State (n.c.t. of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu@afsan Guru
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date of judgment
- 4 August 2005
- Judge
- Justice P. Venkatarama Reddi
- Neutral citation
- 2005 INSC 333
- Reported in
- [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 79
- Acts & sections
- Section 123 IPC, Section 121 IPC, Section 196 CrPC, Section 162 CrPC, Section 8 Evidence Act, Section 302 IPC, Section 173 CrPC, Section 164 CrPC
- Subject
- Criminal
Full judgment
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NA VJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU
AGUSUST 4, 2005
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[P. VENKATARAMA REDD! AND P.P. NAOLEKAR, JJ.]
Pena/Code, 1860-Sections 120-8,121, 123 r/wSection302-Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002-Sections 3, 32, 50 & 52-Terrorist attack on· Parliament House Complex-Conspiracy by accused-Five terrorists killedEight security personnel and one gardener died-13 security personnel and
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3 others injured-3 persons convicted and sentenced to death-One acquitted-
Confirmed by High Court-Justification of-Explosive Substances Act, I 908Sections 3 and 4. Penal Code, 1860-Sections 120A & 1208-Evidence Act, 1872Section IO-Criminal Conspiracy-Concept-Proof of by circumstantial evidence-Theory of Agency-Applicability of Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002-Sections 2(h) and 50-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 196-Sanction orders-Whether Lieutenant Governor a competent authority-Addition of offence under Section 120-B JP(' which does not require sanction-Whether reveals nonapplication of mind-Constitution of India, Articles I 20-B, 239 & 239AA. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002-Sections 36 to 48-Telegraph Act! Rules-Section 5(2)/Rule 419A-lnterception to telephone calls-Legality and admissibility of-Procedure and conditions-Discussed Evidence Act, 1872-Sections 10 and 30-Code ofCriminal Procedure, 1973-Section 164-Confession under POTA recorded by a Police OfficerProcedural safeguards-Evidentiary value of-Nature of corroboration required-Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002-Sections 32 & 52.
Evidence Act, I 872-Sections 63 and 658-Cellular phone call recordsProof and authenticity of-Admissibility of as secondary evidence.
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Evidence Act, 1872-Sections J and 27-Discovery of fact--State of things or facts-Within the knowledge of accused-Admissibility of-
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Credibility of the information-Extent of necessary caution and care-Joint disclosures-Admissibility of-Simultaneous disclosures by more than one accused-Reliance upon by Courts-Discussed. On 13th December, 2001 five heavily armed persons practically stormed the Parliament House complex and inflicted heavy casualties on the security men on duty. In the gun battle that lasted for 30 mimutes or so, these five terrorists who tried to gain entry into the Parliament when it was i": session, were killed. Nine persons including eight security personnel and one gardener succumbed to the bullets of the terrorists and 16 persons including 13 security men received injuries. The five terrorists we.re ultimately killed and their abortive attempt to lay a seize of the Parliament House thus came to an end. After the conclusion of investigation the investigating agency filed report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. against the four accused persons on 14.5.2002. Charges were framed under various sections of Indian Penal Code, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 {'POTA') and the Expiosive Substances Act, by the designated Court. The trial concluded within a record period of about six months. 80 witnesses were exami~ed for the prosecution and 10 witnesses were examined on behalf of the accused. 330 documents were exhibited. The three accused, 'A', 'S' and 'G' were convicted for the offences under Sections 121, 121A, 122, 'Section 120B read with Sections 302 & 307 read with Section 120-B IPC, sub-Sections (2), (3) & (5) of Section 3 and Section 4(b) of POTA and Sections 3 & 4 of Explosive Substances Act. Accused 1 & 2 were also convicted under Section 3(4) of POTA. Accused No. 4 viz., 'AG' was acquitted of all the charges except.the one under Section 123 IPC for which she was convicted and sentenced to undergo R.I. for five years and to pay fine. Death seutences were imposed on the other three accused for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 120:-B IPC an~ Section 3(2) of POTA. They were also sentenced to life imprisonment on as many as eight counts under the provisions of IPC, POTA and Explosive Substance Act in addition to varying amounts of fine. The amount of Rs. 10 lakhs, which was recovered from the possession of two of the accused, namely, 'A' and 'S' was forfeited to the State under Section 6 of the POTA. The designated Judge submitted the record of the case to the High Court of Delhi for confirmation of death sentence imposed on the three
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STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU 81
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accused. Each of the four accused filed appeals. The State also filed an appeal seeking enhancement of life sentence to death sentence in relation to their convictions under Sections 121, 121A and 302 !PC. In addition, the State filed an appeal against the acquittal of the 4th accused on all the charges other than the one under Section 123 !PC. The Division Bench of High Court dismissed the appeals of 'A' and 'S' and confirmed the death sentence imposed on them. It allowed the appeal of the State in regard to sentence under Section 121 IPC and awarded them death sentence under that Section also. The High Court allowed the appeals of 'G' and 'N' and acquitted them of all charges. Hence these appeals by the accused and the State.
Dismissing the appeal of' A', partly allowing the appeals of 'S' and dismissing the States appeal against the acquittal of 'G' and 'AG', the Court.
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HELD: I.I. Sanctions under Section 50 of POTA and Section 196 Cr.P.C. were accorded by a competent authority. The Lt. Governor who continues to be the Administrator also derives his or her authority to grant sanction under Section 50 of POTA by virtue of the legislative fiction created by Clause (h) of Section 2 read with Article 239. The Administrator is deemed to be the State Government for the purpose of Section 50 of POTA. In effect and in substance, there is a clear delegation of power statutorily conferred in favour of the Administrator (designated as Lt. Governor) in respect of granting sanction under POTA. The fact that the sanction order carries the designation of the Lt. Governor is of no consequence and does not in any way impinge on the operation of Section 2(h) read with Article 239. POTA is a Parliamentary enactment. Sub-Clause (b) of Clause 3 of Article 239AA makes it explicit that notwithstanding the law making power conferred on the Legislative Assembly ofNCT, the Parliament retains its power undor the Constitution to make laws with respect to any matter for a Union Territory or any part thereof. (130-A-D]
Goa Sampling Employees' Association v. G.S. Co. of India Pvt. Ltd., [19851 1 sec 206, distinguished. 1.2. As regards the sanction under Section 196 Cr.P.C. lt is recited in the sanction order (Ext. Pl 1/2) that the Lt. Governor acted in exercise
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of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 196 Cr.P.C. read with the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs notification dated 20th March, 1974. Under that notification, there was delegation of powers to the Lt. Governor to grant sanction. The said notification which finds place in the Annexures to the written submissions made on behalf of 'G' shows that it was issued under Article 239(1) of the Constitution enabling the Administrator of the Union Territory to discharge powers and functions of the State Government under the Cr.P.C. The delegation of power contained Jn the said notification will continue to operate unless the Parliament by law provides otherwise. The Government of NCT of Delhi Act, 1991 does not in any way affect the validity of delegation contained in the Presidential Notification issued under Article 239. (131-E-G) 1.3. The careless and inept drafting of the sanction order has given scope for some comments. However, this careless drafting cannot deal a fatal blow to the sanction order. Looking at the substance and reading the entirety of the order, this Court comes to the irresistible conclusion that the sanction was duly given for the prosecution of the accused for the offences under POTA after the competent authority (Lt. Governor) had reached the satisfaction prima facie in regard to the commission of the POT A offences as well. A specific reference to the POT A offences mentioned in FIR is contained in the opening part of the order. The order then contains the recital that the Lt. Governor was satisfied that the four accused persons "haveprimafacie committed offences punishable under Sections 121, 121A, 122, 124 and 120B of the IPC being involved in criminal conspiracy to commit the said offences with intention of waging war against the Government of India along with other offences." In the context in which the expression 'along with other offences' occurs, it must be reasonably construed so as to be referable to POT A offences mentioned in the opening clause. The operative part of the order is more explicit inasmuch as the Lt. Governor granted sanction for the prosecution of the four accused in a competent Court "for committing the said offences punishable under Sections 3, 4, 5, 20 & 21 of the POT A". It is pertinent to notice that in the sanction order under Section 196 Cr.P.C. the POT A offences do not find specific mention at all. Thus, a distinction was maintained between the sanction under POT A and the sanction under Cr.P.C. f132-C-G) 1.4. Though the conspiracy to commit the c.ffences punishable by Section 121 is covered by Section 121A, probably Section 120-B was also
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STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@ AFSAN GURU
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referred to by way of abundant caution though the prosecution for the
said offence does not require sanction. At any rate, the insertion of a
seemingly overlapping provision does not and cannot affect the validity of the sanction order. Nor can it be said that the addition of Section 124 which has really no application to the present case by itself vitiates the sanction order. From the insertion of one inapplicable provision, a
reasonable inference cannot be drawn that there was no application of mind by the competent authority. A meticulous and legalistic examination as to the offences applicable and not applicable is not what is expected at the stage of granting sanction. In any case the non-mention of an
inapplicable Section goes to the root of the matter or otherwise makes it vulnerable to attack. 1133-A-DI
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Goku/chand Dwarkadas v. The King, AIR (1948) Privy Council 82, referred to.
1.5. The oral evidence of PW 11 - Deputy Secretary, Home who dealt with file also reveals that the notes prepared by himself and the Principal Secretary, Home had drawn the attention of the Lt. Governor to the role
of individual accused and the Principal Secretary's note was approved
by the Lt. Governor. Various documents placed before the sanctioning authority were also mentioned by PW 11. PW! I brought the original sanction file and it is seen from the judgment of the trial Court that the trial Judge had gone through the file apart from making it available to the defence counsel. The oral evidence let in by the prosecution by examining PW 11 dispels any doubt as to the consideration of the matter by the sanctioning authority before according the sanction. There is no legal infirmity in the order passed by the Commissioner of Police, which is Ext. PW 11/3. [134-F-H; 135-GI
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Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1958) SC 124; State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, [ 19921Supp.1SCC222; Superintendent ofPolice v. Deepak Chowdary, (19951 6 SCC 225 and Rambhai Nathabhai Gadhvi & Ors. v. State a/Gujarat, 119971 7 sec 744, referred to.
1.6. No fault could be found with the Investigating Officers in going slow in bringing POTA into picture. At any rate, it may be a case of bona fide error or overcautious approach. Once the action of the police authorities in deferring the invocation of POT A is held to be not ma/a fide,
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it is not possible to countenance the contention that the provisions· of POT A especially those contained in Chapter V and. Se.ction 52 ought to have been complied with earlier. [139-B, C]
Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijiaya, [1990) 4 SCC 76; Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon v. State. of Gujarat, [ 1988) 2 SCC 271 and State of West Bengal v. Mohammed Khaleed, [1995] 1 sec 684, referred to. 2.1. It is settled law that a 'fundamental defect' should be found in the charges if the Court has to quash it. Whether the accused was misled and whether there was reasonable possibility of prejudice being caused to the accused on account of defective charges are relevant considerations in judging the effect of wrong or deficient charges. Section 215 ofCr.P.C. makes it clear that no error or omission in stating either the offence or the particulars required to be stated shall be regarded material unless the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission and it has occasioned a failure of justice. [140-A, B]
William Salaney's case, AIR (1956) SC 116 and State of A.P. v. C. Ganeswar Rao, [19641 3 SCR 297, referred to.
2.2. It is not always "to give affirmative evidence about the date of formation of the criminal conspiracy". This Court does not think that if instead of mentioning. the first week of December, 2001' the wording 'before December, 2001' is employed, the prosecution should .fail merely for that reason. The accused cannot be said to have been misled or prejudiced on that account. On the othec hand, it is more than clear that the accused did understand the case they were called upon fo meet. The question whether Section 1208 applies to POT A offences or Section 3(3) alone applies is not a matter on which a definite conclusion should be reached ahead of the trial. It is not uncommon that the offence alleged might seemingly fall under more than one provision and sometimes it may .not be easy to form definite opinion as to the Section in which the offence appropriately falls. Hence, charges are often framed by way of abundant caution. Assuming that an inapplicable provision has been mentioned, it is no ground to set aside the charges and invalidate the trial. [140-E-G]
£sher Singh v. State of A.P., [2004) 1 sec 585, 607, relied on.
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAY JOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU
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3.1. The confession ofa co-accused ought not be brought within the sweep of Section 32(1). As a corollary, it follows that the confessions of the 1st and 2nd accused in this case recorded by the police officer under Section 32(1), are of no avail against the co-accused or against each other. The High Court was right that such confessions cannot be taken into consideration by the Court under Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act. The reason is that the confession made to a police officer or the confession made while a person is in police custody, cannot be proved against such person, not to speak of the co-accused, in view of the mandate of Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. If there is a confession which qualifies for proof in accordance with the provisions of Evidence Act, then of course, the said confession could be considered against the co-accused facing trial under POTA. But, that is not the case here. [154-H; 155-A-C] P. Narayana Swami v. Emperor, AIR (1939) PC 47; Bharat v. State of U.P., [197113 S~C 950; Haroom Hazi Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra, [1968] 2 SCR 641; Pyare Lal v. State of Assam, AIR (1957) SC 216; Subramania Gounden 's case, [19581 SCR 428; Shankaria v. State ofRajasthan, 11978] 3 SCC 435; Parmanand Pegu v. State of Assam, 120041 7 SCC 779; Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1952) SC 159; Bhuboni Shau v. King, AIR (1947) PC 257; Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar, [19641SCR623 and Jameel Ahmed & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, [20031 9 sec 673, referred to.
3.2. The contention for the State that even if the confession of coaccused is not covered by Section 32(1), it can still be taken into account by the Court under Section 30 for the limited purpose of corral.orating or lending assurance to the other evidence on record, cannot be accepted. [155-DI 3.3. As the law now stands, the confession recorded by the police officer under Section 32(1) of POTA is admissible in evidence. The voluntariness and reliability of confession can of course be tested by the court. The admission of such confession would also be subject to the observance of the other provisions of Section 32 of POTA which are in the nature of procedural safeguards aimed at ensuring that the confessions are made by the accused in an atmosphere free from threat and inducement. [160-F-GI 3.4. The mere fact that the expression 'admissible only' is used without being followed by the words 'in evidence', does not, by any cannon of construction, deprive the confession recorded under Section 32
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of POT A its evidentiary value; otherwise Section 32(1), more especially the expression 'admissible' contained therein will become ineffectual and senseless. [161-B, CJ Naranjan Singh v. Jitendra, (19901 4 SCC 76; Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, [19941 3 SCC 569; People's Union/or Civil Liberties v. Union of India, [2004) 9 SCC 580 and Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, [1978) 2 SCC 424, referred to. Regina v. Middleton, [1975) All E.R. 191; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 and Escobedo v. Linnaeus, 378 US 478, referred to.
4. The confessional statement (Ext. 88) made by one of the parties to the conspiracy was made use of against the other parties/accused. It is interesting to note that the decision in State of Gujarat v. Mohammed Atik rendered by one of the Judges, was noticed but the crucial part of the observation therein ruling out the applicability of Section 10 was not adverted to. The 2nd Coveeshar case AIR (1965) SC 682 was also noticed. This Court is unable to give effect to the law laid down :n these two cases which runs counter to the larger Bench decisions especially when the previous decisions bearing on the point were not discussed. No boubt the judgment in 2nd Caveeshar case was of three Judges but the 4th proposition laid down therein is not so categorical as to convey the idea that even the confessional statement recorded after the arrest, could be used against the co-conspirators. However, in view of the fact that confessional statement is not being relied on, the question of applicability of Section I 0 fades into insignificance. [168-G, H; 169-A, Fl Kehar Singh & Ors. v. State (Delhi Administration), [1988) 3 SCC 609; Mirza Akbar v. King Emperor, AIR (1940) PC 176; Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. State of Bombay, [1958) SCR 161; State of Gujarat v. Mohammed Atik and Ors., (1998) 4 SCC 351; Mohd. Khalidv. State of West Bengal, [20021 7 SCC 334; Bhagwan Swarup v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1965) SC 682; Ammini & Ors. v. State of Kera/a, (1998) 2 SCC 301; Tribhuvan v. State of Maharashtra, [1972) 3 SCC 51t; Bhagwandas Keshwani & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, [1974) 4 SCC 611 and State of Maharashtra v. Damu, (2000) 6 sec 269, referred to. Queen v. Blake, 115 ER 49 and Mirza Akbar, AIR (1940) PC 176, referred to.
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STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU 87 ~
5.1. One more principle which deserves notice is that cumulative effect of the proved circumstances should be taken into account in determining the guilt of the accused rather than adopting an isolated approach to each of the circumstances. Of course, each one of the circumstances should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Lastly, in regard to the appreciation of evidence relating to conspiracy, the Court must take care to see that the acts or conduct of the parties must be conscious and clear enough to inter their concurrence as to the common
design and its execution. fl 75-F) • .Ji
5.2. The theory of agency can be extended too far to find all the conspirators guilty of the actual offences committed in execution of the common design even if such offences were ultimately committed by some of them, without the participation of others. Those who committed the Offences pursuant to the conspiracy by indulging in various overt acts will be individually liable for those offences in addition to being liable for criminal conspiracy; but, the non-participant conspirators cannot be
found guilty of the offence or offences committed by the other conspirators. There is hardly any scope for the application of the principle of agency
in order to find the conspirators guilty of a substantive offence not committed by them. Criminal offences and punishments therefor are
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governed by statute. The offender will be liable only if he comes within the plain terms of the penal statute. Criminal liability for an offence cannot be fastened by way of analogy or by extension of a common law principle. fl 76-C-E)
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5.3. It is only in order to prove the existence of conspiracy and the parties to the conspiracy, a rule of evidence is enacted in Section 10 based on the principle of agency. Section 10 of the Evidence Act provides that anything said, done or written by one of the conspirators in reference to
the common intention of all of them can be proved as a relevant fact as
against each of the conspirators, subject to the condition prescribed in the opening part of the section. Thus, the evidence which is in the nature of hearsay is made admissible on the principle that there is mutual agency amongst the conspirators. [178-F-H)
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5.4. It may be noted that by the 1977 Act, the offence of conspiracy at common law was abolished and a statutory definition of 'conspiracy to commit the offence' \Vas enacted. The provision that was interpreted
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by the House of Lords is not in pari materia with the provision in the Indian Penal Code. However, one clarification is needed. If there is proof to the effect that the accused played a role, attended to certain things or took steps cons.istent with the common design underlying the conspiracy, that will go a long way in establishing the complicity of the accused, though it is not a legal requirement that the conspirator should do any particular act beyond the agreement to commit the offence. [18!-F-G)
Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay, AIR (1961) SC 1762; Kehar Singh & Ors. v. State (Delhi Administration), [1988) 3 SCC 609; Yashpal Mittal v. State of Punjab, [1977) 4 SCC 540; State of H.P. v. Krishan Lal Pradhan, [1987) 2 SCC 17; State v. Nalini, [1999) 5 SCC 253; Mohd Khalid v. State of W.B., [2002) 7 SCC 334; Mohammed Usman v. State of Maharashtra, [198J] 2 SCC 443; Tanibeert Pankaj Kumar, [1997] 7 SCC 156; VC Shukla v. State, (1980) 2 SCC 665; Noor Mohammad Yusuf Momin v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1971) SC 885; Esher Singh v. State of A.P., (2004) 11 SCC 585; Firozuddin Basheeruddin v. State of Kera/a, (2001) 7 SCC 596; Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India, [1993) 3 SCC 609 and Babu Lal v. Emperor, AIR (1938) PC 130, referred to.
Quinn v. Leathern, [1901] AC 495; Mulcahy v. Queen, [1868) 3 HL 306; Van Riper v. United States, 13 F 2d. 961; R. v. Anderson, (1985) 2 All E.R. 961; Alvin Krumlewitch v. United States of America, (93 L.Ed. 790); Regina v. Murphy, (1837) 173 ER 502 and US. v. Falcone, (109 F. 2d, 579), referred to.
Halsbury's Laws of England; Ameican Jurisprudence, 2nd Edn., Vol. 16, pg. 129 and Dr. Hari Singh Gour: 'Commentary on Penal Law ofIndia, (Vol. 2, 11th Edn. Pg. 1138), referred to.
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6.1. The decision of the Privy Council in Katayya's case, which has been described as a locus classicus, had set at rest much of the controversy that contered round the interpretation of Section 27. To a great extent the legal position ha~ got crystallized with the rendering of this decision. The authority of Privy Council's decision has not been questioned in any of the decisions of the highest Court either in the pre or post independence era. Right from 1950s, till the advent of the new century and till date, the passages in this famous decision are being approvingly quoted and teiterated by the Judges of the Apex Court. Yet, there remain certain
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STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@ AFSAN GURU
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grey areas. (186-D-F]
Pu/ukuri Kotayya v. Emperor, AIR (1947) PC 67, relied on. !nayatullah v. State of Maharashtra. [1976) 1 SCC 828; State of Maharashtra v. Damu, [2000) 6 SCC 269; Sukhan v. Emperor, AIR (1929) Lahore 344; Ganuchandra v. Emperor, AIR (1932) Bombay 286 and Queen Empress v. Babu Lal. 1884, Indian Decisions, 6 Allahabad 510, referred to.
6.2. Katayya's case is an authority for the proposition that 'discovery of fact' cannot be equated to the object produced or found. It is more than that. The discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the information given by the accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental awareness of the informant as to is existence at a particular place. [190-G]
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Pu/ukuri Kotayya v. Emperor, AIR (1947) PC 67, relied on.
6.3. Though in m-0st of the cases the person who makes the disclosure himself leads the Police Officer to the place where an object is concealed and points out the same to him, however, it is not essential that there should be such pointing out in order to make the information admissible under Section 27. It could very well be that on the basis of information furnished by the accused, the Investigating Officer may go to the spot in the company of other witnesses and recover the material object. By doing so, the Investigating Officer will be discovering a fact viz., the concealment of an incriminating article and the knowledge of the accused furnishing the information about it. Of course, it is subject to the rider that the information so furnished was the immediate and proximate cause of discovery. If the Police Officer chooses not to take the informant-accused to the spot, it will have so bearing on the point of admissibility under Section 27, though it may be one of the aspects that goes into evaluation of that particular piece of evidence. How the clause-"as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered" has to be ·understood deserves consideration. The interpretation of this clause is not in doubt. Apart from Kotayya's case, various decisions of this Court have elucidate and clarified the scope and meaning of the said portion of Section 27. [197-F-H; 198-A;C)
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Sukhan v. Emperor; AIR (1929) Lahore, 344; Ganuchandrav. Emperor, AIR (1932) Bombay 286; Attappa Goundan v. Emperor, ILR(l937) Madras
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695; Emperor v. Ramanuja Ayyangar, AIR (1935) Madras 528; Omprakash, (1972) 1SCC249; Mohmed Inayatullah v. The State ofMaharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 828; Udai Bhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR (1962) SC 1116; Himachal Prdesh Administration v. Om Prakash, (1972) 1 SCC 249; Eerabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka, (1983) 2 SCC 330; Pandurang Kalu Patil v. State of Maharashtra, [2002) 2 SCC 490 and Bodhraj v. State of J & K, [2002] 8 SCC 45, referred to. 6.4. Joint disclosures-to be more accurate, simultaneous disclosures, per se, are not inadmissible under Section 27. 'A person accused' need not necessarily be a single person, but it could be plurality of accused. It seems that the real reason for not acting upon the joint disclosures by taking resort resort to Section 27 is the inherent difficulty in placing reliance on such information supposed to have emerged from the mouths of two or more accused at a time. In fact, joint or simultaneous disclosure is a myth, because two or more accused persons would not have uttered informatory words in a chorus. At best, one person would have made the statement orally and the other person would have stated so substantially in similar terms a few seconds or minutes later, or the second person would have given unequivocal nod to what has been said by the first person. Or, two 'persons in custody may be interrogated separately and simultaneously and both of them may furnish similar information leading to the discovery of fact. Or, in rare cases, both the accused may reduce the information into writing and hand over the written notes to tt,e police officer at the same time. It is not that such disclosures by two or more persons in police custody go out of the purview of Section 27 altogether. If information is given one after the other without any break-almost simultaneously, and if such information is followed up by pointing out the material thing by both of them, there is no good reason to eschew such evidence from the regime of Section 27. However, there may be practical difficulties in placing reliance on such evidence. It may be difficult for the witness (generally the police officer), to depose which accused spoke what words and in what sequence. In other words, the deposition in regard to the information given by the two accused may be exposed to criticism from the stand point of credibility and its nexus with discovery. Admissibility and credibility are two distinct aspects. Whether and to what extent such a simultaneous disclosure could be relied upon by the Court is really a.matter of evaluation of evidence. (199-H; 200-A-D)
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STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) r. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU 91
Mohd Abdul Hafeez v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR (1983) SC 367; Ramkishan v. Bombay State, AIR (1955) SC 104 and Lachhman Singh v. The State, [1952] SCR 839, referred to.
7.1. It is contended on behalf of accused 'S' that the call records relating to the cellular phone No. 919811573506 said to have been used by •s• have not been proved as per the requirements of law and their genuineness is in doubt. The call records relating to the other mobile
number related to 'G' and 'A' are also subject to the same criticism. It
is the contention of the counsel that in the absence of a certificate issued under sub-Section (2) of Section 65B of the Evidence Act with the particulars enumerated in clauses (a) to (e), the information contained in
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the electronic record cannot be adduced in evidence and in any case in the absence of examination of a competent witness acquainted with the functioning of the computers during the relevant time and the manner in which the printouts were taken, even secondary evidence under Section
63 is not admissible. Two witnesses were examined to prove the printouts of the computerized record furnished by the cellular service providers namely AIRTEL (Bharti Cellular Limited) and ESSAR Cellphone. The call details of the mobile No. 9811573506 (which was seized from the
house of 'S') are contained in Exhibits 36/1 to 36/2. The covering letters
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signed by the Nodal Officer of Sterling Cellular Limited are Ext.P36/6 and P36/7 bear the dates 13th & 18th December respectively. The call details of mobile No. 9811489429 attributed to 'A' are contained in Ext. P36/3 and the covering letter addressed to the Inspector (Special Cell}PW66 signed by the Nodal Officer is Ext.36/5. The call details of 9810081228 belonging to the subscriber 'G' are contained in Exts. 35/8. The above two phones were obtained on cash card basis. The covering letter pertaining thereto and certain other mobile numbers was signed by the Security Manager of Bharti Cellular Limited. The call details relating to another cellphone number 9810693456 pertaining to 'M' is Ext. 35/5. These documents i.e. Ext.35 series were filed by PW 35 who is the person that signed the covering letter dated 17th December bearing Ext. 35/1. PW35 deposed that "all the call details are computerized sheets obtained from the computer". He clarified that "the switch which is maintained in the computer in respect of each telephone receives the signal of the telephone number, called or received and serves them to the Server and it is the Server which keeps the record of the calls made or received. In case where· call is made and the receiver does not pick up the phone, the
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serve which makes a loop of the route would not register it". As far as PW36 is concerned, he identified the signatures of the General Manager of his Company who signed Ext.P36 series. He testified to the fact that the call details of the particular telephone numbers were contained in the relevant exhibits produced by him. It is significant to note that no suggestion was put to these. two witnesses touching the authenticity of the call records or the possible tempering with the entries, although the arguments have proceeded on the lines that there could have been fabrication. In support of such argument, the duplication of entries in Exts. 36/2 and 36/3 and that there was some discrepancy to the Cell I.D. and IMEi number of the handset at certain places was pointed out. The factum of presence of duplicate entries was elicited by the counsel appearing for' AG' from PW 36 when PW36 was in the witness box. The evidence ofDWlO-a technical expert, was only to the effect that it was possible to clone a SIM by means ofa SIM Programmer which to his knowledge, was not available in Delhi or elsewhere. His evidence was only of a general nature envisaging a theoretical possibility and not with reference to specific instances. It is not in dispute that the information contained in the call records is stored in hi.tge serv~rs which cannot be easily moved and produced in the Court. That is what the High Court has also observed. Hence, printouts taken form the computers/servers by mechanical process and certified by a responsible official of the service providing company can be led into evidence through a witness who can. identify the signatures of the certifying officer or otherwise speak to the facts based on his personal knowledge. Irrespective of the compliance of the requirements of Section 65B which is a provision dealing with admissibility of electronic records, there is no ·bar to adducing· secondary evidence under the other provisions of the Evidence Act, namely Sections 63 & 65. It may be that the certificate containing the details in sub-Section (4) of Section 65B is not filed in the instant case, but that does not mean that secondary evidence be given even if the law permits such evidence to be given in the circumstances mentione~ in the relevant provisions, namely Sections 63 & 65. [201-F-H; 202-A-H; 203-A-E) 7.2. Both the witnesses were responsible officials of the concerned Companies who deposed to the fact that they were the printouts obtained from the computer records. In fact the evidence of PW35 shows that he is fairly familiar with the computer system and its output. If there was some questioning vis-a-vis specific details or suggestion of fabrication of printouts, it would have been obligatory on the part of the prosecution
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU 93 to call a technical expert directly in the know of things. [203-F-H)
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7.3. As regards the presence of duplicate entries in Ext.36/2 and 36/3, it seems an innocuous error in the computer recording is being magnified to discredit the entire document containing the details without any warrant. As explained by the counsel for the State, the computer, at the first instance, instead of recording the IMEi number of the mobile. instrument, had recorded the IMEi and cell ID (location) of the person calling/called by the subscriber. The computer rectified this obvious error immediately and modified the record to show the correct details viz., the IMEi and the cell l.D. of the subscriber only. The document is selfexplanatory of the error. A perusal of both the call records with reference to the call a 11:19:14 hours exchanged between 9811489429 ('S's') and 9811573506 ('A's') shows that the said call was recorded twice in the call records. The fact that the same call has been recorded twice in the call records of the calling and called party simultaneously demonstrates beyond doubt that correctness or genuineness of the call is beyond doubt. Further'. on a comparative perusal of the two call records, the details of Cell I.D. and IMEi of the two numbers are also recorded. Thus, the same call has been recorded two times, first with the cell ID and IMEi number of the calling number (9811484929). The same explanation holds good for the call at 11:32:40 hours. Far from supporting the contention of the defence, the above facts, evident from the perusal of the call records, would clearly show that the system was working satisfactorily and it promptly checked and rectified the mistake that had occurred. It was not suggested nor could it be suggested that there was any manipulation or material deficiency in the computer on account of these two errors. Above all, the printouts pertaining to the call details exhibited by the prosecution are of such regularity and continuity that it would be legitimate to draw a presumption that the system was functional and the output was produced by the computer in regular use, whether this fact was specifically deposed to by the witness or not. Thus, the call records are admissible and reliable and rightly made use of by the prosecution. [204-D-H; 205-A-C)
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R. v. Shepard, [1993) AC 380, referred to . 8. It is not shown by the prosecution that the Joint Director, Intelligence Bureau who authorized the interception, holds the rank of Joint Secretary to the Government of India. Secondly, the confirmation
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orders passed by the Home Secretary (contained in volume 7 of lower Court record, Page 447) would indicate that the confirmation was prospective. It is distressing to note that the confirmation orders should be passed by a senior officer of the Government oflndia in such a careless manner, that too, in an important case of this nature. HoweHr, these deficiencies or inadequacies do not, preclude ihe admission of intercepted telephonic communication in evidence. It is to be note that unlike the proviso to Section 45 of POTA, Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act or Rule 419A does not deal with any rule of evidence. The non-compliance or inadequate compliance with the provisions of the Telegraph Act does not per se affect the admissibility. The legal position regarding the question of admissibility of the tape recorded conversation illegally collected or obtained is no longer res integra. [206-D-G)
R.M Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 1 SCC 471, relied on.
Pooranmal v. Director of Inspection, (1974) 2 SCR 704; State v. NMT Joy Immaculate, [2004] 5 SCC 729; Ali Musfata v. State of Kera/a, (1994) 6 SCC 569 and Ramsingh v. Ramsingh, (1985) Suppl. SCC 611, referred to. 9.1. POT A has absorbed into it the guidelines spelt out in Kartar Singh 's case and D.K. Basus 's case in order to impart an element of fairness and reasonableness into the stringent provisions of POTA in tune with the philosophy of Article 21 and allied constitutional provisions. These salutary safeguards are contained in Sections 32 and 52 of POTA. [208-C, DJ
9.2. The mandate of sub-sections 2 & 3 is not something new. Almost similar prescriptions were there under TADA also. In fact, the fulfillment of such mandate is inherent in the process of recording a confession by a statutory authority. What is necessarily implicit is, perhaps, made explicit. But the notable safeguards which were lacking in TADA are to be found in sub-sections 4 & 5. 1208-G-H; 209-AJ
9.3. The lofty purpose behind the mandate that the maker of confession shall be sent to judicial custody by tht CJM before whom he is produced is to provide an atmosphere in which he would feel free to make a complaint against the police, if he so wishes. The feeling that he will be free from the
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STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU 95
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shackles of police custody after production in the Court will minimize, if not remove, the fear psychosis by which he may be gripped. he various safeguards enshrined in Section 32 are meant to be strictly observed as they relate to personal liberty of an individual. The strict enforcement of the provision as to judicial remand and the invalidation of confession merely on the ground of its non-compliance may present some practical difficulties at times. Situations may arise that even after the confession is made by a person in·custody, police custody may still be required for the purpose of further investigation. Sending a person to judicial custody at that stage may retard the investigation. Sometimes, the further steps to be taken by the investigator with the help of the accused may brook no delay. An attempt shall however be made to harmonize this provision in Section 32(5) with the powers of investigation available to the police. At the same time, it needs to be emphasized that the obligation to send the confession maker to judicial custody cannot be lightly disregarded. The police custody cannot be given on mere asking by the police. It shall be remembered that sending a person who has made the confession to judicial custody after he is produced before the CJM is the normal rule and this procedural safeguard should be given its due primacy. The CJM should be satisfied that it is absolutely necessary that the confession maker shall be restored to poliee custody for any special reason. Such a course of sending him back to police custody could only be done in exceptional cases after due application of mind. Most often, sending such person to judicial custody in compliance with Section 32(5) soon after the proceedings are recorded by the CJM subject to the consideration of the application by the police after a few days may not make material difference for further investigation. The CJM has a duty to consider whether the application is only a ruse to get back the person concerned to police custody in case he disputes the confession or it is an application made bona fide in view of the need and urgency involved. The non-compliance with the judicial custody requirement does not per sevitiate the confession, though its non-compliance should be one of the important factors that must be borne in mind in testing the confession. (209-A-H]
9.4. The provisions of Section 32, which are conceived in the interest of the accused, will go a long way to screen and exclude confessions, which appear to be involuntary. The requirements and safeguards laid down in sub-sections (2) to (5) are an integral part of the scheme providing for admissibility of confession made to the police officer. The breach of any one of these requirements would have a vital bearing on the admissibility
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
and evidentiary value of the confession recorded under Section 32(1) and may even inflict a fatal blow on such confession. (210-A-C]
9.5. The violation of procedural safeguards under Section 52 does not stand on the same footing as the violation of the requirements ofsub-Sections (2) to (5) of Section 32. Sub-Sections (2) to (5) of Section 32 have an integral and inseparable connection with the confession recorded under Section 32(1). They are designed to be checks against involuntary confessions and to provide an immediate remedy to the person making the confession to air his grievance before a judicial authority; These safeguards are, so to say, woven into the fabric of Section 32 itself and their observance is so vital that the breach there will normally result in eschewing the confession from consideration, subject to what has been said earlier about the judicial custody. The prescriptions under Section 52, especially those affording an opportunity to have the presence of the legal practitioner, are no doubt supplemental safeguards as they will promote the guarantee against selfincrimination even at the stage of interrogation; but these requirements laid down in Section 52 cannot be projected into Section 32 so as to read all of them as constituting a code of safeguards of the same magnitude. To hold that the violation of each one of the safeguards envisaged b~ Section 52 would lead to automatic invalidation of confession would not be in consonance with the inherent nature and scheme of the respective provisions. However, it is clarified that the denial of the safeguards under sub-Sections (2) to (4) of Section 52 will be one of the relevant factors that would weigh with the Court to act upon or discard the confession~ To this extent they play a role vis-a-vis the confessions recorded under Section 32, but they are not as clinching as the provisions contained in sub-Sections (2) to (5) of section 32. (214-G, H; 215-A-DJ Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, [1994) 3 SCC 569; Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, (1978) 2 SCC 424 and MP. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, AIR (1954) SC 300, referred to.
Miranda v. Arizona, (1966), 384 US 436, referred to. 10.l. When 'A' along with other accused was produced before the special Judge, he was offered the assistance of a counsel. However, the said advocate was not willing to act as amicus. On 14.5.2002, the charge sheet was filed in the Court on 17.5.2002, the trial Judge appointed
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STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU 97 another counsel who agreed to defend 'A'. She filed Vakalatnama along with her junior on the same day on behalf of the accused. On 3.6.2002, the arguments on charges were heard. The counsel conceded that there was prima facie material to frame charges. The Court framed charges against all the accused on 4.6.2002 and the accused pleaded not guilty. True, the appellant was without counsel till 17.5.2002 but the fact remains that till then, no proceedings except extending the remand and furnishing of documents took place in the Court. The next date which deserves mentioned is 5.6.2002. On that date, all the counsel appearing for the accused agreed that postmortem reports, MLCs, documents related to recovery of guns and explosive substances t the spot should be considered as undisputed evidence without formal proof which resulted in dropping
of considerable number of witnesses for the prosecution. The senior
counsel for appellant 'A' by referring to the application field by Ms. Seema Gulati on 1.7.2002 seeking her discharge from the case, highlights the fact that the took no instructions from 'A' or discussed the case \\-'ith
him and therefore no concession should have been made by her. The contention has no force. Assuming that the counsel's statement that she
took no instruction from the accused is correct, even then there is nothing
wrong in the conduct of the Advocate in agreeing for admission of formal documents without formal proof or in agreeing for the framing of charges. The counsel had exercised her discretion reasonably. The appellant accused
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did not object to this course adopted by the amicus throughout the trial. No doubt, some of the documents admitted contained particulars of identification of the deceased terrorists by appellant' A', but, the factum of identification was independently proved by the prosecution witnesses and opportunity of cross-examination was available to the accused. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that there was a reasonable possibility of prejudice on account of admission of the said documents without formal proof. 1216-A-HJ 10.2. On 1.7.2002, the counsel filed an application praying for her discharge from the case citing a curious reason that she had been engaged by another accused 'G' to appear on his behalf. An order was passed on 2. 7.2002 releasing her from the case. Her junior who filed Vaka lat along with her was then nominated as amicus to defend 'A' and the brief was handed over to him. No objection was raised by 'A' on that occasion. Inspection of record by the counsel was allowed on 3.7.2002 and on subsequent occasions. On 8.7.2002, accused 'A' filed a petition stating
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
therein that he was not satisfied with the counsel appointed by the Court and that the needed the serves of a senior Advocate. He named four Advocates in the petition and requested the Court to appoint one of them. On 12th July, the trial Judge recorded that the counsel named by the accused were not willing to take up the case. The junior counsel was therefore continued especially in view of the fact that he had experience of dealing with TADA cases. 'A' was also given the opportunity to crossexamine the prosecution witnesses in addition to the amicus. In fact, he did avail of that opportunity now and then. On serval occasions, there was common cross-examination on behalf of all the accused. No indicia of aparent prejudice, is discernibl(!.from the manner in which the case was defended. Though the objection that he was not satisfied with his counsel was reiterated on 12.7.02 after PW 15 was cross examined, this Court does not think that the Court should dislodge the counsel and go on searching for some other counsel to the liking of the accused. The right to legal aid cannot be taken thus far. It is not demonstrated before this Court as to how the case was mishandled by the Advocate appointed as amicus except pointing out stray instances pertaining to cross-examination of one or two witnesses. Taking an overall view of the assistance given by the Court and the performance of the counsel, it cannot be said that the accused was denied the facility of effective defence. [216-H; 217-A-F)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, referred to. 11.1. This Court is of the view thatthe talk which 'A' had with TV·and press reporters admittedly in the immediate presence of the police and while he was in police custody,·should not be upon irrespective of the fact whether the statement was made to a Police Officer within the meaning of Section 162 Cr.P.C. or not. This Court is not prepared to attach any weight or credibility to the statements made in the course of such interview prearranged by the police. The police officials in their over-zealousness arranged for a media interview which has evoked serious from the counsel about the manner in which publicity to be given thereby. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that PW60 the DCP, who was supervising the investigation, surprisingly expressed his ignorance about the media interview. Thus, the wrong step taken by the police should not enure to the benefit or detriment of either the prosecution or the accused. (222-G, H; 223-A, BJ 11.2. The clear words of the provisions viz. sub-section (5) of Section
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STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU 99
32 of the POTA do not admit to an interpretation that judicial custody should be ordered by the Chief Judicial Magistrate only when there is a compliant from the 'confession maker' and there appears to be unfair treatment of such person in custody. An already stated, the obligation to send the person whose alleged confession was recorded to judicial custody
is a rule and the deviation could at best be in exceptional circumstances.
In the present case, it does not appear that the ACMM (l'W63) had in mind the requirement of Section 32(5) as to judicial custody. At any rate, the order passed by him on 22.12.2001 on the application filed by PW80 4'
,1.
does not reflect his awareness of such requirement or application of mind
to the propriety of police remand in the face of Section 32(5) of POTA. Compelling circumstances to bypass the requirement of judicial custody are not apparent from the record. 1224-F-H; 225-Ai
L
11.3. The more important violation of the procedural safeguards lies in the breach of sub-section (2) read with sub-Section (4) of Section 52. It is an undisputed fact that the appellants were not apprised of the right to consult a legal practitioner either at thetime they were initially arrested or after POTA was brought into picture. It may be recalled that the POTA offences were added on 19th December and as a consequence thereof, investigation was taken up by PW80-an Asst. Commissioner of Police, who is competent to investigate the POTA offences, But, he failed to inform the persons under arrest of their right to consult a legal practitioner, nor did he afford any facility to them to contract the legal practitioner. The opportunity of meeting a legal practitioner during the course of interrogation within closed doors of police station will not arise unless a person in custody is informed of his right and a reasonable facility of establishing contact with a lawyer is offered to him. If the person in custody is not in a position to get the services of a legal practitioner by himself, such person is very well entitled to seek free legal aid either by applying to the Court through the police or the concerned Legal Services Authority, which is a statutory body. Not that the police should, in such an event, postpone investigation indefinitely till his request is processed, but what is expected of the police officer is to promptly take note of such request and initiate immediate steps to place it before the Magistrate or Legal Services Authority so that at least at some stage of interrogation, the person in custody would be able to establish contract with a legal practitioner. But, in the instant case, the idea of appearing the persons arrested, of their rights under sub-Section (2) and entertaining
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a lawyer into the precincts of the police station did not at all figure in the mind of the investigating officer. The reason for this refrain or crucial omission could well be perceived by the argumen't adduced on behalf of the State that the compliance with the requirements of Section 52(2) of POT A did not arise for the simple reason that at the time of arrest, POT A was not applied. But this argument ignores the fact that as soon as POTA was added and the investigation commenced thereunder, the police officer was under a legal obligation to go through all ttie procedural safeguards to the extent they could be observed or implemented at that stage. The non-invocation of POT A in the first instance cannot become a lever to deny the safeguards envisaged by Section 52 when such safeguards could still be extended to the arrested person. The expression 'the person arrested' does not exclude person initially arrested for offences other than POT A and continued under arrest when POT A was invoked. The 'person arrested' included the person whose arrest continues for the investigation of offences under POT A as well. It is not possible to give a truncated interpretation to the expression 'person arrested' especially when such interpretation has the effect of denying an arrested person the wholesome safeguards laid. down in Section 52. (225-A-H; 226-A, BJ 11.4. The importance of the provision to afford the assistance of counsel even at the stage of custodial interrogation need not be gainsaid. The requirement is in keeping with the Miranda ruling and the philosophy underlying Articles 21, 20(3) & 22(1). This right cannot be allowed to be circumvented by subtle ingenuities or innovative police strategies. The access to a lawyer at the stage of interrogation serves as a sort of counterweight to the intimidating atmosphere that surrounds the detenu and gives him certain amount of guidance as to his rights and the obligations of the police. The layer's presence could pave the way, to some extent, to ease himself of the mental tension and trauma. (226-B-D) 11.5. The Parliament advisedly introduced a Miranda ordained safeguard which was substantially reiterated in Nandini Satpathy by expressly enacting in sub-Sections (2) & (4) of Section 52 the obligation to inform the arrestee of his right to consult a lawyer and to permit him to meet the lawyer. The avowed object of such prescription was to introduce an element of fair ~nd humane approach to the prisoner in an otherwise stringent law with drastic consequences to the accused. These provisions are not to be treated as empty formalities. It cannot be said that the
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAY JOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU 101
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violation of these obligation under sub-Sections (2) & (4) have no relation
·-. and impact on the confession. It is also much to expect that a person in
custody in connection with POTA offences is supposed to know the fascicu/us of the provisions of POTA regarding the confessions and the
procedural safeguards available to him. The presumption should be otherwise. The lawyer's presence and advice, apart from providing
psychological support to the arrestee, would help him understand the
implications of making a confessional statement before the Police Officer
and also enable him to become aware of other rights such as the right to
.
remain in judicial custody after being produced before the Magistrate. )
The very fact that he will not be under the fetters of police custody after her is produced before the CJM pursuant to Section 32(4) would make him feel free to represent to the CJM about the police conduct or the treatment meted out to him. The haunting fear of again landing himself into police custody soon after appearance before the CJM, would be an inhibiting factor against speaking anything adverse to the police. That is the reason why the judicial provision has been introduced in sub~Section
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(5) cf Section 32. The same objective seems to be at the back of subsection (3) 164 Cr.P.C., through the situation contemplated therein is somewhat different. [226-F-H; 227-A-D] 11.6. The breach of the obligation of another provisions, namely, sub-Section (3) of Section 32 which is modelled on D.K. Basu 's guidelines has compounded to the difficulty in acting on the confession, Section 52(3)
enjoins that the information of arrest shall be immediately communicated
by the Police Officer to a family member or in his absence, to s relative of such person by telegram, telephone or by any other means and this fact shall be recorded by the Police Officer under the signature of the person arrested. PW80-the 1.0. under POTA merely that "near relatives of the
accused '"ere informed about their arrest is I learnt from the record".
He was not aware whether any record was prepared by the Police Officer arresting the accused as regards the information given to the relatives. It is the prosecution case that 'A's' relative by name Mohd. Ghulam Bohra ofBaramulla was informed through phone No. witness had spoken to this effect. A perusal of the arrest memo indicates that the name of Ghulam Bohra and his phone number are noted as against the column 'relatives to be informed'. 'A's' arrest memo seems to have been attested by 'G's' brother who according to the prosecution, was present at the police cell. But, that does not amount to compliance with sub-Section (3)
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because he is neither family member nor relation, nor even known to be a close friend. This lapse is pointed out for the reason that ifthe relations had been informed, there was every possibility of those persons arranging a meeting with the lawyer or otherwise seeking legal advice. [227-D-H] 11.7. Another point which has a bearing on the voluntariness of confession is the fact that sufficient time was not given for reflection after the accused were produced before PW60 recording the confession. He stated in the evidence that he give only 5 to 10 minutes time to the accused for thinking/reflection in reply to the question by the counsel for 'S'. It is true that there is no hard and fast rule regarding grant of time for reflection and the rules and guidelines applicable to a confession under Section 164 Cr.P.C. do not govern but in the present case, the time of 5 or 10 minutes is, by all standards utterly inadequate. Granting reasonable time for reflection before recording a confession is one way of ensuring that the person concerned gets the opportunity to deliberate and introspect once again when he is brought before the prescribed authority for recording the confession. (228-A-C) 11.8. The said lapses and violations of procedural safeguards guaranteed in the statute itself impel this Court to hold that it is not safe to act on the alleged confessional statement of 'A' and place reliance on this item of evidence on which the prosecution places heavy reliance. (228-D) 11.9. The omission to challenge the confessional statement at the earliest before the Magistrate shall be viewed in the light of violation of procedural safeguards. (228-F)
11.10. As regards the delay in retracting, the first fact to be taken note of is that appellant 'A' was evidently nor aware of the contents of the confessional statement on the day on which he was produced before the ACMM because the Magistrate did not make it available to him for perusal nor the gist of it was made known to him. There is nothing in the proceedings of the ACMM to that effect. It was only after the charge sheet was filed in the Court on 14th May and a copy thereof was served to him that he became aware of the details of the confessional statement. Then 'A' filed a petition before the trial Court on 2.7.2002. This was followed by another petition filed on 15th July, the main purpose of which was to highlight that 'G' and the other accused had no direct or indirect
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STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@ AFSAN GURU 103
connection. Thus, it cannot be held that there was abnormal delay in disowning the confession, the effect of which would be to impart credibility to the confessional statement. 1228-G, H; 229-A-CI II.II. It was pointed out that the grounds on which the confessional statement was refuted by' A' are not consistent. This Court does not think that this so-called discrepancy will give rise to an inference that the confessional statement was true and voluntary. One has to look to the substance of what the accused said while refuting the statement rather
than building up a case on the basis of some inconsistencies in the defence J
plea. 1229-C, DJ
Miranda v. Arizana, 384 US 436; Nandini Satpathy v, P.f. Dani, [1978J 2 SCC 242; The People v. Healy, (1990) 2 IR 73 and Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, [1957J SCR 953, referred to.
12.1. In the postmortem reports pertaining to each of the deceased terrorists, 'A' signed against the column 'identified by'. On this aspect, the evidence of PW76 remained on-shattered. In the course of his examination under Section 313, 'A' merely stated that he was forced to
identify by the police. There was not even a suggestion put to PW76 touching on the genuineness of the documents relating to identification
memo. It may be recalled that all the accused, through their counsel, agreed for admission of the postmortem reports without formal proof. Identification by a person in custody of another does not amount to making a statement falling within the embargo of Section 162 Cr.P.C. It would be admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act as a piece of evidence relating to conduct of the accused person in identifying the dead bodies of the terrorists. 1229-G, H; 230-A, BJ
Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Admn.), AIR (1979) SC 400, relied on.
12.2. The details of the phone calls and the instruments used ti1row light on the close association of' A' with the deceased terrorists. [232-EJ
13. Coming to the details of evidence relating to hideouts and recoveries, it is to be noted that caused 'A' is alleged to have made a disclosure statement to PW 66--lnspector Mohan Chand Sharma on 16th December, 2001. It is marked as Ext. PW64/I. In the said disclosure
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
statement, all the details of his involvement are given and it is almost similar to the confessional statement recorded by the DCP. This statement has been signed by' A'. In fact it is not required to be signed by virtue of the embargo in Section 162(1). The fact that the.signature of accused 'A' was obtained on the statement does not, however detract from its admissibility to the extent it is relevant under Section 27. (236-H; 237-A-D] 14.1. In view of the short time gap and the order for a large quantity of silver powder, there is no reason to doubt the identification of' A' by PW 40. PW 40 also identified the deceased Hamza by his photograph Ext. 40/2. According to PW 40, it is he who accompanied' A' the next day. However, in the memo of pointing out which is Ext. 40/1, it w.is recorded that 'A' disclosed that he visited the shop with Haider. This discrepancy or mistake in recording the name does not make a dent on the veracity of evidence of PW-40 on the point of identification of photograph in Ext. 40/2. The High Court accepted the evidence of PW-40. Then, about the purchase of silver powder, PW-76 recorded in Ex.42il thar 'A' disclosed having purchased the silver powder from the shop of PW-42. It may be stated that on the packets of silver powder (Ex.P/51), the name and address 'Tolaram & Sons, 141, Tilak Bazar' was written. Thus, the name and address of the shop was already known to the Police. Therefore, Section 27 cannot be pressed into service. However, the conduct of 'A' in pointing out the shop and its proprietor (PW-42) would be relevant under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, PW-42 in his deposition testified to the factum of purchase of 50 kgs of silver powder by 'A' on 11.12.01. The witness identified the seized samples as having been sold by him. He also identified 'A'. He specifically stated that the quantity purchased by him being large, 'A's' presence was very much there in his memory. It may be recalled that silver powider was recorded from the premises at"Jndira Vihar. The samples seized from Indira Vihar were identified by PW-42. It is to be noted that Alumiinium powder was one of the ingredients used in the IEDs found in the possession of the deceased terrorists at the Parliament complex. (241·-H; 242-A-E]
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14.2. Three polythene packets of dry fruits bearing the name of'Sawan Dry Fruits' (Ex. P/l 0) and having the address 6507, Fatehpuri Cho wk were recovered at the scene of offence near the bodies of the deceased. PW-76 stated that 'A' led them Ito the shop of Sawan Dry Fruits, PW41-the salesman, gave evidence riegarding the transaction of sale on 11.12.01. He
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STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU 105
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identified accused 'A' as the person who had purchased the dry fruits. The witness also identified the photograph of Rana even as that of the person who accompanied' A'. PW41 also stated that' A' was in the shop for nearly half an hour. The High Court, while observing that there was nothing to discredit the evidence of PW-41, however, ignored his testimony on a tenuous ground that the Police were already aware of the source of purchase of the dry fruits. Though there was no discovery within the meaning of Section 27, there is no reason why the evidence of PW-41 should be eschewed on that account. However, in regard to the identification of the photograph of
deceased terrorist, his evidence does not inspire confidence, in view of the
time lag of8 months and the manner in which the answer was sought to be elicited from him. [242-F-H; 243-A] 14.3. The evidence of PW-43 establishes the fact that' A' bought the Mixer-Grinder of Sujata make on 7.12.01. The relevant cash memo was filed by him. The witness identified 'A' in the Court and also the MixerGrinder. The High Court has accepted the testimony of this witness. Thus, the nexus between the Mixer-Grinder \Vhich was recovered from
the premises at Gandhi Vihar and the one purchased by' A' from the shop of PW-43 stands established by the evidence on record. The evidence of
the report of the experts, namely PWs 22 & 24 establish, as held by the High Court, that the composition of chemicals found sticking to the jar of the mixer grinder and the chemicals in the bucket "'ere of the same composition as "'as the composition of the chemica1s in the explosives
seized from the deceased terrorists at Parliament House. [243-B-E[ 14.4. A motorcycle was found at A-97, Gandhi Vihar and the same was seized by the 1.0. The witness handed over the book containing the delivery receipt (Ext. 29/2 & 29/3) to the police, which were filed in the Court as PW 29/2 &PW29/3. The witness identified 'A' and 'S' in the Court and the deceased terrorist Mohammed from the photograph (Ext. 29/5). He was however unable to identify the lady in view of the fact that she was at a distance. The High Court rightly took the view that in view of what was narrated by the witness, the identification of the accused and the deceased terrorist was quite probable. It was not a case of 'fleeting glance'. [243-F-H; 244-A[
14.5. The High Court held that the evidence of PW20, who was an independent Vt'itness, was in no manner tainted and held that 'A' was
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
involved in the purchase of the car used by the terrorists to enter the Parliament House. This conclusion was reached by the High Court even after excluding the evidence of PW23, Principal Scientific Officer who confirmed that the signatures on the delivery receipt-Ext. PW 116 talling with his specimen signatures. In this context, contention was raised before the High Court that in view of Section 27 of POT A specimen signature should not have been obtained without the permission of the Court. [244-G-H; 245-A)
State ofBombayv. Kattikalu Oghad, (1962) 3SCR10 and State ofU.P. v. Boota Singh, [1979] 1 SCC 31, referred to. 15.1. It is well settled that conducting the Test Identification Parade relates to the stage of investigation and the omission to conduct the same will not always affect the credibility of the witness who identifies the accused in the Court. [247-B)
Malkhansingh & Ors. v. State of M.P., [2003) 5 SCC 746, referred to. 15.2. In the present case, the accused persons themselves led the witnesses to the concerned shops and the places and pointed ou,t the witnesses. Therefore, the question of holding TIP thereafter does not arise. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses who could identify the two accused persons can be safely relied upon for more than one reason. Firstly, the time leg between the date of first and next meeting was not much it wasjnst a few days or at the most two weeks. Secondly, there was scope for sufficient interaction so that the identity of the accused could be retained in their memory. It was not a case of mere 'fleeting glimpse'. For the same reasons, they could identify Mohammed by photograph which was quite clear. If the step was taken by the 1.0. to have the test identification of photographs of dead bodies, it would have given better assurance of the reliability of identification. However, the failure to do so cannot be a ground to eschew the testimony of the witnesses whose evidence was concurrently accepted by the trial and the appellate Court. It is not the case of the appellant or any of the accused that the identification by photographs is not permissible under law. (247-F-H; 248-A) 15.3. This Court agrees with the High Court that the testimony of PWs 59, 72, 73 & 7 establish beyond doubt that fake documents were
..
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU 107
.
'
created from the laptop which was evidently in the possession of the
deceased terrorists and eventually recovered from' A' and 'S' in Srinagar.
The evidence of these witnesses could not in any way be shattered in the cross-examination. There was no cross-examination of the witness-PW59 by 'A'. The limited cross-examination on behalf of 'S' did not yield anything favourable to the accused. As regards PW72, most of the crossexamination was in the nature of hypothetical questions. Though there was no suggestion of any tampering to this witness, the.witness stated that there was no evidence of replacement of the hard disk upon a perusal of the reg file. There was no suggestion to PW72 that the documents (printouts) taken from the laptop were not the real ones. The different experts recorded same conclusions without knowing the report of each other. 1250-C-F] 15.4. The testimony of DWS---<:omputer engineer, who was examined on behalf of accused 'G' does not in any way substantiate the point of criticism about the possible tampering of laptop nor does it make a dent on the findings of the experts examined by the prosecution. The testimony
of this witness was not with reference to any of the files on which certain doubts were raised. His testimony is, by and large, on hypothetical aspects
and does not relate to the authenticity of the contents oflaptop as reported by the other experts. Thus the laptop found in the custody of the appellants and the results of analysis thereof would amply demonstrate that the laptop was the one used by the deceased terrorists contemporaneous to the date of incident and it should have passed hands on the day of the
incident or the previous day. The accused carrying the same with him soon after the incident furnishes cogent evidence pointing towards his
involvement. 1251-C-E]
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16. The circumstances clearly establish that appellant 'A' was associated with the deceased terrorists in almost every act done by them in order to achieve the objective of attacking the Parliament House. He established close contacts with the deceased terrorists, more especially, Mohammed Short of Participating in the actual attack, he did everything to set in motion the diabolic mission. As is the case with most of the conspiracies, there is and could be no direct evidence of the agreement
amounting to criminal conspiracy. However, the circumstances
cumulatively considered and weighed, would unerringly point to the collaboration of the accused 'A' with the slain 'Fidayeen' terrorists. The
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
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circumstances, if considered together, as it ought to be, establish beyond reasonable doubt that' A' was a party to the conspiracy and had played an active part in various acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy. These · circumstances cannot be viewed in isolation and by no standards of common sense, be regarded as innocuous acts. His conduct and actionsantecedent, contemporaneous and subsequent all point to his guilt and B are only consistent with his involvement in the conspiracy Viewed from another angle, the Court can draw a presumption under Section 114 of Evidence Act having regard to the natural course of events and human conduct that appellant 'A' had nexus with the conspirators who were killed and all of them together hatched the conspiracy to attack the C Parliament House and in that process to use explosives and other dangerous means. There is sufficient and satisfactory circumstantial evidence to establish that 'A' was a partner in this conspired crime of enormous gravity. (251-E-F; 252-A-C]
17. t. The conspiracy to commit terrorist act attracts punishment under sub-Section (3) of Section 3. Accused 'A' who is found to be a party to the conspiracy is therefore liable to be punishable under that provision. Having regard to the nature, potential and magnitude of the conspiracy with all the attendant consequences and the disastrous events that followed, the maximum sentence of life imprisonment is the appropriate punishptent to be given to 'A' under Section 3(3) of POT A for conspiring to commit the terrorist act. His conviction under Section 3(2) of POT A is set aside. The conviction under Section 3(5) of POT A is also set aside because there is no evidence that he is a member of a terrorist gang or a terrorist organization, once the confessional statement is excluded. Incidentally, it is mentioned that even going by confessional statement, it is doubtful whether the membership of a terrorist gang or organization is established. [256-G, H; 257-A, Bl 17.2. The gravity of the crime conceived by the conspirators with the potential of causing enormous casualties and dislocating the functioning of the Government as well as disrupting normal life of the people of India is some thing which cannot be described in words. The incident, which resulted in heavy casualties, had shaken the entire nation and the collective conscience of the society will only be satisfied if capital punishment is awarded to the offender. The challenge to the unity, integrity an sovereignty of India by these acts of terrorists and conspirators, can only be compensated by giving the maximum punishment to the person who is proved to be the
'(.
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) 1• NAVJOT SANDHU@ AFSAN GURU 109
conspirator in this treacherous act. The appellant,' A' who is a surrendered militant and who was bent upon repeating the acts of treason against the na\ion, is menace to the society and his life should become extinct. Accordingly, his death sentence is upheld. [258-G, H; 259-A[
State ofBihar v. Murad Ali Khan, [1988] 4 SCC 655; State of MP. v. Veereslnvar Rao Agnihotri, [1957] SCR 868 and Zaverbhai v. State of Bombay, AIR (1954) SC 752, referred to.
18.l. The conspiracy to commit offences punishable under Section 121 attracts punishment under Section 121A and the maximum sentence could be imprisonment for life. The other limb of Section 121A is the c.onspiracy to overa\\'e by means of criminal force of the show of criminal force, the Central Government or any State Government. The explanation to Section 121-A clarifies that it is not necessary that any act or illegal omission should take place pursuant to the conspiracy, in order to constitute the said offence. War terrorism and violent acts to overawe the established Government have many things in common. It is not too easy to distinguish them, but one thing is certain, the concept of war imbedded in Section 12lis not to be understood in international law sense of inter-country war involving military operations by and between t\\·o or more hostile countries. Section 121 is not meant to punish prisoners of war ofa beligerent nation. Apart from the legislative history of the provision and the understanding of the expression by various High Courts during the pre-independence days, the Illustration to Section 121 itself makes it clear that 'war' contemplated by Section 121 is not conventional warfare between two nations. Organizing or joining an insurrection against the Government of Jodi.a is also a form of \'t'ar. 'Insurrection' as defined in dictionaries and as commonly understood connotes a violent uprising by a group ·directed against the Government in power or the civil authorities. An act of insurgency is different from beligerency. It needs to be clarified that insurrection· is only illustrative of the expression 'war' and that it would cover situations analogous to insurrection if they tend to undermine the authority of the Ruler or Government. [268-G, H; 269-A-D]
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18.2. The expression 'waging war' should not be stretched too far
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to II.old tb.at all tb.e acts of disrupting public order and peace irrespective of their magnitude and repercussions could be reckoned as acts of waging war against the Government. A balanced and realistic approach is called
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
for in construing the expression 'waging war' irrespective of how it was viewed in the long long past. An organized movement attended with violence and attacks against the public officials and armed forces while agitating for the repeal of an unpopular law or for preventing burdensome taxes were viewed as acts of treason in the form of levying war. This Court doubts whether such construction is in tune with the modern day perspectives and standards. Another aspect on which a clarification is called for is in regard to the observation made in the old decisions that "neither the number engaged nor the force employed, nor the species of weapons with which they may be armed" is really material to prove the offence of levying/waging war. (272-E-G) 18.3. The single most important factor which impels this Court to think that this is a case of waging or attempting to wage war against the Government of India is the target of attack chosen by the slain terrorists and conspirators and the immediate objective sought to be achieved thereby. The battle-front selected was the Parliament House Complex. The whole of this well planned operation is to strike directly at the sovereign authority and integrity of our Republic of which the Government oflndia is an integral component. The attempted attack on the Parliament is an undoubted invasion of the sovereign attribute of the State including the Government of India which is its alter ego. The attack of this nature cannot be viewed on the same footing as a terrorist attack on some public office building or an incident resulting in the breach of public tranquility. The deceased terrorists were roused and impelled to action by a.strong anti-indian feeling as the writings on the fake Home Ministry sticker found on the car (Ext. PW 118) reveals. The huge and powerful explosives, sophisticated arms and ammunition carried by the slain terrorists who were to indulge in 'Fidayeen' operations with a definite purpose in view is a clear indicator of the grave danger in stove for the inmates of the House. The Planned operations if executed, would have spelt disaster to the whole nation. A war-like situation lingering for days or weeks would have prevailed. Such offensive acts of unimaginable description and devastation would have posed a challenge to the Government and the democratic institutions for the protection of which the Government of the day stands. To underestimate it as a mere desperate act of a small group of persons who were sure to meet death, is to ignore the obvious realities and to stultify the wider connn~ation of the expression of 'war' chosen by the drafters of IPC. The target, the obvious objective which has
.
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STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) 1·. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU 111
political and public dimensions and the modus operandi adopted by the hard-core 'Fidayeens' are all demonstrative of the intention of launching a war against the Government of India, The undoubted objective and
determination of the deceased terrorists was to impinge on the sovereign
authority of the nation and its Government. Even if the conspired purpose and objective falls short of installing some other authority or entity in the place of an established Government, it does not detract from the offence
of waging war. There is no warrant for such truncated interpretation.
1273-C-H; 279-A-F] 18.4. The criminal acts done by the deceased terrorists is order to capture the Parliament House is an act that amounts to waging or attempting to wage war. The conspiracy to commit either the offence of waging war or attempting to wage war or abetting the waging of war is punishable under Section 121A !PC with the maximum sentence of
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imprisonment for life. In the circumstances of the case, the imposition of
maximum sentence is called for and the High Court is justified in holding appellant 'A' guilty under Section 121A !PC and sentencing him to life imprisonment In addition, The High Court has also held the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 121 !PC on the premise that the abetted the waging of war. The sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the trial Court was enhanced to death sentence by the High Court. The conclusion reached by the High Court both in regard to the applicability of Section 121 IPC and the punishment, is correct and needs no interference. 1277-F-H; 278-A] 18.5. As criminal acts took place pursuant to the conspiracy, the appellant, as a party to the conspiracy, shall be deemed to have abetted the offence. In fact, he took active part in a series of steps taken to pursue the objective of conspiracy. The offence of abetting the waging of war, having regard to the extraordinary facts and circumstances of this case, justifies the imposition of capital punishment and therefore the judgment of the High Court in regard to the conviction and sentence of'A' under Section 121 IPC shall stand. [278-E]
18.6. The planned attack on the Parliament House, by the use of explosives and fire powers, was evidently a part of the conspiracy to
wl1icll 'A.' was a party. The preparation of explosives meant to he used by terrorists (co-conspirators) in the course of the planned attack of the Parliament House was well within the knowledge of 'A'. He, in fact,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
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procured the materials i.e. chemicals etc., for facilitating the preparation of explosive substances at the hideouts. This is what the evidence on record clearly points out. He is, therefore liable to be punished under clause (a) read with sub-section (i) of Section 4 of POT A and accordingly he shall be sentenced to the maximum sentence of imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.10000, in default of which, he shall undergo R.I. for six months. However, the conviction under Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act is set aside as this Court is of the view that the ingredients of the said Section are not satisfied in order to find 'A' guilty under that Section. Thus,' A' will have life sentence on three counts. However, as he is sentenced to death, the sentence of life imprisonment will naturally get merged into the death sentence. [279-F-H; 280-AJ Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi, [2003] 8 SCC 461; Magan/al Radha Krishan v. Emperor, AIR (1946) Nagpur 173 and Mir Hasan Khan v. The State, AIR (1951) Patna 60, referred to.
Rex v. Andrew Hardie, (1820, 1 State Trials N.S., 610); Pan American World Air Inc. V ActnaCas & Sur Co., 505 F.R. 2d. 989; Joysv. DPP, (1946) All ER 186; Lodewyk Johannes v. AG iJf Natal, (1907] AC 326; Anthony Crammer v. USA, 325 US 1-77 and United States v. Villata, 1797 CC Pennsylvania 419, referred to.
English Salute ofHigh Treason of 1351 i.e. Statute 25, Edward III, c.2; Sir James F. Stephen, - "A History of the Criminal Law of England'', (1883) publication; 'Law of Crimes' by Ratanlal and Dhirajlal (25th Edition); Digest ofCriminal Law by Sir James Stephens; Prof L. Oppenheim : Treatise on International Law, referred to.
19.1. Taking into account the confessional statement which stands corroborated by various circumstances proved, the High Court reached the inevitable conclusion that 'S' was a party to the agreement constituting conspiracy. Once the confessional statement is excluded, the evidence against 'S' gets substantially weakened and it is not possible to conclude beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the other circumstances enumerated by the High Court, that 'S' had jointed the conspiracy to attack the Parliament House and did his part to fulfill the mission of the conspirators. Apart from the confession, the High Court seems to have been influenced by the fact that 'S' was in touch with his cousin as well
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STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAY JOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU 113
'...
as the deceased terrorist Mohammed through cell phone. But this finding,
as far as telephonic contact \\'ith Mohammed is concerned, is not borne
out by the cell phone records on which the prosecution relied. There was no occasion on lYhich 'S' contacted Mohammed or any other terrorist.
To this extent, there seems to be an error in the High Court's finding in the last sentence of circumstance No. 2. The inference drawn in relation
,,
to circumstances No. 6 that 'S' "was equally liable for what was happening at the hideouts", cannot also be accepted. He may have knowledge of what was going on but it could not be said that he was equally liable for the acts done by the deceased terrorists and 'A', unless there is enough material apart from the confession, to conclude that he was a party to the conspiracy. 1285-B-F]
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19.2. The contention advanced on behalfof'S' that test identification parade ought to have been held, cannot be accepted having regard to the legal position clarified. The fact that PW 37 did not produce the register expected do be maintained by him, does not also discredit his testimony which has been believed by both the Courts. 1286-C, D]
19.3. Having regard to the fact situation in the present case, the police officers cannot be faulted for not going in search of the witnesses ir:a the locality. There is no law that the evidence of police officials in
regard to seizure ought to be discarded. They took the help of 'G' who
by then '"as in police custody to locate the house of 'S' and that 'G' \\'as
with the police, was mentioned by ·'AG' in her Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement. 1287-B, q 19.4. Though the time of arrest, as per the prosecution version, seems to be doubtful, from that, it cannot be inferred that the search and recovery was false. One does not lead to the other inference necessarily. The search and recovery of phones having been believed by both the Courts, this Court is not inclined to disturb that finding. In any case, the fact that the phone No ..... 73506 was in the possession of 'AG' stands proved from the intercepted conversation and the evidence regarding the identification of voice. 1287-H; 288-A, Bl 19.5. The so called identification by PW 32 on the revelation by the police cannot be relied upon. In fact, the High Court did not believe this witness on the point of identification of photos. However it is quite clear from the chemicals and explosive materials found there this hideout was
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
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taken by 'A' to accommodate the deceased terrorists who stated there to do preparatory acts. The fact that 'S's' motorcycle was also found there; would give rise to a reasonable inference that 'S' kept it for use by 'A' and his companions. It also reinforces the conclusion that 'S' was aware of the Indira Vihar above of these persons. [289-A, B] 19.6. PW 34 stated that he could only identify the photograph of Mohammed but not rest of them when the police showed him the photographs. His evidence on the point of identification of Mohammed's photograph inspires confidence as Mohammed stayed in the premises for a few days. The witness also deposed to the fact that on 13th December, 2001, 'A', 'S' and four more persons left the premises around 10 a.m. and all excepting 'A' got into an Ambassador car and 'A' came back to the premises. However, he did not mention that one of the accompanying persons was Mohammed. His evidence establishes that 'S' was a frequent visitor to Gandhi Vihar hideout and he was with' A' and some others even on the crucial day. [289-E-Gl
Sahib Singh v. State of Punjab, (1996) 11 SCC 685; Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), (1988) 3 SCC 609 and Sanjay v. NCT, (2001) 3 sec 190, referred to.
20. 1. The important circumstances against 'S' are :
t.
Taking a room on rent along with 'A' at Christian Colony hostel into which 'A' inducted the terrorist Mohammed about a month prior to the incident. 'S' used to go there.
2.
The motorcycle of 'S' being found at Indira Vihar, one of the hideouts of the terrorists which was hired by 'A' in the 1st week of December 2001.
3.
His visits to Gandhi Vihar house which was also taken on rent by 'A' in December 2001 to accommodate the terrorists and meeting 'A' there quite often, as spoken to by PW 34.
4.
Accompanying 'A' and Mohammed for the purchase of motorcycle by 'A'.
5.
His frequent calls to 'A' especially on the date of attack.
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STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) 1·. NAY JOT SANDHU@ AFSAN GURU 115
6.
His leaving Delhi to Srinagar on the date of attack itself in his truck with 'A' who carried a mobile phone, laptop used by terrorists and cash of Rs. 10 lakhs.
7.
The fear and anxiety with which he and his wife conversed over phone on the night of following day.
These circumstances, without anything more, do not lead to the conclusion that 'S' was also a party to the conspiracy in association with the deceased terrorists. The important missing link is that there was no occasion on which 'S' ever contacted any of the deceased terrorists on phone. 'S' was not sho\\'D to be moving \\'ith the deceased terrorists at any
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time excepting that he used to go with 'A' to the Boys' hostel where Mohammed was staying initially and he once accompanied 'A' and
Mohammed to the mobile phone shop. He did not accompany 'A' at the time of purchases of chemicals etc. used for preparation of explosives and
motor car used by terrorists to go to Parliament House. In the absence of any evidence as regards the identity of satellite phone numbers, the
Court cannot presume that the calls were received from a militant leader
who is said to be the kingpin behind the operations. The frequent calls and meetings bef\Veen 'S' and 'A' should be viewed in the context of the fact that they were cousins. Though his inclination and willingness to lend
a helping hand to 'A' even to the extent of facilitating him to flee away
from Delhi to a safer place soon after the incident is evident from his
various acts and conduct, they are not sufficient to establish his complicity in the conspiracy as such. Certain false answers given by him in the course
of examination under SectioD" 313 Cr.P.C. are not adequate enough to make up the deficiency in the evidence relating to conspiracy as far as 'S' is concerned. At the same time, the reasonable and irresistible inference
that has to be he drawn from the circumstances established is that the appellant 'S' had the knowledge of conspiracy and the plans to att•ck the Parliament House. His close association with 'A' during the crucial period,
his visits to the hideouts to meet 'A', which implies awareness of the activities of 'A', the last minute contacts between him and 'A' and their immediate departure to Srinagar in 'S's' truck with the incriminating
laptop and phone held by 'A' would certainly given rise to a high degree of probability of knowledge on the part of'S' that his cousin had conspired
with others to attack the Parliament and to indulge in the terrorist acts. He was aware of what was going on and he used to extend help to 'A'
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
whenever necessary. Having known about the plans of' A' in collaborating with terrorists, he refrained from informing the police or Magistrate intending thereby or knowing it to be likely that such concealment on his part will facilitate the waging of war. [293-C-H; 294-A-G) 20.2. By his illegal omission to apprise the police or Magistrate of the design of' A' and other conspirators to attack the Parliament which is an act of waging war, appellant 'S' has made himself liable for punishment for the lesser offence under Section 123 JPC. If he had given the timely information, the entire conspiracy would have been nipped in the bud. The fact that ther,e was no charge against him under this particular Section, does not, in any way, result in prejudice to him because the charge of waging war and other allied offences are the subject matter of charges. Accused 'S' is not in any way handicapped by the absence of charge under Section 123 IPC. The case which he had to meet under Section 123 is no different from the case relating to the major charges which he was confronted with. In the face of the stand he had taken and his conduct even after the attack, he could not have pleaded reasonable excuse for not passing on the information. Viewed from any angle, the evidence on record justifies his conviction under Section 123 IPC. Thus, 'S' is found guilty under 123 IPC and is sentenced to the maximum period of imprisonment of 10 years (rigorous) specified therein. He is also sentenced to pay fine of Rs. 25000 failing which he shall suffer R.I. for a further period of one year. The convictions and sentences under all other provisions of law are set aside. 1295-C-H) 21.1. The High Court concluded that "the evidence on record does not bring out a light level of consciousness qua S.A.R. Gilani in the conspiracy." This Court is in agreement with the conclusion reached by the High Court. 1297-B, CJ 21.2. However, this Court would like to advert to one disturbing feature. 'G' rejoiced and laughed when the Delhi event was raised in the conversation. It raises a serious suspicion that he was approving of the happenings in Delhi. Moreover, he came forward with a false version that the remark was made in the context of domestic quarrel. It could only be said that his conduct, which is not only evident from this fact, but also the untruthful places raised by him about his contacts with 'S' and 'A', give rise to serious suspicion at least about his knowledge of the incident and his
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STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v NAY JOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU 117
tacit approval of it. At the same time, suspicion however strong cannot
take the place of legal proof. Though his conduct was not above board, the Court cannot condemn him in the absence of sufficient evidence pointing
unmistakably to his guilty. Thus, the verdict of the High Court is affirmed and the acquittal of 'G' of all charges is upheld. !302-E-H; 303-Af 22.1. The Trial Court convicted' AG' of the offence under Section 123 IPC imputing her the kno\vledge of conspiracy and concealing the evidence of design to \vage war by reason of her illegal omission to inform the police. The High Court acquitted herofthe charge. The Hig~ Court is fully justified
in doing so. The prosecution case against this accused, who is the wife of
'S', is \vcak, especially, in the light of the exclusion of confessional staten1ents Gf co-accused. The High Court rightly held the confessions inadmissible
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against the co-accused. Even the confessions of co-accused do not attribute to her in clear terms the role of conspirator, though on the basis of
confessions it could perhaps be held that she was in the know of things well before the planned attack ou the Parliament. In fact, there was no earthly reason for inviting her to join in conspiracy. She was pregnant by then.
Then it is to be noted that no recoveries were effected at her instance
coming within the purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Practically there is no evidence left to bring her within the purview of Section 123 IPC much less '"'ithin the net of conspiracy to \\'age war and to commit terrorist
act. Indisputable, no positive or participatory role has been attributed to her ands rightly observed by the High Court, "she provided no logistics;
she procured no hideouts; she procured no arms and ammunition; she \\'as not even a motivator." She could have had some knowledge of the suspicious movements of her husband "'ith 'A' \\'ho is his cousin and a surrendered
militant. Of course, she was aware of the fact that 'S' accompanied by 'A' left in her truck on the day of Parliament attack in post-haste; but, the
involvement of' A', direct or indirect, and the attitude of her husband in
relation to the Parliament attack could have could have come to her knowledge after the attract when they abruptly left for Srinagar in the truck. The prosecution sought to rely on her disclosure memo Ex. PW 6/14 but nothing was recovered as a direct result of the information given by her. Of course, as far as passing on the information regarding the truck by which 'S' left for Srinagar, there is no dispute. But the recovery of laptop etc. from the truck is not distinctly re la table to the information contained in the alleged disclosure statement. The articles in the truck were recovered at the instance of' A' and 'S' 'vhen it '\'as intercepted at Srinagar. There is
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
no link between the disclosure and the recoveries as a cause and effect.
[303-B-H; 304-A)
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22.2. As rightly observed by the High Court the telephonic conversation between her and her husband 'S' shows that "Shaukat and Afsan were talking between the lines. Afsan was scared" An inference can be drawn-that she was concerned about the safety of 'S' and that she was aware that 'S' and 'A' did something that attracted police surveillance. But from this circumstance alone, no inference can be drawn with a reasonable degree of certainty that she was having knowledge of the plan to attack the Parliament before it happened. The scanty evidence on record does not justify her conviction either on the charges framed against her or under Section 123 IPC for which she was held guilty by the trial Court. The High Court's view is unexceptionable. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 373-375 of 2004. From the Judgment and Order dated 29 .1 n 2003 of the Delhi High Court in M.R. No. 1/2003, Crl.A. No. 12 of 2003 and 80 of 2003.
Gopal Subramanium, Shanti Bhushan, Shushil Kumar, Ram Jethmalani, Mukul Gupta, Mrs. Mukta Gupta, Si.ddharth Agarwal, Raj Shekar Rao, Satyakam, Dayan Krishnan, Ankur Jain, Ashish Jain, Ms. Nitya Ramakrishnan, Salar N. Khan, Sanjay K. Pathak, Ms. Mini Kaushik, Ms. Anitha Shenoy, Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, Arvind Nigam, Ms. Lataa Krishnamurti, Ms. Nandita Haksar, Ms. P.R. Mala, R. Anand Padmanabhan, A. Dasharatha, S. Balaji Srinivasan, Pramod Dayal, Naveen R. Nath, Mrs. Lalit Mohini Bhat, Ms. Hetu Arora, Ms. Shomila Bakshi, Ms. Inklee Barooah, Saqib, Adolf Mathew, Ms. Amritha Sarayoo and Vinay Arora for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
P. VENKATARAMA REDDI, J.: 1. The genesis of this case lies in a macabre incident that took place close to the noon time on 13th December, 200 l in which five heavily armed persons practically stormed the Parliament House complex and inflicted heavy casualties on the security men on duty. This unprecedented event bewildered the entire nation and sent shock waves across the globe. In the gun battle that lasted for 30 minutes or so, these five terrorists who tried to gain entry into the Parliament when it was in session,
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) "· NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU [REDD!. J.] 119
were killed. Nine persons including eight security personnel and one gardener succumbed to the bullets of the terrorists and 16 persons including l 3 security men received injuries. The five terrorists were ultimately killed and their abortive attempt to lay a seize of the Parliament House thus came to an end, triggering off extensive and effective investigations spread over a short span of 17 days which revealed the possible involvement of the four accused persons who are either appellants or respondents here'n and some other proclaimed offenders said to be the leaders of the banned militant organization known as "Jaish-E-Mohammed". After the conclusion of investigation, the investigating agency filed the report under Section 173 Cr.P .C. against the four accused persons on 14.5.2002. Charges were framed under various sections of Indian Penal Code (for short' !PC'), the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as 'POTA') and the Explosive Substances Act by the designated Court. The designated Special Court presided over by Shri S.N. Dhingra tried the accused on the charges and the trial concluded within a record period of about six months. 80 witnesses were examined for the prosecution and l 0 witnesses were examined on behalf of the accused S.A.R. Gilani. Plethora of documents (about 330 in number) were exhibited. The three accused, namely, Mohd. Afzal, Shaukat Hussain Guru and S.A.R. Gilani were convicted for the offences under Sections 12 l, 12 lA, 122, Section 1208 read with Sections 302 & 307 read with Section 120-B !PC, sub-Sections (2), (3) & (5) of Section 3 and Section 4(b) of POTA and Sections 3 & 4 of Explosive Substances Act. The accused I & 2 were also convicted under Section 3(4) of POTA. Accused No. 4 namely Navjot Sandhu@ Afsan Guru was acquitted of all the charges except the on, under Section 123 !PC for which she was convicted and sentenced to undergo R.I. for five years and to pay fine. Death sentences were imposed on the other three accused for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 120-B !PC (it would be more appropriate to say- Section 120-B read with Section 302 IPC) and Section 3(2) of POTA. They were also sentenced to life imprisonment on as many as eight counts under the provisions ofIPC, POTA and Explosive Substances Act in addition to varying amounts of fine. The amount of Rs. IO lakhs, which was recovered from the possession of two of the accused, namely, Mohd. Afzal and Shaukat Hussain, was forfeited to the State under Section 6 of the POTA. 2. In conformity with the provisions of Cr.P.C. the designated Judge submitted the record of the case to the High Court of Delhi for confirmation of death sentence imposed on the three accused. Each of the four accused
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filed appeals against the verdict of the learned designated Judge. The State also filed an appeal against the judgment of the designated Judge of the Special Court seeking enhancement of life sentence to the sentence of death in relation to their convictions under Sections 121, 121A and 302 IPC. In addition, the State filed an appeal against the acquittal of the 4th accused on all the charges other than the one under Section 123 IPC. The Division Bench of High Court, speaking through Pradeep Nandrajog, J. by a well considered judgment pronounced on 29.10.2003 dismissed the appeals of Mohd. Afzal and Shaukat Hussain Guru and confirmed the death sentence imposed on them. The High Court allowed the appeal of the State in regard to sentence under Section 121 IPC and awarded them death sentence under that Section also. The High Court allowed the appeals ofS.A.R. Gilani and Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru and acquitted them of all charges. This judgment of the High Court has given rise to these seven appeals - two appeals preferred by Shaukat Hussain Guru and one appeal preferred by Mohd. Afzal and four appeals preferred by the State/Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi against the acquittal of S.A.R. Gilani and Navjot Sandhu. It may be mentioned that the accused Mohd. Afzal and Shaukat Hussain Guru are related, being cousins. The 4th accused Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru is the wife of Shaukat Hussain. The third accused S.A.R. Gilani is a teacher in Arabic in Delhi University. It is he who officiated the marriage ceremony of Shaukat Hussain ·Guru and Navjot Sandhu who at the time of marriage converted herself to Islam. 3.(i) Now, let us make a brief survey of the incident and the investigation that followed, which led to the filing of the charge-sheet, as apparent from the material on record. (ii) There is practically no dispute in regard to the details of actual incident, the identification of the deceased terrorists and the recoveries and other investigations made at the spot.
(iii) Five heavily armed persons entered the Parliament House complex in a white Ambassador Car. The said five persons (hereinafter referred to as the 'slain' or 'deceased terrorists') were heavily armed with automatic assault rifles, pistols, hand and rifle grenades, electronic detonators, spare ammunition, explosives in the form of improvised explosive devices viz., tiffin bombs and a sophisticated bomb in a container in the boot of the car made with enormous
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v.. NA VJOT SANDHU@ AFSAN GURU [REDD!, J.] 121
quantity of ammonium nitrate. The High Court observed: "The fire power was awesome-enough to engage a battalion and had the attack succeeded, the entire building with all inside would have perished."
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(iv) It was a fortuitous circumstance that the Vice President's carcade, which was awaiting departure from Gate No. 11 was blocking the circular road outside the Parliament building, with the result the deceased terrorists were unable to get free and easy access to the Parliament House building. The attack was foiled due to the immediate reaction of the security personnel present at the spot and complex. There was a fierce gun-battle lasting for nearly 30 minutes. As mentioned earlier, nine persons including eight security personnel and one gardener lost their lives in the attack and 16 persons including 13 security personnel, received injuries. The five assailants were killed.
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(v) From the evidence of PW5 who was the AS! in-charge of Escort! vehicle of the Vice-President, we get the details of the origin of the incident.
He stated that at about 11.30 a.m. one white Ambassador car having red light entered the Parliament complex and came to the point where the carcade of the Vice-President was waiting near Gate No. 11. Since the escort vehicle was blocking the way, the car turned towards left. He got suspicious and ordered the vehicle to stop. Then, the driver of the Ambassador car reversed the vehicle and while doing so struck the rear side of the car of the VicePresident. When the car was about to move away, he and the driver of the Vice-President's car ran towards the car and caught hold of the collar of the driver. As he was trying to drive away, PW5 took out his revolver. At that juncture, the five persons in the car got out of it and quickly started laying wires and detonators. Then PW5 fired a shot, which struck on the leg of one of the terrorists. The terrorist also returned the fire as a result of which he received a bullet injury on his right thigh. There was further exchange of fire. The evidence of other witnesses reveal that there was hectic movement of the terrorists from gale to gate within the complex firing at the security men on duty and the latter returning the fire.
(vi) The Station House Officer of Parliament Street Police Station, Shri G.L. Mehta (PW!) along with his team of police personnel reached the spot after receiving a wireless message. By that time, the firing spree was over. PW! cordoned off the area. He found one deceased terrorist lying opposite Gate No. I of the Parliament building, one deceased terrorist at the porch of Gate No. 5 and three deceased terrorists lying in the porch of Gate No.
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9. The Bomb Disposal Squad ofNSG, a photographer and a crime team were summoned to the spot. PWl then deputed three Sub-Inspectors (PWs2 to 4) to conduct investigation at the three gates. PWl then examined the spot of occurrence, prepared a rough sketch of the scene of occurrence and seized various articles including arms and ammunition, live and empty cartridges and the car and the documents found therein. Blood samples were also lifted from various spots. The photographs of the five slain terrorists were caused to be taken. Then, he sent the dead bodies to the mortuary in the hospital for postmortem. (vii) After the Bomb Disposal Squad had rendered the area safe and his preliminary observations were over, PWl recorded the statement ofS.I. Sham Singh (PW55) who was in the security team of Vice-President. On the basis of this statement, 'Rukka' (Ext.PW Ill) was prepared and PWl despatched the same to the police station at about 5 p.m. This formed the basis for registration of First Information Report. The FIR was registered for offences under Sections 121, 121A, 122, 124, 120-B, 186, 332, 353, 302, 307 IPC, Sections 3, 4 & 5 of the Explosive Substances Act and Sections 25 & 27 of the Arms Act by the Head Constable (PW14) of the ·Parliament Street Police Station. The copy of FIR was sent to the Court on the same day, as seen from the endorsement on the document (PW 1411). The further investigation was, taken up by the special cell of Delhi Police.
(viii) Investigations conducted by PWl and his team of officers led to the recovery and seizure of the following articles inter alia:
A white ambassador car, DL3CJ1527, with a VIP red light. The car had a sticker of the Home Ministry (subsequently found to be fake) on the windshield (Ex. PW 1/8) containing an inscription at the rear denigrating India and reflecting a resolve to 'destroy' it. Certain papers relating to the car were found inside the car. Six fake identity cards purportedly issued by Xansa Websity, 37, Bungalow Road, New Delhi to different students with their address as 120A, Adarsh Nagar, Delhi and the telephone humber as 9811489429. These identity cards were in the names of Anil Kumar, Raju Lal, Sunil Verma, Sanjay Kou!, Rohail Sharma and Rohail Ali Shah (which were subsequently found to be fake names of the deceased terrorists).
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU [REDD!, J.]
One fake identity card of Cybertech Computer Hardware Solutions in the name of Ashiq Hussain which was being carried by the deceased terrorist Mohammed. Two slips of paper bearing five domestic mobile phone numbers, which were related to the instruments found on the deceased terrorists and two UAE numbers. Three SIM cards corresponding to the mobile phone numbers noted on the slips were found inside the aforementioned three instruments-Ext. P28, P37 & P27. In addition, three other SIM cards were recovered from the purse of the deceased terrorist Mohammad at Gate No. 1. One sheet of paper on which the topographical details regarding the Parliament House building and the compound were handwritten.
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4.(i) So far, about the incident and the preliminary investigations at the scene of occurrence regarding which there is practically no dispute. We shall now narrate briefly the further factual details as unfolded by the prosecution:
(ii) While investigations were on at the spot, PW20 came to the Parliament Complex and met PW!. PW20 provided the first leads to the investigating officials by informing PW! that he had sold the Ambassador car used in the attack (DL 3C J 1527) on 11.12.2001. He had come to the spot after seeing the said car on the television screen. PW20 had brought with him a delivery receipt dated 11.12.2001, photocopy of the identity card of one Ashiq Hussain etc. PW20 identified the deceased terrorist (Mohammad) at Gate No. l as being the said Ashiq Hussain who had purchased the car. (iii) Inspector Mohan Chand Sharma of special cell-PW66 undertook th" investigations pertaining to the mobile phones. Phone call details were obtained and analysed from the respective cellular mobile service providers. Analysis of the call records indicated that the number 981I489429 which was found on the 1.0. cards, (subsequently discovered to be that of the accused Afzal) appeared to be integrally connected with the deceased terrorists and this number had been in frequent contact with the cell phone No. 9810693456 (recovered from the deceased terrorist Mohammad at Gate No. l) continuously from 28.11.200 l till the date of the attack. It was further revealed that this number of Afzal, namely, 9811489429 was in contact with the above cell phone of Mohammad, just before the incident i.e. at 10.40 a.m., I 1.04 a.m. and 11.22 a.m. It was also ascertained that the said number of Afzal was activated only on 6.11.200 l close to the attack.
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Further analysis of the cell phone call records showed that another cell phone number i.e. 9811573506 (subsequently discovered to be that of Shaukat and recovered from the 4th accused Afsan Guru) appeared to be in Close contact with Afzal's number namely 9811489429 and these numbers were in contact with each other a few minutes before the attack on the Parliament commenced. It was also found that the said number of Shaukat was activated only on 7.12.2001 just a week prior to the attack. An analysis of the call records relating to Shaukat's mobile phone further revealed that soon after the attack i.e at 12.12 hours, there was a call from Shaukat' s number to the cell phone number 9810081228 (subsequently discovered to be that of SAR Gilani) and there was a call from Gilani's number to Shaukat's number 10 minutes later. Moreover, it was ascertained that Gilani's number was in constant touch with the other two accused namely Shaukat and Afzal. It transpired that Afzal's cell phone bearing number 9811489429 was reactivated on 7.12.2001 and the first call was from Gilani's number. With the recoveries of the cell phones and SIM cards and on an analysis of the details of phone numbers noted on the slips of papers in the light of the call records, the investigation narrowed down to three numbers, namely, 9811489429, 9811573506 and 9810081228 which belonged to Afzal, Shaukat and Gilani respectively. It was also found that the first two numbers were cash cards and hence the details regarding their ownership were not available. However, as regards 9810081228, the information was received from the service provider (AIRTEL) that SAR Gilani with the residential address 535, Dr. Mukherjee Nagar, Delhi was the regular subscriber. PW66 then took steps on December 13th for obtaining permission from the Joint Director, LB. as per the requirements of Indian Telegraph Act for keeping surveillance and tapping of the mobile phone Nos. 9811489429, 9811573506 and 9810081228. On 14th December, at 12.52 hours, an incoming call to Gilani's No. 9810081228 was intercepted by S.I. Harender Singh (PW70). The call was in Kashmiri language. A Kashmiri knowing person (PW7 l) was requested to interpret the call recorded on the tape. He translated the call in Hindi which was recorded in Ext. PW66/4. That was a call from the brother of Gilani which was made from Srinagar. On the same day, at 8.12 P.M. a call was intercepted on the number 9811573506 which disclosed that one woman was talking in a state of panic to a male person whom she addressed as Shaukat. This conversation was transcribed by PW70 as per PW 66/3. The subsequent forensic analysis revealed that the male voice
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU (REDD!, l.l 125
in the conversation was of the accused Shaukat Hussain and that the female voice was that of his wife-accused No. 4 who was the recipient of the call. The call came from Srinagar. Both the intercepted conversations were analysed and considered by PW 66 (Inspector M.C. Sharma) at about 10 P.M. on 14th December. PW 66 resultantly drew an inference that the persons who
were conversing on the two mobile phones were having knowledge about the attack on Parliament and that two persons namely, Shaukat and Chotu who were connected with the case were in Srinagar. The calling No. 0194 492160 was sent to the Central Agency of Srinagar Police for surveillance.
(iv) The next move was to arrest Gilani, which according to the prosecution was at about l 0 A.M. on December 15th when he was entering his house at Mukherjee Nagar. Shri Gilani is alleged to have made disclosures
to the investigating agency, the contents of which were recorded subsequently as Ex. PW 66/13. The disclosure statement implicated himself and the other accused in the conspiracy to attack the Parliament. According to the prosecution, he disclosed the facts on the basis of which further investigation was carried out, certain recoveries were effected and discovery of facts took place. The identity of the deceased terrorist Mohammad and others, the part played by Shaukat'and Afzal and other details are s.aid to have been given by him. According to the prosecution, Shri Gilani then led the Investigating Officer to the house of Shaukat which was also located at Mukherjee Nagar. The 4th accused Afsan Guru - the wife of Shaukat was found there with cell phone No. 9811573506. The search of the premises resulted in the recovery of another cell phone 9810446375 which was in operation from 2nd November to 6th December. Accused Navjot, on interrogation, disclosed that Mohammad (deceased terrorist) gave Rs. l 0 lac and laptop computer to Shaukat and asked him to go to Sri Nagar in the truck along with Afzal. The truck was registered in her name. The disclosure statement of Navjot is Ex.PW66/14. According to the prosecution, she was arrested at about 10.45 a.m. on 15th December. The truck ruJmber given by her was flashed to Srinagar. Srinagar police was succeSsful in apprehending the two accused Afzal and Shaukat while they were in the truck belonging to Navjot. On their pointing out, the laptop computer and an amount of Rs. I 0 lac were recovered from the truck by the SDPO, Srinagar (PW61). A mobile handset without any SIM card was also found. It transpired that this hand set was used in the operation i.e. No. 9811489429 which established contacts with deceased
terrorists minutes before the attack. Mohd. Afzal and Shaukat Hussain, who were arrested by the Srinagar Police at about 1 I .45 A.M., were brought to
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
Delhi in a special aircraft and were fonnally arrested in Delhi. The investigation was handed over the PW76 (Inspector Gill of Special Cell) on 16th December. (v) It is the case of the prosecution that on interrogation, they made disclosure statements (Ex.PW 64/1 and PW 64/2) in relation to their role in the conspiracy. On December 16th, Afzal and Shaukat led the investigating team to the various hideouts, viz., Indira Vihar and Gandhi Vihar where the terrorists stayed. On the search of these places, the police recovered chemicals, prepared explosives, detonators, gloves, mixer grinder, motor cycles-one belonging to Shaukat and the other purchased by the deceased terrorist Mohammad from PW29 which was allegedly used for reconnaissance (reccee). On December 17th, the investigating officer took Mohd. Afzal to the mortuary at the L.H. Medical College Hospital where Afzal identified the bodies of the five deceased terrorists as Mohammad (dead body found at Gate No. I), Raja, Rana, Hamza (dead bodies found at Gate No. 9) and Haider (dead body found at Gate No. 5). From December 17th to December 19th, Afzal led the police to vari('I"'> shops from where the chemicals and other materials required for preparing explosives were purchased and also the shops from where red lightfound on the seized car, motor cycle, dry fruits, mobile phones etc. were purchased. From December 17th onwards, the laptop was analysed by the IO with the assistance of an expert - PW72. PW72 submitted a report narrating the results of his examination. The laptop was also sent to BPR&D Office in Hyderabad and another report from PW73 was obtained. The forensic analysis revealed that the documents found at the spot with the deceased terrorists including various identity cards and sticker of the Home Ministry, were found stored in that laptop. (vi) On 19th December, the important development was that the provisions of Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance were invoked and the offences under the said Ordinance were also included in the relevant columns of crime documents. According to the prosecution, this was done after due consideration of the material coJ!ected by then and upon getting definite infonnation about the involvement of a banned terrorist organization-Jaishe-Mohammad. The investigation was then taken over by the Assistant Commissioner of Police Shri Rajbir Singh (PW80). He recorded a supplementary disclosure statement being Ext. PW64/3. (vii) On the same day i.e. 19th C'~cember, there was another crucial development. According to the prosecution, the three accused-Afzal,
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU [REDD!, J.]
Shaukat and Gilani expressed their desire to make confessional statements before the authorized officer. On 20th December, PW80 made an application before the DCP (Special Cell) (PW60) for recording the confessional statements of these three accused. PW60 gave directions to PWl8 to produce the three accused at the Officers Mess, Alipur Road, Delhi. On the next day i.e. 21st December, the accused Gilani was first produced before PW60 at the Mess building. However, Shri Gilani refused to make a statement before PW60 and the same was recorded by him. Thereafter, Shaukat Hussain was produced before PW60 at J.30 P.M. Shaukat Hussain expressed his desire to make the confessional statement and the same was recorded by PW60 in his own handwriting which according to him was to the dictation of Shaukat. The confessional statement recorded purportedly in compliance with Section 32 is marked as Ex. PW60/6. The other accused Afzal was also produced before PW60 at 7. JO P.M. on 2 lst December. After he expressed the desire to make the confession, his statement was recorded by PW60 in his own handwriting allegedly as per the dictation of the said accused. This is Ex.PW60/9. PW80 obtained copies of the confessional statements in sealed envelopes. In substance, both Afzal and Shaukat confessed having been parties to the conspiracy to launch an attack on the Parliament House. The details of the confessions will be adverted to later. On 22nd December PW80 produced the accused persons before the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (PW63) in compliance with Section 32 of POTA. The learned Magistrate conducted the proceedings in respect of each of the accused persons in order to satisfy himself that the statements recorded by PW60 were not the result of any inducements or threats. No complaint of any such threat or inducement was made to PW63. Shaukat Hussain and SAR Gilani were remanded to judicial custody on 22nd December itself. However, the police custody of Mohd.Afzal was allowed for the purpose of conducting certain investigations in the light of the supplementary disclosure statement made by him to PW80. (viii) On 4.5.2002 sanction was accorded by the Lt. Governor of1Jelhi in view of the requirements of Section 50 POTA and Section 196 Cr.P.C. Sanction was also accorded by the Commissioner of Police on 12th April for prosecution under Explosives Substances Act. On conclusion of the investigations, the lnvestigating Agency filed the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. against the four accused. By the time the charge sheet was filed and
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the charges were framed, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 was enacted and brought into force with effect from 28th March, 2002. By the same Act, the Prevention of Terrorism (2nd) Ordinance, 2001 was repealed subject to a saving provision. The charges were framed on 4th June, 2002 and the trial before the designated Judge commenced on 4th July. An Advocate was nominated by the court at State's expense for providing legal assistance to the accused Afzal as he did not engage any counsel on his own. Subsequently, the counsel was changed. Before the trial started, an order was passed by the learned designated Judge that certain documents viz. post-mortem reports and documents relating to recoveries of arms, explosives etc. from the scene of occurrence shall be treated as undisputed evidence in view of the consent given by the accused persons and there was no need for formal proof of those documents. After the trial commenced, an application was moved on behalf of Gilani, Shaukat and Navjot challenging the admissibility of the intercepted conversations in evidence. The learned Judge of the designated Court rejected their contention by his order dated 11.7.2002. Assailing this order, the accused moved the High Court. The High Court set-aside the order of the designated court and allowed the applications of the accused. The SLP filed against that order was disposed of by this Court on 9 .5 .2003 during the pendency of the appeals in the High Court holding inter alia that the order passed by designated Judge was in the nature of an interlocutory order against which appeal or revision was barred under Section 34 POTA. Without expressing any opinion on the merits, the parties were permitted to urge the point at issue before the Division Bench of the High Court. The decision is reported in (2003) 6 SCC 641. The verdict of the trial court was given on 16th and 18th December, 2002. The details of conviction and sentences have already been referred to. As noticed earlier, the High Court allowed the appeals of A3 and A4 and dismissed the appeals of A I and A2 and their death sentences were confirmed.
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5. Preliminary submissions:
(i) There are certain issues which arise at the threshold viz., validity of sanction orders, non-addition of POTA offences at the beginning and framing of charges which need to be addressed before we embark on a discussion of other questions.
Sanction:
(ii) Section 50 of POTA enjoins that no Court shall take cognizance of offences under the Act "without the previous sanction of the Central
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STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU [REDD!, J.] 129
Government or as the case may be, the State GovernmenC. So also, Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enacts a bar against taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Chapter VI of the Indian Penal Code except with the previous sanction of the Central Government or the State Government. Some of the offences charged in the present case are under Chapter VI of !PC. (iii) 1{ is first contended by the learned senior counsel Mr. Ram Jethmalani, that the sanctions were not given, nor signed by the competent authority. It is submitted that in relation to the Union Territory, only Central Government is competent. Delhi being a Union Territory known as the National Capital Territory of Delhi with effect from the date of commencement of the Constitution (69th Amendment Act), the Central Government alone is the competent authority to accord sanction .. In the present case, both under POTA and Cr.P.C. sanctions have been accorded 'by order and in the name of the Lt. Governor of the National Capital Territory of Delhi'. The Lt. Governor did not act on behalf of the Central Government nor did he act as Administrator ofU.T. He acted as the Constitutional head of the Government of NCT of Delhi and played the role assigned to him under Section 41 of NCT of Delhi Act, as the authentication in the order shows. Therefore, it is submitted that the sanction purportedly granted under Section 50 of POTA is a nullity. (iv) We find no substance in these contentions. Section 2(h) of POTA read with Articles 239 & 239AA of the Constitution oflndia furnish complete
answers to these argu1nents and that is what the learned senior counsel for the State has highlighted. 'State Government' is defined in Section 2(h) of POTA and it says that "in relation to a Union Territory, 'State Government' means the Administrator thereof'. The expression 'Administrator' finds place in Article 239 of the Constitution oflndia. Article 239(1) reads ... "Save as otherwise provided by Parliament by law, every Union Territory shall be administered by the President acting to such an extent as he thinks fit through an Administrator to be appointed by him with such designation as he may specify". Article 239AA inserted by the Constitution (69th Amendment Act, 1991) effective from l.2.1992 lays down that from that date, the Union Territory of Delhi shall be called the NCT of Delhi and "the Administrator thereof appointed under Article 239 shall be designated as the Lt. Governor." By such designation as the Lt. Governor, the constitutional functionary contemplated
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by Article 239, namely, the Administrator has not lost his status as Administrator. The designation of Administrator gets merged into the new designation of Lt. Governor in keeping with the upgraded status of this particular Union Territory. Thus, the Lt. Governor who continues to be the Administrator also derives his or her authority to grant sanction under Secti.on 50 of POTA by virtue of the legislative fiction created by Clause (h) of Section 2 read with Article 239. The Administrator is deemed to be the State Government for the purpose of Section 50 of POTA. In effect and in substance, there is a clear delegation of power statutorily conferred in favour of the Administrator (designated as Lt. Governor) in respect of granting sanction under POTA. The fact that the sanction order carries the designation of the Lt. Governor is of no consequence and does not in any \\fay impinge on the operation of Section 2(h) read with Article 239. POTA is a Parliamentary enactment. Sub-Clause (b) of Clause 3 of Article 239AA makes it explicit that notwithstanding the law making power conferred on the Legislative Assembly of NCT, the Parliament retains its power under the Constitution to make laws with respect to any matter for a Union Territory or any part thereof. The reliance sought to be. placed on Goa Sampling Employees' Association v. G.S. Co. of India Pvt. Ltd., [1985] 1 SCC 206 is rather misconceived. That case turned on the interpretation of the expression 'appropriate Government' occurring in Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The industrial dispute pertained to the workmen employed at Mormogao Port which is located in the there union territory of Goa, Daman and Diu. It was contended by the employer that the Central Government was not competent to refer the dispute to the Tribunal for adjudication. This contention found favour with the High Court of Bombay which held th~t the Administrator appointed under Article 239 of the Constitution is the State Government for the Union Territory of Goa and is the appropriate Government within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The judgment of the High Court was reversed by this Court after referring to Articles 239 and 239 A and the provisions of the Govt. of Union Territories Act, 1963 and the definitions of General Clauses Act and observed thus: "On a conspectus of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the 1963 Act, it clearly transpires that the concept of Stat~ Government is foreign to the administration of Union Territory and Article 239 provides that every Union Territory is to be administered by the President. The President may act through an administrator appointed by him. Administrator is thus the delegate of the President. His
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STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU [REDD!, J.J 13 l
position is wholly different from that of a Governor of a State. Administrator can differ with his Minister and he must then obiain the orders of the President meaning thereby of the Central Government. Therefore, at any rate the administrator of Union Territory does not qualify for the description of a State Government. Therefore, the Central Government is the 'appropriate Government'. That decision, in our view, has no relevance. This Court was not called upon to consider a specific provision like Section 50 or Section 2(h) of POTA. We are, therefore, of the view that by virtue of specific statutory· delegation in favour of the Administrator who is constitutionally designated as Lt. Governor as well, the sanction accorded by the said authority is a valid sanction under Section 50 of POTA. It is ofrelevance to note that the order of sanction under POTA (Ext.Pl l/l) itself recites that the Lt. Governor acted in exercise of powers conferred by Section 50 read with Clause (h) of sub-Section (l) of Section 2 of POTA. We find on the perusal of relevant file that the Lt. Governor saw the file and he himself approved the proposed sanction. The grant of sanction was not an act done by a delegate of the Lt. Governor under the Business Rules. It may be noted that the sanction file was produced before the trial Court and was allowed to be perused by the defence counsel vide para 149 of the trial Court's judgment. (v) As regards the sanction under Section 196 Cr.P.C. it is recited in the sanction order (Ext.Pl I/2) that the Lt. Governor acted in exercise of powers conferred by sub-Section(!) of Section 196 Cr.P.C. read with the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs notification dated 20th March, I 974. Under that notification, there was delegation of powers to the Lt. Governor to grant sanction. The said notification whi.ch finds place in the Annexures to the written submissions made on behalf of Gilani shows that it was issued under Article 239(1) of the Constitution enabling the Administrator of the Union Territo1y to discharge powers and functions of the State Government under the Cr.P.C. We accept the submission of the learned senior counsel for the State that the delegation of power contained in the said notification will continue to operate unless the Parliament by law provides otherwise. The Government of NCI of Delhi Act, 199 I does not in any way affect the validity of delegation contained in the Presidential Notification issued under Article 239. We therefore hold that the sanctions under Section 50 of POTA and Section 196 of Cr.P.C. were accorded by a competent authority.
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(vi) Touching on the validity of sanction, the next point urged by Mr. Ram Jethmalani was that there was no proper application of mind by the authority granting the sanction. There was no sanction for the offences under POTA whereas sanction was given for inapplicable offences under the Indian Penal Code. The facts constituting the offence have not been stated in the sanction order and no evidence has been adduced to show that the competent authority addressed himself to the relevant facts and material. The careless and inept drafting of the sanction order has given scope for some of these comments. Surprisingly, in the first para of the order containing recital as to the prima facie satisfaction of the Lt.Governor the POTA offences are not specifically mentioned. They are however embraced within the residuary terminology "along with other offences". Instead of mentioning the POTA offences specifically and conspicuously in the order passed under Section 50 of the POTA, the drafter reversed that process by mentioning the POTA offences under the residuary expression "apart from other offences". However, in our view, this careless drafting cannot deal a fatal blow to the sanction order. Looking at the substance and reading the entirety of the order, we come to the irresistible conclusion that the sanction was duly given for the prosecution of the accused for the offences under POTA after the competent authority (Lt. Governor) had reached the satisfaction prima facie in regard to the commission of the POTA offences as well. A specific reference to the POTA offences mentioned in FIR is contained in the opening part of the order. The order then contains the recital that the Lt. Governor was satisfied that the four accused persons "have prima facie committed offences punishable under Sections 121, 121A, 122, 124 and 120B of the IPC being involved in criminal conspiracy to commit the said offences with intention of waging war against the Government oflndia along with other offences." In the context in which the expression 'along with other offences' occurs, it must be reasonably construed so as to be referable to POTA offences mentioned in the opening clause. The operative part of the order is more explicit inasmuch as the Lt. Governor granted sanction for the prosecution of the four accused in a competent Court "for committing the said offences punishable under Sections 3, 4, 5, 20 & 21 of the POTA". It is pertinent to notice that in the sanction order under Section 196 Cr.P.C. the POTA offences do not find specific mention at all. Thus, a distinction was maintained between the sanction under POTA and the sanction under Cr.P.C. The other submission that the addition of the offence under Section 120B which does not require sanction, reveals total non-application of mind,
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDllU@AFSANGURU [REDD!, J.] 133
does not appeal to us. Though the conspiracy to commit the offences punishable by Section 121 is covered by Section 121A, prob.ably Section 1208 was also referred to by way of abundant caution though the prosecution ·for the said offence does not require sanction. At any rate, the insertion of a seemingly overlapping provision does not and cannot affect the validity of the sanction order. Nor can it be said that the addition of Section 124 which has really no application to the present case by itself vitiates the sanction order. From the insertion of one inapplicable provision, a reasonable inference cannot be drawn that there was no application of mind by the competent authority. A meticulous and legalistic examination as to the offences applicable and not applicable is not what is expected at the stage of granting sanction. It was observed by the Privy Council in Gokulchand Dwarkadas v. The King, AIR ( 1948) Privy Council 82 that, "the charge need not follow the exact terms of the sanction, though it must not relate to an offence essentially different from that to which the sanction relates". In any case we do not think that the mention of an inapplicable Section goes to the root of the matter or otherwise makes it vulnerable to attack.
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On the validity of sanction, we have to consider yet another contention
of the learned senior counsel Mr. R. Jethmalani that in the absence of recital of facts to sustain prosecution or proof of consideration of such facts, the sanction order must be held to havo been vitiated on the ground of nonapplication of mind. Relying on the dicta of the Privy Council in Gokulchand's case, it has been pointed out that no facts constituting the relevant offences were set out in the order nor any extraneous evidence was let in to show that the sanctioning authority was seized of the facts alleged to constitute the relevant offence. In Gokulchand's case (supra), the sanction order of the Government was a bald order stating that the Government was "pleased to accord sanction under Clause 23 of Cotton Cloth and Yam (Control) Order to the prosecution of Mr. Gokulchand Dwarkadas for breach of the provisions of Clause I 8(2) of the said order". The Privy Council held that the sanction read with the evidence adduced at the trial was not in compliance with the provisions of Clause 23 of the said Control Order. The following observations in that judgment may be noted:
".. Jn their Lordships' view, in order to comply with the provisions of clause 23, it must be proved that the sanction was given in respect of the facts constituting the offence charged. It is plainly desirable that the facts should be referred to on the face of the sanction, but
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. this is not essential, since clause 23 does not require the sanction to be in any particular form, nor even to be in writing. But if the facts constituting the offence charged are not shown on the face of the sanction, the prosecution must prove by extraneous evidence that those facts were placed before the sanctioning authority ... "
The ruling of the Privy Council was cited with approval by this Court in Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1958) SC 124 and certain other cases. Ultimately, the test to be applied is whether relevant material that formed the basis of allegations constituting the offence was placed before the sanctioning authority and the same was perused before granting sanction. We are of the view that this test has been amply satisfied in the instant case. The sanction orders on their face indicate that all relevant material viz., FIR, disclosure statements, recovery memos, draft charge sheet and other material on record was placed before the sanctioning authority. The fact that the sanctioning authority perused all this material is also discernible from the recital in the sanction orders. The sanction orders make it clear that the sanctioning authority had reached the satisfaction that prima facie the accused committed or conspired to commit the offences mentioned therein. The elaborate narration of facts culled out from the record placed before the sanctioning authority and the discussion as to the applicability of each and every Section of the penal provision quoted therein is not an imperative requirement. A pedantic repetition from what is stated in the FIR or the draft. charge-sheet or other documents is hot what is called for in order to judge whether there was due application of mind. It must be noted that the grant of sanction is an executive act and the validity thereof cannot be tested in the light of principles applied to the quasi-judicial orders vide the de.cisions in State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, (1992) supp. I SCC 222 and Superintendent of Police v. Deepak Chowdary, [I995] 6 SCC 225. Apart from this, the oral evidence of PW! I-Deputy Secretary, Home who dealt with the file also reveals that the notes prepared by himself and the Principal Secretary, Home had drawn the attention of the Lt. Governor to the role of individual accused and the Principal Secretary's note was approved by the Lt. Governor. Various documents placed before the sanctioning authority were also mentioned by PWl I. PWl 1 brought the original sanction file and it is seen from the judgment of the trial Court that the learned trial Judge had gone through the file apart from making it available to the defence counsel. The oral evidence let in by the prosecution by examining PWI 1 dispels any doubt as to the consideration of the matter by the sanctioning authority before according the
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU [REDD!,!.] 135
sanction. The decision of this Court in Rambhai Nathabhai Gadhvi & Ors. v. State ofGujarat, [1997] 7 SCC 744 which invalidated the sanction granted by the competent authority under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act does not come to the aid of the accused in the present case. The Bench consisting of AS. Anand and K.T. Thomas, JJ., after referring to the infirmities in the sanction order, observed thus:
"In such a situation, can it be said that the sanctioning authority
granted sanction after applying its mind effectively and after reaching a satisfaction that it is necessary in public interest that prosecution should be launched against the accused under TADA. As the provisions of TADA are more rigorous and the penalty provided is more stringent and the procedure for trial prescribed is summary and compendious, the sanctioning process mentioned in Section 20-A(2) must have been adopted more seriously and exhaustively than the sanction contemplated in other penal statutes ... "
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Tht above observations do not mean that different standards should be applied for judging the validity of a 5'nction made under the provisions of TADA or POTA and the sanctions under ordinary laws. That is not the ratio of the decision. The learned Judges were only pointing out that enough seriousness was not bestowed in the process of granting sanction for prosecutio·n under a stringent law. The observations contained in para 1~
turned on the facts of that case which are telling. It was noticed that the only document sent to the sanctioning authority, namely, the Director General of Police, was the FIR and the letter of the Superintendent of Police giving only skeletal facts. It was further noticed that the Director-General did not even grant sanction for the prosecution but what he did was to give permission to add certain Sections of TADA. Thus, it was a case ofutter non-compliance with the elementary requirements governing sanction. The facts of the present case are vastly different.
No separate argument was addressed in relation to the sanction given under the Explosive Substances Act. Suffice it to say that we find no legal infirmity in the said order passed by the Commissioner of Police which is Ext. PWI 1/3.
Addition of POTOIPOTA offences
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(6)(i) The next question is whether the addition of offences under Sections 3, 4 & 5 of POT0 1 was justified and whether POTO should have been invoked by the Investigating Officer on the very first day when the FIR was registered. This question will have a bearing on the admissibility of intercepted telephonic conversations which took place prior to 19th December and the compliance with the provisions of Section 52 of POTA which lays down certain safeguards from the point of view of the accused. Chapter V contains provisions -relating to interception of communications. Sect:on 45 which starts with a non-obstante clall;se lays down that the evidence collected through the interception of wire, electronic or oral communication under Chapter V shall be admissible as evidence against the accused during the trial of the case. There are two provisos to the Section and the 1st proviso reads as follows. "Provided that, the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication intercepted pursuant to this Chapter or evidence derived therefrom shall not be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing or other proceeding in any court unless each accused has been furnished with a copy of the o~der of the Competent Authority and accompanying application, under which the interception was authorized or approved not less than ten days before trial, hearing or proceeding:"
It is common ground that the embargo placed by the first proviso comes into operation in the instant case inasmuch as no orders were obtained for interception from a competent authority in compliance with the various provisions of Chapter V. The embargo under proviso to Section 45 is equally applicable when the special Court tries along with the POTA offences, the offences under other enactments viz., IPC, Explosives Act and Arms Act. That is one aspect. Secondly, there are certain procedural safeguards that are laid down in Section 52 when a person is arrested for the offences under POT A. These safeguards were apparently introduced in keeping with the · guidelines laid down in D.K. Basu 's case. They are discussed in detail later on. The question arises whether there was deliberate failure on the part of the investigating agency to invoke POTA initially in order to circumvent the requirements of Sections 45 & 52.
(ii)
Incidentally, another question raised is whether there was
I. wherever the context requires, POTA may be read as POTO.
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAY JOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU [REDD!.!.] 137
>
. manipulation of FIR by not showing the POTA offences though in fact POTA was resorted to by that date. In regard to the latter aspect, the learned counsel for the accused has drawn our attention to the letter of AIRTEL (Cell phone service provider) addressed to the 1.0.-M.C. Sharma (PW66). In that letter (Ext.PW35/l), while giving the reference to the FIR dated 13.12.2001, the offences under various Sections of POTO were mentioned in addition to other offences. From this, an inference is sought to be drawn that the FIR was tampered with by deleting reference to POTO Sections so as to make it appear that on the 13th & 14th December when the interceptions took place, the investigation was not extended to POTO offences. We find it difficult to accept this contention. We find no basis for the comment that the FIR would have been manipulated by deleting the POTO offences. No such suggestion was ever put to the police officials concerned, namely, PWs I, 9 & 14 connected with the registration of FIR and they were not even crossexamined. The original FIR register was produced by PW14. The trial Court perused the same while recording the depositions and returned it. In fact, this contention about the manipulation of FIR was not even raised in the trial Court. The High Court rightly found no substance in this contention. As regards the letter of AIRTEL, no question was put to PW35 - the Security Manager of AIRTEL as to the basis on which the reference was given to the FIR mentioning various POTO offences. When the question was raised for the first time before the High Court, the High Court perused the case diaries and found that the addressee of the letter (Inspector M.C. Sharma) had sent up a written request on 25.12.2001 to furnish the requisite information to him. By that time, the POTO provisions were invoked. According to the High Court, there was every possibility that in that letter of25.l2.200l, the POTO provisions were mentioned and based on that, the same would have been noted in the AIRTEL's letter. The High Court also observed that the possibility of the date 17th being a mistake cannot be ruled out. Irrespective of the question whether the High Court was justified in observing that the date 17th noted in (Ext. PW35/l) could be a mistake, we do not consider it necessary to delve further into this aspect, in view of the fact that none of the witnesses pertaining to FIR were cross examined. By reason of the purported description of FIR given in the letter of AIRTEL (Ext. PW35/l) alone, we cannot reach the conclusion that POTO offences entered initially in the FIR were deleted for extraneous reasons. It is pertinent to note that the letters addressed by the Essar Cell phone provider (vide Exts.
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3616 and 3617, dated 13th and 18th December) do not contain any reference ~roro.
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(iii) It was next contended by the learned counsel appearing for Shaukat and Gilani that from the beginning it was crystal clear that the persons who attempted to take control of the Parliament House were terrorists and there was no apparent reason why the offences under POTO were not entered in the FIR. Attention is drawn to the fact that the language used in the narration given by PWI in the 'rukka', viz. "the terrorist organizations in order to disintegrate the unity and integrity of India and to carry out destructive activities in a planned manner ..... " is a clear pointer that the investigating authority was conscious of applicability of POTO from the beginning, it is contended. Though we feel that POTO provisions could have been invoked on the very first day having regard to the nature and manifestations of this grave crime, we find no justification to characterize the action of the concerned police officers as malafide or motivated. It cannot be disputed that POTA contains drastic and stringent provisions-both substantive and procedural, for dealing with special categories of offences which have bearing on the security and integrity of the country. In view of this special feature of the law, it is necessary to bestow sufficient care and thought before prosecuting an offender under this special law instead of proceeding under the ordinary law. This aspect has been emphasized in more than one decision of this Court dealing with TADA provisions. In Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijiaya, [1990] 4 SCC 76 this Court after noticing the views expressed in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon v. State of Gujarat, [1988] 2 SCC 271 observed thus: " ...the provisions of the Act need not be resorted to if the nature of the activities of the accused can be checked and controlled under the ordinary law of the land. It is only in those cases where the law enforcing machinery finds the ordinary law to be. inadequate or not sufficiently effective for tackling the menace of terrorist and disruptive activities that resort should be had to the drastic provisions of the Act. While invoking a criminal statute, such as the Act, the prosecution is duty-bound to show from the record of the case and the documents collected in the course of investigation that facts emerging therefrom prima facie constitute an offence within the letter of the law. " In Usmanbhai 's case it was said;
"Before dealing with the contentions advanced, it is well to remember that the legislation is limited in its scope and effect. The Act is an
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU [REDD!, J.]
extreme measure to be resorted to when the police cannot tackle the situation under the ordinary penal law. The intendment is to provide special machinery to combat the growing menace of terrorism in different parts of the country. Since, however, the Act is a drastic measure, it should not ordinarily be resorted to unless the Government's law enforcing machinery fails." Having regard to these observations, we cannot find fault with the Investigating Officers in going slow in bringing POTA into picture. At any rate, it may be a case of bona fide error or overcautious approach. Once the action of the police authorities in deferring the invoc&tion of POTA is held to be not ma/a fide, it is not possible to countenance the contention that the provisions of POTA especially those contained in Chapter V and Section 52 ought to have been complied with even before 19th December. It is a different matter that D.K. Basu 's guidelines were already there. The learned counsel Mr. Gopal Subramanium has referred to the judgment of this Court in State of West Bengal v. Mohammed Kha/eed, [1995] J SCC 684 to buttress his contention that the non-invocation of POTA on the first day cannot be faulted. The learned counsel also argued that POTA was invoked on 19th when further evidence came to light revealing a planned terrorist act at the behest of certain terrorist organizations. Be that as it may, we find nothing on record to hold that the investigating officials deliberately and without semblance of justification decided to bypass the provisions of POTO.
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Charges whether defective? 7 (i) We now tum to the next contention of the charges being defective. According to Shri Ram Jethmalani, the first charge which is a charge under Section 1208 !PC is utterly confusing. It is pointed out that a conspiracy to wage war and to commit a terrorist act is punishable under Section 121A !PC and Section 3(3) of the POTA respectively. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the charge under Section 1208 is misplaced. It is also contended that the charge does not set out in clear terms, the exact period during which the conspiracy was allegedly hatched. The learned counsel further submits that the alleged confessional statements on which the prosecution relied would clearly show that the conspiracy started only in the first week of December, 2001, yet the period of offence was stated to be "on or before 13.12.2001".
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
(ii) It is settled law that a 'fundamental defect' should be found in the charges if the Court has to quash it. Whether the accused was misled and whether there was reasonable possibility of prejudice being caused to the accused on account of defective charges are relevant considerations in judging the effect of wrong or deficient charges. Section 215 of Cr.P.C. makes it clear that no error or omission in stating either the offence or the particulars required to be stated shall be regarded as material unless the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission and it has occasioned a failure of justice. The test of prejudice or reasonable possibility of prejudice was applied by this Court in William Slaney's case [AIR (1956) SC 116] in testing the argument based on the omission, error or irregularity in framing the charges. The same test was also applied in State of A.P. v. C. Ganeswar Rao, [1964] 3 SCR 297. It has not been demonstrated in the instant case as to how the accused or any of them were misled or any prejudice was caused to them on account of the alleged defects in framing of charges. No such objection was even taken before the trial Court. As pointed out in William Slaney's case (para 45 of AIR), it will always be material to consider whether the objection to the nature of charge was taken.at an early stage. To the same effect are the observations in Ganeswar Rao 's case (supra). It is difficult to spell out with exactitude the details relating to the starting point of conspiracy. As pointed out in Esher Singh v. State ofA.P., [2004] l SCC page 585, 607, it is not always possible "to give affirmative evidence about the date of formation of the criminal conspiracy". We do not think that if instead of mentioning 'the first week Qf December, 200 l' the wording 'before December, 200 l' is employed, the prosecution should fail merely for that reason. The accused cannot be said to have been misled or prejudiced on that account. On the other hand, it is more than clear that the accused did understand the case they were called upon to meet. The question whether Section 120B applies to POTA offences or Section 3(3) alone applies is not a matter on which a definite conclusion should be reached ahead of the trial. It is not uncommon that the offence alleged might seemingly fall under more than one provision and sometimes it may not be easy to form a definite opinion as to the Section in which the offence appropriately falls. Hence, charges are often framed by way of abundant caution. Assuming that an inapplicable provision has been mentioned, it is no ground to set aside the charges and invalidate the trial. Other legal issues
We shall, now, deal with certain legal issues, which have been debated
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU [REDD!,!.] 141
before us in extenso. These issues have a bearing on the admissibility/ relevancy of evidence and the evidentiary value or weight to be attached to the permissible evidence.
8. Law regarding confessions We start with the confessions. Under the general law of the land as reflected in the Indian Evidence Act, no confession made to a police officer can be proved against an accused. 'Confessions' -which is a terminology used in criminal law is a species of 'admissions' as defined in Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act. An admission is a statement-oral or documentary which enables the court to draw an inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact. It is trite to say that every confession must necessarily be an admission, but, every admission does not necessarily amount to a confession. While Section 17 to 23 deals with admissions, the law as to confessions is embodied in Sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act. Section 25 bars proof of a confession made to a police officer. Section 26 goes a step further and prohibits proof of confession made by any person while he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. Section 24 lays down the obvious rule that a confession made under any inducement, threat or promise becomes irrelevant in a criminal proceeding. Such inducement, threat or promise need not be proved to the hilt. If it appears to the court that the making of the confession was caused by any inducement, threat or promise proceeding from a person in authority, the confession is liable to be excluded from evidence. The expression 'appears' connotes that the Court need not go to the extent of holding that the threat etc. has in fact been proved. If the facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence adduced make it reasonably probable that the confession could be the result of threat, inducement o; pressure, the court will refrain from acting on such confession, even if it be a confession made to a Magistrate or a person other than police officer. Confessions leading to discovery of fact which is dealt with under Section 27 is an exception to the rule of exclusion of confession made by an accused in the custody of a police officer. Consideration of a proved confession affecting the person making it as well as the co-accused is provided for by Section 30. Briefly and broadly, this is the scheme of the law of evidence vis-a-vis confessions. The allied provision which needs to be noticed at this juncture is Section 162 of the Cr.P.C. It prohibits the use of any statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of investigation for any purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of any offence
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under investigation. However, it can be used to a limited extent to contradict a witness as provided for by Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 162 makes it expliCit that the embargo laid down in the Section shall not be deemed to apply to any statement falling within clause ( l) of Section 32 or to affect the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. In the Privy Council decision of P. Narayana Swami v. Emperor, AIR (1939) PC 47 Lord Atkin elucidated the meaning and purport of the expression 'confession' in the following words: " .... A confession must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact is not of itself a confession.'' Confessions are considered highly reliable because no rational person would make admission against his interest unless prompted by his conscience to tell the truth. "Deliberate and voluntary confessions of guilt, if clearly proved are among the most effectual proofs in law". (vide Taylor's Treatise on the Law of Evidence Vol. I). However, before acting upon a confession the court must be satisfied that it was freely and voluntarily made. A confession by hope or promise of advantage, reward or immunity or by force or by fear induced by violence or threats of violence cannot constitute evidence against the maker of confession. The confession should have been made with full knowledge of the nature and consequences of the confession. If any reasonable doubt is entertained by the court that these ingredients are not satisfied, the court should eschew the confession from consideration. So also the authority recording the confession - be it a Magistrate or some other statutory functionary at the pre-trial stage, must address himself to the issue whether the accused has come forward to make the confession in an atmosphere free from fear, duress or hope of some advantage or reward induced by the persons ·in authority. Recognizing the stark reality of the accused being enveloped in a state of fear and panic, anxiety and despair while in police custody, the Indian Evidence Act has excluded the admissibility of a confession made to the police officer. Section 164 ofCr.P.C. is a salutary provision which lays down certain precautionary rules to be followed by the Magistrate recording a confession so as to ensure the voluntar:ness of the confession and the accused being placed in a situation free from threat or influence of the police.
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STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NA VJOT SANDHU@ AFSAN GURU [REDDl.J.J 143
Before we tum our attention to the more specific aspects of confessions under POTA, we should have a conspectus of the law on the evidentiary value of confessions which are retracted -which is a general feature in our country and elsewhere.
As to what should be the legal approach of the Court called upon to convict a person primarily in the light of the confession or a retracted confession has been succinctly summarized in Bharat v. State o/U.P., [1971] 3 SCC 950. Hidayatullah, C.J., speaking for a three-Judge Bench observed thus:
"Confessions can be acted upon ifthe court is satisfied that they are voluntary and that they are true. The voluntary nature of the confession depends upon whether there was any threat, inducement or promise and its truth is judged in the context of the entire prosecution case. The confession must fit into the proved facts and not run counter to them. When the voluntary character of the confession and its truth are accepted, it is safe to rely on it. Indeed a confession, if it is voluntary and true and not made under any inducement or threat or promise, is the most patent piece of evidence against the maker. Retracted confession, however, stands on a slightly different footing. As the Privy Council once stated, in India it is the rule to find a confession and to find it retracted later. A court may take into account the retracted confession, but it must look for the reasons for the making of the confession as well as for its retraction, and must weigh the two to determine whether the retraction affects the voluntary nature of the confession or not. If the court is satisfied that it was retracted because of an after-thought or advice, the retraction may not weigh with the court if the general facts proved in the case and the tenor of the confession as made and the circumstances of its making and withdrawal warrant its user. All the same, the courts do not act upon the retracted confession without finding assurance from some other sources as to the guilt of the accused. Therefore, it can be stated that a true confession made voluntarily may be acted upon with slight evidence to corroborate it, but a retracted confession requires the general assurance that the retraction was an after-thought and that the earlier statement was
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true. This was laid down by this Court in an earlier case reported in Subramania Gounden v. The State of Madras, [1958] SCR 428."
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
The same learned Judge observed in Haroom Hazi Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra, [1968] 2 SCR 641 that a "retracted confession must be looked upon with greater concern unless the reasons given for having made it in the first instance are on the face of them false." There was a further observation in the same paragraph that retracted confession is a weak link against the maker and more so against a co-accused. With great respect to the eminent Judge, the comment that the retracted confession is a "weak link against the maker" goes counter to a series of decisions. The observation must be viewed in the context of the fact that the Court was concentrating on the confession of the co-accused rather than the evidentiary value of the retracted confession against the maker. Dealing with retracted confession, a four-Judge Bench of this Court speaking through Subba Rao, J, in Pyare Lal v. State of Assam, AIR (1957) SC 216, clarified the legal position thus:
"A retracted confession may form the legal basis of a conviction if the court is satisfieJ that it was true and was voluntarily made. But it has been held that a court shall not base a conviction on such a confession without corroboration. It is not a rule of law, but is only rule of prudence. It cannot even be laid down as an inflexible rule of practice or prudence that under no circumstances such a conviction can be made without corroboration, for a court may, in a particular case, be convicted of the absolute truth of a confession and prepared to act upon it without corroboration; but it may be laid down as a general rule of practice that it is unsafe to rely upon a confession, much less on a retracted confession, unless the court is satisfied that the retracted confession is true and voluntarily made and has been corroborated in material particulars."
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As to the extent of corroboration required, it was observed in Subramania Gounden 's case (I 958 SCR 428) that each and every circumstance mentioned in the retracted confession regarding the complicity of the maker need not be separately and independently corroborated. The learned Judges observed: "it would be sufficieHt in our opinion that the general trend of the confession is substantiated by some evidence which would tally with what is contained in the confession".
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STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU [REDD!. J.] 145
Then we have the case of Shankaria v. State ofRajasthan, [1978] 3 SCC
435 decided by a three-Judge Bench. Sarkaria, J, noted the twin tests to be
•,
applied to evaluate a confession: (I) whether the confession was perfectly voluntary and (2) if so, whether it is true and trustworthy. The learned Judge pointed out that if the first test is not satisfied the question of applying the second test does not arise. Then the Court iridicated one broad method by which a confession can be evaluated. It was said: "The Court should carefully examine the confession and compare it with the rest of the evidence, in the light of the surrounding circumstances and probabilities of the case. If on such examination and comparison, the confession appears to be a probable catalogue of events and naturally fits in with the rest of the evidence and the surrounding circumstances, it may be taken to have satisfied the second test." In Parmanand Pegu v. State of Assam, [2004] 7 SCC 779 this Court while adverting to the expression "corroboration of material particulars" used in Pyare Lal Bhargava 's case clarified the position thus: "By the use of the expression 'corroboration of material particulars', the Court has not laid down any proposition contrary to what has been clarified in Subramania Goundan case as regards the extent of corroboration required. The above expression does not imply that there should be meticulous examination of the entire material particulars. It is enough that there is broad corroboration in conformity with the general trend.ofthe confession, as pointed out in Subramania Goundan case."
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The analysis of the legal position in paragraphs 18 & 19 is also worth noting: "Having thus reached a finding as to the voluntary nature of a confession, the .truth of the confession should then be tested by the court. The fact that the confession has been made voluntarily, free from threat and inducement, can be regarded as presumptive evidence of its truth. Still, there may be circumstances to indicate . that the confession cannot be true wholly or partly in which case it loses much of its evidentiary value.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. In order to bt: assured of the truth of confession, this Court, in a series of decisions, has evolved a rule of prudence that the court should look to corroboration from other evidence. However, there need not be corroboration in respect of each and every material particular. Broadly, there should be corroboration so that the confession taken as a whole fits into the facts proved by other evidence. In substance, the court should have assurance from all angles that the retracted confession w1s, in fact, voluntary and it must have been true."
The use of retracted confession against the co-accused however stands on a different footing from the use of such confession against the maker. To come to the grips of the law on the s'ubject, we do no more than quoting the apt observations of Vivian Bose, J, speaking for a three-Judge Bench, in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1952) SC 159. Before clarifying the law, the learned Judge noted with approval the observations of Sir Lawrence Jenkins that a confession can only be used to "lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused." The legal position was then stated thus: "Translating these observations into concrete terms they come to this. The proper way to approach a case of this kind is, first to marshall the evidence against the accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration and see whether, if it is believed, a conviction could safely be based on it. If it is capable of belief independently of the confession, then of course it is not necessary to call the confession in aid. But cases may ari.se where the Judge · is not 'prepared set on the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an event the Judge may call in aid the confession and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence and thus fortify himself in believing what without the aid of the confession he would not be prepared to accept." The crucial expression used in Section 30 is "the Court may take into consideration such confession". These words imply that the confession of a co-accused cannot be elevated to the Status of substantive evidence which can form the basis of conviction of the co-accused. The import of this e,xpression was succinctly explained by the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu
...
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU [REDDl.J.] 147
v. King, AIR (1947) PC 257 in the following words: "The Court may take the confession into consideration and thereby, no doubt, makes its evidence on which the Court may act; but the section does not say that the confession is to amount to proof. Clearly there must be other evidence. The confession is only one element in the consideration of all the facts proved in the case; it can be put into the scale and weighed with the other evidence". (emphasise supplied) After referring to these decisions, a Constitution Bench of this Court in Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar, [1964] 6 SCR 623 further clarified the legal position thus:
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"... .In dealing with a case against an accused person, the Court
cannot start with the confession of co-accused person; it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is pennissible to tum to the confession in order to
receive assurance to the confession of guilt which the judicial nzind is about to reach on the said other evidence. "
(emphasis supplied) What is the legal position relating to CONF£SS/ONS UNDER THE POTA is the next important aspect. Following the path shown by its predecessor, namely TADA Act, POTA marks a notable departure from the general law of evidence in that it makes the confession to a high ranking police officer admissible in evidence in the trial of such person for the offence under POTA. As regards the confession to the police officer, the TADA regime is continued subject to certain refinements. Now, let us take stock of the provisions contained in Section 32 of POTA. Sub-Section of(!) of this Section starts with a non obstante provision with the words "Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in the Indian Evidence Act...." Then it says: "a confession made by a person before a police officer not lower in rank than a Superintendent of Police and recorded by such police officer either in writing or on any mechanical or electronic device .... shall be admissible in the trial of such
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
person for an offence under the Act or the rules, subject to other provisions of the section". By this provision, the ban against the reception of confessional statements made to the police is lifted. That is why the non-obstante clause. This sub-section is almost identical to Section 15(1) of TADA excepting that the words "or co-accused, abettor or conspirator occurring after the expression "in the trial of such person" were omitted. The other four sub-sections (2) to (5) of Section 32 are meant to provide certain safeguards to the accused in order to ensure that the confession is not extracted by threat or inducement. Sub-section (2) says that the police officer, before recording a confession should explain in writing to the person concerned that he is not bound to make a confession and that the confession if made by him can be used against him. The right of the person to remain silent before the police officer called upon to record the confession is recognized by the proviso to sub-section (2). Subsection (3) enjoins that the confession shall be recorded in a threat-free atmosphere. Moreover, it should be recorded in the same language as that used by the maker of the confession. The most important safeguard provided in sub-sections (4) & (5) is that the person from whom the confession was recorded is required to be produced before a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or Chief Judicial Magistrate, within 48 hours, together with the original statement of confession in whatever manner it was recorded. The CMM or the CJM shall then record the statement made by the person so produced. If there is any complaint of torture, the police shall be directed to produce the person for medical examination and thereafter he shall be sent to the judicial custody.
9. Section 15 of TADA
It is necessary to advert to the exposition of law on the probative quality of the confession recorded by the empowered police officer under Section 15 of TADA Act.. we may recall that under Section 15, the confession is admissible in the trial of the person who made the confession or the coaccused/abettor/conspirator. In State v. Nalini (supra), Thomas, J took the view that the confession coming within the purview of Section 15 is a substantive evidence as against the maker thereof but it is not so as against the co-accused/abettor or conspirator in relation to whom it can be used only as a corroborative piece of evidence. Wadhwa, J, held that the confession of an accused serves as a substantive evidence against himself as well as against the co-accused, abettor or conspirator. S.S.M. Quadri, J, broadly agreed with the view taken by Wadhwa, J. The following observations made by the
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU [REDDl.J.J 149
'
learned Judge reflect his view-point: "On the language of sub-section (1) of Section 15, a confession of an accused is made admissible evidence as against all those tried jointly with him, so it is implicit that the same can be considered against all those tried together. In this view of the matter also, Section 30 of the Evidence Act need not be invoked for consideration of confession of an accused against a co-accused, abettor or conspirator charged and tried in the same case along with the
accused." The learned Judge further observed that in view of the non obstante provision of Section 15( 1), the application of Section 30 of the Evidence Act should be excluded and therefore the considerations germane to Section 30 cannot be imported in construing Section I 5( 1). Quadri, J, therefore dissented from the view taken by Thomas, J. At the same time the learned Judge was of the view that in so far as the use of confession against the co-accused is co~cemed, rule of prudence requires that it should not be relied upon "unless corroborated generally by other evidence on record". In paragraph 705, the learned Judge made the following observations: "But I wish to make it clear that even if confession of an accused as against a co-accused tried with the accused in the same case is
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treated as 'substantive evidence' understood in the limited sense of fact in issue or relevant fact, the rule of prudence requires that the court should examine the same with great care keeping i" mind the caution given by the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu case", keeping in view the fact that the confession of a co-accused is not required to be given under oath and its veracity cannot be tested by cross-examination is yet another reason given by the learned Judge for insisting on such corroboration. Thus the learned Judge struck a balance between two extreme arguments. The view taken by Quadri, J. does not seem to conflict with the view of Wadhwa, J. Though Wadhwa, J. observed that confession of the accused is admissible with the same force in its application to the co-accused and it is in the nature of substantive evidence, the learned Judge, however, qualified his remarks by observing thus: "Substantive evidence, however, does not necessarily mean substantial evidence. It is the quality of evidence thot matters. As to what value
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. is to be attached to a confession will fall within the domain of appreciation of evidence. As a matter of prudence, the court may look for some corroboration if confession is to be used against a coaccused though that will again be within the sphere of appraisal of evidence."
Thomas, J. was of the view that the non-obstante words in Section 15(1) of TADA were not intended to make it substantive evidence against the nonmaker, and it yan be used only as a piece of corroborative material to support other substantive evidence. Reference is to be made to a recent decision of this Court in Jameel Ahmed & Anr. v. State ofRajasthan, (2003) 9 SCC 673 - a case arising under TADA. After a survey of the earlier cases on the subject, this Court observed: "If the confessional statement is properly recorded satisfying the mandatory provisions of Section 15 of TADA Act and the rules made thereunder and if the same is found by the Court as having been made voluntarily and truthfully then the said confession is sufficient to base conviction of the maker of the confession." This proposition is unexceptionable. The next proposition, however, presents some difficulty. The learned Judges added: "Whether such confession requires corroboration or not, is a matter for the Court considering such confession on facts of each case." This Court observed that once the confessional statement becomes admissible in evidence then, like any other evidence, "it is for the Court to consider whether such statement can be relied upon solely or with necessary corroboration.') The ratio behind the view taken by the learned Judges is perhaps discernible from the following· passage: "We haye already noticed that this provision of law is a departure from the provisions of Sections 25 to 30 of the Evidence Act. As a matter of fact, Section 15 of the TADA Act operates independent of the Evidence Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure." The Court then observed that the confession duly recorded under Section 15 of TADA Act becomes admissible in evidence by virtue of .statutory mandate and if it is proved to be voluntary and truthful in nature there is no reason "YhY such a statement should be treated as a weak piece of evidence requiring corroboration merety because the same is recorded by a police officer. We have to add a caveat here, while wholeheartedly
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU [REDD!, l.l 151
accepting the view that the confession recorded by a police officer under Section 15(1) of TADA Act (corresponding to Section 32(1) orPOTA) stand on the same footing as the confession recorded by a Magistrate and the Court can act upon it in spite of its retraction if it inspires confidence .in the mind of the Judge, we feel that the rule of corroboration evolved by this Court as a matter of prudence in relation to a retracted confession recorrled by a Magistrate under Cr.P.C. need not be dispensed with. Viewing the confession in the light of other evidence on record and seeking corroborative support therefrom is only a process of ascertaining the truth of the confession and is not extraneous to the first proposition laid down by their Lordships in paragraph 35. Viewed from another angle, we wonder whether a confession recorded by a police officer under the special enactment should have more sanctity and higher degree of acceptability so as to dispense with the normal rule of corroboration and leave it to the discretion of the court whether to insist on corroboration or not, even if it is retracted. The better view would be to follow the same rule of prudence as is being followed in the case of confessions under general law. The confessional statement recorded by the police officer can be the basis of conviction of the maker, but it is desirable to look to corroboration in a broad sense, when it is retracted. The non obstante provision adverted to by the learned Judges should not, in our considered view, affect the operation of the general rule of corroboration broadly.
As regards the confession being used against a co-accused, this Court in Jameel Ahmed's case (supra), laid down the following propositions: "(iii) In regard to the use of such confession as against a co-accused, it has to be held that as a matter of caution, a general corroboration should be sought for but in cases where the court is satisfied that the probative value of such confession is such that it does not require corroboration then it may base a conviction on the basis of such confession of the co-accused without corroboration. But this is an exception to the general rule of requiring corroboration when such confession is to be used against a co-accused.
(iv) The nature of corroboration required both in regard to the use
of confession against the maker as also in regard to the use of the same against a co-accused is of a general nature, unless the court
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. comes to the conclusion that such corroboration should be on material facts also because of the facts of a particular case. The degree of corroboration so required is that which is necessary for a prudent man to believe in the existence of facts mentioned In the confessional statement."
While we agree with the proposition that the nature of corroboration required both in regard to the use of confession against the maker and the · co-accused is general in nature, our remarks made earlier in relation to the confession against the maker would equally apply to proposition No. (iii) in so far as it permits the Court in an appropriate case to base the conviction on the confession of the co-accused without even general corroboration. We would only add that we do not visualize any such appropriate case for the simple reason that the assurance of the truth of confession is inextricably mixed up with the process of seeking corroboration from the rest of the prosecution evidence. We have expressed our dissent to this limited extent. D In the normal course, a reference to the larger Bench on this issue would be proper. But there is no need in this case tn apply or not to apply the legal position clarified in proposition No. (iii) for the simple reason that the trial court as well as the High Court did look for corroboration from the ~ircumstantial evidence relating to various facts n.arrated in the confessional statement. Perhaps, the view expressed by us would only pave the way for E a fresh look by a larger Bench, should the occasion arise in future.
The learned senior counsel Mr. Ram Jethmalani severely criticised the view taken in Nalini, Jameel Ahmed and other cases decided after Nalini. He pointed out that the confession of a co-accused is held to be admissible in view of the expression "shall be admissible in the trial of such person or coaccused". But, the legislature did not intend that in deviation of the general Jaw, the confession of a co-accused could become the sole basis of conviction irrespective of whether it is corroborated in ~elation to material particulars or not. The counsel commends the acceptance of the ratio laid down by Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu in the context of a confession covered by Section 30 of Evidence Act. The counsel reminds us that admissibility is one thing, and the weight to be attached to the evidence is another. The learned counsel Mr. Ram Jethmal.ani repeatedly pointed that the crucial observations of the Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh 's case (supra) were not noticed by this Cout1 in Nalini 's case and this error, according to the learned senior counsel, perpetuated. The learned counsel has drawn our attention to the categorical
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@ AFSAN GURU (REDD!, J.] 153
observation of this Court in paragraph 255 of the majority judgment to the effect that "the present position is in conformity with Section 30 of the Evidence Act." He has also drawn our attention to the submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General in Kartar Singh 's case that the probative value of the confession recorded under Section 15 should be left to the Court to be determined in each case on its own facts and circumstances. According to the learned counsel, the confession of co-accused should not have been elevated to the status of confession operating against the maker. The contention advanced by the learned senior counsel is not without force. However, we need not dilate further on this aspect as the terminology in POTA is different and the view which we hold is that Section 32 of POTA does not enable the Court to take into account the confession of the coaccused. We shall now advert to this aspect, on a comparative reference of the provisions of TADA Act and POTA.
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10. Use of confession under POTA against co-accused Now, let us examine the question whether Section 32(1) of POTA takes within its sweep the confession of a co-accused. Section. 32(1) of POTA which makes the confession made to a high ranking police officer admissible in the trial does not say anything explicitly about the use of confession made by co-accused. The words in the concluding portion of Section 32( 1) are: "shall be admissible in the trial of such person for an offence under this Act or rules made thereunder." It is, however, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel Shri Gopal Subramanium that Section 32(1) can be so construed as to include the admissibility of confessions of co-accused as well. The omission of the words in POTA "or co-accused, abettor or conspirator" following the expression "in the trial of such person" which are the words contained in Section 15(1) of TADA does not make material difference, according to hi1n. It is his submission that the words 'co-accused' etc. were included by the 1993 amendment of TADA by way of abundant caution and not because the unamended Section of TADA did not cover the confession of co-accused. According to the learned senior counsel, the phrase "shall be admissible in the trial of such person" does not restrict the admissibility only against the maker of the confession. It extends to all those who are being tried jointly along with the maker of the confession provided they are also affected by the confession. The learned senior counsel highlights the crucial words"in the trial of such person" and argues that the confession would not merely be admissible against the maker but would be admissible in the trial of the
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
maker which may be a trial jointly with the other accused persons. Our attention has been drawn to the provisions of Cr.P.C. and POTA providing for a joint trial in which the accused could be tried not only for the offences under POTA but also for the offences under IPC. We find no difficulty in accepting the proposition tiat there could be a joint trial and the expression "the trial of such person" may encompass a trial in which the accused who made the confession is tried jointly with the other accused. From that, does it follow that the confession made by one accused is equally admissible against others, in the absence of specific words? The answer, in our view, should be in the negative .. On a plain reading of Section 32(1 ), the confession made by an accused before a police officer shall be admissible against the maker of the confession in the course of his trial. It may be a joint trial along with some other accused; but, we cannot stretch the language of the section so as to bring the confession of the co-accused within the. fold of admissibility. Such stretching of the language of Jaw is not at all warranted especially in the case of a Jaw which visits a person with serious penal consequences (vide the observations of Ahmadi, J (as he then was) in Niranjan Singh v. Jitendra, [1990] 4 SCC 76 at page 86, which were cited with approval in Kartar Singh's case). We would expect a more explicit and transparent wording to be employed in the section to rope in the confession of the co-accused within the net of admissibility· on par with the confe~sion of the maker. An evidentiary rule of such importance and grave consequence to the accused could not have been conveyed in a deficient language. It seems to us that a conscious departure was made by the framers of POTA on a consideration of the pros and cons, by dropping the words "co-accused" etc .. These :;pecifrc words consciously added to Section 15(1) by 1993 amendment of TADA so as to cover the confessions of co-accused would not have escaped the notice of Parliament when POTA was enacted. Apparently, .the Parliament in its wisdom would have thought that the law relating to confession of co-accused under the ordinary Jaw of evidence, should be allowed to have its sway, taking clue from the observations in Kartar Singh 's case at paragraph 255. The confession recorded by the police officer was, therefore, allowed to be used against the maker of the confession without going further and transposing the legal position that obtained under TADA. We cannot countenance the contention that the words 'co-accused' etc. were added in Section 15(1) of TADA, ex majore cautela.
V:f e are, therefore, of the view that having regard to all these weighty considerations, the confession of a co-accused ought not be brought within
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NA VJOT SANDHU@ AFSAN GURU [REDD!, J.] 155
the sweep of Section 32(1). As a corollary, it follows that the confessions of the 1st and 2nd accused in this case recorded by the police officer under Section 32(1 ), are of no avail against the co-accused or against each other. We also agree with the High Court that such confessions cannot be taken into consideration by the Court under Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act. The reason is that the confession made to a police officer or the confession made while a person is in police custody, cannot be proved against such person, not to speak of the co-accused, in view of the mandate of Sections 25 and 26 of the Ev!dence Act. If there is a confession which qualifies for proof in accordance with the provisions of Evidence Act, then ?f course, the said confession could be considered against the co-accused facing trial under POTA. But, that is not the case here. For these reasons, the contention of the learned senior counsel for the State that even if the confession of co-accused is not covered by Section 32(1 ), it can still be taken into account by the Court under Section 30 for the limited purpose of corroborating or lending assurance to the other evidence on record cannot be accepied. Learned senior counsel appearing for the State submits that there is no conflict between Section 32 of POTA and Section 30 of the Evidence Act and therefore the confession recorded under Section 32(1) of POTA can be ta.ken into consideration against the co-accused, at least to corroborate the other evidence on record or to lend assurance thereto. There is no difficulty in accepting the contention that Section 30 of the Evidence Act can also play its part in a case of trial under POTA, especially when the other offences under the IPC are also the subject matter of trial. But a confession to the police officer by a person in police custody is not within the realm of Section 30 of the Evidence Act and therefore such a confession cannot be used against the co-accused even under Section 30 of the Evidence Act. While on the subject of confession made to a police officer under subsection (I) of Section 32 of POTA, it would be apposite to refer in brief to the decision of this Court in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994] 3 SCC 569. The constitutional validity of the provisions of TADA Act came up for consideration before the Constitution Bench. Section 15(1) of TADA Act was the main target of attack. The majority of Judges, with Ratnavel Pandian, J, leading them, upheld the provisions of the Act including Section 15(1 ). There was a weighty dissent by two learned Judges (K. Ramaswamy, J. and R.M. Sahai, J.) as regards the validity of Section 15(1). The constitutional issue
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
of the vires of the impugned provisions of TADA, including Section 15(1 ), was examined from the perspective of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, that is to say, from the standpoint of classification of offenders and justness and fairness of the procedural provisions. The three learned Judges did not find Section 15(1) obnoxious to Article 14 or Article 21, though they took judicial notice of the inhuman treatment often meted out by overzealous police officers and the archaic, third degree methods adopted by them during the investigation of the cases. In upholding the validity, the Court took into account the legal competence of the legislature to make a law prescribing a different mode of proof, the meaningful purpose and object of the legislation, the gravity and consequences of terrorism and the reluctance of the public in coming forward to give evidence. How far these considerations are relevant in providing for the reception in evidence of the confessional statement recorded by a police officer has not been elaborated. Apparent hesitation of the learned Judges in upholding the most criticized provision, namely Section 15( 1) of TADA, is reflected in the set of guidelines set out by their Lordships at paragraph 263 to ensure as far as possible that the confession obtained by the police officer is not tainted with any vice and to impart a process of fairness into the exercise ofrecording the confes.sion. Tue· Central Government was bidden to take note of the guidelines and incorporate necessary amendments to the Act. These guidelines, by and large, have become part of Section 32 of POTA to which we have already referred. There was also an exhortation at paragraph 254 to the high-ranking police officers empowered to record the confession that there should be no breach of the accepted norms of recording the confession which should reflect only a true and voluntary statement and there should be no room for hyper criticism that the authority has obtained an invented confession. Another interesting part of the discussion is the manner in which the Court gave its response to the critical comments made by the counsel as to the reprehensible methods adopted to extract the confession. The learned Jµdges said with reference to this comment: "if it is shown to the Court that a confession was extorted by illegal means such as inducement, threat or promise, the confession thus obtained would be irrelevant and cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the maker." The Court thus merely emphasized the obvious and added a remark that the Court on several occasions awarded exemplary compensation to the victim at the hands of the police officials. The Court took the precaution of clarifying that the police officer investigating the case under TADA Act can get the confession or statement of the accused recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. by a Magistrate.
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAY JOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU [REDD!, J.] 157
The Constitution Bench Judgement is binding on us. In fact, the ratio of that Judgment applies with greater force to the POTA, as the guidelines set out by the Constitution Bench are substantially incorporated into Section 32. It is perhaps too late in the day to seek reconsideration of the view taken by the majority of the Judges in the Constitution Bench. But as we see Section 32, a formidable doubt lingers in our minds despite the pronouncement in Kartar Singh 's case (supra). That pertains to the rationale and reason behind the drastic provision, making the confession to police officer admissible in evidence in a trial for POTA offences. Many questions do arise and we are unable to find satisfactory or even plausible answers to them. If a person volunteers to make a confession, why should he be not produced before the Judicial Magistrate at the earliest and have the confession recorded by a Magistrate? The Magistrate could be reached within the same time within which the empowered police officer could be approached. The doubt becomes more puzzling when we notice that in practical tenns, a greater degree of credibility is attached to a confession made before the judicial officer. Then, why should not the Investigating Officer adopt the straightforward course of having resort to the ordinary and age-old law? If there is any specific advantage of con~erring power on a police officer to record the confession receivable in evidence, ifthe intendment and desideratum of the provision indisputably remains to be to ensure an atmosphere free from threats and psychological pressures? Why the circuitous provision of having confession recorded by the police officer of the rank of S.P. (even if he be the immediate superior of the I.0. who oversees the investigation) and then requiring the production of the accused before the Chief Metropolitan or Judicial Magistrate within 48 hours? We can understand if the accused is in a remote area with no easy means of communications and the Magistrate is not easily accessible. Otherwise, is there real expediency or good reason for allowing an option to the 1.0. to have the confession recorded either by the superior police officer or a Judicial Magistrate? We do not think that the comparative ease with which the confession could be extracted from the accused could be pleaded as justification. If it is so, should the end justify the means? Should the police officer be better trusted than a Magistrate? Does the magnitude and severity of the offence justify the enttustment of the job of recording confession to a police officer? Does it imply that it is easier to make an accused confess the guilt before a police officer so that it could pave the way for conviction in a serious offence? We find no direct answer to these questions either in Kartar Singh 's case (supra) or the latest case of People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, [2004] 9 SCC 580.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
The quality of a nation's civilization can be largely measured by the methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal law, as said by the eminent American jurist Schaefer. We may recall as well the apt remarks of Krishna Iyer, J. in Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani [1978] 2 SCC 424:
"The first obligation of the criminal justice system is to secure justice by seeking and substantiating truth through proof. Of course, the means must be as good as the ends and the dignity of the individual and the freedom of the human person cannot be sacrificed by resort to improper means, however worthy the ends. Therefore, 'third degree' has to be outlawed and indeed has been. We have to draw up clear lines between the whirlpool and the rock where the safoty of society and the worth of the human person may co-exist in peace."
In People's Union for Civil Liberties case, a two Judge Bench of this Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 32 following the pronouncement in Kartar Si~gh 's case. The learned Judges particularly noted the 'additional safeguards' envisaged by sub-Sections (4) and (5) of Section 32. The court referred. to the contention that there was really no need to empower the police officer to record the confession since the accused has to be in any case produced before the Magistrate and in that case the Magistrate himself could record the confession. This argument was not dealt with by their Lordships. However, we refrain from saying anything contrary to the legal position settled by Kartar Singh and People's Union for Civil . Liberties. We do no more than expressing certain doubts and let the matter rest there. It has been pointed out to us that even in advanced countries like U.K.
and U.S.A., where individual liberty is given primacy, there is no legal taboo against the reception of confessional statement made to police in evidence.
We do not think that it is apt to compare the position obtaining in those countries to that in India. The ground realities cannot be ignored. It is an undeniable fact that the police in our country still resort to crude methods of investigation, especially in mofussil and rural areas and they suffer many handicaps, such as lack of adequate personnel, training, equipment and professional independence. Thesf' features, by and large, are not so rampant in those advanced countries. Considered from the standpoii:it of scientific
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU [REDDI.J.I 159
investigation, intensity of training and measure of objectivity, the standards and approaches of police personnel are much different in those countries. The evils which the framers of the Indian Evidence Act had in mind to exclude confessions to the police, are still prevalent though not in the same degree. After independence, no doubt, some positive steps have been taken to improve the working pattern, utility and image of the police force, but, much desires· to be achieved in this direction. Complaints of violation of human rights by resorting to dubious methods of investigation, politicization of the police establishment and victimization of the straightforward and honest officers are some of the criticisms that are being heard day in and day out. Even many amongst the public tacitly endorse the use of violence by police against the criminals. In thiS scenario, we have serious doubts whether it would be safe to concede the power of recording confessions to the police officers to be used in evidence against ·the accused making the confession and the co-accused. The Law Commission of India in its l 85th Report on review of the Indian Evidence Act has expressed strong views disfavouring the admission of confessions made to Police Officers. The Commission commented that the basis for introducing Sections 25 and 26 in the Evidence Act in 1872 holds good even today. The Commission observed - "we are compelled to say that confessions made easy, cannot replace the need for scientific and professional investigation". In England, even though the confessions to the police can be received in evidence the voluntariness of the confessions are tested by adopting stringent standards. Section 76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, deals with confession in England. Sub-section (2) of Section 76 is important:
"(2) If, in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession made by an accused person, it is represented to the court that the confession was or may have been obtained(a)
by oppression of the person who made it; or
(b)
in consequence of anything said or done which was likely, in the circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable any confession which might be made by him in consequence thereof,·
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. the court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence against him except in so far as the prosecution proves to the court beyond reasonable doubt that the confession (notwithstanding that it may be true) was not obtained as aforesaid."
Thus the prosecution has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the confession was made voluntarily and was reliable. The Court of Appeal decision in Regina v. Middleton, [1975] All E.R. 191 shows that whenever the admissibility of a confession is challenged ~a trial within a trial" is conducted to test the voluntariness of such confession at the earliest. In England, in the light of the Human Rights Act of 1988, a fresh look is being taken into the existing provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and other allied laws including the Law of Confessions. In United States, according to the decisions of the Supreme Court viz., Miranda v. Arizona, [384 US 436]; Escobedo v. Linnaeus, [378 US 478], the prosecution cannot make use of the statements stemming from custodial interrogation unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards to secure the right against self-incrimination and these safeguards include a right to counsel during such interrogation and warnings to the suspect/accused of his right to counsel and to remain silent. In Miranda case (decided in 1966), it was held that the right to have counsel present at the interrogation was indi"spensable to the protection of the V Amendment privilege against selfincrimination and to ensure that the right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process. However, this rule is subject to the conscious waiver of right after the individual was warned of his right.
· As the law now stands, the confession recorded by the police officer under Section 32(1) of POTA is admissible in evidence. The voluntariness and reliability of confession can of course be tested by the court. The admission of such confession would also be subject to the observance of the other provisions of Section 32 of POTA which are in the nature of procedural safeguards aimed at ensuring that the confessions are made by the accused in an atmosphere free from threat and inducement. There is one argument of Mr. Sushi! Kumar appearing for the ·accused Afzal which needs to be adverted to. His contention is that the word 'evidence' is not used either under Section 32(1) or Section 32(2) of POTA
STATE(N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAY JOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU [REDD!. J.]
unlike Section 15(2) of TADA which requires the Police Officer to warn the pers'fll making the confession that it may be used as 'evidence' against him. He therefore argues that the only route through which the confession can be tre1>1ed as evidence against the accused is by having recourse to Section 164 Cr°P.c. The contention, in our view, is devoid of merit. The mere fact that the expression 'admissible only' is used without being followed by the words
'in evidence', does not, by any canon of construction, deprive the confession
recorded under Section 32 of POTA its evidentiary value; otherwise Section 32( l ), more especially the expression 'admissible' contained therein will become ineffectual and senseless. We cannot, therefore, accept this extreme
l,ntention.
11. Section JO of Evidence Act
The next question is whether the confession of the accused which cannOt be proved against a co-accused either under Section 32(1) of POTA or under Section 30 of the Evidence Act, would be relevant evidence against the coaccused involved in the conspiracy by reason of Section 10 of the Evidence Act. The section reads thus:
"IO. Things said or done by conspirator in reference to common design.- Wbere there is reasonable ground to believe that two or
more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an
actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by any one of such
persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of the persons believed to so conspiring, as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it."
In Kehar Singh & Ors. v. State (Delhi Administrat:on), (1988] 3 SCC 609, Jagannatha Shetty, J., has analysed the section as follows: "From an analysis of the section, it will be seen that Section 10 will come into play only when the court is satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have
conspired together to commit an offence. There should be, in other words, a prima facie evidence that the person was a party to the conspiracy before his acts can be used against his co-conspirator.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. Once such prima facie evidence exists, anything said, doAe or written by one of the conspirators in reference to the common intention, after the said intention was first entertained, is relevant against the others. It is relevant not only for the purpose of proving the existence of conspiracy, but also for proving that the oilier person was a party to it."
Section 10 of Evidence act is based on the principle of agency operating between the parties to the conspiracy inter se and it is an exception to the rule against hearsay testimony. If the conditions laid down therein are satisfied, the act done or statement made by one is admissible against the conspirators (vide AIR 1965 SC 682).
c'1
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The learned senior counsel Mr. Gopal Subramanium submits that Section 10, which is an exception to Section 30 of the Evidence Act, can be availed of by the prosecution to rely on the facts stated in the confessional ~tatement of the accused to prove the existence of conspiracy and the coconspirator being party to it. He contends that there is more than prima facie evidence in this case that there was a conspiracy to launch an attack on the Parliament building and therefore, the first ingredient of· the reasonable ground of belief is satisfied. The next and more controversial part of the submission is that the statement of one of the conspirators who has made the confession throwing light on the common intention of all the accused can be used in evidence against the co-conspirators or the co-accused irrespective of the fact that such statements were made after the conclusion of the conspiracy and after the accused were a1rested. As the law laid down by the Privy Council in Mirza Akbar v. King Emperor, AIR (1940) PC 176) on the interpretation of Section I 0 does not support the contention of the counsel for the State, the learned counsel was critical of the dictum laid down in that case and equally critical of the long line of authorities which accepted the ruling of the Privy Council. This is what Lord Wright said in Mirza Akbar's case: "This being the principle, their Lordships think the words of Section 10 must be construed in accordance with it and are not capable of being widely construed so as to include a statement made by one conspirator in the absence of the other with reference to past acts done in the actual course of carrying out the conspiracy, after it has been completed. The common intention is in the past. In their
f
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STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAY JOT SANDHU@ AFSAN GURU [REDD!, J .] 163
•
Lordships' judgment, the words 'common intention' signify a common intention existing at the time when the thing was said, done or written by one of them. Things said, done or written while the
•
conspiracy was on foot are relevant as evidence of the common
intention, once reasonable ground has been shown to believe in its existence. But it would be a very different matter to hold that any narrative or statement or confession made to a third party after the common intention or conspiracy was no longer operating and had ceased to exist is admissible against the other party. There is then no common intention of the conspirators to \vhich the statement can have reference. In their Lordships' judgment Section 10 embodies this principle. That is the construction which has been rightly applied to Section 10 in decisions in India.
In these cases the distinction was rightly drawn between
D '
communications between conspirators while the conspiracy was
going on with reference to the carrying out of conspiracy and statements made, after arrest or after the conspiracy has ended, by way of description of events then past."
In Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. State of Bombay, [1958] SCR 161, a three-Judge Bench of this Court approvingly referred to the decision of the Priiy Council. However, the following observation made therein does not go counter to the submission of Mr. Subramanium: "where the charge specified the period of conspiracy, evidence of acts of co-conspirators outside the period is not receivable in evidence". But, the ultimate conclusion is not strictly in conformity with that remark. After referring to this and the other decisions, Thomas, J. observed in State of Gujarat v. Mohammed Atik and Ors. [I 998] 4 SCC 351 thus:
"Thus, the principle is no longer res integra that any statement made by an accused after his arrest, whether as a confession or otherwise, cannot fall within the ambit of Section I 0 of the Evidence Act."
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. ,_ Referring to the decision in Mohammed Atik's case (supra) and Sardul Singh Caveeshar (supra), Arijit Pasayat, J., speaking for a three-Judge Bench_ in Mohd. Khalid v. State of West Bengal, [2002] 7 SCC 334, stated the legal position thus: "We cannot overlook that the basic principle which underlies Section lQ of the Evidence Act is the theory of agency. Every conspirator is an agent of his associate in carrying out the object of the conspiracy. Section I 0, which is an exception to the general rule, while permitting the statement made by one conspirator to be admissible as against another conspirator restricts it to the statement made during the period when the agency subsisted. Once it is shown that a person became snapped out of the conspiracy, any statement made subsequent thereto cannot be used as against the other conspirators under Section 10." Ultimately, the test applied was whether any particular accused continued to be the member of the conspiracy after his arrest. Though the learned Judge stated that "similar view was expressed by this Court in State v. Nalini", we find no such statement of law in Nalini 's case. However, this accidental slip does not make any difference. The law is thus well settled that the statements made by the conspirators after they are arrested cannot be brought within the ambit of Section 10 of the Evidence Act, because by that time the conspiracy would have ended. If so, the statement forming part of the confessional statement made to the police officer under Section 32(1) of POTA cannot be pressed into service by the prosecution against the other co-accused. Thus, the endeavour to bring the confessional statement of co-accused into the gamut of evidence through the route of Section 10 is frustrated by a series of decisions, starting from Mirza Akbar's case (1940). Learned senior counsel Mr. Gopal Subramanium argued that the view taken by the Privy Council runs counter to the language of Section 10, and moreover, if that interpretation is to be adopted, there would hardly be any evidence which could be admitted under section 10, the reason being that the statements would necessarily be made by the witnesses after the termination of conspiracy. The correct interpretation, according to the learned senior counsel is, whether the statements made by the conspirators testifying to the common plan, whether confessional or not, relate to the period of conspiracy
~
J J
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU [REDD!. J.I 165
or to the period post-termination. The relevance of such statements under -.,'>ection 10 cannot be whittled down with reference to the point of time when the statement was made. The leaned senior counsel, therefore, submits that the exclusion of post-arrest statements of the conspirators, is not warranted . ' by the language employed in the section and it makes Section 10 nugatory. • Though, in our view, the Section can still play its role, we find some force in this contention. But, it is not open to us to upset the view reiterated in a long line of decisions.
The learned counsel Mr. Gopal Subramanium has also endeavoured to invoke precedential support for his argument. He referred to Bhagwan Swarup v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (l 965) SC 682 (known as the 2nd Caveeshar case) in which Subba Rao, J., speaking for a three-Judge Bench analysed the ingredients of Section 10 as follows:-
; "(l) There shall be a prima facie evidence affording a reasonable ground for a Court to believe that two or more persons are members of a conspiracy, (2) if the said condition is fulfilled, anything said, done or written by any one of them in reference to their com1non intention will be evidence against the other, (3) anything said, done or written by him should have been said, done or written by him • after the intention was formed by any of them; (4) it would also be
relevant for the said purpose against another who entered the
conspiracy whether it was said, done or written before he entered the conspiracy or after he left it; and (5) it can only be used against a co-conspirator and not in his favour." The limitation inferred by the Privy Council that the acts or statements of the conspirator should have been made when the conspiracy was afoot was not imported in to the interpretation of the section. On the other hand, the proposition No. 4 might indicate that even the statement made and acts done after a person left the conspiracy, could be proved against others. The Privy Council decision in Mirza Akbar's case was not referred to. The issue as raised now was not discussed. However, the !st Caveeshar case (AIR 1957 SC 747) in which the Privy Council's decision was cited, was adverted to. In the I st Caveeshar's case also decided by a three Judge Bench (supra), the ratio of the Privy Council decision in Mirza Akabar's case was approved and applied.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
The learned counsel then referred to the case of Ammini & Ors. v. State of Kera/a, [1998) 2 SCC 301, wherein this Court referred to Section IO ofr the Evidence Act and observed thus:
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"The High Court held as there was reasonable ground to believe that Ammini and other accused had conspired together and, therefore, the confession made by A-I could be used against other accused also." There was no reference to the earlier cases which were binding on the Court. The view of the High Court was merely endorsed. The learned senior counsel Mr. Gopal Subramanium then submitted that in Nalini's case this Court admitted the confessional statement made by one of the accused after his arrest under section 10 of the Evidence Act. But we do not find anything in that judgment to support this statement. Wadhwa, J on whose judgment reliance is placed did not say anything contrary to what was laid down in Mirza Akbar's case. After referring to Mirza Akbar's case, Wadhwa, J. adverted to the contention that Section 10 becomes inapplicable once the conspirator is nabbed. The comment of the Iearr,ed Judge was;
"That may be so in a given case but is not of universal application. If the object of conspiracy has not been achieved and there is still agreement to do the illegal act, the offence of criminal conspiracy is there and Section 10 of the Evidence Act applies". (vide para 579 of SCC)
Then follows the crucial finding that the prosecution in the present case has not led any evidence to show that any particular accused continued to be a member of the conspiracy after he was arrested. It shows that the ultimate conclusion accords with the view expressed in Mirza Akbar.
At paragraph 58 I, there is further discussion on the scope of Section I 0. One observation made by the learned Judge in that para needs to be clarified. The learned Judge observed thus: "When two or more persons enter into a conspiracy any act done by any one of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of Jaw, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor. This means that everything said, written or done by any
•
•
f
;
• STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU [REDD!, J.) 167
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of the conspirators in execution of or in reference to their common intention is deemed to have been said, done or written by each of
them!!.
(emphasis supplied) j
I
'
•· We do not find any such deeming provision in Section 10. No doubt, Section 10 rests on the principle of agency. But, it does not in terms treat the statements made and acts done by one conspirator as the statements or acts of all. Section 10 only lays down a rule ofrelevancy. It says that anything done or said by one of the conspirators in reference to the common intention is a relevant fact as against each of the conspirators to prove two things: (i) existence of the conspiracy and (ii) that they were parties to the conspiracy. As pointed out by the Privy Council in Mirza Akbar's case, the thing done, written or spoken in the course of carrying out the conspiracy ''was receivable as a step in the proof of the conspiracy". This dictum was approvingly referred to in the 1st Caveeshar case (AIR 1957 SC 747).
The learned senior counsel then referred to the decision of this Court in Tribhuwan v. State of Maharashtra, [1972) 3 SCC 511, in which the accused examined himself as a witness and his evidence was admitted under
Section 10 of the Evidence Act, mainly on the ground that his deposition could be subjected to cross-examination. So also in the case of K. Hashim v. State of Tamil Nadu, the evidence of co-accused who subsequently became approver, was admitted under Section 10. These two cases rest on a different principle and cannot be said to have differed with the view taken in A;irza Akbar's case.
-
However, there are two decisions of this Court rendered by two Judge Benches, which have taken the view that the facts stated in the confessional statement of one of the accused can be used against the other accused. The first one is Bhagwandas Keshwani & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, [1974) 4 SCC 611 decided by a two-Judge Bench (M.H. Beg and Y.V. Chandrachud, JJ), in which Beg, J. observed thus:
"It seems to us that the extreme argument that nothing said or done by Vishnu Kumar could be taken into account in judging the guilt of Keshwani when there is a charge for conspiracy under Section 120B !PC overlooks the provisions of Section I 0 of the Evidence
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
Act... At any rate, proof of the fact, even from admissions of Vishnu Kumar, that false and fictitious cash memos were prepared d~ to an agreement between the two accused, could be used against each accused."
None of the previous decisions were referred to by their Lordships. The other case is that of State ofMaharashtra v. Damu, [2000] 6 SCC 269 which was also decided by a two Judge Bench. The learned Judges after analyzing the ingredients of Section 10, held thus:
"In this case there can be no doubt, relying on Ex.88 that there are reasonable grounds to believe that all the four accused have 1 conspired together to commit the offences of abduction and murders of the children involved in this case. So what these accused have· spoken to each other in reference to their common intention as could \ be gathered from Ex.88 can be regarded as relevant facts falling within the purview of Section 10 of the Evidence Act. It is not necessary that a witness should have deposed to the fact so transpired between the conspirators. A dialogue between them could be proved through any other legally permitted mode. When Ex.88 is legally proved and found admissible in evidence, the same can be used to ascertain what was said, done or written between the conspirators. Al the things reported in that confession referring to what A-1 Damu Gopinath and A-3 Mukunda Thorat have said and done in reference to the common intention of the conspirators are thus usable under Section 10 of the Evidence Act as against those two accused as well, in the same manner in which they are usable against A-4 Damu Joshi himself." Thus, the confessional statement (Ext.88) made by one of the parties to the conspiracy was made use of against the other parties/accused. It is interesting to note that the decision in State of Gujarat v. Mohammed Atik, (supra) rendered by one of the learned Judges, was noticed but the crucial part of the observation therein ruling out the applicability of Section 10 was not adverted to. The 2nd Caveeshar case (AIR 1965 SC 682) was also noticed. However much we are convinced of the arguments advanced by the learned senior counsel for the State, we are unable to give effect to the law laid down in these two cases which runs counter to the larger Bench decisions
,
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU [REDDI.J.J
noticed supra, especially when the previous decisions bearing on the point were not discussed. No doubt the judgment in 2nd Caveeshar case was of three learned Judges but the 4th proposition laid down therein is not so categorical as to convey the idea that even the confessional statement recorded after the arrest, could be used against the co-conspirators. The case of Queen v. Blake decided in [1844] I 15 ER 49 is illustrative of the parameters of the common law rule similar to Section I 0 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Privy Council in the case of Mirza Akbar, AIR (1940) PC 176 referred to that case and observed thus: " ... The leading case of (1844) 6 QB 126: I 15 ER 49 (E) illustrates the two aspects of it, because that authority shows both what is admissible and what is inadmissible. What, in that case, was held to be ad1nissible against the conspirator was the evidence of entries made by his fellow conspirator contained in various documents actually used for carrying out the fraud. But a document not created in the course of carrying out the transaction, but made by one of the conspirators after the fraud was completed, was held to be inadmissible against the other... It had nothing to do with carrying the conspiracy into effect."
In the light of the foregoing discussion, we have no option but to reject the contention of Mr. Gopal Subramanium on the interpretation of Section IO, though not without hesitation. However, in view of the fact that confessional statement is not being relied on, the question of applicability of Section 10 fades into insignificance.
12. Conspiracy
As conspiracy is the primary charge against the accused, we shall now advert to the law of conspiracy-its definition, essential features and proof. Section 120-A of !PC defines criminal conspiracy. It says: "when two or more persons agree to do or cause to be done (i) an illegal act or (ii) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy. Section 120-B prescribes the punishment to be imposed on a party to a criminal conspiracy. As pointed out by Subba Rao, Jin Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay, AIR (1961) SC 1762:
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. " .. .the gist of the offence is an agreement to break the Jaw. The parties to such an agreement will be guilty of criminal conspiracy, though the illegal act agreed to be done has not been done. So too, it is not an ingredient of the offence that all the parties should agree to do a single illegal act. It may comprise the commission of a number of acts".
Under section 43. <?f the IPC, an act would be illegal if it is an offence or if it is prohibited by law. Section 120-A and 120-B were brought on the statute book by_',Yay of amendment to IPC in 1913. The Statement of Objects and Reasons to the amending Act reveals that the underlying purpose was to make a mere agreement to do an illegal act or an act which is not illegal by illegal means punishable under law. This definition is almost similar to the definition of conspiracy, which we find in Halsbury's Laws of England. The definition given therein is: "Conspiracy consists in the agreement of two or more persons to do an unlawful· act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. It is an indictable offence at common law. The essence of the offence of conspiracy is the fact of combination by agreemeqt;.The agreement may be express or implied or in part express and in part implied ..... and the offence continues to be committed so long as the combination persists, that is until the conspiratorial agreement is terminated by completion of its performance or by abandonment or frustration or however it may be".
In America, the concept of criminal conspiracy is no different. In American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edn., Vol.16, Page 129, the following definition of conspiracy is given:
"A conspiracy is said to be an agreement between two or more persons to accomplish tog~ther a criminal or unlawful act or to achieve by criminal or unlawful means an act not in itself criminal or unlawful ... The unlawful agreement and not its accomplishment is the gist or essence of the crime of conspiracy."
Earlier to'-the intro.duction of Section 120-A and B, conspiracy per se was nor 'an ~ffence under the Indian Penal Code except in respect of the
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU [REDD!,!.] 171
offence mentioned in Section 121-A. However, abetment by conspiracy was and still remains to be an ingredient of abetment under clause secondly of Section 107 of !PC. The punishment therefor is provided under various sections viz. Section 108 to 117. Whereas under Section 120A, the essence of the offence of criminal conspiracy is a bare agreement to commit the offence, the abetment under Section 107 requires the commission of some act or illegal omission pursuant to the conspiracy, A charge under Section 107/l 09 should therefore be in combination with a substantive offence, whereas the charge under Section 120-A/120-B could be an independent charge. In the Objects and Reasons to the Amendment Bill, it was explicitly stated that the new provisions (120-A & B) were "designed to assimilate the provisions of the Indian Penal Code to those of the English Law .... " Thus, Sections 120-A & B made conspiracy a substantive offence and rendered the 1nere agreement to commit an offence punishable. Even if an overt act does not take place pursuant to the illegal agreement, the offence of conspiracy would still be attracted. The passages from Russell on Crimes, the House of Lords decision in Quinn v. Leathern, [1901] AC 495), and the address of Willes, J to the Jury in Mulcahy v. Queen, [1868] 3 HL 306 are often quoted in the decisions of this Court. The passage in Russell on Crimes referred to by Jagannatha Shetty, J in Kehar Singh 's case [1988] 3 sec at page 731, is quite apposite: "The gist of the offence of conspiracy then lies, not in doing the act, or effecting the purpose for which the conspiracy is formed, nor in attempting to do them, nor in inciting others to do them, but in the forming of the scheme or agreement between the parties. Agreement is essential. Mere knowledge, or even discussion, of the plan is not, per se enough"
This passage brings out the legal position succinctly.
In Na/ini's case, S.S.M. Quadri, J, pointed out that the meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing an illegal act or an act by illegal means is a sine qua non of the criminal conspiracy. Judge L. Hand, in Van Riper v. United States, (l 3 F 2d. 961) said of conspiracy: "When men enter into an agreement-for an unlawful end, they become ad hoc agents for one another
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
.A
and have made a partnership in crime."
In Yashpal Mittal v. State of Punjab, [1977] 4 SCC 540, Goswami, J, speaking for a three-Judge Bench analysed the legal position relating to criminal conspiracy. At pages 610-611, the learned Judge observed that "the very agreement, the concert or league is the ingredient of the offence." and that "it is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every detail of the conspiracy". It was then observed that "there must be unity of object or purpose but there may be plurality of means, sometimes even unknown to one another, amongst the conspirators."
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Dr. Sri Hari Singh Gour in his well known 'Commentary on Penal Law oflndia', (Vol.2, I Ith Edn. page 1138) summed up the legal position in the following words: "In order to constitute a single general conspiracy there must be a common design. Each conspirator plays his separate part in one integrated and united effort to achieve the common purpose. Each one is aware that he ·has a part to play in a general conspiracy though he may not know all its secrets or the means by which the common purpose is to be accomplished. The evil scheme may be promoted by a few, some may drop out and some may join at a later stage, but the conspiracy continues until it is broken up. The conspiracy may develop in successive stages. There may be general plan to accomplish the common design by such means as may from time to time be found expedient." In State of H.P. v. Krishan Lal Pradhan, [1987] 2 SCC page 17, it was reiterated that every one of the conspirators need not take active part in the commission of each and every one of the conspiratorial acts. In the case of State v. Nalini, [1999] 5 SCC 253, S.S.M. Quadri, J, after a survey of case law made the following pertinent observations: (at paragraph 662) "In reaching the stage of meeting of minds, two or more persons share information about doing an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. This is the first stage where each is said to have knowledge of a plan for committing an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means.
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) '· NAVJOT SANDHU@AFSAN GURU [REDD!, I.I ! 73
Among those sharing the information some or all may form an intention to do an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. Those who do form the requisite intention would be parties to the agreement and would be conspirators but those who drop out cannot be roped in as collaborators on the basis of mere knowledge unless they commit acts or omissions from which a guilty common intention can be inferred. It is not necessary that all the conspirators should participate from the inception to the end of the conspiracy; some may join the conspiracy after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them and some others may quit from the conspiracy. All of them cannot but be treated as conspirators. Where in pursuance of the agreement the conspirators commit offences individually or adopt illegal means to do a legal act which has a nexus to the object of conspiracy, all of them will be liable for such offences even if some of them have not actively participated in the commission of those offences.
There is exhaustive reference to various cases by Arijit Pasayat, J, in Mohd. Khalid v. State of W.B., [2002] 7 SCC 334. In Mohammed Usman v. State of Maharashatra, [ 1981] 2 SCC 443 it was observed that the agreement a1nongst the conspirators can be inferred by necessary implication. There is one particular observation made by Jagannadha Shetty in Kehar Singh 's (supra) case which needs to be explained. The learned Judge observed: "It is, however, essential that the offence of conspiracy requires some kind of physical manifestation of agreement. The express agreement, however, need not be proved nor is it necessary to prove the actual words of communication. The evidence as to transmission of thoughts 3haring the unlawful design may be sufficient". The expression 'physical manifestation' seems to be the phraseology used in the Article referred to by the learned Judge. However, the said expression shall not be equated to 'overt act' which is a different concept. As rightly stated by the learned senior counsel, Mr. Gopal Subrarnanium, the phrase has reference to the manifestation of the agreement itself, such as by way of meetings and communications.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
Mostly, the conspiracies are proved by the circumstantial evidence, as the conspiracy is seldom an open affair. Usually both the existence of the conspiracy and its objects have to be inferred from the circumstances and the conduct of the accused. (Per Wadhwa, J. inNalini's case (supra) at page 516). The well known rule governing circumstantial evidence is that each and every incriminating circumstance must be clearly established by reliable evidence and "the circumstances proved must form a chain of events from which the only irresistible conclusion about the guilt of the accused can be safely drawn and no other hypothesis against the guilt is possible." G.N. Ray, J. in Tanibeert Pankaj Kumar [ 1997 (7) SCC 156], observed that this Court should not allow the suspicion to take the place of legal proof. As pointed out by Fazal Ali, J, in VC. Shukla v. State, [1980] 2 SCC 665," in most cases it will be difficult to get direct evidence of the agreement, but a conspiracy can be inferred even from circumstances giving rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence." In this context, the observations in the case Noor Mohammad Yusuf Momin v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1971) SC 885 are worth nothing: " .... in most cases proof of conspiracy is largely inferential though the inference must be founded on ·solid facts. Surrounding circumstances and antecedent and subsequent conduct, among other factors, constitute relevant material." A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution relies cannot be held to be adequate for connecting the accused in the offence of criminal conspiracy. The circumstances before, during and after the occurrence can be proved to decide about the complicity of the accused. [vi de Esher Singh v. State of A.P., 2004 (11) SCC 585]. Lord Bridge in R v. Anderson, [1985] 2 All E.R. 961 aptly said that the evidence from which a jury may infer a criminal conspiracy is almost invariably to be found in the conduct of the parties. In (AIR 1945 PC 140), the Privy Council warned that in a joint trial care must be taken to separate the admissible evidence against each accused and the judicial mind should not be allowed to be influenced by evidence admissible only against others. "A co-defendant in a conspiracy trial", observed Jackson, J, "occupies an uneasy seat" and "it is diffk..ilt for the indiv~dual to make his own case stand
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@ AFSAN GURU [REDD!, J.J
on its own merits in the minds of jurors who are ready to believe that birds of a feather are flocked together." [vide Alvin Krumlewitch v. United States ofAmerica, (93 L.Ed. 790). In Na/ini 's case, Wadhwa, J pointed out, at page 517 of the SCC, the need to guard against prejudice being caused to the accused on account of the joint trial with other conspirators. The learned Judge observed that "there is always difficulty in tracing the precise contribution of each member of the conspiracy but then there has to be cogent and convincing evidence against each one of the accused charged with the offence of conspiracy". The pertinent observation of Judge Hand in U.S. v. Falcone (109 F. 2d,579) was referred to: "This distinction is important today when many prosecutors seek to sweep within the dragnet of conspiracy all those who have been associated in any degree whatever with the main offenders." At paragraph 518, Wadhwa, J, pointed out that the criminal responsibility for a conspiracy requires more than a merely passive attitude towards an existing conspiracy. The learned Judge then set out the legal position regarding the criminal liability of the persons accused of the conspiracy as follows:
•
"One who commits an overt act with knowledge of the conspiracy is guilty. And one who tacitly consents to the object of a conspiracy and goes along with the other conspirators, actually standin&. by while the others put the conspiracy into effect, is guilty though he intends to take no active part in the crime." One more principle which deserves notice is that cumulative effect of the proved circumstances should be taken into account in determining the guilt of the accused rather than adopting an isolated approach to each of the circumstances. Of course, each one of the circumstances should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Lastly, in regard to the appreciation of evidence relating to conspiracy, the Court must take care to see that the acts or conduct of the parties must be conscious and clear enough to infer their concurrence as to the common design and its execution. K.J. Shetty, J, pointed out in Kehor Singh 's case that "the innocuous, innocent or inadvertent events and incidents should not enter the judicial verdict." Before we close the discussion on the topic of conspiracy in general, we must note the argument of the learned senior counsel for the State Mr. Gopal Subramanium who in his endeavour to invoke the theory of agency in all its dimensions so as to make each of the conspirators constructively
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
liable for the offences actually committed by others pursuant to the conspiracy, relied on the dictum of Coleridge, J. in Regina v. Murphy, (173 ER 502), which will be referred to later on. The learned senior counsel submits that where overt acts have been committed, all conspirators will have to be punished equally for the substantive offence irrespective of non~participation of some of them in such overt acts. The observations made by Wadhwa, J in Nalini at paragraph 583 and by Mohapatra, J, in Firozuddin Basheeruddin v. State of Kera/a [2001 (7) SCC 596), are pressed into service to buttress his argument that all the conspirators would be liable for all the offences committed pursuant to the conspiracy on the basis of the principle of agency where the conspiracy results in overt acts constituting distinct offences. We do not think that the theory of agency can be extended thus far, that is to say, to find all the conspirators guilty of the actual offences committed in execution of the common design even if such offences were ultimately committed by some of them, without the participation of others. We are of the view that those who committed the offences pursuant to the conspiracy by indulging in various overt acts will be individually liable for those . offences in addition to being liable for criminal conspiracy; but, the nonparticipant conspirators cannot be found guilty of the offence or offences committed by the other conspirators. There is hardly any scope for the application of the principle of agency in order to find the conspirators guilty of a substantive offence not committed by them. Criminal offences and punishments therefor are governed by statute. The offender will be liable only if he comes within the plain terms of the penal statute. Criminal liability for an offence cannot be fastened by way of analogy or by extension of a common law principle. We have to explain the decision in Ferojuddin 's case at length in view of heavy reliance placed on it. The Court observed thus at para 25: " ... Thus, one who enters into a conspiratorial relationship is liable for every reasonably foreseeable crime committed by every other member of the conspiracy in furtherance of its objectives, whether or not he knew of the crimes or aided in their commission ... " In para 26, the discussion was on the point of admissibility of evidence i.e. whether declaration by one conspirator made in furtherance of a cotispiracy and during its subsistence is admissible against each co-conspirator. In other
.,
STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. NAVJOT SANDHU@ AFSAN GURU [REDD!.).]
words, the question of applicability of the rule analogous to Section I 0 of the Evidence Act was the subject matter of discussion. The following passage from Van Riper v. United States, [13 F 2d 961 at page 967] was quoted.
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"Such declarations are admitted upon no doctrine of the law of evidence, but of th