Sri Manjegowda v. The Commissioner

Court
High Court of Karnataka
Date of judgment
8 October 2026
Judge
Justice Suraj Govindaraj
Case number
WP No. 51965 of 2017
Result
DISMISSED
Subject
Property & land

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 8TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ WRIT PETITION NO. 51965 OF 2017 (GM-TEN) BETWEEN 1 . SRI MANJEGOWDA S/O LATE SIDDEGOWDA, AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS PUTTAJJI MANE, AANJANEYA TEMPLE ROAD, NARIGUDDENAHALLI, JYOTHI NAGARA POST, CHIKKAMAGALURU TALUK & DISTRICT-577102. 2 . SMT PARVATHAMMA W/O LATE PARVATHEGOWDA, SINCE DEAD BY LR’s 2(a) SRI. LOKESH S/O LATE PARVATHEGOWDA AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS 2(b) SMT. PUTTAMMA @ PUTTALAKSHMI W/O LATE MANJUNATH K.P. AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS 2(c) SRI. MANJUNATH S/O LATE PARVATHEGOWDA, AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS 2(a) TO 2(c) ARE R/O NARIGUDDENAHALLI, JYOTHINAGARA POST, CHIKKAMAGALURU-577102. 3 . SMT LAKSHMAMMA W/O LATE SHESHAIAH, AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS AMBALE VILLAGE, CHIKKAMAGALURU TALUK & DISTRICT-57102. 4 . SMT CHANDRAMMA W/O LATE LOKESH,

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AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS AANJANEYA TEMPLE ROAD, NARIGUDDENAHALLI, JYOTHI NAGARA POST, CHIKKAMAGALURU TALUK & DISTRICT-577102. 5 . SRI PARAMESH N P S/O LATE CHANDRAMMA, W/O LATE PUTTASWAMYGOWDA, AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS AANJANEYA TEMPLE ROAD, NARIGUDDENAHALLI, JYOTHI NAGARA POST, CHIKKAMAGALURU TALUK & DISTRICT-577102. 6 . SRI KRISHNAMURTHY N P S/O LATE CHANDRAMMA, W/ LAT PUTTAWMYGOWDA, AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS AANJANEYA TEMPLE ROAD, NARIGUDDENAHALLI, JYOTHI NAGARA POST, CHIKKAMAGALURU TALUK & DISTRICT-577102. 7 . SRI VISHWANATH N P S/O LATE CHANDRAMMA, W/O LATE PUTTASWAMYGOWDA, AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS AANJANEYA TEMPLE ROAD, NARIGUDDENAHALLI, JYOTHI NAGARA POST, CHIKKAMAGALURU TALUK & DISTRICT-577102. 8 . SMT D R JAYAMMA W/O K.M.RUDRAPPA, AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS KYATHANABEEDU VILLAGE, LAKYA POST, CHIKKAMAGALURU TALUK & DISTRICT-577102 9 . SMT KAMALAMMA W/O LATE D.R.KUMARASWAMY, AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS DODDAKURUBARAHALLI VILLAGE, JYOTHI NAGAR POST, CHIKKAMAGALURU TALUK & DISTRICT-577102. 10 . SMT D R SHANKARAMMA D/O LATE RUDREGOWDA, AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS DODDAKURUBARAHALLI VILLAGE, JYOTHI NAGAR POST,

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CHIKKAMAGALURU TALUK & DISTRICT-577102. 11 . SRI D R PARAMESHWARAPPA S/O LATE RUDREGOWDA, AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS DODDAKURUBARAHALLI VILLAGE, JYOTHI NAGAR POST, CHIKKAMAGALURU TALUK & DISTRICT-577102. 12 . SRI D R RENUKAPPA S/O LATE RUDREGOWDA, AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS DODDAKURUBARAHALLI VILLAGE, JYOTHI NAGAR POST, CHIKKAMAGALURU TALUK & DISTRICT-577102. 13 . SRI KANTHARAJU D K S/O LATE KUMARASWAMY, AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS DODDAKURUBARAHALLI VILLAGE, JYOTHI NAGAR POST, CHIKKAMAGALURU TALUK & DISTRICT-577102. ...PETITIONERS (BY SRI: K.R. LINGARAJU., ADVOCATE) AND

1. THE COMMISSIONER CITY MUNICIPALITY, CHIKKAMAGALURU-577101. 2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, REVENUE DEPARTMENT (LAND ACQUISITION) VIKASA SOUDHA, DR.B.R.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU-560001. 3. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, VIKASA SOUDHA, DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU-560001.

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4. THE COMMISSIONER CHIKKAMAGALURU URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMISSIONER, KALYANA NAGAR, BYPASS ROAD, JYOTHI NAGAR POST, CHIKKAMAGALURU-577101. 5. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER CHIKKAMAGALURU DISTRICT, CHIKKAMAGALURU-577101. 6. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER CHIKKAMAGALURU SUB-DIVISION, CHIKKMAGALURU-577101. 7. THE TAHASILDAR CHIKKAMAGALURU TALUK & DISTRICT-577101. 8. K S RAJU S/O SANNEGOWDA, AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS CHURCH STREET, NAIDU BEEDI, CHIKKAMAGALURU TALUK & DISTRICT-577101.

…RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. SARITHA KULKARNI., AGA FOR R2, R3 AND R5 TO R7; SRI. A. NAGARAJAPPA., FOR R1; SRI. A. RAVISHANKAR., ADVOCATE FOR R4) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OR ORDER IN THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI QUASHING THE E-PROCUREMENT RE-TENDER NOTIFICATION DTD.24.5.2017 AND NOTICE PROCEED THE WORK ORDER DTD.4.11.2017 ISSUED BY R-1 VIDE ANNEX-A AND B IN RESPECT OF PETITIONERS LAND BEARING SY.NO.450 MEASURING 4 ACRES 13 GUNTAS SITUATED AT HIREMAGALURU VILLAGE, KASABA HOBLI, CHIKKAMAGALURU TALUK AND DISTRICT AND ETC. THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS AND HAVING BEEN RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 18.08.2026, THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ

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CAV ORDER

1.

The petitioners are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs:

a. Issue a writ or order in the nature of Certiorari quashing the e-procurement re-tender notification bearing No. CMC/CKM/CR/106/2016-2017 dated 24/05/2017 and Notice to proceed the work order dated 04/11/2017 issued by respondent No.1 vide Annexures'A' & 'B in respect of petitioners land bearing survey No. 450 measuring 4 acres 13 guntas Hiremagaluru Village, Kasaba Hobli, situated at Chikkamagaluru Taluk & District. b. Declare the Preliminary Notification bearing No. LAQ:2/89-90 dated 12/01/1990 issued under section 4(1) of L.A Act., and Final Notification bearing No. R.D.9.Bhu.Swa.Chi.90 dated 23/03/1991 issued under section 6(1) of the L.A Act both are issued by respondent No.5 vide Annexure-C & D were stands lapsed by virtue of Section 24(2) of "the right to fair compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013" in respect of petitioners land bearing survey No. 450 measuring 4 acres 13 guntas situated at Hiremagaluru Village, Kasaba Hobli, Chikkamagaluru Taluk & District. C. Pass such other order or orders as this Hon’ble Court deems fit under the facts and circumstances of the case including cost of the proceedings, so as to meet the ends of Justice and equity.

2.

The petitioners are before this Court contending that on acquisition of land by the respondents, the award amount has neither been deposited nor paid and it is for that reason that this Court ought to hold that the

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acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

Resettlement

Act,

2013 [hereinafter referred to as the “LA Act 2013”]. 3.

Sri.K.R.Lingaraju, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that, 3.1.

Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that

e-procurement

tender

and

consequential Work Order issued for carrying out certain development works on the acquired land have been challenged in the present proceedings. Petitioners Nos.1 to 7 claim to be the owners of land bearing Survey No.450, measuring 3 acres, situated at Hiremagaluru Village, Kasaba Hobli, Chikkamagaluru Taluk and District. The original owner of the said land was Smt. Puttamma, wife of Sidde Gowda, whose name was shown in the preliminary notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter, “the LA Act,

1894”).

Smt.

Puttamma

died

on

02.11.2007 and her daughter Chandramma died on 29.06.2013 . Petitioners Nos.1 to 7 claim to be legal heirs of Puttamma and

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Chandramma

and

assert

that

they

have

remained in peaceful possession and cultivation of the land without interference by any third party. 3.2.

Petitioners Nos.8 to 13 claim to be the owners of land bearing Survey No.450, measuring 1 acre

guntas,

situated

at

Hiremagaluru

Village, Kasaba Hobli, Chikkamagaluru District. The original owner was one Rudre Gowda, son of late Veerabhadre Gowda, whose name was shown in the preliminary notification issued under Section 4(1) of the LA Act, 1894. Rudre Gowda died on 08.12.2003, and one of his sons had

predeceased

Petitioners

Nos.8

to

him

on

09.04.1997.

claim

to

be

surviving legal heirs of late Rudre Gowda and assert that they have continued to remain in peaceful possession and cultivation of the said land. 3.3.

Respondent

No.4–Urban

Development

Department issued a preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of the LA Act, 1894, on 12.01.1990, which was published in the Official Gazette on 15.03.1990, notifying various lands

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for

development

Project

of

Development

of

Hiremagaluru

Chikkamagaluru

Department

Urban

(hereinafter,

“CUDA”). The lands belonging to Puttamma and

Rudre

Gowda

were

included

in

notification, their names being shown as the kathedars

of

respective

properties,

measuring 3 acres and 1 acre 13 guntas, respectively. Thus, the total extent of land in Survey No.450 notified for acquisition was 4 acres 13 guntas. 3.4.

It is contended that, without affording the kathedars

an

opportunity

of

hearing

as

contemplated under Section 5A of the LA Act, 1894, a declaration under Section 6(1) of the said Act came to be issued on 23.03.1991. According to the petitioners, the kathedars came to know of the said declaration only in October 1992. Consequently, they submitted a representation dated 01.10.1992 to the State Government seeking deletion of their lands from the acquisition proceedings, contending that they were solely dependent upon the lands for their livelihood. Pursuant thereto, the State

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Government called upon CUDA to furnish its comments. 3.5.

On 29.05.1993, CUDA furnished a layout plan stating that the lands were required for the proposed layout. Thereafter, several rounds of correspondence ensued between the concerned authorities regarding the necessity of the lands for the project. Ultimately, by order dated 04.01.1995, the State Government rejected the request of the landowners for dropping the lands from acquisition.

3.6.

It is contended that the said order dated 04.01.1995 was passed without complying with the principles of natural justice and without considering

relevant

documents

and

materials placed by the landowners. On that basis, the petitioners contend that the order dated 04.01.1995 is unsustainable in law. 3.7.

Thereafter, the kathedars once again sought deletion of the lands from the acquisition proceedings, resulting in a further exchange of correspondence between the parties. According to the petitioners, the said request remained under

consideration

and,

consequently,

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possession of the acquired lands was never taken in terms of Section 16(1) and (2) of the LA Act, 1894. It is further submitted that the award amount was not deposited in the Civil Court,

as

Government

neither

CUDA

required

nor

lands

for

State

proposed project. 3.8.

Learned counsel, therefore, submits that, in the aforesaid factual background, upon the coming into force of the LA Act 2013, the acquisition proceedings stood affected by the provisions of the said enactment.

3.9.

He submits that Section 24(2) of LA Act 2013 would

be

applicable,

which

is

reproduced

hereunder for easy reference: 24.(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the

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notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

3.10. Placing reliance upon Section 24(2) of the LA Act, 2013, learned counsel submits that, since compensation has admittedly not been paid, the acquisition proceedings are deemed to have lapsed. 3.11. It

is

submitted

that,

in

aforesaid

circumstances, the petitioners were constrained to

approach

this

Court

when

Chikkamagaluru City Municipality proceeded to develop the petitioners’ land as a park by issuing an e-tender dated 24.05.2017. 3.12. Learned counsel further submits that, when the representation submitted by the petitioners seeking

deletion

acquisition

of

proceedings

land

was

still

from

pending

consideration, the respondents could not have proceeded to issue the e-tender. It is submitted that the landowners had proposed to provide a 60-feet road through their property, which is situated at the fag end of the layout, and that the said proposal ought to have been accepted, with the balance extent of land being deleted

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from the acquisition proceedings. According to learned counsel, so long as the said proposal remained

pending

before

State

Government, CUDA could not have proceeded to issue an e-tender for development of the land as a park. 3.13. Learned counsel submits that this Court had called upon the respondents to furnish a report regarding payment of compensation. According to the report, no compensation had either been paid

to

petitioners

or

deposited

in

accordance with law. It is submitted that the contention of the respondents that, insofar as

land

petitioners

measuring

acres

Nos.1

is

to

belonging

to

concerned,

compensation amount had been deposited in Execution Petition No.247 of 2003 before the Court of the Civil Judge, Chikkamagaluru, is misconceived. According to learned counsel, the alleged deposit was not made with the consent or

concurrence

of

landowners

and,

therefore, cannot be treated as payment of compensation to them.

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3.14. Learned

counsel

further

submits

that

preliminary notification had already been set aside by this Court in W.P. No.27115 of 1991 by order dated 19.06.1998. It is contended that, the said order being applicable to the lands in question, there was no acquisition notification in force. 3.15. He further submits that, since the Karnataka Urban

Development

Authorities

Act,

1987

(hereinafter, “the KUDA Act”) came into force on

01.05.1988,

proceedings

for

acquisition

could not thereafter have been initiated under the LA Act, 1894. On this premise, it is contended

that

entire

acquisition

proceedings are vitiated in law. 3.16. Learned counsel also submits that possession of the land was never taken in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions. It is in that background,

according

petitioners

have

filed

amendment

application

challenging

acquisition

notification

bearing

to

him,

that

No.R.D.9.Bhu.Swa.Chi.90

dated 23.03.1991 by way of I.A. No.1/24.

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3.17. Learned counsel reiterates that the alleged payment of Rs.1,49,100/- made on 15.06.2006 in Execution Petition No.247 of 2003 cannot, in law, be regarded as payment of compensation to the petitioners. 3.18. He submits that, insofar as the land belonging to petitioners Nos.8 to 13 is concerned, the compensation amount continues to remain in the treasury and has not been deposited before any court of law. According to learned counsel,

statutory

requirement

is

that

compensation amount be deposited before the competent Reference Court and that a deposit made before any other court, including an Execution

Court,

would

not

satisfy

requirement of law. 3.19. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that this Court, in W.P. No.27115 of 1991, by order dated 19.06.1998, followed the judgment of the Division

Bench

dated

15.06.1998

in

W.P.

Nos.3539 to 3542 of 1996 and connected matters, wherein it was held that a notification issued

under

Acquisition

Act,

Section 1894,

4(1)

of

subsequent

to

Land

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Central Amendment Act

of

1984, was

without authority of law. Applying the said principle, this Court quashed the notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) insofar as

lands

therein

were

concerned,

while

reserving liberty to the State Government to initiate fresh proceedings. 3.20. Learned counsel submits that the preliminary notification in the present case is also dated 12.01.1990,

subsequent

to

aforesaid

amendment. Hence, relying upon the decision in W.P. No.27115 of 1991 and the Division Bench judgment referred to therein, he submits that the acquisition proceedings concerning the petitioners' lands are without authority of law and

cannot

constitute

basis

for

subsequent development of the land. 3.21. It is further submitted that, in the absence of any fresh acquisition proceedings pursuant to

liberty

reserved

by

this

Court,

respondents could not have continued to rely upon the original acquisition proceedings or taken

consequential

steps,

including

development of the petitioners' lands as a park.

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3.22. On the aforesaid grounds, learned counsel submits that the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the acquisition proceedings, as well as the consequential action taken pursuant thereto, are liable to be interfered with. 3.23. On the above grounds, he submits that the writ petition is required to be allowed. 4.

Sri A. Ravishankar, learned counsel appearing for respondent

No.4–Chikkamagaluru

Development

Authority

Urban

(hereinafter,

“CUDA”),

opposing the writ petition, submits that 4.1.

The challenge raised by the petitioners is wholly misconceived, particularly in view of the fact that the acquisition proceedings were initiated several decades ago, the awards were passed, compensation amounts were deposited with the Land Acquisition Officer, possession of the acquired lands was taken, and the lands were thereafter

utilised

development

of

for

formation

residential

and

layout

at

Hiremagaluru. 4.2.

Learned counsel submits that the acquisition proceedings

commenced

as

early

as

on

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12.01.1990 with the issuance of the preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of the LA Act, 1894, for the

purpose of formation of a

residential layout at Hiremagaluru by CUDA. The acquisition was not a mere proposal which remained at an initial or intermediate stage. According to learned counsel, the statutory proceedings were thereafter carried forward to their

logical

conclusion;

declarations

were

issued, awards were passed, compensation amounts were made available to the Land Acquisition Officer, and the acquired lands were ultimately utilised for the purpose for which they had been acquired. 4.3.

It is submitted that pursuant to the acquisition proceedings, the requisite awards came to be passed in respect of the acquired lands. CUDA deposited the award amounts with the State Government/Land Acquisition Officer and the amounts were thereafter disbursed by the competent

authority.

According

to

learned

counsel, the acquisition therefore cannot now be

characterised

as

an

incomplete

or

abandoned acquisition merely on the basis that the petitioners have subsequently raised a

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dispute regarding the manner or place in which a particular component of the compensation was deposited. 4.4.

Learned

counsel

further

submits

that

subsequent conduct of the acquiring authority and the manner in which the acquired lands were

utilised

furnish

clear

evidence

of

completion of the acquisition. A residential layout was formed pursuant to the acquisition. Sites were carved out from the acquired lands and allotted to several persons. The allottees have, over a period of time, constructed their residential houses and have been occupying the same. Thus, according to learned counsel, the acquisition has resulted in the creation of a fully developed residential layout and the acquired lands have been substantially put to the very purpose for which they were acquired. 4.5.

It is submitted that, once the acquired lands have

been

incorporated

into

an

approved

residential layout, sites have been formed and allotted,

and

third-party

allottees

have

constructed residential houses thereon, the petitioners

cannot

seek

to

reopen

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acquisition proceedings after such a long lapse of

time,

particularly

interests

of

when

several

third

rights

parties

and have

intervened. 4.6.

Learned counsel submits that the contention of the petitioners that the acquisition proceedings are liable to lapse under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act proceeds on an incorrect factual premise.

According

requirements

to

him,

concerning

statutory

possession

and

payment/deposit of compensation have been substantially complied with. The acquisition had culminated in the formation of the layout and utilisation

of

land,

and

therefore

petitioners cannot rely upon Section 24(2) merely by asserting that the compensation amount was not personally received by them. 4.7.

Insofar as the representations submitted by the petitioners and other landowners seeking denotification

of

their

respective

lands

are

concerned, learned counsel submits that the same

had

been

duly

considered

by

competent authorities. He submits that CUDA had

considered

requests

and

had

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exchanged

correspondence

Government.

The

State

consideration

of

with

State

Government,

after

matter,

rejected

request for de-notification. 4.8.

According to learned counsel, the said rejection was

not

an

communication

interim

communication

merely

seeking

or

a

further

information. It constituted a decision on the request made by the landowners. Once the State Government rejected the request for denotification, the acquisition continued to remain operative. The petitioners did not challenge the said order of rejection at the relevant point of time. 4.9.

Learned counsel submits that the subsequent submission of yet another representation by the petitioners cannot have the effect of reviving a request which had already been considered and rejected by the competent authority. The mere fact that the petitioners may have continued to correspond with the authorities or may have submitted

a

further

representation

seeking

reconsideration does not mean that the earlier order of rejection ceased to operate.

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4.10. He therefore submits that the contention that

request

for

de-notification

remained

pending before the Government, and that CUDA was consequently precluded from acting upon the acquired land, is untenable. According to learned counsel, no subsisting order restraining CUDA from utilising the acquired land was brought to the notice of the Court. 4.11. Learned

counsel

further

submits

that

petitioners' contention regarding non-taking of possession

is

contrary

to

subsequent

physical developments on the acquired lands. The fact that a residential layout was formed, that sites were carved out and allotted, and that houses were constructed by third-party allottees demonstrates that the acquired lands were taken over and utilised. 4.12. It is submitted that a notification under Section 16 of the LA Act, 1894, had also been issued indicating taking over of possession. Though the original notification under Section 16 is presently not available in the records, the absence of the physical document by itself cannot negate the subsequent and undisputed

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events demonstrating utilisation of the acquired lands. According to learned counsel, the actual development of the layout and occupation by third-party

allottees

constitute

material

circumstances supporting the respondents' case that possession had been taken. 4.13. Learned counsel submits that the acquisition was not confined to a paper exercise. The entire process resulted in actual development of the area. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the photographs produced before the Court, which, according to learned counsel, demonstrate the existence of residential houses and other infrastructure in the layout. 4.14. The photographs, according to learned counsel, have to be appreciated along with the approved layout

plan,

allotment

of

formation

sites

and

of

roads,

development

undertaken by CUDA. These circumstances, taken cumulatively, establish that the acquired land had been put to the intended public purpose. 4.15. Learned

counsel

specifically

addresses

extent of 4 acres 13 guntas forming part of

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Survey No.450 and submits that the petitioners have proceeded on an incorrect assumption that the entire extent of the land ought to have been covered by residential sites if it were to be treated as having been utilised. 4.16. According to him, the acquired land has, in fact, been put to different uses forming part of the overall residential layout. Out of the total extent of 4 acres 13 guntas, approximately 1 acre 15 guntas has been utilised for formation of residential sites, approximately 10 guntas has been utilised for formation of a road, and approximately 2 acres 28 guntas has been earmarked and utilised as a park. 4.17. Learned counsel submits that the petitioners appear to be relying principally upon the fact that the extent of approximately 2 acres 28 guntas

presently

appears

to

be

vacant.

According to him, however, the said area cannot be treated as unused land merely because

it

has

not

been

converted

into

residential sites. 4.18. The area has been earmarked as a park in the layout itself. A park constitutes an integral

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component intended

of

for

a

residential

layout

and

is

common

benefit

of

residents and site owners. Therefore, according to learned counsel, the land does not cease to be

utilised

merely

because

no

individual

residential construction has been undertaken upon it. 4.19. Learned

counsel

further

submits

that

provision for the park was not an afterthought or a subsequent proposal intended merely to defeat the petitioners' claim. The park area was contemplated

while

layout

plan

was

prepared and sanctioned. Consequently, the fact that the area remains substantially open is consistent with the sanctioned purpose of the land. 4.20. He submits that an open area earmarked as a park cannot be equated with an abandoned or unutilised parcel of land. The utility of a park is precisely that it remains open and is available for common use. Thus, according to learned counsel, the petitioners cannot contend that the land has not been utilised merely because

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residential sites or structures are not found upon every portion of the acquired extent. 4.21. Learned counsel submits that, in respect of the entire acquisition covering approximately 140 acres 36.5 guntas, CUDA deposited a total sum of Rs.50,27,000/- with the Land Acquisition Officer

on

amount

06.04.1993.

was

The

deposited

fact

with

that

Land

Acquisition Officer and was thereafter dealt with by

competent

authority

demonstrates,

according to learned counsel, that the acquiring authority had made available the compensation amount in accordance with the acquisition proceedings. 4.22. He submits that the acquisition proceedings, therefore, cannot be reopened by isolating the case

of

acquisition

petitioners

and

from

development

larger

project.

The

acquisition was undertaken as one integrated project

for

residential

formation layout,

of

Hiremagaluru

and

subsequent

development demonstrates implementation of the public purpose.

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4.23. Learned

counsel

further

submits

that

this

Court, while considering the rival contentions regarding payment or deposit of compensation, called upon the State Government to furnish the relevant material. This direction was issued particularly because the stand of CUDA was that the compensation had been duly paid or deposited. 4.24. Pursuant to the said direction, CUDA and the State

Government

placed

their

respective

materials before the Court. CUDA, in particular, filed

a

memo

dated

06.02.2026

enclosing

various documents relating to the payment and deposit of compensation. 4.25. One of the documents relied upon by learned counsel is the Form No.4 register maintained by the concerned Court. According to learned counsel,

entries

therein

establish

connection between the compensation amount pertaining to the land of Puttamma and the subsequent execution proceedings. 4.26. He submits that Execution Petition No.247 of 2003 was instituted by Sri K.P. Manjunath. In the said proceedings, Puttamma was arrayed as

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Judgment Debtor No.3. Her son Manjegowda, who is petitioner No.1 herein, was arrayed as Judgment

Debtor

No.4.

Her

daughter

Chandramma, who is petitioner No.4 herein, was arrayed as Judgment Debtor No.5. Another daughter, Lakshmamma, who is petitioner No.3 herein, was arrayed as Judgment Debtor No.8. Petitioners Nos.5 to 7, being the children of another

daughter

Chandramma,

were

also

connected with the said execution proceedings, their mother having been arrayed as Judgment Debtor No.7. 4.27. Learned counsel submits that the relevance of the said execution proceedings lies in the fact that amounts payable by the Land Acquisition Officer were the subject matter of a garnishee proceeding. The decree-holder in Execution Petition No.247 of 2003 had a claim for a sum of Rs.1,72,872/-. Since amounts were lying with the Land Acquisition Officer, a requisition was made pursuant to a garnishee order for payment out of the amounts available with the Land Acquisition Officer.

- 28 HC-KAR

4.28. It is submitted that, pursuant to the said order, the Land Acquisition Officer deposited a sum of Rs.1,49,100/- in Execution Petition No.247 of 2003. The amount was thereafter released by the Execution Court by Cheque No.144411 dated 13.02.2007 in favour of the decreeholder. 4.29. According to learned counsel, the significance of this transaction is that the amount did not remain merely as an internal entry in the records of the Land Acquisition Officer. It was actually transferred pursuant to a judicial order and was utilised towards satisfaction of the liability of Puttamma and her family in the execution proceedings. 4.30. Learned counsel submits that the petitioners cannot

now

contend

that

amount

of

Rs.1,49,100/- was wholly unrelated to the compensation

payable

in

respect

of

acquired land. According to him, the amount was lying with the Land Acquisition Officer and was attached pursuant to a garnishee order issued

in

execution

proceedings.

The

- 29 HC-KAR

subsequent

release

of

amount

was

therefore a consequence of the judicial process. 4.31. He further submits that the petitioners and their predecessors derived the benefit of the said payment in the sense that the amount was appropriated towards satisfaction of the decree against

Puttamma

execution

and

proceedings

her

family.

were

The

thereafter

settled/closed to that extent. Consequently, according to learned counsel, it is not open to the petitioners to contend that no amount whatsoever

had

been

paid

or

that

acquisition authority had wholly failed to make available compensation. 4.32. Learned counsel submits that the question whether the payment was made directly to the petitioners

is

not

determinative

of

respondents' case. According to him, what is relevant is that the compensation amount was subjected to a judicial process and was utilised for discharging an enforceable liability of the landowners. The payment was thus made for and on behalf of the persons claiming through Puttamma.

- 30 HC-KAR

4.33. On this basis, learned counsel submits that the petitioners cannot derive an advantage from the circumstance that the amount was released to a decree-holder rather than being directly handed over to each individual landowner. 4.34. Insofar as the extent of 1 acre 13 guntas originally

belonging

to

Rudre

Gowda

is

concerned, learned counsel submits that CUDA had deposited a sum of Rs.65,852/- with the Land

Acquisition

Officer

towards

compensation payable in respect of the said land. 4.35. According to learned counsel, this deposit, coupled with the other material placed before the Court, demonstrates that CUDA had taken the necessary steps towards payment of the awarded compensation. Therefore, it cannot be contended that CUDA had deliberately withheld the compensation or had failed to take any steps towards discharging its obligation arising from the acquisition. 4.36. Learned

counsel

further

submits

that

petitioners' case regarding the alleged nonutilisation of the 1 acre 13 guntas also cannot

- 31 HC-KAR

be accepted on the basis of the physical appearance of the property alone. Reliance is placed upon the Google Map produced before the Court, which, according to learned counsel, demonstrates surrounded

that

by

subject

residential

property

sites

that

is

have

already been formed pursuant to the layout. 4.37. The surrounding development, according to learned counsel, establishes that the land forms part and parcel of the larger residential layout and cannot be viewed as an isolated parcel independent of the development undertaken by CUDA. 4.38. Learned counsel submits that, apart from the residential

sites,

a

road

measuring

approximately 10 guntas has also been formed in the area. The remaining extent has been earmarked for development as a park. The formation of the road and the provision for the park are, according to learned counsel, integral components of the approved layout. 4.39. He therefore submits that the fact that a particular portion of the land has not been built upon does not establish that possession has not

- 32 HC-KAR

been taken or that the land has not been utilised. The purpose of the acquisition was formation of a residential layout and not merely construction of buildings upon every square foot of the acquired land. 4.40. Learned counsel reiterates that a residential layout necessarily comprises several categories of land, including residential sites, roads, parks, civic amenity areas and other common-use areas. Each such component serves the public purpose for which the layout is developed. Consequently, the Court, according to learned counsel, ought not to determine utilisation solely by examining whether a particular parcel contains a residential structure. 4.41. Learned counsel submits that the area reserved for

park

was

specifically

taken

into

consideration at the stage of sanctioning the layout plan. The park therefore forms part of the sanctioned development and is not a subsequent device adopted by CUDA after the petitioners initiated the present proceedings. 4.42. According to him, if the petitioners' contention were accepted merely because the park area

- 33 HC-KAR

presently remains vacant or open, it would result in an anomalous situation where every open space in a residential layout could be treated as unutilised land, notwithstanding its earmarking and intended use as a common amenity. 4.43. Learned counsel further submits that the rights of third-party allottees have intervened during

long

period

following

acquisition.

Several persons were allotted sites, acted upon such allotments and constructed residential houses. The layout has therefore acquired a substantial degree of finality and third-party rights have accrued. 4.44. In such circumstances, according to learned counsel, the petitioners cannot seek to reopen the acquisition on the basis of a subsequent challenge, particularly when the acquisition proceedings themselves were initiated in 1990 and the layout has since been substantially developed. 4.45. Learned counsel submits that the petitioners' attempt to invoke Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act cannot be considered in isolation from the

- 34 HC-KAR

factual developments that have taken place over

intervening

years.

The

Court,

according to him, must take into consideration the award, deposit of compensation, formation of the layout, taking over and utilisation of the acquired

lands,

allotment

of

sites

and

construction of houses by third parties. 4.46. According

to

learned

counsel,

these

circumstances collectively establish that the acquisition

proceedings

have

culminated

in

implementation of the public purpose and that

petitioners

cannot

contend

that

acquisition has remained incomplete merely because they dispute the manner in which certain compensation amounts were dealt with or because a portion of the land is being maintained as an open park. 4.47. Learned counsel accordingly submits that there is

no

merit

acquisition

in

contention

proceedings

have

that

lapsed

under

Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. According to him,

possession

acquired

lands

had

been

taken

and

had

been

utilised

for

purpose for which they were acquired. The

- 35 HC-KAR

compensation amounts had also been deposited with the competent authority and, in the case of the land belonging to Puttamma, a portion thereof had subsequently been appropriated pursuant to a judicial order in the execution proceedings. 4.48. Learned

counsel

further

submits

that

petitioners cannot derive any advantage from the subsequent request for de-notification. The competent authority had already considered and rejected the request, and that decision was not

challenged.

The

subsequent

representations, according to him, could not keep the acquisition proceedings in a state of perpetual uncertainty or prevent CUDA from implementing the sanctioned layout. 4.49. On the question of the e-tender issued for development submits

of

park,

that

tender

consequential

step

for

learned was

counsel

merely

implementing

a

sanctioned layout and providing the common amenity contemplated therein. Since the land had already been acquired and earmarked as a park in the layout, the issuance of the e-tender

- 36 HC-KAR

cannot be characterised as an independent or unauthorised

act

affecting

petitioners'

alleged continuing rights over the land. 4.50. Learned counsel submits that the petitioners, having allowed the acquisition proceedings and subsequent

development

to

remain

unchallenged for several years, cannot now seek to unsettle the completed acquisition and the rights that have accrued in favour of thirdparty allottees. The challenge, according to him, has to be considered in the context of the enormous lapse of time and the substantial development that has taken place pursuant to the acquisition. 4.51. It is therefore submitted that the material placed on record establishes three essential aspects: first, that the acquisition proceedings had culminated

in

awards and

deposit

of

compensation; second, that possession was taken and the acquired lands were incorporated into and utilised for the residential layout; and third, that the lands forming part of Survey No.450 have been utilised for residential sites,

- 37 HC-KAR

roads and the park contemplated under the sanctioned layout. 4.52. Learned counsel accordingly submits that the petitioners have failed to establish either of the factual circumstances necessary to sustain their claim under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. According to him, the record demonstrates that

acquisition

had

been

substantially

completed and implemented much prior to the present

proceedings,

and

therefore

subsequent challenge to the acquisition, the etender and the development of the park is liable to be rejected. 4.53. The reliance placed by the petitioners on the order dated 19.06.1998 in W.P. No.27115 of 1991 is wholly misconceived. The said order did not quash the acquisition notification in its entirety. The notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were quashed only insofar as the lands of the petitioners

in

said

writ

petition

were

concerned. 4.54. Learned

counsel

submits

that

present

petitioners were not parties to W.P. No.27115 of

- 38 HC-KAR

1991 and did not challenge the acquisition of their lands at the relevant point of time. Therefore, they cannot seek to derive the benefit of the relief granted in a proceeding instituted by different landowners in respect of their respective lands. The decision relied upon by the petitioners cannot be construed as having the effect of automatically nullifying the acquisition proceedings in respect of lands which were not the subject matter of that writ petition. 4.55. It is further submitted that the Division Bench judgment dated 15.06.1998, which was relied upon

by

this

Court

while

deciding

W.P.

No.27115 of 1991, also resulted in relief being granted

in

respect

petitioners

in

petitioners

herein,

of

those

lands

of

proceedings.

having

consciously

The not

challenged the acquisition proceedings at the relevant time, cannot now seek to reopen the acquisition after several decades by relying upon a judgment rendered in proceedings to which they were not parties.

- 39 HC-KAR

4.56. Learned counsel submits that, in the present case, the acquisition proceedings in respect of

petitioners'

lands

completion.

Awards

compensation

has

have

proceeded

have been

been dealt

to

passed, with

in

accordance with the acquisition proceedings, possession has been taken and the acquired lands

have

been

utilised

as

part

of

residential layout. Residential sites have been formed and allotted, roads have been laid and the remaining portion has been earmarked and utilised as a park. Third-party rights have also intervened

by

way

of

allotment

and

construction of residential houses. 4.57. In

these

submits

circumstances,

that

learned

petitioners

counsel

cannot,

after

having failed to challenge the acquisition at the appropriate

stage,

seek

to

unsettle

completed acquisition by relying upon the order in W.P. No.27115 of 1991. The said order, being confined to the lands of the petitioners therein, does not have the effect of reviving a challenge which the present petitioners never raised in respect of their own lands.

- 40 HC-KAR

4.58. Learned counsel therefore submits that the reliance placed upon W.P. No.27115 of 1991 is misplaced and cannot invalidate the acquisition proceedings concerning the petitioners' lands, which had attained finality and had been acted upon long prior to the institution of the present proceedings.

Consequently,

petitioners

cannot challenge the subsequent development of the acquired land on the strength of the said decision. 4.59. On the aforesaid grounds, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4–CUDA submits that the writ petition, including the challenge to

e-tender

and

consequential

development of the park, is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. 4.60. On all the above grounds, he submits that the writ petition is required to be dismissed. 5.

Sri

Bopanna

Beliappa,

learned

Additional

Government Advocate, on instructions, submits that 5.1.

The total compensation awarded in respect of the land bearing Survey No.450, measuring 4 acres 13 guntas, was Rs.2,14,952/-.

- 41 HC-KAR

5.2.

Out of the said amount, a sum of Rs.1,49,100/was deposited in Execution Petition No.247 of 2003 on 30.06.2006 in so far as Puttamma’s family.

5.3.

Learned

Additional

Government

Advocate

submits that the compensation amount was deposited by CUDA with the Land Acquisition Officer and, in turn, the Land Acquisition Officer dealt with and disbursed the award amount in the concerned proceedings. 5.4.

It is further submitted that, insofar as the extent belonging to Rudre Gowda is concerned, the amount of Rs.65,852/- was paid to Rudre Gowda on 06.04.1993, as reflected in Form KFC-57 produced along with the memo dated 10.02.2026. According to learned Additional Government Advocate, once the said amount had

been

received

by

Rudre

Gowda,

question of any further deposit of the said amount would not arise. 5.5.

Learned

Additional

therefore

submits

Government that

Advocate

contention

of

petitioners Nos.8 to 13 that compensation in respect of their land was neither paid nor

- 42 HC-KAR

deposited is contrary to the records. On that premise, he submits that the writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. 6.

Heard Sri. K. R. Lingaraju, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri. A. Ravishankar, learned counsel for Respondent No. 4 and Sri. Bopanna Beliappa, learned Additional Government Advocate. Perused papers.

7.

The points that would arise for consideration are: (i)

Whether the acquisition proceedings in respect of Survey No.450 measuring 4 acres 13 guntas have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act for want of taking of physical possession and/or payment of compensation?

(ii)

Whether the petitioners can, at this stage, rely upon the order dated 19.06.1998 in W.P. No.27115 of 1991 and the Division Bench judgment referred to therein to challenge the acquisition of their lands, notwithstanding that they were not parties to those proceedings and had not challenged the acquisition at the relevant time?

(iii) Whether the subsequent formation and implementation of the residential layout, including formation of sites, roads and the park and accrual of third-party rights, has any bearing on the relief sought by the petitioners?

- 43 HC-KAR

(iv) Whether the petitioners are entitled to quashing of the e-procurement re-tender notification dated 24.05.2017 and the Work Order dated 04.11.2017? (v)

What Order?

8.

The above points are answered as follows:

9.

Answer to Point No.(i): Whether the acquisition proceedings in respect of Survey No.450 measuring 4 acres 13 guntas have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act for want of taking of physical possession and/or payment of compensation? 9.1.

Sri K.R. Lingaraju, learned counsel for the petitioners, rests the case of the petitioners on Section

24(2)

of

LA

Act

2013.

His

submission is that an award was made under the LA Act, 1894, long before the 2013 Act came into force, but the compensation was never paid to the landowners and physical possession

of

land

was

never

taken.

According to him, each of these failures attracts the deemed lapse provided in Section 24(2), and since compensation has admittedly not been paid, the acquisition must be declared to have lapsed.

- 44 HC-KAR

9.2.

On the

question of compensation,

learned

counsel makes three separate points. 9.3.

The first is that this Court had called for a report from the respondents on payment of compensation, and that the report shows that no compensation was paid to the petitioners or deposited in accordance with law.

9.4.

The second concerns the extent of 3 acres which stood in the name of Smt. Puttamma and is now claimed by petitioners Nos.1 to 7. He accepts that a sum of Rs.1,49,100/- was deposited in Execution Petition No.247 of 2003 before

Court

of

Civil

Judge,

Chikkamagaluru, on 15.06.2006. His grievance is that the deposit was made without the consent or concurrence of the landowners, and so it cannot in law be treated as payment of compensation to them. 9.5.

The third concerns the extent of 1 acre 13 guntas which stood in the name of Sri Rudre Gowda and is now claimed by petitioners Nos.8 to 13. To this extent, he submits that the compensation is still lying in the treasury and has not been deposited before any court.

- 45 HC-KAR

9.6.

His submission is that the amount has to be deposited

before

competent

Reference

Court, and a deposit made before any other court, including an Execution Court, does not meet that requirement. 9.7.

On possession, learned counsel submits that possession was never taken in terms of Section 16(1) and (2) of the LA Act, 1894. He links this to the requests made by the landowners for deletion of their lands. According to him, those requests kept the matter under consideration with the Government, and it is for this reason that neither was possession taken nor was the award amount deposited in the Civil Court. The petitioners, he says, have continued in peaceful possession

and

cultivation

of

land

counsel

for

throughout. 9.8.

Sri

A.

Ravishankar,

learned

Respondent No.4–CUDA submits that Section 24(2) has been invoked on wrong facts. The acquisition, according to him, did not stop midway. Awards were passed, CUDA made the compensation

available

with

Land

Acquisition Officer, possession was taken, and

- 46 HC-KAR

the lands were used to form the residential layout at Hiremagaluru. The petitioners, he says, cannot rely on Section 24(2) merely by asserting

that

compensation

was

not

personally received by them. 9.9.

On compensation, learned counsel points out that

CUDA

deposited

a

total

sum

of

Rs.50,27,000/- with the Land Acquisition Officer on 06.04.1993, covering the entire acquisition of about 140 acres 36.5 guntas. For the land of Smt. Puttamma, he relies on the memo dated 06.02.2026

and

Form

No.4

register

maintained by the concerned Court. He explains that Execution Petition No.247 of 2003 was filed by Sri K.P. Manjunath. Smt. Puttamma was Judgment Debtor No.3. Petitioner No.1 was Judgment Debtor No.4, petitioner No.4 was Judgment Debtor No.5 and petitioner No.3 was Judgment

Debtor

No.8.

The

mother

of

petitioners Nos.5 to 7 was Judgment Debtor No.7.

The

decree-holder

had

a

claim

of

Rs.1,72,872/-. Since money was lying with the Land Acquisition Officer, a garnishee order was made, the Land Acquisition Officer deposited Rs.1,49,100/- in the execution petition, and the

- 47 HC-KAR

Execution Court released it to the decree-holder by Cheque No.144411 dated 13.02.2007. His submission is that this money was applied, through a judicial process, to discharge an enforceable liability of Smt. Puttamma and her family. It was, therefore, paid for and on their behalf, and they took the benefit of it. For the land of Sri Rudre Gowda, he submits that CUDA deposited Rs.65,852/- with the Land Acquisition Officer towards the compensation payable. 9.10. On possession, learned counsel submits that a notification under Section 16 of the LA Act, 1894, was issued, though the original is not presently available in the records. The absence of the paper, he argues, cannot wipe out what has happened on the ground. Out of 4 acres 13 guntas in Survey No.450, about 1 acre 15 guntas has been used for residential sites, about 10 guntas for a road, and about 2 acres 28 guntas has been earmarked and kept as a park. He relies on the photographs and the Google map produced before this Court to show that the land is surrounded by the formed layout. An open space kept as a park, according to him, is not abandoned or unused land.

- 48 HC-KAR

9.11. Sri

Bopanna

Beliappa,

learned

Additional

Government Advocate on instructions, places three

facts

before

compensation measuring

this

Court.

awarded

for

acres

The

Survey

total

No.450,

guntas,

was

Rs.2,14,952/-. Out of this, Rs.1,49,100/- was deposited in Execution Petition No.247 of 2003 on 30.06.2006 as far as the family of Smt. Puttamma is concerned. For the extent of Sri Rudre Gowda, the sum of Rs.65,852/- was paid to Sri Rudre Gowda himself on 06.04.1993, as shown in Form KFC-57 produced with the memo dated 10.02.2026. He adds that CUDA deposited the compensation with the Land Acquisition Officer, who in turn dealt with and disbursed

it.

Once

Sri

Rudre

Gowda

had

received the amount, he submits, there was nothing left to deposit anywhere, and the claim of petitioners Nos.8 to 13 that the amount was neither paid nor deposited is contrary to the records. 9.12. This point concerns the petitioners' contention that the acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act on the ground that

- 49 HC-KAR

possession of the land was not taken and compensation was not paid. 9.13. The validity of the acquisition notifications is a separate question and is considered under Point No.(ii). For the present point, the relevant provisions are Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act and Sections 16 and 31 of the LA Act, 1894. 9.14. Section 24(2) applies where an award under Section 11 of the LA Act, 1894 was made five years or more before the commencement of the 2013 Act and, due to inaction on the part of the acquiring authority, possession had not been taken and compensation had not been paid. 9.15. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal, [(2020) 8 SCC 129], has settled the meaning of Section 24(2). In paragraph 366.3, it has held that the word “or” occurring between possession and compensation is to be read as “nor” or “and”. Thus, lapse occurs only where, for five years or more before the commencement of the 2013 Act, the authorities had

neither

taken

possession

nor

paid

compensation. If either possession had been

- 50 HC-KAR

taken or compensation had been paid, there is no lapse. 9.16. The Constitution Bench has further held that Section

24(2)

applies

where,

because

of

inaction of the authorities, possession was not taken and compensation was not paid for five years or more before 01.01.2014. The provision is therefore intended to deal with continuing inaction in pending acquisition proceedings. 9.17. In the present case, the making of the award is not in dispute. The total compensation awarded in respect of Survey No.450 was Rs.2,14,952/. The learned Additional Government Advocate has stated that the compensation amount was deposited with the Land Acquisition Officer on 06.04.1993 and that payment of Rs.65,852/- to Sri Rudre Gowda is recorded on the same date. Since compensation could have been deposited or paid only after the award was made, the award

was

necessarily

made

before

06.04.1993. Thus, the award was made more than five years before 01.01.2014. 9.18. Since the acquisition can lapse under Section 24(2) only if both possession was not taken and

- 51 HC-KAR

compensation was not paid, it is appropriate first

to

examine

whether

compensation

in

respect of the entire extent was paid. If that is established, the question of possession would not be decisive on the issue of lapse. 9.19. Compensation relating to 3 acres of Smt. Puttamma: In respect of the extent of 3 acres originally

standing

in

name

of

Smt.

Puttamma, the material placed before the Court shows that Execution Petition No.247 of 2003 was

filed

before

Civil

Judge,

Chikkamagaluru. Smt. Puttamma and some of her legal heirs were judgment debtors in the said proceedings. The decree-holder had a claim of Rs.1,72,872/-. Pursuant to a garnishee order, the Land Acquisition Officer deposited Rs.1,49,100/- in the execution proceedings. The amount was thereafter released by the Execution Court to the decree-holder by Cheque No.144411 dated 13.02.2007. These facts are borne out by the Form No.4 register produced along with the memo dated 06.02.2026. 9.20. The petitioners contend that the amount cannot be treated as compensation paid to them

- 52 HC-KAR

because it was deposited in the execution proceedings without their consent and was not deposited before the Reference Court. 9.21. This contention requires consideration in the light of Section 31 of the LA Act, 1894. Under Section 31(1), the Collector is required to tender

compensation

awarded

to

persons entitled to it and to pay the same to them. Sub-section (2) provides for deposit in the Reference Court where the persons entitled do not consent to receive the compensation, where there is no person competent to alienate the land, or where there is a dispute as to the person entitled or the apportionment. 9.22. The present case, however, is not one where

compensation

amount

of

remained

Rs.1,49,100/-

unpaid. was

The

attached

pursuant to a judicial order in execution of a decree against Smt. Puttamma and her family and was thereafter paid to the decree-holder towards

satisfaction

of

that

decree.

The

payment was thus made out of the amount standing to the credit of the landowners and was applied towards their subsisting liability.

- 53 HC-KAR

9.23. The fact that the payment was made to the decree-holder,

rather

than

directly

to

landowners, does not by itself establish that the compensation remained unpaid. The relevant circumstance is that the amount was subjected to a judicial attachment and was thereafter applied towards the liability of the persons entitled to the compensation. 9.24. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that petitioners Nos.1, 3 and 4 were themselves judgment debtors in the execution proceedings and the mother of petitioners Nos.5 to 7 was also a judgment debtor. There is no material to show

that

garnishee

order

or

subsequent release of the amount to

decree-holder was challenged by them before the Execution Court or in any other proceeding. Smt. Puttamma, in whose name the land stood, continued to live until 02.11.2007, but no material has been placed to show that she questioned the appropriation of the amount during her lifetime. 9.25. The petitioners' further submission that the amount was not deposited in the Reference

- 54 HC-KAR

Court also does not advance their case. The Constitution Bench in Indore Development Authority has made it clear that non-deposit of compensation in Court does not result in lapse under Section 24(2). The consequence of nondeposit is dealt with separately in the proviso to Section

24(2),

and

failure

to

deposit

compensation in Court may have consequences under the 1894 Act, including payment of interest, but does not by itself result in lapse. 9.26. In the circumstances, the Court is satisfied that the amount of Rs.1,49,100/- was paid out of the compensation payable in respect of the 3 acres of Smt. Puttamma and was applied, pursuant to the order of the Execution Court, towards the liability of Smt. Puttamma and her family. 9.27. Compensation relating to 1 acre 13 guntas of Sri Rudre Gowda: The position regarding the remaining extent of 1 acre 13 guntas is somewhat different. The petitioners contend that

compensation

was

not

paid

and

remained in the treasury. CUDA states that Rs.65,852/-

was

deposited

with

Land

- 55 HC-KAR

Acquisition

Officer.

The

learned

Additional

Government Advocate relies upon Form KFC57, produced along with the memo dated 10.02.2026, to submit that the Land Acquisition Officer paid Rs.65,852/- to Sri Rudre Gowda on 06.04.1993. 9.28. These statements of CUDA and the State are not inconsistent. CUDA's case relates to the deposit made with the Land Acquisition Officer, whereas the State relies upon the record of the subsequent payment to the landowner. They represent two stages of the same transaction. 9.29. Form KFC-57 is an official record which records payment of Rs.65,852/- to Sri Rudre Gowda on 06.04.1993. Against this record, the petitioners have not produced any document from the treasury, the Land Acquisition Office or any other

authority

showing

that

amount

remained unpaid. Sri Rudre Gowda continued to live until 08.12.2003. No material has been placed before the Court to show that he had, during his lifetime, raised any claim that the compensation had not been paid. The present petitioners claim through him.

- 56 HC-KAR

9.30. This Court is conscious that disputed questions of fact ordinarily ought not to be decided in a writ

proceeding

requires

oral

where

their

determination

evidence.

The

present

case,

however, does not rest merely on competing oral assertions. There is an official record of payment made in 1993, whereas the petitioners have placed no contemporaneous material to contradict it. On the material available, the Court has no sufficient basis to disregard the official record. 9.31. Accordingly,

this

Court

finds

that

compensation of Rs.65,852/- in respect of the extent of 1 acre 13 guntas was paid to Sri Rudre Gowda on 06.04.1993. 9.32. In any event, even if the petitioners' version that the amount was not paid and remained in the treasury were to be accepted, their case would not necessarily result in lapse. The Constitution Bench in Indore Development Authority has held that Section 24(2) does not permit a concluded acquisition to be reopened merely on the ground that compensation was deposited in the treasury rather than in Court,

- 57 HC-KAR

or on the ground of the manner in which possession was taken. 9.33. Compensation for the entire extent: The two

amounts

account

for

entire

compensation awarded for Survey No.450. The amount execution

of

Rs.1,49,100/-

proceedings

and

applied

in

amount

of

Rs.65,852/- paid to Sri Rudre Gowda together total Rs.2,14,952/-, which is the compensation awarded for the entire extent of 4 acres 13 guntas. The petitioners have not disputed the total award amount. 9.34. Thus, the record does not disclose any part of the compensation for Survey No.450 which remained unpaid. This finding, by itself, is sufficient to answer the question of lapse under Section 24(2). 9.35. The proviso to Section 24(2) does not require separate consideration in the facts of the present case. No claim has been made in the writ petition for compensation under the 2013 Act on the basis of the proviso, and no material has been placed before the Court to establish

factual

conditions

necessary

for

its

- 58 HC-KAR

application. In any event, as explained in Indore Development Authority, the proviso deals with the consequence of non-deposit of compensation and does not create a separate ground for lapse of the acquisition. 9.36. Physical possession: Although the finding on compensation is sufficient to reject the claim of lapse, the question of possession has been argued at length and is also relevant to the other points arising for consideration. It is therefore appropriate to examine it. 9.37. Section 16 of the LA Act, 1894 provides that after

an

award

is

made,

Deputy

Commissioner may take possession of the land, whereupon

it

vests

absolutely

in

Government. Section 16(2), as applicable in Karnataka,

permits

fact

of

taking

possession to be notified in the Official Gazette and provides that such notification shall be evidence of possession. 9.38. The

Constitution

Development

Bench

Authority

in has

Indore held

that

possession under the 1894 Act is taken by drawing up an inquest report or memorandum

- 59 HC-KAR

and that, once possession is taken under Section 16, the land vests in the State and there is no divesting under Section 24(2). 9.39. The petitioners contend that possession was never taken in accordance with Section 16. CUDA states that a notification under Section 16 was issued, but the original document is not presently available. The absence of the original notification is a circumstance which cannot simply be ignored. At the same time, Section 16(2) treats such notification as evidence of possession; it does not make publication of the notification the act by which possession is taken. 9.40. This Court must therefore consider the other evidence bearing upon possession. On this aspect, the following facts are not seriously disputed: approximately 1 acre 15 guntas of Survey No.450 has been formed into residential sites; approximately 10 guntas has been used for a road; the sites have been allotted and houses have been constructed thereon; and the remaining extent of approximately 2 acres 28 guntas is shown as a park in the sanctioned

- 60 HC-KAR

layout. The three components together account for the entire extent of 4 acres 13 guntas. 9.41. These facts are significant. The land was not merely

notified

subsequently

for

acquisition.

incorporated

into

It

was

layout,

divided into sites, allotted to third parties, used for a road and earmarked as a park. Third-party allottees have constructed houses and are in occupation.

These

are

not

merely

administrative steps; they constitute substantial evidence that the acquiring authority took control of the land and dealt with it as part of the layout. 9.42. Section 36(3) of the KUDA Act also provides that land acquired for the Urban Development Authority is to be handed over to the Authority after it has vested in the Government under Section 16 of the LA Act, 1894. The fact that CUDA thereafter formed and allotted sites in Survey No.450 is therefore consistent with the land having vested in the Government and having been handed over to the Authority for development.

- 61 HC-KAR

9.43. The same conclusion follows in respect of the portion shown as a park. The sanctioned layout treats

entire

extent

as

part

of

one

development. The fact that the park area remains open does not, by itself, show that it remained in the possession of the former owners. An open area reserved as a park is an intended use of the acquired land and not evidence of abandonment. 9.44. The petitioners' own case also has relevance. Their grievance is that the portion presently lying vacant is being developed as a public park. They have not produced any material showing that they continued to cultivate or otherwise exercise physical possession over that portion after the acquisition. The fact that the land is vacant cannot, by itself, establish continued possession by the petitioners. 9.45. The subsequent conduct of the authorities is also consistent with the acquisition having been acted upon. The request for deletion of the lands was considered and rejected by the State Government on 04.01.1995. Thereafter, the land formed part of the layout in which sites

- 62 HC-KAR

and roads were developed and a portion was shown as a park. The later representations made by the petitioners do not, by themselves, undo the earlier decision or establish that possession was never taken. 9.46. This Court does not consider it necessary to draw any adverse inference merely from the fact that the petitioners did not approach the Court earlier. Delay and subsequent conduct may have relevance while considering other reliefs, but the finding on possession here rests principally on the documentary and physical evidence of development of the land. 9.47. The

absence

of

original

Section

notification does not alter the conclusion. The respondents

have

explained

that

proceedings are several decades old and that the original document is not presently available. More importantly, the question of possession is not determined by that notification alone. The formation and allotment of sites, construction of houses,

formation

of

road

and

sanctioned layout showing the remaining extent as a park are circumstances which, taken

- 63 HC-KAR

together, establish that the land was treated and dealt with by the acquiring authority as acquired land. 9.48. The petitioners have also relied upon the pendency of their requests for deletion of the land. The record, however, shows that the State Government had already rejected the request on 04.01.1995. The mere submission of a subsequent representation could not, without an order staying or withdrawing the acquisition, prevent the authorities from proceeding with the development of land which had already been acquired. The fact that CUDA had, as early as 29.05.1993, informed the Government that the land was required for the layout, and that the land was subsequently utilised for sites, a road and a park, is consistent with this position. 9.49. The Court therefore finds, on the material available, that possession of the entire extent of 4 acres 13 guntas was taken and that the land vested in the Government under Section 16 of the LA Act, 1894.

- 64 HC-KAR

9.50. Conclusion: The case before the Court is therefore

not

one

in

which

authority

took

no

steps

after

acquiring

issuing

acquisition notification. The compensation was dealt with in 1993 and, in respect of the 3 acres of

Smt.

Puttamma,

Rs.1,49,100/-

was

amount

subsequently

of

applied

pursuant to the order of the Execution Court towards the decree against her and her family. The remaining Rs.65,852/- was recorded as having been paid to Sri Rudre Gowda on 06.04.1993. The acquired land was thereafter incorporated into the layout, sites were formed and allotted, a road was laid and the remaining extent was earmarked as a park. 9.51. More importantly, compensation for the entire extent has been accounted for. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that there was some defect in the manner in which the compensation was deposited or in the manner in which possession was taken, such defect would not, in view

of

law

declared

in

Indore

Development Authority, result in lapse of the acquisition under Section 24(2).

- 65 HC-KAR

9.52. The

essential requirement

for

lapse

under

Section 24(2), failure to take possession and failure to pay compensation, is therefore not established.

On

contrary,

material

shows payment of compensation for the entire extent and also supports the conclusion that possession was taken. 9.53. Accordingly, this Court answers Point No. (i) by holding that the acquisition proceedings in respect of Survey No.450, measuring 4 acres 13 guntas, have not lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. 10.

Answer to Point No.(ii): Whether petitioners can, at this stage, rely upon the order dated 19.06.1998 in W.P. No.27115 of 1991 and the Division Bench judgment referred to therein to challenge the acquisition of their lands, notwithstanding that they were not parties to those proceedings and had not challenged the acquisition at the relevant time? 10.1. Sri K.R. Lingaraju, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that this Court, by order dated 19.06.1998 in W.P. No.27115 of 1991, followed the judgment of the Division Bench dated 15.06.1998 in W.P. Nos.3539 to 3542 of 1996 and connected matters. According to him,

- 66 HC-KAR

the Division Bench had held that issuance of a notification under Section 4(1) of the LA Act, 1894, after the Central Amendment Act 68 of 1984 was without authority of law. 10.2. It is submitted that the preliminary notification in the present case was issued on 12.01.1990, after the said amendment. Therefore, according to learned counsel, the acquisition of the petitioners' lands was also without authority of law. He submits that, once this Court had quashed the acquisition notifications in W.P. No.27115 of 1991 and liberty was reserved to

State

Government

to

initiate

fresh

proceedings, the State could not continue with

acquisition

without

issuing

a

fresh

further

submits

that

notification. 10.3. Learned

counsel

Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987 had come into force on 01.05.1988 and, therefore, acquisition thereafter could not have been initiated under the LA Act, 1894. He also contends that the declaration under Section 6(1) dated 23.03.1991 was issued without

- 67 HC-KAR

giving the kathedars an opportunity of hearing under Section 5A. 10.4. It

is

also

submitted

that

State

Government's order dated 04.01.1995 rejecting the request for deletion of the lands was passed without considering the relevant material and without complying with the principles of natural justice. On these grounds, the petitioners seek to challenge the declaration dated 23.03.1991 by way of I.A. No.1/24. 10.5. Sri A. Ravishankar, learned counsel for CUDA, submits that the reliance placed on the order dated 19.06.1998 in W.P. No.27115 of 1991 is misplaced.

The

order

acquisition

notification

did in

not its

quash

entirety.

The

acquisition was quashed only insofar as it related to the lands of the petitioners in that writ petition. 10.6. He submits that the present petitioners were not parties to those proceedings and their lands were not the subject matter of the relief granted therein. Therefore, the order could not have the effect of setting aside the acquisition of the present petitioners' lands.

- 68 HC-KAR

10.7. Learned

counsel

submits

that

same

principle

applies

to

Division

Bench

judgment dated 15.06.1998. The relief granted in that case was in respect of the lands of the landowners who had approached the Court. The present petitioners, who had not challenged the acquisition of their lands, cannot now seek to extend that relief to themselves after several decades. 10.8. He further submits that, by the time the present

proceedings

were

initiated,

acquisition had been acted upon. The layout had been formed, sites had been allotted and third-party rights had come into existence. The petitioners cannot, after such a long lapse of time, seek to unsettle the acquisition on the basis of a judgment rendered in proceedings to which they were not parties. 10.9. As regards the request for deletion, learned counsel submits that the State Government had considered the request and rejected it by order dated 04.01.1995. The said order was never challenged by the petitioners at the relevant time.

- 69 HC-KAR

10.10. The principal submission of the petitioners is that

order

dated

19.06.1998

in

W.P.

No.27115 of 1991, read with the Division Bench judgment dated 15.06.1998 in W.P. Nos.3539 to

3542

of 1996

and

connected

matters,

rendered the acquisition notification in the present

case

ineffective.

The

question,

therefore, is not merely what principle was laid down in those proceedings, but what was actually quashed by the orders passed therein and whether the present petitioners can rely upon those orders to reopen the acquisition of their own lands after more than two decades. 10.11. It is not disputed before this Court that the order dated 19.06.1998 in W.P. No.27115 of 1991 quashed the acquisition notifications only insofar as they related to the lands of the petitioners in that proceeding and reserved liberty to the State to initiate fresh proceedings in respect of those lands. 10.12. This distinction is important. A writ petition is decided with reference to the relief sought and the subject matter before the Court. If an acquisition notification covers several parcels of

- 70 HC-KAR

land belonging to different landowners, and the Court quashes the notification only insofar as it relates to the lands of the petitioners before it, the order does not, by that fact alone, annul the acquisition in respect of every other parcel covered by the notification. 10.13. The liberty reserved to the State Government to initiate fresh proceedings must also be understood in the same context. Since the acquisition in respect of the lands before that Court had been set aside, liberty was reserved to initiate fresh proceedings in respect of those lands. It does not follow that the State was required to initiate fresh proceedings in respect of lands which were not the subject matter of that writ petition and in respect of which the acquisition had not been quashed. 10.14. The present petitioners were not parties to W.P. No.27115 of 1991. More importantly, their lands were not the lands in respect of which the acquisition was quashed. The operative effect of that order, therefore, cannot be extended to the petitioners' lands merely because the same

- 71 HC-KAR

acquisition notification may have covered both sets of lands. 10.15. The fact that the Division Bench judgment was referred to and followed in W.P. No.27115 of 1991

does

not

alter

this

position.

The

petitioners may rely upon the legal principle declared by a Division Bench as a precedent, subject to its applicability to the facts of their case. What they cannot do is treat the relief granted in another writ petition as though their own lands had also been covered by that relief. 10.16. It is, therefore, unnecessary for this Court, in the present proceedings, to assume that the entire

notification

stood

quashed

merely

because relief was granted in respect of certain lands under the same notification. The record before this Court does not support such a conclusion. 10.17. Delay and subsequent conduct: There is another

circumstance

considerable

importance.

which

assumes

The

petitioners

themselves state that the kathedars came to know of the declaration under Section 6(1) in October 1992. They thereafter submitted a

- 72 HC-KAR

representation

dated

01.10.1992

seeking

deletion of their lands from the acquisition. 10.18. Thus, the petitioners were aware, at least from 1992, that their lands had been included in the acquisition and that a declaration under Section 6(1) had been issued. Their response at that stage was not to challenge the validity of the acquisition

proceedings

before

this

Court.

Instead, they requested the Government to delete their lands from the acquisition. 10.19. That request was considered and rejected by the State Government on 04.01.1995. The petitioners did not challenge that order at that stage. They also did not institute proceedings challenging the Section 4(1) notification, the Section 6(1) declaration or the alleged violation of Section 5A. 10.20. This is significant because the grounds now sought to be raised were available to the petitioners at that time. The alleged absence of a hearing under Section 5A, the alleged lack of authority to issue the notification under the LA Act, 1894 after the KUDA Act came into force, and the alleged invalidity of the acquisition

- 73 HC-KAR

were all matters which could have been raised when the petitioners became aware of the acquisition. 10.21. The petitioners also did not approach the Court when the judgments dated 15.06.1998 and 19.06.1998 were rendered. If, according to the petitioners, those judgments had the effect of invalidating the acquisition of their lands also, there was no apparent impediment to their approaching

Court

at

that

stage

and

seeking similar relief. Instead, the acquisition was allowed to proceed. As noticed while considering Point No.(i), an award was made, compensation was dealt with, possession was taken and the land was incorporated into the layout.

Residential

sites

were

formed

and

allotted, a road was formed and the remaining portion was earmarked for a park. 10.22. The present challenge was brought only after

e-tender

dated

24.05.2017

and

subsequent Work Order dated 04.11.2017. The challenge to the acquisition itself was sought to be introduced later by I.A. No.1/24. Thus, the challenge to the acquisition is being raised after

- 74 HC-KAR

a very long period and after the acquisition has been acted upon. 10.23. This Court is not proceeding on the basis that mere delay can validate an acquisition which is void in law. The question here is narrower. The petitioners seek to reopen an acquisition of their lands which they admittedly knew about from

1992,

rendered

in

by

relying

proceedings

upon

a

judgment

concerning

other

lands, after the acquisition has been completed and the land has been put to the use for which it was acquired. In such circumstances, the discretionary

jurisdiction

under

Article

cannot ordinarily be invoked to unsettle the completed acquisition. 10.24. Effect of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act: There is also a statutory reason why the petitioners cannot use the present proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act to revive the old challenge to the acquisition. 10.25. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority, has held in paragraph 366.9 that Section 24(2) does not create a fresh cause of action to

- 75 HC-KAR

challenge

legality

of

concluded

land

acquisition proceedings. It does not reopen concluded proceedings or revive stale and timebarred claims. 10.26. The significance of this principle in the present case

is

clear.

approached

this

The

petitioners

Court

complaining

originally of

proposed development of the acquired land and seeking

to

acquisition

invoke

Section

proceedings

24(2).

themselves

The were

initiated in 1990 and 1991. The petitioners, by their own showing, were aware of the Section 6(1) declaration in 1992. The validity of that declaration was not challenged then. 10.27. Section 24(2) cannot be converted into a means of reopening that old challenge. The question under Section 24(2) is whether the statutory conditions for lapse were satisfied as on the commencement of the 2013 Act. It is not a mechanism for reviving a challenge to the validity of the original acquisition which had become stale. 10.28. The distinction between the two questions must therefore be maintained. The Division Bench

- 76 HC-KAR

judgment and the order dated 19.06.1998 may have decided the validity of the acquisition insofar as the lands before those Courts were concerned.

That

does

present

petitioners'

not

mean

that

acquisition

stood

automatically quashed. Nor does Section 24(2) provide a fresh opportunity to challenge that acquisition on grounds which were available to the petitioners decades earlier. 10.29. Challenge based on the KUDA Act: The petitioners next contend that, since the KUDA Act

came

into

force

on

01.05.1988,

acquisition could not thereafter be initiated under the LA Act, 1894. 10.30. This submission overlooks Section 36(1) of the KUDA Act. That provision expressly provides that acquisition of land under the KUDA Act otherwise

than

regulated,

so

by far

agreement as

is

to

be

applicable,

by

provisions of the LA Act, 1894. 10.31. Section 36, therefore, does not exclude the LA Act, 1894. It incorporates that Act for the purpose of compulsory acquisition under the KUDA Act. Section 36(3) further contemplates

- 77 HC-KAR

that, after the land vests in the Government under Section 16 of the LA Act, 1894, it may be transferred

to

Urban

Development

Authority. 10.32. The very structure of Section 36 thus shows that the KUDA Act and the LA Act, 1894 were intended to operate together in the matter of compulsory acquisition. The mere fact that the KUDA Act had come into force before the preliminary notification dated 12.01.1990 does not, by itself, invalidate the acquisition. 10.33. No specific provision of the KUDA Act has been identified by the petitioners which prohibited the use of the LA Act, 1894 for the acquisition in question. Nor has any specific procedural requirement under the KUDA Act, which was allegedly

violated

before

issuance

of

Section 4(1) notification, been established on the material placed before this Court. 10.34. Challenge

based

on

Section

5A:

The

petitioners also contend that no hearing was afforded under Section 5A before issuance of the declaration under Section 6(1).

- 78 HC-KAR

10.35. The

importance

of

Section

5A

cannot

be

disputed. It provides a statutory opportunity to a person interested in the land to object to the proposed acquisition and requires consideration of

objections

before

Government

proceeds to make the declaration under Section 6(1). The difficulty for the petitioners is that this objection is being raised more than three decades after the declaration. The petitioners' own case is that they became aware of the declaration in October 1992. They did not challenge the declaration then. They instead sought deletion of the lands, and that request was rejected on 04.01.1995. The petitioners cannot,

after

allowing

acquisition

to

proceed for decades, seek to have the entire acquisition reopened merely on the basis of a bare assertion that no hearing was afforded. 10.36. More importantly, even assuming that the petitioners

have

a

grievance

regarding

compliance with Section 5A, that grievance had to be raised when the declaration was known to them. The subsequent enactment of the 2013 Act and the filing of a petition under Section

- 79 HC-KAR

24(2) cannot revive such a stale challenge to the original acquisition. 10.37. Order dated 04.01.1995: The petitioners also challenge the order dated 04.01.1995 rejecting their request for deletion of the lands. The nature of that order must first be kept in view. The petitioners had sought deletion of their lands from an acquisition which had already proceeded to the stage of a Section 6(1) declaration. The State Government considered that request and rejected it. The order was not an adjudication of a challenge to the validity of the Section 4(1) or Section 6(1) notifications. 10.38. If the petitioners considered the rejection to be contrary to law or in breach of natural justice, they could have challenged it at that stage. They did not do so. The fact that further representations

may

have

been

submitted

subsequently does not, by itself, keep the original

acquisition

proceedings

open

indefinitely or prevent the respondents from acting upon an acquisition which had already been completed.

- 80 HC-KAR

10.39. This Court therefore finds no basis to treat the order dated 04.01.1995, or the subsequent representations, as preserving an otherwise concluded challenge to the acquisition. 10.40. I.A. No.1/24: By I.A. No.1/24, the petitioners seek to introduce a direct challenge to the declaration dated 23.03.1991. 10.41. The

amendment

sought

is

not

merely

a

clarification of the existing challenge. It seeks to introduce, at this stage, a direct challenge to an acquisition declaration which was made more than three decades ago and of which the petitioners admittedly became aware in 1992. 10.42. Even if the amendment were allowed, the challenge would face the same difficulty of extraordinary delay and the fact that the acquisition has already been acted upon and completed.

The

amendment

cannot

be

permitted merely to introduce a claim which cannot itself be entertained at this stage. The application for amendment is therefore liable to be rejected.

- 81 HC-KAR

10.43. The order dated 19.06.1998 in W.P. No.27115 of

1991

did

not

quash

acquisition

in

its

entirety.

The

relief

notification

was

confined to the lands which were the subject matter of that petition. The present petitioners' lands were not before that Court. The same is true of the relief granted by the Division Bench in

W.P.

Nos.3539

to

3542

of

1996

and

connected matters. 10.44. The present petitioners were aware of the acquisition by October 1992. They did not challenge the Section 4(1) notification or the Section 6(1) declaration. They sought deletion of their lands, but the request was rejected on 04.01.1995, which order was not challenged at the relevant time. The acquisition thereafter proceeded and was acted upon. 10.45. The petitioners cannot now treat the orders passed in proceedings relating to other lands as though those orders had also quashed the acquisition of their lands. Nor can Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act be used to revive a challenge to

validity

of

an

acquisition

available to them decades earlier.

which

was

- 82 HC-KAR

10.46. The challenge based on the KUDA Act also fails, since Section 36 of that Act expressly makes the LA Act, 1894 applicable to compulsory acquisition. The challenge based on Section 5A is

raised

after

an

notwithstanding

extraordinary

petitioners'

delay,

admitted

knowledge of the declaration from 1992. The challenge to the order dated 04.01.1995 is likewise belated. 10.47. For all the above reasons, this Court answers Point No. (ii) by holding that the petitioners cannot, at this stage, rely upon the order dated 19.06.1998 in W.P. No.27115 of 1991 or the Division Bench judgment referred to therein to reopen the acquisition of their lands. 11.

Answer to Point No.(iii): Whether subsequent formation and implementation of the residential layout, including formation of sites, roads and the park and accrual of thirdparty rights, has any bearing on the relief sought by the petitioners? 11.1. The submission of Sri K.R. Lingaraju, learned counsel

for

petitioners,

is

that

petitioners continue to be in possession and cultivation

of

land

and

that

Chikkamagaluru

City

Municipality

has

now

- 83 HC-KAR

sought to develop the remaining portion as a park. 11.2. Learned

counsel

also

submits

that

petitioners had offered to provide a 60-feet road through the property, which is situated at the fag end of the layout, and that the remaining extent ought to have been deleted from the acquisition. 11.3. Sri A. Ravishankar submits that the acquisition was followed by formation of the Hiremagaluru residential

layout.

Sites

were

formed

and

allotted, and houses have been constructed by the allottees. A road has also been formed. The remaining extent of the subject land is shown as a park in the layout plan. 11.4. Learned counsel submits that the fact that a portion of the land remains open does not mean that it has not been put to use. A residential layout necessarily contains not only residential sites but also roads, parks and other common areas. According to the break-up placed before the Court, out of 4 acres 13 guntas, about 1 acre 15 guntas has been utilised for sites, about 10 guntas for a road

- 84 HC-KAR

and

about

acres

guntas

has

been

earmarked as a park. These three extents together account for the entire land in Survey No.450. 11.5. Learned counsel further submits that thirdparty rights have arisen in the meantime. Sites have been allotted and houses have been constructed. After such a long period, the petitioners cannot seek relief which would unsettle the existing layout and affect persons who are not parties to the present proceedings. 11.6. The question under this Point is whether the subsequent formation

formation

of

layout,

of sites and roads, the portion

earmarked as a park, and the creation of rights in favour of third parties have any bearing on the relief sought by the petitioners. 11.7. At the outset, it is necessary to keep apart two different questions. The formation of a layout or the creation of third-party rights does not, by itself, prevent an acquisition from lapsing if the statutory requirements for lapse are otherwise satisfied.

Therefore,

subsequent

development of the land cannot be treated as

- 85 HC-KAR

an

independent

answer

to

a

claim

under

Section 24(2) of the LA Act, 2013. 11.8. In the present case, however, this Court has already

held

under

Point

No.(i)

that

acquisition has not lapsed. The subsequent development of the land is relevant for another reason.

It

bears

upon

question

of

possession and also upon whether discretionary relief should be granted after the acquisition has been acted upon for several decades. 11.9. The land has formed part of the layout: The material placed before the Court shows that the entire extent of 4 acres 13 guntas in Survey No.450 has been dealt with as part of the Hiremagaluru

layout.

According

to

respondents, about 1 acre 15 guntas has been used for residential sites, about 10 guntas for a road and about 2 acres 28 guntas has been shown as a park. These three extents together account for the entire land in question. 11.10. The petitioners have not produced any material to show that any portion of the land falls outside the layout. Their own case is that the property is situated at the fag end of the layout

- 86 HC-KAR

and that they had offered to provide a 60-feet road through it. This itself shows that the property has been dealt with as part of the layout. 11.11. The formation and allotment of sites is also significant. The material before the Court shows that sites have been formed and allotted and that houses have been constructed. A road has also

been

formed.

These

facts

are

not

consistent with the petitioners' claim that the entire

land

continued

to

remain

in

their

possession and cultivation. The photographs and Google Maps placed on record clearly establish this. 11.12. This

Court

has

already

considered

these

circumstances while dealing with possession under Point No.(i) and has held that possession of the entire extent was taken over. The subsequent development of the land lends further support to that finding. The layout, therefore,

is

substitute

for

not

being

referred

statutory

to

as

a

requirement

relating to possession; it is being considered as

- 87 HC-KAR

evidence of what happened to the land after the acquisition. 11.13. The

portion

shown

as

a

park:

The

petitioners' case appears to proceed on the basis that the extent of about 2 acres 28 guntas cannot be treated as having been put to use because no residential sites have been formed

on

it.

This

submission

cannot

be

confined

to

accepted. 11.14. A

residential

layout

is

not

residential sites. Roads and open spaces may form part of the layout. Therefore, the fact that a portion has not been covered by buildings does not, by itself, mean that the land was not acquired or that it continued to remain with the former owners. 11.15. In the present case, the relevant fact is that the disputed extent is shown as a park in the layout. It is therefore not an unidentified or unused piece of land lying outside the layout. It has been earmarked for a particular purpose within the layout.

- 88 HC-KAR

11.16. The record also shows that CUDA had furnished the layout plan to the State Government on 29.05.1993

stating

that

lands

were

required for the layout. The request for deletion of

lands

was

thereafter

rejected

on

04.01.1995. There is nothing on record to show that the portion now shown as a park was subsequently brought into the layout only after the petitioners approached this Court. 11.17. The

later

issuance

of

e-tender

for

development of the park does not alter this position.

It

indicates

that

authorities

proposed to develop the portion which had already been shown as a park in the layout. The e-tender cannot therefore be treated as an admission that the land had remained with the petitioners. 11.18. The fact that the park was yet to be fully developed when the petition was filed is also not decisive. The question is whether the land formed part of the layout and had been taken over for the acquired purpose. An open area earmarked as a park cannot be treated as land

- 89 HC-KAR

outside the layout merely because further development was proposed. 11.19. The petitioners' proposal for a 60-feet road: The petitioners rely upon their proposal to provide a 60-feet road through the property and contend that the remaining land ought to have been deleted from the acquisition. 11.20. This proposal does not assist the petitioners. It was a proposal for an alternative arrangement and not an order deleting the land from the acquisition.

The

request

for

deletion

had

already been considered and rejected by the State Government on 04.01.1995. No material has been placed before the Court to show that the said decision was subsequently withdrawn or that the petitioners' proposal was accepted. 11.21. The fact that the petitioners were willing to give land for a road also does not establish that possession of the remaining land continued with them. At the highest, it shows that the petitioners sought a different use of the land and deletion of the balance extent from the acquisition. That proposal did not result in any change in the acquisition proceedings. What it

- 90 HC-KAR

could, however, show is that the layout has been formed and this road was offered by the petitioners to be provided as access to the layout, which does not help the petitioners. 11.22. Effect

of

third-party

rights:

The

next

question is the effect of the rights created in favour of third parties. The record shows that sites have been allotted and houses have been constructed in the layout. These persons have acquired their interests during the period in which the petitioners did not challenge the acquisition. 11.23. The relief sought by the petitioners is in respect of the acquisition of the entire extent of 4 acres 13 guntas. That extent includes the portion on which residential sites have been formed and houses constructed, the road, and the portion shown as a park. 11.24. A declaration in respect of the entire extent would therefore have consequences beyond the dispute

between

petitioners

and

acquiring authorities. It would affect persons who have been allotted sites and constructed houses on the basis of the layout, although 09/10/2026, 12:15, Bengaluru

- 91 HC-KAR

those

persons

are

not

parties

to

these

proceedings. 11.25. This aspect is particularly relevant because of the delay on the part of the petitioners. As noticed under Point No.(ii), the petitioners came to know of the Section 6 declaration in 1992. They sought deletion of the land, but the request was rejected on 04.01.1995. They did not challenge the acquisition at that stage. The layout

was

thereafter

formed,

sites

were

allotted and houses were constructed. 11.26. This Court must therefore consider not only the claim made by the petitioners but also the consequences of granting the relief sought. Where the acquisition has been acted upon, the land has been incorporated into a residential layout, sites have been allotted and houses have

been

constructed,

this

Court

cannot

ignore the position that has arisen over the years,

particularly

when

petitioners

themselves did not challenge the acquisition for a long period. 09/10/2026, 12:15, Bengaluru

- 92 HC-KAR

11.27. The subsequent formation and implementation of the layout has a bearing on the present proceedings in three respects. 11.28. Firstly, it supports the finding already recorded under Point No.(i) that possession of the entire extent was taken over. The residential sites, road and the portion shown as a park together account for the entire extent of 4 acres 13 guntas. 11.29. Secondly, the fact that about 2 acres 28 guntas remains open does not establish that the land was left with the petitioners. The material shows that this portion forms part of the layout and is earmarked as a park. The subsequent proposal to develop the park is consistent with that position. 11.30. Thirdly, the formation of sites, construction of houses and creation of third-party rights are relevant to the exercise of discretionary writ jurisdiction. The petitioners seek to disturb an acquisition and layout which have been acted upon for several decades, without challenging

acquisition

at

stage

challenge was available to them. 09/10/2026, 12:15, Bengaluru

when

such

- 93 HC-KAR

11.31. These circumstances do not, by themselves, determine the question of lapse under Section 24(2).

That

question

has

already

been

answered under Point No.(i). They are relevant to the present Point because they show the extent

to

which

acquisition

has

been

implemented and the consequences that would follow if the relief sought by the petitioners were granted at this stage. 11.32. For these reasons, this Court answers Point No. (iii) by holding that the subsequent formation and implementation of the residential layout, including the formation of sites and roads, the earmarking of the remaining portion as a park, and the creation of third-party rights, have a material bearing on the relief sought by the petitioners. 12.

Answer to Point No.(iv): Whether petitioners are entitled to quashing of the eprocurement re-tender notification dated 24.05.2017 and the Work Order dated 04.11.2017? 12.1. Sri

K.R.

Lingaraju

submits

that

Chikkamagaluru City Municipality issued the eprocurement

re-tender

09/10/2026, 12:15, Bengaluru

notification

dated

- 94 HC-KAR

24.05.2017 for development of the disputed land as a park and thereafter issued the Work Order dated 04.11.2017. According to learned counsel, these proceedings were impermissible because the acquisition had already lapsed and the land continued to belong to the petitioners. 12.2. Learned

counsel

further

submits

that

request of the landowners for deletion of the land from the acquisition proceedings was still under

consideration.

The

landowners

had

offered to provide a 60-feet road through their property

and

had

sought

deletion

of

remaining extent. According to him, until that request was finally decided, the respondents ought not to have proceeded with development of the land as a park. 12.3. Sri A. Ravishankar submits that the e-tender was issued only to implement the layout which had already been formed on the acquired land. The portion in question had been earmarked as a park in the layout. Therefore, the e-tender and the subsequent Work Order were steps towards implementation of the existing layout 09/10/2026, 12:15, Bengaluru

- 95 HC-KAR

and did not amount to any fresh action against the petitioners' land. 12.4. With regard to the request for deletion, learned counsel submits that the State Government had already considered and rejected the request by order dated 04.01.1995. The petitioners did not challenge

that

order.

The

subsequent

representations made by them could not, by themselves, revive a request which had already been decided. 12.5. Learned counsel submits that no subsequent order recalling or modifying the order dated 04.01.1995 has been produced. Nor has any order

of

Court

or

Government

restraining the respondents from implementing the layout been brought to the notice of this Court. 12.6. The challenge to the e-tender and the Work Order has to be considered in the background of what had happened to the land before those proceedings were initiated. 12.7. The

acquisition

commenced

with

preliminary notification dated 12.01.1990. The 09/10/2026, 12:15, Bengaluru

- 96 HC-KAR

declaration under Section 6(1) was thereafter issued on 23.03.1991. The landowners became aware of the declaration in October 1992 and submitted a representation dated 01.10.1992 seeking

deletion

of

their

lands

from

acquisition. 12.8. The request for deletion was considered by the State Government. CUDA furnished its layout plan on 29.05.1993 and stated that the land was

required

for

layout.

After

correspondence between the authorities, the State Government rejected the request for deletion on 04.01.1995. 12.9. The petitioners did not challenge the order dated 04.01.1995 at that stage. Nor did they obtain

any

proceedings

order

staying

or

restraining

acquisition

CUDA

from

proceeding with the layout. 12.10. The acquisition was thereafter acted upon. An award was made, compensation was dealt with in the manner considered under Point No.(i), possession was taken over and the residential layout was formed. Sites and roads were formed and sites were allotted to third parties. 09/10/2026, 12:15, Bengaluru

- 97 HC-KAR

The portion now in question was shown as a park in the layout. 12.11. It was much later, in 2017, that the eprocurement

re-tender

was

issued

for

development of the park. The Work Order followed on 04.11.2017. Thus, the e-tender was not the event by which the land was first sought to be brought into the layout. It was a subsequent step for implementing the layout which had already been formed. 12.12. The petitioners' challenge to the e-tender is based on their assertion that the land continued to belong to them because the acquisition had lapsed

or

was

otherwise

invalid.

That

contention has already been considered under the earlier Points. 12.13. Under Point No.(i), this Court has held that the acquisition had not lapsed. Under Point No.(ii), this Court has held that the petitioners cannot, at

this

stage,

reopen

validity

of

acquisition on the grounds now urged by them. Under Point No.(iii), this Court has found that the disputed extent forms part of the layout 09/10/2026, 12:15, Bengaluru

- 98 HC-KAR

and that the portion in question has been earmarked as a park. 12.14. Those findings are material to the present issue. If the acquisition had lapsed and the petitioners had established a subsisting right in the land, the authority of the respondents to undertake development thereon would require examination. But once the acquisition is held to have remained effective and possession is found to have been taken, the petitioners cannot

challenge

subsequent

implementation of the layout merely on the ground that the land was once owned and cultivated by them. 12.15. The principal argument of the petitioners is that their request for deletion was pending when the e-tender was issued. The record does not support

that

contention.

The

request

for

deletion was made in 1992 and was considered by the State Government. It was rejected on 04.01.1995. The petitioners did not challenge that decision. 12.16. It is stated that further representations and correspondence

followed.

09/10/2026, 12:15, Bengaluru

However,

no

- 99 HC-KAR

subsequent order has been placed before this Court showing that the order dated 04.01.1995 was recalled, set aside or modified. There is also

no

material

showing

that

State

Government subsequently directed CUDA to keep the land out of the layout. 12.17. Mere correspondence cannot, by itself, undo a decision

already

taken

by

competent

authority. Nor can a subsequent representation, without an order accepting it, suspend the operation of the earlier decision. 12.18. The proposal to provide a 60-feet road stands on the same footing. It was only a proposal made by the landowners. There is no material to show that the State Government accepted the proposal or formally released the remaining land from acquisition. 12.19. In the absence of such an order, the petitioners cannot contend that the respondents were required

to

wait

indefinitely

before

implementing the layout. The acquisition and the layout could not be kept in a state of uncertainty merely because the landowners continued to make representations. 09/10/2026, 12:15, Bengaluru

- 100 HC-KAR

12.20. The

e-tender

dated

24.05.2017

was

for

development of the park shown in the layout. The Work Order dated 04.11.2017 followed the tender process. 12.21. The petitioners have not pointed out any independent illegality in the tender process or in the Work Order. There is no challenge that the tender conditions were illegal, that the process was conducted arbitrarily, or that the Work

Order

was

issued

contrary

to

applicable rules. 12.22. The challenge is therefore not really to the tender

process.

It

is

to

respondents'

authority to use the land for the purpose for which

it

had

been

acquired.

Since

acquisition has been held to be subsisting and possession has been held to have been taken, that

challenge

cannot

succeed.

The

development of the park also cannot be treated as a new acquisition. The land had already been included in the layout, and the park was part of that layout. The e-tender was only a step towards giving effect to that planned use. 09/10/2026, 12:15, Bengaluru

- 101 HC-KAR

12.23. There is another circumstance which cannot be ignored. By the time the e-tender was issued, the acquisition had been acted upon for more than two decades. Residential sites had been formed

and

allotted,

houses

had

been

constructed and roads had been laid. The petitioners now seek to quash the e-tender and Work Order as part of their larger challenge to

acquisition.

Such

relief

cannot

be

considered without taking into account the position which has arisen during the long period in which the petitioners did not challenge the acquisition. 12.24. In the present case, the petitioners had notice of the acquisition at least by October 1992. They sought deletion of the land, their request was

rejected

in

1995,

challenge

that

thereafter

implemented.

and

decision.

they

The The

did

not

layout

was

e-tender

was

issued only in 2017 for development of the park. In these circumstances, there is no justification to grant a discretionary writ which would

have

completed

effect

acquisition

existing layout. 09/10/2026, 12:15, Bengaluru

of

reopening

and

disturbing

- 102 HC-KAR

12.25. As discussed under Point No.(i), possession has been considered on the basis of the entire material available before the Court, including the subsequent formation and implementation of the layout. The fact that the land has been dealt with as part of the layout, residential sites and

roads

have

been

formed,

and

remaining portion has been earmarked as a park, supports the conclusion already reached regarding possession. 12.26. The concerned authorities should, nevertheless, make appropriate efforts to trace and preserve the original acquisition and possession records. Proper

maintenance

of

such

records

is

particularly important where the acquisition is of considerable vintage. 12.27. The e-tender dated 24.05.2017 and the Work Order dated 04.11.2017 were issued after the acquisition had been acted upon and the layout had been formed. The park for which the tender was issued forms part of that layout. 12.28. The

petitioners

have

not

established

any

subsisting right in the land which would prevent the respondents from implementing the layout. 09/10/2026, 12:15, Bengaluru

- 103 HC-KAR

Their request for deletion had already been rejected in 1995, and no subsequent order releasing the land from acquisition has been produced.

The

subsequent

representations

made by the petitioners did not, by themselves, keep

request

for

deletion

pending

or

prevent the respondents from proceeding with the layout. The e-tender and the Work Order therefore cannot be quashed on that ground. 12.29. In view of the findings recorded under Points Nos.(i) to (iii), and particularly the findings that

acquisition

has

not

lapsed,

that

petitioners cannot now reopen its validity, and that the disputed land forms part of the existing layout, this Court answers Point No. (iv) by holding that the petitioners are not entitled

to

relief

procurement

re-tender

24.05.2017

or

of

quashing notification

Work

Order

04.11.2017.

13.

Answer to Point No.(v): What Order? 09/10/2026, 12:15, Bengaluru

e-

dated dated

- 104 HC-KAR

13.1. In view of the above, this Court passes the following: ORDER (i)

The writ petition is dismissed.

(ii)

The prayer for a writ of certiorari to quash the e-procurement re-tender notification bearing No.CMC/CKM/CR/106/2016-2017

dated

24.05.2017

and

Work

Order

dated

04.11.2017,

at

Annexures-A

and

B,

for

a

is

rejected. (iii)

The

prayer

declaration

that

preliminary notification bearing No.LAQ:2/8990 dated 12.01.1990 and the final notification bearing

No.R.D.9.Bhu.Swa.Chi.90

23.03.1991,

at

Annexures-C

and

dated D,

have

lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation Acquisition,

and

Transparency

Rehabilitation

and

in

Land

Resettlement

Act, 2013, in respect of land bearing Survey No.450, measuring 4 acres 13 guntas, situated at

Hiremagaluru

Village,

Kasaba

Hobli,

Chikkamagaluru Taluk and District, is rejected. 09/10/2026, 12:15, Bengaluru

- 105 HC-KAR

(iv)

I.A. No.1/24 is Dismissed.

(v)

Interim

order,

if

any,

stands

vacated.

All

pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand disposed of.

This Court has been assisted by Mr. Sourav, Law Clerk, in the formulation of this Judgment.

09/10/2026, 12:15, Bengaluru

(SURAJ GOVINDARAJ) JUDGE

LN List No.: 3 Sl No.: 1

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