SMT. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date of judgment
28 April 1962
Judge
Justice S.K. Das
Neutral citation
1962 INSC 174
Reported in
[1963] 1 S.C.R. 778
Result
Dismissed
Acts & sections
Article 32 Constitution, Article 359 Constitution
Subject
Tax & GST

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Full judgment

77S 1962

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963] SMT. UJJAM BAI

v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (S. K. D.As, J. L. KAPUR, A. K. SARKAR. K. SUBB.A R.Ao, M. HID.AY.ATULLAH, N. RAJ.AGOPALA AYY.ANGAR and J. R.MUDHOLKAR, JJ.) Fundamental Right, Enforcement of-Assessment by Sales Tax Officer under a valid Act-If open to challenge o" the sole ground of misconstructi·on of Act and Notificati"on-Oonstitution of India, Arts. 19(l)(g), 32-Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948(U.P. XV of 1948), s.4(1)(b). The petitioner was a partnt:r in a firm that carried on the business of manufacture and sale of hand~made biilis. On December 14, 1957, the State Government issued a notification under s. 4(l)(b) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. Section 4(1)(b) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, providos as follows:-

"No tax shall be payable on( a) The sale of water, milk, salt, newspapers and motor spirit as defined ii) the U. P. State Motor Spirit (Taxation) Act, 1939, and of any other goods which the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt.

(b) The sale of any goods by the All India Spinners' Association of Gandhi Ao;hram, Mcerut, and their branch("s or such other persons or class of persons as the State Government may from time to time exempt on such conditions and on payment of such fees, if any, not exceeding eight thousand rupees annually as may be specified by notification in the Official Gazette." The notification dated December 14, 1957, issued under s. 4(1jtb) was as follows:"In partial modification of notifications No. ST 905/X, dated March 31, 1956 and ST 418/X 902(9) 52, dated January 31, 1957, and in exercise of the powers confer1ed by clause (b) of sub-section !I) of section 4 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948(U.P. Act No. XV of 1948), as amended up to date, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh is pleased to order that no tax shall he pavable under the aforesaid Act with effect from December 14, 1957, by the dealers in respect of the

1 S. C. R. SYPRBME COURT RENRTS

following classes of goods provided that the Additional Central Excise Duties leviable thereon from the closing of business on December 13, 1957, have been paid on such goods and that the dealers thereof furnish proof to the satisfaction of the assessing authority that such duties have been paid. I. ................. . 2. . ........... . 3. Cigars, cigarettes, biris and tobacco, that is to say any form of tobacco, whether cured or uncured and whether manufactured or not and includes the leaf, stalks and stems of tobacco plant but does not include any part of a tobacco plant while still attached to the earth." By a subsequent notification is•.med on November 25, 1958, hand-made and machine-made bidia were unconditio· nally exempted from payment of sales tax from July 1, 1958. The Sales Tax Officer sent a notice to the firm for the as~essment. of tax on sale of bidis during the assessment period April l, 1958, to June 30, 1958. The firm claimed that the notification dated December 1.4, 1957, had exempted bidia from payment of sales tax and that, therefore, it was not liable to pay sales tax on,xhe sale of bidia. This position was not accepted by the Sales Tax Officer who passed the following order on December 20, 1958,"The exemption envi~aged in this n'>tification,applies ·to dealers in respect of sales of biris provided that the additional Central Excise duties leviable thereon from the closing of business on 13. 12. 1957 have been paid on such go0ds. The assessees paid :no such excise duties. Sales af biris by the assessees are therefore liable to sales tax". The firm appealed under s. 9 of the Act to the Jqdge (Appeals) Sales Tax, but that was dismissed on May 1, 1959. The firm had however moved the High Court under Art. 226 ~f tlie Constitution before that date. The High Court took the view. that the firm had another remed}'\ under the Act and that the Sales Tax Officer had not committed any appareht firror in interpreting~ notification of December 14, 1957. An appeal against the order of the High Oourt on a certificate under Art. 133 (l)(a) was dismissed bv this Court for non· pros~cution anp the firm filed an application for restoration of the appeal: and condonation .of dday. During the pendency of that,~ppe!ll the present 'PeLitivn was filed by th~ ,petitioner under Art. 32 of the constitution for the enforcement of her fundamental ri~ht under Arts. 19(1)(g) and of the con'Stlhltions. Before the Consiitntion Bench

n61

Bmc. Ujjam B•i

••

SC.ti of UIUlr l'r•tlish

1961 Smt. Ujjam Bai

v.

Slfll~ of UU11r

Pratksh

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [196S]

which heard the matter a preliminary objection was raised against the maintainability of the petition and the correctness of the decision of this Court in Kailash Nath v. State of U.P. A I.R. 1957 S.C. 790 relied upon by the petitioner was challenged. That Bench referred the following questions for derision by a larger Bench," I. Is an order of assessment made by an authority under a taxing statute which is intra vires open to challenge as repugnant to Art. 19 (I) (g), on the sole ground that it is based on a misconstruction of a provision of the Act or of a notification issued thereunder ?" 2. Can the validity of such an order be questioned in a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution ?11

Held (per Das, Kapur, Sarkar, Hidayatullah and Mudholka~, JJ.) that in the case under consideration the answer to tht que!tions must be in the negative. The case of Kai/,ash Nath was not correctly decided and the deci•ion is not sustainable on the authorities on which it was baaed. Kai/JJshNath v. State of U. P., A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 790, disapproved. Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bih,ar, (1955) 2 S. C. R. 603 and Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India, (1956) s. C. R. 267, explained. Per S. K. Das, J.-The right to move this Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of fundamental right~ conferred by Pait IIJ of the Constitution is itself a guaranteed fundamental right and this Court is not trammelled by procedural technicalities in making an order or issuing a writ for the enforcement of such rights. There is no disagreement that in the following three classes of cases a question of the enforcement of a fundamental right may arise and if it docs arise, an application under Art. 32 will lie, namely, (IJ where action is taken under a statute which is ultra vires the Constitution; (2) where the statute is intra vir~s but the action taken is without jurisdiction; and ( 3J where the action taken is procedurally ultra vire• as where a quasi-judicial authority under an obligation to act judicially passes an order in violation of the principles of natural justice. Where, however, a quasi-judicial authority makes an order in the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction in pursuance

l s.c.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS

of a provision of law which is intra vires, .an error of law or fact committed by that authority cannot be impeached otherwise than on appeal, unless the erroneous determination relates to a matter on which the jurisdiction of that body depends. A tribunal may lack jurisdiction if it is improperly constituted, or if it fails to observe certain essential preliminaries to the inquiry; but it does not exceed its jurisdiction by basing its dedsion upon an incorrect determination of any question that it is empowered or required (i. e. has jurisdiction) to determine. In such a case, the characteristic attribute of a judicial act or decision is that it binds, whether right or wrong, and no question of the enforcement of a fundamental right can arise on an application under Art. 32. Therefore, an order of assessment made by an authority under a taxing statute which is intra vires and in the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction cannot be challenged on the sole ground that it is passed on a misconstruction of a provision of the Act or of a notification issued thereunder. The validity of such an order cannot be questioned on an application under Art. 32. The proper remedy for correcting such an error is to proceed by way of appeal or if the error is an error apparent on the face of the record, then by an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Mall&arjun v. N_arhari, (1900) 5 L.R. 27 I.A. 216, Aniyoth KunAamina Umma v. Ministry of Rahabilitation,(1962)1 S.C.R. 505, Gulabdas II Co. v; Assistant Collector of Customs, A.l.R. 1957 S. C. 733, Bhatnagar & Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1957) S. C.R.- 701, and Parbhani Transport Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Regional Transport.Authority, (1960) 3 S. C.R. 177, referred to. Case law reviewed.

Per Kapur, J.-Since the statute was constitutionalJy valid every part of it must be 10 and the determination by the Sales Tax Officer, acting within his jurisdiction under the Act, even though erroneous, was valid and legal. An order of assessment under a statute that was ultra

tJ&ru could not be equated with one passed under another that wu intra tliru, even though erroneous. Unlike the former the latter was a constitutioJaal and legal Act and could not violate a fundamental right and or· be impugned under Art. 3~ of the Constitution.

If the Salea Tax Officer, acting quasi-judicially, miscon$.. trued the notification, which it had jurisdiction to c~nstruc) and imposed a tax, there could be no infringement qf Art. 19 ( 1) (g) of the ConatitutiQn

11161

Smt. fljjam Bai

v.

State of Ultar Pradesh

1911

Sr.rt. Ujj•m B1i

••

Sl1u •I Uttlf'

P""4sh

SUPREME COURT REPORTS Ll963] Case law discussed.

Per Subha Rao, J.-The Conslitulion is the paramount Jaw. As the Constitution declares the fundamental rights and also pres-:ribcs the restrictions that may be imposed thereon, no institution can overstep the limits directly or indirectly by encroaching upon the said rights. This Court has no more important function to perform than to preserve the funda mental rights of the people, and has l:'-cen given all the instituti<r nal conditions necessary to exercise its jurisdiction without fear or favour. It is settled law that Art. 32 confers a wide jurisdiction on this Court to enforce the fundamental rights that the right to enforce a fundamental right is itself~ fundamental right, and that it j1 the duty of this Court to entertain an application and to d~cidc it on merits whenever a party approaches it, irrespective of whether the question raised involves a question of Jurisdiction, Law or fart. Though the Legislature can make a law imposing rcasonaplc restrictions on a fundamental right in the interest of the public, the Constitution docs not empower the Legislature tp make an order of an executive authority final so '!S to deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction under Art. 32 of the Constitution.

The principles and procedure evolved by the courts in England in regard to the issue of prerogative writs cann.ot circumscribe tbe wide power of the Supreme Court to issue orders and directions for the enforcement of fuml11mcnta I rights. The issuance of such writs can be regulated by evolving appropriate procedure to meet different situations. What• ever may be the stage at which this Court is approached this Court roay in i1s discretion, if the question involved is one of jurisdiction or a construction of a provision, decide the qucs.. tion and enforce the right without waiting till the procedure pres<ribcd by a law is exhausted; but if it finds that questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and Jaw arc involved, it may give an opportunity to the party, if he agrees, to renew the application after he has exhausted his remedies under the Act, or, if he docs not agree, to adjourn the petition till after the remedies arc exhausted. If the fundamental right of the petitioner depends upon the findings of fact arrivca at by the administrative tribunals in exercise of the p0wcrs conferred on them under the Act, this Court may in its discretion ordinarily accept the findings and dispose of the application on the basis of those findings. The principle of rea jvdicata accepted by this llOW't in Daryao v. Stal• of U. P. cannot be involved in the case 0£ orders of administrative tribunals. That apart, when

a

1 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

petitioner seeks to quash the order of a tribunal, no question of ru judicata arises, as that doctrine implies that there should be two proceedings and that in the former proceeding an issue has been decided inter-pa.rtes and therefore the same cannot be rcagitated in a subsequent proceeding. Daryao v. State of U. P. (1962) 1 S. C.R. 564. considered.

Whether relief can be given under Art. 32 against the order of a court or not, it is c\ear that administrative tribunals arc only the limba of the Executive, though they exercise quasi-judicial functions, and therefore arc clearly comprchen· ded by the expression "other authorities" in Art. 12 of the Constitution and in appropriate cases writs can be issued against them. On a plain reading of the impugned notification it is clear that hand-made bidis arc exempted from sales tax under the Act and therefore the Sales-tax Authorities have no power to impose sales tax thereon. The decision of this Court in the case of Kailaah Nath v. State of U. P., was not incorrect or based on irrelevant decisions. KailashNath v. State of U. P., A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 790, followed. Gulabdas & Co. v. Assistant Collector of Customs, A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 733, Bhatnagara &: Oo. Lid. v. Union of India, (1957) S. C.R. 701 and Pharbani Transport Co-operative .jociety v. Regional Transport Authority, (1960) 3 S. C.R. 1'77. considered.

· Mjs. Ram Narain Sona Ltd. v • ...4,asU. Commisaion,er of Sales Paz, (1955) 2 S. C.R. 483, J. V. Gokal & Oo. v. Asatt. Collector of Salu Paz, (1960) 2 S. C.R. 852 and M. L. Arora v. Ezcise and Tazation Officer, (1962) 1 S. C. R. 823 referred to.

'

'

Case-law discussed.

Per Hidayatullah, J .-Article 32 contains a gwµ-a,ntcc:d right to move the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundain• ental rights and any person whose fundamental rights bav~ been invaded has a guaranteed right to ~k relict from the Court without having to seek to enforce his remedies elsewhere first. :-.nt the right which he can claim ·is no~ a general right of .~ppeal tgain.'lt dcci!!ion, of courts ao.d tribqna1$, The Supreme Court in examining such petitions·would examine them

1961 Smt. Ujjam B•I

•• Ult• s 1a.t1 •f Prntl,sh

784 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963] 198'

s,,.t. UJjam Bai v. Slat1 of U" 1r

Pr•tl1sh

from the narrow stand point of a breach of fundamental rights. If a petitioner fails to establish that, he will fail outright. Taxing laws may sufl'cr froru mauy defects : they may be opposed to the fundamental rights, they may be made by a legislature beyond its own competence, or without observing the formalities laid down by the Constitution. If a taxing law is opposed to fundamental rights it can be challenged under Art. 32. It is not necessary to resort only to Art.265 because Art. 32 stands in no need of support from Art.265. The taxing authorities are instrumr.ntalitics of Govern.. ment. They are a part of the executive even though in assessing and levying the tax they act as quasi-judicial bodies. Their actions in demanding the tax in the ultimate analysis are executive actions. If that action is not backed by law or is beyond their jurisdiction an aggrieved person can have recours• to Art. 32 of the Constitution. Where, however, no question of vire• of the law or jurisdiction is involved the Supreme Court would ordinarily not interfere in a petition under Art. 32 even though the interpretation he erroneous as the matter can be set right by recourse to such appeals or revisions as the law permits. This is based upon the well accepted rule that a court having jurisdiction may decide wrongly as well as rightly. If there i• an error not involving jurisdiction that error can be corrected by the ordinary means of appeals and revisions including an appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court. But if the law is unconstitutional or the interpretation is about jurisdiction which is erroneous a writ under Art. 32 can be claimed. The Supreme Court will keep its two roles separate, namely, (a) as the Supreme Appellate Tribunal against the decisions of all r.ourts and tribunals and (b) as Court of guaranteed J"Cllort for enforcement of fundamental rights. It will not act as the latter when the case is only for exercise of its power as the former. It will, however, interfere if a clear case of breach of fundamental rights is made out even though there may be other remedies open including an approach to the Supreme Court in its appellate jurisdiction.

Ptr Ayyangar, J.-From the fact that a statute was competently enacted and did not violate fundamental rights, it did not necessarily follow that quasi-judicial authorities created by it could not violate fundamental rights. Legislative competence covered only such action as could on a proper interpretation of the statute be taken under it. If a law did not create a liability an authority acting under it could Rot do so by a 111iainterpret1ltion of it, for Legialative backing for

1 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

the imposition of such a liability would be plainly lacking. The answer· to the question should, therefore, be that an action of a quasi-judicial authority would violate a fundamental right where by a plain and patent misconstruction of the statue such an authority affected fundamental rights. This would constitute another category besides the three others in respect of which violation of such rights was not in doubt, namely, where the statute itself was invalid or unconstitutional, where the authority exceeded its jurisdiction under the Act and where it contravened mandatory procedure prescribed by the statute or vielated the principles of natural justice. The exerciae of the judicial power of the State might alsq equally with the Legislative and Executive part involve the violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. Since in the instant case the construction put upon the notification by the Sales Tax Officer was reasonable possible, it was a c;ase of mere error of law and not a pat~nt error or an error apparent on the face of the record which could justify the issue of a writ of certiora1i.

Per Mudholkar, J.-The question of enforcement of a fundamental right could arise if a tax wa! a§sessed under a law whiCh was (I) void under Art. 13 or, (2) was ultra virea the Constitution or, (3} where it was suborainate legislation, it was ultra virea the law under which it was made or inconsistent with any other law in force. A Similar question would arise if the tax was assessed by an authority (I) other than the one empowered to do so under the taxing law Qr (2) in violation of the procedure prescribed by law or, (3) in colourable exercise of the powers conferred by the law. \Yhere a tax ~ a&Sessed bona· fide by a competent authority under a vahd law ind under the procedu1e laid down by it, no question of infringement of any fundamental right could arise, even though it was based upon an erroneous construction of law unless the tax imposed was beyond the competence of the Legislature 01· violated any of the fundamental rights or any other provisions of the Constitution. A mere misconstruction of a provision of ?aw did not render the decision of a quasi-judicial tribunal void as being beyond jurisdiction. It stood till it was corrected in the appropriate manner and if such a decision a person was held liable to pay tax he could not treat it as a nullity and contend that it was not authorised by law: The position would be

1968 Smt. Ujjam 81J1

·v.

Staleiof Utta1 Pra<Jesh

Smt. U.iJam B11i

the same even though upon a proper construction the law did not authorise the levy. '

••

Sl.t• •f U1tar l'rt1duh

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]

0RIGIN.4.L JURlSDICTION :

l!J59.

Petition No. 79 of

Petition under Art. :!2 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights. WITH Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 1349 of 1961. Application for restoration of Civil .Appeal No. 172 of 1960 M/s. Mohan Lal Hargovind Dai v. The_Sales Tax Officer, Allahabad. M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, G. K. Daphtury, Solicitor·General of India, G. S. Pathak, S. V. Khare, S. N. And.leg, Rameahwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the petitioner. H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, M. V. Goswami and O. P. Lal, for the respon· dents.

N. ,A. Palkhivala, B. Parthaaqrathi, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. G. Mathur, and Ravinder Narain, for Intervener (Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co., Ltd., Bombay).

A. S. fl. Chari, D. P. Singh and M. K. Ram11murthi, for Intervener (State of Bihar) . H. N. Sanyal, Additioru&f, Bolicit<>r-Genera/, of Ind.Us,, B, R. L. Iyengar and T.JI. Sen, for Intervener (State of lly110re). S. N. Andley, Rameahwar Nath and Vohra, for the petit\oner (in C. M. f. No. 1349 of 1961). H. N. 8anya/,, .ddditional Solicitor-General of India, G. G. Mathur, M. V. Go&Wa'llJ,i for C. P .. ui, for the respondent (in C. M. P. No. 1349 of 1961).

1 S. C. R.

--(

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1961. April 28. The above petition coming up for hearing in the first instance before the Constitution Bench consisting of S. K. Das, J. L. Kapur, M. Hidayatallah, J.C. Shah and T. L. Venkataram Ayyar, JJ., the matter was referred to the Chief Justice under O. V-A, r. 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1U50, as a.mended, by a Judgment delivered by VENKAT.A.RAMA AIYAR, J.-The petitioner is a partner in a. firm oa.lled Messrs. Mohan Lal Hargovind Das, which carries on business in the manufacture a.nd sale of biris in number of States, and is dealer registered under the U .P. Sales Tax Act 15 of 1948 with its head office at A1Iahabad. In the present petition filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution, the petitioner impugns the validity of a levy of sales tax made by the Sales Tax Officer, Allahabad, by his order dated December 20, 1~58.

On December 14, 1957, the Government of Uttar Pradesh issued a notification under s. 4(1) (b) of the Act exempting from tax, sales of certain goods including biris, provided that the additional Central Excise duties leviable thereon had been paid. Jn partial modification of this notification, the Government issued another notification on November 25, 1958, exempting from tax unconditionally sales of biris, both machinemade and handm ·tde, with effect from July 1, 1958, The effect of the two notifications aforesaid taken together is that while for the period, Deoember 14, 1957, to June 30, 1958, the exemption of biris from tax was s1~bject to the proviso contained in the notification dated December 14, 1957, for the period commencing from July 1, 1958, it was unconditional and absolute. The petitiom~r's firm filed its return for the quarter ending June, 1958, disclosing a gross turn-

1962 Sml. U]Jam 11-i

v.

Sto•• 11! Utl•r Pruesh

-~---·

.. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]

over of Rs. 75,44,633(- and a net turnover of Rs. lll/- representing the sale proceeds of empty Smt. Ujjarit Bwi. packages, and deposit~d a sum of Hs. 3.51 n.P. as •• SttJllofUttar sales tax on the latter. On November· 28, 1958, the Pradesh . ·Sale~ Tax Officer, Allahabad, sent a notice to the \ pe'. ... .>aer's firm for assessment of tax on the sale of biris during the period, April J, 1958, to June 30, · ··· ·1958, and·cin the date 'of enquiry which was held on December 10, 1958, the petitioner filed a petition stating that by rea,son of the exemption grant, ed under tlie notification No. ST-4485/X dated December 14, 1957, no tax was payable on the. sale of biris.. By his order dated. December 20, 1958, the Sale Tax Officer rejected tbis .. contention. He observed: . 1362 .

"The exemption envisaged in this noti. fication applies to dealers in respect of Biris; . provided that the· additional Central Excise . ·duties leviable thereon from the closing of . business on December 13, J 957, have beeri ·paid on such· goods.. The assessee paid no such Excise duties. Sales of Biris by the assessee are, therefore, liable to sales tax." Against this order; there was an a}'peal (Appeal No. 441'of1959) to the Courts of the Judge (Appeals), Sales Tax, Allahabad, who, by his order dated l\fay ·' I, 1959, dismissed the same on the ground that the · ·exemption from sale tax under the notification ·r · related "to such classes of goods only on which the -~ Additional Central Excise Duty was . leviable.'' Under s. IO of the Act; a person aggrieved by an order in appeal might take it up on revision before ·the Revising Authority, and under s, 11, the asses. see has a right to require that any question of law '" .. ,.... arising out of the order of assessment be referred to the opinion of the High Court. The Petitioner did not take any proceedings under· the Act against . . the order.in appeal'dated l\Ia;v 11 1959, anq that 4a& .. peco!lle fmal. · . . . .. ·

1 S. C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

While Appeal No. 441 of 1959 was pending, the petitioner also filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution a petition in the High Court of Alla.ha.bad, for a. writ of certiorari to qua.sh the assessment order dated December 20, 1958. That was dismiSBed on January 27, 1959, by the learned Judges on the ground that, as the assessee could contest the validity of the order in appropriate proceedings under the Act, and as, in fact, an appeal had b~en filed, there was no ground for exercising the extra.ordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226. In this view, the learned Judges did not decide the case on the merits, but observed that the "language of the notification might well be read as meaning that the notification is to apply only to those goods on which an additional Central excise duty had been levied and paid." The petitioner then field an application under Art. 133 of the Constitution for certificate for appeal to this Courts against the above order, and that was granted. But instead of pursuing that remedy, the petitioner has chosen to file the present application under Art. 32 challenging the validity of the order of assessment dateed December 20, 1958. It is alleged in the petition that t.he imposition and levy of tax aforesaid "amounts to tP,e infringement of the fundamental rights of the petitioner to carry on trade and busineSB guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution," and that it is further "an illegal confisoation of property without compensation and contravenes the provisions of Art. 31 of the Constitution." The prayer in the petition is that this Courts might be "pleased to issue(a) a writ of certiorari or other order in the na.ture of certiorari qua.ahing the ~order of the Sales Tax Officer, Al1ahabad, dated 20th December 1958; (b) a writ of mandamus directing the opposit.e parties not to realise any sales tax from the petitioner on the basis of the said order dated 20th

Deoember, 1958."

196B Smt. Ujjam Bai

v. Stet1 of Uttu Praduh .AiyarJ.

1962 Slilt. Ujja,. Bo; v. Sl•I• of Utltrr p •tfnh

SUPREME COURT .REPORTS (1963]

No argument has been addressed to Ull that the impugned nrder of aEsessment is in contnvention of Art. 31. Such a contention would be wholly untenable in view of the decision of this Court in Ramjilal v. Inwme-t,ax Officer (') and Laxmanappa Hanumant,appa v. Union of India' ('), where it has been held that when tax is authorised by law as required by Art. 265, the levy is not open to attack under Art. 31 of the Constitution. Th whole of the argument on behalf of the petitioner is that the assessinen t order is unconstitutional as infringing Art. 19(1 )(g ). It is contended in support of this position that the Sales Tax Officer has misconstrued tlie notification dated December 14, 1957, in holding that exemption of tax thereunder is limited to biris OD which additional excise duty had b1 en levied, that as s result of such misconstruction tax he.6 been imposed which is unauthorised, and that constitutes an interference with the light of the petitioner to <'arry on business guarantePd by :Art. l9(l)(g). That is how the jurisdiction of this Court un<ler Art. 32 is invoked. To this, the answer of the respondents is that the Sales Tax Officer had correctly construed the notification in limiting the exemption to iroods on which additional euise duty had been paid The respondents fort her raise a preliminary o bjeotion to the maintainability of this petition on the ground that Jaws of taxation which are protected by Art. 26.'i fall outside the purview of Part III of the Constitution, and are not open to attack as infringing fundamental rights iruaranteed therein, 1tnd that even if they are subject to the restrictions in Part III, an order of assessment made by a tribunal acting iudicially under a statute which b intra i>ires such as the impugned order dat<'d DecPmber 20 1958. does not infringe Art. 19(1\(g), and that, further, a petition un<ler Art.32 is not maintainable (1) [1951] S.C.R. 127. 136, 137.

(2) (1"55) 1 S.C.R 769, 772.

l S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

for challenging it, even if it is erroneous on the merits. On these contentions, the points that arise for decision are whether taxa.tion laws are subject to the limitations imposed bv Part III; whether th~ order of assessment dated December 20, 1958, is in contravention of Art. 19(l)(g); and whether it can be impugned in a. petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. The first question that fa.Hs to be considered is whether the restrictions imposed in Part of the Constitution have application to taxation laws. The contention of the respondl"nts is that ·taxation is a topic which is dealt with separately in Pa.rt XII of the Constitution, that the governing provision is Art.265, which enacts that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of la.w, that when there is a law authorising the imposition of tax and that does not contravene any of the inhibitions in Part XII, then the lery thereunder cannot be attacked as infringing any of the fundamental rights declared in Pa.rt III. In support qf thi.s contention, the following observations in Ramjil,al,'s case (1) were relied on: "Reference ha.a next to be ma.de to article 265 which is in Part XII, Chaptt•r I, dealing with · 'Finanoe''. That article provides th11t ·tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. There was no similar provision in the correspond in~ chapter of the Government of India. Act, 1935. If collection of taxes amounts to de.privation of property within the meanin~ of Art. 31(1), then there was·no point in making a. separate provision again as ·has been made in article 265. It, therefore, follows tha.t clause ( 1) of Article 31 must be regarded as concerned with deprivation of propert.y otherwise thnn by the imposition or collection or tax, for otherwise article 265 becomes

m

(I l (1951) S C.R. 127, 136, 137.

1161

Smt U'J]tD11 Bai

'·

S~lefUtlti'

PNll'ish A.iyar J.

19'2 Sml. Ujjam Bai v. Sl•I• of UUar

Pra'4sh

SUPREME COtmT REPORTs [1963)

wholly redundant. In the United States of America the power of taxation is regarded aa distinct from t,he exercise "of police power or eminent domain. Our Constitution evidently has also treated taxation as distinct from compulsory acquistion of property and has made independent provisition giving protection &gainst taxation save by authority of law ......... In our opinion, the protection against imposition and collectiol} of taxes save by authority of law directly comes from article 265, and is not secure<:l. by clause (1) of Article 31. Article 265 not being in Cha.pter III of the Constitution, its protection is not a fundamental right which can be enforced by an applicAtion to this court under article 32. It is not our purpose to say that the right secured by article 265 may not be enforced. It may certainly be enforced by adopting proper proceedings. All that we wish to state is that this application in so far as it purports to be founded on article 32 read with article 31 ( 1) to this court is misconceived and must fail." A similar decision was given in LaxmanaJYP<J Hanurnant.appa v. Union of lntlMt (1). Where an order of assessment made in November, 1953, was attacked in a petition under Art. 32 on the ground that the Act under which it was made, viz,, the Taxation on Inoome (Investigation Commission) Act (30 of 1947) was void under Art. 14 of the Constitution. !{ejecting this contention, Mahajan, C. J., delivering the Judgment of the Court, observed: "The assessment orders under the Incometax Act itself were made against the petitioner in November. 1953. In these circumstances (I) (1955) I s.c.R. 769, 772.

I

l S.C.R.

SUPREME OOORT REPORTS

we are of the opinion that he is entitled to no

1911

Pelief under the provisions of article 32 of the Constitution. It was held by this Court in Bamji'lal v. lncome1f.az Officer, Mohindergarh(1) that as there is a. specie.I provision in article 26.5 of the Constitution that no tax shall be levied or collected accept by authority of law, clause (1) of artiole:&l must therefore be r6garded as concerned with deprivation of property otherwise than by the iimposition or collection of taix, and ina~muoh as the right conferred by article 265 is not a right conferred by Part III of the Constituiion, it could not be enforced under article 32."

Sml. Ujjam B d v.

The argument of the re~pondents based on the a.hove decisions is tha.t a law imposing a ta.x enacted by a. competent Jegisla.tur~ .is not open to atta.1:k under the provisions of Pa.rt III. The contt>ntion of the petitioner, on the other hand, is that a. law of taxation is.also subject to the limitations prescribed in Part III of the Constitution, and the recent decision of this Cour:t in K. T. MoopilNair. v. The 8wte of Keral,a (2 ) ie relied on in support of it. There, the question was whether the provisions of the Tra.vanoore-Coohin Land Tax Act 15 of 1955, as amended by the 'l'ra..vanooreOoohin Land Tax (Amendment) Act 10 of 1957, contravened Art. 14 of the Constitution. The Court wurof:the opinion that the.y did. Then the contention WAS raised that in view of Art. 265 the legislation wae not open to attaok .under therprovisions of Pa'dt III. •In repelling this contention, the Co.urt Observed: "Article 265 i~poses a. limitation on the ta.zing power of the State in so far as it prov:ides that. the State sba.11 not levy or collect a tax, except by authority of law, that (I) (19Sl) S.(;.R. 127, 136, 137.

(2) ( 1961) 3

s.c.a. 71.

s1ai. •I f1 ,,.,.

J96J

Smi. Ujjam Bai

••

S1at1 If UlltW

p,.tJ4s'

A\yar I.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963] ia to say, a tax cannot be levied or collected by a mere executive fiat. It has to be done by authority of law, which must mean valid law. In order that the law may be valid, the tax proposed to be levied must be within the legislative competence of the Legislature imposing a tax and authorising the collection thereof and, secondly, the tax must be subject to the conditions laid down in Art.13 of the Constitution. One of such conditions envisaged by Art. 13( 2) is that the Legislature shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the equality clause in Art. 14, which enjoins the State not to deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protec. tion of the laws of the country. It cannot be disputed that if the Act infringes the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution, it must be struck down as unconstitutional."

In the result, the impugned legislation was struck down as unconstitutional. It might appear at first sight that this decision is in conflict with the decisions in Ramjilal's case (1) and Laxmanapp's case ('). But when the matter is closely examined, it will be seen that it is not so. In Ramjilal's case (1) and in Laxmnappa's case('), the contention urged was that the tax which is duly authorised by valid legislation a.s required by Art. 265 will still be bad under Art. 31(1) a.s a.mounting to deprivation of property. This was negatived, and it was held that Art. 31(1) had no application to a law, which was within the protection afforded by Art. 265. There are observations in the above decisions which might be read a.s meaning that taxation la.we a.re altoirether outside the operation of Pa.rt III. But, in the context, they have reference to the application of A~ 31(1.). In (I) ( 1951) s.c.R.127. 156, IS7.

(2) ( 1955) I S.C.R 769. 17Z.

1 S.C.R

SUPREME OOURT REPORTS

Moopil Nair's oase (1), the contention urged was that even though a taxing law might be discriminatory. it was not open to attach under Art. 14 by reason of Art. 265. In negativing this contention, this Court held that a law which authorised the imposition of a tax under Art. 265 was also a law within Art. 13, and that, therefore, if it contravened Art. 14 it was liable to be struck down. This decision js clearly an authority for the position that laws of taxation must also pass the test of the limitations prescribed in Part III of the Constitution. But it is not an authority for the position that a.11 the provisions contained in Part III are necessarily applicable to those laws. It did not decide contrary to Ramjilal's case (2 ) and LaxmJJnappa's Qase.(3) that Art.31(1) would apply to a taxation law, which is otherwise valid. In our judgment. the correct position in law is that a taxation law infringes a. fundamental right cannot be shut. out on the ground that Art. 265 grants immunity to it from attack under the provisions of Part III, but that whether there has been infringement must be decided on a consideration of the terms of the particular Article, which is alleged to have been infringed, It is on this reasoning that taxation laws were held in Rumjilal's case (2) and in LaxmJJooppa's case C) to be unaffected by Art. 31(1), whereas in Moopit Nair's case (1 ) tht1y · were held to be within the purview of Art. 14. In this view. the ·question that arises for decision is whether Art. 19(1) (g), which is alleged to have been infringed, is applicable to a sales tax law which bas been enacted by a competent legislature and which is not otherwise Ultra vires. Article 19(1) (g) enacts that all citizens have the right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or busines~. Is a law imposing a tax on ea.le by a dealer an infringement of his right to carry on trade ? We . must (l) (1961) S s.C.ll. '7. · (2) (1951) S.C.ll. 127, 136. 137. ($) (1VS5) 1 S.C.ll. 769, 722.

1962 81111. Ujjom Bai

v.

State of Uttar Praduh

1962 Smt. Ujjam Bai

••

Stat1 oj Uttar

Praderh

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963J

assume for the purpose of the prosent diaoussion that the sales tax statute in question is within the competenca of the legislature and is not ultra vires. Where a law is passed by a legislature which has no competence to enact it as when a States Legislature imposes what is in substance, a tax on income, a subject which is within the exclusive competence· of the Centre under Entry 82, that legislation has no existence in the eye of 'law and any levy of tax under the provisions of that law will not be within the protection afforded by Art. 265, and will, in consequence, be hit by Art. 19( 1) (g). The same result would follow when a law though disguised as a taxation law, is, in substance a law which is intended to destroy or even burden trade and not to raise revenue. That is colourable legislation which cannot claim the benefit of Art. 2tl5, and it must be held 'to contravene Art. 19(1) (g) unless saved by Art. 19(6). But where the law in within the competence of the legislature and i9 otherwise valid and is not colourable can it be said that it is liable to b~ attacked as infringing Art. 19(1) -(g)? The.object of the legislation is not to prevent the dealer from carrying on his business. Far from it it envi· sages that the tra'ler will carry on his business and carry it on a large scale so that the State might iiarn the tax. It. is, therefore, difficult to conceive how a sales tax law can fall within the vision of Art. 19(1) (g). Arts. 19(1) (f) and 19(1) (gl are in the same position as Art. 31 ( 1). They all of them enact that the citizen shall have the right to hold property or to carry on business without interference by the State. If Art. 31( I) is as held in Ramjilal'Bcase (1) and Laxamanappa'B case (') inapplicable to taxation laws, Arts. 19(1) (f) must on the same reasoning also be held to be inapplicable to such la.ws. (I) (1~51) S.C.R. 127, 136, 137.

(2) ( 1955) I S.C:lt. 769, 772.

1 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

The question can also be considered from another standpoint. Art.19(1) (g) and Art. l!J(6) from parts of one law which has for its object the definition of the fundam~ntal right of a citizen to carry on bueiness. Article 19( l) (g) declares that right. and Art. 19(6) prescribes its limits. The two provisions together make-up the whole of the fundamental right to carry on business. If a taxation law is within Art. 19(1) (g) it must also be capble of being upheld as a reasonable restriction under Art. 19(6). But can imposition of a tax be properly said to be a restriction on the carrying on of trade within Art. 19(6)? It is only if that is so that the question of reasonableness can arise. If the imposition of sales tax is a restriction on the carrying on of business then the imposition of income tax must be that even to a greater degree. Likewise land tax must be held to be a res1'riotion on the right of a citizen . to hold property guaranteed by Art. 18(1) {g). Indeed it will be impossible to conceive of any taxation law which will not be a restriction under Art. 19(1) (fj or Art. 19(1) (g). It is difficult to imagine that that is the meaning which the word ''restriction" was intended to bear in Arts. 19(5) Hind (6). That this is not the correct interpretation to be put on the word "restriction" will be clear when Art. 19(6) is further. examined. Under that provision, the question whether a restriction is reasonable or not is one for the determination of the Court and tha.t determination has to be made on an appreciation or the facts established. If it is to be held th11it taxation laws a.re within Art. 19(1) (g) then tbe qut'lstion whether they are reasonable or not becomes justiciable and how is the Court to· judge whether they are · so or not ? Can tht1 Court say that\hat the taxation is excessive and is unreasonable? What are t.he materials on which the matter could be decided, and what are the criteria on which the decision thereon could

1962 Smt. Ujjam Bai

••

St7te of Uttar Pradesh

Aiyar •

1961

..

Smt Ujjam Boi

State of Una., Prad~sh

•'

-I ~

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)

be reached ? It would, therefore, seem that the reasonableness of taxation laws is not a matter which is justiciable and therefore they oould not fall within the purview of Arts. 19 (5) and (6). If it is to be held that taxation laws are within the inhibition enacted in Art. 19(2) (g), then all those laws must be struck down as unconstitutional, because they could never be saved under Art. 19(5) and Art. 12(6). It should be noted that Art. 19(1) (g) and Art. 19(6) form parts of one soheme and for a proper understanding of the one, regard must be had to the other, Article 19(1) (g) cannot operate where Art. 19(6) oannot step iµ and the considerations a.rising under Art. 19(6) being foreign to taxation laws Art. 19(1) (g) can have no application to them. We may now refer to the decisions of this Court where the question of a.pplioability of Art. 19(1) (g) to taxation laws has been considered. Himmat/nJ, Harilal Metha v. The St,ate of Madhya Prade.sh (1) the question a.rose with refere· nce to a sales tax which was sought to be imposecl under explanation I~ to s. 2 (g) of the Central Provinces and Ber:u Sales Tax Act 21 of 1947, under which a sale was defined as a transaction by which property in goods which were aotually within the !State was transferred wherever the sale might have been made. That provision was held to be ultra vires the State Legislature. A dealer then filed an application under Art. 226 in the High Court of Nagpur questioning the vires of that provision and asking for appropriate writ. The State resisted the application on the ground that as there was a special machinery provided in the Act for questioning the assessment a. petition under Art. 226 was not maintainable. In rejecting this contention this Court-held that, "Explanation II to seotion 2 (g) of the Aot having been deola.red ultra any (1) [19MJ s.c.a. 1122,1121.

llirea.

s.c.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS '799

imposition of saJes tax on tbc appeJlant ·in Madhya Pradesh is without the authority of law, and that being so a threat by the State by using the ·coercive ma·chinery of the impugned Act to realise it from the appellant is a sufficient infringement of his fundamental right under Art. 19( 1) (g) a.nd it was clearly entitled to relief under Art. 2~6 of the Constitution". Thie decision is a direct authority for the proposition that when a provision in a taxing statute is ultra vires and void any action taken thereunder is without the authority of law, as required under Art. 265 and that in that situation Art. 19 (1) (g) would be attracted, This decision was approved in The Bengal Immunity Company Limired v. The State of Bihar (1). The facts of that case are that the appellant-Company filed a petition under Art. 226 in the High Court of Patna for a writ of prohibition restraining the Sales Tax Officer from making an assessment of sales tax pursuant to a notioe issued by him. The appellant claimed that the sales sought to be assessed were made in the course of inter-State Trade that the provisions of the Bihar sales Act 19 of 1947 which authorised the imposition of tax on such sales were repugnant to Art. 286(2) and vofol and that, therefore, the proceedings taken by the. Sales Tax Officer should be quashed. That application was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that if the Sales Tax Officer made an assessment which was erroneous the a.ssessee could challenge it by way of appeal or revision under ss.24 & 25 of the Act and that as the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Officer, no writ of prohibition or certiorari could be issued. There was an appeal against this (l) [l95S] 2. S. C.R. 603, 619, 620.

. '

-1111

Sm1. Ujjom Bai

v.

Slal1 of Vttat Pradl11t

.)mt. Ujja1n ·Bai

••

Slot• of U11., p,•tksA

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]

order to this Court and therein a preliminary objection was taken that a writ under Art. 226 was not the appropriate remedy open to an asdeBBee for challenging the legality of the proceedings before & Sales Tax Officer. In rejecting this contention this Court observed: "It ia however clear from article 265 that no tax can be levied or collected except by authority of law which must mean a good & valid law. The contention · of the appellant company is that the Act which authorises the assessment, levying and collection of Sales tax on inter state trade contravenes & constitutes an infringement of Art. 286 and is therefore ultra vires, void and unenforceable. If however this contention be well founded the remedy by way of a writ must on principle and authority be available to the party aggrieved''. And dealing with the contention that the petitioner should proceed by way of appea,J or revision under the· A<'t, this Court observed: "The answer to this plea is short and simplb, The remedy under the Act cannot be said to be adequate and is, indeed, nugatory or useless if the Act which provides for such reme<ly is itself ultra vires and void and the principle relied upon can, therefore, have no application where a party comes to Court with an allegation that his right has been or is beinii; threatened to be infringed by a law which is ultra vires the powers of the legislature which enacted it and as such void and prays for appropriate relief under article 226". It will be seen that in this ease the queation arose with reference to a provision in the taxing statute, which was ultra 11ires, and the decision was only that any action taken under such a proYision

-

I S.C.R.

SUPREME COUR1' REPOR11S

was without, ·the authority of law and was, therefpr.e, an unoonstitutiona.l interference with the right to carry on business under Art. 19( l)(g). There is nothing, in these two decisions which lends any support to the contention that, where the provision of law under which assessment is made i~ intra vires, the order is liable to be impugned as contravening Art. 19(1 )(g), if the order is, on the merits, erroneous. fhat, howa.ver, was held in the decision ill Kailaa Nalh v. Swt.e of U. P. (1). In that case, a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution was filed in this Court challenging an order of assessment on the ground that the l:>a.les Tax Officer h.ad disallowed an exemption on a misconstruction of a notification issued under s. 4 of tfle U. P. Sales Tax Act, and that thereby the right of the petiti0ner to carry on business under Art. 19(l)(g) had been infringed. An objection waa taken that, even if the Sales Tax Officer had misconstrued the notification, no fundamental right of tJie petitioner had been infringed, and that "the petition was not maintainable, Overruling this contentfo.D, Govinda Menon, J., observed: "If a.tax is levied ~thout due lega.~ autho• i:ity on any trade or business, then it. is open to the citizen, aggriev.ed to approach this G:lowt. for B writ under Art. 32, ''since his l'light to O&l'1')7 Gil a irade is violated, or. infring~ by the; impoaition ud suoh being. the oaae, Art. 19(l)(g) oomes into play~'~ In SURPOrt of this view, the obser.~atione in The Bengal lmmunib.J Oompany'a case ~;i) w,ere relied on. Tll.e Petitioner contends. that, on this reasoning, Ar.t~.19(L)(g),must. be held to be violated.not merely whm an assessmont is made under a. sta.tute which ia. ~ra vires, but also when it is made on a. misconatruction of & statute, which. iS intra tJires., It je {l)i A:,t.R, 19512' S,1;.. 790; 792, 793,

(2) (1955) 2 8 C.R. 603, 619, 620

1161

S""· Ujj""' Ba v. Siat.·t>.f Ut1111

Pradailt ,{iJ!Clf' J.

1981 Sm1. Ujjam Bai v.

Stau of uu.,. Pr.drh

Aiyor J.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]

incontrovertible that that is the effect of the decision in Kailask Nath's case('). But it is equally incon.· trovertible that the decision in The Bengal Immunity Company's case {2 ), which it purports to follow, does not support it. There is a fundamental distinction between an order of assessment made on a provision, which is ultra 'Vires, and one made on a valid provision, which is misconstrued. Where the provision is void, the protection under Art. 265 fails, and what rt>mains is only unauthorised interference- with property or trade by a State Officer, and Arts. 19(1) (f) and (g) are attracted. But where the provision itself is valid, Art. 265 operates, and any action taken thereunder is protected by it. . An authority having jurisdiction to decide a matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, & the protection afforded by· Art. 265 is not destroyrd, if its· decision turns out to be erroneous. To such cas~s, Art. 19(I){g) has no application. Both in Himmaflal's case ( •) and in Bengal Immunity Company's case (') the decision of the Court that the proceedings constituted an infringement of the rights of the citizen under Art. 19(l)(g) was based expressly on the ground that Art. 265 did not apply to those proceedings. But this ground did not exist in Kailash NafJl's caae (6), and that makes all the difference in the legal position. The decision in Kailash Nath's oase (6) which merely purported to follow Tlie Bengal, Immunity Company's case ('), is open to the criticism that it has overlooked this distinction. We may now refer to two decision subsequent to the one in .Kailask Nath oase ( 1), which have been relied on by the petitioner. In Tata Iron and 8f£el Co., Lf,t},. v. 8. R. S~rkar (•), the question arose under the Central Sales Tax Act. Under tbat Act, sales in the course of inter-State trade are (I) AIR 1957 S.C. 790, 792, 793. (3) ( 1954) S.C.R. 1122, 1127

(2) (1955) 2. S.C.R. 603, 619, 620(4) (1961) 1.s.c.R. 379, sas, 402.

.•

1 S.0.R.

•

SUPREME OOURT REPORTS

liable to be taxed at a single point. The petitioner was assessed to tax on certain sales falling within Act by the Central Sales Tax Officer, Bihar, and tbetax was also duly paid. Thereafter, the Central Sales Tax Offioer in West Bengal ~ade an order assessing to tax the very sales in respect of whioh tax had been paid. The petitioner then moved this Court under Art. 32 for an order quashing the order of assessment. A preliminary objection to the maintainability of the pe~ition_ was taken on behalf of the respondent State on the ground that, under the Act the petitioner could file a.n appeal against the order of asseBBm:ent, .and that proceedings under .Art.32 were, thJefore, incompetent. In overruling this contention, Shah, J., referred to the decisions of this Court in Himmatlal's case (1), Bengal Immunity Ootnl/)(J,ny's case (2) and The Sfllt,e of Bombay v. UnitJ!,d Motors (India) Ltd (') and observed; ••In these cases, in appeals from orders passed by the High Courts in petitions under Art. 226, this Court held that an attempt to levy tax under a statute which was 'Ultra virea, infringed the fundamental right of the citizens, and recourse to tile High Court for proteotion of the fundamental right was not prohibited because of the provisions contained in Art. 265. In the oa"le before us, the tMe8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, are not ohallenged; but in Kailaah Nath v. Stat,e of U. P., a petition chaJlenging the levy of a tax was entertained by this .court ~ven though the Act under the authority of whioh the tax was sought to be recovered was not challenged as 'ldlra vires. It is not necessary for purposes of this case to decide whether the principle of Kaila81 N afh'a oase is inoonsistent with the view e%pressed by this court in Ramjilal'a Ca&e (1) (19M> s c.&. 1122. (3) (19.SS) S.c.R. •••

n21.

<2> (1955> 2 s.c:R. 603, &19, 620.

Smt. UJJom Bai

••

State -f Ullar PrGtlllh

80A 1112 8ro1. UiJ- Biii·

•• ... s-.ru11

,.,..,,.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (19~3)

'.!:he learned Judges then proceeded to hold that, as there was under the Act a single liability and that had been discharged, proceeding11 for the assessment of the same sales a second time to ~a.x infringed the fundamental right of the pet1t10ner to hold property. Dealing with this- point, Sarkar, J., observed in the ea.me case: "This Court held that an illegal levy of sales tax on a trader under an Act the legality of which was not challen'ged viola~ his fundamental rights under -Art. 19(1) (g) and a petition under Art. 32 with respect to such violation lies. The earlier case of 1951 S. C. R. 127 does not appear to have been considered. b is contended that the decision in Kailash Nath's case, requires reconsidera· tion .. We do not think, however, that the present is a fit case to go into the question whether the two cases are not reconcil&ble and to decide the preliminary question raised. The point was taken at a last stage of the proceedings after' much cost.a had been incur:ced". It is clear from the above observations th'l.t the learned Judges were of the opinion that t,he decision in Kailash Nath' s <Jll8e (1) required reconsideration. The ratio of the decition in Tat,a Iron and St,eeJ, Go. Ltd. v. S.R. Sarlcar(') would appear to be that, as the law did not autho11ise the _imposition of tax a second tim& on ea.Jes,. on wh1oh tax hae be1>n levied and collected, proceedings for assessment a second time. are without jurisdiction, and, therefure, Art. 19 {l) (f} ii attracl;ed. In the p~esent case, there is no contention that the prooee<ii.ng11 of the Sales Tax officer a.:ce without juriediotion. The. petitioner also relied on a recent !Meision Ill A.T.ll. 1957 SC 790, 792, 793. (2l- (19611 I S.C R. 379 !Jl3, 402.

-

I S.C.R. SUt>REME OOURT REPORTS

of this Court in Bhri Madanla/, Arora v. The Excise and Taxation officer, Amritsar (1). In tha.t oase, a notice for assessment was · issued after the expiry of the pl'riod prescribed therefor by the Statute. The assessee thereupon applied to this Court under Art. 32 for quashing the proeeedings on the ground tha.t they were without jurisdiction, and it was held that, as the taxing authority had no pow~r under the statute to issue the notice in question, the proceedings must be quashed. This a.gain is a. case, in which the authority had no jurisdiction under the Act to take proceedings for assessment of tax, and it makes no difference that such assumption of jurisdiction was ·based on a misconstruction of statutory provisions. In the present case, we ar& concerned with an alleged misconstruction, which bears on the merits of the assessment, and does not affect the jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Officer to make the assessment, and the two are essentially different. And we should add that the present question wn not raised or decided in that case. It remains to refer to the decision in M oopil Nair's case (2), which has been already discussed in connection with Art. 14. In that. case, the provisions of the Trava.ncore-Cochin Land Tax Act 15- of J 955 as amended by the Travanoore-Cochin Land Tax (Amendment) Act 10 of 1957, were held to be'bad as ·violative also of Art. 19 (l) (f). As the considerations e.pplioable to Ans. 19 (1) (f) and 19 (l~ (g) are the same, we should have to examine the ground on which this decision rests. They were, thus stated: •'Ordinarily, a taxing statute Jays-down a regular machinery for making assessment of the tax proposed to be imposed by the statute. It lays down detailed prooedute as (1)/(1962) J S.C.R. RZJ. (2) <1961> s s.c.a. 11.

19'1 S1nl. Vijca11(Bal

"·

St•r. o/ Uuor P,.0,11'

IHI Sml, Ujjui Biii

••

SIM, •f Ullar Prildlsll

Al_,., J,

SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [11163)

to notice to the proposed &88e88ee to ma.ke a return in respect of property proposed to be taxed, prescribes the authority and the procedure for hearing any objeotions to the lia.bility for taxation or as to the extent of the tax propoeed to be levied, a.nd finally, as to the right to challenge the regularity of assessment ma.de, by recourse to proceeding in a higher Civil Court ...... The Act being silent as to the machinery and procedure to be followed in making the asse88ment leaves it to the Executive to evolve the requisite machinery a.nd procedure. The whole thing, from beginning to end, is treated as or a purely administrative character, completely i!!noring the legal position that the assessment of a. ta.x on person or property 'is a.t least of a qua.si-judicial ,character ...... It is clear, therefore, tha.t a.pa.rt from being discriminatory and imposing unreasonable restrictions on holding property, the-Act is clearly oonfisoatory in character and effect .... For these reasons, as also for the reasons for which the provisions of ss. 4 and 7 have been declared to be unconstitutional, in view of the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution, all these operative sections of the Act, namely, 4, 6A and 7, must be held to offend Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution also.'' From tJie above observa.tfons, it will be - n that the ground on which the law was held to be in contrav,ention of Art. 1 9 ( l) (f) wu not one which had any reference to the merits of the assessment but to the procedure laid down for imposing tax. This decision is an authority only for the position that, where the prooedure laid down in a taxing statute is oppoaed to rulee of natural justice, then any i'llposition of tax under auoh a prooedure DlUSt be beld to vto1-te Art. llf

(1) (f).

i s.c.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Reference may be made to the following passage in Willoughby's Constitution of the United States, Second Edn, Vol. 3, p. 1718 relied on for the respondents : "It is established that the guaranty to suitors of due process of law does not furnish to them a right to have decisions of courts reviewed upon the mere ground that such decisions have been based upon erroneous findings of fact or upon erroneous determinations of law. Such errors, if committed by trial courts, can be corrected only by ordinary appeJlate proceedings as provided for by law. Especially bas this doctrine been declared in cases in which the Federal Courts have been asked to review the decisions of State courts". Our attention was also invited to the decisions in Mc Govern v. New York (1) and Amerioan Railway Express Oo. v. Kentucky (2). It was observed in the latter case: ''It is firmly e.Jtablished that a merely erroneous decision given by a State court in the regular course of judicial proceedings does riot deprive the unsuccessful party of proper· ty without due process of law."

The above remarks support the contention of the respondent that an order of a Court or tribunal is not hit by Art. 19 (i) (g). The result of the authorities may thus be summed up: (1) A tax will be valid only if it is authorised by a law enacted by a competent legislature. That is Art. 265. {I) [19131 229 U.S. 363. L. ed. 1228. (2) [1927] 279 U. S, 269~ 71 L. ed .. 639, 64-2.

1962 Smt. Ujjam Bai

v.

Bttlte of Uttaf'

Prad,sh

1161

..

;s,.1. UJjam Bai Stal1 oJ Ull•r P1adtsh

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]

(2) A law which is authorised as aforesaid must further be not repugnant ·to any of the provisions of the Constitution. Thus, .a law which contravenes Art. 14 will be bad, Moopil Nmr'a case (1). (3) A law which ill made by a competent legislature and which ·is not otherwise invalid, is not open to attack under Art. 31 (1). Ramjilal's case (') and Laxmanappa's case ( 2 ). (4) A law which is Ultra vires either because the legislature has no competence over it or it contravenes, some constitutional inhibition, has no legal existence, and any action taken thereunder will b" an infringement of Art. 19 (l)(g) Himmatlal'a case (') and Laxmanappa's case (') The remit will be same when the law is a colourable piece of legislation. ( 5) Where assessment proceedings art> taken without the i.uthority of law, or where the proceedings an• r~pugnant to rules of natural justice, there is an infringement of the right, guaranteed under Art. 19 (1 l(f) and Art. 19 (1 )le): Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. 1'); Moopil Nair's case (1) and Skri Madan Lal Arora's easel'). Now, the question is, when a law is enacted by a oompetent legislature and it is not unconstitutional as contravening any prohibition in the Constitution such as Art. 14, and when proceedings for assessment of tax are taken thereunder in the manner provided therein, and there is no violation of rules of natural justicP, does Art. 19 (I )lg) apply, even though the taxing authority might have, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, misconstrued the legal provisions? The decision in Kailash Nath'a case ( 7 ) would appear to support the contention that it does; but for the reasons already given, we think tl) (1961) 3S.C.R. 77. •2) (1951) S.C.R.1?7.13.6, 137. 13) (1955. I S.C.R. 769, 792. (4) 11954) S.C.R. ll22, 1127. (5) ( 1961) I s.c.R. 37 >. 383, 402. 161 (1962) I S.C.R. 823. (7) AIR 1957 S.C. 790, 792, 793.

1 &O.R.

SUPREME OOUBT REPORTS

8@9

that its correctness is open to question and the point ·needs reconsideration.

1961 '

There is another objection taken to the maintainability of this petition. Art. 32, under which it as presented, confers on a person, whose fundamental right guaranteed in Pa.rt III is infringed, a right to move this Court for appropriate writs for obtaining redress. 1.1he contention of the petitioner is that the order of assessment dated December 20, 1958, amounts to interference with the rigl\t of the firm to carry on busineeis and is, href~re, in collWavention of Art. l9 (l} (g), and that reoJief Bbduld be'gra.nted under Art. 32. Now, '1he objection that is taken on behitlf of the respondents is ~hat· the guarantee given under Art. 19 (1) {g)'is-againflt &n action of the executive e>r Jegisla.ture of the State, that the order of assesement now- in question is one paSBed in judicial proceedings and is, therefore, outside the purview of Art. 19 (1) (g). 1f this -contention is well-founded, then Art. 32 will have no application and the present petition must fail on this ground. · 'llhe consffitution&I pr<>Tisions bearing on· this que..mon are Arts. 12, 13, 19 and 32. Article 12 enams that : "In· this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, ~the State' in~ludes the _Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of ea.ob of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India. or under the control of the Government of India''. A.rtiele, 1:3 (3) (a) defines 'law' as follows : '' 'law includes any Ordinance, order, bye· law, rule, regulation, notification, CUl'tom or asage ha.vmg in the territory of India. the force ofiaw;"

..

Srnl. Ujjam Bai Stai. of Ut1ar Pradl1h

SH>

[1963] ..

SUPRBUE COURT.REPOR'J',S'

1§62.

Article 19 (1) enacts.that the citizen·. shall have the '.seven rights mentioned therein, and Arts. 19 (2) to v. 19 (6) save· Jaws, whether existing or to be· made, si.~.1u~i"'' which impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise· - - . . of those rights, subject to the. conditions laid down AiJorJ •. ·' therein. Article 32 (1) guarantees "the right to . move the §upreme Court by. appropriate proceed.. - · ings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part". . Then we have Art. 32 (2), which is as follows : . .. ·· . .. :: ..... J~ ~. '•The Supreme Court shall have 'power ; .... ' to issue directions 01' orders or writs, including ' writs in the nature of habeas corpus, manclamus, . . prohibition, quo . warranto. and . · which ever ·may be appropriate;-for"'the enforcement of any of the rights ·conferred by . this Part". · · ·

smt.Uii•"!Bai

<

-

-

:

f

: -

'

-- :· • -.

certiOrari,

It will he convenient now to set out the contentions of the parties urged in support of their respective positions., The contention of.the respondents based uponArt.12 is ;that the word "State" . in Part III means only the Executive and the Legislature, that the Judiciary is excluded therefrom, and t.hat, therefore;"no question of a funqamental right can arise with reference to an order passed by an authority discharging judicial . functions. The answer of the petitioner· to· this is that the word "State" comprehends all the three organs, the Executive, the Legislature. and the· Judiciary, that . the express mention of the Governinent and the Legislature in Art. 12 cannot·' be construed as <"Xclu· ding the Judiciary, that the uiie of the word "iucludes" shows that. the enumeration which followsia not exhaustive, and that, therefore, the 'ordinary •. · ····· and the wider connotation of the word· ••State' is not cut down by Art. 12. ' ... It is true that the word ••includes" ~ormally ·signifies that what is enumerated as included is not

1 S.C.R. J ·---._..-

•

•

SUPREME cOuRT REPORTS

sit

exhaustive. But the question ultimately· is, what is the intention of the Legislature, and that has to be . gathered on a reading of the enactment as a whole. It is possible that in some context the word "includes" might import that the enumeration is exhaustive. The following observations - of Lord Watson in Dilworth v. Commissioner of St,amps (1) were relied-upon:; - ---· · .,· "The word 'include' is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such thing3 as they signify according to their natu" ral import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. But the word 'include' is susceptible of another construction, which may become imnerative, if the context of the Act is sufficj. ent to show that it was not i:nerely employed for the purpose of adding to the natural significance of the words or _expressions defi· ned. It may be equivalent to 'mean and include,' and in that case it may afford an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions." ·. Now, when tho Legislature' wants to enlarge the sense in which an expression is generally, used so as to take in certain other things, it does so by ming the word "includes". Therefore, it may be argued that the word ••includes" would be appropriate only when the expression, the connotation of which is sought to be extended by the word "inclu· des", does not, in its ordinary sense; include_ . what is suught to be "included'', and that as the (I) [1899] A. C. 99, !OS, 106.

1962 Smt. Ujj•m 8•i v. S t•t• 1J Uttor

PraUsfa

.di,yarJ.

812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] 1962 S1111.. UjJom B•i Y.

S/41t.ofU11., Pritduh .di)ar "·

Executive ·and the Legislature of a State are, according to all accepted notions, understood as included in the word "State", the use of the word "includes" with reference to them would make no sense. The Article ·also provides that the werd "State'' is to include '~all local or other authorities". With reference to them, the use of the word "includes" will be quite appropriate, because they would not in the ordinary sense of the words "the State", be understood as inclu<led therein. A reading of the Article, as a whole, would seem to show that the intention of the Legislature ·was; on. the one hand, to restrict the sccepted connotation of the word "State", and, on the other hand, to extend it by induding "local or other authorities". There is much to be said in favour of the contention of the respondents that in the context the word "includes" must to be read as "means and includes". In further support of the contention that orders of Courts and Tribunals are not, in general, within the purview of Part III, the respondents rely on the definition of 'law' in Art. 13(3). Judgments and orders made in the course of judicial proceedings do not fall within that definition. It is contended that the soheme of the Constitution is that, whenever there is an infringement of a fundamental right by the Executive or the Legislature, the person aggrieved has a right of resort to this Court under Art. 32, that being the consequenee of the definition of '.State' under Art. 12 and of •law' under Art. 13(3); that Courts and Cdbunals are not law-making bodies in the sense in which law is defined in Art. 13(3), their function being to interpret law; and that it will, therefore, be inappropriate to bring them within Part III, which euact·s li:mitations on power to make laws. It is urged that the scheme of the Constitution does no contemplate judicial orders being brought up before this Court in a petition under

1 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Art. 32. Whenever a fundamental right is infringed, it is said, the party aggrieved has a. right to resort to the Civil Courts either in their ordinary jurisdiction or under Art. 226, and the decisions of the Courts will ultimately come up to this Court on appeal under Arts. 132 to 136. Thus, when executive and legislative action infringes fundamental rights, the Supreme Court oan deal with it under Art. 32, whereas orders of Courte and Tribunals, in which questions of infringement of fundamental rights are decided, will come up for review before the Supreme Court under Arts. 132 to 136. We may now refer to the decisions where this question has been considered by this Court. In Bashesker Nath v. The Commissioner of lnoome-tax (1) occur the following observations. relied on for the respondents: "In the third place it is to be observed that, by virtue of Art. 12, 'the State' which is, by Art. 14, forbidden to discriminate between persons includes the Government and Parliament of India. and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. Article 14, therefore, is an injunction to both the legislative as well as the executive organs of the State and the other subordinate authorities. As regards the legislative orga.n of the State, the fundamental right is further consolidated and protected by the provisions of Art. 13 ... That apart, the very language of Art. 14 of the Constitution expressly directs that 'the State', by which Art. 12 includes the executive organ, shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the law. Thus Art. 14 (l} [1959) Supp. ( l) S.C.R. 528 551, 552.

1962

Smt. UJjam B.;.

v.

Stote of Uttar Praduh

Apar J1

196t Sm,, Ujjom Bai v.

Stat1 of Utlar

PraJ1sli

-·-

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]

proteots us from both lei:islation, and executive tyranny by way of discrimination." The above remarks are based on the view that the words "the State" in Art. It comprehend only the Executive and the Legislature. A more direct deoision on this point is the one in S. 8. Md. Amirabbas Abbasi v. State of Madhya Bharat (1). There, the facts were that one Amirabbas Abbasi applied to the Court of the District Judge at Ratlam for an order that he should be appointed guardian of the person and properties of his two children. The application was rejected by the District Judge, who appointed another person, Sultan Hamid Khan, as the guardian. An appeal against this order to the High Court was also dismissed. Amirabbas Abbasi then filed a petition in this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution, challenging the validity of the order of the District Court on the ground that it was di11criminative and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. In dismissing this petition, this Court observed: "The second respondent was appointed guardian of the minors by order of a competent court, and denial of equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws oan be claimed against executive action or legislative proceSB but not against the deoision of a competent tribunal. The remedy of a person aggrieved by the decision of a competent judicial tribunal is to approach for redreSB a superior tribunal, if there be one." The following observations in Ratilal v. State of Bombay (') are also relied on for the respondents: "The second observation which must be made is that the protection ajforded b,Y tJu~ (1) [1960] 3. s. c. ~. 138, 142. (2)

A.J.R.~[1959JBom. 2+2, 253,

l S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Constitution to fundamental rights is against executive, or legislative interference, A decision of a regularly constituted Court cannot however be ehallenged as an interference with fundamental rights in the abstract. The Court in the very nature of things adjudicates upon conflicting claims and declares rights and does not by the operation of its own order seek to · infring any Fundamental rights." These observations would appear to apply with equal force to judioial proceedings:before tribunals, as they cannot be . regarded as representing the executive or the~legislative function of the State. .

"

It is next contended for the petitioner that the Salee Tax Officer will at least fall within the category of "other authorities" in Art. 12. The meaning of the expression "other authorities" was considered in The University of Madras v. Shantka Bai (1). There, the question was as to whether the University of Madras was "other authority'' within that Article. In deciding that it was not, it observed that the words "other authorities" must be construed ejus<km generis with what had been enumerated in the Article, nemely, the Government or the Legislature. Thie clearly supports the respondents. It is contended for the petitioner that even if Courts· could not be held to be 11 other authorities", quasi judicial tribunals must be regarded as falling within that expression, and that Salee Tax Officers are at best only quasi judicial officers, and they cannot be put on the same footing as regular Courts. It is argued that sales tax authorities are Officers of Government to whom is entrusted the work of levy and coJlection of taxes, that that is primarily an executive function, that the officers have, no doubt, to a.ct judicially ip deterJllin~ th(' (1) I.A.Jt. 195f M•d, f,7,

JIOB

imt. Ujj•m B•i v. S1at1 •f Ultar Pradesh

.A~ar J,

J941 S•I. Ujj~m B•I

••

Slol• oJUUSf' Prod.1h ~J.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)

tax payable but that that is only incidental to the discharge of what iR essentially an adminis\rative act, that, at best, the assessment proceedings are quasi· judicial in character, and that accordingly an Officer imposing a tax must be held to be "other authority" within Art. 12. Io this view, it .is urged, the assessment order dated December 20, 1958, fa.Ile within the purview of Part III. The respondents dispute the correctness of this contention. They concede that a Sa.lee Tax O.ffioer has certain functions of an administrative charaeter, but urge that the proceedings with which we are concerned, are entirely judicial. In this connection-, it will have to be borne in miud that it is a feature well-known in the Government of this country that. ooth executive and judicial functions a.re vested in the same Officer, and because of the undesirable results-which followed from this combination, Art. 50 of the Constitution has enacted as one of the Directive Principles that, "The State shall take steps to separ&te the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State". When an authority is clothed with two functions, one adruinistrative and the other judioial, prooeodings before it which fall under the latter category do not cease to be judicial by reason of the fa.et that it has got other non-judicial functions. What ha.a to be seen is the capacity in which the authority acts with reference to the impugned ma~ter. It will, therefore, be necessary to examine the character in which the Sales Tax Officer functions when he t&koa proceedings for aaseBSmeint of tax.. Under the provisions of the Act, the Sales Tax Offioer ha.a to i-e notice to the aBS08866, take evidence in the ma.Uer, hear him and then decide, in a.ooorda.noe with, tlae provisions of the statute, whether tax- is payable, and if so, how much. Against hie order, there,is an

I S.C.R.

,__l

. ..

;

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

appeal in which again the parties have to be heard and a decision given in accordance with law. The legality or propriety of an order passed in an appeal id again open to consideration on revision by a Revising Authority who must be "a person qualified under dause (2) of Art. 217 of the Constitution for appointment as Judge of a High Court". Section ll, which is on the same lines as s. 66 of the Indian Income-Tax Act, providee that the Revising Authority might refer for the opinion of the High Court any question of law arising out of its order, and under s. 11(4), the assessee has a right to move the High Court for an order that the Revising Authority do refer the question of law arising out of the order, if there ha11 been an erroneous refusal to refer. Now the respondents contend that the proceedings commencing with a notice iPsued by the Sales Tax Officer and ending wi~h a reference to the High Court are entirely judicial, that it is in that view that petitions for certiorari and prohibition are entertained against orders of assessment under Art. 226 of the Constitution, and appeals against such orders are entertained by this Court under Art. 136. It will be inconsistent, it is urged, to hold, on the one hand, that the orders passed in these assessment proceedings are open to appeal under Art. 136 on the footing that they are made by Tribunals, and, on the other, that they are open te attack under Art. 32 of the footing that they are ma.de by executive authorities, It is also contended for the petitioner that the definition of "State" in Art. 12 is to govern Part JTI "unless the context otherwise required", and that in the context of Art. 32; "The State" wouH include Courts and Tribunals exercising judicial functions. Article 32, it will be noticed; confers ,~t,he Court jurisdiction to issue among others, ·~ii of Certiorari and prohibition. The argument l@ th~t as these writs are issued only with reference to judicial proceedings, the restricted

1961

Smt. Ujjam Bai

••

Stale Df Utt r

Ptadesh

•

19'1

Smt. Ujjtm1 Bai

v.

Slot. of Ult., PrliUsh

SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]

definition of "the State" in Art. 12 as excluding them must give way to the express la.ngua.ge of Art. 32. It is accordingly contended that even on the footing that the order of assessment is judicial in character, the present petition for issue of certiorari is within Art. 32. It is true argue the respondents, that certiorari and prohibition lie only in respect of judicial and not administrative acts, and it must, therefore, be taken that Art. 32 does envisage that there could be a petition under that Article with respect to judicial proceedings. It is also true, as held by this Court, that the right of an aggrieved party to resort to this court under that Article is itself a fundamental right under Art. J2. But the right of resort to this Court under Art. 32(1) is only when there is an infringe· ment of a fundamental right which had been guaranteed in Part III, that it is Articles 14 to 31 that declare what those, fundamental rights are, for the breach of which remedy can be had under Art. 32(2), and that what has to be seen, therefore, is whether there is anything in the Article whioh is said to have been infringed, which is repugnant to the definition of ••the State" in Art. 12. Examining, it is said, Art.19( l)(g) which is alleged to have been violated, there is nothing in it which is repugnant to the restricted connotation of the expression ••the State" in Art.12, and judicial proceedings therefore cannot be brought within it. It is further argued that Art.19(2) to 19(6) clearly show that it is only laws existing and to be made that are within their purview, and judicial pronouncements not being law cannot fall within the ambit of those provisions. In the result, it is contended that the definition of "State" in Art. 12 stands and an order made by a Court or tribunal cannot be held to infringe Art. 19(1) (g) read along with Art. 12. If that is the true position, 1eplies the petitioner, then what purpose is served by the provi-

l s.c.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1B61

sion in Art. 32 that this Court might issue writs of B 1i certiorari or prohibition ? The answer of the res- Fmt. Ujjam v. Stale of UU,r pondents is that among the subst.antive enactments Pr<stkslt forming Arts. 14 to 31, there a.re Rome which are specially, directed against judicial proceedings, and Aiyar J. the writ of certiorari or prohibition will lie in respect of them. One such, for example, is Art. 20, which is as follows: ''20. (1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the Act charged as an offence, nor be subjeo.ted to a penalty greater than that whioh might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. (2) No person shall be prosecuted a.nd punished for the same offence more than once. (3) No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." Thia Article clearly applies to prosecutions and convictions for offences. It bas reference~ there· . fore, to judicial proceedings, and the restricted definition of "Sta.te'' in Art. 12 is, in the context, excluded. And prooeedings contemplated by Art. 20 being judicial, writs of certimari and pro· hibition can issue. In this connection, the respondents rely u~on the expression "whichever may be appropriate' occurring in Art. 32(2). It means, it is said, that when once an infringement of a funda.menta.l rights is established, the writ which the Court can iBSue must depend upon the nature of the right involved. It is accordingly contended that Art. 19{l){g) is, on its terms inapplicable to judicial proceedings, and no writ of certiorari can issue for the infringement of a. right under that Article. It was alJto argued for the petitioner tli~t

Sml. Ujj.., Bid Y.

St.ii •I Utt., p,tuf,1h

SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963]

under the American law certiorari lies against decisions of the i:-tate Courts when they ·are repug· nant to the provision of the Constitution, and the decision in National Association for the Advance· ment of Colored People v. State of Alabama (') was relied support of this position. There the question related to the validity of a provision in a statute uf Alabama requiring foreign corporations to disclose, among other things, the names and addresses of their local members and agents. The appellant-Corporation having made default in complying with this provision, the State instituted an action for appropriate relief, and the Court granted the same. Then the Corporation moved the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the provision in the statute was an invasion of the right to freely assemble, guaran· teed by the Constitution. One of the grounds on which the State resisted the application was that no certiorari will lie for quashing an order of Court. In rejecting this contention, the Court observed' "lt is not of moment that the State has t,here acted solely through its judicial branoh for whether legislative or judicial, it is still the application of state power which we are asked to scrutinize." It is unnecessary to refer to other decisions in which 11imilar view~ have been taken. The principle on which all these decisions are based was thus stated in Virginia v. Rives (') : "It is doubtless true that a State may act through different agencies,-either by its legiBlative, its executive, or its judicial auth· oritiee ; and the prohibitions of the amendment extend to all action of the State denying equal protection of the laws, whether (II (1958) 2 L. ed. 2d. 1488. 1500, 357 U- S. 449. (1880) 100 U.S 313, 318: 25 SI. ed 667, 669.

(2l

1 s.c.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

it be action by one of these agencies or by another." These decisions have no bearing on the point now under consideration, which is not whether a writ of certiorari will lie under the general law against decisions of Courts-on that, there could be and has been no controversy-but whether, on the terms of Art. 12, that will lie against an order a of Court or Tribunal. The above is a. resurM of the arguments addressed by both sides in support of their respective contentions. The question thus debated is of considerable importance on which there has been no direct pronouncement by this Court. It seems desirable that it should b~ authoritatively settled. We accordingly direct that the papers be placed before the Chief Justice for conRtituting a larger Bench for deciding the two following question :-· 1. Is an order of assessment made by an authority under a taxing statute which is intra vires, open to challenge as repugnant to Art. 19(1) (g), on the sole ground that it is based on a misconstruction of a provision of the Act or of a notification issued thereunder? 2. Can the validity of such an order be questioned in a petition under Art. 32, of the constitution ? 1!162. April IO. The matter was finally heard by a larger ·Bench consisting of S. K. Da.s, J. L. K:tpur, A. K. Sarkar, K. Subba Rao, M. Hidayatullah, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and J. R. Mudholkar, .TJ. and The following Judgments were delivered S. K DAs. J.-The facts of the case have been 1tated in the judgment of my learned brothor

sm1. UHtJm JJ11i

"·

St11t1·0/ Uttar Pradesh

lhu .1.

I

19~1

Smo. Ujj.m Bol

v.

S1at1 •! Ull.,

Pr•dlih

D<uJ.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (19631

K11.pur J., and it is not necessary for me to restate them. I have reached the Sil.me conclusion as has been reached by my learned brother. But in Tiew of the importance of the question raised, I would like to state in my own words the reasons for reaching that conclusion. The two questions which have been referred to this larger Bench are: 1. Is an order of assessment made by an authority under a taxing statute which is Intra virllll, open to challenge as repugnant to Art. 19 (1) (gl, on the sole ground that it is based on a misconstruction of a provision of the Act or of a notification issued there under? 2. Can the validity of such an order be questioned in a petition under Art. 3.2 of the Constitution ? These two questions are inter-connected and substantially relate to one matter: is the validity of an order ma.de with jurisdiction under an Act which is Intra virllll and good law in all respects, or of a notification properly issued thereunder, liable \o be questioned in a. petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution on the sole ground that the provisions of the Act, or the terms of the notification issued thereunder, have been misconstrued? It is necessary, perhaps, to start with the very Article, namely, Art. 32, with reference to which the question has to be answered. "32. (l) The ri!!'ht to move thfl Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed. (2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs,

• 1 $.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

including writs in· the nature of 1uJbms oorpua, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this P:i.rt. (3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by cla1110s (1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other Court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exeroisable by the Supreme Court under olause (2). (4) The right guaranteed by this article shall· not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution.''

The Article occurs in Part III of the Constitution headed 'Fundamental Rights'. It is one of a series of articles which fall under the sub-head, "Right to Constitutional Remedies". There can be no doubt that the right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the right conferred by Part III is itself a guaranteed fundamental right. Indeed, cl. (l) of the Article says so in express terms. Clause (2) says that this Court sha11 have power to issue directions .or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of kabeJJs COr]YUs, mandamus, prohil>ition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcment of any of the rights conferred by Part III. Clause (4) makes it clear that the right guaranteed by the Article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by the Constitution. Article 359 of the Constitution · states that where a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation the President may by order declare that the right to move any court for the enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part III as may be mentioned in the order and all proceedings pending

116J

Sml. Ujj.,,. Bai

••

S,.,, oJ Uttar Praiuh

DaJ.

J96t Smt. Ujjam B.ii

v.

Statt of Ultar Pradtsla

DasJ.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]

in any court for the enforcement of the rights so mentioned shall remain suspended etc. It is clear, therefore, that so Joni;: as no order is made by the President to suspend the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution every person in India, citizen or otherwise, ha• the guaranteed right to move the Supreme Court for enforcement of the rights conferred on him by Part III of the Constitution and the Supreme Court has the power to issue neceSBary directions, orders or writs which may be a.pp· ropriate for the enforcement of such rights. Indeed, this Court bas held in more than one decision that under the Constitution it is the privilege and duty of this Court to uphold the fundamental rights, whc>never a person seeks the enforcPment of Ruch right•. The oath of office which a Judge of t.f1e Supreme Court takes on assumption of office con· ta.ins infer alia a solemn affirmation that he will "uphold the Constitution and the laws". The controversy before us centres round the expression "enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part" which occurs in els. (!}and (2) of the Article. It has not been disputed before us that this Court is not trammelled bv technical considerations relating to the issue of writs habeas corpus mandAJmus, Prohibition, quo warranto and certiorar( This Court said in T. 0. Basappa v. T. Nngnppa (I): "In view of the express provisions in our ConHtitution we need not now look back to the early history or the procedural technicalities of these writs in English law, nor feel oppressed by any difference or change of opinion expressed in particu Jar cases by English Judges. We csn make an order or issue a writ in the nature of certiorari in all approprfote case and in appropriate manner, (I) [1955] I S.C.R. 250. 256.

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT RFPORTS

1110 long as we keep to

the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in English law," Therefore, apart altogether from all technical consi· derations, the broad question before us is-in what circumstances does the question of enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution arise under Art. 32 of the Constitution, remembering all the time that the constitutional remedy under Art. 32 is itself a fundamental right? On behalf of the petitioner it has been submitted that whenever it is primu facie established that there is violation of a fundamental right, the question of its enforcement arises; for example, (a) it may arise when the statute itself is ultra vfres and some action is taken under such a statute, or (b) it may also arise when some action is taken under an intra vires statute,but the action taken is without jurisdiction so that the statute though intra vires does not support it; or (o) it may again arise on misconstruction of a statute which is intra vires, but the misconstruction is such that the action taken on the misconstrued statute results in the violation of a fundamental right. It has been argued before us that administrative bodies do not cease to come within the definition of the word ''State" in Art. 12 of the Constitution when they perform quasi-judicial functions and in view of the true scope of Art. 32, the action of such bodies whenever suoh action violates or threatens to violate a fundamental right gives rise to the question of enforcement of such right and no distinction can be drawn in respect of the three classes of cases referred to above. As to the case before us the argument is that the taxing authorities misconstrued the terms of the notification which was issued by the State Government on December 14, 1957 under s. 4(1)(b) of the United Provinces Sales Tax Act, U.P. Act No. XV of 1948 and as a result of the miscon-::.truction, they

19~1

Smt, U:ijam Bai

v,

State of Uttar Pradesh

1961 ~mt. Ujj•m Bai

••

St•t< •I Uuu Pr•d11J.

•

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]

have assessed the petitioner to sales tax on the sum of Rs. 4,71,541.75 nP. which action, it is submitted, has violated the fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioner under Art. 19(l)lf) and (g) and Art. 31 of the Constitution. The misconstruction, it is argued, may lead to a transgression of constitutional limits in different ways; for example, in a case where an inter-State transaction of sale is sought to be taxed despite the constitutional prohibition in Art. 286 of the Constitution as it etood previously, by wrongly holding that the transaction is intra-State, there is a transgreseion of constitutional limits. Similarly, where a quasi-judicial authority commits an error as to a fact or issue which the authority has complete jurisdiction to decide under the statute, but the error is of such a nature that it affects a fundamental right, there is again a transgression of constitutional limits. The argument is that there is no distinction in principle between these clf\sses of misconstruction of a statute, and the real test, it is submitted, should be the individuality of the error, namely, whether the error impinge on a fundamental right. If it does, then the person aggrieved has a right to approach this Court by means of a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. On the contrary, the contention of the respondents which is urged as a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition in that on the facts stated in the present petition no question of the enforcement of any fundamental right arises and the petition is not maintainable. It is stated that the validity of the Aot not being challenged in any manner, every part of it is good law; ther1>fore, the provision in the Act authorising the Sales-tax Officer as a quasi-judicial tribunal to assess the ta.x is a valid provision and a decision ma.de by the said tribuniil strictly acting in exercise of the quasi-judicial power given to it must necessarily be a fully

l S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

valid and legal act. It is pointed out that there is no question here of the misconstruction leading to a transgression of constitutional limits nor to a.ny error relating to a collateral fact. The error which is (lomplained of, assuming it to be an error, is in respect of a matter which the assessing authority ha.s complete jurisdiction to decide; that decision is legally valid irrespective of whether it is correct or otherwise. It is stated that a. legally valid aot cannot offend any fundamental right and the proper remedy for correcting an error of the nature complained of in the present case is by means of an appeal or if the error is an error apparent on the face of the record, by means of a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Before l proceed to consider these arguments it is necessary to clear the ground by standing that certain larger questions were also mooted before us, but I consider it unnecessary to examine or decide them. Such questions were: (I) whether taxation laws are subject to the limitations imposed by Part III, particularly Art. 19 therein, (2) whether the expression ''the State" in Art. 12 includes "courts" also, and (3) whether there can be any question of the enforcement of fundamental rights against decisions of courts or the action of private persons. These larger questions do not fall for decision in the present case and I do not consider it proper to examine or decide them here. I should make it clear that nothing I. have s!ated in the present judgment should be taken as expressing any opinion on these larger questions. It is perhaps necessary to add alio that this 'writ petition. could have been disposed of on the very short ground that there was no misconstruction of the notification dated December 14, 1957 and the resultant action of the assessing authority did not affect any fundamental right of the petitioner. That is the view which we have expressed in the conneotrd appeal of M/s. Chhota.bhai J ethabhai Patel & Co. v. The Sales Tax Officer,

1961

Bmt. Ujjarn v.

Stata of Uttar B1i Pr11d1h

Ai.Jar J,

1962 Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar

Pradesh AiJarJ.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)

Agra and another (Civil Appeal No. 99 of 1961) in which Judgment is also being delivered to-day. The writ petition, however, has been referrt-d to a larger Bench for the decision of the two important constitutional questions relating to the scope of Art. :12, which I have stated earlier in this judgment. It is, therefore, necessary and proper that I ·should decide those two questions which undoubtedly arise as a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition. I now proceed to a consideration of the main arguments advanced before us. On some of the aspects of the problem which has been debated · before us there has been very iittle disagreement. I may first delimit the filed where there has been agreement between the parties and then go on to the controversial area of disagreement. It has not been disputed beforA us that where the statute or a provision thereof is ultra vires, any action taken under suoh ultra vires provision by a quasi-judicial authority which violates or threatens to violate a fundamental right does give rise to a question of enforc.iment of that right and a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution will lie. There are several decisions of this Court which have laid this down. It is unnecessary to cite them all and a reference nee,d only be made to one of the earliest decisions on this aspect of the case, namely, Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1). A similar but . not exactly the same position arose in the Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihr1r ('). The facts of the the appellant company case were that filed a petition under Art. 226 in the High Court of Patna for a writ of prohibition restraining the Sales Tax Officer from making an assessment of sales tax pursuant to a notice iesued by him. The appellant claimed that the sales (I) [19541S.C.R.1122. (2) '.1955) 2 S.C.R. 60,, 619, 620.

'

...

• 1 S.C.R.

I

I

'

' t

1.,.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

sought to be assessed were made in the course of inter-State trade, that the provisions of the Bihar Sa.Jes Tax Act, 1947 (Biha.r Act 19 of 1947) which authorised the imposition of tax on such sales were repugnant to Art. 286(2) and void, and that, therefore, the proceedings taken by the Sales Tax Officer should be quashed. The application was dimissed by the High Court on the ground that if the Sales Tax Officer ma.de an assessment which was erroneous, the assefj8ee could ·challenge it by way of .appeal or-revision under ss. 24 and 25 of that Act, and that · as the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Oft'cer, no writ of prohibition or ce'rliorari could be issued. There was an appeal against this order to ~bis Court and therein a preliminary objection was ta.ken that a writ under Art. 226 was not the appropriate remedy open to an assessee for challenging the legality of the proceedings before a Sales Tax Officer. In rejecting the contention, this Court observed: "It is, however, clear from article 2i5 that no tax can be levied or collected except by authority of law which must mean a good and valid law. The contention of the appellant company is that the Act which authorises the assessment, levying and collection of Sales tax on inter-State trade contravenes and constitutes an infringement of Article 286 and is, therefore, ultra virea, void and unenforceable. If, however, this contention by well founded, the remedy by way of a writ must, an principle and authority, be available to the party aggrieved.'' And dealing with the contention that the petitioner should proceed by way of appeal or revision under the Act, this Conn observed: "The answer to this plea. is short and simple. The remedy under the Aot cannot

196S Smt. Ujjam B•i

v.

Stal1 of Ullor

Prad1rh

1962 mt. Vjjam Bdi'

••

Stai. of Utt.r Prad1sh

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) be said to lie adequate and is, indeed, nugatory or useless if the Act which provides for such remedy is itself ultra vires and void and the principle relied upon can, therefore, have no application where a party comes to Court with an allegation that his right has been or is being threatened to be infringed by a law which is ultra vires the powers of the legislature which enacted it and as such void and prays for appropriate relief under article 226."

It will be seen that the question which arose in that case was with reference to a provision in the taxing s_tatute which was ultra vires and the decision was that any action taken under such a provision was without the authority of law and was, therefore, an unconstitutional interference with the right to carry on business under Art. 19 (l)(f). In circumstances somewhat similar in nature there have been other decision of this Court which the violation of a fundamental right W&H taken to have been established when the assessing authority sought to tax a transaction the taxation of which came within a constitutional prohibition. Such cases were treated as on a par with those cases where the provision itself was ultra vires. The deci&ion in Bidi Supply Co. v. The Union of India (')arose out of a somewhat different set of facts. There the Central Board of Revenue transferred by means of a general order certain cases of the petitioner under s. 5 (7·A) of the Indian Income-tax Officer, District III, Calcutta, to the Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, Ranchi. It was held that an omnibus wholesale order of tranfer as was made in the case was not contemplated by the su b·section and, therefore, the impugned order of transfer which was expressed in general terms without reference to any particular case and {I) [1956) 2 S.C.R. 67.

II

I

I

i

•

l s.c.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

without any limitation as to time was beyond the competence of the Central Board of Revenue. It was also held that the impugned order was discriminatory against the petitioner and violated the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution. This decision really proceeded upon the basis that an executive body cannot, without authority of law, take action violative of a fundamental right a;nd if it does, an application under Art. 32 will lie. In that case no question arose of the exercise of a quasi-judicial function in the discharge of undoubted jurisdiction; on the contrary, the ratio of the decision was that the order pas9ed by the Central Board of Revenue was without jurisdiction. The decision was considered again in Pannal,al Binjraj v. Union of India (1 ) after further amendments had been made in s. 5 (7-A) of the India Income-tax Act, 1922 and it was pointed out that s. 5 (7-A) as amended was a. measure of administrative convenience and constitutionally valid and an order passed thereundet· could not be challenged as unconstitutionaJ. There are other decisions which proceeded on a similar basis, namely that if a quasi-judicial authority acts without jurisdiction or wrongly assumes jurisdiction by committing an error as to a collateral fact and the resultant action threatens or violates a fundamental right, the question of enforcement of that right arises and a petition under Art. 32 will lie. (See TafAJ !rem and Steel Co. Ltd. v. S. R. Sarkar (2); and Madan Lal Arora v. The Excise and Taxation Officer, Amritsar (3 ). In Tat,a Iron and St,eel, Oo. Ltd. v. S.R. Sarkar( 2) the question arose under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Under that Aot sales in the course of inter-State trade are liable to be taxed at a single point. The petitioner was assessed to tax on certain sales (1) (1957] S.C.R. 233.

(2) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 379, 383.

(3) [1962] 1S.C.R.8~3, ~ ( -(

Ill{

-lHt

Smt. Ujj11m B•i Vo

S t•ld oj Uttu

Pradtsh

1962

Sm,. Ujjam Bai

v.

Slat• OJ Uttar

Pradesh

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]

falling within the Act by the Central Sales Tax Officer' Bihar, and .the tax was also duly paid. Thereafter the Central Sales Tax Officer in West Bengal made an order assessing to tax the very sales in respect of which tax had been paid. The petitioner then moved this Court under Art. 32 for an order quashing the assessment. A preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition was taken on behalf of the respondent State on the ground that under the Act the petitioner could file an appeal against the order of assesament and that proceedings under Art. 32 were, therefore, incompetent. In overruling this contention Shah, J., referred to the decisions of this Court in Himmatlal Harilal Mehta'.~ case (lj, Be:nga/, Immunity's Company's case(') and the State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd. (')and observed:

"In these cases, in appeals from orders passed by the High Courts in petitions under Art. 226, this Court held that an attempt to levy tax under a statute which was ultra vires infringed the fundamental right of the citizens and recourse to the High Court for protection of the fundamental right was not prohibited because of the provisions contained in Art. 265. In the case before us, the vires of the Central Sales Tax Act,1956, are not challenged; but in Kailash Nath v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (•) a petition challenging the levy of a tax was entertained by this Court even though the Act under the authority of which the tax was sought to be recovered was not challenged as ultra vires. It is not necessary for purposes of this case to decide whether the principal of Kailash Nath's case(') is inconsistent with the view expressed by this Court in Ramjilal v. Income-tax Officer, Mohindargarh (')." <D [1954J s.c R. m2. (3) ll9~3] s.c.R. 1969.

(2) [195SJ 2 s.c.R. 603, 619, 620. (4) A.I.R 1957 s.c. 790. (S) [1951] S.C.R. 127.

,

1 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

The learned Judge then proceeded to hold that as there was under the Act a single liability and that had been disoha.rged, there could be no proceedings for the assessment of the same sales a seoond time to tax. The ratio of the decision would appear to be that a.s the law did not authorise the imposition of tax a second time on sales · on which tax had been levied and collected, proceedings for assessment a second time were without jurisdiction. In Madan Lal Arora's case( 1) a notice for assessment was issued after the expiry of the period prescribed therefore by the statute. The a.ssessee thereupon applied to this Court under Art. 32 for quashing the proceedings for assessment on the ground the.t they were without jurisdiction and it was held that as the taxing authority had no power under the statute to issue the notice in question the proceedings were without jurisdiction and must be quashed. This again was a case in which the authority had no jurisdiction under the Aot to take proceedings for assessment of tax and it made no difference that such assumption for juriadiOtion was based on a misconstruction of statutory provision. It is necessary perhaps to refer here to another class of cases which have sometimes been characterised as cases of procedural Ultra vires. When a statute prescribes a manner or from in which a duty is to be performed or a power exercised, it seldom lays down what will be the legal consequences of failure to observe its prescriptions. The courts must, therefore, formul.i.te their own criteria for determining whether the procedural rules are to be regarded as mandatory in which case disobedience will render void or voidable what has been done, or as directory in which case disobedience will be treated as a mere irregularity not affecting t~ validity of what has been done. A quasi-judicial authority is under an obligation to act judicially. Suppose, it doea not (1) (1962) J S. C.R. 823.

1961 Sml. UjJam Bdi v. Skl'e of Utt.,,. hddash

834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] 196• Sml, UjjtUn Bai y.

Std• •I Ull" p,...,A

so act and passes an order in violation of the principles of natural justice. What is the position then? There are some decisions, particularly with regard to customs authorities, where it has been held that an order of a quasi-judicial authority given in violation of the principles of natural justice is really an order without jurisdiction and if the order threatens or violates a fundamental right, an application under Art. 32 may lie. (See Sinha Govindji v. The Deputy ControUer of Imports & Exports, Madras(l) ). These decisions stand in a class by themselves and really proceed on the footing that the order passed was procedurally ultra vires and therefore without jurisdiction. So far I have dealt with three main classes of oases as to which there is very little disagreement: (1) where action is taken under an ultra virea st11tute; (2) where the statute is intra vires, but the action taken is without jurisdiction; and (3) where the action taken is procedurally ultra vires. In all these oases the question of enforcement of a fundamental right may arise and if it does arise, an application under Art. 32 will undoubtedly lie. As to these three classes of cases there has been very little disagreement between the parties before us. Now, I come to the controversial area. What is the position with regard to an order made by a quasi-judicial authority in the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction in pursuance of a provision of law which is admittedly intra vires ? It is necessary first to clarify the concept of jurisdiction. J urisdiotiun means authority to decide. Whenever a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal is empowered or required to enquire into a question of law or fact for the purpose of giving a decision on it, its findings thereon cannot be impeached collaterally or on an application for certiorari but are binding until (I)

1962) IS. C. R. 54-0.

I S.C.R.

..

I

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

reversed on appeal. Where a quasi-judicial authority has jurisdiction to decide a matter, it does not lose its jurisdiction by coming to a wrong conclusion whether it is wrong in law or in fact. The question, whether & tribunal has jurisdiction depends not on the truth or falsehood of the facts into which it has to enquire, or upon the correctness of its findings on these facts, but upon their nature, and it is determinable ''at the commencement, not at the conclusion, of the inquiry'. ( Rex v. Bolten(1)) Thus, a tribunal empowered to d*"termine claims for compensation for loss of office ha.a jurisdiction to determine all questions of law and fact relating to the measure of compensation and the tenure of the office, and it does not exceed its jurisdiction by determining any of those questions. incorrectly but it hs.s no jurisdiction to entertain' a claim for reinstatement or damages for wrongful dismissal, and it will exceed its jurisdiction if it makes an order in such terms, for it has no legal power to give any decision whatsoever on those matters. A tribunal may lack jurisdiction if it is improperly constituted, or if it fails to observe certain essential preliminaries to the inquiry. But it does not exceed its jurisdiction by basing its decision upon an incorrect determination of any questipn that it is empowered or required (i.e.,) has jurisdiction to determine. The strength of this theory of jurisdiction lies in its logical consistency. But there are other oases where Parliament when it empowers an inferior tribunal to enquire into certain facts intend to demarcate two areas of enquiry, the tribunal's findings within one a.rea being conclusive and with in the other area impeachable. ''The jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal may depend upon the fulfilment of some condition precedent or upon the existence of some particular fact. Such a fR.ct is collateral to the actual matter which the tribunal has to try and the determination whether it exists (I) [1841] l Q. B. 66; 74.

1111

Smt. Ujjam B•i y,

S !llU of Ult•r Pr•itsb

i962 Sml, Ujiam B 1i v. Statl oj Uttsr A(v•r J,

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963)

or not is logically prior to the determination of the actual question which the tribunal has to ky. The tribunal must itself decide :is to the collateral fa?t when, at the inception of an inquiry by a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, a challenge is made to its jurisdiction, the tribunal has to make up its mind whether it will act or not, and for that pur· pose to arrive at some decision on whether it ha~ jurisdiction or not. There may be tribunals which, by virtue of legislation constituting them, have the power to determine finally the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; but, subject to that an inferior tribunal cannot, by a wrong decision with regard to a collateral fact, give itself a jurisdiction which it would not otherwise po~sess." (Halsbury's Laws of Eng· land, 3rd Edn. Vol. II page 59). The character· istic attribute of a judicial act or decision is that it binds, whether it he right or wrong. An error of !ll.w or fact committed by a judicial or quaeijudicial body cannot, in gPneral, be impeached otherwise than on appeal unless the erroneous determination relates to a matter on which the juris· diction of that body depends. ihese principles govern not only the findings of inferior courts stricto sensu but also the findings of administrative bodies which are held to be acting in a judicial capacity. Sueh bodies am deemed to have been invested with power to err within the limits of their jurisdiction; and provided that they ket1p within those limits, their decisions must be accepted as valid unless set aside on appeal. Even the doctrine of res judicata has been applied to such decisions. (See Livingstone v. Westminister Corporation (1}; Re Birkenhead Corporation (') Re 56 Denton Road Twiclcenharn (')Society of ..illedical Officers of He,alth v. Hope('). In Burn & Co., Calculta v. Their Employees(') (I) [1904] 2 KB. 109. (3) [1953] Ch. 51. (5)

\2) (1952) Ch. 359. •4) [195'l] 2 W.L.R. 377, 391, 396, 397, 402. [1956] ~.C.R. 781.

1s.c.R.

•

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

this Court said that although the rule of re,s judicata as enacted by s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not in terms apply to an award made by an industrial tribunal its underlying principle which is founded on sound_ public policy and is of universal application must apply. In Daryao v. The State of U. P. (1) this Court applied tba doctrine of res judicata in respect of application under Art. 32 of the Constitution. It is perhaps pertinent to observe here that when the Allahabad High Court was moved by the petitioner under Art. 226 of the Constitution against the order of a.SHessment. passed on a.n alleged misconstruction of the notification of December 14, 1957, the High Court rejected the petition on two grounds. The first ground given was that the petitioner had the alternative remedy of getting the error corrected by appeal the second ground given was expressed by the High Court in the following words: "We have, however, heard the learned counsel for the petitioner on merits also, but we are not satisfied that the interpretation put upon this notification by the Sales Tax Officer contains auy obvious error in it. The circmnst&nces make the interpretation advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner unlikely. It is admitted that even handmade biris have been subject to Sales Tax since long before the date of the issue of the above notification. The object of passing the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Central Act No. 58 of 1957, was to levy an additional excise duty on certain important articles and with the concurrence of the State Legislature to abolish Sales Tax on those articles. According to the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner during the period 14th December, 1957, to (I) (1961] (2J S,

c. A, S91.

1962

Sml. Ujjam B•I v. Stille of Uttar Prad1sh

,. Smt. Uiiorn••i T,

S1at1 t/ Utttr

Pr&Mslr.

.dij"9r J.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] 30th June, 1958, the petitioner was liable neither to payment of excise duty nor to payment of Sa.lea Tax. We do not know why there should h!Lve been such an exemption. The language of the notification might well be read as meaning that the notification is to apply only to those goods on which a.n additional Central excise duty had been levied and paid."

If the observations quoted a.hove mean that the High Court rejected the petition also on merits, a.pa.rt from the other ground given, then the principle la.id down in Daryao v. The St.ate of U. P. (1) will apply and the petition under Art. 32 will not be maintainable on the ground of res jwUc.ata. It is, however, not neoesaa.ry to pursue the question of re.a judicala any further, because I a.m restinir my decision on the more fundamental ground that a.n error of law or fa.ct committed by a judicial body cannot, in general, be impeached otherwise than on appeal unless the erroneous determination relates to a matter on which the jurisdiction of that body depends.

In Malkarjun Narhari (') the Privy Council dealt with a oa.se in which a. ea.le took place after notice had been wrongly served upon a. person who was not the legal representative of the judgment. debtor's estate, and the executing court had erroneously decided that he was to be treated a.s such represenfa.tive. The Privy Council said : "In so doing the Court was exercising its jurisdiction. It made a. s!Ld mistake, it is true; but a. Court ha.a jurisdiction to decide wrong a.s well a.s right. If it decides wrong, the wronged party can only take the course prescribed by law for setting matters right; (1) 1961 2 S.C.A. 5q1,

12) (1950) t.ll. 279, A, 216, 225.

1 S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS

and if that course is not taken the decision, however wrong, o"a.nnot be distu.rbed''. . The above view finds support from a number of decisions of this Court. Aniyoth Kunhamina Umma v. Ministry of Rehabilitation (1). In this case it had been held under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 19f>O, that a certain person was an evacuee and that certain plots of land wh\ch belonged to him were, therefore, evaouee property and vested in the Custodian of Evacuee Property. A transferee of the land from the evacuee then presented a pPtition under Art. 32 for restoration of the lands to her and complained of an infringement of her fundamental right, under Art. 19 ( 1) (f) and Art. 31 the Cons· titution by the aforesaid orders under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. The petitioner had been a party to the proceedings resulting in the declaration under that Act earlier mentioned. This Court held that as long aa the decision under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act which had become final stood, the petitioner could not complain of any infringement of any fundamental right. This Court diSmissed the petition observing : 1.

of

"We are basing our decision on the ground that the competent authorities under the Act had come to a certain decision, which decision has now become .final the petitioner not having moved against that decision in an appropriate court by an 8.ppropri"te proceeding. As Jong as that decision stands, the petitioner cannot complain. of the infringement of a fundamen· ta.I right, for she has no such right". 2. Gulal:xla8 & Oo. v. Assiatant Collector of Ouatoms (1) In this case certain imported goods had been assessed to customs ta.rift'. The assessee con-

tenued in a petition under Art. 32 that the duty (1) [1962] 1 S. o.R. SOS.

(2) A.J.R, [19S7] S.C. 733, 736.

Smt. Ujj• ;flli

•• U""'

St1l1 1/ Pr.Or/a

·--

'-fJGrJ.

1951 Smt. Ujjam Bai

v.

SI la •f Utt.r

Prwl•sh

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]

should have been cha.rged under a different item.of that tariff and that its fundamental right was violated by reason of the assessment order charging it to duty under a wrong item in the tariff. This Court held that there was no violation of fundamen· ta! right and observed : "If the provisions of law under which impugned orders have been passed are with jurisdiction, whether they be right or wrong on fact, there is really no question of the infraction of a fundamental right. If a. parti· cular decision is erroneous on facts or merits, the proper remedy is by way of an appeal". 3. Bhatnagar&: Oo. LW,. v. The Union of India(!) In this case the Government bad held that the petitioner ha.d been trafficking in licences and in that view confiscated the goods imported under a licence. A petition had been filed under Art. 32 challenging this action. It was held :

"If the petitioner's grievance is that the view taken by the appropriate authority in this matter is erroneous, that is not a matter which oan be legitimately agitated before us in a. petition under Art. 32". 4, The Parbhani Transport Oo-operativeBociety Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authority, Aurangabad (1). In this case it was contended that the decision of the Transport Authority in granting a permit for a motor carriage service had offended Art. 14 of the Constitution. This Court held that the decision of a quasi-judicial body, right or wrong, could not offend Art. 14.

There are, however, two decisions which stand out and mast be mentioned here. A contrary view wa.s taken in Kaila$h Nath v. The State of U. P. (•) (1) [19~7) S.C.R. 701, 702. (2) [1960] 3 S C.R. 177. (3) A.I.R. [19S7] S.C. 790.

1 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

There. a question precisely the same as the one now before us had arisen. A trader assessed to sales tax had claimed exemption under certain notification R.lld·this claim had been rejected. Thereupon he had moved this Court under Art. 32. It was contended that the right to be exempted from the payment of ta.x wa.s not a fundamental right a.nd therefore, the petition under Art. 32 was not competent. Tf\i,s Court rejected that contention basing itself on Bengal I mmunity Company's case(l} and Bidi Supply Oo' s case (2). The two cases on which the decision was rested had clearly no application to the· questio~ der,ided. I have shown earliar that in both those oases the very statute under which action had .been taken was challenged as ultra vires. In Kailash Nath's case (3) the question was not considered. from the point of view in which it has been placed before us in the present case and in which it was considered in the four cases referred to above. Therefore, I · am unable to agree with the view taken in Kailash Nath'8 case (3).

In Ramavatar Budhai Prasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer (' J the question raised was whether betel leaves were exempted from sales tax under certain provisions of· the C. P. & Berar Sales Tax Act. This Court agreed with the view of the assessing authority that they were not exempted. The question as to the maintainability of the application under Art. 32 was neither raised nor was it decided. This decision cannot, therefore, be taken as an authority for holding that an application under Art. 32 is maintainable even in respect of orders which are made in the undoubted exercise of jurisdiction by a quasi-judicial ~uthority. Certain other decisions were also cited before us, namely, Thakur Amar Singkji v. State of Rajast}w,n (i); M/s. Mohanl,al Hargovind Dass v. The Stale (I l [19SS] 2 S.C.R. fi03, 619, 620. (3) A.I.R. [19S7] S.C. 790.

(2) [JQ<6] S.C.R. 267.

(4) LI962] 1 S.C.R. 279. (S) [1955] 2 S.C.R.. ~.

196S . Sml. UJ}am B•i

v.

State of Ut'cw Pradish

A.!1ar J.

1962 Smt. Ujjam Bai

v. St•te of U. P. Praduh. Aiyarh

SUPREME OOUR'!' REPORTS [1963j

.of Madhya Pradesh (1); Y. Mahaboob Sheriff v. Mysore State Transport Authority ('), J. V. Gokal &1, Go. (Private) Ltd. v~ The Assistant Collector of Salestax (Inspection) (');and Universal Imports Agency v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports('). These decisions fall under the category in which an executive authority acts without authority of Jaw, or a quasi.judicial authority acts in transgression of a constitutional prohibition and without jurisdiction. I do not think that these decisions support the contention of the petitioner. In my opinion, the correct answer to the two questions which have been referred to this larger Bench must be in the negative. An order of assessment made by an authority under a taxing statute which is intra vires and in the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction cannot be challenged on the sole ground that it is passed on a misconstruction of a provision of the Act or of a notification issued thereunder. Nor can the validity of such an order he questioned in a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. Thti proper remedy for correcting an error in such an order is to proceed by way of appeal, or if the error is an error apparent on the face of the reoord, then by an .application under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It is necessary to observe here that Art. 32 of the Constitution does not give this Court an appellate jurisdiction such as is given by Arts. 132 to 136. Article 32 guarantees the fight to a constitutionid remedy and relates only to the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. Unless a question of the enforcement of a fundamental right arises, Art. 32 does not apply. There can be no qut:stion of the enforcement of a fundamental right if the order challenged is a valid and legal order, in spite of the allegation that it is erroneous. I have, therefore, come to ihe conclusion that no question of the (I) [19SS] 2 S.C.R. .~O!I. \3) (19601 's. c. R. 852.

(2) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 146. (4) [1960] I s.c.R. 906.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

. enforeement of a fundamental right arises in this case and the writ petition is not maintainable. i It is necessary to refer to one last point. The petitioner's firrn had also filed an appeal on a certificate of the Allahabad High Court against the order of that Court dismissing their petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The appeal against that order was dismissed by this Court for non-prosecution on February 20, 1961. In respect of that order of dismissal the petitioner's firm has filed an application for _restoration on the ground that it had been advised that in view of a rule having been issued under Art. 32 of the Constitution, it was not necessary to prosecute the appeal. The petitioner's firm has prayed for condonation, of delay in filing the application for restoration of appeal. In my opinion no sufficient cause has been ma~e out for allowing the application for restorR.tion. The petitioner's firm had deliberately allowed the appeal to be dismissed for non-prosecution and it cannot now be allowed to get the dismissal set aside on the ground of wrong advice.

Bmt. Ujiam B ti

v.

State of U~tw Pradesh AiyarJ.

Furthermore, in the appeal filed on behalf of M/s. Chhota.bhai Jethabhai Patel & Co. v. The Sales Tax Officer, Agra and another (Civil Appeal No. 99 of 1961) we have decided the question on merits and have held that the assessing authorities did not put a wrong construction on the notification in qusstion. KAPUR,

J.-In this petition under Art. 32 of

the Constitution which is directed against the order passed by the Sales Tax Officer, Allahabad, dated December 20, 1958, the prayer is for a. writ of certiorari or other order in the nature of certiorari quashing the said order, a. writ of mandamus against the respondents to forbear from realizing the sales tax imposed on the basis of the said

Kapur J.

1962

Smt. Ujjam Bai v. S la:e of Uttar

Pradesh

KopurJ ..

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)

order and such other writ or direction as the ·petitioner may be entitled· to. The petitioner is a partner in the firm M/s. Mohanlal Hargovind Das which carried on the business of manufacture and sale of handmade biris, their head office being in Jubbalpore in the State of Madhya Pradesh. They also carr.Y on business in U. P., and in that State their principal place of business is at Allahabad. Under s. 4 ( 1) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act (Act XV of 194i>) hereinafter called the 'Act', the State Government is authorised by a notification to exempt unconditionally under cl. (a) and conditionally under cl. (bi any specified goods, On December 14, 1957, the U. P. Government issued a notification under s. 4( l}(b) of the Act exempting cigars, cigarettes, biris and tobacC'o provided that the additional Central Excise Duties leviable under the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 (Act 58 of 1957) had been paid. This notification was subsequently modified and on November 25, 1958, another notification was issued unconditionally exempting from sales tax biris both handmade and machine-made with effect from July I, 1958. Tl:te exemption of biris from sales tax was conditional under the notification dated December 14, 1957, for the period December 14, 19.n, to June 30, l!J58, but was unconditional as from July 1, 1958. The petitioner's firm submitted its return for the quarter beginning April 1, 1958, to June 30, 1958, showing a gross turnover of Rs. 75,44,633 and net turnover of Rs. lll. The firm claimed that as from December 14, 1957, biris had been exempted from payment of sales tax which had been replaced by the additional central excise duty and therefore no tax was leviab\e on the sale of biris. The requisite sales tax of Rs. 3.51 nP on the turnover of Rs. 111

1 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

was deposited as required under the law. The petitioner's firm also submitted its return for the periods December 14, 1957, 1;o December 31, 1957, and from January 1, 1958, to March 31, 1958. For the subsequent periods returns were made but those are not in dispute as they fell within the notification of November 25, 1958. The Sales Tax Officer on November 28, 1958, sent a notice to the petitioner's firm for assessment of tax on sale of biris during the assessment period April l, 1958, to Jund 30, .H)58. On December 10, 1958, the petitioner's firm submitted an application to the Sales Tax Officer stating that no sales tax was exigible under the Act on the sale of biris because of the notification dated December 14, 1957. This pla.ce was rejected by the Sales Tax Officer and on December 20, 1958, he assessed the sales of t.he petitioner's firm to sales tax amounting to Rs. 4,71,541· 75nP. In his order the Sales Tax Officer held:"The exemption envisaged in this notification applies to deale,rs in respect of sales of biris provided that the additional Central Excise duties levia.ble thereon from the closing of business on 13-12-1957 have been paid on such goods. The assessees paid no such Ex0ise duties. Sales of biris by the assessees are therefore liable to sales tax". Aga_inst this order the firm took an appeal under s. 9 of the Act to the Judge (Appeals) Sales Tax, Alla.ha.bad, being Appeal No. 441 of 1959, but it was dismissed on May 1, 1959. The petitioner's firm filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Allahabad challenging the validity of the order of assessment and demand by the Sales Tax Officer. This was Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 225 of 1951-1 which was dismissed on January 27, 1D59 on the ground that there was another remedy open to the

1962 Sml, Ujjam Bai v. Srate u.f U lfar Pra<ksh

Kapur J.

Sml. Ujjam Bai

••

Stal• of Uttar

Pre de sh

Kapur J.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]

petitioner under the Act. The High Court also observed:" We have come to the conclusion that the Sales Tax Officer has not committed any apparent or obvious error in the interpretation of the notification of 14th December 1957". Against the order,ofthe High Court an appeal was brought to this Court on a certificate under Art.133(l)(a). During the pendeney of the appeal this petition under Art. 32 was filed and rule was issued on May 20, 1959. Subsequently the appeal which had been numbered C-A. 572/60 was dismissed ·by a Divisional Bench of this Court for non-prosecution. An application has been filed in this Court for restoration of the appeal and for condonation of delay. That matter will be dealt with separately. In the petition under Art. 32 the validity of the order of assessment dated December 20, 1958, is challenged on the ground that the levy of the tax amounts to "infringement of the fundamental right of the petitioner to carry on trade and business guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(gi" and further that it is an "illegal consfiscation of property without payment of compensation and contravenes the provisions of Art. 31 of the Constitution". The prayers have ..!ready been set out above. As before the Constitution Bench which heard the petition a preliminary objection against the competency of the petitioner's right to move this court under· Art. 32 of the Constitution, was raised and the correctness of the decision in KailashNath v. The, St,ate of U.P. ,(1) was chl\llenged, the Constitution Bench because of that decision and of certain other decisions of this court and because of the im· portance of the question raised made the following order: (I) A.I.R. 1957 S. C. 790.

1 s.c.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1962

"The question thus debated is of consideSmt. l!jjam Bai rable importance on which there has been no v. State of Utlar direct pronouncement by this court. It seems PiadeJh desirable that it should be authoritatively settled. We accordingly direct that the papers Kapur J. be placed before the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench for deciding the two > following questions: 1. Is an order of assessment made by an authority under a. taxing statute which is intra vires open to challenge as repugnant to Art. 19(l)(g), on the sole ground that it is based on a misconstruction of a provision of the Act or of a. notification issued thereunder?". 2. Can the validity of such an order be questioned in a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution?'' Tha.t is how this matter bas come up before this bench. ·. Before examining the rival contentions raised and the controversy between the parties it is necessary to state that (i) in the present case we are not called upon to decide whether els. (f) and (g) of Art. 19 are applicable to a taxing statute or to express our preference for the view of this court ~s expressed in a. group of oases beginning with Ramjilal v. lncome-fAJx Qfficer, Mohindergarh( 1) over the later view taken in the second Koohunni (2 ) case or K. T. Moopil Nair v. State of Ke.rala (3 ), (2) whether the word ·'State" in Art. 12 of the Constitution Comprises judicial power exercised by courts and (3) the wider question whether Art. 32 is applicable in the case of infringement of rights by private parties. The controversy in the present case in this ; the petitioner contends that a.n erroneous order, in this o

(I9Sl) s.c.R. 121, '<2> (1960) 3 s.c.R. sa1. (3) (1961) s s.c.R. 77.

1962

Smt. Ujjam Bai

v.

State of Ultar Pradesh

XapurJ.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)

case, of assessment resulting from a misconstruction of a notification iBsued under a statute by a quasi-judicial authority like the Sales Tax Officer even if the statute is intra 'lireB is an infringement of the fundamental right to carry on trade under Art. 19(1) (g) on the ground that the essence of the right under that Article is to C!l.rry on trade unfettered and that such a right can be infringed as much by an executive act of an administrative tribunal as by a quasi·judicial decision given by such a tribunal. The petitioner mainly relies on the decision of this Court in Kailash Nath v. St,ate ojU.P. The submission of the respondent, which was urged as a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this petition, was that the impugned decision of the Sales tax Officer does not violate any fundamental right. The respondent argued that if the constitutionality of the Act is not challenged then all its provisions must necessarily be constitutional and valid including the provisions for the imposition of the tax and procedure for assessment and appeals against such assessments and revisions therefrom would be equally valid. A decision by the Sales tax Officer exercising quasi-judicial power and ailting within his powers under the Act and within his jurisdiction must necessarily be ·valid and legal irrespective of whether the decision is right or wrong. Therefore an order of the Sales tax Officer even if erroneous because of misconstruction of notification issued thereunder remains a valid and legal order and a tax levied thereunder cannot contravene fundamental rights and cannot be challenged under Art. 32. An aggrieved party must prooeed against the decision by way of appeal etc. as provided under the statute or in appropriate oases under Art. 226 of the Constitution and finally by appeal to this Court under Art. 136. For the order to

eJ.

1 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORrs

84~

be valid a.nd immune from challenge under Art. 32, it is nece:3sary th'3refore that (l) the statute is intra vires in all respects; (~) the authority acting under it acts quasi-judicially ; (3) it acts within the powers given by the Act and within jurisdictfon; and (4) it does not contravene rules of natural justice. In Mulkarjun Bin ShidramaPpa Pasare v. Narhari Bin Skivappa ('), Lord Hobhouse while dealing with an erroneous order of a court said: "The Code goes on to say that the Court shall issue a notice to the party against whom execution is applied. It did issue notice to Ramlingappa. He contended that he was not the right person, but the Court, having received his protest, decided that he was the right person, and so proceeded with the execution. It ma.de a sad mistake it is true; but a Court has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right. If it decided wrong, the wronged party oan only take the course prescribed by law for setting matters right ; and if that course is not taken the decision, however wrong, cannot be disturbed." In an earlier case dealing with the revisional powers of the Court, Sir Barnes Peacock in Rajah Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh (2) said:"The question' then is, did the judges of the Lower Courts in this case, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, act illegally or with material b:regularity. It appears that they had perfect jurisdiction to decide the question which was before them, and they did decide it. Whether they decided it rightly or wrongly they had jurisdiction to decide the case ; and even if they decided wrongly, they did not exercise their jurisdiction illegally or with • material irregularity".

{I) [1900] L.R.. 27 I.A. 2I6.

(2) [1884] L.R. 11I.A.237, 239.

1962 Sml. U}jam B•i v. StaJ1 o/ U1tar Pradesh

850 SUPREME COURT REl'OB.T5 (1963] 1961

..

Snd Ujjam Boi

SlaJe of Uttaf' Pradesh

KapurJ.

This principle has been accepted by this Court in cases to which reference will be made later in this judgment. Although these cases were dealing with the decisions of Courts they are equally applicable to decisions of quasi-judicial tribunals because ill both cases where the authority has jurisdiction to decide a matter it must have jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly and if the decision is wrong the aggrieved party can have recourse to the procedure prescribed by the Act for correcting the erroneous decision. Now Art. 32 is a remedial provision and is itself a fundamental right which entitles a citizen to approach this court by an original petition in any case where his fundamental right has been or may be infringed. The relevant part of the Artiole provides :-· Art. 32 (l) ·"The right to move the 8upreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Pa.rt is guaranteed. (2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, que warrant,o and oortiorari, whichever may be· appropriate for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this "Part".

Under Art. 32 (l) a citizen can approach this Court when his fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution are invaded the remedy for which is provided in cl. (2) of Art. 32. Thus the remedy under Art. 32 is not available unless the fundamental rights of a. citizen a.re invaded. In my opinion the contention raised by t.he respondents is well founded. If the statute a.nd it. constitutionality is not challenged then every pa.r.

i s.c.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

of it is constitutionally valid including the provisions authorising the levying of a tax and the mode and procedure for assessment and appeals etc. A determination of a question by a Sales tax Officer acting within his jurisdiction must be equally valid and legal. In such a case an erroneous construction, assuming it is erroneous, is in respect of a. matter which the statute has given the authority complete jurisdiction to decide. 'fhe decision is therefore a valid act irrespective o!.its being erroneous. An order of assessment passed by a quasijudicial tribunal under a statute which is 11,ltra vires cannot be equated with an assessment order passed by that tribunal under an intra vires statute even though erroneous, The former being with out authority of law, is wholly unauthorised and has no existence in law and therefore the order is an infringement• of fundamental rights under Art. 19( l) (f) & (g) and can be challenged under Art. 32. The latter is not unconstitutional and has the protection of law being under the authority of a valid law and therefore it does not infringe any fundamental right and cannot be impugned under Art. 32. To say that the doing of a legal act violates a fundamental right would be a contradiction in terms. It may be pointed out that by an erroneous decision of the quasi-judicial authority the wronged party is not left without a remedy. In the first place under the Act before an assessment is ma.de the Sales tax Officer is required to 'give notice and hear objections of a taxpayer and give decision after proceeding in a judici..a.l manner that is after considering the objections, aud such evidenoe as is led. Against the order of assessment an appeal is provided by s. 9 of the Act and against such an appellate order a revision can be ta.ken under s. 10 of the Act under a. 11 a reference to the High Court on a question of law

19611

Sml. Ujjam Bt1.1

v. Shte of Uttar Pradewh KapurJ.

1982 Smt. Ujjam Bai

v.

S141e of Utlar Pradesh

Ka;'tJr J.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)

is provided and if the revising authority refuses to make a reference then the High Court can be moved to direct the revising authority to state a case and t.hen an appeal would lie under Art. 136 of the Constitution of India and it may be added that a pritition under Art. 226 would lie to the High Court in appropriate cases against which an appeal will lie to this Court under Art. J 36. It may here ba added that the prncedure prescribed by the Act shows that the Sales tax Officer has to determine the turnover after giving the taxpayer a reason hie opportunity of being heard and such an assessment is a quasi-judicial act Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S., Advani (1). If a Sales tax Officer acts as a qutU!i-judicial authority then the decision, whether right or wrong, is a perfectly valid act which has the au thm:ity of an intra vires statute behind it. Such a decision, in my opinion, does not infringe any fundam11ntal right of the petitioner and any challenge to it• under Art. 32 is unsustainable. Before giving the reasons for any opinion I think it necessary to refer to the constitutional provisions dealing with the power to tax. This subject is dealt with in Part XII of Constitution and Art. 265 therein which is the governing provision provides : "No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law." Therefore a taxing law enacted by a legislature, which it is not competent to enact, will have no existence in the eye of law and will be violative of Art. 19 (l)(g). The same result will follow if f;he law is a colourable piece of legislation e.g., a law disguised as a tl\xing law but. really law but confiscatory measure the object of which i• not to raise revenue but confiscation. Similarly, if a tax is assessed by an authority which has no jurisdict. (I) [19SOJ I s.c.R. 621, 725.

I S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

tion to impose it will also be outside the protection of law being without authority of law. The same will be the case· where an Executive authority levies a.n unauthorised tax. Then there are cases like the present one where a quasi-judicial tribunal imposes a .tax by interpreting a notification under a taxing provision and the objection ta.ken is that the interpretation is erroneous. The cases relied upon by counsel for the appellant a;nd the respondent fall within one or other of these categories.

A.s I have said above, the submission of the learned Additional Solicitor _ General is well founded. It has the support of the following of this Court which I shall decisions In GUlahdas v. Assistant now deal with. Collector of Oustom (1) it was held that if the order impungned is made under the -provisions of a. statue which is intra vires and the order is within the jurisdiction of the authority making it then whether it is right or wrong, there is no infraction of the fundamental rights and it has to be challenged in the manner provided in the Statute and not by a petition undnr Art. 32. In that case the petitioner was aggrieved by the order of the Asc:iistant Collector of Customs who assessed the goods imo0rted undJr a licence under~ different entry and consequently a higher Excise Duty was imposed. The petitioners feeling aggrieved bv the order filed a petition under Art. 32 and the objection to its maintainability was that the application could not be sustained because no fundam~ntal right had been violated by the impugned order it having been properly and correctly made by the authorities competflnt to make it. The petitioner there contended that the goods imported, which were called 'Lyra.' brand Crayons werA not crayons at all and therefore imposition of a higher duty by holding them to be crayons was a.n infringement of fundamental (I) A.I.R. l9j7 S.C. 733, 736.

1962 Smt. Ujjam B~i

••

Stat• of Uttar Pradesh Kapur J.

19~1

Sm'• Ujj.;m Bai v.

Sl•t• of Uttar PraJ,sh

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]

right under Art. l9(l)(f) & (g). This contention was repelled. Delivering the judgment of the Court, S. K. Das, J., observed at p. 736 .:"What, after all, is the grievance of the petitioners? They do not challenge any of the provisions Of the India Traiff Act, 1934 (XXXII of 1934) or any of the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (VIII of 1878). It is for the Customs authorities to determine under the provisions of the said Acts "It" hat duty is payable in respect of certain imported articles. The Customs authorities ca.me to a. decision, right or wrong, and the petitionera pursued their remedy by way of an appeal to the Central Board of Revenue. The Central Board of Revenue dismiSBed the appeal. D'nless the provisions relating to the imposition of duty are challenged as unconstitutional, or the orders in question are oh&llenged as being in excess of the powers given to the Customs authorities and therefore without jurisdiction it is difficult to see how the question of any fundamental right under Art. 19(1) els. (f) & (g) of the Constitution can a.t all a.rise. If the provisions of law under which the impugned orders have been passed are good provisions and the orders ps.ssed are with jurisdiction, whet.her they be right or wrong on facts, there is really no question of the infraction of a fundamental right. If a particular decision is erroneous on facts or merits, the proper remedy is by way of an appeal.

All that is really contended is that the orders are erroneous on merits. That surely does not give rise to the violation of &ny

1 S.C.R.

SUPREME OOURT REPORTS

fundamental right under Art. 19 of the Constitution." . The second case is Bhatnagar Oo. Ltd. v. The Union of lndift (1). In that case the Sea Customs authorities ordered thA confiscation of goods on the ground th!J.t the petitioner had been trafficking in licenses under which the goods had been imported. This order was challenged under Art. 32. It was held that the order of confiscation made as a result of investigation, which ·the Customs Authorities were competent to make, was not open to challenge in proceedings under Art. 32 of the Constitution on the ground that the conclusions were not properly drawn. It was observed : ''If the petitioner's grievance is that the view taken by the appropriate authorities in this matter is erroneous that i1 not a matter which can be legitimately agitated before us in a petition under Art. 32. It may perhaps be, as the learned So1icitor General suggested, that the petitioner may have remedy by suit for damages but that is a matter with which we are not concerned. If the goods have been seized in accordance with law and they have been ~ized as a result of the findings recorded by the relevant authorities competent to hold enquiry under the Sea Customs Act, it is not open to the petitioner to contend that we should ask the authorities to exercise discretion in favour of the petitioner and allow his licences a further lease of life. Essentially the petitioner's grievance is against the conclusions . of fact reached by the relevant authorities." -

The third case is The Parbhani Transp<Yrt Go-operative Society Ltd. v. The Re,gional Transport Authority, Aurangabad (2 ) where the (I) (1957) s.c.a. 101, 112.

t2) [19601 s s.c.R. in. 188.

1961.

Sml. Ujjom Bai

••

Sta~1 of Uttar

· Prad11h

EaparJ,

1962

...

Smt. Ujjam Bai S1at1 of Ui'• Prad1sh

-

Kapur J.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]

decision of a. Transport Authority in granting a motor carriage permit was challenged as a contravention of Art. 14. The Court held that the Regional Transport Authority acts in a quasijudicial capacity in the matter of granting permits, and if it comes to an erroneous decision the decision is not challengeable under Art. 32 of the Constitution because the decision right or wrong could not infringe Art. 14. Sarkar J., said at p. 188:"The decision of respondent No. I (Regional Transport Authorit}) may have been right or wrong ......... but we are unable to see that the decision offends Art. 14 or any other fundamental right of the petitioner. The respondent No. l was acting as a quasijudicial body and if it has made any mistake in its decision there are appropriate remedies available to the petitioner for obtaining relief. It cannot complain of a breach of Art. 14". Lastly reliance was placed on an unreported judgement of this Court in Aniyotk Kunkamina Umma v. The Ministry of RehabiUtatian, Government of India, New Delhi (') The petitioner in that case was a reprssen~­ ative-in-interest of her husba.nd who had been declared an evacuee by the Custodian of Evacuee property. Her appeals first to the Deputy Custodian and then to the Custodian General were unsuccessful. She then field a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. It was held that J,he appropriate authorities of competent jurisdiction under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950 having determined that the husband was an evacuee within that Act and the property was evacuee property it was not open to the 'petitioner to challenge the decision of the CustOdian (II) [1962] I s.c.R. sos.

t S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

85'1

General under Art. 32 of the Constitution. S. K. Das, J., delivering the judgment of the Court observed:"Where, however, on account of the decision of an authority of competent jurisdiction the right alleged by the petitioner has been found not to exist, it is difficult to see how any question of infringement at right c~n arise as a ground for. a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution unless the decision on the right alleged by the petitioner is held to he a nullity or can be otherwise got rid of. As long as that deoision stands, the petitioner cannot complain of any infringement of a fundamental right. The alleged fundamental right of the petitioner is really dependent on whether Kunhi Moosa Haji was an evacuee property. Is the decision of the appropriate authoritie~ of competent jurisdiction cannot be otherwi~ got rid of, the petitioner cannot complaiq of her fundamental right under Arts. 19( l )( f) and 31 of the Constitution". These authorities show (1) that if a statute is intra vir~B than a competent order under it by an authority apting a.a a quasi-judicia] authority is equally intra vires (2) that the decision whether 1·ight or wrong is not violative of any fundamental right and (3) that if the order is erroneous then it oan be qu~s~ioned only under the provisions of that statute because the order will not amount to an infringement of a fund.a.mental right as_ long as the statute is consititutAona.l. In appropriate case it may be cha.llenged under Art. 226 and in both cases an ,appeal lies to this Court.. I may now examine decisions of this Court relied upon by the learned Attorney General in whioli the operation of. taxation laws as violating .Ai.t. 19(1)(g) was considered and the pr<>oedure by

Smt. Ujjca B•i V;.

BIGll of

u,;.,

PttJP.•"

E•,ur J.

...

Srt 1. Ujjam Bai SI•,. •f UtMr

P,;.USA

x-,J.

SUPREME COURT REPORTs [1963]

which this Court was approached. In support of his case the Attorney General mainly relied on KaiJaBh Nath v. St,ate of U.P.(1) and tried to buttress that decision by certain oases decided before and subs· equent to it. He submitted that a misconstruction of a provision of law even by a quasi-judicial tribunal is equally an infringement of fundamental rights under Art. 19( l)(f) & (g) because as a· con· sequence of such misconstruction the tax is an ilh•gal imposition. In KaiJaBhNath's case it was contended before the Sa.lea tax Authorities that cloths, on which Excise duty had already been paid and which was then processed, hand-printed and exported, no sales tax was leviable as it was exempt under the notifi· cation under s. 4 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act. The Sales tax Authorities however held the exemption ti:> be applicable only to cloth which had not been processed and hand-printed and was in the original oondition. A petition under Art. 32 was filed against that order and it was contended that the rights of the aliseSBee undE r Art.. 19( 1)(g) were infringed by the order misinterpreting the notifica· tion. The Court said:"If a tax is levied without due legal authority on any tr~de or business, then it is open to the citizen aggrieved to approach this oourt for a writ under Art. 32 since his right to oarry·on trade is violated or infringed by the imposition and such being the case, Art. 19(l)(g) comes into play". The objection there taken on behalf of the State was in the following terms:''That the imposition of an illegal .tax will not entitle the citizen to invoke Art. 32 but he muiit resort to remedies· available under ordinary law or proceed under Art. 226 of the Constitution, in view of the fact that the right (I) A.LR. 1957 S.C. 790,

1 s.c.R.

SUPREltE OOURT REPORTs

to be exempted from the payment of ta.x cannot be said to be a fundamental right · which comes within the purview of Art. 32". This contention was repelled because of the folio· wing observations in the Bengal, l mmunity Oo. LW,. v. 8ta'l6 of Bihar ( 1 f. "We are unable to agree the above conclusion. In reaching the conclusion the High Court appearH to have overlooked the fact that the main contention of the appellant oompany, as set forth in its petition, is that the Act, in so f~r as it purports to tax a non· resident dealer in respect of an inter.State sale or purchase of goods, is Ultra vires the Constitution and wholly illegal ......... '' The other oases referred to in that judgment were Mokam'TMilYasin v. Town Area Oommittee, Ja/,alabad.( 2 ); State of Bombay v. United Motors ('); Himmatlal Haf'ilal, Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh (') and Billi Supply Oo. v. Union of India (6 ). Thus the decision in that case was bused on decisions none of which supports the proposition that a misoonstrution by a quasi-judicial tribunal of a notification under the provision of a statute which is intra viru is· a violation of Art. 19( I )(g). On the other hand they were all oases where the imposition of tax ol license fee 01· executive action was sought to be sup· port6d by an tdtra vires provision of the law and was therefore void and violative of Art. 19 (l)(g). As· this distinction was not kept in view the remedy by way of petition under Art. 32 was held to be available. The question as now raised was not argued in KaUa8hNath'8 case. The distinction between a competence order of aase88nlen~ made .under a provision of law which is intra tJires even if it is errone6us.and an order made (&)

[1955) 2 s. C.- R. 603• 618.

(2) Ll~52l: S•·C. l,\o 1J12..

csJ U95JJ s.c.a. 1069 ·ion. (4> C1954J s. c. a.. 1122. (5) c19'61s.c.a.257, 211, 277,

IHI

..,,.

Sm1. Ujj- B•i

••

Stot1 of Ulln ~,

S.. 11. l:l'jjam B~i

v. 8lt1ll of UUar Pr•thsh

Kirpur J,

SUPREME COURT REPORTS fl963]

under a provision of law which is ultra vires in fundamental in the matter of applicability of Art.32. In the former case the provision of law being valid the. order will be protected as being under the authority of a valid law and therefore it will not be violative of Art. 19(l)(g) and Art. 32 is not available to challenge that order. In the latter case, the provisions of .law being void the protection of law does not operate and the order is an unauthorised interference with the rights of a oitizen under Art. 19(1 )(g). It can therefore be challenged under Art. 32. This distinction does not seem to have been kept in view in Kai/,ash Natk's case (1). That case is further open to the criticism that it is based on decisions which were not cases of erroneous interpretations of notifications under intra vires statutes but were cases where an unconstitutional provision of law was sought to be used to support a tax. For the reasons I have given Kailash Natk's case(l) cannot be accepted as well founded". In yet another case where the remedy under Art. 32 was sought to challenge the decision of a Sales tax Officer is Ramavtar Budhaipraaad ero. v. Asdstant Saks tax Officer, Akola ('). There a Sales tax Officer on a construction of a Schedule of the Sales tax Act had held that betel leaves were subject to sales tax as they were not vegetables which were exempt from that tax and this Court upheld that decision. The question as to the availability of Art. 32 was not raised.

Besides Kaikuh Nath' s case which I have dealt with above the other case relied upon by the learned Attorney General fall within the following categories in none of which the question as now ar.gued &rose or was considered. (I) Where the tax imposed Dr action taken is under a statute which is unconstitutional. (1) A.I.IL 1957 S.C. 790.

(2) [1961] 1 S.c.R. 279.

I S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(2) Where the Executive action is without

authority of law.

196Z

Sme. Ujjom Bai

( 3) Where the taxing authority imposes a. tax

Y •. Sro1t fl/ URar

or acts without authority of law.

Pradesh

(4} Where the quasi-judicia] authority without having jurisdiction determines a fa.ct or gives a

Kap111 J.

decision. I shall now discuss the cases which fall in the first category i.e. where action is taken under a statute which is unconstitutional. The action ta.ken thereunder must necessarily be unconstitutional which is challengeable by an aggreived party under Art. 32.

In Himmaflal Hari"lal Mehta v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1) sales ta.x was neither levied nor demanded but apprehending that an illegal sales tax may be assessed and Jevied a petition under Art. 226 was filed in the High Court which was dismissed and an appeal was ·brought to this Court and thus it was not a petition under Art. 32. In that case the sales tax 'Qnder explanation II to s. 2(g) of the Central Provinces & Berar Sales tax Act (Act 2 of 1947) was held ultra vires of the State Legislature because it offended Art. 286(l}(a) and its imposition or threat of imposition was held without authority of law and therefore infringement of the constitutional right guaranteed under Art. 19( l)(g} entitling the petitioner to apply under Art. 226 of the Constitution. This case therefore decided that a tax under an Act which is unconstitutional, ultra vires a.nd void is without authority of law under Art. 265 and is an infringement of Art. 19 (I) (g). This case and RamJilal's case (2) received approval in The Bt?Jn(Jal Immunity Co. case (8). In the Bt?Jn(Jal Immunity case also tho right infringed was by an Act which was ultra 'Vires (I)

(1954) S.C.R. 1122.

(2) (1951) S.C.R.. 127,

(ll (19SS) 2 S.C.R. ~. 61&

S•I, Ujjm Boi Y.

Sl•t• •/ U11.., Pralu"/t,

IC_,., .1

SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]

and the remedy under the Act wa1 held to be inadequate, nugatory or useless. The facts of that case were that the appellant company filed a petition under Art. 226 in the High Court of Patna for a writ of prohibition restraining the Sales tax Officer from making an assessment of sales tax pursuant to a notice issued by him. The appellant claimed that sales sought to be asst'BSed were made in the course of inter-State trade, that the provisions of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Bihar Act 19 of 1947) which authorised the imposition of tax on such sales were repugnant to Art. 286 ( 2) and void, and that, therefore. the proceedings taken by the · Sales tax Officer should be quashed. The application was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that if the Sales tax Officer made an assessment whioh was erroneous, the assessee could challenge it by way of appeal or revision under ss. 24 and 25 of the Act and that as the matter was within the jurisdic· tion of the Sales tax Officer, no writ of prohibition or certiorari could be issued. There was an appeal against this order to this Court and therein a prelimina.ry objection was taken that a writ under Art. 226 was not the appropri:ate remedy open to an assessee for challenging the legality of the proceedings before a Sales tax Officer. In rejecting this contention, this Court observed:"It is, however, clear from article 265 that no tax can be levied . or collected except by authority of law which must mean a good and valid law. The contention of the appellant company is that the Act which _authorises the asseBBment, levying and collection of sales tax on- inter-State trade contravenes and constitutes an infringement of Art. 286 and i11, therefore, tiltra virea, void and unenforceable. If, however, this contention be yell "ded, tJie 1;81DedJ b7 wa7 of a wri&

1 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

must, on principle and authority, be available to the party aggrieved." And dealing with the, contention that the petitione1· should proceed by wa.y of itppeal or revision under the Act, this Court observed :"The answer to ~his plea. is short and simple. The remedy under the Act cannot be said to be adequate and is, indeed nugatory or useless if the Act which provides for such remedy is itself ultra vires and void and the principle relied upon can, therefore, have no application were a party comes to Court with an allega~ion that his right has been or is being threatened to be infringed by a law which is ultra tJires the powers of the legislature which enacted it and as such void and prays for appropriate relief under article 226." (p. 620). It will be seen that the question which a.rose in that case was with reference to a provision in a taxing statute which was ultra tiires and the decision was only that action taken under such a provision was without the authority of law and was, therefore, an unconstitutional interference with th~ right 'to carry on business under Ar.t. 19\l}(g). In Mohmmad Yasin v. The Town Area O<Ymmittee, Jal<ilabad (1) the imposition of the license fee was without authority of law and was therefore held to be ohallengeable under Art. 32 because such a license fee on a business not only takes away the property of the licensee but also operates as on unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on business. In Balaji v. TM, Income TQ4; Oj/icer, Special I nvesf,i,gation Oircl,e, .A.kola C') the Income tax Officer included, after the registration of a iil'.m,, the income of the wife and of the minor olaildnm who had been admitted to partnenbip. ~·) (1152)8.C.Lm.

(_2~ (19$i) 2 &.c.L -

IHI

Smt. Ujjm Bt1

....

S1ot. of UllM

-

_Prad#h

KliJ*r J.

IHI lfMI. Ujji.ne 6oi

v. S••hWtsh •!

Ultar

SUPREMlll OOURT REPORTS (1963]

The assessee attacked the constitutionality of s." 16(3)(a)(i)(ii) of the Income tax Act. The first question there raiserl was of the legislative competence of Parliament to enact the law· and that Parliament was h9ld competent to enact. Socondly the constitutionality of the provision was questio. ned on the ground that it violated tl1e doctrine of equality before tho law under Art. 14 of the Constitution and that ground was also repelled and it was held that tue legislature had selected for the purpose of classification only that group of persons who in fact are used as a cloak to perpetuate fraud on taxation. The third ground of attack was based on Art. 19(l)(f) & (g) of the Constitution. Relying upon the case of Mohd. Yasin v. Town Area Cammittee.( 1) which was a case of license fees and llimmatlal Harilal .ilfrhta's case(') ·in which there was no determination by any tribunal but there was a threat of an illegal imposition, the court held that not only must a law be valid in the sense of there being legislative competence, it must also not infringe the fundamental rights declared by the Constitution. This again was not a case of a determination of a question by a taxing authority acting quasi-judicially but the .const!tutionality and vires of the statute were challenged. The second category of cases is were the Taxing Authority imposes a tax or acts without authority of law and the assessment made by the Taxing Authority is without jurisdiction. Tat,a Iron & 8f£el, Co., Lf.d., v. S. R. Sarkar (') was a case under the Central 8ales Tax Act under which sales in the course of inter-State trade are liable to be taxed only once and by one State on behalf of the Central Government. The petitioner company in that case was asse88ed to tax of certain sales falling within that Act by the Central ~ales tax Officer, Bihar. and the tax wa.e paid. 'l'hey were again taxed by tlle Cll (1952; S.C.R. 572. (2) ( 1954) S.C.R. 1122. (~)

(l!Hil) I S.c:.ll. S19,,

a

I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Central Sales tax Officer, West Bengal who held that under the statute that was the "Appropriate Statfl'' to levy the tax as the situs of sale was in West Bengal and that was assailed under Art. 32. The objection to the maintainablity of the petition on tfte ground that an appeal against the order or assessment could be taken and that proceedings under Art. 32 were incompetent was overruled. Shah J., in delivering the judgment of the majority referred to the decision of this Court in Himmatlal Harilal Mehta's case, (1 ); r.Phe Bengal Immunity Co. case( 2 ) and the State of Bombay v. United Motors India LU. (3) and observed as follows:"In these cases, in appeal from orders passed by the High Courts in petitions under Art. 226, this C0urt held that an attempt to · levy tax under a statute which was ultra vires infringed the fundamental right of the citizen and recourse to the High Court for protection of the fundamental right was not prohibited because of the provisions contained in Art. 265. In the case before us, the vires of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, are not challenged; but in Kailash Nath v. The Sta~ of Uttar Pradesh A. I . .R. 1957 S.C. 790 a petition challenging the levy of a. tax was entertained by this Court even though the Act under the authority of which the tax was sought to be recovered was not challenged as ultra vires. It is not necessary for purposes of this case to decide whether the principle of Kailash Nath's case is inconsiste11t with the view expre1:1sed by this Court in Ramjilal's case [1951] S. C. R. 127''. The learned Judges also held that the statute made it impossible to levy two ta.xes on the same ·sale a.nd only one tax being payable it could be collected on behalf of the Government. of India. by one (2) (1955) 2. S.C.R. 603,; 6~8. ( S) [l~SJ S.C.ll. 10691 1077.

(1) (1954) S.C.R. 1122.

1911 Sml. UJjamB

"· Ulta Slate </ Produh Kapur J.

Sml. Ujj..,. Bai ~·

St•l1 oj U ttar Pr.i11h

SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]

State only and one sale could not be taxed twice. It having been collected once the threat to recover it again was Prima Jacie an infringement of the fundamental right of the petitioner. Sarkar J., who gave the minority judgment observed:"In Kail,ash Nath v. The State of U. P., A.I.R. 1947 S. C. 790, this Court held that an illegal levy of sales tax on a trader under an Act the legality of which was not challenged violates his fundamental rights under Art. 19( l )(g) and a petition under Art. 32 with respect to such violation lies. The earlier case of Ramjilal v. Income tax Officer, Mohindergarh [1951] S.C.R. 127 does not appear to have been considered. It is contended that the decision in Kailash Nath's case requires reoon· sideration. We do not think however that the present is a fit case to go into the question whether the two oases not reconcilable and to decide the preliminary question raised· The point was taken as a late stage of prooee· dings after much costs had been incurred. The question arising on this petition is further of general importance a decision of which is desirable in the interest of all concerned. As there is at least one case supporting the competence of the petition, we think it fit to decide this petition on its merits on the footing that it is competent''. It cannot be said that this case is an authority which supports the contention of the petitioner. Apa.rt from the fact that Kaifash N ath's case (1) did not receive approval it was decided on the ground of the Central Sates tax being a tax, which could be collected on a sale once and by one State on behalf of the Government of India, and having been imposed and paid once could not be imposed a second time. In other wo?ds lt wa11 (ll A.Lil- 1'57 s.c. 790.

l S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

a tax whioh was without jurisdiction and therefore fell within Art. 12( l )(f).

i968

Smt. Ujjam Biii y,

A similar case also relied upon by the peti· tioner is J. V. Gokal & Go. (Privat,e) Ltd. v. The .AssisfJlmt Oolle0tor of Sales Tax (Inspection) ( 1).. The There the petitioner had entered into contracts with the Gov~rnment of India for the supply of certain quantities of foreign sugar. When the goods were on t.he high seas the petitioner deliver· cd to the Government shipping do.cumeiits pertaining to the goods and received the price. On· their arrival they were taken possession of by the Government of India after paying the requisite customs duty. Fvr the assessment year 1954-55 the petitioner was asseRsed to sales tax in calcula.ting whioh the prioe of the sales made to the Government of India deducted. The Assistant Collecter of Sales tax issued a notice to the petitioner proposing to review the said assessment passed by the Sales tax Officer. Objections were filed but were rejected and it waB held by the Assistant Collector that sales tax was payable in respect of the two transactions. Against this order a petition was filed under Art. 3:~ which was supported by the Union Government. It was contended by the petitioner that the sales in question were not liable to sales tax inasmuch as they took place in the course· of. import of. goods into India. This Court held that the property in the goods passed to the Goyernment of India when the shipping documents were delivered against payment and that the sales of goods by the petitioner to the Government took place when the goods were on the high seas and were therefore e.x:emptfrom sales tax under Art. 286 (l)(b) of the Constitution. 'l'his was also a case of lack of legislative authority and jurisdiction to im{>OSe the sales tax.

St.ti oJ Ull•r

Pradt1h

190! Smt~ lTJj•rn Bai

v.

Sidle oj Uetar PrU.sh

Kapur I

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)

Then there are oases where the Executive action is without authorjty of law. One such case is Bombay Dyeing Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bombay (I) which was not a petition under Art. 32 but an appeal against can order under Art. 226. In that oase under the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund Act, .which authorised the constituting of a fund for financing labour welfare, notices were served upon the appellant company to remit the fines and unpaid ac<Jumulations in its custody to the Welfare Commissioner. The appellant company questioned in a petition under Art. 226 the validity of that Act as a contravention of Art. 31(2). The High Court held that Act intra vim~ and dismissed the petition. On appeal against that judgment this Court held that the unpaid accumulations of wages and fines were the property of the Company and any direction for the payment of those sums was a contravention of Art. 31(2) and therefore invalid. It was also held that assuming that the money was not property within the meaning of Art. 31(2 )and Art. 19( l) ( f) applied that Article would also be of no help to the Welfare Commissioner bAcause it co.uld not be supported under Art. 19 ( 5) of the Constitution. Moreover this was not a case of a determination by a quasi-judicial tribunal but was a case of executive action without authority of law. In Bidi Supply Co. v. The Union of India(') an order passed by Central Board of Revellue transferring the assessment records and proceedings of the petitioner from Calcutta to Ranchi under s. 5 ( 7 A) of the Inoome tax Act was challenged under Art. 32 as an infringement of the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Arts. 14, 19(l)(g) and 31 of the Constitution. The impugned order by the Central Board uf Revenue was made acting in its executive oapaoity and this (II (19SB) S.C.R, 1122.

12) (l9S~) S.c;:.R. 257, 271,27l,

t s.c.R.

SUPREME OOURT REPORTS

Court, without deciding the question whether the order could be supported on the ground of reasonable clas8ification held that the order expressed in genera.I terms without· any reference to any particular case and without any limitation aa to time was not contemplated or sanctioned by sub-s. 7(A) of s. 5 and therefore the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of sub-ss. 1 and 2 of s. 64 of .Indian Income tax Act. The question decided therefore was that the Central Board of Revenue acting under s. 5(7A) was not empowered to pass an ''omnibus wholesale order of transfer". It was not a quasi-judicial order of an administrative tribunal acting within its jurisdiction hut an unauthorised executive order of an administrative tribunal acting in its administrative capacity. Section 5(7A) was subsequently 'a.mended and in a somewhat similar oase Pannal,· al Binjraj v. Union of India ( 1) it was held that the amended s. 5( 7A) was a measure of administrative convenience and was constitutional and an order pa::sed thereunder was equally constitutional. In Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajastkan(2) the State of Rajasthan passed orders assum· ing certain jagirs under Rajas than Land Reforms and H.esumption of Jagirs Act. In the case of one o( the jagirs it was held by this Court that the notification,· by which the resumption was made, was bad as regards ·properties comprised in that petition because the properties were not within the impugned Act, and being dedicated for religious 1mrposes was exempt under s. 207 of the Act. rhis again was not a case of any quasi-judicial decision but it was a notification issued by the executive Governmeµt in regard to properties not within the Act which was challenged in that case. ....

(1)[19S7]S.C.R.233.

(2)[195S]2S.C.R.303,

196! Smt. Ujjam Bai

v. BC•u 11} Ullar Prathsh

Kapur J.

19611 Sml. Ujjam lfll

••

Bl•l"J Ull., p,iiuJ,

SUPREME COURT .ttEPORTS [1963)

A case strongly relied upon by the petitioner was Mfs. Mohanalal Hargovind Das, Jabalpur v. The St,ate of Madhy(J, Prad(',{Jh ( '). The petitioners there were called upon to file their returns of the total purchase of tobacco made by them out of Madhya Pradesh with a view to assess and levy purchase tax. The return was filed under protest and the Sales tax Authorities, as it was required under the law, called upon the petitioners to deposit the purchase tax. No quasi-judicial determination was made, no decision was given after hearing the taxpayer, but deposit was asked to be made as that was a requirement of the statute. In a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ of mandamus restraining the State of Madhya Pradesh from enforcing Madhya Pradesh Act against the petitioners it was contended that the transactions were in the course of inter-State trade. The nature of the transaction was that finished tobacco which was supplied to the petitioners by tlie suppliers moved from the State of Bombay to the State of Madhya Pradesh and the tra.nsaotions which were sought to be taxed were therefore in the course of inter-State trade and were not liable to tax by the State. That was not a case of misconstruction of any statue by any quasi- judicial authority but that was a case in which the very tra.Illlaction was outside the taxing powers of the State and any action ta.ken by the taxing authorities was one '~ithout authority of l~w. The statue did· not give jurisdiction to the Authority to decide an inter-State transaction was an intra-State sale. If it had so done the statute would have been onoonstitutional under Art. 286( 1)(a). ln Madanlal Arora v. The Excise Taxation Officer Amritsar (1), notices were issued to the assesee enquiring him to attend with the documents and ll) [1955) 2 S. C.R. 509.

(2) [1962) I S.C.R. 823.

1 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPOR'l"S

other evidence in support of his returns. In the last of these notices it was stated that on failure to produce the documents &nd evidence the case will be decided ''on best judgment assessment basis". The petitioner did not comply with the notices but filed a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution chellenging the right of the authority to make a "best judgment assessment" on the ground that at the date of the last notice the sales. tax authority had no right to proceed to make any "best judgment assessment'' as the three years within which alone such assessment could be ma.de had expired. This contention was held to be well founded. In· deed the respondent conceded that he could not contend to the contrary. This therefore was a case in which the taxing authority had no jurisdiction to take proceeding for s.sseesment of tax because of the expiry of three years which had to be courited from the end of the each quarter in respect of which the return had been filed. The question was one of lack of jurisdiction and it made no difference that the Sales tax Officer had misconstrued the provision.

Y. Mahaboob Sheriff v. Mysare 8tat,e Tran8p(lrl Authority ( 1). was a case under the Motor Vehicles Act. The petitioners' application for the renewal of the permits were granted by the Regional Transport Authority empo'!ered to grant renewal for the period of one year. A petition under Arts.· 226 and 227 of the Constitution was filed against the order of renewal after the usual appeals had been taken and .proved unsuccessfol and the petition was summari1y dismissed. Thereafter a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution was filed in this Court and the question for determination was whether on a. proper oonstruction of the provision of s. 58 (1) (a) and (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act the period of renewal like in the oaae of original ll) C1%0l 2 s. c. R. ''"'

-1161

Smt. Ujjam B.t V•

S.•11 of Ufl.r

Prada.A

rlajur J.

1111!2

Bmt. Ujjam. BtJi Stet, of'· Utttu l'ralltsh

SUPREME OOURT REPORT3 [1963]

permit had to· be not less than three and not more than five years. It was held that it had to be for that period as provided in snb-s. (ll (a) of s. 58 read with sub-s. 2 of that section. This, it was submitted, was an authority for the proposition that where a provision is misconstrued by an authority having jurisdiction to construe a section a petition under Art. 32 is competents. In the first place the question as to whether Art. 32 was applicable was not raised and was therefore not decided. Secondly what was held was that if the authority renewed a permit the renewal had to be for a particular. period as specified in s. 58 and could not be for a lesser period. The question was therefore of jurisdiction. In Universal Imports Age:ncy v. The Okie/ Oontroller of Imports and EX'pOTts (1). the petitioners, in Pondicherry, entered before its merger with India, into firm contracts with foreign sellers and the goods agreed to be imported were shipped before or after the merger. The gom;ls were confiscated by the Controller of Customs on the ground that they were imported without a licence but as an option in lieu of confiscation the goods were releas1>d on payment of a fine. On a petition under Art. 32 it was held by a majority that under paragraph 6 of the French Establishments {Application of Laws) Order 1054, the transactions in question fell within the words "things done" il} the saving clause and were not liable to tax. This saving olause W&H contained in the Order applying Indian laws in place of the French laws. The construction was not of the taxing statute but of certain Orders by which the taxing statute had been applied to Pondioherry. These Orders the Taxing Officer had no power to construe and there was no law to support the order of the Collector. In any case this is an instance of want of jurisdiction tO tax transactions (l) [1961} l S. C. R. 305.

1 S.C.R,

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

which the law excludes from the taxing powers of the authority levying the tax. There again the questign of the applicability of Art. 32 to quasi· judicij,1 41,'ltermination was not raised. There ie one other class of cases of which K. T. Moopil Nair's case (1) is an example. That was a. case where the tax was of a. confiscatory nature and the procedure was contrary to rules of natural justice. The imposition of land tax at a flat rate of Rs. 2 peir acre imposed under the pro· visions of Travancore Cochin Land Tax Act (Act 15 of 1955) as amended by Travancore Cochin Land Tax Act, (Act 10 of 1957) was held to be violative of Arts. 14 and 19 (1) (f). A taxing statute it was held by a majority of the Court, was not immune from attack on the ground that it infringes the equality clause under Art. 14, and the tax was also bald to be violative of Art. 19 (1) (f), because it was silent as to the machinery _and procedure to be followed in making the assessment leaving to the executive to evolve the requisite machinery and procedure thus treating the whole thing as purely administrative in character and ignoring that the assessment on a person or property is quasi-judicial in character. It was also held that a ta~ of Rs. 2 was unreasonable as it was confiscatory in effect. The main ground on which the law was held to be au infringement of Art. 19 (1) (f) was the procedure or the want of procedure for imposing taxes and therefore its being opposed to rules of natural justioe. Here again the vice was in the A ct and not in any misinterpretation of it. No donbt the a.mount of the tax imposed was also held to be uureasona.ble because it was in effect confiscatory but this is not a matter which is necessary in the present case to go into as the question whether Art. 19 (l) applies to taxing laws or not w11.s not debated by the parties before us. On the main (I)

(1961) 3 S.C.R. 77.

1961 Smt. Ujjom B4i v. St,ee nf Uttar PrtlrUsh

Kapur J.

•.

Smt. Ujjam Bai

Stale <'f Uttar Pra<hsh

KapurJ.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]

contention as to the applicability of Art. 32 these were the submissions of the learned AttorneyGeneral. A review of these cases shows that ( 1) the law which is ultra vireR either because of the legis)a. tive incompetence or its contravention of some constitutional inhibition is .a non-existing law and any action taken thereunder, quasi.judicial or otherwise, would be contravention of Art. Ill (I) (f) and (g) and the result will be no different if it is a colourable piece of legislation; (2} where the proceedings are repugnant to the rules of natural justice the right guaranteed under Art. 19 (1) (f) and (g) are infringed; (3) the consequence is the same where assessment is made by an authority which has no jurisdiction to impose the tax nnd (4) if an administrative tribunal acting quasi-judicially misconstrues a provision which it has jurisdiction to construe and therefore imposes a tax infringement of Art. 19 ( 1) (g) would result according to Kailash Nath' s case (') but there is no such infringe· ment according to cases which the learned Additional ~olicitor General relied upon and which have been discussed above. The reason why the deci· sion in the latter cases is correct and the decision in Kailash Nath' s case (1) is not have already been given a.nd it is unnecessary to repeat them. Mr. Palkhivala who intervened in C. M. P. 1496/61 in support of the petition in the main argued the question whether a misconstruction of a taxing statute can involve the violation of a fundamental right under Art. 19 ( 1) (g). His contention was that an erroneous construction which result in transgression of constitutional limits would vio late Art. (19) (1) (!!)and that the difference between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error was immaterial and that a misconstruction of a statute can violate the right to trade and he relied upon

a

(I) A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 7>0.

I S.O.R.

SUPREME OOURT REPORTS

M/s. Mohanlal Hargovind Das v. The State of Madhya Pradesh C) which was a case of inter-State sale and which has already been discussed. He also relied upon the decision in R. S. Ram Jawaya Kapur v. The State of Punjab (2 ) • . In that case it was held that the acts of the Executive even if deemed to be sanctioned by the legislature can be declared void if they infringe any of the fundamental rights but no question of judicial determination by quasi-judicial tribunal arose there. Similarly in M/s. RamNarain Sons Ltd. v. Asstt. Commissioner of Sales tax (a) the question raised was of the meaning and scope of the proviso to Art. 286 \2) and therefore the question was one of inter-State sales which no statute could authorise to tmn into intra-State sale by a judicial decision.

It was argued before us that the decision of a tribunal acting quasi-judicially op~rates as res judicata and further that the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad when it was moved by the petitioner under Art. 226 of the Consjtution against the order of assessment passed on the ground of misconstruction of the notification of December 14, 1957 also opera.tos as res judicata as the appeal against that order has been withdrawn. The High Court rejected the petition under Art. 227 firstly on the ground that there was an alternative remedy of getting the error corrected by way of appeal and secondly the High Court said:"We have, however, heard the learned counsel for the petitioner on merits also, but we a.re not satisfied that the interpretation put upon this notification by the Sales Tax Officer contains any obvious error in it. The circumstance-a make the interpretation advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner unlikely. It is admitted that even hand-made biris have been subject to Sales tax: since long ll) [19551 2 S.C.R. 509. (21 [19S5] 2 S.C.R. 225. (3) (I95S) 2 s.c.a. of-98.

1961

Smt. Ujjam Bai v. Stale of Uttar Pradesh

Kapur J.

1962 Sml. Ujj11m Bai v. Bta11 of Uttar l'Tod,.,sh

Kapur J.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] before the date of the issue of the above notification. The object of passing the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Central Act, No. 58 of 1957 was to le1•y an additional excise duty on certain important articles and with the concurrence of the State Legislature to abolish Sales tax on those articles. According to the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner during the period 14th December, 1957 to June 30, 1958, the petitioner was liable neither to payment of excise duty nor to payment of sales tax. We do not know why there should have been such an exemption. The lanimage of the notificatiou might well be read as meaning that the notification is to apply only to those goods on which an additional Central excise duty had been levied and paid."

It is unnece~sary to decide this questiou in this case. It was next argued that the Sales tax Authorities are all officers of the State charged with the function of levy and collection of taxes which is essentially administrative and that when they act as quasi-judicial tribunals that function is only incidental to the discharge of their administrative function and therefore the assessment order of December 20, 1958, was an executive order and falls within Art.19(l)(g). Reference was made to BidiSupply Go., v. The Union of lndi:a ( 1 ) (at pp. 271 and 277), a case under s. 5(7-A) of the Income tax Act. At page 271 the definition of the word "State" is set out and at p. 277 Das, C. J., said that the "State" includ•s its Income tax Department. There is no dispute that the Sales tax Department is a department of the State ~nd is included within the wnrd "State" but the question is what is the nature and quality of the determination made by a Sa.Jes Tax Officer (I) (1956) S.C.R. 257, 271, 277.

l S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

when he is performing judidal or quasi-judicial functions. The argument of 1he learned Attorney General comes to this that even though in the perform1.nce of quasi-judioial functions the Taxing Officer may have many of the trappings of a court still he is not a court and therefore the decision of the taxing authority in the present case was not entitled to the protection which an erroneous decision of a proper court has; Ohaparala Krishna Brahman v. Oururu Govardhaiah (1) where it was held that the Income tax Officer is not a court within s.195 of the Criminal Procedure Code was cited in support of the contention that the taxing authority in the present case was not a court. So also Bdl Co. of Australia Ltd. v. The Federal Commissioner of Taxation ( 2) 1 where it was held that a Board of Revenue created by the Income tax Assessment Act to review the decision of Commissioner of Income tax is not a court exercising the judicial powers of the Commonwealth. At page 298 Lord Sankey. L. 0., observed: "An administrative tribunal may act judicially, but still remain an administrative tribunal as distinguished from a Court, strictly so called. Mere externals do not make a direction to an administrative officer by an ad hoc tribunal an exercise by a court of judicial power". It was also observed in that case that there are tribunals with many of the trappings of"' court, which nevertheless are not courts in the strict sense exercising judicial power. There is no gainsaying that Sales tax Officer is not a court even though he may have many of the trappings of a court including the power to summon witnesses, receive evidence on oath and making judicial determinations. In the strict sense of the term he is not a oourt exercising judicial power; but the (I) A.I.R. 1:>54 Mad. 822.

(2) (1931) A. C. 275, 298.

1962 Sml Ujj;m Bai v.

Slota of Utlar Prad,sh

Kapur J.

-

II

196Y Smt. l.Jjj;.im Bai v. St•l~ of Utlar

Pradish

Kapur J.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)

question for decision in the present case is not whether he is a Court or not but whether the determination made by him in regard to the exemption available to the petitioners on the sale of biris was a decision made by a quasi-judicial authority in the exercise of its statutory powers and within its jurisdiction and therefore not an administrative act. The rharacteristic of an administrative tribunal is that it has no ascertainable standards. It only follows policy and expediency which being subjective consideration~ are what a tribunal makes them. An administrative tribunal acting as an administrative tribunal and acting as a. judicial tribunal may be distinguished thus: "Ordinarily 'administrative' tribunals need not act on legal evidence at all, but only on such considerations as they see fit. A statute requiring such evidence to be received prevents a tribunal's making up its mind until it has given thio evidence a chance to weigh with it. But it is a fallacy to assume that the tribnnal is thereby limited to acting on that evidence. If it is an 'administrative' tribm~al it must still be iroverned by policy and expendiency until it has heard the evidence, but the evidence need not influence its policy any further than it sees fit. A contrary view would involve the decision's being dictated by the evidence, not by policy and expediency; but if certain evidence with it a right to a particular decision, that decision would be a decision on legal rights; so the tribunal would be administering •justice' and would be exercising judicial not •administrative". ((1933) L. Q. R. 424). There are decisions of thi~ court in which certain

1 S. C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

tribune.ls have been held judicial bodies; Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Banh LtiJ,. (') Provinoe of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani ( 2 ) where Das, J., (as he then was) observed at p. 725: "that if a statutory authority has power · to do any aot which will prejudicially a.ffect the subject then, although there are not two parties apart from the a:uthority and the contest between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to a.ct judicially". See also N agendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of Hills Division ch Appeals, Assam:(a). It is unnecessary again to examine in detail the provisions of the Act to determine the character of the Sales tax Officer when he takes assessment proceedings for they have already been referred to. They are all characteristics of judicial or quasi-judicial process and would clothe the Sales tax Officer making assessment orders with judicial or quasi-judicial' character. Indeed, because the order of asseSBment was judicial or quasi-judicial the petitioner filed in the High Court a petition for oertiorari and against. that order an appeal under Art. 136 as also a. petition for certiorari under Art. 32. Taking the nature of the determination by the Sales tax Officer in the instant case it cannot be said that he is purely a.n administrative authority or the order passed by him is an executive order; on the contrary when he is determining the a.mount of tax payable by a dealer, he is acting in a. quasi-judicial ca.pa.city. (1)

(1950) S.C.R 459, 463. (2) (-19508.C.R. 621, 725. (3) (1958) s.c.R. 1240, 1257, 1258.

1962 Sml, Ujjom Bai

...

Stall of Ultor Prilrlesh

Kopur J.

l!JfJZ

,Smt. UJi~m Bai v. State rJj Uttar P11desh lrtJftur J.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]

Mr. Chari, intervening on behalf oft.he State of Bibar, submitted that in Art. 12 the judicial branch of the State was not included in the definition of t.he word "State" and the words "other bodies" there <lid not comprise a tribunal having jurisdiction to decide judicially and its decisions could not be challenged by way of a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. In view of my decision that a quasi-judicial order of the Sales tax Officer is not challengeable by proceedings under Art. 32, I do not think it necessary to decide the wider question whether the d<'finition of the word "State" as given in Art. 12 comprises the judiciar department of the State or not. In view of the decision as to the correctness of the decision in Kailash Nath's case (I). it is not necessary in this case to go into the conectness or otherwise of the order of the Sales tax Officl)r. The petition under Article 32 therefore fails and is dismissed. There will be no orders as to cvsts. (G. M. P. No. 1349of1961) KAPUR, J.-11-Iessrs. 11-Iohanlal Hargovind Das, the assessee firm had filed an appeal on a certificate. of the All aha bad High Court against the order of the Cou1 t dismissing their petition under Art. 226 of .the Conbtitution challenging the imposition of the sales tax, on the ground that another remedy was available. The appeal against that order was dismissed by this Court for non-prosecution on February 20, 1961. Against that order of dismissal the assessee firm has filed an application for restoration on the ground that it had been advised that in view of the rule having been issued under Art. 32 of the Constitution wherein the contentions were the same as raised in the appeal against the order undor Art. 226 it was unnecessary to prosecute the appeal. It also prayed for condonation of delay in filing the application for restoration. \I) A. I. R. (1957 J S.C, /90.

1 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

No sufficient ca.use has been made out for allowing the application for restoration. The assessee firm deliberately allowed the appeal, which was pending in this Court, to be dismissed for non. prosecution and after deliberately taking that step it cannot be allowed to get the dismissq.l set aside on the ground of wrong advice. The application for restoration is therefore dismissed with costs.

1962 Smt. Ujiam Bai v. Slute tf Uttar P1ad1sh Kapw J.

SARKAR, J.-I have had the advantage of reading the judgments just delivered by my brothers Das and Kapur and I am in agreement with them.

S1J1karJ.

SuBBA RAO, J.-I have carefully gone through the judgment prepared by my learned brother Kapur, J. I am unable to agree. The facts have been fully stated in his judgment and it is therefore not necessary to cover the ground over again.

Subha Rao J,

This larger Bench has been constituted to canvass the correctness of the decision in Kailash Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1). After hearing the elaborate arguments of learned counsel, I am convinced that no case has been made out to take a different view. Learned Attorney General seeks to sustain the correctness of the said decision. He broadly contends that this Court is the constitutional protector of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution, that every person whose fundamental right is infringed has a guaranteed right to approach this Court for its enforcement, and that it is not permissibe to whittle down that jurisdiction with the aid of doctrines evolved by courts for other purposes. He argues that in the present case an executive authority functioning under the Uttar .Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948 (Act XV of 1948), hereinafter called the Act, made a clearly erroneous order imposing tax on exempted goods, (I) A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 790.

1962 Smt. Ujjam Bti

v. State of Uttdr Prade•h

Subia Rao J.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]

namely, bidis, and that it is a clear infringement ot the fundamental right of the petitioner to carry on business in bidis. Whenever such a right is infrin· ged, the argument proceeds, by a State actionhere we are only concerned with State action-it is the duty of this Court to give the appropriate relief and not to refuse to do so on any extraneous considerations. The Additional Solicitor General appearing for the State does not admit this legal position. He says that the Act is a reasonable restriction on the petitioner's right to carry on business in · bidis, that thereunder a Sales-Tax Officer has jurisdiction to decide, rightly or wrongly, whether bidis are exempted from sales-tax, and that, therefore, his order made with jurisdiction cannot possibly infringe the fundamental rights of the petitioner. Mr. Chari, who appears for the intervener, while supporting the argument of learned Solicitor General emphasizes the point that the fundamental rights enshrined in Art. 19( I l(g) of the Constitution is only against State action, that the definition of •'State" in Art. 12 thereof excludes all authorities exerc:ising judicial power, that the sales-tax authority, in making the a.ssessment in exercising judicial power, and that, therefore, no writ can be issued by this Court against the said authority. Before attempting to answer the questions raised, it is relevant and convenient to ascertain precisely the position of the fundamental right.e under the Constitution and the scope of the jurisdiction of this Court in enforcing those rights. Fundamental rights are enshrined in Part III of the Constitution as the paramount rights of the people. Article 13(2) prohibits the State from making any law which takes away 01! abridges the rights conferred by the said Part and decl,area that

1 s.c.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

any law made in contravention of this clause shall. to the extent of the contravention, be void. These rights may be broadly stated to relate to ( i) right to equality-Arts. 14 to 18, (ii) right to freedomAtts. 19 to 22, (iii} right against exploitationArts. 23 and 24, (iv) right to freedom of religionArts. 25 to 28, (v) cultural and educational rightsArts. 29 and 30, (vi) right to property--Arts. 31 and 31A, and (vii) right to constitutional remediesArts. 32 to 35. The~e are the inalienable rights of the people of this country-some of them of noncitizens also-believed to be necessary for the development of human personality ; they are essential for working out one's way of life. In theory these rights are reserved to the people after the delegation of the other rights by them to the institutions of Government created by the Constitution, which expresses their will : see observations of Patanjali Sastri, J., as he then was, in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras(1). In State of Madras v. Shrimati Champakam Dorairajan (2) the same idea was more forcibly restated thus: The chapter of Fundamental Rights is sacrosanct and not liable to be abridged by any legislative or Executive Act or order, except to the extent provided in the appropriate article in Part III. The directive principles of State Policy have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the Chapter of Fundamental Rights." In the context of fundamental rights, an important principle should be borne in mind, namely, that the English idea of legislative supremacy is foreign to our Constitution. As this Court pointed out in A. K. Gopalan's case (l) the Constitution of has not accepted the English doctrine absolute supremacy of Parliament in matters of legislation, Therefore, every institution, be it the '

(1) (19~0) S.C.R. 88.

(2) (1951) S.C.R. 525, 531.

196Z Smt. Ujjam Bai y,

Btate of Uttar Pradesh

--

Subb1J Rao J.

1961 8mt. Ujjam Bci

v. Stat• of Utrar Pr.(l,sh

Subba R1Jo J.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)

Executive, the Legislature of the Judiciary, can only function in exercise of the powers conferred on it that is, the Constitution is the paramount law. As the Constitution declares the fundamental rights and also prescribes the restrictions that oan be imposed thereon, no institution can overstep the limits, directly or indirectly, by encroaching upon the said rights. But a mere declaration of the fundamental rights would not be enough, and it was necessary to evolve a machinery to enforce them. 80 our Constitution, entrusted the duty of enforcing them to the Supreme Court, the highest judicial authority in the country. This Court has no more important function than to preserve the inviolable fundamental rights of the people ; for, the fathers of the Constitution, in their fullest confidence, have entrusted them to the care of this Court and given to it all the institutional conditions necessary to exercise its jurisdiction in that regard without fear or favour. The task is delicate and sometimes difficult ; but this Court has to discharge it to the best of its ability and not to abdicate it on the fallacious ground of inability or inconvenience. It must be borne in mind that our Constitution in effect promises to usher in a welfare State for our country ; and in such a state the Legislature has necessarily to create innumerable administrative tribunals, and entrust them with multifarious functions. They will have powers to interfere with every aspect of human activity. If their existence is necessary for the progress of our country, the abuse of power by them may bring about an authoritarian or totalitarian state. The existence of the aforesaid power in this Court and the exercise of the same effectively when the oroaRion arises is a necessary safeguard against the abuse of tho power by the administrative trilmnal~. Tho scope of the power of this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution has l.icen expounded by

I S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

this Court on many occasions. The decisions not only laid down the amplitude of the power but also the mode of exercising that power to meet the different situationg that might present them~elves to this C)urt. In Ramesh Thappar v. State of-MadraB (1) this Court declared that under the Constitution the Supreme Court constituted as the protector guarantor of fundamental rights, and it cannot, consistently with the responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to entertain applications seeking protection against infringement of such rights, although such applications are made to the Court in the first instance without resort. to a High Court having concurrent jurisdiction in the matter. This Court again in Rashi,d Ahmad v. The Municipal Board, T(airana (2 ) pointed out that the powers given to this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution are much wider and are not confined to issuing prerogative writs only. This Court further elucida. ted the scope of the jurisdiction in T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa (3 ), wherein Mukberjea, J., speaking for the Court defined the scope of the power thus: "In view of the express provisions in our Constitution we need not now look back to the early history or the procedural technicalities of these writs in English law, nor feel oppressed by any difference or change of opinion expressAd in particular cases by English Judges." Thi." Court again elaborated the scope of its power under that Article in Kavalappara Kottarathil Koch1tn1u: Moopil Nayar v. The State of Madras, 4 ). Das, C. J., after reviewing the earlier case law on the subject observed: "Further, even if the existence of other a~lequate Jegal remedy may be taken into oons1deration by the High Court in deciding (I) (1950) S.C.R. 59~. (2) (1950) S.C.R 566. (3) (1955) I S.C.R. 250, 256. (4) (1959) Sup11 2 SC. R. 316, 325. 337,

1961 Smt. U}iam B11i

••

State of Uttar Prad,sh Subba Rao J.

1962

Smt. Ujjom BtJi v. Stat1 of U1tar P1ad1sh

Suota Rao J.

SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963] whether it should issue any of th& prerogative writs on an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution, as to which we say nothing now-this Court cannot, on a similar ground, decline to entertain a petition under Art. 32, for the right to move this Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution is itself a guaranteed right."

In that case it was pressed upon this Court to hold that in exercise of its power under Art. 32 of the Constitution, this Court could not embark upon an enquiry into disputed questions of fact, and various inconveniences were pointed out if it was otherwise. After conaidering the cases cited in support of that contention, this Court came to the conclusion that it would fail in its duty as the custodian and protector of fundamental rights if it was to decline to entertain a petition under Art. 32 simply because it involved the determination of disputed questions of fact. When it was pointed out that if that view was adopted, it might not be possible for this Court to decide questions of fact on affidavits, the learned Chief Justice observed: "As we have already said, it is possible very often to decide questions of fact on affi. davits. If the petitions and the affidavites in support thereof are not convincing and the court is not aatisfied that the petitioner has established his fundamental right or any breach thereof, the court may dismiBB the petition on the ground that the petitioner has not discharged the onus that. lay on him. The court may, in some appropriate cases, be incli· ned to give an opportunity to the parties to establish their respective cases by filing further affidavits or by issuing a commission or even by ~etting the application down for trial

1 S. C. R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

on evidence, as has often been done on the origina.1 sides of the High Courts of Bombay and Calcutta, or by adopting some other appropriate procedure. Such occasions will be rare indeed and such rare cases should not, in our opinion, be regarded as a cogent reason for refusing to entertain the petition under Art. 32 on the ground that it involves disputed questions of fact.'' Finally,· this Court also held that in appropriate oases it had the power, in its discretion, to frame writs or orders suitable to the exigencies created by enactments and that where the occasion so required to make ev~n a declaratory order with consequential relief. In ·short, this decision recognized the comprehensive jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitutio 1 and gave it full effect without putting any artificial limitations t.hereon. But in Daryao v. State of U. P. (1). this Court applied the doctrine of res judicata and held that the petitioners in that case had no fundamental right, as their right on merits was denied by the High Court in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution and that as no appeal was filed therefrom, it has become final. But the learned Judges carefully circumscribed the limits of the doctrine in its application to a petition under Art. 32. Gajendtagadkar,J., speaking for the Court observed: ''If the petition filed in the High Court under Art. 226 is dismissed not on the merits but becausei of the laches of the party applying for the writ or because it is held that the party had an alternative remedy available to it, then the dismissal of the writ petition would not constitute a bar to a subsequent p~titfon under Art. 32 except in cases where and if the facts thus found by the High Court may themselves be relevant even under Art. 3·~. If a writ {1) (1962) 1 S,C.R. 574.

1962 Smt. Ujj"m B.ri II•

State of Utt4r P1ad1~h

Subba Ra1 J.

1952

Sml. Ujjam Bai V,

Stat, oj Uttar Pr"d~sh

Sulba Hao J.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963] p3tition is dismissed in limine and an order is pronounced in that behalf, whether or not the dismissal would constitute a bar would depend upon the nature of the order. If the order is on the merits it would be a bar; if the order shows that the dismissal was for the reason that the petitioner was guilty of !aches or that he had an alternative remedy it would not be a bar, except in cases which we have already ir.dicated. If the petition is dismissed in limine without passing a speaking order then such dismissed cannot be treated as creating a bar of res judiwta. It is true that, prima facie, dismissal in limine even without passing a speaking order in that behalf may strongly suggest that the Court took the view that there was no substance in the petition at all; but in the absence of a speaking order it would not be easy to decide what factors weighed in the mind of the Court and th:\t makes it difficult and unsafe to hold that such a summary dismissal is a dismissal on merits and as such constitutes a bar of res judicaUJ against a similar petition filed under Art. 32. If the petition is dismissed as withdrawn it cannot be a bar to a subsequent petition under Art. 32, because in such a case there has been no decision on the merits by the Con rt."

Though this decision applies the doctrine of res judicata, the aforesaid observations indicate the anxiety of the Court to confine it wit.bin the specified limits and to prevent nny attempt to overstep the said limits. Shortly stated it is settled law that Art. 32 confers a wide jurisdiction on this Court to enforce the fundamental rights, that the right to enforce a fundamental right is itself a fundamental right, and that it is the duty of this Court to entertain an application and tr:i decide it on merits whenever a party approaches it to decide whether he has

1 s.c.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

a fundamental right or if so whether it has been infringed irrespective of the fact whether the question raised involves a question of law or depends upon questions of fact. The doctrine of res judicata applied by this Court does not detract from the amplitude of the jurisdiction, but only negatives the right of a petitioner on the gr0und that a competent court has given a final decisiou against him in respect of the right claimed. In this case a further attempt is made on be· half of the State to rnstrict the scope of the Court's jurisdiction. Uninfluenced by judicial decisions, let us approach the question on principle. An illustration arii::ing on the fact;s of the present case will highlight the point to be decided. A citizen of India is doing business in bidis. He has a fundamental right to carry on that business. The State Legislature enacts the Sales Tax Act imposing a tax on the turnover and on the sales of various goods, but gives certain exemptions. It expressly declares that no tax-shall be levied on the exempted goods. The said law is a reasonable restriction on the petitioner's fundamental right to carry on the business in bidis. Now on a true construction of the relevant provisions of the Act, no tax is leviable on bidis. But on a wrong construction of the relevant provisions of the Act, the Sales-tax Officer imposes a tax on the turnover of the petitioner relating to the said bidis. He files successive statutory appeals to the hierarchy of tribunals but without sucess. The result is that he is asked to pay tax in respect of the business of bidies exempted under the Act. The imppsition of the said illegal tax on the turnover of bidfs is certainly an infringement of his fundamental right. He comes to this Court and prays that his fundamental right may be enforced against the Sales-tax Officer. The Officer says, ''It may be true that my order is wrong; it may also be that the Supreme Court may hold that my construction

lH!I

Smt. Ujjam Bai v. Sue ~1 Uit~r

Prwsia

SuUa Ra~ J.

--•

IHI

..

Swu. lJJjam Boi

,.,...,k s•u.".. "·

SI-'< •f uu.,

SUPREME COURT REl>ORTS [1963]

of the section as accepted by the highest tribunal is perverse; still, as under the Act I have got the power to decide rightly or wrongly, my order though illegal operates as a reasonable restriction on the petitioner's fundamental right to carry on business." This argument, in my view, if accepted, would in effect make the wrong order of the Sales-tax Officer binding on the Supreme Court, or to state it differently, a fundamental right can be defeated by a wrong order of an executive officer, and this Court would become a help· less spectator abdicating its functions in favour of the subordinate officer in the Sales-tax Depart· ment. The Constitution says in effect that neither the Parliament nor the Executive ran infringe the fundamental rights of the citizens, and if they do, the person affected has a guaranteed right to approach this Court, and this Court has a duty to enforce it; but the Executive authority says, "I have a right to decide wrongly and, there· fore the Supreme Court cannot enforce the fundamental right". There is nothing in the Constitution which permits such an extraordinary position. It cannot be a correct interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution if it enables any authority to subvert the paramount power conferred on the Supreme Court. It is conceded that if the law is invalid, or if the officer acts with inherent want of jurisdiction, the petitioner's fundamental right can be enforced. It is said that if a valid law confers jurisdiction on the officer to decide rightly or wrongly, the petitioner ha.a no fundamental right. What is the ha.sis for this principle ? None is discernible in the provisions of the Constitution. There is no provision which enables the Legislature to make an order of an executive authority final so as to deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction under Art, 32 of the Constitution.

1 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPOR'rS

But the finality of the order is sought to be sustained on the principle of re,s judicata. It is argued that the Sales-tax Tribunals a.re judicial tribunals in the sence they a.re courts, and, therefore their final decisions would operate as res judicata on the principle enunciated 1:>y this Court in Daryao's case (1). Can it be said tha.t Sales-tax authorities under the Act are judicial tribunals in the sense they are courts? In a Welfare Sta.te the Governments is called upon to discharge multifarious duties affecting every aspect of human activity. This extension of the governmental activity necessitated the entrusting of many executive authorities with power to -Oecide rights of parties. They are really instrumentalities of the executive designed to function in the discharge of their duties adopting, a.s far as poBBible, the principles of judicial procedure. Nonetheless, they are onl.v executive bodies. They may have the trappings of a court, but the officers manning the same have neither the training nor the institutional conditions of a judicial officer. Every Act designed to further the social and economic progress of our country or to raise taxes, constituted some tribunal for deciding disputes arising thereunder, such as income-tax authorities, Sale-tax authorities, town planning authorities, regional transport authorities, etc. A scrutiny of the provisions of the U. P. Sales-tax Act with which we are now concerned, shows that the authorities constituted thereunder a.re only such administrative tribunals as mentioned above. The preamble to the Act shows that it was enacted to provide for the levy of tax on the sa.le of goods in UttarPradesh. The Act imposes a tax on the turnover of sa.les of certain commodities and provides a machinery for the levy, assessment and collection of the said tax. Under the Act the State Government is authorized to appoint 1Jertain assessing authorities. It provides for an appeal against the order of the assessing authority and for a revision in (1) (1912) 1

s.c.a. 57t.

S111t. Ujj•"' :A•i v. Bt•ts •f U(tar Prsus1'

SuHs

'll•• J.

1961 Srnl- C!jj1Jm 81i v. Si.it• of U tta' PrttdeJh Su&ho Rio J.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]

some cases and a reference to the High Courts in others. The State Government is also authorized to appoint a hierarchy of authoriti<'s or trilmnals for deciding the appeals or revisions. The ll..>oessing authorities are admittedly the officers of the Sales-tax Department and there is nothing in the Aot to indicate that either the assessing authority or the appellate authority need possess any legal qualification. It is true that legal qu11.lification is prescribed for the revising authority, but that does not make him a. court or make the inferior tribunals courts. The said authorities have to follow certain principles of natural justice, but that doPs not make them courts. The scheme of the Act clearly shows that the saleta.x authorities appointed under the Act, following the principles of natural justice, ascertain the turnover of an assessee and impose the tax. The hierarchy of tribunals are intended to safeguard the interest of the assessees as well as the State by correcting wrong orders. The fact that, following the analogy of the Income-tax Act, at the instance of the party aggrieved a. reference can be made by the reviewing authority to the High Court on a question of law shows only that the help of the High Court can be requisitioned only to elucidate questions of law, but the High Court has no power to make final orders, but on receipt of the judgments of the High Court, the revising authority shall make an order in conformity with such judgment. Now let us consider the decisions cited at the :Bar which would throw some light on the nature of such tribunals. In considering whether the Board of review created by s. 41 of the Federal InoomeTax Assessment Act, 1922-25 w1is a judicial authority, the Judicial Committee in Shell Company of Australia Limited v. Federal Commission of Taxation(') observed. "The authorities are clear to show that there are tribunals with many of the trappings ll) (1930) A. C. 275, 296, 298.

1 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

of a Court which, nevertheless, are not Courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power." The Judicial Committee further observed: "An administrative tribunal may act judicially, but still remain an administrative tribunal as distinguished from a Court, strictly so-called. Mere externals do not make a direction to an administrative officer by and ad hoc tribunal an exercise by a Court of judicial power." The Allahabad High Court in Messrs Kamlapat Moti Lal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, U. P. (1 ) held that the Incoma-tax authorities are not courts and, thl)reforn, their decisions cannot operat,e as res judicata. Malik, C. J., observed: "The income-tax authorities rannot be treated as Courts deciding a disputed poi11t, except for the purposes mentioned ins. 37, and further there is no other party before them and there are no pleadings. As haEI been said by Lord Herschell in Boulter v. Kent Justices (2 ),'' "There is no truth, no lis, no controversy inter partes, and no decision in favour of one of them aad against the other, unless, indeed, the entire public are regarded as the other party''. The Income-tax authorities are mainly concerned with finding out the assessable income for the year and not with deciding any question of title. But to arrive at that income they have at times to decide certain general questions which might affect the determination of the assessable income not only in the year in question but also in subsequent years ...•••... ( 1) A.I.R. 1950 All. 249, 251.

~2)

(1897) A.C. 556.

196' Smt. Ujjam Bot v. Slal1 •f 1Jtl•r Pradesh Subba Rao J.

1961 S11d. Ujj• l•i

••

SUu •/UU•r

- ~·""'

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)

An assessment is inherently of a pauing nat~re .and i~ cannot provide

an estoppel by rea Judicata m later years by reson of a matter ?eing taken in to account or not being taken mto account by the Income-tax Officer in an earlier year of asseRSment." An instructive discussion on the question whether an Income-tax Officer is a court within the meaning of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is found in Krishna Brahman v. Gornrdhanaiah ( 1), where Balakrishaa Ayyar, J., after ·considering the case Jaw on the subject and the provisions of the Income-tax Act, held that an income-tax officer was not a "court". The learned Judge did not think that the sdoptation of norms of judicial procedure or the fact that appeals were provided for, was sufficient to make them courts. The learned Judge obeerved: "When exercising his powers under Chapter IV of the Act, it seems to me, that the Income-tax Officer is acting in a purely administrative capacity. It is his duty to ascertain what the income of the particular individual is and what amount of tax he ehould be required to pay. There is therefore no '!is' whatever before him." The same reasoning would equally apply to sales· tax authorities. This Court in Bidi Supply Go. v. The Union of lndia(1), speaking through Das, C.J., set aside the order of an Income-tax Officer and in doing so observed : "Here, 'the State' which includes its Income-tax Department has by an illegal order denied to the petitioner, as compared with other Bidi merchants who are similarly situate, equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and the petitioner can legitimately complain of an infraction of his fundamental right under article 14 of th4' Constitution." \1) ,\.Lll. l!IM Med. 822. &a~.

1 S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Though this cannot be called a direct decision on the question raised in the present case, it indicates that this Court treated the Income-tax Officer as a department of the executive branch of the Government. This Court again in GUllapalli Nageswara Rao v. S'tate of Andhra Pradesh (1) pointed out the distinction between a quasi-judicial act of an Executive authority and the judicial aot of a court thus: "The concept of a quasi-judicial act implies that the act is not wholly judicial; it describes only a duty cast on the executive body or authority to conform to norms of judicial procedure in performing some acts in exercise of its executive powers." It is, therefore, clear that administrative tribunal cannot be equated with courts. They are designed to discharge functions in the exercise or the executive power of the State, and the mere fact that the relevant statutes, with a view of safeguard the interest of the people, direct them to dispose of matters commin!t before them following the principles of natural justice and by adopting the same well-known trappings of judicial procedure, does not make them any the less the executive orgna.s of the State. It is not possible to apply the principle of res judicata to the orders of such tribunals, for obviously s. l l of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to such orders, and the genera.I priciple of res judicat,a de'hors tha,t provision has never been applied to such orders. It is true that some statutes expressly or by necessary implication oust the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in respect of certain matters but such exclusion cannot affect the extraordinary powers or superior courts conferred under Arts. 226, 227 and 32 of the Constitution. (1) [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. 319, 3~3-3st.

l.981 Sm1. Ujj,,,,, Bti~ v. Slat. ej.Utt1r

Prritfi.Jlt,

Subb1 RaoJ.

lllJ Sm.I. Ujj-. B 2i

••

Stal• •f UUsr l'r•thilt S u66eR•1J.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)

'l'here is a simpler answer to the plea of rtBIn the present case the Sales.tax authorities deoided thn ca.so against the petitioners . The jJetitioners are seeking tho help of this Court under Art.32 of the Constitution to enforce their fundamental rights on the ground that he said orde;: infringes their rights. To put it differently, the petitioners by this application question the orders of the Sales-tax authority. How is it possible to contend that the order which is now sought to be quashed can operate as res-judicata precluding this Court from questionin_g its correctness ? The prinoiple underlying the doctrine of res judicata is that no one shall be vexed twice on the same matter. This implies that there should be two proceedings,and that in a former proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction, an issue has been finally decided inter partes and therefore the same cannot be reagitated in a subsequent proceeding. On the said principle the impugned order itself cannot obviously be relied upon to sustain the plea cf res-judicata. The argument ab-inronvenienti d0es not appeal to me. As it is the duty of this Oourt to enforce a fundamental right of a party if any authority has infringed his right, considerations based upon inconvenience are of no relevance. It is suggested that if the jurisdiction of this Court is not restricted in the manner indicated, this Court will be flooded with innumerable petitions. A part from the fact that this is not a relevant circumstance, a liberal interpretation of Art. 32 has not had that effect during the ten year8 of this Court's existence, and I do not see any justification for such an a.pprehension in the future. It is further said that if a wider interpn.tation is given namely, that if this Court has to aacertain in each ease whether a statutory authority has infringed a.

judicata.

l S.C.B..

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

fnnda.mental right or not, it wiil have to decide complicated questions of fa.ct involving ora.l and documentary evidence, and the machinery provided under Art. :i2 of the Constitution is not adequate to discharge that duty satisfactory. This again is an attempt to cloud the issue. If the jurisdiction is there and there are difficulties in the way, this Court will have to evolve by convention or otherwise some procedure to avoid the difficulties. A similar argument of inconvenience was raised in Kavalappara Kottarathil Kockuani Moopil Nayar v. Stat,e of Madras (1 )'and was negatived by this Court. This Court evolved a procedure to meet some of the difficult situa.tions that might arise in particular oases. That apart, this Court also may evolve or mould further rules of practice to suit different contingencies. If a party comes to this Court for enforcem~n t of a fundamental right the existence whereof depends upon proof of facts and the said party has not enhausted the remedies available to him by going through the hierarchy of tribunal created by a particular Act, this Court, if the party agrees, may a.How him to withdraw the petition with liberty to file it at a. later stage, or, if the party does not agree, may adjourn it Si'ne die till after the remedies are exhausted. If, on the other hand the party comes here after exhausting bis remedies and after the tribunals have given their findings of fact, this Court may ordinarily accept the find.ings of fact as ic. does in appeals under Art. 136 of the Constitution. If the party complains that the order made a~ainst him by a tribunal is based upon a wrong construction of the provisions of a statute, this Court may ascertain whether on a correct interpretation of the statute, the petitioner's fundamental right has been violated. There ma.y be many other situations, but I have no doubt (1) [19591 Supp.

(2) S.C.R. 316. 325, 337.

1962 Sml. Ujjam Bai

"·

Stat• 1/ Utt°' p,.adish

Sul>ba RllO J,

1911

Smt. Ujjam Boi

••

St"" •! UUar h.U•h

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1~63)

that this Court will deal with them as and when they arise. I would, therefore, unhesitatingly reject the argument based on inconvenience . I shall now proceed to deal with the main argument advanced by learned counsel for the respondent. Briefly stated, the argument is that the Sales- tax Officer has jurisdiction to construe rightly or wrongly the provisions of the Act, whioh is a valid Jaw, and that even if the so.id authority wrongly corastructed .a provision of the Act and imposed the tax, though on a right construction of the said provision it cannot be so imposed, the said order does not infringe the fundamental right of the petitioner. With respect, if I may say so, this argument equates the guaranteed right of a citizen under Art. 32 of the Constitution with that of the prerogative writs obtaining in England, such as writs of certiorari, prohibition and manadamus, issued against orders of inferior tribunals or authorities. This also confuses the fundamental right enshrined in Art. 32 of the Constitution with one or more of the procedural forms this Court may adopt to suit each occasion. Th" approach to the two question is different. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 32 is couched in comprehensive phraseology and, as pointed out earlier, is of the widest amplitude: it is not confined to the issue of prerogative writs, for the Supreme Court ha.s power to issue directions or orders to enforce the fundamental right; even in respect of issuing the said writs, this Court is not oppressed by the procedural technicalities of the prerogative writs in England. While under Art. 32 this Court may, for thA purpose of enforcing a fundamental right, issue a writ of 1xrtiorari, prohibition or mandamus, in a suitable case, it may give the relief even in a case not reached by the said writs. The limitations imposed on the prero~ative wrjts cannot

,

i S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 899

limit the power of the Supreme Court undPr Art. 32 ·of the Constitution. In order a writ of certiorari may lie against a tribunal, the said tribunal must have acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction conferred upon it by law or there must be somo error of law apparent nn the face of the record. There are similar limitations in the case of writs of prohibition and mandamus. In the context of the issue of the said writs, courts were called upon to define what -''jurisdiction" means. ,Turis<liction may be territorial, pecuniary, or persona.I. There may be inherent want of jurisdiction or irregular exercise of jurisdiction. A tribunal may have power to decide collateral facts for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction; or it may have exclusive jurisdiction to decide even the said facts. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edn., Vol. III, the scope of the power of mandamus, prohibition and ~rtiorari is stated thus at p. 59 : "The primary function of the three orders is to prevent any excess of jurisdiction (prohibition and certiorari; or to ensure the exercise of jurisdiction (mandamus). The jurisrliction of inferior tribunals may depend upon the fulfilment of some condition precedent (such as notice) or upon the existence of some particular fa.ct. Such a fact is collateral to the actual matter which the inferior tribunal has to try, and the determination whether it exists or not is logically and temporalJy prior to the determination of the actual question which the inferior tribunal has to try. The inferior tribunal must itself decide as to the collateral fact: when, at the inception of an inquiry by a tribunal of limited jurisdiction a challenge is made to its jurisdiction, the tribunal has to make up its mind whether it will act or not, and for that purpose to arrive a.t some decision on whether it has jurisdictjoJJ or not.'' ·

196t Smt. Ujjam Bai v.

Sfale of Ute.,.

PrrJd.sh

Subba Rao J.

196• Smt. UJi•m B•i

v.

Slllt. of Uttar l'rrMUsh

Subba Rao J.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] "There may be tribunals which, by virtue of legislation constituting them, have the power to determine finally the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; but, subject to that, an inferior tribunal cannot, by a wrong decision with regard to a collateral fa.ct, give itself a jurisdiction which it would not otherwise possess or deprive itself of a jurisdiction which it otherwise would possess".

It is clear from this passage that a tribunal may have to decide collateral facts to exercise its jurisdiction, but unless the relevant statute confers an exclusive jurisdiction on that tribunal, it cannot wrongly clutch at jurisdiction which it has not or refuse to exercise jurisdiction which it possesses. The doctrine of jurisdiction with its limitations may be relevant in the matter of issue of prerogative writs to quash the orders of tribunals made without or in excess of jurisdiction, but the said restrictions cannot limit the power of the Supreme Court in enforcing the fundamental rights, for under Art. 32 of the Constitution for enforcing the said rights it has power to issue directions or orders uncontrol by any such limitations. That apart, even within the narrow confines of the doctrine of jurisdiction, it is wrong to confine the jurisdiction to inherent want of jurisdiction. A person, who has within the narrow confines of the doctrine of no authority to function under an Act, if he purports to act under that Act, his order will be no doubt without jurisdiction. If an authority by a wrong construction of a section purports to exercise jurisdiction under an Act which it does not possess at all, it may again be described as inherent want of jurisdfotion. But there may be many cases on the border line between inherent want of jurisdiction and exercise of undoubted juriEdictiC>n. 'Ihe authority may have jurisdiction, to decide ceftain disputes under an Aot, ~t bJ a

1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

wrong construction of the provisions of the Act, it may make an order affecting a particular subjectmatter, which, on a correct interpretation, it cannot reach. By a slight modification of the facts a.rising in the present case, the point may illustrated thus : A provision of the Sales-tax Act says that the sale of bidis is not taxable; the statute prohibits taxation of bidis; but the Sales·tax Officer on a wrong oon· struotion of the provision holds that hand-made l>idis are taxable; on a correct interpretation, the Act does not confer any power on the Sales·tax Officer to tax such bidis. In such a ease on a wrong interpretation of the provisions of the Act, he has exercised jurisdiction in respect of a subject-matter, which, on their correct interpretation, he- does not possess. In a sense he acts without jurisdiction in taxing goods whioh are not taxable under the Act. The criterion of jurisdiction must also fail in a case where an aggrieved party approaches this Court before the Sales-tax authority makes its order. A Sales-tax authority may issue only a notice threatening to ta.ke action under the Act : at that point of time, there is no decision by the tribunal. The person to whom notice is given approaches this Court and complains that the authority under the colour of tb.e Act proposes to infringe his fundamental right; in that case, if this Court is satisfied that his fundamental right is infringed, it ha.a a duty to enforce it. But it is said that when the Sales-tax Act provides a machinery for getting the validity of his ola.im tested by the tribunals, he must only resort to that machinery. This argument may be relevant to the question whether a. civil courts jurisdiction is ousted in view of the special machinery created by a statutf>, but that circumstance cannot have any bearing on the question of enforcement of fundamental rights, for no law can exclude the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution. Nor is the

196t S111e. Ujjam Bai

Slal1 of"·UUar Pradlsh

Subba Ra~ J.

902 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS t1963] 1111 Smt. Ujjsn M•i

v.

S1at1 •I UllM

Prad,sl

Smk 11 .. J.

argument that if a citizen comes to this Court when the proceeding before the Sales.tax authorities is in the midstream, this Court will be permitting a citizen to short-circuit the rest of the procedure laid down by the Act, has any relevance to the question of its jurisdiction under Art. 32. This may be an argument of inconvenience and this Court, as has already been indicated, may adjourn the case till the entire proceedings come to an end before the highest Sales-tax authority. This argument of inconvenience cannot obviously a.rise when a party approaches this Court after availing himself of all the remedies available to him under the Act. I would, therefore, hold that the principles evolved by the courts in England and accept by the courts in India governing the iSBue of prerogative writs cannot circumscribe the unlimited power of the Supreme Court to iSBue orders and directions for the enforcement of the fundamental rights. Even otherwise, in cases similar to those covered by the illustration Supra, a prerogative writ can be iSBued for quashing the order of an inferior tribunal, and a fortiori an order can be issued for enforcing a fundamental right under Art. 32 of the Constitution. Even if the said legal position be wrong, the present oa.se falls within the limited scope of the principle governing the issue of a writ of certiorari. In Hari Vishnu Kamatk v. Syed Almuul Jshaque( 1), the scope of that power vis-a-vis an error of law has been stated thus: "It may therefore be ta.ken as settled that a writ of certiorari could be issued to correct an error of law. But it is essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the fa.oe of the record. The real diffi. oult:y with reference to this ma"6r, however, (l) [Jll55] l 8,0.ll; U06, 1129.

1 S. C. R~

SUPREME OOURT REPORTS

is not 80 mnch in the statement of the prin-

1161

oiple as in its app1ioa.tion to the faots of a partioula.r oase. When does an error oa.se to be mere error, and become an error apparent on the face of the record ? Learned counsel on either side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by whioh the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated. Mr. Pathak for the first respondent contended on the Strength of certain observations ofChagla, O.J., in Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat M'Unioipality(1), that no error oould be said to be apparent on the face of the record if it was not self-evident, and if it required an examination or argument to establish it. This test might afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of oases. But there must be cases in whioh even this test might break down, because judicial opinions also differ, and an error that might be considered by one Judge as self-evident might not be so considered by another. The fa.ct is that what is an error apparent on the face of the record, cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left ·to be determined judicially on the facts of eaoh case."

Snd. UJJam Ila

Whether there is an error of law on the f aoe of the·record can be determined only on the facts of ea.oh oase, and, as this Court pointed out, an error that might pe considered as self-evident by one Judge may not be 80 considered by another. Except perhaps in a rare case, it is always possible to argue both ways. I would not, therefore, attempt to law down a father oriterion then that which has been aooepted by this Cour~, .namely, (1) A.LR. (1953] Dom. 153.

.

••

SIM• *f Uflcr

Prad11h

..

:mt. Ujjam Bai Siott of Utt•r

Prode1A SufbQ li'ooJ.

SuPREME COUltT REPORTS tl963)

that the question must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of ea~h ca11e. In the present case, the recitals in the notification clearly disclose that there is an error of law on the face of the order of the tribunals. If that error is corrected, as we should do, the position is that the Sales-tax tribunals imposed a tax on the sales transactions of biris which they had no power to do. In that event, there is a clear infringement of the fundamental rights of the petitioners to carry on business in biris. Now let us look at the decisions of this Court to ascertain whether all or any of them have applied the criterion of jurisdiction in the matter of enforcement of fundamental right of a citizen. Where under s. 11 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, the Controller was given jurisdiction to determine whether there was non-payment of rent or not, as well as the juridiction, on finding that there was non-payment of rent, to order eviction of a tenant, it was held by this Court in Rai Brij Raj Krishan v. S. K. Shaw and Brolkrs (1) that even if the Controller had wrongly decided the question whether there had hr.en non·payment of rent, his order for eviction on the ground that the.~e had been non-payment of rent could not be questioned in a civil court. This decision has nothing to do with the scope of this Court's power to enforce a fundamental right, but it deals only with the question of the ouster of the civil court's jurisdiction when a special tribunal is created to finally decide specific matters. In Messrs. Mohanl,al Hargovind Das Biri Mercha.nts Jabalpur v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (') when the Sale-tax authorities of Madhya Pradesh on & wrong view of the transactions carried on by (I) [i951] S.c.R. 146.

i7) [1956] 2 S.C.R, 509,

1 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1962 \he petitioners thflrein, held that the said transactions were intra-State transactions and on that Smt. Ujjam llal basis required them to file a statement of return of •• Utta.f Stah of total purch11se of tobacco ma.de by them, this court, Pratlash on a correct view of the transactions came to the Subbo Ro•J· conclusion that they related to inter-State trade and, on that view, enforced thelfundamental right of the petitioners. Though there was no decision of the Sales-tax: authorities that the transactions were intra-State, the notice was on that basis ; but yet that did not prevent this Court from oomin2 to a different conclusion and enforcing the fundamental right of the petitioners. In Messrs. Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. Asstt. · Commissioner of Sale-tax (1) the Sales-tax authorities determined the turnover of the petitioners including therein the proceeds of sales held by them to be intra-State transa.otions. This Court held, considering the nature of the tran8&otions once again, that they were not sales inside the State and were only sales in the course of interState trade and commerce, and, on that basis; enforced the fundamental right of the petitioners. This Court again enfm·ced the fundamental rights of the petitioners in J. V. Gokul & Co. v. Asstt. Collector of Sale-tax (2 j by reversing the finding of the Sales-tax Officer, who had held that the sales in that case were intra-State and holding that they were made in the course of import.

Ignoring the first decision wherein there was no order of the Sa.lea-tax Officer on merits, in the other two decisions, the Sale-tax Officer in exeroise of his jurisdiction decided on the facts before him that the sales were intra-State sales, whereas this Court on a reconsideration of the facts held that they were outside sales. The criterion of jurisdio· tion breaks in these cases, for the Salee-tax Officer II) •19'5) 2 SC R 483.

(2) (19FO) 2 S.C.R. 152.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]

l96B

has inherent jurisdiction to decide the question the sales were inside sales or outside sales. whether Smt. Ujjam Bai v. But an attempt is made to distinguish these oases State of Ullar on the ground that by a wrong view of the transacPradesh tions, the sales-tax Officer violated the provisions of Subba Bao J. Art. 286 of the Constitution, and therefore he had no inherent jurisdiction to impose the tax. There are no merits in this distinction. The Sales-tax Officer had jurisdiction to dAoide under the relevant sales·tax Act whether a transaction was inside or outside sale. He had the jurisdiction to decide rightly or wrongly; on the basis of his finding, though a wrong one, the sales were 11ot exempt from taxt.tion. If, on the facts of the ease, the Sales-tax Officer had arrived at the correct conolution, he would not have any power to impose a tax on inter-State sa

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