentation and technique in the years since Frye. The test at issue in Frye measured only changes in the subject's systolic blood pressure in response to test questions. [Frye v. United States ... ] Modern instrumentation detects changes in the subject's blood pressure, pulse, thoracic and abdominal respiration, and galvanic skin response. Current research indicates that, when given under controlled conditions, the polygraph technique accurately predicts truth or deception between seventy and ninety percent of the time. Remaining controversy about test accuracy is almost unanimously attributed to variations in the integrity of the testing environment and the qualifications of the examiner: Such variation also exists in many of the disciplines and for much of the scientific evidence we routinely find admissible under Rule 702. [See McCormick on Evidence 206 at 915 & n. 57] Further, there is good indication that polygraph technique and the requirements for professional polygraphists are becoming progressively more standardized. In addition, polygraph technique has been and continues to be subjected to extensive study and publication. Finally, polygraph is now so widely used by employers and government agencies alike. To iterate, we do not now hold that polygraph examinations are scientifically valid or that they will always assist the trier of fact, in this or any other individual case. We merely remove the obstacle of the per se rule against admissibility, which was based on antiquated concepts about the technical ability of the polygraph and legal precepts that have been expressly overruled by the Supreme Court." (internal citations omitted)
28. Despite these favourable observations, the polygraph results were excluded by the District Court on remand. H However, we have come across at least one case decided after
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Daubert (supra.) where a trial court had admitted expert opinion testimony about polygraph results. In United States v. Galbreth,
908 F. Supp 877 (D.N.M. 1995), the District Court took note of New Mexico Rule of Evidence 11-707 which established standards for the admissi.on of polygraph evidence. The said provision laid down that polygraph evidence would be admissible only when the following conditions are met: the examiner must have had at least 5 years experience in conducting polygraph tests and 20 hours of continuing education within the past year; the polygraph examination must be tape recorded in its entirety; the polygraph charts must be scored quantitatively in a manner generally accepted as reliable by polygraph experts; all polygraph materials must be provided to the opposing party at least 10 days before trial; and all polygraph examinations conducted on the subject must be disclosed. It was found that all of these requirements had been complied with in the facts at hand. The District Court concluded with these words, Id. at p. 896: " ... the Court finds that the expert opinion testimony regarding the polygraph results of defendant Galbreth is admissible. However, because the evidentiary reliability of opinion testimony regarding the results of a particular . polygraph test is dependent upon a properly conducted examination by a highly qualified, experienced and skilful examiner, nothing in this opinion is intended to reflect the judgment that polygraph results are per se admissible. Rather, in the context of the polygraph technique, trial courts must engage upon a case specific inquiry to determine the admissibility of such testimony." 29. We were also alerted to the decision in United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225 (9th. Circ. 1997). In that case, the Ninth Circuit Court concluded that the position favouring absolute exclusion of unstipulated polygraph evidence had effectively been overruled in Daubert (supra.). The defendant had been convicted for the possession and distribution of
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cocaine since the drugs had been recovered from a van which he had been driving. However, when 'he took an unstipulated polygraph test, the results suggested that he was not aware of the presence of drugs in the van. At the trial stage, the prosecution had moved to suppress the test results and the B District Court had accordingly excluded the polygraph evidence. However, the Ninth Circuit Court remanded the case back after finding that the trial judge should have adopted the parameters enumerated in Daubert (supra.) to decide on the admissibility of the polygraph test results. It was observed, Id. at p. 228:
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"With this holding, we are not expressing new enthusiasm for admission of unstipulated polygraph eviden'ce. The inherent problematic nature of such evidence remains. As we noted in Brown, polygraph evidence has grave potential for interfering with the deliberative process. [Brqwn v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389 (9th Circ. 1986) at 1396-1397] However, these matters are for determination by the trial judge who must not only evaluate the evidence under Rule 702, but consider admission under Rule 403. Thus, we adopt the view of Judge Jameson's dissent in Brown that these are matters which must be left to the sound discretion of the trial court, consistent with Daubert standards."
30. The decisions cited above had led to some uncertainty about the admissibility of polygraph test results. However, this F uncertainty was laid to rest by an authoritative ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Scheffer, 523 US 303 (1998). In that case, an eight judge majority decided that Military Rule of Evidence 707 (which made polygraph results inadmissible in court-martial proceedings) did not violate an accused person's Sixth Amendment right to present a defence. G The relevant part of the provision follows:
"(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be
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admitted into evidence." 31. The facts were that Scheffer, a U.S. Air Force serviceman had faced court-martial proceedings because a routine urinalysis showed that he had consumed methamphetamines. However, a polygraph test suggested that he had been truthful in denying the intentional consumption of the drugs. His defence of 'innocent ingestion' was not accepted during the court-martial proceedings and the polygraph results were not admitted in evidence. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the decision given in the court-martial proceedings but the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces reversed the same by holding that an absolute exclusion of polygraph evidence (offered to rebut an attack on the credibility of the accused) would violate Scheffer's Sixth Amendment right to present a defence. Hence, the matter reached the Supr~me Court ":Jhich decided that the exclusion of polygraph evidence did not violate the said constitutional right. 32. Eight judges agreed that testimony about polygraph test results should not be admissible on account of the inherent unreliability of the results obtained. Four judges agreed that reliance on polygraph results would displace the fact-finding role of the jury and lead to collateral litigation. In the words of Clarence Thomas, J., Id. at p. 309: "Rule 707 serves several legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. These interests include ensuring that only reliable evidence is introduced at trial, preserving the jury's role in determining credibility, and avoiding litigation that is collateral to the primary purpose of the trial. The rule is neither arbitrary nor disproportionate in promoting these ends. Nor does it implicate a sufficiently weighty interest of the defendant to raise a constitutional concern under our precedents." 33. On the issue of reliability, the Court took note of some Circuit Court decisions which had permitted trial courts to
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consider polygraph results in accordance with the Daubert factors. However, the following stance was adopted, Id. at p. 312: "... Although the degree of reliability of polygraph evidence may depend upon a variety of identifiable factors, there is simply no way to know in a particular case whether a polygraph examiner's conclusion is accurate, because certain doubts and uncertainties plague even the best polygraph exams. Individual jurisdictions therefore may reasonably reach differing conclusions as to whether polygraph evidence should be admitted. We cannot say, then, that presented with such widespread uncertainty, the President acted arbitrarily or disproportionately in promulgating a per se rule excluding all polygraph evidence." 34. Since a trial by jury is an essential feature of the criminal justice system in the U.S.A., concerns were expressed about preserving the jury's core function of determining the credibility of testimony. It was observed, Id. at p. 314:
" ... Unlike other expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the jurors' knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth. Jurisdictions, :in promulgating rules of evidence, may legitimately be concerned about the risk that juries will give excessive weight to the opinions of a polygrapher, clothed as they are in scientific expertise and at times offering, as in respondent's case, a conclusion about the ultimate issue in the trial. Such jurisdictions may legitimately determine that the aura of infallibility attending polygraph evidence can lead jurors to abandon their duty to assess credibility and guilt. ... "
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
35. On the issue of encouraging litigation that is collateral to the primary purpose of a trial, it was held, Id. at p. 314: " ... Allowing proffers of polygraph evidence would inevitably entail assessments of such issues as whether the test and control questions were appropriate, whether a particular polygraph examiner was qualified and had properly interpreted the physiological responses, and whether other factors such as countermeasures employed by the examinee had distorted the exam results. Such assessments would be required in each and every case. It thus offends no constitutional principle for the President to conclude that a per se rule excluding all polygraph evidence is appropriate. Because litigation over the admissibility of polygraph evidence, is by its very nature pollateral, a per se rule prohibiting its admission is not an arbitrary or disproportionate means of avoiding it." 36. In the same case, Kennedy, J. filed an opinion which was joined by four judges. While there was agreement on the questionable reliability of polygraph results, a different stand was taken on the issues pertaining to the role of the jury and the concerns about collateral litigation. It was observed that the inherent reliability of the test results is a sufficient ground to exclude the polygraph test results and expert testimony related to them. Stevens, J. filed a dissenting opinion in this case. 37. We have also come across a decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in R v Beland, [1987] 36 C.C.C. (3d) 481. In that case the respondents had been charged with conspiracy to commit robbery. During their trial, one of their accomplices had given testimony which directly implicated them. The respondents contested this testimony and after the completion of the evidentiary phase of the trial, they moved an application to re~open their defen~e while seeking permission for each of them to undergo a polygraph examination and produce the results in evidence. The trial judge denied this motion and the respondents were convicted. However, the appellate court
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allowed their appeal from conviction and granted an order to re-open the trial and directed that the polygraph results be considered. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the results of a polygraph examination are not admissible as evidence. The majority opinion explained that.the B admission of polygraph test results would offend some well established rules of evidence. It examined the 'rule against oath-helping' which prohibits a party from presenting evidence solely for the purpose of bolstering the credibility of a witness. Consideration was also given to the 'rule against admission of c past or out-of-court statements by a witness' as well as the restrictions on producing 'character evidence'. The discussion also concluded that polygraph evidence is inadmissible as 'expert evidence'. 38. With regard to the 'rule against admission of past or D out-of-court statements by a witness', Mcintyre, J. observed (in Para. 11):
"... In my view, the rule against admission of consistent outof-court statements is soundly based and particularly apposite to questions raised in connection with the use of the polygraph. Polygraph evidence when tendered would be entirely self-serving and would shed no light on the real issues before the court. Assuming, as in the case at bar, that the evidence sought to be adduced would not fall within any of the well recognized exceptions to the operation of the rule - where it is permitted to rebut the allegation of a recent fabrication or to show physical, mental or emotional condition - it should be rejected. To do otherwise is to open the trial process to the time-consuming and confusing consideration of collateral issues and to deflect the focus . of the proceedings from their fundamental issue of guilt or innocence. This view is summarized by O.W. Elliott in 'LieDetector Evidence: Lessons from the American Experience' in Well and Truly Tried (Law Book Co., 1982), at pp. 129-30:
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
A defendant who attempts to put in the results of a test showing this truthfulness on the matters in issue is bound to fall foul of the rule against self-serving statements or, as it is sometimes called, the rule that a party cannot manufacture evidence for himself, and the falling foul will not be in any mere technical sense. The rule is sometimes applied in a mechanical unintelligent way to exclude evidence about which no realistic objection could be raised, as the leading case, Gillie v. Posho shows; but striking down defence polygraph evidence on this ground would be no mere technical reflex action of legal obscurantists. The policy behind the doctrine is a fundamental one, and defence polygraph evidence usually offends it fundamentally. As some judges have pointed out, only those defendants who successfully take examinations are likely to want the results admitted. There is no compulsion to put in the first test results obtained. A defendant can take the test many times, if necessary "examinershopping", until he gets a result which suits him. Even stipulated tests are not free of this taint, because of course his lawyers will advise him to have several secret trial runs before the prosecution is approached. If nothing else, the dry runs will ha~ituate him to the process and to the expected relevant questions."
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39. On the possibility of using polygraph test results as character evidence, it was observed (Para. 14): " ... What is the consequence of this rule in relation to polygraph evidence? Where such evidence is sought to be introduced it is the operator who would be called as the witness and it is clear, of course, that the purpose of his evidence would be to bolster the credibility of the accused and, in effect, to show him to be of good character by
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inviting the inference that he did not lie during the test. In other words, it is evidence not of general reputation but of a specific incident and its admission would be precluded under the rule. It would follow, then, that the introduction .of evidence of the polygraph tests would violate the charactJr evidence rule." 40. Mcintyre, J. offered the following conclusions {at Paras. 18, 19 and 20):
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"18. In conclusion, it is my opinion, based upon a consideration of rules of evidence long established and applied in our courts, that the polygraph has no place in the judicial process where it is employed as a tool to determine or to test the credibility of witnesses. It is frequently argued that the polygraph represents an application of modern scientific knowledge and experience to the task of determining the veracity of human utterances. It is said that the courts should welcome this device and not cling to the imperfect methods of the past in such an important task. This argument has a superficial appeal, but, in my view, it cannot prevail in the face of realities of court procedures. 19. I would say at once that this view is not based on a fear of the inaccuracies of the polygraph. On that question we were not supplied with sufficient evidence to reach a conclusion. However, it may be said that even the finding of a significant percentage of errors in its results would not, by itself, be sufficient ground to exclude it as an instrument for use in the courts. Error is inherent in human affairs, scientific or unscientific. It exists within our established court procedures and must always be guarded against. The compelling reasor., in my view, for the exclusion of the evidence of polygraph results in judicial proceedings is two-fold. First, the admission of polygraph evidence would run counter to the well established rules of evidence which have been referred to. Second, while there is no reason
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
why the rules of evidence should not be modified where improvement will result, it is my view that the admission of polygraph evidence will serve no purpose which is not already served. It will disrupt proceedings, cause delays, and lead to numerous complications which will result in no greater degree of certainty in the process than that which already exists.
20. Since litigation replaced trial by combat, the determination of fact, including .the veracity of parties and their witnesses, has been the duty of judges or juries upon C an evaluation of the statements of witnesses. This approach has led to the development of a body of rules relating to the giving and reception of evidence and we have developed methods which have served well and have gained a wide measure of approval. They have facilitated the orderly conduct of judicial proceedings and are D designed to keep the focus of the proceedings on the principal issue, in a criminal case, the guilt or innocence of the accused. What would be served by the introduction of evidence of polygraph readings into the judicial process? To begin with, it must be remembered that E however scientific it may be, its use in court depends on the human intervention of the operator. Whatever results are recorded by the polygraph instrument, their nature and significance reach the trier of fact through the mouth of the operator. Human fallibility is therefore present as before, i= but now it may be said to be fortified with the mystique of science .... " Narcoanalvsis technique 41. This test involves the intravenous administration of a drug that causes the subject to enter into a hypnotic trance and become less inhibited. The drug-induced hypnotic stage is useful for investigators since it makes the subject more likely to divulge information. The drug used for this test is sodium pentothal, higher quantities of which are routinely used for
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A inducing general anaesthesia in surgical procedures. This drug is also used in the field of psychiatry since the revelations can enable the diagnosis of mental disorders. However, we have to decide on the permissibility of resorting to this technique during a criminal investigation, despite, its'. established uses in B the medical field. The use of 'truth-serums' and hypnosis is not a recent development. Earlier versions of the narcoanalysis technique utilised substances such as scopolamine and sodium amytal. The following extracts from an article trace the evolution of this technique, [Cited from: C.W. Muehlberger, 'Interrogation c under Drug-influence: The so-called Truth serum technique', 42(4) The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 513-528 (Nov-Dec. 1951) at pp. 513-514]: ·
"With the advent of anaesthesia about a century ago, it was observed that during the induction period and particularly during the recovery interval, patients were prone to make extremely na"ive remarks about p_ersonal matters, which, in their normal state, would never have revealed. Probably the earliest direct attempt to utilize this phenomenon in criminal interrogation stemmed from observations of a mild type of anaesthesia commonly used in obstetrical practice during the period of about 1903-1915 and known as 'Twilight sleep'. This anaesthesia was obtained by hypodermic injection of $Olutions of morphine and scopolamine (also called 'hyoscine') followed by intermittent chloroform inhalations if needed. The pain relieving qualities of morphine are well known. Scopolamine appears to have the added property of blocking out memories of recent events. By the combination of these drugs in suitable dosage, morphine dulled labor pains without materially interfering with the muscular contractions of labor, while scopolamine wiped out subsequent memories of the delivery room ordeal. The technique was widely used in Europe but soon fell into
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
disrepute among obstetricians of this country, largely due to overdosage. During the period of extensive use of 'twilight sleep' it was a common experience that women who were under drug influence, were extremely candid and uninhibited in their statements. They often made remarks which obviously would never have been uttered when in their normal state. Dr. Robert E. House, an observant physician practising in Ferris, Texas, believed that a drug combination which was so effective in the removal of ordinary restraints and which produced such utter candor, might be of value in obtaining factual information from persons who were thought to be lying. Dr. House's first paper presented in 1922 suggested drug administration quite similar to the standard 'twilight sleep' procedure: an initial dose of % grain of morphine sulphate together with 1/100 grain of scopolamine hydrobromide, followed at 20-30 minute intervals with smaller (1/200 - 1/400 grain) doses of scopolamine and periods of light chloroform anaesthesia. Subjects were questioned as they recovered from the light chloroform anaesthesia and gave answers which subsequently proved to be true. Altogether, Dr. House reported about half-adozen cases, several of which were instrumental in securing the release of convicts from State prisons, he also observed that, after returning to their normal state, these subjects had little or no recollection of what had transpired during the period of interrogation. They could not remember what questions had been asked, nor by whom; neither could they recall any answers which they had made." 42. The use of the 'Scopolamine' technique led to the coining of the expression 'truth serum'. With the passage of time, injections of sodium amytal came to be used for inducing subjects to talk freely, primarily in the field of psychiatry'. The author cited above has further observed, Id. at p. 522:
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"During World War II, this general technique of delving into a subject's inner consciousness through the instrumentality of narcotic drugs was widely used in the treatment of war neuroses (sometimes called 'Battle shock' or 'shell sh'ock'). Fighting men who had been through terrifically disturbing experiences often times developed symptoms of amnesia, mental withdrawal, negativity, paralyses, or many other mental, nervous, and physical derangements. In most instances, these patients refused to talk about the experienc~s which gave rise to the difficulty, and psychiatrists were at a loss to discover the crux'of the problem. To intelligently counteract such a force, it was first necessary to identify it. Thus, the use of sedative drugs, first to analyze the source of disturbance (narcoanalysis) and later to obtain the proper frame of mind in which the patient could and would 'talk out' his difficulties, and, as they say 'get them off his chest' - and thus relieve himself (narco-synthesis or narco-therapy) - was employed with signal success. In the narcoanalysis of war neuroses a very light narcosis is most desirable. With small 'doses of injectable barbiturates (sodium amytal or sodium pentothal) or with light inhalations of nitrous oxide or somnoform, the subject pours out his pent-up emotions without much prodding by the interrogator."
43. It has been shown that the Central Investigation Agency (C.l.A.) in the U.S.A. had conducted research on the use of sodium pentothal for aiding interrogations in intelligence and counter-terrorism operations, as early as the 1ssq·s [See G 'Project MKULTRA - The CIA's program of research in behavioral modification', On file with Schaffer Library of Drug Policy, Text available from <www.druglibrary.org>]. In recent years, the debate over the use of 'truth-serums' has been revived· with demands for their use on persons suspected of H involvement in terrorist activities. Coming to the test procedure,
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
when the drug (sodium pentothal) is administered intravenously, .the subject ordinarily descends into anaesthesia in four stages, namely: (i)
Awake stage
(ii)
Hypnotic stage
(iii)
Sedative stage
(iv)
Anaesthetic stage
44. A relatively lighter dose of sodium pentothal is injected to induce the 'hypnotic stage' and the questioning is conducted during the same. The hypnotic stage is maintained for the required period by controlling the rate of administration of the drug. As per the materials submitted before us, the behaviour exhibited by the subject during this stage has certain specific characteristics, namely:*
It facilitates handling of negative emotional responses (i.e. guilt, avoidance, aggression, frustration, non-responsiveness etc.) in a positive manner.
*
It helps in rapid exploration and identification of underlying conflicts in the subject's mind and unresolved feelings about past events.
*
It induces the subject to divulge information which would usually not be revealed in conscious awareness and it is difficult for the person to lie at this stage
*
The reversal from this stage occurs immediately when the administration of the drug is discontinued.
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[Refer: Laboratory Procedure Manual - Forensic NarcoAna/ysis (Directorate of Forensic Science, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi - 2005); Also see John
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M. Macdonald, 'Truth Serum', 46(2) The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 259-263 (Jul.-Aug. 1955)] ,
45. The personnel involved in conducting a 'narcoanalysis' interview include a forensic psychologist, an anaesthesiologist, a psychiatrist, a general physician or other medical staff and a language interpreter if needed. Additionally a videographer is required to create video-recordings of the test for subsequent scrutiny. In India, this technique has been--·administered either inside forensic science laboratories or in the operation theatres of recognised hospitals. While a psychiatrist and general physician perform the preliminary function of gauging whether the subject is mentally and physically fit to undergo the test, the anaesthesiologist supervises the intravenous administration ofthe drug. It is the forensic psychologist who actually conducts D the questioning. Since the tests are meant to aid investigation efforts, the forensic psychologist needs to closely co-operate with the investigators in order to frame appropriate questions.
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46. This technique can serve several ends. The revelations E could help investigators to uncover vital evidence or to corroborate pre-existing testimonies and prosecution theories. Narcoanalysis tests have also been used to detect 'malingering' (faking of amnesia). The premise is that during the 'hypnotic stage' the subject is unable to wilfully suppress the memories F associated with the relevant facts. Thus, it has been urged that drug-induced revelations can help to narrow down investigation efforts, thereby saving public resources. There is of course a very real possibility that information extracted through such interviews can lead to the uncovering of independent evidence G which may be relevant. Hence, we must consider the implications of such derivative use of the drug-induced revelations, even if such revelations are not admissible as evidence. We must also account for the uses of this technique by persons other than investigators and prosecutors. Narcoanalysis tests could be requested by defendants who
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
want to prove their innocence. Demands for this test could also be made for purposes such as gauging the credibility of testimony, to refresh the memory of witnesses or to ascertain the mental capacity of persons to stand trial. Such uses can have a direct impact on the efficiency of investigations as well as the fairness of criminal trials. [See generally: George H. Dession, Lawrence Z. Freedman, Richard C. Donnelly and Frederick G. Redlich, 'Drug-Induced revelation and criminal investigation', 62 Yale Law Journal 315-347 (February 1953)] 47. It is also important to be aware of the limitations of the 'narcoanalysis' technique. It does not have an absolute success rate and there is always the possibility that the subject will not reveal any relevant information. Some studies have shown that most of the drug-induced revelations are not related to the relevant facts and they are more likely to be in the nature of inconsequential information about the subjects' personal lives. . It takes great skill on part of the interrogators to extract and identify information which could eventually prove to be useful. While some persons are able to retain their ability to deceive even in the hypnotic state, others can become extremely suggestibl~ to questioning. This is especi<IJIY worrying, since investigators who are under pressure to deliver result$, could frame questions in a manner that prompts incriminatory responses. Subjects' could also concoct fanciful stories in the course of the 'hypnotic stage'. Since the responses of different individuals are bound to vary, there is no uniform criteria for evaluating the efficacy of the 'narcoanalysis' technique.
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48. In an article published in 1951, C. W Muehlberger (supra.) had described a French case which attracted controversy in 1948. Raymond Cens, who had been accused G of being a Nazi collaborator, appeared to have suffered an apoplectic stroke which also caused memory loss. The French Court trying the case had authorised a board of psychiatrists to conduct an examination for ascertaining the defendant's amnesia. The narcoanalysis technique was used in the course H
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of the examination and the defendant did not object to the same. However, the test results showed that the subject's memory was not impaired and that he had been faking amnesia. At the trial, testimony about these findings was admitted, thereby leading to a conviction. Subsequently, B Raymond Cens filed a civil suit against the psychiatrists alleging assault and illegal search. However, it was decided that the board had used routine psychiatric procedures and since the actual physical damage to the defendant was nominal, the psychiatrists were acquitted. At the time, this case created quite a stir and the Council of the Paris Bar Association had passed a resolution against the use of drugs during interrogation. [Refer C. W Muehlberger (1951) at p. 527; The Raymond Gens case has a/so been discussed in the following article:' J.P. Gagnieur, 'The Judicial use of Psychonarcosis in France', 40(3) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 370-380 (Sept.-Oct. 1949))
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49. An article published in 1961 [Andre A. Moenssens, 'Narcoanalysis in Law Enforcement', 52(4) The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 453-458 (Nov.E Dec. 1961)) had surveyed some judicial precedents from the U.S.A. which dealt with the forensic uses of the narcoanalysis technique. The first reference is to a decision from the State of Missouri reported as State v. Hudson, 314 Mo. 599 (1926). In that -ca~e. the defence lawyer in a prosecution for rape F attempted to~rely on the expert testimony of a doctor. The doctor in turn declared that he had questioned the defendant after injecting a truth-serum and the defendant had denied his guilt · while in a drug-induced state. The trial court had refused to admit the doctor's testimony by finding it to be completely G unreliable from a scientific viewpoint. The appellate court upheld the finding and made the following observation, Id. at p. 602:
"Testimony of this character- barring the sufficient fact that it cannot be classified otherwise than a self-serving declaration - is, in the present state of human knowledge,
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
unworthy of serious consideration. We are not told from what well this serum is drawn or in what alembic its alleged truth compelling powers are distilled. Its origin is as nebulous as its effect is uncertain ...."
50. In State v. Lindemuth, 56 N.M. 237 (1952) the testimony of a psychiatrist was not admitted when he wanted to show that the answers given by a defendant while under the influence of sodium pentothal supported the defendant's plea of innocence in a murder case. The trial court's refusal to admit such testimony was endorsed by the appellate court, and it was noted, Id. at p. 243:
"Until the use of the drug as a means of procuring the truth from people under its influence is accorded general scientific recognition, we are unwilling to enlarge the already immense field where medical experts, apparently equally qualified, express such diametrically opposed views on the same facts and conditions, to the despair of the court reporter and the bewilderment of the fact-finder.• 51. However, Andre Moenssens (1961) also took note of a case which appeared to endorse an opposing view. In People v. Jones, 42 Cal. 2d 219 (1954). the trial court overruled the prosecution's objection to the introduction of a psychiatrist's testimony on behalf of the defendant. The psychiatrist had conducted several tests on the defendant which included a sodium pentothal induced interview. The Court found that this was not sufficient to exclude the psychiatrist's testimony in its entirety. It was observed that even though the truth of statements revealed under narcoanalysis remains uncertain, the results of the same could be clearly distinguished from the psychiatrist's overall conclusions which were based on the results of all the tests considered together. 52. At the federal level, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dealt with a similar issue in Lindsey v. United States, 237 F. 2d 893 (9th Circ. 1956). In that case, the trial
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court had admitted a psychiatrist's opinion testimony which was based on a clinical examination that included psychological tests and a sodium pentothal induced.interview. The subject of the interview was a fifteen-year old girl who had been sexually assaulted,~nd had subsequently testified in a prosecution for B rape. On crq_~s-examination, the credibility of the victim's testimony had been doubted and in an attempt to rebut the same, the prosecution had called on the psychiatrist. On the basis of the results of the clinical examination, the psychiatrist offered his professional opinion that the victim had been telling c the truth· when she had repeated the charges that were previously made to the police. This testimony was admitted as a prior consistent statement to rehabilitate the witness but not considered as substantive evidence. Furthermore, a tape recording of the psychiatrist's interview with the girl, 11Yhile she D was under narcosis,' was also considered as evidence. The jury went on to record a finding of guilt. When the case was brought in appeal before the Ninth Circuit Court, the conviction was reversed on the ground that the defendant had been denied the 'due process of law'. It was held that before a prior consistent . statement made under the influence of a sodium pentothal E injection could be admitted as evidence, it should-be scientifically established that the test is absolutely accurate and reliable in all cases. Although the value of the test in psychiatric examinations was recognised, it was pointed out that the reliability of sodium pentothal tests had not been suffi~iently F · established to warrant admission of its results in evide~ce. It was stated yiat "Scientific tests reveal that people thus prompted to speak freely do not always tell the truth". [Cited from Andre A. Moenssens (1961) at pp. 455-456) 53. In Lawrence M. Dugan v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 333 S.W.2d. 755 (1960), the defendant had been given a truth serum test by a psychiatrist ernployed by him. The trial court refused to admit the psychiatrist's testimony which supported the truthfulness of the defendant's statement. The defendant had H pleaded innocence by saying that a shooting which had
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
resulted in the death of another person had been an accident. The trial court's decision was affirmed on appeal and is was reasoned that no court of last resort has recognised the admissibility of the results of truth serum tests, the principal ground being that such tests have not attained sufficient recognition of dependability and reliability. 54. The U.S. Supreme Court has also disapproved of the forensic uses of truth-inducing drugs in Townsend v. Sain, 372 US 293 (1963). In that case a heroin addict was arrested on the suspicion of having committed robbery and murder. While in custody he began to show severe withdrawal symptoms, following which the police officials obtained the services of a physician. In order to treat these withdrawal symptoms, the physician injected a combined dosage of 1/8 grain of Phenobarbital and 1/230 grain of Hyoscine. Hyoscine is the same as 'Scopolamine' which has been described earlier. This dosage appeared to have a calming effect on Townsend and after the physician's departure he promptly responded to questioning by the police and eventually made some confessional statements. The petitioner's statements were duly recorded by a court reporter. The next day he was taken to the office of the prosecutor where he signed the transcriptions of the statements made by him on the previous day. [The facts of this case have also been discussed in: Charles E. Sheedy, 'Narcointerrogation of a Criminal Suspect',. 50(2) The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 118-123 (July-Aug 1959) at pp. 118-119] 55. When the case came up for trial, the counsel for the petitioner brought a motion to exclude the transcripts of the statements from the evidence. However, the trial judge denied this motion and admitted the court reporter's transcription of the confessional statements into evidence. Subsequently, a jury found Townsend to be guilty, thereby leading to his conviction. When the petitioner made a habeas corpus application before a Federal District Court, one of the main arguments advanced
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A was that the fact of Scopolamine's character as a truth•serum had not been brought out at the time of the motion to suppress the statements or even at the trial before the State Court. The Federal District Court denied the habeas corpus petition! without a plenary evidentiary hearing, and this decision was · s affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the matter came before the U.S. Supreme Court. In an .opinion authored by Earl Warren, C.J. the Supreme Court held that the Federal District Court had erred in denying a writ of habeas corpus· without giving a plenary evidentiary hearing to examine the c voluntariness of the confessional statements. Both the majority opinion as well as the dissenting opinion (Stewart, J.) concurred on the finding that a confession induced by the administration of drugs is constitutionally inadmissible in a criminal trial. On this issue, Warren, C.J. observed, 372 US 293 (1963), at pp. D 307-308:
"Numerous decisions of this Court have established the standards governinQ\the admissibility of confessions into evidence. If an individual's 'will was overborne' or if his confession was not 'the product of a rational intellect and a free will', his confession is inadmissible because coerced. These standards are applicable whether a confession is the product of physical intimic;lation or · psychological pressure and, of course, are equally applicable to a drug-induced statement. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which confession would be less the product of a free intellect, less voluntary, than when brought about by a drug having the effect of~ 'trut~ serum'. It is not significant tha't the dryg may. have been administered and the questionsi asked· by persons unfamiliar with hyoscine's,properties as a 'truth serum', if these properties exist. Any questioning by police officers which in fact produces a confession which is not the product of a free intellect renders that confession inadmissible."
a
(internal citations omitted)
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
56. In United States v. Swanson, 572 F.2d 523 (5th Gire. 1978), two individuals had been convicted for conspiracy and extortion through the acts of sending threatening letters. At the trial stage, one of the defendants testified that he suffered from amnesia and therefore he could not recall his alleged acts of telephoning the co-defendant and mailing threatening letters. In order to prove such amnesia his counsel sought the admission of a taped interview between the defendant and a psychiatrist which had been conducted while the defendant was under the influence of sodium amytal. The drug-induced statements supposedly showed that the scheme was a joke or a prank. The trial court refused to admit the contents of this sodium amytal induced interview and the Fifth Circuit Court upheld this decision. In holding the same, it was also observed, Id. at p. 528:
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" ... Moreover, no drug-induced recall of past events which D the subject is otherwise unable to recall is any more reliable than the procedure for inducing recall. Here both psychiatrists testified that sodium amytal does not ensure truthful statements. No re-creation or recall, by photograph, demonstration, drug-stimulated recall, or otherwise, would . E be admissible with so tenuous a predicate." 57. A decision given by the Ninth Circuit Court in United States v. Solomon, 753 F. 2d 1522 (9th Gire. 1985), has been cited by the respondents to support the forensic uses of the narcoanalysis technique. However, a perusal of that judgment shows that neither the actual statements made during narcoanalysis interviews nor the expert testimony relating to the same were given any weightage. The facts were that three individuals, namely Solomon, Wesley and George (a minor at the time of the crime) were accused of having committed robbery and murder by arson. After their arrest, they had changed their statements about the events relating to the alleged offences. Subsequently, Wesley gave his consent for a sodium amytal induced interview and the same was
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administered by a psychiatrist named Dr. Montgomery. The same psychiatrist also conducted a sodium amytal interview with George, at the request of t~e investigators.
58. At the trial stage, George gave testimony which proved to be incriminatory for Solomon and Wesley. However, the statements made by Wesley during the narcoanalysis interview were not admitted as evidence and even the expert testimony about the same was excluded. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court held that there had been no abuse of discretion by the trial court in considering the evidence before it. Solomon and C Wesley had contended that the trial court should have exclt:t~ed the testimony given by George before the trial judge, since the same was based on the results of the sodium amytal interview and was hence unreliable. Ttie Court drew a distinction between the statements made during the narcoanalysis D interview and the subsequent statements made before the trial court. It was observed that it was open to the defendants to show that George's testimony during trial had been bolstered by the previous revelations made during the narcoanalysis interview. However, the connection between the drug-induced E revelations and the testimony given before the trial court could not be presumed. It was further noted, Id. at p. 1525:
"The only Ninth Circuit case addressing narcoanalysis excluded a recording of and psychiatric testimony supporting an interview conduct~d under the influence of sodium pentothal, a precursor of sodium amytal. [Lindsey v. United States, 237 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1956) ... ] The case at bar is distinguishable ~bcause no testimony concerning the narcoanalysis was offered at trial. Only George's current recollection of events was presented. In an analogous situation, this circuit has held that the current recollection~of witnesses whose memories have been refreshed by hypnosis are admissible, with the fact of hypnosis relevant to credibility only [United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198-199 (9th Cir. 1978) ... ], cert.
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
denied. We have cautioned, however, that "great care must be exercised to insure" that statements after hypnosis are not the product of hypnotic suggestion. Id. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling to admit the testimony of the witness George. The court's order denying Solomon's Motion to Suppress reflects a careful balancing of reliability against prejudicial dangers:" 59. However, Wesley wanted to introduce expert testimony by Dr. Montgomery which would explain the effects of sodium amytal as well as the statements made during his own druginduced interview. The intent was to rehabilitate Wesley's credibility after the prosecution had impeached it with an earlier confession. The trial court had held that even though narcoanalysis was not reliable enough to admit into evidence, Dr. Montgomery could testify about the statements made to him by Wesley, however without an explanation of the circumstances. On this issue, the Ninth Circuit Court referred to the Frye standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence. It was also noted that the trial court had the discretion to draw the necessary balance between the probative value of the evidence and its prejudicial effect. It again took note of the decision in Lindsey v. United States, 237 F. 2d 893 (1956), where the admission of a tape recording of a narcoanalysis interview along with an expert's explanation of the technique was held to be a prejudicial error. The following conclusion was stated, 753 F.2d 1522, at p. 1526:
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"Dr. Montgomery testified also that narcoanalysis is useful as a source of information that can be valuable if verified through other sources. At one point he testified that it would elicit an accurate statement of subjective memory, but later said that the subject could fabricate memories. He refused to agree that the subject would be more likely to tell the truth under narcoanalysis than if not so treated.
Wesley wanted to use the psychiatric testimony to bolster
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the credibility of his trial testimony that George started the fatal fire. Wesley's statement shortly after the fire was that he himself set the fire. The probative value of the statement while under narcoanalysis that George was responsible, was the drug's tendency to induce truthful statements. Montgomery admitted that narcoanalysis does not reliably induce truthful statements. The judge's exclusion of the evidence concerning narcoanalysis was not an abuse of discretion. The prejudicial effect of an aura of scientific respectability outweighed the slight probative value of the evidence." 60. In State of New Jersey v. Daryl/ Pitts, 56 A.2d 1320 (N.J. 1989), the trial court had refused to admit a part of a psychiatrist's testimony which was based on the results of the defendant's sodium-amytal induced interview. The defendant had been charged with murder and had sought reliance on the testimony to show his unstable state of mind at the time of the homicides. Reliance on the psychiatrist's testimony was requested during the sentencing phase of the trial in order to show a mitigating factor. On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the trial court's decision to exclude that part of the testimony which was derived from the results of the sodiumamytal interview. Reference was made to the Frye standard while observing that "in determining the admissibility of evidence derived from scientific procedures, a court must first ascertain the extent to which the reliability of such procedures has attained general acceptance within the relevant scientific community." (Id. at p. 1344) Furthermore, the expert witnesses who had appeared at the trial had given conflicting accounts about the utility of a sodium-amytal induced interview for ascertaining the mental state of a subject with regard to past events. It was stated, Id. at p. 1348: "On the two occasions that this Court has considered the questions, we,have concluded, based on the then-existing
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state of scientific knowledge, that testimony derived from a sodium-amytal induced interview is inadmissible to prove the truth of the facts asserted. [See State v. Levitt, 36 N.J. 266, 275 (1961 ) ... ; State v. Sinnott, ... 132 A.2d 298 (1957)) Our rule is consistent with the views expressed by other courts that have addressed the issue. ... The expert testimony adduced at the Rule 8 hearing indicated that the scientific community continues to view testimony induced by sodium amytal as unreliable to ascertain truth. Thus, the trial court's ruling excluding Dr. Sadoffs testimony in the guilt phase was consistent with our precedents, with the weight of authority throughout the country, and also with contemporary scientific knowledge as reflected by the expert testimony .... " (internal citations omitted) 61. Since a person subjected to the narcoanalysis technique is in a half-conscious state and loses awareness of time and place, this condition can be compared to that of a person who is in a hypnotic state. In Horvath v. R, [1979) 44 C.C.C. (2d) 385, the Supreme Court of Canada held that statements made in a hypnotic state were not voluntary and hence they cannot be admitted as evidence. It was also decided that if the post-hypnotic statements relate back to the contents of what was said during the hypnotic state, the subsequent statements would be inadmissible. In that case a 17 year old boy suspected for the murder of his mother had been questioned by a police officer who had training in the use of hypnotic methods. During the deliberate interruptions in the interrogation sessions, the boy had fallen into a mild hypnotic state and had eventually confessed to the commission of the murder. He later repeated the admissions before the investigating officers and signed a confessional statement. The trial judge had found all of these statements to be inadmissible, thereby leading to an acquittal. The Court of Appeal had
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reversed this decision, and hence an appeal was made before the Supreme Court. 62. Notably, the appellant had refused to undergo a narcoanalysis inteNiew or a polygraph test. It was also evident that he had not consented to the hypnosjs. The multiple opinions delivered in the case examined the criterion for deciding the voluntariness of a statement. Reference was made to the well-known statement of Lord Summer in Ibrahim v. R, [1914] A.C. "'599 (P.C.), at p. 609: "It has long been established as a positive rule of English criminal law that no statement made by an accused is admis~ible in evidence against him unless it is shown by the prosecution to have been a voluntary statement, in the sense that it has not been obtained from him either by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised or held out by a person in authority."
63. In Horvath v. R (supra.), the question was whether statements made under a hypnotic state could be equated with E those obtained by 'fear of prejudice' or 'hope of advantage'. The Court ruled that the inquiry into the voluntariness of a statement should not be literally confined to these expressions. After examining several precedents, Spence J. held that the total circumstances surrounding the interrogation should be considered, with no particular emphasis placed on the hypnosis. F It was obseNed that in this particular case the interrogation of the accused had resulted in his complete emotional disintegration'; and hehce the statements given were inadmissible. It was also held that the rule in Ibrahim v. R (supra.) that a statement must be induced by 'fear of prejudice' G or 'hope of advantage' in order to be considered involuntary was not a comprehensive test. The word 'voluntary' should be given its ordihary and natural meaning so that the circumstances which existed in the present case could also be described as · those which resulted in involuntary statements.
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64. In a concurring opinion, Beetz., J. drew a comparison between statements made during hypnosis and those made under the influence of a sodium-amytal injection. It was observed, at Para. 91:
"91. Finally, voluntariness is incompatible not only with promises and threats but actual violence. Had Horvath made a statement while under the influence of an amytal injection administered without his consent, the statement would have been inadmissible because of the assault, and presumably because also of the effect of the injection on his mind. There was no physical violence in the case at bar. There is not even any evidence of bodily contact between Horvath and Sergeant Proke, but through the use of an interrogation technique involving certain physical elements such as a hypnotic quality of voice and manner, a police officer has gained unconsented access to what in a human being is of the utmost privacy, the privacy of his own mind. As I have already indicated, it is my view that this was a form of violence or intrusion of a moral or mental nature, more subtle than visible violence but not less efficient in the result than an amytal injection administered by force."
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65. In this regard, the following observations are instructive for the deciding the questions before us, at Paras. 117,118: "117. It would appear that hypnosis and narcoanalysis are used on a consensual basis by certain police forces as well as by the defence, and it has been argued that they can serve useful purposes. 118. I refrain from commenting on such practices, short of noting that even the consensual use of hypnosis and narcoanalysis for evidentiary purposes may present problems. Under normal police interrogation, a suspect has the opportunity to renew or deny his consent to answer each question, which is no longer the ,case once he is,
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although by consent, in a state of hypnosis or under the influence of a 'truth serum'." (internal citation omitted) 66. Our attention has also been drawn to the decision
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reported as Rock v. Arkansas, 483 US 44 (1987), in which the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that hypnotically-refreshed testimony could be admitted as evidence. The constitutional basis for admitting such testimony was the Sixth Amendment which gives every person a right to present a defence in criminal cases. However, the crucial aspect was that the trial court had admitted the oral testimony given during the trial stage rather than the actual statements made during the hypnosis session conducted earlier during the investigation stage. It was found that such hypnotically-refreshed testimony was the only defence available to the defendant in the circumstances. In such circumstances, it would of course be open to the prosecution to contest the reliability of the testimony given during the trial stage by showing that it had been bolstered by the statements made during hypnosis. It may be recalled that a similar line of reasoning had been adopted in United States v. Solomon, 753 F. 2d 1522 (9th Circ. 1985), where for the purpose of admissibility of testimony, a distinction had been drawn between the statements made during a narcoanalysis interview and the oral testimony given during the trial stage which was allegedly based on the drug-induced statements. Hence, the weight of precedents indicates that both the statements made during narcoanalysis interviews as well as expert testimony relating to the same have not been given weightage in criminal trials.
G Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) test
67. The third technique in question is the 'Brain Electrical Activation Profile test', also known as the 'P300 Waves test'. It is a process of detecting whether an individual is familiar with H certain information by way of measuring activity in the brain that
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
is triggered by exposure to selected stimuli. This test consists of examining and measuring 'event-related potentials' (ERP) i.e. electrical wave forms emitted by the brain after it has absorbed an external event. An ERP measurement is the recognition of specific patterns of electrical brain activity in a subject that are indicative of certain cognitive mental activities that occur when a person is exposed to a stimulus in the form of an image or a concept expressed in words. The measurement of the cognitive brain activity allows the examiner to ascertain whether the subject recognised stimuli to which he/ she was exposed. [Cited from: Andre A Moenssens, 'Brain
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Fingerprinting - Can it be used to detect the innocence of persons charged with a crime?' 70 University of Missouri at Kansas City Law Review 891-920 (Summer 2002) at p. 893] 68. By the late 19th century it had been established that the brain functioned by emitting electrical impulses and the technology to measure them was developed in the form of the electroencephalograph (EEG) which is now commonly used in the medical field. Brain wave patterns observed through an EEG scan are fairly crude and may reflect a variety of unrelated brain activity functions. It was only with the development of computers that it became possible to sort out specific wave components on an EEG and identify the correlation between the waves and specific stimuli. The P300 wave is one such component that was discovered by Dr. Samuel Sutton in 1965. It is a specific event-related brain potential (ERP) which is triggered when information relating to a specific event is recognised by the brain as being significant or surprising. 69. The P300 waves test is conducted by attaching electrodes to the scalp of the subject, which measure the emission of the said wave components. The test needs to be conducted in an insulated and air-conditioned room in order to prevent distortions arising out of weather conditions. Much like the narcoanalysis technique and polygraph examination, this test also requires effective collaboration between the
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investigators and the examiner, most importantly for designing the stimuli which are called 'probes'. Ascertaining the subject's familiarity with the 'probes' can help in detecting deception or to gather useful information. The test subject is exposed to auditory or visual stimuli (words, sounds, pictures, videos) that B are relevant to the facts being investigated alongside other irrelevant words and pictures. Such stimuli can be broadly classified as material 'probes' and· neutral 'probes'. The underlying theory is that in the case of guilty suspects, the exposure to the material probes will lead to the emission of c P300 wave components which will be duly recorded by the instruments. By examining the records of these wave components the examiner can make inferences about the individual's familiarity with the information related to the crime. [Refer: Laboratory Procedure Manual - Brain Electrical D Activation Profile (Directorate of Forensic Science, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi - 2005)] 70. The P300 wave test was the precursor to other neuroscientific techniques such as 'Brain Fingerprinting' developed by Dr. Lawrence Farwell. The latter technique has. E been promoted in the context of criminal justice and has already been the subject of litigation. There is an important difference between the 'P300 waves test' that has been used by Forensic Science Laboratories in India and the 'Brain Fingerprinting' technique. Dr. Lawrence Farwell has argued that the P300 F wave component is not an isolated sensory brain effect but it is part of a longer response that continues to take place after the initial P300 stimulus has occurred. This extended response bears a correlation with the cognitive processing that takes place slightly beyond the P300 wave and continues in the range G of 300-800' milliseconds after the exposure to the stimulus. This extended brain wave component has been named as the MERMER (Mem<:>ry-and-Encoding-Related-MultifacetedElectroencephalographic Response) effect. [See generally: Lawrence A. Farwell, 'Brain Fingerprinting: A new paradigm
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
in criminal investigations and counter-terrorism', (2001) Text can be downloaded from <www.brainwavescience.com>] 71. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (FMRI) is another neuroscientific technique whose application in the forensic setting has been contentious. It involves the use of MRI scans for measuring blood flow between different parts of the brain which bears a correlation to the subject's truthfulness or deception. FMRl-based lie-detection has also been advocated as an aid to interrogations in the context of counter-terrorism and intelligence operations, but it prompts the same legal questions that can be raised with respect to all of the techniques mentioned above. Even though these are non-invasive techniques the concern is not so much with the manner in which they are conducted but the consequences for the individuals who undergo the same. The use of techniques such as 'Brain Fingerprinting' and 'FMRl-based Lie-Detection' raise numerous concerns such as those of protecting mental privacy and the harms that may arise from inferences made about the subject's truthfulness or familiarity with the facts of a crime. [See generally: Michael S. Pardo, 'Neuroscience evidence, legal culture and criminal procedure', 33 American Journat of Criminal Law 301-337 (Summer 2006); Sarah E. Stoller and Paul Root Wolpe, 'Emerging neurotechnologies for lie detection and the fifth amendment', 33 American Journal of Law and Medicine 359-375 (2007)] 72. These neuroscientific techniques could also find application outside the criminal justice setting. For instance, Henry T. Greely (2005, Cited below) has argued that . technologies that may enable a precise identification of the subject's mental responses to specific stimuli could potentially be used for market-research by business concerns for surveying customer preferences and developing targeted advertising schemes. They could also be used to judge mental skills in the educational and employment-related settings since cognitive responses are often perceived to be linked to
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academic and professional competence. One can foresee the potential use of this technique to distinguish between students and employees on the basis of their cognitive responses. There are several other concerns with the development of these 'mindreading' technologies especially those relating to the privacy B of individuals. (Refer: Henry T. Greely, 'Chapter 17: The social effects of advances in neuroscience: Legal problems, legal perspectives', in Judy Illes (ed.), Neuroethics - Defining the issues in theory, practice and policy (Oxford University Press, 2005) at pp. 245-263]
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73. Even though the P300 Wave component has been the subject of considerable research, its uses in the criminal justice system have not received much scholarly attention. Dr. Lawrence Farwell's 'Brain Fingerprinting' technique· has attracted considerable publicity but has not been the subject D of any rigorous independent study. Besides this preliminary doubt, an important objection is centred on the inherent difficulty of designing the appropriate 'probes' for the test. Even if the 'probes' are prepared by an examiner who is thoroughly familiar with all aspects of the facts being investigated, there is always E a chance that a subject may have had prior exposure to the material probes. In case of such prior exposure, even if the subject is found to be familiar with the probes, the same will be meaningless in the overall context of the investigation. For example, in the aftermath of crimes that receive considerable F media-attention the subject can be exposed to the test stimuli in many ways. Such exposure could occur by way of reading about the crime in newspapers or magazines, watching television, listening to the radio or by word of mouth. A possibility of prior exposure to the stimuli may Gtlso arise if the G investigators unintentionally reveal crucial facts about the crime to the subject before conducting the test. The subject could also be familiar with the content of the material probes for several other reasons.
74. Another significant limitation is that even if the tests
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demonstrate familiarity with the material probes, there is no conclusive guidance about the actual nature of the subject's involvement in the crime being investigated. For instance a bystander who witnessed a murder or robbery could potentially be implicated as an accused if the test reveals that the said person was familiar with the information related to the same. Furthermore, in cases of amnesia or 'memory-hardening' on part of the subject, the tests could be blatantly misleading. Even if the inferences drawn from the 'P300 wave test' are used for corroborating other evidence, they could have a material bearing on a finding of guilt or innocence despite being based on an uncertain premise. [For an overview of the limitations of these neuroscientific techniques, see: John G. New, 'If you could read my mind - Implications of neurological evidence for twenty-first century criminal jurisprudence', 29 Journal of Legal Medicine 179-197 (April-June 2008)] 75. We have come across two precedents relatable to the use of 'Brain Fingerprinting' tests in criminal cases. Since this .'technique is considered to be an advanced version of the P300 Waves test, it will be instructive to examine these precedents. In Harrington v. Iowa, 659 N.W.2d 509 (2003), Terry J. . Harrington (appellant) had been convicted for murder in 1978 and the same had allegedly been committed in the course of an attempted robbery. A crucial component of the incriminating materials was the testimony of his accomplice. However, many years later it emerged that the accomplice's testimony was prompted by an offer of leniency from the investigating police and doubts were raised about the credibility of other witnesses as well. Subsequently it was learnt that at the time of the trial, the police had not shared with the defence some investigative reports that indicated the possible involvement of another individual in the said crime. Harrington had also undergone a 'Brain Fingerprinting' test under the supervision of Dr. Lawrence Farwell. The test results showed that he had no memories of the 'probes' relating to the act of murder. Hence,
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A Harrington approached the District Court seeking the vacation of his conviction and an order for a new trial. Post-conviction relief was sought on grounds of newly discovered evidence which included recantation by the prosecution's primary witness, the past suppression of police investigative reports B which implicated another suspect and the results of the 'Brain Fingerprinting' tests. However, the District Court denied this application for post-conviction relief. This was followed by an appeal before the Supreme Court of Iowa. 76. The appellate court concluded that Harrington's appeal C was timely and his action was not time barred. The appellant was granted relief in light of a 'du~ process' violation, i.e. the failure on part of the prosecution at thetime of the original trial to share the investigative reports with the defence. It was observed that the defendant's right to a fair trial had been D violated because the prosecution had suppressed evidence which was favourable to the defendant and clearly material to the issue of guilt. Hence the case was remanded back to the District Court. However, the Supreme Court of Iowa gave no weightage to the results of the 'Brain Fingerprinting' test and E did not even inquire into their relevance or reliability. In fact it was stated: "Because the scientific testing evidence is not necessary to a resolution of this appeal, we give it no further consideration." [659 N.W.2d 509, iat' p. 516) '
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77. The second decision br9ught to our attention is Slaughter v. Oklahoma, 105 P. 3d 832 (2005). In that case, Jimmy Ray Slaughter had been convicted for two murders and sentenced to death. Subsequently, \e filed an application for post-conviction relief before the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma which attempted to introduce in evidence an affidavit G and evidentiary materials relating to a 'Brain Fingerprinting' test. This test had been conducted by Dr. Lawrence Farwell whose opinion was that the petitioner did not have knowledge of the 'salient features of the crime scene'. Slaughter also sought a review of the evidence gathered through DNA testing
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and challenged the bullet composition analysis pertaining to the crime scene. However, the appellate court denied the application for post-conviction relief as well as the motion for an evidentiary hearing. With regard to the affidavits based on the 'Brain Fingerprinting' test, it was held, Id. at p. 834: "10. Dr. Farwell makes certain claims about the Brain Fingerprinting test that are not supported by anything other than his bare affidavit. He claims the technique has been extensively tested, has been presented and analyzed in numerous peer-review articles in recognized scientific publications, has a very low rate of error, has objective standards to control its operation, and is generally accepted within the 'relevant scientific community'. These bare claims, however, without any form of corroboration, are unconvincing and, more importantly, legally insufficient to establish Petitioner's post-conviction request for relief. Petitioner cites one published opinion, Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509 (Iowa 2003), in which a brain fingerprinting test result was raised as error and discussed by the Iowa Supreme Court ('a novel computer-based brain testing'). However, while the lower court in Iowa appears to have admitted the evidence under non-Daubert circumstances, the "test did not ultimately factor into the Iowa Supreme Court's published decision in any way." Accordingly, the following conclusion was stated, Id. at p.
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836: "18. Therefore, based upon the evidence presented, we find the Brain Fingerprinting evidence is procedurally barred under the Act and our prior cases, as it could have been raised in Petitioner's direct appeal and, indeed, in his first application for post-conviction relief. We further find a lack of sufficient evidence that would support a conclusion that Petitioner is factually innocent or that Brain Fingerprinting, based solely upon the MERMER effect,
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would survive a Daubert analysis."
CONTENTIOUS ISSUES IN THE PRESENT CASE 78. As per the Laboratory Procedure manuals, the impugned tests are being conducted at the direction of B jurisdictional courts even without obtaining the consent of the intended test subjects. In most cases these tests are conducted conjunctively wherein the veracity of the ·information revealed through narcoanalysis is subsequently tested through a polygraph examination or the BEAP test. In some cases the C investigators could first want to ascertain the capacity of the subject to deceive (through polygraph examination) or his/her familiarity with the relevant facts (through BEAP test) before conducting a narcoanalysis interview. Irrespective of the sequence in which these techniques are administered, we have. D to decide on their permissibility in circumstances where any. of these tests are compulsorily administered, either independently ' or conjunctively. 79. It is plausible that investigators could obtain statements E from individuals by threatening them with the possibility of administering either of these tests. The person being· interrogated could possibly make self-incriminating statements on account of apprehensions that these techniques will extract the truth. Such behaviour on part of investigators is more likely to occur when the person being interrogated is unaware of his/ F her legal rights or is intimidated for any other reason. It is a settled principle that a statement obtained through coercion, threat or inducement is involuntary and hence inadmissible as evidence during trial. However, it is not settled whether a statement made on account of the apprehension of being G forcibly subjected to the impugned tests will be involuntary and hence inadmissible. This aspect merits consideration. It is also conceivable that an individual who has undergone either of these tests would be more likely to make self-incriminating statements when he/she is later confronted with the results. The
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [K.G BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
question in that regard is whether the statements that are made subsequently should be admissible as evidence. The answers to these questions rest on the permissibility of subjecting individuals to these tests without their consent.
I. Whether the involuntary administration of the impugned technigues violates the 'right against self-incrimination' enumerated in Article 20(3) of the Constitution? 80. Investigators could seek reliance on the impugned tests to extract information from a person who is suspected or accused of having committed a crime. Alternatively these tests could be conducted on witnesses to aid investigative efforts. As mentioned earlier, this could serve several objectives, namely those of gathering clues which could lead to the discovery of relevant evidence, to assess the credibility of previous testimony or even to ascertain the mental state of an individual. With these uses in mind, we have to decide whether the compulsory administration of these tests violates the 'right against self-incrimination' which finds place in Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. Along with the 'rule against doublejeopardy' and the 'rule against retrospective criminalisation' enumerated in Article 20, it is one of the fundamental protections that controls interactions between individuals and the criminal justice system. Article 20(3) reads as follows: "No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." 81. The interrelationship between the 'right against selfincrimination' and the 'right to fair trial' has been recognised in most jurisdictions as well as international human rights instruments. For example, the U.S. Constitution incorporates the 'privilege against self-incrimination' in the text of its Fifth Amendment. The meaning and scope of this privilege has been judicially moulded by recognising it's interrelationship with other constitutional rights such as the protection· against 'unreasonable search and seizure' (Fourth amendment) and the
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guarantee of 'due process of law' (Fourteenth amendment). In the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 14(3)(g) enumerates the minimum guarantees that are to be accorded during a trial and states that everyone has a right not to be compelled .to testify against himself or to confess B guilt. In the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 6(1) states that every person charged with an offence has a right to a fair trial and Article 6(2) provides that 'Everybody charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty c according to law'. The guarantee of 'presumption of innocence' bears a direct link to the 'right against self-incrimination' since compelling the accused person to testify would place the burden of proving innocence on the accused instead of requiring the prosecution to prove guilt.
82. In the Indian context, Article 20(3) should be construed with due regard for the inter-relationship between rights, since this approach was recognised in Maneka Gandhi's case, (1978) 1 SCC 248. Hence, we must examine the 'right against self-incrimination' in respect of its relationship with the multiple E dimensions of 'personal liberty' under Article 21, which include guarantees such as the 'right to fair trial' and 'substantive due process'. It must also be emphasized that Articles 20 and 21 have a non-derogable status within Part Ill of our Constitution because the Constitution (Fourty-Fourth amendment) Act, 1978 F, mandated that the right to move any court for the enforcement of these rights cannot be suspended even during the operation of a proclamation of emergency. In this regard, Article 359(1) of the Constitution of India reads as follows:-
"359. Suspension of the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part Ill during emergencies. - (1) Where a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, the President may by order declare that the right to move any court for the enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part Ill (except Articles 20 and 21) as may be mentioned in the
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order and all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the rights so mentioned shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation is in force or for such shorter period as may be specified in the order .... " 83. Undoubtedly, Article 20(3) has an exalted status in our Constitution and questions about its meaning and scope • deserve thorough scrutiny. In one of the impugned judgments, · it was. reasoned that all citizens have an obligation to cooperate with ongoing investigations. For instance reliance has been placed on Section 39, CrPC which places a duty on citizens to inform the nearest magistrate or police officer if they are aware of the commission of, or of the intention of any other person to commit the crimes enumerated in the section. Attention has also been drawn to the language of Section 156(1), CrPC which states that a police officer in charge of a police station is empowered to investigate cognizable offences even without an order from the jurisdictional magistrate. Likewise, our attention was drawn to Section 161(1), CrPC which empowers the police officer investigating a case to orally examine any person who is supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. While the overall intent of these provisions is to ensure the citizens' cooperation during the course of investigation, they cannot override the constitutional protections given to accused persons. The scheme of the CrPC itself acknowledges this hierarchy between constitutional and statutory provisions in this regard. For instance, SeGtion 161 (2), CrPC prescribes that when a person is being examined by a police officer, he is not bound to answer such questions, the answers of which would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge or a penalty or forfeiture. 84. Not only does an accused person have the right to refuse to answer any question that may lead to incrimination, there is also a rule against adverse inferences being drawn from the fact of his/her silence. At the trial stage, Section 313(3) of
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the CrPC places a crucial limitation on the power of the court to put questions to the accused so that the latter may explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. It lays down that the 'accused shall not render himself/herself liable to punishment by refusing to answer such questions, or by giving B false answers to them. Further, Proviso {b) to Section 315(1) of CrPC mandates that even though an accused person can be a competent witness for the defence, his/her failure to give evidence shall not be made the subject of any comment by any , of the parties or the court or give rise to any presumption against himself or any person charged together with him at the trial. It is evident that Section 161(2), CrPC enables a person to choose silence in response to questioning by a police officer during the stage of investigation, and as per the scheme of Section 313(3) and Proviso (b) to Section 315(1) of the same code, adverse inferences cannot be drawn on account of the accused person's sil.ence during the trial stage.
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Historical origins of the 'right against self-incrimination' 85. The right of refusal to answer questions that may E incriminate a person is a procedural safeguard which has gradually evolved in common law and bears a close relation to the 'right to fair trial'. There are competing versions about the historical origins of this concept.· Some scholars have identified the origins of this right in the medieval period. In that account, F it was a response to the procedure followed by English judicial bodies such as the Star Chamber and High Commissions which required defendants and suspects to take ex officio oaths. These bodies mainly decided cases involving religious . non-conformism in a Protestant dominated society, as well as G offences like treason and sedition. Under an ex offiCio oath the defendant was required to answer all questions posed by the judges arid prosecutors during the trial and the failure to do so would attract punishments that often involved physical torture. It was the resistance to this practice of compelling the accused to speak which led to demands for a 'right to silence'.
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86. In an academic commentary, Leonard Levy (1969) had pointed out that the doctrinal origins of the right against selfincrimination could be traced back to the Latin maxim 'Nemo tenetur seipsum prodere' (i.e. no one is bound to accuse himself) and the evolution of the concept of 'due process of law' enumerated in the Magna Carta. [Refer: Leonard Levy, The right against self-incrimination: history and judicial history', 84(1) Political Science Quarterly 1-29 (March 1969)] The use of the ex officio oath by the ecclesiastical courts in medieval England had come under criticism from time to time, and the most prominent cause for discontentment came with its use in the Star Chamber and the High Commissions. Most scholarship has focussed on the sedition trial of John Lilburne (a vocal critic of Charles I, the then monarch) in 1637, when he refused to answer questions put to him on the ground that he had not been informed of the contents of the written complaint against him. John Lilburne went on to vehemently oppose the use of ex.-officio oaths, and the Parliament of the time relented by abolishing the Star Chamber and the High Commission in 1641. This event is regarded as an important landmark in the evolution of the 'right to silence'. 87. However. in 1648 a special committee of Parliament conducted an investigation into the loyalty of members whose opinions were offensive to the army leaders. The committee's inquisitional conduct and its requirement that witnesses take an oath to tell the truth provoked opponents to condemn what they regarded as a revival of Star Chamber tactics. John Lilburne was once again tried for treason before this committee, this time--for his outspoken criticism of the leaders who had prevailed in the struggle between the supporters of the monarch and those of the Parliament in the English civil war. John Lilburne invoked the spirit of the Magna Carta as well as the 1628 Petition of Right to argue that even after common-law indictment and without oath, he.did not have to answer questions against or concerning himself. He drew a connection between the right against self-incrimination amt. .1heiJtra'rantee
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of a fair trial by invoking the idea of 'due process of law' which had been stated in the Magna Carta. 88. John H. Langbein (1994) has offered more historical insights into the emergence of the 'right to silence'. (John H. Langbein, 'The historical origins of the privilege against selfincrimination at common law', 92(5) Michigan Law Review 1047-1085 (March 1994)] He draws attention to the fact that even though ex officio oaths were abolished in 1641, the practice of requiring defendants to present their own defence in criminal proceedings continued for a long time thereafter. The Star Chamber and the High Commissions had mostly tried cases involving religious, non-conformists and political dissenters, thereby attracting considerable criticism. Even after their abolition, the defendants in criminal courts did not have the right to be represented by a lawyer ('right to counsel'),or the right to request the presence of defence witnesses ('right of compulsory process'). Hence, defendants were more or-less compelled to testify on their own behalf. Even though the threat of physical torture on account of remaining silent had oeen removed, the defendant would face a high risk of conviction if_ he/she did not respond to the charges by answering the material questions posed by the judge and the prosecutor. In presenting his/her own defence during the trial, there was a strong likelihood that the contents of such testimony could strengthen the case of the prosecution and lead to conviction. With the passage of time, the right of a criminal defendant to be represented by a lawyer eventually emerged in the common law tradition. A watershed in this regard was the Treason Act of 1696 which provided for a 'right to counsel' as well as 'compulsory process' in cases involving offences such as treason. Gradually, the right to be defended by a counsel was extended to more offences, but the role of the counsel was limited in the early years. For instance defence lawyers could only help their clients with questions of law and could not make submissions related to the facts.
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89. :Y-he practice of requiring the accused persons to A narrate or contest the facts on their own corresponds to a prominent feature of an inquisitorial system, i.e. the testimony of the accused is viewed as the 'best evidence' that can be gathered. The premise behind this is that innocent persons should not be reluctant to testify on their own behalf. This B approach was followed in the inquisitional procedure of the ecclesiastical courts and had thus been followed in other courts . as well. The obvious problem with compelling the accused to testify on his own behalf is that an ordinary person lacks the legal training to effectively respond to suggestive and c misleading questioning, which could come from the prosecutor or the judge. Furthermore, even an innocent person is at an inherent disadvantage in an environment where there may be unintentional irregularities in the testimony. Most importantly the burden of proving innocence by refuting the charges was 0 placed on the defendant himself. In the present day, lhe inquisitorial conception of the defendant being the best source of evidence has long been displaced with the evolution of adversarial procedure in the common law tradition. Criminal defendants have been given protections such as the presumption of innocence, right to counsel, the right to be E informed of charges, the right of compulsory process· and the standard of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt among others. It can hence be stated that it was only with the subsequent emergence of the 'right to counsel' that the accused's 'right to silence' became meaningful. With the F consolidation of the role of defence lawyers in criminal trials, a clear segregation emerged between the testimonial function performed by the accused and the defensive function performed by the lawyer. This segregation between the testimonial and defensive functions is now accepted as an G essential feature of a fair trial so as to ensure a level-playing field between the prosecution and the defence. In addition to a defendant's 'right to silence' during the trial stage, the protections were extended to the stage of pre-trial inquiry as well. With the enactment of the Sir John Jervis Act of 1848, H
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provisions were made to advise the accused that he might decline to answer questions put to him in the pre-trial inquiry and to caution him that his answers to pre-trial interrogation might be used as evidence against him during the trial stage.
90. The judgment in Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, (1978) 2 sec 424, at pp. 438-439, referred td the following extract from a decision of the US Supreme Court in Brown v. Walker, 161 US 591 (1896), which had later been approvingly cited by Warren, C.J. in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966):
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"The maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which have long obtained in the continental system, and, until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection of additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, were not uncommon even in England .. While the admissions or confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale· of - incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime under investigation, the case with which the questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him info a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition. The change in the English criminal procedure in that particular seems to be founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand. But, however adopted, it has become firmly embedded in English, as well as in American jurisprudence. So deeply
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did the inequities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the State, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment."
Underlying rationale of the right against self-incrimination 91. As mentioned earlier, 'the right against selfincrimination' is now viewed as an essential safeguard in criminal procedure. Its underlying rationale broadly corresponds with two objectives - firstly, that of ensuring reliability of the statements made by an accused, and secondly, ensuring that such statements are made voluntarily. It is quite possible that a person suspected or ac('.used of a crime may have been compelled to testify through methods involving coercion, threats or inducements during the investigative stage. When a person is compelled to testify on his/her own behalf, there is a higher likelihood of such testimony being false. False testimony is undesirable since it impedes the integrity of the trial and the subsequent verdict. Therefore, the purpose of the 'rule against involuntary confessions' is to ensure that the testimony considered during trial is reliable. The premise is that involuntary statements are more likely to mislead the judge and the prosecutor, thereby resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Even during the investigative stage, false statements are .likely to cause delays and obstructions in the investigation efforts. 92. The concerns about the 'voluntariness' of statements allow a more comprehensive account of this right. If involuntary statements were readily given weightage during trial, the investigators would have a strong incentive to compel such statements - often through methods involving coercion, threats, inducement or deception. Even if such involuntary statements are proved to be true, the law should not incentivise the use of
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A .interrogation tactics that violate the dignity and bodily integrity of the person being examined. In this sense, 'the right against, self-incrimination' is a vital safeguard against torture and other 'third-degree methods' that could be used to elicit information. It serves as a check on police behaviour during the course of B investigation. The exclusion of compelled testimony is important, otherwise the investigators will be more inclined to extract information through such compulsion as a matter of course. The frequent reliance on such 'short-cuts' will compromise the diligence required for conducting meaningful investigations. c During the trial stage, the onus is on the prosecution to prove the charges levelled against the defendant and the 'right against self-incrimination' is a vital protection to ensure thaf the prosecution discharges the said onus. 93. These concerns have been recognised in Indian as well D as foreign judicial precedents. For instance, Das Gupta, J. had observed in State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, [1962] 3 SCR 10, at pp. 43-44:
"... for long it has been generally agreed among those who have devoted serious thought to these problems that few things could be more harmful to the detection, of crime or conviction of the real culprit, few things more likely to hamper the disclosure of truth than to allow investigators or prosecutors to slide down the easy path of producing by compulsion, evidence, whether oral or documentary, from an accused person. It has been felt that the existence of such an easy way would terid to dissuade persons in charge of investigation or prosecution from conducting diligent search for reliable independent evidence and from sifting of available materials with the care necessary for ascertainment of truth. If it is permissible in law to obtain evidence from the accused person by compulsion, why tread the hard path of laborious investigation and prolonged examination of other men, materials and documents? It has been well said that an abolition of this
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privilege would be an incentive for those in charge of enforcement of law 'to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper into a poor devils' eyes rather than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence.' [Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, History of Criminal Law, p. 442] N.o less serious is the danger that some accused persons at least, may be induced to furnish evidence against themselves which is totally false - out of sheer despair and an anxiety to avoid an unpleasant present. Of all these dangers the Constitution makers were clearly well aware and it was to avoid them that Article 20(3) was put in the Constitution." 94. The rationale behind the Fifth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution was eloquently explained by Goldberg. J. in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 US 52 (1964), at p. 55: "It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that selfincriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contests with the individual to shoulder the entire load; our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual to a private enclave where he may lead a private life; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes a shelter to the guilty, is often a protection to the innocent." A similar view was articulated by Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone in Wong Kam-ming v. R, [1979] 1 All ER 939, at p. 946:
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" ... any civilised system of criminal jurisprudence must accord to the judiciary some means of excluding confessions or admissions obtained by improper methods. This is not only because of the potential unreliability of such statements, but also, and perhaps mainly, because in a civilised society it is vital that persons in custody or charged with offences should not be subjected to ill treatment or improper pressure in order to extract confessions. It is therefore of very great importance that the courts should continue ito insist that before extrajudicial statements can be admitted in evidence the prosecution must be made to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the statement 'was not obtained in a manner which should be reprobated and was therefore in the truest sense voluntary." 95. V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. echoed similar concerns in Nandini Satpathy's case, (1978) 2 sec 424, at p. 442: • ... And Article 20(3) is a human article, a guarantee of dignity and integrity and of inviolability of the person and refusal to convert an adversary system into an inquisitorial scheme in the antagonistic ante-chamber of a police station. And in the long run, that investigation is best which uses stratagems least; that policeman deserves respect who gives his fists rest and his; wits restlessness. The police are part of us and must rise in people's esteem through firm and friendly, not foul and sneaky strategy."
96. In spite of the constitutionally entrenched status of the right against self-incrimination, there have been some criticisms of the policy underlying the same. John Wigmore (1960) argued G against a broad view of the privilege which extended the same to the investigative stage. [Refer: John Wigmore, 'The privilege against self-incrimination, its constitutional affectation, raison d'etre and miscellaneous implications', 51 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 138 (1960)] He has
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asserted that the doctrinal origins of the 'rule against involuntary confessions' in evidence law and those of the 'right to selfincrimination' were entirely different and catered to different objectives. In the learned author's opinion, the 'rule against involuntary confessions' evolved on account of the distrust of statements made in custody. The objective was to prevent these involuntary statements from being considered as evidence during trial but there was no prohibition against relying on statements made involuntarily during investigation. Wigmore argued that the privilege against self-incrimination should be viewed as a right that was confined to the trial stage, since the judge can intervene to prevent an accused from revealing incriminating information at that stage, while similar oversight is not always possible during the pre-trial stage.
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97. In recent years, scholars such as David Dolinko (1986), Akhil Reed Amar (1997) and Mike Redmayne (2007) among D others have encapsulated the objections to the scope of this right. [See: David Dolinko, 'Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?', 33 University of California Los Angeles Law Review 1063 (1986); Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First E Principles (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997) at pp. 65-70; Mike Redmayne, 'Re-thinking the Privilege against Selfincrimination', 27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 209-2'32 (Summer 2007)] It is argued that in aiming to create a fair state-individual balance in criminal cases, the task of the F investigators and prosecutors is made unduly difficult by allowing the accused to remain silent. If the overall intent of the criminal justice system is to ensure public safety through expediency in investigations and prosecutions, it is urged that the privilege against self-incrimination protects the guilty at the G cost of such utilitarian objectives. Another criticism is that adopting a broad view of this right does not deter improper practices during investigation and it instead encourages investigators to make false representations to courts about the voluntary or involuntary nature of custodial statements. It is H
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reasoned that when investigators are under pressure to deliver results there is an inadvertent tendency to rely on methods involving coercion, threats; inducement or deception in spite of the legal prohibitions against them. Questions have also been raised about conceptual inconsistencies in the way that courts B have expanded the scope of this right. One such objection is that if the legal system is obliged to respect the mental privacy of individuals, then why is there no prohibition against compelled testimony in· civil cases which could expose parties to adverse consequences. Furthermore, questions have also c been asked about th~ scope of the privilege being restricted to testimonial acts while excluding physical evidence which can be extracted through compulsion. '.
98. In response to John Wigmore's thesis about the separate foundation~ of the 'rule against involuntary D confessions', we must recognis'e the infusion of constitutional values into all branches of law, including procedural areas such as the law of evidence. While the above-mentioned criticisms have been made in academic commentaries, we must defer to the judicial precedents that control the scope of Article 20(3). E For instance, the interrelationship between the privilege against self-incrimination and the requirements of observing due process of law were emphasized by William Douglas, J. in Rochin v. California, 342 US 166 (1951), at p. 178:
"As an original matter it might be debatable whether the provision in the Fifth Amendment that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself serves the ends of justice. Not all civilized legal procedures recognize it. But the choice was ma.de by the framers, a choice which sets a standard for leg~I trials in this country. The Framers made, it a standard of due process for prosecutions by the Federal Government. If it is a requirement of due process for a trial in the federal courthouse, it is impossible for me to say it is not a requirement of due process for a trial in the state
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courthouse."
1-A. Whether the investigative use of the impugned techniques creates a likelihood of incrimination for the subject? 99. The respondents have submitted that the compulsory administration of the impugned tests will only be sought to boost investigation efforts and that the test results by themselves will not be admissible as evidence. The next prong of this position is that if the test results enable the investigators to discover independent materials that are relevant to the case, such subsequently discovered.materials should be admissible during trial. In order to evaluate this position, we must answer the following questions:
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Firstly, we should clarify the scope of the 'right against self-incrimination' - i.e. whether it should be construed as a broad protection that extends to the investigation stage or should it be viewed as a narrower right confined to the trial stage?
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Secondly, we must examine the ambit of the words 'accused of any offence' in Article 20(3) - i.e. whether the protection is available only to persons who are formally accused in criminal cases, or does it extend to include suspects and witnesses as well as those who apprehend incrimination in cases other than the one being investigated?
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Thirdly, we must evaluate the evidentiary value of independent materials that are subsequently discovered with the help of the test results. In light of the 'theory of confirmation by subsequent facts' incorporated in Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 we need. to examine the compatibility between this section and Article 20(3). Of special concern are situations when persons could be
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compelled to reveal information which leads to the discovery of independent materials. To answer this question, we must clarify what constitutes 'incrimination' for the purpose of invoking Article 20(3). Applicability of Article 20(3) to the stage of investigation
100. The question of whether Article 20(3) should be narrowly construed as a trial right or a broad protection that extends to the stage of investigation has been conclusively C answered by our Courts. In M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, [1954] SCR 1077, it was held by Jagannadhadas, J. at pp. 1087-1088:
"Broadly stated, the guarantee in Article 20(3) is against 'testimonial compulsion'. It is suggested that this is confined to the oral evidence of a person standing his trial for an offence when called to the witness-stand. We can see no reason to confine the content of the constitutional guarantee to this barely literal import. So to limit it would be to rob the guarantee of its substantial purpose and to miss the substance for the sound as stated in certain American decisions. . .. " "Indeed, every positive volitional act which furnished evidence is testimony, and testimonial compulsion connotes coercion which procures the positive volitional evidentiary acts of the person, as opposed to the negative attitude of silence or submission on his part. Nor is there any reason to think that the protection in respect of the evidence so procured is confined to what transpires at the trial in the court room. The phrase used in Article 20(3) is 'to be a witness' and not to 'appear as a witness': It follows that the protection afforded to an cccused in so far as it is related to the phrase 'to be a witness' is not merely in respect of testimonial compulsion in the court room but may well extend to compelled testimony previously obtained
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from him. It is available therefore to a person against whom a "formal accusation relating to the commission of an offence has been levelled which in the normal course may result in prosecution. Whether it is availat;>le to other persons in other situations does not call for decision in this case." · 101. These observations were cited with approval by B. P. Sinha, C.J. in State of Bombay v. Kathi Ka/u Oghad & Others, [1962) 3 SCR 10, at pp. 26-28. In the minority opinion, Das Gupta, J. affirmed the same position, Id. at p. 40: " ... If the protection was intended to be cc!>nfined to being a witness in Court then really it would have been an idle protection. It would be completely defeated by compelling a person to give all the evidence outside court and then, having what he was so compelled to do proved in court through other witnesses. An interpretation which s9. completely defeats the constitutional guarantee cannot, of course, be correct. The contention that the protection afforded by Article 20(3) is limited to the stage of trial must therefore be rejected."
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102. The broader view of Article 20(3) was consolidated in Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, (1978) 2 SCC 424: " ... Any giving of evidence, any furnishing of information, if likely to have an incriminating impact, answers the description of being a witness.against oneself. Not being limited to the forensic stage by express words in Article 20(3), we have to construe the expression to apply to every stage where furnishing of information and collection of materials takes place. That is to say, even the investigation at the police level is embraced by Article 20(3). This is precisely what Section 161 (2) means. That sub-section relates to oral examination by police officers and grants immunity at that stage. Briefly, the Constitution and the Code aro coterminus in the protective area. While the code
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may be changed, the Constitution is more enduring. Therefore, we have to base our conclusion not merely upon Section 161 (2) but on the more fundamental protection, although equal in ambit, contained in Article 20(3)." (at p. 435)
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"If the police can interrogate to the point of self-accusation, the subsequent exclusion of that evidence at the trial hardly helps because the harm has already been done. The police will prove through other evidence what they have procured through forced confession. So it is that the foresight of the framers has pre-empted self-incrimination at the incipient stages by not expressly restricting it to the trial stage in court. True, compelled testimony previously obtained is excluded. But the preventive blow falls also on pre-court testimonial compulsion. The condition, as the decisions now go, is that the person compelled must be an accused. Both precedent procurement and subsequent exhibition of self-incriminating testimony are obviated by intelligent constitutional anticipation." (at p. 449)
103. In upholding this broad view of Article 20(3), V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. relied heavily on the decision of the US Supreme Court in Ernesto Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966). The majority opinion (by Earl Warren, C.J.) laid down that custodial statements could not be used as evidence unless F the police officers had administered warnings about the accused's right to remain silent. The decision also recognised the right to consult a lawyer prior to and during the course of custodial interrogations. The practice promoted by this case is that it is only after a person has 'knowingly and intelligently' G waived of these rights after receiving a warning that the statements made thereafter can be admitted as evidence. The safeguards were prescribed in the following manner, Id. at pp.
444-445:
" ... the prosecution may not use statements, whether
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exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. [ ... ]As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned." 104. These safeguards were designed to mitigate the disadvantages faced by a suspect in a custodial environment. This was done in recognition of the fact that methods involving deception and psychological pressure were routinely used and often encouraged in police interrogations. Emphasis was placed on the ability of the person being questioned to fully comprehend and understand the content of the stipulated warning. It was held, Id. at pp. 457-458:
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"In these cases, we might not find the defendant's statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms. Our concern for adequate safeguards to protect the precious Fifth Amendment right is, of course, not lessened in the slightest. In each of the cases, the defendant was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures .... It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere carried its own badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity. [Professor Sutherland, 'Crime and Confessions', 79 ·Harvard Law Review 21, 37 (1965)] The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our . Nation's most cherished principles - that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, n~tatement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice." 105. The opinion also explained the significance of having a counsel present during a custodial interrogation. It was noted, Id. at pp. 469-470:
'The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators. Therefore, the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendmeht privilege under the system we delineate today. Our aim is to assure that the individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process. A once-stated warning, delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself suffice to that end among those
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who most require knowledge of their rights. A mere warning given by the interrogators is not alone sufficient to accomplish that end. Prosecutors themselves claim that the admonishment of the right to remain silent without more 'will benefit only the recidivist and the professional.' [Brief for the National District Attorneys Association as amicus quriae, p. 14] Even preliminary advice given to the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly overcome by the secret interrogation process. [Cited from Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485 ... ]Thus, the need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires." 106. The majority decision in Miranda (supra.) was not a sudden development in U.S. constitutional law. The scope of the privilege against self-incrimination had been progressively expanded in several prior decisions. The notable feature was the recognition of the interrelationship between the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that the government must observe the 'due process of law' as well as the Fourth Amendment's protection against 'unreasonable search and seizure'. While it is not necessary for us to survey these decisions, it will suffice to say that after Miranda (supra.), administering a warning about a person's right to silence during custodial interrogations as well as obtaining a voluntary waiver of the prescribed rights has become a ubiquitous feature in the U.S. criminal justice system. In the absence of such a warning and voluntary waiver, there is a presumption of compulsion with regard to the custodial statements, thereby rendering them inadmissible as evidence. The position in India is different since there is no automatic presumption of compulsion in respect of custodial statements. However, if the fact of compulsion is proved then the resulting statements are rendered inadmissible as evidence.
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Who can invoke the protection of Article 20(3)? 107. The decision in Nandini Satpathy's case, (supra.) also touched on the question of who is an 'accused' for the purpose of invoking Article 20(3). This question had been left open in M.P. Sharma's case (supra.). Subsequently, it was addressed in Kathi Kalu Oghad (supra.), at p. 37:
"To bring the statement in question within the prohibition of Article 20(3), the person accused must have stood in the character of an accused person at the time he made the statement. It is not enough that he should become an accused, anytime after the statement has been made."
108. While there is a requirement of formal accusation for a person to invoke Article 20(3) it must be noted that the D protection contemplated by Section 161 (2), CrPC is wider. Section 161 (2) read with 161 (1) protects 'any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case' in the course of examination by the police. The language of this provision is as follows:
161. Examination of witnesses by police. (1) Any police officer making an investigation under this Chapter, or any police officer not below such rank as the State Government may, by general or special order, prescribe in this behalf, acting on the requisition of such officer, may examine orally any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. (2) Such person shall be bound to answer truly all questions relating to such case put to him by such officer, other than questions the answers to which would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge or to a penalty or forfeiture. (3) The police officer may reduce into writing any statement made to him in the course of an examination under this
SELVI & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
section; and if he does so, he shall make a separate and true record of the statement of each such person whose statement he records. 109. Therefore the 'right against self-incrimination' protects persons who have been formally accused as well as those who are examined as suspects in criminal cases. It also extends to cover witnesses who apprehend that their answers could expose them to criminal charges in the ongoing investigation or even in cases other than the one being investigated. Krishna Iyer, J. clarified