Society for Human Resource Management Shrm v. Strategic Hrm & Ors.
- Court
- High Court of Delhi
- Date of judgment
- 3 November 2026
- Judge
- Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav
- Case number
- CS(COMM) No. 128 of 2026
- Acts & sections
- Section 20 CPC, Section 168 BSA
- Subject
- Civil
Full judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI BEFORE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV #
CNR No. DLHC010427772026
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CS(COMM) 987/2026 and I.A. 24805/2026 and I.A. 24806/2026, I.A. 24807/2026 Between: ABD MAESTRO PRIVATE LIMITED 394-C, LAMINGTON CHAMBERS, LAMINGTON ROAD, MUMBAI - 400 004 ALSO, AT ASHFORD CENTRE, 7TH FLOOR, SHANKARRAO NARAM MARG, LOWER PAREL (WEST), MUMBAI - 400013 .....PLAINTIFF (Through: Mr. Rajiv Nayyar, Sr. Advocate, Mr. Akhil Sibal, Sr. Advocate along with Mr. Shrawan Chopra and Mr. Achyut Tewari, MS. Krishna, Ms. Kairavi, Ms. Sugandh, Mr. Pratham, Mr. Mridul and Ms. Shreya, Advocates..) Versus GREAT GALLEON VENTURES LTD. 160, KANCHAN BAGH, INDORE, MADHYA PRADESH ALSO, AT 308-309, PRINCE'S BUSINESS SKYPARK, SCHEME NO. 54, A.B. ROAD, INDORE, MADHYA PRADESH – 452010
PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS: A-33, GROUND FLOOR, NARAINA INDUSTRIAL AREA, PHASE L, NEW DELHI, SOUTH WEST DELHI, DELHI, 110028. .....DEFENDANT (Through: Mr. Chander M. Lall, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Kapil Wadhwa, Ms. Priyanshi Bhageria and Ms.Ananya Mehan, Advocates.) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------%
Reserved on: 24.09.2026 Pronounced on: 03.11.2026 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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CNR No. DLHC010431792026
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CS(COMM) 996/2026, CAV. 444/2026, I.A. 24980/2026 & I.A. 24981/2026 AMBER NUTRITION PRIVATE LIMITED THROUGH ITS AUTHORISED SIGNATORY MR. RAJESH DHINGRA 332/2, BEHIND AGRAWAL TOL KANTA, UDHYOG NAGAR, GRAM PALDA, INDORE-452002, MADHYA PRADESH, INDIA .....PLAINTIFF (Through: Mr. Samrat S. Kang and Mr. Swapnil Agrawal, Advocates.) Versus 1. MR. MANISH CHANDAK TRADING AS M/S PANKAJ CONFECTIONARY G-115, C/O RONAK CONFECTIONARY, AGRO FOOD PARK, BORANDA, JODHPUR – 342001, RAJASTHAN
.....DEFENDANT NO.1 2. MR. JAI KISHAN BOOB TRADING AS M/S POONA SWEET PRODUCTS, 1, BEHIND GEETA BHAWAN, MAHESH SCHOOL ROAD, JODHPUR, 342003, RAJASTHAN .....DEFENDANT NO. 2 (Through: Mr. Shravan Kumar Bansal and Mr. Pankaj Kumar, Advocate for D-1.) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------%
Reserved on: 24.09.2026 Pronounced on: 03.11.2026 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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CNR No. DLHC010326252022
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CS(COMM) 598/2022 and I.A. 121/2023 JANGEER SINGH TRADING AS JANGEER SINGH KABULSHAH AGRICULTURE WORKS NEAR NEW DHAN MANDI, ANOOPGARPH ROAD, RAISINGH NAGAR, DISTT. SRI GANGA NAGAR, RAJASTHAN, THROUGH ITS AUTHORISED SIGNATORY MR. PARVINDER SINGH .....PLAINTIFF (Through: Mr. Vikas Khera (VC), Ms. SnehaSethia, Ms. Kumari Pragati and Ms. Payal Aggarwal, Advs..) Versus YOGESH JANGID TRADING AS JANGID AGRO ENGINEERING KANASIA NAKA, AB ROAD, UJJAIN - 456770, MADHYA PRADESH
.....DEFENDANT (Through: Mr. J. Sai Deepak, Senior Advocate with Mr. Avinash Sharma, Mr. Raghav Nagar and Mr. Rishab Nagar, Advocates for D1.) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------%
Reserved on: 28.09.2026 Pronounced on: 03.11.2026 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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CNR No. DLHC010437382026
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CS(COMM) 1010/2026 and I.A. 25298/2026, I.A. 25299/2026, I.A. 25300/2026 & I.A. 25301/2026 NAMASTU ENTERPRISE PRIVATE LIMITED THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE, MR. SUMIT MARDA A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013 (CIN: U46491WR2026PTC293004), AND A REGISTERED MICRO ENTERPRISE UNDER THE MSME ACT (UDYAM REG. NO. UDYAM-WB-08-0133978), REGISTERED OFFICE AT 19, PANCHANANTALA ROAD, BALLY, HOWRAH, WEST BENGAL – 711201 .....PLAINTIFF (Through: Mr. J. Sai Deepak, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Saral Sharma, Mr. Karikey Sharma and Ms. Purnima Vashishtha, Advs..) Versus 1. KAJALBEN MAHESHBHAI KAKLOTAR PROPRIETOR OF M/S KHODAL ENTERPRISE (TRADING AS ―M. KAASA‖) HAVING ITS PRINCIPAL ADDRESS AT THIRD FLOOR, FLAT NO-309, BUILDING- F, EWS-37(P2), TP NO. 45, FP NO. 117, SUMAN VANDAN-2, NR SAI PUJAN APP, JAHANGIRPURA, ICHCHHAPOR, SURAT, GUJARAT, 395005
ALSO AT: 221, SANTOSHI KRUPA SOC NR BAPA SITARAM CHOWK, SURAT, GUJARAT – 395004, INDIA .....DEFENDANT NO.1 2. AMAZON SELLER SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED CIN: U51900KA2010PTC053234 HAVING REGISTERED OFFICE AT SATTVA HORIZON, SURVEY NO 6/1 AND 7/1, VINAYAK NAGAR, KATTIGENAHALLI VENKATALA VILLAGE, YELAHANKA HOBLI BANGALORE, KARNATAKA – 560064 .....DEFENDANT NO.2 (Through: None.) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------%
Reserved on: 28.09.2026 Pronounced on: 03.11.2026 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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CNR No. DLHC010451972026
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CS(COMM) 1041/2026 & I.As. 26095-99/2026 ZYDUS WELLNESS PRODUCTS LTD ZYDUS CORPORATE PARK SCHEME NO. 63, SURVEY NO. 536 KHORAJ (GANDHINAGAR), NR. VAISHNODEVI CIRCLE SARKHEJ – GANDHINAGAR HIGHWAY AHMEDABAD – 382481, GUJARAT … PLAINTIFF (Through: Mr. Adarsh Ramanujan with Ms. Archana Sahadeva, Mr. Rahul Bhujbal and Mr. Yash Raj, Advocates.) versus TUSHAR CHIMANLAL CHITALIA [TRADING AS: TUSHAR HEALTH CARE (INDIA)]
2ND FLOOR, 219/220, DIAMOND INDUSTRIAL ESTATE KETKI PADA ROAD, DAHISAR EAST MUMBAI, MAHARASHTRA, 400068 AND ALSO D/B/A AND AT: M/S HELLO (INDIA) KH NO 999, SALEMPUR RAJPUTANA INDUSTRIAL AREA ROORKEE, HARIDWAR UTTARAKHAND, 247667 .....DEFENDANT NO. 1 KUNAL SHAH D/B/A: NAVKAR DISTRIBUTORS FLOOR NO. 5, ROOM NO. 110, 22/24 ANANTWADI BHULESHWAR, MUMBAI - 400002, MAHARASHTRA .....DEFENDANT NO. 2 ENDURANCE INTERNATIONAL GROUP (INDIA) PVT. LTD. D/B/A PUBLICDOMAINREGISTRY.COM UNIT 401, 4TH FLOOR, IT BUILDING 3, NESCO IT PARK NESCO COMPLEX, WESTERN EXPRESS HIGHWAY, GOREGAON (EAST) MUMBAI 400063 .....DEFENDANT NO. 3 INDIAMART INTERMESH LTD. D/B/A WWW.INDIAMART.COM 1ST FLOOR, 29 DARYAGANJ NETAJI SUBASH MARG, DELHI – 110002 .....DEFENDANT NO. 4 INFOCOM NETWORK PVT. LTD. A-86, PHASE-II OKHLA INDUSTRIAL AREA DELHI – 110020
.....DEFENDANT NO. 5 JOHN DOE ADDRESS UNKNOWN .....DEFENDANT NO. 6 (Through: None. ) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------%
Reserved on: 30.09.2026 Pronounced on: 03.11.2026 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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CNR No. DLHC010307162026
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CS(COMM) 746/2026 and I.A. 18505-18510/2026
1.
SANJAY KUMAR JAIN KARTA OF SANJAY JAIN (HUF) TRADING AS M/S RADHA PHARMACY, B/H.ARYA SAMAJ, SHEOGANJ, DIST- SIROHI, (RAJASTHAN) … PLAINTIFF NO.1
2.
KAACHAL EXPORTERS PRIVATE LIMITED BEHIND ARYA SAMAJ, SHEOGANJ, SIROHI, RAJASTHAN,307027 … PLAINTIFF NO.2 (Through: Mr.Harish Kumar and Mr.Pranav, Advocates.) versus NANDI AYURVED NEAR WATER TANK, VILLAGE SANDIYA THE. SOJAT DISTT. PALI, RAJASTHAN, 306306 .....DEFENDANT NO. 1 NIRMAYA AYURVED THROUGH ITS PROPRIETOR
VILLAGE SANDIYA, THE, SOJAT, DISTT. PALI, RAJASTHAN-306306 .....DEFENDANT NO. 2 VAID DHANVANTARI AYURVEDA NEAR BANSAL B.K.O UBHAWAL ROAD, SANGRUR, PUNJAB-148001 .....DEFENDANT NO. 3 RAMESH BELT HOUSE & MAYUR PUJA BHANDAR MATRIKUNDIYA, TEHSIL RASHMI, CHITTORGARH, RAJASTHAN, 312203, .....DEFENDANT NO. 4 INDIAMART INTERMESH LIMITED 1ST FLOOR, 29 DARYAGANJ, NETAJI SUBASH MARG, NEW DELHI , DELHI – 110002 .....DEFENDANT NO. 5 (Through: None.) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------%
Reserved on: 01.10.2026 Pronounced on: 03.11.2026 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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CNR No. DLHC010246432026
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CS(COMM) 611/2026, I.A. 15270/2026, I.A. 15271/2026, I.A. 15272/2026, I.A. 15273/2026, I.A. 15274/2026, I.A. 15275/2026 & I.A. 27570/2026 AMRITSAR HAVELI CUISINES PRIVATE LIMITED J-2/3, MAIN NAJAFGARH ROAD, RAJOURI GARDEN, NEAR CENTURION BANK OF INDIA, NEW DELHI-110027
… PLAINTIFF NO.1 RUBJEET SINGH GROVER 312, EAST MOHAN NAGAR, AMRITSAR, PUNJAB, 143001 … PLAINTIFF NO.2 (Through: Mr. Anshuman Upadhayay, Mr. Naseem Sheikh and Mr. Rahul Singh, Advs.) versus AMARBIR SINGH PARTNER OF CAFE GREEN BREW TOWN HALL, INSIDE SARAGARHI SARAI, INSIDE SARAGARHI SARAI, AMRITSAR, PUNJAB- 143006 .....DEFENDANT NO. 1 KULWINDER SINGH PARTNER OF CAFE GREEN BREW TOWN HALL, INSIDE SARAGARHI SARAI, INSIDE SARAGARHI SARAI, AMRITSAR, PUNJAB- 143006 .....DEFENDANT NO. 2 GAGANDEEP SINGH PARTNER OF CAFE GREEN BREW TOWN HALL, INSIDE SARAGARHI SARAI, INSIDE SARAGARHI SARAI, AMRITSAR, PUNJAB- 143006 .....DEFENDANT NO. 3 JASPAL SINGH SIDHU PARTNER OF CAFE GREEN BREW
TOWN HALL, INSIDE SARAGARHI SARAI, INSIDE SARAGARHI SARAI, AMRITSAR, PUNJAB- 143006 .....DEFENDANT NO. 4 (Through: None.) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------%
Reserved on: 05.10.2026 Pronounced on: 03.11.2026 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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CNR No. DLHC010371962026
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CS(COMM) 874/2026 and I.A. 21757-21761/2026 PHARMED LIMITED SATTVA MINDCOMP TECH PARK GROUND FLOOR, OFFICE 1, 149-A, EPIP II PHASE, WHITEFIELD INDUSTRIAL AREA, BENGALURU - 560 066, KARNATAKA Also at: 1/23-B, 2nd Floor, Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi-110002, India .....PLAINTIFF (Through: Ms.Lakshmidevi Somanath and Ms/Kanishka Vaish, Advocates.) versus BEST BIOTECH 76-13-18B/6 A&B, OPP. AVSR SKY COURT, BESIDE LANE OF SAMSKRUTI FUNCTION HALL URMILA NAGAR ROAD, BEST BIOTECH STREET, BHAVANIPURAM, VIJAYAWADA ANDHRA PRADESH 520012.
.....DEFENDANT NO. 1 SAVYA PHARMACEUTICALS PLOT. NO-5A-4, SECTOR 09, IIE PANTNAGAR, U.S.N. - 263153 UTTRAKHAND .....DEFENDANT NO. 2 JUST DIAL LIMITED PALM COURT, M.M. MALVIYA ROAD, UPPER GOVIND NAGAR, MALAD (WEST), MUMBAI-400097 Also at: No. 184, 187, 3rd Floor, Temple Steps, B Block, Anna Salai, Little Mount Saidapet, Chennai - 600015 .....DEFENDANT NO. 3 (Through: Mr.Avinash Kumar Sharma and Mr.B. Sidhi Pramodh Rayudu, Advocates for D-1. Mr. Bharat Garg with Ms. Surabhi Pandey and Mr. Davansh Garg, Advocates for D3.) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------%
Reserved on: 07.10.2026 Pronounced on: 03.11.2026 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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CNR No. DLHC010048972026
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CS(COMM) 128/2026 & I.A. 3790/2026, I.A. 9921/2026 SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SHRM A U.S. BASED COMPANY HAVING REGISTERED OFFICE AT: 1800 DUKE STREET, ALEXANDRIA,
VIRGINIA 22314, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .....PLAINTIFF (Through: Mr. Neeraj Bhardwaj with Mr. N.K. Bhardwaj, Mr. Bikash Ghorai & Mr. Salil Oberoi, Advocates.) versus STRATEGIC HRM HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE HILITE BUSINESS PARK, CALICUT, (KOZHIKODE) KERALA, PIN- 673014 .....DEFENDANT NO. 1 GODADDY.COM LLC, 14455, NORTH HAYDEN ROAD, SUITE-219, SCOTTSDALE, ARIZONA 85260 .....DEFENDANT NO. 2 HOSTGATOR.COM LLC 5005 MITCHELLADALE ST, SUITE 100, HOUSTON, TEXAS, UNITED STATES- 77092 .....DEFENDANT NO. 3 (Through: Ms. Julien George with Ms. Deepika Pokharia & Mr. Vedam Anand, Advocates for D1.) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------%
Reserved on: Pronounced on:
07.10.2026 03.11.2026
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CNR No. DLHC010179982026
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CS(COMM) 444/2026, I.A. 11717/2026, I.A. 16164/2026, I.A. 15483/2026 & I.A. 28513/2026 KBB NUTS PVT. LIMITED B-57 LAWRENCE ROAD, INDUSTRIAL AREA, DELHI - 110035. .....PLAINTIFF (Through:
Mr. Manish Biala and Mr. Devesh Ratan, Advocates.) versus
MR. SURESH CHAND PROPRIETOR, MIS ARUNA FLOOR DAL & OIL MILL F-179, RIICO INDUSTRIAL AREA, GANGAPUR CITY, SAWAI MADHOPUR, RAJASTHAN- 322201.
.....DEFENDANT NO. 1 MS. ARUNA DEVI PROPRIETOR, MIS ARUNA ENTERPRISES 1 KRISHNA MILL, SHEETLA MATA ROAD, GANGAPUR CITY, SAWAI MADHOPUR, RAJASTHAN – 322201
.....DEFENDANT NO. 2 DNA NUTS & DRY FRUITS THROUGH ITS PARTNERS 1 GANGAPUR CITY ,PURAANI ANAAJ MANDI, NEAR MANDIR, GANGAPUR CITY, SAWAI MADHOPUR, RAJASTHAN - 322201. .....DEFENDANT NO. 3 MR. DEEPAK KUMAR GOYAL
PARTNER, DNA NUTS & DRY FRUITS 1 GANGAPUR CITY, PURAANI ANAAJ MANDI, NEAR MANDIR, GANGAPUR CITY, SAWAI MADHOPUR, RAJASTHAN - 322201. .....DEFENDANT NO. 4
MR. ANSHUL KUMAR GUPTA PARTNER, DNA NUTS & DRY FRUITS 1 GANGAPUR CITY ,PURAANI ANAAJ MANDI, NEAR MANDIR, GANGAPUR CITY, SAWAI MADHOPUR, RAJASTHAN - 322201. .....DEFENDANT NO. 5 (Through: Ms. Niyati Vishwakarma, Advocate for D-1 and 2 (thr. VC ) Mr. Naveen Gupta and Ms. Sandhya Gupta, Advocates for D-3 to 5.) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------%
Reserved on: 09.10.2026 Pronounced on: 03.11.2026 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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CNR No. DLHC010391112026
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CS(COMM) 917/2026 and I.A. 22773/2026, I.A. 22775/2026 JSW MG MOTOR INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORISED SIGNATORY, 10TH FLOOR, MILESTONE EXPERION CENTRE SECTOR 15, GURUGRAM, HARYANA- 122001 .....PLAINTIFF NO.1 SAIC MOTOR CORPORATION LIMITED ROOM 509, BUILDING 1, NO. 563,
SONG TAO ROAD, PILOT FREE TRADE ZONE, SHANGHAI, CHINA- 201203 .....PLAINTIFF NO.2 (Through: Mr. Saif Khan, Mr. Prajjwal Kushwaha and Ms. Diya Vishwanath, Advocates.) versus TRISTAR AUTO AGENCIES (VIZAG) PRIVATE LIMITED, REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR, B. RAJESH CHITTIBABU, DOOR NO.38-13-54, NH-5, LAKSHMI NAGAR, MARRIPALEM, VISAKHAPATNAM-530018 .....DEFENDANT (Through: None.) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------%
Reserved on: 09.10.2026 Pronounced on: 03.11.2026 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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CNR No. DLHC010375502026
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CS(COMM) 883/2026 & I.A. 21989/2026 SHIROMANI GURDWARA PARBANDHAK COMMITTEE THROUGH BALWINDER SINGH SECRETARY & AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE TEJA SINGH SAMUNDRI HALL, SRI DARBAR SAHIB COMPLEX, AMRITSAR, PUNJAB (INDIA) PIN – 143006 .....PLAINTIFF NO.1
G-NEXT MEDIA PVT. LTD. THROUGH KRISHAN KUMAR FINANCE MANAGER & AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE F-138, PHASE VIII B, INDUSTRIAL FOCAL POINT, SAS NAGAR, MOHALI, PUNJAB, 160055, INDIA, .....PLAINTIFF NO.2 (Through: Mr. Rajiv Nayar, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Kapil Midha, Mr. Karmanya Singh Sareen, Mr. Krishnagopal Abhay, Mr. Sahib Singh Dhillon, Ms. Pari Bhardwaj, Mr. Soumya Benerjee, Ms. Shree Sruthi, Ms. Tushita Poddar, Ms. Yadavi Malhotra, Mr. Pratham Vir, Mr. Shreyas Maheshwari and Mr. Naman Maheshwari, Advs. for P-1. Mr. J. Sai Deepak, Sr. Adv. with Ms. Mahima Kirori, Mr. Anshul Saharan and Ms. Purnima Vashishtha, Advs. for P-2.) versus GALACTIC TELEVISION & COMMUNICATIONS PVT. LTD. CORPORATE OFFICE: 78, OKHLA INDUSTRIAL ESTATE, PHASE-3, NEW DELHI – 110020 REGISTERED OFFICE: SCO NO. 45 (FIRST FLOOR) SECTOR-82 SAS NAGAR (MOHALI), PUNJAB – 140306 .....DEFENDANT NO.1 GTC NETWORK UK LIMITED THROUGH DIRECTOR RABINDRA NARAYAN HAVING REGISTERED ADDRESS:
167-169 GREAT PORTLAND STREET, LONDON, ENGLAND, W1W 5PF .....DEFENDANT NO.2 RABINDRA NARAYAN MANAGING DIRECTOR OF DEFENDANT NO. 1 78, OKHLA INDUSTRIAL ESTATE, PHASE-3, NEW DELHI – 110020 .....DEFENDANT NO.3 MANPREET SINGH DIRECTOR OF DEFENDANT NO. 1 78, OKHLA INDUSTRIAL ESTATE, PHASE-3, NEW DELHI - 110020 .....DEFENDANT NO.4 (Through: Mr. P. S. Patwalia, Sr. Adv. and Mr. Pawan Singh Bindra, Sr. Adv. with Mrs. Pavitra Kaur, Mr. Harkirat Singh, Mr. Sushant Singh, Mr. Sushant Singh, Mr. Aditya Notani, Ms. Dhanushiya S., Ms. Deveshi Chand and Mr. Priyansh Kumar, Advocates.) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------%
Reserved on: 12.10.2026 Pronounced on: 03.11.2026 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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CNR No. DLHC010494792026
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CS(COMM) 1115/2026 and I.A. 28420-28426/2026 MARICO LIMITED 7TH FLOOR, GRANDE PALLADIUM, 175, CST ROAD KALINA SANTACRUZ (EAST) MUMBAI400098 MAHARASHTRA
....PLAINTIFF (Through: Mr.Neeraj Grover, Sr. Advocate with Mr.Ankur Sangal, Mr.Ankit, Mr.Shaurya, Mr.Varoon and Ms.Sanandika, Advocates.) versus SHREE UDAY OIL AND FOOD INDUSTRIES LLP PLOT NO. 3240, GIDC CHHATRAL, PHASE-3 MANGALAM ALLOYS, GANDHI NAGAR, KALOL GUJARAT- 382729 ALSO AT: A-309, SUMEL- 11, ABOVE VIJAY SALES OPPOSITE NAMASTE CIRCLE AHMEDABAD - 380004, GUJARAT .....DEFENDANT (Through: None.) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------%
Reserved on: 13.10.2026 Pronounced on: 03.11.2026 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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CNR No. DLHC010424552026
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CS(COMM) 980/2026 and I.A. 24644/2026, I.A. 24645/2026, I.A. 24646/2026, I.A. 24647/2026, I.A. 24648/2026, I.A. 24649/2026 and I.A. 24650/2026 HAVELI RESTAURANT AND RESORTS LTD 2ND FLOOR, G - 135, JAIN COLONY, SECTOR - 22, ROHINI, DELHI-110086. ALSO AT VILLAGE KHAJURLA, PHAGWARA, KAPURTHALA, PUNJAB - 144402.
.....PLAINTIFF (Through: Mr. Peeyoosh Kalra, Mr. Srish Kumar Mishra, Mr. Vinayak Goel, Mr.Alexander Mathai Paikaday, Mr.Ankit Jain, Advocates and Mr.Ajay Sandhal, AR.) versus SHUBHAM FOOD ENTERPRISES SUKHI JOHRI, DHARAMPUR, DHARAMPUR, SOLAN, HIMACHAL PRADESH, 173209. .....DEFENDANT (Through: None.) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------%
Reserved on: 14.10.2026 Pronounced on: 03.11.2026 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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CNR No. DLHC010497832026
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CS(COMM) 1120/2026 and I.A. 28592/2026, I.A. 28593/2026, I.A. 28594/2026, I.A. 28595/2026, I.A. 28596/2026, I.A. 28597/2026 LABORATE PHARMACEUTICALS INDIA LIMITED CORPORATE OFFICE: PLOT K-17, SECOND FLOOR, UDYOG NAGAR, INDUSTRIAL AREA, ROHTAK ROAD, NANGLOI, NEW DELHI-110041 .....PLAINTIFF (Through: Mr. Siddharth Bambh, Ms. S. Garg and Ms. Aroshi Pal, Advocates.) versus
M/S JMBS HEALTHCARE THROUGH ITS PARTNERS ADDRESS: KALA AMB ROAD, NEAR PREET PALACE, NARAINGARH AMBALA, HARYANA- 134203 ALSO, AT: PLOT NO. 92, HPSIDC INDUSTRIAL AREA, NEAR SHREE SAI ENTERPRISES, BADDI, HIMACHAL PRADESH - 173205 .....DEFENDANT (Through:
None.)
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Reserved on: 14.10.2026 Pronounced on: 03.11.2026 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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CNR No. DLHC010475012026
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CS(COMM) 1081/2026 and I.A. 27355-27362/2026 BEIERSDORF AG BEIERSDORFSTRAßE 1-9 22529 HAMBURG, GERMANY .....PLAINTIFF NO.1 NIVEA INDIA PVT. LTD. KURLA (WEST), PHOENIX MARKET CITY, A WING, 4TH FLOOR, ART GUILD HOUSE, 400070 MUMBAI, INDIA .....PLAINTIFF NO. 2 (Through: Mr. Pravin Anand, Mr. Dhruv Anand, Ms. Ms. Bhavya Verma and Mr.Dhananjay Khanna, Advocates.)
versus DUVAC COSMEDICS B/403, SAMANVAY SILICON, OPP KALYAN HOTEL, SAYAJIGUNJ, VADODARA – 390020 ALSO AT: PLOT NO-504 VADODARA MARKET, BHD JETALPUR GAM, AKOTA, VADODARA-390020, GUJARAT .....DEFENDANT NO. 1 GLEXON HEALTHCARE PRIVATE LIMITED SHYAM INDUSTRIAL HUB, A-18, BAKROL-GATRAD RD, BAKROL, GUJARAT – 382430 .....DEFENDANT NO. 2
M/S JAHNAVI MEDICAL STORE SF 216, SIDDHARTH CREST, OPPOSITE NIZAMPURA BUS STAND, VADODARA – 390024, GUJARAT .....DEFENDANT NO. 3 (Through:
None.)
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Reserved on: 15.10.2026 Pronounced on: 03.11.2026 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------#
CNR No. DLHC010041822026
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CS(COMM) 111/2026 and I.A. 3271/2026, I.A. 5167/2026 KAJARIA CERAMICS LIMITED CORPORATE OFFICE AT: J-1/ B-1(EXTENSION) MOHAN COOPERATIVE INDUSTRIAL ESTATE, MATHURA ROAD, NEW DELHI- 110044 THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY MR. SACHIN SAXENA ALSO AT: SF-11, SECOND FLOOR, JMD REGENT PLAZA, MEHRAULI GURGAON ROAD, VILLAGE SIKANDERPUR GHOSI, GURGAON, HARYANA- 122001 .....PLAINTIFF (Through: Mr. J. Sai Deepak, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Rishabh Gupta, Ms. Akshita Makin, Mr. Vikrant Rana, Ms. Lucy Rana, Mr. R. Abhishek Avadhani, Advocates.) versus MR. YOMESH VIJAYA TRADING AS M/S. WESTERN DRYMIX ADDRESS: PLOT NO. 205, DELHI MIA ROAD MATSYA INDUSRTRIAL AREA, ALWAR RAJASTHAN – 301030 ALSO AT: 02/19, RC MANSION PREET VIHAR, TRANSPORT NAGAR, ALWAR, RAJASTHAN-301001 .....DEFENDANT
(Through: Mr. Ashutosh Kumar, Mr. Utkarsh Gupta, Mr.Sajan Shankdhar, Mr. Sanidhya Sharma, Mr. Deepank Singhal, Ms. Shruti Gupta and Mr. Ayush Sharma, Advocates.) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------%
Reserved on: 16.10.2026 Pronounced on: 03.11.2026 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------JUDGMENT INDEX
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES RAISED AND THE ANSWERS FOUND ........................................................................................................ 25 II. ANALYSIS ............................................................................................. 37 A. THE PRAYERS TO BE TESTED ........................................................ 37 B. ―CARRIES ON BUSINESS‖ ............................................................... 39 C. ―CAUSE OF ACTION, WHOLLY OR IN PART‖ .............................. 79 (i) Quia Timet Action ............................................................................. 79 (ii) An Action for Passing Off ................................................................ 92 (iii) An Action for Infringement in the Offline World ............................ 97 (iv) An Action for Infringement in the Online World .......................... 105 D. ―DYNAMIC EFFECT‖ AND IT CONFERRING JURISDICTION . 122 E. THE USE OF AN ―INVESTIGATOR‖ ................................................ 124 F. THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON-CONVENIENS ...................... 130 G. DOCTRINE OF DEMURRER ........................................................... 170 III. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................ 176
IV. ADJUDICATING THE ISSUE OF TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION ....................................................................................... 182 V. APPLICATION TO FACTS .............................................................. 191 ABD MAESTRO PRIVATE LIMITED V. GREAT GALLEON VENTURES LTD. ....... 191 AMBER NUTRITION PRIVATE LIMITED V. MR. MANISH CHANDAK & ANR...... 194 AMRITSAR HAVELI CUISINES PRIVATE LTD. AND ANR. V. AMARBIR SINGH AND ORS. ......................................................................................................... 209 HAVELI RESTAURANT AND RESORTS LTD. V. SHUBHAM FOOD ENTERPRISES 210 BEIERSDORF AG & ANR. V. DUVAC COSMEDICS & ORS. ............................ 194 NAMASTU ENTERPRISE PVT. LTD. V. KAJALBEN MAHESHBHAI KAKLOTAR AND ANR. ......................................................................................................... 216 JSW MG MOTOR INDIA PVT. LTD. V. SAIC MOTOR CORPORATION LTD. .... 218 KBB NUTS PVT. LTD. V. MR. SURESH CHAND AND ORS. ............................. 222 MARICO LTD. V. SHREE UDAY OIL AND FOOD INDUSTRIES LLP .................. 224 ZYDUS WELLNESS PRODUCTS LTD. V. TUSHAR CHIMANLAL CHITALIA AND ORS. ................................................................................................................. 226 LABORATE PHARMACEUTICALS INDIA LIMITED V. M/S JMBS HEALTHCARE . 229 JANGEER SINGH TRADING V. YOGESH JANGID............................................. 232 KAJARIA CERAMICS LTD. V. YOMESH VIJAYA............................................... 234 PHARMED LTD. V. BEST BIOTECH AND ORS. ............................................... 236 SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT V. STRATEGIC HRM ........ 236 SHIROMANI GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMITTEE VS GALACTIC TV & COMMUNICATION ...................................................................................... 240 SANJAY KUMAR JAIN AND ANR. V. NANDI AYURVED AND ORS. ..................... 243
VI. ORDER ............................................................................................... 245
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES RAISED AND THE ANSWERS FOUND The present judgment deals with seventeen commercial suits filed before this Court. In more than half of these suits, neither parties, through any means, are at Delhi. In each of these suits, the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the parties are situated is competent to adjudicate upon the lis sought to be agitated before this Court. They however, while disturbing the horizontal allocation of territorial jurisdiction, knock this Court, on novel and ingenious grounds. 2.
It is vehemently argued on behalf of the plaintiffs that this Court has
been entertaining and deciding cases of parties located across the length and breadth of India. It has done so on the basis that part of cause of action has arisen within Delhi or that either of the parties carries on business at Delhi. It is argued by counsel that in the world of IP litigation, a suit for infringement along with passing off can be filed at a place where a website having the infringing products is accessible and commercial transactions can get concluded on the website. This, it is submitted, constitutes a part of the cause of action and makes a suit maintainable under Section 20(c) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.1 3.
It is also submitted that a defendant or a plaintiff ―carries on
business‖ at a place from where the website advertising, promoting, or
―CPC‖.
offering for sale, the goods or services in question, is accessible. It is clarified by learned counsel that for jurisdiction to be conferred, the website, also, need not be hosted by the defendant, nor is it necessary that the listing (if any) be made by the defendant. Importantly, it has been argued, that because the plaintiff or a person set up by him, has placed an order on an emarketplace like Flipkart or Amazon for the defendant‘s goods, and given the address of Delhi, jurisdiction is manifestly made out. Such a transaction, the Court may observe, the plaintiff or his agent could have done from Ladakh, Tamil Nadu, Arunachal Pradesh, or Gujarat. The argument of counsel, however, remains that this Court must entertain such a suit because its agent gave the delivery address of Delhi. 4.
A statute or a provision cannot be interpreted in a manner that confers
an unbridled, unguided and uncanalised right on the plaintiff to create jurisdiction within the territory of a given Court and obligates it to decide that lis. Such an exercise of an uncircumscribed right is bound to create a mockery of the concept of territoriality and the ―local limits‖ of the court. 5.
In today‘s digital world, every website is accessible pan-India, if not
worldwide; services can be availed of through the internet in every remote corner of the country, and goods can be delivered to most, if not all, places. If the position of law is what has been stated above, jurisdictional rules would have no meaning. The horizontal division of jurisdiction in the world of IP disputes would cease to have any application. The jurisdictional provisions under the CPC, which allocate jurisdiction amongst courts, may as well be given a burial.
6.
In some of the decisions passed by this Court undoubtedly jurisdiction
has been exercised in the manner canvassed by counsel. After enjoying, effectively, a pan-India jurisdiction, it becomes difficult for a court today to draw a Lakshman Rekha and restrain itself from stepping outside its bounds. This issue, however, demands closer consideration. The question is not one of losing territory but of institutional discipline. If jurisdiction is naturally made out, the Court must entertain the suit without hesitation. But if a dispute ought to be agitated before another court and is brought to Delhi, almost forcibly, and such a suit is entertained, the other rightful and natural forum which should have exercised jurisdiction over the matter gets deprived of the opportunity to adjudicate upon that cause of action. Institutional discipline and respect require this Court to refrain from entertaining such a suit. The statutory and constitutional scheme evinces a carefully structured division of courts‘ jurisdiction. Constitutional morality demands that this Court respect that scheme and abides by it. 7.
It may be possible that some of the features that this Court has,
arguably, no other High Court does. Its role in the advancement of IP law in this country, and its implication abroad, simply cannot be overstated. 8.
The establishment of the IPD, following the abolition of the
Intellectual Property Appellate Board, was accompanied by the IPD Rules and specialised Patent Suit Rules. These reflect an understanding that patent and other technology disputes may call for a different approach to pleadings, technical evidence, confidentiality and case management. 9.
In fact, the World Intellectual Property Organization‘s International
Guide to Patent Case Management for Judges too identifies several
procedural features of the Delhi model: concurrent expert evidence or ―hottubbing‖,2 remote evidence,3 preservation of evidence and litigation-hold notices,4
guidance
confidentiality
on
clubs,7
damages,5 summary
consolidation
adjudication,8
of
proceedings,6
technically
qualified
assistance,9 and mediation or early neutral evaluation.10 10.
The filing procedure before this Court is also uniquely suited for
commercial disputes. Actions in fresh, pending and disposed of cases are ordinarily filed electronically by the advocate or litigant in person. Court fees are capable of being deposited electronically, and hearings are conducted in physical, hybrid or video conferencing mode. 11.
The Registry communicates objections to the filing advocate or
litigant by email, SMS or web hosting,11 and once the objections are cleared the case is processed for listing. Any urgent matter filed before 12 noon is put before the Court for hearing on the following working day,12 and the daily cause lists of this Court notify that fresh petitions and applications filed before 12 noon are listed before the roster Bench accordingly. The practical consequence is that a plaintiff whose filing is free of defects may ordinarily expect the matter to be taken up on the next working day. This is
Rule 16, IPD Rules. Rule 15, IPD Rules. Rule 18, IPD Rules. Rule 20, IPD Rules. Rule 26, IPD Rules. Rule 19, IPD Rules. Rule 27, IPD Rules. Rules 31 and 32, IPD Rules. Rule 37, IPD Rules. Rule 18.3 of the e-Filing Rules. Rule 12 of Chapter I of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018.
a unique feature which perhaps may not be available in any other court. It guarantees quick listing, hearing, and adjudication of disputes. 12.
Two related features of this Court also give litigants a measure of
certainty after a matter is instituted. First, an order is ordinarily recorded and uploaded on the website of this Court on every date on which a matter is listed, whether before the Bench or before the Joint Registrar, including where the proceeding is confined to an adjournment or to directions on pleadings. The record of proceedings is, therefore, available to the parties, and to anyone examining the file, without reliance on oral accounts of what transpired. Second, every matter ordinarily leaves the courtroom with a fixed next date, and that date is reflected on the case status page. Where a matter does not reach, it is ordinarily assigned a fresh date of listing. Matters are, thus, not left to languish without a date, and parties and counsel are able to plan the progress of the litigation, including compliance with timelines under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, with reasonable predictability. 13.
Last among these features, and one the most important is the Bar
practising before this Court. It includes a large body of advocates and law firms who devote their practice to commercial and intellectual property litigation. This Court also has the advantage of being assisted by lawyers who are specialists and authorities in their fields. The doyens of India‘s IP Bar practice before this Court. 14.
The uniqueness of this Court, thus, lies not simply in assigning IP
matters to designated judges, but in building an institutional and procedural framework suited to the peculiar legal, scientific and commercial questions presented by IP disputes.
15.
India‘s IP landscape to a large extent has grown under the Banyan
Tree, which is the Delhi High Court. While the Banyan provides shelter and comfort, it also stunts the growth of other trees below it. 16.
There is no reason to believe that other High Courts will not rise to
the occasion, create a specialised machinery like this Court, and make IP litigation conducive either before them, or the district courts. 17.
This Court, without any doubt, must not command a reputation that
no matter how minuscule a connection the lis has with Delhi, the plaintiff or the defendant, the High Court of Delhi, would entertain a suit. 18.
In Aligarh Muslim University v. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P)
Ltd.,13 the Supreme Court in the context of another premier High Court observed ―we are surprised, not a little, that the High Court of Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a case where it had absolutely no jurisdiction.‖ In Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu,14 which arose after the decision in Aligarh Muslim University, the Supreme Court, noted that the institutional integrity of a court is predicated upon the manner in which its members conduct themselves. If a lis having no material connection with a given court is entertained, suspicions arise and eyebrows get raised. Para. 12 of the decision is extracted as under: ―12. …It must be remembered that the image and prestige of a court depends on how the members of that institution conduct themselves. If an impression gains ground that even in cases which fall outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, certain members of the court would be willing to exercise jurisdiction on the plea that some event, however trivial and unconnected with the cause of action had occurred within the jurisdiction of
(1994) 4 SCC 710. (1994) 4 SCC 711.
the said court, litigants would seek to abuse the process by carrying the cause before such members giving rise to avoidable suspicion. That would lower the dignity of the institution and put the entire system to ridicule…‖
19.
Bearing in mind considerations of predictability, fairness, and the
larger public interest, this Court has attempted to re-examine the caselaw on jurisdiction in IP suits. The position of law, as the discussion below shall reveal, is not as laissez-faire as learned counsel have contended it to be. A brief snapshot of the manner in which caselaw has been dealt with in the present judgment is as under: 20.
The decisions of the Supreme Court in Patel Roadways Limited v.
Prasad Trading Company,15 Dhodha House v. SK Maingi,16 and Indian Performing Rights Society v. Sanjay Dalia and Anr.,17 and of this Court in Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey & Ors.18 authoritatively declare the meaning of the expression ―carries on business‖, as it appears in Sections 20(a) and (b) of the CPC and Sections 62(2) and 134(2) of the Copyright Act, 195719 and the Trade Marks Act, 1999,20 respectively. The judgment of this Court in World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Reshma Collection & Ors.,21 despite noticing the decision of Dhodha House, appears to have fallen foul of its material conclusions. The underlying reasoning of WWE, more importantly, becomes completely unworkable after the decision of the Supreme Court in Sanjay Dalia and of this Court in Ultra Home.
(1991) 4 SCC 270. Followed in New Moga Transport Co. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors., (2004) 4 SCC 677. (2006) 9 SCC 41. (2015) 10 SCC 161. 2016 SCC OnLine Del 376. ―Copyright Act‖. ―Trade Marks Act‖. 2014 SCC OnLine Del 2031.
21.
In the subsequent chain of decisions of our Court, which begin from
Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. v. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt. Ltd.22 and end at ITC v. Adyar Gate Hotels Ltd.,23 it was not pointed out to the learned Division Bench that WWE is no longer a binding precedent on the issue raised in these cases. The observations and findings given by the learned Division Bench in these judgments, thus, may not be binding as they were rendered on the basis of WWE. 22.
Similarly, for claims concerning passing off, the decisions of our
Court in Glen Raven Mills Inc. v. Vaspar Concepts Pvt. Ltd. and Anr.,24 and Indovax Pvt. Ltd. v. Merck Animal Health and Ors.,25 were not canvassed before the Court in Burger King Corporation v. Techchand Shewakramani and Ors.26 The decision in Burger King having been rendered without adverting to earlier applicable judgments on the issue of passing off, may not be binding insofar as it relates to a claim for passing off. 23.
The judgment of the Division Bench of our Court in Banyan Tree
Holding (P) Ltd. v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy and Anr.,27 continues to govern jurisdictional issues when a plaintiff pleads a cause of action for infringement or passing off on the basis of a website. Banyan Tree, inter alia, requires the plaintiff to, prima facie, show using material/documents, that some commercial transactions using the website were entered into by
2025 SCC OnLine Del 8727. 2026 SCC OnLine Del 4852. 1995 SCC OnLine Del 724. 2017 SCC OnLine Del 9393. 2018 SCC OnLine Del 10881. 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780.
the defendant with a user of its website within the forum State. The decision of another Division Bench in Tata Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Hakunamatata Tata Founders and Ors.,28 dispenses with this requirement in Banyan Tree on the basis of a decision of this Court in Millennium & Copthorne International Limited v. Aryans Plaza Services Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.,29 and of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Lifestyle Equities CV v. Amazon UK Services Ltd.30 24.
It was, however, not pointed out to the learned Division Bench in
Tata Sons that the decision in Millennium & Copthorne International Limited was rendered by a learned Single Judge of our Court, which could not have disturbed the mandatory requirements of Banyan Tree. It was also not brought to the notice of the Division Bench that the law in England was fundamentally different from that declared in Banyan Tree. The finding rendered by the Division Bench that a ―looming presence‖ and an ability to access the website may be sufficient to constitute ―targeting‖ appears to be in conflict with both Banyan Tree and the law prevailing in England, as propounded in the judgment rendered by the UK Supreme Court,31 in appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Lifestyle Equities. 25.
The use of an ―investigator‖ to enter into trap transactions so as to
concoct jurisdiction in a forum which otherwise has no jurisdiction is also impermissible, as declared in Banyan Tree. The decisions of our Court in Machinenfabrik Rieter AG and Anr. v. Tex Tech Industries India Pvt. Ltd.
2022 SCC OnLine Del 2968. 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8260. [2022] EWCA Civ 552. 2024 UKSC 8.
and Anr.,32 and Reiter AG and Anr. v. Kavassery Narayanaswamy Venkatasubramanian,33 hold that Banyan Tree’s dictum concerning trap transactions does not apply to offline transactions. It was, however, not pointed out to the learned Benches in these cases that the conclusion of Banyan Tree on the issue of trap transactions was itself based on cases which concerned offline transactions. The decisions in Machinenfabrik Rieter AG and Reiter AG may not, therefore, be binding precedents on this issue. 26.
Accordingly, the decisions which govern this Court are: first, Patel
Roadways, Sanjay Dalia, and Ultra Home to interpret the expression ―carries on business‖ under Section 20(a) of the CPC and Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act and 62(2) of the Copyright Act; second, Glen and Indovax for determining where the cause of action for a passing off action in the offline world has accrued; third, Burger King, to adjudicate on territoriality for suits concerning trademark infringement in the offline world; and fourth, Banyan Tree, for determining jurisdictional issues when a plaintiff pleads cause of action for infringement or passing off on the basis of a website. 27.
The Court is conscious that finding some difficulty in the application
of the aforenoted decisions, a reference order has been passed by a coordinate Bench,34 to decide the issue of jurisdiction in infringement and passing off suits. The filing of fresh suits, however, has not come to a halt. Many matters require urgent interim relief to be granted and the issue of this
2021 SCC OnLine Del 1825. 2025 SCC OnLine Del 4379. 2026:DHC:7198.
Court‘s territorial jurisdiction necessarily requires an adjudication. There cannot, it may be stressed, be a vacuum in law. 28.
The Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Sadarangani v. Union of
India and Ors.,35 was requested to abstain from pronouncing judgment on an issue which was the subject matter of a reference to the larger bench.36 The Supreme Court, while rejecting the plea, observed as under: ―29. …the pendency of a reference to a larger Bench, does not mean that all other proceedings involving the same issue would remain stayed till a decision was rendered in the reference…Till such time as the decisions cited at the Bar are not modified or altered in any way, they continue to hold the field.‖
Thus, through the present judgment, this Court intends to decipher, pending the reference made to a larger Bench,37 the position of law governing territorial jurisdiction for infringement and passing off claims, arising under the law governing the intellectual property rights of the parties. 29.
Learned counsel appearing for the parties in the captioned matters
have been heard, and their written submissions and compilation of judgments, concerning the issues dealt with in the present judgement have also been perused. A thoughtful consideration has been given to the submissions made in the instant batch of matters. 30.
A lis concerning infringement and passing off is governed by Section
20 of the CPC. A suit for infringement, additionally, is covered by Sections
(2012) 11 SCC 321. (2012) 11 SCC 321, para. 23. Hindustan Unilever Limited v. Kwick Living (I) Pvt. Ltd., CS (Comm) 904/2026, judgment dated 25.08.2026.
62(2) and 134(2) of the Copyright and Trade Marks Act, respectively.38 For ease of reference these provisions are reproduced, in seriatim, as under: Section 20 of the CPC: ―20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises. Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction— (a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally works for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. Explanation.—A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in India or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place.‖
Section 62 of the Copyright Act: ―62. Jurisdiction of court over matters arising under this Chapter. (1) Every suit or other civil proceeding arising under this Chapter in respect of the infringement of copyright in any work or the infringement of any other right conferred by this Act shall be instituted in the district court having jurisdiction. (2) For the purpose of sub-section (1), a ―district court having jurisdiction‖ shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or any other law for the time being in force, include a district court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, at the time of the institution of the suit or other proceeding, the person instituting the suit or other proceeding or, where there are more than one such persons, any of them actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain.‖
Cumulatively termed as ―special provisions‖.
Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act: ―134. Suit for infringement, etc., to be instituted before District Court. (1) No suit— (a) for the infringement of a registered trade mark; or (b) relating to any right in a registered trade mark; or (c) for passing off arising out of the use by the defendant of any trade mark which is identical with or deceptively similar to the plaintiff‘s trade mark, whether registered or unregistered, shall be instituted in any court inferior to a District Court having jurisdiction to try the suit. (2) For the purpose of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1), a ―District Court having jurisdiction‖ shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or any other law for the time being in force, include a District Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, at the time of the institution of the suit or other proceeding, the person instituting the suit or proceeding, or, where there are more than one such persons any of them, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. Explanation.—For the purposes of sub-section (2), ―person‖ includes the registered proprietor and the registered user.‖
31.
The case law pertaining to specific aspects may be analysed. It is
important, however, to caveat the discussion that follows by noting that since certain judgments deal with multiple issues, a straitjacket categorisation has not been possible. A judgment under a given heading may not exclusively deal with the topic identified in the heading. II. ANALYSIS A. THE PRAYERS TO BE TESTED 32.
If a single suit has been filed alleging infringement and passing off,
jurisdiction for both claims needs to be individually established before the suit can be termed as being maintainable.
33.
In Dhodha House, the Supreme Court examined the decision of the
Allahabad High Court holding that a suit under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, and the Copyright Act, 1957, was primarily under the former, for which resort cannot be made to Section 62 of the latter Act. Dismissing the appeal, SB Sinha J. observed: ―54. For the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of a court only because two causes of action joined in terms of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the same would not mean that thereby the jurisdiction can be conferred upon a court which had jurisdiction to try only the suit in respect of one cause of action and not the other. Recourse to the additional forum, however, in a given case, may be taken if both the causes of action arise within the jurisdiction of the court which otherwise had the necessary jurisdiction to decide all the issues.‖
34.
Similarly, Dabur India Ltd. v. K.R. Industries39 arose from a suit
filed before a learned Single Judge of this Court alleging copyright infringement and passing off qua a product‘s carton which the plaintiff claimed was protected as ―artistic work‖ within the meaning of the Copyright Act. It was held that, insofar as the relief of passing off is concerned, jurisdiction in Delhi is not made out as the defendant resided in Andhra Pradesh, and there was no documentary evidence to show that the respondent was selling goods in Delhi. The said view was affirmed by the Division Bench and the case travelled to the Supreme Court. SB Sinha J. dismissed the appeal and upheld the view taken by the Division Bench and the Single Judge. The Supreme Court held that where jurisdiction for a suit for passing off is not made out before a given court, merely by clubbing prayers for infringement and passing off, and relying on Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, jurisdiction cannot be established.
(2008) 10 SCC 595.
35.
In Dabur India, the Court held that a composite suit meant a suit
founded on an infringement action where incidental powers of the court are required to be invoked. In such a case, the plaintiff seeks a remedy which can, even otherwise, be granted by the Court. A composite suit is not one where two different causes of action have been clubbed together. An action for passing off is distinct from an infringement claim, and Section 62 cannot be relied upon in such a case by clubbing both these causes in a single suit. 36.
From the discussion above concerning the manner in which prayers in
a suit are to be tested, it may be concluded that a suit for infringement is different from that of passing off. In a given case jurisdiction may be established for infringement but not for passing off. If a composite suit is filed seeking reliefs for both infringement and passing off, it must be established that jurisdiction is made out for each relief. If it is found that a court does not have jurisdiction to proceed with any of the reliefs, the suit cannot proceed. 37.
Having noted the aforesaid, the specific provisions that can be
invoked to plead jurisdiction may be examined. B. “CARRIES ON BUSINESS” 38.
The expression ―carries on business‖ finds mention under Sections
20(a) and (b) of the CPC, and Sections 62(2) and 134(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957 and Trade Marks Act, 1999, respectively. While the CPC provision allows a suit to be instituted where the defendant ―carries on business‖, the special provisions allow for a suit to be filed where the plaintiff ―carries on its business‖.
39.
In Patel Roadways Ltd. v. Prasad Trading Company,40 the Supreme
Court interpreted the phrase ―carries on business‖ in the context of Section 20(a) of the CPC and the effect which the explanation to the said provision has on its construction. While two appeals were disposed of via a common order, the underlying facts of the appeals were identical. For the present purposes, reference may be made to one of them. M/s. Patel Roadways (P) Ltd., the defendant, carried on the business of a carrier and transported goods on hire. It had its principal office at Bombay and branch offices at various places, including at Tamil Nadu. A contract was entered into between the defendant and M/s. Prasad Trading Company, the plaintiff, who was a dealer in cardamom. Under the contract, the plaintiff entrusted goods to the defendant at its sub-ordinate office at Tamil Nadu. After the goods were transported by the defendant and kept in a godown at Delhi, they got destroyed and damaged in a fire. Contending that the fire was a result of negligence on the part of the defendant‘s staff, the plaintiff instituted a suit at Tamil Nadu. 40.
Before the trial court, an objection of territorial jurisdiction was
raised. It was the defendant‘s case that since it carried on business at Bombay, the courts at Bombay had jurisdiction to entertain the lis under Section 20(a) of the CPC. The jurisdiction of the courts at Madras was, in turn, ousted owing to the operation of an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the contract between the parties. This objection came to be rejected by the Trial Court, and also by the High Court in revision.
(1991) 4 SCC 270.
41.
The Supreme Court found that the explanation to Section 20 is in two
parts: the first part states ―a corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in India‖, and the second part states ―in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place‖. The two parts of the explanation were found, by the Supreme Court, to deal with distinct scenarios; the first dealt with a case where a defendant-corporation has a sole office or a principal office at a particular place. In this case, the corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at that place where it has its sole office or principal office. 42.
The second case dealt with by the explanation is where the principal
office of a corporation is at one place, and the sub-ordinate office is at another place. In this case, if the cause of action has accrued at the place where the sub-ordinate office is situated, the corporation shall be considered to be carrying on business at that place. The Courts within whose jurisdiction a corporation has its principal office would then not have jurisdiction to entertain the lis. Paras. 9 and 12 of the decision in Patel Roadways read as under: ―9. …The Explanation is in two parts, one before the word ―or‖ occurring between the words ―office in India‖ and the word ―in respect of‖ and the other thereafter. The Explanation applies to a defendant which is a corporation, which term, as seen above, would include even a company such as the appellant in the instant case. The first part of the Explanation applies only to such a corporation which has its sole or principal office at a particular place. In that event the courts within whose jurisdiction the sole or principal office of the defendant is situate will also have jurisdiction inasmuch as even if the defendant may not be actually carrying on business at that place, it will ―be deemed to carry on business‖ at that place because of the fiction created by the Explanation. The latter part of the Explanation takes care of a case where the defendant does not have a sole office but has a principal office at one place and has also a subordinate office at another place. The words “at such place” occurring at the end of the
Explanation and the word “or” referred to above which is disjunctive clearly suggest that if the case falls within the latter part of the Explanation it is not the court within whose jurisdiction the principal office of the defendant is situate but the court within whose jurisdiction it has a subordinate office which alone shall have jurisdiction “in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office‖. **** 12. We would also like to add that the interpretation sought to be placed by the appellant on the provision in question renders the Explanation totally redundant. If the intention of the legislature was, as is said on their behalf, that a suit against a corporation could be instituted either at the place of its sole or principal office (whether or not the corporation carries on business at that place) or at any other place where the cause of action arises, the provisions of clauses (a), (b) and (c) together with the first part of the Explanation would have completely achieved the purpose. Indeed the effect would have been wider. The suit could have been instituted at the place of the principal office because of the situation of such office (whether or not any actual business was carried on there). Alternatively, a suit could have been instituted at the place where the cause of action arose under clause (c) (irrespective of whether the corporation had a subordinate office in such place or not). This was, therefore, not the purpose of the Explanation. The Explanation is really an Explanation to clause (a). It is in the nature of a clarification on the scope of clause (a) viz. as to where the corporation can be said to carry on business. This, it is clarified, will be the place where the principal office is situated (whether or not any business actually is carried on there) or the place where a business is carried on giving rise to a cause of action (even though the principal office of the corporation is not located there) so long as there is a subordinate office of the corporation situated at such place. The linking together of the place where the cause of action arises with the place where a subordinate office is located clearly shows that the intention of the legislature was that, in the case of a corporation, for the purposes of clause (a), the location of the subordinate office, within the local limits of which a cause of action arises, is to be the relevant place for the filing of a suit and not the principal place of business. If the intention was that the location of the sole or principal office as well as the location of the subordinate office (within the limits of which a cause of action arises) are to be deemed to be places where the corporation is deemed to be carrying on business, the disjunctive ―or‖ will not be there. Instead, the second part of the Explanation would have read ―and, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has a subordinate office, also at such place‖.
(Emphasis supplied)
43.
It may also be clarified that in Patel Roadways jurisdiction was
sought to be established exclusively through Section 20(a) of the CPC. The case of the defendant in the said case was that despite cause of action (wholly or in part) not accruing at its principal office, which was at Bombay, jurisdiction of that forum Court was made out by an application of Section 20(a) of the CPC. It is this contention that the Supreme Court rejected. 44.
The following conclusions can be drawn from the decision of the
Court in Patel Roadways: first, if a corporation has a sole office, it can be sued at that place under Section 20(a) of the CPC as it shall be deemed to carry on business at that place; second, if a corporation has more than one offices, meaning there is a principal office and other sub-ordinate office(s), and they are located at different places, then: a. If no cause of action (wholly or in part) has arisen where the defendant-corporation has its subordinate office, then the corporation can be sued at the place where it has its principal office. b. If cause of action (wholly or in part) has arisen where the defendant-corporation has its subordinate office, and no cause of action has arisen at the company‘s principal office, then a defendant-corporation can only be sued at the place of its subordinate office and not at the place where it has its principal office.
45.
In Dhodha House v. SK Maingi,41 the Supreme Court decided two
civil appeals by a common order. The first, being 6248/1997, arose from a decision of the Allahabad High Court, and is dealt with at para. 33 of this judgment. The discussion under this head need not be gone into for the present purposes. The second civil appeal 16/1999 arose, originally, from a suit filed before this Court for trademark and copyright infringement, along with an action for passing off. The defendant and the plaintiff were found to be carrying on business in diesel engines at Rajkot, Gujarat. Jurisdiction was sought to be invoked, inter alia, by relying on Section 62 of the Copyright Act, and claiming that the plaintiff ―carries on business‖ at Delhi.42 An interim injunction application of the plaintiff was rejected on the ground that jurisdiction was not made out. Upon an intra-court appeal being preferred before the Division Bench, the same was allowed. 46.
The order of the Division Bench,43 at para. 3 notes that the jurisdiction
of Delhi was invoked on three counts. Firstly, in view of Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act. Secondly, on grounds that the defendants had sought registration of the trade mark for sale at Delhi as well. Thirdly, by invoking Section 20(c) of the CPC claiming that goods bearing the impugned mark were being sold at Delhi. The Division Bench did not delve into the third ground and found jurisdiction to be made out based on the first two. In order to conclude that the plaintiff was ―carrying on business‖ at Delhi, the Division Bench relied upon the pleading made in the plaint that the
(2006) 9 SCC 41. (2006) 9 SCC 41, para. 13. 1998 SCC OnLine Del 181.
plaintiff‘s goods are sold in Delhi. Mere sale of goods was equated with a corporation carrying on business at that place. 47.
The decision of the Division Bench was assailed before the Supreme
Court, which held that merely because a corporation‘s goods are available in the market at Delhi or are actually being sold at Delhi, would not mean that the corporation is carrying on business at that place.44 This view expressed by the Supreme Court at paras. 47 and 51 of the decision is in contradistinction to what was held by the Division Bench of this Court. It must be stressed that this observation of the Supreme Court in Dhodha House forms an essential part of the ratio decidendi of the said decision. 48.
At para. 46, while relying on the authoritative commentary of Mulla
on CPC, SB Sinha J., expounded on the meaning of the phrase ―carries on business‖ and observed as under: ―46. The expression ―carries on business‖ and the expression ―personally works for gain‖ connote two different meanings. For the purpose of carrying on business only presence of a man at a place is not necessary. Such business may be carried on at a place through an agent or a manager or through a servant. The owner may not even visit that place. The phrase ―carries on business‖ at a certain place would, therefore, mean having an interest in a business at that place, a voice in what is done, a share in the gain or loss and some control thereover. The expression is much wider than what the expression in normal parlance connotes, because of the ambit of a civil action within the meaning of Section 9 of the Code. But it is necessary that the following three conditions should be satisfied, namely, ―(1) The agent must be a special agent who attends exclusively to the business of the principal and carries it on in the name of the principal and not a general agent who does business for anyone that pays him. Thus, a trader in the mofussil who habitually sends grain to Madras for sale by a firm of commission agents who have an independent business of selling goods for others on commission,
(2006) 9 SCC 41, paras. 47 and 51.
cannot be said to ‗carry on business‘ in Madras. So a firm in England, carrying on business in the name of A.B. & Co., which employs upon the usual terms a Bombay firm carrying on business in the name of C.D. & Co., to act as the English firm's commission agents in Bombay, does not ‗carry on business‘ in Bombay so as to render itself liable to be sued in Bombay. (2) The person acting as agent must be an agent in the strict sense of the term. The manager of a joint Hindu family is not an ‗agent‘ within the meaning of this condition. (3) To constitute ‗carrying on business‘ at a certain place, the essential part of the business must take place in that place. Therefore, a retail dealer who sells goods in the mofussil cannot be said to ‗carry on business‘ in Bombay merely because he has an agent in Bombay to import and purchase his stock for him. He cannot be said to carry on business in Bombay unless his agent made sales there on his behalf. A Calcutta firm that employs an agent at Amritsar who has no power to receive money or to enter into contracts, but only collects orders which are forwarded to and dealt with in Calcutta, cannot be said to do business in Amritsar. But a Bombay firm that has a branch office at Amritsar, where orders are received subject to confirmation by the head office at Bombay, and where money is paid and disbursed, is carrying on business at Amritsar and is liable to be sued at Amritsar. Similarly a life assurance company which carries on business in Bombay and employs an agent at Madras who acts merely as a post office forwarding proposals and sending moneys cannot be said to do business in Madras. Where a contract of insurance was made at place ‗A‘ and the insurance amount was also payable there, a suit filed at place ‗B‘ where the insurance company had a branch office was held not maintainable. Where the plaintiff instituted a suit at Kozhikode alleging that its account with the defendant Bank at its Calcutta branch had been wrongly debited and it was claimed that that court had jurisdiction as the defendant had a branch there, it was held that the existence of a branch was not part of the cause of action and that the Kozhikode Court therefore had no jurisdiction. But when a company though incorporated outside India gets itself registered in India and does business in a place in India through its agent authorised to accept insurance proposals, and to pay claims, and to do other business incidental to the work of the agency, the company carries on business at the place of business in India.‖ [See Mulla on the Code of Civil Procedure, 15th Edn., Vol. I, pp. 246-47.]‖
49.
From the aforenoted, it is clear, therefore, that as per Dhodha House,
―carrying on business‖ at a place means: a. Having an interest in a business at that place, a voice in what is done, a share in the gain or loss and control thereover. b. If it is contended that a corporation is carrying on business through an agent, at the bare minimum, that agent must be a special agent who attends exclusively to the business of the principal and carries on the business in the name of the principal. c. The activities must also be an essential part of the business. d. Most importantly, mere availability or sale of goods at a given place does not amount to ―carrying on of business‖. This ruling is the most essential part of the ratio decidendi in Dhodha House. 50.
The principles expounded in Dhodha House were aptly applied by
this Court in Sholay Media Entertainment and Anr. v. Yogesh Patel and Ors.45 In this case, a suit was filed for trademark infringement along with passing off. It was alleged that the defendant owned www.sholay.com, which violated the plaintiff‘s mark. To establish jurisdiction, it was averred that the defendant advertised SHOLAY, in a magazine called ―ITInformation Technology‖, which was circulated and sold in Delhi. The magazine issue was also stated to be accompanied by a free CD, that directly connected the user to the defendant‘s website. Relying on Dhodha House, S. Ravindra Bhat J. (as his Lordship then was), found that goods being
2010 SCC OnLine Del 4738, per S. Ravindra Bhat J.
available, or even sold, in Delhi would not be sufficient to conclude that a corporation ―carries on business‖ at a given place; the ―essential part of the business‖ ought to take place there. The decision in Sholay Media Entertainment, thus, represents a perfect and apt application of the Dhodha House principles. 51.
A departure from the position of law enunciated in Dhodha House
appears to have been made in World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Reshma Collection & Ors.46 The suit was filed for trademark and copyright infringement, along with an action of passing off. The plaintiff-company was incorporated in the State of Delaware, United States and all the defendants resided in Mumbai. It was an admitted position that the defendants did not carry on business within the territory of Delhi. Jurisdiction was sought to be established by the plaintiff by relying upon Sections 134(2) and 62(2) of the Trade Marks Act and Copyright Act. Upon there arising a doubt as to the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, arguments took place on this issue. In exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC, vide a detailed order47 dated 04.10.2013, the learned Single Judge returned the plaint for want of territorial jurisdiction. 52.
Para. 8 of the order of the learned Single Judge in WWE notes the
grounds on the basis of which jurisdiction of this Court was sought to be invoked. It reads as under: ―8. In Paragraph 32 of the plaint, the plaintiff claims jurisdiction of this court under Section 134(2) of the Trademarks Act, 1999 and Section 62(2)
2014 SCC OnLine Del 2031 (DB). 2013:DHC:5122.
of the Copyright Act, 1957 by claiming that the plaintiff carries on business within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court in the following manner – i. The plaintiff‘s programmes consisting of its various characters are broadcast at Delhi ii. The plaintiff‘s products such as its merchandising goods and books are available in Delhi iii. The plaintiff‘s goods and services are sold to consumers in Delhi through its websites which can be accessed in Delhi‖
53.
From paras. 21 to 23, the Court painstakingly analysed the issue at
hand and concluded that the plaintiff, under the specialised provisions, is not ―carrying on business‖ within the territory of Delhi. It was observed that if mere accessibility of a website was sufficient to constitute carrying on of business, the plaintiff, could file a suit wherever its website was accessible. Upon testing the purported presence of the plaintiff in India on the touchstone of the principles laid down in Dhodha House, Vipin Sanghi J. (as his Lordship then was) found that the plaintiff was not ―carrying on business‖ at Delhi. Jurisdiction under Sections 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act and 62(2) of the Copyright Act was, thus, not made out. Paras. 21 to 23 of the decision deserve to be reproduced and read as under: ―21. I may deal with the plaintiff‘s submission regarding territorial jurisdiction on account of its website being accessible in Delhi first, as bulk of the submissions have been advanced on this issue. Section 134(2) of the Act uses the expression ―carries on business‖. The objective of inserting Section 134(2) was to provide the plaintiff a convenient forum to file a suit for infringement, as long as the plaintiff voluntarily resides, carries on business or personally works for gain at such place. The said provision goes beyond the normal rules laid down in the C.P.C. for vesting jurisdiction in Courts. The test to be satisfied as regards the aspect of carrying on business has been laid down in Dhodha House (supra). The sum and substance of the criteria laid down in Dhodha House (supra) is that an essential part of the plaintiff‘s business, coupled with an element of control exercised by the plaintiff, must exist in such place where the plaintiff claims to be carrying on business either on its own or through an exclusive agent.
22. The aforementioned criteria will be equally applicable to a party that concludes transactions with its customers over the medium of internet as opposed to a physical retail space. Internet is another medium which provides audio-visual interactive facility for doing business. Merely because it is a more advanced or superior medium, it does not impinge on the determination of the issue whether the merchandiser is carrying on business at a particular place. Prior to the advent of e-commerce over the internet, and even now, business was and continues to be done over telephone and fax. Merely because a person has embarked upon an ecommerce business model, the tests which apply for determination of issues, such as – when and where the contract is made, or whether the vendor carries on business at the place where the merchandise may be sold, or service may be offered, would not change and would be the same as apply to communications over telephone and fax (see Bhagwan Goverdhandas Kedia Vs. Girdharilal Parshottamdas & Co. AIR 1966 SC 543). In such cases, the plaintiff would have to show that it actually has business interest at the relevant place; a voice in what is done; a share in the gain or loss and some control thereover. For example, the plaintiff could show that it has an exclusive C&F operator in the forum State, or an exclusive dealer that stocks the goods or services of the plaintiff in the forum State – to be delivered or shipped as per a consumer‘s convenience. The plaintiff could show that it has a registered/branch office to address a consumer‘s dissatisfaction over the plaintiff‘s merchandise or services. The plaintiff can show that it has an exclusive tie up with an agent to manufacture the plaintiff‘s goods for a particular geography. In the present case, no essential part of the plaintiffs business is carried on at Delhi. In fact, the plaintiff has not pleaded to having any branch office or exclusive agent anywhere in India, let alone Delhi. Merely because the website of the plaintiff is accessible in Delhi is not sufficient to clothe this court with jurisdiction. 23. If the plaintiff‘s submission were to be accepted, it would mean that the plaintiff could file a suit at any place which provides internet access to the plaintiffs website, irrespective of the defendant‘s location, only on account of the plaintiff‘s website being accessible in that State. The insertion of Section 134(2) was with a view to enable the plaintiff to institute a suit where it has actual and substantial business interest so that an additional forum convenient to the plaintiff is available. If the intent of the legislature had been to vest jurisdiction solely on account of accessibility of plaintiff‘s website at the place of suing, then the same would have been expressly provided for, especially keeping in mind plaintiff‘s submissions that the legislature has recognized new media on account of various amendments.‖
54.
The learned Single Judge in WWE had also dealt with the plaintiff‘s
grounds invoking jurisdiction under Section 20(c), which did not, ultimately,
become an issue before the Division Bench. However, the reasoning of the learned Single Judge on this issue is exceptionally lucid and deserves to be reproduced: ―28. …The broadcast of the plaintiff‘s programs in Delhi is also not sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Just as mere advertisement in a journal or paper is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction (See ONGC Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu, 1994 (4) SCC 711). Similarly, broadcast of the plaintiff‘s programmes is insufficient to vest jurisdiction in this Court. 29. The plaintiffs submission founded upon ―New Media‖ has no merit. Wherever the legislature thought it necessary, it amended the laws to make provision for the ―New Media‖. The Parliament has not amended the Act, the Copyright Act, or the C.P.C even while amending other legislations, and enacting the I.T. Act, in the manner as contended by Mr. Anand. The ―new media‖, as aforesaid, does not change the basic concepts or legal principles which apply to trade and commerce. They continue to remain the same as applicable to the ―old media‖ i.e. telephone and FAX. Even otherwise, I am of the view that the proposition advanced by Mr. Anand has no merit as, its acceptance would lead to undue hardship to those resorting to e-commerce and open them to multifarious litigations in every nook and corner of the world where their goods or services may be sold over the internet, even though they do not meet the requirements laid down in Banyan Tree (supra). The same would stifle the growth of e-commerce.‖
55.
This order of the learned Single Judge was assailed before the
Division Bench which allowed the appeal. 56.
The Division Bench in WWE found that jurisdiction under the special
provisions can be invoked as the plaintiff was ―to a certain extent, carrying on business‖ at Delhi. The facts that constituted carrying on of business were firstly, customers in Delhi making offers to purchase merchandise and goods. Secondly, these goods being confirmed/accepted by the plaintiff through its website. Thirdly, money being paid from Delhi. The Court opined that the availability of transactions through the website at a particular place is virtually the same as a seller having shops in that place in the
physical world. As per the Division Bench, if there was a shop of the plaintiff in Delhi from where it sold its various goods and services, ―it could not be denied that the plaintiff carried on business in Delhi.‖ Para. 24 of the said decision captures the reasoning and is extracted as under: ―24. But, we are not concerned with the question of cause of action between the appellant/plaintiff and its customers in Delhi because the defendants are not such customers and they are, in any event, all residents of Mumbai. What we are examining is whether the third condition specified in Dhodha House (supra) is satisfied or not. In other words, if the contracts and/or transactions entered into between the appellant/plaintiff on the one hand and its customers are being concluded in Delhi, can it not be said that the essential part of the business of the appellant/plaintiff, insofar as its transactions with customers in Delhi are concerned, takes place in Delhi? The offers are made by customers at Delhi. The offers are subject to confirmation/acceptance of the appellant/plaintiff through its website. The money would emanate or be paid from Delhi. Can it not then be considered that the appellant/plaintiff is, to a certain extent, carrying on business at Delhi? In our view, it would be so. Because of the advancements in technology and the rapid growth of new models of conducting business over the internet, it is possible for an entity to have a virtual presence in a place which is located at a distance from the place where it has a physical presence. The availability of transactions through the website at a particular place is virtually the same thing as a seller having shops in that place in the physical world. Let us assume for the sake of argument that the appellant/plaintiff had a shop in Delhi from where it sold its various goods and services. In that case, it could not be denied that the plaintiff carried on business in Delhi. This is apart from the fact that the appellant/plaintiff may also have been regarded as having voluntarily resided in Delhi. When the shop in the ―physical sense‖ is replaced by the ―virtual‖ shop because of the advancement of technology, in our view, it cannot be said that the appellant/plaintiff would not carry on business in Delhi.‖
57.
Quite a few issues arise concerning the reasoning adopted by the
Division Bench in WWE. They shall be cumulatively considered after taking note of the decisions in Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home. 58.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Sanjay Dalia, originally arose
by the filing of CS (OS) 527/2007 before this Court. The plaintiff in the said
case was a non-profit-making company having its registered office at Mumbai. The plaintiff claimed that it was established for the purposes of monitoring, protecting, and enforcing the rights, interests, and privileges of its members (comprising authors, composers, and publishers of literary and/or musical works), as well as on behalf of the members of other sister concerns who are owners of copyrights in their literary and musical works. Defendant no. 1 was the Chief General Manager of defendant no. 2-Cineline Cinemas. Defendant no. 2 was claimed to have 33 screens up and running in various locations and 97 screens in the making. 59.
It was alleged in the plaint that the defendants had been indulging in
continuous violation of the rights of the plaintiff by communicating to the public literary and musical works from the plaintiff‘s repertoire without having obtained a license from the plaintiff. An objection of territorial jurisdiction was raised on the ground that the entire cause of action had arisen in Mumbai. Both the plaintiff and the defendant no. 2 were also stated to have their principal offices in Mumbai. The assignment deeds, which formed the fulcrum of the plaintiff‘s case, were also executed in Mumbai by artists residing in Mumbai. The plaintiff, however, relying on Section 62(2), claimed that it was ―carrying on business‖ in Delhi through its branch office, and thus was entitled to maintain its suit at Delhi. 60.
A novel argument was put forth by the learned senior counsel48
appearing for the defendants therein. He submitted that the explanation to Section 20(a) of the CPC ought to be read into Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act and Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act. Per contra, the
Mr. Rajiv Nayyar.
learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff submitted, while relying upon the Joint Committee deliberations with respect to the Copyright Bill, 1955, and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Exphar SA,49 that the explanation to Section 20(a) of the CPC cannot be incorporated into Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act. 61.
Badar Durrez Ahmed J., sitting as a Single Judge of our Court in
Sanjay Dalia vide order50 dated 31.08.2007 accepted the contentions of the defendants and read into Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, the explanation appended to Section 20(a) of the CPC. In categorical terms, the Court found that ―merely having a branch office at Delhi would not mean that the plaintiff carries on business in Delhi. The plaintiff would be deemed to carry on business at a branch office only if cause of action had arisen in Delhi‖. 62.
The plaintiff preferred an intra-court appeal which was dismissed vide
order51 dated 19.11.2008. Notable observations were made by the Division Bench concerning the jurisdictional avenues available to a plaintiff and when, generally, they can be invoked and curtailed. These observations are discussed in the later part of this judgment. Specifically, on the appeal which was before the Division Bench, at the outset, Mr. A.S. Chandhiok, learned senior counsel with his usual fairness to the Court, had accepted that no part of the cause of action had arisen at Delhi. His contention, however, was that Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act does not require the accrual of cause of action at the branch office, in order to constitute ―carrying on business‖. The Division Bench noted that while the explanation is absent in the text of
(2004) 3 SCC 688. 2007:DHC:1031. 2008:DHC:3060-DB.
Section 62(2), the CPC was the ―grundnorm, the ethos and essence of which percolates through all other statutes.‖ While affirming the view of the learned Single Judge, the appeal came to be dismissed by the Division Bench. This order came to be assailed before the Supreme Court in Sanjay Dalia.52 63.
The Supreme Court interpreted the additional option available to a
plaintiff under Sections 62 and 134(2) of the Copyright Act and Trade Marks Act respectively. The Court held that the option is subject to the caveat that if the plaintiff resides, carries on business or personally works for gain at a place where the cause of action has also arisen, the suit should be filed at that place and not at some other places where the plaintiff may have a branch office, etc. The Supreme Court, thus, incorporated the explanation appended to Section 20 of the CPC into Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act. The decision of the Division Bench and the learned Single Judge were, resultantly, affirmed. 64.
In Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Purushottam Kumar
Chaubey & Ors.,53 a Division Bench of this Court headed by Badar Durrez Ahmed J. after relying upon Sanjay Dalia and Patel Roadways iterated two significant propositions: First, that for the purposes of Section 20 of the CPC, when the principal office and subordinate office of a company are situated at different places, the company would be deemed to carry on business either at the principal office, or at its subordinate office if cause of action has accrued at that place,
(2015) 10 SCC 161. 2016 SCC OnLine Del 376.
but not at both places.54 Second, the application of Sanjay Dalia leads to four distinct factual scenarios, and the additional option under Sections 134(2) and 62(2) of the Trade Marks Act and the Copyright Act, respectively, can be exercised only in the following manner: S. No.
Place of Plaintiff‘s Principal Office (Sole office in s. no. 1)
Place of Plaintiff‘s Subordinate/ Branch Office
Place where the cause of action arose
1. 2. 3. 4.
A A A A
-B B B
C A B C
65.
Place where the Plaintiff can additionally sue under Section 134(2) and Section 62(2) A A B A
Before delving, further, a brief analysis may be made, concerning the
judgment of WWE, the issues with its reasoning, and the authoritative force it carries post the decision of the Supreme Court in Sanjay Dalia and in Ultra Home. 66.
Firstly, at the outset it may be noted that the Division Bench‘s
conclusion in WWE that ―it could not be denied that the plaintiff carried on business in Delhi‖ if it had a shop from where it sold its goods and services, goes against the express words of Dhodha House. At para. 51 the Supreme Court in Dhodha House had observed ―…it is possible that the goods manufactured by the plaintiff are available in the market of Delhi or they are sold in Delhi but that by itself would not mean that the plaintiff carries on any business in Delhi‖. It is clear that the sale of goods, in and of itself, either through a physical store or a ―virtual store‖, would not be sufficient to
2016 SCC OnLine Del 376, para. 12.
hold that a corporation ―carries on business‖ at that place. Depending upon the nature of the business engaged in and the kind of activity being undertaken at a given place, it needs to be determined, whether, among other things, ―the essential part of the business‖ is conducted at that place. 67.
Secondly, while placing reliance on para. 46(3) of Dhodha House, the
Division Bench had found that the case of the plaintiff was akin to the example given by SB Sinha J. of a Bombay firm having a branch office at Amritsar, where orders were received, subject to confirmation by the head office at Bombay and where money was paid and disbursed. Since in Dhodha House, the branch office at Amritsar, in the example, was considered as a place where business was carried on, the Division Bench, by the use of analogy, found that the plaintiff-corporation in WWE was ―carrying on business‖ in Delhi. The example taken note of, however, does not appear to be applicable to the plaintiff‘s facts; particularly, when examined in light of the other examples given in Dhodha House. These examples noted by SB Sinha J. at para. 46(3) of the said decision are: a. A retail dealer who sells goods in the mofussil cannot be said to ―carry on business‖ in Bombay merely because he has an agent in Bombay to import and purchase his stock for him. He cannot be said to carry on business in Bombay unless his agent made sales there on his behalf; b. A Calcutta firm that employs an agent at Amritsar who has no power to receive money or to enter into contracts, but only collects orders which are forwarded to and dealt with in Calcutta, cannot be said to do business in Amritsar;
c. Similarly, a Life Assurance Company which carries on business in Bombay and employs an agent at Madras who acts merely as a Post Office forwarding proposals and sending moneys cannot be said to do business in Madras; d. But a Bombay firm that has a branch office at Amritsar, where orders are received subject to confirmation by the head office at Bombay, and where money is paid and disbursed, is carrying on business at Amritsar and is liable to be sued at Amritsar; and e. When a company though incorporated outside India gets itself registered in India and does business in a place in India through its agent authorized to accept insurance proposals, and to pay claims, and to do other business incidental to the work of agency, the company carries on business at the place of business in India. 68.
A mapping of the above examples to the facts of WWE would reveal
that a website that has its server outside India, and allows customers in Delhi to buy products is closer to examples (b) and (c) than example (d), which the Division Bench took into consideration. It is again important to clarify that mere conclusion of commercial transactions, in and of itself, is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of ―carrying on business‖. This formed part of the ratio decidendi of Dhodha House, and was expressly mentioned at paras. 47 and 51 of the decision. 69.
The view that mere conclusion of transactions in WWE‘s facts could
not constitute ―carrying on business‖ is also strengthened by the nature of business engaged in by the plaintiff therein. Incorporated in the State of
Delaware, USA, the plaintiff-company was engaged in the development, production and marketing of television programming, live events and the licensing and sale of branded consumer products featuring its brand. The plaintiff was stated to have offered a variety of memorabilia including, but not limited to, apparel, posters, calendars, fact books, sunglasses, water bottles, key-rings, DVDs, etc. It was stated to have more than 200 licenses distributing its products in 86 countries, including India. It had been averred by the plaintiff that it licensed out its well-known trademarks and the images/characters to different parties for use on merchandise in a wide range of products. 70.
This being the expanse, nature and breadth of the plaintiff‘s business,
a simple purchase of a product/service via the internet could not have constituted ―carrying on business‖ at Delhi. A perusal of the judgment would also reveal that while the activity of entering into transactions has been described in detail by the Division Bench the issue of whether this activity is an ―essential part‖ of the plaintiff‘s business has not been analysed. Indeed, owing to this, the conclusion of the Division Bench was that the plaintiff ―to a certain extent‖ carries on business in Delhi. Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act and Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, however, do not allow a plaintiff to sue at a place where it carries on business ―to a certain extent‖. 71.
Thirdly, the conclusion arrived at by the Division Bench would allow
a corporation not having any presence in India to sue a defendant at all places where it engages in online website sales with customers at a given place. A foreign corporation can, relying on the additional avenues under
Sections 62(2) and 134(2) of the Copyright and Trade Marks Act, respectively, sue a defendant belonging to Ladakh at the courts in Kanyakumari, if the plaintiff has made such sales at Kanyakumari. Such an interpretation would allow the additional option, granted to a plaintiff under the specialised statutes, to be used as a means to harass a defendant and indulge in forum shopping. 72.
While analysing the decisions rendered on this issue and the
applicable statutory regime, this Court is conscious of the settled principle that what binds the Court is not every line and observation made in the judgment but the ratio decidendi of the decision. It is the legal principle on the basis of which a conclusion is arrived at and an order is given, that is to be followed by Courts. 73.
The defendants were residents of Mumbai and the plaintiff was a
multinational company having ample resources and wealth. The additional options under the Trade Mark and Copyright Act were intended to, as noted in the Joint Committee report55, provide relief to authors, who were deterred from instituting infringement proceedings because the Court was at a considerable distance from their place of ordinary residence. 74.
The consequence of there not being a place where the plaintiff is
―carrying on business‖ for the purposes of the special legislations would simply mean that the plaintiff has to file a suit under Section 20. A plaintiffcorporation like the one in WWE would face no difficulty, at all, by
Published in the Gazette of India dated 23.11.1956.
instituting the suit at the place where the defendant resides, carries on business, or personally works for gain. 75.
Considering the discussion above, the decision in WWE would not
govern the field on this issue, and would have to be restricted to its own peculiar and unique facts. Such facts may possibly exist in a case dealt with at paras. 77-78 below. 76.
What remains of Badar Durrez Ahmed J.‘s opinion in WWE after his
own subsequent opinion in Ultra Home and the decision of the Supreme Court in Sanjay Dalia, which in turn affirmed his Lordship‘s56 decision rendered by him as a Single Judge, may now be examined. Two situations may be considered: 77.
Firstly, where the plaintiff is entering into commercial transactions,
through the means of internet, with customers only within the jurisdiction of one court. And secondly, where the plaintiff is entering into commercial transactions, through the means of internet, with customers within the jurisdiction of multiple courts. 78.
In the first case, if the principles in WWE are applied, a deemed
physical office would be created at the sole place where commercial transactions are getting concluded. Since that would be the sole office, applying the dictum in Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home, the plaintiff-company shall be deemed to carry on business at that given place, and jurisdiction under the special provisions may be made out. This, however, shall be rare as it would be rather abnormal for an international corporation not having
Badar Durrez Ahmed J.
any presence in India to have transactions only within the jurisdiction of one court. 79.
In order to bring oneself within this first category, a plaintiff may
deliberately omit to plead that transactions are also getting concluded within the jurisdiction of other courts. In such a case, a given court may put suitable questions to the plaintiff, inter alia, under Section 168 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 202357. If it is found that the plaintiff had cleverly attempted to conceal from the court, facts which had a bearing on jurisdiction, he need not, it is trite law, be heard on merits at all. He who comes to the court seeking an equitable relief must come with clean hands disclosing all that is material. 80.
However, if, after being honest and fair to the Court, a company is
found to be concluding contracts only within the jurisdiction of one Court, jurisdiction may be made out under the specialised statutes, under the WWE reasoning. This may also, arguably, amount to specifically targeting a given forum state as per the standard in Banyan Tree,58 and resort to the additional forum may, perhaps, not even be required. 81.
In the second category, which would be most cases, transactions
would get concluded within the jurisdiction of multiple forum courts. As per the ruling in WWE itself, there would be multiple deemed physical stores, all at the same footing, spread across multiple jurisdictions. Amongst these stores, there would be no ―principal office‖. Resultantly, these sub-offices
―BSA‖. 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780.
would be deemed to be ―carrying on business‖ only when cause of action (as per the standard in Banyan Tree) accrues at that place. 82.
Post the decisions in Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home, the mere
presence of a store at a given place without the accrual of cause of action, cannot be considered to be ―carrying on business‖. As was noted by Badar Durrez Ahmed J. himself as a Single Judge in Sanjay Dalia,59 ―merely having a branch office at Delhi would not mean that the plaintiff carries on business in Delhi. The plaintiff would be deemed to carry on business at a branch office only if cause of action had arisen in Delhi‖. 83.
If it can be established that cause of action as per the Banyan Tree
standard had accrued at the place where the deemed physical stores exist, a basis to sue, under Section 20(c) of the CPC, would already exist. A resort to the specialised provisions again may not be required. Thus, for an overwhelming number of cases, the decision in WWE, post Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home, can no longer be made applicable. 84.
It may be argued that under certain circumstances the additional
option to sue under Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act and Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act would not, meaningfully, exist for a foreign company. When could, arguably, such a case arise? Where an international conglomerate, that has no physical presence in India, wishes to protect its IP rights, which are purportedly infringed by website sales in India, within the jurisdiction of multiple courts in India. Inconvenience to such a plaintiff by
Which ultimately came to be affirmed both by the Division Bench and the Supreme Court.
an insistence to sue under the conventional Section 20 grounds, does not seem to be a real possibility. 85.
Therefore, no real prejudice would be caused if the option, which was
intended to provide small artists in India the opportunity to sue for their intellectual property, is not made available to an international giant. An interpretation to the contrary would allow a company to harass a defendant by filing suits, at any one of the multiple places where its online sales are taking place. The additional option intended to redress the difficulties of artists cannot be interpreted in a way that allows the plaintiff to erode the foundations of conventional jurisdictional rules. In this connection, the following dictum of CK Thakker J. in Laxman Prasad60 may be taken note of: ―Section 20 has been designed to secure that justice might be brought as near as possible to every man‘s hearthstone and that the defendant should not be put to the trouble and expense of travelling long distances in order to defend himself.‖61
86.
An unmodified and wholesale application of the rule in WWE would
place the defendant be at the mercy of the plaintiff. This would, as was pithily observed by the Coordinate Bench ―through the very concept of territorial jurisdiction of courts to the winds.‖62 87.
Thus, owing to WWE being in the teeth of the ratio of Dhodha
House, and after the decisions in Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home, no longer being workable, the decision of the Division Bench no longer governs the issue.
(2008) 1 SCC 618. (2008) 1 SCC 618, para. 35. CS (Comm) 904/2026, judgment dated 25.08.2026, para. 52.
88.
The decision of the Division Bench in Blueberry Books & Ors. v.
Google India Pvt. Ltd.,63 does not disturb the conclusion reached above. In the said case, the Division Bench sat in appeal over an order of the learned Single Judge, accepting the interim applications made by some of the defendants, whereby they were directed to be deleted from the array of parties in the plaintiff‘s copyright infringement suit. 89.
The suit filed by the plaintiff in Blueberry Books claimed that the
defendants were infringing the copyrighted work of the plaintiff through internet applications across several platforms and website applications. At the outset, it was noted that the plaintiff was a Delhi based firm. On this short ground, it was found that jurisdiction under Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act was made out.64 In relation to an argument made that jurisdiction of this Court was ousted as infringing activity took place outside borders of India and in USA alone, it was observed that once jurisdiction under Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act was made out, it was not to be additionally proven, that the infringing activity also took place within Delhi. The observations made by the Division Bench at para. 19 were made in passing, and as noted in the paragraph itself, were in arguendo. They do not constitute binding precedent. 90.
In Allied Blenders & Distillers Pvt. Ltd. v. Agribiotech Industries
Ltd.,65 a suit was instituted for trademark and copyright infringement along with a claim for passing off, for its mark and artwork ―OFFICERS CHOICE‖ and ―OFFICERS CHOICE BLUE‖, registered in favour of the
2016:DHC:4326-DB. 2016:DHC:4326-DB, para. 14. 2020 SCC OnLine Del 2861.
plaintiff. Jurisdiction of Delhi, under Section 20(a) of the CPC was invoked. It was submitted that the defendant ―carries on business‖ at Delhi through its office bearing the address of Beetal House, New Delhi.66 This address, it was argued by counsel therein, was also indicated to be an address of the defendant on its own website. While hearing the plaintiff‘s application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2, for ad-interim reliefs, a jurisdictional objection was raised by the defendant. 91.
The Court found that at the ad-interim stage, the website of the
defendant, containing the Beetal House Address under the ―Contact Us‖ page, was sufficient to prima facie conclude that the defendant carried on business at Delhi. The analysis provided for in Dhodha House for determining whether a corporation ―carries on business‖ was found to require completion of pleadings and evidence, and thus, was not delved into. For ease of analysis, the ―Contact Us‖ page of the defendant therein is extracted as under: ―REGISTERED OFFICE: ADDRESS: SP-825, Road No. 14, Vishwakarma Industrial Area, Jaipur 302013 (Rajasthan) Tel. No. 01412331771-2, Fax. 0141 2330810 E-mail : info@bajoriagroup.in REGISTRARS: ADDRESS: Beetal House, 3rd Floor, 99 Madangir, Behind Local Shopping Centre, Near Dada Harsukhdas Mandir, New Delhi-110062
―Beetal House Address‖.
Phone-91-11-2996 1281-83 Fax-91-11-2996 1284 E-mail : beetal@beetalfinancial.com COMPLIANCE OFFICER: ADDRESS: Ms Anisha Jain, SP-825, Road No. 14, Vishwakarma Industrial Area, Jaipur-302013, (Rajasthan) Tel. No. : 0141-2331771/2 Fax. No. : 0141-2330810 E-mail : bajoriagroup@dataone.in‖
(Emphasis supplied) 92.
While it is true that what was before the court was simply the plaint
and along with it a document showing the ―Contact Us‖ page of the defendant, on the basis of that material as well, the Dhodha House test, if applied, would have led to a different conclusion. The ―Contact Us‖ page showed two addresses of the defendant. The first was the address to the defendant‘s registered office and the second was the address to an office which bore the heading ―REGISTRARS‖. It would, ex facie, indicate that the Beetal House Address was that of the registrars and not the corporation. Even otherwise, even if the address of the registrars was to be considered as that of the corporation, what was ultimately before the court were two offices. 93.
In such a situation, naturally, under the explanation to Section 20 of
the CPC, the defendant-company shall not be considered as being one with a sole office. It became essential, therefore, to determine where its principal place of business was and where was its sub-ordinate office. It was not brought to the notice of the Coordinate Bench that in Sanjay Dalia, itself, the Supreme Court noted that ordinarily, the residence of a company would
be where its registered office is.67 The controlling power, also, as a fact, generally, was found to be exercised at the registered office, and that office, is, therefore, the principal place of business.68 94.
The defendant in Allied Blenders as per the plaint, was not selling its
goods in Delhi. The compliance officer, as the webpage of the defendant narrated, was also situated at the registered office i.e., at Jaipur, Rajasthan. In such a situation, even by a prima facie consideration of the material, it would appear that the principal place of business was at the registered Jaipur office. The Beetal House Address at Delhi would then be a sub-ordinate office. For the purposes of Section 20(a), such a place would carry on business, only when cause of action also accrued at that place. It would be difficult, therefore, to hold, even while considering the plaint alone, that the defendant was ―carrying on business‖ at the Beetal House Address. 95.
Lastly, it may also be highlighted that the decision of Allied Blenders
& Distillers Pvt. Ltd., was rendered while adjudicating an ad-interim interlocutory prayer of the plaintiff. The Court did not render any final decision on the rights and obligations of the parties. It was merely an adinterim order subject to the outcome, not merely of the suit, but also of the interim injunction application. The precedential value of such a judgment is, therefore, doubtful. In any case, the decision of Allied Blenders & Distillers Pvt. Ltd., is not a binding precedent and turns on its own unique facts. 96.
In Cable News Networks INC v. CTVN Calcutta Television Network
Pvt. Ltd.,69 a company incorporated in Delaware, US, with its headquarters
Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das, (1994) 4 SCC 225. (2015) 10 SCC 161, para. 16.
in Atlanta, Georgia, filed a suit before this Court, primarily, for trademark infringement along with a claim for passing off. There was no subordinate office that the plaintiff had within the jurisdiction of Delhi. The defendant had its registered office at Kolkata. The plaintiff‘s case was that the defendant conducted its business under the name Uttar Bangla and commenced using the name Calcutta News, with the acronym CN only in 2014. The design of the defendant‘s logo with C and N, joined at the bottom, was contended to approach the plaintiff‘s logo so close as to create confusion. 97.
The Court observed that the defendant carried on business within the
territorial limits of Delhi. Para. 114 of the said decision contains the reasoning and reads as under: ―114. Viewed thus, it is clear that the averments in the present plaint, as enumerated in para 42.2.15 supra, sufficiently assert that the defendant carries on business within the jurisdiction of this Court. The defendant is engaged in the business of dissemination of news, over its news channel. There is a specific assertion, in para 49(a) of the plaint, that the defendant carries on business within the territory of this Court through its website, social media pages and YouTube channels. How it does so, cannot be examined under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC. Further, para 49 goes on to assert, in so many words, that the defendants are offering news services under the impugned logos within the territory of this Court. The business of the defendant being offering of news services, this assertion is a complete answer to the submission, of the defendant, that the suit is bad for want of territorial jurisdiction and has, therefore, to be returned under Order VII Rule 10.‖
98.
The registered office of the defendant in the said case was at Kolkata.
As per Sanjay Dalia, specifically para. 16, the defendant-company would be deemed to have its principal office at Kolkata. Given that mere sale of goods
2023 SCC OnLine Del 2436.
cannot constitute carrying on of business, similarly, mere display of news could also not have attracted Section 20(a) of the CPC. The essentiality analysis required under Dhodha House was not sufficiently pressed before the learned Single Judge. Similar observations are to be made concerning the conclusion at para. 118 of the said judgment that the plaintiff carried on business at Delhi because its pan-India news channel was viewed in Delhi. 99.
In Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. v. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt.
Ltd.,70 the plaintiff had filed a suit for infringement of its registered trademark along with a claim for passing off. The case against the defendant was that while a Marketing Agreement was entered into between the parties, under which the defendant was permitted to use the plaintiff‘s mark, the use undertaken by the defendant was in violation and outside the scope of the said agreement. The jurisdiction paragraph in the plaint is reproduced at para. 3.2 of the judgment which reads as under: ―3.2. … JURISDICTION 50. The present suit is a consolidated suit for infringement and/or passing off three Plaintiff's Subject Marks, by the same Defendant, arising out of the same course of transaction. This Hon'ble High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present suit under Section 134(2)3 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 since the Plaintiff's registered address is within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court, i.e., New Delhi, and the Plaintiff ordinarily carries on business in New Delhi. The two registered marks asserted in the present suit has been registered with the Delhi Trademarks Registry. Further, the seed packets of the impugned goods of the Defendant are available on various ecommerce platforms like India Mart etc., which are available for access within New Delhi, and in any event, are dynamic websites that permits communication and placement of orders. In addition, the relationship between parties to the suit arises out of the Marketing Agreement executed in New Delhi. As such, this Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has territorial
2025 SCC OnLine Del 8727.
jurisdiction to entertain the present suit. The suit is valued beyond the minimum pecuniary jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court and is also a commercial suit within the meaning of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.‖
100. The Court found that Delhi courts had territorial jurisdiction to maintain and entertain the plaint on quite a few grounds, one of which deserves consideration under the present heading. 101. The Division Bench concluded that the mere fact of the defendant‘s product being available for sale on an e-commerce website is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Section 20(a) i.e., of the defendant carrying on business within the territory of Delhi. To arrive at this conclusion, the Court relied upon WWE and what it considered to be its ratio, namely, that a website allowing the purchase of a product is akin to a physical store of brick-and-mortar. 102. The reasoning in WWE, has been questioned in this judgement at paras. 66-71 and 76-87. It has also been detailed as to why it no longer governs the field. Distinct from the merits of WWE, the applicability of WWE to Kohinoor Seed Fields is also possibly doubtful. In WWE, the plaint had averred that commercial transactions were being concluded at Delhi. Per contra, no such averment was present in Kohinoor Seed Fields. Even otherwise, unlike a case where a sole office of a corporation is present, which in turn is deemed as the place where it is carrying on business, where multiple offices are present, it is essential for the Court to inquire where the principal place of business is. 103. Additionally, in WWE, the website on which the transactions were getting concluded belonged to the plaintiff itself, while in Kohinoor Seed
Fields, it were third-party marketplaces. Thus, even assuming WWE to be the law governing the issue raised in Kohinoor Seed Fields, its reasoning of transactions getting concluded being akin to sales taking place at a physical store cannot apply to Kohinoor Seed Fields as the website itself was not of the individual whose store was sought to be created. Thus, owing to it not being pointed out to the Division Bench that WWE on facts may not be applicable, and that WWE was and is no longer the authority holding the field, the decision in Kohinoor Seed Fields, in turn, is not treated to be binding precedent on this issue. 104. Relying on Kohinoor Seed Fields, three decisions were rendered which are Raju Kumar v. Vinod Sah,71 Sauss Home Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Reckitt Benckiser India Pvt. Ltd.,72 and ITC Ltd. v. Adyar Gate Hotels Ltd.73 Each of these three cases involves the application of the rule laid down in Kohinoor Seed Fields. 105. The material portion of Raju Kumar reads as under: ―20. Section 20 CPC specifically empowers a plaintiff to sue a defendant before any court within which the defendant principally carries on its business or where the whole or part of the cause of action has arisen. As we have held in our decisions in Diamond Modular and Kohinoor-II, prominently following the earlier Division Bench in World Wrestling Entertainment, in the e-commerce age, every virtual platform over which the defendant's goods or services would be available operates as a brick and mortar store present in every location where that website is accessible. Though, in Banyan Tree Holding, the Court had held that it is necessary to show conclusion of a commercial transaction over the said website, that position now does not survive after the decision in World Wrestling Entertainment, which postulates that even the possibility of concluding a commercial transaction would be sufficient. Tata Sons further dilutes the
2026 SCC OnLine Del 893. 2026 SCC OnLine Del 937, paras. 61-65. 2026 SCC OnLine Del 4852.
principle by holding that even the possibility of interacting over a website, without any commercial element involved, would also be sufficient to invoke territorial jurisdiction of a particular court within whose jurisdiction the website is accessible.‖
106. The material portion of Sauss Home Products reads as under: ―61. On the aspect of territorial jurisdiction, the Division Bench of this Court has already held in Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. v. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt. Ltd. that the availability of the products of the appellant on the India Mart website would by itself confer jurisdiction on any Court within which the website was accessible. ... **** 62. The law has, thus, travelled from Banyan Tree Holding to World Wrestling Entertainment v. Reshma Collection and thereafter to Tata Sons. In view of the fact that the appellant's product was admittedly available on the India Mart platform, it could not be said that the appellant was not carrying on business within the jurisdiction of this Court. The fact that the Indiamart platform may have been a B2B21 platform rather than a B2C22 platform, cannot make any substantial difference to this legal position in view of the law as it has developed on the aspect of territorial jurisdiction.‖
107. In Adyar Gate, the plaintiff-company having its registered office at Kolkata, West Bengal filed a suit before this Court contending that the defendant was infringing its trademark ―DAKSHIN‖ by using it at its restaurant in Chennai. The plaintiff also contended that the defendant was passing off its services as those of the plaintiff. An ad-interim injunction was granted by the learned Single Judge of our Court but the main injunction application was dismissed on grounds of territorial jurisdiction as also on merits. Assailing this order of dismissal, the Division Bench was moved. 108. The Division Bench in Adyar Gate clarified that the defendant had no branch or outlet in Delhi and that it is not physically possible to avail the
services provided in the Chennai Dakshin restaurant from Delhi.74 The Court, however, concluded that jurisdiction at Delhi was made out under Section 20(a) of the CPC. Two independent reasons were given to arrive at this conclusion. Firstly, the defendant was carrying on business in relation to its restaurant in Chennai at Delhi and at every place where the Zomato page could be accessed and a reservation could be booked using the ―Order Online‖ link.75 Secondly, and additionally, it was found that jurisdiction was also made out at Delhi because the defendant was responding to critical reviews by its customers of its Chennai restaurant on the Zomato page, which was accessible at Delhi.76 The development in the law taken note of at para. 98 of the judgment reads as under: ―98. As per the law which has developed over the decisions in Banyan Tree Holding, World Wrestling Entertainment, Ultra Home Construction, Tata Sons, Kohinoor Seed Fields and Sauss Home Products, among others, interactive accessibility is the key to determining territorial jurisdiction. The accessibility must be interactive. In other words, a mere webpage which provides information, and with which it is not possible to interact but only to learn about the goods or services of a defendant, may not confer jurisdiction over a Court from within whose jurisdiction the website can be accessed. However, if the website is interactive and, more particularly, if it is possible to conclude a commercial transaction over the website, territorial jurisdiction would prima facie exist.‖
109. It can, thus, be seen that Kohinoor Seed Fields and its application in Raju Kumar, Sauss Home Products, and Adyar Gate are premised on the application of WWE to Section 20(a) of the CPC and of the purported dilution of the principles in Banyan Tree in the subsequent decision of Tata Sons. Paras. 179-186 of this judgment raise certain issues concerning the
2026 SCC OnLine Del 4852, para. 88. 2026 SCC OnLine Del 4852, para. 98. 2026 SCC OnLine Del 4852, para. 102.
decision of Tata Sons. It suffices to observe at this stage that there is no real curtailment of the Banyan Tree principles in Tata Sons. The requirement of concluding commercial transactions still remains a fundamental requirement for conferring jurisdiction under Section 20(c) of the CPC. Insofar as the decision of WWE is concerned, the analysis above has revealed that its reasoning was at odds with Dhodha House and post the decisions in Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home, the judgment in WWE may not govern the field. 110. Cumulatively, it was not pointed out to the Division Bench that the incorporation of WWE into Section 20(a) of the CPC, and the claim of Banyan Tree having been diluted, may not be correct. Resultantly, Kohinoor Seed Fields, and the decisions that follow it, do not constitute binding precedent on this issue. It is further settled that a judgment is precedent for what it decides, it can never be binding qua issues which were not raised before it. 111. At last, the effect of the decision in Kohinoor as seen through Adyar Gate, may be appreciated through the means of an example. Let there be a defendant having its registered office at Kanyakumari and a sub-ordinate office, through the means of an actual flourishing restaurant, at Delhi. Assume that cause of action may have accrued at any place apart from Delhi. If the plaintiff, in such a case, files a suit in Delhi, invokes Section 20(a) of the CPC, and contends that the defendant is carrying on its business at Delhi, the plaint would be returned. The dictum of Patel Roadways would allow the plaintiff to file at the place of its sub-ordinate office (in this the restaurant at Delhi) only when cause of action has also accrued at that place. Meaning, thereby, that a restaurant having a number of employees and a
considerable infrastructure, is not in and of itself sufficient to contend that the defendant is carrying on business at Delhi. 112. But if instead of investing capital, time and human resource at Delhi, a defendant were to have a website that allows people to make bookings at its restaurant in Kanyakumari, as per the dictum of Kohinoor and Adyar Gate, the defendant would be carrying on business at Delhi and become susceptible to the jurisdiction of Delhi courts under Section 20(a) of the CPC. It is this conundrum that gets first created by WWE, and the learned Division Bench is made to apply in Kohinoor and Adyar Gate. As noted above, owing to the errors in WWE not being pointed out to the Division Benches, the said decisions are not binding on the issue raised. 113. It may also be noted that a Special Leave Petition, challenging the decision in Kohinoor Seed Fields, is presently pending before the Supreme Court, on which notice was issued vide order dated 20.02.2026. 114. A brief reference may also be made to the decision of the Division Bench in Hindustan Unilever Limited v. Kwick Living (I) Pvt. Ltd.,77 where, it was observed, inter alia, that a defendant‘s own declaration as to its ―principal place of business‖ to the Goods and Services Tax authorities, would be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of ―carrying on business‖ under Section 20(a) of the CPC. Though the ultimate conclusion of the Division Bench was arrived at on the basis of additional grounds, this specific finding, may be analysed in some depth.
2026 SCC OnLine Del 6703.
115. It was not pointed out to the Division Bench that the ―principal place of business‖, under the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, is a defined term.78 Section 2(89) of the Act reads as under: ―2. Definitions. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires: (89) ―principal place of business‖ means the place of business specified as the principal place of business in the certificate of registration‖
(Emphasis supplied) 116. Under Section 25 of the GST Act, 2017,79 a corporation is required to register itself in each State/Union Territory where it becomes liable for registration. In every such State it has to provide a ―principal place of business‖ which is within that State/Union Territory. The meaning of the expression ―principal office‖ as it appears in the explanation to Section 20, is, ordinarily, as per Sanjay Dalia, the place of its registered office. The rationale being that this is generally the place where the controlling power of the corporation is exercised. The principal office is also at a single place regardless of the States in which a company may operate. 117. The import, requirements, and constituent elements, of what constitutes a ―principal office‖ is fundamentally in contradistinction to what is considered as the ―principal place of business‖ under the GST Act. The declaration made by the defendant for the purposes of GST, in order to comply with the requirement of the GST Act, cannot be incorporated to determine where the corporation has its ―principal office‖ for the purposes
―GST Act‖. ―Section 25. Procedure for registration. (1) Every person who is liable to be registered under section 22 or section 24 shall apply for registration in every such State or Union territory in which he is so liable within thirty days from the date on which he becomes liable to registration, in such manner and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed…‖
of Section 20(a) of the CPC. In Hindustan Unilever, the binding and applicable statutory provisions, were not pointed out to the Division Bench. Resultantly, the conclusion on this issue, may not have binding effect. 118. From the discussion above, the following conclusions may be drawn concerning the interpretation of the expression ―carries on business‖: a. The decision of WWE, does not govern the field concerning the interpretation of the expression ―carries on business‖ owing to: first, it being irreconcilable with the judgments in Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home; and second, it ignoring material portions of Dhodha House. b. The judgment in Kohinoor Seed Fields, which incorporates the dictum of WWE, and applies it to the expression ―carries on business‖ under Section 20(a) of the CPC, is not a controlling authority on the interpretation of this expression. The decisions of Raju Kumar and Sauss Home which apply the dictum in Kohinoor Seed Fields, similarly, are not authorities on this issue. c. The law, therefore, concerning the meaning and import of the expression ―carries on business‖ as it appears in Section 20(a) and (b) of the CPC, Sections 134(2) and 62(2) of the Trade Marks Act and Copyright Act, respectively, is governed by the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in, inter alia, Patel Roadways, Dhodha House and Sanjay Dalia, as also the dictum of this Court in Ultra Home.
d. If a corporation has a sole office, it shall be deemed to carry on business at that place of its sole office. If, however, there is more than one office, it must be deciphered where the principal place of business of that corporation is. This principal office shall ordinarily be the place of its registered office. Once the principal office is discovered, the other offices shall be the subordinate offices/branch offices. e. A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its subordinate office if the cause of action for a given suit accrues at that place. In such a scenario it shall not be open for the company to sue a defendant at the place of its principal office, where no cause of action has accrued. C. “CAUSE OF ACTION, WHOLLY OR IN PART” 119. There are various dimensions to the expression ―cause of action, wholly or in part‖, as it appears in Section 20(c) of the CPC. It is again difficult to compartmentalise them in defined silos but for the ease of exposition, they are being considered under the heads that follow. (i) Quia Timet Action 120. The learned authors of the celebrated commentary Snell’s Equity,80 at para. 18-029, has observed the following in relation to a quia timet action: ―(2) Claimant’s rights not yet interfered with. Although the claimant must establish his right, he may be entitled to an injunction even though an infringement has not taken place but is merely
John McGhee, QC and Steven Elliott, QC, 34th Ed., Sweet and Maxwell, 2020.
feared or threatened; for ―preventing justice excelleth punishing justice‖. This class of action, known as quia timet, has long been established, but the claimant must establish a strong case; ―no one can obtain a quia timet order by merely saying ‗Timeo‖‘. He must prove that there is an imminent danger of very substantial damage, or further damage, e.g. by showing that the threatened act ―is attended with extreme probability of irreparable injury to the property of the plaintiffs, including also danger to their existence‖. The court applies a two-stage test: ―(a) First, is there a strong probability that, unless restrained by injunction, the defendant will act in breach of the claimant‘s rights? (b) Secondly, if the defendant did an act in contravention of the claimant‘s rights, would the harm resulting be so grave and irreparable that, notwithstanding the grant of an immediate interlocutory injunction (at the time of actual infringement of the claimant‘s rights) to restrain further occurrence of the acts complained of, a remedy of damages would be inadequate?‖
(Emphasis supplied) 121. In M/s Jawahar Engineering Co. and Ors. v. M/s. Javahar Engineers Pvt. Ltd.,81 the plaintiffs claiming to be the registered trade mark holder of the mark ‗Javahar‘ filed a suit claiming that the defendants had applied for the registration of the trade mark ‗Jawahar‘ in respect of diesel oil engines, inter alia, for the Union Territories of Delhi and Chandigarh. This application was advertised in the Trade Mark Journal. 122. After the completion of pleadings, a preliminary issue on territorial jurisdiction was framed. The learned Single Judge decided the issue against the defendant and found that requisite territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit was made out. It was held that jurisdiction was established, as an advertisement in the Trade Marks Journal was published by the Registrar of Trade Marks, Delhi. Upon an intra-court appeal being preferred, the Division Bench held that ―the real point which gives the court jurisdiction is
1983 SCC OnLine Del 41.
not the place where the advertisement has appeared, but the fact that the trade mark is sought for sale in Delhi amongst other places.‖82 123. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s PM Diesels Ltd. v. M/s. Patel Field Marshal Inds. and Anr.,83 had relied upon the decision of Jawahar Engineering, to conclude that jurisdiction of Delhi was made out by an application for registration of trade mark being filed by the defendant. This order in PM Diesels was assailed before the Supreme Court, which was decided by the decision in Dhodha House. 124. SB Sinha J. in Dhodha House while disagreeing with the reasoning in Javahar Engineers observed that an application for trade mark registration could either be rejected or allowed. The mere filing of an application before the concerned registrar, therefore, does not affect jurisdiction nor does it constitute a cause of action, wholly or in part, to maintain a suit. 125. In Pfizer Products, Inc. v. Rajesh Chopra and Ors.,84 Badar Durrez Ahmed J. observed that the decision in Javahar Engineers was merely distinguished in Dhodha House and not disapproved. It was opined by the Court that Javahar Engineers continued to be good law, even after the decision in Dhodha House. 126. The decision of the Supreme Court in K. Narayanan and Anr. v. S. Murali,85 decisively settles the issue. The case arose from an action of passing off filed by the plaintiff against the defendant on the ground that an
1983 SCC OnLine Del 41, para. 10. 1998 SCC OnLine Del 181. 2006 SCC OnLine Del 177. This decision has also been referenced by Dr. Sikri J. in LG Corporation & Anr. v. Intermarket Electroplasters (P) Ltd. and Anr., 2006 SCC OnLine Del 1661 and was also approved by the Division Bench in Pfizer Products Inc v. Rajesh Chopra, 2006 (32) PTC 301, para. 13. (2008) 10 SCC 479.
application seeking pan-India registration of the trade mark was filed by the defendant before the Trade Mark Registry at Chennai. The High Court of Madras revoked the leave to sue, which was affirmed by the Division Bench, and the matter reached the Supreme Court. Relying on Jawahar Engineers, it was submitted before the Supreme Court that when an injunction is sought, it is not necessary that the threat should have become a reality before the injunction is granted or refused; it can even be sought for a threat which is yet to materialise. 127. The Supreme Court held that a proposed registration of a mark which may or may not be granted, will not confer a cause of action to the plaintiff, whether the application for registration is filed by the plaintiff or the defendant. The material portion of the judgment reads as under: ―11. Let us now consider the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the appellants argued before us that the Division Bench of the High Court in its impugned judgment had taken a contrary view from the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi in Jawahar Engg. Co. v. Jawahar Engineers (P) Ltd. [1983 PTC 207 (Del)] which has held that the real point which confers jurisdiction on the court is not the place where the advertisement is published but the place for which the trade mark is sought for sale. It has also held that when an injunction is sought, it is not necessary that the threat should have become a reality before the injunction is granted or refused and it can even be sought for a threat that is still to materialise. **** 13. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that when the respondent filed a trade mark application at the Trade Mark Registry at Chennai, a threat was communicated regarding the use of the trade mark in Chennai, and it was immaterial whether there was actual use or not and the appellants would be entitled to an injunction (being a prohibitive remedy) against the said mark. The learned counsel for the appellants finally argued that the respondent had based its application for registration of the trade mark on use of the mark throughout India without any geographical limitation from 1-4-1995, which included the city of Chennai, which thus
entitled the appellants to file the suit at the High Court of Madras based on the claims made in the trade mark application. **** ―20. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after carefully examining the aforementioned judgment of the High Court and also of the learned Single Judge, we do not find any infirmity in the judgment of Division Bench of the High Court holding that before registration is granted for the trade mark, there is no right in the person to assert that the mark has been infringed and that a proposed registration which may or may not be granted, will not confer a cause of action to the plaintiff, whether the application for registration is filed by the plaintiff or the defendant.‖
128. In Deepak Kumar Kheka v. Yogesh Kumar Jaiswal & Ors.,86 a registered holder of trademarks had filed a suit before the Commercial Court at Saket seeking permanent injunction and certain other consequential reliefs. It was an admitted position that no goods bearing the trade mark were prevalent in the market. However, on the ground that ―a strong and credible apprehension that the impugned goods bearing the impugned trade marks (were) going to be infused into the markets‖ within the jurisdiction of the Commercial Court at Saket, the suit was instituted as a quia timet action. Relying on K Narayanan, the Commercial Court allowed the defendant‘s application under Order VII Rule 11 and rejected the plaint on the ground that it did not disclose a cause of action. This order was impugned before the Division Bench of this Court. 129. It was canvassed before the Division Bench that the Supreme Court‘s observations in K. Narayanan were confined only to cases of passing off. Rejecting this contention, the Division Bench held:
2025:DHC:6176-DB
―18. What Mr. Bansal essentially seeks is that we should read the reference to ―infringement‖, in para 20 of the judgment of the Supreme Court as referring to passing off. 19. It goes without saying that this Court can hardly seek to rewrite a judgment of the Supreme Court. Moreover, even in the opening sentence of para 13 of the same decision, we find that the Court has recorded the submission of the Counsel for the appellant before it held that the filing of a trademark application by the respondent at the Trade Mark Registry at Chennai amounted to a communication of a threat regarding the use of the trademark at Chennai and it was immaterial whether there was actual use or not. Clearly, these two observations, read together, indicate that the Supreme Court is of the view that no application for injunction on the ground of infringement of the trademark would lie where the defendant has only applied for a registration of the mark. 20. When we read paras 13 and 20 in juxtaposition, it is clear that the Supreme Court has held that no cause of action, to maintain a suit for infringement, would lie merely on the defendant filing an application for registration of a trade mark.‖
130. It is, thus, clear that the filing of an application for registration of trade mark does not give rise to a cause of action for filing a quia timet suit for infringement or passing off. 131. In Allied Blenders & Distillers Pvt. Ltd. v. R.K. Distillery Pvt. Ltd.,87 a Division Bench of this Court dealt with an order of the learned Single Judge returning the plaint for want of jurisdiction. The suit was filed by the plaintiff for trademark and copyright infringement along with a claim for passing off. The plaintiff‘s trademark in respect of whiskey was ―Officers Choice‖, whereas the respondent‘s mark was ―Regular Choice‖. The plaintiff did not have its registered office in Delhi and the defendant did not reside in Delhi. The infringing goods were sold at Andhra Pradesh and not at Delhi. The Court, while setting aside the order of the learned Single Judge,
FAO (OS) No. 251/2016.
held that the suit of the plaintiff was in the nature of a quia timet action based on the apprehension that the defendant would start selling its whiskey under the impugned mark and label ―Regular Choice‖ in Delhi. 132. For determining the question of territorial jurisdiction while considering an application under Order VII Rule 10, it was re-iterated by the Court in R.K. Distillery that the averments made in the plaint are to be taken as true and correct. Considering the pleadings made by the plaintiff, specifically at para. 28 in the plaint, it was found that the plaint could not be returned. Para. 28 of the plaint reads as under: ―JURISDICTION: 28. This Hon‘ble Court has the territorial jurisdiction to try and entertain the instant suit by virtue of Section 62 (2) of the Copyright Act, 1957 and Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1999 as the Plaintiff being the owner of the copyright and the registered proprietor of the trademark in issue has its office located at A-61/5, Ground floor, G.T. Kamal Road Industrial Area, Azadpur, Delhi. Moreover, the Plaintiff is also carrying on its business within the territorial limits of this Hon‘ble Court in a variety of ways such as (but not limited to) sale of its products under the relevant marks in New Delhi. The scale of business and activity of the Defendant is not known at present and it is apprehended as being highly likely that the product sold under the impugned mark ―Regular Choice‖ will be made available in New Delhi. As the scope and extent of the Defendant‘s business is not known at present, it is believed that they have a reasonably large scale business around India and it is therefore strongly apprehended that they will launch the impugned product in New Delhi and would be available within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court. It is submitted that the threat that the Defendants will sell and / or offer for sale the impugned product within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court is credible and imminent. There is a reasonable apprehension that the Defendant is likely to sell its products bearing the impugned mark and label within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. Thus, giving rise to a substantial and integral part of the cause of action within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court. This Hon‘ble Court therefore has the necessary jurisdiction by virtue of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.‖
133. Importantly, the Division Bench in R.K. Distillery further observed that while the plaint‘s averments for adjudicating an application under Order VII Rule 10 need to be considered as true and correct, while adjudicating an application for interim injunction, relatively stricter scrutiny is warranted. The defendant‘s written statement/reply to the interim injunction application as also the documents placed by it on record, can be considered at this stage. For the grant of interim injunction, a plaintiff is required to establish a prima facie case that jurisdiction does in fact exist. Para. 22 of the said decision reads as under: ―22. We must make it clear that the considerations with regard to territorial jurisdiction in the context of Order VII Rule 10, CPC are entirely different from those in the context of an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2, CPC or in the context of an issue framed in the suit with regard to territorial jurisdiction. While in the backdrop of Order VII Rule 10, it is only the averments contained in the plaint that have to be seen in the case of an application for the grant of interim relief under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2, the contentions of the defendant in the reply to this application as also those contained in the written statement are required to be examined to arrive at a prima facie view. So, while in the case of an Order VII Rule 10 CPC application, the issue of jurisdiction is decided on the basis of what is stated in the plaint and, that too, after assuming the statements to be correct, an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2, CPC requires the examination of the contentions of the defendants that may be contained in the written statement and / or the reply to the application as also the other material which may be placed by the defendant before the court. Here, there is no question of considering the pleas of the plaintiff by way of a demurrer. Furthermore, the standards would be higher when an issue with regard to territorial jurisdiction is to be finally decided in the course of trial of the suit. Thus, while for the purposes of an examination under Order VII Rule 10, CPC, the court may come to the conclusion that it has territorial jurisdiction, this would not come in the way of the defendant in raising a question as to territorial jurisdiction, both when the issue of temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2, CPC is being considered and when an issue as to territorial jurisdiction is being decided in the course of trial of the suit. To put it differently, while a plaintiff may succeed in demonstrating, for the purposes of Order VII Rule 10 CPC that this court has territorial jurisdiction and that the plaint ought not to be returned, he
may fail in obtaining an order of interim injunction on the ground that the plaintiff‘s entitlement is itself shaky because the issue of territorial jurisdiction is highly debatable and prima facie not tenable. Therefore, the decision of the court in putting down an objection of the defendant and in rejecting the defendant‘s prayer for return of the plaint under Order VII Rule 10, CPC, would not come in the way of the defendant raising the question of territorial jurisdiction, both as an objection to the grant of an interim injunction as also at the time of decision of the issue of territorial jurisdiction, if framed, at the time of trial of the suit.‖
134. Similarly, M/s Allied Blenders & Distillers Pvt. Ltd. v. Prag Distillery Pvt. Ltd. and Anr.,88 was a decision which arose from facts that were largely similar to those in R.K. Distillery Pvt. Ltd.. The Division Bench held ―the mere fact that the plaint contained an averment that there was credible and imminent apprehension that the infringing product would be launched by the defendants within the territorial jurisdiction of this court, would by itself constitute a cause of action‖. 135. In Shree Nath Heritage Liquor Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Octaga Green Power and Sugar Co. Ltd. and Ors.,89 the Court decided on the preliminary issue framed by it on the question of territorial jurisdiction. The suit was filed for design infringement and passing off action by defendant‘s ―GRENADE XXX RESERVE BOTTLE‖ rum product. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant resided within the jurisdiction of this Court. The impugned product also was not sold in Delhi. Jurisdiction was pleaded contending the suit to be a quia timet action on grounds that the defendant‘s product is about to be launched in Delhi. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kuldip Singh v. Subhash Chander Jain
FAO (OS) No. 49/2017. 2017 SCC OnLine Del 9137.
and Ors.,90 where R.C. Lahoti J., while finding the suit in question therein to be pre-mature, importantly observed: ―6. A quia timet action is a bill in equity. It is an action preventive in nature and a specie of precautionary justice intended to prevent apprehended wrong or anticipated mischief and not to undo a wrong or mischief when it has already been done. In such an action the court, if convinced, may interfere by appointment of receiver or by directing security to be furnished or by issuing an injunction or any other remedial process. In Fletcher v. Bealey [(1885) 28 Ch D 688 : 54 LJ Ch 424 : 52 LT 541] , Mr Justice Pearson explained the law as to actions quia timet as follows: ―There are at least two necessary ingredients for a quia timet action. There must, if no actual damage is proved, be proof of imminent danger, and there must also be proof that the apprehended damage will, if it comes, be very substantial. I should almost say it must be proved that it will be irreparable, because, if the danger is not proved to be so imminent that no one can doubt that, if the remedy is delayed the damage will be suffered, I think it must be shown that, if the damage does occur at any time, it will come in such a way and under such circumstances that it will be impossible for the plaintiff to protect himself against it if relief is denied to him in a quia timet action‖. 7. Kerr on Injunctions (6th Edn., 1999) states the law on ―threatened injury‖ as under: ―The court will not in general interfere until an actual nuisance has been committed; but it may, by virtue of its jurisdiction to restrain acts which, when completed, will result in a ground of action, interfere before any actual nuisance has been committed, where it is satisfied that the act complained of will inevitably result in a nuisance. The plaintiff, however, must show a strong case of probability that the apprehended mischief will in fact arise in order to induce the court to interfere. If there is no reason for supposing that there is any danger of mischief of a serious character being done before the interference of the court can be invoked, an injunction will not be granted‖.
(Emphasis supplied)
(2000) 4 SCC 50.
136. Relying on Kuldip Singh, in Shree Nath Heritage Liquor, this Court held that even for a quia timet action, a plaintiff has to show that there is a strong possibility of the defendants selling their product in Delhi, which is likely to cause injury to its business and trade mark. Significantly, it was noted that the defendant therein did not have an excise license for Delhi which would enable it to sell the impugned product. The plaintiff, also, did not plead that the defendant possesses an excise license which would allow the defendant to sell the impugned product at Delhi. While stressing on the fact that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant were in Delhi, the plaint was found to be an attempt at forum shopping and an outcome of clever drafting. Resultantly, the plaint was returned. 137. The standard of scrutiny applied by the Division Benches in Prag Distillery Pvt. Ltd. and R.K. Distillery Pvt. Ltd. for a quia timet action was far lesser. While the decision in Shree Nath Heritage Liquour could be justified on the ground that it was passed on the preliminary issue which was framed after the completion of pleadings, it seems more appropriate to view it in the context of the additional issues which came to be raised before the learned Single Judge. The decision of RC Lahoti J. in Kuldip Singh was not noticed by the Division Benches, nor was the issue of the goods concerned being regulated by the Excise Act, and requiring a license to sell, adverted to. Both these aspects have a bearing on whether a cause of action for a quia timet action was made out. A judgment, it is trite law, is a precedent for what it decides and not what can be inferred from it. The issues not presented before a Court can never be said to be decided by it.
138. A brief reference may also be made to the decision of Allied Blenders & Distillers Pvt. Ltd. v. Agribiotech Industries Ltd.,91 where jurisdiction was sought to be invoked on the ground that the suit was in the nature of a quia timet action and cause of action under Section 20(c) of the CPC has been made out. It was found that ―the mere apprehension of the likelihood of the defendant launching the allegedly infringing product within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, would confer jurisdiction‖.92 The decision of Shree Nath Heritage, was not adequately canvassed before the learned Single Judge. In Shree Nath Heritage, the court had observed that a strong possibility of the defendants selling the impugned goods must be established. For alcohol, which is an excisable commodity, a license to sell must exist with a defendant for a quia timet action to be made out. 139. In Novartis AG and Anr. v. Zydus Healthcare Limited and Anr.,93 a Division Bench of this Court crystallised the manner in which an application seeking outright rejection of a quia timet plaint is to be adjudicated. Paras. 50 and 51 of the said decision read as under: ―50. What has to be seen, therefore, in assessing whether a quia timet plaint can be rejected outright under Order VII Rule 11, is (i) whether the plaint alleges (a) a deliberate expressed intention to engage in activity the result of which would raise a strong possibility of infringement, (b) that the activity to be engaged in is imminent, and
2020 SCC OnLine Del 2861. 2020 SCC OnLine Del 2861, para. 42. 2022 SCC OnLine Del 4373.
(c) that, if the defendant were to engage in the activity, the plaintiff would suffer substantial, if not irreparable, prejudice, (ii) that the claim of the plaintiff is not merely speculative, in the hope that sufficient facts, to support the allegations, would be gleaned on discovery during the course of trial, and (iii) that the plaint contains cogent, precise and material recitals of facts. 51. Nothing more is to be seen, when examining an Order VII Rule 11 challenge.‖
(Emphasis supplied) 140. From the discussion above, concerning quia timet actions, it can be concluded that: a. The cause of action for quia timet action accrues when the defendant expresses a deliberate intention to engage in an activity the result of which would raise a strong possibility of infringement. b. The activity to be engaged in must be imminent, and of such a character that if the defendant were to engage in the activity, the plaintiff would suffer substantial, if not irreparable, prejudice. c. For goods and services that are subject to regulatory control, in determining whether a quia timet action is maintainable, it is essential to consider whether the defendant holds the required licences or permissions, statutory or otherwise, required for their sale, use or any other commercial exploitation. For instance, for the commercial sale of liquor, an excise license
under the State‘s specific Excise Act is required, for manufacturing a pharmaceutical product, license under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 may be required, and for the sale of insecticides a license under the Insecticides Act, 1968 may be required. (ii) An Action for Passing Off 141. In Himachal Pradesh Horticulture Produce Marketing and Processing Corp. Ltd. v. M/s. Mohan Meakin Breweries Ltd.,94 the plaintiff had filed a suit for infringement and passing off seeking, inter alia, a permanent injunction and rendition of accounts. In order to establish territorial jurisdiction of the Courts at Ludhiana, the plaintiff had averred that apple juice manufactured by the defendant was sold with the plaintiff‘s mark in Ludhiana. 142. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana placing reliance on the opinion of Cornelius J. in Firm Bhagwan Dass v. Watkins Mayor and Co.,95 observed that cause of action wholly or in part, for a claim of passing off, can be said to have arisen only when: first, the defendant has directly made sales of the goods carrying the impugned trademark within the jurisdiction of a given Court. Second, the sales are made by the defendant not to an individual consumer but to a distributor or a wholesaler or a retailer. Third, such sales are at a commercial scale. 143. The Court in Mohan Meakin opined that if this much was not insisted upon, corporations can make a mockery of jurisdictional rules and big firms
1980 SCC OnLine P&H 297. AIR 1947 Lah 289.
could file civil actions as per their own whims and fancies. Para. 9 of the said decision is worth reproducing and reads as under: ―9. …If this much is not insisted upon, then the defendant can be dragged into litigation in any part of the country by only adducing flimsy kind of evidence that has been adduced in the present case by a company which has its head office at Solan in Himachal Pradesh where the defendant too have their head office and where it was convenient to the plaintiff to prosecute the suit and to the defendant to defend the suit. A big firm like Mohan Meakin Breweries Limited has its ramifications all over the country and it is easy for it to have dragged this public Corporation into litigation even at a far off place like Kanya Kumari if the only evidence necessary to give jurisdiction to that Court was of purchasing of a few bottles by any agent of Mohan Meakin Limited from someone locally there.‖
(Emphasis supplied) It must be stressed that the said decision was delivered on the 29 th of September, 1980, approximately 15 years before the official release of public internet services in India. 144. In Glen Raven Mills Inc. v. Vaspar Concepts Pvt. Ltd. and Anr.,96 a suit for trademark infringement along with passing off was filed before this Court seeking, inter alia, a permanent injunction. The plaint narrated that the plaintiff instructed its attorneys to investigate the use of the impugned mark by the defendant. As part of the investigation, one Mr. Debjit Gupta, a resident of Delhi, placed an order for goods under the impugned mark via exchange of letters. Thereafter, pursuant to the order, goods were dispatched by the defendants and were delivered to Mr. Gupta at Delhi. 145. S.K. Mahajan J. concluded that goods could not be stated to be delivered in Delhi. The Court noticed that freight had been paid by the plaintiff, and the carrier, thus, was found to be the plaintiff‘s agent. Relying
1995 SCC OnLine Del 724.
on Section 39 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930,97 it was held that the delivery of goods to the carrier/agent was made at Bangalore, which shall be deemed to be the delivery to the plaintiff. The entire contract for supply of goods was, thus, completed at Bangalore with no cause of action, wholly or in part, accruing in Delhi. 146. Further in Glen, this Court analysed, that assuming the delivery did in fact happen in Delhi, whether jurisdiction was made out under Section 20(c) of the CPC. Placing reliance on the decisions of Mohan Meakin Breweries Limited and Bhagwan Dass, the Court observed that in a case of passing off, it is necessary to prove that the supply made by the defendant at a particular place was on a commercial scale. There should also be a direct transaction of sale and purchase between the defendant and a distributor, whole-seller or a retailer, and such transactions should be of a commercial proportion.98 Para. 12 of the said decision reads as under: ―12. With a view, therefore, to give jurisdiction to the Court in a case of passing off, it is necessary to prove that the supply made by the defendant at a particular place was on a commercial scale. There should have been direct transaction of sale and purchase between the defendant and a distributor or a wholeseller or a retailer and such transactions should be of commercial proportion.‖
147. In Indovax Pvt. Ltd. v. Merck Animal Health and Ors.,99 originally a suit for trademark infringement along with passing off was filed, which subsequently, was confined by the plaintiff to passing off alone. Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants resided within the jurisdiction of the court. The question which arose was whether cause of action can be said to have arisen
―Sale of Goods Act‖. 1995 SCC OnLine Del 724, para. 12. 2017 SCC OnLine Del 9393.
within the jurisdiction of the forum court. To support its case, the plaintiff along with the plaint had filed an invoice issued in Jind, Haryana to prove the accrual of cause of action. Subsequently, however, the plaintiff filed on record three invoices of one ‗Baxi Medical Stores‘ in Delhi, along with the amended plaint. These invoices were purported to be issued not to the plaintiff but to third parties. 148. Deepa Sharma J. in Indovax appointed a Local Commissioner in order to discover the source from where Baxi Medical Stores procured the stock of the impugned products, sold under the invoices attached by the plaintiff. The Local Commissioner in its report dated 26.11.2013 stated that Baxi Medical Stores sourced the stock from Karnal, Haryana and that the proprietor of Baxi Medical Stores also admitted that he is not a distributor of defendants and had merely procured the three vials of product INNOVAX from outside Delhi. The proceedings were found to be an abuse of process and an attempt by the plaintiff to forum-shop. 149. The Court reiterated the test, inter alia, laid down in Glen, namely, that for cause of action to accrue in a suit for passing off, the defendant must have directly made sales of the goods carrying the impugned trademark, not to an individual consumer, but to a distributor, wholesaler or retailer, at a commercial scale. Mere availability of goods, it was opined, does not confer jurisdiction. The invoices put on record by the plaintiff were found to be a result of the plaintiff‘s own acts. The Court found that the impugned goods were otherwise not available in Delhi, but were procured from the authorised dealer of the defendant at Haryana. No cause of action was found
to have arisen within the jurisdiction of Delhi and the plaint was resultantly returned. 150. From the discussion above, it may be concluded that in a suit for passing off: a. Cause of action (wholly or in part) can be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of a court only if the defendant has made sales of the goods carrying the impugned trademark within the jurisdiction of a given Court. Direct sales are made by the defendant not to an individual consumer but to a distributor, wholesaler or a retailer. Such sales are at a commercial scale. Mere availability of goods within the jurisdiction of a forum court does not confer jurisdiction. b. Sale of goods within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum court by a firm which does not act as a distributor, wholesaler, retailer, or agent of the defendant, does not confer jurisdiction. c. Where goods are procured by a firm from another firm that is outside the jurisdiction of the forum court and in turn sold within the territory of the forum court, jurisdiction shall not, be conferred. d. Additionally, delivery of goods to the agent/carrier of the plaintiff or its investigator, for onward transmission, is deemed delivery upon the plaintiff or its investigator. This conclusion is not restricted to suits for passing off, but is a general conclusion
arrived at by the application of Section 39 of the Sale of Goods Act. (iii) An Action for Infringement in the Offline World 151. In the year 1915, the Allahabad High Court in the case of Kheshtra Pal Sharma v. Pancham Singh Varma,100 decided a civil revision filed against the judgment of the District Judge, affirming the Subordinate Judge‘s order returning the plaint in a suit for trademark infringement and passing off on the ground that territorial jurisdiction was not made out. The plaint averred that the plaintiff had been making and selling in Muttra a medicine named ―Sudha Sindhu‖. The mark ―Suddha Sindhu‖ was claimed to be registered in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant, a resident of Gaya, had advertised for sale at Gaya, a medicine made by him and named ―Asli Sudha Sindhu‖. Advertisements of the defendant‘s medicine had appeared in papers published in Muttra, and in circulars and hand-bills distributed in Muttra. 152. Dr. Tej Bahadur Sapru along with Pandit Motilal Nehru appeared for the revisionists and argued that if a person advertises as his own, a trade mark belonging to another, he thereby infringes the mark. The distribution of hand-bills and the publication of advertisement in Muttra was contended to be the infringement complained of which gave the plaintiff his cause of action. Per contra, Dr. Sunder Lal appeared for the respondent and argued that for jurisdiction of a given court to be invoked there must be actual sale of the impugned goods within the local limits of a given court.
1915 SCC OnLine All 115.
153. The Division Bench found actual sale to be dispensable to determine infringement of a registered trademark. Mere advertisement was found to be sufficient to invoke jurisdiction of a given Court. The material portion of the judgment reads as under: ―The question is whether the publication of the advertisement, by the respondent, of his medicine, Asli Sudha Sindhu, in papers, hand-bills and circulars published in Muttra is an infringement of the applicant's trademark. For the purpose of this application we must of course assume that the applicant is entitled to the trade mark which he claims, and that the respondent's advertisement is calculated to induce people to believe that they will get from him the applicant's medicine. No authority has been produced in support of the argument that such an advertisement cannot be an infringement of the trade mark. On the other hand several English cases have been cited which show that it has been held for some years past that a trade mark may be infringed by means of an advertisement. We think it is sufficient to refer to the decisions in Jay v. Ladler (1), Bourne v. Swan and Edgar, Limited (2), and to the injunction which was issued by the House of Lords in the case of Frank Reddaway v. George Banham (3). On the authorities we must hold that if the facts are as alleged by the applicant his trade mark has been infringed within the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge of Muttra. We therefore allow this application, set aside the orders of the courts below and direct that the record be returned to the court of first instance and the suit restored to the pending file to be disposed of according to law. Costs here and hereto will be costs in the cause.‖
154. In Burger King Corporation v. Techchand Shewakramani and Ors.,101 the plaintiff had filed a suit for trademark infringement along with a claim for passing off for its mark ―BURGER KING‖ and ―HUNGRY JACK‘S‖. All the defendants were based out of Mumbai and the plaintiff was a US based company. The question before the court was whether territorial jurisdiction was made out in Delhi. On the website of the defendant, it was mentioned that street carts containing the impugned mark of the plaintiff were ―coming soon‖ at Delhi. The threat of the defendants
2018 SCC OnLine Del 10881.
launching Burger King carts in Delhi was found by the Court to be imminent and credible, particularly because of, among other things, an article appearing in the Business Digest magazine on 30.07.2014. Considering the unique facts and circumstances of the said case, the court found that jurisdiction for a quia timet was made out in Delhi. 155. In M/s. Intas Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Allergen Inc.,102 a Division Bench of this Court noted that the dictum in Dhodha House of jurisdiction not being conferred by goods manufactured by the plaintiff being available or sold in the market of Delhi, applied while interpreting the phrase ―carries on business‖ and not while construing Section 20(c). In the said case, the plaint had averred that the impugned goods were sold and distributed within the jurisdiction of the forum court. The defendant had not denied this pleading in its written statement. Finding sale and distribution of goods in Delhi to be an admitted position, the Court held that jurisdiction of Delhi Courts is made out. 156. Similarly, in Pfizer Enterprises Sarl v. Cipla Ltd.,103 a Division Bench of this Court dealt with a suit for trademark infringement along with a claim for passing off. Jurisdiction of Delhi courts was sought to be invoked, inter alia, on the ground that the defendant‘s products under the impugned mark are available for sale in Delhi and jurisdiction under Section 20(c) of the CPC was, therefore, made out. Qua the Pfizer appeal104 which arose from an order of a learned Single Judge dated 16.07.2008, the Division
2006 SCC OnLine Del 802. 2009 (107) DRJ 735 (DB). Two separate appeals were decided vide a common order in Pfizer Enterprises Sarl. One of the appeals was the Pfizer Appeal (FAO (OS) 356/2008).
Bench noted that the defendant had not specifically traversed the pleadings pertaining to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Resultantly, the plaintiff would not be required to lead any evidence on this aspect of the case. Thus, the factum of sale of the impugned goods having been admitted, jurisdiction was found to be made out. 157. While the conclusion in Burger King of jurisdiction for a quia timet action being made out was sufficient to adjudicate upon the controversy which arose in the said case, additional observations were made concerning the elements of ―cause of action‖ in a passing off and infringement suit. It was held by the Court that cause of action for a trademark infringement suit arises when a person ―uses in the course of trade‖ any mark without the owner‘s consent. After referring to the definition of using a mark under Section 2(2) of the Trade Marks Act, and other provisions relating to the rights conferred upon a registered mark holder, the court found that any unauthorised use of the mark within the jurisdiction of this Court would constitute a cause of action to sue. Paras. 19 and 21-22 of the decision read as under: ―19. What constitutes cause of action in the context of a suit alleging violation of rights in a trade mark, would therefore be the question. In a case involving trade mark infringement, infringement happens when a person ―uses in the course of trade‖ any mark without the owner's consent. Thus, use of a mark is the cause of action in an infringement as also in a passing off action. If use takes place in a territory where the suit is filed, that court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. When there is use of a mark, there is a cause of action to sue, where the use takes place. it is relevant to point out that ―use‖ of a trade mark as per Section 2(2)(c) of the TM Act is as under: ―(2) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, any reference— ∗∗∗ (c) to the use of a mark—
(i) in relation to goods, shall be construed as a reference to the use of the mark upon, or in any physical or in any other relation whatsoever, to such goods; (ii) in relation to services, shall be construed as a reference to the use of the mark as or as part of any statement about the availability, provision or performance of such services;‖ **** 21. Thus, jurisdiction of a court in a trade mark action, could be invoked where there is use upon or in relation to goods. The phrase ―in relation to‖ has been interpreted to include advertising, promotion, publicity, etc. Thus, in addition to actual sale of goods and providing services, if a person advertises his or her business under the mark in a territory, promotes his or her business under the mark in a territory or for example invites franchisee queries from a particular territory, sources goods from a particular territory, manufactures goods in a particular territory, assembles goods in a particular territory, undertakes printing of packaging in a particular territory, exports goods from a particular territory, it would constitute ―use of a mark‖. 22. This scheme of the TM Act is amply clear from a reading of Sections 28 and 29 as also Section 56. Under Section 28, the rights conferred are the exclusive right to use of a mark. Under Section 29, use of a mark could be any form of use, including— • as part of a trade name or a corporate name or name of a business concern [Section 29(5)]; • use by affixing it to products/services [Section 29(6)(b)]; • use by affixing it to packaging [Section 29(6)(b)]; • use by offering goods/services for sale; • use for the purpose of import or export[Section 29(6)(c)]; • use on business papers [Section 29(6)(d)]; • use in comparative advertising which is detrimental to distinctive character or repute of the mark [Section 29(4)]; • use in advertising [Section 29(7)]; • Applying a mark in a territory for purposes of export of goods/services [Section 56(1)]; and • Use by which a trade connection is created between the user and the proprietor [Section 56(2)].‖
158. At para. 23 of the decision in Burger King, the learned Senior Judge observed that ―principles which apply to infringement, actions to determine “use” would equally apply to passing off actions.‖ The decisions of this Court in Glen and Indovax, which were earlier in time, were not pointed out
to the learned Single Judge. The finding at para. 23 is in the teeth of the ratio in Glen and Indovax insofar as an action of passing off is concerned. Since these judgements were not taken note of by the learned Single Judge, no justification can be found in Burger King to deviate from the views taken in the earlier decisions. Thus, the observations made by the learned Single Judge in Burger King are to be confined exclusively to infringement cases while Glen and Indovax continue to hold the field for passing off cases. 159. An example of what may not constitute cause of action may now be considered. In Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. v. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt. Ltd.,105 the plaintiff had filed a suit for infringement of its registered trademark along with a claim for passing off. Upon an objection of territorial jurisdiction being raised, this Court found that jurisdiction of Delhi was made out on a number of grounds. One of these grounds was that the trademark was registered at Delhi. The Court opined that the factum of registration at Delhi was part of the cause of action as it was an essential fact needed to be proved to support the right to judgment. 160. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Alchemist Ltd. and Anr. v. State Bank of Sikkim and Ors.,106 and Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd.,107 were, however, not pointed to the Division Bench. 161. In Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd.,108 the writ petitioner had challenged the denial of benefits under an import-export passport scheme before Gujarat High Court, which had entertained the writ petition, and the
2025 SCC OnLine Del 8727. (2007) 11 SCC 335. (2002) 1 SCC 567. (2002) 1 SCC 567.
same was assailed before the Supreme Court. Different factual indicia, prima facie, appearing to favour the jurisdiction of different High Courts were present. Facts supporting the jurisdiction of the Gujarat High Court were: The petitioner carried out business of export and import from Ahmedabad; non-granting and denial of utilisation of the credit in the passbook was to affect the business at Ahmedabad; the orders of export and import of the petitioner are placed from and are executed at Ahmedabad; documents and payments for export and import are sent/made at Ahmedabad; and credit of duty claimed in respect of exports were handled from Ahmedabad since export orders as well as payments were received at Ahmedabad. 162. Facts supporting the jurisdiction of Madras High Court: Passbook in question was issued by an authority at Chennai; designated authority, which is the competent person in respect of matters concerning the Passbook Scheme is at Chennai; the entries in the passbook under the scheme are to be made by authorities at Chennai; and the export of prawns made by the petitioner and the import of the inputs, benefit of which the petitioner was seeking, will also have to be made through the Chennai port. 163. The Supreme Court in Adani Exports held that the Gujarat High Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the lis, and it was the Madras High Court, before which the writ petition should have been filed. It was reiterated by the Supreme Court that each and every fact pleaded in the petition does not constitute a cause of action unless the facts have a nexus and relevance with the dispute. Facts which have no bearing on the lis or the
dispute involved in the case do not constitute cause of action (wholly or in part). 164. In Alchemist Ltd., a company having its registered and corporate office at Chandigarh, in furtherance of an invitation to offer made by the State of Sikkim, concerning disinvestment in the Bank of Sikkim, deposited 4.50 crores with the State Bank of India, Chandigarh. Upon the proposal of the company being rejected, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana was moved claiming that a part of the cause of action had accrued within its jurisdiction. The High Court found that no part of cause of action had arisen within its territory. This finding was affirmed by the Supreme Court noting: ―37. From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the ratio laid down in a catena of decisions by this Court, it is clear that for the purpose of deciding whether facts averred by the appellant-petitioner would or would not constitute a part of cause of action, one has to consider whether such fact constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of action. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the court, the court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a ―part of cause of action‖, nothing less than that.‖
165. If the logic of Kohinoor Seed Fields was to be applied to the facts of Alchemist Ltd., the factum of proving part-performance at Chandigarh, by depositing 4.50 crores at the branch office of the State Bank of India, was material to the judgment. Arguably, it would also be important for such a corporation to prove that it was actually incorporated. But would the situs of incorporation have any bearing on the cause of action? Certainly not. In the facts of Kohinoor Seed Fields, the factum of the trademark being registered at Delhi has nothing to do with the bundle of facts constituting the cause of action. Thus, owing to the decisions of Alchemist Ltd. and Adani Exports
not being pointed out to the learned Division Bench, the decision of Kohinoor Seed Fields, may not be binding on this issue. 166. From the discussion above, it may be concluded that in a suit for infringement of trademark: a. Cause of action (wholly or in part) can be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of a court when the defendant, in the course of trade, uses a mark which is identical with or deceptively similar to the trade mark, in relation to goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered, within the jurisdiction of the forum court. b. Registration of a mark within the jurisdiction of a given court does not constitute a part of the cause of action. (iv) An Action for Infringement in the Online World 167. There are multitude of forums available to a plaintiff in order to sue for infringement or passing off. For instance, they may sue where the defendant resides, carries on business, or personally works for gain. Additionally, under the specialised statutes, if applicable, where the plaintiff resides, carries on business or personally works for gain. Another set of forums are to be made available under Section 20(c) of the CPC in the context of online activity. 168. CS(COMM)-980/2026 is one of the commercial suits dealt with in the present batch of matters. In the said case, jurisdiction of Delhi courts is pleaded on the grounds that the ―infringing activities of the Defendant are
not geographically limited but are borderless and accessible from anywhere, including New Delhi, in view of the online activities being conducted through various online platforms.‖ This case, and specifically the pleading made, is a prime example of why high jurisdictional thresholds ought to be set under Section 20(c) of the CPC, where infringement is claimed through the use of internet. The requirement of proving cause of action (wholly or in part), in the context of internet activity, cannot encompass each and every one of the wrongs mentioned in Burger King. 169. Although an internet activity may constitute a statutory wrong under the Trade Marks Act or the Copyright Act, it may not confer jurisdiction on a given court, owing to other counter-vailing considerations, that are required to be balanced with the right of the plaintiff. These considerations include, inter alia, predictability i.e., a given defendant must have a reasonable idea of where it may be sued. It ought not to be the case that for a particular act purportedly done by a defendant it could be equally sued at Ladakh and at Jhumri Telaiya. Next, the jurisdictional avenues made available must be fair and reasonable. The places where the plaintiff can sue cannot be, as is claimed in CS(COMM)-980/2026, at all places where the so-called borderless infringing activity is taking place. Some degree of balancing is essential. 170. There is, it may be clarified, no cavil with the age old proposition that where there is a right there is a remedy. None can question whether a plaintiff has a right to sue upon infringement taking place. The issue, however, concerns where it can sue.
171. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy and Anr.,109 which was rendered approximately 17 years ago, recognised the concern noted above. The Division Bench being conscious of the scheme of the Trade Marks Act, including the multifarious acts that constitute infringement, provided a high threshold for when Section 20(c) of the CPC can be invoked. It may again be stressed that if jurisdictional rules are to have any meaning at all, in the context of internet activity, high thresholds are necessarily required to be set. The decision in Banyan may now be examined. 172. The judgment arose from a reference order110 made by a learned Single Judge of this Court. After considering the submissions made by Mr. Pravin Anand, the Division Bench framed the following questions: ―7. … (i) For the purposes of a passing off action, or an infringement action where the Plaintiff is not carrying on business within the jurisdiction of a court, in what circumstances can it be said that the hosting of a universally accessible website by the defendants lends jurisdiction to such Court where such suit is filed (―the forum court‖)? (ii) In a passing off or infringement action, where the defendant is sought to be sued on the basis that its website is accessible in the forum state, what is the extent of the burden on the Plaintiff to prima facie establish that the forum court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit? (iii) Is it permissible for the Plaintiff to establish such prima facie case through ―trap orders‖ or ―trap transactions‖?‖
173. The material portion of the discussion made by the Court concerning the first question, reads as under:
2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780. 2008 SCC OnLine Del 1740.
―40. …It appears to this court that for the purposes of a passing off action or an action for infringement where the Plaintiff is not carrying on business within the jurisdiction of the forum court, and where there is no long arm statute, the Plaintiff would have to show that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the jurisdiction of the forum court. It is not enough merely to show that the website hosted by the defendant is an interactive one. It would have to be shown that the nature of the activity indulged in by the defendant by the use of the website was with an intention to conclude a commercial transaction with the website user. **** 42. This Court holds that jurisdiction of the forum court does not get attracted merely on the basis of interactivity of the website which is accessible in the forum state. The degree of the interactivity apart, the nature of the activity permissible and whether it results in a commercial transaction has to be examined. For the ―effects‖ test to apply, the Plaintiff must necessarily plead and show prima facie that the specific targeting111 of the forum state by the defendant resulted in an injury or harm to the Plaintiff within the forum state. For the purposes of a passing off or an infringement action (where the plaintiff is not located within the jurisdiction of the court), the injurious effect on the Plaintiff's business, goodwill or reputation within the forum state as a result of the defendant's website being accessed in the forum state would have to be shown. Naturally therefore, this would require the presence of the Plaintiff in the forum state and not merely the possibility of such presence in the future. Secondly, to show that an injurious effect has been felt by the Plaintiff it would have to be shown that viewers in the forum state were specifically targeted. Therefore the ―effects‖ test would have to be applied in conjunction with the ―sliding scale‖ test to determine if the forum court has jurisdiction to try a suit concerning internet based disputes.‖
The material portion of the discussion made by the Court concerning the second question reads as under: ―45. This court holds that in order to prima facie establish that the defendant purposefully availed of the jurisdiction of this court, the Plaintiff would have to show that the defendant engaged in some commercial activity in the forum
Para. 22 of the decision in Banyan Tree, after relying on the comments of Prof. Thomas Schultz and Prof. Michael Geist, explained targeting as follows: ―Schultz defines targeting to mean ―in essence that the activity must be intended to have effects within the territory of the state asserting jurisdiction.‖ According to another scholar, Professor Michael Geist (―Is There a There There? Towards Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction‖ 16 Berkeley Tech LJ (2001) 1345 at 1357) the principle of targeting is to ―identify the intentions of the parties and to assess the steps taken to either enter or avoid a particular jurisdiction.‖ Targeting is described as ―something more than effects, but less than physical presence….‖
State by targeting its website specifically at customers within that State. … In any action for passing off or infringement, it would have to be shown that the defendant by using its mark intended to pass off its goods as that of the Plaintiff's. A mere hosting of a website which can be accessible from anyone from within the jurisdiction of the court is not sufficient for this purpose. Also a mere posting of an advertisement by the defendant depicting its mark on a passive website which does not enable the defendant to enter into any commercial transaction with the viewer in the forum state cannot satisfy the requirement of giving rise to a cause of action in the forum state. Even an interactive website, which is not shown to be specifically targeted at viewers in the forum state for commercial transactions, will not result in the court of the forum state having jurisdiction. In sum, for the purposes of Section 20(c) CPC, in order to show that some part of the cause of action has arisen in the forum state by the use of the internet by the defendant, the Plaintiff will have to show prima facie that the said website, whether euphemistically termed as ―passive plus‖ or ―interactive‖ was specifically targeted at viewers in the forum state for commercial transactions. The Plaintiff would have to plead this and produce material to prima facie show that some commercial transaction using the website was entered into by the defendant with a user of its website within the forum state and that the specific targeting of the forum state by the defendant resulted in an injury or harm to the Plaintiff within the forum state. Question no. (ii) is answered accordingly.‖
(Emphasis supplied) 174. Importantly, in Banyan Tree, the Court consciously rejected the contention that purposeful availment ought to be replaced by purposeful avoidance. The acceptance of purposeful avoidance as a test would allow jurisdiction to be conferred merely because blinkers and blockers have not been put qua the forum state‘s access to the website, and commercial transactions have in turn taken place. Thus, the mere fact that a website has not restricted its accessibility to a forum court cannot be sufficient to conclude that targeting and purposeful availment has taken place. 175. In Sholay Media Entertaiment, the Banyan Tree standard was found to not have been met and the plaint was returned to the plaintiff. Importantly, this Court relied upon an important decision of the Karnataka
High Court in Presteege Property Developers Ltd. v. Prestige Estates Projects Ltd.,112 which held that even booking or placing an order through the internet is insufficient to conclude that a transaction took place within the jurisdiction of a given court. 176. Next, in Impressario Entertainment & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. v. S&D Hospitality,113 a suit was filed by the plaintiff for the infringement of its registered trademark along with a claim for passing off. It was contended that the plaintiff was the owner of the registered trademark ―SOCIAL‖ and ―STONE WATER‖ which it utilised with respect to cafes. While the registered office of the plaintiff was in Mumbai, it was stated that it ran four cafes in Delhi. It was claimed that the defendant ran two restaurants at Hyderabad using the trade mark ―SOCIAL MONEY‖, which infringed the plaintiff‘s trademark and constituted the tort of passing off. Jurisdiction of Delhi was sought to be claimed on grounds that the defendant had its presence on websites like Zomato114 and Dine-Out, from which it could invite customers of the plaintiff to visit its outlet in Hyderabad. 177. While ordering for the return the plaint, this Court in Impressario held that the listing of the cafe on the given website was neither sufficient to constitute cause of action (wholly or in part) nor to claim that the defendant carried on business within Delhi. Even if it was assumed that customers in Delhi actually made bookings on the websites, this was found to be insufficient as the actual transaction was to take place at Hyderabad. The
MFA No. 494 and 13696, 2006. 2018 SCC OnLine Del 6392. Back then, Zomato did not deliver food.
analysis made at para. 19 of the decision deserves reproduction and reads as under: ―19. Thus even if the defendant has been able to attract customers from other jurisdiction including by way of Zomato and Dine-Out, the services of the defendant cannot be availed unless the customers go to Hyderabad. Through Zomato and Dine Out the customers will only be able to invite a customer and resume a table at the restaurant of the defendant at Hyderabad. The commercial transaction would take place only on the customer availing the services of the defendant at Hyderabad. Claim of the plaintiff is that at least one customer through the website booked the table at defendant's restaurant from Delhi believing that it was a restaurant of the plaintiff. On the basis of a solitary transaction, through internet plaintiff cannot claim that cause of action having arisen at Delhi this Court will have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Facts pleaded in the plaint do not pass the tests laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. (supra).‖
It may be highlighted that the decision in Impressario involved the application of the Banyan Tree standard to a case of trademark infringement. 178. In Tata Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Hakunamatata Tata Founders and Others,115 the plaintiff was the holding company of the TATA Group of Companies that had filed a suit, primarily, for trademark infringement along with a claim for passing off. The plaintiff owned the registered trademark ―TATA‖ and the defendants were claimed to be using its mark for doing online
trading
in
cryptocurrency
through
their
websites
―www.tatabonus.com‖ and ―www.hakunamatata.finance‖. It was further averred that the owner of the websites had its office based in the UK. Behind the website, there were also a team of individuals who were UK nationals of
2022 SCC OnLine Del 2968.
Pakistani origin. The question was whether territorial jurisdiction was made out. 179. The Division Bench began its analysis by citing a decision in Millennium & Copthorne International Limited v. Aryans Plaza Services Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.,116 where a learned Single Judge diluted the Banyan Tree standard and dispensed with the requirement of showing injury or harm to the plaintiff within the forum state. The second question answered in Banyan Tree was what is the burden of proof on the plaintiff to prima facie establish that the forum court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit. This was answered by the Division Bench by holding that the plaintiff would have to plead and produce material to prima facie show that some commercial transaction using the website was entered into by the defendant with a user of its website within the forum state resulting in an injury or harm to the plaintiff within the forum state. This answer given by the Division Bench was ignored by the learned Single Judge in Millennium & Copthorne International Limited. A perusal of the decision in Millennium & Copthorne International Limited would reveal that no reasons were given to detract from the view in Banyan Tree. The learned Single Judge, thus, could not have diluted the ruling in Banyan Tree. 180. In Tata Sons, the Court, thereafter, referred to a decision of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Lifestyle Equities CV v. Amazon UK Services Ltd.,117 and laid down that ―targeting‖ is to be interpreted as per the
2018 SCC OnLine Del 8260. [2022] EWCA Civ 552.
dictum in Lifestyle Equities CV.118 While the decision in Banyan Tree was premised on the tests adopted in the USA, Tata Sons switched the baton to the law declared by English courts which was premised on ―targeting‖ as opposed to specific targeting which was required under the Banyan Tree standard. 181. Para. 22 of Tata Sons deserves to be extracted, it reads as under: ―22. We are in complete agreement with the above view of the English court. Even if a website is not directed at customers in a particular country, the fact that they are not restricted by the website to have access to it, is enough to characterise it as targeting. Targeting need not be a very aggressive act of marketing aiming at a particular set of customers. Mere looming presence of a website in a geography and ability of the customers therein to access the website is sufficient, in a given case. It may not be forgotten that in the matters of infringement of trade mark, it is the possibility of confusion and deception in the mind of public due to infringing trade mark that is good enough for the court to grant injunction.‖
182. The opinion of the Division Bench that a given website not being restricted to a forum constitutes targeting does not sit well with the observations made in para. 41 of Banyan Tree. In the said paragraph, the argument of ―purposeful availment‖ being replaced with the test of ―purposeful avoidance‖ was rejected. Thus, the mere fact that filters don‘t exist to block the access at a forum state cannot be sufficient to constitute specific targeting. The plaintiff must not merely show the lack of blockers but something in addition to that. 183. The finding that a ―mere looming presence of a website in a geography and ability of the customers therein to access the website is
It may be noted that the decision of the Court of Appeal, though affirmed in its outcome by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in Lifestyle Equities CV and Anr. v. Amazon UK Services Ltd. and Ors., 2024 UKSC 8, was modified to some extent in terms of its reasoning.
sufficient‖ appears to be against the ratio of both Banyan Tree and Lifestyle Equities CV where the UK Supreme Court, in appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal, observed as under: ―18. Accessibility of the website was not enough, however, as the court went on to explain, at para 94: ―On the other hand, the mere accessibility of the trader‘s or the intermediary‘s website in the member state in which the consumer is domiciled is insufficient. The same is true of mention of an email address and of other contact details, or of use of a language or a currency which are the language and/or currency generally used in the member state in which the trader is established. **** 21. On the other hand, the court continued, at para 64, mere accessibility of the accused website from the territory covered by the trade mark was not enough to establish targeting of consumers in that territory. That would have the consequence that such websites and advertisements which, although obviously targeted solely at consumers in third states, would wrongly be subject to EU law. **** 25. The Court of Appeal revisited the issue of targeting in Argos Ltd v Argos Systems Inc [2018] EWCA Civ 2211; [2019] Bus LR 1728. There, Floyd LJ (with whom Lord Kitchin JSC and Sir Colin Rimer agreed) emphasised, at para 48, that the mere fact that a website is accessible from anywhere in the world, and therefore may attract occasional interest from consumers there when this is not intended, should not give rise to any liability. He continued…‖
184. The reasoning adopted in Tata Sons to dilute the decision in Banyan Tree, thus would have no precedential value. 185. Independently, however, a fact centric limitation could be added to the rule in Banyan Tree. In Banyan Tree, the defendants were residents of Hyderabad. The question which the Division Bench, therefore, answered was: what would warrant jurisdiction being conferred upon a given forum court under Section 20(c) of the CPC, given that the avenues under Section 20(a) always remain open. In order to prevent Section 20(c) from becoming an unruly horse, the burden of proof requirement under Banyan Tree was
conceived of. However, in the facts of Tata Sons, the defendant had no presence in India at all. If a given plaintiff cannot invoke the provisions of Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act and Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, then the only avenue which remains available is Section 20(c). 186. If, in such a case, compliance with the burden of proof under the Banyan Tree standard is demanded, a plaintiff may not be able to sue at all. Thus, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of a case, particularly, where the defendants had no presence in India the Banyan Tree standard may be relaxed. This relaxation is not available where defendants reside in Delhi and no exceptional situations are presented. 187. Before parting with the decision in Tata Sons, a brief observation may be made on the decision of Lifestyle Equities CV, which was relied upon in Tata Sons. While the said decision of the English court was premised on the language used in the EU regulations, and thus is not per se applicable, some guidance may be taken in the manner in which targeting is adjudged. 188. The specific targeting and purposeful availment required by Banyan Tree is not intended to be a subjective intention of a person to step into a forum court‘s territory. The Court while seeking compliance with the Banyan Tree standards is not engaging in an exercise to determine the state of mind of the person controlling the corporation. The intention is to be objectively determined by analysing the indicia available on a given website. The words used by the UK Supreme Court, at para. 30 provide some guidance: ―the task of the court is to decide whether the foreign trader’s activities, viewed objectively, from the perspective of the average
consumer, are targeted at such consumers in the UK. It is therefore not necessary to establish that the foreign trader had the subjective intention of targeting customers in the UK‖. 189. In Cable News Networks INC v. CTVN Calcutta Television Network Pvt. Ltd.,119 a learned Single Judge, after relying upon WWE and Tata Sons, dispensed with the requirement propounded in Banyan Tree of prima facie proving that an actual commercial transaction took place. This, as has been noted above, may not be permissible. 190. In Johnson & Johnson Pte. Ltd. v. Abbireddi Satish Kumar and Ors.,120 a suit for trademark infringement was filed by the plaintiff claiming that its ―ORSL‖ marks and trade dress were being infringed by the defendant. The Court gave the following reasoning at para. 19 to conclude that jurisdiction at Delhi was made out: ―19. Considering the averments made in the plaint, it is manifest that this Court has jurisdiction in the present matter. The plaintiff has made categorical averments in the plaint as regards placing an order for the products of the defendants in Delhi. Thus, when the website marketing the goods of the defendants is accessible from Delhi, though the said website may have stopped its operation subsequently, and products may not have been ultimately delivered in Delhi, the very fact that the said website could be accessed with the products of the defendants shown online, at the time of filing of the suit, this Court would have territorial jurisdiction. The same would constitute use in relation to goods, as the goods of the defendants were promoted and advertised through the third-party website, within the jurisdiction of this Court, at the time of filing of the suit.‖
191. A reading of the said decision would reveal that the learned Single Judge did not, at all, avert to the decision in Banyan Tree. Reference was made to Burger King Corporation, and its exhortation on the ―use‖ of a
2023 SCC OnLine Del 2436. 2025 SCC OnLine Del 688.
mark was used to claim that the mere listing of goods on a website is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. It may be noted that the Banyan Tree tests apply to infringement cases as well. Burger King Corporation merely describes the kinds of infringement that may take place by various uses of the mark. However, if the infringement is online, the Banyan Tree tests must necessarily govern the field. The only way in which Burger King could be considered as superseding the dictum in Banyan Tree would be if it can be said that the Division Bench in Banyan Tree was not aware of the ways in which a trademark gets infringed under the Trade Marks Act. There is no indication that the Bench was not aware of the provisions relating to this aspect. 192. In Sun Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. v. Artura Pharmaceuticals P. Ltd.,121 a co-ordinate bench of this Court relying on Tata Sons Ltd., held that the requirement to consummate a commercial transaction has been dispensed with in toto. Resultantly, by merely relying on the ―Contact Page‖ of the defendant‘s website, it was concluded that the Banyan Tree standard of purposeful availment through specific targeting, was satisfied. As noticed above, the same may not be permissible, least of all, because of the foundational factual difference between Tata Sons Ltd. and Sun Pharmaceuticals. Similar observations may be made regarding the decision in Ravinder Singh v. Regoshin Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.,122 which was rendered relying on Sun Pharmaceuticals.
2025 SCC OnLine Del 8642. 2026 SCC OnLine Del 3716.
193. The decision of Kohinoor Seed Fields has already been considered under the heading of ―carrying on business‖. It has been observed at paras. 102-103 and 111-112 of this judgement, that the incorporation of WWE into Section 20(a) of the CPC may not be correct. The reliance on Tata Sons to hold that the principle in Banyan Tree has been diluted has also been examined, and it has been found that material issues were not pointed out to the Division Bench. Additionally, it appears that Kohinoor Seed Fields, has also made an observation on Section 20(c) of the CPC. While there may not be a detailed analysis of how access to websites constitutes cause of action, in para. 20.3 of the judgment, the Division Bench has concluded that the impugned goods being available for sale across e-commerce websites, including at Delhi, constitutes a substantial part of the cause of action. The said paragraph reads as under: ―20.3 We need not delve too deep into this aspect, as, in our view, a substantial part of the cause of action in the present case does arise within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, because (i) the asserted trade marks of the appellant stand registered within the jurisdiction of this Court, (ii) the Marketing Agreement was executed at Delhi and (iii) the allegedly infringing goods of the respondent are available for sale and purchase, across e-commerce websites, at Delhi. As such, no occasion arises to invoke the Ultra Home Construction doctrine.
(Emphasis supplied) 194. This conclusion was reached by the Division Bench despite observing at para. 19.5.5 that the decision in WWE is not an authority on Section 20(c) of the CPC. It would be fit to merely observe that the observations made in the context of Section 20(c) constituted obiter dicta and not binding precedent.
195. The subsequent decision in Rukhmani Keshwani v. Raju Agarbatti Works & Anr.,123 however, applies the passing reference in Kohinoor Seed Fields to the substantive interpretation of Section 20(c). Previously, Courts attempted to move around the decision in Banyan Tree, recognising its application in the domain of Section 20(c). In Rukhmani Keshwani, the Court found that the law has developed past Banyan Tree. Paras. 54 to 56 and 58 of the decision in Rukhmani Keshwani are reproduced as under: ―54. The jurisprudence governing internet-based territorial jurisdiction has evolved progressively, beginning with the principles enunciated in Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy, where the Court differentiated between a passive website and an interactive commercial platform designed to target consumers within a particular jurisdiction. 55. This principle, however, did not remain confined to the narrow passive versus interactive website dichotomy. The doctrine was subsequently expanded and contextualized in WWE (supra), wherein the Court recognized that the true test is whether the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the forum by commercially targeting customers therein through electronic means. 56. The aforesaid principles were further elaborated by one of us (C. Hari Shankar J.) in Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. v. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt. Ltd., where this Court, while noting the transformation of commercial activity in the digital era, observed that modern ecommerce platforms are designed to transcend territorial barriers and facilitate commercial engagement across jurisdictions. This Court emphasized that once a defendant consciously projects its goods or services through interactive online interfaces enabling commercial solicitation, inquiry, negotiation, or purchase by consumers situated within a forum State, such activity constitutes a material part of the cause of action. **** 58. The ratio emerging from Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd (supra) is that the Court must examine the substance of the commercial targeting and the purposeful availment of the forum, rather than mechanically confining itself to the existence or absence of completed transactions. Thus, where online listings are intended to solicit business, display commercial contact
2026 SCC OnLine Del 4904.
details, facilitate customer interaction, and expand market reach into multiple jurisdictions, the territorial nexus is sufficiently established.
196. It is difficult to discern a basis in either WWE or Kohinoor Seed Fields for the conclusions noted in paras. 54 to 56 and 58 above. 197. WWE as has been noted above was a decision rendered in the context of Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act and Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act. Badar Durrez Ahmed J., explicitly, at para. 8 of the decision notes that the decision of Banyan Tree shall not have any application. If that be the case, the finding in Rukhmani Keshwani at para. 55 that the doctrine of Banyan Tree was ―expanded and contextualised‖ in WWE, may not be correct. 198. Next, the finding rendered in para. 56 of Rukhmani Keshwani that Kohinoor Seed Fields has held that an activity constituting the conscious projection of goods or services ―through interactive online interfaces enabling commercial solicitation, inquiry, negotiation, or purchase by consumers‖ also does not seem to find support in the text of Kohinoor Seed Fields. Similar observations may be made with respect to the ruling in para. 58 of Rukhmani Keshwani that Kohinoor Seed Fields allows for sufficient ―territorial nexus‖ to be made out if online listings are intended to ―solicit business, display commercial contact details, facilitate customer interaction, and expand market reach into multiple jurisdictions.‖ In the context of Section 20(c) of the CPC, this appears to be against the dictum of Banyan Tree. Further, in para. 59 of Rukhmani Keshwani the following has been observed:
―59. This Bench in Raju Kumar v. Vinod Sah (authored by C. Hari Shankar J.) relied upon and applied the principles enunciated in Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd (supra) while determining territorial jurisdiction in online trademark disputes. The judgment in Raju Kumar (supra) has since been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Vinod Sah v. Raju Kumar.‖
199. It appears that an SLP124 was dismissed against the decision of Raju Kumar v. Vinod Sah. It is trite law, as was also declared in Kunhayammed and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Anr.,125 that the dismissal of an SLP in limine does not amount to a merger of the impugned decision with the order of the Supreme Court. Thus, the order remains as that of our Court. 200. Before parting, a brief reference may especially be made to the Copyright Act. The decisions of this Court in Nilesh Girkar v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. and Ors.,126 and Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. v. Mohalla Tech Pvt. Ltd.,127 concern factual matrices where the conclusion of commercial transactions may not be possible. In such a situation it would not be appropriate to insist upon a commercial transaction where none can take place. Making available a copyrighted film on rogue websites would give rise to a cause of action by it becoming accessible in Delhi. That is not, however, the end of the inquiry. As the discussion below shall reveal, considerations of forum conveniens shall have a role to play. The place where the uprooting of the protected content takes place, where the plaintiff resides and carries on business, are material considerations to determine as to whether the cause of action at Delhi is
SLP (C) No. 12585/2026, order dt. 30.04.2026. AIR 2000 SC 2587. 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6040. 2025:DHC:11002.
slender/minuscule and the lis is better left to be adjudicated by another court that is forum conveniens. 201. From the discussion above the following conclusions can be drawn concerning cause of action for infringement and passing off in the online world: a. To establish that cause of action (wholly or in part) has arisen through the means of website activity, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the jurisdiction of the forum court by specifically targeting persons within its territory and it resulting in an injury or harm to the plaintiff within the forum state. b. Additionally, the plaintiff must also demonstrate the conclusion of commercially concluded transactions between the defendant and persons within the forum court‘s jurisdiction through the website in question. c. The requirement of prima facie demonstrating commercially concluded transactions taking place can be relaxed in a case where the plaintiff cannot invoke the provisions of Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act and Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, and the defendant has no presence in India at all. D. “DYNAMIC EFFECT” AND IT CONFERRING JURISDICTION
202. In a number of cases concerning the present batch of matters, for instance CS(COMM) 611/2026, CS(COMM) 917/2026, CS(COMM) 444/2026, and CS(COMM) 874/2026, the plaintiff has claimed jurisdiction of Delhi on the basis of the elusive expression of the ―Dynamic Effect‖ of the infringement taking place in Delhi. There is no reference made at the bar to dictionaries, lexicons, or commentaries to indicate what dynamic effect is. The arguments of counsel would indicate that it constitutes the effect that an infringement has at the place where the plaintiff has its presence. 203. A brief reference may also be made to the decision in Adyar Gate, where jurisdiction was also found to be made out under Section 20(c) of the CPC. The case concerned an action for trade mark infringement and passing off filed by ITC Ltd. which had its registered office at Kolkata and a restaurant at Delhi. Invoking an expression, which may ordinarily lie in the doctrine of forum conveniens, the Court held that the ―determinative part‖ of the cause of action had accrued at Delhi. By observing that the use of the mark by the defendant in its restaurant at Chennai, had an effect on ITC Ltd.‘s restaurant at Delhi, jurisdiction of this Court was established. By doing so, the Court, effectively applied the dynamic effect principle using the text of Section 20(c). 204. The dynamic effect principle and such an interpretation of part cause of action, in the opinion of this Court, may not confer jurisdiction. The rationale behind the legislature enacting Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act and Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act was allowing a given plaintiff to sue where it resides, carries on business or personally works for gain. If indeed, the effect, dynamic or otherwise, of an infringement could confer
jurisdiction under Section 20(c) of the CPC, why would the legislature have enacted the specialised provisions? No tenable answer can be found. The concept of dynamic effect, therefore, appears to be unknown to jurisdictional principles governing the specialised statutes and the CPC. A pleading that invokes jurisdiction basis the ―dynamic effect‖ like it does in the above-noted suits, ought to be ignored. 205. From the discussion above the following conclusions concerning the principle of dynamic effect can be drawn: a. If the principle of dynamic effect is applied to cases of infringement, the amendment to the Trade Marks Act and the Copyright Act shall be rendered otiose. Jurisdiction, therefore, cannot be established basis this principle. b. An attempt to find jurisdiction under Section 20(c) of the CPC on the basis that the effect of the infringement is felt at the place where the plaintiff has its presence, also, goes against the spirit of the specialised provisions. It also renders the amendments nugatory. Such an interpretation, thus, ordinarily ought to be avoided. E. THE USE OF AN “INVESTIGATOR” 206. In Machinenfabrik Rieter AG and Anr. v. Tex Tech Industries India Pvt. Ltd. and Anr.,128 a suit was filed for trademark and patent infringement. The plaintiffs had their registered office in Mumbai, defendant no. 1 was placed in Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu, and defendant no. 2 was a resident of
2021 SCC OnLine Del 1825.
Chandigarh. None of the parties had their head office, branch office, or residence within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Delhi‘s jurisdiction was sought to be invoked by making the following pleadings: ―That the plaintiffs instructed their investigator to ascertain the scope and extent of the defendant no. 1‘s activities. Pursuant to initial investigation, the plaintiffs‘ investigator placed an order with defendant 1 via an email dated 26-12-2019; a performa invoice was issued on 27-12-2019; thereafter, an email was received from a representative of defendant 2 who informed the investigator that defendant 2 is a supplier of spare parts manufactured by defendant 1. The plaintiffs, then, made the payment and samples were despatched by defendant 1 on 29-1-2020 and the same were received by the plaintiff's investigator on 31-1-2020 in Delhi. Two such separate orders were also received by the plaintiffs‘ investigator. It was claimed by the plaintiff that the products so received from defendant 1 at Delhi infringe the plaintiffs‘ patent. The plaintiffs had also filed documents including invoices showing delivery of goods in Delhi.‖
207. It was found by the Court that the dictum of the Division Bench in Banyan Tree, concerning the impermissibility of trap transactions, does not apply to offline transactions. Para. 13, in which the finding was reached, reads as under: ―13. In my opinion the above judgment of the Division Bench does not have application to the facts of this case. That was a case in which territorial jurisdiction was claimed by the plaintiff based on the defendants alleged presence in Delhi through their website which was accessible in Delhi. It was contended that the website is not a passive website since inputs from customers through interactive web page were being taken. The court was dealing with the issue of territorial jurisdiction of this Court on account of the defendants hosting a website which was accessible in Delhi. It was in those facts that the Division Bench had come to the aforenoted conclusions. The present case is a case of offline transaction.‖
208. Two issues arise concerning the above-noted conclusion: first, a learned Single Judge in Indovax (P) Ltd. had already applied the law laid down in Banyan Tree to offline transactions; no reasons were given for departing from the said view; and second, a reading of Banyan Tree,
particularly paras. 46-56, would reveal that the discussion of Banyan Tree was not made solely in the context of online transactions. The case law, taken note of by the Division Bench to arrive at the answer to the third question formulated in the reference, was not exclusively concerning online transactions. 209. As a matter of principle as well, allowing jurisdiction to be conferred through transactions entered into between an investigator of the plaintiff and a given defendant seems unjust and unfair. Allowing this to happen would allow litigants to engage in forum shopping and litigation tourism. If this were to be condoned, all that is required is for a given plaintiff to have a clever enough agent who orchestrates a well-designed plan to concoct jurisdiction before a given court. It has been settled by a catena of decisions that jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a court where none in actuality exists. By allowing this, effectively, jurisdiction is being artificially created at a given place which the plaintiff believes is favourable to him. The ―investigator‖ may very well be at Port Blair, or arguably may be asked to be at that place, when a defendant is at Ladakh. The mere fact that goods were delivered in Port Blair should not become a reason to force the person at Ladakh to go to Port Blair. 210. Jurisdiction rules can never be interpreted in a manner that allows a plaintiff to engage in such a mischief. Courts are not meant to be silent spectator in this theatre called ―jurisdiction‖ scripted by the plaintiff. The scene in such scripted plays usually goes in the following manner: An investigator in Delhi is engaged by a company in Mumbai to get goods delivered from a company, which operates in Chennai. This Court is moved
and a vociferous plea is raised that under Section 20(c) of the CPC cause of action has partly arisen in Delhi. In order to protect the plaintiff‘s goodwill, the counsel for the plaintiff eloquently argues that urgent ex parte ad-interim reliefs are required to be granted. 211. Such ‗gaming of the system‘ cannot be allowed to go by. Transactions with such an ―investigator‖, in and of themselves, are not sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. Two exceptions, however, are possible: first, where the plaintiff can prima facie demonstrate, on the basis of his plaint and the documents attached with it, that but for such an ―investigator‖ being hired to plead jurisdiction, cause of action under Section 20(c) of the CPC could not be maintained before another court. And second, where ex facie it can be demonstrated that sales of the impugned goods are taking place within a forum court, and an investigator merely provides evidence. For instance, if the defendant has readily supplied its goods within Delhi to various retailers, distributors and stockists, and the plaintiff‘s investigator buys these goods from these classes of persons, that report may not be discarded. 212. However, if in the natural course of events, jurisdiction can in fact be founded under Section 20(c) of the CPC at a place other than Delhi, the use of an ―investigator‖ to forge jurisdiction before this court, shall, ordinarily, be an abuse of the process of law and impermissible. The fact of the plaintiff being aware of the defendant using his registered trademark, or passing off its goods, in the ordinary and natural course of the trade, at a jurisdiction different from Delhi, is most material to the lis. If the plaintiff is aware of such facts the option of engaging an ―investigator‖ may get foreclosed. NonSignature Not Verified
disclosure with respect to this, shall amount to the plaintiff coming to the court with unclean hands. An equitable relief of injunction can never be granted to such a claimant. It is trite law as was also noted by RC Lahoti J. in Dorstener Maschinenfabrik AG v. Sand Plast India Ltd. and Ors.,129 that despite a given claimant satisfying the trinity requirements, an injunction can be refused on grounds, inter alia, of conduct as it is an equitable relief. 213. Additionally, it may be noted that despite the plaintiff not disclosing to the court facts pertaining to the defendant‘s usual, natural, and ordinary sale/use of the impugned mark, the Court may in exercise of powers conferred under Section 168 of the BSA put relevant questions to the parties. The said provision reads as under: ―168. Judge's power to put questions or order production. The Judge may, in order to discover or obtain proof of relevant facts, ask any question he considers necessary, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties about any fact; and may order the production of any document or thing; and neither the parties nor their representatives shall be entitled to make any objection to any such question or order, nor, without the leave of the Court, to cross-examine any witness upon any answer given in reply to any such question: Provided that the judgment must be based upon facts declared by this Adhiniyam to be relevant, and duly proved: Provided further that this section shall not authorise any Judge to compel any witness to answer any question, or to produce any document which such witness would be entitled to refuse to answer or produce under sections 127 to 136, both inclusive, if the question were asked or the document were called for by the adverse party; nor shall the Judge ask any question which it would be improper for any other person to ask under section 151 or 152; nor shall he dispense with primary evidence of any document, except in the cases hereinbefore excepted.‖ [
1994 SCC OnLine Del 777.
214. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen in his speech,130 while elaborating on the purpose of Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (the precursor to the BSA), opined: ―…It is absolutely necessary that the Judge should not only hear what is put before him by others, but that he should ascertain by his own inquiries how the facts actually stand. In order to do this, it will frequently be necessary for him to go into matters which are not themselves relevant to the matter in issue, but may lead to something that is, and it is in order to arm Judges with express authority to do this that section 165, which has been so much objected to, has been framed.‖
A brief reference may also be made to the following portion of Sir John Woodroffe & Syed Amir Ali’s Law of Evidence:131 “Section 165 is intended to arm the judge with the most extensive power possible for the purpose of getting at the truth. The effect of this section is that in order to get to the bottom of the matter before it, the court will be able to look at and enquire into every fact whatever and thus possibly acquire valuable indicative evidence which may lead to other evidence strictly relevant and admissible.”132
And: ―It is obvious that the judge contemplated by the section is not a mere umpire at a witcombat between the lawyers for the parties whose only duty is to enforce the rules of the game and declare at the end of the combat who has won and who has lost.‖133
215. The subsequent decision in Reiter AG and Anr. v. Kavassery Narayanaswamy Venkatasubramanian,134 was rendered on the basis of the decision in Machinenfabrik Rieter AG; the conclusion reached may be doubted on the grounds detailed above.
Speech of the Hon‘ble Sir James Fitzjames Stephen on the 12 March 1872, in submitting the Report of the Committee to the Council. 21st Ed., 2020, Lexis Nexis. 21st Ed., 2020, Lexis Nexis, Vol. IV, Pg. 4873. 21st Ed., 2020, Lexis Nexis, Vol. IV, Pg. 4881. 2025 SCC OnLine Del 4379.
216. From the discussion above, the following conclusions can be drawn concerning the use of an investigator/agent to establish jurisdiction: a. As a rule, the use of an investigator or any other person set up by the plaintiff to find jurisdiction before a forum court amounts to concocting jurisdiction. The findings of such an investigator, thus, ordinarily, cannot be relied upon. b. The two exceptions to this rule are: first, where the plaintiff can prima facie demonstrate, on the basis of his plaint and the documents attached with it, that but for such an ―investigator‖ being hired to plead jurisdiction, cause of action under Section 20(c) of the CPC could not be maintained before another court. And second, where ex facie it can be demonstrated that sales of the impugned goods are taking place within a forum court, and an investigator merely provides evidence. For instance, if the defendant has readily supplied its goods within Delhi to various retailers, distributors and stockists, and the plaintiff‘s investigator buys these goods from these classes of persons, that report may not be discarded. F. THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON-CONVENIENS 217. The conclusions rendered by this Court under this section curtail the options available to a plaintiff to institute a suit. The objection raised by counsel, against the reasoning adopted by this Court, is an alleged unbridled right that the plaintiff has to institute a suit, in the absence of an express bar contained in the statute. In doing so the counsel have conflated the
availability of a forum before which a suit may lie, with an indefeasible vested right to bring the suit in that forum. 218. This right, perhaps may have existed, at a given point in time; the law, however, has travelled far ahead. Today, suits ought to be tested on the ground on forum non conveniens. The development in law was captured in eloquent words by Lord Denning MR in Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. v. Block,135 the material portion of which reads as under: “The law It often happens that a plaintiff is entitled to bring proceedings in two or more jurisdictions. Sometimes it is said that the choice is his. He can choose whichever of them suits him best. If he can get more damages in one than he can in the other, then good luck to him. Let him go there. If he will be met by a time bar in one and not in the other, let him go to the one where he is not barred. If it is more convenient for the plaintiff in one than it is for the defendant, then the plaintiff can choose. You need not spin a coin between the two contestants. It always comes down in favour of the plaintiff, so it is said, unless the defendant can prove that it would work an injustice to him. That was the way the English Court of Appeal approached the problem in St. Pierre v. South American Stores (Gath & Chaves) Ltd., (1936) 1 KB 382, [1935] All ER Rep 408 and the Supreme Court of Illinois approached it in James v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co., (1958) 152 NE 2d 858. … The basis of all this reasoning has now been removed. In England by the House of Lords in MacShannon v. Rockware Glass Ltd., (1978) 1 All ER 625, [1978] AC 795. In the United States by the Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, (1981) 454 US 235. The plaintiff has no longer an inborn right to choose his own forum. He no longer wins the toss on every throw. The decision rests with the Courts. No matter which jurisdiction is invoked, the Court must hold the balance between the plaintiff and the defendant. It must take into account the relative advantages and disadvantages to each of them: not only the juridical advantages and disadvantages, but also the personal conveniences and inconveniences: not only the private interests of the parties but also the public interests involved. The Court decides according to which way the balance comes down. …”
(19831) 1 WLR 730.
219. The jurisdictional tension in suits filed before the Intellectual Property Division,136 at its core, stems from archaic procedural laws being applied to modern, technology-driven, manifestation of substantive rights. Section 20 of the CPC, as a residuary jurisdictional rule, has been in existence ever since the Bengal Regulation III of 1793, under the Cornwallis Code. The essence of the provision has remained the same, throughout the procedural codes of 1882, 1877 and 1859. The options given to a plaintiff under these provisions did not take into account actions being founded on the use of internet. The concept of a ‗pan-India‘ harm, injury, or effect, could not have been fathomed by the drafters of these provisions. A simple textual application of Section 20 to a lis concerning intellectual property rights, may result in unintended consequences as the jurisdictional rule, in most cases, is a misfit for the action it seeks to govern. 220. Section 20 of the CPC provides a dual umbrella of options to institute a suit. The first umbrella is defendant centric: a plaint can be presented within the local limits of a court where the defendant resides (actually or voluntarily), carries on business, or personally works for gain. This rule resonates with the Justinian dictum ‗actor sequitur forum rei‘ i.e., plaintiff follows the defendant‘s forum. It forces a plaintiff to leave his home-ground and go into the territory of the defendant.137 On occasions this may be inconvenient. Thus, an option is given to the plaintiff to file where the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen. The first illustration to Section 20 exemplifies this scenario. It is reproduced as under:
―IPD‖. The dictum in M/s RSPL Limited v. Mukesh Sharma and Anr., FAO (OS) No. 145/2016 and Chandra Kishore Chaurasia v. R A Perfumery Works Pvt. Ltd., 2022:DHC:4454, similarly, also may not remain good law today.
―(a) A is a tradesman in Calcutta, B carries on business in Delhi. B, by his agent in Calcutta, buys goods of A and requests A to deliver them to the East Indian Railway Company. A delivers the goods accordingly in Calcutta. A may sue B for the price of the goods either in Calcutta, where the cause of action has arisen, or in Delhi, where B carries on business.‖
221. The person ‗A‘ in the illustration has an option to sue the defendant at Calcutta, which is the place where the cause of action accrued. He need not go to the far off place viz. Delhi. The object and purpose of allowing a plaint to be presented before a Court where the cause of action partly accrues is to enable the plaintiff to sue nearer to himself, not to take the lis away from the place having a dominant and substantial connection with the case. 222. In Krishna Veni Nigam v. Harish Nigam,138 the Supreme Court was moved for the transfer of a case pending before the Family Court, Jabalpur, to the Family Court of Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. The Court held that the doctrine of forum conveniens is applicable in civil proceedings despite the plaintiff being the dominus litis. The Supreme Court, therefore, did not find the powers of transfer vested with it to be in conflict with the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Para. 13 of the said decision reads as under: 13. We have considered the above suggestions. In this respect, we may also refer to the doctrine of forum non conveniens which can be applied in matrimonial proceedings for advancing interest of justice. Under the said doctrine, the court exercises its inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings at a forum which is considered not to be convenient and there is any other forum which is considered to be more convenient for the interest of all the parties at the ends of justice. In Modi Entertainment Network v. W.S.G. Cricket Pte. Ltd. [Modi Entertainment Network v. W.S.G. Cricket Pte. Ltd., (2003) 4 SCC 341] this Court observed : (SCC pp. 356-57, para 19) **** Though these observations have been made in the context of granting anti-suit injunction, the principle can be followed in regulating the exercise of jurisdiction of the court where proceedings are instituted. In a civil
(2017) 4 SCC 150.
proceeding, the plaintiff is the dominus litis but if more than one court has jurisdiction, court can determine which is the convenient forum and lay down conditions in the interest of justice subject to which its jurisdiction may be availed [Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 254, para 30] .
(Emphasis supplied) 223. In Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.,139 a Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court speaking through Vikramjit Sen J. laid down the judicial approach which is to be adopted on jurisdiction, and specifically for Section 20 of the CPC. The Court found that the doctrine of forum conveniens has application in civil suits. Para. 12 of the said decision reads as under: ―JUDICIAL APPROACH ON JURISDICTION 12. We shall take a short digression in terms of brief discussion of the approach preferred by this Court in the context of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as, ‗CPC‘), which inter alia, enjoins that a suit must be instituted in a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the Defendant actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, or where the cause of action wholly or in part arises. The Explanation to that Section is important; it prescribes that a corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office, or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place. Since this provision primarily keeps the Defendant in perspective, the corporation spoken of in the Explanation, obviously refers to the Defendant. A plain reading of Section 20 of the CPC arguably allows the Plaintiff a multitude of choices in regard to where it may institute its lis, suit or action. Corporations and partnership firms, and even sole proprietorship concerns, could well be transacting business simultaneously in several cities. If sub-sections (a) and (b) of Section 20 are to be interpreted disjunctively from sub-section (c), as the use of the word ‗or‘ appears to permit the Plaintiff to file the suit at any of the places where the cause of action may have arisen regardless of whether the Defendant has even a subordinate office at that place. However, if the Defendants’ location is to form the fulcrum of jurisdiction, and it has an office also at the place where the cause of action has occurred, it has been held
(2014) 9 SCC 129.
that the Plaintiff is precluded from instituting the suit anywhere else. Obviously, this is also because every other place would constitute a forum non conveniens. This Court has harmonised the various hues of the conundrum of the place of suing in several cases and has gone to the extent of laying down that it should be courts endeavour to locate the place where the cause of action has substantially arisen and reject others where it may have incidentally arisen. Patel Roadways Limited, Bombay v. Prasad Trading Company, AIR 1992 SC 1514 : (1991) 4 SCC 270 prescribes that if the Defendant-corporation has a subordinate office in the place where the cause of action arises, litigation must be instituted at that place alone, regardless of the amplitude of options postulated in Section 20 of the CPC. We need not dilate on this point beyond making a reference to ONGC v. Utpal Kumar Basu (1994) 4 SCC 711 and South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Nav Bharat Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. (1996) 3 SCC 443.‖
224. In a similar vein this Court in Ansal Buildwell Ltd. v. North Eastern Indira Gandhi Institute of Health & Medical Science and Ors.,140 noted that the doctrine of forum conveniens applies in the context of civil proceedings and had held as under: ―25. In the context of forum conveniens it may be noted that in an appropriate case, a court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the said doctrine. While invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens a court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction notwithstanding that some part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.‖
225. The chartered High Courts of Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, having original ordinary jurisdiction, routinely apply the doctrine of forum conveniens to civil suits. For instance in Madanlal Jalan v. Madanlal,141 the Calcutta High Court held that leave to sue may be revoked by applying the doctrine of forum conveniens. The material portion of the decision reads as under:
2005 SCC OnLine Del 268. 1945 SCC OnLine Cal 145.
―(g) that in giving or refusing leave or maintaining or revoking leave the Court will ordinarily take into consideration the balance of convenience and may, if the balance is definitely in favour of the defendant, apply the doctrine of forum conveniences;‖
Relying on Madanlal Jalan, in Union of India v. M. Kuppuswamy Naicker,142 the Calcutta High Court similarly observed: ―6. It is well settled that in giving or refusing leave or maintaining or revoking leave the Court would ordinarily take into consideration the balance of convenience and may, if the balance is definitely in favour of the defendant, apply the doctrine of forum convenience, vide Madanlal Jalan v. Madanlal reported in AIR 1949 Cal 495.‖
226. In TN Seshan v. All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam,143 the High Court of Andhra Pradesh decided a challenge to an order declining to revoke the leave for instituting four suits by plaintiff and granting leave for a fifth suit. At para. 12 the Court took note of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, it reads as under: ―12. Before, however, we part with this judgment we propose to clarify that refusal to revoke the leave is not treated as an order to deny to the defendants the right to challenge the facts or traverse the facts which appear to give rise to the cause of action and in case the facts alleged in the plaint stand rebutted or disproved or not proved by the plaintiff in accordance with law, the Court may take the view that the Court's ordinary civil jurisdiction is not attracted and the suit should be filed somewhere else. One of the settled principles is, while examining whether, on the ground of a part of cause of action of the suit has arisen within the territorial limits of the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the court, leave should be granted or not, to test the locus conveniente i.e., whether it shall be convenient for the plaintiff and inconvenient for the defendant or whether it shall be convenient for the defendant and not for the plaintiff, or whether it shall be convenient for both, if the trial is held in the court and not anywhere else. The principle of balance of convenience of the parties in this regard is stated in a Bench decision of the Madras High Court by one of us in Turicorin Alkali Chemicals & Fertilisers Ltd. v. Cochin Silicate & Galss Industries (4) 1992 (1) LW 308. In the instant case, however such a plea is not required to be
1977 SCC OnLine Cal 235. 1995 SCC OnLine AP 546.
examined at all for it was a plea of inconvenience of the defendant which prevailed before the Supreme Court and the cases have been transferred from the Madras High Court to this Court.‖
227. In Arun Digambar Varangaonkar v. M/s Karpe Gruh Udyog and Ors.,144 a suit was filed before the Bombay High Court for trademark and copyright infringement along with a claim for passing off. It was contended that the defendants were using the plaintiff‘s protected artistic work and mark in relation to masala products and spice preparations so as to infringe upon protected works, and also pass off his goods as that of the plaintiffs. It was contended by the plaintiff therein that he resides at Amravati and also at Bombay. The products of the plaintiff were sold in Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat. The plaintiff also caused an enquiry and purportedly found that the impugned preparations of the defendants were available in Bombay and caused purchases of them to be made. Two cash memos in respect of the test purchases made by the plaintiff from Messrs Amruta Traders had also been placed on record to demonstrate the preparations being the impugned trademark. 228. RM Lodha J. (as his Lordship then was), found that the plaintiff mainly resides at Amravati and carries on business also at Amravati. The goods were also manufactured at Amravati. The defendants reside and also manufacture the impugned goods at Amravati. It was found that two cash memos produced by the plaintiff, prima facie, showing sale of goods at Bombay was not sufficient to entertain a suit at Bombay. Invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens, the Court observed as under:
1997 SCC OnLine Bom 132.
―10. From the perusal of the plaint itself, it transpires that plaintiff mainly resides at Amravati and he carries on business also at Amravati. The goods are also manufactured by Plaintiff at Amravati. The Defendants reside nt Amravati and they also manufacture the goods concerning the disputed trade mark and the device at Amravati. Except two cash memos produced by the Plaintiff along with the plaint there is no other material prima facie showing the sale of the disputed goods manufactured by the Defendants in Bombay or within the jurisdiction of this Court. Subsection (2) of section 62 of the Copy Right provides that the suit in respect of the infringement of the copy right or any right conferred under the Copy Right Act shall be instituted in the district court within local limits of whose jurisdiction the person instituting the suit actually and voluntarily resides or carries business or presently works for gain. Obviously sub-section (2) of section 62 enables the suitor to file the suit or initiate civil proceedings arising under Chapter XII of Copy Right Act in the District Court within whose jurisdiction he actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. This wholesome exceptional provision is intended to save suitor if he so desires for redressal of his grievance in respect of the infringement of copy right or any right conferred the Copy Right Act from suing at the place where defendant resides or carries on business. Section 62 of Copy Right Act, of course, cannot take away the jurisdiction of this Court which it has under Letters Patent but at the same time this Court shall not entertain and try a suit under Copy Right Act where whole of cause of action has not arisen within its jurisdiction or material part of cause of action has not arisen within its jurisdiction or where though some part of cause of action has arisen within its jurisdiction but balance of convenience strongly and definitely is in favour of suit being proceeded within some other Court. In applying the doctrine of forum convenience the court may consider place of residence or business of the parties, the place where transactions took place, the volume of evidence and convenience or inconvenience of producing it at a particular forum, expenses of trial and such other relevant considerations. As already observed earlier, plaintiff in his plaint has himself come out with the case that he resides at Amravati and also at Bombay. The principal residence of the plaintiff, therefore, appears to be at Amravati. The goods are also manufactured at Amravati. The Defendants, according to Plaintiff himself reside at Amravati and carry on business at Amravati. The volume of evidence that may be led by the parties can be conveniently produced at Amravati. The trial at Amravati shall save the parties from unnecessary expenses and, therefore, balance of convenience definitely would be if the suit is tried at Amravati.‖
229. The argument that the High Courts of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras could invoke the doctrine of forum conveniens only because of the wording of their respective Letters Patent is erroneous. The decisions of the Supreme
Court in Dashrath and Harish Nigam were not in the context of Letters Patent. While Dashrath was concerned with the application of the CPC, Harish Nigam‘s dictum applies to all civil proceedings. 230. The doctrine of forum conveniens does not require an express statutory basis for its invocation in civil proceedings. A civil court has inherent power to decline to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that it is not the forum conveniens. 231. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,145 the Supreme Court of the USA decided on the issue ―whether the United States District Court has inherent power to dismiss a suit pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens and, if so, whether that power was abused in this case‖. Authoring for the majority, Justice Jackson opined that the doctrine of forum conveniens has application even for intra-state disputes. ―It is conceded that the venue statutes of the United States permitted the plaintiff to commence his action in the Southern District of New York, and empower that court to entertain it. [Footnote 3] But that does not settle the question whether it must do so. Indeed, the doctrine of forum non conveniens can never apply if there is absence of jurisdiction or mistake of venue. **** In all cases in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into play, it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process; the doctrine furnishes criteria for choice between them. The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute. These statutes are drawn with a necessary generality, and usually give a plaintiff a choice of courts, so that he may be quite sure of some place in which to pursue his remedy. But the open door may admit those who seek not simply justice, but perhaps justice blended with some harassment. A plaintiff sometimes
330 US 501 (1947).
is under temptation to resort to a strategy of forcing the trial at a most inconvenient place for an adversary, even at some inconvenience to himself.‖
(Emphasis supplied) 232. Unequivocally, the Supreme Court of Illinois in Torres v. Walsh,146 held that the invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens does not require a statutory backing. It originates and lies in the common law. The lucid words of Justice Clark read as under: ―While in Illinois we are without any statutory authorization, we find that such authority to transfer a case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens exists at common law, and, therefore, statutory authorization is unnecessary as it only recognizes and codifies a right that previously existed at common law. The doctrine of forum non conveniens originated in the common law of England which Illinois adopted as it existed ―prior to the fourth year of James the First" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 1, par. 801).‖‖
233. There is, thus, no requirement for there to be a provision in the CPC, providing in explicit terms, that the doctrine of forum conveniens applies to civil suits. A careful analysis of the provisions of the CPC would also reveal that there is indeed scope to read this doctrine into the Code. A bar on the application of this doctrine simply cannot be found in the Code. To analyse this, a few provisions of the CPC, may be extracted as under: Section 15 of the CPC reads as under: ―15. Court in which suits to be instituted. Every suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it.‖
Section 20 of the CPC reads as under: ―20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises.
456 N.E.2d 601, 98 Ill. 2d 338.
Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction— (a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally works for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. Explanation.—A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in India or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place.‖
234. Sections 15 and 20 of the CPC contain the necessary conditions that ought to be satisfied by the plaintiff while instituting a suit. A plaint cannot be instituted before a forum which is not of the lowest grade competent to try it. A suit not governed by Sections 16 to 19, will have to be instituted in accordance with Section 20 and comply with the requirements of subsections (a) to (c). Satisfaction of Sections 15-20 of the Code determines whether a forum is capable of adjudicating a lis. The doctrine of forum nonconveniens is, however, concerned with whether a forum ought to adjudicate a given case. The doctrine of forum conveniens, it is trite law, is applicable only when a forum is found to possess jurisdiction. It is after that stage, the inquiry begins: whether it is appropriate to adjudicate that suit. No conflict, at all, can be found between the doctrine of forum non-conveniens and the provisions of the CPC. 235. A Code cannot be expected to contemplate every possible issue that may arise in civil proceedings. Section 151 of the CPC, which saves the
inherent powers of the Court, is intended to redress those very situations, which are not effectively redressed by the remaining portion of the Code. Reliance may be placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal,147 where Raghubar Dayal J. speaking for a Four Judge Bench, observed as under: ―18. …the Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of Order 39 CPC. There is no such expression in Section 94 which expressly prohibits the issue of a temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by Order 39 or by any rules made under the Code. It is well settled that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, for the simple reason that the legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them. The effect of the expression ―if it is so prescribed‖ is only this that when the rules prescribe the circumstances in which the temporary injunction can be issued, ordinarily the Court is not to use its inherent powers to make the necessary orders in the interests of justice, but is merely to see whether the circumstances of the case bring it within the prescribed rule. If the provisions of Section 94 were not there in the Code, the Court could still issue temporary injunctions, but it could do that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. No party has a right to insist on the Court‘s exercising that jurisdiction and the Court exercises its inherent jurisdiction only when it considers it absolutely necessary for the ends of justice to do so. It is in the incidence of the exercise of the power of the Court to issue temporary injunction that the provisions of Section 94 of the Code have their effect and not in taking away the right of the Court to exercise its inherent power. **** 20. Further, the provisions of Section 151 of the Code make it clear that the inherent powers are not controlled by the provisions of the Code. Section 151 reads: ―Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.‖ 21. A similar question about the powers of the Court to issue a commission in the exercise of its powers under Section 151 of the Code in circumstances not covered by Section 75 and Order 26, arose in Padam Sen v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1961) 1 SCR 884] and this Court held that the Court can issue a commission in such circumstances. It observed at p. 887 thus:
1961 SCC OnLine SC 17.
―The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the legislature.‖ These observations clearly mean that the inherent powers are not in any way controlled by the provisions of the Code as has been specifically stated in Section 151 itself. But those powers are not to be exercised when their exercise may be in conflict with what had been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the legislature. This restriction, for practical purposes, on the exercise of those powers is not because those powers are controlled by the provisions of the Code but because it should be persumed that the procedure specifically provided by the legislature for orders in certain circumstances is dictated by the interests of justice.‖
236. Justification for invoking the doctrine of forum non-conveniens can be adequately found in Section 151 of the Code. Additionally, the language of Order VII Rule 10 may also be examined. The words used are under: ―10. Return of plaint. (1) Subject to the provisions of rule 10A, the plaint shall at any stage of the suit be returned to be presented to the Court in which the suit should have been instituted. Explanation.— For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that a Court of appeal or revision may direct after setting aside the decree passed in a suit, the return of the plaint under this sub-rule.‖
(Emphasis supplied) 237. The word ―should‖ is defined in the following manner in various dictionaries: ―Should. The past tense of shall; ordinarily implying duty or obligation; although usually no more than an obligation of propriety or expediency, or a moral obligation, thereby distinguishing it from ―ought.‖ It is not normally synonymous with ―may,‖ and although often interchangeable with the word
―would,‖ it does not ordinarily express certainty as “will” sometimes does.‖148 ―Should. 1. used to say or suggest that something is the proper, reasonable, or best thing to do; used with have to say that something was the proper, reasonable, or best thing to do but was not done. 2. used to say that something is expected or correct.‖149 ―Should vb the past tense of shall: used as an auxiliary verb to indicate that an action is considered by the speaker to be obligatory (you should go) or to form the subjunctive mood with I or we.‖150 ―Should:— used to show what is right, appropriat